

**UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND**



**For the Degree, of**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**In**

**Development Studies**

**A Comparative Assessment of the Socio-Economic  
Dimension of Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram  
Insurgency: Towards the Security-Development Nexus in  
Nigeria**

**FACULTY OF ARTS**

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## DECLARATION

I, David James Ojochenemi, hereby declare that this dissertation is my own original work and that all sources have been accurately reported and acknowledged, and that this document has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted at any university in order to obtain the same academic qualification



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## **DEDICATION**

To God Almighty, the source and summit of all wisdom and knowledge, for the various miracles that accompanied this project into fruition.

To my Beloved family, for the spiritual and material support.

To all the victims of insurgencies in Nigeria.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

My earnest gratitude goes firstly to God, the source and summit of all wisdom and knowledge, for His unending love and care over me during this study.

I remain highly indebted to my supervisors Prof John Akokpari and Dr Mandla Mfundo Masuku for undertaking to supervise this study. Your careful observation, critical comments contribution, guidance and care towards the successful completion of this project is deeply appreciated. May God's favour replenish you and your Family?

I extend heartfelt thanks and appreciation to Mr and Mrs Rose Ebube, Mr Daniel David, Mr and Mrs Rita Shaibu, Mr and Mrs Monica Apeh. There is no better support like the support of Family. Thanks for the prayer, fasting, care and material contribution towards the success of this project. God bless you immensely.

A special appreciation goes to the Department of Politics and International Studies where this project was initiated. Additionally, appreciation goes to the librarians of the University of Zululand for all the support.

I am deeply grateful to Dominic Okoliko, who has been a friend "that is closer than a brother" for demonstrating his friendship through many sacrifices to ensure the success in this project.

Special thanks to Fr Kevin O'Hara of St Patrick's Missionary Society for his caring support for me and the material contribution to this project. Your many years' experience in the Niger Delta contributed in an unquantifiable measure to the success of this project. Thank you.

Special thanks for Fr Charles, Fr John Roche, Mr Ilesanmi K Damilola and Dr Longmam Pienswang, Dr and Mrs Joy Obaje, Miss Zamahlubi Radebe, Miss Lavinia Haikukutu for the caring and friendly support.

Special thanks and appreciation go to Prof and Dr Mrs Isike for their moral and caring support in face of my many challenges. You are deeply appreciated.

Special thanks to Benjamin Maiangwa for his kind assistance each time I ran to him for help and most especially for the review and words of encouragement that often resuscitate hope and invigorate me in the face of challenges and discouragement.

I am sincerely grateful to all the respondents without whom this study would not have been possible. I want to sincerely thank the staff of SACA in Yanegoa, including Mr Abba Ayemi, Mr Williems Shades, Mr Chidi Usanga, and Mrs Irene Njoku, and members of the Ikarama, Imirigi, and Ikoroma Communities in Bayelsa State, as well as all those whose names cannot be mentioned herein for ethical reasons. May God Almighty reward you all in abundance for your direct and indirect contributions to this study

## ABSTRACT

This study critically explores, in comparative terms, the socio-economic dimension (drivers and effects) of Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram insurgency, within the ongoing debate on the nexus between security and development. Using the mix of *Root Cause* and *Rational Choice* theories (2RCs), the study through qualitative methods, demonstrates the relative implication of socio-economic causes and effects of both insurgencies, based on evidence from interviews, available video documentaries and literatures. Acknowledging the weak, however irrefutable, connection between security and development, the study underscores that the social and economic dimension of both insurgencies must be factored into a long-term recovery plan, despite the seeming religious façade of Boko Haram.

The study demonstrates that while poverty, for instance, is necessary but insufficient in explaining conflict, its persistence amidst affluence and economic growth suggest that it significantly determines the hopelessness, angst and lack of trust in the system that often nudges *some* citizens to seek alternative means of redress. Such means may be ethnonationalism or religion as suggestive of the Niger Delta militancy or Boko Haram insurgency respectively. In addition, both insecurities have been hijacked by certain individuals for self-benefiting ends. This hijack is somewhat driven by personal rational calculus and oiled by the pan-Nigeria “socio-economic neediness” among the masses. In this regard, while the masterminds manipulate this ‘socio-economic neediness’, the lower ranks (of these insurgencies) derive immediate economic or political benefits from participation through criminality.

Meanwhile, the study found that socio-economic causes are more easily identifiable in the Niger Delta insurgencies as compared to Boko Haram’s, especially from the standpoint of legitimate grievances. For the Boko Haram insurgency, the socio-economic underdevelopment in the northern region are ideologically manipulated to mobilise wide support for the insurgency through monetary inducement, leveraging on the vulnerability of the populace. This is especially compounded by the lower level of education among its ranks of foot soldiers and general level of human underdevelopment across the region.

The implication of Nigeria’s mono-cultural economy for the country’s development trajectory and the current instabilities are explored to illuminate what, why, and how the resultant socio-economic underdevelopment could be related to both insurgencies. Accordingly, the popular criticism of the socio-economic dimension that often allude to the relatively higher level of

poverty in other parts of the north compared to Borno is critically revisited. This is done by demonstrating that Boko Haram is *hardly* a Borno or North-east phenomenon *exclusively*. Indeed, the historical and ideological resonance of Islamic extremism of Boko Haram, across the entire northern region, strongly reinforces this view.

The study further demonstrates how the protracted insurgencies, among other agitations in the country continue to inhibit Nigeria's overall development, creating an endless circle of conflict. Hence, in contributing to the attainment of a durable and sustainable resolution, this study advocates that adequate and improved redress of the socio-economic dimension, among the other notable undeniable dimensions must take place. In this regard, the study critically engages the mix of defence, diplomacy and development (the 3D) as used in other conflict regions in the world, to decipher possible ways forward. Minding context dependence of such policy frameworks and the difficulty with transferability however, the study ultimately seeks only to draw adaptable lessons, especially its accents on inter-agency cooperation (human and material resource) in comparable insurgencies. Herein lies the security-development nexus in Nigeria, given the deepening human insecurity and underdevelopment spawned by both insurgencies

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3D	Defence, Diplomacy and Development
ANSGs	Armed Non-State Groups
ASUU	Academic Staff Union of Universities
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CPI-TI	Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International
DHS	Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey
DRD	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crime Commission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSI	Failed State Index
GDI	Gross Domestic Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GPI	Global Peace Index
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
GWT	Global War on Terror
HAM	Hearts and Mind
HAM	Hearts and Minds
HDI	Human Development Index
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTI	Jama'atulTajdidi Islam
MAN	Manufacturers Association of Nigeria
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
₦	Nigerian Naira
NANS	National Association of Nigerian Students
NAPEP	National Poverty Alleviation Program
NARD	National Association of Resident Doctors
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NEED	National Economic Empowerment and Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NMA	Nigerian Medical Association
PTF	Petroleum Trust Fund
SACA	Stakeholders Alliance for Cooperate Accountability
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SEED	State Economic Empowerment and Development
SELL	Sharing Education and Learning for Life
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

# CHAPTER 1

## GENERAL BACKGROUND INTRODUCTION

### 1.0 Background to the Study

Nigeria's turbulent history and worrisome present has become a focal point in academic discourse on insurgency, especially in recent times. Besides the bloody civil war of 1967-70, the problem of insurgency has been known in Nigeria especially since the 1980s. The last two decades have seen a rather ghastlier dimension of this phenomenon. Militancy, characterised by hostage-taking and kidnapping of oil workers and frequent disruption of oil production activities through the destruction of oil and gas installations and facilities, continue to threaten peace and stability in the south, especially in the Niger Delta region of the country. This had hardly subsided when the Islamic sect, popularly dubbed Boko Haram surfaced in the north-east, whence it spread to other northern states with its terror campaign. Besides the above and the pockets of intra-ethnic strife across the country, other known groups have continued to foment trouble and induce instability. For instance, in the middle belt, especially in Jos and Benue, attacks and ransacking of villages by alleged Fulani herdsmen, have continued unabated (Durotoye 2015).

Meanwhile, like the Niger Delta insurgency, Boko Haram (translated as "Western education is forbidden") had a relatively peaceful origin. The Islamist sect preferred to be known as "*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (Association for propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad)".<sup>1</sup> Its violence assumed a grislier dimension in 2009, following what has been widely described among scholars as the 'extrajudicial killing' of its leader, Yusuf Muhamad (Akinola 2015). However, on March 2015 it declared its allegiance to the Islamic State (IS); hence, changing its name to the Islamic State of West Africa Province ISWAP (Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afriqiyah) (Bugnacki 2015). It appears that despite the name-changing, the tag 'Boko Haram' commands the most popularity.

Unlike the survivalist demands of various militant groups in the Niger Delta, Boko Haram appears to be pushing a religious agenda, given its claims to be on a mission to Islamise the Nigerian state (Mohammed 2009; Pérouse de Montclos 2014). Boko Haram was responsible for the abduction of nearly 300 Chibok (Nigeria) schoolgirls in April 2014 that sparked the global campaign tagged "Bring back our girls" (David *et al.* 2015). Hundreds more have been

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<sup>1</sup> "Arabic: جامع لها فن س لا تعدل ل داهج لاو Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād), better known by its Hausa name Boko Haram (pronounced [bō:kò: hārām]" (Babajide 2014: n.p)

abducted since then in Nigeria and in the neighbouring states such as Cameroon as the group gradually regionalises its deadly campaign. Boko Haram violent campaign has resulted in deaths of over 20000 people, which makes it one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in recent times. In fact, according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2014), Boko Haram is ranked among the four most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. Along with ISIL, the Taliban and Al Qaeda, they were collectively responsible for 66% of terrorism in 2013. Based on GTI (2015) figures, Nigeria was among the five countries that accounted for over 80% terrorism-related deaths, the other four being Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. The appearance of Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau, in *Time Magazine's* 100 most influential individuals in the world in 2015, attracted diverse reactions from various quarters. This is however suggestive of the unprecedented dimension of the current Boko Haram terrorism relative to other political conflicts in Nigeria, including the Niger Delta insurgency, be it in terms of deadliness, intractability and the wantonness of its killings.

Unsurprisingly, many countries around the world, including the United States of America, Israel, Britain, Japan and China among others have since offered to assist Nigeria in its counter-terrorism efforts. It is not entirely clear how this proposed assistance has taken shape. However, intelligence gathering, training as well as material support to thwart the effectively coordinated insurgencies have formed part of the assistance. In monetary terms, Barna (2014: 22-24) noted that besides the 9.9 million Euro support fund for counter-terrorism under the instrument for Stability (IFS), Nigeria also received a total of 700 million Euros through the European Development Fund (EDF), between 2009 and 2013, as a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement. Additionally, the Nigerian state has spent enormous amounts in trying to curtail both insurgencies.

Although, the state's intensified military counter-insurgency (COIN), especially in the weeks leading to the 2015 National Elections was largely applauded for its remarkable success, the killing and kidnapping by both Boko Haram continued at varying levels. For instance, following the heavy casualty that Boko Haram suffered in the hand of the Joint Multinational Taskforce, the largely dispersed militants have resorted to guerrilla tactics of hitting soft targets, with suicide bombing continually being recorded. In fact, suicide bombings were recorded barely hours after, almost as a response to, President Muhammadu Buhari's inaugural speech, 29<sup>th</sup> May, 2015, in which he indicated his resolve to decisively halt the activities of the sect he described as "a mindless, godless group....far away from Islam as one can think of"

(Vanguard News 2015a: May 29). Therein he indicated plans to move the military command base to Maiduguri, the epicentre of the Boko Haram activities to advance the efforts of the previous administrations. The following weeks saw a marked increase in attacks by the sect.

The first hundred days of President Buhari's administration saw a notable rise in killing and bombings, especially of soft targets by the rather daring group. In the words of the deputy Senate President, Senator Ike Ekweremadu, "the actions of Boko Haram seem to have resurfaced now not only in Borno, they have carried out their activities also in Plateau, they have gone to Adamawa, Kaduna" (Information Nigeria 2015: October 9).

Despite the demonstrated resilience of the Boko Haram, these incidences are often explained away as "a desperate pang of a dying monster". As the Publicity Secretary of the current administration, Lai Mohammed, argued then: "the truth of the matter is that Boko Haram, having been uprooted from its hideouts and put on the run, has become very desperate, hence it is now using its last arsenal to inflict as much damage as it can before it is annihilated, which is just a matter of time" (Vanguard News 2015b: July 10).

While there is widespread belief that the present administration has remarkably contained the excesses of Boko Haram attacks, it is obvious that the sect still poses a severe threat to peace, stability and development in Nigeria. In fact, despite the military gains in the counter-insurgency that began towards the end of the previous administration till date, Boko Haram has remained destructive and equally influential in the north-east region. To be sure, besides the unending attacks by the sect, a video release in September 2016 shows thousands of Boko Haram members offering Salah prayer. In the video ammunition were brazenly displayed and a threat to the Buhari administration was issued after the prayer led by their Imam, who reiterated their allegiance to Shekau (Vanguard News 2016: September 14).

While the propagandist dimension to such a video, posted occasionally by the sect, is not taken for granted, it is equally uncritical to underestimate the political rhetoric and undertone of Lia's "desperate pang of a dying monster" claims. The monster has evidently refused to die. In the meantime, the constitutional rights to security and welfare of the victims of these sporadic attacks continue to suffer violation as the people remain vulnerable to Boko Haram's attack (Nigeria Constitution 1999: sec 14, 2b). So much for Boko Haram, let us turn to the Niger Delta militancy or insurgency.

Aside from the growing rate of armed robbery and other crimes across the country, insurgency in the Niger Delta region has continued, though at a relatively lower level especially prior to February 2016. The relative stability is attributable to the Amnesty program introduced toward the end of 2009 by the Late President Umar Musa Yar Adua. Between this period (2010 - early 2015), sporadic killing and community violence reduced remarkably. However, this relative peace gradually “disappeared, to the consternation of those who had touted a DDR approach to the conflict in Nigeria’s oil ‘republic’” (Eke 2015: 750). Sabotaging and pilfering/vandalization of oil pipelines as well as aggravated incidences of kidnap for ransom, with the latter shifting “from high profile abduction to anyone in society that can offer a price” (Eke 2015: 750).

Toward the end of 2015 till the time of writing this thesis there has been a massive breakdown in security and peace in the region due especially to the resurgence of various militant groups, notable among which is the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). Like other previous militant groups in the region, the NDA has framed its campaign around political and economic self-determination. Their complaint pivots on the perceived marginalization and the environmental degradation that oil exploration has engendered in the region over the years. Their *modus operandi* is mainly the attacking of oil facilities in the region with aim to “cripple the Nigeria economy”, and mounting resistant attacks on the Nigeria security apparatus (ICG 2015). The violence against the government and oil companies is believed, by the militants, to be a bargaining strategy for inclusion (Director2; Peace-builder2).

The insecurity in the Niger Delta region has attracted much attention from different quarters, given, among other factors, its momentous international economic implications including the impact on international oil prices (Ibeanu 2000; Idemudia and Ite 2006; Courson 2009; Aghedo 2013). Basically, the interplay of statehood formation, ethnoreligious nationalities, corruption, as well as the adverse effects of Nigeria mono-cultural political economy in relation to politics of minority have been adduced as integral to the endearing militancy in the region (Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007; Courson 2009; Watts 2013). Besides the environmental degradation that characterises oil exploration in the region, scholars have provided apt description of the region as politically and socio-economically marginalised. These are conspicuously manifested in the depressing level of “underdevelopment, the jolting sense of neglect that engulfs the place and the general misery and violence that govern the lives of most of its inhabitants” (Osha 2006: 17). Aside from the “heavily-armed security apparatus”, government’s presence in many parts

of the region is hardly visible (Ebeku 2006: 4). Amnesty International reported in 2005 that “the inhabitants of the Niger Delta remain among the most deprived oil communities in the world – 70 per cent live on less than US\$1 a day, the standard economic measure of absolute poverty” (cited in Ebeku 2006: 4).

Corroborating this view, the UNDP (2006: 36) report on Human Development reveals that the poverty rate in the whole of the South-South region of Nigeria (including the Niger Delta) was at 74.8% at the time of the report. Despite the heavy revenue generated from the region “the government provides very little infrastructure, public works or conditions conducive to employment” (cited in Ebeku 2006: 4). Some locals associate “the internal displacement from their ancestral peasant agrarian economy with the activities of oil corporations and state repression of community protests” (Courson 2009). Expectedly, both peaceful and violent protests by members of the local communities have expressed resistance under various Environmental Movement Organizations (EMO) and armed militant youth’s groups. Predominant among these include the following: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Urhobo Youth Movement (UYOMO), Ikwerre Youth Movement (IYM), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities (FNDIC), the Membutu Boys, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Martyrs Brigade and, most recently the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in the southern region.

It serves to note that such political resistance is not only limited to Nigeria. For instance, various countries in Africa have witnessed similar resistance due to the similarity in their causes. A cursory review of this reality in most of sub-Saharan Africa, is deem valuable at this junction. This is done to give a much richer scope to the debate in the subsequent analysis, and to highlight how this dynamic play out regarding Nigeria’s conflict-prone political economy. For instance, a number of scholars have linked African conflict to the deleterious legacy of distorted political economy deepened by years of military dictatorships and bad post-independence (Adejumobi 1995; Momoh 1995; Olaitan 1995; Ihonvbere 1996; Amuwo 2009)

### **1.0.1 The Sources of Conflict in Africa**

African politics especially post-colonial era has been characterised by conflict caused by factors ranging from struggle over resources (scarce and/or abundant), unequal wealth distribution, gross human rights abuse, bad leadership/governance as well as identity politics (Keller 2014;

McCauley 2014). In this regard, Ikelegbe (2005) precisely observed that resource wars, rebellion and insurgencies that characterise several African states such as Angola, Sudan, Zaire (DRC), Liberia and Sierra Leone (especially in the 1980s and 1990s) are a result of these distortions in Africa. Conflicts over resources define inter-group relations especially in the absence of effective nationalistic and developmental government (Brown 2001; Sambanis 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Besançon 2005; McCauley 2014). Fear of marginalization is often rife in the contestation for the control of state power given the influence of political power over [socio]-economic welfare as clearly is the case in Nigeria.

The increasing manifestation of this dynamics in the continent at large is also glaring. Recent African stories, as with the Middle East, are replete with incidences of transnational and domestic terrorism or insurgencies, as it were, sometimes assuming the form of violent religious extremism (Cilliers 2003; Harbeson and Lyman 2007; Alexander 2012). The various uprisings in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Mali, Central African Republic, among others, in recent times are an eloquent testimony to this. Some scholars have noted that this trend is benchmarked upon the fact that the continent provides a safe haven for the flourishing of anti-state movements due to the general weakness of most of its states epitomised in the low level of human security and development (Davis 2007; Okumu and Ikelegbe 2010).

This can be underscored in relation to the recent wave of terrorism by a network of Jihadist groups, operating especially in North, East and West Africa with links to the Middle East. Prominent among these groups include: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Shabaab, Al-Nusra Front, Ansar al-Sharia, Hezbollah, Hamas, Boko Haram and Al Qaeda. Some of these sects are considered offshoots of Al Qaeda, whose aim revolves around the creation/promotion of theocracy uniting all Islamic states. Despite their divergent geospatial origins, a jihadist ideology appears to unite these groups, which are making inroads in Africa. Recruitments, especially of many disenfranchised youths across the continent have been easy for this groups for a myriad of reasons (Davis 2007). For instance, As identified by interviewers of formers Al-Shaabab fighters, some of these reasons include: “religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (poverty, education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging” (Botha and Abdile 2016b: 3). Often, the ethnoreligious or ideological aspect of the above insurgencies are overstretched to the detriment of other compelling dimensions such as their socio-economic underpinnings

It is against this backdrop that the insurgencies by the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram requires more scholarly attention within the debate on contested poverty-conflict nexus. Comparatively, while the militancy in Niger Delta is easily construable from a human security/development standpoint among scholars (for instance, Omotola 2006; Nwankpa 2014; Obi 2014; Ogoloma 2014), there is hesitation to peg Boko Haram insurgency in the same category given its overwhelming religious manifestation (Alozieuwa 2012; Nwabueze 2013). Yet, happening within the same confines of the Nigerian State, there may be some semblances between these two insurgencies at the level of causes and effect, especially socio-economically. For instance, according to Watts (2013: xiv) “Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), while seemly markedly different on their face, share some striking family resemblances”. To better appreciate this, an exploration of the historical contextualization of the conflict-inducing factors paralleling the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria, and their correlation in other parts of Africa due, among other reasons, to shared colonial heritage, is consider pertinent at this point.

### **1.0.2 Conflict Prone Colonial Legacy**

Today, after more than 50 years of political independence and a century of existence, the Nigerian state is characterised by a multiplicity of ethnic groups that continuously cling to identity affiliations and ethnoreligious sentiments. The forces of cultural, religious, and ethnic striving are not only mutually reinforcing but also constantly self-regenerating, leading to interregional enmity, suspicion, and violent conflicts (Ihonvbere 1988; Bach 1989). Scholars have noted that, based on ethnic and religious differences, if not animosities, cultural differences are often being “instrumentalized by ethnic entrepreneurs [in order] to gain access to political and economic resources” (De Soysa 2002: 396). The manifestation thereof in Nigeria is arguably one of the driving forces behind various inter-ethnic/religious/regional antagonisms that are sometimes expressed in secessionist threats and militancy (Ayoade 1973). This description is often used to frame the narrative of inequalities by politicians, activists, and leaders of rebel groups; including Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents’ groups.

In addition, the culture of ethnoreligious thinking by which many Nigerians tend often to read ethnic and religious meanings into events in the country, has often fuelled suspicion and mistrust, translating to hatred and varying degrees and forms of social conflict (David *et al.* 2015). This is understandable under the theory of social conflict which essentially argues that social divisions impact negatively on political behaviour (Seymour and Rokkan 1967). In their

ethno-regional context, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies amply reinforce this view. For instance, both by its pronouncements and its actions, Boko Haram has exacerbated Nigeria's cultural fault lines. On several occasions Boko Haram targeted Christian churches during service hours with suicide missions. Nevertheless, despite its declarations, its killing and destruction cut across ethnic and religious groups as well as nationalities. Meanwhile, this reality has its foundation partly in colonialism. In other words, the colonial system laid the foundation of Nigeria's conflicts, as in many formal colonies; whilst several postcolonial actions and events exacerbated them.

The harmful legacy of colonialism is integral to understanding Africa's conflict, especially as it pertains to the foundation of various African states. Many conflicts across the continent owe their explanation to the colonialist's arbitrary and greedy hodgepodge (or division as it were) of various diverse ethnic groups – irrespective of the variety of historical, political, cultural, as well as the religious affinities of these groups (Adebanwi and Obadare 2010)<sup>2</sup>. What is more, the politics of colonialism also means that the colonised African states have to share common enemies with its colonizers, thereby becoming part of its wars, as redolent of the fact that many African countries “acted as ideological proxies for the East and West” during the Cold War (Okumu 2009a: 29).

Yet beyond colonialism, post-colonial African leaders have often sustained the faulty foundation laid by colonialism, thereby aggravating the socio-economic and political demise in Africa, including in Nigeria (Alemazung 2010; Otoghile and Igbafe 2014; Kristensen 2016). The factors at play in this regard cover the gamut of elite manipulation and conspiracy, leadership deficit, ethnic manipulation, religious bigotry, and the ethnicization of politics as well as the politicization of ethnicity, *inter alia* (Ake 1976; Achebe 1984: 1; Uwazie *et al.* 1999; Suberu 2001). Other non-negligible factors include the adverse effect of globalization. Essentially, the negative impact of this link on domestic governance is particularly illuminating

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<sup>2</sup> In the case of Nigeria state, a product of British imperial conquest, what began as the annexation of Lagos in 1861 ended with series of seizures and the sacking of various kingdoms and empires in the hinterland, until they were all brought under British sovereignty in 1900 (Sanya 1993). At the end of the imperial campaign, an entity emerged encompassing more than two hundred groups of people with varying histories, cultures, and orientations, who were ultimately joined in two waves of amalgamation in 1906 and 1914. In essence, the formation of the Nigerian state was not out of a proper political bargaining or historical evolution but rather of “colonial violence and metropolitan arbitrariness” (Adebanwi and Obadare 2010: 388) that had little or no consideration for ethnic, linguistic, or cultural boundaries. Its formation, therefore, sowed the seeds of animosity – ethnic, religious, and cultural.


as far as the dynamics of Africa's inter/intra-state conflicts, including ethnoreligious conflicts, are concerned (Cronin 2003; Li and Schaub 2004; Njoku 2011; Utas 2012).

Prevailing internal factors such as systemic corruption and mismanagement, which continues to engender overwhelming human security challenges ranging from epic unemployment rates, alarming environmental degradation, poverty, child mortality, HIV/AIDS, to maternal mortality, *inter alia*, have created severe state legitimacy issues in most African countries (Omotola 2009a; Uzodike and Isike 2009; Agbiboa 2013a). The knottiness of these issues simply highlights the "paradox of plenty" in Africa. Indeed, despite being home to a mammoth quantity of some of the world's precious natural resources, such as gold, diamonds, crude oil, *inter alia*, Africa remains frail economically and politically. Consequently, the continent lags relative to other regions of the world in various development index. Given the admittedly complex nexus between development and security, the above developmental challenges have quite often initiated, animated and sustained conflicts among individuals or groups, who may be fighting over available resources and/or its scarcity. The conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan, the Niger Delta (Nigeria) and more recently, Ivory Coast, Mali, Libya, and South Sudan directly or indirectly reflect this complex dynamic in the continent (Barnes 2005; Karl 2007; Oyefusi 2007).

In the context of Nigeria, its monocultural oil economy has been regarded as one of the fundamental structural factors (along with bad leadership) that has undermined its development trajectory post-independence, especially considering how it has stifled overdue diversification of the economy. For instance, prior to the 1970s, agriculture accounted for 85 per cent of the Nigeria total export, constituting almost 60 and over 70 per cent of the nation's GDP and total export earnings respectively in the 1960s (Ileso 2000: 7). Nigeria led the world in groundnut production, second in cocoa production, and was a major exporter of rubber, hides and cotton (Walker 2000). The agricultural sector not only provided employment for over 75 per cent of the population, but also funded various major national development projects including the building of the oil refineries. Oil discovery and exploration changed all that, plummeting exports from agriculture eventually to an insignificant 5 per cent (Walker 2000: 86). The rise of oil to 90% of foreign exchange in the mid-1970s meant the downfall of agriculture with severe implications for socio-economic development (Ileso, 2000:8; Walker, 2000:79). This

reality was particularly negatively implicating, as shall be made clearer subsequently, due to the nature of the economic system in which this oil business subsists.<sup>3</sup>

To date, oil has remained the backbone of Nigeria’s economy as other sectors vital to sustainable development have been relegated to the background (See figure 1.1). The rather sharp economic decline and bleak economic outlook of Nigeria in 2015, after the positive trend in terms of economic growth in recent years, clearly testify to the deleterious effect of Nigeria’s mono-cultural economy. According to Karl (2007: 663) “One of the most important social consequences of the resource curse is that oil-exporting countries have unusually high poverty rates, poor health care, high rates of child mortality, and poor educational performance given their revenues—outcomes that contradict the beliefs about what should happen within oil-exporting countries”



**Figure 1. 1: Crude Oil and Non-Oil Export Earning in Nigeria 1988-1996**

<sup>3</sup> The imposition of the taxation system (paid in British currency) practically necessitated that subsistent producers abandon agriculture and become part of the capitalist system by taking up paid employment or selling their products to earn the currency for tax. As Olaitan (1995:127) avers, “the essence of this development was the monetisation of the Nigerian economy and the creation of social relations of exchange”. More so, the Nigerian economy practically became a foreign-oriented economy as it was “assigned the subservient task of production of agricultural produce and other raw materials for manufacturing concerns in Europe while depending on the European economies for manufactured goods” (Oliantan, 1995:131). Like most of its colonised counterparts, especially in Africa, raw materials were exported from the country at low prices and the finished products were being imported at high prices. This characteristic of the economy was unfortunately not only maintained but consolidated by the indigenous post-colonial leaders, with the adverse implication that the price values of Nigeria raw material remained determined by the metropolitan economies, given the nation’s tenuous relationship to production. Local bourgeoisie classes, who were practically “underdeveloped, dependent, corrupt, unproductive, undisciplined and unpatriotic, wasteful and highly fractionalised” were created and incorporated into the services of the foreign-oriented economy (Ihonvbere, 1994:10).

**Source: the Central Bank of Nigeria, *Nigeria: Major Economic, Financial and Banking Indicators*, Abuja: CBN, 1997:8 (See also Omotola 2006: 6)**

This petrodollar economy has continued to oil and entrench systemic corruption because it offers an easy ticket for unethical wealth accumulation by self-serving political elites. Hence the lootability thesis of oil wealth has been adduced as a basis for the woes of most oil-rich Gulf States and African oligarchies such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, and have also been linked to conflict (Oyefusi 2007). For instance, Gary and Karl (2003:9) maintained that oil wealth usually engenders high levels of “corruption, profligacy, social crisis, poor governance, human right abuses and ultimately violent conflict”.

Against this complex background, even though the driving forces behind the growing trend of terrorism in parts of Africa appears, *prima facie*, to be ethno religiously driven, their other inducers are substantively linkable to the weakness of those states, especially the inability of African leaders to foster development and peaceful coexistence among the diverse populace (Mentan 2004; Davis 2007; Dokken 2008; Salkida 2012). Thus a notable weak state syndrome has resulted from decades of misrule by the operators of statecraft, who, in lieu of fostering national unity, solidifying state legitimacy and building national identities through the provision of security and the necessary services, have “resorted to predatory and kleptocratic practices” (Mentan 2004: 2).

Subsequently, deep feelings of frustration and alienation are entrenched amongst the populace and some may choose violence, and possibly in the name of religion, as a way of responding to what they perceive as an “unjust system” in various African countries. The Islamist sect, Boko Haram, is one of such groups in Nigeria, which believes itself to be responding to the nation’s “unjust system”. This can be gleaned from a plethora of studies that have provided useful analyses of Boko Haram, assaying its religious, political, socio-cultural and international dimensions (Aghedo and Osumah 2012; A.I. Ajayi 2012; Onapajo *et al.* 2012; David *et al.* 2015).

In the same vein, the militancy in the Niger Delta region has received extensive scholarly writings. Yet Ibeanu’s apt observation that the predominant attitude in the region [Niger Delta] “is not whether there will be more trouble, but when and where” still remain valid (Ibeanu 2000: 31). Indeed, despite the relative stability witnessed in the region with the resultant increase in oil production and revenue generation following the 2009 Amnesty program, durable peace and stability still elude the region. This is the case, given that it was not certain

that “the militants surrendered all the arms in their possession, as is the case with most armed insurgents” (Nwankpa 2014: 71).

The warning that as long as “government continues to fail to address the underlying grievances behind the lawlessness in the area, instability and illegal activity in the form of kidnappings, piracy and pipeline vandalism will degenerate further to a point eerily similar to that witnessed during the MEND insurgency” (McNamee 2013) seem to have materialised with the resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta region in February 2016. There are many indications to this reality prior to 2016. Recall the pirates’ attack on a US vessel on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October 2013, and the abduction of two US nationals by Niger Delta pirates; the explosion in an oil refinery in Warri on 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 2013 for which MEND claimed responsibility (Nwankpa 2014: 71). Additionally, pipeline vandalism that is geared towards oil theft, causing about 20 per cent loss (400, 000 barrels per day) have been recorded (Nwankpa 2014).

Furthermore various recent reports on the Niger Delta region clearly suggest that “we may not have seen the end of violence in the Niger Delta region as there is an increase in piracy in the region and other violent incidents that are largely unreported” (Nwankpa 2014: 71). Besides the “29 piracy incidents, including two hijackings, 11 ships boarded, 13 vessels fired upon and three attempted attacks” (Nwankpa 2014: 71) various high-profile kidnap for ransom incidents have been on the rise in the region, putting in question the efficacy of the Amnesty program (McNamee 2013).

Indeed, with 30 out of the 34 piracy attacks recorded in 2013 alone being related to Nigeria, not to mention the unreported violent cases, it is incorrect to say that sustainable peace has returned to the region following the Amnesty deal (Nwankpa 2014). Equally vital is the question of sustainability of the Amnesty policy itself, given that the same amnesty has been prescribed as panacea to Boko Haram (Durotoye 2015)<sup>4</sup>. The prescription resulted in several recommendations, which remain unclear whether they were implemented or not, considering that Boko Haram remain untamed till date, with records of violent attacks in 2018. Thus, it is disingenuous to ignore a possibility of a full-scale resurgence of these insurgent groups,

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, following the growing intense pressure from the northern elites, including the prominent Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar, erstwhile former president, Goodluck Jonathan, set up a 26-member Amnesty committee headed by Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki on 17 April 2013 precisely in order to address the problem of Boko Haram insurgency (cited in Dorutoye, 2015).

assuming the current military approach can halt the activities of this militant group without properly addressing the grievances of the people in the region.

Furthermore, the adverse effects or implication of both insecurities among political agitations in Nigeria, on all fronts, and especially in terms of social and economic impact, can hardly be overstated. Chapter 7 of this study highlight these impacts, though inexhaustibly, considering the nature of these insurgencies. At the point of this writing, what can be clearly observed is that government's continuous promises of bringing an end to the situation is almost always greeted by yet another attack(s). Arguably the major challenge to addressing these insurgencies is tied to the misdiagnoses of the root causes and the prevailing attitude towards quick-fix solutions due, among other reasons, to the lack of requisite political will and endemic corruption. Suffice it to underscore that this dynamic of conflict is hardly a preserve of Nigeria; resonance thereof in the continent at large has been subject of extensive scholarly narratives (de Villiers 2015; Thompson and Udogu 2016). It is against this backdrop that one of the key explanations of both insurgencies, namely the socio-economic cause and effects requires closer attention.

### **1.1 Research Problem Statement**

Although studies on the enduring insurgency in the North-east of Nigeria by the Islamist sect Boko Haram, as well as the militancy in the Niger Delta region by various insurgency groups, have grown remarkably, little attention has been given to a comparative analysis between these insurgencies. This is perhaps due to their compellingly divergent objectives and *modus operandi*. Hence, despite the mushrooming scholarly works on both insurgencies, there is a paucity of scholarship comparatively assaying their socio-economic dimensions (causes and effects) especially through the prism of Nigerian political economy and in relation to the sustainability of the government's response hitherto. Meanwhile, the national legislative and policy stance towards both insurgencies gives a strong impression of notable similarity between both insurgencies despite the above-stated differences. For instance, the 2011 Terrorism Prevention Acts categorises the activities of both Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram as an act of terrorism, based on its definition of a terrorist. This raises an interesting question as to whether both are similar in some sense, especially from the standpoint of their socio-economic causes and effects as well as the overall conceptualization of both. If not, how are their differences understood? Besides, given the convergence of the negative effects of both insurgencies on Nigeria's overall development, understanding the above is relevant for policy.

This is especially the case as many analysts, scholars and policy-makers continue to emphasise socio-economic development as critical to addressing both insecurities, despite the religious/ideological stance, if not facade, of Boko Haram.

Arguably, at a general level, among the pertinent questions that remained unanswered include: How long would these insurgencies persist if at all Nigeria will ever extricate its self from the circles of violence? How do various survival mechanisms, so far adopted by the directly affected Nigerians, feed into the sustenance or eradication of these security challenges? What can, and should, be done to address political violence in Nigeria? And more importantly, with the above undesirable reality in mind, how do victims of these various conflicts cope, considering socio-economic and political factors in relation to governance and development in Nigeria? These questions are hardly misplaced as these insurgents have to some extent impressed on Nigerians a considerable sense of invincibility, despite the change of government as well as the enormous resources that have since been committed to COIN. Accordingly, it is imperative to have a sufficient understanding of the conditions that drive this seeming intractable challenge in Nigeria, especially from the lesser researched and highly contested socio-economic prism. Similarly, to be well equipped to address the developmental dimension of the crises along with other dimensions, such understanding is imperative.

The relevance of such understanding to Counter-insurgency (COIN) is particularly benchmarked upon the divergent views regarding the impetus for the rise and persistence of these insurgent groups. This has forestalled the realization of an effective and comprehensive COIN informed by the prioritization of conflict prevention, an integral tenet of peacebuilding. Yet the efficacy of policy response, in the long term, rests on a rounded knowledge of both the causal and sustaining factors, considering that conflict management in Nigeria have been characterised by shallow quick-fix tilted towards temporal ceasefire, making resurgences almost always likely (David 2013). The short-lived stability experienced in the Niger Delta region, following the change of tactics by government, is reminiscent of this view. Practically, “neither Nigeria nor foreign donors are investing enough to end violent conflict in the Niger Delta. While Nigerian officials opt to buy short-term cease-fires, such as the 2009 Amnesty process, other governments spend too little in money and manpower to grow local civil society, engage core conflict issues, or adequately understand the region’s problems” (Newsom 2011: 1).

Undoubtedly issues of bad governance and gross underdevelopment, in relation to the Nigeria rentier state and predatory political economy, are integral to this consideration. This is because their bearing on the issues of socio-economic conditions of the most affected people and vice versa still requires deeper scholarly articulation. The underpinning assumption is that ending the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies by merely using force (if entirely possible) is hardly tantamount to attaining sustainable peace and development in Nigeria unless the socio-economic drivers are effectively addressed in a sustainable manner along with other relevant causal factors. Little wonder, the EU strongly urged the Nigerian government to “step up measures to reverse negative socio-economic trends such as the widening of inequalities and increasing poverty rates, and in particular to make every effort to reduce youth unemployment” while underscoring the need to addresses “governance deficit and system-wide corruption at all levels” for it to be successful in its COIN (Barna, 2014:23).

Accordingly, this study engages the 3D counter-insurgency, which involves the mix of Defence, Diplomacy and Development as one way of attaining this sustainable resolution to both insurgencies, if carefully adapted to the Nigerian context. Considering that the 3D aptly accents the utility of development (especially socio-economic development) along defence and diplomacy in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, it arguably offers policy-relevant insights towards dealing with the insurgencies.

## **1.2 Research Aim and Objectives**

The principal aim of this study is: To explore how socioeconomic factors drive insurgencies in the north-east (by Boko Haram) and Niger Delta region (by selected groups) in a comparative sense. Related to this overarching aim, the other sub-aims that include:

- To draw the parallels between the insurgencies in the north-east and Niger Delta region of Nigeria within the conceptualization of terrorism and insurgency;
- To situate the debates on insurgency in the North-east and Niger Delta within the context of their socio-economic drivers in relation to Nigerian political economy;
- To assess the implication of both insurgencies for social and economic development in Nigeria;
- To interrogate the Dutch 3D’ (Défense, Diplomacy and Development) COIN model as a possible comprehensive solution to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

### **1.2.1 Research Questions**

Based on the outlined objectives, the central question of the study is: Among other factors, how do socio-economic factors drive Niger Delta militant (selected groups) and Boko Haram insurgency in comparative sense? Other sub-questions include:

- a) How can the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency be comparatively explained within the conceptualisation of terrorism and insurgency?
- b) What are the socio-economic drivers of political conflicts and how do these relate to Boko Haram terrorism and the militancy in the Niger Delta, regarding Nigeria political economy?
- c) How do both insurgencies impact on the social and economic development of Nigeria?
- d) How can the problem of insecurity, particularly the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram and insurgency be comprehensively addressed with the aid of the 3D COIN approach?

## **1.3 Research Methodology**

To effectively address the research objectives and questions, this research design prioritises methods that can adequately discern the requisite evidence for the study, as outlined below within the limit of available resources.

### **1.3.1 Research Philosophy and Approach**

Of the three common research epistemological traditions discernible in literature, namely positivism, realism and interpretivism, this study is closely aligned with the interpretivist tradition (Grbich 2013). Interpretivism, which is predominantly used in social sciences, is mainly concerned with understanding the complexity of human behaviours through the exploration of “people’s experiences and their views or perspectives of these experiences” (Gray 2014: 37). Undergirded by the assumption that knowledge is “constructed jointly in interaction by the researcher and the researched through consensus” interpretivist research, such as this one, focuses on exploring the “way people interpret and make sense of their experiences in the worlds in which they live and how the contexts of events and situations and the placement of these within wider social environments have impacted on constructed

understandings” (Grbich 2013: 7). Accordingly, its methodological approach is predominately qualitative since the paradigm accents the fluidity of reality and the consequent multiple interpretation of same reality. Against this backdrop, this study attempts to understand the behaviours of the insurgents, political actors and leaders in Nigeria through the prism of socio-economic interpretation within relevant historical contextualisation. How reality is understood and interpreted by these various actors is argued to be critical to the narratives and perceptions that drive the insurgencies.

Meanwhile, cognizant of the comparative bend to this study, a comparative research method is employed in a qualitative fashion to comparatively assay the socio-economic dimension of these insurgencies. Pierce (2008:55) rightly argues that, “by comparing two or more cases, researchers can identify causal variables which could not be deduced from a single case”. As such this method helps “to provide a rich, contextual description which identifies clearly the observed similarities and differences” between both case of Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency (Pierce 2008: 55-6).

While the socio-economic drivers of insurgency generally are considered, the study particularly focuses on comparing these drivers in the context of both insecurities against the backdrop of Nigeria’s political economy. This extends to the understanding of the social and economic developmental impact of both insurgencies, especially given the high probability of resurgence in an event that the identified drivers are inadequately addressed in post-conflict peacebuilding. By comparing the two cases, independent variables (causes) are distinguished from other variable (Pierce 2008: 56). The resultant detailed understanding of both phenomena helps to appraise the argument whether socio-economic conditions do or do not cause/drive insurgency/terrorism in Nigeria. Suffice it to acknowledge the problem of “many variable, few cases” associated with comparative research, and the consequent “weak capacity to sort out rival explanation” (cited in Collier 1993: 107). However, to address this challenge, effort is made to concentrate more on comparable social and economic variables in both insurgencies regarding Nigeria complex political and economic history; thus, the narrower focus on comparable socio-economic dimension.

### **1.3.2 Data Sources**

Despite its media popularity, terrorism studies remain uniquely challenging due mainly to the difficulty associated with obtaining data directly from the perpetrators – a problem inextricably linked with terrorism’s furtive nature (LaFree *et al.* 2014). Indeed, “the clandestine nature of

terrorist organisations and the ways and means by which intelligence information can be obtained will rarely enable data collection which meets commonly accepted academic standards” (Merari 1991: 88). Cognizant of this general limitation, which significantly inhibits the accessing of data directly from insurgents, the study relies extensively on both secondary and primary sources. One distinction that can be made between primary and secondary data is that while the latter is often “constructed by the researcher in the context of his or her own research project”, the former is often collected or produced by a third party who may or may not be fellow researcher, for either research or other purposes (Thomas 2004: 191).

Contextualizing this view for this study, primary data herein comprise both the interviews and other first-hand or direct evidence as well as materials emerging from the time period being discussed, which includes official and unofficial reports of organization and government agencies including Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Transparency International, World Bank, UNESCO, Amnesty International (AI), United National Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), United Nation’s Security Council, United Nation’s Human Development(HDI) as well as video documentaries related to the insurgent groups.

Additionally, major periodicals and newspapers (national and international) such as the *Nigerian Guardian*, *Punch*, *Daily Sun*, *British Broadcasting Cooperation*, *Aljazeera*, *This Day*, *Vanguard*, *Nigerian Tribune*, *CNN*, among others were duly consulted. Admittedly, although the classification of newspapers reports as primary or secondary data is controversial, this study adopts a rather fluid distinction in this regard. It considers newspaper reports as both primary and secondary depending on the parameters of classification. They are considered secondary within the parameter of them having not been constructed by the researcher per Thomas’s (2004) differentiation above. However, they are also considered as primary to the degree that they present first-hand information of the phenomenon under-study, which otherwise are not directly accessible to the researcher. The secondary data include books, academic journals, and published research as well as conference papers. In this regard, it suffices to clearly state that, as an extension of previous degree (MA) study (based on the recommendation of the examiners), substantiation resources are drawn from the study (David 2013) which focused only on Boko Haram and the ensuing publication during this current study (David 2015). This has been declared in accordance with the University’s policy (See Annexure B) Where necessary, data from these sources are updated to added new insights or further clarity. Indeed, the extensive use of secondary material helps the research to elicit in-depth historical,

geographical and contemporary information of relevance to the insurgencies, with the view to lend better explanation to its socio-economic dimension, amid other non-negligible explanations such as politics and religion, which are not the direct focus of this study.

It is instructive to stress that, contrary to some views, secondary data is not necessarily inferior to the primary data. Hence, the reliance on secondary data facilitates a broader interpretation of the phenomenon under question. Additionally, credible and useful internet websites of relevant organisations and statistical databases were also sourced to substantiate the complex interplay of socio-economic indices with other factors in generating and sustaining political agitations such as the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency. Evidences drawn from these multiple data sources provide a fitting base for meaningfully addressing the research objectives and the overall aim within the limits of available resources.

### **1.3.2.1 Sampling Technique**

For the primary data, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with twenty-one (21) experts/key informants, given the need for relevant information to meet the set objectives of this study. Respondents are defined as experts or key informants hand by the virtue of nature of the work in the conflict region, experience in the field as well as first-hand witnesses to the activities of either one of the insurgencies or both. In this regard, both a purposeful and snowballing sampling techniques were used to identify expert respondents or key informants. The procedure of identifying these responded involved two stages. First, the researcher directly identified a few experts/informants believed to have relevant information for this study. Second, while the first set of respondents were being interviewed they were requested or volunteered to provide information about other respondents that they know who have relevant information for the study. In other words, a snowballing technique was helpful in arriving at other respondents through the few directly identified by the researcher.

The use of snowballing technique, in addition to the purposeful sampling, is informed by the need increase the number of respondents identified by the researcher with the view to reach considerable primary data saturation. It serves to clearly underscore that, rather than being chosen as representatives of the population, these experts drawn from within Nigeria (predominately) and outside – comprising academic researchers, religious leaders, directors and leaders of NGOs, community members (especially youths) as well as eyewitnesses– where chosen for their likelihood as well as availability to provide the requisite information.

Furthermore, while no strict criteria were used in arriving at the above number of respondents, a considerable level of data saturation and the need for manageability of information was influential in the decision to interview 21 respondents to further corroborate the secondary data.

Interviews were mostly audio-recorded and in some few cases video-recorded depending on the preferences of the interviewee(s) and in keeping with relevant research ethics. Generally, for security purpose and in keeping with the University of Zululand's ethical policy, the respondents have been anonymised with descriptive code in the analysis where they are directly cited (*see details in the reference list*). Minding this ethical consideration, respondents' consent was explicitly sought through the administration of the university's *Informed Consent Forms* to the respondents. The form, which clearly spells out the implication of their voluntary participation and their freedom to withdraw without any consequence was clearly explained to the respondents. The respondent eventually signed the forms to seal their consent, before being engaged in an in-depth interview.

One of the benefits of in-depth interviews for this study is that it allows "the object of study to speak for him/her/itself rather than" being provided "with a battery of our predetermined hypothesis-based questions" (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 289). The choice of expert-based interview, rather than the insurgents, is primarily due to the insecurity associated with directly accessing the insurgents, with consideration to the unique nature of the phenomenon of terrorism and the limits of available resources. Minding these limitations, efforts have thus been made to reach out to individuals and organizations that have rich and/or direct experiences with these insurgencies. This criterion was reached by considering the kind of work the respondents do or their research engagement on peace-building and development within Nigeria, particularly in the North-east and in the Niger Delta region, but also beyond Nigeria.

One of such key Non-governmental organizations which this study engaged very closely and extensively with the aim of reaching to members of communities, for instance, in Bayelsa state, and getting better first-hand view was the Stakeholder Alliance for Cooperate Accountability (SACA 2015b))<sup>5</sup>. Other individuals interviewed include peace-builders and security experts

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<sup>5</sup> According to its 2014 Newsletter, "SACA is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) registered with Corporate Affairs Commission and working to promote international standards and best practice, transparency and accountability, right relations and respect for human rights and environmental justices, among the multinational oil companies operating in the Niger Delta" (SACA 2015b:1). The NGO currently focuses on 4 Major community Clusters around Shell's Integrated Oil and Gas Gathering Project (IOGP).

SACA's location in Bayelsa state, where oil was first discovered, provides some level of convenience for the researcher in relating their work to other Niger Delta Communities faced with similar challenges.

including staff of the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) in South Africa and Ethiopia, as well as development consultants working in the Nigeria. One of these consultants has also consulted for the UNDP, in its project in the Niger Delta. Equally, for Boko Haram, relevant bodies and individual working on peacebuilding process were also interviewed. Among these include, a coordinator of Sharing Education and Learning for Life (SELL), a professor of History (formally an academic staff of the University of Maiduguri and the Nigeria defence academy), as well as youths from Maiduguri – graduate from University of Maiduguri. Also interviewed is one of Nigeria’s foremost public intellectual and religious figures; who was also a member of the Presidential Amnesty Committee for Boko Haram set up in 2013 by the erstwhile President Goodluck Jonathan.

In reaching out to these respondents, the researcher also had the opportunity of visiting some parts of Northern and Southern Nigeria, where these insurgencies had been recorded. These places include Sokoto, Katsina, and Abuja (in northern Nigeria where the researcher had also lived prior to this study) as well as Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta region. Suffice to admit that while the above-mentioned northern states are geographically remote from Borno<sup>6</sup> where Boko Haram’s reign of terror is fully felt, the sect’s members are drawn from various northern states and even beyond the geographical boundaries of Nigeria. What is more, the socio-cultural commonality across the northern region; which the researcher directly observed, in relation to available statistical data, provides useful insights for this study. Importantly, the socio-economic conditions in most Northern states are similar. Hence, it is arguably safe to assume that data drawn from these places provides considerable and useful insight into the socio-economic conditions behind the insurgencies. These are also augmented with other recent empirical studies in the relevant region, including in particular Botha and Abdile (2016a); Courson (2016); (Mercy Corps 2016b); Onuoha (2016) and others; who provide rich primary data and statistical information. This is ultimately geared towards ascertaining the validity and reliability of this study.

### **1.3.3 Data analysis**

The study employs a qualitative content analysis (QICT hereafter) to explore the socio-economic dimension of insecurities in a comparative sense. This research method has been defined as “the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic

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<sup>6</sup> Due to some other consideration, including security and resource constraints, the researcher was unable to visit Borno state, though individuals from the state were interview in Sokoto and Katsina

classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). Unlike its quantitative counterpart, QICT attempts to methodologically control critical textual analysis “within their context of communication” in a systematic manner “without rash quantification” (Mayring 2000: 2).<sup>7</sup> Corroborating this view, Zhang and Wildemuth (2005: 1) stresses that QICT “emphasises an integrated view of speech/text and their specific contexts”, allowing “researchers to understand social reality in a subjective but scientific manner”. Useful to the QICT is thematic approach, which is employed to lend support to the thesis of the study. According to this approach, qualitative data are systematically analysed “by identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking commonalities, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs, or explanatory principles” (Mills *et al.* 2010: 2).

As observable in various literature on research methodology, themes or patterns within data can be identified in one of two primary ways in thematic analysis. The first one is in an inductive or ‘bottom-up’ way Frith and Gleeson (Frith and Gleeson 2004), while the second one is a theoretical or deductive or ‘top-down’ way (Hayes 2000). For the purpose of this study, a deductive approach is applied “to explore themes identified” by the adopted theoretical and conceptual frameworks as well as the relevant literature (Reason & Bradbury, 2008). This is cognizant of the form of data sources available for this study, a critical engagement of theoretical and historical literature pertaining to insurgency and counter-insurgencies are simultaneously presented along with evidence from interviews and video documentaries through a deductive approach. Hence, relevant themes pertaining to the Nigerian political economy, the Boko Haram insurgency, and the Niger Delta insurgency are used to support the thesis of the study especially in terms of socio-economic dimension (causes and effects). For instance, relevant socioeconomic variables such as poverty, inequality, education, unemployment, *inter alia* (as deducible from the theoretical and conceptual framework detailed out in chapter three of this study) are used in a thematic structure to substantiate the argument on the socio-economic dimension of the emergence and persistence of Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency. By so doing the research attempts to test applicability of the

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<sup>7</sup> Compared to its quantitative content analysis, QICT “goes beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be manifest or latent in a particular text” Wildemuth (2005:1).

adopted theoretical frameworks by triangulating various data sources with reference to the aim of this research.

#### **1.3.4 Reliability and Validity**

The use of multiple data sources, that is data triangulation, contributes immensely to the reliability of this study, helping to cross-check for accuracy and validity. For instance, to check participant's biases, other publications and views of respondents were critically engaged, crisscrossed and integrated to provide a more unified and objective view. Similarly, interview with experts in the fields, staff members of relevant organizations working towards peace-building and development in the affected regions, help to cross-check the validity of extant literature on this study, thereby contributing to the reliability and validity of the study's findings. To also ensure the accuracy of data obtained from interviews, concerted effort was made to double-check with respondents that their view was adequately captured. This was done either by re-asking certain questions or paraphrasing their points and asking for their approval or disapproval, to be sure. Similarly, as a Nigerian who has also lived and worked in some part of northern Nigeria, the researcher's considerable familiarity with the, political, socio-cultural and economic dynamics in Nigeria, especially in the North is also an advantage.

#### **1.4 Research Significance**

Given the apparently divergent demands yet terroristic approach of both Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram, it is interesting and policy-relevant to assay the common denominator(s) between the two groups. Indeed, "distinguishing between different types of militancy is important: if their causes are different then the response may not necessarily have to be the same. For instance, poverty-reduction may be an important counter-measure for a group like Boko Haram, but utterly irrelevant to, say, al-Qaida" due to context consideration (GTI, 2015:82). In this regard, it is critical and useful to understand the socio-economic dimension of both insecurities to ascertain the utility of development in addressing the instabilities, while simultaneously minding other relevant factors that evidently tear at the core of Nigeria's unity and development vis-à-vis these insecurities. The import thereof for understanding Nigeria's overall socio-economic development, and its implication for conflict prevention and resolution cannot be underestimated for several reasons.

Firstly, insurgencies in one region of the country often pose serious threat to the stability and development of other sections of the country. Among other reasons, this is because of the oil-centric nature of Nigerian political economy and its implication for the agitation for resource

control, the arguably faulty federalism and the overconcentration of power in the centre. Thus, the study joins others similar studies in re-advocating for a sustainable nationwide framework that can adequately not only addressing these current insurgencies but other similar or likeminded groups or individual that may likely come up in the future.

Secondly, the Nigerian government's response to instability in one region often determines the reaction of other regions, especially in terms of the emergence of similar insurgency groups, given similar prevailing socio-economic conditions. Hence, by providing a rich background description of varied socio-economic and political information; about the Nigerian state, the study emphasises the need for re-establishment of a level playing ground for an effective and sustainable COIN. The assumption is that the absence of such has so far contributed immensely to the socio-economic and political imbalances that often fuel ethnoreligious and political conflict across the nations or thwarts post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building processes.

Thirdly, in view of the growing defence spending of the Nigerian state mainly due to these insurgencies, a preventive approach through adequate and efficacious socio-economic development, in conjunction with other counter-measures, is deemed more sustainable. In this regard, this study critically interrogates the 3D approach to COIN, with the view to adopt possible insights towards addressing Nigeria's insurgencies. Ultimately, this study seeks, within this conceptual framework, some insights deemed relevant to the attainment of sustainable peace and development in Nigeria given its robust analytical utility toward understanding and addressing insurgency. The hopeful contribution of this framework is pivoted on the assumption of the admittedly complex relationship between [in]security and development or de-development as it were. Indeed, development cannot properly take hold in an insecure environment just as insecurity inhibits development as clearly demonstrated in the impact analysis chapter. The significance of such understanding is undoubtedly critical to nation-building and development.

### **1.5 Limitations of the Study**

Given the focus on the socio-economic dimension, the study is unable to adequately capture other critical causal factors behind these insurgencies including but not limited to the ethnoreligious and political aspects. Thus, at the surface, an impression of a reductive explanation might be given. However, this limitation is also part of the strengths of this study given that, with its full focus on socio-economic factors, while not jettisoning the explanatory

efficacy of other factors, the study provides an in-depth explanation and clarification of the highly contested socio-economic thesis of terrorism, especially in a specific context, and the overall nexus between development and security. The study emphasises the importance of context in understanding ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ socio-economic factors are non-negligible in understanding insurgency, at least, in the Nigerian context. Nevertheless, the non-socio-economic dimensions, including religion, culture, politics, environmental and identity issues are not entirely neglected in the study, as brief references are intermittently made to them.

Meanwhile, as an on-going phenomenon, it is hardly possible for this study to exhaustively explain all the socio-economic dynamics of the insurgencies. Furthermore, it is admitted that sourcing first-hand information directly from the insurgents would have added more value to this study in understanding their motivation, if it had been possible. Due to the paucity, if not absence, of such first-hand material, the study’s scope is largely limited to providing an in-depth understanding of views of experts and other first-hand informants in conjunction with notable socio-demographic, economic and political factors that are deemed critical to the emergence and persistence of these insurgencies. Hence, further future studies, which can move beyond this scope to engaging the insurgents directly where possible, are encouraged.

### **1.6 Summary of Study Structure**

The study is divided into nine chapters. *The first chapter* provides an in-depth overarching introduction and relevant historical background to the insurgencies in Nigeria as well as the resonance with the general sources of conflict in Africa. The chapter also outlines and explains the research problems, objectives, questions, methodologies as well as the significance of the study.

The *second chapter* provides a review of literature, situating the study within the broader security-development nexus, through the lenses of terrorism research. Accordingly, the chapter critically engages the contested concept of terrorism and insurgencies vis-à-vis the debate on terrorism and freedom fighters in order to contextualise Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency.

*Chapter three provides* and delineates the principal theoretical and conceptual frameworks on which the core thesis of the study is pivoted, namely, the root cause theory, the rational choice theory and the Dutch 3D conceptual model. This theoretical and conceptual framework will inform the analysis and discussion in the relevant chapters.

*Chapter four* gives a detailed description of the insurgency in the Niger Delta (selected group), with regards, especially, to their origin, demands and modus operandi. This is done to set the appropriate stage for assessing their underlying causes, particularly the socio-economic dimension both in terms of causes and effects.

*Chapter five focuses* on Boko Haram mainly by outlining its origin, objectives, membership, leadership, international links, and their *modus operandi* including its sponsorship/support,

*Chapter six comparatively analyses* the socio-economic drivers of the Niger Delta insurgencies and Boko Haram, which is followed by an impact assessment of both insurgencies on social and economic development in Nigeria in *chapter seven*.

*Finally, chapter 8* puts forwards useful recommendation within the 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) conceptual framework. This attempt at a comprehensive approach to COIN is geared towards highlighting the need for preventing the emergence of other like-minded groups in the future due to the issues of socio-economic underdevelopment that are, among other factors such as politics and religion, deemed pivotal to the insurgencies in Nigeria.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW: SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIA POLITICAL ECONOMY**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

Conceptual clarification is very important to a meaningful academic endeavour of this nature. The complexity of the phenomenon under study, namely terrorism, and the comparative focus of this study makes such clarification almost indispensable. Boko Haram's deadly campaign has been variously, if not interchangeably, narrated under headings such as terrorism, insurgency, extremism, militancy, jihadism, among other conceptual references, which constitute the broader issue of insecurity. Similarly, the crises in the Niger Delta have been discussed under similar headings including piracy. Both crises are engaged under the broader concepts of security and development with reference to Nigeria's political economy to understand the possible relationship between them especially at the causal level.

Thus, through a critical engagement with relevant literature, this chapter aims to (1) provide a working understanding of these relevant concepts that constitute the broader issue of insecurity, especially terrorism, insurgency, and development; (2) explains the convergence of these various forms of insecurity on the issues of socio-economic development; (3) relate the resultant insights and understanding to the discourses on Nigeria's political economy, considering its implication for the underdevelopment trends that tend to reinforce insecurity in the state. This critical engagement with the relevant concepts related to insurgency/terrorism help to lay the foundation for drawing the necessary parallels between the two insurgencies. It also provides the relevant background to the subsequent theoretical framework for a critical engagement with the complex and contested security-development nexus in Nigeria. By so doing, this literature review shall engage various arguments on the socio-economic dimension of insurgency/terrorism with the view to explicate the socio-economic dimension of both insurgent groups.

#### [ENREF 22](#) [ENREF 54](#) [ENREF 35](#) [ENREF 62](#)**2.1 Security: Meaning Matters**

Scholarly engagements of the concept of security has evolved remarkably, especially in the past three decades, with significant conceptual and policy implications for scholars and policymakers alike (Smith 1999; Thomas 2001; Amer *et al.* 2013; Soren 2015). As with many other key terms in the social sciences, security, a largely subjective, complex and multidimensional concept, remains difficult to strictly define. The challenge of defining social phenomena such as security, arguably revolves around three interesting observations made by

Choucri (2002: 98), namely that: “(1)What you see depends on how you look at it (2) Who counts defines who is counted (3) What is counted depends on who counts, how and why? In other words, who benefits?” No matter how one would want to wish away the relativist perspective, various complex factors matter in understanding the meaning of terms, including security, which are crucial in dealing with the social world.

Originally, based on the realist paradigm, the concept of security was parochially military-centric, denoting mainly military defence of state territory and interest (Baldwin 1997); hence, was consigned to the domain of *Strategic Studies* or *Security Studies* (David, 2013). However, as Smith (1999: 79) observes, the preoccupation of security studies with “military statecraft limits its ability to address the many foreign and domestic problems that are not amenable to military security”. In this view subsists the idea of the growing *insecurity of security*, that is “a situation wherein the continued prioritisation of military concerns at the state level in traditional discourses and practices of security has served to further individual insecurity and failed to respond adequately to the most pressing threats to individuals throughout the world” (McDonald 2002: 277).

Indeed, security, as a concept, has increasingly assumed a more encompassing connotation (Buzan 1991; Gabriëlse 2007). Issues that can be rightly deemed as security problems yet, falling outside the military domain, have aptly crept into the security discourse globally especially post-Cold War era. Beyond its initial centeredness on the state’s military might, security has been deepened and widened to include, economic, political, social and environmental considerations (Buzan 1991). In fact, security “involves thinking about militarism and patriarchy, mal-development and environmental degradation. It involves thinking about the relationship between poverty, debt and population growth. It involves thinking about resources and how they are distributed” (Jill 1998: 129). In this regard, Choucri summarised the widening scope of security under three broad domains namely, (1) military capacity and defence, dubbed Military Security [MS]; (2) modes of governance and regime performance, dubbed as Regime Security [RS]; and (3) Structural conditions and environmental viability, dubbed as Structural Security [SS]. As far as Choucri (2002: 100) is concerned, “A state is secure to the extent that all three dimensions or conditions for security are in place; and it is insecure to the extent that one or more conditions (or dimensions) of security are threatened or eroded”.

Based on the foregoing discourse, the notion of national security is increasingly being subsumed under the idea of human security (HS), with emphasis on the security of individual rather than merely that of the state (Thomas 2001; McDonald 2002; Menkhaus 2004). As Shamieh (2016: 1856) observed, central to human security is the valuation of individual's interest in terms of the "vulnerabilities faced and capacities gained"; thereby, addressing the policy question of security "for whom", "by whom" and "how should it be realised". Unsurprisingly, in his address to the UNSC meeting on AIDS/HIV in Africa, on January 10, 2000, the erstwhile World Bank President, James Wolfensohn submits for instance that, "When we think about security, we need to think beyond battalions and borders. Rather, we need to think about human security, about winning a different war, the fight against poverty" (cited in Thomas 2001: 161). The idea of human security underscores a strong sense of universality and comprehensiveness of security. Thus, consistent with the UNDP's seven sub-categories of human security according to its 1994 Report, Shamiel highlights these categories with their main corresponding threats thus:

1. Economic security: main threat poverty;
2. Food security: main threat hunger;
3. Health security: main threat diseases and injuries;
4. Environmental security: main threats pollution and environment[al] degradation;
5. Personal security: main threat all forms of violence;
6. Community security: main threat discrimination, and
7. Political security: main threat political repression (Shamieh 2016: 1856).
- 8.

Human security is understood as both "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" which are two inseparable sides of the coin. It accents "security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights" (Axworthy 1997: 184). The lack of such freedoms has been directly and/or indirectly linked to insecurities such as insurgency and terrorism (Ejibunu 2007; Petřík 2010; Bandyopadhyay and Younas 2011; Ogonnaya and Ehigiamusoe 2013; Abdullahi *et al.* 2014; START 2015).

Meanwhile, in construing these concepts as forms of insecurity, it is worth bearing Chroucri's three truisms in mind; namely, that [1] "One's security may be another's insecurity; (2) Strategies designed to create security may enhance insecurity; (3) Security may be "objective" but in the last analysis it is in the eye of the beholder, i.e., "subjective." These considerations are critical especially, their implications for the noticeable politicization or legitimization of terrorism (both as an idea and a practice) making it a difficult phenomenon to understand and deal decisively with. The difficulty begins from the very lack of consensus in defining the term

‘terrorism’ as widely acknowledge by scholars and policymakers alike (Ganor 2002; Garrison 2004; Schmid 2004b; Lizardo 2008; Okumu 2009b).

### **2.1.2 Defining terrorism: A Quest for the Holy Grail?**

Terrorism is widely acknowledged as a topical issue globally, especially post-9/11. However, despite having attracted vast scholarly attention, its scholars as well as policy-makers have yet to acquiesce on a universal definition (Schmid 2004b; Lizardo 2008; David *et al.* 2015; Schmid 2016). Hence, a mosaic of divergent, if not contradictory, meanings have been ascribed to the term (O’Neill 2002a; Schmid and Jongman 2005). The undesirable repercussions of this definitional conundrum for terrorism studies was perceptively captured by Ross’s (1993: 326) conclusion that academic study of terrorism is “descriptively rich but analytically barren”.

The seeming impossibility of defining terrorism must have also influenced Levitt (1986: 97) to compare the search for a universal definition to the search for the ‘Holy Grail’.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the challenge with defining terrorism is precisely about surmounting the tenuousness of language itself. Ferdinand De Saussure, the renowned postmodernist linguist, aptly noted that just as meanings are arbitrarily bestowed on persons and things, the concept, “terrorist” is only a perception imposed on someone. It does not necessarily describe any intrinsic truth about the person (cited in Desbruslais 2009: 19). This definitional conundrum is arguably linked to the endearing difficulty with ‘profiling’ as a tool for countering terrorism, since there is hardly any peculiar way to reliably identify a terrorist.

Consequently, this lack of definitional consensus is not immaterial to the attainment of the much-needed effective policy, control, as well as adaptability measures towards the problem of terrorism (David 2013). For instance, it problematises how one can, and should, differentiate terrorism from other forms of conflict (Merari 1993: 214; Schmid 2016). Besides being a global challenge that requires international cooperation, a lack of common definition is a major impasse to the requisite co-operations for managing, if not ending, terrorism as policy-makers and political leaders often disagree on “acts of terrorism”. For instance, without a universal acceptability of “some of the basic assumption and semantics necessary for the definition of terrorism”, it remains logically impossible for the US to prove that the 1985 “Libyan-sponsored

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<sup>8</sup> This definitional conundrum perspicaciously dubbed the “Bermuda Triangle of terrorism” by Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation – one of the first researchers in the field of terrorism – is corroborated by Philip Schlesinger who argues that “no common agreed definition can, in principle, be reached, because the very process of definition is itself part of a wider test over ideologies or political objectives” (cited in David, 2013 :24). The controversy is both conceptual and semantical partly owing to the fact that what is usually referred to as terrorism has surfaced in “so many different forms and under different circumstance” (ibid)

attack on the Rome and Vienna airports constitute terrorism rather than what Gadhafi saw as armed struggle or fighting for freedom” (Merari 1993: 213).

This is the crux of the cliché: one “person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” (Primoratz 2004: ix); hence, making it extremely difficult to label certain acts as terrorism as opposed to other similar acts.<sup>9</sup> In this, intricacies arguably lie with the legitimatization of seemingly ‘terrorist acts’ by any group of people or individuals. Hence, scholars have repeatedly stressed the need for some consensus on the definition of terrorism (Levitt 1986; Ganor 2002; Schmid 2004b). Let us briefly review some official definitions and highlight some of their key features.

The U.S. State Department, construes terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Richardson 2011: 17). Though succinct, this definition excludes or denies the possibility of state terrorism. However, according to the British legal definition, terrorism is “the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear” (cited in Merari 1993: 215).

For its part, the Nigerian government, which is directly focused on herein, defines a terrorist as:

Anyone who [is] involved or who causes an attack upon a person’s life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to a government or public facility, transport system, an infrastructural facility including an information system, a fixed platform located on the intercontinental shelf, public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss (cited in Njoku 2011).

One challenge with official definitions is that they often fail to “distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict, such as guerrilla or even conventional warfare” (Merari 1993: 215). Discernibly, terrorism is hardly distinguished from any other form of violent crime based on the Nigerian government’s definition, which also categorises both the activities of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents as terrorism. Notably, attacks on civilians are usually a part of most official definitions of terrorism. This is in spite of the findings that some “modern warfare now has 10 times as many civilian casualties as combatants” (O’Neill 2002b: 22).

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<sup>9</sup>Menachem Begin, the leader of Irgun (Lehi' Zionist rival), in postwar Palestine was the first to refer to his followers as "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists against the backdrop of the naming game that characterises the notion of terrorism. Meanwhile, the concept freedom fighter became trendy thereby complicating the understanding of terrorism especially during the epoch referred to by Rapoport's "second-wave".

Besides, concepts such as “non-combatant”, “civilian”, and “politically motivated”, which are often used in official definitions, are not necessarily univocal in the definition of terrorism (Burgoon 2006: 178). These, among other factors, underscore the ambiguity with official definitions. For instance, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which ended World War II is hardly considered by the US as terrorism; yet, it fits the above definitions of terrorism, albeit on a huge scale (Merari 1993)<sup>10</sup>.

Observably, the definition of terrorism has become largely dependent on what aspect of the act the definer is focusing: the *objectives* or the *means* (David 2013). The merits of the *means* perspective, as Schmid (2004a) has observed is that it offers a narrow(er) and precise definition of terrorism, given especially its emphasis of the notion of *illegitimate use of force*, in which case it is about non-state actors since the state should have a monopoly of the use of force.

Yet, this perspective’s strength is also its weakness, as it leaves one with the question: can a state be engaged in terrorism? According to Wight (cited in Jackson and Sinclair 2012: 57) the answer is a negative because “what most people mean when they refer to terror are forms of non-state violence, and those that confuse the issues of ‘state terror’ with terrorism needs to defend their accounts by providing a more theoretically nuanced version of both the state and terrorism”. Wight (2009: 101) surmised that, in the Weberian sense, if the notion of illegitimate force forms part of the definition of terrorism, “then the concept of ‘state terrorism’ is a contradiction of term”, because only the state has the monopoly of force.

Intellectually satisfying as Wight’s view may seem, other scholars have differed in critical terms (Teichman 1989; Primoratz 1990; Baur 2004; Schmid 2004a; Arowolo 2013; Schmid 2016). Baur (2004) introduced the concept of “pro-establishment terrorists” to counter such reductive views of terrorism; states can be, and have been, guilty of terrorism. He named Hitler, Idi Amin, Stalin, Saddam Husain and sons, and Mussolini, among others, in association with “pro-establishment terrorism”. Similarly, according to Jalata (2013: 3) “Both state and non-state actors use terrorism; the former has used it to maintain state power or to loot resources and the latter mostly to resist the oppressive and exploitative policies of states”.

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<sup>10</sup> Beside the very destruction of civilian by the actual bombing, Merari (2008:216) observes the fear-inducing impact of the content of a leaflet which was dropped over Japanese cities by American bombers in August 1945 thus: “These leaflets are being dropped to notify you that your city has been listed for destruction by our powerful air force. The bombing will begin in 72 hours.....We want you to see how powerless the military is to protect you. Systematic destruction of city after city will continue as long as you blindly follow your military leaders”

The foregoing highlights the twist in the semblances between terrorism and war crimes. For instance, even though the idea of ‘war crimes’ has enjoyed more definitional consensus in international humanitarian law relative to terrorism, it also involves deliberate attacks on non-combatants, according to Schmid (2016). As if to clear the above ambiguity, Schmid (2004a: 204) underscores the notion of *motivation*, by differentiating between collateral but unintentional damage to civilians and intentional attacks on civilians in relation to war and most contemporary terrorism respectively. He infers that “terrorism is a counter-value, rather than a counter-force, tactic since civilians not involved in combat are the prime target” (Schmid 2004a: 204). Still, the definition problem with terrorism remains. From an academic point of view, it is observed that “more than 100 diplomatic and academic definitions of terrorism” exists, underscoring the lack of consensus on the term (Krueger and Maleckova 2002: 119).

Hence, semantically, the “contested concept” of terrorism, has become “somewhat ‘Humpty Dumpty’”, that is, “anything we choose it to be” (Farrell 1982: 6; Moten 2010: 36).

Yet, it is useful to ask if this difficulty is merely about semantics? O’Neill (2002a: 5) believes the definition impasse is arguably as political as it is semantically problematic, especially given its connectedness to the “root causes” debate on terrorism. It is about “taking a position on whether there are limits on the use of violence, relations between the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ ethics in international relations, how a population can legitimately resist living under occupation, and increasingly [the notion of] sovereignty” O’Neill (2002a: 5). He argues that while some states believe that defining terrorism is necessary toward addressing the cause, others fault such approaches as susceptible to legitimizing or justifying terrorism. Nonetheless, scholars such as Ganor (2002) believe a standard definition of terrorism can be possible based on international law. While acknowledging the contentious debate, we shall, for the sake of utility adopt and justify a working definition for this study.

### **2.1.2.1 A Working Definition**

Terrorism herein “*refers to a political communication strategy for psychological mass manipulation whereby unarmed civilians (and non-combatants such as prisoners) are deliberately victimized in order to impress third parties (e.g. intimidate, coerce or otherwise influence a government or a section of society or international public opinion), with the help of portrayals of demonstrative violence in front of audiences and/or for coverage in mass or social media*” (Schmid 2016: 14). It is important to note how this definition reduces the

common confusion of insurgency with terrorism. The latter, as defined herein is aptly seen as one of the tactics of the former, which is better construed as a *movement*, without denying that some organisations can be both (Asal *et al.* 2016). As such, insurgency may or may not use terrorism to reach its goal. In this distinction also lies the similarity between terrorism and insurgency, which often warrant their interchangeable use, namely: the predominance of non-state actors, its differences from non-conventional warfare, as well as the sameness of their goals (Folorunso 2013).

Given the focus of this study on Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents, as non-state actors, the above definition is useful, since it workably views both groups as insurgent groups using terrorism in varying degrees. It is also plausible that the definition does not necessarily exonerate state(s) of committing terrorism, construed as a communication strategy and a means of political control. In view of the above fluidity of both terms, this study employs both terms *interchangeably* for richer analysis. It is, however, admitted that though insurgency subsumes terrorism, it is not necessarily defined by, or limited to, terrorism. “Indeed there is nothing inherent in insurgency or guerrilla warfare that requires the use of terror” (Folorunso 2013: 88).

It is within such understanding that one makes sense of the view expressed by a respondent who noted that the *demands* of both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents must be factored into the decision to call them terrorists or not (Lecturer/NDA). In his view, both groups are “people who are struggling to free themselves from certain oppression...one from the state, in the case of Boko Haram, they want to survive independently of the state... to create a state within a state,” whereas for the Niger Delta agitation, it is more of a call for self-determination. However debatable this position might be, it is of notable relevance to how we deal with the socio-economic aspect of these insurgencies especially in comparative sense. How the socio-economic dimension is understood will ultimately determine the policy response. For instance, as posited by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2015: 82), “Poverty-reduction may be an important counter-measure for a group like Boko Haram, but utterly irrelevant to, say, al-Qa’ida”.

### **2.1.2.2 Insurgency and terrorism: are they distinguishable?**

Some differences could be noted between insurgency and terrorism despite their striking similarities, which are of relevance to both insurgencies. As Kiras (2010: 188) aptly observed, these differences are best analysed in negative terms. For example, despite shared features, insurgency is “not conventional war or terrorism” (2010: 188). Unlike the insurgents, actors of

conventional war are bound to follow standardised international rules of engagement in war given that the latter are trained, and they deploy more or less symmetric equipment (Kiras 2010: 188). Similarly, insurgency is usually confined within a national boundary compared to terrorism, which may transcend national boundary; hence, the concepts of inter/trans-national terrorism.

Accordingly, some respondents also concurred, that the concept of terrorism fits better with the Boko Haram crises than the Niger Delta situation (Peace-builder3; Peace-builder5). Furthermore, relative to terrorism, insurgency easily gets wide local supports; hence could be considered as a miniscule and localised form of terrorism (Kiras 2010). This view also provides the basis for which the Niger Delta case was being considered less as a terrorist group by some of the respondents. Although a terrorist organization may also mobilise physical and moral support among the population, they often do so through intimidation, especially of civilian population, as is more often the case with Boko Haram (Pate 2015). Given its extremism, terrorism may attract less support from the populace. Furthermore, the positive perception and clear pronouncement of goal(s) often make insurgency likely to achieve its political goal, including the overthrow of government (Kiras 2010)..

Nevertheless, the line between insurgency and terrorism is, at best, thin, because both are a form of 'dirty war', at worst. Most probably due to their 'hit-and-run tactics, both insurgency and terrorism do not draw lines between combatant and non-combatants in their targets. This is in stark contrast to definitions as per conventional warfare. Indeed, in pursuant of their goal(s), an insurgent group can adopt terrorist's tactics. The adoption of a rather more violent confrontational approach against the apartheid regime in South Africa during the 1960s, by the ANC is illustrative (Klotz 1999; Gurney 2000). Besides, consistent with conventional perception, both are often attributed to non/sub-state actors. Hence, although willful participation in insurgency is quite often dictated by "circumstances rather than by choice", compared to participation in terrorism, "whenever possible, insurgents concurrently use a variety of strategies of struggle. Terrorism, which is the easiest form or strategy of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes" (Merari 1993: 213). Hence, terrorism is classified under the broad theme of insurgency, especially since the latter occurs in various shades including "revolution, *coup d'etat*, guerrilla, terrorism and riots" (Merari 1993).

It is against this backdrop that the interchangeable use of terrorism and insurgency is permissible within this study for the sake of utility yet with due mindfulness of the above

intricacies (Kiras 2010: 187). The aforementioned intricacies arguably highlight some difficulty in neatly differentiating Boko Haram activity from the Niger Delta insurgency. Considering that “the ultimate goal of insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory or, to force political concessions in sharing of power” (Folorunso 2013: 89), there is a plausible sense in which Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram are better understood as insurgent groups using terrorist tactics (Researcher1).

Although both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents initially, and at various stages, directed their attacks at the state especially the state’s security outfits, they (most especially Boko Haram) eventually began to target civilians. This is in view of their said objectives, however unclear (to be discussed in detail subsequently). Meanwhile, quite atypical of terrorist organizations, Boko Haram at some points in July 2014 included in its repertoire of strategies the capturing of territorial spaces in north-eastern Nigeria (Weeraratne 2015). At this point, Boko Haram arguably exhibited a characteristic of guerrilla fighters by reducing the secrecy often associated with terrorist activities or organisations. On the part of the Niger Delta insurgents, territorial capture has not been strictly reported, apart from the intermittent call for the independent Niger Delta Republic since the earliest day of revolution in the 1960s (Imhonopi and Urim 2016). Basically, thus, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and criminal activities are amongst the overlapping *tactics* of insurgency (Folorunso 2013: emphasis added). Meanwhile, it is pertinent to understand how terrorism differs from guerrilla warfare despite the marked unconventionality of both tactics relative to conventional war strategies *per se*.

### **2.1.2.3 Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare**

Although terrorism and guerrilla warfare may appear identical in some respects, including especially their goal, both are distinguishable. For instance, by “the means used – or more precisely, by the targets of their operations” (Ganor 2002: 288) the two may be distinguished. As Ganor avers, the deliberate use, or threat to use violence, may be common between guerrilla warfare and terrorism and their goals may equally be political, ideological and religious. However, their targets, namely security personnel and civilians respectively differentiate them. In view of that, he argues that “an attack aimed against government personnel should therefore be defined as terrorism if the target was not in a decision-making position of the state’s Counter-Terrorism policy” (Ganor 2002: 288). In this sense, there is a noticeable difference, however slight, between Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram. Relative to the latter, the former has been more indiscriminate in their targets especially in its use of suicide bomb and

demonstrated focus on, and use of, soft targets in various apolitical arenas such as places of worship and schools.

#### **2.1.2.4 Terrorism-Crime Continuum**

Even as a tactic, terrorism can take political and/or criminal form. The blurred distinction between politically and criminally motivated violence has been acknowledged in literature, including those regarding Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram (Schmid 2004a; Schmid 2005; Yahaya 2015; Glazzard *et al.* 2018). In corroboration, Coady (2004a: 41) stresses the broad and fuzzy border between merely criminal and fully political. He notes that criminal activities can become involved with the political, even in the matter of violence, as was the case with the criminal drug lords in Colombia some years ago. Also groups whose rationale is basically political may indulge in ordinary criminal activities, such as bank robbery, in order to finance their operations” (Coady 2004a: 41). These criminal dimensions commonly find expression in the form of indiscriminate bombings, armed assaults on civilians, and focused assassinations, kidnappings, hostage-taking and hijacking as have been recorded of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents in various degree respectively.

#### **2.1.2.5 Terrorism as a Political Tool**

Beyond the criminal perspective, the clear political motivation for the use of terrorism is also widely acknowledged (Weinberg *et al.* 2004; Schmid and Jongman 2005; Spencer 2006; Oviasogie 2013). For instance, the report of the Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism stated that “terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purposes” (Schmid 2004a: 214). Hence an understanding of terrorism within the broader context of political conflict, according to Schmid (2004a), is necessary, considering the reality of globalization, state interdependence and the growing internationalization of terrorist networks. The convergence of the political and criminal aspects of terrorism elicits the notion of “political crime”.<sup>11</sup> The resonance thereof with the case of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies is hardly far-fetched. While the criminal elements are conspicuous in their campaign, both group’s aspiration for self-determination, even if not shared by all the members of the population, presages the political element that drives the resort to, and support for, insurgency in the respective regions. In the

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<sup>11</sup> This occurs when an act is considered ‘criminal’ but its motive or intent is deemed ‘political’

case of Boko Haram, its political aspiration may be the demand to Islamise Nigeria.<sup>12</sup> Beyond this, Boko Haram is believed to be heavily supported by some political elites in Nigeria, for various self-interested political reasons, including: to make the previous administration (of President Goodluck Jonathan) ‘ungovernable’, to distort the image of Islam, to entrench Sharia and the overall Islamization of the country (Mazrui 2002; Mohammed 2009; Suberu 2009; Ita-Imoh and Gbenegbara 2014). However, the persistence of the sect under the current Buhari’s administrations leaves some of these explanations less satisfactory.

On the part of the Niger Delta, the clamour for self-determination, particularly on both political and economic fronts is widely adjudged by scholars as an integral political dimension to the insurgency (Obi 2006; Clark 2009; Agbibo 2011). This is largely born out of years of political and economic marginalization in the region due to the weak institutional structure of the Nigeria’s lopsided federalism, which has mostly tilted power towards the dominant ethnic groups to the detriment of ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta (Ikporukpo 1996; Okoko and Nna 1997; Uzodike *et al.* 2010; Uzunmwangho and Ekpu 2011; Gideon 2012). The enduring implication thereof are demonstrated in the evident far-from adequate basic social amenities and the near absence of government in many communities in the region (Obi 2009). This is compounded by the environmental degradation characterised oil exploration in the region. Yet petroleum resources from the region has served as the economic backbone of Nigeria over the years as its revenue proceeds have been used in developing other parts of Nigeria, including Abuja and Lagos (Director2; Obi 2009). This is partly reinforced by the considerable fragility of the Nigerian state as corroborated by its poor ranking in the annual fragile state index (see Table)

The World Development Reports of 2011 (cited in Porter *et al.* 2013: 310) stated that “fragility and conflict are fuelled by the absence of effective and legitimate institutions for which the provision of basic security, justice, and economic opportunities for citizens”. Arguably, it is the absence of such legitimate institutions which tends to give the insurgents reasonable grounds to perceive themselves as freedom fighters rather than the terrorist or criminals that they are often dubbed by the government in the latter’s attempts to solicit international support/sympathy. This is consistent with the view of a respondent from the Niger Delta region for whom, the so-called Niger Delta terrorists are only freedom fighters (Peace-builder4). For

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<sup>12</sup> Part of their demand at some point include the ultimatum to the erstwhile president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, to convert to Islam and the southerners to vacate the north within the given period of 3 days in year 2012

him, regardless of their criminal attribute, the groups would not have come into existence or sustained their agitation if the region's grievance and governance deficit were promptly addressed. Rather, the insurgents found a legitimate cause and capitalised on it for their own particular benefits. In some cases, they use illegal or criminal means to achieve their goals.

#### **2.1.2.6 A Person's Terrorist, Another's Freedom Fighter?**

Despite the view from the Niger Delta above, there are opposing standpoints concerning the morality of terrorism/insurgency supporting or disputing the cliché: 'one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter' (Ganor 2002; Primoratz 2004).<sup>13</sup> On the one hand scholars seem to consent that terrorism is *prima facie* morally repugnant, regardless of the motives, agent(s), the victim(s) as well as the 'how' of its execution (Coady 1985; Primoratz 1990; Coady 2004b; Jollimore 2007). This standpoint is pivoted on the just war theory<sup>14</sup> under the *Jus in Bello*, which underscores the principle of discrimination between military and civilian targets and refraining from harming innocent civilians (Coady 2004a; Primoratz 2004; David 2013). Certain nominal differentiation, however disputable, has been postulated between acts deemed as terrorism and liberation struggle. For instance, in their April 1998 meeting, foreign and interior ministers of the Arab League had officially maintained that "belligerent activities aimed at "liberation and self-determination" are not in the category of terrorism, whereas hostile activities against regimes or families of rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assaults (Haaretz, cited in Ganor 2002: 292). Corroborating this, Schmid (2004b: 379) reasons that while the above cliché "undoubtedly reflects a political praxis, its moral relativism is highly unsatisfactory from an ethical and intellectual point of view".

According to Ganor (2002: 293), "many in the Western world have accepted the mistaken assumption that terrorism and national liberation are two extremes in the scale of legitimate use of violence" based on the assumption that freedom fighters are incapable of perpetrating terrorist act. For instance, Benzoin Netanyahu is quoted as saying that "far from being a bearer

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<sup>13</sup> The Israeli-Palestinian long-standing conflict represent a persuasive example of the subjectivity hovering around the debates on terrorism, in terms of its moral and conceptual implications. While to outsiders both parties are committing acts of terrorism, the involved parties not only denied such allegation but also ironically blame the others for perpetuating terroristic acts against them by simply justifying their own use of violence as not terroristic (Primoratz 2004 :ix). Interestingly, this same conflict has quite some resonance with some Christian-Muslim conflict in various parts of the globe including Nigeria, where Boko Haram has made allusion to America's support of Israeli in marginalizing the Palestinian community (or the Muslim world) as one of their grievances against the West.

39 <sup>14</sup>The Just War tradition has two phases: the *just ad bellum* and *Jus in Bello*. The former designates the conditions under which resorting to war is justifiable while the latter focuses on the methods by which such war should be conducted. Beside the just war theory, other perspectives on the justification or condemnation of terrorism can be gleaned from the utilitarian tradition and the so-called realist tradition (Coady, 2004a: 42)

of freedom, the terrorist is the carrier of oppression and enslavement” (Ganor 2002: 293). Similarly, citing Yasser Arafat, Primoratz (2004: 5) argues that “no degree of oppression and no level of desperation can ever justify the killing of innocent civilians”. Elsewhere, I have argued that while there may be compelling ‘justification’ for resort to violence and terrorism in addressing real or perceived grievance(s), it is indeed not the only, and best, approach (David 2013). Hence, Ganor’s observations which is consistent with the Just war theory is worth highlighting here:

By characterizing terrorism as a mode of operation directed against civilian targets, as opposed to basing the definition on the goals of the violence, we refute the slogan that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ This distinction between the target of the attack and its aims shows that the discrepancy between ‘terrorism’ and ‘freedom fighting’ is not a subjective difference reflecting the personal viewpoint of the definer (Ganor 2002: 298).

As far as the above position is concerned, “Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do... Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter schoolchildren; terrorist murderers do” (cited in Ganor 2002: 293). Thus, Primoratz (2004: xix) contends “in general, but especially in the present worldwide terrorism alert, the moral prohibition of terrorism ought to be understood and endorsed as absolute.”

It is pertinent however to ask: are the concepts of ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ mutually exclusive? The response to this question largely depends on who is responding. Merari’s incisive observation that “trying to present the terms ‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’ as mutually exclusive in general is a logical fallacy ... the first characterizes a method of struggle and the second - a cause”, is noteworthy in this regard (1993: 225). He justifies his views by noting the wide gamut of the terrorist’s aspirations, from religious, environmental, human rights, ethnic grievance to fight for self-determination (Merari 1993). Indeed, quite aside from its variegated manifestations, the very term terrorism has undergone appreciable semantic evolution from its original *regime de la terreur* (reign of terror) during the French Revolution when it was first used (Schmid 2004b: 399; David 2013). Its use has shifted from the “*regime de la terreur*” (government by intimidations), to anarchist and socio-revolutionary bombers in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, to the Red terror, to anti-colonial struggle, then to the Palestinian struggles in the 1960, and finally to the religious fundamentalism since the 1990s to date (Schmid 2004b).

People who have been tagged as ‘terrorist’ at various times in history hardly refer to themselves as terrorists since they perceive themselves as fighting for “common good” or the liberation of

their people. The tagging of Yasser Arafat and Nelson Mandela, in their liberation struggles for the respective states, are cases in point. As Adegbulu (2013: 262) recollected, “in 1987 and 1988, the UK and US governments branded the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, a ‘terrorist group, a typical example of a shallow attribution even at the time, let alone in light of Nelson Mandela’s later emergence as Statesman”. Herein lays the convergence of terrorism and freedom fighters based especially on the diverse perceptions of terrorism. In fact, a respondent opines that the similarity between both insurgencies is that “both of them are fighting for some form of freedom” (Lecturer/NDA). Indeed, the shared feeling of discontent among local population often gives terrorist grounds for justification of its terrorism (David 2013). Considered as a sole weapon available to the political powerless, terrorism employed by insurgent groups may be justified by the insurgent as a necessary and perhaps most effective means of expressing, if not addressing, their grievances (David 2013).<sup>15</sup> Such perception may not solely be among the terrorists but also even among the populace, which inadvertently, gives some level of justification, if not legitimacy to insurgency or terrorism. Though the UNSC “reiterates that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed” (UNSC 2016: 3), understanding the terrorists’ perception of the enemy is at least essential to grappling with the justification they offer for their acts (David 2013).

Nonetheless, it could be argued, based on the working definition above, whereby terrorism is a strategy, that even freedom fighters could be said to employ terrorist strategies. Thus, both are not necessarily mutually exclusive. To be sure, the concept ‘innocent’ under the *just war* theory may not inevitably mean the same for the terrorist especially given its very subjectivity (Ganor 2002: 293). In fact, the terrorist sometimes believes that the so-called innocent/civilian/non-combatant sustain the ‘unjust’ system against which they fight. For instance, regarding attacks on Israelis, Osama Bin Laden stated that: “we do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned [Americans] are all targets” (cited in Schmid 2004b: 384). He reasoned that:

The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government, they elect their president, their government manufactures arms and gives them to Israel and Israel uses them to massacre Palestinians. The American Congress endorses all government measures and this proves that the entire America is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims (cited in Kinyon 2004: 3).

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<sup>15</sup> Considered from the perspective of an attempt to address grievance and inequality Schmid noted that the weapon of terrorism is indeed a very powerful weapon for the powerless.

From another vantage point, Schmid (2004a: 205) aptly observed that the “moral difference between the conduct of soldiers and terrorists has grown smaller” given that “some wars have become more terroristic – targeting predominantly civilians than military opponents”. Thus, “many acts of violence which we consider ‘immoral’ as a means to achieving an end, are, in the view of the religious or ideologically motivated terrorist, justified by the absolute end for which the terrorist purports to fight” (Schmid 2004a: 211). The link, thus, between this justification and causal or driving factors including socio-economic ones have non-negligible policy implications for sustainable COIN and peace-building in Nigeria and elsewhere.

It however acknowledges also that while the above assertions provide notable intellectual satisfaction, its import for COIN is rather more complex and odious. Going by the *just war* theory, it is easy to condemn terrorism as evil with no regard to the perspective of the ‘terrorists’. Unfortunately, the so-called terrorist including the case of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgent groups do not share the above view. Hence, Ozsoy (2007: 56) maintains that the “initial steps of fighting terrorism is arguably to comprehend the terrorist point of view towards the world, humanity, and their justification of their violent methods”. As he sees it, the lack of such comprehension often leads the state to rely on military sanctioning as a solution, neglecting the trend that military sanctions are often “retaliated against with more severe violence and triggers a vicious cycle” (Ozsoy 2007: 56). The pattern of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies resonate strongly with this view.

It is within this understanding that a critical engagement with the intricate relationship between development and (in)security is germane with reference to the insurgencies under consideration. Thus, it is indeed relevant to briefly give a working understanding of the concept of development to establish the yardstick for unravelling the possible nexus between Development and security in the context of Nigeria, the same context within which both the Niger Delta insurgency and Boko Haram insurgents operate.

## **2.2 The Development of “Development”**

Like security, the concept of development has evolved and continues to evolve. For instance, albeit construed as an “intentional social change in accordance with societal objectives” in modern sense (Hettne 1992: 6), the concept of development has stood for a medley of meanings from various perspectives (ranging from the Classical political economy in the 1800s to the then Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from 2000-2015. Pieterse (2010) summarily

presented these various meanings from the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the 21<sup>st</sup> century including, among others, remedy for progress, catching up, industrialization, modernization, economic growth, human flourishing, deregulation, and structural reforms. Post 2015, emphasises have shifted to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>16</sup>, all of which highlight the view that rather than being a static phenomenon, the concept of development itself is developing in keeping with social, environmental, as well as political realities, with arguably significant implication for the contested security-development nexus (WCED 1987).

Contrary to the classical and modern thinking of development, which was largely structuralist - emphasizing large-scale patterning of social realities by structural changes in the economy, the state and the social system - development is increasingly assuming a human face in recent decades especially towards the late 20th century. In this respect, development is progressively considered only meaningful to the degree that it prioritises the individuals or society, at least conceptually (Sen 1999; Uzodike 1999; Ocampo 2004; Stewart 2004). Hence, a growing shift toward a multidimensional understanding of development from the previous mono-cultural perspective of modernization and westernization is visible in the prevailing literature (Soren 2015). For the study, we adopt Sen's definition of development: "a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. (...) Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states" (Sen 1999: 3). This multidimensional approach, within which the concept of human development has become very dominant in the conceptualisation of development, provides a fitting foundation for understanding the security-development nexus that is relevant to this study.

### **2.2.1 Human and Social Development**


The construction of the Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations Development derives from the growing human-centred understanding of development, as proposed by Sen (1999). It expands the concept of development beyond the circumscribed orthodox meaning which relied arguably too much on economic growth indices, GDP, industrialization, personal income and modernization. Sen rather emphasised the qualitative and intangible aspects of development including, but not restricted to, human freedom, choice and capabilities. Three

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<sup>16</sup> The idea of "Sustainable development" is understood here as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" according to the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987:8).

key goals of development can be discernible in this approach, namely: [1] making people the ends rather than means of development; [ii] prioritization of people’s capability over what they can produce; and [iii] centralizing the aim of development policies on people's “quality of life”, including their health, security, and overall flourishing. Along this line, the individual or group dimension of development relates to issues such as “growth towards self-reliance and ‘responsibleness’ towards one’s welfare and destiny”, according to Remenyi (2004: cited in David and Asuelime, 2015). Hence, “while earlier measurable aspects, such as GDP, Purchasing Power Parity, Gross National Income GNI *inter alia* are retained in the connotation of development, the qualitative dimensions are equally” and increasingly being underscored (David and Asuelime 2015).

The attempts of UN-HDI to measure human development is largely being limited to income, health and education. This circumscribed notion has arguably engendered the prevailing misconception of human development as human capital. It is against this backdrop that the idea of social development (SD), the institutional aspect of development, has gained traction in recent years as the latest frontline in the widening conceptualization of development. (see figure 2.1). It serves to underscore that while the use of concentric circle in figure 2.1 below does not necessarily mean any prioritization of one sphere over the other, it does suggest the trajectory of development from the initial money metric lenses of GDP, GNI, and PPP through the HD to the idea of SD. The indices of SD, which are critical to the quality of life – the focus of HD – include the enabling institutional atmosphere that empower the individual to translate their “economic and human assets into personal welfare...” For example, an individual living in a society characterised by extreme physical insecurity and conflict may find it impossible to start a business or attend college, regardless of their personal initiative, skill (Foa 2007).



**Figure 2. 1: Spheres of Development**

Source: Author’s creations, adapted from Foa (n.d. : 4)

Hence, specific features of SD include: “norms of non-discrimination based on caste, ethnicity or gender; absence of the frictions between social and ethnic groups that generate conflict, criminal violence, and insecurity; collective norms of trust and cooperation that ensure efficient provision of public goods; and the informal civic institutions that ensure accountability in local government” (Foa 2007). These represent the softer aspects of development, which are hardly captured by GDP. Hence, social development is critical to human development as it provides the enabling environment for human flourishing to take place. Even though it also suffers the problem of measurement, SD adds significant meaning to the understanding of human development. Essentially, the idea of SD highlights the “invisible dimensions of development at the meso and macro level: levels of social cohesion/social capital, degrees of discrimination, extent of social exclusion, governance and accountability issues” (Haan and Webbink nd: 9). This dynamic relationship between HD and SD in the understanding of development provides a fitting foundation for understanding the socio-economic dimension of the insurgencies by Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram. The assumption is that they provide the indices of development that either promote or mar individual freedom from want and fear that ultimately shapes socio-economic progress and wellbeing.

Consistent with this trend are the several ways in which international development cooperation has been changing, including the growing prioritization of programs over projects, and multilateral over bilateral cooperation apropos development policies. Within the human development perspective, individual living standard in terms of welfare and quality of life are paramount. This perspective has significance for this study as it borders more directly on the issue of human security. According to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, “The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government” (Nigeria Consitution 1999). Both the quantitative (in terms of industrialisation and increase in GDP) and qualitative dimensions (in terms of the mix of quality of life, empowerment and good governance) of development that promote such welfare and security have eluded many Nigerians. It is against this backdrop that the nexus between developments and security in Nigeria requires closer engagement, especially through the prism of Nigeria’s political economy. Due to the limitation of space and to avoid a replication of the previous study upon which the current one builds, only a cursory overview of Nigeria’s political economy will be highlighted (see David 2013, Chapter 3). Political economy is theorised herein as “the mutual

influence of economic activities and policies on politics and its ideologies, cultural and historical factors, and the self-interests of affected groups” (Bouchat 2013: 3).

### **2.3 An Overview Nigeria’s Political Economy**

The state is theoretically construed as “an organisation within the society that co-exists and interacts with other formal and informal organisations, from families to economic enterprise or religious organisation” (cited in Olaitan, 1995:125). By its monopoly of the use of force, the state is distinct from other organisations. Ideally, its authority binds all its subjects by rights and responsibility. To survive and efficaciously discharge its duties and responsibilities, the state must efficiently manage its economic activities (production, distribution and consumption thereof). Indeed, “any society will perish if it ceases to produce material wealth given that the production of material wealth is the basis of life and development of any society” (Olaitan 1995: 125-6), The organization of these economic and social activities that preserve the society is the prerogative of the state. Hence, a symbiotic relationship must exist between the state and the economy to be productive and progressive (Olaitan 1995: 127). How has this foregoing played out in the Nigerian context over the years?

In 2014 Nigeria, following the rebasing of its GDP after two decades, overtook South Africa to become the largest economy in Africa with an estimated GDP of 80 trillion Naira (\$488 billion) for 2013 (Magnowski 2014). Sequel to this, Nigeria has experienced higher than global average economic growth standing at almost 6 per cent per annum within the preceding decade. This is relatively higher than other West African and sub-Saharan African countries. However, besides rightly questioning the utility of this rating for ordinary Nigerian, many have expressed worries over the continual over-dependence on oil “despite recent improvements in the non-oil sector, driven by agriculture and trade and services” (Pate 2015: 16). This concern is apt, considering the endearing implication of oil-led growth in Nigeria largely characterised by the concentration of wealth in few hands as well as the associated volatility of oil wealth. The current economic underperformance that characterised the Nigeria state, especially since the plummeting international oil prices in late 2014, clearly reinforces this with reference to Nigeria’s political economy.

Structurally, the Nigerian import-dependent economy is largely driven by foreign directed trade, as was the design during colonial rule. Two notable legacies of colonialism in Africa, which fundamentally shape the variegated forms of political conflicts, are particularly relevant to this study. These include: [1] the weak economic foundation engendered by the homeland

bound economic policies of the colonial masters; and [2] weak national orientation of the colonies during and after state formation, characterised by the intra/inter-ethnic and religious antagonism (David 2013). One of the implications of the first legacy is that it laid a solid foundation for economic corruption and impunity, backed by violent clampdown on critics of the status quo<sup>17</sup>. Like in other former colonies, this legacy still characterises present-day Nigeria with attendant de-developmental consequences. Little wonder that many “Africans regarded colonialism as an alien, despotic, and non-democratic system designed by the Europeans to help the later exploit African resources for the benefit of the metropolitan citizens” (cited in Egbo *et al.* 2010: 8).

Thus, *ab initio*, this structure aimed at protecting the economic interest of the Britain with little or no long term development plan for Nigeria (Ogene 1988: 72). A major determinant of this reality was the presence of oil, among other cash crops, given its economic relevance to the colonialist. The discovery and exploration of oil in commercial quantity followed the pattern of enriching the colonial power at the expense of long term economic and political development of Nigeria (David 2013). This has remained a reality even the today’s Nigeria, over 5 decades years after its independence from British rule. One critical foundation of Nigeria’s economic underperformance till date has been its oil-centric economy and lack of or slow diversification of the economy over the years.

### **2.3.1 The Nigerian Oil-Centric Economy and Consequences**

Nigeria remained the largest oil producer (exporter) in sub-Saharan Africa’s sub-region. Its percentage of oil and gas deposited in Africa is estimated at 32% and 34.2 % respectively (Oyefusi 2007). The figure should be higher, if the intended exploration in the northern region is included. As Table 2.1 below suggest, Nigeria heavily depends on oil for her revenue, which averages 75 per cent, in the decades between 2005 and 2015. In fact, prior to the plummeting oil prices in 2014, which unsurprisingly hit the Nigeria economy significantly, throwing the nation into its current economic recession, oil revenue constituted an average of 77 per cent of the nation’s revenue between 2003 and 2013.

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<sup>17</sup> Omotola rightly alluded that colonial experts designed Nigeria in such a way as promote law and order pivoted mainly on the “pedagogy of force and violence” (2005:8)

**Table 2. 1: Oil and Non-oil Revenue Composition in Nigeria 2005-2015 (₦Billion)**

Year	Oil Revenue	Non-Oil Revenue	Total	Oil Rev %
2005	4,762.4	857	5,619.40	85
2006	5,287.6	773.4	6,061	87
2007	4,462.9	1,252.5	5,715.4	78
2008	6,530.6	1,336.0	7,866.6	83
2009	3,191.9	1,652.9	4,844.8	66
2010	5,396.1	1,907.6	7,303.7	74
2011	8,879	2,237.9	11,116.9	80
2012	8,026	2,628.8	10,654.8	75
2013	6,809	2,950.6	9,759.6	70
2014	6,793.8	3,275.0	10,068.80	67
2015	3,830.1	3,082.4	6,912.50	55
Total	63,969.40	21954.1	85,923.50	75

Source: Author's Compilation, Data from CBN Annual reports (various years).

Meanwhile, a divergence of views have coloured the discourse on the implication of resources for national development over the years (Altman 2003; Watts 2004). Development economists, for instance, in the camp of the *Staple theory of growth*<sup>18</sup> had initially maintained the view that natural resource abundance helps the developing world in catching up with the more industrialised countries (Watkins 1963). The logic is that resource availability provides the much-needed capital and revenue for the government to implement means that facilitate and lead to development. This is because the demand of those resources is believed would generate the requisite revenue for development of relevant infrastructure, technology and, ultimately, human capital.

This view, however, came under serious criticism as resource-abundance became increasingly sources of conflict and a myriad of social, economic and political quagmire (Collier *et al.* 2003; Deininger 2003; Ross 2003). The Nigerian situation best fit the latter view apropos resource abundance-development nexus especially as oil predispose a nation to conflict due to corruption, poverty, destitution and a general atmosphere of dissatisfaction that often accompanied the mismanagement of such resources. Corroborating this view, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2013: 570) observed how “waste and poor institutional quality stemming from oil appear to have been responsible for its poor long-running economic performance”.

<sup>18</sup> Originally associated the Canadian economic historian, Harold Innis, the staple theory has been used to explain economic growth and development in relation to export-led economy since the 1950. It was originally used to model Canada's economic evolution in the context of exportation

Hence, Nigeria has been described as a clear manifestation of the so-called *resource curse* (Ko 2014; Osaghae 2015). The reason widely adduced for this reality is simply the huge, quick, and hardly stable wealth that oil offers and “the shocks to which the government and the national economy are subsequently exposed to”, for instance due to price volatility (Oyefusi 2007: 2).


In this regard, three broad effects have been identified regarding the *resource curse* argument, which are of relevance to Nigeria’s developmental woes. These include: [1] the Dutch Disease [2], the volatility effect and [3] the rent-seeking effect. Simply put, the Dutch Disease effect essentially underscores the unhelpful contraction of non-resources (manufacturing) sector that often accompany resources booms (Hausmann and Rigobon 2003). The volatility thesis articulates the adverse implications of the global instability in prices of natural resources for an economy that heavily depends on such resource. The third effect, namely the rent-seeking effect, asserts “that resource dependence (especially oil) often lead to a vicious developmental cycles whereby all actors (public and private, domestic and foreign) have overwhelming incentives to seek links with the state in order to share in the resource pie” (Oyefusi 2007: 9). Nigeria, from all metrics, appears to manifest all these effects, especially the third, which continually “penalizes productive activities, distort the entire economy, and hinders growth” till date (Oyefusi 2007: 9).

In line with the *resource curse* thesis, Nigeria has had its share of resource-induced civil strife. The violence in the Niger Delta is a prime case. The Boko Haram crisis is not entirely unconnected to oil especially as it bears on social, economic and political factors critical to the peace and stability of the region. To this effect, Bouchat (2013: 2) argued that “the root cause for these, and other, problems may be the result of the political economy of Nigeria and the resulting centrifugal and centripetal forces that hold Nigeria as a unified state in the balance”. One pertinent area to seek this link is in investigating the values that oil exploration, for over four decades, has added to per capita income growth, as an indicator (though limited) of development. Let turn to the socio-economic standing of Nigeria through selected indicators such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, and literacy rate.

### **2.3.2 Socio-Economic Challenges in Nigeria**

Following the economic crises of the 1980s, both rural and urban poverty in Nigeria have continued to soar higher and higher over the years in absolute and relative sense. Figure 2.2 below for instance clearly demonstrate a rising poverty incidence and population since the 1980 in Nigeria. Although based on the World Bank’s (2011:8) report Nigeria has experienced

robust economic growth since 2001, the pace at which this translates to impact on the socio-economic conditions of the larger Nigerian populace appears relatively slow, a view corroborated by Witwack (2013). Regardless of the “positive trend of strong economic growth” and the improvement of “democratic resiliency”, in recent times, especially prior to 2015, “the fundamental problems that have challenged Nigerian progress throughout its history remain simmering” (Bouchat 2013: 2). For instance, Nigeria’s Human Poverty Index (HPI) as at 2001 was 41.6; ranking 54th out of the 78 poorest countries of the world in terms of provision of education and services such as potable water, public-health measure and sanitation (Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke, 2003:7). Nigeria in that same year ranked among the lowest of the low in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), with an index of 0.456, ranking, 156th in the world. In fact, the situation has merely deteriorated such that between 2005 and 2011, Nigeria’s HDI stood at an average of 0.445, which is about a 97 per cent decline in comparison with the 2001 score (UNDP 2011).



**Figure 2. 2: Relative Poverty Headcount, 1980-2010**

Data Source: National Bureau of Statistic NBS (2010)

According to the international indicator for extreme poverty, 70.2 per cent of Nigerians live on less than 1 dollar or ₦124 per day (UNHD, cited in Buba 2007: 2). Infrastructures such as potable water, roads, electricity, *inter alia* continue to elude the country despite the economic growth rate. As Buba (2007: 2-4) reveals, based on UNHD data: child mortality rate remains high with about 201 immediate deaths out of every 1000 live births; maternal mortality rate stood at 704 per 100000 as at 2004; the health sector can only afford one doctor per 1000 people; preventable disease such as malaria remains among the leading causes of death; the

spread of HIV/AIDS remains high, with more than 930 000 children estimated to have been orphaned by the disease while another 5 million were estimated to be living with the disease and its consequences in 2007. Unsurprisingly, the United Nations Human Development report of 2013, ranked Nigeria as the 36<sup>th</sup> least developed country of the world. These indicators are clearly reminiscent of the discrepancy between the economic growth and development, which is largely felt by the masses. Hence, given that these indicators fly in the face of abundant minerals, one can safely draw the conclusion that rather than the mere resource itself it is the maladministration of the “political economy of resources that drives the growth and poverty results” (Roemer and Gugerty, 1997:21).

The Nigerian political economy is characterised by the concentration of the dividend of mineral wealth in the hand of the few, which explains the currently excruciating poverty and underdevelopment in the society. As Adebajo (2008: 2) had incisively described, Nigeria is “a colossal collection of impoverished masses [and] a crumbling Tower of Babel built on the rickety foundations of oil rents collected and squandered by its leaders”. Thus, Nigeria’s socio-economic malaise can be attributed to the nation’s overreliance on crude oil, seen as underlying the unemployment, poverty, kidnapping, militancy and (Abellegah 2012; David 2013).

The World Bank (2011:8) noted that the failure of economic growth to tally with socio-economic development is possibly “due to weak employment creation as well as sub-optimal patterns of public expenditure.” Accordingly, even though Nigeria has enacted several market reforms over the years that have impacted on its economic growth, the development of the citizen is only minimally improved, if at all. As Sen (1999) aptly noted that any economic growth in terms of GNI that does not reflect the capability and opportunities people enjoy is questionable in terms of relevance. In the same vein, the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize winner in Economics, Douglass C. North, underscores the salience of institutional factors supporting the political, economic and social in the creation of national wealth. North (2005) observed that there ought to be a direct correlation between the citizen’s quality of life and the nation’s economic development, otherwise economic growth is worthless, and rightly so. This view is pivotal to the UN’s Human Development Index HDI,<sup>19</sup> in which Nigeria’s ranking over the

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<sup>19</sup> The HDI assesses a country’s average achievements based on [1] long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy of the total population of a country at birth, [2] Knowledge production as measured by the adult literacy rate (with tow-third weight) and the combined primary secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one-third weight), [3] a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in PPP terms in US dollars. Available at: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html>; <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html> [Accessed on 23 August 2013]

years have been unimpressive despite its mammoth natural and human wealth. Thus, in the Human Development Report (2013), Nigeria is rated 132 out of 187. Some of the factors acting alone and in combination to cause poverty in Nigeria as well as in other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, which is of pertinence to this study include:

Low savings and investments; Weak institutions of governance; Poor infrastructure and structural weaknesses in the economy; Low incomes outstripping high population growth; High external dependence; Political and social instability which manifest in social strife; Lack of technological capacity to deal with environmental challenges like disease epidemics, floods, drought, pest outbreaks; Adverse effects of globalization in terms of capital flight vis-à-vis inflow of capital (Musa 2006: 7).

Another key socio-economic indicator, education, is an important aspect of human development since its outcome is a veritable indication of well-being (World Bank, 2011: 6). Corroborating this view, Duze (2011: 803) aptly noted that “a nation’s overall development is inextricably tied to its educational system”. Unfortunately, the Nigerian education system remains in a state appositely described by Ibe (2006) as “shameful” due to – among other reasons – corruption which constantly diverts education funding; hence engendering incessant strike actions (Ibe 2006; Olujuwon and Odunayo 2010; Kennedy 2011).


Consequently, despite government’s efforts to promote education and literacy in Nigeria, primary school completion rate stood at 75.2 per cent in 2006 (Buba, 2007:2-3). As an important aspect of the then MDGs indicators for monitoring, progress in education highlights poor net enrolment ratio in primary education, the primary school completion rate and the youth literacy rate as at 2009. See Table 2.2, for instance. The indicators put net enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education at 57.0 per cent and 47.8 per cent respectively out of the 100 per cent target of the MDGs. Based on UNESCO record in 2010, approximately 10.5 billion children in Nigeria are out of school. According to the records, Nigeria “accounts for almost one in five out-of-school children in the world” (Abdulmalik 2013).

**Table 2. 2: Progress on the education goal of the MDGs in Nigeria as at 2009**

	<b>2009</b>	<b>2015 Target</b>
Net enrolment ratio in primary education (%)	57.0	100
Net enrolment ratio in secondary education (%)	47.8	100
Proportion of pupils <b>starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary (%)</b>	94.0	100
Literacy rate of 15-24-year olds, men (%)	70.7	100
Literacy rate of 15-24-year olds, women (%)	74.9	100
Adult literacy rate, women & men (%)	66.5	100
Adult literacy rate, men (%)	57.4	100
Adult literacy rate, <b>women (%)</b>	65.4	100

Sources: (World Bank, 2011: 6), Author' compilation

The above is hardly surprising because the 6 to 8 per cent of Nigeria's budget officially committed to the education system can only provide a sub-standard quality of education. Little wonder Nigeria trailed behind smaller nations such as Botswana, Kenya, and Ghana in key MDG indicator such as net primary enrolment and youth literacy as at 2009 (See figure 2.3). In fact, as at 2010 UNESCO reported that over 10.5 million Nigeria children within the primary school age were out of school (cited in David, 2013). Strike in the education sector is now not only rampant but has almost become the only means to demand for reforms (Forest, 2012:36-7). Access to the largely sub-standard education, particularly higher education, is extremely difficult despite the over 100 universities across the country. Forest (2012:36-37) observed that "each year more than 500000 young men and women (ages 16-25) apply to one or more of these institutions, but because of the low intake capacity only about 150000 of them are admitted. This has promoted the luxurious private higher educational institutions in Nigeria affordable only to the rich few.



**Figure 2. 3: Key MDG Indicators: Nigeria and Selected Countries in Africa as at 2009**

Source: Cited in (David 2013)

More so, linked with the problem of education is the rising unemployment rate at the national level, which stood at 23.9 per cent in 2011 according to the report of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2013:35). The same report disclosed that female unemployment was also higher in 2011 at 24.3 per cent, compared to male unemployment rate of 23.5 per cent. According to age categories, the age groups 15-24 and 25-44 had higher unemployment rates

as well: 37.7 per cent and 22.4 per cent respectively. Rural unemployment stood at 25.6 per cent compared to urban unemployment of 17.1 per cent. These bad socio-economic indices are worst in the northern region and the Niger Delta region where oil spillages have severely compromised livelihood and living standards. A major factor that reinforces Nigeria socio-economic malaise vis-à-vis the foregoing political economy discourse is corruption.

### 2.3.2.1 Corruption in Nigeria

A *Washington Post* commentator, Rupert (1998), once observed that “in Nigeria, corruption is not part of government; it is the object of government”. So worrying is the problem that the renowned Nigerian writer, Achebe (1983: 58) warned that Nigeria is at the brink of an early grave if she does not take proactive measures to checkmate the widespread corruption. The problem of underdevelopment and abject poverty in Nigeria are principally benchmarked on the chronic level of corruption (political or bureaucratic) in the society.<sup>20</sup> Nigerian monocultural economy fuels grand embezzlement particularly among the ruling elites. Indeed “through lack of vision or corrupt intent, Nigeria’s leaders have failed to diversify its economy or maintain its infrastructure, to the serious detriment of the economy” (Bouchat 2013: 10). This reality reinforces the venality and despotisms that Guest (2004: 63) attributes to “governments that depend on natural resources for most of their incomes”. Obadina (1999:10) noted that the “culture of kickbacks, bribery and embezzlement has encouraged mismanagement and wasted huge amounts of limited national resources”. Albeit not a preserve of Nigeria, given its universal scope, corruption is nonetheless pervasive and almost inexorable in Nigeria, both in the military and civilian administration. Table 2.3 below illustrates the gloomy picture of the level of corruption in Nigeria by Transparency International, between 1996 and 2015.<sup>21</sup>

The negative implication of corruption for development is widely recognised and Nigeria is not an exception (Ribadu 2006; Brada *et al.* 2012; Transparency International 2012; Arezki and Gylfason 2013; Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Okorie 2014; Chitakunye *et al.* 2015; Suleiman and Karim 2015). Considering Nigeria’s enormous natural wealth, as against its unenviable

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<sup>20</sup>Corruption has been widely construed as the abuse of public office for private gains for the benefit of the holder of the office or some third party (Transparency International). Political corruption can be broadly understood as unethical behaviour, which violates the norms of the system of political order (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 1993: 6).

<sup>21</sup> Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (CPI-TI) available at <http://www.transparency.org>. TI’s corruption perception Index rates countries on the scale of 0 to 10. 0 refers to the most corrupt countries while ten refers to the least corrupt country. In producing the index, the scores of countries/territories for the specific corruption-related questions in the data sources are combined to calculate a single score for each country.


development standing in the world, corruption arguably explains its consistent poor United Nation’s annual Human Development Index (HDI) ranking among its peers. For instance, between 2005 and 2012, Nigeria has maintained the dismal average of 0.4545 in the HDI. This trend may be related to the de-developmental and dehumanising effect of corruption in the country. To better appreciate this dynamic, see figure 2.4 below which compares the level of corruption based on the CPI-TI and the HDI among six selected countries, including Nigeria. What is discernible from the figure is that the three countries with the high level of corruption, among which is Nigeria, also have the poorest ranking in the Human Development Index. While this relationship is not necessarily linear, it corroborates the view that corruption bears on the development in a complex way. Some of the acknowledged channels through which corruption bears on development include: its distortion of expenditure; its diversion of foreign direct investment (FDI); its entrenchment of poverty and inequality; among others.

**Table 2. 3: Transparency International’s corruption perception index/ranking on Nigeria, 1996-2015**

Years	Score <sup>22</sup> (0- 100)	No of countries in ranked	Index (Max = 10)
1996	1	54	0.7
1997	1	52	1.8
<b>1998</b>	5	85	1.9
1999	2	99	1.6
2000	1	90	1.2
2001	2	91	1.4
<b>2002</b>	2	102	1.6
2003	2	133	1.4
2004	3	146	1.6
2005	6	159	1.9
2006	17	163	2.2
2007	33	179	2.2
2008	59	180	2.7
2009	44	180	2.5
2010	42	178	2.4
2011	37	182	2.4
2012	27	174	2.7
<b>2013</b>	25	177	n.a
2014	27	175	n.a
2015	26	168	n.a

*Source:* Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (various years), Author’s compilation

<sup>22</sup> Countries are scored from 0 to 100 for most corrupt to very clean respectively.



**Figure 2. 4: Corruption Perception versus Human Developments Index (HDI) in 2005 among selected countries.**

*Sources* : UN-HDI, TI-CPI (2005), Author's compilation

Of more significance to this study is the bearing of corruption on political instability especially through the problem of underdevelopment in Nigeria. Corruption in Nigeria has “fuelled political instability by placing a high premium on the control of state office” (Obadina, 1999:10). Due to the looting that characterises public offices, seeking political positions have become a lucrative business, since “anything spent to secure a political office is regarded as an investment which matures immediately one gets into office” (Dike 2008). Thus, political elites use every means at their disposal, including the use of force to pursue selfish interest.

Typical of a fragile state, the Nigerian government has continued to spend generously on the military and other institutions of state coercion, while development-inducing aspects of the economy, such as basic education, health care, and infrastructural development are either neglected or underfunded by the government (David 2013). This is most often geared towards protecting and consolidating the continual hold on power and occupation of such offices by the elite, despite their demonstrated inability to profitably lead Nigeria (Dike 2008; Idakwoji 2010; Nwogwugwu and Ayomola 2015).

This distortion of expenditure arguably accounts for the incongruity between natural wealth and high level of underdevelopment that breeds conflict (Axworthy 1997; Idakwoji 2010; Francis *et al.* 2011). For instance, despite having received an estimated US\$228 billion from oil exports between 1981 and 1999, Nigeria remains extremely underdeveloped with an

alarmingly high rate of illiteracy, which is worse in the northern region because education funds are siphoned (Udeh 2000). Akin to this, Abdulmalik (2013: np) cited the indictment of some officials “for stealing funds released to the nomadic education commission, an agency charged with the responsibility of getting Fulani herdsman to enrol their kids in school”. Furthermore, “despite the over \$30 billion spent on improving the energy sector in recent years”, Nigeria remains “the world leader in private demand for generators” as public power supply remains epileptic as always (cited in David 2013:63). This has in turn impeded development by reinforcing poverty through stifling of productive activities and efficient social service deliveries.

Indeed, due to corruption, Nigeria has one of the world’s worst income distributions, with most of the wealth going to a select few (Forest, 2012:32). What is even more piquing about corruption in Nigeria is that it goes with impunity while talks by political actors about accountability and integrity by itself has remained mere rhetoric considering the lack of genuine commitment to detect and penalise unethical behaviour (David 2013). In Nigeria corruption encumbers the fair distribution of social services and adds another layer to the resentment caused by the lack of political participation. The larger masses of society have no voice, are ignored and placated (Forest 2012). This has virtually resulted in eroding the functional capacity of the state, thereby creating “their government” rather than “our government” mentality among Nigerians as evinced by the widespread lack of patriotism.

It is relevant to underscore that the over US\$380 billion allegedly lost by the Nigerian state to graft since independence (Ibukun 2011), could afford Nigeria significant socio-economic and political development. As at June 4 2016, the Federal Government reportedly “released a list of recovered stolen funds broken down as N78 billion, 185 million dollars, 3.5 million pounds and 11,250 Euros” (Premium Times 2016b: , October 26). Most recently, various huge amount of money allegedly stolen by public office holders have been either confiscated or are being investigated. Notable among these include: the \$9.8 million and £74,000 (about ₦3 billion in total) recovered from erstwhile Group Managing Director of the NNPC, Andrew Yakubu (Premium Times 2017a); the “\$151 million and N8 billion recovered from three sources with the aid of the recently initiated whistleblower policy” (Premium Times 2017a: , February 12); the \$153.3 million temporarily seized from the former Petroleum Minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke (Premium Times 2017b: , January, 6). In view of the foregoing it is now important to engage arguments on the link between socio-economic development and terrorism and decipher its implication for Nigeria.

#### **2.4. Between Socio-economic Development and Terrorism/Insurgency**

The nexus between terrorism and socio-economic variables such as inequality, poverty, social or political exclusion, and education *inter alia* has been shown to be rather complicated and inconclusive both from the perspective of the individual and the collective (BjØrgo 2005; Gupta 2005; Newman 2006; Darcy and Noricks 2009; Piazza 2011). If anything, there are opposing views over the relationship. On the one end of the spectrum, some empirical findings from various contexts seem to disconfirm the view that poverty causes terrorism. In this camp are studies based on cross-national data analysis showing that underdeveloped countries by their gloomy socio-economic standings – measured by macro-economic indicators – are not necessarily more likely to produce terrorists than their middle or high-income counterparts (Abadie 2006; Piazza 2006; Dreher and Gassebner 2008). In fact, according to Krueger (2007), the view that there is a link between socio-economic condition and terrorism is entirely based “on faith” rather than on “scientific evidence”, as some empirical findings suggest that no relationship exists between poverty, education and terrorism. Hence, Schmid and Jongman (2005: 6-7) maintained that “a range of socio-economic indicators – illiteracy, infant mortality and gross domestic product per capita – are unrelated to whether people involved in terrorism. This view is also supported by the fact that perpetrators of 9/11 were “middle-class, educated misanthropes led by a rich religious fanatic” (Burgoon 2006: 177).

However, some studies seem to offer different observations regarding the nexus between terrorism and poor socio-economic factors (Nagel 1974; Berrebi 2003; Li and Schaub 2004; Blomberg and Rosendorff 2006; Burgoon 2006; Piazza 2006; Bandyopadhyay and Younas 2011; Piazza 2011). These studies variously pivot their argument on a nuanced explication of the various socio-economic. For instance, poverty is not circumscribed to the predominant money-metric explanation. Poverty is rather construed as “the absence of acceptable choices across a broad range of important life decisions — a severe lack of freedom to be or to do what one wants (Foster *et al.* 2013: 1). Accordingly, “dimensions of deprivation that relate to human capabilities, including consumption and food security, health, education, rights, voice, security, dignity, and decent work” are equally identified as vital to the notion of poverty (Oshewolo 2010: 265). This view is corroborated by the Human Poverty Index, developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which sees poverty as the absence of the capability to “lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect, and the respect of others” (cited in Oshewolo, 2010: 265). Poverty has been commonly measured either in relative or absolute terms. Absolute poverty is “a condition

characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to services” (UN 1995: Annex II, para. 19)). On the other hand, relative poverty entails “the concern with inequality or relative deprivation, where the bare minimum is socially guaranteed” (Oshewolo, 2010: 267).

For instance, Thomas (2001: 163) highlighted “a correlation between the level of entitlement to human security and the propensity for conflict, defined not in orthodox inter-state arms terms but in the wider sense to include the most frequent form of warfare, intra-state”. Observing that between the year 1990 – 95, 57%, 34% and 14 % of conflict were recorded in countries ranked low, medium and high respectively in the HDI, Thomas noted the possibility of “a causal relationship between lack of material entitlement, health and education, and war” (Thomas 2001). Relatedly, using a pooled time-series analysis, Li and Schaub (2004) found that developing countries are more susceptible to international terrorists attack than their economically developed OECD counterparts. The variance in terms of socio-economic conditions in these two categories of countries is noteworthy in terms of how they discourage or encourage terrorism. Similarly, Bravo and Dias (2006) also underscore the negative correlation between terrorists incidences and the level of development based on geopolitical factors in Eurasia, acquiescing with the hypothesis that socio-economic variables are crucial, among other factors, to the proliferation of terrorism.

In the same vein, higher levels of economic inequality is noted to be positively correlated with terrorism, according to Lai (2007); while Burgoon (2006) for his part accentuates the importance of social welfare spending in the reduction of international terrorist attacks – a view that is pivoted on the socio-economic determinants of terrorism. In fact, as far as policy-oriented study such as that of Burgoon (2006) is concerned:

Social welfare policies – including social security, unemployment, and health and education spending – affect preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that, on balance, discourage terrorism: by reducing poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, thereby diminishing incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, and by weakening extremist political and religious organizations and practice that provides economic and cognitive security where public safety nets are lacking (2006: 177).

From the perspective of international terrorism target, Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006) demonstrated that nationals are less probable to launch terrorist attacks abroad to the degree

that their income levels increased. They also observed that higher income levels, democratic, and economically opened countries are more likely to be targets of international terrorism.

In sum, therefore, while rightly acknowledging the inexistence of a simple causality between poverty (as a socio-economic index) and terrorism, O'Neill (2002a: 9) similarly argued that "to say that poverty has nothing to do with terrorism goes too far in the other direction and is equally simplistic and false." He explains how, regardless of the complex causal link, a significant improvement among the local population helps them essentially to alienate, rather than celebrate, terrorist organizations. The remarkable decline in insurgency among Muslim youths, who had initially lacked economic prospect, in Philippine island of Mindanao after the US and Japan heavily invested in the region is provided as a testimony to this view. Other cases cited include Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, November 17 (Greece) and Japanese Red Army which are now hardly celebrated among what used to be their pools of support (O'Neill 2002a: 10). Recently, USAID also highlighted, from its field research, that "unmet socioeconomic needs may be significant not because of actual material deprivation, but because of the related perception of those marginalized populations" abandoned by state and society and left a governance gap (USAID Policy 2011: 3).

One way of appreciating the possible link between socio-economic preconditions and terrorism/insurgency is to consider Mao's analogy that the relationship between guerrilla and the people is like the relationship between the sea and the fish. Indeed, without the sea the fish will not only be unable to swim but will also die (cited in Kiras 2010: 192). The basis for support may vary amongst the individuals, which in turn determines the nature and extent of their respective support/sympathy. Nonetheless, the aggregation of these varying supports is to insurgent what the sea is to the fish. For instance, informed by this view, Kiras links the fate of Che Guevara's *foco*-led insurrection to its inability to secure domestic support (Kiras 2010: 192). Hence, despite the dispute regarding the nexus between terrorism and socio-economic conditions, the idea that terrorism or insurgency endures only if it has the covert or overt supports and sympathies of the local populations is pertinent (Awofeso *et al.* 2003; Cragin and Chalk 2003; Laplante 2008; Darcy and Noricks 2009; Davis and Cragin 2009; Kiras 2010; David 2013).

#### **2.4.1 Implication for Nigeria: Niger Delta and Boko Haram Insurgencies**

It is arguably against this rather complex backdrop that the socio-economic dimension of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgency cannot be undermined. Various recent studies have attempted thus to engage this possible relationship with reference to governance in Nigeria, looking at individual insurgent groups (Ikelegbe 2005; Arowosegbe 2009; Etemike 2009; Agbiboa 2011; Musa 2012; Agbiboa 2013d; David 2013). A commonality among these studies is that the deplorable socio-economic conditions at the grassroots, in conjunction with other factors in domestic politics in Nigeria as well as the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has led to the emergence of various anti-state militia and terrorist groups.

The basis for support may include factors such as: primordial antagonism, religious, cultural, fear, socio-economic, political, intimidation, or even forceful indoctrination, which as whole or individually shapes the perception of the insurgents versus state by the population. In the context of Nigeria such support has seen the rise of various ethnonational/religious movements. Prominent among these include: The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); The Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC); Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF); Militant Action in The Niger Delta (MAND); Arewa Youth Forum (AYF); Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP); and most recently Boko Haram, Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). A number of these groups tend to believe in changing the status quo through force especially since non-violence means seem ineffective due, among other reasons, to lack of political will on the part of government to address groups grievances decisively and sustainably. Meanwhile, scholarly engagement with the dimension of socio-economic dimension of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, especially in comparative terms, remain insufficient

Perhaps this gap might be due to the foregoing view that socio-economic arguments pertaining to modern terrorism at a global level has remained controversial (Caruso and Schneider 2011; Krieger and Meierreiks 2015). As earlier noted, at best, many scholarly works on the causal factors acknowledge, but quite superficially, that socio-economic factors are significant underlying causes of terrorism (Miljkovic and Rimal 2008; Freytag *et al.* 2010; Lewis 2014). At worst, socio-economic factors are claimed as having no explanatory significance for the rise and persistence of Boko Haram, especially due to the ideological or religious facade. Yet, different inducers of terrorism have been equally identified which have given a twist of complexity to the so-called ideological driven insurgencies.

One such perspective is the social and behavioural perspective, which links terrorism to “social, economic, political and other environmental factors” (Moten 2010: 45). In lieu of restricting terrorism to a given religion, time or location, this perspective often associates terrorism with “root causes”, such as social economic inequality and political deprivation, within the international community. In this regard, seemingly religious-minded terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have also been explained as offshoots of “internal and international” political complexities. Terrorism is employed for revenge due to the perceived sense of injustice perpetrated against them by “others” including their ‘corrupt’ leaders backed by western powers. “Washington’s actions in the Muslim world, in general, are seen by many Muslims as evidence of collaboration with regimes that compromise Islamic values and oppress their citizens” (Moten 2010: 53).

It is against such backdrop that charismatic leaders like Bin Ladin in his 1996 *fatwa* (religious edicts) could call upon his Muslim compatriots to fight against the “invading enemy”, namely America and Israel. Hence, the 9/11 attacks were greeted with cheers and celebration as an open form of moral heroism among certain groups of people in the Arab world – the same act that was considered as unmitigated evil among Americans and the rest of the world (Kraemer 2004). An analyst has observed that the “West, through the lens of 800 years of history dating from the Crusades, is seen by many as the source of everything wrong in the Moslem world. The West, interpreted as Satan filled with spies, military invaders, economic exploiters and cultural corrupters, fuels this vision of a cataclysmic struggle to preserve an entire way of life and belief system that is under assault” (cited in O’Neill 2002b: 21). A study by Merari in 1985 reveals how “Palestinian suicide bombers often have at least a relative or close friend who was killed or injured by Israelis” (cited in Moten 2010: 46). This points to the underlying “hatred” of the West in the so-called “Muslim World” or the Middle East.

The demographic and economic determinants of terrorism constitute another perspective. Herein, terrorism is situated within the link between economic and demographic factors such as high-fertility and high-growth regions in most non-western, particularly, Muslim societies. The point of contention here is that such natural endowment hardly translates into a good standard of living for the members of such societies, considering for instance, the large number of unemployed youths that might be found in such societies (Moten 2010: 47). This situation facilitates a “revolution of rising frustrations” as people are forced by poverty, hopelessness, and a sense of frustration to join extremist organizations (Moten 2010: 47). Moten argues that the above conditions are worsened if the established governments are authoritarian and illiberal

as has been attributed to some Muslim majority countries. In lieu of responding to the frustration of the population, government in these societies tends to repress opposition movements by not providing them a non-violent means of voicing out their grievances. In such situation as has often being the case in Nigeria, radicalism and terrorism becomes a more convenient means by which rebel groups believe the status-quo can be changed.

It serves to acknowledged that not everyone endorses the above explanation Islamist terror groups. For some American policymakers, terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda are considered as essentially inclined towards violence by virtue of their Islamic religion (Moten 2010: 48). But critics of this position considered this as an excuse by the US state for their invasion of certain states in the Middle East (Johnson 2004). For instance, Moten (2010: 52), emphasised thus: “the Afghanistan attack and the Taliban overthrow were carried out not because they were harbouring Al Qaeda but because they were not cooperating with the oil consortium, led by the US Company Unocal, to allow a pipeline across their country from central Asian oil fields”. Nevertheless, the question of perception is arguably critical to individual or group resort to, and support for, terrorism as it influences its emergence, persistence and, more importantly, resurgence even if temporally quelled through force. Hence COIN is effective to the degree that it addresses this problem of perception.

Meanwhile despite the utility of the socio-economic perspective with regard to ideological terrorism, only a few studies seem to have focus on Boko Haram, highlighting the extensive challenges of underdevelopment (inequality, poverty, education, marginalization, high rate of youth unemployment/underemployment, relative deprivation etc) in Nigeria as causal variables (Musa 2012; Agbibo 2013d; David 2013; Dauda 2014).

By comparing the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, this current study further deepens the above perspective and highlights possible new insights from the broader lenses of the security-development nexus. This is pertinent because while some perception such as beliefs system that characterised the ideological basis for the sect, for instance, may be difficult to deal with due to their highly subjective nature, an effective COIN would have to take note of the more objective rationale for support, among which include the socio-economic conditions in relation to governance or gaps in governance. Accordingly, understanding the role of development (broadly including mental and physical transformation) in mitigating if not eradicating both insurgencies is deemed quintessential. It is assumed that balancing development and counter-ideology (through effective diplomacy) with the military approach is

critical. The utility thereof in boosting the population's perception of government's presence in terms of good governance is arguably an indispensable aspect of effective COIN. This is especially the case given the role of bad governance and underdevelopment in the rise of both insurgencies.

## 2.5 Summary and Conclusion

Besides engaging the concept of security and development, and highlighting the complex relationship between the two, this literature review has shown the lack of consensus among scholars regarding the very concept of terrorism and the socio-economic drivers of insurgency/terrorism. Some studies have adopted a middle ground regarding the foregoing disagreement over the role of socio-economic factors. This general lack of consensus as identified above is not inconsequential to COIN. According to [ENREF 42](#)Piazza (2011: 340) these ambiguities has “left terrorism studies unable to articulate a clear counter-terrorism policy recommendation”. While linking socio-economic factors to seemingly “religious terrorism”<sup>23</sup> such as Boko Haram or the multi-faceted Niger Delta insurgency appears to be a quantum leap, it is of value to an effective COIN if this dimension is to be thoroughly understood. As Schmid (2004b: 212) rightly observed:

Additional factors need to exist in order to fuse religion with political violence. Poverty of the people (not necessarily of the terrorist who identifies with them), social injustice and state repression are often listed as prime causes of insurgent terrorism. They can drive people to migration, revolt, crime, suicide or religious fervour. The terrorist temptation is often a combination of some or all of these. The migration is to paradise, the revolt is against the status quo, the method used is normally considered criminal, suicide preceded by murder is one of the means and religion offers a justification.

Hence, the substantive agreement among scholars regarding the explanatory utility of local support for the emergence, persistence and resurgence of violence, gives room for deeper investigation into the role of socio-economic dimension of insurgency/terrorism. The foregoing review situates this link within the role of the perception of, and disposition to, the terrorist's cause, by the local population where it may draw moral and material support and the therefore have an implication on the effectiveness of COIN.

In line with the notion of development in the broad sense, this chapter also explored the tendency of the Nigeria political economy to fuel insurgency through its characteristic alienation and frustration of its citizens, due mainly to the general lack of accountability and

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<sup>23</sup>This has to do mainly with fundamentalist terrorism that employ religion as its basis; for example, groups such as Boko Haram.

systemic corruption oiled by over-dependence on petrodollar. It was shown that the prevalence of corruption and the resultant underdevelopment in Nigeria are both tied to the monocultural nature of its political economy which engendered the nation's socio-economic crises. Essentially, there has been a great divide between indicators of economic growth and economic development. The latter has remained gloomy as redolent of the high level of inequality, unemployment and poverty, no thanks to the lack of commitment to structural reformation and the much-needed diversification of the national economy, which has exposed the country to “a development trap” (ICG 2006a: 1), of which the masses are often at the receiving end.

In response, various interest groups have tried to express their dissatisfaction in different non-violent and violent manners depending on their context. Among other reasons, these groups have emerged due mainly to “perceived injustice and continual insecurity, marginalization, poverty, unemployment, corruption, lack of social infrastructure and general breakdown of law and order” (Chinwokwu, 2012:429). Confounding the issues is also the state's heavy-handed response that has often transformed the initial non-violence approach of resistant groups to a violent one as reminiscent of the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies under study. Hence, In the next chapter, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that will enable a nuanced understanding of the role of socio-economic dimensions (causes and effects) of terrorism among other factors is laid for the subsequent exploration of both insurgencies in comparative terms.

## **CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS**

### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks deemed to have utility in explaining the socio-economic dimension (i.e. cause and effect) of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies among other similar theories. A theoretical framework is a requisite philosophical foundation for linking the theoretical aspects of a phenomenon to its practical components. To systematically and coherently address the set objectives for this study, this chapter provides and delineates the principal theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the core thesis of the study, namely, the root cause theory, the rational choice theory and the Dutch 3D conceptual model. The root cause theory, which can be deemed to be the principal theory in this study, is employed for its overall search of common causal factors for Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency despite their seemingly divergent goals shaping the rational choice. Within root cause theory, the importance of relative deprivation and state failure thesis is appreciable, hence is cursorily given some attention. Given certain limitations of the root cause, the rational choice is also used to consolidate the tenet of the root regarding causal explanation. Meanwhile, beyond the search for causal explanation the Dutch 3D (Development, Diplomacy and Defence) conceptual approach is used to give direction and scope the explanation especially with reference to the recommendations deemed relevant for winning both the war and the battle against the insurgencies. Then they are assessed in terms of their applicability in counter-insurgency [COIN] within the context of Nigeria, minding context specificity of all conflicts and the need to avoid the trap of procrustean approaches to resolution. By so doing, the theoretical foundation is laid for an effective comparative analysis of the socio-economic drivers of, and possible solutions for, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

### **3.1 The Changing Dynamics of Conflict**

The international system, post-Cold War is marked by an appreciable decrease in interstate conflict, as “most conflicts and protracted political crises today do not occur between sovereign states but are of an internal or regionalized type” (Duffield 2000: 73). Despite this decline – amounting to “more than 35% during the 1990s... serious armed violence persists in many parts of Asia and Africa” (Goodhand, 2003:630). Of late, especially post-9/11 and the accompanying ‘War on Terror’ narrative of the Bush Administration, there has been a proliferation of intrastate armed conflict(s) especially those employing terrorist tactics (Okumu and Ikelegbe 2010).

Prominent of these in recent times include the emergence of Islamic State (IS), partly a result of the regional destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa since the Arab Spring<sup>24</sup>. A notable characteristic of Islamist terrorism in the new era is the shift from the predominant tactics of targeting western societies to a more localised inter-group conflict as observable of groups such as Boko Haram (Montclos 2014). This dynamic is prevalent in Third World countries especially in the Middle-East and Africa, from Libya, Syria, Iraq to Nigeria.

West Africa is most prominently challenged by the scourge of the Boko Haram, that affects Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, where a handful of conflicts have religious colouration, thereby rendering the task of causal explanation problematic. Over the years, a mosaic of theories has been advanced in order to understand *casus belli*, especially in the domestic context. Why do people rebel? Similarly, the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgencies have also been explained using various theories, including, but not limited to, the Failed/Failing State, Human Need Theory (HNT), Resource-Curse, the Relative Deprivation (RD) Theory and the Rational Choice Theory (RC) (Alozieuwa 2012; David 2013; Yahaya 2015). Several conspiracy theories have also been propagated in this regard, which however lack sufficient empirical backings (see for example Ogbozor 2016). Due to the limitation of space, only a cursory review of examples, of these theories, are provided.

To begin with, the adherents of the State Failure, or weak state thesis, upholds that a state's inability to discharge its due responsibilities provides a fertile ground for terrorism (Newman 2007; Maiangwa 2012). By way of definition a failed state is one that is "unable to perform a set of functions taken to be characteristic and definitive of a properly functioning state: to maintain secure boundaries, ensure the protection and security of all the population, provide public goods and effective governance, maintain law and order throughout the territory" (Jones 2008: 180).

The failure to meet these responsibilities often negatively impacts on the state's legitimacy, including its' monopoly of the use of force; hence are both necessary and sufficient conditions to generate various forms of politically motivated violence, including terrorism (Princeton and Morrison 2004; Davis 2007; Piazza 2008). A failed state is also characterised by other indicators such as low GDP per capita output. Simply put, the rise in insurgency in Africa or other developing nations, with such negative indicators in recent times, is explained from this

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<sup>24</sup> This basically refers to the serious of protest that engulfed the Middle East and North Africa from late 2010. It affected countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Syria (ongoing).

angle (Mentan 2004; Davis 2007). Somalia and Sudan, for instance, are widely used examples to illustrate the relationship between a failed or “collapsed” state and insurgency. Somalia, under this theoretical consideration, is often cited. The rationale being how the country provides a safe haven for the Al Qaeda terrorist network, in view of their influence on Al-Shabaab among others in the region (Hill 2005; Newman 2007; Jones 2008).

In this regard, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies have been linked to the failure of the Nigerian state to adequately discharge the set of functions constitutive of a properly functioning state (Idemudia and Ite 2006; Adibe 2012; Oviasogie 2013).

Meanwhile, the cloud of conceptual confusion that engulfs the notion of “failed states”, means a rigorous explication of the concept is quintessential to understanding how it explains conflict vis-à-vis Nigeria’s instability. For instance, the designation of Nigeria as a failed state has been jettisoned as simply lacking substance in explaining the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism, especially when using indices such as per capita income (above \$2700 billion in 2013) and GDP growth, indices that have been promulgated in recent years (Adibe 2012: 55). What of the question of historical facts on stages of development, and implication thereof for concept of failed state? The thesis misrepresents the fact that the “developed” states at some stage in their history also exhibited those characteristics being attributed to developing “failed states”. Herein lies the significance of Wai’s question: “could what is defined as state failure actually be part of the processes of state formation or reconfiguration, which are misrecognized or misinterpreted because of the poverty of Africanist social science and ethnocentric biases of the particular lenses used to understand them”? (Wai 2012: 28).

It is pertinent not to misconstrue, at least, what is not yet a complete process, such as the formation of the Nigerian state, as failed (David *et al.* 2015). As Adibe (2014: np) aptly observed, the emergence of Boko Haram and the splinter group, Anasur (largely extinct), is *rather* best understood “as symptoms of the crisis in Nigeria’s nation-building processes”.

Equally, as a critique of the failed state thesis, Jones (2008: 182) avers that the failed state discourse “obfuscates the historical social relations of crisis while legitimizing the reproduction of imperial social relations” by offering what he described as “a beguilingly simple, richly descriptive, pseudo-analytical approach”. Indeed, the discourse appears to [mis]treat Africa’s current structural stasis as entirely disconnected to the historical unfavourable foreign influence.

A recent study by Schmid (2016), compared states weakness with terrorism’s severity measured by terrorism index and number of refugees and found no conclusive evidence. Rather, “some weak states score low on the terrorism index and have few refugees (e.g. Haiti and Chad), while some countries that score high on the Terrorism Index and the state failure indices, score low on refugees (e.g. Yemen or Libya)” (Schmid 2016: 24). Hence, it is safe to concur with the view that “Weak or failed statehood could never be a satisfactory explanatory variable in isolation from other factors” (Newman 2007: 483).

Nonetheless, the state failure thesis has its own merits for this study especially in understanding the broader security-development nexus, considering Nigeria’s inadequate delivery of political and economic goods to its citizenry, which do contribute to the formation of anger and frustration (Maiangwa 2012; Onapajo and Uzodike 2012; Salkida 2012). Nigeria has consistently maintained a negative ranking between 13<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> in annual Failed State Index between 2007 and 2016, leaving the state in the *Alert Group* (see Table 3.1)<sup>25</sup>. A closer scrutiny of the component index that leaves Nigeria at the 13<sup>th</sup> position in 2016, that is, *Very Alert* zone in comparison to the world’s 5 most peaceful countries in the same year based on the Global Peace Index (GPI 2016), can further illuminate the relevance of this rank. Notably, the countries, namely Iceland, Denmark, Austria, New Zealand, and Switzerland, respectively, are among the world’s developed countries, which is insightful given the peace-development nexus. Nigeria in the same year ranked 149 in the world, and among the five least peaceful state in sub-Saharan Africa, just above troubled countries like the DRC, CAR, Somalia, South Sudan (GPI 2016).


**Table 3. 1: Nigeria’s Ranking in the Fragile States Index (2007-2018)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Number of Countries</i>
2007	17	177
2008	19	177
2009	15	177
2010	14	177
2011	14	177
2012	14	177
2013	16	178
2014	17	178
2015	14	178
2016	13	178
2017	13	178
2018	14	178

<sup>25</sup> It serves however, to acknowledge the dependence of FSI on various armed group in the country. See: <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings>

Source: *The Fund for Peace* (2007-2018),<sup>26</sup> Author's Compilation.

Nonetheless, “while weak or failed states might provide an enabling environment for certain types of terrorist groups to operate, additional explanatory variables need to be identified” (Newman 2007: 463). Besides, the lack of consensus on what constitute the “failed state”, the theory says little or nothing if applied to the Niger Delta crises, given the explanatory relevance or contribution of the *resource-curse theory*. The resource-curse theory simply links the emergence of collective violence in that region to the availability of “huge natural resource endowments”. The logic of this argument is that these resource often “blighten [rather than brighten] the prospects for development by serving as a source of motivation for people either to struggle over scarce resources or form armed groups to engage in conflict in order to exploit the opportunity to loot” (Obi 2009: 109). The relevance thereof for the Niger Delta conflict subsists in the notable political highjack of the original struggle, for self-benefiting ends by some individuals and groups, as will further detailed subsequently in this study (Peace-builder4; Peace-builder5; Nwogwugwu *et al.* 2012).



**Figure 3. 1: Components of the FSI 2016 for selected states**

Source: Authors compilation. Data Source: Failed State Index<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> <https://fundforpeace.org/fsi/wp-content/uploads>

<sup>27</sup> <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org>

Meanwhile, one major challenge to curbing insurgency in Nigeria is the politicization of the crises through various conspiracy theories. In 2014, Adibe identified, for instance, two of such theories that have been anything but helpful in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria namely that:

[1] Northern politicians sponsor Boko Haram to make the country “ungovernable” for President Goodluck Jonathan; [2] President Jonathan sponsors Boko Haram either to mobilize support from the south and Christians or to weaken and de-populate the north ahead of the 2015 presidential election (Adibe 2014).

In addition, there is the controversial view that Boko Haram has been sponsored by the United States of America (Lecturer/NDA). For instance, according to an adherent of this view, “all these groups, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State, have been, in one way or another, armed, trained and financed by the US-NATO alliance and their allies in the Middle East”(Lévesque 2015: np). Part of the reasoning within this (conspiracy?) theory is arguably prompted by the US’s hesitation to assist the Nigerian state with the requisite military hardware in the latter’s fight against the insurgency. Hence, adherents of the theory tend to dismiss US’s allusion to abuse of human rights by Nigeria’s Military personnel as being the main reason for their hesitation as merely an excuse for their covert plan to disintegrate Nigeria. However, in view of their lack of verifiability, especially due to the strong political undertone, these theories only help to further complicate an already complex problem.

From another perspective, the *Human Needs Theory* (HNT), especially as advocated by John W. Burton (1990), along with Maslow (1943), *Theory of Human Motivation* is also adduced in explaining terrorism. Essentially the HNT makes a case for conflict resolution to be strongly anchored in the new methods of understanding and satisfying human needs, given that conflict often spring from these unmet needs.

This theory has been offered as an explanation for the conflict in Sri Lanka (Danielsen 2005) as well as the emergence of Boko Haram (Alozieuwa 2012). According to this framework, which bears striking resemblance with the *relative deprivation* thesis (also closely aligned with the psychologically based *frustration-aggression thesis*), the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism has been construed through the prism of the deplorable socio-economic conditions in Nigerian society generally, and in the northern region in particular (Adibe 2012; Alozieuwa 2012). The basis of these three interrelated theories is that unmet needs create frustrations in people, which may propel them towards violence against the perceived (right or wrong) source

of their problem. Let us look at the relative deprivation in more detail in view of its explanatory contribution to this study, especially as has been used espoused in the case insurgency in the Niger Delta.

### 3.1.1 Relative Deprivation (RD)

The first exponent of the theory of relative deprivation, sociologist J.A Davis (1959) advanced the theory with reference to two groups, in-group and out-group, with the former referring to the rebel group while the latter refers to the society or the others. Rather than being distinguished by Marxist notion of ownership of the means of production, these two groups are distinguished based on “any identifiable quality such as race, religion and ethnic or economic capability” (cited in David 2013: 12). The perception of the out-group as being well-off triggers a sense of deprivation for the in-group, which might make the latter antagonistic towards the former (Gupta 1990: 53). The sense of deprivation arises “when one desires something, compares him/herself with those who actually do have” the desirable objects, and then feels that he/she “deserves the attainment of those objects” (Gupta 1990: 54).

The most orthodox development of RD in relation to collective rebellion is probably found in the archetypal work of Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (1970). Essentially, Gurr’s *relative deprivation theory* closely aligns with Aristotle’s position that the relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an *absolute* measure of inequality, drives political rebellion (Richardson, 2011:5).<sup>28</sup> In his recent works, Gurr has improved on the idea of relative deprivation, which he now calls “grievances and sense of injustice to capture the essence of the state of mind that motivates people to political action” (Gurr 2011). This improvement is meant to cater for some incompleteness in the original theory, which, as he now sees, pertains to the insufficient attention given to issues such as people’s source of grievance, their relative position in society, people’s belief about justice and its source, the process of mobilization, and the importance of mobility and global networks in the 21st century’s globalised world (Gurr 2011; Gurr 2015). Gurr’s position relates to other psychological standpoints that generally situate political conflicts within the framework of frustration whereby people are believed to “take up violent resistance when they feel frustrated by the gap between what they *actually* have and what they *feel they should* have” (Gupta 1990: 2 emphasis added).

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<sup>28</sup> For Aristotle, thus, “the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have” (cited in Richardson, 2011:5).

In general, however, the above behavioural hypotheses cast some worthwhile doubts on the traditional explanation that situate conflict within the sphere of irrationality and instinct.<sup>29</sup> Yet, one of the problems in linking frustration with aggressive behaviours is that frustration is only necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for an individual or a group's participation in political protest. In the context of this study, for instance, further explanation needs to be offered as to why the non-deprived Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents' resort to terrorism. Furthermore, the role of demographical and geographical factors in the emergence of terrorism, which are non-negligible in the case of Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram, are not easily discernible from the above behavioural hypotheses; hence the need for a more encompassing theoretical framework.

On the part of Human Needs Theory, it has also been observed that rather than absolute needs, it is the perception of inequality considered as the cause of those needs that motivate people to resort to violence (Richardson, 2011). Hence, while these three inter-related behavioural theories offer plausible explanation for the emergence of insurgency, each on its own may be too reductive to cast adequate light on the emergence and persistence of the insurgencies under consideration. As Hutchful and Aning (2004: 200) pertinently noted "mono-causal explanation of conflicts may be deceptively attractive or persuasive due to their apparent simplicity, but they are ultimately unhelpful" given that "as conflicts unfold and mutates, so do the motivations and relationships underpinning them". It is against this backdrop that this study would endorse Root Cause theory, complemented by the Rational Choice Theory to underscore the diverse social economic impetus of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria.


### **3.2 Root Cause (RC)**

Basically, the Root Cause [RC] correlates terrorist activity with "underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions" (Newman 2006: 750). Accordingly, poverty, urbanisation, population explosion, urban migration, Burgeoning age structure, population density, unemployment and social change are highlighted by Newman (2006) and the conditional variables that gives rise to the independent variables. The independent variables include, inequality, exclusion, repression, dispossession, sense of humiliation and alienation, sense of foreign occupation/hegemony clash of identity/dispute with identity aspect, violent conflict, negative effects of globalisation and sudden economic downturns. The interaction between this variable is further mediated by catalytic variables such as leadership, funding and

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<sup>29</sup>This view is inspired by Freudian psychology; which situates violent behaviours in human instinctive, learnt and subconscious nature.

state sponsorship to explain why and how terrorism occur (Newman 2006:751). (See figure 3.1 below). Suffice to acknowledge that all factors among the dependent and independent variable do not necessarily have to be present, especially considering the critical role of the catalytic variables such as leadership and funding as we shall see subsequently.



**Figure 3. 2: Interactions between ‘Root Causes’ and Direct Factors of Terrorism**

Source: Adapted from Newman (2006: 766)

In analysing the root cause, BjØrgo (2005: 3-4) rightly differentiated between preconditions and precipitants of terrorism. The former refers to factors that set the stage for terrorism in the long run whilst the later represents the specific events or phenomenon that immediately precede or trigger outbreak of terrorism. BjØrgo identified four levels of causation, namely [1] structural [2] facilitators [3] motivational, and [4] triggers. The first level highlights causal factors that impinge on people’s lives “in ways that they may or may not comprehend at a rather abstract macro level” (BjØrgo, 2005:3).


Some key variable at this level include, globalization, rapid urbanization, demographic imbalances, class structure, among others. At the second level are causes characteristic of modern era, which though not primary, that makes terrorism both attractive and possible, including “the evolutions of modern news media transportation, weapons technology, weak states, controls of territory etc. At the third level are motivational causes pertaining to the grievances experienced by people at a personal level motivate them to [re]act in a given way (BjØrgo, 2005). These are usually the tools that ideologues and political leaders capitalise on in persuading people into action. Hence, “motivational causes may also be seen as concentrated ‘symptoms’ of more fundamental structural causes”. Finally at the fourth level are the trigger causes which directly provoke terrorist acts, including call(s) for revenge or even peace talks so as to undermine negotiation and discredit moderates (BjØrgo 2005: 3-4).

Following the above, “leadership, funding, state sponsorship, political upheaval”, are considered catalysts to root causes of terrorism (Newman 2006: 751). The case of Boko Haram is quite illustrative of this view. Yusuf who is widely believed to be the progenitor of the group, is known to have captivated his followers through is eloquence of speech pivoted on a deep knowledge of the Islam, by which he could accentuate the *structural* ills of the Nigerian state (David, 2013). Hence, he could mobilise his followers, largely disenfranchised youths against the “unjust” Nigerian government. Arguably, the RC theory accommodate the blend of the disguise of individual’s criminal motivation (based on rational choice calculation) and the group’s overall ideology, as having been visible in both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, as far as the economic opportunism that defines the criminal dimension of the struggles is concerned. As Gupta (2005) identified and explained, three basic types of participants in a group’s terrorism are distinguishable in line with their basic source of motivation: [1] the ideologue, [2] the captive participants, and [3] the mercenaries. Ideologues, also known as “true believers”, are mainly motivated by the promotion of the group’s ideas and welfare, the mercenaries are motivated by selfish interest such as raping and looting opportunities, while the captive participants are motivated by fear, that is, the cost of non-participation.

Meanwhile, an inherent interrelatedness of these different precipitant motivations blurs the line between group’s utility and the individual utility. The distinction is arguably of explanatory significance as to why individual members’ criminal and economic motivations are sometimes submerged under the group seemingly noble ideology.

This is possibly the case with Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram, noted for various criminal activities such as material robbery and killing of the innocent, vandalism, kidnapping for ransom etc. In this way, the root cause thesis also augments for some of the weaknesses in the aforementioned behavioural theories in explaining why different individuals react to frustration in different ways. Figure 3.3 illustrates the complex interactions among the various root factors that do precipitate terrorism; which is adduced herein. Admittedly, it is reductive, if not erroneous, to imagine there is a single root cause behind an act of terrorism (Maleckova 2005: 100). Nevertheless, Newman stated that the key indicators could include: poverty, political freedom, economic dislocation, unemployment, population growth, social change and urban migration, amongst others. These are integral to the idea of human insecurity challenges as are evident in Nigeria.

In a similar fashion, a further dissection of the root cause variable(s) are provided by Darcy and Noricks (2009), highlighting the notably complex interaction among variables in increasing the root cause likelihood for terrorism.



NOTE: "and" conditions are approximate; sometimes, not all factors are necessary.

**Figure 3.3:** A Factor Tree for Root Causes of Terrorism

Source: Adapted from Darcy and Noricks (2009)

It is not that all factors are necessary. In line with this, and due to this study's focus on social and economic factors, it suffices to admit factors therein that may not all be necessary or given much attention.

### **3.2.1 Critique of Root Cause Theory**

Like other theories, the RC does not answer all the questionable scholarly appeal(s). A mushrooming literature emphasises a weak link between socio-political and economic structural factors, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity and terrorism, casting doubts on the efficacy of the root causes thesis (Gupta 2005: 16). Some scholars jettisoned the root causes perspective as “misleading as an explanation for terrorism or prescription for dealing with it” (Jervis 2002: 41). For instance, some conclusion that undermines the RC theories is drawn (erroneously?) based on the view that 250 members in most Palestine militia groups interviewed were not “uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs; thus suggesting a weak or no correlation between terrorism and root causes such as socio-economic conditions” (Hassan 2001: 37). Similarly studies have shown that “none of the 19 perpetrators of 9/11 attacks suffered from poverty, lack of education or lack of exposure to the privileged lifestyle of the Western world” (Gupta 2005: 19).

The implication is that since structural deprivations are merely necessary conditions, there is a weak correlation between terrorism/other forms of political violence and poverty. Hence, as a control measure for terrorism, the RC thesis is further criticised as infeasible given that certain factors such as media, technology *inter alia*, which oxygenate terrorism, cannot necessarily be addressed by way of removal. In other words, it leaves us with the pertinent question: how do we address terrorism via removing certain root causal or precipitating variables such as the above-provided variables, which are of vital, if not imperative, status to society? (Bjørge 2005). To address some of these criticisms, the rational choice theory is endorsed as a complimentary theory. The combination of both theories is deemed useful especially in understanding both insurgencies in a comparative sense, as far as the socio-economic dimensions are concerned.

### **3.3 Rational Choice (RC)**


Originating in the work of Cesare Beccaria in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Rational Choice theory has been widely used to explain conflict by economists and criminologist, by situating the motivation for terrorism essentially around utility maximization from a rational cost-benefit calculus (Anderton and Carter 2005; Gupta 2005; Hafez 2006; Perry and Hasisi 2015). As David (2013) synthesises the main arguments of the RC, the primary behavioural assumption underpinning individuals’ participation in violent extremism “is that the cost of participation is less than the benefits”. The cost-benefit analysis can cover the range of political, economic,

social; as well as cultural/religious benefit depending on the individual/group's priorities. Consider as such, the rational choice is arguably applicable to the economic benefit and/or religious benefits that motivate either of Niger Delta insurgency and/or Boko Haram insurgency, notwithstanding the issue of root causes grievances.

Meanwhile highlighting a notable caveat in the economic calculus, David (2015:9) corroborates with Gupta's (2005) view that the limitedness of the accruing benefit from such collective violent activities to the individual and the "fact that the individual's effort is quite insignificant when the group is large in size" makes the RC assumption problematic.

This is because it does not explain why individual would participate in such group or its collective actions from an economic lens (Gupta, 2005: 17). In other words, it presupposes that either the individual is irrational or has ulterior motives in sacrificing their welfare for a group's objective when there is hardly any personal benefit. Hence, Gupta aptly holds that "the most pressing problem with the traditional economic assumption of self-utility maximization is that it provides us with a truncated view of a human rationality, which ultimately can lead to a faulty policy prescription for eliminating the threats of terrorism" (2005: 18). Indeed, the individual terrorist/insurgent is neither a psychopath nor is his/her decision to participate in the collective action of the group entirely irrational.

Herein lies the utility of the advances made on the rational choice theory in explaining suicide terrorism in recent studies (Anderton and Carter 2005; Perry and Hasisi 2015). There is sense in which expectation of rewards, be it material, social psychological or spiritual, accounts for the individual's willingness to participate in terrorism or insurgency (see figure 3.4). This complex dynamic further helps to clarify the seemingly 'irrational' decision of suicide bombers. As Perry and Hasisi (2015: 57) have rightly argued, "the choice to commit an act of terror in general, and a suicide act of terror in particular, is a rational choice based upon an individual's subjective understanding of the situation and anticipated benefits. If the suicide bombers believe that martyrs are eligible for "paradise rewards," from their point of view it is rational to kill themselves in an act of martyrdom". This dynamic perspective also highlights the importance of charismatic leadership.



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**Figure 3. 4:** Hypothesised Relationships Among Factors Implicated in Radicalization

Source: Adapted from Helmus (2009: 96)

For both Niger Delta and Boko Haram militants, the cost-benefit calculus of the rational choice argument can be deciphered both in terms of their similarity and their differences. From the point of view of similarity, the criminal features in both insurgents can be understood from the point of the view of the utility maximization curve (in terms of expected rewards, material or spiritual) in the rational choice argument. In order word, while the rational choice is useful for instance, in explaining the bank robbery, oil bunkering, looting, kidnapping for reason among other self-benefiting drive of members of both or either insurgent group especially at the individual level, it is mute on their system-directed grievances. For the Boko Haram, the rational RC is mute on the predominant targeting of non-Islamic adherents, especially Christians, in its initial stage. Hence, David (2013:10) argued that “the rational choice theory requires some argumentation in order to be able to explicate the motivations of both the individual members and the groups, given that the two are not necessarily always in concord”. Corroborating, Gupta (2005) aptly maintains that collective vision is what keeps the group together, and this is often not the same with individual’s motivation.

It is against this aforementioned backdrop that the complementary use of both root cause and rational choice theory (2RCs hereafter) is believed to provide a solid theoretical foundation for individual and group motivation.

In this merger, the grievance and greed hypothesis of conflict also finds suitable interaction in explaining the driving factors behind Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies. The merger helps to account for the notable criminal elements; that has resulted in the hijack of the underlying grievances, which provides a veritable environment for the emergence and persistence of both insurgencies. The two theoretical approaches are deemed useful also in highlighting of the possible differences, among the similarities, between Boko Haram insurgents and Niger Delta insurgents in terms of group and individual motivation. In effect, since no choice is made in a vacuum, the [ir]rationality of the choice to participate in insurgency or not reinforces the importance of permissive environment (root cause) within which terrorism thrive.

Among these root causes include socioeconomic variables such as inequality, economic dislocation, social and political exclusion and other factors that are of explanatory relevance to violent conflicts such as the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram. Hence the use of the 2RCs can meaningfully illuminate not only *what* socio-economic factors matter in the Niger Delta insurgency and/or the Boko Haram insurgency, but also (and significantly so) *how* these factors matter in relative or absolute terms, minding the ideological aspect as well.

### **3.3.1 Justification for Root cause and Rational choice (2RCs) theories**

The salience of the Root cause theory in understanding the emergence and persistence of insurgency is well acknowledged among scholars (Hudson and Majeska 1999; O'Neill 2002a). Indeed, “even if the generalization is true (and most terrorist leaders are not uneducated or personally deprived), the background of terrorist leadership is only one variable; support for terrorism is also important, and the social condition(s) can be significant in this respect” (Newman 2006: 755). Further stressing this point, Newman counters the critics of the root cause thesis who see terrorists as rarely personally deprived or uneducated. His main argument is “that terrorists (just like all people) surely do not act only according to their own experience or background...they perceive that they are responding to social conditions, irrespective of their own personal situation” (Newman, 2006:755).

Importantly, the ‘Root Cause’ theoretical framework incorporates both directly and indirectly; some of the core variables of the socio-economic theories mentioned earlier, and in particular, the relative deprivation thesis. Against the backdrop of the abounding arguments that relate economic conditions such as economic deprivation, poverty and income inequality with terrorism (Li and Schaub 2004: 231; Burgoon 2006: 176), the root causes theory can fittingly

identify key socio-economic factors, among other factors, that give rise to the insurgency in Nigeria including the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram. Accordingly, in lieu of being treated as merely transient security crises, addressing the root factors is argued to be a more durable measure to countering an insurgency, for which multifaceted dimensions are relevant. As Gupta (2005:16) argues, an exploration of the root cause analysis of terrorism would do well to underscore the quintessential difference between terrorism and other criminal acts. Indeed, despite having elements of criminality, terrorism is a political phenomenon. Hence, one cannot neglect the perceived grievances that drive insurgency. In the incisive words of Gupta:

Not all grievances are baseless. In our zeal to fight terrorists' atrocities, it is easy to disregard legitimate grievance. Although absolute poverty and other aspect of economic deprivation have a weak link to terrorism, a pervasive sense of humiliation and hopelessness does not. The global community must recognize the need to address the legitimate grievance of disaffected people in a meaningful way (2005:27).

Indeed, "until policy-makers can understand the root causes of terrorism, they will be unable to implement effective measures to prevent it" (Richardson 2011: 5). The inverted U-shaped relationship between government coercion and political violence further complicate the military counter-terrorist strategy. It is only more tangible for an effective and long-term "solution to the problems of terrorism with high ideological contents" such as Boko Haram, to be sought within the political arena and not just on the battlefield (Gupta 2005: 24). More importantly, the root causes approach does not limit the causal dimension to conflict within the confines of a given state. Its accents of the role of globalization and the sudden economic downturn, which, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, are to highlight the inter/multinational nature of these phenomena. Indeed, the multiple and complex causes of conflict should always be put into consideration via a more "nuanced multidisciplinary, and dynamic approach" (Hutchful and Aning, 2004:200). Herein lays the utility of the three economic hypotheses of contemporary intra-state conflicts, as highlighted by Stewart (2004: 273), which are arguably useful in putting the economic dimension of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in perspectives for comparison. These include: (1) group inequality, (2) private motivation and incentives and (3) failure of social contract; that is "the failure of the state to play its part in the social contract by delivering economic benefits or social services" (Stewart 2004: 273).

These issues remain the nub of the commonly shared grievance as well as the private motivation below the individual's rational choice calculation, that are central to these insurgencies. It is against this backdrop that the combination of the root causes (RC) and the

rational choice (RC), herein referred to as the 2RCs, is deemed useful in this effort to explicate the intricacies around the socio-economic dimension of both Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram. The convergence of these theories on a construct herein referred to as the *Greed, Need and Creed spectrum* shall be further detailed in the comparative analysis of both insurgencies subsequently in order to highlight their possible similarities and differences in terms of socio-economic dimension. Let us now turn to the 3D, conceptual approach to COIN.

### **3.4 The 3D: Development, Defence and Diplomacy.**

The 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) conceptual approach is used complementarily with the 2RCs to give scope and direction to the unit of analysis. This is particularly done in proffering relevant counter-insurgency policies for the affected regions. In line with the prevailing view that COIN is not simply the job of the military alone, the need for an effective integration of other actors has continued to gain traction among policy-makers and academic community alike (Kilcullen 2006a; Gabriëlse 2007; Glazzard *et al.* 2018). Broad inter-agency responses to insurgency, that is, a mix of military, political and development regarding state-building especially in post-conflict reconstruction as has been observed, for instance, in some parts of Afghanistan, as critical in dealing with insurgency. The underlying logic is hardly unconnected to the recognition of Mao Zedong's view that "a revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political" (cited in David Galula 2006: 63).


Undoubtedly, there is no standard type of COIN. Prescriptions, as well as theories, have varied over the years but often with one overarching ambitious aim, namely, to permanently cure insurgency. Since the 20th century the fundamental principle of COIN, using a mix of military and non-military approaches, has been variously demonstrated. This is especially the case with multilateral bodies such as the UN, OECD, and NATO.

This will have been constructed in various concepts including the Whole of government Approach (WoG), Comprehensive Approach (CA), and the 3D (Development, Diplomacy and Defence) approach (see figure 3.5) The conventional use of 3D in COIN, which is the main focus herein, is mostly attributed to Dutch foreign policy; especially regarding their Operations in Afghanistan (Grandia *et al.* 2009: 13).<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, countries like Canada and the United Kingdom have promoted this multi-track COIN in insurgent-ridden country of Afghanistan

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<sup>30</sup> Framed along the line of Clausewitzian trinity of army, people and government, the 3D underscores the triune of politics, security and development in COIN. "In places where we are trying to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, our military efforts should support and be seen to support this overall effort. Where we are trying to win over the population for a more peaceful and stable order, our developmental instruments should support and be seen to support the overall effort" (: 15).

since 2006 (Bot 2006; Koenders 2007). Even, the Americans have used a similar approach in Vietnam known as CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program), which was based on the so-called Hearts and Minds theory.



**Figure 3. 5: The 3D Counter Insurgency**

Adapted from: Lijn (2011: 25)

Theoretically, the 3D approach draws heavily from (but not reducible to) the Hearts and Minds (HAM) approach as popularised in Malaya in 1952. During this time British High Commissioner to Malaya, Gerald Templer, famously remarked that “the answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (cited in Cohen 2014: 1). The main tenet of HAM is the indispensability of winning the support of the populace to implement effective COIN. It is considered crucial in addressing the state legitimacy crises in insurgency-ridden zones. Hence, for instance in Afghanistan, HAM was demonstrated as “humanitarian and development operations performed mainly by military units or civil-military hybrids in order to increase stability through good faith and thereby increase the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan, as well as the international presence” (Egnell 2010: 289).

Templer underscored thus that for an insurgent group to be deprived of its “mobility, invisibility and legitimacy”, COIN must focus primarily on destroying the support it enjoyed among the populations (Egnell 2010: 284). This population-centric approach appositely underscores, as part of the causes of conflict, the negative impact of ‘development’ and modernity on traditional societies; thus, striving to address the resultant institutional gaps. This is believed to be achievable through winning “the public’s support (their ‘hearts and minds’) for the government

by ameliorating some of the negative effects of development while speeding up the provision of modernity's benefits" (Grandia *et al.* 2009). In this light, Michael Fitzsimmons provided a very useful analysis of the ideological and theoretical foundation of HAM thus:

The premise of most Western thinking on counter-insurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy for the ruling regime among some critical portion of the local population. Among the mechanisms available to counter-insurgents for establishing that legitimacy, one of the most prominent in both practice and doctrine has been the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. *Good governance*, by this logic, is the key to "winning hearts and minds" (cited in Egnell 2010: 285, emphasis added)

### **3.4.1 The Development Element**

Given the non-negligible development-security nexus (however complex), the 3D, as advocated herein, aims (or should aim) to address issues of underdevelopment, and especially socio-economic conditions that give rise to social unrest in line with the other factors. The essence of development, for instance, through economic aids, helps to "persuade the population to support the government instead of the insurgents" (Grandia *et al.* 2009: 14).

Hence, the building of effective administrative capacity for the provisioning of security, basic needs and services in a manner which is perceived as legitimate by the local population" is crucial to an effective COIN (2009: 19). Akin to this, HAM approach as demonstrated in the 3D, stresses development over and above security (Schafer, 1988:2). One must be cognizant of Egnell's (2010) observation concerning the tendency to construe development from the perspective of linear trajectory, and the implication thereof in turning development to a means rather than an end, in and of itself. However, the development sort herein is not only construed as a means to an end (such as peace and stability) but it is also an end in and of itself. It is construed as necessary stability and peace, which forms part of the overall end, namely development, in the broadest sense of the word.

Accordingly, in Uruzgan, (economic) development reportedly scaled up especially in the Afghan Development Zones (ADZs) due to the application of the 3D. External aid and support combined with a few agricultural initiatives gave rise to economic growth, while the local government service delivery capability was being enhanced. [inter]governmental organisations such as the UN alongside national and international NGOs could actively participate in the various developmental programs covering the gamut of education, health, agriculture and

livestock development (Grandia *et al.* 2009: 38-42). More importantly, as Grandia *et al.* (2009: 42) explained, the development project such as agriculture, geared towards poverty reduction, was appositely presented as an Afghan's rather than a Dutch's project. The two pertinent reasons for these include: [1] that the insurgents may not destroy it because it is of *foreign* origin. This facilitated its sustainability; and [2] boosts the perception of the local governments among the populace in terms of its ability to *care for them* (emphasis added). Furthermore, Grandia (2009:45) noted there was a balance between the development and aid efforts by the international organisation. The "improved security situation", resulted in increased economic activity, as the opening of a market in a village where insurgents once had stronghold.

### **3.4.2 The Diplomatic Element**

The notion of diplomacy is hardly disconnected to the idea of development. The object is persuasion that can solidify the allegiance of the population to the government or switching it from insurgents. This also is about governance. It is about reducing, if not eliminating, the existence of ungoverned areas, through soft power rather than hard power. Indeed, "once warfare is connected to both development and diplomacy, strategic and tactical military decisions can have a lasting impact on long-term objectives" (cited in Grandia *et al.* 2009: 45). In the same vein, the diplomatic element in 3D pertains to the efforts of the counterinsurgents to neutralise external assistance to the insurgents and, at the same time, mobilise outside support for their own cause. For instance, its operationalization in Afghanistan included the launching of the Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) in 2007, with the mandate to *improve governance* for the attainment of stability (Grandia *et al.* 2009: 38, emphasis added). It is within such clime that negotiation and political settlement can arguably foster stability and peace. On its own, diplomacy may not always yield this result; hence, the relevance of the integration with the military dimension (defence) as well as development.

### **3.4.3 The Defence Element**

It must be noted that the success of diplomacy and development is hardly possible without the military firm hold on the violence of insurgency' at least for a period. Hence, the defence element of 3D encompasses the wide range of military tasks including waging war, peacekeeping or coordinating disaster response to attaining peace and stability. This is the most common approach to conflict around the globe. Meanwhile, in the 3D framework, it means more. It means the nearness of the military to the people. Akin to this, Kilcullen (2006b: 109); (Kilcullen 2006a) underscore the importance of being present to the population – being there for people.

Presence should be established by living in close proximity to the population, through frequent patrolling on foot, night patrolling and sleeping in local villages. This type of activity, though seemingly dangerous, will establish links with locals and increase human intelligence – thereby increasing the security of the counter-insurgents (cited in Egnell 2010: 291)

The inadequacy, if not lack, of such presence not only makes the operationalization of the other Ds less effective, but also difficult. In the case of Nigeria, this has resulted, for instance to the re-capture of territory by the insurgents.

#### **3.4.4 Challenges of HAM/3D**

The HAM approach has its own challenges. Not only is it open to a variety of [mis]interpretations, including mere appeasement of the people through softness and goodwill to the population without stamping of authority through the use of force, it is also not immune to abuse (Egnell 2010). However, its broader operationalization, especially, through the 3D reduces this weakness tied to a narrower conception of legitimacy, which has meant that “counter-insurgents have had preconceived ideas about what needs and grievances to address rather than to actually listen to the local population” (Egnell 2010: 292).

The relevance of the HAM, as operationalised through the 3D, lies in its emphasis on the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) anchored essentially on good governance with the aims of depriving the insurgents the oxygen to breath, namely the population. The population’s support may be due to an affinity with, or coercion from, the insurgents and/or the combination of both (Kilcullen 2006b). Hence, a healthy balance of hard power with soft power helps to bring the population into the picture of COIN, since people are key to understanding and addressing the root causes of the insurgency. This dynamic, to some extent, is an improvement over its misinterpretation and misapplication in the narrative of colonial withdrawal largely rooted in the legal-rational conception of legitimacy (Egnell 2010).

As far as governance is concerned, the HAM approach brings to the fore two basic but critical political factors behind insurgency, namely, bad administration and the lack of administration (Grandia *et al.* 2009). Both are glaringly obvious in Nigeria and impact negatively on security. Accordingly, the 3D concept is used to interrogate which developmental, diplomatic, as well as defence initiatives are likely to prove effective in Nigeria’s COIN efforts considering the limited utility of the military approach as a sole tactic. Importantly, in this study, the 3D is not limited to intervening force or external force, but proffered to the host nation’s force, namely Nigeria. In other words, lessons drawn from the 3D approach are to be carefully and cautiously tailored into Nigeria’s COIN strategies.

The 3D conceptual framework is arguably a comprehensive counter-insurgency framework both in long and short term in Nigeria since the “ability to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, coordinated fashion (i.e., diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) is increasingly essential to achieving effective results” (Leslie *et al.* 2008: 1). Meanwhile, in the need to avoid some of the challenges it has faced elsewhere such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 3D in Nigeria must be predominantly engineered from within to take adequate cognizance of internal socio-cultural nuances, while leveraging on external support, where available and possible. In other words, this study advocates for the abstraction of relevant lessons from the 3D for contextual application in Nigeria.

The Dutch 3D COIN seems to have been mainly popularised in Afghanistan and Iraq. By implication, the assessment of its applicability and efficacy in long term is anything but easy due to the limited environment where it has been operationalised. Doubting the applicability of all three Ds by the PRTs, COIN specialist, Long, is of the “impression that operations in Afghanistan very seldom embody all three Ds- they either focus on development/diplomacy or on defence, not both as an integrated approach” (Long, cited in Grandia *et al.* 2009: 18). No doubt the 3D as operationalised in Afghanistan suffered from several challenges including lack of adequate integration, its principles are useful when treating the multifarious aspect of modern insurgency; which are markedly different from conventional wars. Nevertheless, its strength lay in “the shared responsibilities and planning” that it promotes among various agencies (Olsthoorn *et al.* 2016: 264). Its’ general emphasis on human security is pertinent and is of relevance to this study. This is particularly so due to the multi-dimensional drivers of conflict and terrorism in modern era, ranging from material, ethnic, religious, to ideological demands such as those experienced in Nigeria. In other words, it stresses the two crucial sides of the COIN, as the detailing of this dynamics shall reveal in the chapter 9 of the studies. In the meantime, it is assumed that a skilful coordination of defence, diplomacy and development is critical for the application of a durable COIN.

### **3.5 Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter explained the theoretical foundation on which the study is based. The chapter explicates the efficacy of the Root Cause (RC), Rational Choice theoretical framework and the 3D (Development, Diplomacy and Defence) conceptual framework. Subsumable under the RC theory is the relative deprivation (RD) thesis, in view of its explanatory relevance for the focus of this study. Despite its own limitation, the root cause theory will be used to assess the extent to which certain socio-economic conditions “provide a social environment and widespread

grievances that, when combined with certain precipitant factors; result in the emergence of terrorist organizations and terrorist acts” (Newman 2006: 750), in relation to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

Furthermore, the root cause is augmented with the rational choice theory to account for certain nuances that are not covered by the root causes such as the role of the human agency. The combined power of both theories as 2RCs helps to better illuminate the admittedly complex social and economic dimension of both insurgencies amidst other non-economic factors, and the ideological dimension. The 3Ds is also explicated with the view to shape the requisite comprehensive approach toward addressing both insurgencies, amongst others, in Nigeria, while acknowledging some challenges with its operationalization, notably among which, is its western foundation as well as the challenges of operationalization in weak states. Hence, the cautious adoption of the 3D is due mainly to the need for highlighting adaptable lessons from its operationalization elsewhere, with an ultimate view of giving scope and direction for its utility in Nigeria by minding context specificity of every conflict.

Meanwhile, before delving into the application of these theoretical and conceptual frameworks to the findings and discussion of this study, it is extremely important to provide an adequate descriptive profiling of the insurgent groups under study. This is useful in providing the necessary indicators and insights that will facilitate a meaningful analysis and discussion of the socio-economic dimension of the insurgent groups in the subsequent chapters. Thus, the next two chapters provide a detailed description of Boko Haram and selected insurgent groups in the Niger Delta respectively. The treatment of these groups in two separate chapters is particularly warranted by the need to maintain a reasonable length between chapters, given that each of the group requires a detailed account. This is also consistent with the approved structure of the proposal by the University’s Higher degree committee


## **CHAPTER 4 NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY IN CONTEXT**

### **4.0 Introductory Remark**

The history of Niger Delta is chequered with political conflicts and the associated deleterious implications for the larger Nigeria state, due to the region's economic relevance to the Nigerian petrodollar economy. To meaningfully explore the drivers of insurgency in the Niger Delta region, it is germane to provide a rich historical background description, since this is very relevant to the subsequent investigations of the socio-economic dimension of terror/insurgency. Commencing with a cursory mapping of the socio-political and economic history of the Niger Delta region, especially prior to the discovery of oil, this chapter highlights the subsequent geopolitical significance of the region vis-à-vis Nigeria's petrodollar economy. Furthermore, structural factors such as Nigerian federalism, that inhibits development and how that impacts on oil-producing minority ethnic groups especially since the discovery of oil will be discussed within the context of the broader National Question(s). Following the above logically is the wake of resistance in the region resulting from both the unresolved National Question(s) as well as the arguably lopsided federal government conflict management's strategies. The key actors in the resistance, particularly the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) will be selectively profiled among several others in the region for the sake of manageability and their relative relevance to this study. Brief reference will also be made to the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA); which is among the latest in the region.

### **4.1 The Niger Delta Region: A Brief Historical Background**

In political and academic parlance, the Niger Delta region has been extensively discussed in relation to militant agitation for resource control and self-determination especially in recent decades (Obi 1998; Ojatorotu and Okeke-Uzodike 2006; Osaghae *et al.* 2007; Watts 2007; ICG 2015). As the figure 4.1 below demonstrates, the Niger Delta geographically covers the natural Delta and Niger River that spans over 70,000 square kilometres and makes up 7.5 per cent of Nigeria's land mass from Cross River in the east to Benin River in the West (Dike 1956; Uwasomba and Alumona 2014). The region is regarded as one of the foremost wetlands in the world, rated as the ninth vastest drainage area in the world, and it "possesses a massive oil infrastructure consisting of 606 fields, 5,284 wells, 7,000 kilometres of pipelines" (Watts 2007: 639). The region is also home to 10 export terminals, 275 flow stations, 10 gas plants, 3 (of Nigeria's 4) refineries, and a massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector.



**Figure 4. 1: Geopolitical Map of the Niger Delta Region: Federal Republic of Nigeria**

*Source:* Niger Delta Diaspora Organisation Europe<sup>31</sup>

The region’s four broad ecological zones, namely “the coast inland, the coastal sandy barrier ridge zone, the mangrove swamp zone, the freshwater swamp zone and the lowland rainforest zone” (UNDP 2006) account for its distinctive economic, social, and cultural features that are pertinent to the subsequent discourse. For instance, its relief and hydrological characteristics are integral to the region’s fragility as well as significance in Nigeria political and economic discourse. Hence, much of the region’s vast (under)development records have been, rightly or wrongly, attributed, to the complexities of the physical landscape. According to Ariweriokuma (2008: 254) “the Deltaic wetlands are interspersed with creeks and brackish water and mangroves trees so do not presents themselves as easy terrain for commercial ventures or general development”. Additionally, its “water-logged, flood-prone terrain” is regarded as the most difficult in Nigeria, according to the UNDP (2006) Report.

Inversely, in agricultural terms, the region’s “extensive forests, [a surfeit of] wildlife, and fertile agricultural land” makes its conducive for fish farming and the cultivation of various crops including, but not limited to, “rice, sugarcane, plantain, beans, palm oil, yam, cassava, and

<sup>31</sup> Available from <http://www.nddoe.org/the-niger-delta-map-project/>

timber” (Okonta and Douglas 2003: 63). Underscoring this agricultural implication, UNDP (2006: 74) reported that “over 60 per cent of Niger Delta inhabitants derive their livelihood from the natural environment”, which explains the vitality of environmental preservation in the region.

In current geopolitical mappings, the Niger Delta represents all the oil bearing states in south-south Nigeria consisting of nine states namely, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers, encompassing 185 local governments. Its ethnic pluralism is discernible from the myriads of groups inhabiting the region, including: the Andoni, Bekwara, Bini, Efik, Egbema, Ekoi, Ibibio, Ikwerre, Ijaw, Igbo, Isoko, Itsekiri, Kalabari, Ogoni, Urhobo Ogoni, Urhobo, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Isoko, Efik, Ibibio, amongst many others. With its population of over eight million, the Ijaws constitute the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta and are the “fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria after the three dominant ones”(Ojakorotu 2008: 165; Ana 2011: 182), which partly explains their dominance in the political resistance that has come to characterise the region over the years.

Demographic records show that the steadily growing Niger Delta population was over 40 million in the last National Census in 2006 according to the National Population Commission (NPC 2009). At the time, the national population was only 140 million. Impliedly, the Niger Delta population was over 23% of the national population (NPC 2009). Meanwhile, the Niger Delta Development Commission’s (NDDC) figure for the region’s population density of about 265 people per square kilometre was considered to be the highest in the world (cited in UNDP 2006). Further, its typically youthful population largely leaves many outside the working age bracket, as they are mostly in “their formative years, when social investment is heaviest” (UNDP 2006: 24). The socio-political and economic ramifications of these features, in relation to the region’s fragility and political instability, is better appreciated if one takes cognisance of their historical-political milieu.

#### **4.1.1 Acephalous Political Setting**

Socio-politically, what is currently known as the Niger Delta area predates the Nigerian state as a British Colony by at least a decade (Alagoa 1970; Agbiboa 2011). The British Niger Delta Protectorate and the Niger Delta Coast Protectorate were already well recognised by the mid-1880s and the late 1890s (Onduku 2001). During this period, many communities in the Niger

Delta including the Ijaws were governed or led based on “the principle of ward and/or houses” by “their own local leaders who distinguished themselves in the service of their people while serving the British” (Onduku 2001). Accordingly, its political *cum* administrative features political setting was largely ‘acephalous’, with distinctive features that facilitated the generally egalitarian and decentralised government system in the region prior to the advent of the colonialists.

Among these identifiable features for instance, include the Canoe House system, and the predominance of the secret cult (Ojatorotu 2008; Agbiboa 2011; Abejide 2014). The Canoe House system involved “corporate organisations of kinsmen, strangers and slaves assembled for the purpose of successful participation in the overseas slave trade” (Ojatorotu, 2008: 29). Naval power was key to the trade and often accounted for the separation of the new group from the parent House. However, the separation does not break the allegiance of the new group to the parent house (Ojatorotu 2008).

In other words, “the popular conception was that a new house is economically independent but subordinate, politically, to the mother house” (Agbiboa 2011: 61). The predominant role of secret society such as the Ekine in Nembe and Kalabari in the decision-making and running of society was key in the social organisation and running of the society (Ojatorotu 2008: 30). Ekine “brought together all important men whose decisions concerning Ekine were then executed by the society’s junior members” (Osaghae, 1998 quoted in Agbiboa 2011: 62). Difficult topography encourages people to gather in small communities and hold discussions on societal issues; thus, accounting for a reasonably decentralised government structure. This experience of a decentralised and considerably egalitarian political system prior to the amalgamation in 1914, made it largely possible for the Niger Deltans to promote individual and collective rights especially in relation to ownership of property. Hence, the drastic change under the Nigerian centralised government has hardly been without negative implications for the socio-economic wellbeing of the people in the region. This has also been compounded by the characteristic marginalization of ethnic minorities in Nigeria politics (Ojatorotu and Okeke-Uzodike 2006; Ojatorotu 2008).

#### **4.1.2 Socio-Economic Background**

According to historical records, prior to the advent of the colonialist, the Niger Delta inhabitants were considerably successful in trading, especially of palm oil that they produced

in large quantities, and from whence the region received its name oil Rivers Protectorate by the British in 1889 (Dike 1956; Alagoa 1970). Subsistent agriculture (farming and fishing) and trading constituted the basis of livelihood for the Niger Delta inhabitants, prior to the oil exploration. However, the drastic shift in socio-economic feature of Nigeria during the subsequent oil economy not only resulted in loss of land, but also the loss of fertility and fish due to oil spillages (Ebeku 2006; Agbiboa 2011). Thus, the sentimental attachment to the land thus far, and the ramification thereof for the conflict in the region is appreciable against this backdrop. The eventual environmental degradation accounts for high levels of urban migration from the creeks and hinterland in search of largely inexistent greener pasture, with growing adverse implication for lack of agricultural manpower in the rural areas (Director2; Badmus 2010; Barna 2014). For now, we shall turn our attention to the oil exploration in the region and the implications thereof.

#### **4.2 Oil Exploration and the Exploitation in Niger Delta**

The Niger Delta region was rightly dubbed as the “Goose that lays the golden eggs” (Peace-builder3; Agbiboa 2011) in view of the centrality of the petrol generated from that region to the Nigeria’s economic life. According to Oviasuyi and Uwadiae (2010), “about 98 per cent of exports, over 80 per cent of government’s annual revenue and 70 per cent of budgetary expenditure” is derived from petroleum generated from the region. The exploration of Petroleum in the region has however impacted negatively on the local community, despite this strategic geographical and economic importance to Nigeria’s political economy.

##### **4.2.1 Geopolitical [In]Significance of the Niger Delta**

Nigeria’s Niger Delta assumed its current geopolitical significance mainly in 1956 when oil was discovered precisely in Oloibiri, present-day Bayelsa state. This discovery and accompanying exploration, with the benefit of insight, has amounted to both blessings and curse for the region in relation to the national and international economy (Idemudia and Ite 2006: 391). Numerous scholars have highlighted the centrality of crude oil generated from the Niger Delta to the Nigeria economy (Obi 1998; Ojakorotu and Okeke-Uzodike 2006; Omotola 2006; Omotola 2009b; Omotola 2009a; Ogundiya 2011). Harbouring “Nigeria’s crude oil reserves to the tune of 33 billion barrels, while the natural gas reserves are 160 trillion cubic feet” (Omotola 2009b: 36), the Niger Delta has remained the bane of Nigeria’s economy<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Another recent study puts the value crude reserves at 40 billion (Emordi, 2015)

According to the CIA World Factbook in 2006 estimates, “oil provides 20 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP, 95 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings and 65 per cent of its budgetary revenues” (cited in ICG 2006c: 5).

The paradox, however, is that “the region is one of the poorest, least developed and least reciprocated for its contributions to national wealth” (Ikelegbe 2001: 437). In the political equation of Nigeria, the regions until 2007, was politically un[der]represented at the national level, despite its contribution. This is largely courtesy of the lop-sidedness of the Nigeria’s federal structure and its tendency to encourage minority exclusion. Agbiboa (2011: 18) highlighted two fundamental implications discernible from the political exclusion and underrepresentation that typifies Nigeria’s federalism thus: [1] it “tends to flatten the vestiges of federalism and democracy” thereby oiling “the interests of the majority ethnic groups, while foiling those of the minority ethnic groups”; [2] It entrenches “unequal fiscal regimes” thereby generating “minority ferment in federations with multi-ethnic groups”. A closer consideration of these subtleties of Nigerian federalism is pertinent.

#### **4.2.1.1 Federalism and Resource Control/Allocation**

Although it was Sir Bourdillon who initiates the idea of federalism in 1939, Nigeria’s constitutional journey toward federalism arguably commenced with the 1946 adoption of the Arthur Richards Constitution (Ojatorotu 2008). This was further consolidated by the 1951 Macpherson Constitution and culminated in the tripod federal system of government in Nigeria, namely the Northern, Western and Eastern regions representing the three dominant ethnic groups: Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo respectively (Ibeanu 2000; Suberu 2001; ICG 2006a). Albeit preferred over the colonialist imposed Arthur Richards Constitution for its reasonable involvement of Nigerians, the Macpherson Constitution<sup>33</sup> hardly addressed the problem of minorities as the big three ultimately dictated Nigeria’s political and economic space over time (Ojatorotu 2008). The absence of the requisite institutional framework or pro-national leadership to help in squelching ethnic tension reveal the weakness in this constitution(s), such that barely three years into its operation, violence erupted in Kano city which pitched northerners against southerners. Oliver Lyttleton, the then British Secretary of

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<sup>33</sup> In drafting this constitution, wide consultations were held with the population of the village, district, and divisional, provincial, regional and national levels. The outcome revealed an overwhelming yearning among Nigerian for “a structure that would give the regions greater autonomy and political space” (ICG, 2006 :2).

State for the Colonies had to step in and convene a conference involving the leaders of various political parties in London in 1953.

The eventual outcome was the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution that established the direction of the constitutional reforms in favour of federalism, and on which newly independent Nigeria was to construct the 1963 Republican Constitution (ICG 2006b; Ojatorotu 2008). Unfortunately, this arrangement was ultimately for administrative convenience and financial prudence rather than broad socio-political and economic development of the nation to the degree that minority rights would be adequately protected. Even though the Republican Constitution saddled the regions with the responsibilities of handling residual matters including various socio-economic programs, and guaranteed them significant power the reality has been overdependence on the centre for many development projects (ICG 2006b: 2). These various constitutional reforms unwittingly deepened the negative effects of majoritarianism<sup>34</sup> in the already polarised Nigeria state where ethnic allegiance tends to supersede patriotism.

The above, by implication, erected “the boundaries of the northern, western and eastern regions around the identities of the major ethnic formations of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively” (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 16). Hence, ethnic minorities, such as the Niger Delta inhabitants had to contend with the domination of the big three, especially dealing with “Northern Chauvinism” (Osaghae and Suberu 2005; Agbiboa 2011). Indeed, “the fact that it was almost double the size of the combined Western and Eastern regions” and had been favoured by the colonialist system of indirect rule, fostered northern superiority, with severe implication for ethnic minorities (ICG 2006b). Unsurprisingly, the lopsided colonial ethno-regional federal structure eventually triggered a number of violent reactions and secessionist campaign due, among other reasons, to the implication thereof for resource allocation for ethnic minorities. Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 17) cited the “Tiv riots of 1962 and 1964, and the secessionist campaign as pioneered by Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro and his Ijaw collaborators in 1966<sup>35</sup> as cases in point to accentuate the enduring “disenchantment of the ethnic minorities

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<sup>34</sup> Mariam Webster defines Majoritarianism as “the philosophy or practice according to which decisions of an organized group should be made by a numerical majority of its members”

<sup>35</sup> “In January 1966, Boro had proclaimed the Niger Delta Peoples Republic with himself as Head of State. He engaged the Nigeria Police Force in a bloody battle and defeated them, but the Armed Forces of Nigeria went into the war and Boro and his men held up the federal troops for a quite a while before he was defeated on the 12th day” (Onduku 2001: 3)

with their inequitable incorporation into the majority-dominated regions”. The ethno-regional tension climaxed in the three-year civil war (1967 – 1970), sparked by the Igbo-led coup.

Relatedly, Uzodike *et al.* (2010: 166) have situated and diagnosed the Niger Delta problem with the fact that “the national government [in Nigeria] has centralised the ownership and control of oil resources in such a way that nearly all component states and local government areas depend primarily on transfers”. Through various Decrees, the post-Civil War Military led federal government increasingly concentrated power in the centre by weakening the various smaller units that were created over the years – from “the initial twelve in 1967, to nineteen in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and 36 in 1996” (ICG 2006b).

Contrary to the rationalization that these devolution will “give more autonomy to ethnic and sub-ethnic nationalities and to bring government nearer to the people”, the design was essentially “to dilute regional power and so quash any remaining secessionist rumblings” (ICG 2006b: 2). Meanwhile, affected groups, especially ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta, defied the design, questioning the federal arrangement that has left them with nothing but misery while other parts of the country enjoyed the dividends of the petrodollar. As Uzodike *et al.* (2010: 166) aptly observed “many in the South, particularly the Niger Delta inhabitants, often adjudge the transfers to be done so unfairly that the North — with apparent control of political power and, as such, resource sharing power – is unduly favoured”

Summarily, therefore, the key issues undergirding the various internal conflicts in Nigeria, including the Niger Delta, according to Ojatorotu (2008), are: [1] minority agitations; [2] centralization of power; [3] revenue generation and allocation; and [4] constitutionalism and political restructuring. Of relevance to the Niger Delta insurgency are the first and third issues, which found their legalization and institutionalization in the second and fourth issues. Minority agitation in the region has been linked with the exclusionary political space entrenched by the tripodal regional arrangement initially and subsumed eventually on the lopsided federalism. This is in line with the view that “a significant number of people who belong to minorities across the world live in extreme poverty,” that results mainly from “the discrimination and racism that they face at the hands of majority communities and Governments” (Khan 2010: 9).

Arguably, nothing highlights the pain of the Niger Delta inhabitants more than the reality of unfavourable resource allocation. The agitation in the region for increase in the derivative

principle from the current 13 % to 50 % is arguably tied to the broader question of fiscal federalism and financial accountability in Nigeria (Gideon 2012), (see: table 4.1). The questionable manner of resource allocation, whereby “the Federal Government takes 52.68 percent (including special funds): states 26.72 percent, while the Local Governments are allocated 20.6 percent” has remained fundamental to the various developmental challenges in Nigeria (Gideon 2012: 56). It has not only concentrated resources in hand of the few at the federal level but has also attracted enormous corruption to the centre especially since the predominance of petroleum in the economy (Uwasomba and Alumona 2014). In addition, because Nigeria’s limited (largely regulatory) role, in the oil exploration from the outset, further compound injustice. This is further appreciable when one considers the practice during pre-oil economy. For deeper appreciation of the foregoing, it is pertinent to review the national legislative configuration in relation to exploration in the Niger Delta to decipher the legislative ambience that instituted and sustained the marginalization of the people of the Niger Delta.

**Table 4. 1: Derivative Principles in Nigeria 1960 – Date.**

Year	Derivative %	Regime	
1960	50	Tafawa Balewa	Civilian
1970	45	Yakubu Gowon	Military
1977	25	Olusegun Obasanjo	Military
1981	5.0	Shehu Shagari	Civilian
1984	1.5	Muhammed Buhari	Military
1992	1.0	Ibrahim Babangida	Military
1999 – date	13	(Abubakar)-1999 Constitution	(Transitional) - Civilian

Sources: Adapted from Gideon (2012: 60)

The lack of requisite indigenous expertise, and significant capital, for the development of oil economy necessitated the joint venture agreement between Nigeria and British Multinational Companies from the onset. This arrangement, largely limited Nigeria’s maximization of its’ resource wealth, considering that “instead of being operational ... they were reduced to a transit point position where they only have to depend on levies and royalties” (Ojakorotu 2008: 79). The agreement, it must be stressed, was not limited to oil exploration but also involved other minerals including limestone, cement, tin etc. In this regard, given the profit drive of the British companies, virtually all the laws passed under the colonialist government, ranging from the Mineral Oils Ordinances in 1914 to the Petroleum Act gave the British and Multinational Companies more economic advantage over Nigeria. Ojakorotu noted that even upon joining OPEC in 1972 and the eventual establishment of the Nigeria National Petroleum Commission NNPC by the Act 33 in 1977, the economic power remained with Multinational Companies.

Nigeria, as the less powerful actor in the joint venture, depends on the fortune of these companies for its royalties. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the government's regulations have always been clearly bent on serving the interests of the companies, for which its own profit is dependent.

Legislations such as the 1969 Petroleum Act, the 1978 Land Use Act, and the Exclusive Economic Zone Decree of 1978 have served this purpose over the years. Similarly, the Nigerian constitution gives the ownership of mineral, oil and gas in country exclusively to the federal government, which is the only link to the Multinational Oil Companies (MNCOs). The extensive implications involve the extent to which they exclusively vested ownership of land and resources to the government, especially the federal government and its accredited agents. This is glaringly the case in the Niger Delta as far as the federal government's control of resources remains. The current move to constitutionally strip the Federal government of its power to control resources is benchmarked on this view, with due respect to the pain of the Niger Delta inhabitants, and the overall bid, to revive and strengthen the struggling national economy (Ovuakporie and Agbakwuru 2017). This is a step in the right direction considering the negative impact of Nigeria's over-reliance on oil, at the detriment of other available mineral resources. As the Minority Leader of the Current National Assembly correctly observed, "We are one of the richest nations, blessed with so much resources, minerals and non-minerals, but nobody is tapping them because we mistakenly found oil. I think the day we discovered oil was our dooms day. So we need to ask if we want to live for oil or oil will live for us" (Ovuakporie and Agbakwuru 2017: np).

The point remains the urgent need for diversification of the economy and equitable distribution. The Niger Delta inhabitants are not only dispossessed, but also disempowered economically, which is why they consider the operation of the legal framework to be oppressive and alienating (Ikporukpo 1996; Okoko and Nna 1997; Ojatorotu and Gilbert 2010; Gideon 2012). Connected to this are also legislative issues surrounding the derivation formula vis-à-vis revenue allocations. Based on the centrist federal structure, various fiscal policies and laws in Nigeria have been rightly called to question because of their continued entrenchment of de-

development(Roy 1987)<sup>36</sup> of Nigeria in general and the Niger Delta; hence, the contextualization of the crisis in the National Question.

#### **4.2.1.2 The National Question: Internal Colonialism**

Extensive works have fittingly situated the Niger Delta conflict within the context of the National Question, with the view to proffer a sustainable peace and development in the region (Osaghae 1998; Adejumobi 2003; Osaghae and Suberu 2005; Akwara *et al.* 2013). The essence of the National question, as Osaghae (1998: 315) rightly puts it is “how to structure the Nigerian federation in order to accommodate groups and guarantee access to power and equitable distribution of resources”.

For his part, Adejumobi maintained that the unresolved question revolves, broadly, around the following:

1. What should be the component units and tiers of government in the Nigerian federation?
2. How should they be constituted, based on ethnic contiguity or administrative expediency?
3. How should political power and administrative responsibilities be shared among the levels and tiers of government?
4. How should the ownership of economic resources be structured in the Nigerian federation?
5. What should be the acceptable formulae for sharing federally collected revenue?
6. What should be the nature of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria? (quoted in Agbiboa 2011: 71)

Despite the attempt of various Commissions<sup>37</sup> since independence to address these issues, domination (both perceived and real) of ethnic minority groups by the major ethnic groups remained, courtesy of the lop-sidedness of the federal structure and the culture of weak implementation of policies reports. The net effect is the glaringly rising “impoverishment, frustration and disillusionment of the people” (Adejumobi 2000: 126; Adejumobi 2003; Gideon 2012). Poignantly, the majoritarian politics is revoltingly perceived as “internal

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<sup>36</sup> De-development herein must be understood according to Roy (1987: 56) as “a process which undermines or weakens the ability of an economy to grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical inputs needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural level” as arguably the case in Nigeria.

<sup>37</sup>Ojatorotu clearly identified some of these Commissions that have prioritised the derivations principle issues but have been unable to rest the challenges. These Commissions including the “Phillipson (1946), Hicks-Phillipson (1951), Chick (1953) and Raisman (1958) Commissions and later the Bimms (1964), Dina (1968), Aboyade (1977) and Okigbo (1979) Commissions”, he argues, could have addressed the lingering issues if not for poor implementation due largely to manipulation by dominant ethnic groups for self-interested end (Ojatorotu, 2008: 56)..

colonialism” by the locals and environmental rights groups alike, given how the exploitative control of the resources by “outsider” especially the politically dominant ethnic groups has entrenched poverty and environmental degradation in the region, leaving the indigene in squalor (Onduku 2001; Idemudia and Ite 2006; Afiotan and Ojatorotu 2009).

Essentially, internal colonialism entails the undue political and economic power especially apropos resource control wielded or by the majority ethnic groups even in minority territories merely on the basis of numerical superiority (Naanen 1995: 9; Agbibo 2011). One of the negative implications of the above include how the derivation principle has been gradually deemphasised at the expense of the producing Niger Delta minority groups, by the domineering majority ethnic groups. For instance, as Table 4.1 above clearly demonstrated, from its highest in 50% between 1960 and 1967, the derivation fell to a meagre 13% in 1999 (Ogundiya 2011). This reality is critical to the lingering debate on, and agitation for, fiscal federalism.

#### **4.2.1.3 Lack of Fiscal Federalism and Implications Niger Delta**

A large body of literature have extensively assessed the socio-economic and environmental injustice in Nigeria, including especially how it bears on the Niger Delta crisis, due to a lack of fiscal federalism (Emenuga 1993; Ikporukpo 1996; Akpan 1999; Okoh and Egbon 1999; Okoh 2007). In a nutshell, Ikporukpo (1996: 322) clearly articulated that the “territorial fiscal subsidisation”, that became “the norm” since the 1970s, when oil became the economy’s mainstay, is perceived as an unjust deviation from the earlier principle of derivation by the people of the Niger Delta. The abandonment of the above principle for “the principles of population size and extent and equality of states” tends to favour the numerically superior ethnic groups, which had also enjoyed the latter principle when their products were the bane of Nigeria’s economy as the expense of the Niger Delta region (Ikporukpo 1996: 322).

This biased shift in fiscal federalism renders this political exclusion more acute for the oil-bearing states of Niger Delta. Hence, Gideon (2012: 61) maintained that “the twin concepts of Fiscal Federalism and Niger Delta crisis are the most urgent political and economic challenges that confront the government of Nigeria”. Indeed, abounding evidences demonstrate that oil exploration in Niger Delta reinforces the “resource curse” thesis in the Niger Delta, especially considering the accompanying suffering, violence indescribable and irredeemable ecological devastation (Watts 2004; Ojatorotu and Okeke-Uzodike 2006; UNDP 2006; Osaghae *et al.* 2007; Agbibo 2011; Paki and Ebienfa 2011: 141; Gideon 2012). For instance, the Niger Delta

features as one “of the five most petroleum-polluted environment in the world” thereby qualifying Nigeria as a ‘hot spot’ for the threats of Climate Change according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (cited in Pavšič 2012 ).<sup>38</sup> Hence Onduku (2001) was right to argue that “despite being the richest geopolitical region in terms of natural resource endowment, the Niger Delta’s potential for sustainable development however remains unfulfilled, and is now increasingly threatened by environmental devastation and worsening economic conditions”.

#### **4.3 The Wake Resistance in the Region: From MOSOP to MEND**

Historical evidence suggest that resource-related conflict in the Niger Delta region dates as far back as 1894 when King Koko of Nembe “resisted the Royal Niger Company’s attempts to shut out the Nembe people from the lucrative trade in palm oil” (UNDP 2006: 16). Meanwhile, it is oil related resistance that has brought the region to the limelight since 1956, when the region became a prominent source of global energy supply. Due to injustice, marginalization, and political exclusion suffered by the Ijaws and other Niger Deltans, the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) led by Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, an Ijaw man born in Kaiama, an ancient town in the present Bayelsa State of Nigeria, staged a 12-day revolution in 1996.

Boro, and his 59 youths, whom he had trained in the use of firearm, protested the massive exploitation that oil exploration in the region brought to Niger Delta communities. Their ultimate goal was secession and the establishment of the Niger Delta Republic (Boro 1982)<sup>39</sup>. According to Epelle (2010: np), the February 23, 1966 attacks at Yanegoa, was characterised by raids of armoury, kidnapping of police officers, blowing of pipelines and gun battles with police. After 12 days, however the national security outfit overcame Boro and some of his men, who were tried for treason and sentenced to death. However, Boro was reprieved and eventually co-opted in the Nigeria military during the civil war (1967-1970) (Ojakorotu 2008). This interestingly marked the beginning of the use amnesty in the region to deal with the trouble maker and not the trouble itself in Nigeria. However, the seeds of further agitation had been sown.

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<sup>38</sup>Onduku (2001:8) observed that “particularly threatened is the mangrove forest of Nigeria, the largest in Africa and sixty per cent of which is located in the Niger Delta. Also facing extinction are the fresh water swamp forests of the Delta, which at 11700 km square are the most extensive in West and Central Africa and the local people depend on this for sustenance”.

<sup>39</sup> Besides, given fear of domination by the Igbos in the east region, the agitation was equally “predicated on the suspicion that the military government of General Aguiyi Ironsi would hijack the control of oil resources of the region” (Ojakorotu 2008:165).

Years later in the 1990s, after the dust from the Nigeria Civil War appeared to have reasonably settled, various militia groups gradually [re]surfaced. In effect, less than a decade between 1990 and 1999, over 24 ethnic-based minority rights groups rose in the region (Adejumobi 2003: 3). These included: the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Chikoko, Ijaw National Congress (INC), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Ijaw Peace Movement (IPM), Isoko National Youth Movement (IYM), Itsekiri Nationality Patriots (INP), and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Niger Delta Volunteer Force, *inter alia*. Asuni (2009: 3) cited in a study conducted in 2007, in Delta states, which revealed “forty-eight recognizable groups in the Delta State alone, boasting more than 25,000 members and with an arsenal of approximately 10,000 weapons”. The study claims there may be “up to 60,000 members of armed groups in the Niger Delta as a whole”<sup>40</sup> (Ikelegbe 2001).

It has been rightly acknowledged that the various social movement in the region adopted broad strategies, method and tactics regardless of the differences in their background, leadership, area of operation and experiences. These, according to Ikelegbe (2001) and corroborated by Ojakorotu (2008: 172) include:

- **Advocacy and agitation** (intended to raise public awareness on the plight of the people of the Niger Delta through “press statements, interviews, conference communiqués, advertorials, commentaries and publicized meetings”).
- **Dialogue** (which has found expression in the call for meetings and consultation with a view to reconciling the communities and the oil multinationals).
- **Monitoring** (of MNOC and government activities in the Niger Delta especially in volatile communities where there is no love lost between the main actors).
- **Popular action** (against MNOC and the state).
- **Litigation** (resort to the legal process to compel MNOCs for instance, to clean up oil spills and to pay compensation to affected communities).
- **Armed confrontation** (in extreme cases where all the other methods appear to have failed)

The adoption of a given method of protest by any of the groups was driven by various motivations and objectives as well the response of government. Meanwhile, this study shall now focus on only on MOSOP, IYC, and especially MEND, which attracted more of ‘terrorist tag’ relative to the other two. In addition to the challenge of limited space, the choice of these

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<sup>40</sup> The unpublished Study was “conducted between July 2007 and September 2007 by Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW ... was commissioned by Delta State government as the basis for the state’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process” (Asuni 2009: 3).

three is motivated by [1] their prominence and influence, if not notoriety, in the region; and [2] their international impact. Indeed, the three-selected group could be regarded as the most popular on these accounts; though not necessarily in isolation from the rest other groups in entirety, given the convergence of the whole struggle on the clamour for self-determination and resource control.

#### **4.3.1 Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People [MOSOP]**

Although the Ogonis are small ethnic group in Nigeria, “the 404 square miles they inhabit produced 634 million barrels of oil between 1958 and 1995, estimated by company officials to be worth \$5.2 billion” (ICG 2006c: 4). MOSOP was the mass-based democratic social movement that drew international attention in the early 1990s. Founded by the prolific writer, orator, businessman, and human rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and others of his ilk, MOSOP renewed the long-standing clamour for better treatment of the people of the Niger Delta. The group drew up Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) in 1990 and presented it to the Babangida Military administration, and other key IGOs and NGOs including; UN subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination against Minorities, Green Peace and Rain Forest, Action Group, *inter alia* (Na‘Allah 1998). Summarily, the OBR clearly stipulated:

- the demand for a right to control their political affairs
- the control and use of a fair share of economic resources derived from Ogoniland
- the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation
- Adequate and direct representation in all Nigerian national institutions (Na‘Allah, 1998: 71).

The main objective once again was agitation for self-determination and just resource control by the Ogoni community (Gideon 2012). Saro-Wiwa observed that “Ogoni has offered Nigeria an estimated \$30 billion and received nothing in return, except a blighted countryside; an atmosphere full of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon... polluted streams and creeks of rivers without fish, and land which is, in every sense of the term, an ecological disaster” (cited in Na‘Allah 1998: 69). For most part, MOSOP’s agitation in the 1990s was largely peaceful, using the OBR as major tool. The group used various possible democratic means especially civil disobedience in decrying the injustice meted on the people of the Niger Delta. However, these complaints not only fell largely on deaf ears, they also resulted in the arrest and execution of its key leaders including the Ken Saro-Wiwa and others by General Sani Abacha’s government in 1995. The highly questionable execution of the Ken Saro Wiwa and the eight (8) others reinforced the view in the region that government was never going to

accede to their demands through non-violent means, hence the resort to violent strategy (Ojakorotu 2008). With the benefit of hindsight, it can be safely argued that this use of force or threat as deterrence strategy by the government was not entirely successful.

#### **4.3.2 The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC)**

In what appears to be frantic efforts to avoid the largely futile non-violent approach of MOSOP towards the struggle, the Ijaws, under the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), opted for a more violent alternative. On December 1998, the Ijaws marked the remembrance of Adaka Boro with the launching of Ijaw Liberation Chatter, in Kaiama, the home-town of Boro. The Chatter dubbed Kaiama Declaration had no other agenda than the same unresolved exploitation that Boro had fought against 28 years earlier. Depending largely on the “energy, vision and anger of the youths in the Niger Delta”, IYC has its supports base in the communities’ grassroots and intended to “build pan-Ijaw neo-nationalism” (Obi, quoted in Ojakorotu 2008: 167). The group, at a gradual pace, became “extremely violent and their tactics are guerrilla-like following the ascendancy of Asari Dokubo to IYC presidency in 2001” (Ojakorotu 2008).

Like Sari Wiwa’s MOSOP, the IYC’s tremendous contact with human rights organizations in the West, through its major offices helped in internationalizing the resistance, drawing the attention of the world to the people’s plight in the Niger Delta region. In addition to violent confrontation with the security outfits, the groups employed the tactics of hostage-taking to their activities (Ojakorotu 2008; Agbiboa 2011: 130). The IYC eventually proliferated gradually into various smaller groups for various reasons, including the rivalry between key personalities within the group.

Tom Ateke and Asari Dokubo are two key figures involved in IYC, especially at the initial stage in the late 1990s. Asuni (2009: 15) observe that these two figures “framed their positions in society quite differently...While Ateke revelled in his image as a criminal thug, Asari espoused ideological aims, seeing himself as a freedom fighter battling the establishment”. Asari however, eventually fell out with IYC to form its own private militia in 2004. Again like every other group in the region, the private militia, Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), “preached greater local control of natural resources and political power” (Asuni 2009: 15). Its ultimatum to oil companies to shut down operation by October 1, 2004 or risk a major guerrilla operation dubbed “Operation Locust Feast” resulted not only in a jump in oil prices, due to panic, but brought about some swift, though temporal, government’s intervention.

### **4.3.3 The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta MEND**

The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) is largely construed as an “amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta” (Oyefusi 2007; Courson 2009; Mähler 2010; ICG 2015). Emerging towards late 2005 during the Obasanjo’s administration, MEND became the one face of various armed groups including the NDPVF, Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities, among others. The predominantly Ijaw militant group centred its operation in the three major oil states namely: Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta State, although spanning other states in the region (Courson 2009). Its’ background has been linked to many factors in the region’s struggle for political and economic self-determination. Among these factors include: the seeming futility of the non-violent method of protest by previous resistance, the arrest and detention of Asari Dokubo and Alamiesiegha, and the deepening plight of the Niger Deltans<sup>41</sup>. As Shadi, quoted in Courson (2009: 24) noted, “all manners of peacefully resisting the environmental, social, and economic degradation of their country at the hands of the oil companies have proven to be futile...their only recourse has been the violent and mutually unbeneficial “war on oil companies”. Thus, various militias in the region came together under one umbrella to pursue the long-standing agenda of self-determination, but this time clandestinely, a feature that resulted in the “terrorist” tagging of the group (Ejibunu 2007; Osaghae *et al.* 2007; Courson 2009: 17).

#### **4.3.3.1 Objectives, Target, Tactics and Impact**

During the raid of Shell Oil facility on January 11 2006, the Movement’s spokesperson, Jomo Gbomo clearly communicated the group’s objective thus: “to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil”, while also warning “the Chinese government and its oil companies to steer well clear of the Niger Delta” (Howden 2006; Giroux 2010). Corroborating this view, Shadi noted that MEND’s “ultimate aim is to free the Niger Delta and its people from the vicious grip of the MNOCs and a corrupt and irresponsible government” (quoted in Courson 2009: 25). Four fundamental demands of the MEND, discernible from its statement issued by the group on March, 1 2006, include: “increased political participation, increased

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<sup>41</sup> Asuni explained the perception of the Ijaw concerning the arrest as ‘blatant government provocation’ based on two factors: [1] Bayelsa is the only Ijaw-majority state in Nigeria, which is why the arrest was seen as an insult; and [2] “Chief Alamieyeseigha was linked to opponents of President Obasanjo also added to suspicions that his detention was politically motivated (2009: 17)

involvement in the oil and gas industry, socioeconomic development, and reduced militarization of the region” (Asuni 2009: 18).

The Movement’s first attacks reported in December 2005 involved the bombing of a pipeline. This was followed in January by raids of Shell’s offshore rigs; killing and kidnapping of oil workers; demands that shell pay the local communities US\$1.5 billion for the oil exploration activities and the consequent environmental pollution; and further bombing of oil facilities in April 2006 (Asuni 2009; Giroux 2010)<sup>42</sup>. In fact, offshore oil facilities were hitherto considered as unreachable by militants; however, on June 20, 2008, the highly sophisticated MEND successfully launched an attack on “the SPDC operated Bonga oil platform (the largest offshore oil platform in the Niger Delta)” (Courson 2009: 23). Various sophisticated and destabilizing attacks by MEND on the oil industry, using advanced bombing, firepower and combat training, followed their threats thereby forcing the Nigeria oil-dependent economy to lose billions of Naira (Giroux 2010). As “a tactically astute and strategically coherent militia that is disdainful of old-line local leaders it believes have betrayed the Niger Delta communities”, it is hardly surprising that MEND’s threats to cripple the Nigerian oil industry almost succeeded (ICG 2006b: 6).

Consistent with its threat, MEND’s various attacks significantly disrupted oil activities in the region with reverberating effects on the Nigeria economy. For instance, its’ “dramatic wave of attacks on oil installations in February 2006 reduced the country’s oil output by about 25 percent” by May of the same year (ICG 2006b: 6; Giroux 2010). Other significant enterprises, including the Julius Berger construction company with operations in the Delta were also forced to withdraw from the region as a result of the militancy (Giroux 2010). According to Giroux (2010), “In November 2007, the Managing Director of Shell Nigeria reported that MENDs attacks on the oil industry had amounted to losses of \$61 million per day; a staggering amount that aggregates into billions lost annually”. Moreover, its abduction of oil workers and demands for ransom “made oil and gas service companies increasingly reluctant to dispatch personnel to repair sabotaged or ruptured pipelines, contributing to the enduring shut-in of over 600,000 barrels a day of oil production” (quoted in Obi 2009: 105).

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<sup>42</sup> Following the ransom payment made by Bayelsa State government, the hostages were freed on January (Asuni 2009). Similarly according to Giroux (2010: n.p) “as this violent campaign continues to gain momentum and global exposure, MEND becomes a stronger and more lethal force that could potentially expand its attacks to other targets in Nigeria and throughout the Gulf of Guinea to offshore oil installations”.

Beyond the oil companies, MEND extended its violent campaign to governments' targets. For instance, in April 20 2006 MEND bombed the Bori military base, in Port Harcourt, killing two people, as a warning, according to its email statement, "to the Nigerian military, oil companies and those who are attempting to sell the birth right of the Niger Delta peoples for a bowl of porridge" (quoted in Giroux 2010: np). Hence, this incident, and another bomb, detonated by MEND at a petro tanker garage in Warri city, were described by the groups as "symbolic rather than strategic" (Courson 2009: 21).

#### **4.3.3.2 Organisational Structure**

MEND is generally an incoherent group containing "a constantly shifting line-up of militants" (Asuni 2009: 19) with a fairly clandestine *modus operandi*. MEND maintained an obscure leadership which partly explains its disentanglement into three distinct branches in succession (namely Western MEND in Delta State, Eastern MEND in Rivers State, and Central MEND in Bayelsa State) just within months of its formation (Asuni 2009: 19). Its' membership comprises "poor, unemployed young Ijaw men and former military personnel" (Giroux 2010: np). According to Giroux (2010: np), the group does not claim any direct links with other militant – or terrorist – groups in the region", however, associated loosely with other Delta-based groups including "the Martyrs Brigade and the Coalitions for Military Actions in the Niger Delta". Albeit not making exclusive ethnic demand, MEND's membership is predominantly Ijaws, perhaps due to the population size of the Ijaw in its' main stronghold.

Meanwhile, as a body however, the IYC gradually began to lose its sympathy for MEND. "Though generally supportive of MEND's political and economic goals, it said the armed struggle initiated by the Movement has been contaminated by criminals and is spinning out of control" (cited in ICG 2009: 4). Indeed, evidence supporting the criminal dimension is available and existent. Besides, the waning sympathy for the Movement was also catalysed by the dissatisfaction with group's inability to draw the government into constructive negotiation despite the violence. Indeed, it was increasingly difficult for the people to see "that the militants' campaign has retained its ideological integrity" as its criminal manifestation in violence against, and exploitation of, its own people became increasingly obvious (Watts 2007; ICG 2009). Some respondents questioned the ideological integrity of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) on the same ground (Peace-builder4; Peace-builder5).

#### **4.3.3.3 [Inter]National Political Influence**

Akin to previous groups such as MOSOP and IYC, MEND eagerly drew both national and international attention through the media. The hostage-taking, especially of foreign nationals, “have been connected to a sophisticated strategy for engaging global media through the use of IT, and drawing the attention of intervention agencies to the crisis and plight of the people in the region” (Courson 2009: 20). Moreover, at some time MEND was bent on ensuring that its disruption of oil production affected the global oil market prices. This is reminiscent of “the immediate hike in prices at gas stations around the world” following the January 2006 attack. The attack, indeed, served “as a timely reminder of the importance of this unstable region to international oil supplies” (Asuni 2009) as it sent messages to both potential and actual investors, including especially the US, whose warship was “visiting the Gulf of Guinea to conduct training with Nigerian Navy” for reasons hardly unconnected with the protection of its oil interest in the region. Hence, with the subsequent, if not consequent, rise in oil and gas cost internationally, Gbomo celebrated saying that “the fact that we have influenced the price of world oil, no matter how little, and caught the attention of the foreign media indicates we are on the right track” (quoted in Giroux 2010: np).

Beyond the severe impact on the economy at the national level, MEND activities have had impacts on the national politics. The 2007 election of Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw man who was previously the Governor of Bayelsa state (as the vice president was celebrated), by MEND as a political dividend of their campaign and a step in the right direction for the emancipation of the people of Niger Delta. As Giroux (2010) observed this opportunity meant the Ijaws would for the first time in the history of Nigeria to have a “direct voice in a major government position”. As if to demonstrate to the incoming administration their resolve to continue the fight unless something urgent and sustainable was done to address the plight of the Niger Delta inhabitants, MEND quickly launched an attack on Chevron Pennington’s offshore terminal, kidnapping six foreign oil workers on 1 May 2007. According to the Movement, the attack was not only “intended to embarrass the out-going regime. It is also a warning to the incoming government, which we view as an extension of the present. We will continue with our struggle for justice until we achieve all our goals without exception” (Quoted in Giroux 2010: np). At the time, MEND’s immediate demands, besides the generic clamour in the region, were “chiefly the release of jailed members and the Delta's share of the oil revenues”.

Meanwhile, not only were these demands unmet but another key members of MEND, Henry Okah, was arrested in Angola *en route* to Nigeria on September 24 2007, on charges of “gun-running, after which he was deported to Nigeria and arraigned on a 47 count charge, including treason, before a high court in Jos, Central Nigeria” (Obi 2009: 106). Unsurprisingly, the development resulted in intensely reigniting the violent campaign. Prior to this time, Henry Okah, had “agreed to participate in the dialogue process....supported the formation of the Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee (NDPCRC), and nominated its chairman and secretary after a meeting with the Nigerian Vice President in 2007” (Courson 2009: 22).

#### **4.3.3.4 Financial Sources**

The Movement and various other militia groups in the region finance their campaign activities through numerous means, including community support, donations from politicians, ransom payments from kidnapping, security contracts and most importantly proceeds from illegal oil bunkering, which is widespread in the region (Paki and Ebiefa 2011: 141). It is essential to underscore that the support of some community members, for the illegal bunkering, is to some extent perceived as a justifiable alternative to addressing the community’s poverty, blamed largely on government’s responsiveness to the quandaries of the people (Peace-builder1; Peace-builder4). For instance, a respondent noted that one of the key Niger Delta militant leaders – Government Ekpemupolo popularly known as Tompolo – was running a multi-million-naira project, which gave food to a lot of people (Peace-builder1). In another study, an Ijaw respondent stated:

Criminal gangs are supported in their communities because they channel their ‘loot’ into filling the social gaps abandoned by various governments’ responsibility to its citizens. For example, the militants support community healthcare centres with financial resources, they fund students to sit for university entry examinations, and award scholarships to individuals to study for university degrees in Ghana and Western universities (quoted in Emordi 2015: 66)

The blame was not restricted to the federal government but also the governors in the region who were viewed as external impostors colluding with the federal government in deepening the socio-economic and political marginalisation of the people as they make too little or no effort in addressing the roots causes (Osaghae *et al.* 2007). The elites for their part keyed into the fragility of region and capitalised on the anger of the youth in pursuing personal interest (Youth/Religious leader1). The 2007 election and the various subsequent political dramas that followed in the region, especially in Rivers state, accentuated the mingling of politicians with the militants for self-benefiting purpose. By the co-optation of some of the ‘boys’ by the

politicians, some militants were not only enriched, but further armed for the purpose of hunting down opposition(s) and the rigging of elections – quite a usual trend across the federation (Oyefusi 2007; Amuwo 2009). This dynamic has raised questions concerning the ideological motivation, if not justification, of the resistance (Watts 2007; Oriola and Agozino 2013).

#### **4.3.3.5 Criminalised Resistance?**

Government's preference to tag the militants in the region, including MEND, as 'criminal' is hardly without corroborating evidences, though sometimes for self-serving reason(s). As has been referred to earlier, ransoms from hostage-taking remained one of the major incentives drawing militants back to violence in the absence of *viable alternatives*. As a tactic of the insurgency, hostage-taking became increasingly beneficial in the region, especially for individual insurgents, due to the economic gain from ransom payment by victims. Many "have openly decried hostage-taking" (Ojakorotu and Gilbert 2010: np). It was observed that kidnapping for ransom<sup>43</sup> has become beneficial to "only the few youths involved along with their collaborators in government who masquerade as negotiators and cajole the government officials to dole out millions of naira as ransom fee to the boys in the creek" (Ojakorotu & Gilbert 2010: np).

Herein lies the thrust of the rational choice theory adduced in this study. In fact, commenting of the lethality of the sort of weapon recovered during the amnesty,<sup>44</sup> Eke (2015: 755) opined that the militants' access to such "weapons facilitated criminality more than it aided freedom fighting". Corroborating, a respondent from the Niger Delta critically questioned the legitimacy of the NDA agitation. In his own words: "There was a bigger struggle, which is still there sleeping...Unless this bigger struggle is addressed this people will always capitalise on this bigger struggle to perpetrate their criminal activities" (Peace-builder5). Hence, in linking the underdevelopment problem the region's insurgency, the respondent observed that the lack of social amenities like good roads significantly facilitates the inaccessibility of some communities, including the creeks where the militant reign supreme, by the security agents for quick and effective counterinsurgencies.

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<sup>43</sup> Eke explained that the new dimension of hostage taking no longer only target foreign expatriates (who have become fewer and have increased their security measures) but also Nigerians, including unsecured traditional rulers, businessmen and women, medical doctors, university and High school teachers and poorly guarded government workers" (Eke 2015 : 759).

<sup>44</sup> Deadly weapons submitted from the militants included: "Brownies (hand-guns), general purpose machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, dynamites, rocket propelled grenade launchers and bombs, rocket charges, stickers grenades and several tons of different ammunition" (Eke 2015: 755).

Furthermore, the “political collusion with militants” by politician has equally implicated intra-communities/ethnic rivalry, which not only undermined the ideology of the struggle but also prospect of peace (Asuni 2009: 13). The predominance of political thuggery, whereby politicians back youths, especially cult members, with arms and finance in exchange for selfish assignment underscores the blurring of ideological motivation with criminal one in the region. For instance the Human Rights Watch (2007: 84) recorded how a cult member had described a meeting in government house in Port Harcourt, prior to the April 2007 polls, during which “he saw government officials hand out between N5 million and N10 million (\$38,000 to \$77,000) to several different cult groups in return for their assisting or simply accepting the PDP’s plans to rig the polls” (see also Asuni 2009). Being an illegal and unwritten agreement between the parties, sometimes the loyalty of the ‘boys’ is largely subjected to the bidding capacity of the politician or political party. Hence cases of ‘boys’ falling out with their ‘bosses’ and switching allegiance is not uncommon. Regardless, the overall implication is that more chaos is fomented in an environment that was already flooded with lethal weapons. Since Nigeria’s returned to Democracy in 1999, till date, various election in the region, as elsewhere in the country have been characterised by political thuggery.

#### **4.4 Government Response and Ramifications**

Albeit the government from the outset has not been unaware of the developmental challenges of the Niger Delta inhabitants, and have made some attempts to salvage these challenges, the success rate has remained unacceptably inadequate. The moment the early explorers first encountered difficulty with the region’s terrain in their attempt to establish their administrative machinery, the British made some effort in mapping out strategies to develop the area. To be sure, one of the recommendations of the consequent Henry Willink’s Commission set up by the British government in 1958 was that “the Niger Delta should be accorded special attention in order to achieve a meaningful development in furtherance of the needs of the region” (Ariweriokuma 2008: 254). Various other botched developmental recommendations have come and gone without substantive positive outcome due to several factors including poor policy implementation compounded by corruption and inefficiency.

Nevertheless, a part of its’ COIN, the government finds it more convenient to describe the Niger Delta militants as terrorist, criminals and miscreants involved in illegal oil activities. Arguably, this position is hardly unconnected with the frantic efforts by the government to legitimise its coercive conflict management strategy to protect the petrodollar economy. Some

international analysts have equally described the militant as terrorist groups (Courson 2009: 20). Accordingly, the object of the government was the total annihilation of these so-called ‘terrorists’ or ‘criminal’ using a high-handed approach to “establish fear as a deterrence strategy” (Eke 2015: 754). Consistently, in lieu of political actions driven towards long-term peace-building and development, military force had been prioritised, with implication for increased military expenditure. The allocation of ₦69 billion to Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) for development as against the ₦444 billion allocated to security (in hard power terms) in the Niger Delta drives this point home (Courson 2009: 19-20,23). Suffice to acknowledge that with the high level of corruption, and secrecy shrouding the security votes in Nigeria, it is hardly the case that security budget has not been serving the interest of a few who perhaps would invest in sustaining the insecurity for selfish reason. “Huge sums of monies are designated security votes and have been embezzled by these governors while failing to secure their various states. More often than not, they justify the expenditure on equipping the police and the manning of various checkpoints in their states” (Omilusi 2016: 33). The popular and on-going Dasukigate<sup>45</sup> crisis regardless of the alleged political witch-hunting explanation of the same, is suggestive of the profiteering posture of political elites and army officer toward the security budget that undermines security in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, with the arms and ammunition, jet fighters and boats, the Military Task Force increasingly securitised the Niger Delta conflict by stepping up attacks in various communities among which include Kurutie, Benikurukuru, Kunukunuma, Okerenkoko, Goba, Abiteye (Kiangbene) and Gbaramatu believed to be the militants’ hideout. According to Courson (2009: 23-24):

The military air, land and sea attack on communities left several persons dead (mainly children, women and the elderly) and several others missing (the missing cannot be ascertained because the region remains cordoned off by the JTF); Oboko Bello, a community leader in the kingdom put the figure of missing and dead tentatively at between 500 and 2,000

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<sup>45</sup> This is involves the allegation of an estimated \$2.1 billion meant for procurement of arms and ammunition in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency being diverted and shared among government officials. The term “Dasukigate” derives etymologically from “the infamous Watergate political scandal that forced the American president, Richard Nixon, to resign from office in 1974 in order to avoid the politically worse fate of impeachment” (Jeyifoon 2015: np). In the context of Nigeria, it is linked with the diversion of moneys intended for purchase of arms and armaments for the army in its counter-insurgency war with Boko Haram to various private pockets (Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)(Jeyifoon 2015: np)

#### 4.4.1 Long Term [De] Developmental Response?

The government's attempt to simply extinct various militias groups through the military and legal fiats have, unsurprisingly failed considerably in restoring durable peace and stability in the region (Oluwaniyi 2011; Aghedo 2015; Eke 2015). Such tactics have at best inadequately addressed “the core issues the militia and separatist phenomena raise: the politics of marginalisation, the appeals to ethnic and religious identities that flourish in the absence of an effective federal system and the glaring weaknesses of the security sector” (ICG 2006b: 18). The major effort of government in resting the unrest in the region is the ‘Amnesty Programme’ initiated in 2009. However, questions have been raised about the efficacy and sustainability of the programme. A closer look at the Deradicalization, Demobilization and Rehabilitation program (DDR), especially under the 2009 amnesty programme, is pertinent.

#### 4.4.2. From Anarchy to Amnesty and Back

The Nigeria government eventually seems to realise that more killing does not necessarily lead to more stability. Accordingly, coupled with international pressure, the government began to consider alternative means of addressing the anarchy in the region. Dialogue and consultation with various stakeholders were initiated in June 2009. Eventually these culminated in “the announcement by the federal government of an amnesty to militants willing to lay down their arms and be ready to be re-integrated into society... with the dropping of charges against, and release of Henry Okah”. In response, MEND declared a 60-days ceasefire in 2009. Meanwhile, the exclusion of some militants from the programme was protested by some aggrieved. For instance, ex-militant ‘General Keithy Sese’ had threatened the Nigerian state and multinational companies as result of non-inclusion (*Punch*, 18 November 2010). Unsurprisingly, the emergence of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) since late 2015 clearly demonstrates the return to anarchy in the region due among other reasons to the ill management of the overall community's grievances, despite the amnesty (Peace-builder1; Peace-builder4). As Nwankpa (2014) aptly summits, the use of amnesties by states actually enhances human rights when they are done in good faith and with the utmost consideration for truth and accountability, but, when they are used deliberately to prevent justice, their legitimacy becomes questionable<sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> State amnesties do not protect individuals and groups that have committed gross human rights violation of international standard from international prosecution, as the Chilean and Argentine post-amnesty trials and the trial of Liberian Charles Taylor in the International Criminal Court prove. Amnesty enhances legitimacy if they fulfill certain conditions: strive for accountability and truth, and guarantee reparations and participation. Otherwise, from the perspective of fundamental human rights of victims, amnesties are criticised because they violate five crucial principles namely *right to justice, right to truth, right to judicial protection, right to reparations, and, right to access to court* (Slye 2002 cited in Nwankpa 2014).

Amnesties are viewed as providing short-lived social stability and are inimical to the long-term enjoyment of a stable democracy, human rights and rule of law. Although amnesty is not altogether undesirable, its gains are rather temporary and conflict with justice and human rights ideals. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is perhaps the only one, out of several amnesties around the world that comes closest to achieving this balance in terms of legitimacy, according to Nwankpa (2014). The Niger Delta Amnesty undoubtedly resulted in subsequent increase of oil production and revenue (from 700,000 barrels per day to between 2.4 million and 2.6 million barrels per day) and, consequently, increases in the generation of oil revenue (Jamestown Foundation, 2013; Alike, 2013). Its' other merits include the empowerment of some ex-combatants, in various skills and providing them with a means of livelihood (Onapajo and Moshood 2016), among its' major criticism, is the failure of the program to address the root cause of the conflict including the basic socio-economic and environmental needs in the region (Oluwaniyi 2011). The failure undermined the adjudged success of the Niger Delta amnesty programme, especially given its arguably unsustainable payment of grants to an arbitrarily selected few and the corruption that pervaded the process (Obi 2014; Onapajo and Moshood 2016; Tobor 2016).

#### **4.4.2.1 Post-Amnesty: No War, No Pay, No Peace**

It is agreeable that, from the onset, many had observed the amnesty deal with some reservations and misgivings about its implementation in a sustainable manner (Eke, 2015). Such reservations are hardly unfounded, given the "trust deficit" that often characterised previous economic reconstruction and peace-building strategies both in the region and across the larger federation. The lack of political will, to see such strategies through, has created a gulf between policy and implementation. Hence, for Oviasuyi and Uwadiae (2010: 24), "the so-called stage-managed amnesty for the militants of the region, as reported by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), may be an exercise in futility and colossal wastage of public funds, which should have been used to develop the region". Corroborating this, Nwankpa (2014: 72) argues that the Niger Delta amnesty is hardly different from "past amnesties such as the one General Gowon offered Isaac Boro...and the Biafran warlords during and after the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War (1967-1970), or the many presidential pardons granted to political prisoners", perhaps, to suggest its implication for the problem of resurgence.

Political high-jacking of genuine protestation is a commonplace in the federation because of politician's "penchant quest for politics of 'disorder', in which youths are instrumentalized in elite corruption and neo-patrimonial quests for power and resources" (Idemudia 2010; Osumah and Aghedo 2011; Eke 2015: 751). Commenting on this negative phenomenon, as it occurred during the most recent governorship election in Bayelsa in 2016, the national leader of the Youth Democratic Party (YDP), Arc Ezeikel Nya-Etok, clearly noted on Channel's Television Live Commentary (5 December 2015) that unless this 'boys' relationship with politicians is eradicated and electoral violence will not cease. It is not entirely unknown that "local elite, including traditional rulers, bred communal and intergenerational crises ... prior to the amnesty regime" (Eke 2015: 751).

Besides the problem of poor implementation, the unhidden criminal angle regarding the anger of the militants further complicates as well as undermines the success of the amnesty deal. Total peace tends to jeopardise the highly attractive spoils from the oil insurgency for the militant. Hence, the 'amnesty' can be viewed as merely a 'buy off' of key militants that is highly unsustainable. Considering how the "deal has unfortunately led to the re-marginalization of some ex-fighters whose violent agitation for inclusion in the amnesty currently threaten the peace" in the region, the question of long-term sustainability remains ever fresh. Violence is being increasingly used as a "bargaining strategy for inclusion", leaving the ability of government to meet all demands in long term indeterminate. Further, the doubt whether the militants surrendered all their weapons also leaves the attainment of peace also in doubt. In this regard, Eke (2015: 759) observed that "large caches of arms remain in circulations and the consequence has been continuous kidnapping, armed robbery privacy and oil theft on an even larger in some cases"

Other economic considerations that logically undermine the amnesty deal include the fact that "the 65,000 Naira monthly stipend paid to the ex-militants is well above the 18,000 Naira (\$90.50) national minimum wage and most entry-level salaries, many recipients would rather receive that payment than accept a job" (ICG 2015: 3). In addition, the fear that the program's method of paying fighters in a given camp through its ex-commanders tends to reinforce a bond between ex-militant commander and the 'boys', which can easily be exploited by these commanders in "rallying their fighters for any new cause" is hardly unfounded (ICG 2015: 3). Further still, the amnesty programme has arguably merely attracted colossal wealth to the ex-commanders largely at the expense of the 'boys' and, more importantly, the development of

the region, which portends enormous danger, given the endearing anger. For instance, ‘Government Tompolo’ was described as living “like a fabled Indian Maharajahs courted by both Federal and State governments” owning “an oil block and private jets that are worth N2.12 billion” (Ileowo cited in Eke 2015: 757).

Additional concerns, that have become increasingly pertinent in recent time, is the sharp decline in global oil price, and the implication thereof for the highly “expensive buy off”<sup>47</sup> or ‘cash for arms’ amnesty policy. Furthermore, the ICG (2015: 3) also rightly acknowledged the looming danger in the “serious mismatch between the training the former militants receive and the job market”, highlighting the evidence that by the “end of March 2015, reportedly only 151 of the 15,451 graduates from the training programs had found jobs with credible organisations in the country”. Eke (2015:762) lucidly explained this challenge as follows:

Part of the amnesty programme was an agendum to convert the energies of ex-militants into a productivity impetus. The plan involved training these ex-fighters both within the country and overseas. Unfortunately, for many, skills are acquired without appropriate avenues for practice, just as knowledge is gained with hardly any opportunities to earn a living out of it. Self-employment remains a remote possibility as the enabling infrastructure is mainly non-existent. In these circumstances, only one feeling becomes apparent; that of increased frustration. Given that there was also no concrete plan for de-radicalization, frustration easily degenerates into resurgence of violent engagement with the state.

The proclivity of all these factors to reignite conflict in the region is enormous. Indeed, not only are these graduates in the various training programs around the world having higher expectations for more lucrative jobs upon completion, they have also been exposed to more developed countries. The inability to meet this expectation may lead frustrated trained graduates back “to militancy or violent crime, only now better educated and more likely capable of extracting new concessions from the federal government” (ICG 2015: 3). Against this backdrop, Eke (2015) highlighted two fundamental problems in the Amnesty thus:

The first is that devoid of real development efforts, the amnesty deals simply reflects a ‘cash for arm’ policy and becomes an attraction for criminal who violently engage the government for the purpose of enjoying same state largesse. On the second note, because the promises of infrastructural development by the government is yet to go large scale (as emphasis is on those granted amnesty), and partly due to the continued environmental insensitivity by oil multinationals, the possibility of renewed struggles by ex-combatants, genuine or not, remains ever present (Eke 2015: 756).

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<sup>47</sup> To underscore the long-term unsustainability in financial terms, Eke (2015:756) juxtapose the ‘N 72 billion and N 88 billion’ spent by the Federal Government (FG) spent in 2012 and 2013 respectively on its programme for repentant Niger Delta ex-militants and the far less spent on basic education.

Hence, without the requisite funds to keep ‘buying off’ the militants (both those benefiting from the government under the DDR programme and those left out) there is indeed no peace in Niger Delta as the recent re-emergence of militancy under the NDA clearly demonstrates.

#### **4.5 Summary and Conclusion**

Besides a cursory review of the Nigerian history of oil exploration and its implication for the Niger Delta regions in legislative, environmental, economic and political terms, this chapter has attempted to give a detailed profile of the key militant groups in the region, especially MOSOP, IYC, MEND, and most recently the NDA, which over time have challenged the social, political and economic marginalisation of the people of Niger Delta. The chapter underscored the structural factors within the Nigeria federal system that have facilitated the agitation in the region as well as the ineffective conflict management technique of the Nigeria state due to its high-handedness, insincerity, corruption, poor policy implementation legacy, and elite collusion with militant for parochial selfish interest. These, coupled with the criminal motivations of some militants in the region, have been assayed as hanging the quest of peace in the balance and jeopardizing the yet insufficient efforts of the Nigerian State to nib the insurgency in the bud. The chapter surmised therefore that negligence of the socio-economic drivers as part of the underlying root causes of the resistance, particularly, makes the DDR largely unsustainable.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

Over the years, fundamentalist movements have been common in the northern region of Nigeria. Boko Haram is among the latest, which nonetheless have fomented more trouble than any before it. That Boko Haram constitutes an enigma to development, peace and security not only in the northern region, however, across the country and the West African region is well acknowledged. Indeed, relative to other insurgent groups in Nigeria's history, Boko Haram insurgency remains largely incomprehensible and its ruinous activities seem to have defiled counter-measures. Like various other destructive terrorist groups around the world, Boko Haram's 'facelessness', as the erstwhile president, Goodluck Jonathan acknowledged, has indeed facilitated its obduracy (Ekwueme and Obayi 2012). Arguably, the sect's persistence is partly owing to the lack of comprehensive understanding that is complicated by the politicization of the whole phenomenon. Virtually everything about the sect is contested, ranging from its name, the reasons for its emergence, radicalization, its international link to the scope of its activities (Adibe 2012). While it is overambitious, and thus outside the scope of this study, to rest this challenge, this chapter attempts to profile the group as comprehensive as is possible in order to enable a clearer comparison with the insurgency in the Niger Delta subsequently. Accordingly, this chapter offers a broad descriptive account of Boko Haram, taking into consideration, its mission, origin, ideology, *modus operandi*, international scope, target and tactics as well as its sponsorship.

#### **5.1 Evolution and Identity**

Scholars generally peg Boko Haram's full-blown insurgency in 2009, given the radical dimension it assumed at the time. However, its general evolution goes farther in time. In this regard, many dates have been postulated including 2004, 2003, 2002, 1999, and 1995 (David 2013).<sup>48</sup> Those who cite 1999 allude to the sect's emphasis on strict implementation of the Sharia law, as endorsed in 1999 in the 12 core northern states. Yet even more backwards, at

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<sup>48</sup>A group known as Sahaba Muslim Youth Organization, which evolved in 1995, is also believed to have metamorphosed into Boko Haram. Similarly, Boko Haram is traced to a group known as the *Ahlulsunnawal'jama'ah* that emerged in 1995 under the leadership of Abubakah Lawan before he moved to Saudi Arabia (Onuoha, 2010:55).

least in terms of its ideological background, the sect's evolution has been traced to the Maiatatsine uprisings of the early 1980s.<sup>49</sup>

Certain commonalities have been observed of the both Islamist groups including especially their *modus operandi*, mission and indeed, the enabling environment in which both thrive, regardless of the time difference (Adesoji 2011; Musa 2012). Discernibly, there is obscurity regarding the precise date of origin and identity of Boko Haram. While the period between 2002 and 2004 enjoys wide scholarly endorsement, this study consents with 1995 (David 2013). This is because it was when they sect first emerged under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan as a *Sahaba* (literarily meaning companion of Muhammed) group though not with the name Boko Haram. At the time, the a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect worshipped at the al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri (Friel 2014). Upon Lawan's departure for studies at the University of Medina, he was eventually succeeded by Mallam Yusuf (Ubhenin 2012: 7).

### 5.1.1 What is in a Name?

The Islamist sect, Boko Haram is confusingly believed to have flourished under various nomenclatures including: *Ahlul Sunnawal'Jama'ahhijra*, the Nigerian or Yobe Taliban,<sup>50</sup> *Yusufiyyah* (named after the successor of Lawan, Yusuf), and the Boko Haram (Richardson 2011; Danjibo 2012; Omitola 2012). The variegated tag, and the resultant confusion regarding the understanding of Boko Haram, arguably arises from the fact that these seemingly different groups promote similar ideologies. Nonetheless, certain chronological differences can be identified among some of these groups. For instance, while it has been identified that Boko Haram originally emerged in 1995, the Yobe Taliban only emerged in 2002 (Sani 2011: 22).

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<sup>49</sup>Named after its Cameroonian founder, Muhammadu Marwa Maiatatsine, the Maiatatsine was an Al-Masifu group with estimated 3000-5000 members that existed in the 1980s. The sect is said to have denounced what an average Kano Muslim at the time would consider sacrilegious such as "ostentatious display of wealth, owning houses, wearing Muslim customs, such as facing Mecca while praying"(Sani, 2011). The sect members, who sought to purify the practice of Islam to conform with the teachings of their leader eventually began to pose security challenge to the locals and thus got itself entrapped in violent confrontation with the authority in what is commonly referred to today as the Maiatatsine crises in the 1980s. At least over 5 000 lives and property worth millions of Naira are said to have been lost in the series of violent religious attacks by the sect Maiatatsine carried out in the commercial city of Kano.

119 <sup>50</sup>This identity according to Onuoha (2010) was only pejoratively used for the sect among the locals, given the unpopularity of its philosophy and teachings among the people. Hence despite being fashioned like the Afghanistan Taliban there are no hard facts to conclude that the group has any other link with the former, besides an ideological one. As Nigerian Taliban, the sect ambushed and attacked the police in 2004, killing about 15 (Omitola 2012).

It suffices to bear in mind that the Nigerian or Yobe Talibans are not infiltrated from the Talibans of Afghanistan, though styled after the latter. Some accounts noted that the group initially consisted essentially of Nigerian university graduates, ex-military personnel and professionals, and were “easily identified by their Spartan dress code and long beards, reminiscent of Osama bin Laden” (Sani, 2011:22). They call themselves *Al SunnaWalJamma*, which in Arabic language translates: followers of Prophet Mohammed’s Teaching” (Sani 2011: 22). Like the Boko Haram, the Nigerian or Yobe Talibans envisaged replacing “the corrupt incumbent administration with a holier government founded purely on the teachings of the Qur’an and the Hadith” (Sani, 2011:23).

Meanwhile, various scholars concur that the term Boko Haram is a combination of the Hausa word, *Boko*, and an Arabic word, *Haram*. *Boko* refers to book or, the noun, *ilimin* which means education while *Haram* refers to forbidden. The word, *Boko* was particularly used derogatively about the colonial-styled education, as opposed to the *ilimin Islamiyya* (Islamic education). Hence, Boko Haram is widely believed to translate as Western Education is forbidden (a sin or sacrilege) (Waldek and Jayasekara 2011). Their rejectionist attitude (especially of western education), does not exist in a vacuum.

Isa (2010: 332) clarifies how the term ‘boko’ has been used, by Islamic scholars and clerics, in order to refer to “elites who spoke, acted, ruled and operated the state like their Western colonial masters”. According to this account, ‘*yan boko*’ (modern elites trained at secular schools) were largely perceived as blameworthy for the poverty and government collapse, evident in the region due to their corrupt attitude to power and national resources. Hence, “the system represented by the ‘*yan boko*’ is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore un-Islamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness” (Isa 2010: 332).

Indeed, an anti-western ambience has historically characterised northern Nigeria following attempts by evangelical Christians’ to convert Muslim right from the colonial era. This was largely perceived as southern domination at all fronts, social, political, cultural and economic. Hence, Boko Haram embodies, at least at its initial stage, a radical opposition to the “imposition of Western education and its system of colonial social organization, which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order”; hence, the translation ‘western education is forbidden’ (Mohammed 2009; Gargon and Bean 2010; Onuoha 2011; Agbiboa 2013b: 72). Meanwhile, according to Onuoha (2012c: 2), the sect consider the tag Boko Haram as incorrect and prefer

to be called *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (meaning a People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad).

Boko Haram is largely conceded as a non-monolithic, but one with splinter groups estimated to be a least six by some unconfirmed reports due to its highly diffused organizational structure. The most popular is the Ansaru – *Jama'at Ansar al-Muslim in fi Bilad al-Sudan* Arabic meaning for Supporters of Muslims in the Land of Black Africans (Zenn 2014). Like Boko Haram, Ansaru, which parted and later reunited with Boko Haram in 2012, seeks the reinstallation of the Caliphate across Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. However, it has differed with Boko Haram on the killing of non-Muslims, which it considers as 'un-Islamic' and 'inhumane'.

Thus, its' targets include Christians and the government. The sect, whose leading members included Muhammed or Mamman Nur and AQIM-trained Khalid al-Barwani, specialise in kidnapping western nationals for ransom and making of sophisticated bombs of Al Qaeda hallmark. Al-Barwani-led Ansaru's owning up to the kidnap and eventual killing of an Italian and British engineer in March 2012 revealed that the sect was not operating under the leadership of Shekau but rather "under al-Qa`ida in the Lands Beyond the Sahel" (Zenn 2014: 3). It is primarily operated in Kano, Katsina, Yobe, Bauchi and Borno (Barna, 2014). Zenn (2014:3) suggested that leadership rivalry and dispute over sharing of fund between Shekau and al Barwani led to the eventual arrest and execution of the later after pro-Shekua factions leaked information about al-Barwani

Friel (2014) noted that some of the splinter groups "have formed alliances with foreign Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in Somalia, which have helped in bringing about the radicalization of its leadership". While this alliance is hardly verifiable for obvious reasons – their clandestine nature – the shared ideological goal lends credence to this view. In March 2015, Boko Harm declared its allegiance to the Islamic State of Syria or the Levant (ISIS or ISIL), commonly dubbed IS. The sect gave itself a new name: *Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya* Islamic state of West Africa Province (ISWAP)<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> According to Yahaya (2016:299) "Shared commitment to the global Jihad movements that is based on a Salafi-Jihad ideology have led to increased cooperation between the two groups from a low point to the recent pledge of allegiance by Boko Haram to ISIS that has culminated in the change of name from Boko Haram to Islamic State of West African Peninsula (ISWAP)"

This came at the time when the sect was experiencing a considerable loss in the hand of the Nigerian soldiers, following the heightened military offensive aimed at reclaiming occupied territories and ultimately exterminating the sect. The objective of the Nigerian-led Multinational coalition was to be backed by the announced deployment of 8700 soldiers by the AU to the affected region (Omoruyi and Fenemigho 2015). Thus, some commentators had noted that, probably, Boko Haram was “hoping to secure material and ideological support from the Islamic State (IS) and attempting to starve off the group’s accelerating decline as a coalition of West-African states, with support from the African Union (AU), has driven it out from most of the territory that it formerly occupied in north-eastern Nigeria at the beginning of 2015” (Bugnacki 2015: np).

The changing of name has not brought any distinctive change in its campaign as the sect is still mostly referred to as Boko Haram. While direct operational collaboration between the Islamist groups is hardly discernible, tactical approach become more visible in line with their long shared ideological goal as Boko Haram increased beheading of its captives like IS. Ultimately, “the extent to which Boko Haram is receiving material support from IS or members of Boko Haram are participating in IS’s propaganda efforts appears to be fairly limited” (Bugnacki 2015: np).

## **5.2 Ideological Background, Mission and Location**

Since the 19th century, Islamic extremist movements characteristically averse to western culture often [mis]identified with Christianity have been common in northern Nigeria. Among these include the *Kala-Kato*, the *Darul-islam*, the *Ahmadabad* Movement, the *Khadiriyha*, *Darika Shi’a Salafiya* (or *Izala*), the *Tijjaniya*, *Tariqqagroup* and the *Muhajirun* (Pothuraju 2012). However, the extremity and violence of Boko Haram is uniquely unprecedented, especially since 2009. Its aversion to western-styled education can be traced to the British’s non-intervention education policy in the northern region of Nigeria during the colonial era, which prohibited the Christian missionaries from evangelizing the northern region.

With the merging of education and religious doctrine for holistic impact (Akanle 2011), Islam took deeper hold of the region. This policy, gave the north its special “Islamic identity” but with two long term implications (Dudley 1968: 18). Firstly, western education was not only discouraged but also abhorred. Secondly, the southerners, who had welcomed it, were viewed with suspicions by their northern counterparts. Northern parents were convinced that Koranic education was better for their children as it would allow them acquire the necessary moral

training in the face of the economic challenges and the resultant lawlessness among Nigerians (Thomson 2012).

Hence it is hardly a happenstance that Muhammed Yusuf, a charismatic and popular Qur'anic scholar emerged from such Islamic education background. He was renowned for proselytizing widely throughout northern Nigeria, as well as assisting in the implementation of Sharia law in several northern states in the early 2000s (Friel 2014: 97). Thus, some have argued that his motivation was rather ideological than material (Isa 2010; Chothia 2012; Salkida 2013).

Yusuf and his followers are believed to be influenced by the ideology of a 13<sup>th</sup> century Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyya who sternly advocates a strict adherence to the Qur'an and authentic Sunna (practices) of the Prophet Muhammad, which he argued contains all the religious and spiritual guidance necessary for salvation in earthly and heavenly lives (Salkida 2012). Ibn Taymiyya was not only opposed to the ideas of philosophers and Sufis regarding religious knowledge, spiritual experiences and ritual practices, but also the flexibility of the other schools of jurisprudence in Islam, which he believed have become distorted by Greek logic and thought as well as Sufi mysticism (Salkida, 2012). Meanwhile, besides the ideological façade, the deep-rooted ethnic tensions across northern Nigeria and the middle belt states are also linkable to the anti-western ideological position of Boko Haram (Waldek and Jayasekara 2011: 170) .

Furthermore, Boko Haram strongly rejects the secular authority, and instead pursued the quest to Islamise the Nigerian state. Its mission thus is simply to radically change the socio-political order in the state for a Sharia-governed system (Onuoha 2012c; Onuoha 2012b). The inspiration for the prevalence of such rejectionist trend in northern Nigeria is traceable to the Jihad led by Usman Dan Fodio between 1804 and 1808, which united the Hausa land, under the Sokoto Caliphate. Indeed, this empire and the system of powerful Islamic caliphates of preceding centuries “constituted the apex for high Muslim civilization given its typical role in uniting the region, rejection of corruption and creating prosperity under Islam” (cited in Thomson, 2012:47-48).

Prominent northern leaders wished the caliphate to be revived as at independence in 1960. The Sokoto Caliphate was also a religious community, distinguished by its faithfulness, and its leader, the Sultan of Sokoto, claimed descent from the prophet Mohammed (Thomson 2012: 47). Hence, aside his opposition to perceived corruption in the ruling Habe Dynasty, Fodio

maintained that if non-Muslims are to be accommodated in the region they would have to be subjected to the Sharia law (Aguwa 1997: 339).

Complaining about the current social system, believed to be an imposition by the colonial master, Yusuf is quoted as saying “our land was an Islamic state (Northern Nigeria) before the colonial masters turned it to a *Kafir* land” (cited in Ogene 1988: 27). As far as the sect was concerned, even the re-introduction of Sharia in the 12 northern states in 1999 did not improve anything, considering the growing level of corruption. Thus this “failure to achieve the expected full implementation of Sharia in northern Nigeria helps explain some of the deep-rooted resentment and anger of a considerable number of Muslim youths at what they perceived as the government’s “deception” and “insincerity” (ICG 2014: 7). This resentment fuelled their call for an authentic Islamist revolution” (Friel 2014: 75). The Ibn Taymiyya’s formulation, which gives Muslim rights to revolt against inept and corrupt state was adopted as the platform for mobilization by the group (Umar 2013: 24).

Therefore, despite its ‘facelessness’, Boko Haram’s clearest stated objective is not only to Islamise the northern states but also the entire Nigeria, believed to have been adulterated by ‘corrupt’ western culture, and by so doing they may change the status quo. In this regard, Boko Haram opposes western liberalism in its entirety if it contradicts Islam. It has been argued that, like the Afghanistan Taliban, the sect aims at creating “an independent state that comprises all the characteristics of the modern state, including a government, population, territory and strong security base, which would be run by its ideology. It also advocates an economic system that would basically be characterized by trading and farming as alternatives to the modern economic system characterized by capitalism” (Ogene 1988: 29).

Having connections with politicians, at its embryonic state, was a major boost for the spread of Boko Haram. This must be understood within the context of political thuggery; which is a common practice, among politicians across Nigeria. Given the “winner-takes-it-all” approach to electoral contestation in Nigeria, politicians at all levels often apply “a win by all means” technique to the process. Among the common practices include, forceful snatching of ballots boxes, political assassination or intimidation of opponents and their supporters often with the view to influence electoral outcomes (Aniekwe and Kushie 2011).

Often used for these crimes are the jobless youths, including especially the influential, if not violent, ones for obvious reasons. Unfortunately, these youths are often used and dumped. It was noted for instance that, in Gombe State, a group of boys known as “*Kalare*” have proven

“easy prey for politicians who offer them small amount of money, drugs, alcohol and weapons in exchange for engaging in acts of intimidation and assaults or simply to accompany their campaigns in a demonstration of muscle” (Omeiza cited in Aniekwe and Agbiboa 2014: 10).

Boko Haram was in no way different in this regard considering its original alliance with Ali Modu Sherrif, a reputed politician and wealthy businessman. Sherrif, who later became the governor of Borno State employed the “services” of Yusuf with the promised to strictly implement Sharia law upon assuming office (Friel 2014). “In fulfilment of this agreement, the state government allegedly provided funds to Yusuf through Buji Foi, a disciple of Yusuf whom Sheriff made religious affairs commissioner when he became Governor in 2003” (Friel 2014). Sharia was however not implemented, at least not the taste of Yusuf, which is what, many have argued, nudged him into inciting the group against the government, especially through their defiance to the laws of the state. As he became critical of the government of Ali Modu Sheriff and official corruption, Yusuf’s popularity rose, and the group expanded into other states, including Bauchi, Yobe and, Adamawa and Kano, among others, (Elkaim 2012; David 2013; Umar 2013).

### 5.3 Leadership and Stated Objectives

At its’ inception, Boko Haram was led by Muhammad Yusuf as the commander in chief (Amir ul-Aam).<sup>52</sup> Arguably, a number of factors must have motivated his appointment to this leadership position by a committee of *Shaykhs* in 2002 (Gargon and Bean 2010). Besides being a charismatic speaker and well versed in the knowledge of the Qur’an, Yusuf had acquired a remarkable profile at the time. He was associated with the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) under the leadership of Ibrahim el-Zakzakky prior to 1990, and eventually decamped to the *Jama’atulTajdidi Islam* (JTI) led by Abubakar Mujahid, due arguably to his discomfort with the influence of Shi’ia Muslims in the former group. Yusuf gained an outstanding profile and recognition in the latter group and was made Amir of the JTI. According to Kilcullen (2006a:

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<sup>52</sup> Yusuf hailed from a very poor background in Jakusko, Yobe state. He dropped out of school and received a radical Islamic education in Chad and Niger, during which he developed a strong abhorrence for Westernization and Modernization, through his exposition to the Salafist ideology. This Salafist ideology, strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyya ideologies, espouses a staunch defence of Sunni Islam, a strict adherence to the Qur’an and Sunna traditions of Prophet Mohammed. He set up a religious complex in Maiduguri in the state of Borno with a mosque and an Islamic school, which not only attracted the region’s poor, but also Muslims from nearby countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Francis 2011; Chothia 2012).

Yusuf gained popularity among the local people upon his return to Nigeria as he established the Yusufiyah and, through local radio and television stations voiced out his radical Islamic views (Danjibo, 2012:6). He set up a religious complex in Maiduguri in the state of Borno with a mosque and an Islamic school (Madrassah), which not only attracted the region’s poor, but also Muslims from nearby countries like Chad, Niger.

170), Yusuf was also reported to be a member of the Borno State Sharia. These authors accentuate Yusuf's rise to Boko Haram leadership as tied to his oratory skills and Islamic knowledge, with which he spoke openly and preached on radio stations.

Eventually Yusuf ousted the Shaykhs who appointed him "on allegations of corruption and failure to preach pure Islam" (Onuoha, 2012:3). By this, Yusuf not only showed his radicalism but also his zeal to promote the Islamic faith, even when he had to controvert the views of other Islamic scholars. He jettisoned most views of Western Science, including the view that the earth is spherical or that the rain is caused by evaporation. Ironically, however, he led a life of opulence embellished by western luxuries, possessing for instance Mercedes car (Li and Schaub 2004: 3), while also maintaining private attorneys and doctors (Umar, 2013:19). Indeed, as Umar noted, by Nigerian standards Yusuf would not be considered as poor. Nonetheless, the sect's descent to Islamic extremism and its quest to overthrow the secular Nigerian state was chiefly motivated by Yusuf's personal charisma, namely his outright denunciation of the pervasive decadence in government and society (David 2013).

His ability to maintain control over his adherents had kept the sect one until the recent emergence of Ansaru (Umar, 2013:20).<sup>53</sup> A video footage from 2009 showed how he won the cheering approval of roaring crowd when he taught (Smith 2015). Little wonder, when he fell out with the security, following the killing of his men, Yusuf had the staunch support of his largely Muslim audience, whom he charged with the responsibility to challenge the security. "The same way they gunned down our brother, they will come here one day to open fire at us if we allow this to go unchallenged" (Smith, 2015:4). As far as he was concerned "it's better for the whole world to be destroyed than to spill the blood of single Muslim" (Smith, 2015:4).

As the leader of the Boko Haram, Yusuf was deputised by Na'ib Amir ul-Aam I & II, who in turn had their own respective assistance both at the state and local governments where they existed (Onuoha, 2011b:3). When Yusuf was killed in police custody following his arrest during the riots of July 2009<sup>54</sup>, the mantle of leadership was given to Mallam Sunni Umaru, who publicly stipulated the objectives and intent of the sect. The following rather lengthy

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<sup>53</sup>Ansarul, for example, claims that it is against the killing of civilians, as opposed to Boko Haram's more indiscriminate targeting selection. The genesis of Ansarul is likely connected with the paradigmatic suicide attacks Boko Haram employed throughout the north and central regions, which killed many Muslims during the fall of 2011 and spring of 2012. Ansarul leader is Abu Usmatul (Oyefusi 2007)

<sup>54</sup>Over 800 followers of which more than 100 were Boko Haram members were killed during the fallout with the security.

extract gives us an appreciable insight into the sect's objectives signed by Malam Umaru August 09, 2009 as reported in Vanguard Newspaper (14, August 2009):

1) First of all that Boko Haram does not in any way mean Western Education is sin as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means Western Civilization is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education.

In this case we are talking of Western Ways of life which include: constitutional provision as if relates to, for instance the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexuality, lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilization.

2) That the Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised which is according to the wish of Allah.

3) That Mallam Yusuf has not died in vain and he is a martyr. His ideas will live forever.

4) That Boko Haram lost over 1000 of our Martyr members killed by the wicked Nigerian army and police mostly of Southern Nigeria extraction. That the southern states, especially the infidel Yoruba, Igbo and Ijaw infidels will be our immediate target.

5) That the killing of our leaders in a callous, wicked and malicious manner will not in any way deter us. They have lost their lives in the struggle for Allah.

Having made the following statement, we hereby reinstate our demands:

1) That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamise Nigeria and ensure the rule of the majority Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one.

2) That from the Month of August, we shall carry out series of bombing in Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt. The bombing will not stop until Sharia and Western Civilization is wiped off from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities are turned into ashes.

3) That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished.

4) We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas; which is the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilisation into the shores of Nigeria.

5) We call on all Northerners in the Islamic States to quit the followership of the wicked political parties leading the country, the corrupt, irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership, and join the struggle for Islamic Society that will be

corruption free, Sodom free, where security will be guaranteed and there will be peace under Islam.

6) ﷲ ﷲ ﷲ ﷲ ﷲ That very soon, we shall stir Lagos, the evil city and Nigeria's South West and South East, in a way no one has ever done before. Al Hakubarah

IT'S EITHER YOU ARE FOR US OR AGAINST US

Although Umar's clarification about the meaning of Boko Haram is mild, his argument suggests that the sect is not merely opposed to formal western-styled education but its entire cultural implications. The sect acknowledges the *supremacy* of Islamic culture, which it believes subsumes education and not the other way around. Non-members are referred to as *Kuffar* (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or *Fasiqun* (wrong-doers). Hence, Sakilda, a journalist known to have had directed contact with group, referred to Boko Haram as an 'ideological problem'.

How the leadership shifted to Shekua is not exactly clear. However, according to Zenn (2014: 2), in an interview granted "a blindfolded journalist in a hideout near Maiduguri, Borno State" Shekau claim he had assumed the leadership of the sect" in 2010. Shekau,<sup>55</sup> is generally considered deadlier and more ruthless than Yusuf and was behind the kidnap of the Chibok girls. He is known for constantly posting videos of the sect's activities on YouTube. In one of such videos, Shekau showed the kidnapped girls and threatened to sell them in obedience to "Allah's command". He is one of the most wanted terrorists in the world, with the US offering \$7million as reward for his capture since 2013 when he was named a global terrorist by the US.

In a series of Boko Haram's propaganda videos being posted since 2012, Shekau has repeatedly articulated some of the ideological objectives of the sect, most of which are consistent with those stated above by Mallam Umar. For instance, according to the full translation of one such video posted after the kidnap of the Chibok girls, Shekau denounces the National Pledge, which is recited in secular (western) schools. He condemned the pledge of loyalty, service and honesty to Nigeria as well as the pledge to defend the oneness of the country, as not only "wrong" but also an "act of paganism". "For me, I pledge to Allah. My God, to be faithful to my Allah and

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<sup>55</sup>"Profile of Nigeria's Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau Abu-Bakr Shekau," *BBC News*, June 22, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18020349>. According to Umaru (2013:23), Shekau, does not possess the oratorical skills and charisma of Yusuf but he is ideologically committed and very ruthless. He is believed not to have direct communication with the sect's foot soldiers.

you to your country...to be faithful, loyal and honest to serve Allah...“This is our differences and that is where I detect that Western education is infidel”. He also denounces Christianity and the idea of development with threats thus:

You are sitting down in the name of clerics with turbans; you are sitting with Christians thinking it is mediation. Saying it is development and progress, what progress after you have deviated from Allah? We will die killing and slaughtering them, if you meet infidels in battle-field brethren, just harvest their necks; Allah said it and not Shekau. Harvest Jonathan’s neck, harvest Kashim’s neck, Allah said cut out Burabura’s neck, even in Ka’aba if some is doing Salat for so long as he is deviating from what Allah said, he is infidel. Cut out their necks until the time that you will get majority over infidels of the world. And you will get it, Allah said it, time will come that you will form majority over infidels, face to face.

We will hold you as slaves, who told you there is no slave? They said human rights, silly liars, when did you know human rights? You just come and lie in the name of Allah, Allah who created human doesn’t know rights until you silly<sup>56</sup>

Boasting about the kidnap of the Chibok girls, Shekau claimed he and his member are obeying the command of Allah. He declared war against Christians and democracy and their constitution. “Allah says we should finish them when we get them. It was in this land that they cleaned defect with Quran in Maiduguri, in university they did similarly. They are cheating Islam and deceiving. I support not Abraham Lincoln, Ban Ki-moon, and any unbeliever. This war is against Islam. God will not leave us. You are dying because of money and I will die believing in Allah”.

In essence, Boko Haram claim allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s strong teaching that “Muslims are obligated to raid the land of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system, barring any practice that contradicts the *sharia* from being publicly voiced among the people, as was the case at the dawn of Islam” (Ibrahim 2007: 51)

### **5.3.1 Shekau’s Death and ‘Resurrection’**

Questions regarding whether Shekau is dead or alive remain a red herring especially in view of the contradictory accounts often given of him. Since 2013 reports have claimed that Shekau has been killed, only to be later rebuffed by his propaganda videos. The latest of such was in February 2015, which was followed by a long silence. However, in August an audio purportedly posted by Shekau attempted to jettison any claim of his death. Meanwhile, analysts have picked holes in this propaganda tactic by the sect. For instance commenting on the audio,

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
<sup>56</sup> <https://nigeriansforigeria.com/videos/video-and-translation-of-boko-harams-threat-to-sell-the-abducted-girls/>

Allison (2015) argues that the use of Hausa rather than Shekau's native Kanuri dialect or the Arabic language raises suspicion around its authenticity. In the same vein, Zenn (2014: 6) points to the possibility of stage-management in Shekau's propaganda videos criticizing, for instance, the "*mishwak* (a teeth-cleaning twig); and the same carpet and armo[u]red personnel carrier in several videos".

By and large, this 'death and resurrection' of Shekau has, unsurprisingly, aroused the suspicion that "Shekau may actually be a composite of several people, a kind of sculpted super-terrorist designed to inspire and intimidate in equal measure" (Allison 2015: np). There appears to be a serious effort by the sect to create an image of an undying Shekau. Thus, the term 'Shekau' "may have become a *nom de guerre* [war name], representing all Boko Haram leaders, including the real Shekau, in a confederation" (Zenn 2014: 3, translation added). In this regard, Allison (2015: np) aptly suggested that "until someone kills off the *idea* of Shekau, rather than his physical body, he will live to make another video, and fight another day". Besides, considering the defused structure of Boko Haram, "The possibility of multiple factions using Shekau as their "spokesman" or at least Shekau's name with look-alikes in videos suggests that Shekau's "stamp-of-approval" is relevant for showing unity or enhancing credibility" (Zenn 2014: 6). The implication thereof for counter-terrorism perhaps is that the focus on killing Shekau or any other is of little relevance. Indeed as Shulte-Bocholt (2006) use the enterprise theory to explain, as long as the "demand" exist for continuation of terrorist or criminal activities after the leader is killed other leader would step in to offer such "services". Hence, focus on killing the leader is perhaps a misplaced priority in COIN, considering for instance how the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US has hardly changed much in terms of the international influence of Al-Qaida brand of Islamist extremism.

#### **5.4 Location of the Sect's Activities**

Initially, Boko Haram's core areas of operation were mainly the north-eastern states such as Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe. But eventually it spread to virtually all the northern states including Kaduna to far Kebbi state especially in the wake of its mix up with al-Barwani-led cell. The sect also vowed to detonate bomb in southern cities of Nigeria; which it has dubbed the "axis of evil". These include Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Enugu (Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012). While this threat is yet to be carried out, considering their little or no operation in southern state, Boko Haram has since spread to northern states including the federal capital, Abuja and have boasted in a video of having members in all the 36 states of Nigeria. See Figure 5.1 which reveals the recorded attacks of Boko Haram across the north.



**Figure 5. 1: Boko Haram Related Attacks as at May 13, 2014**

Source<sup>57</sup>

The sect’s activities took a very dramatic turn in 2014 when it commenced capturing of territories and establishing military bases from whence they launch attacks. As at December in 2014, Boko Haram was reported to be controlling about 22 local governments in the north-eastern region. From their controlled territories, the sect launched various sophisticated attacks including on government military bases. The prominent of these was the capture of the multinational military base in Baga, Borno State, on January 4, 2015, where Boko Haram possibly boosted its armoury with more sophisticated military hardware’s seized at the time. This new development arguably portrayed Boko Haram more as an ambitious insurgent than a “faceless terrorist” groups. The group virtually ran their government in the occupied territories, such as Bama, which it declared as headquarter of their Caliphate. To be sure, upon the reported recapture of many of these territories, the minister of information, Lia Mohammed gave the following situation reports in an interview:


If you go to Bama today, you will not believe you are in Nigeria. Every signboard and notice are in Arabic, you will think you are in Saudi Arabia, Algeria or Tunisia. There is no single notice in English left. There, we have Moroccans, Tunisians, Malians living there, and they turned that place into an Arabic town. That convinces me more

<sup>57</sup> <http://www.vox.com/2014/5/13/5710484/boko-haram-maps-charts-nigeria>

that this is not just a local war. Just some months ago, Boko Haram was using Bama as headquarters of their caliphate, appointing emirs from there, and collecting taxes. They had their own government. It is from this perspective I want you to appreciate what this government has achieved (Balogun 2016)

### 5.4.1 The Regionalization of Attacks

Beyond Nigeria Boko Haram has increased its attacks in neighbouring states of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Its activities seem consistent with the sect’s defiance of territorial boundaries. According to Shekau, “we don’t know Cameroon or Chad...I don’t have a country. *Islamiyya* is what I have” (cited in Zenn 2014: 1). Meanwhile, this latter regional focus was facilitated by the cooperation of the neighbouring countries with Nigeria in the crackdown against the sect, as it drastically reduced the easy movement across borders hitherto enjoyed by the sect due to porous border and weak border management. The new development largely limited the sect’s ability to take refuge across the border but at the same time irked the sect. Hence, Boko Haram increased their attacks in these countries as way of trying to deter the neighbouring countries from cooperating with the Nigeria security force. Figure 5.2 below demonstrates the trend of attacks within the given time. More than any time in the past, July 2015 saw more attacks by the Islamist carried out more attacks in the neighbouring West African states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.



**Figure 5. 2:** Boko Haram Transnational/ sub-regional attacks 2014-2015

Sources: Author’s compilation, (data from USF Global Initiative 2015; ACLED 2016),

## 5.5 Membership and Recruitment Methods

Although considered largely a domestic terrorist group especially at its embryonic stage, Boko Haram has surely emerged into a transnational terrorist group since its membership is no longer only drawn from northern Nigeria but also from neighbouring countries such as Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Sudan and Mali (Lawal, 2009:35). In fact, a “video footage found in captured Boko Haram camps by Nigeria's military and seen by Reuters seems to give some of the clearest indication that foreign fighters hold positions of power within the Nigerian Islamist militant group” (Payne 2015: np). The footage identified a man speaking Sudanese Arabic. Similarly, *This Day News* (20 Feb 2015) reported the capture of two French Nationals, amongst the Boko Haram, which was suggestive of foreign membership.

Part of the enabling factors for this link is the porosity of Nigerian borders; the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which facilitates easy migration among western African nations; and the ethnolinguistic and historical ties between these countries and northern Nigerians over the years (Onapajo, *et al.* 2012:345). This fluidity in trans-border movement enables the logistical as well as ideological interaction among likeminded sects along that axis of West of Africa. While, according to some unverifiable estimates, Yusuf had over 280 000 followers “there are no current and credible public estimates of Boko Haram’s current membership” especially under Shekau who is known for leading the group “with an iron fist, killing rivals and not permitting other commanders to get publicity by appearing in his videos” (Mauro 2014: np). Various other accounts put the sect’s membership in few thousands, including Botha and Abdile (2016) derived directly from the confession of ex-fighters putting an estimated figure of 10 000 to Boko Haram membership. This is higher than the 6000 members estimated by Barna (2014) including paid criminals and thugs who cooperate with the sect for financial gain without necessarily sharing in its ideology. Indeed, the unending nature of the terrorist attacks however suggests that 6000 members is likely to be an underestimation. Although it is understandably difficult to put a figure on the sect’s membership, Boko Haram enjoys a large pull of members including those who willingly joined and those forced.

The Economic drivers of the insurgencies are also traceable in its recruitment as members are drawn from diverse socio-economic backgrounds including the unemployed, illiterates, graduates, single, dependent, *inter alia*, majority of its foot soldiers are from poor background in Nigeria or outside Nigeria. The provision of welfare, food and shelter by the sect constituted a strong incentive for attracting membership among whom include the almajiri and “refugees

from the wars across the borders of Chad as well as jobless Nigerian youths” (Umar 2013: 19). Underscoring the implication of the *almajiri system* for the rise of extremism in West in the Zenn noted that “

When you have millions of young boys, as is the case in northern Nigeria, for example, that are part of a largely unregulated educational system where all they learn is Arabic language Qur’an recitation from Islamic scholars, whose credentials and loyalties may be dubious, it can make those boys more susceptible to violent interpretations of the Qur’an that Boko Haram endorses (Heras 2013: np).

Little wonder, aside those intellectuals who, swayed by the sect ideology abandoned their jobs, burnt their certificates and sold their assets to join or/and promote the sect, a multitude of idle Muslim youths unable to secure jobs have been attracted to the sect. Other reports have suggested also that some Igbo Youths and retired soldiers have also joined the sect (cited Onapajo, 2012:354)<sup>58</sup>.

Other source of membership include tradesmen, carpenters, and drivers who were disgruntled with the provisions of government (Lawal 2009: 34). Prompted by its all for cultural purity, Boko Haram’s members avoid interaction with the local Muslim population, and government and private establishments deemed to have been influenced by Western culture. With their rejection of the modern establishments and various forms of modern technologies, which are believed to hamper Muslims from rightly observing daily prayers, and earnings from such establishment are forbidden (Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012:27). Judging from the overwhelming number of jobless youth, uneducated, school drop-outs, political thugs and students from low socio-economic backgrounds, Aghedo and Osumah (2012: 861) noted that Boko Haram membership “largely relates to the depth of feeling about socioeconomic injustice, marginalization and human insecurity”. Nevertheless, recent study based on direct interview with Boko Haram fighters clearly reveals the significant role of forceful recruitment of both young women and men. Given its ideological bend, religious institutions and mosques were identified as key recruiting grounds, Botha and Abdile (2016) which highlighted key role of personal contact in recruitment processes for instance, through force or inducement.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, the youths from Borno that was interviewed for this current study also confirmed

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
<sup>58</sup> It suffices to point out the striking similarity between the sect and the Maiatatsine of the 1980 in terms of recruitment. Both sects took advantage of the dwindling economic condition in the country to attract followers.

<sup>59</sup> This study was anchored conducted interviews between in December 2015 and January 2016 “119 former Boko Haram members and 60 peace builders representing civil society organizations”, mainly in order to understand the individual’s motivation for joining Boko Haram sect (Botha and Abdile, 2016).

this reality playing out especially as the insurgency got more lethal. Meanwhile, beside the forceful recruitment that was notably higher for female, “Boko Haram ex-fighters reported overwhelmingly (60%) that their first introduction was through people close to them – friends, immediate family and family” (Botha & Abdile, 2016).

### 5.6.1 Women as Symbols and Swords

In its initial phase, Boko Haram spared women from its attacks. Until April 2014, during the popular Chibok girls’ abduction, little was known about participation of women and young girls in Boko Haram insurgency. However, between June 2014 and June 2016 about 89 attacks have been attributed to women and young girls mostly between 7 and 17 years of age (Bloom and Matfess 2015). These attacks, most often suicide bombings, were mostly targeted at civilian. Recent empirical studies on female-led attacks, mostly young girls used as suicide bombers, have revealed female membership. For instance, according to Botha and Abdile (2016:2) “former Boko Haram members estimated that a total of 500 to 1000 women are part of Boko Haram” who are included as “leaders, explosive experts, intelligence and recruiters” (See Figure 5.3).



**Figure 5.3:** Gender distribution of roles (%) among Boko Haram based on interview with 119 ex-fighters.

*Source:* Author’s creation, Data based on Botha and Abdile (2016)

The growing participation, or forceful incorporation, of women, in the activities of Boko Haram is arguably tied to three explanations. The first is that, like children, women are more vulnerable to forceful recruitment. The second pertains to the “societal and cultural expectations of women to depend economically on men”, which leaves them, “with few options when husbands or fathers leave to become active members of Boko Haram or if they die (Zainab Usman, Sherine El-Taraboulsi and Khadija Gambo Hawaja as invoked in Nagarajan 2015)”(Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech 2015: 47).

Given the region’s general economic backwardness, the materials supports from Boko Haram in terms of “money, food, and other benefits to members and widows of insurgents”, in contrast to the lack of compensations or social safety nets for victims or citizens from the Nigerian state, the insurgency appears a preferable choice to some of these women, who have little or no alternatives anyway (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech 2015: 47).

Thirdly, an endemic cultural undervaluation of women in the region by which girls are mainly considered as only worth grooming for marriage, a practice often premised on the permission of Islamic teachings, facilitate the growing inclusion of women in the activities of Boko Haram. In this regard, the social position of women relative to men, by which “women and young girls are perceived as expendable material and burdens to be rid of” somewhat explains the “gifting” of teenage girls to marriage by their parents to Boko Haram or, worse still, the exchanging of girls for financial benefit by parents (Oriola 2017: 105).

Meanwhile, these very factors to some extent make women involvement symbolic to the sect, which construes “women as the bearers of its future despite its brutality toward them” (Oriola 2017). For one, the use of teenage girls for suicide bombings is considered as “a deliberate strategy to dominate rural residents and create a new generation of Islamist militants” (cited in Bloom and Matfess 2015: 110). In the same vein, Oriola (2017: 100) compellingly demonstrates how “women of various age groups perform various important functions for Boko Haram and are therefore fundamental to the organization’s operational mechanics, global reputation, and terroristic success”. Among these functions include the use of women as human shield, bargaining chip as well as for domestic work, besides their role in childbearing, which are all critical to the sect success.

## 5.6 Training, Targets and Tactics

The ability of the Boko Haram to wage complex terrorist campaign against the national security outfit suggests that it has some well-trained members; courtesy of international link. Following their initial loss as Nigeria Taliban in the early 2000s, and especially after Bin Laden declared Nigeria “ready for liberation” in 2003, Yusuf and others travel outside “to receive funds to build madrasas and mosques and acquire militant training and advice from al-Qa`ida” (Zenn 2014: 2). Their ability to make various kinds of bombs is also testament to the Boko Haram growing access to special trainings. Hence, the group mainly attacked its’ “enemies” with machetes, club and small arms. Increasingly, the group embarked on using different sophisticated gadgets such as Molotov cocktail and simple improvised explosive devices (IED) (Stewart 2013).<sup>60</sup> Suicide bomb, Motorcycle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (MVEID) Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) have been eventually added to the group tactical repertoire thus making them more dangerous, lethal, and intractable (Thomson 2012: 53). They also devised various intelligent means of concealing these IEDs from being detected. For instance, they disguise them in gadgets like school bags for suicide bombing, a tactic which they probably copied from the attack in Boston, United States, in April that killed three and injured many (David, 2013).

Also, Boko Haram’s initial major targets include the security outfit of the Nigerian government such as the army and police; and the Christian (largely Igbos) minorities in the north and central regions of the country; and the Muslim political and religious elites in northern Nigeria. However, with the change of tactics victims of Boko Haram’s carnage became increasingly random and indiscriminate, as Muslims are also not spared. Besides, there is an angle of vendetta to the group’s target of the Nigeria security agencies, particularly the police, which partly has to do with the so-called extra-judicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf while in police custody (A.I. Ajayi 2012; Cook 2013).

Meanwhile, Sani (2011) observed that the sect always targeted the police from its very inception due to the various disagreements that have led to confrontation between the two. The great number of civilian casualties so far contradicts the sect’s claim to be only against the state and its security agency. In fact, typical of terrorist groups, victims of Boko Haram bombing, attacks and kidnappings are usually innocent civilians especially women and children.

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<sup>60</sup> According to Onuoha (2012c) these IEDS are usually constructed with the use of explosive substances such as Trinitrotoluene (TNT), Pentaerythritol (PETN) and Ammonia (fertilizers), among others. This tends to suggest the presence of highly trained personnel in the use manipulation of chemicals, among the group.

According to Human Rights Watch report<sup>61</sup> (March 2015) more than one million people have been forced to flee their homes since 2009 when the insurgent campaign began. The same report noted that only within the first three months of 2015, not less than 1000 civilians had been killed as the result of the sect increased attacks, following its threat to disrupt the election.

Other major targets include churches, supermarkets, shops, and banks. In line with its anti-secular and anti-Christian standpoint, Boko Haram have directed its attacks on schools or universities, singling out Christian students for execution (Mohammed 2009; Ojo 2010; Onuoha 2010a). Indeed, the ethnoreligious undertone of Boko Haram's target demonstrates a gross misrepresentation of Islam and faulty perception of western culture (Lecturer/NDA). The group once declared, "We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas which is the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilization into the shores of Nigeria" (Onapajo *et al.* 2012: 328). Fundamentally, Boko Haram's terror campaign has evolved in complexity with a widening scope of targets and tactics. Suffices, to underscore that this indiscriminate killing and slaughtering by Boko Haram is one of the factors the clearly distinguished them from the Niger Delta insurgents (Peace-builder3; Youth1; Youth4).

### **5.7 Finances and Supporters**

For Boko Haram to have not only sustained its campaign for so long but also grown more sophisticated, it has a strong financial base, although, typical of terrorist groups, little is known about these sources. Nonetheless, the following sources have been suggested: [1] financial contribution from its members<sup>62</sup> (especially at its embryonic stage); [2] ransoms paid by kidnapped victims; and<sup>63</sup> [3] income derived from the sect's constant raid of financial institutions such as the banks and supermarkets as part of its terrorist tactics. For instance, on 18 July 2011, 7 arrested Boko Haram suspects raided the Unity Bank of Nigeria at Alkaleri town in Bauchi, taking off with ₦17.8 million to support Boko Haram terrorist activities (David 2013; Nwankwo 2013).

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<sup>61</sup>Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/26/nigeria-least-1000-civilians-dead-january>

<sup>62</sup>Members had to pay a daily levy of 100 Naira to their leader.

<sup>63</sup> With the intensification of security counter terrorism; which has limited the sect's bank robbery strategy, kidnappings for ransoms, (particularly of key figures such as politicians, business persons, traditional rulers, senior civil servants and foreigners) have become means of raising money. According to a Nigerian government report, the Islamist militant group Boko Haram was paid more than \$3m (£2m) before releasing a French family of seven. The payer was not disclosed however (David 2013)

There are strong views that the sect is being sponsored/supported by prominent Nigerian politicians, and businessmen<sup>64</sup> particularly in the northern region. The arrest of the contractor Alhaji Bunu Wakil, a Borno state citizen, and 91 others in January in 2011 is a case in point (David, 2013). These were alleged to be financiers of Boko Haram. Also, Osayande (2015) reported the arraignment of Boko Haram's sponsor and stimulant dealer, who was caught with ₦1 million cash.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, according to the Centre For Financial Crime & Security Studies (2015), the seizing of territories must have also afforded the sect opportunity to loot and extort locals especially business persons, citing the allegation by a Nigerian official that "Boko Haram taxes fishermen or seizes their catches". Similarly, news reports revealed in February how Niger air force bombed a convoy carrying smoked fish, believed was for Boko Haram's financier, to Nigeria.

Similarly, then president, Goodluck Jonathan had decried the infiltration of all the arms of his government (judiciary, executive and the legislature) by sympathisers or even members of the sect (Solomon 2012). Unfortunately, however, the Goodluck Jonathan's PDP-led (Peopled Democratic Party) administration was unable to clearly name and shame any of these sympathisers/supporters. Instead, his administration was also accused not only of supporting but also playing politics with the sect to influence the 2015 national election. While the accusation and counter-accusations have not been proven by any authentic source, they have negatively impacted on the success of Nigeria counterinsurgency. Thus, the Boko Haram phenomenon is "a manifestation of mobilization and manipulation within the elite-class as well as of the class opportunistic competition... within the power group who are frequently in contention for political power and offices as well as for scarce state-owned economic resources" (Uadiale 2012: 88).

### **5.8 International Scope and Perspectives**

Some evidence strongly suggests that while having a multitude of internal predicate, Boko Haram is internationally linked to other Jihadist groups both in terms of logistical cooperation and financial sponsorship (Onapajo *et al.* 2012; Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech 2015;

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<sup>64</sup> Part of why Boko Haram is believed to be sponsored by Nigeria elite classes has to do with Yusuf's demonstrated connection with people in high places of authority as redolent of his several unexplainable disappearances from police custody back to his compound in Maiduguri. For instance on one occasion, Yusuf was reported to have returned to his Maiduguri compound from Abuja barely five days after his arrest. But more importantly powerful individuals in the exotic cars with tinted windows (for the purpose of hiding their identity) are reported to have gone to see Yusuf on a Friday before he was killed (Collier et al 2003)

139 <sup>65</sup> Available from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/troops-arrest-boko-harams-sponsor/> (Accessed on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2016).

Kristensen 2016). Corroborating the view, Friel (2014: 6) explained that “Boko Haram has developed the means to sustain extended campaigns of mass violence through ideological outreach toward international jihadist groups, providing operational and logistical support to embolden the movement. Boko Haram shares similar ideology with other Islamist movements such as the Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In fact, based on its own claim, “Boko Haram is just a version of the Al-Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah” (Vanguard News 2009: August 14). Similarly, A.I. Ajayi (2012) averred that a link was established between the Algerian Salafist Group by the Boko Haram leader. This availed the members’ training opportunities, especially technical training, including the making and using of the IEDs and “dirty bombs” as well as training for combat.

The sect’s adroitness and tactical sophistication in confrontation lends credence to the view that its speciality in the above could not merely have emerged from domestic training (Dearn 2011). For instance, outcome of the forensic analysis of the August 2011 attack on the UN building in the state capital Abuja reveals that the sect used large quantities of the “highly powerful and volatile plastic explosives pentaerythritol tetranitrate and triacetone triperoxide”, an indication of international link and expertise (Lewis 2009: 347). Furthermore, Onapajo *et al.* (2012: 347) suggested links between Boko Haram and some Iraqi insurgent groups based on the report of John Myrick, a US bomb expert, that traced a deadlier type of bomb known as a “shaped charge” – used exclusively in the 2003 Iraq war – to insurgencies in Somalia and Nigeria. Not surprising thus, that the former Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff (under President Jonathan), Lieutenant General Onyeabor Azubuike Ihejirika, categorically claimed that:

It is definite that the groups that call themselves Boko Haram or terrorists receive training and possibly funding from elements abroad. This was evident from the type of weapons we have captured from them; the type of communication equipment we have captured from them; and the expertise they have displayed in preparation of improvised explosives and these are pointers to the fact that there is foreign involvement in the terrorism going on in Nigeria (cited in Onapajo *et al.* 2012:347)

What is more, the sect’s international scope, especially its operation in other countries has also been recorded. For instance, the sect’s kidnapping of a French family from Cameroon, signalled the “willingness of Boko Haram to operate outside of Nigeria’s boundaries for the first time, and to execute attacks for the cause of Ansar Eddine or AQIM” (Oyefusi 2007: 12). Boko Haram reportedly fought in northern Mali in 2012 when “the militant Salafist groups

AQIM, MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), and Ansar al-Dine controlled the northern part of the country and established closer relations with these groups” (Karmon 2014: np). At a fundamental level, the prevailing features of bad governance, underdevelopment and a general atmosphere of poverty and discontent that characterised affected regions of Nigeria, Niger and Chad is a major catalyst for Al-Qaeda’s infiltration of, and cooperation with, Boko Haram (Amundsen 2010; David 2013). Such conditions have provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda in countries such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan and Algeria (Alozieuwa 2012)

### **5.8.1 International Sponsorship and Support**

Emerging evidences suggest that Boko Haram receives financial support from other jihadist groups beyond the borders of Nigeria. Aside the material support, the sect has also been given assurance of human support (Okpara 2012). For instance, an Algerian terrorist group was said to have transferred 40 million Naira to the sect (cited in A.I. Ajayi 2012: 105). Other suspected funders of Boko Haram include the *Al-Muntada al-Islami*, an England-based agency “associated with Saudi Arabia charity and Da’awa institutions as well as other institutions that have been classified as terror financing agencies” (Afokpa 2013; Umar 2013: 21). On another front, about US\$300 000 was also reported to have been received from Al-Qaeda by Muhammed Damugun (a businessman and director of Media Trust Ltd) “to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism, and aiding terrorists in Nigeria” (Onuoha 2010a: 57). These youths who are said to be about 10 years of age, were trained in desolated places in order to be hardened enough and “full of bitterness for the Nigeria’s socio-economic and political situation” (Sani 2011: np). This state of mind was perhaps deemed useful for them to be able to confront the Nigerian security and civilians in as stern and inhuman manner as they do.

The sect has also been reported to generate its fund through the trafficking of drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, from South America to Europe. Similarly, following the destabilization of the Libya, arm smuggling from the region became part of their means of finances (TAFT 2013; Friel 2014). According to the Financial Action Task Force (TAFT) report, an arrest of Boko Haram insurgent in Burkina Faso indicated the sect conduct terrorist financing and activities outside the borders of Nigeria (TAFT 2013: 17)

## 5.9 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has provided a detailed overview of Boko Haram, reviewing its evolution, ideological foundation, *modus operandi*, leadership, membership, targets and tactics, international dimension and links as well as its sponsorship. It is safely deductible from the overview that Boko Haram has evolved from a domestic Islamist groups supported and financed from within with the aim to effect systemic revolution into transnational/international jihadist group. This transformation impacted on the sect's *modus operandi*, membership and tactics as it derives inspiration as well as logistical and financial cooperation from beyond the borders of Nigeria. This chapter also gives the various historical and contemporary factors that impacted on the sect's evolution, especially domestic socio-political and economic situations that trigger and boosted the evolution as well as sustained the continued activities of the sect. The subsequent chapter shall thus attempt to explore these socio-economic factors as they play out even till date, comparing the insurgencies by the Niger Delta militant and Boko Haram in order to identify possible differences and similarities.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **NIGER DELTA MILITANTS AND BOKO HARAM INSURGENCIES: COMPARING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS**

#### **6.0 Introduction**

In the on-going framing and blaming discourses on the underlying causes for the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, various useful explanations have been offered. Admitting the efficacy of these varied discourses, this chapter focuses on the socio-economic dimension of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in comparative terms within the 2RCs theoretical lenses. It assesses existing similarities and differences in the two insurgencies in order to clarify not only *what* but also *how* socio-economics variables relate (or not) to either or both insurgencies, against the backdrop of the detailed region-specific analysis of both insurgencies provided in the preceding chapters.

Such understanding is arguably critical in cautioning policy-makers against the replication of possible “lesson-learnt” from one insurgency to the other since both exist in the same national context. A range of relevant themes that fall within the social and economic spheres are assessed in relation to the insurgencies. These themes, as identified in the theoretical and conceptual framework for this study, include various indices of human under-development; such as poverty, lack of education, under/unemployment, social injustice and vulnerability, corruption/bad governance, among others. These factors are deemed critical, as their outright dismissal, on the one hand, or misattribution, on the other hand, as underlying causes can impact on policy and its efficacy toward the (re)building of peace and development in Nigeria. It suffices to reiterate that the focus on abovementioned factors does not presuppose that the insurgencies are solely driven by these factors. Rather the study seeks to clarify how these highly contested socio-economic factors, which deserve policy-makers’ attention, can be understood, among other factors, as explanatory of the insurgencies.

#### **6.1 Socio-Economic underdevelopment Matters**

*Prima facie*, the two insurgent groups seem almost incomparable especially considering the divergent framing of their respective goals: religion for Boko Haram and ethnonationalism (to a very large extent) for Niger Delta. Hence, Ogoloma (2013: 124) argued that “for the Niger Delta crisis, the activities are militant in nature, whilst the Boko Haram is insurrectional and terrorism in objectives”. However, a careful perusal through extant literature reveals an emphasis on socio-economic development as part of the imperatives to sustainably address the

insurgencies, which suggest that socio-economic drivers are important in both uprising (Ayelowo 2016; Glazzard *et al.* 2018). Similarly, while faulting the proposed amnesty for Boko Haram (which basically derives from a comparison with Niger Delta situation)<sup>66</sup>, some scholars have contemporaneously underscored the need for socio-economic development in both regions (Aghedo and Osumah 2014b; Nwankpa 2014). Acknowledging some commonalities between both insurgencies at the level of incentives, be it grievance-based or greed-based, Nwankpa (2014: 74) stresses the importance of socio-economic interventions (through development of infrastructure, job creation and poverty alleviation) by the government so as to disincentivise the largely impoverished youth that are being recruited into these groups.

Reinforcing this view *vis-a-vis* Boko Haram for instance, Ensign, the president of the American University based in Adamawa submits that “While the conflict in the North is generally reported as a religious one...religion is being used to manipulate people, and that unless something is done about the underlying conditions of extreme poverty in the north, there will be more killings, more refugees and more despair” (Ensign 2014: np).

Thus, amidst the admittedly complex drivers of insurgency, the critical question should be: how do socio-economic factors matter, in regard to the Boko Haram insurgency compare to the militancy in the Niger Delta region, whose socio-economic explanation seem to enjoy wider appeal? Addressing this critical question means much for the attainment of *sustainable* peace and development, with nationwide implication for legal and policy framework towards COIN. The resurgence of militant activities in the Niger Delta in recent times (since February 2016) especially under the NDA and other less popular cults, regardless of the 2009/10 amnesty, clearly highlighting the problem of ‘quick fixes’ (UN Peacemaker 2009; Onuoha 2016).

While an ideological explanation for Boko Haram is prevalent, the socioeconomic explanation has remained largely controversial. Shekau’s claim on video that the war “is between Muslims and non-[M]uslims....not a tribal war, nor is it ... a war for financial gains, it is solely a religious war” reinforces the wider appeal of the religious discourse (cited in Harnischfeger 2014: 35). Yet various other scholars seem to agree with Sulemana (2014: 81), that “Boko

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<sup>66</sup> Nwankpa for instances criticised the proposed amnesty for Boko Haram as being insensitive to the plight of the victims and ignorant of growing evidence that group’s ideology and other motivation that are crucial to an effective counterterrorism measure. Minding the different dynamics of the insurgencies Nwankpa (2014) argued that the proposed such amnesty for Boko Haram can hardly achieve the same positive effects as in Niger Delta crises.

Haram looks more certain to be the direct outgrowth of the historical and contemporary burden of the Nigerian state, rather than the result, necessarily, of religious fanaticism” (Maiangwa 2012; Okeke-Uzodike and Onapajo 2015). On the part of the Niger Delta insurgency, the narratives of its socio-economic impetus are not too scanty; however, the resolution heretofore, has largely been tilted towards quick-fix, especially through military suppression and faulty political dialogue characterised by “time buying” co-optation of militants, and inadequate attention to structural ambience (Peace-builder5; Researcher1).

Cognisance must be taken *ab initio*, that owing to the irreducibility of the causal explanation, of both insurgencies, to a single variable, this study only attempts to engage the socio-economic dimension, while minding the explanatory utility of other non-socioeconomic factors. For example the non-economic factors linkable to Boko Haram may include, but not limited to, the international rise in violent Islamism in recent decades especially since the 9/11 attacks; the historical dynamics of Islamic extremism in northern Nigeria; the political character of Islam and its’ resonance with global jihad, as well as national political struggle (Mozaffari 2007; Ayoob 2008). Thus, the politico-religious intercepts of Boko Haram in the context of Nigeria is correspondingly key to the emergence and, the hitherto, intractability of the sect’s terrorist campaign. For the Niger Delta, the agitation for political self-determination and internal ethnic strife shaped by “age-long animosities arising from land disputes, territorial claims, chieftaincy tussles” are also noteworthy (Courson 2016: 2). Unfortunately, these factors, which fall outside the scope of the current study arguably complicates *how* socio-economic drivers are linkable (or not) to the insurgencies within the highly debated security-development nexus. Yet, understanding this *how* is very vital since “blanket statements about economic ‘root causes’ tend to obscure rather than clarify the analysis”, considering the context dependence of each conflict (Lewis, 2014, np).

Consistent with extant literature, the key socio-economic factors identified by the respondents as significant to these insurgencies include high rate of youth unemployment, poverty and inequality, faulty education as well as population bulge especially among the youths in Nigeria (Community/Religious Leader; Peace-builder3; Researcher1; Researcher5; Youth2; Mercy Corps 2016b; Mercy Corps 2016a). These are considered working *together*, and fuelled by systemic corruption in Nigeria, in driving conflict across the country. Hence, these factors can hardly be treated in isolation if we are to get a robust understanding; rather, they must be understood in relation to one another. After all, poverty, inequality and unemployment as key

indices of HD interact both at individual and social level (Foster *et al.* 2013) likewise their implications for these conflict (Goodhand 2003; David 2013).

### **6.1.1 The Poverty and Inequality Discourse**


Two understandings or approaches to poverty are discernible in the literature, namely: the money-metric and the multidimensional approaches (Sen 1999; Alkire 2002). This study prefers the latter view of poverty given its reliance on the broader view of human development, especially in terms of mental or psychological impoverishment (poverty) as adduced of the case of Boko Haram by one of the respondents (Lecturer/NDA; Researcher5). Contrary to this broad definition, the common reduction of poverty to money-metric measurement is arguably partly responsible for the polarised debate on poverty-terrorism correlation. Indeed, the money-metric approach to poverty fails to adequately capture the essence of human and social development within which poverty encompasses both the qualitative and quantitative dimension (Alkire 2002; Foster *et al.* 2013).

Hence, regarding the poverty-terrorism link in Nigeria, literature focusing on the quantitative aspect of poverty, and development in general, shows two extreme views. On the one hand, the leftist stresses a connection between violence and the lack of development. On the other hand, the right-leaning advocates deny or minimises such a link (Lewis 2014). This polarisation of view is not inexistent in, or without implication for Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in related literature (Montclos 2014). In the case of Boko Haram, while some straightforward views of the link maintain simply that “the militants have been doing so well because some parts of Nigeria have been doing so poorly”, critics either disagree or acknowledge an inherent complexity that transcends poverty (cited in Lewis, 2014: no page). Similarly, the emphasis on the greed thesis in the rethinking of the Niger Delta insurgency suggests an undermining of the socio-economic causes (Joab-Peterside *et al.* 2012).


On the part of Boko Haram, a popular approach to the poverty thesis in literature usually draws on comparison of poverty levels in northern and southern region (Musa 2012; Rogers 2012). Incidentally, available data, although with a notable level of inconsistencies, shows that the northern region is poorer than its southern counterparts. See figures 6.1 (A & B). Based on this, it is often being concluded simply that Boko Haram is a direct product of endemic poverty in the northern region (Ikejiaku 2012; Musa 2012; David 2013; Akinola 2015; Sampson 2016). However plausible, these approaches on their own, devoid of deeper historical and contextual analysis conceal more than they reveal vis-à-vis the discrepancy between the poverty levels in

the various (sub) regions as causal factors. For instance, a quick glance at the map to the left on the distribution of poverty clearly reveals a concentration of many “very poor” communities not only in the northern region including Borno, Kano Zamfara, and Katsina and Niger but also in southern region such as the supposedly rich Lagos.

A



B



**Figures 6. 1:** Poverty Distribution and Access to Drinking Water in Nigeria 2012  
Sources: Geo Current

Accordingly, Hoechner (2015: 270) argued that it is misleading to think that these “statistics in themselves could ‘explain’ the current crisis.” Although the aptness of Hoechner’s view is also dependent on how the statistics are interpreted, the observable inconsistencies in the statistics are limitations to their explanatory efficacy. For instance, the pan-Nigeria representation of high poverty levels of the map to the right leaves one with the question: why is there no terrorism/insurgency in all parts of the country as a result?


Similarly, the map label B above shows that the north-east including Borno fairs better in some development indices such as the availability of potable water falling within the highest percentage range of 40-78.3 % relative to other southern states including Calabar, Ondo Bayelsa, and Abia with lower records. This reinforces the critical observation made by some respondent that Borno is not necessarily the poorest state in Nigeria (Researcher1). Thus, Lewis (2014: np) logically suggested that: “If poverty were the ultimate cause of extremist violence in northern Nigeria, we would expect such a movement to develop not in Borno but rather further to the west”. Although this conclusion is also highly questionable since it misrepresents Boko Haram as merely a Borno phenomenon, it is a critical call for deeper engagement with the poverty thesis of Boko Haram. Apart from not also explaining why the other poor (or poorer) parts of Nigeria are relatively peaceful, the regional comparison is mute on the non-economic tone in which Boko Haram has framed, if not disguised, its campaign till date (Lewis 2014).

A slight variation of this approach is usually the comparison of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, wherein the Boko Haram insurgency is, again, dependent upon the higher poverty in the three northern geopolitical zones compared to their counterparts in the southern region (David, 2013). In this regard, David (2013) provided the historical trajectory of underdevelopment of the northern region including the north-east region, which is considered as providing a safe haven and easy recruits for Boko Haram. Still however, a broad north-south comparison of poverty obscures the fact of the prevalence of Niger Delta insurgency in the supposedly rich south. There is little wonder that respondents to this study were also divided over the issues of socio-economic drivers of Boko Haram insurgency, with some arguing that “it is not about poverty” (Peace-builder3; Researcher1), while others emphasised poverty as key to the manipulation of youths in the region (Researcher4; Youth2). For instance, based on

his direct experience of living in, and studying about, the north and the south, a respondent perceptively argued that “there is a whole lot of misrepresentation of the northern Nigeria in the literature” regarding socio-economic marginalisation and its implication for Boko Haram (Researcher1).

From the foregoing, the so-called economic explanation of Boko Haram is far from simplistic. However, out-rightly dismissive of this dimension to the insurgency by Boko Haram, for instance, on the basis that Borno or North-east is not the poorest is also rather too simplistic, if not misleading. Beyond the northeast, other parts of northern Nigeria including Sokoto, Zamfara and Kano where poverty levels are also notably high have also experienced Boko Haram’s activities, though relatively lower, as suggestive of figures 6.1 above. As a respondent alluded, the concentration of Boko Haram in Borno must do with a range of other factors, including, but not limited to, Borno being [1] its place of origin [2] Yusuf place of origin [3] strategically located in the border between Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon where many of its followers, especially foot soldiers, are also derived (Peace-builder3; Researcher1). Thus, if poverty has no explanatory effect on Boko Haram, it should rather be premised upon other compelling evidence than a mere reduction of the sect’s activities to Borno or the northeast as Lewis (2014) suggests.

Meanwhile, a very revealing empirical study by Sowunmi *et al.* (2012), which represent the poverty incidence in Nigeria according to senatorial zones, clearly exposes widespread poverty standing at a high of 74.5% across all the senatorial zone in the northeast (See Figure 6.2). Earlier study also reveal to geospatial dimension of the problem, which is “more entrenched in the rural areas” (Omotola 2008: 502). The study also reveals that “the Northeast and Northwest zones with rural predominance had more than 34% of their population categorized as core poor when compared against those with urban bias” (Omotola 2008: 502). In fact, national poverty average was below those of states such as “Adamawa (34.4%), Bauchi (43.9%), Taraba (36.1%), Yobe (49.6%), Kebbi (47.2%), Sokoto (55.2%), Kogi (61.1%), and Kwara (34.9%)” all of which falls into the Northern region (Omotola 2008: 502).




**Figure 6. 2:** Poverty Rates across Nigeria’s Six Geopolitical regions

Source: Adapted from Sowunmi *et al.* (2012)

Furthermore, as **figure 6.3** below corroborates, in 2009, when Boko Haram got violent and virulent, the north-east was the least developed geopolitical region in Nigeria, with the HPI of 48.9 and correspondingly low HDI of 0.332. Boko Haram could spread to other northern region given many factors including shared cultural/religious history but also similar level of impoverishment. Unsurprisingly, recent study by Botha and Abdile (2016a) reveal that “15.13% of Boko Haram respondents indicated that they joined the organization” because of poverty; 5.88% because of the “employment opportunities the group presented; 5.88% because of “being frustrated with life”. Thus, despite the religious colouration of its campaign, these are indicators that are arguably non-negligible in terms of understanding Boko Haram’s relative ease of recruiting its foot soldiers and the population’s support for the sect (Researcher1). Indeed such outlook from the above indices partly reinforce the view that Boko Haram is only “using religion as a decoy, as its main motivation is economic; it is capitalizing on the extreme level of poverty in the north-east of Nigeria to swell its rank of foot soldiers” (Musa 2012: 111). Similarly, Delia *et al.* (2015: 524) rigorously presented empirical data confirming “that Boko Haram is a radical movement with support dependent on socio-economic fact[or]s” and

concluded that, “the best way to counter it may be through a betterment of social and economic realities”.



**Figure 6. 3:** Nigeria’s Human Poverty Index (HPI) and Human Development Index (HDI) 2009

Source. Author’s; Data based on UNDP (2009: 10)

Further, at a more material level, monetary inducement and prospect of looting provided the immediate benefits that oil the motivation of sect’s members, influencing widespread supports for attacks of non-indigenes, especially the Igbos, as they hoped to loot or take over their victims’ businesses and assets after attacks (Youth1; Youth2). Corroborating, an earlier study (David, 2013) that demonstrated how young people burnt down schools at Boko Haram’s injunction for a fee as low as ₦5000, the respondents from the Borno noted how their peers cooperated with Boko Haram at a fee as low as ₦2000.<sup>67</sup> This is consistent with view of another respondent on the financial inducement that was used to lure the largely poor residents in Maiduguri into cooperating with Boko Haram. In a respondent’s words, at some point in time, “there was a lot of money being pumped into these things...there was a price tag on each soldier. You kill one soldier you have a million Naira. Yes! A million Naira was the price tag on each Nigerian soldier” (Peace-builder3). Similarly, an 18-year-old female suicide bomber, Amina recently confessed being paid a meagre ₦200 (less than 1\$) to detonate bomb in Maiduguri when she was captured by men of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps

<sup>67</sup> Akin to this, the respondents narrated how money was used to tempt their fellow youths into joining Boko Haram (Youth2; Youth3).

(NSCDC) (Vanguard News 2017: February 8). BBC's Richard Hamilton conclude that "it is perhaps no surprise that extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, continue to have an appeal in Northern parts of the country, where poverty and underdevelopment are most severe" (BBC News, 2012). It had been observed that Yusuf was at some point motivated by financial compensation when he became reluctant to support the group but the sponsors "worked hard to win him back and heavily remunerated him financially, making life much easier for him and above poverty line" (Musa 2012: 117).

Accordingly, David (2013); Nwankpa (2015) insisted that, despite the criticism of the poverty thesis, that there is a strong economic tinge to Boko Haram's insurgency. Indeed, "the desiccation of the Sahel and the drying up of Lake Chad are crucial factors in the Boko Haram conflict, even if Shekau does not appreciate the importance" thereof (Nwankpa 2015: 16). The plausibility of the above view arguably lies in the gradual deterioration of the region's economy due both to insurgency and COIN as well as the historical abandonment of the regions agricultural economy for the petrodollar at the national level (David *et al.* 2015). Studies (cited in Mercy Corps 2016b: 7) have shown "that poorer households have a higher likelihood of participating in and supporting an armed group". Unsurprisingly, the provision of welfare, food, and shelter by the sect, especially at its embryonic and largely non-violent stage, for the needy population arguably accounted for the supports and/or sympathy towards the, sect, by some members of the population especially "refugees from the wars across the borders of Chad as well as jobless Nigerian youths" (Umar 2013: 9). This is especially reinforced by lack of reliable government institution to address immediate needs and desperation (Lecturer/NDA; Peace-builder1; Peace-builder3; Youth1). Thus, it can be safely inferred that Boko Haram filled the empty spaces created by a phenomenon of "ungoverned areas" across Nigeria including the Northeast. It is hardly surprising that whereas Botha and Abdile (2016) place poverty as the number three cause of Boko Haram, a respondent (a young graduate) from Maiduguri charged: "poverty, poverty, I must repeat this, is the number one, the genesis" (Youth2). This sort of perception feeds directly into the general ambience of socio-economic discontent in virtually all parts of Nigeria, including the Niger Delta region due to years of mismanagement, which has invariably promoted the sense of the state's *legitimacy crises* beneath both insurgencies (Helmus 2009; Maiangwa 2012; Okoro 2014).

On the part of Niger Delta insurgency the recourse to violent agitation mainly by the youths is framed within the negative implication of the economic-politics link on the lives of the citizens (van Mierlo 2016). As the economic history of the region reveals, oil exploration has not

amounted to a commensurate human and infrastructural development (Akani 2013). Rather, it has constituted a major source of human insecurity having wrecked people's sources of livelihood and in the process created a dependency syndrome. This is the prevailing situation whereby some of the locals are readily attracted to handouts and compensation from oil companies and charity organisations (Community/Religious Leader; Peace-builder4; Peace-builder5; Youth/Religious leader1; Akani 2013).

Suffice it to acknowledge the dimension of self-induced poverty among some populace. For instance, a respondent from the region, accented the growing tendency among some people in the region to disguise their unwillingness to engage meaningful agriculture in the spillage blame, stressing that agricultural farmlands are still substantially available to many (Peace-builder4). Nonetheless, the UNDP (2006) reports puts poverty across the entire south-south at 73 per cent. More than a decade after the comprehensive report of the UNDP (2006) on the region, the challenges of "poor development" which has resulted in "disillusionment, frustration among the people about their increasing deprivation and deep-rooted mistrust" remain unresolved. Despite some improvement, perception of the region as story of "a paradox, grinding poverty in the midst of vulgar opulence...the case of a man [sic] who lives on the banks of a river and washes his hands with spittle...the case of a people who live on the farm and die of hunger" still endures till date (Community/Religious Leader; Researcher1; Ekpu 2004: 10).

The link, thus, between poverty and militancy in the region is through both the anger and frustration resulting from the fact that the region resources has not adequately served the need of the people especially in comparison with other oil bearing communities around the world where the same oil companies in the Niger Delta region operate (Director2; Peace-builder5). In lieu, it has enriched a very few who are hardly from the region, over the larger population in region directly suffering from the environmental hazards of the oil exploration. In the words of a respondent "We hear about oil block but the owners of these oil blocs are Hausa, Yoruba and we here rightly suffering the hazards, we don't know what the oil block is about" (Community Member1). As Okereke (2016) also observed, currently "80-90% of crude oil blocks are allocated to northerners". This dynamic, coupled with the fact that companies' headquarters (AGIP, Chevron, Mobil) are situated outside of the region, is seen by the people in the region as taking jobs opportunities away from them. For instance, a respondent bemoaned that the "Mobil production Headquarter is in the Niger Delta, but where they meet

to apportioned contracts is outside the Niger Delta” (Peace-builder4). Corroborating this, another respondent highlighted the problem of poverty and disposition thus:

*If all was well with us, nobody would be bothered...The major problem is socio-economic. Our people are poor, poor and poor, which is not how it is supposed to be, yet people that do not even know the colour of oil are the ones who owns the oil blocks*

Albeit not every poor person in the region simply resorts to violence, the well-known marginalization, the wider socio-political imbalances that characterises minority-majority relationship in Nigeria, as it directly affects the Niger Delta, arguably creates incentives for the discontented especially considering the relative importance of the region to the nation’s economy. Besides, the general sense of grievances potentially provides the ambience for various forms of manipulation and highjack. Parenthetically, the youths are the most affected by the poverty; thus, they become ready tools for manipulation by the masterminds as well as politicians. This manipulation of the ‘boys’ by elites is common across Nigeria. For instance, Ojo (2013) highlighted such incidences of members of Bakassi boys and MASSOB in the south-east; the Egbesu Boys and MEND in the South, Yansara-Kusa in Bauchi, Yankalare in Gombe, ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe states, just to name a few, that have been heavily armed and violently used by political elites in election contestation.

Furthermore, the financial colouration of the Amnesty programme, whilst not entirely condemnable, feeds on the neediness’ of the region’s youths, in the psychological sense (Peace-builder1). Consistent with extant literature, it was observed during the fieldwork that the Amnesty programme along with the various compensatory mechanisms used in the region to appease community from time to time, not only creates dependency but also tension between individuals as well as between communities (Director2). Hence, while noting some of the merits of the Amnesty Programme, some respondents lamented that it “did not go down to the real people”; due especially to the arbitrariness especially in terms of the selection criteria of beneficiaries (Peace-builder1; Peace-builder2; Peace-builder4). In addition, the failure of the amnesty<sup>68</sup> is partly blamed on the lack of legal backing and lack of proper institutionalisation, resulting in its incoherence and lack coordination that opened the programme up for manipulation and risked it being hijacked, rather than providing a standard framework for effective applicability elsewhere, say the case of Boko Haram as was being advocated (Peace-

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<sup>68</sup> Considering that relative the big population, only about 30,000 militants were demobilised and being paid allowances, it has been rightly noted that: “the plan was not comprehensive enough to tackle job creation and employment of demobilised militants. It has also neglected community involvement especially non-combatants who had been impacted by violence” (Office of the National Security Adviser 2015).

builder1; Peace-builder2). Hence, master-minds easily exploit these flaws occasionally to instigate anti-state sentiments among the discontent while framing the narrative of the agitation around popularly shared grievance.<sup>69</sup>

Further aggravating the discontent and angst is the adoption of double standards by oil companies in the discharge of their CSR toward the people, relative to what they do in other developed countries (Director1; Peace-builder5). Multinational oil companies have treated various communities in the region below international standards of CSR. For instance, SACA video documentary reveals that contrary to what happen in Ireland, where Shell was obligated to reroute its gas pipeline to more than 243 meter away from any dwelling following protestation from the host community, oil-bearing communities in Bayelsa state including Ikarama, Koroama, Imirigi amongst others, are treated differently (SACA 2014). For instance, the documentary clearly reveals a 20-inch-high pressured gas pipeline situated only 9.80meters from peoples' dwellings despite agitation by the community. Consequently, gas flaring and its accompanying health hazards are a common reality in oil hosting communities in the region. Again, compared to what obtains, for instance, in Shell's gas project in Ireland, where high standards for emergency rescue plan enshrined in the National Framework for major emergencies, SACA (2014) observed that it was not aware of such plan in the region. "They will gather all the gases in the various places, come and flare in here, give us acid rain and contamination, while they are not even taking care of us, no health facilities, no development facilities" a respondent lamented (Peace-builder5).

Overall "analysis of poverty and human development paints a very dismal picture particularly when the region is compared with other oil-producing regions in the world"(SACA 2014). Akin to this, the implication of the higher level of poverty for insurgency in the Niger Delta region arguably subsists in the feeling of *relative deprivation* among the populace engendered mainly by oil exploration that further aggravate the environmental fragility of the region amidst government's absence. This is also reinforced by the lack of adequate stakeholder's representation in projects planning and implementation resulting in inequality and inequity between and within groups as well as between individuals. As some groups or individual get richer relative to others, the tendency for the 'left- behinds' to follow the part of violent is encouraged. As a resident of Bille (a remote village in the Niger Delta region) noted "We are

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<sup>69</sup> In the north, it is the perceived adulteration of Islamic region by western culture and Christians. In the Niger Delta, it is a narrative of long-term marginalization as the cause of people impoverishment.

angry, a hungry man is an angry man. We cannot be on top of millions and that million is not reaching us” (Mutasa 2015).

Thus, compared to the Boko Haram insurgency, the idea of relative rather than absolute poverty provides a compelling explanation for the Niger Delta insurgency. This partly address the statistical inconsistencies earlier noted. It is against this complex backdrop that “the chronic human and infrastructural underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region is a legitimate basis for discontent, especially given the region’s strategic relevance to Nigeria’s survival” (Uzodike and Isike 2009: 113).

#### **6.1.1.1 The Robin Hood Effect, Minority Exclusion and the Rational Choice**

A popular critic of socio-economic drivers of terrorism often revolves around the view that some terrorists are known to be affluent and educated. However, such criticism tends to underrate the *Robbin Hood effect’s* explanation which, according to Krueger and Laitin (2008), is a situation whereby an individual is motivated to fight for their fellow citizens rather than merely for their own socio-economic wellbeing. Albeit Kruger and Latin’s focus were on transnational terrorism, the same effect is hardly inexistent in the domestic terrorism by Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents. The framing of objectives, regarding the liberation struggle (even if only rhetorically), against oppressive and corrupt system provides significant motivation for support, be it active or passive. Active support might mean direct participation in the struggle, while passive support could involve logistical backing by the populace, including but not limited to, concealing vital information from the security agencies, or general sympathy with the group’s course.


Thus, the grievance-based perspective finds expression either in the terrorist’ or local population’ discontent with the system. Both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents have evidently capitalised on the discontent to garner support. This dynamic tends to have direct or indirect implication for: [1] the terrorist’ motivation, [2] the populace support and sympathy, [3] the security personnel attitude and disposition to fighting the menaces [4] and the politicians’ proclivity to manipulate the situation. The net effect thereof is the persistence of the attacks and violence as if nothing is being done to nip it in the bud.

Consistent with the rational choice theoretical lenses earlier explained, individual choice to participate or not can be driven by a range of cost-benefit calculations (see chapter 3), which are sometimes connected to socio-demographic and economic state of the decision maker in these regions. On the part of Boko Haram, like other Islamist terrorist group, the rhetoric’s of

heavenly bliss for participation in Jihad; and the heroic feeling of bringing down the “corrupt system” provides a beneficiating view for the largely poor local population in their choice making process. Additionally, viewed through its transnational posture, Boko Haram terrorism fits the *Robbin Hood Effect* in the sense that its members are also drawn from the Chad and Northern Cameroon and Niger, where both and political and economic instability (particularly Chad) have been responsible for emigration. Similarly, in the Niger Delta, the widespread socio-economic grievances provide opportunity for self-actualization both for the insurgents and the framer of the marginalisation narratives especially the activist, politicians and ideologues that are not necessarily impoverished in material sense. Thus, so long as the local population continues to suffer from the oil companies and government’s negligence, they will always be rooms for all forms of manipulation and activism genuine or otherwise.

The economic benefit calculation in the Niger Delta may include the operation of illegal refineries as well as the vandalization of pipelines, to either extract crude oil for sale, or attract companies’ attention for clean-up contracts. On the part of the Boko Haram, these gains entail a direct benefit for looting, bank robbery, extortion and stealing from shops or compensation for carrying out an attack.

Hence, whilst the statistics may show higher level of development in the Niger Delta relative to other regions in Nigeria, the distribution of such development across the population may vary considerably; thereby accounting for why the population left out of the benefit may resort to terrorism to be heard or to benefit. Thus, a respondent aptly noted that it is rather more profitable to look at the poverty statistic on the Niger Delta through the prism of the high level of inequality *within* the communities. This, he reasoned, better explains the poverty vis-à-vis inequality in the Niger Delta than merely depending on broad national comparison precisely because such indices hardly reflect the situation of every individual (Researcher2). See **figure 6.4** below. This view is consistent with the direct observation made by Researcher on the reality on grounds in Bayelsa state. It was clear that while a handful of ex-militants were now enjoying some enormous amount of wealth driven from their agitation, most of the population in the region especially those who have not chosen the part of violence still live in squalor. Thus, beyond the grievances, individuals or certain groups of likeminded individuals make rational decision to participate in the struggle for divergent personal motives, ranging from direct economic benefit to psychological and spiritual benefits.



**Figure 6. 4: Inequality versus poverty level in the 6 geopolitical zones in Nigeria**

Source: Data from UNDP (2009)

Based on the foregoing, it is not unreasonable for the most disadvantaged to resort to the same violent or illegal path perceived to have enriched their community members in the past. Inferably the combination of these widespread grievances with individual motivation, often shaped by rational cost-benefit calculation makes the 2RCs a solid foundation for understanding the admittedly complex socio-economic drivers of Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency. Accordingly, illegal activities for survival is mixed up with the insurgency. This is possibly strengthened by the notable systemic lack of appreciation for hard work in Nigeria that invariably promotes the “short cut” to riches (Peace-builder1). Corroborating this view, one of the respondents cited a case of a pastor who later resorted to militancy due to mockery by his relatively richer peers who had become financially enhanced by the amnesty programme (Peace-builder5). While linking the advent of the NDA to the stoppage of amnesty money, he also stresses that a handful of people claimed to be militants simply to get the windfall from the amnesty cash. Indeed, the resort to violence is encouraged by the prevailing tendency of government and/or the multinationals to co-opt the violent or the ‘loudest complainer’ rather than addressing the shared grievance through sustainable programmes as much as possible (Peace-builder2; SACA 2014).

In line with the grievance’s thesis, *minority exclusion* particularly in the case of Niger Delta insurgency was identified as critical to the struggle. Consistent with previous studies, the politics of minority exclusion that has dominated Nigeria’s political history is also vital to the deplorable socio-economic condition in the Niger Delta (Agbibo 2011; Ani and Genevieve

2013). Compared to the Boko Haram, the Niger Delta struggle is mainly championed by minority ethnic groups that have been remarkably marginalised within the majoritarian national political and economic landscape.

Virtually all the northern-based respondents, including the youths from Maiduguri, acknowledged that this factor significantly differentiate the Niger Delta socio-economic grievances from Boko Haram. They rightly placed the ‘legitimacy’ of the Niger Delta insurgency within the historical marginalisation of the region’s ethnic minorities, considering the region’s importance to Nigeria revenue generation, which a respondent aptly analogised as the “chicken that lay the golden egg” (Peace-builder3; Youth2; Youth4). Nonetheless, based on their direct knowledge of region, some respondents especially from the Niger Delta region were quick to acknowledge the hijack and criminalization of the original legitimate struggle by a very few, for self-benefiting end (Community/Religious Leader; Peace-builder5). Another respondent noted:

For Boko Haram they say they are fighting against western education, but for our people in the Niger Delta, they are fighting about social exclusion, marginalisation, and underdevelopment based on the fact that we have done a lot for the country but the country have done nothing for us (Peace-builder4).

So much on poverty, let us turn to the related problem of unemployment, particularly among the youths in the affected regions and in Nigeria as a whole.<sup>70</sup>

### **6.1.2 Un- and underemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities**

Like poverty, the relationship between the insurgencies and unemployment is hardly simplistic or linear.<sup>71</sup> The supposed linear relationship hardly withstands scrutiny in specific conflict as suggestive of “emerging evidence based on speaking directly with youths who participate in violence” (Mercy Corps 2016b: 7). Besides, a comparison of countries internationally interestingly reveals that countries with alarming level of unemployment rate including Djibouti (54%), Congo (46%), Bosnia and Herzegovinian (42.9%), Haiti (40.6%), Afghanistan (40%) are not necessarily insurgency-ridden, except for Afghanistan. Besides, those with decent job may also be attracted to terrorism, as individual level motivation varies considerably

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<sup>70</sup> Youth is construed here as “*a transitional stage in life between childhood and adulthood*, rather than as a rigid construct based on age” (Hilker and Fraser 2009 :9)

<sup>71</sup> Unemployment in Nigeria has been defined as “the proportion of those in the labour force (**not in the entire economic active population, nor the entire Nigerian population**) who were actively looking for work but could not find work for at least 20 hours during the reference period to the total currently active (labour force) population” (NBS 2016:).

calls for critical engagement with the unemployment-insurgency link. Essentially the link between unemployment and these insurgencies required deeper scrutiny since “employment status alone does not appear to determine whether a young person is likely to join an insurgency” (Mercy Corps 2015). On the part of Boko Haram, for instance, an attempt at a demographical mapping of former Boko Haram interviewed by Mercy Corps in a recent study, reveal that “some had jobs, and others did not” (Mercy Corp, 2016:1)<sup>72</sup>.

Yet, a total dismissal of any link between unemployment and insurgency is arguably injurious to the efficacy and sustainability of any COIN. For instance, Botha and Abdile’ recent empirical study reveals that:

15.13% of Boko Haram respondents indicated that they joined the organization as a result of poverty, whereas 5.88% of former members referred to the employment opportunities the group presented. A further 5.88% of Boko Haram respondents referred to the feeling of being frustrated with life as contributing to their vulnerability to the organization (2016:5).

So, understanding these dynamics in the case of Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency has utility for Nigerian COIN. For instance, several respondents directly or indirectly alluded to the cliché: “an idle man is a devil’s workshop” in attempting to stress how the joblessness of some of the youths involved in these insurgencies is important (Community Member1; Director2). Virtually all the respondents acquiesce with the view. As at March 2009, youths between the age bracket of 15 and 44 constituted 58.7% of the unemployed in Nigeria. Incidentally, according to the NBS (2009), the 10 states with the highest percentage rate of unemployment (far above the National level of 19.7%) in 2009, namely: Bayelsa (38.3%), Yobe (27.3%) Adamawa (29.4), Borno (27.7%), Kano (27.6%), Gombe (32.1%), Rivers (27.9%), Katsina (37.3%) Bauchi (37.2%), Akwa-Ibom (34.1%) happens to be in the region directly infested by both insurgencies, though in varying degrees. It is well known that both insurgencies are predominantly youth-driven. 100% of the respondents for this study, presented divergent views on *how* youth unemployment or underemployment in Nigeria facilitate the insurgency in the north-east and south-south.

Despite this, the same study also showed that “before joining the organization the majority (51%) of Boko Haram respondents were employed” (Botha and Abdile 2016a: 5). This leaves one with the question: how can unemployment be rightly linked to the Boko Haram, as well as

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<sup>72</sup> In its recent research in three north-eastern states, Borno, Gombe and Yobe, Mercy Corp (2016) “interviewed 47 former Boko Haram participants, family members and friends of current members, community members and young people who resisted participation conducted interview with dozens of former members of the sect”

the Niger Delta discourse since respondents and literature suggest it cannot be outrightly dismissed? To adequately understand this, recall that the problem of unemployment/underemployment is hardly a 'stand-alone' factor. Like poverty, the phenomenon of unemployment vis-à-vis the insurgency in Nigeria's northeast can be pegged in its largely unnatural cause due to corruption. In this regard, Harnischfeger (2014: 35 emphasis added) argued that the militant's "rebellion is born out of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment; it is a response to *corruption and social neglect*".

First, the pecuniary benefits that political elites have driven from public offices over the years by stealing and stashing away public resources that could have been surely used to create jobs in the country was rightly adduced by some respondents as the main trigger of anger among the youths (Researcher4; Researcher5; Youth1; Youth4). Another view, which some respondents corroborates, is the discrimination of people in recruitment due to nepotism and favouritism especially among the elites; which is often driven along religious and ethnic lines. In fact, the recent recruitment saga of relatives of some highly placed elites into the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) workforce without the legal requirement of advertisement was cited as infuriating factors by one of the respondents, which, he believes, may or may not lead to rebellion depending of other related economic factors (Peace-builder2). Furthermore, some of the respondents submits that the prevailing loss of education's utility in providing jobs, especially for the ordinary masses in the communities has resulted in their taking to arms for survival (Peace-builder3; Researcher1). Thus, "unemployment is a major problem, but underneath that is hopelessness and a belief that there is no fairness. Young people get angry and frustrated and look for something to do" (Mercy Corps 2015: 2).

As already established, a regional comparison reveals a higher level of unemployment in the north compared to the south (David 2013). The relative higher rate of unemployment in the northern region is partly due to the abandonment of agricultural sector that was the mainstay of northern economy prior to the oil boom (David 2013). Its decline is mainly due to leadership failure. This has essentially contributed to the gross underdevelopment in the region, thereby aiding the crime and security bedlam in the region. It was clearly revealed that Boko Haram has "exploited common desires of youth in this region, to get ahead economically and distinguish themselves in their communities. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses" (Mercy Corps 2016b: 2). Hence, Forest (2012) argues that even if the group has its backgrounds in theology, "its swelling ranks are as a result of a huge reservoir of unemployed

urban youths from many parts of the country... who have completely become disenfranchised". When one mix this reality with "radical Islam, which promises a better life for martyrs" a better understanding of the Boko Haram and related phenomenon in the north becomes more comprehensive (cited in David 2013: 98).

On the part of the Niger Delta insurgency, the capital-intensive nature of the oil industries uniquely aggravates the (nation-wide) problem of unemployment in the region as it meant less employment opportunities for the youths in the region. A respondent, strongly argued that the link between unemployment and the crisis in the Niger Delta region, "is very clear" (Director2). He noted that the oil industry, being capital rather than labour intensive, only employ few people. Yet, "the little they employ is from outside the Niger Delta region; they don't employ persons of this region because they keep on having the claims that the people are not skilled" (Director2). Additionally, Babatunde (2012: 51) observed that if the Niger Deltans are "employed at all, it is in the most menial and poorly-paid jobs, where they suffer the indignity of seeing outsiders arrive to take pre-eminence over them in the oil industry". Unfortunately, their other legitimate sources of livelihood have been adversely affected by the oil exploration, for instance due to spillages, which are often not promptly or properly cleaned up. For instance, in Ikarama community of Bayelsa state, an oil spill in popular fishing Oil Lake in December 2008 was left un-cleaned until August 2013, when Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility (ECCR) had alerted Shell London (SACA 2015a). Subsequent laboratory analysis of the Lake by SACA revealed that the clean-up was improperly done as heavy metals could still be found in the water.

Aside from the environmental degradation that has aggravated poverty level in the region, the paltry payment (and even non-payment) of youths for some services that they render to oil companies in the region is a source of anger and frustration that often leads to violence in region. For instance, in June 2013 youths in Ikarama community had allegedly ruptured a pipeline after having impounded Shell's vehicle earlier in protest for non-payment of the meagre 50 Euros (₦10 000 at the time) they were being paid as surveillance workers, monitoring high-pressure pipelines (SACA 2014). It was also observed by some of the youths that for 10 months (between January and October 2014) they were not paid for their surveillance services. Inferably, in the absence of meaningful jobs, illegal activities associated with oil exploration and pilfering tend to provide viable alternative survival mechanism for the discontented youths in the region (SACA 2014). It is against this backdrop that the slowdown in the remittance of the amnesty payment to ex-militants in the current administration saw the

resurgence of the NDA. Based on this dynamics, Ayelowo's (2016: 5) observation is worth noting:

Although many are of the opinion that the Niger Delta Avengers is being manipulated by corrupt politicians who are afraid of the current onslaught on corruption. This could be true but it would mean that they are just taking advantage of the situation as usual. Had the underlying problem of unemployment been addressed, they would have been robbed of that opportunity.


Furthermore, the nature of the amnesty payment also constituted a reasonable ground for a dependency on violence for survival due to its absence of sustained empowerment programme for the masses. The programme lacked adequate planning, monitoring and evaluation of the process. This haphazard approach of the government created opportunity not only for corruption in the enlisting of baneberries but also a scenario whereby some people intends to believe the only way to benefit from such money is to be known for violence (Community Member1; Peace-builder1). As a respondent, rightly critiqued: "you just line up these guys with no identity, with no record of anything, and you start distributing money to them. I don't think government has the capacity of the mechanism for tracking how those monies were being distributed. Then you now have this problem in the Niger Delta which everybody has the sense of entitlement. What guarantee did you have that monies actually got to the right destination?" (Peace-builder1). Equally, the lack of requisite mentoring and evaluation of the programme to help the 'privileged beneficiaries' better manage the drastic income jump was a problem. The monies could have been better channelled to empower the youths through durable programmes and the process adequately monitored (Peace-builder1).

Due to the prevailing tendency, the respondent fear that "we are going to continue on this road for a very long time, in which the lack of seriousness in dealing with the causative factors of violence, creates an environment in which people feel that the higher the volume of resentment expressed in violence the better the chances you have accessing resources"(Peace-builder1). Furthermore, unemployment in the region has fuelled the amber of violence since it renders the youths vulnerable to being influenced by politicians who employed them as political thugs, arming them for violent attacks against opponents (Ojo 2013). Accordingly, while statistics may place the region higher than others in terms of economic standing the foregoing nuances, in collaboration with other factors, gives insight into the violence in the region.

### **6.1.3 The Significance of Education**

In the yet inconclusive debate on the education-terrorism nexus, scholars have maintained the (in)significance of education level of a terrorist in their resort to terrorism, depending on their

frame of reference. For some, poor education does not determine terrorism. Using, for instance, evidence from the perpetrators of 9/11 (and other terrorist’s activities in the developed world); one side of the argument easily concludes that the perpetrator did not resort to terrorism because of their low education level; rather, that their high educational level was more likely instrumental to their sophisticated terrorist assignment. Adherents of this view tend therefore to suggest that improvement in education is not necessarily policy relevant. Yet education is considered as strategic to why individuals resort to terrorism, including ideologically driven terrorism such as Boko Haram insurgencies, especially taking into consideration the very content of education itself. One prevailing argument, which has gained traction with respect to Boko Haram is that the sect is more likely to persuade the illiterate or uneducated to unquestioningly join the movement due, perhaps to the latter’s inability for independent critical thinking. This is particularly owing to the poorer level of education in the northern (compared to the south), as the following figure 6.5 suggests.



**Figure 6. 5: Percentage of Children of Primary School Age Attending Primary Or Secondary School (Net Attendance Ratio) Geopolitical Zones**

Source: Author’s; Data from UNDP (2009)

This dynamic is critical to understanding the wider appeal of the sect in the region. “Many youths in the north lack education, have few or no skills and are hardly employable” (ICG 2015: 3). Hence, it is particularly problematic that “education is poorer, and the size of household is larger in the north compared to the south” (David, 2013: 104). From a measurable perspective, abounding evidence, with historical and contemporary worth and weight, suggests

that the region fairs badly in terms of education penetration. With regard the north-east region, DHS Education Data survey (2011) reports on Nigeria clearly showed two states with highest percentage level of out-of-school children were Borno (12%) and Zamfara (68 %). The report also disturbingly indicated that 72 per cent of children from Borno have never been to school compared to 4 per cent in the FCT (Patrick and Felix 2013). “Out of over 120 children, the report revealed that Zamfara have an average of 28 children in school. Borno state have 29 children...Sokoto 34, Yobe 42, while Plateau State has the highest number of children in school with 113 of every 120” (Patrick and Felix 2013).

Consistent with other literature on this phenomenon, most of respondents, both from the south and the north, stress the fact many recruits of Boko Haram fall prey to the sect due among other reason to this low level of education in the region. Akin to my earlier study, a notable social phenomenon that cuts across the north is that “millions of Almajiri students sent to Quranic schools far from their families and required to beg for alms (Almajiranchi) or work as domestic help to pay for their upkeep” (ICG 2015: 4). As a result, they are often gullible to the directives the teachers including their radically include ones.

#### **6.1.3.1 Content and Utility of Education**

In highlighting the quantifiable aspect, the issues of nature and content of education is equally critical to a profitable understanding of the implication of education for the insurgencies, especially by Boko Haram. Both the literature and the interviewees reveal two key perspectives of education that are of explanatory relevance to the study. These include the *utility* and the *mental liberation* considerations. At both levels, education fails in the northern region even though not exclusively. From the economic utility perspective western education, which have been historically discouraged by northern elites, has served little to lift ordinary citizens out of suffering (David *et al.* 2015). Yet the type of education that the children of the elites receive often differ “from the traditional education in the various societies, and this by itself was enough to mark them out as a group” (Kwanashie 2002: 50). Pérouse de Montclos (2014: 11) aptly surmises that the new “education enabled them to climb the social and economic ladder over and above their peers who had a different kind of education, Quranic education. The lack of such education and the resultant emptiness and implication for income status, makes those who are surviving well, based on that same education, enemies of the sect. An ideologically-

bent group would consider the very system that bring such discrepancy between people as the main target for change; thus, it frames its change mantra around this core foundation (Peace-builder3). Accordingly, those who abhor such change become victims of the violent means adopted towards realizing that.

Akin to these differences, the enabling power of education for independent critical thinking is largely lacking in the predominant memorization of Quranic by the ordinary citizens, thereby partly defeating the mental liberation dimension of education. Relatedly, the insufficient attention so far given to civic education and history, with emphasis on national unity in Nigeria education curriculum, contributes to the culture of religious intolerance (Researcher5). Indeed, the capability for critical questioning, which is the mental *liberation perspective* of education, is notably limited on the part of its members especially the low-rank recruits. As one of the foremost Islamic scholar Shiek Ahmad Gunmi rightly observed:

The north is just learning. Even these boys that are making noise in the name of Boko Haram are just learning the basics of Islam. When you have deep knowledge of Islam or Christianity, you won't do certain things. There are people who are illiterate in the affairs of religion. Those going into the university get a little of western education, a little of Islamic education then they have this nostalgia about the triumphant days of Islamic civilisation, mixed with myth, then they think they can apply it now in modern time without going into detailed historical perspective of issues. It is lack of knowledge (Vangaurd News 2017: January 23).

Little wonder, some former Boko Haram fighters and a group of peacebuilders in Adamawa, strongly underscored “the lack of education” in conjunction with poverty and unemployment as significant “factors creating frustration” (Botha and Abdile 2016a).

Meanwhile, on the part of the Niger Delta insurgency, the role of education or lack thereof is complicated. In fact, going by its own pronouncement on its website, the NDA considers itself as “a group of educated and well-travelled individuals that are poised to take the Niger Delta struggled (sic) to a new height that has never been seen in this nation before” (Okereke 2016: 1). Although, such pronouncement and the statistics suggest that education is hardly a problem, this is hardly true for the wider population including those involved in the struggles, especially those whose source of livelihood have been directly affected by the oil spillages. A student recounted how oil spills in a lake from whence he usually generates his school's fees affected his ability to continue his education, just as others blamed their poverty level on their inability to obtain better education (SACA 2014; SACA 2015a). Hence, without solely relying on the conclusion often drawn from a general comparison of education level between the north and south, the issue of nature, contents and value of education helps to further illuminate why

insurgent violence also exist in the seemingly educated south as well as in the north. Thus, understanding the interaction between education and other factors such as inequality and poverty is of more utility in the education-terrorism nexus.

#### **6.1.4 Social Infrastructural underdevelopment**

There is also a sense in which the material infrastructural development intertwines with the above in providing conducive environment for the insurgency. Infrastructural development covers the gamut of good roads, steady power supply, good health system etc. The near inexistence of these factors, in the affected region were adduced by respondents from the Niger Delta region, can partly account for the anger that fuel the militancy in the region. A respondent argued that the ‘non-motorability’ of the creeks, a notable feature of poor infrastructural development in many communities in the Niger Delta region, is critical not only to why militants have survived the security clampdown, but also to why they can combatively engage with the military since they are better familiar with the region than the military (Peace-builder5).

This is consistent with a recent study on the Niger Delta crises that infrastructural development remained poor. And “issues like insufficient funding, projects abandonment, community attitude and leadership style are the major impediments to sustainable human development in the Niger Delta” (Okinono *et al.* 2015). A recent revelation by the minister of Niger Delta Affairs highlights how endemic corruption has foiled developmental progress in the Niger Delta region. In his words, “it was a situation where people thought that the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was a platform for collecting and sharing. That is the reason we had more than ₦420 billion disbursed in the ministry and the rate of project completion was just 12 per cent. There was so much waste” (Akpan 2016: np)

In the same vein, another respondent alluded to the same factors as facilitative of the difficulty with militarily dealing with Boko Haram in the Sambisa forest. Although, the military are trained to engage in any battle-field, there is no doubt that comparative advantages exist in battle-field for the insurgent given their relative familiarity with the terrain.

##### **6.1.4.1 Corruption and Social Vulnerability**

Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies can hardly be understood outside the social problem of endemic corruption in Nigeria as many respondents rightly noted (Peace-builder3; Researcher3). Corruption is recognised as the number one challenge to socio-economic development in Nigeria, having permeated the political, social and economic spheres of

Nigeria. Recall that Nigeria has consistently ranked badly among the most corrupt countries as far as the CPI-TI is concerned. One of the overarching effects of corruption in Nigeria is the overwhelming sense of social vulnerability that it creates across Nigeria especially among the lower class. Corruption is regarded as “a key factor in crime, unemployment, inter-religious and communal conflicts, unrest in the Niger Delta, police brutality and other instances of injustice and dysfunction”(UNDP 2009: 108). Accordingly, a respondent perceptively links its nationwide deleterious socio-economic impacts with the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies thus:

When you live in an environment like this, where the generic word is insecurity, which has to do with the issues of hunger, sickness; and a culture of vulnerability, which literarily has taken over the lives of the people – everywhere you turn people feel miserably vulnerable: a woman who is pregnant today does not know whether she would carry through the pregnancy; a student writing jamb doesn't know whether he will get the right result, a student who gets the right results doesn't know whether he/she will gain admission into the university... Thus, this environment of chaos uncertainty produces the fumes that we now have today, whether you call them Boko Haram today, the Avengers tomorrow; because there is no clear goal as to where we are going. The result being that everybody is helping themselves (Peace-builder1).

The above respondent highlighted that corruption is a significant underlay of the anti-western stands of Boko Haram, adding that because other regions have not resorted to violence, on the same account, today does not mean they will always not. Once there is trigger and a unifying ideology, which currently for Niger Delta and Boko Haram revolt is predominantly ethno-nationalism/resource control and religion respectively, violence will mostly ensue as the preconditions are readily available (Peace-builder1). Similarly, Kuka argued, with reference to Boko Haram, that “clearly in the eyes of sect members the persistence of corruption, collapse of public morality, injustice and so on, could only be attributed to those who govern. In their reasoning those who govern us do so because they have acquired their tools by gaining Western education”(cited in Agbiboa 2013c: 9). On another note, the inadequate payment of soldiers as well as the benefits that some high-ranking military officers derive from sustaining the war by providing inadequate incentives for the non-commissioned officers NCOs is also critical. For instance, the latter “have accused officers of corruption and of aiding the enemy by selling equipment and intelligence to Boko Haram” (Pate 2015: 28). The ensuing frustration of the NCOs which has resulted in mutiny in some cases has no doubt be affected the efficacy of COIN especially in Boko Haram affected region. Thus, not only has corruption underdeveloped Nigeria socio-economically, it is also undermining military efficiency by demotivating the soldiers. Besides according to the Transparency International, “When a country's institutions

are weak, its security forces are not trusted, and its borders are not strong, as is the case in Nigeria, giving terrorist organisations room to flourish”.

Interestingly the advent of the civilian regime saw a deliberate weakening of the Nigerian military by the political elites perhaps for fear of forceful overtake. The massive retirement of many Generals under the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007) is noteworthy. The unintended consequence however was that a weakened army, coupled with systemic corruption that facilitates maneuverer, meant that various militant groups could reasonably challenge the state security outfits not only on the battle-field but also in terms of intelligence gathering(s).

It must also be highlighted that the impact of intergenerational trauma resulting from military incursion contributes to the broad issues of economic deprivation that sustains the resistance in the Niger Delta. As a respondent, aptly alluded:

Most of the protester in the Niger Delta or the eastern region [as in the case of IPOB] are all young people, who are affected by what they heard happened to their families, and those of them who have their families living with scares of the 1967-70 civil war, who are still living with various military incursions in the Niger Delta.... Even the Odi attack of 1999 is still very fresh. Most young people now grew up hearing how their families were all wiped away by the various military incursion in the region (Researcher1).

Elsewhere a respondent's view corroborates this historical-social and economic dynamics to the struggle in the Niger Delta that drives the youths towards violence in the Niger Delta. “Look at the People in the Northern part of the country; they always have Fuel all year around. We do not have job then why not fight and die so that our children will not suffer as we are now suffering and they will regard us as heroes.” (cited in Emordi 2015: 56). Indeed, failure to constructively manage this trauma in both insurgencies is only a recipe for intergenerational angst against the Nigeria State.

## **6.2 Notable Similarities and Differences**

Based on the foregoing certain, similarities and difference can be highlighted of both insurgencies. From a grievance perspective, some motivations that are both applicable to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies includes “perceptions of social exclusion, real or perceived discrimination, frustrated expectations, and government repression (Aldrich 2012: 48). Hence, many respondents observed that amidst the marked differences, there are similarities in terms of underlying causes especially from the point of view of socio-economic variables. Meanwhile, there exist differences in the goals and modus operandi. For the Niger Delta, the goal roughly revolves around ethnonational self-determination; for Boko Haram, it

revolves around religious/ideological self-determination. Hence, in identifying a difference at least politically, a respondent argued that while Niger Delta insurgents demonstrate their want for inclusion in the majoritarian democracies, Boko Haram wants exclusion for a theocratic state (Researcher1). Cognisant must be taken however of the fact that at various points in time the Niger Delta insurgents have also clamoured (however weakly) for the creation of Niger Delta Republic, from the time Isaac Boro (Ifeka 2006; Courson 2009; Okereke 2016).

Furthermore, a respondent from Borno and others rightly argued that for Boko Haram “their grievances is not clearly known to the federal government...This is pure terrorism ..., in the Niger Delta this are people that are fighting for their own rights” minding the fact that the federal government structure has not had enough positive reflection in their lives in view of the contribution to the economy (Peace-builder3; Peace-builder5; Researcher5; Youth2). Indeed, the posture of Boko Haram, in terms of its pronouncement and action, is consistent with the findings elsewhere that underscore the religious narrative which legitimises “violent struggle to defend Islam against the crusader West” as setting Muslim insurgencies apart from others (Leuprecht *et al.* 2010).

The Niger Delta insurgents, compared to Boko Haram’s, have rarely posed any direct threat of imposing its government system on the entire Nigerian state. In lieu, the struggle has mostly revolved around the clamour/need for autonomy regarding resource control; perceived as the only means of approach in order to addressing the various underdevelopment challenges in the region (Aghedo 2015; Emordi 2015; Onapajo and Moshood 2016; Onuoha 2016). Undeniably, what drives this clamour/need in both insurgencies is to some extent similar when considered through the wider prism of political, economic, administrative and structural deficiency in Nigeria; *vis-a-vis* human and social development. Hence, the position of Mazrui (2002: 67), that “against economic marginalization, Sharia is a form of passionate protest”, in the north is held by some respondents and scholars as far as the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram and similar group in the region are concerned (Youth2; Francis 2011; David 2013; Delia *et al.* 2015).

Meanwhile the foregoing evidences suggest that social and human underdevelopment is common to both insurgencies either as motivating factors for the lower ranks, or manipulative tool for the leaders/ideologue/political elites that frame the narratives. However, in relative’s terms, especially minding the pronouncement of the insurgents, it is inferable that the socio-economic drivers are directly more evident and tangible in the Niger Delta insurgency relative

to the Boko Haram. Accordingly, Ogoloma (2013: 125-6) avers that unlike Boko Haram which has “openly declared that it has no other agenda than working to establish an Islamic kingdom.. the Niger Delta militants were not terrorists and did not pose any security challenge to the country. Similarly, a respondent rather accentuates that relative to the Niger Delta case, the impoverishment in the north is more of “spiritual/mental”, as far as the relationship between the masterminds and the vanguards involved in the insurgency is concerned (Researcher1)<sup>73</sup>. Notwithstanding, literature and respondents acquiesce that “Boko and Niger Delta militants are comprised mainly of less privileged and poverty-stricken members of the society” (Yahaya 2015: 61). Thus, Aghedo and Osumah (2014b: 5) noted that “one fundamental similar feature of the operational bases in the two cases is the level of unemployment, poverty, and economic destitution in both regions”.

Further, both insurgencies also involve “criminals and outlaws” albeit the Niger Delta militants do not directly wage war against the state’s security outfits as much as Boko Haram, aside from engaging in self-defence battle and destroying oil facilities (Aghedo and Osumah 2014b), in the attempt to draw distinctions between Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgent groups, all respondents in the study points to the modus of operation, target and tactics of the insurgencies as a significant differential rather than their underlying causes, which most respondents traced to the problem of governance and institutions in Nigeria. In this regard, the peculiar sophistication, lethality and targets of Boko Haram, in the view of most respondents from the north, was a function of the monetary inducement of some abjectly poor and disillusion populace as well as unifying Islamist ideology that linked it up to both national and international financial support. Informed by this dynamics Aghedo and Osumah (2014b: 13) averred that “substantially, at the roots of both insurgencies are governance crisis, elite political corruption and banditry”. Overall, all the respondents acknowledged the centrality of neediness paring with either greed or creed or both, in explaining the social and economic dimension of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

Therefore, while poverty and lack of education remained only necessary but insufficient explanation, the *narrative*, within which this stark reality ravaging the Nigeria masses is framed gives them significant explanatory power. This is especially in collusion with other factors such as religion and ethno-social and environmental realities which differ in the

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
<sup>73</sup> The vanguards include the foot soldiers directly affected by absolute poverty while the masterminds include those that might not necessarily be impoverished but whose interest may be political

respective regions of conflict. These socio-political realities such as religion (for Boko Haram) and ethnonationalism (for Niger Delta) present a unifying force for igniting the flame of these grievances in their respective contexts. Other region-specific factors; which give each insurgency its unique character in relation to the socio-economic discourses are notable. Boko Haram thrived in the north-east by drawing on its cultural and religious links with neighbouring West African countries such as Niger, [Northern] Cameroon, and Chad, wherein a shared cultural and religious sense of Islamic brotherhood remains critical to the transnational recruitment. Coincidentally, these countries have been struggling socio-economically. This dynamic partly explains the relative peace in other geopolitical regions in Nigeria that lack such unifying force thereby explaining to some extent why such region may be relatively peaceful, despite deplorable socio-economic indices (Peace-builder1).

With Nigeria's lack of comprehensive identity databases, national sense identity and belonging has come to be defined along religious line especially in the northern region thus blurring clear distinction between Nigerian Muslims and other Muslims from these neighbouring states. This is further compounded by the historical religious divide in Nigeria mainly between Muslim and Christians, which has often triggered violent conflicts especially in the north (Researcher5). A Muslim in the northern Nigeria can easily identify with a non-Nigeria Muslim than a Nigerian Christian due to the shared religious Arabic language and this religious divide. Various accounts of Boko Haram's attacks including some of the respondents of this study, highlighted that ability to recite the Quran has sometimes been employed by the sect in distinguishing victims in attacks especially when and where attacks were directed at non-Muslims. By framing their campaign in the rhetoric's of anti-secular movement, opposed to the marginalisation of Muslims by the perceived secular western world, the sect is then able to induce overt and covert support for its activities. As various video release of the sect often depicts, the Nigeria states and its western allies must be stopped from adulterating the Islamic religion through Jihad. The symbolic bombing of the UN headquarter in Abuja in 2010 is a case in point (David 2013). To some of the poor and less educated recruits, the Jihad is tantamount to upturning the corrupt system supported by western liberal democracy and capitalism, which is believed to undergird the deplorable social conditions that are experienced (David 2013).

The global framing of grievance is one critical appeal of Boko Haram that offers it wider transnational support compared to the Niger Delta insurgency; which is a largely localised grievance base directly on economic and political marginalization. In addition, this unifying language of religion swells the formidability and sophistication of Boko Haram relative to the

Niger Delta insurgents. The latter are sometimes more divided as reminiscent of the various inter-community conflict recorded in the region. This makes it easier for the state and/or oil companies to capitalise on its divide and rule tactic, instigating them against each other through various forms of co-optation and inducements including monetary. The differences and similarities between both insurgencies, as the following analysis have attempted, is diagrammatically highlighted in figure 6.6 below, placing overall argument within the *greed, need and creed spectrum* for analytical purpose.



**Figure 6. 6: illustration of the dynamics of the internal socio-economic factors in Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies**

Source: author's

The diagram attempts to demonstrate how the root causes of the insurgency, links to socio-economic discontent, common to both insurgencies at a generic level. It highlights the region-specific factors that collude with these social and human development challenge and which are given the spark of violence through the narratives of masterminds/elites/ideologue or activist. These *human agents* directly or indirectly actualise the conflict potential inherent in these

generic root causes through their narrative framing and their inducement of discontented and radical population using material or ideological incentives in the respective insurgencies. Herein lies the convergence of greed, need and Creed in both insurgencies.

### **6.2.1 Greed Need and Creed Spectrum**

According to Goodhand (2003: 630) there are three broad perspectives in literature concerning the poverty-conflict (dis)connection, namely [1] the cost-based [2] grievance based, and [3] the greed-based perspectives. Regarding the 2RCs theoretical frameworks of this study, a slight variation can be constructed of the complex mix of greed, need and creed in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies. Basically, in this Greed-Need-Creed nexus, a mix of grievance, greed and belief system interplay in the individual's rational calculation to the determination of the decision to participate in the insurgency. For the Boko Haram, the 'creed' basis is arguably the heavenly benefit; the 'greed' basis is material benefit; while overall neediness of the insurgents especially the foot soldiers and the community members, constitute the grievances; within which the utility maximization is rationally (or irrationally?), calculated by the individual insurgent. Accordingly, "for the poor, taking up the gun becomes a rational livelihood strategy" (Goodhand 2003: 632) especially at the individual level, while the collective perception of denied need lessens the burden of mass mobilization for the masterminds, increase the sense of heroism for the fighters and the activists that frame the struggle. Denied needs, especially at root causes level, cover the gamut of grievances ranging from political repression to economic deprivation, which constitutes a major source of angst among the populace considering the nation's enormous resources and human endowment.

Therefore, with the awareness of the socio-economic injustices that create the neediness, masterminds and leaders of radical movement such as Boko Haram, frame, in a religiously appealing narrative, the need for participating in Jihad against the so-called corrupt government as heroic thing to do and of which the spiritual benefits outweigh the short-term cost. Then, beside their attempt to provide the lacking basic social amenities, the sect goes further to use financial inducement or force to create the impression of higher benefit over cost thereby appealing to the populace's grievances and indirectly incentivizing them, for instance consider the reward of 1 million naira for killing a Nigeria soldier (Peace-builder3).

Additionally, cohesion is used to tilt the cost-benefit calculation for the decision maker by increasing the cost of non-participation for the populace who are unfortunately often without

adequate state security protection due largely to inept governance. All these provide an atmosphere whereby the decision-making is characterised by a sense of comparative advantage for participation in violence against the state. This reality also provides a workable template for the evident politicization of the crises especially by elites seeking to promote parochial ethnic or political agenda, as reminiscent of the lack of required wilfulness and cooperation to deal with the insecurity from the onset. Some aspects of this dynamic are also applicable in the Niger Delta insurgency only that the framing of narrative in the case of Niger Delta is hardly around creed.

Accordingly, while socio-economic malaise such as poverty seem common to both insurgencies generically, their differences is further illuminated by the predominant tendency towards to religious creed on the part of the Boko Haram, or towards greed or self-enrichment on the part of the Niger Delta insurgents especially at individual level. Suffice to note that this distinction is not necessarily a strict one given that economic greed is found in both insurgencies. Indeed, “individuals sometimes move toward or away from terrorist organizations in part according to whether personal-level opportunities exist” (Darcy and Noricks 2009: xxiii).

Meanwhile, the *creed* basis of Boko Haram insurgency arguably reinforces the framing of its narratives in absolute terms, calling for Islamist state (a theocracy), which is perhaps perceived as hopeful alternative to the overall problem of neediness in the region. Thus, a respondent noted that: “religion was a way to galvanize wider support. But the immediate and remote cause of Boko Haram can be traced to a lot of economic issue”, stressing that there is no distinction between north and south regarding political and economic injustices in Nigeria (Peace-builder3). This absolutism of Boko Haram resonates with the view that “religiously motivated challengers are more likely to view their struggle in totalistic term” (Sederberg 1995: 308). Centrally, the idea of “supreme values” or “supreme trap” as in the case of Boko Haram, which pushes members to extremes such as suicidal attacks (Bernholz 2004) is appreciably absent in the case of Niger Delta struggle, which in recent times have lost much of the heroism attributable to era of Ken Saro Wiwa and his peers.

It is important to underscore that the narrative within which the widespread poverty is frame ultimately determines the explanatory power of the socio-economic thesis, since the poverty is

only a necessary but not sufficient explanation (Peace-builder1; Krueger and Maleckova 2002; Goodhand 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Hence, the above spectrum does not entirely dismiss socio-economic underdevelopment in the case of Boko Haram. In lieu, it suggests that relative to Niger Delta, other more forceful interfacing factors such as religion and culture in the north tends to tone down the poverty factor of Boko Haram insurgency. Accordingly, though a clear connection between economic motives could not be directly found, the statistics revealed that the employment and education status of respondents did affect the motives to join the organization (Both & Abdile, 2016). In this regards, Goodhand's (2003: 630) view that: "absolute measures of poverty may be less significant, than poor people's expectations and a sense of grievance, as triggers to violence" gives some meaningful insight to concealment of 'poverty' in Boko Haram insurgency. This is reasonably so because it reduces the thrust of the poverty thesis relative to other more glaring feature such as religion and politics. Arguably therefore, while the *modus operandi* of both insurgencies differs remarkably, their causal drivers find some convergence in this complex trinity of greed-need-creed.

Therefore, if the Greed-Need-Creed is considered as a spectrum for instance, Boko Haram is arguably more towards the *creed* end of the spectrum while the Niger Delta arguably falls more towards the *greed* side. This view of the Niger Delta is pivoted on the fact that the original region-wide clamour for resources control is often being subsumed in the evident enrichment of a few individuals that have hijacked the struggle.

Meanwhile, the centrality of poverty (in terms of need) to both insurgencies makes their criminal dimensions a profitable venture in the *rational choice* sense of utility maximization. For instance, it can influence the decision of individual to participate in violence or not. As Stevens and Cloete (1993) have rightly observed regarding economic causes of crime [1] Poor people desire the possession of the rich, which can drive them into theft; [2] Desire to possess certain riches articles coupled with lack of the money causes crime; and [3] peer pressure and the need to possess beautiful things drives crimes. Corroborating, some youths in the Niger Delta, during a workshop with SACA, openly admitted that they vandalise oil pipes, a practice they alleged was usually in collaboration with oil companies staff in order for the latter to get new clean-ups contracts, benefits of which can trickle down to the youths (Director1; SACA 2014). Indeed, "with the lack of economic opportunity in the Niger Delta and constant reminders of the high-level fleecing of the region's natural wealth by lawmakers, locals are left

feeling they are not only forced into criminal activities such as bunkering or piracy, but morally justified in committing them” (McNamee 2013: 10-11).

Likewise some Boko Haram ex-fighters admitted that they joined the groups with hope of economic opportunities, besides their hope of better life in Paradise (David 2013; Botha and Abdile 2016a). Alongside the physical allure of cash, the desire to possess beautiful things is hardly limitable to earth’s beauty and riches. Allusion to the glories of heaven and 72 virgins for martyrs has been demonstrated as key cost-benefit calculus behind the seemingly irrational decision of the Islamist terrorists, especially the suicide bombers (Darcy and Noricks 2009; Aghedo and Osumah 2014a; Babajide 2014; Perry and Hasisi 2015). Therefore, it can be argued that the socio-economic challenges such as poverty perceptively dubbed a “northern phenomenon” are among the non-negligible causal factors (cited in David, 2013). These are some of the issues that the sect’s deluded members (due to poor education) believed can be redressed by the reign of Allah; hence the support for the theocratic Caliphate (ICG 2010; David 2013).<sup>74</sup> The romantic narrative of this envisaged caliphate reveals a need-satisfying promise. Albeit mostly spiritual and heavenly, the need for those arguably parallels the material neediness of the populace; hence, their grievances. Thus, it is not inapt to underscore socio-economic underdevelopment as vital to the emergence and persistence of these insurgencies in their uniquely constructed regional context.

### **6.3 Summary and conclusion**

This chapter argues that even if other factors such as ethnonationalism and ethnoreligious factors are critical drivers of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies respectively, socio-economic conditions are non-negligible driving factors especially for their persistence and/or resurgence. Meanwhile, *how* socio-economic factors play out in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies is arguably a function of the socio-cultural atmospheres in the respective regions, which varies considerably, thereby accounting for the divergent framing of the narratives of their respective objectives. This also plays out in the divergent *modus operandi* of both insurgencies. Thus, attempt is made to analyse these dynamics employing the trinity of greed, need and creed analytical spectrum to show how socio-economic motivation plays out in similar but different fashion. This spectrum (deliberately constructed) accounts for the relative sense in which socio-economic factors has been perceived or articulated more in one insurgency than the other especially regarding legitimacy, though not necessarily strictly.

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<sup>74</sup> “The erstwhile governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Chukwuma [Charles] Soludo observed that persistently high levels of poverty in the country had become a “northern phenomenon” (ICG 2010)

Amidst the contentious poverty-terrorism nexus, evidence from the interviews, available video documentaries and literature suggest that the socio-economic causes were easily and readily identifiable for the Niger Delta insurgencies; especially in comparison to the Boko Haram's, from the standpoint of legitimate grievances. For Boko Haram, the socio-economic factors are ideologically manipulated to mobilise support for the insurgency through monetary inducement, leveraging on the vulnerability of the populace' especially due to lack of education among its ranks of foot soldiers. The analysis of the intricacies involved underscored that "economic deprivation and social marginalization of inner-city youths in the Kanuri city of Maiduguri" resulting both from years of neglect, the insurgency, as well as heavy-handed COIN *ab initio* are very "important context for the initial mobilization" (Office of the National Security Adviser 2015).

Furthermore, the allusion to the relatively higher level of poverty in other parts of the north, compared to Borno, as a criticism is revisited, by emphasizing the fact that Boko Haram is not strictly a Borno phenomenon. Although Borno remains Boko Haram stronghold, evidence of its attacks and ideological resonance in the entire northern region corroborates the view that Boko Haram campaign transcends the confines of Borno. Meanwhile, regarding the issue of greed, both Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency have been high-jacked by individuals for self-benefiting end, based on personal rational decision undergirded by the pan-Nigeria "socio-economic neediness". The masterminds manipulate this socio-economic neediness while the lower ranks derive immediate economic or political benefits from participation. It is against this complex backdrop that scholars such as Delia *et al.* (2015: 524) aptly acknowledge, with rigorous empirical data, that "Boko Haram is, indeed, a religious movement propelled, in its own framing, by a strong Islamist ideology". However, they have further argued that "Support for the movement appears to be determined by factors extraneous to religiosity — including household prosperity and perceptions of the Nigerian state".

In drawing on these nuances, this chapter has attempted to underscore that an outright dismissal of the socio-economic dimension is counter-productive in long-term peacebuilding and development. This view is premised on the resultant severe impact of the insurgencies in terms of human and social underdevelopment to date, which is co-producing the unrest. Arguably, these impacts are significant recipe for resurgences of pure underdevelopment-driven conflicts even in the future assuming the current challenges are addressed in any other way without concerted effort at socio-economic development and the transformation of the status quo. For

a fuller appreciation of this, an impact assessment of both insurgencies on development shall form the crux of the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSURGENCIES FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA**


#### **7.0 Introduction**

This chapter assesses the impact of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria with the aim to highlight the long, medium and short-term implication for social and economic development in Nigeria, particularly in the most affected region. Various themes and sub-themes that reinforce the key causal factors (poverty, inequality, dispossession, education, unemployment, among others) engaged in the theoretical and conceptual frameworks are identified under two broad themes namely, social and economic impact. These are then critically analysed in this chapter, with the view to: [1] redirect policy priority and; [2] motivate the right approaches and tools devoid of past mistakes, for instance stressing the importance of increased civil-military cooperation as shall be seen in the final chapter 8. Given the convergence of the impact of both insurgencies on the national development, the assessment shall not be limited to the directly affected regions but extends to the overall Nigerian state. Accordingly, it suffices to state that only where necessary will the relative severity of one insurgency over the other be highlighted in comparative terms. This is especially so given the fact that the impacts are not geographically bound even though it may be relatively higher in one place than others. Suffices it to clearly state, *ab initio*, that the exact quantification of the negative consequences of both insurgencies is not possible, considering the human losses involved.

#### **7.1 Measurability of Impact?**

Observers of Nigeria's security crisis have correctly argued that "there are no criteria to quantify the loss to the economy", especially by the Boko Haram insurgency (Eme and Ibieta 2012: 21). Beside Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, Nigeria is also currently faced with host of other destabilizing agitations, including the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) agitation in South East (Gwaza 2016; Onuoha 2016) as well as the ongoing killings by herdsmen especially in the Middlebelt region. The trend since 2008 is particularly worrying. See **Figure 7.1**. Nevertheless, as the figure clearly reveals, Boko Haram insurgency has outdone the other insecurities in terms of social and economic damage, and especially in terms of loss of lives and properties in its relative short time of violence. The challenge of accurately quantifying the impact of these insurgencies is linkable to the difficulties that developing nations like Nigeria face in terms of gathering quality data. Where available, the data is often

aggregated making it difficult to understand the direct impact of the conflict in isolation. These challenges of impact quantification are further compounded by the fact that these insurgencies do not fall within the domain of normal war. Hence, some experts believe, that it will be difficult to have the full knowledge of the actual number of deaths that have occurred as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency; and the level of deprivations and destruction of properties that people suffered as well as how these incidences send the region and its inhabitants backwards in terms of developmental opportunities (Allen *et al.* October 6, 2014). Considering its peculiar and indiscriminate target of civilians, it is agreeable that Boko Haram insurgency has inflicted more economic and social damages on Nigeria, in its relative short time of violence (2009-date), compared to the insurgency in the Niger Delta. Accordingly, this analysis give more attention to the Boko Haram, considered the “the most deadly terrorist group in the world’ as the terrorists group increased its death toll by over 300% from the previous year to 7,512 fatalities in 2014 (GTI 2015). In view of Boko Haram’s lethality, Nigeria is put at par with grievous terrorists-ridden countries of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria, which together, accounted for 78% of the lives lost in 2014 (GPI 2016: 29).



**Figure 7. 1: Social Violence by types in Nigeria, 1998-2014**

Source: Author’s Creation, Data source from Nigeria Social Violence Project<sup>75</sup>

<sup>75</sup> [www.connectsaisafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Social\\_Violence](http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Social_Violence)

In the 2015 GTI, Nigeria is third to Iraq and Pakistan and first within the African region (see table 7.1). Suffices to acknowledge that figure or data accessed herein are but an estimation of the impacts of the insurgency. It is widely agreed that the destruction in terms of lives and properties engendered directly by Boko Haram insurgency is unparalleled since the end of the civil war in Nigeria (Aghedo and Osumah 2014b). Besides its direct negative impact on Nigeria security institution and national image, these insurgencies have resulted in a myriad of political, psycho-social and economic problems including mass immigration; rising social mistrust; and political apathy across the country. General panic and fear of the seemingly ‘invincible agitators’ is rife among Nigerians as no one is fully secured from the indiscriminate attacks, especially by the Boko Haram. Government officials and buildings, traditional rulers, police and military formations and religious worshippers have all been targeted. Similarly, the scale of the impact of Niger Delta crisis on Nigeria’s wellbeing is pervasive. As oil remains Nigeria’s mainstay, despite recent and on-going efforts at diversification of the economy, crisis in the region that produces the commodity should expectedly impact significantly on Nigeria. Thus, the intractable conflict in the region “has made oil conflict to transcend economic, politics and social lines such that the entire national polity is tensed with strained relationships between groups on the one hand and on the other hand between groups and the state” (Akume 2014: 222)

**Table 7. 1: Ten leading countries with terrorism presence**

<i>Global Rank</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Score</i>
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.233
3	Nigeria	9.213
4	Pakistan	9.065
5	Syria	8.108
6	India	7.747
7	Yemen	7.642
8	Somalia	7.6
9	Libya	7.29
10	Thailand	7.279


Source: Author’s, Data sourced from Global Terrorism Index (2015)

The above compellingly suggest that Boko Haram insurgency is one of the most significant conflicts in the world. Expectedly, the impacts it has on the economy of the Nigerian people is

enormous as it has “literally shut down the economy of the north-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria with concomitant hunger and joblessness amongst the people” (Gabriel *et al.* 2014: np). We now take a closer look at some notable social and economic implications of these insurgencies, particularly regarding Boko Haram, due to its unique *modus operandi* and the relative scarcity of literature in this area.

## 7.2 Social Impact

Among the notable social impacts of both insurgencies is the loss of lives and properties, social displacement, crises for education and health, social mistrust among others. As figure 7.2 below suggests more damages have been done in the North East than in the south-southern geopolitical region.




**Figure 7. 2: Social violence in South-South and North-East, 1999-2014 compared.**

Source : Author’s compilation, Data Source, Nigeria Social Violence Project.

### 7.2.1 Death, Displacement and Destruction.

Both insurgencies and counter-measures continue to claim thousands of Nigerian lives with equally grave psychological impacts, especially in terms of induced fears and intimidation on the public especially in the immediate communities. For instance, as government forces confront and dislodge Boko Haram, with incessant fighting after the latter’s brief annexure of some Local Governments areas in the northeast, many civilians fleeing the towns and villages

into the forests lost their way and/or were trapped. Some of these people “died of hunger and thirst”, according to a report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2015: 36). See Figure 7.3 and annexure C reported deaths because of Boko Haram attacks 2009 and 2016. Similarly, Annexure C reveals major attacks by Boko Haram between 2009 and 2015. The number of Internally Displaced Person (IDPs) in Nigeria has skyrocketed. To be sure, as of July 2015, the record of internal displaced person stood at 1.3 million (56% of whom are children) in Nigeria (UNHRC 2015).



**Figure 7. 3: Boko Haram Related Deaths in Nigeria’s North, 2009-2016**

Source: Allen (2016)

Unsurprisingly, Boko Haram insurgency has been regarded as one of Africa’s fastest growing displacement. The IDCM (2016) reported that at the close of 2015 the number of people displaced by conflicts and violence in Nigeria is about 2.2 million. As table 7.2 illustrates, this places Nigeria second in rank to the conflict-torn nation of Democratic Republic of Congo. Similarly, the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO 2016) reported that the figure of IDPs had risen to 2.4 million in Nigeria, 60 per cent of which “have been displaced multiple

times, with each displacement further reducing their initial assets, and the deepening of their vulnerability”. *See also:* Allen (2016).

Professor Isaac Adewole, the Nigeria’s current Minister of Health, has argued that as it concerns northeast, these figures “are only a tip of the iceberg” and should be treated as conservative. According to him, “Nigerians affected may be over 50 million directly and indirectly” (Okeke 2015a). Highlighting this concern, UNICEF asserts that in the four north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe alone, an estimated 14.8 million people were affected by the insurgency as on the first of February 2016. This discrepancy further reinforces earlier submission that the actual impacts of Boko Haram on the Nigeria populace may be difficult to know with certainty. Notwithstanding, the statistics show that since the advent of Boko Haram, people’s access to safe residence to support basic living has been drastically reduced. In 2014 alone, Boko Haram was responsible for displacing more than three-quarters of at least 975300 people in Nigeria (IDMC 2015). The rest of the people got displaced; largely due to communal clashes in the Middle-Belt region of the country.

**Table 7. 2:** Number of people displaced by conflicts and violence in Nigeria

<b>Country</b>	<b>Last updated</b>	<b>No of IDPs</b>
<b>DRC</b>	Mar. 2015	2857400
<b>Nigeria</b>	31 Dec. 2015	2152000
<b>South Sudan</b>	31 Dec. 2015	1690000
<b>Somalia</b>		1107000
<b>Libya</b>	Jul-15	434000
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Aug. 2015	369500

Source: Author’s compilation, Data from IDMC (2016)

Meanwhile, the demographic discrepancy favours the young people; as the group most affected by the insurgency. For instance, in Ditwa IDP camp located in Borno, of the 72 000 IDPs sheltered there, about 40000 of them were identified as children with some reportedly un-accompanied or orphaned. That is more than a half of the IDP population in that camp. UNICEF publication paints similar picture. It says that of the 7 million people affected by the crisis in the four northeast states of Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe that needs help, 3.8 million of them are children. That is more than half of the group in need and they make up about a quarter of the general population affected by the crisis in the four states (UNICEF 2016). Considering

the possibility of this vulnerable population being radicalised due to hardship and the frustration in IDP further signals the sweeping negative social effects of the insurgency.

Similarly, for the Niger Delta insurgency, besides the “huge loss in terms of oil revenues and profits, members of the Nigerian military and security operatives (Joint Task Force), the armed militias, and villagers caught in the crossfire have lost their lives, and properties worth millions of naira have also been destroyed” (Obi 2009: 106). As with Boko Haram, the insurgency in the Niger Delta has also accounted for both forced and willing migration of persons within and beyond the country’s borders; thus, altering the demographical composition of the affected areas as people flee for safety or economic survival. This is evidently not without implication for Nigeria’s overall workforce as “people who join the fighting forces, who are killed or flee, can no longer work productively” towards the nation’s political, social, and economic development (Stewart 2004: 263). Expectedly, the mass movement of people also accounts for the growing phenomenon of brain-drain and other socio-economic problem in Nigeria, especially in the directly affected regions (Adebayo 2014: 483). In the Niger Delta, oil spillage is often responsible for displacement and forced migration as the locals lose their means of livelihood, be it agricultural land or fishing rivers and lakes.

#### **7.2.2.1 Lives in Captivity and in IDP Camps.**

The harshness and consequent psychological trauma suffered under Boko Haram’s captivity by the victims can hardly be overstated. An escapee once tearfully recounted “I can’t get the images out of my head. I see people being slaughtered. I just pray that the nightmares don’t return.” (cited in Bloom and Matfess 2015: 110). The gendered dimension of the suffering is also noteworthy especially as cases of sexual violence is reportedly prevalent (UNICEF 2016). Evidence emerging from the IDP camps indicates widespread exploitation of women and coercive transactional sex perpetrated even by authority figures (Olatunbosun-Alakija et al. 2016). For instance:

During their captivity, almost all the women were repeatedly raped, gang-raped, and subjected to sexual slavery... the foot soldiers have more than one wife...female captives were also subjected to non-sexual violence that served the insurgents’ needs; as a part of this, the women were denied food, forced to carry the insurgents’ possessions and weapons, deprived of sleep, and forced to cook(cited in Bloom and Matfess 2015: 110).

Living conditions in the IDP camps remains remarkable miserable as hunger and starvation remains critical issues. Following the frustration and hopelessness, the story of a young man

caught stealing in Maiduguri, who was about to be lynched, was recounted. The young man responded to his accusers: Only two things can happen to me now: [1] you can kill me and I will rest, or [2] you can imprison me where I would be fed, both of which I preferred to going back to the IDP camp (Peace-builder3: reworded for clarity.). Such incidences clearly underscore the hardship being experienced in the IDP camps. Inferably, the agitation among some people to return to their communities is not necessarily due to the return of safety in the region, considering the unending bomb attacks, but rather due also to the frustration in the IDP camps (Peace-builder3).

In some cases, (in Adamawa State for instance), people resort to survival sex to meet their basic needs and these include children (IDMC 2015: 36). Such state of desperation leaves the people, especially young people susceptible to recruitment into the insurgency group and other vulnerable social deviance that can lead them to further disenfranchisement in the society. It is on record that some of the IDPs have had repeated displacement, a fact that analysts say increases households' needs and reduces coping strategies for those affected (IDMC 2015).

It was estimated that “4.5 million people face acute food insecurity in northeast Nigeria and require immediate assistance” (FAO 2016). The inadequacy of the humanitarian response to meet the depth of humanitarian crisis caused by the insurgency in the north has gained international attention in recent times. In one instance, Ms Mandisa Mashologu, UNDP Acting Resident Representative for Nigeria declared that:

The humanitarian response plan for the northeast of Nigeria is budgeted to cost \$240 million. This would support only a fraction of those critically affected people and only 10% of that cost is currently funded” (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016: 22).

Also, the high degree of brutality witnessed by many of these survivals, symptoms of extreme stress and psychological trauma remains taunting features for the IDPs. For instance, IDMC documented that many children continue to show considerable anxiety over loud noises as it reminds them of the violence they witnessed. The targets of insurgent groups like Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram are not merely “the victims that die in the bombings but the public as a whole” and they are interested in creating fear and panic, which could persuade government to accede to their demands (Ikyase and Ejue 2015: 4144).

### **7.2.2 Social mistrust, Bad Blood, and National Disunity**

The sexual violence and forced marriage especially of teenage girl that characterise insurgency such as the Boko Haram (and to some extent the Niger Delta insurgency) poses a threat to trust especially in the reintegration of victims and their “Boko Haram children” in the community. “Children born as a result of sexual violence risk being rejected and even killed for fear that they could turn against their families and communities when they grow up” (UNICEF 2015: 4). Furthermore, the UN estimated that “Boko Haram exploits children for 20 per cent of bombing attacks” (USAID Fact Sheet 2016). This has the implication of making the communities’ members suspicious towards children, an arguably traumatising experience for some children who must still deal with the trauma of the incessant attacks.

Furthermore, “Boko Haram’s attacks have also deepened religious and regional fault lines, reversing some of the country’s hard-won gains in building national unity and stability (ICG 2014). Instances were cited by a northern-based respondent concerning the breakdown of trust in the community during Boko Haram attacks, especially in cases where Muslim members of given communities were seen to be aiding the sect to burn Christian homes. The respondent noted that “many people in the IDP are living with this anger and what they want is to return to the community and deal with those people” (Peace-builder3). Indeed, the growing social mistrust resulting from the insurgencies and “the attendant proliferation of small arms and the militarization of society” (Omilusi 2016: 33) is no doubt a recipe for a vicious circle of violence. This in turn can significantly inhibit Nigeria’s nation-building quest and the consolidation of its nascent democracy (Omilusi 2016). The resultant circle of conflict can be broken only if the psychosocial effects of the insurgency are adequately identified and addressed. Overall, Boko Haram insurgency has widened the ethno-regional/religious divide in Nigeria by undermining various mechanisms put in place over the years to foster unity in Nigeria. The National Youth Service Corps NYSC programme is a case in point. A “survey shows that a lot of students have vowed never to participate in the compulsory one-year National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) programme if posted to the northern part of the country. Those who were inadvertently posted to the north redeployed immediately after three weeks of mandatory camping” (Omilusi 2016: 31). This impact is appreciably less in the case of Niger Delta as the target of attacks is predominantly government and oil companies.

#### **7.2.4 Health Care Crisis**

The humanitarian crisis, engendered by the insurgency, has increased health challenges for Nigerians living in the affected states. Illustrating the severity, Dr Musa Babakura of the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital commented that “the whole health care system in northern Borno has collapsed and health care delivery is nil” (Okeke 2015b). The insecurity situation complicates matters of access to medical services, as people must travel long distance to access such service. The other scenario concerns medical personnel’s increasing difficulty to penetrate the strongholds of Boko Haram war fronts where many people are trapped. Thus, progress in vaccine administration across the affected states and most northern states have deteriorated. Dr Ado Mohammed who is the Executive Director, National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) gave a telling report on this:

Virtually all the primary health care infrastructure in the northeast have been destroyed and it has made it difficult for us to access our children. In Borno, within the last two years, we have not been able to access more than 35 per cent of the children for immunisation (Okeke 2015b).

Okeke (2015b) highlighted government report, which indicates that about 28 health workers have lost their lives and about 445 health facilities were badly destroyed by the insurgency. Dr Salman observes that the health facilities affected across the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa include 147 primary health cares, 7 general hospitals, three community health clinics and 27 dispensaries and cold stores. This whole dynamics has “compelled residents to seek medical attention in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, thereby adding to the pressure on limited health facilities in the host communities” (Onuoha 2014: 8; Omilusi 2016)). Also, because of understaffing and inadequate facilities to cater for the health needs of survivors of the insurgency, major care is focused on the children and pregnant women. By implication, other chronic illnesses receive less attention. AOA Global reports a research conducted in one of the urban IDP camp that revealed an alarming increase in the rates of STDs and HIV/AIDS (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016).

#### **7.2.5 Educational Crisis**

As the incessant attacks of Boko Haram did not spare schools, education sector scores high losses in the conflict. A disturbing picture thereof, was painted by Governor Kashim Shettima, who decried the educational crisis in his state of Borno thus:

It is unacceptable that the 10 Local Government Areas of Northern Borno State were only able to present four students eligible for access to tertiary institutions last year. Four out of two million. This has got to change (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016).

The most notable mark on the state of education in the affected region undoubtedly is the Chibok girls' tragedy. On the 14<sup>th</sup> of April 2014, about 276 girls were abducted by the terrorists and have been held hostage since then until recently when some of them allegedly regained their freedom. It is recorded that this was not the first time, nor the last time, during the insurgency that learners were attacked and abducted by the insurgency groups. In fact, AOA Global (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016) argues that there are about a thousand of such cases and that "Chibok serves as a symbol for girls abducted, raped, violated and simply brought to international glare a trend that had obtained years before but ignored". Thus, occurrence such as these spread fears across the northern states and create unsafe environment and unhealthy disposition to education by the populace of the region. As the conflict deescalates in recent times, most schools remain closed. One challenge in getting them to function again concern the fact that most of the IDPs are sheltered in school compound and buildings (IDMC 2015). Since humanitarian assistance in the meantime tends to be limited to life-saving interventions, most school-age children among the IDPs generally are unable to pursue their education. While its already worrying that the rate of children dropping out of school in the northeast is reportedly 30 times higher than in south-eastern Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorism only aggravates this negative trend (Omilusi 2016: 31).

This crisis particularly highlights gender issues that underpin conflicts; that is, woman, girls and children in general face enormous risks during conflicts. Girl-child education is particularly affected by Boko Haram activities especially due to its abduction and enslavement of women as reminiscent of the 2014 Chibok girls' kidnapping saga. Thus, insurgency, especially Boko Haram's is negatively impeding educational development in Nigeria's northeast, given its professed aversion to Western education (Awortu 2015: 218). Given the historical educational gap between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria, it is safe to argue that the insurgency is further widening that gap. For example, while Lagos state have 92% literacy rate, Borno State reportedly has under 15% (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016). The UNICEF (2016) report states that in the Fufore transit camp, located in Adamawa State, an estimate of 1,700 children are without access to education; and that a field assessment of their educational needs conducted in January 2015 shows that about 90% of school-age children had never attended school. With about seven years of historical conflict that targets 'western education', efforts to

close the alarming gap between north and south in terms of progress in education has now become more herculean a task.

### 7.2.6 Social infrastructural Damage and Budget Diversion

The insurgents and their confrontations with the government forces combined to have produced a great damage and destruction to both public and private properties and social infrastructures in the larger Nigeria and specifically in the affected north-eastern states. Some of the public utilities affected included telecommunications, roads, water, health and educational facilities. In Borno alone, World Bank estimates the cost of destruction to be about US\$ 6 billion (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016). This means even a higher cost for reconstruction (See table 7.3)

**Table 7. 3:** Infrastructure and service delivery needs

Sector	(US\$ Million)
Agriculture	881.4
Community infrastructure	250.8
Education	721.4
Energy	147
Environment	315.1
Health	666.8
ICT	272.1
Private housing	114.4
Public building	374.1
Social protection	499.5


*Source:* Authors Creation, Data from World Bank (2016)

To put this in context, an excerpt is given below from Governor Shetima on the details of destructions in Borno State – the worst affected state by the insurgency crisis. The governor relied on a Post-Insurgency Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Report on Borno State. The governor:

Highlighted the loss of about 20000 people in the years of the insurgency and material losses of about \$5.9 billion (approximately N1.9 trillion) including destruction of 956453 houses, 5335 classrooms and other school buildings; 201 health centres, mostly primary health clinics, dispensaries and some general hospitals, 1630 water supply

sources; 665 municipal buildings, prisons, police stations and electricity offices; 726 power distribution substations; 16 parks, game reserves; green wall projects, orchards; ponds; river basins and lakes either poisoned or bombed in addition to 470000 livestock that were either stolen or killed (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016).

Similarly, it was reported, for instance, that during the Bama attack in 2014, Boko Haram “destroyed 40 shops, killed livestock and stole roughly four million naira (\$25,000, 19,000 euros) from Bama residents” (Vanguard News 2013: 04 November). Figure 7.4 below gives a picture of the enormous task involved, particularly, in the area of infrastructure and social services recovery as far as the northeast is concerned. Considering the enormous borrowing required to meet yearly budget, the infrastructural destruction and the resultant cost of rebuilding that often accompany these insurgent attacks not only amount to a damaging budgetary diversion but also mounting debts that inhibits overall social and economic development of Nigeria.



**Figure 7. 4: Overview of Recovery Cost of Boko Haram Insurgency**

Source: Author’s creation, Data sources World Bank (2016)

Linked to this phenomenon is the questionable justification given by governments for skyrocketing security expenditure, considering the lack of adequate accountability in the country. Yet as observed by Omilusi (2016), “many governments justify excessive expenditures on security as intent to secure the homeland. Many governors, particularly in the northern part Nigeria have justified their non-performance and lack of development of their states to the fact that they are fighting terrorism in their various states”.

### 7.3 Economic Impacts

Associated with the foregoing social impact are some telling economic implications that also need closer attention. Way back in 2012, Boko Haram alone was reported to have been responsible for over \$600 billion (about 1.3 trillion Nigerian Naira at the time) lost by the Nigerian economy. Additionally, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD reported that FDI flows to Nigeria fell to \$6.1 billion (933.3 billion Nigerian Naira) in 2010, a decline of about 29 per cent from the \$8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) realised in 2009 fiscal year – a development which is scarcely unconnected to the insurgency (cited in David, 2013). Expectedly these costs have multiplied since then. Also, these consequences impact beyond the bounds of Nigeria. Neighbouring countries in the sub-region, especially Cameroon, Niger and Chad republic are adversely affected by the economic destabilisation in northern Nigeria.

On the other hand, the monetary cost of Boko Haram's insurgency to national revenue generation is arguably less compared to the Niger Delta insurgency for obvious reason: the national economy depends heavily on the oil-generated revenue from the Niger Delta region. Besides, Boko Haram commenced its deadly campaigns as early as 2009, which implies a shorter span of activity relative to the Niger Delta insurgency, which has featured in various forms since the 1960s. The latter has been disrupting business activities, resulting in billions of dollars being lost due to its impact directly on oil production. For instance consistent with MEND's goal of cutting Nigerian output by 30 per cent, only within the first three months of 2006, \$1 billion in oil revenues was reportedly lost along with over 29 Nigerian military killed in the rebellion (Watts 2007). In fact, only within 2008, *News watch* report (cited in Tonwe *et al.* 2012: 45) the following oil loss in barrels per day (see Table 7.4 below). The advent of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in 2016 has replayed this monumental loss of oil revenue due its attacks. According to Jamestown Foundation (2013), The Nigerian government loses \$7 billion and \$5 billion to yearly oil pipeline attacks and the repairs of the pipelines respectively (Reuters, as cited by Jamestown Foundation, 2013). Indeed, the implication of the insurgency for Nigeria's current economic recession is hardly concealable.

**Table 7. 4:** Impact of Niger Delta Militancy on oil revenue 2008

S/N	Month	Estimated Qty of Barrel of oil loss per day	Total Barrels of Oil loos for Month	OPEC Basket Price for Bonny Oil \$ US	Total Amount Loss for the Month is US dollar (Million)
1	January	700,000	21,700,000	88.35	1,917,195,000
2	February	700,000	21,700,000	90.64	1,839,992,000
3	March	700,000	21,700,000	99.03	2,148,951,000
4	April	700,000	21,700,000	105.16	2,208,360,000
5	May	700,000	21,700,000	119.16	2,590,763,000
6	June	700,000	21,700,000	128.33	2,694,930,000
7	July	700,000	21,700,000	131.22	2,847,474,000
8	August	700,000	21,700,000	112.41	1,633,793,000
9	September	700,000	21,700,000	96.85	2,439,297,000
	<b>Grand Total</b>				<b>\$20,720,842,000</b>

Source: Adapted from Tonwe *et al.* (2012: 45)

Furthermore, in their examination of the effect of the cost of peace, militancy and unrest on the productivity of firms in Nigeria focusing on the Niger Delta region, Arong and Ikechukwu (2013) affirmed a significant negative correlation between the cost of peacekeeping and firms' productivity in the region. Both government and firms located in the area spend huge amount of money on security. Such money can be usefully engaged in other productive means, including improved Cooperate Social Responsibility.

Similarly, maintaining peace in the area has caused Federal Government huge amount of money. As Akeem and Erhun (2010) affirmed, in 2009 when Yar'Adua granted amnesty "the recurrent expenditure of the federal government increased on a basis at an average of 12.26 due to security measures taken by government to ensure peace in the Niger-Delta region" (cited in Arong and Ikechukwu 2013: 87). Essentially, the increasing human and economic consequences of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies undoubtedly continue to dash the hopes of better socio-political and economic development in Nigeria. As Omilusi (2016: 34) appositely argued "the tragedy is that the collapse of local economies and the erosion of social capital reinforce a downward spiral of further impoverishment, which in itself sow the seeds of further conflict". Let us emphasise some of the economic impacts.

### 7.3.1 Impact on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and Gross Domestic Product GDP


The level of investment in a national economy is considered an integral determinant of economic growth given that it provides enabling capital to drive the economy. For many poor and developing nations, shortage of savings and inadequate accumulation of capital means that

external sources are the alternatives. Thus, FDI, which “occur when foreigners either wholly or jointly with local investors establishes their physical presence in another country through the acquisition of physical assets such as factories, buildings, plants, machineries, etc.” are important to developing nations like Nigeria (Bakare 2010: 171). Yet, the insecurities are a blockade to FDI inflow since it is common knowledge among investors that business can hardly “thrive in tensed and unsecured environment” (Oriakhi and Osemwengie 2012: 88).

Indeed, the high risk and uncertainty, which are hallmarks of terrorism-stricken societies depress net FDI inflows to a country (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008) as it kills investors’ confidence. Studies have aptly identified social/political instability as having a negative effect on the flow of FDI alongside other factors (Erdal and Tatoglu 2002; Asiedu 2006; Wafure and Nurudeen 2010; Nwogwugwu *et al.* 2012). While examining determinants of FDI inflows to Africa, Asiedu (2002); Asiedu (2006) for instance, emphasised the roles of level of inflation, efficiency of legal system, corruption and political instability as influencing factors. Regarding Nigeria, the nature of political regime, macroeconomic variables (real income per capita, rate of inflation, interest rate, debt servicing), state of infrastructures, natural resources, deregulation, market size and internal conflict have been rightly identified as determinants of FDI inflows (Nwankwo 2006; Abu *et al.* 2010; Wafure and Nurudeen 2010; Idowu and Awe 2014).

Consistent with this study’s position, Idowu and Awe (2014) particularly deduced that a change in internal conflict has a significant negative effect of 0.32 per cent on FDI inflows to a country. Unsurprisingly, in their examination of the relationship between Nigeria’s national security state and FDI inflows into the country between 1980 and 2009, employing Least Squares technique, Oriakhi and Osemwengie (2012) also found a negative relationship between FDI and national security. Their conclusion corroborates another comparative study on the impact of terrorism on FDI/GDP across seventy-eight developing countries between 1984 and 2009 by Bandyopadhyay *et al.* (2011), which equally found negative and significant correlation between terrorism and FDI flows as well as a share of GDP. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) reached similar conclusion in their study, which used the terrorism risk index for 2003 to 2004 in a cross-country analysis. They found out that high risk and uncertainty, which are clearly hallmarks of terrorism-stricken societies, depress net FDI inflows to a country. The case of Nigeria is not different as reminiscent of the noticeable inverse relationship between Nigeria’s Terrorism index and Nigeria’ Account trade to GDP within the last decade (See figure 7.5).


Observably, it is within these periods that both insurgencies significantly shaped the security landscape of Nigeria, inducing fear and panic.



**Figure 7. 5: Nigeria terrorism Index Versus Current Account Trade to GDP 2006 -2016**

*Source: tradingeconomics.com; generated by author*

Already as at 2007 Nigeria was trailing in the 40<sup>th</sup> position in the world among attractive economies for investors due to the political instability especially in the Niger Delta. In Africa, it was in 4<sup>th</sup> position behind South Africa, Egypt and Morocco at the time. By 2009 Angola had a higher FDI inflow standing at \$13bn compared to Nigeria (\$8.286 billion) (Nwogwugwu *et al.* 2012). By 2010 when Boko Haram attacks had only been recorded in a few places, FDI inflow had fallen considerably. Although, Boko Haram insurgency is largely confined to the north-eastern part of Nigeria in terms of operation, its impacts on the level of investors' confidence in Nigeria's economy is more extensive. Hence, it is not surprising to notice the sharp downward trend of FDI inflows to Nigeria especially since 2011, a period that saw more sophisticated attacks from Boko Haram. See figure 7.6. The year 2009 is key to understanding figure 7.6 and table 7.5 because it was the year in which Boko Haram escalated, recording a death toll of 22 persons just as Niger Delta insurgency was gradually subsiding. Together with the state response, death toll resulting from the insurgency that year reached 110 fatalities. The reduced inflow of FDI to the tune of US\$ 6999 million, that is, US\$ 2551 million less than the previous year, is suggestive of a reduced foreign investors' confidence in the Nigeria's economy. Although, it picked up in 2011, as the insurgency persisted with increasing fatality and destruction, FDI inflows to Nigeria has been in a nose-dive ever since.



**Figure 7. 6: Nigeria's FDI flows (US\$ Millions, 2010-2015)**

Source: Author's compilation; (Data from UNCTAD 2016)

**Table 7. 5: Social violence trend in Nigeria, 2009-2014**

<i>Year</i>	<b>Boko Haram</b>	<b>State/ Haram</b>	<b>Boko State, Other</b>	<b>Communal</b>	<b>Herder-Farmer</b>	<b>Political</b>	<i>Total</i>
<i>2009</i>	22	788	188	196	52	24	1270
<i>2010</i>	104	2	174	1047	579	74	1980
<i>2011</i>	421	82	74	1685	219	1561	4042
<i>2012</i>	1343	575	123	505	229	139	2914
<i>2013</i>	1645	1097	188	579	837	60	4406
<i>2014</i>	5551	2423	295	631	1191	83	10174
<i>Total</i>	9086	4967	1042	4643	3107	1941	24786

Source: The Nigeria Social Violence Project<sup>76</sup>; Authors compilation.

### 7.3.2 Impact on the Transport and Tourism Sector

Another sector, that has been heavily affected is the transport and tourism sectors. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), global economic worth of tourism sector is third to the twin drivers of global economy; that is, technology and telecommunication sectors (A.P. Ajayi 2012). Poirier and Dieke (2000) argue that “tourism today is second only to oil as the world’s leading export commodity, accounting for global earning of more than US\$ 300 billion or nearly 25% of total world gross national product (GNP) in the last decade. Because of its

<sup>76</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-social-violence-project>

potential to make a significant contribution to the national economy of any country, nations covet and compete for its consumers. Meanwhile, tourism's peculiarly sensitive nature makes it susceptible to extreme events including terrorism, political violence and natural disaster (Araña and León 2008; A.P. Ajayi 2012). As A.P. Ajayi (2012: 128) suggests, there exists significant "symbiotic relationship between peaceful atmosphere and tourism development in a destination". This relationship is such that the influx of tourists to a destination is significantly conditioned on the level of perception about the safety of lives and properties of tourists in the inbound country.

Evidently, such perception depends on the nature of images projected about the tourists' destination country around the globe. For instance, the United State of America constantly provide periodic information to its citizens and tourists in general on crisis-ridden regions and nations since the advent of 9/11, and Nigeria has often featured in such warnings due to the insecurities. Beyond such efforts of lone governments like the US, the media and scholarly publications around the globe play crucial role in the task of image-making and perceptions of tourist destinations. Through their unflinching reports about events around the world, which undoubtedly capture too often the horror of social violence, they imprint fear in the minds of would-be tourists with a possible influence on their choice of destinations. Egypt's 2011 political crisis is a case in point. Mwathe (2011) reports that while inbound tourists flow had picked before the crisis, the period and during the crisis witnessed massive reduction in tourists visit to historical sites in Luxor, Aswan and Cairo with a resultant effect on the hospitality business as well as the transport sector.

In the case of Nigeria, it must be noted that the country's tourism is largely still in potency. In fact, "countries like Kenya, South Africa, Egypt, and Zimbabwe earn more from the proceeds of tourism than Nigeria" (A.P. Ajayi 2012: 130). Meanwhile, the present administration considers the sector as key to its agenda of diversifying the Nigeria's economy from the mainstream sector. According to Otenga Olusegun Runsewe, a former Director General of the Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation (NTDC), Nigeria's tourism sector generates about N80 billion annually placing it as a key economic sector in Nigeria (cited in Chukwurah *et al.* 2015: 23). It is on this basis that the insurgencies are serious threats.

In case of Boko Haram, the negative implication for the Yankari Game Reserve in Bauchi State of Nigeria is an illustrative. According to Matthew and Fada (2014), who studied the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on economic activities of the reserve, which used to attract large

number of both local and international tourists, witnessed drastic decline in influx of visitors. Recall some of the gruesome attacks that established the state as among the dreaded states within Boko Haram influence. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of July 2009 for example, the clash between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security personnel resulted in the death of 50 members of the sects, 2 Nigerian policemen and a soldier. In August of the following year, Bauchi prison, which housed some of the apprehended members of Boko Haram, was set ablaze to free Boko Haram inmates. These and other events informed the behaviours of tourists towards the Bauchi Yankari Game Reserve. This is revealed in an interview granted by a staff of the Yankari Game Reserve to a group of researchers on the impacts of terrorism on tourism industry in Bauchi State:

“For us at this end, business has been epileptic as customers keep away leading to drop in occupancies. Our average room occupancy these days is between 10 and 15% which is considered worst ever” (cited in Matthew and Fada 2014: 57).

Another officer of the Reserve confirmed similar report as he asserts that:

“there is a lot of cancellation of booking or reservation particularly from Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Abuja because the location of Yankari game reserve happens to be in the northeast and the visitors are afraid of coming to Yankari because of prevailing insecurity, especially those who are using flight from Lagos to Abuja or from Lagos to Kano. The activities of Boko Haram terrify people” (cited in Matthew and Fada 2014: 57).

These cancellations which Adejoh and Audu’s (2014: 59) empirical study reported as being high for the years 2011 and 2012 could lead to redundancy and unemployment for labour in the industry. Within the tourism sector, entertainment industry requires a mention. During the heights of insurgency in the northern Nigeria, many national and international entertainments events planned to take place in Nigeria were cancelled. Matthew and Fada (2014) highlighted the cancellation of English top-flight club in EPL 2012, and Arsenal proposed 2012 tour to Nigeria. In both cases, the fears of possible attacks were cited as reasons for the cancellation of the events. The Nigerian Premier Leagues have also suffered similar fate. Some of the games affected included Jigawa Golden Star and Ocean Boys not to mention how fear of attacks led to the cancellation of the game between Nigeria’s Super Eagles and the Samba Boys of Brazil in 2012. These cancellations have direct impacts on the tourism and hospitality industry as they both thrive during sport festivities.

In the transport sector for instance, the insurgency by Boko Haram especially brought about a ban on the popular motorcycle transportation (also known as Okada riding) for commercial

purpose, which as was an important means of livelihood and transportation for many settlers in major cities of the north-eastern states. To be sure, in Borno alone, with over 80, 000 people, lost their means of livelihood including *Okada* riders(motorcyclists), motorcycle dealers, mechanics, spare parts dealers and others in the value-chain business of motorcycle in the region. The extended impact of this on the movement of people and goods across the state can only be imagined considering the general challenges of transportation in Nigeria. In Bama area of Borno State for example, the attack on the town in which the Sheju of Bama's palace was affected and over 500 vehicles were razed down at a motor park have left many drivers jobless. In that attack, 600 houses, 200 shops, market were burnt with properties worth millions of naira destroyed (Gabriel *et al.* 2014). Chukwurah *et al.* (2015: 375) painted a worse scenario for the road transport workers plying Nigerian roads to the north. According to them, a 13-seater bus used to earn about N40 – 45, 000 a week on two trips. For the airline industry, the estimate is about N3 billion a day. They assert that analysts' judgement is that half of these amounts are lost due to terrorist attacks and fear of possible attacks. In one instance, Shehu reported how 13 people travelling in a bus within Baga were ambushed and brutally murdered by the insurgents (Vanguard News 2013). In view of this, to fill a 13-seater bus heading for the northeast has become a herculean task for many bus drivers.

Furthermore, Mallam Modu Koroma, a local dry fish trader in Baga Market of Maiduguri metropolis, in an interview granted to Vanguard newspaper by lamented that “Commercial activities in the Borno trade hub are down by half, because of the campaign of violence waged by terrorist group Boko Haram and government efforts to curb it” (Gabriel *et al.* 2014). Another respondent to the same newspaper, Mr Kwaji Philemon of Michika Local Government Area of Adamawa State, and a provision retailer in the main market, complained that his sales downturned as traders from neighbouring villages of Gulak, Madagali, Gwoza, Izge and others are unable to make a trip down to the market to patronise him. Consequently, his children access to quality education has been put on the line. In his own words: “I am now planning to pull my five children out of private schools and put them in a government-owned school in Michika, as [I] cannot afford the fees” anymore (Gabriel *et al.* 2014).

It has noteworthy to highlight that Boko Haram insurgency also affected agriculture, the mainstay economic sector of the north. Because of the incessant crisis, many farming seasons have not been well utilised especially in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. Apart from displacing

many of these farmers from their stead, those who survived the indiscriminate attacks found it difficult to farm.

### **7.3.3 Economic Cost of Violence Containment**

The world continues to spend enormous amounts on creating and containing violence and little on building peace. In the GPI (2016) report, it is stated that the economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2015 was \$13.6 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This figure represents 13.3 per cent of the world's economic activity (gross world product) or \$1,876 for every person in the world. To put this in perspective, it is approximately 11 times the size of global FDI. Because of the peculiar nature of Nigeria's security needs, there has been a staggering increase in military expenditure since the advent of insurgency in Nigeria. One report released in May 2015 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden shows that Nigeria ranked as the 6th highest spender on the military in Africa, with a staggering \$2.327 billion (N372.3 billion) in 2012 alone (Ibrahim and Baba 2014). Expectedly, the implication of the above is that the economic losses from conflict dwarf the expenditures and investments in peace-building and peacekeeping (GPI 2016).

Relatedly, expenditure related to the prevention and alleviation of violence can divert resources from other, more beneficial causes such as health, education or public infrastructure (IEP 2016: 23). IEP methodology covers costs of prevention, protection and consequences. Some examples of direct costs resulting from violence in a society can include medical costs from violence; lost wages from violence-related incapacitation or death; insurance premiums paid by business to protect against the consequences of asset destruction and private security guards (IEP 23). Indirect: loss of human capital resulting from displacement of humans by violence is also of economic relevance's as such can no longer contribute to the productivity of a Nigeria, particularly the most affected region. Of equal importance is the impact that the crisis has on Nigeria's security architecture. Despite the increasing militarisation of Nigeria's COIN and its resultant gains, both insurgencies continue to affect Nigeria's security forces by way of casualty suffered.

Furthermore, it is evident that the bombing and vandalism of oil facilities in the Niger Delta is further worsening the already degraded environmental conditions, with ripple effects on the region's economy, and Nigeria's by extension (Community/Religious Leader; Ordinioha and Brisibe 2013; Eloamaka Carol Okonkwo 2014).

#### **7.3.4 Human Capital Flight**

The insecurity caused by Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents have also resulted in high level of human capital flight. In some cases, it highlights unprecedented movement of people displaced by the insurgencies from their domain to other part of Nigeria, especially in Boko Haram strongholds. These internally displaced persons (IDPs) suffer great economic loss. For many of them, their abode also provided the source of lively, and having to lose that simply means a huge cost to them. More than that, the absence of these entrepreneurs in the zones where they could access other factors of production with relative ease (land, labour and capital) points to a greater loss to the national economy. This point is borne in Eme and Ibietan (2012: 21-22) in their assertion that “the human capital/entrepreneurship drain is crippling the Northern economy and there are concerns that it is being transmitted to the Nigerian macro-economic environment.

The class of those who are displaced into countries beyond Nigeria suffer similar fates and equally contributes to Nigeria’s economic woes. Their contributions, to the economic activities of Nigeria, are abruptly brought to a stop by the insurgency. Also, for many that attempt to cross the northern Africa into Europe, the journey often leads to some of them becoming refugees with constrained privileges besides incessant loss of valuables and lives associated with the migration. In the case of internal migration, the possibility of overloading the infrastructures in destination is raised. According to UNICEF (2015: 1) report, “In north-east Nigeria, about 90 per cent of displaced families are sheltered by some of the world’s poorest communities, placing additional strain on already limited resources”.

#### **7.3.5 General Business Impact**

Mr Umar Ibrahim Yakubu in respect of Boko Haram insurgency remarked that about “97 per cent of businesses were negatively affected by the security problem”. Some of them had to close down, some of them had to retrench their workers, and others had to cut down in the number of hours of operation (Dialoke and Ikeije 2016: 30). In Chukwurah *et al.* (2015), the percentage of business that partially closed operations in the affected northern states is 73.3% (including Borno, Yobe, Kano and Sokoto). Eme and Ibietan (2012) noted how the Kano *Kanti Kwari Market* which serves as the commercial nerve centre for the north and neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Western Sudan for over 500 years has been turned into a shadow with increasing low market turnout. Hence underscoring the impact of Boko Haram activities in the Kano, for instance, erstwhile minister of information incisively noted

that when you destabilize peace in Kano you threaten the foundation of economic and social well-being of the northern region,” (Suleiman, 2012:48).

### **7.3.6 Impact on Service Sector**

Attacks on the service sectors like educational, health, financial and construction institutions have also damaging implication for the economy. In the educational institution for instance, foreign and Nigerian students from outside the affected states relocated to the souths in search of peaceful environment to learn. In some cases, schools were closed, including the shutting down of the University of Maiduguri east campus as a result of security threat on the 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2011 (Adebayo and Adebayo, 2015: 163). Eme and Ibietan (2012: 24) report that “many professionals in the service sector and doctors have sort for transfer out of affected zones in the north” with some of them resigning their appointments when their requests were denied. The response of some business management in the region to make salaries more attractive in the region still did not generate huge response from professionals who entertain fear of the insurgency. At a health review meeting in Abuja in 2015, Dr Salma Anas-Kolo, a former Director of Special Projects at the Federal Ministry of Health and a former Commissioner of Health in Borno State described the worse in Borno with the following words, “In Borno, there were 35 medical doctors with the state government in 2011 which increased to 115 in 2013 but currently, only 75 are remaining” (Okeke 2015a).


As with churches and Mosques, the financial sector is also being targeted, by the sect, as if it was criminal activity. In an evidential confession, a top shot in the terrorist group revealed that in one of their attacks on the banks in the northeast, about N41 million was carted away. This loss does not include the destruction of the facility.

### **7.3.7 Impact on Agriculture, Food Security, and Oil Revenue**

Both Niger Delta Boko and Haram insurgencies have significantly offset the historical tripod economic symbiosis between the North, East (including the south) and west that has held Nigeria in reasonable balance. Because of the favourable terrain of the south-west region, it supports the chunk of domestic and international commerce within the country. The South-south and some of south-east states support the Nigeria’s mainstay oil industry. And the north has the largest portion of land with much of it being arable; thus, supporting agricultural production. On the one hand, due to incessant attacks in the northern region, primary production of farming has dwindled in the northern Nigeria. Based on FAO (2016) report, an estimated USD 3.7 billion losses in terms of “livestock losses, destruction of irrigation and

farming facilities and collapse of extension services, coupled with reduced production due to access limitations”, whilst “lootings and fear of attacks have prevented many farmers from working in their fields, leading to the loss of harvests, productive assets and extremely reduced purchasing power”.

Additionally, surging migration from the affected states of the north to southern states and outside Nigeria have direct impacts on the sector. Most of these displaced individuals are farmers. A recent report equally points out a new challenge in the post-conflict era: “The landmines laid by Boko Haram, during the height of the insurgency, pose challenges that continue to endanger lives and limit access to farm lands and communities” (Olatunbosun-Alakija *et al.* 2016: 34). The increasing inability of Nigeria to meet its domestic food demands thus has a bearing in the insurgency crisis. Analysis on food and nutritional insecurity of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa in August-September 2016, as shown in Figure 7.7 clearly highlights the plight of the people in the region, especially in Borno. Linked to the food security issue, is also the injunction of the military that standing crops such as maize disallowed in certain communities to deter insurgents from hiding in between to attack people.




**Figure 7. 7: Food and nutritional insecurity of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa in August-September 2016**

Source: adapted from FAO (2016)

The national agricultural impact is similar in the case of the Niger Delta insurgency although less compared to Boko Haram insurgency in terms of the historical comparative advantage of the north. Recall the minimal attention to agriculture due to the predominance of oil economy and associated environmental impact, which have over the years reduced the agricultural

contribution of the south. The insurgency has further dwarfed oil revenue amidst the deleterious effect of the fall in international oil prices that has worsen economic recession.

The militants' *modus operandi*, in term of “blowing/shutting down of oil installations and facilities, setting off car bombs, and illegal oil bunkering (estimated at between 80,000 and 300, 000 bbl./day) has negatively impacted Nigeria’s economic development (Nwogwugwu *et al.* 2012). This is increasingly, heightened due to the grow disruption in crude oil production. See **figure 7.8**. Similarly, Thomas (2008) reports that between 2003 and 2004, oil output was reduced by about 40% due to the crisis. The figure of 2006 was slightly lesser by 7%. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) alone cut production by about 370,000 bpd in Western Delta (cited in Arong and Ikechukwu 2013: 87).



**Figure 7. 8: Disruption due to militancy in the Niger Delta.**

Source. US. Energy Information Administration<sup>77</sup>

Considering Nigeria is still heavily dependent on oil revenue, it is not surprising that the Niger Delta insurgency is aggravating effect of the current economic underperformance on government revenue and by extension the masses. As figure 7.9 below reveals, the relatively higher economic productivity of the Niger Delta states compared to its northern counterparts suggest the significant economic impact of Niger Delta insurgency, for the entire country as far as the current political-economic structure of Nigeria is concerned. It in fact, it affects the vary ability of Nigeria state to fight the insurgency in the north. This reality portends a myriad

<sup>77</sup> Retrieved from <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27572>

of challenges to the overall development of the country as far as national revenue and development links are concerned. For instance, it not only gives the Niger Delta insurgents a higher stake in using violence as a bargain chip, it directly results in shortening of revenue required to fight various security challenges including especially the Boko Haram's, all of which a critical to Nigeria's overall development.




Figure 7. 9: Comparative Economic Productivity of Nigeria's 36 states, 2007

Source: GeoCurrent Map<sup>78</sup>

#### 7.4. Summary and Conclusion

In view of the unquantifiability of the social and economic impacts of Niger Delta Boko and Haram insurgencies, this chapter has tried to highlight some of the key implications of both insurgencies for Nigeria's social and economic development. It stresses how these insurgencies are further worsening the deplorable socio-economic problem of poverty, unemployment, inequality, and general underdevelopment that provides the conducive ambience for the insurgencies in the first place. This impact analysis can help policy-makers and government to better appreciate the enormous work required for the attainment of durable peace and development in the affected region, and Nigeria in its entirety. The negligence of these issues in long-term COIN is deemed problematic as far as the socio-economic dimensions of the insurgencies are concerned. This is because they are categorically, "affecting adversely the present and future development" of Nigeria (Omilusi 2016: 32). Hence the final chapter shall now turn to the need for comprehensive intervention in the affected regions.

<sup>78</sup> <http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/insurgencies/poverty-root-cause-boko-haram-violence>

## CHAPTER 8

### GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

#### 8.0 Introduction

This chapter suggest ways of sustainably addressing the two insurgencies, emphasizing how to prevent the possible rise of other like-minded group(s) in the future in Nigeria, by engaging the 3D approach to COIN, noting its accentuation of the social and economic drivers of insurgencies. Minding the nationwide implication of both insurgencies regardless of region-specific inducers, this chapter reiterates that “unless a more robust counter-terrorism strategy is designed and implemented together with significant governance and political reforms, geared at reversing the historic social and economic imbalance” (Sampson 2016), the national quest for peace and development remains elusive. Hence, useful insights from the 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) conceptual frameworks are critically engaged with the view to comprehensively address both insurgencies across the nation. This is done with due acknowledgement of the non-reducibility of both insurgencies’ causal drivers to mere socio-economic factors as the preceding analysis have shown. Hence, COIN is here construed as an umbrella term that describes the complete range of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies, involving “political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, and are almost always used in combination” (Kilcullen 2010: 1). Finally, a general conclusion is drawn based on the findings of this study.

#### 8.1 Brief Recap of the 3D

The 3D approach is basically “an organising principle for organisations aimed at security, good governance and development in order to create a secure enough climate for further development” (Lijn 2011: 11). Its operationalization in Afghanistan is such that: “In Defence, the emphasis is on stability through assisting the Afghan government in developing its own security institutions. Diplomacy is aimed at improving the local, regional and national government and preventing conflicts. Development is directed at improving the socio-economic perspectives for the local population” (Gabriëlse 2007: 68). Bearing this in mind, the applicability of the 3D for Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies is better appreciated to the degree that the (under)development dimension (cause and effect) of both insurgencies are adequately recognised. The preceding assessments have precisely been attempted with an aim to foreground such appreciation of the socio-economic dimension.

The willingness of local population to cooperate with the state or not is often a function of the degree to which the people perceive government legitimacy, minding its implication for human development and security. Verret and Army (2013) have argued that “isolating the insurgents from the population will allow the counterinsurgents to shift potential support towards the legitimate government. Securing the population should be seen as a priority”.

Where this is lacking due, among other reasons, to severe human and socio underdevelopment, insurgents tend to gain upper hand in the battle for the HAM of the population. Hence, in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Colombia where COIN was framed around the idea of 3D in various degrees, the goal has been predominantly about “orienting development and diplomatic efforts toward counterinsurgency military efforts” (Marks 2010: 4) with the view to achieve “the ultimate goal: the strengthening of local institutional capacity” (Gabriëlse 2007: 67), which will likely impact appreciably on socio-economic life of the country. This task of state building amidst various security problems must involve a broad inter-agency cooperation. Meanwhile, before delving into the detail, it suffices to highlight certain caution for the 3D applicability in Nigeria.

### **8.1.2 Caution for 3D COIN**

Cognisant of the context dependence of every conflict, the ability of a weak state, such as Nigeria, to operationalise the 3D mix, was observably questioned especially during the field interview (Peace-builder 4). As earlier suggested regarding the criticism and counter-criticism of Nigeria as a weak/failed state, it is almost indubitable that Nigeria exhibits some of the characteristics of a weak state<sup>79</sup>, which can militate significantly against the operationalization of the 3D mix. Hilker and Fraser (2009: 10) aptly observed that “in contexts with strong governance and robust social and political systems, conflicting interests are managed, and ways [are] found for groups to pursue their goals peacefully; but in situations of fragility where there is poor governance and weak political and social systems, grievances, disputes and competition for resources are more likely to become violent”. Consistent with literature on the 3D COIN, the near absence of well-coordinated institutions for COIN in Nigeria, and post-conflict peace-building, and development, was considered by some respondents as particularly worrying (Researcher 1; Peace-builder4).

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<sup>79</sup> Recall that weak state has been construed as one that “does not control all parts of its territory, nor is it able to guarantee the security of its citizens since it does not have the monopoly on the use of violence and is only to a limited extent able to maintain the rule of law and provide for the delivery of public services for its inhabitants”.

Furthermore, the compelling view that “insurgents and terrorists evolve rapidly in response to countermeasures, so that what works once may not work again, and insights that are valid for one area or one period may not apply elsewhere” (Kilcullen 2010: 2) calls for a development of flexible and context relevant counter-measures towards the two insurgencies. Minding these challenges thus, the operationalization of the 3D herein is mainly geared toward adapting possible lessons from the use of 3D elsewhere rather than a blind adoption of everything 3D. For instance, the CIMIC thrust of the 3D COIN arguably underscored the utility of developing “solid partnerships with reliable local allies, in order to design, in concert with those allies, locally tailored measures to target the drivers that sustain the conflict and thus to break the cycle of violence” (Kilcullen 2010: 4). This involves the combination of the socio-economic measures and force to deal comprehensively with insurgency. This dimension of the 3D portend usefulness for Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies in their respective contexts.

Overall, the strength of the 3D approach, which many acknowledge overrides its weaknesses, resides precisely in the fact that: “The whole is more than the sum of its parts. This is the overriding argument for coherence” (Lijn 2011: 12). Meanwhile, on a general level, the non-static nature of COIN knowledge “makes organizational learning and adaptation a critical success factor”, even in the case of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

Hence, this study ultimately advocates for leveraging adaptable knowledge, especially regarding the obvious need for inter-agency cooperation (human and material resource) in countering both insurgencies in Nigeria. It is arguable that herein lays the security-development nexus, minding the widening utility of the concept of security in Nigeria, considering especially how the direct and indirect developmental challenges, aggravated by the insurgencies, can impact on sustainability of peace-building and development. Let us now turn to the possible operationalization of the Defence aspect of 3D in Nigeria especially regarding the preceding causal and impact analysis of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

## **8.2 Defence Strategy in Nigeria Revisited**

Literature on insurgency in Nigeria tends to condemn the military COIN, which have been amply considered as a recipe for escalation of both insurgencies understanding (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe 2013; Ikyase and Ejue 2015; Sule and Othman 2015). But not all critics necessarily always provide a more efficient alternative, perhaps due to the complexity of these insurgencies military response remains the automatic response of the Nigerian state, as would any other state under threat. This has its own utility in the whole picture of COIN. It is a

necessary means of creating a semblance of peace especially in short term on which any long-term developmental plan can take hold. Interestingly, from the recent study and the interviews of this study, there is remarkable support for military solution to the Boko Haram insurgency (Peace-builder3; Youth1; Youth2; Langer *et al.* 2016).

Comparatively, the same treatment is not fully advocated in the case of the Niger Delta insurgents. Given the perceived relative legitimacy of the Niger Delta insurgent struggle, a respondent rightly noted that “the positive peace that we need, which would be in form of justice is not there and if there is no justices there is no way that coercive force can bring about peace in the Niger Delta” (Peace-builder4).

Clearly the protection of the population, including former fighters, from Boko Haram is paramount. In fact, based on their interview with former Boko Haram, Botha and Abdile (2016a) highlighted fear of revenge from Boko Haram, abduction, forced recruitment, and the victimization of former Boko Haram by communities as part of the reasons for favouring more military intervention. Evidently, terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram and IS, for instance, often specifically hunt down those whom they see as collaborating with the intelligence agency. The recent slaughter of over 60 people in Mosul, Iraq, is a case in point (The Guardian 2016: October 25). By implication more security is needed for local citizens whose support the military require for better intelligence gathering. The military must work closely with individuals, civil societies and development partners for better intelligence gathering. Meanwhile, effective and profitable CIMIC is mainly possible through a good level of cordial and protective, rather than the fearful, relationship between the parties involved.

Taking the above into consideration, the absolutist posture of Boko Haram’s demands, and their temporal capture of territories, where they rule with iron fist strongly preclude the efficacy of an entirely non-military remedial framework. This is not exactly the case with the Niger Delta insurgency. Although securing the civilian populations through adequate policing is important in the Niger Delta in the region, the insurgents therein do not directly and deliberately attack civilians or forcefully recruit civilian as typical of Boko Haram. They have also demonstrated more willingness to political dialogue. Meanwhile, considering the centrality of financial inducement in the recruitment, adequate policing of banks and financial institutions that are occasionally raided by the insurgents, especially Boko Haram, remains critical to reducing its lethality and recruiting strength. Hence, adequate *policing* is paramount to dealing with both insurgencies, but at arguably different levels.

However, evidence regarding the two insurgencies under study amply reinforces the view that despite its merit in some sense, “repression overall is a stimulant, rather than a suppressor, of domestic terrorism within countries” (Piazza 2015: 13). In fact, given the disruptive implications of Niger Delta insurgency for revenue generation in Nigeria’s mono-cultural oil economy; government’s markedly fire-brigade approach is clearly counterproductive.

Part of the reasons for this counter-productivity pertains to the difficulty with distinguishing target insurgents from local population in military COIN. This often results in the harming of innocent locals and even their means of livelihood however cautiously done. The same can be argued about Boko Haram insurgents, since military strategy is likely to compel the terrorists “to create new networks of support as a form of survival strategy” aside from providing them “with critical experience in tactics” (Agbibo 2014: 62). For instance, in the case of Boko Haram, respondents from Borno recounted how the militarisation of the state at the early stage of Boko Haram not only led to the escalation but also affected the local economy through the sense of fear it created (Youth1; Youth4).

COIN often provokes the anger of local population; as has been the case with Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies. In this vein, in an interview with *Premium Times*’ Ishola Williams, a retired major general in the Nigerian Army, linked the failure of the military partly to reality that “the community intelligence, comprising the state security service (SSS), Civil Defence and Police, are not friendly with the community where they operate; they don’t get good information from residents to help them uncover activities and hideouts of criminals and even the Boko Haram insurgents” (Olufemi and Akinwumi 2016: np). Such anger and the consequent concealing of useful information from the military remains counter-productive to COIN. Hence, even though “former Boko Haram members welcomed military engagement, its rules of engagement and overall conduct will determine the long-term success of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy” (Botha & Abdile, 2015:7).

Notable is also the low level of trust in the government that tends to inhibit cooperation with the military. The efficacy of any COIN resides in the degree to which it not only stops the terrorist but also the terror, in which case mere military force have not been entirely successful in the Nigeria COIN (Aghedo and Osumah 2014b; Aghedo and Osumah 2014a; Langer *et al.* 2016). This is sometimes due to the lower level of professionalism that has been demonstrated in the fight against the insurgencies by the military, coupled with the challenges of inadequate equipment of the military force and insufficient moral motivation of the soldiers, due among

other reasons to non-payment of wages and allowances. Botha and Abdile (2016) suggest that pitiless military actions have often motivated Boko Haram action for revenge; thus, they advocate better professionalism and better adherence to military rule of engagement. Although this is very difficult, it can make or mar the productivity of COIN with implication for future radicalization. Meanwhile, considering the unconventionality of these insurgencies, the Nigerian military also needs to reinforce its' training to better suit the demands.

The clear utterances of Boko Haram's Jihadist belief "that rulers who do not apply Sharia must be overthrown and that only Muslims should exercise political and military responsibilities" was apparent under Jonathan's administration (Audu 2011: np). However, Boko Haram's persistence and threat to Buhari's administrations puts question marks on what the sect want. And in a secular state such as Nigeria, negotiating with the sect would not mean conceding to its demands to Islamise Nigeria. Any direct and indirect attempt toward such direction would likely amount to full-blown civil war driven clearly along religious line in Nigeria. Hence, negotiating with the sect, especially from an angle of strength (militarily) rather and weakness, means looking for other compromises that do not necessarily sacrifice overall national interest (Egbue *et al.* 2015). This partly explains why students from the region as well as northern-based respondents to this study prioritise military solutions.

### **8.3 Advance Diplomacy beyond Dialogue**

In the context of conflict resolution, the notion of diplomacy is sometimes (mis)understood in terms of negotiation/dialogue. In this sense, the question of the viability of dialoguing with terrorist is often raised in view of the clandestine nature of terrorist. However, aside from being "the official government and international efforts to settle a dispute or conflict through dialogue and mediation", diplomacy is often used almost interchangeably with governance within the 3D conceptual framework (Grandia *et al.* 2009). In this regard, it prioritises efforts at regaining government legitimacy. For instance, in its operationalization in Uruzgan, diplomacy focuses on the broad issue of "governance" often accompanied by development (Grandia *et al.* 2009). It focuses on dealing with issues of human rights abuses such unlawful detainment, unnecessary delay of trial; it involves frantic effort at discussing reconciliatory approach to ending violence, not necessarily only with the insurgent but also with the population whose input are invaluable. Effective diplomatic governance uses soft power to tactfully address grievances, for instance through mediational engagement. For instance, it can entail "an ability to create incentives for need-based situations to receive even-handed government attention,

open opportunities for creed-based groups to overcome their fears, and close possibilities for greed-based leaders to achieve their goals by destroying other groups” (Zartman 2000: 264).

The import of this for the complex trinity of the creed-need-greed dynamics to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, as demonstrated earlier, is not far-fetched. It is evident that leadership is critical to the possibility of survival/persistence of any coherent insurgent group, Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents included. The ability to predict and effectively manage what an insurgent group is likely to do or not in any given situation is often a function of effective diplomatic governance.

In this regard, some respondents particularly noted that the emergence of the NDA this year could have been reasonably avoided if the current administration had been more diplomatic in its public utterances, stressing that he could have handled the 2015 national election grief with a bit more tact (Peace-builder1; Researcher5). Stressing the utility of diplomacy as a preventive mechanism, a respondent clearly argued that the government could have averted the advent of the Niger Delta Avengers by a better management of its current highly contested fight against corruption using the EFCC, considered by many as political witch-hunting. In his words:

Now in the Niger Delta, could it have been possible to stop the Avengers, my answer is Yes! And my argument has always been that, having won this election massively and having had somebody like Jonathan go out there to make a concession, with Buhari himself and the entire world praising him, you cannot allow your attack dogs [EFCC] to disrespect Jonathan. Because these people are grieving... You could easily have said you want to come after Tompolo or other people in the Niger Delta, but you could have done the same thing differently. You could have paced that kind of attitude (Peace-builder1).

As far as the respondent was concerned, “governance is about thinking through things”, and this would have entailed being very diplomatic towards the fragile nature of the Niger Delta region especially at such political times charged with post-election angers.

Furthermore, diplomacy would also involve the openness of the federal government to yield to the aspirations of the citizen. For instance, the growing clamour for restructuring should be diplomatically engaged rather than rashly jettisoned on parochial political ground. Additionally, one of the major grievances of the Niger Delta inhabitants, that the current administration has not taken to consideration in building its legitimacy in the regions is the predominant appointments of northerners despite complaints from many quarters for adequate integration of all parts of the country (Community Member1; Peace-builder1). Government must demonstrate that it listens even in extremely difficult situations. Thus, to adequately

achieve this, a respondent advocate for better synergy between leaders and intellectuals in the university and research institutions in thinking through national policy frameworks, rather than the predominant assumption that the leaders “know what they need to do” (Peace-builder1).


Relatedly, the view that “today’s terrorists don’t want to seat at the table, they want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (cited in Nia 2010: 6), as well as the seeming ‘facelessness’ of terrorist groups, often raise concern regarding the feasibility of peace talks, which reinforces the need for a broader view of diplomacy beyond dialogue. This prevailing perception of terrorist is not entirely wrong even in the case of Boko Haram regardless the obscurity that seem to surround the claims by government regard its attempts at negotiation. It has been stated that “Shekau has repeatedly ruled out talks with the government, despite claims by some purported sect members that these were on-going” and “Members who proposed dialogue were killed on Shekau’s orders, silencing other pro-dialogue individualist” (ICG 2015: 21).

Nevertheless, all the challenges and criticism around the non-feasibility of dialogue with terrorist group needs to be critically reviewed considering various developments in recent times. Recent reports shows that dozens of Boko Haram surrendered themselves to the authorities in Niger, Chad (VOA 2016: , Decemer 28) just as about 240 Boko Haram fighters “voluntarily surrendered to the Nigerian Army after they came under intense fire from troops” in 2016, with more reportedly willing to follow suit in the hope of pardon (Premium Times 2016a: , November 1). Such development presents an opportunity to engage the sect politically as much as possible. Similarly, Botha & Abdile (2016) argued that political participation of some ex-Boko Haram, especially in the previous election points to the possibility of some member’s readiness for political dialogue and hope for good governance. This, in Botha and Abdile’s view, also suggest that some Boko Haram members are not incorrigibly anti-establishment.

However, part of the challenges to arriving at an effective peace talk with the sect is the perception of insincerity on the part of both government and sometimes the sect. On the part of the government for instance, the decision by the Nigeria Military to place rewards of “50 million naira (\$317,000) on Shekau and 10 million naira (\$63,400) each on eighteen other commanders” designated as terrorists in 21 June 2012 by the Nigeria state, arguably inhibited the talks. Expectedly, in such clime, ‘terrorists’ would be wary of government sincerity for negotiation, fearing that calls for negotiation may be a trap to catch them. Similarly, regarding the Niger Delta insurgency, the very designation of the agitation in the region as terrorism has

often suggested that government’s disposition is to hunt down rather than negotiate. Beyond Nigeria, diplomacy entails “synergy and intelligence sharing between Nigeria and the countries affected by the activities of Islamic state in order to curb against the growing ties between the two groups” (Yahaya 2016: 16) as well as more effective border control with neighbouring states such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, guarding against the illicit flow of Arms.

On another note, diplomatic engagement with the religious institution is also key to undermining the effects of radical Islamist such as Boko Haram. Although religion has often been politicised in Nigeria, its values can be rightly leveraged upon in dealing with various form of conflicts including the insurgencies. As Cox *et al.* (2014: 5) appositely observed “ultimately, the best hope for stepping back from religious politicization may reside in the religious communities themselves, which continue to engage in extensive efforts to bridge their divisions and coexist peacefully”. Religious and community/traditional leaders remain integral in the overall efforts at preventing radicalization and mediating conflict; government must work closely with them in sincerity. Government must use these leaders and individuals to reach to masses from amongst whom radicals are drawn by the sect through its compelling narrative (Leuprecht *et al.* 2010). As Leuprecht *et al* (2010) demonstrated in the pyramid of jihadi narrative, in the case of UK, it is from the neutral masses that sympathisers and justifiers develop (See Figure 8.1). In this regard, a due recognition of the potential of religious institution in not only curbing Boko Haram menace but promoting peace was thus emphasised by Botha and Abdile (2016), following their import as recruiting ground.



**Figure 8. 1: The Narrative Pyramid and Action Pyramid of Jihadi**

Source: Leuprecht *et al* (2010)

### **8.3.1 (Re)Building Trust and Killing Impunity**

As governance in the broadest sense, diplomacy in the context of Nigeria’s insurgency should be geared at “building and rebuilding relationships, healing and not hurting feelings in relations (as much as possible) and promoting and not undermining mutual interest”(Ikyase and Ejue

2015: 4147). In this regard, the promotion of transparency and accountability in governance, for instance, has both direct and indirect effect of winning the HAM of the population in the directly affected regions. It would not only show the determination of government to address the grievances with the current status quo that have impoverished many Nigerians, it is also critical to boosting government legitimacy by providing a sense of hope for those have been forcefully pushed to the margins as result of the pervading culture of impunity.

This way, passive or activate support of Anti-state group can be reduced if not eliminated. As the ICG (2015) rightly pointed out, “official impunity is a major grievance for many and an effective recruiting tool for Boko Haram and other militant groups”. In fact, the failure of the Nigerian government to indict the police officer involved in the alleged extrajudicial execution of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 despite this being repeatedly demanded by human rights groups, and it was a major Boko Haram’s condition for ceasefire, is worrying (ICG 2015). Some respondent to this study alluded to this factor as suggestive of some hideous reality behind the Boko Haram insurgency, which might implicate some political elites sponsoring Boko Haram. Akin to the above-concerted effort must be made by the federal government to criminalise the politicization of religion by the political elites for the case of Boko Haram. So far efforts at prosecuting such political elites has remained insufficient and inadequate, as reminiscent of the case of the former governor of Borno, Sheriff.


Arguably, linked to the above also is need for better integration of former insurgents, considering that not all of member freely joined; some were forcefully recruited or deluded into joining. Similarly, addressing the problem of Nigeria trust deficit remains critical to winning both the war and the battle. On the part of ex-fighters, this essentially would mean their protection and reintegration into their local communities and institution (Botha and Abdile, 2016). Hence, Botha and Abdile’s (2016) advocacy for the stressing of messages “that emphasise that Boko Haram fighters are to be seen as victims, pitied as much as feared” over and above messages that focus on fearing these ex-fighters has utility in the broader scheme of the deradicalization programme. Indeed, their experience as members of the insurgent groups may help the COIN. There is also a need for inclusive deradicalization of the insurgents.

Ultimately, diplomacy involves resolute efforts at political reform primarily focus on “strengthening governance processes and institutions to ensure transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in ways that increase the legitimacy of government at all levels in Nigeria”

(Onuoha 2014: 186). Many respondents stressed the need for a legal policy framework embedded injustice must be put in place across the country (Director2; Peace-builder1). For instance, programmes such as Amnesty, need to be legally instituted, rather than being arbitrarily applied here and there. This would enable proper intermittent reviews that would align the publicity with national budget capacity and will essentially, constitute avoiding double standards in responding to every crisis in the country thereby, providing a level playing ground for all the regions or states; regardless of party or ethnic affiliation.

#### **8.4 Development towards Peace and Stability.**

Based on the similarities between Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies as far as socio-economic dimension are concern the need for government to address underlying socio-economic drivers in line with other regional specific factors is critical to the overall COIN in the context of Nigeria (Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech 2015). Improved attention should be given to conflict-sensitive development, especially those highlighted in this study, namely poverty, inequality, lack of social welfare and the problem of corruption. This view is echoed by Agbibo (2015: 34) who rightly maintained that “countering the pervasive insecurity in the Sahel requires not only rebuilding a healthier state-citizen relationship, but also addressing the political, social and economic marginalisation that has been driving it.” Accordingly, a possible circularly relationship between (under)development and security/conflict as far the preceding cause and impact analysis of the both insurgencies are concerned is shown in figure 8.2 below. The figure suggests that just as conflict/insurgency are to some extent driven by poor human, social and infrastructural development, the presence of conflict/insurgency itself aggravates the challenges of development. Hence, a negligence of the complex relationship between conflict and development is deleterious to the quest for sustainable peace in the affected areas as both security and development challenges ought to be addressed simultaneously. For instance, if forced migrants due to the insurgencies are not adequately resettled and provided with basic human necessities, they may not only fall prey to the radical ideologies of insurgent groups but also become sources of social tension in their hosting communities. Similarly, poor institutions due to underdevelopment undermines human capability development thereby rendering people vulnerable to radicalisation.



**Figure 8. 2: Possible Relationship between Development and Conflict**

Source: Author's synthesis

This intricate relation reinforces Azar's view that view that "peace is development in broadest sense of the term"(cited in Ramsbotham *et al.* 2011: 105). Indeed, while the manifestation of social and human underdevelopment such as poverty, poor institution does not authentically lead to conflict, the human agency brings their potentiality for conflict to actuality. Based on the, post-conflict reconstruction vis-à-vis the goal of 3D in the context of Nigeria should be about focusing the efforts of various agencies, including governmental and non-government organisations, at preventive measures. This would range from effort at reversing the impact of conflict, "addressing root causes of potential conflict and strengthening socioeconomic development to supporting reform of the security sector" (Gabriëlse 2007: 71). The socio-economic transformation required in Nigeria, towards dealing with the insurgencies, entails significant emphasis on monitoring, periodic evaluation, and accountability, given the glaring tendency for fund diversion and/or mismanagement in the society.

#### **8.4.1 Conflict Sensitive Development**

The socio-economic grievances that underlie the Niger Delta crises remain quite glaring today regardless of the criminalization of the struggle by certain individuals. Suffice it to underscore that "personal and group grievance, for instance, probably tend to induce one another. Personal grievance will lead an individual to interact with others sharing the same grievance, and the

personal becomes political” (Leuprecht *et al.* 2010: 48). This partly accounts for the participation of individuals in violence against the state even if they themselves are not necessarily aggrieved for their socio-economic state (see the Robbin Hood Effect). Hence, addressing the society-wide development challenges can go along in dealing with individual’s grievances in the Niger Delta region as well as the Boko Haram insurgencies, despite the religious colouration of the latter, in long term. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the development programmes in checkmating insurgencies is largely dependent on the balance between need and community input.

In order to avoid wasting invested funds in social and economic development, programmes must be locally driven through effective stakeholder’s engagement to meet the aspirations of individuals and communities in the respective regions. Such would help avert the repetition of previously failed development strategy (Cragin and Chalk 2003: 33; Uwasomba and Alumona 2014). Thus, conflict sensitive development, characterised by deep involvement of the populace, remains critical in resolving both crises, along other localised dynamics of the respective insurgencies. This is another area where CIMIC is critical as well. Extensive literature and respondents to this study overwhelmingly acquiesce that addressing socio-economic root causes including the creation of better employment opportunities for the youth, improvement of living standards, improvement of education system quantitatively and qualitatively, improvement of justice system and the rule of law, *inter alia*, are vital to dealing sustainably with both insurgencies.

Nevertheless, from the comparative prism, other region-specific challenges are equally critical in deciding priorities of development programmes. In this regard, while the improvement of education in the south is not negligible, the need for massive mental reorientation (through western education) in the north-east is even more demanding of attention. “Long-term strategy that will undercut the jihadist appeal in northern Nigeria” must be brought to the fore in the COIN; in order to “address the sources of socio-economic inequalities and human insecurity” as outlined earlier (Agbibo 2014: 62). Based on the social and economic impact analysis of the insurgencies in the previous chapters, dealing with various human development crises as health crises, food insecurity, capital flight, forced migration, environmental degradation and infrastructural collapse, among others, are quintessential to the on-going COIN (Community Member2). Among other things, this requires that government should pay more attention to the call for economic restructuring considering that the mono-cultural oil-dependent structure has significantly failed to empower the powerless masses. In that regard, the call for economic

diversification and improvement in agriculture is not only apt, it is equally indispensable to reviving Nigeria's collapsing economy. Akin this, Dr Ahmed Shield Gunmi applauded the previous administration's creation of various Almajiri schools across the north, although faulted the abysmal execution of the project. Indeed, "countering narratives of grievance, along with offering a better vision of the future, is the job of development" (Mercy Corps 2015), which must be factor into the COIN strategies.

#### **8.4.2 Need for Strong and Efficient Institutions**

With reference to the Niger Delta region, government must promote stronger and more efficient institutions which would ensure that "allocation and compensation to oil producing communities are not diverted but that they actually get to the people of the communities" (Ikechukwu 2012). Such institutions must adequately monitor the activities of oil companies to ensure they conform to international best practices. They must hold companies accountable inadequately discharging their CSR in the region by stipulating an effective code of conduct, with strong legal backing. Similarly, government needs to properly harness the developmental programmes of NGOs, NPOs and civil society organisations working in the affected regions, since government alone can hardly provide the required development resources.

#### **8.4.3: Intensify Youth Inclusion**

Besides the urgent need for poverty reduction especially among the youth, their inclusion in national decision-making process is paramount to building peace and development in Nigeria. In this respect, the relative absence (or under-representation) of youths in leadership requires urgent redress, given that their exclusion "exacerbates generational tensions, and presents an enormous risk for sustainable peace and development" (Agbibo 2015: 30). This also involves due acknowledgement of the contribution of some youths in towards peace-building and development. Both in the Northern and Niger Delta region, many youths are working with government to restore peace and such efforts need to be duly acknowledged and boosted by relevant incentives (Youth/Religious leader<sup>1</sup>). Thus, improved engagement rather than appeasement and containment of all the youths (both the peaceful and violent ones) at community level is quintessential to maximising the positive energies of the youth towards peace-building and development in the affected region. Accordingly, it is useful to "develop a youth and violence prevention guidance note alongside Youth Participation Guide which assesses the evidence and gives guidance on programme development" (Hilker and Fraser 2009: 6)

#### 8.4.4 Education and its Content

Considering its indispensability to both human and social development of any country, quality education remains critical to dealing with the development quagmire that undermines peace and security in Nigeria. This is regardless of Boko Haram self-acclaimed aversion to Western Education. Just as respondents from the northeast confirmed, there is a great deal of misrepresentation of Islam by Boko Haram anti-western education rhetoric's. Hence, as I have argued elsewhere, in order to deal with the issues, it behoves on the Nigerian state "to assess, through its agencies, what is being taught in religious gathering in order to discourage religious intolerance" (David 2013: 119) considering that religious grounds and institution such as madrassa were among the recruiting venues. Intensified efforts at promoting western education in this institution also remain critical factors to discouraging the religious bigotry that often drive Islamism. In line with the suggestion of the a few respondents, the sort of education needed to transform the north should transcend the colonial style of basic reading and writing; it should improve critical awareness and liberation of mindset (Peace-builder3). This especially in view of the danger of half-education as alluded to by Gunmi earlier.

Additionally, the incorporation of the culture of peace into the formal education's curriculum is advocated considering the prevailing culture of ethnoreligious intolerance. Hence the place of peace education in the Nigeria curriculum must be well reinforced. This involves the reinstating the study of history in the curriculum with the view to educate the youth concerning the trajectory of the Nigerian state (Researcher5). But most importantly, historical education should be fashioned in manner that it will help deal adequately the intergenerational traumas and animosities that evidently contribute to the agitation in the various parts of the country. Akin to this, the establishment or promulgation of existing "institutions that can effectively handle interreligious affairs and promote interfaith dialogue in the Nigerian state" is equally important.

Furthermore, *vocational education* must be encouraged more than ever before, in view of the growing inability of the state to provide the required jobs for its teeming youths. This should help in equipping the youth "with basic vocational education and training skills, including the right education that leads to self-reliance and as well support them with seed funds to start their own business" (Nwachukwu 2016: 82).

#### **8.4.5 International Development Assistance**

Within the 3D approach, the responsibility of the international community to support the Nigerian government cannot be overstated. Given the fragility of Nigeria state, it lacks the requisite human and material resources for dealing with these insurgencies adequately. Efforts of the international communities in the form of humanitarian aids, monitoring and evaluation, training and equipment must be sustained. In this regard, the support of the regional military coalition (e.g AU, and ECOWAS) against insurgency in the north-east in recent must be sustained. Similarly, international communities must also aid civil society organization in checkmating the ethical practices by oil companies in the Niger Delta.

Assistance must indeed improve beyond military cooperation to civil society cooperation's in all possible areas, including intelligence gathering, and dealing with the root causes that makes drivers insurgencies in the West African sub-region. The public sector in these respective countries (Niger, Chad and Cameroon) needs continual strengthening in its service delivery to the citizens. For genuine stability, peace and development to take hold in the conflict-affected regions, improved international cooperation especially in terms of financial and logistical support is required. The complementary role of the international community is continually useful to Nigeria counter-insurgency, particularly in the aspects of technological supports/gadgets and intelligence gathering instruments and intelligence. In this respect the assistance of developed nations is especially significant. Indeed, Nigeria needs to collaborate with, and learn from other countries with similar challenges (David *et al.* 2015).

### **8.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE**

On the surface a comparison between the insurgency in the north-east by Boko Haram, and in the Niger Delta region, by the various militant groups (including especially, MOSOP, IYC, MEND and NDA) seems unnecessary especially minding their marked ideological differences, which considerably shapes their goals, objectives, strategies, and targets.

In fact, the very close alignment of Boko Haram's ideological position with the growing global Islamist terrorism as well as its transnational dynamics of late provides a marked differential compared to the local resource control agitation by various militant groups and environmental activists in the Niger Delta. Hence, the various academic and political attempts to class these insecurities under the Monika of insurgency, terrorism, militancy raise some scholarly interest as to whether they might be some comparability between the insurgencies. This particularly

due to the overwhelming view that the highly contested term “terrorism” seems to more aptly apply to Boko Haram than the Niger Delta crisis, especially if the indiscriminate targeting of civilian is factored in. Meanwhile, at a national level, the political elites tend often to approach both insecurities with remarkably similar attitudes, as if their causal drivers are the same. To be sure, the 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act’s definition of terrorism classed the various activities that can be found in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insecurities as acts of terrorism. Expectedly, any national attempt at dealing with the so-called terrorism would often pivot on such Acts and its undergirding and institutional mindset.

On the academic front, it is quite evident that literature on both insurgencies has bourgeoned overtime, with various scholars focusing on their different aspects. Meanwhile, a common factor in the literature that explains the causal factors of Boko Haram, especially from an economic point of view, is the leaning towards the deplorable socio-economic conditions in the northern region compared to its southern counterpart. Yet the very linkages between socio-economic factors and terrorism remain hotly contested globally. Furthermore, the instability in the Niger Delta region further obscures our understanding on this ground, putting a question mark on the socio-economic explanation of both insurgencies. Statistical representation of the southern Nigeria as richer compared to north would logically imply that the former region should be peaceful as far as the socio-economic argument is concerned. Hence consistent with various other studies in different context, critics often tend to disregard any socio-economic explanation, drawing on the fact that poverty is a pan-Nigerian phenomenon; hence, cannot explain insurgency in any region of the country. Some critics of the socio-economic explanation for Boko Haram insurgency have perceptibly questioned that if it is about poverty, why are the north-western states in Nigeria not worst hit by Boko Haram since some states in this region are statistically poorer than the north-east. Moreover, the notable hijacking of the struggles, by certain individuals and groups, has increasingly obscured, if not concealed, the economic deprivation argument.

Meanwhile only a very few scholarly efforts have directly and exclusively engaged the socio-economic dimension of these two insurgencies in a comparative sense, in order to further clarify the above obscurities. Yet the tendency to draw a conclusion that socio-economic factors are significant (or not) in the rise and persistence of either or both insurgencies is not inexistent, among politicians and academics, who predominately premise their position superficially on broad regional comparison. Interestingly, such conclusions are drawn mainly based on the scantily available statistical representation (if not misrepresentation) of the socio-

economic indices, such as poverty, unemployment, and poor education, amongst others in the affected regions. Based on this, policy prescriptions often either underscore or undermine the need for socio-economic development of the affected region. Albeit, useful in some sense, these often-limited statistical indices are sometimes inconsistent and, ultimately, insufficient in giving an adequate understanding of the socio-economic dimension of insurgencies in Nigeria. Hence further explanation is needed to approve or disprove of the socio-economic argument for the emergence and sustained insurgencies in the north-east and south-south amongst other political agitations across the Nigerian state.

Thus, in line with my earlier study (David, 2013) that solely focused on Boko Haram, this study advances the argument of the socio-economic dimension (cause and effect) of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies from a comparative standpoint. In situating the argument within the broad security-development nexus, the study highlights the definitional conundrum with the concept of terrorism, with a view to emphasise the effect thereof for naming the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insecurities as “terrorism/insurgency” or not, minding the implication thereof for a unified national COIN amidst their context-specific dimensions (*research objective 1*).

Attempts are made to engage the contentious debate on the correlation between development and terrorism within the context of the two insurgencies. This is meant to highlight context-specific factors for the respective insurgencies yet noting their convergence on other broader Nigerian factors including but not limited to socio-economic underdevelopment. Despite the disapproval of a link between development and security in some quarter, the study has attempted to call for caution by reiterating the view that “just as economic development cannot take place amidst war, conflicts, and domestic tension, so peace, security and stability cannot take root in situations of abject poverty and hopelessness” (Abubakar 2000/2001). Thus, the socio-economic dimension (causes and effects) of these insurgencies in Nigeria, provides some insight in understanding the security-development nexus in the given context. The study stresses the non-negligible link between underdevelopment and insecurity in the affected regions in varying degrees (*Research objective 2*).

The study found that while poverty is *necessary* but *insufficient* for explaining conflict, its persistence amidst affluence and economic growth in Nigeria suggest its significance as determinant of the hopelessness and lack of trust in the system that often prompt *some* citizen to seeking alternative means, be it in religion or ethnonationalism as suggestive of Niger Delta Boko and Haram insurgencies respectively (*Research objective 2*).

Principally, by leveraging on the views of experts in the field of security and development, including those directly involved in peace-building and transformation in the relevant region, the study has attempted to highlight the complexity involved in situating both crises within the terrorism discourse especially regarding their local root causes. For instance, in the case of Boko Haram, while acknowledging its other important causal factors including its global and transnational angles that are hardly amenable to local factors, the starting point in addressing the crises undoubtedly include righting the various local wrongs by the Nigerian state, among which are socio-economic underdevelopment, even if it is not necessarily peculiar to the region.

Similarly, the need for government to deal with local grievances on which the so-called ‘oil terrorist’ capitalises, despite the criminalisation of the struggle, remains key to winning the HAM of the population, and towards embracing non-violence in the Niger Delta region (*Research objective 4*). This not only aids the government in getting the required local support to muster a common ground against the insurgents but also helps in improving the efficacy of international support that have become indispensable in both insurgencies. In so doing therefore, this study has attempted to identify possible similarities and differences between Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, especially within the context of the Nigerian state, with due cognisance of the structure of its’ political economy; that has contributed towards the impoverishment of its population, constantly creating and recreating conflict-prone ambience, which oxygenates both insurgencies and a host of other political agitations across the country.

Theoretically, in addition to *root causes* perspective, the individual motivation for participation is situated in the on *rational choice* view of utility maximisation which takes the form of aspiration for “better life”, be it material here on earth and/or spiritually in the afterlife, by the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents. By drawing on these nuances, an attempt is further made to investigate the complex convergence of the root causes of both insurgencies on the key socio-economic variables, among a myriad of other causal drivers, highlighting the thin line that divides both insurgencies within the highly debated socio-economic causes of the insurgencies. Essentially, this study does not consider Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies as momentary threats that would simply be ‘crushed’ in a military sense, based on the COIN hitherto employed by the Nigerian state security agencies<sup>80</sup>. The growing

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<sup>80</sup> The Nigeria government, under various administrations, is known to have mostly framed its management of insecurity in militaristic tone of crushing the ‘enemy’. In fact the escalation of the resurgence in the Niger Delta crises under the NDA in February 2016, after a few years of relative peace Post Amnesty, appears to have followed President Buhari’s rather undiplomatic vow to crush the militants as he crushed the Boko Haram (Premium Times 16 April 2016)

frustration, and the political atmosphere of discontent, of the populace in the most affected regions, particularly the de-development impact of the insurgencies amidst the lack of collective political will both on the part of the leaders and the ordinary citizen to decisively nib the crisis in the bud, very much reinforces the above view.

This has been mainly engendered by the political economy of state robbery that typifies the Nigerian economy at almost all levels (*Research objective 2*). Even genuine grievances are sometimes overwhelmed by the greed as often the case in Niger Delta where compensatory benefits are undermined by corruption and inequity. Over and above this is the undermining impact of the colonial legacy of policing as a sole tactic towards social dissidents. As Omotola (2006) rightly alluded, the design of Nigeria by the colonial experts to promote law and order was informed practically by the pedagogy of force and violence. And like other African countries, this legacy of colonial violence which, in turn, influences the colonised to be violent, continues to jeopardise peace, stability and development in Nigeria (Fanon 1965: 40). Indeed, “unless the federal and state governments, and the region as a whole, develop and implement comprehensive plans to tackle not only insecurity but also the injustices that drive much of the troubles, Boko Haram, or groups like it, will continue to destabilise large parts of the country” (Durotoye 2015: 1248)

Hence, while it might be reductive to explain these insurgencies under the heading of socio-economic factors, to jettison or undermine these factors altogether is arguably detrimental to the security and stability of the affected regions and Nigeria in general. This, in turn, is counterproductive to Nigeria’s efforts towards development. Hence, against the backdrop of the arguments of studies from some other contexts that seem to disconfirm any link between socio-economic variables and terrorism, this study accentuates the fact that the Nigerian context presents a different food for thought: socio-economic factors cannot be written off (see also David, 2013). Indeed, unless Nigeria tackles those socioeconomic issues that tend hitherto to legitimise resorts to violence, the occurrence and re-occurrence of “Boko Harams” and “Niger-Delta militants’ insurgency would remain a major blockade to peace, security and development in Nigeria and the West African sub-region (*Research objective 2*).

Additionally, with the view to stress the overall security-development interface in the broader context of Nigeria, effort is made to report the impact of both insurgencies on social and economic development in Nigeria. This is in keeping with the need to understand the implication of the nationwide development challenges for post-conflict transformation that, left

unchanged, will continue to undermine Nigeria quest for stability, peace and development in the long run. In other words, as impact assessment advances towards “post-conflict reconstruction” (or preferably *post-conflict transformation* since a *reconstruction of the same environment* that festered the conflicts in the first place should *hardly be advocated*), attention to the underdevelopment causes and effects of both insurgencies remain indispensable. By implication, control measures employed – if not entrenched in a long-term socio-economic and political development – may merely amount to an ineffective quick-fix, and ultimately to the reoccurrence of the insurgencies in years ahead.

Herein, arguably, lies the hotly debated security-development nexus, the degree of which may vary from one context to another and from one conflict to another. In the context of Nigeria, this study shows how important and non-negligible the nexus is. Thus, while the need for more military protection is required on the part of Boko Haram, given its predominant target of civilians, less of military is required for the Niger Delta in the view of most respondents. This reinforces the position that the link between underdevelopment and insecurity in the Niger Delta appears to have a stronger explanatory efficacy, regardless of the higher developmental placement of the region over other regions in the country for instance, in terms of poverty rating (***Research objectives 2 and 4***).

On the part of Boko Haram, postulation of a link between underdevelopment and the insurgency requires further cautiousness regardless of the relative underdevelopment in the region at the level of statistical representation. Among many other possible reasons, this is because underdevelopment challenges in the region are mainly contributing factors to other regional specific issues including especially religion and politics (***Research objective 2***). Yet the prevalence of economic incentives to both insurgencies tends to reinforce the nationwide challenges of human and social underdevelopment as contributing to both insurgencies, since the masterminds capitalised on such. In the case of Boko Haram, this dynamic obfuscates clear-cut religious explanation, if reductive position is to be rightly avoided. It is in this complexity that underdevelopment can be alluded, though more *cautiously*, as an explanation. It is not necessarily *the* sole explanation, and yet cannot be undermined in both insurgencies as far as Nigerian economic and political structure and institutions impact on these insurgents. These accounts, therefore, for the convergences of various policy prescriptions on the need for development, along with diplomacy and defence, despite the notable differences between the two.

Accordingly, the study underscores the import of a holistic approach toward COIN, inspired by the idea of 3D approach and its accent on inter-agency cooperation, considering the enormous amount of resource (human and material) required to turn the tide in Nigeria (*Research objective 4*). The essence is to situate short, medium and long term COIN strategies within the understanding that “security and development are inseparable elements of nation-building” (Dion 2014: 209), which an evidently fragile nation like Nigeria cannot undermine on any account. In the final analysis, the efficacy of Nigerian COIN will be dependent on the degree to which contemporary security is accurately understood, at its base, to be “a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military-police effort” (Dion 2014: 213).

The corollary learning is to move from a “singular military approach to a multidimensional whole-of-government and whole of alliance/coalition paradigm” (Dion 2014: 213). Thus, lessons derivable from the 3D arguably provide insights toward inter-agency cooperation that can be adaptably used towards addressing both the root causes and the growing developmental impact of these insurgencies on the entire country Nigeria (*Research objective 4*).

This study is pivoted on the assumption that adequate provision of social welfare service and good education, of which the Nigerian government has generally fallen short thus far, is one critical and sustainable way of mitigating the growing tendency towards violence in the country. The policy relevance of this study transcends the bounds of Nigeria, given the emphasis on the importance of conflict prevention globally. Hence, the regional, continental as well as global relevance cannot be under/overestimated in the 21st Century globalised world. This complex dynamic is further appreciable by taking adequate cognisance of the two sides of the COIN regarding the human security-development correlate through the prism of the 3D as have been presented above in the theoretical framework.

#### **8.5.1 The Two Sides of the COIN: Towards a Comprehensive Approach**

Indeed, to avoid the predominant quick-fix approaches, and achieve durable result, there is a need for improved cooperation between security agencies and developmental agencies, especially those that are embedded in civil society. The Military-Civic dimension of COIN seems at once both antagonistic and complimentary, depending on what it is emphasised: *enemy-centric* or *population-centric* (Plakoudas 2014: 132-3). Adherent of the enemy-centric approach prioritise the crush of the enemy in military term as the pathway to victory. On the other hand, the supporters of the population-centric considered victory over the

insurgents/terrorists as attainable through secured control over the local population from whom the insurgents draw supports. The local population of insurgent-infested location have been divided in three categories namely “[1] An active minority for the cause [2] A neutral or passive majority and, [3] An active minority against the cause”. The winning over of most the population is paramount to the destruction, disruption and dislodgment of insurgents/insurgencies. However, the attainment thereof is largely pivoted on the extent to which military strategies are effectively synergised with development and diplomacy with an eye on (re)building the perception of government’s legitimacy. Indeed, “while the security line of operation is essential, the governance and developmental lines are even more important to build a lasting peace” (Verret and Army 2013: 99). Hence, it is imperative to “understand the linkages between development in its broadest sense, including human rights, environmental sustainability, good governance, participatory democracy, removal of inequalities and discrimination and gender equality, with peace and security if policies, strategies, programs and initiatives are to be successful in conflict prevention, resolution and sustained recovery” (Jervis 2002). The case of Niger Delta amply reinforces this view.

Admittedly, achieving the above is both complex and difficult otherwise there would be less conflict around the world. However, it is the worth striving for, with all necessary tools and competence. Meanwhile, the efficacy of either depends largely on contextual factors driving or sustaining the insurgency. Various variables beneath modern terrorism/insurgency tends more to delimit the efficacy of the previously effective militaristic sole tactic of COIN. As noted earlier, the parochial view of the traditional militaristic COIN tends to de-emphasise the centrality of Human Security to sustainable peace and development. This is perhaps due, among other reasons, to the focus on national/territorial integrity or the “law and order” approach: Yet, COIN “requires population-centric intelligence and not exclusively enemy-centric intelligence (although the latter is certainly needed in support of security operations)” (Kitzen 2012: 717). Indeed, idea of human security (HS) suggests that military sole tactic to security hardly encapsulate the full, if not ever widening, dimension of security besides the fact that it is hardly sustainable. In lieu, the bullets often escalated violence, transforming seemingly peaceful protest into violent ones as reminiscent of Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

Hence, the HS approach underscore that the traditional national/military security is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means to the attainment of the “freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity” (Okpara 2012), which this study considered as vital in dealing

with both insurgencies. The *Partners for Peacebuilding Policy* (3Ps, 2011) highlighted five principles of HS namely, that it is [1] people-centred [2] comprehensive, [3] multi-sectorial, [4] context-specific, and [5] prevention-oriented. By its people-centeredness, HS prioritises the empowerment of the people and gets them directly involved in the peacebuilding process. In terms of comprehensiveness, HS is not just about granting the psychological freedom from fear and want, but also freedom to live in dignity. By its Multi-sectorial focus, HS recognises the interdependent dimension of global and local threats, insecurities and vulnerabilities, human rights and development. Hence, it undergoes the importance of contributions from all sectors within and beyond the country in peacebuilding.

By context-specificity, it is meant the need to acknowledge, and appropriately address, the uniqueness of local among global threats in assessment and planning. Finally, by prevention-oriented, HS is pre-emptive rather than re-active since it addresses both immediate and structural factors causing fear, want and humiliation. These, especially the context specificity accents of HS, helps to underscore the local dimension of the insurgencies, which government tends to cover-up by merely attributing these insurgencies to the global phenomenon of terrorism. Yet, this is not to dismiss the external factors as have been reasonably acknowledged in the study.

Undoubtedly the “structural causes of conflicts are complex, inter-linked, multidimensional, and often intertwined with a society’s history” (Ocampo 2004: 3) covering the gamut of political, cultural, social and economics. Hence unlike national security whose actors are limited to the military, actors of HS are broad and multi-levelled, involving the government, civil society, business, academic, religious, media and others. Similarly, its security assessment scope is wider, including WMD, Terrorism, state fragility, poverty, economic disparity, inter-group cleavages (Maleckova 2005).

It is against this backdrop that the 3D is not only useful but emphasises the security-development nexus. While the operationalization of 3D is anything but easy, the plausibility in today’s complex conflict is laudable. Perhaps, this fear of its applicability that tends to have fixated most COIN at the level of mere military engagement. The deleterious effects thereof in Nigeria are not far-fetched. The unending circle of irregular warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, such as the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies, are suggestive of this. Yet, it is not only germane that root causes are identified but also that the applied COIN is as comprehensive as necessary and possible. Hence, the 2RCs and the 3D approach underscore a population-centric dynamic

of COIN, by emphasising the mix of defence, diplomacy and development in countering the insurgencies and building durable peace. In tandem with Robert Thomson's idea of COIN, prevention (of violent conflict) is always better than cure considering especially the "cost-effectiveness of prevention when compared with the exorbitant bill for subsequent relief, protection and reconstruction if prevention fails" (Ramsbotham *et al.* 2011: 117).

However, prevention sometimes appears more difficult than 'cure' particularly in relation to timing. For instance, while it is always best to quell insurgency at its early stage, government might sometimes be in denial of the existence of the group. That it took the Nigerian government years to proscribe Boko Haram as terrorist organisation is an eloquent testimony to this fact. While conspiracy theories have it that the US's delays in naming Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) was because of political manipulation, Nigeria's delay might be due to such denial or political unwillingness. This is hardly surprising, given the high politicization of the crises through religion (Office of the National Security Adviser 2015). The development deficit that drives the insurgencies, from within, cannot be overlooked.

Development therefore is considered as central to COIN in both insurgencies under consideration herein (Peace-builder1; Peace-builder2; Peace-builder5; Researcher5; Bratton 2004; Agbiboa 2015). Certainly, conflict has a reversal effect on development in various ways due to its destructive feats. But "lack of development itself constitutes a powerful source of grievance fuelled by a combustible mix of poverty, inequality, marginalization and exclusion that often precipitate into violent conflagrations" (UN 2004). As a respondent corroborates, "Our responses to insurgency and militancy is a recipe for further conflicts" (Peace-builder2)

Hence, the 3D is an indispensable foundation for a collective security system that accents prevention over containment of conflicts. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten human security, without necessarily removing military intervention. It is vital in preventing or reversing the erosion of state capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. It is part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war and for addressing the environments in which both terrorism and organised crime flourish (Gupta 2005). In this respect, security budget within the HS paradigm is fundamentally tilted towards investment efforts involving economic development, good governance, and robust multi-track diplomacy in long term (Thomas 2001; McDonald 2002; Okumu 2009a; McCormack 2011). In short term, however,

HS effort could include effective security sector reform (SSR), Disarmament, and demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and Policy advocacy.

Because it is not merely *enemy-centric*, HS largely pre-empts the would-be enemy. As Plakoudas (2014: 133-4) properly argues, counterinsurgent must indeed score a clear-cut and permanent victory over the insurgents, since it is the case that “time and space allow insurgent groups to recover and recoup their losses.” Indeed, the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgents have demonstrated this, ample time. Admittedly, the difficulty with suppressing the ‘enemy’ is not necessarily a preserve of the Nigerian state. Many governments around the world suffer from the same problem. However, these challenges vary in degree from country to country or society to society.

Often, the extent of a nation’s military sophistication, which is sometimes a reflection of the level of development, is some relatable determinants of the extent of this challenge for states. The consistency of this view with the ideas of the Comprehensive Approach (CA)<sup>81</sup> or Whole of Government (WoG) in counterinsurgency is appreciable (UK government 2006; Dion 2014; Tela 2014). In this regard, both the Canadian forces and the US doctrine broadly views COIN as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency” (cited in Verret and Army 2013: 95). With the requisite political will, Nigeria can indeed borrow adaptable lessons from the above conclusion in addressing the seemingly different by considerably similar insurgencies in the Niger Delta and northeast, especially from a socio-economic dimension, among other relevant factors. This study has thus attempted to demonstrate that in order to attain a robust and sustainable COIN, socio-economic root causes and the negative developmental impact of the insurgencies have to be clearly identified and addressed simultaneously, using the compressive conceptual frameworks such as the 3Ds (development, diplomacy and defence).

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<sup>81</sup> The US Army Comprehensive Approach is defined as: An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

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**APPENDIX I  
PARTICIPANTS INFORMED CONSENT**

Department of Anthropology and Development Studies  
Faculty of Arts  
University of Zululand,  
South Africa.  
2<sup>nd</sup> June 2015.

Dear Respondent,

I am a PhD candidate of the above-named Department and institution conducting a research study on “A comparative assessment of the socio-economic dimension of Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency: Towards the Security-Development Nexus”. This research study is purely an academic exercise and does not in any way have political, economic or social implication.

1. I require your participation in my study as respondent to my research questionnaire.
2. Please note that your participation in this study is entirely voluntarily.
3. The information will never be used for any other purpose other than research mentioned above.
4. I pledge that I shall ensure anonymity where required and as agreed between us through the use of code names.
5. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time of your choice without any negative or undesirable consequences to you.
6. Please note that there is no monetary gain from participation.

For classification, if you have any question or concern about participation in this study, please contact my supervisor at the numbers listed below or with the above address. It is expected that it will take about 15-30 minutes to answer the questions. I hope you will take the time to participate.

Yours faithfully,  
Mr James Ojochenemi David  
Student No. 201549487

.....  
Investigator’s Signature and Date                      (Supervisor)

**CONSENT**

I,.....(Names of participants/code) hereby confirm that I understand the content of this document and the nature of the research study, and I consent to participating in the research project. I understand that I am at the liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

.....  
Signature of Participant and Date

## APPENDIX II

### OPEN ENDED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE:

#### Questionnaire

- 1) Does the understanding of insurgency/terrorism apply to Niger Delta militancy Boko Haram insurgency, and (if so) in what degree/way?

.....  
.....  
.....

- 2) Are there any fundamental differences between Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East and Niger Delta militancy in the South-South?

.....  
.....  
.....

- 3) Do socio-economic factors play major role in both insurgency and to what degree?

.....  
.....  
.....

- 4) Does the history of Nigeria political economy have any implication for the emergence of insurgency in Nigeria regarding Boko Haram and Niger Delta militancy?

.....  
.....  
.....

- 5) How does Nigeria's political economy impinge on socio-economic life and state legitimacy issues among the populace?

.....  
.....  
.....

- 6) How do these insurgencies impact on social and economic development in Nigeria

.....  
.....  
.....

- 7) Given the records so far, is it possible to attain a peaceful and insurgency-free Nigeria through military means?

.....  
.....  
.....

- 8) In what ways can Nigeria sustainably deal with these insurgencies?

.....  
.....  
.....

## ANNEXURE A

### CANDIDATE'S ORIGINALITY DECLARATION (RESEARCH PAPERS, MINI-DISSERTATIONS, DISSERTATIONS AND THESES)

#### ORIGINALITY DECLARATION

<b>Full Names and Surname</b>	James Ojochenemi David
<b>Student Number</b>	201549487
<b>Title of dissertation/thesis</b>	<b>A Comparative Assessment of the Socio-Economic Dimension of Niger Delta Militancy Boko Haram insurgency: Towards the Security-Development Nexus in Nigeria</b>

I acknowledge that I have read and understood the University's policies and rules applicable to postgraduate research, and I certify that I have, to the best of my knowledge and belief, complied with their requirements.

I confirm that I had obtained an ethical clearance certificate for my research (Certificate Number UZREC 171110-030 PGD 2015/114) and that I have complied with the conditions set out in that certificate.

I further certify that this thesis is original, and that the material has not been published elsewhere, or submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other university, except as follows:

That this is a progression of my Master's dissertation "*the Root Causes of Terrorism: An Appraisal of the Socio-economic determinants of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria*" out of which two articles, namely, "*Is Boko Haram poverty driven*", and "*Interrogating the changing concept of terrorism*" have been co-published in the *Journal of African Renaissance* (2015), as well as a Springer Brief (Book), titled: **Boko Haram: The Socio-Economic Prism**, published by Springer (2015) during the course of the project


While the current study is partly a continuation of the above, its originality is based on the comparative analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency with the Niger Delta insurgency, and the critical exploration of the 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) counter-insurgency. These not only constitute a new dimension to the study but also its originality within the field of development studies.

*(Where part of the work has been published elsewhere, or where the work is a continuation or progression of research that was submitted for another degree, e.g. an Honours project or a MA*

*dissertation this must be stated clearly, the name of the work must be provided, and an explanation must be given regarding the extent of the current work's originality.)*

I declare that this thesis) is, save for the supervisory guidance received, the product of my own work and effort. I have, to the best of my knowledge and belief, complied with the University's Plagiarism Policy and acknowledged all sources of information in line with normal academic conventions.

I have/have not subjected the document to the University's text-matching and/or similarity checking procedures. *(One could indicate that this process applied only to some chapters or that it occurred during the course of the research and not in respect of the final product.)*

<b>Candidate's signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	17/09/2018

**ANNEXURE B**  
**SUPERVISOR'S CONSENT, WITH HOD AND DEAN'S**  
**ENDORSEMENTS, TO SUBMIT A MANUSCRIPT FOR EXAMINATION**

**CONSENT TO SUBMIT A MANUSCRIPT FOR EXAMINATION**

(To be completed separately by supervisors and co-supervisors)


I hereby confirm that the manuscript of the following candidate has been submitted for examination

- With my consent
- Without my consent, for the reasons indicated in the attached document  
*(Delete that which is not applicable, and attach document if the second option is selected)*

My consent implies that I believe that

- The candidate has complied with institutional policies, in particular the Research Ethics Policy, and the conditions, if any, specified by the University's Research Ethics Committee  The manuscript meets the required standards and is ready for assessment


My consent does not imply or guarantee that the examiners will hold a similar view and that the examination process will be successful.

<b>Full Names and Surname</b>	James Ojochenemi David
<b>Student Number</b>	201549487
<b>Degree</b>	D.Phil. Development Studies
<b>Name of Supervisor</b>	Prof John Akokpari
<b>Supervisor e-mail address</b>	<a href="mailto:john.akokpari@uct.ac.za">john.akokpari@uct.ac.za</a>
<b>Name of Co-supervisor</b>	Dr Mandla Masuku
<b>Co-supervisor e-mail address</b>	<a href="mailto:MasukuM@unizulu.ac.za">MasukuM@unizulu.ac.za</a>
<b>Title of dissertation/thesis</b>	<b>A Comparative Assessment of the Socio-Economic Dimension of Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency: Towards the Security-Development Nexus in Nigeria</b>
<b>Supervisor's signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	09 May 2019

**HEAD OF DEPARTMENT AND DEAN'S ENDORSEMENT**

To the best of my knowledge, the University Rules and the procedures stipulated in the Postgraduate Assessment Guide have been adhered to in respect of the above-mentioned candidate.			
<b>Name of HoD/Dean</b>	<b>Department/Faculty</b>	<b>Signature</b>	<b>Date</b>

## Annexure C



Reports of Boko Haram Attacks between May 2011- July 2015

Source: (USF Global Initiative 2015).