

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

**THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ZULU KING CETSHWAYO AND THE BRITISH
AUTHORITY AT PORT NATAL 1872-1882**

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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



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AUTHORITY AT PORT NATAL 1872-1882**

BY

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(B.A, P.G.C.E, B.A. HONS)

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
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DECLARATION

I declare that: Relations between Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authority at Port Natal 1872-1882, is a product of my effort, both in conception and execution, and all sources I have used have been appropriately acknowledged.



Sekwenele Happiness Khoza

Student

30 March 2021

Date



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Supervisor

30 March 2021

Date

DEDICATION

To my baby sister:

Samkelisiwe Sphesihle Khoza

May you grow and become the shining star that you are destined to be.

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ABSTRACT

British High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir Bartle Frere (1877-80), said the history of the Zulu King Cetshwayo ka Mpande (1872-9) was 'written in characters of blood.' He described the Zulu king as an "irresponsible, bloodthirsty despot, bloodthirsty and aggressive despot, ignorant and bloodthirsty despot" and as a "ruthless savage". He referred to his grinding despotism, his faithless, cruel character, atrocious barbarities, power of murder and plunder, murders and massacres and his cruelty and treachery. He alluded that King Cetshwayo's aim was to emulate the sanguinary fame of his uncle Chaka (Shaka), in shedding blood, to resume the most sanguinary of his predecessors' practices and to break loose from all restraint and to re-establish the regime of Chaka's unmitigated barbarism. This study sought to examine, in more systematic detail than what has been done in recent times, the evidence for and against the contemporary charge that King Cetshwayo was a cruel tyrant and his relations with the British authorities culminating in the 1879 conflict. Moreover, Sir Bartle Frere had a strong interest in discrediting King Cetshwayo, and this in itself should lead one to treat his allegations with great caution. Frere was a distinguished former Indian civil servant selected by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon, to carry out his scheme of South African confederation. With the wisdom of hindsight, it could be argued that this was a hopeless task, but Frere was determined to succeed, and obstacles only made him more determined. He soon decided that the Zulu kingdom was the main obstacle to success. An independent African kingdom in which the young men were required to serve the king in a military capacity and were not permitted to work for wages for white employers was entirely incompatible with the confederated state which Frere was endeavouring to construct. This and other findings within the search of literature led the research to investigate the phenomenon under investigation. Using Conflict and Great man theory, the study will look at the Zulu Kingdom under King Cesthwayo leading to the war of 1879. A qualitative research approach was adopted and the study relied on secondary sources. Interviews and archival sources were primary tools. The study finds that both the British and Zulus had responsibility in the eminent war of 1879. It brings forward that the British invaded Zululand.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABAQULUSI- The people who were in charge of “izinduna”, the leading ones being persons of high esteem and good reputation within the kingdom.

AMABUTHO- Regiments.

AMAKHOSI- Plural of Inkosi.

AMAKHANDA- Plural of khanda, Military Homesteads.

IBANDLA- Council of State.

IBUTHO- Regiment.

IKHANDA- Military Homestead in the Zulu Kingdom.

IMPI- Is a Zulu word meaning war or combat, and by association anybody of men gathered for war.

IMIZI- Plural of Umuzi

INDUNA- Civil or military appointed to positions of authority or command.

INKOSI- A chief (particularly Zulu).

ISIGODLO- Palace

IZIKHULU- People at the top, i.e. the king and aristocracy. It consists of the Zulu royal family and leaders of chiefdoms.

IZINDUNA- Plural of Induna

UMKHONTO- Zulu spear

UMUZI- Place viewed as a village, establishment, residence and home. Umuzi consisted of the headman 'umnumzane', with his wives and children, his younger brothers with their wives and families, and, in many cases, married sons as well.

Z.A.R- The South African Republic (Dutch: Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek; the ZAR; also known as the Transvaal Republic, Afrikaans: Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek). was an independent and internationally recognised state in what is now South Africa, from 1852 to 1902.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The period 1872-1882 was the most turbulent period in the history of the Anglo-Zulu relations. Cetshwayo became the king of the Zulus and his actions as heir apparent and king led to the destruction of the Zulu kingdom. The Langalibalele Rebellion of 1906 increased the fears of the settlers for a Zulu attack. Carnarvon used the opportunity to harness the fears of Natal colonists to implement his confederation project. The attempt to implement the confederation led to the war and the destruction of Zululand.

Cetshwayo ascended a throne with less power relative to the local chiefs like Mnyamana, Zibhebhu and Hhamu. It took eleven months for Cetshwayo to be inaugurated after the death of his father. He had to make irresponsible diplomatic choices to balance the power before he could feel secure to ascend the throne. Cetshwayo developed a sense of unfounded trust towards the Europeans due to his lack of power and legitimacy in Zululand. This misplaced trust in Europeans was visible in the appointment of John Dunn as his advisor. The invitation of Shepstone for the coronation was viewed as ill-advised by the Zulu elders. The adoption of a defensive strategy in the face of an invading imperial force backfired badly, especially after the defeat of the Zulus.

In the 19th Century. Britain had the largest empire which was achieved by invading and annexing territories belonging to other people. Among the conquered areas was South Africa. In 1805 the British Navy defeated the French Navy and took the Cape Colony from the Dutch as a strategic post. It needed the Cape for the establishment of a refreshment

station and to protect its increasing fleet travelling to and from India. After the colony was awarded to Britain at the European Peace Conference, it started settling its citizens in the area.

The colonisation process was led by soldiers. After conquering, the soldiers gave way to administrators and the two soldiers and administrators; worked together to address different issues and their relationship was complimentary. The administrators represented the legal authority and the military beat those who resisted'.

Among those to be conquered militarily were the Zulus. The Anglo-Zulu relations started in 1824 with a group of Britons who left the Cape to explore the Natal area for trading opportunities on behalf of the merchants. Under the leadership of Lt Francis Farewell, the group was warmly received by King Shaka kaSenzangakhona. This group stayed for many years outside the influence of the British and colonial government. The Boers under the leadership of Piet Retief and Gert Maritz settled in Natal, including the Port of Natal between 1837 and 1838. It was after the Boer settlement that Britain developed interests in the Port of Natal, attacked the Boers in 1842 and declared it a British territory.'

The official arrival of the British colonial administrators and the existence of a colony adjacent to the Zulu kingdom changed the strategic outlook of the area drastically. As from 1842 Zululand was bordered by the British colony on the South and a Boer republic on the North West. These groups were interested in the affairs of the Zulu kingdom because of its strategic significance. The Anglo-Zulu relations went sour in late 1870's and culminated in a war of 1879.




Figure 1: King Cetshwayo

CHAPTER ONE

AIMS, RESEACH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In 1879 Britain went to war with the most powerful African state in southern Africa, a war which proved the costliest in blood and treasure, and in political consequences, of any the British had thus far fought in the region. Meeting its financial cost caused a cabinet crisis, the disaster at Isandlwana weakened Britain in its dealings with other powers, and together with other overseas disasters the war helped to cause the government to lose the next election.

The effects of the war on the Zulu people were obviously much greater. The war also had important effects on the people of South Africa generally and on the course of South African history. The defeat of the Zulu, together with the defeat of the Pedi later in 1879, the crushings of uprisings in East and West Griqualand, and the annexations following the last Cape eastern frontier war, mark the establishment of that untrammelled white

supremacy in South Africa which was to last for over a century.

This rash of wars was largely a response to British annexations and pressures, many of them associated with the policy of confederation. Though this policy failed to achieve unity, it achieved one of its most important purposes, which was to strengthen white rule in South Africa.⁵ In the early 1870s white rule had been precarious over much of South Africa, and appeared to be becoming more so as Africans took advantage of the mineral discoveries to gain the firearms which had defeated their fathers in the era of the Great Trek.

By the early 1880s the picture was very different. Africans were defeated and disarmed, white claims to land and taxes were enforced, and Africans were supplying labour at low cost without any further need to lure them with offers of guns.⁶ The overthrow of the Zulu kingdom played the major role in this transformation - both directly, and indirectly, as an example to others.

1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The primary aim of this study was to dig deep in finding about the events resulting to the one war that led the Zulu nation at the mercy of the British government. The following were the research objectives:

- I. To analyse relations between the Zulu king Cetshwayo and the British Authorities at Port Natal.
- II. To investigate the nature of Zulu politics in relation to British Authorities at Port Natal.
- III. To critically explain the general Anglo-Zulu relations during the period in question.
- IV. To evaluate motives behind the road to 1879 conflict between the Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authorities at Port Natal.

- V. To give a critical exposition on the outbreak of 1879 Anglo-Zulu armed conflict and its aftermath.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- I. How were the relations between the Zulu king Cetshwayo and the British Authorities at Port Natal like?
- II. What was the nature of Zulu politics in relation to British Authorities at Port Natal?
- III. In what way could the Anglo-Zulu relations during the period in question be explained generally?
- IV. What were the motives behind the 1879 conflict between the Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authorities at Port Natal?
- V. Why did the 1879 Anglo-Zulu armed conflict break out and what was its aftermath?

1.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The topic and the nature of the study demanded that Great-Man and Conflict theories be a framework upon which it is undertaken.

1.4.1 The Great Man Theory

The great man theory is a 19th-century idea according to which history can be largely explained by the impact of great men, or heroes; highly influential and unique individuals who, due to their natural attributes, such as superior intellect, heroic courage, or divine inspiration, have a decisive historical effect.¹ The theory is primarily attributed to the Scottish philosopher and essayist Thomas Carlyle who gave a series of lectures on heroism in 1840, later published as *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History*, in which he states: Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here.

¹ Wikipedia.org

They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may justly be considered, were the history of these.²

Carlyle stated that "*The history of the world is but the biography of great men*", reflecting his belief that heroes shape history through both their personal attributes and divine inspiration.³ In his book *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History*, Carlyle saw history as having turned on the decisions, works, ideas, and characters of "*heroes*", giving detailed analysis of six types: The hero as divinity (such as Odin), prophet (such as Jesus), poet (such as Shakespeare), priest (such as Martin Luther), man of letters (such as Rousseau), and king (such as Napoleon). Carlyle also argued that the study of great men was "*profitable*" to one's own heroic side; that by examining the lives led by such heroes, one could not help but uncover something about one's own true nature.⁴

The Great-Man theory is related to this study as King Cetshwayo is regarded and viewed as a great leader of his time. He is regarded as the last great King of the independent Zulu Kingdom whose strong military leadership and political acumen restored the lowest prestige of the Zulu nation, which had declined during the reign of his father King Mpande.⁵ King Cetshwayo had heroic courage when it came to fighting his battles and conquering the Zulu nation, he was equally determined to defend Zulu sovereignty

² T. Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero- Worship and the Heroic in History*, Fredrick A. Stokes & Brother, New York 1888

³ T. Carlyle, "The Hero as Divinity" in: *Heroes and Hero-Worship* (1840).

⁴ T. Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History*, Fredrick A. Stokes & Brother, New York, 1888. p.2.

⁵ Cetshwayo Zulu King. www.britannica.com accessed 12 April 2019

against white intrusion and to maintain the status quo within the kingdom.⁶ He had divine inspiration and was very intellectually gifted. These descriptions put King Cetshwayo in the category of being a Great-Man and great leader of past history. Having been a man who had a humongous contribution in Zulu history.

One of the most forceful critics of Carlyle's formulation of the great man theory was Herbert Spencer, who believed that attributing historical events to the decisions of individuals was an unscientific position.⁷ He believed that the men Carlyle called "great men" were merely products of their social environment. You must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown... Before he can remake his society, his society must make him.⁸

One of the great man theory's greatest critics was Herbert Spencer. He said that it was unscientific to say that history was moulded by heroes' decisions.

You must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown. ... Before he can remake his society, his society must make him.

Weaknesses of the Great Man Theory

The main issue with the Great Man theory of leadership is that not everybody with "leadership qualities" ends up leading people.

If leadership is ingrained, then everybody with the right qualities would land in a leadership role.

⁶ C Ballard & A Duminy (ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New perspectives .1981,p 32

⁷ R.A. Segal, Hero Myths, Wiley-Blackwell, 2000, p3

⁸ H. Spencer, The Study of Sociology, Appleton, 1896, p31

The environment, the current leader, and group traits cumulatively decide what kind of leaders are required and how good a leader is.

1.4.2 Conflict Theory

The underlying principle of this theory states that tensions and conflicts arise when resources, status and power are unevenly distributed between groups in society and that these conflicts become the engine for social change. In this context, power can be understood as control of material resources and accumulating wealth, control of politics and the institution that make up society, and one's social status relative to others (determined not just by class but by race, gender, sexuality, culture, and religion among other things) .⁹

*“A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirements for the residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut”.*¹⁰

Conflict theory originated in the work of Karl Marx, who focused on the causes and consequences of class conflict between the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production and the capitalists) and the proletariat (the working class and the poor). Focusing on the economic, social, and political implications of the rise of capitalism in Europe, Marx theorised that this system, premised on the existence of a powerful minority class (the bourgeoisie) and oppressed majority class (the proletariat), created class conflict because the interests of the two were at odds, and resources were unjustly

⁹ www.thoughtco.com

¹⁰ Marx, K. Wage, Labour and Capital, 1847

distributed among them.¹¹

This theory relates to this study in that the main cause of the conflict between the British authority and King Cetshwayo was due to the British authority's intentions to overpower and dominate over the Zulu nation. The British intended to take away the resources that belonged to the Zulu people, such as land, cattle and even their women. The British also intended to be the sole leaders and controllers of Natal at the time. The reason for the War therefore was the Zulu King and Nation resisting all changes.¹² This theory has been criticised by that it generally seeks to scientifically explain the general contours of conflict in society: how conflict starts and varies, and the effects it brings. The central concerns of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of scarce resources and power. What these resources are might be different for each theorists, but conflict theorists usually work with Weber's three systems of classification: class, status, and power.¹³

Conflict theories generally see power as the central feature of society, rather than thinking of society as held together by collective agreement concerning a cohesive set of cultural standards, as functionalists do. Where power is located and who uses it (and who does not) are thus fundamentals to conflict theory. In this way of thinking about things, power is not necessary bad, it is a primary factor that guides society and social relations.¹⁴ Just as Structural Functionalism was criticised for focusing too much on the stability of societies, conflict theory has been criticised as it tends to focus on conflict to the exclusion of recognising stability. Many social structures are extremely stable or have gradually progressed over time rather than changing abruptly as conflict theory would suggest.¹⁵

¹¹ www.thoughtco.com

¹² Ibid

¹³ www.wikipedia.org

¹⁴ www.thoughtco.com

¹⁵ Ibid

One common criticism of conflict theory is that it fails to capture the way in which economic interactions can be mutually beneficial to the different classes involved. For example, conflict theory describes the relationship between employers and employees as one of conflict, in which the employees wish to pay as little as possible for the employees' labor, while the employees wish to maximize their wages. In practice, however, employees and employers often have a harmonious relationship. Moreover, institutions such as pension plans and stock-based compensation can further blur the boundary between workers and corporations, by giving workers an additional stake in the success of their employer.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005)¹⁶ a research methodology or strategy is determined by the nature of the research question and the subject being investigated. As a result, the research format used in an investigation should be seen as a tool to answer the research question. Research methodology is the specific procedures or techniques used to identify, select, process, and analyse information about a topic. In a research paper, the methodology section allows the reader to critically evaluate a study's overall validity and reliability.¹⁷

A qualitative research approach was chosen as the methodology for this study as this approach reinforces an understanding and interpretation of meaning as well as intentions underlying human interaction. Both primary and secondary data analysis were used as historical sources.

¹⁶ Denzin N.K & Lincoln Y.S., *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Handcover, 5th Revised Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA Sage

¹⁷ Research Methodology. <https://libguides.wits.ac.za> accessed 05 April 2019

1.5.1 Qualitative research

Qualitative research is a multifaceted research method involving an interpretative, naturalistic approach to subject matter. The multifaceted nature of qualitative research enables researchers to develop a holistic picture of the phenomenon in question. ¹⁸

In qualitative research the objective is exploratory and descriptive rather than explanatory.¹⁹ The descriptive nature of qualitative research allows the researcher to provide a description of the experiences of participants. Secondary data are the type of sources that are records from past events, also known as desk top method for data collection. They are referred to as “*secondary*” because they are not immediately from the events. They could be in the forms of print and digital media such as newspapers, articles, government records, pictures and books, archival records, audio recordings, etc.

1.5.2 Interviews

Potter (1996)²⁰ argues that interviews are valuable tools for collecting data in qualitative research. A one-on-one interview method allows the researcher to interact with the participants and to observe non-verbal cues during the interview process. In this study an unstructured interview method was used to allow for an open, in-depth discussion of the research topic.

Denzin and Lincoln (2005)²¹ argue that unstructured interviews allow the researcher to understand the complexity of the situation without imposing any prior categorization. Through choosing interviews as a method of data collection the researcher hoped to gain

¹⁸ Denzin N.K and Lincoln Y.S., Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. In *The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research*. Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln Y.S. Eds., Handbook of Qualitative research, 3rd Edition, Sage, Thousand Oaks 1-32

¹⁹ Ferreira M., Mouton j, Puth G., Schurink E. & Schurink W., Introduction to Qualitative Research. California

²⁰[http:// repository. Up.ac.za/ bitstream/handle/chapter3.pdf](http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/chapter3.pdf)

²¹ Denzin N.K. and Lincoln Y.S. , *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (Handcover, 5th Revised Edition0)*, Thousand Oaks

a deeper understanding of the participants.

The researcher conducted interviews as a method of data collection. An unstructured interview approach was adopted. This approach facilitates an understanding of the problem from the perspective of the participants under investigation. The main advantage of interviews stems from their capacity to offer a complete description and analysis of a research subject without limiting the scope of the research and the nature of the participant's responses.²²

1.5.3 Sampling

When conducting research many types of sampling are possible, although researchers in qualitative research usually focus on relatively small samples.²³ Research participants are generally selected because they are able to provide rich knowledge and are willing to articulate their experiences, thereby providing information that is rich and which will be able to challenge and enrich the researcher's understanding.²⁴

Snowball sampling technique was used to select participants for this study. Snowball sampling can be used to identify experts in a certain field such as medicine, manufacturing processes or customer relation methods and gather professional and valuable knowledge.²⁵ The researcher specifically selected participants who are experts in the field of African history, specifically Zulu history. The study targeted History specialists and Amakhosi for interviews.

Sample size- Refers to the number of participants or observations included in a study.

²² Collis J. and Hussey R. (2003) Business Research 2nd edition, Palgrave: Macmillan

²³ <http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/charpter3.pdf>

²⁴ Crabtree, B. F., & Miller, W. L. (Eds.). (1992). Research methods for primary care, Vol. 3. Doing qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications

²⁵ Explorable.com

This study had a total of 20 participants to interview, including both history specialists and amakhosi of royal houses. A number of 15 interviewees became the research specialists; including (History professors and doctors, people who work in Achieves and news reporters). A number of 5 amakhosi, with age ranging from 45 upwards were interviewed. The researcher selected amakhosi with the specific age because of the assumption that they were more knowledgeable as opposed to amakhosi that were relatively younger.

1.5.4 Data analysis

Data analysis is the most important part of any research since it forms the last stage of research that assists in developing relevant theory of the phenomenon being researched. Its purpose is analyzing all available data extracted from various sources of information as afore mentioned. It is under this column where collected data was given a dire scrutiny to meet the intended objective of the study. The researcher analysed data in a theoretical manner as given by the source.

1.5.5 Archival sources

Sources of research data in which documents and artefacts have been saved, collected, and/or classified. Archives can range from modest collections of unique documentation (such as that of individual sporting entrepreneurs or athletes) to highly formalized collections (such as the files of meetings and correspondence of the International Olympic Committee, housed in the Olympic Museum in Lausanne, Switzerland; or the collection of Olympic Games posters collected and classified in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London, UK). Care must be taken by the researcher to authenticate the archival source, or locate corroborating data or evidence. Finding a unique archival source is the dream of the sport historian, but careful scrutiny is still essential to contextualize such sources alongside complementary sources of data and alternative accounts or bodies of

evidence²⁶.

In conclusion

The first chapter of this thesis opens with the Background, Aims, Research Questions and Methodology of the study and further describes all the fundamentals of this study. This chapter is the skeleton in which the flesh of the study is to be filled in the following chapters. Without the first chapter the study would be empty and senseless. It is fully informed and gives great insight into what is expected in the study.

CHAPTER TWO **LITERATURE REVIEW**

²⁶ <http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive> The online resource of The Times newspaper.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the variety of literature written on the concept of the relations between Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authority at Port Natal during the period under study, i.e. 1872-1882. The main aim of the chapter is to give an exposition of reviewed literature in respect of the topic in question.

2.2 Reviewed Literature

Norman Etherington in "**Anglo-Zulu Relations 1856-1878**"²⁷ presents the relations between the Zulus and colonial Natal as friendly, especially from the side of Zulu king. During the coronation of King Cetshwayo, Theophilus Shepstone was invited as a guest of honour. The visit was not taken serious by the colonial officials, but it was used later against the Zulus in justifying the invasion of Zululand. Personality clashes between Cetshwayo and Shepstone were present during this period. Shepstone was trying hard to exercise supremacy over the Zulu king who did not take kindly to such an act. Furthermore, there was lack of communication in general.

This allowed the rumour mongering to thrive in the Anglo-Zulu relations. The rumours peddled were always on security and kept the colonial society suspicious of their native neighbours' intentions. There was also a serious shortage of labour in the colony and the Zulus were not helping in addressing this requirement. Measures were taken to attract black labourers beyond the borders of the colony and the Zulu kingdom, especially Eastern Transvaal and north of Delagoa Bay.²⁸ This process was complicated and did not solve the labour shortage in Natal.

²⁷ N. Etherington .Anglo-Zulu Relations 1856-1878. In Ballard. C &Duminy, A (ed) The Anglo-Zulu War: New perspectives. 1981

²⁸ Ibid

Serious security concerns of the colonial white population were identified by Bill Guest as the source of the confederation ideal. In "The War, Natal and Confederation"²⁹ he argues that the white population of the Natal colony felt overwhelmed by the presence of the black population. The colony was surrounded by native societies from all directions, Zulu kingdom in the East, Sotho in the North and Xhosa in the South. The number of black people within the colony exceeded that of the white population by 1:18 in 1871. Rumours were always circulated about an impending Zulu invasion of Natal; even conflicts with other native populations were always perceived by the white population as Zulu-inspired.³⁰

The conflict with the Xhosa's in the Eastern Cape. Pedi-Boer conflict in the Transvaal and the skirmish with Langalibalele in the Drakensberg were all perceived as motivated and supported by Cetshwayo. These concerns were further compounded by an increasing need for land and labour which could not be satisfied from the Zulu kingdom. The lack of responsible government in Natal made it easy for the personality of Sir Bartle Frere to manipulate the situation towards the invasion of Zululand.

According to Donald Morris in "The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879"³¹ a party of British citizens lead by Francis George Farewell in 1824 were the first to interact with the Zulus. These members were part of the Cape Colony Britons who out on expedition. They were given a warm reception and remained in Zululand interacting with the Zulu king until his death in 1828. On 17 August 1824 Farewell got Shaka to sign a deed entitling him to 3 500 m2 of land around Port Natal. During the reign of Dingane, who took over after Shaka.there

²⁹ B. Guest. The War, Natal and Confederation, in Ballard. C & Duminy, A (ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New perspectives. 1981

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ D.R. Morris,. The Washing of the Spears: The rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879. 1965

were only sporadic interactions with the British colonialists.

It is the Boers that kept Dingane busy on all fronts. One notable battle between the Zulus and the Boers was fought in 1838 on the banks of Incombe River, later known as Blood River because of that event. The Boers formed an alliance with Mpande and overthrew Dingane in 1840. The British colonised Natal in 1842 after defeating and displacing the Boers from the Port of Natal.³² In 1843 the area south of Tugela River was declared a British colony and British citizens started settling in the area. The settlement and expansion of colonial activity occurred during the reign of Mpande who was seen to be friendly towards both British and Boer settlers. Cetshwayo took over, after the death of Mpande in 1872, and found a kingdom that was already earmarked by the colonial fraternity for invasion.

Kevin Shillington, in "History of Southern Africa"³³, states that Trek Boer groups under the leadership of Gert Maritz and Piet Retief settled in Natal during the period 1837-1838. They established their parliament in Pietermaritzburg and used Port Natal for trading. This is the group that interacted with Dingane for about three years. Due to the flight with Dingane in 1839, Mpande was sheltered by this group of settlers. In 1840 Mpande invaded Zululand, with the assistance of the Boers and defeated Dingane to claim the Zulu kingship. The Boers, for their trouble, forced Mpande to pay tribute to them in the form of cattle and land. In 1842 the Cape Colony decided to send a force to invade Natal and expel the Boers from the Port of Natal.

Dutch and US ships were calling at the port raising fears of competition from other great powers and coastal security concerns from Britain. Furthermore, the Boer settlers were

³² D.R. Morris, . The Washing of the Spears: The rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879. 1965

³³ K. Shillington. History of Southern Africa. 1987

accused of practising slavery and pushing surplus Africans in southern direction. The Boers displaced from Natal moved northwards to settle in the Transvaal and Anglo-Zulu relations remained normal until the death of Mpande in 1872.³⁴

Phillip Kennedy in "Mpande and the Zulu Kingship"³⁵ follows Mpande's life from the time of King Shaka until the end of his own reign. During Shaka's reign he survived by being a favourite of his half-brother. Their closeness resulted in Shaka presenting Mpande with two wives who bore him Cetshwayo and Mbuyazwe amongst others. Growing away from Dingane allowed him to gather some followership to an extent that by 1832 Henry Fynn was certain of his (Mpande) future kingship. During the late 1830's Mpande's relations with Dingane soured to an extent that Mpande survived two assassination plots perpetrated by his brother between 1837 and 1839. He had to defect to the Boers in Natal to save himself and his followers.

The Boers accepted him and used him to defeat Dingane. He was installed as a king of the Zulus and he soon changed his allegiance to the British who fought the Boers in 1842 and colonised Natal in 1843. During his term of office Mpande did not name his heir apparent causing Cetshwayo to purge a large number of his half-brothers to earn the right to become an heir apparent. The power during Mpande's time slowly devolved to the local chiefs to an extent that at his death there were chiefs who were more powerful than Cetshwayo.³⁶ Due to this state of affairs Cetshwayo had to resort to whites from Natal to secure his kingship.

In "An Imperial High Commissioner and the Making of the War"³⁷, Peter Colenbrander argues that Sir Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner to South Africa for the main purpose of waging war with the Zulu to advance Lord Carnarvon's dream of

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ P. A, Kennedy. Mpande and the Zulu Kingship. IV1981, pp. 21-38

³⁶ P. A, Kennedy. Mpande and the Zulu Kingship. IV1981, pp. 21-38

³⁷ P Colenbrander. "An Imperial High Commissioner and the Making of War, 1979, pp 15-19

Southern Africa confederation. Frere strongly believed that Britain had a responsibility to civilise the native states by peace and war where necessary. This view was shaped by events in India where he witnessed princely states being assimilated and subordinated by the British Empire.

As High Commissioner in South Africa he assumed office in March 1877 and started the preparations for the Zulu war without a delay. The Zulu kingdom was the only African state that exhibited signs of cohesiveness and military prowess to an extent that it was deemed a threat by the colonial officials. In order to establish grounds for war Frere employed various tactics against Cetshwayo. The negative information was supplied by the missionaries and colonial officials. The establishing of the grounds for war culminated into an ultimatum that was given to the Zulus where they were required to comply with its near impossible terms in 30 days or face war. In this way Frere succeeded in tricking the Zulus into a war that was not necessary.

In "The Man Who Would be Inkosi: Civilising Missions in Shepstone's Early Career"³⁸, Thomas McClendon states that Theophilus Shepstone life and character was shaped by the family's religious background and the Frontier Wars of the Eastern Cape. In 1854 he made a proposal where the African population between Tugela River and Pondoland would be moved into reserved locations where he would be their "king". The plan was built on the findings of a Locations Commission which investigated the problem of Africans who were flowing into the British territory in increasing numbers. The budget of the Natal government was not funded by the British Empire and there was a shortage of labour.

Bishop Colenso and the Commissioner supported the plan. Bishop Colenso saw an

³⁸ T McClendon. The Man who Would be Inkosi: Civilising Mission in Shepstone's Early Career. 2004, pp 339-358

opportunity where converts could be easily accessible while the Commissioner assumed this would reduce the security threat posed by Africans to the colonial population. Shepstone on his side saw this as an opportunity for him to raise his status by controlling a large pool of human resources which could give him access to greater things. Africans were moved to the locations and placed under the control of magistrates and Theophilus Shepstone never became the "king"³⁹. McClendon portrays Shepstone as a person who is calculating and would not hesitate to utilise an opportunity to use the African population for his own ends.

In his book entitled "The Road to iSandlwana"⁴⁰ Philip Gon argues that the annexation of the diamonds fields of Griqualand West opened the horizons for the British Empire. Lord Carnarvon, on the advice of Theophilus Shepstone wanted to create a confederation that would include the Boer republics, the Cape colony and Natal. The independent African kingdoms were a source of fear for the colonial officials, who saw them as a perpetual threat. In order to prepare ground for his project Lord Carnarvon sent James Anthony Froude to investigate and market the idea of the confederation.

Froude's visit was met with resistance from some colonialists, especially Sir Barkly (the High Commissioner in South Africa). Sir Barkly was replaced as high commissioner by Sir Bartle Frere on Froude's recommendation. Transvaal, a northern Boer republic, was annexed by Theophilus Shepstone in 1877, three weeks after Sir Bartle Frere's assuming of office. This was followed by the conquering and reorganisation of the Eastern Cape after the last frontier war in 1878. Some 2500 German settlers were also brought in to Eastern Cape to assist with farming after a great famine in 1877 had devastated the area.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ P, Gon. The Road to Isandlwana: The Roads to an Imperial Battalions,1979

⁴¹ P, Gon. The Road to Isandlwana: The Roads to an Imperial Battalions,1979

The Zulu kingdom had a reputation of being the best native army in Southern Africa and colonial Natal viewed this force as a perennial threat. Once the other areas were pacified, it was time to deal with the Zulus. At the beginning of October 1878, more than 60 days before the presentation of the ultimatum to the Zulus. British forces were already occupying three places along Natal/Zululand border.

As an "Introduction" of "The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives"⁴² Duminy & Ballard argue that it was the need for livestock, confederation and the new technology that fuelled the Anglo-Zulu War. The armed conflict in the Eastern frontier was always characterised by the British forces seizing cattle from the Xhosa natives. The ultimatum handed to the Zulus included herds of cattle as fine for certain violations. The growing industrialisation rivalry amongst the European powers made it imperative on colonial empires to consolidate and protect their investments abroad. Labour markets in the colonies had to be created to ensure that there is uninterrupted labour supply for the imperialists.

The introduction of breech loading Martini-Hendry rifles and the Gatling machine gun gave the British forces a sense of superiority. During the Frontier Wars these weapons proved to be very effective even when faced with massed attacks. The personality of Sir Bartle Frere is cited as one important factor that made the war a possibility. The High Commissioner was handpicked by Lord Carnarvon for the purpose of establishing the confederation of Southern Africa and he was prepared to achieve it at any cost.⁴³

Colin Webb in "The Origins of the Anglo-Zulu War: Problems of Interpretation"⁴⁴ criticises the earlier British orthodox writers who depicted the Anglo-Zulu War as inevitable. It is

⁴² C, Ballard & A, Duminy (Ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives. 1981

⁴³ C, Ballard & A, Duminy (Ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives. 1981

⁴⁴ C, Webb. The Origins of the Anglo- Zulu War: Problems of Interpretation.

argued that Zulus were far less of a threat to the British Natal and even in the face of war they were still suing for peace. The reasons for the war had their source in capitalist interests. Lord Carnarvon and Sir Bartle Frere wanted to create a South African dominion that was supported by a strong economy. Most accusations against Cetshwayo were followed up by Bishop Colenso and most of them were found to be untrue. The writers of the time were reporting from the British perspective and preferred to overlook certain information. The notion of the war being inevitable is based on the general feeling of the colonial administrators who were using the theory as an explanation to their higher authorities in order to escape punishment.

Peter Colenbrander in "The Zulu Political Economy on the Eve of the War"⁴⁵ states that Cetshwayo was leading a less cohesive Zulu nation compared to that of the Shakan era. The shortage of cattle, which were central to the life of a Zulu, had impacted negatively on the economy of the kingdom and caused it a serious strain on the Zulu economic life. Trading activities were partly responsible for the shortage of cattle. Trading for firearms and implements were also responsible for depleting herds of cattle in Zululand. Between 80(H) and 20 000 firearms are estimated to have entered Zululand during 1870's. The Boers also traded implements with Zulus at unfavourable terms. Population growth dynamics and migration impacted negatively on the Zulu force levels. Polygamy was practiced mainly by rich people who were a minority in the Zulu kingdom; the majority of the people were monogamous. During the 1870's Natal experience an increased inflow of people from Zululand. This further deprived the Zulu Army of additional young men for military mobilisation.

Jeff Guy, in "The Role of Colonial Officials in the Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom" ⁴⁶states that after the defeat of the Zulus, British Government issued an instruction forbidding the

⁴⁵ P, Colenbrander. The Zulu Political Economy on the Eve of the War.

⁴⁶ J, Guy. The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom. 1980.

annexation of Zululand as a colony. The instruction did not give guidelines regarding the management of the defeated and destructed Zulu kingdom. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who replaced Bartle Frere, decided to divide Zululand into 13 chiefdoms and appointed new chiefs accordingly. The new chiefs developed rivalry amongst themselves which metamorphosed into a civil war.

As the king was imprisoned, Zibhebhu kaMaphitha started attacking the chiefs who were aligned to the exiled king. Shepstone was amongst many people who criticised this division of Zululand in favour of a system where the chiefs would be reporting to a white magistrate. Wolseley rejected this idea citing the instruction not to annex Zululand as the reason for his action. The absence of clear guidelines on the terms of settlement allowed the colonial officials, particularly Wolseley a free hand in reorganising Zululand after the war. Reorganising the Zululand into thirteen chiefdoms resulted in civil war that claimed many lives of the inhabitants of the territory.

Charles Ballard in "Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn: The Architects and Agents of the Ulundi Settlements"⁴⁷ argues that it was Wolseley and Dunn who were responsible for the terms of settlement in Zululand. Wolseley did not trust the colonial officials and the missionaries and did everything in his power to exclude their participation and inputs. He only accepted Theophilus Shepstone's advice on the number of chiefdoms where he was advised to consider thirteen instead on his considered six chiefdoms. As Frere was still in South Africa, Wolseley was supposed to keep him informed on the progress of pacification.

Wolseley believed that Frere's confederation policy was a total failure and he preferred to exclude Frere as much as possible. John Dunn had extensive interests in Zululand and

⁴⁷ C, Ballard. Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn: The Architects and Agents of the Ulundi Settlement, in Ballard, C & Duminy, A (ed). The Anglo-Zulu War: New perspectives. 1983

stood to lose all of it in case the Zululand was in Cetshwayo's hands or those aligned towards the king. Wolseley realised that Dunn was cooperating fully and used him to create a buffer zone between Natal and Zululand. After allocating the largest territory to Dunn, his services were further useful in the selection of the twelve chieftains for the remainder of the chiefdoms. The Ulundi settlement was therefore an expression of Dunn's aspirations and Wolseley's whims.

In his article "Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo kaMpande 1872-1879"⁴⁸ Richard Cope argues that an attack on Cetshwayo's character by Frere, Shepstone and Robertson was designed to incite the colonial officials into viewing the war against the Zulus as a just cause. Frere did not have knowledge of Zulu affairs but relied on a missionary called Robertson for information demonising the Zulu king. Robertson had an axe to grind with Cetshwayo for refusing missionaries permission to operate freely in Zululand. The truth was that missionaries left Zululand in 1877 due to a rumour pertaining to an imminent British invasion of Zululand.⁴⁹

The anonymous author of the negative publications was widely believed to be Robertson. Events that occurred in the past were recycled as proof that the King was a "blood thirsty barbarian" whose reign was "written in characters of blood". Shepstone as the former Secretary of Native Affairs he was viewed as an authority on the Zulu affairs and he used this influence to spread incorrect information about the Zulu Kingdom.⁵⁰ The absence of wide media coverage resulted in rumours thriving to extent that rumours were generating new stories. These conditions made the rumours more effective in fuelling fears of an imminent Zulu invasion amongst the colonial settlers.

⁴⁸ R.L ,Cope. Written in the Characters of Blood? The Reign of King CetshwayokaMpande 1872-9. 1995. Pp247-269

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Ibid p270

Richard Cope in "Local Imperatives and Imperial Policy: The Source of Lord Carnarvon's South African Confederation Policy"⁵¹ discusses factors that were fuelling the confederation ideal. The native societies and the Boers were viewed by the Colonial Office as an obstacle to the creation of the confederation. The violent encounter between the British forces and Chief Langalibalele confirmed this fear which was unfounded. The press was also responsible for encouraging the annexation of native territories.

Local and British interests as represented by JH Froude and John Paterson of Standard Bank were instrumental in advocating the confederation ideal. JH Froude was sent by Lord Carnarvon to investigate and promote the confederation in South Africa. It was Froude who recommended the replacement of Sir Barkly and he was further instrumental in Frere's appointment. Paterson was a merchant in Port Elizabeth and a founder of Standard Bank. He was very vocal on the benefits the confederation could bring for South Africa and his views were in line with those of Lord Carnarvon. The economic situation was such that the depression in Europe during 1873-1896 was contrasted by a boom in South Africa over the same period.

In his book *Zulu Rising: Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift*,⁵² Ian Knight states that the commander on the spot sent a request to London for officers to volunteer for a special service in South Africa due to an imminent war with the Zulus. The special service allowed soldiers of the British Army to detach themselves temporarily for field appointments. These appointments aroused interest from young officers who were on garrison duties. Field service was viewed as an opportunity to break away from the routine peacetime duties for active service in the field. The active service was adventurous and provided an opportunity for medals and possibly accelerated promotion. It was due to these reasons that young officers did not hesitate to enlist for a special service.

⁵¹ R. L. Cope. *Local Imperatives and Imperial Policy: The source of Lord Carnarvon's Laws' of 1873*. 1985 pp11-62

⁵² I. Knight. *Zulu Rising: Epic Story of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift*. 2020.

In the article "British Imperial Opposition to Natal Expansion 1865-1873"⁵³ Benjamin Kline exposes Natal's expansionist tendencies from 1865. Between 1865 and 1868 the Natal colonists, led by Keane and Shepstone attempted to annex Basutho land without success. The annexation was motivated by a request for protection from Mshweshwe who was under attack from Free State Boers. The first request was rejected by Cape Town and this caused Mshweshwe to send the second request to Natal. In 1867 the Colonial Office in London directed Wodehouse, the Cape Governor, to allow Natal to annex Basutho land. Wodehouse was reluctant to allow Natal officials to annex the Basotho kingdom he therefore found an opportunity in 1868 to defy London and annexed it as a British protectorate. The continued harassment of the Basotho by the Boers gave Wodehouse the excuse he needed to justify his annexation of Basutho land and deny the Natal colonists the opportunity to expand their territory.⁵⁴

In the article entitled "A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879"⁵⁵ Jeff Guy estimates that about 30 000 firearms were imported into Zululand during the period 1872-1877. Guy further estimated that there were not less than 8 000 firearms in the Zulu Army at the start of the Anglo-Zulu War. John Dunn is identified as the main actor in the Zululand arms trade. Most of the firearms were the obsolete stocks disposed by the European armies after the introduction of breech loading rifles. The firearms would be imported from Europe to Durban harbour from where they were re-exported to Delagoa Bay. John Dunn would collect the firearms from Delagoa Bay and bring them to Zululand where they would be exchanged for cattle.

During the period 1872-1878 a double muzzle loader's price increased from one cattle to

⁵³ B, Kline. British Imperial Opposition to Natal Expansion 1865-73. 1992, pp 19-35

⁵⁴ B, Kline. British Imperial Opposition to Natal Expansion 1865-73. 1992, pp 19-35

⁵⁵ J.J, Guy. a note OF Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special References to the Anglo-Zulu War. 1879. 1971 pp 557-570

four cattle. The cattle would then be driven across Tugela into Natal where they would be exchanged for cash. Cetshwayo enlisted the services of Basotho gunsmiths to maintain the firearms and give musketry training to the Zulu people⁵⁶. In the war the firearms were not effective due to serviceability and tactical application. Most of firearms were obsolete and Zulus were still combining the use of firearms with the spear. In some cases Zulus were still having two additional throwing spears which were decommissioned by Shaka more than 50 years earlier.

Rod Thornton in "Historical Origins of the British Army's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Techniques"⁵⁷ argues that during the colonial period a heritage was created whereby British Army officers could conduct operations in their regions without too much interference from the homeland. This was partly due to amicable relations that existed between the colonial administrators and the army officers. Administrators were representing the legal authority of the British Empire and were allowed to take the lead in dealing with the political side while the army would join later to address the military side of the problem. The homeland also believed in allowing the man on the spot to address the situation as he deemed fit. This approach was based on the reality in terms of distance and the old British Army tradition of mission command. The concept of mission command gave the commander on the spot the benefit to make decisions and report later, take accolades if he did well or take punishment if he failed.⁵⁸

In the article "The Cohesion of the Zulu Polity under the Impact Anglo-Zulu War: A Reassessment"⁵⁹ Laband argues that there was a difference of opinion amongst the king

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ R, Thornton. Historical Origins of the British Army's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Techniques. 2005 pp 26-44

⁵⁸ R, Thornton. Historical Origins of the British Army's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Techniques. 2005 p 45

⁵⁹ J.P, Laband. The Cohesion of the Zulu Polity under the Impact of the Anglo-Zulu War. 1985 pp 34-62

and the council. He observed that the council was not in favour of the war against the British but the wider population felt that the terms of the ultimatum were a provocation and insult to the Zulu nation. The central issue was the surrender of Sihayo's sons on which the king and the populace were unanimous in their refusal to comply with such a requirement. Sihayo was one of the few chiefs Cetshwayo could trust and betraying him was unthinkable.

In the end it was John Dunn who was left exposed. The councillors felt that as the ambassador he misled king regarding the true intentions of the British Empire. This division threatened Dunn and his interests in Zululand and there were even suggestions to put him to death. In order to protect his interests on the 31st of December 1878 Dunn defected to the British forces and collaborated with them.⁶⁰ His defection gained him the trust of Garnet Wolseley, who was later charged with the post war settlement in Zululand. Due to his contributions during the war. Dunn was the first to become chief and got most land closer to the Natal amongst the thirteen chiefs and was instrumental in the appointment of the other twelve chiefs.

John Laband in "The Illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War"⁶¹ divided the war into four phases, namely: the first invasion, regrouping, second invasion, and pacification and withdrawal. The first invasion took place during the period of 6-31 January 1879. After suffering losses at iSandlwana the British forces withdrew and waited for reinforcements from the homeland. Regrouping and receiving of the reinforcements was carried out between the 1st of February and 18th of March 1879.

Once Lord Chelmsford was happy with his forces he launched a second invasion which lasted from the 6th of April until the 8th of July 1879. This invasion culminated with the

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ J, Laband & P, Thompson. The illustrated Guide to the Anglo-Zulu War. 2000

Battle of Ulundi where the Zulus were defeated. After the victory at Ulundi the British forces started with the exercise of pacifying the area which lasted until the 22nd of September 1879 and was followed by a withdrawal. The strategy of the British Army was to advance on three fronts and converge at Ulundi where they would finish the Zulu Army and capture the King. The British Army had about 18 000 men for deployment while the Zulus were ready to field about 30 000 men.⁶²

In his article entitled "Political Power within the Zulu Kingdom and the Coronation Laws"⁶³ Richard Cope argues that at the death of his father Cetshwayo did not have enough power to claim legitimacy in the Zulu polity. Mpande had allowed for the diffusion of power to local chiefs and izikhulu (those of higher authority). In an attempt to anchor and legitimatise himself Cetshwayo had to invite Shepstone to the coronation. Shepstone welcomed the opportunity as he was seeking to have an influence in politics of Zululand. At the coronation Shepstone read some rules which were to be followed in Zululand. These laws were perceived by Cetshwayo to be directed to the chiefs and izikhulu. But Cetshwayo was later accused by Frere of violating the same rules and consequently, his kingdom invaded. Mpande left Cetshwayo as heir apparent but lacking in relative power and legitimacy. This led him to seek legitimacy using Shepstone who abused the opportunity for his own ends.⁶⁴

Donald Morris in "The Washing of the Spears"⁶⁵ argues that after the defeat of the Zulus Wolseley deliberately appointed those chiefs who either had subservient attitude towards British or showed hostility to the Zulu royal house. Some of the appointees, like Hlubi kaMotha and John Dunn, were compensated for their services during the war. The

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ R.L, Cope. Political Power within the Zulu Kingdom and the "Coronation of Laws" of 1873. 1985 pp11-62

⁶⁴ R.L, Cope. Political Power within the Zulu Kingdom and the "Coronation of Laws" of 1873. 1985 pp11-62

⁶⁵ D. R. Morris. The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879. 1965

combination of these appointments laid a foundation for future disturbances and further destruction of the Zulu kingdom. Cetshwayo was arrested late in 1879 and incarcerated in Cape Town before until 1882.

In July 1882 the Zulu king arrived in England for a meeting with Queen Victoria who allowed for him to return to his throne at once. The ship carrying the Zulu king and his entourage docked at Port Dunford, in Zululand and there were no Zulus to meet him. He was taken by Shepstone and the Dragoon guards to his new place at Mthonjaneni. Later he built his new kraal at Ulundi and settled in his devastated kingdom. A civil war ensued after his settlement and culminated in his death on the 8th of February 1884. Even after the death of Cetshwayo Zululand remained in turmoil and more Zulus continued to die while Britain refused to take any responsibility for the territory beyond Tugela River.

The literature above shows a great variety of writings about King Cetshwayo and the British authorities post the 1879 conflict. This study seeks to fill in the gap of knowledge by investigating the true character of King Cetshwayo to validate the existing literature. The researcher intends to critically investigate the true relations of the Zulu nation and British authorities.

2.3 Conclusion

Historians and writers all have different conceptualization on why the British settled in South Africa, landed in Zululand and played a central role in the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu war. In the light of the reviewed literature, it could be concluded that the Zulu kingdom was the only African state that exhibited signs of cohesiveness and military prowess to an extent that it was deemed a threat to colonial establishments. Another narrative, however, has it that king Cetshwayo was leading a less cohesive Zulu nation compared to that of the Shakan era. This act was designed to incite the colonial officials into viewing the war against the Zulu Kingdom as a just cause. A plethora of literature exists on

relations between King Cetshwayo, the Zulu Kingdom and British Authorities over the past decades, yet there exists an interpretative hiatus. This study attempted to expose and interrogate literature that does not show self-opinionatedness and chauvinism towards the late Zulu King.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICS OF THE ZULU KINGDOM UP TO 1873

3.1 Introduction

The Zulu kingdom was closely associated with whites almost from its inception, and they were a potential threat to the kingdom almost from its inception too. Dingane grew to distrust the British traders at Port Natal as their African following increased, and the Boer Voortrekkers assisted his brother Mpande to overthrow him. But the price Mpande had to pay was a large proportion of his kingdom. The British annexation of Natal brought the

Zulu some respite, for in the mid-nineteenth century the imperial government was a reluctant empire-builder. Natal's colonists and officials, however, saw the Zulu kingdom as their hinterland: their interests were expansionist, and they assumed that in the natural course of progress Zululand would become part of Natal.

The more obvious threat to the Zulu kingdom remained the Boers' territorial encroachments from their new home in the Transvaal. Boer expansion into Zululand was a threat to Natal's interests too, and the Zulu Kings followed a policy of maintaining the best possible relations with the Natal government as a counterweight to Boer expansion. This even led them to invite Natal to intervene in Zulu succession disputes, and in the event this intervention facilitated the destruction of the Zulu kingdom when imperial policy took an expansionist turn.

3.2 Zulu, Boer and British Relations

The influence of the state established by Shaka extended all over south-east Africa, but the core of the kingdom lay between the Drakensberg and the sea, bounded in the north by the Swazi and the Tsonga, who were treated as tributaries by the Zulu Kings (more effectively in the case of the Tsonga than in the case of the Swazi) and in the south by the Thukela river, the land beyond which was not an integral part of the kingdom in the sense that its inhabitants were likewise treated as tributaries rather than as direct subjects of the King.⁶⁶

In 1837 the Voortrekkers entered Natal. They allegedly found it apparently almost empty of inhabitants. Their leader, Piet Retief, sought to negotiate a cession of land south of the Thukela from Shaka's successor Dingane. Dingane, however, feared the newcomers, and attempted to eliminate the danger by killing Retief and his immediate followers, and

⁶⁶ J. Write & C. Hamilton, 'Traditions and Transformations: the Phongolo-Mzimkhulu region in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries', Ch. 3 in A. Duminy & B. Guest (eds.) *Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910: a New History* (Pietermaritzburg, 1989) pp.71-3.

attacking the main trekker encampment at Weenen. This pre-emptive strike was not successful. The trekkers received reinforcements and defeated the Zulu at the battle of Blood river on 16 December 1838. But Dingane was not overthrown by this action. A peace was patched up whereby the Thukela became the boundary between the Zulu kingdom and the republic of Natalia.

In 1839 Dingane's brother Mpande, with thousands of his followers, defected to the trekkers. Prince Mpande succeeded in winning their confidence and support, and a concerted invasion of Zululand resulted in the defeat and death of Dingane at the Battle of Blood River. Mpande was made King of the Zulus, under trekker suzerainty. The trekkers, who had taken no part in the actual fighting, collected 30 000 cattle and claimed in addition that Mpande owed them a large sum in 'war expenses'. In lieu of this sum, the land between the Black Mfolozi and the Thukela was added to the Republic of Natalia.

The republic was short-lived. After much vacillation Britain annexed Natal, and in August 1843 the trekker volksraad tendered its submission to Commissioner Henry Cloete. A treaty concluded in October 1843 between Cloete and Mpande fixed the Thukela and Mzinyathi (Buffalo) rivers as the boundary between the British colony of Natal and the Zulu kingdom. There it remained until 1897, when Zululand was incorporated into Natal.

Both countries were inhabited by Zulu-speaking Africans. It was allegedly the apparent emptiness of Natal that attracted the Voortrekkers. But it was much less empty than it seemed. Many of the former inhabitants had probably taken refuge from the disturbances of the early nineteenth century by retreating to inaccessible parts, and with the restoration of peace they re-emerged. Many of the Zulu who fled to Natal with Mpande never returned to Zululand, and they were later joined by their kinsmen and friends⁶⁷. Large numbers of such immigrants or refugees continued to enter Natal until 1854, when the Natal

⁶⁷ R. Mael, 'The Problem of Political Integration in the Zulu Empire' Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1974 (University Microfiches International, Ann Arbor, 1978) pp.116-7.

government required all such immigrants to enter the service of a white colonist for three years at fixed wages. This appears to have stemmed the tide⁶⁸. Nevertheless by 1879 the black population of Natal was bigger than the population of Zululand.⁶⁹

It was largely this black influx, and the Boer lack of confidence in the British ability to deal with it, that persuaded most of the trekkers to move to the Transvaal after 1843. The white population of Natal came to be predominantly British. But they were outnumbered by more than fifteen to one by Africans. It was to deal with this situation that Theophilus Shepstone was appointed Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes in 1845. Like many 'native administrators', Shepstone was the son of a missionary, and grew up on mission stations in the Eastern Cape, where he had learned to speak the Xhosa language, which is very similar to Zulu. At the age of 18, during the frontier war of 1835, he entered the government service as an interpreter on the staff of the Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban. From 1839 to 1845 he was 'Diplomatic Agent' at Fort Peddie, in the 'Ceded Territory'.⁷⁰

3.3 The Genesis of Zulu Kingdom Politics

There is much debate about what caused the Zulu kingdom to come into existence,⁷¹ but there is no doubt that in the final stages it was Shaka's conquests or threats of conquest that imposed unity on what had formerly been the numerous independent chiefdoms of the northern Nguni region. Despite this imposition of unity most of these chiefdoms continued to exist, often under the same ruling lineages, recalcitrant rulers being replaced by more complaisant kinsmen where necessary. New chiefdoms were also formed,

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.146-8

⁶⁹ One estimate of the population of the Zulu kingdom in 1879 is about 200 000: P.J. Colenbrander, 'Warriors, Women, Land and Livestock; Cetshwayo's Kingdom under Stress?', unpublished seminar paper, 1977, p.3. The official estimate of the African population of Natal in 1879 was 319 934: Blue Book of the Colony of Natal, 1879, pp.V4-V5.

⁷⁰ R.E. Gordon, Shepstone, the Role of the Family in the History of South Africa, 1820-1900(Cape Town, 1968) provides details of Shepstone's early career.

⁷¹ Recent summaries are Wright & Hamilton, 'Traditions and Transformations'; and J.B. Peires, 'Paradigm Deleted: the Materialist Interpretation of the Mfecane', Journal of Southern African Studies, 19, 2 (June 1993).

headed by Shaka's relatives and by recipients of his favour. In all cases these local administrative positions became hereditary, if they were not so already, and constituted a potentially centrifugal, disintegrative force.

The main centralizing agency in the Zulu kingdom was the amabutho ('regimental') system. Young men were enrolled in the amabutho (singular - ibutho) on a nation-wide basis, not on a territorial basis. Until they were permitted to marry (not usually much before the age of 40) they lived for most of the year in amakhanda ('military kraals') which were technically royal residences, being presided over by a female relative of the King. They were thus removed from their father's homesteads and their local chiefs' jurisdictions and came under the direct control of the King. In this way military power and loyalties were transferred from the territorial chiefs to the King. The amabutho were more than regiments - they were also work parties. They built homesteads and cattle byres, tended cattle, cultivated crops, and hunted. They did all this for the King, not for their fathers or local chiefs. The amabutho system was thus a means of transferring labor and hence wealth and hence power from the territorial chiefs to the King.

Memories still remained of the pre-Shakan days of independence and freedom from onerous duties to the state. The unity of the Zulu kingdom had been achieved by military conquest and was maintained by the regimental system. It was an artificial unity in the sense that it had no economic basis. Except that a greater surplus was appropriated by the newly-formed state, the economic system continued as before. The geography and ecology of Zululand was such as to provide all the different kinds of soil and grazing necessary for this type of economy within quite small areas.⁷² There was no economic

⁷² B. Sasnom, 'Traditional Economic Systems' and 'Traditional Rulers and their Realms' in W.D. Amos & D-Tooke (d.) *The Bantu-Speaking Peoples of Southern Africa* (London, 1980); J. Guy, *Ecological Factors in the Rise of Shaka: a study of the Zulu Kingdom*, Ch. 4 in Marks & Atmore, *Economy and Society*; M. Hall, *Settlement Patterns in the Iron Age in Zululand: an Ecological Interpretation* (Oxford, 1981) chapters 8 & 9.

necessity for political unity, nor any economic advantage to be gained from it. Economic forces were no barrier to separatist ambitions.

The political history of the Zulu kingdom centers on this conflict between centrifugal and centripetal forces. The power of pre-Shakan chiefs had been limited by the ease with which dissatisfied subjects could secede and attach themselves to another chief. Secession from the Shakan state was much more difficult. But it was made much easier by the establishment of an alien state on its southern borders. Dingane's fate had been sealed when Mpande seceded to the trekkers.

Mpande in his turn found his power eroded as a large proportion of his subjects re-established themselves in the British colony of Natal. The labour obligations imposed on such refugees by the Natal government in 1854 helped to check this process. Dissidence now become bottled up in Zululand. The balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces was sufficiently even - that is to say, separatist ambitions were sufficiently matched by the legitimacy of the monarchy - for dissidence to take the form of support for rival members of the royal family.⁷³

Amongst the Nguni the normal rule of succession was that a chief was succeeded by the eldest son of his Great Wife. Shaka and Dingane never married and acknowledged no sons. Dingane assassinated Shaka and Mpande defeated Dingane in battle. Precedent thus provided little clue as to who was Mpande's legitimate heir. Mpande had many sons, but never declared a Great Wife. Cetshwayo's mother, however, was the only one of Mpande's wives who came of a chiefly family, and Cetshwayo was generally regarded as

⁷³ I have relied extensively on Mael, 'Political Integration' for this account of the internal conflict in the Zulu kingdom.

destined to succeed his father. It was said that Mpande had pointed him out as his heir to the trekkers in Natal in 1839 when Cetshwayo was still a child.

3.4 Emperor Shaka and the State Formation ()

The reign of King Shaka marks a crucial phase in the history of the Zululand Kingdom. The incorporation of the coastal and mid-Thukela chiefdoms into Zulu empire expanded the domains of Emperor Shaka's state. It is of importance to look at how Emperor Shaka governed his state. The loosely decentralized confederation of clans that King Dingiswayo created was still largely in place. But the weakness of this system became obvious when King Dingiswayo was killed and the confederation began disintegrating. While there was this transition, Emperor Shaka watching that disintegration, he decided on a very different administrative model had been new in the region. It is important to state that his administrative model was different than that of his predecessors. He decided to claim absolute authority over his state. This means that he created a law-and-order government with a highly centralized structure that lasted to the present day.

During his reign Emperor Shaka established a hierarchy of civil and political officials subordinate to him. At the helm of this centralized hierarchy, he himself was the state's spokesman to the spirit world, the ultimate legal court of appeal, the supreme commander of the army and the head of the civil government. He used the military structures, the bureaucracy and a secret service to maintain his command over this highly centralized state.

3.4.1 The Role of Amabutho in State Administration

Amabutho functions were to protect the state. The introduction of new regimental structures helped Emperor Shaka prevented chiefdoms from becoming centers of political opposition and kept the state's most useful resource – manpower – directly under his control. The amabutho system, run by an efficient bureaucracy staffed by Emperor Shaka's key officials in regional positions of authority, was really the heart of the state structure.

The amabutho became an instrument of royal control throughout Emperor Shaka's growing state. This was because their membership was recruited from all clans that were incorporated into the Zulu state and instilled with a sense of national, rather than local, identity. These amabutho served as an instrument both of internal control and of external defence, keeping the peace, enforcing Emperor Shaka's punishments, defending the population against raiders.

Speaking about the Zulu amabutho, Bryant said the following:

“While ease and freedom were abundant, stern discipline continuously reigned..... They were there for the sole purpose of fulfilling the king's behests. They acted as the state army, the state police, the state labour-gang. They fought the clan's battles, made raids when the state funds were low – the state funds of course being the king's cattle; they slew convicted and even suspected malefactors and confiscated their property in the king's name; they built and repaired the king's kraals, cultivated his fields and manufactured his war-shields ... In such ways as this was each and every individual of the Nguni clan, boys and girls, maids and men alike, taught, first to father, then to king, to be ever obedient, docile, disciplined, self-sacrificing unto the last, unto the supreme test of offering one's life on the

*field of battle.*⁷⁴

The male subjects were first members of an ibutho and then members of the Zulu state. The men felt intense loyalty toward the king, because he gave them food, arms, regalia, position, rewards of cattle and eventually their wives. Each Emperor Shaka's ibutho had its own village and herd of cattle for food. The amabutho were quartered at separate kraals. Like the cattle, the war shields of the members of the amabutho belonged to the king, because they were made from the hides of the royal herds. Thought to have powerful ritual properties, they were kept in a special hut at a nearby royal kraal.

Meals were eaten family-style, with meat and milk provided by the state (as was millet beer, when the occasion warranted it), while staple grains were provided by the families of the men in the ibutho. To further the process of socialization, during meals the warriors would shout Shaka's praises and thank him for his generosity.

During Shaka's rule, service in the army was continuous and long-term. Every warrior remained most of the time with his ibutho, leaving only when Shaka gave permission for the entire regiment to retire. Shaka postponed the married status as long as possible for his warriors, to keep them under his control. A number of amakhanda, or royal homesteads were built around Emperor Shaka's state.

These amakhanda served as quarters for the various Zulu regiments. What is noticeable is that the amakhanda, were built at strategic points in the state to defend against enemies, serve as centers of administration, and offer support as symbols of royal authority. Emperor Shaka probably had 13 or 14 of these royal homesteads.⁷⁵ It appears that when not at war he would travel between them, taking residency in turn. The largest

⁷⁴ A.T. Bryant: *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, pp. 78–79

⁷⁵ M.F.R. Kets de Vries: *Lessons on Leadership by Terror-Finding Shaka Zulu in the Attic*, p. 46.

ikhanda was kwaBulawayo which stands in the hills above the Mhlathuze Valley.

The ikhanda besides being in a military kraal was a repository for the cattle, most of which were taken in wars. These cattle were the property of the state and drawn on for state purposes, but the king would not take any from a kraal without consulting the induna in charge.⁷⁶ Because there was no regular pay for these people, those who had been outstandingly brave in battle Emperor Shaka gave presents of cattle which they could take home and the spoils taken in war were nearly liberally distributed. Beads and other ornaments were also given by the Emperor's favor to warriors who distinguished themselves in war.

3.4.2 The Role of Izinduna in State Administration

Izinduna were central figures in the administration of the Zulu state. These people acted as representatives of the king. The izinduna acted as the king's deputies and they had power over life and death. These people also commanded the amabutho. They also played a key role in the central administrative structure of the Zulu state. They were the king's walking embodiment; as chief intermediaries between Emperor Shaka and his subjects. They were the executors of Emperor Shaka's commands. They occupied important military and administrative posts. They replaced the power of the traditional clan inkosi who was removed by Emperor Shaka.⁷⁷

It is important to state that in the earlier years of his reign, when clans submitted to the Zulu state, Emperor Shaka accepted the ruling family as subordinate leaders in his administrative hierarchy. When some chiefdoms resisted incorporation, Emperor Shaka immediately put one of his own subordinates in charge; then as time passed he would

⁷⁶ M.F.R. Kets de Vries: *Lessons on Leadership by Terror-Finding Shaka Zulu in the Attic*, p. 145.

⁷⁷ M.F.R. Kets de Vries: *Lessons on Leadership by Terror-Finding Shaka Zulu in the Attic*, p. 46.

add additional supporters in positions of power within the chiefdom. If appointees were resistant to his rule, he simply had them killed and replaced them with candidates more to his liking.⁷⁸

It important to draw some hints in the selecting criteria of izinduna and subordinates for his administration. Emperor Shaka not often looked to members of the royal family though he had a number of half-brothers. He preferred commoners, often regimental leaders exceptional for their prowess in warfare, who had little or no traditional right to be amakhosi, and who were therefore indebted to and dependent upon Emperor Shaka for their position. With no hereditary authority of their own, they were more likely to support Emperor Shaka faithfully. What must be pointed out is the fact that the land under amakhosi in KwaZulu Natal is not ancestral land in every case, but includes in most cases, land given by Emperor Shaka himself to some of the ancestors of the present amakhosi as rewards. These rewards were for the heroism displayed by those ancestors in the various wars in which they participated.⁷⁹

3.4.3 The Military Organisation

After Shaka had seized power, he further developed the disciplined organization of the military. Fighting techniques devised by Shaka were revolutionary and played a significant role in the rise of the Zulu military and political power. The first thing he did was to introduce the assegai (a short thrusting spear) and train the army to encircle the enemy in a shield-to-shield formation so that rival warriors could be stabbed at the heart , prior to his reign, opposing armies had lined up and lobbed their spears at each other. Shaka introduced close hand to hand combat using long bladed short-shafted stabbing

⁷⁸ M.F.R. Kets de Vries: Lessons on Leadership by Terror-Finding Shaka Zulu in the Attic, pp. 46-47

⁷⁹ M.G. Buthelezi: King Shaka Celebrations: Address by Mangosuthu Buthelezi. October 5, 1996

spears.⁸⁰ After changing the traditional fighting tactics, he reduced shields to more manageable proportions and trained his men to use their shields to hook their opponent's shield and wrench it aside, thus exposing his left flank to the Zulu warriors spear.

These military-technical innovations were to be of enormous importance. The efficiency of the military apparatus allowed Shaka to gather a large number of chiefdoms into one entity and to incorporate the defeated troops into the Zulu military. Shaka's army became the biggest and the strongest in the Zulu Kingdom and it was not easy to defeat. Though some chiefdoms were able to disperse into other territories, Shaka's wars resulted in the merging of some 300 formerly independent chiefdoms into the Zulu Kingdom⁸¹.

Shaka also developed a strategy concentrating his soldiers into a fighting formation resembling a buffalo head. In the centre or 'chest' was the greatest concentration of men, comprising the most experienced fighters. They were deployed in two parallel formations, so that the soldiers in the front would engage the enemy, while those in the rear would be hidden from sight.⁸²

This strategy was designed firstly to deceive the enemy into believing that they were being opposed by a relatively small force, and secondly so that the soldiers held in reserve would be able to reinforce the frontline soldiers if necessary. As they would be fresh, they could also chase and outdistance the defeated enemy in retreat. Emanating from the chest were two horns whose purpose was to encircle the enemy. When

⁸⁰ Military Organization of the Zulu: Strength of the Zulu Nation. <https://southafrica.co.za/military-organisation-of-the-zulu.html>. 2021.

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Military Organization of the Zulu: Strength of the Zulu Nation. <https://southafrica.co.za/military-organisation-of-the-zulu.html>. 2021

attacking, a common tactic was to feint with one horn, while the other concealed in the bush and long grass could sweep around unseen to surround the enemy. These tactics proved to be a decisive factor in the Zulu Kingdom's dramatic rise to power.

The internal political structure of the Kingdom changed dramatically during this time. When a regiment had accomplished a certain period of service to the king, which could be up to ten years, the king would decree that the members of a particular age-set could marry and sew headring⁸³. Thus further weakening traditional kingship ties and the powers of the elders in favour of his central authority.

One of the results of controlling the age at which men could marry was a balance in Zulu society between population growth and available resources. Shaka also resorted to violence to neutralize the powers of the Zulu sorcerers so that he alone would have a monopoly on magical practices. In addition, cowards in battle, kinsmen treating Shaka's mother badly, and anybody arbitrarily chosen by Shaka could be seized and killed. In 1828, three conspirators, two of whom were brothers of Shaka, stabbed him to death. Dingane, allegedly one of the assassins and a brother of Shaka, then allegedly murdered his fellow conspirators and became the King of the Zulu. However, there are different versions to how King Shaka died. A.T. Bryant questioned these accounts of the assassination of King Shaka, arguing that there was no European eyewitness to Shaka's death.⁸⁴

All accounts differed in details; some versions gave Mbopa as striking first and Mhlangana as administering the coup de grace. Some denied that Dingane took any hand in the actual assault, while others attributed him with the actual death stab. Some

⁸³ Military Organization of the Zulu: Strength of the Zulu Nation. <https://southafrica.co.za/military-organisation-of-the-zulu.html>. 2021

⁸⁴A.T. Bryant , *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Containing Earlier History of the Eastern-Nguni Clans* (London: Longman, 1929), Chapters 66 and 67 for a fuller Eurocentric discussion of the reign and the death of King Shaka

authors argue that Shaka was inside the cattle-fold, others outside; some, standing, others sitting.⁸⁵

3.5 The Reign of King Dingane ()

King Dingana's regiments were Dlambedu, Mtshamate and iNhlekane. Then, there were Izinyosi (formerly Ingcobinga) under King Shaka, Imvokwe, Imkhulutshane (or Indlavini), Ihlaba, Khokhothi and Insewane. After he had formed his own regiments, he devoted his time to the internal consolidation of his authority. Early in his reign, he was faced with challenges from several important factions who accused him of being responsible for the assassination of King Shaka. Based on oral traditions and testimonies, it is claimed that he killed almost all potential opponents including his siblings whom he suspected of disloyalty. This led to the unjustified claim that King Dingane was a weakling who was easily manipulated by his powerful paternal aunt, the Queen Regent Mkabayi.⁸⁶

But according to other isiZulu oral traditions and testimonies, the greatest threat to King Dingane's reign was posed by the arrival of white colonisers, settlers, missionaries and traders in great numbers compared to the period when King Shaka was in charge. Dingane was accused of being a savage barbarian and a cruel despot who killed his subjects for no apparent reason. Furthermore, it was claimed that these attributes later influenced his attitude towards white colonisers and settlers. But others maintain that until 1835, King Dingane was not hostile towards these white interlopers. Indeed, he went to great pains to court their presence and was consistent in the pursuit of this

⁸⁵ J. Pridmore, 'Henry Francis Fynn: An Assessment of his Career and an Analysis of the Written and Visual Portrayals of his Role in the History of the Natal Region', Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Natal, 1996, Chapter 7

⁸⁶ S. M Ndlovu. African Perspectives of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona: The Second Monarch of the Zulu Kingdom. 2017. P1

objective.

It was necessary for the Zulu monarch to adopt an accommodating, diplomatic stance because he coveted the white settlers' trade goods and technology, notably their muskets, which would enable him to revolutionize the method of warfare by adding a regiment of amabutho (warriors) armed with guns.⁸⁷

One of the positive images of King Dingane is that of a careful and practical statesman, a realist whose strength lays in governing his subjects through consensual political methods. From Tununu's oral testimony, we learn that '*uDingana wabusa ngesigodlo, nangompakathi, namabutho*' [Dingane ruled with grace of isigodhlo, subjects and amabutho]. His government functioned through consultation about serious matters of state such as abolishing Shaka's amabutho system and the land question. He held the land in trust for his subjects and in practice all land was distributed at his discretion.⁸⁸

King Dingane had prominent chief advisors and izinduna such as Ndlela ka Sompisi, Nzobo (Dambuza) and Hlambamanzi.⁸⁹ The latter, the king's perceptive political advisor, was instrumental in informing the king of the problems and the powers behind colonialism and settler capitalism, including the 'land question'. Hence, Tununu's assertion of the king as a person '*owabusa ngesigodhlo, namabutho nangomphakathi*', because he consulted their views.

The ambiguous role of both Ndlela and Nzobo (Dambuza) as part of the consultative

⁸⁷ S. M Ndlovu. African Perspectives of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona: The Second Monarch of the Zulu Kingdom. 2017. P2

⁸⁸ S. M Ndlovu. African Perspectives of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona: The Second Monarch of the Zulu Kingdom. 2017. P75

⁸⁹ On Hlambamazi see N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1936), 276–278.

and dynamic political arrangements by which King Dingane governed permeates both the oral traditions and izibongo. On one level, the king is depicted as an accessible 'democrat', always in consultation and governing with an appointed body of councillors. The council did not consist only of blood relatives but also of people such as Ndlela and Nzobo, who were selected for their particular leadership qualities.

Thus Sivivi describes imbizo, a formal gathering of umkhandhlu/ council held at King Dingane's royal court in the following terms:

"The people will meet the King in the cattle kraal enhla nenhla near the isigodhlo; esibayeni enkundhleni where the grass has been centa'd away. People would not come without this invitation or summons. This calling out took place every time Dingane wanted his umpakati. All matters, including proposed laws were discussed, the way in which Senzangakhona, Phunga and Mageba [did] ... the induna who says what the king states, to the umpakati was Ndhlela ... the word umKandhlu was the proper name for a council, the old Zulu word; but when Shaka came he brought with him the word umpakati which means the same thing ... no giyaing took place when affairs of state are discussed only when impi is xoxwad [discussed] ... Nzobo alias Dambuza kaSobadhli used to sit in the gate".⁹⁰

On another level, both his subjects and sworn enemies depicted King Dingane's belief in consultation and consensual politics as a form of weakness. They emphasized how reliant he was on his paternal aunt, the Regent Mnkabayi,⁹¹ and on his two principal advisors and izinduna Nzobo and Ndlela.⁹² Jantshi recalled that: Dingana said,

⁹⁰ JSA, KCM 24320, Testimony of Sivivi.

⁹¹ JSA, KCM 24317, Testimony of Ngidi; JSA, KCM 24220, Testimony of Socwatsha

⁹² C. de B. Webb and J. Wright eds., The James Stuart Archive of Recorded

*“I do not want an isigodhlo. That is what is destroying the people’. Nzobo said, ‘You can’t be called a king if you have no isigodhlo. How, without one, can you be a king?’ Dingana replied, ‘It is the isigodhlo that is the cause of people always being pushed to death. It is a bad institution.’ Nzobo said: ‘the killing of people is a proper practice, for if no killing is done there will be no fear.’ Dingana then concurred and the isigodhlo continued to exist”.*⁹³

King Dingane was the first Zulu monarch to be confronted by the destabilising threat of white settler colonialists and imperialists arriving in large numbers. According to amaZulu, this era marked the beginning of invasion and land dispossession; it had to be resisted at all costs. The king found it difficult to maintain the essentially peaceful relations which his predecessor, King Shaka, had established with white invaders and their African wards. Moreover, the arrival of the armed Voortrekkers was also perceived as a threat by the king who soon faced a belligerent united front comprising Voortrekkers and white imperialists scrambling for land belonging to the indigenous population.⁹⁴

King Dingane objected vehemently to their trading, hunting and settling without his permission—and of their reluctance to supply him with firearms. He understood the power and technological advantages represented by the possession of guns. As a result, there were a number of battles between the king and white colonisers. These confrontations were driven by the ideological myth postulating that land in South Africa had been ‘empty’ before the arrival of white settlers and colonialists. This Eurocentric myth was a key rationale for colonial domination, and it stirred the king’s persistent

Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighboring Peoples, Volume 1, testimony of Lunguza, 330; and Testimony of Jantshi, 196.

⁹³ bid.

⁹⁴ Cubbin A.E :The English Alliance with the Voortrekkers against the Zulus during March and April 1838, in *Historia*, 38, 2 (1988).

resistance to white rule and domination.⁹⁵ The reign of the Zulu king was also marked by the arrival in numbers of white missionaries from the American Board.

They included, among others, Daniel Lindley, George Champion, Aldin Grout and Frederick Owen of the Church Missionary Society who lived in close proximity to UMgungundlovu and had an amicable working relationship with the king. This was because King Dingane understood all too well the meaning and power of literacy as an ideological tool used by missionaries to subjugate Africans. The missionaries had to quickly learn to speak isiZulu in order to use this language as a tool for implementing cultural imperialism. According to Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, the supremacy of the whites, their values and civilisation, was only won when the culture and the value system of the defeated Africans were reduced to nothing and when the Africans themselves loudly admitted the cultural hegemony of their conquerors.⁹⁶

King Dingane tried to employ strategies to counter the threat posed by white settlers by sending some of his subjects to acquire relevant knowledge, such as technological knowledge as well as craft and material culture from them. These efforts are discussed in the oral testimonies collected by Stuart. As an example, King Dingane sent Tununu with a team of two men and seven women to Reverend Grout of the American Board Mission to learn about guns and how to sew clothes. The king gave the girls strict instructions to avoid lessons on Christianity while at the mission school:

⁹⁵See Ngoza kaLudaba, *Eyewitness Accounts in the Church of England Mission, Izindatyana zabantu: kanye nezindaba zaseNatal* (Bishopstowe: no publisher, 1858). Ngoza was a participant in all the confrontations and points out that King Dingane won at UMgungundlovu where he outmanoeuvred Piet Retief and his party. The Zulu warriors also prevailed at emTyezi, eTaleneni and oThukela, where King Dingane's regiments beat a united front between the Boers and the English settlers. Ngoza asserts that they were also victors at emaGabeni (oPate) after Bhongoza kaNgcobo, the Zulu king's intelligence officer, had led the Voortrekkers into an ambush immediately after the battle at iNcome. See also Cubbin, 'The English Alliance with the Voortrekkers'.

⁹⁶ B.M. Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*, 55.

“I was sent by Dingana [together with] two boys, seven girls at esigodhlweni to Rev. Grout at Mvoti in order to learn the use of the gun and also how to drive a wagon whilst the girls were to learn to sew clothes ... The girls were not to learn Christianity etc. ...”⁹⁷

King Dingane created a plan to get rid of Piet Retief, the leader of Voortrekkers after their arrival in Natal in 1837. King Dingane invited Piet Retief and his people to a dance in the cattle kraal and instructed them not to bring any weapons as the Zulu’s would not bring any spears but just knobkerries. The Boers indeed left their guns outside the palace as instructed and during the dance they were ambushed and attacked with the knobkerries. The Boers were taken to a hill of Matiwane and they were all killed there. The Boers that remained at Mzinyathi were also killed and the King’s stolen cattle was brought back to him

This pre-emptive strike however was not successful. The trekkers received reinforcement and defeated the Zulu at the battle of Blood river in 16 December 1838. Dingane however was not overthrown by this action. A peace was patched up whereby the Thukela became the boundary between the Zulu kingdom and the republic of Natalia. In terms of Eurocentric historiography, in 1847 U.G. Louts of the Netherlands was the first white scholar to publish a book on the Voortrekkers. He ascribed the victory at ‘Blood River’ to the superior weapons possessed by white emigrants. He was also firmly convinced that ‘God in His almighty wisdom had destined and elected them to bring Civilisation and implant it among ignorant pagans [Africans]’.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ JSA, KCM 24258, Testimony of Tununu, 60. See also J. Guy, ‘Making Words Visible: Aspects of Orality, Literacy, Illiteracy and History in Southern Africa’, *South African Historical Journal*, 31 (1994) 3–27; and J. Guy, ‘King Shaka kaSenzangakhona: A Reassessment’, *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, 16 (1996), 1–30.

⁹⁸ Van Jaarsveld, ‘A Historical Mirror of Blood River’, 9–11. The author was violently abused by right-wing Afrikaners after he presented the conference paper, which questioned several myths linked to the ‘Battle of Blood River’. The conference about the battle was held at the University of South Africa, 28–30 March 1979. P23

Dingana's rule clearly shows the extent to which the regime of Shaka had profoundly affected and changed the Zulu political order. While Dingane initially promised to restore peace and happiness in the country, and the Zulu people were referring to him as their liberator. The system of terror was quickly restored. The death of Shaka had brought about a weakening of central political order. The different tribes that had unified under his rule now sought to remove themselves from Zulu authority.

To keep the Kingdom united, Dingane saw no other way but to resort to the methods of violence instituted during Shaka's reign. The renewed terror made relations with the neighboring Europeans increasingly turbulent. During Shaka's regime, the British and the Boer settlers in the area had not interfered with Zulu rule, largely because they could not stand up to the military might of Shaka's army. As the European presence grew stronger and the economic advantages of trade with the Zulu decreased, the autonomy of Zulu political developments was affected. Dingana's brother Mpande joined the Europeans and united in the military force, in 1839 Mpande with thousands of his followers, defected to the trekkers. He succeeded in winning their confidence and support and a concerted invasion of Zululand resulted in the defeat of Dingane⁹⁹.

3.6 The Era of King Mpande ()

King Mpande ruled at a time when the development of new institutions of new institutions of domination, notably the amabutho, facilitated the emergence of a form of centralised authority and gave to chiefs a new coercive capacity. Unlike his progenitors, Mpande waged few wars abroad. The style of his military expeditions, however, resembled that of his predecessors. After his campaigns a re-vitalization of the Shakan amabutho

⁹⁹R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P14

control system took place. New amakhanda were built and occupied by the amabutho, including a harem around his isigodlo (palace) at Nodwengu.¹⁰⁰

King Mpande's system of regiments was a key aspect of state formation in south-east Africa. The dominance of the Zulu ruling group was closely associated with its control over the amabutho. Military units of Shaka, Dingane and Mpande were initially based at Esiklebheni or at Nobamba military imizi. Esiklebheni assumed the significance and ideological weight of an ancestral establishment, and became an evocative and sacred site.¹⁰¹ It was at Esiklebheni and Nobamba that the new recruits to the Zulu army spent the first period of their training. These establishments reoriented new recruits towards the idea of a Zulu nation united under a Zulu king.

3.6.1 Mpande's Relations with the Republic of Natalia

The Voortrekkers crossed the Drakensberg (Khahlamba) and arrived in KwaZulu Natal in late 1837 and settled in the upper Thukela basin. There followed two years of uncertainty while they attempted to the Zulus and gain recognition for the occupation.¹⁰² During this period the condition of the country was unsettled and the Voortrekkers tended to congregate in central laagers in times of hostilities.¹⁰³ After the battle of Blood (Ncome) River in December 1838, however, more widely spread Voortrekker settlement was considered possible in much of the region south of the Thukela River.

Relations between Mpande and the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia had its origin on 15 October 1839 when Mpande met the Voortrekker leaders on the banks of Thukela

¹⁰⁰ B. Wright and DR Edgecombe: "Mpande ka Senzangakhona — 1798 — 1872". C.C. Saunders: Black leaders in Southern African History, pp. 52 — 54.

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² Beall et al: Conceptualising Natal — implications of a regional political economy, pp. 1 — 5.

¹⁰³ H. Stander: "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, pp. 213-215

River.¹⁰⁴ The first Voortrekker he met was Johan Hendrik (Hans Dons) de Lange who was hunting for the hippopotamus (izimvubu) on the banks of Thukela.¹⁰⁵ De Lange informed the Volksraad, the supreme executive and legislative authority in the Republic, about Mpande's presence and loyalty to the Voortrekkers.¹⁰⁶ Some of the Voortrekker officials were not convinced and suggested that he be assassinated. This did not materialize, probably due to the numerical preponderance of Mpande's adherents (about 17 000) and large numbers of cattle (about 25 000).¹⁰⁷

The leader of the Volksraad, A.W.J (Andries) Pretorius, engaged in cordial conversation with Mpande. He was aware that king Dingane (Mpande's half-brother) had suffered defeat against the Swazi and that Mpande had refused to help him raise new reinforcements. Thus, Mpande's presence before the Volksraad was based on his request to be left alone to settle between Mhlali and Mvoti Rivers" wqLen asked why he did not rule the Zulu nation after the death of king Shaka, he replied:

"I was heading a punitive expedition against chief Soshangane. On my return I found Dingane in power, having killed Shaka and all children of the harem".¹⁰⁸

Pretorius realized that declaring Voortrekker friendship with Mpande would ensure their security against a possible Zulu invasion from north of Thukela.¹⁰⁹ Such declaration laid the foundation for the battle of Maqongqo hills which took place on 29 January 1840. In

¹⁰⁴ Resolution of the Volksraad, 2 August 1841, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 644-5

¹⁰⁵ R.RR Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 30.

¹⁰⁶ Napier to Glenelg, 30 November 183, Bird- L Annals of Natal, pp. 4234

¹⁰⁷ M-N'L Fuze: Abantu Abamvama, p. 31; H. Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, pp. 215-18.

¹⁰⁸ RRR Dhlomo: Umpande kaSenzangakhona, pp. 31 — 38.

¹⁰⁹ Napier to Glenelg, 30 November 1839,-Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 316-7. J. Stuart: (Incwadi Yezindaba za Bantu ba KvaZulu, naba se Natal), pp. 7— 10.

that war Dingane's regiments were completely crushed by those of Mpande. It is imperative to state that while Mpande had entered into a military alliance with Andries Pretorius against Dingane, his army led by Nongalaza ka Nondela Mnyandu fought those of Dingane, led by Ndlela ka Sompisi Ntuli without any Voortrekker military involvement.¹¹⁰ Before the two powerful factions converged at Maqongqo, Dingane heard of the alliance and sent two unarmed emissaries, Dambuza (alias Nzobo) Ntombela and Sikhombazana to Andries Pretorius.¹¹¹

Their mission was to conclude a peace treaty with the Voortrekkers. After a strict hearing the Voortrekkers captured and killed them.¹¹² They were pointed out by Mpande's adherents as the main instigators responsible for the murders on Retief and at Bloukrans and Moordspruit during the reign of Dingane.¹¹³ The killing of Dambuza and Sikhombazana was something unequalled in European legal or Western diplomatic terms. They were unarmed emissaries whose mission was to conclude a truce. In Western society, killing emissaries constituted a criminal act (though not necessarily leading to prosecution).¹¹⁴ Emissaries facilitated communication between two combatants and in African tradition such killings were viewed as cowardice. On the other hand Stander argued that the main prosecutor was Mpande himself who was part of the court martial, named on 31 January 1840 near the Black Mfolozi (iMfolozi eMnyama) River.¹¹⁵

Dambuza admitted guilt on all charges and in the light of all evidence, the military court resolved to execute both emissaries, as there could only be more murders should they

¹¹⁰ R.RR Dhlomo: Umpande ka Senzangakhona, p. 39.

¹¹¹ H. Stander. Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 257.

¹¹² 76 A-J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia. Cf Archives Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1942, pp. 145 — 146

¹¹³ De Zuid Afrikaan, byvoegsel 10 April 1840. dagverhaal, 22 — 31 January 1840, p. 5.

¹¹⁴ RR Dhlomo: U Dingane Ka Senzangakhona, p. 34.

¹¹⁵ H. Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 256.

go back and advise Dingane.¹¹⁶ The Voortrekker forces of Pretorius were on the banks of the Black Mfolozi when they heard that Mpande had defeated Dingane at Maqongqo.¹¹⁷ After a protracted battle at Maqongqo, Pretorius and some members of the Volksraad arranged a meeting with Mpande. On 5 February 1840, five days before the meeting, Mpande was installed as king of the Zulu nation in accordance with Zulu tradition.¹¹⁸ This was done in the presence of the most powerful chiefs in KwaZulu, Klwana Buthelezi and Maphitha ka Sojiyisa. They pledged their loyalty and support to the new Zulu king.¹¹⁹

Andries Pretorius met Mpande again on 10 February 1840 at Pietermaritzburg and appointed him as king.¹²⁰ The fact that Mpande had already been crowned king by the Zulu people on 5 February 1840 was relegated to the background. Mpande was persuaded to take an oath before the Volksraad, acknowledging the supremacy of the Volksraad, undertaking to rule KwaZulu in peace and maintaining cordial relations with the Voortrekkers.¹²¹ Mpande was then honored with a praise name, "*Prince of the Emigrant Zulus*"

Mpande was made king of the Zulu's, under trekker sovereign. The trekkers, who had taken no part in the actual fighting in the Battle of Blood River, collected 30 000 cattle and claimed in addition that Mpande owed them a large sum in 'war expenses'. In lieu of this sum, the land between the Black Mfolozi and the Thukela was added to the Republic of Natalia. King Mpande's coronation by the Boers signaled the beginning of a new era for the Zulu nation. Never before had a Zulu King been appointed to the throne

¹¹⁶ G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius p. 125; A-J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia. Cf. Archives Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1942, p. 145.

¹¹⁷ H. Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 256.

¹¹⁸ Minutes of the Natal Volksraad, 15 October 1840, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 536 — 539.

¹¹⁹ R. Cope- The Zulu Kingdom. 1824 — 1879. pp. 2 10: R.RR. Dhloho: UMpande ka Senzangakhona, p. 31

¹²⁰ H. Stander. Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 256.

¹²¹ R.J. Mann: The Zulus and Boers of South Africa — a fragment of recent history, pp. 40 — 44.

by foreigners. This was done intentionally by the Boers to destroy the Zulu kingdom which King Shaka had built so triumphantly by spear and bloodshed. The Zulu's had a long tradition when appointing their Kings. These traditions were set aside when Prince Mpande was made king by the Boers, a practice which still continues today. The last proper traditional coronation of Zulu king was performed when king Dingana ascended the throne.

King Mpande's son's Prince Cetshwayo and Prince Mbuyazi were both born in 1830. These princes belonged to the same regiment, uThulwana or amaMboza. Prince Cetshwayo was the son of the first Queen of King Mpande, Queen Ngqumbazi. The king had also indicated that Prince Cetshwayo was his Heir, in that he went as far as registering him as his heir with the whites. The whites then said that because the Zulu's had conflicts over the throne, Cetshwayo would be cut on the ear as a way to easily distinguish the princes from one another. The second queen, Queen Monase became King Mpande's favorite amongst the Queens. The King found it difficult to hide his affection for her as a result the King became fonder of Prince Mbuyazi who was the son of the Queen Monase than of Prince Cetshwayo. This caused deep concern among the chiefs of the land. Prince Maphitha had been given the responsibility of raising the heir to the throne, that being Prince Cetshwayo. He discussed the issue with Prime Minister Msiphula, asking him to warn the King about causing conflict amongst the sons since he knew who the rightful heir was.

They discussed this with the king, who did not seem to give the matter his attention. When they realized that the King was not listening to their warning, they reported the issue to his council which also failed to convince him. The King responded by saying, "The bull is amongst the calves- a king appoints himself in the Zulu Kingdom". When Prince Cetshwayo realised that King Mpande wished to appoint Prince Mthonga as his successor he sent troops to assassinate him at his home, Ndumezulu. Bhejane of

Nomageje of the Khoza together with Mnyakanya of Madondo Xulu led the troops.

By the mid-1850s Cetshwayo was approaching the age of thirty, and, like most heirs, was becoming impatient to obtain his inheritance. Like eighteenth century Princes of Wales, he and his cause became a rallying point for dissidents of all kinds - not only territorial chiefs and their followers who hoped for greater autonomy under a young and untried King, but also younger men who, impatient with the military inactivity of the latter part of Mpande's reign, hoped for glory and booty under a more active young King.

By this time Mpande's eldest sons had established separate residences of their own. As Mpande grew old and sickly (though he was not in the event to die until 1872) so the attraction of the reversionary interest became stronger. The separate princely residences became separate courts - it became possible to perform one's service for a prince instead of for the King. Control of the amabutho was slipping out of the King's grasp. In these circumstances the best that Mpande could do was to keep the opposition divided. Of all the princes, Cetshwayo had the most support. Mpande therefore conferred marks of favour on Cetshwayo's chief rival, Mbuyazi, and urged his other sons to support him. In this way the Zulu kingdom became divided between two great factions, the uSuthu of Cetshwayo and the iziGqoza of Mbuyazi.

In October of 1872 Mpande died of the infirmities of age — the last of Senzangakona's sons and the only one of the twelve who reached maturity to die peacefully in his own kraal. The last years of his life had been fruitful ones for the nation, and the old monarch in his lassitude had been granted affection if not respect. A peace of 32 years had been broken only by the fight at 'Ndondakusuka, the kraals were flourishing, and the cattle had long since made good the losses from the Boer depredations. All the men between twenty and sixty years of age were enrolled in regiments which could be mobilized in a

few days, and the nation was more powerful than it had ever been before.¹²²

3.6.2 Mpande's Ties with the British at Port Natal

The relations that existed between king Mpande and the British colonial establishment at Natal were not strange to the Zulu royal harem and the kingdom in general. The first penetration of the Zulu state by forces of colonialism was through the agency of traders, missionaries and hunters in 1824. Trade, however, did not fundamentally disrupt the economic and social organization of the kingdom.¹²³ This remained so despite the fact that the area in which Zulu kings continued to rule was later reduced first by Voortrekkers and then by the British occupation south of the Thukela River.¹²⁴

Then the first British traders landed at Port Natal in 1824, king Shaka had already established his frontier to south of the Mvoti River and had built a military homestead (ikhanda) or outpost there, at a spot still referred to as "*Shaka's Kraal*".¹²⁵ Through presents and messengers the British settler leaders, Lieutenant George Farewell, Lieutenant Henry King and Mr H. Francis Fynn, entered into negotiations with Shaka to obtain permission to establish a trading station at the landing place.¹²⁶ It could be mentioned that presents of marvelous objects (e.g. mirrors, earrings, bracelets) had a subtle power, which no Zulu king could withstand, and Shaka accepted them and at times turned a blind eye on the actions of the traders.

Dingane, Shaka's immediate successor had quasi-friendly relations with the British.

¹²² D.R. Morris, 1966. *The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Kingdom*. P200

¹²³ J. Beall et al: *Conceptualizing Natal — implications of a regional political economy*, pp. 1 - 3

¹²⁴ B.P.P: *Statement by Gardiner*. 9 and 11 1836, Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines, session 4 February to 20 August 1836, printed for Parliament. 1836- viipp. 461 -73.

¹²⁵ R.J. Mann: *The Zulus and Boers of South Africa — a centofrecenthisto* , p. 17.

¹²⁶ Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 September 1836: Gardiner to Smith. Cape 8 March 1837, Bird- L *Annals of Natal*, p. 313

After the assassination of Shaka in 1828, he sent emissaries to the British at Natal to announce his succession to the Zulu throne.¹²⁷ The British local leaders at Natal showed scant recognition of the position of the Zulu potentate. The British also disobeyed Dingane's summons to Henry Francis Fynn to advise him on a contemplated military expedition against the Swazi kingdom northeast of his domains: Hostility toward Colonial establishments, however, was always a characteristic feature of Dingane's reign¹²⁸. The wars he launched led to the social dislocation of some clans and refugees increased, seeking a haven in inaccessible areas. A substantial number of these were increased by traders, missionaries and hunters at Natal.¹²⁹

Mpande was devoid of the aptitude for martial exercises which manifested in Shaka and Dingane. Then the British colonial establishment superseded that of the Voortrekkers, Mpande extended a hand of friendship to the local British settlers.¹³⁰ Such ties, however, led to conflict between the British and Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia. In 1840, Mpande permitted the Voortrekkers to occupy the area between the Thukela and Black Mfolozi Rivers while concluding a boundary agreement with the British, stretching from the sources of Mzinyathi to its junction with the Thukela.¹³¹ These terms were influenced by the flow of Zulu refugees and the increasing power of Mpande.

Following such gestures the British Commissioner Henry Cloete later entered KwaZulu with traders D.C. Toohey and Henry Ogle to convince Mpande that the British had established complete control of the Colony of Natal.¹³² Mpande pledged to resettle all Zulus living south of the boundary in KwaZulu after the harvest. In return, Cloete

¹²⁷C-0.48/483: Minutes, regarding Frere to Carnarvon- secret and confidential, 21 July 1877.

¹²⁸ N.A.: Herbert to Shepstone (private), 6 December 1887, Shepstone Papers Vol 25: C.O. 879/13/150: Hicks Beach to Shepstone- Confidential, 13 March 1878.

¹²⁹ A. de V. Minnaar: Conflict and Violence in NataVKwaZulu-historical perspectives

¹³⁰ R. RR Dhlomo: Umeagde Ka Senzangakhona, pp. 80-98.

¹³¹ Report of the LanddrGst of Thukela- October 1839. Bird. I. Annals of Natal, 1497 — 1845, pp. 2534

¹³² Dispatch of the Secretary of State, 25 May 1844. Bird- I. Annals of Natal, 1888, p.533

promised to discourage the flow of refugees, return renegade cattle, but not refugees themselves.¹³³ This alarmed the Volksraad of the Republic of Natalia. It feared the return of British rule over the Voortrekkers. Thus, on 14 February 1840 Andries Wilhelmus Pretorius, then President of the Volksraad wrote to the British governor at the Cape, Sir George Napier laying claim to Natal:

"Whereas the Volksraad of the South African society, on account of the unprovoked war which the Zulu king, or Zulu nation, has commenced against the South African society was compelled to incur an expense of Rds. 122 600 for horse and wagon hire, and other expenses of war: and whereas the Zulu king, according to all appearance and information, has deserted his territory and crossed the Pongola, I do hereby declare and make known, that in the name of the said Volksraad of the South African society, I seize all the land from the Thukela to the Black Umvaloos, where it runs through the Double Mountains near to where it originates, as so along the Randberg (the ridges) in the same direction to the Drakensberg (or kwahlamba Mountains), including the St. Lucia Bay. This created unfriendly relations between the Volksraad and the British, especially because Mpande had given permission to the British to control St. Lucia Bay".¹³⁴

This created unfriendly relations between the Volksraad and the British, especially because Mpande had given permission to the British to control St. Lucia Bay.

3.7 The Advent of Cetshwayo

¹³³ Two treaties, both 5 October 1843, *Ibid.*, II, p 293; Cloete to Montagu, 23 & 29 October 1843, *Ibid.*, II, pp. 290-9, 301-3.

¹³⁴ V.C. Malherbe: *What They Said, 1795-1910 History Documents*. p. 68; Zietsman to Zuid Afrikaan, 5 January 1841, *Bird. I. Annals of Natal*, p 623.

Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's Secretary for Native Affairs, had long aspired to bring Zululand under British control. When King Mpande died, Prince Cetshwayo, was anxious for British support against rival claimants, and against the South African Republic, with which he had a border dispute. Shepstone came to Zululand in 1861 to proclaim Cetshwayo the heir. Cetshwayo then invited Shepstone to preside over a ceremony recognizing him as King. Shepstone's hopes that his 'coronation' of Cetshwayo would lead to greater control over Zululand were disappointed, but it did serve as a precedent for British intervention¹³⁵.

Cetshwayo was also hoping that Shepstone's involvement would enhance his position in the eyes of the British authorities, but Shepstone was actually enhancing his own status and prestige by associating himself with the king¹³⁶. After crowning Cetshwayo, Shepstone opined that Zululand was not a place favorable for missionary operations. Cetshwayo and the Zulu kings before him held a view that religion was competing with their authority over their Zulu subjects. Missionaries were facing a dilemma. They persuaded Zulu converts to remain loyal to the kings without success. The converts argued that one person cannot be a subject of two kings therefore on becoming a convert the Zulus denounced their king immediately. Cetshwayo expelled some of the missionaries, some left Zululand on their own accord and a few remained in the territory¹³⁷.

The news of Shepstone going to Zululand to crown a king brought some hope that conditions might improve for missionary work to resume. His knowledge and influence over Africans both in Natal and beyond borders made him seem dispensable. His opinion acquired great weight. However, Shepstone returned to Natal with the bad news

¹³⁵ C.T. Binns. *The Last Zulu King: The Life and Death of Cetshwayo*, London: Longman

¹³⁶ www.sahistory.org.za

¹³⁷ www.britannica.com

that religious conversion was still forbidden in Zululand. Missionaries became advocates of invasion of Zululand.

As a result, they were ready to cooperate with Bartle Frere, even the Norwegian missionaries who detested British imperialism began to see invasion as a solution. When Frere was looking for information to justify the war against the Zulus he found the missionaries ready to cooperate. It was against this background that Robertson, one of the Missionaries in Zululand actively participated in the spreading of propaganda against Cetshwayo in the process of justifying the invasion¹³⁸.

In the four years after the battle of Ndongakusuka, the conflict between Mpande and Cetshwayo took the form of competition to gain the support of the Natal government. In the course of this they both emphasized their loyalty and obedience to the British¹³⁹. It seemed to Shepstone a favourable opportunity to extend greater control over Zululand. Since the conflict within the Zulu kingdom might provide the Z.A.R with a similar opportunity, it also made it more necessary.

Another reason for intervention in the Zulu kingdom was that the continuing conflict there was sending waves of refugees into Natal and threatening itself to spill across the border. Shepstone was not convinced by Cetshwayo's protestations of loyalty to Natal. Mpande was not expected to live long. It seemed to be in Natal's best interests to ensure that the King had a more complaisant successor than Cetshwayo was likely to be once he gained control of the Kingdom.

After the Battle of Ndongakusuka, Mpande's sons who were not aligned to Cetshwayo were exiled to Natal and Transvaal. Prince Mkhungo was one such son who went to Natal

¹³⁸www.Zulu-Culture.co.za

¹³⁹ R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P.22

and Shepstone took him to Bishop Colenso so that he could be groomed for future use. Colenso was heard on various occasions boasting of having a Zulu king under his roof. Colenso and Shepstone were plotting against Cetshwayo and pretended to be his friends. As a diplomatic agent Shepstone was supposed to be promoting good relations between the Africans and Europeans. On the contrary he created policies that kept the two groups apart and he used the Africans to enhance his reputation with the Europeans¹⁴⁰.

These policies were Shepstone's system of indirect rule through chiefs, the cognition of customary law and the establishment of reserves. These policies very largely imposed on Shepstone by the Colonial Office as the cheapest way of maintaining control. The establishment of this system of indirect rule required a considerable extent that tribes become constructed and chiefs had to be appointed to rule them. The degree of Shepstone's success in carrying out this task was measured by the internal peace which prevailed in the nineteenth century in Natal despite how small the white population, the civil service and the garrison was.

It was widely believed both in Natal and Zululand that Mkhungo was being groomed to succeed to the Zulu throne. This belief was probably correct. Shepstone apparently left no record of such an intention¹⁴¹. However, Colenso was less discreet, he repeatedly described Mkhungo as Mpande's rightful heir. Shepstone knew that the imperial government and the High Commissioner, Sir George Grey were opposed to the Natal government's becoming entangled in Zulu politics. The proposal that Bishop Colenso should resign his sit and become Bishop of a new diocese of Zululand was in part a covert attempt to establish a Natal presence in Zululand in the interests of Colenso's

¹⁴⁰ Biography of Cetshwayo ka Mpande, the Last King of an Independent Zulu Nation (1872-1879). Africanhistory.about.com

¹⁴¹ G.B. Nourse. The Zulu Invasion Scare of 1861 (M.A thesis, University of Natal, 1949) pp.35-36

protégé Mkhungo¹⁴².

Colenso told his metropolitan that he felt “a strong call within my heart for that work”, but he added that “the Providence of God, in bringing Panda’s son and intended heir, uMkhungo under my charge appear to have given me an external call which I cannot neglect”. Shepstone himself even considered resigning his position and accompanying Colenso to Zululand, it was hoped that he would be accompanied by a lot of natives from Natal. The scheme was in fact a revival of their earlier scheme for the area South of Mzimkhulu so that as Colenso said, “that migration wd. Then take place to the N.E of this colony, which was to have gone to the S.W”¹⁴³

Colenso’s visit to Zululand in September and October 1859 forced a drastic modification of this visionary scheme. Colenso discovered that “*the whole strength of the Nation lies with Ketchwayo*”. It would he concluded be “absurd” to support Mkhungo. He however still wished to establish a Zulu mission. His efforts he said would now be directed “to try to bring the King to acquiesce in the wish of the Nation”. With Cetshwayo made King with British support “much may be done, under God for the advancement of the whole Zulu people”¹⁴⁴.

Nevertheless, Colenso was as reluctant to abandon his protégé as Shepstone was to abandon what he had supposed to be his trump card. In August 1860 Colenso was still hoping that Mkhungo might be restored “by God’s providence to a position of authority among his people.”¹⁴⁵ In September 1860 Sir George Grey visited Natal, and after conferring with Shepstone, produced a plan for the partition of Zululand between Cetshwayo, Mkhungo and Shepstone. Shepstone was to have his ‘safety-valve’ in which

¹⁴² R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P.23

¹⁴³ U.W.L. Selected Records of the Archbishop of Cape Town, Ba3, Colenso to Gray, 8 June 1859

¹⁴⁴ P.Kennedy, 1976. Fatal Diplomacy: Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the Zulu Kings, 1839-1879 . p.182

¹⁴⁵ U.W.L., Selected Records of the Archbishop of Cape Town, Ba 3, Colenso to Gray, Aug 1860 [sic]

the majority of Natal's African population was to be resettled and governed by him while Cetshwayo and Mkhungo were to govern their portions of Zululand with the assistance of British officers, and thus come affectively under Natal's control.

Grey's uncharacteristic support for Shepstone's ambitions in Zululand was intended as the quid pro quo for Natal's acquiescence in the High Commissioner's plans to extend the Cape's frontier to the Mzimkhulu, thus annexing territory which Faku, the Mpondo Chief had ceded to Natal. Lieutenant-Governor Scott of Natal, however refused to acquiesce in this and was supported by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, withdrew his support from Shepstone's plans.

By the time these diplomatic maneuverings had worked themselves out, the plan for partition had already been overtaken by events in Zululand. News of the plan to partition Zululand leaked out to the newspapers¹⁴⁶, and soon reached Cetshwayo's ears. He sent an alarmed message to Shepstone in January 1861, asking if it were true that he intended attempting to negotiate a cession of part of Zululand and seizing it by force of arms if negotiations failed. Shepstone denied contemplating the use of force but still at that stage confident of Grey's support confirmed his desire to negotiate the cession of part of Zululand to provide for the wants of the natives in the Colony. This can have done little to reassure Cetshwayo.

In March another shock followed. Cetshwayo learned of Mpande's plan to nominate a younger son Mthonga, son of Nomantshalia as his heir. Cetshwayo contemplated fleeing to Natal,¹⁴⁷ but in the event took sterner action. Nomatshali was put to death. Mthonga, with a brother and two izinduna, succeeded in escaping to the Boers of Utrecht. Cetshwayo followed with an armed force, but did not cross into the Utrecht

¹⁴⁶ P.Kennedy, 1976. Fatal Diplomacy Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the Zulu Kings, 1839-1879.p.187

¹⁴⁷ R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P.25

district. He kept Shepstone informed of his movements and again requested his mediation.¹⁴⁸ But Shepstone learned independently that Cetshwayo had succeeded in recovering Mthonga.¹⁴⁹

3.7.1 Cetshwayo's nomination as heir

It was probably this apparent evidence of collaboration between the Transvaal Boers and Cetshwayo coming on top of the withdrawal of Grey's support or his more ambitious schemes, that persuaded Shepstone to abandon Mkhungo and throw the full weight of the Natal Government behind Cetshwayo. He may also have heard that the Z.A.R, which had formerly supported Mpande, had decided to back Cetshwayo instead¹⁵⁰. It would be disastrous for Natal if Cetshwayo became King with the support of the Z.A.R. and despite the opposition of Natal. Without the permission of the High Commissioner or the Secretary of State, Shepstone belatedly but hastily responded to Mpande's and Cetshwayo's four years of requests for mediation. His instructions from Lieutenant-Governor Scott were to 'induce Panda to follow what is evidently the wish of his people, and to declare Cetshwayo his heir'¹⁵¹

Shepstone's reception in Zululand was unfriendly.¹⁵² Mpande was much opposed to Cetshwayo being nominated as heir. He spoke fondly of his sons in exile, describing them as "the seed which a wise man wishes kept until the sowing time arrives". But since he believed that his position and even his life depends on the Natal government's support, and since Shepstone now demanded that he should name Cetshwayo his heir, he had no option but to comply. Cetshwayo received his nomination most ungraciously. He

¹⁴⁸ S.N.A. 1/6/3, memo by Shepstone, 30 March 1861

¹⁴⁹ Kennedy, *Fatal Diplomacy*, p.190

¹⁵⁰ D.C McGill. *A History of the Transvaal (1853-1864) with a New Interpretation of the Transvaal-Zulu Relations which Culminated in the Zulu War off 1879* (Ph.D. thesis University of Cape Town, 1943) pp.257-8

¹⁵¹ S.N.A. 1/6/3, no 246, Scott to Shepstone, 15 April 1861

¹⁵² *Ibid*

seems to have regarded Shepstone's belated patronage as Dr. Johnson did Lord Chesterfield's as the action of one who "looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the water, when he has reached ground, encumbers him with help"¹⁵³

The nomination ceremony was one of a fiasco, and nearly a disaster. Cetshwayo at first refused to attend, and when he was eventually prevailed upon to do so he arrived with a bodyguard of 5000 men. Shepstone noticed that each had a single assegai, reserved to conceal the blade in his small travelling shield. Heralds proclaimed Cetshwayo as heir and Commander-in-Chief of the army (and thus the real ruler of the country). They then turned to Shepstone and demanded in the name of the Zulu nation, the return of Mkhungo and Sikhotha. Only their return would restore peace and quiet to the Zulu Kingdom.

They declared for as long as they remained in the colony the constant rumors of the Natal government's intentions regarding them would cause apprehension and unsettlement. Shepstone agreed to convey this request to the Natal government but gave no hopes of a compliance with it. A long and acrimonious argument then ensued. Tempers were inflamed by the action of Ngoza, Shepstone's induna, who without permission had entered the isigodlo (the women's quarters) of Mpande's residence. This in itself was a gross breach of etiquette, but it had political implications as well.

Ngoza was the guardian of Monase and her two sons, Mkhungo and Sikhotha and he had entered the isigodlo to communicate with Monase's daughters. Cetshwayo and his supporters declared that it was this constant exchange of messages between the natal and Zululand branches of the family that kept up a continual ferment about the Natal government's intentions and made it imperative that Mkhungo and Sikhotha should be returned. There were clamorous demands that Ngoza should answer for himself. Shepstone refused to allow him to do so, and was insulted and according to one eye

¹⁵³ S.N.A. 1/6/3, no 246, Scott to Shepstone, 15 April 1861

witness¹⁵⁴ spat at, by Cetshwayo. Shepstone believed that if he had not firmly resisted the demand that Ngoza should answer for himself, the meeting might have had a very serious termination.

According to Shepstone, Cetshwayo apologized the next day for the intemperance of the meeting but Shepstone was clearly not mollified by this. His description of Mpande's attitude towards the nomination of Cetshwayo was equally true of his own, he "*was induced by the force of circumstances alone to appoint Cetshwayo his successor, he strongly deprecated the necessity, although he succumbed to it and fervently hopes that this appointment may prove nullity*"¹⁵⁵.

Shepstone returned to Natal in a black mood. In his confidential report to Lieutenant-Governor Scott he described Cetshwayo as:

*"exceedingly intelligent and energetic...but particularly restless and impatient of restraint or contradiction. He was surrounded by men as Councilors of a similar stamp, and I am inclined to the opinion that he will become sooner or later, a troublesome neighbor. He is at present the terror of the whole country, and surrounded as he constantly is by a strong force of young restless men. There is no guarantee for moderation or prudence to be hoped for"*¹⁵⁶

Mpande and the older men of Zululand were, said Shepstone "*thoroughly loyal to the Natal government, but at present all is overcome by the will and caprice of this young man*". It seemed to Shepstone that Cetshwayo was willing to carry on a sort of political dalliance, with either the Boers or Mshweshwe or both.

¹⁵⁴ Xubu (or Gxubu) ka Luduzo- see footnote 34 above.

¹⁵⁵ R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P. 27

¹⁵⁶ R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P. 27

It flatters his vanity and is grateful to his ambition and that morbid feeling of animosity which he evidently feels towards the Native tribes of natal” now the seat of the IziGqoza faction. Shepstone believed that Moshweshwe was planning to unite all the powerful African chiefs in a combination to resist and if possible destroy the white man, and that Cetshwayo was associated with this plan. Mpande, a shrewder judge than Shepstone, had scoffed at such stories: “and do speculators suppose that Moshweshwe will ever venture for any political consideration to leave the rock that shelters him?, he will do so when the rabbits feed on the plain”¹⁵⁷ Shepstone considered that Mpande was either unaware of the extent of the negotiation being carried on, or else underrated them. In a final gloomy postscript to his confidential report Shepstone stated that he had heard that President Pretorius of the South African Republic was on a visit to Zululand to obtain the cession of a port in that country¹⁵⁸.

In his other report of the same date, the one intended to be published, Shepstone stated that he had “*successfully accomplished the object of Your Excellency’s instructions*”¹⁵⁹. It was of course true that he had, as instructed induced Mpande to declare Cetshwayo his heir. The real purpose of the visit however had been to strengthen Natal’s influence over Zululand by putting the latter’s new ruler in his debt. Shepstone’s belated expediency had failed to achieve this effect, and nowhere is the failure more eloquently exposed than in the pages of Shepstone’s confidential report.

The event showed that Shepstone need not have been so gloomy. If Cetshwayo had ever entered into the alliance, or even a dalliance with the Boers it was short-lived. Pretorius did not get his port. Cetshwayo denied the Boer claim that he had ceded land in return for Mthonga. The succession dispute within Zululand which had made both Mpande and

¹⁵⁷ R.L.Cope. 1995. The Origins of The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. P.28

¹⁵⁸ S.N.A 1/8/7, p.395, Confid., Shepstone to Scott, 22 June 1861

¹⁵⁹ S.N.A 1/8/7, p.385, Confid., Shepstone to Scott, 22 June 1861.

Cetshwayo, reliant on Natal's favor, was for all practical purposes settled in 1861, but it was immediately replaced by a land dispute with the Transvaal.

Natal had almost as great an interest in keeping the Boers out of Zululand as had the Zulu themselves, and Cetshwayo came to rely on support from Natal in his resistance to the Transvaal's territorial claims. It remained essential for the ruler of Zululand to be on good terms with Shepstone, though now for a different reason.

3.7.2 Cetshwayo's Installation: Reactions and Results

Shepstone's official report on the installation leaves one with the impression that it was successful, dignified, important and impressive. Not everyone agreed. Many regarded the 'tin-pot coronation' as something of a farce.¹⁶⁰ The unimpressive nature of the ceremony, the small numbers attending it, and the 'tinsel crown' were much commented on in the Natal newspapers.¹⁶¹ The Natal Witness, the leading advocate of responsible government and champion of colonial as opposed to imperial interests, produced a scathing attack on the entire expedition, stating that the ceremony had been unimpressive, the real coronation had been that conducted by Masiphula, the new laws had been broken immediately and the arrangement for the passage of labourers would be ineffective, the only benefit being the campaigning experience gained by the Volunteers.¹⁶²

There were more favourable comments. The Natal Mercury, the representative of coastal sugar interests, welcomed the arrangement concerning the passage of labourers through Zululand, and even the Witness was later compelled to admit that the arrangement was

¹⁶⁰ Etherington, 'Anglo-Zulu Relations' in Duminy & Ballard, *Anglo-Zulu War*, p.33, quoting John Akerman, a Natal politician, and Robert Robertson, the missionary.

¹⁶¹ The Natal Colonist, 9 Sept. 1873, editorial; The Natal Witness, 23 Sept. 1873, 'Monthly Summary, the Coronation of Cetywayo'; The Natal Mercury, 9 Sept. 1873, editorial; The Times of Natal, 10 Sept. 1873, 'Zulu Expedition'

¹⁶² The Natal Witness, 23 Sept. 1873, 'Monthly Summary, the Coronation of Cetywayo'.

working.¹⁶³ The expedition produced a widespread impression that the Zulu kingdom was no longer a formidable military power, an impression apparently based on the small number of soldiers at the installation, their apparently poor discipline, and the shortage of food on the occasion.¹⁶⁴

The reaction of Shepstone's superiors in the Colonial Office to the expedition was at first distinctly negative. The Earl of Carnarvon, who with the Conservative victory of 1874 had become Secretary of State for the Colonies, minuted '*I greatly doubt the wisdom of the expedition*' since it 'pledges us to a protectorate or something very like it' and so was likely to embroil Britain with the Z.A.R. It must always be remembered that the very qualities & merits & past successes of Mr. Shepstone in native affairs tend to blind him to the danger of these future complications and make him set a horribly undue value on what he describes as British prestige.¹⁶⁵

Carnarvon's official reply to the dispatch enclosing Shepstone's report on the expedition was sent only after he had seen Shepstone personally. The contrast between this dispatch and the above-quoted minute illustrates the influence Shepstone gained over Carnarvon. Carnarvon stated that although he was still not altogether convinced that it had been wise to undertake the mission, on account of the risk involved, he placed 'much confidence in his [Shepstone's] belief that it was very important not to lose this opportunity of causing his influence to be asserted and recognised, as well as that its results are likely to be of value'.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ The Natal Mercury, 9 Sept. 1873, editorial; The Natal Witness, 2 June 1874, 'Monthly Summary, the Coast', 15 Dec. 1874, 'Amatonga Labourers', 15 Jan. 1875, 'Amatonga Labourers'.

¹⁶⁴ The Natal Mercury, 9 Sept. 1873, editorial, & 16 Sept. 1873, 'The Coronation of Cetuywayo' by Thomas Baines; The Times of Natal, 10 Sept. 1873, 'Zulu Expedition', & 17 Sept. 1873, editorial; The Natal Colonist, 23 Sept. 1873, 'Monthly Summary, the Zulu Coronation Expedition'

¹⁶⁵ C.O. 179/114, minute by Carnarvon, 20 June 1874, on Natal 5791, Pine to Kimberley, 13 April 1874.

¹⁶⁶ B.P.P., C.1137, p.27, no. 2, Carnarvon to Pine, 7 Nov. 1874

For both Cetshwayo and Shepstone the results of the expedition proved disappointing. Cetshwayo became King to the exclusion of his rival claimants, but his other objectives were not achieved. If, as I have argued, the 'coronation laws' were designed to strengthen the King's power relative to that of the territorial chiefs by giving him an appellate jurisdiction in their areas, it is clear that they did not have this effect. There is much evidence that Cetshwayo never succeeded in making the right to inflict capital punishment a royal monopoly and that the chiefs retained the power to execute without reference to the King.

In fact, the only real limitation on the chiefs' power over their own subjects lay in the King's control over the amabutho, which Cetshwayo maintained, despite some strain and conflict. In the sphere of central government Cetshwayo had to rule in conjunction with the izikhulu, the great chiefs who made up his ibandla or council of state. Again there is evidence of conflict. Cetshwayo's wishes were sometimes frustrated by the izikhulu, but equally, he was sometimes able to overrule their objections.¹⁶⁷ Cetshwayo was a constitutional rather than an absolute monarch. R.C.A. Samuelson, who was the son of a missionary brought up in pre-war Zululand, described the great chiefs as 'the real rulers of Zululand'.¹⁶⁸ This is probably an exaggeration. Cetshwayo was not a cipher, even though his attempt to curb the power of his chiefs by means of Shepstone's coronation laws was unsuccessful.

Cetshwayo's hope of gaining Shepstone's and Natal's active assistance in Zululand's border dispute with the Z.A.R. was also disappointed. Indeed, if he really hoped to recover all the land up to the Drakensberg,¹⁶⁹ which would include territory long since settled by Boers and incorporated into the Z.A.R., such a hope can only be regarded as completely unrealistic. In any case Shepstone had his own aims and ambitions in this

¹⁶⁷ R.L. Cope, 'Political Power', pp.11-31.

¹⁶⁸ R.C.A. Samuelson, *Long Long Ago* (Durban, 1929) p.27

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid* p.49.

area. If British rule had been extended to the disputed territory, however defined, it would have been filled with 'surplus' Africans from Natal and would therefore not have been available for Zulu settlement and as a field for Zulu royal patronage.

Shepstone succeeded in negotiating a satisfactory agreement concerning the passage of migrant labourers along the coastal route through Zululand, but otherwise the high hopes with which he had entered Zululand were not fulfilled. As we have seen, the flattering remarks made by the Zulu about their desire for greater unity with the Natal, which led Shepstone to expect a virtual surrender of sovereignty, turned out to be, as he had characterized earlier such utterances, 'more complimentary than real'. And the only land the Zulu were willing to cede to Natal was land which it was not in their power to give, being territory claimed by the Z.A.R., most of it under its effective occupation and rule. If Natal were to obtain a 'safety-valve', an opening to the north, which Shepstone considered a necessity, it would be able to do so only by the exercise of imperial force, physical or moral, against either the Z.A.R. or Zululand, or both. Imperial policy was about to take a turn which would bring this consummation within the bounds of practical politics.

Cetshwayo appears to have believed in a special relationship between the Zulu and the British, as represented by the Natal government, and he acknowledged the superior power of the British Empire. 'But you must know', he told a British official in 1877, 'that from the first the Zulu nation grew up alone like a tree, separate and distinct from all the others, and has never been subject to any other nation' .¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless the fact that Shepstone installed Cetshwayo and proclaimed the fundamental laws of the kingdom made it appear, or made it possible to make it appear, that Zululand was henceforth in some sense subject to Britain. It could be, and was, used to justify further intervention. In

¹⁷⁰G.H. 1397, report on Zululand, by F.B. Fynney, 13 July 1877

particular, the new laws proclaimed at the coronation were used to justify the invasion of 1879. In his ultimatum to the Zulu King, the High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere stated:

These laws for the well-being of the Zulu people were the conditions required by the British Government in return for the countenance and support given by it to the new Zulu King by the presence of its representative, and by his taking part in the King's coronation; and once spoken as they were, they cannot be broken without compromising the dignity, the good faith and the honour of the British Government.¹⁷¹ As we have seen, these laws were probably intended to limit the powers of the chiefs. But they came to be regarded as promises made by the King, promises which it was alleged he had broken by ruling in a sanguinary and lawless fashion.¹⁷²

It should be noted that neither Lieutenant- Governor Pine nor Shepstone expected the new laws to have an immediate or sweeping effect Pine wrote that they would probably not be strictly observed, but that they would be a 'beacon to guide future generations into the path of higher civilization'.¹⁷³ Shepstone stated that it cannot be expected that the amelioration described will immediately take effect To have got such principles admitted and declared to be what a Zulu may plead when oppressed, was but sowing the seed which will still take many years to grow and mature.¹⁷⁴

The more important point is Frere's assertion that Cetshwayo's assent to these laws was the condition required by the British government for Shepstone's presence at the coronation, and that his alleged disregard of them therefore compromised that government's dignity, good faith and honour. This is simply not true. The British

¹⁷¹ B.P.P., C.2222, p.206, message no. 2 to Cetshwayo, 11 Dec. 1878, encl. no. 2 in no. 53, Frere to Hicks Beach, 13 Dec. 1878

¹⁷² Whether this allegation was true or not is considered in R.L. Cope, 'Written in Characters of Blood? The Reign of King Cetshwayo Ka Mpande 1873-1879', *Journal of African History* 36 (1995).

¹⁷³ B.P.P., C.1137, p.3, no. 1, Pine to Kimberley, 13 April 1874

¹⁷⁴ B.P.P., C.1137, p.16, Shepstone's report on the installation of Cetshwayo, n.d., encl. in no.1, Pine to Kimberley, 13 April 1874.

government proper, the imperial government, did not know about the expedition until after the event. All that the Natal government required was that the occasion would not be marred by bloodshed, and this condition was kept. The initiative for the new laws did not come from the British side. Shepstone stated that it was only after entering Zululand that he found that the Zulu regarded him as 'clothed with the power of fundamental legislation', that this 'was a responsibility [he] had not contemplated' but from which he felt he 'could not withdraw' .¹⁷⁵

One could also argue that it was Masiphula who had really installed Cetshwayo as King, and that Shepstone's ceremony had been nothing more than a recognition of his installation; and that since Cetshwayo, therefore, did not owe his crown to Shepstone or the British government, any breach of any undertaking made on the occasion of Shepstone's visit could not affect his legitimacy or right to rule. The fact remains that by inviting Shepstone to Zululand and by apparently confirming Shepstone's view of his function on that occasion,¹⁷⁶ Cetshwayo had given hostages to fortune and facilitated future British intervention in the Zulu kingdom.

3.8 Conclusion

The Zulu Kingdom and its leaders were closely associated with the Whites from the time they first arrived in Zululand. Their arrival had one of the biggest impacts into the politics of the running of the Zulu Kingdom, in particular the politics of the Kingdom. This chapter looked at the beginning of the political structure built by Emperor Shaka, and how it interchanged with each and every Zulu King that sat on the throne. The whites were also

¹⁷⁵ Ibid p18

¹⁷⁶ B.P.P., C.1137, p.48, Shepstone's report on the installation of Cetshwayo, n.d., encl. in no 1, Pine to Kimberley, 13 April 1874

a potential threat to the Kingdom as they wanted to had long aspired to bring Zululand under British control and build on their land.

Natal's colonists and officials saw the Zulu kingdom as their hinterland, their main idea was expansionism. They had assumed that in the natural course of progress Zululand would become part of Natal. The more obvious threat to the Kingdom however remained the Boers' territorial encroachments from their new home in the Transvaal. Boer expansion into Zululand was a threat to Natal's interests too, and the Zulu Kings followed a policy of maintaining the best possible relations with the Natal government as a counterweight to Boer expansion. This even led them to invite Natal to intervene in Zulu succession disputes, and in the event this intervention facilitated the destruction of the Zulu Kingdom when imperial policy took an expansion turn.

CHAPTER FOUR

ZULU-BRITISH BOADER RELATIONS: A PRELUDE TO ARMED CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

Towards the end of King Mpande's reign the Boers encroached a good deal, both on the North and the East building and settling down on the Utrecht part of Zulu lands and specifically on the Luneburg district where they first went for wood. They were moving on the part of land that King Mpande had specifically told them not to occupy. They were often told that they were on Zulu soil and had to leave off cutting wood, but it had no effect and to the King's message they answered that they were well aware that they had no right to the land but were "building for the king".

The Boers at one time endeavoured to buy the Utrecht district with 200 heard of cattle, however King Mpande refused and made the Boers pay 100 heard of cattle as repayment that they were residing in Utrecht. It was never to be considered as payment for the land

but as acknowledgement that the Boers were living there by the King's leave. After this the Boers kept on encroaching and treated the Zulu borders with much harshness.¹⁷⁷

When Britain took control of the Transvaal four years later, Cetshwayo assumed, in view of previous British pledges, that he would be able to regain lost territory. The border dispute by now had festered for sixteen years. During that time, while Boers had seized Zulu land and cattle, Shepstone had urged them to show moderation and restraint.¹⁷⁸ They had duly complied. They had provided a full statement of their case in writing. Now Cetshwayo wanted the matter resolved. Now the Transvaal is English ground, "I want Somtseu to send the Boers away from the lower part of the Transvaal, that near my country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are bad people, they lie, they claim what is not theirs, and ill-use my people" said King Cetshwayo.¹⁷⁹ This chapter aims to shine a light in the disputes between the British Authority and King Cetshwayo over the borders in Zululand. The Boers violated direct orders from King Mpande by going to the land they were not allowed to go which made matters very difficult when Cetshwayo became King because relations regarding the border only became worse during his term as the King.

4.2 The Zulu-Boer boarder dispute

One may distinguish three distinct territories in dispute between the Z.A.R. and the Zulu kingdom: the Utrecht district between the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) and the Ncome (Blood) rivers extended up to the Phongolo; the area between the Utrecht district, the Phongolo river, and in the east the line marked A-A on the map; and an ill-defined region north of

¹⁷⁷ Webb B. and Wright B. A Zulu King Speaks: statements made by Cesthwayo ka Mpande on the histoy and customs of his people. 1987. P 20-24

¹⁷⁸Meredith. M, 2007. Diamonds, Gold and War: The British, the Boers, and the making of South Africa. Part 2. Chapter 8; The Washing of the Spears. P 89

¹⁷⁹ Meredith. M, 2007. Diamonds, Gold and War: The British, the Boers, and the making of South Africa. Part 2. Chapter 8; The Washing of the Spears. P 89

the Phongolo. This last region is not usually included within the 'disputed territory'; not only the Z.A.R. but the British authorities in Natal too took it as virtually axiomatic that the Zulu had never had any legitimate claim to land north of the Phongolo. But the Zulu certainly did claim land north of the Phongolo, and acted upon their claim, so we must consider what their claim rested upon, as well as the nature of the rival claims in this area.

The Z.A.R. claimed land in this area by virtue of cessions made by the Swazi King. The cession of 1855, which included a strip of land about 15 kilometres wide extending in an easterly direction towards the Lebombo mountains along the north bank of the Phongolo, was made partly in return for protection against the Zulu, but mainly in return for the Boers' abandoning the cause of a rival claimant to the Swazi throne. With the death of the claimant, and the failure of the Boers to pay all the cattle they had also promised, the Swazi King considered himself no longer bound by the cession and the Swazi resumed occupation of much of the land. In 1866, however, the regents for the King's minor successor ceded the land again, apparently in response to the growing Zulu threat.¹⁸⁰

The Zulu claim to land north of the Phongolo rested upon the conquests of Shaka and the Zulu Kings' consequent overlordship of the rulers of the area, including the Swazi King himself, Sobhuza I having submitted to Shaka.¹⁸¹ Even Shepstone stated on one occasion, at a time when he was particularly anxious to play down the claims of the Z.A.R. over the Swazi, that 'the amaSwazi King and people have always been tributary to the Zulus'.¹⁸² This claim was rejected by the Swazi as well as by the Boers and, as a rule, the British. But the Swazi claim that the Phongolo was 'the ancient boundary that always

¹⁸⁰ P. Bonner, *Kings, Commissioners and Concessionaires: the Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State* (Johannesburg, 1983) pp.74-6, 110-3

¹⁸¹ B.P.P., C.1961, p.27, Dunn to Bulwer, 20 April 1876, encl. inno. 1, Bulwer to Carnaivon, 29 June 1876.

¹⁸² B.P.P., C.1748, p.56, minute by Shepstone, 3 June 1876, encl. inno. 38, Bulwer to Carnaivon, 12 June 1876

separated our countries¹⁸³ had the strength attributed to it by whites only in respect of the lower reaches of the river, near the Lebombo mountains.

Further west, away from the centre of Swazi power, the claim became more dubious. The area north of this part of the Phongolo had been inhabited by small independent chiefdoms which had submitted without resistance to Shaka, and since then the sovereignty of the Zulu Kings had been acknowledged at least intermittently in this area.¹⁸⁴ But the Swazi Kings also claimed these people as subjects, and in times of Zulu weakness, such as the period of conflict between Dingane and Mpande, and during the succession dispute of the 1850s, the Swazi Kings were able to secure from them an acknowledgement of their supremacy.

The minor chiefs of this frontier line were in fact obliged to khonza (submit) to either the Zulu or the Swazi King as circumstances dictated - sometimes they gave their allegiance to both simultaneously.¹⁸⁵ The Zulu claim to this territory was older, but the Swazi King exercised more effective control over it in 1855 when he ceded it to the Boers. Nevertheless the Zulu never accepted that the Swazi had any right to cede this territory to the Boers,¹⁸⁶ and never accepted that the Phongolo was the boundary of Zululand.

¹⁸³ B.P.P., C.2220, p.393, statement of messengers from the Amaswazi Tribe, 31 May 1869, encl. in no. 2, Bulwer to Frere, 17 July, 1878.

¹⁸⁴J.W. Colenso, Bishop Colenso's Commentary on Frere's Policy (Bishopstowe, n.d.) second • pagination series, p.129. This volume in the Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban, is a bound compilation of documents and commentary Colenso sent to politicians, journalists, and the Aborigines Protection Society in England. Colenso obtained his information about the region north of the Phongolo from members of the house of Masobhuza, Langalibalele's chief wife, who was a sister of Mswati, the Swazi King, and who settled at Bishopstowe after the exile of her husband. The chiefs mentioned are Mate, father of Mahlangampisi, Magonondo, father of Manyonyoba, and Mlambo. Colenso also pointed out that the Ngwe, under their chief Phutini, Langalibalele's uncle, lived both north and south of the Phongolo before 1848, when, with Langalibalele's Illubi, they fled from their overlord Mpande to Natal (*ibid.*, p.117). See also Natal Archives, Colenso Papers, Vol. 2, p.258, Colenso to Bulwer, 26 & 28 March 1879.

¹⁸⁵ Bonner, Kings, pp.45, 49 & n.19, 92-3.

¹⁸⁶ T.S. Van Rooyen, 'Die Verhouding Tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Geskiedenis van die Oas-Transvaal tot 1882', Archives Year Book, 1951, Vol. I (Cape Town, 1951) pp.68-9

They gave practical expression to their claims. From at least 1860 land north of the Phongolo was being colonized by Zulu from south of the river. A Z.A.R. Border Commission of 1866 found many homesteads belonging to Hamu, Masiphula, Mnyamana and other Zulu chiefs north of the river.¹⁸⁷ By the mid-1870s it is estimated that there were between 15 000 and 30 000 Zulu north of the Phongolo.¹⁸⁸

The land south of the Phongolo making up the Utrecht district was almost unoccupied after the Illubi and the Ngwe fled from Mpande to Natal in 1848, which might help explain why Mpande ceded it in that year for 100 head of cattle to the men who made him King. The Natal Commission appointed in 1878 to investigate the border dispute expressed doubt as to the validity of this cession, but awarded the area to the Transvaal Province (as the Z.A.R. had become following the British annexation of April 1877) on the grounds of established occupation and government and Zulu acquiescence in this.¹⁸⁹

The disputed territory around which so much controversy centred and which generated so much conflict was the land between the Utrecht district and the .¹⁹⁰ The alleged cession took place in March 1861, and resulted from the flight of Cetshwayo's rival Mthonga to the Utrecht district.¹⁹¹ Mthonga and his attendants were detained by the members of a standing Commission appointed in the Z.A.R. the previous year to work for Cetshwayo's speedy accession to the Zulu throne and to obtain a cession of land.

¹⁸⁷ Bonner, Kings, pp.76 & 132-3; C. de B. Webb & J.B. Wright (eds.) The James Stuart Archive, Vol. 4 (Durban & Pietermaritzburg, 1986) p.315, evidence of Ndukwana, 1900.

¹⁸⁸ Colenso, Commentary, second pagination series, p.117; Bonner, Kings, p.133.

¹⁸⁹ B.P.P., C.2220, pp.371 & 381, Border Commission report, 20 June 1878.

¹⁹⁰ McGill, 'History', chs. IX, XVII & XVIII, is the most thorough and detailed account of the question. I have checked Dr. McGill's most important references in the Transvaal Archives. The question is also discussed in less detail in H. Stander, 'Die Verhouding Tussen die Boere en z.oeloe tot die Dood van Mpande in 1872', Archives Year Book for South African History, 1964, Vol. 2 (Cape Town, 1964) chs. VI, VII & VIII. This work is written from a strongly and uncritically Afrikaner nationalist standpoint, and its usefulness is limited by the author's tendency to treat all sources, contemporary documents, later recollections, and secondary sources, both scholarly and popular, as having the same evidential status. The report of the Border Commission set up in 1878 to investigate the question is in Appendix II of B.P.P., C.2220.

¹⁹¹ see above, p.25.

Cetshwayo followed Mthonga with an annexed force, but did not cross into the Utrecht district. After a series of transactions, which it is difficult to reconstruct with any certainty due to the dubious nature of the evidence, the fugitives were returned to Cetshwayo and the Z.A.R.

Commission came away with a document with Cetshwayo's mark on it ceding land to the line A - A. Cetshwayo acknowledged that he had signed a paper, but stated that he had been given to understand it contained the minutes of the discussions and a guarantee of the safety of the returned fugitives. Cetshwayo was not King and had no power to cede land. The documents suggest that the Z.A.R. Commission recognised Cetshwayo as King, or at least as heir. Nevertheless, another Z.A.R. Commission visited Mpande in August 1861 to obtain a ratification of Cetshwayo's cession. According to this Commission, Mpande said that Cetshwayo had no right to cede land but signed a document ceding the same land himself. Mpande, however, always denied ratifying or making any cession

This border dispute can be seen as the immediate cause of the war of 1879. Since by then the Transvaal was under British rule, the war was fought between the Zulu and the British. As Administrator of the Transvaal, Shepstone supported the Transvaal case. He had become convinced that the Zulu were in the wrong, and that they knew they were in the wrong. The same applies to Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner, whose ultimatum led to the war. But what seemed Zulu treachery and aggression would be something very different if the Zulu were in the right. To understand the genesis of the war of 1879, therefore, an attempt to reach some conclusion on the rights and wrongs of the border dispute is unavoidable.

It is difficult to think of a means by which the existence of an agreement between literate and illiterate parties could be proved or disproved by the production of documents. The Boers may have deceived the Zulu concerning the contents of the documents to which

they affixed their marks. The documents presented to the 1878 Commission may not have been those 'signed' by the Zulu, but documents subsequently drawn up by the Boers with forged Zulu marks attached. Indeed, the document containing the alleged cession, initially supposed to be the original, turned out to be a 'copy', which was inexact at least to the extent that it contained the signature of a man who was not present on the occasion the original was drawn up.¹⁹² Such documents, in fact, could be produced without the Zulu having signed anything.

Conversely, of course, the Zulu could untruthfully but plausibly make allegations that such things had been done. Some of these difficulties could have been obviated had the Zulu been given copies of written agreements, but this was not done. The documents were drawn up, read out, interpreted, witnessed and preserved by an interested party. In these circumstances, the best one can do is to see if there are any particular reasons for distrusting the documents, and to consider the plausibility of what they contain. The first dubious circumstance that should be noted is that Landdrost Smuts of Utrecht informed Acting President Schoeman of the alleged cession only seven weeks after it was supposed to have been made, in letters dated 20th May 1861.¹⁹³ What seems to have spurred Smuts to write was the news that a Commission including Schoeman and M.W. Pretorius was approaching Utrecht. But had the cession been genuine and unequivocal he would surely have reported the glad news without delay.¹⁹⁴

A document dated 16 March 1861 signed by Landdrost Smuts purports to give an account of the preliminary discussions between the Z.A.R. Border Commission and Cetshwayo's representatives. In it the latter are represented as describing a recent meeting with Shepstone at which Cetshwayo refused to 'unite' with him as Mpande wished, saying 'Pretorius and the Boers made Umpanda king of Zululand; if Umpanda wishes to go over

¹⁹² B.P.P., C.2220, p.379, Border Commission report, 20 June 1878.

¹⁹³ S.S. 40, sup. 1/61 & 2/61, Smuts to Schoeman, 20 May 1861.

¹⁹⁴ McGill, 'History', p.268

to the English, let him go, but we all join ourselves on the side of the Boers.' Cetshwayo, they said, offered reciprocal military assistance and 'would do as he was bid by the people there; if the people asked him for land he would give it'.¹⁹⁵

But the only meeting between Shepstone and Cetshwayo in 1861 took place on 16 May.¹⁹⁶ This anomaly is not simply an error of dating. The meeting between the Z.A.R. Border Commission and Cetshwayo's representatives unquestionably took place before Shepstone's meeting with Cetshwayo - the latter was in part a response to the former - and the Z.A.R. Commission and Cetshwayo's representatives cannot possibly have discussed something which had not yet taken place. On these grounds, and because all the persons present on the occasion of the receipt of this message from Cetshwayo denied to the 1878 Commission that it had referred to Shepstone or declared that they could not remember any allusion to him, the Commission dismissed this document as 'plainly a fabrication'.¹⁹⁷ The fact that fabrication was resorted to in the case of one document must cast doubt on the others, including the deed of cession (which was, as we have seen, a 'copy' containing at least one false signature) especially in view of the delay in reporting the alleged cession.

The documents with which the Transvaal supported its case before the 1878 Commission represent only a selection of those available. The supposed cession of March 1861 was far from being the most favourable to the Transvaal. On the contrary, it was the most modest, and was presumably pushed because, this being so, it was the most plausible. There exists, for example, a document signed by five representatives of the Z.A.R., on the one hand, and Mpande, his chief councillor Masiphula and four other Zulu chiefs on the other, dated 30 March 1858, which declares Mpande's entire country, from the Thukela to the 'Comwoema' which flows through the Lebombo mountains to the sea, to

¹⁹⁵ McGill, 'History', p.261.

¹⁹⁶ This was the meeting at which Cetshwayo was recognised as heir: see above, pp.26-7.

¹⁹⁷ B.P.P., C.2220, p.378, Border Commission report, 20 June 1878; McGill, 'History', p.26ln

be 'het Eigendom van die Goevememend van de Suid Afrecaansche Republiek'.¹⁹⁸ On a later occasion Mpande was somewhat less generous. On 16 December 1864 he allegedly ceded to the Z.A.R. only the land to the south of the watershed north of the Mhlathuze river, although at the same time he acknowledged himself and his people to be subjects of the Z.A.R. The document containing this cession is witnessed by Masiphula and another Zulu and by three representatives of the Z.A.R.¹⁹⁹

No-one could credit these 'cessions'. But in the case of the alleged agreement of March 1861 there was a good reason why Cetshwayo might have ceded some territory. Mthonga was a dangerous rival who threatened Cetshwayo's chances of becoming King. It would be worth Cetshwayo's while to cede a small part of the country if by so doing he could secure his possession of the rest of it by recovering Mthonga and his brother from the Boers, and by gaining Boer support for his succession. The fact that the fugitives were returned appeared to Sir Bartle Frere a powerful argument in favour of the Transvaal case.

Why otherwise should the Boers have handed them over? 'Here', wrote Frere, 'was a strong motive why Cetshwayo should make a cession, which at other times he would have refused; there appears no doubt that he did make some cession and got possession of the Princes of the Royal House.'²⁰⁰ It is important to note therefore that the actual deed of cession contains no reference to the fugitive princes. When President Pretorius explained the land cession to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal in 1865 he did not represent it as the *quid pro quo* for the two fugitives, but stated that the land had been obtained 'at a remuneration', presumably the 25 cows, bull, horse, bridle and saddle represented in the document as a present. Pretorius went on to explain:

¹⁹⁸ S.S. 19, R.1981N58, Treaty, 30 March 1858; the full text is quoted in McGill, 'History',p.428

¹⁹⁹ S.S. 62, R.1181N64, treaty with Mpande, 16 Dec. 1864; the full text is in McGill, 'History',pp.428-429

²⁰⁰ B.P.P., C.2222, p.43, memo by Frere, n.d., encl. in no. 19, Frere to Hicks Beach 16 Nov 1878.

*“The reasons that gave rise to this agreement are simply that during the disturbances in the Zulu country between Panda and Cetywayo, the people of Cetywayo crossed the boundaries to follow up fugitive adherents of Panda, and thereby endangered the lives and property of the inhabitants of the Republic, and it was considered advisable to establish a boundary to prevent such incursions and inroads for the purpose of murder and bloodshed”.*²⁰¹

Why then were the fugitives returned? Pretorius's letter provides a clue. The presence of the fugitives in Utrecht was a great temptation to Cetshwayo to send an annexed force into the area to recapture them. Later in 1861 a rumour that Cetshwayo intended to seize Mkhungo had thrown the colony of Natal into a panic, had caused all available troops to be sent to the border, and had caused the Lieutenant-Governor to make urgent requests for reinforcements to the High Commissioner in the Cape, although the rumour later proved to be groundless.²⁰² It was the arrival of a strong armed force on the other side of the Ncome (Blood) river that prompted the Boers to open negotiations about the return of the fugitives. A border farmer, P.L. Uys, recollected that:

*“...a large Kafir Commando, of which the Captain Umzilikaza was headman, had at the same time come to the other side of the Blood River and threatened us that they had orders from Cetywayo to pursue Dingezi [one of Mthonga's attendants] and if we did not give up Dingezi and the two sons of Panda and the cattle, and the people, they would come amongst us and take them by force”.*²⁰³

²⁰¹ B.P.P., C.1961, p.22, Pretorius to Maclean, 23 March 1865, sub-enclosure in no.1, Bulwer to Carnarvon, 29 June 1876.

²⁰² Nourse, 'Zulu Invasion Scare'.

²⁰³ B.P.P., C.2242, p.76, 'A Remembrance between Us and the Zulu Tribes, how Matters Went on', by P.L. Uys, 1 Dec. 1877, encl. in appendix ill, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

The minutes of the meeting held on 1 April at which it was decided to hand back the fugitives confirm this view. The Z.A.R. Border Commission informed the meeting that Cetshwayo was close by with a large force and had asked for the fugitives to be returned; upon this, 'considering that through the Kaffirs having taken refuge with us our laws have already been transgressed, and that they endanger the safety of this State', it was resolved to hand them over. A further reason or justification for returning them mentioned in the minutes was that Cetshwayo and his captains had guaranteed their safety; but there is no mention of any cession of land.²⁰⁴ No doubt the Border Commission tried to take advantage of the situation to extract a land cession from Cetshwayo; but the fact that they complied with the latter's demand for the return of the fugitives by no means proves that they were successful.

The failure of Landdrost Smuts to impart the glad news of the land cession would be intelligible if there were no glad news to impart. Seven weeks later the approach of Acting-President Schoeman and M.W. Pretorius might have led to the concoction of a land cession designed to show that the Border Commission appointed the previous year had not been idle.²⁰⁵ Pretorius and the Commission of which he was the head went on to visit Mpande on 19 June, taking with him a document for the King to sign stating that he approved, permitted and ratified the cession of land made by Cetshwayo. This document, bare of any signatures, is still in the archives in Pretoria.²⁰⁶

As the minutes of this Commission record, Mpande stated that Cetshwayo had no right to cede land, that he had not ceded any, and that he, Mpande, would not cede any either.²⁰⁷ The members of the Commission then visited Cetshwayo, who denied having

²⁰⁴ C.O. 879/13, African no. 150, p.98, Minutes of meeting at Waaihoek, 1 April, 1861, sub-enclosure in Confid., Shepstone to Carnarvon, 18 Jan. 1878.

²⁰⁵ See above, pp.32-3.

²⁰⁶ S.S. 38, R.4489/61, encl. 1 in Proes to Schoeman, 26 June 1861.

²⁰⁷ Encl. 2 in *ibid*

ceded land.²⁰⁸ Pretorius made a personal report to Schoeman concerning his visit to Cetshwayo, in which he stated that the people of Utrecht had misrepresented ('verbloemd') the transactions of March 1861, and that the Zulu had proved them to be liars to their face ('Overtuigd zijnde dat de kaffers de menschen in hun gesigt voor leugenaars hebben gemaakt... ',etc).²⁰⁹

These events and the documents they generated were not brought to the attention of the 1878 Commission of enquiry into the border dispute. Instead a document dated 5 August 1861 was produced. This bore the alleged mark of Mpande (though not those of any Zulu witnesses) and the signatures of three Utrecht farmers. It represents Mpande as stating that Cetshwayo had no right to cede land but that he would cede the same land himself.²¹⁰ In view of the fact that Mpande had refused less than two months earlier to ratify or make any cession to the son of the man who had made him King, it is difficult to take this document seriously.

The weight of all this evidence, in my opinion, makes it virtually impossible to believe that any cession of land was made by the Zulu in 1861, or to doubt that in this dispute the Zulu were in the right and the Z.A.R. was in the wrong. It is possible that Mpande and Cetshwayo held out hopes of a land cession in order to gain the support of the Boers against each other during this period of internal conflict. Mpande appears to have considered himself under a particular obligation to the people of Andries Pretorius for their assistance in overthrowing Dingane and making him King.

His expressions of loyalty to the Boers were no doubt construed as acknowledgements of their ultimate sovereignty. Just as the Zulu considered that Shaka's former dominance left them with rights to land and sovereignty across the Phongolo, so the Boers seem to

²⁰⁸ S.S. 38, R.4489/61, encl. 4 in Proes to Schoeman, 26 June 1861.

²⁰⁹ S.S. 38, R4489/61, Pretorius to Schoeman, 14 July 1861; see McGill, 'History' pp.268-272 for this Commission's visit to Zululand.

²¹⁰ An English translation is in B.P.P., C.2242, p.64, encl. in appendix III, no.I, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

have believed that their installation of Mpande gave them rights of a similar kind over Zululand.²¹¹ Perhaps they regarded the documents with which they sought to prove their case in the same way as the monks of the middle ages are said to have regarded the charters they forged: as merely supplying formal proof for the benefit of inquisitive outsiders of what were undoubted rights sanctioned by history.

There is certainly something medieval in their apparent belief that the multiplication of deeds of cession would strengthen rather than weaken their claim. If their view of the matter was as I have suggested, it might explain what Frere found so difficult to accept: that 'so many men of fair repute in their own time among their own people conspired to perpetrate such a fraud'.²¹² It was, in Gibbon's phrase, a 'pious fraud'.

4.3 The Genesis of the Dispute to 1873

The line supposed to have ceded in 1861 was beacons off in 1864. But, no doubt as a result of Zulu resistance, the Z.A.R. made no immediate attempt to establish effective and permanent occupation down to this line. In fact, right up to 1879 a considerable part of the disputed territory remained occupied and ruled solely by Zulu. The high-water mark of Boer encroachment was reached in March 1876; after this the tide turned, and the Zulu took the offensive. The position at that date was as follows:

"Land west of the Ncome (Blood) river was firmly in Boer control and was definitely part of the Z.A.R.²¹³ There were occupied Boer farms down to the Old Hunting Road which seems to have been regarded in practice as the

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² B.P.P., C.2222, p.27, minute by Frere [1 Aug. 1878], encl. in no. 19, Frere to Hicks Beach 16 Nov. 1878. The date appears in the original in the Natal Archives though not in the Blue Book

²¹³ B.P.P., C.2220, p.381, Border Commission report, 20 June 1878.

boundary of the Utrecht district and therefore of the Z.A.R. But there were also Zulu in this area who recognized only Zulu sovereignty and over whom the Z.A.R., by a tacit agreement, exercised no jurisdiction".²¹⁴

The Boers used the land between the Old Hunting Road and the line supposed to have been ceded in 1861 for grazing purposes, but there was no permanent occupation of this area, although fanns had been marked out and registered,²¹⁵ and the Landdrost of Utrecht exercised no jurisdiction in it.²¹⁶

The gradual Boer encroachment provoked and was checked by Zulu protests, disturbances and war-scares in the border region. Several Z.A.R. commissions visited Mpande in an attempt to effect a peaceful settlement, but the Zulu King refused to accept the 1861 line and refused to order the Zulu inhabitants of the disputed territory to leave.²¹⁷ Indeed, it was observed that more Zulu were moving into it from other parts of Zululand.²¹⁸ This Zulu settlement of the area may have been the result of population pressure in other parts of the country, but it seems likely that it was also intended to establish effective occupation, the better to resist Boer claims. Cetshwayo was reported in 1865 to have ordered the Zulu not to move out of the disputed territory on pain of death, in order to prevent the Boers from occupying it.²¹⁹

The Zulu authorities kept the Natal government informed of events on the border, and repeatedly requested its intervention. A message from Mpande and Cetshwayo described

²¹⁴ T.A., S.N. 6, Minutes, p.163, evidence of G.M. Rudolph (Landdrost of Utrecht) before 1878 Border Commission.

²¹⁵ B.P.P., C.2242, p.57, appendix 3, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

²¹⁶ T.A., S.N. 6, Minutes, p.163, evidence of Rudolph before 1878 Border Commission

²¹⁷ McGill, 'History', pp.293 & 298-9.

²¹⁸ McGill, 'History', p297

²¹⁹ Ibid., p295

Pretorius's visit of June 1861.²²⁰ They stated that the Boers had been obliged to admit that their 'cession' was invalid, but said they persisted in demanding land, stating that they wanted a port and threatening to seize land by force.

This attempt by the Z.A.R. to obtain an independent outlet to the sea evidently caused the British some disquiet, for we find in June 1862 High Commissioner Wodehouse warning Pretorius, then on a visit to Cape Town, that St Lucia was British (by virtue of the 1843 treaty between Mpande and Cloete) and that Britain had objections to any further extension of the territory of the Z.A.R. in the direction of Zululand. Wodehouse, however, accepted Pretorius's story that a cession had already been made.²²¹

The beaconing off of the land claimed by the Z.A.R. in 1864 led to another Zulu complaint to the Natal government and another enquiry by the High Commissioner to the Z.A.R. It was on this occasion that Pretorius explained that the land had been obtained at a remuneration and to prevent incursions. The High Commissioner appears to have been convinced by this, and the Secretary of State agreed that there were no grounds for British interference.²²²

It may have been this complaisant British attitude, together with disturbances on the border that led Pretorius to make plans, in June 1865, to seize part of Zululand by force. He hoped to divide the Zulu by offering the throne to Hamu, Cetshwayo's brother, and to enlist the aid of the Swazi King in return for part of the territorial spoils. He hoped to annex all the land south of the Black Mfolozi. A force of 300 burghers was actually assembled in the Wakkerstroom district under Commandant-General Paul Kruger. But the weakness of the republic forced it to abandon this scheme. It was fighting a losing battle in the Soutpansberg, burghers were refusing to do military service, no help was forthcoming

²²⁰ McGill, 'History', p36

²²¹ Ibid pp.279-80.

²²² Ibid pp.290-1

from the Swazi King, and the war between Basutoland and the Orange Free State had its dangers for the Z.A.R.

The Zulu took advantage of the Z.A.R.'s weakness. It was particularly during the period 1865-8 that the formerly relatively sparsely inhabited disputed territory was settled by Zulu and Zulu settlements were also formed north of the Phongolo. The Boers were unable to resist. The point was reached where the Landdrost of Wakkerstroom urged that Shepstone be asked to arbitrate.²²³

A more determined attempt by the Z.A.R. in 1869 to achieve a more effective occupation of the disputed territory provoked resistance and a Zulu request for British arbitration. Cetshwayo also renewed an earlier request for the Natal authorities to take over the disputed territory, pointing out that there had never been any border dispute with Natal.²²⁴ Shepstone had long sought a 'safety- valve' in adjoining territory,²²⁵ but what the Zulu hoped for from a British takeover of the area was the exclusion of Boers, not the inclusion of Natal's 'surplus' Africans.

Lieutenant-Governor Keate and President Pretorius did eventually agree that the former should arbitrate, but the attempt came to nothing. After Keate decided against the Z.A.R. in the Diamond Fields dispute in 1871, Pretorius resigned and the Volksraad resolved not to continue with the Zulu border arbitration. Keate left Natal in July 1872, and his successor seems to have known nothing about the proposed arbitration.²²⁶ The Zulu were not told that arbitration had been abandoned, and Cetshwayo was still expecting it in November 1872, when he told the Natal government that he was taking no action in

²²³ McGill, 'History', pp.294-300

²²⁴ S.N.A. In/6, p.87, message from Mpande, Cetshwayo and the Zulu People, 5 June 1869. The earlier requests for British arbitration were in S.N.A. 1/7/4, p.238, message from Mpande, 24 April 1865, and S.N.A. In/4, p.235, message from Cetshwayo, 25 April 1865.

²²⁵ See above, pp.16-7

²²⁶ B.P.P., C.1961, pp.1-5, minute on the history of the disputed territory, by Shepstone, 25 June 1876, encl. in no. 1, Bulwer to Carnarvon, 29 June 1876; Stander, 'Verhouding', p.374; G.H. 1325, no.91, Musgrave to Bishop Wilkinson, 21 Dec. 1872.

response to Boer acts of aggression because the matter was in the hands of the Natal government.²²⁷

Shepstone told Cetshwayo in reply that the Lieutenant-Governor had recently written to the President of the Z.A.R. on the subject, and urged, as he had done many times before, peace and forbearance.²²⁸ Lieutenant-Governor Musgrave's letter to President Burgers told him of the wishes which the Zulu had repeatedly urged upon the Natal government concerning the border dispute, but made no suggestions regarding a solution. The letter was mainly concerned with Cetshwayo's brother Mthonga, whose flight to Utrecht in 1861 had been the first cause of the border dispute.

Mthonga had escaped from Cetshwayo's custody in 1865, this time to Natal. He caused excitement in Zululand by making a clandestine visit to Mpande, and having resisted the attempt of the Natal government to put him in the charge of a trusted induna remote from the Zulu border, he fled once more into the Transvaal. Musgrave's despatch informed Burgers of this, and pointed out that Mthonga's presence might embroil the Z.A.R. with the Zulu people.²²⁹

Perhaps Burgers felt that the presence of Mthonga might give him an advantage in negotiating directly with the Zulu authorities. Certainly he was opposed to any possible cession of the disputed territory to Natal.²³⁰ He made an attempt to negotiate with the Zulu in January 1873, but found no one to meet him at the Zulu border on the appointed day. As he was returning, messengers overtook him with a gift of two oxen and the news that Mpande had died, and the Zulu nation was in mourning and could therefore transact

²²⁷ S.N.A. 1/7/6, p.179, Dunn to Musgrave, 9 Nov. 1872.

²²⁸ S.N.A. 1/7/6, p.181, Shepstone to Dunn, 20 Nov. 1872.

²²⁹ G.H. 1325, no. 86, Musgrave to Burgers, 30 Oct. 1872

²³⁰ M.S. Appelgryn, Thomas Francois Burgers; Staatspresident 1872-1877 (Pretoria & Cape Town, 1979) p.70.

no business. In the winter, the President was told, Cetshwayo would be glad to meet him.

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4.4 The Anglo-Zulu Mediation

Shepstone's attempt to settle the border dispute by direct negotiation with a Zulu delegation on 18 October 1877 was a complete failure. This was not because he tried to claim what the Z.A.R. had claimed - he did not - but because the Zulu were intensely suspicious of him, and because he refused to hold an enquiry into the whole matter, attempting instead to go straight to what he believed to be a reasonable compromise. The Zulu delegation wanted strict justice and were in no mood to compromise. The meeting broke up without agreeing to anything except to report the matter to the King.

Cetshwayo modified the Zulu claim but otherwise supported his delegates. Both the King and his delegates took practical steps to assert their claim to the disputed territory, steps which broke the peace that had prevailed on the frontier for the past few months and led some Boers to abandon their fanns. Shepstone, casting about for an explanation for his hostile treatment by the Zulu, came up with the unconvincing argument that the Zulu izikhulu were trying to drag Britain into a war as a means of overthrowing Cetshwayo. Certain events also led him and others to attribute Zulu recalcitrance to the malign influence of Bishop Colenso. The rebuff he received from the Zulu and the rise of Boer opposition to his rule caused Shepstone to revise his opinion of the merits of the border dispute and to adopt the Z.A.R. claim in its entirety.

Shepstone's belief that the suspicion and distrust with which he was now regarded by the Zulu would facilitate an amicable settlement of the border dispute could not have been more mistaken. Unlike Cetshwayo's Swaziland ambitions, this was a question on which the King, the izikhulu, and the nation at large were united and on which they felt very

²³¹ The Natal Mercury, 13 Feb. 1873, letter from Utrecht correspondent, 30 Jan. 1873.

strongly. It is probable that the population of Zululand was increasing,²³² and there is no doubt that in the later 1870s rainfall was undergoing a decline which reached its nadir in the great drought of 1878.²³³ The disputed territory was mostly upland country which was healthy for man and beast and which tended to receive more rain than lower land. In a time of drought it was becoming increasingly valuable, and secure possession of it was becoming increasingly important.

The territorial dispute with the Transvaal had festered for sixteen years. Boers had occupied Zulu territory, seized Zulu cattle, destroyed Zulu crops, burnt Zulu grazing, and assaulted and murdered Zulu people. The Zulu had submitted to all this without resistance; instead, they had begged Shepstone to intervene. Shepstone had urged them to show moderation and restraint, which they had done, but still the question had remained unsettled. Then, when the Boers had tried to tax the Zulu, beating them and seizing their cattle, Cetshwayo had risked an armed demonstration. This had proved surprisingly effective. The tax had been abandoned and many Boers had fled. It had also seemed to galvanise Shepstone into action, for he had asked the Zulu for a full statement of their case in writing, which they had given him, and he had gone to England with all the papers on the question to see the advisers of the Queen about it.

In the meantime, the failure of the Boers against Sekhukhune had showed that they were not so much to be feared as the events of Dingane's time had suggested. Shepstone had then returned, said nothing to the Zulu, entered the Transvaal, and the next thing the Zulu had heard was that he had taken the Boers under his protection. Incredible though this

²³² Colenbrande. P , 1981 'The Zulu Political Economy on the Eve of the War', in A. Duminy & C. Ballard (eds.) *The Anglo-Zulu War: New Perspectives* (Pietermaritzburg) pp.84-5.

²³³ C.W. De Kiewiet, *The Imperial Factor in South Africa: a Study in Politics and Economics* (Cambridge, 1937, repr. London, 1965) pp.205-6. See the rainfall figures for Durban from 1875 onwards and the magistrates' reports from the various districts of Natal in the Natal Blue Books. There are no such systematic reports for Zululand, but see the incidental remarks of S.M. Samuelson in S.P.G., Vol. E31, p.1265, quarterly report, Dec. 1876, & Vol. E32, p.1992, quarterly report, June 1877; and *The Net*, 1 May 1877, p.80, letter from Robertson, 20 Feb. [1877]. Since the missionaries left Zululand in early 1878, this source of information is not available for that year.

seemed, it turned out to be true. He had said that he would come and talk to them about the border question. Now he had come. But what would he say?

The meeting took place on 18 October 1877. Shepstone did not wish large numbers of Zulu to traverse land occupied by Boers, so the meeting was held on a large flat-topped hill, subsequently known as Conference Hill, just west of the Ncome river, near its junction with the Lynspruit. Shepstone was accompanied by his son Henrique, whom he had appointed as the Transvaal's Secretary for Native Affairs, by Gert Rudolph, the Land drost of Utrecht, by other officials, and an escort of forty-five soldiers. No farmers were permitted to attend as Shepstone feared that their presence might cause the discussions to become too heated. About five hundred Zulu were present, of whom three hundred were men of rank, who referred to themselves as 'the Zulu nation'.²³⁴

Shepstone had hoped that the Zulu, relieved to find that he had come only to settle the border question and not to annex their country, would prove complaisant and amenable. He was shocked at their attitude. They were, he reported, exacting and unreasonable in their demands, and the tone they exhibited was very self-- asserting, almost defiant and in every way unsatisfactory.²³⁵

At no moment during the whole interview was there apparent the smallest hope of any reasonable arrangement; the arrogant and overbearing tone adopted by the Prime Minister was of course concurred in by all his colleagues.²³⁶ Shepstone told Herbert that the Zulu 'were respectful and civil to me personally'.²³⁷ He later told Carnarvon that 'their

²³⁴ S.P. 6, Shepstone's diary for 1877, entry for 18 Oct.; S.P. 68, pp.281-2, Shepstone to Herbert, 28 Oct 1877; B.P.P., C.2242, p.51, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

²³⁵ S.P. 68, p.282, Shepstone to Herbert, 28 Oct. 1877

²³⁶ B.P.P., C.2242, p.52, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877

²³⁷ S.P. 68, p.282, Shepstone to Herbert, 28 Oct. 1877

bearing was haughty...and it seemed difficult for them to treat me with the respect that they had usually paid me'.²³⁸

Other accounts of the meeting suggest that in these statements Shepstone considerably played down the disrespectful manner in which he was in fact treated. Cetshwayo later stated that Shepstone 'became very angry' at being called 'Somtseu' to his face instead of being addressed as 'Inkosi'.²³⁹ Bulwer stated, apparently on the basis of private letters, that the Zulu did not treat Shepstone with their usual marks of respect, 'and by some one of them he was grossly insulted'.²⁴⁰ These insults were caused by two things, one; the distrust that the Zulus now had on Shepstone and two; the way in which he wanted to handle the settling of the dispute. Which was manipulation and lies.

Shepstone began the meeting by asking the Zulus what they claimed as the boundary. The Zulus objected to this procedure, claiming that they had reported everything concerning the border dispute to him and that it was no use talking about it again as they had nothing more to add. They only wanted to meet face to face with Boers and listen to their claim. Shepstone refused this by claiming that he didn't want to talk about old quarrels which made the Zulus believe that Shepstone had become a Boer since he was refusing that their rights be established and their wrongs redressed.

Shepstone insisted that the Zulu should name the boundary that they claimed, so Mnyamana eventually stated that the boundary the Zulu knew was the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) to the Drakensberg, and the Drakensberg as far north as the sources of the Vaal. This was rejected by Shepstone as unthinkable. He proposed instead the Blood (Ncome) river and the Lynspruit to its source. He did not state where the boundary should go after that, but presumably he meant it to go in a straight line in a northerly direction to the Phongolo. He also suggested leaving a belt of territory of unspecified width 'beyond' this line,

²³⁸ B.P.P., C.2242, p.52, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877

²³⁹ Guy .J. 1979. The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: A civil War in Zululand 1879-1884. P47

²⁴⁰ G.H. 1351, p.31, no. 9, Bulwer to Carnarvon, 24 Dec. 1877

presumably on the Zulu side of it, unoccupied except by a British agent who would hear complaints from either side, the ultimate possession of this belt to be left for future consideration in perhaps five years' time.

He did not specify the Phongolo as the northern boundary, but he always took it for granted that this was the limit that the Zulu could claim in that direction. Part of the difficulty between Shepstone and the Zulu was that they were talking about different things. For Shepstone, the disputed territory was the land the Boers claimed by virtue of the alleged cession of 1861. This excluded the land west of the Ncome, or Ncome-Lynspruit, which had allegedly been ceded in 1854 by Mpande; it also excluded the land north of the Phongolo, which the Transvaal did not recognise as ever having been the Zulu's and which it claimed by virtue of a cession by the Swazi.

The Zulu delegation rejected Shepstone's proposed boundary as indignantly as he had rejected theirs. Shepstone attempted to prove that the Zulu had recognized the Boers' right to the land west of the Ncome river by pointing out that Boer farms east of the river had been abandoned while the Boers west of the river had not been molested. This aroused more Zulu indignation. They argued that they had not driven the Boers away because they had sought a peaceful solution to the dispute. Instead of resorting to force they had referred everything to Shepstone and trusted him to settle the question. They had obeyed his injunctions to exercise restraint, and now that he had joined the Boers he used their restraint as an argument for depriving them of land which they had never ceased to claim.

4.5 Zulu Hostility and Resistance

Shepstone, searching for an explanation for the Zulu's unexpected hostility and refractoriness, was much struck by the counsellors' public denunciation of Cetshwayo on

the occasion of the return of his messengers from the Zulu King. He thought he had discovered in this the clue he sought. The conventional view of Zulu politics was that there was a war party headed by the King and supported by the young regiments, and a peace party, headed by the grave old counsellors and supported by the majority of the older married men. Now, however, it was the counsellors who were the extremists and the King who was relatively moderate. It appears that it was this inversion of expectations that led Shepstone to see a hidden meaning in the public conflict between Cetshwayo and his counsellors.

This conflict, he told Frere, is a novel picture in Zulu affairs and appears to me to point to the possibility of a revolution in Zululand, and as the only chance of gain to the revolutionary party would be to drag us into hostilities with the Zulu King, the danger is that an attempt may be made to do this.²⁴¹

This was no mere passing speculation. He continued to express this view even after the conflict between the King and his counsellors had been resolved, and he made this view the basis of his policies and actions. Three weeks later he wrote again to Frere:

*“I have a very strong suspicion that the headmen are pressing things to their extremes to bring about confusion and relieve them from the present state of things. I can account for their conduct only in this way”.*²⁴²

A further five weeks later he wrote:

“My impression that the revolutionary spirit in Zululand is the main strength of this exacting conduct is daily growing stronger. It requires a disturbance

²⁴¹ S.P. 68, p.286, Shepstone to Frere, 9 Nov. 1877.

²⁴² S.P. 68,p.296, Shepstone to Frere, 1 Dec. 1877.

*for its own ends, and it requires too that this disturbance should be with us or they that favour it fear those ends would not be attained".*²⁴³

The most polite comment one can make upon this hypothesis is that it was a very bold piece of inference and that the evidence in its favour was very scanty. As we shall see, it seemed to Bulwer an entirely unnecessary hypothesis; to him the circumstances of the border dispute provided a sufficient explanation for all the Zulu's words and actions, and Shepstone's wrong-headed view of the matter was one of the reasons that led him to intervene and cause the conduct of the negotiations to be removed from Shepstone's hands.

Why should Shepstone have espoused such an extravagant hypothesis? The reason seems to be that it provided him with an excuse for his failure. The 'Africander Talleyrand', as Frere called him, the master of African diplomacy, the Great White Father of the Zulu King, could not admit, even to himself, that he had misjudged the situation and mismanaged the Zulu. There had to be some additional and extraneous factor to account for things having gone so wrong. He told Frere that in normal circumstances he would have had little fear of failure, but if *'the balance is disturbed by any revolutionary tendencies, an element of uncertainty is introduced into one's calculations'*.²⁴⁴ Another extraneous factor was the war on the Cape eastern frontier, and the exaggerated reports of British reverses which Shepstone was sure were reaching Zululand. *'Such responses'* he told Frere, *'are doubtless calculated to keep up the excitement of the war party and to stimulate the feelings of all in the direction of a struggle with us'*.²⁴⁵

Shepstone and others believed a further extraneous influence was at work. Cetshwayo himself was cast in the role of outside agitator in relation to Sekhukhune and increasingly in relation to every case of 'native trouble' in South Africa. But there was a growing

²⁴³ S.P. 68, pp.317-8, Shepstone to Frere, 5 Jan. 1878.

²⁴⁴ S.P. 68, p.287, Shepstone to Frere, 9 Nov. 1877

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p.299, Shepstone to Frere, 7 Dec. 1877.

suspicion that the agitator himself was subject to external manipulation. F.B. Fynney, after a visit to Zululand, made the mysterious statement that 'the King in all he does is acting under advice, by whom given I am not prepared to say'.²⁴⁶ Shepstone wrote that the reason for the Zulu's conduct was 'a mystery to me unless I attribute it to representations from near Maritzburg, made in ignorance of my real intentions and with the object of thwarting them whatever they may be'.²⁴⁷ There is no doubt as to whom they were referring. The arch-manipulator was the sinister Dr Colenso.

Shepstone was at first prepared to believe that Colenso was not deliberately malicious, and that the danger was only that Cetshwayo might 'put a very different construction upon the Bishop's words to what the Bishop intends'.²⁴⁸ But later he came to believe that Colenso was intentionally mischievous. Nor was he alone in this view. Herbert minuted on a despatch from Shepstone:

It is impossible to guess what Bishop Colenso may do or meditate. All that one can predicate of him is that he will work mischief if he can, & will not be over particular as to his doings. It is conceivable that he may be egging on Cetshwayo to claim an extended frontier with the view of taking up his residence with him and controlling the Zulu policy.²⁴⁹ The reaction of whites in the border districts was frenzied. Colenso was threatened with assassination if he should visit Utrecht;²⁵⁰ and the Utrecht correspondent of The Transvaal Argus wrote:

The great difficulty in the way of a settlement seems to lie in the intervention of the powerful wirepuller behind the Zulu scenes, and the powerful and pernicious influence he

²⁴⁶ B.P.P., C.2242, p.85, report of mission to Zulu King and nation, by Fynney, 22 April 1878, encl. in appendix V, no. 1, Bulwer to Hicks Beach, 24 April 1878.

²⁴⁷ S.P. 68, p.340, Shepstone to Bulwer, 31 Jan. 1878

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p.296, Shepstone to Frere, 1 Dec. 1877

²⁴⁹ C.O. 291/I, minute by Herbert, 11 Feb. 1878, on Tvl. 1524, Confid. Shepstone to Carnarvon, 7 Dec. 1877

²⁵⁰ K.C., Colenso Papers, File 29, K.C.M. 50279, fragment in Colenso's handwriting, n.d. but early 1878

exercises at Exeter Hall, the meddling priest who is actuated purely by a mania for notoriety, and who does not care a brass farthing for the true interests of the black races; who would sit Nero-like on an ant-heap and sing his own praises while the Zulus were desolating the country with fire and assegai. Robben island is the only fitting place for such dangerous maniacs.²⁵¹

Colenso was in communication with Cetshwayo at this time - that much was true. Cetshwayo sent a message to him after the meeting between Shepstone and the Zulu delegation saying that he was in great trouble over the boundary question and asking his advice. Colenso urged him not to think of fighting the British, which could only end in the ruin of himself and his people, and suggested that he should submit the matter to arbitration. On 5 December messengers came from Cetshwayo, Hamu and Mnyamana, stating that the Zulu had abandoned their claim to part of the disputed territory and were strongly desirous of maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with the British, that they had sent messages to this effect to Shepstone and Bulwer but that they were afraid that their words might have been 'lost on the way'. They therefore wished Colenso to write a letter to Bulwer and to the Queen clearly stating their proposals and wishes. Distrust of the Shepstone family, it emerged, was the cause of the Zulu fear that their words were not getting through to Bulwer and the Queen. Cetshwayo suspected that Theophilus Shepstone had never, as he had promised to do, conveyed his complaints about the Boers to the Queen.²⁵²

Theophilus Shepstone's brother John was the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, and all communications to Bulwer passed through his hands. Thus in both the Transvaal and Natal a member of the Shepstone family stood between the Zulu and the British government. It was to bypass the Shepstone's that the Zulu authorities asked Colenso to

²⁵¹ The Natal Witness, 3 Jan 1878, reprint of letter from Utrecht correspondent of The Transvaal Argus, 14 Dec. 1877

²⁵² G.H. 1398, papers on claim of Smith and Colenso to be Cetshwayo's agents, statements of Umfunzi & Nkissimane to Attorney-General, 5 Feb. 1878.

commit their words to writing.²⁵³ Colenso declined to interfere in this way, but since the messengers were very urgent he suggested they might engage a lawyer to do it for them. He said he did not suggest his son Frank, but it was to him and his legal partner, Walter Smith, that they went.²⁵⁴

Smith and Colenso junior informed Bulwer that they had been appointed Diplomatic Agents to the Zulu Government, and that all dealings with Cetshwayo should henceforth be conducted through them. But Bulwer refused to accept this arrangement, so Cetshwayo was obliged to hope that a distinction could be drawn between Natal and Transvaal Shepstone's. He told Bulwer that he was 'quite satisfied that his Excellency will see all justice done him, and that Mr J. Shepstone he looks on as in the place of his Brother Sir Theophilus [with] whom he had no fault to find whilst he was in Natal' .²⁵⁵

"It was these events, magnified and distorted by fear, suspicion, and rumour, that created the belief in the evil machinations of the Bishop of Natal. But we must return to what was really happening on the frontier between the Transvaal and Zululand".

4.6 Zulu-Anglo Frontier Engagements

Shepstone believed, probably correctly, that the eviction orders of late October and early November had not been authorized by Cetshwayo. There was and is no doubt, however, that the next attempt by the Zulu to establish their occupation of, and hence their right to, the disputed territory was ordered by the Zulu King. On the evening of 16 November Charles Potter, the store- keeper, rode into Utrecht with the news that 2 000 armed Zulu

²⁵³ S.N.A. 1/4/1, no. 12, Dunn to Bulwer, 21 Dec. 1877, conveying message from Cetshwayo

²⁵⁴ G.H. 1052, Colenso to Bulwer, 2 Sept. 1878.

²⁵⁵ S.N.A. 1/4/1, no. 93, Dunn to Bulwer, 1 Jan. 1878. On the 'Diplomatic Agents' episode, see also footnote 23 above, and F.E. Colenso & E. Durnford, *History of the Zulu War and its Origin* (2nd ed., London, 1881) pp.137-40.

had that morning marched up to the Phongolo river with orders from Cetshwayo to build an ikhanda or 'military kraal' within three miles of Luneburg. They had been ordered, according to Potter, to molest no-one, but if fired on to return the fire. Mpande had built an ikhanda in this position, but it had been destroyed by the Boers.

There had been talk from time to time of rebuilding it, but nothing had been done. Although he knew the project was not a new one, Shepstone was greatly alarmed by the news that an attempt was now being made to carry it out. An ikhanda in the position proposed would, he believed, command most of the districts of Utrecht and Wakkerstroom, block communications with Swaziland, and cause the evacuation of great numbers of farms hitherto unaffected by the border dispute. 'I feel therefore', he wrote to Bulwer late in the evening he heard the news, 'that the building of this kraal must be prevented at all hazards.' He asked him to make the troops at Newcastle available to him should he need them. He also despatched Captain Clarice and Gert Rudolph to find the Zulu force and attempt to induce its commanders to delay any action while he remonstrated with Cetshwayo.²⁵⁶

Oracle and Rudolph located the force on 18 November near the junction of the Ntombe and the Phongolo rivers. Its commanders stated that their intentions were purely pacific, that Cetshwayo had ordered them to build a kraal to accommodate his native subjects who were living on farms occupied by Boers in this district. that the land belonged to the Zulu nation who had a right to do what it liked with its own, [and] that their orders were not to molest the white inhabitants or to injure their property but to go home after their work was done.

Oracle and Rudolph pointed out that the land could not be flatly asserted to be Zulu territory: the question was in dispute, and negotiations were pending, and in these circumstances the building of the ikhanda was an act of aggression. The Zulu admitted

²⁵⁶ G.H. 789, Confid., Shepstone to Bulwer, 11 p.m., 16 Nov. 1877

the force of this argument, but said that they dared not disobey Cetshwayo's orders. As a compromise, they stated that they would build only the framework of the ikhanda, which could easily be removed if necessary, and then return home at once.²⁵⁷

On the following day the Zulu force retired, having constructed only a small cattle enclosure and stacked some poles on the ground. Nevertheless the passage of the Zulu force through the disputed territory caused about twenty more farmers to abandon their farms, and a number of deserted farmhouses were pillaged and damaged by the Zulu returning home.²⁵⁸

On 21 November an embassy of sixteen Zulu men of rank came to Utrecht with a conciliatory message from the Zulu King. Cetshwayo now stated that he approved of the answers which Shepstone had made to the chiefs at the conference of 18 October, that their demands had been excessive, and that he wished his 'father' to say where the boundary ought to be, and that he would object if he did not agree with it. The members of the embassy had not been authorised to say anything about the recent ikhanda-building expedition, of which they had in fact heard only on the way up. Nevertheless they pointed out that it was an old ambition, and said that it should not be interpreted as a hostile act.²⁵⁹

Shepstone had earlier decided to send his son Henrique and Gert Rudolph to Cetshwayo to attempt to establish a temporary boundary, pending a final settlement, as well as to complain of the action of the Zulu in the disputed territory. The ikhanda-building expedition was now added to the list of complaints. Shepstone seemed to be in two minds as to the likelihood of Rudolph's and Henrique Shepstone's mission being successful. To Bulwer he wrote that he was 'unable to judge' how likely they were to succeed, so To Frere he

²⁵⁷ B.P.P., C.2242, pp.62-3, Clarke & Rudolph to Shepstone, 19 Nov. 1877, encl. in appendix m, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

²⁵⁸ G.H. 789, Confid., Shepstone to Bulwer, 23 Nov. 1877

²⁵⁹ Ibid.; B.P.P., C.2242, p.51, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

wrote that the recent embassy, which included several military commanders, saw very clearly that matters had become very serious and were anxious they should not get worse; this gave him 'every hope that the Zulus have by their injudicious conduct given me the whip hand in the coming negotiations'.²⁶⁰ To the members of the embassy itself he said he had 'but little hope of any very satisfactory issue'.²⁶¹

Shepstone's indecision on the point probably arose from the nature of the message which his son and Rudolph were to convey. The Zulu had earlier rejected his proposal that the Ncome (Blood) river and the Lynspruit should be the boundary. Rudolph and H.C. Shepstone were now commissioned to claim for the Transvaal all the land allegedly ceded in 1861; but, as a temporary arrangement, they were to accept the 'Old Hunting Road' as a provisional boundary. It was thus only in November 1877, well after the acrimonious meeting of 18 October, and not before it, that Shepstone came to put forward the full Boer claim to the disputed territory.

4.7 Overture towards Utrecht Boers

Shepstone claimed to have been converted to the Boer case by his discovery after his arrival in Utrecht of 'the most incontrovertible, overwhelming and clear evidence' in its favour, evidence which had never been communicated to the government in Natal and of which he had therefore previously been ignorant.²⁶² He sent this evidence to Carnarvon in two despatches dated 7 December 1877 and 18 January 1878.²⁶³ It is not at all convincing.

Many of these documents are ex parte statements made long after the event by Boers involved in the transactions of 1861 and 1864, which prove nothing except that the Boers

²⁶⁰ S.P, p.290, Shepstone to Frere, 23 Nov. 1877.

²⁶¹ G.H. 789, Confid., Shepstone to Bulwer, 23 Nov. 1877

²⁶² B.P.P., C.2079, p.54, no. 38, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 2 Jan. 1878.

²⁶³ C.O. 879/12, African no. 147, p.196, Confid. Shepstone to Carnarvon, 7 Dec. 1877; C.O. 879/13, African no. 150, p.90, Confid. Shepstone to Carnarvon, 18 January 1878

claimed the disputed territory. Other documents - reports of commissions to Mpande and Cetshwayo and so on - prove nothing but the continued opposition of the Zulu to the line claimed by the Boers. Only four of the documents Shepstone sent to Carnarvon date from 1861, the year in which the cession was allegedly made. The most important is the treaty of 28 and 29 March which contains Cetshwayo's alleged deed of cession. This had, however, been communicated to the Natal government: Shepstone had appended a copy of it to a minute he had written as Secretary for Native Affairs in June 1876, and it was printed in the British Parliamentary Paper C.1961 on p.23.

Another of these 1861 documents consists of the minutes of the meeting held on 1 April at which it was decided to return the fugitives in consideration for which it was later claimed that Cetshwayo had agreed to cede land. In this document there is no reference to any cession of land: the reason for returning them is stated to be that their retention endangered the safety of the state, and that Cetshwayo had promised not to injure them.²⁶⁴

Another document dated 16 March 1861, purports to be a record of a message from Cetshwayo in which he offered to cede land. But it also purports to describe his meeting with Shepstone, a meeting which took place only in May; the document is thus palpably a subsequent fabrication.²⁶⁵ The last of these four documents is Mpande's so-called ratification of 5 August 1861. It was in fact a denial of the validity of any cession by Cetshwayo, and a fresh deed of cession. It was signed by three frontier farmers and witnessed by a single Zulu. I have given reasons above for believing that it is extremely unlikely that Mpande ever made such a cession.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴C.O. 879/12, African no. 147, p.196, Confid. Shepstone to Carnarvon, 7 Dec. 1877; C.O. 879/13, African no. 150, p.90, Confid. Shepstone to Carnarvon, 18 January 1878

²⁶⁵ See above, ch. 2, p.33.

²⁶⁶ See above, ch. 2, p.36.

The three last documents were apparently not communicated to the Natal government; but it will readily be seen that as evidence they cannot be described as 'most incontrovertible, overwhelming and clear'. Shepstone in fact seems to have attached the greatest weight to the assertions made to him in 1877 in Utrecht. He described them as 'the most important testimony',²⁶⁷ and he told Carnarvon, when sending the documents which he claimed proved the Transvaal case, that 'having received the evidence of the chief actors in the events called in question, including that of the President himself, I have thought it best not to multiply documents unnecessarily'.²⁶⁸

Ex-President Pretorius's testimony is of interest.²⁶⁹ It purports to give an account of his visit to Mpande and Cetshwayo immediately after the alleged cession of 1861. The discrepancy, or rather complete contradiction, between this account of his visit and the reports he made at the time can only with great difficulty be ascribed to forgetfulness.²⁷⁰ The original reports are in the Transvaal archives now and must have been there in 1877.

Perhaps Shepstone or his aides did not succeed in finding them. Even so, the inherent implausibility of the statement must surely have cast doubt on its truthfulness. For example, Pretorius stated that 'Panda said we had acted in a friendly way one to another, you by giving me my sons, and I by giving you a strip of land.' Shepstone must surely have known that the last thing Mpande had wanted in 1861 was the surrender of Mthonga. Whom he wished to be his heir, into the clutches of Cetshwayo, the rival claimant to the succession.

It is impossible to believe that Shepstone's volte-face on the border question was the result of any process of argument or intellectual conviction. The fact is simply that in Natal he had believed the Zulu, but in the Transvaal he believed the Boers. He was quite

²⁶⁷ B.P.P., C.2242, p.56, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

²⁶⁸ C.O. 879/13, African no. 150, no. 58, p.90, Confid., Shepstone to Carnarvon, 18 Jan. 1878

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p.99, statement of M.W. Pretorius, 22 Dec. 1877, encl. in Shepstone to Carnarvon, 18 Jan. 1878.

²⁷⁰ See above, ch. 2, p.36.

capable, in a different context that of the Boer agitation against British rule in the Transvaal, of characterizing the Boers at large as 'exceptionally deceitful'.²⁷¹ But in the context of the Transvaal-Zulu border dispute it was convenient or necessary for him to believe everything they said and to dismiss the Zulu case as 'characterised by lying and treachery to an extent that I could not have believed even savages capable of'.²⁷²

The real reason for Shepstone's conversion must be found in the political situation in which he was now placed. The growth of Boer opposition to his rule together with the conduct of the Zulu brought home to him the logic of his new situation and the inappropriateness in this context of the views on the border question he had absorbed as Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal.

It was during Shepstone's stay in Utrecht that the Boer opposition to British rule began to manifest itself.²⁷³ A fortnight after he arrived in Utrecht he could write: 'Wherever I have been during this trip I have been very warmly received and I believe that confidence in the new state of things is fast growing up among the Boer population.'²⁷⁴ 'Shepstone had travelled to Utrecht through the frontier districts of the eastern Transvaal, and in areas such as this, where strong government had been most sorely missed, there was some Boer support for the new regime.

A little over three weeks later, on 28 October, he commented that there were still a good many Boers who hoped that the deputation to England would succeed in getting the annexation reversed.²⁷⁵ By 23 November he was referring to a 'good deal of anti-British feeling' in the Heidelberg district (which was far removed from any frontier).²⁷⁶ By the time

²⁷¹ S.P. 68, p.351, Shepstone to Herbert, 19 Feb. 1878

²⁷² Ibid., p.302, Shepstone to Bulwer, 10 Dec. 1877

²⁷³ On this generally see M.C. Van Zyl, *Die Protes-Beweging van die Transvaale Afrikaners 1877-1880* (Pretoria & Cape Town, 1979)

²⁷⁴ S.P. 68, p.275, Shepstone to Frere, 5 Oct 1877

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p.281, Shepstone to Herbert, 28 Oct. 1877

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p.292, Shepstone to Frere, 23 Nov. 1877.

he eventually left Utrecht the Boer population of the country was in a state of incipient revolt, which was temporarily defused only by the sending of a second deputation to England.

When Shepstone first arrived in Utrecht he received a number of loyal addresses approving of the annexation. The wording of the addresses, however, made it quite clear what those who signed them expected from Shepstone, and quite clear also that their loyalty was conditional upon those expectations being fulfilled. What they wanted and expected, in the words of one of the addresses, was that Shepstone should 'make the integrity of this State respected by the barbaric neighbouring nation, and its despotic ruler'. In his replies to these addresses Shepstone promised only 'the fullest consideration, and such action as justice and prudence may suggest'.²⁷⁷

The rebuff he received from the Zulu at the meeting of 18 October and the subsequent disturbances in the disputed territory were not such as to encourage such an even-handed approach; rather, they were such as to incline him to adopt the more obvious course of upholding the interests of the state of which he was the ruler. It was, he said, after the Boers had brought to his notice 'the danger I appeared to be in of surrendering the just rights of the Transvaal' that he changed his mind.²⁷⁸ 'I need scarcely say' he told Carnarvon, 'that the White population in this country expect that Her Majesty's Government will be better able to vindicate those rights than that which it has superseded'.²⁷⁹

The white population of the Transvaal had every reason to expect this, for this was virtually what Shepstone had promised them when he had annexed their country. His justification for the annexation had been the inability of the republican regime to protect its citizens against the encroachments of the black hordes that surrounded it. In a

²⁷⁷ B.P.P. C.1961, pp.153-7, no.79, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 4 Oct. 1877, and enclosures.

²⁷⁸ B.P.P., C.2079, p.54, no.38, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 2 Jan. 1878.

²⁷⁹ B.P.P., C.2242, p.58, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

despatch written a month before the annexation, and which bears all the marks of having been intended for publication, Shepstone referred specifically to Cetshwayo in these terms:

Since the Sekukuni fiasco he has assumed the exercise of sovereignty over a portion of Transvaal territory. He has ordered this farmer to leave his farm, and granted to another the privileges of remaining on his. These orders have been obeyed, numbers of farms have been abandoned, and the houses and standing crops of the Boers have been taken possession of by the Zulus; so that the process that has been going on for years in the North of abandoning farms and houses and other property to the natives, is now commencing in the South.²⁸⁰

Having annexed the Transvaal ostensibly in order to rescue it from these conditions, there was something anomalous in his upholding even part of the Zulu claims. To have continued to do so after the Zulu had caused more Boers to flee their farms would have been very difficult. To have done so after growing Boer discontent with British rule had manifested itself would have been suicidal. But the change from one view of the matter to another led him into tortuous arguments and assertions of very doubtful honesty, and exposed him to the accusation (by an official of the Colonial Office) of having 'turned his coat in the most shameless manner'.²⁸¹ The horrible mess he found himself in gave him a strong personal interest in the abolition of the Zulu kingdom as part of the complete reconstruction of South Africa along the lines mapped out by Lord Carnarvon.

²⁸⁰ B.P.P., C.1776, p.127, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 12 March 1877, encl. in no. 90, Barkly to Carnarvon, 27 March 1877.

²⁸¹ Guy, *Destruction*, p.46, quoting Edward Fairfield in 1885. Etherington, 'Anglo-Zulu Relations', pp.40-1, argues that Shepstone upheld the Transvaal claims in order to secure the labour mitigation 'corridor' through the disputed territory to Natal. I have found no evidence to support this, which is, indeed, not a plausible argument as applied to the post-annexation period, when the whole Transvaal was under British rule. Shepstone faced great problems in the Transvaal, and it is most unlikely that he was preoccupied with Natal's labour problems at this period.

At the 18 October meeting, before his conversion, Shepstone had claimed for the Transvaal the Ncome (Blood) river and Lynspruit line on the strength of the 1854 treaty with Mpande. After his conversion he professed to believe that the line agreed on by this treaty had been the Old Hunting Road. The wording of the treaty, though obscure, gives no support to this interpretation.²⁸² Shepstone, however, claimed to remember that in 1873 Cetshwayo had said to him that 'he supposed that as his father had given the road to the Boers, he should have to consent to that'.²⁸³

Shepstone's reports on his visit to Zululand in 1873 contain no reference to any such remark, nor, indeed, to any such resigned attitude. On the contrary, he had reported then that 'the Zulu view is that the whole of the Transvaal occupation below the Drakensberg is an encroachment upon their territory', and he had laid stress on the 'vehemence' and 'strong and angry feeling' of Cetshwayo and his counsellors on the question, feelings which could 'scarcely be described in language too strong'. One may argue and say that the real reason for this change of professed opinion was that he felt that the 1861 session would be much more difficult to sustain than the 1854 session (and the conclusions of the 1878 Commission bore this out) and that he was therefore trying to get as much as possible on the strength of the latter.

4.8 The Abortive Attempts at Conciliation

We must return to the mission of Henrique Shepstone and Gert Rudolph. Shepstone instructed them to tell Cetshwayo that he had changed his mind and that he now claimed the line of 1861, but that he was prepared, without conceding any Transvaal rights, to

²⁸² B.P.P., C.2220, p.371, Border Commission report, 20 June 1878, encl. in appendix II, no. 1, Bulwer to Hicks Beach, 16 July 1878.

²⁸³ B.P.P., C.2242, p.57, appendix III, no. 1, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 1 Dec. 1877.

accept the Old Hunting Road as a provisional boundary. Given these instructions, there was no chance of the mission being successful. It proved to be a disaster. Not only was Shepstone's new claim even more unacceptable than his old, but the Transvaal delegates complained bitterly of the way Shepstone had been treated at the 18 October meeting, for which Cetshwayo had already apologised in his message of 21 November,²⁸⁴ and they also complained of the eviction notices served on the Boers in late October and early November, which had subsequently been withdrawn, and of the attempt to build an ikhanda in the Phongolo valley, which had subsequently been abandoned.

The Zulu's attempt at conciliation, it seemed, produced no similar response in Shepstone, but rather led him to press home what he supposed to be his advantage. The results of H.C. Shepstone and Rudolph's mission were therefore entirely negative. The mission served only to harden the Zulu's attitude, and exacerbate the relations between Zululand and the Transvaal and between Cetshwayo and Shepstone. Cetshwayo, with the support of his counsellors, rejected Shepstone's claim and repeated the claim he had earlier made. He stated that the whole problem had arisen because he had respected Shepstone's urgings in earlier years not to fight the Boers; if it had not been for this the Zulu would have enforced a settlement of the question long ago.

He said that if Shepstone wished to cast him off there was a man of equal rank in Pietermaritzburg who would take him up and write to the Queen for him; this was almost certainly a reference to Bulwer, but Shepstone assumed it referred to Colenso. Cetshwayo told the Transvaal delegates to tell Shepstone to move the people living in the land he claimed or some accident would happen. He also stated that he intended to proceed with the building of the Phongolo ikhanda forthwith. He added, however, that he would not be the first to go to war.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴S.N.A. Ifl/10, no. 62, minute on the relations of the Zulu with the government of the Z.A.R. as described from a Zulu point of view, 20 Feb. 1874.p213

²⁸⁵ T.A., S.N. 6, H.C. Shepstone & Rudolph to Shepstone, 4 Dec. 1877

H.C. Shepstone and Rudolph returned to Utrecht on 1 December. Shepstone treated the message they brought as an ultimatum. He interpreted Cetshwayo's words as the announcement of his intention to occupy the territory he claimed by force. He consequently sent a counter-ultimatum to the Zulu King. He told him that he would not permit the erection of a 'military kraal' on the Phongolo, that he would henceforth regard the Old Hunting Road as the provisional boundary between the Transvaal and Zululand, and that if there were any further aggression north of this road the Zulu should not blame him for the consequences.²⁸⁶

At the time of the Zulu ikhanda-building expedition in November Shepstone had asked for permission to use the troops stationed at Newcastle should this prove necessary. He now asked the commanding officer in Newcastle to send as large a force as he could spare to Utrecht.²⁸⁷ He also had half the infantry and all the artillery in Pretoria moved by stages to Utrecht.²⁸⁸ He considered the possibility of raising volunteers in the Orange Free State and calling out the Swazi.²⁸⁹

He instructed the Landdrosts of Utrecht and Wakkerstroom to advise the burghers to place their families in secure positions and hold themselves in readiness for active service.²⁹⁰ He appealed to Bulwer for co-operation: a demonstration that Natal and the Transvaal were acting in concert would, he believed, have a restraining effect on

²⁸⁶ B.P.P. C.2242, p.77, appendix III. no. 2, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 4 Dec. 1877.

²⁸⁷ T.A., General Letter-Book 2, Shepstone to Major Tucker, Dec. 1877

²⁸⁸ Ibid., Shepstone to Commandant, Transvaal, 1 Dec. 1877; to O.C. Heidelberg, 8 Dec. 1877; to O.C. Standerton, 15 Dec. 1877.

²⁸⁹ S.P. 68, p.299, Shepstone to Frere, 7 Dec. 1877.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p.311, Shepstone to Frere, 15 Dec. 1877; T.A. General Letter-Book 2, H.C. Shepstone to Landdrost M. W. Stroom, 13 Dec. 1877. This volume does not contain the instruction to the Landdrost of Utrecht, which was probably given verbally. A memorial of 79 burghers dated 2 Feb. 1878, enclosed in G.H. 790, no. 9, Shepstone to Bulwer, 8 Feb. 1878, shows that such advice was received from the Landdrost of Utrecht

Cetshwayo.²⁹¹ He suggested to Frere that a warship patrolling the Zululand coast 'might be of great service in deciding the Zulu King to adopt a more reasonable policy'.²⁹²

Shepstone hoped that his military preparations would reassure those fanners who still remained on their fanns and put a stop to the evacuation of farms which was still proceeding. They had just the opposite effect. His advising the burghers to hold themselves in readiness for active service was interpreted as an intimation of an imminent outbreak of war, and what was described as a 'stampede' took place, as the border farmers removed not only their families but themselves from the scene of possible danger. For two days the roads to the Vaal were choked with 2 000 waggons and large herds of cattle, as the areas between the Ncome and the Mzinyathi rivers and between the Phongolo and the Mkhondo (Assegai) rivers, areas previously unaffected by frontier scares, were almost completely abandoned. Most Boers were determined not to give any assistance to Shepstone: he had annexed their country with the excuse that they were incapable of defending themselves, and now they believed it was up to him and his soldiers to defend the country.²⁹³

The anticipated Zulu invasion, like all anticipated Zulu invasions, never happened. In the territory claimed by Cetshwayo, Zulu helped themselves to abandoned property; west of the Ncome river, in territory not claimed by the Zulu, the desolation of the abandoned fanns was not even thus disturbed. An officer in the Royal Engineers rode through the area south of the town of Utrecht in late December and reported:

²⁹¹ G.H. 789, Confid., Shepstone to Bulwer, 4 Dec. 1877; S.P. 68, p.314, Shepstone to Bulwer, 24 Dec. 1877

²⁹² T.A., General Letter-Book 2, Shepstone to Frere, 22 Dec. 1877

²⁹³ De Volksstem, 18 Dec. 1877, 'The Zulu Difficulty'; *ibid.*, 1 Jan. 1878, letter from Wakkerstroom correspondent, 20 Dec. 1877; *ibid.*, 8 Jan. 1878, quoting letter from Utrecht, 27 Dec. 1877; The Natal Mercury, 22 Jan. 1878, letter, 12 Jan. 1878.

“In the two days we passed through a country showing abundant signs of settlement, but except the fanns immediately near the town of Utrecht, the defence centres and Mr. Uys' fann, the country was deserted”.

The comfortable looking houses with doors and shutters fastened, the orchards and gardens with fruit rotting on the ground, the dogs, cats, geese and poultry which came round us when we dismounted, seeking for food, left a melancholy impression on our minds almost weird from the absence of ostensible cause. There was no appearance of fire; we saw no marks of violence anywhere.²⁹⁴

Shepstone in Utrecht was almost surrounded by a desolate countryside: a far wider area than ever before had been abandoned. And yet the Zulu did nothing. Cetshwayo's 'ultimatum' was a product of his temporary irritation and of Shepstone's failure of nerve. H.C. Shepstone and Rudolph had borne an unwelcome message and had conducted themselves in an undiplomatic fashion, and this had produced an irritable response from Cetshwayo. This response, perhaps exaggerated by Henrique Shepstone and Rudolph, was interpreted by Theophilus Shepstone as an ultimatum. But subsequent events showed that it was not intended as such. Subsequent Zulu statements were all of a pacific nature.

The Zulu messengers to whom Shepstone delivered his counter-ultimatum on 3 December smiled at the thought of Cetshwayo's going to war with Shepstone and said 'he was only talking to his "father" to gain his point'.²⁹⁵ On 18 December a message came from Cetshwayo to say that he had heard it was believed he intended to attack the Transvaal but that he had no such intention. He said that he had heard as well that the Transvaal was preparing to attack him. He also stated that he was investigating reports

²⁹⁴ S.S. 258, R.2649, Macdowil (?) to (?), 26 Dec. 1878

²⁹⁵ B.P.P., C.2242, p.78, appendix ill,no. 2, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 4 Dec. 1877.

that the force sent to build the ikhanda in November had damaged property, contrary to his orders.

The messenger brought no reply to Shepstone's previous message, what I have called his counter-ultimatum, which he said, Cetshwayo had 'not yet sufficiently consulted his great men about'.²⁹⁶ The reply came six days later, and it was essentially that there was no reply he could make. He had named two boundaries both of which Shepstone had rejected. The Old Hunting Road on the other hand was right in Zululand. All he could suggest was that his father should point out a place sufficiently large for the Zulu people to move to. In referring to the 'man in Pietermaritzburg' and the letter to the Queen he said he was 'merely beseeching his father, remembering that he had brought him up and crowned him and hoping that therefore he would listen to him '. He also said he would pay compensation for all damage done by the ikhanda-builders once his enquiries were complete.²⁹⁷

Two days earlier (the suspense perhaps being unbearable) Shepstone had sent messengers to Cetshwayo to demand a reply to his counter-ultimatum: did he still intend to occupy by force the territory he claimed by building a military kraal on the Phongolo, and did he want a peaceful settlement or war? He also told him he intended to station troops on the west bank of the Blood (Ncome) river to reassure the few farmers still remaining in the lower Utrecht district. He was telling him this, he said, so the Zulu in the area would not take alarm and flee, as the Boers had done when Cetshwayo had sent a large force without any warning to build a military kraal.²⁹⁸

The men who took this message found Cetshwayo in the midst of the umkhosi, the annual military review. They stayed at Ulundi for three days. The King placed them near him to

²⁹⁶ C.O. 879/13, African no. 150, no. 1, Confid., Shepstone to Carnarvon, 20 Dec. 1877; S.P. 6, Shepstone's diary for 1877, entry for 19 Dec.

²⁹⁷ T.A., S.N. 6, statement of Pili, Faku, Ungexeni & Usizibana, 24 Dec. 1877.

²⁹⁸ T.A., General Letter-book 2, Shepstone to Frere, 22 Dec. 1877; S.P. 6, Shepstone's diary for 1877, entry for 22 Dec

see the regiments dancing. The soldiers knew who they were and made contemptuous references to Shepstone, demanding to be led to war against the white men and declaring they would die for the disputed territory. 'You hear what they say', said Cetshwayo, *'that is the Zulu people speaking, and I dare not go against what they say about the land; they would tum against me were I to do so.'* He also, however, remarked that many of those who clamoured loudest would be the first to desert him if anything went wrong.

Cetshwayo said that he could not accept Shepstone's territorial claim and could not relinquish his own. But he would not fight. Even if Shepstone sent an army against him would not resist; when the army came it would find him unarmed, for he could not fight his father. If he had wished to fight, he would have fought the Boers, who had given him great provocation, but he had not done so in deference to his father. He could have no objection to Shepstone's stationing troops on the Ncome (Blood) river, since he did not claim that territory. By the same token, however, there was no necessity for it. He also questioned its wisdom. Had he sent a force to the opposite bank of the river to give his people confidence, would it be possible for the two forces to face each other without conflict arising? He had, however, no intention of sending such a force.

Before leaving, the messengers saw Mnyamana and the other izikhulu. They said they agreed with Cetshwayo concerning the boundary line, but disagreed with his statement that he would not fight under any circumstances. They said that they would not commence hostilities, but they would resist the occupation of the disputed territory, and were prepared to die fighting on this question. 'Take your official message, however', they said; 'what we say is only conversation, but it is the truth.'²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹B.P.P., C.2079, p. 51, no. 38, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 2 Jan. 1878; *ibid.*, p.56, statement of Nongamulana & Sabulawa, 31 Dec. 1877, encl. in no. 39, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 5 Jan. 1878.

4.9 Conclusion

The land and boarder dispute were the first conflicts that the Zulus and the British faced. When King Mpande gave land to the British, he specifically told them to not cross over the Transvaal but they encroached until a lot of them occupied the lands.

In October 1877, Shepstone attended an ill-tempered meeting with a Zulu delegation near the Blood River, infuriating them by suggesting a compromise with the Boers over the land issue. The meeting broke up in disarray. Livid that his authority should be challenged, Shepstone told London that the Zulu delegation had been 'exacting and unreasonable in their demands, and the tone they exhibited was very self-asserting, almost defiant and in every way unsatisfactory. At no moment during the whole interview was there apparent the smallest hope of any reasonable arrangement.'

Shepstone now turned against Cetshwayo with a vengeance. Insisting that he had come into possession of 'the most incontrovertible, overwhelming and clear evidence', never previously disclosed, he threw his weight into supporting Boer claims to the disputed territory and dismissed the Zulu case as 'characterized by lying and treachery to an extent that I could not have believed even savages capable of'. The Zulu delegation did eventually modify its claim to a line running along the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) river, the Ngcuba river (near the town of Utrecht) to its sources, a watershed parallel to the Drakensberg running northwards to the Mkhondo (Assegai) river and then that river eastwards. But Shepstone rejected this as just as impossible as their earlier claim. Since it was apparent that no agreement could be reached, Shepstone proposed referring the matter to Cetshwayo.

The Zulu delegation opposed this proposal. They stated that they represented the Zulu nation, that Cetshwayo and Mpande were present in them, that they had full powers to settle the question, and that no-one would gainsay what they decided. Shepstone said he could come to no agreement with them, and that even had he been able to do so he would

not have considered it final until Cetshwayo had also agreed. Since Shepstone would not discuss the matter any further, the Zulu reluctantly agreed to this course of action, and with this the meeting broke up.



Figure 2: Zululand surrounded by the British

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ZULU-BRITISH WAR OF 1879

5.1 Introduction

The Anglo-Zulu war is perhaps the most well-known colonial campaign of the Victorian or any other era. We know more about it than many other wars and it has generated an enormous amount of excellent scholarship. My particular interest in this chapter, however, is driven by the wider context of the Anglo-Zulu war, of what were the events that led to it and what ignited them. It has often been assumed in the popular imagination that this war was little more than an unprincipled land grab driven by greed and instigated by a maverick, but the aim of this chapter is to challenge some of these assumptions and to put forward a more radical and, a more plausible answer to the question of why there was an Anglo-Zulu war in 1879.

The pretext for the war had its origins in border disputes between King Cetshwayo, and the Boers in the Transvaal region. Following a commission enquiry on the border dispute which reported in favour of the Zulu nation in July 1878, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, acting on his own, added an ultimatum to the commission meeting, much to the surprise of the Zulu representatives who then relayed it to Cetshwayo. Cetshwayo had not responded by the end of the year, so an extension was granted by Bartle Frere until 11 January 1879.

Many Scholars, “Many historians mark the 10 January 1879 as the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War, while others claim that the 12 January 1879 (first attack) or the 22 January 1879 (first decisive battle of Isandlwana) marked the beginning of the war”³⁰⁰ regard this as the initial beginning of the war because although many conflicts have occurred before but none had led to such a distinguished War presided by battles of very high violence, planning and impeccable urges to conquer. This chapter seeks to look at the journey that took place leading up to the war of 1879, the battles that were conquered within the war as well as the articulated and calculated planning that was needed to win these battles. This chapter will therefore put into clarity the reasons that led the British to accumulate full control of the Zulu Kingdom.

5.2 The Dispute Commission

The Border Commission began its work at Rorke's Drift on 12 March 1878.³⁰¹ As instructed by Shepstone,³⁰² the Transvaal delegates claimed the line allegedly ceded in 1861 and beaconed in 1864, thus dropping the claim to additional territory made in Joubert's proclamation of 1875.³⁰³ The Zulu delegates, on the other hand, were evidently instructed to claim the maximum possible, for they claimed the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) to its sources and then a line extending far into the eastern Transvaal, north of the Olifants river. They thus made a formal claim to the territory between the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) and Ncome (Blood) rivers, territory to which Cetshwayo had earlier abandoned his claim. The extravagant Zulu claim to territory north of the Phongolo fell outside the scope of the

³⁰⁰ Anglo-Zulu Wars 1879-1896. 2011 <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/anglo-zulu-wars-1879-1896>

³⁰¹ Some information on the day to day proceedings of the Commission is to be found in Natal Archives, H.C. Shepstone Papers, Vol. 3, diary for 1878, and in G.H. 790, report made to Theophilus Shepstone by the Transvaal delegates, 20 April 1878, encl. in no. 9, Shepstone to Bulwer, 18 May 1878

³⁰² T.A., S.N. 6, minute by Shepstone for the guidance of the Transvaal delegates, 12 March 1878

³⁰³ Ibid , Ch. 3, p.81

Commission, which had been instructed by Bulwer to consider only the territory alleged to have been ceded by the Zulu to the Boers.

The Transvaal claim to territory north of the Phongolo was based on a Swazi cession of 1855 (which the Zulu claimed the Swazi had no right to make) and not on a Zulu cession.³⁰⁴ This was therefore a separate question. Nevertheless, it needed to be solved, as the Commission pointed out. The reason why the Commission was not asked to do so was probably simply the fixed assumption on the part of whites that the Zulu could have no claim north of the Phongolo. P.L. Uys, who was also one of the Transvaal delegates, was the first witness to give evidence. When the Zulu delegates were invited to cross-examine him they declined to do so, saying that everything he said was false, that they had come only to state their claim, and that they had received no authority from Cetshwayo to question Transvaal witnesses or to call any of their own.³⁰⁵

This uncooperative attitude arose from the Zulu's initial distrust of the Commission and their lack of faith in its impartiality.³⁰⁶ The presence on it of John Shepstone probably had a lot to do with this. As the Commission's proceedings continued, however, the Zulu lost their initial distrust. The Commissioners dealt with the Transvaal and Zulu delegates on a level of strict equality, which was a source of great dissatisfaction to Henrique Shepstone and his father,³⁰⁷ but which seems to have reassured the Zulu. They certainly called witnesses, and though it is not clear whether they questioned the Transvaal witnesses, the members of the Commission subjected both sides to searching questioning. After the conclusion of the enquiry, Cetshwayo sent a message to Bulwer

³⁰⁴ Ibid , Ch. 2, pp.29-31

³⁰⁵ Natal Archives, H.C. Shepstone Papers, Vol. 3, diary for 1878, entry for 15 March; G.H. 1300, p.118, Confid., Bulwer to Frere, 24 April 1878.

³⁰⁶ B.P.P., C.2242, pp.80-5, Bulwer to Frere, 24 April 1878, message from Bulwer to Cetshwayo, 29 March 1878, and report by Fynney, 22 April 1878, all encl. in appendix V, no. 1, Bulwer to Hicks Beach, 24 April 1878.

³⁰⁷ G.H. 791, no.34, Shepstone to Bulwer, 28 June 1878, and minute on this by Bulwer, n.d.; S.P.

69, p.132, Shepstone to Frere, 12 Oct. 1878; E. Durnford (ed.) *A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa, 1872 to 1879* (London, 1882) pp.178-9

stating that he now saw that the Natal government wished to do him justice and expressing perfect satisfaction with the way the enquiry had been conducted.³⁰⁸

Part of his satisfaction may have arisen from a belief that the Zulu had got the better of it; and, conversely, part of the Transvaal delegates' dissatisfaction with the enquiry may have arisen from a fear that they had not been successful. H.C. Shepstone's diary suggests that things did not go well for the Transvaal. Two days after Uys completed his evidence he is described as having 'amended' it. Other witnesses are described as having 'made a mess of it', having 'made a regular mess of it', and as being 'forgetful' or 'very forgetful',³⁰⁹ though others are described as having given their evidence well. The inadequacy of some of the Transvaal witnesses was apparent to others. William Ngidi, one of Colenso's converts, wrote to another, Magema Fuze, that;

*the Dutch are beaten, they are unable to confirm the boundary, their paper has been lost - it has rotted away - it has had something spilt over it - it has been destroyed anyhow, the Dutch have lost their case, & are much blamed by the English for being unable to confirm the boundary.*³¹⁰

Such reports then began to surface in the press. The Natal Witness reported on 13 April that rumours kept arriving that the Transvaal witnesses had failed to prove their case,³¹¹ and its Biggarsberg correspondent wrote on 22 April that it was 'rumoured pretty freely here that as far as the case has gone, it does not look favourable for the Transvaal'.³¹² It is likely that a similar impression prevailed in Zululand. Cetshwayo's message to Bulwer

³⁰⁸ S.N.A. 1{7/13, p.114, message from Cetshwayo, 15 May 1878.

³⁰⁹ Natal Archives, H.C. Shepstone Papers, Vol. 3, diary for 1878, entries for 18 & 20 March & 1 April.

³¹⁰ K.C., Colenso Papers, File 29, K.C.M. 50268, trans., 23 March 1878, encl. in File 29, K.C.M. 50269, Colenso to Chesson, 14 April 1878, in which the writer and recipient of K.C.M. 50268 are identified. The translation from Zulu is by Colenso

³¹¹ The Natal Witness, 13 April 1878, 'Mail Summary'.

³¹² Ibid., 27 April 1878, letter from Biggarsberg correspondent, 22 April 1878; see also The Natal Mercury, 8 April 1878, 'The Week'

expressing satisfaction with the enquiry appears to imply that its outcome would be favourable to the Zulu:

*“Cetywayo and the Zulu people are awaiting with beating hearts what the Lieutenant Governor of Natal will decide about the land that the Boers have given them, the Zulus, so much trouble about - for the Zulus wish very much now to occupy the land they never parted with, as it is now the proper season for doing so”.*³¹³

The Transvaal Boers also wished to occupy the land. Both sides in fact made attempts to reoccupy the land after the sitting of the Commission, with the result that May 1878 was characterised by renewed tension and alarms in the border area. Some of the Boers who had been living in laager were evidently encouraged by Shepstone to resume the occupation of their farms, but were driven off by groups of Zulu. The Zulu went further than this, however: they ordered farmers who had remained on their farms to quit, including farmers as far north as the Mkhonto (Assegai) river, and also in the area west of the Ncome river, in territory, that is, to which Cetshwayo had earlier relinquished his claim.

All this was done in the name of the Zulu King, and the impression evidently prevailed among the Zulu that Bulwer had granted them all the land they had claimed at the Rorke's Drift enquiry. Parties of Zulu also commenced building homesteads in the territory they claimed, including one at Luneburg, where the attempt six months earlier to build a 'military kraal' had caused such alarm. The 'kraal' that was built, however, proved to be an ordinary residential umuzi, not an ikhanda or 'military kraal', and the commander of the building party, the induna Faku, whose residence the umuzi was to be, contradicted the earlier Zulu orders to the Luneburgers to leave, and stated that Cetshwayo had ordered that Transvaal subjects were not to be molested or disturbed in the occupation of their

³¹³ S.N.A. Jf/13, p.114, message from Cetshwayo, 15 May 1878

land. It is possible, indeed, as Colenso argued, that the building of the Luneburg umuzi was Cetshwayo's response to the frontier disturbances, and that Faku was sent to Luneburg in order to control the local Zulu and prevent them from disturbing the peace.³¹⁴

Shepstone's response to the frontier disturbances could almost be described as sulky. In reply to letters and petitions from his alarmed subjects he invariably replied that Zulu matters had been taken out of his hands and that they should direct their pleas and requests to Bulwer.³¹⁵ He evidently felt deeply humiliated by the removal of the negotiations with the Zulu from his hands. Bulwer did not agree that his offer of arbitration had made him responsible for the preservation of order on the Transvaal-Zululand border.³¹⁶ Nevertheless he sent a message to Cetshwayo urging him not to anticipate the border award as it was reported some of his subjects were doing.³¹⁷

Cetshwayo denied having acted aggressively, and stated that all he had done was to ask Rudolph not to permit the Boers to reoccupy the farms, pending the outcome of the enquiry, for fear of disturbances.³¹⁸ Rudolph ascertained that the earlier orders to quit

³¹⁴J.W. Colenso, Bishop Colenso's Commentary on Frere's Policy (Bishopstowe, n.d.) 1st section, p.90. Information on the disturbances following the sitting of the Rorke's Drift Commission is taken from a large number of sources: G.H. 790, no. 29, Shepstone to Bulwer, 18 May & enclosures; G.H. 791, nos. 32 & 33, Shepstone to Bulwer, 3 & 8 June 1878, & enclosures; G.H. 1326, no. 93, Bulwer to Shepstone, 7 June 1878; S.N.A. 1/4/1, no. 606, H.C. Shepstone to J.W. Shepstone (A.S.N.A.), 16 May 1878, encl. Rudolph to H.C. Shepstone, 10 May 1878, & Engelbrecht to Rudolph, 11 May 1878; S.N.A. 1/3/30, no. 90, RM. Newcastle to J.W. Shepstone (A.S.N.A.), 18 May 1878, encl. Rudolph to RM. Newcastle, 16 May 1878; S.S. 283, R 1761, Rudolph to G.S., 25 May 1878; S.S. 284, R 1877, Bohmer to Shepstone, Luneburg, 31 May 1878, encl. in Rudolph to G.S., 3 June 1878; The Natal Witness, 21 May 1878, letter from Utrecht correspondent, 15 May 1878; *Ibid.*, 25 May 1878, letter from *ibid.*, 16 May 1878.

³¹⁵E.G., G.H. 353, Osborn (Transvaal G.S.) to Filter, 1 June 1878, encl. in no. 32, Shepstone to Bulwer, 3 June 1878; G.H. 354, G.S. to Engelbrecht, 28 June 1878, encl. in no. 34, Shepstone to Bulwer, 28 June 1878.

³¹⁶G.H. 791, minute by Bulwer, n.d., on no. 34, Shepstone to Bulwer, 28 June 1878.

³¹⁷S.N.A. 1/13, p.116, message to Cetshwayo, 23 May 1878

³¹⁸S.N.A. 1/4/1, no. 815, Dunn to Bulwer, 14 June 1878. He also sent a message to the same effect to Rudolph: S.S. 293, R.2503, Rudolph to H.C. Shepstone, 12 July 1878, encl. Dunn to Rudolph, 14 June 1878. The earlier message to Rudolph alluded to in the text, which Rudolph received on 15 May 1878 (encl. in S.S. 281, R.1593, Rudolph to G.S., 15 May 1878) had, according to Rudolph, requested him to remove the fanners from the southern portion of the triangle of land between the Blood (Ncome) and the Buffalo (Mzinyathi). This area had been largely evacuated by

had been sent by local border chiefs.³¹⁹ In June Cetshwayo sent messages countermanding these orders, and it was reported that he had given strict orders against any further destruction of homesteads or molestation of white people. Although Zulu continued building homesteads in the disputed territory, these measures by the King produced a greater degree of calm amongst those whites who still remained on their farms.³²⁰

5.3 The Zulu's Obstacle to Confederation

With the benefit of hindsight we can see that Carnarvon's confederation scheme was doomed to failure.³²¹ Many contemporaries, indeed, could see this. But for Frere such a conclusion would have relegated him to the position of a mere Governor of the Cape and constituted a confession of personal failure; so this was a conclusion he could not accept. The reason why confederation was doomed was the lack of support for it in South Africa. The republics had no wish to lose their independence, and the annexation of the Transvaal, which was intended to facilitate confederation, instead produced growing opposition to it, not only among the Boers of the Transvaal itself but among their sympathisers throughout South Africa.

farmers in December 1877 (see above, ch. 7, pp.221-2); possibly what Cetshwayo wished Rudolph to do was to prevent them returning to their farms

³¹⁹ S.S. 282, R.1674, Rudolph to G.S., 19 May 1878.

³²⁰ The Natal Witness, 15 & 25 June, 2 & 20 July 1878, letters from Utrecht correspondent, 6, 9, 16, 25 & 30 June 1878; S.S. 291, R.2365, Bohmer to Shepstone, 5 July 1878.

³²¹ Graham Dominy argues ('"Frere's War"?: a Reconstruction of the Geopolitics of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879', Natal Museum Journal of Humanities, 5, Oct. 1993, p.202) that: 'Had the invasion of Zululand gone according to Frere's plan, then it is highly likely that the confederation scheme would have succeeded.' It is difficult to see why. The Zulu were defeated a few months later, and this did not convert either the Transvaal Boers or the Cape government to confederation; and the battle of Isandlwana did not cause Britain to abandon the policy of confederation.

The Cape, as the biggest, richest and most powerful state in South Africa, containing a white population five or six times than all other states combined, would have constituted the major component of a confederated South Africa. But the Molteno administration had no desire to assume responsibility for the un-subdued Africans and disaffected Boers of the interior. Frere came to believe that the essential cause of both these troubles was the Zulu kingdom, and that its overthrow would reconcile the Boers and dishearten the Africans.³²²

The belief in the existence of a black conspiracy to overthrow white domination became current from the time of the Pedi repulse of the Z.A.R. army,³²³ which according to Shepstone had 'sent the thrilling intelligence through all the immense masses of natives between the Zambezi and the Cape Colony' that such an enterprise was practicable.³²⁴ When war broke out on the Cape eastern frontier, Shepstone told Frere and Carnarvon it was partly the result of messages from Cetshwayo. He assured them in fact that the Zulu power was the root of all the native trouble in South Africa and that no peace could be expected until it was extirpated.³²⁵

Frere's experiences in India during the Mutiny perhaps made him susceptible to such conspiracy theories.³²⁶ Less than four months after his arrival in South Africa he was writing to Carnarvon that he had 'seen enough to feel sure that Shepstone is quite right as to the widespread influence of any Kaffir disturbance, & still more of any Kaffir success,

³²² Dominy G. 1993. Reconstruction of the Geopolitics of the Anglo- Zulu War of 1879', Natal Museum Journal of Humanities. pp.265-9 & 288-91

³²³ Ibid, ch. 5, p.152.

³²⁴ B.P.P., C.1776, p.108, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 6 March 1877, encl. in no. 87, Barkly to Carnarvon, 20 March 1877.

³²⁵ Ibid, ch. 7, p.229.

³²⁶ G.R.O., PCC/1/8 & 12, Frere to Hicks Beach, 3 June & 16 July 1878. His susceptibility to conspiracy theories is shown by the seriousness with which he took a bizarre letter he received concerning a Dutch secret society founded in South Africa in 1815 or earlier and still going strong, making use of Masonic organization, etc., etc. - G.R.O., PCC{2f31a & b, Frere to Hicks Beach, 24 Nov. 1879, encl. Copy, -- to Frere, 10 Nov. 1879

on the Kaffir population everywhere', and that such causes would sooner or later produce 'a "scare" at least, on our Kaffir Frontier'.³²⁷ Such a 'scare', which developed into a war, duly occurred on the Cape eastern frontier in the very next month, and Frere's belief that one 'Kaffir disturbance' was likely to lead to another hardened into the conviction that a deliberate attempt at a concerted movement was afoot.

In March 1878, while the ninth frontier war was still being fought, he expressed to Herbert his conviction 'that Shepstone and others of experience in the country were right as to the existence of a wish among the great chiefs to make this war a general and simultaneous rising of Kaffirdom against white civilization', and that although they were incapable of formal combination 'there was a widespread feeling among them, from Secocoeni to Sandilli' that the time had come to resist the changes threatening 'the idle, sensuous elysium of Kaffirdom'.³²⁸

By June 1878 he appears to have reached the conclusion that the seemingly unconnected outbreaks then occurring were in reality the products of a single cause. He wrote to the Secretary of State:

"...as you will see from the accounts we send you from the Pando & Zulu Borders, from the Transvaal Gold fields & from the Diamond Fields, it is quite clear that the war spirit is abroad, as Shepstone & most frontier men told us it was, a year ago; - the joint result of a long peace, the growth of a generation of Kaffirs who know not the power of the White races in war, the unrestrained possession of firearms, & the breakdown of the Transvaal Boers in their last Kaffir War....The letters I send you officially will show you how little the best

³²⁷ P.R.O. 30/6(33, no. 86, Frere to Carnarvon, 19 July 1877.

³²⁸ Frere to Herbert, 18 March 1878, quoted in Martineau, Life of Frere, Vol. II, pp.223-4

informed men on the spot could foresee or account for these disjointed outbursts of rebellion. It was just the same after the Indian Mutiny". ³²⁹

As he became more convinced that there was a deliberate conspiracy, so he became more convinced that Cetshwayo was the leader of it. During the war on the Cape eastern frontier he made a number of references to the presence of emissaries from Cetshwayo among the unaffected chiefs.³³⁰ By September 1878 he reported that while all was now peaceful on the Cape eastern frontier it was clear that along the whole border of Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River border, wherever the Zulu influence is felt, the 'war fever', as it has been appropriately termed, has not been allied, and that it must be mitigated and subdued before we can hope for a condition of permanent peace.

By November he had reached the conclusion, to which he adhered for the rest of his life, that the outbreaks on the Cape eastern frontier had been 'simply premature explosions of a combination in which Cetshwayo was the moving spirit' and that 'in dealing with Kreli and Sandilli, we were trying to cure the symptoms, and that the real seat of the disease is here, in Zululand'.³³¹

The overthrow of the Zulu kingdom would end Cetshwayo's intrigues and be a salutary lesson to Africans everywhere. The Cape would be reconciled to entering a confederation responsible for the administration and defence of a pacified country. The British would have fulfilled their promise to protect the Transvaal from the Zulu and other Africans, and the Boers would settle down to a restoration of self-government within a confederation under the British flag. After a few years as Governor-General of this splendid new

³²⁹ G.R.O., PCC/1/8, Frere to Hicks Beach, 3 June 1878

³³⁰ P.R.O. 30/6(34, Frere to Carnarvon, 11 & 14 Nov. 1877; G.H. 686, Confid., Frere to Bulwer, 18 Nov. 1877; Frere to Herbert, 18 March 1878, in Martineau, Life of Frere, Vol. II, pp.224-5.

³³¹ Frere to Hicks Beach, 10 Nov. 1878, in Worsfold, Sir Bartle Frere, p.111

dominion, a peerage and the applause of a grateful nation might bring an illustrious career to a fitting climax.

5.4 The rules of the Ultimatum

Frere needed the overthrow of the Zulu kingdom to persuade a reluctant Transvaal and an almost equally reluctant Cape into confederation. He forced on a war with the Zulu for imperial reasons, but he had to represent it as being forced on him for local, defensive reasons. This made it embarrassing for him that, as he was obliged to admit, there was 'a considerable party in Natal and the Cape Colony who have taken, and advocated in the public press, views regarding Zulu affairs strongly opposed to the use of coercion'.³³² A further embarrassment was that while Frere was describing the aggressive blood-lust of the Zulu in ever more lurid terms in an attempt to alarm the home government into sending out reinforcements, the Zulu themselves were doing nothing to justify this description.

There were no frontier incidents after Mbelini's raids on the Swazi in early October.³³³ On the same day that Frere telegraphed Hicks Beach to say that reinforcements were 'urgently needed to prevent war of races' and that the Zulu were 'insolent' and 'burning to clear out white men',³³⁴ a message was received from the Zulu King stating that he wished to 'sit down and rest and be peaceful'. His subsequent messages were equally pacific, as was a message received on 13 November from the izikhulu.³³⁵

Sir Bartle Frere was appointed British high commissioner to South Africa in 1879 to realise the policy of confederation (policy to bring the various British colonies, Boer republics and

³³² B.P.P., C.2222, p.225, no. 58, Frere to Hicks Beach, 27 Dec. 1878.

³³³ Ibid , pp.275-6.

³³⁴ B.P.P. C.2222, p.8, telegraphic, Frere to Hicks Beach, 5 Nov. 1878, encl. in no 6, Frere to Hicks Beach, 5 Nov. 1878.

³³⁵ S.N.A. 1{7/13, p.148, message from Cetshwayo, 5 Nov. 1878

independent African groups under common control, with a view to implementing a policy of economic development). Sir Bartle Frere saw the self-reliant Zulu kingdom as a threat to this policy, a belief supported by Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs), who averred that the Zulu people had revived their military power under Cetshwayo, making them more of a threat to peace and prosperity in South Africa.³³⁶

On 11 December 1878, under the flimsy pretext of a few minor border incursions into Natal by Cetshwayo's followers, the Zulu were given an impossible ultimatum that they should disarm and Cetshwayo should forsake his sovereignty. The inevitable invasion of Zululand began after the ultimatum had expired on 10 January 1879. Instead of fragmenting the Zulu as Shepstone predicted, this made the Zulu rally to their king's cause.³³⁷

In December 1878, an ultimatum was sent to the Zulu king Cetshwayo, requiring him, amongst other things, to disband his army. Knowing that Cetshwayo would never accept these terms, Frere arranged for an army led by Lord Chelmsford to prepare for invasion. The terms which were included in the ultimatum delivered to the representatives of King Cetshwayo on the banks of the Thukela river on 11 December 1878. No time was specified for compliance with item 4, twenty days were allowed for compliance with items 1–3, that is, until 31 December inclusive; ten days more were allowed for compliance with the remaining demands, items 4–13. The earlier time limits were subsequently altered so that all expired on 10 January 1879.

1. Surrender of Sihayo's three sons and brother to be tried by the Natal courts.

³³⁶Beginning of the Anglo-Zulu War, 10 January 1879. 2011 .<https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/beginning-anglo-zulu-war-10-january-1879#:~:text=On%2011%20December%201878%2C%20under%20the%20flimsy%20pretext,the%20ultimatum%20had%20expired%20on%2010%20January%201879> .

³³⁷ Ibid

2. Payment of a fine of five hundred head of cattle for the outrages committed by the above and for Cetshwayo's delay in complying with the request of the Natal Government for the surrender of the offenders.
3. Payment of a hundred head of cattle for the offence committed against Messers. Smith and Deighton.
4. Surrender of the Swazi chief Umbilini and others to be named hereafter, to be tried by the Transvaal courts. Observance of the coronation promises.
5. Observance made by King Cetshwayo at his coronation
6. That the Zulu army be disbanded and the men allowed to go home.
7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued and other military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives.
8. That every man, when he comes to man's estate, shall be free to marry.
9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in Zululand, shall be allowed to return and reoccupy their stations.
10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach and any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their teaching.
11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who will see that the above provisions are carried out.
12. All disputes in which a missionary or European is concerned, shall be heard by the king in public and in presence of the Resident.

13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out until it has been approved by the Resident.³³⁸

Cetshwayo had 20 days from the 11th Dec to comply with Bartle Frere's conditions. On the 18th he sent word that he would try to send the cattle and the wanted men but that the river was in flood and it may take longer. Of course, the king had no intention of giving up his impi and was hoping that there would be some negotiation if he looked as if he were at least trying to comply. But Frere was in no mood for a conversation. He wanted all conditions met within 20 days or else the British army would cross into Zululand on the 21st day and advance after the 30th day.³³⁹

Frere wanted to provoke a conflict with the Zulus and in that goal he succeeded. Cetshwayo rejected the demands of 11 December, by not responding by the end of the year. A concession was granted by Bartle Frere until 11 January 1879, after which Bartle Frere deemed a state of war to exist. The British forces intended for the defence of Natal had already been on the march with the intention to attack the Zulu kingdom.

To ensure that there was no interference from London, Frere delayed informing the Colonial Office about his ultimatum until it was too late for it to be countermanded. The full text of his demands did not reach London until 2 January 1879. By then, Chelmsford had assembled an army of 18,000 men- redcoats, colonial volunteers and Natal African auxiliaries- along the Zululand border ready for the invasion. For his part, Cetshwayo strenuously attempted to avoid war with the British and, should it occur, limit its scope and effects. He ordered his troops to defend their country only if attacked and not to carry the war beyond its borders. He directed them to avoid killing any of the invaders other than the regular British soldiers in their red coats.

³³⁸ Martineau 1895, p. 248.

³³⁹ Griffin C. Anglo-Zulu War 1879.

<https://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/africancampaigns/zuluwar/henrybulwer>

5.5 The First invasion

Cetshwayo returned no answer to the preposterous demands of Bartle Frere, and in January 1879 a British force under Lieutenant General Frederick Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford invaded Zululand, without authorization by the British Government. On 11 January, they crossed the border and invaded Zululand. Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand composed of over 15,000 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle.

In the event, Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main centre column, now consisting of some 7800 men comprising the previously called No. 3 Column and Durnford's No.2 Column, under his direct command. He moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand. Three columns were to invade Zululand, from the Lower Tugela, Rorke's Drift, and Utrecht respectively, their objective being Ulundi, the royal capital

While Cetshwayo's army numbered perhaps 35,000 men, it was essentially a military force which could be called out in time of national danger.³⁴⁰ It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties.³⁴¹ Zulu warriors were armed primarily with Assegai

³⁴⁰ Knight 1996, p 11 states "they were a part-time citizen army, and were armed primarily with traditional weapons".

³⁴¹ Knight, Ian (2005). British Fortifications in Zululand 1879 p8

thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide.³⁴² This was the armour that had been upgraded by King Shaka.

The initial entry of all three columns was unopposed. On 22 January the centre column, which had advanced from Rorke's Drift, was encamped near Isandlwana; on the morning of that day Lord Chelmsford split his forces and moved out to support a reconnoitring party, leaving the camp in charge of Colonel Pulleine. The British were outmanoeuvred by the main Zulu army nearly 20,000 strong led by Ntshingwayo ka Mahole Khoza. Chelmsford was lured eastward with much of his centre column by a Zulu diversionary force while the main Impi attacked his camp.

Chelmsford's decision not to set up the British camp defensively, contrary to established doctrine, and ignoring information that the Zulus were close at hand were decisions that the British were soon to regret. The ensuing Battle of Isandlwana was the greatest victory that the Zulu kingdom would enjoy during the war. The British centre column was wrecked and its camp annihilated with heavy casualties as well as the loss of all its supplies, ammunition and transport. The defeat left Chelmsford no choice but to hastily retreat out of Zululand. In the battle's aftermath, a party of some 4,000 Zulu reserves mounted an unauthorised raid on the nearby British army border post of Rorke's Drift and were driven off after 10 hours of ferocious fighting.

While the British central column under Chelmsford's command was thus engaged, the right flank column on the coast, under Colonel Charles Pearson, crossed the Tugela River, skirmished with a Zulu impi that was attempting to set up an ambush at the Inyezane River, and advanced as far as the deserted missionary station of Eshowe, which he set about fortifying. On learning of the disaster at Isandlwana, Pearson made plans to withdraw back beyond the Tugela River. However, before he had decided whether of not

³⁴² Archer et al. 2008, p. 462 state "They had a national army of twenty-five thousand men equipped with cowhide shields, assegais and clubs.

to put these plans into effect, the Zulu army managed to cut off his supply lines, and the Siege of Eshowe had begun.

Meanwhile the left flank column at Utrecht, under Colonel Evelyn Wood, had originally been charged with occupying the Zulu tribes of north-west Zululand and preventing them from interfering with the British central column's advance on Ulundi. To this end Wood set up camp at Tinta's Kraal, just 10 miles south of Hlobane Mountain, where a force of 4,000 Zulus had been spotted. He planned to attack them on 24 January, but on learning of the disaster at Isandlwana, he decided to withdraw back to the Kraal.

Thus one month after the British invasion, only their left flank column remained militarily effective, and it was too weak to conduct a campaign alone. The first invasion of Zululand had been a failure.³⁴³ It had never been Cetshwayo's intention to invade Natal, but to simply fight within the boundaries of the Zulu kingdom. Chelmsford used the next two months to regroup and build a fresh invading force with the initial intention of relieving Pearson at Eshowe. The British government rushed seven regiments of re-enforcements to Natal, along with two artillery batteries.

On 12 March, an armed escort of stores marching to Luneberg, was defeated by about 500 Zulus at the Battle of Income, the British force suffered 80 killed and all the stores were lost. The first troops arrived at Durban on 7 March.³⁴⁴ On the 29th a column, under Lord Chelmsford, consisting of 3,400 British and 2,300 African soldiers, marched to the relief of Eshowe, entrenched camps being formed each night. Chelmsford ordered Sir Evelyn Wood's troops to attack the abaqulusi Zulu stronghold in Hlobane. Lieutenant Colonel Redvers Buller, led the attack on Hlobane on 28 March. However, as the Zulu main army of 20,000 men approached to help their besieged tribesmen, the British force

³⁴³ Laband 2009, "The Anglo-Zulu War is described in terms of the 1st invasion and 2nd invasion." P5

³⁴⁴ Morris, Donald R. (1998). *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879* pp291-292

began a retreat which turned into a rout and were pursued by 1,000 Zulus of the abaqulusi who inflicted some 225 casualties on the British force.

The next day 20,000 Zulu warriors attacked Wood's 2,068 men in a well-fortified camp at Kambula, apparently without Cetshwayo's permission. The British held them off in the Battle of Kambula and after five hours of heavy attacks the Zulus withdrew with heavy losses but were pursued by British mounted troops, who killed many more fleeing and wounded warriors. British losses amounted to 83 (28 killed and 55 wounded), while the Zulus lost up to 2,000 killed. The effect of the battle of Kambula on the Zulu army was severe. Their commander Mnyamana tried to get the regiments to return to Ulundi but many demoralised warriors simply went home.³⁴⁵

While Woods was thus engaged, Chelmsford's column was marching on Eshowe. On 2 April this force was attacked en route at Gingindlovu, the Zulu being repulsed. Their losses were heavy, estimated at 1,200 while the British only suffered two dead and 52 wounded. The next day they relieved Pearson's men. They evacuated Eshowe on 5 April, after which the Zulu forces burned it down.

5.6 The Battle of Isandlwana

Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the invaders and over the Tugela, and strike

³⁴⁵ Morris, Donald R. (1998). *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation Under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879* p142

at Natal.³⁴⁶ Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns, with the main centre column now consisting of some 7,800 men – comprising the previously called No. 3 Column, commanded by the Colonel of the 24th Richard Thomas Glyn,³⁴⁷ and Colonel Anthony Durnford's No. 2 Column, under his direct command.³⁴⁸ He moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekeer, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.³⁴⁹

The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Regiment of Foot (2nd Warwickshire Regiment), which were hardened and reliable troops.³⁵⁰ In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, many of whom were exiled or refugee Zulu. They were led by European officers, but were considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed. Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and several Congreve rockets.³⁵¹

Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were around 4,700 men in the No. 3 Column, and around 3,100 men in the No. 2 Column that comprised the main

³⁴⁶[https://www.anglozuluwar.com/images/Journal_4/2\)_Col_Glyn_-_BB.pdf](https://www.anglozuluwar.com/images/Journal_4/2)_Col_Glyn_-_BB.pdf)

³⁴⁷<https://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/africancampaigns/zuluwar/richardglyn.htm>

³⁴⁸ Colenso, pp. 263–64 gives 7,800: 1752 Imperial and Colonial troops and 6,054 Native Contingent and 377 Conductors and Drivers for the No. 2 Column under Durnford and the No. 3 Column under Glyn which made up Chelmsford's Main Column. The strength of the entire invasion force is given as a total of 16,506 for the five columns: 6,669 Imperial and colonial troops: 9,035 troops in the native contingent; 802 Drivers

³⁴⁹Giliomee, Hermann; Mbenga, Bernard (2007). *New History of South Africa* (First ed.). Tafelberg Publishers. p. 166. ISBN 978-0-624-04359-

³⁵⁰ The 24th Foot was an historically hard-fighting if hard-luck regiment. In 1741 it suffered heavy casualties at Cartagena; during the Seven Years' War it surrendered to the French at the Siege of Minorca in 1756 and was present at the defeat in the Battle of Saint Cast; it was surrendered at Saratoga by Burgoyne in 1777; it was captured at sea by the French in 1810; it suffered over 50 percent casualties at the Battle of Chillianwalla in 1846. Its depot was moved to Brecon in Wales in 1873 and so, by 1879, about 30% of the recruits were Welsh.

³⁵¹ Maxwell, Tony (October 2009). *Searching for the Queen's Cowboys*. Bratonmax. p. 236.

centre column. Colonel Anthony Durnford took charge of No. 2 Column with orders to stay on the defensive near the Middle Drift of the Thukela River.³⁵² Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season. This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.³⁵³

The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger.³⁵⁴ It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties.³⁵⁵ Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide.³⁵⁶ The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system. Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi.³⁵⁷

However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without

³⁵² Colenso, pp. 263, 1747: Imperial and Colonial Troops, 2,566 Native Contingent, 293 Drivers

³⁵³ Colenso, pp. 264–66, 273, Chelmsford, 16 January: "No.3 Column cannot move forward eight miles ... for at least four days ..."

³⁵⁴ Ian Knight, Alan Perry. Rorke's Drift 1879 Pinned like rats in a hole, Osprey, 1996, ISBN 1-85532-506-3, p. 11, "they were a part-time citizen army, and were armed primarily with traditional weapons."

³⁵⁵ Ian Knight, Adam Hook, British Fortifications in Zululand 1879, Osprey, 2005, ISBN 1-84176-829-4, p. 8

³⁵⁶ World History of Warfare, by Christon I. Archer University of Nebraska Press, 2002, ISBN 0-8032-1941-5, p. 462 "They had a national army of twenty-five thousand men equipped with cowhide shields, assegais and clubs. Lock, p. 62, John Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs at the time on the Zulu army – "Equipment: Each man carries his shield and assegais, and a kaross or blanket if he possesses one, he may also have a war dress of monkey skins or ox tails, this is all."

³⁵⁷ Smith-Dorrien, Chapter 1B "It was a marvellous sight, line upon line of men in slightly extended order, one behind the other, firing as they came along, for a few of them had firearms, bearing all before them." eyewitness account, emphasis added

awaiting his attack."³⁵⁸ The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed. Fortunately for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.³⁵⁹ Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors: "March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red soldiers."³⁶⁰

On 18 January, some 4,000 warriors were detached from the main body to attack Charles Pearson's No. 1 Column near Eshowe. The remaining 20,000 Zulus camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda. The next day, the main force arrived and camped near Babanango Mountain, then moved the next day to a camp near Siphezi Mountain. Finally, on 21 January they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on 23 January, but they were discovered by a scouting party on 22 January. Under the command of Ntshigwayo kaMahole the Zulu army had reached its position in easy stages. It marched in two columns within sight of each other, but a few miles apart to prevent a surprise attack. They were preceded by a screening force of mounted scouts supported by parties of warriors 200–400 strong tasked with preventing the main columns from being sighted.³⁶¹ The speed of the Zulu advance compared to the British was marked. The Zulu impi had advanced over 80 km in five days, while Chelmsford had only advanced slightly over 16 km in 10 days.³⁶²

³⁵⁸ Bourquin, S..Military History Journal, V. 4, No. 4, The Zulu Military Organization, South African Military History Society, ISSN 0026-4016, Dec. 1978

³⁵⁹ Colenso, p. 294

³⁶⁰ Lock, p. 86

³⁶¹ Ibid pp. 129–31

³⁶² Ibid pp. 87, 129–30

The British under Chelmsford pitched camp at Isandlwana on 20 January,³⁶³ but did not follow standing orders to entrench. No laager (circling of the wagons) was formed. Chelmsford did not see the need for one, stating, "It would take a week to make." But the chief reason for the failure to take defensive precautions appears to have been that the British command severely underestimated the Zulus' capabilities. The experience of numerous colonial wars fought in Africa was that the massed firepower of relatively small bodies of professional European troops, armed with modern firearms and artillery and supplemented by local allies and levies, would march out to meet the natives whose poorly equipped armies would put up a fight but in the end would succumb.

Chelmsford believed that a force of over 4,000, including 2,000 British infantry armed with Martini–Henry rifles, as well as artillery, had more than sufficient firepower to overwhelm any attack by Zulus armed only with spears, cowhide shields and a few firearms such as Brown Bess muskets. Indeed, with a British force of this size, it was the logistical arrangements which occupied Chelmsford's thoughts. Rather than any fear that the camp might be attacked, his main concern was managing the huge number of wagons and oxen required to support his forward advance.³⁶⁴

Once he had established the camp at Isandlwana, Chelmsford sent out two battalions of the Natal Native Contingent to scout ahead. They skirmished with elements of a Zulu force which he believed to be the vanguard of the main enemy army. Such was his confidence in British military training and firepower that he divided his force, taking about 2,800 soldiers which include half of the British infantry contingent together with around 600 auxiliaries, and departed the camp at dawn on 22 January to find the main Zulu force with the intention of bringing them to battle so as to achieve a decisive victory, leaving the

³⁶³ Giliomee, Hermann; Mbenga, Bernard (2007). *New History of South Africa* (First ed.). Tafelberg Publishers. p. 166

³⁶⁴ Colenso, pp. 264–66, 273–75

remaining 1,300 men of the No. 3 Column to guard the camp. It never occurred to him that the Zulus he saw were diverting him from their main force.³⁶⁵

Chelmsford left behind approximately 600 British red coat line infantry – five companies, around 90 fighting men in each, of the 1st Battalion and one stronger company of around 150 men from the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment of Foot to guard the camp, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine. Pulleine's orders were to defend the camp and wait for further instructions to support the general as and when called upon. Pulleine also had around 700 men composed of the Natal Native Contingent, local mounted irregulars, and other units. He also had two artillery pieces, with around 70 men of the Royal Artillery. In total, over 1,300 men and two artillery guns of the No. 3 Column were left to defend the camp excluding civilian auxiliaries.³⁶⁶

Pulleine, left in command of a rear position, was an administrator with no experience of front-line command on a campaign. Nevertheless, he commanded a strong force, particularly the six veteran regular infantry companies, which were experienced in colonial warfare. The mounted vendettas, cavalry scouts, patrolling some 11 km (6.8 mi) from camp reported at 7:00 am that groups of Zulus, numbering around 4,000 men, could be seen. Pulleine received further reports during the early morning, each of which noted movements, both large and small, of Zulus. There was speculation among the officers whether these troops were intending to march against Chelmsford's rear or towards the camp itself.

Around 10:30 am, Colonel Anthony Durnford, whose left arm was paralyzed from the Xhosa War, arrived from Rorke's Drift with 500 men of the Natal Native Contingent and a rocket battery of the No. 2 Column to reinforce the camp at Isandlwana. This brought the issue of command to the fore because Durnford was senior and by tradition should have

³⁶⁵ <https://www.history.co.uk/article/the-battle-of-isandlwana-and-the-anglo-zulu-war-of-1879>

³⁶⁶ Knight (1992, 2002), p. 36

assumed command.³⁶⁷ However, he did not over-rule Pulleine's dispositions and after lunch he quickly decided to take the initiative and move forward to engage a Zulu force which Pulleine and Durnford judged to be moving against Chelmsford's rear. Durnford asked for a company of the 24th, but Pulleine was reluctant to agree since his orders had been specifically to defend the camp.³⁶⁸

Chelmsford had underestimated the disciplined, well-led, well-motivated and confident Zulus. The failure to secure an effective defensive position, the poor intelligence on the location of the main Zulu army, Chelmsford's decision to split his force in half, and the Zulus' tactical exploitation of the terrain and the weaknesses in the British formation, all combined to prove catastrophic for the troops at Isandlwana. In contrast, the Zulus responded to the unexpected discovery of their camp with an immediate and spontaneous advance. Even though the indunas lost control over the advance, the warriors' training allowed the Zulu troops to form their standard attack formation on the run, with their battle line deployed in reverse of its intended order.³⁶⁹

The Zulu Army was commanded by ESA (Princes) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli. The induna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half-brother of Cetshwayo, commanded the Undi Corps after Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the regular inkhosi, or commander, was wounded.³⁷⁰ While Chelmsford was in the field seeking them, the entire Zulu army had outmanoeuvred him, moving behind his force with the intention of attacking the British Army on the 23rd. Pulleine had received reports of large forces of Zulus throughout the morning of the 22nd from 8:00am on. Vedettes had observed Zulus on the hills to the left front, and Lt. Chard, while he was at the camp, observed a large

³⁶⁷ Pulleine's rank was brevet lieutenant colonel; in other words he was still being paid as a major

³⁶⁸ Knight (1992, 2002), p. 40

³⁶⁹ Colenso, Colenso, Frances; assisted in those portions of the work that touch on military matters by Lieut. - Colonel Edward Durnford (1880). *History of the Zulu War and Its Origin*. London: Chapman and Hall. p. 409

³⁷⁰ Morris, Donald R. *The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879* Da Capo Press, 1998.

force of several thousand Zulu moving to the British left around the hill of Isandlwana. Pulleine sent word to Chelmsford, which was received by the General between 9:00am and 10:00am.³⁷¹

The main Zulu force was discovered at around 11:00am by men of Lt. Charles Raw's troop of scouts, who chased a number of Zulus into a valley, only then seeing most of the 20,000 men of the main enemy force sitting in total quiet. This valley has generally been thought to be the Ngwebeni some 7 miles (11 km) from the British camp but may have been closer in the area of the spurs of Nqutu hill. Having been discovered, the Zulu force leapt to the offensive. Raw's men began a fighting retreat back to the camp and a messenger was sent to warn Pulleine.

The Zulu attack then developed in the traditional horns and chest of the buffalo, with the aim of encircling the British position. From Pulleine's vantage point in the camp, at first only the right horn and then the chest (centre) of the attack seemed to be developing. Pulleine sent out first one, then all six companies of the 24th Foot into an extended firing line, with the aim of meeting the Zulu attack head-on and checking it with firepower. Durnford's men, upon meeting elements of the Zulu centre, had retreated to a donga, a dried-out watercourse, on the British right flank where they formed a defensive line. The rocket battery under Durnford's command, which was not mounted and dropped behind the rest of the force, was isolated and overrun very early in the engagement. The two battalions of native troops were in Durnford's line. While all the officers and NCOs carried rifles, only one in 10 in the ranks had a firearm, and those few weapons were muzzle-loading muskets with limited ammunition.³⁷² Many of the native troops began to leave the battlefield at this point.³⁷³

³⁷¹ Colenso 1880. pp. 287, 288

³⁷² Thompson, pp. 17, 22. About 20% of each battalion had some sort of firearm

³⁷³ Morris, Donald R. p371 .The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 Da Capo Press, 1998

Pulleine only made one change to the original disposition after about 20 minutes of firing, bringing in the companies in the firing line slightly closer to the camp. For an hour or so until after noon, the disciplined British volleys pinned down the Zulu centre, inflicting many casualties and causing the advance to stall.³⁷⁴ Indeed, morale remained high within the British line. The Martini–Henry rifle was a powerful weapon and the men were experienced. Additionally, the shell fire of the Royal Artillery forced some Zulu regiments to take cover behind the reverse slope of a hill. Nevertheless, the left horn of the Zulu advance was moving to outflank and envelop the British right.³⁷⁵

Durnford's men, who had been fighting the longest, began to withdraw and their rate of fire diminished. Durnford's withdrawal exposed the right flank of the British regulars, which, with the general threat of the Zulu encirclement, caused Pulleine to order a withdrawal back to the camp. The regulars' retreat was performed with order and discipline and the men of the 24th conducted a fighting withdrawal into the camp. Durnford's retreat, however, exposed the flank of G Company, 2nd/24th, which was overrun relatively quickly.³⁷⁶

An officer in advance of Chelmsford's force gave this eyewitness account of the final stage of the battle at about 3:00 pm:

*“In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp. This was done several times – a pause, and then a flash – flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the tents had disappeared”.*³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ Smith-Dorrien, Chapter 1B gives a start time for the battle of around 8:00 am with the Zulus falling back behind the hills until noon and the final Zulu advance beginning at 1:00 pm

³⁷⁵ Morris, p. 373; Colenso, p. 285.

³⁷⁶ Morris, pp. 373–74.

³⁷⁷ Colenso, p. 292, the officer states it was 3:00 pm.

Nearly the same moment is described in a Zulu warrior's account:

*“The sun turned black in the middle of the battle; we could still see it over us, or should have thought we had been fighting till evening. Then we got into the camp, and there was a great deal of smoke and firing. Afterwards the sun came out bright again”.*³⁷⁸

The time of the solar eclipse on that day is calculated as 2:29 pm.

The presence of large numbers of bodies grouped together suggests the resistance was more protracted than originally thought, and a number of desperate last stands were made. Evidence shows that many of the bodies, today marked by cairns, were found in several large groups around the camp – including one stand of around 150 men. A Zulu account describes a group of the 24th forming a square on the neck of Isandlwana.³⁷⁹ Colonial cavalry, the NMP and the carabineers, who could easily have fled as they had horses, died around Durnford in his last stand, while nearby their horses were found dead on their picket rope.³⁸⁰ What is clear is that the slaughter was complete in the area around the camp and back to Natal along the Fugitive's Drift. The fighting had been hand-to-hand combat and no quarter was given to the British regulars. The Zulus had been commanded to ignore the civilians in black coats and this meant that some officers, whose patrol dress was dark blue and black at the time, were spared and escaped.³⁸¹

The British fought back-to-back with bayonet and rifle butt when their ammunition had finally been expended.³⁸² A Zulu account relates the single-handed fight by the guard of

³⁷⁸ Mitford, Bertrand, *Through the Zulu Country*, p. 95

³⁷⁹ Colenso, p. 413

³⁸⁰ Lock, Ron; Quantrill, Peter (2002). *Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-up*. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers. P 219

³⁸¹ Smith-Dorrien, Chapter 1C

³⁸² Knight (1992, 2002), p. 49; Morris, pp. 375, 377.

Chelmsford's tent, a big Irishman of the 24th who kept the Zulus back with his bayonet until he was speared and the general's Union flag captured.³⁸³ Both the colours of the 2nd 24th were lost, while the Queen's colour of the 1st 24th was carried off the field by Lieutenant Melvill on horseback but lost when he crossed the river, despite Lieutenant Coghill having come to his aid. Both Melvill and Coghill were killed after crossing the river, and received posthumous Victoria Crosses in 1907 as the legend of their gallantry grew, and, after twenty-seven years of steady campaigning by the late Mrs. Melvill (who had died in 1906), on the strength of Queen Victoria being quoted as saying that 'if they had survived they would have been awarded the Victoria Cross'.³⁸⁴ Garnet Wolseley, who replaced Chelmsford, felt otherwise at the time and stated, "I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are being killed."³⁸⁵

Of the 1,800-plus force of British troops and African auxiliaries, over 1,300 were killed, most of them Europeans, including field commanders Pulleine and Durnford. Only five Imperial officers survived, and the 52 officers lost was the most lost by any British battalion up to that time. Amongst those killed was Surgeon Major Peter Shepherd, a first-aid pioneer.³⁸⁶ The Natal Native Contingent lost some 400 men, and there were 240 lost from the group of 249 amaChunu African auxiliaries.³⁸⁷ Perhaps the last to die was Gabangaye, the portly chief of the amaChunu Natal Native Contingent, who was given over to be killed by the udibi (porter or carrier) boys. The captured Natal Native Contingent soldiers were regarded as traitors by the Zulu and executed.³⁸⁸

³⁸³ Ibid

³⁸⁴ Lock, p. 222.

³⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 214

³⁸⁶ Aged 37, from Leochel Cushnie, Aberdeenshire, who together with Colonel Francis Duncan had established the concept of teaching first-aid skills to civilians and had written the book "Aids for cases of Injuries or Sudden Illness", BMJ 1994; 309 : 1718 (Published 24 December 1994) The earliest days of first aid.

³⁸⁷ Thompson, Paul Singer. Black soldiers of the queen: the Natal native contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War, University of Alabama Press, 2006, ISBN 0-8173-5368-2 pp. 75–76.

³⁸⁸ Lock, pp. 223–24.

There was no casualty count of the Zulu losses by the British such as made in many of the other battles since they abandoned the field. Nor was there any count by the Zulu. Modern historians have rejected and reduced the older unfounded estimates. Historians Lock and Quantrill estimate the Zulu casualties as "... perhaps between 1,500 and 2,000 dead."³⁸⁹ Historian Ian Knight stated: "Zulu casualties were almost as heavy. Although it is impossible to say with certainty, at least 1,000 were killed outright in the assault..."³⁹⁰ Some 1,000 Martini-Henry rifles, the two field artillery guns, 400,000 rounds of ammunition, three colours, most of the 2,000 draft animals and 130 wagons, provisions such as tinned food, biscuits, beer, overcoats, tents and other supplies, were taken by the Zulu or left abandoned on the field. Of the survivors, most were from the auxiliaries.

The battle of Isandlwana stunned the world. It was unthinkable that a 'native' army armed substantially with stabbing weapons could defeat troops of a western power armed with modern rifles and artillery, let alone wipe it out. Until news of the disaster reached Britain, the Zulu War was just another colonial bushfire war of the sort that simmered constantly in many parts of the worldwide British Empire. The loss of a battalion of troops, news of which was sent by telegraph to Britain, transformed the nation's attitude to the war.

5.7 The Battle of Rorke's Drift

One day later (23 January 1879), a depot at Rorke's Drift was attacked against the orders of Cetshwayo, who favoured a defensive strategy. After the overwhelming victory over the British at Isandlwana, Zulu reserve forces who were not involved in the previous day's battle retaliated with an attack on the "hastily erected fort" at the small garrison of Rorke's Drift. Here the British fought with 'rifle fire and bayonets' and the Zulu force, led by Prince Dabulamanzi, suffered 500 casualties in this fruitless engagement. This provided the British with "much needed propaganda to counter the Zulu success at Isandlwana".

³⁸⁹ Lock, p. 229.

³⁹⁰ Knight, Ian. *Isandlwana 1879: The Great Zulu Victory*, Osprey, 2002, p. 86.

Defence of Rorke's Drift, was an engagement in the Anglo-Zulu War. The successful British defence of the mission station of Rorke's Drift, under the command of Lieutenants John Chard of the Royal Engineers and Gonville Bromhead, began when a large contingent of Zulu warriors broke off from their main force during the final hour of the British defeat at the day-long Battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879, diverting 6 miles (9.7 km) to attack Rorke's Drift later that day and continuing into the following day.

Just over 150 British and colonial troops defended the station against attacks by 3,000 to 4,000 Zulu warriors. The massive but piecemeal attacks by the Zulu on Rorke's Drift came very close to defeating the much smaller garrison, but were consistently repelled.³⁹¹ Eleven Victoria Crosses were awarded to the defenders, along with a number of other decorations and honours.

5.7.1 Account of the Battle of Rorke's Drift:

At about 4:20 pm, the battle began with Lieutenant Henderson's NNH troopers, stationed behind the Oscarberg, briefly engaging the vanguard of the main Zulu force.³⁹² However, tired from the battle at Isandlwana and retreat to Rorke's Drift as well as being short of carbine ammunition, Henderson's men departed for Helpmekaar. Henderson himself reported to Lieutenant Chard the enemy were close and that "his men would not obey his orders but were going off to Helpmekaar".³⁹³

Henderson then followed his departing men. Upon witnessing the withdrawal of Henderson's NNH troop, Captain Stevenson's NNC company abandoned the cattle kraal

³⁹¹ Knight, Ian, 2003, *The Zulu War 1879*, Osprey, P37

³⁹² Knight 1996, p.36, and on p.88 this is described by Knight as "the first shots of the battle".

³⁹³ Morris 1998, p. 401

and fled, greatly reducing the strength of the defending garrison.³⁹⁴ Outraged that Stevenson and some of his colonial NCOs also fled from the barricades, a few British soldiers fired after them, killing Corporal William Anderson.³⁹⁵

With the Zulus nearly at the station, the garrison now numbered between 154 and 156 men.³⁹⁶ Of these, only Bromhead's company could be considered a cohesive unit. Additionally, up to 39 of his company were at the station as hospital patients, although only a handful of these were unable to take up arms.³⁹⁷ With fewer men, Chard realised the need to modify the defences, and gave orders that biscuit boxes be used to construct a wall through the middle of the post in order to make possible the abandonment of the hospital side of the station if the need arose.³⁹⁸

The majority of the attacking Zulu force swept around to attack the north wall, while a few took cover and were either pinned down by continuing British fire or retreated to the terraces of Oscarberg. There they began a harassing fire of their own. As this occurred, another Zulu force swept on to the hospital and north western wall. Those British on the barricades – including Dalton and Bromhead – were soon engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The British wall was too high for the Zulus to scale, so they resorted to crouching under the wall, trying to get hold of the defenders' Martini–Henry rifles, slashing at British soldiers with assegais or firing their weapons through the wall. At places, they clambered over each other's bodies to drive the British off the walls but were driven back. Zulu fire, both from those under the wall and around the Oscarberg, inflicted a few casualties, and

³⁹⁴Morris, p. 402. Chadwick, G.A. . *Military History Journal*, V.4, No.4, The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, South African Military History Society, ISSN 0026-4016, Jan. 1979. "This reduced the strength of the defenders drastically ..."

³⁹⁵ Knight 1996, p.45, Corporal Scammell of the NNC is noted as remaining.

³⁹⁶ Whybra (2004) gives the most up-to-date analysis of the numbers present at the Battle of Rorke's Drift. He counts 154 definite participants, with 2 others listed as "possibles".

³⁹⁷Whybra 2004, pp. 65–67.

³⁹⁸ Porter 1889, p. 31.

five of the seventeen defenders who were killed or mortally wounded in the action were struck while at the north wall.

After the disastrous and apparently inexplicable slaughter of the 1st Battalion, the 24th Foot at the Battle of Isandlwana, Bromhead's B Company, 2nd Battalion of the same regiment, with their colleagues, restored the prestige of British arms by their successful defence of the mission station. Zulu Warrior: Battle of Rorke's Drift on 22nd January 1879 in the Zulu War

Just as it was incomprehensible to the public in Britain, that 1,000 British infantry, armed with modern breach loading rifles, could be overwhelmed by native warriors, armed principally with stabbing spears, it was astounding that a handful of the same troops could withstand the overwhelming attack, delivered against the mission station later the same day. On 11th January 1879, Lord Chelmsford led the Centre Column of his invading army into Zululand, crossing the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift. On 22nd January 1879, the Zulu Army sidestepped Chelmsford's advancing force and wiped out the troops he had left at his advanced camp, by the hill of Isandlwana, principally the 1st Battalion, 24th Foot under Colonel Pulleine.

Cetshwayo, the Zulu King, when he dispatched his army to fight Chelmsford's invading columns, issued orders that his warriors were not to enter the British colony of Natal. He still hoped to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the war and did not wish to be labelled the aggressor. Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead, 24th Regiment, second in command at the Battle of Rorke's Drift on 22nd January 1879 in the Zulu War.. As the battle at Isandlwana drew to a close, several Zulu regiments under Cetshwayo's younger brother, Prince Dabulamanzi kaMapande, reached the Buffalo River, cutting off the few escaping British. These regiments had not been involved in the battle and looked for a way to join in the success. Dabulamanzi, an aggressive leader, resolved to lead these Zulu regiments to

the further triumph of capturing the British base at the Rorke's Drift crossing, on the Buffalo River.

A single company of infantry garrisoned the mission station at Rorke's Drift, B Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th Foot. Although the 24th was designated the South Warwickshire Regiment, this company was manned largely by Welshmen. The company colour sergeant was Frank Bourne; the sole officer in the company was Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead. The mission belonged to the Reverend Otto Witt, a Swede. Mr Witt's church had been turned into a store by the British Army; his house a military hospital under Surgeon James Reynolds. Lieutenant John Chard, Royal Engineers, arrived at Rorke's Drift on 19th January 1879, with a party of sappers. Chard had cause to journey up to Isandlwana immediately before the battle and on his return, saw groups of Zulus. On 22nd January 1879, the garrison heard firing from the distant battle and a group of officers climbed the nearby hill. They saw what they eventually realised to be parties of Zulus, advancing towards the mission station. News of the disaster at Isandlwana was confirmed by the arrival of Lieutenant Ardendorff from the camp.

5.8 Second invasion

By the beginning of April 1879, the Zulu kingdom had received two staggering blows, from which it would never really recover. Despite the Zulu success at Hlobane Mountain on 28th March, the main army - the same amabutho who had triumphed at Isandlwana, just two months before - had been utterly defeated at Khambula hill the following day. Moreover, just a few days later, and at the other end of the country, the Zulu forces investing Pearson's column at Eshowe were scattered at Gingindlovu. At both ends of the country, then, the Zulus had been broken, and their total casualties over those three battles numbered nearly 3,000 dead, with hundreds more wounded. In the blinking of an

eye, all the strategic advantages, which King Cetshwayo had earned at Isandlwana, had been lost, and the war had turned decisively against him.³⁹⁹

Kambula and Gingindlovu shook the king's faith in his army's ability to bring the war to a successful conclusion by military means. Holding back the British, he said, was like "warding off a falling tree". While his warriors dispersed to undergo the necessary post-combat purification rituals, to heal their wounds and to rest, the king tried to re-open diplomatic contacts with the British, to try to discover what terms they would accept for peace. Yet there was now no hope of a negotiated settlement, for it was equally obvious to Lord Chelmsford that the war was turning in his favour, and both he and Sir Bartle Frere needed a decisive victory in the field, to erase the stain of Isandlwana.⁴⁰⁰

Moreover, throughout March and April a steady stream of reinforcements had arrived in Durban, and Chelmsford now had far more troops at his disposal than he had hoped for at the beginning of the campaign. With the Zulu capacity to mount an offensive broken, he was now in a position to mount a fresh invasion of Zululand. His goal remained King Cetshwayo's principle homestead at oNdini (Ulundi), in the heart of the country. Chelmsford had learned much from the disastrous first invasion of January. Whereas his original columns were weak and failed to take proper precautions on the march, he planned his new columns to be juggernauts. They would be much stronger than the original columns, and would not only protect their halts with improvised laagers each night, but would also establish a chain of fortified posts in their wake to guard their lines of communication.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁹ Knight I. The Fallen Tree: The Second Invasion of Zululand, April-July 1879. P1

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid

⁴⁰¹ Knight I. The Fallen Tree: The Second Invasion of Zululand, April-July 1879. p1.

<https://www.bing.com/search?q=The+Second+Invasion+of+the+Anglo-Zulu+War+of+1879&cvid=834e0a57e4ea4acc8ee3eb30f45f0ee0&aqs=edge.0.69i59j0j69i60l3j69i57j0.2132j0j1&pglt=43&FORM=ANNTA1&PC=LCTS#>

For the second invasion Chelmsford planned on making two main thrusts into Zululand. The first would be made up the coast, using troops from Pearson's old column and the Eshowe relief column. The new coastal column was designated the First Division, and was given into the command of Major General H.H. Crealock, one of several Major-Generals who had been sent to South Africa as reinforcements. Crealock was an experienced officer whose younger brother - John North Crealock – was Chelmsford's Assistant Military Secretary. Chelmsford planned that his second main thrust would come from the north-west, following roughly the line of the old Centre Column.

However, as Chelmsford wished to spare his men the sight of the battlefield of Isandlwana - where the dead still lay unburied - he planned a new line of communication, anchored upon the village of Dundee, and crossing the Mzinyath and Ncombe rivers upstream from Rorke's Drift. This column would swing down above Isandlwana, and rejoin the old planned line of advance near Babanango Mountain. It would be called the Second Division, and composed of troops fresh out from England. It was commanded by another new arrival, Maj. Gen. Newdigate, although Chelmsford himself accompanied this column, and Newdigate, like Glyn before him, found himself with little real opportunity to exercise his authority.⁴⁰²

A new cavalry division, consisting of the 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards and 17th Lancers, and commanded by Major-General Marshall, as to be attached to the Second Division. Evelyn Wood's column was the only one of Chelmsford's original columns which had remained active in the field. Chelmsford was reluctant to rob Wood of an independent command, so he was given the local rank of Brigadier-General, and his column was re-designated the Flying Column. Its orders were to affect a junction with the Second Division, and advance in tandem with it to oNdini. Crealock's column began its forward progress first, moving forward from the Thukela on 21st April. Chelmsford did not

⁴⁰² Ibid

anticipate any serious resistance from Zulu living in the coastal sector, and Crealock's orders were to destroy two important royal homesteads which lay on his line of advance - emaNgweni and Hlalangubo (old oNdini). He was also to establish strong posts on his line of communications.

From the first, Crealock's progress suffered from a serious lack of transport facilities. Many of the wagons accumulated by the old Centre Column were still rusting on the field of Isandlwana, while the accumulation of reinforcements had created a further demand. The Natal authorities were increasingly worried that the ordinary commercial economy of the colony would grind to a halt as transport drivers abandoned their regular work for the easy pickings offered by the army, and were becoming more and more reluctant to cooperate with Chelmsford's requests. Crealock sent repeated messages to Chelmsford pleading for new wagons, oxen and mules. He received only a fraction of those he asked for, and his progress became so slow that his column was dubbed 'Crealock's Crawlers' by the rest of the army.⁴⁰³

The high mortality rate among his animals did not help. The coastal sector is hot and damp, and the humid conditions, over-work and mis-management led to the death of thousands of animals, most of which were simply dragged to the side of the road and allowed to rot. In places the decomposing bodies of oxen lying every few yards along the road marked the line of advance of the First Division. The stench was appalling, and within a few weeks the presence of so many dead animals began to affect the health of the First Division's troops. Outbreaks of enteric fever - typhoid - and dysentery soon put a worryingly high proportion of Crealock's troops hors de combat.

Nevertheless, Crealock achieved some of his objectives. He established a strong post above the AmaTigulu River, called Fort Crealock, and another, above the Nyezane, called Fort Chelmsford. These served as staging posts for his advance, and convoys of supplies

⁴⁰³ Knight I. The Fallen Tree: The Second Invasion of Zululand, April-July 1879. p2.

made their laborious way between them. Sadly, both these important - but unglamorous - sites have been largely obliterated today, as the coastal sector is extensively farmed for sugar cane. A stone monument near the site of Fort Chelmsford bears testimony, however, to the number of Crealock's men who succumbed to disease. Crealock's men also pushed forward to the coast, at a spot euphemistically known as Port Durnford, where contact was established with naval shipping.

Port Durnford was a misnomer, which offered nothing in the way of a natural harbour, but merely a stretch of the beach where the surf beat less strongly. Nevertheless, it was possible to land supplies by surfboat, and the First Division had established an important link with the wider world. When hostilities ended, the captured King Cetshwayo was taken off from Port Durnford by surfboat, and into exile. Crealock also destroyed the two amakhanda, as he had been ordered. On 4th July mounted patrols from the First Division set fire to emaNgwani. It consisted of over 300 huts, but appeared to have been deserted for some time. Two days later, the same patrols burnt Hlalangubo, which had over 600 huts, but was similarly deserted.⁴⁰⁴

That the Zulu made no attempt to distract the British from burning these two important complexes suggests the extent to which their capacity to resist was suffering. Indeed, the king had experienced some reluctance on the part of his warriors to muster when he first attempted to re-assemble the army at the end of May. By June they were prepared to answer the summons, but it was clear that they were no longer able to fight on more than one front at a time. Many of the fighting men from the coastal districts - who had hitherto stayed in their own areas to fight the invaders - had gone to oNdini to be ready to fight in defence of the heartland, leaving the coastal districts occupied only by old men, women and children. Many chiefs who lived in the area had also stayed at home, and despite the

⁴⁰⁴Knight I. The Fallen Tree: The Second Invasion of Zululand, April-July 1879. P2

fact that the nation did not consider itself beaten, some began tentative negotiations with the British.

The grim truth was that while many remained loyal to the king, with their young men gone they stood little chance of resisting the huge British column which was steadily occupying their territories. As early as 21st April Prince Makwendu kaMpande, one of Cetshwayo's junior brothers, had surrendered to Crealock, and by the beginning of July such local dignitaries as Dabulamanzi - who had commanded at Rorke's Drift - and Mavumengwana kaGodide - the joint commander at Isandlwana - had established contact. On 4th July a large number of regional chiefs entered Crealock's camp and surrendered.

That same day, Chelmsford had won the final battle of the war. His advance had been very different in character to that of Crealock's division. Worried by the lack of transport wagons, Chelmsford had at last braved the terrible field of Isandlwana. On 21st May the cavalry division had ridden out to the old battlefield, and carried away those wagons still lying there which were still serviceable. Some attempt was also made to bury the dead, although those wearing red coats were left where they fell, as Glyn had requested that the 24th be allowed to bury its own. It was the first major expedition to the battlefield, which proved a sobering site. While many of the dead had been reduced to skeletons, and the bones scattered by scavengers, others had desiccated in the hot African sun, and their features were still chillingly clear.⁴⁰⁵

Chelmsford must surely have congratulated himself on the wisdom of his decision to avoid the Isandlwana road with his main column. Chelmsford had assembled his column on the banks of the Ncome River - the border with Zululand - near Koppie Alleen by the end of May, while Wood had begun to move towards it from the north. On 31st May Chelmsford crossed the Ncome and the advance began. Almost immediately, tragedy struck. The Zulu would remain more active in the central districts than on the coast, because a

⁴⁰⁵ Knight I. The Fallen Tree: The Second Invasion of Zululand, April-July 1879. P2

number of warriors had remained at home to guard their homes and crops, while the king had deployed a large number of scouting parties to observe the British progress. The main British advance would therefore be accomplished in the face of almost constant skirmishing.⁴⁰⁶

On 1st June a small patrol including Lt. Carey of the 98th Regiment and the exiled Prince Imperial of France set out from the Second Division to select a suitable camping ground. Despite the fact that the area had already been swept for Zulus, and the Flying Column was only a few miles away, the patrol was ambushed at the deserted homestead of an induna named Sobhuza, and the Prince was killed. Although the Prince's death created a scandal, it was a minor incident in the history of the war. More serious opposition to the British progress occurred a few days later. On the morning of the 5th, irregular cavalry from the Flying Column encountered a strong Zulu force on the banks of the Ntinini River (also known as the Upoko). The Zulu were secured in the rocks at the foot of a hill known as eZungeni.

The irregulars opened fire on the Zulu, but began to retreat when the Zulu deployed to surround them. The sound of firing brought forward the 17th Lancers, attached to the Second Division. The Lancers had not so far seen action, and were keen to test themselves against the enemy. They deployed in line and repeatedly charged across the open ground at the foot of eZungeni, but failed to make contact with the enemy. The regiment's adjutant, Lt. F.J.C. Frith, was shot through the body by a Zulu marksman, and killed. The 17th then retired to the Division camp, carrying Frith's body across the saddle. The Zulu had clearly got the best of the incident, and the attempt to use regular cavalry tactics in the bush had struck one cynical observer as being like "chopping wood with a razor".⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶ Knight I. The Fallen Tree: The Second Invasion of Zululand, April-July 1879. P3

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid

The Second Division established a fortified post near the Nondweni River, called Fort Newdigate. From here it was decided to send a convoy back to the border for supplies, and a halt was made until it returned. While stranded at Fort Newdigate the Second Division experienced a terrifying false alarm one night. Sentries out in the darkness fired warning shots, and immediately the entire column stood to at its alarm posts. With visions of Isandlwana before their eyes, the infantry around the perimeter opened fire at an imaginary enemy. Even some of the artillery opened fire. It was some time before order could be restored, and no enemy were found to be in the vicinity.

A total of seven men were wounded, and several horses were killed. Among those whose glittering career was almost brought to a premature conclusion was Lt. Chard of Rorke's Drift fame, who had been on picket duty, and had taken shelter in a trench with his command. Infantry inside the camp had mistaken the rampart above it as the outside of the laager, and fired upon it, with the result that Chard and his men had passed an uncomfortable few minutes, lying in the mud with a storm of bullets whistling over their heads. Despite such scares, Chelmsford's advance seemed inexorable. By the middle of June, they had reached the great range of hills which overlooks the emaKhosini, the place of kings, where the Zulu chiefdom had begun, and where Cetshwayo's ancestors were buried. With an air of desperation, the king tried several times to open negotiations with them, but the British had nothing to gain by talking. By this time, they had become increasingly ruthless, too, determined to bring the war to a conclusion by any means possible.

They regularly burnt any Zulu homestead they came across, whether it had any military connection or not, and drove off whatever cattle they could find. On 26th June Chelmsford ordered a great raid into the emaKhosini itself, and many of the royal homesteads - which had existed in one form or another since Shaka's time - were destroyed. In one of them, esiKlebheni, the inkatha ye sizwe ya'kwaZulu - the sacred coil of the nation, a magical symbol of Zulu unity created by Shaka himself - was also

destroyed. The omens for the kingdom were truly appalling. At the end of June Chelmsford descended the Mthonjaneni heights towards the White Mfolozi River, and oNdini beyond. Here he established camp on the banks of the river, while a flurry of last minute diplomatic activity took place.

Yet Chelmsford was not concerned with Cetshwayo's diplomatic overtures so much as with his own military preparations, for despite the fact that he knew his replacement – Sir Garnet Wolseley - was already in South Africa, and desperate to halt his advance, so as to be able to bring the war to a close himself, Chelmsford was determined not to make any last mistakes. On 3rd July he signified his readiness for the final battle by breaking off his negotiations with Cetshwayo, and by sending his mounted men across the river to scout the Ulundi plain. That night, the British could hear the unnerving sounds of the Zulu amabutho preparing for battle in the great royal homesteads around oNdini. At first light on 4th July 1879 Lord Chelmsford led the fighting men of the Second Division and Flying Column across the river, to bring the second invasion of Zululand to its dreadful and inevitable conclusion.

5.9 Conclusion

Needing to restore its authority in southern Africa, Britain set out not just to crush resistance but to dismantle the Zulu state. Cetshwayo sent a series of envoys to Frere: 'What have I done? I want peace. I ask for peace.' But Frere was in no mood to listen. Bolstered by reinforcements and armed with rockets, artillery and Gatling machine guns, British forces, after a ponderous five-month campaign, routed the last of Cetshwayo's impis at the battle of Ulundi. More than 1,500 warriors died for the loss of thirteen on the British side. A new British proconsul, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, was despatched to

deal with this troublesome part of south-east Africa, with powers to act as 'supreme civil and military authority' not only over Natal and Zululand but also over the Transvaal; what the British cabinet wanted was a 'dictator' to sort out the mess.

Wolseley was the most famous British general of his time, with a record of reckless daring combined with a talent for organisation. He had served in the Crimea, Burma, India and China. More recently, he had led the British campaign to subdue the Ashanti in West Africa and served briefly as governor of Natal. He was also vain, outspoken and frequently contemptuous of other people. In short order, Wolseley packed Cetshwayo off to prison in Cape Town and broke up his kingdom into thirteen 'kinglets', stripping Cetshwayo's Usuthu clan of their status, land and cattle and rewarding Zulus who had sided with the British, or who had capitulated early, in a ruthless display of divide-and-rule tactics.

A sizeable chunk of southern Zululand was given to a white gun-runner, John Dunn, once an ally of Cetshwayo, who had deserted him at the beginning of the war to join the British camp. The entire 'disputed territories' were ceded to the Transvaal. Wolseley claimed that his 'settlement' had laid 'enduring foundations of peace, happiness and prosperity' but it resulted only in years of bitter strife amongst rival Zulu factions. Next, Wolseley turned his attention to smashing Sekhukhune's Pedi state in eastern Transvaal.

In November 1879, he mustered a motley army of British troops, colonial volunteers, Transvaal African auxiliaries and 8,000 Swazi warriors to destroy Sekhukhune's capital at Tsate. While Wolseley led the main column along the valley to the town, the Swazi regiments descended from the heights that lay behind it. It was all over in a few hours. Sekhukhune was taken prisoner and incarcerated in Pretoria; his followers were dispersed into new settlements, losing much of their land. Wolseley assumed that such a demonstration of imperial might would have a salutary effect on the restless mood of the Transvaal Boers. But, by crushing both Cetshwayo and Sekhukhune, the British had

liberated the Transvaal Boers from the two greatest threats to their security. They now saw a new opportunity to get rid of the British.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

During the period 1873-1884 the number of European settlers in South Africa and Natal increased drastically. British interests in the territory changed and clashed with those of the native societies in the region. Britain anticipated an economic slowdown that would be accompanied by a decline in British pre-eminence on the World politics.

Lord Carnarvon, in his capacity as the Secretary of Colonial Affairs, conceived the idea of a Southern Africa confederation that would be a panacea for Britain's political and economic ills. The confederation was an idea to coalesce all British territories in Southern Africa and form an English speaking confederation that would be economically independent of Britain. It was envisaged that the confederation would provide an economic relief to the Empire as well.

Lord Carnarvon was still mulling over the confederation ideal in 1873 when the Langalibalele Rebellion broke out. The incident changed the security perceptions of the Natal colonialists for the worst and brought Carnarvon into contact with Theophilus Shepstone. The colonialists feared that an attack on them by the Zulus would have more devastating effects compared to the one by Langalibalele.

Shepstone was on a crusade to extend his influence beyond the Natal Africans and used the opportunity to convince Carnarvon that Zulus were a greater threat to the

confederation ideal. In the aftermath of the Langalibalele Rebellion Carnarvon saw a window of opportunity for his confederation project. In 1874 he sent James Froude to prepare ground for the implementation of the project. In 1875 he followed up by sending Sir Garnet Wolseley as an administrator of Natal for six months. Froude and Wolseley did not succeed in achieving Carnarvon's objectives.

The implementation of the confederation was fast tracked by the appointment of Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner in South Africa for a two-year contract. He assumed his duties early in 1877 and in terms of the contract he had to complete his assignment in March 1879. On his arrival he concluded that the colonialists in South Africa and the Zulus were the main obstacles to the implementation of the confederation. He effectively isolated the colonialists in his activities and resolved to destroy the Zulu Kingdom at all costs.

Lord Chelmsford was appointed early in 1878 on Frere's recommendation for the sole purpose of waging war against the Zulu King. The war was not approved by the British cabinet and parliament. The defeat of the British at iSandlwana and the embarrassment that followed caused the British government to approve reinforcements. The war against the Zulus and the destruction of Zululand was therefore approved at the highest level of the British government.

The war resulted in the destruction of the Zulu Kingdom and everything it represented. Cetshwayo's strategy of playing victim and defending from within his own territory did not yield the expected results. After the defeat on 8 July 1879 the British Army soldiers burnt homesteads, including Ulundi, and looted all livestock they could find. After his capture, Cetshwayo was treated like a common criminal and incarcerated for more than three years before being sent back to his devastated kingdom.

The final blow in the destruction of Zululand was delivered by Wolseley who was assisted by John Dunn using Shepstone's advice obtained in 1875 briefing. Cetshwayo contributed

to the defeat and destruction of Zululand through his diplomatic and military strategy choices. The Zulu King's choice of Shepstone and Dunn in diplomatic relations with the British and his defensive strategy during the war were his undoing.

Mpande's thirty-two-year reign without taking a great-wife or nominating an heir apparent was a source of instability for the Zulu Kingdom, especially after his death. Cetshwayo had to fight for the right to ascend to the throne. In the process he sent most of his half-brothers into exile in Natal and Transvaal. During Mpande's long reign local chiefs became more powerful and influential in their areas.

On ascending the throne Cetshwayo was less powerful than the combined power of the chiefs. Consequently, he resorted to his diplomatic relationship with Shepstone and Dunn in order to check the chiefs' relative power. Unfortunately, Shepstone and Dunn used their relationship with the king for their own benefits. His association with the two gentlemen sowed the seeds for the destruction of his kingdom.

The defeat of the Zulu Army and the destruction of the Zululand succeeded in creating the core and periphery amongst the Zulus. Zululand was divided into thirteen chiefdoms with John Dunn and Zibhebhu kaMaphitha having the largest portion of land and resources.

This created conditions for the colonialists and Britain to manipulate the affairs in Zululand. Although Britain did not annex the Zulu territory soon after the victory. Dunn and Zibhebhu ensured that there was no peace in Zululand until it was officially annexed in 1887. Garnet Wolseley was certain about Dunn's loyalty to the British interests when he allocated him large portion of land adjacent to Natal.

After Wolseley's settlement the imperial chain of control spanned from the colonial office down to those chiefs in Zululand who open for British manipulation. The type of oath all chiefs took amounted to the acknowledgement of the Queen as the supreme authority in

Zululand. The acceptance of chief s office opened them for British manipulation as subject of the Queen.

Fears of an impending unemployment decline in British pre-eminence resulted in the conception of the confederation ideal. Britain needed raw materials to keep its industrial machinery dominating the World economy. British officials, like Carnarvon, argued that Britain needed an avenue to cushion the economy against unemployment in the homeland.

The establishment of the confederation in South Africa was supposed to make more resources, including labour, available for the British economy. The Zulu state was viewed by the colonial officials as an obstacle and a threat to British interests. The implementation of the confederation, according to Shepstone's advice, required the dismantling of the Zulu war machinery and way of life.



Figure3: The British soldiers marching towards Isandlwana, 1879

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APPENDIX 1

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND



Interview sheet on The Relations between Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authority at Port Natal, 1872-1882

Dear Respondents,

I am Sekwenele Happiness Khoza doing a Masters Degree at the University of Zululand, and currently conducting a research on the Relations between Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authority at Port Natal, 1872-1882. When King Cetshwayo's reign commenced in 1872, it was entering the second generation. This study seeks to examine, in more systematic detail than what has been done in recent times, the evidence for and against the contemporary charge that King Cetshwayo was a cruel tyrant and his relations with the British authorities culminating in the 1879 conflict. A lot of scholars have written about the interactions of King Cetshwayo and the British authorities however, more light has to shine upon the details of the interactions leading to one of the biggest conflicts in the country, the Zulu-Anglo war. This study's objective is therefore to investigate the nature of Zulu politics in relation to British Authorities at Port Natal as well as to critically explain the general Anglo-Zulu relations during the period in question. You are assured of your rights, including the right of consent, protection from disclosure of information and respect for your privacy. Anonymity and confidentiality are promised and maintained. Your assistance is therefore highly appreciated.

Thank you,

Project Leader:

Sekwenele Happiness Khoza

Contact: 071 771 6835

Email: sekwenelekhoza@gmail.com

SECTION A: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Draw a cross/tick in the block that expresses your opinion most accurately.

Gender:

Male		Female	
-------------	--	---------------	--

1. Race

African	
Coloured	
Indian	
White	
If other, please specify	

2. Age

20-30	
31-40	
41-50	
51-60	
61 and above	

3. Department

4. Position

1. How were the relations between the Zulu king Cetswayo and the British Authorities at Port Natal like?

2. What was the state in the Zulu affairs and politics under the leadership of King Cetshwayo?

3. What was the nature of Zulu politics in relation to British Authorities at Port Natal?

4. What were the motives behind the 1879 conflict between the Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authorities at Port Natal?

5. Why did the 1879 Anglo-Zulu armed conflict break out ?

6. What could have been done to prevent the conflict between the Zulu nation and the British authorities?

7. What were the events leading to the break out of the war?

8. Was this war inevitable during this period in time?

9. What was the main factor that made the British win the war over the Zulu's in 1879?

10. What was the aftermath of the war on the Zulu nation and its people?

Thank you!

APPENDIX 2

UNIVERSITY OF INNOVATION

RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE Website: <http://www.unizulu.ac.za>
(Reg No: UZREC 171110-030) Private Bag X1001



ZULULAND RESEARCH &

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ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE


Certificate Number	UZREC 171110-030 PGM 2021/24
Project Title	The Relations between Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authority at Port Natal, 1872-1882
Principal Researcher/ Investigator	S.H Khoza
Supervisor and Cosupervisor	Dr M.Z Shamase
Department	History
Faculty	Arts

Type of Risk	Low Risk — Desktop, field work or laboratory					
Nature of Project	Honours/4 th Year		Master's	x	Doctoral	Departmental

The University of Zululand's Research Ethics Committee (UZREC) hereby gives ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project. The Researcher may therefore commence with data collection as from the date of this Certificate, using the certificate number indicated above.

- Special conditions:
- (1) This certificate is valid for 1 year from the date of issue.
 - (2) Principal researcher must provide an annual report to the UZREC in the prescribed format [due date-25 January 2022]
 - (3) Principat researcher must submit a report at the end of project in respect of eth ical compliance.
 - (4) The UZREC must be informed immediately of any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the documents that were presented to the meeting.

The UZREC wishes the researcher well in c earcher well in conducting research.



Professor Mashupye R. Kgaphola

Profe

University Research Ethics Committee
Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research & Innovation

25 January 2021

<p>CHAIRPERSON UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND RESEARCH E rHICS COMMITTEE (UZREC) REG NO: UZREC 1 71110-30</p> <p>RESEARCH & INNOVATION OFFICE</p>

Per ardua ad astra
Through difficulties to the stars



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ACADEMY OF WISDOM HOLDINGS

Reg . No: 2007/ 005105/ 07

16 May 2021
Khoza SH
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University of Zululand
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Kwa-Dlangezwa
3886
EMPANGENI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: MASTERS' DISSERTATION EDITING

The above matter refers.

We are pleased to report that the Masters' dissertation titled: "*The Relations between Zulu King Cetshwayo and the British Authority at Port Natal, 1872-1882*" by Miss Sekwenele Happiness Khoza whose student number is 201432923 , has been edited for the use of language. The following areas have accurately been attended to: Correction of typographical errors; Correction of names and non-English terms according to a specific reference source (style guide/dictionary); Correction of punctuation errors such as mislaid commas, incorrect dash use; Omission of inconsistent queries in the text.; Elimination of widows and orphans, other inappropriate typographical results; and Identification of errors that result from the use of computers, such as garbled tables, passages/chapters in the wrong font, use of homonyms, etc.

Our expert team has contributed by giving your dissertation that stylistic shine which will ablaze your marker's eyes by determining suitable style and rearranging the material into proper structure/order for the targeted destination (external examiners); eliminating slang, redundancies, wordiness and clarification of vague vocabulary; establishing a steady style, language and point of view according to the intended audience maintaining the author's voice; improving the associations, transitions, parallelisms, and paragraphing and insurance of persistent style in headings, captions, figures, and illustrations; and suggesting additions, erasures, or re-structuring of data. We did all this at no additional costs at all.

Your comments to this report will be highly appreciated.

Yours truly,

S. Mahabeer
Senior Editor

Directors : Dr M Naidoo; Mr S Mahabeer; Dr M Lotter