

**THE COMPULSION OF THE APARTHEID
REGIME, ITS DEMISE AND THE ADVENT OF A
NEW POLITICAL DISPENSATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA, 1948-1996**

MUSA AHMED JIBRIL

**UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
2015**

**The Compulsion of the Apartheid Regime, its Demise and the
Advent of a New Political Dispensation in South Africa, 1948-1996**

By

Musa Ahmed Jibril

**A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts in fulfilment of the
academic requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

in the

Department of History

At the

University of Zululand

Promoter: Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase

Date Submitted: 02 April 2015

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Promoter: Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase, RSA

External Examiners: Prof Moses Ochonu, USA

Prof Yusufu Lawi, Tanzania

Prof Johan Cecil De Villiers, RSA

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QUOTATIONS

“I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” – Nelson Mandela

“We are like a zebra, it does not matter whether you put the bullet through the white stripe or the black stripe. If you hit the animal, it will die.” – Pik Botha

APPROVAL

This thesis has been read and approved in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, South Africa.

.....

Date.....

Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase

PROMOTER

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis “The Compulsion of the Apartheid Regime, its Demise and the Advent of a new Political Dispensation in South Africa, 1948-1996” represents my own work and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and properly acknowledged for future reference.

By.....

Student Name: Musa Ahmed Jibril

DEDICATION

This research work is gallantly dedicated to my late father Alhaji Ahmad Mashi and my loving mother Hajiya Khadija Ahmad, for their love and trust in educational pursuit.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praises be to Allah the Most High, benevolent and merciful God. The Heavens declare His glory, and the firmament shows and proclaims His handwork. In the course of researching and producing this thesis and in my entire educational pursuit, I have encountered favour of diverse kinds from so many people. Many have left an indelible mark upon my life. I owe my present academic status to such people, some of whom are worthy of special recognition. First, I wish to thank my parents in persons of Alhaji Ahmadu Mashi and Hajiya Khadija Ahmadu for their unflinching support for my educational journey, may God reward them abundantly.

I am particularly thankful to my promoter Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase, for his patience in correcting my work and giving constructive criticisms. His confidence in me and the sincere supervision he provided will forever be unforgettable. Equally, I am grateful to the History Head of Department at the University of Zululand, Prof. Hamilton S. Simelane and the departmental staff whose views and attitude have improved and prepared me for the modern world challenges.

My heartfelt gratitude goes to my family members from Alhaji Kabir to Amina. I am equally grateful to Alhaji Jibril Baba Ahmed for his support and courage in my educational career. My sincere appreciation goes to Alhaji Aliyu Ahmed Mashi for his words of courage and the sacrifice he made during and after my undergraduate studies. I am equally grateful to my ardent wife Asma'u and our children Musa and Ahmed for the sacrifice and patience they displayed during the course of my study.

My sincere appreciation equally goes to staff and management of the Umaru Musa Yar'adua University, Katsina, Nigeria for their support and encouragement toward the actualisation of the set goal. I thank no less my colleagues who always put trust and confidence in me during the research epoch. They include: Mr. S.A. Fari, Mr. M.A. Kwarah, Mr. S. Bello, Mr. S.M. Zubairu and Mr. N.Y. Abba. Finally, I wish to thank all those whose names could not be mentioned who in one way or the other helped to ensure this work became a reality.

ABSTRACT

The word apartheid refers to the racist belief that certain people are less human than others. In South Africa, the system technically began with the 1913 Land Act which set aside eighty-seven per cent (87%) of the most fertile land for white South Africans, leaving behind only thirteen per cent (13%) to be shared by the majority black Africans. This unequivocally generated a socio-political crisis in the country.

Despite a plethora of literature on apartheid as such, there seems to have been some paucity of empirical studies on apartheid's compulsion, its demise and the rise of a new political era during the period from 1948 to 1994. Puzzlement and curiosity within the public mind in South Africa and the world, about the gross violation of civil liberties perpetrated by the apartheid regime, prompted a scientific study of this nature.

This study does not argue that the year 1948 marked the beginning of compulsive policies in South Africa. On the contrary; there were various forms of compulsions that existed in South Africa prior to the period in question. The year 1948, however, serves as the point of departure for the study. The year 1948 ushered in the adoption and implementation of apartheid's -social engineering by the ruling National Party- as an official State ideology.

Between 1948 and 1988, a series of compulsive racial laws, which violated fundamental civil liberties, were passed by the South African parliament. Compulsive structures and strategies were devised and refined by the apartheid regime on the assumption of power in 1948 to safeguard and perpetuate the power in the face of a hostile and non-compliant majority. This led to a gradual, peaceful protest which later metamorphosed into various forms of political struggle. It was these forms of struggle that ensured the demise of apartheid and witnessed the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa.

From 1988 various political prisoners embarked on a hunger strike as a form of resistance to demonstrate their anger and rejection of apartheid compulsion. The hunger strike attracted the attention of the international community. This eventually led to more criticism and put pressure on the apartheid regime. As such, diplomatic and economic embargoes were placed on South Africa which greatly undermined its political and economic interests.

What followed was mass disobedience and violent protests from different racial groups against the apartheid regime, thereby leading to the deaths of thousands of people, particularly those who vehemently opposed the compulsive racial laws. The victims that survived were either injured, imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Thus, the period between 1988 and 1990 was marked by intense resistance. In addition, the period in question destabilised the very foundation of 'apartheidism' as an ideology in South Africa. It also signalled the demise of the compulsive segregationist policies in the country.

The years between 1990 and 1994 played a vital role in the history and historiography of South Africa. They witnessed the release of the long-awaited political prisoner, Nelson Mandela, who championed the remaining campaigns against the compulsive apartheid tendencies. He was officially and unconditionally released from prison after spending about 10,000 days behind bars. The period in question was characterised by various apartheid strategies aimed at destabilising the liberation movement.

The regime introduced improved survival strategies in arming the police and other security agents with more power to crush all forms of insurrection against it. In the space of four years, thousands of people lost their lives in regime-sponsored and politically related violence. South Africa was thrown into a state of anarchy characterised by, among other things, intense rivalry among political formations. The year 1994, however, witnessed a departure from

apartheid to democracy. It paved the way for the emergence of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president of South Africa.

The period between 1994 and 1996 played a vital role towards consolidating a popular democratic political system in South Africa. The emerging government was faced with a plethora of administrative, social, economic and political challenges. In 1996, the Government of National Unity (GNU), as part of its policy for national reconciliation, established a commission of enquiry known as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The commission's mandate was to investigate various crimes committed by both the regime and other opposition political organisations, including the liberation movement. The findings of the commission revealed that the apartheid regime and its agencies, the Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP, the African National Congress, ANC, and other political groupings had committed varying degrees of abuses on fundamental civil liberties in South Africa.

It could be argued that South Africa's democratic elections produced an outcome which closely paralleled the Namibian experience and not that of Angola. The advent of a new political dispensation was welcomed and accepted beyond the borders of South Africa. The tri-cameral parliament with its dominant white house, token houses for 'Coloured' and 'Indian' populations and total exclusion of African blacks, disappeared and was superseded by a democratically elected non-racial parliament.

The homeland or Bantustan structures, i.e. the four (4) 'independent' and the six (6) 'self-governing' homelands melted away, capitulated or were deposed in the headlong and non-compulsive run-up to South Africa's first democratic elections. Although the structures disappeared, their legacy lingered on in the form of a multiplicity of effects with which South Africa has had to grapple for years to come.

Nominally the architects of apartheid's compulsion survived the transfer of power to a majority government. Given their past record, they were extremely fortunate not to have been summarily banished to the political wilderness. This could be attributed either to the generosity of spirit displayed by the majority or to the good sense of the majority in pursuit of a compromise path to limit the possibility of violent conflict, or perhaps a mixture of both.

A democracy, given the seminal role played by the security establishment as the instrument of compulsion and destabilisation, required security institutions for its continued well-being. Thus, the transformation of these institutions from instruments of compulsion to friendly protectors of civil liberties was crucial. Thus, from 1996 onwards, the new South Africa was substantially free from the kind of political violence which had resulted in deaths on an on-going basis.

UITTREKSEL

Die word “apartheid” verwys na die rassitiese beginsel dat sommige mense minder menslik is as ander. In Suid-Afrika is die stelsel tegnies begin met die 1913 Wet op Grond, wat sewe-en-tagtig present (87%) van die mees vrugbare grond vir blanke Suid-Afrikaners opsy gesit het. Dus moes slegs dertien present (13%) grond gedeel word deur die meerderheid van swart Afrikaners.

Dit het ongetwyfeld ‘n sosio-politieke krisis geskep in die land. Ten spyte van ‘n oorvloed van literatuur oor apartheid as sulks, skyn daar ‘n gebrek te wees aan empiriese studies oor die dryfvere van apartheid, die stelsel se ondergang en die ontwikkeling van ‘n nuwe politieke era gedurende die periode 1948 tot 1994.

Verwarring en nuuskierigheid vanuit die openbare denke in Suid-Afrika en van regoor die wêreld oor die brute skending van burgerregte wat deur die apartheidsregime gepleeg is, het hierdie wetenskaplike studie aangespoor.

Hierdie studie beredeneer nie die feit dat die jaar 1948 die aanvang van dwangbeleid in Suid-Afrika ingelei het nie. In teendeel, daar was verskeie vorme van dwangbeleid wat in Suid-Afrika bestaan het voor hierdie periode.

Maar, die jaar 1948 dien as vertrekpunt vir hierdie ondersoek. Die jaar 1948 het die aanvaarding en implementering van die gemeenskapsmanipulasie van apartheid deur die regerende Nasionale Party as ‘n amptelike staatsideologie ingelei.

Tussen 1948 en 1988 is ‘n reeks rasse wette, wat basiese burgerlike vryhede skend, deur die Suid-Afrikaanse parlement aangeneem. Die apartheidsregime het ‘n reeks dwangstrukture en strategië ontwikkel en verfyn tydens die magsoorname in 1948, om die mag te beskerm en behou in die lig van ‘n vyandige en opstandige meerderheid.

Dit het gelei tot 'n groeiende vreedsame protes wat later ontwikkel het in verskeie vorms van politieke opstand. Dit was hierdie vorme van opstand wat uiteindelik die ondergang van apartheid bewerkstellig het en die begin van 'n nuwe politieke bestel in Suid-Afrika ingelei.

Teen 1988 het verskeie politieke gevangenes met 'n eetstaking begin. Dit was hul uitdrukking van verset, teenstand en verwerping van die dwangbeleid van apartheid.

Die eetstakings het die aandag van die internasionale gemeenskap getrek, en dit het uiteindelik gelei tot nog meer kritiek en druk op die apartheidsregering. As 'n gevolg is diplomatieke en ekonomiese beperkinge op Suid-Afrika geplaas, wat grootliks die land se politieke en ekonomiese belange geknou het.

Dit is gevolg deur massa burgeropstande en gewelddadige protesaksies van verskillende rassegroepe teen die apartheidsregime, wat tot die dood van duisende mense gelei het (veral diegene wat vuriglik teen die rassewette gekant was). Diegene wat oorleef het was beseer, gevange geneem of gedwing om in ballingskap te gaan. Dus is die periode tussen 1988 en 1990 gekenmerk deur intensiewe teenstand. Daarby was daar ook die destabilisering van die boustene van "apartheid" as 'n ideologie in Suid-Afrika. Dit het die begin van die einde van 'n beleid van verdeeldheid in die land aangedui.

Die jare tussen 1990 en 1994 was kardinaal in die geskiedenis en geskiedgeografie van Suid-Afrika. Die lang-verwagte vrylating van die politieke gevangene, Nelson Mandela is gesien. Hy het die laaste veldtogte teen die dwangbeleide van apartheid gelei. Hy is amptelik en onvoorwaardelik vrygelaat uit die tronk waar hy omtrent 10 000 dae deurgebring het.

Tydens hierdie periode was daar nog verskeie dwangstrategieë gemik op die destabilisering van die opposisie bevrydingsbewegings. Die regering het nuwe

oorlewingsstrategië ingebring wat daarop gemik was om die polisie en ander veiligheidsagente met groter magte te bemagtig om sodoende alle vorme van opstand teen die staat te vernietig.

Gedurende hierdie vier jaar het duisende mense hul lewens verloor in staatsondersteunde politieke geweld. Suid-Afrika was byna in 'n staat van anagie, wat gepaard gegaan het met intensiewe wedywering tussen verskillende politieke organisasies.

Gedurende die jaar 1994 kon gesien word dat daar 'n beweging weg van die apartheidsregime was. Dit het die weg gebaan vir die inhuldiging van Nelson Mandela as die eerste demokraties-verkose president van Suid-Afrika.

Die tydvak 1994 tot 1996 het 'n kardinale rol gespeel in die konsolidasie van 'n populistiese politieke stelsel in Suid-Afrika.

Die nuwe regering wat na vore getree het, is gekonfronteer met 'n magdom van administratiewe, sosiale, ekonomiese en politieke uitdagings. Teen 1996 het die nuwe "Regering van Nasionale Eenheid" -RNE- se die beleid van nasionale versoening die gelei tot die skepping van 'n kommissie van ondersoek, bekend as die Waarheid- en Versoeningskommissie.

Hierdie kommissie het die mandaat ontvang om verskeie misdade, gepleeg deur beide die staat en ander politieke organisasies, te ondersoek. Die bevindinge van die kommissie het getoon dat die apartheidsregering en hul agente, die Inkatha Vryheidsparty, die African National Congress (ANC) en ander politieke organisasies verskeie grade van miskenning en skendings van fundamentele burgerregte in Suid-Afrika gepleeg het.

Daar kan geredeneer word dat die Suid-Afrikaanse demokratiese verkiesing tot 'n resultaat gelei het wat grootliks soortgelyk was as dié in Namibië, en nie soos die uitkoms in Angola nie.

Die skepping van 'n nuwe politieke bestel was grootliks aanvaar. Die drie-kamer parlement met sy dominante blanke kamer en nominale huise vir die Bruin en Indiër bevolkings en die totale uitsluiting van alle swartmense, het verdwyn en is vervang met 'n demokratiese verkose, nie-rassige parlement.

Die vier (4) “onafhanklike” en ses (6) “self-regerende” tuislandstrukture het een na die ander weggesmelt, oorgegee of is vernietig in hierdie goed-beplande periode in die aanloop tot Suid-Afrika se eerste demokratiese verkiesings. Hoewel die structure verdwyn het, het hul erfenis bly voorduur in die vorm van 'n magdom van nagevolge waarmee Suid-Afrika moes worstel vir baie jare.

In naam het die argitekte of skeppers van die apartheidsdwangbeleid die oorgang van mag na 'n meerderheidsregering oorleef. Gegewe hul geskiedenis, was hulle geweldig gelukkig om nie eenvoudig na die politieke wildernis verban te word nie. Dit kan toegeskryf word aan òf die vrygewigheid van gees wat deur die meerderheid vertoon is, òf die gesonde verstand van die meerderheid om 'n kompromiepad te volg ten einde die moontlikheid van geweldadige konflik te vermy, of miskien 'n mengsel van albei.

'n Demokrasie, gegewe die rudimentêre rol wat die sekuritietsmagte as instrumente van dwang en destabilisasie gespeel het, benodig hierdie veiligheidsinstellings vir sy voortbestaan. Dus was die verandering van hierdie instellings van instrument van die dwangbeleid tot vriendelike beskermers van burgerregte kardinaal.

Dus: sedert 1994 was Suid-Afrika grootliks vry van die tipe politieke geweld wat voorheen voortdurend tot die dood gelei het.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
ANCFC	African National Congress Freedom Charter
ARMSCOR	South African Armament Industry
ASO.....	Azanian Students Organisation
AWB.....	<i>Afrikaner-weerstandbeweging</i> -Afrikaner Resistance Movement (English acronym)
BAA	Bantu Authority Act
BBWA	Bantu Building Workers Act
BC	Board of Censors
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BEA	Bantu Education Act
BHLCA	Bantu Home Land Citizenship Act
BII	Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence
BLM	Black Liberation Movement
BPC	Black People's Convention
BTU	Black Trade Union
CCB	Civil Co-operation Bureau
CCSA	Christian Council of South Africa
CD	Congress of Democrats
CLAA	Criminal Law Amendment Act
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSAG	Concern South African Group
CPA	Criminal Procedure Act
CPSA	Congress of the People of South Africa
CRW	Counter Revolutionary Warfare

DBE.....Department of Black Education

DCCDirectorate Covert Collection

DMIDepartment of Military Intelligence

DPDemocratic Party

ECCEnd Conscription Campaign

FELLDTA.....Federation of Local and Long Distance Taxi Association

FFFreedom Front

FSFrontline States

GEDGreat Economic Depression

GNUGovernment of National Unity

GRAGroup Areas Act

HRCHuman Rights Commission

IFPInkatha Freedom Party

IMAImmorality Amendment Act

ISAInternal Security Act

KZNKwaZulu-Natal

LALand Act

LTOLethlabile Taxi Organisation

MDMMass Democratic Movement

MK*Umkhonto we Sizwe* – Spear of The Nation

NANursing Act

NAANative Administration Act

NGK*Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* -Dutch Reformed Church
(Afrikaans acronym)

NIRANewspaper and Imprint Registration Act

NISNational Intelligence Service

NKANational Key Points Act

NLANative Labour

NLANative Land Act

NLANative Labour Act

NLAANative Laws Further Amendment Act

NPNational Party

NRANatives Resettlement Act

NRCNative Representative Council

NTLAANative Trust and Land Amendment Act

NUAANative Urban Areas Act

PACPan-African Congress

PASSPan-Africanist Security Service

PMMAProhibition of Mixed Marriage Act

PRAPopulation Registration Act

PSAPublic Safety Act

RCBRace Classification Board

RIPRobben Island Prison

RSARepublic of South Africa

RSAAReservation of Separate Amenities Act

SAAWUSouth African Allied Workers Union

SACPSouth African Communist Party

SACPOSouth African Coloured People Organisation

SADFSouth African Defence Force

SAICSouth African Indian Congress

SALLDTA.....South Africa Local and Long Distance Taxi Association

SANNCSouth African Native National Congress

SAPSouth African Parliament

SAPFSouth African Police Force
 SASFSouth African Security Force
 SCASuppression of Communist Act
 SDUSelf Defence Units
 SHRCRSouth African Human Rights Commission Review
 SOSASouth African Students Organization
 SOWETO.....South Western Township
 SRVASeparate Representation of Voters Act
 SSCState Security Council
 TISTranskei Intelligence Service
 TRCTruth and Reconciliation Commission
 UAEUnited Arab Emirates
 UEAUniversity Education Act
 UNSAPUnited National South African Party
 UPUnited Party
 USAUnion of South Africa
 USAUnited States of America
 USSRUnited Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia USSR
 VISVenda Intelligence Service
 WCPWestern Cape Province
 ZRHZulu Royal House

General Introduction

Compulsion refers to structures and methods which were devised and refined by the Nationalist government, on its assumption of power in 1948,¹ in order to safeguard and perpetuate that power in the face of a hostile and non-compliant majority. It is an exposition of the apartheid regime's gross violations of civil liberties during the political conflicts of the past. Compulsion is the response of the apartheid regime and its supporters to resistance against the policies of apartheid; resistance by the people of South Africa, resistance by South Africa's neighbours and resistance by the international community.

Compulsion took many forms, from the blunt controls of legislation to the more subtle controls of what became known as 'low intensity conflict'. The apartheid regime became a pioneer in compulsion, not only adopting the techniques of other past and modern-world oppressive regimes, but also refining them to a pitch of perfection and even evolving new techniques, which served as a model for others to follow.

Compulsive regimes abound in the historical record but few have raised compulsion to the level of an art form in the way that the apartheid regime managed to do. The breadth and intensity of its arsenal of weapons scaled new heights or, perhaps more correctly, plumbed new depths.

The year 1948, therefore, witnessed the ushering in of a regime that devised and refined such compulsive methods and structures. This was as a result of the

¹. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: "The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid" In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds.): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, p.2.

“whites-only”² election which led to the victory of Dr Daniel Malan’s National Party (NP).³ The National Party was formerly an opposition to the United National South African Party (UNSAF) popularly known as the United Party. It ruled South Africa between 1948 and 1994. The new regime, in a bid to safeguard and protect itself from all forms of opposition, resolved to employ compulsive policies of racial segregation collectively known as apartheid. It was a cruel socio-economic and political system that was engineered to control and coerce the lives of Africans, Indians and Coloureds in all ramifications of life.⁴

It is imperative to note that apartheid referred to the belief that certain people were less human than others. The system also accommodated the 1913 Land Act⁵ which set aside 87% of the most fertile land for the minority white people, leaving behind only 13% to be shared by the majority black Africans. This system unequivocally generated a socio-political imbroglio in South Africa during the period 1948 to 1990.

Apartheid, as alluded to above, is an Afrikaans word describing 'the status of being apart', which affected every aspect of South African life. In reaction to

². C. C. and S. M.: *Long Walk to Freedom- The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, p.27.

³. Loyal Nationalist Friends: *National Party Information*, pp.xii-xiii.

⁴. M. Z. Shamase: ‘A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985, p.46.

⁵. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: “The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid” In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds.): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, p.2.

this policy, there emerged a gradual and peaceful, but later violent, resistance.⁶ The apartheid regime imposed compulsive legislations which resulted in gross violation of civil liberties and imprisonment of various leaders and adherents of political organizations. The system was designed in a manner that justified white supremacy. Legislations empowered the White minority to segregate, exploit, divide and terrorise the Black majority through the use of police and the military as instruments of compulsion.⁷

The apartheid regime, in its desire to actualise its set objectives, solicited the support and backing of *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) generally referring to the Dutch Reformed Church⁸ and a powerful secret organisation known as the Broederbond.⁹ The NGK, being a religious body, took the assignment of justifying the apartheid compulsion. During the period in question, it could be argued that the NGK misrepresented the Gospel in its attempts to justify and consolidate apartheid compulsion in South Africa. In scriptural terms Dr Daniel Malan, a former NGK minister and the first Prime

⁶. M. R. Mchunu: 'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of History, University of KwaZulu-Natal), p. iii.

⁷. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid- A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.8.

⁸. M. R. Mchunu: 'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of History, University of KwaZulu-Natal), p.vi.

⁹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid- A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.10.

Minister of the apartheid regime, argued that Afrikanerdom was the creation of God.¹⁰ He further stated that:

"I know of no other policy as moral, as responsible to the Scripture, as the policy of separate development...If the...Christian Afrikaner can be convinced there are no principles or biblical foundations for the policy of separate development, it is but a step to the conviction that it is unchristian. And if we believe it is unchristian or immoral it is our obligation to fight it."¹¹

This notion, inevitably led to a new concept and ideology of Christian Nationalism among the Afrikaners. It could also be argued that for the duration of the regime compulsion era, the NGK continued to give spiritual, moral and legal justifications to Apartheid. The regime claimed to have unarguable "divine"¹² right to rule over blacks and other racial groups for eternity. The Broederbond metamorphosed into a top-secret organisation whose membership was restricted only to Afrikaners. With its primary objective to safeguard white superiority, the Bond masterminded a landslide victory for the apartheid regime during the 1948 general elections.

In the post-1948 era, until the demise of the regime, the Bond secretly continued propagating and justifying the principles of apartheid. J.C. van Rooy of

¹⁰. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid- A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.64.

¹¹. Ibid, p.47.

¹². B. Philip, D. Peter and P. Deborah: 'The Shaping of Apartheid: Contradiction, Continuity and Popular Struggle', Cited from Philip Bonner. et al. eds. *Apartheid's Genesis, 1935-196*, p.68.

Potchefstroom University (former Chairman of the Bond) and L.M. Lombard (General Secretary) wrote:

"Let us focus attention on the fact that the primary consideration is: whether Afrikanerdom will reach its ultimate destiny of domination...in South Africa. Brothers, our solution of South Africa's ailments is not whether one party or another shall obtain the whip hand, but that the Afrikaner-Broederbond shall govern South Africa."¹³

Thus, it could be argued that the *modus operandi* of the apartheid regime was premised on discrimination, denial and segregation in every aspect of socio-political and economic life of South Africa. It grossly violated civil liberties in various ways and in different forms, while retaining its essentially discriminatory and violent features. During the period in question, the anti-apartheid stance gathered momentum as anxiety and hatred towards the regime continued to spread throughout the country.

In 1990, President FW de Klerk had no alternative but to initiate negotiations to end the compulsive reign of the apartheid regime. In April, 1994, South Africa held her first all-inclusive general election that gave the African National Congress (ANC)¹⁴ a landslide victory. This also saw Nelson Mandela emerging as the first democratically elected president of a free and democratic South Africa. Two years later, a commission was set to investigate the crimes and abuse of civil liberties under the apartheid regime and also forge reconciliation

¹³. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid: A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.17.

¹⁴. N. Joel: "A Continuing Search for Identity: Carrying the Burden of History", Cited from L. Arianna. et al. (eds.): *One Hundred Years of the ANC-Debating Liberation Histories Today*, p.123.

between the perpetrators and the victims of apartheid's compulsive propensities.¹⁵

Against this background, this research study makes a pragmatic shift, from the generally known versions, in exploring and giving an exposition of the compulsion of the apartheid regime, its demise and the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa during the period 1948-1996. Such compulsion was studied with in-depth analysis of the violation of civil liberties in all aspects of South African life.

CHAPTER ONE

Aims, Objectives and Methodology of the Study

¹⁵. M. Ballinger: *From Union to Apartheid*, pp. 3-4.

"The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance; it is the illusion of knowledge." - Hawking, 2011.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

A bulk of literature exists on apartheid and its policies in South Africa. The problem, however, has been an academic *cum* scientific *lacuna* in penetrating the ignorance, puzzlement and curiosity within the South African public mind about the compulsion of the apartheid regime, perpetrated since 1948 ostensibly in the name of an ideology of social engineering. A pragmatic shift and a provision of scientific exegesis in the study of the apartheid regime's compulsive strategies in the period 1948 – 1996 became a necessity.

It also became imperative to scientifically document the compulsion of the apartheid regime and its impact, thereby throwing more light on the multi-faceted intricacies during the period under study. This justified a study of the compulsion of the apartheid regime, its demise and the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa in the epoch 1948 – 1996, thereby helping to assess the completeness of the eradication of apartheid compulsion and destabilization.

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The broad aim of this research work was to delve into the intricate nature, operations, response thereof and consequences of apartheid compulsion in

South Africa, thereby exploring the extent of civil liberties' violations during the period of 1948-1996. It was also part of the aim of the study to provide an in-depth analysis, with empirical evidence, of the harsh realities of the apartheid compulsive tendencies and the general impact thereof on the people of South Africa. As such, the study set out to achieve the following objectives:

- 1.3.1 Giving an exposition of the conception and maturity of the apartheid regime's strategy as the classical form of compulsion
- 1.3.2 Exploring the rationale behind the compulsive strategies of the apartheid regime
- 1.3.3 Tracing and establishing a general view of the 1990-1994 destabilization strategy of the apartheid regime as the successor to the 1948-1989 strategy
- 1.3.4 Identifying major protagonists and antagonists during the apartheid regime's compulsive era
- 1.3.5 Providing the exegesis of the incipient collapse of the apartheid regime's compulsion that opened the way to a negotiated transfer of power
- 1.3.6 Elucidating on the varying impact of the apartheid regime's compulsive rule on the people of South Africa
- 1.3.7 Analysing and evaluating the extent of civil liberties' violation during the period in question
- 1.3.8 Highlighting the underlying factors for the demise of the apartheid regime's compulsion, culminating in the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa

1.3.9 Indicating the key features of a new political dispensation as the aftermath of the demise of the apartheid regime's compulsion

1.3.10 Evaluating the legacy and completeness in the eradication of the apartheid regime's compulsion and destabilization epoch

1.4 Research Questions

The study sought to answer the following questions:

1.4.1 How did the apartheid regime's compulsion unfold and what circumstances prompted its fruition?

1.4.2 What was the response of the apartheid regime and its adherents to resistance against its compulsive policies?

1.4.3 What was the impact of the apartheid regime's compulsion on the people of South Africa, her neighbours and the international community?

1.4.4 How could the forms that the apartheid regime's compulsion took best be described?

1.4.5 In what way could apartheid's blunt controls of legislation and the more subtle controls of what became known as "low intensity conflict" be analysed and evaluated?

1.4.6 How did the apartheid regime become a pioneer in compulsion, not only adopting the techniques of other past and present-day compulsive regimes, but also refining them to a level of perfection and even evolving new methods, which served as a model for others to follow?

1.4.7 To what extent did the apartheid regime implement formal, informal, target, financial and external forms of compulsion?

1.4.8 In what way could the apartheid regime's wide powers of arrest without trial, banning of persons, political organizations, gatherings/associations, and publications be analysed and evaluated?

1.4.9 How could the demise of the apartheid regime's compulsion and its impact thereof best be accounted for?

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study

This research study had the compulsion of the apartheid regime, its demise and the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa, as its scope. The study had the year 1948 as its point of departure and concluded with the year 1996. It had as its scope and limitation the compulsion of the apartheid state and particularly the compulsive structures and methods, which were formulated and refined by the government of D.F. Malan on its ascendance to power in 1948. These structures and methods allowed the apartheid government to monopolise and perpetuate socio-economic and political powers in the face of a recalcitrant and non-compliant majority.

This study does not argue that apartheid compulsion in South Africa began in 1948. On the contrary, the foundations for both were laid as early as the arrival of the Dutch colonists in 1652 and later, in some earnest, by the British colonists especially after the discovery of gold and diamonds. Like other

colonial states, the British colonial power successfully applied the divide and rule tactics which paved the way for the gradual incorporation of a privileged South African elite within the indigenous population. This was achieved by granting the elite some limited powers and also providing them with ways to defend such powers.

Albeit in a long South Africa's history of colonial conquest and oppression, and of racial exploitation and discrimination, the year 1948 stands out as the time of a radical shift from the *ad hoc* art of control to the rigorous science of compulsion in South Africa. To this end, it served as a point of departure for this research on the compulsion of the apartheid regime.

The research in question limited itself to four distinct epochs from 1948 to the end of 1996. The first epoch covered the period from 1948 to 1989 during which the total strategy was conceived, born and matured as the classical form of apartheid compulsion. The second epoch was signified by the incipient collapse of apartheid power that became evident from 1988 to 1990 and opened the way to a negotiated transfer of power. The third epoch then traced the "destabilization strategy" which emerged as the successor to total strategy and which accompanied negotiations during the period from 1990 to the first democratic elections in April 1994. The last epoch took into cognisance the post-election period beginning from May 1994 to December 1996. This was an attempt to examine the totality of the suppression of apartheid compulsion and destabilization.

1.7 Significance of the Study

While numerous books, articles, and commentaries chronicled resistance to and the compulsion of the apartheid regime, there appeared to be a great deal of ignorance, puzzlement and curiosity within the South African academic worldview about the gross violations of civil liberties that were perpetrated during the apartheid years; all in the name of an ideology of socio-economic and political engineering. The significance of this study lies in its contribution to penetrating that ignorance and responding to the need for a clearer understanding of that past.

It could also be argued that this study would complement and reinforce the existing literature on apartheid and to the knowledge of the level of the violation of civil liberties in South Africa. This study would constitute a valuable historical resource for the benefit of the public at large, and for the interest of students, domestic and international, of contemporary South African history and with a particular interest in the subject of the compulsion wrought by the apartheid regime.

1.8 Research Methodology

1.8.1 Method

The employment of ‘historical research methods’ articulated an intelligible account on the compulsion of the apartheid regime, its demise and the advent of

a new political dispensation in South Africa during the epoch in question. Historical research is the process of systematically examining past events to give an account of what has happened in the past. It is not a mere accumulation of facts and dates or even a description of past events. Rather, it is a flowing, dynamic account of past events that involves an interpretation of the events in an attempt to recapture the nuances, personalities, and ideas that influenced those events.

One of the goals of historical research is to communicate an understanding of past events. As such, conducting historical research becomes important in uncovering the unknown (i.e. some historical events are not recorded); answering questions (i.e. there are many questions about our past that we not only want to know but can profit from knowing); identifying the relationships that exist between the past and the present (i.e. knowing about the past can frequently give a better perspective of current events); recording and evaluating the accomplishments of individuals, agencies, or institutions; and assisting in understanding the culture in which we live.¹⁶

The nature of this study adheres to a view that there is no single approach used in conducting historical research, although a general set of steps is typically followed, including an identification of the research topic and formulation of the research problem or question; data collection or a literature review; evaluation of materials; data synthesis; and report preparation or preparation of the narrative exposition.

¹⁶. R.B. Johnson and L.B. Christenson: *Educational Research: Qualitative, Quantitative, and mixed approaches*, pp.300-316.

The research product was a combination of primary and secondary sources (i.e. published and unpublished sources). There was the issue of the determination validity, trustworthiness, or authenticity of these sources (external criticism) to be considered. This study also determined the reliability or accuracy of the information contained in the sources collected (internal criticism). It has been proven in this study that first-hand accounts by witnesses to an event, for example, were typically assumed to be more reliable and accurate. This was done by positive and negative criticism.

Positive criticism referred to assuring that the statements made or the meanings conveyed in the sources were understood. This is often difficult because of the problems of vagueness and presentism. Vagueness refers to uncertainty in the meaning of the words and phrases used in the source; while presentism refers to the assumption that the present-day connotations of terms also existed in the past. Negative criticism refers to establishing the reliability or authenticity and accuracy of the content of the sources used. This was the most difficult part because it required a judgement about the accuracy and authenticity of what is contained in the source.

This study used three heuristics in handling evidence to establish its authenticity or accuracy: corroboration, sourcing, and contextualization. Corroboration entails comparing documents to each other to determine whether they provide the same information. Sourcing involves identifying the author, date of creation of a document, and the place in which it was created. During contextualization, the researcher identifies when and where an event took place.

An array of identified primary and secondary sources, relevant to the topic in question, were extensively utilised in this study. These sources were integrated in a sequence which fitted naturally into the main epochs as mentioned above, and were put together within the structure by appropriate narratives and evaluations. No attempts were made to modify the tense of original sources, but on the contrary, every effort was made to preserve the 'real-time' integrity of each source and to preserve the impression of a running commentary of the times and circumstances in which they were written. Oral interviews were noted as crucial sources in order for the study to re-construct and record the lives of generations of those who experienced the compulsion of the apartheid regime. As such, those targeted for interviews included Politicians, Academics, Trade Unionists, Civil Servants and some of the 'direct' victims of the apartheid regime.

In making use of the oral information, the research undertook to be cautious in considering various defects associated with the source. For instance, distortion of facts, exaggerations and understatements, deliberate suppression of facts and invention of events. All these were rectified by finding verification in written sources. Non-written sources were also noted to be of immense help towards the successful completion of this study. These included family albums, government records, photographs, personal diaries, minutes/records of political parties and other pressure groups, video clips and audio cassettes. Furthermore, several visits were undertaken to the National Archive, Museum of Apartheid and History and Culture Bureaus. Valuable data in the form of books, essays from journals, pamphlets, magazines, periodicals, unpublished theses and dissertations was identified for usage in this study at the University of Zululand's "Zulu Collection" section. This was noted as a repository of vital sources on the topic in question.

In the light of the above, the review of related literature in the research process identified all the related variables and clarified more issues pertaining to the study. As such, for adequate comprehension of the history and historiography of the repression of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, a broad range of written sources were utilised in the study. These sources differed in strength and limitations. Some provided extensive information and were utilised, while others, provided little but vital information as well.

1. 8. 2 Dissemination of Research

The findings of this research project were anticipated to be disseminated by means of publications, seminars and incorporation into school and universities' curriculum. Publications would be in the form of journal articles; a published book; and reading extracted papers in local and international conferences and workshops. This would solicit the involvement of professional historians (research and writing), specialists, history teachers and learners (cultural field), genealogists and biographers, librarians, historians and journalists, lawyers and theologians as well as civil servants with a keen interest in the contemporary history of South Africa. The research findings would also be disseminated for world consumption through the internet.

1.9 Ethical Consideration

Ethical guidelines in this research study were strictly adhered to. This was done by acknowledging the resource materials used (intellectual ownership right). This study, by its nature, involved the application of empiricism covering different groups of people, i.e. those who had experienced traumatic or stressful life circumstances. The study also involved a selected group of people (who had

experienced the apartheid regime), academics, politicians, trade unionists and statesmen.

Various interview sessions were conducted and the research ensured protection of the respondents' autonomy. Participants were not required to commit an act which might diminish self-respect or cause them to experience shame, embarrassment, or regret. Participants were also not exposed to questions which might cause stress or disappointment.

1.10 Thesis Structure

The research is comprised of six chapters. The first entails the aims, objectives and methodology of the study. The second chapter examines the construction of the apartheid compulsion. It also deals with the racial 'legal policies', detention without trials, dehumanisation and abuses of fundamental civil liberties coupled with underground covert operations. The third chapter explores the various crises faced by the apartheid regime. Such crises include: the hunger strike, the 1989 mass disobedience and protest against the regime. It also examines the nature of internal and external pressures posed on the apartheid government.

The fourth chapter looks into the policies used by the regime in destabilising the liberation movement. It also discusses the tricks and intrigues involved during the negotiation settlement and how the majority of people in South Africa succeeded in breaking the chains of apartheid compulsion. Chapter five deals with the justification of a new era - the advent of a popular democratic system. It also discusses the various challenges faced by the coalition Government. The

last chapter of the research covers the legacy of apartheid compulsion and an evaluation thereof.

1.11 Theoretical Framework

Theories do not cause change in history, but, they are used in understanding historical changes. It is in this regard that the study of the compulsion of the apartheid regime and its demise in South Africa required the application and utilisation of a trans-disciplinary approach and theories, as a single theoretical approach would not suffice to understand its complexity.

Thus, three theoretical approaches were employed for empirical analysis. They entail the structural theory of conflict as propounded by F.S. Ademola;¹⁷ the biological theory of conflict as presented by A. Ikelegbe,¹⁸ and finally, the human needs theory as articulated by C. Burton.¹⁹

The proponents of the theory of conflict posit that structural imperfections (internally conditioned or externally generated) are the main cause(s) of conflicts within various societies. In other words, structural theorists opine that conflicts occur in a society based on the structural nature of that society. However, the theory is divided into two broad concepts i.e. the radical and the

¹⁷. F.S. Ademola: 'Theories of Social Conflict' In: S.G, Best. (Ed.): *Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa: A Reader*, p.25.

¹⁸. A. Ikelegbe: 'Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramification of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle.', *Journal of African Studies*, p.24.

¹⁹. C. Burton: *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*. In: H. Mohammed. (Ed.). *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, p.14.

liberal structural theorists. In this regard, the Radical Structural Theorists view a Marxist historical and dialectical materialist interpretation of history as the major factor leading to the outbreak of conflict in a society.²⁰ To a larger extent, they rely on the struggle for materialism as the main cause of conflict in a society. The structuralists further observed that conflict emanated from society as a result of capitalist exploitative tendencies in relation to the -basic- societal needs. In other words, a high level of exploitation, (which had to do with the denial of fundamental civil rights especially against the working class) inevitably leads to a violent conflict within a political system. Thus, the proponents of this theory advocated for a systematic political change through the radical transformation of the economic and political structure of society.

From another angle, the liberal structuralist, observe that the struggle for common interests within societies/groups usually serve as a unifying factor against socio-economic and political exploitations. In essence, common interest is seen as a social engine which often resulted to the formation of various organisations against any form of exploitation.²¹ These organisations in return are expected to serve as vanguards of socio-economic and 'political engineering' geared towards overthrowing an exploitative political system.

Generally speaking, the structural school argues that conflict or violence is an inherent phenomenon naturally built in man. Thus, continuous struggle between

²⁰. H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' In: H. Mohammed. (Ed.): *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, pp.12-14.

²¹. H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' In: H. Mohammed. (Ed.): *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, pp.12-14.

two opposing economic and social indices inevitably leads to the outbreak of conflict. This could be seen in the case of the perpetual struggle between the 'haves' and 'have' not's, the privileged and the less privileged, the upper and lower classes and also between the factory owners and industrial workers/labourers, and, between the rulers and the ruled. Thus, it could be observed that in most societies where economic and social differences are pooled to an extreme end, violent conflict is likely to erupt.

In terms of the above, Mohammed posits that liberal structural theorists like Galtung Johan, believe that in a plural society, where there is a high level of economic and political inequality, social intolerance and ethnic or racial discrimination, conflict is bound to occur.²² Coupled with this, other social and economic indices such as underdevelopment, overpopulation, un-controlled waves of migration, a dispassionate political system and unfavourable social settings, usually result in the outbreak of conflict within -such- a geo-political setting. Thus, struggling for the maintenance of social and/or economic supremacy through the domination of the weak by the strong, inevitably results in the outbreak of conflict. It should be noted that one of the basic weaknesses of the structural theory of conflict is that it relies so much on material differences as the main cause of conflict in a society. Yet, it best fits in with our understanding of the causes and course of apartheid compulsion in South Africa and the events that followed. Black majority were dominated by a white minority.

The biological/behavioural theorists, on the other hand, look at conflict from the point of view of the social behaviour of man. They posit that the biological

²². H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' Cited from: H. Mohammed: (Ed.): *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, pp.12-13.

theory of conflict is made up of three main variables, namely: psychological, sociological and political variables. They view man (note that 'man' here is used in a plural form referring to both male and female) as a social animal. These theorists argue that man is naturally evil and he develops the tendency to react violently to/against any form of unfavourable condition, be it social, economic or political. In other words, human beings are by nature "masters of conflict rather than servants."²³ This shows that man is naturally created with destructive tendencies especially when his anger is pushed to an extreme end.

Furthermore, biological theorists like Ted Robert Gurr, John Dolard, Feierabend, Monga, Berkowitz and Yates opine that conflict is a product of perpetual aggression and frustration which usually results in the outbreak of conflict. In addition to this, Mohammed observes that the greater the discrepancy within a particular social setting, the greater the chances for violence to erupt.²⁴ In other words, the more individuals are denied access to their fundamental civil rights and other basic necessities, the more the tendency for conflict to emanate. Other scholars approach the biological theory of conflict from physiological point of view. They opine that the complexity of human behaviour which comprises basic necessities, degree of success or failure and level of stress or threat, are consciously or sub-consciously responsible for the outbreak of violence.

²³. H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' Cited from H. Mohammed: (Ed.): *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, pp.13.

²⁴. H. Mohammed: 'Basic Concepts and Theories of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution' In: H. Mohammed. (Ed.): *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*, pp.12-14.

The human needs theorists observe that for peace and tranquillity to prevail within a particular social setting, basic human needs such as social recognition, equal access to economic opportunity, security of life and property, welfare and political representation must be provided and/or equally distributed among the people.²⁵ Thus, they posit that human beings need some basic services which are expected to be provided by the state. As such, any attempt to deny or delay such basic needs is likely to ignite violent conflict. However, Burton, posits that the degree and success of preventing or minimizing conflict depends on how best the state meets up with the basic demands of its citizens. For instance, in a good number of under-developed countries, where the state failed to provide basic human needs due to economic crisis, conflict has always been the case.²⁶

It should be noted that there are quite a number of theories dealing with conflict studies, but this study picked only three, i.e. the structural theory of conflict, the biological theory of conflict and the human needs theory of conflict. This is attributed to the fact that the theories reflect and address issues that have to do with social inequality, economic exploitation and deprivation and political domination and oppression as was the case in South Africa during the period in question. It should be noted however, that none of these theories is devoid of weaknesses or limitations.

1.12 Literature Review

²⁵. Ibid, p.13.

²⁶. C. Burton: *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*. Cited from: H. Mohammed, (Ed.): *Concepts and Issues in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*. Vol. I, General Studies Unit, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria, pp.15-16.

A broad range of written sources were required to provide an adequate account and elucidation of the history and historiography of the compulsion of the apartheid regime and its demise and subsequent advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa during the epoch 1948-1996. These sources were noted to differ in strength and limitations. Some provided extensive information and formed the basis of the study.

In his 1999 study, Piet Meiring provides detailed analysis of the rationale behind the establishment of the Truth Commission and its *modus operandi*.²⁷ The author examines the work and terms of reference of the Commission which entailed stories and testimonies of the victims of apartheid, confessions and applications for amnesty (by offenders who were guilty of violating fundamental civil liberties), offering apologies to victims of apartheid and the need for national reconciliation.

The study further observes how the 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' became a subjective political tool - of historical narratives - of the African National Congress. In this way, the study posits that the Commission mainly focused on bad deeds of the apartheid regime. The current research fills a gap of details of atrocities committed by the ANC, IFP and other political organisations. The current research also provides additional information on the role(s) of the Truths and Reconciliation commission and how it shaped our understanding of the post-apartheid South Africa.

²⁷. P. Meiring: *Chronicles of the Truth Commission: A Journey through the past and present into the future of South Africa*, pp.123-127.

In their 2013 study, W. Beinart and S. Dubow examine the concept and nature of segregation and factors that led to the rise of apartheid as South Africa's official state ideology.²⁸ The study also examines how the political struggle against apartheid metamorphosed into a violent reaction from both the South African Defence Force (SADF) and various anti-apartheid liberation organisations.

Beinart and S. Dubow study further argues whether segregation was rooted in the actions of early settlers or in the late nineteenth century mineral revolution and migrant labour system. The study also delves on whether apartheid was an intensification of earlier segregation policies or a new philosophy. On the contrary, the current research fills the gap of providing solid background information in understanding the concept of racial segregation and the foundation of apartheid in South Africa.

In his 1996 study,²⁹ H Giliomee provides an insight into the administration record of 'the last Afrikaner leaders' and how they tried to create a corridor of power sharing with black South Africans without losing control and relevance at the center. The study posits that Hendrik Verwoerd was so convinced that he was right and so eloquent in convincing the leadership and supporters of the National Party. It does not, however, give details of the political *modus operandi* during that time. The current research delves into the intricacies of *modus operandi* and how it was carried out.

²⁸. W. Beinart and S. Dubow: *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, pp.1-288.

²⁹. H. Giliomee: *The Last Afrikaner Leaders: A Crucial Test of Power*, pp.408-429.

In line with the above, the study made a good presentation of the apartheid historical evidence and never deviates from the scholarly norms of rational academic discourse. The author draws on primary sources and personal interviews coupled with the official documents of the National Party. It also offers a coherent account of the ways in which various political developments unfolded up to the advent of multi-racial political system in South Africa. While the study contributes to the current research by providing background information on the political system of administration of various successive apartheid leaders, the current research give more light to our understanding of the conception of apartheid as well as the rise of the National Party between 1948 and 1994.

In her 1991 study, Deborah Posel focuses on influx control of human labour, where race ideologues and capitalists were likely to interact in clandestine ways. The study highlights how different Nationalist factions differed on how to implement apartheid policies in South Africa. It also posits how the utilisation of land through agriculture, commerce, and industry successfully overcome the purist ideologues until the National Party and Broederbond were better positioned to accommodate such pressures.

The study provides a useful and balanced examination of the complexities of implementing and administering apartheid regime. It also contributes to the current research particularly in our understanding of how land and labour were mobilised under successive apartheid governments. The relevance of the current research is its detailed account of factors that led to the lost of black political power in South Africa.

Another inciting work is that of FW de-Klerk, *The Last Trek: A new beginning*.³⁰ The study is an autobiography of the author and it examines the rationale behind the introduction of apartheid policy coupled with the factors that led to the decline of apartheid system as an official national policy. The study offers thoughts on where the country was heading to and what place the Afrikaner people might have in a new multi-racial South Africa. The author was the last apartheid president of South Africa, as such, the study suggests that he must have known that his party would lose and that was why he effectively handover political power of the Afrikaners to the ANC. The study also reassured the Afrikaner *volk* that this is not the end for them but merely a fresh challenge. He further examines the relationship between the FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela and how their relationship subsequently deteriorated leading to the collapse of the coalition Government of National Unity (GNU).

In line with the above, the study contributes to the current research by providing background information on the political system of administration of various successive apartheid leaders. It also shades more light to our understanding of the conception of apartheid as well as the rise of the National Party between 1948 and 1994. On the contrary, the current research provides detailed understanding of the political transition from apartheid to popular democratic system in South Africa.

³⁰. F.W. de Klerk: *The Last Trek: A new beginning*, pp.340-356.

One instructive work is Ngcokovane's study on the "Demons of Apartheid"³¹ His work, a PhD Thesis published as a book, covers the periods between 1948 and 1989. The study investigates the mechanism put in place by three organizations, i.e. the Nederduitse *Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK), the Afrikaner Broederbond and the National Party, all in their attempts to justify and safeguard the superiority of white South Africans over the majority black. Such a mechanism is known as apartheid. The author exposes and coins these three organizations as the 'demons of apartheid'. As mentioned above, the research began in 1948, due to the election victory of the National Party (N.P) which led to the forceful imposition of apartheid as a national policy in South Africa. Thus it observes the role played by the N.G.K. in justifying the policies of apartheid from religious, ethical and moral points of view. The study also encapsulates how the Gospel was misinterpreted by the N.G.K to justify and rationalise the concept of apartheid especially among the Afrikaner people. On the other hand, a systematic and careful survey was made by the author in analysing the role played by the Afrikaner Broederbond especially in the formulation of apartheid policies in South Africa.

The study observes that various legislations were introduced into the constitution in order to find moral and ethical backing for apartheid. The study further discusses the response of the black South Africans to apartheid that formed various political, cultural and labour organizations. This new development made the apartheid regime react vehemently by imposing new racial laws.

³¹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.109.

The study also examines the constitutional crisis faced by the National Party in the early eighties coupled with increased protest and demonstrations from the black South Africans. Though, the study did not 'leave to see the light of day' - the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa. It suggests various ways that would lead to the liberation of blacks and other racial groups in South Africa. Ngcokovane's study has provided the current research with vital information particularly the *modus operandi* of the National Party, the Broederbond secret organisation and the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) and how they contributed to the institutionalisation of apartheid policy in South Africa. Ngcokovane's work, however, left some gaps on the compulsive nature of apartheid policies which this study fills.

In his 2005 study, Singh examines the nature of inter-group relations between Indians and black Africans in Durban -particularly in post-apartheid South Africa. The study discusses how the two racial groups were marginalised by the whites' apartheid government.³² It also posits the nature of the struggle for supremacy between Indian bus owners and black taxi owners/drivers. The study opines that with the demise of apartheid, Indians were faced with increased competition in the Durban transport industry. The transport monopoly hitherto enjoyed by the Indians was seriously challenged with the emergence of new black taxi owners. According to the study this led to a struggle for monopolisation of certain bus/taxi routes between the two racial groups in question. In effect this competition for control over transport led to the deaths of hundreds of people as a result of attacks and counter attacks from both sides.

The study further examines the emergence of the 'informal black settlement' in the outskirts of Durban. It opines that black squatters posed a social threat to the

³². A. Singh: *Indians in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, pp.21

existence and survival of Indians in Durban. Such security threats were analysed in the form of theft, burglary, disappearance of clothes from washing lines, hijacking of cars and armed robbery. These developments, forced some of the Indian families to relocate to other parts of the country. Others saw emigration as a last resort from the deteriorating social and political disorder that bedevilled post-apartheid South Africa. The study further takes into consideration the continued deterioration of the educational system and the subsequent emergence of mixed-race schools. Thus, it observes that Indian teachers were faced with new challenges from black students on one hand, and, also between Indians and black African students on the other. The study also examines the impacts of poverty on the educational development of black African students. It discusses black parents' inability to provide their children with books, uniforms, transport fares, breakfast or lunch. An observation is equally made on how the shortage or lack of transport facilities affects black African students from reporting to school on time. This study provided the topic in question with an in-depth analysis on the nature of inter-group relations between Indians and Black South Africans with particular reference to post-apartheid Durban. However, the work leaves out an elucidation on the varying impact of the apartheid regime's compulsive rule on the people of South Africa which this current study provides in detail.

In her 1997 study, Charlene Smith discusses how the apartheid political opposition activists were imprisoned in Robben Island. She makes particular reference to Nelson Mandela.³³ It also examines the brutalities and dehumanisation inflicted upon the prisoners. The study posits how deprivation, neglect and the abuse of civil liberties metamorphosed into an avenue for

³³. C. Smith: *Robben Island - A Place of Inspiration: Mandela's Prison Island*, p.52

reconciliation, forgiveness, hope and liberation. It further examines the evolutionary stages of the RIP from a social mail station to a place of exile, and, to a military defence post then to a maximum security prison and finally to a world heritage site.

The study takes into account various escape bravados and the improvisation of new techniques of communication and survival strategies among the prisoners. An observation is equally made on how the unique nature of the RIP transformed the prisoners into having a strong bond of brotherhood, compassion and comradeship with a high spirit of determination against the apartheid policies. The study also examines how the RIP served as one of the nerve centres of both social and political engineering against the apartheid regime. It further accounts for the spirit of conviction and sacrifice nurtured by the prisoners towards the liberation and actualisation of a popular democratic system in South Africa. The study prompted this research to delve into more details on inhuman treatment meted on various political prisoners under the apartheid regime.

In his 1994 study, Johnson examines how the small town of Umtata (an administrative centre of the Transkei province) metamorphosed from white to black dominance.³⁴ It examines how minority white South Africans established economic and political control over the majority of black inhabitants of Umtata. An observation of the harsh policies of apartheid in Umtata and racial segregation thereafter were also taken into consideration. The study further takes into cognisance how blacks, Indians and the coloureds were

³⁴. W. R. Johnson: *Dismantling Apartheid- A South African Town in Transition*, p.67.

disenfranchised and denied access to serve under the Umtata administrative units.

The study also examines the collapse of the apartheid regime in relation to the town of Umtata and the subsequent emergence of the ANC as the ruling political party through a democratic process. It also posits how post-apartheid South Africa creates an enabling environment for the rise of black middle class bourgeoisie. In relation to this, an analysis of the evolution of a new social order and the abolition of the segregationist policies -in South Africa- were taken into consideration.

The study further posits how the demise of the apartheid regime led to the outward relocation of white communities from Umtata to other parts of South Africa where there is a high concentration of whites. In addition, the study opines that proportionate privileges hitherto enjoyed by the white communities in Umtata, were gradually substituted with a new class of multi-racial elites. Although it observes that the majority of less privileged inhabitants of Umtata found it difficult to differentiate between apartheid and post-apartheid governments, it posits that life was still difficult and unbearable for blacks in post-apartheid South Africa. In other words, there was no significant change in the economic and social welfare of black South Africans in the post-apartheid era. The inherent gaps in the study, justified a need for the current research which provide detailed information on the nature of inter-group relations - particularly- among the black and white residents of Umtata.

In his 2003 study, Buntman examines how apartheid government imprisoned thousands of people who opposed its segregationist policies.³⁵ The study posits how the Robben island prisoners organised and resisted various forms of subjection from the apartheid government. Thus, it observes that the RIP was designed primarily to oppress those who opposed apartheid policies. On the contrary, the study examines how the prisoners gallantly transformed their prison condition into a strong and formidable wave of resistance against the apartheid government. It observes that opposition political organisations continued to boost the morale of various apartheid political prisoners. The study also examines RIP as an 'institution of dehumanisation' and how it was transformed into a 'university of resistance'. It also opines that the inhuman treatment meted on the prisoners, developed the spirit of conviction on the part of the prisoners, which eventually led to the triumph of popular democracy in South Africa. This study necessitated this research to delve into detailed factors responsible for the mobilisation and organisation of apartheid political prisoners against the regime.

In his 1984 work, Motlhabi discusses how the apartheid government refused to accept the black population as part of South Africa's citizens; instead the apartheid government insisted that blacks should, and must, live each according to its own ancestral ethnic group independent of one another. For instance, it was observed that the apartheid regime called for the formation of black labour unions based along ethnic lines in order to polarise various resistance movements against the regime.

³⁵. F.L. Buntman: *Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid*, p.112.

The study also challenges and later debunks the idea which says that the Gospel was in favour of racial segregation or the superiority of whites over the blacks. In due course, an analysis was made (as forwarded by the N.G.K and the Nationalist government) on 'Moral Laws' 'Legislations' and 'Philosophies' of the apartheid regime in the context of Christian theology.³⁶ The study further posits the reorganization of the constitutional structure and leadership of the above mentioned political organizations towards the actualisation of political liberation. It goes on to suggest the application of non-violence method as the first step in actualising socio-economic and political freedom. But, if failed, then, war or revolutionary alternatives would remain open for consideration.

The aforementioned work played a vital role towards the development of the current research. It served as an eye-opener into the role and organisational structure of the leading oppositional political organisations. The study did not cover much on the compulsive tendencies of the apartheid regime, coupled with the violation of civil liberties and the subsequent social unrest at the turn of the last decade of the 20th century. Therefore, the current study is set to cover the existing gap as a contribution to knowledge.

In their 1993 work, Philip Bonner, Peter Dexter and Deborah Posel concentrate much on the first phase of apartheid (i.e. 1948-1961).³⁷ Their study posits that the central dynamic of apartheid was the struggle over the distribution and

³⁶. M. Motlhabi: *The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid: A Social-Ethical Analysis*, p.73.

³⁷. Phil. Bonner, Peter Dexter and D Posel: 'The Shaping of Apartheid: Contradiction, Continuity and Popular Struggle' Cited from: B. Philip, et al. (eds.): *Apartheid's Genesis, 1935-196*, p.43.

control of cheap labour. Thus it was observed that the ideologies of racial domination and segregation were conceived in the womb of South Africa long before the birth of apartheid as a national policy in 1948. The research further examines various historical antecedences leading to the justification and forceful entrenchment of the radical and ruthless racial policy of apartheid in South Africa.

An increase in black population and the emergence of these new settlements - occupied by black labourers- across the urban and commercial cities in South Africa, posed an economic and social threat to white hegemony. In response to this, the government of 1948 was left with no other option but apartheid, and other racial legislations, as a means of checkmating what the government considered a 'threat to the survival of white South Africans. Thus, it observes that the domestic, rural economy began to decline as a result of a new shift from a rural to urban economy. This laid a fertile ground for the decline of the domestic rural economy. Their work has necessitated this research to contribute towards an understanding of the evolution of black labour camps in most of the industrialised cities across South Africa. In addition, the current research provided an insight on how apartheid transformed the domestic rural economic system of production by exposing it to industrialised modern capitalist economy.

In his 1991 study, Shamase examined the organizational policies and *modus operandi* of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the National Party (NP) during

apartheid's compulsive era.³⁸ The study posits that the two political parties agreed on the multi-cultural nature of South Africa and also recognized the multi-party system of election in the country. While the NP advocated for a separate development based on ethnic or racial groups, the IFP on the other hand, expressed the view that no single organisation or body could determine the socio-political and economic future of the country. As such, his study suggests that the two parties in question believed in the idea of non-violence and preached of dialogue and negotiations as remedies to the liberation struggle against the apartheid regime and its policies.

The study argues that the National Party was an illegitimate regime which only represented the interests of the minority of South Africans. The Inkatha was also seen as a mere organisation that perpetuates ethnicity. Above all, it was noted as a body which collaborated with the invaders against the sacred sovereignty of Africa as a whole. This study provided additional information in understanding the nature of the relationship between the NP and IFP during the apartheid regime, it did not cover much on how the apartheid government succeeded in violating civil liberties in South Africa. As such, the current research is set to fill that gap in detail.

By 1985, the study suggests the political scenario of South Africa appeared to be what one may call “a brutal face off”. It also takes into account, without delving into detail, the ugly political picture of the country in the mid-1980s which led to the declaration of a state of emergency. The era covered in the

³⁸. M. Z. Shamase: ‘A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985’, p.74.

study, afforded this research opportunity to provide valuable information on the implementation of apartheid's compulsive policies.

In his 1998 study, Ntuli examines the factors responsible for the forceful removal of the Mthiyane people from their ancestral home land eMandlazini (now Richards Bay) to Ntambanana in 1976.³⁹ Thus it observes that the Group Areas Act gave the apartheid regime the power and authority to forcefully evict people occupying certain designated areas. It is for this reason that the Mthiyane people –inhabitants of eMandlazini- received an order from the regime on the 25th December 1975 to vacate the area in question on or before the 6th of January 1976. Ntuli's study prompted the current research to delve more into compulsive apartheid policy of forced evictions/removals which in many ways affected fundamental civil liberties.

In his 1998 study, Jackie Grobler examines the foundation of popular political protest among South African blacks.⁴⁰ The study also discusses the activities of black politicians within and outside the country. This could be seen in terms of the formation and organisation of various political movements, political protest and also the creation of awareness and enlightenment among black Africans. The study is divided into three distinct epochs. The first phase covers the period between 1875 and 1939. This period, marked the basis for black political consciousness in South Africa. The period also examines the loss of black political autonomy and the ascendance of white supremacy and how it affected

³⁹. S.H. Ntuli, 'The History of the Mthiyane People who were removed from Richards Bay to Ntambanana, Wednesday, 6th January 1976.', p.7.

⁴⁰. J. Grobler: *A Decisive Clash?-A Short History of Black Protest Politics in South Africa*, 1875-1976, pp.1-128.

African traditional settings. The period, according to the study, marked the basis for de-tribalisation of black South African traditional values.

The second phase covers the period between 1940 and 1960. Under this period, the study examines the growing clash between African nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism. The third phase covers between 1961 and 1976. This period covers the underground activities of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) within and outside the country. It also discusses the establishment of foreign base units by the opposition political organisations across the Frontline States (FS). As a result of this study, the current research undertook an indepth analysis of the background and nature of nationalism among black South Africans up to 1976.

In his 1994 study, which is derived from his personal experience as an inmate in the Robben Island Prison for about ten years,⁴¹ Alexander examines the level of cruelty, deprivation, dehumanisation, neglect and general abuse of fundamental civil liberties. The study deals with the experience of apartheid political prisoners in the Robben Island Prison (RIP), particularly those who openly opposed the institutionalisation of racial policies in South Africa. Thus, it observes how the incarceration of various political prisoners helped to mobilise the majority of people in South Africa against the apartheid government. A critical analysis is carried out on the inhuman treatment meted on various political prisoners within the four walls of the prison.

⁴¹. N. Alexander: *Robben Island Dossier*, p.13.

A systematic observation reveals that various apartheid political prisoners were relegated to below the level of human beings. It equally examines how political prisoners managed to reorganise themselves through the spirit of nationalism, with a high level of conviction against the apartheid government. The study contributes towards the understanding of the compulsive nature of the apartheid regime on its political prisoners.

In his 2004 study, Bozzoli focuses on the township of Alexandra, a suburb of Johannesburg.⁴² Accordingly, the township served as a concentration camp for the Johannesburg industrial labourers and squatters. He argues that the inhuman nature of the apartheid racial policies in South Africa forced the majority of township inhabitants to organise and mobilise themselves into a popular protest against the apartheid regime. Furthermore, an intensive analysis into the living conditions of people in the township is carried out. It reveals that Alexandria - like other impoverished black rural settlements- was faced with abject poverty, poor sanitation, deprivation and marginalisation. The study also reveals that a combination of socio-economic and political miseries in Alexandria had succeeded in producing a pathological anger and retreat towards the white's racial policies in South Africa.

However, the study opines that the cruel nature of the apartheid government had resulted in the outbreak of a series of revolts against the segregationist policies of apartheid in the township of Alexandra. A good number of people (from the township in question) were injured while hundreds lost their lives as a result of various forms of state security brutalities. It went ahead to prove how revolts in Alexandria differed from other revolts across apartheid South Africa. It opines

⁴². B. Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.87.

that in the case of Alexandria, the major cause of revolts were spatial in nature rather than racial. It also argues that another cause of revolts in the township had to do with the high level of poverty -which resulted in social disorder- rather than racial segregation. This study prompted this research to provide more information on how the compulsive tendencies of the apartheid regime resulted in the outbreak of social disorder particularly among the less privileged industrialised townships in South Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

Constructing the Vehicle of Compulsion: Apartheid Laws in motion, 1948-1988

"History shows that penalties do not deter men when their conscience is aroused...for to men, freedom in their own land is the pinnacle of their ambitions, from which nothing can turn men of conviction aside." -Nelson Mandela, 1964,

Introduction

The year 1948, as alluded to in the previous chapter, introduced a new concept to the South African vocabulary, i.e. apartheid. The era saw the emergence of the National Party¹ as the ruling party in South Africa with D.F. Malan as the Prime Minister of the country. The period between 1985 and 1988 witnessed the imposition of a state of emergency by the apartheid regime in its desire to suppress and control protests and opposition to its governance of South Africa.² The regime introduced a wide range of compulsive and discriminatory measures designed, not only to stem the tide of black Africans' development and also to break the level of working class resistance, but also to protect the *status quo* of the minority white South Africans.³

Therefore, in light of the above, this chapter attempts to delve into the imposition of various compulsive legislative policies on the vast majority of

¹. National Party in South Africa was an opposition party to the then United National South African Party, popularly known as the United Party. After the 'general election' of 1948, the National Party emerged 'victorious' and since then, it continued to rule South Africa putting in place compulsive apartheid policies up to 1994.

². FW, de Klerk: *The Last Trek - A new beginning* & D, Posel. *The Making of Apartheid: Conflict and Compromise*, 1948-1961.

³. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.35.

South Africans by the apartheid regime. It should be noted, however, that the study does not argue that the year 1948 was the beginning of the establishment and execution of such policies. On the contrary, there were quite a number of discriminatory government policies that were put in place prior to the period in question. The institutionalisation of compulsive measures made the apartheid regime unique from the previous white governments prior to 1948.⁴

This chapter limits itself to the inhuman legislative policies that began to surface from the emergence of the National Party (NP) as the ruling regime and the immediate imposition of apartheid as a national policy. The ‘apartheid regime’ is used in this study to refer to the administration of the Nationalist Party in South Africa.⁵ As will be seen from this chapter onwards, the apartheid regime resorted to the use of compulsive strategies as a means of compelling and entrenching its political agenda.

This was achieved through the support of the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) which refers to the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa. It can be argued that the NGK was indirectly responsible for the forceful entrenchment of the policy of apartheid in South Africa. This particular Church (i.e. NGK) grossly misrepresented the teachings and contents of the Gospel in order to further the interests of White South Africans in support of apartheid. In fact, some scholars of contemporary political history are of the view that the compulsive policy of apartheid was conceived in the womb of the NGK prior to

⁴. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: “The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid” In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*. Routledge, p.3.

⁵. H.Giliomee and B. Mbenga: *New History of South Africa*, p.312.

the turn of the 20th century.⁶ On the other hand, the Afrikaner Broederbond (popularly known as the Bond) was a powerful secret organisation that influenced the political philosophy of the apartheid regime. It was established in South Africa towards the end of the 19th century (though it came to the limelight in the year 1918). It began as a Youth organisation of the Afrikaners and later metamorphosed into a powerful secret cult. Its membership was exclusively limited to Afrikaners.

By the turn of the century, the Broederbond had reorganised itself and began to plan and execute various policies towards the preservation of Afrikaans and Afrikaner interests in South Africa. During the period of apartheid, the Broederbond came to play a vital role in terms of establishing and executing various policies. To some extent, it could be argued that the Broederbond was remote-controlling the National Party's decisions throughout the period of apartheid.⁷

It is in light of the above that this chapter makes a close examination of the various shapes and forms of apartheid's compulsive strategies. For instance, the laws that justified the imposition of such legislations and also the instruments used by the regime to ensure the success of such legislations notably; the police, army, internal security agents and the judiciary, were studied in relation to the abuse and violation of civil liberties. Other compulsive strategies could be seen in the form of detention without trial, solitary confinements, banning of

⁶. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, pp.46,48.

⁷. Confidential interview of Mr Kenneth Mthembu (Zulu and Pastor) held on 15th June 2013, at Sandton, Johannesburg, Gauteng Province.

opposition groups, forced exiles, imprisonments, assassinations, under-ground disappearance of individuals and leading political figures and their supporters, incarcerations and tortures which in many cases resulted in deaths in detention.⁸

The compulsive legislations of the apartheid regime completely chained every aspect of human life - particularly the black majority. Some scholars, however, argued that the imposition of these compulsive legislative laws in one way or the other also negatively affected the lives of some white South Africans. This meant that those whites who proved to be neutral/liberal and those who directly or indirectly decided to identify themselves with the liberation struggle suffered almost the same fate as other opponents of the apartheid regime. As such, it can be argued that the laws were primarily established with the intention of exploiting and marginalizing the majority of black Africans and other racial groups that opposed the apartheid regime.

Institutionalisation and Legitimation of Compulsive Policies

The apartheid regime embarked on a carefully calculated scheme, using legislation as a weapon of exploitation and oppression. These legislations⁹ (as would be seen), were used to separate races on the one hand, and to suppress

⁸ C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, pp.48-50.

⁹ J. Netshitenzhe: "A Continuing search for Identity: Carrying the burden of History" Cited from A, Lissoni. (Ed.): *One Hundred Years of the ANC- Debating Liberation Histories Today*, pp. 30-34.

opponents ('law breakers') on the other. In essence, all laws in the country were meant for the protection of the whites and virtually, all rules and regulations were for the subjugation of Black South Africans.

What made South Africa's apartheid era different from forms of segregation and racial hatred that occurred in other countries was the systematic way in which the National Party formalized it through the imposition of various legislations.¹⁰ Under these laws, South Africa was presumed to be a multinational not multiracial country.¹¹ The apartheid regime referred to South Africa as a multinational country in order to prove that the country was a combination of different ethnic groups and races and that each was allowed to realize its potentialities independent of one another. Thus emphasis was on the policy of 'separate development' of all racial groups. This idea was born out of fear of black domination as noted by Ngcokovane. He said:

"There is fear among whites not to be dominated, which is part of the psycho-sociology shaping the racial policy of the apartheid regime."¹²... "Whenever a new contingency arose, the government simply created new legislation to deal with the problem. A security blanket enveloped the country providing comfort for the minority and smothering the majority."¹³

¹⁰. B.E.Alistair: *'Apartheid Legislation in South Africa'*, p.1.

¹¹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.3.

¹². Ibid, p.138.

¹³. Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 1. p.24. For details refer: P, Meiring. *Chronicles of the Truth Commission: A Journey through the past and present into the future of South Africa*.

The apartheid regime began by establishing legislations that prepared a fertile ground for the protection and maintenance of the status-quo of the white South Africans. These legislations were usually passed as bills in the house of parliament before they were considered laws. The smooth passing of the laws was obvious because the vast majority of parliamentary members were members of the ruling National Party. In addition, a reasonable number of parliamentarians from opposition parties welcomed the idea of apartheid as a national policy in South Africa.

It can therefore be argued that, the main tool or machinery used to this end (i.e. enforcement of apartheid laws) was the systematic application of legislative laws. Although these legislative policies differed in contents and mode of operations, they were all geared towards achieving the goal of apartheid. It is equally important to note that the opposition political groupings in South Africa did protest, instead of watching a smooth execution of such compulsive legislations on them. As such, for more understanding and academic cogency, the chapter also attempts to examine and discuss these compulsive policies in relation to the violation of civil liberties in South Africa.

The Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act, PMMA (Act no. 55) of 1949¹⁴ can be seen as the first of such compulsive measures passed under the apartheid regime. In terms of this law, it was prohibited for blacks to marry whites, Indians, or coloureds. It was also against the law for Indians to marry blacks, whites, coloureds and vice-versa. It should be noted that this law (i.e. Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act) went beyond the concept of marriage

¹⁴. B.E. Alistair: *Apartheid Legislation in South Africa*, p.1.

between different racial groups. The underlying secret lay in the fact that the apartheid regime wanted to avoid cross hybridization of people and culture which might (in the end) pose a critical challenge to the supremacy of the minority white South Africans. Thus, the government wanted to polarize the existing gap between exploited racial groups thereby creating a policy of divide-and-rule which would make it easier for socio-political and economic exploitation.

There was also the introduction of the Immorality Amendment Act, IMA (Act no. 21) of 1950.¹⁵ Under this act, it was prohibited for a white man/woman to attempt or commit adultery or any related 'immoral' acts (such as extra-marital affair) with a black woman/man. Surprisingly, this same act was silent on committing immoral (sexual) act amongst the blacks, whites and other racial groups. In this regard, Ngcokovane asserted that:

"Ironically, while the white male politicians have been passing Bills that bar social and sexual intercourse between their daughters or wives and Black men, Black women on the other hand, in the [sic] hundreds have been victims of whites men's sexual exploitation. The very authors of social and sexual segregationist Bills including a large number of prominent Afrikaners are directly responsible for the existence of Africans of mixed ancestry. What is more absurd, however, is the...maintenance of the 'perfect purity of white blood' while constantly violating the laws that are meant to back up that very theory."¹⁶

In essence, this bill was forwarded in order to avoid the tendency of establishing any social relationship that might lead to the feeling of having social equality among other racial groups.

¹⁵. Ibid, pp.1-2.

¹⁶. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, pp.102-103.

As such, the apartheid regime, in its bid to control and ensure the successful exploitation of human labour, decided to incorporate certain laws that were put in place prior to 1948. This could be seen with the introduction of the Land Act of 1950 which contained the Native Land Act policy, NLA (Act no. 27) of 1913 and the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923. The former made it illegal for blacks to purchase or lease land from whites except in reserve. This restricted black occupancy to less than eight per cent in such areas.¹⁷

This meant that though one fifth of the population of South Africa consisted of minority whites, they owned 87% of the land and 90% of the economic resources which meant that invariably they controlled almost all of the country's political power.¹⁸ The latter laid the foundation for residential segregation in urban areas.¹⁹ The blacks were made to believe that they had lost rights over their land by virtue of various agreements and treaties they had entered into with the whites for centuries. R. Turner made the following observation:

"The African(s)...did not have private property or a concept permission to use bits of their 'tribal' areas which they were not using at the time, they were rather surprised when whites turned round and explained that the land was now the exclusive possession of the whites, whether they were using it or not. And if they objected, then the whites, often honestly believing that they had bought the land, used force to impose their definition of the situation."²⁰

¹⁷. Ibid, p.16.

¹⁸. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.1.

¹⁹. B. E.Alistair: *Apartheid Legislation in South Africa*, p.2.

²⁰. R. Turner: *The Eye of the Needle*, p.28.

This shows that the majority of black South Africans lost their traditional rights over their ancestral land by virtue of the compulsive legal policies. The law inevitably forced blacks to serve as labourers, receiving meagre amounts as wages. In order to buttress the above point, Ngcokovane also observed that:

"...such an argument is analogous to that of a person who enters someone's bedroom while the owner is still in the kitchen, and then explains, when the bedroom owner returns, that it was unoccupied, so it is his/her bedroom now. Then, drives the owner of the bedroom into the pantry and takes the kitchen as well, to punish the owner for complaining."²¹

Consequently, the year 1950 could be seen as another beginning of the incorporation and tightening of black human labour to the land under the apartheid compulsive regime. They were made to be tenants on their own land with little or no right to question the authority of the landlords.²² As such, in order to ensure strict control of economic resources and access to social welfare, the apartheid regime came up with another mechanism (legislation) known as the Population Registration Act, PRA (Act no. 30) of 1950.²³ This law, led to the creation of a national register in which every person's race was recorded for easy identification. In addition to this, the Race Classification Board RCB (composed of mainly white officials) was responsible for taking the final decision in regards to individual racial identity particularly in disputed cases.

²¹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.28.

²². Majority of black Africans in South Africa were forced to give up their lands to minority white settlers either through the use of superior arms or by virtue of compulsive legislations imposed on them and were forced to accept.

²³. C. Cachalia and M.Suttner: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, p.27.

Under this law, blacks were seriously exploited and marginalised especially when it came to employment opportunities and conditions of service either in factories, industries or on white farms.

The apartheid regime, in its bids towards consolidating its power and authority, decided to take the inhuman compulsive legislations to a higher level. This was achieved by endorsing what was called the Group Areas Act, (Act no. 41) of 1950.²⁴ The Act, led to the forceful physical separation of races by creating different and distinct residential areas for each racial group. Each racial group was given a specific area(s) to serve as its place of residence.

The above law paved the way for the forceful removal of blacks and coloureds from their traditional areas of residences. The apartheid regime backed the policy with what it coined as 'people living in wrong areas'. The majority of blacks suffered an untold hardship under this legislation.²⁵ They were robbed of 90% of their residences and farmlands. Traditional landlords turned into ordinary squatters on their own land. In most cases, they were served with a short ultimatum to vacate their lands or else face the power of the police and military bulldozers. The new areas or settlements with which they were provided were more or less open ghettos. In line with the above assertion, Mandela, observed that:

"The Government decided to move people out of townships in the 1950s. It said that the townships were slumps-but the real reason was that the government did not want Africans to own property in the cities.

²⁴. H. Giliomee and B.Mbenga: *New History of South Africa*, p.318.

²⁵. Confidential interview of Mr Moosa Tyamzashe (Xhosa and businessman) held on 17th June 2013, at Soweto, Johannesburg, Gauteng Province.

The government divided the people into seven ethnic groups extending apartheid policy within Black Africans and said that they should move to Meadowlands, 13 miles outside Johannesburg."²⁶

On the other hand, an increase in the number of blacks in urban and commercial centres made it possible for the whites to develop suspicion at the prospect of surviving in the midst of majority blacks. At the same time, going back to the period of the Second World War, the black labour force was highly needed to fill in the vacancies created by the demand of white labour during the war. Indeed, the development of urban industrialisation in South Africa during World War II would not have been possible without the increased incorporation of the black labour force within the areas of production and manufacturing. This scenario reached a climax where even women were not left behind. They contributed in the field of manufacture and productivity because the influx of labourers to the urban centres was becoming a permanent process.²⁷

Furthermore, the Group Areas Act was designed in order to reshuffle the very nature of African traditional settlement and also to subjugate Africans below the level of humans. As they were forced to leave, little or no compensations were issued to them as incentives to start a new life. In most cases, children and the elderly became vulnerable and exposed (in the new areas) to diseases such as: cholera, malaria and typhoid among others, due to bad sanitary conditions and

²⁶. M. Z. Shamase: 'A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985', p.33.

²⁷. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.33.

unhygienic food and water. Such new settlements could be seen closely located to most industrial towns and cities.²⁸

The apartheid regime blindfolded its eyes from the naked truth of the rule of nature. This could be seen in the rural-urban movement of people which appeared to be a natural economic development. For instance, the transformation of the South African economy from agrarian to an industrialized mode of production, made the country witness the emergence and development of new companies and industries. This new development meant an increase in the demand for cheap human labour. Black Africans from the rural areas began to move *en masse* to urban centres in order to supply their labour to earn a living. The white industrialists welcomed the idea though it was short-lived because the apartheid government saw the increasing number of blacks in urban centres as a threat to their supremacy.²⁹ As such, they decided to allocate special quarters for the labourers to serve as their temporary residence. Soweto³⁰ could be seen as a good example of such a settlement. This is because almost all industrial and commercial centres in South Africa have an affiliate of such labour camps. This could be seen from the life as experienced by Nelson Mandela:

²⁸. Confidential interview of Mr Moosa Tyamzashe (Xhosa and businessman) held on 17th June 2013, at Soweto, Johannesburg, Gauteng Province. (Male hostels were constructed for black African labourers in the outskirt of the industrialise cities, coupled with other areas where mining activities took place).

²⁹. Confidential interview of Ms Lindiwe Zulu (Zulu and Cabinet Minister) held on 10th July 2013, at Randfontein and Kagiso, West Rand District municipality, Gauteng Province.

³⁰. H. Giliomee and B. Mbenga: *New History of South Africa*, p.355.

"In the early hours of 9th February 1955, an estimated number of about 4,000 police and army troops surrounded Sophiatown. The removal had begun and there was no stopping the government [sic]. Truckloads of families were moved from Sophiatown to Meadowlands. Bulldozers crushed the houses to the ground."³¹

The above expression was a complete abuse and violation of fundamental ethics of civil liberties. The apartheid government was quite aware of such abuses yet, it blindfolded its eyes from the harsh realities, and bearing in mind (with support from NGK and Bond) that nothing would stop it from achieving its desired goal of Afrikaner domination of blacks and other racial groups.

Another law was introduced known as the Suppression of Communist Act, (Act no.44) of 1950 to serve a dual purpose. The first was to crush the ideology of communism from spreading throughout the country. The government held the belief that communism and its ideologies were responsible for the emergence of opposition parties with radical and violent philosophies. Secondly, the apartheid regime wanted to suppress communism in order to reduce the political strength of the opposition parties, mainly the ANC which was formed in 1912³² in reaction to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. By 1914, barely two years after the formation of ANC, the National Party was born. The ANC was established "to defend and advance the rights of the African people after

³¹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.35.

³². J. Kane-Berman: *South Africa's Silent Revolution*, p.29.

what it referred to as the violent destruction of their independence and the creation of the White supremacist Union of South Africa.”³³

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was established in 1959.³⁴ As the name implied, it was established with the sole intention of safeguarding and protecting the rights of black Africans in South Africa. Unlike the ANC, the PAC advocated for the membership of black Africans only. If compared with the ANC, it would be right to say that the PAC was more conservative in its philosophies. The party also advocated for the total emancipation of black Africans from white colonial domination.³⁵

The regime believed that various communist countries were helping the opposition groups in terms of funds, weapons and training. The act further defined communism as any attempt geared towards mobilizing and organising any form of socio-political, economic opposition which would lead to any kind of protest or violence. The act empowered the Minister of Justice to shortlist suspected members of such organisations, prosecute and ban them in most cases for a period of five years. The ban could be in the form of not allowing them to hold public office, attend public meeting(s) or from visiting certain specified

³³. M. Z. Shamase: ‘A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985’, p.188.

³⁴. W.H. Kansteiner: *South Africa: Revolution or Reconciliation?*, p.27.

³⁵. S. Armstrong: *In Search of Freedom*, p.70.

areas within the country. This is a clear manifestation of abuse on freedom of movement.³⁶

Furthermore, the law not only made it illegal for Africans to be members of the communist party but it also empowered the regime with compulsive powers to deal with any organisation or group of persons who did not agree with its inhuman policies. It also defined communism such that it broadly covered any call for a radical change. Members were sometimes banned from participating in any form of political organization or restricted to live within a particular area.³⁷ This idea was totally contrary to the freedom of movement as enshrined in the fundamental principles of civil liberty.

The year 1951 witnessed the passing of more compulsive legislations. For instance, there was the Bantu Building Workers Act, (Act no. 27) of 1951.³⁸ Under this act, blacks were trained as -semi-skilled- artisans in the field of trade and building construction. But according to the law, after graduating, they were allowed to work only in areas that were designated for black South Africans. The law also made it a criminal offence for black labourers to perform any skilled work in the urban areas except places that were approved by the apartheid regime.

According to Ngcokovane:

"Job reservation has its origin in the Mines and Works Act of 1911...any employer who employs Africans in one of these skills (building,

³⁶. C. F. Forsyth and J. E. Schiller (eds.): *'Human Rights - The Cape Town Conference. 'In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Human Rights in South Africa*, p.5.

³⁷. B. E. Alistair: *Apartheid Legislation in South Africa*, p.2.

³⁸. B. E. Alistair: *Apartheid Legislation in South Africa*, p.2.

plastering, masonry, carpentry, painting, sign writing, plumbing, and electrical fitting) commits a criminal offence."³⁹

The above law was put as a mechanism towards controlling cheap labour from black Africans and it also served as a means of preserving similar job opportunities for the whites in the cities. There was also the Separate Representation of Voters Act, (Act no. 46) of 1951. This law made it possible for the removal of all Coloureds and Indians from the general voters register. The introduction of this law was politically motivated because the apartheid regime wanted to make voting in the country a white affair in the subsequent elections. As such, Africans were completely disenfranchised from exercising their political rights. Yet, they were forced to accept the outcome of the elections as part of their political representation. S.J.M. Steyn observes that "apartheid had no positive side, only a negative one since its intention is to deprive black people of their vote and to substitute something in its place."⁴⁰

This shows that the majority of the people (black South Africans) were deprived of making and taking resolutions on policies that affected their lives. They were disenfranchised under the compulsive apartheid laws from participating in the politics of their motherland. As mentioned earlier, quite a number of black South Africans left their villages and moved to the urban centres searching for job opportunities. The government responded for the second time by empowering the minister of Native Affairs to remove blacks from what the apartheid government termed as public and private land. The minister was also

³⁹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.77.

⁴⁰. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.93.

empowered to establish new concentration camps as a temporary shelter for the labourers.

The apartheid regime also designed and introduced another legislation known as the Bantustan or Homeland policy which defied the rights of Africans in South Africa. The policy imposed an idea or coined a concept of a mere independence to the so called Homelands. They included: Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Transkei, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa, and KwaZulu.⁴¹ By virtue of being 'independent', they were completely stripped of their South African citizenship and directed to exercise their political rights independently of South African territory. This policy has been compared to the Nuremburg laws that denationalized Jews in old Nazi Germany. Passing of the above mentioned law, led to a widespread condemnation of the apartheid government by the international community.⁴² The Bantu Authority Act, (Act no. 68) of 1951,⁴³ introduced a policy which led to the establishment of 'Bantustan' (i.e. Homeland) and regional authorities and, with the aim of creating greater self-government in the homelands, abolished the Native Representative Council.⁴⁴

By 1952, there emerged what can be termed as two legal citizens living in a single country as different nationals. In other words, another law was introduced

⁴¹. M.P.K: Sorrenson: *Separate and Unequal*, p.67.

⁴².C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.88.

⁴³. M.Z, Shamase: 'A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985', p.183.

⁴⁴. Native Representative Council was introduced by the apartheid regime. It was a policy which made it possible for the black Africans to be represented by a council of white officials at parliament and they took decisions on behalf all Africans in South Africa.

which redefined the citizenship of Africans in South Africa. It was the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952. It reshuffled and redefined the status of blacks who had the right to stay in urban centres as permanent residents. Though, section 10 of the Act exempted those that were born in certain towns and cities and those that were employed (in towns) for a period of fifteen years and above.⁴⁵ The law also exempted labourers who had worked continuously under the same employer for a period of at least ten years and above.

From the aforementioned, the legislation was geared towards achieving a dual purpose: first, the apartheid regime wanted to limit and control the number of blacks living in towns and cities. This was due to the fact that the majority of white South Africans were afraid that if the population of blacks was not controlled, white supremacy and the status quo would be in great danger. If there was no control they believed there would be the possibility of blacks reacting against such compulsive legislations. D.B. Molteno rightly observes that:

"The growth of 'Native' population was supposed to be stopped...since those bills were passed the 'Native' population in the urban areas has more than doubled, and it has doubled not because of a general stampede of 'Natives' to the towns, as some members try to make out, but because they have been deliberately brought to the towns by European employers."⁴⁶

The above shows that another reason for the outward migration of rural black Africans to the greater part of South Africa's urban metropolis, had to do with

⁴⁵. M. Ballinger: *From Union to Apartheid*, p.126.

⁴⁶. The Union of South Africa: *Debates of the House of Assembly*, p.257.

the growing demand for cheap labour by the white industrial owners.⁴⁷ Secondly, the government wanted to create an environment that would make it possible for white employers to exploit the cheap labour of Africans from rural areas. That is, by making it a policy that any labourer who stayed and worked under an employer for a period of ten years (without changing place of work) would be allowed to stay in the urban areas. This idea violated the status of civil rights because for an employee to live in a town or city, he/she had to confine him/herself to a single employer whether or not the conditions of service(s) favoured him/her. This is a clear form of economic slavery.

In its struggle to justify and consolidate its power and authority, the apartheid regime came up with another policy in 1952 which censored and controlled the movement of black Africans and coloureds by imposing the use of pass books. The pass book was expected to be carried along while going to the cities or restricted areas.⁴⁸ The pass book determined where they could live/reside, work or travel. Any African who was found in the wrong place without the said pass book would be arrested, charged and prosecuted. The content of the pass book included a photograph, details of place of origin, employment record, tax payments, and record of encounters with the police. An anonymous source reveals that:

⁴⁷.Confidential interview of Mr Mqiniseni Mkhwanazi (Zulu and former uMkhonto weSizwe member) held on 5th August 2013, at Esikhawini, Umhlathuze local municipality, KwaZulu-Natal Province.

⁴⁸. M. Z. Shamase: 'A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985', p.188.

"No black person could leave a rural area for an urban one without a permit from the local authorities. On arrival in an urban area a permit to seek work had to be obtained within 72 hours."⁴⁹

The above proved that any job seeker who could not obtain a work permit within a period of three days, stood the risk of being forced to go back to where he/she came from. The passing and enforcement of the pass law appeared to be one of the brutal assaults on civil liberty as far as the history of apartheid South Africa is concerned. Black South Africans were made to be foreigners on their own soil. Their freedom of movement was completely abused. By 1953, the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act⁵⁰ was put into law. It prohibited Africans from organising any form of protest or strike regardless of the condition(s) in which they had found themselves. They were censored and controlled by the legislation like flocks of sheep, yet, any attempt to protest against such brutal laws was seen by the state as an act of treason liable for prosecution, imprisonment and occasionally execution.

The apartheid regime went beyond mere physical segregation. It went on to introduce the Bantu Education Act in 1953 which was amended and elaborated the following year.⁵¹ The Act required transfer of the African educational system from the provincial education authority to the Department of Black Education (DBE). The policy forced African students in South Africa to attend African schools which were divided along tribal groups. This was an attempt to

⁴⁹. <http://www.Bostoncoalitionforpalestinianrights>. 'Apartheid: From South Africa to Israel/Palestine Making the Connections', p.3.

⁵⁰. M. Ballinger: *From Union to Apartheid*, p.239.

⁵¹. H. Giliomee and B. Mbenga: *New History of South Africa*, p.320.

further divide blacks along ethnic lines. This Act later faced violent reactions from the black African students' in the mid 1970's.

The minister responsible for this Act was Dr H. Verwoerd⁵² who is considered as the grand architect of apartheid. The Department of Black Education was given the responsibility to design and compile a new curriculum that would be 'suitable' for the demands and aspirations of black South Africans. In other words, Africans were expected to have access to education that could only help them to assume their roles in a white -dominated community.

Thus, the rationale behind the introduction of this act was to prevent Africans from receiving good and qualitative education that would prepare them to compete with the whites in terms of employment and political equality. While introducing the bill, H.F. Verwoerd made the following comment:

"When I have control of the 'native' education I will reform it so that the 'natives' will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them (and later): What is the use of teaching a 'Bantu' child mathematics when it [sic] cannot use it in practice?...Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunity in life."⁵³

From the foregoing, it is clear that the apartheid regime had no intention of giving quality education to Africans. Instead, it was bent towards denying South

⁵². Dr. Hendrick Frensch Verwoerd, ruled South Africa as the Prime Minister between 1958 and 1966. He is considered as the grand architect of apartheid. During his administration, the country witnessed intense formulation and enforcement of legislations that were geared towards violation of civil liberties.

⁵³. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.108.

African blacks access to what education meant in its very definition. Access to qualitative education is a fundamental civil right of all humans irrespective of blood, ethnic group, religion or race. As such, any attempt to deny a person or groups of people of such right can be seen as educational genocide against such people. Meanwhile, it should be noted that up to the time of compiling this study, the psychological effect of apartheid's compulsive policy on education is still vibrating in the minds of young and promising South African students. Though much has been done towards redirecting the educational curriculum, more effort is needed in this regard.

Meanwhile, by 1959, the University Education Act was put into law a year after the emergence of Verwoerd as the new Prime Minister. The law made provision for the separation of universities according to racial groups. Blacks and coloureds were provided each with specific schools. No matter how competent African students' were, they would only secure admissions in the universities that were designated for them.⁵⁴ This was to make sure that communications and interactions among various racial groups were reduced to the barest minimum.

Another legislation worth of mentioning was the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (Act no.49) of 1953.⁵⁵ This Act may be seen as an element of

⁵⁴.Confidential interview of Mr Mqiniseni Mkhwanazi (Zulu and former uMkhonto weSizwe member) held on 5th August 2013, at Esikhawini, Umhlathuze local municipality, KwaZulu-Natal Province.

⁵⁵.M. Z. Shamase: 'A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985', pp.40-41.

social apartheid. The policy was meant to push racial segregation to another level. It was designed to prohibit non-Europeans from utilizing the same public services with the minority White South Africans. Such public services could be in the form of public buildings, cinemas, shopping malls, cemeteries, beaches, restaurants, hospitals, clubs, railway transports, buses/taxis and recreational centres.⁵⁶ All these were meant to eliminate any possible contact between whites and other racial groups, particularly black South Africans. This proved that the facilities provided to black South Africans by the government were not meant to be of the same quality with those allocated to White South Africans.

The Public Safety Act (PSA) No.3 of 1953 gave the British governor general the authority by decree to suspend all laws and establish a state of emergency depending on the circumstances surrounding the entire polity. Under this Act, about ninety-eight whites; thirty-six coloureds; ninety Indians and 11,279 Africans were arrested and detained. Within the same year, the government passed yet another compulsive bill into law. The Criminal Law Amendment Act No. 8,⁵⁷ which abolished all kinds of political protest and ‘derogatory’ political speeches that would affect or even damage public policies and laws. This Act further stated that anyone accompanying a person found guilty of offences committed while protesting or found in any form of political opposition geared

⁵⁶. M. Z. Shamase: ‘A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985’, pp.40-41.

⁵⁷. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond’s Justification of Apartheid*, p.112.

towards protesting against any law, would also be presumed guilty until proved otherwise.⁵⁸

A year later, the Natives Resettlement Act was passed into law. The law called for the establishment of a Resettlement Board that would be responsible for the forceful removal of 60,000 Africans from Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare and Pageview⁵⁹ and later eMandlazini, now Richards Bay.⁶⁰ The Native Trust and Land Amendment Act of the same year, led to the removal of the obligation and responsibility of the government to provide alternative space for the displaced squatters. This is synonymous to what one may call 'the highest level of cruelty' on fellow humans. Each and every new law was equally faced with new opposition sometimes a violent one as rightly forwarded by Mandela:

"The lesson that I learnt from the destruction of Sophiatown was clear: we could no longer fight the iron fist of the government with peaceful methods alone such as strikes, stayaways, speeches and marches. A freedom fighter learns, sooner or later, that it is the oppressor who makes the rules of the battle. We realized that we had to fight fire with fire."⁶¹

Subsequently, by 1955 another compulsive bill was passed into law which openly violated the sanctity of African people's privacy. It was named the

⁵⁸.C.F. Forsyth and J. E. Schiller (eds.): 'Civil liberties - The Cape Town Conference'. In: *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Civil liberties in South Africa, January 26, 1979*, pp.5-6.

⁵⁹. Confidential interview of Ms Koos Van der Merwe (Afrikaner and medical doctor) held on 16th August 2013, at Ratanda, Lesedi local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁶⁰. S. H. Nthuli: 'The History of the Mthiyane People who were removed from Richards Bay to Ntambanana', Wednesday 6th January 1976, p.8.

⁶¹. C. Coco and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom- The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, p.35.

Criminal Procedure Act.⁶² It accorded additional power to the police and other security agents to make arrests, enter and search houses or premises without warrant. A lot of Africans suffered from police intimidations and persecutions. There was also the Customs and Excise Act of 1955 as well as the Official Secrets Act No.16 of 1956⁶³ which gave the apartheid regime the power to establish a Board of Censors to censor books, films and other related materials imported into or produced in the country. The nationalist government bent down to make sure that it controlled the psychology of people by deciding what everyone would see, hear or read. The following year, the Native Administration Act No. 42⁶⁴ was put into law. It granted the regime the power to banish black Africans by forcing them to reside in the rural areas far away from their families. In addition to this, the law forced some of the opposition groups into forced exiles.

In 1957 two separate bills were put into law. The first was the Native Laws Further Amendment Act,⁶⁵ which gave the Minister of Home Affairs, in conjunction with the Minister of Justice, the power to charge and deport Africans who were said to be living illegally in foreign land. Secondly, there was the Nursing Act⁶⁶ which stated categorically the provision of separate registers and rolls of nurses along racial groups. It was made clear that black nurses would only attend to black patients while at the top, the Nursing Council

⁶². C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.114.

⁶³. C. F. Forsyth and J. E. Schiller (eds.): 'Civil liberties - The Cape Town Conference'. In: *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Civil liberties in South Africa, January 26, 1979*, p.6.

⁶⁴. Ibid

⁶⁵. M, Ballinger. *From Union to Apartheid*. pp.229-230.

⁶⁶. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.115.

(composed of only white officials) was in charge of the entire nursing profession. This implied that African patients received relatively poor attention particularly when it came to medical welfare. This was also clear in terms of access to good and quality medical diagnostic service, drugs, clean and a healthy environment (hospital), modern medical equipment and proper and advance training for medical staff.⁶⁷

The Might of Apartheid's Compulsive Power

The analysis of the above-mentioned compulsive apartheid strategies brings us to an examination of four variables namely: social, economic, political and territorial forms of apartheid. Hence the analysis will focus on the various shapes and forms of the compulsive policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The South African constitution, under the apartheid regime, was designed such that it prepared a fertile ground for the minority white South Africans to continue to monopolize decisions of the parliament, against the general interest of the majority people.

According to the apartheid government an increased influx of black Africans into various urban centres posed a serious challenge to the social and economic survival of white South Africans. As such, the regime came up with additional

⁶⁷. Confidential interview of Mr David Masina (Sotho and active politician) held between 23rd and 25th September 2013, at Meyerton and Alberton, Midvaal local municipality, Gauteng Province.

compulsive laws that counteracted the survival of blacks in urban centres.⁶⁸ Secondly, Afrikaners were also faced with the threat of British influence which posed a serious challenge to their political and economic supremacy. As such, apartheid was introduced with different faces as a tool of protection. For instance, immediately after the formation of Malan's cabinet with the appointment of new Ministers, each Minister focused his Ministry towards introducing and enforcing policies of racial segregation.

These compulsive policies could be seen from the division (in almost all aspects of life) between the whites and the blacks on one hand, and also between Africans on the other hand. The regime, through its policy of the Bantu Homelands, wanted to inject the spirit of tribalism among the blacks which would result in an increase in ethnic hatred.⁶⁹ The philosophy of apartheid wanted to ignite the flames of tribal and ethnic conflicts among Africans by attempting to polarize Africans to an extreme end. The purpose was to redirect African's focus from the realities of the situation going on in the country. Though, the idea failed to a great extent due to the high level of political enlightenment and awakening especially from the ANC and PAC.⁷⁰

⁶⁸. Confidential interview of Mr Mqiniseni Mkhwanazi (Zulu and former uMkhonto weSizwe member) held on 5th August 2013, at Esikhawini, Umhlathuze local municipality, KwaZulu-Natal Province.

⁶⁹. Confidential interview of Mr Thabo Mamabolo (Sotho and former politician) held on 11th September 2013, at Khutsong, Merafong City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁷⁰. M. Z. Shamase: 'A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985, p.48.

Socially, the educational system focused on establishing an environment premised on a master-servant relationship (a situation where black Africans would continue to live under the supervision of the whites irrespective of their educational qualifications). Black schools were not well equipped with facilities that would support an environment conducive to learning. The majority of the teachers/instructors were not properly trained. This led to high school students being poorly equipped for university.⁷¹ The future of black African students was left in the hands of the Afrikaans. This is because throughout the period of apartheid, virtually all the Ministers of education and the majority of the rectors that were assigned to head the black and coloured universities were Afrikaans who had little commitment towards developing the educational system of Africans.⁷²

On the other hand the apartheid regime, through various propaganda campaigns, succeeded in inserting a high level of fear into the minds of white South Africans about the impending degeneration of whites in South Africa. They were made to understand that if they failed to support apartheid policies to their logical conclusion, then they stood the risk of being dominated and overwhelmed by the increasing population of Africans in the towns and cities. Furthermore, after securing approval from the parliament, the apartheid government went ahead to divide the country into zones based on racial classification. Africans, who constitute the majority of the population, were, according to the law, given only thirteen percent (13%) of the entire land. They were left to squabble⁷³ within a tiny portion. In addition, most of the 13%

⁷¹. M. Ballinger: *From Union to Apartheid*, p.228.

⁷². C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.190.

⁷³. Ibid, p.103.

allocated to the blacks was more or less slums and highly unproductive portions of land.

Restriction and segregation of races was extended by limiting certain areas to be visited or resided in by the black Africans. The whites on the other hand, were free to move or visit any area of their choice without any hindrance. Places of worship were also divided. In essence, church services were designed based on racial groups. Blacks could only attend churches that were allocated for them. The same was applicable to other racial groups. The NGK (i.e. Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa) took the lead in this aspect as mentioned in the previous chapter. Another face of these compulsive policies could be seen in places of burial. The apartheid government made it a policy that cemeteries must be allocated based on racial groups. Blacks were given specified lands as places to bury their family members⁷⁴. As such, blacks, coloureds and Indians were not allowed to be buried in cemeteries that were preserved for the whites. In other words, it would be correct to say that the compulsive racial policies of apartheid in South Africa were extended beyond life on earth.

The apartheid regime extended its tentacles to the field of medical health care by making it a crime to donate blood (i.e. blood transfusion) outside one racial group. This is obvious because apartheid was totally against the idea of mixing blood with 'inferior' racial groups. In addition to this, sick ones were not allowed to be carried in the same ambulance with whites. Each race was provided with separate ambulances. Even restaurants were not left behind.

⁷⁴. B.A. Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.253.

There were certain restaurants that were earmarked for whites only.⁷⁵ No matter how rich you were, so long as you were not white by race, you would not access or be entertained in such restaurants. Any attempts to prove otherwise, would lead to arrest by the police or any other security agents. Clubs and post/telegraphs shared the same faith. In the field of transportation, the then Minister of Railways, Mr. Paul Sauser, declared that mixed travel on trains must be put to an end. That is, black Africans would no longer enjoy the services of the railway on the same level as the whites.

Margaret Ballinger states that:

"...Since such travel did not exist except in the Cape Town area, this meant in effect the separation of White and non-White on the Cape suburban railway service, which these groups had shared both profitably and peacefully since the first South African train had been flagged on its way from Cape Town to Wellington...."⁷⁶

The apartheid regime came up with another policy which prevented apartheid opposition forces from having access to military training or be allowed to be enlist in the South African army. According to the Nationalist Party, the 'enemy' must be protected and never allowed to protect themselves. For examples, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Erasmus, announced that there was the need to tighten up the defence system of the country, particularly in terms of military training in the rural areas of the country. According to him, it became necessary for the government to put in place such restrictions because of possible anticipated

⁷⁵. Confidential interview of Ms Esther Lubbe (English and former Police) held on 9th July 2013, at Vereeniging, Sedibeng District municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁷⁶. M, Ballinger. *From Union to Apartheid*. p.230.

internal threat, which might lead to war as a result of what the nationalist termed "underground communist activities."⁷⁷

Another face of the compulsive segregationist policy could be seen in the field of economic exploitation. For instance, in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, Africans were subjected to long working hours and received low wages compared to their counterparts. Qualifications and specialisations were out of context so long as you were black or coloured. No matter the level of education attained by Africans, they were expected to work and receive orders from, sometimes less educated, whites. The government continued to preach the concept and slogan of "Never a white under black"⁷⁸

This proved that the central dynamic of the apartheid regime lay in the struggle for the control and distribution of cheap labour. The use of cheap labour led to an increase in industrial production and expansion in the mining sector. This resulted in rapid urbanization by attracting more labour force from the rural areas.⁷⁹ To further buttress the level of exploitation and over dependency on black cheap labour, Stuart made the following observation during the second seating of the parliament, thus he posits that:

"...When you talk to a manufacturer you know perfectly well that the difference between whether he will show a profit at the end of the year or not, is whether he has been able to infiltrate a little 'Native' or

⁷⁷. Ibid, pp.230-231.

⁷⁸. C. Ngcokovane. *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.103.

⁷⁹. B, Philip, D, Peter, and P, Deborah: 'The Shaping of Apartheid - Contradiction, Continuity and Popular Struggle' In B, Philip. *et al.* eds. *Apartheid's Genesis, 1935-1962*, p.98.

‘Coloureds’ labour. Talk to the mines; their position does not need any repeating.”⁸⁰

The above expression shows that industrial and economic success largely depended on the ability to secure cheap human labour, which was readily available in various black settlements throughout the country. Political apartheid formed yet another form of compulsive apartheid policy in South Africa. As previously mentioned Africans were totally and completely disenfranchised by the regime’s compulsive laws. This idea predated the 1948 apartheid regime. For instance, during the 1948 election, there were only two Indians who remained on the South African voters list. Black South Africans were completely excluded from the voter’s role. In this way, the government of D.F. Malan and subsequent administrations continued to increase the flames of segregation particularly against Africans. Ngcokovane made an observation from the words of Stuart thus:

“Tell them that they will never, never, never, whatever rank of life they may attain, qualify for the same franchise with the Europeans.”⁸¹

It should be noted however, that, during and after the Second World War, there was an increase in the demand for African labour in the towns and cities as a result of the vacuum created due to the absence of Europeans who moved to various war fronts. As a result, a good number of Africans left rural areas for the cities and towns in order to supply the demand for much needed labour. This created fear among white farmers because they were losing cheap black labour on their rural farms. Secondly, some of the Europeans, especially the Dutch,

⁸⁰. The Union of South Africa: *Debates of the House of Assembly*, p.2957.

⁸¹. The Union of South Africa, pp.257.

became sensitive of losing their jobs due to the continued increased of an African labour force in the cities.⁸²

Resistance to Compulsive Laws

It was under this pressure that the apartheid regime set up a commission to investigate and find a remedy to the situation. As such, a commission was set up known as the Tomlinson Commission of 1948. The commission's terms of reference were limited to what the regime called the socio-economic development of Bantu areas. The commission compiled and submitted its findings based on the following recommendations:

"...[T]here can be no middle justifiable [*sic*] course in the future...the only alternatives available are either the path of ultimate or complete separation, or of complete integration."⁸³

In light of the above, however, a close examination revealed that the commission was given the task of investigating issues that affected Africans, yet, there was no single African in it. In the light of this, right from the establishment of the commission Africans did not expect any form of justice from the committee. This could also be seen when the commission pre-empted its findings in the following way "...in view of the diversity of the African peoples,...*the commission*[emphasis added] found it highly improbable that

⁸². Confidential interview of Ms Palesa Mofokeng (Sotho and political activist) held on 27th June 2013, at Soshanguve, Pretoria, city of Tshwane metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁸³.C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.105.

integration could be brought about [sic]...the only alternative left is complete segregation."⁸⁴

The apartheid regime and its compulsive policies relied much on the Tomlinson Commission's report in extending its brutality and inflicting an untold hardship on the majority of the South African people. Politically, Africans were subjected to the status of foreigners and ordinary squatters in their own country. It may be rightly said that the apartheid regime in South Africa went beyond what one may call the evils of colonialism.

However, by the middle of the 1950's, there was an increase in the level of injustice, brutality and sufferings by Africans. It was widely believed that a special squad of security policemen received special training particularly in torture techniques from France and Algeria and this led to a sudden and dramatic increase in various forms of torture. The Tomlinson commission established that the some of the officers received training in France at some point during the first half of the 1960s. They include: Hendrik van den Bergh (then head of the Security Branch), TJ 'RooiRus' Swanepoel, DK Genis, Lieutenant Daantjie 'Kardoebroek' Rossouw, G Klindt, a major Brits (from the Railway Police), a Lieutenant van der Merwe and one Coetzee. The commission also confirmed that a number of officers received further training in interrogation and counter-interrogation techniques in France in about 1968. Officers known to have attended this course include: TJ 'RooiRus' Swanepoel, Major JJ 'Blackie' de Swardt, Hans Gloy, Roelf van Rensberg and Dries

⁸⁴. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, pp.105-106.

Verwey.⁸⁵ The country witnessed a series of protests and riots which at one stage or the other, affected almost all parts of South Africa except perhaps certain areas that were completely under the sway of the regime.⁸⁶

The opposing groups reacted to the new developments by adopting a powerful and formidable organisation known as the Congress of the People of South Africa CPSA. The idea behind the establishment of the congress was proposed by Professor Z. K, Mathews. It was this brilliant idea that moved and pushed the entire liberation struggle, setting it on a new tract with a new philosophy. The birth of CPSA took place on June, 26th 1955 in Kliptown, a few miles southwest of Johannesburg.⁸⁷

At the beginning the congress had about 3,000⁸⁸ representatives drawn from across the whole country. It had no racial or ethnic prejudice as the people had agreed to talk with one single voice. The congress was sponsored by four organizations, namely: the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Coloureds People Organisation (SACPO) and the Congress of Democrats (CD).⁸⁹ The CPSA passed a resolution by signing the freedom charter on behalf of the majority South

⁸⁵. Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of South Africa. Vol. II. p.63.

⁸⁶. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, pp.445-446.

⁸⁷. J. Kane-Berman: *South Africa's Silent Revolution*, p.8.

⁸⁸.C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid- A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.115

⁸⁹. J. Kane-Berman: *South Africa's Silent Revolution*, p.45.

Africans.⁹⁰ The introductory part of the freedom charter began with radical and historic words as pointed out by Mandela:

"We, the people of South Africa, declared for all our country and the world to know...that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white...and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the *entire* [emphasis added] will of the people."⁹¹

In line with the above, it appeared that the leaders of the liberation struggle remained adamant in their conviction of having equal rights for all South African citizens. The apartheid regime disregarded the demands and aspirations of the majority of South Africans by interpreting the above development as a step towards revolution. A year later, the government of Strijdom intensified its brutality by adopting new laws aimed at silencing and destroying new forms of oppositions.

In 1956, the Native Administration Act was put into law. It empowered the regime with banishment orders to be served without prior notice to the accused. It would be right to say that under apartheid's compulsive regime, everyone that was not pleased with the segregationist policies was seen as a suspect or an enemy of the state. By 1957, the Native Act was also passed.⁹² The law prohibited any court from stopping execution or banishing an accused person once the order was given. In other words, the laws stripped any accused person or group of persons from the option of securing bail once the order was issued. Another compulsive and brutal law was passed in 1957. The law empowered the Minister of Native Affairs to stop and eject any black person found

⁹⁰. D. Dube. *The Rise of Azania - The Fall of South Africa*, pp. 84-89.

⁹¹. C. C. and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom- The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, pp.37-38.

⁹². A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.457.

worshipping in the whites' Churches. The Christian Council of South Africa responded vehemently against the law by issuing a statement:

"If this clause which restricted Blacks from attending *whites' churches* [emphasis added] becomes a law, we shall be forced to disregard the law and to stand whole-heartedly by the members of our churches who are affected by it, and, if necessary, to suffer with them as our brethren in Christ." ⁹³

Contrary to the views of some scholars who argue that all white Churches were in support of racial segregation, this was in fact not true. In fact, some white theologians came out publically, particularly during church congregations to oppose apartheid's racial policies. Meanwhile, the ANC and other civil rights political organizations continued to oppose and agitate for freedom and equality. They defied unjust laws and opposed such laws vehemently. The apartheid regime already had it in mind that such compulsive legislations were going to face a violent rebellion. When this actually happened, the state responded with a new weapon of compulsion through arbitrary arrests and detentions without trials. Several penalties were instituted in place for those who broke the laws and/or staged any form of political protest.⁹⁴ In its determination to crush the leadership and the organizational structure of the ANC, the regimes decided to arrest and detain the ANC's political leaders across the country. These arrests were made during the second half of the 1950's, as noted by Mandela:

⁹³. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.115.

⁹⁴. E. J. Van Der Merwe: 'Untold Stories of a Group of Black South Africans about the Apartheid Era,' p.2.

"Within a week, 156 leaders of the ANC and its allies had been arrested and charged with high treason...the government had made its move."⁹⁵

The year 1958 witnessed the emergence of Hedrick French Verwoerd as the new Prime Minister of South Africa. Between 1958 and 1966, the country witnessed an increase in the level of the government's brutality and what one may call 'state sponsored terror' on the vast majority of the South African populace. In other words, some of the radical and ugly pictures of apartheid appeared during the time in question. Verwoerd, with the help of the National Party, the NGK and the Broederbond, swore that complete racial segregation must see the light of the day through compulsive apartheid policies.⁹⁶

Yet, the period in question witnessed a total change of tactics and approach with an increase in police powers and brutalities. Apparent discriminations, abuse of civil rights and a lack of respect for the rule of law/due process become the order of the day. The anger of the opposition political organizations was riled and the majority of South Africans were pushed to the wall. Yet, the regime closed its eyes in its determination to actualize its set objectives. In other word, the regime under Verwoerd began by placing restrictions on the freedom of political organizations, political speeches and assembly. Civil liberty only existed in theory because the state, as mentioned earlier, had increased the power of the police and other secret/undercover agents in its new 'face off'.

The Apartheid Covert Operations

⁹⁵. C. Coco and S, Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Authobiography of Nelson Mandela*, p.40.

⁹⁶. R. J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p.36.

Besides using legislations in implementing racial segregation and economic exploitation, the regime resorted to the use of security and the judicial system as its new weapons.⁹⁷ Violence became institutionalized as civil rights continued to be abused using different improvisational methods to justify the actions of the regime. For instance, between 1948 and 1994, the only thing that was not changing in South Africa was the National Party's commitment to apartheid. On the other hand, things that were changing could be seen in the ways and manners by which apartheid's compulsive regime continued to apply different methods in its approach to the Africans.⁹⁸ In addition to this, an electronic source observed that:

"As aggressive opposition to apartheid escalated, the South African government enacted draconian security laws, and engaged in clandestine strategies that amounted to state-sponsored terror violence, in order to retain its illegitimate regime."⁹⁹

It was under these circumstances that the ANC and the PAC continued to intensify their oppositions against various abuses of civil liberties and also continued to demand for the freedom and equality of all racial groups in South Africa. They continued to organize workers and Africans in general, by distributing different pamphlets and enlightening the people on the need to wake up and fight for their own liberation. For instance, according to a source, PAC called for "*African males in every city and village...to leave their passes [sic] at home, join demonstrations and, if arrested, offer no bail, no defence, no*

⁹⁷. B. Gilligan: *Twentieth Century Studies - The Struggle for Freedom*, p.68.

⁹⁸. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K. N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.111.

⁹⁹. <http://www.apartheidpolicies.amazon.com>

fine."¹⁰⁰ This statement shows a high level of commitment by the PAC towards the liberation struggle. It can be argued that the PAC played a vital role in enlightening the majority of the deprived people of the country through various forms of political awareness campaigns.

By the late 1950's, the nature of African's peaceful protests and demonstrations slowly and gradually began to metamorphose into violent and more radical forms of opposition. In other words, there was a gradual shift, in terms of opposition, from passive resistance to active resistance. By the turn of another decade, to be precise on March, 21st, 1960, an event took place which radically redirected the *modus operandi* of the opposition groups. A group of un- armed and defenceless civilians gathered to protest in front of a police station at Sharpeville¹⁰¹ (35 miles south of Johannesburg and north of Vereeniging, Transvaal province)¹⁰² against the policy of pass law.

The people under the leadership of the PAC reorganized and decided never to use or present their pass book to the apartheid security officials.¹⁰³ The police, after securing more reinforcements numbering about 150, decided to first use teargas in order to disperse the angry protesters. The people on the other hand, out of determination and conviction, decided to remain adamant to what they

¹⁰⁰. J.Currey: *Africa Since 1935, Vol. VIII of the UNESCO General History of Africa*. Cited from A Mazrui. (Ed.), pp.259-260.

¹⁰¹. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: "The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid" In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds.): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Ccentury South Africa*, p.15.

¹⁰². C. Coco and S, Marc: *Long Walk to Freedo - The Authobiography of Nelson Mandela*, p.47.

¹⁰³. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.165

were fighting for. As such, the police decided to open fire on the crowd as observed by Mandela in 1960:

"...When the area was cleared and the dust had settled, 6 *black Africans* lay dead. Most of them were shot in the back as they were running *away* from the police. More than 4,000 people, including dozens of women and children, had been wounded...news of the Sharpeville massacre spread across the world. Suddenly, the horror of apartheid was there for all to see. South Africa was never to be the same again."¹⁰⁴

It can be argued that the above incident had opened a new page in the history of the liberation struggle against apartheid. For instance, it generated more critics and condemnation from the international community. Internally, there was increased protest and other forms of sabotage geared towards expression of total dissatisfaction with the regime's brutality.

According to *Time Magazine*, the official figure of those killed at Sharpeville in 1960 include: eight women, ten children and fifty-one adult males. About one hundred and eighty were injured, including: thirty-one women, nineteen children and one hundred and forty adult males.¹⁰⁵ As shown in the above quotation, the majority of those killed were shot in the back while trying to run away from the police. This is contrary to other sources which stated that the protesters were shot while trying to storm the police station at Sharpeville. Yet, the two versions clearly agreed on the fact that there was a massacre at Sharpeville against unarmed and defenceless civilians.

¹⁰⁴. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.47.

¹⁰⁵. 'The Sharpeville Massacre', *Time Magazine*, 4th April, 1960, p.4.

This new development left the opponents of apartheid and their political organisations with no option other than to accept the reality that only destiny would decide who was to die and who was to survive. Meanwhile, the African political leaders organized three days of mourning for those who were massacred. They also called on their supporters to burn their pass books as a way of showing their grievances against the regime.¹⁰⁶ The government, on the other hand, immediately issued a notice to ban the ANC and PAC. In other words, from April, 8th, 1960, the regime made it clear that the leadership and the entire organizational structures of the two parties were abolished.

Other organizations who also shared the fate of banning were the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) in the Ciskei. This followed after the role it played in organising a bus boycott in 1983 which led to a widespread political unrest. By 1985, the apartheid regime declared a state of emergency in Transkei which banned the Congress of African Students (COSAS), the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the Azanian Students Organisation (ASO).¹⁰⁷

The regime achieved this under the power and authority vested on the Suppression of Communism Act backed by the emergency law. Following this, any person or group of persons believed to be members of the ANC or the PAC¹⁰⁸ would be arrested and charged for treason. The minimum sentence according to the law was ten years imprisonment. Under these conditions black

¹⁰⁶. Confidential interviews of Ms Stella Van Jaarsveld (Afrikaner and former high school history teacher) held between 26th and 27th July 2013, at Vanderbijl Park and Sebokeng , Emfuleni local municipality, Gauteng Province.

¹⁰⁷. 'The Sharpeville Massacre', Time Magazine, 4th April 1960, p.5.

¹⁰⁸. C. Coco, and S, Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, pp.45-46.

South Africans were forced to maintain a very low profile until the emergency period was over. From the onset, the state of the majority of South Africans who were desperately looking for justice was left in the hands of student unions, church organisations and to a lesser extent, trade unions.

Henceforth, political strikes coupled with violent protests became the order of the day between apartheid's security personnel and various opposition groups who believed in the spirit of fighting for the liberation of the majority of South Africans. Most of these protests occurred in the black townships while the regime intensified arrests and detentions without trials.¹⁰⁹ Various political leaders and their supporters were arrested and imprisoned without following any legal procedure. South African prisons and police stations were filled with political opponents; especially those who publically opposed the regime.

On arrival at the Prison, most of the prisoners were first asked to remove their clothes and appeared naked prior to interrogations. This was in order to humiliate those who were considered enemies of the state. Conditions in both the police stations and the prisons were terrible but the regime continued with its compulsive tendencies towards the opposition organisations and their supporters.¹¹⁰ The prisons and the police cells were highly congested to accommodate the number of people that were arrested. The prisoners were forced to sleep on mats (for those who were lucky) or on the floor.¹¹¹ In most cases, they were not allowed to use their long trousers. Sometimes prisoners

¹⁰⁹. M.P.K, Sorenson: *Separate and Unequal*, p.76.

¹¹⁰. Confidential interview of Mr Jackson X (Coloured and former Mayor) held on 21st October 2013, at Kanana, Eastern Cape Province.

¹¹¹. S. Charlene: *Robben Island - A Place of Inspiration: Mandela's Prison Island*, p.98.

were not provided with blankets. They suffered untold hardships especially during winter periods.

The condition of the toilets was very bad. They were also served with unhygienic food and were forced to eat it, failure to do so resulted in solitary confinement. This form of torture had various degrees of both emotional and psychological effects on the detainees. Renfrew Christies remarked on solitary confinement, saying: *"You don't come out of seven months in solitary confinement and feel you're even remotely sane or even a normal human being."*¹¹²

Detainees were subjected to long hours of hard labour. They were harassed by prison warders and the police who constantly visited the prisons. In most cases, political prisoners were not allowed to see their families nor have access to any information from outside the four walls of the prisons.¹¹³ The regime also empowered the police and the warders to torture suspects by adopting different methods. Sometimes, torture was used on detainees on arrival in order to soften them before they were questioned.¹¹⁴

Laloo Chiba, a former apartheid detainee made the following observations:

¹¹². R. Christies: *Personal narration of experience while in detention under compulsive apartheid regime*, p.103.

¹¹³. <http://www.southafricaapartheid>, p.2.

¹¹⁴. <http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za>, p.3.

"During the first 48 hours, we were all severely tortured¹¹⁵...I had screamed out in pain. I had pleaded for mercy from...I had given them the pleasure of listening to my screams and it is something that haunts me up till today¹¹⁶...they placed a white paper A4 size,...on the floor and they asked me to stand on that. They said that I was not allowed to move off from that sheet of paper... I stood there from about nine o'clock on Monday morning until Wednesday early in the evening...that was a period of approximately fifty-eight to sixty hours without sleep."¹¹⁷

In light of the above, a lot of prisoners were forced to make confessions under duress. Detainees' were exposed to different forms physical torture: they were deprived of having sufficient and sound sleep. According to a report, detainees were usually interrogated from midnight which lasted for several hours, over a period of many days. With fewer hours of sleep, they were forced to move to their various places of work early in the morning. Detainees were also subjected to stand for long periods and sometimes forced to carry heavy objects as a means of punishment for what the security officers called inability to co-operate.

Other forms of physical torture could be seen in the form of exposing detainees to cold. They were sometimes kept naked for long periods; doused with water or suspended from poles with handcuffs on their ankles and wrists. In addition to this, detainees also suffered plain assault by way of beating, kicking, hitting and

¹¹⁵. L. Chiba: *Personal narration of experience while in detention under compulsive apartheid regime*, p.34.

¹¹⁶. Ibid.

¹¹⁷. Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, p.57. For details refer to: P. Meiring: *Chronicles of the Truth Commission: A Journey through the past and present into the future of South Africa*.

crushing of legs.¹¹⁸ To prove this, Mandela made the following comments as part of his experience under detention; thus:

"I had been suffering from a bad cough for a while, which would not go away. I had complained about the dampness of my cell, but nothing had been done about it... I was examined there by a Doctor who told me that I had water on the lung...He told me that I had tuberculosis...."¹¹⁹

On the other hand, detainees were also subjected to psychological torture. This could be seen in the form of solitary confinement, sometimes for the entire detention period; verbal abuse which had negative and emotional effects; humiliation and degradation; denial of access to toilets and washing facilities; negative and abusive racial comments. Others included: intimidations such as being stripped naked, taken from prison/police detentions into the bush and hooding; death threats with automatic rifles and other weapons; threats of torture for non-compliance,¹²⁰ dangling from the window; forced standing; threats of being thrown into the sea from a boat; forced to sit on an imaginary chair; forced to stand with stones inside detainees shoes; tightening of bricks around testicles; threats about families and loved ones, such as threats to kill or detain; threats of indefinite detention and being left alone for long periods without interrogation. For example, the report of the TRC, made the following observations in its findings:

"[T]he more severe the torture, the more vulnerable the detainee and the greater the silence. Extreme torture such as electric shocks or suffocation frequently resulted in loss of bladder or bowel control that detainees found painfully degrading. Some individuals gave in under pressure of torture and gave evidence against their former comrades. Often such detainees remained silent because of feelings of intense guilt...They tortured me for those seven days and the only thing that really made me break in the end was when they

¹¹⁸. Detainees Parents Support Committee's Report, p.3.

¹¹⁹. C. Coco and S. Marc. *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandel*, p.125.

¹²⁰. Detainees' Parents Support Committee's Report, p.3

threatened to ... kidnap my four-year-old nephew... bring him to the 13th floor and drop him out the window ... I felt I could risk my life and I could let my body just be handed over to these men to do what they liked, but I couldn't hand over someone else's body...."¹²¹

The above findings further revealed the cruel nature of the Robben Island Prison. It also portrayed a high level of human deprivation coupled with general abuse on fundamental civil liberty. In addition, some of the detainees also suffered psychological trauma after release. This was due to past negative experience(s) they shared while in detention. Eddie Daniels, a former detainee states that *"I believed that my arrest had killed my mother. It was all hallucinations because of the psychological pressure."*¹²²

Meanwhile, the compulsive inhuman nature of the apartheid regime took a new dimension from 1963 when detention without trial was introduced. Apart from several forms of abuse suffered by the detainees in the hand of security forces, others did not live to tell their own part of the stories. In other words, between 1963 and 1984, a total of about 73 detainees died while in custody of the apartheid regime. Their deaths must be seen as a logical extension and repercussion of the negative treatments they had suffered in the hand of their interrogators. While the regime stated that most of the deaths resulted from suicide, it may be argued that several detainees died under detention and torture. For instance, the report of the Detainees' Parents Support Committee (DPSC) reveals that:

"The incidence of deaths can be related directly to the intensity of security and police action against opposition to government policies. For instance, nearly half of these deaths, 25 in all, occurred in the 18 months following 16 June

¹²¹. P. Meiring. *Chronicles of the Truth Commission: A Journey through the past and present into the future of South Africa*. For details refer to: Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of South Africa, p.46

¹²². <http://Youtube.com>. E, Daniels. *Personal narration of experience while in detention under compulsive apartheid regime*.

1979. It is also significant that deaths in detention decreased sharply in number subsequent to the highly publicized deaths of people like Imam Haron in 1969, Ahmed Timol in 1971, Steve Biko in late 1977 and Paris Malatji in 1984...the provision of detention without trial are such that [sic] place the detainees virtually at the mercy of the interrogator, away from any interference from the courts, lawyers, independent doctors, family or friends and for as long as the interrogator wishes. These are the tools with which the law provides the interrogator...."¹²³

The above proved that the use of torture under detention depended on how secured the apartheid regime felt it was from the opposition political organizations. In other words, detention was used as one of the weapons of apartheid compulsion while torture served as the main detention instrument. Coupled with this, the pattern of abuse and violation of civil liberties was almost the same across the major prisons in the country. Jeffreys Bay in Johannesburg, Protea in Soweto, Durban and Sanlam Building in Port Elizabeth among others, were good examples where such abuses took place. The police and other security agencies were encouraged by the government in carrying such heinous crimes against their victims.

It should be noted that the majority of those who were imprisoned were arrested and charged under false accusations. In most cases, the government found it difficult to charge the suspect with a genuine crime. Mass imprisonment remained the last weapon against the people. This could be seen as an open abuse and clear violation of civil liberty. From the international scene, a lot of criticisms and out-right condemnations coupled with isolations were placed on the apartheid regime. But the state closed its ears and continued with its compulsive brutalities on the people. This was the situation in which South

¹²³. Detainees' Parents Support Committee's Report, p.4.

Africa found itself in until mid-1960¹²⁴ when the ANC and the PAC decided to change the rules of engagement by substituting passive resistance with armed resistance.

Furthermore, between 1960 and late 1970, the ANC and the PAC decided to take arms as a last resort in their struggle for liberation. As such, by the beginning of the 1980's, the two leading opposition political organizations intensified their act of sabotage by attacking and destroying key government installations and other forms of sabotage. The apartheid regime responded by passing another bill known as the National Key Points Act.¹²⁵ The new policy empowered the Defence Minister to declare major and strategic areas of the opposition as a 'key point' of attacks. People living close to such key areas were warned to vacate as security would launch attacks at any time they deemed fit. Yet, the act was silent on the security mode of oppressions on such identified target areas. The press were not expected to know when, how and what should happen after the said oppressions.

Between 1985 and 1988, the apartheid regime was faced with increased protests and various forms of sabotage. There appeared what one may call a little civil-war within the country. The armed wing of the ANC and the PAC namely: *Umkhonto-we Sizwe* and *Poqo*,¹²⁶ were responsible for a series of bombings and

¹²⁴. R.J, Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p.37

¹²⁵. J. Kane-Berman: *South Africa's Silent Revolution*. (South Africa, South African Institute of Race Relations), p.81

¹²⁶. *Umkhonto we-Sizwe* in other words, known as the MK, is a Zulu word which is loosely translated as 'The Spear of the Nation'. It was the Military wing of the ANC that was established with the sole responsibility of creating/igniting violent protest and staging attacks on various government

other forms of sabotage against the apartheid government. The ANC and the SACP as mentioned earlier were banned by the regime. For that reason, they were forced to go underground. The United Democratic Front (UDF) and Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) continued with the philosophies of the former opposition political organisations. The government was left with no option other than to defend itself from what it considered as a threat from the enemy. The compulsive regime extended its policies by restricting the freedom of press across the country. Printing presses and journalists (except those that were identified by the state) came under intense pressure. The Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act of 1971, together with the Internal Security Act, were used by the government as tools in suppressing newspaper companies that were publishing information that was contrary to government interest.

Furthermore, by February 1988 about 17 political organizations were banned across the country due to what the regime called their refusal to co-operate with the constitution of the regime. It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that segregationist and compulsive policies of apartheid made it a policy that each racial group was expected to bury its deaths in a separate burial ground. By the mid-1980's, another inhuman and ruthless policy was brought to show.¹²⁷ It dictated when, where and how funerals of apartheid's victims would be conducted. A lot of people died during or after funerals as a result of various security attacks on mourners. Jabulani S. made the following observation:

"Funerals of political unrest victims became a highly charged form of gathering due to the interference of the security forces that inevitably resulted in yet more deaths, ensuring that funerals would take place virtually every weekend from 1985 onwards...the authorities attempted to restrict or limit the number of mourners at such funerals by banning these funerals from taking

installations. Most of its members were recruited based on trust and total commitment to the liberation struggle. They received most of their trainings in Tanzania and other Neighbouring states. MK's mode of 'operation' was similar to that of *Poqo* another armed wing established by the PAC.

¹²⁷ . B.A. Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.268.

place at weekends...which inevitably aroused the extreme anger of communities [sic] at the gross number in which they were allowed to bury their dead...on all funerals in over 70 Black townships such law continued to prevail as at December 1989." ¹²⁸

In light of the above, it could be argued that the administration of Botha played a vital role towards completing the picture of the compulsive apartheid policies.¹²⁹ After consolidating his power and authority, his government made a move towards making constitutional changes. These changes were made (according to the regime) to meet the aspirations of the people of South Africa. A tri-cameral legislature was introduced in 1983 for the first time which provided an additional two chambers in the parliament; one for the Africans of mixed ancestry and the other for South African Indians. Black Africans who constituted the majority of the country's population were totally ignored.¹³⁰ This new development, created more problems than it could solve. Jabula Sithole made the following remarks in regards to the administration of Botha:

"The resistance of mid-1980's destroyed utterly the 'total' tactics of the Botha government. Tri-cameralism and African urban councils had been firmly rejected by the demand for 'People's Power'. The campaign to win hearts and minds was in tatters, with thousands in detention and an occupying army in the townships...with the collapse of total strategy, the government seemed bankrupted of ideas, relying on internal repression and external bravado." ¹³¹

¹²⁸. South African Detainees' Parents Support Committee's Report, p.5.

¹²⁹. W.H, Kansteiner. *South Africa: Revolution or Reconciliation?*, p.105.

¹³⁰. M. Z. Shamase: 'A Comparative Study of the Aims, Structure and Strategies of the National Party and Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in the Decade 1975-1985', p.170.

¹³¹. South African Democracy Development Education Trust. *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*. S, Jabulani. 'The ANC Underground, Armed Actions and Popular Resistance in Pietermaritzburg and the Surrounding Natal Midlands Townships' 1980-1990, part 1 and 2,

It was under this situation that the government decided to devise a new strategy in dealing with the opposition forces and at the same, the government tried to safeguard its power and authority through such policies. Meanwhile, the powers of the South African Police Force (SAPF) and other security agencies were increased. With enough legislative and government backings, the police force appeared to be more brutal and highly unmerciful not only to the black Africans but also to some white elements. In other words, some of the white South Africans who decided to support the course of liberation and equality of all races, coupled with those who proved to be neutral/liberal were not spared by the regime. For instance, about one hundred and forty-two people were killed in 1984 as a result of various campaigns organised by the UDF against the constitutional policy of the tri-cameral legislation. The UDF called its members and supporters to boycott rent, schools and it encouraged more strikes against the regime. The government responded with police and army brutalities under operation Palmiet.¹³² Thus, within a period of three months, the UDF was also declared by the apartheid regime as an extension of the ANC's philosophies which must be banned.

Meanwhile, political prisoners were faced with increased brutalities and sufferings while the government's political opponents in both rural and urban areas were left at the mercy of the police and military bullets. At this juncture, it became clear that the apartheid government had reached its climax of abuse and violation of civil liberties in South Africa. State security became more covertly involved in the summary execution of opponents, arson, sabotage and other forms of reprisals. , Towards the end of 1980's, the apartheid security forces identified themselves in an open extra judicial killing of various political opponents and their supporters. All these were carefully calculated and executed

¹³² . J. Kane-Berman: South Africa's Silent Revolution, p.82.

in such a way that neither the security forces nor the state would be held responsible for the violation of South Africans' civil liberties.¹³³

Conclusion

The period between 1948 and 1989 witnessed the birth and forceful execution of apartheid as a national policy in South Africa. Successive apartheid administrations came up with different strategies and legislations all in an attempt to safeguard what the regime termed as white's supremacy. This idea was of course met with peaceful but later violent resistance. Opposition to the state's policies made the government improvise new tactics through compulsive policies.

It can therefore be argued that the period between 1978 and 1988 witnessed an increase in the government's improvisations towards dealing with different opposition groups. Yet, the regime was more determined, radical, and ruthless against those who were considered enemies of the state. There were increased banning and restriction orders, arrests, detention without trials, political imprisonments, banishments, assassinations and summary executions. The regime through the help of the Broederbond (who mostly served as undercover agents of apartheid compulsion) ensured the banning of political associations, assemblies and expressions. Top political leaders and their supporters were either detained or disappeared from the eyes of the public. This was mostly achieved under the state of emergency declared in the mid-1980s.

¹³³. Ibid, p.82.

Under this platform, the compulsive apartheid regime embarked on clandestine, operations in neutralizing political opponents irrespective of racial or ethnic background. Several undercover agents were employed and they were assigned the task of neutralizing, destroying, eliminating or wiping out political opponents and their structures across the country. The majority of South Africans became more vulnerable to the compulsion of the regime. This situation was accompanied with an increased abduction of political opponents and the kidnapping of various opposition leaders and their supporters. Many of those who were abducted were either killed or forced to go into exile.

The late 1950s and late 1980s, the compulsive apartheid regime arrested and detained over eighty thousand people. Although historical records are silent regarding the accurate number of those detained, a tentative figure suggests that out of the total number of those arrested, about ten thousand were women, fifteen thousand were children below the age of eighteen and about sixty-five thousand males. There is no doubt that detention was used as a common weapon by the South African Security Force in maintaining the statuesque supremacy of the state. When these instruments failed, the apartheid regime resorted to the use of various forms of brutalities coupled with the violation of civil liberties across the country.

CHAPTER THREE

Demise on the Horizon: The Siege of Apartheid's Compulsive Power, 1988-1990

“The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles”- Karl Marx

Introduction

In the previous chapter, it was observed that the period between 1984 and 1986 witnessed increased determination on the part of the regime to crush all forms of opposition to apartheid. This resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency, beginning in some parts of the black townships and later across the whole country. The apartheid regime, under the leadership of P.W. Botha, first came up with various constitutional changes which led to the establishment of black supervisory councillors in the townships and the subsequent introduction of a tri-cameral legislative system.¹ This new political change, paved the way for the incorporation of Indians and coloureds into the South African parliament.² Although they were given the status of observers, the black majority was completely left out. This political development prompted an upsurge in the levels of violence in black townships. In a bid to arrest the situation, the regime responded by deploying security forces to occupy most of the black townships. The South African Defence Force (SADF) moved to such troubled areas in support of the South African Police Force (SAPF).³

Meanwhile, there was growing and intensifying resistance to compulsion within and outside the borders of South Africa. The regime was equally determined

¹. P. Gobodo-Madikizela: *A Human Being Died that Night*, p.147.

². J. Momberg: *From Malan to Mbeki*, p.43.

³. H, Giliomee: *The Last Afrikaner Leaders - A Crucial Test of Power*, p.13.

towards protecting its hegemony through the use of security forces. This state of affairs also resulted in increased global isolation and sanctions on South Africa, under the apartheid regime.⁴

In another twist of historical developments, the intensification of the struggle against racial segregation gradually spelt out the demise of apartheid in South Africa. This signified the beginning of an end to the compulsive policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The government under President Botha, used the police in clandestine wave of brutalities, abductions, arrests, detentions without trials and summary executions of protesters/oppositions.⁵ This eventually led to the outbreak of hunger strikes by various prison inmates as a sign of protest against the regime.

Meanwhile, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) continued to organise various kinds of defiance campaigns against the regime. The government responded with its usual compulsive actions, targeting the ANC/UDF political leaders within and outside the country, with directives coming from the State Security Council (SSC).⁶ This resulted in gradual and consequently total isolation of the white minority regime by the international community. From 1988 to 1990, apartheid in South Africa was shaken to its very foundations.

⁴. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: “The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid” In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds) (2013): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Ccentury South Africa*. Routledge, p.19.

⁵. M. R. Mchunu: ‘A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008’, p. 87.

⁶. S. Charlene: *Robben Island*, p.149.

For almost four decades, the regime maintained and legitimised its compulsive apartheid policies in South Africa.⁷ However, increased dissatisfaction by people both within and outside the country proved to the contrary. This could be seen in the levels of violent upheavals that characterized most of the black-dominated areas. In addition, there was massive underground sabotage attacks carried out by armed groups of the banned ANC and the UDF. The army, police, economic institutions and local chiefs within the townships were the major targets.⁸ The years 1988 and 1989 also witnessed a notable increase in the number of worker strikes. This was mostly organised by the Black Trade Union (BTU). On the other hand, the effect of the Bantu Education Act led to the intensification of students' protests.⁹ Such military and political turmoil in the South African political scene compelled the regime to impose yet another state of emergency. This was in a bid to crush all forms of opposition to apartheid. The regime's attempts, as observed by Kevin, to ban political organisations failed to demobilise the people of South Africa against apartheid. He argued that:

"While the government had succeeded in disrupting - in some places, destroying – the ANC/UDF politico-administrative structures for organising the population, the popularity of and support for the liberation movement had not disappeared from the population."¹⁰

The above quotation shows that the more the regime dealt with the liberation forces, the more adamant and recalcitrant the forces became. In addition, it can

⁷. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.131.

⁸. Confidential interview of Nkateko Ledwaba (Sotho) held on 26th June 2013, at Pretoria, city of Tshwane metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.132.

¹⁰. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.165

be argued that apartheid's compulsive policies against opponents of the regime resulted in creating more popularity for the opposition's political organisations.

Thus, the period between 1988 and 1990 fell within another epoch of an emergency period in South Africa. The regime was more determined and focused in dealing with all forms of opposition. Surprisingly, the majority of black South Africans were also prepared and more determined not only to oppose the regime, but also to break the chains of domination and decades of marginalisation.¹¹ By 1988 the regime had, under emergency laws, succeeded in putting hundreds of opposition groups behind bars, including women and children who were *doli incapax* (below the age of 18).¹²

Hunger Strike as a tool of Resistance

Meanwhile, members of the opposition groups who were either imprisoned or under police custody soon realised that protests, strikes, boycotts and various acts of sabotage were not enough in fighting against the compulsive propensities of the white minority regime. Accordingly, they (i.e. detainees) resorted to a dangerous but well calculated health risk that is, engaging in hunger strikes. Their aim was to attract the attention of the regime and the international community as a whole.¹³

¹¹. C. Coco and S, Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, pp.132-133.

¹². S. Charlene: *Robben Island*, p.148.

¹³. www.medic.wikia.com/wiki/hungerstrike

At this juncture, it could be asked why the hunger strike? It is clear that, by its nature, a hunger strike is protest method. It could also lead to serious health complications and sometimes death.¹⁴ Yet, the detainees applied this method against apartheid as a new way of resisting apartheid.

On the 23rd January 1989, a group of about hundred detainees at the Diepkloof prison embarked on an indefinite hunger strike demanding their unconditional release.¹⁵ Prior to the 1989 hunger strike, however, there had been quite a number of hunger strikes carried out by detainees/prisoners. However, what made the 1989 hunger strike¹⁶ different from the previous ones was the fact that it involved virtually all apartheid detainees across the country and it lasted longer. In addition, the strike attracted the attention of many organisations within and outside the country. In reaction to the hunger strikes, the minister of Law and Order, with the support of the regime's highest echelons, decided to ignore the naked realities on the ground. The strike soon metamorphosed into an international issue. It succeeded in attracting the attention of many countries, international human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations, international press, civil liberty groups, and other religious organisations.¹⁷

Towards the end of January 1989, a group of about 100 men detained under the Emergency Laws decided to take law into their own hands. They organised themselves, forced open the gates of prison cells and escaped. It is notable that the hunger strike marked an important epoch in resistance against apartheid in

¹⁴. www.medic.wikia.com/wiki/Hunger_strike

¹⁵. Human Right Commission (Review) in South Africa, report of 1989, p.46.

¹⁶. S. Charlene: *Robben Island*, p.138.

¹⁷. C. Coco and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Authorised biography of Nelson Mandela*, p.133.

South Africa.¹⁸ It also succeeded in building confidence among detainees across the prisons and police stations in South Africa. The Human Rights Commission observed that:

"While the internal resistance became the engine of change in South Africa, it took the hunger strike to get that engine running again. Change took place in South Africa not because of any change of heart on the part of the state but because of the cumulative effect of both internal duress and pressure from the international community."¹⁹

Thus, when the regime reorganised its security operatives to contain protest actions across the country, the anti-apartheid movement intensified its mass action. The political situation in 1989 actually brought the regime to the brink of collapse.

By the end of March 1989,²⁰ over 700 detainees had joined the hunger strike, demanding their immediate and unconditional release from detention. The Human Rights Commission observed that between the months of January and December, those that were detained under the state of emergency had succeeded in staging 53 hunger strikes across the country, involving about 1429 detainees.²¹

The subsequent increase in the demand for the release of political detainees within and outside the country, in addition to the deteriorating health conditions of those that were involved in the hunger strike, forced President Botha to order

¹⁸. M. R. Mchunu. *'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008'*.

¹⁹. C. Coco and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Authorised biography of Nelson Mandela*, p.134.

²⁰. R.J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p.175.

²¹. Human Rights Commission (Review) in South Africa, report of 1989,p.76

the Minister of Law to release detainees. About 202 political prisoners, comprising the first batch, were released from detention. This led to an increased pressure through protests and mass action in South Africa for the release of those that were left behind.²² The intensification and worldwide condemnation of apartheid's compulsion, led to the release of about 650 detainees. This figure was, however, challenged by the HRC, when their record indicated that only 500 detainees were released.²³

The detainees on the other hand, felt that their demands for total and unconditional release had not been met by the regime. Therefore, they resorted to frequent escapades from detention centres and hospitals and sought refuge in various international embassies and consulates. By mid-1989, hunger strike as a weapon of liberation was extended beyond the state of emergency.²⁴ In essence, those that were incarcerated for violating other compulsive apartheid policies equally welcomed the idea and joined the surviving political vanguard Mass Democratic Movement in protest against apartheid. Ultimately, the recalcitrant attitudes among the detainees, coupled with intensified international pressure, compelled the government to release an additional nine hundred political detainees/prisoners.²⁵

²². The banning of ANC and UDF during the emergency years in the mid 1980's, made UDF form an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions which lead to the birth of the Mass Democratic Movement in 1989.

²³. Human Right Commission, p.77.

²⁴. C.Coco. and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Authorised biography of Nelson Mandela*, p.128.

²⁵. Confidential interview of Ms Phumzile Nkohla (Xhosa and Attorney at Law) held on 25th October 2013, at Emdikane, Eastern Cape Province.

Meanwhile, President Botha ordered for the increase of security intelligence services on anti-apartheid elements.²⁶ This led to a counter revolutionary warfare backed by an increase of personnel in the South African Police and the South African Defence Forces. The reorganisation of the security system was proof that the regime was not willing to succumb to the glove of apartheid compulsions. Instead, the regime came up with new methods of crushing political dissidents. The State Security Council was also given the mandate to provide security and intelligence information about the activities of opposition groups both within and outside South Africa. The regime relied heavily on those reports to counter the activities of the liberation movements.²⁷

While it is not part of this chapter to delve into the period of 1984 to 1987, it is necessary to note that a series of dramatic events which occurred within the said era had a direct political bearing on the epoch 1988 to 1990. For instance, the declaration of the state of emergency from the mid 1980's coupled with growing tensions and political protests, led to the legitimisation of state violence. This was accompanied by a selective assassination of political opponents, disappearances and arrests of political leaders from various liberation groupings and their adherents.²⁸ It should be noted however, that the Defence Act provided an unconditional immunity to members of the security forces in carrying out compulsive and tyrannical activities on the defenceless and oppressed people of South Africa.²⁹

²⁶. P. Gobodo-Madikizela: *A Human Being Died that Night*, p.146.

²⁷. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, pp.138, 140.

²⁸. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.141.

²⁹. C. Ngcokovane: *Demons of Apartheid - A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the N.G.K., N.P. and Broederbond's Justification of Apartheid*, p.68.

Mass Disobedience and Protest against the Apartheid Regime

There was also resurgence and intensification of political violence against the apartheid regime, particularly in the black townships. The regime responded vehemently by tightening the security system by dispatching secret police to various townships to crush all forms of opposition. In addition, the regime increased cross border raids to checkmate the rate of influx of weapons and guerrilla fighters into South Africa. The regime also devised another technique of assassination and abduction of anti-apartheid political leaders and their supporters. Most of the victims were members of the ANC, SACP and the UDF. High profile activists who sought refuge in most of the frontline states of Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe were faced with a series of attacks from the apartheid regime.³⁰ The regime's invasion of the front line states led to the loss of lives from both sides and to the destruction of properties.

From the aforementioned, it is clear that the SAP and SADF had lost sight of the political realities within South Africa. This was best displayed by the regime's intransigence as the state refused to succumb to the majority demands of the people. Instead, the regime embarked on militarisation of the polity within and outside South Africa. Despite all of this, the regime still failed to crush its political opponents and its actions further motivated the freedom fighters. The more the regime applied its compulsive policies on the oppressed people, the more motivated and recalcitrant they became.³¹ Kevin observed that,

³⁰.A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p. 152.

³¹. Human Rights in South Africa: *Rule of Fear*, p.92.

*"Total Counter-Revolutionary Strategy had run its course and had not succeeded in defeating the enemy, only holds it."*³²

To buttress the above statement, Winnie Mandela, in one of her political speeches asserted that, *"The more they oppress us, the harder we fight."*³³

Another circumstance which dragged the apartheid regime into the theatre of total defiance had to do with an over-investment in the armaments and military sectors. A huge amount of South Africa's budget went to the security vote, military and defence. This could be seen with the invasion and crushing of the frontline states who were either suspected of providing asylum to guerrilla fighters or were organising covert insurrectionary activities against the apartheid regime. It was estimated that the apartheid regime spent over R2 million daily in its effort to crush the ANC and the UDF leadership in exile.³⁴ It could be argued that such investment could have been redirected towards improving the general welfare of the people.

The South African Armament Industry (ARMSCOR) was rated as the third largest corporation in the country and the largest arms manufacturer in the

³². A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.167.

³³. G. Jeff and F. Justin: *Mandela - The man and his country*. [Youtube]. South Africa: ABC News.

³⁴. Right from the formation of the military wings of ANC and UDF i.e, *Umkhonto we-Sizwe* and *Poqo*, good number of volunteers moved across the frontline states of Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe for training in the guerrilla military warfare. The apartheid state of South Africa invaded these countries with the aim of crushing the guerrilla fighters.

southern hemisphere. ARMSCOR appeared as number 10 on the global list of armament industries.³⁵ Unarguably, the proliferation of arms and ammunitions in South Africa, during that time originated from a massive investment in armaments by the apartheid regime in its bid to curtail the spread of anti-apartheid tendencies. Evidently, the repercussions of such investment visibly manifested themselves in the state of crimes and security challenges which continued to bedevil South Africa.

According to South African Human Rights group, there was an increase in the sales of ammunition across South Africa. As such, it was estimated that about one fourth (1/4) of the white population in the country owned guns. During the same period, there was an over-reliance on the SAP and the SADF in suppressing resistance and protests in the field of education, health and labour sectors.³⁶ This aggravated tension and created a lack of certainty on both sides. This could also be seen as an additional '*ingredient which produced a bitter soup*' of the defiance campaign.

As the regime was investing in the security sectors, a large portion of South Africans were left below the poverty line. The period was accompanied by increased unemployment, poverty and total dissatisfaction among the majority of citizens. Yet, the apartheid regime continued with its policies of compulsion against leaders and supporters of the liberation movement.³⁷ At this point, if

³⁵. Human Rights in South Africa: *Rule of Fear*, p.70.

³⁶. Ibid, p.70.

³⁷. Confidential interview of Pieter Uys (Afrikaner and political analyst) held between 17th and 20th October 2013, Vertersport and Bekkersdal, Westonaria local municipality, Gauteng Province.

there was anything that remained constant within the polity of South Africa, it was the spirit, determination and conviction among the liberation movement. The HRC in its report stated that, "*The South African regime's repressive...and the indications it is giving that it cannot live without the state of emergency are indication of a political paralysis that gripped it.*"³⁸

Internal and External Pressures

Towards the end of 1989, the ship that was navigating the compulsive policies of apartheid began to sink slowly. These were all signs for a gradual movement towards the liberation of the majority of citizens in South Africa. This period also witnessed another siege of the apartheid regime. September 6th 1989 was declared as the date for the last all-whites election in South Africa.³⁹ The election was expected to take place without immediate scrapping of apartheid compulsive policies and while the state of emergency was still in top gear. Thus, the majority of the population were about to witness yet another election in which they had no right to participate. No doubt this scenario raised a number of questions among scholars, about the nature of the democratic route South Africa was pursuing.

The political temperature within the polity had reached a boiling point while the concept of disenfranchisement was fully utilised by the regime. It was in this wave of circumstances, that the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) appeared on the political scene as both the protagonist and antagonist of the apartheid regime. This was due to the fact that increased detentions without trials, arbitrary arrests, persecution of political opponents and their sympathisers,

³⁸. Human Rights in South Africa: *Rule of Fear*, p.92.

³⁹. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.476.

ruthless crushing of opponents and total abuse of civil liberties. In addition to mass protests, increased guerrilla attacks and other forms of sabotage became the order of the day. The Human Rights Commission observed that:

"...arbitrary detention without trials awaits anyone stepping over an invisible line drawn anywhere at any time by any member of the security forces".⁴⁰

An increased global condemnation against the apartheid regime gave the MDM an opportunity to rally popular support for total defiance against apartheid compulsion. The banning of the UDF seriously dashed the hopes of most blacks and the liberal white element. Following this, within a short period the message and popularity of the MDM spread like wildfire into the nooks and crannies of South Africa.⁴¹ In other words, the MDM appeared like a messiah to the oppressed class of the country.

The initial demands of the MDM comprised lifting the emergency laws and a call for a true representation of all South Africans to participate in the 1989 elections. The MDM further called for the unbanning of all political organisations and the unconditional release of political leaders and those that were illegally arrested or detained by the regime. It also demanded equal opportunities for socio-political and economic welfare of the country, irrespective of racial or economic status. Above all, it advocated the total dismantling of the apartheid structures and policies. The regime of President

⁴⁰. Human Rights Commission, p.46; See also: F.W. De Klerk: *The Last Trek – A New Beginning*, p.351

⁴¹. R.J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p.222.

Botha reacted vehemently to such demands while the security forces continued to arrest and to detain opposition groups.⁴²

The compulsive political antics of the regime compelled the MDM to embark on an aggressive option. Such an option entailed rolling mass action which, in terms of the ANC's liberation philosophy, fitted in with mass struggle at home, underground sabotage, armed struggle and the call for continued international isolation of apartheid and its ideologies.⁴³ The rolling mass action went beyond mere protests and holding of political speeches. This could be observed when doctors began to refer black patients to white hospitals. Black pupils also began to appear in front of white school gates. A series of protests were staged in front of white schools in spite of the intervention of the security forces. The same method was employed in the transport sector. The campaign also encompassed equal access to social amenities such as the use of beaches, playgrounds and clubs with a popular slogan: "declare *all* [emphasis added] facilities open to all races".⁴⁴

The impact of the defiance campaign was mostly felt in the Western Cape Province (WCP). The campaign was met with resultant anger of the security forces, particularly the riot police, who unleashed their wrath against the adamant and recalcitrant students of the province. As a result, another form of defiance resurfaced. This time, it was neither championed by the MDM nor the Black Liberation Movements. Instead, it erupted from within the white liberals, the Indians and the coloureds.

⁴². S. Anthony: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, pp.381-407.

⁴³. N. Alexander: *An Ordinary Country - Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa*, p.47.

⁴⁴. Human Rights Commission, p.68.

The regime, in its effort to maintain the status-quo, embarked on mass conscription into the army and other security departments. This was accompanied with a systematic and progressive extension of compulsory military service in order to cope with the security challenges. The idea was outrightly rejected, especially by liberal white youths and their parents. Most of the youths refused to be conscripted into the two-year military service while others deserted their training camps.⁴⁵ Therefore, by the year 1990, South Africa witnessed mass immigration of young talented youths who were not willing to serve in the apartheid army. The majority of the youth cast doubts whether the SADF was defending the country or the racial system of apartheid. Thus, their attitudes were based on the fact that the increased presence of the SADF in most of the black townships and the continued destabilisation engulfing Angola and other frontline states was rooted in the injustice of the segregationist policies of apartheid.⁴⁶

The white liberal activists who refused to be conscripted or otherwise acted against the wishes of the Pretoria regime were made to pay for their actions behind bars.⁴⁷ This led to protest organised by white mothers under the banner of End Conscription Campaign. They demanded the abolition of conscription and the immediate withdrawal of their children from black townships and the frontline states. Most of these protests occurred in Pretoria and the Western Cape. It can be argued that the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) had contributed in adding more salt to the injury already caused by the siege.

⁴⁵. Human Rights in South Africa - *Rule of Fear*, p.68.

⁴⁶. O. Okenwa: *How Lumumba Suffered in Life and Died in Katanga*, p.34.

⁴⁷. Human Rights in South Africa: *Rule of Fear*, p.73.

In addition, continued global isolation, coupled with internal rebellions, prepared a fertile ground for the last kick of a dying horse to occur. In other words, the unfolding process of a possible negotiation towards a peaceful transition to a new political dispensation began to surface.⁴⁸ By 1990 it was evident that the future was bleak for the apartheid regime. The regime of President F.W. de Klerk, who came into power after Mr P.W. Botha suffered a stroke and subsequently recalled by the National Party, soon realised that the most suitable alternative for the National Party and its compulsive tendencies could only be a negotiated peace settlement.⁴⁹ This was the case despite the fact that there was a growing concern over internal problems that emanated within the National Party as a result of the transitional political crisis that bedevilled the party in 1989.

It should be noted that the 1980s witnessed the early signs of the apartheid regime's demise. The apartheid government and its compulsive policies were shaken to their very foundation during the years 1989 and 1990. It appeared to be illogical from the side of the majority governments of Western Europe and America to continue their Machiavellian support for a white minority regime which exposed a globally stigmatised policy of racial discrimination.⁵⁰

The growing intensification of global isolation and the embargo imposed on the apartheid regime marked an important epoch in completing the circle of the siege on apartheid and its compulsive tendencies. The Reagan and Bush

⁴⁸. H. Giliomee and B. Mbenga: *New History of South Africa*, p.353.

⁴⁹. Zululand Observer, 8th June 1990, p.15.

⁵⁰. N. Alexander: *An Ordinary Country - Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa*, p.45.

administrations in the United States of America took the lead in placing harsh economic sanctions on the apartheid regime.⁵¹ Companies in the United States of America were banned from investing and participating in businesses and other commercial activities in the country. There was also an embargo on the importation of South Africa's Uranium and Coal into the United States. U.S banks were also forbidden from transacting any form of business with or within South Africa. The South African Airlines were also denied landing rights in the whole of the United States.⁵²

Furthermore, the International Community continued to demand for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. There was also a demand for the withdrawal of the SAP and SADF from the black townships. In addition, there was a call for the review of the South African constitution, and above all, there was a strong call for the abolition of apartheid and its structures across the whole country.⁵³ It can be argued that the intervention of the international community in the political crisis facing the country had two opposing consequences on the people and the regime. First, the majority of South African citizens enthusiastically welcomed the idea of foreign intervention. They viewed it as another beginning that would assist them to actualise their dream of liberation from the apartheid compulsion.

⁵¹. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: "The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid" In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds) (2013): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, p.19.

⁵². G. Jeff., F. Justin and G. Jeff. *Mandela: The man and his country*. [YouTube]. South Africa: ABC News.

⁵³. J. Momberg: *From Malan to Mbeki*, pp.189-195.

On the other hand, the apartheid regime did not welcome the idea. In fact, the regime vehemently criticised the imposition of economic embargos as a blatant violation of its international status. Yet the embargos succeeded in crippling South Africa's economic strength accompanied by massive disinvestment and outflow of capital from South Africa. The efforts of sanctions compounded the existing economic crisis affecting the country.⁵⁴ The growing intensification of guerrilla wars, attacks and various acts of sabotage together with the invasion of the frontline states, were major setbacks that affected the economy. To this end, it was observed that combined global economic sanctions cost South Africa a total of about 32 to 40 billion dollars.⁵⁵ This had serious repercussions on the value of the South African currency and the economy at large.

It can be argued that the crisis of apartheid power and its siege were not only externally motivated. The internal bitter political realities within South Africa were also not in accord with the injustice of apartheid and the selfish desires of the regime.⁵⁶ However, it should be noted that the period in question did not record a smooth siege of the apartheid regime. The apartheid government did not fold its arms to allow the 'enemy' to go quietly into the night.⁵⁷

⁵⁴. Confidential interview of Prof Lekalakala (Tswana and former MEC) held on 6th October 2013, at Mohlakeng, Randfontein local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁵⁵. G. Jeff., F. Justin and G. Jeff. *Mandela: The man and his country*. [You Tube]. South Africa: ABC News.

⁵⁶. N. Joel: "A Continuing search for Identity: Carrying the burden of History" In: L, Arianna. *et al.* (eds). *One Hundred Years of the ANC- Debating Liberation Histories Today*. pp. 30-34.

⁵⁷. N. Alexander. *An Ordinary Country - Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa*, p.170.

Thus, political opponents were exposed to direct threats of the regime, all in an attempt to crush those who opposed the regime. The apartheid regime identified only two camps: those for and those that were against the state. The SAP and the SADF, under the umbrella of the State Security Council were given the sole power and authority to decide who were the enemies of the regime, and, who were not. Under this platform, a good number of people were arrested and detained without trials. It was estimated that about 1,569 protesters were detained between the months of August and November 1989.⁵⁸

The apartheid regime intensified its compulsive policies while general abuse of civil liberties across the country increased. The ban on all sorts of meetings (particularly those considered by the government as a threat) from the beginning of the imposition of the emergency rule in the mid 1980's, were redesigned during the period in question. In most cases, riot police moved in to disperse what they termed as unlawful meetings and other politically related gatherings. This led to arrests and detention.⁵⁹ It should be noted that the compulsive measure taken by the regime, as analysed in the previous chapter, continued to prevail from the middle of the 1980's up to the turn of the 1990. What differentiated the later from the former was the *modus operandi* used in controlling the media. It can be stated that the emergency regulations were used in banning and controlling the press.

The compulsive decrees, as observed by the Human Rights Commission's Review in South Africa, entailed filming, photographing or reporting on unrest

⁵⁸. G. Shimoni. *Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa*, p.48.

⁵⁹. Human Right Commission (Review), p.6.

or security force action in ‘unrest’, which includes unlawful gatherings and processions, without official permission, publishing a ‘subversive statement’- defined as a statement discrediting military service, promoting ‘people’s courts’ and other alternative structures of power, urging illegal strikes and boycott actions, or assessing the effectiveness of such actions, or calling for the release of people detained under the Emergency, reporting on the circumstances or treatment of an Emergency detainee, or giving information in connection with a detainee’s release, etc.⁶⁰

By the beginning of September 1989, the press was faced with a clandestine harassment and other forms of abuse from the instruments of apartheid compulsion such as the SAPF and the SADF. In 1990, a total of about 74 journalists were arrested and detained and their equipment was either seized or destroyed by the security personnel. Such equipment entailed video cameras, video cassettes, audio tape recorders and other valuable stationeries.⁶¹

Meanwhile, increased protests, especially in black dominated areas, also faced the anger and brutalities of the riot police. Thus, there was frequent use of teargas, batons and water cannons, rubber bullets and birdshot.⁶² In dealing with apartheid opponents therefore, the question of the use of minimum force was completely out of question. In analysing the socio-political and economic turmoil in South Africa and its environs, the HRC, observed thus, “The root cause of instability in the Southern African region is the minority regime of the

⁶⁰. Human Right Commission (Review), pp.6-7.

⁶¹. J. Momberg: *From Malan to Mbeki*, pp.189-195.

⁶². C.Saunders: *Illustrated History of South Africa - The Real Story*, p.56.

Republic of South Africa and its refusal to comply with generally accepted principles of justice”.⁶³

In the final analysis, it can be argued that the general political unrest which clouded South Africa and the spill-over effects of the invasion of the frontline states was prompted by the racial and compulsive tendencies of the apartheid regime of South Africa.

Conclusion

By the turn of the last decade of the 20th century, it appeared that the compulsive apartheid regime was exposed to serious political and security challenges. The defiance and security challenges facing the regime during the period in question could be discerned in terms of mass mobilization and the rolling mass action against the government, mostly championed by the Mass Democratic Movement.⁶⁴ In addition, there was growing international condemnation against the apartheid regime. This led to the imposition of a series of sanctions and embargos against South Africa.

Rejection and dejection of the racist apartheid tendencies and its policy of conscription was also echoed by the liberal white youths. The invasion of the frontlines states by the South African regime posed additional security and economic challenges to the survival of apartheid. Following this the regime, led by President F.W. de Klerk, was left with no option, but to open up and accept a

⁶³. Human Right Commission (Review), p.9.

⁶⁴. K.A. Hampton: ‘The Decline of Zulu Nationalism as a Defining Feature of IFP Policy, 1994-1997’.

peaceful negotiation. Needless to say, there were enormous challenges that lay ahead for the liberation struggle against the compulsive apartheid policies in South Africa. Similarly, the road to a new political dispensation proved narrow though a blue light could be seen at the end of the tunnel.

CHAPTER FOUR

Fundamental Shift in Compulsive Apartheid Policies and the Last Survival Strategies, 1990-1994

“After crossing the Rubicon, the promised land appeared before the two contenders...”

–N, Alexandra, 1994

Introduction

The turn of the last decade of the 20th century saw the apartheid regime moving towards succumbing to the general will and aspirations of the majority people of South Africa. Considering the high level of tempo, both within and outside the country, de Klerk decided to introduce sweeping reforms. It was a move that almost cost him his political career before the very eyes of white conservatives and other members of parliament. It should be noted, however, that an international development took place in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which helped bring an end to the apartheid regime in South Africa.¹ By 1989 the Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, had introduced new economic and political policies in Russia popularly known as *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*; meaning openness and reforms.²

This new development heralded the subsequent collapse of Communism as a national ideology in Russia. The year saw the disintegration of the USSR. This development paved the way for the ascendance of capitalism as a global

¹. H. Giliomee: *The Last Afrikaner Leader - A Crucial Test of Power*, p.10. For details refer to: R. Du Preez. ‘The Impact of the end of Cold War on the Transition in South Africa.’; B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies, *South Africa in the 20th century*, p.244.

². M. Gorbachev. <http://www.perestroikaandglasnost/uploads>.

economic and political ideology. It also led to the emergence of a new balance of power in global politics. The United States of America emerged as a unipolar power, took the lead in championing the course of capitalism and democracy in world power politics.³

This fundamental shift inevitably signalled an end to the ‘global threat’ of communist ideologies to apartheid South Africa. As such, the Nationalist Party began to open up for negotiations with anti-apartheid political organisations, particularly the ANC. Though, many scholars have detailed the nature of the underground secret meetings that were held between Mandela and de Klerk while the former was still in prison, such details of secret negotiations do not form part of this chapter.

A twist of historical paradox appeared before the very eyes of the South African parliamentarians on the 2nd of February 1990.⁴ President de Klerk, in his historic address before the parliament, announced the unbanning of all political and subsidiary organisations.⁵ These entailed the African National Congress (ANC)⁶, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and, the Pan African Congress (PAC). Prior to this period, the Mass Democratic Movement was the only vibrant political opposition which continued to mount pressure against the

³. M.Gorbachev: <http://www.perestroikaandglasnost/uploads>.

⁴. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: “The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid” In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds) (2013): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, p.20.

⁵. S. Charlene: Robben Island, p.149.

⁶. J. Soske, A. Lissoni and N. Erlank: "One Hundred Years of the ANC - Debating Struggle After Apartheid" In: L. Arianna: *et al* (eds.) *One Hundred Years of the ANC- Debating Liberation Histories Today*, pp. 29-34.

regime. Exactly nine days later on the 11th February 1990,⁷ the long awaited prisoner, who championed the remaining campaigns against the compulsive tendencies of the apartheid regime, was officially and unconditionally released after spending about 10,000 days in prison.⁸ In his speech, Mandela showed his appreciation for the support given to him and his fellow comrades during the period of incarceration. He pleaded for unity and patience for the road ahead. Part of the speech that caught the imagination of the world entailed the following words:

"Friends, comrades and fellow South Africans, I greet you all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all. I stand here before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you, the people. Your tireless and heroic sacrifices have made it possible for me to be here today. I therefore place the remaining years of my life in your hands."⁹

It can be argued that the released of Mandela marked a turning point in the history of South African politics. The regime of Pretoria and various anti-apartheid political organisations began to reorganise and re-strategise against the impending political violence that bedevilled the South African political scenario. In line with the above, the USA openly and actively began to identify itself with anti-apartheid's revolutionary movement in South Africa. For instance Mandela, during the course of his tours in Europe and the America, was warmly and enthusiastically welcomed by the capitalist nations. They promised him their active support in dismantling the apartheid regime. But, one question that must be taken into cognisance is; why the U-turn by the capitalist states, particularly in the year 1990? The most obvious answer had to do with

⁷. P. Gobodo-Madikizela: *A Human Being Died that Night*, p. 148.

⁸. B.A. Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.253.

⁹. G. Jeff, F. Justin, and G.Jeff. *Mandela: The Man and his country*. [You Tube]. South Africa: ABC News.

the collapse of the USSR and its communist ideologies.¹⁰ This was the reason, coupled with the resilience of the South African populace in the struggle, why the South African government decided to give up apartheid as its national policy by repealing the policies which banned anti-apartheid political organisations and, the subsequent release of Mandela.

The period 1990-1994, was accompanied by the intensification of radical government policies as a means of digging its foot into the ground. The anti-apartheid elements, especially the ANC, resorted to the use of arms and sabotages in uprooting the apartheid system. A continued to call for increased foreign sanctions and condemnations against the apartheid regime, became the order of the day.¹¹

Meanwhile, the two main ‘actors’ in the theatre of political struggle for and against apartheid policies were faced with serious condemnations from their fellow comrades. For instance, de Klerk was accused by the white right-wing conservatives of being too liberal and trying to betray the course of Afrikaans by repealing the law(s) which banned anti-apartheid political organisations. Secondly, white conservatives, mostly Afrikaans, accused de Klerk of betraying Afrikaner Volks by releasing Mandela.¹²

From another angle, Mandela, was also accused by the ANC's radical comrades of participating in various secrets deals with the apartheid government without

¹⁰. R. Du Preez: ‘The Impact of the end of Cold War on the transition in South Africa’, p.86.

¹¹. Weekly Mail & Guardian Newspaper, pp.13-15.

¹². H. Giliomee: *The Last Afrikaner Leaders - A Crucial Test of Power*, p.410.

their prior notice. He was also accused of dropping the armed struggle in favour of negotiations. The new wave of political violence that blanketed the country was coined with a new name by the regime - "Blacks on Blacks"¹³. In essence, the government tried to exonerate and distance itself from rural and township violence by putting the blame on blacks killing blacks.

It is on this basis that this chapter critically examines how the regime tried to survive by radically redirecting its policies and rules of engagement towards the anti-apartheid political organisations and the majority people of South Africa.¹⁴ The analysis focuses on the emergence of a new total strategy, the rationale behind it, what makes it different from the previous apartheid strategies, and how it affected South African foreign relations and what followed thereafter.

Analysing the Instruments of Diversion

The period covering 1990 to 1994, was considered by many scholars¹⁵ as the period when the apartheid regime resorted to the use of violent methods against whoever stood in its way. The regime saw the need for countering, disfiguring and preventing a smooth and peaceful negotiation for popular democratic rule in

¹³. The connotation of "Blacks on Blacks" was introduced by the apartheid regime and to a greater extent the right - wing conservatives; to prove that the on-going political crisis in the country was a mere struggle for political dominance among ethnic groups in South Africa. It was also used to prove that the ANC was not capable of ruling the country in the future.

¹⁴. Confidential interview of Pearl Scott (English and former high school history teacher) held on 14th August 2013, at Heidelberg, Lesedi local municipality, Gauteng Province.

¹⁵. A. O. Kevin and Joe Hanlon are of the view that the period in question marked the beginning of apartheid's total strategy.

South Africa. Meanwhile, it should be noted that destabilisation policies, as far as the history of apartheid is concerned, dated back to the inception of the national government in 1948. This is evident in the level of government institutionalisation of various compulsive and inhuman legislations that were put in place and backed by its constitution and the members of its parliament. This had inevitably set the compulsive vehicle of oppression in motion.

It is notable that many commentators on apartheid's destabilisation policies have limited their inquiry to government-sponsored underground attacks, murder, assassinations and the disappearance of political opponents.¹⁶ In essence, destabilisation goes beyond this level, for it encompasses psychological, emotional and economic forms of destabilisation. All these were geared towards re-directing the minds of the freedom fighters. For instance, the intelligence units of the South African army had (or were given) the plan of dividing the black majority by way of infiltrating various oppositional political organisations.

One of the major instruments used for and against apartheid was the in-depth use and reliance on secret services.¹⁷ For instance, it was observed that the National Intelligence Service was given the task of polarising the leadership of the ANC between those at home and those in exile. Meanwhile, the apartheid regime applied the services of, most especially, what it termed as the "*Third*

¹⁶. Confidential interview of Tsepiso Mampuru (Sotho and historian) held on 6th July 2013, at Mamelodi, Pretoria, city of Tshwane metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

¹⁷. A. O, Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-200*, p.76.

*Force" in executing most if its plans. In his 1987 study, Sampson posits that: "a network of security and ex-security operatives, acting frequently in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, were involved in gross violations of human rights, including random and targeted killings."*¹⁸

The ANC/SACP launched an affiliate underground secret organ known as Operation VULINDLELA popularly referred to as operation *Vula* (i.e. a Zulu phrase meaning to penetrate).¹⁹ This organ was given the task of infiltrating various government plans and policies. However, operation *Vula* was brought to an end by February 1991²⁰ because it was soon discovered by the South African Defence Force (SADF) and more importantly, ANC and other political organisations had then started to negotiate with the government.²¹ The ANC's military wing, MK, continued to operate while negotiations were still on. This meant that from the beginning of 1990 both sides were equipped with spies and relied so much on security information for future political struggle.

The unbanning of the ANC, SACP, PAC and the release of Mandela as well as other political prisoners did not make the ANC and its allies have trust and confidence in de Klerk and his government. In fact, as 1990 turned to 1991, the ANC continued to send its members abroad (especially Algeria and other communist countries) to acquire training in guerrilla warfare.²² The external wing of MK especially in the front line states continued to infiltrate the country

¹⁸. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.445

¹⁹. N. Alexander. *An Ordinary Country - Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa*, p.174.

²⁰. *Ibid*, p.176.

²¹. Zululand Observer. 22 April 1990, p.16.

²². C. Coco and S. Marc. *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*. p.35.

with arms and ammunitions. It had also (secretly) smuggled over 20,000 of its exiled freedom fighters back into the country. This was the situation that prompted the SADF and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to break into the security system of MK and unravel MK's plans against the government. Looking at the internal political scenario, in addition to increased external pressure and economic sanctions, the two contenders were nonetheless forced to sit on the table of negotiation and counter negotiations.²³

From another angle the regime, in its effort to counter the revolutionary elements and their policies, decided to supplement the services of the Department of Military Intelligence by giving the NIS the task of re-organising the security apparatus across the whole country.²⁴

The South African Defence Force had, as far back as 1989, established a secret underground unit known as the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and part of its mandate was to (first) deal with the activities of the white left wing radical groups. They were to cause havoc, threats, intimidation and on some occasions execute those who appeared to be liberal or sympathising with the black liberation movements. By July 31st 1990, the CCB was replaced with the Directorate Covert Collection (DCC). The majority of those who served under CCD were incorporated into the DCC. It was covertly funded and equipped with instruments for destabilising the political opponents and terrorising Black townships.

²³. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.511.

²⁴. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.87.

Meanwhile, between 1991 and 1992, another instrument of destabilisation that was established back in the mid-1980s, 'officially' resurfaced. It was fully charged with the spirit of wiping away and crushing any stone that would stand before the way of the regime. It was known as the "Third Force".²⁵ The SADF and SAP worked closely but covertly with the Third Force in creating political unrest in various townships and Hostels in Gauteng and Eastern Cape provinces. Lack of trust and uncertainty was established among the black residents who were in hostels.²⁶ Ethnic and political hatred was used in dividing the people and turning them against each other. Hundreds of blacks were killed in politically related violence in hostels and townships.

The ANC and other opponent political organisations demanded for an end to political and ethnic violence or else they would quit the negotiations that were going on. Mandela accused de Klerk of holding peace talks while creating violence through the back door.²⁷ In response to this accusation de Klerk, set up the Harms commission to investigate into the allegations. When the commission presented its findings, it was observed that the South African Police (SAP) was covertly sponsoring and directing the activities of the Third Force.

In his 2011 study, Kevin observed how the SAP "*train, organise, arm, and deploy*" the Inkatha forces into areas that were predominantly occupied by the anti-apartheid supporters.²⁸ The government also utilised the media as part of its diversionary weapon against the liberation movements. Both print and

²⁵. Sowetan, p.7; Beeld, 17 November.1996, p.6.

²⁶. Weekly Mail & Guardian, 9 March 1991, p.22.

²⁷. A. Samson: *Mandela- The Authorised Biography*, p.457.

²⁸. A.O.B. Kevin. *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*,p.185

electronic media were extensively used in spreading rumours and propaganda. The South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC) and the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) presented news: "alleging links between *the ANC's* armed wing, MK, the provincial Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organisation."²⁹

The above mentioned liberation organisations and the PLO were all fighting for the same course. They all held the belief that a 'successful' abuse was made on their fundamental civil liberties. Psychologically speaking, the SABC and BBC's reports on the inter-relationship between the above-mentioned organisations could be seen as an understatement, bearing in mind the nature of their political agitations and the struggle for liberation.

It was also found that the assassinations of top anti-apartheid figures like Anton Lubowski (killed in Namibia), David Webster and Griffiths Mxenge were co-sponsored and covertly organised by the Hit Squad, the Death Squad, under the supervision of the SAP and SADF.³⁰ In addition to this, there was also the Vlakplaas popularly known as the 'evil farm' located a few miles away from Pretoria. The Vlakplaas farm was used by apartheid security agents for various purposes, such as punishing apartheid political opponents, extracting information through cruel means, and, executing members of the anti-apartheid forces. These inhuman compulsive tendencies were organised and carried out under the command of Eugene de Kock, who was then head of the apartheid

²⁹. Die Burger, 5 April, 1994, p.2.

³⁰. P. Gobodo-Madikizela: *A Human Being Died that Night*, p.14.

underground operations and also head of the South African police department death squad.³¹

On the other hand, de Kock continued with a violent campaign in neutralising the opposition forces. He also wanted to demoralise anti-apartheid supporters and also to stop exiled members of political oppositions from returning back to the country. This was relatively achieved through the violation of civil liberty which resulted in untold hardship and more deaths particularly at the Vlakplaas farm.³²

Apart from the above mentioned units that were used by the regime in destabilising the negotiation settlement, it was also discovered that other silent units assisted in actualising the said goal.³³ For instance, the State Security Council (SSC), the National Security Management System (NSMS) and the dreadful vigilantes carried out destabilisation activities. Top politicians within the National Party were reported to have played different roles in creating an unpleasant environment during the negotiation process. There were various attempts to destabilise the much needed unity between the ANC, the MDM and the UDF.

³¹. Die Volksblad, 2nd April 1996, p.3.

³². Confidential interview of Mr Mqiniseni Mkhwanazi (Zulu and former uMkhonto weSizwe member) held on 5th August 2013, at Esikhawini, Umhlathuze local municipality, KwaZulu-Natal Province.

³³. A.O.B. Kevin. *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.181.

The vigilantes (*these were state-sponsored loose groups in the townships who became involved in numerous violent attacks on members of mass organizations, including murders of individuals associated with them*³⁴) restricted their activities within the townships and hostels by attempting to wipe out apartheid political opponents and their supporters -particularly ANC supporters.³⁵ They unleashed a reign of terror especially in those areas that were known to be opponents of the state. In the course of discharging their 'duties', no one was spared. There were instances, where villages were destroyed and burnt to ashes.³⁶ Children, women, old and young were not spared. There is no doubt that the activities of the vigilantes seriously disrupted the negotiation process. Increased violence in both rural and urban areas resulted in the death of many people.³⁷

The regime refused to actively participate in dealing with the situation. In fact, the regime referred to the situation as ethno-political violence being carried out by Blacks on Blacks.³⁸ In essence, the state tried to prove to the people and especially the international community that the ugly political picture of South Africa, resulted from the struggle for both ethnic and political domination. One may argue that the regime was fully behind the outbreak of political violence between various black communities. This was the position of a black lady, Nomvula Nonkoyane, while responding to a white South African journalist:

³⁴ Rob Davis et al. *The Struggle for South Africa*, p.429.

³⁵ M.R. Mchunu. 'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008', p.iv.

³⁶ *History Uncut- Inkatha-ANC Clashes*. B, Tilley and L, Dworkin. [Youtube]. South Africa, ABC News.

³⁷ Human Rights in South Africa - *Rule of Fear*, pp. 79-80.

³⁸ S.H. Ntuli. 'The History of the Mthiyane People who were removed from Richards Bay to Ntambanana, Wednesday 6 January 1976.' p.28.

"We have been living with the hostel dwellers, we have our community structures right inside the hostels that have been operating with us for quite long years. And, we have never had any tribal conflict in this particular township. And, we can never even look at this thing as a tribal war. I am a Zulu, we got so many other people who are Zulu speaking who are now in the leadership of this community [sic] and we never had this kind of a thing... So we cannot say it is a tribal war going on in Natal, but, it is a war generated by the system to destabilise all the progressive forces that are trying to come up with a solution."³⁹

There were also instances where the SACP, PAC and especially ANC supporters were attacked, injured and killed by either the vigilantes or other covert agents of the state. It was in response to these attacks and counter attacks that the leadership of the ANC decided to intensify their attacks on various government buildings and infrastructure and other forms of sabotage.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the ANC, during one of its meetings with the regime's officials argued that for peace to reign in the country; the government must first address the current political problems and also deal with the socio-economic imbalances among the people. It also called for the improvement of welfare by upgrading the standard of living in the townships and rural areas.

All this were going on at a time when both parties were having meetings at various levels trying to find a solution to the political problems that bedevilled the country. The regime attempted to divide the black majority to its own advantage by introducing puppet local township councillors. They were given the task of maintaining law and order within their domain. They were also made to understand that soon they will be given full sovereignty over their localities. Some of the members of the vigilantes served as their personal guards. Many

³⁹. B. Tilley and L. Dworkin: *History Uncut- Inkatha-ANC Clashes*. [You Tube]. South Africa, ABC News.

⁴⁰. G. Jeff, F. Justin and G. Jeff: *Mandela: The Man and his country*. [You Tube]. South Africa, ABC News.

people in such areas paid with their lives and properties for showing signs of dissatisfaction with the councillors. The majority of these cases were recorded in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. The SADF did not fold their arms when the vigilantes were busy unleashing different kinds of atrocities in the townships.

"In most cases, the police were also cited from diverting the attention of the public by confronting and teargasing congregations of worshippers as they left their churches on Sundays; using catapults with stones against residences in order to provoke the people; blackmailing shebeen owners into providing them with liquor; breaking up fences for firewood; placing teenagers in small bins behind a buffel. A corporal then beat the boys with sticks; Hiding in/or around houses while a buffel was driven round in such a manner that it would provoke people's action and assaulting residents by using sticks and also throwing different names to them."⁴¹

The regime's diversionary policies took another trend of destabilisation. This could be seen when the black homelands were given more support from Pretoria. For instance, the independent homelands of Transkei, Ciskei,⁴² Venda and Bophutatswana were officially financed and supported by the regime.⁴³ The rationale behind this new development was to reduce the political power and influence of the ANC in the homelands. Secondly, it was hoped that the newly 'independent' homelands would turn their backs against the ANC and other progressive political elements. The Pretoria government believed that

⁴¹. Rapport, 7 April 1996, p.4.

⁴². W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: "The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid" In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: (eds) (2013): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, p.15.

⁴³. Confidential interview of Eric Ndou (Sotho and former high school history teacher) held on 15th July 2013, at Germiston and Benoni, Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

establishing these political units would inevitably destabilise the quest for popular participation of the majority citizens of South Africa.⁴⁴

Between 1991 and 1993 Mandela was busy travelling within and outside African continent. He was soliciting for international support and funds for the ANC. At the same time, he was calling for increased economic and diplomatic sanctions against the apartheid regime.⁴⁵ At the same time, F.W. de Klerk was equally busy with his foreign visits, trying to secure more support for his government. In most of the countries he visited, especially: Britain and the United States of America, he called on business investors to invest more in the economy of South Africa by promising them full security of investment.

It was during these trial periods that another dual form of destabilisation was brought to show. It nearly crippled the whole negotiation process. On one hand, was the transformation of the Inkhata cultural organisation into a viable political party generally known as the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP). It was dominated mainly by the Zulu-speaking people and became prominent in the whole of KwaZulu-Natal and some parts of the province of Gauteng.⁴⁶ The IFP was headed by Chief Mangosutu Buthelezi, a royalist from the Zulu traditional monarchy. In the beginning, the primary aim of the IFP was to safeguard the culture and interest of the Zulu people especially from the growing popularity of the ANC.

⁴⁴. J, Netshitenzhe. "A Continuing Search for Identity: Carrying the Burden of History" In: Arianna L. *et al.* (eds) pp.15-16.

⁴⁵. A. Sampson: *Mandela -The Authorised Biography*, p.482.

⁴⁶. S.R., Maninger. 'The Conflict Between ANC and IFP Supporters and its Impact on Development of KwaZulu-Natal.'p.56.

Towards the end of 1991 the hidden hand of the compulsive apartheid regime hijacked, recruited and redirected the IFP activities towards the destabilisation process of the negotiation settlement. There is no doubt that during the time in question the reactionary activities of the IFP seriously undermined the democratic transitional process.⁴⁷ For instance, several anonymous agents who served under C1 and C10 units of the SADF/SAP confessed that the government was responsible for recruitment, training, arming and directing the IFP hit squads into "illegal killings, fraud, forgery, bombings and other acts of public violence"⁴⁸ especially against the leadership and supporters of the ANC. A good example was the bombing of the ANC's head office in Johannesburg which led to the death of 16 people and injury of over 20.⁴⁹

In addition to this, between July 1990 and June 1993 an estimated number of 101 people lost their lives every month in politically related violence in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. This amounted to a total of about 3,653 deaths. To be precise, between the months of January and March 1991 an estimated number of 400 people were killed. Towards the end of July, the Zulu workers in the townships of Transvaal and Sebokeng located a few miles south of Johannesburg, while staging a protest, attacked ANC supporters leading to the death of more than 30 people mostly ANC affiliates.⁵⁰ Extreme radicals and MK members of the ANC, threatened to break away from the negotiation and to continue with guerrilla warfare and other forms of sabotage. Mandela accused de Klerk of operating a dual face: one was preaching for peace and tolerance

⁴⁷. Zululand Observer, 13th March, 1993, p.8

⁴⁸. Human Rights Report in South African, p.74.

⁴⁹. Ibid, p.76.

⁵⁰. A. Sampson: *Mandela-The Authorised Biography*, pp.436, 438.

and the other was busy (through the back door) putting more fuel in the crisis that was past sweeping over the country.

Another stumbling block that emerged during the negotiation process was the emergence of a radical white wing formation. For example, the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Volksfront, the Freedom Front and the infamous neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement (i.e. Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) popularly known as the AWB, sought to destabilise the negotiations through a campaign comprising targeted assassination, diversion, disruption, kidnapping, assault, intimidation and above all open violence against the opposition party leaders. The White wing conservatives accused de Klerk of trying to sell the Afrikaner Volks to the blacks. As such they demanded for separate land for their Volks.⁵¹

The growth of political violence, particularly in KwaShange and Vulindlela⁵² coupled with other townships, in addition to increased suspicion on the support given to the IFP⁵³ (and other secret security departments) by the government, forced de Klerk to set up an investigation committee to look into its causes and the level of (the said) government participation in both urban and townships crises. The outcomes of the investigations that were carried out by the different commissions namely: the Goldstone, the Steyn and the Khan commissions revealed that the SADF and SAP were deeply involved in organising and supporting (both in kind and in cash) various secret organisation/units in

⁵¹. R.J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, pp. 224-5.

⁵². M.R. Mchunu. 'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008', pp.1-3.

⁵³. K. A. Hampton. 'The Decline of Zulu Nationalism as a Defining Feature of IFP Policy, 1994-1997.'

diverting the attention of the majority citizens of the country and also undermining the popularity of the ANC across the country.

As mentioned earlier, Kevin also observes that the findings of the commissions included the existence of another compulsive unit of destabilisation -the Vlakplaas execution centre,⁵⁴ which was fully indoctrinated with apartheid and racist ideologies and fully armed against elements of the anti-apartheid regime. Likewise, Gobodo-Madikizela equally observes that “*the Vlakplaas had been the most visible of the apartheid state's counter revolutionary warfare elements active in South Africa.*”⁵⁵

In light of the above, conservative white right wing and the radical black left wing (IFP) came together and formed an association known as the Concern South African Group, COSAG. Their primary objective was to prevent the negotiation process by preaching and campaigning for anti-election policies. The white conservatives believed that, if care was not taken, the Afrikaner Volk and other white South Africans would be eclipsed by the black majority. From another angle, the IFP believed that the ANC must not be allowed to dominate the scene of South African politics. In line with this, it was also observed that between 1991 and 1993 about 5-7 million refugees had crossed borders into South Africa from the frontline states.⁵⁶

⁵⁴. A.O.B. Kevin: The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005, p.187.

⁵⁵. P. Gobodo-Madikizela: *A Human Being Died that Night*, p.87.

⁵⁶. Sowetan, 10 May 1993, p.4.; B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies: *South Africa in the 20th century*, p.246.

This resulted in an increase in the number of unemployed youth, leading to other forms of security challenges. Proliferation of arms and drugs among the black communities can be seen as one of the leading examples. The regime was quite aware of the problems from its secret security services but decided to turn a blind eye to them. It was believed that in some instances, the SAP covertly encouraged the sale and distribution of drugs in the black townships.⁵⁷ The primary objective was to encourage crime and violence within the black communities so that their attention and focus would be diverted from usurping political power. It was now clear that the regime had succeeded in dividing attention, causing confusion and a lack of trust among the township dwellers and those who lived in the urban hostels. It systematically encouraged political and ethnic bigotry in most of the black communities.

While AWB was campaigning for a separate home for the white race, the IFP continued with violent attacks and the destruction of properties of those who either identified themselves with the ANC or any of the opposition parties. The SAP continued with military and financial support to the IFP through a bank account in Johannesburg.⁵⁸ Taking a bird's eye view of the political violence in South Africa during the period in question, it can be said that a tiny line divided the ANC and the IFP from moving into the theatre of a civil war.⁵⁹ Mandela made several attempts and appeals to Chief Buthelezi calling for suitable ways

⁵⁷.Confidential interview of Ms Anne-Marie Potgieter (Afrikaner and paediatrician) held on 4th September 2013, at Krugersdorp, Mogale City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁵⁸.An anonymous confession by former South Africa Police who covertly served in the destabilisation process under the apartheid regime during the early years of the 1990's

⁵⁹. R.J. Walton: Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition, p. p.223.

on how to end the massacres in the townships and the local communities. It was not until late 1993 that signs of peaceful negotiations began to surface between the two political parties. Prior to this period, de Klerk had suspended top officials of the SAPF and ordered for the immediate closure and discontinuation of all kinds of support to the IFP. This was as a result of the findings made by Khan's Commission on the involvement of the SAP in covert operations in the intensification of political and ethnic violence in South Africa.

Breaking the Chains of Compulsion

It was in the midst of growing tension and political violence that the political leaders from both sides decided to come together and began to negotiate about the democratic constitution and the future of South Africa.⁶⁰ On the 20th December, 1991, they converged and formed a political association known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).⁶¹ A total of 19 delegations representing both government and other political organisations converged and began to negotiate about the current political violence and the future of the country.⁶² The outcome of their meeting led to the formation of five (5) transitional working committees, each constituting 38 delegates and 38 advisers. They were given the mandate to create a conducive environment for a peaceful political participation; determine the basic principles of a democratic constitution; map out transitional procedures for the independent homeland of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda; set out a smooth timetable for the

⁶⁰. C. Coco and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Authorised biography of Nelson Mandela*, p.142.

⁶¹. P. Gobodo-Madikizela: *A Human Being Died that Night*, p.148.

⁶². Zululand Observer, 16 March 1992, pp.2-3.

future negotiations and transition and provide suitable alternatives for solving future problems that may arise during the transitional period.⁶³

As noted by Sampson, "*there were some dangerous absentees, including conservative right-wing Afrikaner parties and Chief Buthelezi*" of the IFP who demanded three separate delegations for the Zulus.⁶⁴ The conservatives believed that the negotiation process would not hold any water without their presence.⁶⁵ They accordingly decided not to attend meetings unless their demands were met. The political struggle between the ANC and the regime entered a gloomy phase when the conservative groups, mainly the IFP and the white-wing extremists, took a side against the former.

The negotiation and peace settlement began to show signs of improved relations between what could be referred to as the ex-prisoner and the ex-jailer. Though, there was a high level of accusations and criticisms against de Klerk and Mandela from their respective party supporters. Soon afterwards, the two actors realised the need to embrace a peaceful settlement for the future political and economic survival of the country.

They resorted to a peaceful negotiation instead of political confrontation. The conservative supporters of the NP and the ANC were, however, not happy with the negotiation process. The second meeting of the convention took place on the 17th March 1992, where the leaders addressed the delegates. In his speech, de

⁶³. Document of the South Africa's multi-party Constitutional negotiation. p.54.

⁶⁴. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.456.

⁶⁵. R.J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, pp.224.

Klerk demanded a democratic system based on a power sharing formula. The NP also demanded power-sharing through a rotational political system where the seat of the presidency would be rotated between blacks and whites.

De Klerk further called for the surrender of MK's weapons to the government to prove that the ANC was willing to negotiate,⁶⁶ an idea that was vehemently and outrightly rejected by the leadership of the MK.⁶⁷ Stressing the need for a peaceful negotiation and calling for an end to political violence, attacks and massacres in both the townships and the rural areas, Mandela summed up his speech as follows:

"The process of moving towards democracy is unstoppable. History grants all of us a unique opportunity. To exchange this opportunity for a bowl of lentil soup of the past, and negative bravado, is to deny the future."⁶⁸

At the end of the convention of CODESA II in May 1992, major parties agreed and signed a Declaration of Intent, aiming to bring about an un-divided South Africa, with a Nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism and loyalty to the state.⁶⁹ Yet, another major setback was recorded on the 17th June 1992⁷⁰ when Inkatha supporters laid a siege on Boipatong, killing more than forty people and inflicting serious injuries upon 67 others. It was later discovered by the Goldstone's Commission that the SAPF covertly organised and directed the

⁶⁶. R.J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, pp.224.

⁶⁷. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.459.

⁶⁸. B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies: *South Africa in the 20th century*, p.246.

⁶⁹. Document of the South Africa's multi-party constitutional negotiation, p.54.

⁷⁰. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services- From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, pp.188-9. See also; Sowetan: 17, June, 1992.

attack by the rival IFP.⁷¹ De Klerk, reacted by suspending six top ranking officers including de Kock (a top SAPF officer) after he was found guilty in connection to the massacre of anti-apartheid supporters.⁷²

In its final report that was presented on 18 March 1994, the Goldstone Commission vividly proved the level of SAPF and DMI's involvement in supporting the violent activities of Inkatha through the use of the vigilantes especially in the KwaZulu-Natal Province.⁷³ As the peace settlement continued, it became clear among the protagonist of the apartheid regime that the aura of South African power and authority was gradually shifting towards the corridor of the ANC. Pik Botha,⁷⁴ noted this in his remark calling on both parties to embrace peace and unity:

"We are like a zebra, it does not matter whether you put the bullet through the white stripe or the black stripe. If you hit the animal, it will die"⁷⁵

Despite the above, on the 17th June 1992, a group of Inkatha supporters well equipped with weapons, laid a siege on the Vaal township of Biopatong and massacred 45 people. White men with blackened faces allegedly joined the attack and the police colluded.⁷⁶ Deeply convinced about the role played by the SAP and the government in general, Mandela, threatened to quit from the

⁷¹. M.R. Mchunu. 'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008', p.iv.

⁷². A. Sampson. *Mandela-The Authorised Biography*, p.438.

⁷³. Eastern Province Herald, 15 July 1994, p.6.

⁷⁴. S. Armstrong. *In Search of Freedom*, p.141.

⁷⁵. A. Sampson: *Mandela -The Authorised Biography*, p.459.

⁷⁶. South African Human Rights Report, p.67.

negotiation process as he argued, "Why [sic] we continue to talk to a regime that is murdering our people."⁷⁷

Consequently, Mandela accused de Klerk and his government of betraying the negotiation process by diverting and destabilising the already wounded and broken political sheep. Using at his disposal "factual inaccuracies, distortions and blatant party propaganda" aiming to delay and deny popular democracy that was badly needed by the majority people of South Africa. At this juncture, the whole negotiation process was nearly brought to its knees. The delegates were again deeply polarised as suspicion and a lack trust overtook the floor of the World Trade Centre located a few miles away from Johannesburg.

September 1992 saw political violence sweeping throughout the country while the economic crisis was fast eroding the very foundation and the future survival of South Africa. The ANC responded by establishing its own armed defence unit known as "Self Defence Units" (SDUs).⁷⁸ Ronnie Kasrils, an SACP stalwart, was authorised to mobilise, train and disperse the SDU's men to counter the Inkatha's wave of attacks. There is no doubt that the activities of the SDUs contributed to the escalation of violence in the black townships. Furthermore, on the 10th April 1993, another major political set-back was recorded. Chris Hani, the General Secretary of the South African Communist Party and former commander of *Umkhonto We Sizwe* (MK), the armed wing of

⁷⁷. Herald, 12 December 1995, p.4.

⁷⁸. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.192.

the ANC was assassinated.⁷⁹ He was shot to death by a Polish immigrant who was believed to be hired by the conservative whites as part of their anti-election campaign. His death led to an unprecedented outbreak of violence and anarchy in most parts of South Africa.⁸⁰

Barely two weeks later, on the 24th April 1993, a stalwart in the history of the ANC's political struggle by the name of Oliver Reginald Tambo, naturally disappeared from the face of the earth.⁸¹ The two events shook the foundation of the ANC. Yet, after a period of mourning, Mandela went ahead to prove that he was capable of paddling the South African canoe to the promised land by calming the already tense political atmosphere. In his televised national address he appealed to the people to remain calm and to despise all form of violence. Mandela also talked to the regime of de Klerk on the need to be serious and honest with the negotiation process.⁸²

Meanwhile, the relationship between de Klerk and Buthelezi soured. The regime soon realised the need to work with the ANC and its allies to forge peace that would lead to the advent of a new political dispensation. The IFP began to show signs of discontent with the new relationship and mutual understanding between the ANC and the NP. Thus, when the IFP realised that

⁷⁹. ---'Chris Hani' *Sowetan*, 7th December 1993. For more about the assassination of Chris Hani, refer to: *Leaders-Chris Hani*.(2004). Tilley, Brain, and Dworkin Lawrence. [Youtube], Robben Island Museum/Mayibuye Archive. The Afravision Collective.

⁸⁰. R.J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p.225.

⁸¹. Zululand Observer. 11 April 1993, p.3.

⁸². Confidential interview held on 16th December 2013, at Lusikisiki, Emdikane- Eastern Cape Province.

they were side lined, they began to show signs of recalcitrance to both the government and the supporters of the antiapartheid regime. Sampson observed that:

"De-Klerk's previous strategy had depended on an alliance with Buthelezi, but the Zulu leader was proving impossible to deal with while the revelations about the third force had discredited the relationship. Roelf Meyer began to have some success in persuading de Klerk that the Afrikaners could live with majority rule, provided they could share some of the power."⁸³

Buthelezi made a drastic move in what one may call 'a declaration of war' against the NP and the ANC, threatening to secede and form a new country for the Zulus. Mandela, as mentioned earlier, tried several times to make Buthelezi see the need for peace and unity in the country but to no avail. Mandela took another tour (in the midst of political uncertainty) of the European Nations, soliciting support and increased sanctions on the apartheid regime. He was welcomed by the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In his address to the British members of Parliament in London, Mandela, posited that "*... history demands, that you help us.*"⁸⁴

The apartheid regime was faced with increased economic and diplomatic pressures, particularly from the United States of America. A good number of foreign investors, with capital and the will to expand the frontiers of their businesses, slowly and gradually began to withdraw their investment in South Africa. This seriously undermined the economic strength of the regime.⁸⁵ By the first week of June 1993 virtually all political parties, with the exception of the

⁸³. Die Volksblad, 28 May 1999. p.1. Weekly Mail, 16 April 1993, p.2

⁸⁴. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.470.

⁸⁵. R. J. Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p.175.

IFP and the AWW conservatives (mostly Afrikaners), agreed to hold South Africa's first all-race democratic elections on the 27th April 1994.⁸⁶ In the IFP stronghold, KwaZulu-Natal, the supporters of the party intensified their attacks and intimidations against mainly ANC supporters,⁸⁷ although, in some instances the ANC loyalists were to be blamed for inciting such violence.

The Promised Land Re-surfaces

Two fundamental issues posed a serious threat toward the actualisation of the forthcoming elections. The IFP and the white conservatives refused to participate in the elections and called on their members to boycott the polls. Secondly, Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana threatened to secede from South Africa. He declared his homeland independent and also called for a boycott of the elections. This led to rolling mass action and chaos. The regime responded by threatening non-payment of salaries to the civil servants in the region if they failed to participate in the elections.⁸⁸

As tension intensified in Bophutatswana, the right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbewiging (AWB) and Freedom Front (FF) of General Constand Viljoen made a calculated political risk by moving into the region with weapons to support Lucas Mangope. Eugene Terre'Blanche, the leader of the AWB, together with his supporters were taken by surprise on arrival. They were stationed at the airport a few miles away from the metropolis waiting for the

⁸⁶. Sowetan, 1st December 1993, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁷. M.R. Mchunu. 'A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008', p.6.

⁸⁸. S. Allister, C. Dan and L. Lasely: *The Death of Apartheid - The whites last stand*. [You tube]. South Africa.

supply of weapons before they could move into action.⁸⁹ After waiting for some hours, Terre'Blanche and some of his supporters moved into Mmabatho, the administrative capital of Bophuthatswana, and began to shoot with pistols on defenceless and unarmed civilians. The Bophuthatswana police, outraged by the actions of the AWW and FF, went on a mutiny against Mangope by firing back at the white intruders. Constand Viljoen, sensing the danger that lay ahead, withdrew together with his supporters. The AWB recorded a humiliating defeat with heavy casualties as they tried to retreat. Terre'Blanche lost his political ground, never to rise up again.⁹⁰

A few days before the elections, General Constand Viljoen's Freedom Front (FF) and Chief Buthelezi's IFP agreed to participate in the general elections. On the 27th April 1994, about 200,000 electoral officials, volunteers and observers participated in running the election process. A total of about 23 million registered voters cast their votes. Mandela moved to Inanda Township, a few miles north of Durban,⁹¹ and cast his vote at Ohlange High School. This was near the grave of John Dube, the pioneer and first president of the ANC in 1912.⁹² Mandela recalled his experience on that day:

"As I stood over his grave, John Dube, I did not think of the present, but of the past. I thought about all the men and women who had fallen in the struggle. I did not go into the voting station alone that day. I was casting my vote with all the people who had given their lives to make this day possible... I marked an X next to the letters "ANC" and then slipped the

⁸⁹. F.W. De Klerk: *The last trek -A New Beginning*, p.340.

⁹⁰. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.484.

⁹¹. C. Coco and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom*, p.148.

⁹². A. Sampson. *Mandela-The Authorised Biography*, p.490.

folded ballot paper into the wooden box. I had cast the first vote of my life."⁹³

At the end of the elections, a total of 400 seats were contested for in parliament. The National Party won 53% in the Western Cape where 69% of the coloureds voted for de Klerk and his party. The IFP won a majority of 51% of the national votes in KwaZulu-Natal. In the remaining seven provinces, the ANC won a majority of 62.6% with 252 seats.⁹⁴ It should be noted that during the second congress of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which took place on the 15th May 1992, a resolution was passed for the adoption of the Government of National Unity. That is, any party that won the election would co-govern with the remaining parties along for a period of five years. From the elections, Nelson Mandela emerged as the first democratically elected president of the Republic of South Africa. Thabo Mbeki was sworn in as First Deputy President while de Klerk was sworn in as Second Deputy President.⁹⁵ The members of parliament were given the task of drafting a new constitution for a new South Africa.

A close examination of the political scenario in South Africa between 1990 and 1994 reveals that thousands of people lost their lives, others imprisoned, some went missing while others were permanently injured. A lot of families were either broken or disintegrated. A total of forty-two death sentences were recorded while about 237 people were to spend jail terms between five and twenty years. In 1990 about 5,000 people were detained without trial. By March

⁹³. Albert Venter and Chris Landsberg, *Government and Politics in the New South Africa*, p.62.

⁹⁴. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.491.

⁹⁵. C.Coco and S. Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, p.151.

1990 there was a death record of 61.4 % in the East Rand; 21.2% in Soweto and 8.0% in Vaal.⁹⁶ A round figure of 3,000 people had lost their lives while over 7,000 were injured.

Between 1900 and 1991 Natal accounted for one third of the politically related deaths in the country.⁹⁷ By 1993 the percentage had increased to 50%. The East Rand sub-region of PWV accounted for a total of about 60% deaths in the country. In its findings the Human Rights Commission listed that between 1990 and 1992 actions of the Security forces (i.e. SADF and SAP) accounted for the deaths of 5.7%. The activities of the vigilantes led to the deaths of 5,060 on average a percentage of 81.2%. Several attacks that were carried out by the Hit-Squad (against the supporters of anti-apartheid) resulted in the deaths of 126 people with an average percentage of 2.0.⁹⁸ The right wing sponsored attacks was responsible for the deaths of 44 people with an average of 0.7%. The cause of 647 deaths accounting for 10.4% could not be ascertained.⁹⁹

The record of deaths and injuries in train attacks in year one reached 67 deaths and 284 injuries in 16 incidents. Year two recorded 227 deaths and 566 injuries in 230 incidents. A total of 295 deaths and 850 injuries in 246 incidents were recorded. In the second half of Year two, train attacks accounted for over 10% of all deaths, an indication of urban terrorism of a special kind. One particular train attack ranked as a major massacre. The human Rights Commission recorded about 80 bomb attacks between January and April 1994 leading to the

⁹⁶. South African Human Rights Commission's Report, p.58.

⁹⁷. P. Van Niekerk and B. Ludman: *A-Z of South African Politics*, p.44.

⁹⁸. Sowetan News Paper, 3rd December 1993, p.12.

⁹⁹. M. Coleman. (Ed.): *A Crime Against Humanity - Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*, p.73.

death of hundreds and injuring of dozens. By December 1994 a total of about 14,000 people were killed in different, politically-related violence, while over 22,000 were either slightly injured or permanently disfigured.¹⁰⁰

Conclusion

It may be concluded that the siege of the regime by both local and international pressure groups signalled the demise of apartheid as a system of governance in South Africa. The period between 1990 and 1994 witnessed the escalation of the culture of violence to an unprecedented level. Those who blame the carnage on the compulsion of the apartheid regime argued that it was clear that the products of apartheid were conducting the reign of terror that was tearing the foundation of a new dispensation in South Africa apart.

They spoke of generations of apartheid steeped in a culture of inferiority, let down by a third-rate system of education, ill-equipped for the challenges of a new South Africa, and forced to live in an unbearable condition in the townships, hostels, and squatter settlements. It could be concluded that the products of apartheid were discriminated against, denied their dignity, treated like foreigners in the country of their birth and taught to despise other cultures. Anger and frustration boiled over.

While provocateurs, mainly in de Klerk's police force, were accused by the ANC of trying to preserve apartheid by setting blacks against blacks, militant

¹⁰⁰. M. Coleman. (Ed.): *A Crime Against Humanity - Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*, pp.69-72.

ANC youths accused their venerable old leaders of giving up the armed struggle prematurely and leaving their supporters utterly defenceless. The ANC accused the police of favouring Inkatha and also raised the notion of a sinister “Third force” within the security forces bent on destabilising the liberation movement. The regime blamed the power struggle on the different black political factions, despite the fact that the architects of apartheid used ethnicity to divide the country into minorities in their quest to perpetuate separate development and racial discrimination.

Under apartheid, tribalism, culture and ethnicity were used as a means to separate and denationalise black South Africans. A black person’s ethnic and racial origin categorised him for all aspects and purposes of life – where he would live, whom he would associate with or marry, and the tribal homeland to which he would belong, regardless of where he was born. South African townships were divided into ethnic regions to accommodate Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, and others.

Meanwhile, the regime-sponsored vigilantes played an important role in discrediting black organisations, creating the impression that the regime and security forces were playing a peace-keeping role while blacks were tearing themselves apart. As the legal pillars of apartheid crumbled, the argument ensued whether the regime was serious about change or whether it had a hidden agenda. On the other hand, one need only look around the world to note that societies in transition experienced some form of instability. Studies societies in transition show them to be characterised by instability and frequent periods of unrest. In South Africa, the rival groups were playing for high stakes and there was no second place. The winner took all.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Advent of a new Political Dispensation, 1994-1996

"The task of repairing past damages, incurred during apartheid, have proven to be more difficult than initially anticipated." – A. Singh

Introduction

The general elections of April, 27th, in which the ANC emerged victorious¹, signalled the demise of apartheid's compulsive policies and the 40 years' rule of the National Party in South Africa. The Black voters welcomed the opportunity to cast their votes for the first time in their lives. The swearing-in of Nelson Mandela on the 10th May 1994 dramatically changed the history of South Africa. According to the political negotiation of 1992 and 1993, it was agreed that a Government of National Unity² (GNU) would be formed which would involve all political parties that took part in the elections. However, this political arrangement (i.e., the formation of the GNU) was given a five (5) year lease.

The resolution as contained in the minutes of the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), provided that the president-elect would be assisted by two deputies, one from his party and the other from the political party that emerged second. Accordingly, Mandela hand-picked Thabo Mbeki from the ANC as the first deputy president while former president de Klerk from the National Party became the second deputy president. According to the negotiated

¹. J, Soske. A. Lissoni., and N, Erlank. *"One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Struggle After Apartheid."*, In: L, Arianna. *et al.* eds. *One Hundred Years of the ANC- Debating Liberation Histories Today*. p.44.

². A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.204.

interim constitution, three-tier government (national Provincial and Municipal levels) was to be adopted with a unicameral system of legislation.³

A total of four hundred candidates were elected to serve as legislators in parliament. These members of parliament were elected across all racial groups and were given the responsibilities to make decisions on behalf of the people of South Africa. Ministerial positions, provincial and local government offices were occupied by people irrespective of their racial backgrounds. The NP, the ANC and other opposition political organisations were hailed both within and out the country for their ability to hold free and peaceful elections. De Klerk, Mandela and Buthelezi were particularly acknowledged by the international community for avoiding a possible civil war.⁴

The new government, in its bid to ensure national reconciliation, embarked on a policy of integration and incorporation of various government structures created during the apartheid epoch. The KwaZulu and the independent homeland security apparatuses were absorbed by the new government. The government was, however, faced with a series of economic crisis vis-à-vis corruption among various government officials; social insecurity; lack of administrative experience and poor execution of government policies. A fall in the price of gold, in addition to the consequent devaluation of the Rand, was complimented by political crisis within the cabinet. South Africans began to feel and witness the extension of social welfare services in the fields of education, agriculture, health care services, transportation and electrification. In 1995 a motion was raised for the establishment of a commission which would be responsible for

³. A. Sampson: *Mandela- The Authorised Biography*, p.518.

⁴. Weekly Mail & Guardian, 8 July 1994. pp. 4-5.

healing the wounds of apartheid and also provide an avenue for offering apologies and forgiveness.⁵

Justification of a New Era

The victory of the ANC in the general elections of 1994 and the subsequent emergence of Mandela as the new president of South Africa, undoubtedly paved the way for the arrival of a new political dispensation. The tri-cameral parliament (TCP) that was established in the mid 1980's was replaced with a new parliament cutting across all racial groups. Except for the provinces of Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, ⁶ where the NP won the majority in the former and the IFP won the majority votes in the latter, the remaining seven provincial premiers came from the ANC.⁷ Challenges and concerns as regards the conduct and results of the elections were expressed by the IFP, NP, and the AWB.⁸

Meanwhile, to say that political violence and other security threats that bedevilled the country, prior to the elections ceased to exist immediately after the elections would be an understatement. There were of course, various forms of politically related violence and sabotages in KwaZulu-Natal. Though they were at a very low-level compared to those experienced in the pre-election days. In its report on the level of politically related violence during and after the

⁵. M.R. Mchunu. '*A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela Districts and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors, 1987-2008*'. p.67

⁶. S.R, Maninger. 'The Conflict Between ANC and IFP Supporters and its Impact on Development of KwaZulu-Natal.' p.78

⁷. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.205.

⁸. M, Coleman. (Ed.). *A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*. p.231.

elections, the Human Rights Committee of South Africa provides the instructive statistics. Firstly, it observes that between July 1993 and April 1994, a total of 461 people were killed. However, the figures sharply declined to 133 between May, 1994 and December 1994. The number further decreased to 100 by January to December 1995. The following year witnessed the lowest rate of deaths in politically related incidents as it further dropped to 83.⁹

The IFP-dominated province of KZN accounted for the highest rate of politically related violence after the general elections. The province accounted for almost 67% of politically related deaths countrywide. This was due to the lingering old rivalry between the two opposing political parties; The ANC and the IFP.¹⁰ In addition to this, the conservative members of the IFP felt that they were not fully represented in the new government of South Africa and they regarded the ANC and its supporters as opportunists of political power. Statistics of political violence which resulted in a number of deaths were compiled and forwarded by the HRC in its report, showing that there was an increase in the number of politically related deaths of innocent people in KZN between 1994 and 1996. For example, in 1994, KZN recorded that 67% of deaths but the figure rose to 89% the following year and 84% in 1996.

However, in comparison to the remaining eight provinces put together, the number of politically related deaths of people amounted to less than 30%. These figures are still debated among scholars, but they have at least presented a close

⁹. M. Coleman (Ed.): *A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*. p.231.

¹⁰. S.H, Ntuli. 'The History of the Mthiyane People who were removed from Richards Bay to Ntambanana, Wednesday, 6 January 1976', pp.28, 30.

picture of politically related deaths in KZN.¹¹ It could also be said that the unequal access to education and poverty contributed to high levels of unemployment. Furthermore, the struggle for cultural hegemony could be seen as another factor that accelerated levels of violence in post-apartheid KZN.

The Zulu, particularly the supporters of the IFP, believed that the Zulu people were the 'original' inhabitants of South Africa. With their numerical preponderance, they expected that they would have a better position to control the activities and decisions of the new GNU. Contrary to the expectations, however, they felt that they were side-lined and betrayed particularly by the ANC for allocating most of the political positions to its members.¹²

Meanwhile, the ANC-led Government of National Unity was faced with different challenges than it had earlier expected. In January 1996 Mandela himself acknowledged this. He said: *"It was more difficult to defend the freedom we have won, than struggling or fighting for it."*

There was de-mobilisation and incorporation of the former homelands of Bophutatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda in addition to six other self-governing territories. The former state organs namely; the army, the police force and other related 'assets' were integrated into the GNU. However, a good number of personnel from the structures that were absorbed from the homelands

¹¹ . M. Coleman. (Ed.). *A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State* p.235.

¹² . This is a common view among most of the people that were confidentially interviewed in Gauteng province.

and the self-governing territories were not efficiently trained and lacked the necessary skills and capabilities.¹³

In addition, looking at the negative role played by apartheid's security forces, one may doubt the possibilities of their survival in the new democratic dispensation. Meanwhile, every state needs the services of security for its survival. The GNU therefore recognised the need to incorporate some of the security apparatus of the apartheid regime. However, the ANC-led GNU began to face challenges from within the security system. For example, some elements of the old regime that were absorbed by the new government were not fully loyal to the GNU as evidenced by various forms of sabotage and non-compliance.

The HRC validated the above assertion in its report, which in part notes that: "Their [referring to the apartheid security forces] emphasis has shifted from being engaged in obstructing the advent of democracy to promoting (criminal) self-interest."¹⁴

In validating the extent of the absorption and incorporation of the former apartheid security structures, Kevin, in his study of the Intelligence Services in South Africa observed that by 1 January, 1995, the new government dissolved the National Intelligence Service (NIS). It was immediately replaced by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The former deputy head of the ANC

¹³. R. Louw: *Southern African Report*, Cited from: A. Sampson: *Mandela- The Authorised Biography*, p. 518.

¹⁴. M. Coleman. (Ed.). *A Crime Against Humanity- Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*, p.240.

Department of Intelligence and Security, Sizakele Sigxashe, was appointed as the first head of the new agency.¹⁵ The new security department i.e. NIA, was expanded to absorb former security branches that were established by the old regime and other political organisations. These included the ANC's Department of Intelligence Service (DIS); the Bophutatswana Internal Intelligence (BII); Pan-Africanist Security Service (PASS); the Transkei Intelligence Service (TIS); the Venda Intelligence Service and virtually all members of the former NIS.¹⁶ The newly created NIA and SASS composed of an estimated number of 4,000 personnel.¹⁷

It could be argued, however, that some of the basic administrative and financial challenges faced by the GNU were rooted within the incorporated structures themselves. The majority of the incorporated staff saw the new opportunity as a way for self-enrichment. This paved the way for corruption, nepotism, favouritism, mismanagement of government resources, inflation of contracts, awarding of contracts to close relatives/fellow comrades and/or unqualified person(s). These challenges were visible across the three- tiers of government.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the ANC-led GNU, though with low administrative experience, continued to work for the unity of the coalition government. Yet, there were some government officials within the ruling party who sought to use their political positions in order to create more wealth for themselves and/or tried to constrain the rights of some opposition political parties. As mentioned earlier, the multi-plurality of the parliament gave the new government its unique future

¹⁵. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services*, p.209.

¹⁶. Die Afrikaner, 1 March 1994, p.3.

¹⁷. Volksblad, 18 April 1994, p.3.

¹⁸. Zululand Observer, 17 February 1995, p.6.

of democratic settings. Former revolutionaries turned policy makers alongside their white counterparts. Archbishop Desmond Tutu also expressed that *"I love this dream, You sit in the balcony and look down and count all the terrorists. They are all sitting there passing laws. It is incredible."*¹⁹

It would, however, be naïve to believe that decision- making among the multi-racial parliamentarians was smooth and easy. There was of course a lack of trust among the parties, especially when it came to the passing and adoption of bills into laws. The black parliamentarians were usually against any opinion that might be presented from their white's counterpart. The latter were equally not comfortable with the opinions of other parliamentarians, especially the blacks from the ANC. In other words, the ANC members of parliament were in constant fear of subversion from the whites MP's. There was also some fear of political dominance and retaliatory policies by the black MP's against the minority whites. Sampson was explicit on this trend:

"Some black ministers suspected their Afrikaner officials of refighting old apartheid battles on new fronts... Mandela was aware of pockets of Afrikaner right-wing resistance - in the police, the army and intelligence - holding out against any reforms..."²⁰

This was true in respect of the uneasy nature of the coalition government at the cabinet level and, as in respect of what was going on within parliament. At both

¹⁹. A. Sampson: Mandela - The Authorised Biography, p.512.

²⁰. A. Sampson: Mandela - The Authorised Biography, p.514.

levels power tussle continued to describe the nature of the relationship among members of the state organs.²¹

Meanwhile, within the executive wing, the Government of National Unity was faced with challenges of forming a non-racial cabinet, one that includes all racial groups within the country, as well as all political parties that participated during negotiations and the subsequent conduct of the general elections. By 1994, a coalition government was formed which incorporated other political parties like the Democratic Party (DP), the Freedom Front (FF), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the United Democratic Front (UDF), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the National Party (NP). Before this, Mandela had approached the PAC President Clarence Makwetu four times asking him to be part of the new government without success.²²

In line with the above developments, Roelof Meyer from the NP was appointed as the Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development. Derek Keys from the NP was given the responsibility of managing the Ministry of Finance. Kraai van-Niekerk, also from the NP, was appointed as Minister for Agriculture. Dawie de Villiers from the NP was appointed to head the Ministry for Environment while Pik Botha was appointed as Minister for Minerals and Energy. Retired General Meiring was made the Head of the Defence Force. Chris Stals, former member of the broederbond secret organisation and a member of the NP was appointed as the Governor of the Reserve Bank, an

²¹. Sunday Times, 19 March 1995 & Weekly Mail & Guardian, 8th March 1995, p.2.

²². A. Sampson: Mandela - The Authorised Biography, p.507.

appointment that received high criticisms from the ANC comrades. Inkosi Mangosutu Buthelezi from the IFP took charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence.²³ Trevor Manuel, from UDF, became the Minister for Trade and Industry.

On the side of the ANC, Frene Ginwala, a lawyer who served the ANC for over thirty years in various capacities in Tanzania, Lusaka and London, emerged as the new speaker of the parliament. Joe Modise was appointed Minister for Defence and Ronnie Kasrils became his deputy; while Pierre Steyn was appointed to the position of Secretary of Defence. Dullah Omar was made the Minister for Justice.²⁴ Mac Maharaj headed the Ministry of Transportation. Joe Slovo, former SACP secretary general and leader of the MK became the Minister for Housing.²⁵ Alfred Nzo took charge of the Foreign Ministry. Kader Asmal took responsibility for the ministry of Water Resources. Jeff Radebe was appointed the Minister for Public Works. Stella Sigcau took charge of the Ministry for Public Enterprises. Tito Mboweni became the Minister for Labour.²⁶ Sydney Mufamadi, from SACP was made the Minister of Safety and Security.²⁷

Within the ANC caucus, there were accusations and counter accusations that the political appointments greatly favoured those ANC comrades who returned

²³. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.205.

²⁴. Ibid, p.205.

²⁵. S, Allister., C, Dan., and L, Lasely. *The Death of Apartheid - The whites last stand*. [Youtube]. South Africa.

²⁶. A. Sampson. *Mandela- The Authorised Biography*. p.508.

²⁷ A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.205.

from exile as opposed to those who maintained the political tempo internally. However, it could be argued that the majority of those ANC officials/supporters who went on exile during the days of apartheid were politically exposed and more educated compared to those at home. This could be the reason(s) why such political appointments favoured them most. In addition, Cyril Ramaphosa, an important figure in the struggle who also served as the ANC's chief spokesperson during the negotiation settlement, turned down a cabinet offer after he was dropped by Mandela in favour of Thabo Mbeki as his first deputy vice-president.

Having these challenges at hand, the executive and the legislative arms continued to operate within the provisional constitution, learning their weaknesses from their mistakes and building upon them. A lack of experienced administrative staff indeed served as a serious obstacle to the new government, particularly at provincial and local government levels. With the exception of the Western Cape, almost all the remaining provinces greatly felt the negative impacts of the Bantu education acts.²⁸ Because the apartheid education system denied black South Africans access to good and quality education, after the general election there were few educated blacks who were expected to fill a wide range of administrative positions across the country.

Despite all this, it appeared that a new South Africa had emerged through a democratic process. Members of cabinet and parliamentarians were committed to discharging their duties irrespective of their racial backgrounds. The

²⁸. M, Ballinger. *From Union to Apartheid*. South Africa: Cape Town. Junta and Company.p.239.

Afrikaner MPs were truly committed in making sure that the new and nascent government fulfilled its responsibilities. Taking into cognisance the non-racial nature of the ANC led GNU, Sampson observes that

"The most striking feature of the ANC government was the range of background and race, including whites, Indians and Coloureds, Muslims, Christians and communist, brought together by a forty-year struggle."²⁹

It turned out that the whites' fear of communist tendencies (as observed in the previous chapter) among members of the ANC was proved to be unfounded. For example, former radical members of the SACP like Thabo Mbeki, Mac Maharaj, Joe Slovo and the former UDF radical Trevor Manuel did not show any interest in communist ideologies in the post-election era. Instead, they became committed to serving the new government. In most cases, the white MPs were astonished to see black MPs involving themselves in hot debates, criticising and arguing on national issues. De Klerk was gratified to find himself sometimes adjudicating in their disputes.³⁰ This proved that the real elements of democratic system were operating based on the principles of checks and balances.

Meanwhile, after spending eight months in office as Minister for Housing, Joe Slovo died. His death was a great blow to Mandela and the ANC. Prior to his death, he had contributed to the struggle for the liberation of South Africa both as Secretary General of the SACP and also chief of staff of the MK. Slovo had played a vital role during the political negotiations process. In fact, he came up

²⁹. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*.p.508.

³⁰. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*.p.509.

with the idea which led to the establishment of the coalition government. On the eve of his death, he made the following remark in an interview session:

"I never really worked out in my mind whether I would or wouldn't live to see it. But, I thought always that it is within the realm of possibility, that I would live to see the transformation that has taken place. I feel that we can all leave the theatre in peace having achieved what we have achieved."³¹

A few days after the death of Slovo, the struggle and the old rivalry between the ANC and the two main opposition parties i.e. the NP and the IFP was rekindled. For instance, the ANC soon discovered that about 3,500 police officers that were charged with committing crimes against humanity during the apartheid days were granted indemnity from persecution on the eve of the election. Mandela was not happy with the decision and a heated debate ensued between the leadership of the ANC and the NP.

In addition to this, prior to the death of Slovo, signs of cracks began to resurface within the GNU.³² For example, during the formation of the cabinet and also the ministerial appointments, de Klerk complained bitterly that Mandela refused to consult him about the appointments of the ANC ministers.³³ Another challenge came up which clearly shows that there was a lack of trust especially on the security sector. The NP wanted to be given the ministerial seat of either the police or the defence but their request was turned down by the ANC.

It could be right to say that the NP wanted such a position (i.e. the ministry of police or that of the defence) in order to prepare a soft landing for the security

³¹. S. Allister., C. Dan., and L. Lasely. *The Death of Apartheid - The whites last stand*. [Youtube]. South Africa.

³². Afrikaner, 19th September, 1996. p.6.

³³. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*.508.

agents who had participated in various forms of state covert operations-particularly those who served under the Third Force.³⁴ On the other hand, the ANC wanted to control such positions in order to ensure that justice prevailed in handling officers who were involved in various criminal activities. By virtue of the fact that the ANC had more power within the cabinet and parliament, nearly all demands of the NP were not favoured.

De Klerk was not impressed with the actions of the ANC. He accused Mandela of becoming power corrupted as he took unilateral decisions without consultations. Following this stance, he decided to withdraw from the coalition government. Later, some NP officials persuaded him to stay. Towards the end of 1995, de Klerk again demanded for indemnity for the Afrikaans security forces who served under the apartheid regime. For example, Magnus Malan, the former defence minister during apartheid days, was charged with murder and crimes against humanity. De Klerk defended the latter on the grounds that he was not involved in such accusations.

Mandela, the head of the ANC, was not happy with the actions of his second deputy Vice President as he retorted: "*I am the President of the country. I decide who gets indemnity, not him.*" (referring to de Klerk). He also accused de Klerk of trying to divide the ANC by creating confusion and interfering on policies and decisions of the president. In his reply to the ANC, de Klerk, noted that "Ours had never been a marriage of love, now the honey-moon was over."³⁵

³⁴. A.O.B. Kevin: The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005, p.153.

³⁵. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*. p.511.

This shows that the bitter relationship between the two political giants, and the subsequent formation of the GNU, did not fully help the coalition process.

The massacre of 28 ANC supporters in Bisho's independence stadium in September 1992, by 69 Ciskei homeland soldiers, resurfaced in August, 1994. The ANC cabinet members learnt that the former homeland ruler Brigadier Oupa Gqozo indemnified the troops that had killed ANC marchers at Bisho prior to the general election.³⁶ In reaction to this, the Supreme Court rejected the decree that was used by Oupa Gqozo by prosecuting the soldiers involved. De Klerk and other members of the National Party saw this as a move towards unravelling old wounds of apartheid. In other words, the ANC had planned to use its political position in retaliation against the officials of the old regime particularly the security forces.³⁷ This clearly showed that the coalition government between the two political giants was not working properly when it comes to policy and decision making. De Klerk therefore decided to withdraw from the coalition government and subsequently resigned from politics.

In the previous chapter, it was observed that part of the demands made by Buthelezi as a pre-requisite for the participation of the IFP in the general elections was to allow international mediators to come into the country, discuss and finally settle the issue of KwaZulu-Natal's autonomy. The IFP also called for the adoption of a separate constitution for the KZN province.³⁸ In essence, even after the elections, Buthelezi and the IFP were still calling for the adoption of a loose federalism which would allow each province to be semi-autonomous.

³⁶. Weekly Mail & Guardian. 16th March 1995. p.6.

³⁷. Beeld, 22 February 1996, p.6.

³⁸. Aida Parker Newsletter, 30th April 1995 & Zululand Observer, 2 April 1995, p.17.

The ANC turned down the IFP's request on the grounds that the new GNU was still taking its shape.³⁹ As such, it was too early for the coalition government to entertain such proposals.

It could be stressed that, the ANC-led GNU was not ready to risk its newly acquired political power, instead it focussed on consolidating its power and authority within the national polity, while the IFP felt that it was betrayed by the ANC and Mandela in particular. It was in this context that Buthelezi boycotted the first post-election constitutional talks and went further to call on Zulus to resist the power and authority of the GNU.⁴⁰ Mandela reacted to this with full force as he threatened to cut off finance for the execution of various projects and the salaries of civil-servants in the province. It was observed that de Klerk could have been the source behind Buthelezi's reaction against the coalition government. This was because the former found it difficult to be on board with the ANC-led GNU. As such, de Klerk might have been looking for a partner to break away with in order to weaken the central government.⁴¹

Towards the end of 1994 the struggle for traditional power and influence within the Zulu royal house was rekindled. Though, monarchical by its nature, its impacts had a spill over effect on the already weakened IFP-ANC relationship. On its front line caption, which reads "Zwelethini nods to Buthelezi's old rival.",

³⁹. Confidential interview of Mamatjie Sedibe (Sotho and military veteran) held on 25th August 2013, at Carletonville, Merafong City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁴⁰. Aida Parker Newsletter, 30th June, 1994. p.3.

⁴¹. *Zwelethini nods to Buthelezi's old rival*. Weekly Mail & Guardian, 16 March, 9 June 1995, p.26.

the Weekly Mail and Guardian (1994), reported that " King Goodwill Zwelethini has sought an urgent meeting with Mangosuthu Buthelezi's oldest enemy Prince Mcwayizeni..."⁴²

Prior to the period in question (i.e. 1994-1996) Prince Mcwayizeni had been in a serious feud with Buthelezi for 26 years over the position of the Traditional Zulu Prime Minister. The former was the most senior prince in the Zulu royal house and as such he felt that he was the rightful candidate for the most powerful position in the Zulu royal house. In validating the nature of the Zulu royal rivalry which metamorphosed into IFP-ANC conflict in KZN, Malala in his article opines that the two men's differences revolved around the position of "traditional prime minister"⁴³ to the king the most powerful position in the Zulu royalty. As the most senior prince in the royal family, Mcwayizeni was by all traditional accounts supposed to occupy the position.

Until 1994, Buthelezi held the position, despite being a junior prince. Indeed, in a bitter battle for the position and thereby control of the royal house, Prince Mcwayizeni alleged that Buthelezi was not a member of the Zulu royal clan, but of a 'lower' house. "He has nothing to do with matters of the royal family. He is not a Zulu; he is a Buthelezi,"⁴⁴ said Mcwayizeni. Prior to the period in question, Prince Mcwayizeni had broken away from the KwaZulu homeland parliament in 1989 and, joined the ANC in early 1990's. The Independence newspaper reported that:

⁴². Aida Parker Newsletter, 30th June, 1994 & Weekly Mail & Guardian, 11 June 1994. p.1.

⁴³. Albert Venter, *Government and Politics in the New South Africa*, p.189.

⁴⁴. Ibid; p.4.

"... Mcwayizeni's opposition to Buthelezi's involvement with the Zulu royal family became more vocal. For this, he came under increasing attack - his house was petrol-bombed and several attempts were made on his life. In the meantime, water and electricity at his house in Nongoma were cut off by the responsible department in Buthelezi's KwaZulu homeland government."⁴⁵

It could be argued that Prince Mcwayizeni's decision to join the ANC was politically motivated. Perhaps, he realised that Buthelezi had strengthened his position within the Zulu royal house, and as the head of the KZ homeland. As such, the only option left for Prince Mcwayizeni was to join the ANC and continue to campaign against the IFP that not all Zulus were linked to the IFP.

In 1992 Prince Mcwayizeni was elected to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC. In April, he rose to be one of the ANC's members of parliament. This shows that the two princes although, having common identity to the Zulu royal house, appeared to be opposing each other on political ground. In September 1994, Buthelezi felt highly dishonoured and side-lined when King Good Zwelethini sent a letter to Mandela through Prince Macwayizeni inviting him to attend the annual Shaka Day celebration at Stanger (the place where King Shaka Zulu is buried) without informing Buthelezi. He accused King Goodwill Zwelithini and Prince Mcwayizeni of trying to form an opposition to the IFP. He also accused them of being sell-outs to the ANC whose main objective was to divide and dominate the Zulu people. Buthelezi also accused Mandela of trying to divide the Zulu royal family and also for using politics to create division among the Zulu people. In addition to this, headmen from East

⁴⁵. J. Malala. *'Obituary. Prince Mcwayizeni Israel Zulu'*, The Independence, 15 September. Available at: <http://www.Independence.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-prince-mcwayizeni-israel-zulu-11119176.html>.

Rand hostels condemned King Zwelithini for inviting Mandela and other ANC officials to attend the celebration without prior notice to Buthelezi.⁴⁶

In reaction to the accusations, the then ANC spokesperson in KZN, Dumisani Makhaye, reminded Buthelezi that he had only two positions in the country, that of being the Minister of Home Affairs and privately, the president of the IFP. Dumisani noted that:

"He has never been the so-called traditional prime minister of the king."
Said "Nobody has ever appointed Buthelezi to that position."⁴⁷

This clearly revealed how the power tussle within the Zulu royal family metamorphosed into a bitter political rivalry between the IFP and the ANC.

Meanwhile, in 1995, an attempt was made by the ANC-led GNU to uncover and probe hit-squad police activities in KZN. A three man committee which comprised of Chris Louw, Farouk Chothia and Ann Eveleth was set up to investigate the matter and report back to the government. But the IFP officials in KZN province refused to cooperate with the committee members. The KZN Premier, Frank Mdlalose and his provincial Safety and Security Minister Celeni Mthethwa, refused to cooperate with the committee members. "*How can you cooperate*" said Mthethwa "*with something you are not involved in?*"⁴⁸ In addition, the Home Affairs Minister, Buthelezi, retorted by issuing a veiled threat with a strong warning that if the ANC refused to follow normal

⁴⁶. 'Zwelithini nods to Buthelezi's old rival', Weekly Mail & Guardian, .Vol.10. No. 36, September, 9-16, 1994.p.5.

⁴⁷. Ibid.

⁴⁸. Weekly Mail & Guardian, Vol.10. 23-39 September 1995. p.2.

procedures in investigating the allegations against the former KwaZulu Police (KZP) he, together with IFP supporters, would withdraw from the GNU.⁴⁹

In the light of this exchange, it may be argued that the ANC was bent on making sure that those who had served as apartheid's tools of compulsion were thoroughly investigated and faced the wrath of the law. It wanted to achieve this by taking advantage of its position within the GNU. On the other hand, the IFP saw itself as being pushed to a defensive position and therefore decided to sabotage the investigation by refusing to cooperate with the committee.

Another challenge emerged when the government decided to conduct the local government elections across the nine provinces. It was announced in July 1995 that elections would take place in November.⁵⁰ But prior to this period, a task group had been formed by the government on the 15th July 1994 comprising of Thozamile Botha, Piet Colyn and Fanie van der Merwe.⁵¹ They were given the task of steering the election process. The decision was unanimously endorsed by cabinet members. Roelf Meyer was to oversee the general process and the conduct of the elections. A week after the cabinet meeting, Buthelezi protested against the cabinet decision and urged his colleagues that he be allowed to take charge of the elections. He stressed that local government elections were a function of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The cabinet resolution that led to the

⁴⁹. Confidential interview of Ms Nikita Gelderblom (Afrikaner and former politician) held on 6th September 2013, at Orient Hills, Mogale City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁵⁰. M. Coleman. (Ed.): *A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*, p.229.

⁵¹. Eastern Province Herald (Newspaper), 15th July, 1994. p.6.

formation of the electoral task committee under Meyers' Ministry was taken after he had left the cabinet meeting to attend another meeting with the Egyptian ambassador. A newspaper reported that a constitutional expert retorted to the demand of Buthelezi that:

"...He [Buthelezi] is the strongest proponent of federalism in the Country, but now he wants a central department to take charge of elections assigned to the provinces."⁵²

The expert was referring to earlier demands made by Buthelezi before and after the general elections demanding that KZN be a semi-autonomous province. In October 1995 the Local Government elections were postponed in KZN. The following month elections were conducted across the country except for the province of KZN and some part of the Western Cape Province.⁵³ The reason for this might have been that KZN and the Western Cape were the main seats of the opposition political organisations in post - apartheid South Africa. Continued opposition to the new government policies, fear of insecurity by the electoral/government officials in the provinces, attitudes of ANC's government officials, coupled with the arrogance of its supporters could have been some of the reasons that prevented holding elections in those provinces.

Continued rivalries and confrontational tendencies within the coalition government greatly undermined its activities. It was in the middle of this situation that the government began to face increased social and economic challenges in the country. Although these challenges were not completely new

⁵². Weekly Mail & Guardian, 23-29 September 1995. p.2.

⁵³. M. Coleman: (Ed.): *A Crime Against Humanity - Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*, p.229. See also: Star (Newspaper) 10th October 1995.

to the government and the people, they took a new shape and posed a high level security concern. The taxi-violence, with its roots in the era of the apartheid destabilisation strategy, had materialised into violent attacks on trains, buses and taxi commuters mostly at stations which resulted in the death of hundreds of people. The attacks were either carried out through state covert operations or by the loyalists of various political organisations.⁵⁴

During the time in question, the taxi violence metamorphosed into a fraternity with violent struggles for the control and maintenance of economic power. This was because the enterprise appeared to be promising and highly lucrative. As such, maintenance of 'territory' was highly emphasised. A popular slogan that was commonly used by the taxi drivers due to the violent nature of the enterprise was "Own a gun before you own a taxi."⁵⁵ This clearly shows the level of insecurity among various taxi drivers operating on different routes across the country.

The volatile nature of the taxi transportation industry made it clear that a taxi driver had no right to cross certain boundaries that were not designated for his operations. This was to ensure that monopoly and competition were maintained among the operators. The proliferation of arms and ammunitions⁵⁶ within the taxi transportation industry could be seen as a major factor that contributed to

⁵⁴. M. Coleman: (Ed.): *A Crime Against Humanity - Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*, p.233.

⁵⁵. This is a popular slogan among various taxi drivers in South Africa.

⁵⁶. I.S. Kankara. "Influx of aliens, small arms proliferation and our National Security" being a paper presented at African Regional Conference on Sustainable Development, Nigeria: University of Calabar. p.3.

social unrest in the post-election period. The areas/cities that were mostly affected by the taxi violence during the time in question were Johannesburg, Soweto, East Rand, Pretoria, Durban, Bisho, King Williams Town, Umtata and generally speaking, the provinces of KZN, Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Limpopo and the North West.⁵⁷ The most noticeable associations involved in the taxi violence were the Lethlabile Taxi Organisation (LTO), the Federation of Local and Long Distance Taxi Association (FELLDTA) and the South Africa Local and Long Distance Taxi Association (SALLDTA).⁵⁸

Meanwhile, there was increased competition in Durban between the Indian bus owners and black taxi drivers. This was because the fare charged by the Indian bus drivers was lower compared to the ones charged by the taxi drivers. Secondly, the passengers preferred to use the buses as they were safer even though they were not as fast as the taxis. Therefore, the taxi drivers found themselves in a disadvantaged situation and the 'only way for them to survive' the competition was by imposing certain embargos on various routes. This was to ensure strict controls and monopoly within the business circle. The taxi drivers were also known for their attitudes for breaking traffic laws, reckless driving and speeding. The unhealthy competition between the two groups led to serious tension and crisis which resulted in the deaths of many drivers and passengers.⁵⁹ Increased competition led to claims and counter-claims among drivers over the ownership of pickup and drop off points. This led to an increase

⁵⁷. M. Sekhonyane. "A Violent Legacy: The taxi industry and government at loggerheads." Institute for Security Studies Jackie Dugard, Centre for Applied Legal Studies. p.15.

⁵⁸. Ibid; p.16.

⁵⁹. A. Singh. *Indians in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, p.100.

in violent attacks and counter attacks among the taxi/bus transportation industry operators, which resulted in many deaths.

Another challenge faced by the GNU was an increased wave of political violence in the field of mining. For instance, between 1994 and 1996 there was a crisis outbreak in the mining sector which resulted in the death of hundreds. The supporters of the two opposing political parties - the ANC and the IFP-, who served as labourers in various mine fields, found it difficult to adjust to their political differences. The labourers usually grouped themselves according to their ethnic or political parties. Thus, fighting usually broke out on the mining fields or in their hostels.⁶⁰ For example, in KZN the IFP mine labourers felt that they were betrayed by the ANC for not honouring the agreement reached between Buthelezi and Mandela prior to the first general elections as discussed earlier. This led to a series of attacks on the ANC supporters which resulted in the death of hundreds of labourers. In addition, the IFP were not happy with the victory of the ANC while the 'arrogance' of the ANC supporters in the mine fields could be seen as another reason that led to the outbreak of such violence among the mine labourers.

In Gauteng and other provinces where the ANC had the majority supporters, the IFP mine labourers were equally attacked in their hostels. There is no doubt that the political rivalry among the mine labourers in the post-election period invariably led to a decrease in mineral production which resulted in low levels of revenue collections by the government. It also contributed to the proliferation

⁶⁰. Confidential interview of Mr Jackson X (Coloured) held on 21st October 2013, at Kanana, Eastern Cape Province. See also: New Nation (Newspaper) 1995-1996.

of arms among various mine workers as a lack of trust among the labourers continued.⁶¹

The HRC, in its report, argued that it was difficult to identify the causes and nature of the mine violence or relate it to either political, ethnic, socio-economic or a combination of all.⁶² But an empirical view of the cause and the nature of such violence prior to the first general elections revealed that attacks on hostels were politically motivated. In addition, there were several instances where people from the same ethnic group, but supporting different political parties organised and attacked each other.

The new government also faced an increase in the level of crimes which led to many deaths. This followed a high level of crime by organised syndicates, armed robbers, vehicle-hijackers, thugs, burglars, stock thieves, thieves of state assets, arms and drugs traffickers, serial murderers, ghost workers and fake pensioners.⁶³ On the other hand, the entrenchment of squatter camps in places like Durban, where there was a high level of African squatters living close to the Indian townships, led to increase in house burglaries, car hi-jacking, assaults and murders while clothes usually disappeared from washing lines.⁶⁴ The reason could be traced back to the high rate of unemployment and unequal economic opportunities among the black South Africans. In the field of administration, the

⁶¹. Confidential interview of Prof Lekalakala (Tswana and former MEC) held on 6th October 2013, at Mohlakeng, Randfontein local municipality, Gauteng Province.

⁶². M. Coleman. (Ed.). *A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing Repression of the Apartheid State*.p.233.

⁶³. Ibid: p.240.

⁶⁴. A. Singh. *Indians in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. p.110.

GNU was faced with high levels of corruption, favouritism and maladministration. Sampson, in his study, observes that:

"The ANC needed to clean up both the networks of bribes and favours in Pretoria and poisoned Bantustan governments built up by the black dictators; while entrepreneurs were now dangling bribes in front of politicians to acquire business foothold, particularly for casinos."⁶⁵

To validate the above assertion, Mandela was not impressed with the actions of young politicians who appeared to be over ambitious in pursuing their political careers.⁶⁶ Government officials saw the advent of the new political era as a way of enriching themselves while the hope and aspirations of the majority poor citizens almost remained the same. Members of Parliament were accused of collecting a fat salaries and huge allowances. The President reacted by cutting down the salaries of government officials in a bid to salvage the economic crisis.

The above challenges could be seen as part of the reasons that led to the demoralisation of foreign investors in the country. This was accompanied by continued fall in the value of the Rand as new investors turned their attention to the emerging Asian economies like Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore. The fall in the price of gold in the global market inevitably affected the national income of South Africa and labour became more expensive. It translated into a decrease in the government revenue which made it impossible for the GNU to execute most of the public projects it had promised before the elections. The ANC-led GNU made various attempts to

⁶⁵. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*. p.517. See also: Renwick, R. *Mission to South Africa: Diary of a Revolution*.

⁶⁶. Albert Venter, *Government and Politics in the New South Africa*. p.108.

salvage the situation by attracting foreign investors, by reducing exchange controls and privatising certain economic sectors. A newspaper report observed that in May 1996 increased crime rate and slow employment growth seriously undermined the execution of various government projects. It also contributed to declining business confidence.⁶⁷

In addition to this, the national debt that was inherited from the apartheid regime constituted 5% of the annual national budget. This also compounded the economic challenges faced by the new government. This was manifested when the government failed to reach its target of constructing one million new houses for its citizens a project that was planned to be completed within a period of five years. The dream of creating more jobs for the people was not fully actualised as the use of machines supplemented human labour. High-level unemployment was visible among the blacks as employment required more skill. "*It was here,*" noted Sampson, "*that the full cost of apartheid policies, and particularly of Bantu education, showed itself.*"⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the Bantu Education Act, as observed in chapter two, was designed to provide black South Africans with elementary education. It denied them access to good and quality education that would allow them to compete with other racial groups. Meanwhile, the whites succeeded in carving the level of unemployment to the barest minimum. This was because they had more experience in the fields of administration, banking, industries and commerce. They also had the economic power of investing in different sectors of the

⁶⁷. Die Volksblad, 28 May 1999 & Financial Times News Paper. 13 January 1995. p.5.

⁶⁸. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*.514.

economy. In addition, foreign investors usually trusted their investment with the whites.

In the field of education, there were accusations, especially from the Indian communities, that the education department in post-apartheid South Africa was imposing 'premature retirement' on Indian teachers in order to create more job opportunities for black South Africans. There were also allegations of brain drain in the education sector as qualified teachers took new jobs with higher salary packages. In addition, the ANC-led GNU was criticised for imposing a policy of forced integration among various racial groups especially in government public schools.⁶⁹

It should be noted that part of the policies of the new government was to ensure freedom and equality of all racial groups. It is therefore not surprising that such critics appeared from other racial groups particularly the Indians. The whites had fewer challenges with the policy because a high percentage of their children were sent to private schools. Meanwhile, the black African students faced a shortage of transportation facilities as they usually missed their first period in schools. This could be attributed to the remote locations of their houses. In addition, their parents could not afford to pay for their daily transport fare. Some students used to walk for two hours before reaching their schools.

It may be said that a continued decrease in government revenue as a result of the fallen price of gold, withdrawal of foreign investment from the national economy, and lack of expertise in public administration were some of the reasons that led to the fall in the standard of education during the formative

⁶⁹. A, Singh. *Indians in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. p.121.

years of the new GNU. Yet, another fact that cannot be ruled out during the time in question was that a good number of government officials saw the transition from the apartheid regime to a new democratic dispensation as an opportunity for enriching themselves and their close allies.

Towards the end of 1996, the ANC-led GNU admitted serious mistakes and promised to build on its weaknesses. The government admitted that prior to the advent of the new administration, it was expecting challenges, but it had never thought of such challenges to be as huge as what it actually experienced.⁷⁰

A close analysis of the government activities between 1994 and 1999 reveals that there were significant achievements in various government policies. Such developments can be discerned from the extension of Primary Health Services (PHS). There was an increase in the construction of hospitals and clinics, particularly in the rural areas, while racial segregation in the field of medical services was reduced to the barest minimum. There was also the extension and supply of clean water to rural areas. This greatly helped to reduce the rate of contaminated water- borne diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and typhoid. Construction of new roads was another major achievement of the GNU's administration. The linking of roads to the rural areas greatly eased the long hardship experienced by the rural dwellers. Local farmers found it easier to transport themselves and their agricultural produce to the urban population.

⁷⁰. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.518. See also: Business Day, October, 1996, Die Volksblad, November, 1996 & Herald, 12 December 1996.

The construction of new schools in the remote areas meant that more children could have access to education. There was also an extension of electricity, particularly in remote and rural areas. This greatly transformed the lives of the masses and also gave them a sense of belonging. New mechanised agricultural systems were introduced. There was also an emergence of a new bourgeoisie among the blacks, coloureds, and Indians with expanding economic opportunities. The prospect, however, looked less hopeful with increased unemployment and new jobs failing to materialise at a time when overseas investors were turning their attention towards the rising economies of Asia.⁷¹

Meanwhile, in July 1995 the South African parliament approved a bill which led to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission under section 2 (1) of the promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (Act 34 of 1995).⁷² The Commission was established in order to provide a suitable avenue for a prosperous national unity and integration. It was also geared among other things to serve as a platform for the narration of experience(s); eye witness accounts; confessions and the offering of apologies. Part of the commission's duty was to investigate alleged crimes committed by apartheid security forces and other forms of covert operations.⁷³ Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu was given the legal duty to serve as the chairman of the Commission.

Prior to the commencement of the Commission's enquiries, de Klerk demanded that for the sake of equity, fairness and effective national reconciliation, the activities of all former opposition political groupings be part of the findings of the Commission. In other words, the Commission had to include all guerrilla

⁷¹. Afrikaner, 19th September, 1996. p.6. & Volksblad, 24 January 1997, p.5.

⁷². A.O.B. Kevin: The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005, pp.220-221.

⁷³. B.A. Bozzoli: Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid, p.258.

activities of the ANC's armed wing (i.e. MK). The Commission, according to de Klerk, had to investigate the level of violation of civil liberties in various ANC camps across the frontline states. It also had to unravel the roles played by the SACP in executing various acts of sabotage. The role of the Pan African Congress armed wing - the Azania Peoples Liberation Army (APLA) - had to be probed as well. Finally, the commission had to look into the underground and covert activities of the IFP, particularly the vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal.⁷⁴

By mid-1996 the Commission had agreed to incorporate and focus its investigations and findings on the gross violation of civil liberties committed between pro and anti-apartheid political organisations. Thus, the success of the commission depended not only on revealing various atrocities committed by apartheid security forces and other government officials, but also on their willingness to ask for forgiveness and offering of sincere apologies to the victims.

However, right from its inception, the TRC was faced with serious setbacks which hindered it from discharging its duties properly. Lack of full autonomy; poor quality of submissions by the regime's security and government officials; distortion of facts; non-compliance; subjective narration of events and deliberate destruction of government records were some of the obstacles. In this regard, Kevin made the following observations:

"... almost no senior apartheid political or security force leader applied for amnesty or testified to the TRC's hearings...refusing to accept full responsibility for the activities of their security forces...

⁷⁴. A.O.B. Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.221.

they insisted that no orders were given... for the assassination of apartheid opponents."⁷⁵

In light of the above, a question could be asked on how could it be possible for the pro-apartheid security forces to carry out all forms of abuse on fundamental civil liberties of the people without due notice and consent of the apartheid regime? It is possible that security agents in some instances carried out extra-judicial killings and other forms of injustices against humanity. But to say that security forces carried out such attacks on apartheid's opponents without orders from the regime would be a gross misrepresentation of facts on the ground.

In addition to the above, there was also what could be noted as an antagonistic attitude of the ANC officials and their supporters towards the Commission. Most of the ANC officials felt that they were in control of government, and therefore thought that the Commission was supposed to respond to the demands of their party. Virtually all anti-apartheid political organisations felt that what they fought for during the liberation struggle was for the general freedom and equality of all people. Hence there was no justification for them to ask for amnesty from the Commission. They accordingly expected that the perpetrators of apartheid would come and confess before the Commission and also ask for forgiveness.⁷⁶ It seems that the ANC and other liberation political organisations pre-empted the activities and findings of the Commission by putting the apartheid's regime on the defensive side. This can be discerned from the ANC's

⁷⁵. Rapport, 04 January 1995, p.5.

⁷⁶. B.A. Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.253.

claim that it was "*fighting a just war of liberation which justifies any and all activities which had been carried out...*"⁷⁷

In the end, very few of the ANC members applied for individual amnesty. Meanwhile, if the Truth and Reconciliation Commission⁷⁸ (TRC) was to achieve its main purpose of national reconciliation, Mandela and de Klerk as well as their close allies, were supposed to appear before the Commission.

Taking into consideration the above challenges faced by the Commission at the end of its inquiry, the TRC did a good job in the unearthing of various kinds of violations of the civil liberties in South Africa. The Commission had also helped in clarifying certain misconceptions that were hitherto subjectively documented. Indeed it provided a suitable avenue for national reconciliation and integration. It may be said that the TRC also helped in laying the foundation of a new South Africa.

Conclusion

The year 1994 was a turning point in the political scenario of South Africa. It was a year that officially marked the end of apartheid as an official policy of the regime in the country. It also saw the emergence of a democratic political system characterised by equality before the law. The April general elections and the subsequent swearing-in of new government officials in May 1994 justified the advent of a new order in South Africa. A coalition Government of National

⁷⁷. B.A. Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.253.p.222.

⁷⁸. H. Giliomee and B. Mbenga: *New History of South Africa*, pp.413-414.

Unity (GNU) was formed involving all political parties that participated in the election. By virtue of its electoral victory, the ANC led the GNU with Nelson Mandela as the first post-apartheid president. The post-apartheid cabinet and parliament were multiracial in nature. Various people with different racial backgrounds and of different political parties came together for the first time in the governance of their country.

However, these developments were accompanied by a series of challenges inherited from the past apartheid regime. Those challenges were the end products of compulsion through various apartheid laws forced on the majority people of South Africa. The new challenges that faced the GNU can be attributed to the lack of administrative experience, corruption and social insecurity, national economic crisis and continued suspicions as well as lack of trust among the political actors of the post-apartheid period.

Yet, there was discernible improvement and transformation in the Health Care Sector, Transportation and Communication, Industries and Commerce, Agriculture, Education and other social services. There also emerged a new middle class of people particularly among the blacks who had long been left behind in terms of economic power. There was also a considerable decline in politically-related violence across South Africa.

CHAPTER SIX

The Legacy of the Apartheid Regime: An-evaluation

“A Nation can win freedom without its people becoming free” –O, Nkomo, 2000

Introduction

It could be unarguably said that the period between 1948 and 1994 marked an important epoch in the history and historiography of South Africa. It must be highlighted that the year 1948 witnessed the emergence and victory of the National Party (NP). Dr Daniel Malan emerged as the new Prime Minister of South Africa. As part of its (i.e the National Party) policies, racial segregation was officially imposed on the majority citizens of the country. This marked the beginning of compulsion and institutionalisation of apartheid system in South Africa. The compulsive racial laws that were introduced were officially backed by the state through the use of force and security might. In line with this, the study did not argue and say that the year 1948 marked the beginning of racial segregation in South Africa. On the contrary, there were various forms of racial segregations that existed prior to the time in question.

The regime conferred the police and other security forces with enormous power to deal with any form of opposition against it. The majority black were subjected to various forms of compulsion. This led to a peaceful and later violent protest against the apartheid regime. Those who opposed the compulsive racial policies were faced with the wrath of the regime. Most of blacks and some Indians, coloureds and liberal whites were jailed with severe punishment. Many went on forced exile leaving behind an untold agony to their families and relatives. Above all, thousands of South Africans lost their lives in various circumstances. In other words, some of those who opposed or fought against the

compulsion of apartheid did not live to see the decline of apartheid and the subsequent liberation of South African people. The African National Congress (ANC) and other opposition political organisations continued to fight against the compulsive apartheid policies up to the turn of the last decade of the 20th Century.

The year 1994 was a watershed in the socio-economic and political history of South Africa. The year witnessed the repealing of all forms of racial segregation. It paved way for the emergence of a new political dispensation. The ANC emerged as the new dominant political power. A new page in the history of South Africa was opened on the 10th May 1994 when Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the first black president of South Africa. This led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). It gave opportunity for political parties that participated in the election to be part of the coalition government. The GNU was indeed faced with different administrative problems coupled with lack of exposure for policy makers. Walton argued that the majority citizens of the country could not immediately differentiate between apartheid and post-apartheid periods. He opined that black people of Umtata town (the administrative center of the former Transkei) remained subordinate to whites ever after liberation. Their level of poverty and lack of general welfare continued to worsen.¹ It could be observed that the ANC- led government had relatively succeeded in transforming the lives of the majority citizens of South Africa within the first five years in office. The new government's bid for national reconciliation saw the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The mandate of the commission, among others, was to look into crimes committed during the apartheid era and those who perpetrated different

¹. R.J, Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, p. ix.

crimes against humanity. It also opened room for confessions and offering of apologies.

This research made an analysis of the imposition of various compulsive racial policies and how they were forcefully enshrined in South African constitution which only represented the interest of the minority whites. An empirical analysis was also made on various inhuman apartheid legislative policies beginning from 1948. The role of the Dutch Reformed Church (i.e *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk*) towards the imposition of apartheid policies was equally taken cognisance of. It was observed that the leadership of the Church had misrepresented the orthodox teachings of the gospel in order to represent and justify the imposition of compulsive racial policies. Ngcokovane, for instance, believed that apartheid as an ideology was conceived in the womb of NGK prior to the turn of the 20th century.²

The roles and contributions of the Afrikaner Broederbond (popularly known as the Bond) as a secret (whites' only) organisation was discussed at length. The Bond emerged as a Youths Organisation of the Afrikaners and later metamorphosed into a power secret cult with membership restricted only to Afrikaners. Further analysis was made on how members of the Broederbond reorganised and began to execute different kinds of policies that were geared towards the preservation of Afrikaans and Afrikaner hegemony over the black

². R.J, Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*, pp.46,48.

majority and other racial groups. During the period in question, it was argued that the Bond was remote-controlling the activities of the National Party.³

It was further discerned that the imposition of various, compulsive racial laws and the instruments used by the apartheid regime to ensure proper application of such 'laws' were rooted in various security agents such as the police, army, and the judiciary. There is no doubt that the compulsive apartheid policies were institutionalized in line with the violation of civil liberties. Such abuses were analysed in terms of arrests without warrant, summarily execution of political opponents, forced exiles, detentions without trials, solitary confinements, banning of opposition groups, imprisonments, under-ground disappearance of individuals and leading political activists, incarcerations and tortures which resulted in several deaths in detention.

The study also examined how the apartheid regime dealt with many of the white elements who proved to be liberal or opposed its compulsion and racial ideology. In other words, a number of whites who directly or otherwise identified themselves with various opposition political groupings were made to suffer the same fate with other opposition groups. It was further argued that the primary objective of the apartheid regime was to secure white supremacy over the majority people of South Africa.

³. R.J, Walton: *Dismantling Apartheid - A South African Town in Transition*.p.59.

The administration of successive apartheid regime was taken into consideration, thereby covering that of D.F. Malan, J.G. Strijdom, H.F. Verwoerd, B.J. Vorster and P.W. Botha.⁴ An analysis of the state of emergency in the mid-1980s and how it affected the liberation struggle formed an integral part of this study. The effects of the emergency period and how it demoralised the liberation struggle against the apartheid regime was also examined. The regime banned all form of protests, political gatherings, campaigns, meetings, political associations and expression. Coupled with this, top political leaders and their supporters were detained while others disappeared from the eyes of the public.

It was under this state of affairs that the compulsive apartheid regime embarked on clandestine underground operations in neutralizing political opponents from various racial and ethnic backgrounds. Several undercover-agents were employed and assigned the task of neutralizing, destroying, eliminating or wiping out opponents and their structures across the political spectrum. The study portrayed how the majority and less privileged South Africans became more vulnerable to the compulsive racial policies during the emergency period. A close examination was made on how the compulsive apartheid regime unilaterally arrest and detained over 80 000 political opponents between the 1950s and 1980s. About 10 000 of those were women, close to 15 000 children, mostly below 18 years of age.

The between 1988 and 1990 witnessed transitional epoch between the administration of P.W. Botha and F.W. de Clark. An analysis was made on how P.W. Botha came up with constitutional changes which led to the establishment

⁴. H, Giliomee: *The Last Afrikaner Leaders –A Crucial Test of Power*, pp.79-84.

of the Tri-cameral Parliament.⁵ It was noted that the apartheid regime under President Botha gave room for the inclusion of Indian and coloured racial groups to parliament but given an observatory status. Black South Africans who constituted majority of the population were left out. Instead, the regime constituted black supervisory councillors in the townships. They served as intermediaries between the regime and the black racial groups. Further, analysis was made on how the people in the townships opposed the imposition of black councillors. The councillors were seen as apartheid collaborators who betrayed the liberation struggle. The new political changes were faced with increased protests which resulted in the occupation of the black townships by the South African Defence Force (SADF).

The study further gleaned over the ever-growing and intensifying resistance to compulsive racial laws within and outside South Africa. The regime was equally faced with increased diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. The response thereon entailed increased brutalities against those who opposed the regime's policies. White liberals who rose against compulsive apartheid racial laws equally faced the wraths of the regime. Some were forced to go into exile while others were incarcerated or executed. By the late 1980s, there was intensification of resistance to apartheid rule which led to the emergence of cracks on the four walls of apartheid South Africa. It was observed that a combination of internal and external pressure compelled the apartheid regime to capitulate to the general will and aspirations of the majority people of South Africa. The year 1989 marked the beginning of an end to the compulsive policies of apartheid regime, though, the regime's clandestine brutalities,

⁵. W. Beinart, and S. Dubow: "The Historiography of Segregation and Apartheid" In W. Beinart, and S. Dubow (eds). (2013): *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, p.18.

abductions of political leaders and their supporters, arbitrary arrests, detention without trials and summary execution of political opponents could still be discerned. The majority people of South Africa, particularly those that were jailed, responded with hunger strike as a form of protest. The study further examined how hunger the strike attracted the attention of the International Community which resulted in massive disinvestment from South Africa.

The study argued that apartheid in South Africa was shaken to its very foundation when Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) succeeded in organising various kinds of defiance campaigns against the apartheid regime.⁶ Such campaigns were analysed in terms of mass protests, attacks on the regime's properties and various acts of sabotage. Resistance to compulsory conscription by the liberal white youths and the subsequent invasion of the frontline States by apartheid regime were equally examined. A close examination was made on the strategic and timely emergence of F.W. de Klerk to the political scene in September 1989. De-Klerk was the last President of apartheid South Africa. Secret negotiations between the regime and the leadership of the ANC within and outside the country were taken into consideration.⁷

The study among other things, covered the period between 1990 and 1994. It was noted that by the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, the apartheid regime was bended to its knees. The struggle for political power and influence between the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkhatha Freedom Party was given due consideration. An indepth analysis of the rivalry between

⁶. S, Charlene: *Robben Island*, p.149.

⁷. For details on the negotiation process refer to; S, Anthony: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, pp.381-407.

the two parties (i.e ANC and IFP) led to the death of thousands of black South Africans. The regime in its efforts to weaken the liberation movement, applied the divide and rule tactics. Hatred and violence among various opposition political groupings, particularly the ANC and the IFP were promoted by the apartheid regime. The violence was tagged as "Black on Black",⁸ implying that it was blacks that are killing fellow South Africans. The country was thrown almost into a state of anarchy and bloody civil war.

It was in the light of the above that, de Klerk introduced sweeping changes within the political system. This study also made a close analysis of an international political development that took place in Russia and how it contributed to the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa. In 1989 the Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced economic and political reforms known as *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* ⁹ (openness and reforms).

This new development heralded the collapse of communism as a national ideology in Russia. In 1990 it paved way for the subsequent disintegration of the United Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia (USSR) and the ascendance of capitalism as a global economic and political ideology.¹⁰ A capitalist new world order emerged with the United States of America (USA) championing the course of capitalism and democracy. The study argued that the collapse of USSR and its ideology meant that the tendency of South Africa becoming a

⁸. The connotation of "Blacks on Blacks" was introduced by the apartheid regime and to a greater extent the right - wing conservatives; to prove that the on-going political crisis in the country was a mere struggle for political dominance among ethnic groups in South Africa. It was also used to prove that the ANC was not capable of ruling the country in the future.

⁹. [www.encyclopaediabritannica .Online academic edition.com](http://www.encyclopaediabritannica.com)

¹⁰. [www.encyclopaediabritannica .Online academic edition.com](http://www.encyclopaediabritannica.com)

communist state in the post-apartheid period was no longer viable. As such, USA and its capitalist allies began to show open support for the liberation struggle against apartheid.

In this study it was further noted how increased dissatisfaction and rebellion coupled with international pressure, forced the apartheid regime to open up for negotiations with the leadership of various anti-apartheid political organisations, particularly the ANC. President de Klerk's historic speech of February 2nd 1990 was equally examined. The content of his speech signalled the end of apartheid and the advent of a new political order in South Africa. He announced the unbanning of the opposition political organisations who championed the course of the liberation struggle.¹¹ The anti-apartheid political organisations that were studied entailed the African National Congress ANC, the South African Communist Party SACP, and, the Pan African Congress PAC.¹² By 11th February 1990, exactly nine days after the unbanning of the liberation political organisations, Nelson Mandela, the long awaited political prisoner was released after spending over 10 000 days in jail.

The study made an observation on how the release of Mandela changed the course of the liberation struggle against the apartheid regime.¹³ It was noted that his released from prison paved way for political negotiations between the apartheid regime and the various political organisations. It was in the midst of

¹¹. S, Charlene: *Robben Island*, p.149.

¹². J, Soske., A, Lissoni., & N, Erlank: 'One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Struggle After Apartheid', In: L, Arianna, et al. (eds): *One Hundred Years of the ANC- Debating Liberation Histories Today*, pp. 29-34.

¹³. B.A, Bozzoli: *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, p.253.

these negotiations that the country was thrown into a political turmoil. Thousands of South Africans were displaced while others paid with their lives.¹⁴ The study argues that the number of people who lost their lives in politically related violence between 1990 and 1994, outnumbered those that were killed from 1948 to 1989. An observation was equally made on how USA openly and actively showed its support to the liberation struggle by identifying itself with the revolutionary movements in the country.

Needless to say the release of Mandela from prison was accompanied by various, well organised internal tours. In most of the countries visited by Mandela, he solicited the support and funding for the ANC. Most of the countries promised him their active support in the dismantling apartheid regime. The study raised questions as to why the sudden U-turn by the capitalist states, particularly in 1990? What prompted the apartheid regime to give up compulsive racial policies after it had existed for over forty years? And, lastly why the release of Mandela in 1990?

In the light of the above, an examination was made on how the apartheid regime made its last stand against the opposition groups. Increased waves of brutality, use of force by the state security agents such as the army, the police and other underground agents were carefully studied. In response this development, various anti-apartheid elements resorted to the use of arms, increased sabotage, assassination of white officials and black collaborators, while workers stayed

¹⁴. C, Coco & S, Marc: *Long Walk to Freedom - The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*.p.134.

away from their place of work. There was also an increased call for economic and diplomatic sanctions against the regime.¹⁵

The study observed how the two main figures in the theatre of political struggle for and against the apartheid regime faced serious condemnations from their supporters. For instance, de Klerk was accused of betraying the course of Afrikanerdom by repealing the law(s) which banned anti-apartheid political organisations. Secondly, the conservative whites (mostly Afrikaners) accused him of selling Afrikaner Volks to the black majority by releasing Mandela. Mandela was equally accused by the ANC's radical comrades for participating in various secret deals with the regime without their prior notice. He was also accused of dropping the course of the armed struggle for negotiations. The study also took cognizance of how the apartheid regime embarked on clandestine security operations by empowering the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) in dealing with all forms of opposition against it. The covert operations carried out by the regime had somehow succeeded in diverting and destabilising the negotiation process and the political atmosphere in the country.

This concluded by analysing the general political situation in South Africa between 1990 and 1994. Observations were made on how political chaos, fear, uncertainty and deaths blanketed the political atmosphere of South Africa. Violent activities of the Black Vigilante groups, formed and sponsored by the apartheid regime, the Hit-Squads, the Death Squads, Vlakplaas, the supporters of the ANC, IFP and AWB were analysed.

¹⁵. Weekly Mail & Guardian Newspaper. 2nd Febraury 1993, pp.13-15.

The period between 1994 and 1996 was well-covered. It was observed that the year 1994 marked the demise of apartheid South Africa. The year also witnessed the advent of a new political dispensation. The year 1994 also opened a new page in the history of South Africa in that it paved the way for the emergence of new socio-economic order. The general election which took place on 27th April 1994 was closely examined. The election led to the emergence of Nelson Mandela as the first democratic president of South Africa under the leadership of the African National Congress. An observation was equally made on how the swearing-in of Nelson Mandela on the 10th May 1994 marked a turning point in the history and historiography of the country.¹⁶

The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU)¹⁷ and its modus-operandi were discussed. Further analyses were made on the resolutions reached by the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which allowed the president-elect to be assisted by two deputies. One from his party and the other from the political party that emerged second. A discussion was given on content of the interim negotiated constitution of CODESA which provided the new administration with three tiers of government and a unicameral legislation system.

The study further gave a cursory look at how the four hundred legislators were elected into the South African parliament cutting across all racial groups. According to the new constitution, the parliamentarians were given the task of

¹⁶. A. Sampson: *Mandela - The Authorised Biography*, p.514. See also, Star (Newspaper), 26 April 1994

¹⁷. A.O.B, Kevin: *The South African Intelligence Services - From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p.204.

making and taking decisions for the country. An examination was made of the response of the international community and how they commended de Klerk, Mandela and Buthelezi for avoiding a possible civil war.¹⁸ The policy for integration and incorporation of erstwhile apartheid regime's structures was taken cognisance of, including the former independent homelands security apparatus, the apartheid administrative staff and the apartheid security forces.

It was further observed that the new government (popularly known as Government of National Unity - GNU) was faced with a series of socio-economic and political challenges. Such observations were made at the level of economic crisis, corruption among various government officials, social insecurity, lack of administrative experience and poor execution of government policies. An examination was made on how the fall in the price of gold and continued devaluation of South African Rand affected much of the regime's economic policies. Albeit, the study also examined some economic and social developments were achieved by the ANC-led Government of National Unity. For instance, South Africans began to feel and witness the extension of social welfare services in the fields of education, agriculture, health care services, transportation and rural electrification services. An observation was made on a motion that was raised in parliament which led to the establishment of Truth and Reconciliations Commission (TRC) in 1995. An examination of the *modus-operandi* of the TRC and the outcomes of its investigations were analysed. A cross-examination was made on the emergence of new middle-class, particularly among the black populace who were (for long) left behind in terms of economic empowerment. This was accompanied with a sharp decrease in politically-related violence across South Africa.

¹⁸. Weekly Mail and Guardian Newspaper, pp.4-5.

General Conclusion

It could be concluded that the compulsion of the apartheid regime and its demise finally led to the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa. The transfer of political power to a democratically elected government was essentially accomplished and accepted. However, it would be naive to think that the acceptance of the outcome was unqualified in all quarters and that the orchestrated destabilisation of the past came to an abrupt end on the day the election results were announced. The forces which had been at work to defend and retain apartheid power attempted to salvage whatever benefits they could from their erstwhile privileged position.

Nevertheless, the tri-cameral parliament with its dominant white house, token houses for 'coloured' and 'Indian' populations and total exclusion of African blacks, disappeared and was superseded by a democratically elected non-racial parliament. Three tiers of representative government were established under a constitution, initially in a negotiated interim form and later in a democratically adopted final form, which was the highest law in the land and to which all governmental structures and indeed all citizens were accountable.

However, traces of the past could still be discerned, at least until the next elections in April 1999. At the national tier of government the transitional phase committed South Africans to an obligatory government of national unity which allowed the National Party to play a role of power sharing for a five (5)-year period (even though, for tactical reasons, they decided to withdraw from playing this role). The NP, during final constitutional negotiations, made strenuous efforts to have the compulsory power sharing arrangement extended beyond April 1999, but they were denied this extra lease of life.

Within the second tier of government, the provincial tier, there existed a relatively high degree of federalism that served to perpetuate the survival of at least two (2) of the old stakeholders in apartheid power. In the Western Cape the National Party held a dominant position, while in KwaZulu-Natal the old KwaZulu homeland lived on in the somewhat modified form of the KZN provincial government. Especially in the case of the latter it was clear from post-election statistics that a significant measure of instability still existed and the potential for destabilisation continued.

At the third tier, the level of local government, the distortions of apartheid persisted. South Africa was squarely in a transitional phase which incorporated, by agreement, the presence of racially skewed representation in local councils in the interests of continuity and to allow for a period of development of skills and experience within previously disadvantaged communities. This temporary arrangement was to come to an end by 1999 though some resistance and the potential for destabilisation could be anticipated, particularly in historically conservative white towns and also in rural areas dominated by traditional leaders, both past beneficiaries of apartheid power.

Homeland structures were also relegated to the scrapheap of history. One after the other, the four (4) 'independent' and the six (6) 'self-governing' homelands melted away, capitulated, or were deposed in the headlong and irrepressible run-up to South Africa's first democratic elections. But although the structures had disappeared, their legacy lingered on in the form of a multiplicity of effects with which South Africa would have to grapple for some time to come. Homelands' administrations, armies, police forces and assets had to be

integrated into the New South Africa, with the new provincial administrations bearing the brunt of this rationalisation.

The homeland system opened up huge opportunities for corruption, self-advancement and enrichment and irresponsible management of resources. As a result, the new South Africa had inherited debt, missing assets, 'ghost' pensioners, 'ghost' workers and self-promoted officials, to mention but a few forms of mismanagement, fraud and corruption. Many of the old beneficiaries of homelands were still there, clinging onto their benefits and making a negative contribution to the growth of a healthy democracy.

Nominally the NP had survived the transfer of power to a majority government, in itself a remarkable feat under the circumstances. Given their past record they could count themselves extremely fortunate not to have been summarily banished to the political wilderness. They could attribute their fortune either to the generosity of spirit shown by the majority or to the good sense of the majority in pursuing a path of compromise in order to limit the possibility of violent conflict, or perhaps a mixture of both.

In any event, the architects of formal apartheid compulsion were permitted to participate in democratic elections and to test their support at the polls. They emerged with 20.4% of the national votes cast, and with a majority in the Western Cape province of 53%. Both results were attributable to their support within the white electorate and those within the Afrikaans speaking 'coloured' community whom the NP contrived to attract on the basis of the 'devil you know.' In terms of the interim constitution, this support entitled the NP to take

its place in the government of national unity and to play a controlling role in the Western Cape provincial legislature.

Surprising as this outcome might have been to some, the NP lost its political power and with it the access to the trappings of power such as the security forces and public administration. Furthermore, local government elections in November 1995 and May 1996 indicated declining support for the NP, while almost daily revelations about atrocities of the apartheid past continued to batter their already badly dented image. The struggle to throw off the baggage of the past and to create a new identity appeared to be an impossible task. All indications were that the National Party was a spent force and was unlikely to survive in its present form. As a spent force, its potential for further destabilisation was limited.

The white right wing also survived the transition to a non-racial democracy but in a radically altered form. Never a monolith, it could be said to have split broadly into two (2) blocs, a process which preceded the elections. The first bloc emerged as a political party, the Freedom Front (FF), which opted to pursue its political objectives by peaceful and constitutional means. It participated in the elections, emerging with 424 555 votes, or 2.17% of the votes cast; in 4 provinces, (PWV, Eastern Transvaal, OFS and Northern Cape) it was able to muster around 6% of the votes. Amongst its objectives were the establishment of a Volkstaat (an Afrikaner homeland) on the basis of 'substantial proven support'. To this end it negotiated the inclusion of a provision in the interim constitution (and extended into the final constitution) for the establishment of a Volkstaat council.

In addition, the final constitution provided for the establishment of a commission for the promotion and protection of the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities. Armed with these concessions, the Freedom Front was able to convince nearly half-a-million supporters that they were not about to lose their cultural identity and that their future lay in peaceful and constitutional processes. Their problem now lay in how to demonstrate 'substantial support' within geographical pockets and how to string these pockets together to form an entity which was politically and economically viable.

The second bloc consisted of those right wing organisations which chose to pursue extra-parliamentary and often violent means of reaching their objectives. This non-homogeneous bloc included the old Conservative Party of the tricameral parliament and the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB) amongst many others. As noted throughout this research study, their rejection of democratic elections was expressed in the form of a paroxysm of violence which reached a peak in the week preceding election day, costing 19 lives in that week alone.

However, it is imperative to note that no bombings or other organised attacks by the white right wing were recorded in the 31 months following the elections from May 1994 to November 1996. The only incidents and casualties recorded in that time arose from the actions of individuals, such as farmers shooting child trespassers or alleged chicken thieves, or racial clashes at schools and tertiary education institutions. Then, on Christmas Eve 1996, the long period of freedom from right wing bomb attacks was shattered by two (2) explosions in Worcester,

Western Cape which claimed four (4) lives and injured 60 others. A group by the name of *Boere Aanvals Troepe* claimed responsibility.

It could be argued that the AWB which, from February 1990 to April 1994, was involved in well over 100 organised violent acts including about 100 bomb attacks had, since the elections, refrained from further similar violence. It is of interest to note that the AWB in a submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice, when debating the bill to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in January 1995, stated that they would like to become part of an all-inclusive political settlement in South Africa.

The problem of the AWB at the time of making the submission (and the reason for making it) was that many of their general staff and senior officers were either in detention or awaiting trial (for the violent acts of early 1994) under severe bail conditions, and more to the point, ineligible for amnesty because of the cut-off date in the constitution for acts committed after 5th December 1993. The AWB went on to plead 'for the sake of peace' that the cut-off date be extended so as to qualify their members for amnesty for acts committed up to election day. In their submission they pointed to the cut-off date as the last stumbling block lying in the way of a final and peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems.

The AWB had to wait nearly two years for their plea to be agreed to but in the meantime they adhered to what appeared to have been a self-imposed moratorium on violent acts. It remained to be seen if they would adhere to the spirit of their submission and engage in becoming 'part of an all- inclusive

political settlement in South Africa'. In summary, the white right wing with its deep divisions, limited support and minimal resources, could not be considered as a meaningful survivor from the apartheid era capable of derailing democracy in South Africa. At worst, any continuing destabilising role would be limited to sporadic and declining racial acts and incidents of sabotage.

It could be argued that few would deny the seminal role that the security establishment played as the instrument of repression and destabilisation in the past. Given that a democracy, too, required security institutions for its continued well-being, the transformation of these institutions from instruments of repression to friendly protectors of citizens' rights, became critical.

The new constitution spelt out the responsibilities, objectives and norms of behaviour to which the defence, police and intelligence services could aspire and thereby established the mold of the end-products of transformation which began some time ago and was on-going. The task of successful transformation was formidable when considering the starting ingredients of apartheid security forces, homeland police and armies, and the armed wing of the liberation movements.

Within this context it is not surprising that elements from the old apartheid security apparatus were resisting and impeding transformation. Old attitudes and old networks persisted, both within state structures and within the privatised security industry which sprang up to capitalise and thrive upon the new criminal instability which had taken hold. This industry became the home for former members of security force special units, mercenaries and 'dogs of war'. In some

cases their tentacles even extended into the international arena (as with the externally based activities of Executive Outcomes) and with a capacity to engage in illegal arms trade and the peddling of state secrets to which they had been privy in the past.

A particularly worrying aspect was the extent to which these elements, located both within state and privatised institutions, were a vested interest in instability and were simultaneously positioned strategically to foster that instability, particularly criminal instability for personal gain. Their emphasis had shifted from being engaged in obstructing the advent of democracy to promoting (criminal) self-interest. This was manifesting itself in police and other complicity in crime syndicates, gun-running, drug trafficking, taxi wars, protection rackets, vehicle hijackings and scams, stock theft, theft of state assets, and so on ad infinitum. Taken together, these activities amounted to economic sabotage on a massive scale, every bit as crippling to an emerging democracy as the political destabilisation of the past.

The new constitution defined the basic values and principles of democratic administration to which the public service aspired. Not surprisingly there was a huge gap between this ideal and the practices of the past apartheid structures. Here too, then, a radical transformation was necessary but on a scale which would come into some perspective when only it could be realised that over a million public servants were involved and that the existence of ten (10) homeland administrations complicated the task enormously.

Responses by the old inherited public servants to the transformation challenges had been varied. There were those who genuinely and enthusiastically welcomed the arrival of a new atmosphere of openness, transparency and accountability in administration after long years of suffocation. Then there were those with a resistance to change, for ideological or attitudinal reasons, which resulted in an uncooperative passivity. Finally there were those who were actively engaged in what could only be described as economic sabotage by profiting personally from the opportunities that were exposed during the period of transition for corruption, taking of bribes, theft of state assets, drawing of salaries by ghost workers, sale of forged documents and scams of every conceivable kind. This amounted to destabilisation of an extremely debilitating nature.

The history of the business community as a role player in the development of apartheid in South Africa went back much further in time than that of the National Party. For economic reasons, the early business community was an enthusiastic promoter and supporter of a system which ensured an unlimited supply of cheap compliant labour for its mines, industry and agriculture.

The advent of National Party power in 1948, with a penchant for tightening apartheid compulsion within an ideological framework, served only to enhance the benefits which the business community could derive from the economic practices of apartheid. Amongst the additional benefits were an extraordinary range of government incentives for establishing and running so-called border industries located close to homeland labour reservoirs; government support for 'strategic' industries (often of doubtful viability) through high levels of protection against imports and competition; and the award of valuable

government contracts to those who gave their support to the system of apartheid.

However, the wheel of fortune was to turn and from being a prime beneficiary of, and stakeholder in, apartheid power, the business community watched in dismay as apartheid began turning into an albatross around its neck. The revulsion of the international community against apartheid compulsion resulted in the South African economy being threatened with collapse, with the business community as the biggest potential loser.

Against this background, the business community could count itself fortunate not only to have survived the demise of the apartheid regime and its compulsion, but to have survived with its assets intact. Survival also implied transformation from apartheid economic practices to democratic economic practices which would address the needs of 100% of the population and not only 15% as in the past.

The extent to which such transformation was taking place had been slow to emerge and South Africa was yet to witness much enthusiasm on the part of the business community for substantive fixed productive investment which would create jobs and ensure growth. Moreover, resistant elements within business were frustrating the development of a democratic culture through engaging in white-collar crime of all kinds, money laundering and the illegal transfer of assets abroad. It was in the business community's own best interests to take steps to counter the impression that it had not yet unequivocally shifted its allegiance from apartheid to democracy.

If the concept of a 'third force' could be accepted as an amalgam of stakeholders in apartheid compulsion which actively opposed the arrival of non-racial democracy in South Africa, whether they acted individually or at times in concert with one another, then it would be a valid question to inquire how the surviving stakeholders fitted together in the post-apartheid era and what transformation the third force had itself undergone.

Firstly, the membership of the team had changed, as noted throughout this research study, with some dropping out, some relegated to a minor role and others going their own way. Secondly, the objectives had altered quite radically in that, having lost the battle to prevent the advent of a democratic order, the emphasis had now shifted to the individual pursuit of personal interests. There was little scope for teamwork when it came to salvaging remnants of benefits and privileges from the wreck of apartheid and so the days of the third force were numbered. In its dying form it had assumed the ugly characteristic of an economic saboteur, which opportunistically and criminally exploited the instability inherent in a transforming society.

SOURCE LIST

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Confidential interview of Mr Kenneth Mthembu (Zulu and Pastor) held on 15th June 2013, at Sandton, Johannesburg, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Mr Moosa Tyamzashe (Xhosa and businessman) held on 17th June 2013, at Soweto, Johannesburg, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Nkateko Ledwaba (Sotho and former Chief Whip) held on 26th June 2013, at Pretoria, city of Tshwane metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Ms Palesa Mofokeng (Sotho and political activist) held on 27th June 2013, at Soshanguve, Pretoria, city of Tshwane metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Tsepiso Mampuru (Sotho and historian) held on 6th July 2013, at Mamelodi, Pretoria, city of Tshwane metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Ms Esther Lubbe (English and former Police) held on 9th July 2013, at Vereeniging, Sedibeng District municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Ms Lindiwe Zulu (Zulu and Cabinet Minister) held on 10th July 2013, at Randfontein and Kagiso, West Rand District municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Eric Ndou (Sotho and former high school history teacher) held on 15th July 2013, at Germiston and Benoni, Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interviews of Ms Stella Van Jaarsveld (Afrikaner and former high school history teacher) held between 26th and 27th July 2013, at Vanderbijl Park and Sebokeng, Emfuleni local municipality, Gauteng Province.

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Confidential interview of Pearl Scott (English and former high school history teacher) held on 14th August 2013, at Heidelberg, Lesedi local municipality, Gauteng Province.

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Confidential interview of Mamatjie Sedibe (Sotho and military veteran) held on 25th August 2013, at Carletonville, Merafong City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

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Confidential interview of Ms Anne-Marie Potgieter (Afrikaner and paediatrician) held on 4th September 2013, at Krugersdorp, Mogale City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Ms Nikita Gelderblom (Afrikaner and former politician) held on 6th September 2013, at Orient Hills, Mogale City local municipality, Gauteng Province.

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Confidential interview of Pieter Uys (Afrikaner and political analyst) held between 17th and 20th October 2013, Verterstport and Bekkersdal, Westonaria local municipality, Gauteng Province.

Confidential interview of Mr Jackson X (Coloured and former Mayor) held on 21st October 2013, at Kanana, Eastern Cape Province.

Confidential interview of Dr Pallo Jordean (Xhosa and former Cabinet Minister) held on 23rd October 2013, at Lusikisiki, Kwa-Kanana, Eastern Cape Province.

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APPENDIX: I
AFRIKAANSE VRAELYS

VRAELYS

Onderhoud begin om: _____

Onderhoud voltooi om: _____

INLEIDING

Dié vraelys staan in verband met 'n studie met die doel om 'n uiteensetting te gee van die konsepsie en voltooiing van die apartheidsregime se strategie as die klassieke vorm van dwang, algemene siening van die 1990-1994-destabiliseringstrategie van die apartheid regime na te spoor en vas te stel as die opvolger van die 1948-1989-strategie en die eksegeese te bied van die beginstadium van verval van die apartheidsregime se dwang wat die weg gebaan het tot'n onderhandelde magsoordrag en die aanbreek van 'n nuwe politieke bedeling in Suid-Afrika.

Die studie sal uitgevoer word deur Musa Ahmed Jibril van die Departement Geskiedenis, Lettere Fakulteit, Universiteit van Zululand, Suid-Afrika. Mr. Jibril onderneem hierdie studie met die oog op Doktorsgraad in Filosofie. Response op hierdie vraelys sal dus help om konkrete inligting te bied oor die onderwerp.

U word versoek om dié vraelys/onderhoud te voltooi, want'nuburger /inwoner in die studiegebied (Suid-Afrika). U deelname aan dié navorsing is vrywillig, maar van groot belang vir die sukses daarvan. U besluit om deel te neem of nie sal nie u huidige of toekomstige verhouding met die navorser raak nie. Deur hierdie vrae te beantwoord sal u gehelp word om sekere lastige kwessies te identifiseer en die geleentheid kry om u menings te stel.

Benader al die vrae asseblief objektief en na die beste van u wete en wees verseker dat al die inligting wat u gee vertroulik sal wees. Let egter dat daar geen regte of verkeerde antwoorde is nie. Die studie stel net in u menings belang.

Het u enige vrae voor ons begin?

Afdeling A:

1. Provinsie van herkoms _____
2. Provinsie waarin u woon _____
3. Woonarea _____
4. Geslag : Manlik ☐ ☐ Vroulik
5. Hoe oud is u? _____

6. Wat is die hoogste opvoedkundige kwalifikasie wat u behaal het?
 - a. Laerskool
 - b. Hoërskool
 - c. Kollege
 - d. Universiteit
 - e. Ander: spesifiseer _____

7. Wat is u huidige beroep?
 - a. Landbou
 - b. Staatsamptenaar
 - c. Landbou
 - d. Sakeman/-vrou
 - e. Ander: spesifiseer _____

8. Wat is u huwelikstatus?
 - a. Getroud
 - b. Enkellopend
 - c. Geskei
 - d. Weduwee/wewenaar

Afdeling B:

1. Wat dink u was die rede(s) agter die konsepsie en voltooiing van die apartheidsstrategie sedert 1948?
 - a. behoud van wit heerskappy oor die ander rasse
 - b. versekering van afsonderlike ontwikkeling van elke ras
 - c. sosio-ekonomiese en politieke uitbuiting
 - d. Nie so seker nie
 - e. Ander

2. As u antwoord (E) is spesifiseer asseblief hier onder
.....
.....

3. Was die apartheidsregime demokraties in sy bedryf en uitvoer van politieke mag?
 - a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie

4. Glo u dat die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) 'n deurslaggewende rol gespeel het in die dwang van die Apartheidsregime in Suid-Afrika?
 - a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie

5. Dink u dat die Afrikaner Broederbond aktief deelgeneem het aan die skending van burgerlike vryhede gedurende die Apartheidsera?
- Ja
 - Nee
 - Nie so seker nie
 - Glad nie
6. In watter mate het die Broederbond die dwangstrategieë van die Nasionale Party beïnvloed?
- Hoog
 - Laag
 - Nie so seker nie
 - Glad nie
7. Was die strategieë van die apartheidsregime hoegenaamd dwingend?
- Ja
 - Nee
 - Nie so seker nie
 - Glad nie
8. Dink u dat die kerk gekant was teen die dwangneigings van die Apartheidsregime?
- Ja
 - Nee
 - Nie so seker nie
 - Glad nie
9. Wat dink u was die middel(s) wat die apartheidsregime vir uitvoering van sy strategieë gebruik het?
- Polisie
 - Leër
 - Wetgewing
 - Kerk
 - Al die bostaande
 - Geen van die bostaande

10. As u antwoord 'F' is, verskaf asseblief redes vir die bostaande?

11. Was u in diens as 'n staatsamptenaar tydens die apartheidsregime?
 a. Ja
 b. Nee
12. Indien ja, spesifiseer asseblief die aard van die beroep

13. Hoe slaan u die omstandighede/aard van u diens aan?
 a. Uitstekend
 b. Goed
 c. Redelik
 d. Nie seker nie
 e. Glad nie
14. Dink u dat, behalwe vir die afdwing van afsonderlike skole, die opvoedkundige stelsel onder Apartheid van dieselfde gehalte was?
 a. Ja
 b. Nee
 c. Nie so seker nie
 d. Glad nie
15. Dink u dat daar gelyke indiensnemingsgeleenthede vir alle rasse in Suid-Afrika tydens die Apartheidstydperk was?
 a. Ja
 b. Nee
 c. Nie so seker nie
 d. Glad nie
16. Indien ja, wat dink u was die rede(s) daar agter?

-
.....
17. Het swartes en ander rassegroepe verteenwoordiger(s) in die Parlement gehad gedurende die apartheidsregime?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
18. Dink u dat ons die belangrikste protagoniste en antagonistte van die apartheidsregime moet identifiseer?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
19. Dink u dat daar gelyke toegang tot mediese geriewe vir alle rasse in Suid-Afrika tussen 1948 en 1990 was?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
20. Was u of enige van u familiën direkte slagoffer van die dwang van die apartheidsregime?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
21. Was u of enige van u familie in gevangenis onder die Apartheidsregime?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie

22. Indien 'ja' spesifiseer die rede(s) daarvoor.

.....
.....

23. Was u betrokke by enige van die weerstandsbewegings teen die dwang van die apartheidsregime?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee

24. Indien 'ja' in watter hoedanigheid?

.....
.....

25. Indien 'Nee' waarom?

.....
.....

26. Behoort u aan enige van die opposisiepartye/organisasies wat weerstand teen die Apartheidsregime gebied het?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee

27. Indien 'ja' spesifiseer asseblief die name van die party(e)/organisasie(s).

.....
.....

28. Indien 'Nee' verstrek asseblief u rede(s) daarvoor.

.....
.....

29. Wase u betrokke by enige sabotasiedaad teen die Apartheidsregime?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee
- c. Nie seker nie
- d. Glad nie

30. Indien 'ja' gee asseblief 'n voorbeeld(e)

-

31. Glo u dat daar skending van burgerlike vryhede in Suid-Afrika gedurende die Apartheidsera was?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
32. Indien 'ja', kan u asseblief voorbeelde van sulke skending(s) gee.
-

33. Dink u dat swart Suid-Afrikaanse studente ook betrokke was by die weerstand teen die Apartheidsregime?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
34. Hoe slaan u die vlak van studentedeelname aan die weerstand teen die dwang van die apartheidsregime aan?
- a. Uitstekend
 - b. Goed
 - c. Gemiddeld
 - d. Nie so seker nie
35. Dink u dat daar swartes, Indiërs of kleurlinge was wat met die Apartheidsregime saamgewerk het?
- a. Ja
 - b. Nee
 - c. Nie so seker nie
 - d. Glad nie
36. Uit ervaring of van wat u gehoor het by voormalige gevangenes, hoe slaan u die lewensomstandighede in die tronke van Suid-Afrika onder die Apartheidsregime aan?

- a. Uitstekend
- b. Goed
- c. Gemiddeld
- d. Sleg
- e. Die slegste

37. Dink u dat daar vryheid van spraak en uitdrukking onder die apartheidsregime in Suid-Afrika was?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee
- c. Nie seker nie
- d. Glad nie

38. Dink u dat daar persvryheid onder die Apartheidsregime in Suid-Afrika was?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee
- c. Nie seker nie
- d. Glad nie

39. Hoe slaan u die aktiwiteite/opoffering van verskillende opposisieleiers aan?

- a. Hoog
- b. Laag
- c. Gemiddeld
- d. Nie seker nie

40. Dink u dat die jaar 1994 die koms van werklike/ware demokrasie in Suid-Afrika ingelui het?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee
- c. Nie seker nie
- d. Glad nie

41. Dink u dat die beginstadium van verval van die apartheidsregime se dwang die weg gebaan het vir 'n onderhandelde magsoordrag?

- a. Ja
- b. Nee
- c. Nie seker nie
- d. Glad nie

42. Indien 'ja' in watter mate?

.....

.....

.....

.....

43. Indien 'Nee' waarom?

.....

.....

Hoe sien u die sielkunde van diegene wat traumatiese of stresvolle lewensomstandighede onder die Apartheidsregime ondergaan het?

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Dankie.

APPENDIX: II
ENGLISH QUESTIONNAIRE:

Interview initiated at: _____

Interview completed at: _____

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to explore the compulsion of apartheid regime, its demise and the advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa, 1948-1996. The study is to be conducted by Musa Ahmed Jibril of the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, South Africa. Mr. Jibril is conducting this study for the award of PhD Degree in History. The study will help in providing concrete information on the subject matter.

You are asked to complete this questionnaire/interview because you are a citizen /residence in the area of study (South Africa). Your participation in this research is voluntary but of great importance to its success. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher. Answering these questions will help you identify some tedious issues besides giving you the opportunity to state your opinions. Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you give will be confidential. Note however, that, there are no right or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Before we begin do you have any questions?

Section A:

9. Province of Origin _____
10. Province of Residence _____
11. Area of Residence _____
12. Sex : Male ☐ Female ☐
13. How old are you? _____

14. What is your highest formal education attained?

- a) Primary School
- b) High School
- c) Collage
- d) University
- e) Others specify _____

15. What is your present occupation?

- a. Farming
- b. Civil servant
- c. Trading
- d. Business men/women
- e. Others Specify _____

16. What is your marital status?

- a. Married
- b. Single
- c. Divorce
- d. Wido

Section B:

44. What do you think were the reasons behind the introduction of Apartheid as a national policy in South Africa?

- a. maintenance of white supremacy over the other races
- b. ensuring separate development of each race
- c. socio-economic and political exploitation
- d. Not so sure
- e. Others

45. If your answer is (E) please specify below

.....
.....
.....

46. Do you believe that there was a real Democratic system in South Africa under Apartheid regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

47. Do you believe that Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) played a vital role towards the imposition of Apartheid policies in South Africa?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

48. Do you think that the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) actively participated in terms of policy making during the Apartheid regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

49.To what extent did the Broederbond influence the activities of the National party?

- a. High
- b. low
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

50.Do you think that the Church played a vital role in formulating and executing Apartheid policies?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

51.Do you think that the Church was against Apartheid policies?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

52.What do you think were the instrument(s) used by the National party in executing Apartheid's compulsive policies?

- a. Police
- b. Army
- c. Legislations
- d. Church
- e. All of the above
- f. None of the above

53. If your answer is 'F' please state your reasons for the above?

.....

.....

.....

.....

54. Were you employed under the Apartheid government?

- a. Yes
- b. No

55. If yes, please specify the nature of the occupation

.....
.....

56. How do you rate the condition/nature of your service in that employment?

- a. Excellent
- b. Good
- c. Fair
- d. Not sure
- e. Not at all

57. Besides the imposition of separate schools, do you think that the educational systems under Apartheid were of the same quality?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

58. Do you think that there was equality for employment across all races in South Africa during the period of Apartheid?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

59. If yes what do you think were the reasons behind?

.....
.....

.....
.....

60. Do the Black and other races have representatives in Parliament?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

61. Do you think that the Black and other races were represented by whites in the Parliament?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

62. Do you think that there was equal access to medical facilities across all races in South Africa during the period of compulsive apartheid regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

63. Did you or any of your relative(s) happen to be a direct victim of the police/army brutality during the Apartheid regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

64. Were you or any of your relatives imprisoned under the Apartheid regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No

- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

65. If yes, please specify the reasons behind

.....

.....

.....

66. Were you involved in any of the struggles against the compulsive apartheid policies of the regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No

67.If 'yes' in what capacity?

.....

.....

68.If 'No' why?

.....

.....

69. Do you belong to any of the opposition parties/organisations that were against the apartheid's compulsion policies?

- a. Yes
- b. No

70. If 'yes', please specify the name of the party/organisation

.....

.....

71. If 'No' please state your reason behind

.....

.....

72. Were you involved in any act of sabotage against the Apartheid regime?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not sure
 - d. Not at all

73. If 'yes' please provide an example(s)

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.....

.....

.....

74. Do you believe that there was abuse of civil liberties in South Africa during Apartheid era?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

75. If 'yes', can you please give examples of such abuse(s)

.....

.....

.....

.....

76. Do you think that black South African students were also involved in the struggle against the compulsion of the apartheid regime?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

77. How do you rate the level of student's participation in the struggle against Apartheid?
- a. Excellent
 - b. Good
 - c. Average
 - d. Not so sure
78. Do you think that there are blacks, Indians or Coloureds who collaborated with the apartheid's compulsive regime?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
 - d. Not at all
79. From experience or what you heard from former prisoners, how do you rate the condition of life in the prisons of South Africa under the Apartheid regime?
- a. Excellent
 - b. Good
 - c. Average
 - d. Bad
 - e. Worst
80. Do you think that there was freedom of speech and expression during apartheid's compulsive regime in South Africa?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not sure
 - d. Not at all
81. Do you think that there was freedom of the press under the Apartheid regime in South Africa?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not sure

d. Not at all

82. How do you rate the activities/sacrifice of various opposition leaders during the compulsive reign of the National Party?

- a. High
- b. Low
- c. average
- d. Not sure

83. Do you think that the year 1994 saw the beginning of real/true democracy in South Africa?

- a. yes
- b. no
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

84. Do you think that the 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' achieved its set objectives?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

85. If 'yes' to what extent?

.....

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.....

.....

86. If 'No' why?

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.....

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.....

87. How do you see the psychology of those who passed through certain traumatic or stressful life circumstances under Apartheid regime?

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.....
.....

Thank you.

APPENDIX: III

SESOTHO QUESTIONNAIRE

MIBUTSO YA KGETHOLLO IN SESOTHO

Di Interview e Yetselweko: _____

Di Interview Egetelweko: _____

INTRODUCTION

Di potso tse ditlabe di botswa mona ditlabe di bonahatsa menahano le ho-hola hwa kgethollo (apartheid), Hape le ho utlwisisa bobbe ba kgethollo bathong. Hape le ho latella di tselatse bona-hetse di sebediswa ho wesa mehlape ya kgethollo (apartheid) di lemong tsa 1990-1994. Ho baneng Ho tloha di lemong tsa 1948-1989 ho ele hwa bana le ditsele tse ngata tse sebedisitswe ho lwantshana le kgethollo (apartheid) mara hoile hwa getelwa ho qoqisane hore Afrika borwa le batho bayona baphele katlasa tokoloho.

Di patso tsena di yentswe ke Musa Ahmed Jibril, Eileng moithuti lefapeng la Arts, University ya Zululand, Afrika borwa. Monghadi Jibril oyi thuela hoba ngaka lefapeng la Philosophy. Ho araba wahao dipotso tsena hotla thusa haholo mailana le ho utlwisisa di tsela tsa kgethollo (apartheid).

Mona okotjwa hore o arabe dipotso tsena hobane o moduli wa Afrika borwa. Kamanyo ya hao mona etlabe ele ka ho ithaopa wa hao. Ho araba kafo ose arabe hwa dipotso tsena haona ho etsa bobbe hara wena le monga di potso tsena. Ho araba dipotso tsena hoka othusu lewena hore obone melato ene batho ba shebane leyona kanakong tseo.

Rekopa o arabe dipotso tsena ka tsela etla thusa banga batso, empa otsebe hore haona karabo ehepahetse kapo efasahetseng.

Pele ogalu ho araba ekabe onale dipotso?

Section A:

17. Le bitso la profinsi otswang ho yona _____
18. Le bitso la profinsi eo odula ho yona _____
19. Tulo eo odulang ho yona _____
20. Ekabe omutho yamme kapo ☐ wantate? ☐
21. Dilemo tsa hao dikae? _____

22. Ekabe oyi thutile ha fihlelakae?

- a) Ko Primary
- b) Ko High School
- c) Ko College
- d) Ko University
- e) Or kokae? _____

23. Mosebetsi ole ho-wona ke ofeng?

- a) Molimi
- b) Civil servante
- c) Ungumrhwebi
- d) Trading
- e) Monna wa kgwebo/mosadi wa dikgwebo _____

24. Ekabe tsa lenyalo di eme jwang?

- a) Oyetse
- b) Hao wanyala
- c) O arohane le eo one onyalane leyena
- d) O hlakahalletse ke mutho one o nyalane leyena

Section B:

88. Ekabe diketso, le menahano ya di nako tsa (apartheid) ka 1948 enele ho etsetsa?

- a. Hore makgoa adule ale kahodimo wa mehlape emeng ya batho
- b. Hore mohlape omong le omong wa batho oyi-holele ka bohona
- c. Socio-ekonomi le polotiki
- d. Yao tsebe huntle
- e. Ke le baka le-leng?

89. Haebe okqethile (e) re kopa ogwole hore ho baneng

.....
.....

90. Ekabe baetapele ba kgethollo (apartheid) ne ba natianela bathe hane ba tsamahisa mahla abona a polotiki?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Haketsebe hantle
- d. Esing le hanyane

91. Ekabe onahana hore kareke ya NGK a Bapetse karolo ekgolo ho dumella kgethollo (apartheid) Afrika borwa?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Haketsebe hantle
- d. Esing le hanyane

92. Onahana hore lefapha la “Afrikaner Broederbond” enielemokgatlongwaholwantshana le ditukelotsabathokanakongtsakgethollo?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe

- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Esing le hanyane

93. Ekabe le fapha la “Afrikaner Broederbond” nele ekelletsa menahano enesing metle ya “National Party” ha kakung?

- a. Haholo
- b. Hanyane
- c. Ha ketsebe hantle
- d. Tseng lehanyane

94. Ekabe diketso tsa kgethollo "apartheid regime" nedi sututswa ke thloyo ene esa tshwarehe?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tse be hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

95. Ekabe onahana hore kereke ene-esa tsa maisane le ditsela tsa kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

96. Ekabe onahana ke difeng detsela tsenedi sebediswa ke kgethollo (apartheid) reigme ho phethahatsa menahano yabona?

- a. Se ponesa
- b. Masole
- c. Melawo
- d. Kereke
- e. Tsona tsohle
- f. Eseng le engwe

97. Ha ebe okgethile (F) rekopa ore gwolle hore hobaneng?

.....
.....

98. Ekabe one osebetsa ka nako tsa kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe

99. Habe karabo yahao ele eya, rekopo ore jwetse mosebetsi one yetsa

.....
.....

100. Ekabe one otswerwe jwang mosebetsing?

- a. Hantle ha holo
- b. Hantle
- c. Hantle nyana
- d. Hake tsebe hantle
- e. Hone Hose hantle

101. Hare tlosa arohatsho yadikolo, Ekabe ona hore thuto dikolong tsohle ene etshwana?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

102. Ekabe onahana hore batho neba hirwa ka hotshana Afrika borwa hopota nakong tsa kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe

- c. Eseng le hanyane
- d. Habetsebehantle

103. Ha ebe o kgethile (A) rekopa ore jwetse hore hobaneng otsho jwalo?

.....

104. Ekabe batho ba batsho, le ba mmale emeng ne bona ka nako tsa kgethollo (apartheid) e ba emedi palamenteng?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le elengwe

105. Ekabe wena onahana hore Retshantse re bonahatse baetapele, le batho bane ba sa tshware batho babang hantle ka nakong tsa kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le elengwe

106. Ekabe onahana hore merihane ephekolang batho, di pitlele ne di Sebediswa ka hotshwana ke batho bohle ba Afrika borwa hara dilemo 1948-1990?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng leha ngwe

107. Ekabe wena kapo emong waheno, oyile waba emong ailing a Sokodiswa ke tshohanyetso ya kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle

d. Eseng leha ngwe

108. Ekabe wena kapo emong wa heno oile waya tshonkaneng ka nakong tsa kgetholo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le elengwe

109. Haikabe okgethile (A) Re kopa ore jwetse lebaka la hoya tshankaneng.

.....
.....

110. Ekabe one o omahane le batho bane ba lwantshana le tshohanyetso yakgethollo?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe

111. Ha ebe okgethile (A) ke efeng?

.....
.....

112. Ha ebe okgethile (B) Re kopa otsho hore hoboneng?

.....
.....

113. Ekabe one o le lefaphing lene le lwantshana le kgethollo?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe

114. Haebe o kgethile (A) Rekopa orefe lebitso la lefapha

.....
.....

115. Haebe o kgethile (B) Rekopa lebaka lahao.

.....
.....

116. Ekabe one o amane le ho bolaya kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

117. Ha ebe okgethile (A) Re kopa mohlala

.....
.....

118. Ohana hore hone hona le Hotlolo ya malawa Afrika borwa nakong tsa kgethollo?

- a. Eya
- b. No
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Not at all

119. Ha ebe okgethile (A) Re kopamohlala

.....
.....

120. Onahana hore baithuti ba batsho neba amane le ho lwantshana le hatello ya kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle

121. Ekabe baithuti bathusitse ha kae ha ne ho lwantshwana le kgethollo?

- a. Haholo
- b. Hantle
- c. Hantlenyana
- d. Hake tsebe hantle

122. Ekabe hone hona le batha ba batsho, ma khalate kapo ma India ane a sebedisana le batho ba kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

123. Ka tsebo yahao, kapo ka hutlwa ka batho ba bang, se emmo di tshankaneng tsa kgethollo (apartheid) ne sele jwang?

- a. Se sele setla ha holo
- b. Nese le hantle
- c. Hantle
- d. Ne dilempe

124. Ekabe onahana hore batho bane ba dunyelwetswe ho buwa katsela ebaie rata mona Afrika borwa nakong tsa kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

125. Ekabe onahana hore di koranta nedi yetsa ka tsela engwe le engwe e bae rata, ka tlasa mo lawo wa kgethollo (apartheid)?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

126. Ekabe hoi neh ela hwa ba etapele ba mekgatlo ene elwantshana le kgethollo (apartheid) e thusitse ha kae.

- a. Haholo
- b. Hanyane
- c. Hantle
- d. Hake tsebe hantle

127. Ekabe onahana hore se lemo 1994 ke sona nese jwentsha tokuloho ya nnete?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

128. Onahana hore howa wa ba etapele ba kgethollo (apartheid) ho ille hwa bula menyako wa ho qoqisana ka ho nehana matla, le tokoloho Afrika borwa?

- a. Eya
- b. Tshehe
- c. Hake tsebe hantle
- d. Eseng le hanyane

129. Haebe okgethile (A) re kopa orejwetse hore hobaneng.

.....
.....
.....

130. Haebe okgethile B, Hobaneng?

.....
.....
.....

131. Ekabe di kelello tsa batho ba kopaneng le mathata a kgethollo (apartheid), ba feta di jwang hana- jwale?

.....
.....

Kea leboha.

APPENDIX: IV
XHOSA QUESTIONNAIRE

IMIBUZO YODLIWANO-NDLEBE

Lubanjelwe: _____

Lwagqitywa: _____

INTSHAYELELO

Oludliwano-ndlebe, lwenziwa ukuze kufumaneka ulwazi olunzulu oluzukuveza iindlela ezazisetyenziswa ngexesha lobandlululo ukunyanzela abantu ukuba benze into abanyagi funiyo. Oludliwano-ndlebe luzaku khagela yaye lumise imibono eyehlisa amandla karluhumentle wobondlululo ngonyaka wama 1990 ukuyakutsho kowama 1994. Luzakuphinda luveze ukuba wakwazi njani ukungena endaweni yorhulumente wonyaka wama 1948 ukuyakutsho kowama 1989.

Okokuqhibela luzakuveza ukuba yintoni eyakhokhela ekuweni kwalorhulumente nokuba yintoni eyakhokhela ekuweni kubekho uthethiswano kumelwane ngoku dlutisa amandla okuphatha, kwa kunye nokufika kwendelela entsha yokuhatha eMzantsi Afrika.

Oludliwano-ndlebe luzakuba lubanjwe ngu Musa Ahmed Jibril, osuka kwiPhondo laKwaZulu-Natala, kwiDyunivesithi ya KwaZulu kwiCandelo lezobuciko kwisebe le zenbali. Umnumzana Jibril wenza izifundo zakhe zobu Gqirha. Impendulo zenu kulebuzo ziza kumnceda ukuba abenolwazi oluggibeleleyo ngalomba wobandlululo.

Uyacelwa ukuba uththe inxaxheba uphendule lemibuzo ngoba ungummi woMzantsi Afrika. Awukho umvuzo xa uthatha inxaxheba, uyithatha ngoba uthanda, kodwa oluphanda luzakuphu melela ngoba wena uthetha inxaxheba. Ukuthatha kwa kho inxaxheba ukuzitshintsha ubuhlobo phakathi kwakho nalo opethe uphando. Ukuphendula lemibuzo kuzaphinde ufumane ulwazi ngeminye imiba eyenzeka ngela xesha obungayazi wena.

Uya celwa ukuba uphendule lemibuzo ujolise kwiziganeko ezenzekayo ngokwenene. Uyaqinisekiswa ukuba awuzithyilwa ukuba uze nolwazi oluthile. Alukho ulwazi olulungileyo nolugalunganga. Oluphando lufuna nje imibono yakho.

Phabi kokuba siqale unombuzo mhlawumbi?

Section A:

25. I phodo osuka kulo _____
26. Uhlala Kweliphi Iphondo _____
27. Indawo Dhlala kuyo _____
28. Isini : Indoda ☐ Umntu wasethyini ☐
29. Mingaphi iminyaka yako? _____

30. Ufunde waphela kweliphi ibanga?
- a) Ibanga Eci phantsi
 - b) Ibanga Eli phezulu
 - c) Ekholegini
 - d) EdyUnivesithy
 - e) Enye, Cacisa _____

31. Usebenza Phi?
- a) Ungumfama
 - b) Ujongene Nokwakhiwa
 - c) Ungumrhwebi
 - d) Ungusomashishini
 - e) Enye, Cacisa _____

32. Isimo Somthato?
- a) Utshaatile
 - b) Uwedwa
 - c) Uqhawule Umtshato

d) Ungum Hlolokazi

Section B:

132. Ucinga ukuna yintoni unobangela owamisa waqinisa indlela yokuphatha yorhulumantle wobandlululo ukususella kunyaka wama 1948?

- a. Ukugcina abantu abamhlophe benga phezu kwezinye iintlanga
- b. Ukwenza ukuba zonke lintlanga zi kule bucala
- c. Ukuxhatshazwa kwezoqoqosho
- d. Andi qini sekanga
- e. Ezinye

133. Ukuba impendulo yakho kulombuzo unga sentla ngu (E) cacisa apha nge zantsi

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134. Ingaba urhulumente wobandlululo wayese benzisa intando yabaninzi xa esebenzisa amandla ache kwe zopolitiko?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

135. Uyakholewa ukuba (NGK) yadlala indime ebaluleki leyo ukuqinisekisa ukuba abemi boMzantsi Afrika benziswa into abangaya funiyo ngexesha lobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekansa

d. Nakanye

136. Ucinga ukuba Afrikaner Broederbond yadlala indima ebalulekileyo uku xhaphaza inkululeko yabemi ngexesha lobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekansa
- d. Nakanye

137. I Broederbonder bond yayi tshintsha kangakanani indlela iNational Party eyayinyanzele ngayo ukuba abantu benze into aba nga yifunno?

- a. Yayonyusa
- b. Yayihlisa
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

138. Ingaba urhulumantle wobandlululo waye kwazi ukunyanzela abantu ukuba benze into abangayifuniyo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

139. Ucinga ukuba ibandla lalingaha mbiselani nalemi khwa yorhulumentle wobabdlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

140. Ucinga ukuba zeziphi izinto ezazi setyenziswa ngulorhulumente ukumisa imithetho yakhe?

- a. Ama Polisa
- b. Umkhosi
- c. Imithetho ebekiweyo
- d. Icawe
- e. Zonke ezi zibaliweyo

f. Ayikho ebaliweyo

141. Ukuba impendulo yakho ngu (F) kulombuzo unga sentla cacisa apha ngezantsi?

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.....

142. Ngexesha lalorhulumentle, wawu sebenza utebenzela a bantu?

a. Ewe

b. Hayi

143. Uba uthe ewe, wawusenza wuphi umsebenzi

.....
.....

144. Wawusebenza njani?

a. Ngokuncome kayo

b. Ngokulungileyo

c. Ndandisenza uphela sinwabe

d. Andiqinisekanga

e. Nnakanye

145. Njengokuba urhulumente wuye misele ukuba izikolo zohlukane ukuba izinga lemfundo lalifana ezikolweni?

a. Ewe

b. Hayi

c. Andiqinisekanga

d. Nakanye

146. Ucinga ukuba zonke iintlanga emZantsi Afrika nge xesha lobandlululo, zazinamathuba alinganayo oku fumana um sebenzi?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

147. Ukuba uthe ewe kulombuzo ungasentla, cacisa ukuba yintoni unoba ngela?

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148. Ingaba abantu abamnyama nezinye iintlanga babe nabo abameli epalamente nge xesha lobadlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

149. Ucinga ukuba kufanele sichonge abantu ababe khokhele nge laxesha lobandlululo nabantu ababenga hambiselani nalo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

150. Ucinga ukuba phakathi konyaka wama 1948 ukuya kowama 1990, iintlanga zonke zomzantsi Afrika zizinamalungelo afanayo okungena kuma ziko ezempilo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

151. Ingaba ukhona umntu ohlobene naye oli xhoba lalorhulumente okanye ulilo wena?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye
- e. Yes

152. Ingaba sikhona isihlobo sakho esa fakwa entolongweni okanye wena uqobo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye
- e. Yes

153. Una uphendile ngo 'ewe' kulombuzo unga sentla nika izizathu apaha ngezantsi.

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154. Ingaba ubukhe wakwelinye lamaqela ebemiselene nobu burhulumente bobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi

155. Ukuba uphendule ngo 'ewe' wawusenza ntoni?

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156. Ukuba uphendule ngo 'hayi' kwa kutheni?

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.....

157. Ingama ulilungu lelinye lamaqela ayemelene norhulumente wobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi

158. Ukuba uthe 'ewe', leliphi elo qela

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159. Ukuba uthe hayi, ku theni?

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160. Wawu bandakanyeka ekuzameni ukucekela phantsi urhulumente wobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

161. Ukuba uphendule wathi 'ewe' nika umzakelo

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Uyakholelwa ukuba amalungelo abemi boMzantsi Afrika aye xhatshazwa nge xesha lobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

162. Ukuba uthe 'ewe' nika imizekelo yoloxatshazwo

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163. Ucinga ukuba abfundi abamnyama boMzantsi Afrika babezibandakanya nokumelana norhulumente wobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

164. Babezibandakanya kangakanani abafundi ekuzameni ukumelana norhulumente wobandlululo.

- a. Ngokuncomekayo
- b. Ngokulungileyo
- c. Ngokuzamayo
- d. Andiqinisekanga

165. Ucinga ukuba bakhona na a bantu abamnyama, amandiya okonye amakhaladi awayencedisa ekumiseleni urhulumente wobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

166. Kumava akho okanye kwinto owayivayo nge zibotshwa zaziphethwe njani ngexesha zisesentolongweni ngexesha lo rhulumente wobandlululo?

- a. Yayincomeka
- b. Yayilungile
- c. Average
- d. Yayingcono
- e. Yayimbi kakhulu

167. Ucinga ukuba abantu babe khululekile na ukuveza izimvo zabo ngexesha lobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

168. Ucinga ukuba amaphepha-ndaba ayebhala ngokukhulu lekileyo ngexesha lobandlululo?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

169. Ingaba uzibona zinjani izinto ezenziwe ngabantu ebabechasene nobuburhulumente

- a. Yayonyusa
- b. Yayihlisa
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

170. Ucinga ukuba unyaka wama 1994 nguwo oweza noburhulumente be ntando yabaninzi eMzantsi Afrika?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

171. Ucinga ukuba ukuwa kwamandla korhulumente wobandalululo kwavula indlela yokuba kuthethiswane ngokudlulisela amandla?

- a. Ewe
- b. Hayi
- c. Andiqinisekanga
- d. Nakanye

172. Ukuba uphendule wathi 'ewe' kangakanani?

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173. Ukuba uthe 'hayi' kutheni?

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.....

174. Ingaba xa ujogile inqqodo yabantu qbahlukumezeka ngexesha lorhulumente wobandlululo isebenza kanjani?

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Enkosi.

INGQALAMIBUZO

Inhlololwazi iqalwe e: _____

Inhlololwazi iqedelwe e: _____

ISINGENISO

Okuyiyona nhlosongqangi yalolucwaningo kuwukuninga ngesihluku soMbuso waBandlululo, ukuwa kwawo nokuvela kohlelo olusha lwezepolitiki eNingizimu ebuswa ngokwentando yeningi eminyakeni yezi 1948-1996. Ucwaningo lolu lusingathwe nguMusa Ahmed Jibril woMnyango wezoMlando, oHlelweni lwezobuCiko, eNyuvesi yakwaZulu (oNgoye), e-Afrika eseNingizimu. uMusa Ahmed Jibril usingatha lolucwaningo ukuze kuphothuleke iziqu zobuDokotela kwezokuJula ngoLwazi. Lolucwaningo luzosiza ekutholakaleni kolwazi olunzulu ngesihluku sombuso wobandlululo.

Njengesakhamuzi saseNingizimu Afrika uyacelwa ukuba ugcwalise ngokugcwele lengqalamibuzo/nhlololwazi. Iqhaza lakho lingokuzikhethela kanti libalulekile ekuphumeleleni kwalolucwaningo. Isinqumo sakho sokubamba noma ungabambi iqhaza kulolucwaningo ngeke sithikameze ubudlelwano bakho nomsingathi walo. Izimpendulo zakho zoba yimfihlo kanti nawe ziyokusiza ekwambulelweni ezintweni eziningi. Khululeka futhi wazi uqonde ukuthi azikho izimpendulo ezimbi nezinhle kulolucwaningo oludinga nje imibono yakho.

Ngaphambi kokuba siqale ngabe ikhona imibuzo onayo?

Ingxenye yokuqala:

33. IsiFundazwe odabuka kuso_____
34. IsiFundazwe ohlala kuso_____
35. indawo ohlala kuyo_____
36. Ubulili : Owesilisa ☐ Owesifazane ☐
37. Uneminyaka emingaki? _____
38. Ngabe ufunde wagcinaphi?
- a) sEmabangeni aphansi
 - b) Emabangeni aphakathi
 - c) Emabangeni aphakeme (eKolishi)
 - d) Emabangeni aphakeme (eNyuvesi)
 - e) Okunye, chaza _____
39. Wenza msebenzi muni njengamanje?
- f. Ezolimo
 - g. Isisebenzi somphakathi
 - h. Ezohwebo
 - i. Usomabhizinisi
 - j. Okunye, chaza_____
40. Ngabe uyisima kanjani kwezomshado?
- e. Ngishadile
 - f. Angishadile
 - g. Ngehlukanisile
 - h. Ngingumfelokazi
 - i.

Ingxenye yesibili:

175. Ngokucabanga kwakho ngabe ukwethulwa kobandlululo njengenqubomgomo kahulumeni eNingizimu aFrika kwakuhlosweni ngakho?

- a. Ukugcina abamhlophe bengaphezulu futhi bephethe ezinye izizwe
- b. Ukuqinisekisa ukwehlukana kwezizwe ngezizwe
- c. Ukuqonelwa ngokwezomnotho, ezepolitiki nezokuhlalisana
- d. Anginasiqiniseko
- e. Okunye

176. Uma impendulo yakho ibe ngu-(e), chaza kafuphi

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177. Ngabe uyakholwa yini ukuthi kwakukhona ukubusa ngokwentando yeningi ngaphansi kombuso wobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

178. Uyakholwa yini ukuthi iBandla lamaDashi (NGK) labamba iqhaza elikhulu ekugcinweni kobandlululo eNingizimu aFrika?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

179. Ngokucabanga kwakho ngabe umbuthano wamaBhunu ontamolukhuni (Broederbond) yaba negalelo kwinqubomgomo yobandlululo na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

180. Kwaba kangakanani ukugxambukela koNtamolukhuni (Broederbond) ezenzweni zeQembu lamaNeshinali (National party)?

- a. Kakhulu
- b. Kancane
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Ngisho nolunci

181. Ngabe iBandla laba neqhaza yini ekwakhiweni nasekuphumeleleni kwemigomo yobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

182. Ngabe iBandla laliphikisana yini nemigomo yobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo

c. Anginasiqiniseko

d. Angazi kwasampela

183. Ngokwazi kwakho yimaphi amathuluzi ayesetshenziswa umbuso wobandlululo?

a. AmaPhoyisa

b. Umbutho wezeMpi

c. Imithetho eyayishaywa

d. IBandla

e. Konke lokhu okungenhla

f. Nakunye kwalokhu okungenhla

184. Uma impendulo yakho ingu- 'F' ngenhla, beka izizathu ezinqala?

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185. Ngabe wawuqashiwe ngesikhathi sombuso wobandlululo?

a. Yebo

b. Cha

186. Uma impendulo yakho kungu Yebo, chaza uhlobo lomsebenzi wakho.

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187. Ungawuchaza uthini umsebenzi owawuwenza?

- a. Wawuncomeka
- b. Wawumuhle
- c. Wawusivivi
- d. Anginasiqiniseko
- e. Ngeke ngazi kwasampela

188. Ngaphandle kwezikole ezazehlukene ngokobuhlanga, ngabe ezemfundo zazisezingeni eliphezulu?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

189. Ngabe kwakunokulingana yini emathubeni emisebenzi phakathi kwezinhlanga ezahlukene?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

190. Uma uthi yebo, thani qaphu izizathu ezazenza kube njalo?

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191. Ngabe abantu abaNnyama nezinye izizwe ezazibandlululwa sezimelelekile yini na ePhalamende?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

192. Ngabe iPhalamende labaMhlophe lalimele nabaMnyama kanye nezinye izizwe ePhalamende na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

193. Ngabe izizwe zonke zazinamathuba alinganayo yini ngokwezempilo esikhathini sobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

194. Ngabe wena noma ezinye zezihlobo zakho nahlukumezeka kakhulu ngesikhathi sombuso wobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

195. Ngabe wena noma izihlobo zakho nake naboshwa yini ngesikhathi sombuso wobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

196. Uma kwakunjalo beka izizathu zalokho.

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197. Wawuzimbandakanyile yini nomzabalazo ekulweni nombuso wobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Cha

198. Uma kwakunjalo wawulwa kusiphi isigaba noma izinga?

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199. Uma kwakungenjalo shono ukuthi yingani?

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200. Ngabe uyilunga noma ingxenye yemibuthano namaqembu ayelwa nombuso wobandlululo?

a. Yebo

b. Cha

201. Uma kwakunjalo yiliphi iqembu owawuyingxenye yalo noma umbuthano owawuhambisana nawo?

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202. Uma kwakungenjalo beka izizathu zalokho.

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203. Ngabe wawuyingxenye yobushokobezi obabulwa nombuso wobandlululo?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

204. Uma kwakunjalo, nikeza izibonelo zalokho.

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205. Uyakholwa yini ukuthi kwakukhona ukuxhashazwa kwamalungelo oluNtu ngesikhathi sobandlululo na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

206. Uma kunjalo nika izibonelo zalokho kuxhashazwa kwamalungelo oluNtu.

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207. Ngabe abafundi babantu abaMnyama babeyingxenye yomzabalazo ngesikhathi sobandlululo na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

208. Ungalibeka ngokuthi lalingakanani iqhaza elabanjwa ngabafundi abaMnyama emzabalazweni wobandlululo na?

- a. Lalimangalisa kakhulu
- b. Lalilikhulu
- c. Lalikahle nje
- d. Anginasiqiniseko

209. Ngabe babekhona yini abaMnyama, amaNdiya namaKhaladi ababehambisana nombuso wobandlululo na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

210. Ngokwazi kwakho nangokuzwa ngababeboshiwe, ngabe zazinjani izimo emajele ngesikhathi sobandlululo na?

- a. Zazisezingeni eliphezulu
- b. Zazilungile

- c. Zazikahle nje
- d. Zazizimbi
- e. Zazisabisa kabi

211. Ngabe kwakhona yini ukukhululeka kombono nokucabanga ngokuzimela ngesikhathi sobandlululo na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

212. Ngabe yayikhona yini inkululeko yabezindaba namaphephandaba ngesikhathi sobandlululo na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

213. Ungakubeka ngokuthi kwakungakanani ukuzinikela kwamadela kufa emzabalazweni wenkululeko na?

- a. Kwakukukhulu kakhulu
- b. Kwakukuncane
- c. Kwakusivivi
- d. Anginasiqiniseko

214. Ngabe unyaka wezi-1994 waphendla indlela eya enkululekweni ngokwempela eNingizimu Afrika na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

215. Ngabe Ikhomishane yamaqiniso nokubuyisana yayifeza yonke imigomo eyayibekelwe yona na?

- a. Yebo
- b. Chabo
- c. Anginasiqiniseko
- d. Angazi kwasampela

216. Uma kwakunjalo, chaza eminye yemiphumela eyaba mihle?

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217. Uma kwakungenjalo, chaza kafuphi ukuthi yingani?

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218. Ngabe usibona kanjani isimomqondo salabo abahlukumezeka kakhulu yisankahlu sombuso wobandlululo na?

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Okumhlophe!