Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
dc.contributor.advisor | Erusmus, M.G. | |
dc.contributor.advisor | Milton, J.R.L. | |
dc.contributor.author | Dlamini, Charles Robinson Mandlenkosi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-24T08:26:07Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-24T08:26:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1998 | |
dc.description | A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor Legum in the Department of Criminal and Procedural Law at the University of Zululand, 1998. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard of proof that is applied in criminal cases. The burden of proving the guilt of the accused in this manner rests on the state, and does not shift to the accused. This is in contrast to the evidential burden which may shift to the accused to rebut a case against him or her. There have, however, been statutory exceptions where the burden shifted to the accused. But this has been changed by the Constitution. The rule has ideological and philosophical underpinnings. Criminal law is an awe-inspiring aspect of the law the enforcement of which could lead to the deprivation of the liberty of a person. Personal liberty in Western society is a cherished value so that its deprivation should result if the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. This is often concretised in the saying that it is better for a hundred guilty persons to go free than that one innocent person be found guilty. The rule that the state has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt originated from English law during the eighteenth century and it was aimed at protecting the individual against the abuse of state power. Although this is a long-standing rule, there has been no clear definition of this rule either in English law or South African law. The duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt extends to every element of the offence. There are instances where this may not be the case. These are cases where judicial notice is taken of certain facts or where there is strict liability and it is therefore not necessary to prove the existence of mens rea especially in the form of intention. Although these do not completely dispense with the requirement of proving the guilt of the accused, they result in the reduction of this burden. In a number of legislative enactments, in the past the burden of proof was shifted to the accused through the use of presumptions. Not all presumptions had this effect but only those where the accused was presumed guilty because of the existence of certain facts and hadto prove his or her innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. This is called the reverse onus. The Constitutional Court decided that these were in conflict with the provisions of sections 25 and 35 of the interim and final Constitutions respectively which, inter alia, provide for the right to silence and the presumption of innocence. Consequently these have been declared invalid as being unconstitutional. In this way the Constitution has been interpreted to affirm the core democratic values of liberty, equality and human dignity. Although the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been used, it has not been clearly defined. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be regarded as proof which should convince a reasonable fact finder after considering all the relevant evidence that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. This proof must be based on evidence and not merely on intuition or belief otherwise it is not a standard at all. | |
dc.identifier.other | 151084 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10530/271 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Criminal procedure. | en_US |
dc.title | Proof beyond a reasonable doubt | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |