History

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An assessment of the roles of Frere and Cetshwayo in British hegemonistic ambitions in Southern Africa which led to the destruction and fragmentation of the Zulu State by the Anglo-Boer War of 1879
(2002) Nicolaides, Angelo; de Villiers, J.
This thesis provides a detailed account of events leading up to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, and undertakes to explain inter-alia, why the war came about The focus of the study is thus on the roles of personalities including especially, Lord Carnarvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies), Theophilus Shepstone, (Natal's Secretary for Native Affairs), Sir Bartle Frere (the High Commissioner) and Cetshwayo kaMpande (King of Zululand). The war of 1879 arose out of predominantly British hegemonistic ambitions. Frere was entrusted by Carnarvon to implement a confederation policy in southern Africa. The latter consequently engineered a war on the pretext that the Zulu Kingdom was a menace to the Colony of Natal that had to be eliminated before confederation could be possible. Frere therefore exploited certain border incidents and maligned the character and rule of Cetshwayo whom he chose to label a tyrannical oppressor. Contrary to instructions from Sir Michael Hicks Beach at the Colonial Office and indeed the British Cabinet, Frere then sent an ultimatum to Cetshwayo that could not possibly have been accepted by the Zulus, given the nature of their polity - it would have lost its very way of life. Most of the issues can best be understood and analysed by looking at the Victorian Age and the promoters of British Imperialism. A salient feature of the Victorian Age was that Britons were by and large always likely to misinterpret some of the assumptions upon which African and indeed Zulu thought and actions were based. Victorians, such as Frere, by using their own set of values as the criteria for judgement, adopted postures in southern Africa which can only be interpreted as mischievous, false and irrelevant Frere was 'colonial' and patronizing and displayed an arrogance towards his superiors and the Zulus. Zulus had their own vivid perception of their problems, as well as their own sets of values, customs, beliefs , political and socio-economic structures. Frere was determined to manipulate events in southern Africa for his own ends and regarded himself as the champion of imperialism. He deluded himself further into regarding Cetshwayo as a monarch whose state was based on the institutions of militarism and forced labour- the very negation of liberty. It is evident that the relationship between Cetshwayo and his subjects was not a simple one but it was one which developed from Shakan times and which was clearly accepted by most subjects. As militaristic as it appeared to be, the Zulu state was not planning to embark on a war. It was forced by circumstances created by Frere into one which culminated in its dismemberment In reading the thesis and considering the various factors we should constantly bear in mind the questions: Was Frere sincere in his actions or was he out for personal aggrandisement and to what extent was Cetshwayo an oppressive autocrat?
A comparative study of the aims structure and strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the decade 1975-1985
(1991) Shamase, Maxwell Zakhele; Maphalala, S.J.; de Villiers, J.
It is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that no study of this nature has ever been undertaken in the field of history in South Africa. This justifies the necessity of undertaking a comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the crucial decade 1975-1985. It was during that decade that these two political groupings moved closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa. By this time the NP, in spite of preserving hegemonic principles on behalf of the White electorate and amid increased international isolation, had proved itself the invincible doyen in the body politic of South Africa. Inkatha cadres argued that their movement was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's, spawned by Black resistance to apartheid and had authentic roots in the core of the liberation struggle. The principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha were devoid of discernible dissimilarities. One may assert, however, that it was enigmatic that such principles and aims could not compel the two groupings to solve the socio-economic and political problems facing South Africa in that decade. Such a dismal failure to seek solutions that would benefit all the people of South Africa reflected negatively on both the NP and Inkatha. In 1985 this emerged as a harbinger for the state of morass in South Africa's political scenario. The organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha remained by far the best organized in South Africa, capable of overwhelming any challenge mounted by other groups. In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and Provincial leaders, while Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from Branches, Regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making bodies. The National Council (NC) was the policy-making body and represented all national leadership formations of Inkatha. It was not possible to stipulate how many members of Inkatha at any one time belonged to the NC. This was due to the fact that organizations were constantly affiliating to - the movement. The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress. The organisational policies of the NP and Inkatha had vestiges of commonality. Both groupings accepted and respected the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. They both endorsed the notion of a multi-party democracy, although the NP comprehended this in the context of separate development. Inkatha noted this as taking into account the fact that no single organisation, from whatever quarter, would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa. Disinvestment, sanctions and violence were abhorred by both groupings as a strategy to dismantle apartheid. They favoured negotiation politics and non-violence both as objectives and strategies. Both groupings conveyed assurance to achievements of a political apparatus that could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities through negotiations. The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. They both believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common goal. It could be mentioned, however, that the different situations and platforms from which they operated, polarised them against each other. The NP and Inkatha's relations with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings created a hiatus in terms of their aims and strategies. This crippled the evolvement of consensus politics in South Africa. In the decade 1975-1985 the Parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) , the New Republic Party (NRP) , the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) . In principle, they agreed with the NP and Inkatha in standing for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa. The NP and Inkatha had unfavourable relations with the extra-parliamentary political formations. These were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NF), and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Their relations with both the NP and Inkatha in terms of their aims and strategies were marked by what one may convoke "timorous digressions." Most of them referred to the NP Government as illegitimate while viewing Inkatha as perpetrating political tribalism which to them was the greatest enemy of African freedom. By 1985 this intricate structure of political groupings and different aims and strategies, characterized a divided South Africa.
The development of Umlazi Mission Station and Reserve, 1856 - 1948, with special reference to the land problem
(1993) Ndaba, Dean Jabulani.; de Villiers, J.
The aim of this study was to give a general survey of the history of Umlazi Mission Station with particular emphasis on the land question between 1856 and 1948. The study highlights the fact that during these years, the Anglican Mission Station was characterised by many problems which aroused much controversy among various parties concerned. The numerous factors that led to the dispute among the parties can be broadly categorised as: (i) the inconsistent or erratic land policy of the Natal Colonial Government on mission stations which subsequently deprived the Blacks of Umlazi the right to own the land, (ii) ecclesiastical problems within the Anglican Church and the schism that emerged, (iii) interest shown by Whites and Indians in the mission station, (iv) the expansion of Durban as an industrial and commercial city, the dynamics of urbanisation and the proximity of Umlazi to Durban, (v) the pressure exerted by the Durban City Council to acquire Umlazi Mission for a black urban township and the resistance by black landowners at the mission station against incorporation, and (vi) Government intervention through the appointment of the Native Affairs Commission (1945) and the Broome Commission (1947 - 1948). The conclusion drawn is that Umlazi was a victim of many factors - geographic, religious, social, economic and political. The crucial period in the history of the mission station was 1942 -1948. The events during this period show how the geographic factor became the central issue in the dispute. The mission station had inevitably to be affected by the urbanisation process because of its proximity to the rapidly growing city. In addition to the above the industrial development in Durban was following a southward direction which brought the boundaries of the city close to Umlazi. Had the mission station been situated elsewhere in some remote part of the country, as with most mission stations in Natal, the development of the area would probably have taken a different course. This trend whereby rural areas situated close to fast growing urban areas are urbanised, is a world-wide phenomenon. However, one cannot overlook the fact that the Blacks were politically disadvantaged and without parliamentary power to veto the decision. This study shows, however, that much was done by the Smuts Government during the height of the controversy to treat the matter in an unbiased fashion by using commissions, consultations and open discussions from all parties concerned. All these events make the history of Umlazi Mission exceptional, fascinating and worthy of study.
Opposition by black rural communities to being forcibly removed to black homelands with emphasis on the experience of KwaNgema and Driefontein communities in the Wakkerstroom district : a historical perspective, 1980-1985
(1998) Ndaba, Dean Jabulani; de Villiers, J.
KwaNgema and neighbouring Driefontein were Black-owned freehold settlements in the Wakkerstroom district, Transvaal. Whereas KwaNgema had been granted officially to the community in 1904, Driefontein had been purchased in 1912. Because of their proximity to predominantly White areas, in 1965 both areas were declared by the National Party government as 'Blackspots'. Subsequently, in line with the government's homeland consolidation policy, the inhabitants of the two settlements were notified that they would be moved to the KaNgwane and KwaZulu Homelands. In terms of the Native Administration Act of 1927, the government could, at its pleasure, remove Black tribes from certain areas. But it was not until 1981 when plans to construct the Heyshope Dam were announced, that the government informed the two communities that their removal was a certainty. The new dam, to be built on the Assegai River, would flood parts of both settlements. Between 1981 and 1985, the residents of KwaNgema and Driefontein opposed resettlement on the following grounds: — They were historically and legally entitled to the land. — Relocation and the rebuilding of new homes would be a costly undertaking. — There was much uncertainty about their future security in the Homelands, in terms of landownership rights, employment, pensions, etc. — The KwaNgema people argued that the Act of 1927 did not apply to them, as they were not a tribe, but 'Umndeni' that operated on Western democratic lines. — Adjacent vacant land could be utilized for settling only those residents threatened by the dam. The government rejected all claims and counter-proposals made by the Blacks. Controversy characterised by state repression, leadership disputes and other problems ensued. The crisis was eventually resolved in August 1985 in favour of the KwaNgema and Driefontein communities. The government withdrew its resettlement plans. Only residents threatened by the dam were relocated to adjacent land. All residents retained their property rights. Factors contributing to this historic settlement were: — The unrelenting protest by the two communities arid their institution of legal action against the government. — The murder by the police of Saul Mkhize in April 1983. Mkhize was the Driefontein community leader who spearheaded the resistance. His unexpected death increased criticism of the government's forced removals policy nationally and internationally. — The refusal by Enos Mabuza, leader of KaNgwane, and Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu to accommodate the two communities in their Homelands. — Increasing condemnation of the government's removals policy domestically and abroad. — The changing political climate in South Africa, resulting inter alia, in the review of the removals policy. The conclusion drawn from this study, is that the experience of KwaNgema and Driefontein was an outcome of a combination of forces -historical, ideological, legal, anthropological, social and economic. Another important highlight of this research is that land ownership is indeed a fundamental aspiration and right for all people which, if denied, may lead to conflict.
The reign of King Mpande and his relations with the Republic of Natalia and its successor,the British Colony of Natal
(1999) Shamase, Maxwell Zakhele; de Villiers, J.
King Mpande Ka Senzangakhona was the third in succession in the dynasty of "martial" Zulu potentates whose military valour transformed small clans into a single powerful nation. The evolvement of the ideal of nationhood among the Zulu people ruled by Mpande had its origin in the praises of his father Senzangakhona Ka Jama. When the specialist declaimer of praises said that, "a cord of destiny let us weave, O Menzi scion of Jama, That to universes beyond the reach of spirit-forms, we may ascend" , he was indicating that Zulus were people whose destiny was to traverse the universe and transform the human being into a conscious citizen of the cosmic order (in South-east Africa). King Shaka, Mpande's half-brother, adopted the ideal of this court-poet as the main inspiration of the revolution which he led after the death of Senzangakhona. It was the ideological blueprint on which he built the Zulu nation. Born in about 1798 Mpande was the son of Senzangakhona and queen Songiya of the Hlabisa clan. The Zulu lineage largely begotten by Mpande, the first king to have children, became a royal group with high status. Mpande decreed that all children begotten by members of the Zulu royal family be referred to as abantwana (princes and princesses). Nevertheless, Mpande began on a very precarious footing. In his youth he was plagued by umchoboka (skin dermatitis). His predecessors and contemporaries viewed him as indolent, inept, obese and even cowardly. Most historical accounts referred to Mpande's inferior genealogical status, cowardice, physical and mental deficiencies. On the contrary, Mpande was a recruited warrior and had been incorporated into the regiments on the death of Senzangakhona in 1816. He retained a submissive role during the next few years, thereby creating an impression that he would not contend for the kingship. The source of Mpande's strength could be traced from his name. It comes from a Zulu word impande meaning "root". The symbolic meaning of a root is that it is a source of life. In Senzangakhona's calculations Mpande was to be the source, strength and growth of the nation. This bore truth in that Zulu potentates whose genius earned the nation dignity and pride, descended from his direct line. It could be that Senzangakhona had a premonition of his son's reign by naming him Mpande. King Shaka also gave Mpande the responsibility of fathering a son. This could be viewed as an underlying factor in Mpande's becoming a natural successor to the Zulu throne. By 1837, Mpande had built up a substantial personal following living with him at Mlambongwenya homestead of his father in the Eshowe district . Here he lived a peaceful life fearless of possible invasion from adversaries. It also precluded his half-brother Dingane from embarking upon the same kind of purges as he did against his other half-brothers and potential rivals. Mpande became king of the Zulu nation in 1840 and while he reigned during the epoch that was devoid of full-scale conventional wars, he had to live through times when sporadic attacks were the rallying point of relations between members of the Nguni-speaking communities such as Xhosa, Swazi and Mpondo. Unlike his progenitors Mpande waged few wars abroad. He dispatched Zulu regiments to raid the cattle of the Swazi, Bapedi, Hlubi, AmaNgwe and AbakwaNkosi. Mpande also intervened in a succession dispute in Maputoland. The style of Mpande's military expeditions was not different to that of his predecessors. His campaigns were followed up with a re-vitalization of the Shakan amabutho (regiments) control system and building of new amakhanda (establishment erected and occupied by the amabutho, containing in addition a harem) around his palace of Nodwengu. In the late 1840's the success of Mpande's military campaigns was restricted by sporadic interference by both the Voortrekkers and the British of Natal. Relations between Mpande and the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia began on 15 January 1839 when Mpande met the Voortrekker leaders on the banks of Thukela River. The head of the Volksraad, Andries Pretorius engaged in cordial conversation with Mpande. Pretorius realised that declaring Voortrekker friendship with Mpande would ensure their security against possible invasion from the north of Thukela. Such declaration laid the foundation for the battle of Maqongqo hills, which took place on 29 January 1840. In that war, the regiments of Dingane were defeated by those of Mpande. After a protracted battle at Maqongqo, (29 January 1840) Andries Pretorius and some members of the Volksraad arranged a meeting with Mpande. They met Mpande on 10 February 1840 and installed him as king. This happened after the Zulu nation had already crowned him king on 5 February 1840. He was persuaded to take an oath before the Volksraad, acknowledging the supremacy of the Volksraad, undertaking to rule KwaZulu in peace and maintaining cordial relations with the Voortrekkers. Mpande was then honoured with a praise name, "Prince of the Emigrant Zulus". In acceptance of the terms of friendship and defence between himself and the Voortrekkers Mpande said, "If one would do anything to your disfavour or disadvantage, you can only let me know and be assured that I will hurry to your assistance with my whole army and I will sacrifice my last men for you." On 14 February 1840 Pretorius issued a proclamation whereby the territory from the sea next to the Black Mfolozi River, where it ran through the double mountains, close to the origin and then next to Hooge Randberg in a straight line to the Drakensberg, St. Lucia Bay inclusive was declared as border between KwaZulu and the Republic of Natalia. On the banks of the Klip River the Voortrekkers received about 36 000 head of cattle looted after the Maqongqo battle. They received an additional 15 000 head of cattle from Mpande as a token of allegiance. The Voortrekkers, convinced of Mpande's cordial disposition, agreed not to interfere with his domestic affairs. This was with the proviso that Mpande keep to the agreements regarding humanitarian principles aimed at preventing unnecessary bloodshed. During Mpande's kingship a plethora of Zulu refugees flocked to Natal south of Thukela. About 3 000 displaced Zulus and other Africans stayed in the vicinity of the harbour before the arrival of the Voortrekkers. The Voortrekkers grouped them into no less than six regional reserves. They were defecting from Mpande's rule and refused to go back to KwaZulu. With the increase of Zulu homesteads in Natal it became imperative for the Volksraad (Legislative body) of the Republic of Natalia to threaten to inflict capital punishment on those who refused to be sent back to KwaZulu. The second British occupation of Natal (1842) took place before the Republic could execute its plan. The Voortrekker plan included moving Zulu refugees to an area opposite Mzinyathi or between Mthamvuna and Mzimvubu Rivers. They could rule themselves, but as subjects of the Republic and a Voortrekker agent would oversee their affairs. The Cape Governor George Napier argued that the territory between Mzimvubu and Mzimkhulu Rivers had been ceded by inkosi (Chief) Faku of the Mpondo to the British sovereign. He regarded it as their special task to protect the Zulus to whom he pledged ''every conceivable virtue" against the Voortrekkers whom he thought intended evil due to their previous unauthorised emigration from the colony and subsequent clashes with Mzilikazi and Dingane. Napier had to strengthen the bond between the Natal colony and Natal Zulus through special agents and missionaries. He received authorisation from Imperial Minister, Lord John Russell to resume the military occupation of Natal. The negotiations, which the Voortrekkers entered into with Napier, were challenged by the proclamation of 2 December 1841. It announced the British re-occupation of Natal and claimed that the Voortrekkers were actually British renegade subjects. The proclamation also contained accusations of Voortrekker maltreatment of Mpande5s subjects in Natal. The conflict between the Voortrekkers and the British had an adverse effect on relations between Mpande and the Republic of Natalia. The Republic of Natalia was subjected to Colonel A.J. Cloete on 15 July 1842. The Voortrekkers were compelled to surrender to the British due to Mpande's promise of future assistance to the British. Cloete gave Mpande the impression that the British occupation of Natal was the defeat of the Voortrekker power to which the Zulus owed their vassalage. Mpande appeared to be pleased with the British occupation of Natal. In 1842 Mpande concluded a border agreement with the British to settle land claims from the sources of Mzinyathi (Buffalo) to its junction with the Thukela. In June 1843 Mpande realised that the influx of Zulu refugees into Natal weakened his authority. He requested the British to send the refugees and their cattle back to KwaZulu. The British ignored Mpande ?s plea and the request by the Voortrekkers that Zulu refugees be kept in locations. Next Mpande turned to the Voortrekkers who still remained in Natal and both parties agreed that Zulu refugees caused displeasure for their administrations. In 1840 there were only about 2 000 - 3 000 Zulu refugees in Natal, but by 1843 they had increased to no less than 50 000. The Zulu king denied that he had given up the area between Thukela and Mzinyathi Rivers to the British. Mpande wanted to pursue a moderate and more peaceful diplomacy. He welcomed the Voortrekkers as a buffer between his kingdom and the British. To determine the border between the Voortrekkers and the Zulus, Mpande sent a few of his headmen to the Voortrekkers. It was agreed that the whole area up to the Mzinyathi River would be occupied by the Voortrekkers. However, the British lieutenant governor Benjamin Pine viewed Mpande as a monarch with a double-agenda. He believed that Mpande promoted his own case with the ulterior object of creating dissension between the Voortrekkers and the British. Mpande wished to enter into a defensive military treaty with the Voortrekkers. This was prompted by Zulu refugees in Natal who wanted Mpande deposed and incriminated the British authorities of indifference to Mpande's alleged persecution of Zulus in KwaZulu. Mpande was also infuriated by the prolonged protection the British gave to Zulu refugees. Thus, Mpande gave permission to some Voortrekkers to occupy land strategically situated at Klip River and Utrecht to resist possible British military offensives. Simultaneously he pledged allegiance to the British colonial establishment in Natal by denying co-operation with the local Voortrekkers. This brought about conflict between the British and the Voortrekkers. William Harding, the British Surveyor-General, concluded that Mpande had practiced the grossest deceit towards the British government and that his proceedings with reference to the Voortrekkers amounted to the crime of deliberate fraud. But, Mpande extended a hand of friendship to the British colonial establishment in Natal. He diplomatically refused to give the British military assistance during the conflict with the Voortrekkers in 1842. Mpande said: 4iNo, you are now fighting for the upperhand, and whichever gains must be my master"3. The Zulu king did not assist either party, but as soon as the British troops proved themselves to be in power he sent emissaries to Colonel Cloete to say that he was about to march against the Voortrekkers. Mpande objected to British hunters and traders entering KwaZulu. He also pressed for the return of cattle that Zulu refugees took when they left his kingdom. Mpande's emissaries argued that the British had promised to return the cattle, but that only a hundred had been delivered. Mpande further expressed his need for firearms and the British troops to check Swazi provocations in the north of KwaZulu. The colonial establishment in Natal promised to ensure that no one interpose between the Zulus and the British. The British pleaded ignorance of the arrangement regarding cattle, but conceded the necessity to regulate traders entering the king's domains. The British imperialists regarded the Zulu kingdom as a menace, but were hamstrung when Mpande reaffirmed his loyalty to them. Mpande also abandoned plans for an alliance with the Voortrekkers. By pledging his support to the British, Mpande also did not necessarily cease his encouragement of the remaining Voortrekkers south of the Thukela. He hoped that keeping alive British-Voortrekker enmity would serve his own interests. 3 G.M.Theal: The Republic of Natalia, p.39. The encounters between Mpande and various Christian missionaries were presaged by sporadic attacks on mission stations by his predecessor Dingane. Mpande was not unfavourably disposed to missionary work. He gave the American Board of Commissioners, English Wesleyan Methodist Society, Norwegian Mission, Berlin Mission, Hanoverian Mission, Church of England and Roman Catholic Mission permission to settle in KwaZulu to present the Christian gospel to the Zulu people. The strategy of winning the Zulu nation en masse to Christianity- through Mpande's court did bear positive fruits. The fundamental ethical, metaphysical and social ideas of the Zulu people were disputed by doctrines preached by the missionaries. Probably to monitor their activities, Mpande repeatedly and earnestly requested that at least one missionary should reside near his headquarters, but this did not materialise. During Mpande's reign, the colonial establishments were viewed by the missionaries as super-exploiters of the Zulu people. The attitude of the Voortrekkers towards Zulu Christian proselytes (amakholwa) was negative. This antagonism of the Voortrekkers was prompted by the political ramifications that evangelization had on them. The proselytes demanded exemption from the legal liabilities the colonial authority at Pietermaritzburg had imposed on the Zulu people. These factors, however, did not deter Mpande's attempts to use missionary connections to keep colonial threats of invasion in check. Mpande's skilful diplomacy in handling different colonial establishments proved ineffective in forging unity between his hostile sons. This also stigmatized his dignity as the reigning monarch. He was the reigning monarch, but political matters in the 1850's led to challenges by the two claimants Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo. The question of Mpande5 s heir remained unsettled. The government of the Transvaal Republic (ZAR) maintained that Mpande regarded his son Cetshwayo as successor to the Zulu throne. At his palace, he whispered that Mbuyazi was heir, because his mother was presented to him by king Shaka. The British exploited Mpande's preference of Mbuyazi as his successor to the throne instead of Cetshwayo. The majority of the Zulus, however, preferred Cetshwayo as their future king, whilst the British viewed him as unacceptable due to his alleged antagonism towards White people. Internal strife culminated in the battle of Ndondakusuka on 2 December 1856. During the battle some of the British traders were compelled to leave their cattle behind on an island in the Thukela River. After the war, Mpande sent a message to Lieutenant-Governor Scott that Cetshwayo had expressed willingness to compensate traders who lost property at Ndondakusuka. The subsequent Zulu civil war of 1856 demonstrated a decline in Mpande's power and influence within the Zulu kingdom. From 1857 until his death in 1872, the Zulu kingdom and her relations with foreign powers were effectively run by Cetshwayo and Prime Minister ("Ndunankulu") Masiphula Ntshangase of Emgazini. Nevertheless, Mpande's earlier relations with both the Voortrekker and the British colonial establishments in Natal proved him a skilful diplomat rather than a warrior. Contrary to being a generally known obese Zulu potentate, Mpande possessed the skills and actions of a shrewd politician.
The transformation of KwaZulu homeland from a primary Agrarian to a more integrated political and socio-economic entity, 1972 - 1994
(2006) Ntuli, Sihle Herbert; de Villiers, J.
The purpose of this thesis is to present the critical understanding of how KwaZulu and its people have changed and developed under the abnormal conditions of apartheid.
Zulu perceptions and reactions to the British occupation of land in Natal Colony and Zululand, 1850-1887 : a recapitulation based on surving oral and written sources
(2006) Masina, Edward Muntu; de Villiers, J.
This thesis seeks to close some lacunae that exists in the historiography of Natal and Zululand. Whereas the activities of the colonials are well documented and widely read, the actions and responses of the Zulu people to colonial expansion in Natal and Zululand have been neglected or only given a cursory glance. The impact of colonialism that resulted in the loss of land and a livelihood among the Zulu, could only be articulated with the necessary sensitivity by the Zulu people themselves. This, therefore, is an attempt to give audience to the Zulu voice. The study focuses on the period 1850 - 1887 which was characterized by a steady immigration, infiltration and penetration of the British into the traditional, social and political life of the Zulu people in Natal and Zululand. The elephant trails charted the way of the traders and hunters into the heart of Zululand and missionaries followed in their footsteps. The initial attempts at evangelization met with fervent resistance from the Zulu, simply because it contrasted with Zulu custom and was too alien to be readily comprehended and accepted by the Zulu, who still owed sole allegiance to their king. Nevertheless, colonial land policies and the establishment of Christian mission reserves led to the rise of an African peasantry which adapted to the white man's ways and flourished. The colonials introduced the "Shepstone system" which crammed the Zulu Into barren reserves and restricted their ownership of land in Natal Colony. This resulted in the steady decline of the peasantry as a recognizable social class. The dominant forces of capitalism and the promulgation of laws prohibiting Zulu freedom of movement eventually destroyed the African peasantry. The destruction of the homestead economy and the loss of land and cattle gave rise to a new class of poor people among the Zulu of Natal Colony. Meanwhile, in Zululand, signs of underdevelopment were already evident during the 1870*s. Federation schemes pursued by the British, with the desire to dominate the southern African region, coupled the suspicions that King Cetshwayo was planning to attack Natal, culminated in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Despite Cetshwayo's plea for peace, the British invaded Zululand with the sole purpose of destroying the Zulu dynasty, which they viewed as an obstacle to British overlordship. British victory in the war led to Wolseley's clumsy settlement which unleashed a terribly bloody civil war that left Zululand devastated and the Zulu dynasty permanently weakened. Then came, rather too late, the annexation of Zululand by Britain in 1887.

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