

**A SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE RATE  
OF CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA, WITH SPECIFIC  
REFERENCE TO THE PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-  
NATAL**

by

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of  
**Doctor of Philosophy**  
in the subject  
**Sociology**  
at the  
**University of Zululand**

Promoter: Prof AA Okharedia

January 2003

## **DECLARATION**

This thesis is an original piece of work by the author, and that all sources used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by means of direct and indirect reference.

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**NG TSHABALALA**

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my late parents, Phahlane and Sisi, my late brother and sister, Mubi and Mase, my loving wife Phumelele, my son Andile and my two daughters, Nomfundo and Nqobile, my two brothers, Bonginkosi and Siphoh.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

- The Lord Almighty for giving me strength and support through the research undertaking.
- Thanks go to my promoter, Prof AA Okharedia, without whose encouragement and pushing I would not have completed this project.
- My thanks extend also to those who helped all along to make this thesis a reality. There are specific individuals whose names need to be mentioned:
  - Prof TA Dube, who is Vice-Rector (Academic Affairs and Research) at the University of Zululand.
  - Dr M Lubisi, a senior lecturer in the Department of IsiZulu, Namagugu, at the University of Zululand.
  - Mr VI Khoza, a senior lecturer in Criminal Justice, at the University of Zululand.
  - Mrs D Viljoen who, with endless patience, typed the manuscript.
  - My family whose understanding, care and support enabled me to complete my studies.
  - Members of staff of the National Institute for Crime Prevention and Re-Integration of Offenders, for their assistance in referring me to prisoners.

- Ms B Sigwebela of the University of Zululand Library, for her valuable assistance with regard to obtaining information for the present study.

► It is of some significance that I can record my further appreciation to the experts of crime and labour issues as well as the prisoners who participated in the study.

## **ABSTRACT**

This study investigates the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime in South Africa with specific reference to KwaZulu-Natal Province. In assessing the major impact of unemployment on the rate of crime, the work of key thinkers such as, Durkheim, Merton, Marx and Keynesian classical theories, had a tremendous influence in this research. Other theories used are considered as contributory to this study.

The hypotheses that were formulated for statistical testing revealed that unemployment contribute greatly to the high rate of crime in South Africa. This research also showed that the low level of education is responsible for the high rate of unemployment, and bears a direct relationship with the high rate of crime. Furthermore, this research showed that the minimum wage legislation by government contribute to the high rate of unemployment.

In the light of the above findings, the study recommends the following: the co-ordinated effort and assistance of the diverse organizations such as prisons, business, trade unions, welfare agencies, schools and religious institutions in combatting the problem of crime. This study also recommends a need for a strong relationship between the anti-crime programme and the Reconstruction and Development Programme. There is also a need for educational programmes aimed at reducing vulnerability to crime in South Africa. Furthermore, it is recommended that, rural areas in particular, be prioritized for special job creation projects and skills development programmes. Finally, a Parsonian analysis of our findings revealed a need for the integration and co-operation between the two social structures – the Ministry of Labour and the Department of Correctional Services units, which have earlier been highlighted by sociologists as the functional aspect of the social structure that keeps the social system stable.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately, unemployment still remains the most severe problem the South African society is experiencing today. Nearly five million South Africans, one third of the work force are jobless. It is estimated that more than 40% of the country's economically active population are unable to find work in the formal sector of the economy. Although many unemployed people manage to derive an income from the activities in the informal sector, there is obviously not enough room for everyone to do so.

Although the extent of the unemployment problem has been on the increase for the last two decades, it became particularly visible after the scrapping of the influx control legislation in the mid-1980s which resulted in a large scale migration of blacks from rural to metropolitan areas in a fruitless search for work (Barker, 1995).

South Africa's labour market, these days, is still paralyzed by continuing racism, powerful unions and restrictive labour practices. The average white wage is still five times the average black one. The World Bank calculated that, even after allowing for differences in skills and experience, whites are paid twice as much as blacks. Besides being morally ugly, this is inefficient. Companies that pay a premium for a pink skin are unlikely to do well (Economist, Vol. 34, Issue 8092:42).

In recognition of the severity of the unemployment crisis, former state president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, convened a national Job summit in October 1998. This was followed by a number of provincial job summits in 1999. In terms of the constitution of South Africa, the newly created provinces have statutory responsibilities towards the economic development of their regions.

Unemployment is considered to be the root cause of many other problems South Africa is facing today, such as poverty, suicide and crime. Crime in particular acts as a symptom of deeper socio-political issues in South Africa. South Africa has seen a dramatic increase in the level of crime since 1985. Since the 1960s, there has been a growing international awareness of the state's lack of success in its attempt to eliminate crime. From this point onwards, there developed what is often referred to as the "crisis of the criminal justice system" (Donziger, 1996).

Mamphela Ramphele, a black-consciousness activist, more recently vice-chancellor of University of Cape Town, now at the World Bank, has other explanations for the violence that she says, "is part of the everyday reality of the lives of children and adults in South Africa". Black men, she believes, were systematically humiliated by apartheid. It kept them subordinate (black men were commonly called 'boys'). It undermined their roles as protectors (their wives and children were often dumped in distant 'homelands'). And frequently it prevented them even from providing for their families (ill educated, many men were too proud to do menial jobs, leaving the women to act as breadwinners). The net effect was to rob them of their very manhood. Today, "their only escape from complete powerlessness is the control they exercise over African women and children" (Economist, Vol. 358, Issue 8210:7,3,low).

More recent international research tends to highlight a few identifiable risk factors that contribute to high levels of crime. These include:

- Poverty and unemployment deriving from social exclusion particularly from the youth.
- Dysfunctional families with uncaring and incoherent parental attitudes, violence and parental conflicts.
- Social valuation of a culture of violence.
- Discrimination and exclusion deriving from sexist, racist or other forms of oppression.

- Presence of facilitators such as firearms, and drugs.
- Inadequate surveillance of places and availability of goods that are easy to transport or sell.
- Degradation of urban environment and social bonds (ICPS, 1997:20-21).

There are a range of pressures, which together have created high levels of crime in KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN). These include, poor urban design, high levels of unemployment, capacity problems in the justice system, and an “uncivil” society resulting from South Africa's turbulent political past (Ingrid Palmary).

It has been argued that having a job with a good salary is likely to reduce the chances that an individual will turn to criminal activities (Hirschi, 1996).

The present study sought, therefore, to explore the association between unemployment and crime, and other social variables, which lead to frustration in the individual who make up the society.

## 1.2 **UNEMPLOYMENT: EARLY SCHOLARLY THOUGHTS**

The economist of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seem in many ways better equipped to analyse the global unemployment of the nineteen eighties than many of those alive today. This can be seen in two important respects. Firstly, the classical economists, were political economists who put social institutions and social relations at the centre of their analysis. For these economists, and especially for Marx, the study of political economy and the analysis of exchange-value necessarily started from those socio-economic conditions that shaped the class relations of society (Dobb, 1973:31).

Marx's preface to the critique of Political Economy, argues that society's economic organisation

or its mode of production consists in a distinctive pattern of forces and relations of production, this is the foundation or base on which arises a complex political and ideological superstructure and definite forms of social consciousness, initially for each mode of production, the relations of the production facilitate the development of productive forces, they later act as a fetter on this development. This initiates an era of social revolution in which the dominant relations of production (and their legal expression in property rights) are challenged; any resulting changes in the economic basis sooner or later. This pattern holds for all societies from primitive communism through antiquity and feudalism to contemporary capitalism, which is described as the last antagonistic mode of production (Stones, 1998:26).

Secondly, the classical economists were concerned with the long-period questions of growth and development, and so their analysis of the causes of unemployment was essentially long period, bound up with the relationship between the available labour force and an economy's productive capacity. Whatever the verdict on individual theorists, in at least these two respects, the classical approach looks potentially relevant to the present-day employment problems not only of underdeveloped economies to which its relevance has long been recognised, but also of industrialised economies (Godfrey, 1986:31).

### **ADAM-SMITH (1723-1790)**

Adam Smith put forward a 'subsistence wage' theory of the supply of labour and a 'wage fund' theory of the demand for labour. Bearing in mind that most classical economists accepted Say's law that supply creates its own demand.

On the supply side, every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it (Smith, 1776:182). Thus, there is a strong connection between the demand for labour and its supply. If the reward of labour is 'liberal', this encourages an increase in population and hence labour supply, if multiplication is excessive, the wage falls and so does the rate of increase of labour supply. The demand for labour depends on 'the funds which are destined for the payment of wages', which are of two kinds: firstly, the revenue which is over and above what is necessary for the maintenance;

secondly, the stock which is over and above what is necessary for the employment of their masters.

Thus, since the rate of change in the demand for labour depends on the rate at which a nation's wealth and therefore its surplus revenue and surplus stock are changing and since labour supply responds with an inevitable lag to changes on the demand side, Adam Smith argued that 'scarcity of employment is quite possible in the long period. The unemployed would be prepared to work for lower wages in order to get a job, and at lower wages rates it would be profitable for employer to take workers on'. The demand for and supply of labour would come into balance and unemployment would disappear.

### **THOMAS MALTHUS (1766-1834)**

Malthus, in contrast, closes all doors to hope by elevating what was for Smith a particular case to the status of an eternal law. Taking as unchallengeable postulates the necessity of food and of passion between the sexes, he points to the 'constant tendency' of population 'to increase beyond the means of subsistence' (Malthus, 1826:3).

Malthus argued that population was growing at a geometric rate, (i.e. 2, 6, 8...), while food was being supplied at an arithmetic rate, (i.e., 1, 2, 3...). If population remains unchecked, starvation was inevitable. Malthus referred to this as the natural law of population growth. He argued that this law would hold regardless of the political system of any country.

He argued that the produce of the earth may increase for ever and be greater than any assignable quantity, yet still the power of population being in every period so much superior, the increase of the human species can only be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence by the constant operation of the strong law of necessity, acting as a check upon the greater power. In the absence of moral restraint or of promiscuous intercourse, unnatural passion, violations of the marriage bed, and improper arts to conceal the consequences of irregular connexions, ...preventive checks that clearly come under the head of vice, the ultimate check is provided by shortage of food.

As, by the law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, population can never actually increase beyond the lowest nourishment capable of supporting it, a strong check on population, from the difficulty of acquiring food, must be constantly in operation. This difficulty must fall somewhere, and must necessarily be severely felt in some or other of the various forms of misery, or the fear of misery, by a large portion of mankind (Godfrey, 1986:35).


Malthus' emphasis on the difficulties of expanding food supplies leads him to question the extent to which an increase in Smith's national wealth would contribute to a real wage increase or to the maintenance of additional labour. Accumulation, he suggests, by increasing the nominal price of labour, would lead to a proportional rise in food prices, a tendency which would be offset only very slowly by the attraction of additional capital into agriculture and only in exceptional circumstances by the possibility of importing sufficient food.

### **DAVID RICARDO (1772-1823)**

Ricardo was marginally more hopeful than Malthus, taking over the substance of his surplus population theory but allowing for the possibility of wages exceeding the bare minimum of subsistence and placing more emphasis on the accumulation of capital as 'the means of employing labour' (Ricardo, 1821:55).

On the supply side of the labour market he assumes an infinitely elastic supply of labour at what he calls the 'natural price' of labour, defined as 'that price which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution. The natural price of labour thus depends on its cost of production, that is, on 'the price of the food, necessaries, and conveniences required for the support of the labourer and his family'. The tendency of the market price of labour to conform to its natural long-run price, however, does not mean that wages can never rise over the long period.

On the demand side, Ricardo's crucial assumption is of diminishing returns in agriculture, which implies downward-sloping and therefore separate average and marginal productivity of labour curves, as in the diagram below where Kaldor summarises Ricardo's analysis.



*Source:* Kaldor (1955)

**Figure 1.1: The Agricultural Sector in Ricardo's Model Source: Kaldor (1955)**

Quantities of corn (representing all agricultural produce) are measured along the Y-axis and quantities of labour along the X-axis.  $P_{a_o}$  is the average productivity of labour curve and  $P_{m_o}$  the marginal productivity of labour curve. Since an unlimited supply of labour is available at the wage  $OW$ , the numbers of labourers employed depends on the size of the wages fund available, in this case it is  $OWKM$ , enough to employ  $OM$  workers. This means that the total output of corn is  $OCDM$ . Since rent is the difference between the product of labour on marginal land and the product of average land represented in the figure by  $BCDA$ , profits (out of which accumulation is financed) are determined as a residual,  $WBAK$  in this case. Increases in the wages fund and therefore in employment and output progressively squeeze profits between wages and rising rent until ultimately (when  $OZ$  workers are employed in Figure 1.1) they disappear altogether.

In short, in countries with an abundance of fertile land, accumulation could relieve the pressure of population against the means of subsistence and of employment, but in countries where all the fertile land was already cultivated the harsh Malthusian logic would apply and a reduction in the number of people would be the only remedy. It is a truth which admits not a doubt that the comforts and well-being of the poor cannot be permanently secured without some regard on their part, or some effort on the part of the legislature, to regulate the increase of their numbers, and to render less frequent among them early and improvident marriages (Godfrey, 1986:39).

## **KARL MARX (1818-1883)**

The British classical economists discussed so far were interested in absolute surplus population and saw endogenous variations in birth and death rates as the mechanisms through which the supply of labour adjusts to changes on the demand side. They also tended to emphasise the pressure of population against the means of subsistence rather than against the means of employment. Marx focuses more directly on labour market, with emphasis on relative surplus population pressing against the means of employment. Marx is particularly opposed to Malthus' attempt to posit surplus population as an eternal law rather than a condition specific to bourgeois society.

Marx saw unemployment as resulting from the capitalist system itself. He did not believe that in the long-term capitalist economies could be managed to eliminate unemployment, nor did he think that market forces would reduce unemployment of their own accord. Marx saw unemployment as an endemic problem of capitalism, and one that could get progressively worse.

He did not, however, believe that capitalist economies always had and would have high levels of unemployment. He believed that such economies went through cycles. Periods of expansion in which there was full employment were followed by periods of crisis during which unemployment rose.

Marx believed that capitalist economies worked in the following way: The bourgeoisie are primarily interested in maximising the amount of surplus value produced. Surplus value is the difference between the costs of producing commodities and the price they are able to sell them for. In order to be successful, members of the bourgeoisie must compete with each other. To succeed they must invest some of their profits in new machinery, which can produce goods more efficiently. In this process they accumulate capital in the form of machinery used in production (Haralambos, 1995:245).

During booms, the over-accumulation of capital takes place. The bourgeoisie install new

machinery, but as their businesses expand they find there are not enough workers to operate it. Because workers are scarce, competition between firms for workers force them to raise wages. Increased wage levels inevitably means that the rate of profit falls, since the higher the wages the smaller the proportion of the total costs of production that becomes surplus value. As the rate of profit falls, the confidence of the bourgeoisie is reduced, and they are less willing to invest in new technology.

The boom is followed by a slump. With the lack of new investment, and old machinery being taken out of production, unemployment inevitably rises. Eventually unemployment forces down wage rates, profitability, business confidence and investment increase, and the economy starts to expand again. Capitalists require workers who can be hired during booms, and fired during slumps. Marx refers to the part of the workforce who is used in this way as the reserve army labour. The unemployed are the victims of the cyclical way in which the capitalist economy works.

According to Marx's labour theory of value, it is only labour power, or work, which actually creates wealth or surplus value. As production becomes increasingly mechanised, the bourgeoisie invest a greater proportion of their capital in machinery. Labour costs decline as a proportion of the bourgeoisie's expenditure on production. Rise in productivity can increase the surplus value produced by each worker, but as the price of investment in new machinery rises, it becomes increasingly difficult for profits to remain high. To maintain profits each worker has to be exploited at a higher rate.

To Marx, this situation cannot continue indefinitely. Workers will eventually realise they are being exploited, develop class-consciousness and overthrow the capitalist system.

### 1.3 **STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Seven years after the entrenchment of democratic principles in South Africa, the African National Congress government has brought clean water to the townships, handed out housing subsidies and laid telephone lines to mention a few. But, unemployment is still widespread.

South Africa is a country of 41 million people, fringed by African poverty, with a rigid labour market, an oligopolistic economy and high real interest rates. Even gold output is declining, as mining the reserves becomes more difficult. One third of the workforce are jobless, and among black South Africans, more than 40 percent have no work. "Unemployment is problem number one," says former South African Reserve Bank Governor Chris Stals. South Africa has the highest rate of unemployment in the world, economist say (World Report, Vol. 121, Issue 7, 1995:40).

The roots of the unemployment crisis can be traced back to the sanctions against South Africa while it practised apartheid, weak gold prices and economic mismanagement by the previous government. The South African Reserve Bank observed that total unemployment is rising by one or two percentage points each year. Unless the economy can grow much faster than its current 1-2% a year, South Africa will find that its starkest divide is no longer between black and white, but between those at work and those who despair to make a living due to unemployment (Economist, Vol. 349, Issue 8092, p.49).

With food prices soaring and fuel costs threatening to get out of hand, the South African Reserve Bank has pointed a worrying picture of inflation and hinted that it may miss its inflation target of 3-6% for this year by as much as two percentage points (Business Day, 04/04/2002).

Unemployment is conceivably the root cause of many other problems South Africa is facing today, such as poverty, suicide and crime. Crime in particular is acting as a grim social leveller in the new South Africa.

A survey conducted by The Star Newspaper in the first quarter of 1999 showed that about 85% of respondents believed that crime has worsened in the period since 1994.

Respondents pointed to poverty, unemployment and a disregard for the law as the main causes underlying the increase in crime (The Star, 21 April 1999).

In a recent study sponsored by Nedcor, a South African bank, 58% of the whites and 41% of blacks named crime as the country's most serious problem (Economist, Vol. 341, Issue 7987,

1996:21).

The police at present have records on crime syndicates operating in the country. The opening of post-apartheid South Africa has turned the country into a transshipment point for drugs from Latin America and Asia, heading for the European market. Johannesburg's sophisticated banks have become a target for money-launderers. Much of the car-hijacking in Johannesburg is linked to syndicates that run luxury cars north to nearby countries such as Zambia.

The appointment of the late Steve Tshwete as Minister for Safety and Security and Penuell Maduna as Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development after the 1999 elections and their subsequent "tough stance" on crime was interpreted as a signal that government speaks tough on crime and wanted to reverse the high crime levels. The actions and statements of these ministers combined with the activities of the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions gave impetus to government's fight against crime (INTERFUND, Vol. 3, No.3, 2001).

Combatting crime is critical. Foreign investors have opened distribution centres or offices in South African. But they won't sink real money until the crime wave abates. Crime is also impelling skilled South Africans to flee the country in search of better salaries and benefits associated with their skills. It will take some time before South Africa's apartheid-determined shortage of indigenous physicians, engineers, accountants, lawyers, sociologists, etc., is met.

Moreover, the extent to which crime is now an everyday problem for many people suggests that family life and society at large, is under threat of a complete breakdown.

#### 1.4 **MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY**

As an initial effort, the present research examines the reciprocal relationship between crime and unemployment.

Crime throughout the country remains rampant, with a string of heists against cash-in-transit vans. Murder rates in urban areas, which increasingly suffer from a general climate of lawlessness, show

no signs of slowing down, all of which despite the presence at the helm of the police of one of South Africa's most respected businessmen, Meyer Kahn, who heads South African Breweries. Mr Kahn, who was appointed to reform the police management, in a series of interviews, admitted that there was a long way to go to change the way the police operated. He also lamented the lack of morality of South Africa's citizens (South Africa Country Report, Issue 3, p.10).

Indeed, every year, for the past 7 years, South Africa's police have recorded an increasing number of serious crimes, in excess of 2 million annually. Despite the minister of safety and security's angry protestations that the crime rate has stabilised, statistics from his own department indicate that recorded crime in South Africa increased by 24 percent between 1994 and 2000. A quick comparison indicates the scale of the problem: Interpol reports that in 1998 in Russia, 110 violent robberies were recorded per 100 000 people, in South Africa the number were 208 (Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2001, Issue 126, p.80).

Despite figures showing a stabilising trend in most of the serious crime categories in the 7 years since 1994, the incidence of crime and violence remained at high levels during 1999-2002.

There was an overall increase of almost 5 percent in reported incidents in the 20 most serious categories of crime between 1998 and 1999, all of which showed an annual incidence in excess of 20 cases per 100 000 of the population. Of these 20 crime types, only five evidenced some decrease in reported figures – murder, attempted murder, housebreaking (business premises), theft of motor vehicle, and arson. The 15 remaining categories showed increases ranging from some 2 percent for reported cases of rape to 13 percent for reported cases of other types of robbery (Crime Information Centre (CIAC), Semester Report 1/2000).

A survey conducted by The Star newspaper in the first quarter of 1999 showed that some 85% of respondents believed that crime had worsened in the period since 1994. Respondents pointed to poverty, unemployment and a disregard for the law as the main causes underlying the increase in crime. Few respondents blamed perceived increases in crime on corrupt government officials or on the SAPS. With respect to methods of dealing with the increase in

crime, almost three-quarters of the respondents favoured the reintroduction of the death penalty, with this sentiment expressed most strongly among white, Indian and Coloured respondents (The Star, 21 April 1999).

In respect of the sentences handed down to convicted offenders, a survey conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) among 470 respondents over the age of 17 in the Eastern Cape showed that a large majority of respondents thought that the sentences handed down to convicted offenders were too lenient, and that this played a significant role in the perceived increases in crime since 1994. Three-quarters of the respondents favoured the reintroduction of capital punishment for those convicted of serious offences (Business Day, 13 April 2000).

Many South Africans continued to question the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. There are also considerable challenges ahead in renovating South Africa's prosecution service, as Martin Schönteich, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, and Andre de Vries, a director of public prosecutions, make clear in their comments. While the number of crimes reported to the police has increased over the past 7 years, the number prosecuted remains low, as do conviction rates: In 1999, for example, the police recorded 2.4 million crimes, 200 000 of which resulted into convictions. For some of the more serious crimes, conviction rates were even worse: 2 percent for car hijacking, 3 percent for aggravated robbery, and 8 percent for rape (Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2001, Issue 126, p.80).

In the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, held in Durban in September 2001, to listen to the speakers assembled, you'd think racism was one of post-apartheid South Africa's most pressing challenges. It is not. In a recent survey conducted by the South African Institute of Race Relations, South African's ranked racism as the country's ninth-biggest problems. Among the issues they care about more were unemployment, crime, poor housing, standard of health care, lack of safe drinking water, and Aids. In other words, roughly the same list you'd find in most Third World countries (New Republic, 9/17/2001, Vol. 225, Issue 4522:81).

## 1.5 **BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LIVING CONDITIONS OF BLACKS PRIOR TO 1994**

In 1950, the South African government passed the Group Areas Act that required separate residential areas for people of different racial groups. The Population Registration Act passed in the same year, classified people into distinct racial categories. Along with pass laws mandating that blacks carry identification passbooks, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act entrenched the official segregation of apartheid into the legal structure. The government forced many land-owning blacks off their property and sent them to crowded black homelands that had neither the space nor the industry to support the influx of people. The Group Areas Act resulted in the forced removal of more than 834,000 people (*Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law*, Summer 2000, Vol.[sic], Issue 1, p.789, 33p).

During the following decades, urban planners began to restructure the physical boundaries of the country's major cities and established new infrastructures for the separate racial domains mandated by the Group Areas Act. These planners extracted so-called "coloured", Indian, and black people from the tangled mass of their inner-city ghettos and forced them out to physically isolated townships, far from the eyes of white city dwellers. Because the black homelands were not economically viable, many men became migrant labourers and moved into hostels in black townships, the only legal place for them to move.

Planners did not design townships for the safety of the residents or for a legitimate police force to prevent crime within the communities. On the contrary, they designed townships, which are nearer in structure and function to internment camps than to residential areas, so that police and military personnel could survey and control political opposition to the white state. According to a South African sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, townships included unobstructed, rectilinear fields of fine and wide streets for the passage of police vans and armoured cars ... sprinkled with strategically located police stations, and ... enclosed by barbed wire. These "man-class satellites" were often surrounded by "buffer strips", called machine-gun belts because they were "ideal for army manoeuvres" in time of trouble. The "trouble" white planners foresaw was political strife against apartheid.

Therefore, urban engineers created townships not to facilitate the safety of residents in the communities, but rather to facilitate the safety of the white state. Townships became traps for those who lacked their own transportation. Dwellers, there were imprisoned by their poverty, unemployment, and isolation in community architecture designed for political surveillance and repression. The crime of apartheid in urban townships needs to be understood through this lens. Blacks were legally trapped in townships and the apartheid state was able to target violence against anti-apartheid activists in township areas (Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law, Summer 2000, Vol.[sic], Issue 1, p.789, 33p).

In response to economic sanctions and international condemnation of apartheid, South Africa changed dramatically. In January 1990, then President FW de Klerk, ordered the South African Defence Force and the South African Police to begin acting in a non-partisan manner. In February 1990, De Klerk ended a thirty-year ban on the government's major opposition group, the African National Congress. He also released thousands of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela. The government also repealed the Group Areas Act.

## 1.6 **THE HISTORY OF KWAZULU-NATAL**

According to Deidre Linden, South Africa is today one of the world's great trading nations and Natal, the Republic's smallest but most densely populated Province makes a large contribution to this development with its manufacturing industry and its major port at Durban Harbour.

Natal is on the threshold of great events. All the indicators point to tremendous economic expansion. So vast its potential, so high its growth rate and so scientific its planning that there would appear to be no reason why it should not capture the supreme industrial pinnacle in time.

But alas, upon ascending to the thrown of South Africa's elite province, Natal experienced a remarkable history worth sharing. In horrific scenes blood was shed, tears were lost and heartache grew, but Natal survived the passing tornado of disruption and bloomed into a beautiful province to be proud of.

A short crash course in geography taught me that Natal was a former province in eastern South Africa, located on the Indian Ocean. The region of Natal is at present contained by the province of KwaZulu-Natal, one of nine provinces established in April 1994, at the time of South Africa's first free democratic elections. Now the history of this enthralling province stretches back to the Phoenicians. It seems likely that they were those enterprising, fearless navigators who inhabited the Middle East coast, and that already become a sea-faring nation some 3 000 years ago when they supposedly were the first civilized people to set foot in the city of Durban.

But, it was at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with a Bantu-speaking people, which formed the Nguni-group that first ignited Natal's spark. Shaka the great warrior chief, was the chief of the Zulu group that formed a branch of the Nguni. Though his path as a leader was very hard, it was indeed very successful. Shaka, the son of the Zulu chieftain but born of a repudiated wife, spent his childhood and youth in exile, stigmatized and humiliated. In his twenties he disguised himself for six years as a warrior in the service of Chief Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa. When Shaka's father died in 1816, Dingiswayo sent Shaka to rule the Zulu. And with this he immediately reorganized the Zulu fighting force and, with innovations in tactics and weaponry, shaped it into a formidable military machine geared to total warfare. Within a year, Shaka had quadrupled the number of his subjects and army members by absorbing conquered groups into his Zulu Nation.

But what is not in doubt is that Vasco de Gama, the great Portugese navigator, steered his three small ships, Sao Gabriel, Berreio and Sao Rafael, up the Pondoland coast and named the unknown land, Natal from the Portugese word, Christmas, as he arrived in December 1497. European settlement began to establish formidably in 1824 when the British established a trading post at Port Natal, now known as Durban. The Europeans acquired the site from Shaka. Psychologically disturbed throughout his life, and obsessively fearful of being supplanted by an heir, Shaka became clearly deranged by the death of his mother in 1828. Dingane, Shaka's half-brother and another great South African Zulu chief, formed an alliance with other members of his family and in doing so took part in the assassination of the increasingly despotic Shaka on September 24, 1828. Following this Dingane subsequently murdered his co-conspirators and became king of Zululand.

As king, Dingane tried to end the ten years of continual war, but to keep the kingdom from splintering he was forced to continue Shaka's repressive policies. In 1835 the Great Trek was formed, that initiated the migration of Afrikaners from the Cape of Good Hope into what is now the northern part of South Africa lasting into the early 1840s. Pieter Retief, an Afrikaner commander, was one of the leaders of the Great Trek. Retief led a group of Voortrekkers in the Orange River area, known presently as the Orange Free State, where he was elected supreme commander. The trekkers, however, divided into two groups, with Retief and his followers wanting to go east, to the region of Natal, and the others wishing to remain in the Orange River country under command of Hendrik Potgieter.

Retief led his group east into Zululand and sought a land concession from the Zulu chief, Dingane, who was deeply suspicious of the Afrikaners. Dingane only agreed to make a land grant on the condition that Retief restore to him cattle that had been stolen by Chief Sekonyela of the Tlokwa. Retief retrieved the cattle and returned them to Dingane in February, with Afrikaners already streaming into Zulu territory, and news reached a nervous Dingane of Potgieter's victory over Mzilikazi, another Zulu chief. Dingane took fright and formulated a plan and on February 6, 1838, he invited Retief and his party to a celebration in Dingane's kraal, where his warriors later massacred and murdered them. As a result, the other Voortrekkers united under Andries Pretorius and made an alliance with Dingane's brother, Mpande, against Dingane. The death of Retief and his followers was avenged on December 16, 1838, at the Battle of Blood River one of South Africa's most gruesome and horrific historic tales. Andries Pretorius killed 3 000 Zulu's with a force of 500 men. After this defeat, some of Dingane's followers broke away and followed his brother, Mpande, who collaborated with the Boers to defeat Dingane's forces in 1839. Retief in his heroic figure became a hero to all and with this his followers created the republic of Natalia which survived until 1843, when it came under British control. Many Afrikaners left when Natal came under British control.

In 1844 Natal was annexed to the Cape Colony, but it was reestablished as a separate colony in 1856. During the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, many British immigrated to Natal. Starting in 1860, the British brought indentured laborers from India to work on the sugar plantations in Natal. Later, many free Indians immigrated to Natal; the region today still continues to have the largest

Indian population in South Africa.

In 1879 another war between the British and the Zulu in Natal ended with a British victory. Natal gained limited self-government in 1893, and four years later Zululand was officially incorporated into the colony. In 1899 the Anglo-Boer War erupted between South Africa and Great Britain. When gold was discovered in 1884 the discovery lured thousands of British miners and prospectors to settle in South Africa. The influx being so great that the city of Johannesburg was created almost overnight. The Afrikaners, primarily farmers, resented the newcomers, whom they called Uitlanders or foreigners, and in token of their feeling, taxed them heavily and denied them voting rights. The resentment on both sides grew, ultimately leading to a revolt by the Uitlanders against the Afrikaner government.

Ultimately Natal was invaded by Afrikaners in 1899 at the outbreak of the Boer War, but the Afrikaners were driven out by the British in 1900. Ten years later Natal became one of the original provinces of the Union of South Africa. Following the run to independence, Hendrik Verwoerd succeeded in establishing the Union of South Africa into the Republic of South Africa in 1961.

From 1948, with the triumph of the National Party's election win, South Africa was racially segregated under a system known as apartheid. In the 1950s all black South Africans were divided according to ethnicity and assigned to certain territories called Bantustans, or black homelands. The Bantustan of KwaZulu was created in Natal and designated as a supposed homeland for the Zulu. KwaZulu consisted of many small fragments of land scattered throughout the province. In 1994 following the release of Nelson Mandela some time later, South Africa held its first free democratic elections and then in that same year Natal and the Bantustan of KwaZulu were recombined to form the new province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Today KwaZulu-Natal is a wonderful province. KZN can boast with beautiful recreational sights for all races with beautiful sight-seeing to be done as well. Not only is KZN a picturesque province, but it has a variety of things to offer its visitors. This province is one of the few remaining nature wonderlands in the world; its scenery is varied, it is rich in historical sights and it has a year round sunny climate. KwaZulu-Natal is one of the most popular holiday playgrounds

in the Southern Hemisphere.

In conclusion it is my believe that it is an amazing milestone that KwaZulu-Natal survived its formidable past with flying colours. And furthermore I truly believe that KwaZulu-Natal is on the threshold of great events after all, KZN is now but a mere seed waiting to bloom into something even more spectacular (Deidre Linden).

## 1.7 **THE HISTORY OF NATAL**

The analysis of the history of Natal by Liam Durham shows that for the past four centuries many thousands of people from Britain and Europe have left their homes and sailed across the oceans in order to make new homes in other countries including South Africa. Many immigrants have come to our country. In the days of Simon van der Stel the French Huguenots settled at the Cape. When the British occupied the Cape for the second time in 1806, the European population of the Cape Colony was about 40,000. By 1819 about 4,000 British were at the Cape. The Dutch by this time numbered about 43,000. Then during the next two years the British population was doubled.

In 1820 about 4,000 British settlers arrived at the Cape. They were accustomed to freedom of speech and criticized the government because of the way the emigration scheme had been handled. It was partly because of the settlers' complaints that the British government investigated their grievances. The settlers had a great influence on the development of the country.

A serious shortage of land developed because both Europeans and Africans were cattle farmers and required extensive grazing land. Quarrels arose over the possession of land on the Cape frontier, and many wars were fought between the Africans and Europeans.

Pressure on the frontier increased as the Xhosa were being pushed from behind, but at the same time were unable to move forward because of the pressure of the European farms, while the frontier farmers formed commandos and rode off into African territory in search of cattle which had been lost.

Many frontier farmers began to think that there would never be peace and safety on the frontier. The result was that many farmers decided to leave the Colony and go on trek.

Many of the farmers relied on African slave labour. The English and French also entered the slave trade. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a movement to have slavery abolished began. Slave owners were angry when these laws were applied in the Cape Colony, they thought the laws were unnecessary and an interference with private property. Finally in August 1833 the British parliament passed an Act abolishing slavery throughout the British Empire.

The slave owners in the Colony suffered many hardships, as the loss of so much money was a serious blow to a poor colony. The farmers also feared that the liberation of thousands of slaves would increase lawlessness and idleness, and that there would be a shortage of labour on the farms. Many frontier farmers were so indignant that they decided to trek from the Colony. Piet Retief published their grievances in the *Grahamstown Journal* on the 2.2.1837.

### **2.7.1 Conditions in the Interior of South Africa**

In the interior lived African tribes. The African tribes of southern Africa consisted of people whose ancestors migrated from parts of central Africa three or four hundred years ago. This migration was really a form of natural expansion, as the area became overcrowded with increasing population there was insufficient grazing or available land for everyone.

In Natal the first settlement on the shores of Durban Bay was established in 1824 when two Englishmen, Lieutenants Farewell and King, obtained a grant of land from the Zulu king Shaka. Soon other Englishmen arrived and started to trade in ivory. In 1835 an ex-naval officer, Captain Gardiner, settled at Port Natal to do missionary work, and in the same year the town of Durban was founded. Gardiner persuaded Dingaan, who became chief of the Zulu in 1828, to allow another missionary, Rev Francis Owen, to establish a mission station near the kraal called Umgungundlovu.

In the area now called Zululand lived a number of independent groups of the Nguni tribe. One

group called the Mthethwa under their chief Dingiswayo were stronger than the others. This group grew more and more powerful. One of his warriors was Shaka the son of the chief of the Zulu group. In 1816 when his father died, Shaka became chief of the Zulu people. Shaka became the most powerful chief of all the groups in the country called Zululand.

### 1.7.2 **The First European Settlers in Natal**

For three hundred years after Vasco da Gama had sailed along the coast of Natal, passing the area now called Natal at Christmas time, ships of trading companies passed the entrance to the bay which was later called Port Natal, but little use was made of the vast inlet. The reason for this was that a sandbar guarded the entrance to the bay and prevented large ships from entering. Nevertheless from time to time a passing vessel would anchor outside the bay and send a small boat nosing in for food and water.

The British navy surveyed the whole coast as far as Delagoa Bay, and this aroused the interest of trading companies of the Cape Colony in the possibilities of trading with the area Natal. The first two traders on the scene were Lieutenants James Saunders King and Francis Farewell, who had served in the British navy during the Napoleonic wars. King found sanctuary in the bay in 1822 and charted it before sailing for the Cape. In 1824 Farewell, accompanied by Henry Francis Fynn and several other adventurers, sailed for Natal in two vessels. They hoped to trade with the Zulu people. Fynn became a favourite with Shaka as he had knowledge of medicine and attended to one of Shaka's wound. Shaka was so grateful that on 7 August 1825 he granted to Farewell and his followers all the land around Port Natal and extending a hundred miles inland.

The settlers at the port were then able to commence the trade in ivory, skins and gum which was the beginning of the great commercial city of Durban. Meanwhile the ivory traders were exploring the country to the south of Port Natal. The settlers had also been building their huts of wattle and daub with thatched roofs and reed doors. The traders were able to enjoy wild fruits and bananas, which grew well in this climate. Farewell's wife, Elizabeth, who had been separated from her husband for two and a half years, arrived at the port. She was the first European woman to settle in Natal.

Shaka was assassinated by Dingaan, who became king of the Zulu people. Francis Farewell was the founder of the settlement in Natal. Natal was attracting attention in the Colony and new men began to appear on the scene. Dr Andrew Smith, a military surgeon at the Cape, reported with enthusiasm about the opportunities offered by Natal, and consequently many Cape Town inhabitants petitioned the government in favour of the occupation of Natal.

Early in 1835 Captain Alien Francis Gardiner established a mission station on the ridge overlooking the Bay. He called his station Berea, a name which this area of Durban still bears. Gardiner was responsible for the calling of a public meeting on 23 June 1835 for the purpose of organizing the settlement. When a suitable place had been found, the settlers were each given a plot of ground on condition that they built decent houses of a certain size. Land was also set aside for the building of a church, a school and a market place. Gardiner suggested that the new town should be named Durban in honour of the governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Benjamin D'Urban.

Meanwhile one of the Voortrekkers Piet Retief who had left the Cape in 1837 arrived in Natal and received a warm welcome from the few British settlers at Port Natal. He sent a letter of greetings to Dingaan telling him of his wish to visit the royal kraal to discuss the question of land. Dingaan was willing to grant the Trekkers land on condition that certain cattle stolen by another chief were restored. This Retief did. Dingaan was becoming afraid of the Boers with their firearms and horses. Retief returned to the royal kraal to make final arrangements about the land. Dingaan killed Retief and his men. The impi were sent out to attack the rest of the Trekkers who were spread out along the various rivers near the present towns of Escourt, Weenen and Colenso. After these attacks some of the Trekkers left Natal and settled in Potchefstroom. The Zulu warriors then attacked Durban, the British there being forced to take refuge in a ship anchored in the bay.

In November 1838 the last of the Voortrekker leaders to leave the Colony, Andries Pretorius arrived. Pretorius gathered together a commando of 464 men and travelled into Zululand. About a week later the commando occupied a position on the banks of a river, which was later called Blood River. On the 16 December, about 10,000 Zulu stormed the laager, wave after wave, but the fire of the Trekkers mowed them down as they rushed at the wagons. The Zulu withdrew. The position of the Boers was strengthened when Mpande, a half brother of Dingaan, joined the

Boers. They inflicted another severe defeat on the Zulu king, who fled to Swaziland and was killed by the Swazi's. The Voortrekkers now established the Republic of Natal, with the capital at Pietermaritzburg.

### 2.7.3 **The Republic of Natal**

The republic stretched from the Tugela to the Umzimvubu River in the south. There were three districts: Pietermaritzburg, Port Natal and Weenen. They elected a volksraad a law-making body. Andries Pretorius was made the commandant general of the republic, and was still regarded as the leader of the people. The Republic of Natal lasted three years only, for in May 1843 Britain annexed the territory and made it a British colony. Resulting from reports reached in Cape Town that the relationships between the Boers in Natal and the Africans were causing trouble. Sir George Napier, sent a force of 260 men under Captain TC Smith to the southern borders of Natal to see what was happening.

The Boers, led by Pretorius, decided to force the British out of Natal. They summoned the commando to come to their assistance from Winburg. The Boers were encamped at a place called Congella, about 3 miles from the British camp, which was at a spot today known as the Old Fort. The British camp was besieged. Dick King, an English trader at the port escaped from Port Natal, and rode to Grahamstown for reinforcements. The siege lasted for almost a month. Then British reinforcements arrived at Port Natal; the Boers withdrew and in July 1842 the volksraad surrendered. About a year later Britain decided to annex Natal, and sent an official, Henry Cloete, to reach an agreement with the Voortrekkers. They were not prepared to accept the British policy of equality between the Africans and the Europeans or remain under British rule. Many of the Voortrekkers immediately packed their wagons and crossed the Mountains.

The British took control in 1843, and the territory became part of the Cape Colony, subsequently reverting to separate colonial status in 1856. Zulu resistance was finally crushed by the British in 1879, and the colony was granted self-government in 1893.

During the South African Wars (Boer Wars), the colony was invaded by the Boer army, but

reverted to British rule in 1902 after the Boer defeat. In 1910 Natal was incorporated into the newly created Union of South Africa.

#### 2.7.4 **KwaZulu-Natal**

The 1980's and the 1990's witnessed a bitter, violent conflict between rival supporters of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party led by Chief Mangosutu Buthelezi. About 10,000 people were killed and conflict has impeded the province's economic development. Following the election of a democratic South African government. KwaZulu-Natal became one of nine provinces in May 1994. Chief Buthelezi became Minister of Home Affairs in the Government of National Unity. It is the only province with a monarchy explicitly provided for in the 1993 constitution, and the reigning Zulu king of KwaZulu-Natal is Goodwill Zwelithini. The provincial assembly and premier are elected for five year terms, or until the next national election. Political parties are awarded assembly seats based on the percentage of votes that each party receives in the province during the national elections. The assembly elects a premier, who then appoints the members of the executive council (Liam Durham).

#### 1.8 **AIMS OF THE STUDY**

- (a) To examine the relationship between unemployment and the rate of crime in South Africa.
- (b) To establish the relationship between the individual's level of education and the rate of crime and unemployment.
- (c) To determine the relationship and the level of co-operation and integration between the Ministry of Labour and the Department of Correctional Services in reducing the level of crime and unemployment in South Africa.

- (d) To determine the relationship between government's legislation on minimum wages and its effect on the rate of unemployment and crime in South Africa.

## 1.9 **SUMMARY**

Unemployment still remains the most severe problem the South African society is experiencing today. It is the root cause of many other problems such as poverty and crime. The present study sought to explore the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. The next chapter presents the theoretical issues that are relevant to this research.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical issues that are relevant to this research. In the same vein, an attempt will be made to review past studies on unemployment and crime at both international and national levels.

#### **2.2 THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF STRUCTURAL STRAIN**

One major explanation of deviance is the notion that social conditions may be so frustrating to some people that they are driven in desperation to deviant ways of behaviour. The idea that deviance performs a necessary and important social function dates back to Emile Durkheim's "*The Rules of the Sociological Method*", published in 1895. Durkheim made the surprising statement that deviance is a natural part of social life, "an integral part of all healthy societies" (1895/1958:67). The book is, of course, methodological in aim, and the immediate context of Durkheim's development of his theory of deviance is a chapter on how the investigator should distinguish between the normal and the pathological in his analysis of social facts (Nisbet, 1974:215).

A social fact refers to any institution or phenomenon which is common in all societies of a particular type at a particular stage in their development. A phenomenon which met this test must be scientifically regarded as normal, normality was a matter of fact, not of moral or philosophical judgments. The social fact was not just a subjective idea. It was a thing existing in its own right, an inevitable part of a particular kind of social fabric.

Crime occurred not merely in all advanced societies but in all societies of whatever type, at all stages in their development. It must therefore be accepted as a social fact, a normal part of

society which could not be eradicated at will. It did not follow that the criminal as an individual was always normal from the biological and psychological points of view. On the contrary, a normal society would always contain some abnormal individuals (Radzinowicz, 1966:72).

Durkheim went even further. He had said that the claim of a phenomenon to be accepted as a social fact would be strengthened if it could be shown that society could not function without it. To abolish crime completely it would be necessary to have a penal system so stringent that it would exclude all deviation on the part of individuals. Without deviation there could be no adaptation, no change, no progress, a society could not survive. Crime, claimed Durkheim, is “bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life, and by that very fact it is useful, because these conditions, of which it is a part, are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law” (Zeitlin, 1993:345).

Law and morality vary from one social type to another and change within one type as conditions are modified. To allow for these transformations, the collective sentiments at the basis of morality must not be hostile to change. An inflexible pattern is an obstacle to new patterns. “Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited extent”. The conditions that made crime possible also made change possible and crime might even directly prepare the way for change.

To the charge that he was condoning crime, Durkheim’s reply would be that crime and punishment must be considered together. Punishment also was a “social fact”, useful and normal in every society. It had a special role to play in upholding and strengthening common values. Just as crime had a part in allowing for flexibility, punishment had a part in supporting solidarity. “A society without criminality would necessitate a standardization of the moral conceptions of all individuals which is neither possible nor desirable, on the other hand, if there was no system of repression, a certain moral heterogeneity would exist which is irreconcilable with the very existence of society (Radzinowicz, 1966:74).

Crime may change its shape as society itself changes, but it remains a part of all societies, whatever their racial, national, social, moral or economic conditions may be. As crime rates have continued to rise in South Africa, and as research has shown how pervasive criminality is, the

reality of Durkheim's conception of crime as an intrinsic part of society has been driven home.

Thus in Durkheim's view a healthy society requires both crime and punishment, both are inevitable, and both are functional (Haralambos, 1990:390).

Another theory in this vein was developed by Gabriel Tarde. Like Durkheim, he achieved distinction in the broader field of sociology as well as criminology. Unlike Durkheim, he made the study of crime his central theme. Unlike Durkheim, too, he was deeply versed in the practical administration of the law.

The keynote of all his work can be found in his deep sense of movement and change in society and its manifold effect upon crime, upon the definitions of crime, the nature of crime, the propositions of crime, the types of offenders and the way they were punished.

He pointed out that the progress of civilization was continually reducing the influence of the physical factors which had so much interested his predecessors, such factors as race, climate, seasons, even sex. It was the social factors that now dominated the trends in crime. He refused to single out any one of them as the major determinant, describing instead a whole series of changes which made crime easier and more rewarding. Such were the growth of large cities which became centres of criminal infection and imitation, breeding grounds of recidivism, the greater prizes now offered by a prosperous society, the lesser risks threatened by a more merciful penal system, the maxims and passions, the cupidity and cunning of a society swayed by greed, the shadier practices of many business concern (Radzinowicz, 1966:84).

The sources of crime in an increasingly prosperous society must be sought not in absolute poverty or wealth or even welfare but in relative feelings of content or discontent, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, the extension of artificial needs and the over-stimulation of aspirations. They must be sought in the general decline in veracity and good faith and the propagation of a spirit of deceit, in the emancipation from dogmas and the weakening of religious beliefs, and in the continued state of ferment. It was stability, one of the fundamental conditions of morality, that was conspicuously packing. The individual could do little against this tide of social change.

“When a man thinks he is following his little individual reason”, he said, “it is still the great logic of society which drives him. The individual bestirs himself, the environment sweeps him along” (Radzinowicz, 1966:85).

Some times Tarde’s ideas seem to be leading him in the same direction as Durkheim, at least to an acceptance of crime as an inevitable part of society, “if the tree of crime”, he said, “with all its roots and rootlets, could ever be torn out of our society, it would leave a vast abyss”. “Let us not” he exhorted, “think we are purchasing too dearly, at the price of all our offences and crimes, and even of all our deceits, our enlightenment and our discoveries”.

A similar theory that rising crime rates must be inextricably bound up with the progress of civilization, was developed by Arthur Cleveland Hall, Fellow in Sociology at Columbia in a book which deserves to be remembered.

The aim of the book was to prove that:

the pertinent enlargement of the field of crime is a necessity for all truly progressive nations. Many acts, formerly harmless, or socially beneficial, become harmful as civilization grows higher and more complex. Society’s conflict with its criminal members, due to the enforcement of new social prohibitions, is one of the chief means by which humanity, in every age, has risen from a lower to a higher plane of civilization. For the amount of a nation’s crime depends upon the degree of civilization attained, the rapidity of social evolution, necessarily calling into existence new forces of crime, and the general attitude of the people toward the criminal law, and especially the new laws, obedience being more difficult to obtain where individual liberty is customary and highly prized, and restraint consequently more irksome (Radzinowicz, 1966:87).

It is always hard to accept that crime is normal, it is even harder to accept that its increase may be an integral part of the social and economic progress that is so highly prized.

Even Durkheim wavered at this point. In spite of their generality, he suggested that the

exceptionally high crime rates of modern industrialized society might be pathological rather than normal. He also suggested that certain kinds of crime might be linked with a condition of society to which he gave the name of anomie.

### 2.3 **ANOMIE THEORY**

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) suggested that there are those who experience personal frustration and alienation as a result of conditions within a society. Those conditions are within a large societal structure and termed anomie. A major assumption of anomie is that large numbers of people find themselves at a disadvantage relative to legitimate economic activities. They are seen as being motivated to engage in illegal activities (Shoemaker, 1990).

RK Merton was the first to develop the concept of anomie in relation to crime. Durkheim's conception of a society so devoted to commercial and industrial progress that it encouraged unlimited aspirations in the individual whilst neglecting to control their expression, seemed to him supremely applicable to the United States. Here was a society in which the value placed upon economic success far outweighed consideration of the means used to attain it. But Merton added another dimension to the theory of anomie, a dimension in some ways curiously reminiscent of Bonger, though developed in a more subtle way. Bonger had suggested that the structure of a capitalist society exerted different pressures towards egoism upon different classes. Merton now suggested that, because of their place in the social structure, some classes might be more vulnerable than others to anomic tendencies.

In fact, the legitimate avenues to success were almost inaccessible to some. It was very difficult for members of the lower strata to acquire the educational and social equipment necessary for success. There was a clash, in fact, between the cultural structure of society as a whole, the goals it prized and the means it approved, and its social structure, which severely hampered some groups in attaining, by legitimate means, the success held out to them as their duty to seek and their right to achieve.

Merton reasoned that to some degree all people internalize the goals that are considered worth

striving for in their culture. Everyone also internalizes the norms that govern proper and legitimate ways of working toward those goals. But when legitimate opportunities for achieving culturally defined goals are limited or non-existent, people may seek alternative ways to achieve those goals, or they may abandon the goals altogether. Merton's key point is that strain in the social structure invite deviance. In his words, "some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conforming rather than conforming behaviour" (Merton, 1968:132).

Merton argued that all deviance is not alike, nor is it always destructive to society. Because the social structure is complex, various individual responses are possible. Merton further argues that there are different modes of adaptation by individuals within the culture-bearing society.

Here, we consider five modes of adaptation, as these are schematically set out in the following table, where (+) signifies "acceptance" or availability of goals and institutionalized means, (-) signifies "rejection" or unavailability of goals and institutionalized means and (+) signifies rejection of both goals and means and substituting them with new ones.

### Merton's Model of Deviance and Anomie

Mode of Adaptation	Cultural Goals	Institutional Means
Conformity	+	+
Innovation	+	-
Ritualism	-	+
Retreatism	-	-
Rebellion	+	+

**Source:** Adapted from Merton, 1957

- (1) **Conformity:** Merton argued that in this mode of adaptation, most people conform most of the time, for they have internalized the rules of acceptable behaviour. For those in a society who can play by the rules, who have enough resources, and whose goals society approves of, there is no contradiction between means and ends.

- (2) **Innovation:** This response occurs when the individual has assimilated the cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally internalizing the institutional norms governing ways and means for its attainment. For example, business people who operate consumer scams and citizens who cheat on taxes are all examples of this mode of behaviour.
- (3) **Ritualism:** A ritualist plays it safe. He or she concentrates on the means - going along with the rules - but has given up on reaching the goal. For example, bureaucrats who are more concerned about filling out forms correctly than about achieving the purpose of their organization. "Red tape" becomes their goal (end) rather the means of a goal.
- (4) **Retreatism:** This response consists of people who are in the society but not for it. Sociologically, these constitute the true aliens. Retreats are dropouts in the eyes of society - the people who give up looking for work and become skid row bums, chronic drug addiction who doesn't even try to kick their habits, and vagrants who drift aimlessly through life.
- (5) **Rebellion:** This mode of adaptation leads men outside the envioning social structure to envisage and seek to bring into being a new that is to say, a greatly modified social structure. It presupposes alienation from rising goals and standards. These come to be regarded as purely arbitrary. And the arbitrary is precisely that which can either exact allegiance nor possess legitimacy, for it might as well be otherwise.

In all this, however, there is a freedom from rigidity, from any doctrinaire to claim that anomie provides a complete or exclusive answer. On one hand Merton did not suggest that it accounted for all lower-class crime, let alone for crime as a whole. On the other he did not limit its application to the least privileged group. He thought that it might also be behind some white collar crime. Nor did he suggest that crime was the only possible response to the pressures towards anomie, on the contrary, he classified a series of alternative responses from conformity (the commonest) to innovation, to ritualism to retreatism, to rebellion (Radzinowicz, 1966:91).

Like Durkheim, Merton saw deviance as a necessary part. Even more, his model of deviance and anomie can be productive, creative, and keep society from growing rigid and ossified.

## 2.4 **SOCIAL INTEGRATION THEORIES**

### 2.4.1 **Criminal homicide and suicide theory: Henry and Short**

Andrew F Henry and James F Short Jr., developed in the mid 1950s a theory of criminal homicide and suicide which built in part on Durkheim's concepts of social integration and regulation. These authors viewed homicide and suicide as extreme forms of aggression, as well as alternative responses to frustration. They gave central attention to three variables: status, strength of the relational system, and degree of external restraints. By status, Henry and Short meant prestige. By strength of the relational system, they referred to the degree to which individuals are involved in social or cathectic relationships with others. By external restraints, they meant the extent to which individuals are required to conform to the demands and expectations of other persons.

A person of low status is required to conform to the demands and expectations of persons of higher status merely by virtue of his lower status. A person involved in intense "social" interaction with another person is required to conform to the demands and expectations imposed as a condition of the relationship. These observations may be summarized in the following proposition: the strength of external restraint to which behaviour is subjected varies positively with the strength of the relational system and inversely with position in the status hierarchy (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990:33).

Henry and Short went on to suggest that homicide varies positively with strength of external restraint over behaviour. Persons of lower status are subjected to one-sided restraints. They must conform to the expectations of those of higher status while the latter need not conform to their expectations. This leads low-status individuals to blame others for the frustration they consequently experience. They tend to aggress outwardly toward others rather than toward themselves.

Henry and Short suggested that suicide, on the other hand, is characteristic of high-prestige groups. They argued that as prestige increases, there is a decrease in the strength of the relational system, that is, in the extent to which individuals are involved in social or cathectic relationships with others. Further, they held that as prestige increases, there is a decrease in the strength of external restraint, the degree to which behaviour is required to conform to the demands and expectations of others.

In summary, their position was that as prestige of individuals becomes greater and external restraints and the strength of the relational system decrease, suicide increases, conversely, as prestige becomes lower and restraints and strength of the relational system increase, homicide also increases (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990:32-34).

When behaviour is subjected to strong external restraint by virtue either of subordinate status or intense involvement in social relationships with other persons, it is easy to blame others when frustration occurs. But when the restraints are weak, the self must bear the responsibility for frustration. Strong external restraints mean conflict among individuals where as weak restraints imply an absence of conflict.

The Henry and Short formulation is admirable in that it brings together into one unified theory sociological, psychological, and economic factors (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990:33-34).

#### 2.4.2 **Reciprocity and integration: Straus and Straus**

Jacqueline and Murray Straus reformulated Durkheim's original ideas concerning social integration in a 1953 research report.

Based on their analysis of homicide and suicide in Ceylon, they concluded that the major social condition related to those two forms of deviance was closeness or looseness of structuring of a society. A society is closely structured, that is, integrated, to the extent that reciprocal rights and duties are stressed and enforced. In a society that is closely

integrated, the emphasis on reciprocity in carrying out roles and norms operates to preclude violence towards others. This is because individuals are helping each other play out their roles effectively and hence see little reason to blame each other for whatever severe frustration they experience. Hence, Straus and Straus predicted low homicide rates and high suicide rates in closely integrated societies.

On the other hand, in loosely structured or loosely integrated societies, reciprocal rights and duties are stressed and enforced relatively little. Individuals are not helping each other to carry out their roles and hence find it easy to blame each other for the frustrations they feel. Thus, Straus and Straus predicted high homicide and low suicide rates in loosely integrated societies. Their formulation and Durkheim's theory are congruent in this sense. Durkheim predicted altruistic suicide when social integration was high. Straus and Straus predicted suicide in general under conditions of high integration. Where they predicted homicide under conditions of low integration, Durkheim predicted egoistic suicide. However, Durkheim did in passing suggest that homicide would also be high when integration was low (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990:34-35).

## 2.5 **SUBCULTURAL THEORY**

### 2.5.1 **Albert K. Cohen**

In his analysis of a delinquent subculture, Cohen stressed the impact of social class. For Cohen, the delinquent subculture exists because it offers a solution to the status problems and frustrations experienced by working-class boys in their efforts to achieve middle-class success. Working-class boys are constantly evaluated by "middle-class measuring rods", as Cohen phrases it. However, their working-class background does not adequately equip them to practice the middle-class standards of aggression, deferment of gratification, self-reliance, self-discipline, ambition, and academic achievement. Given this discrepancy, such boys often experience status frustration, which they deal with by developing what Cohen terms a delinquent response: the youths reject middle-class standards and turn to the delinquent subculture of the gang.

This subculture provides them with new forms of status achieved through gang membership. Cohen (1955) describes this delinquent subculture as:

- (a) non-utilitarian, that is, not mainly concerned with economic gain
- (b) negativistic, in the sense that a certain malice entered into the defiance of authority
- (c) not simply at odds with respectable society, but lived by rules which ran counter to it
- (d) celebrated 'short-run hedonism' not only living for the moment, but actively resisting any attempt to plan for the future, was versatile rather than specialized in its delinquency and owed allegiance to the gang alone (Taylor, 1999:237).

In accounting for this behaviour, Cohen elaborated a theory of sub-cultures, that is, cultures within cultures. Like Merton, Cohen begins from a structural perspective, because there is unequal access to opportunities, Cohen argues that this creates pressure on certain groups within the social structure to engage in non-conforming rather than conforming behaviour.

However, he deviates from Merton when he sees some delinquency as being a collective response directed by subcultural values. In this way, Cohen shows how pressure from the social structure to deviate is reinforced by pressure from the deviant subculture.

### 2.5.2 **Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin on types of delinquent subcultures**

Drawing on Merton's theory, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1964) discovered that delinquent subcultures reflect the neighbourhood and its ability to provide both legitimate and illegitimate means for success. Depending on the locale, a delinquent

subculture could be crime and rackets oriented (innovative), centered around fighting (rebellious) or focussed on drugs (retreatist).

In neighbourhoods where adult rackets were prevalent gang delinquency serves as a kind of apprenticeship for recruitment to the mob. In areas so disorganized that even the rackets avoid them, the conflict gang prevails. Where 'double failure' occurs, the world of crime being no easier to succeed in than the 'straight' world, the retreatist pattern of drug use is likely to be chosen. Moreover, in all this swirl of activity, the school is of no account to downtown boys what inspires their sense of alienation is not school failure but lack of material success. Well-paid jobs are their goals rather than status in school. Cloward and Ohlin predicted the crisis that would occur when deindustrialization led to the large scale disappearance of secure and well-paid manual jobs, a development documented vividly by Wilson (1996:29-38).

Sykes and Matza took a different tack, arguing that the idea of delinquent sub-cultures conjured up a mythical picture of lower-class youth committed to incessantly at warfare against middle-class adult institutions. In reality, most delinquency was petty and intermittent. By over-predicting delinquency, these theories could not account for its decline in adulthood, nor for the techniques of neutralization deployed in explanation by the young people involved (Sykes & Matza, 1957:664-700). Phrases such as 'I didn't mean to do it', 'They had it coming to them', 'Everybody does it', are not just rationalizations but attempts to neutralize a sense of guilt which, if the offenders were so righteously indignant about their social situation, they would not even feel. So what makes delinquency attractive in the first place? Here the stress is placed on what delinquents have in common with the rest of society, rather than on what sets them apart.

They are seen as sharing adherence to 'subterranean values' (Matza & Sykes, 1961), such as the equation of toughness with masculinity, the search for excitement and a disdain for routine work. These are the values of gentlemen of leisure as well as delinquents. Delinquents differ, however, in acting them out without respect for time and place. Their

accentuation makes for a 'sub-culture of delinquency', in which law breaking is an option not a necessity. Youths may drift into delinquency by a temporary loosening of controls rather than through commitment to a delinquent way of life (Matza, 1964). The more extreme forms of delinquency arise from desperation or 'compulsive' behaviour. In correcting for what he saw as positive defects (the scientific search for causes which override free will), Matza may have under predicted delinquency yet been obliged to retain a positivistic model for its most extreme forms (Taylor, 1999:238-239).

Another important contribution to the theory was made by Edwin Schur (1979:312) who expanded the concept of subculture beyond delinquency to include: group-based criminality, whether by "professional thieves" or delinquent gangs; those forms of "deviant consumption and selling" that are often engaged in on a repeated basis - as in the "drug scene" or prostitution; basic personal orientations - such as homosexuality and, perhaps in cases of extreme involvement, political or religious orientation; and other stigmatized behaviours that constitute generalized life-styles ... such as "skid row" patterns or bohemianism ("hippies", the youthful "counter cultures", etc.).

### 2.5.3 **Lower class subculture – Walter B Miller**

Walter B. Miller's approach to deviance differs from those of Cohen, Cloward and Ohlin. Miller does not see a deviant subculture arising from the inability of members of lower social strata to achieve success. Instead he explains crime in terms of the existence of a distinctive lower subculture.

Miller believes that lower class have had for centuries their own cultural traditions which differ significantly to those of higher strata. He claims that their values and ways of life which are passed on from generation to generation actively encourage lower class members to break the law. He describes six focal concerns of delinquent subcultures and these are:

- (a) trouble, arising from frequent conflict with teachers and police;

- (b) toughness, the value placed on physical size, strength, and athletic skills, especially among males. In practice this can lead to assault and battery in order to maintain a reputation for toughness;
- (c) smartness, the ability to succeed on the streets, to out think or “con” others, and to avoid being similarly taken advantage of;
- (d) excitement, the search for thrills, risk, or danger to gain needed release from a daily routine that is predictable and unsatisfying;
- (e) a concern with fate, derived from the lack of control these youths feel over their own lives;
- (f) lastly, autonomy, a desire for freedom often expressed as resentment toward figures of authority (Macionis, 1995:213).

It was Miller’s view that these six focal concerns either directly or indirectly leads to criminal behaviour patterns, especially violence and theft. These patterns are customary in lower-class subcultures, part of the way of life of the urban poor. They are seen as deviant by lower-class persons only in the sense that middle-class authorities define them as deviant and react to them with hostility and punishment.

Miller was essentially providing an alternative to the cultural support explanation of crime and delinquency provided by Sutherland, Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin. Cohen posited a subculture of crime set up outside lower-class who were thwarted in their striving for legitimate success goals. Miller argued in effect that there did not exist a separate criminal subculture. Rather, behaviour patterns which the middle-class defined as criminal were threaded through the subculture of the lower-class and were a functional part of lower-class everyday life (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990:44-45).

#### 2.5.4 **Subcultures of violence – Wolfgang and Ferracuti**

In the mid 1960s Marvin E Wolfgang, a sociologist, and Ferracuti (1967), a psychologist set forth a subcultural explanation of violent crime. This was really a return to Sutherland's position but confined to such forms of deviance as homicide and assault and, to a lesser extent, rape and robbery. The two researchers suggested that in some locales, certain neighbourhoods of urban areas, certain regions of a country, and certain countries, there existed bodies of customs, norms, and values that favoured violence as a solution to life problems. Individuals, especially males, learned and practised violence, that is, violent crime was seen as an institutionalized form of deviance. Violence was, in the Wolfgang-Ferracuti formulation, a customary form of response in certain social settings. A subculture of violence is characterized by a quick resort to physical combat as a measure of daring, courage, or defence of status appears to be a cultural expression, especially for lower socio-economic class males. When such a culture norm response is elicited from an individual engaged in social interplay with others who harbour the same response mechanism, physical assaults, altercations, and violent domestic quarrels that results in homicide are common.

Wolfgang and Ferracuti do not give sustained attention to how and why subcultures of violence develop. They do, however, suggest in passing that such subcultures are likely to arise when relative deprivation for economic goals is great, that is, in the lower socio-economic strata (Palmer & Humphrey, 1990:41-42).

#### 2.5.5 **Cultural Conflict – Thorstein Sellin**

Another approach has been that of Professor Thorstein Sellin in his concept of cultural conflict. It is obvious enough that the conflicting values of an immigrant and the society into which he comes may result quite directly in crime, but more serious, more subtle and persistent are the conflicts arising from the mutual assimilation of these different value systems, which weaken any sense of absolute values and produce conflicts within the individual himself. Moreover, it must be remembered that such interchange of ideas and

values is not produced only by immigration. Tarde had noted the influence of increased mobility and communications in feeding the ferment of change, in encouraging imitation, including the imitation of expansion of criminal ideas. Cultural interchange and cultural conflict of this type is a part of civilization and pervades the whole civilized world.

Conflict arising from industrialization and urbanization is another facet of culture conflict which has affected all progressing societies. It has been a conflict produced partly by the speed of social change, again uprooting people from familiar surroundings, leading them to question their old-established values. It may also be seen as a transition from a co-operative agricultural way of life, to a competitive industrial one. Durkheim pictured the primitive society as cohesive and co-operative, in contrast with the egoism and competition of life today. The impact of such a transition, even in modified form, must produce a conflict of values, must weaken the defences against crime (Radzinowicz, 1966:96-98).

These broad conceptions of anomie, social disorganization and cultural conflict, though different in their approach, have all suggested ways in which progressive societies, in the very process of expanding affluence, may also have expanded crime.

Studies by Cohen, Miller, Cloward and Ohlin and others have served to emphasize two things: the variety of social pressures upon groups and individuals and the variety of response made possible by the different opportunities and personalities of those concerned. The purely sociological approach yields to that of social psychology. Cohen pointed out that not all delinquent underprivileged boys used crime for material ends. Some were more concerned to reassert their status by reversing the middle-class values that had rejected them, by resorting to destruction and violence, by setting up groups which gave them prestige in their own chosen terms. Miller claimed that this same toughness was simply an exaggeration of qualities valued by the working class themselves, an expression of the boy's determination to be accepted as men. Cloward and Ohlin stressed a factor which had tended to be somewhat neglected, the factor of opportunity.

It might be true, they argued that these boys became delinquent because they were denied more legitimate outlets, but the form of their delinquency would depend on what illegitimate outlets were open to them. Thus in an area where adult criminals were well organized and criminal opportunities were open they were likely to become criminal gangs. In an area where such opportunities were poor they were more likely to develop fighting gangs, such as those referred to by Cohen.

The individual personality came in too: those who were unable, either because of their inhibitions or their disabilities, to take either of these kinds of opportunity, might drift into "retreatism" and become drug addicts. Anomie, or something very like it, might be the underlying social cause, but individuals would still be affected differently according to the opportunities presented by their environments and their individual ability to take them (Radzinowicz, 1966:98-99).

When Cloward and Ohlin speak of criminal opportunities they are thinking primarily of the chance to learn criminal attitudes and techniques. It seems, however, that in trying to account for crime in an affluent society we cannot ignore criminal opportunities in another sense, the sheer frequency with which situations present themselves which make crime both tempting and easy. To put it bluntly, there are far more goods to be stolen and their owners are far more careless with them. There are far more transactions and far more opportunities to cheat.

## 2.6 **SOCIAL CONTROL THEORIES**

Edward A. Ross (1866-1951) was the first to use the term social control, using it broadly to include "the moulding of the individual's feelings and desires to suit the needs of the group" (Ross, 1901). Here Ross refers to both informal relations - those moral nets again and supernatural beliefs, ceremonies, public opinion, art, and education. These cultural expressions maintain the normative structure of society in two ways:

- (1) by being the mechanisms through which society expresses its views over its members, and

(2) by prodding the member's conformity to the norms and values.

Ross' Contemporary, William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), took a similar position in *Folkways* (1960) stressing that "habits and customs that become regulative for succeeding generations very largely control individual and social undertaking".

Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929) noted how our very view of ourselves was like a looking glass that reflected others' views of us, along with our reactions, pride or shame to those opinions. George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) introduced the idea of significant others, those people whose opinions are most important in valuing our behaviour, typically our inmates, friends, and work partners. As their values influence us, they congeal into a generalized other, a social "conscience" created from the collective attitudes and expectations of society around us (Davis & Stasz, 1990:42-44).

Social control theorists, identify two forms of control: inner and outer. Inner control refers to those social norms and values which people internalize as their own. Inner control works because people experience satisfaction and balance when they behave consistently with internalized norms. Guilt, self reproach, and self-condemnation result when they violate them. From this view, deviance is a result of a failure or lack of moral socialization. Outer control refers to the presence or absence of social rewards and punishments in response to conformity or disobedience. The theory predicts the highest level of deviance among those who lack both inner and outer controls, and the lowest level among those who have both (David & Stasz, 1990:42).

Hirschi's (Siegel, 1989:198), *Causes of Delinquency*, presents both a statement of the theory and empirical support based on a sample of some 2000 high school boys in the San Francisco-Oakland area. The boys were asked to fill out questionnaires covering a variety of attitudes and behaviour, including crime. Race and social class did not seem to be important factors in delinquency. Hirschi asked himself the question: why do people obey social rules? His answer was that there is a social bond that ties us to society. "Control theory assumes that delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken". Hirschi specifies four

elements in the abstract concept of the social bond and measure each. Then he correlates the boy's scores on each element with their delinquency. The four elements of the social bond correspond with four levels of analysis: feeling (called affect - accent on the first syllable), cognition (based on rational calculation), behaviour, and belief or values (see table below) (Livingstone, 1996:389):

**Table 2.2: Elements of the Social Bond**

LEVEL	ELEMENT	DESCRIPTION
Affective	Attachment	Emotional closeness to family, peers, school
Cognitive	Commitment	Rational calculation of the costs of lawbreaking for future goals
Behaviour	Involvement	Time spent in conventional activities (e.g. homework)
Evaluative	Belief	Ideas that legitimize delinquency

**Source:** Livingstone, 1996:389

Hirschi, building on Durkheim's analysis of deviance, suggests that conformity arises from the four types of social control mentioned in the above table.

### 2.6.1 Attachment

The most important element of the social bond is the affective (emotional) component - what Hirschi called attachment. Strong social attachments to others encourage conformity, weak relationship in the family, peer group, and school leave people freer to engage in deviance.

### 2.6.2 Commitment

Commitment is the part of the social bond that involves a person's rational calculation of the costs and benefits of violating laws. Commitment links choices in the present to goals in the future. The higher one's commitment to legitimate opportunity, the greater the advantages of conformity. A young person bound for college, with good career prospects has a high stake in conformity. In contrast, someone with little confidence in

future success is more likely to drift towards deviance (Macionis, 1995:215).

### 2.6.3 **Involvement**

Involvement is the component at the social bond. Extensive involvement in legitimate activities - such as holding a job, going to school, and completing homework, or pursuing hobbies, inhibits deviance. People with little legitimate involvement - who simply "hang out" waiting for something to happen, have time and energy for deviant activity.

### 2.6.4 **Belief**

Belief refers to abstract ideas people hold about conventional authority, on the one hand, and crime, on the other. Conventional beliefs dampen the urge toward crime. Strong beliefs in conventional morality and respect for authority, figures also restrain tendencies toward deviance, people with weak beliefs are more vulnerable to temptations toward deviance (Macionis, 1995:213-215).

The variations in self-reported delinquency did not correlate much with differences of class, ethnicity or income, factors stressed heavily by strain and labelling theories, but did match those associated with social control, for example, children scoring highly on measures of communication and identification with their parents were significantly less involved in delinquency than those who scored less well in these respects. Two decades later, Hirschi felt sure enough of this approach to present it, with Gottfredson, as a general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Low self-control stemming from poor socialization in families and schools, and inconsistent monitoring and punishing of deviance, is viewed as the main common denominator in offending behaviour (Taylor, 1999:242-243).

Wilson and Herbert (1978), in a broadly similar study in England, developed a concept of 'chaperonage' to explain differences in delinquency between children from much the same background. In a carefully chosen sample of 56 socially deprived families, all of whom were poor, overcrowded and similarly circumstanced, striking differences in the delinquency of their

children correlated strongly with the extent to which the parents monitored their behaviours, for example, in accompanying them to and from school, setting play and bed times, and vetting children as companions. 'I blame the parents' was not, however, her conclusion, since the emotional costs involved in such chaperonage were too severe. She emphasized instead the priority of ending social deprivation. However, parental supervision, at least of young children, was seen as a 'neglected feature' of delinquency control.

Control theory also emerged well from an important study on the gender gap in offending behaviour. Hagan *et al.* (1979) used Hirschi's methods in Toronto to explore what they termed the 'sexual stratification of social control'. Boys and girls reported strikingly different experiences of parental supervision, encouragement to take risks and involvement in delinquency. In brief, boys were encouraged to take risks far more than girls and were more subject to lax parental controls. They were also far more likely to be involved in delinquency than girls. But these links held within as well as between genders, suggesting the causal significance of socialization for delinquency regardless of gender. Nevertheless, the major finding was that the informal social control of girls is far more intensive and extensive than that of boys, who as a result are more subject to formal social control by the police and the courts. These findings also confirm the importance of cultural definitions of masculinity in delinquency, which field studies have shown to be most powerfully associated with machismo, the overriding stress on the tough, arrogant, combative image of the male (Taylor, 1999:244).

Another theory in this vein links crime with changes in 'routine activities' (Felson, 1994). Opportunities for 'motivated offenders' to commit crime consists of 'suitable targets' and the absence of 'capable guardians', and the commonplace structures of social life can multiply such opportunities in unforeseen ways. For example, the huge increase in car ownership not only creates millions of fresh opportunities for car-related crime, but also makes it far easier for motivated offenders to travel rapidly and anonymously, the 'quick getaway' on a mass scale. Similarly, the growth of single person households and women working part time expands targets for residential burglary denuded of capable guardians. Such trends arguably increase the supply of motivated offenders, because rational offending is enhanced by easier gains for less risk.

Nye (1958), Briar and Piliavin (1965) suggest that because control theories emphasize an individual's bond to society, they look at the family as a source of or preventive to delinquency. After all, they say, most boys act delinquently at one time or other, but for only a minority does this delinquency become a primary focus of their everyday life. While peer groups can be powerful persuaders, even more powerful is the family that provides approval, love, protection, and material needs. A well-functioning family provides the outer controls that give the boy a stake in conforming to conventional norms.

One feature of inner controls that has attracted much interest is neutralization techniques. These are rationalizations or illogical excuses deviants make to account for their violation of values, norms, and laws (Sykes & Matza, 1957:644-670). That is, rule breakers often accept the rules, but bend them. A murderer may claim legal justification of her act on the basis of self-defence or insanity (Liska, 1981). Studies have uncovered five common forms of justification:

- (i) Denying responsibility: The deviant argues that external forces caused the act, as in "he made me to do it".
- (ii) Denial of injury: The deviant writes off the extent of harm suffered, as when a rapist claims "she was asking for it".
- (iii) Denying a victim: The deviant claims the victim deserves injury, as when youth engage in "gay bashing".
- (iv) Condemning the condemners: The deviant shifts attention to attack authority, as when vandals destroy campgrounds to attack the government.
- (v) Appeal to higher loyalties: The deviant rationalizes deviance as superior to conventional behaviour, as when the Rajneeshees in Oregon harassed township people to make them leave their area.

Not all control theorists agree that these techniques are motives for deviance. For example, Hirschi thinks delinquent boys talk with neutralizations after the fact, but believes the real impetus for their misbehaviour comes from their poor social bonds to conventional society. So the way people talk about their deviance may have little to do with the real reasons they broke the rules. Whether or not attitudes cause actions, has long been debated by sociologists (Davis & Stasz, 1990:42-43).

## 2.7

### 2.7.1 **Differential Association**

Edwin H Sutherland (a member of the Chicago School of American Sociology, associated with the University of Chicago) linked crime to what he called differential association (Sutherland, 1949). Sutherland rejected the idea that criminals were somehow abnormal or deficient. Crime, according to Sutherland, is not some nearly instinctive, unsocialized act. It is learned behaviour. Law-abiding behaviour, street crime, white-collar crime, they are all learned. Sutherland, coined the phrase, "white-collar crime" and was one of the first sociologists to study the topic. Sutherland begins the nine-point statement of his theory under the following:

- (1) Criminal behaviour is learned. Crime and deviance are learned in the same way as conventional behaviour.
- (2) Criminal behaviour is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
- (3) The principal part of the learning of criminal behaviour occurs within intimate personal groups. Sutherland emphasized the primary group as the chief source of social learning. Impersonal agencies of communication (e.g., films, newspapers, and other media) play a relatively unimportant part in the specific process of deviant learning.

- (4) When criminal behaviour is learned, the learning includes techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated and sometimes very simple, and the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Deviant attitudes and motives prepare the way for the movement into a deviant career.
- (5) the specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of legal codes as favourable and unfavourable. Values in modern society may be contradictory, conflicting, or ambiguous. Legal codes reflect value splits, and, for some groups, encourage positive attitudes toward breaking the law.
- (6) A person becomes deviant because of an excess of definitions of favourable to violation of law over definitions unfavourable to violation of law. This is the principle of differential association.
- (7) Differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
- (8) The process of learning criminal behaviour by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in other learning.
- (9) Although criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values, since non-criminal behaviour is an expression of the same needs and values (Linvington, 1996:355-356).

To understand crime, therefore, we must understand why that person sees that situation as an occasion for crime. However, in saying that criminals see things differently than

non-criminals, Sutherland does not mean that there is anything abnormal about them. Their thought processes have evolved in the same way as anyone else's. In other words, Sutherland, too, refuses to assume that the causes of crime must be evil or abnormal. Instead crime, like any other form of behaviour, is learned, and criminals are socialized into criminal life just as non-criminals are socialized into conventional ways of life.

### 2.7.2 **Labelling Theory**

One of the first sociologists to develop the labelling perspective was Edwin Lemert (1951, 1967).

Labelling theory begins by recognizing that no act is inherently criminal or non-criminal. The "badness" of an act does not stem from its intrinsic content, but from the way other people define and react to it (Van der Zanden, 1990:135).

Crime, therefore, is not just a matter of rule breaking but also of rule making and rule enforcement. In other words, crime is a joint product of the interaction of those who create and enforce the rules and those who break them.

Traditional criminology theories look at only one side of the interaction, the criminal. Labelling theory, in contrast, has usually focussed on law enforcers and law creators.

Becker who also made contributions to the labelling theory in his book, *Outsiders* (1973). *Outsiders* is one of the basic texts of the labelling approach, calls moral entrepreneurs. In it he argues that social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction constitute deviance (Cockerham, 1995:471).

They are in the business of making and enforcing morals, rules about what people should and should not do. By referring to the police, legislators, and reformers as moral entrepreneurs, Becker is taking an attitude of irony and skepticism toward the sorts of people and institutions that usually receive automatic and uncritical respect, not just from

the public but from other criminological theories as well. Law creators and law enforcers usually present themselves as working for the general good, as motivated by abstract principles of right and wrong, without regard to the particular interests of any one group. But the term entrepreneur implies that this enterprise brings them some profit. The profit need to be financial, it may be more abstract, perhaps the confirmation of one moral position over another.

The labelling theory questions both the motives and effects of these moral entrepreneurs. It does not take them at face value but looks for the discrepancies between what they do and what they say they do. For example, instead of accepting crime statistics as a true and objective measure of criminal behaviour, labelling theorists long ago pointed out that these numbers also depend on the behaviour of the police. This skepticism led to the many studies showing how crime statistics reflect not just crime but also the public relations interests of the police department, its routine procedures for handling complaints and arrests, and the general expectations and prejudices of police officers (Livington, 1996:379).

This skepticism and irony are basic to much of labelling theory. Even with law enforcement, labelling theory takes a somewhat ironic approach. It asks "What does law enforcement really do?" The official position of law enforcers is, of course, that they prevent crime. Indeed, sometimes they do. But often enforcing the law has unintended results, both for individuals and for crime in general. The criminal justice process is supposed to keep people from committing crime. However, labelling theory argues this process by defining the person as a criminal may push him or her towards crime rather than away from it. Other people will respond to the label rather than to other facts about the person, and this response will make it more difficult for the labelled person to move easily into non-criminal society.

People labelled deviant typically find themselves rejected and isolated by "law-abiding" people. Friends and relatives may withdraw from them. In some cases, they may even be institutionalized in prisons or mental hospitals. Rejection and isolation push

stigmatized individuals toward a deviant group with other individuals who share a common fate (Van der Zanden, 1990:135).

Some people reduce this idea to the oversimplified notion that labelling a person a criminal or homosexual will inevitably make the person become that label. This process is called the self-fulfilment prophecy since the prophecy (person X is a criminal) makes itself some true (person X then becomes a criminal because of the prophecy). It can happen, but labelling theory does not claim that it must happen. Labelling theory merely suggests that researchers explore this as one of a number of possible outcomes. These theories want to see exactly how the labelling process can work and what other factors can affect the outcome. People with enough money, power, status, or organizational support may be better able to resist the negative effects of labelling. For example, Richard Nixon's involvement in the Watergate Scandal ended his presidency. However, not long after his resignation, he was being treated much more like a statesman than as an unindicted conspirator in a series of crimes.

Some research in the labelling tradition looks closely at the criminal justice system itself, at police officers, lawyers, or prison workers, as thoroughly as other research has looked at criminals. Rather than accept the statements of officials, researchers investigate what people in the criminal justice system actually do. The police, for example, often do not arrest lawbreakers, officers have a great deal of discretion in responding to crimes. A labelling theorist would want to know just what determines whether a cop will make an arrest. A violation of law is only one of many factors influencing that decision. In fact, some times an officer may make an arrest even though the person has not broken the law, chiefly as a means of defusing a potentially explosive situation. Besides examining the enforcement of the law, labelling theory also has direct its attention to the creation of laws. If law enforcement is a process of human interaction, so is law making. Laws do not write themselves, they are created by people with a particular interest in having such laws passed.

In *Outsiders* (1973), Becker devoted some work to the history of the federal law, finally

passed in 1937, that outlawed marijuana. The law was not the result of some spontaneous and broad-based democratic sentiment against the drug. Instead, it could be traced to the efforts of only a few people in law enforcement agencies. They drafted legislation for congress, but more important, they also managed, through an influx of stories in the popular press, to create an exaggerated image of marijuana and its dangers. The point is not whether marijuana is more or less harmful than it was portrayed. More important is the general insight that moral entrepreneurs try to use the law, especially the criminal law, as a tool to promote their moral view of the world (Livington, 1996:380).

### 2.7.3 **A General Theory of Crime**

Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi (1990:169) point out that, "Societies differ in what they define as criminal, the popular forms of criminal behaviour are not the same from one society to another, and crime-control institutions take markedly different shapes across societies".

Gottfredson and Hirschi identify low self-control as the key variable associated with criminal behaviour, regardless of the type of crime or the culture in which it is committed. People with high self-control are less likely under all circumstances to commit crime, while people with low self-control are more likely to find themselves in some circumstances in which they will commit crime. Not everyone who has low self-control will become criminal, but such individuals have a decisively greater tendency in this regard than people who have high self-control and make conscious decision not to commit crimes.

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:15) define crimes as "acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit of self interest".

They identify the following characteristics of criminal acts:

- (1) Crime provide immediate gratification (people with low self-control have a "here and now" orientation).

- (2) Crime provide easy or simple gratification (i.e., money without work, sex without commitment).
- (3) Crime is exciting, risky, or thrilling (involves stealth, danger, speed, agility, deception or power).
- (4) Crime provides few long-term benefits (crime is not equivalent to a job or career, and it interferes with long-term commitments to job, marriage, family or friends).
- (5) Crime generally requires little skill or planning (cognitive, abilities and skills required for crime are often minimal, and extensive training is not necessary).
- (6) Crime results in pain or discomfort for the victim (people with low self-control tend to be self-centered, indifferent, or insensitive to the suffering and needs of others).

Gottfredson and Hirschi therefore claim that people with low self-control are likely to commit criminal acts if they are impulsive, insensitive, risk takers, shortsighted, nonverbal, and typically favour physical rather than mental solutions to problems and difficulties in their lives. In their pursuit of pleasure or relief from momentary irritation, they will do non-criminal things like smoke, gamble, drink to excess, and have indiscriminate sex, their self-centeredness also tends to make them poor spouses, friends, or employees. As such people live their lives, state Gottfredson and Hirschi, they are thrust into situations where their lack of self-control pushes them toward a criminal act (Cockerham, 1995:444).

The major cause of low self-control leading to a greater propensity toward crime, in Gottfredson and Hirschi's view, is ineffective child rearing. They note that many connections between family situations and delinquency, like a lack of discipline,

supervision, and affection in the homes of delinquents. Moreover, the behaviour of parents can be a factor if it involves excessive drinking and other forms of heightened self-gratification and lack of warmth toward their children, along with little or no supervision. Perhaps the parents have a criminal record themselves. They feel that most people are sufficiently socialized by their families to avoid involvement in criminal acts, others learn self-control in the schools.

However, parents do not always work with school personnel to reduce truancy and disruptive behaviour by their children. Still, even without parental support, Gottfredson and Hirschi believe that the net effect of school should be positive. A major predictor of crime, in their view, is not liking school, which is consistent with studies of delinquency. Thus, the person who emerges from family and schooling with a low degree of self-control is more likely than his or her counterpart with high self-control to commit a crime.

There are, of course, other causes of crime, including peer pressure, economic living conditions, and a lack of opportunity to do anything else. However, not everyone confronted with such circumstances responds by committing crimes. What Gottfredson and Hirschi accomplish with their theory is to explain why some people become criminals and others do not. The key difference appears to be the shortsighted pursuit of self-interest and an absence of the self-control that causes people to feel concerned about the consequences of their acts. A person can have a high disadvantaged life situation and not become a criminal. Conversely, another person may have many advantages in life, such as plenty of money or a good education, yet still commit robbery or murder (Cockerham, 1995:446).

#### 2.7.4 **Symbolic Interactionism**

According to Herbert Blumer, symbolic interactionism rests on three premises:

- (1) The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of

the meanings that the things have for them.

- (2) The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows.
- (3) The third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters (Blumer, 1969:2).

As far as the study of crime is concerned, the first premise entails the view that whether a given act is criminal or not depends on the meanings which are attributed to it. Acts are not criminal in themselves, their criminality is a property or meaning conferred upon them (Erikson, 1962). From a symbolic interactionist point of view, crime is a matter of social definition. The second premise, means that these conferred meanings arise interactionally whether in interaction with others or with oneself. Thus, in the course of direct social interaction persons may construe each others behaviour as criminal. Similarly, in the process of self interaction a person may take the standpoint of others towards his or her behaviour and thereby identify it as criminal.

The third premise means that what a particular meaning is conferred or construed depends upon how the act is interpreted by the parties to the interaction. This also implies that how an act is interpreted depends on how the interactional setting or situation is defined by participants. Interactionists have paid particular attention to the face-to-face situational and organizational aspects of the contexts of symbolic interaction.

In accordance with these premises symbolic interactionist studies of crime focus on the examination of the processes and contexts of social interaction whereby and in which:

- (1) certain forms of behaviour become prohibited by criminal law, that is, the process of crime definition through legislation;

- (2) certain acts and persons become subject to law enforcement, that is, the process of crime selection by the police;
- (3) certain acts and persons become fitted with the label “criminal”, that is, the process of crime interpretation by the courts;
- (4) criminal identity is developed, maintained and transformed.

Symbolic interactionists have conducted ethnographic studies of the social organization and meaning of ‘crime’ as far as those who engage in it are concerned. Dating back to the work of the Chicago School of Sociology, such studies have produced a wealth of ethnographic sociological literature in the fields of crime and deviance from, for example, Anderson (1923) through Whyte (1943), Carey (1968), Adler (1985) to Prus and Sharper (1991).

## 2.8 **CONFLICT THEORIES**

Merton’s structural strain theory emphasizes that legitimate means are not equally available to all; conflict theory focus on this point. Lower-class persons, women, and many ethnic minorities simply do not have the same degree of access to the means of success as the more affluent. Access to legitimate means is, therefore, a valued resource over which there is conflict. Conflict theory also stresses that those who hold power are also able to define success goals, as well as legitimate and illegitimate means, in ways that favour them. It further assumes that the economic system of capitalism is responsible for the class divisions within a society. The norms which define deviance are, conflict theorists argue, those of the powerful. Laws and their enforcement emphasize the illegality of activities which are offensive to the morality of the privileged classes and which threaten their property and affluence. Stated less stridently, the laws and their enforcement are greatly influenced by the distribution of power and privilege. Poor people who are more likely to steal, use drugs, and carry weapons must confront strict laws against them and harsh enforcement of these laws compared to affluent people who commit white-collar and corporate crimes like embezzlement, industrial pollution, health and safety violations, consumer fraud, election fraud, political dirty tricks, stock manipulation, and the like.

And the more powerful can enlist the support of the broad middle class to support them. Indeed, by focussing enforcement energies on the crimes of the poor, there is less enforcement of those crimes committed by the non-poor, thereby enabling the rich to “get away” with their forms of crime (Turner, 1994:196).

Tucker (1978:70) states that this greed, self interest and hostility generated by the capitalist system, motivate many crimes at all levels of society. The dehumanization that is perpetuated by the ruling class shows the background to the causes that makes people to be antisocial. This opens the doors for hatred of one man from another man. Marx further stated that man no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions - eating, drinking, procreating or at most in his dwelling and dressing up, etc., and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal. Marx called this “alienation”.

Most crimes therefore share a single important similarity. They represent rational responses to the competitiveness and inequality of life in capitalist society.

### 2.8.1 **Power Theory: Thio**

Alex Thio (1978) outlined his power theory of negative deviance. This theory attempts a broader explanation than Quinney’s social reality theory of crime, since it applies to a wider range of deviance than crime and to societies everywhere, not only capitalistic and totalitarian societies. Thio contends that life is always unequal, that all do not possess the same power, that is, all are not equally able to control the behaviour of others.

Thio sets forth three propositions:

- (a) “The more power people have, the more likely they will engage in lower-consensus deviance, the less serious, more profitable, or more sophisticated type of deviance with lower probability of being labelled deviant”. Lower consensus deviance is that which

has relatively little societal-wide recognition as serious negative behaviour. The powerful control to a considerable degree which behaviours gain widespread recognition as seriously negative and as punishable. Thus, they arrange to have less consensus about the more profitable forms of deviance. These forms are less often punished and if they are, they are punished less harshly. Conversely, the powerful arrange to have more consensus about the less profitable forms of deviance. Thus higher-consensus deviance, which tends to be harshly punished, is left to the powerless (Humphrey, 1990:47).

- (b) "It is more likely that the powerful will engage in lower-consensus deviance than the powerless will commit higher-consensus deviance". That is, the powerful are more seriously negatively deviant, more criminal, than the powerless. The powerful, Thio reasons, have more opportunities, the range of possibilities for negative deviance is greater. It is easier for example, for a businessman to defraud his customers or the revenue service than it is for a lower-class person to rob a bank.

Also, the powerful have a greater likelihood of feeling subjectively deprived than the powerless. The powerful person's goals are virtually unlimited.

Thio contends that, "The more power one has, the higher one's aspirations are, and the greater one's subjective deprivation is". The powerless, in contrast, do not expect much. Further, there are fewer social controls on the powerful. They are less vulnerable to exposure and punishment than the powerless and this encourages them in their negative deviance.

- (c) “Deviance by the powerful induces deviance by the powerless that, in turn, contributes to deviance by the powerful”. In brief, the powerful influence the powerless to be deviant by leading them into illegal activities, by setting poor examples, and by reinforcing inequality in the society. The powerless aid and abet the negative deviance of the powerful by an unwillingness to prosecute them for their crimes. Agents of social control, being the tool of the powerful, are themselves without power and fear losing their jobs if they prosecute the powerful. The fact that the powerless commit “heinous” crimes makes the powerful self-righteous and tolerant of their own deviance. The powerless direct their criminal activities against themselves. The poor are largely the victims of violence and theft by the poor. This only compounds their oppression and perpetuates inequality, contends Thio (Humphrey, 1990:47-48).

### 2.8.2 **Political Conflict: Quinney**

Richard Quinney (1974, 1977, 1979) presented his social reality theory of crime. This went further than previous formulations in attempting to show that political and class power factors were the root explanations of crime. Quinney’s control thesis was that the politically powerful created one form of negative deviance, crime and gave it its “social reality” as a means of social control. He extended Marxism in his analysis of criminal law as being an instrument of social control.

His major propositions are:

- (a) Criminal law is an instrument of the state and ruling class to sustain and perpetuate the existing social and economic order.
- (b) Crime control in capitalist society is accomplished through a variety of institutions and agencies established and administered

by a governing elite namely, officials representing ruling class namely, private property interests.

- (c) The contradictions of advanced capitalism require that the subordinate classes remain oppressed by whatever means necessary, but especially through the coercion of the law.

In a strong expression of his view, Quinney argues:

The legal system provides the mechanisms for the forceful and violent control of the rest of the population. In the course of battle, the agents of the law (police, prosecutors, judges and so on) serve as the military force for the protection of domestic order... In other words, the military abroad and law enforcement at home are two sides of the same phenomenon: the preservation of the interests of the ruling class (1974:136-138).

Quinney's propositions emphasize that the law, media, welfare system and state agencies combine to control the underclass. They typically accomplish this through complex and frustrating bureaucracies. When this administration fails, control agents will resort to violence.

Conflict theorists also remind us that those who carry out the rules are seldom the ones in power or the ones who make them. For example, the police, they swear to uphold the enforcement of the laws, but not all the laws are enforceable equally all the time. Just which laws are observed in which parts of the cities depends upon the top officials of the city and police department. When a precinct has a reputation for roughing up minorities during arrests, someone higher up is tacitly okaying this behaviour. Similarly, a social case worker may know she could be more effective by taking an individualized approach to her clients, but the city requires instead that she fill out identical paperwork for all cases.

Conflict theorists thus suggest the labelling researchers are wrong to spend too much

time on these middle-level functionaries. Rather than point to the police or social workers as the bad guys, it is more important to address those who set the direction for implementing abusive and dehumanizing treatment of minorities or welfare women (Davids & Stasz, 1990:47-49).

Having discussed the work of key thinkers on crime, we will now examine the work of some key theories of unemployment.

## 2.9 THE CLASSICAL AND KEYNESIAN VIEWS OF UNEMPLOYMENT

South Africa is currently experiencing an unemployment crisis of devastating proportions. A lot has been said and written about the crisis, but little has been done to find the possible solutions to the problem of unemployment.


Various theories have been developed to try and explain the existence of unemployment. These theories enjoy varying degrees of empirical and intellectual support. The classical and Keynesian views of unemployment will be discussed below, as well as other general theories of unemployment.

The economic theory of unemployment which John Maynard Keynes attacked is termed the 'classical' theory. Keynes lumped together as classical economists all those who accepted Say's law. This theory explained unemployment in terms of rigid money wages. When unemployment was high, wages were expected to fall inducing employers to hire additional workers until all those who wished to have jobs at lower wages had them. Since it was argued that reductions in wages would restore full employment, then the reason for prolonged periods of joblessness must be the failure of money wages to fall, for example, as a result of trade union pressure. The appropriate policy to reduce unemployment according to this analysis was to cut wages.

According to the classical theory the equilibrium real wage for labour is determined by the intersection of labour supply and demand. In Figure 2.1 on page 63, units of labour are shown on the horizontal axis and the real wage on the vertical axis. The real wage is the ratio of money

wages,  $W$ , to prices,  $P$ . If money wages rise while prices remain unchanged, then the real wage will increase. If prices rise and money wages remain unchanged then the real wage will fall. Basically, the real wage is a measure of the quantity of goods and services that the money wage will buy.

**Figure 2.1: The Labour Market**



Source: Glaister *et al.* (1987)

In Figure 2.1 the labour demand curve  $D_L$  slopes downwards in accordance with the marginal productivity theory and is the marginal revenue productivity curve of labour for the economy. The supply of labour  $S_L$  is upward sloping showing that more units of labour will be supplied as the real wage rises. Equilibrium in the labour market is shown at point E with a real wage of  $(W/P)_E$  and where  $L_E$  units of labour are supplied and demanded. This is assumed to be the full employment equilibrium as all labour wishing to work at real wage  $(W/P)_E$  is being hired.

If, for some reason, the real wage was above the equilibrium level of  $(W/P)_E$ , for example at  $(W/P)_1$ , then the demand for labour would be shown by point A on the demand curve, indicating  $L_1$  units of labour would be demanded. At the higher real wage rate more units of labour would be supplied shown by point B on the supply curve, indicating that  $L_2$  units of

labour would be supplied. With a real wage of  $(W/P)_1$ , there is an excess supply of labour shown by the distance AB which mean that  $L_2-L_1$  units of labour will be unemployed. If however, the real wage were allowed to fall, say by cutting money wages, then full employment could be restored. A fall in real wages would cause the demand for labour to increase, as there would be a movement down the demand curve, while at the same time fewer units of labour would be supplied as there would be a movement down the supply curve. The combined effect is to reduce the excess supply of labour and with a sufficient fall in the real wage, the labour market will return to the equilibrium point E, where  $L_E$  units of labour are employed. The classical economists believed that if workers would let their real wages fall, from  $(W/P)_E$  in Figure 2.1, then full employment would be reached. The level of unemployment shown by  $L_2-L_1$ , would only be temporary and would be removed quickly if real wages fell rapidly.

This view of unemployment, which concentrates solely on the workings of the labour market as an explanation of unemployment, was criticized by Keynes in his book 'The general theory of employment, interest and money', in which he provided a macroeconomic explanation of the causes of unemployment. According to Keynes, wage cuts could not be expected to lower unemployment because reductions in money wages throughout the economy would produce equivalent declines in prices. If money wages fell by 10% so too, Keynes argued, would prices because changes in wages can be assumed to have a proportionate effect on changes in prices in the short run. An employer whose workers accepted 10% less pay would find his costs reduced by almost 10% so allowing him to lower prices in the hope of obtaining additional sales. If all employers acted in this way, prices would fall by 10%. As the real wage shows the ratio of money wages to prices in the economy, if money wages fall by 10% and this causes prices to fall by 10%, it follows that the real wage remains unchanged. If, at real wage  $(W/P)_1$ , shows in Figure 2.1, a given percentage change in money wages is followed by the same percentage change in prices then the real wage level will remain at  $(W/P)_1$ , so providing no incentive for expanding employment, and so the level of unemployment will remain unaltered.

Having shown that rigid money wages were not the cause of unemployment, Keynes turned to an explanation in terms of a failure of the economy to generate sufficient demand for output. According to this argument, unemployment stems from a general failure of consumers, business

and government to purchase enough goods and services to generate sufficient demand to employ all the labour that is available at the prevailing rates of pay. So when there is inadequate aggregate demand, the demand for output is below the level needed to create the number of jobs for full employment. Moreover, the classical economists' policy prescription of cutting money wages would only exacerbate the situation, as this would leave workers with less purchasing power and further reduce the level of aggregate demand.

Keynes argued that an important cause of the cyclical movements in aggregate demand was the swings in investment spending by businesses. A lack of private investment spending would depress the general level of aggregate demand if there were not an offsetting increase in demand from other sectors, for example, the government.

### 2.9.1 **The distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment**

Workers are voluntarily unemployed when they have been offered a job that they could fill but they prefer to look for a job at a higher wage (or more job satisfaction) rather than accept the offer. Workers are involuntarily unemployed when they would be willing to accept a job for which they are qualified at the current wage (or below it) but are unable to find any such job.

These definitions are relevant in considering the difference between the classical economists' and Keynes' views on unemployment. We have seen in Figure 2.1, that at a real wage of  $(W/P)$ , the resulting level of unemployment  $L_2 - L_1$ , was considered by the classical economists to be a temporary phenomenon. Provided the real wage was allowed to fall, equilibrium employment would be reached with  $L_2$  units of labour employed, and unemployed would be eradicated. If though, there were impediments and frictions which prevented the real wage from falling, for example, workers refusing to allow their money wages to be reduced, the level of unemployment would persist. In this situation the classical economists viewed the unemployment as being voluntary as it resulted from the unwillingness of workers to accept a lower money (and real) wage. According to this view the unemployed are preventing themselves from gaining

employment due to their resistance to wage cuts. The unemployment  $L_2 - L_1$  is voluntary in that it would be eliminated if the workers would allow their real wage to fall to  $(W/P)_E$ .

Keynes countered this argument by maintaining that workers are prepared to accept a fall in real wages when it is brought about by a rise in prices relative to wages. If money wages are fixed but prices rise, the real wage will fall stimulating an increase in the demand for labour. As money wages are unchanged, workers will be prepared to accept the job offer even though their real wages have declined. According to this argument, the unemployment  $L_2 - L_1$  in Figure 2.1 is deemed to be involuntary as workers are prepared to accept job offers at lower real wages, if such offers are made to them at unchanged money rates.

Why might workers accept a cut in real wages through a rise in prices but not accept a fall in real wages by a reduction in money wages? There are two main reasons.

- Groups of workers, when they negotiate their money wage rates, are concerned not only with the absolute level of their wages but also with the level of their wages relative to other groups of workers. An increase in prices will reduce the real wage of all groups of workers in the economy and will not affect relativities between different groups. If money wage cuts are accepted by one particular group of workers, they do not know that similar cuts will be followed by other groups. By accepting money wage cuts the pattern of relativities with other groups of workers will have been destroyed, and for this reason money wage cuts will be resisted.
- Keynes argued that workers negotiated for money wages not real wages and hence suffered from money illusion, i.e., workers bargain for monetary magnitudes without reference to past changes in prices. So, even though prices may rise and thereby

reduce the real wage, workers will still be prepared to accept jobs at unchanged money wages.

This analysis implies that unemployment can be reduced (and is therefore involuntary) by pushing up prices enough to reduce the real wage to the equilibrium level. It follows that whenever an increase in aggregate demand successfully reduces unemployment, the unemployment must have been involuntary. In terms of Figure 2.1, unemployment  $L_2 - L_1$  is currently involuntary and workers will remain unemployed at current levels of aggregate demand. Only when aggregate demand has risen sufficiently to reduce the real wage to  $(W/P)_E$  through price rises will unemployment be eradicated.

The notion that increases in aggregate demand cause prices to rise as well as unemployment to fall implies that there is a relationship between the price level and the level of unemployment. This relationship is the subject of much controversy and debate, especially with regard to the degree of choice that may exist between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment.

The reason for discussing the views of the classical economist and the Keynesian perspective on unemployment is to investigate in this research how government legislation on minimum wages in South Africa has contributed to the rate of unemployment and the consequences of unemployment on the rate of crime.


### 2.9.2 **The unemployment – inflation trade-off**

The basic problem which is central to modern economic policy making is the conflict between high levels of employment and stable prices. Up until the end of the 1960s it was generally believed that there was a stable relationship between the level of unemployment and the rate of price increase. This relationship is characterised by the Phillips curve, named after AW Phillips who first showed a statistical relationship between the rate of wage increases and the level of unemployment. As there is a close relationship between changes in wages and changes in prices, the statistical relationship

discovered by Phillips between wages and unemployment also holds between prices and unemployment.

The Phillips curve relationship between prices and unemployment is shown in Figure 2.2. This shows that when the unemployment rate is low the rate of inflation will be high, while if unemployment increases this will slow down the rate of inflation. This relationship can be viewed as follows.

**Figure 2.2: The Phillips Curve**



*Source: Glaister et al. (1987)*

An increase in aggregate demand will lead to an increase in the demand for goods and services in individual product markets, firms will experience an increase in sales and the price of their products will be bid up. To try and meet the increase in the demand for their output firms will hire more workers which will push up wage rates. These higher wage rates may be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. Thus an increase in aggregate demand causes unemployment to fall and prices to rise. The reverse process applies with a reduction in aggregate demand. Firms will find it more difficult to sell their products so price rises will slow down, workers will be laid off and, with a reduced demand for labour, wage rises will slow down also.

As noted above, during the 1960s, economic policy makers believed that they faced a stable, unchanging Phillips curve which presented them with a policy dilemma. There was a conflict between low levels of unemployment and price stability. By manipulating aggregate demand, policy makers believed that they could move the economy along the Phillips curve, but they faced an unpleasant choice. By stimulating aggregate demand they could reduce unemployment and move the economy, for example, from point A to point B, but this would mean a higher rate of inflation. On the other hand, they could depress aggregate demand so reducing the level of employment and move the economy from point B towards point A, at the same time lowering the rate of inflation.

The Phillips curve explained the course of inflation in South Africa in the sixties (at which time the Phillips curve was also at its most popular). However, by the early seventies the inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment, as illustrated by the curve, no longer existed, due to the 1973 oil crisis which had caused stagflation for the first time. Stagflation is a condition of rising unemployment and rising inflation.


Many economists maintain that the Phillips relationship could exist in the short term, but that it would be unstable. According to this view, the curve shifts in the short term, and the trade-off between variables disappear in the long-term (Mohr, 1988:17). The long-term trade off between inflation and unemployment is important to policy makers, because of its influence on the effectiveness of measures aimed at countering unemployment and inflation.

### 2.9.3 **The 'full employment' level of unemployment**

In discussing the arguments of the classical economists and Keynes' views on them, mention was made several times of 'full employment'. Care must be taken over the use of this term, however, and it is important to note that it is not a zero rate of unemployment. Figure 2.3 shows a Phillips curve labelled  $P_1$  (ignore the curve labelled  $P_2$  for the moment). If the government is prepared to accept a rate of inflation of  $\pi\%$ ,

then the government's preferred position for the economy will be at point X on  $P_1$ , with unemployment of  $b$ . If initially the unemployment rate is  $a$  with a zero rate of inflation, then policy makers will be prepared to increase the aggregate demand, so reducing unemployment, even though this causes an increase in prices, until the economy reaches point X. At this point the limit of the government's tolerance of inflation of  $i\%$  is met, with an unemployment level of  $b$ . Unemployment  $b-a$  may be thought of as demand-deficient unemployment. The government is not prepared to increase aggregate demand and reduce unemployment further as this would mean a rate of inflation greater than it is prepared to accept.

**Figure 2.3: The Phillips Curve (2)**



Source: Glaister *et al.* (1987)

Unemployment can only be further reduced while maintaining an inflation rate of  $i\%$ , if it is possible to shift the Phillips curve to the left. If there is a poor match in the structure of the demand for, and the supply of, labour, i.e., structural unemployment exists (perhaps due to differences in the skill requirements of employers and the skills available from workers or to the immobility of the work force), it may be possible through retraining to produce a better match of firms' demands and individuals' supplies of skills,

thereby improving the structure of the labour market. This will lead to a new Phillips curve shown as  $P_2$  in Figure 2.3, with the economy now at point  $Y$ . By maintaining a rate of inflation acceptable to the government at  $i\%$ , the unemployment level is now reduced to  $d$ , which implies that  $b-d$  is a measure of structural unemployment.

There remains a level of unemployment  $d$  which is largely frictional unemployment. There will always be a group of workers who will spend a short time searching for jobs, for example, new entrants to the labour market or individuals who spend a short period of unemployment moving between jobs. With a free labour market where individuals are at liberty to change jobs, it is not possible or even desirable to eliminate frictional unemployment completely. However, measures to improve information flows, which help to reduce the time necessary to find a job (for example Job Centers), are desirable. A level of unemployment  $d$  would then represent a full employment level of unemployment. It should be noted though that given the unemployment-inflation trade-off shown by the Phillips curve  $P_2$ , the full employment level is fundamentally a matter for policy makers. If the government changes its belief about what it regards as an acceptable level of inflation then the full employment level will shift accordingly. If an inflation rate of  $p\%$  is now considered to be unacceptable and the government chooses to depress aggregate demand the economy will move towards  $c$  on  $P_2$ . According to this analysis then, the full employment level is politically determined.


#### 2.9.4 **The monetarist view and the 'natural' rate of unemployment**

Whether policy makers in fact have a choice in the trade-off between unemployment and inflation has been questioned, especially by monetary economists such as Professor Milton Friedman. They introduce the notion of expectations into the analysis and argue that in the long run the Phillips curve is vertical such that no matter what rate of inflation policy makers may choose as an objective, the rate of unemployment will be the same. This rate of unemployment is termed the 'natural' rate; it represents the amount of structural and frictional unemployment which is left in the economy when supply and demand are in balance.

It is argued that in the long run the government cannot maintain a level of unemployment below the natural rate and if it attempts to do so inflation will accelerate. This argument can be developed using Figure 2.4. In the short run there is a number of Phillips curves, one for each expected rate of inflation. Workers will base their behaviour on what they expect the rate of inflation to be, as the rate of inflation affects the value of the real wage. It can be assumed, then, that the expected rate of inflation will affect the determination of money wages, as the greater the expected rate of inflation, the greater the increase in money wages workers would demand in order to preserve the value of their real wage.

Assume that the economy is at point A where there is a zero rate of inflation and people have expectations of price stability shown by the short-run Phillips curve,  $P_e = 0$ . Point A shows the natural rate of unemployment  $U_N$ , and represents labour market equilibrium in that all those individuals wishing to work at the prevailing level of real wages have jobs. Those individuals unemployed at  $U_N$  will be searching for jobs at a higher level of real wages.

**Figure 2.4: Phillips Curve**



Source: Glaister et al. (1987)

If at point A the government believes that the unemployment rate is too high and that a rate of  $m$  is preferable, they could expand aggregate demand and move the economy towards point B. This increase in aggregate demand will cause prices to rise, which lowers the real wage and so induces employers to expand output and employment. Unemployed workers will be prepared to accept jobs as they will see their money wages rising through the increased demand for labour. At the same time they have expectations of a zero rate of price inflation and so believe that their real wages are also rising. Eventually though, workers who have accepted jobs will come to realise that prices have in fact risen and they have over-estimated the value of their real wage. At point B prices are rising at 10% per annum, which is 10% faster than workers had anticipated. If workers form then expectations on the basis of current and past behaviour of prices, they will begin to anticipate the 10% rate of inflation. Workers will come to expect a 10% rate of inflation and the short-run Phillips curve will shift to the right, shown by the curve  $P_e=10$ .

Unlike Keynes, the monetarists assume that people have no money illusion. According to this argument, workers are not interested in wages measured in pounds and pence, but in what their wage will buy in real terms. In order to maintain the real wage at the same level as at point A (Figure 2.4), wages now need to increase by 10% to match current and expected price increases. At point A the labour market was in equilibrium. By stimulating aggregate demand, the government fooled the unemployed into believing that the real wage had risen and it was therefore worthwhile accepting a job offer. As workers come to realise that the real wage has not risen they will quit their jobs and search for others at a higher real wage. In adjusting to the real situation the economy may be viewed as moving to point C. Wages and prices will now rise in line with expectations. Unemployment will have returned to the original level of  $U_N$ , but now prices are rising by 10%.

If the government again attempts to reduce the rate of unemployment to  $U_1$  by stimulating aggregate demand further, this will involve a movement along the short-run Phillips curve  $P_e=10$ , i.e., from point C towards point D. This time workers would be at

10% per annum. They soon come to realise, however, that prices are rising faster than this and the value of the real wage is falling. At point D (Figure 2.4) where the government has again reduced unemployment to  $U_1$ , a rate of inflation of 20% comes to be anticipated and workers will demand wage increases of the same amount in order to preserve the value of their real wage. Again there will be a shift to the right of the short-run Phillips curve, shown by  $P_{\epsilon}=20$ , with the economy moving from point D to point E. The economy again has a rate of unemployment of  $UN$  but now the inflation rate is 20%.

Despite attempts by the governments to reduce unemployment below  $UN$  it has been unsuccessful. According to monetarist argument, it is futile of the government to attempt to hold unemployment below this rate, all that will happen is that inflation will accelerate and the economy will eventually return to the natural rate. In the long run, the Phillips curve is a vertical line through the natural rate of unemployment. This means that there is no choice of a trade-off between unemployment and inflation in the long run. The government must accept the natural rate of unemployment at  $UN$  and the only choice the government has is in the rate of inflation. Any constant rate of inflation is possible at the natural rate of unemployment. The policy prescription, Therefore, is that the government should not interfere in the economy by using fiscal or monetary policy to reduce unemployment below the natural rate, but should adopt a policy of steady but slow growth in the money supply to control the rate of inflation.

As an exercise, you may care to work through the consequences of attempting to reduce the rate of inflation from 20%. What will happen to the unemployment rate if government attempts to move the economy from point E point C in Figure 2.4, by reducing aggregate demand?

For the monetarists, the natural rate of unemployment is the full employment rate. A basic question arises, however: what rate of unemployment is the 'natural' rate? This question has not been answered particularly clearly. Professor Friedman has argued that it is not a constant but depends on a number of factors which are liable to change, for example

the degree of occupational and geographic immobility, the extent of trade union restrictive practices and the flow of information about job opportunities. Presumably by reducing the degree of imperfection in the labour market, by establishing an efficient system of information flows, increased geographical and occupational mobility (e.g., with retraining), and with a co-operative work force, the natural rate of unemployment can be reduced. This requires a policy which places less emphasis on aggregate demand management which is the crux of Keynesian policy, and directs attention instead to factors which will improve the competitive structure of the labour market.

### 2.9.5 **General theory of unemployment**

General theories of unemployment can be broadly split into main branches: duration theories and insider-outsider theories. Duration theories revolve around the notion that as one is unemployed for longer and longer periods of time. For example, when  $U_t > U_{nt}$  (where  $U_t$  is unemployment at time  $t$  and  $U_{nt}$  is the natural rate of unemployment at time  $t$ ) one's 'human capital' tends to diminish. In other words, individuals who are unemployed for long periods of time tend to lose their skills, and those skills that they retain often become outdated. The net result is continued unemployment for those in this situation, unless their skills are updated through training provided prior to them continuing to seek employment. This is relevant to South Africa, as there are many people who have been unemployed for a long period of time. Wittenberg (1988) notes that approximately half of the black people who are strictly unemployed at age 30 have been jobless for longer than three years. Over such long periods of time, their human capital may have diminished and technology may have advanced and outpaced them.

Insider-outsider models attempt to explain the existence of involuntary unemployment. Such models were developed by a series of contributions by Lindbeck and Snower between 1985 and 1988. They argued that the main source of insider (the employed) power is high turnover costs of hiring and firing by firms. Unions compounded these problems by enhancing the power of the insiders and raising the turnover costs of firms,

e.g., by threatening to strike. This then leads to involuntary unemployment. This model may be relevant to South Africa as unions are strong and their numbers are increasing.

The payment of efficiency wages is another theory put forward to explain non-clearing labour markets. Firms pay wages above the market-clearing level to motivate their workers and to increase the costs to the worker of shirking. The consequence of shirking-being fired- is more severe when wages are above the market-clearing rate. Employers also try to minimize the impact of adverse selection through efficiency wages. Higher than market clearing wages tend to attract highly qualified people and serve to sift out 'wheat from the chaff and minimize the information asymmetry (Joshua Jackson).

#### 2.5.10 **The search theory of unemployment**

The theory starts with the assumption that workers have different skills and that jobs have different skill requirements. Workers need to find well-paying, desirable jobs, while firms need to find the most productive workers. Neither firms nor workers have all the information they need about the options available to them, so they must engage in search. Since search is costly and time-consuming, both firms and workers must use some of their resources to find a good match.

Workers are assumed to search only when they are unemployed. They face an uncertain environment (just as firms do). When a worker gets a wage offer, for instance, she must decide whether to accept it or continue searching for a better offer. Accepting the offer means forgoing the chance of a higher wage offer later, while continuing the search means losing the wages she would have earned if she had accepted the offer and started working. The wage at which the worker is indifferent between continuing the search and accepting the current job is called the reservation wage. The worker accepts all job offers above this wage and turns down all offers below it. When a search is successful, that is, when there is a match between the needs of the worker and the firm, the worker leaves unemployment. However, existing matches sometimes fall apart, which leads to the worker becoming unemployed. However, existing matches

sometimes fall apart, which leads to the worker becoming unemployed. At the equilibrium unemployment rate, the number of workers leaving unemployment equals the number of workers becoming unemployed (Economic Letter, Vol. 2001, Trehan, Bharat).

Having discussed some key theories of unemployment, we will now examine some empirical studies on crime and unemployment both nationally and internationally.

## 2.10 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT

### 2.10.1 The Labour Force Survey (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa in September 2001

The LFS is a twice -yearly rotating panel household survey, specifically designed to measure the dynamics of employment and unemployment in the country. It measures a variety of issues related to the labour market, including employment rates, according to standard definitions of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Statistics South Africa conducts experiments on using a rotating panel methodology to collect labour force statistics. A rotating panel sample involves visiting the same dwelling units on a number of occasions (five at most).

The first pilot round of Labour Force Survey fieldwork took place in February 2000, based on a probability sample of 10 000 dwelling units. The sample was increased to 30 000 dwelling units. The present survey gives the findings from the fourth round of the LFS, which took place in September 2001, when a new sample of 30 000 dwelling units were visited.

<b>Table 2.5: The Labour Market in September 2001</b>		(000s)
a	Total employed	10 833
b	Total unemployed	4 525
c	Total economically active = a + b	15 358
d	Total not economically active	12 006
e	Total aged 15 – 65 years = c – d	27 365
f	Official unemployment rate = $b \cdot 100/c$	29,5%
g	Labour market participation rate = $c \cdot 100/e$	56,1%
h	Labour absorption rate = $a \cdot 100/e$	39,6%

**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210

Table 5.2 shows that, in September 2001, there were an estimated 27,4 million people aged between 15 and 65 years. Among these people:

- 15,4 million were economically active, of whom
  - # 10,8 million were employed and
  - # 4,5 million were unemployed.
  
- In addition, 12,0 million were not economically active, of whom
  - # 4,9 million were full-time scholars,
  - # 1,2 million were full-time house makers,
  - # 1,2 million were disabled or chronically ill, hence unable to work,
  - # 0,8 million were either too young or too old to work, and,
  - # 0,3 million were retired.
  
- The remainder were not economically active for other reasons.
  
- The official unemployment rate is estimated to be 29,5% (South Africa, 2001 Statistics).

**Table 2.6: LFS Comparison**

FEBRUARY 2000, SEPTEMBER 2000, FEBRUARY 2001 AND SEPTEMBER 2001 LABOUR MARKET MEASUREMENTS USING THE OFFICIAL DEFINITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT WITHIN 95% CONFIDENCE LIMITS					
Variable		Lower limit (000s)	Estimate (000s)	Upper limit (000s)	Statistical significance of Sep 2001 result compared to this
a	Total employed = a				
	Feb 2000	11 491	<b>11 880</b>	12 268	Significant
	Sep 2000	11 446	<b>11 712</b>	11 979	Significant
	Feb 2001	11 563	<b>11 837</b>	12 111	Significant
	Sep 2001	10 602	<b>10 833</b>	11 063	
b	Total unemployed (official definition) = b				
	Feb 2000	4 085	<b>4 333</b>	4 581	Not significant
	Sep 2000	3 910	<b>4 082</b>	4 254	Significant
	Feb 2001	4 069	<b>4 240</b>	4 412	No Significant
	Sep 2001	4 343	<b>4 525</b>	4 707	
c	Total economically active = a + b = c				
	Feb 2000	15 730	<b>16 213</b>	16 696	Significant
	Sep 2000	15 453	<b>15 794</b>	16 135	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	15 728	<b>16 077</b>	16 427	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	15 057	<b>15 358</b>	15 659	
d	Total not economically active = d				
	Feb 2000	9 798	<b>10 242</b>	10 685	Significant
	Sep 2000	10 815	<b>11 100</b>	11 386	Significant
	Feb 2001	10 763	<b>11 044</b>	11 324	Significant
	Sep 2001	11 706	<b>12 006</b>	12 307	
e	Total aged 15-65 years = c + d = e				
	Feb 2000	25 705	<b>26 454</b>	27 203	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	26 385	<b>26 894</b>	27 404	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	26 596	<b>27 121</b>	27 646	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	26 878	<b>27 365</b>	27 851	
f	Official unemployment rate = b*100/c = f				
	Feb 2000	25,5%	<b>26,7%</b>	27,9%	Significant
	Sep 2000	25,0%	<b>25,8%</b>	26,7%	Significant
	Feb 2001	25,6%	<b>26,4%</b>	27,2%	Significant
	Sep 2001	28,8%	<b>29,5%</b>	30,3%	
g	Labour market participation rate = c*100/e = g				
	Feb 2000	60,2%	<b>61,3%</b>	52,3%	Significant
	Sep 2000	58,0%	<b>58,7%</b>	59,4%	Significant
	Feb 2001	58,6%	<b>59,3%</b>	60,0%	Significant
	Sep 2001	55,4%	<b>56,1%</b>	56,8%	
h	Labour absorption rate = a*100/c = h				
	Feb 2000	43,8%	<b>44,9%</b>	46,0%	Significant
	Sep 2000	42,8%	<b>43,5%</b>	44,3%	Significant
	Feb 2001	42,9%	<b>43,6%</b>	44,4%	Significant
	Sep 2001	38,8%	<b>39,6%</b>	40,3%	

Source: Statistics South Africa, p.210

## The main labour market trends

The statistics in Table 2.6 indicate that there were quite a number of changes in the labour market between February 2000 and September 2001. Some of these are significant, while others not.

- The total **number of unemployed people** was estimated to be 4 240 000 in February 2001. We are 95% confident that the actual value of this estimate lies somewhere between 4 069 000 and 4 412 000. In September 2001, the total of unemployed people is estimated to be 4 525 000. This number falls, within the 95% confidence limits range between 4 343 000 and 4 707 000. Therefore the increase in the number of unemployed people between February 2001 and September 2001 is not statistically significant. It can be explained by sampling error.
- Taking sampling error into account, the total **number of people who were not economically active** was significantly higher in September 2001 than the three earlier rounds.
- Similarly, although there were no significant changes in the **number of employed people** between February 2000 and February 2001, a significant decrease is found in September 2001.
- The increase in the **unemployment rate** from 26,4% in February 2001 to 29,5% in September 2001 is statistically significant. However, the drop in the rate from 26,7% in February 2000 to 25,8% in September 2000 and the slight increase to 26,4% in February were not statistically significant.
- The **labour market participation rate** decreased between February 2000 and September 2000, remained more or less the same between September

2000 (58,7%) and February 2001 (59,3%), then decreased significantly in September 2001 (56,1%).

- The **labour absorption rate** showed a similar picture.

In summary, the number of employed has decreased, while the number of unemployed has remained more or less static. The total number of economically active has decreased slightly while the number of who are not economically active has increased significantly. The above suggest that there was a significant change in the labour market picture, overall, between February 2001 and September 2001. The reasons for this change will become clear as we probe further into the issue (Statistics South Africa, 2001).

**Table 2.7: LFS Comparison**

<b>FEBRUARY 2000, SEPTEMBER 2000, FEBRUARY 2001 AND SEPTEMBER 2001 SECTOR IN WHICH EMPLOYED PEOPLE WORK ESTIMATES WITHIN 95% CONFIDENCE LIMITS</b>					
<b>Variable</b>		<b>Lower limit (000s)</b>	<b>Estimate (000s)</b>	<b>Upper limit (000s)</b>	<b>Statistical significance of Sep 2001 result compared to this</b>
<b>Total employed</b>					
	Feb 2000	11 491	<b>11 880</b>	12 268	Significant
	Sep 2000	11 446	<b>11 712</b>	11 979	Significant
	Feb 2001	11 563	<b>11 837</b>	12 111	Significant
	Sep 2001	10 602	<b>10 833</b>	11 063	
<b>Among the employed</b>					
<b>Employed in the formal sector (excluding agriculture)</b>					
	Feb 2000	6 413	<b>6 678</b>	6 942	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	6 647	<b>6 842</b>	7 036	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	6 481	<b>6 678</b>	6 876	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	6 682	<b>6 873</b>	7 064	
<b>Employed in commercial agriculture</b>					
	Feb 2000	662	<b>757</b>	852	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	606	<b>667</b>	728	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	636	<b>699</b>	761	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	611	<b>666</b>	720	
<b>Employed in subsistence or small-scale agriculture</b>					
	Feb 2000	1 350	<b>1 508</b>	1 667	Significant
	Sep 2000	890	<b>965</b>	1 039	Significant
	Feb 2001	585	<b>653</b>	722	Significant
	Sep 2001	326	<b>359</b>	394	
<b>Employed in the informal sector</b>					
	Feb 2000	1 704	<b>1 821</b>	1 936	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	1 861	<b>1 933</b>	2 006	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	2 573	<b>2 665</b>	2 757	Significant
	Sep 2001	1 808	<b>1 873</b>	1 938	
<b>Employed in domestic service</b>					
	Feb 2000	940	<b>1 001</b>	1 061	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	952	<b>999</b>	1 046	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	870	<b>914</b>	959	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	830	<b>916</b>	952	

Source: Statistics South Africa, p.210

## **Employment by sector**

- The total number of employed people was stable between February and September 2000, and September 2000 and February 2001, at approximately 11,8 million. In September 2001 however, there was a significant decrease of approximately a million compared to the results of the previous surveys.
- The total number of people employed in the formal sector, excluding agriculture, over this time period, was stable, at approximately 6,9 million.
- Employment in commercial agriculture also remained stable, at approximately 0,7 million.
- In subsistence or small-scale farming, however, there was a significant decrease. In February 2000, there were 1,5 million people in subsistence farming, decreasing to 1,0 million in September 2000, 0,7 million in February and then 0,4 million in September 2001. Seasonal variation may account for the difference between February and September in both 2000 and 2001. The floods in early 2001, which affected the more rural provinces such as Limpopo (formerly Northern Province) and Mpumalanga, may explain the smaller number in agriculture in February 2001. Self-classification may also have had some influence on the results, as for the informal sector in general.
- In the informal sector, the difference in the number of those working over the six-month time period between February 2001 and September 2001 is statistically significant, indicating a decrease of approximately 0,8 million jobs. There are no statistically significant differences between the figure of September 2001 and those of February and September 2000. Of the four surveys, it is the February 2001 figure that stands out. Self classification may have had some influence on these results. In February 2001 more probing questions about self employment and small businesses were asked to in a follow-on survey, which may have led

to a large number of respondents than usual classifying themselves as employed. In September 2001 a new sample was drawn, and once again respondents may have classified themselves as not economically active rather than as employed in the informal sector. Moreover the ease with which people may enter or leave the informal sector is notable, relative to formal sector opportunities and other circumstances. A fluctuating picture is therefore not necessarily surprising.


- In domestic service, there has been a gradual, but non-significant decline in employment opportunities over the time period.

In summary, both in the informal agricultural sector and the informal sector as a whole, employment trends tend to vary as a result of seasonal and other factors. The informal sector offers less secure, possibly short-term employment opportunities. People within the sector may be leaving it and re-entering it at different rates at various times of the year. Those in the sector who are perhaps having a downturn and are not working are likely to define themselves as not economically active, rather than as unemployed. In addition, unless carefully probed, people may not regard subsistence agriculture and informal economic activity as work. The picture on informal work is thus as an unstable one (Statistics South Africa, 2001).

## EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY

**Figure 1 and Table 2.8**

**Figure 1: Employment by Industry: February 2000, September 2000, February 2001 and September 2001**



**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210

**Table 2.8: Employment by Industry**

<b>LFS COMPARISON: FEBRUARY 2000, SEPTEMBER 2000, FEBRUARY 2001 AND SEPTEMBER 2001 LABOUR MARKET MEASUREMENTS USING THE OFFICIAL DEFINITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT WITHIN 95% CONFIDENCE LIMITS</b>						
<b>Variable</b>		<b>Lower limit (000s)</b>	<b>Estimate (000s)</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Upper limit (000s)</b>	<b>Statistical significance of Sep 2001 result</b>
Total employed						
	Feb 2000	11 491	<b>11 880</b>	<b>100,0</b>	12 268	Significant
	Sep 2000	11 446	<b>11 712</b>	<b>100,0</b>	11 979	Significant
	Feb 2001	11 563	<b>11 837</b>	<b>100,0</b>	12 111	Significant
	Sep 2001	10 602	<b>10 833</b>	<b>100,0</b>	11 063	
<b>Employed by industry</b>						
Agriculture						
	Feb 2000	2 102	<b>2 285</b>	<b>19,2</b>	2 468	Significant
	Sep 2000	1 593	<b>1 694</b>	<b>14,5</b>	1 795	Significant
	Feb 2001	1 296	<b>1 394</b>	<b>11,8</b>	1 493	Significant
	Sep 2001	981	<b>1 051</b>	<b>9,7</b>	1 121	
Mining						
	Feb 2000	393	<b>467</b>	<b>3,9</b>	542	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	479	<b>531</b>	<b>4,5</b>	583	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	455	<b>504</b>	<b>4,3</b>	553	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	437	<b>487</b>	<b>4,5</b>	537	
Manufacturing						
	Feb 2000	1 380	<b>1 469</b>	<b>12,4</b>	1 559	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	1 506	<b>1 576</b>	<b>13,5</b>	1 645	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	1 551	<b>1 627</b>	<b>13,7</b>	1 702	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	1 540	<b>1 605</b>	<b>14,8</b>	1 671	
Electricity						
	Feb 2000	73	<b>1 469</b>	<b>12,4</b>	1 559	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	73	<b>1 576</b>	<b>13,5</b>	1 645	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	83	<b>1 627</b>	<b>13,7</b>	1 702	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	83	<b>1 605</b>	<b>14,8</b>	1 671	
Construction						
	Feb 2000	550	<b>596</b>	<b>5,0</b>	643	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	607	<b>639</b>	<b>5,5</b>	670	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	561	<b>589</b>	<b>5,0</b>	617	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	566	<b>594</b>	<b>5,5</b>	622	
Trade						
	Feb 2000	2 300	<b>2 434</b>	<b>20,5</b>	2 569	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	2 340	<b>2 426</b>	<b>20,7</b>	2 513	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	2 924	<b>2 916</b>	<b>24,6</b>	3 008	Significant
	Sep 2001	2 317	<b>2 397</b>	<b>22,0</b>	2 478	

Transport						
	Feb 2000	509	<b>547</b>	<b>4,6</b>	585	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	523	<b>551</b>	<b>4,7</b>	578	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	525	<b>554</b>	<b>4,7</b>	583	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	514	<b>543</b>	<b>5,0</b>	571	
Business services						
	Feb 2000	779	<b>837</b>	<b>7,0</b>	896	Significant
	Sep 2000	875	<b>928</b>	<b>7,9</b>	981	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	929	<b>985</b>	<b>8,3</b>	1 042	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	920	<b>975</b>	<b>9,0</b>	1 030	
Community services						
	Feb 2000	1 793	<b>1 900</b>	<b>16,0</b>	2 007	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	1 912	<b>1 994</b>	<b>17,0</b>	2 076	Not Significant
	Feb 2001	1 920	<b>2 000</b>	<b>16,9</b>	2 079	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	1 908	<b>1 988</b>	<b>18,3</b>	2 068	
Private household						
	Feb 2000	1 007	<b>1 187</b>	<b>10,0</b>	1 267	Not Significant
	Sep 2000	1 149	<b>1 205</b>	<b>10,3</b>	1 260	Significant
	Feb 2001	1 043	<b>1 099</b>	<b>9,3</b>	1 155	Not Significant
	Sep 2001	1 014	<b>1 055</b>	<b>9,7</b>	1 096	

**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210


Figure 1 and Table 2.8 show that:

- Employment in mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction and transport, and in community services, has remained more or less stable over the time period February 2000 to September 2001.
- On the other hand, employment in agriculture has decreased over this time period, particularly subsistence farming.
- Whilst between September 2000 and February 2001, employment in trading industries increased significantly, a significant decrease is found between February 2001 and September 2001, making February 2001 stand out, with the highest figure of approximately, 2,9 million. A large number of trading businesses is informal.
- Between February 2000 and September 2001, employment in business service industries (finance) also increased significantly.

- Employment in private households decreased significantly between September 2000 and September 2001.

## UNEMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AND NON-URBAN AREAS


**Figure 2: Official unemployment rate in urban and non-urban areas: February 2000, September 2000, February 2001 and September 2001**



**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210

Figure 2 suggest that between February 2000 and September 2001 the unemployment rate increased in non-urban areas while it remained more or less stable in urban areas. The increase in non-urban areas could be due to the decreasing employment in trade and agriculture, which is noticeable in Figure 1 and Table 2.8.

## UNEMPLOYMENT BY PROVINCE




**Figure 3: Official unemployment by province February 2001 and September 2001**

**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210

Figure 3 shows that between February 2001 and September 2001 there was an increase in unemployment in all provinces except Western Cape and Northern Cape. However the change is more noticeable in KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo than in other provinces.

## UNEMPLOYMENT BY POPULATION GROUP




**Figure 4: Official unemployment by population group: February 2000, September 2000, February 2001 and September 2001**

**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210

Figure 4 indicates a high unemployment rate for Africans compared to other population groups. Whilst among coloured, Indian and white people, the unemployment rate has remained more or less the same from February 2000 to September 2001, African unemployment rose sharply in September 2001.

## UNEMPLOYMENT BY POPULATION GROUP AND SEX

**Figure 5: Official unemployment by population group and sex: September 2001**



**Source:** Statistics South Africa, p.210

Figure 5 suggests that unemployment is highest among African women and lowest among white men. However the disparity in gender within population groups is highest among the Indian population.

Having discussed the South African situation, we will now examine the nature of unemployment in other countries based on empirical studies.

### 2.11 UNEMPLOYMENT IN ZIMBABWE

#### 2.11.1 Introduction

The Central Statistics Office (CSO) in Zimbabwe regularly conducts household surveys as part of the Zimbabwe National Household Survey Capacity Programme. Selected questions are consistent from one survey to another, and so provide longitudinal information, which enables one to examine trends in household characteristics over time.

As we all know, in 1990 Zimbabwe embarked on a programme of economic reform (ESAP) and 1991-1992 saw one of the worst droughts in living memory – with close to 70% of the population living in the rural areas (CSO, 1992) and dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, this constituted a major disaster. One result of these events was


increased migration to the urban areas by people in search of employment. A further drought in 1995-1996 compounded the effect. By 1995 the effects of the AIDS pandemic were becoming more visible and then families have had to assume increased support systems, particularly for orphaned children, as breadwinners die. Worsening economic conditions plus ever increasing corruption and crime have been the norm since 1995. Today we frequently see newspaper articles stating that thousands have been retrenched, businesses are closing, unemployment is soaring, etc. Inflation has moved from 15% in 1990 to an all time high of 70% in October 1999 – recent information has it hovering at 56% (CSO, December 2000).

Such economic performance would, in theory be expected to be accompanied by huge increases in unemployment – instead, the CSO reports that unemployment has decreased from 22% in 1992 to an all time low of 6% in 1999.

Surely there must be some mistake!

No there is no mistake – it is simply a matter of definition.

### ZIMBABWE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 1987-1999



**Source:** Central Statistics Office, Zimbabwe (1992)

### 2.11.2 Definitions

The CSO uses the International Labour Organisation's recommendations for defining economic activity and thereby unemployment. During a census or household survey each person aged 15 years and above in each household is classified into one of 8 categories as follows:

- |   |                         |
|---|-------------------------|
| a) paid employee                                | f) student              |
| b) employer                                     | g) homemaker            |
| c) own account worker, including peasant farmer | h) retired/sick/too old |
| d) unpaid family worker                         | i) other                |
| e) unemployed/looking for work                  |                         |

Those classified in the five categories a) – e) are defined to be economically active with the remainder being economically inactive. The economically active population is thus that portion which is available for the production of goods and services, i.e., the labour force. The activity rate is the proportion of economically active persons, among the whole population – it thus measure the participation of a population in the labour force.

The unemployment rate is the proportion of the economically active population that is unemployed and actively looking for employment.

This is the working definition which Zimbabwe uses in order to comply with international standards and conventions. Thus our unemployment rate decreases as poverty increases, simply because those without regular employment are NOT actively looking for work, because there is little hope of finding it.

Let us look more closely at the trends in economic activity since 1992.

### 2.11.3 Economic Activity Rates


Age specific activity rates gives the proportions of the population, age group by age group, that are economically active. Rates are available for the period 1987-1999, disaggregated by gender and by place of residence (rural or urban), and overall have changed little during the past decade.

Female activity rates rise to 83% at age 45-55 years while the rates for males climb more swiftly to 95% by age 35. In the rural areas rates rise to peak at 92% for those aged 35 years while in urban areas the maximum is closer to 80%.

Examining the disaggregated data we see that people are remaining active longer – of those aged 65+ years, 36% in 1992 compared to 67% in 1999, (were economically active. This is true for both males and females and is particularly evident in the rural areas.

### 2.11.4 Type of Economic Activity

Next we examine the actual activities among those who are economically active, summarised in the figure below for the years 1992, 1997 and 1999. It is evident that between 1992 and 1997 there were very real changes whilst from 1997 to 1999 have remained much the same.



**Source:** Central Statistics Office, Zimbabwe (1992)

Paid employee rates have dropped from 45% in 1992 to 37% in 1999. The drop is most evident in the rural areas and particularly among males.


Unpaid family worker rates have increased substantially among rural males – from 7% in 1992 to 21% in 1999, accompanied by a small decrease among females and little change in the urban areas.

An examination of own account worker rates highlights the changes in the economic activities of the population. All sectors show large increases. Urban rates have doubled, from 9% in 1992 to 19% in 1999, particularly among males. Rural rates have increased from 34% to 54%, particularly among females. Overall 58% of females and 29% of males are in the own account section.

Unemployment rates show substantial decreases in all sectors. The most noticeable changes are among rural females, dropping from 17% in 1992 to 1% in 1999. Rural males show similar decreases, 24% in 1992 to 2% in 1999. Urban male and female rates in 1999 were around 15%, dropping from 31% for females and 20% for males in 1992.

### 2.11.5 Type of Economic Inactivity

Finally we investigate any changes among those who are not economically active, summarised in the figure below for the years 1992, 1997 and 1999. Again there are large differences between 1992 and 1997, which in turn is similar to 1999.



**Source:** Central Statistics Office, Zimbabwe (1992)

The proportion of homemakers decreased between 1992 and 1997 but is on the increase again. The proportion in retirement is definitely decreasing, confirming the observation above that the older people are remaining economically active for longer. It is interesting to note that the proportion engaged in the study appears to have increased since 1992, although there was a decrease from 1997 to 1999.

#### 2.11.5 **Conclusions**

It is clear that the worsening economic conditions, exacerbated by droughts and the AIDS pandemic, are causing subtle changes in the economic activity patterns in the country. This is accompanied by/caused by the changing population composition. The most recent mortality data (CSO 2001) tells us that, in the period 1994-1999.

- One in every ten children born did not live to see his/her fifth birthday.
- One in every 34 men aged 45-49, died.
- One in every 64 women aged 35-39, died.
- At one in every 150 births, the mother died.

Orphans projections estimate that, by 2005, one in every three children aged 0-14 years will have one or both parents dead (USAID, 2000).

Older people are no longer able to retire but have to keep active in order to add to the household income – often it is the grandparents who have had to assume the burden of caring for the orphans.

Females are increasingly moving into economically active group, particularly those in the rural areas.

The proportion taking up own account work, whether it is selling sweets on the city streets or communal farming, is steadily increasing.

The proportion of males in the rural areas who are working for no income but for board and lodging in return for agricultural work, is increasing annually.

The proportion of paid employees, particularly in the urban areas is steadily decreasing.

There is little longitudinal data available in respect of child labour. However, we can expect that, with the increasing number of orphans and the continuing worsening economic conditions, it will become more and more common to see children at work rather than at school. The information that is available shows that, in 1990 about 4% of children aged 10-14 years were economically active. By 1999, 8% of those aged 5-17 years were economically active – in other words for every dozen children there will be one at work or looking for work! (CSO Zimbabwe, 1992).

## 2.12 **SURVEY ON CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT**

### 2.12.1 **The European Experience**

The rationale for choosing to discuss or examine the former Yugoslavia in Europe is that, like South Africa, there has been a transition in Yugoslavia in terms of its government.

Perhaps, a brief history of Yugoslavia will explain its way to independence.

### 2.12.2 **A Brief History of Yugoslavia**

The Yugoslavia which emerged from World War II was a six republic federation. From north-west to south east, the political entities were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosman-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.

At various times during the past millennium, the country now known as Yugoslavia and its surrounding countries, straddled the borders of three faith groups: Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Roman Catholicism. Various sources give conflicting stories of the area's past. The following is an attempt at describing the history of Yugoslavia.

- Prior to 6<sup>th</sup> century CE: Kosovo and the surrounding area were occupied by the Illyrian people, who became present-day Albanians.
- 6<sup>th</sup> & 7<sup>th</sup> centuries CE: The Serbs arrived in Kosovo and the surrounding area.
- 12 & 13<sup>th</sup> century: Rastko (1174-1236 CE) created the first Serbian national church. After a brief alliance with Rome, the church became part of Orthodox Christianity.
- 14<sup>th</sup> century: The Ottoman Turks conquered what is now Yugoslavia at the Battle of Kosovo in the *Field of Blackbirds* in 1389 CE. Serbian Prince Lazar could have avoided the conflict by agreeing to pay tribute to Murad I, the Turkish Sultan. However, Lazar and his army rejected this option. They swore the *Kosovo Covenant*. This committed them to fight to the death of the last man rather than submit to control from a foreign power. Islam was introduced by the Turks during their occupation.
- 15<sup>th</sup> century: Muslim influence was extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Islam expanded accordingly.
- 16<sup>th</sup> century: Slovenia and Croatia came under the influence of Austria. Roman Catholicism was introduced. Thousands of Serbs were forcibly relocated to the Croatian border with Bosnia.
- 19<sup>th</sup> century: After Russia defeated the Turks, Serbia was granted independence. But Kosovo and Macedonia remained under the control of the Turks. The Austro-Hungarians got control of Bosnia-Herzegovina and retained Croatia and Slovenia.

- Pre-World War II: With the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the collapse of the Ottoman empire, and the conclusion of World War I, Yugoslavia became a kingdom under King Alexander. His dictatorship included Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. A fascist separatist movement, the *Ustase*, was established by the Croats to promote their independence.
- World War II: The Nazis over-ran Yugoslavia. The country was partitioned. The fascist Ustashe (Croats: primarily Roman Catholics) established a puppet Nazi state, which included Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Large numbers of Serbian Orthodox believers, Jews and Roma (Gypsies) were exterminated. The killings were perpetrated by the Nazis, the Ustashe, and occasionally by the Bosnian Muslims. The 21<sup>st</sup> division of the German Waffen SS was recruited almost entirely from ethnic Albanians, *"in the winter of 1944-45 it carried out the last ethnic cleansing exercise of the war. It did this in Kosovo, against the Serbs"*. During the war, Jews were relatively safe in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs largely protected them from the Holocaust. A civil war followed World War II; as many as 1 million Yugoslavs were killed.
- 1945 to 1980: Joseph Tito unified the 8 republics into a communist dictatorship, independent of Russia. He was able to suppress religious and cultural rivalries among the Roman Catholics, Serbian Orthodox and Muslims during his lifetime. But, as noted in the quotation at the start of this essay, no concerted attempt was made by the political or religious leaders to settle centuries-old religious hatreds. An opportunity was missed that might have avoided (or reduced) ethnic cleansing and genocide during the 1990's. Tito angered the Serbs by granting autonomy to the north-eastern province of Vojvodina and the southern province of Kosovo in 1974.
- 1980's: Tito died in 1980. In 1987, while investigating allegations that the minority Serbs in Kosovo were being attacked by the ethnic Albanian majority.

Slobodan Milosevic had promised his fellow Serbs that *"No one will ever beat you again"* Milosevic quickly became a Serbian hero, and was able to force changes to the Yugoslav constitution through its Parliament in 1989. This terminated the autonomous status of the provinces of Vojvodina (in the north) and Kosovo (in the south). Milosevic *"removed Kosovo's autonomy, established direct Serbian rule over the province. expelled the Albanians from the Kosovo parliament, the state bureaucracy, and state owned industries, and closed the state-run school system and most of the medical system to them"*. The Albanians in Kosovo became a majority with few rights in their own country. Leading Kosovo intellectual, Ibrahim Rogova, promoted a nonviolent approach to resolve the system of Apartheid under which they were persecuted.

- 1990's: The unravelling of Yugoslavia accelerated.
- 1990: The north-west province of Slovenia voted the Communist party out of office. Slovenia won its independence from the rest of Yugoslavia in 1991.
- 1991: Croatia made a bid for independence. Croats and Serbs started a civil war. The UN assisted in establishing a cease-fire, starting in 1992.
- 1991: Macedonia declared independence. It was admitted to the UN under a provisional name in 1993, and was recognized by the US and Russia in 1994.
- 1992: Bosnia declared independence. A civil war among the Croats, Serbs and Muslims erupted. The world was horrified by new images of starving prisoners in concentration camps. The civilian population was heavily targeted by armies on all sides. Hans Kung and Karl-Josef Kuschel commented: *"Similarly, there is no doubt that the Catholic and Orthodox churches in particular have identified themselves all too much with their own political leadership in the most recent controversies and not made a commitment for peace openly, opportunely and energetically"*.

- 1995: The *Dayton Accord*, brokered by the US, established a fragile peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Representatives from Kosovo were excluded from the talks, it probably would not have been possible to get the principal parties in the Bosnian conflict to the Dayton bargaining table if Kosovo was on the agenda. The conflicts in Kosovo was not discussed; *"Rugova's nonviolent strategy lost its credibility."*
- 1996-7: Following the *Dayton Accord*, many ethnic Albanians in Kosovo decided that their nonviolent approach was getting nowhere. The *Kosovo Liberation Army* began a guerrilla campaign.
- 1998: The situation had become critical. The Serb army destroyed several villages in Kosovo in order to evaluate Western reaction. The West responded with *"rhetoric and...meetings"* but no credible threats. The Yugoslavian government then escalated the conflict.

Yugoslavia has been gradually disintegrating since the death of Tito. The country lost much of its territory and population during the 1990's as Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved independence. As of 1999-APR, Yugoslavia consists of only four provinces: Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Montenegro has a large degree of local autonomy. The government and Serbian people of Yugoslavia are totally opposed to losing any more territory to independence or autonomy movements. This has recently led to a massive civil war in Kosovo, and a (currently) lower-scale program of ethnic cleansing in Vojvodina.

## 2.13 **SURVEY ON CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE: THE SERBIA, MONTENEGRO AND KOSOVO EXPERIENCE**

### 2.13.1 **Surveys on Crime And Unemployment: Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo**

The public in Serbia is deeply concerned about corruption, crime and unemployment according to the South Eastern Europe (SEE) Public Agenda Survey. The regional

survey poll involved a total of 10,000 face-to-face interviews conducted during January and February 2002 in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. According to the South Eastern Europe Democracy Support (SEEDS) network, this is the first time that a public opinion survey has been undertaken simultaneously in all nine territories of the Balkans.

The key areas covered by the surveys include the following:

- Attitudes towards economic, social and political issues
- Trust in public figures and international institutions
- Perceptions of minority populations and neighbouring states.

Marti Ahtisaari former President of Finland, European Union Balkans envoy and member of the board of International IDEA (Democracy and Electoral Assistance) commented: "The report contains very useful material for local authorities throughout the region as well as for the international community to help design their policies and actions in Balkan countries. I see this survey as a tool to promote democratic governance by making the opinions of citizens heard on the key questions confronting their societies. I am particularly delighted that International IDEA has used the expertise of think tanks and research institutes from the region in conducting the survey, as I believe that international organizations should utilize local expertise far more widely in their activities in the Balkans."

## 2.14 **OVERVIEW OF THE SURVEY FINDINGS**

### 2.14.1 **Serbia**

Key findings to emerge from the Serbia section of the public opinion survey include the following:

- **On the Economy** When asked "What do you fear most in the present?", respondents put unemployment first (19%), followed by economic problems/living standard deterioration (14,6%) and poverty (11,8%). And

while 51,8% pronounced themselves to be somewhat or very dissatisfied with their present economic situation, a narrow majority – 50,3% – of those polled stated that they expect to see an improvement in their living standards during the next year. On a further positive note, too, almost half (49,8%) of interviewees in Serbia expressed the belief that the country is broadly speaking heading in the right direction, making them the second most optimistic in the region after Kosovo on this topic.

- **On International Institutions** Of those surveyed only 75% expressed even moderate levels of trust in the Hague (ICTY) Tribunal, where former President Slobodan Milosevic is currently on trial for alleged war crimes. Among the other international institutions covered in the survey, the European Union (EU) scores highest for trust (30,8%), with NATO ranked the lowest (6,0%). In addition, a large majority of interviewees (77,9%) expressed fully or partially agreement with the statement 'many things in my country are decided from the outside'.
- **On Public Figures** According to the survey the most trusted public figures in Serbia today are Vojislav Kostunica – with 47,1% of respondents indicating fair to high levels of trust in the Yugoslav President – and narrowly ahead of him Deputy Federal Prime Minister Miroslav Labus, who scores a trust rating of 47,2%. At the other end of the scale, the survey records a trust rating of 14% for Slobodan Milosevic, though 166% of respondents indicated that they did not even wish to answer such questions about their former leader.
- Commenting on the Serbia survey findings Srdjan Bogosavljevic, Executive Director of the Belgrade-based public opinion research institute SMMRI noted: "The most important thing about this poll is that it confirms a major change in Serbian public opinion over the last year. Today people want to talk about real, day to day problems poverty, crime, corruption

where previously they focussed on big political issues such as Kosovo and relations with Montenegro".

"Concerning trust in Milosevic", Bogoslavjevic continues, "it is notable that many people simply didn't want to answer questions about him. For years ordinary people were taught that Milosevic was the greatest, and now they are told that they are supposed to be against him. Many of them simply can't do this, so their response is simply to say 'I don't know' or refuse to answer."

#### 2.14.2 **Kosovo**

Headline findings to emerge from the Kosovo section of the survey include:

- On the Economy and Future Prospects. Just under half of those interviewed – 44.3% – reported that their economic situation has improved either moderately or significantly over the past 12 months, with a slightly higher number (47.3%) declaring themselves to be either somewhat or very satisfied with their present economic circumstances. According to the survey, the most important problems facing ordinary people in Kosovo today is unemployment, highlighted as a key issue by 77.4% of interviewees. Following unemployment is poverty, noted by 38.7% of survey respondents, corruption by 33% and crime by 27.9%. Despite these concerns, however, survey respondents in Kosovo were the most upbeat in the region when asked for their assessment of the course of current developments in their country, with almost two thirds (63.7%) supporting the statement that 'generally speaking, things in our country are going in the right direction'.
- On International Institutions. Somewhat lower down the scale from Serbia, two-thirds of survey respondents (66.6%) in Kosovo agreed with the statement that 'many key decisions about the country are made outside if in stark contrast to their northern neighbours, however, Kosovo interviewees displayed the highest levels of trust in international institutions found throughout the regional survey. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, in Kosovo NATO emerges as the most trusted of the international institutions

covered by the survey, with a massive 91,3% of interviewees reporting fair to high degrees of trust in the Western military alliance. Next most trusted international institution, according to the survey, is the United Nations (77,3%) closely followed by the European Union (72.1%) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with a 70,2% fair to high trust rating.

- On interethnic relations. While only 58% of Kosovo interviewees agreed with the statement that 'our people is endangered by a civil war', marginally over a third (33.5%) fully agreed with the view that 'ethnic minorities have too high demands in their struggle for their rights'. At the same time, only 6,2% of those polled ranked ethnic; conflict among the three most important issues confronting Kosovo today.

### 2.14.3 **Regional trends**

Important regional trends that emerge from the survey include:

- Issues of public concern. Across the region, the three issues most consistently identified by the survey as eliciting concern among ordinary people are unemployment, corruption and crime, with unemployment ranked number one issue of concern in seven of the nine countries and territories covered. The exceptions are Romania and Montenegro, where corruption was identified as the highest-ranking issue of public concern. Unemployment registered the highest levels of public concern in Bosnian Federation (79%), closely followed by Kosovo, Croatia, Bulgaria and Macedonia, all of whom had on or above 70% of respondents placing joblessness in the top category of concern.
- The economy and future prospects Regionally speaking, inhabitants of Kosovo are the most optimistic both about the economy and the future. 63,7% give a positive rating to the direction the country is heading, 43,3% pronounce themselves satisfied with their present economic situation, and 53,5% think it will improve over the coming 12 months. At the other end of the scale, the survey finds Bulgarians to be the most pessimistic on the same counts, with

44,5% of interviewees reporting agreement with the statement 'the country is going in no direction'. 81,5% dissatisfied with their present economic situation and 31,5% supporting the view that things will be even worse one year on from now.

- Trust in national institutions. Among the institutions covered in the survey, trust in mass media ranks highest in Romania, with 68,7% reporting fair or high levels of trust, followed by Bulgaria with a corresponding rating of 56,7%. Trust in mass media gets its lowest rating in Montenegro (21,5%). On the Police and Army, the Police scores the highest trust ratings in Kosovo (75%), and the lowest in Serbia (23,5%), while for the Army, trust is again highest in Kosovo (82,7%), closely followed by Romania (79,4%), and lowest in Montenegro (30,9%) and Croatia (41,3%). With the current government, Kosovo (57,5%) is again followed by Romania (44,3%) in the regional trust rankings, with Serbian and Macedonian interviewees giving the political authorities the lowest ratings – 29% and 11,7% respectively. For business and private enterprise, Montenegro shows the highest trust ranking (53,7%) followed by Croatia (50,6%) and Bulgaria the lowest (29,9%).
- Trust in international institutions. Of the range of institutions covered in the survey, trust in NATO is highest in Kosovo (91,3%) and Romania (57,7%), lowest in Republika Srpska (51%) and Serbia (6,0%). For the European Union, highest levels of trust are again reported in Kosovo (72,1%) and Romania (58,7%), and the lowest in Republika Srpska (16,6%). For the Stability Pact a similar pattern is evident, with trust ratings for the Pact highest in Kosovo (49,9%), Montenegro (26,1%), and Romania (25,6%), lowest in Serbia (12,7%) and Republika Srpska (8,3%). For the Haque Tribunal (ICTY), according to the survey trust ratings are highest in Kosovo (83,3%) and the Bosnia Federation (50,5%), and lowest in Serbia (7,6%) and Republika Srpska (3,6%).

Commenting on the overall findings of the regional survey, Alin Teodorescu, Chief Executive Officer of IMAS, the Bucharest-based public opinion research institute responsible for the surveys conducted during January and February 2002, states: "This is the first professionally conducted measurement of public opinion undertaken simultaneously in all nine territories, using the same questionnaire and based on the same high quality standards."

"The main findings show that public opinion in those nine countries and territories is in very varying stages of development". Teodorescu continues "At one end is Kosovo, and to some extent Romania, where there is a high appreciation of international organizations coupled with high levels of optimism about the future. At the other end of the scale there is Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro, where we see evidence of widespread disappointment over the current course of developments low optimism concerning the future, low appreciation of international organizations and even low self-esteem."

"With the notable exception of Kosovo, the survey also reveals a critical lack of trust in official institutions of all kinds across the region as a whole," notes Teodorescu. "And this in itself is an important obstacle to development, as lack of trust means a lack of respect for rules and laws." "Across the region public opinion is dominated by day to day concerns such as poverty, inflation and corruption that have little connection with what at least a sector of the ruling elite in the region considers important. The ethnic, historical or anti-globalizing agenda of these elites is not supported by the people of the region."

"The research we are presenting", he concludes, "is a good basis for policy making because it shows the kind of policies for which there is genuine public support – policies designed to reduce unemployment and inflation, social policies to combat poverty and marginalization. And if governments in the region want to achieve greater public support in their own countries then they need to focus on policies dealing with the public's primary concerns."

Describing the objectives of the regional survey initiative Tanja Petovgi, a former Yugoslav human rights lawyer and project co-ordinator of the SEEDS network, commented; "In co-

operation with local think tanks and research institutes, we want to identify and promote a public agenda that can influence the political agenda and its priorities, and to enrich debates on further democratic reform in the Balkans with solid information about the aspirations and concerns of the public" (South Eastern Europe Public Agenda Survey).

## 2.15 **EMPIRICAL STUDY ON CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT**

### (a) **Yang, Bijou; Lester, David**

The present study conducted by Yang and Lester sought to explore the association between unemployment and crime by examining a specific violent crime, homicide, and by looking at the association over time rather than over regions. Yang and Lester also explored the association between unemployment and suicide rates over the same time period in the United States. These researchers did this because it was argued by Henry and Short (1954) that both self-directed aggressive behaviour (suicide) and outward-directed aggressive behaviour (assault and murder) could result from the frustration resulting from the stresses caused by unemployment.

The time period chose for this research was 1940-1984. Five socio-economic variables were chosen as predictors of the homicide and suicide rates: the unemployment rate, the gross national product per capita, the participation of females in the labour force, the divorce rate, and the percentage of Roman Catholics in the population.

The data were analyzed using RATS (Doan, 1988), with the homicide and suicide rates, the divorce rate, and the gross national product per capita in logarithmic transformation so that estimates would be comparable to one another on a percentage basis. Both the ordinary least square (OLS) method and the Hildreth-Lu search procedure (HLSP) were used to estimate the regression coefficients due to the presence of auto correlation.

The general findings are shown below in the following tables:

**Table 2.9: Association Between Unemployment and Other Social Variables**

Environment Variables (observable)	<i><b>Unemployment</b></i>	Other Variables
State of mind (unobservable)		Frustration
Behaviour outcomes (observable)	Assaultive violence	Self-destruction
Environment variables (observable)	Work	Other variables
State of mind (unobservable)		Challenged
Behavioural outcomes (observable)	Altruism	Achievement

**Source:** Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 23, Issue 1/2

Table 2.9 shows the predicted association between environmental variables (including unemployment), the state of the individual's mind (such as frustration), and the resulting violence (such as murder and suicide). Unemployment and other social variables provide the environment which leads to frustration in the individuals who make up the society. Murder and suicide are the possible consequences of the general level of frustration in the society.

**Table 2.10: Association Between Unemployment Suicide Rate and Homicide Rate from 1940-1984**

Legend for chart:			
A	-	Homicide, Coefficient	
B	-	Homicide, T-value	
C	-	Homicide, P	
D	-	Suicide, Coefficient	
E	-	Suicide, T-value	
F	-	Suicide, P	
		A	B
		D	E
			C
			F
Constant		-10.337	3.33
		-1.157	1.01
			0.002
			0.319
GNP/Capita		0.999	2.44
		0.323	2.14
			0.019
			0.038
Unemployment rate		0.039	3.97
		0.030	8.24
			<0.001
			<0.001
Divorce rate		0.825	8.33
		0.230	6.30
			<0.001
			<0.001
Female labour force participation		-0.039	3.20
		-0.018	4.03
			0.003
			<0.001
Percent Roman Catholic		0.014	1.16
		0.148	0.33
			0.252
			0.742
n = 45		R[sup 2] = 0.91	DW = 0.68
		R[sup 2] = 0.85	DW = 1.53
df = 39		adj. R[sup 2] = 0.89	F = 147.38
		adj. R[sup 2] = 0.83	F = 54.34

**Source:** Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 23, Issue 1/2

Table 2.10 shows that unemployment was significantly associated with the homicide rate and the suicide rate from 1940-1984. A one percent increase in the unemployment rate would raise the homicide rate by 0.04% and the suicide rate by 0.03%.

**Table 2.11: Regression Analyses of Unemployment on Total Homicide and Suicide Rates in 1940-1984**

	A	B	C
	D	E	F
Constant	4.934 0.390	1.31 0.24	0.201 0.808
GNP/Capita	-0.348 0.133	0.90 0.63	0.373 0.531
Unemployment rate	-0.001 0.016	0.09 2.49	0.930 0.017
Divorce rate	0.355 0.196	2.98 4.13	0.005 <0.001
Female labour force participation	-0.005 -0.008	0.35 1.32	0.725 0.196
Percent Roman Catholic	-0.009 0.004	0.28 0.60	0.790 0.550
n = 44	R <sup>2</sup> = 0.97 R <sup>2</sup> = 0.85		DW = 1.51 DW = 2.16
df = 37	adj. R <sup>2</sup> = 0.96 adj. R <sup>2</sup> = 0.82		F = 77.91 F = 45.17
	RHO = 0.99		RHO = 0.47

**Source:** Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 23, Issue 1/2

Table 2.11 shows the regression analysis using the Hildreth-Lu search procedure (HLSP) to correct the autocorrelation. The estimate of RHO was 0.99 for the homicide rate and 0.47 for the suicide rate. The regression results were strikingly different. The association between the unemployment rate and the homicide rate was negligible, while the association between the unemployment rate and the suicide rate was reduced by almost a half, clear indications of the degree of autocorrelation in the regression equations.

**Table 2.12: Regression Coefficient for Total Unemployment Rate on the Homicide and Suicide Rates of Various Sex-by-Race from 1940-1984**

	A	B	C
	D	E	F
A - Homicide, Coefficient			
B - Homicide, P			
C - Homicide, DW			
D - Suicide, Coefficient			
E - Suicide, P			
F - Suicide, DW			
OLS			
White males	0.047 0.025	<0.001 <0.001	0.93 2.17
White females	0.025 0.043	0.001 <0.001	1.19 0.98
Non-White males	0.034 0.025	0.010 0.022	0.62 1.17
Non-White females	0.022 0.060	0.018 <0.001	0.74 1.66
HLSP			RHO
White males	0.003 0.025	0.806 <0.001	0.80 -0.16
White females	0.012 0.010	0.353 0.306	0.47 0.85
Non-White males	-0.002 0.024	0.888 0.080	0.96 0.49
Non-White females	-0.007 0.038	0.555 0.025	0.81 0.22

**Source:** Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 23, Issue 1/2

Table 2.12 shows the same specification of the model for the homicide rates and the suicide rates being applied to four sex-by-race social groups by the use of the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the Hildreth-Lu search procedure (HLSP) methods. First, the presence of autocorrelation seemed to be stronger for the homicide rate than for the suicide rate. Second, the association between personal violence and unemployment became negligible for the homicide rate but not for the suicide rate after the autocorrelation was corrected.

The results of the Jang and Lester study indicated that, with the presence of five common socio-economic variables, including the unemployment rate, the autocorrelation problem seemed to be more serious for the homicide rate than for the suicide rate. After the autocorrelation was corrected, the association between unemployment and homicide became negligible and the divorce rate became the most powerful predictor of homicide rates. In contrast, even after the correction for autocorrelation, the association between unemployment and suicide was still significant though not as large (Journal of Socio-Economic, Spring/Summer 94, Vol. 23, Issue 1/2, p.215, 8p charts).

The loopholes in Jang and Lester's study: The research did not indicate clearly any classical or modern theory within which the study was conducted.

(b) **Chester L Britt**

In another study conducted by Chester L Britt, the main goal of this research was to examine both the contemporaneous and the lagged effects of youth unemployment on crime by using the unemployment and arrest time series data for persons aged 16 to 19 years.

Youth unemployment was measured as the percent civilian unemployment for persons aged 16 to 19 years for the 1958-1990 period. This research was conducted in the United States.

The dependent variables in this research are arrest rates for persons aged 16 to 19 years for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Seven index crimes – homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, theft, and auto theft.

In this research, Britt took the arrest information from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (1959-1991), which is based on arrest reports sent to the FBI.

The resident population estimates needed to compute the arrest rates were taken from the census bureau's series population estimates by age, sex and race (1965, 1974, 1981, 1987) and projections of the population of the United States (1989). These population estimates were then adjusted to reflect the FBI's estimate of the proportion of the US population represented by each year's arrest statistics.

The time series model used by Britt in this research followed Cantor and Land's (1985) use of first difference equations to detrend the arrest time. Series data and assess the unique impact unemployment and changes in unemployment among youth on changes in arrest rates of youth.

The functional form is:

$$\Delta A_t = \alpha + \beta_1 U_t + \beta_2 \Delta U_t + \epsilon_t$$

Where  $A_t$  is the arrest rate at time  $t$ ,  $\Delta A_t = A_t - A_{t-1}$  is the first difference of the arrest rate at time  $t$ ,  $U_t$  is the unemployment rate at time  $t$ ,  $\Delta U_t = U_t - U_{t-1}$  is the first difference of the unemployment rate at time  $t$ ,  $d$ ,  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  are the parameters to be estimated and  $\epsilon_t$  is the stochastic error term.

Difference equation models differ substantively from more common structural equations that incorporate several exogenous variables to explain trends in either crime or arrest rates. These models test the impact of the unemployment rate on the change in the arrest rate while controlling for trends. Thus, after trends have been removed from the arrest data (through first-differencing) the orienting question is: What impact do unemployment at (times  $t$ ) and the change in unemployment (between time  $t-1$  and time  $t$ ) have on the change in the arrest rate between time  $t-1$  and time  $t$ ? For example: what impact do unemployment (between time  $t-1$  and time  $t$ )? For example, we may observe that an arrest rate has increased over some ten year period, but the increase was uniform. In some years, there may have been sharp increases, while in other years, there may have been sharp decreases. The use of the first difference equation permits an assessment of how much of that annual change is attributable to unemployment.

This model permits partial identification of both motivational and opportunity effects, since a time relationship is implied in equation. According to Cantor and Land (1985), contemporaneous opportunity effects will be indicated by  $\beta_1 < 0$ , meaning the youth unemployment rate and change in the arrest rate from  $t-1$  to time  $t$  will be inversely related (i.e., the arrest rate will decrease in response to a high unemployment rate). Conversely lagged motivational effects will be indicated by  $\beta_2 > 0$ , where changes in the youth unemployment rate and the arrest rate from time  $t-1$  to time  $t$  will be positively related (i.e., the arrest rate will increase as the youth unemployment rate increases over the previous year's value).

Findings on Chester Britt's research are shown in Table 2.13 on page 116.

**Table 2.13: Research of Regressing First-Differentiated Arrest Rates on Unemployment and First-Differentiated Unemployment for Youths aged 16-19 years in the USA (1958-1990)**

<b>Offense</b>	<b>Constant</b>	<b>U</b>	<b><math>\Delta U</math></b>	<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>
Homicide	8.477* (2.810)	-0.460* (-2.550)	0.338 (1.288)	0.131
Rape <sup>a</sup>	5.988* (2.423)	-0.328* (-1.917)	0.141 (0.154)	0.065
Aggravated Assault	57.972* (1.791)	-2.667** (-1.377)	0.125 (0.044)	0.004
Robbery <sup>a</sup>	121.120* (7.118)	-6.414* (-5.437)	16.428* (2.609)	0.593
Burglary	222.550* (3.039)	-13.019* (-2.972)	17.914* (2.812)	0.252
Larceny	293.890* (2.272)	-15.144* (-1.762)	26.756* (2.141)	0.108
Auto Theft	29.156 (0.740)	-1.573 (-0.667)	-9.177* (-2.667)	0.206

Notes: – t-statistics (given in parentheses) are based on 29 degrees of freedom  
– a Weighted Least Squares estimates  
– \* p < 0.10 (two-tail test)  
– \*\* p < 0.10 (one-tail test)

Source: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 53, pp.99-109

Table 2.13 presents the regression coefficients for the first-differences arrest time series regressed on unemployment and the first difference of unemployment.

Regression diagnostics indicated statistically significant heteroscedasticity in the models for rape and robbery, and was due to the first difference of unemployment variable. This heteroscedasticity was removed by inverse of the first-differenced least square (WLS) estimates for rape (Table 2.13). Further, diagnostic tests residual autocorrelation or of omitted variable bias (Ramsey Rest Test).

The substantive models for violent crime (homicide, rape, and aggravated results were consistent with the opportunity perspective. The assault arrest series show statistically

significant contemporaneous opportunity effects ( $\beta_1 = -4.60$ ,  $\beta_1 = -0.328$ ,  $\beta_1 = -0.2667$  for homicide, rape and aggravated assault, respectively), but no evidence of a lagged motivational effect. These results suggest that since there are fewer persons (i.e., potential victims and potential offenders) circulating in society at time  $t$  due to a higher unemployment rate, there are reduced opportunities for youth to commit violent crimes, and they also suggest no increased motivation to commit violent crimes, even though unemployment may have been increasing over a two or three year period.

The results for property crimes (robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft) are consistent with Cantor and Land's (1985) expectations about contemporaneous and lagged effects of unemployment. Robbery, burglary and larceny show significant contemporaneous opportunity effects of unemployment on the change in arrest rate ( $\beta_1 = -6.414$ ,  $\beta_1 = -13.019$  and  $\beta_1 = -15.144$  respectively), while the effect for auto theft is not statistically significant.

The lagged effect of youth unemployment on changes in property crime arrest series show motivational effects ( $\beta_2 = 16.428$ ,  $\beta_2 = 17.914$  and  $\beta_2 = 26.756$  for robbery, burglary and larceny, respectively), except for auto theft ( $\beta_2 = 9.177$ ) which shows an opportunity effect of lagged youth unemployment.

Thus, the effect of youth unemployment is consistent with the expectation of a current decline in property crime in response to a high level of unemployment, and therefore lower levels of person-property circulation. Similarly, the lagged effect of youth unemployment is largely consistent with the expectation of an increase in property crime in response to prolonged and increasing unemployment, vanishing public assistance monies, and increase in proportion of the population motivated to commit criminal acts.

Cantor and Land's (1985) analysis of post-World II crime rates found a significant motivation effect for larceny, while other significant relationships indicated opportunity effects of the total unemployment rate. Interestingly, the pattern of results in Table 2.13 corresponds quite well with those of Cantor and Land. With the exception of lagged

motivational effects of youth or robbery and burglary, every other significant relationship shows an opportunity effect.

(c) **The conclusions of Chester Britt's research**

Britt concluded in his research that unemployment and arrest time data series for persons aged 16-19 years from 1958-1990, showed that crime among youth is associated with both the current level of youth unemployment and the annual change in the rate of youth unemployment. For violent offenses such as homicide, rape, and aggravated assault, as well as for property offences such as robbery, burglary and larceny, higher rates of youth unemployment are negatively associated with annual changes in the arrest rates of youth. Conversely, the lagged effect of youth unemployment is limited to property offenses where annual changes in youth unemployment are positively related to annual changes in the arrest rates of youth for robbery, burglary and larceny, but negatively related to changes in the auto theft arrest rate.

**Loopholes in the Britt's research:**

This research by Britt, like any study that uses aggregate data is open to the criticism that it cannot explain the behaviour of individuals. The nature of this study makes it impossible to predict whether an employed or unemployed individual will have the greatest likelihood of committing a criminal offense. However, to the extent that these data indicate the effect of one social trend on another social trend, the conclusions of any opportunity effect of current unemployment on criminal activity, and of a motivational effect of prolonged unemployment on property crime appear to be justified.

In view of the above literature review, we now derive the following hypotheses:

- There is a relationship between unemployment and the rate of crime in South Africa.
- There is a relationship between the individual's level of education and the rate of crime and unemployment.

- There is a relationship in the level of co-operation and integration between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services in reducing the level of unemployment and crime in South Africa.
- There is a relationship between government's legislation on minimum wages and its effects on the rate of crime and unemployment in South Africa.

## 2.16 CONCEPTS USED IN THIS RESEARCH – OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

Conceptualization is necessary to enable the researcher to study, organize and differentiate the variables of the study. An operational definition is a series of instructions describing the operations that the researcher must carry out in order to demonstrate the existence, or the degree of existence, of an empirical occurrence represented by a concept. In other words, the meaning of every scientific concept must be specifiable by indicating a definite testing operation that provides a criteria for the application (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1976:17-18).

### 2.16.1 Crime

Crime refers to a wide range of activities which include violent personal crime, property crime, organized crime and political crime. Van der Walt *et al.* (1982:22) distinguishes between crime defined juridically and crime in a non-judicial sense.

Juridically, crime can be defined as "... a contravention of the law to which a punishment is attached and imposed by the state" (Van der Walt *et al.*, 1982:24). In other words, crime is any act which is forbidden by law, and, if detected is likely to be punished.

### 2.16.2 **Unemployment**

In this research, all persons who are without (not in employment), are currently available for work and are seeking work or wanting to work.

### 2.16.3 **Informal sector**

Is that part of the economic activity of a country that is not recorded in its national accounts and which is mostly regulated (Barker, 1995:xvi).

### 2.16.4 **Economically active population**

For purposes of this research, economically active population will be defined as all persons who furnish their labour for the production of economic goods and services, whether employed or not, and this includes workers formally or informally employed, the self-employed, employers and the unemployed wishing to work.

### 2.16.5 **Unemployment rate**

The number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the total economically active population (Barker, 1995:xviii).

### 2.16.6 **Employment**

In this research, employment includes all persons who during a specific brief period (for example seven days) have worked for five or more hours for a wage or salary or for a profit or family gain, in cash or in kind. The self-employed are included, as are persons who have been temporarily absent from work but still have a formal job attachment.

### 2.16.7 **Income**

For the purpose of this research, income includes any kind of income, for example, also from capital (rents, interests, dividends) property employment or transfer payments (for example social security or welfare from the South African Government).

### 2.16.8 **Prison**

In this research, is an institution that is interested to contain criminals so that they cannot harm more people and to punish wrongdoers. At the same time, a prison is charged with treating or rehabilitating criminals so that they may return to society for re-integration.

### 2.16.9 **Social control**

Persell (1990:166) refers to social control as the relatively patterned and systematic ways in which society guides and restrains individuals behaviours so that people act in predictable and desired ways.

## 2.17 **SUMMARY**

The work of key thinkers such as Durkheim, Merton, and Marx on crime have been covered in this section. In addition, the Keynesian classical theories on unemployment have also been examined. Empirical studies on crime and unemployment at both national and international levels have also been examined. The next chapter will focus on the relationship between crime and society.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **CRIME AND SOCIETY**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the effects of crime on society.

Today, crime is one of the social problems in our society. If one looks at any daily newspaper, one will always find a significant proportion of their column inches devoted to reports of murder, theft, and accounts of sensational court trials. Increases in crime rates is always treated as headline news, and many people see the law and order issue as one of the most pressing in modern society.

Concern about crime appears to be an old social problem from the creation of the world. Abel's murder by his brother Cain is one of the first episodes recounted in the Bible. In Greek mythology, the actions of the gods from Olympus included a considerable number of acts of rape, incest, and impersonation. Later, similar and grosser crimes were to be the central themes of classical Greek drama. Folk tales in many cultures have law-breaking figures as their heroes, and their exploits are often recounted with admiration, Robin Hood in England, or Annasi in Afro-Caribbean tales (Heidensohn, 1989:1).

There is not only a widespread popular concern about crime, even experts on the subject have also long flourished. For example, Plato put forward theories of punishment and was one of the earliest of a long line of philosophers to propose an innovative prison system.

Modern scientific and systematic study of crime and criminals is usually held to have begun with the work of Cesare Beccaria, whose essays on crime and punishment were first published in Italy in 1764 and had great influence.

In the late nineteenth century constitutional or dispositional theories were first put forward within a positive framework, with the emphasis on the scientific study and comparison of offenders. Criminals, who were equated largely with prison inmates, were said to be physiologically distinctive (Lombroso, 1913; Sheldon, 1949). Later in the twentieth century they were seen as disordered in a psychopathological sense (Bowlby, 1964) or because of faulty conditioning (Eysenck, 1977).

Physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and even economists have sought to explain criminal behaviour using the concepts of their own disciplines. They have shared the stage with armies of lay and shadow criminologists, ranging from experienced former police officers to investigative journalists, who also confidently proclaim their version of theories of crime. Yet, of all the interpretations of the strange phenomenon called crime which have been offered, none has been more successful and more convincing than those of sociologists. They have succeeded in portraying crime as a socially situated and defined problem both to an academic and a lay audience. The editors of a major American series on research on crime and justice point out that the criminological journals present largely the work of sociologists and their purpose in producing their volumes is to introduce contributions from disciplines, and on topics less fashionable in the criminological literature (Morris & Tonry, 1980, p.vii).

In the early twentieth century much writing about crime took a perspective known as social pathology. The word pathology means disease, and as the name social pathology implies, this school of thought saw society as something like a living organism. Social pathologists were concerned with crime, drunkenness, divorce, and mental illness, what sociologists today call social problems.

Kitsuse define social problems as the activities of individuals or groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions. The emergence of social problems is contingent upon the organization of activities asserting the need for eradicating, ameliorating, or otherwise changing some condition (Spector & Kitsuse, 1987:75-76).

Social pathologists likened the deviant behaviour to a disease in an otherwise healthy society.

Of course, they were primarily concerned with “curing” the disease. But whatever its good intentions, social pathology as a theory suffered from a major flaw: It assumed that there is an objective state of health for society just as there is for a single organism. To sociologists of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the idea of social pathology did not explain the origin or persistence of the behaviours it intended to correct, it merely labelled them, using an analogy (society as body) based on a basically conservative view of society. Sociologists took a more tolerant view of things like drinking, wife battering, abortion, gender inequality, racial discrimination and divorce. They did not consider them forms of pathology. More importantly, sociologists wanted a better explanation for crime and deviance. Therefore, in place of social pathology, sociologists developed the concept of social disorganization. In this view, society is not an organism, it is an organization. Just as formal organizations are based on rules, the basis of society also lies in its rules, written and unwritten, which are called norms (Livington, 1992:351-352).

Norms are the do's and don'ts in society. They evolve out of the experience of people interacting within society. In turn, they guide, channel, and limit future relationships. Within every society, norms tend to cluster around the major, recurrent activities in which its members are involved. Such norms are often called social institutions. For example, what is called “the family” is in actuality a complex set of norms that regulates relations between the sexes, legitimizes children, prescribes methods for their socialization, determines the boundaries of the family unit, regulates sexual behaviour, provides for a division of labour, and guides the complexities of day-to-day activities. While each specific family unit may be unique in certain ways, depending on the individuality of its members and their interaction, there is an element of commonness among all families within society. These commonalities stem from the normative proscriptions. In the same context, we can also talk of economic, legal, religious, educational and political institutions as each being a cluster of norms (Dinitz *et al.*, 1969:4-6).

Social norms are like a central magnet, keeping people in line. But some members of society are further away, at the edges of the magnetic field, where the norms of society do not pull them as strongly. It is in these areas that deviance will flourish.

The way norms function can be best understood, however, in contrasting societal contexts. It

is useful to contrast the nature of the normative order of modern industrial societies with that of the more traditional societies of the past. Such a contrast would suggest that the nature of deviation would be somewhat different in the two types of societies.

Sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies has offered important typologies for contrasting modern industrial societies and traditional folk societies. Tönnies distinguished between the *Gemeinschaft*, which is characterized by a close-knit community to the *Gesellschaft*, which is characteristic of modern urban life. Social control in the *Gemeinschaft* community is maintained through informal means such as moral persuasion, gossip, and even gestures. These techniques work effectively because people are genuinely concerned about how others feel toward them. Social change is relatively limited in the *Gemeinschaft*, the lives of members of one generation may be quite similar to those of their grandparents (Chaefer & Lamm, 1998:138-139).

The situation is quite different in modern urban societies. In the *Gesellschaft*, social life becomes more segmentalized. The normative order become more and more complex. Since there is great diversity within the society itself. Relationships are governed by social roles which grow out of immediate tasks, such as purchasing product or arranging a business meeting. Self-interests dominate, and there is generally little consensus concerning values or commitment to the group. As a result, social control must rely on more formal techniques, such as laws and legally defined punishment (Schaefer & Lamm, 1998:139).

As a result, modern society, in contrast to a traditional rural society, is likely to develop pockets of disorganization further from the pull of social norms, where people (just like the iron filings) would get "out of line". The main causes of the breakdown in this sense, were industrialization, urbanization, and immigration processes that weaken personal ties and increase anonymity. Sociologist Robert Park included the automobile, movies, and newspapers in this list of "demoralizing" aspects of progress. Robert Park wrote in 1925, long before the introduction of television "apparently, anything that makes life interesting is dangerous to the existing order" (Livington, 1992:351-352).

According to Martin Schonteich, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the

link between the alarming rate of poverty and crime in South Africa is the root cause of government's failure to curb the financially crippling crime scourge, which costs taxpayers R32 billion annually.

Schonteich said the spending was a cause for concern, because crime was diverting funds that could be used in other areas such as the fight against Aids.

Schonteich was concerned that the spending is likely to escalate if the government does not prioritise and alter its anti-crime strategy.

Despite having two different approaches to restoring confidence in the rule of law, Schonteich and Johan Burger, Assistant Commissioner and head of the police's operational coordination, concurred that a combination of factors, including poverty, contributed to the governments failure to combat crime.

During a seminar in Pretoria in September 2002, Burger said the government's anti-crime strategy was a failure and advocated a national strategy that involved other departments. Burger argued that the current strategy has limited scope because it has failed to recognise that to combat crime, its root causes such as unemployment, poverty, poor education and inadequate social service should also be addressed.

While Burger and Schonteich both called for the eradication of poverty, they differed in their approaches towards guaranteeing a crime-free society.

Schonteich highlighted the blockages in the police and prosecution services. He argued that enhancing the capacity of the prosecution service would boost the performance of the entire criminal justice system within a short time and this would lead to huge savings.

Schonteich says that the country's criminal justice system is not functioning optimally, adding that in 2000, for example, police recorded 2,6 million crimes. Of these, about 610 000 (24 percent) went to court and the prosecution service took 271 000 cases (11 percent) to trial.

These resulted in slightly more than 211 000 convictions (8 percent). Schonteich said that for some serious crimes the number of convictions as a percentage of recorded cases was even lower.

In 2000 car hijacking made up 2,3 percent of recorded cases, aggravated robbery 2,8 percent, arson 3,7 percent, residential burglary 4,7 percent and rape 7,6 percent. Only one of 43 car hijacking was convicted (Sowetan, September 10, 2002).

Schonteich suggested that to reverse the current situation some of the functions of both the police and the prosecution service had to be outsourced. He said functions like the forensic unit and commercial criminal investigations should be granted to private investigators who specialised in the field.

Such a venture would leave the police with enough manpower to deal with crime, he said. Turning to the prosecution, Schonteich said it was overloaded and this was made clear by comparing its workload per prosecutor with those in other countries. He said in South Africa there was, on average, one prosecutor for every 10 murders.

Schonteich added that compounding their workload was the fact that prosecutors had to deal with administrative matters, citing a 1997 example in which prosecutors in Cape Town claimed they spent almost 3 000 hours photocopying documents (Sowetan, September 10, 2002).

According to John Kane-Berman of the South African Institute for Race Relations, in an article entitled Crime – Political pressures threaten the credibility of crime statistics, John says that official crime statistics both confirm and contradict the government's claim of success in the fight against crime.

The fact is, crime has decreased since 1994. This is what President Thabo Mbeki told a joint conference of the ANC and Afrikanerbond youth leagues. Statistics shows that he was correct in as far as reported murders are concerned. Their number per 100 000 people has decreased by 36% if the period January to May this year is compared with the same period in 1994. The

downward trend in the murder rate has been apparent for some time, and the institute has previously reported it in its Fast Facts.

But rapes are up by 18%. Assaults, robberies, burglaries of houses and flats, and thefts also occur more frequently than they did in 1994. The overall crime rate has risen by 11%. So, Mr Mbeki's statement was not entirely true. The statistics also contradict the promise made by the incoming Commissioner of Police, Mr Jackie Selebi, that he would ensure a lower crime rate by April this year.

- The statistics on crime would not be available again for some time, because of the moratorium on the release of such figures imposed by the late Minister of Safety and Security, Mr Steve Tshwete. Thus, the percentage changes are calculated by the Institute, but the crime rates per 100 000 of population emanate from the Crime Information Analysis Centre of the South African Police Service.

Ironically, the moratorium has been introduced barely six months after parliament passed a promotion of access to Information Act which is designed to give effect to a clause in the constitution that gave 'everyone' the right of access to any information held by the state.

John Kane-Berman says that the official crime figures have always been subject to certain limitations. In the first place, they reflect reported crime. Actual crime is almost certainly higher, since many crimes may go unreported. Secondly, increases or decreases in the incidence of particular types of crime may reflect increases or decreases in the reporting rate rather than actual increases or decreases.

It is, however, hard to believe that the figures are so unreliable that publication must be suspended. The police suggested that a study of crime reporting by Dr Mark Orkin, outgoing head of Statistics South Africa, revealed major deficiencies. However, shortly after Dr Orkin produced his as yet unpublished report two years ago, the then minister of Safety and Security, Mr Sydney Mufamadi, said it had shown that public scepticism about crime figures was misplaced.

It is also difficult to avoid the suspicion that one of the reasons for the moratorium is the tendency of some crime figures to contradict what the government claims.

Rape is a particularly sensitive topic, given the fact that it helps to spread Aids. President Mbeki seems to have spent more time in speeches questioning the statistics than addressing the problem. The rate last year was 119 per 100 000. In November the police admitted the lack of foundation of a claim they had made that only one in 36 rapes was reported. But the late Mr Tshwete had said that no fewer than 8 683 children under the age of 18 were raped in the first six months of last year. This averages out at 50 rapes a day, says John Kane-Berman.

Whatever the deficiencies in the official figures, there was never any reason to suspect that they were being tampered with by politicians. Their credibility was enhanced by the fact that they showed precisely the kind(s) of contradictory trends one expects to find in the real world. And certainly, when analysis of the figures by the Institute showed decreases in particular crime rates, ministerial offices were swiftly on the telephone to obtain copies of the South African Institute of Race Relation's reports. Mr Mbeki was among those who made use of them in speeches (SAIRR – Fast Facts, August 2000).

The Durkheimian analysis of crime also made for interesting reading. According to Emile Durkheim, crime is fundamentally bond up with the conditions of social life. For Durkheim, crime, far from being a pathology, is a normal phenomenon. He is of the opinion that crime is an inevitable and moral aspect of social life, and that it is present in all types of society. This buttressed the fact that it is not possible to see a society that is crime free and as a matter of fact, crime is an integral part of all healthy societies.

Durkheim regarded some crime as 'an anticipation of the morality of the future'. In this way terrorists or freedom fighters may present a future established order. One can consider, for example, the case of Robert Mugabe, a freedom fighter, who later became the prime minister of Zimbabwe.

Robert Mugabe attended at Fort Hare University in South Africa from 1949-1951. While at Fort

Hare University he came into contact with many future black African Nationalist leaders. Between 1955 and 1960, he taught in Rhodesia, Zambia and Ghana.

He joined Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African National People's Union (ZAPU), and three years later, formed the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In August 1964, Mugabe was jailed for a decade for his nationalist politics. The then Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Smith was striving for a white supremacist state.

While in prison, Mugabe gained bachelor degrees in law and administration. In 1974, he left Rhodesia for Mozambique and launched a guerilla era against Smith's white-only government. The unrest and the violence concerned the British Government to let all leaders, black and white, be included in the next elections.

Thus, the Lancaster House Agreement paved the way for Mugabe's 1980 victory. Thereafter, Mugabe formed a government of National Unity with Joshua Nkomo, but two years later dismissed Nkomo and ruled as a sole leader. To date, Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe for the past two decades, and is still president of Zimbabwe.

With regard to South Africa, in 1976, young people in black communities affiliated themselves with political groupings for the struggle against apartheid. The 1976 riots were against the imposition of Afrikaans as the medium of communication for education in the black schools and was the first organized opposition against the education system which not only completely failed to provide them with a sense of belonging or identification, but also imposed on them a foreign Afrikaner culture.

These youth perceived themselves as frontline soldiers in the struggle for social and political change and therefore, as defenders of their communication. In fighting against the system with their stones and home-made weapons, they became the army for liberation. The struggle provided them with an alternative structure, a sense of belonging and purpose, and with a sense of identity in their new status as liberators. The young people in these political formations were often highly trained, both in political strategy and later militarily for the armed struggle. They were

also focussed in their aims and highly disciplined.

However, during the negotiated transition, the armed struggle was suspended and the political leaders called on the youth to curtail their resistance activities. In the 1980s FW de Klerk, the last white president of South Africa, opened the door for the first fully democratic elections. De Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990, and apartheid was dissolved. Mandela's famous quotation when released from prison was: "I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the idea of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal in which I hope to live and achieve. But if needs be it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die." The first fully democratic general elections took place in 1994, in which the ANC won, and Nelson Mandela became the first black president of the new South Africa. With this, a new era of peace and equality evolved. Many of the leaders of the youth movements were lost to power politics and later to parliament and government.

Durkheim's views on crime have been developed by a number of sociologists. For example, Albert Cohen's (1966) analyses two possible functions of deviance. First, Cohen says that deviance acts as a safety valve for the expression of dissatisfaction. In this way social order is protected. For example, Cohen suggests that 'prostitution performs such a safety valve function without threatening the institution of the family'. According to Cohen, prostitution can provide a release from the stress and pressure of family life without undermining family stability, since relationships between prostitutes and their clients usually avoid strong emotional attachments.

Second, Cohen suggests that certain deviant acts serve as warning device to indicate that an aspect of society is malfunctioning. This may draw attention to the problem and lead to measures to solve it.

Thus, Durkheim and Cohen have moved away from the picture of the deviant as biologically or psychologically abnormal. Instead, Durkheim suggests that society itself generates deviance for its own well being. On the other hand, Cohen argues that certain forms of deviance are a natural and normal response to particular circumstances.

The Durkheimian analysis shows that whenever human beings live together, they display diverse forms of behaviour and some of these behaviours are bound to depart from established norms. Deviant behaviour or crime as the case may be is therefore inherent within our social structures and society. Crime control in South Africa is not an exception to the above analysis. If deviant behaviour is bound to occur in any situation where human beings congregate, then the basic task of a sociologist is how do we control such deviant behaviour. Durkheim is also of the view that when a new social order comes into existence, people have to find different ways of conforming to the new social order. In South Africa, a new social order has come into existence. The change from apartheid to democracy represents a shift in social order. The high rate of crime in South African could be attributed to the new democratic process where individual freedom of movement, speech, association and organizational rights have been on the increase (Tshabalala, 2000).

However, the inference we can draw from the Durkheimian analysis in relation to our research is that as soon as a new social order comes into existence, there is bound to be an increase in crime.

### 3.2 THE NEO-MARXIST PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME

In 1973 Taylor, Walton and Young published *The New Criminology*. It was intended to provide a radical alternative to existing theories of crime and deviance. In some respects Taylor, Walton and Young's views are similar to those of the Marxist writers who have just been examined.

- (a) They accept that the key to understanding crime lies in the material basis of society. Like Marx, they see the economy as the most important part of any society.
- (b) They believe capitalist societies are characterized by inequalities in wealth and power between individuals and that these inequalities lie at the root of crime.

- (c) They support a radical transformation of society: indeed, they suggest that sociological theories of crime are of little use unless they contribute in a practical way to the liberation of individuals from living under capitalism'.

However, in important respects they differ from more conventional Marxist approaches. As such we can see *The New Criminology* as a neo-Marxist perspective on crime.

### 3.3 **CRIME, FREEDOM AND POLITICAL ACTION**

Much of the work by Taylor, Walton and Young is concerned with criticizing existing theories of crime. Marx himself is judged by them to have produced inadequate explanations of crime. He is criticized for coming close to providing an economically deterministic theory. Although they believe economic determinism is untypical of Marx's work in general, when he tried to explain crime they claim that he saw the criminal as driven to crime by the poverty into which capitalism forced some sections of the population.

Taylor, Walton and Young insist that criminals choose to break the law. They reject all theories which see human behaviour as directed by external forces. They see the individual turning to crime as the meaningful attempt by the actor to construct and develop his own self-conception'.

*The New Criminology* denies that crime is caused by biology, anomie, by being a member of a subculture, by living in areas of social disorganization, by labelling or by poverty. It stresses that crimes are often deliberate and conscious acts with political motives. Thus the Women's Liberation Movement, the Black Power Movement and the Gay Liberation Front are all examples of 'people-fighting-back' against the injustices of capitalism.

Furthermore, many crimes against property involve the redistribution of wealth: if a poor resident of an inner-city area steals from a rich person the former is helping to change society. Deviants are not just the passive victims of capitalism: they are actively struggling to alter capitalism.

Like conventional Marxists Taylor, Walton and Young wish to see the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement with a different type of society. Unlike conventional Marxists they refer to the type of society they wish to see as 'socialist' rather than 'communist'. They place greater emphasis than many Marxists on freedom in any future society. They wish to see a society in which groups which are now seen as deviant are tolerated. They believe that hippies, ethnic minorities, homosexuals and perhaps even drug users should simply be accepted in an ideal society, and not turned into criminals by persecution. In capitalist society people have severe restrictions placed upon their behaviour. Taylor, Walton and Young urge support and sympathy for groups who struggle to escape from the chains with which capitalism limits their freedom.

### 3.4 **A 'FULLY SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE'**

In the final chapter of *The New Criminology* Taylor, Walton and Young attempt to outline what they believe would be a fully social theory of deviance. From their critical examination of earlier theories they conclude that deviance needs to be explained from a number of angles simultaneously. They claim that other writers, including Marxists, have tended to give incomplete, or one-sided explanations of crime. They identify seven aspects of crime and deviance which they believe should be studied.

To them, a complete theory examines both the way society as a whole is organized, and the way that individuals decide to carry out criminal acts.

- (a) The criminologist first needs to understand the way wealth and power are distributed in society.
- (b) He or she must consider the particular circumstances surrounding the decision of an individual to commit an act of deviance.
- (c) It is necessary to consider the deviant act itself, in order to discover its meaning for the person concerned. Was the individual, for example, showing contempt for the material values of capitalism by taking drugs?

Was he or she 'kicking back' at society through an act of vandalism?

- (d) Taylor, Walton and Young propose that the criminologist should consider in what ways, and for what reasons other members of society react to the deviance. How do the police or members of the deviant's family respond to the discovery of the deviance?
- (e) The reaction then needs to be explained in terms of the social structure. This means that the researcher should attempt to discover who has the power in society to make the rules, and to explain why some deviant acts are treated much more severely than others.
- (f) Taylor, Walton and Young then turn to labelling theory. They accept that it is necessary to study the effects of deviant labels. However, they emphasize that labelling may have a variety of effects. The amplification of deviance is only one possible outcome. Deviants may not even accept that the labels are justified: they might see their actions as morally correct and ignore the label as far as possible.
- (g) Finally Taylor, Walton and Young say that the relationship between these different aspects of deviance should be studied, so that they fuse together into a complete theory.

*The New Criminology* has had a considerable impact on the sociology of deviance. Many sociologists were attracted to this approach: it seemed to combine some of the insights provided by both interactionist and Marxist perspectives and offer a highly sophisticated approach to studying deviance which could finally overcome the limited and partial picture provided by the previous theories. However it should be remembered that Taylor, Walton and Young had only sketched an outline of how they believed crime should be studied, and that this could be developed further.

In a series of articles, Paul Gilroy has used a similar approach to that of Taylor, Walton and Young in analysing the relationship between race and crime in Britain. In keeping with *The New Criminology* Gilroy claims that crimes committed by ethnic minorities are frequently conscious and deliberate political acts. He believes that they can only be understood once the existence of racism in British society is acknowledged. Furthermore, he suggests that many of the widely held beliefs about black criminality are 'myths'.

Gilroy examines British society as a whole and finds that this capitalist society in the 1970s and 1980s created both the political revolt of blacks and Asians, and the racist policies of the police towards these groups.

### 3.5 **CRIME AS POLITICAL STRUGGLE**

Gilroy rejects the view that black criminals are pathological. He denies that belonging to an 'alien culture' or the poor socialization of ethnic minorities is responsible for some of them becoming criminal. Instead he sees these groups as defending themselves and hitting back at a society which treats them unjustly.

He believes that immigrants to Great Britain brought with them legacies of their political, ideological, and economic struggles in Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent, as well as the scars of imperialist violence'. In anti-colonial struggles the populations of these countries learned how to organize themselves to resist their exploitation. Once they arrived in Britain these ethnic minorities used the marches, demonstrations and riots which had first developed in their native lands. In areas such as Southall, Toxteth, Brixton, Handsworth and the St Paul's area of Bristol, they hit back against police harassment, racially motivated attacks and discrimination.

According to Gilroy the Rastafarian movement has provided a focus for West Indians to organize themselves politically. Rastafarianism is more than a religion: it also involves political beliefs. 'Rastas' believe that white society is corrupt and oppressive, and they aim to overthrow it to create their own heaven on earth.

Although Gilroy sees ethnic minority crime as part of a political struggle, he denies that ethnic minorities are more prone to being criminal than other sections of the population. He claims that 'black criminality' is a myth. He argues that the police have negative stereotypes of West Indians and Asians. West Indians are often seen as 'wild and lawless', or more specifically as 'muggers'. Asians are frequently regarded with suspicion by the police. In particular they are suspected of being illegal immigrants.

Gilroy provides some support for the view that such stereotypes exist by quoting the statements of various policemen. For example, he refers to a police officer in Brixton saying to a reporter 'We are here to give our coloured brethren all the help we can – all they need to go somewhere else' (quoted in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies *The Empire Strikes Back*, p.150).

Furthermore, he points out that the Police Federation magazine has carried stories claiming that Jamaica deliberately shipped convicts to Britain during periods of high immigration. Gilroy believes that official statistics which show heavy West Indian involvement in street crime cannot be trusted. Since the police are largely responsible for enforcing the law, their racist stereotypes will lead to them arresting members of the West Indian and Asian communities almost regardless of whether they have committed any offence.

In some respects Gilroy's views are similar to interactionist and labelling perspectives on deviance. However, he goes further than them in attempting to explain why racial prejudice and stereotypes exist in the first place.

Gilroy argues that British capitalism is undergoing an economic 'crisis', which has led to high levels of unemployment. Ethnic minorities are a 'surplus population' over and above that which is needed for a labour force by the British bourgeoisie. In this situation blacks and Asians are blamed for the problems which are in reality the creation of the capitalist system. Furthermore, their alleged responsibility for crime helps to justify calls for their repatriation to their countries of origin.

Like Taylor, Walton and Young, Gilroy tries to explain crime in terms of the social structure of society as a whole, and particularly its relationship to the workings of the capitalist economic system.

Gilroy's views have attracted strong criticism from John Lea and Jock Young and we will consider these criticisms in this chapter.

Stuart Hall, Chas Cither, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts have attempted to provide a detailed explanation of the crime of 'mugging' in Britain. Like Taylor, Walton and Young and Paul Gilroy their work is influenced by a Marxist perspective, yet differs from traditional Marxist views. *Policing the Crisis* comes close to providing what Taylor, Walton and Young called a 'fully social theory of deviance'. The wide-ranging argument presented in this chapter deals with the origins and nature of mugging, the social reaction to the crime, and the distribution of power in society as a whole. The sole aspect of crime which is dealt with only in passing is the effect of labelling on the deviants themselves.

Hall differs from Paul Gilroy and Taylor, Walton and Young in two important ways.

- (a) He does not share their belief that most crimes are political acts, especially since most of the victims of street crime are 'people whose class position is hardly distinguishable from that of the criminals'. 'Muggers rarely choose the rich as victims – rather they tend to rob from individuals who share their own disadvantaged position in society.
- (b) He is perhaps more heavily influenced by the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci than directly by the work of Marx himself. The influence of Gramsci will become increasingly apparent as this section develops.

### 3.6 **'MUGGING', THE MEDIA AND MORAL PANIC**

In the thirteen months between August 1972 and August 1973, sixty events were reported as

'muggings' in the national daily papers. Dramatic individual cases of such crimes were highlighted in the media. On 15 August 1972 Arthur Hills was stabbed to death near Waterloo Station in London. For the first time a specific crime in Britain was labelled a 'mugging' in the press. On 5 November 1972 Robert Keenan was attacked by three youths in Birmingham. He was knocked to the ground and had some keys, five cigarettes and 30p stolen. Two hours later the youths returned to where he still lay, and they viciously kicked him and hit him with a brick.

It was stories such as these which highlighted an apparently new and frightening type of crime in Britain. Judges, politicians and the police lined up with the media in stressing the threat that this crime posed to society. Many commentators believed that the streets of Britain would soon become as dangerous as those of New York or Chicago. The Home Secretary in the House of Commons quoted an alarming figure that there had been a 129 per cent increase in muggings in London in the previous four years.

Hall *et al.*, argue that there was a 'moral panic' about crime. They try to explain why there should be such a strong reaction to, and widespread fear of mugging. They reject the view that the panic was an inevitable and understandable reaction to a new and rapidly increasing form of violence. As far back as the nineteenth century footpads and garroters (who half strangled their victims before robbing them) had committed violent street crimes similar to those of the modern mugger. Violent robberies were not therefore a new crime at all – indeed as recently as 1968 an MP had been kicked and robbed in the street without the crime being labelled a 'mugging'.

Hall and his colleagues note that there is no legal crime called 'mugging'. Since legally there is no such crime it was not possible for the Home Secretary to accurately measure its extent. They could find no basis in the criminal statistics for his figure of a 129 per cent rise over four years. From their own examination of the statistics there was no evidence that violent street crime was rising particularly fast in the period leading up to the panic. Using the nearest legal category to 'mugging' – robbery or assault with intent to rob – the official statistics showed an annual rise of an average of 33.4 per cent between 1955 and 1965, but only a 14 per cent average annual increase from 1965 to 1972. This type of crime was growing more slowly when the panic took place than it had done in the previous decade.

For these reasons Hall *et al.*, could not accept that the supposed novelty or rate of increase of the crime explained the moral panic over it. They argued that both mugging and the moral panic could only be explained in the context of the problems that were faced by British capitalism at the start of the 1970s.

### 3.7 **CAPITALISM, CRISIS AND CRIME**

Economic problems produced part of the 'crisis'. Many Marxists believe that capitalism faces deeper and deeper crises as time passes. Marx believed that only labour power produced wealth. In capitalist societies labour was exploited because the bourgeoisie kept a proportion of the wealth created by the workforce in the form of profit or surplus value. In order 'to compete with other manufacturers, capitalists needed to invest in new and more efficient machinery. However, as this mechanization took place, less and less labour power would be necessary to manufacture the same quantity of goods. Since surplus value was only created through labour power, the dwindling workforce needed to be increasingly exploited if profits were to be maintained. Eventually this problem would lead to a declining rate of profit, rising unemployment and falling wages. According to Hall *et al.*, such a crisis hit Britain at the time of the mugging panic.

The crisis of British society, however, went beyond economic problems. It was also a crisis of 'hegemony', a term first used by Antonio Gramsci. Hegemony is the political leadership and ideological domination of society. According to Gramsci, the state tends to be dominated by parts of the ruling class. They attempt to win support for their policies and ideas from other groups in society. They try to persuade the working class that the authority of the state is being exercised fairly and justly in the interests of all. A crisis in hegemony takes place when the authority of the state and the ruling class is challenged.

In 1970-72 the British state faced both an economic crisis and a crisis of hegemony. From 1945 until about 1978 there had been what Hall *et al.*, call an inter-class truce: there was little conflict between the ruling and subject class. Full employment, rising living standards, and the expansion of the Welfare State secured support for the state, and acceptance of its authority by the

working class. As unemployment rose and living standards ceased to rise rapidly, the basis of the inter-class truce was undermined. It became more difficult for the ruling class to govern by consent.

Hall *et al.*, provide a number of examples of the challenge to the authority – to the hegemony – of the state.

- (a) Northern Ireland degenerated into open warfare.
- (b) There was a growth in student militancy and increased activity from the Black Power movement.
- (c) The unions posed perhaps the biggest single threat: in 1972 there were more workdays lost because of strikes than in any year since 1919. The miners were able to win a large pay-rise by using flying pickets which prevented coal reaching key industries and power stations.

Since the Government was no longer able to govern by consent, it turned to the use of force to control the crisis. It was in this context that street crime became an issue. Mugging was presented as a key element in a breakdown of law and order. Violence was portrayed as a threat to the stability of society, and it was the black mugger who was to symbolize the threat of violence.

In this way the public could be persuaded that society's problems were caused by immigrants rather than the faults of the capitalist system. The working class was effectively divided on racial grounds, since the white working class was encouraged to direct its frustrations towards the black working class.

### 3.8 **CRISIS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME**

The Government was also able to resort to the use of the law and direct force to suppress the

groups that were challenging them. Force could be justified because of the general threat of violence. Special sections of the police began to take action against the 'mugger'. The British Transport Police was particularly concerned with this crime. In February 1972, six months before the 'mugging' panic began, it set up a special squad to deal with violent crime on the London Underground. Hall *et al.*, claim that the police in general, and this special squad in particular, created much of the 'mugging' which was later to appear in the official statistics. Following the argument of interactionists, they suggest that the police amplified, or made worse, the deviance they were supposed to be controlling.

They give examples of police pouncing unannounced on black youths of whom they were suspicious. Often this would provoke a violent reaction in self-defence by the youths, who would then be arrested and tried for crimes of violence. Many of the 'muggers' who were convicted following incidents like these had only police evidence used against them at trial. 'Victims' of their crimes were not produced because. Hall *et al.*, imply, there were no victims in some cases. The societal reaction to the threat of violence led to the labelling of large numbers of young blacks as deviants. Labelling helped to produce the figures which appeared to show rising levels of black crime, which in turn justified stronger police measures.

Hall *et al.*, do not claim that the reactions to crime, 'mugging', and other 'violence' was the result of a conspiracy by the ruling class. The police, the Government, the courts and the media did not consciously plan to create a moral panic about street crime; the panic developed as they reacted to changing circumstances.

Neither were the media directly manipulated by the ruling class or the Government: different newspapers included different stories, and reported 'mugging' in different ways. Nevertheless, there was a limited range of approaches in the press to the issue. Most stories were based on police statements, court cases or were concerned with the general problem of the 'war' against crime. Statements by the police, judges and politicians were therefore important sources of material for the press. Consequently the newspapers tended to define the problem of 'mugging' in similar ways to their sources: criminal violence was seen as senseless and meaningless by most of the press. It was linked to other threats to society, such as strikes, and was seen as a crime

which needed to be stamped out as quickly as possible. A number of judges who stressed the need for deterrent sentences to turn back the tide of crime were quoted directly. Assistant Commissioner Woods of the Police Federation was widely quoted when he said 'mugging' was a 'reflection of the present violent society' and he declared that 'we are not going to let the thugs win'.

However, if the crisis in Britain produced the conditions in which a moral panic was likely, the media was largely responsible for 'orchestrating public opinion', and directing its attention and anger against the black mugger.

### 3.9 **BLACK CRIME**

Although *Policing the Crisis* concentrates on the moral panic about crime. Hall *et al.*, also make some attempt to explain black criminality. Many immigrants to Britain from the Commonwealth arrived in the 1950s and early 1960s. They were actively encouraged to come to the country during a period of full employment and labour shortage. London Transport, for example, recruited large numbers of West Indians to fill low-paid jobs which might otherwise have remained vacant.

The recession in the early 1970s hit immigrant groups hard. They became a surplus labour force many of whom were not required for employment. Thus Hall *et al.*, estimate that at the time in question, black unemployment was twice the national average, and for school leavers it was four times higher than normal. Those who remained in employment often had to do menial and low-paid jobs, which some referred to as 'white man's shit work'. Some opted out of the employment market altogether. They turned to 'hustling' for money, using petty street crime, casual drugs dealing, and prostitution to earn a living. Hall *et al.*, do not find it surprising that some of this surplus labour force became criminals. They claim:

"a fraction of the black labouring class is engaged in the traditional activity of the wageless and the workless: doing nothing, filling out time, trying to survive. Against this background is it not too much to say that the question 'Why do they

turn to crime?' is a practical obscenity?"

From this point of view street crime is seen as a survival strategy by an unwanted reserve army of labour (Haralambos, 1995:420-425).

### 3.10 THE PROBLEM OF CRIME

One of the basic tenets of left realism is that crimes other than white-collar crimes are a serious problem and they need to be explained and tackled. Left realists counter a number of arguments which criminologists have advanced to suggest that such crimes are not serious.

- (a) Jock Young argues that there has been a real and significant increase in street crime since the Second World War. According to this view criminology has undergone an aetiological crisis (or crisis of explanation) resulting from the rapid increase in officially recorded street crimes in most democratic industrial societies. In Britain, the USA and most Western European countries, crime rates recorded by the police have risen alarmingly.

Some sociologists have tried to deny that the apparent increase is real by pointing to the unreliable nature of criminal statistics. From this point of view increased reporting of crime and changes in police recording of crime might account for the figures. However, Young believes that the rises have been so great that changes in reporting and recording cannot account for all of the increase. He points to evidence from the *British Crime Survey* which shows that at least part of the rising tide of crime is real. There is more reporting of crimes, but there are also more victims.

- (b) Some sociologists have advanced the view that the chances of being the victim of street crime are minimal. Lea and Young point out that while the average chances of being a victim are small, particular groups might face

high risks. It is not the rich who are the usual targets of muggers or thieves, but the poor, the deprived, ethnic minorities or inner-city residents. For example, Lea and Young calculate that unskilled workers are twice as likely to be burgled as other workers. In some of the poorer areas of London the chances of being mugged might be four times the average for the city as a whole. In the USA figures indicate that black men and women are more likely to be murdered than to die in a road accident. It is the deprived groups in society who are most likely to be harmed by these crimes; it is also they who suffer most if they are the victims of these offences. Those with low incomes suffer more if they are robbed or burgled: crime adds to and compounds the other problems that they face.

- (c) Crime is widely perceived as a serious problem in urban areas and this perception has important consequences. Left realists have carried out a considerable number of victimization studies examining such issues as the extent of crime and attitudes towards crime. These studies have been conducted in, amongst other places, Merseyside, Islington, Hammersmith and Fulham. In the *Second Islington Crime Survey* no less than 80,5 per cent of those surveyed saw crime as a problem affecting their lives. Fear of crime was widespread. Some 35 per cent sometimes felt unsafe in their own homes. Many people altered their behaviour to avoid becoming victims of crime. This was particularly true of women. The authors said, 'women are not only less likely to go out after dark, but also stay in more than men because of fear of crime. When women do go out they are more 'careful than men.'
- (d) Lea and Young attack the idea that offenders can sometimes be seen as promoting justice. For example, they attack the image of the criminal presented in *The New Criminology* as a type of modern-day Robin Hood. They deny that muggers can be seen as stealing from the rich and

redistributing income to the poor. As we saw earlier, most of the victims of crimes such as burglary and robbery are themselves poor.

- (e) Left realists do not deny the importance of white-collar and corporate crime. Recent victimization studies carried out by left realists have started including questions on such crimes and they accept that they are *commonplace and serious*. However, they do argue that left idealist criminologists have concentrated on these types of crime too much and to the exclusion of other crimes.
- (f) Left realists also acknowledge the importance of other crimes which tend to be emphasized by left-wing and feminist criminologists, and perhaps neglected by the police. Thus they have also included questions in victim studies on crimes such as sexual assaults and sexual harassment, racially motivated attacks and domestic violence. They do, though, accuse left idealists of 'Schizophrenia' over crime. Lea and Young say:

“There is the story of a seminar in North London where one week the students, reeling from the impact of a description of the deplorable results of imprisonment on inmates decide to abolish prisons. But then next week, after being, quite correctly, informed by a speaker from the Women's Movement of the viciousness of many anti-female offences, decided to rebuild them.”

Left realists claim to have redressed the balance by taking all types of crime equally seriously.

### 3.11 **ETHNICITY AND CRIME**

As well as attacking left idealists for denying the importance of street crimes, they also attack

them for denying that certain types of crime are more common amongst ethnic minorities. Just as they believe the official statistics on the rise in crime reflect a real change, they also believe that Statistics on the ethnic background of offenders are not entirely fabricated.

Paul Gilroy is a particular target of Lea and Young. They seriously question his view that police racism accounts entirely for the official statistics which suggest that ethnic minorities are more prone to crime. They quote the figure that 92 per cent of crimes known to the police are brought to their attention by the public, and only 8 per cent are uncovered by the police themselves. In such circumstances, they argue, it is difficult to believe that the preponderance of blacks in the official figures is entirely a consequence of discrimination by the police.

Lea and Young also make use of the work of the Home Office researchers Stevens and Willis. They calculate that to explain the differences between whites and blacks convicted of offences in 1975 it would have been necessary for the police to have arrested 66 per cent of all black offenders, but only 21 per cent of all white offenders. They argue that it is more likely that blacks do commit some crimes more often than whites.

They also point to a number of aspects of criminal statistics which cannot be explained by police racism alone. The recorded rate for crimes committed by whites is consistently slightly higher than that recorded for Asians. They maintain that police racism would have to manifest itself very strangely indeed to be entirely responsible for such rates.

Furthermore, in the 1960s the recorded rates for first-generation West Indian immigrants were lower than the national average. Even today the official statistics for offences such as burglary show the rate for West Indians to be lower than that for whites. If these statistics were produced by police racism, then they must have exercised positive discrimination in favour of some ethnic minority groups at times.

Lea and Young accept that policing policies and police racism exaggerate the black crime rate. Nevertheless, they do believe that there has been a real increase in the number of certain crimes (particularly robbery) committed by blacks. They find it hard to understand why left idealists

such as Gilroy cannot bring themselves to believe that unemployment and racial discrimination might result in ethnic minorities committing more street crime than others.

Lea and Young are even more critical of Gilroy's claim that such black crime as there is results from a continuation of the 'anti-colonial struggle' conducted in the native lands of immigrants. They point out that most young West Indians are second-generation immigrants who have lived since birth in Britain. Most of their parents in the 1950s and 1960s appear from the statistics to have been highly law abiding. It is hard to see then how they could have passed down the tradition of the 'anti-colonial struggle' to their children.

In any case, most of the victims of crimes committed by blacks are also black. How, Lea and Young enquire, can crimes committed against members of their own community be seen as a political attack on the white racist state? To them it is far more plausible that street crime is a reaction to the oppression that West Indians have experienced in Britain.

### 3.12 **THE EXPLANATION OF CRIME**

In *What is to be Done about Law and Order* John Lea and Jock Young began to develop an approach to explaining criminality. They see crime as rooted in social conditions and argue that crime is closely connected to deprivation. However, they reject those views which suggest that factors such as poverty and unemployment can be seen as directly responsible for crime. A considerable amount of crime, (for example white-collar offences) can only take place if people are working. Groups such as old age pensioners often have low incomes, but despite this they have exceptionally low crime rates. In the 1930s unemployment was very high, yet the crime rate was low compared to the 1980s. In recent writing Jock Young has stressed how rising living standards and the development of welfare provisions have gone hand in hand with a rising crime rate since the Second World War. Lea and Young also note that first-generation West Indian immigrants also had low rates of crime although most of them had low-paid jobs. They conclude that a more sophisticated analysis is required. They base their attempt to explain crime around three key concepts: relative deprivation, subculture and marginalization.

### 3.13 **RELATIVE DEPRIVATION**

Lea and Young believe that deprivation will only lead to crime where it is experienced as relative deprivation. A group experiences relative deprivation when it feels deprived in comparison to other similar groups, or when its expectations are not met. It is not the *fact* of being deprived as such, but the *feeling* of deprivation which is important. Thus in modern societies the media (and particularly advertisers) stress the importance of economic success and the consumption of consumer goods. All individuals are exposed to the values which suggest people should aspire to middle-class lifestyles and patterns of consumption.

*Ethnic minorities today feel more deprived than they did in the past when the media and advertising were less highly developed. Lea and Young claim that part of the difference in Asian and West Indian crime rates can be explained by West Indians having internalized materialist values to a greater extent than Asians whose traditional cultural and religious beliefs have remained stronger. Rather like Merton, they argue that rising crime is partly the result of rising expectations for high standards of living, combined with restricted opportunities to achieve this success because of unemployment.*

In *Ten Points of Realism* Jock Young stresses that relative deprivation is experienced in all social strata. 'Anybody can feel deprived and 'crime can, therefore, occur anywhere in the social structure and at any period, affluent or otherwise'. It can explain the theft of luxuries as well as necessities and crimes committed by white-collar criminals who crave the lifestyles of those better off than themselves. To Young, relative deprivation can also help explain violent crime: relative deprivation can cause frustration which in turn can cause violence.

### 3.14 **SUBCULTURE**

The second key concept Lea and Young use is that of subculture. They see subcultures as the collective solution to a group's problems. Thus if a group of individuals share a sense of relative deprivation they will develop lifestyles which allow them to cope with this problem. However, a particular subculture is not an automatic, inevitable response to a situation. Human creativity

will allow a variety of solutions to be produced. For example, second-generation West Indian immigrants' subcultural solutions to their problems include the Rastafarian and Pentecostalist religions, as well as 'hustling' for money and street crime.

Lea and Young stress that crime is only 'one aspect, though generally a small one, of the process of cultural adaptation to oppression'. Unlike Gilroy, they see West Indian crime as a response to conditions in Britain rather than as a continuation of traditions from the West Indies.

### 3.15 **MARGINILIZATION**

The third and final key concept is that of marginalization. Marginal groups are those who lack organizations to represent their interests in political life, and who also lack clearly defined goals. Lea and Young argue that marginal groups in society are particularly prone to the use of violence and riots as forms of political action.

Lea and Young believe that 'participation in the process of production' is the key to a group avoiding marginality. Workers have clearly defined objectives such as higher wages and improved working conditions. Furthermore, their membership of unions provides them with involvement in pressure group politics. Thus they have no need to resort to violence.

In contrast, young unemployed West Indians do not have clearly defined aims, or pressure groups to represent them. Rather than precise grievances they feel a general sense of resentment that the future does not seem to offer an interesting, worthwhile and rewarding life. Since they have no pressure groups to express these frustrations they are more likely to take to the streets and resort to rioting.

More recent writing by left realists has made little use of the concept of marginalization, but the concepts of relative deprivation and subculture have remained central to their work.

### 3.16 DEALING WITH CRIME

#### 3.16.1 Policing problems

Left realist criminologists pay considerable attention to practical ways in which the problem of crime might be reduced. In *Losing the Fight Against Crime* Richard Kinsey, John Lea and Jock Young put forward a variety of suggestions about ways of changing policing. They argue that there are a number of flaws in current policing practice.

- (a) As crime has risen the police have failed to improve the clear-up rate. The Metropolitan Police, for example, hardly increased their clear-up rate at all between 1976 and 1981 despite a 12 per cent increase in personnel. In the 1973-83 period police efficiency in terms of crimes cleared up per officer fell by 18 per cent meaning that on average each Metropolitan police officer only cleared up four crimes a year. As a result the clear-up rate has become extremely low for most offences, and as low as 6 per cent for burglaries in the Metropolitan Police District in 1983. In such circumstances the police become unable to deter crime.
- (b) The police actually spend little of their time involved in investigating crime. Using evidence from Home Office research, Kinsey, Lea and Young estimate that the average officer probably spends less than an hour a day on investigation and follow-up work.
- (c) Evidence from victimization studies and other sources shows over 90 per cent of crimes known to the police are notified to them by the public. Most crimes which are cleared-up are also solved as a result of information received from the public. However, research suggests that public confidence in the police has declined, particularly in inner-city areas and amongst members of ethnic minorities. For example, the Policy Studies Institute found that in 1983, 75 per cent of West Indians aged 15-

24 in London thought that the police fabricated evidence, 82 per cent thought they used violence on suspects and 66 per cent thought they made false records of interviews (quoted in Kinsey, Lea & Young 1986:66). As trust breaks down between the police and some sections of the public, the flow of information from the victims of crime dries up.

- (d) Lacking the information which is necessary to solve crime the police resort to new policing methods. They drift towards what Kinsey, Lea and Young call military policing. Without the support of the community the police have to resort to tactics such as stopping and searching large numbers of people in an area or using surveillance technology to find suspects. This leads to the mobilization of bystanders. Even those who are not directly involved with the police come to see police officers as part of an alien force intent upon criminalizing local residents almost regardless of their guilt. As a result, a vicious circle is initiated: declining information leads to more military-style policing and information provided by the public is reduced further. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.1 on page 153.

A good example of this process occurred in 1981. The Brixton riots were sparked by a police operation, *Swamp 81*, in which the streets of Brixton were flooded by police stopping and searching people suspected of offences.

### 3.16.2 **Improving policing**

How then can the police improve their performance and begin to clear up more crime? Kinsey, Lea and Young argue that the key to police success lies in improving relationships with the community so that the flow of information on which the police rely increases.

### Figure 3.1: The vicious circle of the collapse of consensus policing



**Source:** Kinsey, Lea & Young, *Losing the Fight Against Crime*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986:42

To achieve this they propose that minimal policing should be used. This is:

“a style of policing under a system of democratic accountability in which information is freely given by the public and where the police are sufficiently trusted to do the job they are paid for – the full and proper investigation of crime.”

This approach involves maximizing the role of the public in shaping police policy. Kinsey, Lea and Young believe that the public should have much more power to shape policing through democratically elected police authorities. These should be able to issue guidelines and direct the police towards dealing with the crimes that are of most public concern. The public should play a major role in determining which incidents the police become involved in. Unless directed to take action by police authorities, the police should only respond to public requests for help.

Kinsey, Lea and Young see little role for stopping and searching suspects and little point in having police on the beat. Such police practice either antagonize the public on whom the police rely or are ineffective. It is only very rarely that police on the beat actually discover crimes.

The police should spend as much of their time as possible actually investigating crime. Kinsey, Lea and Young believe that if the police act in these ways, they can regain the trust of the public and become more effective in clearing up the crimes which are of most public concern.

### 3.16.3 **Over-policing and under-policing**

Although he has argued that the public should establish priorities for the police, Jock Young has also identified areas which he believes are over-policed and under-policed. In other words he thinks the police and the state devote too much of their time and energy to dealing with certain types of crime, and not enough to others. In the former category are minor drug offences and juvenile 'status' crimes such as under-age drinking; in the latter there are a wide range of offences where he believes tighter control by the state is necessary. These include racially motivated attacks, corporate crime, pollution, and domestic crimes of physical and sexual abuse.

### 3.16.4 **Tackling the social causes of crime**

Jock Young does not believe that crime can be dealt with simply by improving the efficiency of the police. As we saw in earlier sections, he and other left realists see the problem of crime as rooted in social inequalities. Only if those inequalities are significantly reduced will the problem of crime be reduced.

Young and Matthews argue 'objectives within the criminal justice system are linked to wider social and political objectives of greater equality, opportunity and freedom of choice'. Young suggests that improving leisure facilities for the young, reducing income

inequalities, raising the living standards of poorer families, reducing unemployment and creating jobs with prospects, improving housing estates and providing 'community facilities which enhance a sense of cohesion and belonging' all help to cut crime. He does not believe that the criminal justice system is the main source of crime control. He says 'It is not the "thin Blue Line", but the social bricks and mortar of civil society which are the major bulwark against crime.' Young insists that 'social causation is given the highest priority.'

### 3.16.5 **The multi-agency approach**

Left realists have not tended to say a great deal about how the wider social causes of crime such as excessive income inequality can be tackled. They have concentrated on suggesting shorter-term and more readily achievable ways of reforming institutions. However, such proposals are not limited to the police.

Young advocates a 'multi-agency' approach. For example, councils can improve leisure facilities and housing estates, while the family, the mass media and religion have a role in improving the 'moral context' which permits so much crime. Social services, victim support schemes and improved security can help alleviate the problems of actual or potential victims. In Young's view the public also have a vital role to play in dealing with crime.


### 3.16.6 **The square of crime**

As we have seen in the above discussion, left realists have examined many facets of crime. These include the causes of crime, the nature of crime statistics, policing, public attitudes towards crime and the police, the chances of being a victim of crime, and so on. In recent years these elements have been brought together into one theoretical approach to the understanding of crime. This has been called the square of crime.

As Figure 3.2 shows, the square of crime involves four elements:

- (a) the state and its agencies;
- (b) the offender and their actions;
- (c) informal methods of social control (sometimes called 'society' or the public');
- (d) the victim.

**Figure 3.2: The square of crime**



**Source:** *Sociology Review*, February, 1993:28

Left realists believe that crime can only be understood in terms of the inter-relationships between these four elements. Roger Matthews states:

“crime is, in an important sense, a socially-constructed phenomena. Its meaning is profoundly influenced by considerations of time and space. Its construction is based upon the interaction of four key elements – victims, offenders, the state and the public.”

The idea that crime is socially constructed, that social factors determine who and what is considered criminal, is nothing new. Labelling theorists, phenomenologists and Marxists all agree that this is the case. The idea that crime needs to be examined from different

angles is not new either. For example, *The New Criminology* proposed just such an approach.

However, left realism claims to go beyond these approaches in a number of ways. Left realists pay far more attention to victims and public opinion than the approaches mentioned above. The New Criminology pays little or no attention to victims in examining crime. Matthews and Young claim that many other theories concentrate on just one part of the square of crime: labelling theory on the state, control theory on the public, positivism on the offender and victimology on the victim. Left realists do not accept that one element of the square of crime is always of prime importance. The importance of different elements varies from crime to crime. Matthews says:

“Each particular form of crime will have a different set of determinants within this framework and will involve a different combination of the key elements within the square. Thus corporate crime and street crime involve different types of victim-offender relation and are regulated by a different combination of formal and informal controls.”

### 3.16.7 **Multiple aetiology**

Whatever the type of crime though, left realists believe that each of these four elements is crucial, and together they determine what crime is, as well as what causes it and how it might be dealt with. Jock Young calls this the principle of multiple aetiology. Crime by its very nature is a product of formal and informal rules, of actions by offenders, of reactions by victims and the state and its agencies. It is therefore important to try to understand why people offend, what makes the victims vulnerable, the factors that affect public attitudes and responses to crime, and the social forces which influence the police.

For example, when examining changes in violent behaviour in a country both alterations in the amount of violence and in public and police attitudes about what constitutes

serious violence have to be examined. Young says:

“Deviance and control cannot be studied independently of each other. You cannot study changes in policing without changes in patterns of crime... Systems of social control profoundly affect deviance and changes in deviance patterns of control.”

The idea of the square of crime can be illustrated by considering the different elements that go to make up crime. For crime to exist there must be laws prohibiting behaviour. The existence or otherwise of those laws is influenced by the public. For an infraction to take place there must be an offender (or someone perceived as an offender) and, usually, a victim.

A variety of social factors influence the behaviour of the victim. For many offences it is the victim who decides whether the offence is reported. Victims will be influenced by prevailing social values in deciding whether they think an offence is immoral, illegal and worth reporting.

The relationship between victim and offender might affect both the victim's willingness to report the crime and the impact that the crime has on him or her. For example, wives might be unwilling to report the domestic violence of their husbands, or they might see the behaviour as 'normal'. The crimes of a spouse will have a different impact on those of a stranger.

The response of the police or other authorities then determines whether the offender is defined as criminal or not. Public opinion can have an impact on the behaviour of authorities. As labelling theorists point out, the decisions and actions of the criminal justice system can influence the future behaviour of those convicted of crime. Changes in any of these areas can affect the crime rate and the problems which criminality poses for society (Haralambos, 1995:428-432).

### 3.17 **SUMMARY**

Crime is one of the social problems in our society. Concern about crime appears to be an old social problem from the creation of the world. The next chapter presents the methodology used by the researcher in soliciting the necessary data needed to investigate the identified research problem.

# **CHAPTER FOUR**

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The principal aim of this chapter is to illustrate the method used by the researcher in soliciting the necessary information and data needed to investigate the research problem. The research problems as we have earlier highlighted are as follows:

- (a) To establish the relationship between unemployment and the rate of crime in South Africa.
- (b) To establish the relationship between the individual's level of education and the rate of unemployment and crime.
- (c) To determine the relationship in the level of co-operation and integration between the Ministry of Labour and the Department of Correctional Services in reducing the rate/level of unemployment and crime in South Africa.
- (d) To determine the relationship between government's legislation on minimum wages and its effect on the rate of unemployment and crime in South Africa.

### **4.2 POPULATION FOR THE STUDY**

This study covers a total population of 110 respondents. The distribution of the respondents is as follows:

- 60 unemployed respondents selected from the department of labour in Richards Bay. The purposive sampling technique was used to select these respondents.
- 20 experts on crime control and labour issues were also selected for the sample. The purposive sampling technique was also used to select these respondents.
- Lastly, with the help of the National Institute of Crime Prevention and Re-integration of Offenders, we were able to select a sample of 30 convicts (prisoners) for the study. The convenience sampling technique was used in this regard.

#### 4.3 **THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

We used questionnaires to solicit the necessary information from the respondents. In developing the questionnaire, we used both closed and open-ended questions.

The rationale for using closed-ended questions included the following:

- Answers obtained make comparisons between respondents easier.
- Answers are easier to code and analyse.
- The meaning of closed-ended questions is clear which minimises the chance of respondents not answering questions.
- Respondents have minimal writing to do which makes it easier to fill in the questionnaire (Bailey, 1987:118).

The questionnaire also consisted of open-ended questions. Qualitative data refers to any

information that the researcher gathers that is not expressed in numbers (Tesch, 1990:55). In this research, qualitative data was grouped into themes by using codes. Information on scored and coded data is reported on chapter six of this research.

The questionnaire was constructed in order to obtain information about the following:

- (i) Demographic characteristics of respondents: Questions 1 – 7.
- (ii) Crime and unemployment in South Africa: Questions 8 – 11.
- (iii) Crime reporting: Questions 12 – 13.
- (iv) Perception of crime: Question 14.
- (v) Victim of crime: Questions 15 – 21.
- (vi) Contact with crime prevention institutions: Questions 22 – 27.

#### 4.4 **ETHICS OF THE STUDY**

Collection of data in this research has been facilitated by the permission to undertake the investigation which was obtained from the Faculty Board of Arts of the University of Zululand.

Such permission constitutes an important element among the ethical issues in sociological research, i.e., the issue of informed consent of the subjects to be investigated. Vito *et al.* (1988:42) view informed consent as important to the research process in the following aspects:

- (a) Informed consent increases the ability of subjects to make a decision to participate.
- (b) It screens out those subjects who believe might be harmed.

- (c) Trust and respect is increased by showing the subject(s) that they are valued.
- (d) It reduces the legal liability of the investigator (Vito *et al.*, 1988:42-43).

In this research, consent from the subjects was obtained after the purpose of the study had been fully explained, and this included what would happen to the results, and also how would the subjects benefit from the study. Anonymity of the subjects was maintained and subjects were not forced to participate.

#### 4.5 **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

Social science is often referred to, quite unfairly, as the study of the obvious. However, it is desirable, if not necessary, to test hypotheses about the nature of social reality, even those that seem logical and self-evident. Our everyday commonsense observations are generally based on narrow, often biased preconceptions and personal experiences. These can lead us to accept without criticism invalid assumptions about the characteristics of social phenomena and behaviour.

The researcher used the chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ) nonparametric test which is applicable to a wide variety of research problems. The chi-square allows us to test the significance of the difference between a set of observed frequencies ( $f_o$ ) and expected ( $f_e$ ), that is, between the given facts and the theoretical anticipation, in order to assess whether the facts support the theoretical considerations.

The chi-square statistic focuses directly on how close the observed frequencies are to what they are expected to be (represented by the expected frequencies) under the null hypothesis. Based on just the observed and expected frequencies, the formula for chi-square is:

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e}$$

Where  $f_o$  = observed frequency in any category  
 $f_e$  = expected frequency in any category.

To interpret the chi-square value, we must still determine the appropriate number of degrees of freedom. This can be done for tables that have any number of rows and columns by employing the formula:

$$df = (R - 1)(c - 1)$$

where  $r$  = number of rows in the table of observed frequencies

$c$  = number of columns in the table of observed frequencies

$df$  = degrees of freedom

The degree of freedom of the problem must be defined, and the  $X^2$ -table must be consulted.

To test the null hypotheses, any convenient level of significance will be used. This is the criterion for deciding whether the observed difference is significant or not, that is, whether the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) has to be rejected or not. Obviously, the greater the differences between the observed and the expected frequency the more likely we have a significant difference, suggesting that the null hypothesis is unlikely to be true.

#### 4.6 **QUALITATIVE DATA**

Qualitative data analysis is a process that is less discrete than that found in quantitative analysis. In qualitative data analysis, the information is grouped into themes by using codes. Codes are labels that assign units of meaning to the information obtained.

There are various types of coding techniques such as: the constant comparative method (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maykut & Morehouse), content analysis (e.g., Gottschalk, Holas & Viney, 1986), open, axial and selective coding (e.g., Strauss, 1987), domain analysis (e.g., Neuman, 2000; Spradley, 1979), pattern coding (e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994; Neuman, 2000).

In this research, in order to obtain clarity from the respondents, the information narrated by the respondents was analysed along the lines suggested by Giorgi (1985), who suggested the following four essential steps in this method:

- read the entire description in order to get the general idea of the whole statement. In the present study, all the information narrated by the respondents was read through systematically until the researcher felt comfortable with the terminology and expression used by the respondents. Areas of similarities were categories into themes.
- Once the sense of the whole has been grasped, the researcher reads through the text once more with the specific aim of discriminating meaning units and with the focus on the phenomenon being researched. In this study, the information narrated by the respondents was reread with a sociological perspective, and using this technique, certain themes began to emerge.
- Once meaning units have been delineated, the researcher then goes through all the meaning units and expresses the sociological insight contained in them more directly.

The actual content of the respondent's narratives was considered appropriate and hence retained in the text, without correcting mistakes or grammatical errors made.

- The researcher synthesizes all transformed meaning units into statements regarding the subjects experience.

In the current study, data collected, codes, and scored by the researcher is reported on chapter six of this research.

#### 4.7 **FIELD EXPERIENCE**

The major thrust of the study was to gain insight into the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime in South Africa. In particular, the researcher wanted to understand both the meaning of unemployment from the world of the unemployed person as well as the meaning of the world of the prisoner (convict) as viewed by him or her.

The present study utilizes a multi-method approach to the investigation of the relationship between crime and unemployment. Each data collection technique yielded a different slice of data or a different vantage point from which to understand the problem under study.

Since data was collected from different places and at different times, each will be discussed independently. Each state of data collection was conducted in two phases. Data was collected from the following places:

##### (i) **Richards Bay Labour Department**

During the first two weeks prior to the administration of the questionnaire, the researcher made informal contacts and conversations with officers, experts on crime, and in particular, with people waiting outside of the labour department offices with the hope of securing employment for themselves. Time spent with the unemployed people provided an opportunity for them to express their thoughts and opinions about what they felt the African National Congress government should be doing in order to address the problem of crime and unemployment. Indeed, most unemployed people seemed so grateful to have the opportunity to express themselves which to them, the researcher may have assumed a sort of unintended therapeutic role.

The second phase of the research consisted of the administration of the questionnaire to a purposive sample of 60 unemployed respondents. Informed consent was obtained from the participants prior to administering the questionnaire. The nature and purpose of the study was explained to the subjects.

(ii) **National Institute for Crime Prevention and Re-Integration of Offenders**

The officials at NICRO had been very receptive to the idea of research being conducted on convicts (prisoners). Acceptance of the researcher by senior officers was enhanced by the aims and objectives of the research in relation to the employment duties of officials at NICRO.

In addition, during the first two weeks prior to administering the questionnaires, informal contacts and conversations with officers were initiated. The researcher was provided with materials containing NICRO's mission statement. Comments such as the following were typical among staff members at NICRO:

"We are looking forward to seeing some real change. We are tired of crime. It should be interesting. I'm very glad you are doing this study. Of course, before change could be made, the facts have to be known. Your research will provide such facts."

The second phase of the research consisted of conducting oral interviews with prisoners (convicts). With the assistance of the officials at NICRO, the researcher was able to administer the questionnaires to a Judgmental sample of 30 respondents.

Twenty (20) experts on crime control and labour issues were also interviewed. In short, all respondents including officials from NICRO, experts on crime and labour issues, and prisoners who participated in the research, were friendly, cordial and co-operative throughout the period of data collection.

#### 4.18 **LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

For ethical reasons, it is necessary to point out some of the limitations and problems encountered which include the following:

- Lack of sufficient literature and studies on crime and unemployment in Africa.
- The questionnaires had to be translated to Zulu for some respondents.
- Some respondents refused to answer certain questions.

#### 4.19 **SUMMARY**

This chapter presented the methodology, followed by the researcher in soliciting the necessary information needed to investigate the research problem. Data collected and analyzed is presented in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to analyze and discuss fully the research findings of the hypotheses that we have earlier highlighted.

In order to establish the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime in South Africa, simple percentages oral interviews, personal observations, chi-square analyses, correlational analyses as well as themes that emerged from the interviews were used to investigate the identified research hypotheses and problems associated with unemployment.

Restatement of the hypotheses:

- There is a relationship between unemployment and the rate of crime in South Africa.
- There is a relationship between the individual's level of education and the rate of crime and unemployment.
- There is a relationship in the level of co-operation and integration between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services in reducing the level of unemployment and crime in South Africa.
- There is a relationship between government's legislation on minimum wages and its effects on the rate of crime and unemployment in South Africa.

**Table 5.1 Residential Distribution of the Unemployed Respondents in Urban and Rural Areas**

Towns	Area	Rural	%	Urban	%	Total
Empangeni	I	3	32.0	11	32.0	14
Richards Bay	II	3	23.0	11	23.0	14
Mthunzini	III	4	30.8	9	19.0	13
Esikhawini	IV	2	15.4	8	17.0	10
Vulindlela	V	1	7.7	7	15.0	8
<b>Total</b>		<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>60</b>

Table 5.1 illustrates that 47 (78%) of the unemployed respondents interviewed lived in urban areas. Only 13 (22%) of the respondents live in rural areas. This research confirms that our urban centres have more of the unemployed than the rural areas. This large number of the unemployed urbanites can be attributed to the regular movement of people from the rural to the urban centres with the hope of getting a job.

Unfortunately the dreams of those rural – urban migrants do not come true in terms of job opportunities and this makes them to turn to criminal activities in order to make a living.

## 5.2 CORRECTIONAL ANALYSIS

At this juncture, we shall examine if there is any correlation between the residential and unemployment rate as shown in table 5.1.

<b>X</b>	<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>XY</b>
11	121	3	9	33
12	144	3	9	36
9	81	4	16	36
8	64	2	4	16
7	49	1	1	7
<b>∑X = 47</b>	<b>∑X<sup>2</sup> = 459</b>	<b>∑Y = 13</b>	<b>∑Y<sup>2</sup> = 39</b>	<b>∑XY = 128</b>

The correlation coefficient (r)

$$(r) = \frac{5(128) - (47)(13)}{\sqrt{[5(459) - 2209][5(39) - 169]}}$$
$$r = \frac{29}{47}$$
$$r = 0.6$$

This research confirms that there is a positive correlation between the residential area (urban) and the rate of unemployment. Unemployment is more associated with urban areas than rural areas. Perhaps this is why we have more crimes committed by the unemployed in urban areas than rural areas. The unemployed are likely to take to unapproved means (crime) in order to survive.

Generally speaking, migration from rural to urban centers by the unemployed is primarily an economic phenomenon which for the individual migrant can be a quite rational decision despite the existence of urban unemployment. The economic model postulates that migration proceeds in response to urban – rural differences in expected rather than actual earnings. The fundamental premise is that migrants consider the various labour market opportunities available to them, as between the rural and urban sectors, and choose the one which maximises their expected gains from migration. Expected gains are measured by (1) the differences in real incomes between rural and urban working and (2) the probability of a new migrant obtaining an urban job.

In terms of the economic theory on rural urban migration, Micheal Todaro is of the view that members of the labour force, both actual and potential compare their expected incomes for a given time horizon in the urban sector (i.e., the difference between returns and costs of migration) with prevailing average rural incomes, and migrate if the former exceeds the latter.

In the classical example of the above situation given by Todaro, he argues that an average unskilled or semi-skilled rural worker has a choice between being a farm labourer (or working his own land) for an annual average real income of say, 50 units, or migrating to the city where a worker with his skills or educational background can obtain a wage employment yielding an annual real income of 100 units. The more commonly used economic models of migration,

which place exclusive emphasis on the income differential factor as the determinant of the decision to migrate, would indicate a clear choice in this situation. The worker would seek the higher-paid urban job. It is important for us to recognise, however, that these migration models were developed largely in the context of advanced industrial economies and, as such, implicitly assumed the existence of a full or near-full employment.

In a full employment environment the decision to migrate can be predicted solely on securing the highest paid job wherever it becomes available. Simple economic theory would then indicate that such migration should lead to a reduction in wage differentials through the interaction of the forces of supply and demand, both in areas of emigration and points of immigration.

Unfortunately such analyses as that given by Western Economists is not realistic in the context of South Africa and other third World countries. In the first place, South Africa and other developing economies are beset by a chronic and serious unemployment problem, with the result that a typical migrant cannot expect to secure a highly paid urban job immediately. It is much more likely, therefore, that on entering, the urban labour market the migrant will either become totally unemployed or will seek casual and part-time employment in the urban sector. In view of this, it is suggested that in making a decision to migrate from the rural area to the urban area, the migrant must balance the probabilities and risks of being unemployed or underemployed for a considerable period of time against the positive, urban-rural real income differential.

The fact that a typical migrant can expect to earn twice the annual real income in an urban area than in a rural environment may be of little consequence if the actual likelihood of the migrant securing the higher paying job within, say, a one-year period is one chance in five.

Todaro is of the opinion that, the probability of a migrant being successful in security the higher paid urban job is 20 percent, and therefore his expected urban income for one year period is in fact 20 units (i.e.,  $0.20 \times 100 = 20$ ) and not the 100 units that an urban worker in a full-employment environment would expect to receive. The central argument here is that the time

dimension of when a migrant can secure a job in the urban centre is also a determinant factor of whether the unemployed in the rural area would like to move to the urban centre for a job, the differences in wages between rural and urban notwithstanding.

However, our submission in this research is that even when we bridge the income differences between the rural and urban workers in South Africa, those in the rural areas will still move to the urban centre for other social amenities and psychological gratifications.

The above problems notwithstanding, some possible measure will be suggested on how, to minimize the rural – urban migration since the movement can never be stopped but it can only be minimized or checked.

(a) **The need to balance, urban-rural employment opportunities**

Since migrants are assumed to respond to differentials in expected incomes, it is virtually important that the imbalances between economic opportunities in rural and urban sectors be minimized. As a matter of fact, if the government allows urban wage rates to grow at a greater pace than the average rural income, this will stimulate further rural-urban migration in spite of rising levels of urban unemployment. This heavy influx of people into urban areas not only gives rise to socio-economic problems in the cities, but it may also eventually create problems of labour shortages in rural areas, especially during the busy harvesting seasons.

(b) **Urban job creation**

The traditional (Keynesian) economic solution to urban unemployment without simultaneously attempting to improve rural incomes and employment opportunities, can lead to the paradoxical situation where more urban employment leads to higher levels of urban and rural unemployment. Once again, the imbalance in expected earning opportunities is the crucial concept.

Since migration rates are assumed to respond positively to both higher urban wages and higher urban employment opportunities, it follows that for any given positive urban-rural wage differential, higher urban employment rates, will widen the expected differential and induce even higher rates of rural-urban migration. For every new job created, two or three migrants who were productively occupied in rural areas may come to the urban centre. Thus, if 100 new jobs are created, there may be as many as 300 new migrants and, therefore, 200 more urban unemployed. A policy designed to reduce urban unemployment, therefore, may lead not only to the higher levels of urban unemployment but also to lower levels of agricultural output and employment.

(c) **Educational expansion**

The apartheid government in South Africa created a large mess of uneducated and unemployable individuals through the Bantu education system among the black race. This has contributed to the influx of the half backed, uneducated individuals who migrate from the rural areas to the urban centres in search of employment. Unfortunately, employers in the urban centre tend to use educational attainment and academic qualifications as a means of recruitment. Those with better qualifications are offered better jobs and positions. In recent times, jobs which could formerly be filled by those with primary education (sweepers, messengers, filing clerk etc.) now require secondary certificates (clerks, typists, bookkeepers, etc.) now necessitate a degree. It follows that for any given urban wage, if the probability of success in securing a modern sector job is higher for those with more education, their expected income differential will also be higher and the more likely they will be to migrate to the urban centres.

To rectify this situation, the South Africa government need to provide educational skills where those in the rural areas can use such skills in their local environment.

(d) **Rural development programmes**

The South African government needs to develop programmes of integrated rural

development as is being carried out by the RDP. The emphasis in these rural programmes should focus on both industry and agricultural development if the urban unemployment problem is to be solved. There is the need to restore a proper balance between rural and urban sectors. This rural development programme must also reflect the local needs of the people in rural areas.

(e) **Expansion of small scale, labour intensive industries**

The composition or 'product mix' of output has obvious effects on the magnitude of employment, since some products (often basic consumer goods) require more labour per unit of output and per unit of capital than others. Efforts to expand these mostly small-scale, labour-intensive industries can be accomplished in two ways: directly through government investment and incentives, and indirectly through income redistribution (either directly or from future growth) to the poor whose structure of consumer demand is both less import-intensive and more labour-intensive than the rich.

(f) **Choosing appropriate labour intensive technologies of production**

One of the principal inhibiting factors to the success of any long-run programme of employment creation both in urban industry and rural agriculture is the technological dependence of South Africa on imported machinery and other equipments from the developed nations.

The recommendation here is that both domestic and international efforts must be made to reduce this dependence by developing indigenous technological research and adaptation capacities by South Africans themselves. Such efforts might first be linked to the development of small-scale, labour intensive methods of providing rural infrastructure needs, including roads, irrigation and drainage systems, as well as essential health and educational services.

**Table 5.2 The Marital Status of Those Who Were Convicted of Crime**

<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Unemployed when the crime was committed</b>	<b>Employed when the crime was committed</b>	<b>Total</b>
Single	2	1	3
Married	16	2	18
Divorced	4	2	6
Widow	2	1	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>30</b>

Table 5.2 shows that the majority which is 66% of those who committed crime when they were unemployed are married. The propensity for those who are unemployed and married to commit crime can be attributed to family responsibilities which rest on them squarely. A further analysis of the sex distribution shows that the above 66% of those who committed crime are males. The inference we can draw here is that the family responsibilities especially where there is no social security for the unemployed in our society put much pressure and stress upon the head of the family to provide means of a livelihood for his family. Males as head of the family retain ultimate responsibilities for family finance.

In South Africa and other African countries, the men as the head of the family are expected to take proper care in terms of finance and other subsistence expenses within the family. The inability of the head of the family to perform the above functions, the individual is not only seen as a failure in the community, but as a non-existent entity with other stigma placed on the individual.

In order to avoid such stigmas, the man would go to any length to provide the family with all the necessary facilities to live a proper life.

We will now use the correlational analysis to examine critically if there is any relationship between marital status and the propensity of the unemployed to commit crime as shown in table 5.3

<b>X</b>	<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>XY</b>
2	4	1	1	2
16	32	2	4	32
4	16	2	4	8
2	4	1	1	2
<b>∑X = 24</b>	<b>∑X<sup>2</sup> = 56</b>	<b>∑Y = 6</b>	<b>∑Y<sup>2</sup> = 10</b>	<b>∑XY = 44</b>

The correlation coefficient (r)

$$(r) = \frac{4(44) - (24)(6)}{\sqrt{[4(56) - 576][4(10) - 6]}}$$

$$r = \frac{32}{17.8}$$

$$r = 1.9$$

This is a high and positive correlation.

The above correlation coefficient confirms that there is a positive relationship between marital status and crime rates among the unemployed.

As we have discussed above, the responsibilities of those men who are married and unemployed may force them to commit crime so as to be able to provide food, shelter and other necessities of life for their family members, especially in our society where there are no adequate social security measures to take care of the unemployed and his family.

Our research also shows that the commonest crime committed by the unemployed are theft and fraud. This further buttressed the fact that the main reason for the unemployed committing the crime of theft and fraud revolve around the means to survive.

**Table 5.3 Percentage Distribution of Employment Status of the Respondents**

Distribution of Respondents	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Unemployed	60	55
Convicts (prisoners)	30	27
Experts on crime control and labour matters	20	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>6</b>

Table 5.3 above shows that sixty (55%) of the respondents in this research are unemployed. Thirty (27%) of the respondents are convicts (prisoners) and twenty (18%) of the respondents are experts on crime control. These experts include, criminologists and those officers in the correctional services who have been dealing with criminals.

The rationale for selecting the above respondents is to enable us to gain insight into the propensity of individuals to commit crime as a result of unemployment problems; especially among those unemployed. The convicts (prisoners) were also selected so as to find out if they were unemployed at the time they committed the crime. Experts on crime control were also selected so as to find out their views on the relationship between unemployment and crime.

**Table 5.4 The Level of Education of the Unemployed and the Convicts (Prisoners)**

Level of Education	Unemployed	Percentage	Convicts (Prisoners)	Percentage
University degree	3	5	-	-
Diploma	4	7	-	-
Standard 10	5	8	5	17
Standard 9	-	-	1	3
Standard 8	8	13	6	20
Below Standard 8	30	50	12	40
Never went to school	10	17	6	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 5.4 illustrate that the majority of the unemployed in this research are not well educated. Thirty (50%) of the unemployed never completed standard 8. Perhaps we may attribute the

inability of the unemployed to secure jobs to their low level of education. The low level of education contributes greatly to their failure to secure employment.

The education of the people is seen in this research as an area that the government need to work at or take seriously, if the rate of unemployment is to be reduced in South Africa, thus minimizing the rate of crime. As a matter of fact, education is often seen by both development planners and the general public in largely instrumental terms, the spread of education is thought to be necessary to provide the technological manpower necessary for the development of the society. It also helps to improve the people's standard of living through well paying wage employment.

However, education should not be seen solely in manpower terms. Education in South Africa has been expected to produce committed citizens, and help individuals to make the most of their cognitive capacity. The socialization functions of education are increasingly appreciated. Although education for its own sake is frequently considered a luxury however there are at least some people at all levels of society who appreciate that deepening one's knowledge can be a worthwhile endeavour in the long run even if there is no immediately practical benefits.

It is often assumed that parents send their children to school so that they will obtain the qualifications necessary for wage employment. To the extent that this is true, widespread unemployment and self employment represents frustrated parental aspirations and should lead to dissatisfaction with the educational system. It might be hypothesized that in such a situation parents would either withdraw their children from school or do their best to ensure that able children remain in school long enough to rise above the "bulge" to a level where their education is profitable in terms of employment prospects.

Most people would agree that it is now necessary not only to be literate but also to have certificates in order to get a good job (suitable employment). There is a general agreement that widespread education promotes the need of the country and affects the children who pass through the system more deeply than just providing pre-occupation training.

Past studies have shown that in addition to securing employment opportunities as a result of good education, education also fosters both geographic and social mobility. According to JC Caldwell (1968:361-77), as the level of education rises, so does the rate of employment opportunity and migration increases. The same view is also held by O Olakanpo (1968:137-52), who argues that among self-employed entrepreneurs in Africa, success increases with educational attainment, literacy is especially important.

Table 5.4 above also confirms that 50% of the unemployed respondents never completed standard 8. This group can be regarded as dropouts. One of the major problems in South Africa in as far as education is concerned, is the very high percentage of students who drop out before completing a particular educational cycle. For example, it has been estimated that in South Africa about 45 out of every 100 students who enter primary school dropouts before completion. In other countries in Africa and Asia, the median dropout rate is about 20-25 of every 100 students.

This large number of dropouts in South Africa join the ranks of the unemployed. In view of the above discussion, there is an urgent need for the government to encourage individuals to complete their studies in both primary school and tertiary institution if the rate of unemployment is to be reduced.

Table 5.4 shows that the majority 12 (40%) of the convicts (prisoners) have very poor education. They did not complete standard eight. Perhaps poor education must have hindered them from getting a job, and this is likely to contribute to their propensity to commit crime. To confirm this statement, we will now examine how many of the prisoners, were employed at the time they committed the crime. This is illustrated in table 5.6 below.

**Table 5.6 Employment Status of the Prisoners when they were Convicted**

<b>Status of the Respondent Convicts (Prisoners) when they committed the crime</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Employed	8	-
Not employed	22	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 5.6 above shows that the majority of the convicts were unemployed when they committed crime. In this simple analysis, it became clear that unemployment has a direct bearing on the propensity of individuals to commit crime.

The 22 (73%) who are unemployed also made it clear during our interviews with them that they would not have been involved in criminal activities if they were to receive any form of social security when they lost their jobs. The South African government has not extended the social security benefits to the unemployed, especially in the informal sectors, and this has contributed greatly to the high rate of crime.

The limited nature of protection in terms of the South African social security benefits has adversely affected the unemployed who worked previously in the informal sector of the economy. This category of workers here has not only been marginalised but have been excluded from social security benefits.

This, of course, stems from the fact that the social insurance system, notably unemployment insurance and compensation for work injuries and diseases, do not provide coverage to those outside formal employment. Social assistance measures seldom operate to the direct advantage of the informally employed. Due to the targeted nature of both social services and programmes, many of the unemployed from the informal sectors are excluded. It is clear, therefore, that the present social security system in South Africa is, for purposes of providing a true safety net for the rural and urban poor and the informally employed and structurally unemployed amongst them, hugely deficient, operating within a paradigm where a consistent model for the alleviation of the suffering of the unemployed has yet to develop.

Legally speaking, the exclusion of workers of the informal sectors from the social security; benefits raises serious questions of a constitutional nature. Section 27(1)(c) of the South African Constitution grants the right to access to social security (inclusive of the right to access to social assistance) to everyone. This right is underpinned by the fundamental right to quality, enshrined in Section 9. Jurisprudentia the right to equal treatment has already been spelt out in the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. However, we do not intend to discuss further the legal issues involved in the exclusion of workers from the informal sectors from enjoying social security benefits because it is not within the paradigm of this thesis.

**Table 5.7 The Relationship Between Unemployment and the Rate of Crime**

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Yes, unemployment increases the rate of crime</b>	<b>No, unemployment does not increase the rate of crime</b>
Unemployed	55	5
Convicts (prisoners)	27	3
Experts on crime control and labour matters	18	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 5.7 shows that 55 respondents out of 60 unemployed respondents agree that unemployment increases the rate of crime in our society. Only 5 out of the 60 unemployed respondents did not agree that unemployment increases the rate of crime. With regard to the convicts (prisoners) 27 out of 30 are of the opinion that unemployment increases crime. Only 3 of the prisoners did not agree that unemployment increases the rate of crime.

Among the experts on crime control and labour matters, 18 out of 20 respondents agreed that unemployment increases the rate of crime. Only 2 out 20 respondents did not agree that unemployment increases crime.

Hypothesis: The relationship between unemployment and crime. This relationship will be tested with the help of chi-square ( $X^2$ ) analysis.

H<sub>0</sub>: Unemployment rate does not increase the rate of crime.

H<sub>1</sub>: Unemployment rate increases the rate of crime.

<b>Response</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>Convict (prisoners)</b>	<b>Experts on crime control and labour matters</b>	<b>Total</b>
Unemployment rate increases the rate of crime	55 (54.5)	27 (27.3)	18 (18.2)	100
Unemployment rate does not increase the rate of crime	5 (5.5)	3 (2.7)	2 (1.8)	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>110</b>

Observed  $X^2 = 7.74$

Df = 2

Critical value at 0.05 level of significance = 5.99

Since  $X^2 = 7.74$  and the critical value at 0.5 level of significance is 5.99 which is less than the observed  $X^2$  we therefore reject the H<sub>0</sub> (null hypothesis) and accept H<sub>1</sub> (alternative hypothesis).

Our inference from this chi-square analysis is that unemployment contributes greatly to the high rate of crime in South Africa. A further statistical computation on the relationship between unemployment and the rate of crime, using the contingency coefficient analysis, reveals that there is a positive relationship between unemployment and crime rate.

From our research data, the contingency coefficient "C" is 0.2, and this confirms a positive relationship.

**Table 5.8 The relationship between low level of education and unemployment**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>Convict (prisoners)</b>	<b>Experts on crime control and labour matters</b>	<b>Total</b>
Low level of education contributes to unemployment and crime	51	23	16	90
Low level of education does not contribute to unemployment and crime	9	7	4	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>110</b>

Table 5.8 shows that the majority of our respondents are of the view that low level of education contributes to the high rate of unemployment. To test this statistically in relation to crime, we shall use the chi-square analysis to find out the relationship between low level of education and the rate of unemployment and crime.

$H_0$ : Low level of education does not contribute to high rate of unemployment and crime.

$H_1$ : Low level of education contribute to high rate of unemployment and crime.

<b>Response</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>Convict (prisoners)</b>	<b>Experts on crime control and labour matters</b>	<b>Total</b>
Low level of education contribute to unemployment and crime	51 (49.0)	23 (24.5)	16 (16.4)	90
Low level of education does not contribute to unemployment and crime	9 (10.9)	7 (5.5)	4 (3.6)	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>110</b>

Observer  $X^2 = 10.9$

Critical value at 0.05 level of significance = 5

Since the  $X^2$  is greater than the critical value at 0.05 level of significance, we reject the  $H_0$  (null hypothesis) and accept the  $H_1$  (alternative hypothesis).

Our inference from this analysis is that low level of education among the populace is responsible for the high rate of unemployment and it bears a direct relationship with the high rate of crime.

It must be buttressed here that the relationship between low level of education and the rate of unemployment had earlier been established by academics, for example, the research work of Perry (1974) shows that many African secondary and high schools dropouts experience difficulty in finding employment above the level of unskilled and semi-skilled occupations.

Generally speaking, one of the major problems of Third World countries is the high percentage of students who dropouts before completing a particular education cycle. For example, it has been estimated that in Latin America 60 out of every 100 students who enter primary school dropouts before completion. In some Latin American countries, the primary school drop out rate is as high as 75 percent. In Africa and Asia, the median dropout rates are approximately 54 and 20.2 percent respectively. But here too the variation among countries has been very wide with dropout rates as high as 81.3 and 64 percent respectively in certain African and Asian nations.

At the secondary level, median drop out rates for those entering in the late 1970's were 41.9 percent in Africa and 18 percent in Latin America and Asia. In Europe the rate was approximately 11.4 percent. One consequence of the disproportionate high media-rate for African countries is serious and growing problems of the secondary school leaver who joins the rank of the educated unemployed.

The research work of Sinfield (1981), on education and unemployment, confirms that the risk of unemployment is much closer to school leaving age. He argues further that high unemployment among young people are not confined to those with age group of 18-19 years, but also to those with the age group of 20-24 years who have the next highest rate of unemployment after those under the age of 18 years.

According to Allen (1986) unemployment is caused by jobs that demand workers with skills or other attributes not usually possessed by young people, and that young people failed to adapt

to this situation. White and McRae (1989) in their research findings pointed out that unemployment is highly influenced by the lack of qualifications and good education. They further stated that different kinds of selection processes are involved, that is:

- (i) Qualifications may influence the type of employment entered, and different types of employment may be prone to different risks on unemployment.
- (ii) Within all or most types of employment, those young people with less qualifications may be more at risk of becoming unemployed than those with more qualifications.
- (iii) Within unemployed, those with qualifications may have high chances of being selected into new jobs than those without qualifications.

The studies on unemployment by Daniel and Stilgve (1977) and Jones (1983) respectively, have shown that educational qualifications and part-time work experience prior to leaving school are important determinants of the probability of being unemployed.

**Table 5.9 Co-operation Between Ministry of Labour and the Department of Correctional Services in Minimizing Unemployment and Crime**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>Convicts (prisoners)</b>	<b>Experts on crime control and labour matters</b>	<b>Total</b>
Yes, the above co-operation will minimize unemployment and crime	53	24	18	96
No, the above co-operation will not minimize unemployment and crime	7	6	1	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>110</b>

Table 5.9 shows that the majority of our respondents are of the view that co-operation between the Ministry of Labour and the Department of Correctional Services will help minimize the rates of crime and unemployment. For us to be able to establish the fact that the co-operation

between the ministry of labour and the department of Correctional Services will help to minimize the rates of unemployment and crime, we have had to use the Chi-square ( $X^2$ ) to fully establish the facts.

$H_0$ : The co-operation between the ministry of labour and the correctional services will not help to minimize unemployment and crime rates.

$H_1$ : The co-operation between the ministry of labour and the correctional services will help to minimize unemployment and crime rates.

<b>Response</b>	<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>Convict (prisoners)</b>	<b>Experts on crime control and labour matters</b>	<b>Total</b>
Yes, the above co-operation will minimize unemployment and crime	53 (52.4)	24 (26.2)	19 (17.5)	96
No, the above co-operation will not minimize unemployment and crime	7 (7.6)	6 (3.8)	1 (2.5)	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>110</b>

Observer  $X^2 = 10.69$

Df = 2

Critical value at 0.05 level of significance = 5.99

Since the  $X^2 = 10.69$  and the critical value at 0.05 level of significance is 5.99, which is less than the observed  $X^2$ , we reject the  $H_0$  (null hypothesis) and accept the  $H_1$  (alternative hypothesis).

Our conclusion is that the co-operation between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services will help to minimize unemployment and crime rates.

The argument here is that those working in the ministry of labour will be able to give information on job opportunities to those who are unemployed and thus reducing their propensity to commit crime as a means of survival.

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Yes, the above co-operation will minimize unemployment and crime	53 (52.4)	24 (26.2)	19 (17.5)	96
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<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>110</b>

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Our conclusion is that the co-operation between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services will help to minimize unemployment and crime rates.

The argument here is that those working in the ministry of labour will be able to give information on job opportunities to those who are unemployed and thus reducing their propensity to commit crime as a means of survival.

In the same vein, those in the ministry of labour will also be able to give the offices of the correctional services information on how to secure job opportunities for the criminals when they are released from jail. This will help in preventing the criminals from committing further crime as a means of survival, thus reducing the rate of recidivists going back to prison.

This integration and co-operation between the two social structures – the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services, have earlier been highlighted by sociologists as the functional aspect of the social structure that keeps the social system stable.

This finding is supported by the Parsonian model which rests on the premises that complex affairs of a society could not be conducted unless they were organized in some systematic way, and on the further hypothesis that human societies, from the most primitive to the most complex, have so much in common that there must be a set of fundamental organizing principles shared by all societies but carried to much higher degree of elaboration in some than in others. The aim being to discover what these basic principles are and how they operate.

The cross-cultural similarities of social organization and process arise because, given the nature of the human organism and the physical environment, certain “problems” must be solved if man is to live as a social animal – that is – to employ scarce means co-operatively (socially) and more or less rationally (sometimes, economically) to attain given ends. What these problems are, says Parsons in effect, can be determined by analyzing the requirements of this co-operative and (more or less) rational ends-means process.

Every society, being a social system must contain roles with responsibilities for solving basic system problems at the societal level. When the scale and complexity of those problems become sufficiently great, there is “division of labour”, and roles appear that have primary responsibility to contribute to the solution of any one of those problems. Consequently, any sufficient complex society will be found to have four sets of specialized roles, one for each of the basic system problems. Each such set of specialized roles, it is contended, constitutes a sub-system of society and obeys the laws governing the operation of social systems (ES 13-19, 53).

In the context of the social system, Parsons usually pictures society or the social system as a large square, which he divided into four equal parts. These parts are the four functional system problems which are represented by the letters AGIL. What does Parson mean by the letters AGIL in his 'square'?

By A, Adaption, he means the problem of securing sufficient resources from the environment and distributing them throughout the system. If it is to survive, a social system needs certain structures or institutions that will perform the function of adaptation to the environment. Taking South Africa as a social system, a Parsonian analysis would point to the economy as the institution that meets this end. In South Africa, there is an urgent need to review the strategies to overcome poverty and create jobs. The report of a recent Nedlac Executive Council Meeting outlines a creation strategy, and the process towards the job's summit. It describes the South African economy as "fundamentally not a labour absorbing one", and asserts that "an ambitious and co-ordinated policy programme will be required to address key constraints and pursue opportunities."

The G stands for goal attainment, the system's need to mobilize priorities. This system problem is essentially the concern of political institutions.

Integration, I, is at the heart of the four-function paradigm, because the solution to this problem has been a priority for functionalists, especially since Durkheim. By integration, Parsons means the need to co-ordinate, adjust, and regulate relationships among various actors or units within the system to keep the system functioning.

As already mentioned in this research that, every society contain roles with responsibilities for solving basic system problems at the societal level. When the scale and complexity of those problems become sufficiently great, there is "division of labour" and roles appear that have primary responsibility to contribute to the solution of only one of these problems.

The importance of co-operation within any social system is also seen in the work of Emile Durkheim, in his analysis on the division of labour in society was the role it plays in promoting or contributing to the maintenance of social order. He argues that the division of labour in society

was the role it plays in promoting or contributing to the maintenance of social order. Durkheim argues that the division of labour in our society which lead to a high level of interdependence is responsible for the existence of society. In the same vein, we are arguing here that the division of labour in our society, that is, the different work performed by the different units of the South African government, is responsible for the existence of smooth running of our society. All departments within the government according to the Parsonian argument should be interrelated and interdependent (Tshabalala, 2001).

A Parsonian analysis would point at the integration and co-operation between the departments of correctional services and the ministry of labour in alleviating the problem of high rates of crime and unemployment in South Africa.

In this research, one of the survey questions were: "While in prison, are you engaged in any skills or educational programmes?" It emerged from the interviews that inmates are engaged in a number of skills and educational programmes. To mention a few, these include the following:

- Brick making
- Weiding
- Problem solving skills
- Business skills training
- Farming
- Plumbing
- Vocational training
- Plastering
- Building training
- Painters and decorators

On completion of their sentences, and having acquired some of the above-mentioned skills, ex-offenders go back for re-integration into their communities.

For an extended period of time, some of these ex-offenders remain unemployed. As a result

of lack of employment opportunities, the conclusion was obvious. As Merton argued, members of these groups, because of unemployment, would be under severe pressure to reject the legitimate means which do not help them and seek success by illegal means instead.

Consequently, since members of these groups have also been labelled as criminals, these unintended effects of law could force the individual to easily engage in crime, and as a result promote a situation of recidivism.

However, if there could be co-ordination, co-operation, integration, and interrelatedness between the department of correctional services and the ministry of labour, we could have a situation whereby *ex-offenders with certain acquired skills, being attracted to the department of labour for job placement, skills development, and as a result, a decrease in the rates of crime and unemployment would be inevitable.*

Training and skills development is one of the most vital issues facing our country today. The global skills shortage is magnified in South Africa, where the continued exodus of skilled labour, coupled with the legacy of educational inequalities, has had a negative impact on many facets of the South African business.

The four system need, the L (Latent pattern maintenance-tension management), is twofold: first, the need to make certain that actors are sufficiently motivated to play their parts in the system or maintain the value "pattern", and second, the need to provide mechanisms for internal tension management. This problem is one of keeping the value system intact and guaranteeing the conformity of the members of the system by transmitting societal values. In South Africa, relevant institutions are family, religion, and education, and the central question is moral commitment to shared values.

The crucial point to remember about the four system needs is that Parsons considered them to be the prerequisites for social equilibrium. Their continuing operation on a day-to-day basis is in turn ensured, according to Parson's theory, by two mechanisms: socialization and social control. If socialization "works", all members of a society will be committed to shared values,

make “appropriate” choices, and generally do what is expected of them in terms of adaptation, integration, and so forth.

For example, people will marry and socialize their children (L) and within the family fathers will, as they “should”, be the breadwinners (A). Moreover, such successful socialization produces what Parsons refers to as “complementarity” of expectations. This means that both parties involved in an interaction situation share and accept the same cultural values and normative expectations, so that each actor knows what the other expects, and their responses complement each other. Actors are motivated to meet the demands of societal expectations, want to, and do interact appropriately, and the happy result is equilibrium (Wallace, 1980:33).

Role “interaction” is the basic component of a social system in Parson’s schema. By ensuring “appropriate” role interaction, the two mechanisms of socialization and social control generally promote and maintain equilibrium in the social system. However, a Parsonian analysis would look at disequilibrium arising in the social system, that is, (crime) because of strain, that is, (unemployment) in the social system that affect the way our “systems needs” are met.

Parson’s model provides a way of looking at society that focuses our attention on the interdependence of different institutions, on the way human societies everywhere grapple with similar problems in spite of their surface differences, and on the continuities in social life and how they are secured.

Above all else, Parson’s system is a system in equilibrium because each actor is morally committed to perform culturally and socially expected functions. As Parson’s put it, “many complex processes are necessary to maintain the functioning of any societal system, if its members never did anything, a society would very soon cease to exist”. Parsons treats “deviance” in a way that implies disapproval, to which negative sanctions are appropriately applied (Wallace, 1980:46-56).

**Table 5.10 The effects of minimum wage legislation on the rate of unemployment**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Yes, the minimum wage affects the rate of unemployment</b>	<b>No, the minimum wage does not affect the rate of unemployment</b>	<b>Total</b>
Unemployed	45	15	60
Convicts (prisoners)	20	10	30
Experts on labour and crime control	15	5	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>110</b>

The above table 5.10 shows that the majority of the respondents are of the view that the minimum wage legislation as entrenched in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, contributes to the high rate of unemployment. The point emphasized by the respondents is that many employers cannot afford to pay the minimum wage, and because of this, they have to reduce the number of workers.

Apart from the minimum wage, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act also stipulates clearly that no employer may require or permit an employee to work longer than 45 hours a week, or nine hours a day if the employee works five days or fewer per week, and eight hours if the employee works more than five days a week all work beyond that is overtime, which can be worked only with the employee's agreement, which must be renewed annually and cannot exceed three hours a day or ten hours a week.

In addition to the duty to observe these prescribed hours, employers are also required to regulate working hours in accordance with the provision of any Act governing occupational health and safety, with due regard to the health, safety and family responsibilities of its employees and any relevant code of good practice issued by the minister under the BCEA.

With regard to night workers, special provision is made for them which employers find it difficult to comply with all the time. For example, those employees who work after 18h00 and before 06h00 the next day, their consent must be sought first by their employer before they are asked to do that shift. The employee, when they agree to such a shift, they must be compensated with an allowance. An employee is not permitted to do night work unless transportation is

available between his or her residence and the workplace at the commencement and conclusion of the shift.

Furthermore, if the employee works at night on a regular basis, (i.e., at least 50 times a year), the employer is required to inform the employee of any health and safety hazards associated with the work the employee is required to perform and of his/her right to undergo a medical examination on request at the employers expense. If the employee suffers from a health condition associated with the performance of night work and it is 'reasonably practicable' to do so, the employer must transfer the employee to a suitable day work within a reasonable time.

Employees are entitled to a meal interval of one continuous hour after five hour's work for which they must be paid if they are required to work or be available for work. They must also be paid for any portion of a meal interval in excess of 75 minutes unless they live on the premises. Once again, employers and employees can agree, in writing to reduce the period of meal intervals to no less than 30 minutes, or dispense with them altogether if the employee works less than six hours a day.

Every employee is entitled to a daily rest period of at least 12 consecutive hours between ending and commencing work, and a weekly rest period of at least 36 consecutive hours which must, unless otherwise agreed, include a Sunday. Daily rest periods can be reduced by written agreement to 10 hours if the employee lives in and has a meal interval of longer than three hours. The weekly rest periods can be altered by agreement to 60 hours per fortnight, or be reduced by up to eight hours in any week if the rest period in the following one is extended proportionately.

A detailed oral interview we held with one of our respondents who is unemployed on the relationship between minimum wage legislation and the rate of unemployment had this to say:

"You see, since the new minimum wage legislation came into existence, many of the employers I contacted for a job are not willing to absorb more labour because of the minimum wage and other conditions of service which the

employers complained bitterly that they cannot afford to pay new employees. This minimum wage has left many of us unemployed and this has adversely affect our lives.”

In South Africa today, the minimum wage that an employer can pay to unskilled labour is thirty five (R35) a day. This is approximately seven hundred and eighty rand (R780) per month, excluding Sundays. As far as employers in small and medium scale businesses are concerned, this is relatively too high and they cannot afford it. The small and medium scale businesses in South Africa play a bigger role in employment opportunities than the large scale business. The small and medium scale businesses contribute closely to forty percent of the GNP in agriculture, construction, trade and transport sectors. In fact, apart from its contribution to GNP, its greatest contribution to the South African economy is in terms of employment. At present, employment in the formal, non-agriculture, private sector is estimated to be approximately 4.7 million people. The public and agricultural sectors combined, employ approximately 2.6 million people while the informal sector employs a further 2.7 million people.

**Table 5.11 Percentage contribution of small and medium scale businesses to employment in the main industrial sectors**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Small scale businesses</b>	<b>Medium scale businesses</b>	<b>Large scale businesses</b>	<b>Total</b>
Agriculture	17.98	52.31	29.71	100
Mining	3.43	2.59	93.97	100
Manufacturing	18.96	24.58	56.46	100
Electricity	0	0	100.5	100
Construction	40.21	13.45	46.34	100
Trade	59.5	13	27.49	100
Transport	34.88	20.84	44.27	100
Business services	44.32	5.2	50.48	100
Other services	70.9	8.23	20.86	100
Average: All sectors	33.72	20.76	45.52	100

**Source:** Ntsika, 2000

The above table 5.11 shows that on the average small and medium scale businesses employ 54.5 percent of all the formal, private sector enterprises, compared to 45.5 percent in large enterprises.

**Table 5.12 Percentage contribution of small and medium scale businesses to salaries and wages in the main industrial sectors**

Sector	Small scale businesses	Medium scale businesses	Large scale businesses	Total
Agriculture	9.19	38.81	51.4	100
Mining	2.17	1.97	95.56	100
Manufacturing	15.35	21.58	63.07	100
Electricity	0	0	100	100
Construction	33.88	12.88	51.24	100
Trade	52.9	29.9	17.2	100
Transport	24.78	22.25	52.97	100
Business services	84	13.1	2.9	100
Other services	27	2.9	69.1	100
Average: All sectors	67.37	16.94	15.69	100

**Source:** Ntsika, 2000

Table 5.12 above shows that small and medium scale businesses dominate the total salaries and wages paid to employees in South Africa. The bone of contention here is that the legislation on minimum wages should be promulgated in such a way that employers in small and medium businesses can afford such payments.

If they cannot afford the minimum pay, then the large number of the South African labour force will remain unemployed for a long time and for them (the unemployed) to survive they may take to other unapproved means of survival (crime).

#### 5.4 SUMMARY

This chapter presented the analysis and interpretation of data based on the information obtained from the unemployed, the prisoners, and experts on crime control and labour issues. The next chapter gives some conclusions of the main findings and also the recommendations that might help in alleviating the problem of crime and unemployment in South Africa.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter intends to draw some conclusions on the basis of the findings made in this research. Thereafter some recommendations will be made and a plan of action proposed. The primary aim of this study was to find out by means of empirical investigation the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, with specific reference to Empangeni and Richards Bay areas.

Several important conclusions are derived from the data analysis of this research. The preceding findings indicate clearly that unemployment contributes to the increase in the rate of crime in KwaZulu-Natal Province. The hypotheses that were formulated for statistical testing showed the following:

Unemployment contribute greatly to the high rate of crime in South Africa.

The findings of this research support the functionalist perspective especially the work of Robert Merton's strain theory. The strain theory argues that criminal involvement should be relatively high whenever *legitimate opportunities to achieve success are closed to the individual*. Merton's central hypothesis was that, sociologically, deviant behaviour is a symptom of a specific sort of social disorganization, a lack of fit between *culturality prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for achieving them*. A further statistical compulation on the relationship between unemployment and the rate of crime, using the contingency coefficient analysis, revealed that there is a positive relationship between crime and unemployment.

On the issue of whether low level of education contribute or does not contribute to the high rate of unemployment and crime, findings revealed that low level of education among the

populace is responsible for the high rate of unemployment, and bears a direct relationship with the high rate of crime. The relationship between low level of education and the rate of unemployment had earlier been established by academics. The research work of Perry (1974), showed that many African secondary and high school dropouts experience difficulty in finding employment above the level of unskilled and semi-skilled occupations.

The research work of Sinfield (1981), on education and unemployment confirms that the risk of unemployment is much closer to school leaving age.

Allen (1986) also argued in his research that unemployment is caused by jobs that demand workers with skills or other attributes not usually possessed by young people, and that young people failed to adapt to this situation.

Furthermore, White and McRae (1989) in their research findings pointed out that unemployment is highly influenced by lack of qualifications and good education. This research also confirmed the above statements by showing that the major problems of Third World Countries is the high percentage of students who drop out before completing a particular education cycle.

The findings of this research are also supported by Robert Merton's theory of deviance. Merton reasoned that to some degree all people internalize the goals that are considered worth striving for in their culture. Everyone also internalizes the norms that govern proper and legitimate ways of working towards those goals. But when legitimate opportunities for achieving culturally defined goals are limited or non-existent, people may seek alternative ways to achieve those goals, or they may abandon the goals altogether. Because the social structure is complex, various individual responses are possible. He further argued that there are different modes of adaptation by individuals within the culture-bearing society. In Merton's typology, individuals who are unemployed as a result of lack of education would fall under Innovation, as a mode of adaptation. This response occurs when the individual has assimilated the cultural goals, that is (obtaining employment), but the institutionalized means are not available to the individual, that is (lack of education). As a result, the individual will look for alternative means in order to survive, which in this case is engagement in non-conforming behaviour. Merton's key point is that strain

in the social structure invite deviance.

From our analysis on the issue of government's legislation on minimum wages, we found that the majority of the respondents we interviewed are of the view that the minimum wage legislation as entrenched in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, contribute to the high rate of unemployment. The point emphasized by the respondents is that many employers cannot afford to pay the minimum wage, and because of this, they have to reduce the number of workers. One of the respondents interviewed had this to say about the effects of government's legislation on minimum wage:

"You see, since the new minimum wage legislation came into existence, many of the employers I contacted for a job are not willing to absorb more labour because of the minimum wage and other conditions of service which the employers complained bitterly that they cannot afford to pay new employees. This minimum wage has left many of us unemployed and this has adversely affect our live."

With regard to the issue of co-operation between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services in minimizing crime and unemployment. From our findings, our conclusion is that the co-operation and integration between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services units will help to minimize unemployment and crime rate. This integration and co-operation between the two social structures – the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services units, have earlier been highlighted by sociologists as the functional aspect of the social structure that keeps the system stable. The findings of this research are supported by Parson's model which rests on the premises that complex affairs of a society could not be conducted unless they were organized in some systematic way. Every society being a social system must contain roles with responsibilities for solving basic system problems at the societal level. In the context of the social system, Parsons pictures society or the social system as a large square, which he divided into four equal parts. These parts are the four functional system problems, which are represented by the letters AGIL.

In the Parsonian model, the letter I, stands for Integration which is the heart of the four-function paradigm, because the solution to this problem has been a priority for functionalists, especially since Durkheim. By Integration, Parsons meant the need to co-ordinate, adjust, and regulate relationships among the various actors or units within the system to keep the system functioning. A Parsonian analysis of our findings revealed a need for integration and co-ordination between the departments of labour and correctional services in alleviating the problem of high rate of crime and unemployment in South Africa.

In our research, one of the questions put to the convicts (prisoners) was: "While in prison, are you engaged in any skills or educational programme?" It emerged from our interviews that inmates are engaged in a number of skills and educational programmes. On completion of their sentences, and having acquired some skills, ex-offenders return to their communities for re-integration. For an extended period of time they remain unemployed. As a result of lack of employment opportunities, the conclusion was obvious. Members of these groups because of unemployment, would be under severe pressure to reject the legitimate means which do not help them, and seek success by illegitimate means instead. Consequently, since members of these groups have been labelled as criminals, these unintended effects of law could force the individual to easily engage in crime, and as a result promote a situation of recidivism. Such individuals who have acquired skills in prison, could be absorbed into the labour market, if there could be co-operation and information flow between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services, in respect of where there are vacancies and other job opportunities.

The fact that the correctional services department and the ministry of labour work in isolation respectively, the rate of unemployment will not be drastically reduced for the fact that ex-convicts who are unable to find jobs on their own will again commit crime so as to be able to survive, thus becoming perpetual criminals and become recidivists.

Our recommendation at this juncture is that, there is an urgent need for the South African government to set up a body that will help to build up the integration and co-operation between the various ministries. This will create information flow and help the ministries to work very closely, thus each benefiting from one another.

The research findings also confirmed that our urban centres have more of the unemployed than the rural areas. A correlational analysis was also used to examine if there is any correlation between the residential and unemployment rate. Our findings confirmed that there is a positive correlation between residential area (urban) and the rate of unemployment. Unemployment is more associated with urban areas than rural areas. Perhaps this is why we have more crimes committed by the unemployed in urban areas than rural areas.

The Economic theory on rural-urban migration by Micheal Todaro is of the view that members of the labour force, both actual and potential, compare their expected incomes for a given time horizon in the urban sector (i.e., the difference between returns and costs of migration with prevailing average rural incomes, and migrate if the former exceeds the latter. South Africa and other developing economies are beset by a chronic and serious unemployment problem, with the result that a typical migrant cannot expect to secure a highly paid urban job immediately.

In terms of the marital status of respondents, the findings revealed that those who committed crime when they were unemployed are married. In South Africa and other African countries, the men as the head of the family are expected to take proper care in terms of finance and other subsistence expenses within the family. The inability of the head of the family to perform the above functions, the individual is not only seen as a failure in the community, but as a non-existent entity with other stigma placed on the individual. The researcher also used the correlational analysis to examine if there is any relationship between marital status and the propensity of the unemployed to commit crime. Our findings confirm that there is a positive relationship between marital status and crime rate among the unemployed. Our findings also revealed that the commonest crimes committed by the individuals are theft and fraud.

On the issue of education and the rate of unemployment the findings of this research shows that the majority of the unemployed are not well educated. The education of the people is seen in this research as an area the government need to work at or take seriously, if the rate of unemployment is to be reduced in South Africa, thus minimizing the rate of crime. As a matter of fact, education is often seen by both development planners and the general public in largely instrumental terms, the spread of education is thought to be necessary to provide the

technological manpower necessary for the development of our society. It also helps to improve the people's standard of living through well paying wage employment.

Past studies have shown that in addition to securing employment opportunities as a result of good education, education also fosters both geographic and social mobility. According to JC Caldwell (1968:361-377) as the level of education rises, so does the rate of employment opportunities and migration increases. Arguing in the same vein, Olakampo (1968:137-152) argued that among self employed entrepreneurs in Africa, success increases with educational attainment, literacy is especially important.

In terms of the employment status of the prisoners when they were convicted, the analysis confirmed that the majority of the convicts were unemployed when they committed crime. In this simple analysis, it became clear that unemployment has a direct bearing on the propensity of the individual to commit crime. The South African government has not extended the social security benefits to the unemployed, especially in the informal sectors, and this has contributed greatly to the high rate of crime. Legally speaking, the exclusion of workers from the informal sectors from social security benefits raises serious questions of a constitutional nature. However, we decided not to discuss further the legal issues involved in the exclusion of workers from the informal sectors from enjoying social security benefits since this is not within the paradigm of this thesis. However, there is an urgent need to provide better social security services to the unemployed.

Our analysis on the percentage contribution of small and medium scale businesses to employment in the main industrial sectors shows that on the average, small and medium scale businesses employ approximately 54,5 percent of all the formal, private sector enterprises, compared to 45,5 percent in large enterprises in South Africa (NSIKA, 2000). In addition to the above, we also found that small and medium scale businesses dominate the total salaries and wages paid to employees in South Africa. The bone of contention here is that legislation on minimum wages should be promulgated in such a way that employers in small and medium businesses can afford such payments. If they cannot afford the minimum pay, the large number of the South African labour force will remain unemployed for a long time and for the

unemployed to survive, they may take to other unapproved means of survival (crime).

## 6.2 **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The study therefore recommends the following:

- Although South Africa has a National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), the starting point for any national anti-crime programme is an acknowledgement that the police alone are unable to combat crime. This problem requires the co-ordinated effort and assistance of diverse organizations and institutions, such as prisons, business, trade unions, welfare agencies, schools and religious institutions.
- Since poverty is inherent in much of the crime committed by individuals, and since crime undermines economic development, there is a need for a strong relationship between an anti-crime programme and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
- Since criminals tend to inhabit their own subculture, a culture which encourages and reinforces criminal behaviour, it is important to establish a public campaign telling criminals that their behaviour will result in prosecution and conviction.
- Educational programmes aimed at reducing vulnerability to crime are essential in South Africa.
- The challenge to South Africa to fight worldwide problem of unemployment is intensified by the fact that the country's workforce is predominately low-skilled, has a problem of lack of education and inadequate work experience. It is recommended that rural areas in particular should be prioritised for special job creation projects and skills development programmes coupled with vocational training centres where those who are not very educated can learn some hand work.
- A computerised database of the unemployed should be developed which could serve

as a “talent bank” for the labour offices and employment agencies.

- A concerted effort should be made to register the unemployed and to expand the job counselling and placement services of the Department of Labour to rural areas.

Finally, our submission in regard to the last mentioned recommendation is that the co-operation and integration between the ministry of labour and the department of correctional services, in particular, will help to minimize the rate of unemployment and crime. The argument here is that those working in the ministry of labour will be able to give information on job opportunities to those who are unemployed and thus reducing their propensity to commit crime as a means of survival.

In the same vein, those in the ministry of labour will also be able to give the officials of the department of correctional services information on how to secure job opportunities for criminals when they are released from prison. This will help in preventing the criminals from committing more crime as a means of survival, thus reducing the rate of recidivists going back to prison.

We shall recall that in the data analysis of this research, Parson's model provided a way of looking at society that focuses our attention on the interdependence of different institutions, and on the way human societies everywhere grapple with similar problems in spite of their surface differences, and on the continuities in social life and how they are secured. Role interaction is the basic component of a social system in Parson's schema. By ensuring “appropriate” role interaction, the two mechanisms of socialization and social control generally promote and maintain equilibrium in the social system.

Above all else, Parson's system is a system in equilibrium because each actor is morally committed to perform culturally and socially expected functions. As Parsons put it “many complex processes are necessary to maintain the functioning of any societal system, if its members never did anything, a society would very soon cease to exist.”

### 6.3 **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, unemployment and crime is a daily reality of many residents in KwaZulu-Natal province. This problem must be addressed, because the quality of life of people in our province is severely affected by the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime.

There is an urgent need by the government, NGO's and higher institutions to work together and find a lasting solution to the high rate of crime and unemployment in our society.

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UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

QUESTIONNAIRE.

A SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF  
UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE RATE OF CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA WITH  
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO KWAZULU-NATAL PROVINCE

Dear Respondent

The purpose of this research is to investigate the effects of unemployment on the rate of crime in KwaZulu-Natal province. All information supplied will be treated with outmost confidentiality.

Mark your answer with an "X" in the appropriate box provided.

Thanking you for your co-operation

A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Q.1 What is your gender?

Male

1

Female

2

Q.2 What is your marital status?

Married

1

Single

2

Divorced / Separated

3

Widow / Widower

4

Q.3 Indicate your highest educational qualification?

Never went to school

1

Below Standard 8

2

Standard 8

3

Standard 9

4

Standard 10

5

Diploma

6

Degree

7

Q.4 In which of the following areas do you reside?

Empangeni

1

Ngwelezane

2

Richards Bay

3

Esikhawini

4

St. Lucia

5

Vulindlela

6

Mthunzini

7

Q.5 What is your present occupation?

Unemployed	1
General labourer	2
Semi-skilled labourer	3
Professional worker (doctor, lawyer, teacher, etc.)	4
Worker in transport (driver, dispatcher)	5
Craftsman or production worker	6
Student	7
Service worker (nursing, social worker, etc.)	8
Agricultural and related worker (tending crops, animals, forest, farmer)	9
Housewife	10
Retired	11
Other (specify) .....	12

Q.6 What was the main reason why you were absent from work during the last seven days?

Mark only one reason

Own illness or injury	1
Arrested	2
Caring for family or others	3
Maternity or paternity leave	4
Strike / Stay away / lockout	5
Problems with transport	6
Bad weather	7
Vacation / leave	8
Unrest (violence)	9
Temporary laid off	10
Other (specify) .....	

Q.7 Do you think that unemployment increases the rate of crime in South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2

Q.8 How long have you been trying to find work or start a business?

Less than a month	1
1 month to less than 2 months	2
2 months to less than 3 months	3
3 months to less than 4 months	4
4 months to less than 6 months	5
6 months to less than 1 year	6
1 year to less than 3 years	7
3 years or more	8

Q.9 How do you support yourself / family?

Did odd jobs during past 7 days	1
Supported by a person in the household	2
Supported by charity, church, welfare	3
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF)	4
Saving or money previously earned	5
Old age or disability pension	6
Begging for money in the street	7
Selling vegetables in the street	8

Q.10 Do you think that governments legislation on minimum wages increases the rate of unemployment in South Africa?

Yes	1
No	2

Q.11 Do you think that unemployment as a result of lack of education increases/decreases the rate of crime in South Africa?

Increases

1

Decreases

2

Q.12 Do you report all incidents of crime to the South African Police Service?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.13 If you do not report all incidents of crime to the South African Police Services, indicate your reasons.

Mark only one

The incident would not receive proper attention	1
The SAPS are not co-operative	2
The SAPS are incompetent	3
The SAPS are arrogant	4

Q.14 In your opinion, has the crime rate in the area where you live increased over the past year?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.15 Have you ever been arrested for committing a crime?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.16 If yes, how long have you been sentenced?

3 months

1

6 months

2

More than 12 months

3

Q.17 What type of crime did you commit?

Murder	1
Assault	2
Robbery	3
Wife beating	4
Child abuse	5
Burglary	6
Larceny	7
Motor vehicle theft	8
Victimless crime	9
Governmental crime	10

Q.18 Where you employed when you committed this crime?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.19 Do you think that lack of job opportunities is likely to contribute to crime rate?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.20 While in prison, are you engaged in any skills or educational programme?

Yes

1

No

2

If Yes, mention a few .....

Q.21 Do you think that there is any need for Ministry of Labour to work closely with the department of correctional Services so as to minimize the rate of crime and unemployment?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.22 On the whole, were you satisfied with the way the correctional services officials treated you?

Mark only one

Correctional services officials are corrupt	1
Officials should improve their academic qualifications	2
Officials should implement a more active crime prevention strategy	3
The relationship between inmates and officials should be improved	4
Officials should receive more practical training	5

Q.23 Are you currently engaged in any rehabilitative programme with NICRO?

Yes

1

No

2

Q.24 If yes, why? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q.25 If no, why? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q.26 If yes to question 24, briefly state why is this necessary \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q.27 Is there any opportunity for prisoners to speak to:

Psychiatrist

1
---

Psychologist

2
---

Doctor

6
---

Teacher

4
---

Social Worker

5
---

Priest

6
---

**Thank you for your wonderful co-operation**

## **Annexure B**

### **Map**

