History

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The participation of the Zulus in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902
(1978) Maphalala, Simon Jabulani; Haasbroek, D.J.P.
In order to understand the Zulu participation in the AngloBoer War and the Holkrantz murder in May 1902, it is essential to trace in broad outline the attitude of the Zulus towards the white settlers in Natal. the Governmell~ of Natal, the British Government and the Government of the S.A. Republic or those subjects of the Transvaal and Natal who becarne involved in the internal faction struggles in Zululand. The matter will only become intelligible by explaining the complexity of those policies which evolved from such contacts from the time of the arrival of the first white settlers in 1824 to the outbreak of the War in 1899.
A historical survey of the abakwaMzimela tribe of the Mthunzini district
(1988) Mmutlana, Rufus Mokgotlha.; van Jaarsveld, F.A.
In the past a historical survey of' an African society was a very rare endeavour, because this field of historical research was erroneously regarded as being out of the scope of the historians. At the moment historians have no excuse, for there is an enormous amount of primary source materials waiting to be explored. These sources have been available, but they were not utilized due to the lack of knowledge. Due to the slowness of the South African historians in responding to the challenging demand of writing about the history of African societies, non-academic writers pioneered the process. With particular reference to this research, works of earlier historians like A. T. Bryant cannot be overlooked. In reviewing Bryant's work, "Olden Times in Zululand and Natal", Shula Marks pointed out that it is full of "unscientific assumptions and strong prejudices" As a result of this discovery Bryant's work had to be used with caution. It however remains the most valuable written source on early Zulu history.
A comparative study of the aims structure and strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the decade 1975-1985
(1991) Shamase, Maxwell Zakhele; Maphalala, S.J.; de Villiers, J.
It is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that no study of this nature has ever been undertaken in the field of history in South Africa. This justifies the necessity of undertaking a comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the crucial decade 1975-1985. It was during that decade that these two political groupings moved closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa. By this time the NP, in spite of preserving hegemonic principles on behalf of the White electorate and amid increased international isolation, had proved itself the invincible doyen in the body politic of South Africa. Inkatha cadres argued that their movement was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's, spawned by Black resistance to apartheid and had authentic roots in the core of the liberation struggle. The principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha were devoid of discernible dissimilarities. One may assert, however, that it was enigmatic that such principles and aims could not compel the two groupings to solve the socio-economic and political problems facing South Africa in that decade. Such a dismal failure to seek solutions that would benefit all the people of South Africa reflected negatively on both the NP and Inkatha. In 1985 this emerged as a harbinger for the state of morass in South Africa's political scenario. The organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha remained by far the best organized in South Africa, capable of overwhelming any challenge mounted by other groups. In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and Provincial leaders, while Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from Branches, Regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making bodies. The National Council (NC) was the policy-making body and represented all national leadership formations of Inkatha. It was not possible to stipulate how many members of Inkatha at any one time belonged to the NC. This was due to the fact that organizations were constantly affiliating to - the movement. The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress. The organisational policies of the NP and Inkatha had vestiges of commonality. Both groupings accepted and respected the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. They both endorsed the notion of a multi-party democracy, although the NP comprehended this in the context of separate development. Inkatha noted this as taking into account the fact that no single organisation, from whatever quarter, would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa. Disinvestment, sanctions and violence were abhorred by both groupings as a strategy to dismantle apartheid. They favoured negotiation politics and non-violence both as objectives and strategies. Both groupings conveyed assurance to achievements of a political apparatus that could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities through negotiations. The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. They both believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common goal. It could be mentioned, however, that the different situations and platforms from which they operated, polarised them against each other. The NP and Inkatha's relations with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings created a hiatus in terms of their aims and strategies. This crippled the evolvement of consensus politics in South Africa. In the decade 1975-1985 the Parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) , the New Republic Party (NRP) , the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) . In principle, they agreed with the NP and Inkatha in standing for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa. The NP and Inkatha had unfavourable relations with the extra-parliamentary political formations. These were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NF), and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Their relations with both the NP and Inkatha in terms of their aims and strategies were marked by what one may convoke "timorous digressions." Most of them referred to the NP Government as illegitimate while viewing Inkatha as perpetrating political tribalism which to them was the greatest enemy of African freedom. By 1985 this intricate structure of political groupings and different aims and strategies, characterized a divided South Africa.
The development of Umlazi Mission Station and Reserve, 1856 - 1948, with special reference to the land problem
(1993) Ndaba, Dean Jabulani.; de Villiers, J.
The aim of this study was to give a general survey of the history of Umlazi Mission Station with particular emphasis on the land question between 1856 and 1948. The study highlights the fact that during these years, the Anglican Mission Station was characterised by many problems which aroused much controversy among various parties concerned. The numerous factors that led to the dispute among the parties can be broadly categorised as: (i) the inconsistent or erratic land policy of the Natal Colonial Government on mission stations which subsequently deprived the Blacks of Umlazi the right to own the land, (ii) ecclesiastical problems within the Anglican Church and the schism that emerged, (iii) interest shown by Whites and Indians in the mission station, (iv) the expansion of Durban as an industrial and commercial city, the dynamics of urbanisation and the proximity of Umlazi to Durban, (v) the pressure exerted by the Durban City Council to acquire Umlazi Mission for a black urban township and the resistance by black landowners at the mission station against incorporation, and (vi) Government intervention through the appointment of the Native Affairs Commission (1945) and the Broome Commission (1947 - 1948). The conclusion drawn is that Umlazi was a victim of many factors - geographic, religious, social, economic and political. The crucial period in the history of the mission station was 1942 -1948. The events during this period show how the geographic factor became the central issue in the dispute. The mission station had inevitably to be affected by the urbanisation process because of its proximity to the rapidly growing city. In addition to the above the industrial development in Durban was following a southward direction which brought the boundaries of the city close to Umlazi. Had the mission station been situated elsewhere in some remote part of the country, as with most mission stations in Natal, the development of the area would probably have taken a different course. This trend whereby rural areas situated close to fast growing urban areas are urbanised, is a world-wide phenomenon. However, one cannot overlook the fact that the Blacks were politically disadvantaged and without parliamentary power to veto the decision. This study shows, however, that much was done by the Smuts Government during the height of the controversy to treat the matter in an unbiased fashion by using commissions, consultations and open discussions from all parties concerned. All these events make the history of Umlazi Mission exceptional, fascinating and worthy of study.
The origin of the Mkhwanazi tribe under Mkhontokayise J. Mkhwanazi
(University of Zululand, 1993) Simelane, Antonio L.; Maphalala, S.J.
The History of the Mkhwanazi tribe between the UMhIathuze and the UMlalazi rivers in the east and west respectively and the Indian Ocean and the Ongoye moun tains in the South and North is an off shoot of the Mkhwanazi tribe of the chief Somkhele in the Hlabisa district • Its history can be clearly' understood by first looking at the history of the Mkhwanazi tribe in the Hlabisa district.
Faction fighting in Msinga District from 1874-1906
(1994) Mthembu, Bhekuyise Isaac; Maphalala, S.J.
Faction fighting in Msinga started because of the shortage of land in this division. The oldest residents of the valley, the Sithole, aMachunu and aBathembu lived together very peacefully. Trouble started after the Colonial Government's demarcation of the valley into a reserve. Hundreds of people driven away from various parts of Natal arrived. These people had been removed from their areas because the Government needed those areas for settling white colonists. This part of Natal is arid, hilly and rocky. As a result, subsistence economy in the form of agriculture declined to a very large extent. The Government had no economic policy for these people. Starvation soon made the izizwe of the valley restless. Their amakhosi could not help them in any way. Eventually, it was a question of everyone struggling for survival. It was, for instance, not possible for aMabaso to live in peace with aBathembu because their location was completely surrounded by that of aBathembu. Inkosi Mganu Mvelase of aBathembu was not a war-like ruler but his neighbour, Inkosi Thulwana Ndabezitha of aMabaso had many grievances regarding land. In the long run, these amakhosi became enemies. Their izizwe started trying to push each other out of the reserve. When the two izizwe were up in arms against each other, it was the beginning of a tragedy for the whole division. Faction fighting that broke out between the two izizwe gave birth to the rest of the wars and the lamentable system of alliances. The attitude of the white civil servants towards Inkosi Kula Majozi worsened the state of the reserve. The enmity between the Sithole and aMaqamu was further aggravated by the partition of aMaqamu location after the deposition and exile of Inkosi Kula. The Government also proved to be inconsiderate of the feelings of aMaqamu by putting some of them under Inkosi Sibindi of aMabomvu. The Government was fully aware of the enmity between the two izizwe. Some of aMaqamu found themselves under Inkosi Bhande Sithole. When Inkosi Kula was reinstated, these people made a lot of noise demanding to be under their own inkosi. Fighting subsided in 1906, but that did not mean that the Government had succeeded in stopping faction fighting in the reserve. This was proved by the outbreaks of devastating wars between aBathembu and aMachunu in 1922 and 1944. The main significance of faction fighting is that it affects all aspects of life of the people involved. It is still very difficult to develop these victims economically and even educationally. The easy availability of guns has made matters far worse, even in the absence of a faction fight. Young men, most of whom with no formal schooling, easily get trapped in hooliganism. ^Employment chances are always slim. There are absolutely no activities to keep these young people occupied. They openly live by crime. To most of them, stealing is the way of life. They are nsed as hired killers only to meet the same fate themselves eventually. Even those who have access to arable land, show no interest in v i cultivating the soil. These wasted children have no way of making themselves economically productive. They are a burden to themselves and to the Government. Their built-in culture of fighting, has taught them to look down upon any man who does not possess a gun. Such a man is derogatorily referred to as a woman. When a faction fight breaks out, schools are usually disturbed because boys are bound to join their ward male members. They remain in hiding, preparing for attack or counter-attack, until fighting is over. Should fighting intensify, schools stop functioning altogether. Many boys leave school in such circumstances The question that remains now is, who or what will stop the war in Msinga? Unless a solution is found, to remedy the situation and restore dignity to these people, the future of Msinga will remain bleak
The history of abakwaMthethwa
(University of Zululand, 1995) Mthethwa, Absalom Muziwethu.; Cubbin, A.E.
AbaKwaMthethwa form a very important component of the Zulu nation as we know it today. They were in fact the vanguards in the implementation of the idea of a confederation of smaller states (clans) under one supreme ruler or a king who become their overlord. The history of abaKwaMthethwa is so wide that one would need volumes to do justice to it. This project is only going to deal with their movement from around uBombo mountains round about AD 1500 to 1818 when king Dingiswyo was assassinated by Zwide, inkosi of the Ndwandwe people. This project will furthermore concentrate on the life of Dingiswayo from the time he escaped death from his father. The project also seeks to examine the controversy surrounding Dingiswayo's formative journey. It is intended that Dingiswayo's influence and his contribution socially, politically, military and economically to the upliftment of the Mthethwa confederacy will be examined. Finally mention will be made of the royal imizi, some principal imizi not necessarily royal ones, as well as religious imizi that are to be found at KwaMthethwa.
Opposition by black rural communities to being forcibly removed to black homelands with emphasis on the experience of KwaNgema and Driefontein communities in the Wakkerstroom district : a historical perspective, 1980-1985
(1998) Ndaba, Dean Jabulani; de Villiers, J.
KwaNgema and neighbouring Driefontein were Black-owned freehold settlements in the Wakkerstroom district, Transvaal. Whereas KwaNgema had been granted officially to the community in 1904, Driefontein had been purchased in 1912. Because of their proximity to predominantly White areas, in 1965 both areas were declared by the National Party government as 'Blackspots'. Subsequently, in line with the government's homeland consolidation policy, the inhabitants of the two settlements were notified that they would be moved to the KaNgwane and KwaZulu Homelands. In terms of the Native Administration Act of 1927, the government could, at its pleasure, remove Black tribes from certain areas. But it was not until 1981 when plans to construct the Heyshope Dam were announced, that the government informed the two communities that their removal was a certainty. The new dam, to be built on the Assegai River, would flood parts of both settlements. Between 1981 and 1985, the residents of KwaNgema and Driefontein opposed resettlement on the following grounds: — They were historically and legally entitled to the land. — Relocation and the rebuilding of new homes would be a costly undertaking. — There was much uncertainty about their future security in the Homelands, in terms of landownership rights, employment, pensions, etc. — The KwaNgema people argued that the Act of 1927 did not apply to them, as they were not a tribe, but 'Umndeni' that operated on Western democratic lines. — Adjacent vacant land could be utilized for settling only those residents threatened by the dam. The government rejected all claims and counter-proposals made by the Blacks. Controversy characterised by state repression, leadership disputes and other problems ensued. The crisis was eventually resolved in August 1985 in favour of the KwaNgema and Driefontein communities. The government withdrew its resettlement plans. Only residents threatened by the dam were relocated to adjacent land. All residents retained their property rights. Factors contributing to this historic settlement were: — The unrelenting protest by the two communities arid their institution of legal action against the government. — The murder by the police of Saul Mkhize in April 1983. Mkhize was the Driefontein community leader who spearheaded the resistance. His unexpected death increased criticism of the government's forced removals policy nationally and internationally. — The refusal by Enos Mabuza, leader of KaNgwane, and Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu to accommodate the two communities in their Homelands. — Increasing condemnation of the government's removals policy domestically and abroad. — The changing political climate in South Africa, resulting inter alia, in the review of the removals policy. The conclusion drawn from this study, is that the experience of KwaNgema and Driefontein was an outcome of a combination of forces -historical, ideological, legal, anthropological, social and economic. Another important highlight of this research is that land ownership is indeed a fundamental aspiration and right for all people which, if denied, may lead to conflict.
The history of the Mthiyane people who were removed from Richards Bay to Ntambanana wendsday 6 January 1976
(University of Zululand, 1998) Ntuli, Sihle Herbert.; Cubbin, Tony
This paper seeks specifically to analyse the history of the people who were forcibly removed from the present day Richards Bay (previously called Mhlathuze Lagoon.) to the arid land of Ntambanana. The Paper will concentrate on the experience endured by these people' during this unfortunate episode. The experience entailed difficulties, deaths, hunger, resistance and even in some cases willingness or happiness, homelessness etc. It is also interesting to indicate that the Group Areas Act, which strongly manifested itself through force removal was forcefully implemented in moving the original inhabitants of Richards Bay.
John L. Dube, his Ilanga Lase Natali and the Natal African Administration, 1903-1910
(1999) Gasa, Enoch Doctor; Maphalala, S.J.
J.L. Dube is one of the Zulu Natalians who, being an African nationalist, involved himself in the affairs of his kith and kin. He is the founder of the first African established school in Natal, viz. Ohlange. He also succeeded to establish and publish ILANGA LASE NATAL as a medium of contact among the Africans who were economically, politically and socially acute. Dube set himself the task of revealing the failures of Shepstonism. He pointed out how it could have been utilised to promote acceptable administration of Africans. He even pinpointed the type of reforms that the Africans yearned for. When this was not heeded, he involved himself unflinchingly in politics. He organised fellow-Christian Africans with success. Dube was, however, an exponent of non-violent political change. He wished that in its dealings with the Africans, the government would be fair, objective and humane. Dube remonstrated against the subjugation of the Africans by the colonial government. He preferred that the Africans should be consulted, and elevated in the scale of civilization. For this to happen, he pressed that the attitudes of the whites towards blacks would have to change. The unwieldy officialdom, obscenely abusive party politics, and unequal treatment of whites and blacks at law would also have to be remedied or replaced. He advocated that land should be equitably distributed and Africans introduced to a new mode of land ownership. The whites would have to reduce then-excessive demands for land and African labour. He also demanded a worth¬while education system for the blacks that would promote all their human aspects. The government was urged to adequately financially provide for and control African education. It should not leave this to the lot of missionary societies. Dube also pressed for the enfranchisement and representation of Africans in the Natal legislature. It was only then that the government would quickly apprehend, comprehend, and redress problems that related to Africans. Subsequent to the 1906 rebellion, Dube was hopeful that there would be an end to maladministration of African affairs. He was highly expectant that the recommendations of NNAC, the drive of the new governor, the new direction of policy, though late, would put the colony on a new course. However, then the movement towards Union was afoot. It remained to be seen what would transpire.
The reign of King Mpande and his relations with the Republic of Natalia and its successor,the British Colony of Natal
(1999) Shamase, Maxwell Zakhele; de Villiers, J.
King Mpande Ka Senzangakhona was the third in succession in the dynasty of "martial" Zulu potentates whose military valour transformed small clans into a single powerful nation. The evolvement of the ideal of nationhood among the Zulu people ruled by Mpande had its origin in the praises of his father Senzangakhona Ka Jama. When the specialist declaimer of praises said that, "a cord of destiny let us weave, O Menzi scion of Jama, That to universes beyond the reach of spirit-forms, we may ascend" , he was indicating that Zulus were people whose destiny was to traverse the universe and transform the human being into a conscious citizen of the cosmic order (in South-east Africa). King Shaka, Mpande's half-brother, adopted the ideal of this court-poet as the main inspiration of the revolution which he led after the death of Senzangakhona. It was the ideological blueprint on which he built the Zulu nation. Born in about 1798 Mpande was the son of Senzangakhona and queen Songiya of the Hlabisa clan. The Zulu lineage largely begotten by Mpande, the first king to have children, became a royal group with high status. Mpande decreed that all children begotten by members of the Zulu royal family be referred to as abantwana (princes and princesses). Nevertheless, Mpande began on a very precarious footing. In his youth he was plagued by umchoboka (skin dermatitis). His predecessors and contemporaries viewed him as indolent, inept, obese and even cowardly. Most historical accounts referred to Mpande's inferior genealogical status, cowardice, physical and mental deficiencies. On the contrary, Mpande was a recruited warrior and had been incorporated into the regiments on the death of Senzangakhona in 1816. He retained a submissive role during the next few years, thereby creating an impression that he would not contend for the kingship. The source of Mpande's strength could be traced from his name. It comes from a Zulu word impande meaning "root". The symbolic meaning of a root is that it is a source of life. In Senzangakhona's calculations Mpande was to be the source, strength and growth of the nation. This bore truth in that Zulu potentates whose genius earned the nation dignity and pride, descended from his direct line. It could be that Senzangakhona had a premonition of his son's reign by naming him Mpande. King Shaka also gave Mpande the responsibility of fathering a son. This could be viewed as an underlying factor in Mpande's becoming a natural successor to the Zulu throne. By 1837, Mpande had built up a substantial personal following living with him at Mlambongwenya homestead of his father in the Eshowe district . Here he lived a peaceful life fearless of possible invasion from adversaries. It also precluded his half-brother Dingane from embarking upon the same kind of purges as he did against his other half-brothers and potential rivals. Mpande became king of the Zulu nation in 1840 and while he reigned during the epoch that was devoid of full-scale conventional wars, he had to live through times when sporadic attacks were the rallying point of relations between members of the Nguni-speaking communities such as Xhosa, Swazi and Mpondo. Unlike his progenitors Mpande waged few wars abroad. He dispatched Zulu regiments to raid the cattle of the Swazi, Bapedi, Hlubi, AmaNgwe and AbakwaNkosi. Mpande also intervened in a succession dispute in Maputoland. The style of Mpande's military expeditions was not different to that of his predecessors. His campaigns were followed up with a re-vitalization of the Shakan amabutho (regiments) control system and building of new amakhanda (establishment erected and occupied by the amabutho, containing in addition a harem) around his palace of Nodwengu. In the late 1840's the success of Mpande's military campaigns was restricted by sporadic interference by both the Voortrekkers and the British of Natal. Relations between Mpande and the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia began on 15 January 1839 when Mpande met the Voortrekker leaders on the banks of Thukela River. The head of the Volksraad, Andries Pretorius engaged in cordial conversation with Mpande. Pretorius realised that declaring Voortrekker friendship with Mpande would ensure their security against possible invasion from the north of Thukela. Such declaration laid the foundation for the battle of Maqongqo hills, which took place on 29 January 1840. In that war, the regiments of Dingane were defeated by those of Mpande. After a protracted battle at Maqongqo, (29 January 1840) Andries Pretorius and some members of the Volksraad arranged a meeting with Mpande. They met Mpande on 10 February 1840 and installed him as king. This happened after the Zulu nation had already crowned him king on 5 February 1840. He was persuaded to take an oath before the Volksraad, acknowledging the supremacy of the Volksraad, undertaking to rule KwaZulu in peace and maintaining cordial relations with the Voortrekkers. Mpande was then honoured with a praise name, "Prince of the Emigrant Zulus". In acceptance of the terms of friendship and defence between himself and the Voortrekkers Mpande said, "If one would do anything to your disfavour or disadvantage, you can only let me know and be assured that I will hurry to your assistance with my whole army and I will sacrifice my last men for you." On 14 February 1840 Pretorius issued a proclamation whereby the territory from the sea next to the Black Mfolozi River, where it ran through the double mountains, close to the origin and then next to Hooge Randberg in a straight line to the Drakensberg, St. Lucia Bay inclusive was declared as border between KwaZulu and the Republic of Natalia. On the banks of the Klip River the Voortrekkers received about 36 000 head of cattle looted after the Maqongqo battle. They received an additional 15 000 head of cattle from Mpande as a token of allegiance. The Voortrekkers, convinced of Mpande's cordial disposition, agreed not to interfere with his domestic affairs. This was with the proviso that Mpande keep to the agreements regarding humanitarian principles aimed at preventing unnecessary bloodshed. During Mpande's kingship a plethora of Zulu refugees flocked to Natal south of Thukela. About 3 000 displaced Zulus and other Africans stayed in the vicinity of the harbour before the arrival of the Voortrekkers. The Voortrekkers grouped them into no less than six regional reserves. They were defecting from Mpande's rule and refused to go back to KwaZulu. With the increase of Zulu homesteads in Natal it became imperative for the Volksraad (Legislative body) of the Republic of Natalia to threaten to inflict capital punishment on those who refused to be sent back to KwaZulu. The second British occupation of Natal (1842) took place before the Republic could execute its plan. The Voortrekker plan included moving Zulu refugees to an area opposite Mzinyathi or between Mthamvuna and Mzimvubu Rivers. They could rule themselves, but as subjects of the Republic and a Voortrekker agent would oversee their affairs. The Cape Governor George Napier argued that the territory between Mzimvubu and Mzimkhulu Rivers had been ceded by inkosi (Chief) Faku of the Mpondo to the British sovereign. He regarded it as their special task to protect the Zulus to whom he pledged ''every conceivable virtue" against the Voortrekkers whom he thought intended evil due to their previous unauthorised emigration from the colony and subsequent clashes with Mzilikazi and Dingane. Napier had to strengthen the bond between the Natal colony and Natal Zulus through special agents and missionaries. He received authorisation from Imperial Minister, Lord John Russell to resume the military occupation of Natal. The negotiations, which the Voortrekkers entered into with Napier, were challenged by the proclamation of 2 December 1841. It announced the British re-occupation of Natal and claimed that the Voortrekkers were actually British renegade subjects. The proclamation also contained accusations of Voortrekker maltreatment of Mpande5s subjects in Natal. The conflict between the Voortrekkers and the British had an adverse effect on relations between Mpande and the Republic of Natalia. The Republic of Natalia was subjected to Colonel A.J. Cloete on 15 July 1842. The Voortrekkers were compelled to surrender to the British due to Mpande's promise of future assistance to the British. Cloete gave Mpande the impression that the British occupation of Natal was the defeat of the Voortrekker power to which the Zulus owed their vassalage. Mpande appeared to be pleased with the British occupation of Natal. In 1842 Mpande concluded a border agreement with the British to settle land claims from the sources of Mzinyathi (Buffalo) to its junction with the Thukela. In June 1843 Mpande realised that the influx of Zulu refugees into Natal weakened his authority. He requested the British to send the refugees and their cattle back to KwaZulu. The British ignored Mpande ?s plea and the request by the Voortrekkers that Zulu refugees be kept in locations. Next Mpande turned to the Voortrekkers who still remained in Natal and both parties agreed that Zulu refugees caused displeasure for their administrations. In 1840 there were only about 2 000 - 3 000 Zulu refugees in Natal, but by 1843 they had increased to no less than 50 000. The Zulu king denied that he had given up the area between Thukela and Mzinyathi Rivers to the British. Mpande wanted to pursue a moderate and more peaceful diplomacy. He welcomed the Voortrekkers as a buffer between his kingdom and the British. To determine the border between the Voortrekkers and the Zulus, Mpande sent a few of his headmen to the Voortrekkers. It was agreed that the whole area up to the Mzinyathi River would be occupied by the Voortrekkers. However, the British lieutenant governor Benjamin Pine viewed Mpande as a monarch with a double-agenda. He believed that Mpande promoted his own case with the ulterior object of creating dissension between the Voortrekkers and the British. Mpande wished to enter into a defensive military treaty with the Voortrekkers. This was prompted by Zulu refugees in Natal who wanted Mpande deposed and incriminated the British authorities of indifference to Mpande's alleged persecution of Zulus in KwaZulu. Mpande was also infuriated by the prolonged protection the British gave to Zulu refugees. Thus, Mpande gave permission to some Voortrekkers to occupy land strategically situated at Klip River and Utrecht to resist possible British military offensives. Simultaneously he pledged allegiance to the British colonial establishment in Natal by denying co-operation with the local Voortrekkers. This brought about conflict between the British and the Voortrekkers. William Harding, the British Surveyor-General, concluded that Mpande had practiced the grossest deceit towards the British government and that his proceedings with reference to the Voortrekkers amounted to the crime of deliberate fraud. But, Mpande extended a hand of friendship to the British colonial establishment in Natal. He diplomatically refused to give the British military assistance during the conflict with the Voortrekkers in 1842. Mpande said: 4iNo, you are now fighting for the upperhand, and whichever gains must be my master"3. The Zulu king did not assist either party, but as soon as the British troops proved themselves to be in power he sent emissaries to Colonel Cloete to say that he was about to march against the Voortrekkers. Mpande objected to British hunters and traders entering KwaZulu. He also pressed for the return of cattle that Zulu refugees took when they left his kingdom. Mpande's emissaries argued that the British had promised to return the cattle, but that only a hundred had been delivered. Mpande further expressed his need for firearms and the British troops to check Swazi provocations in the north of KwaZulu. The colonial establishment in Natal promised to ensure that no one interpose between the Zulus and the British. The British pleaded ignorance of the arrangement regarding cattle, but conceded the necessity to regulate traders entering the king's domains. The British imperialists regarded the Zulu kingdom as a menace, but were hamstrung when Mpande reaffirmed his loyalty to them. Mpande also abandoned plans for an alliance with the Voortrekkers. By pledging his support to the British, Mpande also did not necessarily cease his encouragement of the remaining Voortrekkers south of the Thukela. He hoped that keeping alive British-Voortrekker enmity would serve his own interests. 3 G.M.Theal: The Republic of Natalia, p.39. The encounters between Mpande and various Christian missionaries were presaged by sporadic attacks on mission stations by his predecessor Dingane. Mpande was not unfavourably disposed to missionary work. He gave the American Board of Commissioners, English Wesleyan Methodist Society, Norwegian Mission, Berlin Mission, Hanoverian Mission, Church of England and Roman Catholic Mission permission to settle in KwaZulu to present the Christian gospel to the Zulu people. The strategy of winning the Zulu nation en masse to Christianity- through Mpande's court did bear positive fruits. The fundamental ethical, metaphysical and social ideas of the Zulu people were disputed by doctrines preached by the missionaries. Probably to monitor their activities, Mpande repeatedly and earnestly requested that at least one missionary should reside near his headquarters, but this did not materialise. During Mpande's reign, the colonial establishments were viewed by the missionaries as super-exploiters of the Zulu people. The attitude of the Voortrekkers towards Zulu Christian proselytes (amakholwa) was negative. This antagonism of the Voortrekkers was prompted by the political ramifications that evangelization had on them. The proselytes demanded exemption from the legal liabilities the colonial authority at Pietermaritzburg had imposed on the Zulu people. These factors, however, did not deter Mpande's attempts to use missionary connections to keep colonial threats of invasion in check. Mpande's skilful diplomacy in handling different colonial establishments proved ineffective in forging unity between his hostile sons. This also stigmatized his dignity as the reigning monarch. He was the reigning monarch, but political matters in the 1850's led to challenges by the two claimants Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo. The question of Mpande5 s heir remained unsettled. The government of the Transvaal Republic (ZAR) maintained that Mpande regarded his son Cetshwayo as successor to the Zulu throne. At his palace, he whispered that Mbuyazi was heir, because his mother was presented to him by king Shaka. The British exploited Mpande's preference of Mbuyazi as his successor to the throne instead of Cetshwayo. The majority of the Zulus, however, preferred Cetshwayo as their future king, whilst the British viewed him as unacceptable due to his alleged antagonism towards White people. Internal strife culminated in the battle of Ndondakusuka on 2 December 1856. During the battle some of the British traders were compelled to leave their cattle behind on an island in the Thukela River. After the war, Mpande sent a message to Lieutenant-Governor Scott that Cetshwayo had expressed willingness to compensate traders who lost property at Ndondakusuka. The subsequent Zulu civil war of 1856 demonstrated a decline in Mpande's power and influence within the Zulu kingdom. From 1857 until his death in 1872, the Zulu kingdom and her relations with foreign powers were effectively run by Cetshwayo and Prime Minister ("Ndunankulu") Masiphula Ntshangase of Emgazini. Nevertheless, Mpande's earlier relations with both the Voortrekker and the British colonial establishments in Natal proved him a skilful diplomat rather than a warrior. Contrary to being a generally known obese Zulu potentate, Mpande possessed the skills and actions of a shrewd politician.
The Natal government's policy towards amakhosi in the former Kingdom of KwaZulu 1846-1910
(2000) Ndhlovu, Bongani Cyprian; Maphalala, S.J.
The policy of the Natal Colonial government towards amakhosi was overtly hostile. In 1843 the British forcefully took over a large territory, which formerly belonged to kwaZulu, from the Voortrekkers. They renamed their newly acquired land as Natal. Three years later a Boundary Commission was instituted with a clear mandate to demarcate boundaries. The results were very unfavourable to the African people in Natal. Fertile land was given to white people, while Africans were crowded into eight land barren magisterial districts. This meant that the Africans were deprived of land to live, plant and graze then-livestock. It also meant the introduction of foreign administration, customs and religion to amaZulu. Furthermore it meant that African people were converted into a cheap labour force for whites in the territory which historically belonged to them. This foreign rule greatly demolished amaZulu system of administration. Amakhosi, the institutions which formed the core of amaZulu bottom-up system of administration, were highly disregarded. In an attempt to run kwaZulu without any cost and responsibility, the British government implemented its indirect rule policy in the kingdom. Here hereditary leadership was replaced by the British appointed amakhosi. As the description points out, the latter paid allegiance to the colonial government. To ascertain that laws promulgated by the Natal government were implemented in kwaZulu, a hierarchy of white officials was introduced over these appointed amakhosi. These officials were granted powers to appoint and demote amakhosi. Furthermore they had powers to confiscate lands and to define and re-difine boundaries. Following the defeat of amaZulu in 1879 by the British government, kwaZulu was further divided into thirteen "Chiefdoms". The 1879 Settlement dealt a tremendous blow to hereditary amakhosi. The British tried to neutralize amakhosi who were loyal to the Royal House by exalting respected men in the former kingdom, abanumzane and complete strangers to the position of ubukhosi. The main objective was to divide and rule the kingdom. This policy successfully worked for the Natal Colonial Government. The results were civil wars and faction fights. The kingdom witnessed a prolonged civil war between the royalists, supporters of the Royal House, and the loyalists, supporters of the Natal Colonial Government. The loyalists strictly enforced their rule over the supporters of the Royal House, while the latter fiercely resisted the imposed order and were calling for the return of the hereditary and traditional amaZulu leadership. The government responded by supporting their appointed amakhosi against the supporters of the Royal House. As long as African people were fighting and killing each other, the Natal Colonial Government remained assured that a strong and united force against it would not be formed. It argued that if the African people in kwaZulu were divided, it would be easier to rule them. AmaZulu who were crowded in the reserves were also righting each other in endless wars in an attempt to get more land. In the process livestock, crops and property that belonged to their perceived enemies were severely damaged. The governor, who had powers to intervene, was not prepared to do this. Fighting and killings continued. In 1910 when the whites only Union Government was formed, the aspirations of the African people were ignored. Today the South African Government is still struggling with the inherited policies of the Natal government towards amakhosi. And the solution lies not only with the government but with all the role-players.
The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 : the right hand column, with particular reference to the Zulu people defending themselves against the British invasion
(2002) Ntuli, Sihle Herbert; Cubbin, A.E.
I have long since been interested in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. I have come to realise that the many British versions need to be balanced by a more Zulu oriented approach. Therefore the purpose of this thesis is to attempt to present a Zulu perspective which I hope will encourage a popular Zulu involvement both in research and tourism. What is prominent in my thinking is bringing to the foreground the lesser known, but nevertheless, significant, coastal campaign of the Zulu War of 1879. As the campaign unfolds I will attempt to see the developments from the Zulu position as they defended their homeland from British aggfe3sion. They, especially the younger warriors, were prepared to die for their King and traditional way of life. They had a proud military tradition and were intent on victory once war broke out on 11th January.
An assessment of the roles of Frere and Cetshwayo in British hegemonistic ambitions in Southern Africa which led to the destruction and fragmentation of the Zulu State by the Anglo-Boer War of 1879
(2002) Nicolaides, Angelo; de Villiers, J.
This thesis provides a detailed account of events leading up to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, and undertakes to explain inter-alia, why the war came about The focus of the study is thus on the roles of personalities including especially, Lord Carnarvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies), Theophilus Shepstone, (Natal's Secretary for Native Affairs), Sir Bartle Frere (the High Commissioner) and Cetshwayo kaMpande (King of Zululand). The war of 1879 arose out of predominantly British hegemonistic ambitions. Frere was entrusted by Carnarvon to implement a confederation policy in southern Africa. The latter consequently engineered a war on the pretext that the Zulu Kingdom was a menace to the Colony of Natal that had to be eliminated before confederation could be possible. Frere therefore exploited certain border incidents and maligned the character and rule of Cetshwayo whom he chose to label a tyrannical oppressor. Contrary to instructions from Sir Michael Hicks Beach at the Colonial Office and indeed the British Cabinet, Frere then sent an ultimatum to Cetshwayo that could not possibly have been accepted by the Zulus, given the nature of their polity - it would have lost its very way of life. Most of the issues can best be understood and analysed by looking at the Victorian Age and the promoters of British Imperialism. A salient feature of the Victorian Age was that Britons were by and large always likely to misinterpret some of the assumptions upon which African and indeed Zulu thought and actions were based. Victorians, such as Frere, by using their own set of values as the criteria for judgement, adopted postures in southern Africa which can only be interpreted as mischievous, false and irrelevant Frere was 'colonial' and patronizing and displayed an arrogance towards his superiors and the Zulus. Zulus had their own vivid perception of their problems, as well as their own sets of values, customs, beliefs , political and socio-economic structures. Frere was determined to manipulate events in southern Africa for his own ends and regarded himself as the champion of imperialism. He deluded himself further into regarding Cetshwayo as a monarch whose state was based on the institutions of militarism and forced labour- the very negation of liberty. It is evident that the relationship between Cetshwayo and his subjects was not a simple one but it was one which developed from Shakan times and which was clearly accepted by most subjects. As militaristic as it appeared to be, the Zulu state was not planning to embark on a war. It was forced by circumstances created by Frere into one which culminated in its dismemberment In reading the thesis and considering the various factors we should constantly bear in mind the questions: Was Frere sincere in his actions or was he out for personal aggrandisement and to what extent was Cetshwayo an oppressive autocrat?
King Dingane : a treacherous tyrant or an African nationalist?
(University of Zululand, 2004) Shongwe, Acquirance Vusumuzi.; Cubbin, A.E.; Mathenjwa, L.F.
This thesis focuses on the reasons why King Dingane of the Zulu nation has been portrayed predominantly as a treacherous tyrant in South Africa's Eurocentric historical databases and poses the question whether he should, instead, not be regarded as the forerunner of African nationalism. It also examines the roots of European imperialism in South Africa, as recorded in governmental, geographical, trade and missionary records, and points out that, as with the first colonial invasion by Islam that resulted in the Tarikh chronicles, European imperialism was also inherently based on foreign and nationalistic biases. The study concludes that these preconceived notions have adulterated and overwhelmed the purer African voice that is uniquely represented by the oral tradition. Because the subdued African voice is regarded as more reliable than the written Eurocentric records, this study attempts to augment the Africa- centered work of Africanist historians who have, for several decades, revisited the oral history of Africa in order to recover, rehabilitate and represent a point of view and perspective intrinsic and special to Africa. The history of King Dingane of the Zulus encapsulates the problem of African historiography best because most of the sources from which accounts of his reign are reconstructed are European, and for this reason, propagate a Eurocentric bias. For example, while Eurocentric White historians are able to present, in print, three eyewitness accounts of the death of Piet Retief, the African point of view based on oral history is largely disregarded. This study seeks to redress this imbalance by championing the African point of view, which is considered to be not only sensible but also plausible and justifiable. Likewise, much attention has been given to the many studies that demonise King Dingane for the single act of viciously killing the purportedly innocent and innocuous Voortrekkers, while the broad contours of context against which his actions should be judged are disregarded. The purpose of this thesis is to debunk the myth of King Dingane's unfairness and criminality. It can therefore be interpreted as an effort at decriminalizing King Dingane's actions - a dimension that earlier as well as contemporary scholars of African history have hitherto ignored. It is hoped that in time similar studies on other issues will broaden this perspective and help to create the balance so sorely missing in Zulu history. A theoretical framework for historical representation is provided in chapter one of the study, while chapter two examines the mindset of the White explorers that arrived in Africa, and their imperial agenda that sought to control, drastically change and re-order everything. Chapter three attempts to portray the greatness of King Dingane in dealing with matters of governance as well as other issues that were to have a profound impact on the way in which he came to be portrayed in history books. Chapter four discusses the relationship between King Dingane and the British Settlers at Port Natal, while chapter five deals with the relationships between King Dingane and the Voortrekkers, who sought the very freedom from the British in the Cape Colony that they were prepared to destroy among Africans in the Zulu Kingdom. The final chapter deals with public history and perceptions about King Dingane in the 21^' century. The two museums that commemorate Impi yase Ncome/the Battle of 'Blood River' on 16 December are contrasted with each other and their potential for nation building is examined in a critical light. The central thesis of this study is that the historiography of the early years of the 19'^ century inevitably, and perhaps even deliberately, represented King Dingane as a tyrant with neither nationalistic proclivities nor stately qualities. The popularity of this historiographic perspective is arguably symptomatic of a hegemonic disciplinary praxis that seeks to privilege the principles of selection, preference and bias in the use of the vast archive of sources available to the historian, from the written to the oral source. To all intents and purposes, this principle, which interpolates the discourse of history as well as the producers and consumers of historical scholarship, has led to a limited, over-determined and totalizing view of King Dingane. It is this biased discourse that articulates with the dominant ideology that not only informed scholarship, but also reflected the ideology of the institutions responsible for shaping historiography. A full analysis of the circumstances surrounding King Dingane at the time, including the history, the culture, the political dynamics and the personalities of the actors, leads one to the inexorable conclusion that this thesis arrives at - namely that the king did what 'a king had to do.' It is furthermore concluded that the evidence leads one to believe that King Dingane should be seen as a forerunner of Black Nationalism, instead of being branded as a treacherous, bloodthirsty tyrant.
The transformation of KwaZulu homeland from a primary Agrarian to a more integrated political and socio-economic entity, 1972 - 1994
(2006) Ntuli, Sihle Herbert; de Villiers, J.
The purpose of this thesis is to present the critical understanding of how KwaZulu and its people have changed and developed under the abnormal conditions of apartheid.
Zulu perceptions and reactions to the British occupation of land in Natal Colony and Zululand, 1850-1887 : a recapitulation based on surving oral and written sources
(2006) Masina, Edward Muntu; de Villiers, J.
This thesis seeks to close some lacunae that exists in the historiography of Natal and Zululand. Whereas the activities of the colonials are well documented and widely read, the actions and responses of the Zulu people to colonial expansion in Natal and Zululand have been neglected or only given a cursory glance. The impact of colonialism that resulted in the loss of land and a livelihood among the Zulu, could only be articulated with the necessary sensitivity by the Zulu people themselves. This, therefore, is an attempt to give audience to the Zulu voice. The study focuses on the period 1850 - 1887 which was characterized by a steady immigration, infiltration and penetration of the British into the traditional, social and political life of the Zulu people in Natal and Zululand. The elephant trails charted the way of the traders and hunters into the heart of Zululand and missionaries followed in their footsteps. The initial attempts at evangelization met with fervent resistance from the Zulu, simply because it contrasted with Zulu custom and was too alien to be readily comprehended and accepted by the Zulu, who still owed sole allegiance to their king. Nevertheless, colonial land policies and the establishment of Christian mission reserves led to the rise of an African peasantry which adapted to the white man's ways and flourished. The colonials introduced the "Shepstone system" which crammed the Zulu Into barren reserves and restricted their ownership of land in Natal Colony. This resulted in the steady decline of the peasantry as a recognizable social class. The dominant forces of capitalism and the promulgation of laws prohibiting Zulu freedom of movement eventually destroyed the African peasantry. The destruction of the homestead economy and the loss of land and cattle gave rise to a new class of poor people among the Zulu of Natal Colony. Meanwhile, in Zululand, signs of underdevelopment were already evident during the 1870*s. Federation schemes pursued by the British, with the desire to dominate the southern African region, coupled the suspicions that King Cetshwayo was planning to attack Natal, culminated in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Despite Cetshwayo's plea for peace, the British invaded Zululand with the sole purpose of destroying the Zulu dynasty, which they viewed as an obstacle to British overlordship. British victory in the war led to Wolseley's clumsy settlement which unleashed a terribly bloody civil war that left Zululand devastated and the Zulu dynasty permanently weakened. Then came, rather too late, the annexation of Zululand by Britain in 1887.
The tourism potential of Zululand north of the Tugela River with special reference to Zulu culture and history
(2011) Dube, Mbusiseni Celimpilo; Van Jaarsveld, F.A.
This thesis highlights historical sites with tourism potential between the Tugela and Lower Umfolozi Rivers up to Kosi Bay and the Mozambique border. This is roughly the area administered by the Uthungulu Regional Council today. These historical sites are monitored and administered by two most important acts i.e. the National Heritage Resources Act No. 25 of 1999 and the KwaZulu-Natal Heritage Act No. 10 of 1997. This research project comprises four chapters. It examines factors related to pre-colonial Zulu culture and focuses on how these factors could attract tourists. Furthermore it deals with historical places rich in tourism potential, showing how these historical places can attract the tourists. Chapter one addresses Zulu history from the earliest times to the present and the important aspects shaping current Zulu culture. Chapter two deals with traditional ceremonies which are part of African culture. Chapter three deals with sites of archaeological and historical interest. It further identifies and describes specific areas that are rich in Zulu history. The fourth chapter examines the Maputaland area and the St. Lucia Node and surroundings. The purpose is to explore the tourism potential of each heritage site and or region. Zulu customs that have the potential to become tourist attractions are identified and discussed prior to conclusions, which are drawn in the last chapter.
A critical study of the impact of the Government of National Unity in South Africa, 1994-1999
(University of Zululand, 2014) Mpanza, Jonathan Bafana; Shamase, M.Z.
It is important to note that much has been written on South Africa’s national Unity Government. Previous studies conducted on this topic were not as extensive as expected. Such studies were also unscientific, non-academic and more of journalistic writings. This lends credence to the necessity of undertaking an in-depth study on the topic which entails, inter alia, the impact of the Unity Government’s performance on various areas of governance from 1994-1999. The year 1994 is considered a turning point in the political history of South Africa. The people of South Africa gave the national Unity Government (GNU) a mandate through the country’s first democratic elections on the 27th April 1994 to embark on the fundamental transformation of the country. The upside of it was the trust and confidence that the black majority of South Africa had in the ANC-led government to redeem the country from high levels of unemployment, abject poverty, economic decline, to mention but a few. However, what was considered a set of solution to South Africa’s socio-economic problems, presented yet another set of challenges for the new government. Policy formulation and implementation became one of the major challenges of the unity government. The three parties in government namely, the African National Congress, Inkatha Freedom Party and the National Party did not always agree on issues of fundamental importance.On the education front, the statistical data point to service delivery and resource allocation challenges. Compared to learning institutions in white communities, some schools in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and Free State, were inadequately resourced and service delivery was far from reality. The unequal distribution of resources became the order of the day. The need to ensure economic growth and development through sound economic principles and policies could not be over-emphasized in the prevailing circumstances. The NP was critical of the ANC’s economic policies and often criticized them in public. This hampered the envisaged collective effort to effectively address the economic ills of the country. Another area of challenge was the multi-party politics within the government. It was expected that the ANC, IFP and NP as part of the coalition government sing the same tune in order to advance the course of democracy in South Africa. However, this was not always the case. The IFP advocated for a federal state, the NP felt so strong about the need for power-sharing, while the ANC on the other hand, with compromised stance on unitary state, had serious reservations about such propositions. This caused serious divisions among the three parties and it had a negative and detrimental impact on their collaborative effort. Eventually, the NP deemed it fit to withdraw from the Unity Government; thereby swelling the opposition ranks. Failure to reconcile their differences created a dangerous loophole. Another responsibility, with which the unity government was charged, was the realignment of South Africa’s foreign relations. This was quite a difficult challenge to deal with given the country’s image in the global context. South Africa had lost credibility with the global community because of the apartheid policy whose cause she championed unreservedly since 1948 up until the 1990s. The Unity Government’s sole responsibility in this regard, was to change the perception of the global community through the establishment of sound international relations and the maintenance of diplomatic ties. This would help South Africa expand on her economic sphere through foreign trade and investment; which were critical to economic growth and development. The legacy left by the interim Unity Government, points to the inadequate capacitation and perhaps limited resources to efficiently respond to the needs and demands of the country. In the post 1999 period, South Africa was still confronted with persistent poverty, high levels of unemployment, unequal allocation and distribution of resources as well as service delivery challenges. The first five years of democracy in South Africa were such a robust political engagement. It could be termed a “trial and error” period. Challenges of diverse magnitudes under such conditions would often be inevitable. Negative criticism becomes a possible eventuality. In the case of South Africa, the Unity Government was perceived by most South African citizens as the agent of transformation despite its shortfalls.
Post-conflict transitional negotiations: a comparative analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa
(University of Zululand, 2015) Daudu, Innocent Abhulimen; Asuelime, L.E.
Sub-Saharan Africa has been faced with an increase in levels of intra-state armed conflict since the last century. Intra-state conflicts have not only shown to be complex by their very nature, but have also shown numerous challenges in finding a solution that could be applied in an effective manner to bring about a guaranteed lasting solution. It is on this basis that interest and attention has been given to the transitional processes from conflict to peace. The conflict transformational process of two dissimilar countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of South Africa form a case study for understanding this quagmire. The transitional negotiations of the DRC from 2003–2006 and that of South Africa from 1991–1994 are the cases in point. The major issues for conflict resolution therefore includes understanding transitional negotiations as a vital process that can make or mar lasting peace in conflict prone areas. This research questions includes; Does citizen participation in transitional negotiations impact on sustainable peace in post- conflict societies? Given the vested interests and the often conflicting interests of various citizen groupings, does citizen participation create stability in the negotiation process for the purpose of creating a sustainable peace, or does it create a greater possibility of non-agreement and regression into conflict? Is it possible to obtain peace in countries that are complex political emergencies where elite interests are outweighing and civil liberties and interests are compromised? How do mediators overcome the problem of self-serving elites in transitional negotiations? Using the post-conflict DRC and South Africa as case studies and for comparative analysis, how can the differences in their outcomes be aggregated? This study is a mix of explanatory and exploratory research. Qualitative methods were used in the research. An expert sampling technique was adopted to conduct interviews in order to represent the different perspectives and theories of the outbreak of conflicts and violence. The principal theories that the study was based on are the Protracted Social Conflict Theory and the Transformative Cosmopolitan Theory. The study hypothetically argues that the paucity of or inclusion of citizens in transitional negotiations can either lead to sustainable peace in post-conflict societies or regress to a conflict stricken society. It also gauged the relations between the state and civil society organizations in working with citizens in order to avoid local conflicts that can interrupt negotiation processes. It expounds on the relationship between the interests of the political elites and the interests of the citizens. This study has determined that the lack of citizen participation in transitional negotiations does impact negatively on sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. In both case studies, it was shown that conflict has continued at the local level. The study has shown further that an inclusive approach to negotiations as well as peace building in post-conflict societies can be beneficial to the state, as there would be sustainable peace. Where mediators have been unable to balance the interests of the self- serving elites and needs of society, the failure has led to high intensity conflicts such as the local conflicts in the DRC becoming independent of the national level, thus making them difficult to resolve.

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