

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND



For the degree of

Doctor of Administration

In the field of

Public Administration

Sub-Regional Hegemons, Integration and Governance: South Africa's Role in Southern
Africa after Democratization

FACULTY OF COMMERCE, ADMINISTRATION & LAW

Candidate: Daniel Nkosinathi Mlambo

Student number: 201231522

Supervisor

Dr T.C. Adetiba

2020

DECLARATION

I, Daniel Nkosinathi Mlambo (student number: 201231522) declare that:

- i. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original work.
- ii. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
- iii. The thesis does not contain other people's data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from those people.
- iv. This thesis does not contain other authors writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other authors. Where other authors have been quoted, then:
 - a. Their words have been rewritten but the general information attributed to them has been referenced.
 - b. Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside inverted commerce and referenced.
 - c. This thesis does not contain text, graphics, or tables that have been copied and pasted from the internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and these sources being detailed in the thesis and in the reference section.

Name of candidate:

Daniel Nkosinathi Mlambo

As the supervisor, I agree to the submission of this thesis for examination

Dr T.C. Adetiba

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my family who have sacrificed a lot for me to have a good education, and more importantly to my father Bheki Aaron Mlambo (the late). In addition, I dedicate this work to the almighty God.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

To make it through this challenging yet fruitful journey would not have been possible without the influence of several individuals, who played significant roles from day one to finish. Firstly, I would like to thank the tremendous intellectual guidance and robust support of my supervisor, Dr Toyin Cotties Adetiba. Your strong critique, spirit, belief and wealth of knowledge pertaining to my research topic has been of tremendous value and I would have not gotten this far without it. Special appreciation also goes to my parents, Bheki Aaron Mlambo (the late) and Nombuso Mkhwanazi not only for their vital support but also for installing in me important life values of hard work, I am positive this will produce positive result moving forward. Special thanks also go to my brothers Victor Mlambo and Simphiwe for their vital support. Not forgetting my grandmother Agnes Mkhwanazi, who has always been a pillar of strength. My gratitude also goes out to all respondents that availed themselves to assist in answering the research questions while also adding some other valuable insights. Thank you very much for your vital support, prayers and strength. I certainly would not have gotten this far without you. To my other external family members, thank you for your support.

I would like to extend my appreciation to the Moses Kotane Institute (MKI) for their contribution towards financing my PhD studies since the 2019 academic year. Special thanks also goes to all those that supported me in this challenging yet special journey, your contribution(s) along the way has been of utmost importance and is highly valued, special thanks for your encouraging words and support. To afregarde editlink academic editing and data analysis, thank you for your support with regards to analysis and editing.

Lastly, my gratitude goes to my wonderful friends for their support. Special thanks to Nompumelelo Dlamini, Zamani Zulu, Nhlanhla Simelane, Mandla Mubecua, Nkosinathi Ndimande, Clifford Duma, Siphesihle Mpanza, Siyanda Mfeka, Nselelo Sibiya, Mxolisi Mnguni, Mnotho Mthembu, Bongani Mchunu, Thamsanqa Buys, Siyanda Xulu, Dr Mogotsi C. Maleka, Andiswa Mkhwanazi Hlobisile Ngwenya, Slindile Ngcobo, Gift Ndlovu, Manqoba, Qwabe, Vumase, Tshepo, Thulebone and all New Generation of Academics Programme (nGAP) colleagues and mentors at Tshwane University of Technology (TUT).

May God Bless You All.

Daniel N. Mlambo

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ABC – All Basotho Convention

ACCORD – African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

ACPPDT – Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation

AD – Alliance of Democrats

AEC – African Economic Community

AFCFTA -- African Continental Free Trade Area

AFF-SAP – African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Transformation

AMU – Arab Maghreb Union

ANC – African National Congress

APPER – African Priority for Economic Recovery

APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism

ARF – African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund

AU – African Union

BCP – Basotho Congress Party

BEE – Black Economic Empowerment

BNP – Basotho National Party

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CAADP – Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme

CCR – Centre for Conflict Resolution

CEMIS –Centre for Military Studies

CEN-SAD – Community of Sahel – Saharan States

CET – Common External Revenue

CLM – Congolese Liberation Movement

CODESA – Convention for a Democratic South Africa

COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CONSAS – Constellation on Southern African States

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

CP – Conservative Party

CRP – Common Revenue Pool

CSAS – Centre for Southern African Studies

CU – Customs Union

CUC – Customs Union Convention

DBSA – Development Bank of Southern Africa

DC – Democratic Congress

DFA – Department of Foreign Affairs

DHET – Department of Higher Education

DIRCO – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC – East African Community

ECCAS – Economic Community for Central African States

ECOWAS – Economic Community for West African States

EU – European Union

FAL – Final Act of Lagos

FDI – Foreign direct Investment

FGD – Foundation of Global Dialogue

FIB – Force Intervention Brigade

FLS – Frontline States

FNB – First National Bank

FTA – Free Trade Area

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNU – Government of National Unity

GPA – Global Political Agreement

GST – General Systems Theory

HCTs – Higher Commission Territories

HSRC – Human Science Research Council

HST – Hegemonic Stability Theory

IBSA – India, Brazil, South Africa

ICC – International Criminal Court

ICD – Inter-Congolese Dialogue

ICGLR – International Conference of the Great Lake Region

ICT – Information and Communications Technology

IEC – Independent Electoral Commission

IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGD – Institute of Global Dialogue

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IPA – Interim Political Authority

ISDSC – The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

ISS – Institute of Security Studies

JBCC – Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation

LCD – Lesotho Congress for Democracy

LDF – Lesotho Defence Force

LHWP – Lesotho Highlands water project

LPA – Lagos Plan of Action

M23 – March 23 Movement

MAP – The Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery

MDC – Movement for Democratic Change

MDC – Multilateral Development Council

MFP – Marematlou Freedom Party

MONUSCO – United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

MPNF – Multi-Party Negotiating Forum

NAFTA – North American Free Trade Area

NAI – New Africa Initiative

NDP – National Development Plan

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NIP – National Independent Party

NP – National Party

NPC – National Planning Commission

NPO – Non-Profit Organization

NSM – Non-Aligned Movement

OAU – Organisation of African Unity

OEM – Original Equipment Manufacturer

OPDSC – Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

PAC – Pan Africanist Congress

PAP – Priority Action Plan

PCRD – Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

PFD – Popular Front for Democracy

PICI – The Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative

PIDA – The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 2010-2040

POA – Programme of Action

PPDF - Project Preparation and Development Facility

PSC – Peace and Security Council

RCD-GOMA - Rally for Congolese Democracy

RCD-ML – Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement

RCD-N – RCD Nationale

RCL – Reformed Congress of Lesotho

REC – Regional Economic Community

RISDP – The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

RSF – Revenue Sharing Formula

SAA – South African Airways

SACP – The South African Communist Party

SACU – Southern African Customs Union

SADB – South African Development Bank

SADC – The Southern African Development Community

SADCC – The Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SAIIA – South African Institute of International Affairs

SAPS – South African Police Services

SATM – School of Airlines and Travel Management

SIPO – Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

SOE – State-Owned Enterprise

STAP – Short Term Action Plan

SWAPO – South West African People Organization

TDCA – Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement

TMALI – Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute

UDM – United Democratic Front

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

USA – United States of America

USAID – The United States Agency for International Development

UWC – University of the Western Cape

ZANLA – The Zimbabwe National Liberation Army

ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

ZIPRA – The Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army

ABSTRACT

The study aimed at understanding expert opinion on the linkage between hegemonic states and regional integration, the benefits of post-apartheid regional integration, South Africa's socio-economic and political efforts in the region and whether the country's post-1994 foreign policy had been beneficial to regional integration. A panel of experts with immense expertise in regional foreign policy and integration were consulted. Structured interviews were used to collect data from this sample. The collected data were analysed through thematic content analysis. From the analysis, five major themes emerged. These were: Theme 1, Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration; Theme 2, Regional integration under post-1994 leaders; Theme 3, South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region; Theme 4, Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures and Theme 5, Recommendations on the regional integration role. Under these themes, it was noted that regional leaders generally led regional integration although lesser powers also had an impact on its formation and perpetuation. It was also found that South Africa's foreign policy has been highly dynamic with different presidents putting different emphases on regional integration and most energy towards the process having been put under President Mbeki's tenure. South Africa's main tool in regional integration was described as diplomacy-based soft power. South Africa had been of considerable economic and political stability benefit to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region although the country did not get much out of the region and was under constant criticism for its perceived hegemonic stance. The study recommended a focus on regionalism rather than hegemony, putting more emphasis on economic integration and taking into consideration of the wills of other countries within its regions of interest.

Key words: Regional Integration, Hegemony, Foreign Policy, South Africa, Southern Africa

List of Tables

Table 1.1: Validity and Reliability in Quantitative and Qualitative studies

Table 2.1: Showing Balassa's stages of integration

Table 2.2: Showing the implementation phase of the Abuja Treaty

Table 2.3: Features of different types of Hegemony

Table 2.4: Four attributes of a Hegemonic State

Table 3.1: Showing Foundations of Soft Power

Table 3.2: Three categories of Soft Power

Table 4.1: "Outcomes-based approach" Identifying South Africa's Foreign Policy Objectives.

Table 4.2: Discourse formations on South Africa's foreign policy during various presidencies post-democratization

Table 4.3: Stages of Foreign Policy Formulation.

Table 4.4: Party Electoral Performance in the 1993 Lesotho Elections

Table 4.5: Party Electoral Performance in the 1998 Lesotho Elections

Table 4.6: South Africa's 2019 military Strength

Table 6.1: Four attributes of a hegemonic state versus the sample's view.

List of Figures

Figure 4.1: Showing current SADC member states

Figure 5.1: Subthemes - Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration

Figure 5.2: Subthemes: Regional Integration under post-1994 leaders

Figure 5.3: Subthemes: South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region

Figure 5.4: Subthemes: Regional integration and foreign policy; Successes, benefits and failures

Figure 5.5: Recommendations on the integration role

Figure 6.1: Individualistic view in foreign policy decision-making-cognitive approach

List of Appendices

Appendix A: Questions for one-on-one interview with key respondents

Appendix B: Respondent informed consent declaration

TABLE OF CONTENT

CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	iv
ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS	v
ABSTRACT	xi
List of Tables	xii
List of Figures	xiii
List of Appendices	xiv
CHAPTER ONE	1
BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Preliminary Literature Review	4
1.3 Theoretical Framework	6
1.3.1 Regionalism	7
1.3.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)	8
1.3.3 The General Systems Theory (GST)	9
1.4 Problem Statement	11
1.5 Research Objectives	12
1.6 Research Questions	13
1.7 Research Paradigm	13
1.7.1 Research Methodology	14
1.7.2 Research Population and Sampling Method.	14
1.7.3 Data Analysis	17
1.7.4 Validity and Reliability	17
1.7.5 Internal Validity	18
1.7.6 External Validity	18
1.7.7 Reliability	19
1.8 Intended contribution to the body of knowledge	19
1.9 Resources	20
1.10 Intellectual Property and Innovation	20
1.11 Knowledge Dissemination	20
1.12 Limitations of the Study	21
1.13 Structure of the thesis	21
1.14 Ethical Considerations	22

CHAPTER TWO	25
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	25
2.1 Introduction.....	25
2.2 Regional Integration.....	25
2.3 Probing the Quest for Regional Integration in Africa pre- and post-colonialism	28
2.3.1 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)	32
2.3.2 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL)	36
2.3.3 The Abuja Treaty	38
2.3.4 The African Union (AU)	40
2.3.5 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)	43
2.4 Regional Integration efforts pre-colonialism and post-colonialism: From a Southern Africa Perspective	44
2.4.1 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU).....	44
2.4.1.1 The 1910 SACU Agreement	45
2.4.1.2 The 1969 SACU Agreement	46
2.4.1.3 The 2002 SACU Agreement	46
2.4.2 The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)	48
2.4.3 The Frontlines States (FLS).....	50
2.4.4 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).....	51
2.4.5 The Southern African Development Community (SADC).....	53
2.5 What attributes make a Hegemonic State?.....	55
2.6 Understanding South Africa’s Democratic Transition 1990-1994: From Pariah State to expected leader in Southern Africa	62
2.7 Theoretical Framework	65
2.7.1 Introduction.....	65
2.7.2 Regionalism	65
2.7.3 Hegemonic Stability Theory	70
2.7.4 The General Systems Theory	73
2.8 Conclusion	74
CHAPTER THREE	76
POST-DEMOCRATIZATION: A REFLECTION ON SOUTH AFRICA’S QUEST FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP.	76
3.1 Introduction.....	76
3.2 South Africa as a proclaimed hegemonic state in Southern Africa.....	77
3.3 Meeting the Criteria for Regional Leadership: A Soft Power Approach.....	82
3.4 Impediments facing South Africa’s regional integration and governance frameworks	85
3.5 Conclusion	89
CHAPTER FOUR	90

EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA’S REGIONAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA POST-DEMOCRATIZATION	90
4.1 Introduction.....	90
4.2 South Africa’s post-1994 membership in the SADC: From Segregation to Partnership.....	91
4.3 South Africa’s Post-1994 Foreign Policy: A New Paradigm Shift Post the Apartheid Era.....	97
4.4 Conceptualising Foreign Policy	100
4.4.1 Dawn of a Democratic State and South Africa’s new Foreign Policy Aspiration(s) ..	101
4.4.2 Constraints facing South Africa’s Foreign Policy post-democratization.....	110
4.4.3 South Africa’s Foreign Policy moving forward: What remedy (if any)?.....	114
4.5 Unearthing South Africa’s role in Mediation and Peacekeeping (Lesotho and the DRC) in Southern Africa post-democratization.	116
4.5.1 Instability in Lesotho	118
4.5.2 Political Volatility in the DRC	124
4.6 Conclusion	129
CHAPTER FIVE	130
DATA ANALYSIS	130
5.1 Introduction.....	130
5.2 Theme 1: The perceived link between regional powers and regional integration	130
5.2.1 Regional powers as facilitators of successful integration	131
5.2.2 Regional powers and regional integration: visible, albeit complex link.....	132
5.2.3 Regional powers as competitive/colluding forces in regional blocs	133
5.3 Theme 2: Regional integration under post-1994 leaders	134
5.3.1 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mandela.....	135
5.3.2 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mbeki.....	136
5.3.3 Regional integration and foreign policy under Zuma.....	137
5.3.4 Regional integration and foreign policy under Ramaphosa.....	139
5.4 Theme 3: South Africa’s foreign policy processes and tools within the region	140
5.4.1 Diplomacy and soft power approach.....	141
5.4.2 The effectiveness of soft power as a foreign policy tool	142
5.4.3 Perceptions of regional states on South Africa’s hegemonic aspects.....	143
5.5 Theme 4: Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures.....	145
5.5.1 Comparative limited regional integration experience	146
5.5.2 South Africa’s positive performance and contribution in the region.....	147
5.5.3 Socio-economic development in the region	148
5.5.4 Peacekeeping and Mediation.....	149
5.5.5 Mutuality of benefits – South Africa versus SADC	150
5.6 Theme 5: Recommendations on the regional integration role	151
5.6.1 Focus on economic rather than political relationships	152

5.6.2 Focus on domestic rather than regional development	152
5.7 Conclusion	153
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS	154
6.1 Introduction.....	154
6.2 Theme 1: The perceived link between regional powers and regional integration	154
6.2.1 Regional powers and regional integration visible link.....	155
6.2.2 Regional powers as facilitators of successful regional integration	156
6.2.3 Regional powers as competitive/colluding forces in regional blocs	157
6.2.4 Regional integration under post-1994 leaders.....	158
6.2.5 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mandela.....	160
6.2.6 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mbeki.....	162
6.2.7 Regional integration and foreign policy under Zuma and Ramaphosa.....	163
6.3 Theme 2: South Africa’s foreign policy processes and tools within the region	164
6.3.1 Diplomacy and soft power approach.....	164
6.3.2 The effectiveness of soft power as a foreign policy tool	167
6.3.3 South Africa’s hegemonic tendencies	168
6.4 Theme 3: Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures	169
6.4.1 Comparative limited regional integration experience	170
6.4.2 The theoretical framework views	170
6.5 Conclusion	173
CHAPTER SEVEN.....	175
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	175
7.1 Introduction.....	175
7.2 Summary of the study	176
7.2.1 Chapter 1: Introduction	176
7.2.2 Research methodology.....	177
7.2.3 Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical frameworks.....	178
7.2.4 Regional integration.....	178
7.2.5 Hegemony/ hegemonic states.....	178
7.3 Theoretical frameworks	179
7.3.1 Regionalism	179
7.3.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory.....	180
7.3.3 The General Systems Theory.....	180
7.4 Chapter 3: Post-Democratization: A Reflection on South Africa’s Quest for Regional Leadership.....	180
7.5 Chapter 4: Data analysis and summary of findings	181

7.5.1 Theme 1: Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration	181
7.5.2 Theme 2: Regional integration under post-1994 leaders.....	182
7.5.3 Theme 3: South Africa’s foreign policy processes and tools within the region	182
7.5.5 Theme 4: Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures .	183
7.5.6 Theme 5: Recommendations on the regional integration role	184
7.6 Chapter 5: Discussion	184
7.6.1 Conclusions on research questions	184
7.6.1.1 Research question 1	184
7.6.1.2 Research question 2	185
7.6.1.3 Research question 3	185
7.6.1.4 Research question 4	185
7.6.1.5 Research question 5	186
7.7 Recommendations.....	186
7.7.1 Recommendations for further studies.....	186
7.8 Conclusion	187
8 BIBLIOGRAPHY	189
BOOKS	189
CHAPTERS IN BOOKS	195
JOURNAL ARTICLES	200
INTERNET ARTICLES/SOURCES	210
GOVERNMENT REPORTS	218
DISSERTATION(S)/THESIS	218
CONFERENCE PROCEEDING’S.....	221
APPENDICES	222
APPENDIX A.....	222
Questions for one on one interview with key respondents	222
APPENDICES	223
APPENDIX B	223
Respondent informed consent declaration.....	223

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Globally and particularly after the end of the cold war¹, regional integration has been observed as a vital factor for regional co-operation and development by various states as well as global multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN) because of several gains it can bring to its member nations. These gains include the creation of more conducive trade relations and improved bilateral engagements among states within regional groupings (Hartzenberg, 2011; Razzaque and Basnett, 2014). Regional integration can also attract foreign direct investments (FDI), help to improve regional peace and security and foster infrastructural development within member countries and within the region as a whole (De Melo and Tsikata, 2014; Aworaro, 2015). The need for regional integration in Africa over the past decades has been manifested by numerous programmes and policies developed and at times implemented by African heads of states and African regional institutions (Odubajo and Akinboye, 2017). The establishment of the Organization of African Unity² (OAU) by African leaders in 1963 was meant for African countries to willingly integrate and co-operate as a means of addressing their development challenges.

Regional integration, as a phenomenon, is associated with the emergence of regional economic and political powers, or states that are more powerful to the extent of influencing, controlling and/or driving the agenda and activities of a given sub region, sometimes referred to as regional hegemons or hegemonic states (Prys, 2012; Oroluntoba and Gumede, 2014). Post-colonial Africa has seen the emergence of major political and economic powers within its respective subregions. These include Egypt in North Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa³. These states are expected to be at the forefront of their respective subregions' regional integration attempts and those of the continent at large (Mwiti, 2013). These powers are not necessarily the formulators of their respective sub regions but are

¹ This was a state of political resentment that took place from 1945 to 1990 between nations controlled by the Soviet Union (Eastern bloc) and those controlled by the USA (Western bloc).

² This is currently known as the African Union (AU) after the OAU was dispersed in 2002 (Bwalya and Mutula, 2015). The AU further adopted the Abuja Treaty, hereby considering regional integration as a pivotal blueprint project in driving and enhancing economic development in Africa.

³ By Southern Africa, I mean a geographical region located in the southern tip of the African continent and made up of several independent states. These include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland (now eSwatini), Zambia and Zimbabwe.

considered critical for the successful continuation of political and economic development in their respective blocs. Increased regional integration activity, especially in relation to emerging economic and political powers such as South Africa, China, India and Brazil, has caught the attention of many scholars keen to understand how these powers affect the economic and political affairs of their regions (Bekerman and Rikap, 2010; Shen, 2018; Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017; Mngomezulu, 2020).

Over the last two decades, there has been increased attention paid to these regional hegemonies and the role they play or intend to play within their specific sub regions. The most renowned work on hegemonies can be credited to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci in his series, *Prison Notebooks*, written between 1929 and 1935. To him, a social class affirms its hegemonic stance when it tries to implement its own interest via an ideology that also brings the interests of other subordinate classes in line with its own interests. This could also take the form of classifying its own interests as general interests for the whole society. To Gramsci, hegemony is a form of dominance, though it does not have to entail the use of force (Destradi, 2010). Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemony is applied in studies on modern-day relations among states, including political, economic and militaristic relationships among states within the various regions and sub regions of the African continent and the world at large.

South Africa is regarded as one of the biggest regional powers on the African continent and by far the biggest in Southern Africa (McNamee, 2016). Although Pretoria possesses an ample amount of political and economic potential, there has been vast scholarly debate (particularly post-1994) on whether it has duly utilised this potential for the benefit of Southern Africa's regional integration and governance. After re-emerging in 1994 from its political doldrums and also becoming a member of the Southern African Development Community⁴ (SADC) in the same year, there were high hopes regionally, continentally and globally (albeit not entirely⁵) for South Africa to spearhead and carry most of the weight of the region's economic and political reforms as a result of its relatively superior economy. Hence, its regional stance has

⁴ By SADC, I mean one of eight recognised African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) located in the southern tip of the African continent, which is made up of 16 countries. Its mandate (post-1992) when formed was to enhance regional integration, political and security cooperation between its member states.

⁵ This was because South Africa had through its apartheid government utilised its hegemonic power and policies to destabilise the economies of neighbouring states. This led to many individuals being displaced and caused millions of dollars in damages. In this regard, to most it was the same South Africa as that of the apartheid era, with just a change in leadership.

over the years (predominantly post-1994) endured vast regional, continental and global attention (Saunders, 2014).

From a Southern African perspective, there are several reasons why an emerging power (South Africa) attracts much attention. The first pertains to regional integration; the current and future development of the region is manifested as to how member states co-operate, pool resources and offer support to one another. However, as some are minor and lack the required resources, an emerging power is regarded as the one capable of spearheading regional socio-economic development (Gwala, 2015). The second has to do with regional security challenges; in this regard, an emerging power may deploy diplomatic and, if necessary, military force to stabilise such threats due to its relatively strong diplomatic negotiation power and military infrastructure (Oloruntoba and Gumede, 2014).

Some scholars, among them, Bach (2016), Wodrig (2017), Oloruntoba and Gumede (2014), Albright (2019), Vickers (2017) and Graham (2017) have written extensively on sub regional hegemony and integration, particularly their foreign policy and nexus between continental (African) hegemony (i.e., Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya). There is a dearth of studies exploring how emerging powers have demonstrated their regional leadership within their particular subregion through regional integration and governance and the potential this has for development and predominantly for this study post-1994 in Southern Africa. As a result, while this study ponders on South Africa's (as an emerging regional hegemon) regional integration and governance attempts in Southern Africa, it particularly aims to address the question of how this has been led by the 1994 democratically elected African National Congress⁶ (ANC) government since it gained power from the apartheid-driven National Party⁷ (NP). Through his seminal paper entitled 'South Africa's Future Foreign Policy' in November 1993, five months prior to the first-ever South African democratic elections, former president of South Africa Nelson Mandela stressed that:

⁶ Established in 1912 by John Langalibalele Dube in Bloemfontein as the South African Native National Congress, the ANC is the current governing party of the Republic of South Africa. It has been at the helm since 1994 after the first-ever democratic elections on South African soil, a period that witnessed Nelson Mandela become the first- ever black state president (Jenkins Jr, 1998; Chapman, 2016).

⁷ Established in 1915, the NP governed the Union of South Africa. It came into power in 1948 and was at the helm until 1994 until eventually disintegrating in 1997. Some of its policies included but not limited to the segregation arrangement of apartheid and to promote white minority rule (Ramutsindela, 1997; Furlong, 2017).

Southern Africa commands a special significance in our foreign policy, we are intimately part of Southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region (Mandela, 1993).

Despite this, the current state of affairs in Southern Africa continue to be marred by social instability, poverty, low levels of economic growth, regional conflicts and marginalisation from global politics (Aworaro, 2015). As a nation expected to take the lead post-1994, South Africa has thus far faced severe criticism for not clearly articulating its foreign policy goals in post-apartheid Southern Africa (Smith, 2016). It is with this background in mind that the study examines emerging powers for Africa's sub regional integration and governance, in this case, South Africa in Southern Africa post-1994. Of importance to this study, therefore, is the necessity to rigorously unearth South Africa's post-apartheid regional hegemonic position, given its economic strength and role it has played (thus far) in Southern Africa since the inauguration of the democratically elected Mandela to the current Cyril Ramaphosa's administration(s). This is acute in influencing and drawing a nuanced and robust standpoint on South Africa's role in Southern Africa post-1994.

1.2 Preliminary Literature Review

From a global perspective, most regional integration attempts, particularly from the early 1950s have had little success (Magidimisha *et al*, 2018). This is the result of regional states possessing diverse levels of development and economic growth. Hence, regional hegemons are often viewed as pivotal role-players to facilitate regional integration within their sub regions. Drawing from the above, one may notice that hegemonic states in Europe such as Germany and France have been and are essential in facilitating regional integration where minor states lack required resources and, in the same vein, providing regional leadership and policy formulation. However, it must be noted that regional integration in the developing world tends to diverge from that of the developed as a result of the vast difference in political dynamics and socio-economic development. During the post-1960s, a period when independence in some African states was becoming a reality, regional integration became a pivotal doctrine for enhancing continental development and economic growth. As African states were about to become independent actors in the global arena, leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah envisioned continental integration as a pivotal mechanism in the development of Africa (Leshoele, 2019).

Genge, Kornegay and Rule (2000) posit that from an African perspective, the need for continental integration may be traced through the formation of the OAU in 1963. The OAU was to spearhead regional integration by enhancing unity, solidarity, stimulate development and co-operation, while also safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states. When most African states had gained their freedom from European colonisers, the need for more robust regional integration frameworks further took shape through the adoption of the Abuja Treaty⁸ on 3 June 1991 (discussed further in Chapter two) by African heads of states (Uneca, 1995).

Oloruntoba and Gumede (2014) argue that in Africa, regional integration is underpinned by both political and economic factors. Politically, as they clarify, it was driven by strategies in the struggle for decolonisation. African heads of states saw the desire to unite and collaborate as so to transform their current state of underdevelopment. From an economic perspective, regional integration is regarded as a mechanism for collective socio-economic growth, enhancing regional infrastructure and to fulfil economic diversification. It is in this regard that throughout the years, regional integration has been hotly debated in relation to Africa's development agenda as shown by various continental institutions⁹. Nevertheless, what role is there for emerging sub regional hegemonies in facilitating regional integration and governance, and what is the nexus between these hegemonies and regional integration? The argument is that the prosperity of these states is vital because of their relatively superior economic might but also to fast-track regional development initiatives.

According to McNamee (2016), throughout the apartheid regime (1949-1994) with the NP in governance, South Africa was viewed as a pariah state due to the policies of the white apartheid government that largely centred on advancing its own national interest while bringing political instability to Southern Africa. Here, its predominantly superior military force was at times deployed to counter any perceived threats in neighbouring regional states. After about four decades, the smooth transition in governance from the NP to the ANC rapidly positioned South Africa as a regional state ready to take regional and continental leadership in the eyes of the continental and international community (Games, 2013).

⁸ The Abuja Treaty entered into force in 1994.

⁹ These include but not limited to the OAU, Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty, and the NEPAD.

Hence, a shift from regional hegemonic domination to that of multilateral partnerships vis-à-vis other regional states came about (Mwiti, 2013). In this regard, only the end of apartheid after the first-ever democratically held elections could South Africa rise as a state capable of now (as a result of its relatively superior economy) foster regional socio-economic growth and governance. South Africa has over the years involved itself in African institutions including the AU, the African Development Bank, the SADC and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) while also being a global player in the G20¹⁰ and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) formations (Mwiti, 2013). Nevertheless, and not without controversy, these emerging powers have been often examined as both catalyst and anticatalyst for sub regional and continental economic growth prospects. While from a global and continental perspective South Africa is observed as a well-resourced and advanced state in the region, its apartheid-driven past is often received with major doubts by other regional states. Post-1994, there have been those who have been critical about South Africa's regional stance and for its failure to utilise its emerging power status in the region towards effective regional integration through its post-apartheid foreign policy (see Anand, 2004; Husar, 2016).

In addition, over the years, it has failed to resolve regional crises in Southern Africa, including those from its adjacent neighbour, Zimbabwe (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017). Likewise, there has been the fear of South Africa utilising its economic might to suppress the attainment of regional integration while focusing more on its global relations (including the BRICS formation) than on those relations in the region; the situation is exacerbated by its foreign policy lacking strong developmental frameworks for regional development.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework depicts the theories and concepts regarded as applicable in finding clarifications to the problem that has been identified (Reindal, 2008). It presents and describes the theory which explains why the research under investigation occurs. From this, the theory informs the purpose of the study, problem statement, research questions and research methodology (Pajares, 2007). Drawing from the above, regionalism, hegemonic stability and the general systems theory are the applicable theories to conceptualise the dynamics of this research area. These theoretical frameworks share the essential assumptions about building

¹⁰ G20 is an international forum of 20 major economies that include 19 individual states: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the EU.

multilateral institutions, closer co-operation, cross-border trade, power, dominance, force, and exploring the interconnectedness of different actors within a particular system.

1.3.1 Regionalism

The word region is derived from the Latin word '*regio*' which relates to an area or wider geographical jurisdiction recognised by similar features, hence, a region encompasses a number of states linked by a geographical connection (Nye, 1968). Regionalism may also be multidimensional, as it embraces political, social and economic activities between states. As Ferabolli (2015) puts it, regionalism depicts an attempt by a group of nations that intend to spearhead their political, economic, social or cultural co-operation. These may be categorised by the arrangement of regional integration, regional co-operation, development integration and market integration. Yi (2007) asserts that regionalism may also be linked with policy programmes (aims to be fulfilled) and strategies (ways and mechanisms through which these aims should be fulfilled). According to Derry-Kessarlis (2013), regionalism as a theoretical framework seeks to understand the holistic of what confines a region. To her, it aims to portray the influence of both state and non-state actors in spearheading regional integration within a specific subregion. In this regard, the theory portrays that non-state actors often shape the policies driven at government level.

Therefore, there is a nexus between state and non-state actors towards regional integration. However, regionalism does not only pertain to the link between state and non-state actors. It also includes individuals, other agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) all working together in strengthening social cohesion and regional integration (Soderbaum, 2004). Thus, regionalism becomes politically stimulated once cross-border trade and the acknowledged need for closer co-operation are recognised by regional states, and when the government responds to such internal and external forces via means of trying to ascertain a trans-national level of governance (Aworaro, 2015).

After the demise of the Cold War, there were major strides witnessed in the occurrence and flow of regionalism (Hanggi, Roloff and Ruland, 2006). Borzel (2011) posits that regional establishments appeared to derive strength after the end of the war, as they were perceived as an instrument by which nations could collaborate resources collectively to foster regional peace, social justice and wealth. From an African viewpoint, regionalism may be traced as far

as the pre-independence era, where the regionalist desire found expression in Pan-Africanism¹¹ (Otobo, 2004); though this period was during the colonial era, limited regional formations were established. To African heads of states, regionalism was professed as an esteemed method to unite the continent both politically and economically (Asante, 1997).

By narrowing this to Southern Africa, regional integration was grounded on the philosophy that regionalism could be an efficient and realistic stimulus to socio-economic development (Chingono and Nakana, 2009). Schimmelfennig (2016) in his analysis opines that material gains are the fundamental drivers for regionalism, as states expect to obtain remunerations by transacting with each other. These benefits include reduced transaction costs, economies of scale, technological transfer and innovation, improved FDIs and more exposure to international markets (Boas, 2001). In this regard, this theory is suitable for this study as it aids in enlightening the justification as to why countries develop policies to harden closer working relations and co-operation in various aspects, including trade, investments and security opportunities.

1.3.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)

According to Yilmaz (2010), ‘hegemon’ as a word originates from the Greek word ‘*Hegemonia*’ that entails the dominant and oppressive rank of one constituent within a structure over its other counterparts. A hegemonic state is one that possesses the vital power (military, political and economic) within a particular sub region or international arena (Puchala, 2005). In essence, the theory outlines how a superior state utilises its superiority over other states in a way that forces them to comply with its economic and political ideology (Ake, 1981). The theory argues that a specific sub region is likely to be stable if there is the presence of a single prevailing hegemonic state. To Webb and Krasner (1989), this has been a hotly debated theory for articulating the patterns of economies amongst advanced capitalist states post-1945. According to this theory, without a hegemonic nation, regional or international stability is unlikely to prosper (Prys, 2012).

Generally, international economic openness and constancy are only possible when there is a single hegemonic nation at the fore. This is the most distinctive explanation used by numerous economists, political scientists and international relations scholars to enlighten models of

¹¹ Pan-Africanism has its foundation in the struggles of the African people against enslavement and colonisation. It is founded on the certainty that harmony is vital to economic, social and political growth; thus, it aims to unite and improve individuals of African origin (Kinni, 2015).

economic relations between advanced states. As Gramsci (1971) argues, the middle-class enjoys a system of ideological hegemony above the rest and its power is both central within state setup and also dispersed via society, family traditions and the media. Accordingly, the theory is vital in understanding the role played by a regional hegemon within a specific sub region or international arena. Only a hegemon has the necessity to provide regional law and order. The hegemonic nation has the capability to deliver public goods. This is a result of its (hegemony) possessing a robust military arsenal, economy and a stable political system. In this vein, it can provide regional security and invest in sub regional economic growth blueprints. Other hegemonic attributes include possessing crucial raw materials, capital and receiving significant amounts of imports (Mat Yazid, 2015).

Hegemonic nations are persistently developing and do not stagnate; they have to reshuffle their ideologies from time to time. A hegemonic state not only can annul existing rules or prevent the approval of rules that it disputes but can also play a prominent part in the formation of new ones that either suit or benefit it (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998). When a hegemonic nation portrays leadership through coercion, mediation or persuasion, it is basically executing its prevalence power (Agnew, 2005), through the capacity to purely regulate the procedures and measures of global politics and economic relations. Regional hegemons intend to frequent increase their power and negotiating capabilities via other states or regional groups by employing action policies for their national advancement and creating regional collaboration treaties (Molefi, 2003). South Africa depicts the role of a hegemon in Southern Africa albeit in an emerging format; its relatively superior economy, technological resources, financial strength, military might, and political stability undeniably grants it the platform to facilitate and contribute to the region's regional integration agenda (Brennan and Murray, 2015). This theory is intriguing as it grants a persuasive validation of the rise and deterioration of the global economic order. Renowned scholars such as Charles Kindleberger have often said, "... for the world economy to be stabilized there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer". The theory relates to the study as it assists in offering a nuanced assessment of post-1994 South Africa's regional integration intentions in Southern Africa.

1.3.3 The General Systems Theory (GST)

The general systems theory (GST) which has been widely used in post-World War II was developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an Austrian-born biologist in the 1930s. A system may be defined as a set of parts interacting through a relationship (such as societies), which involves a complex of interacting organisms (Kitto, 2014). The theory is used in an array of disciplines

including science, education, history, sociology, philosophy, public administration, political science and others. David Easton is a renowned scholar of this theory in the field of Public Administration. To von Bertalanffy (1968), one could never understand a particular system by isolating a single component that plays a significant role in that precise system (Heil, 2017).

The theory articulates that we cannot explain a particular phenomenon by isolating its components (Bernard, Paoline and Pare, 2005). Therefore, it presents the sense of wholeness within a specific system and how diverse and different components here work together or collectively to produce something (von Bertalanffy, 1968), thus examining what role each component has to play within a certain system. The theory was proposed as a means to critically understand a particular environment, life cycles and food chains. Therefore, by utilising this theory, one can better understand the world we live in; moreover, it allows one to explore its disadvantages and what causes these. It aims to provide a framework where we can examine forms of objects that work collectively or as a single component. It intends to deal with every system within society and how one can explain these systems from a holistic point of view (Ball, 1978).

Hence, the theory focuses on the interactions between parts as a means to understand the organisation's outcomes and functions of these, thus providing a vigorous motive on the interactions of subsystems (Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig, 1964). On the other hand, the theory may also contribute to understanding the factors whereby outlined mediation within systems does not become operational. In this regard, diverse components such as the public, private and NGO sectors are all regarded as sophisticated systems. Hence, the theory aims to delve into the interconnectedness of diverse systems within a particular system; in this regard; one may not understand South Africa as a whole without critically and vigorously understanding its interconnectedness within the system (Southern Africa). The theory will be noteworthy in offering fundamental understanding for the study in relation to the diverse actions in regional integration; these comprise decision-making, policy formulations, public-private partnerships and implementation of development projects. Likewise, the critical components of the theory are vital in the theoretical positioning when describing and analysing the affiliation of government, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the private sector and civil society in the framework of their mutual roles concerning regional integration in Southern Africa.

The triad theoretical frameworks will aid in the logical prognosis of the study as firstly, they inform the intention for countries wanting to formulate policies to enrich closer collaboration on aspects such as trade, politics and security and to further advance their relevance within their continent or regional bloc. Secondly, these theories offer in part some understanding of why some countries are superior to others in their sub region and the extent to which this superiority influences regional development and closer co-operation in that precise region. Importantly, these theories additionally establish how diverse segments with a specific system relate, connect and work collectively to attain precise targets.

1.4 Problem Statement

There have been vast studies (see, for example, Francis, 2006; Prys, 2012; Hamill, 2018; Brennan and Murray, 2015; Krotz and Schild, 2013; Alden and Vieira, 2005; Habib, 2009; Prys, 2009; Adebayo and Virk, 2017; Odigbo, Effiong and Igwe, 2014; Patel and Uys, 2012 and Demissie, 2015) undertaken with the aim of evaluating the role of sub regional hegemon either from a positive or negative viewpoint from both an Afrocentric and Eurocentric perspective. This, as Ogunnubi (2013) contends, has continued to surface in academic literature particularly post the Cold War era. By narrowing this to Africa and importantly Southern Africa, vast scholarly debates, particularly post-1994, have taken place regarding the role of South Africa (as a sub regional hegemon) in Southern Africa. Nevertheless, hegemonic states or those viewed as emerging powers are often characterised as being either benevolent or coercive (or at times, as soft hegemon or hard hegemon). Benevolent hegemon are those that co-operate and work together with other regional members for mutual benefits while also portraying leadership credentials within their region. However, the interests of the hegemon are still at the forefront. On the other hand, a coercive hegemon is regarded as serving its own interests and goals by being exploitive (Snidal, 1985).

Nonetheless, these aspirations are often hidden by the hegemonic nation by its expressing to some extent a desire and motive to work together with other states. In this type of hegemony, the hegemonic state may impose sanctions and political pressure on and threaten subordinate states. These sanctions may be economic in nature; exclusion of other regional states from the hegemon's diversified markets, annulment of trade arrangements and cancellation or reduction of aid (Destradi, 2010). If a state portrays this coercive strategy, the compliance of other states is drawn from the fact that these states undertake rational calculations with regard to the anticipated costs of non-compliance.

Drawing from the above explanation, Schenoni (2018) asserts that Pretoria's apartheid destabilisation policies in the region, which were driven by the NP, resulted in 10 million displaced individuals, 1.5 million deaths and the loss of more than US\$ 60 million in potential economic growth. Hence, there was a need for the post-1994 democratically elected South African government, to spearhead, through its foreign policy, regional economic growth. However, the post-1994 foreign policy of the ANC has over the past two decades been labelled as ambiguous and lacking direction. There are some who believe that its foreign policy is self-serving and is skewed towards an agenda like building its relationship with Western states rather than with its regional counterparts, whereas to some, post-1994 South Africa is a solid regional team player (Hadebe, 2015).

Some scholars have focused on whether South Africa is a partner or hegemon, while others have aimed to define its post-apartheid foreign policy and the role it has thus far portrayed in Southern Africa. Nevertheless, clearly ignored or insufficiently researched has been the need to robustly ponder on South Africa's post-1994 regional integration and governance role through the lens of a benevolent or coercive hegemon in Southern Africa. Of significance to this study, therefore, is a need to vigorously interrogate as to how South Africa has over the past two decades translated its emerging hegemonic role in Southern Africa through utilising its regional power attributes to spearhead economic growth or pursue its self-interest. Drawing from the above, with a view to reaching a nuanced and valid appraisal of post-1994 South Africa in Southern Africa, it is appropriate to interrogate South Africa's regional integration and governance attributes in the region.

1.5 Research Objectives

The objectives of the study were as follows:

- I. To examine the nexus between South African hegemonic tendency and Southern African integration.
- II. To analyse whether South Africa's SADC membership has enhanced the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa.
- III. To evaluate how South Africa's contributions have deepened the sustainability of socio-economic development in the sub region.
- IV. To examine whether post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa has strengthened its contributory roles towards regional integration.

- V. To draw possible recommendations on South Africa's future regional integration role in Southern Africa.

1.6 Research Questions

The study sought to answer the following questions:

- I. What is the nexus between South African hegemonic tendency and regional integration in Southern Africa?
- II. How has South Africa's SADC membership enhanced the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa?
- III. How have South Africa's contributions deepened the sustainability of socio-economic development in the sub region?
- IV. Has post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa strengthened its contributory roles towards regional integration?
- V. What possible recommendations may be drawn for South Africa's future regional integration agenda in Southern Africa?

1.7 Research Paradigm

According to Kivunja and Kuyini (2017), a research paradigm constitutes the belief and principles, which influence how a researcher views the world. It defines the researcher's philosophical orientation and has substantial implications for the choice of the methodology and methods and how the retrieved data will be analysed. Particular paradigms may be associated with certain methodologies; while this is not always the case globally; a constructive or interpretive paradigm normally utilises a qualitative method, while the positivist paradigm is mostly associated with a quantitative methodology (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Blaikie and Priest, 2017). Therefore, to situate the study within a broader epistemological framework, the study adopted a constructivist methodological approach as this is more focused on exploring the social phenomenon.

The worldview from a constructivist standpoint is that multiple realities are formulated through our life experiences and interactions with others through a period of time (Creswell, 2013). It aims to understand everyday events and experiences together with the value individuals attach to these events. To generate knowledge, constructivists believe that global politics is shaped by culture, persuasive ideas, collective values and social identities (Alder, 1997).

Constructivism upholds that researchers construct knowledge and opposes the belief that there is a single methodology to generate knowledge. A predominant method of collecting data in this philosophical approach includes open-ended questions, text and/or image data, participant observation and documents. Drawing from the above, the researcher felt that constructive philosophy was applicable to the philosophical background of the study.

1.7.1 Research Methodology

Kivunja and Kuyini (2017) contend that from a broader perspective, methodology pertains to the methods, research design and procedures used in gathering data. To exemplify this, respondents, data gathering, data analysis and instruments used all form part of the broad methodological fields. From the preceding, this study embraced a qualitative research approach; this approach is mainly utilised in social science research (Saldana, 2011). Qualitative methodology detects every detail of judgement making and generally, a smaller sample is necessary. As Creswell (2003) opines, researchers undertaking qualitative studies intend to gather a robust viewpoint pertaining to human behaviour and the rationale behind it. This approach is of significance in deliberating on the relationship and arrangements between dynamics or the background in which the action happens.

In this regard, the data retrieved and analysed were predominantly qualitative in nature and were drawn from both primary and secondary sources. With regards to primary data, this involved interviews with key respondents. With respect to secondary sources, the researcher exploited relevant published works from books, chapters in books, journals, newspapers, published and unpublished articles such as dissertations and theses, together with credible and reliable online sources of applicable organisations dealing with and/or monitoring South Africa's regional integration and governance endeavours in post-1994 Southern Africa. The dependence on secondary sources enabled the researcher to have a strong and wider clarification of the topic under investigation.

1.7.2 Research Population and Sampling Method.

The research population in its simplest term refers to the proposed population forecasted to be part of the study in a specific geographical area such as a town, region or country. In this study, the research population was made up of several individuals who are in vast ways connected and possess significant knowledge with regards to South Africa's regional integration efforts in Southern Africa post-1994. These individuals were based at different think tanks, research institutes and institutions of higher learning dealing with or monitoring South Africa's

engagement with the Southern African community post the democratic era. Traits such as the objectives and research questions eventually determine how many respondents may be selected to partake in the study. In this vein, the study made use of purposive sampling, hence, also used in-depth interviews (through open-ended questionnaires) with key respondents¹².

This type of sampling (purposive) procedure (also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling) falls under the non-probability sampling technique and basically relies on the judgment of the researcher when it comes to selecting the required respondents; the sample is usually small (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Blaikie and Priest, 2017). Drawing from this, whether the methodology utilised is qualitative or quantitative, sampling procedures are envisioned to maximise efficiency and validity (Palinkaz *et al.*, 2013). A sample generally represents the precise number of respondents who are selected from a research population for interviews and the technique to be utilised depends on the nature, purpose and type of the study. With regards to purposive sampling, the researcher has the nature, purpose and type of the study in his/her mind when identifying the respondents who will form part of the study.

The objective of this sampling technique is to focus on the particular characteristics of individuals who are of interest and who will enable the researcher to answer his/her research questions. It must, however, be noted that the sample size chosen does not necessarily represent the entire population; rather, as is the case in homogenous sampling, respondents are selected as a result of sharing a particular interest (experiences, job, culture) that is of particular interest to the researcher (Etikan, Musa and Alkassim, 2016). With that said, the researcher utilised this sampling method as he had individuals in mind whom, he observed, would contribute immensely to the study as a result of their vast knowledge pertaining to post-1994 South Africa's affairs relating to foreign policy, regional integration and hegemony. In essence, these respondents were selected as a result of their possessing the characteristics and understanding of regional integration dynamics, particularly from a Southern African perspective.

According to Morris (2015), in qualitative research, in-depth interviews are commonly utilised; in his view, when these are done well, they become a powerful mechanism for gathering valuable data. This semi-structured in-depth interview is comparable to a discussion, where two or more people talk about a topic of mutual interest, it involves the researcher asking questions and following up on the answers of the interviewee in an effort to extract as much

¹² This granted the researcher the platform to retrieve significant information directly from individuals with vast experience in the field under study.

data as possible from the interviewee who generally possesses robust knowledge on the subject the interviewer is concerned with. Undeniably, these methodological approaches are suitable and appropriate for this study as they serve to unpack South Africa's hegemonic and governance stance in Southern Africa post-1994.

Overall, out of the overall targeted experts, the study interviewed a panel of three experts. As will be shown in the results section, these were able to give very insightful, well-balanced and highly informative perspectives on South Africa's foreign policy within regionalism and hegemonic contexts. Despite using a small sample, the researcher was able to elicit full and meaningful discussions that could be analysed through content analysis, critiqued in detail and compared and contrasted. This was as a result of the richness of the experiences, studies and expertise of the sample. The researcher notes that a small sample, to a lesser extent, may have resulted in some views of interest relevant to answering the research questions not being explored or not being explored in detail. To a greater extent, however, a comparison of these views with the generality of discussions, journal articles and other publications on the related topics shows that the sample was able to match up to these views and, in addition, provide insightful and novel views.

Whilst all attempts were made to have a comparatively large sample, the researcher was restricted by various factors. Firstly, the need to capture the knowledge of experts in the area of study interest pointed to very few academics who could discuss the study's thematic areas. Among these few, most had expressed a willingness and commitment to participate in the study but were not able to do so due to various reasons. In research literature, some scholars like Saunders (2014) discuss the challenges that academic researchers often face in getting the sample of the desired calibre for a study. These include the difficulty in convincing all the targeted participants to participate and, more often, the lack of interest by the target sample to participate in studies. Faced with these challenges, researchers are forced to make hard choices between making use of fewer participants of the right calibre and being more inclusive in participant selection by including participants who may not meet the credentials that are deemed important in answering the study's research questions. In this study, the former option was taken.

1.7.3 Data Analysis

There are various approaches one may employ to analyse qualitative data. However, for this study, all data obtained were subjected to the fundamental and extensive use of content analysis¹³ and textual critique. Cole (1988) opines that content analysis is a method used to analyse written text ranging from books and book chapters to newspaper articles, discussion notes, speeches, interviews, essays and documents. To Mayring (2000), content analysis is a set of qualitative methods for retrieving and analysing data gathered from specific content. This analysis permits the researcher to validate theoretic text to better enrich the understanding of gathered data. It includes focusing on every detail of written text, thereby often assisting in shedding light on the topic under investigation. As a result, this method is useful as it complements interviews in the data collection process. However, the disadvantage of utilising content analysis as pointed out by Creswell (2003) is the possibility of the researcher being biased and selective in the understanding of the text as a result of its identity and context. Nevertheless, conversely, Chisaka and Vakalisa (2000) suggest that the advantage of utilising content analysis is that it may fill some gaps, which may often result from the utilisation of other data-gathering approaches.

Textual critique refers to the analysis of literary works with the aim of defining their originality and validity. This pertains to reading, reviewing, and depicting of inferences from the discussion of applicable data retrieved (Folarin, 2010). Hence, the aim of textual critique is to define the message, purpose and structure of the text.

1.7.4 Validity and Reliability

In qualitative research, validity is evaluated in terms of trustworthiness of the findings, credibility and comparability of results (Tirivangana, 2013). Therefore, as Zohrabi (2013) argues, validity pertains to establishing truthfulness, thus confirming that the research evaluates what it is supposed to evaluate. Validity also refers to the extent to which a study measures what it intended to measure (Kumar, 2014). When undertaking qualitative research, the researcher should thus pursue a useful balance between internal validity (ability to interpret results with reasonable clarity) and external validity (ability to generalise the information obtained) (Tirivanguna, 2013).

¹³ For more on content analysis, see Krippendorff, K. (2013). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*, 3rd Edition. California, Sage Publications.

Drisko, J.W., & Maschi, T. (2016). *Content analysis*. New York, Oxford University Press.

Neuendorf, K.A. (2017). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Cleveland, Sage Publications.

Some scholars, however, contest the view that reliability and validity are applicable within qualitative research methodologies (Kumar, 2014). Interpretivism, as a paradigm, centres on subjective experiences, views and beliefs, which cannot always be replicated across causes. This subjectivity creates challenges in attaining both validity and reliability in qualitative studies. Additionally, in qualitative studies, the researcher is involved in data collection and his or her views and probes determine the responses and data from the sample (Blaikie and Priest, 2017). Trochim and Donnelly (2007) discuss alternative concepts (see table 1.1) that can be used to assess the integrity of qualitative study results.

Table 1.1: Validity and Reliability in Quantitative and Qualitative studies

Quantitative studies	Qualitative studies
Internal validity	Credibility
External validity	Transferability
Reliability	Dependability, Confirmability

Source: Trochim and Donnelly (2007); Kumar (2014).

In qualitative methods, credibility can be used as a researcher output quality measure instead of internal validity while transferability can be used instead of external validity (Kumar, 2014).

1.7.5 Internal Validity

Trochim and Donnelly (2007) define credibility which is the equivalent of internal validity in quantitative research, as a view that the results from a study are believable from the participants' perspective. In other words, participants in the study can agree that the views expressed in the findings' conclusion are reflective of their general views (Kumar, 2014). To ensure the credibility of results, the research report from the study will be made available to the participants, should they wish to assess the credibility of the study.

1.7.6 External Validity

External validity is the degree to which the outcomes of a research can be applied to other settings (Saunders, 2014). In qualitative methods, research outputs are not expected to be generalisable or inferable to other populations. However, some scholars believe that it is possible to generalise qualitative research results to other settings, albeit in a limited context, and this generalisation is referred to as the transferability of findings (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007). Like with generalisability, transferable results suggest that the research can be trusted. Kumar (2014) asserts that one way of ensuring transferability is to clearly document the research methods applied in a study so that it can be replicated. This approach was followed in

this study and included detailing the methods used in designing the research, sampling, data collection and data analysis.

1.7.7 Reliability

Reliability is the extent to which research findings produce consistent results (Saunders, 2014). It deals with the consistency, dependability and replicability of the results (Zohrabi, 2013). Trochim and Donnelly (2007) and Kumar (2014) assert that in qualitative studies, dependability and confirmability are equivalent to reliability.

Dependability relates to the degree to which the same results can be obtained from a study if it is conducted again while confirmability refers to whether other researchers in a similar or related discipline can corroborate the findings from the study (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007; Kumar, 2014). In this study, dependability and confirmability were enhanced by using research methods commonly applied in similar studies and carefully recording, analysing and reporting data. Dependability was further enhanced by identifying concepts and theories that are generally associated with the topics of discussion and using these to frame research questions.

All in all, to provide credibility and trustworthiness of the research, the research instruments utilised in the study were also examined and approved or rejected by the researcher's supervisor and department. This added supervision also helped to improve the quality of the research and its output, thereby enhancing the credibility of its conclusions.

1.8 Intended contribution to the body of knowledge

South Africa's efforts in playing its expected role in Southern Africa post-1994 are abundant. This is apparent to the significant amount of literature from discussion notes, books, chapters in books, conference proceedings, journal articles and government reports. Nonetheless, these fail to articulate the nexus (if any) between regional integration and sub regional hegemony. Therefore, this thesis sought to (1) delve into South Africa's regional integration and governance attempts since emerging from its political doldrums in 1994 and (2) vigorously articulate its sub regional hegemonic stance vis-à-vis other Southern African states and determine whether this stance has been driven from a benevolent or coercive standpoint post-1994. This will assist in shedding more light on South Africa's foreign policy doctrine post the apartheid era. Perhaps more importantly, the study aimed to contribute knowledge on whether this foreign policy doctrine has been of assistance to Southern Africa's development priorities post the apartheid era, as often portrayed by the South African government over the years.

1.9 Resources

This research had no special resource implications. Current resources were adequate and apart from the usual research and travel grants, no additional institutional resources allocations were required.

1.10 Intellectual Property and Innovation

Other than the usual copyright issues, I did not expect any special intellectual property rights to emanate from this research.

1.11 Knowledge Dissemination

This research was being done with the main aim of contributing to the field of Public Administration and its cognate disciplines such as Public Policy, Political Science, Development Studies, International Relations and so forth, together with the overall understanding of regional integration and regional hegemons. Hence, with the view to presenting my findings, three manuscripts were published in the South African Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) accredited journals to disseminate the role of one of Africa's hegemons in regional integration, in this case, South Africa in Southern Africa. Through this thesis, I, with the assistance of my supervisor was able to publish three manuscripts titled (1) Post-1994 South Africa's Peacekeeping and Military Intervention in Southern Africa: Reference from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho (*Journal of Public Affairs*) (2) South Africa and Regional Integration in Southern Africa Post-1994: Realities, Challenges and Prospects (*Journal of Nation – Building and Policy Studies*) and (3) Regional Hegemonic Power, Integration and Governance: An Appraisal of Post Democratization South Africa (*Journal of Social and Political Sciences*) The former two were published in 2020 while the latter was published in the first quarter of 2021.

Other findings were distributed to various think tanks as policy guides, particularly where some of my respondents are based. To give back to the community via community engagement, I will also seek to present conference papers from my research, both locally and internationally. In addition, the respondents who contributed to the study will be furnished with their copy of my final thesis.

1.12 Limitations of the Study

A big limitation encountered by the researcher was the unavailability of required funding to personally travel to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in Pretoria where most of South Africa's foreign policy actions are taken, and to the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. In addition, the respondents who were initially earmarked by the researcher were at the time of conducting interviews, either busy, had travelled, were busy with data collection for their own studies, did not get back to me in the stipulated time frame or at all, especially those based outside South Africa. Again, some had relocated for personal or work-related reasons. While the researcher would have also loved to interview diplomats from other SADC states based in Pretoria, this was not possible as the researcher was also employed and taking time out to collect data in other provinces was a daunting task.

Hence, the unavailability of key government and research officials to give anticipated and sufficient input was a major limitation to the study. These limitations are important as they precluded the interviewer from interviewing key DIRCO officials who are at the forefront of South Africa's role and policy in Southern Africa. Moreover, diplomats of other SADC states would have offered their views on South Africa's relations with their countries. With regards to the SADC, the researcher could neither get hold of nor interview key officials in this regional bloc, who would have provided rich information on not only regional integration but importantly the role South Africa has played since 1994. To ameliorate these limitations, the researcher had to rely on other avenues, which included government websites, online resources such as YouTube, and primary and secondary data in order to attain the required information. Moreover, the researcher relied on input from interviewees at other universities and research institutes based outside the province, using email and other digital platforms as communication mechanisms.

1.13 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is subdivided into seven chapters. The current chapter aims to lay the framework of the argument through conceptualising the study. It does this by identifying the problem and enunciating the objectives; it also identifies the methodology to be used and justifies the study by clearly stating its importance and how it will contribute to the body of knowledge. Chapter two deals with the appropriate literature on regional integration. In addition, the chapter looks

at the triad theories of hegemonic stability, regionalism and the systems theory, which assist in the prognosis of the study. The third chapter delves into South Africa's quest for regional leadership post-democratisation by, amongst other things, looking at its hegemonic stance in Southern Africa, its soft power approach towards regional issues, and hindrances to some of its regional integration blueprints.

The fourth chapter ponders South Africa's regional integration in Southern Africa since the demise of apartheid by looking at its transition from isolation to expected regional leader. Moreover, it unpacks the post-1994 South Africa government foreign policy towards the region and Africa at large. In this vein, it considers how South Africa's democratic foreign policy (as determined by different heads of states) has differed from the erstwhile apartheid regime. In addition, the chapter also looks at the constraints facing South Africa's foreign policy and what remedy may be utilised to address such hindrances moving forward. The chapter also considers South Africa's mediation and peacekeeping role in the region, particularly in Lesotho and the DRC. The fifth chapter offers the analyses of the study by employing thematic themes in order to give a robust and nuanced appraisal of South Africa's regional integration role in the region post-democratisation. In the sixth chapter, various themes, views and ideologies established in the data analysis are further reviewed and discussed. Chapter seven concludes the study by drawing conclusions from the empirical qualitative study undertaken.

1.14 Ethical Considerations

I have read the University's Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics and its Policy and Procedures on Managing and Preventing Acts of Plagiarism, and I understand their content. My supervisors and I have considered and discussed the ethical issues that arise from this research, and these are dealt with below.

Munro¹⁴ defines ethics as:

Ethics is a set of moral principles which is suggested by an individual or a group, is subsequently widely accepted, and which offers rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct conduct towards experimental subjects and respondents, employers, sponsors, other researchers, assistants and students.

The University's Research Ethics Policy defines research ethics as:

¹⁴ Munro *Ethics and design research at South African higher education institutions*. Design Education Forum of Southern Africa www.defsa.org.za (2011).

... [T]he principles and practices that guide the ethical conduct of research. These should embody respect for the rights of others who are directly or indirectly affected by the research. Such rights include rights of privacy and confidentiality, protection from harm, giving informed consent, access to information pre- and post-research and due acknowledgement. Ethical conduct in research also includes the avoidance of inflicting animal suffering of any kind and protection of the environment.

All research must be ethically sound, but specific circumstances – health research, research involving animals and human respondents, especially children – require special ethical considerations.

I declare that to the best of my knowledge:

- My research does not fall into any category that requires special ethical obligations.
- The research does not create any conflict of interest, real or perceived.

I am not involved in or associated with any project or activity that will become the subject-matter of my research, nor are any of my family members or close friends or associates involved in any way.

Except as might be disclosed in this proposal, I do not have any direct or indirect financial interest in the conduct of this research or do any of my family members or close friends or associates.

I undertake to abide by the general principles set out in the University's policies and the obligations which the policies impose upon me and to mitigate any ethical and other risks that might arise. In particular, I undertake to:

- Respect the dignity, safety and well-being of others, including the graffiti writers, and unless express written permission is given, I will respect anonymity and confidentiality.
- Consider and be sensitive to different cultures, languages, beliefs, perceptions, and customs of persons who participate in or are affected by my research

- Ensure that the research is relevant both to the broad legal and development needs of the country and to the individual needs of those who may be affected by my research
- Conduct the research and produce my thesis on my own, subject to normal supervisory and collegial assistance
- Acknowledge and attribute to others the ideas, designs and writings that are not original
- Reference my work accurately according to my chosen referencing guide, I will comply with copyright requirements and seek the necessary permissions, where required
- Make use of text-matching software throughout the research writing process, as discussed and required by my supervisors, and will submit appropriate reports in this regard with my proposal and thesis when they are in final draft form.

Should circumstances arise that impact upon my ethical obligations, I will disclose them to my supervisors and we will take appropriate action in terms of the relevant University policy.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is made up of two sections: firstly, it reviews relevant literature and contributions from various scholarly publications and/or debates that are directly related to the study. Essentially, it aims to delve into critical points that have already been covered by other scholars with the aim of identifying existing gaps that this thesis aims to fill. The reviewing of literature assisted in covering some of the following key themes: the conceptualisation of regional integration, the quest for regional integration in Africa, colonial and post-colonial regional integration initiatives in Southern Africa, the attributes of a hegemonic state and the understanding of South Africa's democratic transition. Broadly, this chapter will offer an in-depth analysis of scholarly arguments on hegemonic states and regional integration, and the nexus between the two. The subsequent section delves into the theoretical frameworks that underpin this thesis; these are the theories of regionalism, the hegemonic stability theory and the general systems theory. All in all, this section aims to justify the explanation for the choice of these theories as a framework for the analysis of this thesis. The first section starts with a discussion of the concept of regional integration and then the concept of a hegemonic state.

2.2 Regional Integration

As Chitsa (2016) informs the reader, in its simplest form, regional integration¹⁵ refers to the process whereby a group of states join forces and vow to be administered by similar rules and protocols with regards to political, economic and social issues with the aim of achieving common goals for their citizens. This could be realised by creating avenues for refining trade opportunities and enhancing economic policies (Geda and Kebret, 2008; Aworaro, 2015).

¹⁵ It must, however, be noted that regional integration and regional cooperation are terms that are often used synonymously, although they tend to differ. Regional cooperation most often encompasses policies and agreements relating to matters such as preferential or free trade agreements entailing the removal of trade barriers for trade in goods, market access in trade, services and cooperation for investment promotion and protection amongst others. It emerged because of the changing circumstances of the international political economy as well as the changing emphasis of thinking about development policy (Axline, 1994; Das, Vasudev and Gupta, 2011).

According to Van Nierkerk (2005), regional integration can be understood from three dimensions and these are:

- I. Geographical scope – this concerns the number of states partaking in regional integration arrangements, whether based on economic, political and economic considerations.
- II. The substantive coverage – this pertains to the available sectors or activity coverage (labour, trade, sector policies, macro policies and so forth).
- III. The depth of integration – this pertains to measuring the extent of sovereignty a particular state aims to surrender.

Itai and Constance (2014) in their published article titled: *Challenges and Opportunities of Regional Integration in Africa, the Case of SADC* aver that regional integration may be viewed as a team, whereby individuals from different and diverse backgrounds, with varied ways of thinking and diverse personalities join forces to work towards attaining a mutual objective and/or goal of socio-economic development. They further note that regional integration in Africa was primarily envisioned to overcome three vital development hindrances affecting the continent, namely, the reliance on imported capital goods, the minor economies of most African states, and the deficiency of structural complementarity as evidenced in the constricted set of similar low-value goods.

Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) are among several scholars who posit that regional integration is often undertaken by neighbouring states within a specific region that ought to enhance and facilitate co-operation (as a result of common and/or shared identity) via the establishment of institutions that drive and shape mutual action. In this sense, these states work as a unit in order to realise socio-economic and political benefits. However, of importance is that these states must be prepared to share their sovereignty, undertake some degree of sacrifices and political commitments (Aworaro, 2015; Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016; Jikobu, 2018). These scholars further maintain that this is driven by the fact that the states pool their human, financial and material resources towards national and continental development frameworks.

These resources, in turn, stimulate the movements of goods, promote development, economic growth, alleviate poverty, co-ordinate and harmonise socio-economic policies, promote peace and security, and assist in the development of much-needed infrastructure (Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Other benefits of regional integration are that it can contribute to combining

markets as so to be more competitive, surge investment opportunities, augment the continuum of political and economic reforms, and facilitate co-operation via robust security mechanisms (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004; De Melo and Tsikata, 2014; Aworaro, 2015). It is against this background that African states have over the years entered into various regional integration agreements; today there is no African state that is not a member of at least one of the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa.

Nonetheless, as Biniza (2016) asserts, one cannot merely say that regional integration is purely a political process because of a plethora of political bargains and agreements that are in most cases informed by other economic factors. These may include but are not limited to production networks, access to markets, security factors and the geopolitical landscape of member states. In this vein, the general study of regional integration in recent decades has to do with how political stability may be achieved, and, perhaps importantly, how co-operation in diverse spheres may be spearheaded and maintained.

While regional integration offers diverse and many benefits for its member states, these are not always guaranteed as they also depend on the degree and extent of commitments from involved member states (see Mwashia, 2011). In addition, Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) further argue that the lack of engagement(s) and participation towards regional integration frameworks is a stumbling block towards Africa's regional integration endeavours, driven largely by the nature of the African political landscape(s). Apart from non-participation of the general populace, regional integration within the continent is again hampered by the reluctance of African heads of states to share their sovereignty. Other dire obstacles for effective regional integration in Africa include poverty, low-income levels, weak production structures of most states, civil conflicts, terrorism, lack of political rights and trade mechanism, inadequate human capital and dependency on foreign aid (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004).

Drawing from the above arguments, one may deduce that the core and fundamental drive of regional integration arrangements is to bring regional bordering and/or neighbouring states into a coalition and create an association or community. Within this association they work collectively to achieve a set of objective(s) such as development, economic growth blueprints and partnerships in diverse areas which ought to stimulate not only their growth prospects but also that of the specific region where they are based.

2.3 Probing the Quest for Regional Integration in Africa pre- and post-colonialism

Regional integration as a mechanism for sovereign states to foster and stimulate economic co-operation has seen vast scholarly attention around the world particularly in the post-Cold War era, where it has been a distinguishing element of international trade agreements (Adetula, 2014). This is because it has granted states more alternatives for increased competition and co-operation within various regional blocs globally (Bala, 2017). It has further provided member states with the opportunity and options to promote and/or render their best area(s) of specialisation within their specific region. As a result, regional integration has thus far been distinguished as a prominent blueprint where developing and minor states can work collectively both economically and politically in the modern competitive global arena (De Melo and Tsikata, 2014; Aworaro, 2015).

Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) opine that from an Afrocentric perspective, regional integration became a vital mechanism in a period where most African states were gaining or about to gain their independence from their respective European colonisers from the 1950s onwards¹⁶. This was driven by the fact that there was a notion that without some form of unity, African states would be presented with the difficult task(s) of progressing and surviving in the international arena by themselves. Hence, regional integration was driven with the intention of forging robust co-operation, technical links, peace, unity, development and solidarity among continental states (Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

Thus, Pan-Africanism¹⁷, the struggle for independence, is where Africa's quest for integration and co-operation may be drawn from. African states realised that they were lacking in their political, economic and social structures; hence, they looked at regional integration as a viable objective for their revival and development. Throughout the colonial period, African leaders long held the idea of a political and economic union in the continent. In essence, this was

¹⁶ Of importance is also to distinguish between different types of regionalism (in this case old and new). Old regionalism may be drawn from attempts in the 1950s to the 1960s; it was based on historical contexts influenced by the bipolar world structure in the international arena. Also, it was generally specific about its intentions while having a slim focus on security cooperation. On the other end of the spectrum, new regionalism is associated with the current transformation in international politics. It aims to expand areas pivotal to regional integration driven by the private sector, NGOs and civil society (Hette, 2005).

¹⁷ This term has been utilised to depict an international movement of activists and advocates, who especially from the 1890s onwards urged the solidarity of Africans globally. This stemmed from the ideology that such harmony was of pivotal importance for the economic, social and political growth of ethnic Africans, whether based continentally or internationally. Likewise, to Pan-Africanism, Africans on the continent and those in diaspora share a common destiny and history (Langerud, 2016).

already being orchestrated in the 1930s to the 1940s¹⁸. While their first mission was to liberate African states from their respective colonial masters, the second was to bring these liberated states under a single continental umbrella, thus driving African leaders to create a plethora of policies in order to drive this forward (Dinka and Kennes, 2007).

Kanyane (2018), on the other hand, posits that more African states viewed regional integration as a fundamental approach to spearhead the continent's quest for development. This was because African states realised the daunting task that lay ahead in progressing by themselves (individually) in the global arena that is dominated by economically advanced Western states. Similarly, African states were not well equipped to govern themselves as they were lacking in bargaining power and needed resources.

As a result of this, for Africa to develop, it was projected that regional integration could perhaps play an essential role in addressing the continent's political and socio-economic hindrances (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Anyanwu and Conceição, 2014; Kanyane, 2018). Likewise, being part of regional integration initiatives also grants minor states the opportunity to enhance their bargaining power in regional, continental and international fora. Also, regional integration was to be a robust approach to address deterrents such as underdevelopment, unemployment, political instability, health issues and infrastructure amongst others.

Balassa (1961) postulates that regional integration is not a once-off effort (see table 2.1) and normally involves various stages which are made up of a Free Trade Area (FTA), a Customs Union (CU), a Single/Common Market, an Economic Union and Total Economic Integration, thereby leading to the complete integration process.

¹⁸ It must, however, be noted that some RECs which are spearheading regional integration initiatives in Africa have been in existence pre-independence. A good example is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the East African Community (EAC) established in 1910 and 1919 respectively.

Table 2.1: Showing Balassa's Stages of Integration

FTA	Here, member states abolish or remove tariffs while each of the participating members preserves its tariffs plans for states not part of the arrangement.
CU	In this stage, quotas and tariffs are removed on imports from member states and there is a common external tariff. In addition, there is a suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union.
Single/Common Market	One market with a single standard of goods and services. In addition, restrictions on factor movements and trade barriers are removed.
Economic Union	Involves the merger of fiscal and monetary administration. In this stage, there is also harmonisation of national economic policies and elimination of any form of discrimination arising from differences in these policies.
Total Economic Integration	The final step resulting in the complete or total integration process requires the amalgamation of monetary procedures and necessitates the formation of a supra-national body whose resolutions are binding for the participating member states. It will also require member states to cease their national sovereignty.

Source: See Balassa (1961); Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith (2000).

Drawing from the above, Dinka and Kennes (2007) make a very crucial point by noting that African regional integration may be categorised in two waves: the mid-1970s to the early 1980s which may be marked as the first wave, while the first half of the 1990s may be marked as the second wave. These two waves were predominantly shaped by both initiatives and positions

brought forward by African states, together with other events and developments globally. Thus, the first wave was a response to the post-independence pursuit of regional integration by African countries, while the second wave was merely a result of receiving and expanding the mandates of current regional bodies. This took place when the North American countries established the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and at the time when the European Union (EU) consolidated through the establishment of its single market, together with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

For pre- and post-colonial periods, African heads of states have envisioned pivotal continental treaties and blueprints to spearhead the continent's economic growth (Geda and Kebret, 2008; Hartzenberg, 2011; African Development Bank, 2015). The OAU, the Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty and NEPAD are just some of a plethora of treaties that have surfaced in recent decades because of the need to further stimulating sub regional and continental regional integration.

It is nevertheless worth noting that regional integration initiatives from the developed world (i.e., EU) will forever differ from that of the developing world (i.e. Africa). This is because of the vast differences in political and socio-economic dynamics. Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) assert that post-independence, African states have found it tough in managing their country's internal affairs. In this case, regional integration has been hampered by poor governance, poverty, corruption and ethnocentrism, among others. Again, as the authors further note, on a continuous basis the continent is still hindered by vast socio-economic underdevelopment despite having an abundance of natural resources, which, if utilised effectively, could stimulate socio-economic growth and industrialisation. Instead, these resources for African development are exploited by Western, European and Asian countries with minor (if any) benefits to the continent, which is one of the reasons most African states are still weak and dysfunctional in the 21st century (Mbaku, 2018).

Nyaxo (2004) further postulates that, while there has been (in both the pre- colonial and post-colonial era) vast regional integration policies continentally, African leaders have failed to draw a clear path of execution in the praxis as to precisely what should be allotted as vital economic growth frameworks when observing the context of Africa's current peculiar political and socio-economic condition. This is notwithstanding the fact that African leaders have taken major strides in their economic growth plans in the post-colonial era; however, Africa has thus far remained the most underdeveloped continent in the world. For African states to achieve

their set regional integration objectives, addressing national, political and socio-economic challenges is a prerequisite. These will entail responsibility, accountability, good governance and competent state-society relations (Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodik, 2016). The Pan-African drive to enhance peace, stability and development among other things, subsequently led to the formation of the OAU.

2.3.1 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Notwithstanding earlier Pan-Africanism¹⁹ seminars both continentally and internationally, in 1945 in Manchester, England, the Pan African Congress took place, which brought leaders from Diaspora and other African heads of states. Here, a clear vision for Africa was orchestrated: by achieving independence from colonial rule, Africans might control their own economic growth blueprints (Moshi, 2013). According to Akani (2017), with the road to independence starting in Ghana on the 6th of March 1957, there was a change in the content of the Pan-Africa agenda: from racial discrimination to continental unity.

Prior to forming the OAU, African heads of states had a vision for African unity whereby the OAU would be the voice of the African people; nonetheless, they possessed different views as to how this was to be achieved as they had split into two groups, the Pan-Africanists and the gradualists/functionalists. The former's view was that Africans should spearhead total political integration whereby there was to be a single government-driven by common continental institutes. The latter group favoured integration whereby African states took a more gradual approach to integration initiatives; perhaps this was driven by the fact that they realised that African states were newly independent while some were still fighting for their independence. However, the diverse views of these groups did not deter the formation of the OAU on the 25th of May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Martin, 1992). Ouguergouz (2003) affirms that the OAU was founded by 25 independent states of Africa; its structure was to be driven by four principal institutions: (1) The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments; (2) The Council for Foreign Ministers; (3) The General Secretariat; and (4) The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. In 2004 (when it had changed to the AU), the organisation added the Peace and Security Council (PSC).

It is worth pointing out that the establishment of the OAU may be credited to three blocs that materialised in 1960 and 1961. These were the Casablanca group that consisted of Ghana, Mali,

¹⁹ From the 1950s to the 1960s, Pan-Africanism was driven by emerging African leaders at that time such as Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta, Haile Selassie and Julius Nyerere.

Guinea, the United Arab Republic together with the Algerian government. This group was launched on the 7th of January 1961 and led by Kwame Nkrumah and advocated for Pan-Africanism and a shared vision of Africa. The second was the Brazzaville group which became operational on the 12th of September 1961 and made up of mainly French-speaking countries. Lastly, the third was the Monrovia group that was formed in May 1961 (Genge, Kornegay, and Rule, 2000). The formation of the organisation was problematic because of the continent's socio-political landscape and because some African states that under colonial rule, were being exploited, while some were still fighting against apartheid. The establishment of the OAU as Olivier (2010) rightfully points out, marked as the first episode of African integration.

Doumbe-Bille (2012) rightfully notes that the aim of the OAU was to stimulate solidarity and unity among African states, eradicate all forms of colonialism and promote co-operation in economic growth, security and education. While many seminars were held prior to this one, one of the earliest conferences attended by independent African states (northern and western Africa) took place in Accra, Ghana in April 1958. Various topics were discussed here; the most applicable were (1) addressing hindrances of common interest, (2) developing and co-ordinating measures envisioned at stimulating mutual understanding, (3) how the sovereignty of African states would be safeguarded while assisting African countries in their quest for independence, and (4) promoting cultural exchanges and joint assistance structures (Langerud, 2016). A few years after this seminar, it is possible to encounter some of these ideas in the OAU charter²⁰, which became some of the core blueprints of the OAU. The main intentions of the OAU as stipulated in Article 2(1) of its charter are:

- a) To promote unity and solidarity of the African states
- b) To co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts in achieving a better life for the people of Africa
- c) To defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.
- d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and
- e) To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

²⁰ The OAU charter came into force on the 13th of September 1963.

While Article 2(2) firmly articulates the need for member states to harmonise their general policies, particularly in the following fields:

- a) Political and diplomatic co-operation
- b) Economic co-operation, including transport and communication
- c) Educational and cultural co-operation
- d) Health, sanitation and nutritional co-operation
- e) Scientific and technical co-operation, and
- f) Co-operation for defence and peace.

These were to be driven by the following principles as articulated in Article 3(1) of the OAU charter:

- a) The Sovereign equality of all member states
- b) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states
- c) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence
- d) Peaceful settlements of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration
- e) Unreserved condemnation, in all forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part a neighbouring state or any other states
- f) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent, and
- g) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regards to all blocs

In his 1963 published book *Africa Unite*, Kwame Nkrumah robustly recommended unity as a vital doctrine to address the plethora of hindrances newly independent African states would be faced with moving forward. For instance (and briefly), in the OAU charter, both Articles 2(1) and 2(3) affirm that African states had to take control of their own economic growth blueprints, co-operate and co-ordinate so as to compete in the global arena and participate in the economic process, hence, leading to the development and economic growth process. In this regard, since its inception, the OAU made noteworthy strides and contributions to the development of continental and international laws as a mechanism of stimulating peace, security, equality stability and so forth within the continent (Clark, 2016).

The OAU co-ordinating committee supported continental liberation movements through financial, logistics and military support. It played a vital role in supporting the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. These were through mediating and preventing continental

conflict(s) in countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Zaire (currently known as the DRC), Angola and Nigeria. Similarly, through mediation, diplomacy and conciliation, it also assisted in establishing diplomatic ties between Algeria and Morocco (from 1964), Somalia and Kenya and Somalia and Ethiopia from 1968 to 1970. Edo and Olanrewaju (2012) state that from an economic standpoint, the OAU was instrumental in the formation of the African Declaration on Economic Co-Operation, Development and Independence (May, 1973), the Programme of Technical Co-Operation (July, 1975), the Kinshasa Declaration (December, 1978), the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development in Africa (July, 1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (April, 1980) and the African Economic Group in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991. The OAU was also working robustly to see the apartheid system dismantled in South Africa and Namibia. Internationally, the OAU made and maintained several bilateral relations with regional organisations such as the EU, the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) through its members.

One might say that the OAU achieved some of its objectives, particularly the fight against the colonial rule, as presently no African state is under such rule (Roberts, 2013). Nevertheless, there are vast and varied reasons in academic literature as to why the OAU, irrespective of its significant strides in Africa's regional integration endeavours, was not so successful. While some of these include political rivalries and ideological differences, the OAU's notion of not interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states perhaps explains why it was not always successful in deterring coup d'états and political instability in some African states. This, in turn, gave some African leaders more drive to be dictators in their countries. Political leaders in African states such as Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia and Chad, just to name a few, were overthrown as the result of coup d'états without much intervention from the OAU (Edo and Olarewaju, 2012). The authors further emphasise that these coups affected even the founding fathers of the OAU Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Seko Toure of Ghana and Guinea, respectively, who were overthrown on the 24th of February 1966 (Nkrumah) and the 16th of February 1968 (Toure).

This is notwithstanding the fact that there has been an array of coup d'états in Africa after the independence era and Cold War to date. Instead of dealing with these coups and those involved, the OAU gladly allowed them in their summit(s), further sparking speculations why as some of these leaders did not respect the OAU's Charter of Social Justice. Also, there was a perception that some member states were not loyal to the organisation and it was further hampered by the violation of human rights and political instability in some African states

(Jiboku, 2015). Jongur (2014) in his analysis submits that the OAU was also hindered by financial deficit while a number of obstructive political practices were at play and became entrenched in the OAU, which stalled its effectiveness and professionalism. At the other end of the spectrum, some scholars such as Mathews (2005) and Murithi (2014) posit that the OAU was more politically rather than economically driven as its mandate was more centred on protecting the continent's political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

As the OAU was marching forward with its regional integration frameworks in Africa, it put in place the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in 1980, which was adopted by African heads of states. It sought to assist African states to participate fully in regional integration driven by Africans and spearheaded by self-sufficiency; more simply, the LPA was an OAU approach to strengthen Africa in the global arena (Clark, 2016).

2.3.2 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL)

Adedeji (1993) stipulates that as a necessity to further strengthen Africa's regional integration, attempts based on collective and national self-reliance drove (albeit through a series of consultations) the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the OAU and African heads of states to adopt a more development-oriented strategy in Monrovia, Liberia in July 1979. Here, a continental development policy was proposed and enshrined in two documents: the 1979 Monrovia Declaration and the final report termed the LPA in 1980. In coming up with the Monrovia Declaration, African heads of states wanted to address the vital development glitches affecting the continent. Essentially, the declaration aimed to stimulate amongst other things (a) environmental degradation, (b) economic development, (c) low participation in the development process, and (d) international dependence (Sekgoma, 1994). Subsequently, a plan of action termed the LPA for the implementation of the Monrovia declaration was embraced by African heads of states (UNDP Special Unit for TCDC, 1982).

Collective self-reliance and self-sustainable development were some of the strategies to be executed by the LPA, which were to be driven via its short, middle and long-term frameworks. These were to be primarily spearheaded through economic factors comprising intra-African trade and investments via regional integration schemes (Hwang, 2009). The LPA was a quest whereby which African heads of states saw the need to come up and implement other regional integration initiatives, including prioritising continental trade, as this was seen as a more vibrant initiative to stimulate continental growth. In a sense, African states had to first improve trade within the continent (among themselves), before trading with other international states,

hereby, inspiring their own growth reforms. In the LPA, African leaders were committing themselves to co-operate for the strengthening and establishment of regional and subregional institutions that were going to inter alia commit to the following:

- a) Giving an important place in the field of human resource development
- b) Putting science and technology in the service of development by reinforcing the autonomous capacity of African countries in this field
- c) Achieving self-sufficiency in the food and production supply
- d) Implementing completely the programmes of the United Nations Transport and Communication Decade for Africa
- e) Realising the sub regional and regional internally located industrial development
- f) Co-operating in the field of natural sciences
- g) Developing indigenous entrepreneurship, technical manpower and technologies abilities, and
- h) Institutional development at the national, sub regional and regional levels

In addition, the LPA lobbied inter alia for the following:

- a) Africa's huge resources must be applied principally to meet the needs and purpose of its people
- b) Africa's almost total reliance on the export of raw materials must change
- c) Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance with outside contributions only supplementing its own effort; they must be a mainstay of their development
- d) As a consequence of the need for increased self-reliance, Africa must mobilise its entire human and material resources for its development, and
- e) Efforts towards economic integration must be pursued with renewed determination in order to create a continent-wide framework for the much-needed economic co-operation for the development based on collective self-reliance.

To the LPA, keeping a vigorous watch on foreign-owned businesses was imperative, as these were the same businesses that were after African resources. Hence, it was driven by the idea that African people should control their own resources for their own and future development (Benachenhou, 1983).

Not forgetting the Pan-Africanism of the OAU, the LPA was also driven by the same notion; notably, Africans must settle their own problems. Akani (2017) posits that this is perhaps the reason why between 1985 and 1991, the LPA had developed other broad strategies for Africa's

development in order to assist in fulfilling the broader vision it had for the continent's regional integration frameworks; these were:

- i. The African Priority for Economic Recovery (APPER) 1986-1990 in July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- ii. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Transformation (AFF – SAP) in 1989 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- iii. The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (ACPPDT) in Arusha, Tanzania in 1990, and
- iv. The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the world, 1990.

To the LPA, external factors were further contributing to the continent's underdevelopment, such as the exploitation encountered during the colonial period; as a result, Africa as a continent was where it was (underdeveloped) because of colonialism (Adogamhe, 2008). Because of this situation, it called for a more gradual form of regional integration to establish a single Pan-African unity. Here, the state was seen as a viable actor in stimulating development in Africa. In addition, the aim was better employment opportunities through the African Economic Community (AEC), and continental production of vital continental consumer goods by 2000. In sum, its theme, just like the OAU, was to further enhance co-operation and integration as a pivotal means in stimulating Africa's development. In its action plan, the FAL formulated an integration schedule, which again set another milestone in Africa's integration endeavours, the 1991 Abuja Treaty (Jiboku, 2015).

2.3.3 The Abuja Treaty

The Abuja Treaty of 1991 came into effect in May 1994 (because of some shortcomings of the LPA), which was to further enhance regional integration in the continent, African heads of states signed the treaty establishing the AEC (Schlumberger, 2010). This treaty deemed the significant input of civil society, Non Profit-Organisations (NPO's) and private sector critical in the continent's regional integration efforts. The treaty is arguably the most pivotal agreement concerning social, economic, political collaboration and co-ordination in the continent. The treaty propelled a blueprint roadmap (see table 2.2) consisting of six phases geared towards an AEC to be realised in a period of 34 years, not surpassing 40 years outlined in its Article 6 (Jongur, 2014).

Table 2.2: Showing the implementation phase of the Abuja Treaty.

Action/stage	Anticipated time frame (years)
Strengthening existing RECs ²¹ and creation of new RECs where needed.	5 years
Rectifying hurdles to regional trade and also strengthen sectoral integration, particularly in agriculture, transport and communication, industry and energy.	8 years
Establishing an FTA and CU for each REC.	10 years
Co-ordination and harmonisation of tariffs and non-tariff system among each REC with a view to creating a continental customs union.	2 years
Establishing an African common market and adopting common policies among RECs.	4 years
Establishing an African central bank and a single currency, setting an African economic and monetary union, and setting up the first Pan-African parliament.	5 years

Source: DIRCO (2004).

The idea behind this blueprint roadmap is to stimulate the social, cultural and economic integration of the continent driven by continental RECs as they possess and are seen to have a vital role to play in Africa's regional integration attempts (Antonio, 2001). Some of the pivotal objectives of the AEC as stipulated in Article 4(1) include:

²¹ In Africa, there are currently eight recognised RECs. These include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel – Saharan States (CEN – SAD), EAC, Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the SADC. These RECs provide building blocks for continental integration.

- a) To promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development
- b) To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilisation and utilisation of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-reliant development
- c) To promote co-operation in all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the standard of living of African peoples, and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations among members states, and contribute to the progress, development and economic integration of the continent, and
- d) To co-ordinate and harmonise policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the community.

Article 4(2) also aims to enhance inter alia:

- a) The strengthening of existing RECs and the establishment of other communities where they do not exist
- b) The conclusion of an agreement aimed at harmonising and co-ordinating policies among existing and future sub regional RECs
- c) The establishment of a common market
- d) The gradual removal among member states of obstacles of free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment, and
- e) The granting of special treatment to member states classified as least developed countries and the adoption of special measures in favour of landlocked, semi-landlocked and island countries.

The creation of the AEC was to in the long run envisioned to enhance continental trade and the treaty became a significant regional integration blueprint post the Cold War challenges. Certainly, this was spearheaded by the fact that African states were now in charge of their own socio-economic growth prospects, thus, there was a need to collaborate, pull resources together and advance their minor economies as a collective group (Zafarullah and Hugue, 2012).

2.3.4 The African Union (AU)

In July 1999 at the OAU summit in Algiers, Algeria, the decision to form the AU was taken, partly driven by former Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (late) who envisioned a United States of Africa. In the same year, another extraordinary OAU summit driven by the

theme strengthening the OAU to meet the challenges of the new millennium took place in Sirte, Libya on the 9th of September 1999 (Deng and Zartman, 2002; Jeng, 2012). The pivotal objective of this gathering was to modify the charter of the OAU, as it was obvious that the organisation was facing some hurdles to further address some of the continent's burning issues in the 21st century. To achieve this, it was decided to inter alia establish the AU that was to be driven by the provisions of the charters of the OAU and Abuja Treaty (Deng and Zartman, 2002).

At the summit in Lomé, Togo, where the 36th regular AU summit was held in July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted. At their next meeting, the 37th summit of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia, African heads of states agreed that in their subsequent meeting in Durban, South Africa, the AU would officially be formed and the OAU dispersed (Roberts, 2013). Hence, on the 9th of July 2002, the AU was born in Durban and former South African president Thabo Mbeki was elected as its first president. According to Jongur (2014), unlike its predecessor the OAU, the AU was to be more ambitious and would be driven by vital frameworks to spearhead continental integration, sub regionalism, peace and security, human rights, Africa's participation in the global economy, and democratic governance while also developing science and technology frameworks. Fundamentally, the AU was also formed to meet the vast hindrances affecting African states in the 21st century. Mathews (2005) contends that some of the main objectives of the AU are to:

- a) Achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and people of Africa
- b) Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members
- c) Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent
- d) Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people
- e) Encourage international co-operation and taking due account of the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- f) Promote peace, security and stability in the continent
- g) Promote democratic principles, institutions, popular participation and good governance and
- h) Promote and protect human and people's right in accordance with the African Charter on human and people's right and other relevant human rights instruments.

According to Oppong (2010), in 2007 and 2008, the AU came up with two vital protocols for economic integration in Africa: the protocol on the relations between the AU and RECs, and the protocol on the statute of the African court of justice and human rights. These two were to (1) redress the hindrances of regional integration in Africa, and (2) launch a court with jurisdiction over disputes that may arise from the establishment of the AEC treaty. The AU is structured after the EU, which is by far the most successful regional integration mechanism in the world (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2017). Unlike the OAU, the AU was to intervene in states internal affairs. Thus, the objectives of the AU are more comprehensive and driven by the agenda of tackling current African issues. The AU saw as a prerequisite the involvement of the private sector, and NGOs; stimulating intra-African trade would be of importance to the continent's regional integration endeavours and would also integrate Africa's economy with the rest of the world (Edo and Olanrewaju, 2012).

Nevertheless, and as mentioned before, Africa is facing diverse challenges such as peace, governance, human resources and development, unemployment, poverty, corruption, authoritarian rule, and inadequate financial and physical infrastructure, amongst others (Tamfuh, 2016). This is a challenge to more established international organisations such as the UN and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Therefore, there is a risk of the AU becoming another regional integration attempt in Africa with little success stories. In addition, Jongur (2014) asserts that some African heads of states are reluctant to cede their sovereignty, which an effective and robust AU would require to trigger benefits that may accrue.

Again, there is a history of African heads of states signing treaty agreements, yet not abiding by them. Another critical factor worth mentioning that may have deterred the AU in its regional integration blueprints is that of overlapping memberships of many RECs in the continent, which undeniably causes a major challenge (Touray, 2016). In addition, some African RECs are weak while others are better funded than the AU itself, thus, could have a louder voice in the AU. With the intention of further enhancing the hindrances facing African states, and in the same year the AU was formed, another developmental blueprint in the name of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) came into being.

2.3.5 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The NEPAD initiative (an official programme of the AU) was established in July 2001. It is yet another plethora of regional integration frameworks that have been adopted by African heads of states in recent decades. The NEPAD framework emphasises the need for open regionalism, trade liberalisation and integration in the global economy, good governance and peace and security to (like the AU) foster development for the 21st century and responds to the challenges of globalisation (Jiboku, 2015). Essentially, the NEPAD is a merger of other African initiatives launched between 2000 and 2001, the first being the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery (MAP) spearheaded by Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

The second initiative was the Omega Plan orchestrated by Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade; the third was the Compact for African Recovery driven by Kinsley Amoako, who was the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Ultimately, this resulted in both the Omega Plan and MAP being merged into one initiative: the New Africa Initiative (NAI) geared for Africa's sustainable development in the 21st century (Agbu, 2003). The NAI was adopted at the July 2001 Lusaka Summit of the OAU. As a result of the revised NAI document, one may regard the NEPAD as a philosophy of development as it is a comprehensive blueprint aimed at the revival of Africa spearheaded by Africans themselves (Sako, 2004). The NEPAD's four primary objectives are (a) to eradicate poverty, (b) promote sustainable growth and development, (c) integrate Africa into the world economy and (e) accelerate the empowerment of women. It is also driven by five fundamental principles:

- i. Good governance
- ii. Entrenchment of democracy
- iii. Peace and security
- iv. Domestic ownership and leadership, and
- v. Sound economic policymaking and execution.

The NEPAD has since its establishment formulated various development-driven frameworks such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 2010-2040 (PIDA), the Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative (PICI), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM²²),

²² The APRM is an important instrument of the AU and NEPAD, which acts as a self-monitoring mechanism. It aims to develop, implement and steer policies to lead to high standards of economic growth, sustainable development and stimulate continental and subregional integration (Kouassi, 2007). Moreover, it aims to promote

NEPAD, Short Term Action Plan (STAP) and the Priority Action Plan (PAP) as some frameworks to enhance continental regional integration (Signe, 2018). The organisation hopes to be at the core in steering Africa's regional co-operation and integration often driven (just like the AU) by partnerships between the private sector and NGOs. Fundamentally, the main aim of the organisation is to be a blueprint in the continent's regional integration framework as so to realise the Agenda 2063 (the continent's long-term blueprint framework for socio-economic development) objectives through stimulating regional and continental programmes (NEPAD, n.d.).

While it was of relevance to uncover regional integration attempts from a broader African outlook as so to have a clear understanding of why these were of importance to early pan-African leaders, it is, nevertheless, as a basis of this thesis, also important to delve into some other regional integration establishments from a Southern African perspective.

2.4 Regional Integration efforts pre-colonialism and post-colonialism: From a Southern Africa Perspective

Regional integration in Southern Africa, as in Africa, was envisioned to steer forward regional progression together with other socio-economic developments taking place globally. The establishment of regional blocs was given further impetus by Southern Africa's quest to fight against political instability, colonial rule, apartheid, poor economic prospects and extreme geographical fragmentation that brought with it severe economic repercussions to most Southern African states. This led to the formation of a large number of RECs, which were viewed as vital mechanisms to stimulate intra-regional trade and development policies with the ultimate goal of remedying regional deterrents (Dinka and Kennes, 2007; Gibb, 2012). Drawing from the above, the first round in achieving these development blueprints started in the creation of what has become to be known as the world's oldest regional formation, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) established in 1910.

2.4.1 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

The formation of the SACU, according to Salami (2012), may be traced back to as early as 1889 between the Orange Free State's Boer Republic and the British Colony of Cape of Good

the policy that African heads of states institutionalise a regular, independent and positive assessment of their socio-economic and political development.

Hope, which at that time was known as the Customs Union Convention (CUC). A new agreement was signed on the 29th of June 1910, which comprised South Africa and the British High Commission Territories (HCTs), Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland (eSwatini). A *de facto* member was South West Africa (Namibia)²³. The primary objective of the SACU was to enhance economic development via regional co-ordination of trade (Ngalawa, 2014). Since its establishment, the SACU has formulated and implemented various development-oriented agreements that have over the years been ratified by its member states; a concise list is included below.

2.4.1.1 The 1910 SACU Agreement

Fundamentally, this agreement produced the following:

- i. A Common External Tariff (CET) for all goods imported into the union from the rest of the world, a common pool of customs duties as per the total volume of external trade and excise duties based on the total production and consumption of excisable goods
- ii. Free movement of SACU-manufactured products within the region, without any duties or quantitative restrictions, and
- iii. A Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF) for the distributions of customs and excise revenues collected by the union (SACU, 2019).

Still under apartheid rule, South Africa was dominant within the SACU and single-handedly administered it via setting up SACU import duties and policies. As noted by Gibb (1997), South Africa received 98.7% with regards to the joint revenue while other SACU members shared the rest: 1.3%, Bechuanaland 0.27%, Basutoland 0.88% and Swaziland 0.15%. In this vein, other SACU members were mainly reliant on the South African economy (Ngalawa, 2019). In 1925, with a view to stimulating industrial growth, South Africa introduced an import substitution programme which brought with it high protective tariffs which were enforced throughout the SACU area. This brought with it other challenges to the SACU members as it prompted these states to purchase South African products at high costs (Gibb, 2007). As a result of this and because of inadequate revenue sharing, and issues of management and decision-making, other SACU members wanted to re-negotiate this agreement that had lasted for more than five decades. After these countries attained their independence post the 1960s, negotiations to alter the current agreement commenced, thus leading to the 1969 agreement.

²³ Current SACU members comprise Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, eSwatini and South Africa.

2.4.1.2 The 1969 SACU Agreement

This agreement was signed on the 11th of December 1969 and brought with it two major changes:

- i. The inclusion of excise duties in the revenue pool, and
- ii. A multiplier in the RSF that enhanced other SACU members' revenues annually by 42% (SACU, 2019).

Nevertheless, South Africa remained a dominant actor in the new agreement and still reserved the sole decision-making power over excise policies and customs, while also preserving access to the markets of other SACU members. However, by utilising the new RSF formula, other SACU members were (individually) given a portion of the Common Revenue Pool (CRP), which centred on their share of imports products subject to excise duties in the SACU area (Ngalawa, 2004).

There were still issues in this agreement as other SACU members again expressed their concerns on the RSF, questioned the hindrances of external trade (outside SACU borders) and the concern of no progress in joint decision-making. To them, South Africa was still benefitting from this agreement. South Africa had tried numerous times to incorporate these three countries until they became independent in 1966 (Botswana and Lesotho) and Swaziland in 1968 (Peters-Berries, 2010). Thus, the period from 1990 to 1994 had major repercussions on the 1969 agreement; these years were when Namibia gained its independence and South Africa witnessed the end of apartheid. Moving forward, there was a need to re-negotiate the 1969 agreement. This treaty remained active until 2002 where a new agreement came into force.

2.4.1.3 The 2002 SACU Agreement

This latest SACU treaty was signed on the 21st of October 2002 but only entered into force on the 15th of July 2004. Ultimately, the treaty was to address the challenges of the previous 1969 agreement: decision-making, RSF and the hindrance of external trade (SACU, 2019).

Some of the aims of the 2002 treaty are as follows:

- a) Facilitation of regional trade and integration between member states
- b) Establishment of democratic, transport and effective institutions within the union
- c) Promotion of fair co-operation within the union
- d) Increased investment and economic development in the union
- e) Development of common policies, and

f) Facilitation of the equitable sharing of customs and excise revenue in the union.

The new agreement seemed to be more radical than the previous two as it introduced equal-decision formulation methods where each member had a say when it came to formulating new policies. Peters-Berries (2010) further articulates that this treaty also brought with it some major modifications, to exemplify this: the power to set tariffs was removed from the South African Board of Tariffs and Trade to the newly established SACU Tariff Board. Another pivotal change was the establishment of six new SACU institutes. These included:

- i. The council of ministers as the supreme decision-making body
- ii. The Tariff Board comprising experts from member states, which makes endorsements to the council of ministers on tariff trends together with other trade concerns
- iii. The commission that caters for the execution of SACU agreements and decisions to the council
- iv. The Windhoek (Namibia)-based secretariat that caters for the administration of the SACU
- v. The Technical Liaison Committees in the fields of trade and industry, agriculture, transport and technical matters which assist the commission, and
- vi. An ad hoc tribunal that is responsible for any rising disputes within the SACU.

Previously, all institutional support to SACU was provided by South Africa, as there were no separate SACU institutions; again, a new sharing agreement formula was implemented. Instead of distributing a fixed percentage of all duties between the four minor economies, the new formula was to take into consideration the development needs and socio-economic performance of these member states. Accordingly, this treaty showed that South Africa as a more developed was somehow to permit other SACU members to improve their socio-economic position (Ngalawa, 2014).

The SACU plays a significant role in spearheading regional integration amongst its member states as it aims to address the hindrances of trade facilitation, trade negotiations and policy development inter alia. As a result, it has over the years negotiated numerous agreements like the SADC Trade Protocol with the SACU-EFTA Free Trade Agreement, the SACU-USA Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement, and the SACU-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement (SACU, 2011; SACU, 2017) and within SACU, there is free movement of goods. The SACU aims to be a backbone for regional integration and development, industrial

and economic diversification and spearheading of intra-regional trade for its members. However, realising the full benefits of regional integration has been challenging because of the vast difference in the political and socio-economic development of other states, particularly the minor ones who undeniably depends on South Africa's economic strength.

2.4.2 The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS)

The CONSAS was a strategy that was first announced in 1974 by the then South African apartheid prime minister, Mr Balthazar J. Vorster, and was further adopted by his successor, Mr Pieter W. Botha, in 1979. This strategy, as Evans (1984) confirms, was to secure South Africa's economic, political and military objectives. P.W. Botha further spearheaded this initiative at a meeting that took place in Carlton Centre, Johannesburg on the 22nd of November 1979. Glejjeses (2013) asserts that the South African apartheid government envisioned that members of the CONSAS would be anti-communist, lenient of the apartheid regime and keen to oppress the ANC and the South-West Africa People Organization (SWAPO). His (P.W. Botha's) idea was that businessmen had to become involved in strengthening economic relations between some Southern African states and South Africa; the CONSAS would come up with a framework whereby business operations would be the sole drivers of economic growth relations.

These relations were to be driven by military, economic, political and psychological objectives, with the aim of building a series of economic relations between the South African and some Southern African countries, and the signing of joint non-aggression treaties with Pretoria. Fundamentally, the CONSAS strategy was that both neighbouring states and those from afar would firmly be dependent on Pretoria's economic system, hence, increasing South Africa's advantage over them. This, in turn, would constrain these countries (as members of CONSAS) to support any liberation movements. Again, the strategy would necessitate the acknowledgement by at least some of the South African homelands-cum-states; this was anticipated and would perhaps encourage diplomatic recognition by other Western powers (Price, 1985). Likewise, the idea was to build and expand on existing economic links, hereby also respecting the sovereignty of each member state and abstaining from interference in the internal affairs of others (Hill, 1983). To make the constellation a reality, South Africa formed the Southern African Development Bank (SADB) and the Multilateral Development Council (MDC) in 1982; these two institutions would both steer forward the CONSAS policy.

The CONSAS was to consist of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, South West Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The relations between these states were not limited to economic matters but would also be driven via security and other development-oriented frameworks. This was driven by the fact that there was a belief (particularly from South Africa's point of view) that all countries were facing a common enemy – a “Marxist threat” – hence, they should not rely on the west for support. The constellation would also assist in finding regional solutions to regional problems (Geldenhuys, 1981).

The CONSAS strategy aimed to replace the previous buffer-zones of white-ruled colonies (Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia) with other dependent African states, which would have ultimately prevented any liberation movements from attacking South Africa (Christian-Peters, 2010). Essentially, a pivotal aim of the CONSAS strategy was to further protect Pretoria's apartheid policies from both internal and external threats. The apartheid regime realised that its ideas and hegemonic stance might not only be achieved via military oppression, but also had to gain needed support to utilise other avenues such as economic, diplomatic and socio-psychological means.

Nevertheless, the strategy did not hit the ground running, as there was a lack of support for it particularly by the countries it had hoped would jump on board. The Frontline States (FLS) (to be discussed subsequently) was also heavily opposed to the CONSAS idea. Surprisingly, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland affirmed that they would not be part of this grouping because of South Africa's racial policies. Additionally, another blow was the emergence of Zimbabwe as an independent state ruled by Mr Robert Mugabe who further stipulated that his country would not be part of the CONSAS (Braun, 1989); hence, Harare joined the FLS instead. Furthermore, international pressure for the independence of Namibia made the CONSAS idea less conducive. Because of the CONSAS strategy, the FLS issued the Arusha Declaration in 1979, which called for the formation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). This, as some scholars observe, was a serious political defeat for the apartheid South African government. Therefore, the failure of the CONSAS strategy gave the perception of South Africa as a weak hegemon, unable to duly utilise its economic and military sphere to achieve regional diplomatic supremacy (Bhebe, 2015).

2.4.3 The Frontlines States (FLS)

Post the 1960s, regular fora(s) took place between African states comprising Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zaire. These seminars eventually gave birth to what was to be known as the Frontline States (FLS) in 1975 (Aka, 2017), led by Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia. In the same year, Mozambique joined as did Angola did a year later. These countries acted as a caucus concerning Southern African affairs as one of their goals was to liberate black nations within the region. Because of this, guerrilla armies who were fighting for the independence of some Southern African nations were supplied with arms by the FLS (Stanford, 1997). In the words of Hwang (2007), the FLS may be viewed as one of the most pivotal formations to emerge in the 1970s, where racial oppression and colonialism were some of the most debated topics by Pan-African leaders not in Southern African but in Africa at large.

Although the FLS was focused on regional economic co-operation, its key doctrine of the region focused on security matters. The organisation's plans were not only to assist Southern African states to gain their independence but to dismantle the apartheid regime in South Africa that wanted to establish and maintain its political, economic and military hegemony (Ofuately-Kodjoe, 1990). This is why it (FLS) was of the view that it had to diminish member states' economic dependence on South Africa. This was drawn from the fact that Pretoria aimed to utilise its robust military might and economic leverage vis-à-vis its regional neighbours to destabilise not only the FLS members but the capacity of other countries to render support to the liberation struggle that was at play in Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa (Bhebe, 2015).

To counter Pretoria's offensive strategy, the FLS provided liberation movements²⁴ who were fighting for the independence of South West Africa, Rhodesia and South Africa with invaluable material, diplomatic and logistical support as these three countries were witnessing dominant white minority rule in the region. Again, because of South Africa's apartheid doctrine, the FLS formed the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) in 1975 as a mechanism to address numerous security challenges in Southern Africa (Hendricks, 2016). The FLS' quest for an apartheid-free Southern Africa reflected a Pan-Africanist view that apartheid caused political instability and economic exploitation (Koltz, 1995). Perhaps prominently, the FLS

²⁴ Some of these were Zimbabwean fighters aligned to the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), together with South Africa's ANC.

ought to create balanced and equitable collective development in post-apartheid Southern Africa.

The FLS was a response to both apartheid in South Africa and colonial rule in some parts of Southern African, hence, the security and development spheres of the FLS member states were of great importance to the organisation (Ofuately-Kodjoe, 1990). Because of the FLS, Namibia gained her independence in 1990 and South Africa in 1994. The FLS was, however, disbanded in 1994, having achieved some of its core objectives of dismantling colonial rule in Southern Africa (Arnold, 2006). Prior to its being dismantled in 1994, the FLS members met at a seminar in Arusha in July 1979 and focused on how they could further enhance economic co-operation and limit South Africa's hegemony in Southern Africa. Moving forward, a year later, this meeting gave birth to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980.

2.4.4 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

The SADCC was formed in 1980 through the Lusaka Declaration, Towards Economic Liberation, by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe in an attempt to reduce dependency on South Africa with its planned CONSAS strategy. From the onset, the SADCC was not an integration formation but was to offer assistance to the FLS. However, it also endeavoured to enhance the economic development of its member states and political liberation via effective co-ordination using the specific strengths of its member states and available resources. At the Lusaka meeting, it was agreed that the SADCC would implement projects that would be valuable to regional development (Meyns, 1983).

Leys and Tostensen (1982) are of the view that the SADCC was to give much impetus in the communication and transport sectors(s) as its member states relied heavily on apartheid-driven South Africa when it came to these sectors; other significant areas were that of food production and distribution, mainly driven with the notion to diminish food imports from South Africa. According to Mufune (1993), at their meeting in Lusaka in 1980, these members articulated four objectives for themselves:

- i. To co-ordinate the reduction of dependency on metropolitan powers and especially that on the subregional centre of South Africa
- ii. To create and operationalise equitable economic integration among members

- iii. To master local and foreign resources so as to effect national, interstate and regional policies utilisable in the reduction of dependency and the establishment of genuine co-operation among members, and
- iv. To secure financial and technical resources from private and government sources in the international arena.

A programme of action (POA) which was project-driven, was established by the SADCC, which acknowledged key development projects to be pursued. In this way, each state was to be responsible for a particular project, i.e., Swaziland for human resource development, Mozambique for transport and communication, Zimbabwe for food security and so forth (Masemola, 2005). A total of approximately US\$ 2.5 billion to sponsor about 5 000 projects in these sectors was sourced (through foreign aid) by the SADCC (Falola, 2002). This POA-driven method focused on refining member states' development initiatives, rather than regional economic development approaches. The SADCC aimed to foster regional integration and mobilise resources to further stimulate economic development while at the same time forge international links for economic co-operation. Unlike the FLS, it did not emphasise diplomatic, military and political issues but was more rooted in increasing self-reliance and regional economic strength of its member states (Green, 1980). To some extent, the SADCC was successful in its development-driven projects and attracting foreign aid but failed to reverse its member's reliance on South Africa.

It should be noted that the SADCC was not successful in integrating the economies of its member states nor was its co-operation timelines significant; some of its member states also continued to have bilateral links with South Africa. Landlocked states such as Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland relied heavily on Pretoria's railways and ports to export and import their trade within the region and abroad; yet again, South Africa was a source of manufactured consumer goods. In a nutshell, the SADCC was spearheaded by two components. Firstly, it was the vision for its members to be less dependent on the South African economy; secondly, its development strategies were biased towards its POA. With that said, inequalities between member nations were still visible which further stunted the growth of this regional formation (Masemola, 2005). While some SADCC member states were well endowed with minerals, energy and agricultural resources, these were not utilised to their full potential, due to the absence of technological advancement and underdevelopment.

In the light of some of the points mentioned above, and with Southern Africa's geopolitical landscape change in the 1990s, Namibia's independence and the apartheid transition period in South Africa in progress, there was also a need to restructure the SADCC. This led to the SADCC member states signing a treaty on the 17th of August 1992 in Windhoek converting the organisation from the SADCC to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Freer, 1995).

2.4.5 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

The SADC, a sixteen-member REC that has an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$ 607 billion, was established in 1992 after the signing of the Windhoek treaty (as stated earlier) (SADC, 2018). The SADC's pivotal intention is to attain peace and security, and economic development, alleviate poverty, improve the standard of living and spearhead regional integration in Southern Africa. These are to be driven via democratic principles and sustainable development. Hence, the objective of the SADC as stated in Article 5 of the treaty is to:

- a) Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration
- b) Evolve common political values, systems and institutions
- c) Promote and defend peace and security
- d) Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the dependence of member states
- e) Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes
- f) Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the region
- g) Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment, and
- h) Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical social and cultural affinities among the people of the region.

Essentially, the treaty outlines vital commitments and blueprints, which the SADC hopes to achieve via regional integration. Because of this legally binding instrument, member states of the SADC are required to respect and abide by the treaty. The SADC's regional integration framework is structured in a way that it recognises the economic and political diversity of

member states, including their resources, production structures, trade patterns and development priorities (SADC, 2003). Some of the SADC's policy documents make a distinction between soft projects to be spearheaded by the SADC Secretariat and hard projects to be implemented by member states, together with other third-party actors, where the Secretariat will play monitoring and evaluation role (SADC, 2012).

Soft projects entail harmonisation and implementation, policy formulation, programme monitoring and implementation and co-ordination of regional integration; on the other hand, hard projects are made up of infrastructure, which in most cases includes energy interconnectors, transport networks, information and communications technology (ICT) and water resources (SADC, 2012). The SADC has made some significant strides in regional integration predominantly in areas of democracy, peace and security, agriculture and natural resources, finance and investments, and social and human development, among others (SADC, 2005).

The organisation has over the years formulated various regional integration blueprints treaties such as the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan²⁵ (RISDP), and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ²⁶ (SIPO) aimed for the long-term social and economic development (Muntschick, 2018). The RISDP²⁷ came into effect in 2005 for a 15-year period (2005-2020) and was revised in the 38th SADC summit in Windhoek (SADC, 2018). Apart from these, the REC has developed various protocols²⁸ as per Article 22 of the treaty aimed at further enhancing co-operation between member states. However, with that said, successful regional integration will require some of the following components: (1) a related level of industrial development among member states; (2) regional macroeconomic stability; (3) harmonised national macroeconomic policies; (4) significant intra-regional trade; and (5) substantial distributions of the benefits of regional integration. It is worth mentioning that most of these are still missing in most states in Southern Africa as some are at different levels of economic development.

²⁵ The RISDP's core aims are to enhance industrial and market integration, promote infrastructure to enhance regional integration, promote peace and security and stimulate special programmes of regional dimension under clusters.

²⁶ The aim of the SIPO is to stimulate a stable and peaceful political and security environment whereby the region will realise its mandate of poverty eradication, socio-economic development and regional integration.

²⁷ To read more on the revised SADC's RISDP, see:

https://www.sadc.int/files/5415/2109/8240/SADC_Revised_RISDP_2015-2020.pdf

²⁸ For a comprehensive list of the SADC's protocols, visit: <https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/protocols/>

The REC is still encountering some challenges in its regional integration objectives. For instance, some member states are still confronted with poverty, conflicts and low levels of economic productivity. Others are in debt, lack required infrastructure and technical and financial resources, and experience poor governance, multiple memberships to regional organisations, a lack of commitment in implementing some protocols and human rights abuse just to name a few (Chingono and Nakana, 2008). These bring about severe repercussions to the SADC's regional integration frameworks.

Therefore, one may deduce that these regional integration formations from 1910 and perhaps importantly from the 1950s showed the acknowledgement by African heads of states that the continent's political and economic development was of importance in attaining socio-economic growth.

2.5 What attributes make a Hegemonic State?

According to Hulse (2016), there is a growing body of literature on hegemonic states, and emerging or regional powers that are viewed as being dominant within their geographical area and are assumed to robustly shape the nature and contours of regional integration and governance. Several attempts have been made in the international discourse to create a conceptual framework that will grant us the platform to understand hegemonic states, their behaviour and role in regional and global politics (Destradi, 2008). While hegemonic states have been studied as both architects and impediments of development, in academic literature it has become somewhat of a challenge to amply illustrate what makes a hegemonic state. This is primarily because the term is often applied by different schools of thought, hence, drawing different and diverse viewpoints.

To Prys (2007), if one had to ask what makes a hegemon, this can further be broken down into two subquestions: firstly, "What is it?", and secondly "How is it possible?". While the term hegemon was previously largely applicable to the United States of America (USA), post the Cold War era, other emerging hegemons such as China, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria have emerged as fundamental states in their regions. According to Dirzauskaite and Ilinca (2017), the term hegemony may be credited to Robert Keohane, which to him means dominance and leadership. In very simple terms, a hegemonic state is one with robust power capabilities. Hegemons are studied because their supremacy has the potential to alter and therefore implications for the structure of inter-state political relations (Bozdaglioglu, 2009).

In this vein, Williams (2020) asserts that attention paid to hegemonic states has been paramount as a result of the changing political and economic factors such as military power, economy and level of development. As a result, states that possess these attributes in the new world order and have the ability to exercise them over others are able to declare their hegemonic stance; basically, it gives us a nuanced appraisal and understanding of power in global politics. Destradi (2010) submits that most of the academic literature on regional powers has revealed two aspects. On one hand, regional powers are willing to take leadership duties in their region, whereas some have failed to live up to required expectations.

Hegemony implies an influential state in the regional or international system. A hegemon, in the words of Destradi (2010), is a state that is situated in and belongs to a specific geographical area, possesses supremacy in power aptitudes while exercising a degree of influence within its region. This further allows this state to spread its political, moral and cultural values in a given geographical area. In this sense, a hegemon persuades other states to comply with its socio-political and economic ideologies by constantly altering the rules and norms of the system so as to suit its policies. Other attributes of a hegemonic state are its military, power capital and production capability (Yilmaz, 2010). A state that possesses robust military power has the leverage of not only creating security measures for itself in a region hampered by political instability but may also utilise such power to protect the region itself (Destradi, 2008).

For instance, Strange (1987) in her published work, *The Persisting Myth of Lost Hegemony*, avers that the power of the hegemon is reliant on four elements and a state that possesses these four may be considered a hegemonic state. These consist of (1) maintaining the control of needed goods and service production systems; (2) having robust control and management of credit and financial institutions; (3) preserving the capability to shape the influence of other states via defence, threats, escalation of violence or denial; and (4) having the capability to influence the knowledge and informatics (via religiously or technically utilised and acquired communication and production). Hegemonic states have to “mediate” between the burdens or restraints that come from great powers and also have their own ambitions and objectives for regional peace and order. They also contend with other unseen reactions from their neighbours while making them believe that power is shared through the accord of the majority (Destradi, 2008).

To Flemes (2007), a regional power may be classified by the following components: its leadership capabilities, ownership of needed resources, robust foreign policy mechanisms and the recognition of its leadership by other states. To Nye (2003), the attributes of a hegemonic state are (1) possessing robust technology; (2) domination in economy and military; (3) soft power; and (4) superior control in international communication lines. States become global or regional powers if they have a reasonable strategy, sound human resources, are a mediator state rather than an aggressive one, attract educated individuals and have a strong GDP (Yilmaz, 2010). Pederson (2002) outlines that hegemonic states follow diverse strategies such as cooperative, unilateral, concert and empire hegemony; nevertheless, in the end, he states that most follow the strategy of a cooperative hegemon as it is considered the most reasonable strategy for a hegemonic state to enhance institutionalisation. Hegemons must be able to supply regional public goods and regional power values and function as a state with social responsibility, with the ability to influence its neighbours (Prys, 2007).

Concerning the provision of public goods: even if other regional states gain more than the hegemon, its primary objective is the formation of a stable environment for itself (Destradi, 2010). Having said that, one may rank a regional power as a middle power in the international arena, as the regional power may, in general, utilise the region as a catalyst for its global outreach. Prys (2007) asserts that hegemons work towards the steadiness and/or extension of their sway in any region. While some states possess ample degree of material dominance, at times they are unwilling to put it into use despite having the capabilities to do so (Hulse, 2016).

Drawing from the afore-mentioned viewpoints, it is also pivotal, as Destradi (2010) contends, to offer some explanation on the forms of hegemony (see table 2.3 for a detailed analysis), in this case hard, intermediate (at times referred to as benevolent or coercive hegemony as articulated concisely in Chapter one) and soft hegemony. The first (hard hegemony) may be conceived as a strategy of domination based on coercion but exercised in a more subtle form. This pertains to the fact that the hegemon aims to realise its own goals and also satisfy its own interests but ultimately endeavours to hide this doctrine from other regional members while emphasising a communal interest in regional affairs. In this regard, because of political pressure, sanctions, threats and, to a lesser degree, inducements, these states are enforced to alter their practices. In this type of hegemony, there is a process called ‘pseudo-legitimation’ which forces other states to modify their behaviour without, however, internalising the values stimulated by the hegemon.

Intermediate hegemony, on the other hand, is driven by the notion of the establishment of material benefits and rewards for other regional states as so to make them compliant. Additionally, values and norms are often shared to a certain degree between other regional states and the hegemon. In this form of hegemony, the hegemon also pursues its own narrow goals and national interests while at the same time emphasising the existence of common objectives and interest shared with other regional states. There are also side payments provided by the hegemon which are economic in nature, such as economic assistance (loans and development aid) and trade facilitation. The existence to some extent of common values and the absent of threat make this type of hegemony more tolerable than hard hegemony. The last type of hegemony (soft) pertains to the strategy that resembles leadership; nevertheless, the interests of the hegemony are still prevalent. In this kind of strategy, the hegemons stance is based on the hegemons efforts to reshape and modify the values and norms of other states. As Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) put it:

The hegemon is able to alter the normative orientation and practices of secondary elites without sanctions, inducements, or manipulation. Rather, the hegemon engages in a process of socialization and ideological persuasion in which legitimacy emerges through the osmosis of norms and values from dominant to secondary elites.

In this type of hegemony, the compliance of other states is not based on practical calculations, but from a consequence of the convergence of values and norms. Hence, it is the only form of hegemonic tactic, which can obtain a full legitimation from other states (Destradi, 2010).

Table 2.3: Showing features of different types of hegemony.

	Hard Hegemony	Intermediate Hegemony	Soft Hegemony	Leader-initiated	Follower-initiated
Brief Definition	Establishment of an order for the realisation of the hegemon's goals through coercion, but without recourse to military power.	Establishment of an order for the realisation of the hegemon's goals through the provision of material benefits.	Establishment of an order for the realisation of the hegemon's goals through normative persuasion and socialisation.	Pursuit of common goals through a socialisation process launched by the leader.	Pursuit of already existing common goals through the conferring upon the leader of a directive of managerial function.
Ends; Means	Self-interested sanctions, threats, political pressure.	Self-interested material benefits/inducements: economic side-payments, military support.	Self-interested normative persuasion, socialisation (for example, through joint working committees on contentions issues).	Common normative persuasion, socialisation process.	Common acceptance of directive or managerial function.

Self-representation	Co-operative	Co-operative	Co-operative	Co-operative	Co-operative
Discrepancy between self-representation and actual behaviour	High	Middle	Low	Low	Low
Legitimacy	Pseudo-legitimation	Partial legitimation	Legitimation	Legitimation	Legitimation
Subordinate state strategies.	Resistance. If hegemonic strategy successful: compliance based on relational calculations about the cost of non-compliance.	(Resistance). If hegemonic strategy successful: compliance based on rational cost-benefit calculations.	Compliance based on redefinitions of norms and values.	Willing Fellowship.	Initiation of leadership as reaction to a threat/crisis or because of lack of co-ordination.

Change in subordinates states' normative orientation due to dominant states policy	No	No	Yes	Yes	(No)
--	----	----	-----	-----	------

Source: See Destradi (2010).

In the table above, the author illustrates the multifaceted concepts which replicate the complexity of regional hegemony's strategic considerations and the implications of the policies implemented for regional relations.

In a nutshell, one may deduce that if a country possesses robust (in comparison with other states) economic advantages and competencies, and, moreover, enjoys the capability to utilise its economic sway among other regional members who at the same time accept its membership attributes, it may be regarded as a hegemonic state. We can, therefore, undeniably conceptualise hegemonic states by their superior economy, technology, human resources, infrastructure, foreign policy, military power and finance in a specific region where it belongs.

2.6 Understanding South Africa's Democratic Transition 1990-1994: From Pariah State to expected leader in Southern Africa

While it is not the intention of this chapter to comprehensively draw on full scale South Africa's transition period from 1948 to 1994²⁹, it intends to sketch concisely some of these events, particularly, those from 1990 to 1994. Pretoria's conversion from apartheid rule to a truly multi-racial democracy is from a global perspective one of the most pivotal political occurrences post the Cold War era. Despite the negotiations being peaceful in nature, they were far from pleasant. This results from the fact that these negotiations lasted for about four years before agreement was reached by the major three parties at the negotiation table (the NP, the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and others who were involved (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2013).

According to Beall, Gelb and Hassim (2005), the transition in South Africa forecasted to build a mutual future brought with it high hopes for advanced growth, not only in South Africa but also in Southern Africa and further afield. This stemmed from the fact that Pretoria as Africa's biggest economy (at that time³⁰) would perhaps as a result of a democratic government spearhead the continent's development, thus also reducing the inequality amongst blacks and whites not only in Africa but from a global perspective. As Sichel (2012) informs the reader,

²⁹ For a detailed reading on South Africa's transition period, consult the following readings: Howarth, D.R., & Norval A.J. (eds). (1998). *South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspective*. London, Macmillan Press LTD. Saul, J.S., & Bond, P. (2014). *South Africa – The Present as History: From Mrs Ples to Mandela and Marikana*. Suffolk, James Currey. Bell, T., & Ntsebeza, D.B. (2003). *Unfinished Business South Africa, Apartheid and Truth*. New York, Verso. Eby, J.C., & Morton, F. (2017). *The Collapse of Apartheid and the Dawn of Democracy in South Africa, 1993*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. Beinart, W., & Dubow, S. (eds). (1995). *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*. London, Routledge.

³⁰ Currently, Nigeria is Africa's biggest economy.

in South Africa, pre-1994, apartheid was a system formed by the NP predominantly post the 1948 era and comprised segregation and racial discrimination; in sum, it favoured white supremacy over all other races. As a result of such policies, between 1960 and 1990 most political parties, including the ANC and other liberal movements opposed to apartheid, were banned from South Africa by the NP. To some authors such as Maharaj (2008), the road to South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy may be drawn although not limited to other events around the country, which occurred from the 1970s.

These include (1) the textile workers strike in Durban in 1973; (2) the assassination of Steve Biko in 1977 who was behind the idea of Black Consciousness; (3) the 1976 Soweto uprising; (4) major other revolts that came afore after the Soweto uprising particularly in townships; (5) the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 which brought diverse groups i.e. cultural communities and political organisations to dismantle apartheid; (6) the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which aligned most trade unions into the anti-apartheid stance; and (7) the role played by the South African Council of Churches and the Institute of Contextual Theology. This is, however, notwithstanding other external forces that played a role during this time. Nevertheless, when Frederik W. de Klerk became the President of South Africa in 1989, he and his government made steady strides to disassemble the apartheid system. To exemplify this, vast numbers of rules and about 200 laws that were implemented by his NP party were abolished by the South African parliament. Some of these included the Group Areas Act No 41 of 1950, Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950 and Prevention of Mixed Marriage Act No 55 of 1949 (Harshe, 1993).

In essence, the democratic transition gained impetus when Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990 and when the ANC was unbanned by the NP in the same year. These changes thus paved the way for open dialogue between the ANC, NP, IFP and other third parties. Hence, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) that took place in Johannesburg in December 1991 may be regarded as a pivotal starting point in the transition phase of the new democratic South Africa as it brought together the NP and non-white political parties to the negotiation table (Oomen, 2005). Here, a declaration of intent was signed by 19 of the 21 present parties; when discussions continued at CODESA 2 in 1992, negotiations broke down as parties failed to reach an agreement on a constitution and interim government.

Also, there were disagreements about power sharing and majority rule; this led to much violence including the Boipatong Massacre in June of the same year. Fundamentally, CODESA

2 did not end well. However, these negotiations resumed on the 1st of April 1993 under what was known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) which paved the way to move forward (Handelman, 2014). The MPNF drew up the interim constitution that was endorsed by parliament; this interim constitution was a draft constitution as South Africa made its transition from apartheid to democracy. It came into effect on the 27th of April 1994 until February 1997 when a final constitution came into force.

It must, however, be noted that these dialogues were not as smooth as anticipated as there were significant deadlocks encountered along the way. Adam and Moodley (1993) expound that there were right-wing extremists such as the Conservative Party (CP) and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, which wanted to hold on to apartheid. Perhaps this is why, as some authors will agree, the assassination of Chris Hani of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1993 a year before the first ever-democratic elections was associated with other political parties not wanting apartheid to end. Nevertheless, after years of negotiations, this protracted process bore fruit in 1994 when Mr Nelson Mandela became the first black president of South Africa. As state president, Mr Mandela (in order to ensure a smooth transition process) was deputised by Frederik W. de Klerk and Mr Thabo Mbeki (in order to ensure a smooth transition process). In essence, not only from an Afrocentric perspective but globally, South Africa had been reborn (Habib, 1995).

Drawing from the preceding, South Africa's pariah state had come to an end and now that Pretoria was being steered by a democratic government, it was obligated (as per its foreign policy) to involve itself in regional, continental and global politics (McCarthy, 2003). This was to be achieved via a robust foreign policy instrument particularly geared to enhance, among other things, the development and peace of not only Southern Africa but the continent at large. In the same year (1994) South Africa was granted its SADC membership.

With that said, how has a reborn South Africa shaped herself in Southern Africa via regional integration and governance? It must be noted (as mentioned in the first and in this chapter) that as a result of South Africa's destabilisation policy under the NP in Southern Africa, the new South African government had much to rectify post-1994. These relations (South Africa and Southern Africa) will be unpacked in detail in the next chapter, Chapter three,

2.7 Theoretical Framework

2.7.1 Introduction

As a result of being shaped by practical events and processes, theories materialise out of reality and are helpful in this regard as they assist in constructing a better understanding in the fluctuating dynamics of the global arena. This thesis utilises the theories of regionalism, hegemonic stability theory and the general systems theory to better grasp the understanding of sub regional hegemons, integration and governance while offering a nuanced appraisal of South Africa's post-1994 role in Southern Africa. With that said, a theory is meant to guide the researcher in conceptualising the studies, hence with no theoretical setting, the study is deferred in an epistemological vacuity.

2.7.2 Regionalism

During the past few decades, there has been increased attention paid to regionalism in the global arena, which stems from the dramatic rise in regional institutes. Regionalism, particularly post the Cold War era, has mainly been driven by the change in the global political landscape chiefly because of globalisation. One may define regions as a group of states situated in the same geographical setting; these states may not always share the same geographical proximity, same political attitudes, cultural and social homogeneity and economic interdependence (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010). Hettne and Sodertaum (1998) offer the view that regionalism pertains to the multifaceted combination of loyalties, attitudes and opinions, which concentrates the minds of individuals as to what they determine to be a region. This phenomenon becomes politically inspired when envisioned benefits such as the need for closer co-operation and close border trade are acknowledged by member states. Drawing from another terminology, a region may be termed as a group of states which

- i. Establish a legal charter of collaboration
- ii. Formulate a broad economic relationship
- iii. Foresee themselves as recruiting benefits from this co-operation, and
- iv. Anticipate that the region will evolve or change for the better.

The region in this regard, as Poku (2001) puts it, is a multidimensional spectacle that has a variety of actors. There are three vital elements of regionalism; the first is that before one could refer to a region, there must be a number of specific states located in a specific geographical area with some sort of shared historical background. Secondly, these states must be categorised

by close linkages of a specific nature, which means collaborations between them should be more recurrent than those outside the region. Lastly, for the region to accrue needed benefits, an organisation must be established which will provide the region with an institutional and legal framework (Poku, 2001).

Regionalism pertains to the values, objectives and body of ideas, which contribute to the maintenance, creation and/or alteration of a particular region, which eventually leads to institution building. As Chakrabarty, Datta and Roy (2009) assert, it is an effort against political, social and economic deficiencies; moreover, it is also a movement against any hegemonic state who is dominant in a particular region. Regionalism as a procedure entails a group of states which implement a set of preferential policies intended to encourage the exchange of goods between them. Fawcett (2004) is of the opinion that the objectives of regionalism are to pursue and encourage mutual goals in one or more issues areas. Fundamentally, it stimulates a sense of regional awareness or community (soft regionalism) via amalgamating regional networks or groups to sub regional groups formalised by interstate engagements and organisations (hard regionalism).

It has to do with the process of region establishment entailing the procedure by which regions come into being and are merged as one. This 'regionalism' thus leads to the evolution of organisations, networks and regional actors. This scholar further asserts that regionalism is a notion of assigning greater value to a region in contrast to the nation. This notion is conveyed in economic, cultural, linguistic and administrative and political terms. Thus, it is a concept of identity which matures within a particular region that ultimately leads to regional consciousness between the populace of that region. From an Afrocentric stance, African leaders viewed regionalism as a viable solution to unite the continent and drive it forward from both a political and economic outlook. This was largely because of the competitiveness of the global arena, hence, continental leaders envisioned that the ability of African states to survive by themselves posed a major challenge (Asante, 1997). According to Ramutsindela (2001), because of the socio-economic conditions in Africa, regionalism became a prerequisite; these (conditions) included the quest for security and regional consensus, particularly from a Southern African perspective. Here, it was predicted that South Africa will be at the forefront of regional peace initiatives (Poku, 2001). Also, from a Southern African viewpoint, regionalism is not a new phenomenon; as mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the formation of the SACU in 1910 may be regarded as a form of regionalism, which was to steer the regional integration efforts (Penfold, 2017).

Regionalism brings with it diverse benefits; besides enhancing political, economic and security co-operation, it can stimulate democratization and state-building, create norms and values, make states more accountable, reduce transaction costs, improve FDI and exposure to international markets and technology, transform small markets of individual states into larger monetary, economic and trading areas, increase transparency and assist in managing the effects of globalization while also addressing regional governance issues (Fawcett, 2004; Otobo, 2004). Essentially, material gains are seen as the core drivers of regionalism, largely due to the fact that states anticipate attaining remunerations from transacting with one another. In Southern Africa, the motives for regionalism are both economic and political; it was envisioned by policymakers that regionalism would enhance the conditions for economic growth (Boas, 2001).

However, as Kirsten (2009) asserts, for robust regionalism to exist, the proximity of member states is vital, as is the intensity of relationship and the existence of a legally recognised base. From the SADC standpoint, it undeniably qualifies for the status of regionalism. Its member states are in close proximity to one another and there is a shared awareness of a common destiny. A downside to regionalism is that states themselves can also be a source of political instability, terrorism or other related crimes; however, while these are regional problems, they may also invite regional resolutions. Yet again, the limited capacity of resources is a burden whether in the economic, military, institutional or diplomatic sphere.

Another deterrent is the availability of a regional hegemon; strong states are in some cases likely to abuse their powers (Miller, 2006). In sum, regionalism necessitates favourable democratic environment, supportive public institutions and soft infrastructure, also, this requires the working together of both state and non-state actors. The thesis will utilise this theory as the basis to explain co-operation in Southern Africa. The theoretical setting in this thesis assists in informing the rationale as to why states formulate policies to reinforce close relations and collaboration in various aspects such as security, trade and investment opportunities.

In the literature, several theories of regionalism can be identified, leading to the conclusion that different theories were developed for different geo-political contexts and periods (Hettne & Soderbaum, 2006). According to Hettne and Soderbaum (2006), two groups of theories are of interest in modern regionalism debates: the neo-functionalism theory and the new regionalisation theory. Neo-functionalism comes from the evolution of the functionalist view

of regionalism, which asserted that the major reason behind regionalism is peace and security. In Hettne and Soderbaum's view, the functionalists regard the state as a problem and the region as a solution to peace. Nation-states existing outside regions were a threat to regional peace because they were not part of common mandates that were established to preserve the same peace. A region was, therefore, a solution to this problem. Buzdugan (2013) cites Mitrany (1946) who states that if governments worked together on technical tasks and projects, this interstate co-operation would eventually unite people across national divides, resulting in a more peaceful Europe.

Neo-functionalism also adopted the view that a state existing on its own was a problem but also took the notion that regionalism would not only benefit a nation or a region through security but through economic growth as well (Buzdugan, 2013). This economic growth brought about by increasing economic integration would eventually foster increased political co-ordination and regional governance, which would also strengthen regional peace and security. Thus, according to Buzdugan (2013), regionalism was a means towards a political end where regions would eventually maintain similar political systems and identities.

According to Buzdugan (2013), new regionalisation theorists differ from neo-functionalists in that the latter believe that regionalisation works best within a co-operative rather than a competitive trade and economic environment. New regionalism creates more intricate political, economic, social, militaristic and cultural oneness. Nation-states are willing to lose much of their sovereignty, including facets traditionally associated with nationalism, to a regional bloc. New regionalism is, therefore, a move towards oneness among states in a specific region and neo-functionalists perceive economic and trade competition as necessity for regional efficiency. Hettne and Soderbaum (2006), however, contend that the main difference between the two groups is that new regionalism advocates see regionalism as a response and a function of globalisation. Globalisation as a phenomenon has resulted in a more competitive economic order where nations saw coming together as blocs as one of the solutions to neutralise this competition.

Despite the differences in views, the above theories seem to agree that regionalism can result in enhanced economic and political performance. All the theories thus suggest that there is strength in numbers and therefore nation-states come together to realise this strength. Uzodike (2009) believes that while the above theories were formulated with European regions in mind, they are in part applicable to the African continent. Uzodike believes that Africa could benefit

politically, economically and socially but closer co-operation that mimics new regionalism perspectives. Regions could aim at greater openness with the world while maintaining harmonised trade arrangements within themselves. These could strengthen trade relations across countries while creating trade advantages with out-of-region nations (Uzodike, 2009).

This study sympathises with the new regionalism theory, which as indicated above, is a modern extension of the functionalism and neo-functionalism theories of regionalisation. New regionalism calls for increased homogeneity and identity among regional entities, unlike the functionalist and neo-functionalism theories that are centred on increased co-operation of countries within a region despite these countries' retaining a great deal of institution heterogeneity in political, social and economic systems (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2006). In the modern world, new regionalism is perhaps best exemplified by the EU with a single currency, trade regimes and to some extent, migration legislation. Blocs within the African continent, arguably, are not as integrated as the EU but there are generally high aspirations that such an integration would be immensely benefit the economics and politics of Africa (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Anyanwu and Conceição, 2014).

Obydenkova (2006) argues that new regionalism was an outcome of regional integration and globalisation. The scholar, however, acknowledges that new regionalism was not an automatic outcome as the existence of both state and non-state factors may affect how a region adopts to the new regionalism concept. Factors such as ethnicity, geopolitics and economic performance can encourage and facilitate the new regionalism and at the same time, detract regional integration within a new regionalism perspective. Soko (2019), however, questions whether new regionalism is a challenge to or a positive response to globalisation. New regionalisation, as Soko (2019) posits, was a threat to multilateralism and globalisation as it created protectionist blocs that closed regions from the rest of the world. In Soko's view, African regional blocs and continental institutions like the SADC and the AU would help to shield the region from external trade competition whilst making trade arrangements that are highly flexible for its members.

As can be noted, new regionalism, as a theory to some extent relate to the aspirations of the AU and SADC, two regional blocs of importance to South Africa. Looking at Article 5 of the SADC treaty, aspirations of going beyond mere economic, political and social co-operation among members to the creation of common are articulated. Article 5 of the treaty has two particular objects that point towards a new regionalism way of thinking:

- Evolve common political values, systems and institutions, and
- Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical social and cultural affinities among the people of the region.

These objects point to consolidation rather than co-operation, as stated by Hettne & Söderbaum, 2006 and Buzdugan, 2013. The theories of regionalism assume that regional integration is pursued with common developmental and political purposes of which hegemony is not always one. The hegemonic stability theory discussed next, however, puts the need for political and economic dominance among nations as a possible reason behind the promotion on regional integration.

2.7.3 Hegemonic Stability Theory

The theory of hegemonic stability has its origins in the work of the former general secretary of the Italian Communist Party Marxist Antonio Gramsci in his series of *Prison Notebooks* written between 1929 and 1935 (Adamson, 1980). His works came about of the failure of the Communist Party to stop Benito Mussolini and his Fascists Party coming into power. Gramsci applied the notion of hegemony in order to analyse how and in what way social classes come to be dominant in society without coercion (Gramsci, 1971; Gilpin, 1981). He argued that a hegemonic nation demonstrates its superiority using appropriate measures (even via both the media and society) and other states adapt to their position of social, political and economic victimisation; fundamentally, it is, in his view, a form of oppression.

The concept of hegemony helps one understand how dominance is generated, upheld and challenged; it is basically defined as control of one state over others (Bohm, 2018). In the words of Ake (1981), hegemony has to do with how a middle-class state uses its economic advantage over other states in a way that forces them to comply with its political and economic reforms. According to this theory, for the global arena to be stable, there needs to be a dominant state at the fore that will enforce the rules among other members of the region; thus, as Wu (2009) avers, the steadiness and growth of the international system is due to the leadership delivered by the hegemonic state. Augusto and Faria (2003) in their published article *The Value of the Concept of Hegemony for International Relations* posit that the strength of a hegemon (see table 3) may be classified into four components:

Table 2.4: Four attributes of a hegemonic state.

Military Power	The hegemon must possess sufficient and the latest military arsenal that has the power to secure the safety of its geographical area. This also entails the need of skilled forces that are prepared for duty or any dispute arising in the region.
Dominance over Production	The production industry of the hegemon must be of robust calibre capable of producing and exporting high-value goods, in comparison with other states. It must have sole control of energy and raw materials. Likewise, its logistical dominance is of importance as this grants it the platform to establish the movement of regional, continental and international trade.
Finance	This further grant the hegemon the platform for credit-related decisions and where investments should take place.
Technological Power	The hegemon's technological base must be of robust capability. This grants it the avenue to be ahead of other states, hence, inventing the latest products and machinery.

Source: Augusto and Faria (2003).

In the 21st century, regional powers are characterised by the following jurisdictions: military posture, the control of money circulation and the determination of international agenda. For some authors such as Yilmaz (2010), a state must possess some of these characteristics in order to be considered a hegemon: (1) technological advancement particularly in communication; (2) economic capacity prominent internationally; (3) geographically situated on main sea routes; (4) robust military; and (5) diplomatic negotiations.

There are two essential features of a hegemon. The first is that the hegemon is fundamentally self-interested and aims mainly at the realisation of its own goals, which in most cases are presented to other states as mutual goals. The second is that hegemons in most cases function by employing a mixture of power instruments and material incentives (by reshaping or changing the value and norms on other states) so as to gain harmony in the subordinate states. In recent times, South Africa has often been viewed as a hegemon in Southern Africa due to its relatively strong economy in relation to its neighbours. Pretoria possesses ample resources for it to be regarded as a hegemon, post-1994; its financial strength, military power, technology and economy have continued to rise. Also, its inner political stability in relation to some of its neighbours, and greater international exposure have given it more impetus and power to steer regional integration in Southern Africa.

As Gilpin (1981) asserts, a hegemonic state must be able to control raw materials, markets, sources of capital and be competitive when it comes to producing high value goods; this is based on the influence (economically) of the hegemon. The availability and control of such resources help it to cement its place as a prevailing state in a precise region. As a means to stabilise the environment for its development, the hegemonic state invests its resources. The stabilisation pertains to the endowment of public goods to other regional states who act as free riders and take advantage of the stability produced by the hegemon. Because these states are economically too weak to challenge the hegemon, they are forced to conform to the hegemon (Destradi, 2008). Molefi (2003) makes a point that hegemons are forever increasing their negotiating abilities and influence via regional groups and other states by putting in strategies for their national growth. To him, for a state to maintain its hegemonic doctrine, it must on an occasional basis disperse its economic philosophies within its geographical area or afar. A hegemonic state wants to develop forever and for it to continue to maintain its dominance, it must from time to time restructure its philosophies (Joseph, 2002). Gilpin (1981) makes another critical point by articulating that the fact that the hegemonic state depends on its economic and military dominance, the “law of uneven growth” may generally tend to weaken the stance of the hegemony over time, which, he states, is driven by three factors.

The first pertains to the cost involved in maintaining the hegemon’s dominance, including its military expenditure and support to its allies. The second involves the loss of technological and economic leadership as a result of decreasing innovation eroding natural resources. The third has to do with the dispersal of economic technology and military from the hegemon. However, Wu (2009) outlines another argument by stating that there is a notion that in the global arena,

states that are less influential accrue more benefits than the hegemon. This is precisely because they do not partake in the production of public goods but are beneficiaries of such goods from the hegemon. In sum, the theory postulates that for a precise region or international arena to uphold its status and function, it requires the presence of a prevailing hegemonic state to provide the required frameworks for economic growth and development.

2.7.4 The General Systems Theory

The general systems theory may be credited to biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. In his words, by isolating some parts and/or components of a particular system, it is neither understood nor can it function properly; the theory is a way of examining interrelationships in a particular system (Indira, 2014). The general systems theory is a theoretical framework that is transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary and is applied to various other disciplines such as physics, public administration, geography, political science, sociology, chemistry, the social sciences etc. It is normally known by different names such as the theory of open systems, systems model, family systems theory and systems theory. A system may be regarded as a group of components which are interconnected to one another in a way that a change in one component may disturb the other or all components.

If one had to amply understand a system, it would have to be an open system that has both inputs and outputs. The theory takes into consideration all sources of a particular problem and examines each individually and the role each plays in a specific system; it aims to elucidate and explore the behaviour that is common in all various systems (Williams, 1970). According to Muya (2014), the general systems theory has three concepts: (1) wholeness: that is by looking at the entire system; (2) organisation: this is looking at how diverse parts of the system work together; and (3) patterning: observing what patterns are connected. The significance of this theory is evident, as many facets of the region may be observed as systems and our overall understanding of this theory adds to our awareness of regional integration processes. The imperative nature of involving this theory in development-related initiatives is obvious, mainly because of the various parties involved, like the public sector, private sector and civil society, are all seen and regarded as part of a system.

This is particularly true when observing South Africa's role in Southern Africa post-1994 via the plethora of actors involved or spearheading this process. The theory assists one in scrutinising and/or describing any group of objects that work together to produce something positive or negative. These could be organisations, companies, department, countries and so

forth. So how would one link this theory to the study? By utilising this theory, attention is focused on different components that, from a South African perspective, are spearheading regional integration in Southern Africa. Primarily, it will assist in generating knowledge of wholeness; a system is made up of diverse components, items, people and organisations working collectively with the goal of achieving something.

Thus, the system is hindered if one component is removed or does not comply; likewise, South Africa as a state requires various components (government departments, no-state actors and how states interact with their institutions) to work collectively in putting its foreign policy doctrine to use in Southern Africa. In this thesis, the theoretical framework has been informed predominantly by the concept of drawing robust viewpoints on South Africa's regional integration and governance role post the apartheid era. Basically, the general systems theory allows us to better understand the world around us, such as the environment, food chains, life cycles etc. (Hammond, 2003). Through this theory, we can better understand the problems and their causes. Development and integration initiatives in most cases comprise setting objectives, putting in place plans to achieve these objectives, executing frameworks, decision-making, the role of private-public partnerships, policy formulation and monitoring and evaluating the success of targets. Therefore, the acute fundamentals of this theory are vital in its theoretical positioning for narrating and analysing the various components involved in regional integration frameworks.

The triad of theoretical frameworks mentioned above assist in the logical prognosis of the thesis. This is because firstly, they inform the intention for states wanting to formulate frameworks to stimulate closer co-operation on aspects such as security, trade and politics. Secondly, these theories provide in part some nuanced understanding on why some states are more superior than others in a specific geographical area and the degree to which such superiority impacts on the development and closer collaboration in this specific area. Thirdly and more importantly, the theories further demonstrate how diverse components within a particular system relate, connect and work together to achieve specific targets.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter was made up of two sections. The first section reviewed current and up-to-date literature and contributions from various scholarly works which are directly linked to this study. The reviewing of this literature assisted in covering vital themes which make up a core

part of this thesis, including key term(s), what drove the quest for regional integration in Africa pre-colonialism and post-colonialism (via the establishment of a plethora of treaties and organisations), regional integration initiatives in Southern Africa and how can we understand South Africa's democratic transition 1990-1994. This allowed us to draw a valid appraisal on what drove the need for regional integration attempts in Africa, perhaps importantly, in Southern Africa. Section two of the chapter explored the three theoretical frameworks which underpinned this thesis. These were regionalism, hegemonic stability theory and the general systems theory, which were explained while offering the reason for their utilisation within the parameters of this study.

CHAPTER THREE

POST-DEMOCRATIZATION: A REFLECTION ON SOUTH AFRICA'S QUEST FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP.

3.1 Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, the global arena expected and witnessed a major shift from a USA-led unipolar global order to a new world order spearheaded by waves of multiple regional competing powers. Narrowing this to the African continent, there has been strong ongoing debate(s) on how to robustly conceive the upsurge of economic influence and prowess of South Africa, not only in Africa but also importantly in Southern Africa (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017). To Alden and Le Pere (2009) and Prys (2012), Post-1994 South Africa's aspiration to spearhead a leadership role in Southern Africa, strengthened by its economic might and recognition (both within the continent and internationally) has in some way contributed to a remarkable restructuring of both the political and economic architecture. Former South African President Mr Nelson Mandela once described apartheid South Africa as the "skunk of the world" that was culturally, economically and diplomatically isolated from the world. Post-apartheid and inspired by the notion of *Ubuntu*³¹, Pretoria had to now demonstrate that it ought to be committed to global, continental and regional development and economic co-operation.

Drawing from this, Pretoria has remained a beacon of hope for a region, which despite its political disengagement from colonial masters, has continued to face vast economic and political hindrances (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017). One should also point out that this (Pretoria's hegemony) has also bought with it both controversy and growth. Smith (2018) notes that while Pretoria has been recognised by the international community as an African hegemon, these sentiments have not always been accepted by other regional states. In essence, to her, global recognition undoubtedly does not equal regional acceptance. Before taking office in 1994, the current ruling ANC government was already aware of the immense challenges facing it not only domestically but also regionally. A pivotal question here is what through its hegemonic traits and soft power currencies has South Africa employed in wielding influence in Southern Africa. Drawing from this, it is therefore imperative to ponder how the post-1994 leadership magnitude of regional players (in this case South Africa) transforms into regional

³¹ *Ubuntu* translates to humanity with regards to people's relations and allegiances with one another. In essence, it means respecting others in a way that will be beneficial to all.

hegemonic order. The question of whether Pretoria is a fundamental part of regional integration in Southern Africa seems reasonable. However, it is vital to ponder as it grants a prism via which its hegemonic stance can be analysed. In essence, what is South Africa's role in the region? And/or what should it be?

This understanding is acute in order to draw a nuanced review with regards to South Africa as a regional hegemon. Apart from this introduction, this section is made up of four sections. The following section aims to rigorously ponder South Africa as a hegemonic state in the region. The next section looks at South Africa's soft power attributes and how it can (or does) utilise these for better regional leadership. The third section looks at the challenges facing South Africa's post-1994 regional integration endeavours while section four offers the concluding remarks.

3.2 South Africa as a proclaimed hegemonic state in Southern Africa

According to Odubajo and Akinboye (2017), based on Greek and social and political transitions, hegemony has to do with a situation where one precise entity affirms its robust dominance over others via both coercive and passive means. It should be taken into account though that such hegemonic status brings with it enormous responsibilities. While other less powerful states may look to the hegemon for development and direction, it is up to the hegemonic state to act in good faith and be willing to render its political and economic prowess for the benefit of other states. In most cases, the hegemonic state is expected to be at the fore when it comes to co-operation and collaboration at the regional level.

Christiano (2018) posits that when a state's power is more superior to other regional or continental states, that country is considered a hegemonic state because this superiority grants it the advantage of having considerable influence over other regional or continental states. In this case, economic dominance is closely linked with social, cultural, political and hegemony (Modesto and Sajejev, 2016). States that normally dominate other states are known as core countries. For any country to presume the role of a core state, that country must possess a stable independent government, be advanced in technology, and possess the prospective to grow in the global market. Such states may be the USA, Japan, Brazil and other regional states globally. Such core states are industrialised capitalist countries on which the so-called marginal states depend for regional goods as these dominant states control and, in most cases, benefit from global markets (Ogunnubi, 2016).

In essence, Modesto and Sajeev (2016) further argue that these states are recognised as wealthy countries possessing a wide variety of resources and, when compared to others, are in an advantageous location. Also, they possess robust institutions and have an influential global political alliance. By narrowing this to Africa and Southern Africa, to be precise to the 1960s, a period when apartheid still prevailed, one has adequate confirmation of South Africa's hegemonic stance regarding coercive dominance with respect to the utilisation of its hard power currencies to destabilise Southern Africa (Kararach, Otieno and Makuve, 2016). The re-entry of Pretoria into the African economic and political landscape cemented the way for its superiority as a regional hegemon. However, when the ANC government came into power in 1994, it inherited a country that was severely weakened by the vast economic sanctions because of the apartheid regime.

There is no debate that, more than two decades since the end of apartheid and its acceptance to the international community, South Africa's reputation has grown remarkably (Schroeder, 2012). Because of South Africa's robust economy and military might, it is somewhat difficult for any other Southern African country to undertake the position of a hegemon. A hegemon is expected to provide public goods concerning a reliable monetary policy, stable currency and importantly, development assistance (Chiroro, 2012). As a result of their economic and military might, in most cases hegemons control capital, markets, technological advantage and natural resources. Mandela (2010) argues that a hegemonic state must have vast control in terms of the production of highly valued goods, raw materials, control over markets and sources of capital. Despite the vast political changes that have been witnessed in Southern Africa post-apartheid, Pretoria is still regarded as a regional hegemon by various scholars (see for example Mays, 2002; Francis, 2006; Alden and Schoeman, 2015; Sebastian and Warner, 2015; Odubajo and Akinboye, 2017; Tella, 2019).

In its own right, South Africa has tried to be an influential player in the region – with both successes and failures. In academic literature, it is somehow accepted that the behaviour and role of hegemons are linked to the failure or success of regional integration. Nevertheless, at times, these hegemons do not always perform in a way that is accepted, particularly in developing regions (Krapohl, Meissner and Muntschick, 2014). According to Bukae (2017), post-1994, a democratically driven South Africa was expected to alter the destructive hegemony undertaken by the apartheid regime, thereby becoming a constructive hegemon to steer stability, development and regional peace. So, what makes South Africa a regional

hegemon in comparison with other regional states? Well, as Bukae (2017) further argues, one might draw this conclusion from several factors.

Economically, Pretoria is an undisputed leader in terms of basic economic indicators, provision of services, infrastructural development, and resource endowment. In terms of GDP³², trade³³ (imports and exports), industrial and agricultural production, South Africa tops the list. Pretoria's regional role is said to immensely contribute to the region's economic growth, re-industrialisation and technology transfer. Thus, such investments lead to the creation of employment opportunities, price stability and good corporate practices, hence, further attracting FDI from other countries, both continentally and internationally (Mandela, 2010).

Pretoria remains a leading actor in Southern Africa; however, there are disputes as to what kind of actor it is or should be. South Africa views itself as an integral part of the development interests of the region. For the West, South Africa's democratic transition, liberal 1996 Constitution, large and diverse economy, and voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons further confirm its status as the powerhouse of the region. However, some states are not convinced of South Africa's leadership, often questioning its credentials and portraying it as a self-interested hegemon which fails to wield needed regional leadership. Hence, even the ANC's 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) clearly affirms that some states in Southern Africa see Pretoria as a bully, a self-interested hegemon that acts in bad faith (National Planning Commission, 2011).

Much of this resentment stems from the fact that it forms part of the baggage that inevitably accompanies major power status as power disparities at times generate opposition, resistance and even discord, rather than obedience and acceptance. Thus, Pretoria has over the past two decades struggled to counter both the African and Southern African perception of it as a self-interested hegemonic state (Hamill, 2018). Colonialism in Southern Africa had severe effects in spheres such as transport, energy and infrastructure, which have been difficult to address even today. In this vein, South Africa's hegemonic stance is viewed through the prism of categories such as the promotion of the African Renaissance, infrastructural development, military and peacekeeping interventions and the institutional reforms of the SADC.

³² South Africa represents 61% of the SADC GDP. Yet again, in 2017, its GDP stood at US\$ 349.3 billion, the second-largest in the continent after Nigeria. In terms of the latest African Regional Integration Index rankings which are grouped into five dimensions (trade integration, regional infrastructure, productive integration, free movement of people, financial and macroeconomic integration) South Africa is the only Southern African state that scores highly in all five dimensions (African Regional Integration Index, 2019).

³³ Southern Africa is a recipient of 86 % of South African exports.

Other factors contributing to Pretoria's dominance include its road networks, major ports (which grants it an advantageous position with regards to access of goods and the world), an experienced NGO sector and best academic institutions, thus, this further turns its material preponderance into actual influence (Prys, 2007; Raballand *et al*, 2012). Alden and Schoeman (2015) opine that the opening of diplomatic ties post-1994 provided the platform for South African businesses to expand to other Southern African countries like never before.

This saw South African construction and mining firms, media and telecommunications companies and other parastatals make significant inroads in the region. The likes of MTN, Vodacom, Eskom, Transnet, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Checkers, Game, Shoprite, Protea Hotels, Multichoice, First National Bank (FNB), Standard Bank, Anglo Ashanti and so forth have made major strides in a majority of Southern African countries (Mandela, 2010; Modesto and Sajeev, 2016). This dominance of South African businesses has (albeit with numerous accusations) to some extent provided benefits to these states such as employment opportunities and technological advancement. The accusations stem from the fact that competition becomes prevalent, as local businesses have to compete with those from South Africa, which on its own is an enormous task to overcome.

These results in local businesses being unable to compete with those from Pretoria and being forced to shut down, due to fierce competition and restrictions from South African companies such as South African companies' introducing their own price structures regardless of those existing in host countries. Again, unfair competition results in the collapse of minor industries in other regional states (Modesto and Sajeev, 2016). What may be drawn from the above analysis is that South Africa's rapid investment capital, marketing, technological advantage, cutting-edge infrastructure, and human resources have made its companies exploit business opportunities in Southern Africa at times.

As stated earlier, while a regional hegemon is expected to provide public goods, it is of importance for South Africa because of its diverse economy to also open its market for other regional states to invest locally. This argument is drawn from the fact that there are numerous South African businesses (described above) located in other Southern African countries; however, there are minimal (if any) businesses from Southern Africa with business footprints in South Africa. In this vein, such elements do not necessarily promote regional integration. A possible solution may be for South African companies to enter into joint ventures with other regional companies. This would assist other states to develop and make the needed inroads in

the South African economy. One may deduce that the African Renaissance, the formation and launch of the NEPAD, the construction of the AU, security and trade-driven mechanisms in the SADC all show South Africa's determination to realise a hegemonic presence in Southern Africa. Although its regional hegemonic stance is compelling, as stated before, this is not always received well by other regional members.

To some, Pretoria's hegemony is hindered as some regional states are not willing to accept its leadership, merely because of its destabilisation policies in the apartheid era and its economic supremacy post the apartheid era. Thus, its leadership is more welcomed in the international sphere than in the region or in Africa in general. It must also be noted that South Africa has used its hegemonic posture in negative terms. For instance, from as early as 1995, Pretoria used its economic power to unilaterally revoke provision 311 of the SACU treaty. This treaty would have allowed Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS states) to access imported goods from outside SACU borders that were to be utilised for textile production. Yet again, when consultations for the SADC FTA commenced, Pretoria negotiated on behalf of the SACU with no consultations with other SACU members.

South Africa also negotiated trade policies with the EU with no proper consultations with the SACU members. In this vein, some regional states accuse South Africa of pursuing its own interests and not that of the region (Mlambo and Ogunnubi, 2018). On the other side, Hamill (2006); Siko (2014); Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017) note that South Africa has not utilised its hegemonic standpoint in a way to gain support from other regional states. The authors draw this from the fact that Pretoria failed to resolve the Zimbabwe issue that had started in the early 2000s until 2008, despite being aware as to what was unfolding in Harare. This was because of the tension between Mugabe's ZANU-PF and the late Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In essence, South Africa continued to show its support to the Mugabe regime, despite his governance contributing to the decline in the Zimbabwean economy and human rights abuse (Monyae, 2006).

This, as Prys (2012) argues, further shows the little influence Pretoria has on regional issues. Its inability to stem the vast political instability and meet international expectations further dented its hegemonic posture. South Africa's not taking a robust stand in the Zimbabwean situation was a concern to many, both in the region and beyond. Hamill (2018) notes that there are other factors undermining Pretoria's hegemonic position; the country has demonstrated exaggerated deference to the viewpoints of other regional states, rather at times reshaping such

views according to its values and norms. Again, the decline in its economy and being toppled by Nigeria as Africa's powerhouse has not helped South Africa's hegemonic standpoint.

3.3 Meeting the Criteria for Regional Leadership: A Soft Power Approach

There have been new ways of conducting diplomacy in the 21st century. While power is still seen as the central prism determining how states interact, philosophies of power have transformed drastically. While a state's power is often measured along with its hard power currencies (military and economic), present developments in the global arena are allowing states other diplomatic methods, apart from hard power. This is what Nye Jr refers to as soft power (Nye Jr, 2002; Ogunnubi and Amao, 2016). Nye asserts that it is of utmost importance for a state to utilise its soft power currencies and rely less on hard power.

Sidiropoulos (2014) asserts that African countries do not often yield soft power currencies as a result of the autocratic regimes, vast internal conflicts and marginalisation from the global economy. Nevertheless, there is no running away from the fact that South Africa has both soft and hard power attributes; this thesis will focus only on the former. So, what does one mean by soft power? What are Pretoria's' soft power attributes? And how has South Africa utilised these soft power credentials to further articulate its hegemonic stance in the region? If a state has the ability to alter the preferences of other states via appeal and attraction, it possesses soft power attributes (Tella, 2019). According to Chiroro (2012), soft power pertains to the agent's (a state) capability to effectively project its objectives to an audience (foreign public) in a manner that positively alters the audience's attitude, hence, also facilitating a sort of moral belief in the agent.

A vital element of soft power has to do with non-coercive strategies and it is driven by political values, foreign policy and culture (the ability of the nation to achieve desired outcomes without the use of hard power). As mentioned earlier, the concept of soft power was introduced in the late 1980s by Joseph Nye Jr. To him, power is the capability to sway the behaviour of other states in order to get what you want. There are different ways one may go about achieving this: persuade with payments, coerce with threats or attract and co-opt. Soft power may be a useful tool to utilise if a state wants to gather regional influence. If a state possesses soft power attributes, it can become more attractive, influential and persuasive via the utilisation of such soft power currencies. This could be achieved without any utilisation of force or intimidation. Gallrotti (2001) asserts that we derive soft power attributes from two (see table 3.1) general

sources: international sources (foreign policy and actions) and domestic sources (domestic policies and actions) while working with multiple sub sources in between. Such sources play a contributing part in enhancing the image of a state's relations with others.

Table 3.1: Showing Foundations of Soft Power.

International Sources	Domestic Sources
Respect for international law, norms and institutions.	Culture Pronounced social cohesion Elevated quality of life Freedom Sufficient opportunities Tolerance Alluring lifestyle
Fundamental reliance on multilateralism and disposition against excessive unilateralism.	
Respect for international treaties and alliance commitments.	
Willingness to sacrifice short-run national interests to contribute towards the collective good through liberal foreign economic policies	Political Institutions Democracy Constitutionalism Liberalism/Pluralism A well-functioning government.

Source: See Gallrotti (2011).

Ernst and Young (2012) give us another valuable understanding of a state's soft power currencies; to them (see table 3.2), soft power attributes may be understood, organised and grouped into three categories.

Table 3.2: Showing three categories of Soft Power.

Global Image	Global Integration	Global Integrity
Language enrollments	Immigration	Voter turnout
Olympics	Tourism	Freedom index
Most admired companies	English fluency	Rule of law
Media exports	University ranking	CO ² emissions

Source: Adapted from Ernst and Young (2012).

To Van der Westhuizen (2016), one should take into account that just because a country possesses soft power currencies, does not necessarily confirm it will wield soft power actions. Rather, it is how state leaders can conceive and utilise such soft power attributes which should both in the short and long-run impact on policy outcomes. In this vein, poor policy planning and execution can undoubtedly bring with it negative outcomes and hinder a country's soft power.

Continentially, putting aside other external actors, South Africa is perhaps the one country that can be seen to exercise soft power via the validity of its foreign policy, political values and culture. Pretoria's economy is twice that of the Southern African region, which grants it vital economic, comparative and soft power attributes. However, pre-1994 this was not the case as its destabilisation doctrine in the region was that of hard power, driven by the belief that to defeat an enemy, hard power was essential (Burgess, 2014).

From an international perspective, South Africa has the foundation of soft power, which include among other things, as Chiroro (2012) contends, respect for international laws, norms and institutions, enthusiasm to sacrifice short-term national interests to contribute towards the collective good, liberal foreign economic policies and essential reliance on multilateralism. Soft power is created and elevated in terms of the quality of life, social cohesion, tolerance and abundant opportunities for the general populace. While South Africa possesses such attributes, there is still work to be done in some areas. Tella and Ogunnubi (2013) make a very useful point that post-1994, soft power currencies grounded on power attraction, rather than those of hard power and driven by military and economic prowess, have been vital in Pretoria's drive to elevate its capacity and by implication, its global image in pursuit of regional hegemony. Indeed, it is a soft power country possessing the attributes that eschew the utilisation of coercion and force, while also confirming that the appeal and preferences of its ideas are replicated by other regional members (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015). According to Sidiropoulos (2014), one may draw South Africa's soft power currencies from two factors.

Firstly, its political transition which was constructed internally rather than externally; secondly, the nature of its constitutional order which led to writing a Constitution renowned for being one of the most progressive in the world. A supplementary to this was the characteristic charm of Nelson Mandela. Undeniably, Pretoria is definitely a soft power country, with symbolic representation and moral identity, in contrast with its regional neighbors. These soft power attributes are made up of its iconic leaders, political values, forefront policy, its credentials in

peacekeeping operations, its attractive universities, and its entertainment industries (Modesto and Sajeev, 2016; Ogunnubi and Tella, 2017).

South Africa has many global personalities scattered within sports, education, music and so forth. These individuals attract followers globally, hence, further boosting Pretoria's attractions not only in Africa, but also globally, and thus building South Africa's positive image. Moving forward, South Africa needs to pay more attention to its soft power currencies if it is to realise its regional blueprint endeavours. Hence, as it continues to aspire to regional leadership and acceptance, Pretoria's rising regional influence will solely depend on its capacity to successfully use its soft power attributes with its hard power capabilities. It must, however, be noted that there are instances where South Africa's soft power attributes have been severely weakened (Chiroro, 2012)

While these instances have not always been from a Southern African perspective, they have, nevertheless, painted a bad image of Pretoria's soft power credentials in the region and afar. Some of these include South Africa's refusal to grant a VISA to Dalai Lama in 2009, and its failure to arrest Omar al-Bashir (former Sudanese president) who was blamed for committing gross genocide and was sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC). South Africa allowed him to leave the country despite a warrant for his arrest. Yet again, the spate of xenophobic attacks (Modesto and Sajeev, 2016) against foreign nationals from 2008 onwards has also contributed immensely to the decline of South Africa's soft power. This has been further fuelled by prominent figures such as King Goodwill Zwelithini who once stated that all foreign nationals should pack their bags and return to their home countries. This statement was not well received by most Southern African states and others from Sub-Saharan Africa. However, South Africa's ability to further utilise its soft power currencies will largely be determined by its capability to downplay the aggression attached to the progression of its hegemonic ambition. Being a hegemon is not a bad thing; nonetheless, how this role is perceived and pursued is of importance for any country in any region (Ogunnubi and Amao, 2016).

3.4 Impediments facing South Africa's regional integration and governance frameworks

It is no hidden fact (as alluded in Chapter two) that post the colonial era, regional integration became a prominent doctrine to spearhead the continent's economic growth blueprints. However, over the past few decades, there have been vast challenges. Challenges of regional

integration in Southern Africa are a result of colonialism. This has left many regional states crippled in terms of resources for their own development and economic growth perspective such as infrastructure, with continued instability in some member states post the colonial era (Mlambo, 2018). According to Mapuva and Muyenga-Mapuva, (2014), within Southern Africa and perhaps Africa in general, the issue of overlapping membership has remained a problem for most RECs.

Overlapping membership not only brings with it duplication, competition and confusion but it is also a burden to those who pay tax. From a Southern African perspective, the BLNS states are all members of the SACU as well as members of the SADC, while others belong to COMESA³⁴. This brings with it vast hindrances as states have to negotiate in a number of forums and negotiate policies that may be irrelevant and conflicting to some of them. This overlapping membership can also bind states in agreeing into treaties beyond their will (Mapuva and Muyenga-Mapuva, 2014). To add to this, uneven development in the region has caused South Africa as a hegemon to be at the fore of regional integration blueprints. Nevertheless, a critical point of departure would be to ask ourselves what challenges are faced by South Africa in its pursuance of regional integration in Southern Africa.

Alden and Le Pere (2009) assert that the degree to which South Africa's hegemonic stance can efficiently be translated into a leadership role in Southern Africa rests upon two considerations. Firstly, Pretoria is still struggling with the difficulties of consolidating its internal democratic transition. Post-1994, there are still wounds of the apartheid legacy and a plethora of economic and social problems are still at play. Secondly, South Africa is grappling to establish a moral economy that meets both domestic needs and continental challenges. After over two decades post the apartheid era, the failure of the South African government to deliver essential socio-economic change is severely affecting the ruling ANC. As the pressure for domestic responsibilities grows at an alarming rate, Pretoria is forced to diminish its other regional activities³⁵ and particularly those involving development. According to Alden and Schoeman (2015), South Africa's hegemonic standpoint in both Southern Africa and the African continent is challenged by a number of factors, some of which include:

³⁴ Southern African states that are part of COMESA include Comoros, eSwatini, DRC, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

³⁵ The 2012 NDP strictly stipulates that South Africa should focus on its domestic priorities by creating jobs, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality (National Planning Commission, 2011).

- i. The limited aptitude to translate a plethora of vital features of its financial, economic and military power into robust foreign gain;
- ii. Pretoria's failure to effectively exercise influence over some African regimes. A close reference to this may be former Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe; and
- iii. South Africa's declining material power, which is being echoed by its own anaemic domestic economy.

Again, when one looks at South Africa's domestic issues, the three vital problems that have grown remarkably over the past two decades are unemployment³⁶, inequality and poverty, which were and still are a serious problem for the post-apartheid government. While much was expected from the democratically elected government, it has found it tough to alter the country's socio-economic ills. Because of such domestic burdens, most citizens will continue to depend on the government's social grants. Over the years the amount provided by the government through social grants has increased tremendously from ZAR 87.5 billion in 2010/11, ZAR 121.3 million 2015/16 and ZAR 151 billion in 2016/17. At present, over 31% (17 million) of the country's populace of about 58.78 million depend on government's social grant services (Bimha, 2017).

Hence, in order to have a more active role in regional integration, Pretoria has to get its own house in order first. One of the reasons why South Africa's role in the region shrinks is a result of the substantial material and human resources used to address domestic issues. Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017) contend that the wide gap between the rich and the poor has led to increased crime rates, xenophobia, and the wide cronyism and corruption levels within government. While there have been ongoing internal clashes within the ANC government, particularly when Mr Jacob Zuma came into office, the ANC's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has only benefitted a few politically connected individuals, while millions of South Africans remain poor. Concerns about the capture of the state by those connected to former president Jacob Zuma have continued to make headlines in the media. This includes the refurbishing (under dubious processes) of his Nkandla homestead and his association with the controversial Gupta family. Under Mr Zuma's reign as president, the latter had immense influence on the country's political and economic landscape, hence, going as far as offering top government positions to ministers and deputy ministers such as Mcebisi Jonas (Ogunnubi and Ettang, 2018). Therefore, South Africa's regional image of democracy and good governance is tarnished. The decline in

³⁶ Unemployment estimates for the first quarter of 2020 currently stands at 30.1%. (Statistics South Africa, 2020).

political morality and the wide-spread scandals that have rocked the ANC government have cast doubt upon South Africa's continued leadership role.

This is further coupled with the 2012 Marikana mine massacre where the South African police used live ammunition to shoot at protesting mineworkers, wounding and killing 34. As noted by Municipal IQ³⁷ (2019), as a result of poverty and socio-economic issues, South Africa has seen a rapid rise in service delivery protests, particularly in townships and rural areas. In 2018, there were 237 recorded service delivery protests around South Africa, the largest number since 2005 where only 34 such protests were recorded. Thus, such problems distract South Africa's regional engagements (Tella, 2018) as it has to utilise vast resources, which make it an even harder task for Pretoria to deploy its full potential towards regional issues (Odubajo and Akinboye, 2017).

As Christiano (2018) postulates, Pretoria's internal problems are likely to have major repercussions on other Southern African states as a result of their high dependency on South Africa; the decline in the country's economy might also cause a momentous downturn in their economies. These severe (internal) problems make it difficult to pursue and prioritise its own interests while limiting some of these hindrances. Prys (2007) reminds us that another major problem facing South Africa's regional integration endeavours and at times causing tensions with its regional members, is the vast inroads by South African businesses. Some view these businesses as being authoritarian and at times disregarding a specific country's code of conduct. South African companies are accused of not hiring local workers, exploiting high unemployment rates, discouraging trade unionism and failing to protect the health and safety of workers (Hamill, 2018). While these companies are seen to be exploitive, people fail to take into account the role these companies have played in stimulating economies, reviving transport and communication infrastructure, increasing GDP and generating employment. We may somehow deduce that because of such domestic socio-economic challenges, there is doubt that South Africa will place greater emphasis on a Southern African first approach; this will create discord with other regional members.

South Africa's regional leadership is a result of its economic prowess, economic engagement(s) with other states and international recognition; however, this is not because of its democratic development, human rights activism or moral appeal (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017). If a state

³⁷ Municipal IQ is a specialised local government data and intelligence organisation that gathers data on service delivery protest staged against municipalities in South Africa.

is to engage in a leadership role beyond its borders, it requires a vast amount of domestic political support – without this, its diplomatic, economic and military interventions will lack power and legitimacy. While South Africa is grappling with domestic challenges, this does not suggest that Pretoria should in anyway disengage from its regional responsibilities. As a hegemonic state, this will be neither practical nor desirable (Hamill, 2018). Nevertheless, a major challenge lies in finding a way to meet its domestic socio-economic objectives while also contributing to regional development.

Without a robust development-driven domestic policy, South Africa will not have the economic might or reliability to undertake a firmer regional development role. While one may not disregard the fact that South Africa's economy is the most sophisticated in Southern Africa, the current, future sustainability and development of the region are inextricably linked to the stability and progress of other states in the region. To have a firmer voice in the region, Pretoria has to support its citizens while also having the aptitude to keep a conscientious balance between government obligations and civic responsibility.

Moreover, for it to have a more robust role in regional integration, there is a need for South Africa to address the domestic challenges it faces 26 years into a democratic era. For Pretoria, to be an effective hegemon, its role must ultimately involve its superior capabilities in comparison with its regional neighbors. Also, it must hold legitimate power, driven with the ability to co-ordinate beneficial political, social and economic relations with other regional members.

3.5 Conclusion

Essentially, this chapter was made up of four sections. The first section aimed to robustly unearth South Africa's regional hegemonic stance in Southern Africa post-1994. This unearthing made for a nuanced appraisal of Pretoria's post-apartheid hegemonic standpoint. The section aimed to ponder on South Africa's soft power currencies. In essence, it aimed to uncover what Pretoria's soft power attributes are and how it has thus far utilised these to further gain regional recognition as a hegemonic state. Section three aimed to look at the challenges facing South Africa's regional integration endeavors' in the region by fundamentally unpacking how both its domestic and regional challenges have contributed to its being severely affected in terms of a role as a more progressive player towards regional leadership. The fourth section aimed to provide the concluding remarks.

CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA POST-DEMOCRATIZATION

4.1 Introduction

The aim of the previous chapter was to review relevant literature concerning South Africa's quest for regional leadership in Southern Africa post the democratization era. This was to be achieved via three thematic themes, which included delving into Pretoria as a regional hegemonic state, unearthing South Africa's soft power attributes and perhaps most importantly, observing at the obstacles currently facing South Africa in its pursuit for regional integration in Southern Africa post the apartheid era.

Chapter three shows that with regards to its economic standpoint, South Africa stands as an economic powerhouse of Southern Africa (albeit with diverse viewpoints from other regional member states) and its companies have since 1994 made significant inroads in most Southern African countries. Again, it is evident that South Africa possesses all the required attributes to be regarded as a state that possesses soft power attributes in Southern Africa because of its rich resources, albeit with some flaws (the Daila Lama and Omar al Bashir sagas, to name a few). Lastly, the chapter delved into the hindrances facing South Africa's regional integration efforts in Southern Africa. In sum, it shows that without a robust domestic policy, Pretoria will grapple to undertake a firmer regional development role concerning regional integration in the region.

Moving forward, this chapter draws from both primary and secondary data sources to assess Pretoria's regional integration efforts in Southern Africa and to consider factors (if any) that have contributed to successive regional integration frameworks. Such discussions will focus on looking at South Africa's post-1994 membership to the SADC, its foreign policy post-democratization and lastly, its mediation and peacekeeping role in three Southern African countries (Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC). Such assessments are acute for the fact that most (if not all) were of importance to the South African government from the transition years of apartheid and when the Mandela administration assumed office in 1994. Drawing from that, they are of importance to ponder in order to draw a nuanced articulation on what impact they have had in South Africa's regional integration endeavours.

4.2 South Africa's post-1994 membership in the SADC: From Segregation to Partnership

The year 2020 marks exactly 26 years since South Africa became a democratic state and, perhaps equally important, since it became a member of one of Africa's eight RECs in the SADC. Currently, the SADC (see figure 4.1) is headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana and comprises of sixteen countries that have a total population of over 345 million citizens.

Figure 4.1: Showing current SADC member states.



Source: SADC (2019).

Tjonneland (2013) affirms that countries that are SADC members are diverse and comprise both rich and poor states. Some of these states are small island countries and some are landlocked. Again, all of these states have been colonised by a variety of European countries that left significant legacies concerning their political systems, languages and cultures.

Joining the SADC, however, was not South Africa's first time as a member of a Southern African regional bloc. South Africa had since 1910 been a member of the SACU (the oldest customs union in the world). Nevertheless, when South Africa joined the SADC, there was much enthusiasm for the role it would assume, particularly as this was an era post-apartheid and driven by a new democratic government. The SADC came into being after the then ten SADCC members signed a treaty in 1992 transforming the SADCC to the SADC, hence, transferring the former from a loose association into a lawfully binding agreement. Such a transition was viewed as a noteworthy change towards human development and regional integration to revive sectorial in integration and co-operation (Molefi, 2003). Pallotti (2004) submits that the signing of the Windhoek treaty made ambiguous reference to the need for structural transformation of the economies of Southern Africa, together with the new international development priorities of trade liberalisation and private sector-led growth. After the treaty was signed, numerous intentions were envisioned which were geared towards economic development, which included aspects such as security, peace and trade (Hegner, 1998).

The treaty further outlined that the SADC members states ought to involve the populace of the region together with non-state actors in regional integration programmes. At its launch in 1992, the SADC had its original ten members from the erstwhile SADCC, Pretoria together with Mauritius which joined in 1994. In 2005, Madagascar became a member while in 1997, the DRC and Seychelles also became members of this regional grouping (Mays, 2015). In 2004, Seychelles excused itself from this REC, however, re-applied in 2007 and re-joined in 2008. The SADC preferred a development integration method that categorised the economic and political diversities of regional member states, and encompasses their trade patterns, production structures, development initiatives, resources endowments and resources provision mechanisms (Mufune, n.d). It must be noted that when South Africa joined this REC, it joined an organisation of governments and territories of diverse and different economies and geographical states with both large and minor populations. Because of its robust economy, Pretoria became the SADC's most important member (Saurombe, 2010).

The SADC's treaty of 1992 outlined the following objectives:

1. Enhance the lives of the population of Southern Africa through regional integration and development activities
2. Initiate, economic, cultural and social links in Southern Africa through the involvement of people and institutions in the region
3. Implement instruments to gather resources to implement the desired SADC activities
4. Implement strategies aimed at eliminating hindrances to open movement of goods, capital, labour, services and people in Southern Africa
5. Promotion of regional human development and technological transfer
6. Improving management and performance in the region, and
7. Enhance international relations of member countries and assistance in mobilising financial resources (SADC Treaty, 1992; Article 5).

Moreover, the SADC's core principles of regional integration are:

1. Sovereign equality of all member states
2. Regional integration to realise development, promote growth and alleviate poverty
3. Security co-operation to enhance defence, state safety and human safety measures, and
4. Political integration to foster respectable governance, democracy, human rights, law and diplomatic settlements of agreements (SADC Treaty: 1992, Article 4).

Since its formation in 1992, the REC declared that its member states should embrace not only economic integration, but also political, social and security co-operation (Saurombe, 2010). Just a decade after the end of apartheid, South Africa's FDI to SADC member states had become visible. Some of these comprised but were not limited to US\$ 6 billion by Eskom Enterprises in the Inga Project in the DRC, US\$ 56 million by Sun International in Zambia, US\$ 139 million by Vodacom in the DRC, and US\$ 1.1 billion by Sasol in the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique. South Africa produces over 80% of the total GDP of the SADC further outlining its dominance in this REC (Umezurike, Iwu and Asuelime, 2016). This is notwithstanding the fact that most Southern African economies who are members of the SADC have grown quite rapidly in the past two decades, which has stimulated a rise in trade, p driven by South African exports to the rest of the region.

Trade between South Africa and other SADC member states has grown tremendously particularly from the mid-2000s. Arndt and Roberts (2018) confirm that the rise in such growth in trade is consistent with the objective of the SADC's free trade area (FTA) together with the fruitful implementation of the tariff phase down that was agreed upon within the framework of the FTA. Perhaps this is why Arndt and Roberts (2018) confirm that Pretoria was responsible for 51% of the regional GDP of about US\$ 69 billion in 2017, followed by Angola with 18%. In the same year, South Africa was responsible for over 67% of total intra-regional exports. Such disparity undoubtedly paints a picture of the importance of South Africa's SADC membership (Bronauer and Yoon, 2018). Boosting trade within Southern Africa has over the years been of importance to the SADC further shown by an array of strategic policies and legal arrangements that have been introduced and implemented to further spearhead intra-SADC trade.

There is still growth potential concerning intra-SADC trade; however, this is still hindered by tariff and non-tariff barriers, weak manufacturing capacity, poor implementation of trade commitments and underdeveloped trade-related infrastructure (Saurombe, 2010). Intra-regional trade in this regard could perhaps be enhanced by eliminating non-tariff barriers that make trade costlier and problematic. This may also reduce trade costs and address concerns of delays. As much as states are the core drivers of regional integration, the private sector is seen as responsible for nurturing regional value chains and providing goods and services across borders. In this vein, the private sector fills the large institutional and infrastructure loopholes that affect many states not only in Southern African but Africa. The lack of infrastructure in the region has made the private sector the driver of such development (Ayodele, 2017). Borrowing from Pallotti's arguments that development in the region was to be spearheaded by private sector-led growth; the DBSA has via the SADC and other regional members spearheaded such development blueprints in Southern Africa. The DBSA is based in Midrand, South Africa, and is wholly owned by the South Africa government; the bank's focus is on large-scale projects within both the public and private sectors (DBSA, 2019). At its launch in 1983, the bank's initial main focus was on projects in South Africa, but it altered its mandate later to include Southern Africa (DBSA, 2019).

Post-democratization, the bank has been a pivotal institution in financing infrastructural projects that have in some way assisted the SADC's regional integration agenda. In Southern Africa, projects that have been financed by the DBSA include but are not limited to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), the Mozal Aluminum Smelter in Mozambique,

Mozambique to South Africa gas project, and the N4 toll road that formed a portion of the Maputo Corridor. Apart from this, a paper mill in Tanzania was a recipient of a US\$ 9.5 million loan, US\$ 10 million was loaned to the Development Bank of Zambia, the same figure to Zambian state-owned electricity utility ZESCO, and US\$ 6 million to the DRC's national power utility. The bank also assisted in funding the Queen Mamohata Memorial hospital in Maseru, Lesotho, by granting the building consortium US\$ 100 million. In May 2015, the bank through its SADC Project Preparation and Development Facility (PPDF) approved a US\$ 3 million agreement towards the development of a regional interconnector transmission line (DBSA, 2019).

Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe are countries forecasted to benefit from this project. The main goal of the project is to construct and operate a 400kv to 500kv voltage transmission covering a distance of about 935 kilometres through these three countries. While the DBSA has full responsibility for the administration, management and disbursement of the PPDF funds, all decisions are taken by the SADC PPDF steering committee. According to Ayodele (2017), while some of the South African private sector corporations operate independently from the state, their conduct, good or bad, reflects directly on the states' image. Nevertheless, the NDP highlights the importance and the need to draw the private sector in meeting its vision 2030 goals. It views the private sector as pivotal in meeting South Africa's domestic and international needs. Indeed, in chapter seven, a section that deals with positioning South Africa to the world, the NDP firmly outlines that the South African private sector ought to be:

Drawn more closely into our foreign policy-making. It is an incontestable reality of late capitalist international relations that it may be states that secure international trade or financial relations, but it is, ultimately private companies that do business across borders. This reality places a high burden of expectations on South Africa companies to act ethically and responsibility in the region, on the continent and in the world (National Planning Commission, 2011).

Throughout chapter seven, the role of the private sector as a pivotal element is such that the state has begun to adopt the role the private sector can play as a driver of its foreign policy. While the role played by South Africa and its institutions like the DBSA has been notable post-democratization, there has been the notion that South Africa puts its interests first before that of the SADC and its policies have often been incoherent as a result played by different

government departments (the Presidency, DIRCO, National Treasury and others). However, post the apartheid era, state-run enterprises have through the years made notable monetary contributions concerning financing high-end infrastructural projects in Southern Africa, just as the DBSA has and is to date still heavily involved in regional infrastructural projects.

Again, what has appeared to be a hindrance to the SADC is a reliance on donor funding, particularly from the EU (Saunders and Nagar, 2013). Despite some regional integration progress having been attained, many and various explanations have been put forward to explain the sluggish state of development and regional integration in the SADC. Some of these are the lack of political will from member states, diverse and varied levels of economic development and colonial relations of exploitation and dependence (Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva, 2014). However, some see this as the outcome of the absence of a reliable champion to push the SADC's regional integration agenda forward, and as a result of its economy, most have looked into South Africa to champion the SADC's regional integration framework (Saurombe, 2010).

What has also made the SADC struggle with its regional integration policies is the absence of common values between SADC member states, together with a failure to surrender part of their sovereignty. This merely means that the promotion of human rights, democratic norms of governance and respect for the rule of law in the region has for the most part also been deferred. Overcoming such hindrances, as Nganje (2014) argues, will require the aptitude to provide compensation and benefits to poorer and weaker member states to assist them to cope with the cost of transition. While Nganje makes a valid point, it does not seem to provide legitimate and valid reasons regarding how much can be achieved and in what way to move forward. Again, it does not state for how long or what type of compensation and benefits these will include, hence, this statement brings with it many uncertainties. Here a rational resolution would be for robust regional institutes to espouse co-operation and assist poor states, driven by robust leadership to provide needed resources. In this vein, I argue that the DBSA and other South African financing institutes have thus (perhaps not convincingly to some) played a vital part in financing robust infrastructural projects in Southern Africa and beyond. While these have not benefitted all involved (in this case, all 16 SADC states) it has in some way made a remarkable transformation and economic growth status in some states, which has both directly and indirectly benefitted other states in the region.

Stimulating regional growth does not mean that the relevant financing should come from member states but also from the private sector and civil society. However, just as Prys (2009) puts it, the fact that South Africa has robust economic might in comparison with other member states and is a member of the SADC, does not mean it is bound to take a leadership role here. Leadership requires enormous intellectual capacity, diplomatic influence, political will, and a well-articulated development strategy and vision. The leadership South Africa is expected to play here requires enormous number of resources (human and material), together with diverse government departments playing their role (Nganje, 2014). Since the Mandela administration, South Africa has over the years shown some commitments, albeit in various ways, and coupled with diverse views in its foreign policy towards the region (see subsequent section), which ought to lead to both economic growth and development-driven blueprints.

4.3 South Africa's Post-1994 Foreign Policy: A New Paradigm Shift Post the Apartheid Era

In 2002, African scholars in Korwa Adar and Rok Ajulu affirmed that the change taking place in Africa after the demise of the Cold War provides convincing reasons for students, practitioners and scholars to re-evaluate the methodological, theoretical and scholarly underpinning of African states foreign policy and foreign policy-making processes. Qobo (2017) asserts that states are complex organisations whose integration with the world imitates both internal political contestations (via different political persuasion and between the fractions of the elite) and the conception of their identity, together with how they observe their place in the world to be. Therefore, in this view, organisational co-ordination, policy thrust, and execution are all vital in fruitfully projecting a state's brand. As Landsberg and Masters (2017) inform us, foreign policy is rooted in the reasons why certain decisions are taken, thus, foreign policy-making is an inherently political process pertaining to the fact that there is a range of actors, each with own objectives and interest(s), competing to have their own voice heard. While heads of states at times drive foreign policymaking and decisions, the domestic and international environment, actors and institutions, via which they function, are also pivotal. Van Nieuwkerk (2017) opines that foreign policy is made up of and conducted in a context characterised by complexity and change inter alia:

1. A change in the resources, numbers and status of states and non-state actors
2. National security narratives marked by old and new understanding of security, and
3. Power and influence are exercised in new ways.

As a point of departure, it has been a long journey from the apartheid era during which Pretoria was regarded as a pariah state and isolated from the world as a result of its destructive foreign policy aimed at defending and promoting white minority rule (Marthoz, 2012). According to Death (2011), South Africa is a pivotal case for debates on foreign policy because of the saliency of vital questions pertaining to the effectiveness and possibility of an ethical approach to international relations. As already expounded, during the apartheid regime, Pretoria's relations with the outside world were marked by isolation from international institutions and destabilisation towards other African states. In his respected 1993 publication in foreign affairs titled *South Africa's Future Foreign Policy*³⁸, Mr Nelson Mandela stated that "as the 1980s drew to a close, I could not see much of the world from my prison cell, but I knew it was changing. There was little doubt in my mind that this would have a profound impact on my country, on the Southern Africa region and the continent of which I am proud to be a citizen" (Mandela, 1993). Again, in this publication, he outlined the following aspects that were to form the pillar of South Africa's future foreign policy:

1. That the issue of human rights is central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental
2. That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide
3. That considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations
4. That peace is the goal to which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed
5. That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices, and
6. That economic development depends on growing regional and international economic co-operation in an interdependent world.

Evans (1994) expounds these six pillars and outlines that two transitional pillars drove Pretoria's new foreign policy post the apartheid era. These were (1) the revitalisation of the

³⁸ Graham (2012) notes that this article was not written by Nelson Mandela and he had no involvement in its creation; also, the ANC itself had little input in it. The article was actually written by Peter Vale who was supported by various experts (Gary van Staden, Rob Davies and Alan Hirsch). The ANC only approved the piece and allowed Mandela's name to be associated with the article.

South African economy and (2) the desire for a political solution to the internal problems of South Africa to satisfy the international community and ensure their support. We may see South Africa's foreign policy in two phases; the first phase from 1948–1994, which was under the leadership of the NP, and the second phase of the ANC from 1994 to date the transition phase (1990-1994) is covered under the second phase (Stephen, 2005). The landslide victory in the 1994 elections (62.65%) by the ANC undoubtedly allowed it to alter the country's foreign policy which over the years prior to 1994 led to Pretoria's branding as an authoritarian and racist state.

In this vein, post-democratization, South Africa's foreign policy was viewed by the ANC government as a strategy to enhance further development within Pretoria's geographical area particularly the Southern African region. As Alden and Le Pere (2004) put it, the new South Africa faced clashing tensions concerning developing what they call an activist role in foreign policy, premised on a belief in the compatibility of human rights norms, its own development and solidarity politics.

The ANC had a notion that better involvement by the country in sectoral co-operation projects, regional trade and joint development of regional resources, together with infrastructure, could pave avenues to promote development and growth in both South Africa and Southern Africa. Qobo (2017) maintains that the early developments after the ANC was victorious saw South Africa's greater inclination towards an idealistic thrust via various policy documents outlining a greater premium on issues related to human rights and peace-building. To the South African government, the promotion of human rights in the context of economic, political, environmental and social settings was born out of South Africa's (fundamentally, the ANC's) legacy of resistance to the apartheid regime that was to all intentions a crime against humanity (see Ogunnubi, 2019).

Less than a year after the 1994 elections, Pretoria had already established full diplomatic relations with most countries, notably 46 African states; moreover, it had been (re)admitted to full membership of the UN, OAU, G77, the SADC, and the Non-Aligned Movement, and started negotiations with the EU (Alden and Le Pere, 2004). Again, the first foreign policy document adopted by the ANC, 'A Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa', that was approved in 1996 by Cabinet, held out a high vision for the Southern African region via mutual assistance, where necessary, economic co-operation and joint planning of regional development initiatives.

4.4 Conceptualising Foreign Policy

In research, it is of importance to define concepts as so to facilitate the readers' understanding of the intended meaning, thus, the importance of defining the concept, foreign policy. Mngomezulu and Hadebe (2018) contend that when undertaking research, defining key concepts is of importance. To them, this stems from the fact that in some cases, one concept may essentially have varied and/or different meanings. Thus, to prevent ambiguity, it is vital to provide an appropriate understanding of any relevant concept(s). This ensures and ensures that both the author and reader observe matters from a similar viewpoint or may have a comparable understanding of what the concept means.

In defining foreign policy, one has to look at the first term foreign, and there is a need to differentiate between foreign policy and domestic policy. In general, foreign applies to policy towards the world outside a state's territorial borders, while on the other hand; domestic policy has to do with policies made for the internal political system. To exemplify this, signing of a trade agreement, an international treaty or supporting a rebel insurgency in another state are examples of foreign policy, whereas civil rights, education and taxes are examples of domestic policy. Naidoo (2010) informs us that one may view foreign policy as an instrument via which a state and its various government structures conduct relations with the rest of the world (socially, economically and politically).

In essence, it is the output of a state into the global system. Inter alia, analysing foreign policy contains an acute understanding of the domestic and international environments and their relation. In this vein, the internal (domestic) forms the context in which the foreign policy is made, and the external (international) environment is where such foreign policy is implemented. Ogunnubi (2013) offers the view that foreign policy may be articulated as the intended and direct actions of a country towards its external environment, together with the domestic conditions under which such actions are constructed. It is also possible to construe foreign policy as a set of carefully articulated objectives and goals which a state seeks to actualise and realise via the conduct of its relationship with others. This could be in the form of decisions made together with actions taken by a country in its interactions with other states. In sum, one may deduce that the foreign policy of a country is concerned with the behaviour of a state towards other states; basically, it relates to the ways in which the governments of independent states relate to one another in order to achieve various short-term, middle-term and long-term objectives.

4.4.1 Dawn of a Democratic State and South Africa's new Foreign Policy Aspiration(s)

Graham (2012) points out that having had some sort of contact with the international community while in exile for its military and political support, it was ironic and surprising that the ANC entered the transition negotiations with the NP unprepared for discussions pertaining to foreign policy. While in exile, the ANC theorised about governing South Africa; however, it never fully articulated its plans for the country when it achieved power. By 1990, the ANC had thus created only three documents pertaining directly to foreign policy. These were the Freedom Charter of 1955, the Final Report of the Commission on foreign policy from the Kabwe Conference of 1985, and the 1989 Harare Declaration. These documents were never an acceptable basis for the foreign policy of an aspiring governing political party or a liberation movement for that matter; they were just a basic list of envisioned principles (see Graham, 2012).

On the 2nd of February 1990 in the South African parliament, De Klerk announced the immediate end to the ban of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the ANC and the SACP, thus, bringing with it a beginning of a new era in the South African political landscape (Torreguiter, 2009; Jacobs, 2019). Pfister (2003) notes that after his release from prison in February 1990, Nelson Mandela had taken 16 trips overseas and visited 49 countries by mid-1992. These were merely taken to smooth sanctions that had been imposed on South Africa; nevertheless, what made it a daunting task was that the ANC had no guiding foreign policy framework from exile, which could direct and inform such international efforts. Upon receiving his Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 alongside former apartheid president FW de Klerk, Nelson Mandela articulated that:

We devote what remains of our lives to the use of our country's unique and painful experience to demonstrate, in practice, that the normal condition for human existence is democracy, justice, peace, non-racism, non-sexism, prosperity for everybody, a healthy environment and equality and solidarity among the peoples.

Lalbahadur (2016) argues that the alteration in power from the NP to the ANC undoubtedly intended that the newly elected and democratic South African government had to implement a more considered approach to address its foreign policy objectives which encompassed among other things as to how it was going to wield its economic might in a milieu of distrust. The pillars on which Pretoria's foreign policy has rested post-1994, has received much scholarly attention, hence, revisiting the ANC-led foreign policy is a worthy exercise. After the demise

of apartheid and coupled with the 1994 elections, major socio-political and socio-economic shifts brought about a major changeable environment which via policymaking, Pretoria's authorities endeavoured to shape towards a nationally democratized, unified and internationally competitive society. South African leaders had to draft policies that were to reintegrate South Africa into the global economy, while at the same time, policymaking had to also respond to internal conditions that featured high levels of inequality and poverty (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006). Fundamentally, internal and external foreign policymaking was geared to addressing vital areas, notably socio-economic change, democratic consolidation, international competitiveness, and national and racial unification. However, post the apartheid era and as most have noted, it has not been a smooth journey for policymakers to merge objectives related to globalisation with the national transformation (see Cornelissen, 2017).

Post-democratization, because of its smooth transition to democracy, the international community has looked on Pretoria to spearhead values of human rights and democracy, as well as address underdevelopment and eradication of poverty. Hence, South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy has been solely devoted to the African continent, more precisely, Southern Africa (South African Government, 2011). Although the ANC government possessed no previous experience in actually governing a country, nevertheless, since the transition period of 1990-1994, it was able to transform itself from a liberation movement into a solid political party and then into government. Post-democratization, one may look at South Africa's foreign policy in four phases. Phase one is that of Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), phase two is that of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), phase three was the Jacob Zuma administration (2009-2018) and the fourth phase is the current Cyril Ramaphosa³⁹ administration (2019 to date). Right after assuming office, the Mandela administration devoted its attention to consolidating Pretoria's already strained relationship with most African states, particularly those in Southern Africa.

As mentioned earlier, while the Mandela administration had no governance experience, it, however, showed the international community that it could reintegrate itself in regional, continental and international organisations. Besides such, this administration dedicated much of its attention to Africa largely because the country was now seen as a major power in the continent (Ogunnubi, 2013). Fundamentally, Mandela's administration was focused on the reorientation and renewal of South Africa's diplomacy, pursuing the participation and re-

³⁹ One cannot dwell much on the administration of Kgalema Motlanthe because his term in office was short. Again, one cannot say much about the current Ramaphosa administration as he has just assumed office, thus, the crux of his foreign policy towards the region and Africa at large will be robustly assessed as he moves forward in his presidential term.

organisation of South Africa in the international economy. Also, policymakers at this time focused on what Shoba (2018) considers a triple strategy to unite South Africans after the aftermath of apartheid, build a non-sexist and non-racial society together and forge alliances with African states, importantly those in Southern Africa. This was to be done by forming a rainbow nation and keeping in mind the importance of the international community.

Ogunnubi (2013) posits that when Thabo Mbeki, the second South African president post the apartheid era assumed office in 1999, there was a slight paradigm shift in South Africa's foreign policy. His approach was more on African renewal and aimed to bring a sense of purpose and direction. Mbeki sought to establish himself as an African statesman and pan-Africanist via the notion of his African Renaissance with its message of endeavour and African unity. When looking at it from a Southern African perspective, in doing so, Mbeki emphasised the restructuring of the SADC, which, as Ogunnubi (2013) argues, was pivotal concerning his African agenda outlook.

However, considering the fragile relationship between South Africa and its neighbours, such foreign policy principles were not going to be welcomed by some, merely because of the past apartheid regimes destabilisation policies driven by apartheid exceptionalism, spearheaded by beliefs of racial dominance, together with ideological differences actively isolated the government from any political engagement(s) with other African countries (Lalbahadur, 2016). Throughout his tenure in office, Mbeki sought to downplay suggestions that South Africa was a hegemonic state; rather, it was a country focused on the development of Africa as a whole and Southern Africa via the SADC, together with strengthening the AU.

He sought to spearhead this through promoting democratization, regional integration, economic growth, peace and security, and improving the standard of living for the general populace. Again, this was to strengthen the institutional capacity and governance of the SADC while making sure that whatever timeframes were put forward by the SADC, South Africa was able to meet. His passion for African renewal showed in his commitment concerning the African Renaissance project, the transformation of the OAU to the AU, and planning and supporting of the NEPAD as an economic outlook; these organisations contained the notion of African upliftment and economic governance. This was because he recognised the pivotal role(s) multilateral forums could play in stimulating Africa's security architecture, economic growth and development (Ogunnubi, 2013). When Jacob Zuma assumed office in 2009 amid much controversy because of pending corruption and fraud charges against him, his foreign

policy marked another paradigm shift from the North to the South. This, however, did not alter on South Africa's stance in its importance foreign policy on the Southern African region.

Zuma's inauguration also brought with it a name change from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to DIRCO; analysts quoted this as a wise move in Pretoria's foreign policy that also reflects its domestic policies. Zuma's administration was also rooted on the development and economic growth of South Africa. Naidoo (2010) contends that Zuma's "Outcomes-based Approach" (see table 4.1) adopted by his administration in 2009, encompassed four priority areas which reflected the principles of peace, security, prosperity and integration. These were rooted in Pretoria's overarching objective of creating a better South Africa while also contributing to a better and safer Africa.

Table 4.1: Showing “Outcomes-based Approach” identifying South Africa’s Foreign Policy Objectives.

Outcomes-based Priorities	Sub outputs (Deliverables)
Output 1: Enhanced the African agenda and sustainable development.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deepened contribution to regional and continental security and stability and sustainable development • Contribution to peace missions and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), and • Enhanced technical and development co-operation
Output 2: Enhanced regional integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional economic integration and • Regional political integration
Output 3: Reformed global governance and peace and security institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened regional, continental, and global governance institutions and international platforms, and • Enhanced representation of South Africans in international institutions.
Output 4: Enhanced trade and investment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased value-added exports to targeted economies • Increased inward investment from targeted countries, and • Increased market share through aggressive marketing.

Source: See Naidoo (2010).

Zuma’s administration continued its support and vast contribution to the AU and its official frameworks such as the African Monetary Fund, the African Central Bank, the African Court of Justice, the African Investment Bank, NEPAD, the African Court of Human and Peoples right and the APRM. However, a year after becoming South African head of state, Zuma’s foreign policy also brought with it an interest in emerging global economies. South Africa

became the first African country to become a member of BRICS⁴⁰, just two years after the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crises. Hence, while the reaction from scholars and policymakers alike are divided on Pretoria's being a BRICS member (positive and negative), to some, this is one of the best foreign policy achievement post-democratization (Shoba, 2018).

Drawing from the above viewpoint, Anthony, Tembe and Gull (2015) are of the view that the BRIC countries have influenced South Africa's foreign policymaking. While the Mandela and Mbeki foreign policy was more Afrocentric in nature, there was a slight shift in that of Zuma. Mainly because, as these authors further argue, firstly, this BRICS membership gave South Africa a robust platform to further succeed where it was failing to be a Sub-Saharan leader and influential role player; secondly, to have a strong saying in international multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN. Amao (2019) aver that South Africa's BRICS membership provides it with the perfect platform not only to further lead the Southern African region but to also lead the whole continent. To him, this is a result of four pivotal criteria: (1) power resources, (2) claim for leadership, (3) acceptance of leadership, and (4) employment of foreign policy instruments, thus, South Africa can be recognised as a regional power. It is this vein that Van Wyk (2017), in order to amply illustrate the vision of former South African heads of states, provides us with what she calls the discourse formations (see table 4.2) of South Africa's foreign policy during various presidencies after the 1994⁴¹ era.

⁴⁰ These are regarded as five emerging economies who were known as BRIC before South Africa's arrival. These are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. They meet regularly to discuss a variety of development-oriented issues including security, trade, investments, energy and global government reforms.

⁴¹ As started earlier, Kgalema Motlanthe is omitted from this discourse due to his relatively short spell in office while the current Ramaphosa administration has just assumed office.

Table 4.2: Showing discourse formations of South Africa’s foreign policy during various presidencies post-democratization.

Head(s) of State(s)	Nelson Mandela 1994-1999	Thabo Mbeki 1999- 2008	Jacob Zuma 2009- 2018
State Identity	<i>New South Africa</i>	<i>African South Africa</i>	<i>Solidarity South Africa</i>
Founding and maintenance of myth	South Africa miracle	African Renaissance	Diplomacy of Ubuntu
Object of foreign policy	<i>The People</i>	<i>The African people</i>	<i>The People of the Global South</i>
Foreign policy purpose	South African uniqueness	South Africa as a problem-solver	South Africa as a carer
Status	Returnee	Reformer	Leader

Source: Van Wyk (2017).

Drawing from the above, Van Wyk aims to offer us a nuanced appraisal of the direction that was taken by former South Africa heads of states with regards to how they approached their foreign policy narrative in South Africa post-democratization. Nevertheless, Knecht and Weatherford (2004) inform us of the fact that foreign policymaking is not an easy process and involves many actors and five important stages (see table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Stages of Foreign Policy Formulation.

Stage	Action	Plan
One	Agenda setting	Foreign policymakers delineate a list of potential areas of focus and decision-makers point out the rewards and dangers involved.
Two	Opinion generation	This is made up of a brainstorming session; decision-makers make a list of the most important and urgent concerns.
Three	Policy design	Here policy decisions are made as to the issues identified in the previous stage.
Four	Implementation	This stage includes strategies and tactics through which the policy formulated is put into action. This stage includes both states and non-state actors.
Five	Policy review	Here decision-makers evaluate the success and failure of the policy and make necessary amendments or abandon the policy, depending on the outcome of the evaluation process.

Source: Author's own compilation; See Knecht and Weatherford (2004).

This confirms that for every state, its foreign policy is goal-oriented, as there are objectives to be met. However, success concerning the attainment of such objectives is not given as a country might fail to achieve its desired goals. To track some of the ways South Africa has used its

foreign policy, one may look the role it has played (post-democratization) in vital multilateral initiatives that are Afrocentric in nature such as the transformation of the AU to the OAU, the APRM and the NEPAD. This, as Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) stipulate, has helped Pretoria to build further on its already impressive soft power attributes.

Therefore, as the authors further submit, this has resulted in South Africa effectively exercising robust leadership on multilateral platforms on behalf of Southern Africa, Africa and the developing world. In essence, South Africa has transformed herself from a benign regional powerhouse to a benevolent one via a carefully orchestrated foreign policy because of its soft power credentials. In this way, its foreign policy has in some way gained vast international legitimacy, global reputation, respect, and recognition and gained more respect than other African powerhouses such as Nigeria and Egypt. In this vein, while Pretoria might not be the biggest powerhouse in Africa (albeit one in Southern Africa) as it has been surpassed by Nigeria and does not possess the most advanced military capabilities in Africa (see subsequent section), its foreign policy and soft power attributes show vast possible contention with regards for its leadership status in Africa and particularly Southern Africa. When one looks at the latest government blueprint, the NDP vision 2030 that was undertaken by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2011, its chapter seven focuses on positioning South Africa in the world. This chapter contends that Pretoria's foreign policy must be shaped by the interplay of political, environmental, diplomatic security, economics and regional co-operative dynamics that define early 21st century dynamics.

Again, this foreign policy should remain cognisant of global shifts in the hard, soft, smart or metal power from the West to the East. Importantly, a critical and clear understanding of our national, regional and continental priorities should drive South Africa's foreign policy. This should be done by increasing regional integration driven by increased trade, importantly through the immediate SADC neighbours where the South African business has an effective say in foreign policy-making (National Planning Commission, 2011).

We may, therefore, assume that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of principles, objectives, policies, plans and objectives. Given the past and current participation of South Africa in regional, continental and international forums and platforms, one might deduce that it has fully integrated itself in both continental and the international community. In essence, while it is pivotal to unearthing the success of South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy, no foreign policy of a state is forever deemed perfect, hence, there are bound to be hindrances.

4.4.2 Constraints facing South Africa's Foreign Policy post-democratization.

While it is significant to recognise a state's foreign policy, nevertheless it is also pivotal to unearth or perhaps track some hindrances in a country's foreign policy, in this case, South Africa. As Marthoz (2012) argues, the challenges are there and are immense. For instance, Ogunnubi (2019) posit that foreign policy-making is by no means an easy thing; to him, it is basically as a result of diverse factors which include opposing opinions among those assigned with the responsibility of articulating foreign policy, lack of financial and material resources to implement foreign policy, and continuous changes in the global landscape, together with other factors. Firstly, post-democratization, South Africa had to create a foreign policy from scratch, linking itself with many countries that had earlier boycotted it because of the apartheid regime, and joining dozens of continental and international organisations that had also turned their back on it. Twenty-six years later, one would not say that Pretoria had been a pariah state; however, while it has gained credible global recognition post-1994, its foreign policy has continued to be skewed, as observed by many scholars (see Husar, 2016; Headley and Van Wyk, 2012 and Thies and Nieman, 2017), torn between ethics and interests, tolerating authoritarian regimes while being contradictory.

According to Hadebe (2015), South Africa has in recent years been labelled as a country that sets out targets but fails on the implementation and even monitoring of them. Thus, post-democratization, its foreign policy has been seen as incoherent and inconsistent. During the tenure of the Mandela administration, his foreign policy was criticised for often lacking direction. One might offer the view that perhaps he had just assumed office and as stated earlier, lacked prior experience in governing a state, while his ministers who were supposed to guide him in his decision-making processes, lacked knowledge. During his presidency, when unrest unfolded in the DRC, his administration chose to first isolate itself and intervene through the neutral route aimed at negotiating a ceasefire when tensions were already at boiling point. Pfister (2000) argues that such a blunder showed a lack of direction in the first South African administration after apartheid as the government should have intervened earlier as the tense situation in the central African country had been apparent much earlier. Again, when the tiny kingdom of Lesotho experienced political instability in the aftermath of the elections in September 1998, South Africa only intervened when sanctioned by the SADC; it did not go to Maseru at first where the instability was unfolding, but to the Katse dam (see subsequent section) and then to Maseru (Mkalipi, 2002). Saunders (2014) affirms that in the same year, Mandela's foreign policy was further hampered when his administration ignored the severe

concerns of other SACU members by signing a bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. This showed that there was no sign of co-operation from South Africa's point of view with regards to its neighbours. Prys (2009) identifies another blunder in South Africa's foreign policy; to her, South Africa was severely criticised after the 2000 era for its quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe at the time when Mbeki was head of state.

On a contradictory point, Prys argues that President Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" ensured regional stability; however, I tend to question this argument. In this regard, how in her view could this bring about regional stability and the protection of human rights when the rights and instability of millions of Zimbabweans were affected? This points to the fact that human security was more important than regime security. Likewise, if this is her view, did the years moving forward help to stabilise Zimbabwe's economy and its populace or did it further shrink the economic growth of the country bringing with it enormous sanctions and internal protests? From 2000, Zimbabwe was confronted with immense internal complications including sanctions, closures of embassies in European and other countries, termination of aid and a 12-month suspension from the Commonwealth (Miti, 2012; Alao, 2012). Berger (2007) notes that in 2007, leading up to the country's general elections, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) affiliated Morgan Tsvangirai and Lovemore Madhuku were severely beaten and arrested, and in the eyes of many, these acts were orchestrated by the ZANU-PF. The country in 2008 was experiencing inflation of 231 million%. Hence, such revelations further outline that Mbeki's quiet diplomacy stance on the Mugabe regime did not yield any significant results for the economic growth of Harare (Death, 2011).

While Mbeki's diplomacy stance may be traced to the colonialism and apartheid bond between the ANC and the ZANU-PF, in the end, one may argue that his quiet diplomacy towards Mugabe's regime further hampered the growth of Zimbabwe's economy while supporting the latter's authoritarian regime. As such, the crisis in Zimbabwe post-2000 has undoubtedly posed as one of the greatest foreign policy hindrances to the ANC-led government. While the human rights of millions of Zimbabweans were affected, South Africa did not show that it values human rights despite this being enshrined in its foreign policy values. Thus, the criticism aimed at Pretoria is a result of its prioritising its special relations with ZANU-PF over ensuring the application of its human rights agenda in its foreign policy. South Africa's refusal to take an active role in the Zimbabwe issue also brought with it harsh criticism from the West, predominantly the United Kingdom (UK), the EU and the Commonwealth whose stance on Zimbabwe centred on the removal of Robert Mugabe as head of state (Lalbahadur, 2016).

However, through years of quiet diplomacy, Mbeki may be applauded for his role in the dialogue between the ZANU–PF and the MDC, which in September 2008 led to the Global Political Agreement (GPA)⁴² that laid the foundation of the Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU encompassed arrangements on security, legal, constitutional, power-sharing and economic improvements within the country (Miti, 2012).

Alden and Le Pere (2004) are of the view that diverse actors involved in South Africa’s foreign policy are also of concern. The erstwhile DFA often found itself at crossroads with other actors involved in foreign policy-making, which ultimately led to inconsistency, incoherence and opaqueness in policy formulation. Again, post-democratization to date, domestic hurdles such as unemployment, inequality, population growth and crime have not played a significant role in South Africa’s domestic policies, which has ultimately affected its foreign policy projections in Southern Africa and afar. Therefore, the terrain of the Southern African region where South Africa should be at the fore seems to be a challenging one over the past two decades, although some success has been made. Nevertheless, one may presume that South Africa is still a young and developing state confronted with a host of domestic challenges, which at times limits its regional outreach capabilities (Nathan, 2005).

South Africa seems unable to prioritise the importance of the BRICS grouping vis-à-vis the SADC, and the SADC vis-à-vis other groupings of which it is part. Moreover, what undoubtedly had an effect in its foreign policy was Zuma’s tenure as president. His time in office was hindered by massive corruption-related scandals and state capture-related charges, further tarnishing South Africa’s continental and international image and its foreign policy. As head of state, he was confronted with numerous allegations of enriching his family and those close to him while poor South Africans have continued to suffer at the expense of greedy politicians from the ruling ANC.

Again, in line with the earlier point concerning quiet diplomacy and human rights abuse, Mills and James (2016) make a very useful point. They question why the South African government protected former Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, who was in the country in 2013 and who was wanted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC)⁴³. What

⁴² Signed in September 2008 and effective from February 2009, the GPA was an accord between Zimbabwe’s three main political parties, the ZANU–PF and the two MDC structures (Human Rights Watch, 2010). It was a power-sharing agreement between these parties that aimed to address internal challenges (political and economic) facing Zimbabwe.

⁴³ The ICC is tasked with prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and basically relies on state parties to arrest wanted individuals and surrender them to the court (Fehl, 2004).

picture does this paint of South Africa's stance on human rights abuse? Human rights are principles it aimed to stand for in its post-1994 foreign policy. While it disregarded human rights abuse in the Zimbabwean issues, it repeated this again with regards to al-Bashir. Instead of arresting al-Bashir, South Africa intended to withdraw as a member of the ICC⁴⁴ (See Cornelissen, 2017). Nevertheless, as Langa and Shai (2019) note, there is also hostility as a result of the perception that the ICC is selective in its persecutions, hence, South Africa would have received much criticism from other African states if it had gone ahead and apprehended al-Bashir. There was a notion that Pretoria had two choices; (1) that of arresting Bashir as its ICC membership dictated, and (2) supporting a fellow AU member state in Sudan. Drawing from the above viewpoint, I argue that irrespective of its ICC mandate and criticism that it would have received from other African states, South Africa showed no remorse for its failure to prevent human rights abuses, as it should have (as per its foreign policy documents) arrested Bashir and handed him over to the ICC.

The ANC under the Mbeki administration undermined human rights by receiving financial donations from Indonesia, which perpetrated human rights abuse in occupied East Timor. Again, post-1994, South Africa strengthened bilateral ties with what Graham (2012) calls pariah states such as Cuba, Libya and North Korea while continuing arms sales to countries such as Angola, Rwanda and Zaire. Thus, Strategic Comments (2017) submits that South Africa's foreign policy serves little purpose particularly under the Zuma administration as it revolved around his faction in the ruling party; one might say Zuma used his superiority in government to enrich his allies, including the controversial India-based Gupta family. For example, in 2014, it is estimated that US\$ 400 million in kickbacks was awarded to Gupta-related companies in doing businesses with South African SOEs such as Eskom, Transnet and South African Airways (SAA).

Further clouding the South African government's image was when Zuma and other KwaZulu-Natal government departments, especially the Department of Public Works, were targeted because of irregular expenditure accrued in the upgrading of his Nkandla resident in northern KwaZulu-Natal, which included allegations of corrupt activities (Motsepe, 2015). Besides, the recurring xenophobic attacks, particularly since 2008, have not enhanced perceptions of South Africa's foreign policy regionally, continentally and abroad. Thus, its foreign policy is bound to experience some form of setbacks. While the 2011 White Paper on South African foreign

⁴⁴ South Africa's attempt to withdraw from the ICC was ruled unconstitutional and invalid by a South African High Court in 2017, hence, halted (Langa and Shai, 2019).

policy outlines that the South African government intends to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor, this seems to be a mere projection that will be hard to achieve when one looks at the current statistics. Besides, these were the same projections that were made by the Mandela administration 26 years ago. One might ask whether such promises have produced any envisioned results. Has the South African government from Mandela to Zuma been able to diminish such gap? I argue that this trend has continued to rise and will continue to happen moving forward, if one looks at the ever-rising statistics relating predominantly to the number of unemployed people and the ever-increasing population rate. Again, and concisely, Landsberg and Masters (2017) opine that there is a lack of interaction between the people and the state in foreign policy-making. To them, people ought to be engaged and consulted in the drawing up of domestic and foreign policy, hence, involving active consultations with the citizens. Nonetheless, from a South Africa perspective, Pretoria's policy formulation remains a restricted project with a resultant lack of public hearings on government foreign policy. One would expect a democratic government to engage with its people on foreign policy-making as this not only assists the state in both the short and long run but also benefits the citizens.

Perhaps it is worth noting the point in Ogunnubi's (2017) published article titled; *Soft Power: The Fourth 'Tentacle' South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Here, he outlines that from an Afrocentric standpoint, regional powers face an array of hindrances at domestic, regional, continental and global level, ranging from domestic instability (internal political conflicts) and the lack of support from and resistance from small states to accept its hegemony (Ogunnubi, 2017). Such a point perhaps supports the earlier mention of hindrances that are currently facing the South African government post-democratization. With that said, perhaps it is of importance to outline some strategies that could be adopted by the ruling ANC to strengthen its foreign policy projections moving forward.

4.4.3 South Africa's Foreign Policy moving forward: What remedy (if any)?

While it has been stated that there is no consistent foreign policy (particularly from an Afrocentric perspective), one might only look at the positive and, negative aspects, and fail to give any recommendations to amend current foreign policy limitations. Hence, this section of the thesis is devoted to such engagement(s). While these recommendations might not be sufficient depending on one's view, nevertheless, they provide us with a point of departure moving forward. For example, Qobo (2017) in his analysis amply affirms that there is a dire need for businesses and government to have and share a common purpose that is aimed at boosting national economic competitiveness while also improving the reliability of a state's

economic policies domestically and internationally. Again, to him, what is lacking is a strategic form of leadership: effective strategies together with clear ideas. Some African states are not accepting Pretoria's leadership, particularly those in Southern Africa, to the point that even the NDP recognises that South Africa's power is declining, particularly when compared to that of 1994 when the Mandela administration came into power.

Equally, the failure of the current ANC government to uplift the lives of ordinary black citizens (mostly affected by poverty) has not and seems as if it will not assist its foreign policy moving forward, partly because South Africa is still severely affected by vast domestic issues. Accordingly, to address such obstacles (domestic challenges) post-democratization, there is an acute need to alter its domestic policies before its foreign policy (Marthoz, 2012). Perhaps Mills and James (2016) unearth some pivotal arguments here; to them, if South Africa has to realise its foreign policy ambition(s) post the democratic era, three strategic thrusts stand out. Firstly, there is a need to alter the foreign policy from a national interest viewpoint as defined in South Africa's constitution. This means Pretoria must fight poverty and advance human rights values. Secondly, South Africa should render support to its most influential and persuasive brand in spearheading the support for human rights and democracy predominantly from an Afrocentric point of view.

Lastly, the government should strive to create conditions for excellence in thought leadership; regenerating needed resources to DIRCO is of fundamental importance in re-shaping South Africa's foreign policy chiefly in conjunction with other departments such as the departments of Defence (DoD), Labour and Home Affairs while also utilising its robust business and civil society sector(s). Isike and Ogunnubi (2017) put on the table another argument with regards to reshaping South Africa's foreign policy. They identify other government departments that can play a fundamental role in Pretoria's current and future foreign policy through utilising its soft power reservoirs. These include the departments of (1) Tourism, (2) Communications, (3) Arts and Culture, (4) Sports and Recreation, (5) Home Affairs, (6) Science and Technology (renamed Science and Innovation), and (7) Higher Education and Training. They argue that while these departments are not active in foreign policy formulation or implementation, they are, however, becoming significant in outlining South Africa's soft power status.

Therefore, the South African government ought to incorporate them in foreign policy-making whether directly or indirectly; this is also not forgetting non-state actors such as NPOs, corporate businesses, academics, civil society, the media, research institutes, and so forth. This

would create a nuanced platform for Pretoria to influence her foreign policy by representing South Africa's interests. During the transition period (1990-1994) and after the demise of apartheid, many non-state actors and NPOs emerged and hoped for a sea change in state-society relations. Hence, the end of apartheid brought with it other research institutes that were to critically analyse South Africa's foreign policy. In 1994, the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD, now IGD⁴⁵) was established; later came the Institute for Defence Policy (now ISS⁴⁶), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) established in 1992, Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS), Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the Centre for Policy Studies that was established in the 1980 (Landsberg, 2017).

Again, if one has to look at the post-apartheid era, think tanks such as the ACCORD, ISS, the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), IGD and the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) have and are still playing a vital role when it comes to influencing South Africa's foreign policy (Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017). It must, however, be noted that not all these think tanks have major influence in foreign policy decision-making as some are mainly concerned with domestic issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, some have been prominent to engage in regional and continental integration projects spearheaded by sub regional bodies such as the SADC and continental institutions such as the AU (Landsberg, 2017). For the current Ramaphosa administration, restoring South Africa's dignity will be a major priority in the next two to three years. Lacking the confidence and trust of its counterparts, Pretoria will lag in acquiring any polices through regional development goals.

4.5 Unearthing South Africa's role in Mediation and Peacekeeping (Lesotho and the DRC) in Southern Africa post-democratization.

Post the democratic era, one of South Africa's commitments to its foreign policy has been as a leading player concerning continental peace. This may be drawn from several obligations: one, the sins of apartheid, its robust military and economic might unpinning the privilege to play an active military role and the success during its 1990–1994 transition process. Post-democratisation, South Africa's mediation and peacekeeping initiatives have been rather

⁴⁵ Institute of Global Dialogue.

⁴⁶ Institute of Security Studies.

different from those of the UN. Pretoria's has entailed formal negotiations via opposing parties and government, negotiations behind closed doors (quiet diplomacy), bringing in technical experts on various topics about peace, maintaining tight deadlines and timelines while some have been concluded by signing agreements (Nathan, 2013).

After the emergence of the OAU in 1963, coupled with the transition of many African states from colonialism to independence after the 1960s, Africa as a continent has continued to witness an array of political instability. In the DRC, Lesotho, Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Chad and so forth, this has been an ongoing phenomenon that is still witnessed today. Post the democratic era, South Africa was obliged to utilise its robust military advantage to counter any instability predominantly in Southern Africa. Since the Mandela administration, peace has continued to be a pivotal part of South Africa's foreign policy. It is no hidden fact that through and after apartheid, Pretoria has always had a robust military power in comparison to other regional states. Post-democratization, South Africa's peacekeeping missions have included the formation of a transitional government, post-conflict monitoring and security reform(s), thus, its superior military and negotiation capability has to some degree been beneficial in limiting regional conflict (Hendricks, 2015).

In this vein, Pretoria has championed peacekeeping operations on behalf of the SADC and the AU. As Adetiba (2017) expounds, most of these missions have been taken by different government components, particularly driven by the DoD via the SANDF, to deal with what one can call recurrent occurrence of regional instability and peace in the region. In essence, the SANDF (as there are many state and non-state actors) plays a significant role in South Africa's foreign policy albeit not in the decision-making process. In the UN charter, chapter 6, article 3(1), there is provision for the pacific settlement of any arising disputes between countries through negotiation, mediation, arbitration or any other practical means of their choice. Looking at it from a global viewpoint, there has and still is the need for RECs and hegemonic states to partake in any arising conflict(s). This, depending on the magnitude of the conflict entails preventive diplomacy efforts, utilisation of mediation, peace support operations, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding (Mlambo and Adetiba, 2019).

What must be noted is that instability in Southern Africa has severe effects on transparency, trade, FDI and the flow of refugees. The subsequent case studies of political instability in Lesotho and the DRC are utilised to demonstrate South Africa's diplomatic and military intervention in these countries post-democratization. Generally, the motive is to unpack some

of the vital intervention tactics deployed by Pretoria with the main objective of ending any form of instability in these two Southern African states. These two countries have since independence from their respective colonisers witnessed an array of political-related violence which undoubtedly has affected their level of economic growth and development and brought with it severe internal problems. Again, the political instability in these two Southern African countries is a consequence of oppressive domestic political structures where those in power react to opposition by means of violent suppression (Lalbahadur, 2016).

4.5.1 Instability in Lesotho

In Africa and particularly after the colonial era, the rejection of election results by the losing opposition is not something new. In fact, in most cases, it is certain to happen, often bringing with it vast clashes and ending up in the courts (Southall and Fox, 1999). Accordingly, if the tiny kingdom is permitted to accrue development and economic growth that many thought would follow after colonialism, democracy and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, there is a need to carefully understand the historical events (predominantly post-1993), which have made Lesotho dysfunctional, together with the present political mayhem that has continues to rock Maseru. Political instability in the country has been a daunting agenda for all concerned actors, including the international community, political parties, civil society and the SADC who have over the years and presently continue to try to resolve the conflict in the country.

Since its independence from British rule in 1966, the tiny kingdom of Lesotho has often been rocked by internal political mayhem particularly during pre-election and post-election events, which has also brought with it several military coups. Hence, since its formation in 1992, the SADC has often partnered with other Southern African states (mainly South Africa) in trying to manoeuvre a way forward with regards to violence in Lesotho. Drawing from the above, the post-independence situation in Lesotho has become a serious concern for regional, continental and international observers. We may look (however, not delve in detail), as Mokotso (2019) asserts, at Lesotho's situation in four phases. Phase one represents a multiparty democracy (1966–1970), the second phase represents a one-party state (1970–1986), the third phase is a military dictatorship (1986–1993) and the fourth phase is the reform of multiparty democracy from 1993 onwards which at the moment is still in place, despite a coup that interrupted it in 1994.

While Lesotho's political turmoil may be traced from 1966 when Chief Joseph Leabua Jonathan of the Basutoland National Party (BNP) was victorious, this thesis will trace Maseru's political instability from 1993. In the 1993 elections (see table 4.4) where 763 930 voters had registered to vote, under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) emerged victoriously. These elections were watched by over 400 observers from seven domestic NPOs, together with 150 observers from about 15 different countries as well as the SADC, EU, OAU, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Ecumenical Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (Southall and Fox, 1999; Sekatle, 1999).

Table 4.4: Party Electoral Performance in the 1993 Lesotho Elections.

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats
BCP	398 355	74.7	65
Basotho National Party (BNP)	120 686	22.6	0
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP)	7 650	1.4	0
Other	6 287	1.2	0
Total	532 978	100	65

Source: See Molomo (1999).

However, shortly after these elections, instability rocked the tiny nation because of two factions of the army, one of which was pro-BCP while the other pro-BNP. Such instability led to the assassination of Selometsi Baholo on the 14th of April 1994 who was at the time deputy prime minister. This in 1994 led to the overthrow of the democratic government by King Letsie III, which led to major unrest(s) in Lesotho and prompted the SADC to intervene. South Africa was at first reluctant to intervene but following pressure from other regional nations and civil society and after it was summoned by the SADC, finally intervened through mediation led by Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, the late South African foreign affairs minister Alfred Nzo and Joe Modise who was the minister of defence (Mmutle, 2007; Mothibe, 1999). This also gave way for relentless meetings overseen by three SADC states in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, which, in consultation with all involved parties, led to a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) finally agreed upon among all political parties, which eventually led to peace.

Notably, the BCP was reinstated as the legitimate government of the country. For about four years, there was relative peace in the country. However, in 1997, there were internal disputes within the ruling BCP which eventually led to a split. Hence, this gave Ntsu Mokhehle the platform to form the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). Southall and Fox (1999) expound that with regards to the 1998 elections, there was a threefold change in the framework. First, the number of constituencies was increased from 65 to 80. Second, the age at which individuals could vote was lowered from 21 to 18. Third, in reaction to the opposition's grievances of undue government influence and fraud relating the Electoral Commission that ran the 1993 elections, the administration of the 1998 elections was then undertaken by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that was sworn in in September 1997. The IEC was tasked with the obligation to undertake the following processes to ensure that elections would be free and fair: constituency delimitation, registration of voters, administering the nomination of candidates, and voter education and voting process (see Sekatle, 1999). During the 1998 elections (see table 4.5), which were contested by 12 political parties and where there was an increase of 76 678 voters, hence, totalling 837 608, Mokhehle's LCD clinched the elections.

Table 4.5: Party Electoral Performance in the 1998 Lesotho Elections.

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats
LCD	355 049	60.7	79
BNP	143 073	24.5	1
BCP	61 793	10.6	0
MFP	7 460	1.3	0
Other	16 244	2.9	0
Total	583 619	100	80

Source: Molomo (1999).

In the same year, Mokhehle was forced to resign because of illness, and handed the leadership to Pakalitha Mosisili. Nonetheless, although the LCD was victorious in the elections, other parties refused to accept the results, citing that there was some fraud at play. After these parties had lost their court appeal concerning the elections, what followed in Maseru was political mayhem that was also triggered by mounting tensions within the military driven by factions. Yet again, the SADC had to intervene (see Southall and Fox, 1999). At first, South Africa

distanced itself from the mayhem that was taking place in Lesotho, but eventually intervened. South Africa sent about 600 members of the SANDF (codenamed Operation Boleas) to secure the Katse Dam⁴⁷ which supplies water to South Africa, mainly, the economic hub of Gauteng; it is one of the largest dams in the southern hemisphere. While there were allegations that certain mutineers wanted to blow up the dam, on the other hand, some outline that any effect on the dam would have had an impact on South Africa. This further raised questions as to why the SANDF were sent to Lesotho when they failed to intervene in the DRC a year earlier, opting for mediation instead. To Likoti (1998), South Africa's intervention was designed to achieve three main objectives: (1) to secure the Katse Dam, (2) restore order, and (3) clear protestors from the royal palace.

However, following the latest crisis and with the assistance of Botswana and Zimbabwe, South Africa assembled an auditing team led by Chief Justice Pius Langa to again find a resolution to Lesotho's recent political turmoil. The Langa Commission was tasked with hearing evidence presented to it by contesting parties, and working with the IEC, examining the official results and overall recount of the results (Vale, 2003). Langa in the end came up with what was known as the Langa Commission Report⁴⁸ and because of this report and other consultations eventually a breakthrough was achieved. However, his report was discredited even before it was released, as there were already accusations of internal interference when it was being compiled. This is because rather than being presented in Maseru where the mayhem took place, it was presented before the SADC Heads of States Summit in Mauritius from the 13th to the 14th of September 1998. This further brought more confusion to its legitimacy. In essence, it stated that:

We are unable to state that the invalidity of the elections has been conclusively established. We point out, however, that some of the apparent irregularities and discrepancies are sufficiently serious concerns. We cannot, however, postulate that the results do not reflect the will of the Lesotho electorate.

Southall and Fox (1999) argue that this Langa report was vague as it failed to address the rationality of the evidence and it left unfair question marks standing concerning the elections,

⁴⁷ It must be noted that the SANDF encountered heavy resistance with the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and in the end, about eight SANDF soldiers lost their lives together with other Basotho soldiers and civilians.

⁴⁸ For a detailed reading on this report, kindly consult: <http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/commissionsofinquiries/files/Lesotho%201998%20commission%20Final%20report.pdf>

which further gave some measure of satisfaction and dissatisfaction to both the opposition parties and government. The report was twofold in nature. First, it found that the elections were not rigged; on the other hand, it suggested that fraud might have taken place and the elections had some loopholes. However, there were inadequate grounds to lead to the results being annulled.

Through Pretoria's intervention came the Interim Political Authority⁴⁹ (IPA), and South Africa and Lesotho in 2001 signed the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC). This arrangement outlined Pretoria's role to refining its relations with Maseru and other African states (Mmutle, 2007); the latest political mayhem in Lesotho had already cost the country more than ZAR 30 million in damages (Tau, 2000). In the years after the 1998 saga, there has been relative peace in Lesotho; notwithstanding the fact that political instability has been absent, it has continued to simmer via factional battles within Lesotho's coalition governments. Thus, in 2014, Lesotho woke up to the news that there was another coup underway whereby members of the LDF were taking over government departments in Maseru.

Ramalepe and Shai (2016) expound that this latest coup was mainly driven by internal rife within the coalition government made up of All Basotho Convention (ABC), LCD and the BNP. South Africa, though reluctant at first, with the help of Namibia and Zimbabwe met to find a solution for the current stability taking place as Prime Minister Thomas Thabane had asked for South Africa's intervention. Mr Cyril Ramaphosa who was deputy president at that time was tasked with facilitating the dialogue between all concerned stakeholders. Supporting him was an observer known as SOMILES, made up of security and political personnel who were to keep watch over the security and political situation in the kingdom; support was offered to Ramaphosa through SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) mission which included individuals from Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Malawi (Motsamai, 2015). With a view to reducing the already escalating political instability that was at play in Maseru and create a beneficial environment for political dialogue, SOMILES came up with what was known as the Maseru Security Accord.

This accord proposed that three police chiefs, Lieutenant-Generals Tlali Kamoli and Maaparankoe Mahao, and Commissioner of Police Khotatso Tsooana vacate Maseru through a leave of absence. Through Ramaphosa's assistance, the dialogue concluded with the

⁴⁹ This was a body that was to host the next elections in the country and was to consist of two members of each involved party.

agreement of the Maseru Facilitation Declaration in October 2014 (Weisfelder, 2015). In addition, an agreement was reached to re-open parliament on the 17th of October 2014 and for elections to take place on February 2015 at a date that was to be determined by King Letsie III, which was to be overseen by the IEC (DIRCO, 2014). Lansford (2017) notes that the 2015 elections were expected to bring relative stability in the kingdom through a new government. The Democratic Congress (DC) spearheaded by Pakalitha Mosisili won these elections; however, because no outright majority was obtained, he formed a coalition government⁵⁰. Through the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund ⁵¹(ARF) in 2015, South Africa contributed ZAR 18.2 million to the SADC secretariat to assist with the deployment of a SADC observer mission to Lesotho (DIRCO, 2016).

In 2015, Ramaphosa produced a report, which defined dire constitutional security sector and judicial reforms, which Lesotho was to implement. Nevertheless, this did not seem to bring any peace, as in the same year he produced his report, Lieutenant-General Maaparankoe Mahao of the LDF was assassinated by his own soldiers on the 25th of June 2015. Based on his two-year tenure (2015–2017) in office, Mosisili's coalition government received a vote of no confidence in parliament, leading to it being dissolved (Ngatane, 2017). However, Mosisili asked King Letsie III to rather disband parliament and hold new elections in June 2017. In these elections, Thomas Thabane's ABC was victorious, gaining 48 of the 80 constituencies while Mosisili was able to get 16 seats (Peta, 2017). Thabane also formed a coalition government with the Alliance of Democrats (AD), the BNP and the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL).

In 2017, two days before Thabane was to be sworn in as Prime Minister Lipolelo, Thabane's wife was murdered and three months later Lieutenant-General Khoantle Motsomotso was also killed. During the first week of July 2019, South Africa's head of state Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, the SADC's official facilitator of Lesotho's Reforms, visited Maseru. He aimed to persuade all political parties to sign an agreement establishing a Statutory National Legislative Reform Authority to co-ordinate national reforms. He was pleased that this was agreed upon: a 'historic milestone which decisively set Maseru on the road to reform', that is, the major security,

⁵⁰ His coalition government included the LCD, MFP, BCP, National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho's People's Congress (LPC) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD).

⁵¹ The ARF was to assist African states through funding by strengthening socio-economic development, help in preventing conflicts, humanitarian support, promote human resource development, and contribute through on-going political dialogues while additionally enhancing good governance and democracy (Flemes, 2010). It had dismantled the Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund (Act No. 68 of 1968) that was utilised by the South African apartheid regime. Other regional states to have benefitted from the ARF include Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius.

political, constitutional and other vital reforms long envisioned by the SADC spanning a period of five years.

The country is still currently in turmoil (tensions and conflicts), particularly within Prime Minister's Thomas Thabane's⁵² ABC, which is further driving political instability in the country. Through the reforms, Ramaphosa and the SADC aim to halt further coups, the assassination of army chiefs and other security concerns in the country to restore much needed political stability (Fabricius, 2019). Whether such reforms will play a pivotal role in the future in fostering political stability in Maseru, remains to be seen moving forward. One may argue that perhaps the biggest challenge in Lesotho post-independence undoubtedly remains the need for greater accountability, good governance and a robust commitment to democratic values. However, as Mokotso (2019) submits, no matter what constitutional and institutional reforms Lesotho may bring to the fore, without the required political and ideological resources driven via democracy, stability is something that will not be seen anytime soon. To the author, there is a need for the Basotho society to adhere to the principles and values of democracy particularly, as he further argues, concerning all political parties in the tiny kingdom.

4.5.2 Political Volatility in the DRC

Since the mid-1990s, South Africa has partaken in conflict resolution in Africa's Great Lake Region because of the fundamental shift in the domestic politics of core states and the absence of a regional leader, coupled with the relative decline of Western engagement in the region. From the 1990s, the conflict erupted in the Great Lakes Region as a result of the unresolved post-colonial issues of nation and state-building, weak regional institutions for economic integration, resources and environmental vulnerability and problem solving. The Rwandan genocide that took place in 1994 typified such challenges bringing with it an era of instability and turbulence in regional relations (Prunier, 2010; Monyae, 2014). A dire consequence of the Rwandan genocide was its spill over to the eastern DRC where the Hutu perpetrators of this genocide became refugees, which further bought with it a security threat in the country.

Anyone who follows African politics whether pre-independence or post-independence would attest to the fact that the DRC is one country that has over the years witnessed an array of

⁵² In recent events to rock the tiny kingdom, Thabane resigned as Prime Minister of Lesotho in May 2020. This is following months of pressure for him to do so as he was named as a suspect in the murder of his ex-wife Lipolelo on the 14th of June 2017. His current wife, Maesaiah, has also been charged with the murder; however, they continue to deny any involvement. This as evidence suggests that the ex-minister paid those who assassinated his wife ZAR 400 000 to commit the crime as one of the accused has turned state witness. Moeketsi Majoro has been sworn in as Lesotho's new Prime Minister for the embattled kingdom (News 24, 2020; Aljazeera, 2020).

internal instability. Some authors have blamed this on the fact that there are many rebel groups, the need for natural resources, multinational corporations and tribalism (Joseph, 2016). Many rebel groups have been formed here because of the country's rich natural resources; hence, this has kept the DRC unstable. Again, this has been driven by weak state capacity, competition for land, absence of the rule of law, politics of exclusion and external interference. Over the years, diverse actors, including but not limited to the UN, AU, SADC and International Conference of the Great Lake Region (ICGLR), have intervened in the DRC crisis.

However, post-1998, a year where the DRC became a SADC member, most of these interventions have come from this REC. Geographically, the DRC is more than 2 900 kilometres away from South Africa; however, there has been numerous mediation and peacekeeping operations taken by Pretoria in this central African country. We may trace South Africa's involvement in the DRC from 1997 when the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) through the leadership of Laurent Kabila was at crossroads with Mobuto Sese Soko. From the onset, South Africa under the leadership of Mandela tried to intervene via negotiations between the two (Solomon, 2010). A year after Kabila toppled long-time dictator Sese Soko, the country found itself in so much conflict that it was often dubbed Africa's world war. When Mobuto's reign ended, it brought with it high levels of violence amongst different rebel groups (Reyntjens, 2009). Such conflicts were also due to various militias in the country, which included the Mayi-Mayi, Banyamulenge, Tutsi diaspora, Uganda's Lord Resistance Army and Rwandan genocidaires.

As the conflict continued, the SADC in consultation with then Zimbabwean President Mr Robert Mugabe sent in Zimbabwean troops; this is after the Mandela administration had refused to send troops, opting for negotiations instead. During Mandela's time as head of state, South Africa participated in high-level negotiations geared at ending violence in the DRC. However, South Africa's efforts in brokering a deal between Sese Soko and Kabila in 1997 did not yield any significant results (Kisangani, 2016) but Pretoria continued its efforts, which eventually led to the signing of the Lusaka Accords in 1999, which bought a ceasefire. When Mbeki assumed office in South Africa's second administration post-democratization, the Lusaka Peace Accord was signed which bought all concerned parties to the negotiation table.

To ensure peace, the UN sanctioned the deployment of 5 537 military personnel who were to monitor the ceasefire. Here, South Africa assisted in planning such an operation while also providing on-the-ground support. Nonetheless, in 2001, the continent woke up to the news that

Kabila had been assassinated; his death further intensified negotiations. In 2002, as a result of Mbeki's mediation, the Pretoria Accord of July 2002 was signed, which led to Rwanda withdrawing about 20 000 of its troops from the DRC (Kagame, 2015). Again, through Angola's mediation, Uganda withdrew its troops in the DRC following which was known as the Luanda Accord of 2002. The withdrawal of troops from both camps laid the platform for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue⁵³ (ICD) where DRC's future was to be deliberated in Sun City, South Africa. Of the more than 300 delegates that attended the 52-day dialogue at a cost of ZAR 37 million to South Africa, more than 70 % signed the peace agreement (Zondi, 2012).

These talks established democracy-promoting institutions, which included an independent electoral commission, a media authority, an ethics committee to oversee efforts to combat corruption and a national watchdog on human rights. In 2003 at a presentation in parliament, Mbeki explained that South Africa's participation in the UN's United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) in the DRC had cost Pretoria about ZAR 819.6 million (Khadiagala, 2009). In 2005 South Africa sent a team of observers to monitor the parliamentary vote for the approval of a new constitution in the DRC, which was to pave the way for the 2006 elections. This ultimately also paved the way for the DRC to draft its first constitution; in 2006, the country held its first democratic elections. For Pretoria, this was a vital achievement as it had assisted in brokering peace. When elections were about to take place in 2006, South Africa sent about 118 observers to assist the DRC public servants during the elections.

The South African Police Service (SAPS) again assisted in training DRC police in crowd management tactics and all ballot papers were printed in South Africa and distributed in various DRC provinces by the SANDF, Pretoria spent about ZAR 666 million in assisting the DRC in the 2006 elections. At the parliament of South Africa in 2007, Kabila thanked President Mbeki and South Africa for their assistance and support to promote both peace and democracy in his country. He further outlined that Pretoria had invested much-needed resources to bring stability in the DRC, particularly the SANDF, in its relentless support in peace missions (Khadiagala, 2009) Again, in 2012, South Africa started its operations to overthrow the March 23 Movement⁵⁴ (M23); it succeeded in doing so in 2013 when a peace accord was signed. More

⁵³ The dialogue was to bring to the negotiation table all concerned stakeholders from the DRC. These were to include representatives from Government, Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD-Goma), Congolese Liberation Movement (CLM). Political Oppositions, Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), RCD Nationale (RCD-N), civil society and the Mai-Mai militia groups (Apuuli, 2004).

⁵⁴ This was formed in April 2012 with nearly 300 soldiers. They were also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army and was a rebel group based in the eastern part of the DRC in the North Kivu province.

than 1 300 SANDF personnel were deployed by South Africa as part of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to fight the M23 (Chapanyi, 2015). South Africa's support to the DRC, other than peace missions, has seen Pretoria assist the country in infrastructural projects that have included the construction of a new terminal at Kinshasa airport, the rehabilitation and modernisation of the Inga Hydro-Electric Dam and a deep sea port on the Atlantic coast. Relations between South Africa and the DRC continue to improve and in 2014 trade between the two states stood at US\$ 13 million. It must, however, be noted that the DRC continues to be politically unstable, particularly in the eastern parts of the country.

South Africa has continued to assist the DRC in many ways via military support, supporting multilateral organisations and efforts, facilitating elections overview, providing loans and infrastructural projects (Lalbahadur and Rawhani, 2017). While the SANDF has assisted and still assists in the ongoing battle in the DRC, conduct of some of its members has severely affected its reputation. Accusations of harassment, sexual abuse and discipline issues have continued to surface in recent years. In 2015, while on the MONUSCO in the DRC, 47 SANDF members were suspended for violating curfew (Mabera, 2018). In 2017, a member of the SANDF was found guilty of assaulting a Congolese boy and in the same year, another member of the SANDF killed his girlfriend who was also stationed in the DRC. Undeniably, such misconduct erodes confidence in and accountability of the SANDF but also paints a bad image of South Africa's foreign policy regarding peacekeeping, both continentally and internationally.

Drawing from the above, while there has been some inadequacy in South Africa's peacekeeping and mediation efforts, this does not suggest that South Africa (via the SANDF) has not played a critical role in regional peacekeeping, particularly in Lesotho and the DRC. As South Africa is a regional superpower possessing vast military power capability, most continental and international actors have post-democratization looked to South Africa to take the lead in resolving regional political instability. Over the years, the South African government has played a notable role in this regard and Pretoria has continued to increase her military hardware. Accordingly, the latest (2019) assessment of military strength that was released (see table 4.6) by Global Firepower⁵⁵ shows South Africa ranked (in terms of its military strength)

⁵⁵ Global Firepower provides analytical display of data concerning 137 modern military powers. These rankings are based on each nation's potential war-making capability across land, sea and air fought with conventional weapons.

at 32nd in the world out of 137 countries. By narrowing this down to Africa, Pretoria is ranked 3rd only behind Egypt and Algeria.

Table 4.6: South Africa’s 2019 Military Strength.

Numbers	Type
66 300	Active personnel
15 000	Reserve personnel
26 250 m	Manpower at its disposal
14 175 m	People fit for service
963 908	Citizens reach the eligible age to serve annually.
17	Aircraft fighters
23	Transport aircraft
63	Trainer aircraft
195	Combat Tanks
2 500	Fighting armoured vehicles
43	Self-propelled artillery
100	Towed artillery
50	Rocket projectors
4	Frigates
3	Submarines
31	Patrol vessels
2	Mine warfare vessels

Note: m denotes millions

Source: Author’s own compilation; Adapted from Global Firepower (2019).

Such statistics suggest that South Africa possess a robust military prowess and is the most competitive in the Southern African region. While Egypt and Algeria are the continent’s military powers when one looks at their spending and ranking of military assets, nevertheless, this does not merely imply that these two should be regarded as regional military heavyweights when one considers their geopolitical and strategic influence. This stems from the fact that when one considers other vital factors, South Africa, together with another African powerhouse, Nigeria, can be considered African powers.

This, as Ogunnubi (2019) argues, is primarily because both Egypt and Algeria's military capabilities are in most cases focused on North Africa and are primarily geared to respond to domestic challenges and, in the case of Egypt, to respond to its geopolitical tension in the Middle East, particularly with Israel. In addition, concerning peacekeeping, these two do not yield much influence in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to South Africa. While being ranked 3rd in 54 African countries is a good achievement, financially, the SANDF's main equipment sponsor Denel⁵⁶ is struggling and has recently asked the South African government for a ZAR 2.8 billion cash injection to assist it to emerge from a financial crisis it is currently facing (Winning and Bavier, 2019). Thus, the crisis currently facing Denel might also bring with it severe repercussions for the functioning of the SANDF in terms of regional peacekeeping, both presently and moving forward.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter was made up of three vital sections. Firstly, section one aimed to delve on South Africa's role in the SADC since becoming a member in 1994. This was to view what role and/or impact South Africa has had in this REC since becoming a member. The second section aimed to ponder on South Africa's foreign policy post-democratization and how such foreign policy instruments have helped shaped South Africa's regional objectives, together with hindrances it faces in doing so. Section three aimed at pondering South Africa's mediation and peacekeeping role by looking at its role in Lesotho and the DRC.

⁵⁶ Denel SOC Ltd is the largest manufacturer of defence equipment in South Africa and operates in the military aerospace and landwards defence environment. Denel's sole shareholder is the South Africa government. Denel is the key supplier to the SANDF as both an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the overhaul maintenance, repair, refurbishment and upgrade of equipment in the SANDF's arsenal.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS


5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, thematic content analysis is used to analyse the ideological views of three foreign policy experts who have extensively studied South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy. Their views were grouped into themes that represent topical areas related to the research questions of the study. Overall, five themes came out of the study, each with at least two subthemes. These themes were: Theme 1, The perceived link between regional powers and regional integration; Theme 2, Regional integration under post-1994 leaders; Theme 3, South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region; Theme 4, Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures, and Theme 5, Recommendations on regional integration.

5.2 Theme 1: The perceived link between regional powers and regional integration

The first theme of the study came out of discussions on the link between regional powers and regional blocs. The research intended to query whether regional powers were perceived to be the main drivers behind regional integration or whether it was possible that regional integration could succeed without the actions and support of a hegemon/hegemons. There were two broad views that were identified, one being that regional powers were the instrumental drivers of regional integration and there was therefore a visible link between regional power activity in a bloc and the success of such a bloc. Power relations between regional hegemons with interests in the same region were also discussed. Figure 5.1 shows the subthemes under this theme:

Figure 5.1: Subthemes - Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration



Source: Researcher's own compilation.

The different views on this matter were classified as subthemes of Theme 1. The theme arose mainly in response to the question: From your perspective, what is the link between regional powers and regional integration?

5.2.1 Regional powers as facilitators of successful integration

Respondent 3, unlike Respondent 1, was optimistic about the link between regional integration and regional powers. There was a clear-cut link in which the respondent saw regional powers as the drivers of regional integration due to their economic, political and military capacities:

Regional powers play a critical role in spearheading regional integration. Given their military, financial and diplomatic power, they can use soft, hard and smart power in order to ensure that regional integration happens. Respondent 3

Respondent 2 also held an optimistic view of the link between regional integration and regional powers. There were synergetic benefits in nation-states in a region where member-countries collaborated with one another under a regional leader. However, there was a risk that a regional power or regional powers that are part of the integration may bear the burden associated with open border policies, which result in excessive migration. In the views of Respondent 2, this was a disadvantage that a regional power could easily face in the absence of nation-state autonomy:

There is a definite link to intra-regional opportunities when countries work together. However, in my personal views, Countries should have a degree of autonomy and the ability to control borders if the inequality gap between the two countries is material or where opening borders can disturb the equilibrium of that Country. Respondent 2

Regional integration, as suggested by Respondent 2 must therefore not come at the cost of national autonomy and members must still be autonomous enough to develop their internal policies outside regional policy structures. Unlike Respondent 2, however, Respondent 3 saw regional powers as the “victors” of the integration process rather than as entities that may eventually be disadvantaged by the process.

5.2.2 Regional powers and regional integration: visible, albeit complex link

Respondent 1 believed that in global political and economic relations, there was a visible, albeit complex link between regional powers and regional integration. Regional powers generally drove regional integration but with different levels of success across the globe. Success generally depends on the main agenda behind integration. In some blocs or regions, integration with an economic agenda worked successfully while in others it did not. In the same vein, political integration worked in some regions and failed in others. Respondent 1 was cited as saying:

It depends. Brexit demonstrates that the links can be complex. In Asia, it is working because it is strictly economic and based on value chains. In Africa, it is working more politically than economically. Concerning South Africa and SADC, SADC is not as effective as EAC. East Africa has had more opportunities to develop over the decades especially in [sic] regard to economic integration. They have been excellent at that including free movements. Political integration, however, has not been that effective as evidenced by the Somalia case. Respondent 1

In the above citation, Respondent 1 gave four examples to illustrate this point. In Africa, regional integration has focused mainly on political integration as in the case of the SADC and the EAC. In the former, economic integration has not been a success while in the latter, political integration had failed as noted in the Somalian civil war scenario. This was in comparison with Asia where integration has generally been a success because of its economic focus. Overall, Respondent 1 perceives regional integration as a complex issue that cannot be guaranteed to produce envisaged results for both regional powers and other involved nation-states.

5.2.3 Regional powers as competitive/colluding forces in regional blocs

This discourse pointed towards competition and collusion amongst perceived regional powers in specific regions in Africa. Respondents gave views that suggested that the competition for power and control over regions was a phenomenon that connects regional leaders, “led” countries and regional competitors. Respondent 1 hinted that other hegemonies in Africa were Nigeria and Kenya.

I mean really. So, the continent needs to indicate what it expects from all its regional hegemonies, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, etc., so that no hegemon steps out of bounds.

Respondent 1

Hegemonies, as opined by Respondent 1, needed to respect implied balances of power by recognising one another’s interests and views.

Respondent 2 acknowledges that South Africa, despite its economic and militaristic strengths, shares regional leadership with Nigeria:

The country’s role (together with Nigeria) in promoting both regional co-operation and regional integration and governance has been witnessed in many African countries.

Respondent 2

Respondent 2, therefore, speaks of collaboration rather than competition as a more positive link between regional leaders and regional integration.

In addition, Respondent 1 expressed concern at how such collaboration had collapsed under President Zuma’s foreign policy approach: “The Nigerian-South Africa binational committee was finished”.

Respondent 1 further asserts that the state of regional powers was not necessarily determined by economic or political power in the region as in the case of Botswana. While Botswana was not considered a regional power in the actual economic and political sense, it had created SADC and was, therefore, a hegemon in that sense:

SADC ... created by Botswana so it also cannot come in and just take over in terms of reaping. Respondent 1

Respondent 1 also mentioned Paul Kagame, the Rwanda President, as playing a significant and critical role in regional integration, despite Rwanda not being considered a hegemon in any sense. At the same time, regional integration could, therefore, be seen from a leadership

perspective. The current Rwandan leadership, for example, was all for regional integration as shown by its stance on free trade and the School of Airlines and Travel Management (SATM):


The person who has been strong in promoting regional integration is Kagame. Under his AU leadership last year, not only was Free trade signed, but also SATM, the continental airline industry to deal with having to fly to Dubai before getting to Morocco. Can you believe there are no direct flights there? Under Kagame, the AU peace fund for conflict prevention was also established. So, maybe we need not look at a country and look at the individual leadership. South Africa has too much internal drama at this stage. Respondent 1

The view by Respondent 1 also suggests that regional integration was not necessarily linked to regional leaders alone. Lesser countries like Botswana, as opined, had played significant roles in the establishment of the SADC as a bloc. Rwanda is also discussed as a non-regional leader that had successfully contributed to regional integration.

5.3 Theme 2: Regional integration under post-1994 leaders

The second theme of the study was regional integration under post-1994 leaders. This theme arose after noticing that respondents associated regional integration as well as regional foreign policy with a particular leader. South Africa, under its post-apartheid leaders had, therefore exhibited at least four patterns or approaches to regional integration with different leaders from Mandela to Ramaphosa making different contributions.

Figure 5.2: Subthemes - Regional integration under post-1994 leaders



Source: Researcher's own compilation

The subthemes presented above mainly came in response to three questions: How would you rate South Africa's post-1994 contribution towards regional integration and governance in Southern Africa? In general, how would you term South Africa's (from Mandela to Zuma) post-1994 foreign policy stance in Southern Africa? How would you rate South Africa's contribution to mediation and peacekeeping (Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC) in Southern Africa post-1994?

5.3.1 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mandela

Under Mandela, the focus of foreign policy was to establish South Africa's presence on the international scene and to create an image of a new and advancing democracy:

Mandela focused on changing South Africa's global political image and thus spent time marketing South Africa. Respondent 3

South Africa, however, responded as and when necessary, to regional conflict, particularly the Lesotho incident of 1998 and the DRC conflict. Mandela also took approaches that did not necessarily go along with regional expectations as in the Nigerian crisis when he called for harsh penalties against Sani Abacha.

5.3.2 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mbeki

Mbeki's foreign policy stance put more emphasis on regional integration and the African Renaissance. The focus was put on developing an image of Africa as a whole and as a continent that needed to be respected:

Mbeki focused on African integration and mending walls with Nigeria while also making a case for Africa as a continent to be respected. Respondent 3

Under President Mbeki, South Africa played a major and visible role as a regional power within Africa as a whole. Its regional outreach was both economic support and political intervention in conflict zones, including Burundi, South Sudan, the DRC, and Ivory Coast, among others.

It has been presidency driven as in any country. Under Mbeki, South Africa played a major role. I recall visiting countries like Burundi, South Sudan, and DRC where South Africa was actively involved financially and politically. Respondent 1

Respondent 1 notes that South Africa's regional efforts were perceived as excessively political in the case of Burundi. South Africa clashed with another regional European superpower – France – that also attempted to get its hold on the political unrest in that country. The view that, under President Mbeki, South Africa was accused of colonisation suggests that Respondent 1 perceives South Africa's regional hegemony as quite significant:

He was also too absent in South Africa which led to domestic concerns. I recall being in Burundi when the French accused South Africa of colonisation when Burundi became a South Africa peace concern from the Mandela era. South Africa never gained anything out of that. When Mbeki was asked to negotiate peace in Ivory Coast, the French again accused South Africa of colonisation. The Mbeki report which was relevant for the Ivory Coast war outbreak was also ignored and the French imposed their system. Respondent 1

President Mbeki also attempted to strengthen South Africa's regional hegemony through the African Renaissance philosophical approach. This was centred on encouraging Afrocentrism through integration. Respondent 1 associates this view with the establishment of the NEPAD.

The Mbeki era also introduced the African Renaissance theme. It was also an era that saw five African presidents, Obasanjo, the Algerian guy etc. come together and establish NEPAD. Respondent 1

Respondent 1 noted that South Africa's regional hegemonic ambitions under President Mbeki were not widely accepted on the continent. There were views that South Africa was intentionally working towards dominating Africa and underplaying the role of other nation-states and leaders in the determination of regional political matters. The respondent gives examples of the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and the then leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition party, Morgan Tsvangirai, who were openly and diametrically opposed to Mbeki and who celebrated his departure:

However, many African countries did not like Mbeki and South Africa was accused of trying to be a big brother. If you read papers during Mbeki's removal, a lot of African countries celebrated with Zuma's take over. I recall the Ugandan president's excitement. After all, Zuma was corrupt like one of them. None of this good governance touting by Mbeki. Zimbabweans also rejoiced saying that Mbeki had done nothing for them and trashed him. Morgan penned an article about how glad he was that Mbeki was gone. Respondent 1

To summarise, Mbeki saw the whole of Africa as a region in which South Africa could play a significant political and economic part, given its economic strength on the continent. His view of a region was therefore not confined to the traditional Southern African region.

5.3.3 Regional integration and foreign policy under Zuma

Unlike Mbeki whose focus was on Africa, as a region at large, President Jacob Zuma., as perceived by Respondent 1, placed much of his attention on the BRICS, China and slightly less on the SADC.

However, Zuma was not interested in continental regional integration, including SADC. His interest was BRICS and China. Zimbabwe was totally relegated to the back burner. In fact, I forgot Morgan existed until his funeral. No more Sunset meetings on DRC. The Ivory Coast War, I recall Zuma on Television saying West Africa should sort themselves out basically. Zuma believed SADC should be the platform and South Africa needs to focus on its internal issues. Respondent 1

Under President Zuma, South Africa descended from being a regional political hegemony. South Africa ceased playing major political and militaristic interventional roles in Africa's then hotspots, including Zimbabwe, a neighbour and a member of the SADC. An economic region, in the form of the BRICS, became South Africa's priority alongside the development of stronger bilateral relationships with China:

Zuma was more interested in his domestic constituents. African Renaissance was replaced by China-integration not just in South Africa but continentally beginning with the AU building. The West was also happy. Mbeki was a problem with his self-reliance and regional integration theories. With Zuma in office, Africa was back to normal minus the China problem. Respondent 1

The regional political and economic role played by South Africa during the Zuma era, because of its reduced focus on regional economic integration as well as the African Renaissance philosophies, as argued by Respondent 1, was a pleasure to the West. A strong Africa as a region was possibly perceived as an economic threat to Western interests as opined by Respondent 1.

Regardless, Zuma was also not well-liked for his limited focus on regional integration and for his stance of setting South Africa as a country less interested in regional hegemony. This was because South Africa was then detached from the corrupt political systems of the continent that often benefitted from corrupt synergies (as per Respondent 1's view).

However, Zuma did not join the AU boys club of corruption. He had the Gupta's and really not interested in associating with other African leaders unless necessary. The African governments got angry at Zuma who totally ignored them, and started being nice to Mbeki, paying his way to the AU, making him the South Sudan peace person. After pressure with the Mali war etc., and Nigeria occupied with Boko Haram, Zuma dispatched Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the AU so that she can deal with the AU and leave him to have fun with the Guptas. Respondent 1

Zuma, as stated by Respondent 1 also sought a strategic detachment from the AU by deploying and leaving pertinent AU hot issues in the hands of Dr Dlamini-Zuma.

Respondent 3, however, sees a different picture of foreign policy and regional integration under President Zuma. Under President Zuma, South Africa tried to address continental political challenges under the auspices of the AU and the UN:

Zuma spent time trying to address the continent's political challenges and sent more South African soldiers to participate in AU and UN peacekeeping missions.
Respondent 3

Respondent 3, like Respondent 1, therefore believed that different presidents ushered in different versions of the same policy. The respondents, however, differ with respect to the

stance or approach taken by President Zuma. Respondent 1 believes that he was mostly aloof on matters happening on the continent and Respondent 3 believes that he was quite instrumental in bringing in the restoration of peace in some parts of the continent.

5.3.4 Regional integration and foreign policy under Ramaphosa

Respondent 1 pointed from the start that President Cyril Ramaphosa's approach to regional integration has been an economic and business-focused one. Regional integration makes sense to Ramaphosa if it has tangible value chain advantages:

Under Ramaphosa, it is clear he is about business. His speeches are about trade and value chains. The free trade agreement was his interest even before he became president. None of his speeches has talked about addressing peace or conflict on the continent as Mbeki did. Zimbabwe was under pressure to pay ESKOM. It is business. I am not saying he does not care for African lives. But his focus is on economic diplomacy. When he addressed xenophobia on his address, he also chastised those who attacked South African businesses, which was a first for a South African president.

Respondent 1

Ramaphosa does focus on and give attention to the rest of the continent but it is generally very restrained and limited.

Respondent 1 partly attributes Ramaphosa's stance to the existence of a challenging and difficult economic climate at home. As a president in an economy characterised by high unemployment, among other economic challenges, Ramaphosa leaves most of the regional integration issues in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

If you look at Chinese foreign policy, that is the same with Ramaphosa's economic diplomacy. The daily conflict dramas are left to the Minister of foreign affairs, unlike Mbeki who was personally involved. Ramaphosa also has serious issues to deal with like high unemployment, so SADC regional integration will be more economic-based.

Respondent 1

President Mbeki, as stated by Respondent 1, was criticised for abandoning his work at home in pursuit of foreign policy. Ramaphosa, on the other hand, because of the need to focus on a challenging local economy, is forced to give low priority to South Africa's perceived or intended role as a regional power:


I think African's [sic] missed an opportunity with regional integration under Mbeki. Ramaphosa is also working on his political base. So, domestic issues at this stage rule which is job creation. But South Africa leading AU next year on themes relating to silencing guns. So, revisit Ramaphosa foreign policy in SADC and continentally after next year. It is too early to conclude. Respondent 1

Thus, the intensity of regional integration focus, in the case of Ramaphosa, was associated with the nature of the domestic environment.

5.4 Theme 3: South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region

The third theme, South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region, discusses the general foreign policy of South Africa post-1994, specifically, the tools and approaches that South Africa has used to relate to and deal with other countries in its various regional blocs, including SADC and the AU. Theme 3 had three subthemes shown below:

Figure 5.3: Subthemes - South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region.



Source: Researcher's own compilation

This theme differs from Theme 2 in that it does not centre on the activities of different leaders although their roles are acknowledged. Like Theme 2, Theme 3 arose from responses to the questions: How would you rate South Africa's post-1994 contribution towards regional integration and governance in Southern Africa? In general, how would you term South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy stance (from Mandela to Zuma) in Southern Africa? How would you rate South Africa's contribution to mediation and peacekeeping (Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC) in Southern Africa post-1994?

5.4.1 Diplomacy and soft power approach

Respondent 2 believed that South Africa's post-1994 policy stance has been mostly pro-East and hostile towards the west.

Pro – East and hostile – West. Respondent 2

South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy was described as generally diplomatic and driven by soft power despite some inconsistencies where hard power approaches were applied like in the Lesotho 1998 incident under Mandela. Nonetheless, South Africa's approach to regional power has not been a threat to other nations' sovereignty, as opined by Respondent 3:

South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy has been realistic, which is why some argue that there are inconsistencies. In the main, South Africa's foreign policy respects the sovereignty of other African countries and believes in diplomatic solutions to political challenges. This locates the country within the soft power approach. But the DRC/Lesotho incident in 1998 could locate the country within the smart power approach. Respondent 3

Respondent 3 also believed that foreign policy since 1994 has been president-driven with different presidential eras ushering in different policy stances – although these still shared a commonality of respecting other countries' sovereignty and a greater focus on the soft power approach.

Overall, South Africa's foreign policy stance has been arguably empathetic. Of course, the country's critics might argue that South Africa has been pushing self-interests in the context of the realist theory. Respondent 3

The policy has, however, been argued to be self-serving. Respondent 2 believes that South Africa has generally exhibited diplomacy in its foreign policy stance. However, in some

instances, South Africa has taken hypocritical and controversial stances including supporting countries that would have aggressed over others in territorial disputes.

Yes, we are seen as Ubuntu diplomats and we have tried to spread that spirit in our foreign policy in all engagements. However, we are hypocrites when it comes to judging or supporting disputed territories around the world. We allow historic engagements to blur our judgement of future opportunities and sometimes we are sided with the perceived aggressors and on the other with the victims. Respondent 2

Respondent 2 did not give further details on the above.

5.4.2 The effectiveness of soft power as a foreign policy tool

On whether South Africa had used soft power effectively for regional development, Respondent 1 believes that South Africa was not in a position to use soft power per se if one goes by the book. This is because the country does not have an incentive to offer regional states for improved peace and democracy or other internal conditions:

The soft power concept does not apply to South Africa in Africa. There has been no reward South Africa got back during the Mbeki era so maybe that is part of the problem. Mbeki did this out of his genuine passion for Africa. South Africa does not have the funding to do the same extensive infrastructure of bridges and roads like China. So, South Africa has no carrots to offer per the soft power theory. We do not have a bargaining chip required to say we are applying soft power. I do not think this soft power theory applies. Under Mbeki, it was not soft power but more African based public diplomacy through the African Renaissance concept. Under Zuma, it was realpolitik based, and regional integration was out. The jury is still out on Ramaphosa but its pointing towards economic diplomacy based on his speeches. Therefore, he will probably push it as a regional tool. Respondent 1

Respondent 2 ascribes the view that South Africa had soft power to an overrated view of South Africa's significance on the continent. South Africa needed to further develop its statesmanship to a level where it is truly appreciated by the rest of the continent:

I think our perception of ourselves is far greater and positive than the perceptions of our neighbours and our continent. We can only rely on our economy so long as we have it but until we grow more statesmen on a magnitude of the father of our democratic

Country, the late President Mandela, we will become more irrelevant as other countries overtake ours. Respondent 2

On the same issue, Respondent 3 believed that the soft power approach had worked very well despite its drawbacks, particularly delayed solutions:

Indeed, I strongly believe that South Africa's soft power approach to regional (and even continental) politics has been the correct approach. Although this approach delays the process of finding a solution compared to hard power, it is sustainable and does not result in the deaths of innocent civilians nor does it permanently strain relations between South Africa and the affected countries. Respondent 3

The approach had sustainability and low risks of human losses as its strengths.

5.4.3 Perceptions of regional states on South Africa's hegemonic aspects

Respondent 1 believed that South Africa had articulated its post-1994 policy well to the benefit of the region. Its foreign policy has been guided by the AU agenda that put Africa first. This policy view was reflected in South Africa's prime development strategy, the NDP.

Yes, it has. South Africa's foreign policy is premised on the AU agenda, putting Africa first. Including the NDP. Supporting the Free trade agreement leads to part of socio-economic development. Respondent 1

In its articulation of foreign policy, Respondent 1 noted the risk of South Africa being labelled a hegemony to the disgruntlement of other AU members. Therefore, there was a need for a careful approach where foreign policy is articulated within an AU ambit without undue or unappreciated interference into the affairs of other member states:

But you will agree that South Africa has to be cautious. It cannot dictate what should be done in the economies of other African countries. Respondent 1

The same approach where South Africa applies its foreign policy within the ambits of the SADC as a regional body while being cautious of other nation's autonomy is also encouraged by Respondent 1:

Same with SADC, it was created by Botswana and is really their baby so South Africa also needs to be careful there. Respondent 1

All the same, even with problems at home, Respondent 1 opines that SA missed the opportunity of regional integration with Mbeki's exit from power.

Respondent 3 also believed that South Africa had articulated its foreign policy well but how this is judged by and depends on particular instances one chooses to consider. Generally, the policy has been positive, assisting several regional member states to attain or work towards political stability in the AU:

It all depends on what one decides to pay particular attention to. In the main, South Africa has used its foreign policy position to make a contribution to the region's governance and socio-economic development. It is for this reason that the country has provided diplomatic and even military support to countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC and many others. Respondent 3

A similar approach has also been followed with geographically closer countries in the SADC:

The adoption of "Quiet Diplomacy" in dealing with the Zimbabwean political crisis could be interpreted within the context of working towards improved governance as well as socio-economic development in SADC countries. Even the unprecedented use of hard power against Lesotho in 1998 was prompted by South Africa's resolve to see political stability in the region. During the same year (1998), South Africa opted for the "soft power" approach to the DRC crisis and refused to assist President Laurent Kabila militarily. Respondent 3

Like Respondent 1, Respondent 3 opines that South Africa's efforts are not universally appreciated. Respondent 3 goes back to the Mandela era and gives the example of South Africa's call for harsh measures against General Sani Abacha:

Not everyone appreciates South Africa's efforts. That is why President Mandela was criticised when he called for harsh measures against Nigeria's General Sani Abacha in 1996. Respondent 3

There was, therefore, a view that South Africa's policies were either misunderstood or unappreciated by some sections of the regional communities it served.

Respondent 1 discusses the view that South Africa's articulation of its foreign policy in the region is affected by conflicting expectations from other regional member states, in both the SADC and the AU. During President Mbeki's rule when South Africa was highly involved in Africa's political affairs, there were negative views that it was turning into a hegemony. During the Zuma era, the country was apparently blamed for being aloof and uninvolved in continental affairs.


I also think African countries need to be clear about what they want from South Africa. Cannot have it both ways then complain. Under Mbeki, I used to travel on the continent, and they would complain about big brother issues, it was annoying as South Africa has never been in the habit of dictating. Under Zuma, I went to the AU and this time the AU Commission was complaining bitterly that South Africa was not too involved on the continent. Respondent 1

Respondent 1, however, submits to the view of South Africa as a hegemon that must balance its powers in relation to other regional hegemons such as Nigeria and Kenya.

5.5 Theme 4: Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures

Theme 4 is built on responses that indicate the extent to which South Africa has reaped benefits of regional integration as a foreign policy as well as how regional blocs and the African region, in general, have benefitted from South Africa's activities. The five subthemes under this theme are shown below:

Figure 5.1: Subthemes - Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures.



Source: Researcher's own compilation

Under this theme, the shortcomings and disadvantages of regional integration are also discussed. This theme was shaped by the following questions: Would you say South Africa's membership in the SADC has reaped any rewards for Southern African states and the SADC as a REC) in general? How would you rate South Africa's contribution to mediation and peacekeeping (Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC) in Southern Africa post-1994?

5.5.1 Comparative limited regional integration experience

Respondent 2 believed that South Africa, since attaining democracy in 1994, has maintained its strength as an economic power in the southern region of Africa. While South Africa was partially able to stamp its economic authority on this region, it has had not much success in stamping its political authority, due to inexperience.

South Africa has been the de facto power in the South in terms of economy but in terms of experience, the neighbouring countries have gone through emancipation before us and we should have listened and learnt from their experiences rather than try to stamp our authority as the power of that region. Respondent 2

Respondent 2 suggests that South Africa has been adamant to listen to other countries in the region and this has affected its effectiveness as a regional power. While South Africa has been able to exert military force in peacekeeping missions, there is still scepticism whether its attempts at regional superiority in this regard had been wholly positive:

We have been central from peacekeeping efforts to the distribution of power and mediation as and when we have been called upon for such. However, the question that needs to be asked in an African context is whether we are progressive or regressive especially when compared to North, West and East Africa and their current progression. I would say that besides Central Africa, we are probably worst off in terms of resources and economy in decline whilst other regions are growing. Respondent 2

Respondent 2 doubts whether South Africa's attempts at both economic and political hegemony had been positive. The respondent sees the Southern region as slowing down in terms of economic growth despite its being South Africa's domain.

5.5.2 South Africa's positive performance and contribution in the region

During the same period, Respondent 3 believed that South Africa contributed very positively towards regional integration and governance in Southern Africa.

South Africa has contributed immensely to regional integration endeavours as well as improving [democratic] governance in the SADC region. Respondent 3

For instance, South Africa had assisted in politically stabilising Zimbabwe through a government of national unity initiative brokered under President Mbeki. Furthermore, its efforts towards improving governance had been felt beyond the region, specifically in Burundi, Rwanda, Ivory Coast and Sudan:

The notion of the GNU has been South Africa's signature. Countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and many others have benefitted from South Africa's foreign policy stance and have since been able to improve their governance. Respondent 3

In terms of improving regional integration, Respondent 3 identifies three regional bodies in which South Africa has been instrumental. These are the SACU, the SADC and the AU. Respondent 3 specifically believed that these entities “owe their existence to South Africa”:

The country’s role (together with Nigeria) in promoting both regional co-operation and regional integration and governance has been witnessed in many African countries. SACU, SADC and even the AU owe their existence to South Africa. Respondent 3

This contrasts with Respondent 2’s views that other nation-states had greater experience in improving governance in Africa than South Africa and that, despite South Africa’s regional hegemony and regional integration efforts in the south, Southern Africa is probably one of the slowest growing regions on the continent.

5.5.3 Socio-economic development in the region

South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy has also had a positive socio-economic impact on the region. This is despite the fact that there has been very little appreciation and acknowledgement for South Africa’s role in socio-economic development in Africa:

Finally, in terms of regional governance, there is a lot South Africa has done, and no one talks about it. When those M23 rebels were creating havoc in the DRC, it was South African forces that went in the eastern DRC under the UN umbrella and dealt with them. South African forces were for years in South Sudan, no one said anything. South Africa financially assisted several countries such as the one with the Guinea Bissau case under IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa). South Africa assisted to establish a school in Kenya etc. South Africa has had more FDI in Africa than even the West. Respondent 1

Economically, it has provided financial assistance to neighbouring countries, specifically Zimbabwe and eSwatini:

It is also in the same context that South Africa has provided financial support to countries like Zimbabwe and eSwatini. Respondent 3

The kind of assistance given by South Africa, therefore, included financial and developmental assistance.

5.5.4 Peacekeeping and Mediation

With specific reference to mediation and peacekeeping, Southern Africa had benefitted from South Africa's efforts, with different presidents playing different roles in specific regional conflicts. Zuma's intervention in the DRC's M23 crisis and Ramaphosa's intervention in Lesotho were highlighted as examples. Nonetheless, the discourse that South Africa's efforts in the SADC and Africa are not well appreciated reappeared in relation to Mbeki's interventions in the then region's political hotspots:

More action under the Mbeki era which was unappreciated. Zuma did intervene in DRC regarding the M23 issue. South Africa has also been very involved with Lesotho as Ramaphosa as deputy president was tasked to address Lesotho. Respondent 1

Respondent 2 also mentions the DRC issue but generally agrees with Respondent 1's view that South Africa's efforts were not appreciated.

Our best efforts have been in the DRC but there have been suggestions and allegations that this was to protect South-African interests. In Lesotho, we tried a lot of diplomacy in our mediation and in Zimbabwe, I think we have been completely irrelevant. Respondent 2

On the lack of appreciation and criticism, which South Africa received, Respondent 3 sees normality in this as there is no perfect political situation in practice:

The mediation approach adopted by South Africa has been commendable even though I cannot claim that it has been perfect since there is no such in global politics. Respondent 3

Respondent 3 believes that South Africa played different strategies in the crises in Zimbabwe and the DRC. In Respondent 3's view, this demonstrates South Africa's mediation and peacekeeping stance as flexible and agile to the situation.

In Lesotho, both hard and soft power was used, which means that South Africa used "smart power" to bring political stability in that country. In Zimbabwe, the Quiet Diplomacy approach is open to criticism, but it was a better option than military intervention. In fact, due to South Africa's involvement, Zimbabwe averted a civil war. In the DRC, South Africa's involvement has assisted the DRC politically as well as socially and economically. Respondent 3

Respondent 3 saw these interventions as significantly successful to the point that they believed they have averted a civil war in Zimbabwe.

5.5.5 Mutuality of benefits – South Africa versus SADC

On whether other SADC states have benefitted from South Africa's membership to the SADC as a regional economic community, Respondent 1 believed that during Mbeki's presidency there were more benefits:

I think this has been answered. The SADC reaped more benefits under the Mbeki era.

Under Zuma and Ramaphosa, reduced interest in the SADC meant that the region benefitted less both economically and politically from South Africa.

Zuma's interest was more with China and BRICS. Ramaphosa has an interest in SADC but I believe it's more economic diplomacy based. Respondent 1

Respondent 1 also opines that it was difficult for South Africa to support the SADC, meaningfully given its own problems at home:

Lastly, it is difficult to expect South Africa to try to help other countries reap when it still trying to address its own issues such as having the largest inequalities in the world.

Respondent 2 also perceives that other countries had indeed benefitted from South Africa's membership in the SADC, particularly in the areas of peace, security and politics:

Yes, because even countries that do not seem to like South Africa ... revert to enlisting the country's services. We have seen this, for example with the volatile political situations in countries such as the CAR, DRC, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Sudan, among others. Respondent 3

Respondents 1 and 2 briefly shared their perceptions on whether South Africa, in turn, had also benefitted from being a member of the SADC. Both believed that South Africa had not benefitted significantly from being a member of SADC. Respondent 1 notes that as one of the last countries to join the bloc, it cannot be expected to have gained that much in terms of regional political power. South Africa, therefore, needed to share power and influence with other older members of the bloc. Additionally, South Africa cannot be expected to benefit ahead of Botswana, the country that created the SADC in the first place:

It was the last country to join and has to work with the countries there. Respondent 1

Respondent 2 is of the view that there is a probability that South Africa might have benefitted from its peacekeeping experiences in the region, although overall, the country had not gained much from being a member of the SADC:

Maybe in peacekeeping but on all other grounds we have not benefitted appropriately from SADC. Respondent 2

Respondent 3 also believed that South Africa has not itself benefitted much from the SADC although SADC member states themselves had benefitted immensely from South Africa:


Given the country's diversified economy and a relatively stable political climate, South Africa has attracted many foreign nationals who come with both good and bad intentions. On that score, I would say that the country has not reaped positive rewards.
Respondent 3

The benefits included access to South Africa's comparatively robust economy.

5.6 Theme 5: Recommendations on the regional integration role

The last theme was built on various recommendations that the sample gave on how best South Africa's future regional integration role in Southern Africa can be moved forward. Two subthemes were generated under this theme and these are shown below.

Figure 2.5: Recommendations on the regional integration role



Source: Researcher's own compilation.

5.6.1 Focus on economic rather than political relationships

Respondent 1 concludes that regional power and regional integration structures in modern-day international politics have centred on economics. Countries have sought integration with regions they expected to economically benefit from regardless of where these might be located:

It is about economics. That is why most African countries are looking east. Most African countries are actually not even looking to South Africa in terms of regional integration. Respondent 1

5.6.2 Focus on domestic rather than regional development

Respondent 2 concludes that South Africa should focus on achieving domestic growth and stability. Regional domination, either politically or economically, should not be a primary objective. With domestic economic growth and political stability, South Africa can positively affect the region by being a benchmark of political and economic management expediency.

South Africa should be humble. It should focus on achieving growth domestically and creating a benchmark political model that motivates our SADC partners to want to work [with] and learn from us.

With better infrastructure, South Africa can attain regional economic dominance by becoming a preferred regional trade partner:

In addition, engage with us to increase our multilateral trade and improvement of inter-country infrastructure to allow for cheaper logistics and better trade arrangements. Then we should connect with our other regions of Africa in the same manner. Respondent 2

Respondent 3 concluded that South Africa needed to maintain its foreign policies and regional power and regional integration focus despite criticisms from some quarters.

I am of the view that South Africa should not allow its plans to be derailed by its critics. The reality is that the region (SADC) needs South Africa, and the latter has come to the party in terms of taking the lead in uniting the region. Respondent 3

South Africa also needed to equilibrate its fights for regional power status with Nigeria:

Perhaps what needs to happen is that the South African political leadership should improve relations with Nigeria because at times the two countries appear to be

competitors by virtue of the fact that they are both influential in regional and continental politics. Respondent 3

Thus, Respondent 1 recommended economic focus, Respondent 2, domestic focus, and Respondent 3, maintaining the current stance and policies as well as partnering rather than tussling with Nigeria for relevance on the continent in a quest for a better-integrated continent.

5.7 Conclusion

The analysis of results yielded five themes that contributed to the answering of the study's research questions. These themes were: Theme 1, The Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration; Theme 2, Regional integration under post-1994 leaders; Theme 3, South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region; Theme 4, Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures, and Theme 5, Recommendations on the regional integration role. The themes highlighted different ideological views on the roles of South Africa in Southern Africa as well as the successes, challenges, benefits and philosophies associated with these roles. The next chapter further discusses these themes as well as their subthemes in detail.

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, data were analysed using thematic content analysis. A panel of academic experts with extensive knowledge on regional integration were approached as the study's expert sample. In this chapter, the various themes, views and ideologies established in the data analysis are further reviewed and discussed. The discussions are presented on a theme-by-theme basis and encompass three views: views from the sample, views from the literature and the researcher's own deductions. The discussions also develop frameworks that combine the views from the three cited sources. These frameworks are in line with the general views that qualitative research can be used to identify and relate concepts that can be further tested through deductive approaches of quantitative studies. The study had five research questions that were answered through thematic content analysis in the previous chapter. These research questions were:

- I. What is the nexus between South African hegemonic tendency and regional integration in Southern Africa?
- II. How has South Africa's SADC membership enhanced the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa?
- III. How have South Africa's contributions deepened the sustainability of socio-economic development in the subregion?
- IV. Has post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa strengthened its contributory roles towards regional integration?
- V. What possible recommendations may be drawn on South Africa's future regional integration agenda in Southern Africa?

The chapter starts with discussions relating to the first theme.

6.2 Theme 1: The perceived link between regional powers and regional integration

Theme 1 had three subthemes: regional powers and regional integration visible link, regional powers as facilitators of successful integration, and regional powers as competitive/colluding forces in regional blocs. These subthemes were related by the association between the

existence/effectiveness of a regional bloc with the instrumentality of regional powers within the bloc and how these powers relate to each other.

6.2.1 Regional powers and regional integration visible link

The view that regional powers, also referred to as regional hegemons, played important roles in regional development and in shaping regional policy, thus, a link between hegemony and integration, came out from the empirical study. In the literature, several scholars see this association as almost natural and expected. Chiroro (2012) and Christiano (2018) see a hegemon as a regional success facilitator in a region through its financial, economic and developmental assistance and initiatives. Mandela (2010) also argues that a hegemonic state must have a direct link with regional economic direction through its capacity to control markets and factors of production. Nonetheless, in the literature, just like in the study, the capacity of a regional power to control or drive the regional bloc towards its success as envisaged by Chiroro (2012) and Mandela (2010), is not guaranteed. Part of the sample held a view that regional powers did not necessarily have the envisaged influence to drive regional integration due to the complexity and multiplicity of factors that the process held. In other words, it was not always in the power of a hegemon to control these complexities.

Ogunnubi (2016) explores the link between hegemony and regional integration under the hegemonic stability theory rooted in the work of Kindleberger (1973). Under this theory, a clear-cut link between hegemony and regional integration is envisaged. Regional blocs were an aspect and aspiration of nations seeking to create domination fiefdoms. They were, in other words, results of egoistic states seeking self-serving control over others. However, despite this theoretically clear linkage, hegemonic tendencies as per Kindleberger's theory did not necessarily succeed in Africa. Jikobu (2015), like Respondent 1 in the sample, acknowledges that regional integration is a far more complex reality than is theoretically perceived. Within this reality, regional powers do not always get to direct the economic, developmental and political state of affairs in the region of interest. Factors that include lack of interest and commitment, and resistance and dislike of a hegemon neutralise its effectiveness and, in some cases, its relevance within the region. Respondent 1 discusses how political integration has not been much of a success as a result. Jikobu (2015), however, also attributes the poor link between regional powers and regional integration to the foreign nature of hegemony within an African set-up. Regional hegemony was mostly a Western concept that was naturally, directly or indirectly resisted in Africa.

Thus, Respondent 1 shared a view that while links between regional hegemons and regional integration can be identified, the complexities of relationships, as a function of the type of integration determined whether these hegemons would indeed successfully drive or control regional aspirations. The respondent, therefore, shares the broad view that while regional integration offers diverse and numerous benefits for its member states, these are not always guaranteed as they also depend on the degree and extent of commitments from involved member states (Mwasha, 2011; Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). The existence of notable links between regional blocs and identified regional leaders was not a guarantee of regional success.

6.2.2 Regional powers as facilitators of successful regional integration

Another respondent saw a different linkage between regional powers and regional integration. Respondent 2 saw regional powers as having the capacity to facilitate regional co-operation with greater certainty, although they also did not guarantee total success. There was, therefore, greater certainty and reduced complexity in Respondent 2's view of the above linkage. The pre-conditions given by Respondent 2 were the respect for autonomy, meaning reduced and acceptable hegemonic influences over other member states by regional leaders. Additionally, there was a need to control certain equilibriums, especially those related to migration as a way of facilitating or enhancing the possible success of a bloc.

From a theoretical perspective, Respondent 2 delves into the functionalist perspective of regional integration driven by mutuality rather than dominance. Under functionalism, as elucidated by Jikobu (2015), countries consider common interests as the main driver of integration and these do not necessarily need to be driven by a regional power. At the same time, the interests of different participating countries, as well as the risk they incur in the arrangement, are balanced through internal policies. In other words, regional powers do not have the capacity to impose excessive control that limits the internal policy control capacities of individual governments.

Respondent 3 subscribes to the hegemonic stability theory that puts power and ability in the hands of a regional hegemon. Through its militaristic, economic, political and financial powers, a regional hegemon is able to control and drive regional integration. The respondent points out how both soft power and hard power can be applied in the process of regional development implying reduced mutuality, which then requires some form of incentivisation and coercion. Nye (2004) and Qobo (2018) suggest that soft power can be used to attract other nations into

regional blocs under the auspices of a regional leader. This view is shared by Respondent 3 from the sample. The use of hard power to draw participation in a regional bloc, which implies coercion and financial incentives, is also discussed by the same respondent. The hard power approach to regional integration subscribes to the neo-realism view that nations, when in threatened positions, may choose co-operation as a means for self-preservation (Jikobu, 2015 citing Collard-Wexler, 2006).

6.2.3 Regional powers as competitive/colluding forces in regional blocs

Under the first theme, respondents associated regional hegemon with competition for power with some regional members. Balance of power was noted as a factor to consider in the regional leaders' quest to control or lead a region. Regional power positions within regions were constantly being contested and within an African continental set-up, it was observed that both South Africa and Nigeria generally appeared to want to take the ultimate status of a regional leader. At the same time, there was a view that collusion, rather than competition amongst regional powers, provided a better developmental link for regions as Respondent 2 opined that the combined efforts between South Africa and Nigeria had fostered improved governance and improved peace in Africa.

An important point discussed by Respondent 1 was that regional leaders were not necessarily linked to the successful integration of a region as seemingly lesser states can also achieve such a fit. Botswana, which according to the respondent was the major force behind the formation of the SADC, was one such an example. Under such scenarios, regional hegemons cannot be expected to usurp power and control from such founding states, regardless of any political, militaristic and economic power as argued under the hegemonic stability theory. This view also refutes the arguments by Cilliers, Schünemann and Moyer (2015) who assert that it was only "stronger states" that had the ability and capacity to influence and direct major regional policies, including regional integration direction. Arguments by Cilliers, Schünemann and Moyer put much emphasis and focus on countries with economic strength as well as large markets, particularly South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia and Morocco, as shapers of Africa's regional economic and political policies. Thus, they assume that "weaker" countries cannot exert such influence over regional policy, in contrast to the revelations from this study.

Another country that is neither perceived as a current nor a growing regional power that has had a considerable impact on regional policy, is Rwanda. In the study, Rwanda is discussed for its role in leading the signing of an ambitious African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA),

the Kigali Declaration and the Free Movement Protocol. This was signed by 50 states in Africa making it one of the major free trade arrangements in the continent (African Union, 2018). The above example, as given by Respondent 1, points out that countries without militaristic, economic and financial power were not necessarily powerless in driving regional policy. The same respondent also questioned the general belief that smaller nations looked up to regional hegemons for economic policy direction and argued that most African countries were in fact not looking up to South Africa as a regional power. In the works of Cilliers, Schünemann and Moyer (2015), this view is also held as South Africa, in their opinion, was generally becoming a stagnant hegemony.


6.2.4 Regional integration under post-1994 leaders

Destradi (2010) describes various types of hegemonies. Generally, South Africa fits into the soft and leader-initiated hegemony; its operations are hinged on the pursuit of common goals through a socialisation process launched by the leader. Persuasion rather than force is used as a means to entice members to participate in it. Members hope to benefit economically, politically or otherwise while the leader also aims at reaping rewards from the same relationship. This is the view that is presented as the status quo of hegemony in South Africa post-1994. Both the sample of the study and the generality of sources consulted agree to this view. Regardless, leaders of democratic South Africa each ushered in different versions of the same type of hegemony.

From the empirical study, it was clear that South African foreign policy in general, as well as policy on regional integration, has not been uniform under four post-1994 leaders, namely Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. In the body of knowledge, various theories and views attempt to relate international relations and foreign policy with individualistic characteristics of leaders. Hussain and Shakoor (2017) acknowledges this approach as the individualism in foreign policy decision-making. Smith (2012) and Rapport (2016) also assert that individual-level psychological processes interact with government processes to produce unpredictable international relations outcomes and this necessitates individualistic analysis in foreign policy. Thus, leaders operating under the same policy realms, can take different or even conflicting policy directions of foreign policy. The study results strongly conform to these views as respondents noted that regional foreign policy has been a function of individualistic perspectives of different leaders.

Mandela’s foreign policy on regional integration was driven by the need to quickly reintroduce South Africa to the international scene. Regional hegemonic tendencies were not strongly felt under Mandela as South Africa chose to co-ordinate with other countries in finding solutions and also backed out of regional conflicts requiring hard power as in the DRC case. Under Mbeki, South Africa’s regional policy, as asserted by the respondents, took a “big brother” approach where the country focused on leading Africa towards enhanced self-reliance and self-respect through the African Renaissance approach. Under Zuma and Ramaphosa, the sample saw South Africa minimising its focus on continental affairs. The above summary shows different approaches towards the same policy and as suggested by individualism-centred approaches, the roles, beliefs, experiences and perceptions of leaders can easily become foreign policy. This view is summarised diagrammatically below:

Figure 6.1: Individualistic view in foreign policy decision-making-cognitive approach



Source: Hussain and Shakoor (2017).

The South African context, as highlighted earlier, has exhibited quick and wide shifts in dealing with regional power issues and regional integration as part of foreign policy (Helen Suzman Foundation, 2018). The role of individual presidents as actors in foreign policy cannot be

overemphasised. Hussain and Shakkor (2017) point to two conflicting paradigms of foreign policy decision-making. These are the cognitive approach, hinted at earlier, and the rational actor approach.

From the expressions of the sample, it can be noted that the cognitive approach, where beliefs and values affect decision-making and contribute to foreign policy actions as well as the rational actor approach, can be discerned amongst the four leaders. The latter approach is based on the major assumption that leaders make rational foreign policy decisions given the circumstances (Kremer-Asaf, 2015; Rapport, 2016; Hussain and Shakkor, 2017). Respondent 1 asserts that Mbeki made his foreign policy gestures based on strong beliefs in the values of Africanism and in the need for the continent to attain self-reliance. His foreign policy decisions including his wide involvement in continental affairs, sometimes at the expense of South African affairs, can be attributed to his views of African oneness. Going by Respondent 1's views, Ramaphosa on the other is associated with a more rational actor approach. Economic problems at home, among them, low economic growth, high unemployment and increasing inequality, among others, drive his focus towards South Africa and demands a business and economic focused foreign policy approach (that can hopefully help to resolve challenges at home). The sample defines this approach by Ramaphosa as rational and fitting the current circumstances in South Africa.

6.2.5 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mandela

The sample did not discuss Mandela's foreign policy much. Mandela was seen as putting much focus on the branding of South Africa to the world. In the literature, Mandela made speeches on how Southern Africa was a focal area for South Africa's foreign policy as elucidated in his paper, 'South Africa's Future Foreign Policy', where he said: "Southern Africa commands a special significance in our foreign policy, we are intimately part of Southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region (Mandela, 1993)". In the empirical study, Mandela is noted as having taken interest in the Lesotho crises where hard power was applied to reverse a coup d'état.

From the literature, six principles of South Africa's foreign policy, ascribed to Mandela, were listed as follows:

1. That the issue of human rights is central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental
2. That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide
3. That considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations
4. That peace is the goal to which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed.
5. That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices, and
6. That economic development depends on growing regional and international economic co-operation in an interdependent world.

In the empirical study, from the few cited examples of Mandela's engagement with Southern Africa and Africa at large, the first five appear to reflect very well in his actions as a leader. Mandela's criticism and calling for the isolation of Sani Abacha, the Nigerian general who had taken power through a coup in 1993, reflected very well with the first five principles that aimed to promote democracy and peace on the continent as a region. Nonetheless, Respondent 1 from the study, like Myburgh (2008) and Umezurike and Lucky (2015), asserts that this approach was continentally criticised, leaving South Africa isolated on the matter.

The Lesotho political crisis of 1998 is also discussed in the study as a major incident in South Africa's regional policy. Respondent 3 describes the incident as an appropriate example of South Africa's use of hard power to achieve peace and stability objectives in the region. At the same time, however, Monyae (2014) asserts that despite the use of hard power in the crisis, there were no hegemonic tendencies exhibited as South Africa consulted within the region, eventually resulting in the formation of the "Troika" on Lesotho, with Botswana and Zimbabwe. The Lesotho and the Abacha incidents, as well as the DRC civil war (where South Africa refused to militarily intervene), all do not necessarily point towards a hegemonic stance by South Africa in the views of Monyae (2014). In the sample, Mandela is not portrayed as a

leader who drove a regional power-focused foreign policy despite South Africa being actively involved in Africa's affairs.

Nonetheless, Mandela is noted for controversial foreign policy decisions by one respondent in the sample. Referring to the abandoning of political ties with Taiwan under the then Two Chinas Policy and the calling of harsh global punishment for Nigeria's dictatorship, Respondent 2 points out policy inconsistencies, which sometimes sided with aggressors at the expense of victims and the other way round. Youba (2009) discussed similar views and uses these incidents to query the view that Mandela's foreign policy was idealistic.

6.2.6 Regional integration and foreign policy under Mbeki

In the empirical study, there was extensive discussion on the roles played by Mbeki in South Africa's foreign policy post-1994 with a great deal of focus being placed on his time as president. Yiko (2014) argues the Mbeki era was the major foreign policy reformulation era in post-apartheid South Africa. Yiko extends Mbeki's foreign policymaking stretch to the Mandela presidency era where he was the deputy president. Mbeki, as reported by Yiko, was in charge of foreign policy while Mandela concentrated on the domestic front. From the sample, six core characteristics of regional integration and foreign policy under President Mbeki can be noted. These are:

- The African Renaissance philosophy
- Perceived "big brother" (regional hegemony) tendencies
- Soft power and diplomatic approaches
- Concern with co-operating and mending ties with Nigeria
- Excessive involvement and focus on foreign policy relative to domestic policy (in comparison to other leaders), and
- Strong regional integration focus.

These characteristics saw South Africa play a major role in regional politics in comparison to other presidential eras. As discussed earlier, Mbeki's approach resonates more with the cognitive approach to foreign policy. Going by this view, the above characteristics cannot be divorced from his personal philosophies as a leader. One such philosophy that strongly reflects in his policies, as well as in the above characteristics, is the Africa Renaissance philosophy (Youla, 2009).

Youla (2009) attempts to place Mbeki's foreign policy within an idealist-realist spectrum. Youla views realists as being led by the common view that the state is the major actor in international relations and its survival is the most important aspect. The state is, therefore, a self-interested, self-preserving system that exists in an acknowledged anarchic system. The above characteristics as outlined by the respondents do not directly point towards realism. Rather they point towards a hybrid foreign policy regime that acknowledged realist principles but promoted idealism through regional integration as a force for building democracy.

6.2.7 Regional integration and foreign policy under Zuma and Ramaphosa

In relation to the foreign policy and regional integration stance under President Zuma, the sample highlighted the following characteristics:

- Comparatively little interest in the SADC
- More focus on China and BRICS, and
- Focus on a few selected hotspots under the auspices of the AU and the UN.

Ramaphosa's foreign policy and regional integration approach, according to the sample, was more or less a continuation of Zuma's policy that saw limited direct involvement of South Africa on the continent. Ramaphosa focused on regional relationships that supported business and economic needs of South Africa. This was attributed to the existence of several domestic problems in South Africa and the need to apply foreign policy as a possible solution to these problems. Ramaphosa's policy, as Respondent 1 argues, was still developing and therefore could take unexpected turns.

From the above discussions, it can, therefore, be concluded that South Africa's foreign policy, in relation to regional integration and the state of being a regional power, has not been uniformly articulated. Different leaders focused on different aspects of regional integration. South Africa has therefore played different roles that have not necessarily been consistent. All the same, the country has played democratization and peacemaking roles on the African continent under Presidents Mandela and Mbeki. Under President Zuma, South Africa has played similar roles but as a less-interested state often under the obliging auspices of the AU and the UN. The country's interest in regional power politics appears to be taking a gradual transformation from politically focused integration under Mandela and Mbeki to economically focused regional integration under Ramaphosa and partially under Zuma.

Another view that came from the sample related to South Africa's agenda in regional integration. There were different views on what different leaders hoped or aimed to gain from being a subregional power playing various integration roles. There was a view from two of the respondents that Mbeki's foreign policy was hinged on creating benefits that would be felt in Africa as a continent. His agenda was not based on the common hegemonic desires to benefit economically or politically from regional arrangements at the expense of other members. One respondent, in particular, gave an almost philanthropic view of Mbeki's regional intentions.

In contrast, Youla (2009) and Siko (2014) and Monyae (2014) hold the view that Mbeki aimed at putting South Africa ahead of other nations within the African Renaissance context. There was, therefore, a national agenda behind the regional processes and philosophies underlying the African Renaissance approach. The same scholars describe Zuma and Ramaphosa as pursuing foreign integration openly with an agenda of reaping economic benefits for South Africa. The respondents in the sample, in this regard, did not argue with this assertion. Overall, however, the arguments of Mbeki's goal in regional integration versus that of Zuma and Ramaphosa creates an interesting debate on whether regional integration can be pursued strictly or mostly for the benefit of the region. Augusto and Faria (2003) argue that self-interest is an undisputed characteristic of a hegemony, hard or soft.

6.3 Theme 2: South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region

Theme 3 dealt with the broad processes and tools that South Africa applies in its foreign policy and noted quest for regional power status. The theme put much focus on the soft power approach widely discussed by the sample as the country's main tool in the establishment of itself as a hegemon.

6.3.1 Diplomacy and soft power approach

One respondent summarised South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy as biased towards the East and China and hostile towards the West. The pro-Chinese stance, as argued, was driven by the view that China's trade and economic domination was notably growing ahead of Western powers. A South Africa aligned to China, it was perceived, would reap more economic and trade advantages, compared to one aligned to the West. Additionally, China, as a superpower had the capacity and willingness (under the right terms) to support South Africa's global political positions in a more balanced United Nations Security Council (Youla, 2009). This, according to Youla, was a major reason why South Africa, under its idealist international

relations approach under Mandela, decided to inconsistently cease to recognise Taiwan as a sovereign nation. The pro-China approach, as argued, became more pronounced in the Zuma era with the formation of the BRICS. Under the same approach, the African region became less and less of a focal point for South Africa and this, according to Respondent 2, was not well appreciated by regional leaders who felt that South Africa was drifting from African affairs. Phungula (2013), however, does not see the relationship between China and South Africa as replacing regional relations existent since 1994. Rather, several Sub-Saharan African countries were enjoying similar economic and political relationships with Beijing. However, South Africa was the only African country in the BRICS, and this elevated its relationship with China to a different level. South Africa's participation in the BRICS, as argued by Respondent 2 saw it relating less and less with African regional partners.

In the sample, South Africa's foreign policy has been described in many terms by the sample. The main descriptive terms applied include:

- Realism/ Realistic theory-based
- Soft power
- Smart power
- Diplomatic
- Inconsistent
- Empathic
- Self-interested
- Ubuntu diplomats
- Pro-East
- Anti-West
- Hypocritical

These terms show the diversity of views that the sample held on South Africa's foreign policy across four presidential eras from Mandela to Ramaphosa and across various international relations and regionalisation issues over the same era.

In an earlier section, realism was discussed in relation to President Mbeki's foreign policy formulation and implementation principles. Overall, the view that foreign policy drawn under Mbeki is what permeates into today's international relations, appears to hold. Only the early part of Mandela's rule is discussed as an idealist foreign policy ideology. Diplomacy, soft power and smart power as approaches are argued to drive South Africa's foreign policy.

Nonetheless, the sample asserts that there are inconsistencies in policy application as noted in how South Africa dealt with the Nigerian coup crisis under Sani Abacha versus the Zimbabwean human rights and political misrule crisis under Robert Mugabe.

One respondent cites the inconsistent and hypocritical nature of South Africa's foreign policy. Policy inconsistencies, as argued by Youla (2009), point towards constructivist-based foreign policy that changes to suit the needs and demands of political situations versus South Africa's interests and needs at the time. Tjemolance (2011) sees South Africa sharing opposing qualities that include simultaneously being an emphatic regional state and a "bully". This inconsistency, again points towards a constructivist approach where national interests are weighed against the rigours and needs of international relations.

The foreign policy unpredictability issues highlighted by the sample, are also reflected by the Helen Suzman Foundation (2018) which states that:

South Africa's foreign policy is alarmingly unpredictable, often being at odds with the ("DIRCO"s) stated objectives. One cannot but wonder whether any formulated foreign policy guidelines are actually being pursued by DIRCO, or whether South Africa's behaviour in the international arena is answerable to anything or anyone.

While the sample does not go so far as to label the foreign policy as possibly non-compliant with DIRCO, it highlights the same worry. The foundation cites various cases, some of which were discussed in the sample, particularly the Robert Mugabe issue. Others include the attempted withdrawal from the ICC as a protest action against a crime against humanity arrest warrant of Omar al Bashir (HSF: 2018). The foundation, therefore, believes that South Africa's foreign policy, fails, due to its erratic nature, to effectively serve its democratization agenda for Africa and the world and its commitment to peace and stability as well.

In contrast, although the sample shares the view of an erratic foreign policy, it does not acknowledge that this has led South Africa to fail in its role to promote democracy in the region. The sample appears to take a more objective stance and points to an Africa with an ever-changing view and expectation of South Africa. The Sani Abacha incident, once again, is cited as an example of South Africa taking a hardliner stance to a fellow African nation. According to Monyae (2014), South Africa learnt the hard way that it cannot always turn against an African nation (even the ones that were democratically flawed) without negative consequences from fellow African states. The same author traces the "quiet diplomacy" stance of President Mbeki as emanating directly from the experiences learnt during the Sani Abacha era. Despite

Robert Mugabe's globally exhibited and acknowledged human rights abuses, South Africa chose to avoid diplomatic rows with Harare and the rest of Africa on the matter. The constructivist approach that relates policy actions to situations and therefore produces inconsistent outcomes, is thus not wholly seen as the solution to the situation but as a better evil; as Respondent 3 puts it, this erratic policy does not strain relationships between South Africa and regional partners.

6.3.2 The effectiveness of soft power as a foreign policy tool

Soft power was widely discussed as a major foreign policy tool in South Africa's role and efforts in promoting peace, stability and democratic governance on the African region. The applicability and effectiveness of soft power was, however, queried by some sections of the sample. Respondent 1 dug deeper into Nye's soft power theory and argued that soft power, as a theory and reality, is only applicable when the hegemon applying power has the ability to incentivise another to act in a particular way. South Africa, due to its economic situation, did not have resources that it could use for such an incentivisation. Therefore, what South Africa had used was not necessarily soft power but possibly persuasive diplomacy. However, there are some scholars like Ogunnubi (2017), who, in contrast to Respondent 1's view, see soft power as a major international relations and foreign policy force that South Africa has extensively relied on in the post-apartheid era.

In addition to economic incentives as a source of soft power, Tella (2017) asserts that soft power can be attained through acceptance of a power source's political moral grounds to hold that power. This source of power is recognised in the sample by Respondent 2 who, however, cautions that it was not ultimately sustainable. The respondent states that since South Africa cannot overly rely on its economic muscle as a source of soft power, its reputation as a state that stands for real democracy and stability was becoming more and more important.

We can only rely on our economy so long as we have it but until we grow more statesmen on a magnitude of the father of our democratic country, the late President Mandela, we will become more irrelevant as other countries overtake ours.
Respondent 2

The respondent associates the moral acceptance type of soft power with Mandela. This power can be eroded if South Africa does not generate leaders and leadership qualities of a similar calibre to the late former president.

6.3.3 South Africa's hegemonic tendencies

The sample discussed South Africa's hegemonic tendencies and how other regional members had responded to it. Using Destradi's (2010) classification of hegemons, South Africa fits within the soft hegemony of the leader-initiated hegemon spectrum. This specification seems to agree with the consensus of the sample that refutes any views of South Africa being a coercive hegemon. Regardless, there is notable dislike and resistance to South Africa's hegemonic stance within the region and this to an extent limits the effectiveness of its role in peace, democracy and stability in the region. One respondent, therefore, cautions South Africa against imposing its will over other nations no matter how small as this openly leads to resistance and lack of co-operation. South Africa is also cautioned against attempting to monopolise the benefits of regional integration ahead of other members. Finally, South Africa is encouraged to mend ties and to consider the interests of other hegemons in the regions, including Kenya and Nigeria. These views by the sample are hinged on the view that South Africa was being seen to act like a big brother chastising the rest of the region despite its having its own shortfalls.

A common narrative in the sample was that South Africa's efforts in the region were poorly understood by other regional members. Secondly, regional members lacked consistency in relation to what they expected from South Africa. For instance, during President Mbeki's tenure, South Africa was accused of wanting to take over control of the African region. From the sample, it was reported that several states celebrated Mbeki's unceremonious departure from the presidency as it meant he would no longer be able to impose his foreign policy. Later on, South Africa's limited involvement in African affairs under Zuma was also criticised by several African states. This led the sample to conclude that South Africa's regional integration efforts and the roles it played therein were adversely affected by inconsistent and negative views from the continent. In the literature, Tjemolane (2011) agrees with these views in the sample that South Africa, despite been noted as a soft hegemon, is still seen as a partner in development by some member states and an adverse hegemon by others. Hamill (2018) also discusses South Africa's struggle to counter the views that it is an adverse hegemon, with these views coming from within and without the SADC region. The consequential effect of such views, regardless of whether they are accurate or not, has been low participation in regional affairs spearheaded by South Africa (Hamill, 2018).

6.4 Theme 3: Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures

Many scholars discuss the view that regional integration and hegemony as international political and economic relation processes, do not occur in vain (Tjemolane, 2011; Cilliers, Schünemann and Moyer, 2015; Tella, 2017). Actors in these processes expect to benefit from them in one way or another and such benefits could be mutual or unilateral. The reaping of any benefits is usually associated with the realisation of successes, and failures of regional integration processes may mean that no such benefits are realised. The sample of experts consulted in the study pointed out mutual benefits between a hegemon and its region of influence as ideal.

Economically, Africa had benefitted from South African FDI through private investment flows (Mandela, 2010; Modesto and Sajeev, 2016). These scholars list various South African businesses that have invested in the region to the benefit of member states that participate in blocs led by South Africa. At the same time, Modesto and Sajeev (2016) assert that such investments have not come without criticism. Local businesses in investment countries, as argued, are not able to compete with South African entities resulting in closures and perpetuating unemployment, and economic domination by South African businesses. This view, therefore, leads to the querying of the nature of benefits that member states are perceived to have gained.

While the sample was adamant that South Africa has gained much economically, the above viewpoints highlight increasing dominance of South African investment interests in the regions, a factor associated with positive current account and capital inflows into the South African economy (IDC, 2019). At the same time, statistics show that three of South Africa's top 10 export destinations are in the SADC and that Africa as a continent absorbed 26.2% of the country's 2017 exports, making it the largest intra-continental net exporter to the African continent (IDC, 2019). These figures, as well as the views by Mandela (2010) and Modesto and Sajeev (2016), paint a picture of an economy whose trade has significantly benefitted from regional integration.

It is possible that perceptions that South Africa has or is not benefitting much from regionalism in Africa could be driven by a poorly performing local economy. Some respondents also argued that Southern Africa is one of the slowest growing economic regions in Africa and used this to attest that South Africa was not benefitting much from the region and that it had failed to lead economic growth in its immediate sub region. In the sample, the view that it was SADC and

the rest of Africa that had in fact benefitted from South Africa's hegemony in these regions is also shared. This view, which contests the hegemonic stability theory, as noted, is also premised on the view that a South Africa that is benefitting from the region should not be having economic challenges at home. To confirm this view, Respondents 1 encourages South Africa to focus more on domestic policy rather than on foreign policy as a way of dealing with socio-economic problems at home.

6.4.1 Comparative limited regional integration experience

Respondent 2 believed that South Africa had not performed very well in its regional integration efforts. The same respondent stated that South Africa, despite being Africa's economic powerhouse, had not had much of an impact on Africa's political stability. This was because the country had little experience dealing with political and military conflict and in addition did not take advice from other states that could help. Strong hegemonic tendencies were blamed for this non-consultative approach that, at the end of the day, did not work. This view was obviously not commonly shared as the two other respondents contested that South Africa had achieved impressive political milestones in Lesotho, and, to some extent, in Zimbabwe. It had also participated in various peacekeeping missions on the continent. Respondent 3 also mentioned successes in Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Mozambique. Marthoz (2012) confirms the view that South Africa, despite being the last country to gain its freedom, has indeed made commendable fits in peacebuilding on the African continent. Marthoz cites South Africa's success in Madagascar, Kenya, Angola and the Comoros, in addition to the countries listed by Respondent 3.

6.4.2 The theoretical framework views

From a theoretical framework perspective, the results from the study generally conform to the precepts of the hegemonic stability theory attributed to Gramsci (1971). The respondents in the study agree that South Africa demonstrates open hegemonic tendencies although these were not seen as extreme and mainly revolved around soft power. This view conforms to a belief that a hegemonic power demonstrates its superiority within appropriate measures and other nations come to accept such a position. The other characteristics of a hegemon under the Gramsci classification as affirmed by Bohm (2018), include the view that hegemons that entice other nations to fall under their influence are generally middle-income economies that have a notable economic advantage over other regional members. In both the sample and the literature, South Africa conforms to this aspect without much debate. It is argued to be an economic

powerhouse on a continent with low-income and poorer economies that can be easily drawn into the hegemon's path.

Augusto and Faria (2003) in their published article *The Value of the Concept of Hegemony for International Relations* posit that the strength of a hegemon (see table 6.1) may be classified into four components. These four components are compared to the sample's view on South Africa's stature as a hegemon.

Table 6.1: Showing four attributes of a hegemonic state versus the sample’s views

Military Power	The hegemon must possess sufficient and latest military arsenal that has the power to secure the safety of its geographical area. This also entails the need of skilled forces that are prepared for duty or any arising dispute in the region.	South Africa, as asserted by the sample, has greater military power than its regional peers. It can apply sufficient hard power when it sees, if fit (Lesotho), and can contribute to peacekeeping in a militaristic fashion.
Dominance over Production	The production industry of the hegemon must be of robust calibre capable of producing and exporting high-value goods in comparison with other states. It must have sole control of energy and needed raw materials. Likewise, its logistical dominance is of importance as this grants it the platform to establish the movement of regional, continental and international trade.	The sample describes South Africa’s production as generally superior to that of the rests of the continent including competing hegemon such as Nigeria and Kenya.
Finance	This further grants the hegemon the platform over credit-related decisions and where investments should take place.	The sample discusses South Africa’s extend financial assistance to Guinea Bissau under IBSA as finance credit-related decision.
Technological Power	The hegemon’s technological base must be of robust capability. This grants it the avenue to be ahead of other states, hence, inventing the latest products and machinery.	South Africa is also described as possessing superior technological infrastructure in comparison to its regional peers.

Source: Augusto and Faria (2003).

South Africa further suits Yilmaz's (2010) classification of a hegemon. As confirmed from both the sample and the literature, it meets the criteria of (1) technological advancement, particularly in communication, (2) economic capacity prominent internationally, (3) geographical location in main sea routes area, (4) robust military, and (5) diplomatic negotiations requirements with ease.

South Africa also satisfied two essential features of a hegemon, i.e., self-interested aims and the use of various power tools as discussed by Gramsci. From the views obtained through the sample, both features were satisfied. On the self-interest issue, it was noted that after Mbeki, South Africa adopted a more self-centred approach towards regionalisation. This included siding with China under the BRICS in expectation of better value from BRICS, compared to Africa. Ramaphosa also put more focus on value chains that benefitted South Africa ahead of other regional members, as conditions guiding South Africa's regional integration. South Africa, as discussed, had the ability to apply soft power, hard power and smart power to meet political and economic ends as per Gramsci's views. The above characteristics and features of a hegemon depicted in the hegemonic stability theory, confirm put South Africa as a hegemon.

6.5 Conclusion

The above discussion compared the views from the sample with those from the literature in an attempt to shed more light on the topic under discussion. The sample was mostly in agreement that there was a link between regional powers and regional integration, although the links could also be antagonistic in nature. The discussion also revealed that the view by the sample that South African foreign policy was erratic, was also shared by other scholars. The sample, however, saw this erratic nature as necessitated by a constructivist approach in a region where South Africa's efforts were not always widely accepted. It was also established that idealism and realism seem to guide most of South Africa's foreign policy and regional integration efforts. Overall, while the sample argued that South Africa had not benefitted much from regional integration and that it was the regions that had instead benefitted from South Africa, sources in the literature seemed to point to a South Africa that dominates continental trade and has an almost unrestricted access to continental markets. South Africa had played and continues to play important political and militaristic roles in the region. Its economic role, as expected of a hegemon, was, however, argued to be less significant. South Africa's role on the continent was noted as declining with the country focusing more on the East. The next chapter concludes

the study and gives recommendations on how the status quo of regional integration and foreign policy can be improved in South Africa.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This final chapter of the study draws conclusions from the empirical qualitative study undertaken as part of the research as well as relevant views from the literature. The chapter starts with a summary of this research thesis and its findings before giving its recommendations, including recommendations for future studies that will augment the body of knowledge on regional political science.

This study was carried out with an overall agenda of enhancing the understanding and appreciation of South Africa's role in regional integration within the Southern African and general African continent perspectives. South Africa, as discussed in Chapter one, is significantly positioned to serve the above regions, given its economic and political strengths. To fully understand the topic, the study relied on a small sample of experts who have extensively studied and have been part of the South African regional policymaking and policy practice front. Through this sample, insightful findings of immense help in the understanding of South African regional integration perspectives and processes were made.

In its efforts to appreciate and understand the above state of affairs, this study was guided by five research questions. These questions were:

- I. What is the nexus between South African hegemonic tendency and regional integration in Southern Africa?
- II. How has South Africa's SADC membership enhanced the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa?
- III. How have South Africa's contributions deepened the sustainability of socio-economic development in the subregion?
- IV. Has post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa strengthened its contributory roles towards regional integration?
- V. What possible recommendations may be drawn on South Africa's future regional integration agenda in Southern Africa?

The research was able to provide meaningful answers to the above research questions using the methodological processes discussed in Chapter one.

7.2 Summary of the study

The study produced a six-chapter thesis, and this section summarises the contents of these chapters. Chapters two and three mainly dealt with previous studies and concepts from the literature while Chapter four collected empirical data from the sample. Chapter five attempted to reconcile data from previous studies with the researcher's findings. This approach made it possible to compare and contrast as well as to integrate theoretical findings with empirical findings.

7.2.1 Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter one introduced the study, its objectives, context and setting. The chapter placed regional integration as an essential phenomenon whose significance can be seen in the formation of global integration bodies such as the UN. The major drivers behind regional integration included the need to improve regional trade through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, and reduction of trade tariffs and other barriers to free trade. Regional integration was therefore associated with individual and member countries' economic aspirations, including increased trade, production, investment flow and regional trade market shares. Besides economic objectives, regional integration was argued to enhance the security of regions and subregions through improving co-operative security among nations.

The chapter also discussed regional integration within emerging states as well as the global interest in today's international economic and political discourse, especially the increased attention paid to emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, and the role they play in their subregions. Views by Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017) on the debate whether regional integration, as driven by these emerging powers, was of much economic and political impact to their subregions were noted as commonplace among scholars. In Chapter one, the concept of hegemony was introduced with the researchers acknowledging the works of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci who discussed and developed the concept in his series on *Prison Notebooks* written between 1929 and 1935. Hegemony, in Gramsci's views, was associated with the endeavours of one social class to affirm its power and authority over another and general society. To Gramsci, hegemony is a form of dominance, though it does not have to entail the use of force (Destradi, 2010).

In Chapter one, the study's problem statement was identified as the need to appreciate whether South Africa, as a hegemon in Southern Africa, has played a significant economic and political upliftment role in the SADC, as well as in Africa. Various sources from the literature, as discussed in Chapter one, indicate differences in perspectives on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy in relation to regional integration. The existence of many, often contradicting views inspired the study to interrogate this phenomenon using a small but highly qualified and experienced panel of experts. The objectives drawn in light of the identified problem statement were:

- I. To examine the nexus between South African hegemonic tendency and Southern African integration.
- II. To analyse if South Africa's SADC membership has enhanced the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa.
- III. To evaluate how South Africa's contributions have deepened the sustainability of socio-economic development in the subregion.
- IV. To examine if post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa has strengthened its contributory roles towards regional integration.
- V. To draw possible recommendations on South Africa's future regional integration role in Southern Africa.

7.2.2 Research methodology

In Chapter one, the research methodology that guided the inquiry was also identified and motivated. Kivunja and Kuyini's (2017) definition of a research paradigm as constituting the belief and principles as to how a researcher views the world was used. The interpretive paradigm which heavily relies on the use of qualitative research guided the study. The need to appreciate regional integration and post-apartheid foreign policy from a sample's perspectives motivated this approach. Consequentially, a qualitative research method was applied in the study because of its application in surfacing the sample's dynamic beliefs, experiences and knowledge. Data collected from the sample through interviews were analysed using thematic content analysis. This involved coding data into related themes and subthemes through open-coding processes. Finally, the chapter discussed the ethical considerations that guided the research. The study was guided by the University's Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics and its Policy and Procedures on Managing and Preventing Acts of Plagiarism.

7.2.3 Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical frameworks

In Chapter two, literature on the subject matters of foreign policy, regional hegemons and regional integration was discussed. In the same chapter, the theoretical framework that guided further debate in the study was also presented. The chapter started by clarifying the important concepts of the study.

7.2.4 Regional integration

Regional integration was discussed as a subject that had attracted significant interest among scholars. This was associated with its importance in affecting both competition and co-operation among regional members as per Bala's (2017) arguments. Regional integration was also explained as a phenomenon whose importance in Africa grew with African states' quest for independence from colonialism. Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) opine that from an Afrocentric perspective, regional integration became a vital mechanism in a period where most African states were gaining or about to gain their independence from their respective European colonisers from the 1950s onwards. This was driven by the fact that there was a notion that without some form of unity, African states would be presented with the difficult task(s) of progressing and surviving in the international arena by themselves. Hence, regional integration was driven with the perception of forging robust co-operation, technical links, peace, unity, development and solidarity among continental states (Jiboku and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). A comprehensive definition by Chitsa (2016), which refers to regional integration as a process whereby groups of states join forces and vow to be administered by similar rules and protocols with regards to political, economic and social issues to achieve common goals for their citizens, was among the many that were identified from the literature.

The FTA, CU, a common market, an economic union and total economic integration arrangement were discussed as the stages and types of regional integration that can be found in modern-day foreign relations. South Africa was identified as either belonging to or having been affected by the activities of various regional integration groupings over the years, including the OAU, now the AU. Others of African importance include the NEPAD, the SACU, the CONSAS, the FLS and the SADC.

7.2.5 Hegemony/ hegemonic states

The chapter captured debate on what makes a state a hegemon as well as the main agenda behind hegemony among states. Notable views were those of Dirzauskaite and Ilinca (2017) who simplify the concept of a hegemon to mean a state with comparatively robust power

capabilities. Such states, therefore, have a greater capacity to affect interstate political relations, a fact also acknowledged by Bozdaglioglu (2009). Generally, the view that either political or military power advantages between or among states cannot be divorced from hegemony was widely shared in the literature. Scholars such as Destradi (2010) and Yilmaz (2010) assert that hegemony could, therefore, apply a mix of their political, militaristic and economic might to enhance regional security and bring greater economic prosperity to themselves and the regions. Another important aspect in the discussion on hegemony, which the study captured, was the stages and types of hegemony, which can be noted in modern-day politics. These were hard hegemony, intermediate hegemony, soft hegemony, leader-initiated and follower-initiated (Destradi, 2010).

7.3 Theoretical frameworks

In Chapter two, three theories (regionalism, the hegemonic stability theory and the general systems theory) were expounded as part of the process of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of regional integration and hegemony.

7.3.1 Regionalism

Regionalism, as a theoretical perspective stands, is diametrical to hegemony. With regionalism, there is no apparent domination of one state over the other although such a risk exists. Regions were defined as a group of states situated in the same geographical setting; these states may (although not always) share the same geographical proximity, same political attitudes, cultural and social homogeneity and economic interdependence (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010). When states within a region combine their loyalties, opinions and attitudes together with regionalism come to play (Hettne and Sodertaum, 1998).

The various benefits of regionalism include increased political, economic and security cooperation, the possible stimulation of democratization and state-building, the creation and encouragement of norms and values, which make states more accountable, reduced transaction costs, improved FDI, exposure to international markets and technology, and transforming small markets of individual states into larger monetary, economic and trading areas (Fawcett, 2004; Otoo, 2004). However, as Kirsten (2009) asserts, for robust regionalism to exist, the proximity of member states is vital, as is the intensity of the relationship and the existence of a legally recognised base. A common deterrent of regionalism was the availability of a regional hegemon; strong states are in some cases likely to abuse their powers (Miller, 2006). The

researcher ended by suggesting that within the SADC context, it was regionalism that was more apparent and not hegemony.

7.3.2 Hegemonic Stability Theory

As discussed in Chapter two, the theory of hegemonic stability has its origins in the work of the former general secretary of the Italian Communist Party Marxist Antonio Gramsci in his series of *Prison Notebooks* written between 1929 and 1935 (Adamson, 1980). The concept of hegemony aims to make one understand how dominance is generated, upheld and challenged; it is basically defined as control of one state over others (Bohm, 2018). Four attributes of a hegemonic state were argued to be military power, dominance over production, finance and technological power (Augusto and Faria, 2003). Generally, hegemons applied these strengths to dominate other nations within regions, with this dominance being tolerated differently by its intended targets.

7.3.3 The General Systems Theory

The general systems theory was also discussed in relation to regional integration and hegemony. Under this theory, both states and regions to which they belonged were viewed as systems. These systems were interlinked and could therefore be best understood by deconstructing the various components under each one of them. As a system, South Africa's approach to regionalism can be understood via the effects of its various components, these being the public and private sectors, and government departments, among others.

7.4 Chapter 3: Post-Democratization: A Reflection on South Africa's Quest for Regional Leadership.

Chapter three, with the above title, focused on South Africa and discussed the perceptions of it as either a hegemony or a regionalist. Debates on the actual versus expected roles played by South Africa in the Southern African and broad African regions were also highlighted. This chapter was divided into four sections aimed at unearthing South Africa's regional hegemonic stance in Southern Africa post-1994. The concept of soft power as discussed by Nye (2002) was also discussed in the chapter with the focus on how a hegemon may need to balance soft and hard power in meeting regional integration objectives. Impediments facing South African regional integration and governance frameworks were also identified. These included effects of colonialism, which left many regional states crippling for resources for their own development and economic growth perspective such as infrastructure, economic and continued instability in some member states after the colonial era (Mlambo, 2018). Uneven regional

development and unending political crises were also discussed. Key problems for South Africa were noted as the limited aptitude to translate a plethora of vital features of its financial, economic and military power into robust foreign gain, its failure to effectively exercise influence over some African regimes, and its declining material power, which is being echoed by its own anaemic domestic economy.

7.5 Chapter 4: Data analysis and summary of findings

In Chapter four, data were analysed using thematic content analysis, as discussed in the methodology section. The themes that emerged from the analysis are summarised under this section. These are Theme 1, the perceived link between regional powers and regional integration; Theme 2, Regional integration under post-1994 leaders; Theme 3, South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region; Theme 4, Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures; and Theme 5, Recommendations on regional integration.

7.5.1 Theme 1: Perceived link between regional powers and regional integration

Under this theme, there were two broad views that were identified: regional powers were the instrumental drivers of regional integration and there was, therefore, a visible link between regional power activity in a bloc and the success of such a bloc.

According to some respondents, there was a clear-cut link between regional powers as the drivers of regional integration and their economic, political and military capacities. There was also a risk that a regional power or regional powers that are part of the integration may bear the burden associated with open border policies and supposedly excessive migration. In contrast, others held a view that regional powers were the “victors” of the integration process rather than as entities that may eventually be disadvantaged by the process.

There were views that in global political and economic relations, there was a visible, albeit complex link between regional powers and regional integration. Regional powers generally drove regional integration but with different levels of success across the globe. There was discourse that pointed to competition and collusion among perceived regional powers in specific regions in Africa. Respondents gave views that suggested that the competition for power and control over regions was a phenomenon that connects regional leaders, “led” countries and regional competitors. At the same time, it was noted that less-considered countries like Botswana, as opined, had played significant roles in the establishment of the

SADC as a bloc. Rwanda is also discussed as a non-regional leader that had successfully contributed to regional integration.

7.5.2 Theme 2: Regional integration under post-1994 leaders

Under this theme, South Africa, under its post-apartheid leaders, had exhibited at least four patterns or approaches to regional integration with leaders from Mandela to Ramaphosa making different contributions. Under Mandela, the focus of foreign policy was to establish South Africa's presence on the international scene and to create an image of a new and advancing democracy. Mbeki's foreign policy stance put more emphasis on regional integration and the African Renaissance. Focus was put on developing an image of Africa as a continent that needed to be respected. Under Zuma, there were differing views from the samples. South Africa was argued to have climbed down from regional security concerns choosing to focus on its relationship with China. Another view was that under Zuma, South Africa undertook various military missions under the auspices of the AU. Ramaphosa's approach to regional integration has been an economic and business-focused one. This approach was associated with South Africa's multitude of domestic problems, especially economic and inequality-related challenges.

7.5.3 Theme 3: South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region

The third theme, South Africa's foreign policy processes and tools within the region, discusses the general foreign policy of South Africa post-1994, specifically the tools and approaches that South Africa has used to relate and deal with other countries in its various regional blocs including SADC and the AU.

There were views that South Africa's post-1994 policy stance has been mostly pro-East and hostile towards the West. South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy was described as generally diplomatic and driven by soft power, despite some inconsistencies where hard power approaches were applied like in the Lesotho 1998 incident under Mandela.

On whether South Africa had used soft power effectively for regional development, there was a view that South Africa was not in a position to use soft power per se if one goes by the book. This is because the country did not have an incentive or reward to give to regional states to improve peace and democracy or other internal conditions. On the same issue, there was a different view that the soft power approach had worked very well despite its drawbacks, particularly delayed solutions. The approach had sustainability and low risks of human losses as its strengths.

South Africa had articulated its post-1994 policy well to the benefit of the region. Its foreign policy has been guided by the AU agenda that has put Africa first. This policy view was reflected in South Africa's prime development strategy, the NDP.

In its articulation of foreign policy, South Africa ran the risk of being labelled a hegemony. Therefore, there was a need for a careful approach where foreign policy is articulated within an AU ambit without undue or unappreciated interference into the affairs of other member states. There was also a view that South Africa's policies were either misunderstood or unappreciated by some sections of the regional communities it served. Another view was that South Africa as a hegemon must balance its powers in relation to other regional hegemony such as Nigeria and Kenya.

7.5.5 Theme 4: Regional integration and foreign policy: successes, benefits and failures

Under this theme, the shortcomings and disadvantages of regional integration are discussed. While South Africa was partially able to stamp its economic authority, it has had not much success in stamping its political authority on the region due to inexperience. Doubt was expressed as to whether South Africa's attempts at both economic and political hegemony had been positive. The respondents saw the Southern region as slowing down in terms of economic growth, despite its being South Africa's domain region.

South Africa contributed very positively towards regional integration and governance in Southern Africa. For instance, South Africa had assisted in politically stabilising Zimbabwe through a government of national unity initiative brokered under President Mbeki. This contrasts with the views that other nation-states had greater experience in improving governance in Africa.

South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy has also had positive socio-economic impact on the region. This is despite the fact that there has been very little appreciation and acknowledgement for South Africa's role in socio-economic development in Africa. The kind of assistance given by South Africa to other regional members included financial and developmental assistance. With specific reference to mediation and peacekeeping, Southern Africa had benefitted from South Africa's efforts with different presidents playing different roles in specific regional conflicts. Zuma's intervention in the DRC, the M23 crisis and Ramaphosa's intervention in Lesotho were highlighted as examples.

On whether other SADC states have benefitted from South Africa's membership to the SADC as a regional economic community, the general view was that the SADC had immensely

benefitted from South Africa's membership in comparison to how South Africa had benefitted from the bloc in return.

7.5.6 Theme 5: Recommendations on the regional integration role

The last theme was built from various recommendations that the sample gave on how best South Africa's future regional integration role in Southern Africa should be moving forward. One view was that regional power and regional integration structures in modern-day international politics were centred on economics. Countries sought integration with regions from which they expected to economically benefit, regardless of where these might be located.

Another view was that South Africa should focus on achieving domestic growth and stability. Regional domination, either political or economic, should not be a primary objective. With domestic economic growth and political stability, South Africa can positively affect the region by being a benchmark of political and economic management expediency.

7.6 Chapter 5: Discussion

In Chapter five, the findings from the data analysis were discussed. As part of the discussions, the findings were compared and contrasted to findings from previous studies and already existing views and theories relating on the studied subject matter. In Chapter five, it was also established that the findings from the study generally resonated with the hegemonic stability theory. The respondents in the study agree that South Africa demonstrates open hegemonic tendencies, although these were not seen as extreme and mainly revolved around soft power.

7.6.1 Conclusions on research questions

In this section, the final conclusion to the study's research questions is made.

7.6.1.1 Research question 1

To examine the nexus between South African hegemonic tendency and Southern African integration:

It is concluded that hegemonic states in Southern Africa generally tended to lead and influence regional integration. In the case of South Africa, the SADC has benefitted significantly politically and economically through South Africa's leading efforts. It was, however, noted that the hegemonic efforts of South Africa within the region were not wholly appreciated by all regional members as some outrightly complained about "big brother tendencies". Regional

powers generally competed for dominance within regional blocs although co-operative tendencies were also notable. It was also found that regional integration does not necessarily have to be formed and driven by hegemons as smaller, focused states such as Botswana and Rwanda (though outside the SADC) can have the same effects.

7.6.1.2 Research question 2

To analyse if South Africa's SADC membership has enhanced the benefits of regional integration in Southern Africa:

South Africa has benefitted the SADC through driving regional peace and democratization efforts, including interventions in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and in the DRC. Economically, there were views that the region had not benefitted much out of South Africa and to evidence this, the comparatively low economic growth rates that the SADC exhibits was cited, despite its having arguably the largest economy in Africa.

7.6.1.3 Research question 3

To evaluate how South Africa's contributions have deepened the sustainability of socio-economic development in the sub region:

South Africa had mostly intervened in other SADC nations politically with a view to creating a basis for socio-economic development. One respondent described South Africa as being unable to incentivise any socio-economic growth in the region due to its own economic problems. South Africa has also assisted economic development in other SADC countries through the SACU platform. There was, however, general agreement that South Africa, despite its efforts, has not exerted the expected impact on socio-economic development in the SADC.

7.6.1.4 Research question 4

To examine if post-1994 South Africa's foreign policy towards Southern Africa has strengthened its contributory roles towards regional integration:

South Africa has generally exhibited a very dynamic post-apartheid foreign policy driven by the underpinning philosophies of its respective four post-apartheid presidents Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma and Ramaphosa. President Mbeki's policy was discussed as being more focused on regional integration of Africa as a whole. President Zuma's policy was seen as less focused on the region and more focused on the BRICS and China, and therefore had a lesser impact on strengthening the SADC multilaterally. President Ramaphosa's foreign policy was also argued to be economically focused with his administration focusing less and less on political situations

on the continent, and instead putting more attention in regional interactions that have direct economic benefit to South Africa.

7.6.1.5 Research question 5

What possible recommendations may be drawn on South Africa's future regional integration agenda in Southern Africa:

The conclusion to this question is included as a separate recommendations section.

7.7 Recommendations

The following recommendations are therefore made, based on the analysis of the data as well as the direct views of the sample on how South Africa can enhance regional integration and its benefits:

- South Africa should focus on regionalism rather than hegemony. As noted, hegemony attracted resentment to South Africa's economic and political mediation in some parts of Africa and generally reduced cooperativeness among member states.
- As recommended in the study, economic integration was generally of greater value to South Africa, given its ailing economy. The country therefore needed to focus on economic integration without reneging on its political intervention expectations under SADC and the AU.
- South Africa should consider the views and interests of other members of the SADC, particularly those considered to be weaker ones. This could strengthen regional ties and the effectiveness of the SADC as a bloc and South Africa's role in it.
- It is also recommended that South Africa come up with a cost-benefit appraisal platform for its roles in the region. This recommendation comes as a result of the view that whilst some sources suggest that the country has benefitted from the SADC through access to regional markets, others point out that the country has not benefitted much. A more objective view can be established with such a framework in place.

Recommendations on further studies are given in the next section.

7.7.1 Recommendations for further studies

As a way of enhancing the body of knowledge on South Africa's activities in regional integration in Southern Africa, the following studies are recommended:

- A study that reviews South Africa's foreign policy documents alongside those of the major regional bodies and regional states it integrates with. This is important for identification of policy challenges and inconsistencies that affect the effectiveness of foreign policies.
- An analysis of the long-term costs and benefits of participating in the SADC and other regional blocs. This study is necessitated by the observed lack of consensus on whether South Africa had been of benefit to the SADC and, in turn, whether the SADC had benefitted from South Africa's membership.
- A study of the political and economic factors affecting South Africa's effectiveness in its regional integration roles will also shed more light on the highlighted low efficacies with which the country approaches regional integration.
- Finally, a study on the potential future trends in regional hegemony and regional integration is important, noting that the phenomenon has been discussed as a dynamic process depending on political leaders as key actors.

The above studies, as proposed, will help to enhance society's understanding of regional hegemony and integration from a South African perspective.

7.8 Conclusion

This study was conducted as a qualitative study of expert opinion on South Africa's foreign policy as it relates to regional integration and the concept of regional hegemony. Using a panel of three experts, the study was able to reach credible conclusions and to provide a strong exploratory platform upon which further studies on similar or related subject matter can be based. Through thematic analysis, the study was able to answer the research questions of interest and to make pragmatic conclusions that can have a positive impact on the country's regional foreign policy. The study was able to link South Africa's regional foreign policies to the philosophical underpinnings of its respective post-independent presidents. The role of individual presidents as actors in the determination of foreign policy suggests a potentially dynamic policy that wavers with each presidency. Nonetheless, this occurrence was not considered to be a challenge by the researcher; rather, it is a normal and general state of affairs as the researcher did not expect every South African president to take a similar approach to international and regional affairs. What was expected, however, was the development of a general focus on what South Africa intended to achieve from regional integration and working towards that end while taking note of the interests of the actors within regional structures.

Through making such conclusions, the study was able to contribute to the body of knowledge as discussed in Chapter one. The study, as discussed, sought to delve into South Africa's regional integration and governance attempts since emerging from its political doldrums in 1994. It also sought to vigorously articulate its sub regional hegemonic stance vis-à-vis other Southern African states and examine whether this stance has been driven from a benevolent or coercive standpoint post-1994. The study was able to achieve this and to make further contributions on how South Africa can positively affect the regions it participated in, with special focus being on the Southern African region.

8 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Adam, H., & Moodley K. (1993). *The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South Africa*. Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- Adamson, W.L. (1980). *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory*. California, University of California Press.
- Adebayo, A. & Virk, K. (2017). *Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa – Security, Diplomacy and Trade*. United Kingdom, I.B Tauris.
- Agnew, J. (2005). *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
- Aka, P C. (2017). *Human Rights in Nigeria's External Relations: Building the Record of Moral Superpower*. Maryland, Lexington Books.
- Ake, C. (1981). *A Political Economy of Africa*. London, Longman.
- Alao, A. (2012). *Mugabe and the Politics of Security in Zimbabwe*. Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Anand, M. (2004). *Struggle for Human Rights: Nelson Mandela*. Delhi, Kalpaz Publications
- Anthony, R., Tembe, P., & Gull, O. (2015). *South Africa's changing Foreign Policy in a Multi-Polar World*. Stellenbosch, Centre for Chinese Studies.
- Arnold, G. (2006). *The A to Z of the Non – Alignment Movement and Third World*. Maryland, Scarecrow Press.
- Asante, S.K.B. (1997). *Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges*. Hampshire, MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Bach, D.C. (2016). *Regionalism in Africa: Genealogies, Institutions and Trans-state Networks*. New York, Routledge.
- Balassa, B. (1961). *The Theory of Economic Integration*. Illinois, Richard Dule.
- Blaikie, N., Priest, J. (2017). *Social Research: Paradigms in Action*. United Kingdom, Polity Press.

- Boas, M. (2001). *Regionalism and Regional Integration in Africa, A Debate of Current Aspects and Issues*. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Bronauer, J., & Yoon, J.I. (2018). *Regional Economic Development in the SADC. Taking Stock and Looking Ahead*. Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2015). *Business Research Methods*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Bwalya, K.J., & Mutula, S. (2015). *Digital Solutions for Contemporary Democracy and Government*. Hershey, Information Science Reference.
- Chapman, R.D. (2016). *Student Resistance to Apartheid at the University of Fort Hare: Freedom Now, A Degree Tomorrow*. Maryland, Lexington Books.
- Christian-Peters, W. (2010). *The Quest for an African Economic Community, Regional Integration and its Role in Achieving African Unity: The Case of SADC*. Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang.
- Cilliers, J., Schunemann, J., & Moyer, J.D. (2015). *Power and Influence in Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa*. Pretoria, ISS Press.
- Creswell, J.W. (2013). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approached (3rd Edition)*. Washington DC, Sage Publications
- Demissie, F. (2015). *Land Grabbing in Africa: The Race for Africa's Rich Farmland*. New York, Routledge.
- Deng, F.M., & Zartman, I.W. *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement*. Washington DC, the Bookings Institution.
- Dent, C.M. (2016). *East Asian Regional Integration 2nd Edition*. Abington, Routledge.
- Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). (2004). *Regional Integration in Africa*. Addis Ababa, Economic Commission for Africa.
- Falola, T. (2002). *Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Ferabolli, S. (2015). *Arab Regionalism: A Post Structural Perspective*. New York, Routledge.
- Flemes, D. (2018). *Regional Powers and Contested Leadership*. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Francis, D.J. (2006). *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. United Kingdom, Ashgate Publishing.

- Gathil, J.T. (2011). *African Regional Trade Agreements as legal Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Geldenhuis, D. (1981). *The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council: Towards a new Regional Stalemate?* Braamfontein, the South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Gleijeses, P. (2013). *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991*. United States of America, University of Carolina Press.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selection from Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. New York. International Publishers.
- Hamill, J. (2018). *Africa's Lost Leader: South Africa's Continental Role since Apartheid*. United Kingdom, Routledge.
- Hammond, D. (2003). *The Science of Synthesis: Exploring the Social Implications of General Systems Theory*. Colorado, University Press of Colorado.
- Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF). (2018). *South Africa's Foreign Policy and the Constitution*. Johannesburg, Helen Suzman Foundation.
- Husar, J. (2016). *Framing Foreign Policy in India, Brazil and South Africa: On the Like-Mindedness of the IBSA States*. Switzerland, Springer International Publishing.
- Industrial Development Corporation. (2019). *Economic Overview: Recent Development in the Global and South African Economies*. Pretoria, Industrial Development Corporation.
- Jacobs, S. (2019). *Media in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Post-Colonial Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Indiana, Indiana University Press.
- Jeng, A. (2012). *Peacebuilding in the African Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Jenkins Jr, E. (1998). *Pan-African Chronology II: A Comprehensive Reference to the Black Quest for Freedom in Africa, the America's, Europe and Asia 1865-1915*. California, McFarland and Company.
- Joseph, J. (2002). *Hegemony: A Realist Analysis*. London, Routledge.

- Kindleberger, C.P. (1973). *The World in Depression 1929-1939*. Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- Kinni, F.K.Y. (2015). *Pan Africanism: Political Philosophy and Socio-Economic Anthropology for African Liberation and Governance: Caribbean and African American Contributions, Volume 1*. Bamenda, Langaa Research and Publishing.
- Kisangani, E.M. (2016). *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 4th edition*. London, Rowman and Littlefield.
- Koltz, A. (1995). *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid*. London, Cornell University Press.
- Krotz, U., & Schild, J. (2013). *Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysee Treaty to Twenty – First Century Politics*. United Kingdom, Oxford University Press.
- Kumar, R. (2014). *Research Methodology. A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners*. 4th Edition. London, Publications Limited.
- Laffan, B., O'Donnell, R., & Smith, M. (2000). *Europe's Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration*. New York, Routledge.
- Marthoz, J.P. (2012). *The Challenges and Ambiguities of South Africa's Foreign Policy*. NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resources Centre.
- Mays, T. M. (2015). *Historical Dictionary of International Organizations in African and the Middle East*. Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield.
- Mays, T.M. (2002). *Africa's first Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad 1981-1982*. London, Praeger Publishers.
- Morris, A. (2015). *A Practical Introduction to In-Depth Interviewing*. London, Sage Publications.
- Muntschick, J. (2018). *The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU): Regionalism and External Influence*. Cham, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Neuendorf, K.A. (2002). *The Content Analysis Handbook, 1st Edition*. United States of America: Sage Publications
- Nganje, F. (2014). *South Africa and SADC: Options for Constructive Regional Leadership*. Pretoria, Institute of Global Dialogue.

- Nye, J.S. (1968). *International Regionalism: Readings*. Boston, Little Brown and Company.
- Nye, J.S. (2003) *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Oomen, B. (2005). *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era*. Oxford, James Currey LTD.
- Ouguerouz, F. (2003). *The African Charter on Human and Peoples Right. A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa*. London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Patel, S., & Uys, T. (2012). *Contemporary India and South Africa: Legacies, Identities, Dilemmas*. New Delhi, Routledge.
- Peters-Berries, C. (2010). *Regional Integration in Southern Africa: A Guide Book*. Berlin, Germany Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Poku, N. (2001). *Regionalization and Security in Southern Africa*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Prunier, G. (2010). *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Prys, M. (2012). *Redefining Regional Power in International Relations: Indian and South African Perspective*. New York, Routledge.
- Raballand, G., Refas, S., Beuran, M.B., & Isik G. (2012). *Why Does Cargo Spend Weeks in Sub-Saharan African Ports? Lessons from Six Countries*. Washington D.C., the World Bank.
- Rapport, A. (2016). *Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Reyntjens, F. (2009). *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, R. (2013). *The African Union*. Hashemite, Mason Crest.
- Salami, I. (2012). *Financial Regulation in Africa: An Assessment of Financial Integration Arrangements in African Emerging and Frontier Markets*. New York, Routledge.
- Saldana, J. (2011). *Fundamentals of Qualitative Research: Understanding Qualitative Research*. New York, Oxford University Press.

- Schlumberger, C.E. (2010). *Open Skies for Africa: Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision*. Washington, the World Bank.
- Schroeder, R.A. (2012). *Africa after Apartheid: South Africa, Race, and Nation in Tanzania*. Indiana, Indiana University Press.
- Sen, R. (2004). *Free Trade Agreements in Southeast Asia*. Singapore, ISEAS Publications.
- Shen, J. (2018). *Urbanization, Regional Development and Governance in China*. New York, Routledge.
- Signe, L. (2018). *African Development, African Transformation: How Institutions Shape Development Strategy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Siko, J. (2014). *Inside South Africa's Foreign Policy: Diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki*. London, I.B. Tauris.
- Soderbaum, F. (2004). *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The case of Southern Africa*. Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Stanford, K.L. (1997). *Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International Affairs*. Albany, State University of New York Press.
- Thies, C.G., & Nieman, M.D. (2017). *Rising Powers and Foreign Policy Revisionism: Understanding BRICS Identity and the Behaviour through Time*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- Torreguiter, E. (2009). *National Liberation Movements in Office: Forging Democracy with African Adjectives in Namibia*. Frankfurt, Peter Lang.
- Touray, O.A. (2016). *The African Union: The First Ten Years*. Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield.
- Trochim, W.M.K., & Donnelly, J.P. (2007). *The Research Methods Knowledge Base*. Mason, Thomson Custom Publishing.
- Vale, P.C.J. (2003). *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Vickers, B. (2017). *A Handbook on Regional Integration in Africa: Towards Agenda 2063*. London, The Commonwealth Secretariat.
- von Bertalanffy, L. (1968). *General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications*. New York, George Braziller.

Williams, A. (2020). *Political Hegemony and Social Complexity: Mechanism of Power after Gramsci*. Cham, Springer International Publishing.

Williams, H.E. (1970). *General Systems Theory, Systems Analysis and Regional Planning: An Introductory Bibliography*. Michigan, Council of Planning Librarians.

Wodrig, S. (2017). *Regional Intervention Politics in Africa: Crisis, Hegemony and the Transformation of Subjectivity*. New York, Routledge.

Zafarullah, H., & Huque, A.S. (2012). *Managing Development in a Globalized World: Concepts, Processes, Institutions*. Florida, CRC Press.

CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

Adedeji, A. (1993). Comparative Strategies of Economic Decolonization in Africa. In Mazrui, A.A., & Wondji, C. (eds), *General History of Africa: Africa since 1935*. California, University of California Press.

Albright, D.E. (2019). South Africa in Southern Africa. In Myers, D.J. (ed), *Regional Hegemons: Threat Perception and Strategic Response*. New York, Routledge.

Axline, W.A. (1994). Introduction. In Axline, W.A. (ed). *The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation: Comparative Case Studies*. Madison, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Ayodele, O. (2017). Big Business and Foreign Policy: Cog or Driver of South Africa's International Relations Machinery? In Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Sunnyside, Fanele Publishers.

Bhorat, H., & Kanbur, R. (2006). Poverty and well-being in post-apartheid South Africa. In Bhorat, H., & Kanbur, R. (eds), *Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Cape Town, Human Science Research Council Press.

Braun, G. (1989). The Afrikaner Empire Strikes Back: South Africa's Regional Policy. In Brewer, J.D. (ed), *Can South Africa Survive? Five Minutes to Midnight*. London, MacMillan Press.

Brennan, L., & Murray, P. (eds). (2015). *Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative Perspectives*. Abington, Routledge.

Burgess, S. (2014). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and South Africa. In Hentz, J. (ed), *Routledge Handbook on African Security*. New York, Routledge.

- Creswell, J. W. (ed). (2003). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approach*. California, Sage Publications.
- Doumbe – Bille, S. (2012). The African Union: Principles and Purposes. In Yusuf, A.A., & Ouguerouz, F. (eds), *The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework*. Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Gibb, R. (2012). The Southern African Customs Union: Promoting Stability through Dependence? In Saunders, C., Dzinesa, G.A., & Nagar, D. (eds), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects*. London, Zed Books.
- Hamill, J. (2006). South Africa in Africa: The Dilemmas of Multilateralism. In Lee, D., Taylor, I., & Williams, P.D. (eds), *The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy*. Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Handelman, S. (2014). The Minds of Peace Experiment: A Laboratory for People to People Diplomacy. In Handelman, S. (ed), *People to People Diplomacy in Israel and Palestine: The Minds of Peace Experiment*. New York, Routledge.
- Hanggi, H., Roloff, R., & Ruland J. (eds). (2006). *Interregionalism and International Relations*. Abington, Routledge.
- Headley, J., & van Wyk, J.A. (2012). Debating the Public's Role in Foreign Policy. In Headley, J., Reitzig, A., & Burton, J. (eds), *Public Participation in Foreign Policy*. Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hendricks, C. (2016). Crisis Region Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Community and the Security in the Region. In Gebrewold, B. (ed), *Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and Opportunities*. New York, Routledge.
- Kagame, P. (2015). *Insurgency and the Congo Wars*. In Ndahiro, A., Rwagatare, J., & Nkusi, A. (eds), *Rwanda: Rebuilding of the Nation*. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.
- Kanyane, M. (2018). Disaggregated Development: Between 'Trade, Industrialisation and Migration. In Magidimisha, H.H., Khalema, N.E., Chipunga, L., Chirimambowa, T.C., & Chimedza, T.L. (eds), *Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa*. Cham, Springer International Publishing.
- Kararach, G., Otieno, R.O., & Makuve, T. (2016). The Political Economy and Evolution of Development in Zimbabwe. In Kararach, G., & Otieno, R.O. (eds), *Economic Management in*

a Hyperinflationary Environment: The Political Economy of Zimbabwe 1908-2008. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- Khadiagala, G.M. (2009). South Africa's role in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Shillinger, K. (ed), *Africa's Peacemaker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation*, Sunnyside, Fanele.
- Landsberg, C. (2017). The Elitist-Hate Affair: Civil Society and South Africa and South Africa's Foreign Policy (dis) engagement. In Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Sunnyside, Fanele Publishers.
- Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (2017). Bringing Plurality Back in from the Cold: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy. In Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Sunnyside, Fanele Publishers.
- Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (2017). Voice from the Periphery: Grassroots Social Movements and South Africa's Foreign Policy. In Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Sunnyside, Fanele Publishers.
- Lansford, T. (2017). Lesotho. In Lansford, T. (ed.), *Political Handbook of the World: Volume One 2016-2017*. California, Sage Publications.
- Leshoele, M. (2019). Regional Integration Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities in Africa: A Case of the Tripartite Free Trade Area. In Oloruntoba, S.A., & Muchie, M. (eds). *Innovation, Regional Integration, and Development in Africa: Rethinking Theories, Institutions and Policies*. Cham, Springer International Publishing.
- Lumumba – Kasongo, T. (2017). Pan – African Curriculum in Higher Education. In Cross, M., & Ndofirepi, A. (eds), *Knowledge and Change in African Universities: Volume 2 – Re-Imagining the Terrain*. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.
- Magidimisha, H.H., Khalema, N.E., Chipungu, L., Chirimambowa, T.C., & Chimedza, T. (Eds). (2018). *Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa*. Cham, Springer International Publishing.
- Martin, G. (1992). African Regional Cooperation and Integration: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. In Seidman, A., & Anang, F. (eds), *Twenty First Century Africa Towards a New Vision for Self-Sustainable Development*. Trenton, Africa World Press.

- Mbaku, J.M. (2018). Property rights and the exploitation of Africa's environmental resources: preparing for the new millennium. In Mbaku, J.M. (ed), *Preparing Africa for the Twenty-First Century: Strategies for Peaceful Coexistence and Sustainable Development*. New York, Routledge.
- McCarthy, C. (2003). South African Trade and Industrial Policy in a Regional Context. In Petersson, L. (ed), *Post – Apartheid Southern Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future*. New York, Routledge.
- Miller, B. (2006). Competing Realist Perspective in Great Power Crisis Behaviour. In Frankel, B. (ed), *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*. New York, Frank Cass.
- Mngomezulu, B.R. (ed). (2020). *Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Consistencies and Ambiguities*. Newcastle, Cambridge Scholar Publishing.
- Monyae, D. (2006). South Africa in Africa: Promoting Constitutionalism in Southern Africa 1994-2004. In Federico, V., & Fusaro, C. (eds), *Constitutionalism and Democratic Transitions: Lesson from South Africa*. Borgo Albizi, Firenze University Press.
- Murithi, T. (ed). (2014). *Handbook of Africa's International Relations*. New York, Routledge.
- Nagar, D. (2012). Regional Economic Integration. In Saunders, C., Dzinesa, G.A., & Nagar, D. (eds), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems and Prospects*. London, Zed Books.
- Ofoatey – Kodjoe, W. (1990). The SADCC and the Frontline States, Viewing Their Performance: A Comment. In Glickman, H. (ed), *Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa*. New York, Gordon and Breach publishers.
- Ogunnubi, O., & Ettang, D. (2018). Making Sense of South Africa's Soft Power: Projections, Prospects and Possibilities. In Falola, T., & Kalu, K. (eds), *Africa and Globalization: Challenges of Governance and Creativity*. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Price, R. M. (1985). Creating New Political Realities: Pretoria's Drive for Regional Hegemony. In Bender, G.J., Coleman, J.S., & Sklar, R.L. (eds), *Crisis Areas and US Foreign Policy*. California, University of California Press.
- Razzaque, M.A., & Basnett, Y. (2014). Regional Integration in South Asia: An Overview. In Razzaque, M.A., & Basnett, Y. (eds). *Regional integration in South Asia: Trends, Challenges and Prospects*. London, the Commonwealth Secretariat.

- Sako, S. (2004). The NEPAD Economic and Cooperate Governance Initiative: Building Institutions for Sustainable Development. In Nsouli, S.M. (ed), *The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Macroeconomics, Institutions and Poverty*. Washington, International Monetary Fund.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2016) Europe. In Borzel, T.A., & Risse, T. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Sebastian, A.G., & Warner, J.F. (2015). Geopolitical Drivers of Foreign Investment in African Land and Water Resources. In Demissie, F. (ed), *Land Grabbing in Africa: The Race for Africa's Rich Farmland*. New York, Routledge.
- Sichel, A. (2012). Gate – Crashing Prejudices and Perceptions: The Enduring Legacy of Arts and Dance Festivals in Post-Apartheid South Africa. In Friedman, S. (ed), *Post - Apartheid Dance: Many Bodies Many Voices Many Stories*. Newcastle, Cambridge Scholar Publishing.
- Smith, K. (2016). South Africa in Africa and the World: The Diplomatic Strategies of a Global-Regional Power. In Braveboy-Wagner J. (ed), *Diplomatic Strategies of Nations in the Global South: The Search for Leadership*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tamfuh, W.Y.N. (2016). Drugs and Drug Control in Cameroon. In Kalunta-Crumpton, A. (ed), *Pan-African Issues in Drugs and Drug Control: An International Perspective*. New York, Routledge.
- Tella, O. (2019). Internal, Regional and External Impediments to Nigeria and South Africa's Hegemonic Competence in Africa. In Tella, O. (ed), *Nigeria, South Africa Relations and Regional Hegemonic Competence*. Cham, Springer.
- Tirivangana, A. M. (2013). The Nature of Academic Research. In Tichapondwe, S.M., (ed), *Preparing your Dissertation at a Distance: A Research Guide*. Vancouver, Virtual University for the Small States of the Commonwealth.
- Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2017). Government Department and the Challenges of Integrated Foreign Policy Making. In Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Sunnyside, Fanele Publishers.
- Van Wyk, J.A. (2017). Between Plein Street and Soutpansberg Road: Parliament and Foreign Policy during the Zuma Presidency. In Landsberg, C., & Masters, L. (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Sunnyside, Fanele Publishers.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

- Adetiba, T. (2017). South Africa's Military and Peacekeeping Efforts: A new Paradigm Shift in its Foreign Policy since 1994. *Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies*, 9(5), 157-168.
- Adetula, V.A. (2014). Nigeria's Rebased Economy and its Role in Regional and Global Politics. *E-International Relations*, 13, 1-13.
- Adogamhe, (2008). Pan Africanism Re-Visited: Vision and Reality of Africa Unity and Development. *African Review of Integration*, 2(2), 1-34.
- Agbu, O. (2003). NEPAD: Origin, Challenges and Prospects. *Indian Journal of Political Science*, 64(1/2), 97-115.
- Akani, E.C. (2017). From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). What Went Wrong? *International Journal of Development Research*, 7(7), 13517-13525.
- Alden, C., & Le Pere, G. (2004). South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity. *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(100), 283-297.
- Alden, C., & Le Pere, G. (2009). South Africa in Africa: Bound to Lead? *Politikon*, 36(1), 145-169.
- Alden, C., & Schoeman, M. (2015). South Africa's Symbolic Hegemony in Africa. *International Politics*, 52(2), 239-254.
- Alden, C., & Vieira, M.A. (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, Indian and Trilateralism. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(7), 1077-1095.
- Alder, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3), 319-363.
- Amao, O.B. (2019). The Foreign Policy and Intervention Behaviour of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa: A Structural Realist Analysis. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(1), 93-112.
- Antonio, P. (2001). The Challenges for Africa: A Culture of Peace, Good Governance and People-Centred Development. *Asia Pacific Review*, 8(1), 63-74.
- Apuuli, K.P. (2004). The Politics of Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Inter-Congolese Dialogue Process, *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 4(1), 65-68.

- Arndt, C., & Roberts, S.J. (2018). Key Issues in Regional Growth and Integration in Southern Africa. *Development Southern Africa*, 35(3), 298-314.
- Augusto, L., & Faria, E. (2003). The Value of the Concept of Hegemony for International Relations. *Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations*, 2(3), 193-216.
- Aworaro, F. (2015). Regional Integration and Development in Africa: Between the Present Realities and Overcoming the Future. *African journal of Governance and Development*, 4(2), 5-16.
- Bala, M.T. (2017). The Challenges and Prospects for Regional and Economic Integration in West Africa. *Asian Social Science*, 23(5), 24-33.
- Ball, R.A. (1978). Sociology in General Systems Theory. *The American Sociologist*. 13(1), 65-72.
- Beall, J., Gelb, S., & Hassim, S. (2005). Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 31(4), 682-700.
- Bekerman, M., & Rikap, C. (2018). Regional Integration and Export Diversification in MERCOSUR: The Case of Argentina and Brazil. *Cepal Review*, 100, 165-187.
- Benachenhou, A. (1983). South-South Cooperation: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's Independence. *Africa Development*, 8(4), 5-19.
- Bernard, T.J., Paoline, E.A., & Pare, P.P. (2005). General Systems Theory and Criminal Justice. *Journal of Criminal Justice*. 33(3), 203-211.
- Bukae, N.M. (2017). South Africa: A Benign or Malign Regional Hegemon? The Case of the 1998 South Africa Led Military Intervention in Lesotho. *Lonaka Journal of Learning and Teaching*, 8(1), 112-141.
- Buzdugan, S.R. (2013). Regionalism from without: External involvement of the EU in Regionalism in Southern Africa. *Review of International Political Economy*, 20(4), 917-946.
- Chakrabarty, M., Datta, A.K., & Roy, J. (2009). Regionalism: A Colonial Legacy of the British. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 70(3), 693-704.
- Chingono, M., & Nakana, S. (2009). The Challenges of Regional Integration in Southern Africa. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3 (10), 396-408.
- Clark, E.V. (2016). The Organization of African Unity (OAU): A Revisit. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 21(7), 66-72.

- Cole, F.L. (1988). Content Analysis Process and Application. *Clinical Nurse Specialist*, 2 (1), 53-57.
- Cornelissen, S. (2017). National Meaning – Making in Complex Societies: Political Legitimation and Branding dynamics in Post-apartheid South Africa. *Geopolitics*, 22(3), 525 – 548.
- Das, R.M., Vasudev, C.M., & Gupta, M. (2011). Regional Integration and Cooperation in Asia – An Indian Perspective. *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, 3(3), 373-394.
- Death, C. (2011). Leading By Example: South African Foreign Policy and Global Environmental Politics. *International Relations*, 25(4), 455-478.
- Destradi, S. (2008). Empire, Hegemony and Leadership: Developing a Research Framework for the Study of Regional Powers. Hamburg, *German Institute for Global and Area Studies, GIGA Working Paper*, no.79.
- Destradi, S. (2010). Regional Powers and their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony and Leadership. *Review of International Studies*, 36(4), 903-930.
- Edo, V.O., & Olanrewaju, M.A. (2012). An Assessment of the Transformation of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) 1963-2007. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 21, 41-69.
- Etikan, I., Musa, S.A., & Alkassim R.S. (2016). Comparison of Convenience Sampling and Purposive Sampling. *American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics*, 5(1), 1-4.
- Evans, L.H. (1994). South African Foreign Policy and the New World Order. *ISSUP Bulletin*, 3/94.
- Evans, M. (1984). The Front-Line States, South Africa and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives. *Zambezia*, 12(1), 1-19.
- Fawcett, L. (2004). Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism. *International Affairs*, 80(4), 429-446.
- Fehl, C. (2004). Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(3), 357-394.
- Gallrotti, G.M. (2011). Soft Power: What is it, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use. *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1) 25-47.
- Geda, A., & Kebret, H. (2008). Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Review of Problems and Prospects with a Case study of COMESA. *Journal of African Economies*, 17(3), 357-394.

- Gibb, R. (1997). Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. The Case of Renegotiating the Southern African Customs Union. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23(1), 67-86.
- Graham, M. (2012). Foreign Policy in Transition: The ANC's Search for a Foreign Policy Direction during South Africa's Transition, 1990-1994. *The Round Table*, 101(5), 405-423.
- Habib, A. (1995). The Transition to Democracy in South Africa: Developing a Dynamic Model Transformation. *Transformation*, 27, 50-73.
- Habib, A. (2009). South Africa's Foreign Policy: Hegemonic Aspirations, Neoliberal Orientations and Global Transformation. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16(2), 143-159.
- Harshe, R. (1993). Understanding Transition towards Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28(38), 1980-1983.
- Hendricks, C. (2015). South Africa's Approach to Conflict Management in Burundi and the DRC: Promoting Human Security? *Strategic Review of Southern Africa*, 37(1), 9-30.
- Hette, B. (2005). Beyond the 'New' Regionalism. *New Political Economy*, 10(4), 543-571.
- Hettne, B., & Soderbaum, F. (1998). The New Regionalism Approach: Conceptualizing Regionalism. *Politeia*, 17(3), 1-18.
- Hill, C.R. (1983). Regional co-operation in Southern Africa. *African Affairs*, 82(327), 215-239.
- Hussain, N. & Shakoor, F. (2017). The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Russia under Vladimir Putin. *IPRI Journal*, 17(1), 1-25.
- Hwang, K.D. (2007). The Historical Evolution of SADC(C) and Regionalism in Southern Africa. *International Area Review*, 10(1), 56-72.
- Hwang, K.D. (2009). Some Reflections on African Development Strategies in the 21st Century. From the LPA to NEPAD. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 16(2), 125-142.
- Ikenberry, G.J., & Kupchan, C.A. (1990). Socialization and Hegemonic Power. *International Organization*, 44(3), 283-315.
- Indira, S. (2014). General System Theory. *Narayana Nursing Journal*, 3(3), 3-5.
- Inman, R.P., & Rubinfeld, D.L. (2013). Understanding the Democratic Transition in South Africa. *American Law and Economic Review*, 15(1), 1-38.

- Isike, C., & Ogunnubi, O. (2017). South Africa's Foreign Policy Aspirations and the National Development Plan (NDP 2030): The Role of Soft Power. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 35(3), 284-302.
- Itai, T., & Constance, H. (2014). Challenges and Opportunities of Regional Integration in Africa, the case of SADC. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 19(12), 103-115.
- Jiboku, P.A. (2015). The Challenge of Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Theory and Reality. *Africa's Public Service Review and Performance Review*, 3(4), 5-28.
- Jiboku, P.A., & Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2016). Regional Economic Integration and the Governance Challenge in Africa Missing Links in the Africa Peer Review Mechanism. *Africa Development*, 41(2), 47-70.
- Johnson, R.A., Kast, F.E., & Rosenzweig, J.E. (1964). Systems Theory and Management. *Management Science*. 10(2), 367-384.
- Katzenstein, P.J., Keohane, R.O., & Krasner, S.D. (1998). International Organizations and the Study of World Politics. *International Organization*, 52 (4), 645-685.
- Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., Anyanwu, J.C., & Conceição, P. (2014). Regional Integration in Africa: An Introduction. *African Development Review*, 26(1), 1-6.
- Kitto, K. (2014). A Conceptualised General Systems Theory. *Systems*. 2(4), 541-565
- Kivunja, C. & Kuyini, A.B. (2017). Understanding and Applying Research Paradigms in Educational Contexts. *International Journal of Higher Education*, 6(5), 26-41.
- Kouassi, R.N. (2007). The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An Overview of the Historical Landmarks. *African Integration Review*, 1(2), 1-23.
- Krapohl, S., Meissner, K.L, & Muntschick, J. (2014). Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambo's? The Ambivalent Behaviour of Brazil and South Africa in Regional Economic Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(4), 879-895.
- Kremer-Asaf, M. (2015). Can a Decision making approach in foreign policy be applied to leaders in education? *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 209, 277-283.
- Lalbahadur, A. (2016). Economic Statecraft in South Africa's Regional Diplomacy. *South Africa Journal of International Affairs*, 23 (2), 135- 149.

- Lalbahadur, A., & Rawhani, C. (2017). South Africa's; Peacebuilding in the DRC: Convergence and Dissonance with the Liberal Model. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 24(4), 523-545.
- Langa, D., & Shai, K.B. (2019). The Pillars of the Jacob Zuma Led South Africa's Foreign Policy: An Afrocentric Review. *African Renaissance*, 16(3), 105-122.
- Letete, P. (2014). Is tax coordination a solution of trade distortions in SACU? Possibilities of Value Added Tax in the Southern African Customs Union. *The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa*. 43(3), 350-371.
- Leys, R. & Tostensen, A. (1982). Regional co-operation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. *Review of African Political Economy*, 9(23), 52-71.
- Likoti, F.J. (1998). The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource War? *International Peacekeeping*, 14(2), 251-263.
- Mabera, F. (2018). South Africa's Profile as a Peacekeeper: In keeping with the times? *African Security*, 11(3), 223-251.
- Mandela, N. (1993). South Africa's Future Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), 86-97.
- Mansfield, E.D., & Solingen, E. (2010). Regionalism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13(1), 145-163.
- Mapuva, J., & Muyenga-Mapuva, L. (2014) The SADC Regional bloc: What Challenges and Prospects for Regional Integration. *Law, Democracy and Development*, 18(1), 22-36.
- Mat Yazid, M.N. (2015). The Theory of Hegemonic Stability, Hegemonic Power and International Political Economic Stability. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*, 3 (6), 67-79.
- Mathews, K. (2005). Renaissance of Pan-Africanism, the African Union. *India International Centre Quarterly*, 31(4), 143-155.
- Meyns, P. (1982). Non-Alignment and Regional Cooperation: The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). *Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, 15(3), 261-288.
- Mills, G., & James, D. (2016). Resetting South Africa's Foreign Policy. *The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation*, 79, 5-13.

- Miti, K. (2012). South Africa and Conflict Resolution in Africa: From Mandela to Zuma. *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, 1 (1), 1-19.
- Mlambo, D.N. (2018). Unearthing the Challenges and Prospects of Regional Integration in Southern Africa. *Journal of Public Affairs*. 2018; e1882. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1882>
- Mlambo, D.N., & Adetiba T.C. (2019). Post-1994 South Africa's Peacekeeping and Military Intervention in Southern Africa: Reference from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho. *Journal of Public Affairs*, <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1984>
- Mlambo, D.N., Ogunnubi, O. (2018). South Africa's Integration Efforts within the Southern African Development Community: Regional Supremacy or Coalition. *Journal of Public Affairs*. 2018; e1856. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1856>
- Mngomezulu, B.R., & Hadebe, S. (2018). What would the Decolonisation of the Political Science Curriculum Entail? Lessons to be learnt from the East Africa Experience of the Federal University of East Africa. *Politikon*, 45(1), 66 – 80.
- Modesto, S.T., & Sajeev, M. (2016). An Assessment of South African Economic Dominance and Its Influence on Regional Integration. *European Journal of Business and Accountancy*, 4(4), 55-69.
- Mokotso, R. I. (2019). Citizenship Education for Lesotho's Context: Towards a Stable Democracy. *The Journal of Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa*, 15(1), 1-9.
- Molomo, M.G. (1999). External Military Intervention in Lesotho's Recent Political Crisis. *Lesotho Social Science Review*, 5(1), 134-162.
- Mothibe, T.H. (1999). The Military and Democratization in Lesotho. *Lesotho Social Science Review*, 5 (1), 48-63.
- Mufune, P. (1993). The Future of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). *Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 7(1), 14-34.
- Mwasha, O.N. (2011). The Benefits of Regional Economic Integration for Developing Countries in Africa: A Case Study of East Africa Community (EAC). *Korea Review of International Studies*, 1, 69-92.
- Nathan, L. (2005). Consistency and Inconsistencies in South African Foreign Policy. *International Affairs*, 81(2), 361-372.

- Ngalawa, H.P.E. (2014). Anatomy of the Southern African Customs Union: Structure and Revenue Volatility. *International Business and Economic Journal*, 13(1), 145-156.
- Obydenkova, A. (2006). New Regionalism and Regional Integration: The Role of National Institutions. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19(4), 589-610.
- Odigbo, J., Effiong, J., & Igwe, F. (2014). Regional Hegemony and Leadership Space in Africa: Assessing Nigeria's Prospects and Challenges. *Review of History and Political Science*, 2(1), 89-105.
- Odubajo, T., & Akinboye, S. (2017). Nigeria and South Africa: Collaboration or Competition. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 24(1), 61-77.
- Ogunnubi, O. (2016). Effective Hegemonic Influence in Africa: An Analysis of Nigeria's 'Hegemonic' Position. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 52(7), 1-15.
- Ogunnubi, O. (2017). Soft Power: The Fourth 'Tentacle' of South Africa's Foreign Policy. *Insight on Africa*, 9(1), 22-38.
- Ogunnubi, O. (2019). A Veiled Hegemonic Interest and the Multiple Faces of South Africa's Foreign Policy. *AFFRIKA: Journal of Politics, Economics and Society*, 9(1), 193-218.
- Ogunnubi, O. (2019). The Ideational Value of Soft Power and the Foreign Policy of Africa Regional Powers. *Politikon*, 1-22
- Ogunnubi, O., & Akinola, A. (2017). South Africa and the Question of Hegemony in Africa. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 33 (4), 428-447.
- Ogunnubi, O., & Amao, O.B. (2016). South Africa's Emerging "Soft Power" influence in Africa and its Impeding Limitations: Will the Giant be Able to Weather the Storm? *African Security*, 9(4), 299-319.
- Ogunnubi, O., & Isike, C.A. (2015). Regional Hegemonic Contention and the Asymmetry of Soft Power: A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Nigeria. *Strategic Review of Southern Africa*, 37(2), 154-177.
- Ogunnubi, O., & Okeke-Uzodike, U (2015). South Africa's Foreign Policy and the Strategy of Soft Power. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22(1), 23-41.
- Ogunnubi, O., & Tella, O. (2017). Framing South Africa's Soft Power through Non-State Sources. *Strategic Analysis*, (41(5), 478-495.

- Oppong, R.F. (2010). The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa's Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 18(1), 92-103.
- Otobo, E.E. (2004). Regionalism and Trade: A Glimpse of Africa's Experience. *The New Economic Review*, 1 (1), 119-128.
- Palinkaz, L.A., Horwitz, S.M., Green, C.A., Wisdom, J.P., Duan, A., & Hoagwood, K. (2013). Purposive Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, 42(5), 533-544.
- Pallotti, A. (2004). SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(101), 513-531.
- Pederson, T. (2002). Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration. *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 677-696.
- Penfold, E. (2017). Regionalism in the Southern African Development Community: Integration for Better Health. PRARI Working Paper 15-11. *The Open University/South African Institute for International Affairs*.
- Pfister, R. (2003). Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(1), 51-73.
- Prys, M. (2009). Regional Hegemon or Regional Bystander: South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy 2000 – 2005. *Politikon*, 36(2), 193-218.
- Puchala, D.J. (2005). World Hegemony and the United Nations. *International Studies Review*, 7 (4), 571-584.
- Qobo, M. (2017). Africa's Foreign Policy and Nation Branding: Regional Leadership and its Discontents. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 39(1), 9-28.
- Ramalepe, M.A., & Shai, K.B. (2016). Revisiting a big brothers relationship on the context of South Africa and Lesotho. *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives*, 1(2), 94-107.
- Ramutsindela, M. (2005). Perspective on Regionalism in (Southern) Africa. *GeoJournal*, 62(1), 107-110.

- Ramutsindela, M.F. (1997). National Identity in South Africa: the Search for Harmony. *GeoJournal*, 31(1), 99-110.
- Reindal, S.M. (2008). A Social relational Model of Disability: A Theoretical Framework for Special needs Education? *European Journal of Special Needs Education*, 23(2), 135-146.
- Saunders, C. (2014). South Africa in Africa. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 652(1), 222-237.
- Schenoni, L.L. (2018). The South African Unipolarity. *Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies* 36(2), 207-228.
- Sekgoma, G.A. (1994). The Lagos Plan of Action and Some Aspects of Development in Sierra Leone. *Pula Journal of African Studies*, 8(2), 68-94
- Shoba, M.S. (2018). South Africa's Foreign Policy in BRICS. *Journal of African Union Studies*, 7(1), 173-188.
- Sidiropoulos, E. (2014). South Africa's Soft Power. *Current History*, 113(763), 197-202.
- Snidal, D. (1985). The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. *International Organization*, 39(4), 579-614.
- Solomon, H. (2010). South Africa: A Case of High Expectations for Peace. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 17(2), 131-147.
- Southall, R., & Fox, R. (1999). Lesotho's General Election of 1998: Rigged or de Rigueur? *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(4), 669-696
- Strange, S. (1987). The Persisting Myth of Lost Hegemony. *International Organization*, 41(4), 551-574.
- Strategic Comments. (2017). *The Unwinding of South Africa's Foreign Policy*, 23(8), 1-3
- Tella, O. (2017). South Africa in BRICS: The Regional Power's Soft Power and Soft Balancing. *South African Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), 387-403.
- Tella, O. (2018). Currencies, Constraints and Contradictions of South Africa's Soft Power. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 53(3), 430-436.
- Tella, O., & Ogunnubi, O. (2014). Hegemony or Survival: South Africa's Soft Power and the Challenge of Xenophobia. *Africa Insight*, 44(3), 145-163.

- Tjonneland, E.N. (2013). Making sense of the Southern African Development Community. *African Security Review*, 22(3), 190-196.
- Ufo-Okeke, U. (2009). The Role of Regional Economic Communities in Africa's Economic Integration: Prospects and Constraints. *Africa Insight*, 39(2), 26-42.
- Umezurike, S.A., & Asuelime, .L.E (2015). Exploring Diplomatic Crisis of Nigeria and South Africa between 1994 and 2013. *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 4(1), 65-74.
- Umezurike, SA., Iwu, CG., & Asuelime, L. (2016). Socio-Economic Implications of South Africa's Foreign Direct Investment in Southern African Development. *Investment Management and Financial Innovation*, 13(3), 362-370.
- UNDP Special Unit for TCDC. (1982). The Third United Nations Development Decade, The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: A TCDC Perspective. *Africa Development*, 7(1/2), 93-101.
- Van der Westhuizen, J. (2016). South Africa's Soft Power Conundrum: How to win friends and influence people in Africa. *Journal of Political Power*, 9(3), 449-456.
- Webb, M.C., & Krasner, S.D. (1989). Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment. *Review of International Studies*, 15 (2), 183-198.
- Weisfelder, R. F. (2015). Free Elections and Political Instability in Lesotho. *Journal of African Elections*, 12(2), 50-80.
- Yilmaz, S. (2010). State, Power and Hegemony. *International Business of Social Science*, 1 (3), 192-205.
- Zohrabi, M. (2013). Mixed Method Research: Instruments, Validity, Reliability and Reporting Findings. *Theory and Practice in Language Studies*, 3(2), 254-264.

INTERNET ARTICLES/SOURCES

- African Development Bank (2015). Regional Integration Policy and Strategies (RIPoS) 2014-2023. Integrating Africa: Creating the Next Global Market. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Regional_Integration_Strategy_RIPoS_-2014-2023_-Approved_-_Rev_1_-_11_2014.pdf Accessed 23 November 2018.

- African Regional Integration Index. (2019). SADC: Southern African Development Community. <https://www.integrate-africa.org/rankings/regional-economic-communities/sadc/> Accessed 21 April 2019.
- African Union. (2018). AU member Countries Create history by massively singing the AFCFTA Agreement in Kigali. <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180321/au-member-countries-create-history-massively-signing-afcfta-agreement-kigali> Accessed 15 January 2020
- Aljazeera. (2020). Moeketsi Majoro sworn in as Lesotho's new Prime Minister. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/moeketsi-majoro-sworn-lesotho-prime-minister-200520104605163.html> Accessed 12 June 2020.
- Berger, S. (2008). Zimbabwe inflation hits 231 million per cent, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/3167379/Zimbabwe-inflation-hits-231-million-per-cent.html> Accessed 12 June 2019.
- Bhebe, N.M. (2015). Front Line States and African Liberation. <https://www.sundaynews.co.zw/frontline-states-and-african-liberation/> Accessed 14 January 2019.
- Bimha, P. (2017). The Impact of Political Uncertainty on Growth. <https://politicaleconomy.org.za/2017/10/impact-of-political-uncertainty-on-south-african-growth/> Accessed 12 March 2019.
- Biniza, S. (2016). Introducing the Political Economy of Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Political Economy Southern Africa. <https://politicaleconomy.org.za/2016/09/introducing-sadc-regional-integration/> Accessed 24 September 2018.
- Borzel, T.A. (2011). Comparative Regionalism: A new research agenda, KFG Working Paper Series, No 28. http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_28.pdf Accessed 9 April 2018.
- Chidede, T. (n.d). Intra-SADC Trade remains limited: How can it be boosted? <https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/11962-intra-sadc-trade-remains-limited-how-can-it-be-boosted.html> Accessed 28 May 2019.
- Chiroro, B. (2012). South Africa: Optimising the Currency of Soft Power in the International Arena. <http://www.ai.org.za/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/No-79.-Optimising-the-currency-of-soft-power-in-the-international-Arena.pdf> Accessed 23 March 2019.

- Christiano, M.H. (2018). The Emergence of Post-Apartheid South Africa: Hype or Fact. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/402/305/christiano.pdf> Accessed 22 April 2019.
- De Melo, J., & Tsikata, Y. (2014). Regional Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects, WIDER Working Paper 2014/037. <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2014-037.pdf> Accessed 28 February 2018.
- Dinka, T., & Kennes, W. (2007). Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges. <https://ecdpm.org/publications/africas-regional-integration-arrangements-history-challenges/> Accessed 9 October 2018.
- Dirzauskaite, G., & Ilinca, N.C. (2017). Understanding "Hegemony in International Relations Theories. https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/260247380/Understanding__Hegemony__in_International_Relations_Theories.pdf Accessed 9 February 2019.
- Ernst and Young. (2012). Rapid Growth markets Soft Power Index. https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Rapid-growth_markets:_Soft_power_index/%24FILE/Rapid-growth_markets-Soft_Power_Index-Spring_2012.pdf Accessed 2 April 2019.
- Fabricius, P. (2019). Last Week's agreement serves the short-term interest of Ramaphosa and Thabane, but can it save Lesotho? https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-ramaphosas-new-reform-timetable-save-thabanes-skin?utm_source=BenchmarkEmail&utm_campaign=ISS_Today&utm_medium=email Accessed 13 July 2019.
- Flemes, D. (2007). Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000123 Accessed 23 January 2019.
- Furlong, P. (2017). Cousins no more? The 1948 crises in ties between the Netherlands and Afrikaner nationalists. <http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10394/25944/No-78-%282017%29-4-Patrick-Furlong.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> Accessed 21 April 2018.
- Games, D. (2013). Nigeria-South Africa Baseline Study, SAFPI Policy Brief No 44. <http://osf.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Nigeria-South-Africa-baseline-study.pdf> Accessed 4 April 2018.

- Genge, M., & Kornegay, F., & Rule, S. (2000). African Union and Pan-African Parliament: Working Papers. http://www.academia.edu/4812202/African_Union_and_Pan-African_Parliament_Working_Papers Accessed 10 August 2018.
- Genge, M., Kornegay, F., & Rule, S. (2000). Formation of the African Union, African Economic Community and Pan African Parliament. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/idep/unpan003885.pdf> Accessed 21 January 2019.
- Global Firepower (2019). 2019 Military Strength Ranking. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp> Accessed 2 June 2019.
- Green, R.H. (1980). Southern African Development Coordination: The Struggle Continues. <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/5894/rg038.pdf?sequence=1> Accessed 6 February 2019.
- Hartzenberg, T. (2011). Regional Integration in Africa. <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/DP-74-Africa-Regional-Integration-Arrangements-History-Challenges-2007.pdf> Accessed 27 November 2018.
- Heil, A. (2017). Systems Theory. <http://www.siue.edu/~adheil/Systems%20Theory%20Paper.pdf> Accessed 28 May 2018.
- Hulse, M. (2016). Regional Powers and Leadership in Regional Institutions: Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/wp/wp76/WP_76_Hulse_PRINT.pdf Accessed 5 January 2019.
- Human Rights Watch. (2010). Zimbabwe: One Year on, Reform a Failure: Rights Abuses and Repression Prevalent Under Power-Sharing Agreement. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/12/zimbabwe-one-year-reform-failure> Accessed 22 April 2019.
- Kirsten, J.F. (2009). Southern Africa, Regionalism and the SADC. https://dspace.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10394/5253/No_57%282009%29_Kirsten_JF.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Accessed 12 December 2018.
- Maharaj, M. (2008). The ANC and South Africa's Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace. Berghof Transition Series No.2. <https://www.berghof->

foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions_anc.pdf Accessed 12 December 2018.

Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative Content Analysis. <http://utsc.utoronto.ca/~kmacd/IDSC10/Readings/Readings/text%20analysis/CA.pdf> Accessed 1 March 2018.

McNamee, T. (2016). What if Africa's Regional Powers Did Better? South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya as Potential Drivers of Peace and Prosperity. <http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.46615/> Accessed 1 May 2018.

Moshi, E.H. (2013). Organization of African Unity/ African Union and the Challenges of Realizing its Objectives. Workshop to Commemorate 50 years of the OAU/AU held on the 24th of May 2013 at the J.K. Nyerere Hall, MUCCoBs. <https://www.mocu.ac.tz/upload/researches/Prof.%20Moshi%20No.%2042.pdf> Accessed 12 January 2019.

Motsamai, D. (2015). Elections in a time of instability: Challenges for Lesotho beyond the 2015 poll. https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/54095_sareport-issue3.pdf Accessed 12 March 2019.

Motsepe, T. (2015). Five reasons why Zuma is unfit to govern. <https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/opinion/five-reasons-why-zuma-is-unfit-to-govern-1961637> Accessed 14 May 2019.

Mtantato, S. (2018). SA' "Welfare State" is in trouble. <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-28-00-sas-welfare-state-is-in-trouble/> Accessed 17 October 2018.

Municipal IQ. (2019). 2019 Service Delivery Uptick. https://www.municipaliq.co.za/index.php?site_page=press.php Accessed 1 May 2019.

Myburgh, J. (2008). Mandela and Abacha: How not to deal with dictators. <https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/mandela-and-abacha-how-not-to-deal-with-dictators> Accessed 12 January 2020.

Nathan, L. (2013). African Solution to African Problems, South Africa's Foreign Policy. https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/42486/Nathan_African_2013.pdf?sequence=1 Accessed 21 June 2019.

Nepad. (n.d) Who We Are. <https://www.nepad.org/who-we-are/about-us> Accessed 22 January 2019.

- News 24. (2020). Ex-Lesotho PM paid killers R400000.00 to Murder Estranged Wife: Police. <https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/ex-lesotho-pm-paid-killers-r400-000-to-murder-estranged-wife-police-20200611> Accessed 12 June 2020.
- Ngatane, N. (2017). Lesotho Prepares for General Elections. <http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/c6e4af004052ca99814bf96b78d177f4/Lesotho-prepares-for-general-elections-20170307> Accessed 22 April 2019.
- Olivier, G. (2010). Regionalism in Africa: Cooperation without Integration. https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/16138/Olivier_Regionalism%282010%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Accessed 6 January 2019.
- Oloruntoba, S., & Gumede, V. (2014). Regional Hegemons as Catalyst for Continental Integration: A Comparative note on the roles of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa's Integration and Development. [http://www.vusigumede.com/content/2014/ACADEMIC%20PAPERS%202014/Working%20Paper%20\(with%20Femi\).pdf](http://www.vusigumede.com/content/2014/ACADEMIC%20PAPERS%202014/Working%20Paper%20(with%20Femi).pdf) Accessed 14 March 2018.
- Pajares, F. (2007). The Elements of a Proposal. <http://www.humanitarianweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ElementsofaProposal.pdf> Accessed 4 March 2018
- Peta, B. (2017). Thabane wins most seats in Lesotho Elections, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/thabane-wins-most-seats-in-lesotho-elections-9575336> Accessed 1 July 2019.
- Pfister, R. (2000). South Africa's post-apartheid Foreign Policy towards Africa. <https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/144712/eth-23586-01.pdf> Accessed 12 May 2019.
- Prys, M. (2007). What Makes a Regional Hegemon? <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/c46390f8-2be2-410b-afd3-210df3b305b9.pdf> Accessed 1 February 2019.
- Reuters. (2020). Maesaiah Thabane, Lesotho's prime minister's wife, charged with murder. <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2020-02-05-lesotho-prime-ministers-wife-maesaiah-thabane-charged-with-murder/> Accessed 5 February 2020.
- SACU. (2011). Annual Report 2010/2011. http://www.sacu.int/docs/reports_annual/2011/annual2011.pdf Accessed 26 January 2019.

- SACU. (2017). Annual Report. http://www.sacu.int/docs/reports_annual/2018/SACU-Annual-Report-2017.pdf Accessed 23 January 2019.
- SACU. (2019). History of SACU. <http://www.sacu.int/show.php?id=394> Accessed 19 January 2019.
- SADC. (1992). Declaration and Treaty of the southern African Development community. https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf Accessed 8 February 2019.
- SADC. (2003). Southern African Development Community: Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. https://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf Accessed 8 February 2018.
- SADC. (2005). SADC Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Integration. https://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf Accessed 26 January 2019.
- SADC. (2012). Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan. https://www.sadc.int/files/7513/5293/3530/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Executive_Summary.pdf Accessed 2 February 2019.
- SADC. (2018). 38th SADC Summit. https://www.sadc.int/files/3915/3599/0760/38th_SADC_Summit_Brochure_2018.pdf Accessed 3 February 2019.
- SADC. (2018). SADC Executive Secretary encourages media to produce stories that promote regional integration. https://www.sadc.int/files/6615/4100/1931/SADC_Executive_Secretarys_Press_Conference_Briefing.pdf Accessed 4 February 2019.
- SADC. (2019). Member States Booklet 2019. https://www.sadc.int/files/3415/5713/1324/SADC_Member_States_booklet_2019.pdf Accessed 20 June 2019.
- Saunders, C., & Nagar, D. (2013). South Africa and the Southern African Development Community. In Becker, J., & Smet, K., Southern Africa: 20 years post-apartheid. https://www.mattersburgerkreis.at/dl/llKrJMjLkNJqx4KooJK/JEP-4-2013_01_BECKER-SMET_Southern-Africa-20-Years-Post-Apartheid.pdf Accessed 20 May 2019.

- Sekatle, P. (1999). The Lesotho General Election of 1998. <https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/6186/P.%20Sekatle.pdf?sequence=1> Accessed 22 July 2019
- Smith, C. (2012). Personality in Foreign Policy Decision-making. <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/16/personality-in-foreign-policy-decision-making/> Accessed 10 January 2020.
- Smith, K. (2018). South Africa: Still an Ambivalent (Sub) Regional Leader? In Ebert, H., & South African Government. (2011). Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu; White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/final-draft-white-paper-sa-foreign-policy.pdf Accessed 12 May 2019.
- Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. (1991). https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/aec/trt_aec.pdf Accessed 25 January 2019.
- Treaty of the Organization of African Unity. (1963). https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf Accessed 2 December 2018.
- United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). (1995). Report on Regional Strategy for Rational Location of Industries in the Context of the Abuja Treaty. <http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/3000/Bib-24781.pdf?sequence=3> Accessed 7 August 2018.
- van Nierkerk, L.K. (2005). Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages and Lessons of Experience. https://sarpn.org/documents/d0001249/P1416-RI-concepts_May2005.pdf Accessed 7 December 2018.
- Winning, A., & Bavier, J. (2019). Denel asks for R2.8bn cash injection from the state. <https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2019-07-05-denel-asks-for-r28bn-cash-injection-from-the-state/> Accessed 5 July 2019.
- Wu, J.P. (2009). "Successful" Regionalism and the Role of Hegemons. <http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2009/papers/wu.pdf> Accessed 23 January 2019.
- Yi, C. (2007). Emergence of Regionalism: About State Preference Formation. POLIS working Paper No.23. <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/working-papers/wp23yi.pdf> Accessed 29 March 2018.

Zondi, S. (2012). South Africa in Southern Africa: A perspective. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mosambik/09403-no-8.pdf> Accessed 23 March 2019.

GOVERNMENT REPORTS

Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO: 2016). African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). Revised Strategic Plan 2015-2020, Annual Performance Plan 2016-2017, http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/african_renaissance2015_2020/arf_2015_2020.pdf Accessed 23 April 2017

Department of International Relations and Cooperation. (DIRCO: 2004). African Economic Community (AEC). <http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm> Accessed 6 January 2019.

National Planning Commission. (2011) National Development Plan 2030. http://www.dac.gov.za/sites/default/files/NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work_0.pdf Accessed 1 June 2019.

Statistics South Africa. (2020). Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter one 2019. <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2020.pdf> Accessed 23 June 2020.

DISSERTATION(S)/THESIS

Bohm, F. (2018). Hegemony Revisited: A Conceptual Analysis of the Gramscian Concept of Hegemony in International Relations Theory. Masters Dissertation, Lund University, Sweden.

Bozdaglioglu, Y. (2009). Hegemonic (in) Stability and its limit on US Hegemony. Masters Dissertation, Adnan Menderes University, Turkey.

Chapanyi, F.H. (2015). An Assessment of South Africa's Role in Conflict Management, Peace and Stability in the Kingdom of Lesotho (1993-2014), Masters Dissertation, North West University, South Africa.

Chitsa, T.A. (2016). Challenges of Regionalism in Africa and Regional Integration in Africa: A Case Study of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Honours Degree, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe.

- Folarin, S.F. (2010). National Role Conceptions and Nigeria's African Policy, 1985-2007. PhD Thesis, Covenant University, Nigeria.
- Freer, G.S. (1995). South-South Cooperation in Southern Africa. The case of South Africa and the SADCC. PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.
- Gwala, S.P. (2015). An Analysis of South Africa's role in Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Prospects and Challenges. Masters Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Hadebe, S. (2015). South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa 1994-2014: Partner or Hegemon. PhD Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Hegner, S.U. (1998). The Implementation of the southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Trade: Possible Trends for Intraregional Trade for the Countries of a Heterogeneous region, Diploma Thesis, Berlin School of Economics, Germany.
- Jiboku, P.A. (2015). The Quest for African Economic Integration: An Assessment of NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism. PhD Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Jongur, U.D. (2004). An Evaluation of Implementation of the Abuja Treaty and the African Integration Process (2002-2012). PhD Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria.
- Joseph, M (2016). South African peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 1996-2016: Probing the Attitudes of Congolese Refugees in Durban. PhD Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Langerud, M.H. (2016). From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union: From A Policy of Non-Interference to a Policy of Non-Indifference's? Masters Dissertation, University of Oslo, Norway.
- Mandela, B.T. (2010). Regional Hegemony as a tool for peace: An evaluation of South Africa's role in regional development through the Spatial Development Initiatives. Masters Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
- Masemola, H. (2005). An Analysis and appraisal of Restructuring in SADCC/SADC since 1990. Masters Dissertation, University of South Africa.
- Mkaliphi, Z. (2002). Promotion of Liberal Values in South Africa's Foreign Policy: Beyond the Structural Imperatives of the International System? Masters Dissertation, Rhodes University, South Africa.

- Mmutle, S. (2007). South Africa's Peacekeeping Strategy in Southern Africa: The Case of Lesotho 1998-2002, Masters Dissertation, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa.
- Molefi, T.S. (2003). South Africa within SADC: Partner or Hegemon. Masters Dissertation, Rhodes University, South Africa.
- Monyae, MMD. (2014). Learning to Lead: South Africa's role in Africa – Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa.
- Muya, D. (2014). The Nexus Between National and Student Politics. Managing Student Conflict in four African Universities in an Era of Democratic Transition. PhD Thesis, University of Zululand, South Africa.
- Mwiti, M.L. (2013). Hegemony and Regional Stability in Africa: A Critical Analysis of Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa as Regional Hegemons. Masters Dissertation, University of Nairobi, Kenya.
- Naidoo, V. (2010). Between Scylla and Charybdis: South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemma in Southern Africa. PhD Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Nyaxo, O.F.K. (2004). Transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU): A New Vision for the 21st Century, or Political Rhetoric. PhD Thesis, University of Trier, Germany.
- Ogunnubi, O.R. (2013). Hegemonic order and Regional Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative study of Nigeria and South Africa. PhD Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Phungula, N. (2013). The China-South Africa relationship: An economic and Political Assessment of Benefits and Costs. Masters Dissertation, University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal, South Africa.
- Siko, J.A. (2014). "Democratic" foreign Policy making and the Thabo Mbeki Presidency: A Critical Study. PhD Thesis, University of South Africa.
- Stephen, S.K. (2005). An Investigation into South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards Conflict Resolution in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Region: Case study, South Africa's Intervention in Lesotho. Masters Dissertation, University of the North West, South Africa.

Tau, L.M. (2000). Regional Economic Integration in Southern African Development Community: Problems and Prospects, Masters Dissertation, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

Tjemolane, T. (2011). South Africa's Foreign Policy towards Africa, 1994-2010. Partner or Hegemon? PhD Thesis, University of the Free State, South Africa.

Youla, C. (2009). The Foreign Policies of Mandela and Mbeki: A Clear Case of idealism vs Realism? PhD Thesis, University of Stellenbosch.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDING'S

Chisaka, B.C., & Vakalisa, N. (2000). Gathering and Analysing of data using Qualitative research methodology: Paper presented at the Qualitative Research Conference hosted by the Faculty of Education and Nursing at Rand Afrikaans University, South Africa, 24-26 July 2000.

Knecht, T., & Weatherford, M.S. (2004). Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. The Stages of Presidential Decision-Making. Paper presented at the Annual national Conference of the Midwest Political Science association held in Chicago, USA on the 15th to the 18th of April 2004 (published as conference proceedings).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Questions for one on one interview with key respondents

Project Title: Sub-Regional Hegemons, Integration and Governance: South Africa's Role in Southern Africa after Democratization.

Question 1(Q1): From your perspective, what is the link between regional powers and regional integration?

Q2: How would you rate South Africa's post-1994 contribution towards regional integration and governance in Southern Africa?

Q3: In terms of regional governance and socio-economic development, do you think South Africa has articulated its post-1994 foreign policy to the benefit of the region or otherwise?

Q4: In general, how may you term South Africa's (from Mandela to Zuma) post-1994 foreign policy stance in Southern Africa?

Q5: Would you say South Africa's membership in the SADC has reaped any rewards for Southern African states and the SADC as a Regional Economic Community (REC) in general?

Q6: How would you rate South Africa's contribution to mediation and peacekeeping (Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC) in Southern Africa post-1994?

Q7: What concluding remarks (if any) may you offer on South Africa's future regional integration role in Southern Africa moving forward?

Q8: What do you make of South Africa's Soft Power attributes and do you think Pretoria has used this effectively for regional development or not?

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B

Respondent informed consent declaration

(Respondent)

Project Title: Sub-Regional Hegemons, Integration and Governance: South Africa's Role in Southern Africa after Democratization.

Daniel Nkosinathi Mlambo, a PhD candidate from the Department of Public Administration, University of Zululand (KwaDlangezwa Campus) has kindly requested my permission to participate in the above-mentioned research project and/or study.

The nature and the purpose of the research project and of this informed consent declaration have been explained to me in a language that I understand.

I am aware that:

1. The purpose of the research project is to evaluate Africa's hegemons (in this case post-1994 South Africa in Southern Africa) in enhancing regional integration and governance.
2. The University of Zululand has granted the researcher ethical clearance for this research project and I have seen/may request to see the clearance certificate if/when I want.
3. By participating in this research project I will be (1) contributing towards assessing South Africa's post-1994 regional integration and governance position in Southern Africa, (2) assessing its pre-1994 and post-1994 foreign policy, goals and objectives towards Southern Africa and (3) scrutinizing its regional hegemonic stance and role(s) the Republic may play in the Southern African regional integration and governance framework(s) moving forward.
4. I will participate in the project by being interviewed by Mr Daniel Mlambo through being asked a set of eight questions and giving precise answers where possible and Mr Mlambo will take notes and also use an audio recording.
5. My participation is entirely voluntary and should I at any stage wish to withdraw from participating further, I may do so without any negative consequences.
6. I will not be compensated for participating in the research, but my out-of-pocket expenses will be reimbursed.
7. There may be risks associated with my participation in the project. I am aware that:

- a. the following risks are associated with my participation: illness, other commitments beyond my control may arise, some question may be deemed sensitive and interviewees identity might be revealed
 - b. The following steps have been taken to prevent the risks: the researcher will do a thorough follow-up with the interviewees prior to the agreed interview date. Also, if the interviewee feels that the questions are sensitive in any way (due to the nature of his/her job), the interviewer will not force the interviewee to respond to that particular question. Lastly, if the interviewee does not want his/her name to be mentioned in the study, the interviewer will oblige to the request and will thus use code names like (respondent A or B).
 - c. there is a 0% chance of the risk materialising
8. The researcher intends publishing some materials of the research results in the form of journal articles. However, confidentiality and anonymity of records will be maintained and that my name and identity will not be revealed to anyone who has not been involved in the conduct of the research.
 9. I will (receive/not receive) feedback in the form of a written email attachment regarding the results obtained during the study.
 10. Any further questions that I might have concerning the research or my participation will be answered by the University of Zululand's Research and Innovation Office at +27 35 902 6273 or his supervisor Dr T.C. Adetiba at +27 35 903 6092.
 11. By signing this informed consent declaration I am not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies.
 12. A copy of this informed consent declaration will be given to me, and the original will be kept on record.

I, have read the above information / confirm that the above information has been explained to me in a language that I understand and I am aware of this document's contents. I have asked all the questions that I wished to ask and these have been answered to my satisfaction. I fully understand what is expected of me during the research.

I have not been pressurised in any way and I voluntarily agree to participate in the above-mentioned project.

.....

.....

Respondent's signature

Date