


PERCEPTIVE GENERALIZATION

When it is legitimate to describe
others, and when it is not

1905

YASMIN RUSSELL

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DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION

When it is legitimate to deceive

others, and when it is not

By

Yasmin Rugbeer

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requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND

PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

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When it is legitimate to deceive

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In this dissertation, I present the results of an analysis of the nature of deceptive communication. I examine when it is legitimate to deceive others and when it is not. The first part of the study reviews theories and literature relevant to understanding and defining deceptive communication, human perceptions values and beliefs.

I examine possible reasons why animals engage in deceptive communication. I focus on interpersonal deception; self-deception; persuasion and propaganda; nonverbal communication and people's inability to make accurate judgements of deception and ethical perspectives on deception.

Subsequent chapters describe the construction of a survey instrument employed to measure and evaluate the extent of deceptive communication among university students.

Penultimate chapters blend the insights gained from this literature review to interpret the results, obtained through the quantitative research methodology, to describe a set of conclusions and recommendations in the context of deceptive communication - when it is legitimate to deceive others and when it is not.

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
Dedication

This study is dedicated to my darling children Seema and Raoul.

May this dissertation be an inspiration to you

ETHICAL STATEMENT BY RESEARCHER

With the signature below I, Yasmin Rugbeer, hereby declare that the work that I present in this dissertation is based on my own research, and that I have not submitted this dissertation to any other institution of higher education to obtain an academic qualification.


Y. Rugbeer

15 January 2005
Date

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WRITING CONVENTIONS

I wish to draw the attention of the reader to the following conventions that I am following in this study:

1. I am using the abbreviated Harvard style of referencing, for example Gass and Seiter (2003: 49), meaning Gass and Seiter 2003, page 49.
2. I have made a conscious effort to limit the use of footnotes as far as possible in order to facilitate the uninterrupted reading of the dissertation.
3. Illustrative graphics, tables and graphs are all given as Figures 1 – 49 in their chronological sequence of appearance.
4. For commonly used terms full terms are used in headings. Acronyms are used in paragraphs.
5. In consultation with my promoter I consciously tracked down relevant information relating to deceptive communication, and included the relevant material in my dissertation, accompanied by the website address (URL) of the websites where I found the material. Such website addresses are included in my dissertation, both for verification purposes, and for acknowledging the sources of the information that I have drawn together. An example of a typical website address is: http://www.howa_rdcc.edu/profdev/resources/learning/groups1.htm. It should however be kept in mind that the Worldwide Web (WWW) is ephemeral and ever changing. It may well be that websites from which I garnered information will go offline or alter their contents over the course of time. While it is inevitable that some of the servers will shed documents, the periodic updating of files on most websites ensures the renewal of knowledge that does not happen as readily in the print media.

6. In instances where authorship could be established for website contents, or for an electronic document downloaded from websites, the author is given, followed by the website address as in Sanes (2000: <http://www.transparencynow.com/news/power.htm>). I give the URL in place of page numbers because Website contents are not paginated.

7. In the bibliography I have separated the references in authored and non-authored references and authored homepages that relate to deceptive communication. The non-authored references include websites.

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STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS, CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

THE RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

This study focuses on deception as a multifaceted and complex communication phenomenon that has been broadly conceptualised. I explore some of these conceptualisations. Deception, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 259) is a ubiquitous form of communication. Gass and Seiter (2003) state that in one study, 130 subjects were asked to record the veracity (i.e., truth) of their communication in natural situations and found that more than 61% of their subjects' overall conversations involved deception.

Skinner et al (2004: 79) state that language is important for sending and receiving messages, so too is nonverbal communication. Taking Gass and Seiter (2003) and Pease (1999) as point of departure I will make a study of nonverbal communication to illustrate the need for deliberate control of body movement and the mental energy required to fabricate a lie. Gass and Seiter (2003: 191) state that there are many categories of nonverbal communication that affect the process of persuasion. Kinesics, for instance, shows that people are generally more persuasive when they make eye contact and use facial expressions and body movements that signal relaxation and sociability.

Moreover, people make themselves appear more credible, dominant, or powerful and, in turn, affect their persuasiveness using time, artefacts or physical appearance. Various features of the voice, particularly its rate, influence how persuasive one tends to be. Gass and Seiter (2003: 169) also state that by making their words more vivid, intense, offensive, and powerless or powerful, persuaders affect the way audiences respond to their messages.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 169) declare that symbols are arbitrary, but have the power to shape perceptions and construct social reality. Symbols also have connotative and denotative meanings, both of which affect persuasion. I will also examine the power of labels and how, oftentimes, through the use of euphemisms and double-speak, persuaders attempt to lessen (or strengthen) the connotative impact of a word. I will show that ethics and persuasion are closely intertwined, and that persuasion is not inherently unethical.

Question 3: What are young people's current conceptions of the values and beliefs?

My study will focus on a group of respondents at the University of KwaZulu-Natal as a model for the values and beliefs of South African young people. (See chapter 12)

Question 4: Under what circumstances will individuals, public speakers and mass communicators lie to others?

I will focus on the nature of deceptive behaviour of individuals towards others, with particular emphasis on the communicator in small group, public and mass communication. (See chapters 7 and 8)

Question 5: To what extent are people able to make accurate judgements of deception?

I will examine how nonverbal cues, which appear to be less reliable indicators of actual deception than verbal content cues lead to people's inability to make accurate judgements of deception. (See chapter 9)

Question 6: What is the possible relationship between body movement and deception?

I will study the deliberate control of body movement and mental energy required to fabricate a lie to explain the general research finding that fewer body movements occur with deception. I will show that the lack of congruence that is likely to occur in the use of the main gestures, the body's micro signals and the spoken words do not allow us to fake our own body language. (See chapter 9)

AIMS

Based on the above-mentioned six problems the following six aims have been identified. The aims of this dissertation are:

- (a) To analyse the nature of truth and deception
- (b) To establish the relationship between what is considered to be deceptive behaviour among animals and human deceptive behaviour
- (c) To extrapolate and discern the values and beliefs of South African young people by using the conceptions of the values and beliefs of a group of respondents in the Durban district as model for the values and beliefs
- (d) To establish under what circumstances individuals, public speakers and mass communicators will lie to others

- (e) To work out to what extent people are able to make accurate judgements of deception
- (f) To determine the possible relationship between body movement and deception

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The project entails the following:

- The qualitative phase will report canonical as well as current published literature on deceptive communication
- This will be followed by a quantitative, empirical phase of study, during which a representative sample of university students from all ethnic groups in the Durban region will be surveyed by means of a questionnaire to determine what their perceptions are about deceptive communication, as well as the extent to which they engage in deceptive communication during particular interpersonal interactions with a variety of persons that form part of their communication networks
- A detailed analysis of data gathered from the returned questionnaires
- A summary of the relevant results of the survey
- Statement of recommendations based on the summary of results

VALUE OF THE RESEARCH

A study of deception performs a defensive function insofar as it educates people to become better at deception detection and more discriminating consumers of persuasive messages. Gass and Seiter (2003: 259) reveal that humans tend to be fairly inaccurate when trying to detect deception. Some research shows that the average person can detect a liar with about the same accuracy as someone flipping a coin, whereas other research presents an even less optimistic view of humans as lie detectors.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 260) add that the fact that people are not very accurate at detecting deception is unfortunate when you consider the practical and professional contexts within which accurate detection would be desirable (e.g., jurists, law officers, negotiators, customs inspectors, job interviewers, secret service and so forth).

I will present a nuanced value of deceptive communication indicating that it can be sanctioned under normal circumstances. Bok (1978: 39) explains that a lie is clearly justifiable to avert harm and

danger when a life is threatened. Bok (1978: 40) adds where innocent lives are at stake; lies are morally justified, if indeed they are lies in the first place.

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 260) deception is a form of persuasion. Even from the standpoint of pure cases of persuasion, deception involves an intentional attempt to get someone to believe what the liar knows to be false. Gass and Seiter (2003: 173) demonstrate that nonverbal communication plays an important role in creating impressions of ourselves as powerful, authoritative, credible or attractive.

My study will show that persuasion is the central feature of every sphere of human communication, and is an indispensable ingredient in a number of professions. In this regard Gass and Seiter (2003: 4) state that the so-called people-professions – politics, law, social work, counselling, business management, advertising, sales, public relations, and the ministry – might as well be called persuasion professions. Gass and Seiter (2003: 4) have similarly indicated that psychologists, demographers, artists, writers, marketers and business leaders collaborate to create messages expressly intended to shape opinions and change our behaviour.

OVERVIEW

This study focuses deceptive communication; when it is legitimate to deceive others and when it is not.

In this chapter, I state the problems that will be investigated, the aims of the research and the research methodology used to find solutions to the problems

Chapter 2 defines and discusses the key concepts relating to my research regarding deceptive communication.

In chapter 3, I discuss a theoretical framework for the study of deceptive behaviour that enables one to do research on conceptual as well as communicative aspects of deception.

In chapter 4, I focus on the process of communication showing that that current communication problems result from bias and misinformation, as well as from deliberate deception.

In chapter 5, I examine deception in animals showing that deception in animals is not intentional, but a strategy evolved for the preservation of the species.

In chapter 6, I discuss self-deception as an integral part of one's psychic defences, to be a critical constituent of normal (although not thereby desirable) personality make-up.

In chapter 7, I focus on liars' motivations for telling lies, the various deception strategies, and the complex nature of deceptive behaviours between individuals in handling everyday human relationships and in times of war.

In chapter 8 I focus on persuasion as the act of influencing the minds of others and propaganda as an expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends.

In chapter 9, I focus on the relationship between nonverbal communication and the detection of deception.

In chapter 10, I look at ethical perspectives on deception.

In chapter 11, I discuss the fieldwork that was conducted among second year students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

In chapter 12, I present and interpret the results of my research, using a series of bar graphs and pie charts.

In chapter 13, I present the conclusions of the research and make a number of recommendations regarding deceptive communication.

CONCLUSION

The problems that exist with regard to deceptive communication are stated in the first section of this chapter. Thereafter the aims of this research are stated, and the research methodology, which is used to find solutions to these problems, is indicated in order to fulfil the aims of this research. In chapter two I define the key concepts concerning deceptive communication.

KEY CONCEPTS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will define the key concepts relating to the research regarding deceptive communication. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the main concepts that I will be working with, which will be analysed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. I will discuss how deceptive processes determine human behaviour. The study will show in subsequent chapters how deception is part of ones everyday behaviour.

COMMUNICATION

Cherry (1978: 30) reports that we can communicate with one another in this world (or outside it) only in as much as we can share sign-usage. Littrell (1991: 41) defines communication as the process of conveying a message, a thought, or an idea in such a way that the message is received and understood. Through communication people share ideas, facts, opinion and feelings. According to Sternberg (1998: 483), communication can be either verbal or nonverbal. Mersham and Skinner (1999: 7) demonstrate that communication cannot take place unless all three elements of communicator, medium and recipient are present. I will show in subsequent chapters how we communicate to deceive others.

COMPLIANCE GAINING

Gass and Seiter (2003: 236) illustrate that compliance gaining generally focuses on persuasion aimed at getting others to do some thing or to act in a certain way. Compliance gaining research primarily focuses on changing behaviour. Studies on compliance gaining have concentrated on influence in interpersonal, face-to-face contexts rather than one to many contexts. Klopper (2002: 278) states that specific instances of communication can be ordered along a compliance gaining continuum that progresses from cooperation to competition to confrontation. Gass and Seiter (2003: 244) add that regardless of the type of power that is at work, one thing remains clear: power affects compliance gaining behaviour. The study will focus on the use of persuasion in compliance gaining to manipulate others.

CONCEALMENT

Caldwell (2000: 16) describes concealment as withholding important information in an effort to promote or sustain false impression. For example, s/he tells you s/he has been an insurance agent for fourteen years, but s/he fails to mention that s/he has not worked a day since s/he was laid off eight months ago. Blair et al (2001: 58) add that when the concealment strategy is in play, you can expect a lot of lies of omission. Concealment then is a deceptive strategy where a liar deliberately fails to mention important facts or bits of information about his life.

DECEPTION

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 73-74) explain that deception is a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver. Soanes (2002: 224) defines deception as the act of deceiving. Soanes (2002: 224) reports that the verb deceive is to deliberately cause to believe something false, to give a mistaken impression. Sykes (1983: 246) says that to deceive is to persuade of what is false, to mislead purposely. According to Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) to deceive means to mislead, betray, trick, take in, two-time, lie to, swindle, double-cross, con, misinform, cheat, hoodwink, defraud, dupe, delude.

DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 260) argue that deceptive communication strives for persuasive ends and is a general persuasive strategy that aims at influencing the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of others by means of deliberate message distortions (Miller and Stiff 1983: 28). According to Berger and Burgoon (1995: 73-74) deceptive communication deals with message distortion resulting from deliberate falsification or omission of information by a communicator with the intent of stimulating in another, or others, a belief that the communicator himself or herself does not believe (Miller 1983: 92-93).

DISTORTION

Blair et al (2001: 58) describe distortion as manipulation of true information through exaggeration, minimisation and equivocation such that a listener would not know all relevant aspects of the truth or would logically misinterpret the information provided. Dawson (1980: 273) defines distortion as crookedness; a perversion of the true meaning of words; deviation from natural shape or position. The deceiver leads the listener away from the truth through misrepresentation of facts.

DIVERSION

According to Caldwell (2000: 16) diversion is the redirection of a conversation, particularly when it involves direct questions. For example, you ask straightforward questions about her/his work and her/his recent divorce, and s/he changes the subject or says s/he wants to talk about you. Dawson (1980: 275) defines diversion as drawing the attention and force of an enemy from the point where the principal attack is to be made by attacking another point. Diversion is a deceptive strategy aimed at redirecting behaviour.

ETHICS

Soanes (2002: 302) says that ethics deals with the moral principles that govern a person's behaviour on how an activity is conducted. Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) defines *ethics* as the study of moral standards and how they affect conduct (takes a singular verb), a system of moral principles governing the appropriate conduct for an individual or group (takes a plural verb). Larson (1989: 30) adds that it is concerned with the type of character or conduct that is approved or disapproved of, in terms of right and wrong or good and bad. Ethics is also called moral science or moral philosophy. It is generally agreed that ethics seeks a critical grasp of the principles and standards that guide a man in making morally right choices in his daily activities. I will focus on ethical insight as intelligence in evaluation of communication events.

EXAGGERATION

Caldwell (2000: 16) describes exaggeration as the embellishment and inflation of story elements to enhance a personal position or create a false impression. For example, s/he tells you s/he is a senior manager for an electronics manufacturer, but s/he is actually a clerk in the shipping department. Soanes (2002: 306) and Dawson (1980: 331) define exaggeration as an overshowment; a representation of things beyond the truth, to make (something) seem greater than in reality. Exaggeration as a deception strategy seeks to create false ideas in the listener.

FALSIFICATION

According to Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) *falsification* is the alteration of documents or evidence for the purposes of deception. Synonyms include distortion, forgery, fiddling, misrepresentation, deception and alteration. Caldwell (2000: 16) describes falsifications as deliberate statements of false information. For example, he could claim he was the captain of the varsity football

squad, but he has never seen the inside of a college classroom, let alone the team's locker room. Falsification, then, is wilful misstatement or misrepresentation.

FRAUD

Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) defines fraud as the crime of obtaining money or some other benefit by deliberate deception; somebody who deliberately deceives people by imitation or impersonation; something that is intended to deceive people. According to Burchell and Milton (1999: 579), fraud is the unlawful and intentional making of a misrepresentation, which causes actual prejudice or is potentially prejudicial. Fraud then, according to Soanes (2002: 354), is criminal deception intended to gain money or personal advantage.

HALLUCINATIONS

Soanes (2002: 405) describes hallucination as seeing something, which is not actually present. Slade and Bentall (1988: 23) define hallucination as any precept-like experience which occurs in the absence of an appropriate stimulus, has the full force or impact of the corresponding actual (real) perception, and is not amenable to direct and voluntary control by the experiencer. Wolman (1992: 138) adds that hallucination is perception without external stimulation, such as seeing ghosts and hearing voices. A hallucinating patient is unable to distinguish his inner fears, wishes, and dreams from the outer world. I will examine how during this type of sensory deception a person's ability in reality testing is lost.

ILLUSIONS

Caldwell (2000: 49) informs that when the illusion strategy is in play, the emphasis will be on lies of commission – a liar's deliberate misstatement of fact. Caldwell (2000: 95-97) adds that part of a romantic liar's skill in fostering an illusion comes from her/his ability to string together the right markers in the right situations. Markers can come in response to a direct question from you or they can be dropped into a conversation in a seemingly spontaneous fashion. Somebody tells you where s/he grew up, where s/he went to school, where s/he lives, what s/he does for a living – those are markers. Depending on the nature and extent of the impression s/he is trying to foster, a liar may rely on props, settings or even a friend or two in any number of combinations to keep the deception going.

IMPOSTOR

Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) and Soanes (2002: 450) define an impostor as somebody who pretends to be another; somebody who pretends to be somebody else in order to deceive or cheat. The underlying sense is of “putting on” a false identity. Sykes (1983: 502) defines an impostor as one who assumes a false character or passes himself off as someone else, a swindler. Synonyms of impostor include imposter, pretender, fake, fraud, sham, pseudo and role player. An impostor is therefore one who engages in deception under an assumed name or identity

INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION

Buller and Burgoon (1996: 203) describe interpersonal deception as the process whereby communication senders attempt to manipulate messages so as to be untruthful, which may cause them apprehension concerning their false communication being detected. Simultaneously, communication receivers try to unveil or detect the validity of that information, causing suspicion about whether or not the sender is being deceitful.

LEAKAGE

Gass and Seiter (2003: 264-265) state that parts of our bodies that typically communicate little information reveal the most when we are being deceptive. In other words, because we are concentrating so much on our faces, deception “leaks” from other parts of our bodies. Leakage therefore refers to unconscious nonverbal cues that give us away when we try to deceive.

LIAR

Dawson (1980: 531) defines a liar as one who knowingly utters falsehoods. Breazeale (1988: 81) describes the liar as a person who uses the valid designation, the words, in order to make something, which is unreal appear to be real. He says, for example, “I am rich,” when the proper designation for his condition would be “poor”. Bok (1978: 32) indicates that every liar says the opposite of what he thinks in his heart, with the purpose to deceive. Buller and Burgoon (1996) add that lying happens in a dynamic interaction where liar and listener dance around one another, changing their thoughts in response to each other’s moves. Lying involves deliberately deceiving or fooling someone.

MISREPRESENTATION

Burchell and Milton (1999: 581-584) define misrepresentation is an incorrect statement of fact or law made by one person to another. Though misrepresentation is usually made by words, it may be

made and is often made, by conduct alone, or by words and conduct. A fraudster may make a misrepresentation by nodding or shaking his head, using certain stationery, conducting business in a certain manner and disguising merchandise. Other forms of misrepresentation include silence, opinion, the law, and exaggeration. Misrepresentation is a communication strategy aimed at deception.

MORALITY

Encarta World English Dictionary (1999) defines morality as standards of conduct that are accepted as right or proper, standards of conduct that are accepted as right or proper, the rightness or wrongness of something as judged by accepted moral standards. Bennideen (2001: 15) states that morality is thought of as a set of rules (precepts, sanctions) governing behaviour. Moral development then, is the process by which a person comes to accept the set of rules. The source, character and role of morality vary in relation to the individual and the society to which the individual belongs. I will examine morality issues in deceptive communication events.

MORAL REASONING

According to Braeden and Arbuthnot (1981: 5-6) many of the important decisions in our lives are moral ones, i.e. we are often faced with dilemmas which require that we make a judgement about what we "ought" to do in a situation. Braeden and Arbuthnot go on to point out that, given the same situation, different people will arrive at different decisions about what the "right" course of action is. The very reasoning process, by which many individuals may reach their decisions, is known as moral reasoning. My study will examine when it is legitimate to deceive others and when it is not.

NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION

According to Williams (1992: 395) nonverbal communication refers to meaningful sounds or patterns of voice, gestures, facial expressions, bodily postures, and even objects, symbols, or designs that go beyond the formal language system. Sternberg (1998: 485) states that nonverbal communication is a subtle, yet powerful means of getting across a message. Also included are grooming habits, body positioning in space, and consumer product design (e.g., clothing cues, food products, artificial colours and tastes, engineered aromas, media images and computer-graphic displays). Nonverbal communication is an integral part of deceptive communication

OMISSION

Blair et al (2001: 58) describe omission as the withholding of all references to relevant information. Omission can also be used as a deliberate way of concealing. Quotes out of context and half-truths are very hard to detect. Political examples of omission include cover-ups, censorship, book-burning, and managed news. Receivers, too, can omit: can "filter out" or be closed minded or prejudiced. Omission then, is a deceptive communication strategy aimed at manipulating and concealing.

PERSUASION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 34) and Williams (1992: 395) describe persuasion as the attempt to influence another person's beliefs, attitudes, or actions through communication. People use communication in order to persuade others to think in the way that they do or to act in the way that they do. Persuasion is more common than we may realise and is not confined to flamboyant examples of advertising. One may want to persuade someone to loan one some money, or join ones drama group, or help one with repairing one's car. It is true that the word persuasion has a certain sense of manipulation – to get what one wants. In this sense we are all manipulators everyday.

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda in the broadest sense, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 11), Laswell (1995: 13) and Sykes (1983: 825), is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations. These representations may take spoken, written, pictorial or musical form. Both advertising and publicity fall within the field of propaganda. Gass and Seiter and Laswell then add that many official acts of legislation and administration can be seen as acts of propaganda, promoting the objectives of the state. Propaganda, then, is manipulation by the spreading of subversive, debatable or merely novel attitudes.

SELF-DECEPTION

Self-deception requires the self to be a deceiver. Goleman (1998b: 23) states that the inattention to painful truths shields us from anxiety. According to Gergen (1985: 228) intuitively modelling our insight on the deceiving of others, self-deception is to engage in an act, or be in a state, of deliberate and self-caused falsehood. Thus it is to have good reasons to believe something, and yet manipulate our belief system in such a way that we deny it, or — in the most rigorous account — affirm its opposite: thus, it is to believe something on good evidence and yet to refuse to avow it.

SEMIOTICS

Eco (1987: 8) explains that semiotics studies all cultural processes as processes of communication. Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything that can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. The notion of sign lies at the heart of semiotics. This something does not necessarily have to exist or to be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands for it. Semiotics is an enormously broad approach to understanding such matters as meaning, cognition, culture, and behaviour, even life itself. Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything that can be used in order to lie.

SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Gass and Seiter (2003: 127) reveal that families, peer groups, workplaces, even classrooms exert strong pressure on their members to behave in certain ways. Groups are a powerful persuasive force. Gass and Seiter (2003: 130) explain that we have a desire to be right and we conform to a group because we think the group may be correct. At other times when we know that the group is wrong, we may conform so that we gain rewards (e.g., liking) and avoid punishment (e.g., scorn) that are associated with agreement and disagreement. My study will focus on social influence as a means of manipulation and persuasion.

STEGANOGRAPHY

Dawson (1980: 887) defines steganography as the art of writing in cipher or secret characters. Therefore, a fundamental requirement of a steganographic system is that the hidden message carried by stego media should not be sensible to human beings. Steganographic techniques strive to hide the very presence of the message itself from an observer. One less confusing name for steganography would be data hiding. It should be understood that steganography is orthogonal to encryption, and it may be combined with encryption to achieve a higher level of security. The goal of steganography, then, according to Melton (1996: 168), is covert communication.

TRUTH

Soanes (2002: 982) describes truth as a fact or belief that is accepted as true. Bok (1978: 3) says that like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an illusionary ideal. Microsoft Encarta Reference Library (2002) states that truth is conformity: adherence to a standard or law. Truth is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. In other words, our institutions and schools of thought, our universities and charismatic leaders, our ministers, our parents, our teachers, all of these collaborate to create a

context in which something is established as "true." Truth emerges only within a structure of rules that control the language, the discourse and presents itself as the product of discursive practices.

TRUTH BIAS

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 81) define truth bias as a tendency of people to judge a relational partner's behaviour as truthful. As relationships become more intimate, people develop a level of trust in their partner that leads them to judge a partner's behaviour as truthful. Therefore, the truth bias was introduced as a behavioural bias, a tendency to judge a partner as truthful, which reflects the presumption of honesty that accompanies the development of many relationships. Truth bias, according to Caldwell (2000: 43), is our persistent expectation that people will tell the truth, no matter what the circumstance.

TSOTSITAAL

Molamu (2003: xiii) notes that Tsotsitaal is a unique mix of almost all the eleven official languages in South Africa and is spoken predominantly in the African townships around the Vaal Triangle in present-day Gauteng. Tsotsitaal was originally born as a verbal medium to remain one step ahead of White state authorities. A *Tsotsi* is a thug or a gangster, and *taal* is an Afrikaans word for language. Tsotsitaal and Iscamtho have also come about through language contact. Tsotsitaal came into use as coded language so that victims would not realise they were being targeted by gang members.

UNDERSTATEMENT

Caldwell (2000: 16) describes an understatement as minimising or downplaying significant events in somebody's personal history. For example, s/he tells you s/he went through a messy divorce, but s/he does not say anything about the restraining orders her/his ex-partner took out on her/him. Dawson (1980: 997) defines an understatement as a statement conveying less than the truth.

VALUES AND VALUE SYSTEMS

Wela (2001: 39) states that values are learnt slowly in various situations, and the choices we make later determine our values. Individual value systems are the primary form of value systems. Currently values are taken as set emotionally by the brain and are relative to objects or things, or groups of them. When an evaluation is done, the internal features of the object are identified and then their value is judged. That then becomes a standard for future behaviour. My study on deceptive

communication will assess how we evaluate deceptive communication strategies across a spectrum of events in our lives.

WHITE LIES

Bok (1978: 58) defines a white lie as a falsehood not meant to injure anyone, and of little moral import. Many small subterfuges may not be intended to mislead. They are only white lies in the most marginal sense. For example, the many social exchanges: “How nice to see you!” or “Cordially yours!” and other polite expressions are so much taken for granted that if someone decided, in the name of total honesty, not to employ them, he might well give the impression of an indifference he did not possess. The justification for continuing to use such accepted formulations is that they deceive no one, except possibly those unfamiliar with the language. My study will examine the use of white lies in our daily discourse.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I defined the key concepts relating to the research regarding deceptive communication. I described the key elements of the communication process in deceptive communication. In subsequent chapters, I will discuss how each of these concepts forms an important part of deceptive communication. In chapter 3 I will focus on the theoretical framework concerning deceptive communication.

THEORETICAL GROUNDING FOR DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will explain that conceptual blending accounts for a person's cognitive capacity to interrelate and blend concepts extracted from his vast conceptual network of knowledge. I will show that deception is considered as a mainly vocal and strategic communicative act, an emblematic example of adapting behaviour in the management of interpersonal relationships. I will focus on theories of deception and persuasion. I will illustrate that we can apply Interpersonal Deception Theory to explore aspects of deception in human-computer interaction and computer-mediated communication. In this chapter I show that interpersonal deceptive communication is such a complex event it cannot be analysed by the phenomenological model and therefore needs an Interpretivist model.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND INTERPRETIVIST THEORIES

Human behaviour is extremely complex and not susceptible to the formulation of predictive rules that one can use in the natural sciences. Klopper (1999b) points out that theories of knowledge can broadly be classified into phenomenological theories and interpretivist theories. According to Klopper phenomenological theories are based on the assumption that one primarily has to make a detailed observation of phenomena and systematically describe one's observations in order to give a good account of how things are and interrelate in nature. Interpretivist theories assert that human existence and the activities, in which humans engage, are more complex than might be initially seem the case. An interpretivist worldview considers all knowledge to be socially constructed from subjective experience and inference. Knowledge is given value by individuals or groups of people when it meets their needs for a particular situation therefore its meaning and significance can only be understood from within their social context. In this chapter I take an interpretivist point of departure to give an account of current theories of how people use deception in their communication with each other.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND INTERPRETIVISM

Gass and Seiter (2003: 114-115) state that people attempt to make sense of their world by using constructs. *Constructs* are perceptual categories (e.g., fat/thin, popular/unpopular, strong/weak) that we use when evaluating everything from professors to textbooks, to music to arguments. Constructs can be

compared to eyeglasses; just as you see things differently depending on whether you are wearing thick or thin lenses, the constructs you use affect the manner in which you perceive the world. For instance, someone who evaluates you on the sole basis of whether you are Christian or non-Christian will see you much differently than someone who uses more constructs (such as kind or cruel, shy or extroverted, happy or sad, playful or serious, emotional or stoic) to evaluate you. People who use a large number of different and abstract constructs that are well integrated are known as *cognitively complex*, whereas those who use fewer and less abstract constructs are cognitively simple.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 114-115) state that research also shows that people high in need for cognition are persuaded differently than their brain-relaxing counterparts. Although people high in need for cognition pay close attention to messages, evaluating and scrutinising all the time, people low in need for cognition are less motivated to attend to messages and are persuaded by peripheral cues instead. If you are high in need for cognition, you are persuaded by quality arguments. If you are low in need for cognition, you may be persuaded by an attractive speaker, a lot of examples, or a snappy-sounding sales pitch, even if the arguments used are weak.

An interpretivist/constructivist explanation of how humans perceive their environment

According to Klopper (1999a: 292-295), we use personal mental models to conceptualise the natural order of things. Our everyday perceptions of how things are differ markedly from the mental model of reality that science reveals to us. These models are based on each individual's perception of environment and are structured according to set cognitive principles. In the course of the 20th century humanity has formulated a number of theories of knowledge to give an account for our understanding of reality.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF MENTAL SPACES

Spruyt (2003: 239) states that a basic point of departure is the theory on the construction of mental spaces, which corresponds with the understanding of a sentence within a context. These spaces can be pictures, beliefs, anticipations, stories, prepositional realities and thematic or quantified domains of situations in time and space. Each space is a version of a logical, coherent situation or potential reality, where it is accepted that several propositions are true, that objects exist and that there are relations between objects (i.e., thematic roles like agent, patient, route, goal, etc). One typical example of deceptive communication is when we ascribe different roles to persons and things than the real roles they fulfil during actual interactions. The approach that Spruyt documents, and utilises, forms the basis of Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) theory of conceptual blending.

CONCEPTUAL BLENDING

Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) theory of conceptual blending is a prominent theory of how humans interrelate and integrate concepts while they gain new insights about their environment. According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46-47) conceptual blending accounts for a person's cognitive capacity to interrelate and blend concepts extracted from his vast conceptual network of knowledge. It is a symbolisation process that selectively interrelates concepts from two separate cognitive domains, a source space and a target space to conceptualise a new perceived relationship known as a blended space. The process is used in the perception of all kinds of symbolic interrelationships. Taking Fauconnier and Turner (2002) as point of departure Klopfer (2003: 293) explains that one extracts apparently unrelated, but comparable concepts from one's broad domains of knowledge by associating them with one another in two smaller sets of knowledge. These smaller sets are termed source and target spaces. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 217) call them input spaces in the theory.

People in different disciplines have different ways of thinking. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 17) stress that the adult and child do not think alike. The mind of the genius differs from that of the average person and that automatic thinking, of the sort we do when reading a simple sentence, is far beneath the imaginative thinking that goes on during the writing of a poem.

Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 21) explain that the general purpose of conceptual blending is to understand that which is new or abstract in terms of that which is known or concrete. The act of blending entails that we analogically equate entities that we generally consider to be different in significant respects by focusing on unexpected similarities between them. It is the unexpected similarities that enable us to project the features of the concrete entity onto the abstract entity, thereby arriving at a new understanding or blend of the abstract entity. According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 217) people pretend, imitate, lie, fantasize, deceive, delude, consider alternatives, simulate, make models, and propose hypotheses. Our species has an extraordinary ability to operate mentally on the unreal, and this ability depends on our capacity for advanced conceptual integration.

Klopfer (2003: 301) says that humans reconceptualise the basic constituents of meaning all the time. When a prominent official in the Republican Administration of the United States of America, spoke on CNN in 2001 shortly after the September 11 attacks on the USA, he said: *We will drain the swamp where they are hiding and eradicate them!* He essentially reclassified human opponents as nonhuman ones, implying that their attacks on the USA were inhuman. In Fauconnier and Turner's terminology, this amounts to a compression of two separate outer space lexical categories (*human being* and *nonhuman life form*) into a new category (*inhuman human*). Kenneth Bigley was kidnapped on 16 September 2004.

When the Iraqis captured him, he was paraded like the Iraqi prisoners of war, kept in a dog cage, and then beheaded.

It is when we switch role relationships that we are dealing with deception. Those in power engage in deceptive communication to garner support. The particular politician appeals to the value and belief systems of the people when he equates humans to nonhuman life forms. When we have to decide between right and wrong we are engaged in value judgements. Human beings assign semantic roles to people and things regarding specific events they are thinking about. We refer to the events, the role relationships that are identified and the participants as the scenario. During counterfactual blending, we can envision multiple scenarios and a typical example is when somebody intentionally alters any of the meaning relationships that relate to a particular scenario. Agents can ascribe a different role than was actually played, a different action to what the person actually did, and they can also state the person used a particular type of instrument rather than the one that was actually used. They can also claim that any number of individuals participated in the event rather than the group that actually did. People can also claim that the event took place at a different time than when it actually did. A different cause could be ascribed to the event than the actual human motivation to do the event. It is whenever these meaningful constituents of an event are altered that we have deceptive behaviour and therefore deceptive communication. These are all elements of deceptive communication.

COUNTERFACTUAL BLENDS

Klopper (2003: 319) states that counterfactual blends are instances of blending where vital relations are selectively compressed and projected to two alternate blended inner spaces, rendering alternate interpretations as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Counterfactual blends project alternate blended spaces from the same input spaces Klopper (2003: 319)

It is whenever meaningful constituents of an event are altered that we have deceptive communication. A man may approach a driver with his hands outstretched depicting a beggar, and when within close proximity, may suddenly pull out a knife. By projecting a role as a beggar, the man has engaged in covert communication catching the driver off guard so that he could assume his role as thief and rob the driver of his possessions.

Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 87) state that conceptualisation always has counterfactuality available and typically uses it as a basic resource. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 230-231 use “counterfactual” to mean that one space has forced incompatibility with respect to another. Any integration network has implicit counterfactual spaces attached to several of the “actual” spaces we are focussing on. Expressions like “safe beach”, “fake gun”, and “If Clinton were the *Titanic*,” pointedly require us to build counterfactual spaces and to deploy a precise mapping scheme. Counterfactuals are a good exemplar of double-scope blending because the oppositions between the spaces are so manifest. One cannot overstate the importance of counterfactuals in human life.

Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 299) state that humans reconceptualise the basic constituents of meaning all the time. Recategorisation is an important conceptual underpinning for misleading someone else. In the sentence: “I did not eat a piece of the pie, *Raoul* did,” by substituting one agent for another, one intends to redirect the fellow communicator to other individuals, and thereby to mislead her/him about what really happened.

Counterfactual blends relate to alternate scenarios in role relationships. In the deceptive communication scenario, the deceiver sets out as benefactor, attaching a role of benefactor to himself, while intending to hurt the victim. Alternatively, when one is accused of lying, a particular role has been assigned to one – the role of a liar. However, if one has to deny the accusation, then one assigns a different role to oneself – the role of innocent victim.

Counterfactuality is also the name given to ambiguity, which includes the barefaced, or the blatant lie. In the movie *Catch Me If You Can* the lead character deceived a multitude of people by assuming the role of a pilot, a doctor, a lawyer and a history professor, cashing more than \$2.5 million in fraudulent cheques in 26 countries. His life of crime as a conman requires him to assume various

roles to dupe people, but after his arrest he assumes the role of one who assists the FBI in spotting fraudulent cheques.

Deception relates to moral reasoning, the ability to decide what is “right” and “wrong”, “good” and “bad”. Moral reasoning is part of our daily thought processes, allowing one has to weigh whether what one is doing is harmful to another or not.

Klopper (2003: 320) states that dual scope blends are characteristic of jokes, puns, riddles and parables, all of which evoke emotions in the experiencers, and all of which involve value judgements.

Complex blending in language

Even very simple constructions in language depend upon complex blending. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 25-27) state that it is natural to think that adjectives assign fixed properties to nouns, such that “The cow is brown” assigns the fixed property *brown* to *cow*. By the same token, there should be a fixed property associated with the adjective “safe” that is assigned to any noun it modifies. Yet consider the unremarkable uses of “safe” in the context of a child playing on the beach with a shovel: “The child is safe,” “The beach is safe,” “The shovel is safe.” There is no fixed property that “safe” assigns to *child*, *beach*, *shovel*. The first statement means the child will not be harmed, but so do the second and third – they do not mean that the beach or the shovel will not be harmed (although they could in some other context). “Safe” does not assign property but, rather, prompts us to evoke scenarios of danger appropriate for the noun and the context. We worry about whether the child will be harmed by being on the beach or by using the shovel. Technically, the word “safe” evokes an abstract frame of *danger* with roles like victim, location and instrument. Modifying the noun with the adjective prompts us to integrate that abstract frame of *danger* and the specific situation of the child on the beach into a counterfactual event of *harm* to the child. We build a specific imaginary scenario of harm in which child, beach and shovel are assigned to roles in the danger frame. Instead of assigning a simple property, the adjective is prompting us to a frame of danger with the specific situation of the child on the beach with a shovel. This blend is the imaginary scenario in which the child is harmed. The word “safe” implies a disanalogy between this counterfactual blend and the real situation, with respect to the entity designated by the noun. If the shovel is safe, it is because in the counterfactual blend it is sharp enough to cause injury but in the real situation it is too dull to cut.

Moral intelligence in young people

Bennideen (2001: 83-85) states that young adolescence can be a troubling stage of life. The moral intelligence of the young adolescent is often overlooked. Moral intelligence consists of the

personal, social, mental, emotional, and moral skills that make up solid character and guide moral behaviours. It is the capacity to understand right from wrong. Being morally intelligent means to have strong ethical convictions and to act on them so that one behaves in the right and honourable way. Moral intelligence is what a young adolescent needs most to counter negative pressures and do what's right with or without adult guidance.

Bennideen (2001: 83) states that if moral behaviour is imitated, moral character can be learned. An adolescent growing up in a criminal environment for instance can learn criminal ways, even if her/his parents are not criminals (i.e. he has no genes related to criminal behaviour). This would be the behaviour that he is exposed to, this is the type of behaviour he may learn is right and this is the type of behaviour he may consider worth imitating. If his parents do not teach him that criminal behaviour is wrong, the genes that he has inherited from his family may be overpowered by memes related to criminal behaviour – as he sees, he imitates. The adolescent then, having learnt that criminal behaviour is acceptable in his environment, can become a criminal too. In order to ensure young people acquire strong moral habits and beliefs, parents must intentionally model, reinforce, and teach virtues and habits. Unless they do, chances are young people would not acquire them, and they will be left morally defenceless. If young people are treated morally and are deliberately taught moral skills and beliefs, researchers say chances are high they will become moral. Moral-building endeavours must be continuous and not stopped during teenage years when it is often erroneously believed that children's moral growth has stopped.

THE SOMATIC MARKER HYPOTHESIS

One aspect of deceptive communication is to get a person into a particular mind state so that they are unaware of being distracted. Through covert actions one can distract an unsuspecting victim to such an extent that in their particular mind state they are totally unaware of being duped. A hypothetical case could be where a boy, Jack, sitting next to his mate, John, covertly gets him to talk animatedly about his favourite sport, soccer. Placed in front of the boys are two large glasses of milkshake. Jack surreptitiously takes a sip from John's glass while alternately sipping from his own. This deceptive behaviour allows Jack the opportunity to indulge in drinking not only his share, but also to see how much of his friend's drink he could finish without the deception being discovered. In this case Jack has been manipulating the emotions of John so that he could deceive him.

Emotion plays an important role in conceptual blending and memory formation. We typically deceive others because we want them to be in a particular mind state. When people discover they have been deceived, they change from being trusting to being distrustful and angry. The somatic marker

hypothesis relates to the fact that memories are laid down while we are being deceived, and this becomes part of our long-term memory. The somatic marker hypothesis gives a credible account of how people can become distrustful of other people.

Magicians engage in deception by manipulating visual and auditory cues, and keeping their audiences in a state of cognitive puzzlement.

According to Damasio (1996) the somatic marker hypothesis accounts for people's emotional reactions to events. The hypothesis states that one's long-term memory holds not only of the factual contents of an event, but also the emotive state that one experiences as part of such an event. Damasio describes the role of two emotion-processing centres, situated in the two frontal lobes of the human neocortex, and shows that through their involvement emotive mind-body states are intimately involved in concept-forming processes like understanding, planning, critical thinking, self-evaluation and finally in remembering past events. During pleasant events, pleasing emotive states are experienced, and co-indexed as part of the long-term memories of the events. After experiencing unpleasant events, one associates negative emotions as part of the long-term memories of such events.

Klopper (1999a: 304), states that humans experience three basic types of body-state emotive markings, namely unpleasant emotions, neutral emotions, and pleasant emotions. Because unpleasant and pleasant emotions are intimately linked to the human drive for survival they readily spring to the foreground in our consciousness. You immediately know (remember) whether you like or detest a person every time you come across him.

Klopper adds that memories that are formed of everyday events are somatically marked with a subtle, neutral emotive body state. Such memories usually operate in the background. Upon remembering such an event one will experience a hardly noticeable feeling of well-being, a feeling that all is OK.

According to Klopper (1999b) conceptual equivalents of somatically marked memory can be clearly seen in both language structure and narration. The particular lexeme that a person selects from a range of lexemes reflects somatic marking. One can make an error, make a mistake, foul something up or screw something. A female human being can be a goddess, an angel, a lady, a woman, a tart or a bitch. Food can taste divine, like manna, delicious, scrumptious, nice, all right, bland, funny, bad or horrible.

NATHAN'S PARABLE AS A TEST OF THE THEORY OF CONCEPTUAL BLENDING

Klopper (1999b: 292-326) uses Nathan's parable in Turner (1996) as the ideal narrative to test Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual blending. Klopper establishes that reading the events before and after Nathan's visit to King David along with the parable, we have a surprisingly frank account of how David lusted after the wife (Bathsheba) of one of his subjects (Uriah) and how he made her pregnant. We read how he had the hapless man assassinated so that he could take her as one of his wives, and finally how he repented and accepted his punishment when confronted with his deceit. It is a compact but powerful tale of deceit, repentance and forgiveness. Precisely the elements required demonstrating how we blend a variety of mental spaces while interpreting narratives. Klopper shows how a variety of mental spaces interact in the process of interpreting the parable that Nathan told to David.

Nathan tells the parable to David, who assumes he has got away with deception. When listening to the parable, David assumes the role of king as judge and pronounces a verdict as if the accused and the disadvantaged are unknown third parties. Nathan, however, leads David to understand that he has ascribed the wrong semantic roles to the parties. He, David, is not the judge, but the accused. God is the judge.

Bathsheba is the ewe-lamb and Uriah is the disadvantaged party, not only because David estranged his wife from him, but also because he lost his life in the process. David therefore stands doubly accused of adultery and murder.

A critical analysis of Fauconnier and Turner's conceptual blending model shows that it is an appropriate framework to account for a person's cognitive capacity to interrelate and blend concepts extracted from his vast conceptual network of knowledge, and to use counterfactual reasoning to conceptualise alternate scenarios of which one could be the true state of affairs, while the other one is a plausible, but false state of affairs. However, it needs to be adapted in order to account for forms of nonverbal communication, which accompany and contextualise verbal communication.

COMPLIANCE GAINING

Gass and Seiter (2003: 236-255) state that a distinction has to be made between persuasion and compliance gaining. Persuasion, an umbrella term, is concerned with changing beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations and behaviour. Compliance is more restrictive, typically referring to changes in a person's overt behaviour. For example, a mother might tell her 10-year old son, "Take the trash out." If the child says, "I don't want to," the mother might respond, "I don't care what you want. Take out the

trash!" In this case the mother is not concerned with belief or attitude change. She does not care if the child likes taking out the trash, believes in recycling, and so on. She just wants compliance or behaviour change (i.e., the trash taken out). Research examining compliance gaining generally focuses on persuasion aimed at getting others to do something or to act in a particular way.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 236-255) state that compliance gaining differs from more traditional notions of persuasion in a number of important ways. First, for the most part, studies of compliance gaining have concentrated on influence in interpersonal, face-to-face contexts rather than one-to-many contexts. Moreover, the emphasis has primarily been on "senders" rather than "receivers". That is, whereas traditional research has concerned itself with identifying what strategies are most effective, studies on compliance gaining have attempted to identify which strategies are most likely to be used by a persuader. Compliance gaining research focuses on what people do when they want to get something.

Klopper (2002: 278) states that compliance gaining ranges in a continuum from cooperation to competition to confrontation. Gass and Seiter (2003: 237) state that Marwell and Schmitt (1967), after examining past research and theory in the areas of power and influence, identified five basic compliance-gaining strategies:

- *Rewarding activity*: involves compliance in an active and positive way (e.g., using promises)
- *Punishing activity*: involves seeking compliance in an explicitly negative way (e.g., making threats)
- *Expertise*: involves attempts to make a person think that the persuader has some special knowledge (e.g., trying to appear credible)
- *Activation of impersonal commitments*: involves attempts to appeal to a person's internalised commitments (e.g., telling the person s/he will feel bad about herself/himself if s/he does not comply)
- *Activation of personal commitments*: relies on appeals to a person's commitment to others (e.g., pointing out that the person is indebted and should, therefore, comply to repay the favour).

The study showed that there is a wide range of tactics available to persuaders. It was an important study because it became the springboard for compliance-gaining studies that followed.

THEORIES OF DECEPTION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 262-263) explain that several theories of deception have been proposed that provide an understanding of the types of behaviours that are typical of liars. The following sections discuss each of these perspectives.

The Four-Factor Model

Gass and Seiter (2003: 262) reveal that rather than simply list all of the things that people do when telling lies, the Four-Factor Model, tries to explain the underlying processes governing deceptive behaviour. In other words, rather than tell us what people do when lying, the model tries to tell us why people behave differently when lying than when telling the truth. According to the model, the four factors that influence behaviour when lying are arousal, attempted control, felt emotions and cognitive effort.

First, the model assumes that people are more aroused or anxious when telling lies than when telling the truth. This is also the principle on which the polygraph operates. We know that results from polygraphs are inadmissible in courts because they are not 100 percent accurate. This is because a sociopath, for instance, who feels no remorse for murder, certainly will not get anxious when lying. Even so, not all people are sociopaths. We know that many people do feel anxious when they lie; perhaps they fear getting caught. Perhaps telling the lie reminds them of information they want hidden. Perhaps they are simply motivated to succeed in the deceptive task. Whatever the case, we know that such arousal can lead to certain behaviours during deception. Poker players, for example, are said to wear sunglasses because their pupils dilate when they get a good hand. Similarly, pupil dilation can be a reliable indicator of deception.

Other arousal cues can also accompany deception. A few that researchers have investigated include speech errors, speech hesitations, word-phrase repetitions, increased adaptors (e.g., finger fidgeting), eye blinks, vocal pitch and leg movements.

Secondly, Gass and Seiter (2003: 264-265) add that because people do not want to get caught telling lies, the Four-Factor Model argues that they try to control their behaviours when lying. According to the sending capacity hypothesis, when we tell lies, we try to control our behaviours, but, in the process, tend to pay more attention to some parts of our bodies than others. Because it is difficult to monitor all parts of our bodies, we try to control these parts that communicate the most information, such as our faces. But, while busy monitoring our faces, we tend to forget about those parts that communicate little information such as our legs and feet.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 264-265) state that those parts of our bodies that typically communicate little information reveal the most when we are being deceptive. In other words, because we are concentrating so much on our faces, deception “leaks” from other parts of our bodies. At least some research tends to support this notion. For example, one study found that people who watched liars’ heads and faces (higher sending capacity) were less accurate at detecting deception than people who watched liars’ bodies (lower sending capacity). Moreover, in a summary of more than 30 studies in which judges tried to detect others’ deception from either single channels (i.e., only the face, body, tone of voice, or words of the liar) or from particular channel combinations, researchers found that in all conditions in which judges relied on facial cues, detection accuracy was lower. This study also concluded that when judges paid more attention to what liars were saying, they were more accurate at deception detection than when verbal channels were unavailable.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 264-265) state that in addition to arousal and attempted control, the Four-Factor Model asserts that affective factors influence our behaviours when telling lies. In our culture deception is generally frowned on. Children are taught that “the truth shall set them free”, “honesty is the best policy”, “what tangled webs are weaved”, and often chide one another with rhymes such as “liar, liar, pants on fire”. We grow up with stories about “Honest Abe” Lincoln and George “I cannot tell a lie” Washington. It is no surprise then, that deceptive behaviour would be associated with negative emotions such as guilt. It is because of these negative effects that when compared to truthful communicators, deceivers display fewer nods, smiles, and other interest statements and make more disparaging remarks. We should note, however, that not all deception is associated with negative emotions. Liars might also experience “duping delight” as the result of facing or successfully meeting the challenge of deceiving another person.

Finally, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 264-265), the Four-Factor Model asserts that cognitive factors play a role in the way people behave when lying. Stated differently, lying requires you to think a lot harder than telling the truth does. It is easy to tell a story about something you have heard or experienced. When you lie, however, you are oftentimes required to “make things up as you go along”. Not only that, you have to be careful not to contradict something you have said before (liars need a good memory). Because lying requires extra cognitive effort, it is no wonder that researchers have hypothesized that liars, compared to people telling the truth, would take a longer time to respond, pause more when speaking, and deliver messages with few specifics.

Interpersonal Deception Theory

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 265-266) Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon (1996) is by far the most comprehensive summary of deception research. Its goal is to view deception as an interactional phenomenon in which both senders and receivers are involved, simultaneously encoding and decoding messages over time. The liar's and the detector's goals, expectations and knowledge affect their thoughts and behaviours in an interaction. In turn, such thoughts and behaviours affect how accurately lies are detected and whether liars suspect that they are suspected. Interpersonal Deception Theory argues that a liar's communication consists of both intentional (strategic) attempts to appear honest and unintentional (non-strategic) behaviours that are beyond the liar's control.

First, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 265-266), Interpersonal Deception Theory says that, to avoid being detected, liars strategically create messages with certain characteristics. For instance, liars might:

1. *Manipulate the information in their messages* in order to dissociate themselves from the message (e.g., liars might refer to themselves very little so they distance themselves from the responsibility of their statements), convey uncertainty or vagueness (because creating messages with a lot of specific details would increase the likelihood of detection), or withhold information (e.g., liars might create brief messages)
2. *Strategically control their behaviour* to suppress deception cues (e.g., liars might withdraw by gazing or nodding less than people telling the truth)
3. *Manage their image* by smiling or nodding to make themselves appear more credible

Gass and Seiter (2003: 265-266) add that during interactions, deceivers continue to adapt their behaviours, thereby supporting the notion that some deceptive behaviours are strategic.

Secondly, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 265-266), although liars try to control their behaviours strategically, they also exhibit some non-strategic communication. In other words, some behaviours "leak out" beyond the liar's awareness or control. As noted previously in the Four-Factor Model, such communication might result from arousal (e.g., blinks, pupil dilation, vocal nervousness, speech errors, leg and body movements, and shorter responses) or negative emotions (e.g., less nodding, less smiling and more negative statements).

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 304-305) indicate that examining deception as an interpersonal, face-to-face communication event implicates a number of factors that should influence deception detection accuracy. Recognition that senders and receivers engage in strategic behaviour results in shifts attention from static, pre-interactional variables such as age, sex and motivation to interactional variables, i.e., to what they do or think while interacting. For senders this includes examining the type of deception they encode, which may be differentially successful. For receivers, this includes examining suspicion, which can be seen as the counterpart to sender's deceit, and the communication strategies that receivers employ to discern the truth. A communication perspective also considers the relationship between sender and receiver and the degree to which they are familiar with one another. Recognition that deception frequently occurs among acquainted people and that such familiarity results in different communication patterns underscores the importance of examining forms of familiarity and their impact on successful deception and detection. Thus, four moderators of accuracy derived from IDT are deception type, suspicion, receiver probing strategies and familiarity.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 272) state that Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon (1996) argues that familiarity is a double-edged sword: in some ways it may help you be a better deception detector; in other ways it might hinder your ability to detect deception. First, because of certain biases, the better you know a person, the less effective you are at detecting his or her lies. Familiarity increases a person's confidence about judging veracity, which, in turn, leads to truth bias (a perception that others are behaving honestly).

Dual Process Models of Persuasion

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40), state that the dual process models postulate that persuasion operate via two paths. The two models share many similarities and are excellent in explaining how persuasive messages are perceived and processed.

THE ELABORATION LIKELIHOOD MODEL OF PERSUASION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) state that The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (ELM) proposes two basic routes to persuasion that operate in tandem. Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) explain that the first of these they call the *central route* to central processing. This involves cognitive elaboration. That means thinking about the content of the message, reflecting on the ideas and information contained in it, and scrutinising the evidence and reasoning presented.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) state that the second route to persuasion is known as the peripheral route. The peripheral, or peripheral processing, involves focussing on cues that are not directly related to the substance of the message. For example, focussing on a source's physical

attractiveness, or the sheer quantity of arguments presented, or a catchy jingle as a basis for decision-making would entail peripheral processing. According to ELM, the two routes represent the ends, or anchor points, of an elaboration continuum. At one end of the continuum, a person engages in low or no elaboration. At the other end, a person engages in high elaboration.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) illustrate with the example of Rex and Trudy who are on a date at a restaurant. Trudy is very health conscious, so she studies the menu carefully. She looks to see whether certain dishes are fatty or high in calories. When the waiter arrives to take their order, she enquires what kind of oil was used to prepare the pasta. She might sound picky, but Trudy is engaging in central processing. She is actively thinking about what the menu says. Rex, however, is smitten with Trudy's good looks. He hardly looks at the menu, and when that waiter asks for his order, he says he will have what she is having. Rex is engaging in peripheral processing. He is basing his decision on cues that are unrelated to the items on the menu.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) acknowledge the possibility of *parallel processing*, which is, using both routes at once. However, they suggest there is usually a trade-off between central and peripheral processing, such that a person tends to favour one route over the other. Whether a person emphasises the central or the peripheral route hinges on two basic factors. The first of these is the individual's *motivation* to engage in central processing. Because central processing requires more mental effort, a person with greater motivation is more likely to rely on central processing.

The second factor according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40), which determines whether a person will rely on central or peripheral processing, is his or her ability to process information. A person must not only be willing, but also able to engage in central processing. Some people are more adept at grasping ideas, understanding concepts and making sense of things. Some people also have more knowledge of or expertise in certain topics or issues than others. Thus, receivers are more likely to process a persuasive message via the central route if they have the motivation and ability to do so. If they lack the motivation or the ability, they will tend to rely on peripheral processing instead.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) state that aside from ability and motivation, a variety of other factors can tilt the balance in favour of central or peripheral processing. These include distractions, such as background noise, time constraints, a person's mood, or a personality trait called *need for cognition*. Need for cognition has to do with how much a person enjoys thinking about things.

Researchers, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40), have found that persuasion via the central route tends to be more long lasting whereas persuasion via the peripheral route tends to be more

short-lived. When we think about ideas, they are more likely to be absorbed. Similarly, persuasion that takes place via central processing tends to be more resistant to counter-influence attempts than persuasion via peripheral processing. This also makes sense: if you have thought through your position, you are less likely to “waffle”. Researchers have also found that if receivers disagree with the content of a message, using central processing causes them to generate more counter-arguments. That is, they mentally rehearse their objections to the message. If receivers disagree with a message and rely on peripheral processing, however, they will generate fewer counter-arguments or other unfavourable thoughts about the message.

THE HEURISTIC SYSTEMATIC MODEL OF PERSUASION (HSM)

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40), report that as with the ELM, the HSM operates on the assumption that individuals rely on two different modes of information processing. One mode, called *systematic processing*, is more thoughtful and deliberate. Systematic processing in the HSM is roughly analogous to central processing in the ELM. The other mode, called *heuristic processing*, relies on mental shortcuts. Heuristic processing is based on the application of *decision rules* or *heuristic cues* that help simplify the thought process. An example of a decision rule would be buying a TV based on its brand name (“Sony’s are reliable”). An example of a heuristic cue would be choosing one wine over another because the bottle was prettier.

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40), heuristic processing in the HSM is roughly equivalent to peripheral processing in the ELM. By way of illustration, suppose Irwin is thinking of buying a hand-held organiser. If Irwin did not know much about such devices, he would take one of two approaches. He could rely on systematic processing by reading up on handheld organisers in electronics magazines. He would adopt this route if he thought he really needed one (motivation) and he lacked the necessary knowledge about them (sufficiency principle). But he would also need to have time to gather information and be able to understand it (ability). Alternatively, he could opt for heuristic processing. He could base his decision on a friend’s advice using simple decision rule (“Lance knows his electronics”). Or he could base his decision on a heuristic cue, such as the appearance of a particular brand (“This one looks cool”). He would be more likely to resort to heuristic processing if he did not really need a handheld organiser – it was only an electronic toy (low motivation) – or if he did not think he could make sense of the information about them anyway (lack of ability).

Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) model gives an excellent account of how heuristic reasoning takes place. Heuristic reasoning relies on mental shortcuts. Two scenarios are superimposed. Differences are ignored while similarities are foregrounded. This relates to conceptual blending.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 37-40) add that both the ELM and the HSM are useful for explaining and predicting people's reactions to persuasive messages.

Cognitive Dissonance

Gass and Seiter (2003: 64-65) explain that cognitive dissonance is one of the better-known forms of consistency theory. The theory focuses on self-persuasion that occurs *after* one has made a decision. Hence, cognitive dissonance is sometimes referred to as *post-decision theory*. The basic idea behind the theory is that, following a decision; a person worries about whether s/he has made the right choice. Because most decisions involve pros and cons, the person worries about the benefits associated with the foregone alternative and the drawbacks associated with the choice that was made. The person is therefore, motivated to reduce anxiety by justifying the decision that was made. Attempts to justify or reinforce the decision can take place through the individuals' thought processes, words or actions.

Nonverbal Influence

Gass and Seiter (2003: 173) say that nonverbal communication plays an important role in the process of social influence for several reasons:

- We can use nonverbal behaviour to create certain impressions of ourselves. If we are successful in making ourselves look powerful, authoritative, credible, or attractive, we may also be more persuasive
- Through the use of nonverbals, people can establish intimate relationships. Nonverbal cues, such as touch, can be influential in developing rapport
- Nonverbal behaviours can heighten or distract attention from persuasive messages that are likely to reinforce learning. For example, a teacher can use nonverbals to get his or her students to pay more attention to a message, and a heckler can use such tactics to distract listeners
- Through nonverbals, a person can be reinforced to imitate a model's behaviour
- Nonverbal cues can be used to signal a person's expectations and elicit behaviour that conforms to these expectations. For example, a simple frown can inform a child that s/he is not behaving appropriately
- Nonverbal behaviours can be used to violate people's expectations so as to distract them

Impression Management Theory

Gass and Seiter (2003: 173) state that the Impression Management Theory suggests that people control their behaviours – particularly nonverbal behaviours – in order to create desired impressions of

themselves. If you want to be liked, for instance, you might smile. If you want to be intimidating, you might frown. Clearly, however, our nonverbal behaviour can affect impressions other than those made about us. Recently, for example, Seiter (2001) argued that Impression Management Theory should be expanded to include the ways in which we strategically attempt to control impressions made on others. Although such attempt might be aimed at making others appear better, Seiter (2001) argued that sometimes our attempts to appear honest and desirable are undermined by others. That is, sometimes other people may attempt to make us appear undesirable and dishonest.

DECEPTION AS A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIVE ACT

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 261) the Information Manipulation Theory argues that when we are talking with others we typically assume that the information they give us is not only truthful, but also informative, relevant and clear. We are not always right, however. Deception occurs when speakers alter the *amount* of information that should be provided (i.e., quantity), the veracity of the information presented (i.e., quality) the *relevance* of information provided, or the *clarity* of information provided. People can alter the amount, veracity, relevance and clarity of information all at the same time or in different combinations. Gass and Seiter (2003: 261) state that there is an infinite variety in forms of deception.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 73-740) state that with reference to prototypical conception, the act of deception distinguishes itself from the more general experience of cheating. Its prototypical components, in fact, are *the intention to say falsehood, the awareness of falsehood by the liar and the falseness of content*. Its typical attributes are the element of harmfulness/usefulness and emotional connotation.

Within recent approaches to phenomena of miscommunication, deception is considered as a mainly vocal and strategic communicative act, an emblematic example of adapting behaviour in the management of interpersonal relationships. As affirmed by both *Interpersonal Deception Theory* of Buller and Burgoon (1996) and *Strategic Theory of Deception* as hierarchy of intentions of Anolli and Ciceri (1999), lying can be considered as a complex inter-communicative act, intentionally and hierarchically planned. Anolli and Ciceri (1999: <http://www.psico-comunicazione.net/finzionebaE.htm>) report that the liar, in fact, must be able to manage a double intentional level. On the one hand we have the *manifest intention* (or apparent, the so-said "cover message") through which the speaker communicates to receiver a false utterance that must appear true. On the other hand we have the *hidden intention* (or *latent*, that is awareness of deceiving the other in order to achieve one's goals): it is a superior-order intention, a *meta-intention*, known only to the speaker and that must be accurately hidden to the interactant.

Bok (1978: 19) stresses that a society that is unable to distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones, would collapse. But even before such a general collapse, individual choice and survival would be imperilled. The search for food and shelter could depend on no expectations from others. A warning that a well was poisoned or a plea for help in an accident would come to be ignored unless independent confirmation could be found.

Bok (1978) argues that all our choices depend on our estimates of what is the case; these estimates must in turn rely on information from others. Lies distort this information and therefore our situation, as we perceive it, as well as our choices.

Anolli and Ciceri (1999: <http://www.psico-comunicazione.net/finzionebaE.htm>), claim that performing a deception act in a developmental perspective requires then, beneath a meta-communicative competence, the strategic use of the skill of deceiving and simulating. This may mean performing not an imitative game of pretence or an identification process like in symbolic game, but a *played deceitfulness*, aiming at a precise goal. In this context, one is director and actor through a continuous monitoring of one's communicative behaviour and it is very important not to lose the limit between reality and fantasy.

DECEPTION IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION AND COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION

Bengtsson (undated: http://ctw.cs.umu.se/projects/the_social_actor.html) states that psychologists and communication scholars have long studied issues of trust, authenticity, and validity. One broad class of research concerns judgments about the reality of incoming messages. More specifically, extensive studies have been made on interpersonal deception. Most past research on this topic has been limited to focusing on non-interactive situations, though. Recently, however, Buller and Burgoon (1996) have presented interpersonal deception theory (IDT), that deals specifically with discourse and deception as it occurs in interpersonal situations. According to IDT, the goals, priorities, and task requirements of (possibly deceptive) senders and receivers of messages in an interaction lead each to process and understand that same interaction in distinctly different ways. IDT offers a framework for studying which schemes senders may use to perpetrate deception and the extent to which receivers may recognise such devices.

Bengtsson (undated: http://ctw.cs.umu.se/projects/the_social_actor.html) states that IDT focuses on face-to-face conversations. However, as the virtual communication perspective implies, state-of-the-art computer-mediated communication blurs the boundaries between interpersonal and mediated conversations. Moreover, whether a perceived interlocutor is, in fact, human or computerised

(or both) becomes harder to determine as human and computerised agents converge at the concept of virtual agents.

Bengtsson (undated: http://ctw.cs.umu.se/projects/the_social_actor.html) therefore proposes to apply interpersonal deception theory to explore aspects of deception in human-computer interaction and computer-mediated communication. The purpose of such studies is to investigate the interfaces impact on users' ability to negotiate claims of external validity in conversation with virtual agents. Knowledge gained from this research will be important in guiding the design of digital communication services, search agents and information filtering devices.

SYNTHESIS

I propose the following theory to characterise how humans form mental models of their environment with particular focus on deceptive human interactions.

Deception is an intentional, strategic communicative act, cognitively and socially constructed from subjective experience and inference, underpinned by compliance gaining strategies in the management of interpersonal relationships.

The theory has the following corollaries:

1. Human behaviour is extremely complex and not governed by predictive rules used in the natural sciences.
2. All knowledge is socially constructed from subjective experience and inference.
3. The somatic marker hypothesis gives a credible account of how people can become distrustful of other people (Damasio 1996). The hypothesis relates to the fact that memories are laid down while we are being deceived, and this becomes part of our long-term memory.
4. Conceptual blending is a symbolisation process that selectively interrelates concepts from two separate cognitive domains, a source space and a target space to conceptualise a new perceived relationship known as a blended space. The process is used in the perception of all kinds of symbolic interrelationships (Fauconnier and Turner 2002).
5. Counterfactuality is built into the human language allowing us to make representations of ambiguity, falsifications and deception.

6. Heuristic processing relies on mental shortcuts. Heuristic processing is based on the application of decision rules or heuristic cues that help simplify the thought process.
7. Compliance gaining concentrates on influence in interpersonal, face-to-face contexts rather than one to many contexts focussing on what people do when they want to get something. Specific instances of communication can be ordered along a compliance-gaining continuum that progresses from cooperation to competition to confrontation. Compliance gaining strategies include rewarding activity, punishing activity, expertise, and activation of impersonal commitments (Gass and Seiter 2003).
8. Cognitive factors play a role in the way people behave when lying. Lying requires you to think a lot harder than telling the truth does. Because lying requires extra cognitive effort, compared to people telling the truth, liars would take a longer time to respond, pause more when speaking, and deliver messages with few specifics (Gass and Seiter 2003).
9. Deception is an interactional phenomenon in which both senders and receivers are involved, simultaneously encoding and decoding messages over time.
10. Intentional behaviour forms the basis of deception.
11. Certain types of deceptive behaviour are sanctioned, while others are heavily condemned.
12. Lying is a complex inter-communicative act, intentionally and hierarchically planned, where the liar manages a double intentional level. The manifest intention is that which the speaker communicates to the receiver, while the hidden intention is awareness of deceiving the other in order to achieve one's goals.
13. Liars strategically create messages by manipulating the information in their messages, strategically controlling their behaviour and managing their image.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I provided a theoretical framework for the study of deceptive behaviour that enables one to do research on conceptual as well as communicative aspects of deception. With regard to the conceptual aspect of deception, I indicated that Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual blending presented the appropriate framework to account for a person's cognitive capacity to interrelate and blend concepts extracted from her/his vast conceptual network of knowledge, and to use

counterfactual reasoning to conceptualise alternate scenarios of which one could be the true state of affairs, while the other one is a plausible, but false state of affairs.

With regard to the communicative aspect of deception, I showed that deception is considered as a mainly vocal and strategic communicative act, an emblematic example of adapting behaviour in the management of interpersonal relationships. I then focused on theories of deception and persuasion. I illustrated that we can apply Interpersonal Deception Theory to explore aspects of deception in human-computer interaction and computer-mediated communication. In the next chapter I will focus on communication.

COMMUNICATION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I show that communication cannot take place unless all three elements of **communicator, medium and recipient are present**. I state further that **current communication problems result from bias and misinformation, as well as from deliberate deception**. Taking Shannon and Weaver's theory as point of departure, I show that **messages can suffer from a number of unintended distortions and interference**. I show that **symbols are arbitrary but have the power to shape perceptions and construct social reality**. I also examine the power of labels and how, oftentimes, through the use of **euphemisms and doublespeak, persuaders attempt to lessen (or strengthen) the connotative impact of a word**. The chapter also explains speech acts as communicative intentions.

In the first part of the chapter I deal with references that allow me to give a conceptual characterisation of deception. Later in the chapter I examine communication aspects of deception.

THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

Skinner et al (2004: 73) state that contemporary theory regards communication not only as a **dynamic process of exchanging meaningful messages, but as a transaction between participants during which a relationship develops between them**. From this viewpoint communication is defined as a **transactional process of exchanging messages and negotiating meaning to establish and maintain relationships**.

How humans communicate is greatly significant in our lives. Argyle and Trower (1979: 4) say that more of our time is given over to communication than to any other human behaviour. It is vital to the development of our personalities and personal and professional achievement. Argyle and Trower emphasise that it is the part that makes all the rest of what we usually regard as human behaviour possible – because all human behaviour as we know it takes place in society.

Williams (1992: 11) explains that so fundamental is communication to human living that it goes on virtually the whole time in ways of which we are quite unconscious. If two humans come together it is virtually inevitable that they will communicate *something* to each other. Human bodies are very well

designed for sending and receiving person-to-person messages. It is the job of the sender to get the message to its destination and get it understood. In turn, when the intended receiver responds, the full responsibility falls on that person for his or her message. This principle keeps both the responsibility and the authority in the same place, always with the sender.

Williams (1992: 11) writes that communication is an activity, not a “thing”. Communication is what keeps people together just as surely as it is what draws them together in the first place. We believe therefore that it is one of the most important parts of human behaviour.

Current communication problems result from bias and misinformation, as well as from deliberate deception. Intentionally, deceptive discourse is pervasive with frequent media attention focussed on the deceptive messages of prominent figures such as politicians. Deliberate deception has become an effective form of communication during political campaigns and diplomatic negotiations. Deceptive communication is an ancient technique and has been used by human beings as an adequate response to their environment since the origin of the species.

CLASSICAL INFORMATION THEORY

Shannon and Weaver’s theory, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004), provides an explanation for any communication event. It serves as a springboard for any discussion explaining why one has to go beyond the limitations of the General Communication Model in order to deal with complex and dynamic aspects of communication such as the nature of intrapersonal communication (cognition) as manifested in the individual and social construction of meaning, and particularly to account for the differences between cooperative, competitive and confrontational forms of communication.

As the underpinning of the theory, Shannon and Weaver developed a very simple, general model of communication, which is constructed against a mathematical framework, as shown in the figure below. Because his model is abstract, it applies in many situations, which contributes to its broad scope and power.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) explains that Shannon and Weaver thus wisely realised that a useful theory of information would first have to concentrate on the problems associated with sending and receiving messages, and it would have to leave questions involving any intrinsic meaning of a message—known as the semantic problem—for later investigators. Clearly, if the technical problem could not be solved—that is, if a message could not be transmitted correctly—then the semantic

problem was not likely ever to be solved satisfactorily. Solving the technical problem was therefore the first step in developing a reliable communication system.

Parts of a communication system

The accompanying schematic figure titled "Shannon and Weaver's communication model," is adapted from Shannon and Weaver's work on information theory (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2004). The model represents the different parts of the communication system when a message is sent from a sender to a receiver. The model he devised to represent a communication system consists of five major parts: the information source, the transmitter, the medium, the receiver, and the destination.

Shannon and Weaver's theory is the mathematical study of these five components, individually and in combination. Existing communication systems can be studied this way, and new systems can be designed based on the knowledge gained. For example, information theory can provide a way to measure the amount of information produced by a source or to measure the ability of a noisy medium to transmit information reliably.




Figure 2: Shannon and Weaver's communication model: Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004)

The first component of the model, the message source, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004), is simply the entity that originally creates the message. Often the message source is a human, but in Shannon and Weaver's model it could also be an animal, a computer, or some other inanimate object. The encoder is the object that connects the message to the actual physical signals that are being sent. For example, there are several ways to apply this model to two people having a telephone conversation. On one level, the actual speech produced by one person can be considered the message, and the telephone mouthpiece and its associated electronics can be considered the encoder, which converts the speech into electrical signals that travel along the telephone network. Alternatively, one can consider the speaker's mind as the message source and the combination of the speaker's brain, vocal system, and telephone mouthpiece as the encoder. However, the inclusion of "mind" introduces complex semantic

problems to any analysis and is generally avoided except for the application of information theory to physiology.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) explains that the channel is the medium that carries the message. The channel might be wires, the air or space in the case of radio and television transmissions, or fibre-optic cable. In the case of a signal produced simply by banging on the plumbing, the channel might be the pipe that receives the blow. The beauty of having an abstract model is that it permits the inclusion of a wide variety of channels.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) states that noise is anything that interferes with the transmission of a signal. In telephone conversations interference might be caused by static in the line, cross talk from another line, or background sounds. Signals transmitted optically through the air might suffer interference from clouds or excessive humidity. Clearly, sources of noise depend upon the particular communication system. A single system may have several sources of noise, but, if all of these separate sources are understood, it will sometimes be possible to treat them as a single source.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) adds further that the decoder is the object that converts the signal, as received, into a form that the message receiver can comprehend. In the case of the telephone, the decoder could be the earpiece and its electronic circuits. Depending upon perspective, the decoder could also include the listener's entire hearing system.

The message receiver, as demonstrated by Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004), is the object that gets the message. It could be a person, an animal, or a computer or some other inanimate object.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) reveals that Shannon and Weaver's theory deals primarily with the encoder, channel, noise source, and decoder. As noted above, the focus of the theory is on signals and how they can be transmitted accurately and efficiently; questions of meaning are avoided as much as possible.

An important step taken by Shannon and Weaver, as revealed by Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004), was to separate the technical problem of delivering a message from the problem of understanding what a message means. This step permitted engineers to focus on the message delivery system. Shannon and Weaver concentrated on two key questions in his 1948 paper: determining the most efficient encoding of a message using a given alphabet in a noiseless environment, and understanding what additional steps need to be taken in the presence of noise.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) explains that Shannon and Weaver solved these problems successfully for a very abstract (hence widely applicable) model of a communications system that includes both discrete (digital) and continuous (analogue) systems. In particular, he developed a measure of the efficiency of a communications system, called the entropy (analogous to the thermodynamic concept of entropy, which measures the amount of disorder in physical systems) that is computed on the basis of the statistical properties of the message source.

Shannon and Weaver's theory is primarily a theoretical study; nevertheless, it has had an immeasurable impact on the design of practical data communication and storage systems, such as telephones and computers.

A metaphoric representation of Shannon and Weaver's model shows that interference could be construed as misrepresentation.

A critical analysis of Shannon and Weaver's model shows that while it is excellent for technical accounts of how information is encoded, transmitted, distorted and decoded in the in electronic networks (electrons over copper cables), as electromagnetic waves in the radio and microwave frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum, or as light pulses (photons through fibre optic networks), the model cannot give an adequate account of the semantic complexities of interpreting human language. Because the Shannon and Weaver model is not intended as a model of cognition (how neural impulses are transmitted through the neural arrays of the human brain to form complex and often ambiguous concepts, a more appropriate model needs to be devised.

MERSHAM AND SKINNER: COMMUNICATION COMPRISES A TRIAD

Communication scientists have adapted a model as a metaphor for the communication process. It is however, not possible to use the Mersham and Skinner model to explain how deceptive communication takes place. The model assumes that deception is value neutral and that people have the same power relationships. Communication is never neutral. Communication deals with power relationships and is hardly ever egalitarian or equal.

Skinner et al (2004: 74) illustrate that the communication process comprises a triad: a communicator, a message, and a receiver. These three aspects, together with closely related factors such as code, medium, context, feedback and interference, are the major components of the communication process. The relationship between the message and the medium can be compared with the relationship between, for example, an apple (the medium) and its nutrients (the message). Each is a part of the

other—you cannot eat an apple without getting its nutrients, and you cannot get the nutrients without eating the apple.

Mersham and Skinner (1999: 18) say that understanding is an active state. One can look without seeing, hear without absorbing and receive a message without attaching the significance intended by the communicator. To understand and interpret, the recipient must be just as active as the communicator. Skinner et al (2004: 76) state that the message can be described as the information content, which is transmitted in such a way as to be sensorily perceived by the receiver. According to Mersham and Skinner (1999: 18) messages are composed of signs and symbols, which have (for the source and the recipient) a certain meaning. Encoding is the form of expression by the source of an already conceived idea into a message appropriate for transmission.

Skinner et al (2004: 76) states that communication codes (communication stimuli) refer to all possible signs and symbols used in the communication process to convey the message in such a way as to be perceived by the receiver's senses. A distinction is made between verbal and nonverbal codes. Language is the verbal code, while the nonverbal code refers to all nonverbal aspects of human behaviour. The many cues, signs or signals described as nonverbal stimuli have been defined within broad categories: proxemics (the utilization of personal space and physical environment), body movement or facial expressions, eye contact or visual interaction, vocalisation or paralanguage and chronemics.

Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 13-14) define feedback as a response by the recipient to the source's message. Feedback may be thought of as a measure of the effectiveness of a previous communication. The source may take account of feedback in modifying subsequent messages; therefore feedback makes communication a dynamic, two-way process. Positive feedback informs the source that the intended effect of a message was achieved; negative feedback informs the source the intended effect of a message was not achieved.

According to Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 10-11) many failures to communicate are due to mistaken assumptions by the source or recipient about the meaning of a symbol they have exchanged. Meanings are relative and open to subjective interpretation. Meanings are in people, not in the message. Words have no meanings in themselves; the source and the recipient assign their meanings.

Communication is a two-way process

Mersham and Skinner's (1999) model includes a two-way, or interactive, nature of communication. In the figure below, we see how individuals as both the 'communicator' and the 'recipient' are participating equally in interpersonal communication.




Figure 3: A model of the bi-directional communication process. Adapted from Mersham and Skinner (1999:10)

Figure 3 is used to describe how the communicator *encodes* a message according to his/her socio-cultural and autobiographical circumstances. This message is then sent to the recipient via a medium. The recipient then *decodes* the message according to his/her socio cultural and autobiographical circumstances.

Mersham and Skinner's model is a typical example of a General Communication Model. While the General Communication Model allows us to make generalisations about the communication process, there is a need to show the complexities of the different forms of communication. Gass and Seiter (2003: 168), argue that different modes of persuasion may lead persuadees to process messages in different ways. Human communication is not value neutral. Communication manifests as state of formal domination, equality, subordination, or an undecided power relation, which relate to persuasion, social influence and compliance gaining (Gass and Seiter 2003).

INTERFERENCE IN MESSAGES

Skinner et al (2004: 76), show that messages are not transmitted and interpreted in a vacuum. They are given within a complex, unique and dynamic context in which a number of variables could influence the course and interpretation of the communication event.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2004) states that noise is anything that interferes with the transmission of a signal. In telephone conversations interference might be caused by static in the line, cross talk from another line, or background sounds. Signals transmitted optically through the air might suffer interference from clouds or excessive humidity. Clearly, sources of noise depend upon the

particular communication system. A single system may have several sources of noise, but, if all of these separate sources are understood, it will sometimes be possible to treat them as a single source.

Messages between human beings can, as revealed by Bok (1978: 8) and Kiesler (1978: 84), suffer from a number of unintended distortions or interference, originating either at the source, en route or at the reception. The speaker, for example, may be mistaken, inarticulate, or using a language unknown to the listener. En route, the message may be deflected by outside noise, by atmospheric conditions and by interruption. At the receiving end, deafness, fatigue, language problems, or mental retardation may affect the reception of the message.

Bok (1978) goes on to say that any number of appearances and words can mislead us; but only a fraction of them are intended to do so. A mirage may deceive us, through no one's fault. Our eyes deceive us all the time. We are beset by self-delusion and bias of every kind. Yet we often know when we mean to be honest or dishonest. Whatever the essence of truth and falsity, and whatever the sources of error in our lives, one such source is surely the human agent, receiving and giving out information, intentionally deflecting, withholding, and even distorting it at times. Human beings, after all, provide for each other the most ingenious obstacles to what partial knowledge and minimal rationality they can hope to command.

Bok (1978: 13), and Argyle and Trower (1979: 39) add that when we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages meant to mislead them, meant to make them believe that we ourselves do not believe. We can do so through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence.

DECEPTION AND ITS DETECTION

Miller and Stiff (1983) propose a model that includes other factors that underscore the view that deception and its detection take place as part of a communication transaction between sender and receiver. The deceptive message itself is at the centre of the transaction. Miller and Stiff include both verbal and nonverbal behaviours a part of the message. On the part of the sender, it is necessary to consider his or her perceptions of the consequences of getting caught. It is also necessary to consider the motivation of the receiver to detect deception, so that suspicion becomes a factor and the consequences to the receiver of detecting deceit (sometimes receivers would rather not know for sure they are being lied to). The deceptive transaction, like all communication transactions, takes place in a social context.

According to Miller and Stiff (1983: 12), people are able to detect deception only a little better than chance, with rates of successful detection rarely departing from a range of 45% to 65 %. One possible explanation for the relatively poor ability to detect deception is truth-bias, a bias toward judging a sender's message as truthful.

Miller and Stiff (1983) state that given the generally perceived leanness of electronic media and the importance of cues in detecting deception, it should be more difficult to detect deception using electronic media than otherwise. On the other hand, experienced users should have a better chance to detect deception, compare to inexperienced users, given that experience should better enable users to make use of what cues are available to detect deception if it is present.




Figure 4: Model of deceptive communication transactions. Miller and Stiff (1983: 30)

Based on this premise, Miller and Stiff's (1983) model has been modified to illustrate the roles electronic media and experience could play in deceiving and deception detection.




Figure 5: An adaptation of the Miller and Stiff Model (1983)

Miller and Stiff (1983) posit that the medium directly affects the ability of a deceivee to successfully detect deception, and it also mediated the relationship between the deceiver and the message s/he is sending. Miller and Stiff also suggest that experience mediates the relationship between deceiver and message, directly affects the ability of the deceivee to detect deception and directly affects the perceived characteristics of the communication medium. The Miller and Stiff framework has been modified, to include combined motivation to detect deception with the consequences of successful detection, such that consequences are now listed as one of a set of motivations to detect, that also include suspicion, truth bias, and trust. Social context encompasses all, the participants in the communication exchange, their experiences, the message and the media.

DISTRACTION IN MESSAGES

Gass and Seirer (2003: 212) state that according to Learning Theory, to be persuaded people must first comprehend a message. Because distraction hinders comprehension, distraction also should decrease the persuasiveness of a message. For instance, according to Gass and Seiter, in addition to distraction that is external to a communicator (such as hecklers and loud noises) a second type of distraction can be initiated by the communicator. For example, someone who stands too close or who uses intense language might distract you. When a communicator initiates a distraction, our reaction depends not so much on comprehension or counter-arguments, but rather on the communicator's credibility. Specifically, when distracted by a highly credible source, we tend to be more persuaded; when distracted by a less credible source, we tend to be less persuaded.

SYMBOLS AND MEANING

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 154) what distinguishes us from animals is the fact that we are the “symbol-using, symbol-misusing and symbol-making animal”. We invent symbols, and through their use and misuse, we create meaning, define what is real and persuade others. To understand humans and how they influence one another, it is important to understand the nature of symbols.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 154) define a symbol as something that represents something else. Names are a good example. It represents who you are just as a “pig” represents an animal with a curly tail and slimy snout.

One important characteristic of symbols, as told by Gass and Seiter, is that they are arbitrary. Symbols have no necessary connection to what they represent, although we sometimes seem to forget this. Gass and Seiter cite the story of a little boy who thought that “pigs” were called “pigs” because they are so dirty. The word “pig” however, has no direct connection to the curly-tailed animal, just as your name, although it may seem to fit, has no necessary connection to you.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 154) add that because they are arbitrarily connected to what they represent, a second characteristic of symbols is that they are conventionalised, which means that if we want to use a symbol to communicate to someone else, we have to agree on the symbol’s meaning. Without some measure of agreement on the meanings of words, communication and persuasion would be difficult, if not impossible.

The theory of arbitrary signs is dealt with in greater detail later in the chapter under the heading *Semiotics – a theory of codes*.

CONGRUENCY AND VIVIDNESS

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 165) vividness may either help or hinder the persuasiveness of a message; it all depends on how congruent the vivid image is with the message. When vividness is congruent with a message (i.e., when the imagery in the message is relevant to its content), it helps us process the message. This is because vividness grabs our attention and brings to mind relevant information that is stored in our memories. However, they suspected that vivid imagery that is incongruent keeps us from processing a message by priming irrelevant thoughts and undermining our motivation to think about a message.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 165), state that Smith and Shaffer (2000) had students read strong and weak arguments on a variety of topics (e.g., drinking alcohol is dangerous to your health). Some of the students read vividness messages that were congruent (e.g., alcohol consumption could result in bloody, bone-crushing accidents), some read vivid and incongruent messages (e.g., when drinking alcohol, reaction time is slowed to a snail's pace – note, this has nothing to do with the main argument on health dangers), and others read pallid messages. Results of the study confirmed the researchers' suspicions. Specifically, compared to participants who read the incongruent and pallid messages, those who read the congruent messages recalled more of the message's arguments and were better at differentiating strong and weak argument. Research therefore reveals that vividness can be an effective persuasive tool; you simply need to know when to use it.

CONNOTATIVE AND DENOTATIVE MEANING

Gass and Seiter (2003: 154-155) state that there are at least two meanings for every word. The first, the denotative meaning, is a word's direct, explicit dictionary definition. Although denotative meanings can be problematic for communication (e.g., when the dictionary meaning changes, as it did for the word "gay"), agreement on the denotative meaning of a word is likely.

The second type of meaning, connotative, as told by Gass and Seiter (2003: 154-155), refers to the thoughts and emotions associated with a word. Connotations associated with words vary widely from person to person. Although all of us might agree on the denotative meaning of the word "pig" (i.e., curly-tailed animal with snout, etc.), our attitudes associated with the word may be quite different. A person who grew up slopping hogs will have a different view of pigs from one who learnt about pigs from watching movies about cuddly, talking pigs such as Babe from the movie *Babe*. Jews and Muslims are forbidden to eat pork, which is perceived as unclean. Not long ago, a woman in Israel was sentenced to 50 years for depicting Allah as a pig (Gass and Seiter 2003: 155). As persuaders, it is important to recognise that the meanings of words are subjective.

THE USE OF POWER IN CONNOTATIVE AND DENOTATIVE TERMS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 155) state that although connotative meanings tend to be more subjective than denotative meanings, sometimes the connotations associated with certain words are shared by large groups of people (i.e., societies and cultures). As a result, such words can be powerful persuasive tools for motivating people. Gass and Seiter (2003: 155) state that Weaver (1953) labelled them *Ultimate Terms*, which include words or phrases that are highly revered, widely accepted, and carry special power in culture. According to Weaver, there are three types of Ultimate Terms:

- *God Terms*, carry the greatest blessing in a culture and demand sacrifice and obedience. Weaver used terms such as “fact” and “progress” as examples of God Terms. Modern-day God Terms include “family values”, “critical thinking” and “balanced budget”
- *Devil Terms* are perceived by a culture as associated with the absolutely abhorrent and disgusting. Examples of Devil Terms include “Communism”, “Nazi” and “Fascist”. Today terms such as “dead-beat dad”, “racist” “terrorist”, “gang member”, “sweat shop” and “sexual harassment” may be considered Devil Terms because they represent what is evil or detestable to a culture
- *Charismatic Terms*, unlike God and Devil Terms, which are associated with something observable, have a power in some ways that is mysteriously given.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 156) states that although God, Devil and Charismatic Terms have power, their ability to persuade is not stable; the connotations associated with such terms may change over time. For instance, calling someone a communist today would not have the same impact as it did in the days of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Similarly, for some people, the term political correctness has shifted meanings from god term to devil term. Indeed, political correctness, once a term of positive evaluation, referring to a position of humanitarian concerns for the poor, homeless, and disfranchised groups of society has turned to a derisive term surrounded by controversy.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 156) add that considering the power of Ultimate Terms, it is not surprising that politicians spend considerable amounts of money discovering the “right terms” to use in their advertisements and speeches. By way of example, politicians use focus groups in order to discover specific words that should and should not be used in campaigns. The people in such groups watch advertisement and speeches while moving dials from right to left, indicating when they like or dislike what they are hearing and seeing. As a result, politicians learn an entire new vocabulary of God and Devil Terms.

In addition to politicians, according to Gass and Seiter (2003: 156), people in the business world are fond of using Ultimate Terms as persuasion devices. For instance, the word “empowerment” is a modern-day Charismatic Term on which marketers and advisers have capitalised. Products and services that promise to *empower* people have become unavoidable. For instance, as a former suit salesman, one of the authors was regularly asked by customers where the “power ties” could be found or what was the “power colour” for ties this year. The Hotel Del Coronado in Southern California offers its guests “power walk” in the morning. Athletes now have an alternative to Gatorade: Powerade! Some seminars teach that clients take “power naps”.

LANGUAGE INTENSITY

Gass and Seiter (2003: 165-166) state that language that is intense is emotional, metaphorical, opinionated, specific, forceful and evaluative. For that reason, according to Gass and Seiter, Bowers (1964) defined language intensity as the quality of language, which indicates the degree, to which the speaker's attitude deviates from neutrality. Someone who compares "cutting down trees" to "rape" is far from neutral in his or her attitudes about the lumber industry. The following are four theories that attempt to explain when and why intense language does or does not persuade.

Reinforcement Theory

Gass and Seiter (2003: 166) state that Reinforcement Theory assumes that people are motivated to avoid pain and seek pleasure. The same is true when people are being persuaded. If a person generally agrees with the position advocated by a source, the person will find it rewarding and evaluate the source positively. The reverse is true if the person generally disagrees with the position advocated by the source. Language intensity is believed to enhance this effect. Specifically, if the listener generally agrees with the speaker, when the speaker throws some forceful language at the listener, the listener is even more motivated to agree. However, a listener who generally disagrees will react even more negatively than s/he normally would when the speaker uses intense language.

Language Expectancy Theory

Gass and Seiter (2003: 166) state that we have expectations about what types of language are normal to use when trying to persuade other people. For example, we may not think it is normal for a speaker to use intense words such as "rape" and "shockingly". According to Language Expectancy Theory, when persuaders violate our expectations concerning normal language, those violations can either help or hurt the effectiveness of the persuasive message, depending on whether the violations are perceived in a positive or negative way. How violations are perceived depends on who is using the language. Highly credible sources are granted a "wider bandwidth" of acceptable communication than those with low credibility. As such, sources with low credibility are likely to be perceived in a negative way when they use language that is aggressive and intense. This, in turn, leads them to be less persuasive. The reverse is true for highly credible sources. Empirical research supports this claim. For example, based on Language Expectancy Theory, Buller and his colleagues found that safety messages (i.e., literature encouraging sun protection) attributed to paediatricians (i.e., highly credible sources) being more persuasive when they used intense language than when they used non-intense language (Gass and Seiter 2003: 166).

Information Processing Theory

Gass and Seiter (2003: 166-167) state that this theory argues that to be persuaded, you must first attend to and comprehend a persuasive message. If you attend to and comprehend the message, you can compare your own position on the message to the position that is being argued by the source. Ultimately, you must either accept or reject the source's position. Language intensity affects this process by making a source's position on an issue seem more extreme compared to your own position. This can be good up to a point. In general, some discrepancy between a persuader and receiver's position leads to increased attention, and therefore, more attitude change. Too much discrepancy may lead a receiver to reject a message or to scrutinise a message so that s/he fails to attend to all of the message's content. In addition, intense language tends to be more specific and vivid.

Communication Accommodation Theory

Gass and Seiter (2003: 167) state that when we communicate with others we adjust our style of speaking to their style in order to gain approval and increase communication efficiency. For example, we may try to talk the same way others talk so that they will like us better. Gass and Seiter state that Crane and Kikuchi (1993) conducted a study to see if this theory would predict the effectiveness of messages that either were or were not intense. Specifically, speakers delivered intense and non-intense messages to people whose language style could be categorised as either intense or non-intense. Results of the study supported Communication Accommodation Theory. Specifically, speakers using intense language were most persuasive with people who use intense language, whereas speakers using non-intense language were most persuasive with people who use non-intense language. Speakers who "matched" the style of their audience were also perceived as more credible. In a related study, strong arguments using sports metaphors (e.g., "If you want to play ball with the best, don't miss this opportunity") were persuasive among people who like sports but not among those who dislike sports.

SEMIOTICS – A THEORY OF CODES

Eco (1978: 3-5) claims that a design for general semiotics considers a theory of codes, a theory of sign production – the latter taking into account a large range of phenomena, such as the common use of languages, the evolution of codes, aesthetic communication, different types of interactional communicative behaviour, and the use of signs in order to mention things or states of the world. Semiotics studies all cultural processes as processes of communication. Therefore, each of these processes would seem to be permitted by an underlying system of significance.

Eco (1978: 14-15) defined semiosis as an action, an influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant; this tri-relative influence not

being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. Two scholars, Saussure and Peirce, who foretold the official birth and scientific organisation of the discipline, have put definitions forward. While the definition given by Peirce is more comprehensive and fruitful, Saussure's definition has done much to improve semiotic awareness.

Larson (1989: 113) describes semiotics as the 'science of signs' and of the codes used to understand them. The word 'sign' to the semiotician differs from the same word when used by a semanticist. To the semiotician, a sign is a larger category and contains both sign(al)s and symbols as they are used in language and as other conveyors of meaning, for example, logos, colour, light, surroundings, clothing and many others – frequently nonverbal. In order to distinguish the two ways of using these words, we will follow the approach of the semiologists and use "signifier" and "signified" instead. Thus the word "running" as a *signifier* can refer to various *signified* things – running for political office, water running in a stream, someone's nose is running, running a footrace, getting your car running, running a nylon stocking and running from the authorities. The only way we can understand how the word is being used is to see it not only in a sentence but also from the perspective of the culture or subculture in which it is being used. The receiver or communication analyst would look at content, nonverbal aspects of the word, and other culturally imposed patterns.

Larson (1989: 114) adds that semiology takes cultures into account as well as other patterns that affect meanings. One such pattern is what semioticians call "the code", or the way of discovering or translating meaning. A simpler code is the use of black and white hats in old cowboy movies to indicate who the good guy was and who the bad guy was. Another would be the filmic code of pages being blown off a calendar to indicate the passage of time. A third would be what type of cup a person uses for their coffee at the dorm or on the job. Each type of cup – mugs as opposed to Styrofoam cups, as opposed to *fine china* – is a *signifier* and each type of coffee drinker, consciously or unconsciously, on purpose or by accident, is conveying a very different kind of message. Yet words are not even involved. In a semiotic approach to the study of meaning, we try to "read" each message from several perspectives – from the words that are or are not spoken, from the context in which or from which they are spoken, and from the other signifiers included in and with the message – for example, visuals, colours and tone of voice.

The communication event as seen by a semiotician

Eco (1978: 3) defines a communication process as the passage of a signal (not necessarily a sign) from a source (through a transmitter, along a channel) to a destination. In a machine-to-machine process the signal has no power to signify in so far as it may determine the destination of the *sub specie stimuli*.

Eco (1978: 3-8) adds that when the destination is a human being, or “addressee” (it is not necessary that the source or the transmitter be human, provided that they emit the signal following a system of rules known by the human addressee), we are on the contrary witnessing a process of significance – provided that the signal is not merely a stimulus but arouses an interpretative response in the addressee. This process is made possible by the existence of a code.

The semiotician approaches a communication event as if it were a “text” to be “read” by the receiver/analyst. Larson (1989: 114) uses an interesting analogy in explaining this approach at uncovering meaning. He likens the semiotic receiver to the famous detective Sherlock Holmes, who “reads” an event, a room or a piece of evidence very analytically, often uncovering meaning from the smallest detail. Holmes semiotically analyses every aspect of a room by observing the many details that would easily be overlooked by the normal person. The responsible receiver of those many persuasive messages needs to act likewise whenever possible.

According to Eco (1978: 58-59) if a liar pretends to be sick by behaving in a certain way, the semiotic functioning of this behaviour can be analysed, irrespective of the fact that he is actually lying. Every time there is a possibility of lying, there is a sign-function, which is to signify (and then to communicate) something to which no real state of things corresponds. A theory of codes must study everything that can be used in order to lie. The possibility of lying is the proprium of semiosis. Every time there is a lie, there is signification. Every time there is signification, there is the possibility of using it in order to lie. If this is true, then semiotics has found new thresholds: between conditions of significance and conditions of truth in other words, the threshold between an intentional and extensional semantics.

THE USE OF POWER IN COMMUNICATION

Power is usually considered to be the ability to get things done, as defined by Sanes (1996-2000a: <http://www.transparencynow.com/news/power.htm>). It can involve cooperation, outright opposition, partial cooperation and partial opposition, simulated cooperation, combined with actual opposition. Giving orders can evoke compliance or refusal, obeying versus resisting, pretending to obey, or obeying part way. Most relations involve partial cooperation and partial opposition.

Sanes illustrates that power also has another common meaning, which cannot be reduced to the first: it refers to relations of inequality. Power is the ability to give orders and have them obeyed; the ability to provide rewards and impose sanctions; the ability to siphon resources and the results of other people's work for one's own use. In this sense, power, like image, is a position in a social network, so power and position bear a close relation. There are situations that resemble relations of inequality, in

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which the one in the dominant position does not have the power to control the other's behaviours. These situations are much like what we see in groups of animals in which the one in control must face or fight other group members down. The two forms of dominance, the ability to control and the ability to overpower are clearly very closely related.

Persuasiveness of powerful and powerless messages

Gass and Seiter (2003: 168) argue that different modes of persuasion may lead persuadees to process messages in different ways. Written messages, they suspected, may favour systemic processing (i.e., carefully scrutinising arguments in a message). As such, powerless language may be less distracting when presented in writing. In contrast, audio and video presentations may favour heuristic processing (i.e., using shortcuts that require little thinking when deciding to be persuaded), and, as such, may cause people to pay more attention to speaker characteristics. As a result, persuadees may be more influenced by powerful and powerless speech in non-written formats. The results of the study confirmed these suspicions, particularly when audio and written messages were compared. That is, when listening to an audio presentation, people were more persuaded by powerful speech than by powerless speech. When reading the presentation, however, the degree of power in the speech did not seem to matter as much.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 168), state that the type of powerless language a person uses may influence how s/he is perceived. Intensifiers, when used together with hesitations and hedges, are perceived as powerless. When used alone, however, intensifiers are perceived as powerful.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 168) state that females were persuasive with men when they used powerless forms of speech, but persuasive with females when using powerful speech. For male speakers, it did not matter what form of speech was used. This may mean that women, compared to men, need to be more sensitive about the style of speech they use when trying to be persuasive. The results of this study suggest that men have negative stereotypes about women who use powerful speaking styles.

The use of power in the construction of "reality"

Sanes (1996-2000b: <http://www.transparencynow.com/Overview/confuse.htm>) states that the power to create meanings and stories, and have listeners believe that those stories describe the world, rather than seeing them as motivated constructions, is essential if we want to have the power to influence others and shape situations. And we use those stories and meanings, in turn, to maintain our power. When much of the communication is in disguise or falsifies our view of things, then what we are looking at is the relationship not merely between power and meaning, but between power and illusion.

But, according to Sanes, based on the psychodynamic characteristics of upbringing referred to earlier, it is obvious that much of the reality we construct for ourselves and each other is none other than the essential script or fantasy or model that governs our thoughts and motives. Parents convey this essential fantasy to children by constructing their world and worldview. They create the physical stage on which a child's early life is played out, and they fill it with body language. They tell and enact stories that define who the children are, and what their children are doing. They make claims about what is positive and negative, and prescribe what is expected and allowed, all as a form of action and interaction.

Sanes (1996-2000b: <http://www.transparencynow.com/Overview/confuse.htm>) explains that when we look at the governing groups that control much of the public life of nations such as America, including the news and entertainment media, corporations, advertisers and politicians, we find that they do all these same things. They seek to weave a spell around us, to define our reality. They use these techniques to evoke transference and play on it. Just as our parents caused us to enter their unconscious fantasy world through covert communication, so do those in power in society invite us to enter their fantasy world, a world of deceptions and disguises. Politicians become benevolent parents; while journalists invite us to identify with them and vicariously play the role of children who will unseat those who unworthily hold power, and take power for themselves, while denying they are doing so.

Here too, as illustrated by Sanes, all these groups create physical settings and engage in body language; they tell us stories; make claims and prescribe what is required and allowed; all to influence our perception of things. The construction of reality and the effort to instrumentally evoke the transference have been vastly enhanced with science and technology, and turned into a science of marketing and entertainment, in which polls and computers play an essential role in shaping rhetoric, image and propaganda. These governing groups do not merely manipulate physical settings: they construct elaborate sets and simulations, often full of spectacle; they give shape to complex visual and auditory images; make use of costumes and props, and rely on professional-quality acting, to draw us into their invented realities. They similarly hire expert storytellers who analyse each sequence for its role in the larger effort.

Sanes (1996-2000b: <http://www.transparencynow.com/Overview/confuse.htm>) explains that they do all this by playing to our fears and desires, even though, like the hypothetical salesman, they may not understand many of the psychological processes they are tapping into, or do not care about them. Even when they offer us obvious lies and manipulations - "5.8 percent interest"; "free!!!" "Balanced budget" - they are playing to deeper fantasies - parental love, security, and escape from guilt.

In doing this, states Sanes, they re-create the more negative aspects of the role of parent, and they confirm our often-unacknowledged fears about the world. They seek to infantilise the public, to keep it in a state of unknowing and in a state of symbiosis. They offer us a culture in which power is used for manipulation and deception, and is by nature corrupt. And as they increasingly bring up society's children, with their control of the invented realities of television, movies, the Internet, and the rest of the entertainment industry, they become corrupt surrogate parents in a more immediate sense, who implant a map of the world in children in which power is used to violate, in which it is a form of hate rather than love.

Sanes (1996-2000b: <http://www.transparencynow.com/Overview/confuse.htm>) indicates that in America and similar nations, what one finds instead are many centres of power, all trying to manipulate our perception of reality and evoke transference out of more limited form of rational self-interest, to sell product, attain status and so on. In fact, these techniques are now used by virtually everyone seeking power and money, whatever the specifics of their agenda.

The Power Use Model

According to Bruins (1999: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0341/is_155/ai_54831706/pg2) the Power Use Model proposes that (provided the tactics are available to the agent), agents who see the target as an out-group member will use harder tactics than agents who see the target as a fellow in-group member. Whether a target is seen as an in- or an out-group member is, in the model, not simply a matter of predetermined group boundaries as they can be readily observed in our ordinary conceptualisation of reality (e.g., mother, father and children are all members of the group family), but instead, group boundaries are defined at a psychological level. As such, the perception of group boundaries will depend on contextual characteristics of the situation.

Bruins (1999) explains that an example would be that when a child is misbehaving, parents will be more inclined to see themselves as educators of their children (thereby each perceiving the other parent as an in-group member and the child as an outgroup member), but when father and son are planning a hike in the country, the father is more inclined to see the fellow parent as a (gender-based) outgroup member and the child as an ingroup member. Despite the fact that group membership is the only determinant of influence tactic choices, this conceptualisation of perceived group boundaries makes the Power Use Model extremely flexible.

In the model, as reported by Bruins, five different variables are suggested that may each in themselves, or in combination with other variables, mediate the relation between group membership of the target person vis-à-vis the agent and the kind of influence tactic the agent will choose to influence

that target: uncertainty reduction, expected opposition, desire to be liked, assertion of group membership, and cognitive consistency. In fact, all variables could play a role, each under different circumstances or in different situations.

Bruins adds that on the consequences side, the Power Use Model suggests that the target's response (yielding vs. resistance), together with the softness versus hardness of the used tactic, affects the perception of the relationship between agent and target in terms of group membership. Changes in this perception in turn affect changes in one or more of the proposed mediating variables and through them, the likelihood of using soft versus hard tactics in a future influence attempt.

LANGUAGE BEHAVIOUR: THE WORDS AND THE WAY THEY ARE USED

Coetzee and Russel (2000: x-ix), are of the opinion that everybody has a linguistic code, as unique as their fingerprints. This means that people have a unique way of stringing their words together. When a person is practising deception (covertly lying by editing out the parts of the story they wish to conceal), their linguistic code changes.

Coetzee and Russel state that nobody ever tells you the whole truth anyway – it would take too long. A recounting of every minute detail of every single thing that happened in an incident would take as long as the incident itself. We all have a natural editing process that we use when relating a situation or incident. People will tell you what they think is important, or what they think is important for you to know. Either way, it is their perception and within this lies one of the fundamentals of truth detection. This natural editing process can also be used to conceal information that is embarrassing, shaming and/or criminal. Until now the listener has had very limited means to interpret or analyse what was actually being said in order to detect deception and boundaries of the truth.

SPEECH ACTS AS COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS

We engage in the type of communicative interaction where we convey what is going on in our minds. We convey what we see, know, think, believe, want, intend or feel. We convey our mental state by using words. Whatever we are trying to accomplish within language can be called our *communicative intention*. However, Dirven and Verspoor (1998: 163) say that not all talk is meant to convey intentions. Quite often we talk just for the sake of talking.

The actual words that we use to realise a communicative intention is called a *speech act*. According to Austin (1962) concluded that whenever we say anything, we always “perform” a speech act because we “do” something with words. We state a belief, we request something of someone, we

promise something to someone, and we express thanks and so on. Austin 1962: 108 claims that in uttering a sentence, one concomitantly produces three acts: a locutionary, an illocutionary and a perlocutionary act.

Felicity conditions

Searle (1969) also gives a number of conditions for certain particular speech acts that he believes should be met if the act is to be felicitous. He states that there should be normal input and output conditions, that communication is supposed to be literal and serious, to take place between a sender and a receiver who are physically and physiologically able to communicate. This seems to be a general requirement on communication (and this is mentioned by Mersham and Skinner). However, Searle (1969) assumes that verbal communication normally is literal.

Searle's (1969) sincerity condition states that the speaker intends to perform the action his expressed proposition predicates of him. Most communicative acts by convention convey information about a certain attitude of mind or motive that is supposed to be expressed by the communicative act in question. Further, it is bad to be unethical: not having the attitudes one by convention is supposed to have in performing a certain communicative act would be to deceive, and deception is unethical. Thus this condition is really a general ethical requirement on communication to the effect that it should not be deceptive.

Intentionality

Searle (1983: 1) defines intentionality as that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world. One example he quotes is that if you have a fear it must be a fear of something, or that something is going to happen. He calls this feature of directedness or aboutness 'intentionality'. However, he is quick to point out that not all mental states and events have intentionality. He quotes beliefs, fears, hopes and anxieties as intentional, but a person may feel undirected anxiety or nervousness, which may have no apparent cause. These states are accompanied by beliefs and desires, which may or may not have a cause. They are therefore not intentional.

He also warns that intentionality is not the same as consciousness because you may suddenly experience a feeling of sadness without knowing why. According to Searle (1983: 2) consciousness must not be equated with intentionality. To Searle (1983: 3) intending to do something is just one form of intentionality along with belief, hope, fear, desire and lots of others. An act is something you do. Searle uses the illustration that if you are asked "What are you doing now?" and you reply: "I am now wondering whether I can buy land at an auction," that will not be an answer.

Beliefs and goals

Previous accounts of dialogue understanding have assumed that dialogues are cooperative in a Gricean sense so that the participants are truthful, informative but not verbose, relevant and clear. However, such assumptions ignore the possibility of conflicting beliefs and goals on the part of the participants. Carberry (1990) says that acts of deception and cases of mistaken belief have distinct belief conditions, which the hearer can recognise. In using plan recognition to understand the meaning of a speaker's utterance, it is essential to first ascribe the correct set of beliefs to the speaker.

Carberry (1990) adds that the understanding of utterances based on either deception or a mistaken belief is a form of keyhole recognition, which is difficult in practice. However, both sets of belief conditions can be used in the recognition and understanding of conversational implicature in cooperative dialogue. If the speaker is attempting to implicate some additional meaning then s/he must assume that the hearer will recognise their attempt as such. This is only possible if the speaker is sure that the hearer can eliminate the possibility of deception or mistaken belief on the part of the speaker. The process of eliminating such cases as possible interpretations forces the hearer to make additional belief ascriptions, which the speaker can rely on to communicate conversational implicatures.

Clearly, sophisticated uses of deception involve more than the flouting of the felicity conditions of a single speech act. For example, a speaker may attempt to establish a proposition earlier in the dialogue to validate the conditions of the main deception or attempt to mislead the hearer by seizing the initiative of the dialogue to draw it away from the actual subject of the deception.

Speech acts and power relations

Speakers can choose to impart information by using mood. They can elect to make a statement, ask a question, give a command, or make an expletive. For example, the following sentences could all be used to communicate the moods of the people as well as the power relations between people on the Titanic as well as what is happening to them as it sinks.

The following examples imply that the speaker has more power than the addressee:

- Interrogative: "Are there enough lifeboats?"
- Imperative: "Get a life vest quickly, and put it on!"
- Exclamatory: "Help my husband," screamed a woman. "He can't swim!"

In the following examples words are used to perform speech acts in which the addressee has more power:

- Requests: “It would be nice if you could save my jewellery.”
- Apology: “I am sorry I could not be on time.”

SYNTHESIS

In this chapter I explain that Classification Information Theory serves as a springboard for the explanation of the complex and dynamic aspects of communication. I state that because the Shannon and Weaver model is not intended as a model of cognition (how neural impulses are transmitted through the neural arrays of the human brain to form complex and often-ambiguous concepts), a more appropriate model needs to be devised.

Intentional deception occurs through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence. Communication is not value neutral, and manifests as state of formal domination, equality, subordination, or an undecided power relation, which relate to persuasion, social influence and compliance gaining. Merham and Skinner’s model as a typical example of a General Communication Model is therefore not suitable to discuss the complexities of human communication.

Without some measure of agreement on the meanings of words, communication and persuasion would be difficult, if not impossible. Effect persuaders are aware that meanings of words are subjective and attempt to adapt their messages accordingly. Research therefore reveals that vividness can be an effective persuasive tool. The semiotician tries to “read” each message from several perspectives – from the words that are or are not spoken, from the context in which or from which they are spoken, and from the other signifiers included in and with the message – for example, visuals, colours and tone of voice, uncovering meaning from the smallest detail. The responsible receiver of those many persuasive messages needs to act likewise whenever possible.

Those in power in society invite us to enter their fantasy world, a world of deceptions and disguises. Power consists of the ability to move people toward certain ends, and command resources, to get things done. An act of deception occurs when a speech act is performed intentionally to communicate a false proposition. The actual words that we use to realise a communicative intention are called *speech acts*. Acts of deception and cases of mistaken belief have distinct belief conditions, which the hearer can recognise.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I showed that communication cannot take place unless all three elements of communicator, medium and recipient are present. I stated further that current communication

problems result from bias and misinformation, as well as from deliberate deception. Taking Shannon and Weaver's theory as point of departure, I showed that messages could suffer from a number of unintended distortions and interference and that symbols are arbitrary but have the power to shape perceptions and construct social reality. I also examined the power of labels and how, oftentimes, through the use of euphemisms and doublespeak, persuaders attempt to lessen (or strengthen) the connotative impact of a word. The chapter also looked at speech acts as communicative intentions. In the next chapter I will examine deception in animals.

DECEPTION IN ANIMALS

INTRODUCTION

The core intention of this chapter is to study deception patterns in animals. I will show that from birth every creature has an obsession with the continuation of its own life. Survival requires well-developed senses. Deception in animals is not intentional, but a strategy evolved for the preservation of the species.

Communication evolves because it enables the sender to influence profoundly the behaviour of the receiver. I will discuss how the four levels of deception, intelligence for complex feeding patterns and how social manipulation requires large amounts of brain power. Influence strategies and courtship behaviour can be explained in terms of the evolutionary arms race. I will examine how stealth, mimicry, and other strategies of deception are also important features that are indispensable for survival and success. The chapter will show that it is the primates that are capable of creative lying. I will illustrate with examples that deceit is not unique to the human race.

ANIMAL COMMUNICATION

Crail (1983: 7) states that an inborn biological obsession with the continuation of its own life prevails in every creature at the moment of its birth. This is not a choice; it is a compulsion. Language is born out of that compulsion. Once breath itself is found, the first incessant, monotonous, compulsive gestures and sounds from any creature will shout and murmur the need for food and protection.

According to Crail grizzly bears speak in a roar, birds in a tweet, but such signals as they have derived from a common need: survival. Despite the common contention that animals other than humans lack language, there are basic ideas connected to survival that nearly all animals can transmit in one form or another.

Crail (1983: 7) states that when prey grew scarce, but tourists common, western coyotes in the national forests convert themselves into beggars. They often approach tourists with submissive sounds and gestures, looking for a handout. To those who love the coyote and its wild ways, this is a sign of the

animal's degradation through human contact. It is also a sign that the coyote adapts its communication system to the nature of changing times.

According to (Bailey (1994: 140) one of the most sophisticated forms of communication is the dancing of honeybees. Returning from the search for food, a forager performs a dance on the comb in the darkness of the hive which conveys not only the type of flower found, but also its direction and distance from the hive. The other workers sense the information through the vibrations and sounds created by the angle of the dance on the comb, the whirring of the dancer's wings and the wiggling of her abdomen. The dance is also adjusted to allow for the changing position of the sun and the direction and speed of the prevailing wind.

Sounding the alarm

Branson (1993: 104) and Bright (1984: 11) state that an animal has communicated with another when it has transmitted information that influences a listener's behaviour. For example, if a blackbird should see a cat in the garden, it gives an alarm call, and all the other birds in the neighbourhood flee for cover. The bird that has spotted the cat has conveyed information to the rest, which were able to take evasive action. Each bird's behaviour was influenced by the sound.

Bright (1984: 12) adds that the birds in the area benefited. They received an early warning that a cat was about. The spotter benefited too – it escaped in the mass confusion. Modern approaches to animal behaviour warn researchers to beware of mutual benefits. If a bird spots a cat and gives a cry, it draws attention to itself and may risk being caught itself. A bird that cheats by remaining silent would not run the risk, but might take advantage of other birds that do cry out. There must be direct benefit to the bird that sounds the alarm. There is also benefit to the recipient or it would not respond to the call.

Communication as manipulation

Bright (1984: 12) states that Krebs and Dawkins of the University of Oxford propose that communication evolves because it enables the sender to influence profoundly the behaviour of the receiver. Signals from actors manipulate the behaviour of the reactors. At the same time there is the evolution of resistance on the part of the receiver who is being manipulated. Krebs draws on the cuckoo nestling being fed by foster parents as an example of this continuous tug-of-war. He feels that it is not helpful to consider the young cuckoo's gaping mouth as communicating something useful to the sedge warbler. Rather, the cuckoo is manipulating the sedge warbler's behaviour, to the advantage of the cuckoo and to the disadvantage of the warbler parents. During the course of evolution there has been an evolutionary race between sender and receiver. At this point in time, the cuckoo is leading.

Krebs maintains that in say 10 000 years the sedge warbler may have developed the capacity to discriminate against cuckoos.

Bright (1984: 20) states that in order for communication to take place, the receiver must be able to hear the sound. There must be an organ for converting sound waves into vibrations, and in turn into nerve impulses, which represent the original signals and register in the brain. Such an organ is the ear, but ears need not be on the head. Crickets hear through their elbows, spiders detect vibrations through their feet and fruit flies through their antennae.

SYSTEMS OF ANIMAL COMMUNICATION NOT FOR DISSEMINATION OF TRUTH

The above examples amply demonstrate that deceit as an influence strategy is neither new nor a human invention. Rather, the animal precedent is quite clear: Trivers (1985: 395) explains that one of the most important things to realise about systems of animal communication is that they are not systems for the dissemination of the truth. This is the result of a vast amount of research on animal communication. Cronk (1991) suggests following the example of animal behaviour studies in seeing communication more as a means to manipulate others than as a means to inform them. Bailey (1994: 82) states that much of the diversity of life on our planet today has evolved in response to the need to eat and to avoid being eaten.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND

From the time an infant is born, s/he is able to manipulate her/his parents with her/his crying. Subtle variations will indicate to the parents whether the child is uncomfortable or hungry, in pain or frightened. According to Bright (1984: 9) a simple cry will carry information about his emotional state or his identity. Crying is the child's link to the outside world. By crying he elicits or not a parent's response, and begins to share a concept of the environment, developing patterns of competence or helplessness that may persist throughout his life. The child, like so many other animals, gets what he wants with sounds.

Bright (1984: 11) adds that animals use sounds to attract, inform or warn. They can inform others where they are, what state they are in, where food may be found, that they should not come nearer, that they may approach closer, that they are stronger and weaker, or that they are closely related. Sound can also inform predators, so it must be carefully controlled. It may be in competition with the sounds of others. To avoid interference and confusion in a noisy environment, sounds need to be highly specific and used in particular behavioural contexts.

Bright (1984: 13) believes that a primary reason for using sound is that an animal can get far more information packed into a signal for a given unit of time. If a conversation depended on, say, smell, it would be difficult to get rid of the first part of the message in order to send the next bit. There is little a sender could do to manipulate the signal, and it would be extremely laborious to send a long message. The same is true for visual signals. The rapidity with which even a semaphore-type of signal can be changed does not compare with the speed with which a sound can be turned on and off. Sound can also go around corners. At night sound and smell have obvious advantages over sight (unless an individual can make its own light), but scent is likely to linger and attract predators. Sound also enables a creature to announce its territorial rights without having to visit all parts of its domain.

THE AXON AS MESSAGE CARRIER

Branson (1993: 66) states that the main part of a nerve is the nerve cell or neuron. In most animals, nerve cells have the same basic build. There is a cell body that contains the nucleus, and a long thin extension like a wire known as the axon. The axon acts like a wire carrying signals along its length. At its tip, the axon splits into branches. Each branch ends in a button-shaped pad that almost touches the next cell, which may be another nerve cell or a muscle cell. At the other end of the nerve cell, projecting from the cell body, there are also many branches called dendrites that receive messages from other nerves. The axons of some nerve cells are more than one metre long.

Branson (1993: 66) states that the thicker the axon of the nerve cell, the faster the message travels along it. In many animals, special thick axons carry messages that may mean life or death, making the animal take evasive action. For example, in the squid, giant axons run from the brain to the muscles that shoot water from its body, when the animal needs jet propulsion to escape from its enemies.

FIGHT OR FLIGHT RESPONSE

Branson (1993: 72) state that the “emergency reactions” that take place in a frightened person prepare the body for fleeing or fighting the danger. The airways widen and breathing increases, the surface blood vessels contract and make the skin pale, and more blood is sent to the muscles. More sugar is released into the blood to provide easily used energy. The heart skips up its work. We notice other reactions, like the hair on the back of our necks standing up.

Branson (1993: 72) adds that similar reactions take place in animals. A frightened cat’s heart beats faster and its fur stands on end. These “fight or flight” reactions are caused by a chemical, adrenaline, flooding through the body. It is made in special glands, the adrenals, and is released into the

bloodstream in times of stress. The chemical travels rapidly around the body in the blood and affects just a few “target organs” such as the heart and lungs.

DOMINANCE HIERARCHIES

In chapter 4 I examined power relationships in humans power as a state of formal domination, equality, subordination, or an undecided power, to move people towards a particular goal. Grzimek (1977: 389-390) states that whether one animal is superior to another depends on the place and sometimes also on the time of an encounter. This is called relative social hierarchy. On the other hand, when an animal is always dominant regardless of place and time, this is regarded as absolute social hierarchy, generally known as rank order or dominance hierarchy.

Aside from the defence of territories and individual distances, the formation of social hierarchies is yet another source of aggressive interactions. Under normal conditions we find this kind of organisation almost exclusively among members of social species; but in forced communities as in captivity, even normally solitary animals will create dominant and submissive ranks. Physical strength is not the only factor that determines position in the hierarchy. Low-ranking females may rise in status when paired with high-ranking males. Female baboons attain a higher position when in heat or when they have young. The dominant males in a baboon troop do have to earn their rank mainly by physical force and endurance, but after that they keep it by virtue of intelligence and experience even when they grow old and weak.

Function of aggression and dominance

Grzimek (1977: 391) states that the stronger and healthier individuals are selected for reproduction in their competitive fights for females, territories and social dominance, providing the best guarantee for offspring, capable of surviving. This kind of selection through intraspecific conflict has led to the natural breeding of particularly strong animals, especially males well able to defend themselves. Fights may serve to obtain certain objects (especially territories), to maintain individual distance, and to gain a position of dominance. The privileges of high-ranking animals with regard to food and sleeping places ensure that at least those animals remain well fed and rested that are required to fulfil special functions within the group and in the group's defence.

DECEPTION IN ANIMALS: FOUR LEVELS

Slater (1986: 32) illustrates that most animals are in potential danger of being eaten by another animal at some time in their lives but they all have evolved ways of diminishing this danger. Evolution

has produced deceptive mechanisms. Heilmann (undated: <http://www.a3.com/myself/truthppr.htm>) lists four levels of deception:

Level one is permanent appearance, for example a butterfly whose tail looks like a head, so it can escape when a bird attacks its tail thinking it is its head, or animals that look like wasps or other unpalatable species (in humans level one might occur in the form of fat on woman's hip to look like a bigger space for babies or the low male voice).

Level two is coordinated action. Examples are fireflies that mimic the mating flashes of the female of another firefly species in order to prey on the males. It also includes bird's injury feigning in order to distract predators from their nest. (An example of this in humans could it be infatuation: a male that truly believes every week that he will forever love the woman he met this week.)

Level three involves learning, like in a dog that feigns injury because he has been petted more when he had a broken leg. Deceit may depend on the deceived organism's learning, too: a blue jay learns to avoid a palatable butterfly after experiencing the nausea of eating the similar looking distasteful one.

Level 4 involves planning: a chimp who misleads about the location of food, by looking the wrong way or purposefully walking past it, rather like a human who lies on purpose. Conscious planning of deception requires a "theory of mind", an understanding of what goes on in other individual's minds. In animals it is hard to show that an action involves conscious understanding and planning.

SENSES AND SURVIVAL

Bailey (1994: 130) states that the senses are the link between an animal and its environment, and between one animal and another. Simply to survive requires well-developed senses. Food may be located by smell, taste sight or even sound. In large groups, or even among strangers, young animals recognise their parents, and parents their young, by the calls they make or by their distinctive smell. For animals such as wolves, chimpanzees, hunting dogs and meerkats, body postures and facial expressions are vital social signals, helping to bond the group together and reduce aggression.

According to Bailey, to make this range of nonverbal communication possible, many animals have sensory capabilities that far outstrip those of humans. The surprising feats of navigation and migration accomplished by some animals – from small birds to huge whales – often involve unexpected senses: animals may recognise such signals as infrasound and the Earth's magnetic field.

Bailey (1994: 130) adds that senses are crucial in every stage of life. The earliest cells that grow to form an animal can detect gradients of various chemicals, which determine which parts of the cells develop into the different organs of the body. Some of the strongest sensory signals are sent in courtship. In competing for mates, territory and food, the animal that sends the strongest signals is usually the most successful.

INTER-SPECIES SIGNALLING

Branson (1993: 104) states that the warning coloration of venomous animals is an example of one species getting a message across to another. Warning growls and baring of teeth are common expressions of aggressive behaviour among mammals, and are understood across the species divide. Warning displays are used as "keep off" notices by some nesting birds. These can communicate a deceptive message. The Cutthroat finch of Africa is small and harmless, but if disturbed on its nest it will open its mouth and writhe its neck about in an intimidating, snakelike display which is usually enough to put off any curious intruder.

INTELLIGENCE IN PRIMATES EVOLVED BECAUSE OF SOCIAL MANIPULATION

Heilmann (undated: <http://www.a3.com/myself/truthppr.htm>) states that there are two theories about why primates evolved such a high intelligence:

Intelligence for complex feeding patterns

Complex feeding patterns, like processing nuts and finding fruits in the forest and knowing which fruit is ripe at which place and what time requires higher intelligence than just eating grass and leaves. As support, frugivorous monkeys have relatively larger brains than leave eaters. While this might have given brain development an extra boost, it is not convincing that this is the main reason for primate brain size. Small-brained animals like birds and bees find complex food sources that are distributed in time and space. Squirrels have pretty good location memory for what they buried. Therefore, the second theory is much more convincing.

Intelligence for social manipulation

Heilmann (undated: <http://www.a3.com/myself/truthppr.htm>) explains that the complexities of social manipulation require large amounts of brainpower. There are many group-living animals, but their social hierarchy is quite simple and interactions among individuals are limited. Only primates have complex social manipulations and intrigues. They can play off one individual against another, conspire and plot successfully, or retaliate against relatives and allies of attackers.

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SIGN LANGUAGE IN GORILLAS

Crail (1983: 22-23) states that two gorillas trained in American Sign Language appeared to go much further than dolphins or chimpanzees have ever gone. The trainers depicted the gorillas as slangy, deceitful and capable of making up lively epithets. One of the gorillas supposedly called the photographer who dogs their footsteps a “devil toilet”. Francine Patterson, the Stanford trained developmental psychologist who originated the gorilla training, described gorillas as bursting with unexpected thoughts. She stated that Michael, the young male, reported a dream in which coyotes were attacking the Gorilla Fountain his (trailer-house home). She believes he tried to tell them (gorilla signs have to be interpreted) that if anything like that happens; he is ready and will fight off the coyotes to save the humans.

Creative lying

Crail (1983: 137-138) states that Penny Patterson, in stating that gorillas lie, directly confronted the assertion that even though animals may signal ingeniously, they are not capable of creative thinking. Whatever the objections to them, lies are creative. They fall within that part of language, which is “half art”. Lies are different from memorisation or mimicking. They call for a conclusion on the animal’s part that it would not like to get caught or that it would like to talk you out of something.

Crail (1983: 137-138) says that Patterson described an incident in which Koko the gorilla “was caught in the act of trying to break a window screen with a chopstick” she had stolen from the silverware drawer”. She put the chopstick in her mouth to do some of her pretend-smoking, a game she likes to play. The incident suggests that, aside from lying, gorillas also steal from the silverware drawer and conceive fancy ideas for jimmying windows.

When the kitchen sink gave way a few inches when Koko sat on it, she seemed to feel guilty. When Koko was asked if she had done that, her reply was to fix the blame on Patterson’s deaf assistant by saying “Kate there bad”.

INFLUENCE STRATEGIES AND COURTSHIP BEHAVIOUR

According to (Heilmann undated: <http://www.a3.com/myself/truthppr.htm>), a lot of human behaviour, like influence strategies and courtship behaviour can be explained in terms of the evolutionary arms race. Arms races are extremely frequent in evolution. They occur between species, like the cheetah and the gazelle driving each other to ever increasing speed records. Unpalatable and poisonous animals often provide a niche for imitators who free ride on the respect predators confer on the original poisonous species. A three-way arms race occurs between the predator who tries to distinguish between the impostor and the original, unpalatable animal that gains from truly advertising its impalatability and being clearly discernible, and the impostor who can only survive by being indiscernible.

DECEPTION AS A SURVIVAL STRATEGY

In the animal world it is usually the survival of the fittest. The following are strategies in animals, often deceptive in nature, designed to ensure the survival of the species.

Faking injury

Cherfas (1991: 25) describes how the parent bird of the plover flaps away awkwardly as if it is injured and unable to fly if it sees an enemy approach the nest of a ringed plover. At the same time it is leading the enemy away from the young birds in the nest. Once the enemy is well away from the nest, the plover flies up suddenly and escapes. It returns to the nest later when the danger has passed.

The plover deceives the enemy and fakes injury as a survival mechanism. She carries out and modifies her charade only when there is an interested audience, someone who looks as if he might poach her eggs. If the potential predator approaches but looks away from the nest, the plover will most likely sit still. But if the predator approaches with eyes directed toward the nest, then the injury-feigning display begins in full. The plover appears sensitive to the predator's behaviour and has, at her wing tips, a suite of staged moves to pull off the bluff.

Caterpillars on the rampage

The very survival of the eyed hawk-moth caterpillar depends on an inborn behavioural act. Tinbergen (1969: 97) explains that the colouring of the caterpillar is such that when it hangs from the underside of a twig, the light coming from overhead gives it a uniform shade and makes it hard for hungry birds to see. But if turned over, the caterpillar immediately becomes visible. If it is put in this position, it hurries to get back under the twig, since its normal behaviour is to remain upside down.

Many caterpillars feed at night when they cannot be seen by hungry birds. Others that are active during the day protect themselves with bristly poisonous hairs that birds find distasteful, and to prevent themselves being pointlessly killed, they advertise the fact with bright colours. Burton (1990: 20) and Chinery (2000: 22) state that the caterpillar of the elephant hawk moth has two large patches on its head, which look just like eyes. When a bird wants to eat the caterpillar, it lifts up its head to show these 'eyes' and the bird is scared away. Pretending to be much bigger or fiercer than you really are is a good way of frightening your enemies and making sure they do not press home an attack. Displaying large eye-like markings is a particularly good form of bluff, especially when the markings are revealed suddenly. Still others rely on camouflage and render themselves invisible by taking the colour of either the leaf they have destroyed or the twig to which they are clinging. The match is so close that the best chance you have of finding them is to look, not for the insects themselves, but for the mutilated leaves they leave behind. Hunting birds, it seems, adopt the same technique. At any rate, many caterpillars go to considerable trouble to dispose of their leftovers, carefully snipping off damaged stalks or partially eaten leaves and letting them fall to the ground. Others take care not to rest after meals near where they have fed but clamour away to a distant twig.

Not what they seem

Branson (1993: 100) states that some predators deceive prey by mimicking the appearance and initial behaviour of harmless species. On the coral reef there are small predatory fish that resemble cleaner fish and imitate their behaviour. When an unsuspecting fish comes up to be cleaned the predator dashes in and bites off a chunk of flesh. The Zone-tailed hawk of North America uses a similar deception. It often soars in the company of vultures. Small mammals feel no danger from vultures and remain unaware of the hawk until it is too late.

Camouflage and mimicry in the world of the spider

Sterry (1996: 61) states that many spiders have clearly decided that it is better to avoid detection in the first place than to have to defend themselves against attack. Whether in leaves, bark, twigs, flowers or even bird droppings, if you search long and hard enough, there is likely to be a spider that either blends into or resembles its camouflage. Many of these examples of camouflage or mimicry serve a dual purpose, not only hiding the spider from potential predators, but also concealing it from potential prey. A few examples of camouflage, usually accompanied by appropriate behaviour, appear to have only a defensive function.

Sterry (1996) adds that tropical spiders spend much of their time resting on bark. These spiders will generally have markings and coloration to suit a particular tree species and a flattened body fringed with hairs. These hairs serve an important function in that they reduce or almost eliminate any shadow

that might be cast by the spider's legs and body. Many species of the crab spiders are colourful and use their camouflage to good advantage. They are difficult to spot both by potential prey and by predators. When they choose the wrong colour flower, however, they become an easy target.

Spiders employ a variety of stratagems to protect themselves from predators to conceal themselves from potential prey. Neary (1977: 26) explains that a number of species have become masters of deception. Some have perfected a natural camouflage called cryptic coloration that enables them to blend into the background, where they hide or lie in wait. Others bear a protective resemblance to inert objects common in the environment such as lichen or bird droppings.

This differs from mimicry. A mimic spider assumes the physical appearance of different, less vulnerable animals. Some spiders go undetected by seeking refuge in cover provided by their surroundings, such as rocky crevices or leaves. If disturbed, however, a spider will quickly abandon its concealment or drop its assumed identity and simply flee for its life.

Sterry (1996: 27) describes a sunny summer day in a woodland clearing where colourful wildflowers abound and are constantly visited by the nectar-feeding insects filling the air. One flower in particular looks especially inviting and attracts the attention of a passing fritillary butterfly. Lured by the prospect of sugar-rich nectar, the unsuspecting insect gets more than it bargained for: a perfectly camouflaged crab spider grabs it in a deadly embrace. For about half an hour, the butterfly and spider remain locked together, the butterfly seemingly indulging in an unrivalled meal, but it is the spider that is feasting, and when it finishes its meal, the intact but drained remains of the butterfly flutter in the wind and fall lifeless to the ground.

Sterry (1996: 27) states that although not every species uses this form of deception, a great many crab spiders do, and some exhibit the most remarkable camouflage. Pink spiders sit on pink flowers and yellow spiders on yellow ones; some even show a remarkable similarity in terms of shape to the petals on which they are found.

Sterry (1996: 30) states further that the spiders grasp the flower on which they are sitting with the two hindmost pair of legs, leaving the long front two pairs – which are armed with spines – pointing skywards in the anticipation of a victim. When a butterfly or other insect settles on the flower to feed, the legs clamp shut and grab the victim; the internal contents are drained. If the butterfly happens to land too far away on the flower to be caught, the spider will slowly and carefully shift its position to a more favourable one for capturing its prey.

Deceptive hunting techniques

Bailey (1994: 90) states that chase is not the only way a solitary hunter can operate. Birds such as bee-eaters and flycatchers simply wait for an insect to pass, then dart out and catch it. Lizards and jumping spiders do likewise. Foxes and cats pounce on mice in long grass. Tree snakes hang motionless from branches, like rigid vines, as they wait for birds to pass by. The archerfish spits well-aimed streams of water droplets at insects on overhanging branches to knock them into the water.

Bailey (1994: 90) adds that many hunters wait for the prey to come to them. Praying mantises, chameleons, frogs and toads all wait almost motionless for long periods until unwary animals come within reach of their long arms or long, sticky tongues. Successful ambush usually involves camouflage, which is used by a variety of hunters from chameleons and mantises to octopuses and flatfish, which can also change colour to keep in tune with their background. Other hunters stalk their prey, adopting special body poses to make themselves less conspicuous. Polar bears stalk seals on the sea ice where there is no cover at all. Crocodiles lurk just below the surfaces of lakes and rivers, with only their bulging eyes and nostrils showing, edging closer and closer to the shore when the prey come to drink.

Bailey (1994: 90) states that a lure helps to draw the prey to the predator. Anglerfish have lures, which are modified spines of the first dorsal fin. The lure dangles in front of the angler's mouth and wiggles like a worm, attracting the attention of small fish. Once a fish is within reach, the angler suddenly opens its huge mouth, and the prey is sucked in with the in-rushing water. Deep-sea anglerfish use luminous lures that glow in the dark. The snapping turtle has a fleshy pink wormlike lure in the floor of its mouth, and young copperhead snakes have a sulphur yellow tip to their tail, which they wave to entice frogs within striking distance.

Bailey (1994: 90-91) states that there are more elaborate traps. Spider silk is used to construct a whole range of traps, from orb webs that catch flying insects to funnel webs for unwary insects and silken-trap lines which tell the trapdoor spider when to pounce. The net-casting spider makes a small rectangular sheet web, which it dangles, just above the ground, ready to throw over any insect that passes beneath. The ant-lion larva makes a funnel-shaped depression in the sand and waits for passing insects to fall in, bombarding them with sand to help them fall. There are floating traps too: the trailing tentacles of jellyfish, armed with barbed threads for stinging.

Adaptive fancy dress

The tortoise beetle has developed some unique devices to protect itself during each stage of its metamorphosis. Neary (1977: 70) explains that when tortoise beetle larvae have undergone their first moult, instead of discarding their dried skins like most moulting insects, the grubs collect them on a

kind of fork at the end of their tail, piling up skins from successive moults and forming a fancy-dress umbrella that may serve as camouflage and protect them from such predators as parasitic wasps.

As the beetles enter their pupal stage, the mass of dead skin is finally discarded. Although during this time the pupae hang motionless within their mummy-like cases from the undersides of leaves, they undergo dramatic internal changes that result in a shimmering iridescent adult form. As adults, tortoise beetles resort to a different defence tactic. When threatened, they drop to the ground, where they play dead, feet in the air, until the danger has passed.

The masqueraders

Cherfas (1991: 10) states that many animals go to extraordinary lengths to look like something they are not. Neary (1977: 110) and Cherfas (1991: 10) detail how *Kallima* butterflies alight onto a low bush, close their bright hind wings exposing the drab under-surface and freeze into an uncanny imitation of dry leaves. The remarkable disguises of butterflies, moths and their caterpillars have taken three forms:

- 1) Protective resemblance, assuming the shape of something else, like a moth that poses as a thorn
- 2) Mimicry, imitating dangerous or poisonous creatures that are shunned by predators, and
- 3) Crypsis, or camouflage, melting into a natural background such as moss, leaves or lichens

Cherfas (1991: 10) adds that such masquerades are not conscious or deliberate changes wrought by the insects; they are the result of natural selection. When a mutant butterfly happens by chance to take on protective colouring or form and survives, while its undisguised brethren perish, the changes are passed on to some of its offspring, and after many generations become characteristic of the species - a masquerade that is a striking example of the survival of the fittest.

Sbordoni and Forestiero (1984: 208) state that eyespots are another form of signal for disorienting predators. They resemble large eyes and either intimidate the predator or draw its attention to parts of the body that are less vulnerable than the head. This kind of highly conspicuous signal is found on the hind wings of many butterflies and moths and on the thorax or abdomen of caterpillars of several families. The false eyes are often large and lens-shaped, with a series of paler concentric rings around a dark, pupil-like centre; the result is that they always resemble the eye of a vertebrate. Eyespots are most effective when exposed suddenly and directly to the source of danger. A predator then receives the impression of being stared at and threatened by some kind of vertebrae.

The orthopteroids are set apart as the master masqueraders among the insects. Neary 1977: 48 illustrates that the walking sticks look enough like twigs to fool any predator. They remain apparently motionless during the day and move slowly about in search of vegetation under the cover of darkness. Their relatives, the leaf insects, are equally remarkable in their disguise as bogus leaves, which have convinced natives of tropical lands that these animals actually began life as buds on trees or bushes. Neither the stick nor leaf insects will drop their disguise under duress; even when handled, they usually remain motionless.

Neary (1977: 48) states that certain tropical mantises are clever mimics posing in flowerbeds and nodding their brightly coloured heads in the breeze, in unison with real flowers, until some insect approaches. Indeed, “preying” mantids might be a better name for the oddly constructed praying mantises, for they are rapacious killers that are esteemed by many farmers for consumption of crop-destroying insects.

Usefully deaf

Branson (1993: 50) states that some creatures that are otherwise well equipped with sensory organs, such as the octopus and squid, lack true ears. However, this may be useful. Some of their main predators are toothed whales such as the Sperm whale, which are thought to stun their prey with incredibly loud bursts of sound. No squid could escape such a powerful noise at close range, but deafness may protect it while the predator is some way off, and let the squid escape.

SYNTHESIS

In the animal world it is usually the survival of the fittest. Deceptive strategies like faking injury, camouflage and mimicry are designed to ensure the survival of the species. To make this range of nonverbal communication possible, many animals have sensory capabilities that far outstrip those of humans. This chapter has revealed that while animals use body language in faking injury, camouflage and mimicry, humans use a combination of nonverbal and verbal communication to manipulate and deceive others.

CONCLUSION

The core intention of this chapter was to study deception patterns in animals. I showed that from birth every creature has an obsession with the continuation of its own life. Survival requires well-developed senses. Deception in animals is not intentional, but a strategy evolved for the preservation of the species.

Communication evolves because it enables the sender to influence profoundly the behaviour of the receiver. I discussed how the four levels of deception, intelligence for complex feeding patterns and how social manipulation, require large amounts of brain power. Influence strategies and courtship behaviour can be explained in terms of the evolutionary arms race. I examined how stealth, mimicry, and other strategies of deception are also important features that are indispensable for survival and success. The chapter showed that it is the primates that are capable of creative lying. I illustrated with examples that deceit is not unique to the human race. In the next chapter I will focus on self-deception.

SELF-DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will discuss how self-deception forms an integral part of social reality. I will show that when we are self-deceived, we have false beliefs about ourselves. Self-deception is assumed to be an integral part of one's psychic defences, to be a critical constituent of normal (although not thereby desirable) personality make-up. I look at how psychological factors affect the will to believe, and provide examples of cases where people, though confronted with evidence, refuse to affirm their condition. The false self develops at the earliest stage of object relations when there is not good-enough mothering, when the mother does not meet and implement the omnipotence of the infant. I will then look at the effect of the environment on the development of the false self, focussing on self-deception enhancement and self-deception denial. I will focus on the Johari window, describing how the mind will at times protect one from the anxiety of dissonance by creating a blind spot – a zone of blocked attention and self-deception. I will then illustrate that self-deception has played a largely positive role in human evolution.

THE TERM SELF-DECEPTION

Microsoft Encarta Reference Library (2002) states that when one is self-deceiving, one is usually refusing to recognize the truth, usually because to do so would be painful or difficult. What goes wrong, when we are self-deceived, is that we lack self-knowledge; or, more accurately, since one can lack knowledge without falling into error, what goes wrong is that we have *false* beliefs about ourselves. Not any kind of false belief about oneself; I am not self-deceived when I mistake my shoe size. Rather, self-deception requires false beliefs about the kind of subject matter that, were one to get it right, would constitute self-knowledge.

Gur and Sackheim (1979: 147) define *self-deception* as the motivated unawareness of one of two conflicting cognitions. They required that:

- The individual holds two contradictory beliefs (p and not-p)
- These beliefs are held simultaneously
- The individual is not aware of holding one of the beliefs (for example p) and

- The mental operation that determines which mental content is and which is not subject to awareness is motivated

Goleman (1998b: 12) states that self-deception, by its very nature, is the most elusive of mental facts. We do not see what it is that we do not see.

Gur and Sackheim (1979), state that the term self-deception functions at three levels. First, on the descriptive level, we may speak of people's actions as self-deceived. We may believe that a person's current passion is in marked contrast to his long-enduring life patterns, and conclude that his actions are an instance of self-deception. At the same time, this designation informs us of the psychological basis of the conduct. Self-deceived action must, by definition, be the result of a process by the same name. To say that one is "self-deceived" is to say something about one's moral character. Person description generally operates in such a way as to hold persons responsible for their actions. To describe therefore tends to render the person vulnerable to praise and blame (positive and negative social sanctions).

SELF-ESTEEM

According to Goleman (1998b: 98), information that threatens the self – that does not support the story one tells oneself about oneself – threatens the self-esteem. Such threats are a major source of anxiety. For animals, stress is most often in the form of a threat to life or limb. For humans, though, a challenge to self-esteem is enough to brew anxiety.

Baumeister et al (2005: 86) state that self-esteem is a helpful attribute. It improves persistence in the face of failure. Individuals with high self-esteem sometimes perform better in groups than do those with low self-esteem. Also, a poor self-image is a risk factor for certain eating disorders, especially bulimia.

According to Baumeister et al (2005: 86) most investigators just ask people what they think of themselves. The answers are often coloured by the common tendency to want to make oneself look good. Physical attractiveness was found to have a strong correlation with self-esteem. Those with high self-esteem are gorgeous in their own eyes but not necessarily so to others.

A parallel phenomenon affects those with low self-esteem, who are prone to floccinaucinihilipilification, a highfalutin word (among the longest in the Oxford English Dictionary), which is defined as "the action or habit of estimating as worthless" (Baumeister et al 2005: 87).

People with low self-esteem are not merely down on themselves; they are negative about everything. This tendency has certainly distorted some assessments. Baumeister et al have come to the following conclusions about self-esteem:

- Self-esteem is viewed as a communal problem for Americans, who worry that inadequate self-esteem leads to various undesirable behaviours
- Bullies, contrary to popular perception, do not typically suffer from low self-esteem. Neither do those who become sexually active at an early age, nor do those prone to abusing alcohol or illicit drugs
- Raising self-esteem is not likely to boost performance in school or on the job
- People with high self-esteem tend to show more initiative and appear to be significantly happier than others

Baumeister et al (2005: 87) state that the failure to contribute significantly at school or at the office would be easily offset if a heightened sense of self-worth helped someone to get along better with others. Having a good self-image might make someone more likable insofar as people prefer to associate with confident, positive individuals and generally avoid those who suffer from self-doubts and insecurities.

According to Baumeister et al (2005: 90) a few studies have shown that high self-esteem is associated with frequent alcohol consumption, but another suggests the opposite. They found some evidence that low self-esteem contributes to illicit drug use. Baumeister et al (2005) state that Andrews and Duncan of the Oregon Research Institute found in (1997) that declining levels of academic motivation (the main focus of their study) caused self-esteem to drop, which in turn led to marijuana use, although the connection was rather weak. Interpretation of the findings on drinking and drug abuse is probably complicated by the fact that some people approach the experience out of curiosity or thrill seeking, whereas others may use it to cope with or escape from chronic unhappiness. The overall result is that no categorical statements can be made. The same is true for tobacco use, where a study-by-study review uncovered a preponderance of results that show no influence. The few positive findings unearthed could conceivably reflect nothing more than self-report bias. Another complication that also clouds these studies is that the category of people with high self-esteem contains individuals whose self-opinions differ in important ways. Yet in most analyses, people with a healthy sense of self-respect are, for example, lumped with those feigning higher self-esteem than they really feel or who are narcissistic.

THE PROBLEMATICS OF PSYCHIC DEFENCE

Generally, the capacity to notice or perceive threatening vents is identified with the state of consciousness. Gergen (1985: 232) adds that such events are registered in consciousness, and corrective action is initiated. One consciously notices the oncoming taxi and intentionally steps aside. Yet in the case of self-deception we have corrective action (the erection of defences) occurring without conscious awareness of the impulses (beliefs, desires) against which defences are erected. The result is that the theorist is logically pressed into developing yet another form of consciousness, one that perceives or registers the undesirable impulses of the unconscious, sets defences in motion, but does not report its activities to conscious awareness. In effect, one must posit a subceiving agency operating below the level of conscious awareness, yet serving the interests of the conscious mind.

THE ENTRY OF THE TERM "SELF-DECEPTION" INTO THE COMMON VERNACULAR

Gergen (1985: 228) maintains that it is difficult to ascertain the earliest origins of the concept of self-deception. During the past several decades, however, psychoanalytic terminology has ceased to be the rarefied argot of a professional clique and has entered full force into the public language. The proliferation of analytic concepts into the common vernacular has meant that self-deception, a key character of all Freudian mechanisms of psychic defence, has become widely accepted as a fundamental constituent of mental life. It is not unusual to hear others (but seldom oneself) portrayed as "fooling themselves", "lying to themselves", "not facing the truth about themselves", or otherwise engaging in various forms of self-dissemblance. Such discourse has increased the common accessibility to other descriptive forms in which one's psyche is said to be divided against itself. The Marxist concept of "false consciousness", in which one is superficially committed to a system antithetical to one's more basic nature, and "self-alienation", in which one lives an impoverished emotional life cut away from one's true and natural potential, continue to possess strong rhetorical value. Concepts of "inner conflict", "man against himself" and "inauthenticity" are also rendered more felicitous by the entry of self-deception into the common vernacular.

SELF-DECEPTION AS PART OF THE PSYCHE

Gergen (1985: 228-229) states that self-deception is assumed to be an integral part of one's psychic defences, to be a critical constituent of normal (although not thereby desirable) personality make-up. All people defend themselves against their natural impulses; defences are erected to prevent such impulses from reaching consciousness. Psychoanalysis is devoted in large measure to opening the conscious mind to that which is hidden but truly desired, in effect, to reduce the magnitude of self-deception.

THE SELF AND MEMORY

According to Goleman (1998b: 95), memory and attention, are vulnerable to skews. The relationship between attention and memory is intimate. Memory is attention in the past tense: what you remember now is what you noticed before. Memory is in double jeopardy, for apart from an initial skew in what is noticed, there can be later biases in what is recalled. One's ambitions reorganise one's recollections. Even when one tries to tell the truth, one cannot help overemphasising one's own role in every event. A different man in the same position might have observed more dispassionately, reflected on his experiences more thoughtfully, and reported them more accurately.

Goleman (1998b: 96), states that memory is the autobiography; its author is the "self", an especially potent organisation of schemas. Sometimes also called the "self-system" or "self-concept", it is that set of schemas that define what we mean by "I", "me" and "mine", that codify a sense of oneself and one's world.

Goleman adds that the self is built up slowly, from childhood on, as perhaps the most basic grouping of schemas the mind holds. Its origins are in the interactions between parent and infant; its development runs along lines carved by the contours of relationships with parents, family, peers – any and all significant people and events in one's life. The self-system sculpts the way a person filters and interprets experience; it invents self-serving readings of past events. In doing so, the self has in its power all the tools – and temptations – of a totalitarian state. The self acts as a censor, selecting and deleting the flow of information.

Goleman (1998b: 97) states that as the central observer and recorder of life, the self stands in the role of historian, but impartiality is not one of its virtues. The past is remembered as if it were a drama in which self was the leading player. The self fabricates and revises history, thereby engaging in practices not ordinarily admired in historians. Egocentricity pervades mental life. Facts are better remembered the more they have to do with oneself, or, most people in a group feel that they are the centre of activity. In international politics, decision-makers perceive the acts of distant nations as aimed at themselves, when in fact they reflect local conditions. People see their own acts as accounting for chance events, such as winning a lottery ticket.

Goleman (1998b: 97), states that people take credit for success, but not for failure, another form of egocentric bias. Language reveals this bias, as seen in a driver's explanation of an accident to an insurance company: "The telephone pole was approaching. I was attempting to swerve out of its way when it struck my front end."

Goleman adds that a telling sign of the self's egocentricity is the failure of schemas to accommodate new information. This bias becomes manifest in science, for example, as the inclination of researchers to disregard results inconsistent with their theories. People hold to beliefs of all sorts in the face of evidence and arguments to the contrary. These self-deceptions and biases are so pervasive because they are highly adaptive; they protect the integrity of the self's organisation of knowledge. They all reflect the self's propensity to encode information around a central organising principle: what matters to the self. Without such an organising structure, knowledge and behaviour would be linked willy-nilly; with it new information is assimilated in an orderly and useful fashion, indexed in the way that will be easiest to find.

SELF-DECEPTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING

Self-deception refers to a motivated attempt to avoid confronting undesirable aspects of oneself. Brown (1998: 271-272) suggests we have yet to consider the relationship between self-deception and psychological well-being. Self-deception *enhancement* occurs when individuals unrealistically attribute positive characteristics themselves; self-deception *denial* occurs when individuals unrealistically deny possessing negative characteristics.

Brown (1998) states that people who score high in self-deception enhancement describe themselves in terms that seem too good to be true (e.g., "I always know why I like the things I do" and "I am fully in control of my fate"). People who score high in self-deception denial disavow possessing common negative qualities or traits ("I never get jealous over the good fortunes of others" and "I have never done anything that I am ashamed of").

Brown (1998: 272) states that Paulhus and Reid (1991) devised a scale to measure these two forms of self-deception. Scores on the two scales are only modestly correlated, indicating that the tendency to attribute positive characteristics to oneself is somewhat independent of the tendency to deny that negative attributes characterise oneself. The two forms of self-deception also exhibit different correlation with psychological adjustment. Scores on the self-deception denial scale tend to be uncorrelated with psychological adjustment, whereas scores on the deception enhancement scale are positively related to psychological well-being.

TRUE SELF AND FALSE SELF

St. Clair (2000: 67) illustrates true self and false self as both developing from the child's interaction with the environment. Through the infant's impulses (met and confirmed by the mother), the infant discovers the environment and the *not-me* world and the establishment of the *me*. Object

relating comes about when the mother lets the baby find and come to terms with the object (breast, bottle and so on). The true self has a *me* and a *not-me* clearly established.

The caring mother must also protect the infant from complications and impingements from the world that the infant cannot understand. If the environment is not safe, the infant may respond with compliance. The compliance could lead to the isolation of the infant from its own spontaneous and life-giving core. The false self develops at the earliest stage of object relations when there is not good-enough mothering, when the mother does not meet and implement the omnipotence of the infant. Should the infant's gesture be repeatedly missed, the mother substitutes her own gesture, which is met by the infant's compliance.

THE SELF-SYSTEM: GOOD-ME, BAD-ME AND NOT-ME

Goleman (1998b: 102) states that schemas change continually through life, as do images of the past. Various points and stages in life accrue overlapping selves; some congruent, others not. A new self-image emerges and becomes dominant: a gangly, isolated adolescent can become a svelte, gregarious thirty-year old, but the svelte self does not completely eradicate traces of the gangly one.

Goleman (1998b: 103) states that the range of the mother's disapproving acts, from mild reprimand to utter anger, produces a matching, graduated range of anxiety in the child. This anxiety gradient more or less directs the course of how the child develops. The child's history of praise or censure comes to define his experience of himself. The personification of the three phases of what will be *me* are "good-me", "bad-me" and "not-me".

In the "good-me", satisfactions have been enhanced by a reward of tenderness. The good-me emerges as the sense of self we garner from all those times we have felt happy at being a "good" little girl or boy, at being loved; it propels much of its behaviour all through life.

The "bad-me", according to Goleman (1998), entails experiences in which varying degrees of disapproval have generated like levels of anxiety in the child. The bad-me is the sense of self, connected with the anxiety, guilt, and shame at being naughty. Anxiety of this sort is interpersonal; the naughty child feels love withdrawn, which in turn generates anxiety. The bad-me arises in the mind in tandem with those things we do or have done about which we feel regrets or remorse.

Goleman (1998b: 104) adds that the "not-me" bears on a realm of experience of a different order. Although the bad-me arouses anxiety, its contents – the specifics of what arouse that anxiety – remain in awareness. Not so with the not-me. The not-me evolves from feeling of terror and dread so

powerful that they disrupt the ability to comprehend what is happening. Uncanny emotion overpowers the mind, blasting what caused it out of awareness. Because such intense anxiety shatters the ability to comprehend what is happening, it registers as inchoate confusion. These experiences of anxiety alter that organising principle in awareness, the self-system. The self-system performs its mission by operating on experience itself, and protects us against anxiety by skewing attention.

FEAR AND PERCEPTION

Wolman (1992: 75) explains that human behaviour is guided not by things as they are but as they are seen. People may possess a great deal of power and have many powerful friends and be unaware of all that. Power and acceptance as perceived by the individual are the main determinants of behaviour. An individual who is aware of his own power and of his allies is reasonably well prepared to cope with dangers.

Wolman (1992: 75) states that an overestimation of one's own resources combined with an underestimation of the potential threat may lead to a maladjustive lack of fear, and hyper optimistic and overconfident attitude may bring self-defeat. Fear is a normal reaction that helps survival provided it is *realistic* and based on a correct estimate of the potential threat and the power one possesses himself, and the dependability of one's allies. Fear is adjustive if it corresponds to the real situation.

According to Wolman fear is rational when it is based on the awareness of overwhelming threats; it is irrational when one overestimates the power of the threatening forces and/or underestimates one's own powers. Overestimation of one's own powers makes one vulnerable, but underestimation of one's power makes one fear nonexistent dangers. Acute states of fear create morbid physiological reactions such as trembling, profuse perspiration, faint feelings, weakness in joints and muscles, nausea, diarrhoea, and disturbances in motor coordination. A frightened individual may seek escape when none is needed. Unrealistic, irrational fears can have a crippling effect on human behaviour. People obsessed by irrational fears are unable to use their resources and defend themselves against enemies.

DEPRESSIVE REALISM

Brown (1998: 273) argues that depressed individuals are less positively biased than non-depressed individuals and are less prone to self-deception than are non-depressed individuals. One explanation for this finding is that depression involves a breakdown in self-enhancing illusions. From this perspective, not so much that depressives are negatively biased, but that they lack self-protective positive biases.

The relative lack of self-enhancement biases during depression also suggests that depressed individuals may possess accurate self-knowledge. Freud (1957: 246) declares that the melancholic may have a keener eye for the truth than other people who are not melancholic. When in his heightened self-criticism he describes himself as petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the weaknesses of his own nature.

Goleman (1998b: 99), states that self-defeating thoughts are the hallmark of depression, the chronic activation of negative schemas. In milder depression a person will have negative thoughts about herself/himself, but retain some objectivity about them. As the depression worsens, her/his thinking will become increasingly dominated by negative thoughts about herself/himself. The more such negative self-schemas activate, the more distorted his thinking becomes and the less able s/he is to see that her/his depressing thoughts may be distortions. At its most severe, a depressed person's thoughts about herself/himself are completely dominated by intrusive, preoccupying self-condemnations, completely out of touch with the situation at hand.

MENTAL HEALTH

Wolman (1992: 137) states that one criterion of mental health is related to the validity of cognitive functions. An erroneous perception, an oversight of danger, an inability to distinguish fantasy from reality seriously jeopardises one's existence. A realistic perception of what is going on in the outer world and in one's own life increases one's chances for survival and helps in optional adjustment. The mentally disturbed individual is unable to properly utilise his mental capacities because of a malfunction in the realm of feelings. The more one is disturbed, the poorer his contact with reality.

Wolman (1992) states that the situation can become quite serious when the picture of the outer world is distorted. An individual who consistently misconstrues or misinterprets what he perceives is said to be *delusional*. For example, when a mentally disturbed individual flees a policeman who simply wants to check his driver's licence, in fear that the policeman will arrest him for a non-committed crime, or when he ascribes hostile feelings to his friends who are loyal and trustworthy, his reality testing is practically nonexistent. Whereas delusions are distorted perceptions, hallucinations are creations out of nothingness.

HALLUCINATIONS

Slade and Bentall (1988: 8) state that in hallucinations everything happens in the mind. The visionaries, the ecstasies, are people who suffer from hallucinations, dreamers while they are awake. The

activity of the brain is so energetic that the visionary, the person hallucinating, ascribes a body and an actuality to images that the memory recalls without the intervention of senses.

Slade and Bentall (1988: 4) state sensory deception is commonplace and often represents the norm or expected normal experience in a given situation (for example, magic tricks and standard illusions). Hallucinations are neither commonplace nor rare. They represent a frequent (and distressing) experience for minority of individuals but also a rare (and perhaps positive) experience for many people.

Slade and Bentall (1988) state that the phenomenon of sensory deception varies in terms of both its nature and extent and also in terms of its personal and social consequences for the individual. The history of ideas about hallucinatory experiences reflects both changing conceptions about the nature of mental disorder and shifting attitudes towards those who suffer as a result.

Sensory deception, according to Slade and Bentall (1988), whether deliberately engineered by an external agent such as a magician or arising indirectly from within in the case of a hallucinating patient, is usually viewed as a passive experience. The individual does not usually intend the experience concerned, although the response of the individual to experience may be either positive or negative. In general, the passive experience of hallucinations tends to have a negative emotional impact on the individual concerned. Passively received hallucinatory experiences are generally negatively valued, whereas comparable actively sought experiences are usually positively valued. Auditory hallucinations take many forms. For example, some are nonverbal, consisting of noises and music, and others are exclusively verbal.

According to Slade and Bentall (1988: 49-51) Schneider (1959) developed a set of practical diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia which have been particularly influential and which all involve some form of delusional or hallucinatory experience. The three specifically hallucinatory “first-rank symptoms” described by Schneider are: (a) the patient hearing a running commentary on his or her own actions; (b) voices speaking about the person in the third person; and (c) the patient hearing his or her own thoughts spoken aloud – “Gedankenlautwerden”.

The content of psychotic hallucinations varies considerably from individual to individual. Sometimes the voices of patients talk disjointedly or mention odd phrases, which seem to have no relevance to their lives. At other times the voices may talk about the patient’s private thoughts or guilty secrets. Quite often, the auditory hallucinations of patients diagnosed as schizophrenic, whether they consist of short phrases or more extensive monologues, are abusive in nature. Patients may hear negative judgements about any decisions they may have made. Less frequently, the voices may be

neutral in attitude towards the patient or even reassuring. Such voices are most often heard by chronically disturbed patients who have a long history of psychiatric disorder. Visual hallucinations are equally variable in content but are again usually effect-laden (Slade and Bentall 1988: 51).

HYPNOTIC AND POSTHYPNOTIC SUGGESTION

For the psychology of the end of the 19th century, the phenomena of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestion constituted an interesting challenge. Valsiner (1998: 140-141) argues the fact that under hypnotic conditions it is possible to suggest to the patient something obviously untrue of the reality in the given actual context, which would not be remembered when the patient is awakened from the hypnotic sleep (i.e., hypnotic suggestion). This was known in psychiatric literature since the beginning of the century. Likewise, the phenomena of *delay* of execution of the suggestions made during the hypnotic sleep, but actualised after the patient is awakened (i.e., posthypnotic suggestion) were described around that time.

Valsiner (1998) states that besides their clinical importance (e.g., the possibility of curing mental illness through the use of posthypnotic suggestion), these phenomena were of significance in the socio-political sphere. As with the possibilities for behavioural modelling in contemporary social learning theory, post-hypnotic suggestion could be used by interested parties for making dramatic socio-political impacts. The dangers were serious: a person could be made into an assassin, even of a government leader or other public figure by suggesting to him or her under hypnosis to undertake the killing after waking up and to forget the fact that this course of action was suggested by the hypnotiser. If such scenarios were possible, much power for political change was suddenly in the hands of persons who could hypnotise others. Such a possibility could be both horrifying and appealing to people who occupied political positions.

The Johari window

A model, which helps to assess the amount of information we disclose, is the Johari window. This is the conceptual model designed by Luft and Ingham 1955 for describing the different ways self-awareness can be experienced.

Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 124) state that the self-disclosure is about revealing information about the private self to other people. It is essential in the development of close interpersonal relationships. Revealing information to another that s/he already knows is not self-disclosure. Self-disclosure relates to our deepest feelings or intimate thoughts. There are some relationships in which we

are comfortable enough to allow people access to our most intimate thoughts, and others in which we keep our thoughts and emotions to ourselves.




Figure 6: *The Johari Window Luft and Ingham (1955)*

The open pane is the most public area. It reflects openness to the world and a willingness to be known. It comprises all the aspects that are known to you and others.

The Arena

Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 124) state that the region most conducive to effective interpersonal relationships and communication is termed the Arena. In this setting all of the information necessary to carry on effective communication is known to both the communicator (self) and the receivers (others). For a communication attempt to be in the Arena region, the parties involved must share identical feelings, data, assumptions and skills. Since the Arena is the area of common understanding, the larger it becomes, the more effective communication is.

The Blind spot

According to Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 124) when others know relevant information but the self does not, a blind spot area results. This constitutes a handicap for the self, since one can hardly understand the behaviours, decisions, and potentials of others if one does not have the information on which these are based. Others have the advantage of knowing their own reactions, feelings, perceptions and so forth, while the self is unaware of these consequently interpersonal relationships and communications suffer.

According to Goleman (1998b: 237) the dynamic flow of information within and among us points to a particularly human malady: to avoid anxiety, we close off crucial portions of awareness, creating blind spots.

The Façade

Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 124) state that when the self knows information, but this information is unknown to others, a person (self) may react with superficial communication, that is, present a false front or façade. Information that we perceive as potentially prejudicial to a relationship or that we keep to ourselves out of fear, desire for power, or whatever makes up the façade. This protective front, in turn, serves a defensive function for the self. Such a situation is particularly damaging when a subordinate 'knows' and an immediate supervisor 'does not know'. The façade, like the blind spot, diminishes the Arena and reduces the possibility of effective communication.

The Unknown

According to Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 125) this region constitutes that portion of the relationship where neither the self nor other parties know the relevant information. As is often stated: "I don't understand them, and they don't understand me." It is easy to see that interpersonal communication is poor under such circumstances. Circumstances of this kind occur in organisations when individuals in different specialties must communicate to co-ordinate what they do.

Exposure

Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 125) add that increasing the Arena by reducing the façade requires that the individual be open and honest in sharing information with others. The process that the self uses to increase the information known to others is termed exposure because it sometimes leaves the self in a vulnerable position. Exposing one's true feelings by 'telling it like it is' often involves risks.

Feedback

Mersham and Skinner (2001a: 125) state further when the self does not know or understand, more effective communications can be developed through feedback from those who know. Thus, the blind spot can be reduced, with a corresponding increase in the Arena. Of course, whether the use of feedback is possible depends on the individual's willingness to 'hear' it and on the willingness of others to give it. Thus, the individual is less able to control the provision of exposure. Obtaining feedback is dependent on the active cooperation of others, while exposure requires the active behaviour of the communicator and the passive listening of others.

The four panes of the Johari window are interdependent. A change in one pane will affect the others. You may discover things you did not know about yourself from others. This information then moves into the open area. The open pane enlarges and the hidden pane is reduced. It is rewarding and satisfying to learn more about you and therefore gain self-insight.

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

Sternberg (1998: 463) describes cognitive dissonance as a person's disquieting perception of a mismatch between his or her attitudes and his or her behaviour. When you are in a state of cognitive dissonance, your mind gets more and more focussed on one thing – resolving the apparent inconsistencies. Eventually your mind will start working overtime – sometimes to the point that it becomes an obsession.

Lord (1997: 276) states that according to cognitive dissonance theory, people change their attitudes to reduce the aversion arousal they experience when they have two cognitions that contradict each other, or are dissonant. Festinger's 1970 theory of cognitive dissonance provides some insight into the mind's ability to create and protect blind spots even in the face of conflicting evidence. Festinger 1970: 3 states that the existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase dissonance.

Goleman (1998b) believes the mind's ability to create blind spots or a zone of blocked attention and self-deception is partly due to an innate biological function inherited in our survival gene pool. We naturally behave and perceive in a way that helps us avoid embarrassment or threat. We have developed sophisticated techniques that defend us from the cognitive anxiety that comes from exposure. Goleman (1998b: 226) states that the mind will at times protect one from the anxiety of dissonance by creating a blind spot.

THE VIRTUES OF SELF-DECEPTION

Goleman (1998b: 241) states that self-deception has played a largely positive role in human evolution. For example, in one argument, the male who is the most successful genetically is the one who impregnates the most women. The best strategy for doing so is to convince each one that he will be loyal to her, helping raise the children of their union. That is a lie, since his interest is to love her and leave her. However, he will be most likely to succeed if he is earnest in his assurance of loyalty. His best chance for that is to believe his own lies – that is, to first deceive himself.

According to Goleman (1998b: 242), there are many variants of this argument to the evolutionary virtues of self-deception. In another, two hypothetical prehistoric hunters and gatherers are out in barren terrain, searching for berries or some small animal. One convinces the other that would fare better on a distant hill, when in fact the best chances are where they stand. This lie, although

unethical, has great genetic value. If two people are searching for food in a place where there is barely enough for one of them alone, either one might raise his own chance of survival by persuading the other to search elsewhere. The usefulness of believing such lies oneself becomes evident. To lie well, one must first believe one's own lies – a maxim whose truth should not be lost on any modern salesman or politician.

Self-deception, according to Goleman (1998b: 242), can strengthen social bonds as well as manipulate them. The mother who talks to her baby as though he understood her might be fooling herself, but by interacting with him that way – meeting his eyes, gesturing, speaking with expression and giving special intonation to her words – the mother gives him the experiences he needs to gradually learn to understand all those things. If she did not act as though he understood, she might deprive him of those crucial experiences. Better for evolution to have erred on the positive side, tricking parents into being the tutors of an infant whom they treat as though he knows more than in fact he does. In this way he is sure to get the lessons he needs.

Self-deception can also lead to all sorts of virtuous deeds. Goleman (1998b: 242-243) cites the example of the heroism of one Spicer Lung on Pan Am flight 925 from Miami to Houston. According to newspaper reports, Lung broke up an attempt to hijack the plane to Cuba. In moments of heroism such as this, where a rational weighing of odds would argue against doing anything, bravery may well depend on the variety of self-deception summed up in the words "I'm not scared of a weapon." A mundane form of the same positive self-deception is seen in the tennis player who assumes a more confident manner after winning a point against a better opponent, or the salesman who gives himself a pep talk before making a tough sales call, when a rational weighing of odds would be discouraging.

SYNTHESIS

In this chapter I examined self-deception where the self is the subject matter of the deception. What goes wrong is that we have false beliefs about ourselves. Self-deception is a form of psychic defence, which is accepted as a fundamental constituent of mental life. All people defend themselves against their natural impulses; defences are erected to prevent such impulses from reaching consciousness. Psychoanalysis is devoted in large measure to opening the conscious mind to that which is hidden but truly desired, in effect, to reduce the magnitude of self-deception. Self-deception *embancement* occurs when individuals unrealistically attribute positive characteristics to themselves; self-deception *denial* occurs when individuals unrealistically deny possessing negative characteristics. Depressed individuals are less positively biased than non-depressed individuals and are less prone to self-deception than are non-depressed individuals. One explanation for this finding is that depression

involves a breakdown in self-enhancing illusions. Unrealistic, irrational fears can have a crippling effect on human behaviour. People obsessed by irrational fears are unable to use their resources and defend themselves even against enemies.

A model, which helps to assess the amount of information we disclose, is the Johari window; a conceptual model designed by Luft and Ingham (1955) for describing the different ways self-awareness can be experienced. We naturally behave and perceive in a way that helps us avoid embarrassment or threat. We have developed sophisticated techniques that defend us from the cognitive anxiety that comes from exposure. Goleman (1998b: 226) states that the mind will at times protect one from the anxiety of dissonance by creating a blind spot – a zone of blocked attention and self-deception. I add further that self-deception has played a largely positive role in human evolution.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I discussed how self-deception forms an integral part of social reality. I showed that when we are self-deceived, we have false beliefs about ourselves. Self-deception is assumed to be an integral part of one's psychic defences, to be a critical constituent of normal (although not thereby desirable) personality make-up. I looked at how psychological factors affect the will to believe, and provided examples of cases where people, though confronted with evidence, refuse to affirm their condition. The false self develops at the earliest stage of object relations when there is not good-enough mothering, when the mother does not meet and implement the omnipotence of the infant. I then looked at the effect of the environment on the development of the false self, focussing on self-deception enhancement and self-deception denial. I focused on the Johari window, describing how the mind will at times protect one from the anxiety of dissonance by creating a blind spot – a zone of blocked attention and self-deception. I then illustrated that self-deception has played a largely positive role in human evolution. In chapter 7 I will focus on deception.

DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter consists of two parts. The first part deals with deceptive practices between individuals in handling everyday human relationships, while the second part concentrates on covert communication in times of war.

In the first part of the chapter, I will discuss how our capacity to think gives us a crucial survival advantage. I will look at instances when a lie is clearly justifiable. I will discuss how our earliest experiences have taught us that when we tell the truth, we are often punished. I will focus on liars' motivations for telling lies, the various deception strategies, the complex nature of deceptive behaviours, and social influence on children's cognitive development. Studies show that at least some children as young as three or four will deliberately lie. I will explain that the reason relationships involving authority relate to lying is that generally these types of relationships involve a lot of scrutiny. "Duping delight" involves a sense of accomplishment and exhilaration, a feeling of power and achievement. My study will demonstrate that few people, children or adults, feel guilty about telling trivial lies and that males tend to be more successful at lying than females. I will explain the distinction between lying and other forms of deception, citing Bill Clinton as a master of deception by omission. I will focus on the lies of silence, lies that may be acceptable, white lies, the use of placebos, deception as therapy and the damage done by benevolent lies. I will then look at romantic deception, truth bias and cognitive dissonance. I will examine the Machiavellian personality, Munchausen by Proxy, the principle of veracity, normative judgements and deception in research.

The second part of the chapter will focus on the specialised varieties of language that are often used when the purpose is to be secretive, or to deceive. I will look at how prisoners communicated at every opportunity, keeping each other advised on the enemy's tactics and sharing any knowledge they had on any subject. I will discuss spying and espionage as methods used to gather and communicate intelligence. I will discuss covert channels of communication as placing emphasis on the concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. I will then discuss the American Civil War and World War 1 showing how code-breaking (cryptography) began to take on the great importance that it has in intelligence-gathering today.

I will discuss the Enigma machine, as originally designed to protect the secrecy of business messages, as the fastest and most secret communications possible. I will then examine code-breaking, encryption, and steganography and the role of Navajo Code Talkers during World War II. Manipulation by governments, the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Enron's deception, Yengeni's fraudulent act, the Schabir Shaik trial, abuse on Pitcairn Island, paedophile accusations against priests will receive attention in the latter part of the chapter.

SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HUMANS

Goleman (1998a: 201-199) and McCrone (2002: 50-61) describe humans as primordial team players: our uniquely complex social relationships have been a crucial survival advantage. Our extraordinary sophisticated talent for corporation culminates in the modern organisation. One great anatomical legacy of the human need to band together is the neocortex, the brain's topmost layers, which gives the capacity to think.

Goleman (1998a: 201-199) adds that operating in a coordinated band demands a high level of social intelligence, skill in reading and handling relationships. If the more socially intelligent have the greatest number of surviving offspring – and therefore are the most “fit” – then nature would select for changes in the human brain that better handle the complexities of living in groups. In evolution, as today, group members had to balance the advantages of cooperation in fending off enemies, hunting and foraging, and caring for children with the disadvantages of competition within the group for food, mates or other limited resources, particularly in times of scarcity. Add to that having to compute hierarchies of dominance, social and kinship obligations, and quid pro quo exchanges, and the exchange was a staggeringly large amount of social data to track and use well.

Goleman (1998a) states that therein lies the evolutionary pressure to develop a “thinking” brain with the capacity to make all these social connections instantly. In the animal kingdom, only mammals have a neocortex. In this view, social intelligence made its appearance well before the emergence of rational thought; the abstract thinking abilities of the human species piggybacked later onto a neocortex that had initially expanded to deal with the immediate interpersonal world. The neocortex, however, evolved from more ancient structures in the emotional brain, like the amygdale, and so is heavily laced with circuitry for emotion.

According to Goleman (1998a) the neocortex, with its sophisticated understanding of group dynamics, must interpret its data in attunement with emotional signals. Indeed, every act of recognition (“That’s a stranger”) has embedded within it an emotional reaction (“...and I do not like him so I will pretend I do not see him”).

Goleman adds that the same brain circuitry lets us know immediately, for instance, whom among those standing near us in an elevator we should greet and whom not (“The boss looks like she is in a bad mood today – I think I will not bother her”). Moreover, it forges every detail of the corporate working relationships that are the key to survival in today’s organisations.

Even as we pass the driest information back and forth, our neural monitors for emotional nuance are reading innumerable tacit clues – tone of voice, choice of words, subtleties of posture, gesture, timing – for the textured messages that give that information its emotional context. These emotional signals have the power to keep the conversation – or the group – on track or not. Smooth coordination depends on this emotional channel as much as on the explicit, rational content of what is said and done.

THE MIND IN SITUATIONS THAT CALL FOR CHOICE

Damasio (1996: 170) considers a situation that calls for choice (faced with the choice of proceeding or not with a particular deed, for example, the child who is faced with the problem of what to tell the dangerous looking stranger knocking at the front door). The brain of a normal, intelligent and educated adult reacts to the situation by rapidly creating scenarios of possible response options and related outcomes. To our consciousness, the scenarios are made of multiple imaginary scenes, not really a smooth film, but rather pictorial flashes or key images in those scenes, that jump out from one frame to another, in quick juxtapositions.

Examples of what the images would depict include being assaulted by the murderer, the house being burgled, the lives of everyone at home being in jeopardy; safeguarding the family’s possessions, never seeing your parents again. The point the Damasio stresses is that our mind is not blank at the start of the reasoning process. Rather, it is replete with a repertoire of images; generated to the tune of the situation we are facing, entering and exiting our consciousness, a show too rich for us to encompass fully.

Many parents teach their children to lie if telling the truth would put the child in danger. Most children do not see telling a stranger that their parents are asleep when in fact they are not at home, as a lie. They call it a white lie or a fib, believing that if they did not say the lie, the stranger would hurt them. Ekman (1989: 17) does not believe that this is a white lie or a fib. He reserves those terms for cases in which the lie is without much consequence. Telling the truth or lying to a dangerous looking stranger about whether you are home alone has serious consequences. It is a lie, but most of us would approve of it. Many parents also approve of less serious lies, in which the lie benefits the target of the lie.

Bok (1978: 39) explains that there are times when truthfulness accuses or fails to avert such great harm that a lie is clearly justifiable. One such time is where a life is threatened and where a lie might avert the danger. The traditional testing case advanced by the absolutist position is that discussed by Kant himself, where a would-be murderer inquires whether “our friend who is pursued by him had taken refuge in our house.” Mere silence or evasion will not satisfy the assailant. This case will certainly weaken one’s resistance to all lies.

Bok (1978: 40) adds that most others have argued that, in such cases, where innocent lives are at stake, lies are morally justified, if indeed they are lies in the first place. Kant believes that to lie is to annihilate one’s human dignity, yet for these others, to reply honestly and thereby betray one’s friend, would in itself constitute a compromise of that dignity. In such an isolated case, they would argue, the costs of lying are small and those of telling the truth catastrophic.

Similarly, Bok explains, a captain of a ship transporting fugitives from Nazi Germany, if asked by a patrolling vessel whether there were any Jews on board would, for Kant’s critics, have been justified in answering “No”. His duty to the fugitives, they claim, would then have conflicted with the duty to speak the truth and would have far outweighed it. In fact, in times of such crises, those who share Kant’s opposition to lying clearly put innocent persons at the mercy of wrongdoers.

TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES

According to Spence (1995: 53) there is a valid biological explanation why all cultures past and present hoist honesty to the top of the moral totem pole. Those who lie to us put us in jeopardy. We can protect ourselves from assault, but not from the undiscovered lie.

Spence (1995: 60) states that our earliest experiences have taught us that when we tell the truth, we are often punished. If we tell the truth, we often lose, or we are rejected or banished. If we tell the truth about the wrong we have committed, be it ever so petty and innocent, we are often punished. If we tell the truth about how we feel, about our fear, we are scorned. If we reveal our yearnings, we are mocked. If we admit our love, we are sometimes rejected. If we expose our dislike, we are ostracised. If we reveal our anger, our opponents strike back with anger. We learn to shy away from the truth. We build around it. We create myths that blind us from its glare. We avoid the truth like the pox. We have been taught that truth-tellers are naïve suckers, fools.

MOTIVATIONS FOR TELLING LIES

To understand what deception entails conceptually, scholars have attempted to outline several types of communication that might be considered deceptive. Gass and Seiter (2003: 260) state that most attempts to do so have focussed on liars' motivations for telling lies. Gass and Seiter (2003: 260) discuss two forms of deception: *benign fabrications*, which are engineered in the interest of the person contained by them or, if not quite in his interest and for his benefit, then at least not done against his interest and *exploitive fabrications*, which are motivated by the private interests of the deceiver.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 260) state that although some motivations for lying are self-evident, others are less obvious. Various researchers have posited all of the following reasons for lying:

- *Lie to benefit other.* Because she knows that her husband does not want to be disturbed, Babbs tells a door-to door salesman that her husband is not home
- *Lie to affiliate.* Buffy wants to spend some time with her father, so she tells him she needs help with her homework even though she is capable of doing it herself
- *Lie to avoid invasion of privacy.* Muffy tells a co-worker that she is younger than she really is because she believes her age is no one's business but her own
- *Lie to avoid conflict.* Biff tells his neighbour, who has called to complain about Biff's barking dog, that he cannot talk at the moment because dinner's on the table
- *Lie to appear better.* To impress a date, Rex tells her that he was captain of his football team, when, in reality, he was only vice-president of the Latin Club
- *Lie to protect self.* Trudy breaks her mother's vase but tells her the cat did it
- *Lie to benefit self.* Favio tells his parents he needs extra money for textbooks so that he can go to a Limp Biskit concert with the money
- *Lie to harm other.* Barney's in a bad mood so he points in the wrong direction when a motorist asks him for directions

According to Lyle (1993: 74) the reasons for lying can be broken down into the following general categories:

- *Expedience.* the social lie, including harmless flattery, loyalty and belief
- *Necessity.* the professional lie, used in acting and entertainment, espionage, the law, and selling
- *Withholding.* playing for time in situations where you need to evaluate the facts before committing yourself. Suppressing negative or hostile reactions to maintain the status quo
- *Fear.* where telling the truth could result in punishment – for instance, if crime has been committed, fears of losing love, friendship or employment might also prompt a lie

- *Defence*: unwillingness to admit to faults in yourself, or in someone you love
- *Crime*: confidence tricksters are practised deceivers, and the best are pathological liars because they actually believe what they are saying at the time.

Ekman (1989: 33) cites the following as different motives for lying by children:

- To avoid being punished
- To get something you could not get otherwise
- To protect friends from trouble
- To protect yourself or another person from harm
- To win the admiration or interest of others
- To avoid creating an awkward social situation
- To avoid embarrassment
- To maintain privacy
- To demonstrate your power over an authority

Ekman adds that these are not the only motives for lying, but they are among the most common ones reported by children, parents, teachers and experts who have studied or speculated about why children lie. None of the motives for lying is unique to children; they also motivate adult lies. Some of the motives, however, do become more important than others in older children. While there are various motives, there is as much variety to the reasons why some children develop a greater propensity for lying than others. Some of it has to do with a child's personality. Some of it has to do with the environment in which the child is growing up. Some of it has to do with age.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 261) state that in addition to looking at people's motivations for lying, another approach to conceptualising deception is to view it as a strategy for manipulating information. This perspective distinguishes three deception strategies: *distortion* (or equivocation), *omissions* (or concealment) and *falsification* (outright falsehoods).

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IQ AND LYING

Ekman (1989: 34–41) states that tests conducted with children found that below average IQ was more common among liars than honest children. Among one third of those children with the lowest IQs, lied and cheated. None of those children with the highest IQs lied or cheated. Even in between these two extremes, the figures consistently show that the higher the IQ, the lower the percent of children who lie.

Ekman (1989: 64) is of the opinion that children who lie are a lot more maladjusted than those who do not, and lying as a child does predict a greater chance of later trouble with the law. But most children who lie do not get into trouble later in life. There is some evidence that lying is part of a more general personality problem, most often and most ably performed by children who manipulate others to their own ends.

Some children – not all – that lack parental supervision lie more often. Children are influenced to lie by friends who lie or engage in antisocial behaviour that they lie to avoid being punished. The adolescent boys who respected their father were less susceptible to peer pressure.

DECEPTION STRATEGIES

Gass and Seiter (2003: 261) state that deception occurs when speakers alter the *amount* of information that should be provided (i.e., quantity) and the *veracity* of the information presented (i.e., quality), the *relevance* of the information provided, or the *clarity* of the information provided. People can alter the amount, veracity, relevance and the clarity of information all at the same time or in different combinations.

In the concept matrix below, I present correlations between the various deception strategies. An analysis of the matrix reveals that most deception strategies are deliberate, with an intention to mislead and are used for personal gain. The intention of the communicator is to deceive, create a false impression, make a false claim, to confuse and to lead the listener in a wrong direction.

	mislead	deceive	Rob	pretend	hide/ conceal	Intentional action	disguise	Personal advantage
beguile	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
bluff	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
camouflage	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
cheat	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
conceal	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
confuse	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
confound	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
deceive	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
disguise	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
distort	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
dupe	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
exaggerate	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
feint	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
fool	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
hoodwink	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
lie	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
misguide	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
mislead		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
misrepresent	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
pretend	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
trick	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Figure 7: Concept Matrix

The following table gives the meanings of the commonly used words, which describe various ways in which people deceive one another (Microsoft Encarta Reference Library 2002).

Word	Meaning
beguile	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To win and hold somebody's attention, interest, or devotion 2. To mislead or deceive somebody
bluff	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To pretend to have strength, confidence, or the intention of doing something, in order to deceive somebody 2. To try to deceive other players in a card game about the true value of your hand
camouflage	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The concealing of things, especially troops and military equipment, by disguising them to look like their surroundings, for example, by covering them with branches or leaf-clad netting 2. The devices that animals use to blend into their environment in order to avoid being seen by predators or prey, especially colouration 3. Something that is intended to hide, disguise, or mislead
cheat	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Something that is intended to hide, disguise, or mislead 2. To break the rules in a game, examination, or contest, in an attempt to gain an unfair advantage 3. To have a sexual relationship with somebody other than a spouse or regular sexual partner
conceal	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To put or keep something or somebody out of sight or prevent the person or thing from being found 2. To keep something secret or prevent it from being known
confuse	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To make somebody unable to think or reason clearly or act sensibly
confound	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To puzzle or confuse somebody 2. To cause a confused situation to become even more confused
deceive	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To mislead somebody or hide the truth deliberately 2. To convince yourself of something that is not true 3. To be sexually unfaithful to a spouse or sexual partner
disguise	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To make changes in the appearance of somebody or something to avoid being recognized 2. To hide feelings or facts from other people
distort	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Give an inaccurate report of something 2. To describe or report something in a way that is inaccurate or misleading
dupe	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To persuade or induce somebody to do something by trickery or deception
exaggerate	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To state that something is better, worse, larger, more common, or more important than is true or usual
feint	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A mock attack by a military force, intended to draw the enemy's attention away from the true attack 2. A deceptive move in a competitive sport 3. A deceptive action made to disguise what is really intended
fool	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Speak in jest: to say something jokingly or not seriously, or pretend, jokingly, that something false is true 2. To trick or deceive somebody
hoodwink	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To deceive or dupe somebody, especially by trickery
lie	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To say something that is not true in a conscious effort to deceive somebody 2. To give a false impression
misguide	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To lead somebody in a wrong direction or into making a mistake
mislead	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To cause somebody to make a mistake or form a false opinion or belief, either by employing deliberate deception or by supplying incorrect information
misrepresent	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To give an inaccurate or deliberately false account of the nature of somebody or something
pretend	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To claim untruthfully or exaggeratedly to be or to have a particular thing, or to imply something in this way 2. To act in a way intended to make people believe something untrue or misleading about somebody or something 3. To make an untruthful or dubious claim of ownership or the right to something, especially something valuable, admirable, or prestigious (formal)
trick	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A cunning action or plan that is intended to cheat or deceive 2. A prank, joke, or mischievous action or plan to cheat or deceive somebody 3. To cheat or deceive somebody

Figure 8: Meanings of words commonly used to describe ways in which people deceive each other Microsoft Encarta Reference Library (2002)

Which technique a liar chooses, depends upon what the circumstances require. Ekman (1989: 15) emphasises that concealing is no more justifiable, no more moral or proper than falsifying. They are just different techniques for lying. Everyone, child or adult prefers to conceal the truth rather than say something false. It is easier. The concealer does not have to remember to defend a false line, and concealing does not seem as bad. It feels worse to both liar and target alike to be the victim of a false statement: "You lied right to my face!" than concealment. Ekman (1989: 15) argues that concealing is no more justifiable, no more moral or proper than falsifying. Concealment and falsification are different techniques for accomplishing the same objective. The issue is the motive, not the technique employed to accomplish it. If the motive is to mislead, then the choice between falsifying or concealing is simply a matter of which technique will work better in a given instance.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOURS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 267) state that some research has been sceptical about certain assumptions contained in *Interpersonal Deception Theory* and the *Four-Factor Model* as discussed in chapter 3. In some cases, telling lies may be less cognitively difficult and arousing than telling the truth. For example, imagine what you would do if a close friend asked you how you liked her new hairstyle. Imagine also you thought the hairstyle looked hideous. In such situations, rather than creating a truthful and tactful message that would preserve your relationship and your friend's feelings, it might be less cognitively taxing and less stressful to tell your friend that you loved her hair. In short, underlying differences between truth and lies may not be as simple as some models make them out to be.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 267), state that the complex nature of persuasion provide us one of the most compelling reasons for studying it. Telling different types of lies may lead to different types of behaviour. For example, the notion that deception leads to arousal may apply less to fibs and white lies than to more serious forms of deception, such as cheating on a spouse or denying a crime. Fabricating lies may require more imagination and mental effort than telling the truth, but only when lies are narrative in nature (e.g., when explaining the events of a crime you may or may not have witnessed).

SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON CHILDREN'S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

Social learning theory proposes that children learn by observing and imitating others. Meadows (1993: 344), argues that children do naturally imitate, that social reinforcement motivates this, that models to be imitated are usually socially desirable (for example, in being more competent cognitively than the learner, and that thus children will often learn through observation and imitation of more skilled cognition than their own. In this account of learning, the person who is imitated may not be deliberately modelling behaviour, so the 'social' component of the learning process is in the social

reward outcomes of imitation and the social desirability of the model, rather than in the process of learning or in social interpretation between imitators and imitated.

It is helpful to be reminded that children do learn by imitation of 'accidental' models, models that are not seeking to teach them. An adult may turn people away by asking a family member to state s/he is not at home, adults may offer compliments each other while not meaning a word of what they are saying, or even try to pep up a sick patient by saying how well s/he is looking.

LYING AT DIFFERENT AGES

According to Ekman (1989 92-93), parents should be aware of the stages and where their child fits in as stated in the table below. Using reasoning that is based on the stage where that child is at will enable parents to have more impact when explaining to her/him why lying is wrong. According to Ekman, not everyone reaches stage 4. Many adults never go beyond stage 2. Even when children or adults progress to stage 3 or 4, they will not always think in those terms. When they are feeling strong emotions, they may move back to an earlier stage.

	Age	What is Right	Reason to be Good
Stage 0	4	Getting my own way Fairness is my way	Get rewards and avoid punishment
Stage 1	5-6	Doing what you are told What grownups tell you	Not get into trouble
Stage 2	6-8	Do onto other exactly what they do to you	What is in it for me
Stage 3	8-12	Live up to others' expectations Please others	So others think well of me and so I can think well of myself
Stage 4	12+	Fulfil obligations to society	Keep society from falling apart; be a good citizen

Figure 9: Lying at different ages Ekman (1989: 93)

Ekman (1989: 93-95) explains children's attitudes about lying at each stage. In stage 0, preschoolers think mostly in terms of what they want, and whatever that is, is right. For them, lying in itself is not bad if it gets them what they want. At this stage Ekman (1989: 93) believes that parents should let their children know that they are happy when they (the children) tell the truth, and that they do not want them to lie.

Children in stage 1 are impressed by the superior power of grown-ups. They are a lot more cooperative, but the cooperation is based not on understanding the rules but on wanting to obey adults. This the period when children believe parents can always tell when they are lying.

In stage 2, children no longer think parents are always right. Their notion of fairness is the golden rule, an eye for an eye, tit for tat. It is difficult for children at this stage to see that lying harms anyone.

In stage 3, the child wants to live up to the expectations of others. A period of conformity, this phase underscores what has been called the “good boy” or “good girl” morality. Teenagers in this stage care so much about the approval of their friends that other moral concerns may be weakened if they conflict with what they think their peers expect them to do. This is a time when a conscience emerges, in the sense that children are motivated not just to avoid punishment, but also to live up to their own self-image. Children will lie at this age to avoid displeasing their parents, and to avoid ridicule and win approval from their peers.

Teenager who reach stage 4 become concerned with being good members of their community, school or society. Now they may comprehend the real conflict between loyalty to a friend who has committed a transgression and obligation to a society threatened by that transgression.

According to Ekman (1989: 67) in another study, mothers and educators of four-year-old children were asked if children of different ages would deliberately tell a lie. The percent that reported that children lied increased with the age of the child. The table below shows the findings:

Age	Percentage of parents and educators who said children of this age lie
3	33
4	75
5	90
6	100

Figure 10: Percentage of adults who said children lie at the different ages Ekman (1989: 68)

According to Ekman (1989: 68) these studies show that least some children as young as three or four will deliberately lie. The issue addressed was not *when* children lie, but whether children of such young ages can lie under any conditions. Until this work, most scientists believed that three- to six-year olds were not considered able to distinguish between unintentionally making a mistake and deliberately saying something true.

AUTHORITY RELATED LIES

Ekman (1989: 104-105) states that the reason relationships involving authority relate to lying is that generally these types of relationships involve a lot of scrutiny of the inferior side of the relationship from the superior side. Because much of what the inferior party does in this relationship is questioned, watched after, and regulated by the superior party, the opportunity to lie comes up often. The inferior

party lies about what he has done and the superior party (although much less often), lies to pacify the inferior party to fulfil a duty, whatever it may be. Another common reason adults lie to children is to cover up something or to keep the children from knowing something that they are not old enough to know or should not know about. This is a form of protective lying.

Ekman (1989: 107) adds that children lie about other things for which they would not get punished because they want to keep a little bit of privacy. They want to keep away things they are embarrassed about, things that they are shamed of, and things they simply do not want their parents to know about. Children do not tell their parents much of anything about their relationships with the opposite sex. This is usually because most children would either be embarrassed or ashamed to talk to their parents about these matters, so they resort to lying.

Ekman (1989: 108) states that most children are more reluctant to lie to their educators than to their parents because educators are harder to talk to if you get caught and the educator is responsible for grading you, which gives her/him a lot of power. Since educators are always checking on their students (like parents check on children), there will always be some deceit on the children's part just because of the superior/inferior relationship that arises between learners and educators.

A SIGN OF TROUBLE

Ekman (1989: 63) states that lying is in itself a step, perhaps a pivotal step, in leading the child into a pattern of antisocial behaviour. Lying may be one of the earliest signs that a child is headed in a bad direction. Dodging responsibility, learning you can get away with things, sneaking to succeed may teach the child to break other rules. Lying may be the first sign that trouble is brewing. If a child gets away with lying, this might lead the child to take the risks involved in other antisocial acts.

PREPARING THE LINE

Ekman (1989: 84-85) states that lies fail not only because emotional signs – guilt, fear, and duping delight – betray the liar. They also fail when the liar does not prepare ahead of time. Lies are easier when the liar knows beforehand exactly when s/he will need to lie. That advance notice allows the liar time to invent a credible false line and rehearse it, time to anticipate questions and devise answers. Practice makes a perfect liar. The more often you tell a lie, the better you tell it. This is partly because you learn that you can get away with it and your budding confidence deflates any fear of being caught. The question of whether lying is right or wrong usually comes up the first time one contemplates telling a lie. That is when guilt can interfere with the success of a lie. After the first time, lying becomes easier with each successive time. By the second or third time the same lie has been told,

less consideration is given to moral ramifications or possible negative consequences. Lawyers refer to this pattern of sliding into increasingly illegal acts as the “slippery slope”.

DUPING DELIGHT

Ekman (1989: 83) calls the set of feelings that can betray a lie “duping delight”. It includes the excitement of fooling someone, meeting the challenge of “pulling one over on someone”. There may be a sense of accomplishment and exhilaration, a feeling of power and achievement. An adult deceiving a spouse or a child misleading a parent may feel it. In adolescence, this challenge and exercise of power can be an important factor motivating the decision to lie. Even at younger ages children may think of lying as a kind of enjoyable game. In fact, many games for children and adults involve lying. Poker is a perfect example. So is a game called “*Who has the button?*” Playing such games develops and exercises the skills involved in lying.

Ekman adds that in its own way duping delight can motivate a confession when the liar wants to win someone’s admiration. Criminals are often caught because they cannot resist boasting about how clever they were in a particular scam. Children may be tempted to share their accomplishment by telling a friend how easily they misled Mom or Dad. A child is less likely to feel duping delight when lying to a parent, more often when putting one over on a gullible friend, particularly if some friends are around to enjoy the performance.

GUILT ABOUT LYING

Ekman (1989: 80) states that not all children feel guilty when they lie. At younger ages most children believe lying is always wrong. By adolescence, most kids are no longer convinced that all lies are bad. Ekman states further that his research on adults suggests that people do not feel guilt about lying to a target they do not respect and with whom they do not share values. Children are less likely to feel guilty about lying to parents who impose what they think are unjust, harsh and inflexible rules just as adults do not feel guilt about lying to an employer they think has been unfair to them. Guilt about lying is strongest when the liar shares values with the victim of the lie.

Ekman (1989: 81) adds that preadolescents claim that there may not be guilt when the liar believes that everyone else is lying. Ekman suspects this is one reason why adolescents are liars that are more successful. They feel less guilt about lying to their parents or teachers. Rejecting parental values, one form of rebellion, noticing clay feet that authority stands upon, is common in many adolescents. For some, lying may be one way of establishing their own identity, of separating and achieving independence – a necessary stage of adolescence.

According to Ekman (1989) few people, children or adults, feel guilty about trivial lies. When the liar believes the lie will not hurt anyone, not even the target of the lie, guilt is relatively absent. Even when the lie is of great consequence, liars do not feel guilty when lying is authorised. Spies feel no guilt about their deceit because lying has been authorised by the country for which they are working. If someone in authority tells the child to lie, there is little likelihood the child will feel any guilt about the act. Lying is easier without guilt.

GENDER DIFFERENCES AND LYING

Gass and Seiter (2003: 268-269) state that the results of two meta-analyses found that males tend to be more successful at lying than females. Such gender differences are small, perhaps because the deceptive strategies of men and women both have shortcomings. Specifically when they are lying, men tend to restrict their nonverbal behaviour. Although this may prevent them from leaking deceptive cues, if they overdo it, they run the risk of appearing suspicious. Women, however, try to appear more involved in conversations. As a result, this greater activation may cause them to leak more arousal cues and appear more nervous than usual.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LYING AND OTHER FORMS OF DECEPTION

Ekman (1989: 69) states that up to about eight years of age, children consider any false statement a lie, regardless of whether the person who said it knew it was false. Intention is not the issue – only whether information is true or false. The definition of lying as a communication act allows, furthermore, to extend its comprehension to informational approach, borrowed from pragmatics and conversation analysis, through analysis of *false message* and of some of its dimensions such as truth/falsity and clearness/ambiguity.

According to Ekman the intent of the liar is one of the two criteria, which s/he uses to distinguish lies from other kinds of deception. The liar deliberately chooses to mislead the target. Liars may actually tell the truth, but that is not their intent. Truthful people may provide false information—bad advice from a stockbroker—but that is not their intent. The liar has a choice; the liar could choose not to lie. We are all tempted to lie, but we do not always do so. Lying is not irresistible; it is a conscious, considered choice. S/he does recognise that lying can become a habit and then performed with little consideration, but, at least initially, all such habits began as considered choices about whether or not to do so. Presumably, a pathological liar is compelled to lie and by her/his definition, therefore, is not a liar.

Ekman (1989) maintains that the second criterion for distinguishing lies from other deceptions is that the target is not notified about the liar's intention to mislead. An actor is not a liar, but an impostor is. *Let the buyer beware* is one example of an explicit warning that products or services may not be what they are presented to be. (Of course, that warning does not appear in advertisements, nearly all of which are designed to convey the opposite message.) Poker is still another situation in which the rules of the game sanction and notify the players that deception will occur, and, therefore, one cannot consider bluffing to be a lie.

Ekman (1989) goes on to say that sometimes notification of an intention to mislead is implicit in the framing of the situation. In real estate transactions, the potential buyer is implicitly notified that the seller's asking price is not the actual price the seller would accept. Various forms of politeness are other instances in which the nature of the situation notifies the target that the truth may not be spoken. The host would not properly scrutinise the dinner guest to determine if the guest's claim to have enjoyed the evening is true anymore than the aunt should worry whether the nephew is lying when he says that he appreciated being given a tie for Christmas. Deception is expected; even if the target might suspect that the truth is not being told, it is improper to question it. Only certain types of deception may be allowable: the poker player cannot use marked cards; the home seller cannot conceal a known defect.

In courtship, it is ambiguous whether the parties should expect truthfulness. The saying "all's fair in love and war" would seem to warn lovers not to believe all they are told. Recent public opinion polls suggest that lies that downplay the number of previous sexual partners are common among college-aged adults. Ekman (1989) explains that lovers want to believe in the truthfulness of their partners. Many popular songs testify to the betrayal felt when lies are discovered (although some do warn that lies may be expected). Romantic love requires collusive efforts to develop and maintain myths about each other and the nature of the relationship.

Ekman (1989) adds that concealment is just as much a lie as falsification, if there is an expectation that information will be revealed. When filling out a job application that asks for a listing of all previous employment, omitting the one from which one was fired would be a concealment lie, for there is an obligation to reveal. In personal relationships it is not always so clear-cut, and the liar, once discovered, and the target of the lie may disagree about whether or not an obligation to reveal the concealed information was in force.

THE LIE BY OMISSION

Coetzee and Russel (2000) state that there is a fundamental difference between omission of the trivial and unimportant truths and omission of facts like s/he has bad breath, we are sexually attracted to his wife, we are hoping he will die so we can inherit his apartment, or that we took the bigger piece of the pie for ourselves than the one we gave to him.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 16-17) state that Bill Clinton is a master of deception by omission. Most people know that President Clinton denied having had sex with Gennifer Flowers. In a televised interview, a journalist asked the President the very direct question: “Did you have sex with Gennifer Flowers?” President Clinton responded: “*I am so tired of that question.*” He did not answer the question. This is an evasion, because the alternative is to tell a barefaced lie – something we would all rather not do. It leaves the door open (in a strange way) to be able to say: “Well, I never said I didn’t!”

Two more rules of statement analysis are:

- If the subject did not answer the question, then s/he did!
- There is a short way and a long way to answer a question – the long way is deceptive

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 16-17) add that when a question requires a short answer and the subject gives a long answer, the question was a sensitive one for the subject. Further, when the subject does not answer the question s/he violates two rules of statement analysis, and the correct assumption can be drawn that the question is extremely sensitive for the subject. The listener can deduce that President Clinton did have sex with Gennifer Flowers. He could not bring himself to commit to saying ‘No’, which was later shown would have been a lie. We can say that President Clinton is a truthful man. He does not lie overtly. He simply fails to tell the truth, or rather, the whole truth.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 16-17) elaborate that when another inquiring journalist asked President Clinton: “Did you have sex with Monica Lewinsky?” the president had to consider his previous responses to similar questions. His best response this time was: “*I did not have sex with that woman ... [pause] ... Monica Lewinsky.*” In order to analyse the President’s response, remember that he had already given his definition of ‘sexual relations’ and that his definition excluded oral sex. Therefore, in his mind he did not have sex with Ms Lewinsky. Further, by placing a lengthy pause between ‘that woman’ and ‘Monica Lewinsky’ the President evaded the association. He is denying having sex with ‘that woman’ only. ‘That woman’ could be anybody in his mind at that time. ‘Monica Lewinsky’ is voiced after a lengthy pause, as if to separate the name from the activity in question, and as if it were a separate statement.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 16-17) go on to say that the concept of distance in a statement indicates a relative attitude shift and distance in reality as it concerns the subject. Where seemingly inappropriate (subjective) distance exists, it is there for a reason. The subject put it there. The reason in reality may well be an indication of deceptive behaviour and tells us more than the subject realises about their relationships and the events, and/or people in the events described in their stories.

According to Coetzee and Russel (2000: 16-17) another of President Clinton's evasion techniques was highlighted when an investigative journalist asked him: "Did you ever smoke Marijuana?" President Clinton answered: "I have never broken any of the laws of my country." (It was the right answer to the wrong question!) The journalist then asked: "Did you ever break the laws of any other country?" at this point President Clinton knew where the journalist was going and wisely elected to answer the first question, albeit with the caveat: "Yes, but I never inhaled."

Owning the question mark

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 18) state that as much as investigators will seek to control the question mark, they will also strive to control the full stop: the subject is required to place a full stop at the end of each sentence, and not a question mark or even an exclamation mark. A sentence ending with an exclamation mark such as: "Oh, for Pete's!" is not an answer and the question must be asked again.

Coetzee and Russel add that evasion techniques are common in radio and television interviews and the trained broadcaster sees them coming from a mile off. The classic diversionary tactic that steers the inexperienced interviewer away from dangerous ground is the gratuitous compliment followed by an answer that does not answer the question being asked – while the inexperienced interviewer preens from the crumb of acknowledgement from the rich and famous.

The interviewer asks: *"More and more people are walking the streets or in search of work with little prospect of finding it. Mr politician, what are you, as Minister of Employment going to do about the rising level of joblessness?"*

Mr Politician answers: *"I'm very glad that you asked me that question. It is an excellent question and I can assure you that the government is very conscious of the situation and is working very hard to rectify it. But before I answer that question let me turn your attention for a moment to this Government's record in housing where we have..."* (Coetzee and Russel 2000: 19)

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 19) state that the right course of action is to reclaim the question mark, even at the risk of rudeness: "I'm afraid we don't have the time to go down that road, Mr

Minister. What are you going to do about unemployment?" The look on the interviewee's faces will tell the interviewer they know the game is up – and the interviewer gains the psychological advantage. Politicians usually lie by omission, which is just another way to get around a difficult question.

LOVING LIES OF SILENCE

According to Hayford, Ecclesiastes (3: 7) states that there is a time to keep silent and a time to speak. We have to consider whether there is a time for silence that tells a lie. Smedes (1983: 243-244) cites the example of when you are in a group when boring old Harry asks, "Is anyone going to Pinetown?" and you keep your mouth shut even though you plan to take off to Pinetown in five minutes. Your silence is a bald-faced lie.

Smedes adds that we are not morally bound to tell the truth whenever we have a chance to blurt it out. I do not need to tell a friend my son has graduated with distinction when I know his son just dropped out of college. No mother needs to tell her daughter she is ugly. No student is obligated to tell a retiring professor that his lectures were platitudinous harangues. Silence can be golden.

According to Smedes we get into murky moral waters, however, when we ask whether we ought to tell silent lies to people who do have a normal right to our truthfulness. Some of our relationships depend on open truthfulness; we make covenants that are kept alive by truth and are broken by deceit. Marriage is a covenant like this. Yet – in life's brokenness – may it ever be necessary to deceive precisely for the sake of keeping the covenant?

Smedes (1983: 243-244) cites the example of Karen Naidoo who is a married woman with a strong belief in the permanence of marriage with a great need for passion. She has just ended a passionate love affair with another man; and she is now determined to rescue her marriage. She intends to turn it, if she can, into a loving, as well as permanent relationship. She is certain that her husband Dillon would leave her and call the marriage quits if he ever found out about her affair. So, torn between her dedication to marriage and shame at being a silent liar, Karen chooses a policy of loving silence.

Karen believes that she is lying about the past to honour a duty about the present. The important duty of the present is this: she ought to save her marriage. The truth about her affair is a truth about a past infidelity. Her duty to her lasting covenant overtakes her duty to the facts about an affair that is over.

Karen acts out a weak sort of lie; keeping one's mouth shut does not have the same sort of moral wallop that bald-faced lies do. But, weak as it is, her silent deceit puts that same shackles on Dillon that a "robust lie" would. He is kept from making his own free response to important facts that have invaded his life. He is denied his right to truthfulness. Karen is sure he will use his right to truthfulness to prevent her from having a second chance to save their marriage, so she opts for the strong value of marriage and pays for it with the price of a weak sin.

The situation is laced with an irony that afflicts a lot of morality in a fallen life. Marriage is a kind of relationship that needs truthfulness as its essence. Since adultery always threatens to destroy a marriage, lying about it usually is required to save the marriage. Therefore, the offence itself guarantees the "right to lie". The irony is too great.

LIES THAT MAY BE ACCEPTABLE

According to Coetzee and Russel (2000: xi) there is no question that there are times when a lie is called for. We all indulge in *social lying*. Social lies can cover a lot of territory, from harmless bragging and embellishment of one's social status, to lying for the sake of preserving relationships. Ekman (1989: 105) states that this type of lying is more serious when used by adults, as in cases of infidelity. Coetzee and Russel (2000) add that in the course of our social interaction we lie and are lied to regularly – and quite acceptably. Is it okay? Does it hurt anyone? These are questions the perpetrators will ask themselves. One of the primary reasons that leads a lot of people to lie is to protect the image they have of themselves. It is far easier to say, 'We decided to go our separate ways' than 'I got dumped'. We can live more easily with 'I decided to go and look for a bigger challenge,' than 'I got fired'.

The cushioning lie

Lyle (1993: 74) stresses that social lies and less-than-sincere flattery also seem to be necessary to maintain harmony, friendships, and jobs. The phrase, 'lets have lunch sometime', is a well-known social lie, which, while apparently offering a friendly meeting, rarely results in such an encounter. Yet it serves a useful purpose by enabling two people to cooperate in a harmless lie, and remain acquaintances - if not genuine friends.

Similarly, according to Lyle (1993), complimenting someone on his or her cooking or appearance – when both might be dreadful – allows everyone to sustain a reasonably civilised social front and avoid obvious conflict. Politicians are often adept liars, not from a desire to deceive, but from loyalty to their party's policies and leader, from ambition to be elected, or from a need to conceal sensitive information from the public.

Lyle (1993) adds that women make better lie detectors than men, perhaps because they are encouraged to rely on intuition and emotional gut reactions. They are also more expressive exponents of body language – and so practised at interpreting it accurately. Men are often wary of what has been called ‘feminine intuition’.

Tact

Goleman (1998b: 222) states that tact – in the form of discreet inattention – is a keystone of the social alliance to honour the integrity of the frames we share. Sykes (1983: 1087) defines tact as intuitive perception of what is fitting, especially of the right thing to do or say in order to avoid giving offence or to gain goodwill, adroitness in dealing with persons or circumstances. Ekman (1989: 6) characterises tact as requiring evasion, embroidery and sometimes saying something that is completely untrue. Politeness often requires some fabrication. “That meal was absolutely delicious,” is a common statement by a guest to a hostess who may not be a very good cook. When the real reason is that we want to avoid what is expected to be a dull, boring or disastrous evening, we make all sorts of excuses like saying we cannot find a baby-sitter, we have a prior arrangement or we are not well.

Polite lies

Smedes (1983: 232) cites the following examples of polite lies:

- A woman is invited to a party she does not want to attend. She responds that she would love to come, but she is engaged on that particular date.
- A crude guest leaves after an insufferable visit and his hostess says to him that she looks forward to seeing him again.
- A person begins a letter to a man he despises with, “Dear Seelan,” and ends it, “Cordially yours.”

All of this deception is well meant, not to deceive a neighbour, but to keep unpleasantness from becoming impolite.

Exaggerations

Smedes (1983: 232-233) adds that we often inflate our words, not to hurt anybody, but to make them feel better and, maybe, to spice up our own conversation. An average woman becomes a “beautiful person”. An ordinary sermon becomes an “inspiration”. Someone tries rather hard and he is credited with an “incredible effort”. We sprinkle compliments to our friends with “Sensational!” and “Fantastic!” to describe what are only passable performances. Anything less than “terrific” has these days become a failure.

According to Ekman (1989: 29-30) boasting or exaggerating is a very common lie in both children and adults. The motive is to increase one's status, to appear more important, glamorous and exciting to others. The exaggerated account is usually interesting, and more flattering than the unadorned one. In exaggerations, there is a shred of truth that is embellished and paraded, in fakery, the claim is completely untrue – the boast is about something that never happened.

Glosses

Smedes (1983: 23) states that when we put a little phoney lustre on an ugly reality, or pull a false cover over a wretched fact, we are glossing. The company has suffered disastrous losses; but the president tells the stockholders: "The company is in good shape after some seasonal reverses". A child is being told she was adopted; her mother tells her, "You are special, because you are a chosen child". We make life a little easier for the people we deal with by making believe, for a moment, that the walls are off-white when, in fact, they are a sad grey.

Euphemisms

Gass and Seiter (2003: 158) state that euphemisms are inoffensive terms substituted for offensive ones. A euphemism is a figure of speech that is used to describe something disagreeable, terrifying or offensive in a vaguer, milder or more indirect way. Smedes (1983: 232) declares that in a world of rough edged-reality, we like to soften the corners with words that do not cut so easily into the flesh. When someone dies, we say, 'He passed away'. In Victorian times a leg was very delicately called a 'limb' and underwear was referred to as 'unmentionables'. Today politicians often use euphemism to hide the truth. For example, soldiers who die in wartime activities are called 'casualties' and bloody riots are referred to as 'unrest-related incidents'. We 'terminate a pregnancy' instead of 'kill a foetus'. We have 'meaningful relationships' instead of 'commit adultery'. Pornographers cover up the ugliness of their business by calling their shops 'adult bookstores'. The ultimate euphemism was calling the Nazi killing of six million Jews 'the final solution'. As Smedes (1983: 232) states, one could argue that euphemisms are not really lies, but, as Mary Poppins sang, the 'spoonful of sugar' that 'helps the medicine go down'.

The use of euphemism to hide the truth is demonstrated at its best in the world of advertising and in the property market.

<p>HOUSE FOR SALE Quiet living in the dead centre of town. Lovely garden for nature lovers with large tropical fish pond and unusual landscaping. Natural face-brick finish accentuated by genuine antique doors. Sunken lounge with sky roof and water feature. Owner still gives it TLC. A house you could die for! A steal at only R260 000</p>	<p>HOUSE FOR SALE Next door to cemetery. Garden fallen to rack and ruin – mole tunnels everywhere. Swimming pool cracked and overgrown with algae. Plaster on exterior peeling off. Rotten doors need replacement. Sunken floorboards are the result of foundation collapse. Leaking geyser made big holes in parlour roof. Owner murdered tragically in the house – still haunts the place. A rip-off at R260 000.</p>
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Figure 11: The use of euphemism to hide the truth Grade 10 worksheet

Lies to protect our equals

Smedes (1983: 235) cites the example of an incompetent colleague, professionally marginal but a fine character, would not be promoted if we told our supervisor what we knew about him. So we lie for him, not grandly, just enough to get him by. A physician does needless spinal surgery, and botches it. He is sued; his colleagues on the staff cover for him by repairing his damage with follow-up surgery, and they lie for him on the stand.

A minister is playing sexual games with admiring women in his congregation. A few parishioners are getting suspicious and one or two of his colleagues know for sure; but when the presbytery investigates, the colleagues lie to give the man of God another chance.

A trial lawyer defends his rich client with a barrage of lying legalese. After all, we have to stick together and protect our own. A little lying may be the last we can do for our brothers and sisters in the trade

Lies to protect our lessers

Smedes (1983: 235) states that people in power often think that ordinary people cannot cope with the truth. So they lie in order to protect us. They act as our parents who decide when their children are ready for the truth about life.

Political leaders tell lies for the good of multitudes. They “know” that the little people cannot be trusted with the truth. The great lie of 1964 according to Bok (1978: 182) was that of Lyndon Johnson

who “knew” that his own election was for the supreme good of the nation. One way to secure it was to portray his opponent, Barry Goldwater, as a man who would expand the war in Vietnam himself as the man of peace and restraint, so he promised to restrict the US role in the war, all the while planning behind the scenes for massive bombing of North Vietnam. The President lied for the “good” of his children, the people.

According to Bok (1978) leaders are often high-minded people. Indeed, the higher-minded they are, the more they assume they “know” what is good for people. We may assume that Franklin Roosevelt felt that he was gently nurturing his nation; family when he promised he would never send their sons to foreign wars. We may guess that Richard Nixon had a patronising motive when he lied to cover his tracks through Watergate to “save the Presidency”. “Noble lies” seem at the time to be necessary for the good of the little folk. However, as high-minded as they are, lying leaders are deciding for the rest of us when we may know the truth.

Lies to protect the suffering

Smedes (1983: 236-237) says that few people enjoy the superiority over people that a doctor does over his patient. Doctors take an oath to relieve suffering; surely, any doctor may guess, obeying the oath comes before petty scruples about truthfulness. The physician decides whether the sick and dying will be told the truth about his condition. Reasons for lying to the sick and dying are reasons of compassion, of course. They arise from the weakness of the people whom the doctors serve. Sick people often need protection from truthfulness.

First, it is said, the truth will hurt them. Smedes (1983) states that the truth hurts sick and dying people in almost every conceivable way. It hurts just because it is the truth about painful reality. If you are dying of leukaemia, it may hurt more to hear about it than it does to die of it. It hurts a woman with cancer to be told that her days are numbered, because the information may take away her will to live. A doctor cannot know for sure how a patient will react to bad news. How can he be certain that the man who is told he is soon going to die a painful death will not go berserk and jump out the window or fall into a depression? Truthfulness can be a dangerous weapon. Sometimes it may be better to put it in a drawer and use a tender lie instead. There are it seems, tender reasons for deceiving people.

According to Smedes (1983) a second reason is that the truth is too hard to tell. For one thing, the truth about illness is very complex, and it can be told accurately only in technical medical jargon. No doctor can make it all understandable. Besides, there is so little time; there are other patients waiting. To make it harder, many patients are very limited. In large cities many patients may comprehend very little English. The truth about a doctor’s fees is simple; we can put that on a computerised invoice. However,

telling a person the truth about the one thing that touches him most – whether he will live or die – is often too hard even for a graduate of medical school. Every doctor knows, however, that truthfulness is not the same as truth. Truthfulness requires honesty – even when it cannot deliver clarity and completeness. We are talking here about lying as deception – which is different from inability to make everything clear. The question is whether it is good to deceive whenever it is hard to explain.

Third, the truth may be unwanted. Physicians may assume that patients do not want ugly and painful truthfulness. Perhaps it is only healthy people who are certain that they want to know the truth if they were fatally ill. In the time of their own illness, the same persons may be comforted by a lie. From this philosophical observation many doctors conclude that most people who face terrible news about their illness would really rather be lied to than given the truth. In any case, the physician decides whether any specific sick person wants the truth; no doctor *asks* a patient whether he wants to be lied to.

Smedes (1983: 238) adds that the answer depends to some extent on whether, on balance, loving lies are really helpful – more helpful, anyway, than harmful – over the long term. The commandment pushes us into the field with a bias against lying on the ground that truthfulness is of the essence for a human community. In order to overcome this bias, the champion of the loving lie must show that benevolent lies save us from needless evil while causing at worst, only “minimal harm”. It is not enough to claim that a loving lie helps the individual being lied to; we need to be shown that the *practice* of loving lies is not harmful to the community. I will now examine the “minimal harm” of benevolent lying.

WHITE LIES

Ekman (1989: 101) describes a white lie as one that benefits someone or any lie that is told to make a situation easier to deal with. It is intended to have no major repercussions. Bok (1978: 58) adds that other white lies are told in an effort to flatter, to throw a cheerful interpretation on depressing circumstances, or to show gratitude for unwanted gifts. In the eyes of many, such white lies do no harm, provide needed support and cheer, and help dispel gloom and boredom. They preserve the equilibrium and often the humaneness of social relationships, and are usually accepted as excusable so long as they do not become excessive. Many argue that such deception is so helpful and at times so necessary that it must be tolerated as an exception to a general policy against lying.

Bok (1978: 57) characterises white lies at the other end of the spectrum of deception, from lies in a serious crisis. They are the most common and the most trivial forms that duplicity can take. The

fact that they are so common provides their protective colouring. And their triviality, when compared to more threatening lies, makes it seem unnecessary or even absurd to condemn them.

Bok (1978: 59) states that another kind of lie may actually be advocated as bringing a more substantial benefit, or avoiding a real harm, while seeming quite innocuous to those who tell the lies. Such are the placebos given for innumerable common ailments, and the pervasive use of inflated grades and recommendations for employment and promotion.

Bok (1978) adds that a large number of lies without such redeeming features are nevertheless often regarded as so trivial that they should be grouped with white lies. They are lies told on the spur of the moment, for want of reflection, or to get out of a scrape, or even simply to pass the time. Such are the lies told to boast or exaggerate; the many lies told or repeated in gossip; lies told in order to say something; the embroidering on facts that seem too tedious in their own right; and the substitution of a quick lie for the lengthy explanations one might otherwise have to provide for something not worth spending time on.

Smedes (1983: 233) states that we must judge the “white lie” in terms of its tendency, its cumulative impact on people, not just in terms of a single lie. There are trade-offs involved. Here are some possible negative factors, according to Smedes (1983), when we try to justify the harmless lie.

Erosion of our “sense of truthfulness”

According to Smedes (1983: 233) the person who uses the harmless lie as an escape route from every uncomfortable conversation can soon become addicted to lying. If you always try to make people around you feel good by exaggerated praise; if you always soothe anger by glossing over whatever it was that made you feel angry, if you always rescue yourself from socially tight situations by lying about your feelings, you are likely to develop a habit and you risk losing your feel for being truthful, the sense of claim truthfulness has over you.

Evasion of reality

Smedes (1983: 234) adds that the white lie is to communication what Valium is to stress. Used in emergencies, they might be detours around trouble we are not equipped to cope with today. But as a habit, they become patterns of evasion. We use them, not to give us time to catch our breath so that we can confront trouble tomorrow, but to live as though trouble did not trouble us. The habitual white liar is a person who “cops out” of risk and unpleasantness; he deals with interrelational pain by freezing persons into the numbness of habitual hypocrisy.

Moral handcuffing

Smedes (1983: 234) states that the “white lie” ties the deceived person down to the lie and prevents her/him from a free response to reality. Preventing a small pain for now, the “white lie” often causes more pain later on. A writer gets a manuscript back from a publisher with the gentle lie: “your work is too sophisticated for our readers”. The “white lie” is just enough of a bromide to discourage the writer from the painful job of rewriting a boring book. A wife/husband passes through twenty years of secret misery in her/his marriage, afraid to share the truth of her/his discontent with her/his husband/wife. Finally s/he leaves him/her, never having allowed him/her the freedom of painful encounter with the truth about himself/herself. White lies that start out as social crutches tend to become shackles.

Nurture of cynicism

The white lie as a way of life gradually creates cynicism in both liar and deceived. Gradually nobody trusts the other to tell the truth. When we have told “white lies” often enough we assume that others do the same to us. The game of life we assume, calls for both people in a conversation to be gentle liars. But does it stop there? Once you assume that I lie in polite circles, can you trust me in business or politics?

The utilitarian’s view

Bok (1978: 59-60) explains that utilitarians often site white lies as the kind of deception where their theory shows the benefits of common sense and clear thinking. A white lie, they behold, is trivial; it is either completely harmless, or so marginally harmful that the cost of detecting and evaluating the harm is much greater than the minute harm itself. In addition, the white lie can often actually be beneficial, thus further tipping the scales of utility. In a world with so many difficult problems utilitarians might ask: why take the time to weigh the minute pros and cons in telling someone that his tie is attractive when it is an abomination, or of saying to a guest that a broken vase was worthless? Why bother to define such insignificant distortions or make mountains out of molehills by seeking to justify them?

Bok (1978) states that the harmlessness of lies is notoriously disputable. What the liar perceives as harmless or even beneficial may not be so in the eye of the deceived. Also, the failure to look at an entire practice rather than at their own isolated case often blinds liars to cumulative harm and expanding deceptive activities. Those who begin with white lies can come to resort to more frequent and more serious ones. When some tell a few white lies, others may tell more. When lines are so hard to draw, the indiscriminate use of such white lies can lead to other deceptive practices. The aggregate harm

from a large number of marginally harmful instances and may, therefore, be highly undesirable in the end – for liars, those deceived, and honesty and trust more generally.

According to Bok (1978), utilitarians often fail to look at *practices* of deception and the ways in which these multiply and reinforce one another. They tend to focus rather, on the individual case, seen from the point of view of the individual liar. Lies tend to spread. Disagreeable facts tend to be sugarcoated, and sad news softened or denied altogether. Many lie to children and those who are ill about matters that are no longer peripheral but quite central, such as birth, adoption, divorce and death. Deceptive propaganda and misleading advertising abound. All these lies are often dismissed on the same grounds of harmlessness and triviality used for white lies in general. There are practices where lies believed trivial are common. Triviality in an isolated lie can be more clearly seen to differ markedly from the costs of an entire practice – both to individuals and to communities. One such practice is that of giving placebos.

PLACEBOS

According to Bok (1978: 61-68) the common practice of prescribing placebos to unwitting patients illustrates the two miscalculations so common to minor forms of deceit: ignoring possible harm and failing to see how gestures assumed to be trivial build up into collectively undesirable practices. Placebos have been used since the beginning of medicine. Bok (1978) states that they can be sugar pills, salt-water injections – in fact, any medical procedure which has no specific effect on a patient's condition, but which can have powerful psychological effects leading to relief from symptoms such as pain or depression.

Placebos are prescribed with great frequency. Exactly how often cannot be known, the less so as physicians do not ordinarily talk publicly about using them. At times, self-deception enters in on the part of the physicians, so that they have unwarranted faith in the powers of what can work only as a placebo. As with salesmanship, medication often involves unjustified belief in the excellence of what is suggested to others.

The derivation of “placebo” as cited by Bok, from the Latin for “I shall please”, gives the word a benevolent ring, somehow placing placebos beyond moral criticism and conjuring up images of hypochondriacs whose vague ailments are dispelled with adroit prescriptions of beneficent sugar pills. Physicians often give a humorous tinge to instructions for prescribing these substances, which helps to remove them from serious ethical concern. Health professionals argue that placebos are far less dangerous than some genuine drugs.

However, according to Bok (1978), placebos may actually prevent the treatment of an underlying, undiagnosed problem. Moreover, even if the “placebo” works, the effect is often short-lived; the symptoms may recur, or crop up in other forms. Very often, the symptoms, of which the patient complains, are bound to go away by themselves, sometimes, even from the mere contact with a professional. In those cases, the placebo is unnecessary; having recourse to it merely reinforces a tendency to depend upon pills or treatments where none is needed.

Even apart from financial and emotional costs and the squandering of resources, the practice of giving placebos is wasteful of a very precious good: the trust on which so much in the medical relationship depends. The trust of those patients who find out they have been duped is lost, sometimes irretrievably. They may then lose confidence in physicians and even in bona fide medication, which they may need in the future.

Bok (1978) adds that the patients who do not discover the deception and are left believing that a placebo remedy has worked may continue to rely on it under the wrong circumstances. This is especially true with drugs such as antibiotics, which are sometimes used as placebos and sometimes for their specific action. Many parents, for example, come to believe that they must ask for the prescription of antibiotics every time their child has a fever or a cold. The fact that so many doctors accede to such requests perpetuates the dependence of these families on medical care they do not need and weakens their ability to cope with health problems. Worst of all, those children who cannot tolerate antibiotics may have severe reactions, sometimes fatal, to such unnecessary medication.

Such deceptive practices, by their very nature, tend to escape the normal restraints of accountability and can therefore spread more easily than others. There are many instances in which an innocuous-seeming practice has grown to become a large-scale and more dangerous one.

Bok (1978) says that reports of deceptive practices inevitably leak out, and the resulting suspicion is heightened by the anxiety, which threats to health always create. Therefore, even the health professionals who do not mislead their patients are injured by those who do; the entire institution of medicine is threatened by practices lacking in candour, however harmless the results may appear in some individual cases.

Deception by placebo can also spread from therapy and diagnosis to experimentation. Much experimentation with placebos is honest and consented to by the experimental subjects, especially since the advent of strict rules governing such experimentation. But grievous abuses have taken place where placebos were given to unsuspecting subjects who believed they had received another substance.

Bok (1978: 67) cites the example of a number of Mexican-American women who applied to a family-planning clinic for contraceptives. Some of them were given oral contraceptives and others were given placebos, or dummy pills that looked like the real thing. Without fully informed consent, the women were being used in an experiment to explore the side effects of various contraceptive pills. Some of those who were given placebos experienced a predictable side effect – they became pregnant. The investigators neither assumed financial responsibility for the babies, nor indicated any concern about having bypassed the “informed consent” that is required in ethical experiments with human beings. One contented himself with the observation that if the law had permitted it, he could have aborted the pregnant women.

According to Bok the failure to think about the ethical problems in such a case stems at least in part from the innocent-seeming white lies so often told in giving placebos. The spread from therapy to experimentation and from harmlessness to its opposite often goes unnoticed in part *because* of the triviality believed to be connected with placebos as white lies. This lack of foresight and concern is most frequent when the subjects in the experiment are least likely to object or defend themselves, as with the poor, the institutionalised, and the very young.

This is not to say that all placebos must be ruled out; merely that they cannot be excused as innocuous. They should be prescribed, but rarely, and only after a careful diagnosis and consideration of non-deceptive alternatives; they should be used in experimentation only after subjects have consented to their use.

DECEPTION AS THERAPY

Bok (1978: 221 – 225) cites the example of a forty-six year old man, coming to a clinic for a routine physical check-up needed for insurance purposes, is diagnosed as having a form of cancer likely to cause him to die within six months. No known cure exists for it. Chemotherapy may prolong life by a few extra months, but will have side effects the physician does not think are warranted in this case. In addition, he believes that such therapy should be reserved for patients with a chance of recovery or remission. The patient has no symptoms giving him any reason to believe that he is not perfectly healthy. He expects to take a short vacation in a week.

Bok (1978) adds that for the physician, there are now several choices involving truthfulness. Ought he to tell the patient what he has learnt, or conceal it. If asked, should he deny it? If he decides to reveal the diagnosis, should he delay doing so until after the patient returns from his vacation? Finally, even if he does reveal the serious nature of the diagnosis, should he mention the possibility of

chemotherapy and his reasons for not recommending it in this case? Or should he encourage every last effort to postpone death?

According to Bok (1978: 221 – 225) in this particular case, the physician chose to inform the patient of his diagnosis right away. He did not however, mention the possibility of chemotherapy. A medical student working under him disagreed; several nurses also thought that the patient should have been informed of this possibility. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the physician that this was the patient's right. When persuasion had failed, the student elected to disobey the doctor by informing the patient of the alternative of chemotherapy. After consultation with family members, the patient chose to ask for the treatment.

Bok (1978) adds that doctors confront such choices often and urgently. What they reveal, hold back, or distort will matter profoundly to their patients. Doctors stress with corresponding vehemence their reasons for the distortion or concealment: not to confuse a sick person needlessly, or cause what may well be unnecessarily pain or discomfort, as in the case of the cancer patient; not to leave a patient without hope, as in those many cases where the dying are not told the truth about their condition; or to improve the chances of cure, as where unwarranted optimism is expressed about some form of therapy. Doctors use information as part of the therapeutic regimen; it is given out in amounts, in admixtures, and according to timing believed best for patients. Accuracy, by comparison, matters far less.

Bok (1978: 221 – 225) states that lying to patients, has, therefore, seemed an especially excusable act. Some would argue that doctors, and *only* doctors, should be granted the right to manipulate the truth in ways so undesirable for politicians, lawyers, and others. Doctors are trained to help patients; their relationship to patients carries special obligations, and they know much more than laymen about what helps and hinders recovery and survival.

The two fundamental principles of doing good and not doing harm – of beneficence and non-maleficence – are the most immediately relevant to medical practitioners and the most frequently stressed. To preserve life and good health, to ward off illness, pain and death – these are the perennial tasks of medicine and nursing. These principles have found powerful expression at all times in the history of medicine. In the Hippocratic oath, physicians promise to use treatment to help the sick, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing.

Bok (1978: 221 – 225) mentions that the Hippocratic oath makes no mention of truthfulness to patients about their condition, prognosis or treatment.

THE DAMAGE DONE BY BENEVOLENT LIES

Smedes (1983: 238-239) cites the following as damages done by benevolent lies:

First, it casts the deceived in infantile roles. Somebody else is deciding for them when they are strong enough to bear up under the truth and when they ought to be deceived.

Second, benevolent lying robs the deceived of their right to truth. Someone else has decided that people who are mere citizens or patients do not have an intrinsic right to trust people to speak truthfully to them.

Third, lying to help someone robs the deceived of freedom. No one can be free who is forced to make decisions on the basis of false or misleading information. People who are lied to for their own political or physical good are, by that lie, being held in bondage. They cannot make their own response to the bad news about their own reality.

Fourth, such lies rob a person of his touch with reality. It would seem to be important for a human being to be in contact with the reality. It would seem to be important for a human being to be in contact with the reality of himself and his environment. To lose contact with reality is, in some measure, to lose orientation, to lose rationality, and lose a dimension of one's self. A person who lives with falsehood is living in an unreal world, and to force someone into that world by benevolent lies is to demean him.

Benevolent lying corrodes the character of the liar

Smedes (1983: 238-239) states that few people in our sinful condition can long resist the corrosive effects of patronising lying. The sheer arrogance of assuming that you have a right to decide when other people should be lied to is morally destructive. No one can play this godlike role for long without thinking that s/he personally matches the role. The loving liar who begins by lying only in an emergency for the other person's good, soon comes to believe that s/he really has the wisdom to know when anyone deserves the truth. Furthermore, people in power have a hard time keeping clear the time between what is good for the public and what is good for the liar. The patronising politician becomes a liar whenever s/he needs to lie to cover her/his own flanks. The patronising medic begins to tell lies whenever lying helps her/him escape a painful encounter with her/his own medical failure. Benevolent lies, habitually told, corrode the character of the patronising liar.

Benevolent lying breaks community

Smedes (1983: 238-239) adds that patronising lies tend, in the long run, to erode the trust people need for common life. Lies told by politicians for the public good eventually create a cynicism about government, which pull people out of participation in democracy. Lies told to help incompetent colleagues survive, and tend to erode the community's confidence in professional people. Lies told to protect the suffering undermine the trust a community has a right to have in the leading professions. On the liar's side, benevolent lying becomes a tool for manipulating people. The liar destroys communication because s/he uses it as a tool to get what s/he needs from the weak. No community can exist as a community of rational and caring people in an atmosphere of patronising deceit.

The good achieved by lying tends to be short-range good

Smedes (1983: 239) states that when we lie to spare people pain today; our lying may prevent them from doing something about the cause of pain in the future. We lie to protect our colleagues and friends; but we do not give them a chance to correct their faults, and we foist them instead on unsuspecting victims of their incompetence. Lies are almost always told for today's good without due regard for those who must pick up the pieces tomorrow.

Lies to save lives

Smedes (1983: 240-241) states that this may be a workable test: if I can save another person's life only by telling a lie, I am justified in lying. In addition, by the law of self-defence, if I may live to save a neighbour's life, I should be allowed to lie to save my own. In short, when a human life is pitted against truthfulness, let life have the day.

We feel confident about lying to save life because we have an undeniable intuition that destroying a human life is far worse than lying. Most of us simply feel that when it comes to life, we may lie boldly and grandly, and without qualms. We do not need an argument; we rely on our primitive sense for what counts.

According to Smedes (1983) lying to save a life, however, is often a gamble. We are not dealing with legal contracts, as a rule, as if your life can be guaranteed by my lie. Situations in which a person lies to save a life are not always cut and dried. The Gestapo is at the door; you have two Jews in your attic and the Nazis are hunting them. You lie, because you *know* that if the Gestapo finds them, the Jews are dead. But consider an armed man trapped in a bank. He takes everyone in the bank hostage and threatens to kill them all. You tell him that he will be allowed to go free if he puts down his gun and surrenders. You lie; you know he will be arrested. You lie with only a hope that your lie will save a life.

You do not even have favourable odds – yet human life is so much more important than truthful words that even a reasonable chance of saving a life would seem to justify the lie.

MENTAL RESTRAINT

Bok (1978: 35) explains that “mental reservation” or “mental restraint” took its lead from St Augustine’s definition of lying as having one thing in one’s heart and uttering another, but it *left out* the speaker’s intention as part of the definition. It thereby allowed the following argument: If you say something misleading to another and merely add a qualification to it in your mind so as to make it true, you cannot be responsible for the “misinterpretation” made by the listener. Some argued that such mental reservation could be used only for a just cause and when there was a chance for the deceived to make the correct inference. Others went very far in expanding its usage – to the point where a clever person could always find the convenient mental reservation for any falsehood he wanted to convey. Needless to say, this doctrine aroused intense controversy, both within and outside Catholic circles.

Bok (1978: 36-37), adds that since oaths in court were originally sworn in the name of God with the fear that He might strike down those who took his name in order to support falsehoods, some argued that a silent reservation, audible to God but not to the court, might avoid this fate. Thus an adulterous woman might swear that that she had not wronged her husband, adding silently that at least she had not done so that week, or at a certain house, thereby escaping her husband’s wrath and a certain death, while not believing herself perjured in the eyes of God.

Bok (1978: 36) explains that resorting to mental reservations and other internal disclaimers to outward acts has been a matter of life and death in those many periods when religious persecution has raged. In the sixteenth century, for example, the so-called Nicodemites, who had converted to Lutheranism or Calvinism, tried to escape persecution by concealing their religious views and by participating in the Mass. They sought to justify this behaviour on religious grounds, but Calvin condemned them in the harshest terms, advising them to emigrate from Catholic areas rather than to take part in “papist ceremonies”.

Bok (1978: 36-37) says that mental reservation is not altogether a thing of the past. We still swear to omit it in many official oaths of citizenship and public office.

ROMANTIC DECEPTION

Caldwell (2000: 14) defines romantic deception as the unrestrained misrepresentation of significant facts in the context of an intimate relationship. Truly skilled romantic liars use all sorts of

techniques to paint a false picture. They tell straight-out lies, but they also engage in overstatement and understatement. Sometimes romantic liars lie through their silence, and sometimes they deceive with the help of friends. Some actually say very little, but *misrepresent* a lot. Among the various forms of misrepresentation available to a romantic liar are the following:

- Falsification
- Concealment
- Diversion
- Exaggeration
- Understatement

In forming relationships, there needs to be some form of certainty about progeny. In the initial phase of romantic deception, couples go through a stage where there is an understanding that probing questions will not be asked, and each strives to present the best impression of herself/himself.

In the second phase, which is the self-revealing phase, intimate details about themselves, relatives and other relationships are revealed to test how seriousness of the relationship and to give the other party an opportunity to step back from the relationship if s/he so wishes. The person revealing embarrassing details of the unadorned self seeks to see to what extent s/he can trust the partner.

Blair et al (2001) analysed how different forms of deception functioned in different types of intimate relationships. The intimate relationships considered were married couples, engaged couples, dating partners, and friends. Deception within these intimate personal relationships functions differently than in social situations because of its target-specific nature and described target-specific as referring to when an individual in an intimate relationship tends to know which deception strategy will be most successful. In short, the operating factor that differentiates deception within relationships from deception in social settings is its person-specific nature made possible by partner intimacy. One of the main goals was to determine if particular types of deception were favoured in different types of intimate relationships. If partners were intimate, there was a greater chance that a falsification or distortion would be revealed. Falsification (i.e., contradiction) was found to be the most frequently reported deception strategy followed by omission, with distortion as third.

Blair et al (2001: 58) state the research was based on the premise that the central function of deception in relationships is to protect the harmony of the relationship. However, depending on the

type of relationship (marriage, engaged, dating, or friendship) the specific motivation behind a deception was found to differ according to relationship type. Some, deception motivations were found to be more prevalent in certain relationship types. For example, in marriage the reason for deception was concern for one's partner, as the partners assume continuation of the relationship. Conversely, in dating relationships, the reasons for deception focused on maintaining continuation of the relationship, rather than concern for one's partner. This is because continuation of the relationship is not as certain in dating relationships as it is in marriages. In addition to deception, power is another relationship dynamic that functions uniquely in the context of romantic relationships.

Power struggles

The questions of who has power and how to attain and maintain power have been explored by many past researchers. Blair et al (2001: 58) add that power struggles exist on many levels, including societal, political, industrial, and personal levels. Examining the concept of interpersonal power-over, this study explored possible connections between deception use and the attainment or maintaining of power in romantic relationships. Interpersonal *power-over* is defined as one person having the power to influence another when both are members of a specific relationship (i.e., marital and personal relationships). Power-over has been analysed in reference to four constructs: interpersonal, societal, organisational, and individual.

Blair et al (2001: 67) state that Keenan, Gallup, Goulet, and Kulkarni (1997) discussed a theory about sex differences in mating strategies. The concept, derived from evolutionary theory, is that men want to mate with as many women as possible, and that women want a mate who will be committed to help them protect and provide for their children. The different mating goals of the sexes bring their mating strategies into conflict with each other. Men and women both have resorted to deception to enhance their chances for obtaining a mate. Men engage in deceptions that make them appear to be more committed and financially successful to women. Women engage in deceptions that help them appear more physically attractive to men. Perhaps one possible explanation as to why the deception evaluated in this study's deception scenarios did not predict self-differentiation for men is that deception serves as an integral part of men's mating strategy. In short, regardless of their level of self-differentiation, men might still employ deception as a mating strategy.

Truth bias

Caldwell (2000: 43) explains that as much as the truth bias is embedded in society, socialisation is embedded in us as individuals. It is the process of socialisation that gives us the cultural knowledge we need if we are to function as a member of society. At times we rail against it, but it is with us, in us, and around us from cradle to grave.

According to Berger and Burgoon (1995: 81) conceptualised as a cognitive heuristic, the truth bias implies that as relationships become more intimate, partners develop a simple decision rule for judging each other's behaviour, i.e., "My partner has been truthful in the past, therefore s/he is being truthful now." This decision rule substitutes for careful scrutiny of a partner's messages and becomes chronically accessible through constant activation. Operation of the truth bias is consistent with the conception of heuristic message processing and suggests a causal process in which relational intimacy is positively related to the truth bias, which in turn is positively related to judgements of truthfulness and negatively related to detection accuracy.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 81) state further that although the truth bias heuristic is available in well-developed relationships, it was speculated that situational characteristics of deceptive transactions might serve to offset the operation of this heuristic and lead people to engage in more active message processing.

Cognitive dissonance and suspicions

If your intuition does not warn you, your logical faculties probably will. Eventually there will be some things you can probably point to – things about your partner's behaviour – that do not make sense. Caldwell (2000: 123) states that this is what social psychologists refer to as cognitive dissonance – an internal state that results when reality does not line up with your expectations of reality. Our natural tendency is to work toward a resolution of the dissonance. Unfortunately, we sometimes take the easy way out. Instead of holding firm to our expectations of reality (e.g., if this is an honest relationship, then this is what would be happening), we downplay, minimise, or even deny the contradictory evidence. We put aside the reality by altering our perceptions.

Caldwell (2000: 6) states that romantic deception, but its very nature, is cloaked in secrecy, manipulation and illusion. A romantic liar is not the man who tells you a little white lie now and then to keep your spirits up or fails to tell you the whole truth because he wants to spare your feelings. Similarly, a romantic liar is not the man who adds an embellishment here or there just to make a good impression on you when you first meet. Omissions and enhancements like these technically constitute lying, but they do not qualify as romantic deception.

Caldwell (2000) adds that masters in the art of romantic deception get away with the game because they are just that – *masters*. They know what to do and how to do it. When a romantic liar is operating in top form, you probably will not have a clue about what is going on. Some romantic liars specialise in concealing the fact that they are married, while others have a flair for posing as doctors or lawyers when they are not. Some romantic liars like to present themselves as decorated war heroes;

others go a step further by impersonating intelligence agents for the federal government. As a rule, only his imagination and the immediate circumstances limit a romantic liar.

Romantic liars commonly lie about:

- Marital status – lies about whether he is married, how many times he has been married, and what happened to his ex-wife (or wives)
- Family relationships – lies about the number of children he has, which family members are still living, and where they live
- Personal history – lies about where he grew up, where he went to school, whether or not he served in the military
- Present circumstances and lifestyle – lies about where he actually lives and who he is living with, where he works or what he does for a living

Romantic deception is something that plays out in intimate relationships. Caldwell (2000) states that all of us are accustomed to being on the receiving end of a lie now and then – lies from co-workers, acquaintances, politicians and any number of other people. As a result, most of us have probably learned to tolerate some degree of lying. It is one thing to be lied to by a politician, but it's quite another when it is our intimate partner and this is what put romantic deception in a category of its own. Romantic deception is a breach of trust, and it negates the very essence of intimacy: Here is why: *intimacy is based upon self-disclosure*, but self-disclosure is the last thing on the mind of a romantic liar.

THE “WOOL” PULLERS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 268-269) state that the Machiavellian personality is not interested in interpersonal relationships, manipulates others for selfish purposes, and has little sense of social morality. Machiavellian personalities are “wolves in sheep's clothing”. When lying, they appear more innocent than their counterparts (i.e., low Machiavellians). Gass and Seiter state that in a study high and low Machiavellian children tasted bitter crackers and then were offered a nickel for each cracker they could get their little chums to eat. The results of the study showed that the high Machiavellian children were not only the most successful in their persuasive attempts but were also seen as more innocent and honest than the low Machiavellian children.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 268-269) state that in addition to Machiavellianism, a person's social skills also influence how successful s/he is at deceiving others. For example, high self-monitors are

people who use situational information to behave more appropriately, tend to be more skilled at deception, than low self-monitors. Moreover, people skilled at communicating basic emotions are particularly good at convincing others to believe their deceptive messages, whereas those who are apprehensive in their communication tend to leak more deceptive cues. Similarly, people who are expressive and socially tactful, socially skilled and competent communicators are more successful at deceiving others than those who do not possess such skills.

DISEASE OR DECEPTION: MUNCHAUSEN BY PROXY AS A WEAPON OF THE WEAK

According to Schepers-Hughes (2002), Munchausen by Proxy (MBP), has been described in the medical literature as a rare “culture bound syndrome” having surfaced at a particular moment, late modernity, and in a particular “place”, Europe and North America and their extensions. At the heart of this disorder is a lie perpetrated by disturbed mothers who masquerade as the concerned and anxious caretakers of one or more long-suffering children who are plagued by fictive or maternally incited illnesses and, in the worst instance, who are subjected to death by maternal design.

Schepers-Hughes (2002) states that MBP is positioned within a broader comparative context as an extreme pole along a continuum of (mal-) adaptive maternal behaviours in response to unrecognised and unmet needs, not all of which are pathological. Second, the locus of the pathology is expanded to include not only the disturbed and troubled mother-child dyad, but also the relationship between mother and her doctors and other caregivers and protectors. In these medicalised transactions—shot through with power, love, and pain—the child emerges as an almost incidental or “transitional object”, a mere pretext that gives voice and substance to the adults’ (mothers’ and professionals’) narcissistic needs. Finally, the social and moral uses of illness as drama, performance, and pageantry, and as a passively aggressive “weapon of the weak”, are identified as a key structure of MBP disease.

According to Schepers-Hughes (2002), behaviours conforming to the symptoms of Munchausen by Proxy exist along a continuum of maternal behaviours, from normative to deviant. Munchausen by Proxy syndrome is rooted in conventional roles that isolate women, make them overly responsible for the physical care of vulnerable family members, and thereby prone to the social uses and abuses of somatisation and the sick role, and especially to the drama and pageantry of fictive illness and heroic (though false) medical rescue. Here we can see that lying and deception (or self-deception) in a context of bad faith become strategies with a deeper meaning than simple pathology and falsehood.

DECEPTION IN RESEARCH

Sternberg (1998: 29-30) states that research in psychology sometimes involves the deception of the participants. Typically, deception is used in a study when telling participants the truth might seriously distort the results of the investigation, rendering them useless. Sometimes the deceptions are mild, such as not revealing to the subject the true purpose of the experiment until after it is over.

In some cases psychologists have used extreme forms of deception, as did Milgram (1974) as cited by Sternberg (1998), when he led participants to believe they were delivering painful electric shocks to another person, when in fact they were not. When Milgram carried out his studies, researchers were generally not required to obtain advance approval of their plans in order to conduct a psychological investigation. Today virtually all institutions have a research-review process and require approval of investigations prior to their being carried out.

Sternberg (1998) adds that these boards are charged with protecting the rights of experimental participants, and they use two key methods for making sure that participants are protected. First, before participants begin their involvement in such a study, they are required to give *informed consent* to participating in the research; that is, the individuals are told what kinds of tasks they may be expected to perform and what kinds of situations they may expect to encounter, with specific qualifications for use of deception.

Secondly, after the research is completed, the participants are fully debriefed about the research. They are told exactly the nature of the experiment, told about any deception that may have been involved, and given the reason for the deception. Most research-review boards will allow minor deceptions if the value of the proposed research seems to justify the deception, if the deceptions are fully explained afterward, and if they are deemed necessary for the purpose of the experiment. Research-review boards will also sometimes allow the use of minor amounts of pain.

THE PRINCIPLE OF VERACITY

Bok (1978: 30-31) explains that Aristotle's view of lying is that it is mean and culpable, and that truthful statements are preferable to lies in the absence of special considerations. This premise gives an initial negative weight to lies. It holds that they are not neutral from the point of view of our choices; that lying requires explanation, whereas truth ordinarily does not. It provides counterbalance to the crude evaluation by liars of their own motives and of the consequences of their lies. It places the burden of proof squarely on those who assume the liar's perspective. Bok (1978) states further that trust in

some degree of veracity functions as a *foundation* of relations among human beings; when this trust shatters or wears away, institutions collapse.

Bok (1978: 30-31) adds further that such a principle need not indicate that all lies should be ruled out by the initial negative weight given to them, nor does it even suggest what kinds of lies should be prohibited. But it does make at least one immediate limitation on lying: in any situation where a lie is a possible choice, one must first seek truthful alternatives. If lies and truthful statements appear to achieve the same result or appear to be as desirable to the person contemplating lying, the lies should be ruled out. Only where a lie is a *last resort* can one even begin to consider whether or not it is morally justified. Mild as this initial stipulation sounds, it would, if taken seriously, eliminate a great many lies told out of carelessness or habit or unexpected good intentions.

NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 73-74) state that targets of deceptive messages are faced with the onerous task of evaluating and integrating different types of information contained in a source, verbal and nonverbal behaviour in the message environment, i.e., normative judgements. Proper evaluation and integration of these cues are essential for accurate veracity judgements, and the difficulty of this task is underscored by research consistently demonstrating that people are unable to accurately detect deception in others.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 75) add that findings from several investigations provide unequivocal support for the conclusion that people rely heavily on nonverbal cues when judging message veracity, even though most nonverbal cues are not reliable indicators of deception.

For example, in one study, Berger and Burgoon (1995: 75) examined the nonverbal correlates of deceptive messages and compared them with the verbal and nonverbal correlates of people's veracity judgements. Although none of the ten nonverbal cues coded was correlated with actual message veracity, participants relied on seven of these nonverbal cues to make veracity judgements. The correlations with veracity judgements were moderate in size for three nonverbal cues (smiles, posture shifts, pauses and response duration). Moreover, findings were consistent with those from three other studies in which the nonverbal cues related to *actual* truth and deception differed from cues related to people's *judgements* of deception. Thus, one explanation for people's inability to make accurate judgements may stem from the importance people assign to nonverbal cues, which appear to be less reliable indicators of actual deception than verbal content cues.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 74-75) add that although these investigations provided evidence of the primacy of nonverbal cues in judgements of honesty and deceit, they provided few insights about how people integrate verbal and nonverbal message cues with cues in the message environment to make judgements about deception. In one early study, people who were exposed to written or audiotaped message presentations of truthful and deceptive messages were significantly more accurate judges of deception than those who were exposed to a live message presentation.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 77) say that to examine the validity of the distraction explanation, an experiment was conducted in which the mode of message presentation was held constant, and verbal, vocal and visual qualities of a source's message were varied. The verbal, vocal and visual cue manipulations were designed to reflect the types of behaviour commonly found in truthful and deceptive messages. For example, in the truthful verbal conditions, trained actors provided clear, consistent, plausible and concise responses to an interviewer's questions. In the deceptive verbal condition, these responses were less clear, consistent, plausible and concise. Similar manipulations were created for visual and vocal correlates of deception. Videotapes of these interviews were shown to observers who were asked to judge the veracity of the interviewee and to evaluate qualities of the verbal message content.

Consistent with prior studies, observer's judgements were heavily influenced by the visual cue manipulation. Observers exposed to interviews that manipulated visual cues associated with deception rated the source as significantly more deceptive than observers exposed to the truthful visual cue manipulation. Vocal and verbal cue manipulation had little effect on veracity judgements.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 77) add that it was hypothesized that when the context of a deceptive interaction was unfamiliar to observers, observers would base their veracity judgements on culturally held beliefs about what a liar "looks like" instead of characteristics of verbal content. However, when the situational context was familiar, it was hypothesized that observers would base their judgements on verbal content cues. Once again, when actors were employed to manipulate verbal and visual behaviour in response to an interviewer's questions, people relied exclusively on verbal content cues to make judgements. In the unfamiliar situation, however, observer's judgements were influenced by both visual and verbal cue manipulations.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 77) state that one explanation for this unanticipated finding may be that observers in the unfamiliar situation felt less confident basing their judgements exclusively on verbal cues and relied on visual cues as well.

Berger and Burgoon (1995: 77) go on to explain that many everyday situations require people to make veracity judgements in group settings. In these situations, verbal and nonverbal information from message sources is often accompanied by knowledge about the judgement of others. For example, in jury deliberations, jurors are cognisant of each other's judgements. Social normative influences like these have been shown to be quite influential on individual judgements. However, in situations where verbal and nonverbal cues are incongruent, uncertainty about the source's veracity should be high. Therefore, it was hypothesized that when verbal and nonverbal cues were congruent, observers would rely primarily on those cues to make veracity judgements. However, when these cues were incongruent, people's veracity judgements would be influenced by social normative information available to them.

CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE

Language changes over centuries. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 381) state that it is in fact a remarkable feature of all languages that they change over cultural time. Saviile-Troike (1997: 78-79) states that specialised varieties of language are often used when the purpose is to be secretive, or to deceive. Argots have been created by criminals for secret communication among themselves since the days of the Roman underworld, and adolescents in many societies use a secret code comparable to Pig Latin in English, which involves permutation and addition of phonological segments. Saviile-Troike state that most phonological changes intended to obscure various languages are quite simple.

SECRET SPEECH

Saviile-Troike (1997: 79) describes three types of secret speech among the Kewa of New Guinea. *Ramula agaa* 'pandanus language' is used to protect people who travel in swamp forest areas where ghosts and wild dogs are present. People are instructed by their ancestors not to speak their 'normal' language, and to use a secret variety marked by special vocabulary. *Mumu ne agaa* 'whispering talk' is used whenever others within hearing of speech produced at normal volume are not supposed to know what is going on, as when the topic is trading, bespelling, or stealing something. *Kudiri ne agaa* refers to 'secret talk', or talk limited to insiders, such as cult initiates.

Saviile-Troike goes on to say that the first of these types is for external secrecy, known by all in the speech community and directed towards outsiders. Saviile-Troike describes these phenomena in pueblo societies, where internal secrecy assures that no single member possesses all necessary information for the performance of rituals, and preserves the interdependence of subgroups in the social organisation. Pueblo strategies for secrecy include: barring outsiders from performance of ceremonies in ritual spaces, such as the kivas; constructing false and misleading information; evasion of questions; purging the language of Spanish and English loanwords in the presence of those who might

understand them (sometimes requiring elaborate circumlocutions); use of special ritual varieties which contain archaic words, borrowings from other languages, and different semantic systems (i.e., different referents); and special styles of speaking, such as 'talking backwards'.

Saville-Troike (1997: 79) states that secretive purposes may overlap with exclusionary ones for identification, as with teenage slang and the 'CB (Citizens Band) radio lingo'. The latter has been widely used by truck drivers in the United States for solidarity purpose, sharing information on road conditions, asking and giving directions, summoning help in the case of emergency, and for trying to evade the common antagonist, the highway patrolman (called *Smokey the bear*, often seen driving a *plain blue wrapper*). Many drivers expressed considerable resentment during the mid 1970's when CB radio use became popular with thousands of 'outsiders', although they seem to have enjoyed the participation of the President's wife, Betty Ford, whose code name was *First Mama*.

TSOTSITAAL

Molamu (2003: xiii) states that Tsotsitaal developed over the years as a means of communication between people of different ethnic and racial backgrounds in the urban milieu of South Africa. Any language, which is widely used as a medium of communication between members of groups who speak different, and at times, mutually unintelligible languages, is known as lingua franca. The term essentially refers to any mixed language, which arises in places where people from different speech communities come into contact. It is in Sophiatown and neighbouring African residential areas that such a language took root and blossomed. There has always been an exhilarating sense of creativity when people speak Tsotsitaal. It is a language of passion and it served as a gateway to the streets of Sophiatown. Yet others believed that it was a "parlance of secrecy" in a bid mainly to stay one step ahead of white state authorities, especially during the apartheid era. Old words are often revised while new words are constantly added to the lexicon, making it hard for non-township residents to keep up. Tsotsitaal and isicamtho are generally acknowledged as being a form of slang or cant spoken by the youth.

As a vehicle for social interaction primarily among African youth in Johannesburg and surrounding townships, it constitutes a vital part of a distinct subculture. This lingua franca, which constitutes an integral part of the fascinating past of Sophiatown, emerged as an attempt, specifically to resolve problems of communication experienced collectively by young people in the segregated communities of urban South Africa. Invariably, it also served as an important marker of identity and group membership.

Molamu (2003) states that *tsotsitaal* bears the unmistakable imprint of a quintessentially male language, which emerged in a vast jungle of competing tongues. Those who created it, were also motivated by crime. Consequently, *Tsotsitaal* is largely a secret language. In a sense it constituted one of the ways in which African youth sought to exclude non-members, or “*moegoes*” from conversations. *Tsotsitaal* allows gang members to use coded language so that other gang members as well as the general public will not be able to understand their covert use of the language, allowing gang members to plan strategic attacks on unknowing victims. Apart from its use by the youth, *tsotsitaal* may indicate a sign of solidarity in bonding practices between adults who grew up with it and continue to use it with their friends to indicate in-group affiliation. So you could get “My oulady tune altyd mca tamas” i.e. “My mother always prepares a delicious meal.” This living language has crossed the boundaries of time and space.

Tsotsitaal as a distinct vehicle of communication in the midst of several mother tongues came to straddle the Reef and touch the lives of many throughout South Africa. It emerged against a background of putatively distinct ethnic and racial groups and associated multilinguality. Gangs of youth spoke “*fytaal*” or “*mensetaal*”.

Molamu (2003: xxiii) suggests the roots of the word “*tsotsi*” are in central Africa. The fierce reputation of the Tutsi warriors in Rwanda and Burundi had filtered through to the townships on the Reef. It has been suggested that the term “*tsotsi*” is a crude modification of the word “Tutsi”. It has been argued that the lexical modification of this term in Sophiatown and its environs came to refer to violent thugs. All sorts of shadowy gangs, armed with anything from knives, tomahawks and guns, competed for turf in the burgeoning urban sprawl and came to be called the “*tsotsis*”. In the world of the gangsters, toughness and the capacity to unleash ferocious physical violence were fairly pervasive. These young men, distinguished empirically, partly by their criminal and violent behaviour, acquired the name “*tsotsi*”

Both the lexicon of *Tsotsitaal* and *Iscamtho* differ substantially from the standard form of the source languages, and this is one of the outstanding characteristics of these language varieties. So you could get “Heitada, my bra! Hoezit?” meaning, “Hello there, my friend, how are you?” And often the response is: “Sharp sharp!” Other examples from Molamu (2003) include:

Word	Meaning
Babalaasbek	A drunkard, one who frequently suffers from hangovers
Baqa	A term which means "to be caught during the act of committing a deviant and/or criminal act"
Blue Sky	The name of a prison near Boksburg
Good afternoons	Buttocks
Moll	A female companion, often used to refer to a girlfriend
Score	To be successful in stealing
Snotkop	A greenhorn; a young inexperienced person
Workshop	To assault someone
Staak	A wad of notes of money
Zol	A cigarette made by rolling loose tobacco or marijuana
Ambaag	A profession
Bhaya	To buy or purchase; many or much
Cava	Have a look; see
Daai ding	That thing
Mthangala	A plan; scheme
Rika	To cheat

Figure 12: Tsotsitaal Molamu (2003)

PRISON LANGUAGE

The existence of prison gangs in South African Prisons is a reality. Although there are many myths about the origin of such gangs, the only recorded fact is that they had their beginnings in the latter years of the previous century and probably originated among the criminal mine gangs of those days.

Today, gang activity is one of the greatest problems with which prisons in South Africa are confronted. Not only are gangs largely responsible for the unrest prevalent in prisons, but also a high percentage of assaults, smuggling, escapes and sexual malpractice, which are committed by prisoners, can be attributed directly to prisoners' participation in gangs.

The structure and functioning of prison gangs

There are greater and lesser differences in the structure and functioning of various prison gangs. Lotter and Schurink, (1984: <http://judicialinsp.pwv.gov.za/Manual/005-18.htm#TopOfPage>) cite the following general guidelines that underlie the behaviour and activities of all prison gangs.

- Be loyal towards and submissive to the gang
- Brothers should be respected, supported and assisted and there should be harmonious co-existence
- Do not tell-tales or cooperate with officials

The actions of gang members are regulated at various levels. There are specific ways in which gang members must act towards non-gang members, fellow-gang members, members of other gangs, and officials. It is important to note that gangs cannot easily be identified by their behaviour towards officials, because gang codes require gang members to act in a "disciplined" manner towards officials.

The tap code

One of the most important parts of a POW's life was communicating with his fellow captives. The first communication between isolated prisoners of war may have been a name scrawled on a piece of toilet paper with the burnt end of a matchstick. Notes and whispers were attempted, but both were often detected and severely punished.

According to the Tap Code (undated: <http://www.airsoftgent.be/dbase/tapcode.htm>), in June 1965, four POWs – Captain Carlyle ("Smitty") Harris, Lieutenant Phillip Butler, Lieutenant Robert Peel and Lieutenant Commander Robert Shumaker – who were imprisoned in the same cell in Hoa Lo devised a simple, secretive code. The four men, expecting to be split up again, vowed to continue their resistance. To do so, they knew communicating closely would be essential.

Harris remembered an Air Force instructor who had shown him a secret code based on a five-by-five alphabet matrix. Each letter was communicated by tapping two numbers: the first designated the horizontal row and the second designated the vertical row. The letter W, for example, would be 5-2; the letter H would be 2-3. The letter x was used to break up sentences and the letter "c" replaced the letter "k."

According to Tudor (1998: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-pow.htm>) the code used a matrix of the alphabet, five by five, removing the letter 'K' and using 'C' in its place. For instance, if a prisoner wanted to tap out the letter 'O,' he would tap three times, indicating the row, pause and tap four more times, indicating the letter.

Here is the way the alphabet code was set up:

TAPS	1	2	3	4	5
1	A	B	C	D	E
2	F	G	H	I	J
3	L	M	N	O	P
4	Q	R	S	T	U
5	V	W	X	Y	Z

Figure 13: The tap code (undated: <http://www.airsoftgent.be/dbase/tapcode.htm>)

The guards separated the four prisoners after one was caught passing a note, and thus inadvertently spread the code, as the separated men taught it to others. By August 1965, most of the prisoners had been initiated, and were passing messages by tapping on the walls to fellow prisoners. The building sounded like a den of runaway woodpeckers.

According to Tap Code (undated: <http://www.airsoftgent.be/dbase/tapcode.htm>) some of the acronyms entered POW popular usage. One acronym, GBU, was used as a universal sign-off. It was shorthand for "God Bless You." ST right after GN meant, "Sleep tight" and DLTBBB meant, "Don't let the bedbugs bite."

CRYPTOGRAPHY

Moore (71: 1995) reveals that cryptography is the use of technologies designed to disguise the contents of a message. Cryptography typically involves an encryption operation to disguise the data at the transmitter, and the decryption operation to remove the disguise at the receiver. Melton (1996: 168) defines cryptography as the use of codes and ciphers to render communications that have been originally written in plain text unintelligible and secure except to the intended recipients. Cryptography is the process associated with scrambling plaintext (ordinary text, or clear text) into cipher text (a process called encryption), then back again (known as decryption). With cryptography it is possible to hide information in cipher text.

Cryptography concerns itself with four objectives:

- Confidentiality (the information cannot be understood by anyone for whom it was unintended)
- Integrity (the information cannot be altered in storage or transit between sender and intended receiver without the alteration being detected)

- Non-repudiation (the creator/sender of the information cannot deny at a later stage her/his intentions in the creation or transmission of the information)
- Authentication (the sender and receiver can confirm each other's identity and the origin/destination of the information)

Procedures and protocols that meet some or all of the above criteria are known as cryptosystems.

SPYING

Melton (1996) states that spying has been with the human race from time immemorial; it has often been called “the second oldest profession”, and was used by ruling elite's as a major tool to protect their power from real or imaginary threats and rivals, both domestic and external. Espionage never played a decisive role in the history of making because it can neither replace responsible policy-making, nor significantly alter political and military imperatives. Its impact on the international relations increased dramatically in the second half of this century when two world superpowers and their respective allies, guided by irreconcilable ideologies, clashed in a deadly struggle for human minds and ultimately world domination.

According to Melton (1996) that was the essence of the Cold War. After the classic Cold War crises of the 1950's and 1960's, espionage evolved into a far more sophisticated and diverse trade, in which psychological warfare, conspiracies and assassinations featured more prominently than mere clandestine collection of information. Intelligence gathering was transformed by satellites, lasers, computers and other gadgetry capable of ferreting out secrets from every corner of the globe. Methods of spying may have changed considerably through the ages, but even in this modern age of high technology the role of the human spy is as important as it has ever been.

EARLY ESPIONAGE

According to Melton (1996: 18-19) rulers and military leaders have always needed to know the strengths, weaknesses and intentions of their enemies. Consequently, the trade of spying is as old as civilisation itself. Around 500 BC, the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote about the importance of intelligence and espionage networks in his classic book, *The art of War*. The Bible contains more than a hundred references to spies and intelligence gathering. Most of the elements of modern espionage, however, originated in 15th and 16th century Europe.

SPIES AT COURT

Melton (1996: 18-19) states that the political, philosophical and cultural changes of this period fostered the development of intelligence gathering. During the 15th century, the principles of poly-alphabetic ciphers were laid down; these principles were still in use in the early 20th century. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the European courts became centres of intrigue as rulers strove to maintain and increase their power. The ambassadorial system of diplomacy was established, and ambassadors were expected to combine official duties with espionage and subversion. Intelligence services were created and were used to great effect by such men as Cardinal Richelieu in France (1585 -1642) and Sir Francis Walsingham in England (1537 – 1590).

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

According to Melton (1996) by the time of the American Civil War (1861 – 1865), a number of technological advances had occurred that changed the methods used to gather and communicate intelligence. Photography was used for this purpose for the first time. The Confederate States even made use of an early form of the microdot. Telegraphy was used for the first time in a major war in **military communications**, but messages were often intercepted and deciphered. Aerial photography was also devised, using hot air balloons.

MATA HARI

Melton (1996: 18-19) states that Dutch-born Margaretha Zelle (1876-1918) became famous throughout Europe as a dancer under the stage name Mata Hari. She performed a dance, which was, by her account, an authentic Hindu temple ritual. Her fame brought her many influential lovers.

Mata Hari took up espionage in 1914 when the German consul in Amsterdam persuaded her to use her lovers to gain information for Germany. He gave her inks with which to send secret messages. It was not long before Mata Hari's amateurish attempts at spying aroused the suspicion of both French and British intelligence. In spite of this, the French accepted her offer to spy for them. She seduced the German military attaché in Madrid, hoping he would give her information that she could pass on to France.

Mata Hari's end came when she was mentioned in a German secret service telegram from Madrid to Germany. Although referred to as 'agent H-21', she was identifiable, and the message was intercepted by the French – it was in a code that they had already broken.

Mata Hari was arrested as a German spy on her return to Paris. She was tried in a French military court, found guilty and executed by firing squad in 1918.

WORLD WAR 1

Melton (1996) adds that World War 1 (1914 – 1918) began as a struggle between the great European powers: the Triple Entente of France, Britain and Russia against the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Melton (1996: 24) states that as the war progressed, more nations were drawn into the struggle. It was during this war that code-breaking (cryptography) began to take on the great importance that it has in intelligence-gathering today.

According to Melton (1996) during the early 20th century, technology for sending long-distance *messages made great advances. Telegraph and radio messages, in Morse code, were soon vital to the conduct of war.* The intelligence-gathering work of the “agent on the ground”, known in the trade as human intelligence, or HUMINT, was joined by a new craft, signals intelligence – later known as SIGINT. As well as sending and receiving messages, it was now necessary to break the ciphers of enemy nation. Early in World War 1, Russia had not learned the importance of this: the first German victory against Russia was the result of German signals intelligence intercepting Russian army signals that had been transmitted in enciphered Morse code. Some other countries did establish special centres for deciphering messages. For example, the British set up Room 40 of naval intelligence, which was renowned for its deciphering skills.

Melton (1996) explains that early in World War 1, human spies were seen as the main threat by the public on both sides of the conflict. But it was signals intelligence that was to prove far more decisive, and it attained greater importance than in any previous war. For instance, British Admiralty cipher experts deciphered a top-secret German government telegram offering Mexico an offensive *alliance against the United States.* By subtle use of this discovery, Britain helped to bring America into the war on the Allied side. In America, a cryptology section for military intelligence had been created under Hebert Yardley.

CODE-BREAKING

Melton (1996: 168) defines code breaking, also known as cryptanalysis, as the study of ciphers and other kinds of codes in order to reveal the original message, without having access to official keys or encryption systems. Hinsley and Stripp (1993: xv) describe a code breaker as someone who literally breaks an enemy code (or cipher) system. More broadly, code breaking includes the whole staff of a code-breaking unit, including those who collate, assess and distribute the intelligence thus provided.

Melton (1996: 36) states that spies, diplomats and military personnel often relied on cipher machines to protect the secrecy of their messages during World War II. Messages enciphered by means of the German Enigma cipher machine and the Japanese alphabetic Typewriter 97 were deciphered by code-breakers working in special establishments in both Britain and the United States.

CODE TALKING

According to Molnar (1997: <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq61-2.htm>) the code talkers' primary job was to talk, transmitting information on tactics and troop movements, orders and other vital battlefield communications over telephones and radios. They also acted as messengers, and performed general Marine duties. Military commanders credited the Code with having saved the lives of countless American soldiers and with the successful engagements of the U.S. in the battles of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The Japanese, who were skilled code breakers, remained baffled by the Navajo language.

THE PURPLE CODE

Melton (1996: 36-37) adds that in 1939 the Japanese began using a new cipher machine for sending diplomatic messages. They called it the Alphabetic Typewriter 97, but in the United States it was known by the code name Purple. The Purple machine was a development of an earlier one code named Red.

Melton (1996) states that American code-breakers had already cracked the Red system, and now the cryptographer William Friedman and the US army Signals Intelligence service began work to break the new cipher. The cryptographers were aided by the interception on both the Red and Purple machines.

The code-breakers had to help them build a Purple machine of their own. A breakthrough came when they tried using stepping switches – part of the telephone technology of the time. By a lucky coincidence, these worked in exactly the same way as the switches in the purple machine.

By late 1940, Friedman and a team of the US Navy code-breakers were able to construct a Purple machine. It was so efficient that Japan's declaration of the war – sent to the embassy in Washington a day ahead of the attack on Pearl Harbour to allow time for decipherment – was read by American intelligence before it was presented to the US Secretary of War.

NAVAJO CODE TALKERS AND THEIR ROLE DURING WORLD WAR II

Bingaman (undated: http://bingaman.senate.gov/code_talkers/code/code.html) writes that to decipher a message coded by the Navajo Code Talkers, the recipient first translated the Navajo words into English, and then used the first letter of each English word to decipher the meaning. Because different Navajo words might be translated into different English words for the same letter, the code was especially difficult to decipher. For example, for the letter "A," the Code Talker could use "wol-la-chee" (ant), "be-la-sana," (apple), or "tse-nill" (ax). Some military terms that had no equivalent in Navajo were assigned their own code word. The word *America*, for example, was "Ne-he-mah" (Our mother). *Submarine* became "besh-lo" (iron fish).

Molnar 1997: (<http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq61-2.htm>) explains that the Navajo code talkers took part in every assault the U.S. Marines conducted in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945. They served in all six Marine divisions, Marine Raider battalions and Marine parachute units, transmitting messages by telephone and radio in their native language -- a code that the Japanese never broke.

The idea to use Navajo for secure communications came from Philip Johnston, the son of a missionary to the Navajos and one of the few non-Navajos who spoke their language fluently. Johnston, reared on the Navajo reservation, was a World War I veteran who knew of the military's search for a code that would withstand all attempts to decipher it. He also knew that Native American languages—notably Choctaw—had been used in World War I to encode messages.

Molnar (1997) states that Johnston believed Navajo answered the military requirement for an undecipherable code because Navajo is an unwritten language of extreme complexity. Its syntax and tonal qualities, not to mention dialects, make it unintelligible to anyone without extensive exposure and training. It has no alphabet or symbols, and is spoken only on the Navajo lands of the American Southwest. One estimate indicates that less than 30 non-Navajos, none of them Japanese, could understand the language at the outbreak of World War II.

Early in 1942, Johnston met with Major General Vogel, the commanding general of Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, and his staff to convince them of the Navajo language's value as code. Johnston staged tests under simulated combat conditions, demonstrating that Navajos could encode, transmit, and decode a three-line English message in 20 seconds. Machines of the time required 30 minutes to perform the same job. Convinced, Vogel recommended to the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the Marines recruit 200 Navajos. In May 1942, the first 29 Navajo recruits attended boot camp. Then, at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California, this first group created the Navajo code. They

developed a dictionary and numerous words for military terms. The dictionary and all code words had to be memorised during training (Molnar 1997: <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq61-2.htm>).

According to Molnar (1997), once a Navajo code talker completed his training, he was sent to a Marine unit deployed in the Pacific theatre. The code talkers' primary job was to talk, transmitting information on tactics and troop movements, orders and other vital battlefield communications over telephones and radios. They also acted as messengers, and performed general Marine duties.

Molnar (1997) adds that praise for their skill, speed and accuracy accrued throughout the war. At Iwo Jima, Major Howard Connor, 5th Marine Division signal officer, declared, "Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima." Connor had six Navajo code talkers working around the clock during the first two days of the battle. Those six sent and received over 800 messages, all without error.

Molnar (1997) states that the Japanese, who were skilled code breakers, remained baffled by the Navajo language. The Japanese chief of intelligence, Lieutenant General Seizo Arisue, said that while they were able to decipher the codes used by the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps, they never cracked the code used by the Marines. The Navajo code talkers even stymied a Navajo soldier taken prisoner at Bataan. (About 20 Navajos served in the U.S. Army in the Philippines.) The Navajo soldier, forced to listen to the jumbled words of talker transmissions, said to a code talker after the war, "I never figured out what you guys who got me into all that trouble were saying."

Molnar (1997) explains that in 1942, there were about 50,000 Navajo tribe members. As of 1945, about 540 Navajos served as Marines. From 375 to 420 of those trained as code talkers, the rest served in other capacities. Navajo remained potentially valuable as code even after the war. For that reason, the code talkers, whose skill and courage saved both American lives and military engagements, only recently earned recognition from the Government and the public.

The Navajo Code Talker's Dictionary

Molnar (1997: <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq61-2.htm>) adds that when a Navajo code talker received a message, what he heard was a string of seemingly unrelated Navajo words. The code talker first had to translate each Navajo word into its English equivalent. Then he used only the first letter of the English equivalent in spelling an English word. Thus, the Navajo words "wol-la-chee" (ant), "be-la-sana" (apple) and "tse-mill" (axe) all stood for the letter "a." One way to say the word "Navy" in Navajo code would be "tsah (needle) wol-la-chee (ant) ah-keh-di- glini (victor) tsah-ah-dzoh (yucca)."

Molnar (1997) states that most letters had more than one Navajo word representing them. Not all words had to be spelled out letter by letter. The developers of the original code assigned Navajo words to represent about 450 frequently used military terms that did not exist in the Navajo language. Several examples: "besh- lo" (iron fish) meant "submarine," "dah-he- tib-hi" (hummingbird) meant "fighter plane" and "debeh-li-zine" (black street) meant "squad."

Department of Defence Honours Navajo Veterans

According to Molnar (1997: <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq61-2.htm>) long unrecognised because of the continued value of their language as a security classified code, the Navajo code talkers of World War II were honoured for their contributions to defence on Sept. 17, 1992, at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Molnar (1997) adds that thirty-five code talkers, all veterans of the U.S. Marine Corps, attended the dedication of the Navajo code talker exhibit. The exhibit included a display of photographs, equipment and the original code, along with an explanation of how the code worked. Dedication ceremonies included speeches by the then-Deputy Secretary of Defence Donald Atwood, U.S. Senator John McCain of Arizona and Navajo President Peterson Zah. The Navajo veterans and their families travelled to the ceremony from their homes on the Navajo Reservation, which includes parts of Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. The Navajo code talker exhibit is a regular stop on the Pentagon tour.

WINDTALKERS

Windtalkers, the movie, focuses on two of several hundred Navajo Indians who were recruited as Marines in 1942 and trained to use a secret military code based on their native language that was never broken by the Japanese during World War II. On December 8, 1941, the United States declared war on Japan.

For the next several years, U.S. forces were fully engaged in battle throughout the Pacific, taking over islands one by one in a slow progression towards mainland Japan. During this brutal campaign, the Japanese were continually able to break coded military transmissions, dramatically slowing U.S. progress. In 1942, several hundred Navajo Americans were recruited as Marines and trained to use their language as code. Marine Joe Enders is assigned to protect Ben Yahzee - a Navajo code talker, the Marines' new secret weapon. Enders' orders are to protect his code talker, but if Yahzee should fall into enemy hands, he is to "protect the code at all costs." Against the backdrop of the horrific Battle of Saipan, when capture is imminent, Enders is forced to decide whether he can bring himself to kill his fellow Marine to protect the code.

ENIGMA MACHINE

According to Melton (1996: 36-37) Germany's strategy in World War 11 was to wage a war of total mobility on land, sea and in the air. This required the fastest and most secret communications possible. The Enigma cipher machine, originally designed to protect the secrecy of business messages, was adopted for this purpose. Versions of the Enigma were developed for use in different German organisations, such as the armed forces, the security and intelligence services, and the diplomatic corps. German refinements to the Enigma increased the complexity of the cipher continually throughout the war. In 1943 the first computer in the world was needed to break it.

HOW THE ENIGMA WAS CRACKED

Melton (1996: 36-37) states that in 1939, the British began investigating the German Enigma cipher machine. The Government set up a Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park, a short distance outside London, where a community of mathematicians, linguists and creative thinkers in other disciplines worked at first on breaking the Enigma ciphers, and later on breaking other enemy ciphers. The chief problem they faced was to discover the key settings that had been selected when setting up each Enigma machine for its daily use. A further problem was that the equipment itself differed between the various German organisations that used it.

BOMBES

According to Melton (1996: 36-37) before the war, Polish code-breakers had developed machines called "bombes" that had successfully deciphered some of the Enigma messages. Unfortunately, the Germans were continually making the Enigma more complicated. At Bletchley Park, new versions of the bombes were developed. At first, these failed to keep pace with the increasing complexity of the Enigma cipher. Then the mathematician Alan Turing added 26 electrical relays that speeded up the process of deciphering a message. Even then, success was achieved only by means of educated guesswork. Using a process of hypothesis and experiment, code-breakers were able to deduce the wording of the part of the message that spelt out the key settings in use. Mathematician Welchman developed a procedure known as traffic analysis, which made it possible to sort messages according to the organisations that sent them. This would identify the type of Enigma machines used, and again, reduce the number of variables that the bombes had to cope with. Naval enigma signals were broken from 1941 to 1945, partly with the help of captured machines and documents yielding vital information for Britain.

ENCRYPTION

Sieberg (2001: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.terrorist.search>) explains that encryption is the conversion of data into something called cipher text, which must then be decrypted or unlocked by the proper "key." Both processes involve complex algorithms -- a procedure or formula for solving a problem. Breaking into encrypted information requires sophisticated computer skills and mathematics.

STEGANOGRAPHY

Sieberg (2001: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.terrorist.search>) states that beyond encryption is steganography, or the hiding of a secret message within an ordinary message. Data is first encrypted by the usual means, and then inserted using a special algorithm into an innocuous file format, such as an image, thus attempting to evade any scanning of the data. It is similar to identifying code used in some music files -- a proposal being considered by the music industry -- called watermarks.

Sieberg (2001: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.terrorist.search>) explains that within the veiled network of Osama bin Laden's operation, information is likely communicated through both high- and low-tech means, using everything from a Web page to a whisper. There were rumours that Bin Laden's videos transmitted messages to al-Qaeda. A pre-arranged phrase he spoke or a gesture might have been some instructions. Or maybe an Arabic radio station starts playing a new "hit" song, which has a title that translates as "All Martyrs Should Meet at the Bowling Alley In Miami So We Can Plan Our Revenge On the Infidels." Either would be low-tech steganography.

Sieberg (2001: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.terrorist.search>) adds that the American National Security Agency has devoted huge resources trying to trace Bin Laden through his old satellite and portable phones, but he no longer uses them, to avoid being targeted and attacked. However, the NSA may also be battling high levels of encryption used by bin Laden and his group. It is possible that bin Laden is using steganography to covertly distribute information to his supporters and hide messages throughout the Internet and on particular Web pages.

As the nation's cryptologic organisation, the NSA uses satellites and other methods to intercept communication such as e-mail, faxes and telephone calls to detect threats to the country. The NSA is said to be the largest employer of mathematicians -- both code makers and code breakers -- in the United States, and perhaps the rest of the world.

PHISHING

According to Wikipedia (2004: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing>), in computing, phishing is the luring of sensitive information, such as passwords and other personal information, from a victim by masquerading as someone trustworthy with a real need for such information. It is a form of social engineering attack. It is the term coined by hackers who imitate legitimate companies in e-mails to entice people to share passwords or credit-card numbers

According to Wikipedia, the term *phreaking*, which refers to gaining access to telephone networks, most likely influenced the spelling of the term. Still other theories accredit the term "phishing" to originate from the name "Brien Phish" who was the first to allegedly use psychological techniques to steal credit card numbers in the 1980s. Others believe that "Brien Phish" was not a real person but a fictional character used by scammers to identify each other.

Today, online criminals put phishing to more directly profitable uses. Wikipedia states that popular targets are users of online banking services, and auction sites such as eBay. Phishers usually work by sending out spam e-mail to large numbers of potential victims. These direct the recipient to a Web page, which appears to belong to their online bank, for instance, but in fact, captures their account information for the phisher's use.

Typically, a phishing email will appear to come from a trustworthy company and contain a subject and message intended to alarm the recipient into taking action. According to Wikipedia (2004: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing>) a common approach is to tell the recipient that their account has been de-activated due to a problem and inform them that they must take action to re-activate their account. The user is provided with a convenient link in the same email that takes the email recipient to a fake web page appearing to be that of a trustworthy company. Once at that page, the user enters her personal information, which is then captured by the fraudster.

Checking the URL in the address bar of the browser may not be sufficient, as, in some browsers, that can be faked as well. However, the file properties feature of several popular browsers may disclose the real URL of the fake web page.

TELEPHONE AND COMPUTER SCAMS

Croucher (1997: 69) demonstrates that with the proliferation of computers and mobile telephones, there are even more opportunities for scam artists to ply their trade on an unsuspecting

public. The Internet now affords an excellent outlet for those who con their victims with get-rich schemes, sight-regaining miracles, AIDS cures, credit improvement programs and cheap postage deals.

Everyday hundreds of thousands of electronic shoppers jeopardise the security of their credit cards by revealing their details on the Internet. In doing so they expose themselves to the type of fraud where hackers display hundreds of credit card numbers for access by up to 40 million people.

Croucher (1997) adds that one of the more popular Internet scams results from consumers ordering attractive software on-line from aggressive vendors, who subsequently disappear with the takings. Other favourites are those frauds that commonly appear in the classified advertising sections or on bulletin board notices. These postings are disguised as 'testimonials' about the quality and performance of a product or service, and phoney satisfied customers even use the 'chat' lines where the consumer can obtain 'first-hand' endorsements.

Croucher (1997) states that telephone fraud is also on the increase, with not only the illegal cloning of mobile phones but also the growth of telemarketing schemes whereby the consumer can simply order goods and services over the telephone and pay for them using a credit card. It is reported that currently the consumers in the United States are swindled out of an estimated \$40 billion each year by telemarketing frauds alone, with around 40% of these involving some type of bogus investment scheme. Other fraud involving the phone range from rigging dial-in competitions, cloning cellular phones, making calls billed to another number and the theft of personal identification numbers (PINs).

MANIPULATION BY GOVERNMENTS

Bok (1978: 140-142) states that enmity multiplies the occasions when deception in self-defence and in countering unfair coercion is justified. Sieges, invasions, espionage and torture – all are layered with deceit and counter-deceit. Once they have begun and taken hold, it is difficult to say at any one point that an individual cannot have recourse to deception in response. Thus, to mislead one's torturers through every possible stratagem would clearly meet the test of public justification. The victim has no other alternatives to avoid breaking confidences protecting the lives of others. As a result, the torturer has no claim to normally honest answers, having stooped to such methods in the first place. It is unlikely that the practice of lying will spread because of the victim's lie under duress.

Bok (1978) states that, in principle, much argues in favour of such an extension of the justification of lies in self-defence. The threats are real and extensive; alternatives may not exist; and deceit is certainly *expected* on both sides as part of the ongoing hostilities – the more so whenever force is already in open use, self-defence – and the use of every kind of duplicity – can then also outweigh the

ordinary risks of harm incurred by the lies themselves. Even though appeals to retribution and fairness do not excuse lies to enemies, therefore, appeals to self-defence and to the prevention of harm may well do so. Honesty ought not to allow the creation of an emergency by the enemy, when deception can forestall or avert it.

According to Bok (1978), Governments build up enormous, self-perpetuating machineries of deception in adversary contexts. Moreover, when a government is known to practice deception, the results are self-defeating and erosive. They can come to resemble the effects of brainwashing. The result of brainwashing is that people refuse to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well it may be established.

Even when the substitution of falsehood for truth is not total, but seems random or partial to the deceived, or when it affects matters they consider crucial, such a state of cynicism may result. For this reason, the many forms of international deception, which are assumed to be merely a “part of the game” by governments, can have far-reaching effects on both internal and external trust.

Bok (1978) states that there is growing evidence that the world audiences to which propaganda is directed are becoming more distrustful. The sense of being manipulated is stronger and the trust in one’s own government or that of others is shrinking. As a result, citizens the world over have less confidence that they can influence what governments do.

According to Bok, the loss in confidence benefits individuals to an extent. Those in a position to resist oppression by bureaucracies will do so; and fewer can be talked into fighting senseless wars. But the major effects are surely negative. For insofar as problems have to be met jointly – problems, for example, of disarmament, energy, or population – the fact that government information cannot be trusted, is crippling. Bona fide efforts in the joint interest are thus undercut by the cynicism and sense of powerlessness, which result from the knowledge of large-scale deception.

Lies to enemies just because they are enemies are sometimes especially excusable, but are weighed with very special dangers, dangers of bias, self-harm, proliferation, and severe injuries to trust. The very claim that lies to enemies are especially excusable, by allowing so many lies to go unquestioned, ends up adding to much of the oppression and the crises, which might otherwise be avoided. So many forces push in the direction of growing dishonesty in adversary relations. They can never be eliminated; but every effort must be made to hold them down.

POLITICAL DECEPTION

Political lies often involve additional factors, such as a sense of duty, frequently a sense of crisis, and, concerning lies from the leaders, a sense of superiority. The sense of duty that people have when working for a country or a "cause" is much more intense than the mere occupational task of doing a job.

Weapons of mass destruction

World Socialist Web Site (2003: <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jun2003/wmd-j21.shtml>) states that months after the US occupation of Baghdad, and after the onset of the American invasion, the Bush administration has been unable to produce any evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. It is increasingly obvious that the entire basis on which the White House and the American media "sold" the war was a lie.

World Socialist Web Site (2003) adds that in the months leading up to the war, Bush warned repeatedly that unless the United States invaded Iraq and "disarmed Saddam Hussein," the Iraqi leader would supply terrorists with chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons to use against the American people. He cited this allegedly imminent threat as the reason for rejecting international law and unleashing the US war machine against a half-starved, impoverished country that has been under economic blockade for more than a decade.

That these claims have proven to be lies hardly comes as a surprise. Even before the conquest of Iraq, the US charges were widely rejected around the world. No government in Europe or the Middle East regarded Iraq as a serious military threat. The UN weapons inspectors had been unable to locate any WMD after months of highly intrusive inspections. Tens of millions of people—the supposed targets of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—marched in the streets of cities on every continent to denounce the US decision to launch an unprovoked war of aggression.

World Socialist Web Site (2003) states that while US war propagandists presented the attack on Iraq as an extension of the "war on terrorism," it is well known that the Bush administration had drawn up plans to use military force to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein long before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. September 11 was seized on as a pretext for stampeding public opinion to accept US military intervention. The charge that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction was selected, as Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz later admitted, for "bureaucratic reasons"—i.e., it was the one allegation that the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA all agreed could provide a serviceable cover for the real motives: seizing vast oil resources and establishing US dominance of the Middle East.

Enron's deceptive financial reporting

BBC News (2002: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1780075.stm>) reports that in just 15 years, Enron grew from nowhere to be America's seventh largest company, employing 21,000 staff in more than 40 countries, but the firm's success turned out to have involved an elaborate scam. Enron lied about its profits and stands accused of a range of shady dealings, including concealing debts so they didn't show up in the company's accounts. President George W Bush has passed a tough new bill aimed at cracking down on corporate fraud. He has also ordered a review of US pension regulations, after Enron employees lost billions of dollars because their pensions scheme was heavily invested in Enron's own stock.

Yengeni behind bars for fraud

According to SA News (2003: <http://iafrica.com/news/sa/214793.htm>) former African National Congress chief whip Tony Yengeni was found guilty of fraud by a Pretoria magistrate in terms of a plea agreement with the state. He was acquitted of corruption. The charges relate to a 47 percent discount he received on a luxury 4X4 Mercedes Benz in 1998. In a written plea explanation handed up to Pretoria's Commercial Crimes Court, Yengeni admitted he acted in breach of his public duties and with the intent to defraud Parliament. He said he convinced his co-accused, businessman Michael Woerfel, to arrange the car deal. Woerfel was at the time the head of Daimler-Benz Aerospace AG's Pretoria representative office. He admitted that he had failed to disclose to Parliament, in circumstances where there was a duty to disclose, that he had received the benefit, and that he misrepresented the facts and events as set out.

Implications of alleged deception in the Schabir Shaik trial

According to the Sunday Tribune (31 August 2004), the Scorpion's charge sheet against Durban businessman Schabir Shaik has dragged the affairs of Deputy President Jacob Zuma into the public spotlight. Shaik faces alleged charges ranging from corruption, fraud, theft and contravening the Companies Act to money laundering and tax evasion. However, the Scorpions have declined to prosecute Zuma - although claiming to have prima facie evidence of corruption against him. Shaik has publicly claimed to be Zuma's financial adviser and has protested his innocence in the arms deal saga. The charge sheet (45 pages excluding annexures) sets the stage for a mammoth court battle between Shaik and the Scorpions. However, it also casts a dark cloud over Zuma.

RELIGIOUS DECEPTION

Pitcairn Island is short of paradise

Paddock (2004: <http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1249547/posts>) states that when Fletcher Christian and his crew of Bounty mutineers landed 214 years ago on tiny Pitcairn Island, its remote location halfway between New Zealand and Peru made it the perfect place to hide. Its isolation has protected the little colony's customs — some quaint and some sinister — ever since. Now the Pitcairn way of life is under challenge by a modern world that believes basic legal standards, including laws against rape, sex with underage girls and child molestation, should be enforced in even the most inaccessible places on Earth.

Paddock (2004) states that the British government, which has jurisdiction over the Pitcairn colony, with only 47 permanent residents, contends that a culture of rape and sexual abuse has long permeated the South Pacific Island, with some of the community's most influential leaders routinely preying on young girls. Prosecutors have charged seven men — nearly half the colony's adult male population — with 55 counts of rape, indecent assault and sexual abuse of girls as young as 5. The cases date from 1964 to 1998.

According to Paddock (2004), among the accused are the mayor, the postmaster and a former magistrate. At least three of the seven are direct descendants of Christian, the master's mate who led the Bounty mutiny and brought the crew to Pitcairn to avoid the law.

Vatican decrees paedophile priest cases be handled in secret

According to a story filed by Kult (2002: http://www.users.qwest.net/~landea/vatican_decreespaedophile_pries.htm) the Vatican has ordered that paedophile accusations against priests be dealt with in secret. The rules have been approved by Pope John Paul. The guidelines were published in Latin in the Holy See's official gazette. Handling of paedophilia cases has been a major headache for the church. Besides the sting of moral scandal, dioceses have had to deal with expensive claims for financial damages by victims. In 2001, a French bishop was convicted in a criminal court for keeping silent about a priest who sexually abused children. The new rules, apparently aimed at centralising Vatican control of paedophilia cases, also say victims must come make their accusations within 10 years of turning 18. The Roman Catholic Church in the US and elsewhere is under fire for its handling of a series of allegations of sex abuse by priests. The Church is accused of covering up misconduct by priests, in some cases simply moving known abusers from job to job.

CONCLUSION

This chapter consisted of two parts. The first part dealt with deceptive practices between individuals in handling everyday human relationships, while the second part of the chapter concentrated on covert communication in times of war.

In the first part of the chapter, I discussed how our capacity to think gives us a crucial survival advantage. I looked at instances when a lie is clearly justifiable. I discussed how our earliest experiences have taught us that when we tell the truth, we are often punished. I focused on liars' motivations for telling lies, the various deception strategies, the complex nature of deceptive behaviours, and social influence on children's cognitive development. Studies showed that least some children as young as three or four will deliberately lie. I explained that the reason relationships involving authority relate to lying is that generally these types of relationships involve a lot of scrutiny. "Duping delight" involves a sense of accomplishment and exhilaration, a feeling of power and achievement. My study illustrated that few people, children or adults, feel guilty about trivial lies and that males tend to be more successful at lying than females. I discussed the distinction between lying and other forms of deception, citing Bill Clinton as a master of deception by omission. I focused on the lies of silence, lies that may be acceptable, white lies, the use of placebos, deception as therapy and the damage done by benevolent lies. I then looked at romantic deception, truth bias and cognitive dissonance. I discussed the Machiavellian personality, Munchausen by Proxy, the principle of veracity, normative judgements deception in research.

The second part of the chapter focused on the specialised varieties of language that are often used when the purpose is to be secretive, or to deceive. I looked at how prisoners communicated at every opportunity, keeping each other advised on the enemy's tactics and sharing any knowledge they had on any subject. I discussed spying and espionage as methods used to gather and communicate intelligence. I discussed covert channels of communication as placing emphasis on the concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. I then discussed the American Civil War and World War 1 showing how code-breaking (cryptography) began to take on the great importance that it has in intelligence-gathering today.

I discussed the Enigma machine, as originally designed to protect the secrecy of business messages, as the fastest and most secret communications possible. I then examined code breaking, encryption, and steganography and the role of Navajo Code Talkers during World War 11. Manipulation by governments, the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Enron's deception, Yengeni's fraudulent act, the Schabir Shaik trial, abuse on Pitcairn Island, paedophile

accusations against priests received attention in the latter part of the chapter. In chapter 8 I will examine persuasion and propaganda.

PERSUASION AND PROPAGANDA

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will focus on persuasion as the act of influencing the minds of others to comply with what one wants them to do, while communicating with them. I will then focus on persuasion as the cornerstone of a number of positive pro-social endeavours. I will study propaganda as an expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends. My study will examine whether fear appeals are ethically justified. I will show that it is difficult to draw a line between persuasion and coercion, how doublespeak tries to conceal the truth and to confuse, how symbols are used as the raw materials for persuasion, and the use of lies, censorship and distortion in card-stacking. I will study persuasive tactics in advertising like the bait switch tactic, the advantage claim, and the hazy claim. Propaganda means the spreading of doctrine. I will examine Maslow's pyramid of needs and to show how they could be used in everyday persuasive opportunities. Charisma is clearly a double-edged sword. I will look at those characters in society that have had a destructive influence on it and those that have helped improve it.

THE TERM "PERSUASION"

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 34) persuasion involves one or more persons who are engaged in the activity of creating, reinforcing, modifying, or extinguishing beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motivations and/or behaviours within the constraints of a given communication context. This definition emphasises persuasion as an activity or a process; it is something people do.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 2) state that persuasion is pervasive. We are surrounded by influence attempts, both explicit and implicit, wherever we are. It is very difficult to say what is not "persuasion" and to decide where to draw the line between persuasion and other forms of communication. Gass and Seiter examine the ubiquitous nature of persuasion and offer a rationale for learning more about its workings. Gass and Seiter (2003: 7) state that persuasion functions as a pervasive force in virtually every facet of human communication. Humans are by their very nature symbol-using beings. One vital aspect of human symbolicity involves the tendency to persuade others.

Sternberg (1998: 474) shows that one can change someone else's attitudes "by persuading the person to think differently." Williams (1992: 87) states that persuasion is the most complex of the traditional functions of communication. It typically involves the combination of information, entertainment and instruction. It is also the most personal of our communication functions. It is the communication by which we attempt to affect the beliefs and behaviours of people. To persuade, we often appeal to the most personal of another individual's motives. In turn, persuasion directed at us individually can become very personal. We are most likely to believe or act the way a persuasive message requests if the materials of that message are especially appealing to our own needs and values.

Williams (1992) adds that persuasion occurs in all areas of our lives, but like the other functional categories of communication, it is used most often in interpersonal relations. Eventually, our most important interpersonal relationships are based on mutual recognition of each other's unique needs and our willingness to be mutually persuaded through understanding, trust and commitment. There is a close link between the process of persuasion and the development of deep interpersonal relations.

According to Williams (1992) in persuasive speeches, we usually write a proposition as well as a specific purpose. The proposition is a statement that tells us what we want the audience to believe or do at the end of the speech. A proposition of policy concerns judgements of quality or morality, for example whether something is good or bad, right or wrong, desirable or undesirable. These strategies developed by Aristotle more than two centuries ago, can be used to support persuasive speeches: logos, pathos and ethos. Logos appeals to the audience's reason, pathos appeals to the audience's emotions and ethos is concerned with how credible the audience perceives the speaker to be.

Kiesler (1978: 72) states that studies suggest that communicators consider the possibility of rejection when encoding messages and distort messages so as to please recipients. In addition, messages are more likely to be distorted when communicator and audience are dissimilar – in attitude, power, or experience.

Kiesler (1978) adds that distorting a message so that it pleases an audience or making it seem less controversial may, of course, have the effect of producing no change in the audience at all, because the audience is not aware of a need for change. Whether this is a good or bad state of affairs depends on whether change is really desired (perhaps, as in politics, it is simple exposure that the speaker wants) and, if desired, whether it would benefit both or just one of the parties.

Kiesler (1978) states further that unclear messages make the audience more anxious. In contrast, the politicians who make clear a stand regardless of the audience's initial attitudes are taking a risk. One

difference between situations in which clear communications have positive or negative effects lies in the perceived intent of the communicator. When an audience perceives that the message is meant to benefit them and is sincere, a clear direct approach is effective. Even direct threats may be useful if the intent seems benevolent.

Williams (1992: 89) states that the simplest descriptions of persuasion show it as being one-way. There is little you can do to argue back to a television ad, except to not buy the product. Public communications do not typically give us the opportunity to respond to persuasion directly and in the same medium. In that respect, persuasion in the mass media is typically not transactional. It does not allow clarification or bargaining back and forth between the persuader and the one to be persuaded.

Larson (1989: 9) states that in ancient Greece, persuasion was the main means of achieving power and winning in the courts of law. The study of persuasion, or *rhetoric*, was central in the education of all Greeks. All Greek citizens were expected to be their own advocates in the Greek court system. They had to be skilled at persuasion. The Greek Philosopher Aristotle, who was of the first to study rhetoric in depth, called it “the faculty of observing in a given case the available means of persuasion”. Persuasion, according to Aristotle, could be based on a reputation for credibility, or *ethos*. It could use logical argument, or *logos*, and emotion-stirring appeals, or *pathos*.

According to Larson (1989) Roman students of persuasion added specific advice on what a persuasive speech ought to include. The Roman Orator Cicero identified five elements of persuasive speaking: inventing or discovering evidence and arguments. Organising them, styling them artistically, memorising them, and finally delivering them skilfully.

Larson (1989) adds that the words “co-created” and “self-persuasion” are central. Persuasion is the result of the combined efforts of source and receiver. Furthermore, we agree to be persuaded from choice, not coercion. Even techniques for altering behaviour, such as hypnosis or brainwashing, require a willing receiver at some point in the process. Let us consider the well-publicised case of Patty Hearst, who was kidnapped by a left-wing terrorist group in the early 1970's. The evidence showed that, after a period of brainwashing, she began to cooperate with her captors, repeating their dogma, reiterating their beliefs, and even assisting them in committing crimes. The same pattern has been seen when terrorist groups take hostages. The hostages frequently develop emotional ties to their captors, and may even assist the terrorists in the persuasion of themselves and sometimes other hostages. Thus, even in coercive situations, persuasion may be operating, and the role of the receiver is absolutely critical to the success or failure of any persuasive act.

PERSUASION IS OUR FRIEND

Gass and Seiter (2003: 3) state that persuasion is not merely a tool used by con artists, chiselers, charlatans, cheats, connivers and cult leaders. Nobel peace Prize recipients and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalists also are persuaders. Most “professional” persuaders are engaged in socially acceptable, if not downright respectable careers. They include advertising executives, writer celebrity endorsers, clergy, congresspersons, motivational speakers, political activists, political spin-doctors, public relation experts, radio talk show hosts, salespersons, senators and syndicated columnists, to name just a few. Persuasion is found wherever you find people communicating. Gass and Seiter (2003: 4) state that persuasion is the cornerstone of a number of positive pro-social endeavours. Persuasion, then, is a powerful and often positive social force.

MASS COMMUNICATION

Williams (1992: 88), adds that one of the controversies in public communication theory is the degree to which mass communications in themselves can have powerful, persuasive effect on the individual or society. Some theories hold that because the mass media are impersonal and lack the capability of immediate feedback or negotiation, they are inherently weak as persuaders. People are more persuaded by interpersonal communication than mass communication, which may do more to “set” agendas than to change minds (though this generalisation is a controversial one). For example, a TV newscast may get people to think about a new political candidate, but their voting decision will be more likely to be influenced by their conversations with other people about that candidate. Other theorists hold that certain mass media can be very persuasive and that, among other things, this power is inherently dangerous to society. One of the most persuasive parts of this argument is the rhetorical question of why advertisers would spend billions each year if the mass media were not influential.

THE TERM “PROPAGANDA”

Gass and Seiter (2003: 11) state that propaganda was originally defined as the dissemination of biased ideas and opinions, often using lies and deception. The word *propaganda* has since evolved to mean mass “suggestion” or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. Propaganda is the communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of having the recipient come to “voluntarily” accept the position as if it were his own.

PROPAGANDA AND EMOTIONS

Jackall (1995: 222-223) states that our emotion is the stuff with which propagandists work. Without it, they are helpless. With it, harnessing it to their purposes, they can make it glow with pride or burn with hatred; they can make us zealots on behalf of the program they espouse. Propaganda as generally understood is the expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends. With the appeal to our emotion – to our fears and to our courage, to our selfishness and our unselfishness, to our love and our hates – propagandists would influence few opinions and few actions. To say this is not to condemn emotion, an essential part of life, or to assert that all predetermined ends of propagandists are “bad”. What Jackall means is that the intelligent citizen does not want propagandists to utilize his emotions, even to the attainment of “good” ends without knowing what is going on. He does not want to be “used” in the attainment of ends he may later consider “bad”. He does not want to be gullible. He does not want to be fooled. He does not want to be duped, even in a “good” cause. He wants to know the facts and among these is the fact of the utilisation of his emotions.




Figure 14: A propaganda poster that promotes the invasion of Afghanistan. Image db.jhuccp.org/dbtw-wpd/images/imagebas/nga131.jpg at [www.africa2000.com/ PNDX/jhupage.htm](http://www.africa2000.com/PNDX/jhupage.htm)

This poster shows how propagandists work with the emotions of the people. Afghanistan is one of the biggest producers of heroin. Eighty percent of the world supplies are obtained from this country. This poster is an implicit admission that there is a drug problem in the United States, which affects troops as well as civilians. This poster is an act of propaganda to persuade the population that it is legitimate that Afghanistan be invaded, with no dissent from the civilian population.

PROPAGANDA AND MASS COMMUNICATION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 12) states that propaganda involves mass persuasion. Most scholars agree that propaganda targets a mass audience and relies on mass media to persuade. Propaganda is aimed at large numbers of people, and as such, relies on mass communication (TV, radio, posters, billboards, mass mailings, etc.) to reach its audience. Thus, gossip that was shared by one office worker with another at the water cooler would not constitute propaganda, but a corporate rumour that was circulated via e-mail would be.

PROPAGANDA AND ETHICS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 12) state that propaganda tends to rely on ethically suspect methods of influence. Propagandists tend to put results first and ethics second. This characteristic is probably the one laypersons most closely associate with propaganda and the one that gives it its negative connotation.

EDUCATION AND PROPAGANDA

According to Bennetta (1997: <http://www.textbookleague.org/85amis.htm>) corporations distribute bogus "curriculum materials" to the public schools for several purposes – to plug specific products, to enhance students' recognition of corporate names and symbols, and to sow disinformation that can influence the ways in which students perceive current events or current questions of public policy. Some of these materials consist of videos, magazines, handouts or posters aimed directly at students. Others take the form of kits for teachers. The kits deliver product-promotion literature or other corporate propaganda to teachers, and they show the teachers how to disseminate such stuff in classroom lessons.

In the post-Watergate period, states Bok (1978: 61), no one need regard a concern with the combined and long-term effects of deception as far-fetched. But even apart from political life, with its particular and engrossing temptations, lies tend to spread. Disagreeable facts come to be sugar coated, and sad news softened or denied altogether. Many lie to children and to those who are ill about matters

no longer peripheral but quite central, such as birth, adoption, divorce and death. Deceptive propaganda and misleading advertising abound. All these lies are often dismissed on the same grounds of harmlessness and triviality used for white lies in general.

INDOCTRINATION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 133) state that religious cults provide a frightening example of the high level of compliance that may result from intense levels of indoctrination. In recent years, a disturbing number of cult members have died in mass suicides that were encouraged by their leaders.

Indoctrination into cults occurs in four stages:

- In the *softening-up* stage, recruits may be physically separated from their normal environment. During meetings, which might include group meals and weekend retreats, recruits are showered with attention and praise from cult members, a technique referred as “love bombing”. Often recruits are “squired” by enthusiastic group members or “messianic” leaders, deprived of sleep, and then confused. The idea is to lure and stress the recruits
- In the second stage, *compliance*, the recruits, feeling important and loved, tentatively experiment with some of the behaviours requested by the cult, which may include changes in diet and appearance. In this stage, recruits may simply be paying lip service to the demands of the cult
- By the third stage, *internalisation*, the recruits begin to consider some of the demands and beliefs of the cult (e.g., all non-members are evil) to be more acceptable

Finally, in the *consolidation* stage, recruits become loyal to the cult and demonstrate their allegiance with costly behaviours, such as abandoning their careers or academic goals, donating all their personal possessions to the cult, and recruiting new members

ETHICS AND PERSUASION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 13) view the means of persuasion not so much as moral or immoral, but rather as amoral, or ethically neutral. In this respect, persuasion can be likened to a tool, such as a hammer. Like any tool, persuasion can be put to good or bad use.

Gass and Seiter go on to say that it is the persuader’s motives that determine whether a given influence attempt is good or bad, right or wrong, ethical or unethical. They maintain that the moral quality of a persuasive act is determined primarily from the ends a persuader seeks, and only secondarily

from the means a persuader employs. It is not so much *what* strategies and tactics a persuader uses, as *why* s/he uses them.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 13) state that the question whether fear appeals are ethically justified, depends on a number of factors. If a fear appeal was being used to inform a sexually active teen of the risks of HIV infection from unprotected sex, then they would tend to say that the fear appeal was justified. If a fear appeal was being used by a terrorist, who threatened to kill a hostage every hour until his demands were met, then the reaction would be that the fear appeal was unjustified. In each case the motives of the persuader would “colour” the use of fear appeal. Consistent with the tool analogy, fear appeals like other persuasive strategies, can be used for good or bad ends.

PERSUASION AND COERCION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 28-29) explain that it is difficult to draw a line between persuasion and coercion. Coercive strategies are not necessarily limited to negative sanctions. Coercion can take place in the form of rewards, incentives, inducements, flattery, ingratiation, or bribery. Seen in this way, they are not so much polar opposites as they are close relatives. A message or message strategy can easily cross the line from one to the other. Moreover, many communication encounters contain both voluntary *and* involuntary elements. A simple request by a superior to a subordinate: “Boswell, can you give me a lift to pick up my car?” may carry with it an implicit threat for non-compliance. A parent may give a child three good reasons to eat broccoli but may issue a negative sanction as well, “or no desert for you, young lady.”

Gass and Seiter (2003: 29) suggest that most influence attempts we encounter in daily life include both persuasive and coercive elements. Rarely in life is one free to make a completely unfettered choice. There are almost always strings attached. This is particularly true of face-to-face encounters. If a friend asks to borrow 20 bucks, we can say “no”, but there may be relational consequences for declining.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 30) add that people have different dispositions and different personalities that may lead them to perceive messages differently. What one person regards as an innocent request, another may view as highly coercive. Because influence attempts frequently contain both voluntary and involuntary elements, and because the issue of free choice and free will is largely a perceptual phenomenon, Gass and Seiter believe it is most useful to distinguish persuasion from coercion based on the degree of choice available. It is not so much *whether* a situation is persuasive or coercive, but how persuasive or coercive the situation is.

DOUBLESPEAK

Gass and Seiter (2003: 160), and Larson (1989: 7-8) emphasise that even in a persuasive-riddled world such as ours, you would not need defensive training if all persuaders stayed out in the open and if all of them talked straight. Too many people speak in doublespeak. Doublespeak is the opposite of language: It tries to *not communicate*; it tries to conceal the truth and to confuse.

According to Larson (1989: 7-8) the origin of the word is related to a term coined by George Orwell for his chilling description of the world he anticipated in his novel *1984*. There it was called “newspeak”, and was used to shift meanings for words and concepts in order to confuse the citizenry. For example, “war” meant “peace” and “freedom” meant “slavery”. Although Orwell’s frightening depiction of his future has not come to pass, enough of it has come true to make us all take a second look at the doublespeak of our times. Consider the “peacekeeping” missions the United States has engaged in around the world – naval escorts in the Persian Gulf, the war on weapons of mass destruction.

Larson (1989: 7-8) adds that in his first term as President, Ronald Reagan spoke of using what he called “income enhancement” by the government to help hold down the national debt and large deficits. Although he steadfastly resisted the notion the “income enhancement” was really a new name for taxes, that is what it in fact was. No politician wants to be responsible for raising taxes, but the blow is softened when the taxes are camouflaged under the doublespeak label of “income enhancement”.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 159-161) and Larson (1989: 8) state that doublespeak is not limited to politics. A real-estate advert that notes the house is “convenient to the Central Business District” probably means that you will hear cars whoosh by day and night. College administrators who refer to “stricter admission standards” when they mean falling enrolments are using doublespeak, as are used-car dealers who refer to a junk car as a “good work car”.

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 159-160) in the business world, no one gets fired or laid off any more. Instead companies engage in “downsizing”, “right-sizing” or even “bright-sizing”. Mercedes do not sell used cars anymore; it sells “pre-owned automobiles”. To appear more “healthy”, Kentucky Fried Chicken has taken the “fried” right out of their name; now they are simply KFC. Disneyland refers to its customers as “guests” to make what they are describing sound more important. Other companies give their employees job titles that sound more important or grandiose than they really are. A garbage collector is now a “sanitation engineer”. Salespersons and seamstresses have become “marketing representatives” and “clothing consultants”.

Larson (1989: 8) quotes one of the most humorous examples of doublespeak, which received the 1980 NCTE award for doublespeak, from a foreign source, was made by General Joao Baptista Figueiredo, the president of Brazil. He told reporters: "I intend to open this country to democracy, and anyone who is against that I will jail; I will crush!"

All of the examples illustrate how language can be manipulated to shape attitudes. Clearly as persuaders we must be careful about how we use words, and, as persuadees, we must be cautious of the effect the words can have on us.

SEMIOTICS AS THE MAGIC OF ADVERTISING

More and more marketing and advertising research is being conducted from a semiological approach. According to Larson (1989: 115) when advertising is great advertising, it fastens on the myths, signs and symbols of our common experience and becomes, quite literally, a benefit of the product. Because of great advertising, food tastes better, clothes feel snuggier, and cars ride smoother. The stuff of semiotics becomes the magic of advertising.

Larson (1989: 116) states that while the field of semiotics and applied semiotics (i.e., the world of advertising) is rapidly growing and has an extensive body of impressive literature, what we as receivers need is a simplified way of looking at the persuasive messages that bombard us daily, using the semiotic approach to uncovering meaning.

ADVERTISING

Larson (1989: 409-410) distinguishes between our material needs (food, clothing and shelter) and our social needs (a sense of belonging, self-identity, security, status), and note that material needs and social status are frequently communicated through habits of consumption. In other words, the purchased products have been semanticised. The kind of clothing, cars, audio equipment that we buy has a "meaning" to others with whom we socialise. This permits advertisers to exploit our needs for group affiliation, self-identification and status. Advertising is defined as a "text" that is meant to be "read" in all its verbal and nonverbal nuances. The advertising text has three dimensions:

1. It exists in a particular communication situation
2. It is a structured unit and has structure
3. It communicates meaning

Language use in advertising

Symbols are the raw materials for persuasion. Words are central carriers of symbolic meaning. Larson (1989: 399-402) focuses on some key words that are used by advertisers to deceive us. He calls these *weasel words* because they allow the persuaders to seem to say something without ever really saying it. These words make sources weasel their way out of a promise. These are key-tips-off to the kind of pitch we need to guard against.

“HELPS”

Larson (1989: 399) states that the word *helps* is a clever one. It seems to offer aid or perhaps even a cure. We hear that Listerine mouthwash *helps* prevent colds. Even if you get a cold, it *helps* you feel better right away. What is the promise here? Can you expect that you will feel better in a few days if you use Listerine? If you did, could you say your improvement was due to the *help* Listerine gave? These questions point up the problem with a word such as *helps*. We need to be alert to this often-used weasel word. Advertisements for products use it. Politicians promise that they will *help* get this country moving. Those who try to advance to a certain idea or ideology promise that boycotting a chain store will *help* establish new hiring policies that will increase minority representation.

“LIKE”

According to Larson (1989: 400) another weasel word used in advertisements is *like*. For instance, we have a famous cricket star telling us that driving a new Honda Prelude is *like* driving one of those expensive European cars – but for pennies per day and a lot less in overall costs.

We can easily see the deception that can be floated with a word that has as many loopholes as *like*. In newscasts, we hear that this or that event is *like* some event in the past. Cindy Crawford is supposed to be *like* young women all over the world. Soap operas claim to be *like* real life.

That is the secret key to so many of the words we see and hear in print and broadcast advertisements. They are loaded with escape catches so they can promise without really giving. So many promises are given with the word *like*. A certain stereo component will create sound that will make your listening moments almost *like* being there. A prepared food tastes just *like* homemade. A jug of wine tastes *like* the expensive French wines. A facial cream acts *like* “a thousand busy fingers massaging your face.”

“VIRTUALLY”

Larson (1989: 400) states that the weasel word *virtually* resembles *like* except that it seems to promise even more. The new cotton chammois shirts are *virtually* indestructible. Leatherette feels *virtually*

like cowhide. Axe leaves your dishes and glassware *virtually* spotless. The promise seems so specific. There is only a tiny loophole. That loophole widens as much as is needed when the customer says that the chamois shirt wore out after several months' wear or when we find out there are a few spots here and there on the dishes and stemware. If the product did what it claimed, the word *virtually* would not be needed. The same thing applies to the politicians who ask for support for their programs that will *virtually* wipe out discrimination. This weasel word appears in fund appeals as well. The fund is *virtually* within sight of its goal for the new year, so give a little more.

“AS MUCH AS”

According to Larson (1989: 400), the weasel phrase *as much as* tells you the most you can expect from a product and then suggests that the most will be every day. A politician promises to cut taxes by *as much as* 20 percent. We find that this applies to few people. The newscast says there will be *as much as* 80 percent chance of rain. All these uses of this weasel phrase aim to maximise the drama of the promise or event to get us to fall for the flimflam.

“STRONGER”, “FASTER”, OR “BETTER”: THE DANGLING COMPARISON

“Anacin fights pain *better* than ordinary aspirin.” Larson (1989: 400) states that the promise of that claim lies in the comparison being made. What we are *not* told is *how much* better or better *in what ways*. The makers of Anacin might answer: “One-tenth of one percent better.” They could say, “Better because it contains caffeine.” However, they persuade us because the message limits our options. We can compare Anacin only with all other *ordinary* aspirin products. Instead of having a choice of ten, we now have a choice between two: Anacin and the others. So the weaselling has two effects: it intensifies the advantages of one brand. At the same time, it limits the options that we consider.

The candidate says that a program for health insurance is *better*. All other programs are lumped into a single category, just as are all *ordinary* aspirin products. “Everyone says that we have a *better* system of government.” The questions we have to ask are: In what ways? Compared to what? Entertainment programs imply that it is *better* to be sexy, rich, and into sports. Why? In what ways is it so? Compared to what?

CARD-STACKING

Card-stacking, according to Jackall (1995: 221), is a device in which the propagandist employs all sorts of deception to win our support for himself, his group, nation, ethnic group, policy, practise, belief or ideal. He stacks the cards against the truth. He uses under-emphasis and over-emphasis to dodge issues and evade facts. He resorts to lies, censorship and distortion. He omits facts. He offers false testimony. He creates a smoke screen of clamour by raising a new issue when he wants an embarrassing

matter forgotten. He draws a red herring across the trail to confuse and divert those in quest of facts he does not want revealed. He makes the unreal appear real, and the real appear unreal. He lets half-truths masquerade as truth. By the card-stacking device, a mediocre candidate through the build-up is made to appear an intellectual titan, an ordinary prizefighter a probable world champion, a worthless patent medicine, a beneficent cure. By means of this device, propagandists would convince us that a ruthless war of aggression is a crusade for righteousness.

MASLOW'S PYRAMID OF NEEDS

According to Maslow's theory, there are four types of needs that must be satisfied before a person can act unselfishly. The needs are arranged in a hierarchical order. Gass and Seiter (2003: 121) state that the most basic drives are physiological (e.g., the need for food and water). After that comes the need for safety, then the desire for love, and then the quest for esteem. We are driven to satisfy the lower needs, but we are drawn to meet the higher one. Maslow referred to the four lower needs as "deficiency needs" because their lack creates a tension within us. He saw nothing wrong with the human desire to scratch where we itch. As long as we can work to satisfy the cravings, we are moving toward growth. It is when a repressive society or a warped individual curtails our freedom to satisfy our needs that we become ill. Satisfying needs is healthy. Blocking gratification makes us sick.

Williams (1992: 74) states that much of what Maslow has proposed as a psychology of motivation has direct implications for motivation and communication. Maslow has identified a list of psychological traits, or qualities, that are especially characteristic of well-adjusted people. In his theory was the idea that, given satisfaction of basic physiological and psychological needs; we go on to seek fulfilment of still higher needs of beauty, knowledge, and order. We are capable of even higher levels of psychological striving and growth. The best psychological reward is a feeling of self-actualisation, of total fulfilment, of full "humanness".

Larson (1989: 165-170) offered a starting point for examining major need levels. He noted that people have various kinds of needs that emerge, subside and emerge again as they are or are not met. For example, the need for food or water emerges and then recedes as we eat and drink. Maslow argued that these needs have a prepotency – that is, they are tied together such that weaker needs, such as ones for self-respect, emerge only after stronger needs, such as ones for food, have been fulfilled. We probably could not persuade our dehydrated desert wanderer to clean us a little bit before going to the well. We had better fulfil the need for water first. Our need to slake thirst is prepotent; until it is fulfilled, it is impossible for us to consider other ideas.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 121) state that though different individuals' needs may vary drastically, some needs may be universal. Knowing about such needs could prove useful for designing messages that are more persuasive. For example, Gass and Seiter state that people who design and use smoke alarms know about basic security needs. They cite the example of an advertisement with a family standing at the curb in their pyjamas while their house burns down in the background. Advertisers know how to appeal to people's needs.

PERSUASIVE STRATEGIES IN ADVERTISING

Williams (1992: 88) states that beyond interpersonal communication probably the most viable form of persuasion in free-enterprise societies is advertising. The more expensive forms of advertising, from display ads in newspapers and magazines to television commercials, are usually in themselves clear examples of persuasive strategies. Almost any ad in this category has readily identifiable attention-getting characteristics, it is clear in what it wants us to do, and may appeal directly to our motives for acting or believing. Ads may vary considerably, however, in telling us *when* we should act. They range from wanting us simply to believe over the long term that "oil companies are good" (as in an institutional ad) to giving us a coupon to clip out and send in NOW! So we will get our free record and record club membership immediately.

Williams (1992: 89), states that advertising and interpersonal communication are probably two of the most criticised aspects of persuasive communication. Marxists declare that advertising has negative effects in a society because it creates "false markets". It persuades people to buy things that they do not need, including products or services that may be hazardous to their health, such as cigarettes or alcohol.




Figure 15: Sony advertisement

This poster is a metaphor, which relates to Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) theory of conceptual blending. It exploits our needs for group affiliation, self-identification and status. The poster emphasises the clarity a Sony television. The visual cortex is at the back of the head. It implies that if you are using a Sony television, it is as if your visual stimuli are activated to give you acute images like that of a cyborg.

THE BAIT SWITCH TACTIC

Gass and Seiter (2003: 230) state that the travel industry uses the bait and switch tactic. For instance, a company might advertise an inexpensive vacation package as act of a promotion. However, as many prospective travellers discover, very few of these seats or packages are available, and they are often sold out by the time people have committed themselves to the idea of a vacation. The only solution is to go home and mope or buy a more expensive option.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 230) state that research indicates that the bait and switch is an effective strategy for gaining compliance. In one study, these researchers got several students to sign up to participate in a rather interesting and well-paying experiment. When the students showed up for the experiment, however, they were told that it had been cancelled. Even so, these students, compared to those who were not lured, were more willing to participate in another experiment that was less interesting and unpaid. The bait and switch technique requires that the persuadee make two decisions, one before and one after the real cost of compliance is known. The tactic involves a less costly act followed by a more costly one.

THE ADVANTAGE CLAIM

Larson (1989: 402) notes that noodles claim to be fortified in a certain way. This is a supposed advantage over all the other brands. We are asked to assume that fortification with vitamins is good. This assumption is not 100% true. Government regulations force all product sellers to fortify certain foods. When we compare the levels of vitamins in several types of breakfast cereal, we discover that they are all about the same. Most of the protein comes from the milk we add, and not from the cereal. There is just no advantage in the claim that they are "fortified with six important vitamins and minerals". These are advantages that are not.

Politicians often claim to have come from humble beginnings, and this is supposed to be an advantage. It may be a real disadvantage from one perspective: People who had humble beginnings may be insecure. They probably had to compete for everyday things, which may limit their educational

sophistication, sense of diplomacy, social skills, and ability to communicate with leaders in higher social strata.

Whenever we faced with a person, product or idea that claims some significant advantage, we need to ask whether the advantage is real; whether it is exclusive to that person, product or idea; and whether certain disadvantages may not accompany it.

THE HAZY CLAIM

Larson (1989: 402) adds that the hazy claim is widely used in the world of politics. A politician says that she supports the economic policies of free trade and protective tariffs. These policies are 180 degrees apart. The result for voters is confusion. If voters watch images, the problem becomes worse. It proves nothing if a politician kisses babies or plays baseball or talks about the price of maize. These activities do not tell us much about an elected official's ability to construct policies on education, leisure time, or farm prices. They are likely to confuse the voter and draw attention away from the issues. The unclear or hazy claim leaves you not really sure what is being claimed because the source is never clear about it. This is designed to draw attention away from the real nature of the product or candidate.

WHAT MAKES A MESSAGE SUBLIMINAL?

Gass and Seiter (2003: 334-335) state that the word "subliminal" literally means below (sub) the threshold (limen) of human consciousness. Thus, a subliminal message is one that is processed without conscious awareness. This is in contrast to "supraliminal" messages that are consciously recognised and processed. A sound that is reproduced so faintly or quickly that the human ear cannot consciously detect it is subliminal. A sound that is played quietly, but which is nevertheless audible, is supraliminal. Advertisers frequently "plant" products in movies and television shows. Researchers have studied a variety of forms of subliminal processing. Three of the major types include embedded images, sub audible messages, and electronically altered signals. *Embedded images* consist of pictures or words that are shown fleetingly for only a few hundredths or thousandths of a second. The images may be displayed only once, or repeated at regular intervals. *Sub audible messages* are those that are so faint that they cannot be heard, or, in some cases, are played at such high frequencies that the human ear cannot detect them. For instance, some department stores use subliminal messages (e.g., "stealing is wrong") to deter shoplifters. *Electronically altered signals* include backward-masked messages (messages played in reverse) and voice alteration.

THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF CHARISMA

According to Braun (1993: 83) some observers feel the secret of charisma lies in certain physical attributes – a mesmerising voice or a penetrating gaze. But as researchers probe deeper in an effort to understand the magic, they have learned that much of charisma seems to reside in the eyes of its beholders. Figures such as Gandhi, David Koresh, Marshall Applewhite and Jim Jones often emerge in times of trouble, fulfilling the needs of people in search of a saviour. Those who become followers tend to be psychologically dependent, either by their very nature or because of severe stress. Over long periods, stress can create a sense of despair and loss of control, leading to a willingness to turn over decision making to someone with an aura of strength and knowledge.

Braun (1993) states that generally the relationship is one-sided. Although inspiring passion among followers and greatly influencing their behaviour – perhaps even provoking them to kill others or themselves – a charismatic leader typically seems to remain unswayed by the followers' actions.

Whatever its origin, charisma is clearly a double-edged sword, working either as a positive force or as an extremely destructive one. The same intensity of spirit that made a hero of Mahatma Gandhi also sparked fanatical enthusiasm for the likes of David Koresh, Charles Manson and Adolf Hitler.

ETHOS – CHARISMA AND CREDIBILITY

Ethos, the first element in persuasion, had several dimensions according to Aristotle. Larson (1989: 58-59) claims that prior to actually making the persuasive presentation, all persons are perceived in some way by the audience. Even if the persuader is totally unknown to the audience, audience members will draw certain conclusions about him or her based on what they see – the speaker's body, type, height, complexion, how the speaker moves or dresses, if s/he is well-groomed or dishevelled, and a host of other nonverbal messages. In cases where the persuader is known, whether s/he has a reputation for honesty, knowledge, experience, or sense of humour. All these qualities, which were apparent to the audience before the actual presentation, were labelled "reputation" by Aristotle. Then there are characteristics that become apparent as the speech is being given that add or detract from the effectiveness of the message – vocal quality, cleverness of argument, word choice, eye-contact, and gestures. More recently, researchers have added other dimensions – sincerity, trustworthiness, expertise, and dynamism or potency. Taken together they might be what we call "credibility" or "charisma".

Larson (1989) adds that in today's world we often hear of a persuader's charisma or credibility, which fits into Aristotle's conception of the reputation dimension of ethos. Today, however, this is a more artistic kind of proof than it was in Aristotle's day. Press releases, image consultants, flattering

photography, and a host of other things can develop a speaker's "ethos" to an audience. An example of where the persuader's "image" that may have been a detriment to his development is the actor who plays a barman in *Generations*. He may become so recognised as that character that he finds it difficult to get other roles, not only as an actor in serious television, but even as a spokesperson for other products. People see him on screen and say, "He is not a crook. He is only the barman."

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I focused on persuasion as the act of influencing the minds of others to comply with what one wants them to do, while communicating with them. I then defined persuasion as the cornerstone of a number of positive pro-social endeavours. I studied propaganda as an expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends. My study questioned whether fear appeals are ethically justified. I showed that it is difficult to draw a line between persuasion and coercion, how doublespeak tries to conceal the truth and to confuse, how symbols are used as the raw materials for persuasion, and the use of lies, censorship and distortion in card-stacking. I studied persuasive tactics in advertising like the bait switch tactic, the advantage claim, and the hazy claim. Propaganda means the spreading of doctrine. I examined Maslow's pyramid of needs and showed how they could be used in everyday persuasive opportunities. Charisma is clearly a double-edged sword. I looked at those characters in society that have had a destructive influence on society and those that have helped improve it. In chapter 9, I will focus on the relationship between nonverbal communication and the detection of deception.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION AND THE DETECTION OF DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will investigate face's capacity to communicate a large number of messages. I will explore whether speakers who engage in more eye contact, exhibit more facial pleasantness, and use certain types of gestures (i.e., illustrators) are more persuasive than speakers who do not and whether the use of illustrators increases a speaker's persuasiveness. I will then focus on the notion of distance as a vital indicator of deception. I will look at deception detection stating that the investigator should not rely on any one aspect or trait of body language being displayed by a subject, but rather on clusters of traits. I will show further that humans in general, tend to be inaccurate when trying to detect deception.

I will look at the stress of telling lies, stating that although we become far more efficient liars as we grow older, we cannot conceal the physical signs. I will examine how the lack of congruence that is likely to occur in the use of the main gestures, the body's micro signals and the spoken words do not allow us to fake our own body language. I will then add that the difficulty with lying is that the subconscious mind acts automatically and independently of our verbal lie, so our body language gives us away. I will then examine familiarity, as a double-edged sword, which in some ways may help you be a better deception detector; in other ways, might hinder your ability to detect deception. I will show how just as some people are better at deceiving others, some people are more skilful at detecting deception

NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION

According to Sternberg (1998: 485) even when we do not speak, we often communicate our true feelings and beliefs through our facial expressions, our gestures, our posture, our movements and how and whether we look at people. Nonverbal communication is a subtle, yet powerful means of getting across a message. We use nonverbal cues to decipher other people's attitudes and emotional states from their social behaviour. Nonetheless, we should not assume that nonverbal communications are more sincere than verbal ones. People can also use nonverbal signals as masks, smiling at those they intend to destroy. According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 172-173) nonverbal cues play an important role in the overall process of communication. When people are trying to be more persuasive, they change their nonverbal behaviour by increasing their eye contact, gesturing, using facial activity and altering

speech volume and rate. Nonverbal communication plays an important role in the process of social influence. We use nonverbal behaviour to create certain impressions of ourselves. If we are successful in making ourselves appear powerful, authoritative, credible or attractive, we may be more persuasive.

ABOUT FACE

Gass and Seiter (2003: 176-177) state that despite the face's capacity to communicate a large number of messages, there has been very little research examining the role of facial expressions in social influence. The situational nature of facial expressions is apparent if one considers research that has been done on the topic of mirroring. Such research indicates that, rather than using any one type of nonverbal behaviour, a persuader should try to build rapport with others by mimicking their nonverbal cues.

THE EYES HAVE IT

Gass and Seiter (2003: 175) state that the eyes of men converse as much as their tongues. Other expressions regarding the communication potential of eyeballs include "evil eyes", "bedroom eyes", "shifty eyes", "laughing eyes" and "lying eyes". Eye contact has been found to convey dominance, persuasiveness, aggressiveness and credibility. Gass and Seiter (2003: 176) found that speakers who engaged in more eye contact, exhibited more facial pleasantness, and used certain types of gestures (i.e., illustrators) were more persuasive than speakers who did not. Moreover, in an analysis of several studies on eye contact, it was found that, in all but one study, gazing at listeners produced more compliance than averting gaze. Speakers who do not use eye contact to their advantage may have problems gaining trust. However, Gass and Seiter (2003: 176) add that using more eye contact does not always mean you will be more persuasive.

Many of the behaviours we perceive as deceptively simple are not so. For example, Gass and Seiter (2003: 270) found that although liars tend to gaze more, detectors *believed* that liars gazed less. People tend to perceive others as deceptive when they gaze less, smile less, shift their posture more, speak slowly, and take a long time to answer although none of these behaviours signalled actual deception. It is not surprising then that people tend to be inaccurate when detecting deception. However, several factors improve detection accuracy.

Argyle and Trower (1979: 39) are of the opinion that even the most honest of us at times actively try to deceive each other. In Western society it is socially unacceptable to show negative emotions and attitudes in public. People therefore wear socially sanctioned expressions almost like masks, and it takes the perceptive observer to see through them.

The good observer watches those parts of the face and body people do not control very well. Argyle and Trower (1979: 39) have shown that people control their mouths easily, but not the region of the eyes and forehead. We often give away our true feelings in a fleeting expression like a grimace, before controlling it. A false smile is detectable when it is switched on and off too quickly, or it appears around the mouth, but not the eyes, which may be narrowed as in anger.

Argyle and Trower state that leakage of feeling also occurs in the voice. Fear is accompanied by variable volume and pitch and an upward inflection at the end of sentences. The hands also give powerful cues; gripping the hands together, touching and hiding the face indicates anxiety.

FROM THE NECK DOWN

Gass and Seiter (2003: 178) indicate that some of the principles of persuasion that relate to the eyes and face also apply to communication with the rest of the body. For example, just as you mirror a person's facial expressions, you can mirror his or her gestures and body movements. People who lean forward when communicating tend to be more persuasive than those who do not. In addition to these findings, research shows that people are more persuasive when they are pictured using open arm positions (i.e., when their arms and legs are positioned away from their bodies) rather than neutral or closed positions.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: xi) emphasise that behaviour is important because we use more than just words to communicate. Facial expressions, gestures, posture and bearing (body language) all contribute to the big picture. Often a great deal more is communicated by body language than by words. Communication on radio is a far more difficult skill to master than communication on television, simply because the radio broadcaster is denied such a wide inventory of physical expression.

Coetzee and Russel (2000) add that deceptive behaviour becomes apparent in a number of ways, and no one clue in isolation provides conclusive evidence of deceptive behaviour. The person must be closely observed to build up an overall picture. The subject may be sitting with arms folded and head turned away, which is a classical avoidance posture. But it may be because it is cold and they cannot look directly at you because there is a glare behind your head. It may have absolutely nothing to do with deceptive behaviour. The investigator should not rely on any one aspect or trait of body language being displayed by a subject, but rather on clusters of traits.

THE TRUTHFUL TRUNK

Lyle (1993: 77) states that posture tends to be more sincere than gesture, because it is more instinctual and universal. Gestures vary from culture to culture, and person to person. Social criteria, personality types, gender and age affect them. The posture of someone who is not being honest becomes unnatural and forced.

For example, when we are aroused physically or mentally, we assume a more erect posture than when we are bored or depressed. Even people with perfect posture tend to slump a little when they are not giving their whole attention to something. A liar's posture is often stiff and controlled, for as s/he holds back the truth, honest physical expression is being held back as well. This conflict prompts an increase in body shifts – most noticeable in children who will frequently squirm about when they are being dishonest.

Lyle states further that research shows that when people are trying to deceive, they are less likely to touch or sit very close to you. They may actually turn their whole body away, in an attempt to conceal both their face and the truth. People also give you 'the cold shoulder' when they are rejecting you and what you are saying. When someone does this and pretends to agree with you, you may be certain that s/he remains unconvinced underneath.

Further postural language, which frequently conflicts with the spoken word, may be seen socially. According to Lyle (1993), when people would like to leave, their bodies reveal their intentions long before they actually depart. It has been observed that during the last half-an-hour of a visit, people gradually move towards the edge of their chairs, in readiness. Of course, politeness dictates that unless we know someone very well we cannot go abruptly as we did when we were children. Therefore, we silently signal our desire, and hope that the message is understood.

COVER UP

According to Pease (1999: 16) the speed of some gestures and how obvious they look to others is also related to the age of the individual. If a five-year old tells a lie to her/his parent, the mouth will be deliberately covered with one or both hands immediately afterwards. The gesture of covering the mouth immediately alerts the parent to the lie and this gesture continues to be used throughout the individual's lifetime, usually varying only in the speed at which it is done. When the teenager tells a lie the hand is brought to the mouth like that of a five-year old, but instead of the usual handclapping gesture over the mouth, the fingers rub lightly around it.



Figure 16: Nonverbal communication Pease (1999: 17)

This mouth-covering gesture becomes even more refined in adulthood. When the adult tells a lie, his brain instructs his hand to cover his mouth in an attempt to block the deceitful words, just as it does for the five-year old and the teenager, but at the last moment the hand is pulled away from the face and a nose touch gesture results. This gesture is nothing more than the adult's sophisticated version of the mouth-covering gesture that was used in childhood. This is an example of the fact that, as an individual gets older, many of his gestures become sophisticated and less obvious which is why it is often more difficult to read the gestures of a fifty-year old than those of a much younger person.

Allen (1996: 116) argues that although books will tell you that someone who tells lies will often give himself away by touching his mouth or his face while he talks, this may be true of some liars, but it is certainly not true of many. He states further that he has come across an uncomfortably large number of people who can tell the most dreadful whoppers while appearing the very soul of sincerity.

FAKING BODY LANGUAGE AND MICRO SIGNALS

According to Pease (1999: 18) the lack of congruence that is likely to occur in the use of the main gestures, the body's micro signals and the spoken words do not allow us to fake our own body language. For example, open palms are associated with honesty, but when the faker holds his palms out and smiles at you as he tells a lie, his micro gestures give him away. His pupils may contract, one eyebrow may lift or the corner of his mouth may twitch, sweating at the brow, flushing of the cheeks, increased rate of eye blinking and these signals contradict the open palm gesture and the sincere smile. The result is the receiver tends not to believe what he hears.

According to Baron and Byrne, (1997: 49) micro expressions are brief and incomplete facial expressions that occur on individuals' faces very quickly after exposure to a specific stimulus and before active processes can be used to conceal them.

Pease explains that using slow motion cameras shows that these micro gestures can occur within a split second and it is only people such as professional interviewers, sales people and those whom we call perceptive who can consciously see them during a conversation or negotiation. The best interviewers and sales people are those who have developed the unconscious ability to read the micro gestures during face-to-face encounters.

Pease (1999) adds that to be able to lie successfully, you must have your body hidden or out of sight. This is why police interrogation involves placing the suspect on a chair in the open or placing him under lights with his body in full view of the interrogators; his lies are much easier to see under those circumstances. Naturally, telling lies is easier if you are sitting behind a desk where your body is partially hidden, or while peering over a fence, behind a closed door or over the telephone.

According to Pease (1999) the human mind seems to possess a fail-safe mechanism that registers 'tilt' when it receives a series of incongruent nonverbal messages. In the Miss World or Miss Universe contest, for example, each contestant uses studiously learned body movements to give the impression of warmth and sincerity. To the extent that each contestant can convey these signals, she will score points from the judges, but even the experts can only fake body language for a short period of time and eventually the body will emit signals that are independent of conscious actions. Many politicians are experts in faking body language in order to get the voters to believe what they are saying and the politician who can successfully do this is said to have 'charisma'.

The face is used more often than any other part of the body to cover up lies. We use smiles, nods and winks in an attempt to cover up, but unfortunately for us, our body signals tell the truth and there is a lack of congruence between our body gestures and facial signals.

Buller and Burgoon (1996: 727) found that a detached observer was better able to decode deceptive behaviour. This study revealed that senders must engage in their attempts at successful deception while addressing the requirements of encoding and decoding messages and maintaining normalcy in the conversation. Receiver's abilities to detect deception accurately are impeded by the same demands of conversational involvement, which may encourage heuristic processing of the interaction. By contrast, observers are free from the demands of conversational management and the attendant relational issues of interaction, which appears to alter not only their initial assumptions and

goals but also their ability to process the interaction and to accurately detect deception. In cases where interviews are conducted on a one-on-one basis, the very fact that the law official is engaged in the conversation can reduce the chances of interpreting deceptive signals.

Another factor influencing the interpretation of body is cultural differences. As diverse as the different languages, each culture learns and uses body movements differently. A knowledge of, or lack of knowledge of, these differences can enable or cripple an interviewer.

Mortensen (1972: 224) adds that one way to test the notion that distinct types of information are conveyed by the head and body is to create a situation that requires subjects to match a person's body movement with what he is saying. Ideally, the situation should be one of stress and tension, thereby increasing the probability of creating affect display. The more frequent the interruptions, personal attacks and unkind criticism, the more negative the tone of the conversation, and the more likely it is the person will react unequivocally in an emotional manner.

Ekman (1989)'s findings are consistent with larger evidence about body movement. As stress becomes more intense, the frequency of body movement is known to increase. Moreover as a person's mood changes from a relaxed to a tense state, his body responds in kind by becoming increasingly active, particularly with regard to greater shifting movements, twitching etc.

SELF MONITORING

According to Littlepage and Pineault, (1985) one would clearly expect that self-monitoring is an essential component of deception. The usage of self-monitoring acts as a method to increase impression management, and thereby decrease the potential of deception detection. Since deception involves the manipulation of verbal and non-verbal information, one must carry out self-monitoring in order to evaluate which cues are being displayed. Additionally, one must assess the extent to which the individual's manipulation of cues is creating the desired effect. Research has shown that individuals with high levels of self-monitoring ability, as compared to those with low self-monitoring ability, are significantly less likely to be detected when attempting to deceive. It is thought that high self monitors are not only better able to evaluate and manipulate their behaviour, because of a heightened cognitive awareness of their own presentation, but that they are also more practiced at impression management due to the increased usage of self-monitoring behaviours in their everyday lives.

LYING AND EMOTIONS

Ekman (1989: 78) states that when emotions are not involved, it is easier to lie – easier to lie about facts, plans, actions, or ideas than about not being angry, afraid, or feeling any other emotion. It is much easier to lie about not being angry yesterday than to conceal anger felt at the moment. It is easier to conceal mild irritation than fury. Even when the lie is not about emotions, the emotions involved with lying – fear of being caught, guilt about lying, or the challenge and excitement of putting one over can make it harder to lie successfully.

Ekman (1989: 78-79) cites an incident that illustrates how it is easier to lie when there is some distance from emotions. The subject of dentists brings up strong emotions – usually fear – in both children and adults. Aaron, a thirteen year old boy, who had been having trouble with his teeth, was asked by his uncle if he had been to the dentist recently. He replied that it was a piece of cake. Later the uncle found out that the boy had not been to the dentist in several months, and when he did go, he had been very fearful of the Novocain injections.

Ekman (1989) states that several months later the uncle again inquired whether Aaron had been to the dentist. This time the uncle noticed that the boy looked away, did not say anything for a moment, quickly replied “no”, then just as quickly proceeded into a long review of a movie he had seen the night before. Aaron had been to the dentist just the previous week, and from his parents’ report, had had two wisdom teeth pulled and had complained and cried a lot.

Ekman (1989: 79) states that emotions, particularly when they are strong, produce involuntary changes in behaviour that are difficult to conceal. These changes may be registered anywhere and everywhere – in the face, hand movements, posture or the sound of the voice. To succeed, the liar must suppress all of those emotion signs that do not fit the lie. The liar must be able to monitor and control his or her behaviour. This is not easy for most adults; it is even harder for young children. Strong emotions and the effort expended to control signs of those emotions can also be distracting to such a degree that it is hard for the liar to think straight and talk convincingly.

Allen (1996: 116) states that the difficulty with lying is that the subconscious mind acts automatically and independently of our verbal lie, so our body language gives us away. This is why people who rarely tell lies are easily caught, regardless of how convincing they may sound. The moment they begin to lie, the body sends out contradictory signals, and these give us our feeling that they are not telling the truth. During the lie, the subconscious mind sends out nervous energy that appears as a gesture that can contradict what the person said. Some people whose jobs involve lying, such as

politicians, lawyers, actors and television announcers, have refined their body gestures to the point where it is difficult to 'see' the lie, and people fall for it, hook, line and sinker.

They refine their gestures in one of two ways. First, they practise what 'feel' like the right gestures when they tell the lie, but this is only successful when they have practised telling numerous lies over long periods of time. Second, they can eliminate most gestures so that they do not use any positive or negative gestures while lying, but this is also very difficult to do.

According to Lyle (1993: 74) the popularity of spy thrillers depends partly on our pleasure in being kept guessing. A more sinister fascination with falsehood is revealed by public interest in real espionage or murder trials, where the guilt or innocence of the defendant is in doubt. Of course, most people would like to see justice done, but are equally interested in unravelling the threads of deception and intrigue running through the case.

Slade and Bentall (1988: 8) state that in illusions the sensibility of the nervous extremities is excited; the senses are active; the present impressions call into action the reactions of the brain. This reaction being under the influence of ideas and passions, which dominate the insane; these sick people are mistaken about the nature and cause of their present sensations.

EMBLEMS

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 178-179) emblems are nonverbal behaviours, usually hand-movements, with precise verbal meaning. Thus, emblems can substitute for words. Emblems are an important part of communication and serve many functions, persuasion included. Several scholars have argued that a prerequisite for persuasion is attention to and retention of a message, and it seems that by providing more visual information, emblems play a large role in fostering attention and retention in persuadees. People recalled 34% of a verbal message when an emblem accompanied it, compared to only 11% when other types of gestures were used. The more teachers gesture, the more the learners learn.

Pantomimes

Ross (1997) distinguishes two forms of kinesic communication, namely pantomime and gestures. According to Ross (1997) a pantomime is consciously used to convey specific semantic information, while gestures, more generalised body movements, are used to colour, emphasize, and embellish speech.

Ross (1997) states that the victory sign, the index finger and the one next to it raised palm forward, is an example of pantomime. By contrast, folding one's arms while listening to a speaker could be a subconscious gesture of scepticism about what is being said. Tapping one's foot could be a subconscious gesture of impatience. Most spontaneous kinesic activity associated with discourse usually blends gestures and pantomime into consecutive movements.

Most kinesic codes are open to multiple interpretations. Frowning and smiling are examples of universal kinesic codes that are open to multiple interpretations. Just as words like *can*¹ and *book*² have multiple meanings, so pantomimes have multiple meanings as shown in the table:

Pantomimes	Their multiple meanings
Wagging index finger	Warning, scolding, admonition
A raised clenched fist	Expression of power
Shaking clenched fist	Threat of physical violence
Shaking the head from side to side	Denial of permission, disapproval, unwillingness

Figure 17: Table of typical pantomimes and their meanings (Ross 1997)

Ross (1997) states that gestures, on the other hand, have multiple non-specific meanings. If a person frowns during conversation it may indicate puzzlement, disagreement with the message content, or disapproval of the messenger, whereas a smile may indicate friendliness towards the messenger, amusement with the message or messenger, understanding of the message, agreement with the message content, or encouragement to continue.

A smile, though, may also signify nervousness, smugness or self-justification, depending on the communication situation. It should therefore be taken into consideration that identical facial expressions might have widely different meanings under different circumstances.

ILLUSTRATORS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 179) say that although emblems have meaning independent of verbal communication, illustrators accompany speech. Illustrators illustrate, emphasise or repeat what is being

¹ *Can 1*: The knowledge and skills needed to do something; *Can 2* The process of pre-sealing uncooked perishable food into a metal can and then cooking its contents in order to preserve it; *Can 3* A pre-sealed metal container used to cook and store perishable food in to preserve it.

² *Book 1*: A man-made object, usually consisting of a sizable number of printed copies, consisting of text and/or graphics that focus on a particular theme, and which is organized into chapters, subsections, paragraphs and sentences; *Book 2*: The act of prearranging with an owner or her/his agent access to a venue at a predetermined time.

said. Several studies indicate that the use of illustrators increases a speaker's persuasiveness. In one study, actors who used more forceful and rhythmic gestures were more persuasive than those who did not. Moreover, speakers were rated as more persuasive when they used more illustrators.

DISTANCE

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 15) state that all people have an innate desire to tell the truth. People also want to put *distance* between themselves and any untruths or shaming activities that they have been associated with. Many people will simply try to avoid telling a lie and will do everything possible to put distance between themselves and the real truth. This notion of distance is a vital indicator of deception. An example of unexplained and detectable distance in a statement occurred in a high-profile South African murder case. The wife of prominent dentist Dr Casper Greeff was allegedly kidnapped from her home. The motive did not appear to be robbery because only a few items were missing.

Greeff was quoted verbatim as saying: "*I wish they could bring her home. Even if she has one eye or an arm missing, she has two children that miss her terribly.*" This first, uncontaminated statement tells us everything we need to know. Firstly, Greeff did not introduce his wife by name into the statement. This is considered to be highly improper, even rude, and suggest a poor relationship between Greeff and his wife – a clear indication of distance. But even more damning was his use of the word '*could*', instead of the word '*would*'. The doctor was saying that his wife could not be brought home. If he knew that she could not be brought home, it indicates that he knew that there was a reason why she could not be brought home – he knew she was probably dead.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 15) add that that brief statement began a trial of investigation. Greeff did not introduce his wife by name into his story and he said indirectly that she could not be brought home. This alone should have been enough to raise suspicions in the minds of trained statement analysts. However, Greeff went even further – depersonalised his wife by saying "...*even if she has one eye or an arm missing...*" This is an enormous supposition to have made.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 16) state that two men that were later arrested in connection with Mrs Greeff's murder confessed to the crime and led detectives to a site where they had buried her mutilated body in a shallow grave. They stated that Greeff had paid them R60 000 to murder his wife. They also related how Mrs Greeff had begged them to kill her quickly after they had battled to cut her throat with a blunt knife. Ultimately Greeff had succumbed to his inner desire to tell the truth – albeit hidden truth.

HOW DO LIARS BEHAVE?

Gass and Seiter (2003: 263) state that the following cues were found to be associated with deception:

- *Blinks*: Liars blinked more often than did people telling the truth
- *Adaptors*: Liars moved their hand more (fidgeted, scratched, rubbed themselves) when giving responses
- *Speech errors*: Liars made more errors when speaking than did truth tellers
- *Message duration*: Liars messages were briefer than truth tellers' messages
- *Pupil dilation*: Liars' pupils are more dilated than truth tellers' pupils
- *Irrelevant information*: Liars include less relevant material in their responses when compared to truth tellers
- *Negative statements*: Liars' responses contain more negative expressions than truth tellers' responses
- *Shrugs*: Liars shrug more than truth tellers
- *Immediacy*: Liars are less involved in their communication
- *Pitch*: Liars' vocal pitch is more anxious than truth tellers' vocal pitch
- *Hesitations*: Liars, compared with truth tellers, hesitate more when communicating
- *Levelling*: Liars use more levelling terms than truth tellers (i.e., make more over generalised statements)
- *Message discrepancy*: Liars' messages contain more discrepancies than truth tellers' messages

Facial segmentation and body segmentation: Measured by the number of units identified in the stream of behaviour, segmentation cues are of little practical use for deception detection, are vague and lack clear conceptual meaning.

DETECTING THE LIARS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 259) suggest that humans in general, tend to be fairly inaccurate when trying to detect deception. Some research shows that the average person can detect a liar with about the same accuracy as someone flipping a coin, whereas other research presents an even less optimistic view of humans as lie detectors.

Vrij (2001: 596) reasons that with a few exceptions, police officers are not good at detecting deception when they pay attention to someone's behaviour. This article considers factors that hamper lie detection, including the fact that 'typical' deceptive behaviour does not exist and that police officers

often have incorrect beliefs about how liars behave. But strangely, people's lie-detection skills improve when they are asked to detect lies in an indirect way 'Is the person you just saw having to think hard?' rather than in the traditional direct way 'Is the person you just saw lying?'

THE FUNDAMENTALS UNDERPINNING DECEPTION DETECTION

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 2-3) state that in the mid-1970's, two Americans, John Grinder, a linguist, and Richard Bandler, a student of computer science and mathematics, set out to model excellent communicators and become fascinated by what people were actually doing while they were thinking. Without going too deeply into Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP), they noticed, among other things, the way in which people use their spoken sentences. They wanted to know, for example, if people really 'saw' something when they said 'I see what you mean.'

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 2-3) add that they were not the first to notice a relationship between involuntary eye movements and what people were actually thinking. They noticed that when people are visualising something, the eyes tend to become unfocussed. Remembered visual images will tend to cause the person's eyes to flick upwards and to the left, while constructed visual images will cause their eyes to flick upwards and to the right – almost as though they were looking at a sketchpad. This has obvious implications for detecting lying, or truth reconstruction. Likewise, constructed sounds will see the eyes flick right and towards the ears, while constructed feelings will cause the eyes to flick downwards and to the right.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 3) go on to say that when asking someone to relate their memory of an incident or event, any eye tendency to the subject's right suggest that they are making it up rather than remembering. Remembered images, or in other words, truthful images, cause the responses in the bottom row of the figure below.

Created Image



Created Sound



Created Feeling



Remembered Image Remembered Sound Remembered Feelings



Figure 18: *Deception Detection Coetzee and Russel (2000: 3)*

A “CONNECTIONIST” COGNITIVE SCIENCE APPROACH

Gass and Seiter (2003: 275) state that the “connectionist” cognitive science approach suggests that when we are trying to detect deception, there are generally two “hypotheses” (or mental models) in competition with one another in our minds. One hypothesis suggests that the person we are observing is lying; the other suggests that the person is telling the truth. Eventually one of these hypotheses “wins out over the other” and determines the attribution we make about the person we are judging. Whichever hypothesis “wins” depends on how we integrate the vast array of verbal and nonverbal information (e.g., Biff is twitching), past knowledge (e.g., Biff does not like turkey sandwiches), and inference (e.g., Biff is nervous). In other words, the way we integrate such information leads us to support one hypothesis or the other.

SPOTTING THE FACE OF DECEPTION

Briggs (2000: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1739413.stm>) states that the airports of the future could identify potential terrorists by using a lie detector that spots concealed blushing with a super-sensitive thermal imaging camera. The heat that rushes to their face when they tell a fib, according to scientists in the United States, betrays liars. Blood flow to the surface of the skin around the eyes increases when someone tells a lie.

Briggs (2000) adds that the tiny hot spots are invisible to the naked eye, but can be measured by thermal imaging. The researchers believe the new test could be used undercover at airports to identify potential terrorists. There is an urgent need to devise technologies that can be used for automated, high-throughput screening to identify individuals intending to perform acts of terrorism. At present, airports have to rely on a passenger’s response to brief questions such as: “Did you pack your own bags?”

Hands-off approach

Briggs (2000: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1739413.stm>) reports that the new system as explained in the previous section, was tested on 20 volunteers who were told to carry out a fake crime. The individuals were asked to stab a mannequin and rob it of \$20, before pleading their innocence when questioned. Another group of people who had no knowledge of the crime was also tested with thermal imaging. Using the equipment, the scientists managed to correctly identify as guilty seventy-five percent of the "criminals", while 90% of the "innocent" group were successfully cleared of blame. The results were as good as those from a traditional polygraph, or lie-detector test.

Probing

According to Granhag and Strömwall (2002: 244) a suspect is being probed when s/he, within a certain session, is asked to answer anew a previously put question and/or requested to present additional information. Like repeated interrogations, probing is a lie-detection strategy which pertains to both the suspect's verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Unlike repeated interrogations, probing is an immediate and often unexpected test of the suspect's behaviour as s/he is requested to again answer previously put questions. Hence, it could be speculated that suspects who are interrogated at different sessions, and suspects who are probed, are exposed to different demands. How the demands put on repeatedly interrogated suspects affect their behaviour is a question that has been neglected in previous deception research. Research has found that probed suspects tend to behave in a manner, which enhances their credibility. The so-called probing effect can be translated into psycho-legal terms in the following way: (a) the suspect is being probed by the interrogator; (b) the suspect realizes that the interrogator is suspicious; (c) the suspect modifies his or her behaviour to appear truthful; (d) the interrogator increases his or her belief in the suspect. This link has been labelled the Behavioural Adaptation Explanation (BAE).

FEAR OF BEING CAUGHT

Ekman (1989: 82) states that fear of being caught makes lying harder, may motivate a confession and can produce signs in the face, body and voice that betray the lie. The fear can become a torment, and people may confess in order to obtain relief from it. Fear can disorganise the liar's attempts to maintain a consistent line. It can generate changes in how the liar talks, in the sound of the voice, in the expression on the face, which contradicts what the liar is saying and ultimately betray the lie.

Ekman adds that not everyone who lies is afraid of being caught. The fear is usually strongest when the stakes are high, when the consequences of being caught are great. Even then, some liars are

more vulnerable to fear. The target's reputation also influences how much fear the liar feels. Young children who believe their parents omnipotent claim that they can always spot a lie will be more afraid of being caught than older children who have learned that they can sometimes get away with it.

A study of Coetzee and Russel (2000: 4) shows that as we grow older, we become far more efficient liars, both in the words we use and in the way we conceal physical signs – but the physical signs are still there and we simply cannot hide them all.

According to McClish (undated: <http://www.statementanalysis.com>) for most people, knowingly telling a lie creates some degree of stress. This stress will usually surface in the form of a body movement. This is similar to the principle that governs a polygraph test. A polygraph will measure a person's heart rate, respiratory rate, blood pressure and perspiration. When abnormal changes occur in these areas it is a sign that the person is under some stress. Even though the subject may claim he did not do it, the polygraph is detecting stress, which indicates he may be lying. While you cannot detect someone's heart rate just by looking at them, there are other nonverbal signals you can recognize which may indicate a person is being untruthful. These signals include the hands covering the mouth, rubbing the back of the neck, adjusting their clothing, running their fingers through their hair, crossing their arms and legs and a shifting of the eyes.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 259) and Coetzee and Russel (2000: 5) add that signs of stress include too direct eye contact, closed posture, partial closure of posture, dry mouth and thirst, larger than usual social gap between parties and striving to be 'too' normal. However, they hasten to add that these are only signs – not proof of guilt.

Flight-or-fight response and liar stress

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 3) explain that when the mind identifies a threat (real or imagined) the body undergoes stress, with certain very specific physiological responses occurring. These responses are collectively referred to as the flight-or-fight response. These and other signs of stress can be obvious and subtle. Lying is often an attempt to limit stress by avoiding the outcomes associated with the truth, but lying simply replaces one cause of stress with another, and the trained observer soon catches the nuances. The trained observer will be alerted to the possibility of another version of what the subject is saying.

Coetzee and Russel (2000: 4) add that the autonomic nervous system (the ruler of involuntary physiological functioning) detects a threat and kicks in what is called the flight-or-fight response. This gives rise to physiological responses that are so specific that they can be physically measured with

polygraph and voice stress analysis technology. Equipment is not needed, because there are also physiological reactions that the trained observer can detect easily. These include (but are not limited to):

- Dilated pupils
- A marked change in respiratory activity
- Increased sweating
- Trembling
- Onset of facial tics
- A dry mouth (often signalled by a request of water)

FAMILIARITY, BIASES AND DECEPTION DETECTION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 273) state that although truth and lie biases make you less accurate at detecting the deception of familiar others, the knowledge you have gained about familiar others can also make you more accurate at detecting them. Specifically, because you have more background information about familiar others, you might be more likely to notice contradictions in what they say (e.g., your significant other has told you that s/he has never been to San Francisco, but later says, “The view from the Golden Gate Bridge is fantastic). Moreover, you may be more likely to detect her/his deception when the behaviour suddenly changes (e.g., your significant other who is normally calm, becomes more nervous whenever s/he talks about espionage agents). Finally, when you know another person well, you may be more likely to recognize idiosyncratic behaviours that that person only enacts while lying. Familiarity, then, can both help and hinder accurate deception detection. Familiarity is related to biases that decrease accuracy and knowledge that increases accuracy.

SUSPICION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 273) state that as a deceptive interaction is unfolding, people may become suspicious of being lied to, and in turn, may behave in certain ways because of it. In some cases, they may hide their suspiciousness. Suspicious people tend to use shorter responses, take longer to answer and manage their body movements more. In other situations, however, our behaviours may reveal our suspicion and, in turn may affect our partner’s behaviour. If someone who is lying to us thinks we are suspicious, the liar may try even harder to be convincing.

Gass and Seiter (2003) state that although it is apparent that suspiciousness plays a role in both senders’ and receivers’ behaviours, another issue concerns whether suspicion affects detection accuracy. The evidence for the claim that when people are more suspicious they are better at detecting deception does not look too good. Even though we know that suspicious people have more negative perceptions

of the people they are judging, some scholars have found that suspicious subjects are no more accurate at detecting deception than naïve subjects.

POLICE LIE-DETECTION SKILLS

In scientific studies concerning detection of deception, observers are typically given videotapes or audiotapes and asked to judge whether each of a number of people is lying or telling the truth. To date, Vrij and Mann (2001: 112-132) state that eight studies have been published with police officers as lie detectors.

Vrij and Mann (2001) state that the percentages of lie detection (or the accuracy rate) in most of these usually ranges from 45% to 60%, when 50% accuracy is expected by chance alone in these experimental situations. Similar accuracy rates have been found with college students as observers, suggesting that police officers are no better at detecting deception than college students. Several studies have directly tested this by including both college students and police officers as observers in their experiments.

DePaulo and Pfeifer (1986: 249-267) found that police officers were as unsuccessful as college students in detecting deception. Ekman and O'Sullivan 1991: 913-920 found that police officers and polygraph examiners obtained similar accuracy rates to college students, and that only members of the Secret Service were better at detecting lies than college students. The latter finding suggests that some groups of police officers may be better at detecting lies than others. Federal officers (a group of police officers with a special interest and experience in deception and demeanour) and sheriffs (a group of police officers identified by their department as outstanding interrogators) were considerably better at detecting lies than a mixed group of law-enforcement officers (who had not been chosen for their reputation as interrogators).

DePaulo and Pfeifer (1986) investigated observers' confidence in their decisions. They found that police officers were more confident than students, suggesting that being a professional lie catcher may increase confidence in the ability to detect deceit, but does not increase accuracy. Too much misplaced confidence in the ability to catch a liar can be harmful in a deception task, as it is likely that when individuals are highly confident in their ability to detect deception they are less likely to scrutinise a potential liar actively. High confidence often results in making quick decisions on the basis of limited information. High confidence is also likely to reduce motivation to learn more about the topic, as persons may consider that they already know enough. Finally, high confidence may have consequences when information is presented in court. Research has indicated that jurors are particularly influenced by

how confident witnesses are, suggesting that police officers who express with confidence that the suspects' behaviour revealed that they were lying are more likely to be believed by jurors.

REASONS FOR POOR ABILITY TO DETECT DECEIT

Granhag & Strömwall (2001: 85–101) state that there are numerous reasons why people, including police officers, have generally been found to be poor at detecting lies.

The first reason deals with the ecological validity of the findings: what do police officers' skills in detecting lies in an experimental study tell us about their lie-detection skills in real life? Clearly, there are many differences between lie detection in scientific deception studies and lie detection in police interviews. The first difference is one that police officers themselves mention the most: in real life, police officers can actually interview the suspect, whereas in lie-detection experiments they are passive observers.

Granhag & Strömwall (2001: 85–101) found police officers believe that it is easier to detect lies when playing an active role in real interviews than when they are watching a video (However, it is doubtful whether having the opportunity to interview the potential liar improves detection accuracy. Several researchers have compared the accuracy scores of observers who actually interviewed potential liars with those who observed the interviews but did not interview the potential liars themselves.

Studies by Granhag & Strömwall (2001: 85–101) found that observers were more accurate in detecting truths and lies than were interviewers. These findings suggest that actually interviewing someone is a disadvantage in detecting deceit, not an advantage.

HUMANS AS POLYGRAPHS

Just as some people are better at deceiving others, some people are more skilful at detecting deception. Gass and Seiter (2003: 271) state that when people scrutinize messages in order to judge deception (i.e., centrally process messages), they tend to focus on verbal cues rather than nonverbal ones. In contrast, when they use peripheral processing they tend to pay more attention to nonverbal cues. Nonverbal behaviours are more indicative of deception than are verbal behaviours. People who were highly involved in a task (i.e., those who were most likely to scrutinize *verbal* messages) should be less accurate at detecting deception than people who were not involved (i.e., those who process messages peripherally and focus on nonverbal cues). Gass and Seiter (2003: 271) state that being less involved may make you better at detecting deception.

If humans were really good at lie detecting, then there would be no such thing as practical jokes. Many people, who are honest all the time and have a high truth bias, may realise that their lies go undetected and enjoy the occasional charade with their friends and family members.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I investigated face's capacity to communicate a large number of messages. I explored whether speakers who engaged in more eye contact, exhibited more facial pleasantness, and used certain types of gestures (i.e., illustrators) were more persuasive than speakers who did not and whether the use of illustrators increases a speaker's persuasiveness. I then focused on the notion of distance as a vital indicator of deception. I looked at deception detection stating that the investigator should not rely on any one aspect or trait of body language being displayed by a subject, but rather on clusters of traits. I showed further that humans in general, tend to be inaccurate when trying to detect deception.

I looked at the stress of telling lies, stating that although we become far more efficient liars as we grow older, we cannot conceal the physical signs. I examined how the lack of congruence that is likely to occur in the use of the main gestures, the body's micro signals and the spoken words do not allow us to fake our own body language. I then added that the difficulty with lying is that the subconscious mind acts automatically and independently of our verbal lie, so our body language gives us away. I examined familiarity, as a double-edged sword, which in some ways may help us be better deception detectors; in other ways, it might hinder our ability to detect deception. I investigated how just as some people are better at deceiving others, some people are more skilful at detecting deception. In chapter 10 I will focus on ethical perspectives on deception.

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will define the term ethics and discuss approaches to ethics. I will state further we are always confronted with choices, and what each one of us does matters even though we may not know it. I will explore the idea that ethics and persuasion are closely intertwined, and that persuasion is not inherently unethical. The moral quality of a given persuasive act is based primarily on the motives of the persuader and only the secondarily on the strategies and tactics used by the persuader. I add further that persuasion that is intentional, that occurs with the receiver's conscious awareness, that involves free choice and that takes place through language or symbolic action is more ethically defensible than persuasion that takes place through other means. Three qualities that are characteristic of ethical persuasion are respect, equality, and tolerance.

I will study communication dialogue and persuasion techniques, and how lying is not always wrong. I will examine illegal communication and ethics, and the ethics of nonverbal communication. I will focus on falsehoods and misrepresentations, withholding of information and or purposeful ambiguity as types of deception. Legal perspectives take the position that illegal communication also is unethical while religious perspectives stem from the moral guidelines embodied in the ideology and sacred literature of various religions. I will discuss norms as expectations about what behaviours or opinions are right or wrong, good or bad. I will further examine St Augustine's definition of lying as having one thing in one's heart and uttering another with the intention to deceive.

THE TERM "ETHICS"

Encarta Reference Library (2002) defines "ethics" as:

1. The study of moral standards and how they affect conduct, also called moral philosophy
2. A system of moral principles governing the appropriate conduct for an individual or group (takes a plural verb) of moral standards and how they affect conduct (takes a singular verb).

According to Rensburg and Cant (2003: 260) an ethic is value-based and stems from socio-economic contexts. The major theoretical approaches to ethics frequently conflict, and the evaluation of ethics may depend more on the framework than the issue.

According to Bok (1978: xix) the Greek philosopher Epicurus states that ethics deals with things to be sought and things to be avoided, with the ways of life and with the *telos*. “*Telos*” refers to the chief good, the aim, or the end of life. Larson (1989: 30) adds that ethical issues focus on value judgements concerning degrees of right and wrong, goodness and badness, in human conduct.

APPROACHES TO ETHICS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 362) have identified the following approaches to ethics:

Ends versus means

This is an ethical controversy centring on whether the means or method of influence is justified by the desirability of the outcome. Can a persuasive outcome be so good or desirable that the use of force or coercion is justified to achieve it?

Consequentialism

This ethical approach emphasises that which is pragmatic or functional. A persuader should weigh the benefits and drawbacks of his or her actions. Those actions that produce the greatest balance of good over bad are ethical.

Deontological systems

This ethical approach is idealistic in nature. Such an ethical system focuses on the inherent rightness or wrongness of intentions. It is not the persuasive outcome, but the morality of the persuader’s intent that counts.

Amoralism (or Machiavellianism)

This ethical approach authorises whatever a persuader can get away with, constrained only by laws, or fear of social ostracism. The self-interest of the persuader is all that matters; others had better watch out for themselves. Suckers deserve what they get. They should learn from their mistakes.

Situational ethics/ relativism

This ethical approach maintains there are no moral absolutes. There are no ethical maxims. It is not possible to write a moral code that applies to all cultures, persons, times and places. There are always exceptions to every rule. There can be good or bad forms of persuasion, but whether they are

good or bad depends on the situation, the parties involved, the nature of the issue and other related factors.

Universalism

This ethical approach maintains that there are universal, immutable “dos” and “don’ts”. Morals and values can be ordered into enduring codes of conduct. Some actions are right or wrong for all people, places, and times. For example, torture is always wrong. Certain universal human rights must be honoured. There are “hard” and “soft” versions of universalism, meaning that some perspectives are more absolute than others.

Egalitarianism

This approach to ethics, which is also known as the “Golden Rule”, involves doing unto others, as you would have them do unto you. Treat other people, as you would have them treat you. A more modern derivative of this principle is: “What goes around comes around”.

Free market ethics

This ethical approach is based on the metaphor of the free market or capitalism: *caveat emptor* let the buyer beware. There should be little or no prior restraint on persuasive messages. This approach places greater responsibility on receivers to critically evaluate persuasive messages.

Utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill)

This is a teleological approach, based on the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The “Star Trek” version of this principle involves balancing “the needs of many with the needs of one.”

NORMS AND ETHICS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 127) state that norms are expectations held by a group of people about what behaviours or opinions are right or wrong, good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, appropriate or inappropriate (Andrews, 1996). Once norms are understood, we feel pressure to conform to them. *Explicit norms* are written openly. For example, road signs indicate how fast you are permitted to drive, employee manuals may tell you how to dress, and game rules may send you to jail without collecting \$200. Some norms, however, are *implicit*, and not so openly stated. For example, we imagine that when you are a guest in someone’s home, you do not put your feet on the dinner table even though you have never read a rule saying you should not.

Rensburg and Cant (2003: 261) state that the enforcement of ethical actions relies on individual judgement. Even individuals who are highly trained in the philosophy of ethics do not agree about the

application of ethics. The distinction between ethical and unethical behaviour is based on the cultural milieu and is a by-product of social norms therefore it is extremely difficult to determine ethical behaviour. Every society or culture contains a whole set of social norms, based on its particular history, religions, philosophies and the nature of its people and the problems they have faced. While social norms may appear to remain stable being based on long traditions, in fact they are in a continual state of evaluation.

Rensburg and Cant (2003: 261) state that conflicting ethical decisions may also arise from conflicting states of social norms within the same culture. For example, an organisation obtains preliminary test results, which suggest that contact with a specific product on their assembly line may result in a low probability of damage to future offspring. The organisation may decide that the ethically responsible action is to remove all women of childbearing age from contact with the assembly line. However, ethically responsible behaviour prohibits the organisation from denying work based on gender or age. The decision is no longer one of distinguishing ethical from unethical behaviour, but of determining which ethically relevant factor takes precedence.

VALUES

Kitwood (1980:9) states that the domain of human values may be roughly demarcated as that of the beliefs of human beings about what is right, good or desirable and of their corresponding actions and attitudes. Our values are related to our needs and interests, and are shaped by our beliefs.

According to Kitwood (1980: 11) the study of values concerns the understanding of a person's dominant mode of being in the world, the concerns around which an individual's life was centrally organised. All persons, over the age of about 11, possess a personal value system made up of a relatively small number of value elements. These, he maintains, form part of the "core" of the personality, though the position of elements within the "system" may vary gradually with time and experience.

COMMUNICATION AS DIALOGUE

Larson (1989: 35) says that dialogical perspectives emerge from current scholarship on the nature of communication as dialogue rather than monologue. Such perspectives contend that the attitudes toward each other among participants in a communication situation are an index of the ethical level of that communication. Some attitudes are held to be fully human, humane and facilitative of personal self-fulfilment than are other attitudes. Communication as *dialogue* is characterised by such attitudes as honesty, concern for the welfare and improvement of others, trust, genuineness, open-mindedness, equality, mutual respect, empathy, humility, directness, lack of pretence, non-manipulative

intent, sincerity, encouragement of free expression and acceptance of others as individuals with intrinsic worth, regardless of difference over belief or behaviour.

Larson (1989) states that communication as *monologue* in contrast, is marked by such qualities as deception, superiority, exploitation, dogmatism, domination, insincerity, pretence, personal self-display, self-aggrandisement, judgementalism that stifles free expression, coercion, possessiveness, condensation, self-defensiveness, and viewing others as objects to be manipulated. In the case of persuasion, the techniques and presentation of the persuader would be scrutinised to determine the degree to which they reveal an ethical dialogical attitude or an unethical monological attitude towards receivers.

ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

Larson (1989: 47) states that varying degrees of persuasion are attempted in two-person and small-group settings. One difficulty in assessing the ethics of persuasion in such interpersonal situations is that most standards for ethical persuasion are intended specifically for public persuasion. A wide array of ethical issues that typically emerge in interpersonal communication settings are: candour, social harmony, accuracy, deception, consistency of word and act, keeping confidences and blocking communication. Any particular theme may come into conflict with other themes and we may have to choose one over the other in a given situation.

Central to both public and interpersonal communication is a minimal level of trust among participants Larson (1989: 47) offers an ethic of interpersonal trust based on a particular view of human nature. Although humans are essentially good by nature, there are realistic limits and constricting circumstances that most of the time limit achievement of ideal human potential. An ethic that increases our trust in each other is desirable because our trust of others tends to stimulate their trust of us, because our own self-image can be improved, and because our psychological health is nurtured. There are dangers of trusting people. Others may use our trust to deceive us; and continued exposure to broken trust breeds alienation from others and declining self-confidence.

THE ETHICS OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION

Larson (1989: 46) underscores the ethical implications of some dimensions of nonverbal communication. He states that lies are not only found in verbal comments. When a person nods affirmatively in response to something he does not believe or when he feigns attention to a conversation he finds boring, he is equally guilty of lying. A false shrug of the shoulders, a seductive batting of eyelashes, an eyewink, or a smile may all be employed as nonverbal forms of deception.

According to Larson (1989), silence too, may carry ethical implications. If to be responsible in fulfilment of our role or position demands that we speak out on a subject, to be silent may be judged unethical. On the other hand, if the only way that we successfully can persuade others on a subject is to employ unethical communication techniques or appeals, the ethical decision would be to remain silent.

A MATTER OF CHOICE

Grapsas and Ilic (2001) state that the necessity for studying ethics derives from the realisation that people are always confronted with alternative courses of action. In every field of endeavour, there are always more challenges to be met than we can actually do and there is always more than one way to perform any task. Consequently, we continually have to choose between alternative activities and between methods of performing tasks.

Griffin (2002: 87) states that the process of communication interaction is one in which we together create what happens to us and it is one in which small differences can be amplified. What each of us does matters even though we cannot know what the outcomes of our actions will be. It is possible that small actions can escalate to transform global situations.

Larson (1989: 49) states that when we act, we not only *do* something, we also shape our own character. Our choices about what to do are also choices about whom to be. A single lie does not necessarily make us a liar, but a series of lies may. Each choice about what to *do* is also a choice about whom to *be* – or, more accurately, whom to become.

Larson (1989) adds that in Judeo-Christian or Western cultures, good moral character usually is associated with habitual embodiment of such virtues as courage, temperance, wisdom, justice, fairness, generosity, gentleness, patience, truthfulness and trustworthiness. Other cultures may praise additional or different virtues that they believe constitute good ethical character. Ingrained in us as habitual dispositions to act, these virtues guide the ethics of our communication behaviour when careful or clear deliberation is not possible.

THE MOTIVES COLOUR THE MEANS

Gass and Seiter (2003: 358) concede that ethics and persuasion are closely intertwined. They maintain that the moral quality of an influence attempt is derived primarily from the motives or ends of the persuader, and only secondarily from the means of persuasion that are employed. The means of persuasion take on the moral character of the persuader's ends.

In the table below, Gass and Seiter (2003: 359), list three strategies (in column one), along with two contrasting sets of motives (in columns two and three). When paired with the first set of “good” motives, the use of the strategies appears justified. However, when paired with the second set of “evil” motives, the strategies appear highly unjustified. Gass and Seiter believe that the ethical quality of a persuader’s motives tends to “rub off” on the persuasive strategy employed. The strategy itself is essentially neutral or amoral, until such time as it is paired with a particular motive or end. At that point, the entire influence attempt (motive or strategy) takes on a moral/immoral dimension.

The table below shows that the motives colour the means. Gass and Seiter (2003: 359) state that a persuader’s motives colour the means of persuasion, as the examples below illustrate.

Strategy or Means	“Good” Motive or End	“Evil” motive or End
Use of Deception	Trying to conceal a surprise birthday party from the person in whose honour the party is being given	Trying to swindle an elderly person out of her/his life savings
Use of Fear Appeals	Trying to convince a child never to accept a ride from a stranger	Threatening to demote an employee for refusing a superior’s sexual advances
Use of Ingratiation	Trying to cheer up a friend who is depressed about a poor grade in a test	Lavishing attention on a dying relative, in order to inherit the relative’s money

Figure 19: The motives colour the means Gass and Seiter (2003: 359)

Gass and Seiter (2003: 13) state that tools can be used in good and bad ways, depending on the user. They believe that primarily it is the *persuader’s motives* that determine whether a given influence attempt is good or bad, right or wrong, ethical or unethical. They maintain that the moral quality of a persuasive act is derived primarily from the ends a persuader seeks, and only secondarily from the means the persuader employs. It is not so much *what* strategies and tactics a persuader uses, as *why* s/he uses them.

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 13) if a fear appeal were being used to inform a sexually active teenager of the risks of HIV infection from unprotected sex, they would tend to say the fear appeal was justified. If a fear appeal were being used by a terrorist to kill a hostage every hour until his demands were met, they would say the fear appeal was unjustified. In each case, the motives of the persuader would “colour” the use of the fear appeal. Consistent with their tool analogy, fear appeals like other persuasive strategies, can be used for good and bad ends.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 359) state that even coercion can be defended as a justifiable means of achieving certain ends. According to Gass and Seiter (2003) coercion represents a “borderline” case of

persuasion. A child, for example, might be forced to get a vaccination by her/his parents. Psychotic or delusional persons might be forcibly restrained to prevent them from harming themselves or others. Let us consider a hypothetical “ticking bomb” scenario. A terrorist group announces it will set off a nuclear bomb in a major city within 24 hours. The detonation and ensuing radiation will likely kill thousands of people. The police have caught one of the terrorists, who refuses to talk. If the police torture the terrorist, however, they are 90% certain they can learn the bomb’s location and disarm it. The question we have to consider is whether it is morally permissible for the police to extract the information they need through torture in order to save thousands of lives.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 359) add that the so-called ticking bomb scenario has left a number of moral ethicists scratching their heads. What we have to consider is the fact that it is wrong to torture someone, even a terrorist, but is it not *more wrong* to condemn thousands of innocent people to die.

ETHICAL PERSUASION

Adler and Elmhurst (1999: 420) state that persuasion is an ethical and honourable form of communication. Persuasion is the act of motivating an audience, through communication, to voluntarily change a particular belief, attitude or behaviour. Finn et al 1983: 48 state that the misuse of “the persuasive arts” has been so common and at times so notorious, that some have regarded persuasion as inherently evil, something, which by its nature “ought to be avoided”, like a lie.

Finn et al (1983: 48) state that the following can be considered persuasively unethical:

- Outright lying
- Falsifying or faking evidence
- Misrepresentation
- The conscious use of deceptive reasoning
- Misleading the destination about the intent of the message

Finn et al (1983: 48) state that when someone’s attempts to influence are altruistic, the persuasion could be regarded as ethical; however, in the organisational, public relations, advertising and political spheres, and the totally altruistic it is as rare as it is improbable. Even when the communicator is concerned about the welfare of his destination, the misguided, paternalistic and selfish cannot be disregarded; it is the “I-know-better-than-you-what’s-good-for-you” syndrome.

Finn et al (1983: 48) add that alternatives to persuasion include coercion and violence; verbal influence is better than suppression, fists or guns.

To understand the nature of persuasion, Adler and Elmhorst (1999: 420–421) examine the case of the city council announcing its intention to turn a local athletic field and playground into a parking lot. The area's residents are understandably upset. Faced with this situation, the residents have four choices. First, they could accept the decision and do nothing to change it. This alternative is neither persuasive nor satisfying.

Adler and Elmhorst (1999) state that a second alternative would be to use coercion – forcing the council against its will to reverse its decision. The group could try to coerce a change by invading and disrupting a council meeting, demanding that the council promise to keep the park or face more demonstrations. Threatening to mount a recall campaign against any members who insist on supporting the parking lot would be another coercive approach. Although threats and force can change behaviour, they usually are not the best approach. The recipient of the threats can counterattack, leading to an escalating cycle of hostility. Threatened parties often dig in their heels and resist changing to save face. Coercion makes the instigator look bad.

Adler and Elmhorst (1999: 421) state that a different approach to getting someone to change her/his mind involves manipulation – tricking the other party into thinking and acting in the desired way. A deceptive approach to the park-versus-parking-lot problem might be to present the council with a petition against the lot containing forged signatures that inflate the petition's size or to gain public sympathy by exaggerating the adverse effects of the project on certain groups – children, the elderly, and small-business owners, for example.

According to Adler and Elmhorst (1999: 421) besides being ethical, honesty is the best effective policy when it comes to changing the mind of an audience. A “boomerang effect” often occurs when receivers learn that they have been the targets of manipulative communication. Faced with this discovery, they will often change their attitudes in the direction opposite that advocated by a speaker. In other cases, speakers are viewed as more credible when they openly admit that they are trying to persuade an audience.

In mass communication, as stated by Adler and Elmhorst (1999: 421), manipulation takes the form of propaganda: messages that use concealed means to sell the public an ideology. The ideology can be religious, political or economic. Regardless of the subject, propaganda uses a wide array of techniques to impose a uniform system of beliefs on the public. The municipal-parking-lot issue is probably not big enough to generate a propaganda campaign by either the city or the neighbours. When an issue is larger and more ideological, propaganda might come into play. The real-estate industry might, for instance, try to persuade the residents of the city that growth is good for them. Likewise,

conservationists could promote the message that “small is beautiful”. No matter what position one takes on an issue, propaganda can be used to gain converts.

Adler and Elmhorst (1999: 421) add that a final way to achieve change is persuasion – communication that convinces the other person to act voluntarily in the desired way. The citizen’s group could organise an appeal showing that the community sees keeping the park as more important than increasing the amount of available parking. It could describe the benefits of the park, bringing in local residents to testify about its importance to the community.

Adler and Elmhorst (1999: 422) conclude that the manipulation, persuasion and coercion do not fall into three distinct categories. Rather, they blend into one another, like colours of the spectrum. The point where one method of gaining compliance stops and another begins will vary from situation to situation. The best measures of whether a particular message is genuinely persuasive are (1) whether the recipient feels truly free to make a choice, and (2) whether the originator would feel comfortable if s/he were the recipient of the message instead of its sender.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHICAL INFLUENCE

Gass and Seiter (2003: 363) adopt a situationistic or relativistic approach. They state that there are five criteria that distinguish pure cases of persuasion from borderline cases. Pure cases of persuasion are those that are intentional; they occur with the receiver’s conscious awareness, involve free choice on the part of the receiver, take place through language or symbolic action, and involve two or more persons.

Intentionality

Gass and Seiter (2003: 363) state that a number of scholars subscribe to the view that only intentional influence attempts count as persuasion. A persuader whose influence attempts result in harmful, unforeseen consequences can avoid responsibility by saying, “That’s not what I intended.” Studies have shown that unintended messages, such as an overheard ethnic slur, can damage a person’s reputation in the eyes of other persons. Gass and Seiter believe that persuaders should be held accountable for the unintended consequences of their persuasion.

Conscious awareness

Gass and Seiter (2003: 363) maintain that persuasion that takes place with the conscious awareness of all the parties involved is far more ethical than persuasion that does not. If a person knows that s/he is the target of an influence attempt s/he can take active steps to resist the attempt or counter

with an attempt of her/his own. All else being equal, an above-board attempt at persuasion is ethically superior to a hidden, disguised or surreptitious attempt to persuade.

Free choice/ free will

Gass and Seiter (2003: 363-364) state that pure cases of persuasion are those that allow participants to make free, informed decisions as to whether they wish to comply with persuasive messages. Borderline cases of persuasion involve coercion in varying degrees. Gass and Seiter believe the more freedom one has to say "No", the more ethical a given influence attempt is. The more coercive pressure that is brought to bear on a person, the less ethical is the influence attempt. A person cannot *choose* to comply with an influence attempt if the person is unaware s/he is the target of an influence attempt.

Language and symbolic action

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 364) pure models of persuasion centre around the use of language (the spoken or printed word) and symbolic actions (protest marches, sit-ins, etc.). Borderline cases of persuasion include persuasion via nonverbal or behavioural means. Using physical attractiveness or behavioural modification to alter another's behaviour would both constitute instances of borderline persuasion. Gass and Seiter believe that persuasion that takes place through language or symbol usage is generally more ethical than persuasion via nonverbal or behavioural means. Their preference for the former is because language-based influence attempts are generally more easily recognised and more readily understood. Nonverbal appeals are less recognizable as persuasive attempts. Gass and Seiter add that if the recipient is made aware that nonverbal or behavioural strategies will be employed, they see little ethical difference between language-based and non-language-based persuasion.

Persuaders as lovers

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 365), there are three metaphors, which describe the ways people go about arguing:

- *Seducers* use trickery, deceit, charm, flattery and beguilement to achieve their ends; seducers do not view others as equals, but as unwitting victims
- *Rapists* use threats, force, and coercion in an effort to win their arguments. They resort to browbeating, personal attacks, threats and ultimatums to get their way. Like seducers, rapists view others as inferior. Others are treated as objects to satisfy the rapist's needs
- *Lovers* respect one another's dignity and base their relationship on equality. They do not treat each other as victims or objects, but rather as partners. They are open to one another's arguments and look for mutually satisfactory solutions to their differences

Gass and Seiter (2003: 365) state that the three styles of argument apply equally well to persuasive encounters. Three essential attributes or qualities of persuaders as lovers include:

RESPECT

Gass and Seiter (2003: 365) state that ethical influence attempts tend to reaffirm the other person's sense of self-worth. Persuaders who use ethical strategies and tactics tend to demonstrate respect for another's dignity. In contrast, unethical influence attempts tend to express disdain for others. The target of an unethical influence attempt is viewed as "mark", a "sucker" or a "patsy".

EQUALITY

Gass and Seiter (2003: 365) state that influence attempts are most ethical when the parties enjoy equal status in a relationship. This is because in unequal relationships status or power differences are more likely – whether intentionally or unintentionally – to impinge on the choice-making ability of the lower-status person. The person enjoying more status or power may find it difficult to resist using "carrots" or "sticks" to gain compliance. The person occupying the lower- status position may find it difficult to believe that the person with higher status will not resort to rewards and punishments.

Gass and Seiter add that the potential for unethical influence and the perception of unethical influence exists in any hierarchical relationship. They believe that ethical influence attempts are possible even when there are power disparities, but only if the more powerful party allows communication to take place on an equal footing. In organisational communication, the concepts of "downward" and "upward" communication suggest inequality. To minimise such inequality, the possibility for reciprocal influence would have to be established. This would require a superior to make it clear that s/he was suggesting, not ordering. The superior would also need to promise that there would be no reprisals for disagreement and make good on that pledge. The superior would have to be open to having her/his mind changed as well. These same requirements – suggesting, not ordering, avoiding reprisals, and remaining open to influence – would apply to parental influence as well.

TOLERANCE

According to Gass and Seiter (2003: 366), each party in a persuasive encounter must be patient with the other, giving the other a chance to make her/his case. Each part should also be open to the other's point of view, making persuasion a two-way street. If a person wishes to influence another then s/he must also be willing to be influenced.

ETHICS AND DECEPTION

Gass and Seiter (2003: 370) state that the study of deception and deception detection constitutes one of the most ethically sensitive areas of persuasion research. Although some may believe that lying is always wrong, Gass and Seiter believe that there are numerous situations in which telling “white lies” is beneficial for relationships. Such social rituals as complimenting another’s clothing, praising a dinner host’s cooking, or telling the host of a party you had a good time seem fairly harmless, innocuous uses of deception to us. Even where candour is called for, Gass and Seiter believe there is an important difference between being honest and being brutally honest.

Gass and Seiter’s view is that although deception is sometimes socially justified, one should examine the motives of the persuader by asking, “In whose interest is the lie being perpetrated?” Self-serving lies, they believe, are the least ethical. Lies told for the benefit of another are the most ethical.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 371) state that in assessing the ethical merits of deception, one should keep in mind that outright falsehoods and misrepresentations constitute only one type of deception. Deception also can include withholding information or purposeful ambiguity. The latter types of deception are more ethically defensible than “bald-faced” lies. A person might be “diplomatic”, for example, to spare another the pain or loss of face that being blunt might cause. Both withholding of information and purposeful ambiguity can therefore be used to benefit another.

Gass and Seiter add that “honesty is the best policy” only works if there is mutual respect, the relationship is based on equality, and there is tolerance for one another’s views. If these conditions do not exist, then being honest may result in the honest person being fired, punished or ridiculed.

ST AUGUSTINE ON LIES

Bok (1978: 33) states that St Augustine defined lying as having one thing in one’s heart and uttering another with the intention to deceive, thereby subverting the God-given purpose of human speech. His definition left no room at all for justifiable falsehood, and he confessed that this troubled him: he worried about lies to protect ailing persons, for instance, and lies to protect those threatened by assault and defilement. He allowed therefore, that there are great differences among lies and that some are more abhorrent than others are. He set up an eightfold distinction, beginning with lies uttered in the teaching of religion, the worst ones of all, and ending up with lies that harm no one and yet save someone from physical defilement. St Augustine explained these in such a way that he could continue to maintain that God forbade all lies.

Bok (1978: 34) goes on to say that the doctrine that St Augustine maintained turned out to be very difficult to follow. Many ways were tried to soften the prohibition to work around it; and to allow at least a few lies. Three different paths were taken: to allow for pardoning of some lies; to claim that some deceptive statements are not falsehoods, merely interpreted by the listener; and finally to claim that certain falsehoods do not count as lies.

Bok (1978: 34) describes the first as being built upon St Augustine's eightfold hierarchy, going from the most grievous lies to those most easily pardoned. Aquinas set a pattern, which is still followed by Catholic theologians. He distinguished three kinds of lies: the officious, or helpful lies; the jocose lies, told in jest; and the mischievous lies, told to harm someone. Only the latter constitute mortal sins for Aquinas. He agreed with St Augustine that all lies are sins, but regarded the officious and jocose lies as less serious.

Many have argued that there are instances when a lie can be justified. Ekman (1989: 16-17) expounds that the classic example would be misleading a would-be murderer who asks whether the person he is pursuing has taken refuge in your house. The argument that justifies lying is that the murderer has no right to the true information. According to Ekman (1989) students rate as most permissible lies that protect one's privacy from an unwarranted intrusion. Lies that harmed others or that had as their sole purpose advancing one's own gain were judged as the most wrongful. As they grow older children have a more favourable attitude about altruistic lies.

ILLEGAL COMMUNICATION AND ETHICS

Larson (1989: 35) is of the view that legal perspectives take the general position that illegal communication behaviour also is unethical. That which is not specifically illegal is viewed as ethical. Such an approach certainly has the advantage of allowing simple ethical decisions. We would need only to measure persuasive techniques against current laws and regulations to determine whether a technique is ethical. We might, for example, turn for ethical guidance to the regulations governing advertising, or we might use Supreme Court criteria, or state legislation defining obscenity, pornography, or libel to judge whether a particular message is ethical on those grounds. However, we must also consider to what degree legal perspectives lead to oversimplified, superficial judgements of complex persuasive situations.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Larson (1989: 34) states that religious perspectives stem from the moral guidelines and the "thou-shalt-nots" embodied in the ideology and sacred literature of various religions. For instance, the

Bible warns against the use of lies, slander and bearing false witness. Taoist religion stresses empathy and insight, rather than reason and logic, as roads to truth. Citing facts and demonstrating logical conclusions are minimised in Taoism in favour of feeling and intuition.

TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD

Geisler (1999), states that truth is what corresponds to its referent. Truth about reality is what corresponds to the way things really are. Truth is “telling it like it is.” This correspondence applies to abstract realities as well as actual ones. There are mathematical truths. There are also truths about ideas. In each case there is a reality, and truth accurately expresses it. Falsehood then is what does not correspond. It tells it like it is not, misrepresenting the way things are. The intent behind the statement is irrelevant. If it lacks proper correspondence, it is false.

THE ORIGIN OF TRUTH

No concept intimidates and yet draws thinkers so powerfully like the concept of truth. Bok (1978: 5) states that from the beginnings of human speculations about the world, the question of what truth is and whether we can attain it have loomed large. Every philosopher has had to grapple with them. Every religion seeks to answer them.

Bok adds that pre-Socratic Greek tradition required that information be memorised and repeated, often in song, so as not to be forgotten. Everything thus memorised – stories about the creation of the world, genealogies of Gods and heroes, advice about health – all partook of truth, even if in another sense completely fabricated or erroneous. In this early tradition, repeating the songs meant keeping the material alive and thus “true”, just as creating works of art could be thought of as making an object true, bringing it to life.

According to Bok (1978), only gradually did the opposition between truth and error come to be thought central to philosophy and the nature of verification itself spotlighted. The immense preoccupation with epistemology took hold with Plato and has never diminished since. In logic, in epistemology, in theology, and in metaphysics, the topic of “truth” has continued to absorb almost limitless energies.

TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS

Bok (1978) states that in all such speculation, there is a great risk of a conceptual muddle, of not seeing the crucial differences between the two domains: the moral domain of intended truthfulness and

deception, and the much vaster domain of truth and falsity in general. The moral question of whether you are lying or not, is not settled by establishing the truth or falsity of what you say.

In order to settle this question, Bok (1978: 6-10) states that we must know whether we intend our statement to mislead. The two domains often overlap, and up to a point each is indispensable to the other. However, truth and truthfulness are not identical, any more than falsity and falsehood. Until the differences are seen, and the areas of confusion and overlap spotlighted, little progress can be made in coping with moral quandaries of lying.

Bok (1978) adds that the two domains are sometimes taken to be identical. This can happen whenever some believe that they have access to a truth so complete that all else must pale by comparison. Many religious documents or revelations claim to convey what is true. Those who do not accept such a belief are thought to live in error, in ignorance, even in blindness. At times, the refusal of non-believers to accept the dogma or truth revealed to the faithful is called, not merely an error, but a lie. The battle is seen as one between upholders of the faith and the forces of deception and guile.

According to Bok (1978), convinced that they know the truth – whether in religion or politics – enthusiasts may regard lies for the sake of this truth as justifiable. They see nothing wrong in telling untruths for what they regard as a much “higher” truth. The several meanings of the word “false” only add to the ease of confusing the two domains. For whereas “false” normally has the larger sense which includes all that is wrong or incorrect, it takes on the narrower, moral sense when applied to persons. A false person is not one merely wrong, mistaken, or incorrect; it is one who is intentionally deceitful or treacherous or disloyal.

We must single out therefore, from the countless ways in which we blunder misinformed through life, that which is done with the intention to mislead; and from the countless partial stabs at truth, those that are intended to be truthful. Only if this distinction is clear will it be possible to ask the moral question with rigor. Moreover, it is to this question alone – the intentional manipulation of information – that the court addresses itself in its request for “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”.

Many hesitate to grapple with concrete ethical problems, intertwined as they are with psychological and political strands rendering choice so difficult applied ethics, then, has seemed uncongenial and lacking in theoretical challenge to many moral philosophers even apart from any belief in epistemological priority and from muddles about the meaning of “truth”.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I defined the term ethics and discussed approaches to ethics. I stated further we are always confronted with choices, and what each one of us does matters even though we may not know it. I explored the idea that ethics and persuasion are closely intertwined, and that persuasion is not inherently unethical. The moral quality of a given persuasive act is based primarily on the motives of the persuader and only secondarily on the strategies and tactics used by the persuader. I added further that persuasion that is intentional, that occurs with the receiver's conscious awareness, that involves free choice and that takes place through language or symbolic action is more ethically defensible than persuasion that takes place through other means. Three qualities that are characteristic of ethical persuasion are respect, equality, and tolerance.

I examined communication dialogue and persuasion techniques, and how lying is not always wrong. I also looked at illegal communication and ethics, the ethics of nonverbal communication. I examined falsehoods and misrepresentations, withholding of information and or purposeful ambiguity as types of deception. Legal perspectives take the position that illegal communication also is unethical while religious perspectives stem from the moral guidelines embodied in the ideology and sacred literature of various religions. I discussed norms as expectations about what behaviours or opinions are right or wrong, good or bad. I then examined St Augustine's definition of lying as having one thing in one's heart and uttering another with the intention to deceive. In chapter 11 I will focus on fieldwork conducted among university students.

FIELDWORK

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will outline how I conducted the fieldwork among second year students at the University of Durban Westville and the University of Natal to determine what their perceptions are about deceptive communication, as well as the extent to which they engage in deceptive communication during particular interpersonal interaction with a variety of persons that form part of their communication networks. The University of Durban Westville and the University of Natal have now merged and are known as the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

I will outline the development of my research from its conception to the research results. I will present an account of my questionnaire and then discuss the fieldwork that was carried out for the purposes of this study. I will also explain the procedure used to process data from questionnaires to data tables.

THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH

This project was analytic in nature. The qualitative aspect entailed empirical literature study. The quantitative study entailed research methodology based on sampling techniques, fieldwork, questionnaires, and the appropriate form of statistical quantification using the analytical program, SPSS 11.5, and the interpretation of the results in terms of parameters of significance projected by SPSS 11.5.

FIELDWORK

This survey was conducted at two universities in the Durban District in KwaZulu-Natal, the University of Natal and the University of Durban Westville, which together now form the University of KwaZulu-Natal. My colleague (also my husband) and I conducted all survey sessions. All 308 (100%) questionnaires that were handed out to second year psychology students were completed and returned. In order to facilitate the administering of the questionnaires to respondents, my promoter made telephonic contact with Deans of the Faculty of Psychology of the universities concerned to ask them if they would grant me permission to conduct the survey at their universities. Once the Deans consented

to my survey being conducted with their students, I requested the assistance of my husband to help with the actual administering of questionnaires.

At the outset of each session, I explained the nature of my survey and its relevance to present day society and to the field of psychology in particular. I then explained the procedure of administering the questionnaire. I emphasised to respondents that this was an anonymous survey and that it was voluntary. Further, I suggested that if English was a second language to respondents and they found difficulty understanding certain statements, I, as intermediary, could help. This was done in an effort to reduce "No Responses", simply because a respondent may not have understood what a statement meant. I further pointed out that respondents were required to place a tick or a cross, using a pen, in the relevant block in each question. Respondents were told that where necessary, they should write down information that was being asked of them e.g. Question 5 states, " I am _____ years old." I informed the respondents that they should not in any way alter their response, as this would invalidate the response as a "Spoilt Response".

The Survey

I pre-arranged with lecturers a time frame within which the survey would be conducted. I was given an hour within which I administered the questionnaire and collected it from respondents. On collection, I thanked the respondents as well as the Deans of the Faculty of Psychology at each university.

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

In this section, I will briefly outline my questionnaire, which can be found in Addendum 1. It was an anonymous questionnaire for second year university students. At the outset respondents were informed that this was an anonymous survey and that their responses would remain confidential. Having empowered respondents with this information, they were further informed that their participation in the survey was voluntary but that their assistance, through their participation, was needed.

The following is a detailed breakdown of the types of questions that were posed to respondents in this survey: The questionnaire had four parts:

- Part 1 asks permission to use students' responses for academic research

PART 1: PERMISSION TO USE MY RESPONSES FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH

This information is necessary to show that a real person completed the questionnaire. It will be kept strictly confidential. Your personal identity will not be revealed to anyone, also when the results of the survey are published.

I hereby give permission that my responses may be used for research purposes provided that my identity is not revealed in the published records of the research.

Initials and surname _____ Postal address: _____

_____ Postal code: _____

Contact numbers: Home: _____ Cell: _____

- Part 2 asks general personal particulars like age, gender and home language
- Part 3 focuses on deception
- Part 4 asks how wrong it is to deceive others

In Questions 1 to 4, respondents are asked how they feel about themselves. Questions 5 to 9 focus on demographic information regarding age, gender, the area where they grew up, and ethnic group of the respondents.

Question 10 to 30 asks respondents how wrong it is to deceive others. In particular Questions 10 to 11 ask respondents to explain in their own words what they think deception is and how wrong it is to deceive others. Questions 12 to 13 relate to whether cheating in a test or a monopoly game is a form of deception. Questions 14, 15 and 16 ask whether pretending to like someone, promising to visit someone when you have no intention to do so, and overestimating one's own abilities are forms of deception.

Questions 17 and 18 ask respondents whether rugby players and boxers engage in deceptive behaviour. Question 19 asks whether fiction is a form of deception. Questions 20 and 21 ask whether white lies and impersonation are forms of deception.

In Questions 13 to 21 respondents are asked to characterise their relationships with others. In particular, Questions 13 to 16 focus on behaviour towards strangers, Questions 17 to 19 relate to respondents' participation in community service and questions 20 to 21 ask respondents about the extent to which they help at home. Question 22 asks whether the movie Spiderman deceives little boys.

Questions 23 to 30 relate to greetings, tact, the emotionless facial expression of a poker player, concealment of health, dodging the issue, camouflage, and best behaviour on a first date as forms of deception.

Questions 31 to 36 ask how wrong it is for a child to lie to his parents, for hypnotists, illusionists/magicians to deceive their audiences, for spies to deceive people, for parents to tell their children that Father Christmas brought them gifts, and for parents to cover up their rows by giving false accounts of what really happened.

In Questions 37 and 38 respondents are asked how serious a form of deception are covert terms that are used in gang language. Questions 39 to 44 ask how wrong it is e.g., not to speak up when something serious has happened, to conceal having been fired, to compliment your host when you do not mean it, to hide a suspect in your house, and for a salesperson to point out only the good features of a product.

In Questions 45 to 47 I request respondents to say how wrong it is to end a telephone conversation with an excuse, how serious a form of deception code talk is, and how they feel about Sir Jeffrey Archer's sentence for having lied under oath.

In Questions 48 to 55 respondents are presented with scenarios where they have to judge how wrong it is for dating couples not to tell their partners of previous intimate relationships, serious illness, and family history.

The questionnaire takes into account all the key aspects of this survey i.e. how people use deceptive communication, which forms of deception are acceptable, and which are not. This questionnaire therefore provides me with a total picture of each respondent in terms of her/his background, how young people view deceptive behaviour, their values, beliefs and moral reasoning skills.

DATA PROCESSING FROM QUESTIONNAIRES TO DATA TABLES

During the survey session each respondent was required to read questions in the questionnaire and mark their responses by placing a tick or a cross in the appropriate spaces, or by writing down the appropriate information where required. I then entered the responses into the SPSS 11.5 programme.

Setting up the encoding parameters in SPSS

There are two views, worksheets, in SPSS 11.5. These are the "data view" and the "variable view".




Figure 20: The two text entry modes: Data View and Variable View

The coding parameters of the data, which was gathered from the returned questionnaires, are set up in the variable view.




Figure 21: Variable view, used for setting up the coding parameters in SPSS 11.5

Coding parameters are set up in the variable view by clicking on a particular cell in the Values column and stipulating the numeric equivalents of the response options in the questionnaire. In the example below, I show how I activated the Value Labels dialogue box for the gender question, and entered the response options provided on the questionnaire. For each question, one also has to provide Spoilt Response and No Response options in order to account for instances where respondents altered initial responses, or where they neglected to complete a question. It is important to keep track of spoilt responses because a high incidence of spoilt responses could indicate that one has encountered a sensitive issue that warrants further research. It is equally important to keep track of no responses, because if one does not accommodate them, one ends up with different numbers of respondents for different questions, which skews the process of statistical analysis.




Figure 22: Setting the correct value label

Using the value label slot, I typed the questionnaire statement: “I am a ____.” Thereafter I set up the coding parameters by entering the appropriate data code in the Value slot, and the gender range that it represents in the Value Label slot. In the above example, I first typed “1”, followed by “female” in the Value Label slot. After that I clicked on the “Add” button to establish this coding parameter. This had to be done for each of the gender variables. The “Add” button is used to add each gender variable to the list of gender variables. This process had to be followed for each question in the questionnaire.

Types of measurement used

There are three types of measurement used in quantitative research, namely scale, ordinal and nominal measurement. The type of measurement will dictate the statistical procedures that will be used in processing the data and will be used to achieve inferential analysis. Measurements are quantified in order to determine means, medians and modes. The three types of measurements are as follows:

- Scalar measurement is appropriate when respondents express non-standardised subjective personal preferences, attitudes, opinions, etc. measured on a gradually changing continuous scale such as *Never—sometimes—often—constantly*.
- Ordinal measurement is appropriate when respondents make value judgements such as *X is taller than Y; X is more expensive than Y* where the individual responds in terms of standardised, generally accepted measures such as length in centimetres, volumes in cubic centimetres or time scales in seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc. In this type of measurement, various pieces of data are brought together and ranked in either higher or lower values than each other. A response option like “often” constitutes a subjective scalar measure because “often” could be once a day for one person, once or twice a week for another one or once a month for yet a third respondent. By contrast, “every

day” constitutes a standardised ordinal measure because all normal people will use the term “every day” with the same meaning, namely one within twenty-four hours.

- o Nominal measurement is appropriate when respondents select a particular subcategory within an overall category such as age, gender, ethnic group, etc. According to Leedy (1997: 40) when nominal measurement is used, data is usually restricted or limited. For example, when we measure gender, we divide into two groups, namely, male or female.




Figure 23: Choice of measurement is done under the “measure” column

Entering the data from each questionnaire in SPSS

Once the parameters are set in the variable mode, the necessary headings and columns are then generated in the data view. This is where data is entered. In the data mode, shorthand codes are used as column headings. These headings appear as labels in graphs and tables.




Figure 24: Data view

Each question in the questionnaire is assigned a particular column in the database. The appropriate code variant for the individual respondent is entered in the column that deals with that

question. As can be seen from the screen shot of my database, below, I used numeric as well as abbreviated alphabetical codes to represent particular responses:

	resp	completn	likeself	othersli	iamwho	tothones
1	1	blank	I strongly a	I agree	I agree	alway
2	2	complete	I strongly a	I strongly di	I agree	most of th
3	3	complete	I agree	I disagree	I do not wa	most of th
4	4	complete	I agree	I agree	spoilt respo	most of th
5	5	partially co	I agree	I disagree	I agree	most of th
6	6	complete	I agree	I strongly	I agree	most of th

Figure 25: Enter Data

VERIFYING THE ACCURACY OF THE CODING PROCESS

I verified the accuracy of the encoding process by double-checking each code that I had entered after the questionnaire had been encoded onto the database.

DETERMINING THE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS

According to Leedy (1997: 252), *Descriptive Statistics* is a branch of statistics that describes what data looks like. He further states that statistics that takes small samples of a population and from those samples make inferences by *estimating and predicting* that the general characteristics of a population are inferential. In making inferences in this survey, I used significance testing and measures of variation to validate his claims. Significance relates to similarities within groups and differences between groups with regard to particular responses. Statistics can be used to determine whether there are significant similarities in responses to questions within demographic groups, as well as significant differences between demographic groups. High levels of similar responses within groups, correlated with high levels of dissimilar responses between groups are shown as levels of significance on data tables. The nearer the decimal fraction is to 0 (zero) the higher the level of significance. Stringent measurements of significance consider 0.05 to be significant and 0.01 as highly significant. A level of significance of 0.05 therefore means that there is practically is no chance that the variable being tested is irrelevant.

According to Leedy, (1997: 254), when examining deviances, one degree of freedom means that in a normally distributed population, 68% of the population is represented. The standard deviation, which was generated by the SPSS 11.5 database for specific variables (or combination of variables) was used to explore the extent of deviation for reliable estimating and predicting.

With the fully encoded database, I used the general linear model feature of SPSS 11.5 to determine the levels of significance for each question. This was done by selecting the multi-variate option in SPSS.

VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF DATA

Pie charts, bar graphs and statistical tables are used to visually describe results of this survey. Pie charts are particularly appropriate to represent a sub-population of a larger group. It is typically used to represent nominal measurement. Significance and general tables are also used to make inferences in this study as described in the previous paragraph.

The SPSS 11.5 program generated over one hundred highly significant correlations. Not all correlations will be evaluated or analysed in this study. Only those which have relevance to the problems stated in Chapter one will be scrutinised. Inferences, estimates and deductions are made by examining significance tables. Significance tables such as the one below will be located in Addendum 2 for reference purposes.

Correlations

		I am totally honest	cheating is a form of deception
I am totally honest	Pearson Correlation	1	.206**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
	N	308	308
cheating is a form of deception	Pearson Correlation	.206**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
	N	308	308

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 26: "I am totally honest" Vs "Cheating is a form of deception"

The significance table above indicates that there is a strong correlation between "I am totally honest" and "cheating is a form of deception". The table indicates a bi-variate correlation. This means that we are getting the same results in two cells that are being compared. Further, it is an indication that there is a causal relationship between the two variables, which are being tested. By comparing this finding with other similar surveys and literature studies substantial conclusions and recommendations are possible.

The pie chart below is an example of a chart that is used to display all results of a scenario with the ability to highlight certain crucial aspects of the final result. This pie chart indicates that almost 42% of respondents felt it was very wrong not to tell their partners of previous intimate relationships, almost

15% felt it was quite wrong, while slightly more than 24% felt it was not very wrong and almost 15% felt it was not wrong at all.

Nondisclosure of previous intimate relationships




Figure 27: Analysis of a partner's nondisclosure of previous intimate relationships

The bar graph below indicates that more than 80% of respondents felt cheating is a form of deception while slightly more than 10% felt it is not. A higher percentage of respondents strongly agreed with the statements, compared to those who agreed.




Figure 28: Cheating is a form of deception

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I explained the procedure that was followed when conducting this survey. I presented the breakdown of the questions that formed the questionnaire and provided an overview of the fieldwork, which was carried out during this study. Further, I explained how the survey was conducted. I also gave an account of the steps that were followed when encoding data into the SPSS programme. Following this, I explained statistical significance and its relevance to this study. Thereafter, I explained how I would be using visual representation to illustrate my analysis of data. In the next chapter, I will present the results of my study.

RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I will present the results of my survey. I will give an account of my findings and demonstrate my findings through the use of graphs. Tables demonstrating some of my findings can be found in Addendum 2.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISATION OF THE RESPONDENTS

In the following sections, I will give a general demographic characterisation of the respondents that participated in this study:

Gender

Almost 68% (209) of the respondents in my study were female and almost 30% (92) were male. Just over 1% (4) respondents did not indicate their gender on the questionnaire. Almost 1% (2) of the responses were spoilt responses. Being negligible figures, the "Spoilt Response" and "No Response", to the statement "I am a male / female", will not be considered for the purposes of my study. From the pie chart below it can be deduced that there are more females than males at second year level studying psychology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Figure 42 in Addendum 2 shows the composition of respondents in terms of gender. The gender composition of the sample is represented by the pie chart below:

Gender of respondents




Figure 29: Pie chart showing gender of respondents

Age

The figure below shows a breakdown of the age categories of respondents in this study:

	Count	Table %
Age 18 or below	7	2.3%
19	140	45.5%
20	73	23.7%
21 or above	73	23.7%
I do not want to answer	11	3.6%
Spoilt response	3	1.0%
No response	1	.3%

Figure 30: Age of respondents

Respondents' ages ranged from 18 years to over 21 years old. Just over 2% (7) of the respondents range between the ages of 18 and below, and almost 46% (140) of the respondents were 19 years old. Almost 24% (73) of the respondents were 20 years old. Almost 24% (73) of the respondents fell in the 21 or above category. Almost 4% (11) of the response to "I am ___ years old" was "I do not want to answer", showing that respondents felt uncomfortable about revealing their ages. Just 1% (3) were "Spoilt response". Less than 1% (1) of the respondents did not respond to this statement. These being negligible figures will not skew the results of my research.

According to the table above, the age group 19-21 represents the biggest cluster of respondents. The fact that these are psychology students implies that one can expect dependable value judgements

on sensitive issues relating to deceptive communication. Respondents in this age group would be more confident in their value judgements and would not be prone to value judgements based on hormone induced emotional changes found in teenagers.

Ethnic Group

It must be noted that there is a large disparity in the number of respondents polled per ethnic group. Had I decided to poll an equal number of respondents per ethnic group I would have been faced with the choice of having to leaving out certain ethnic groups. I decided to instead include these groups so as to give a fair reflection of the views presented by respondents from each of the ethnic groups in this survey. The ethnic composition of the respondents in this study was as follows:

Ethnic Group		Count	Table %
I am	African	76	24.7%
	Coloured	22	7.1%
	Indian	156	50.6%
	Jewish	6	1.9%
	White	40	13.0%
	I do not want to answer	2	.6%
	Spoilt response	6	1.9%

Figure 31: Ethnic composition of respondents

Almost 25% (76) of the respondents were African, just over 7% (22) were Coloured, almost 51% (156) were Indian, almost 2% (6) were Jewish, and 13% (40) of the respondents were White. An empirical analysis of the data shows that the Jewish respondents of the psychology students are an insignificant number. I am therefore not going to analyse their results as if they are representative of the Jewish community in general.

Almost 1% (2) of the responses to the question “I am” was “I do not want to answer”, which implies that respondents found it uncomfortable to reveal their ethnic identity and almost 2% (6) were “Spoilt response”. Being such a small percentage these responses can be regarded as negligible, and will not be taken into consideration during analysis of data, as there is a negligible chance that they may impact on my results.

There is a truism that a representative research sample should reflect demographic composition of the society being studied. The table above obviously does not reflect the ethnic composition of South Africa, but instead the composition of the second year psychology students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. If the ethnic make-up of the psychology second year class at this university is representative of the greater institution, it can be deduced that a mere ten years after the first

democratic election, and the reconfiguration of South Africa's major institutions (e.g. education, the economic sector and jurisprudence), the affirmative action transformation targets of Government have not yet been met in the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the primary institution of higher education in KwaZulu-Natal. As far as other demographic factors are concerned, it is to be expected that they will also not reflect the ideal social composition that affirmative action is aiming to bring about.

Areas where respondents grew up

The table below shows a breakdown by gender, of areas where respondents in this study grew up:

	Gender							
	Female		Male		I do not want to answer		Spoilt response	
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
Rural area	25	12.0%	15	16.3%			1	50.0%
Urban area	151	72.2%	67	72.8%	2	50.0%	1	50.0%
I do not want to answer	28	13.4%	7	7.6%	2	50.0%		
Spoilt response	5	2.4%	1	1.1%				
No response			2	2.2%				

Figure 32: Gender Vs. Area where respondents grew up

While 12% (25) of the female respondents grew up in a rural area, just over 72% (151) grew up in an urban area. Just over 13% (28) of the female respondents felt uncomfortable about disclosing where they had grown up. Further to this just over 2% (5) were spoilt responses, showing the uncertainty of the females in disclosing information about where they had grown up.

Just over 16% (15) of the male respondents grew up in a rural area, while almost 73% (67) grew up in an urban area. Almost 8% (7) of the male respondents chose not to answer the question, showing that, like the females, they were uncertain about revealing where they had grown up.

Females and males showed the same general pattern of a far larger number of respondents having grown up in an urban area compared to those who grew up in a rural area.

Country where respondents grew up

		Count	Table %
Country where I grew up	South Africa	298	96.8%
	Abroad	8	2.6%
	Spoilt response	1	.3%
	No response	1	.3%

Figure 33: Country where respondents grew up

Almost 97% (298) of respondents grew up in South Africa, while almost 3% (8) grew up abroad. There was an insignificant percentage of less than 1% (1) of "Spoilt response" and less than 1%

(1) of “No response”. Compared to the area where they grew up, most respondents did not feel that the question regarding the country where they had grown up was sensitive in nature and were prepared to disclose the information.

THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Self-Image by Gender

In this section of the questionnaire, I wanted to ascertain the self-image of respondents. This section was situated at the very beginning of the questionnaire so that respondents would from the outset be induced to engage in intrapersonal communication to do self-assessment before they reported on their morals and beliefs regarding deceptive communication.

		Gender			
		Female		Male	
		Count	Col %	Count	Col %
I like who I am	I strongly agree	99	47.4%	49	53.3%
	I agree	95	45.5%	33	35.9%
	I disagree	11	5.3%	4	4.3%
	I strongly disagree	2	1.0%	4	4.3%
	I do not want to answer			1	1.1%
	Spoilt response	1	.5%		
	No response	1	.5%	1	1.1%

Figure 34: Gender VS “I like who I am”

Just over 47% (99) of the female respondents strongly agreed with the question “I like who I am”, while just over 53% (49) of the males agreed with this statement. A larger percentage of males strongly agreed that they like who they are. More females, almost 46% (95) stated they agreed with the statement “I like who I am”, compared to almost 36% (33) of the males. The table above shows that generally, both females than males have a positive self-image. Slightly more than 5% (11) of the female respondents disagreed with the statement, while slightly more than 4% (4) of the males disagreed. About 1% (2) of the female respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, while slightly more than 4% (4) of the male respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Slightly more than 1% of the males said they did not want to answer the question. Slightly more than 1% of the males chose also not to respond. Less than 1% (1) of female responses were both spoilt response and no response. Being such a small percentage these responses can be regarded as negligible, and will not be taken into consideration during analysis of data, as there is a negligible chance that their responses would impact on my results.

The table above shows that the self-esteem of males and females is about the same, showing that we are moving away from a chauvinistic society, where males have a more positive self-image and

females are usually more subservient. Both the genders having a positive self-esteem shows that social transformation is working.

Baumeister et al (2005: 84) state that attention to self-esteem has become a communal concern and sees a favourable opinion of oneself as the central psychological source from which all manner of positive outcomes spring. The corollary, that low self-esteem lies at the root of individual and thus societal problems and dysfunctions, has sustained an ambitious social agenda for decades. According to Baumeister et al campaigns to raise people's sense of self-worth abound.

Baumeister et al (2005: 88) state college students with high levels of self-regard claimed to be substantially better at initiating relationships, better at disclosing things about themselves, better at asserting themselves in response to objectionable behaviours by others, better at providing emotional support and better even at managing interpersonal conflicts. Baumeister et al 2005: 91 state that self-esteem relates to happiness. The consistent finding is that people with high self-esteem are significantly happier than others. They are also less likely to be depressed. Logic suggests that having a good dollop of self-esteem would enhance striving and persistence in school, while making a student less likely to succumb to paralysing feelings of incompetence or self-doubt.

Self-Image by Ethnic Group

The significance table as shown in Figure 43 indicates that there is a strong correlation between "I like who I am" and "I am". The table indicates a bi-variate correlation.

Figure 44 in Addendum 2 shows the results of the correlation of self-image by ethnic group. These are represented in the bar graph below.

Self-image by ethnic group




Figure 35: Self-image by ethnic group

Almost 78% (59) of the African respondents strongly agreed with the statement “I like who I am” compared to almost 82% (18) of the Coloured respondents, slightly more than 37% (58) of the Indian respondents and 20% (8) of the White respondents. On the other hand, slightly more than 21% (16) of the African respondents agreed with the statement “I like who I am” compared to almost 14% (3) of the Coloured respondents, almost 51% (79) of the Indian respondents and almost 73% (29) of the White respondents. An analysis of the bar graph above shows African and Coloured respondents show the same pattern. A far bigger percentage of the ethnic sub-populations strongly agreed that they like whom they are as opposed to the Indians and Whites, where a greater percentage placed value on “I agree”. This shows that the value systems of the Africans and coloureds and that of the Indians and whites may be converging.

General Conclusions about Self-Image

Trends that can be discerned in terms of gender indicate that while female respondents in this survey are overall more positive about themselves, male respondents are not far behind and that students on the whole have a good self-image, which augurs well for their general outlook on life. The significant differences in self-image among respondents, in terms of ethnic group, are worth noting.

While Indian respondents are less sure about themselves African, Coloured, Jewish and White respondents indicate a proportionally higher self-image.

MORAL REASONING

In the moral reasoning section of my questionnaire, I wanted to determine the moral reasoning skills of young people. I presented them with various scenarios and then asked them to make moral judgements in each scenario.

Circumstances that warrant a lie

Respondents were asked: "How wrong is it to tell the police that a suspect is not hiding in your home when s/he is. Figure 45 in the Addendum 2 shows that there is a strong correlation between "I am who others think I am" and "How wrong is it to tell the police that a suspect is not hiding in your home when s/he is?" The strong correlation shows that respondents that have a positive self-image are prepared to mislead the police. This involves blatantly presenting the other party with an outright fabrication of the truth. Respondents did not feel it was morally wrong to hide a suspect in their home because they perceived the suspect to be the victim and the police to be the aggressor.

Respondents' concept of cheating as a form of deception

Ekman (1989: 18) states that when children consider whether to cheat on a school exam, or when adults consider cheating on their income tax or spouse, they usually frame the issue in terms of breaking a rule, not in terms of lying. Lying is just what you have to do if you are going to cheat, a necessary function of being a thief, an embezzler or an adulterer. The cheater *conceals* the real source of the information and *falsely* presents it as his own. Denying having cheated if challenged is a second lie.

My data reveals that there is a strong correlation between "I am totally honest" and "Cheating is a form of deception" as shown in Figure 46 in Addendum 2. Respondents that have a positive self-image, perceiving themselves to be totally truthful and sincere saw cheating as a form of deception. This could possibly be the result of a strong value and belief system entrenched in the students. According to Goleman (1998b: 96) the self is built up slowly, from childhood on, as perhaps the most basic grouping of schemas the mind holds. Its origins are in the interactions between parent and infant; its development runs along lines carved by the contours of relationships with parents, family, and peers. Goleman (1998b: 100) states that people with high self-esteem carry within themselves a loving parent who is proud of their successes and tolerant of their failures.

The data reveals that students who have a positive self-image with a much higher-order self-schema of "I am totally honest" are able to correctly identify cheating as a deception strategy where one

covers up information falsely presents it as his own. My results show although the majority of respondents perceive cheating to be deceptive in nature, there were some differences when respondents were asked whether cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception.

CHEATING IN A MONOPOLY GAME

The table below shows that the majority of the respondents believe that cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception. Most respondents strongly agreed and agreed with the statement. It is interesting to note that there is a split among the Indian respondents. A slightly higher percentage of respondents, 53.2% (83), agreed with the statement, while 44.9% (70) disagreed with the statement. There is unanimity among the White respondents. Just 5% (2) of the respondents disagree while 95% (38) agree that cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception. A greater number of African and Coloured respondents agreed with the statement as compared to those that disagreed. This shows that African and Coloured respondents may share common values.

Cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception

	I am									
	African		Coloured		Indian		Jewish		White	
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
I strongly agree	20	26.3%	8	36.4%	29	18.6%	1	16.7%	16	40.0%
I agree	29	38.2%	6	27.3%	54	34.6%	1	16.7%	22	55.0%
I disagree	21	27.6%	5	22.7%	46	29.5%	3	50.0%	2	5.0%
I strongly disagree	2	2.6%			24	15.4%	1	16.7%		
I do not want to answer	3	3.9%			1	.6%				
Spoilt response	1	1.3%	1	4.5%	2	1.3%				
No response			2	9.1%						

Figure 36: Cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception

White lies

Figure 47 in Addendum 2 shows a correlation between “Area where I grew up” and “Telling white lies is a form of deception”. According to Ekman (1989) a white lie is told to make a situation easier to deal with. According to Bok (1978) white lies are accepted as excusable as long as they do not become excessive.

Telling white lies is a form of deception

	Area where I grew up			
	Rural area		Urban area	
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
I strongly agree	8	19.5%	37	16.7%
I agree	18	43.9%	124	55.9%
I disagree	7	17.1%	40	18.0%
I strongly disagree	2	4.9%	13	5.9%
I do not want to answer	3	7.3%	5	2.3%
Spoilt response	2	4.9%	3	1.4%
No response	1	2.4%		

Figure 37: Telling white lies is a form of deception

Almost 20% (8) respondents who grew up in a rural area strongly agreed with the statement that telling white lies is a form of deception, while almost 44% (18) agreed. Slightly more than 17% (7) disagreed with the statement while almost 5% (2) strongly disagreed. Of those respondents that grew up in an urban area almost 17% (37) strongly agreed with the statement that telling white lies is a form of deception, while almost 56% (124) agreed. Precisely 18% (40) of the respondents disagreed that telling white lies is a form of deception and almost 6% (13) of the respondents strongly disagreed. There is a clear-cut difference between those who agreed and those who disagreed. On the whole, more respondents agreed that telling white lies is a form of deception.

Goleman (1998b: 223) states that white lies are an innocent, even well-intended, form of social deceit. They are a way of protecting the frames that guide a harmonious social life. But the same dynamic can operate to hide facts that are not so innocent. What begins as a white lie, an innocent agreement to keep touchy facts out of frame, can shade over into less innocent social uses.

Ekman (1989: 109-111) adds that the overall consensus of children and adults is that some types of lying are good and some are bad. The question we have to ask ourselves is: "Where do we draw the line?" Almost all of us, adults and children alike, tell white lies all the time. These may be told consciously or unconsciously through habit. So often when asked, we have told our spouses/partners that the outfit s/he is wearing looks good on her or him. Ekman (1989: 109) explains that if we did not have this type of white lie, there would be a lot of hurt feelings. The question asked did not really want an honest comment on the clothes, but an ego boost. The person posing the question expects us to say that we like it even if we have to lie.

Ekman (1989) states that children have no regrets about having to tell these lies, as long as they believe it is done for a good purpose. This may include having to get out of trouble. Children approve of lying, for example, about how late they stayed up and surfed the net. If the lie works and keeps the children out of trouble, we tend to overlook these lies because the lies are not meant to hurt anybody.

The use of tact

According to Goleman (1998b: 210), the well-mannered deployment of attention is a large part of what we call “tact”. Figure 48 in Addendum 2 shows a strong correlation between ethnic groups and “Tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue”.

Tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue

	I am										I do not want to answer		Spoilt response	
	African		Coloured		Indian		Jewish		White		Count	Col %	Count	Col %
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %				
I strongly agree	8	10.5%	4	18.2%	20	12.8%	2	33.3%	4	10.0%			1	16.7%
I agree	21	27.8%	9	40.9%	86	55.1%	3	50.0%	20	50.0%	1	50.0%	3	50.0%
I disagree	19	25.0%	5	22.7%	35	22.4%	1	16.7%	15	37.5%				
I strongly disagree	3	3.9%			11	7.1%			1	2.5%			1	16.7%
I do not want to answer	22	28.9%	3	13.6%	2	1.3%					1	50.0%		
Spoilt response					2	1.3%							1	16.7%
No response	3	3.9%	1	4.5%										

Figure 38: Tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue

Ekman (1989: 28) states that we teach children tactfulness, which means not saying what they know is true – like, “That is really a dull present, Grandma.” We encourage them at times to say what they know is false – like, “Thanks a lot! I really wanted a tie.” The reason we consider this to be tact and politeness rather than lying is not just because it spares the target’s feelings. Everyone knows that for the sake of politeness and tact, we do not always tell the literal truth. We pretend to flatter, approve and show interest. Everyone is taught the rules early.

In Figure 38, almost 11% (8) of African respondents strongly agreed that tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue, and almost 28% (21) of the respondents agreed. Exactly 25% (19) disagreed with the statement, while almost 4% (3) of the respondents strongly disagreed. What is interesting is that almost 29% (22) of the respondents felt uncomfortable about the question and chose not to answer it. This may not have been the issue of values, but an issue of understanding the term “tact”.

More than 18% (4) of the Coloured respondents strongly agreed with the statement that tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue and almost 41% (9) of the respondents agreed. Almost 23% (5) of the respondents disagreed. Almost 14% (3) of the respondents felt uncomfortable about answering the question.

Almost 13% (20) of the Indian respondents strongly agreed with the statement that tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue and just over 55% (86) of the respondents agreed. Just over 22% (35) of the respondents disagreed while just over than 7% (11) of the respondents strongly disagreed. Slightly more than 1% (2) of the respondents chose not to answer the question and slightly more than 1% (2) of the responses were spoilt responses. Being negligible figures, these will not impact on the results.

While 10% (4) of White respondents strongly agreed that tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue, and 50% (20) of the respondents agreed. Almost 38% (15) of the respondents disagreed and almost 3% (1) of the respondents strongly disagreed.

The results show a split in each ethnic group, with the larger proportion of African, Coloured, Indian and White respondents agreeing that tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue.

Goleman (1998b: 222), states that tact – in the form of discreet inattention – is a keystone of the social alliance to honour the integrity of the frames we share. To call attention to a leaky channel is to violate the social contract that obligates us to protect one another's public face – to break a frame. In this sense the failure to exhibit attentional tact constitutes an attack. It violates the larger codes that preserve the smooth workings of the social order.

According to Goleman (1998b: 210) the frames for public interaction define those junctures where paying overt attention is acceptable. The salesperson's "May I help you?" is one such; as is the well timed "How are you today?" of a casual acquaintance as we pass by, or the quick glance other passengers give us as they make room on an elevator. If in any of these instances we find ourselves observed too intently, we feel discomfort, if not embarrassment. The well-mannered deployment of attention is a large part of what we call "tact". We all depend on each other to employ tact, so that we can maintain our course unruffled.

Self-deception

According to Figure 49 in Addendum 2 almost 15% (31) of the female respondents strongly agreed with the statement that overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception, while almost 35% (73) agreed with the statement. Almost 41% (85) of the females disagreed with the statement and just over 7% (15) strongly disagreed. This shows a split within the group. Almost the same percentage as those who agreed, disagreed with the statement.

Almost 19% (17) of the male respondents strongly agreed with the statement that overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception, while almost 34% (31) agreed with the statement. Just over 29% (27) disagreed with the statement and just over 14% (13) strongly disagreed. Just over 4% (4) of the male respondents felt uncomfortable about answering the question. The males show that same basic pattern as reflected by the females. There is a split within the group with a slightly higher percentage of males agreeing that overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception.

The bar graph below represents the respondents views on the statement "Overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception" by gender.

The bar graph below shows the same basic pattern in both genders. More respondents agreed compared to those who strongly agreed. More respondents disagreed compared to those who strongly disagreed. Those who strongly disagreed represented the smallest proportion of respondents in both genders.

Self-deception is the process or fact of misleading ourselves to accept as true or valid what is false or invalid. Self-deception, in short, is a way we justify false beliefs to ourselves. According to Goleman (1998b: 97) facts are better remembered the more they have to do with oneself. Or, most people in a group feel that they are the centres of activity. In international politics, decision-makers perceive the acts of distant nations as being aimed at themselves, when in fact they reflect local conditions. People see their own acts as accounting for chance events, such as winning a lottery ticket. Lying to ourselves is easier than lying to others. We have a sympathetic audience. We receive instant, positive reinforcement with the fantasy we have just accepted. It offers us escape from having to deal with realities that we would rather not accept. When we lie to ourselves, we do not tend to feel fear of being caught.

Overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception




Figure 39: Overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception

Deception in sport

A boxer who feigns a blow is deceiving his opponent

	Gender			
	Female		Male	
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
I strongly agree	16	7.7%	20	21.7%
I agree	50	23.9%	23	25.0%
I disagree	91	43.5%	23	25.0%
I strongly disagree	34	16.3%	20	21.7%
I do not want to answer	14	6.7%	3	3.3%
Spoilt response	1	.5%		
No response	3	1.4%	3	3.3%

Figure 40: A boxer who feigns a blow is deceiving his opponent

Respondents were asked whether a boxer who feigns a blow is deceiving his opponent. Almost 8% (16) female respondents strongly agreed and almost 24% (50) agreed. However, the number that disagreed was larger. Almost 44% (91) disagreed and more than 16% (34) disagreed. Almost 7% (14) of the female respondents were unsure whether it is a form of deception or not and chose not to answer

the question. Spoilt responses were less than 1% (1) and no responses were slightly more than 1% (3). Being such a small percentage these responses can be regarded as negligible, and will not be taken into consideration during analysis of data, as there is a negligible chance that their responses would impact on my results.

Male respondents were equally divided in their opinion. Almost 22% (20) males strongly agreed that that a boxer who feigns a blow is deceiving his opponent and 25% (23) agreed. Exactly 25% (23) of the males disagreed while almost 22% (20) strongly disagreed. Equal numbers of males (43) agreed that the boxer is deceiving his opponent and disagreed that the boxer is engaging in deception. Those respondents that agreed believe that boxers should not employ tactics that dupe the opponents, while those that disagreed imply that deceptive tactics form an integral part of sporting manoeuvres that assist in outwitting opponents.

Females and males that agreed with the statement have looked at the issue of deceiving one's opponent in the moral sense, and have therefore concluded that it is wrong to deceive one's opponent.

According to Bok (1978: 104) the use of force and the use of deception would be acceptable when *consented* to, given certain restrictions. The consent would have to be based on adequate information and ability to make a choice; and there would have to be freedom to opt out of the violent or deceptive situation. Where such informed and voluntary consent obtains, there is no longer a discrepancy of perspectives between liar and dupe, agent and victim. Deceptive bargaining in a bazaar, for instance, where buyer and seller try to outwit one another would present few problems to these reasonable persons. The same is true of professional boxing matches. Deception can be justified in such situations only if they are knowingly and freely entered into, with complete freedom to leave.

Withholding information in relationships

Respondents were asked how wrong is it of a partner not to tell the other one that s/he was involved in a gay/lesbian/bisexual relationship. The 18 or below group as well as the "Spoilt response" and "No response" constitute too small a group to make valid conclusions and will not be considered for the purposes of this study. The largest group is the young adults represented by the 19 year olds.

Just 40% (4) of respondents aged 19, and 20% (2) of respondents aged 20, and 20% (2) of respondents aged 21 or above, felt it was not wrong at all of a partner not to tell the other one that s/he was involved in a gay/lesbian/bisexual relationship.

Almost 38% (9) of the 19 year olds, almost 17% (4) of the 20 year olds and just over 33% (8) of those who are 21 and above felt it was not very wrong of a partner not to tell the other one that s/he was involved in a gay/lesbian/bisexual relationship.

Just over 31% (15) of the 19 year olds as well as just over 31% (15) the 20 year olds, and just over 27% (13) of those who are 21 and above felt it was quite wrong of a partner not to tell the other one that s/he was involved in a gay/lesbian/bisexual relationship.

Almost 51% (110) of those were 19 years old, almost 23% (49) of those who were 20 years old, and just over 21% (46) of those who were 21 and above felt it was very wrong of a partner not to tell the other one that s/he was involved in a gay/lesbian/bisexual relationship. The 19 year olds by a large majority felt it was deceptive of a partner not to disclose such information. There is unanimity among the 19 and 20 year olds who share a strong moral character condemning deception with regard to sexual orientation.

	How wrong is it of a partner not to tell the other one that s/he has been in a gay/lesbian/bisexual relationship?											
	Not wrong at all		Not very wrong		Quite wrong		Very wrong		I do not want to answer		No response	
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
18 or below	1	10.0%	1	4.2%	1	2.1%	4	1.8%				
19	4	40.0%	9	37.5%	15	31.3%	110	50.7%	1	14.3%	1	50.0%
20	2	20.0%	4	16.7%	15	31.3%	49	22.6%	2	28.6%	1	50.0%
21 or above	2	20.0%	8	33.3%	13	27.1%	46	21.2%	4	57.1%		
I do not want to answer	1	10.0%	1	4.2%	3	6.3%	6	2.8%				
Spoilt response			1	4.2%	1	2.1%	1	.5%				
No response							1	.5%				

Figure 41: Nondisclosure of information

According to Blair et al (2001) if partners were intimate, there was a greater chance that a falsification or distortion would be revealed. Falsification (i.e., contradiction) was found to be the most frequently reported deception strategy followed by omission, with distortion as third.

In examining the relationship between power and deception in interpersonal relationships, Blair et al (2001: 61) looked at forms of deception along a continuum ranging from overt to covert deception strategies. The three-point continuum placed covert deception at one end (represented by omission), distortion in the middle, and contradiction at the far end as the most overt type of deception. Blair et al

proposed that the terms covert and overt deception strategies could be substituted with the labels of indirect and direct methods of deception respectively. The labels of indirect and direct are derived from the strategies of influence literature.

Blair et al (2001: 61) state that indirect influence strategies such as withdrawal and hinting, are in general more veiled methods of getting one's way that can be paralleled to the covert forms of deception, such as omission, that are the more surreptitious manner of lying. Similarly, direct strategies of influence, like stating importance, telling, and asking, all involved openly and directly communicating what is desired to the other party. This bears resemblance to overt deception forms, such as contradiction, which involves blatantly presenting the other party with an outright fabrication of the truth.

Blair et al (2001: 67) state that omission might rate higher in social desirability, as students might view omission as the least hurtful deception strategy available. Omission means that they do not have to blatantly contradict the truth or verbally twist it into a distortion.

Goleman (1998b: 156-157) states that the bonds of a relationship are strengthened by tacit blind spots. In well-adjusted marriages we expect that each partner may keep from the other secrets having to do with financial matters, past experiences, current flirtations, indulgences in 'bad' or expensive habits, personal aspirations and worries, actions of children, true opinions held about relatives and mutual friends. These strategically located points of reticence make it possible to maintain a desired status quo. Such protective reticence is all the more secure as we engage in a simple collusion: you don't tell, and I don't ask. Each partner in a working couple ignores areas of shared experience that would threaten the partners' shared sense of a secure, comfortable relationship.

According to Ekman (1989: 28) advice columnist Ann Landers often tells her adult audience not to confess any past infidelities, to let sleeping dogs lie. Ekman cites the example of sixteen-year-old Betsy who stated that she had never lied to her parents about having had sexual intercourse. They never asked so she did not tell them. Ekman believes that we may believe someone does not want to know the truth because it makes it easier for us to do what we know they disapprove of without feeling guilty about it.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I presented the results of my survey. I gave an account of my findings and demonstrated my findings through the use of graphs and tables. My results reveal that students generally have a high self-image and regard cheating to be a form of deception, although there were

some differences when respondents were asked whether cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception. Results showed a split in groups when respondents had to decide whether they were engaging in self-deception. The 19 and 20 year olds who share a strong moral character condemned deception with regard to sexual orientation. In chapter 13 I present my conclusions and recommendations regarding deceptive communication, when it is legitimate to deceive others and when it is not.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In this, the final chapter of my dissertation, I will present my conclusions and recommendations regarding deceptive communication, when it is legitimate to deceive others and when it is not.

CONCLUSIONS

Gass and Seiter (2003) state that communication is not value neutral, because it manifests as states of formal domination, equality, subordination, or as an undecided power relation, all of which pertain to persuasion, social influence and compliance gaining.

From birth every creature has an obsession with the continuation of its own life. Survival requires well-developed senses. Deception in animals is not intentional, but a strategy evolved for the preservation of the species. To make this range of nonverbal communication possible, many animals have sensory capabilities that far outstrip those of humans. While animals use body language faking injury, camouflage and mimicry, humans use a combination of nonverbal and verbal communication to manipulate and deceive others. Intentional deception by humans occurs through gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction to mislead others, to make them believe that we ourselves do not believe, even through silence. Deceptive communication is an ancient technique and has been used by human beings as an adequate response to their environment since the origin of the species. Deliberate deception has become an effective form of communication during political campaigns and diplomatic negotiations.

The difficulty with lying is that the subconscious mind acts automatically and independently of our verbal lie, so our body language gives us away. Although we become far more efficient liars, as we grow older, we cannot conceal the physical signs. The lack of congruence that is likely to occur in the use of the main gestures, the body's micro signals and the spoken words do not allow us to fake our own body language. According to Goleman (1998b: 219) the face has maximum sending capacity, and is especially well-equipped to lie. By contrast, the body is less controllable, slower and less obvious.

While this makes the body a less effective channel for lies, it also makes it more prone to leaks, those nonverbal messages that inadvertently reveal a feeling the person is trying to hide.

The media, particularly television, is responsible for spreading the word that lying is not only useful but also fun. Reality shows like *Survivor*, where alliances are forged and broken on a regular basis, teach us that when push comes to shove, a little creative deception may be necessary to stay alive.

According to Bok (1978) we have to understand that advertising is basically persuasion, not information, nor education, and not coercion. Many important moral and ethical issues (concerning intent and consequences, priorities, individual and social effects, truth and deception, legal and regulatory problems) are related. The more we know about the basic techniques of persuasion, the better able we are, not only to cope with the multiple persuaders in our society, but also to include these ethical issues.

Deception is not based on yes/no options. We have to consider where specific concepts fall in a gradual scale of a continuum from unacceptable to acceptable, for example, the concept of wearing make-up, models that are touched up in the media, people that tint their hair. If we have to make value judgements, these emanate from our value and belief systems within a particular religious framework.

Gass and Seiter (2003: 259) state that whether one observes teenagers embellishing their accomplishments on a first date, card players bluffing in a poker game, negotiators stretching the truth in negotiations, politicians making promises they have no intentions of keeping, criminals lying in police interrogations, researchers serving up cover stories to their subjects, or parents claiming the existence of Santa Claus, it is clear that deception is a ubiquitous form of communication.

Bok (1978: 78) states that just as lies intended to avoid serious harm have often been thought more clearly excusable than others, so lies meant to *do* harm are often thought least excusable. Lies, which neither avoid nor cause harm, occupy the middle ground. Everyone depends on deception to get out of a scrape, to save face and to avoid hurting the feelings of others. Bok (1978: 247) adds that we lead our lives among all forms of duplicity: the changes of subject, the disguises, and the gestures meant to lead us astray. From childhood onwards we develop ways of coping with them, of believing some, seeing through others and consciously ignoring still others.

Bok (1978:110-112) states that a crisis may be acute, as in the life-saving cases; but a state of crisis can also become chronic. The same elements are present – great danger and no escape – but the time frame is entirely different, and there is no one critical turning point. The threat may be continuous,

so that one lie after another rarely staves off disaster, or it may recur over and over again, each time posing the issue of deception. In extreme and prolonged threats to survival, as in plagues, invasions, and religious or political persecution, human choice is intolerably restricted. Survival alone counts; moral considerations are nearly obliterated. People may still give each other help and protection in extremes of physical and mental stress; they may still forego lies and still share alike; but the choice goes far beyond duty. For many, the moral personality is itself crushed; the ability to choose is crushed.

Under such circumstances, the luxury of alternatives is out of the question. The overwhelming justification is survival. It appears to be the most powerful aspect of the principle of avoiding harm – the battle against personal extinction. At such times the spread of deceptive practices cannot be a consideration insofar as it has already taken place. Society *is* in a state of collapse, and a lie will not add to the chaos or the degradation. For all these reasons, public debate of how justifiable such lies are would then be largely beside the point.

Bok (1978: 110) adds it has been argued that although lying might be justified on rare occasions, most of us will, in fact, never encounter a situation where a lie might be excusable. We should proceed in life, therefore, as if no lies should ever be told. This is a comforting thought and makes everyday choices simple, but it holds little consolation for those many whose lives are touched more often and more crushingly by crisis than one might think. More individuals than not lead their lives under a continuous threat to survival or to their political or religious freedom. Even in societies where there are no such threats, there are professional groups – doctors or military personnel, for example – whose members can expect frequent crises in their work. For them, there can be no such easy certainty that a crisis where a lie will be necessary, will probably never come into their lives.

Bok (1978: 105) explains that there are general principles that govern the justification of lies:

- We must ask, first, whether there are alternative forms of action that will resolve the difficulty without the use of a lie
- Secondly, what might be the moral reasons brought forward to excuse the lie, and what reasons can be raised as counter-arguments
- Third, as a test of these two steps, we must ask what a public of reasonable persons might say about such lies

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I recommend that the study of truth and deception should form part of ethics where truthfulness and deception are not considered in relation to the salvation or the damnation of the soul, but the survival imperatives of human beings.
2. Educational institutions have a very large role to play. They have to look at their own practices and examine how scrupulously honest they are in setting an example. Educators have to examine how they cope with cheating, with plagiarism and fraudulent research. Educators have to check to what extent and in what disciplines deceptive techniques are actually taught to learners. Ethical and unethical forms of behaviour should be dealt with in the Life Orientation Learning Area.
3. Colleges and universities, as well as nursing schools, police academies, military academies, accounting schools, and many others need to consider how moral choice can best be studied and what standards can be expected, as well as upheld. The central aim is to prepare students to act wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. Materials on professional and research ethics can be integrated into technical courses, as well as for freestanding ethics courses.
4. Ethics should be studied at university level as part of the philosophy programme.
5. Evidence shows a high level of corruption in all spheres of our life, including the government departments. Government should ensure that ethical policies be enforced with the view to annihilating all traces of deception and corruption. Key personnel could undergo effective training to empower them with the ethically grounded skills and values. This will augur well for South Africa emerging as an economically stable country.
6. Before it is safe to conclude that high self-esteem leads to happiness, further research should address the shortcomings of the work that has been done so far.
7. Finally, in our age when deceit threatens every area of our society, I recommend that the last word should be: Speak the truth, be the truth, for your truth sets others free.

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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY: Respondent Code: _____

VOLUNTARY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
“When it is legitimate to deceive others, and when it is not.”

Department of Communication Science
University of Zululand (Durban Campus)
Researcher: Yasmin Rugbeer
Study Leader: Prof. R.M. Klopper

Note to the respondent

- ☞ We need your help to understand how people use deceptive communication, which forms of deception are acceptable, and which are not.
- ☞ Although we would like you to help us, you do not have to take part in this survey.
- ☞ If you do not want to take part, just hand in the blank questionnaire at the end of the survey session.
- ☞ What you say in this questionnaire will remain private and confidential. No one will be able to trace your opinions back to you as a person.

The questionnaire as four parts:

Part 1 asks permission to use your responses for academic research.

Part 2 asks general personal particulars like your age, gender and home language.

Part 3 asks about deception.

Part 4 asks how wrong it is to deceive others.

How to complete the questionnaire

1. Please answer the questions as truthfully as you can. Also, please be sure to read and follow the directions for each part. If you do not follow the directions, it will make it harder for us to do our project.
2. We are only asking you about things that you and your fellow students should feel comfortable telling us about. If you don't feel comfortable answering a question, you can indicate that you do not want to answer it. For those questions that you do answer, your responses will be kept confidential.
3. You can mark each response by making a tick or a cross, or encircling each appropriate response with a PEN (not a pencil), or by filling in the required words or numbers.

Thank you very much for filling in this questionnaire.

NB: Mark only one option per question or fill in the required information.

PRACTICE QUESTIONS

A. I am an undergraduate student:

- True Sort of true Not very true False

B. I like my girlfriends/ boyfriends choice of clothes:

- True Sort of true Not very true False

PART 1: PERMISSION TO USE MY RESPONSES FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH

*This information is necessary to show that a real person completed the questionnaire. It will be **kept strictly confidential**. Your personal identity will not be revealed to anyone, also when the results of the survey are published.*

I hereby give permission that my responses may be used for research purposes provided that my identity is not revealed in the published records of the research.

Initials and surname _____ Postal address: _____

Postal code: _____

Contact numbers: Home: _____ Cell: _____

PART 2: GENERAL PERSONAL PARTICULARS

Please tell us a little about yourself

Please mark only ONE option per question below.

How I feel about myself:

1. I like who I am:

- I strongly agree I strongly disagree
 I agree I do not want to answer this question
 I disagree

2. Others like me:

- I strongly agree I strongly disagree
 I agree I do not want to answer this question
 I disagree

3. I am who others think I am:

- I strongly agree I strongly disagree
 I agree I do not want to answer this question
 I disagree

4. I am totally honest:
- I'm always honest
 - I'm honest most of the time
 - I'm honest sometimes
 - I'm never honest
 - I do not want to answer this question

5. I am _____ years old. I do not want to answer this question

6. I am a: female male I do not want to answer this question

7. I grew up in: a rural area an urban area I do not want to answer this question

8. I grew up: in South Africa abroad: _____
 I do not want to answer this question

9. I am:

- African
- Coloured
- Indian
- Jewish
- Oriental
- White
- a member of another ethnic group: _____
- I do not want to answer this question

PART 3: WHAT IS DECEPTION?

10. Briefly explain in your own words what you think deception is:

I do not want to answer this question

11. In general, how wrong is it to deceive others?

- Not wrong at all
- It depends on what one is deceiving others about
- I do not want to answer this
- It is somewhat wrong
- It isn't wrong at all

12. Cheating in a test is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
13. Cheating in a monopoly game is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
14. Pretending to like someone that you do not like is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
15. Promising to visit someone when you have no intention to do so is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
16. Overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
17. A rugby player who executes a dummy pass is deceiving his opponent.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |

24. Tact sometimes requires saying something that is completely untrue.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
25. The emotionless facial expression of a poker player, poker face, is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
26. Concealment of the President's state of health after a heart attack is a form of deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
27. There is nothing wrong with dodging the issue if you do not want to hurt the feelings of a friend who puts you on the spot.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
28. A soldier wearing camouflage uniform on the battlefield employs deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |
29. A soldier wearing civilian clothes during a battle in an urban area employs deception.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |

30. The a person who tries to be on her/his best behaviour on a first date is being deceptive.
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I strongly disagree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I agree | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I disagree | |

PART 4: HOW WRONG IS IT TO DECEIVE OTHERS?

31. How wrong is it for a child to lie to her/his parents about not having done homework?
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |
32. How wrong is it for hypnotists to tell hypnotised subjects that onions are apples and to eat them in order to entertain audiences?
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |
33. How wrong is it for illusionists/ magicians to deceive their audiences?
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |
34. How wrong is it for spies to deceive the people around them by living among them?
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |
35. How wrong is it for parents to tell their children that Father Christmas brought them gifts for Christmas, when the parents actually bought the gifts?
- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

36. How wrong is it for parents to cover up their rows with one another by giving their children false accounts of what really happened?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

37. In gang language, members often use covert terms so passersby cannot understand what they are saying. How serious a form of deception do you consider this to be?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

38. If one gang member uses gang language to covertly identify a potential victim for other gang members, how serious a form of deception do you consider this to be?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

39. How wrong is it for learners not to speak up when something serious has happened at school and they know who the culprit is?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

40. How wrong is it to conceal having been fired before in a job application?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

41. How wrong is it to tell your host: "The meal was really delicious," when you did not really enjoy it?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

42. How wrong is it to tell the police that a suspect is not hiding in your home when in fact s/he is hiding in your house?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

43. How wrong is it for a salesperson to only point out the good features of a product?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

44. When an estate agent refers to a property that requires a significant amount of fixing up as being in need of "tender love and care" how serious a form of deception is such a form of sales talk?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

45. How wrong is it to end a telephone conversation by saying there is someone at the door/ that you need to go to the loo when you just want to end the conversation?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

46. During the 1960 Vietnam War the American Army used American Navaho Indians to encode radio messages in Navaho so that the enemy could not understand what was being said.

This process is known as “Code Talk”. How serious a form of deception is Code Talk?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

47. In the year 2000 the well-known author Sir Jeffrey Archer received a four-year jail sentence in Britain for having been found guilty of having lied under oath in a previous court case. How do you feel about his sentence for having lied under oath?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> It wasn't too long | <input type="checkbox"/> It was far too long |
| <input type="checkbox"/> It was a bit too long | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |

48. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it of a partner not to tell the other one of *previous intimate relationships*?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

49. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not to tell the other one that s/he is suffering from a serious illness?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

50. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not to tell the other one that s/he has a parent/ brother/ sister who is in jail?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

51. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not tell the other one that s/he has a parent/ brother/ sister who is seriously deformed?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

52. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not tell the other one that s/he has a parent/ brother/ sister who is in an asylum?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

53. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not tell the other one that s/he has been in jail before?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

54. When a couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not tell the other one that s/he is still involved with another partner?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

55. When a heterosexual couple starts dating seriously, how wrong is it if a partner does not tell the other one that s/he has been in a gay/lesbian/ bisexual relationship before?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not wrong at all | <input type="checkbox"/> Very wrong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not very wrong | <input type="checkbox"/> I do not want to answer this question |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quite wrong | |

Thanks again for helping us with this research project

ADDENDUM 2: TABLES

Gender of respondents

	Count	Col %
Female	209	67.9%
Male	92	29.9%
I do not want to answer	4	1.3%
Spoilt response	2	.6%
No response	1	.3%

Figure 42: Table representing gender composition of respondents

Correlations

		I like who I am	I am
I like who I am	Pearson Correlation	1	.217(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	308	308
I am	Pearson Correlation	.217(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	308	308

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 43: Table showing correlation between "I like who I am" and "I am"

		I am									
		African		Coloured		Indian		Jewish		White	
		Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
I like who I am	strongly agree	59	77.6%	18	81.8%	58	37.2%	4	66.7%	8	20.0%
	I agree	16	21.1%	3	13.6%	79	50.6%	2	33.3%	29	72.5%
	I disagree	1	1.3%			12	7.7%			1	2.5%
	I strongly disagree					5	3.2%			1	2.5%
	I do not want to answer									1	2.5%
	Spoilt response					1	.6%				
	No response			1	4.5%	1	.6%				

Figure 44: Self-image by ethnic group

Correlations

		I am who others think I am	How wrong is it to tell the police that a suspect is not hiding in your home when s/he is?
I am who others think I am	Pearson Correlation	1	-.161(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.005
	N	308	308
How wrong is it to tell the police that a suspect is not hiding in your home when s/he is?	Pearson Correlation	-.161(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.
	N	308	308

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 45: "I am who others think I am" Vs. "How wrong is it to tell the police that a suspect is not hiding in your home when s/he is?"

Correlations

		I am totally honest	Cheating is a form of deception
I am totally honest	Pearson Correlation	1	.206(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
	N	308	308
Cheating is a form of deception	Pearson Correlation	.206(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
	N	308	308

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 46: Correlation between "I am totally honest" and "Cheating is a form of deception"

Correlations

		Area where I grew up	Telling white lies is a form of deception
Area where I grew up	Pearson Correlation	1	-.116(*)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.042
	N	308	308
Telling white lies is a form of deception	Pearson Correlation	-.116(*)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.042	.
	N	308	308

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Figure 47: Correlation between "Area where I grew up" and "Telling white lies is a form of deception"

Correlations

		I am	tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue
I am	Pearson Correlation	1	-.189(**)
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.001
	N	308	308
Tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue	Pearson Correlation	-.189(**)	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.
	N	308	308

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 48: Correlation between "I am" and "Tact sometimes requires saying something completely untrue"

Overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception

	Gender							
	Female		Male		I do not want to answer		Spoilt response	
	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %	Count	Col %
I strongly agree	31	14.8%	17	18.5%	1	25.0%	1	50.0%
I agree	73	34.9%	31	33.7%	1	25.0%		
I disagree	85	40.7%	27	29.3%			1	50.0%
I strongly disagree	15	7.2%	13	14.1%	1	25.0%		
I do not want to answer	3	1.4%	4	4.3%	1	25.0%		
Spoilt response	2	1.0%						

Figure 49: Overestimating one's own abilities is a form of deception

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