

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AIMS, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIES OF THE
NATIONAL PARTY AND INKATHA NATIONAL CULTURAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT
IN THE DECADE 1975-1985

By

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A QUOTATION

"It is always better to be an optimist and suffer half the amount of evil, than always be a pessimist, full of gloomy anticipations and never suffer anything at all.

Fortune favours those who are willing to act, it does not favour those who are timid and balance everything.

Great things are achieved through great dangers."

Xerxes, Persian Potentate.

(ii)

DECLARATION

I declare that: A comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the decade 1975-1985, is a product of my own effort, both in conception and execution, and all sources I have used have been appropriately acknowledged.

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ABSTRACT

It is imperative to take cognizance of the fact that no study of this nature has ever been undertaken in the field of history in South Africa. This justifies the necessity of undertaking a comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the crucial decade 1975-1985.

It was during that decade that these two political groupings moved closer to the political centre of gravity of South Africa. By this time the NP, in spite of preserving hegemonic principles on behalf of the White electorate and amid increased international isolation, had proved itself the invincible doyen in the body politic of South Africa. Inkatha cadres argued that their movement was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's, spawned by Black resistance to apartheid and had authentic roots in the core of the liberation struggle.

The principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha were devoid of discernible dissimilarities. One may assert, however, that it was enigmatic that such principles and aims could not compel the two groupings to solve the socio-economic and political problems facing South Africa in that decade. Such a dismal failure to seek solutions that would benefit all the people of South Africa

reflected negatively on both the NP and Inkatha. In 1985 this emerged as a harbinger for the state of morass in South Africa's political scenario.

The organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha remained by far the best organized in South Africa, capable of overwhelming any challenge mounted by other groups. In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and Provincial leaders, while Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from Branches, Regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making bodies. The National Council (NC) was the policy-making body and represented all national leadership formations of Inkatha. It was not possible to stipulate how many members of Inkatha at any one time belonged to the NC. This was due to the fact that organizations were constantly affiliating to the movement. The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress.

The organisational policies of the NP and Inkatha had vestiges of commonality. Both groupings accepted and respected the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. They both endorsed

the notion of a multi-party democracy, although the NP comprehended this in the context of separate development. Inkatha noted this as taking into account the fact that no single organisation, from whatever quarter, would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa. Disinvestment, sanctions and violence were abhorred by both groupings as a strategy to dismantle apartheid. They favoured negotiation politics and non-violence both as objectives and strategies. Both groupings conveyed assurance to achievements of a political apparatus that could satisfy the political aspirations of all the country's communities through negotiations.

The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. They both believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common goal. It could be mentioned, however, that the different situations and platforms from which they operated, polarised them against each other.

The NP and Inkatha's relations with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groupings created a hiatus in terms of their aims and strategies. This crippled the evolvment of consensus politics in South Africa. In the decade 1975-1985 the

Parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the New Republic Party (NRP), the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). In principle, they agreed with the NP and Inkatha in standing for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa.

The NP and Inkatha had unfavourable relations with the extra-parliamentary political formations. These were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB) or Afrikaner Resistance Movement, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NF), and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Their relations with both the NP and Inkatha in terms of their aims and strategies were marked by what one may convoke "timorous digressions." Most of them referred to the NP Government as illegitimate while viewing Inkatha as perpetrating political tribalism which to them was the greatest enemy of African

freedom. By 1985 this intricate structure of political groupings and different aims and strategies, characterized a divided South Africa.

OPSOMMING

Dit is van die allergrootste belang om daarop te let dat geen studie van hierdie aard nog tevore, op die terrein van geskiedenis, in Suid-Afrika onderneem is nie. Daardeur word die noodsaaklikheid van 'n vergelykende studie van die doelwitte, strukture en strategieë van die NP en Inkatha Nasionale Kulturele Bevrydingsbeweging, gedurende die deurslaggewende dekade van 1975-1985, geregverdig.

Hierdie dekade was juis die tydperk waarin dié twee partye nader aan die middelpunt van die Suid-Afrikaanse politieke speelveld beweeg het. Teen hierdie tyd was dit reeds duidelik dat die NP, ten spyte van sy uitgangspunt van blanke oorheersing en selfs onder toenemende internasionale isolasie, steeds die onoorwonne doyen van die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek gebly het. In Inkatha-geledere word beweer dat dié beweging gedurende die turbulente, vroeë sewentigerjare uit swart weerstand teen apartheid ontstaan het en dat Inkatha se wortels dus in die hart van die vryheidstryd lê.

Daar was feitlik geen opvallende verskille tussen die beginsels en doelwitte van die NP en Inkatha nie. Dit kan beweer word, dat dit eintlik vreemd is dat sulke ooreenstemmende doelwitte en beginsels nie die twee

groepe kon dwing om die sosio-ekonomiese en politieke probleme van dié dekade op te los nie. Hierdie totale onvermoë om oplossings tot voordeel van al die inwoners van Suid-Afrika te vind, plaas beide die NP en Inkatha in 'n ongunstige lig. Dit was reeds die voorspel tot die moeras waarin die Suid-Afrikaanse politieke toneel ná 1985 sou verval.

Die organisasiestrukture van die NP en Inkatha was verreweg die beste in Suid-Afrika en het beide hierdie partye in staat gestel om enige opposisie deur ander groepe te oorweldig. In 1975 het die NP-organisasie bestaan uit 'n nasionale kongres, die hoofraad, wyksrade, distriksrade, kiesafdelingsrade, takke en provinsiale leiers. Inkatha is deur 'n burokratiese stelsel georganiseer, wat takke, streke, en individuele lede asook verskeie konferensies en besluitnemende liggame insluit. Die Nasionale Raad (National Council - NC) was Inkatha se beleidmakende liggaam en die nasionale leierskap is hierin verteenwoordig. Dit is onmoontlik om presies te bepaal hoeveel Inkathalede op enige gegewe tydstip in die NC verteenwoordig was, aangesien organisasies voortdurend besig was om by die NC te affilieer. In elke provinsie setel die oppergesag van die NP in die kongres. Die konsepbesluite van die distriksrade, die voorstelle van die hoofraad en federale

raad, sowel as mosies voorgelê deur lede van die kongres, is deur die kongres bespreek.

Daar was baie gemeenskaplike belange tussen die NP en Inkatha. Albei groepe het die poli-etniese aard van die Suid-Afrikaans bevolking aanvaar en gerespekteer. Albei het die idee van 'n veelparty-demokrasie ondersteun. Die NP het wel hierdie begrip van veelparty-demokrasie binne die konteks van afsonderlike ontwikkeling beskou, terwyl Inkatha dit beskou het as versekering dat geen enkele organisasie, ongeag uit watter oord, die alleenbeskikker oor die toekoms van Suid-Afrika kan wees nie. Strategieë soos disinvestering, sanksies en geweld, waardeur gepoog word om apartheid omver te werp, is deur beide groepe verwerp. Voorkeur is verleen aan onderhandelingspolitiek as doelwit en strategie. Albei die groepe het in hierdie tydperk 'n strewe openbaar na 'n politieke struktuur wat die verwagtinge van al die verskillende gemeenskappe in die land, deur middel van onderhandelings, bevredig.

Die sleutel tot die organisatoriese sukses van die NP en Inkatha was die wyse waarop beide organisasies aan die tradisie van kiesafdelingpolitiek vasgehou het. Die NP en Inkatha het hulle beywer vir 'n stelsel met 'n veelvoud van kiesafdelings, waarin elke kiesafdeling met sy eie spesifieke doelwitte het, maar almal verbind is tot 'n gemeenskaplike doel. In hierdie verband moet egter

genoem word dat die verskillende situasies en platvorms vanwaar die twee organisasies opgetree het, dikwels tot polarisasie gelei het.

Die NP, sowel as Inkatha, se verhoudings met parlementêre groepe enersyds en buite-parlementêre groepe andersyds, het aansienlik verskil. Hierdie verskil het grootliks daartoe bygedra dat konsensuspolitiek in Suid-Afrika in die wiele gery is. Gedurende die dekade 1975-1985 het die volgende parlementêre groeperinge bestaan: die Verenigde Party (VP), die Progressiewe Reformiste Party (PRP), die Progressiewe Federale Party (PFP), die Nuwe Republiek Party (NRP), die Suid-Afrikaanse Party (SAP), die Konserwatiewe Party (KP) en die Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). In beginsel het al hierdie partye met die NP en Inkatha saamgestem oor die billike en gelyke behandeling van alle gedeeltes van die land asook vir die onpartydige instandhouding van regte en voorregte van elke deel van die bevolking, met inagneming van die multi-etniese werklikheid en die bestaan van minderheidsgroepe.

Die NP en Inkatha se betrekkinge met buiteparlementêre politieke groeperinge was swak. Die buite-parlementêre groeperings het die volgende ingesluit: die African National Congress (ANC), die Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), die Black People's Convention (BPC), die South

African Students' Organisation (SASO), die Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), die Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), die Natal Indian Congress (NIC), die National Forum (NF) en die United Democratic Front (UDF). Hierdie era was deurslaggewend sover dit die verhoudings tussen hierdie organisasies aan die een kant en die NP en Inkatha aan die ander kant aangaan. Die meeste van hierdie organisasies het die NP-regering as onwettig beskou terwyl Inkatha van die beoefening van stampolitiek (vir hierdie groepe die grootste bedreiging vir vryheid in Afrika) beskuldig is. Teen 1985 was hierdie verwickelde strukture van politieke groeperinge en die uiteenlopende doelwitte en strategieë, kenmerkend van 'n verdeelde Suid-Afrika.

DEDICATION

This research project is
gallantly dedicated to my
grandmother, Gallinah
Ntombiyokufa Zwane.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to compare (from a historical perspective) the aims, structure and policies of the NP and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the decade 1975-1985. This is based on revealing, by way of analysis, differences and similarities between the two parties. Such an analysis is indispensable for a better understanding of factors and groups that may shape the future of South Africa.

The NP, since its second assumption of power in 1948, has enjoyed the majority support of the White population of this country. On the other hand, Inkatha, as a National Cultural Liberation Movement, since its second inception in 1975, enjoyed a following of about 1,000-000 Black people both in urban and rural areas in South Africa.

The discernment of the political scenario in South Africa, and the role played by the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political groupings, prompts one to conclude that South Africa was at the cross-roads in that decade. A substantial number of observers noted the NP and Inkatha as protagonists in determining the future of this country. A clear notion of the principles, organisational setting and practical policies of the NP and Inkatha in the decade 1975-1985 is supported by a review of their origins in the first chapter - A sound comparative study is also

facilitated by a critical look at the relationship between the NP, Inkatha and other political groupings involved in the political development of South Africa in this period.

The successful completion of this research project was attributed to various individuals, officials and public bodies. Among all of them I wish to record my sincere gratitude to the following:

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- The officials of the KwaZulu Government and leaders of Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (presently known as Inkatha Freedom Party) and the Institute for Contemporary History

in Bloemfontein, for providing me with relevant information on Inkatha and maintaining a constant interest in the progress of this work.

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CHAPTER ONE

**THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY
AND INKATHA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

The National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement of the 1970's and the early 1980's date back to a few decades ago. In spite of the lacuna so evident in terms of their inception, a comparative study of these protagonists in the turbulent political scenario of the Republic of South Africa is prompted by their continuous influence.

The NP was formed in 1914 under General J.B.M. Hertzog⁽¹⁾. One of the underlying motives in the formation of the NP in 1914 encompassed wounds inflicted by the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) to both Afrikaans and English-speakers. Hertzog feared that the fusion of the Afrikaans and the English-speakers would result in the swamping of the Afrikaner culture and language by the English ⁽²⁾. Reconciliation at that stage was, however, not only

1. P. Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, p.30; T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa, A modern history, p.257; C.F.J. Muller (Ed): Five Hundred Years a history of South Africa, p.392; Hansard 3. Cols. 4171.

2. L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa - the solution, pp.37-39.

detested by Hertzog and the NP, but also by the English-speakers. Most English-speakers in South Africa regarded themselves as superior to the Afrikaners. This became evident in 1914 when the English-speakers formed a Unionist Party (UP). Hertzog's NP was committed to gaining equality for the Afrikaans-speakers in White South African society(3). Thus the NP did not believe that Afrikaner nationalism meant Afrikaner supremacy, but that the interests of South Africa be put first.

Regarding the Inkatha it would be necessary to first state that the name inkatha has both practical and profound connotations. In essence, an inkatha was traditionally worn by women to ease the weight of heavy loads carried on the head. According to Maphalala it was a plaited coil worn on the head to carry and assuage the weight of heavy loads(4). Parsons states that the traditional inkatha of the

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- 3 P.W. Coetser and J.H. Le Roux: Die Nasionale Party, Vol IV - 1986, pp. 5-13; Programme of Principles 1914, No. 3 cf. Gordon and Talbot: From Dias to Vorster, p. 398; A. Lemon: Apartheid in Transition, pp. 45-46.
- 4 S.J. Maphalala: Die rol van Inkatha as Nasionale en Kulturele Bevrydingsbeweging in Suid-Afrika, Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis, December, 1985, p. 58.

Zulu people was grass woven into a tight circle encased in python skin. It was a national charm strengthened with the body fluids, hair, nail-clippings and medicines of Zulu kings and of their indunas since the time of Shaka(5). This was done in Zululand before the sanguinary wars of White expansion and pervasion of traditional values.

An inkatha was so strongly woven together that it did not slip and dislodge its burden. It symbolically hosted the bulk, hoard and gravity of the people(6). Nonetheless, the present Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement emerged from Inkatha kaZulu, a cultural organisation mooted by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu (Zulu potentate 1913-1933) in the 1920's. In this context "King" refers to the royal title of the Zulu monarch. He and his people were under the authority of the Union Government(7).

5 N. Parsons: A New History of Southern Africa, p. 60.

6 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, p. 7; W. de Kock: Usuthu Cry Peace-Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p. 56.

7 W.J. de Kock (Ed.): Dictionary of South African Biography, Volume IV, p. 283.

The intention of King Solomon was to preserve the solidarity of the Zulu nation. Amidst the disappearance of cohesiveness, cultural values and the dispossession of Zululand by alien forces, King Solomon felt a need for inculcating traditional human values of the Zulu people, e.g. paying homage to the king, preserving typical religious norms and respect for the elders(8). King Solomon visualised the vitality of engendering a sense of belonging and averting crushing indignities heaped on his people by political forces which were set in motion as a precursor to the system of apartheid.

It may therefore be asserted that Inkatha kaZulu, as propounded by king Solomon, was aimed at admonishing the Zulus of the dangers of cultural domination by the Whites. This was directed to the Whites in toto; not to the NP per se during the 1930's. Both the NP and Inkatha kaZulu confronted timorous digressions in that period.

8 S.J. Maphalala: Die rol van Inkatha as Nasionale en Kulturele Bevrydingsbeweging in Suid-Afrika, Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis, December, 1985, p. 62.

The Great Depression (1930-1933) emerged as a grievous threat pervading the international world and compelled the NP, which had assumed power after the election of 1924, into a coalition with General J.C. (Jan) Smuts' South African Party(9). Thus a coalition of most Afrikaans and English Speaking voters fused into the United South African National Party (USANP) during the latter half of 1933.

Regarding Inkatha, the Great Depression resulted in its financial collapse. Moreover, Inkatha kaZulu declined because the king lacked charisma and his movement could not compete with the popular African National Congress (ANC) whose approach was cross-cultural. Thus Inkatha kaZulu could not survive the test of time. Mare and Hamilton attribute the collapse of Inkatha in the 1930's to the fact that it was the creation of the petty bourgeoisie of Black people in Natal, which used Zulu "traditionalism" as a political tool and a means to

9 B. Pottinger: The Imperial Presidency: P.W. Botha, the first ten years, pp. 3-4; J.P.C. Mostert (Ed.): Die Suid-Afrikaanse Krisis-perspektiewe op die grondwetlike bestel, p. 215.

economic advancement(10). This did not reflect the truth. The intentions of king Solomon were quite different, as already indicated. A further justification for king Solomon's modus operandi may be noted from statements of the missionary L.H. Oscroft in 1924, viz. that the real object of Inkatha was to unite all Black races. Oscroft added that king Solomon and his adherents considered the Black people were victimized in many ways and that they received unfair treatment from the Whites(11). They maintained that the Black people would never be strong unless they unite. According to Oscroft they were casting around for a rallying point or a central figure, and that figure seemed to be king Solomon(12). In this regard the formation of Inkatha in 1975 was mainly due to these same reasons.

10 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An Appetite for Power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of 'loyal resistance', p. 46.

11 DJ 6/953/23/1/ Report of a Meeting of Inkatha held on 8 October 1924, cf. S. Marks: The Ambiguities of dependence in South Africa - class, nationalism, and the state in twentieth century Natal, p. 70.

12 Ibid.

The coalition government of Hertzog and Smuts in the 1930's implacated the more militant Afrikaner nationalists who were augmented by a growing number of poor Whites and the Afrikaner-based industries which experienced set-backs by the maintenance of the British connection. Thus in 1934 they formed the new 'purified' NP under the leadership of Dr D.F. Malan(13), which P.W. Botha shortly afterwards joined as an organiser. The 'purified' NP eventually changed the countenance of South Africa in its pledge to establish a genuine South Africa republic. Amongst its adherents it had a powerful national socialist element, influenced by Nazi Germany. Beneath the surface, the 'purified' NP was fed by a secret organisation called the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB), established on 5 June 1918(14).

With the NP promoting the Afrikaans language, culture and identity, the Afrikaners were placed in

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- 13 A.E. Afgibo, et al: The Making of Modern Africa - the twentieth century, 191-192; B. Lapping: Apartheid - a history, pp. 63-64; J.P.C. Mostert (Ed.): Die Suid Afrikaanse Krisis-perspektiewe op die grondwetlike bestel, pp. 213-217.
- 14 A.N. Pelzer: Afrikaner Broederbond - eerste 50 jaar, p. 13; O. Geyser and A.H. Marais: Die Nasionale Party. Vol. I, pp. 187-190.

key positions of power and influence(15). This intent was clarified in 1935 in a secret message to members by the chairman, Professor J.C. van Rooy of Potchefstroom University. He stated that in addition to the cultural and economic needs, the Afrikaner Broederbond should also have to devote its attention to the political needs of the Afrikaner people (16). Its aim was to promote a completely independent, genuine Afrikaans government for South Africa. According to van Rooy such a government would inspire the Afrikaners and bind them together in irresistible unity and strength(17). To the Bond belonged prominent NP leaders such as D.F. Malan, J.G. Strijdom and H.F. Verwoerd. Dr H.F. Verwoerd, a social psychologist at Stellenbosch University, articulated an intractable philosophy of segregation or apartheid which influenced the even more secret Ossewabrandwag (Ox-wagon Sentinel)(18). In reality

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- 15 J.H. Le Roux and P.W. Coetzer (Eds.): Die Nasionale Party Vol. III - 1982, pp. 410-419.
- 16 B. Lapping: Apartheid - a history, pp. 64-65; Journal for contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 2, August 1987, pp. 47-50.
- 17 O. Geyser and A.H. Marais (Eds.): Die Nasionale Party, Vol. 1, pp. 187-199; B. Lapping: Apartheid - a history, pp. 64-66.
- 18 H. Adam and K. Moodley: South Africa Without Apartheid-dismantling racial domination, p. 20; A. Lemon: Apartheid in Transition, pp. 47-8;

the Ossewabrandwag (OB) was established in 1938 as primarily a cultural organisation for Afrikaners, especially as an outflow of the Great Trek commemorations of that year. It was only after the outbreak of the Second World War and under the leadership of Dr J.F.J Hans van Rensburg, did this organisation become involved in political issues of the time and predominantly national-socialistic in its ideals(19). In many ways the Ossewabrandwag deified Nazism and its outward symbols. B.J. (John) Voster, one of its members, who was interned during the Second World War, for his OB activities, was also to be a future Prime Minister.

Up to 1958 nothing could be said or heard of Inkatha kaZulu. Prince Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the great grandson of king Cetshwayo, grandson of king Dinuzulu, the President of the present Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe), was born on 2 August 1928(20). Between 1933 and 1943 he was a student at

L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa - The Solution, pp. 32, 40, 83.

19 P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux (Eds.): Die Nasionale Party, Vol. IV, 1986, pp. 17-30.

20 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, p. 171.

Impumalanga Primary School at Nongoma. From 1948 to 1950 he studied law at the University College of Fort Hare. The demise of Inkatha kaZulu did not end the ideal of king Solomon's vision to preserve the unity of the Zulu nation as a people proud of their past and well motivated for the future(21). The philosophy of traditional human values of the Zulu people continued to play a crucial role in the struggle of the Zulu people for the promotion of African patterns of thought and value systems. The acknowledgement and souvenirs of African political institutions being democratic, prevailed even during the reign of king Cyprian Bhekuzulu. (1958-1965).

Similarly, the NP leadership propagated the Afrikaner people's patterns of thought and value systems. On 26 May, 1948, the NP under D.F. Malan, with its ally, the Afrikaner Party, (AP) under N C Havenga, representing the Afrikaners who had long been undermined by the British rule, won the parliamentary election from the then predominantly English-speaking majority party, i.e the United

21 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, p. 53.

Party (UP) (22). One of the main election promises of the NP was the implementation of apartheid in order to ensure the continued existence and supremacy of the Whites in their exclusive state, especially the political leadership of the Afrikaners. When the NP assumed power, the new Prime Minister, Dr D.F. Malan, addressed the House of Assembly where he stated that his party would introduce legislation to implement its policy of "apartheid", the separation between the races (23). Races would live and travel separately and education would be separate for all groups at all levels. According to Dr Malan apartheid rested on three unarguable foundations: Afrikaner experience, scientific proof that the White man was a superior being, and biblical witness (24).

The first governmental measures of the NP against integration concerned prohibition against mixed

22 A. E. A. M. Thomashausen: The dismantling of apartheid - the balance of reforms, 1978-1988, p. 2.

23 Hansard 2 cols. 618-635; cols 4176-4179, 4184-4187.

24 J.J. van Rooyen: Ever New-National Party governs 40 years, p. 30; D. Le Roux (Ed.): Informa, November 1984, Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 12, Hansard 2 cols. 4184-4189.

marriages (Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No. 55 of 1949). In 1950 the Population Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950) was passed. This act prescribed the registration of all citizens as either White, Indian, Black or Coloured(25). Shortly afterwards the NP also passed the Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950) which allocated specific residential areas in the cities, towns and other places to specific population groups. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (No. 49 of 1953) followed some years afterwards to sanction and prescribe exclusiveness to everyday life, for example, in regard to access to facilities such as toilets, beaches, parks, health services and transport, so-called "petty apartheid"(26). There followed a quick succession of other laws to enforce segregation in schools, universities, local government and political systems.

It should be noted, however, that in the early fifties the conditions of many Blacks in the

25 A.E.A.M. Thomashausen: The dismantling of apartheid - the balance of reforms, 1978-1988, pp. 2-4; L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa - the solution, pp. 40-42.

26 Ibid.

Southern states of the United States of America could be easily compared to those in South Africa. Verwoerd's theory of apartheid stressed above all that the Blacks were not part of the South African nation, but a "bunch" of separate nations - Xhosa, Zulu or Sotho - which could retain dignity and self-respect outside the White man's world. The journalist Schalk Pienaar, one of Verwoerd's articulate intellectual supporters, stated that:

The Bantu is neither a backward black Englishman, nor a backward black Afrikaner. He is not even a backward black Bantu. He is a Zulu or a Xhosa or a Sotho or what you will. A nation in his own right(27).

Such gestures by the NP struck a responsive chord in 1958 to Prince Buthelezi and king Cyprian Bhekuzulu ka Solomon (Zulu potentate 1933-1966). They convened a gigantic meeting of all the amakhosi (chiefs) at Kwakhethomthandayo near Nongoma to revive Inkatha kaZulu(28). It may therefore be concluded that this 'revival' of Inkatha kaZulu was

27 S. Pienaar and A. Sampson: South Africa - two views of separate development, pp. 9, 13, 15, 56.

28 S.J. Maphalala: Die rol van Inkatha as Nasionale en Kulturele Bevrydingsbeweging in Suid-Afrika, Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis, December, 1985, p. 60.

a camouflage for opposing the apartheid laws of the NP. The revived Inkatha movement existed in juxtaposition to the ANC which was being neutralised at the time by the NP Government for its usage of violence.

Nevertheless, these attempts to restore Inkatha kaZulu were aborted by some NP officials from Pretoria(29). They asserted that the tribal authorities which were to be launched by the Government would preclude the probability of reviving Inkatha kaZulu. Thus the 1958 Inkatha enigma was described by Maphalala as an attempt by King Cyprian and Prince Buthelezi to revive Inkatha kaZulu at a isigungu (meeting) in Zululand near KwaNongoma.

However, this attempt failed, because King Cyprian was hesitant to oppose the Strijdom Government which feared opposition of Black unity movements(30). Soon the NP under Dr Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, the new Prime Minister, promulgated the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act (No. 46 of 1959), extending the

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

right of self-government to Black nations(31). Dr Verwoerd argued that this Act would provide a foundation for the creation of fully independent homelands to enable the Black peoples of South Africa to determine their own pace and direction of development, thereby preserving their historical and cultural heritage. Chief Albert John Luthuli, President-General of the ANC, could not effectively oppose the apartheid laws single handedly after the incarceration of his colleagues in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Cape provinces. Supported by Dr Zamindlela Conco(32), he persuaded Prince Buthelezi, an ANC Youth League member at that time, to combine party and traditional politics(33). In initio the reasons for the combination of the two roles were firstly, to reject the legislation enacted to enable the NP to pursue its policy of national states (homelands) and the Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68) of 1951, which was subsequently refined in 1959, and secondly, to launch vigorous campaigns against separate political

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- 31 Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa - the solution, p. 42.
 32 Z. Conco: Inkatha and the ANC External Mission at the crossroads. Vol. 1, No.7, pp. 14-20.
 33 G. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity, Who wants it? vol. 3, 1987, pp. 14-15.

institutions for KwaZulu(34). The Government rejected Prince Buthelezi's opposition to apartheid at local, regional, provincial and national levels. In 1970 the Government imposed the KwaZulu Territorial Authority on the Zulu people and in 1972 the Executive Council. The Zulu people regarded this "balkanisation of South Africa" as an impending catastrophe. They turned to Prince Buthelezi for leadership through these difficulties(35). Buthelezi decided to apply tactics and strategies which would ensure the retainment of the South African citizenship of his people. He intended to ensure the democratic right of his people to oppose apartheid. This necessitated his eventual launching of the Inkatha in March 1975.

However, the immediate forerunner was a group known as Ubhoko (a walking stick)(36). Members of Ubhoko

34 A.E. Afigbo, et al: The making of Modern Africa - the twentieth century, Vol. 2, pp. 230-231; S. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity, who wants it? Vol. 3, 1987, pp. 14-15.

35 A survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1971, pp. 33-34.

36 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, pp. 17-18; S.J. Maphalala: Die rol van Inkatha as Nasionale en Kulturele Bevrydingsbeweging in Suid-Afrika, Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis, December, 1985, p.60.

included Zulu royalties such as Prince Gideon Zulu and Bishop Alpheus Zulu, academics, such as Professor Sbusiso Nyembezi and Otty Ezrom Hamilton Mandlakayise Nxumalo of the University of Zululand, as well as businessmen, such as Emmanuel Ngobese. The task of Ubhoko was to draw up a constitution for the envisaged Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement. Ubhoko followed the constitution of the Zambian United National Independence Party (UNIP). According to Langner attempts to oppose the divisive effects of the Government's apartheid policy and the stimulation of self-reliance motivated the resurgence of this organisation in 1975(37). This was also acknowledged by Prince Buthelezi himself in his first policy speech as President of Inkatha. In 1975 Prime Minister B.J. Vorster refused to respond to requests made by Prince Buthelezi and other homeland leaders that the influx control legislation be repealed, and that more money should be made available by Government for Black development from taxes generated in the White areas(38).

37 Ibid.

38 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An Appetite for Power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of "loyal resistance". p. 56.

Concessions were only made with regard to the recognition of trade unions for Blacks and the inclusion of Blacks on the boards of homeland development corporations. The question of the return of the non-Communist exiles was, in the words of Prime Minister Vorster, a matter to be considered by the Minister of Labour, Mr Fanie Viljoen(39). The gestures of the Prime Minister could be discerned as the last straw for the formation of a revived Inkatha.

One may draw similarities between the NP and Inkatha in terms of their origins. Although they came into being at different times and under different circumstances, it can be argued that the NP was a product of a yearn for freedom from the thralldom of the British. Inkatha was an offspring of oppression of Black people by successive White governments. The emergence of the NP may be attributed to the South African Party's politics in the early years of the Union, which alienated a large section of the Afrikaner population who feared their demise in the

39 SAIRR: A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1975, p.26.

face of British capitalists who jeered at the Blacks as a cheap labour source(40).

Inkatha may also be regarded as an offspring of a long turbulence and tumult which originated at the battles of Blood River (1838), Isandlwana (1879), the Usuthu insurrection (1888-1893), and the Bhambatha rebellion (1906). The latter was the last armed struggle of the Zulu people against a Government in South Africa. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly debated, inter alia, the establishment of Inkatha in April 1975(41). During the course of this debate the Inkatha President, Prince Buthelezi, accentuated that Inkatha formed a base for Zulu liberation. He asserted that the Zulu people also needed liberation from things such as ignorance, poverty and disease(42). No ambiguity was created by the newly formed Inkatha organisation in 1975, because all members of the Zulu nation were ipso

40 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, p. 142; T.B. Floyd: The Boer Nation's English Problem - the story of a small white nation in Southern Africa and its struggle to exist, pp. 163-68.

41 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An Appetite for Power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of "loyal resistance", p. 56.

42 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Debates (KLAD), Vol. 5, 9-18 April 1975, p. 134.

facto members of Inkatha if they were born Zulus. There could be people who had been inactive as members, but no one escaped membership as long as he or she remained a member of the Zulu nation(43).

At a Soweto rally in 1976 Inkatha was described by Prince Buthelezi as a movement of ordinary men and women who struggled to achieve reconciliation in a balkanised society. He added that they could not wait until the Government in Cape Town fell, before they would achieve that dignity from self-help and from improving on the "miserable mess" they found themselves in(44). Inkatha could provide the NP with no blueprint in 1975, but Prince Buthelezi had to pretend that Inkatha was merely a revival of the old Inkatha of king Solomon(45).

Contrary to the NP, Inkatha gained its support from people who were dispossessed. While the NP clearly articulated its modus operandi in 1948, Inkatha adherents took a bold step after a clampdown on democratic opposition to apartheid in 1960. Thus

43 Ibid.

44 W. de Kock: *Usuthu Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa*, p. 83.

45 *Sunday Star*, 26 January 1986 (Editorial).

the concept of a Zulu nation was used by Inkatha in initio as a means of survival.

While labourers and peasants initially dominated Inkatha, it soon included increased numbers of professional and business people(46). Both the NP and Inkatha never became underground organisations such as the ANC, PAC or SACP. In contrast, their domination of the media in the late 1970's and early 1980's proved the openness of their agendas.

Inkatha challenged the NP from the very year of its inception by popularizing the names of the banned PAC leaders Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe and Zephania Mothopeng. Inkatha quoted banned leaders of the ANC, such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Moses Mabhida. During that epoch the NP Government regarded it a penal offense to quote any leader of a banned organisation(47). It may also be

46 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, p. 7; W. de Kock: Usuthu Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p.85.

47 M.G. Buthelezi: Black self-reliance in the struggle for liberation, Thokoza Township, 12 August 1984, p. 5; S Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, p. 7.

argued that Inkatha's gearing to compete in the political arena for support, occurred with such alacrity that shocked the cadres of the NP. An apt example could be noted from Jimmy Kruger, minister of justice, police and prisons, in 1977 who expressed his rejection of Inkatha on the basis of broadening its base to include all Black people instead of just the Zulus(48).

In 1948 the Whites were pervaded by euphoria. The White electorate gave a landslide victory to the NP because they were persuaded into believing that a policy of White supremacy or exclusiveness could be perpetuated infinitely. Successive NP Governments compromised the principles upon which the 1948 election was fought. This seemed to be continued in the Government's clampdown on the ANC and PAC in 1960 for sabotage. But the founding of Inkatha in 1975 swung back the White euphoria pendulum. Prince Buthelezi argued that Inkatha was born from the turbulent first half of the 1970's(49). In the

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- 48 W. de Kock: *Usuthu Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa*, p. 103.
49 M.G. Buthelezi: *The political situation in South Africa*, Speech at New Jersey, USA, 13 November 1985, pp. 4-5.

CHAPTER TWO

**THE PRINCIPLES AND AIMS OF THE NATIONAL PARTY AND
INKATHA: A COMPARATIVE VIEW**

To facilitate an intelligible comparison of the principles and aims of the NP and Inkatha in the decade 1975-1985 it is imperative to take cognizance of the concepts "principles" and "aims". The word "principle" is derived from Latin principium, meaning beginning. It entails truth which is accepted as a personal code of conduct(1). The minute one has made a valid generalisation, one has discovered a principle. Thus principles are rules according to which a certain group of events always follow within a system. They must be grasped and understood, rather than merely memorised. They are guiding stars, rather than "blue-prints", "recipes" or "tricks of the trade"(2). By "aims" we understand a more general, broader statement of intention. Aims fulfil an important function, in that they direct and orientate a person's thought and intentions about a specific area, activity or

1 P. Harvey (Ed.): the Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, p.345.

2 P.A. Duminy and W.F. Sohngé: Didactics: Theory and Practice, p.19.

field of knowledge, even if these are vague and across a broad front(3). Furthermore, aims usually involve long-term goals and have a greater measure of permanence.

In the decade 1975-1985, a clearly stated and unambiguous programme of principles or a statement of belief was essential for political organisations or parties in South Africa(4). The essentiality of a consistent programme of principles or a statement of belief according to the mouthpiece of Inkatha could be based on a common constitution, the result of reconciliation that could accord comfort to all parties in the political development of the Republic of South Africa. The Inkatha Institute for South Africa in 1988 asserted in retrospect:

"The principles to which political organisations subscribe, are vital to their fortunes. It is around such sets of principles that constitutions are formed and it is by adhering to these set principles that political credibility is established by the organisation concerned ... The opportunists and those who play

3 J. Cawood and J. Gibbon: Educational Leadership - staff development, p. 152.

4 M. G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1978, pp. 8 - 9.

by expediency will find themselves overtaken by debate which will only be the vehicle of those who are able to lay their principles and positions unambiguously on the negotiating table"(5).

In 1975 the programme of principles of the NP acknowledged the guidance and supremacy of God in the fate of peoples and countries(6). On the contrary, Inkatha did not regard God as a guiding and supreme being, but formulated its 1978 Statement of Belief on the basis of common ground between itself and other political parties or organisations whose basic aims and objectives did not differ in principle from those of itself(7). Such formulations had to be translated into constitutional and institutional realities. The translation of the politics of change continued to be subjected to healthy democratic differences of opinion in this decade(8).

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- 5 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 150.
 - 6 N. P. Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 150.
 - 7 M. G. Buthulezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1978, pp. 8 - 9.
 - 8 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 152.

The Inkatha Statement of Belief revolved around a quest for a new and just society in South Africa.

Inkatha argued that:

"We believe that in this eleventh hour of South Africa, responsible leadership must publicly declare its commitment to bring about a just society within the foreseeable future, and we believe that leadership must meet the demands of responsibility by taking whatever steps remain from time to time to avoid a race war."(9).

Inkatha wanted the world to know that the accusations and comments of the NP about its leadership, which it was disseminating all the time through all the apartheid mass media, whatever the NP wished against Inkatha, was nothing more than political propaganda. The NP pursued the development of the life of the South African nation along Christian lines, with due regard to the individual's freedom of conscience and of religion(10). It may therefore be argued that South

9 M. J. Bhengu (Ed.): *Inhlabamkhosi*, Vol. 1, No. 6, January 1984, pp. 23 - 24; *Inkatha* Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1978, pp. 8 - 9; G. Mare and G. Hamilton: *An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance"*, pp. 228 - 229; IISA: *Inkatha year book 1988*, pp. 152 - 153.

10 N.P. Head Office, Durban, *Constitution of the National Party*, 1975, p. 9.

Africa was one of the few adherents of Christian values where, by virtue of her pluralistic nature, religious freedom manifested itself at its venom.

Although Inkatha did not accentuate the notion of Christianity per se, it viewed respect for individuals and the value placed on cultural and large groups as synonymous with progress towards a politically stable society(11). According to Inkatha, the significance of an individual's identity as a South African, however, was valuable in so far as it had roots from within a particular cultural milieu(12). On this principle, Inkatha also acknowledged the free movement of people from one cultural milieu to another(13). In spite of such acknowledgements, the NP perceived Inkatha's belief in the identity of an individual within a particular

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- 11 J S Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 135; W. de Kock: Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p. 176; M. J. Bhengu (Ed.): Inhlabamkhosi. Vol. 1, No. 6 January 1984, p. 23.
- 12 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 152; P. C. Luthuli: What Ought To Be in Black Education in South Africa, pp. 4-8.
- 13 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 228; S Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa, pp. 8-9.

cultural milieu as an end in itself. It was for that reason that on 19 September 1977, a month before the Nationalist Government banned all Black Consciousness Movements, the Minister of Justice, Mr J. T. Kruger, summoned Inkatha President, Prince Buthelezi to the Union Buildings(14).

The Minister of Justice wanted to inquire which course Inkatha was pursuing. He was perturbed by Prince Buthelezi's opening of Inkatha membership to all black South Africans instead of confining it to the Zulus. Prince Buthelezi said that he would not exclude non-Zulus from the movement as long as the NP did not exclude non-Afrikaners(15).

To illustrate this, we may refer to a television interview in 1977 where Buthelezi and Kruger confirmed their different views on Inkatha's future role:

Kruger : "You have a parliament at Ulundi..."

Buthelezi : "The Ulundi thing, as far as I am concerned, is nothing more than

14 J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 127.

15 Ibid.

the local administration of the Zulu people. We are just as much a section of the South African people." ...

Kruger : "The thing that worries me, I told you, Chief, is mainly that you are trying to broaden Inkatha's base to include all black people instead of just the Zulus. Secondly, you must be careful of an infiltration of ANC members. Are you also giving me the assurance that you will not use Inkatha as a black power movement?"

Buthlezi : "What is a black power movement?"

Kruger : "A black power movement is one that polarises black people against whites."

Buthlezi : "But I don't believe in that..."

Kruger : "All right, give me the assurance that you won't allow subversive elements to infiltrate Inkatha."(16)

Buthlezi : "But who are they, Mr Minister?"

Kruger : "If you do that, then I won't be a problem to Inkatha."

Buthlezi : "Inkatha now has over 100,000 members. I cannot guarantee that some people will not try to infiltrate Inkatha..."

Kruger : "You must tell your committee to be careful."(17)

16 W. de Kock: *Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa*, p. 128.

17 Ibid.

Kruger issued a flat warning that Inkatha would not be subverted by the Government if it became a Zulu national organisation like the "nationalist organisations" of the Afrikaners(18). What could be especially noted is that Kruger did not mention any example of such organisations. He, however, endorsed the concept of nationalism. As a nationalist, he believed Inkatha had become a Zulu national organisation. It is therefore evident that Inkatha's principle of an individual's identification within a particular milieu was myopically comprehended by Kruger. Elements from the banned ANC and PAC movements, involved in the "liberation struggle", however, doubted whether Inkatha was a truly national South African liberation movement(19). They argued that Inkatha was formed to organise Zulu-speaking people and to prevent the Government of South Africa from urging "independence" on the KwaZulu homeland. They further argued that Inkatha should organise the Zulus to reject independence for KwaZulu(20).

18 J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 128.

19 People's history! New Nation New History, Vol. 1, 1989, p. 39.

20 Ibid.

In 1985 Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, talked of Inkatha as a "tribal" organisation. Prince Buthelezi responded:

"He knows what it is like to be at the receiving end of accusations that he is in power because of his Shona base and that ZANU is a predominantly Shona organisation... Inkatha is committed to a united, non-racial, multi-party, democratic South Africa and radical change through non-violence and negotiation. Our membership may be predominantly Zulu, but that does not make either 'tribal' organisations (i.e Inkatha and ZANU). Mr Mugabe knows the pain of being presented as an ethnic Shona leader and yet he has inflicted the same suffering on me..."(21)

According to Prince Buthelezi it was a simple statement of fact that political opponents used "tribal" label in order to denigrate him and undermine his leadership position. Prince Buthelezi persuaded blacks not to think of the Zulus as distinct from other African "brothers" in South Africa. This was far from being the case. There was no Zulu freedom that was distinct from the black man's freedom in South Africa(22). According to

21 H. Murray (Ed.): Leadership South Africa, Vol. 5, Number six, 1986, p. 89.

22 M. G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1 No. 3, July 1978, p. 3

Inkatha all blacks had a common destiny, even with White countrymen. To Inkatha these were the implications of a just and non-racial society.

The "tribal label on Inkatha dominated black politics even in the late 1980's. The production of a film "Shaka Zulu" was viewed by some critics as a repercussion of the segregation system and political collusion between the NP Government and Inkatha Movement aiming at legitimizing Zulu nationalism through the agency of ethnicity(23). What one may deduce from such criticisms is that Inkatha could possibly have used Zulu historical connections to inspire popular support as part of its political strategies, but in no way could this be used to confine Inkatha to Zulus only.

Since 1961 the NP maintained that South Africa should remain a sovereign, independent republic. It therefore possessed of all the sovereign rights and functions, in the fullest international sense of the word, having the right to do anything that any other

23 M. Mersham: Political discourse and historical television drama: a case study of Shaka Zulu, p. 320.

independent state might do(24). To Inkatha a completely independent state, in the fullest international sense, was one that guaranteed protection of the political rights of all national groups within a constitutional framework which outlawed discrimination based on colour, sex or creed(25).

The sovereignty of the Republic, as one of the principles of the NP since 1961, could, however, be viewed in terms of the endeavour of the NP to join all peace-loving states in the search for world peace. It could be argued that it was in this sense that in 1975 the NP Government inevitably became increasingly involved in the neighbouring countries of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia(26). The then Prime Minister, B. J. Voster, pledged his government to strive for progress, co-operation, peace and development in Southern Africa and the entire

24 NP Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 9.

25 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 152; M. G. Buthelezi: A message of black survival throughout the long struggle for the liberation of South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1 no. 3, July 1978; J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 135.

26 The Citizen, 28 July 1975, p. 2.

continent of Africa(27). Such gestures earned the NP closer ties with certain African states, including Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia. In the same year (1975) the NP Government promised to grant complete independence to the people of the territory of South West Africa, "but that it will be for the people of the territory concerned, and not for the UN nor SWAPO, to determine their future form of government(28).

Inkatha sensed the feeling of euphoria that pervaded the whole of White South Africa as a result of the detente policy of the NP Government. Prince Buthelezi pointed out the probability of "inevitable bankruptcy" if the NP did not correlate detente gestures within South Africa itself(29).

In 1976 the President of Inkatha noted the failure in many respects, of Prime Minister Voster's detente policy in sub-Saharan Africa. It especially failed in Angola where in addition to White troops, many Coloureds and Blacks served South Africa in the

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 143.

prolonged war campaigns. At that stage Inkatha discerned that the pace of change and the "struggle for liberation" in Southern Africa was gaining momentum, to the extent that the country's all-White Parliament could not dictate events in SWA/Namibia for much longer(30). The President of Inkatha argued that the influence of the NP Government in Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) had proved to be less effective than its Black counterparts(31). On the same aspect he continued:

"I know that the Prime Minister, if I am to judge by his past attitude, is going to think - with many white South Africans, that I am speaking as I do, because I am a kaffir who has forgotten his place. This thought makes many white South Africans mad, as there is nothing they loathe as much as a kaffir who has not been successfully kept in his place. A place not assigned for us by the Almighty, but which our white countrymen have assigned for us for generations through the only power they have used to maintain the status quo, which is through the barrel of the gun ..."(32)

Inkatha's principles were based, inter alia, on individual equality before the law, equality of

30 M. G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1 No. 3, July 1973, p. 1.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

opportunity and equality of benefits from the institutions of the state.

The NP constitution of 1975 acknowledged the independence of South Africa and rejected any opposite view. It argued against opposing views that the government of the country would be carried out on the basis of South African national principles and in a spirit of national autonomy(33). Inkatha noted the intransigence of the privileged sections of the South African population (e.g. many White and Indians) in the face of the need for change(34). Such intransigence was prompted by the growing fears of anger and bitterness from the under-privileged sections of the South African population (majority black people) as a result of the "accumulated injustices" in the official institutions of South Africa(35). Inkatha, however, did perceive the difficulty of facilitating

33 NP. Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, p.9.

34 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, pp . 153-154; W. de Kock: Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p. 177.

35 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 229.

the transition from an "unjust society" to a "just society" based on Christian values(36).

On national unity, the NP stated that it would strive for:

"realization of the national aspirations and convictions of the population of the Republic of South Africa and has, as its objective, the further development of a forceful realization of national autonomy, together with a strong feeling of national unity, based on the mutual and undivided loyalty and dedication to the Republic of South Africa and its interests, on mutual trust, on the recognition of the human dignity and rights of all, on the mutual appreciation of the cultural contributions of each, on the basis of everything that goes to make up the spiritual and cultural assets of the population in all its diverse manifestations and also by way of the protection of the rights of every section of the population."(37)

From the above we may conclude that Inkatha did not differ much from these NP principles, but put emphasis on the enforcement of the rule of law(38).

In the period 1975-1985 the NP Government ruled by

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- 36 J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 136.
 37 NP. Head Office, Durban, Constitution of National Party, 1975, pp. 9-10.
 38 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 153; J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 136.

statutory law, the rule of man and a mixture of common law and discretionary law. Thus Inkatha believed that there should be both a criminal code and a code of justice in which rights to appeal to the highest courts of the land were the right of all persons and that the state should bear the costs of appeal where the appellant pursued a course of action to protect his individual rights(39). According to Inkatha that would only be necessitated by the promulgation of a law society that took no sides. To Inkatha the enforcement of law by the police was only acceptable in so far as it was based on the procedures and methods acceptable to modern Western democracies(40).

One of the approved policies of the NP in 1979 was that the country could best be governed if its population was divided along racial lines. Here the NP differed greatly with Inkatha's non-racialism. In 1976 the Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster,

39 W. de Kock: *Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa*, p. 177; M. J. Bhengu: *Inhlabamkhosi*. Vol. 1, No. 6, January 1984, p. 24.

40 M. G. Buthelezi: *A message of black survival throughout the long struggle for the liberation of South Africa*. *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1 No. 3, July 1978, p. 9.

proclaimed in Parliament that the policy of separate development would continue to regulate developments within South Africa(41). One may thus argue that at that time historic discrimination on many levels was "South Africa's sickness unto death." The Prime Minister argued:

"We should do something to get away from it, and the only way as I see it - and I really do believe in this - is by means of the policy of separate development(42).

Inkatha opposed this policy, as it realized that adhering to it, would be suicidal for the Black people of South Africa. It would amount to "selling South Africa" to an impending "catastrophe of balkanization." Thus Inkatha blocked the Pretoria-type "independence" for KwaZulu in 1976. This "homeland" opened its citizenship to all Black groups (thereby guaranteeing their continuance of South African citizenship) and supported movements which were open to all Black South Africans(43).

41 Die Burger, 4 April 1975, pp. 1 - 2.

42 Ibid.

43 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call Special Edition, pp. 46-48.

KwaZulu was the only region which pursued political policies beyond its administrative boundaries and also the only region which pursued national in addition to regional goals. For such responsibilities Inkatha won every seat in the 1978 elections for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly(44). In spite of the bogus parties like Umkhonto kaShaka which attempted to destabilize Inkatha, massive popular support for Inkatha led to another landslide victory for Inkatha in the 1983 elections for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly(45). The NP from at least 1961 onwards, endorsed the multi-ethnic reality of South Africa and the existence of minorities. It thus argued that it stood for the maintenance of rights and freedom of all parts of South Africa and every section of the population(46). To Inkatha this notion did not concur with the reality that during the period 1975 - 1985 the black population within South Africa did not enjoy freedom of political expression and of press. Inkatha recognized the reality that there were under-privileged communities and privileged

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 NP. Head Office, Johannesburg. Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 10.

communities in South Africa(47). It therefore argued that it was the very special duty of the State to provide the opportunities with resources to enable every individual who was underprivileged to develop to the maximum of his/her ability(48). It could be argued that the maintenance of rights and freedoms became lucrative only in as far as the White English and Afrikaans-speakers of the country were concerned.

In so far as the exertion of an influence by the state, the NP ensured in the period 1975-1985 that the usage of Afrikaans and English was practically based on equality(49). This was based on its wish to cultivate a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation in all respects and in every sector of national life within South Africa(50).

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- 47 M.G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1 No. 3, July 1978, p. 8; IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, pp. 152-153; W. de Kock: Usuthu Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, pp. 176-177.
- 48 M.J. Bhengu (Ed.): Inhlabamkhosi. Vol. 1 No. 6, January 1984, pp. 23-24.
- 49 NP. Head office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 10.
- 50 Ibid.

In this regard it can be said that by 1980 the state-supported institutions had successfully implemented the principles of bilingualism in all Government institutions, in all public administrative bodies and in the various departments of the Public Service(51). The NP, however, failed to accomplish the cultivation of a spirit of goodwill and of mutual trust amongst the other peoples and population groups in the interests of South Africa. The idea of "swart gevaar" continued to dominate White South Africa and rendered meaningful negotiations with Inkatha and other voices of black South Africa improbable*(52).

The NP based participation and decision-making on the principle that:

"everyone, individually and in the group context, should have an effective share in those decisions relating to the government of a country, which determine his way of life, his aspirations and his needs, based on the maintenance and promotion of the rights to self-determination of each people and population group, the

51 Ibid.

52 L. Louw and F. Kendal: South Africa - the solution, pp. 39-40.

*See also G.D. Scholtz: 'n Swart Suid-Afrika? Nasionale Boekhandel, Kaapstad, 1968.

maintenance of an individual community life and the creation of opportunities for co-operation in matters of common interest."(53)

Inkatha did not differ from the NP on this principle, but endorsed the utilization of the state-controlled wealth and resources of the country for the greatest good of the greatest number of people(54). This was due to the fact that Inkatha viewed such wealth and resources as the inheritance of all the people who claimed no area of origin other than South Africa. In 1976 the South African Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, effected this principle by holding talks with various leaders of the homelands(55). Such talks were conducted within the framework of the NP policy. Although the NP at that stage refused requests by Prince Buthelezi regarding representation in the central Parliament, and freehold tenure of land for black people in urban areas, it argued that solutions for South Africa and its problems were to be sought within the

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- 53 NP. Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, pp. 10-11.
- 54 J.S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography p. 135; W. de Kock: Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p. 176.
- 55 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 56.

parameters of the same principle(56). Inkatha's prominence in this regard elevated its leadership to a higher pedestal.

The NP promoted the prosperity of the South African population within the framework of effective competition, private initiative and free enterprise(57). Inkatha did not differ with the NP in this regard, although this framework was rejected by many South African black exiles as part and parcel of the "apartheid-capitalist exploitation" of the country(58).

As its objective, the NP promoted the expansion and the economic autonomy of the Republic of South Africa, in so far as this could serve its best interests, and declared itself to be opposed to any political act that would tend to preclude this(59). In 1984 Inkatha saw Black people in South Africa confronted with the task of bringing about radical

56 Ibid.

57 NP. Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 11.

58 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", pp. 106-116.

59 NP. Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 11.

responsibility. It therefore strives for the creation of conditions which are such that everyone can be assured of making a proper living and will be protected from exploitation of any kind."(63)

To the President of Inkatha such a declaration was nothing more than a mere pursuit of ideologies which were purely socio-political in nature(64). According to Inkatha the NP in the decade 1975-1985 did not really accommodate the economic realities of the country in its actions(65). It can therefore be argued that Inkatha evaluated the handling of the economy of the country by the NP in the late 1970's as highly exploitative. Such notions became evident in 1978 with the Information Scandal(66).

In the light of the unpleasant socio-political scenario in 1978, Inkatha noted the necessity that all people should collaborate with the state to effect the greatest probable redistribution of wealth suitable with maximising the productivity of trade, industry and commerce, whether privately or

63 NP. Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 11.

64 M. G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa, Clarion Call, Vol. 1 No.3, July 1978, p. 2-3;

65 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 113.

66 The Argus, 18 October 1978, p.3.

state-controlled(67). Such necessities were prompted by the fact that the period 1978 - 1980 saw South Africa confronted by a grave crisis in which the poor were threatened with greater poverty.*(68) Poverty in this sense did not specifically refer to Blacks only, but to all sections of the South African population. To Inkatha the quantity and flow of money would best be regulated through fiscal control and increased utilization of land, power and water through the control of the State(69). Prince Buthelezi argued that Inkatha was a vital and living political force, because it expressed the will of the Black people. That in itself made Inkatha relevant to the issues which confronted South Africa there and then(70).

Inkatha's expression of the will of the Black people thus validated its belief in the freedom of an

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- 67 J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, p. 136; W. de Kock: Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p. 177.
- 68 It is evident from the Carnegie Reports of the 1931-1933 depression years, that the NP was well aware of the challenge to eradicate poverty in South Africa.
- 69 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: Black self-reliance in the struggle for liberation, Thokoza township, 12 August 1984, p. 11.
- 70 Ibid.

individual to reside and own ground where he/she wished, to become qualified in any trade or profession for which he/she had the required degree of competence and attended any educational institutions in which he/she had entry qualifications(71).

The NP appeared to have realized, maintained and extended its principles along constitutional lines, as set out in its constitution. Between 1975 and 1983 the aims of the NP, practically the government of that period, could be epitomized as:

- The propagation of the programme of principles of the party;
- Continually carrying out investigations into social, economic and political questions of the day and finding solutions for them, and propagating such solutions for implementation;

71 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 153; G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 229.

- Putting up candidates for the House of Assembly, the President's Council and, if in the interests of the Party, for the election of local authorities;*
- The promotion of the candidate of members designed as such;
- The registration, as voters, of persons eligible to vote;
- Collecting funds to achieve the aforementioned aims(72)

The NP did succeed in propagating the programme of its principles which have already been discussed in this chapter. However, it is imperative to note that such principles were not maintained, implemented and extended by the NP as a party, but as the government of the day (1975-1983)(73). The accomplishment of these principles by the NP was to

72 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 14.

73 Ibid.

Inkatha lucrative only for the White section of the country's population(74).

The NP was devoid of a policy acceptable to both Black and White population of the country in investigating socio-political and economic questions of the period 1975-1985. A viable policy would lead to their successful implementation and there would be less internal and international pressure for the NP to trod on the path that would make both black and White population of South Africa economic, political and social equals(75). During the decade 1975-1985 Inkatha alleged that the NP had already lost its grip on reality(76). In 1976 Inkatha asserted that the policy of the NP had for decades been leading to the position in which:

1. Political treachery stalks the land. Treachery by the government, secret police, bribery, manipulation, detention without trial. Banning of people, banning of organisations are political treachery as far as the majority of South Africans are concerned.

74 M. G. Buthelezi: Violence and the armed struggle. Clarion Call, Vol. 2 No. 7, August 1979, pp. 9-12.

75 M.G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1978, pp. 2-3.

76 Ibid.

2. Constitutionally and institutionally the politics of constructive reconciliation is not possible in our country if the government persists in its headlong plunge into political stupidity.
3. The machinery of oppression which is the most subversive element in our country does not make it possible for the black majority of the country to play a positive role in the corridors of power(77).

In 1976 Buthelezi argued that since 1910 the successive governments of the NP had planted seeds of destruction in South Africa. The Blacks did not believe that the society of South Africa could be defended morally, theologically, or militarily. According to Prince Buthelezi the majority of Blacks would not find it in their hearts to die on the country's borders to defend "a system which is morally repugnant, dehumanises them, and mocks God Almighty for creating us blacks, also in his image."(78)

Inkatha argued that the policies of the NP which it (National Party) viewed as the realization of its

77 Ibid.

78 M.G. Buthelezi: Power is Ours, p. 27; Beeld, 2 November, 1978, p. 5.

aims, were abhorrent and unacceptable to black South Africa for reasons that:

- The government's economic policy is designed to perpetuate the privileged position of whites.
- The government's social policy makes humiliating assumptions about the black man's dignity.
- The government's political policy is the moat around besieged white self-interest(79).

In 1983 when a new constitution was implemented for the Republic of South Africa, the aims and objectives of the NP as a party became synonymous with the national goals of the government of the day(80). The 1983 Constitution Act No. 110 of the Republic of South Africa retained the 1961 preamble, while the aims of the NP as a party in the period 1975-1983 were added as national goals(81). The national goals of the NP as the government of the era were therefore set out in the preamble of the

79 M. G. Buthelezi: A message to South Africa from black South Africa. Clarion Call, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1978, p. 2.

80 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, pp. 2, 57-58.

81 Ibid.

constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1983 (Act No. 110 of 1983).(82) These goals were:

- * To uphold Christian values and civilized norms, with recognition and protection of freedom of faith and worship,
- * To safeguard the integrity and freedom of our country,
- * To uphold the independence of the judiciary and the quality of all under the law,
- * To secure the maintenance of law and order,
- * To further the contentment and the spiritual and material welfare of all,
- * To respect and to protect the human dignity, life, liberty and property of all in our midst,
- * To respect, to further and to protect the self-determination of population groups and peoples,
- * To promote private initiative and effective competition(83).

The national goals of the NP in 1983 did not really address the broad issues that confronted the party in the decade 1975-1985(84). These areas were the increasing pressures from abroad, including the threat of sanctions and the changes taking place on the Republic's borders, particularly in SWA/Namibia

82 Ibid.

83 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, pp. 2, 57-58.

84 Beeld, 6 November, 1984, pp. 2-4.

and Rhodesia; threats to the security of the state and extra-parliamentary Black resistance; the question of the removal of race discriminatory measures; the future of urban Blacks; demands by homeland leaders, particularly with regard to the question of more land and land consolidation; the serious unemployment situation and the state of the economy as well as the implementation of the new constitutional plan(85).

Between 1983 and 1985 the NP restored peace and order by using its armed police forces to suppress riots in black townships. In 1983 the NP proved itself capable of effectively isolating the White population from the traumatic repercussions of the prevailing unrest in Black townships(86).

The NP did, through the media, assure the White electorate of better standards of living and security in South Africa(87). The aims and principles of Inkatha were reconcilable with the international Declaration of Human Rights and had a

85 Ibid.

86 Die Burger, 2 September, 1984, pp. 1-2

87 Die Transvaler, 18 November, 1984, p. 5.

moral basis in accordance with principles of the entire free world(88). In the preamble of its constitution, Inkatha declared itself a non-violent National Cultural Liberation Movement which was a juridical person, capable of suing and being sued in the name of its secretary-general(89). Thus the aims of Inkatha were "to foster the spirit of unity among black people throughout South Africa and between them and their black brothers in Southern Africa and to keep alive and foster the traditions of the people; to help promote and encourage the development of the black people spiritually, economically, educationally and politically; to establish contact and liaise with cultural groups in Southern Africa with a view to the establishment of a common society; to stamp out all forms of corruption, exploitation of man by man and intimidation; to ensure acceptance of the principles of equal opportunity and treatment for all people in all walks of life; to abolish all forms of discrimination and segregation based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed; to inculcate and foster a

88 IISA: Inkatha year book 1988, p. 151.

89 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1975, p. 3.

vigorous consciousness of patriotism and a strong sense of national unity based on a common and individual loyalty and devotion to our land"(90).

In 1984 Inkatha argued that the struggle for liberation of Black people was the prime responsibility of Blacks in whatever arenas could be created to oppose the policies of the NP Government(91). In the same year Inkatha reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and objectives embodied in the constitution and reflected in its principles(92). In 1985 Inkatha resolved to defend its rights to serve in the struggle for liberation by pursuing Inkatha's aims and not to be intimidated into abandoning its commitments even in the face of death itself(93). In August 1984 Prince Buthelezi argued that Inkatha was rooted in democracy, and that it was a true expression of what the people wanted. He retorted:

90 Chief Minister's Dept; Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1975, p. 4. J. S. Smith: Buthelezi - the biography, pp. 126-127;

91 S. Griffin (Ed.): 10th Inkatha Conference Issue. Clarion Call, July/August 1984, pp. 10-11.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

"We in Inkatha are confident about the future, because we labour within the confines of the people's will, and because we are deeply committed to democracy which ensures that Inkatha remains relevant to the people's needs"(94).

Inkatha's aims thus corresponded greatly to that of the NP in this period. Inkatha's commitment to co-operation with any movement or organisation for the improvement of the conditions of the black people, was aimed at solving the socio-economic and political problems of South Africa(95). This nearly succeeded in 1978 when the Secretary-General of Inkatha, Dr Oscar Dhlomo, and Prince Buthelezi held a meeting in Durban with the chairman of the Broederbond, Dr G van N. Viljoen, as well as Prof Willem de Klerk and Prof Tjaart van der Walt(96). The purpose of the Durban meeting was to seek areas of common agreement between the NP and Inkatha. During the course of the meeting, Prof Tjaart van

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- 94 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1975, p.4.
- 95 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi's Speech, Black self-reliance in the struggle for liberation, Thokoza Township, 12th August 1984, p.4.
- 96 J.P. du Toit Bosman: Ondersoek die grondwetlike akkommodasie van die Swartes in die RSA na aanleiding van die standpunt (E) van Inkatha, p. 38.

der Walt remarked that the political problems of South Africa would be solved if Afrikaners and Zulus could find each other(97).

The eventual collapse of such a think tank, consisting of members of the NP and Inkatha in 1979, could be attributed to a question of scepticism and timing. In 1984 Willem de Klerk, a journalist, academic and political commentator, stated that:

"It is true that the two leaders in South Africa at the present moment are Chief Buthelezi and P.W. Botha. They are the leaders of two main groups in South Africa, the Zulus and the Afrikaners. So it is very very important that they must understand each other and they must try to find the solutions to the problems we have in this country. The problem is ... there is a difference in political philosophy between Chief Buthelezi and Mr P.W. Botha. Chief Buthelezi is an outspoken leader who rejects the policy of Separate Development and the homeland concept and is interested in a Unitary State. Therefore, the political philosophies are different(98).

Willem de Klerk's statement left much to be desired. Dhlomo agreed with de Klerk that a political coalition of the NP and Inkatha would be "a

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

formidable one"(99). According to de Klerk and Dhlomo there were no doubts that in a free and democratic election in South Africa an Afrikaner-Zulu political alliance could stage a landslide victory(100). Nevertheless, it was enigmatic that the aims and objectives of the NP and Inkatha, as political groupings with the largest constituencies, could not be compromised en toto. Thus the failure of the NP and Inkatha to seek solutions that would benefit all sections of the South African population, was one of the anomalies of the decade 1975-1985. To speak of collaboration between the NP and Inkatha during this decade would therefore be a matter of political myopia. In this sense a scrutiny of the organisational structure of the NP and Inkatha has justification.

99 H. Murray (Ed.): Leadership SA, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1985, p. 78.

100 J.P. de Toit Bosman: Onderzoek die grondwetlike akkommodasie van die Swartes in die RSA. Na aanleiding van die standpunt (E) van Inkatha, p. 39.

CHAPTER THREE

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY AND INKATHA:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The 1975 constitution of the NP as a party was a revised version of the constitution of the party in the early 1920's. The revision of such a constitution over the years was determined by the socio-political and economic entanglements of the country⁽¹⁾. The 1983 constitution of the NP as the ruling government of the era originated in July 1982 following the promulgation of the constitutional guidelines by the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha⁽²⁾. With regard to Inkatha its 1975 constitution was based on the 1928 Inkatha KaZulu constitution. As a result of defects in the 1928 constitution, the one in 1975 was largely drawn from the constitution of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia⁽³⁾. Prince Buthelezi argues that President Kaunda was the one who said he needed a base to

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1. Rand Daily Mail report, 2 March, 1976, pp.3-5; Harvard cols. 613-636; Ibid. 11 cols. 4176-4179, 4187; L.E. Neame: White Man's Africa - the problem of a white nation in a black continent, pp.83-93.
 2. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No.110, 1983, p.1.
 3. W. de Kork: Usuthu! Cry Peace: Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, pp.44-45.

consolidate people into a cohesive force(4). Prince Buthelezi points out that it was an excuse to mobilize Black people and he used the old name Inkatha because it was known in KwaZulu. The first one was aborted and it could no longer be Inkatha KaZulu, because the Black struggle was one struggle. There was not only a Zulu destiny in South Africa but a Black-White destiny(5). Regarding the NP it must be borne in mind that the 1983 constitution of the party as the ruling government was the culmination of an on-going process initiated in the early 1970's by successive NP Governments. In 1973 the Theron Commission was appointed to investigate into all matters regarding the Coloured population and their political position(6). The proposals of the Theron Commission resulted in the appointment of a Cabinet Committee under the leadership of the then Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, to inquire on the ways

4 Ibid.

5 An interview with Anthony Johnson in the Cape times, 24 October, 1986, Cf. W. de Kock: *Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa*, p. 46.

6 R.E. van der Ross: *The rise and decline of apartheid - a study of political movements among the Coloured people of South Africa, 1860-1985*, pp. 377-379.

and means of improving the constitutional and political development of the Coloureds and Indians(7

The 1977 constitution plan of the NP Government encompassed the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee. However, the Committee was converted into a Select Committee under the chairmanship of A. L. Schlebusch, which later became a commission of inquiry(8). The commission of inquiry recommended, inter alia, that the President's Council be established as a body to give further consideration to the whole question of constitutional development. It was only in May 1982 that the President's Council submitted its recommendations which were thoroughly analyzed(9). On 5 May 1983 the draft constitution was tabled in Parliament after which it was referred to a Select Committee for further investigation(10). On 15 August 1983 a discussion of the draft constitution was resumed in Parliament after a

7 Ibid.

8 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, p.1.

9 R.E. van der Ross: The rise and decline of apartheid - a study of political movements among the Coloured people of South Africa, 1880-1985, pp. 377-379.

10 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, p.1.

further refinement of the bill by the Select Committee(11). On 9 September 1983 the draft constitution was adopted by Parliament with a two-third's majority(12).

In 1979 Inkatha revised its constitution which deleted the provision that the President of Inkatha had to be the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. This was stipulated in the 1975 constitution, which aimed at preventing the politically myopic individuals from accepting an independence plan for KwaZulu(13).

In 1975 the NP as a party was organisationally functioning by means of the Congress, Head Council, Ward Councils, District Councils, Constituency Councils, Branches and a Provincial leader(14). On the other hand Inkatha had a bureaucratic structure from branches, regions, individual members to different conferences and decision-making

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 An Interview with Anthony Johnson in the Cape Times, 24 October, 1986, Cf. W. de Kock: Usuthu! Cry Peace! Inkatha and the fight for a just South Africa, p. 46.

14 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 14.

bodies(15). The Congress was the supreme authority of the NP in each province. It was composed of the members of the Head Council and delegates of each District Council. The Head Council members could be part of the Congress only after it had been furnished, before 15 June of each year, with a register of the branch members of each branch in its area, together with the amount in membership fees, as determined from time to time by the Congress(16).

In Inkatha the National Council(NC) was the policy-making body of the movement. All national leadership formations of Inkatha were represented in the National Council(17). It was not possible to stipulate how many members of the movement at any one time belonged to the National Council. This was due to the fact that organisations were constantly affiliating to Inkatha, e.g. Sofasonke in Soweto, UWUSA, etc. At any one meeting of the National

15 Bella Schmahmann: "KwaZulu in contemporary South Africa: a case study in the 1978 implementation of the policy of separate development, p. 285.

16 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 31.

17 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call Special Edition, p. 14.

Council there were between 2 000 and 2 500 delegates. However, Mare and Hamilton state that the National Council had 300 members on average(18). Unlike the Congress of the NP, the National Council of Inkatha was the most important organ which formed an umbrella structure over Inkatha itself, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) and all other organisations affiliated to Inkatha. Langner argues that Inkatha's National Council comprised of the Central Committee, members of the executives of the brigades, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly members who were also members of Inkatha, one representative from each affiliated organisation, four representatives of the regions, and the organisation's administrative officials(19). He further points out that the absorption of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by Inkatha through the National Council was aimed at making it (KLA) the legislative arm of Inkatha(20).

18 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 61.

19 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 71; Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, p. 25.

20 Ibid.

Schmahmann critically asserts that intermingling the National Council with the Legislative Assembly and the Central Committee with the cabinet precluded the growth of effective opposition political parties(21). In the Congress of the NP, a full-time Party official who was not a delegate, and members of the Federal Council of the NP, had the right to participate in discussions of the Congress, but denied the right to vote(22). There was a federation of the organisations of the NP in the provinces of the Republic of South Africa and South West Africa, i.e the Orange Free State Province, Transvaal, Natal, Cape and South West Africa, for the better management of their joint interests and principles(23).

The Congress supervised all the functions of the Party. The election of a Provincial leader, two deputy chairmen (one female and one male), auditors

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- 21 Bella Schmahmann: "KwaZulu in contemporary South Africa - a case study in the 1978 implementation of the policy of separate development", p. 286.
- 22 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 45.
- 23 Ibid.

of the Party and a chief secretary who also acted as treasurer and secretary of the Head Council, were annually elected by the Congress(24). The Congress discussed the draft resolutions submitted by the District Councils, the proposals submitted by the Head Council and the Federal Council, and motions submitted by members of the Congress(25). The Congress, however, could not act independent of other councils in that the Head Council could, at any time, if this was deemed to be in the interests of the Party, convene an extra-ordinary congress, and could do so upon receipt of a written request from eleven or more constituency councils(26). Moreover, in times of untoward crisis, and when the Congress was not in session, the leader-in-chief of the NP for the Republic could act on behalf of the Congress in matters of urgency.

While the Congress of the NP played a supervisory role on all the functions of the Party, the National Council of Inkatha had to decide on the general policy of the movement(27). In terms of the

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, p. 157.

constitution, each session of the National Council would commence by electing a chairman who would maintain his portfolio until another chairman was elected at the next session. The same chairman would carry out all duties as directed by the President of the movement. The National Council also had power to discuss and review any resolutions, decisions and recommendations of the Central Committee or of any Regional, Branch, Constituency or any other Committee of Inkatha. In this regard the National Council was assisted by the General Conference(GC) which included a trade union delegate and one delegate from all affiliate organisations(28).

Langner views the provision for the representation of other interest groups in the General Conference and the National Council in 1979 as negligible(29). He further states that it was an effective preventative measure against the forming of pressure groups by these affiliated organisations(30).

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- 28 Chief Minister's Dept, Dlundu, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 27.
- 29 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 80.
- 30 Ibid.

The NP authorised its Head Council which acted on behalf of the Congress when it was not in session(31). The Head Council constituted all National members of the House of Assembly and Provincial Executive Committee, the Provincial leader who acted as chairperson of the Head Council, the two Deputy chairpersons of the Congress, the male deputy chairperson acting as chairman of the Head Council in the absence of the Provincial leader, the chief secretary who also acted as secretary of the Head Council(32). All National, Deputy Ministers and all National members of the House of Assembly in all provinces also formed part of the Head Council. The co-option of eight members by the Head Council was with the proviso that two members were to be National members of the President's Council and one member of a youth member(33). Inkatha Central Committee could well be equated to this body of the NP because they were structured in more or less similar manners.

31 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 35.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

The Central Committee of Inkatha consisted of more than 25 members. Regarding composition, the Central Committee had the President of the Movement; Secretary-General; Deputy Secretary-General; twenty members elected by the Movement's General Conference; and members nominated by the President of the Movement in consultation with the Central Committee(34). The number of nominated members increased dramatically. This became evident in 1979 when the constitution was revised. The suggestion was that these positions served to co-opt men in KwaZulu whom it would be preferable to have within the organisation rather than organize opposition from without(35). To the Head Council of the NP, both elected and co-opted members of the Head Council had to serve in it provided they had been Party members for at least 24 months(36). In Inkatha the strategy of co-opting people on to the Central Committee made it unwieldy in terms of its tasks, that an "inner council" was later formed in

34 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 7.

35 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 36.

36 NP Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 36.

1979. This was in the constitution referred to as the Inner Council of the Central Committee(37).

The activities of the Head Council of the NP were managed by the government committee consisting of all members of the Head Council present at a meeting of which due notice had been given(38). The Head Council had an executive committee consisting of the male deputy chairman of the Congress, Provincial leader, and the Chief Whip of Parliament. The executive committee could act with all the powers and qualifications of the Head Council when the Provincial leader, or the person deputising in his stead, regarded the matter to be one of urgency(39). The Central Committee of Inkatha functioned in a manner that the President of the Movement presided at its meetings. The Secretary-General could

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- 37 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 62, E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, pp. 83-86; Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p.10.
- 38 NP. Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 36.
- 39 Ibid.

deputise in the absence of the President(40). When the President resigned to be President the Secretary-General would become a deputy President of the Movement until a new President was elected. It was only when both the President and the Secretary-General were absent that one chosen member of the Central Committee discharged their functions until they resumed their office duties(41). Between sessions of the Central Committee, the President of Inkatha was advised by an Inner Council of the Central Committee which consisted of specially selected members(42).

The trust and funds of the NP were controlled by trustees which consisted of the Provincial leader who had the right to vote, sit and speak in all committees, the chief secretary who was an ex officio member of all committees and also acted as secretary of such committees, and five members designated by the Head Council(43). In this regard

40 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 9.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 37.

the Head Council determined what Party funds were regarded as trust funds. While the Head Council convened at least thrice annually, its meetings, management or executive committee were convened by the Provincial leader as he deemed it necessary. Such meetings could also be convened on request in writing by at least ten members of the Head Council(44).

The funds of Inkatha were directed by the Central Committee and were utilized solely for the furtherance of the aims and objectives of the movement (Inkatha)(45).

Unlike the Head Council of the NP, the expenditure of Inkatha was approved by no other sub-committee except the Central Committee. What made the utilization of Inkatha funds differ from that of the NP, was the fact that in case the movement dissolved, the remaining assets would not be distributed amongst the members, but would be transferred to other associations in KwaZulu or

44 Ibid.

45 Chief minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 29.

Republic of South Africa(46). This was conditional in as far as the transference of these funds would proceed in case such an association promoted or engaged in activities of a cultural nature. The Central Committee determined the entrance and subscription fees of members (whether individual members or affiliated members) as notified in the Standing Orders(47). The funds of Inkatha were derived from donations, loans, moneys received from the issue of membership cards; grants or levies which the Movement received as time went by(48).

Contrary to Inkatha, the Head Council of the NP controlled and administered its funds as it deemed necessary. However, this was subject to special directives from the Congress(49). The Head Council strengthened the funds of the Party by continually consulting various councils of the Party and in various other ways. The classification of functions, appointment of staff and the creation of posts were done in accordance with what was

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 38.

lucrative to the Party(50). The duties of the Head Council of the NP greatly differed from that of the Central Committee of Inkatha. They were based on:

- * Propagating the implementation of resolutions of the Congress to the Cabinet and other competent authorities.
- * Appointing, in an acting capacity, successors to office-bearers nominated by the Congress until the advent of the next Congress if vacancies should occur and no other provision has been made in the Constitution for those posts to be augmented.
- * Fixing the place and date of the Congress.
- * Drawing up of the Congress agenda.
- * Making proposals to the Congress.
- * Reporting to the Congress annually.
- * Supervising the subordinate councils and committees and carrying out all functions deemed to be in the interests of the Party.
- * Keeping a list of lifelong members(51).

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

Contrary to the duties of the NP Head Council, the powers and functions of the Central Committee of Inkatha were:

- * the exercise of complete control over all officials;
- * programming policy of the National Movement as formulated by the National Council;
- * the implementation of the entire policy of the National Movement;

- * to inspect branch offices, minutes, bank records, receipts and membership register before inaugurating and renewing branches;
- * Controlling or regulating activities of and disciplining all officials at the National Headquarters, District, Regional, Constituency, Branch or other levels of the Movement...(52).

The functions of the Head Council of the NP and the Central Committee of Inkatha shared commonness in so far as the propagation and the implementation of

52 Chief Minister's dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 11.

their policies were concerned. The Head Council, whose functions were guided, directed and assessed by the Congress, did not have more influence on the NP as did the Central Committee on Inkatha.

The elections of the NP in the decade 1975-1985 were facilitated by the Head Council by fixing and promulgating the dates before or on which prospective candidates for the House of Assembly whether elected or nominated convened.(53) The President's Council lodged their names and prescribed documents with the Chief secretary for selection. The Head Council further fixed dates of the various stages in which the elections of the Party might take place(54). The approval for the candidate of a candidate who was not a member of the NP and the promotion of his candidature in the election concerned were done so by the Head Council where it was deemed to be in the interests of the Party(55). In this regard the Central Committee of Inkatha differed from the NP's Head Council. The Central Committee only inspected membership

53 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 39.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

registers before inaugurating and renewing branches of Inkatha as a movement(56). In Inkatha, only the National Council was responsible for elections. The Central Committee could only suggest eligible candidates to the General Conference(57).

Contrary to Inkatha, the NP operated equally in all four provinces of South Africa. In 1980, however, the Central Committee consisted of 8 chiefs, 6 women and 7 people who were not from Natal as Inkatha members(58). Langner states that there was apparently much control over the candidature and it almost looked as if the outcome of the elections could be regarded as a foregone conclusion, but that democratic provisions did exist(59). Although the Central Committee was powerful both in the movement and in the KwaZulu politics, the composition of the Central Committee was also altered. In 1981, for example, only 11 members of the first Central Committee were still in office(60). By first

56 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 10.

57 Ibid.

58 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, pp. 83-84.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

Central Committee one refers to the period 1975-1978. Unlike the NP Head Council, the functioning of the Central Committee was perceived through seven sub-committees. Members of these sub-committees were appointed by the President from the Central Committee and the National Council(61). These committees were:

1. The Social and cultural committee
2. The Political and constitutional committee
3. The Economic and finance committee
4. The Defence and security committee
5. The Elections and publicity committee
6. The Appointments and disciplinary committee,
and
7. The community development committee(62).

Unlike the Inkatha Central Committee, the NP Head Council was organisationally responsible for the promotion of participation in national elections by the Party; orderly functions of all the subordinate committees of the NP and the holding of regional conferences in various organisational areas in a

61 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, pp. 159-160.

62 Ibid.

particular province(63). However, this could succeed only when such conferences were regarded as appropriate.

At lower levels the NP had Ward Council (WC) while Inkatha functioned in the form of Branch Executive Committee (BEC)(64). In 1975 a Ward Council consisted of at least 5 members. In 1980 this changed in that not less than 20 members could serve in the Ward Council(65). The Branch Executive Committee of Inkatha consisted of 6 members and other Branch committee members. Only a registered member of the NP during the preceding financial year was eligible to become a member of the Ward Council(66). Similarly, only active and paid-up members of Inkatha could annually be elected into the Branch Executive Committee(67). The office-bearers of the Ward Council and Branch Executive

63 Ibid.

64 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 24; Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 22.

65 NP Head Office, Vryheid, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 24.

66 Ibid.

67 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 22.

Committee were the same in that the former consisted of a ward leader, a deputy ward leader, a secretary and a treasurer(68). The Branch Executive Committee of Inkatha consisted of the branch chairman, vice-chairman, the branch secretary and assistant secretary, the branch treasurer and the deputy treasurer, the branch publicity secretary and his assistant(69). Here it could be argued that the NP and Inkatha shared many things in common. The ward leader, secretary, deputy ward leader or any ward councillor designated by the Ward Council formed a management committee which could dispose of urgent business. A Ward Council co-opted members to supplement any vacancies in the Ward Council(70). The Ward leader played a supportive role in the implementation of the decisions of the Ward Council, District Council, Head Council and Provincial leader. In Inkatha the branch chairman, vice-chairman or branch publicity secretary organised Ward Committees in urban areas and Sub-wards and

68 NP Head Office, Vryheid, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 24.

69 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p.23.

70 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 25.

Village Committees in rural areas(71). These committees were the smallest units of Inkatha supervised by the branch officials(72). The Ward Council of the NP and Inkatha Branch Executive Committee shared unambiguous similarities in that both were organisationally responsible for the recruitment of new members; collection of membership fees; selection of members; keeping a register of members; annual updating of membership lists; taking the initiative for the collection of funds to promote the objectives of both parties; nominating group leaders and supervising the registration of voters(73).

Contrary to Inkatha Branch Executive Committee, the NP Ward Council in the period 1977-1985 kept a watchful eye on the activities of hostile political parties and organisations e.g. ANC, PAC and

71 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 23.

72 Ibid.

73 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 23; NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 26.

Azapo(74). For the NP the Ward Council distributed pamphlets, periodicals and National newspapers. The Branch Executive Committee did the same but this was necessarily the duty of the branch secretary and his assistant. Unlike the Ward Council, the branch secretary forwarded such documents to the Constituency secretary(75). The Ward Council performed some of the duties that were for other bodies of the Party, e.g the promotion of the Party's interests in its branch area and active participation in the House of Assembly elections as well as in the election of local authorities and other councils(76).

At a district level the NP functioned in the form of the District Council. Inkatha had a Regional Headquarters for any area considered by the Central Committee as a Region(77). In this regard, Inkatha concentrated more in rural areas than urban which

74 NP Head Office, Vryheid, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 26.

75 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 23.

76 NP. Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 27.

77 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 17.

the NP used as its strong bases. The NP Head Council granted recognition to the District Council. The District Council existed only where a magisterial district was divided up by constituency borders(78). Inkatha viewed each Regional Authority Area in rural areas as a Region(79). In Inkatha no organizational body could act in the place of the Regional Headquarters as was the case with the NP District Council. The NP Ward Council could replace the District Council if there was only one branch in a district or constituency(80).

The NP District Council consisted of the leader, secretary and deputy leader of each Ward Council in the district or their secundi. An additional representative was designated for every 50 members up to a maximum of 10 representatives where the membership of a branch exceeded 150(81). The Regional Headquarters of Inkatha functioned through a Regional Committee which was composed of the

78 NP. Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 28.

79 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 17.

80 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, p. 29.

81 Ibid.

district chairman; the regional secretary; regional women's secretary; the regional youth and publicity secretary; and two trustees(82). An area under the control of a chief was also represented in the Regional Committee as one unit(83).

Most of the duties of the District Council and the Regional Committee were similar except that before 15 June of each year in the decade 1975-1985, the District Council had to furnish the Head Council with a register of the branch members, membership fees, names and addresses of Ward Council members, annual report of District Council, draft resolutions and annual reports of branches to district Councils(84). Contrary to Inkatha, the District Council of the NP had the right to draw up its own internal rules, provided these were not in conflict with the entire constitution of the Party(85).

82 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 17.

83 Ibid.

84 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1975, pp. 30-31.

85 Ibid.

The NP had a Constituency Council which was set up for each constituency in 1976. In Inkatha each region established a plethora of constituencies which were registered at the National Headquarters(86). The Constituency Council functioned through the management committee which was composed of the elected chairman of the Constituency Council at that stage, the secretary of the Council and at least three members elected from council ranks(87). The management committee was empowered to co-opt one or more district leaders to the management committee on an ad hoc basis.

The constituencies of Inkatha functioned by means of Constituency Committees elected every five years as chairman and Vice-chairman; secretary and assistant-secretary; treasurer and deputy-treasurer; and publicity secretary and assistant-publicity-secretary(88). Each Constituency Committee co-operated with the Regional Officials in the

86 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 19.

87 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1977, p. 33.

88 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 20.

promotion of the objectives, ideals, and interests of Inkatha as a movement(89). This was to be necessitated within the parameters of the rules and the constitution of Inkatha.

During the meetings of the Constituency Council of the NP in 1980, a chairman was elected from its own ranks and he then occupied the post until such time as the council again convened(90). In a constituency with only one district council, the chairman and secretary of the District Council became chairman and secretary of the Constituency Council(91). A branch with a membership of 50 or less was represented by a Ward leader; deputy Ward leader and secretary(92). Unlike that of the NP, the Constituency Committee of Inkatha elected all constituency officials every five years(93). This was done at the Constituency Annual Conference comprising 10 members from each branch, e.g. three from the Youth Brigade; three from the Women's

89 Ibid.

90 The Citizen, 28 May 1980, p. 5.

91 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1980, p. 33.

92 Ibid.

93 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 20.

Brigade; and four from among individual members who were not members of both brigades(94). The Constituency Council of the NP acted in an advisory and co-ordinating capacity during general and by-elections(95). The Constituency Committee of Inkatha conducted interviews with local authorities, organisations, bodies and central Government officials on matters affecting Inkatha as a movement(96). The Constituency Council could act in a decision-making capacity in regard to those matters affecting the constituency as a whole, provided they were not in conflict with the provisions of the NP constitution(97). On the contrary, the Constituency Committee of Inkatha took responsibilities for the propaganda and publicity of the activities of Inkatha in their constituency(98).

94 Ibid.

95 NP head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1980, p. 34.

96 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 20.

97 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1980, p. 34.

98 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 21.

Inkatha regarded itself as a national, cross-ethnic movement on the basis of its branches and membership. The branches of Inkatha had a minimum of 30 members, a committee of eight members, and a branch executive committee of 14 members(99). Venter gives a suggestion that this was indicative of concern not only with effectiveness, but also with status and 'elite formation'(100). It could be argued, however, that committee seats served as a ground for training members and establish branch procedures.

In the NP a branch consisted of a minimum of 15 members. In the case of fewer than 15 persons in a polling district, the Head Council in collaboration with the District Council, had to consent to the establishment of a separate branch(101). These councils could also approve the convention of a meeting to decide about sub-dividing a branch where membership exceeded 500(102). In the period 1975-

99 T.P. Venter: 'Die rol van Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe in the Suid-Afrikaanse politieke proses', p. 36.

100 Ibid.

101 J.J. van Rooyen (Ed): Ever New - National Party Governs 40 Years, pp. 3-24.

102 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1980, pp. 20-21.

1978 this meeting determined the boundaries of the new branch in accordance with the provisions of the party's constitution. During the epoch 1975-1985 secession took place annually, between 1 July and 30 September(103). This, however, was subject to no instructions issued by the Head Council to the contrary(104). Interdependence of the organisational structures was apparent in both the NP and Inkatha, e.g. when a branch with fewer than 500 members deemed it in the interests of the party to split into two or more branches, it furnished reasons to the District Council, in writing, for this reason, thus making the establishment of a separate branch to apply mutatis mutandis(105).

In Inkatha, once a number of branches had been established in each constituency of a region, it was approved by the Central Committee and registered at the National Headquarters(106).

103 NP Offices, Vryheid, Konstitusie van die Nasionale Party, 1981, p. 9.

104 Ibid.

105 Pligte van takkesture, artikel 23, 1985, p. 1.

106 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 21.

Shortly after the formation of Inkatha in 1975, ten branches had to be formed in consultation with the KwaZulu urban representative by making use of the facilities provided by the homeland(107). In 1977 there existed 300 branches (200 rural and 100 urban), 18 of these outside Natal and the Western Cape. In 1984 there was tangible evidence that nearly a third of branches existed in the Transvaal urban areas(108). Nevertheless, observers accepted that Inkatha was predominantly a Natal and Zulu organisation. Schlemmer states that ethnic affiliation and a Zulu-speaking preponderance were reflected in areas outside the province of Natal. He argues that it was basically rurally based in that constituencies in rural areas were in concord with the areas of jurisdiction of the chiefs(109). The 1975 Inkatha constitution made no provision for the termination of its branches. On the contrary, before 31 May of each year (in the decade 1975-

107 Daily News, 26 April 1975, p. 4.

108 B. Schmahmann: "KwaZulu in contemporary South Africa: a case study in the 1978 implementation of the policy of separate development", pp. 277-279.

109 L. Schlemmer: The stirring Giant - observations on the Inkatha and other black political movements in South Africa, Cf. M. Robert et al (Eds.): The Apartheid Regime - political power and racial domination, p. 281.

1985), a NP branch could lapse if its Ward Council neglected to submit membership lists and meet its prescribed financial obligations to the District Council(110). One could assert that all branches of the NP and Inkatha promoted the interests of these political groupings in their areas. They all discussed national, economic, social and political issues and recruited new members. Contrary to those of Inkatha, the NP branches collected membership fees of the existing members, which took place from 1 July 1975 to 30 April 1976(111). This continued throughout the decade 1975-1985. As far as membership intricacies were concerned, a person could become a member of the NP only if he paid the prescribed fees and applied for membership in writing(112). In Inkatha an applicant desiring to become a member submitted his application orally or in writing to the appropriate official at specified offices. Membership in Inkatha was voluntary and open to all citizens who accepted its objectives and

110 J.J van Rooyen: *Ever New - National Party Governs 40 Years*, pp. 3-24; D. le Roux (Ed.): *Informa*, November 1984, Volume XI, No. 3., 12.

111 *Ibid.*

112 NP Head Office, Cape Town, *Constitution of the National Party*, 1977, p. 16.

rules(113). This applied only to Blacks, because political affiliation to organisations or parties by both Black and White citizens in South Africa was prohibited during that decade. The NP membership was conditional in the sense that a person desiring to join the Party had to declare that:

"I, the undersigned, hereby solemnly declare that I endorse the PRINCIPLES of the PARTY, that I shall give effect to them to the best of my ability and that I freely and sincerely undertake, in accordance with the Constitution, faithfully to comply with the obligations of MEMBERSHIP of the PARTY and to submit myself to the authority and discipline of the PARTY".(114)

No person became a member of the NP unless he/she further declared that he/she was not a member of any other political party or organisation of a political nature. A person became a member of the branch in the area in which he resided. If no branch existed in a constituency, he became a member of the nearest branch in an adjoining constituency(115). In the case of a city councillor who represented a Ward

113 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, p. 5.

114 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, 1983, p. 16

115 Ibid.

outside the constituency in which he resided, such a person became a branch member within the city council ward he represented(116). Inkatha differed slightly from the NP in that it classified its members into two categories, i.e individual members; and affiliated members. The individual members consisted of persons of not more or less than 18 years of age who enrolled as members of the Youth and Women's Brigades and who subscribed to membership conditions of Inkatha(117). In this regard, however, eligibility for affiliation was subject to approval by the Central Committee on condition that enrolled members were not members of the organisations which, in its opinion, were the nursery of aberrant political thoughts(118).

The affiliated membership of Inkatha consisted of organisations whose interests were in concord with or not antagonistic towards its objectives. All new members paid a membership fee of R3,00 an annual fee of R2,00. Members of the Youth Brigade, however,

116 Ibid.

117 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, pp. 158-160.

118 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, pp. 5-6.

paid only 50c in terms of "Wide article 19(1)(a) and (b)" of Inkatha constitution(119). Inkatha members were expected to make donations in accordance with their means in order to augment its funds. In the NP the membership fees and contributions were determined by the Congress to the Head Council for the subsequent financial year. The right to determine different membership fees for various groups of members was reserved by the Congress(120).

In the decade 1975-1985 the NP had a membership of about two-million, while Inkatha accomplished the one-million membership vestige(121). Inkatha argues that it was committed to fashion its members not for revolution, but for staging a landslide victory when a democratic, free and fair election would take place(122). What distinguished Inkatha from other organisations or parties "working within the system", like Inyandza of KaNgwane, was that it claimed a vast membership. The vastness of the organisation legitimizes its claim to be a

119 Ibid.

120 NP Head Office; Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1983, p. 18.

121 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, pp. 146-147.

122 Ilanga, 18 December, 1984, p. 4.

liberation movement. Mare and Hamilton admit that the constituency of Inkatha distinguished it from being another "Muzorewa option"(123). They further argued that:

"This will ensure that it can deliver the goods (non-violence, the last chance for peaceful negotiated change, free enterprise, stability, anti-socialism, etc)".124

The Youth Branches of the NP functioned in the same way as other branches. Their history could be traced back to the early 1960's(125). Where there were more than 25 members in the same District Council area, the NP youth could form a separate branch or separate branches, subject to the provisions of the Party's constitution(126). Only persons between the age of 16 and 28 were eligible for affiliation to the NP Youth Branch. Like other general branches of the party, a member of the Youth Branch had to declare that he was not a member of

123 G. Mare and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 71.

124 Ibid.

125 J.J. van Rooyen: Ever New-National Party Governs 40 Years, pp. 19-23; Natpunt, Mondstuk van die Nasionale Party-Studentetakke, Stellenbosch, July 1988, pp. 2-3.

126 Ibid.

any other political party or organisation of a political nature(127). The endorsement of Youth membership of the NP was subject to the provision of the names of Branch, District Council and Constituency. When a person had become a member of the NP Youth Branch and had paid the prescribed fees, he was handed a receipt, duly signed by an office-bearer of the party(128). It could be argued that the receipt served as proof of membership unless his membership was rejected or withdrawn. In the event of a person's membership being rejected, the fees paid by the said person were returned to him by the Ward Council, District Council or Head Council and the receipt was proclaimed by the body concerned(129).

Regarding Inkatha Youth Brigade whose history could be traced back to 1976, a committee of eight members led by Arnold Musa Mkhize emerged in 1978 after the

127 C. Botha (Ed.): Politics Today - a background brief on political developments in the RSA, May 1985, No. 9, p. 3; NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1983, p. 23.

128 Ibid.

129 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1983, pp. 17-18.

first conference of the Youth Brigade(130). Mkhize, a Transvaler, advocated the promotion of Inkatha in the institutions of higher learning as a countervailing measure against the pervading influence of the South African Students' Organisation(131). The modelling of the Youth Brigade was based on the Zambian Youth Service and the Malawian Young Pioneers. In 1976 Inkatha officials visited Zambia and Malawi to scrutinize youth programmes of these countries(132).

Contrary to the NP Youth Branches, the Youth Brigade of Inkatha fell under the jurisdiction of its President. It consisted of those persons who were accepted by the Youth Population as Youth, but who paid a joining fee of R3,00 and a subscription fee of R2,00 annually, if they were not bona fide full-time students and children under the age of 18 years(133). All those under the age of 18 years

130 E.J. Langer: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 153.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Consitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 16.

paid a joining fee of R0,50c and a subscription fee of R0,50c annually(134).

Inkatha leadership had a strict control and guidance of the Youth Brigade. This amazingly decreased the degree of militancy among the Black youth. Prior to 1978 Professor Sibusiso Bhengu, then Secretary-General of Inkatha, was incriminated for revolutionizing the Youth Brigade(135). In 1979 a compact between the NP and Inkatha occupied a centre-stage of South Africa's politics. It could be discerned in the developing relations between the NP-linked student organisation, Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) and Inkatha Youth Brigade. In 1980 the leaders of Inkatha Youth Brigade and the executive members of the Afrikaanse Studentebond exchanged visits and ideas on areas of common agreement(136). The contact between the youth leaders of both parties at that stage was necessitated by the NP's newly established Youth Power S A (Jeugkrug S A)(137). A collaboration between the Jeugkrug and the Youth Brigade, however,

134 Ibid.

135 Natal Witness, 20 October 1978, pp. 2-3.

136 Sunday Express, 18 November 1979, pp. 4-5.

137 Ibid.

indicated commitment to combat the encroachment of radicalism from left and right.

The Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) asserted that Whites would be swamped politically(138). The Inkatha Youth Brigade pointed out, however, that its movement was prepared to accept federalism as an alternative political model instead of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state(139). Black majority rule was the crunch question for many of the Afrikaanse Studentebond's delegates. There was no way in which they wished to be ruled politically by Blacks. This could be attributed to the fact that the White group (mainly Afrikaans to which they belonged, had at that time supreme control of the government, which all representatives at the conference agreed was undemocratic if all population groups were considered as forming part of one South African State(140). Some delegates of the Afrikaanse Studentebond regarded the establishment of a national convention as impossible.

138 Ibid.

139 Ilanga, 17 May 1985, pp. 3-4.

140 Ilanga, 17 May 1985, pp. 3-5.

Organisationally, it could be argued that the NP was stricter than Inkatha in its control and guidance of its Youth Branches. Like any other member of the NP, a Youth Branch member could cease to be a member of the Party if his membership was terminated as a result of an offence or the neglect of his duties or was delegated from the records by the relevant Ward Council, District Council, Head Council, Congress or Provincial leader, acting on behalf of the Congress, owing to misconduct, disloyalty to the party(141). A warning or suspension might, however, precede such deletion of membership.

The NP did not officially take cognizance of the role of women in its organisational structures as did Inkatha. Inkatha had the Women's Brigade under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee in terms of the 1979 constitution of the movement(142). It was launched at the Inanda Seminary towards the end of May 1977. In 1978 about 1000 delegates attended Inkatha Women's Brigade conference where Anastasia

141 NP Head Office, Durban, Constitution of the National Party, 1983, pp. 3-5.

142 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 78.

Thula, wife of the Johannesburg-based Inkatha's urban representative and Central Committee member, Gibson Thula, was elected as secretary(143). The Women's Brigade had to play the role of instructions in the mobilization of the womenfolk and upbringing of children towards the aims and objectives of Inkatha(144).

The organisational functioning of the NP as a party was actually facilitated by Provincial leaders in collaboration with various bodies. Inkatha only had a President whose responsibilities could be compared to those of the NP Government in the decade 1975-1985. The 1983 NP constitutional plan entailed, inter alia, that the Head of State was an Executive President. His office united the functions of both the State President and Prime Minister(145). The President thus decided whether matters were separate or common issues. He was elected by an electoral college consisting of 50 Whites, 25 Coloureds and 13

143 G Mare and G Hamilton: An appetite for power - Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 72.

144 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 153.

145 Constitution '83 in a nutshell, p. 7; The NP Plan for S.A, nd.

Asian members. After his election, the President ceased to be a member of Parliament, but remained the leader of his party(146). On the other hand Inkatha President became its principal officer and had power to give instructions on any matter affecting the movement, to any of its official(147). He was the spokesman of Inkatha on national and international affairs. He had power to take any disciplinary action against any member of Inkatha on the grounds of the member's misbehaviour. Inkatha also gave its President powers to exercise discretion in regard to items for discussion by the Central Committee or the National Council(148). This enabled him to delete any item from the agenda of a meeting.

Once the Electoral College of the NP had elected the State President, he remained in office for a maximum of five years. In the case of an early General Election, the Electoral College could terminate the

146 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, pp. 4-5; The NP Plan for SA, nd; Constitution '83 in a nutshell, p. 7.

147 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 11.

148 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, pp. 156-157.

term of office of the State President, but would remain in office in an interim capacity until the next State President was elected after the General Election(149). While Inkatha President had to read a Policy Speech only, the National Party Government swore the State President into office after taking an oath(150). On 14 September 1984 the State President, P.W. Botha declared:

"In the presence of Almighty God and in full realization of the high calling I assume as State President in the service of the Republic, I do swear to be faithful to the Republic of South Africa and do solemnly and sincerely promise at all times to promote that which will advance and to oppose all that may harm the Republic, to obey, observe, uphold and maintain the constitution and all other Law of the Republic; to discharge my duties with all my strength and talents to the best of my knowledge and ability and true to the dictates of my conscience; to do justice unto all; and to devote myself to the well-being of the Republic and its people. May the Almighty God by His grace guide and sustain me in keeping this oath with honour and dignity. So help me God"(151).

149 Constitution '83 in a nutshell, p. 7.

150 J.J. van Rooyen: Ever New-National Party Governs 40 Years, pp. 61-63; Constitution '83 in a nutshell, pp. 3, 7.

151 Constitution '83 in a nutshell, pp. 3, 7; J.J. van Rooyen: Ever New National Party Governs 40 Years, pp. 61-63.

In 1975 the Inkatha President was elected by the General Conference for a period of five years. The Electoral Commission appointed the returning officer with whom all candidates filed their nomination papers(152). Any member of Inkatha in good standing was eligible to run for the office of President, with the proviso that he qualified to be head of KwaZulu Government(153). Inkatha detractors criticized the stipulation that Inkatha President had to be head of KwaZulu Government in order to fill the leadership role, and that only inkosi (Chief) had to be Chief Minister of KwaZulu Government. They viewed the stipulation as restricting Inkatha leadership to the traditional system of amakhosi (Chieftancy)(154). In this regard one may argue that it was politically myopic of Inkatha detractors because to ascertain that KwaZulu never accepted the farce of independence offered by the NP Government was one of the major priorities of Inkatha after it was formed.

152 Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, 1979, p. 7.

153 Ibid.

154 IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, p. 157.

The NP Government adopted a new constitution in 1984 in accordance with the Westminster principle(158). Parliament consisted of three Houses, a House of Assembly (178 members), a House of Representatives (85 members) and a House of Delegates (45 members), representing Whites, Coloureds and Asians respectively(155). Each House made its own laws on matters affecting the interest of the population group concerned. Legislation on general affairs needed the approval of all three Houses. It could be noted that if all Three of the Houses in Parliament each adopted a vote of no-confidence (censure motions) in the State President's Cabinet, the State President was obliged to resign or call a General Election. In this way Parliament retained its control over the State President and his Cabinet(156).

In addition there was also a President's Council consisting of 60 members. The President's Council advised the State President on matters of public

155 D. Dannhauser (ED.): South African Digest, October 17, 1984, p. 16; The NP Plan for S.A., nd; Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, pp. 17-24.

156 Constitution '83 in a nutshell, p. 7.

interest and decided on legislative disagreements among the Houses referred to it for a ruling(157). The creation of the President's Council was the realization of the aims and principles of the NP Black South Africans were represented at second and third tier level of government. There were also six self-governing Black national states which the NP regarded as having powers just as great or greater than those states and provinces in other countries(158). Leaders of all Black communities were invited to join the NP Government in a National Council to negotiate democratic power-sharing at the highest level of government(159). This became a bone of contention between the NP and Inkatha in the period 1983-1985.

It could be argued that the NP and Inkatha in the decade 1975-1985 remained by far the best organized political groupings in South Africa, with military-style hierarchies and discipline, capable of

157 South Africa Profile: Focus on South Africa, nd.

158 Republic of South Africa Government Gazette. Vol. 219 No. 8914, 28 September 1983, pp. 12-14.

159 Manifesto of the National Party, 29 April, 1981.

overwhelming any challenge mounted by radical groups. In that decade Inkatha was opposed to the strategies of the NP Government. It is in this light that a comparative study of the strategies of the NP and Inkatha becomes imperative.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE STRATEGIES OF THE NATIONAL PARTY AND INKATHA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

In the decade 1975-1985 both the NP and Inkatha acknowledged the poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population. This manifested itself in Inkatha's adoption of an open-ended approach which entailed a multi-party democracy. Such a strategy does not forward any political party as "the" party or as being sacrosanct(1). Dr Dhlomo, Secretary General of Inkatha, argued that his movement had strategies that took into account the fact that no single organisation would be the sole determinant of the future of South Africa(2). He retorted:

"Inkatha has adopted a multi-strategy approach and believes that while it has a vital role to play in shaping the future, it cannot do so alone"(3).

Inkatha perceived socio-political change in South Africa in terms of a movement of the will of the people towards reconciliation. It thus endeavoured

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- 1 S. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity Who Wants it? Clarion Call, Volume 3, 1987, p. 12.
 - 2 O.D. Dhlomo: Inkatha: Its origin, policies and strategies, nd, p. 10.
 - 3 J. Bhengu and T. Myeni (Eds): Dr Oscar Dhlomo addressing the May 1 rally at King's Park in Durban. Umxoxi, Volume 2, 1986, pp. 8-9.

to facilitate the political aspirations of people from all race groups, notwithstanding their political, social, economic and cultural associations, circumstances and locations(4).

While the NP also accepted that such an endeavour was viable for the attainment of unity and peace in South Africa, it vacillated in recognizing Inkatha as a formidable force in the body politic of South Africa(5). On 12 May 1985 Prince Buthelezi further highlighted the viability of the multi-strategy principle. He said:

"When one looks for unity, one does not look for committees sitting round tables talking about ideologies. The only place where we will find unity, is in the hearts and minds of people. We do not have to create unity; we have to eliminate the causes of disunity. We have to take away things that inhibit unity, and the only way we can do this is to accept the multi-strategy principle as vital to the struggle for liberation."(6)

4 Ibid.

5 M.G. Buthelezi: The non-viability of the strategy of violence in the midst of escalating black on black violence. An address at a rally in Amatigulu, 18th June 1985, pp. 1-2.

6 KwaZulu Day of Prayer for Black South Africa, an address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Ulundi, 12th May 1985, p. 7.

The NP believed that a multi-strategy approach was the only way to collectively achieve the best for South Africa. It accentuated, however, its rejection of any system of horizontal differentiation which amounted to one nation dominating another or others(7). On 25 January 1985 State President P.W. Botha said that the NP Government was committed to co-operative co-existence. This, however, was only possible within a system in which there was no domination of one population group over another, which in turn required self-determination for each group over its own affairs and joint responsibility for and co-operation on common interests(8). On the same point P.W. Botha argued:

"But I know for a fact that most leaders in their own right in South Africa and reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of one over the others and it would lead to chaos."(9)

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- 7 O. Geyser: B.J. Vorster - Select Speeches, pp. 226-240; National Party Information 1982, p. xiv.
- 8 Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report: The findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, p. 170.
- 9 Ibid.

To Inkatha the reality was that outside the multi-strategy approach the only unity there could be between (Black) organizations was unity based on uniformity and subservience(10). This could only be found in a disciplined joint commitment to the armed insurrection. In 1982 the NP understood multi-party democracy in the context of separate development, which meant separate, but equal opportunities for every population group.(11" In terms of this policy every ethnic group should develop along its own lines to the full realization of its potential. The NP cadres, however, referred to this policy as vertical differentiation(12). This NP tone changed on 15 May 1985 when State President P.W. Botha promulgated his acceptance of the multi-party democracy as advocated by Inkatha. Thus the NP indicated its commitment to devise such democratic solutions in co-operation with other South Africans who were also committed to peaceful and democratic solutions and who rejected violence as a means of

10 Inkatha Year Book 1988, pp. 122-123.

11 J.P.C. Mostert (Ed.): Politieke Partye in Suid-Afrika - Blanke politieke partye met parlementere verteenwoordiging 1910-1985, p. 63.

12 National Party Information 1982, p. xiv;
Journal for contemporary history, Vol. 12 No. 2, August 1987, pp. 18-50.

achieving political goals(13). The NP believed in negotiating a democratic system of government which was to accommodate all legitimate political aspirations of all the South African communities(14). On 15 August 1985 P.W. Botha retorted:

"Now let me say explicitly that I believe in participation of all the South African communities on matters of common concern. I believe there should exist structures to reach this goal of co-responsibility and participation... It is evident that units will have to be recognized on a geographical and group basis... Each such unit should have autonomy on matters that only affect that unit, while the units on central level should jointly manage matters of mutual concern."(15)

While the NP and Inkatha slightly differed in their perception and application of a multi-strategy approach, the approach itself endorsed deviations

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- 13 Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report: The findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, p. 170.
- 14 J.P.C. Mostert (Ed.): Die Suid-Afrikaanse Krisis-perspektiewe op die grondwetlike bestel, pp. 239-246.
- 15 Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report: the findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, p. 169.

(agreeing to disagree)(16). It could be argued, however, that the adoption of a multi-strategy approach by Inkatha was an appropriate gesture to the politics of reality. In line with the notion that no one organisation could unilaterally liberate South Africa, Inkatha's strategy was to articulate and debate all political, social, economic and cultural issues openly(17). It therefore had the temerity to grasp the thorny nettle of disunity among the Black people of South Africa. Thus Inkatha aired its views knowing that it was in the best interest of the struggle to preserve democratic principles inherent in freedom of speech and association(18). One may argue that both the NP and Inkatha acknowledged the fact that disunity among all population groups in South Africa was a reality based on certain reasons. The NP and Inkatha were

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- 16 S. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity Who Wants it? Clarion Call, Volume 3, 1987, p. 12; Inkatha Year Book 1988, pp. 121-124.
- 17 The Star, 13 July 1978, p. 4; T. Lodge: Black politics in South Africa since 1945, pp. 352-353.
- 18 J.J. van Rooyen (Ed.): Ever New - National Party Governs 40 Years, pp. 61-84; H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (Ed.): Negotiating South Africa's Future, pp. 41-44, H. Murray (Ed.): Leadership South Africa, First Quarter 1985, pp. 10-17.

unanimous that such reasons had to be discussed(19). Inkatha took cognizance of the fact that Black political opinion (as expressed by organisations) had always been deeply divided and that Black political divisions had repeatedly been punctuated by fratricidal violence(20). The NP shared with Inkatha a view that Black/Black conflict leading to violence could be described as Black South Africa's sickness unto death(21). Prince Buthelezi acknowledged, however, the fact that there was still time left for curbing divisiveness on the Black political front. He argued that the right of a leader to present his or her own options for the people (whether it be at local, regional or national level) laid right at the core of democracy.

He pointed out that Inkatha had a God-given democratic right to object to misguided methods that

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- 19 R. Omond: The Apartheid Handbook - a guide to South Africa's everyday racial policies, pp. 41-46; National Party Information 1982, pp. 12-13.
- 20 M.J. Bhengu (Ed.): Inhlabamkhosi. Vol. 1 No. 5 December 1983, pp. 4-6.
- 21 National Party Information 1982, pp. 12-30.

other political groupings were advocating(22).

Addressing the issue of Black unity he said:

"...the only Black unity we can possibly have for the very foreseeable future is a Black unity resting on the acceptance of a multi-strategy approach in the Black struggle for liberation. I believe that once we have accepted a multi-strategy approach the multiplicity of strategies will gradually dissolve as a real unity of purpose builds up between organizations which are now hamstringing each other."(23)

Secretary-General Dhlomo of Inkatha, pointed out that the multi-strategy approach of his organisation dictated that Black people could not afford to adopt "holier-than-thou" political stances in a bid to maintain ideological purity(24). The multi-strategy approach thus gave right to any political grouping to be part of a democratic search for the best and most effective amongst various alternative solutions

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- 22 M.G. Buthelezi: *Power is Ours*, pp. 177-128; O.D. Dlomo: *Inkatha: Its origin, policies and strategies*, p. 11.
- 23 S. Griffin (Ed.): *Disinvestment: As the number of unemployed grow, what do Black workers want?* p. 20.
- 24 O.D. Dhlomo: *Inkatha: Its origin, policies and strategies*, p. 10; O.D. Dhlomo: *The Strategy of Inkatha and its Critics*. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, xviii, 1-2 (1983), p. 53.

for a post-apartheid era(25). Mafunkidze argued that Inkatha's adoption of a multi-strategy approach was a necessary adjustment to the politics of reality(26). This encompassed the pursuit of a non-violent course, `constituency politics, negotiation and power-sharing(27). The NP used non-violence, constituency politics (which expressed itself in what it termed "white electorate") and "conditional" negotiation as its strategies. The NP, however, expressed reluctance to accept power-sharing as a viable commitment which both Whites and Blacks could accept(28).

In the decade 1975-1985 the NP and Inkatha believed that the ideals of non-violence had to be espoused to achieve the unity of the people in a broad multi-strategy front(29). The NP and Inkatha evidently had different notions on the unity of the people. Nonetheless, a commitment to non-violence by both parties was a clear indication that they abhorred an

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- 25 Inkatha Year Book 1988, p. 121.
26 T.S. Mafunkidze: 'South Africa: change through realism', Africa Report, March-April 1973.
27 The Star, 13 July 1978, p. 5-6.
28 Rand Daily Mail, 14 April 1980, p. 4.
29 The Star, 18 December 1979, p. 2; Natal Mercury, 15 August 1978, p. 4.

armed struggle to reach a settlement in South Africa. Inkatha thus rejected the employment of violence as a strategy in the "liberation struggle" in South Africa. It argued that the armed struggle had no prospect of succeeding in the foreseeable future(30). To Inkatha the armed struggle was both impractical and immoral. Prince Buthelezi argued that it was logistically impossible for guerrilla forces to establish liberated zones, and sporadic bombings in urban areas would never topple the NP Government(31). He rejected the armed struggle also because it could be employed as a last resort strategy which no people had the right to employ until they had exhausted all other alternatives(32). Thus the strength of Inkatha and its political valour demonstrated the validity of Prince Buthelezi's contention that apartheid could be opposed through negotiation and non-violent strategies. One may argue that internecine Black

30 M.S. Buthelezi: Policy Speech, March 1985; T. Myeni and Z. Cele (Eds.): King Shaka honoured. Umxoxi, Vol. 4, 1986, p. 5.

31 M.J. Bhengu (Ed.): One South Africa One People. Inhlabamkhosi, Vol. 1 No. 11, June 1984, p. 7; Natal Mercury, 15 August 1978, p. 3.

32 O.D. Dhlomo: The strategy of Inkatha and its Critics. Journal of Asian and African Studies, xviii, 1-2 (1983), p. 54.

strife, mass poverty and the politics of violence and intimidation threatened democracy in South Africa. A political victory in South Africa was to be a victory of the people and not a narrow ideological, party political victory. In the decade 1975-1985 the battle for minds between forces of racism and forces bent on the destruction of a post-apartheid multi-party State polarised the political scene in South Africa(33).

The NP policy of non-violence could best be described in its emphasis on the maintenance of law and order. In 1985 the NP argued that it would shirk its responsibility if it did not state clearly and unambiguously that it was adamant to maintain order(34). Thus perpetrators of violence were admonished that if they did not renounce it, they would inevitably face the full power at the disposal of the State, which had not nearly been applied to the full(35).

33 S. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity Who Wants it?
Clarion Call, Volume 3, 1987, p. 5.

34 Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report: The findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, pp. 169-170.

35 R. Schoeman (Ed.): Politics Today - a background brief on political developments in

As far as the NP Government was concerned, it remained adamant that it was prepared to negotiate with citizens of South Africa, provided they did not resort to violence as a means of attaining their political and other goals, or called in foreign agencies to support them(36). The NP detractors during that era, e.g. Inkatha, ANC and PAC, viewed its stance on violence and strategies of dealing with it, as a kind of State violence(37). The NP, however, argued that because "policy" was the day-to-day practical implementation of one's principles, its non-violence policy was in accordance with its programme of principles(38). Similarly, Inkatha's commitment to non-violence was a practical implementation of its national goals. The 1975 Inkatha Constitution stated that:

"We therefore declare ourselves a non-violent national cultural liberation movement... desiring to abolish all forms of discrimination and segregation based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed, and to

the Republic of South Africa. April 1985, No. 9, p. 2.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 National Party Information 1982, p. 15; Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, p. 2.

ensure the acceptance of the principles of equal opportunity, justice, liberty, solidarity, peace..."(39)

Inkatha asserted that its commitment to non-violence was shared by its members because they controlled real power. Prince Buthelezi stated that when one wielded real power, one did not have to rush out to prove something by stoning somebody to death, or by burning him alive or hacking him to pieces(40) Inkatha was thus aware of its power and did not have to flaunt it in motley mobs doing vile things. It could therefore be argued that in the decade 1975-1985 both the NP and Inkatha condemned violence.

The NP and Inkatha differed in their views on violence in South Africa, particularly in urban Black townships. In 1983 the NP attributed the outbreak of violence in Black townships to "radical and unscrupulous" people who made use of "savage and barbaric" methods to achieve their goals(41). The

39 Chief Minister's Dept. Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, p. 3, S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call Special Edition, p. 32.

40 N. G. Buthelezi: 'Statement to the KwaZul Legislative Assembly. Ulundi, 13th May 1985, p. 3.

41 Natal Mercury, 24 May 1983, pp. 3-4.

NP stated it was common knowledge that innocent and moderate people were victims of the so-called "necklace" executions in public, people who did not support the violent aims of radical political groupings and instigators of unrest(42). To the NP, innocent and moderate people were the ones who were being coerced and intimidated to toe the line of violence. It thus became common practice to report on violence in South Africa by referring to the number of people killed in violent actions or unrest situations, without stating the cause of deaths or circumstances in which people were killed. Invariably, the impression was created that these violent deaths were the result of a spontaneous insurrection against the "apartheid system" and that subsequent utilization of security forces was necessary to quell such insurrections. Violence and deaths were blamed on the police and security forces and put on the account of the NP Government(43).

In a Parliamentary debate in 1985 P.W. Botha said that from the outbreak of unrest in September 1984 until April 1985, 508 people, mostly moderate

42 The Citizen, 12 June 1983, p. 6.

43 Ibid.

Blacks, were brutally murdered by radical Blacks by means of the so-called necklace method(44). "Necklace method" refers to public execution where a tyre is put around the neck of the intended victim, usually a Black moderate, and in some cases children as young as nine years who have incurred the displeasure of the radicals. The tyre is then soaked with petrol(gasoline) and set on fire(45).

Since September 1984 no less than 1417 Black owned businesses, 4435 private homes, of which 814 belonged to Black policemen, 28 churches, 54 community centres, several hundred schools and a number of clinics were either totally destroyed or badly damaged by petrol bombs or other forms of arson(46). P.W. Botha asked whether any reasonable person could expect of the police, who were responsible for the protection of lives and property, to sit back and not to act when dastardly acts of destruction were being perpetrated by elements who intimidated the communities among whom

44 The Citizen, 12 May 1985, pp. 3-4.

45 I. Bigalke and M. Kromberg (Eds.): RSA Policy Review. Vol. 4 No. 1, May 1986, p. 24.

46 Ibid.

they operated(47). It could be argued, however, that the NP indirectly confirmed allegations from the radical Blacks that the police could not be immune from violent actions. The NP argued that in exercising police responsibility to protect the lives and property of innocent people, death as a consequence of their action was sometimes inevitable(48). On the contrary, Inkatha viewed apartheid, maintained by State security forces and opposed by counter-violence, as steering South Africa towards a point of no return. Inkatha regarded apartheid as the fundamental cause of the upward spiral of violence in the period 1978-1985(49). Apartheid was the centre of the South African political logjam and nothing which the NP Government could do would change that reality. The longer the NP Government attempted to keep the central tenet of apartheid intact, the greater would be the increasing upward spiralling of violence and counter-violence. Prince Buthelezi retorted:

47 Die Transvaler, 26 August 1985, p. 3; Natal Mercury, 27 August 1985, pp. 4-5.

48 Financial Mail, 11 August 1986, p. 22; National Party Information 1986, p. 57.

49 T. Myeni and Z. Cele (Eds.): King Shaka honoured. Umxoxi, Volume 4 1986, p. 4.

"We are already on the road to a final conflagration in this country which can only produce a Beirut-type situation".(50)

As mouthpiece of Inkatha, Prince Buthelezi added that the root cause of violent developments in South Africa was the NP's refusal to go to the negotiation table with a meaningful package deal also for the Blacks. Apartheid was more than the exclusion of Blacks from their full share of the economy, or the curtailment of freedom of movement and the separation of races. Apartheid was fundamentally abhorrent because it was the exercise of White decision-making over Blacks(51). It could be noted that the White decision-making power continued to control domestic and foreign policy while Whites kept on arrogating unto themselves the final control of the country's transportation system, the civil service, the police force, the defence force and the economy itself. Prince Buthelezi argued:

"You cannot have democracy without equality before the constitution and

50 Ibid.

51 M.S. Buthelezi: 'KwaZulu Day of Prayer for Black South Africa. Ulundi, 12th May 1985, pp. 1-3.

equality before the law, and while the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and a host of other acts remain on the statute books, democracy will remain undermined and the group rights they are designed to protect will remain under threat of violent annihilation."⁵²

Inkatha did not entirely disagree with the NP in that some Black political groupings (e.g. UOF, ANC and PAC) were the driving forces behind violence⁽⁵³⁾. Inkatha maintained that while these forces were at work aiming to render the country totally ungovernable, the NP Government was tragically contributing with those forces in the production of a violent future which one did not dare to consider⁽⁵⁴⁾.

The key to both the NP and Inkatha's organisational successes was their commitment to the traditions of constituency politics. The NP and Inkatha believed that the ideal of constituency politics was best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which had its own specific objectives, but all of which had a basic common

52 T. Myeni and Z. Cele (Eds.): King Shaka honoured. Umxoxi, Vol. 4, 1986, p. 4.

53 Ibid.

54 M.G. Buthelezi: Press Statement, 9th September, 1985, pp. 1-5.

goal(55). In its constitution the NP provided for the affiliation of a plethora of branches. In terms of the constitution a branch with membership of 50 or less was represented by a ward leader; a branch with 51 to 100 members was represented by a ward leader and secretary; a branch with 101 to 150 members was represented by a ward leader, deputy ward leader and secretary. For every 50 members, or portion thereof above 150 members, the representation was the same as that in the District Council of the NP(56).

It could be noted, however, that the NP and Inkatha slightly differed in their perceptions of constituency politics. For Inkatha, constituency politics provided for the affiliation of a variety of organisations viz: farmers' associations, chambers of Commerce, teachers' associations, nurses' associations, trade unions, church

55 O.D. Dhlomo: The Strategy of Inkatha and its critics. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, xviii, 1-2 (1983) p. 51; National Party Information 1983, p. 34.

56 NP. Head Office, Pretoria, Constitution of the National Party 1983, p. 33, National Party Information 1983, p. 34.

organisations, doctors' associations, etc(57). In the decade 1975-1985 the NP continued to be an independent body and did not wish to amalgamate with any other Party or organisation(58). One may point out, however, that the NP's rejection of the amalgamation with other organisations was based on differences in principle, though the NP and affiliate in 1983 with the Federal Council of South West Africa/Namibia(59).

Inkatha believed that an essential part of the liberation struggle in South Africa was to make it impossible for the South African Government to implement any of its versions of apartheid. Dhlomo argued that each constituency, at a particular point in time, was in a position to become pragmatically effective in opposing any apartheid version, provided the opposition was properly organised and appropriately conscientised(60). Thus Inkatha

57 O.D. Dhlomo: The Strategy of Inkatha and its critics. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, xviii, 1-2 (1983), p. 51.

58 NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, p. 33.

59 National Party Information 1985, p. 52.

60 O.D. Dhlomo: The Strategy of Inkatha and its critics. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, xviii, 1-2 (1983), p. 51.

believed that constituency politics rallied people to the cause and emphasised the fact that this was the only way the oppressed people in South Africa could be mobilised(61).

Dhlomo pointed out that Inkatha strove to ensure through constituency politics that if the NP could act against its leadership, then Black South Africa itself would see to the propagation of the ideals of Inkatha(62). In their day to day living circumstances Black people in South Africa could oppose apartheid more effectively than in symbolic politics. In terms of their organisational structures, however, both the NP and Inkatha viewed professional groups, the youth, workers and traders as forming constituencies(63).

In the decade 1975-1985 President Botha and Prince Buthelezi were probably the best mobilization agents of their parties. Both the NP and Inkatha issued a

61 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call special Edition, p. 22.

62 O.D. Dhlomo: The strategy of Inkatha and its critics. Journal of Asian and African Studies, xviii, 1-2 (1983), p. 51.

63 Financial Mail, 11 August, 1986, pp. 18-20.

number of publications, among them newspapers, to get their message across(64). Langner pointed out that Inkatha believed in the viability of mass mobilization for the evolvment of a power base which would compel a negotiated settlement in the country(65). He argues that Black South Africa constituted more than 70 per cent of the economically viable population of South Africa which could amicably force the NP Government to negotiate with them(66).

The NP and Inkatha used negotiation politics as an objective as well as a strategy. Langner stated that negotiation was one of the aims and objectives of Inkatha as laid down in its constitution(67). In 1985 both the NP and Inkatha conveyed assurance to all people of South Africa that doors were still open to achieve a political apparatus in South Africa. They both agreed that such apparatus had to

64 Die Transvaler, 26 August, 1985, p. 3.

65 E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 142.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

satisfy political aspirations of all the communities through negotiations(68).

It was the conviction of the NP that any future constitutional dispensation providing for participation by all South African citizens should be the result of negotiations with leaders of all communities. Thus the NP would not prescribe who might represent Black communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa(69). The only condition was that those who would participate in discussions and negotiations were to forswear violence as a means of achieving political objectives. The NP maintained that negotiations of necessity implied that participants would accept that not all their requirements were likely to be met; they implied willingness to listen, to discuss and seek solutions. But these solutions would result from deliberations by South Africans in their interests(70). They were essentially going to be a

68 M.G. Buthelezi: Post-graduation address. Kwa-Dlangezwa, 20th July 1985, pp. 3-5.

69 Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report: The findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, p. 80.

70 National Party Information 1984, p. 27.

process of give and take during which people were required, on the one hand, to scale down their demands and, on the other, to be lenient when required to make concessions to satisfy reasonable demands(71). It could thus be argued that on the part of the NP, the agenda for political reform in South Africa was open, but its openness was not endorsed by all the people of South Africa and therefore did not carry weight.

The position of Inkatha on negotiation in the decade 1975-1985 was defined by the untenability of two alternative courses. The first of these courses was co-option to the system and the other was armed insurrection. Inkatha simply rejected co-option on grounds that it was formed in opposition to apartheid and had sought throughout to have Black South Africans brought into the central decision-making process, using control over the regional government of KwaZulu as a platform(72). Inkatha had to persuade the NP that so long as the majority

71 1/82 (25/2/82), 12/82(4/5/82, 14/82(21/5/82).

72 M.L. Marais: Swart politieke mobilisasie binne die konteks van nie-gewelddadige strategie van verandering met spesifieke verwysing na Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. vi; IISA: Inkatha Year Book 1988, p. 116.

of the population in South Africa were excluded from the Government, the structures of government would lack legitimacy. They maintained that South African society would not return to normality and there would be internal and external tensions(73).

The NP's premises on which negotiations would be based were

1. the principle of a united South Africa,
2. one citizenship and a universal franchise within democratic structures,
3. political participation of all communities at all levels on matters of national concern,
4. co-responsibility and power-sharing between these communities on matters of national concern,
5. the devolution of power as far as possible,

73 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: Black self-reliance in the struggle for liberation, Thokoza township, 12 August 1984, p.p. 11-13.

6. the protection of minority rights without one group dominating the other,
7. the sovereignty of law as the basis for the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals as well as groups,
8. equality before the law, and the protection of human dignity, life, liberty and property of all, regardless of colour, race, creed or religion(74).

Inkatha did not directly oppose these premises as most of them were in accordance with its "Statement of Belief"(75). Inkatha, however, set pre-conditions which would test whether the NP was in earnest. Such pre-conditions included, inter alia, the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and

74 Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report: The findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, p. 81.

75 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: A message of black survival throughout the long struggle for the liberation of South Africa - Living from crisis to crisis, Jabulani amphitheatre, 29 January 1978, pp. 8-9.

other Rivonia trialists; the release of other political prisoners, the unbanning of certain organisations, the unconditional return of political exiles, the abolition of discriminatory laws such as the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act, the scrapping of the Tricameral Parliament and assurance from the NP that the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 would be abolished(76). The scrapping of the Tricameral Parliament became a precondition for negotiations already after its formation in 1983. In 1985 the NP confirmed its willingness to review the situation of political prisoners or detainees on condition that violence receded and normality returned. The NP government and State President Botha aired their positive commitment and active involvement in contributing to stability, peace and development of the South African subcontinent(77).

The commitment of the NP to peace and development through negotiations had its first manifestation in the so-called Koornhof Bills of 1981(78). Dr G.J.

76 Ibid.

77 National Party Information 1985, pp. 70-72.

78 The Natal Witness, 1st October 1980, p. 5.

(Piet) Koornhof, was Minister of Co-operation and Development. The NP Government first published the three Bills in October 1980. These became officially known as

- (1) the Local Government Bill, 1981.
- (2) the Laws on Co-operation and Development Amendment Bill, 1981, and the
- (3) Black Community Development Bill, 1981(79)

The promulgation of these bills was a genuine attempt by the NP to remove hurtful discrimination as far as possible(80). These bills had as their central point the question of the rights of Blacks to reside in urban areas and elsewhere in South Africa, outside the homelands and independent states. They also involved the question of property ownership(81). The most important aspect was that the bills merely referred to transitional stages in the history of South Africa. It was due to the importance of these transitional stages that Inkatha had to consider the three bills

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

positively and negatively(82). To Inkatha the most important positive aspect was that qualified Blacks would be given greater mobility within the White areas. A qualified Black worker, was within his/her specific controlled area, free to move wherever he/she wanted to, provided he/she had a job and suitable accommodation. The mobility of qualified Blacks would also extend to other controlled areas, provided a job and accommodation could be found(83).

The NP entertained hopes that in addition to an increased freedom to move, the major impact of the new bills would be a reduction in the day to day frustrations and resentments of the pass laws. In this regard Koornhof said:

"Just as Whites are not required to show a reference book at every turn, so under the new system Black people who qualify, will not be submitted to harassment(84).

Inkatha interpreted these statements as a general wish to end these frustrations and resentment of the pass system. Its close examination of the acts

82 Sunday Times, 2nd November 1980, p. 4.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

showed that while the NP had shut the door against undue harassment related to the reference book, it had opened the door for new harassment by requiring Black people to produce documents on demand proving their place of living and work in a controlled area(85).

In terms of the bills of 1981 community guards of municipalities had to assist to enforce influx control. Inkatha thus argued that the establishment of these guards under community councils with progressive leaders could be a positive aspect. It could actually lead to the lessening of rampant crimes in Black areas. On the other hand, if these communities' guards were to assist in the enforcement of influx control, they could create a negative situation(86).

Inkatha discovered numerous negative aspects in the bills which prompted it to reject them. In a responding letter to Dr Koornhof, Prince Buthelezi wrote:

85 M.G. Buthelezi: Policy Speech. Second Session of the fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1981, p. 112.

86 Ibid.

"I felt that the negative aspects of the Bills outweighed the more positive aspects. I pleaded for the withdrawal of the Bills".(87)

The most important negative aspects of the bills were that a Black person was deemed to be a disqualified person in relation to any immovable property, land or premises outside a township, unless he was officially authorised(88). The Black Community Development Bill was explicit to drastically penalize all offenders, for contravening sections of the Act. Blacks were not only subject to fines and imprisonment in certain cases, but also to pay compensation and to have their property confiscated(89). It could also be argued that in many respects this bill contravened basic principles of the common law of South Africa, namely that in all criminal trials the onus should be on the state.

87 Correspondence with the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Hon. Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof M.P., from the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, M.G. Buthelezi, 21 November 1980, Pretoria.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

Inkatha viewed the onus now as being placed on the accused(90).

Inkatha expressed appallation on the considerable tightness of influx control regulations. The influx control provisions hit at every Black person in the country. Prince Buthelezi argued that they had branded every Black person as almost a prohibited immigrant in his own country. He reported:

"The nationalists should have learnt after being 32 years in office that all attempts at influx control to prevent Africans from coming into the towns should prove an utter failure. But because the laws are there they will cause "hurtful discrimination" to all Africans"(91)

Inkatha incriminated the NP Government of a tendency to make decisions without allowing Blacks in other areas from being heard. Time and again actions were proposed against Blacks without giving them the right to oppose such actions. This was a contravention of the South African common law, whose cardinal principle was that before steps could be

90 M.G. Buthelezi: Policy Speech. Second Session of the fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1981, p. 115.

91 Ibid.

taken against any person, he had the right to be heard(92). Thus Inkatha rejected the bills as one of the attempts by the NP to entrench apartheid. Inkatha maintained that there could be no negotiations between itself and the NP unless they both had an agenda within which Blacks could find it possible to negotiate(93).

Negotiation politics involved the invention of new alternatives. This justified the appropriateness of negotiation when new solutions had to be discovered to replace unacceptable old ones(94). It was on these grounds that Inkatha initiated the Buthelezi Commission which was set up after the first publication of bills on 1980. Frankel argued that Inkatha's search for stability and its support for a federal formula manifested itself in the appointment of the Buthelezi Commission, and had culminated in the search for a "Natal option"(95). The Buthelezi Commission was under the chairmanship of Professor

92 Ibid.

93 Ilanga, 12 October 1981, p.1

94 H.W. van der Merwe: "The human factor in resolving conflict. Keynote Speech, Negotiation Skills and Conflict Resolution Conference, 31 August 1990, p. 1.

95 P. Frankel et al: State, Resistance and change in South Africa, p. 156.

G.D.L. Schreiner, and it brought out its report in 1982. The report covered not only constitutional matters, but also addressed economic, administrative, educational, health and welfare problems(96). Participants in the Commission included the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) as well as Indian and Coloured interest groups.

The 1982 report of the Commission proposed for Natal/KwaZulu a constitutional formula involving a Legislative Assembly based on universal franchise, proportional representation (combined with minimum representation for minority groups and a 10 per cent minority veto in matters concerning cultural and individual rights); an executive coalition (made up of the KwaZulu and Natal provincial executives and Indian and Coloured representatives); a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary(97).

96 S. Griffin (Ed.): The Buthelezi Commission. The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal, Clarion Call, Vol. 2, 1985, p.7.

97 M.L. Marais: Swart politieke mobilisasie binne die konteks van nie-gewelddadige strategiee van verandering met spesifieke verwysing na Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, pp. 218-220; P. Frankel et al: State, Resistance and Change in South Africa, p. 156.

Glaser pointed out that the report of the Commission partially retained Group representation although it was defined in terms of culture. The representation of units was defined rather graphically than ethnically(98). One may thus argue that the Buthelezi Commission was established as a very substantial and historic gesture of willingness to struggle with Whites, Indian and Coloured people to find a path between all the pitfalls of hostility and antagonism which made the solution to the problems of South Africa unattainable. This became evident in what became known as the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba. In this regard the Buthelezi Commission committed itself to consider the most sensible ways of getting to grips with the interdependence of Natal and KwaZulu as well as all the groups in the whole region(99). In doing so the Commission had to consider fully the guiding principle of the NP's constitutional policy and planning in South Africa, viz - that of what was referred to as "segmental

98 D. Glaser: 'Regionalisation: the case of KwaNatal', paper presented at the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa Annual Congress, Durban, 1986, p. 6.

99 S. Griffin (Ed.): The Buthelezi Commission - the requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal. Clarion Call, Volume 2, 1985, p. 7.

autonomy", involving various groups in joint decision-making, but as segregated political groups, with separate voting structures, separate residential areas, separate institutions, etc(100). The Commission took full account of the traditional policies in this regard, but considered that this approach, rather than protecting group interests, was extremely dangerous. The main reason was that where groups entered into political decision-making as explicit racial entities, any political conflict between them would become a racial conflict(101).

While accepting the value of the research and fact-finding of the Commission, the NP roundly rejected its political recommendations. Prince Buthelezi commented that:

100 *Ibid.*
 101 ¹n Ontleding en vergelyking van die grondwetlike voorstelle van die konsosiale Presidentsraad en die Buthelezi-kommissie aan die hand van die beginsels van demokrasie, pp. 66-69; M.L. Marais: Swart politieke mobilisasie binne die konteks van nie-gewelddadige strategiee van verandering met spesifieke verwysing na Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, pp. 218-220.

"...the State President and the National Party must clearly understand that negotiation for me and the vast majority of the people of the KwaZulu/Natal region must be negotiations leading away from the politics of prescription. This is where the whole exercise of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba has great significance"(102).

In 1984, however, the NP's position regarding proposals of the Buthelezi Commission changed. The NP by that time accepted that there were many aspects in the Buthelezi Commission's report which could be explored in consultation with Inkatha. In fact, the 1985 "growth pole" policy of the NP Government proposed regions for decentralized economic development which straddled political boundaries. Nowhere was this more evident than in the region of KwaZulu/Natal(103). Here the advantages were that negotiations with regard to the proposals of the Buthelezi Commission, could take place directly with the NP, giving the process of

102 S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call Special Edition, p. 52.

103 M.L. Marais: Swart politieke mobilisasie binne die konteks van nie-gewelddadige strategiee van verandering met spesifieke verwysing na Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 231; R.E. van der Ross: The Rise and Decline of Apartheid - a study of political movements among the Coloured People of South Africa, 1880-1985, p. 327.

negotiation much greater authority and weight. Thus the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba was a re-assurance that negotiation politics was likely to be an ultimate "winner" in South Africa. In this regard Dr. Dhlomo stated:

"One would not like to raise expectations at a time when deliberations in the Indaba have reached a delicate and crucial state. But whatever can be said about the Indaba, there can be no gainsaying the fact that it has legitimised negotiation politics and boosted the morale of all those South Africans who still believe in a negotiated and non-violent political future"(104).

In 1982 negotiation politics for Inkatha became more effective in its opposition of the cessation of Ingwavuma and KaNgwane areas to Swaziland. Inkatha opposed the NP through a successful legal suit which went as far as the Appellate Division(105). Prior to 1983 the NP Government invited Inkatha to participate in the mechanisms of what it called negotiating bodies and forums. It thus established the President's Council and attempted to set up a Black Advisory Council to legitimize the agenda

104 T.Myeni and Z. Cele (Ed.): King Shaka honoured. Umxoxi, Volume 4, 1986, p. 10.

105 M.J. Bhengu (Ed.): One South Africa One People. Inhlabankhosi, Vol. 1 No. 11, June 1984, pp. 6-7.

which the President's Council was given(106). Inkatha rejected the Black Advisory Council for reasons that the President's Council was the handmaiden of the NP. It was established to formulate a new political dispensation in which Whites would continue to monopolise total power(107). P.W. Botha argued that communication and mutual trust among the population had to be improved if peaceful constitutional development was to be successfully pursued. He further said:

"In my personal capacity as the person with the final responsibility for matters affecting the Black communities I have therefore, after consultation with those concerned, decided to establish an informal, non-statutory forum in which interest groups and representatives of the government bodies concerned will participate on an ad hoc basis and by invitation".(108)

Inkatha refuted the Black Advisory Council or forum as no more, no less, than a "talking shop" meant to

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- 106 S. van der Merwe: Constitution '83 in a nutshell, pp. 8-9.
 107 Speech at the official opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Building by the Chief Minister, M.G. Buthelezi. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Building, 2nd April 1984, pp. 4-8.
 108 P.W. Botha: "South Africa's State President Speaks! Who can fail to listen!" Amunition - No. 4/83(14/3/83, p. 12.

divert the attention of the Black people away from seeking full political rights with Whites, Indians, and Coloureds(109). Prince Buthelezi argued that while Inkatha accepted the principle of give and take in negotiations about the future of South Africa, there was no way in which the African majority could accept being fobbed off with "such lousy political crumbs"(110).

By the year 1983 Inkatha noted that the pace at which the NP Government had responded to change in South Africa as democratic, civilized, industrial country, was still too slow and pushing the prospect of normalization into the remote future(111). The NP insisted however on South Africa being a country of minority groups and being opposed to a single democratic system of government in a unified state. The NP also accentuated that the Whites as a minority group had exclusive rights to final

109 S. Griffin (Ed.): Disinvestment - As the number of unemployed grow, what do Black workers want? Clarion Call, Volume 1 1985, p. 20.

110 Ibid.

111 M.G. Buthelezi: Verklaring aan die KwaZulu Wetgewende Raad. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Building, nd., p. 8.

decision-making in 87% of the land in South Africa which they appropriated for themselves(112).

The bottom line discussions about South Africa in the decade 1975-1985 was directed on: whether circumstances for negotiation politics were propitious enough; and whether the climate being created by the recognised White dependency on Black and Black dependency on White, was favourable enough to bring about a negotiated future. One may argue that real political struggle in South Africa revolved around developing forces which could persuade and if necessary cajole and finally coerce the NP into abandoning its commitment to the constitution of the country at that time. This could urge it to move towards drawing up a constitution in which there could be real and effective power-sharing between Black and White.

In 1984 Inkatha maintained that real negotiations addressing fundamental issues could only get off the ground, if the NP Government had the courage to

112 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: "The Political situation in South Africa." New Jersey, USA, 13 November 1985.

scrap the Tricameral Parliament(113). The next year Inkatha cast a vote of no confidence on the NP strategy outlined in an eight point plan by the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis. These were:

1. commitment to a negotiated search for peaceful solutions;
2. the maintenance of democracy,
3. political participation for everybody in all decision-making processes affecting their lives,
4. determination to prevent domination of one group by another,
5. rejection of discrimination on grounds of race, colour or religion,
6. determination to remove it,

113 J. Bhengu and T. Myeni: Dr Oscar Dhlomo addressing the May 1 rally at King's Park in Durban. Umxoxi, Volume 2 1986, p. 2.

7. endorsement of the principle of sovereignty of law, and
8. the pursuit of a joint declaration of intent to emerge from negotiations(114). Inkatha criticised these statements, particularly political participation as a remnant of classical apartheid and as a rejection of the notion that Blacks and Whites needed to share power(115).

Prince Buthelezi accentuated that real challenge facing South Africans was not to develop protest politics as a central political strategy, or to prepare for an armed struggle which had been a myth for years and would be a dream for another 25 years(116). He argued that rendering South Africa ungovernable would destroy foundations on which future governability depended(117). It could be stated that real challenges facing Black South

114 Natal Witness, 24th May 1985, pp. 2-3.

115 M.G. Buthelezi: Verklaring aan die KwaZulu Wetgewende Raad. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Building, nd., pp. 7-8.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

Africans in the decade 1975-1985 were to mobilise and organise Black constituencies which had bargaining power; develop the politics of democratic opposition as an essential precursor to democratic government and root all policies, strategies, tactics and all visions of the future in membership-based movements. That could be the reason for Inkatha to call for a multi-party democracy, dismantling apartheid barriers and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela(118).

In May 1985 the NP expressed its unpreparedness to accept a unitary state even if it was a federal union. The implication was that White South Africans would not share power with Blacks in a sovereign parliament. The NP insisted on seeking solutions within a formula accepting the rights of Whites to occupy and control 87 per cent of the land(119). It reiterated its commitment to the distinction between "own affairs" and "general affairs" and indicated that "general affairs" could only be discussed between Blacks and Whites in

118 Chief Minister's Dept; Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: "South Africa - the evolving challenge to international companies (Black demands)". Business International Conference, The Plaza, New York City, 7th June 1985, p. 8.

119 Sunday Times, 29 May 1985, p.5.

consultative mechanisms(120). The NP thus confined joint Black/White decision-making to instruments of Government, such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa(121).

The distinction between "own affairs" and "general affairs" was entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 110, 1983(122). The "own affairs" was specified in schedule No. 1 of the Constitution as social welfare, education, art, culture, and recreation, health matters, community development, local government, agriculture, water supply, appointment of marriage officers, election of members of the House of Parliament, finance in relation to own affairs, staff administration, auxiliary services necessary for administration and the rendering of services with the approval of the President(123). General affairs was the residue of everything not covered by "own affairs". The NP expressed its willingness to talk about joint decision-making with Blacks only about things which

120 National Party Information 1985, p. 40.

121 S. van der Merwe: Constitution '83 in a nutshell, p. 3.

122 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 110, 1983, pp. 9-10.

123 Ibid.

affected their lives, i.e about things which the Constitution defined as "own affairs". Inkatha noted that South Africa was heading for total disaster if that was the limited extent to which the NP had committed itself to share power(124).

In the decade 1975-1985 it became evident that the politics of negotiation between Black and White in South Africa could not begin until the NP Government had committed itself to a programme of reform in a declaration of intent which Blacks could co-sign.

In this regard Prince Buthelezi said:

"The politics of negotiation demand that we drop all but the vital non-negotiable positions. A statement of intent therefore should be such that it defines the minimal points of agreement beyond which negotiations can search for agreement on wider fronts."(125)

It was on these grounds that Inkatha drafted a Declaration of Intent which it believed could serve as a discussion document. It appeared in 1985 and

124 Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: "South Africa - the evolving challenge to international companies (Black demands). The Plaza, New York City, 7th June 1985, p. 10.

125 Ibid.

recognized that: the history of mankind showed the need for adaptive change among all people and all nations; nations which had managed to avoid the use of violence in the achievement of national objectives were the nations which had grown in wisdom, both mistakes and lessons not yet learned led to errors of judgement in the mainstream politics in both the Black and White sections of the South African society, the South African people were a family of mankind, seeking to live in harmony in the African community of nations and seeking to do so by expressing civilised ideals in the practical social, economic and political affairs of South Africa, the Westminster model of government was not ordained by God to be the only form of government(126). Thus Inkatha accepted the need to preserve the constitutionality of the adaptive democratic process on which all South Africans would jointly rely in being subservient to the divine will for their country(127).

126 M.G. Buthelezi: Verklaring aan die KwaZulu Wetgewende Raad. KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Building, Ulundi, n.d., pp 14-15.

127 Chief Minister's Dept. Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: "South Africa - the evolving challenge to international companies (Black demands)". Business International Conference, The Plaza, New York City, 7th June 1985, p. 12.

In 1985 the NP did not openly take cognizance of Inkatha's "Declaration of Intent". Thus attempts by both parties to get negotiations on track proved abortive. Earlier, in 1983 Inkatha had turned down the National Statutory Council proposed by the NP. At that time it argued that unless Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners were freed and the ANC, PAC and other Black organisations were unbanned, the National Statutory Council could not function(128). There could be no national reconciliation while Black politics remained fettered and shackled to apartheid restrictions. There was no hope for a peaceful, negotiated future unless the Population Registration, Group Areas and the Immorality Acts could be scrapped(129). The NP Government's 1983 constitution for South Africa was a political thunderbolt which struck at the heart of reconciliation. This increased Black resistance and

128 J. Bhengu and T. Myeni (Eds.): Dr. Oscar Dhlomo addressing the May 1 rally at King's Park in Durban. *Umxoxi*, Volume 2, 1986, p. 3.

129 Chief Minister's Dept; Ulundi, M.G. Buthelezi Speech: The non-viability of the strategy of violence in the midst of escalating black on black violence. Amatigulu Youth Camp, Amatigulu, 18th June 1985, pp. 3-5.

condemnation. Inkatha thus rejected it totally in whole(130).

Inkatha doubted the effectiveness of the Government's proposed Regional Service Councils prior to 1985. The non-viability of these councils were based on three reasons, i.e the NP Government piloted its creation through Parliament without any consultation with representatives of those affected by the proposal, its proposed voting system was unacceptable because the areas most in need of the services of electricity lines or piped water in the Greater Durban area could have minimal or no representation on it; the Regional Services Councils were based on the racially-segregated, under-financed, and increasingly discredited system of Black local government(131). The NP/Inkatha-endorsed notion of power-sharing in the decade 1975-1985 was supported also by various institutions, one of which was the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The essence of the HSRC report of 1985 was that apartheid was originally supposed to prevent

130 Ibid.

131 T. Myeni (Ed.): KwaZulu Natal Indaba Bill of Rights. Umxoxi, Volume 3, 1986, p. 5.

friction between races(132). In practice it resulted in the opposite and became the main reason for political conflict in South Africa. The HSRC therefore recommended that there was a need for political power-sharing and a broadening of democracy(133). However, the kind of power-sharing the NP envisaged was what it termed "healthy power-sharing"(134).

Power-sharing presented itself in various forms, i.e one could have power-sharing by subjecting more than one population group to the system of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state(135). That was the form of power-sharing advocated by Inkatha, but rejected by the NP. One could also have power-sharing by way of proportional representation(136). This was something the NP had never accepted. The only kind of power-sharing acceptable to the NP was giving people joint-responsibility and consultation(137).

132 The Star, 2 July 1985, pp. 2-3.

133 Ibid.

134 NP Head Office, Cape Town, P.W. Botha Speech at the Federal Council of the National Party. Ammunition - No. 5/82 C19/3/82, p. 23.

135 Cape Times, 15 September, 1984, p. 4.

136 Daily News, 11 October, 1983, p. 5., Rapport, 1985, p. 7.

137 Die Burger, 14 May 1982, pp. 4-5.

As far as the NP was concerned the concepts of consultation and joint-responsibility were a form of "healthy" power-sharing, without violating the principle of self-determination. In political and academic circles, however, there was an on-going debate about whether the concept of joint responsibility was a form of power-sharing or contained its elements(138). President P.W. Botha clarified this matter by stating that:

"What is healthy in this, is that if joint decisions have to be taken, such decisions must relate to common interests and people must be afforded the opportunity of dealing with matters affecting them".(139)

The NP asserted that it was, and would remain, obliged to strive for and maintain the right to self-determination for Whites in South Africa. Without relinquishing that right to self-determination one could, however, accept co-responsibility in several spheres, thus giving human

138 G. Leach: South Africa - No easy path to peace, pp. 49-56; Die Burger, 14 May 1982, p. 5.

139 NP Head Office, Cape Town, P.W. Botha Speech: "Power-sharing". The Prime Minister (Discussion of his vote), Ammunition - No. 10/82(22/4/82), p. 44.

dignity and proper rights to other population groups like the Coloureds(140).

Inkatha on the other hand accentuated that power-sharing within the framework of the 1983 constitution was imponderable. It raised the kernel issue that Black people of South Africa would never accept apartheid rendition of power-sharing which left 87 percent of the country, all its wealth, control over the army, the navy, the police, control over transport and control over both internal and foreign policy, in the hands of the country's White minority(141). The only meaningful power-sharing to Inkatha was one centred at central Government level. The emphasis was that it could initiate negotiation with the NP once a statement of intent on power-sharing was jointly made.

Thus one may argue that the decade 1975-1985 heightened political polarisation between the NP and Inkatha. This made it impossible for their strategies to be compromised.

140 Die Burger, 14 May 1982, p. 5.

141 S. Griffin (Ed.): Facing up to sharing power. Clarion Call, Volume 3, 1985, p. 6.

Nevertheless, a point of agreement between the NP and Inkatha could be observed in their advocacy for investment and job opportunities(142). Investment and job opportunities, however, were for the NP a strategy for co-operation with the outside world, winning the hearts and minds of the Black and White urban working classes, as well as economic development of the Southern African region(143). For Inkatha these were strategies for liberation of the oppressed masses at grass roots level(144).

Thus both the NP and Inkatha maintained the strategy of investment and job opportunities by indefatigably campaigning against international disinvestment and sanctions. The NP and Inkatha believed that the issue of disinvestment and sanctions was not one of morality and principle. It was an issue of strategy and practicability. Both parties regarded disinvestment as a misguided and simplistic strategy

142 The Citizen, 15 February 1985, p. 1.

143 Ilanga, 11 September 1984, pp. 1-3.

144 S. Griffin (Ed.): Disinvestment. As the numbers of unemployed grow, what do Black workers want? Clarion Call, Volume 1, 1985, p. 3.

with no real chance of success(145). They asked whether the people in New York, Washington, Quebec, London, Bonn, The Hague, Paris, Rome, Sydney and other world centres really understood the other view of the disinvestment debate in South Africa(146).

The NP agreed with Inkatha that investment which made this free enterprise system viable in SA, meant jobs for the unemployed, clothes for the naked and food for the hungry(147). Every foreign investor who had created employment opportunities in South Africa, knew that every Monday morning there were hordes of unemployed at their factory gates seeking jobs. These people needed a cash wage so that they and their families could survive. Only if they could afford to buy food, they could be in a position also to consider their political prospects. It could thus be concluded that those who advocated disinvestment had adopted a strategy born out of pathetic mis-analysis. Both the NP and Inkatha endorsed the free enterprise system (capitalism) as

145 Ibid.

146 (S. Griffin (Ed.): South Africa: World Spotlight. Clarion Call, Volume 4, 1985, pp. 5-6.

147 Ibid.

the most powerful system man had ever devised capable of fostering sustained national economic growth(148).

The NP and Inkatha (though speaking from different orbits of South Africa's political scenario) warned political leaders in favour of disinvestment, not to jeopardise the role the West could play in developing and stabilizing Southern Africa as a region(149). In this regard there were too many strident and dubious voices expressing radical rhetoric which was often amplified by the media. Western democratic posturing and verbal condemnation left apartheid intact. Apartheid seemed to be well entrenched and most difficult to pulverise. Many critics made the tactical error of attempting to encapsulate this morass in South Africa isolated from Western co-operation and support. The NP Government ignored disinvestment and sanctions by reaffirming its continued commitment to peaceful

148 Ibid

149 Ilanga, 11 September 1984, pp. 3-4.

international co-existence through co-operation and negotiation(150).

In a discussion on the issue of disinvestment Prince Buthelezi urged all South Africa to consider the following points:

*"The South African economy has already reached such a level of self-sufficiency that disinvestment would only act as catalyst for greater achievements.

* The country is a nett exporter of food and energy to Africa and elsewhere in the world.

* The economy of this country is always integrated with the vested interests of the Western industrial world and with the developing economies of Africa".(151)

It could be mentioned that while debate on disinvestment gained momentum both in South Africa and abroad in the decade 1975-1985, both the NP and Inkatha viewed it as bringing about increased hardships and starvation. It would increase disease

150 R. Schoeman (Ed.): Politics Today - a background brief on political developments in the RSA, February 1985, No. 8, pp. 1-2.

151 S. Griffin (Ed.): Disinvestment - as the number of unemployed grow, what do Black workers want? Clarion Call, Volume 1, 1985, p. 18.

in the short term, without medium and long term gains to balance deprivation and suffering(152).

Thus one may argue that the indiscriminate political, social and economic isolation of South Africa, during this decade, applied regardless of repercussions for each action, could affect the non-violent democratic struggle of Inkatha. To the Np this isolation would favour those opposition groups who served double agendas, especially those aiming at bringing about violent change and establishing a socialist or even communist state. Similar economic tactics and strategies between the NP and Inkatha could salvage South Africa from a state of imbroglio in the decade in question.

What polarised them were different institutions and orbits from which they operated. It is for this reason that a comparative study of the relationship between these two political groupings and other

152 T. Myeni (Ed.): KwaZulu Natal Indaba Bill of Rights. Umxoxi, Volume 3, 1986, p. 6; R. Schoeman (Ed.): Politics Today - a background brief on political developments in the RSA, February 1985, No. 8, pp. 1-2.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NATIONAL PARTY AND INKATHA'S RELATIONS WITH
OTHER POLITICAL GROUPINGS

The pluralistic nature of South Africa justifies a comparative study of the NP and Inkatha's relations with other significant political groupings in the decade 1975 - 1985. In this regard it becomes imperative to take cognizance of both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political groupings that existed in that decade.

The parliamentary political groupings were the United Party (UP), the Progressive Reform Party (PRP), the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the New Republic Party (NRP), the South African Party (SAP), the Conservative Party (CP), the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), the Coloured peoples' Labour Party of South Africa (LP), the Indian Reform Party (IRP), the National People's Party (NPP) and Solidarity Party(1).

1. L. Louw and F. Kendall (Eds.): South Africa - The solution, pp. 77-86 Africa Report, March 1985, p. 4.

The UP dated back to the early 1930's when General Hertzog was compelled by the depression into a coalition government with General Smuts and the English-speaking voters(2). In the period 1975 - 1977 the UP advocated the maintenance of group identity and did not call for a common-roll franchise(3). In agreement with the NP, the UP considered that group identity was more meaningful than was the recognition of individual identity(4). The UP and the NP shared the same opinion with Inkatha in this regard(5).

While the NP argued that it stood for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population, with due regard to the multi-ethnic reality and that of the existence of minorities in South Africa, the UP insisted on a separation of the powers on a racial

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2. A. Sampson: Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and apartheid, p. 81.
 3. Argus, 13 October 1977, p. 3.
 4. Cape Times, 2 August 1977, pp. 1-3.
 5. J.P. Du Toit Bosman: Ondersoek die grondwetlike akkommodasie van die Swartes in die RSA na aanleiding van die standpunt (e) van Inkatha, pp. 13-14.

basis at all levels of government(6). This was implemented by the NP as part of its constitutional modus operandi in the formation of a Tri-cameral parliament in 1983.

Inkatha and the UP reached common agreement on the notion that South Africa should become a federation of communities(7). However they had different perceptions of a federation of communities in South Africa. The UP thought of a federation that was identified according to ethnic notions, while Inkatha supported a federated South Africa identified in terms of geographical considerations(8). Unlike the NP, Inkatha was further polarised against the UP by the UP's rejection of the 1976 'Marais Committee' proposal. The committee proposed that:

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6. NP Head Office, Pretoria, Constitution of the National Party, p. 10; Pretoria News, 13 May 1977, p. 7.
 7. Daily Dispatch, 10 March 1977, p. 4.
 8. J.P. Du Toit Bosman: Ondersoek na die grondwetlike akkommodasie van die Swartes in the RSA na aanleiding van die Standpunt (e) van Inkatha, p. 14.

"All South Africans have an equal right to full citizenship and citizenship rights, either in a federation or confederation, which can only be realised in a country where there is no discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, religion or sex".(9)

While the UP existed when Inkatha was still at its embryonic stage as an extra-parliamentary organisation, no formal talks were held between the two parties about the future of South Africa. Thus one may argue that the UP could reach a political settlement in South Africa easier with the NP than with Inkatha.

In July 1975 the Progressive Reform Party (PRP) was under the leadership of Colin Eglin(10). Contrary to the NP's advocacy for separate development, the PRP stood for an open society where people would be entitled to associate with whoever they liked, and to use whatever public amenities they chose(11). This was also in conflict with the NP's Reservation

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9. J.P.C. Mostert (Ed): Politieke Partye in Suid-Afrika - blanke politieke partye met Parlementêre verteenwoordiging, 1910-1985, pp. 81-102.
 10. Natal Mercury, 21 July 1975, pp. 1-2.
 11. P. Malherbe: A Scenario for Peaceful change in South Africa, pp. 38-48.

of Separate Amenities Act (No. 49 of 1953) which enforced the segregation of lifts, toilets, parks, beaches, hotels, cinemas, restaurants, etc.(12)

The PRP's advocacy for people to own or occupy property wherever they liked, challenged the NP's residential apartheid policy which was manifest in the Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950). The Group Areas Act provided for areas to be proclaimed as belonging to a particular racial group, in which case no other racial group could live, trade or own land there(13).

The PRP argued for the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties because South Africa had a conglomeration of the rule of law and common law characteristic of a free society on the one hand, and the rule of man,

12. L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa - The Solution, pp. 40-41.

13. A. Sampson: Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and apartheid, pp. 83, 206, 227, 281.

statutory law and discretionary law symbolic of an unfree society(14).

The NP and Inkatha shared more or less the same principles and policies with the PRP on the recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual human being, the protection of the religious, language and cultural heritages of the various groups forming the South Africa nation, the upholding of the Republic's status as a sovereign African State, the fostering of understanding and co-operation on the continent, and the promotion of the social and economic progress of its people(15). To both the PRP and Inkatha these principles and policies could be realised if the NP abolished all apartheid laws. In principle, the NP, Inkatha and the PRP held the same views on the equitable sharing of political power by all citizens of the country, with safeguards against domination and oppression of any race by another(16). However, only Inkatha

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14. W. Finnegan: Crossing the line - a year in the land of apartheid, p. 40; L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa - The Solution, p. 189.
 15. NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, p. 10; Daily Dispatch, 15 July 1977, p. 4; Pretoria News, 6 August 1978, p. 2.
 16. Pretoria News, 6 August 1978, P. 3; Sunday Express, 29 May 1982, p. 5.

applauded its gesture on the elimination of discrimination against any citizen on the grounds of race, religion, language, or sex, and the creation of conditions in which equality of opportunity could be exercised(17)

Inkatha, the NP and the PRP shared the same principle on the improvement of the quality of "energetic development" of a modern economy utilizing to the full the country's national resources.

The only Parliamentary political grouping that held lengthy discussions with both the NP and Inkatha in the decade 1975-1985 was the PFP. It was formed in 1977 when a handful of renegades from the DP, UP, and the PRP merged to form a unified "verligte" opposition party(18). The launching of the PFP took place in Johannesburg on 5 September 1977. Colin Eglin was elected leader, Ray Swart National chairman, Japie Basson deputy chairman, Harry Schwarz chairman of the federal executive, and

17. Ibid.

18. Pretoria News, 17 September 1978, p. 4; Daily Dispatch, 20 September 1977, p. 6.

Derick de Villiers deputy chairman of the federal executive(19).

Certain aspects of the policy of the PFP was closer to that of Inkatha than that of the NP(20). This was because it encompassed full citizenship rights for all South Africans without discrimination on grounds of race or colour, including:

- * the negotiation of a new constitution for the country at a national convention representative of all sections of the population;
- * the sharing of political rights by all citizens without domination of any one racial group by another,
- * an open society free from compulsory separation or compulsory integration,
- * the right of all to retain their religious, language, and cultural heritages,
- * equality of opportunity for all in an economy based on free enterprise,

19. Natal Mercury, 14 September 1977, p. 3.

20. Daily Dispatch, 15 July 1977, p. 5.

* the right of each citizen to basic freedoms of religion, association, movement, speech and the Press,

* defence of the rule of law and individual rights while acknowledging the State's responsibility to protect society from anyone who sought to overthrow the constitutional government by violence or revolution(21)

It was in the latter policy statement that the NP and the PFP could find common agreement.

The PFP as the official opposition party in parliament argued that if elected to power, it would call a national convention to negotiate a new constitution, which all significant political groupings could attend except those supporting a revolution(22). The PFP regarded full citizenship, with the right to participate in decision-making at all levels of government and safeguards against one

21. Sunday Tribune, 5 May 1978, p. 4.

22. J. Blumenfeld (Ed): South Africa in crisis, p. 136; L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa: The Solution, p. 85; J.P.C. Mostert (Ed): Politieke Partye in Suid Afrika-blanke politieke partye met Parliamentêre verteenwoordiging, 1910-1985, pp. 117-122.

group dominating another as non-negotiable points in any endeavour to solve constitutional problems in South Africa(23).

The PFP agreed with Inkatha in rejecting a unitary constitutional structure of the NP Government and "one-man-one-vote" within such a structure(24). Instead, the PFP proposed a federation which would be made up of territorial units and not of corporately organized ethnic ones. Blumenfeld, a political analyst, argued that there was a built-in ambiguity in this concept. He further pointed out that the PFP agreed that, without Black acceptance, the party would not grow. On the other hand, if it made common cause with radicals, its provenance in White community would shrink(25).

While the NP and the PFP shared the principle of a united South Africa, one citizenship and a universal franchise within democratic structures, the PFP also sought to incorporate some of the techniques of

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23. J.P.C Mostert (Ed): Politieke Partye in Suid-Afrika - blanke politieke partye met Parlementêre verteenwoordiging, 1910-1985, p. 120.
 24. E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 220.
 25. J. Blumenfeld (Ed.): South Africa in crisis, p. 67.

"consociational democracy" into its proposed future order, especially those of proportional representation and minority veto(26). Regarding the minority veto, Blumenfeld stated that the PFP believed that any group commanding 10 to 15% of the vote could be able to veto legislation against its vital interests(27).

Malherbe suggested that in an endeavour to overcome White fear and securing Black co-operation as the first step toward peaceful change in South Africa, the PFP could make a declaration embracing the following:

* the PFP states unequivocally that it believes peaceful change is impossible without a change of government, and acceptance of this thesis is fundamental for participation in the Convention Alliance.

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26. R.J. Southall: Consociationalism in South Africa - The Buthelezi Commission and beyond, Vol. 21 No 1, 1983, pp. 101-109; Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report: The findings of the Commonwealth eminent persons group on Southern Africa, p. 81.
27. J. Blumenfeld (Ed): South Africa in crisis, p.137.

* that it aims to achieve a balance of power position in order to force a change of government which will result in PFP participation.

* that it recognises that it will not be able to insist on the acceptance of everything it stands for as a condition of participating in a coalition with others(28).

Malherbe further suggested that the PFP could also declare that it would insist on certain minimum steps being taken as a condition for participation in a coalition(29).

Prince Buthelezi stressed that Inkatha and the PFP were involved in opposition politics and there was a need to pool their thinking and to introduce the element of political reality into it. Thus Inkatha reprimanded a PFP delegation which visited Ulundi on 13 March 1980 and challenged it to move the level of contact between itself and the PFP out of the "cocktail circuit" into the arena of power

28. P. Malherbe: A Scenario for peaceful change in South Africa, p. 42.

29. Ibid.

politics(30). A standing steering committee was created between Inkatha and the PFP to facilitate regular contact(31).

In 1985 Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert, the then leader of the PFP, praised the friendship and valuable association that existed between his party and Inkatha when addressing the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA)(32). Prince Buthelezi appreciated the PFP's open membership to all races which assured the PFP of partnership with Black organisations(33).

He said:

"We look forward to increasing prospects of expressing that common cause in practical politics. We hope that as we do so we can jointly and severally reap the goodwill which still exists amongst Blacks and Whites in Natal and which bridges the gap between White conservatism and Black demands for radical change in South Africa".(34)

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30. E.J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p.219.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Umxoxi: KwaZulu's Youth Camps - helping to build a nation. Volume 2, July/August 1985, p. 5.
 33. Ibid.
 34. Ibid.

Inkatha expressed its concern about the NP in Natal which it perceived as a "captive" of Conservative Party sentiment(35). Inkatha asked what the PFP could do at local and regional levels to act as an "antidote" to White Natal conservatism. The PFP and Inkatha thus issued a joint statement stating that much common ground existed between the two parties. This could be the basis of negotiation and agreement on a new constitutional framework for South Africa at a National Convention(36). On the contrary, the NP repeatedly dismissed the argument for a National Convention, arguing that sufficient consultative mechanisms already existed to resolve any significant problems. The NP further stated that under no circumstances could the political future of the Afrikaner community be determined in any context other than that of Afrikaner institutions(37).

It may be argued that in a National Convention, once called, the NP was unlikely to even focus attentively on the specific proposals that the PFP could make.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. R.E. Bissell and C.A. Crocker: South Africa into the 1980's, pp. 8, 11-12.

A Parliamentary political party which bolstered the NP image was the South African Party (SAP) which was formed in March 1977(38). The SAP under leadership of Myburgh Streicher took up a centrist position in the political spectrum and its policy was federal, based on group representation, respect for individual freedoms, maintenance of White leadership and the establishment of a society where social justice was ensured(39). The SAP supported the NP Government on issues such as security measures and homeland policy(40).

In 1978 the SAP supported the NP on matters of external security and the maintenance of internal law and order(41). Inkatha rejected the SAP policy on the maintenance of White leadership and homeland policy, especially with regard to granting independence for KwaZulu.

It may be argued that 1977 was a watershed year in the party political history of South Africa in that

38. Natal Mercury, 14 September 1977, p. 6.

39. Daily Dispatch, 14 September 1977, p. 5.

40. Ibid.

41. The Citizen, 21 June 1978, p. 7.

major re-alignments among White opposition parties occurred. The New Republic Party (NRP) was formed as a synthesis of the former UP and DP with a modernised and adapted policy, stating that the party stood for:

- * the recognition and accommodation of the plural nature of South African society and for decentralisation in decision-making, leading to a maximum degree of self-rule and local option,
- * development of African homelands as quickly as possible into viable economic and political units,
- * the establishment of a multi-racial commission to investigate the position of Africans outside the homelands in order that they can be accommodated in federal, confederal, or other constitutional relationships "appropriate to the particular circumstances and subject to negotiation in each instance",
- * the linking of the existing and future autonomous and independent units on a confederal basis, with different units appointing representatives to a central body, while retaining full jurisdiction in their own areas,

* the participation of the White, Coloured and Indian groups fully and equitably in decision-making at all levels of government (sharing the remaining common area).(42)

Neither the NP, nor Inkatha disagreed with the NRP's policy en toto. The NRP leader, Vause Raw, argued that the failure of the NP to give South Africans a clear vision for the future was its greatest disservice to the country(43). The NRP urged the NP to move towards a new order in South Africa. Such a move could recognise the right of every community to preserve and perpetuate its character and traditions, to provide job security and equal opportunities for all without any domination of one group over another(44).

The NRP rejected the Buthelezi Commission recommendations on grounds that they aimed at Black majority domination in Natal(45). Inkatha warned

42. The Citizen, 24 June 1977, pp. 5-6.

43. Ibid.

44. J.P.C. Mostert (Ed.): Politieke Partye in Suid-Africa-blanke politieke partye met Parlementere verteenwoordiging, 1910-1985, pp. 48-71; Rand Daily Mail, 2 February 1982, p. 3.

45. Natal Witness, 6 June 1982, p. 5.

that such responses could lead to the collapse of the Natal joint consultative committee and the cessation of all formal links between itself and the NRP-controlled provincial council(46).

The split in the NP in 1982 was a historical event with wide ramifications for both petty and grand politics in South Africa. On 24 February 1982 the leader of the Transvaal NP, Dr Andries Treurnicht, objected to the concept of sharing power with Blacks(47). He argued that South Africa's solution lay in the system of full political rights for each group, within its own group. He also felt that ethnic differences should preclude groups from working together(48). This led to the official launching of the CP in Pretoria in March 1982 with Dr A. Treurnicht as its leader. The formation of the CP further consolidated the right wing support in South Africa, e.g Dr. Connie Mulder's NCP and Aksie Eie Toekoms which merged with the CP(49).

46. Daily Dispatch, 10 March 1983, pp. 2-3.

47. Rand Daily Mail, 4 March 1982, p. 3.

48. Ibid.

49. Sunday Express, 21 March 1982, p. 6.

State President P.W. Botha stated that the splinter-group action made no difference to the tempo of reform, because the "Treurnicht Group" was never a stumbling block to the NP in the implementation of policies(50). He characterised Treurnicht as:

"Rather a taciturn member of the Cabinet"(51).

It could be argued that by manipulation of facts the CP attempted to tarnish the image of the NP by alleging that:

- (a) Separate development, as embodied in the Group Areas Act, was systematically being fragmented;
- (b) the Government was travelling the road to integration, and
- (c) Black people would be present in White areas for 24 hours of the day(52).

50. NP Head Office, Pretoria, Speech by Prime Minister, P.W. Botha. Ammunition - No. 4/82
C17/3/82.

51. Ibid.

52. NP Head Office, Pretoria, Ammunition - No. 7/82
(8/4/82).

The NP argued in 1982 that this was a superficial political morality on the part of the CP. This became apparent when investigations regarding specific allegations revealed that the three principles underlying the Group Areas Act, i.e. establishment of group areas, control over the acquisition of immovable property (property rights), and the occupation of land or premises, remained unaltered(53). Thus anyone who alleged that the essential character of the Group Areas Act was being eroded, was guilty of a malicious distortion of facts. The NP also revealed in 1982 that there were no grounds for alleging that the Government was then embarking upon the road to integration. The amendments contained no single element of coercion compelling sport administrators and sporting bodies to integrate in the field of sport(54). Thus it remained the NP policy at that stage to recognise the autonomy of sports bodies and control bodies when it came to taking decisions about participation by various population groups in sport.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

The NP maintained that the notion of other people being in White areas for 24 hours, bordered on the ridiculous, though unfortunately on the wrong side of the border(55). In terms of certain provisions of the Group Areas Act, people of another colour could be present within a White area for 90 days, and in terms of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Act, a Black man could be present in a prescribed area for 72 hours(56).

Van der Ross, a political analyst, argued that the CP represented a rift in Afrikanerdom. The emergence of the CP as an official Parliamentary opposition party by 1983, was potentially a greater threat than other parties to the NP Government(57). To Inkatha the formation of the CP was a blow to attempts at normalizing the situation in South Africa(58).

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. R.E Van der Ross: The Rise and Decline of Apartheid - A study of political movements among the Coloured People of South Africa, 1880-1985, pp. 314, 315-361.

58. Sunday Times, 3 March 1982, p. 3.

In March 1982 Treurnicht addressed a crowd of 7,500 CP supporters where he spelt out the party's programme of principles, which was largely based on Verwoerd's constitutional plan of 1966(59). The CP programme of principles entailed:

- * acceptance of the Bible as the norm in the regulation of community life,
- * the Christian National principle, specifically in education, with protection of religious freedom,
- * maintenance of the Republic as a sovereign independent state,
- * equal rights for Afrikaans and English as official languages,
- * recognition of the diversity of the people of Southern Africa with specific recognition of "our own people's particular identity, our right to a separate future, and our right to self-determination",
- * working for the spiritual, cultural and political existence of different peoples and groups as a guarantee of their own freedom and as a bulwark against integration and a disruptive power struggle,

59. Eastern Province Herald, 1 April 1982, p. 6.

- * every people to have their own political structure and authority,
- * rejection of any tendency towards a dictatorship or absolutism in government,
- * commitment to labour peace with particular care for the position of the rights of the White worker in his political and community life(60).

The conflict between Inkatha and the CP was exacerbated by the expansion of the CP's policies which tightened the shackles of apartheid. These policies included, inter alia, that Blacks, Indians and Coloured people should not only have no political rights in "White" South Africa, but should be physically removed from the "White fatherland" to their own homelands(61). In terms of the same CP policies all reforms proposed or introduced since the premiership of Dr. B.J. Vorster had to go. No Blacks were allowed in White parks, in sport teams except at international level, or in trade unions. This included no integration in the army, or in hospitals, or in any office of government(62).

60. Sunday Times, 3 March 1982, pp. 3-5.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

According to the CP the all-White nation lived by Protestant Christian principles, including no Sunday sport and no teachers without a Christian background(63).

The CP encouraged stricter influx control provisions and industrial decentralisation to achieve maximum settlement of Africans in their own territories under their own authorities. In this regard the CP agreed with the NP while Inkatha completely objected. Contrary to the NP, however, the CP further stated that measures granting Africans the right to remain permanently in White South Africa were to be repealed(64). Blumenfeld pointed out that the outbreak of Black unrest in 1984 struck fear into White communities and made respectable the right wing in many Afrikaners' eyes(65). Inkatha asserted that neither the extreme right nor left stood the test of time in South Africa's political circumstances. According to Langner, the CP's antagonism towards Inkatha became evident in Treurnicht's denigration of Prince Buthelezi by

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. J. Blumenfeld (Ed.): South Africa in crisis, p. 68.

creating an impression that Inkatha supported apartheid(66). Thus one may argue that both the NP and Inkatha in the period 1982-1985 acknowledged the fact that the CP was a force to be reckoned if not dealt with, particularly as they differed in principles and policies.

A parliamentary political grouping whose policy was similar to that of the CP was the HNP or Reformed National Party (RNP). It was formed in 1969 and won its first seat in parliament in 1985(67).

The HNP intransigently stood for a White-ruled South Africa with a policy of modified socialism and a strong welfare-state orientation(68). It was only on this point that the HNP differed from the CP policies. The HNP, however, viewed Inkatha as a threat to the existence of the Afrikaners. Its former leader, Dr. Albert Hertzog, said:

"We remain Afrikaners. Let us do nothing which is unworthy of the folk or which

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- 66. E. J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 222.
 - 67. L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa: The Solution, p. 80.
 - 68. R. E. van der Ross: The Rise and Decline of Apartheid, p. 315.

will lead to its downfall. In time all will come right again"(69).

The HNP incriminated the NP for having undermined confidence, not just in the political system, but also in the economy(70). Jaap Marais, HNP leader, in 1985 insisted that the economy had been weakened by the NP's dangerous concessions(71). He argued:

"We had a very strong economy, we had a strong international position and had internal order. What more do you want in a country? Look at the chaotic situation the country is now in ... The basic cause of all this is that the government started with equality ..."(72)

Langner pointed out that although Inkatha found it deplorable that White society could still "throw up" political "monstrosities" such as the HNP, it felt that such a party might be a "blessing in disguise", because its participation in the elections acted as a catalyst to expose anti-Black feelings(73). It could be argued that politics in South Africa in the

69. Marq de Villiers: White tribe dreaming: Apartheid's bitter roots as witnessed by eight generations of Afrikaner family, pp. 282-282.

70. A. Sampson: Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and apartheid, p. 137.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. E. J. Langner: The founding and development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, p. 224.

decade 1975-1985 unequivocally indicated how wide the hiatus remained between Blacks and Whites.

In 1984 the Coloured Labour Party (LP) led by the Reverend Allan Hendrickse, became a parliamentary party after the coloured chamber of the new tricameral parliament was held on 22 August 1984(74). In January 1978 the LP, at its annual conference addressed by Professor S. M. Bhengu, then Secretary-General of Inkatha, decided to identify itself with the aspirations of Inkatha and to meet its leaders with a view to unifying the strategies of the two movements(75).

The representatives of Inkatha, the LP and the Indian Reform Party (IRP) led by Y. S. Chinsamy, met at Ulundi on 11 January 1978 where an interim co-ordinating committee consisting of three members from each organisation was established with Prince Buthelezi as chairman(76). The alliance became known as the South African Black Alliance (SABA). They argued that the alliance was to overcome

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74. L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa: The Solution, p. 81.
 75. Post, 2 February 1978, p. 2.
 76. Ibid.

disunity existing amongst Blacks in order to be able to dismantle apartheid policy of the NP Government (77).

The LP stated through its leader that if the Coloured people wanted to survive in South Africa, they had to think in terms of a close alliance with all Black people. The IRP said that the alliance had healed the rift between Blacks and Indians (78).

The three political allies were characterised by working within the apartheid system to use it as a platform from which to oppose apartheid and to prevent key positions being filled by agents of the NP Government. Having drafted their constitution on 3 March 1978 their aims were:

- * to endeavour to create a just society in South Africa,
- * to determine a common strategy in the struggle against apartheid,
- * to unify all Black organisations striving for political, economic and social change, and

77. Natal Mercury, 12 January 1978, pg. 4.

78. Ibid.

* to prepare for a national convention representative of all South Africans which will map out a charter for a non-racial constitution and to liaise with such organisations as the alliance decides(79).

The alliance, however, disintegrated in August 1978 when the LP expressed willingness to participate in the new constitution proposed by the NP Government if it became law. It thus drew analogies between this position and that of Prince Buthelezi in KwaZulu(80).

Significant among the extra-parliamentary political groupings in the decade 1975-1985 in relation to the NP and Inkatha were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), The Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO), the Natal Indian

79. Ilanga, 4 March 1978, pp. 1-2.

80. Post, 25 August 1978, p. 6.

Congress (NIC), the National Forum (NP) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) (81).

Relations between the NP, Inkatha and the ANC in terms of their aims and principles as well as strategies were marked by what one may convoke, "timorous digressions". The ANC was founded in 1912, two years before the formation of the NP, to defend and advance the rights of the "African" people after what it referred to as "the violent destruction of their independence and the creation of the White supremacist Union of South Africa" (82). The ANC argued that in the course of fulfilling its aim, it emerged to lead the fight of all democratic and patriotic forces to destroy the apartheid state and replace it with a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa in which the people could govern and have equal right (83).

It is imperative to state that during the early years of the ANC, the NP was 34 years away from the

81. L. Louw and F Kendall: South Africa: The Solution, pp. 77-86.

82. ANC Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the ANC, 1958.

83. Ibid.

assumption of power as the Government. Inkatha was formed 63 years after the formation of the ANC. The ANC asserted that it gave a go-ahead in the launching of Inkatha in 1975(84). The ANC argued that it sought that Prince Buthelezi would use the legal opportunities provided by the NP Government to participate in the mass mobilization of its people on the correct basis of the orientation of the masses to focus on the struggle for a united and non-racial South Africa(85). Inkatha sent emissaries abroad to consult with the ANC leadership in exile. This continued until a top level meeting was held in London in 1979(86). It was after this consultative meeting to establish a summit conference between Inkatha and the ANC, that the ANC leadership candidly admitted to have seriously miscalculated. It stated:

"Unfortunately we failed to mobilise our own people to take on the task of resurrecting Inkatha as the kind of organisation we wanted, owing to the understandable antipathy of many of our comrades towards what they considered as working within the Bantustan system. The task of reconstituting Inkatha therefore

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- 84. A. Sampson: Black and Gold: Tycoons, Revolutionaries and apartheid, p. 147.
 - 85. Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC, Zambia, "Organisation in the Bantustans - Buthelezi and Inkatha", 16-23 June 1985.
 - 86. S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle.

fell on Gatsha Buthelezi himself, who then built Inkatha as a personal power base far removed from the kind of organisation we had visualized, as an instrument for the mobilization of our people in the countryside into an active and conscious force for revolutionary change. In the first instance, Gatsha dressed Inkatha in the clothes of the ANC, exactly because he knew that the masses to whom he was appealing were loyal to the ANC and had for six decades adhered to our movement as their representative and their leader".(87)

Prince Buthelezi responded by stating that in all his discussions with the exiled leadership of the ANC he was adamant that Inkatha remained Inkatha, committed to the Black popular will which expressed itself in its "massive membership" articulated through democratic machinery(88). Prince Buthelezi further argued that the establishment of Inkatha in 1975 was not aimed at subverting the ANC, but to prove to its leadership that democratic opposition to apartheid and non-violent tactics and strategies were still possible(89). He retorted:

"We sang old freedom songs and in every possible way identified with the ANC Mission in Exile. I told my people we had sent them there; that they were our

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87. ANC Head Office, Johannesburg, ANC NEC Political Report, Dec 1985.
 88. S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call Special Edition, p. 19.
 89. Ibid.

brothers and sisters and that we should wage a struggle in harmony with them..."(90)

The points of difference in 1975 between Inkatha and the ANC thus revolved around tactics and strategies, especially Inkatha's rejection of violence.

The aims and principles of the NP as a party and the Government of the day, could not be compromised with those of the ANC which shared a lot in common with Inkatha and the SACP.

The end of apartheid in all its forms and the transformation of South Africa into a united, non-racial and democratic country based on the principles of the "Freedom Charter" polarised the NP and the ANC(91). Throughout the decade 1975-1985 both the NP and Inkatha rejected the Freedom Charter, which was principally based on government by the people, restoration of wealth, sharing of land, personal comforts, security and houses, equal

90. S. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity who wants it? Clarion Call, Volume 3, 1987, pp. 11-12.

91. ANC Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the ANC, 1958; NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, pp. 9-11.

rights for all national groups, and education and culture for all(92). They argued that the Freedom Charter was a Communist conspiratorial document(93). It was assumed that the freedom Charter was drafted by Joe Slovo of the SACP whose first phase of the "revolution" had the Freedom Charter as a rallying point. Similar to those of Inkatha, the aims and objectives of the ANC, based on the 1958 Constitution, were:

*to unite the people of South Africa, Africans in particular, for the complete liberation of the country from all forms of discrimination and national oppression,

* to defend the democratic gains of the people and advance towards a society in which the government is freely chosen by the people according to the principles of universal suffrage on a common voters' roll,

92. R. Suttner and J. Cronin: 30 years of the Freedom Charter, pp. 214-218.

93. NP Head Office, Cape Town, National Party Information, 1980, p. 41; G. Maré and G. Hamilton: An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 142.

* to fight for social justice and eliminate the vast inequalities created by apartheid,

* to build a South African nation with a common patriotism and loyalty in which the cultural, linguistic and religious diversity of the people is recognised,

* to promote economic development for the benefit of all,

* to support the cause of national liberation, development, world peace, disarmament and respect for the environment(94). The ANC also structured itself into various sub-units, viz the National Conference, which elected the NEC; the Regional conferences, which elected regional executive committees; the branch meetings, which elected the branch committees(95).

94. ANC Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the ANC, 1958.

95. NP Head Office, Cape Town, Constitution of the National Party, pp. 28-46; ANC Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the ANC, 1958.

An applicant desiring to join the NP had to further declare that he was not a member of any other political party or organisation of a political nature(96). In Inkatha all Black persons over the age of 18 years became members, provided they were not members of organisations which in the opinion of the Central Committee, were ineligible for affiliation to Inkatha(97).

On the contrary the ANC opened its membership to all South African men and women above the age of 18 years, irrespective of race, colour or creed, who accepted its principles, policies and programme and were prepared to abide by its constitution and rules(98).

In the decade 1975-1985 the NP Government viewed the tactics and strategies of the ANC as inspired by the SACP. It argued that the ANC identified itself closely with the objectives of global socialism,

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96. Chief Ministers Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Party, p. 16.
 97. Chief Ministers Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha. p. 5.
 98. ANC Head Office, Johannesburg, Constitution of the ANC, 1958.

with the Soviet Union and its allies as well as with international terrorist organisations such as the PLO(99).

The NP cadres insisted that the ANC had elements who viewed negotiations simply as a tactic to assist in its endeavour to seize power by violent means, not as a means to share power by way of constitutional compromise(100). The NP also alleged that the ANC subscribed to the Soviet revolutionary theory or doctrine (the two-phase revolution), which accorded a central role to "national liberation movements" in Third World countries. This theory identified the national liberation movements as the third most important component in the World-wide revolutionary process, following only the ruling parties in the pro-Soviet states and by approved communist parties in other countries(101).

In terms of the Soviet theory, Third World countries could not move directly to the phase of a communist

99. *The Citizen*, 18 May 1984, p. 5.

100. *Ibid.*

101. NP Head Office, Cape Town, National Party Information, 1985, p. 15., G. M. Mersham: Political discourse and historical television drama: A case study of Shaka Zulu, p. 161.

revolution. The phase of "national liberation" had to be taken as the first step. This phase comprised a coalition of all "progressive elements", i.e. liberals, churchmen, students and workers led by the "vanguard party", which created a broad national front(102) Given the scenario in South Africa, the "vanguard party" during the national liberation phase was the ANC, with the freedom Charter as the rallying point.

After the establishment of "national democracy", the SACP was to lead the second phase of the revolution as the proletariat "vanguard party".(103) During this phase liberal and democratic elements in the former national front were to be dispensed with prior to the establishment of the "people's democracy" or communist state(104).

Both the NP and Inkatha disagreed with the SACP's strategic aim (allegedly adopted by the ANC) to:

102. W. Lethbridge (Ed.): Communism in Africa, pp. 8-9; NP Head Office, Cape Town, National Party Information.

103. Ibid

104. Styn Commission: Commission of enquiry into the mass media, p. 109; NP Head Office, Cape Town, National Party Information, 1985, p. 15.

"destroy the system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa and to replace it with a socialist system in which the ownership of the means of production will be socialised and the whole economy organised to serve the interest of all the people."(105)

In September 1985 the ANC confirmed the NP's allegation that it subscribed to the doctrine of the two-phase revolution(106). It stated:

"We must not allow our desire for socialism to intoxicate us. The people of South Africa must be taught the bitter truth simply, clearly and in a straightforward manner: the chief content of the present phase of our revolution is the national liberation of the Black people. It is actually impossible for South Africa to make even that advance to socialism before the national liberation of the Black oppressed nation."(107)

Sol Dubula, an ANC member in exile, argued that if correct leadership of the "democratic" revolution required the strengthening of the ANC as the major mass organisational force, then that was precisely the way in which the party exercised its leading and vanguard role(108). That was the way the Vietnamese

105. ANC Headquarters, Lusaka, Zambia, African Communist, No. 87, Fourth Quarter 1981.

106. ANC Headquarters, Lusaka, Zambia, Sechaba, East Germany, September 1985.

107. Ibid.

108. ANC Headquarters, Lusaka, Zambia, African Communist, No. 87, Fourth Quarter, 1981.

Communists exercised their vanguard role in relation to the National Liberation Front (FLN) during their liberation struggle. It was also the way in which the early Cuban Communists related to Fidel Castro's July 26th Movement (109).

To force the NP Government to surrender power to Black majority, the ANC in exile campaigned for disinvestment, comprehensive international sanctions and the intensification of the armed struggle it had adopted after its banning in 1960 (110). In 1980 the ANC stepped up sabotage and encouraged school boycotts which further hardened the deadlock between itself and Inkatha (111). Relations between Inkatha and the ANC soured further in the context of Inkatha's increasingly moderate political proposals, its reformism, its response to the KwaMashu school boycotts, the 1983 events at Ngoye (University of Zululand) and Prince Buthelezi's outspoken stand

109. W. Lethbridge (Ed.): Communism in Africa, pp. 9-10.

110. Rand Daily Mail, 13 October 1976, p. 4.

111. G. Maré and G. Hamilton: An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 145.

against the armed struggle and disinvestment campaign(112).

Inkatha argued that the indiscriminate economic, social and political isolation of South Africa deeply affected the non-violent democratic struggle to bring about radical change(113).

Thus for Inkatha the total isolation of South Africa favoured those who aimed at establishing a socialist or even Marxist state. In 1985 Prince Buthelezi stated:

"For me this issue of disinvestment and sanctions is not one of morality and principle. It is an issue of strategy and practicability"(114).

Inkatha warned Western leaders against gambling with the future of Southern Africa(115). Apartheid under the NP had grown vigorously and had thriven for over

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112. C. McCaul Cf. P. Frankel, et al: State, Resistance and change in South Africa, p. 165.
 113. S. Griffin (Ed.): South Africa: World Sportlight. Clarion Call, Volume 4, 1985, p. 5.
 114. T. Myeni (Ed.) KwaZulu Natal Indaba Bill of Rights. Umxoxi, Volume 3, 1986, p. 7.
 115. S. Griffin (Ed.): South Africa: World Sportlight. Clarion Call, Volume 4, 1985, p. 5.

37 years, despite all moral and diplomatic pressures which had been exerted on successive NP Governments.

In September 1985 Prince Buthelezi vehemently opposed the ANC at a mass meeting in Kwa-Mashu, explaining how its so-called armed struggle had been a dismal failure(116). Prince Buthelezi condemned both the NP and the ANC for being out of touch, saying that:

"It is the people in the end who will triumph and Inkatha is rooted in the people's power"(117).

Inkatha argued that for the ANC-type revolution to succeed in South Africa, revolutionary forces first had to have "liberated zones" within the country. These could act as springboards for attack against the State - or at least springboards in an adjacent State from which attacks could be mounted(118). Revolutionaries in South Africa had neither. Secondly, the security forces and the civil service had to be divided in their loyalty to the NP

116. Chief Ministers Dept, Ulundi, Buthelezi's Speech at Umlazi, 28 September 1985.

117. Ibid.

118. S. Vos (Ed.): Black Unity Who wants it? Clarion Call, Volume 3, 1987, p. 10.

Government. One may argue that throughout the decade 1975 - 1985 there was no evidence that the civil service, army or South African police, harboured revolutionary threats. Finally, the masses in South Africa had to support revolutionary activity in sympathetic daily practice(119). This was not the case and Inkatha argued that Black South Africans had to be intimidated into violent activity and support for it by gruesome means(120). The NP and Inkatha advocated non-violence and a negotiated settlement in South Africa. On the other hand the ANC indicated that it regarded negotiations not as a means for achieving mutually acceptable constitutional compromises, but as a means to achieving total power(121).

The ANC admitted in 1985 that it was willing to talk to the NP at a proper moment under proper conditions, as long as talking, apart from anything else, was a leap forward(122). Oliver R. Tambo, the exiled President of the ANC, said:

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Zimbabwe Herald, 4 February 1985, p. 5; NP Head Office, Pretoria, National Party Information 1985, p. 15; Chief Minister's Dept, Ulundi, Buthelezi's Speech at Umlazi on King Shaka Day, 28 September 1985, pp. 4-7.

122. Zimbabwe Herald, 4 February 1985, p. 5.

"However, the NEC is of the view that we cannot be seen to be rejecting a negotiated settlement in principle. In any case no revolutionary movement can be against negotiations in principle. Indeed, in our case it is correct that we encourage all forces, particularly among our White compatriots and in the Western World, to put pressure on the Botha regime to abandon the notion that it can keep itself in power forever by the use of brute force".(123)

In 1981 the ANC stated that it had previously used non-violence as a tactical necessity in order to build organisational strength and raise the fighting mood of the people. Thus the subsequent adoption of a policy of violence by the ANC was on grounds that its policies of peaceful resistance were rejected by the successive NP Governments(124). To encourage violent actions against the NP Government and its surrogate structures in South Africa, the Commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, Joe Modise, appealed in 1985:

"Our people must organise themselves into groups, manufacture traditional weapons which must be used against the enemy. After arming themselves in this manner,

123. ANC Headquarters, Lusaka, Zambia, Radio Freedom Broadcast, October 1985.

124. ANC Headquarters, Lusaka Zambia, African Communist No. 87, Fourth Quarter, 1981.

our people must begin to identify collaborators and enemy agents and kill them. The puppets in the tricameral Parliament and the Bantustans must be destroyed".(125)

This manifested itself more vigorously on intensified vilification campaigns against Inkatha, particularly its leadership. By 1985 the acrimony directed to Prince Buthelezi and Inkatha had reached its vertex. This was best exemplified by the statement uttered by John Nkadimeng, the National Education Council member of the ANC. He said:

"It is clear that this puppet Gatsha [Buthelezi] is being groomed by the West and the racist regime to become a Savimbi in a future free South Africa. The onus is on the people of South Africa to neutralise Gatcha, the snake which is poisoning the people of South Africa. It needs to be hit on the head"(126)

In 1980 the ANC intensified its attacks on the NP, Inkatha and all homeland leaders who rejected its policies. An earnest campaign to free Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, jailed in 1964 for high treason,

125. ANC Headquarters, Lusaka, Zambia, Radio Freedom Broadcast, 1 December 1985.

126. ANC Radio Freedom Broadcast, Addis Ababa, 18 November 1985.

started(127). On 31 January 1985 the Government's longing to be rid of this ANC leader was revealed. The State President P W Botha made an announcement in the House of Assembly. He said:

"The Government is willing to consider Mr Mandela's release in the Republic of South Africa, on condition that Mr Mandela gives a commitment that he will not make himself guilty of planning, instigating or committing acts of violence for the furtherance of political objectives ... It is therefore not the South African Government which now stands in the way of Mr Mandela's freedom. It is he himself. The choice is his ..."(128)

A week later Nelson Mandela replied by rejecting the freedom conditions laid down by the NP Government. He argued that he could not give any undertaking at a time when he and the "oppressed" people in South Africa were not free(129). Thus the NP, Inkatha and the ANC could not be compromised only in terms of their tactics and strategies in the decade 1975-1985.

127. R. Harwood: Mandella, p. 126; Maandelikse oorsig van nuusgebeure, Sentrum vir die ondersoek na rewolusionêre bedrywighede, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, February 1985.

128. Ibid.

129. PAC Head Office, Tanzania, Speech by J.N. Pokela on the 25th Anniversary of the PAC of Azania, UN Headquarters, 6 April 1984, p. 17.

Relations between the NP and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), established in 1958 after a breakaway from the ANC, were unfavourable(130). The reasons could be that the PAC was formed on purely racial basis and that its avowed "Africa for the Africans" stand made it popular with the Black "masses" and the youth(131). The first President of the PAC, Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, opted for Africanism, but denied the charge of racism. He asserted that the PAC was working for a non-racial South African society, but added that this symbolised the inescapable domination by Blacks, since they were in the majority(132).

The PAC referred to the NP Government as that of "an illegitimate clique of settlers", while viewing Inkatha as "perpetrating political tribalism", which was "the greatest enemy of African freedom"(133).

130. PAC Head Office, Tanzania, Speech by J. N. Pokela on the 25th Anniversary of the PAC of Azania, UN Headquarters, 6 April 1984, p. 17.

131. R. E. Van der Ross: *The Rise and Decline of Apartheid*, p. 322.

132. PAC Head Office, Tanzania, R. M. Sobukwe Speech on "The PAC Case", p. 12.

133. G. Maré and G. Hamilton: *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of "Loyal Resistance"*, p. 152.

134. Ibid.

The PAC'S rejection of Inkatha politics clearly manifested itself in 1978 during the funeral of Robert M. Sobukwe. Prince Buthelezi was vilified by the PAC supporters(134). On the other hand the NP incriminated the PAC of being "the nursery of aberrant political ideology"(135).

Contrary to Inkatha and the ANC, the aims of the PAC posed more threat to the NP Government in that it aimed:

- * to fight for the overthrow of White domination and for the implementation and maintenance of the right of self-determination for the African people,
- * to unite and rally the African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism,
- * to work and strive for the establishment of an Africanist socialist democracy,
- * to propagate and promote unity among peoples of Africa, and
- * to promote the educational, cultural and economic advancement of the African people(136).

135. Die Burger, 15 May 1984, p. 2.

136. PAC Head Office, Tanzania, J.N. Pokela Speech on UN day of Solidarity with South African

While the latter could well be compromised with Inkatha's objective to help promote and encourage the development of the Black people politically, spiritually, educationally and economically, the NP's undertaking to maintain the republican independence and to oppose, by every justifiable means, any interpretation, tendency, action or politics contrary to, or encroaching upon such independence, justified its rejection of and antagonism towards the PAC(137).

The PAC regarded itself as the custodian of the genuine aspirations of the "Azanian" masses and thus declared the 1980's as the decade of the "Azanian Revolution".(138) Azania was the name used by the PAC and other Black Consciousness movements for the country as an alternative to "South Africa"(139).

Political prisoners, UN Headquarters, 12 October 1981, p. 5.

137. Chief Minister's Dept., Ulundi, Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha, p, 4; NP Head Office, Cape Twn Constitution of the National Party, p. 9.
138. PAC Headquarters, Tanzania, J.P. Mlambo's article in "Azania News", the official organ of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Volume 26 No. 4-5, p. 34.
139. D. Dube: The rise of Azania, the fall of South Africa, p. 3.

The PAC thus evolved five principles as a guide and rallying point of its struggle for national liberation and self-determination(140). These were:

- (1) Apartheid cannot be reformed, it must be totally and completely eradicated,
- (2) The vehicle for genuine change can never be the regime, but rather the oppressed and dispossessed majority. Therefore, the primary task is to intensify the fighting capacity of the people ideologically, organisationally and militarily,
- (3) All forms of struggles must be encouraged and supported with the armed struggle as the principal form of struggle,
- (4) Internationally, the racist regime must be isolated and the call for comprehensive mandatory sanctions intensified. However, we must regard international action as a complementary factor ... the decisive factor being the internal factor.

140. PAC Headquarters, Tanzania, J.P. Mlambo's article in "Azania News", the official organ of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Volume 26, No. 4-5, p. 34.

(5) The introduction of the East-West conflict into the legitimate struggle for national liberation and self-determination must be strongly resisted(141).

These principles continued to enjoy acceptance and support inside and outside South Africa throughout the decade 1975-1985. The PAC called for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa as part of its strategies(142). It also opted for the path of revolutionary armed struggle which Inkatha strongly condemned. It is imperative, however, to state that the PAC became more effective in the use of the international community to fight against the NP government.

At the Bahamas Common Wealth Summit in 1985 the PAC called upon the NP to declare that it would initiate the process of dismantling apartheid in a specific and meaningful way, terminate the existing state of emergency, release immediately and unconditionally all imprisoned and detained opponents of apartheid,

141. *Ibid.*

142. PAC Headquarters, Tanzania, J.N. Pokela's statements and addresses at the United Nations, (1981-1985), p. 16.

establish political freedom by lifting the ban on political organisations and initiate a process of dialogue(143).

The Commonwealth leaders agreed to apply sanctions if the NP Government failed to comply with their demands(144). The proposed sanctions included, inter alia, strict enforcement of the mandatory embargo, re-affirmation of the Gleneagles Declaration discouraging sporting links with South Africa, a ban on all new Government loans to the South African regime and its agencies, no Government funding for trade missions in South Africa, a ban on the sale of computer equipment to South African military, police and security forces, a ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology, a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa, to preclude the import of Krugerrands, strict embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and para-military equipment from South Africa, and the

143. PAC headquarters, Tanzania, G. Ebrahim's statement at the Nassau Accord, Vanco-uver Bahamas Commonwealth Summit, 1985.

144. Ibid.

discouragement of all cultural and scientific links that promoted apartheid(145).

The PAC presented five non-negotiable pillars of apartheid which had to go if there was to exist a conducive climate for negotiations. These were the Population Registration Act, the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts on which was based the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the Tricameral parliament and the Bantustans(146). In this regard the NP Government was also pressurised by almost all extra-parliamentary forces, including Inkatha.

Adhering to its credo, "vanquish your opponents with arguments", the PAC relaxed military activities through its armed wing, Poqo. It also used a strange, but significant and effective tactic of debating a new name for South Africa(147). The PAC argued that Azania was the original name of the sub-continent and therefore had to replace the "settler-

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

147. PAC Headquarters, Tanzania, J.N. Pokela's statements on the 25th Anniversary of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, UN Headquarters, 6 April 1984.

colonial" appellation of "South Africa"(148). David Dube, a Pan Africanist analyst, argued that Azania was the name used by a broad section of African revolutionaries and progressive forces who supported the "Azanian Revolution" and worked for the overthrow of a "racist" South Africa(149). He further stated that while Azania meant a Blackman's country, "South Africa" was the name given by White "settlers" to the southern tip of Africa to consolidate their political, economic and military oppression and suppression of the indigenous Black population(150). Patrick V. Tobias, an archaeologist, said that the name Azania was given to East Africa, particularly the coast of Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania, from Kisimayu to Kilwa, including the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba(151). He further pointed out that for over 2000 years the Azaniaⁿ coast had been a centre of vigorous mercantile activity.

148. D. Dube: The rise of Azania: the fall of South Africa, p. 47.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. P.V. Tobias: "Africa Columnist", Star, 20 October 1977, p. 5.

In 1978 the NP also contemplated the possibility of a change in the name of the country once it had divided into its composite parts and all the homelands had been given off. Inkatha also believed that South Africans had to ransack the archives in search of a new name(152). Prince Buthelezi said the name Azania had many unflattering connotations, "horrible" and necessarily referred to a place of slaves(153). What could be noted is that both the NP and Inkatha did not suggest an alternative name for South Africa. Dube argued that those who asserted that Azania was a "slave" name and preferred "South Africa", exposed their dismal ignorance of Africa's history and the extent to which they were colonially brainwashed(154). It is evident that the NP and Inkatha had many areas of disagreements with the PAC in terms of their aims and strategies. These disagreements rendered the evolution of consensus politics in the decade 1975-1985 impossible.

152. D. Dube: *The rise of Azania: the fall of South Africa*, p. 59.

153. *Natal Witness*, 23 October 1979, p. 3.

154. D. Dube: *The rise of Azania: the fall of South Africa*, p. 64.

The same decade witnessed the emergence of Black Consciousness as a powerful mobilizing factor central to extra-parliamentary groups(155).

In 1975 the debate about Black Consciousness had increased tremendously in both Black and White circles in South Africa. However, the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), later the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC), was originally the direct protagonist of Black Consciousness in South Africa. The NP viewed SASO, formed at Mariannhill, Natal, in December 1968, as the re-incarnation of radicalism, embalmed in the policies of the banned ANC and PAC(156). Inkatha conceived of SASO as composed of a bunch of elitists who appeared to thrive on rhetoric, opportunism and "drawingroom" politics(157).

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155. G. Maré and G. Hamilton: An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 150.
156. A. Stubbs (Ed.): Steve Biko. "I write what I like", a selection of his writings, p. 16; the Argus, 15 June 1975, p. 3.
157. G. Maré and G. Hamilton: An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and the politics of "Loyal Resistance", p. 150.

It is imperative to state that SASO was primarily limited to learning institutions such as universities and colleges(158). This became evident in its aims, i.e to crystallize the needs and aspirations of the non-White students and to seek to make known their grievances, to make the non-White students accepted on their own terms as an integral part of the South African student community, and to heighten their own confidence in themselves and to contribute largely to the direction of thought taken by the various institutions on social, political and other current topics(159). While the aims of SASO could not really be compared to those of the NP and Inkatha, its Policy Manifesto adopted at their Second General Students' Council in July 1971 struck at the core of national politics. SASO stated its belief in South Africa as a country in which both Black and White lived together(160). It maintained that the White voters had to be made aware that one was either part of the solution or part of the

158. A. Stubbs (Ed.): Steve Biko: "I write what I like", a selection of his writings, p. 16.

159. Ibid.

160. PAC Headquarters, Tanzania, SASO Policy Manifesto, 2nd General Students Council, July 1971, p. 2.

problem(161). Thus SASO upheld the concept of Black Consciousness as its ideological creed, defining it as an attitude that Blacks required to reject all value systems that sought to alienate and reduce his basic human dignity(162). This was a political outlook which insisted that Black people should see themselves as self-defined and not defined by others.

Steven Bantu Biko, the first President of SASO, argued that they recognised White racism as a major force in South Africa(163). He pointed out that since the thesis was White racism, there could only be one valid antithesis, i.e a solid Black unity to counter balance the scale. If South Africa was a land where Black and White lived together without fear of group exploitation, it was only when these two opposites had interplayed to produce a viable synthesis of ideas and modus vivendi(164).

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161. A. Stubbs (Ed.): Steve Biko. "I write what I like", a selection of his writings, pp. 27-30.
 162. H. Bernstein: No. 46 - Steve Biko, p. 13.
 163. Ibid.
 164. A. Stubbs (Ed.): Steve Biko "I write what I like", a selection of his writings, p. 65.

The philosophy of Black Consciousness and its call for Black solidarity evoked a variety of reactions from the NP Government. Whilst White liberals accused the NP for having promoted Black Consciousness, the Deputy Minister of Coloured Affairs, Dr Schalk van der Merwe, incriminated the militant anti-White tendency among Black students on the hypocrisy of White liberals(165). The NP argued that Black Consciousness ran the danger of going out of control, quoting the example of the Afrikaner who at the turn of the century had suffered the humiliation of having lost a war, his country and had feared he would lose his culture and identity, which resulted in Hertzog breaking away from the Smuts-Botha coalition, with the idea of having the Afrikaner establish himself and fuse back into society(166). It could be argued that the NP sounded a note of warning to Black students not to go creating a racist monster that they would not be able to control in the years ahead.

Before the NP Government banned all Black Consciousness movements in 1977, it "advised" SASO

165. The Star, 22 July 1975, p. 1.

166. Rand Daily Mail, 22 July 1975, p. 3.

not to scream at the White man, because this served to convince Whites of the Blacks' intention "to drive them into the sea". This resulted in nothing more than making Whites adamant to cling to political power(167). SASO regarded the so-called Bantustan leaders as a typical example of attempts by the NP Government to define specific leaders for Black people. Thus Inkatha was viewed as a manufactured commodity, stamped: "Made in Pretoria", a commodity which the NP used to demonstrate that Black people were free to speak and oppose the Government as they pleased, as long as they did it within the confines of the law and political structures created for them(168). Dhlomo, Inkatha's Secretary-General, told the Inkatha Youth Brigade in 1979 that the struggle for liberation could not make any significant impact unless the Black consciousness movement was eliminated from the political scene(169).

167. The South African Outlook, 21 September, 1975, p. 5; Deurbraak, 12 August 1975, p. 7.

168. N. J. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda, p. 87.

169. Rand Daily Mail, 15 December 1979, p. 3.

What posed more challenge to the NP and Inkatha was the growing influence of the BPC, formed in 1971 to cater for the interests of the Black people. The stated aims of BPC were actually to:

- * provide a political home for all Black people who cannot reconcile themselves to working within the framework of separate development and to promote Black solidarity,
- * to liberate and emancipate Blacks from psychological and physical oppression,
- * to create a humanitarian society where justice was meted out equally to all,
- * to co-operate with existing agencies with the same ideals,
- * to re-orientate the theological system with a view of making religion relevant to the aspirations of the Black people,
- * to formulate, apply and implement the principles and philosophies of Black Consciousness and Black Communalism, and
- * to formulate and implement an education policy of Blacks, by Blacks for Blacks(170).

170. PAC Head Office, Tanzania, Black People's Convention Press Release, 14 January 1972.

The NP deplored these aims as racialist and conceded that re-orientating the theological system was based on the notion of Black Theology which was situational, using un-Christian methods that rendered it an untrue theology(171). The BPC detested Inkatha and treated it as "leper" in the liberation struggle for its participation in the structures of the NP Government(172). The BPC argued that Inkatha was part and parcel of the "bantustan practices", whose actual intentions were to create a false sense of hope amongst Blacks so that any further attempt by Blacks to "collectively" enunciate their aspirators should be dampened, to cheat the outside world into believing that there was some validity in the multi-national theory so that South Africa could return to international politics, trade and sport with a soothed conscience, and to boost the intertribal competition and hostility to fragment the collective strength and resistance of the Black people(173) Inkatha viewed

171. The Argus, 15 July 1976, p. 4.

172. N.J. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda, p. 93.

173. A. Stubbs (Ed.): Steve Biko. "I write what I like", a selection of his writings, p. 99.

the establishment of independent sovereign states for various African ethnic groups as the NP Government's main strategic objective for the creation of the bantustans(174). Prince Buthelezi argued that KwaZulu was founded by King Shaka kaSenzangakhona. KwaZulu was a timeless geographic entity merely existing in the memory and imagination of those who cherished the pre-colonial epoch of Zulu history(175).

The philosophy of Black Consciousness was perpetrated by the formation of the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO) in 1979 with the stated aims to form a national body to operate within the Black Consciousness framework, to work towards a society where there was a common education system for all people and one parliament for a unitary state(176). In the period 1979-1985 AZAPO rejected the NP policies and regarded Inkatha as a "collaborationist" movement. In terms of support in

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174. N. J. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a double agenda p. 93.
 175. S. Griffin (Ed.): Inkatha and the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Clarion Call Special Edition, p. 45.
 176. S.M. Davis: Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War, 112-113.

most urban townships, however, AZAPO summoned less public support than the identified figures of Inkatha(177). Contrary to the NP's capitalist trappings and the free-enterprise system with a pinch of communalism embalmed in Inkatha policies, AZAPO accentuated that socialism was the end, the means involved Blacks alone(178).

In June 1983 AZAPO established the National Forum (NF) in a bid to gain access to a broader South African audience. The NF, led by Saths Cooper and Neville Alexander, had certain ideological differences with Inkatha, i.e it explicitly stated its ideal of a socialist state while Inkatha opted for a federal state based on Western capitalist interests(179). The NP rejected socialism and communism in favour of Western-type capitalism while the NF viewed capitalism as the real enemy of South Africa(180). The NF perceived itself as the non-legislative "people's parliament" or a forum in

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid.

179. R.E. van der Ross: The rise and decline of apartheid: a study of political movements among the Coloured people of South Africa, 1880-1985, pp. 358-359.

180. Ibid.

which strategies were debated in a democratic manner(181). The NF stance was also deplored by the NIC, founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1894 as a political organisation to champion the cause and aspirations of the Indian population in South Africa(182). The NIC was instrumental in the 1984 countrywide demonstrations against aspects of the NP's political, educational, and economic policies. However, differences between Inkatha and the NIC revolved around the question of participation in the NP Government structures.

The most important political development of the decade 1975-1985 was the emergence of new, extra-parliamentary political groupings and the mobilization of their combined forces, and the identification of opposing ideologies amongst those groups themselves resulting in sharp antagonism(183). In response to a call by Dr. Allan Boesak, the Dutch Reformed Mission Church Assessor, chaplain to the University of the Western Cape and President of the world alliance of Reformed

181. F. Olivier: 'n Blik op die Nasionale Forum, Rapport, 3 March 1985, p. 5.

182. Rand Daily Mail, 21 December 1975, p. 4.

183. L. Dreyer: The Modern African Elite, p. 144.

Churches, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed on 20 August 1983 to oppose the tricameral parliament and the proposed three bills of Dr. Koornhof, i.e Local Government bill, Black Community Development bill and laws on Co-operation and Development bill(184).

Contrary to the NP and Inkatha, the UDF was a loosely-structured body, claiming to have more than 600 organisations affiliated to it. The UDF based its political stand on the Freedom Charter and argued that it stood for a single, non-racial "unfragmented" South Africa, and an end to all forms of oppression and exploitation(185). While the NP Government pulverised the UDF protest marches in 1984 and 1985, Inkatha alleged that its founding was a subtle attempt by the ANC to subvert its democratic opposition to apartheid(186). Prince Buthelezi refused to make Inkatha an internal surrogate of the ANC. Thus violence between the

184. S. C. Nolutshungu: Changing South Africa: political considerations, pp. 140-141.

185. W. Finnegan: Crossing the line - a year in the land of apartheid, pp. 403-404.

186. City Press, 23 April, 1985, pp. 1-2.

Inkatha/UDF adherents began in the Pietermaritzburg area.

The UDF accused Inkatha of collaborating with the NP in keeping institutions of oppression serviced to grind the defenceless "masses" under the yoke of oppression(187). Inkatha argued that those who challenged its right to exist and its democratic right to serve its aims and objectives, challenged the struggle itself(188). Prince Buthelezi told the UDF President, Archie J. Gumede, that Inkatha had an irreducible presence in the liberation struggle and that was a given fact of life which could be ignored to the extreme disadvantage of the struggle itself(189). It could be mentioned, however, that the growing influence of the UDF (in the period 1983-1985) upon the school-children in Black townships, threatened both the NP Government and Inkatha.

187. M. J. Bhengu (Ed.): One South Africa one People. Inhlabamkhosi, Volume 1 No. 11, p. 16.

188. Chief Ministers' Dept, Ulundi, M. G. Buthelezi's letter to Mr. A. J. Gumede, 28 November 1983, in reply to a telex from Mr. A. J. Gumede of 18 November 1983.

189. Ibid.

The most dramatic manifestation of extra-parliamentary dissent in the decade 1975-1985 was the Afrikaner weerstandsbeweging (AWB), formed in 1973 under the leadership of the ex-policeman Eugene Terre'Blanche(190). He proposed that a "volksbeweging" (people's movement) should be formed to restore order in South Africa if the NP Government capitulated in the way White governments capitulated in the rest of Africa(191). The AWB programme of principles was openly anti-semitic and anti-capitalist, incriminating Anglo-America and the Jewish capitalists for necessitating the flow of Blacks into cities and promising to free Afrikaners from spiritual and economic enslavement by Anglo-Jewish money(192). The AWB advocated a "Boer Republic" for the "Boerevolk" which included both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State(193). It could be argued that the AWB's call for a South Africa divided into "vrye volkstate" based on tradition, history and language, did not differ much from Inkatha's notion of the Zulus to exist as Zulus

190. J. Blumenfeld: South Africa in crisis, p. 68.

191. Ibid.

192. A. Sampson: Black and Gold: Tycoons, revolutionaries and apartheid, p. 309.

193. L. Louw and F. Kendall: South Africa: the solution, pp. 79-80.

in a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. Thus the AWB and other right-wing Afrikaners who were becoming highly publicised, e.g the CP, attempted to de-stabilize the NP Government.

By 1985 this complex set-up of political parties and contradictory ideals, called for true leadership and clear objectives in a politically divided South Africa.

CONCLUSION

The NP and Inkatha in the decade 1975-1985 were at the centre of the South African political gravity. In terms of their nearly similar aims and policies the NP and Inkatha could solve the problems facing South Africa but were polarised by the fact that such aims were racialistic. This precluded the availability of democratic machinery to produce consensus opinions.

Divisiveness on both Black and White political fronts enfeebled the people of South Africa and only the merging of the aims of both the NP and Inkatha could lead to the emergence of the South African democratic body politic as intact and healthy. It could be mentioned that the challenge posed by the aims of Inkatha to the NP Government prompted successive governments to annihilate any Black democratic forces of consequences and the NP faced the fact that it had nobody to reckon with. On the other hand the aims of Inkatha were devoid of subtlety necessary to unshackle democracy in South Africa and break forces of racism. This was so because its aims did not address the socio-political

problems faced by the entire population. Thus an overwhelming notion of disunity between Black and Black, between Black and White, and between White and White could not be pulverised. Both the NP and Inkatha endorsed the notion of a multi-party democracy in a multi-strategy approach, thus admitting the need for other political groupings like the ANC, PAC, CP, AZAPO etc. to contribute in finding a peaceful solution to the problems of South Africa.

While it is evident that the organisational structures of the NP and Inkatha were by far the best organised in South Africa, the NP was devoid of a kind of politics that required democratic institutions in which values and norms could be upheld.

The organisational tactic and strategies of the NP and Inkatha shared more similarities than differences which could give room for a compromise. Both parties were pro-investment, anti-sanctions, non-violent, favoured negotiation politics and a multi-party democracy as well as constituency

politics. Inkatha rejected the reforms implemented by the NP on grounds that they were "lousy" political crumbs and that Inkatha could not be used as a mopping pad to clean the political floor of the NP. It was therefore attributed to different ways in which the NP and Inkatha employed their tactics and strategies, that a massive national South African unity was unattainable. In areas where the NP and Inkatha agreed, it became evident that racism in all its manifestations could effectively be opposed by the people of South Africa in their daily life circumstances more than in symbolic politics.

The strategies of the NP and Inkatha demonstrated that these groupings were aware of their power and did not have to flaunt it by doing detestable things, e.g. brutal killing of people through necklace methods in motley mobs. Such power, however, failed to relegate the position of both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political groupings to the background. In view of the role of these groupings with regard to their aims, tactics and strategies in relation to the NP and Inkatha, it could be said that their political struggle was

based on narrow ideological, party-political victory.

Given such a scenario, neither the NP nor Inkatha could genuinely be committed to negotiated search for peaceful solutions and maintenance of democracy which could lead to the victory of the people of South Africa as a whole.

It was only in 1988 that the NP and Inkatha realised that they could collaborate in an attempt to bring about radical changes in South Africa(1). In this light both parties admitted the establishment of a united South Africa with one sovereign parliament, a democratic, non-racial and multi-party political system. They reached a compromise in the protection of individual and minority rights and in the viability of the free enterprise economic system with built-in mechanisms to create wealth, eliminate poverty and afford disadvantaged sections of the South African population maximum opportunity to fully participate and have a meaningful stake in the economy(2). While this was improbable in the

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1. Ilanga, 20- 22 July 1989, p. 6.
 2. Ibid.

decade 1975-1985, it nevertheless indicated that whichever way the political struggle went, Inkatha and the NP would be there in the thick of things.

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