

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

**An Exposition of BRICS Political and Economic Governance:
Towards a New and Balanced Global World Order**

NOXOLO NOMFUNDO KHUZWAYO

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

2020



**An Exposition of BRICS Political and Economic Governance: Towards a New and
Balanced Global World Order**

**Submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Master of Public
Administration in the Faculty of Commerce, Administration and Law, University of
Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa**

Candidate: Noxolo Nomfundo Khuzwayo

Student Number: 20040967

Supervisor: Dr M. Z. Shamase

Declaration

I declare that this thesis “**An Exposition of BRICS Political and Economic Governance: Towards a New and Balanced World Order**” represents my own work and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and properly acknowledged for future reference.



Noxolo Nomfundo Khuzwayo

Student

30 March 2020

Date



Dr M.Z Shamase

Supervisor

30 March 2020

Date

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this study to my son, Ntuthuko, Thank you for your unconditional love and for understanding the situation when mommy is not home but at school. To my parents, aunt Jabu and Baba, aunt Dudu and aunt Mana this would never be possible without you in my life and my sisters Snenhlanhla, Nomfanelo, Azanda, Andiswa and Nokwazi, my family at uMbumbulu you have been a strong support system and a pillar of strength; your prayers kept me going. Khulu and Mkhulu I know you are proud of me where you are; you have been my guardian angels through this journey. I know your prayers when you always told us everything will be okay one day. My friends Lihle Maseko and Sabeliwe Zungu you kept motivating me all the way and showed me true friendship. Mr T Dlomo you instilled this vision in me when you gave me advice to go back to school and continue with my studies when I had no plans to do so. Msholozzi Nxamalala this all started with you in 2010 when I had lost hope and given up on all my dreams; you made it possible for the black child to be educated thank you for that. Last but not least the almighty God you have carried me all the way and you kept your word that says “For I know the plans I have for you, declares the Lord, plans to prosper you and not to harm you, plans to give you hope and a future”.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude to my supervisor Dr M.Z Shamase who has shaped and supported me through this journey from the beginning till the very end, your advice and criticism helped in putting this study onto the right path. I appreciate your effort and your encouragement, which groomed me in the right direction.

My appreciation also goes to Victor Mlambo and Mthandeni Mbatha for your availability. Whenever I needed your help you were always willing.

Thank you to all my respondents for giving me their valuable time and allowing me to conduct interviews on their premises.

Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
AIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CINC	Composite Index of National Capacity
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank

NDP	National Development Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGP	New Growth Path
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PTT	Power Transition Theory
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

List of Figures

Figure 1: Power distribution in the PTT	14
Figure 2: Distribution of power in a globalized world (Lemke and Werner, 1996)	16
Figure No. 3. Share of manufactured products in world exports by technology, 1976-2000.	65

Table of Contents

Declaration	1
DEDICATION.....	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	3
Acronyms	4
List of Figures	6
Chapter One	13
1. Introduction.....	13
1.2 Problem Statement.....	14
1.3 Aims and objectives of the study.....	14
1.3.1 Research Objectives.....	15
1.4 Research questions	15
1.5 Research methodology	15
1.6 Data Collection and Analysis	16
1.7 Study Plan	17
Chapter Two: Literature Review.....	18
2. Introduction.....	18
2.1 Conceptual Theory and Application.....	25
<i>Figure 1: Power distribution in the PTT</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Figure 2: Distribution of power in a globalized world (Lemke and Werner, 1996).....</i>	<i>28</i>
2.2 BRICS in globalization	30
2.3 BRICS goals.....	31
2.4 Diversity in BRICS.....	34
2.5 What is BRICS for its members?.....	36
2.6 BRICS in the changing international order	38
2.7 Does BRICS challenge the current world order?	39
2.8 Conclusion	40
Chapter Three: Research Methodology	42

3. Introduction	42
3.1 Definitions of Research	43
3.2 Research Method	45
3.3 Area of the study	48
3.4 Data collection and analysis	49
3.5 Research process and ethical considerations	50
3.6 Sampling	51
3.7 Analysis and Interpretation of Data	55
3.8 Conclusion	55
Chapter Four BRICS Cooperation: Economic Prosperity for Sustainable Development	57
4 Introduction	57
4.1 Global financial crisis	58
4.2 Exposition of BRICS economies	58
4.2.1 Gross Domestic Product	59
<i>Table No. 1. Difference of BRICS GDP and PPP in 1990 and 2017</i>	59
<i>Table No. 2: Nominal GDP for BRICS and G7 in countries in selected years</i>	60
<i>Chart A: Real GDP growth rates for G7 countries</i>	61
<i>Chart B: Real GDP growth rates for BRICS countries</i>	61
4.2.2 Foreign Direct Investments	62
<i>Chart C: Inward/outward FDI from/to BRICS in 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2017</i>	63
<i>Table No. 3: Top three destinations for outward FDI from BRICS and inward FDI into BRICS for the end of 2012 (% of total FDI)</i>	64
4.2.3 Foreign Exchange Reserves	65
<i>Table No. 4: BRICS Foreign exchange reserves incl. gold in current US \$</i>	65
4.2.4 Trade	66
<i>Table No. 5: BRICS trading profile 2017</i>	67
4.2.5 WTO and Doha Round	68
4.2.6. Intra-BRICS trade overview	69
<i>Table No. 6: Brazil, trade profile</i>	70
<i>Table No. 6: Russia, trade profile</i>	71

<i>Table No. 7: India, trading profile.</i>	72
<i>Table No. 8: China, trading profile.</i>	73
<i>Table No. 9: South Africa, trading profile.</i>	74
4.3 Sectorial analysis	75
4.4 Catch-up process and transfer of industries	76
<i>Figure No. 9. Share of manufactured products in world exports by technology, 1976-2000.</i>	77
<i>Table No. 10: R&D expenditures and high technology export in BRICS, 2000 - 2012.</i>	78
4.5 Manufactured goods specialisation, skill level	79
<i>Chart D: Manufactured goods specialisation index by degree of production skill level, 1995 - 2017.</i>	79
4.5 Conclusion	80
Chapter Five: Governance across the BRICS	89
5. Introduction	89
5.1 Evolution of the term “Governance”	90
5.2 The functioning of “Governance”	90
5.3. Assessing governance across the BRICS	91
5.3.1 Regime or political form and separation of powers	91
<i>Brazil - Federal system</i>	91
<i>Executive Branch</i>	91
<i>Legislative branch</i>	91
<i>National Congress</i>	91
<i>Russia – Federation</i>	92
<i>Executive Branch (White house)</i>	92
<i>Judiciary branch</i>	92
<i>Regional Governments</i>	93
<i>India</i>	93
<i>The executive- The head of the state is the President.</i>	93
<i>Council of Ministers</i>	94
<i>Council of States (Rajya Sabha)</i>	94
<i>The People’s Assembly (Lok Sabha)</i>	94

<i>Supreme Court</i>	94
<i>States and Territories</i>	94
<i>China - Communist</i>	94
<i>National People’s Congress</i>	95
<i>Duties of the NPC</i>	95
<i>President</i>	95
<i>Duties of the President</i>	95
<i>State Council</i>	96
<i>Duties of the State Council</i>	96
<i>Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate</i>	96
<i>South Africa – Democratic System</i>	96
<i>The government</i>	97
<i>The Executive (Cabinet)</i>	97
<i>The National Assembly</i>	97
<i>The National Council of Provinces</i>	97
<i>Provincial Government</i>	98
<i>Local Government</i>	98
<i>The Judiciary</i>	98
<i>State Institutions supporting democracy</i>	99
5.4 Political forms and the link to Economic Development among BRICS states	99
5.4.1 Brazil -Recent history	99
5.4.2 Economy	99
5.4.3 Brazil's international and regional clout	101
5.4.4 Russia -Recent history	104
5.4.5 Economy	105
5.4.6 Russia internal, regional and international issues	106
5.4.7 India - Recent history	109
5.4.8 Economy	109
5.4.9 India on the international stage	110
5.4.10 China - Recent history	113

5.4.11 Economy	113
5.4.12 China and the rest of the world.....	115
5.4.13 South Africa - Recent history	117
5.4.14 Economy	119
5.4.15 South Africa and the rest of the world	121
5.5 Assessing approaches to growth and development	123
5.5.1. New Development Bank	123
5.6 Political Challenges among BRICS states.....	125
5.6.1 Challenges faced by Brazil.....	125
5.6.2 Challenges faced by Russia	128
5.6.3 Challenges faced by India	129
5.6.4 Challenges faced by China.....	131
5.6.5 Challenges faced by South Africa	133
5.7 Difficulties for the New Development Bank (NDB)	134
5.8 Conclusion	136
Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations.....	139
6. Introduction.....	139
6.1 The Politico-economic tradition vis-a-vis regional and international norms and standards of BRICS nations.	140
6.1.1 Political interference/non-interference.....	140
6.2 Influence on global and economic development	141
6.3 Potential for positive regional economic influence.....	142
6.4 Lack of shared standard and norms.....	142
6.5 The nature of governance across the BRICS	143
6.6 Geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government informing good global governance and transparency	144
6.7 BRICS in transforming the global order.....	145
6.8 Conclusion and Recommendation.....	147
6.8.1. Recommendations.....	147
7. Bibliography.....	150



BRICS LEADERS DURING THE PREIDENCY OF JACOB ZUMA IN SOUTH AFRICA



BRICS LEADERS DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF CYRIL RAMAPHOSA IN SOUTH ARICA

Chapter One:

Background of the study

1. Introduction

The concept of BRIC was first introduced by Jim O'Neill in 2001 to describe a group of economically emerging countries (the Federative Republic of Brazil {Brazil}, Russian Federation {Russia}, Republic of India {India}, and People's Republic of China {China}) who, on a purchasing power parity (commonly known as PPP) basis, contributed an aggregate of 23.3% to the world's GDP in the year 2000. The Republic of South Africa formally joined this group in 2010 and together they represent 43% of the world's population with a combined nominal GDP of US \$13, 7 trillion and control 17% of the world trade. It is estimated that by 2027 BRICs (excluding South Africa) countries will overtake the G7 countries. The BRICS are in a similar stage of economic development. This group represents a huge economic power shift from the developed G7 (French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Canada). Therefore it is safe to deduce that these countries' economic wellbeing is of paramount importance to the economic development of the world.

BRICS is not a political alliance, rather it is a group of states that are still developing and are characterised by fast growing economies and these nations have significant influence on regional and global affairs. However, while they are still overcoming poverty, inequality and other challenges they share a common vision that aims to address the similar socio-economic characteristics that compound these nations. Each member of BRICS has its own political and economic characteristics e.g. Brazil has massive amounts of oil, along with large suppliers of agricultural products; Russia has great repositories of oil, along with coal and natural gas; India has iron ore, bauxite and copper ore and is one of the major producers of iron in the world; China has coal, iron ore, petroleum, natural gas, mercury, rare earth elements, uranium and the world's largest potential for hydro power and lastly South Africa is the largest energy producer and consumers on the African continent it has diamonds and gold, the country also has reserves of iron ore, platinum, manganese, chromium, copper, uranium, silver, beryllium and titanium. Therefore, it is clear that the combination of these countries economically is very significant and they play an

important role in the international system, with regards to trade and international relations. Therefore, the study was motivated by these findings, hence it seeks to understand the formulation of BRICS and how this might contribute to a change in the global world order.

1.2 Problem Statement

Through interdisciplinary research across Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS member states), our objective was not to prescribe models for blueprint, but rather, to compare the systems and structures in which law operates, and evaluate the current climate of legal traditions and their relationship to economic development within each country. In this manner, the researcher sought best practices through lessons learnt.

To date, the BRICS member states have shared minimally, at best, their experiences and not been fully able to improve existing initiatives on good global governance and transparency both within the BRICS member states and within the ambit of global multilateral cooperation. The same has been evident within the BRICS member states jurisdictions. Furthermore, the pivotal concepts of political and economic governance remain largely untapped. The panaceas to these problems warrant interrogation. This by no means is an exhaustive list of issues to be explored by the BRICS member states.

This research study addresses both the direct and indirect links between these components and economic development. There is also a particular focus on media and civil society since the last decade has revealed the extent to which these two sources have served increasingly as tools to counter traditional aspects of good global governance and transparency, which translate directly into democratic accountability. As the literature points out, they have been more effective in some contexts than others.

1.3 Aims and objectives of the study

The primary aim of this research was to undertake an intrinsic examination of the BRICS Political and Economic Agenda. To this end, focus was on understanding intra-BRICS power relations at all levels of government, both internally and externally vis a vis regional and international entities toward sustainable economic growth and cooperation, good global governance and transparency.

1.3.1 Research Objectives

- To interrogate the political systems and economic development across the BRICS nations towards an informed understanding of the politico-legal terrain in all BRICS nations vis a vis regional and international norms and standards.
- To analyse the nature and extent of governance across the BRICS.
- To investigate BRICS geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government; and consequently aimed at good global governance and transparency.
- To examine if the establishment of BRICS is aimed at shifting the balance of power from a western led world order.

1.4 Research questions

The primary question of this research was answered by undertaking an intrinsic examination of the BRICS Political and Economic Agenda. How do we understand intra-BRICS power relations at all levels of government, both internally and externally, vis a vis regional and international entities toward economic growth, good global governance and transparency?

The subsidiary questions of this research project are detailed as follows:

- ✓ How do the politico-economic traditions vis a vis regional and international norms and standards in the BRICS nations inform economic development?
- ✓ What is the nature and extent of governance across the BRICS member states?
- ✓ How does the geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government inform good global governance and transparency?
- ✓ Is BRICS a developmental model to challenge the western led world order?

1.5 Research methodology

The proposed study adopted a qualitative research methodology and relied on a multi-disciplinary approach. The reliance on this method is because a qualitative research method enables the researcher to collect data in a natural setting and thereby provide the researcher with an insight into the phenomenon of “interest”. While defining qualitative research, Danzin and Lincoln (2005) argue that a qualitative research methodology is guided by a process which includes field notes, oral interviews, photographs, and recordings. In essence, the qualitative method enables the

researcher to examine issues based on their natural settings and interpret events in terms of the meanings people give to them.

Des Vos et al. (2005), in their study, further stated that qualitative methodology is important because it gives rich information. In addition, this methodology is so comprehensive that it helps the researcher to develop a full understanding of the information being investigated. The data for this study was obtained from an extensive review of the relevant literature taken from scholarly research, books, popular articles, and writings published by the alternative press that deal with specific areas in the field of international relations. The research used secondary data as it is already available and easily accessible.

To add value to the subject presented, the researcher consciously selected informed persons on the issues related to Political Systems, Legal Traditions and Economic Development across BRICS and conducted structured qualitative interviews to acquire data to add knowledge on the subject. In this case the researcher considered the experience and qualifications of the interviewees. These included experts, such as university lecturers, writers, government officials (policy makers) related to the topic, researchers from various institutions, and government officials dealing with international relations matters.

1.6 Data Collection and Analysis

Herrnson (1995) demonstrates that secondary data collection avoids data collection problems and provides a basis for comparison. Secondary data was collected from various sources, which include, but are not limited to: books, magazines, research papers, websites, already published reports, television, radio, newspapers, journals and publications (McDowell, 2002). In this particular study, academic books, journal articles, occasional papers, academic articles, conference papers, reports, government and other organizations' publications, theses and dissertations, newspaper reports and other relevant literature were used. The researcher prepared an interview sheet and made use of digital tape recorders for the purpose of interviews which were transcribed. This method enables the researcher to save time by obtaining the information on digital tape recorders and aids in the preservation of the information for further research.

Reliance on digital tape recorders does not stop the researcher from utilising a semi-structured interviews when the need arise. There could be instances where the researcher could be seeking

specific information gathered from other informants which need to be cross checked for proper precision on the idea. Des Vos et al., (2005) argued that this method gives the researcher and the informants more autonomy which will help give a detailed picture about a particular interest of emerging issues from the interview, and give the informant time to produce a detailed narrative of events. The researcher will also use desk-top inquiry. Dawson (2002) opined that desk-top research comprises of the examination of existing literature to help situates one's study within the context of existing evidence. This involves collecting secondary evidence which assists the researcher in arguing their own study and finding evidence from existing literature. Data was analysed using content analysis as the researcher created themes in order to make findings of the collected data once analysed. Therefore, in essence, themes were created to categorise information collected during the study.

1.7 Study Plan

Chapter one: the first section of this research gave an introduction to the study, addresses the foundation, issue explanation and theory, targets, need, consider design, inquire about approach to the study.

Chapter Two: This chapter review the relevant literature in the subject understudy to see how far other scholars have addressed the issues relating BRICS, their findings and recommendations.

Chapter Three: This chapter present the method used or adopted by this research, data collections, data presentation and analysis

Chapter Four: This chapter explored on the BRICS cooperation, economic and sustainable development

Chapter Five: The governance across the BRICS member states were examined in this section

Chapter Six: This chapter summarised the study, conclude and offer some recommendations

Chapter Two:

Literature Review

2. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the variety of literature written on the concept of an exposition of BRICS political and economic governance: towards a new balanced and global order. The main aim of the chapter is to give an exposition of literature review in respect of the topic in question.

In the last period, the emerging countries have had an important role on the world stage, even while faced with a huge financial crisis. In this sense they represented an important force for global economic recovery, as it was observed in their economic performance. The recognition of global economy and global influence changing are based on the rise of the great power. The first specialist who has investigated the influence of power upon a country's economy was Smith (1776). Paul Kennedy (1986) showed that the relative state of developing countries in the world economy is changing due to difference in growth and organisational reforms.

Attention has shifted to the BRICS countries; individually they have made impressive and increasing contributions to international development. BRICS has attracted significant academic interest, resulting in a significant growth in literature on the subject particularly from 2009 until today. Many studies present that the formation of BRICS was rooted in the long-term common economic interest of the member nations, which includes reforming global financial and economic architecture, strengthening the principles and standards of international law and supporting the complementarities of many sectors of their economies. Pretsowitz (2008) shows in his study that in the era of globalisation almost 3 billion people from emerging countries such as China, India, Russia and Brazil have managed to integrate into the global market.

The challenges facing BRICS political and economic governance have mounted the fact that BRICS currently represents 43% of the world's population, has a combined nominal GDP estimated at USD 13,7 trillion and controls about 17% of world trade. These figures have triggered academic interest in understanding the political, economic, social, scientific and technological significance of this configuration of world power both for its potential and its weaknesses. For this reason, the impact that this arrangement has on innovation, education, health, oceanography

resource economics, diplomacy, science and engineering and other ecologies of knowledge have become an interesting subject of study. This has also led to increased interaction among educational and research institutions from BRICS countries. Some of the research and academic interest from Western countries is indicative that BRICS represents an unknown threat to existing power and privilege. In this sense, BRICS has become a prominent area of study in its own right, and one from which much can be learned about how economic power impacts on political clout and cultural power.

By 2050 the combined economies of the BRICS countries could eclipse all the economies of the world, according to Goldman Sachs who also mentions that BRICS could be a good place for investment because of their growing populations, infrastructure building and expansive middle classes. Goldman Sachs, in the establishment of BRICS, predicted that the real GDP growth in large emerging market economies will exceed the G7 and also the weight of BRICS in the world's GDP will grow, raising important issues about the global economic impact of fiscal and monetary policy in BRICS. As a collective the BRICS nations are unhappy with, and critical of Western dominance of multilateral institutions this is because they have for many years been on the margins and also dissatisfied with the perceived refusal of the West to share global power.

In the same way, Martin Wolf argued BRICS is not a group, BRICS was invented by Jim O'Neill (of Goldman Sachs, in 2001) when they added South Africa which wasn't originally there. He says these countries have basically nothing in common whatsoever, except that they are called BRICS and they are quite important but in all other respects, their interests and values, political system, and objectives are substantially diverse. He continues and says there is no reason whatsoever to expect them to agree on anything substantive in the world, except that the existing dominating powers should cede some of their influence and power that is the one thing they have in common. According to Lin Yaeqin (2009) the rise of the great powers is due to the boom of the emerging countries that seek to catch up with the advanced countries. The already recorded gradual transfer of power from the West to the South and from global players such as the US and the EU to developing countries such as China, Brazil and India appears to be leading to an eventual transformation of the global politic environment.

The main criticism of BRICS, especially from Western observers, is that the five countries are far too diverse to represent a coherent force, and that what separates them heavily outweighs what

unites them (Stuenkel, 2013a). This is the most obvious reason for why cooperation is difficult, and for explaining a future potential breakdown and wholesale defection. Most importantly, compatible interests are prerequisite for cooperation. Even though BRICS interaction is often described as cooperation, this might not be the most accurate description of their relationship. What is observed, and what is referred to as cooperation in some of the literature, op-eds, news, and by BRICS themselves, might better resemble a state of harmony. In such a situation of policy coordination, which is the definition of cooperation, is important in order to realize mutual interests (Keohane, 1984). It also describes situations where there are no gains of deceiving your partners and defecting on the agreement while they continue to cooperate (Oye, 1986). If harmony is the case, the BRICS framework is likely no more than a dialogue platform that functions by identifying mutual interests where policies already align.

Of course this may ultimately increase the prospects of realising mutual interests, but only to a limited degree and in few situations. As above, if harmony is the case, this is the obvious reason for why they do not robustly cooperate. Given overlapping interests, regime building is viewed as the key explanation and strategy for increasing the prospects of multilateral cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986). A regime's principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures help reduce the issues that states trying to cooperate face. Asking what keeps BRICS from robustly cooperating therefore suggests that regime features are weak in the BRICS framework. India, Brazil and South Africa are democracies, while China and Russia fall well short of that mark. Brazil and Russia are primarily natural resources exporters, while China and India focus on manufacturing and services. Although in terms of GDP per capita the average Brazilian compares to the South African counterpart, the stark gap in living standards across the BRICS nations is clear considering that the average Russian is twice as rich as a comparable Chinese citizen, who is in turn twice as well-off as an Indian citizen.

In terms of the size of the grouping's economies, China is by far the dominant player, whereas many commentators suggest that Russia and South Africa do not merit consideration as major emerging markets. In political terms, China, India and Brazil are touted as rising powers in global affairs, while Russia is steadily losing its claim to great power status and South Africa appears to be treading water (2012). A brief explanation about BRICS is articulated by Fourcade which argues that on a basic level the BRICS framework is part and parcel of the process of the economic

exuberance that has shifted interest and capital towards these economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) over the last decades. (2013: 264).

The study by Achin Vanaik (2015: 261), examines the potential and future prospects of BRICS by asking the following questions:

Can it really emerge as a collective that will reject the current neoliberal order and seek to promote a much more social welfare form of capitalist development; that might unleash a dynamic much more conducive to the emergence of more progressive social and political forces whose pressure from below can then take a more radical anti-capitalist direction? Will it seriously challenge the existing world order where the imperialist behaviour of the US continues to be highly, sometimes decisively influential in shaping the course of events?.

Having analysed those questions above, one can easily come to the conclusion that BRICS states has the capacity to bring about both economic and political clout to international relations, in the period when the old western-centric world system is under pressure to transform. They are joined together by this very desire to the world system in order to reflect more truly the diversity of world power, culture, economies and societies in general. They share this reformist impulse and the determination to exercise agency in the hope of an equitable, just and fair world system.

Another argument is the Mielniczuk's social constructivist approach where he argues that a "discursive alignment" (2013, p1087) between the BRICS countries serve as explanation. A developmental-multipolar discourse shared by India and China since the end of the Cold War and adopted by Brazil, Russia and South Africa by the mid-2000s, created the opportunity for converging interests which in turn explain the emerging BRICS political structure. Traces of the same explanation are also found in Babb's (2013) argument, she claims that an alignment took place in the BRICS countries' relationship to IFIs and their advice on economic policies, more specifically that Brazil and Russia came to join India and China's relatively autonomous and independent stance by the turn of the new millennium.

As a triggering factor, the literature emphasises to varying degrees the opportunity created by the financial crisis for the four emerging BRIC economies to assert themselves on issues pertaining to the international financial system. Stuenkel (2013a) for instance, argues that the crisis in the west,

and the stability among emerging economies, created a legitimacy crisis for the international financial order that gave the four countries a platform to cooperate on and substantial bargaining power vis-a-vis the developed world.

Regardless of the underlying reasons for how the framework became a reality, many observers, especially Western ones, have since the beginning tended to dismiss BRICS right away based on their diversity and internal antagonism, claiming that they neither have nor can represent a meaningful and coherent bloc in international relations. The diversity argument tends to be based on the differing economic and political realities in the five countries, which was briefly emphasized in the introduction. A good example of the argument is Walter Ladwig's, published as an op-ed in the New York Times, in build up to the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in March 2012.

William Robinson (2015:231) also argues that BRICS have moved from the surface-level dynamics of interstate political relations in order to get at the underlying meaning of G7/BRICS dynamics. Therefore BRICS politics should aim to differ from older centres of world capitalism to a more balanced and integrated global capitalism. China proposed in the wake of the 2008 collapse not that the yuan become the new world currency but that the IMF issue a truly world currency not tied to any nation-state. Such a move would help save the global economy from the dangers of continued reliance on the US dollar, an atavistic residue from an earlier era of US dominance in a world system of national capitalisms and hegemonic nation-state.

Shameem (2015:88) explains that BRICS has come to mean a practice of politics for people who refuse to be bossed about by superior powers. He continues that the world today is not multi-polar; it is multiplex, where there are multiple great powers bound together by complex forms of restraint and interdependence. With the growing clout of BRICS, the conventional meta narrative of the world powers has become inadequate, if not misleading. Stuenkel (2015:98) questions why should BRICS depend on sluggish multilateral channels such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), or try to imbibe didactic, non-pragmatic western perspectives on issues purely of common interest? It is amusing to be offered solutions to poverty and inequality, bottom of the pyramid health models, low cost housing options, education delivery, energy and water provision, et al by the wise men from organisations and institutions of the Atlantic countries. When was the last time they experienced poverty of this scale, had energy deficiency at this level and suffered from health challenges that are as enormous?

The responses to the challenges faced by the developing world reside in solutions that have been fashioned organically. During the fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi in 2012, leaders for the first time declared they would study the viability of a New Development Bank, which at the time was seen as a significant step toward institutionalising the BRICS grouping. The BRICS group has gained momentum notably since the launch of the project of the New Development Bank of BRICS to help finance group infrastructure projects. The BRICS Development Bank can be of great relevance in world politics since it has the ambition to counterbalance “Western” institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In this sense it’s interesting how Stuenkel has detailed assessment of the evolution of this group of states, since the first time the group BRICS, without South Africa, was mentioned until now when large scale projects are being put into practice.

According to the World Investment Report (2011), findings indicate that economic factors are more significant than institutional and political factors in BRICS economies which thus imply that these emerging economies coming together attracted more than half of global Foreign Direct Investment inflows in the year 2010. The BRICS group offers a number of benefits to foreign investors such as a young and cheap labour force, natural resources and big markets. As international consumption and production has been shifted to emerging economies, Foreign Direct Investment seems to have a positive impact by contributing to their development. At the end of the day it is crucial that the global economy is not dominated by one or two countries. BRICS brings a new voice to the world with the intention to make a new coalition and an ‘anti-Western war machine’ as one scholar argued that the main role of the BRICS group appeared to be a counterbalance to the existing power axis with broader economic and political goals (Organski, 1958). Seemingly this goal has not yet been completed successfully.

To discuss the theoretical embedding of BRICS, the political sciences use the so-called power transition theory (PTT) associating BRICS with a global change from a uni- to a bi- or multipolar world (Glosny, 2010). Introduced by Organski (1968a, b), the PTT describes the international relations as a hierarchic system between countries in which national power is changing over time. A transition period starts when a great power in a secondary position challenges the top nation. He also argued in his book titled World Politics (1958), which laid the foundation of the Power Transition Theory, that a redistribution of power among different countries in the world creates

the conditions for the destabilisation of any existing system and might lead to interstate tensions and possible conflict.

Tammen, R, et al. (2000), also supported the idea that the 21st century is expected to see major changes in world politics. And the most significant of which is likely to be the increase of power from emerging nations such as China (Lemkea & Lemkeb, 2003). Based on PTT, four possible (and certainly not only) reasons dominate the literature. First, national power comes from alliances with other countries or from internal capacities. It is assumed that national power is the key instrument to enforce or defend a country's own interests in a hierarchical world. Alliances like the BRICS platform offer the opportunity to multiply influence and power worldwide.

Thus, power is used to enforce its own interests and improve geostrategic position (Kornegay, 2014). Common BRICS interests are for example improving bargaining power at the multilateral level, the expansion of regional influence, ensuring there is access to markets and natural resources, financial cooperation, and finally the filling of the geopolitical interstice to usher in the post-unipolar world (Kornegay, 2014 and Mathur and Dasgupta, 2013).

A second thinkable motivation to form such an alliance is to reduce the increasing influence of the US and its allies in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (think also of the NATO East enlargement), see MacFarlane (2006). For instance, some authors see the formation of BRICS directly connected with the desire for regional leadership, e.g. some former Soviet Union countries like the Ukraine align itself to Europe and the Western hemisphere and Russia loses their old allies. Clearly, Russia has tried to prevent this.

Third, the BRICS alliance supports holding each other in check (Glosny, 2010). No emerging country shall become a superpower alone, e.g. to form a bi-polar world with the US. To avoid such a bi-polar world is – at least for Brazil, India and Russia – a crucial motive (Garrett, 2010). As a consequence, the rivalry between China and Russia could be directed in a constructive track via the BRICS platform. This goes in line with individual reasons for some BRICS members to participate. For example, Brazil hopes to boost its economy and to improve its acceptance as a regional leader in Latin America (Sotero and Armijo, 2007).

Finally, the planned FTA between the US and the EU (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement, TTIP) as well as the established FTA between Canada and the EU

(Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA) show on the one hand the race for economically strategic partnerships worldwide but on the other hand the closer cooperation between Western economic powers. Consequently, TTIP and CETA are considered as a great incentive to form a BRICS-FTA or sub BRICS FTAs (Krugman, 1991).

It remains to be seen whether the BRICS countries can translate their rapid economic growth into long-term and sustainable development as well as in political power (see Brawley, 2007). Hurdles could present in the form of the upcoming demand for political changes in China and Russia; social unrest caused by social inequality in Brazil or India; and the still, somewhat weak, infrastructure in South Africa. Mathur and Dasgupta (2013) see a lack of new key technologies in the BRICS, but there is a huge potential to cooperate in this field in order to catch up with the G7 (in areas like energy efficiency, aerospace engineering, geospatial technology, etc.). Some authors ask whether the BRICS will be responsible contributors in a rapidly changing world (e.g. in the case of epidemics or natural disasters; see Biersteker and Moret, 2014 or Wade, 2011).

2.1 Conceptual Theory and Application

BRICS and the Balance of Power in International Governmental and Financial Institutions are addressed by a plethora of theories. One of the oldest such theories is the balance of power theory from the realist school of international relations. The underlining principle of this theory is that states will attempt to find equilibrium among one another. Structural realists regard the system as having a tendency toward a natural equilibrium.


It is a doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states. Authors, who apply the balance of power theory to the rise of BRICS, such as Leal-Arcas (2008) and Skak (2011), often posit that emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa do not share Western values and therefore ought to be isolated from core global governance until they subscribe to these values.

As Stefan A. Schirm (2010) highlights, this argument has several flaws. First, it ignores the substantial differences in interests and ideas within the West—that is, between the United States and continental European countries. In addition, the rivalry argument also ignores that emerging powers like Brazil and India are stable democracies with a strong multilateralist record and,

therefore, can hardly be characterised as dominated by differing ideas than those that are prevalent in the West.

As argued by Abramo Organski (1958), who laid the foundation of the Power Transition Theory, a redistribution of power among different countries in the world creates the conditions for the destabilisation of any existing system and might lead to interstate tensions and possible conflict. It is assumed that the international political system is anarchic, where the main actors are states. The PTT is used to predict potential tensions or conflicts when a dominant state loses its power, or a new one (or a group) gains power. Organski (1968 a, b) uses a pyramid (Figure 1) with the most powerful nation at the top (at present, the US), and the least powerful countries at the bottom.

Figure 1: Power distribution in the PTT



Source: Organski (1968)


A transition period starts when a great power in a secondary position challenges the top nation to catch up with it. There are two preconditions to start such a transition period: first, the contender is powerful enough to exercise global power, and second, this country is quite dissatisfied with the status quo concerning the international distribution of power, see Lim (2014). In such a situation, it is assumed that powerful and dissatisfied states tend to overturn the existing international order, because the dominant nation (and its allies) is usually not willing to give up established privileges

and advantages. However, we know from history that the distribution of power and therewith the international system is changing over time.

Upcoming powers establish new institutions, forge alliances and campaign for less (and maybe even non-) powerful states in order to replace the existing super-power, and to pursue their own interests. The latter might be just to maximise economic benefits. A peaceful change is possible when the dominant nation shares (or resigns) privileges and power, or when the challenger holds back until it is as powerful as the dominant nation (and allies). In those cases, peaceful arrangements are very likely. The already recorded gradual transfer of power from the West to the South and from global players such as the US and the EU to developing countries such as China, Brazil and India appear to be leading to an eventual transformation of the global politic environment. Lemke and Werner (1996) argue that national power erodes by increasing distance in a globalised world. They offer a modified PTT approach with regional hierarchies (see also Gilpin, 2001). For example, Figure 2 shows different smaller and larger regional powers (see cone B, C, etc.), which are 'responsible' for 'smaller' (in the sense of less powerful) countries within their region.

The superpower A does not intervene at the regional level but just delegates tasks. Another essential point is that cone A - being the superpower - bears the global responsibility, and with it the highest costs (as we will see when looking for example at the military expenditures). It remains to be seen whether one nation will be able or willing to accept these obligations in the future (although cone A would have seemingly the largest benefits). It is conceivable that cone A is a consortium of representatives from each world region (e.g. the UN).

Figure 2: Distribution of power in a globalized world (Lemke and Werner, 1996)



Source: (Lemke and Werner, 1996)

If one wants to quantify some of these aspects, then a challenging point is to measure national power. Obviously, there are several possibilities: ‘GDP, military expenditures, the composite index of national capacity’ (CINC), see for example De Soysa, Oneal and Park (1997) or Houweling and Siccama (1988).

The advantage of the latter is that for this composite index we have a pretty long time series going back till the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (see Appendix III for upward and downward power mobility of several states from 1816 to today). A shortfall is that this index measures only the national material capabilities and strongly emphasises industrialization (De Soysa, Oneal and Park, 1997). Roland Tammen (2000) also supported the idea that the 21st century is expected to see major changes in world politics, the most significant of which likely being the increase of power from emerging nations such as China (Lemkea & Lemkeb; 2003).

To assess dissatisfaction, different indicators are used: military expenditures, similarity of domestic political system with hegemonic power, and participation in alliances. Lemke and Werner (1996) claim that the rapid growth of military expenditures and military modernisation of China is a clear sign for dissatisfaction. Lim (2014) points out that the deepening of regional integration in East and South East Asia shows the attempt to establish a non-Western area of

influence. In 1992 the ten ASEAN countries signed an FTA, and a few years later, in 1997, ASEAN+3 were founded together with Japan, South Korea and China.

Despite the fact that there is a contradiction on the sustainability of the development of BRICS economies it is by all accounts clear that BRICS countries will involve a main, if not by any means, dominant position on the world economy in the years to come (Wansleben 2012, 7). At present, it seems to be justified to say that at least individual BRICS countries, if not BRICS as an institution, are a "part of the global geopolitical landscape" (Laidi 2011, 1). This is likewise how the BRICS members see themselves. They comprehend themselves as elements in a world that seems to be "experiencing far-reaching, complex and significant changes" (Joint Statement by the third Summit 2011).

It is likely to expect that getting together the BRICS countries would not be an important issue without an understanding that the global order built by the West since the beginning of the 16th century is challenged by the purported rising powers. While discussing the BRICS countries and BRICS as an institution, topics arise such as changing the global order and the possible decline of the USA from its predominant position in international politics.

The changing global order is supported for example by the US National Intelligence Council global trends reports. The most recent report does not foresee how the international system looks later on in the future. Be that as it may, the report takes as given that in 2030 it won't be any more equivalent to how we know now it (Global Trends 2030 2012). Researchers like Jacques (2012), Kupchan (2012) or Tharoor (2012) encourage the thought despite their different points of view.

The issue in this research is to discuss whether BRICS has a role in this changing global world order and what sort of a role it would have. Is BRICS another new sort of an association? Regardless, it fundamentally speaks to emerging states with the exemption of Russia and in that sense it could be an agent for change or perhaps an agent of power transition in the global order. For this situation power would move from the traditional North toward the South which generally has been the called a developing world. In this context the question in this research is whether BRICS as an institution is capable of changing the principles of operation of the international system.

The Schools of International Relations (IR) like the World System Analysis, the Power Transition Theories, the Theory of Hegemonic War or the Long Cycle's Theory anticipate that rising powers challenge the dominating order (Barma et al 2009, 257). Changing international order is firmly associated with the issue of harmony and war in international politics. Green and Kliman (2011, 33) have appropriately indicated the way that scholars from Thucydides to current IR scholars like Robert Gilpin and A.F.K. Organski have portrayed the prospects for peaceful change in the international system.

China's rise alone has prompted a lot of studies attempting to demonstrate whether China's rise can be peaceful or whether it will lead to major clashes in the international system. Theories in international relations suggest that new powers, especially if autocratic, don't rise peacefully (Green and Kliman 2011, 33). Although, Green and Kliman (2011, 34) remind us that there are scholars like John Ikenberry according to whom power transition does not have to result in conflict. The possibility of conflict depends on the kind of existing order.

In the case that the current order is hegemonic, the rising powers do not have a lot of choices other than war to secure their interests. In the case that the order is rule-based and has well-developed and functioning international institutions which will give the controlling power the option to expand its voice and impact, war isn't unavoidable despite the fact that the rising powers have an enthusiasm to create a new order conducive to their preferences. (Green and Kliman 2011, 34)

To be an effective organisation, either in changing the world order or for expanding its voice in the current order, BRICS needs to satisfy a couple of criteria. As a first example BRICS is an institution for some emerging states. Be that as it may, whether it demonstrates trust between the individuals for collective action (Brütsch and Papa 2012, 6) is still to be seen. The underpinning of BRICS should also be sufficiently adaptable to limit intra-coalitional frictions. Further, Adler (1997), has called attention to the idea that the coalition should be transformed into a future community.

2.2 BRICS in globalization

According to BRICS first own expert report (2012, ix) BRICS represents in excess of 40% of the total population and around 25% of the world GDP in 2010. In this sense it is more representative than the G7 whose voice has been decisive in world political issues and economy. In any case, it

is worth China's part of BRICS' statistical figures. BRICS' share in world income, for example, is 15% and China makes up 61% of it (Cameron 2011, 2).

On the off chance that economic trends are sustainable, BRICS will represent a significant part of the world economy's future. As indicated by various estimations BRICS share of global GDP will overtake that of G7 already by 2020 or at the latest 2032 (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 157; Brütsch and Papa 2012, 1; Jacques 2012, 163). Again China's economy is still in a decisive position. China is relied upon as the biggest national economy effectively by 2017. At the same time BRICS produces around 30% of the global total of CO2 emissions because of China (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 106).

From the BRICS point of view it "is a platform for exchange and participation among the member countries" (Joint Statement by fourth Summit 2012). To become something more BRICS needs institutions (BRICS Report 2012, 177). So the idea is that BRICS would not simply stay as an annual gathering for discussions. In the South African Summit the objective was settled to form BRICS into an undeniable fully-fledged mechanism of present and long-term coordination on a wide scope of key issues of the world economy and politics (Joint Statement by fifth Summit 2013).

2.3 BRICS goals

The following analysis is essentially founded on BRICS' Summit reports. The idea is to show how BRICS members see the role of their collaboration and their aims vis à vis the current world order. Indian Think tank report Nonalignment 2.0 (2012) explains the foundation for one basic objective of BRICS. According to the report, central international institutions like the UN and the Bretton Woods are manifestations of the post-Second World War political settlements, and are tightened by the conditions of their inception. In this sense they are creatures of an era still dominated by the West, and therefore it is inappropriate for the world that has seen the end of European empires and the rise of Asia's financial dynamism. (Nonalignment 2.0 2012, 33)

The message above is that from the point of view of the rising powers existing international institutions are not really able to advance their interests. For example in the IMF, BRICS control 14.4% of the votes while the EU and the USA individually control 29,3 and 16,5% of the votes (Brütsch and Papa 2012, 14). Brazil, China, India and Russia are as of now among the 10 largest

shareholders in the IMF (Jacques 2012, 483). Therefore, for example China and India demand the democratisation of international relations just to support multilateralism and the need to give a central role to the UN (A Shared vision 2008). The issue is by all accounts the change of international regimes.

In the fourth BRICS summit in 2012, member states guaranteed for a thorough reform of the UN, including its Security Council, so as to make "it progressively practical, productive and representative [to] manage the present global challenges more effectively" (Joint Statement by fourth Summit 2012). BRICS see the UN as the central point of global governance and multilateralism, and it appreciates general participation (Joint Statement by fifth Summit 2013). Hence making it increasingly representative is significant for BRICS. South Africa's motivation to be in BRICS is to profile itself as a campaigner for the reform of multilateral international organisations (SA in BRICS 2013, 2).

Since the first BRIC summit, the reform of the international monetary institutions has been on the agenda of the summits (Joint Statement by 1st Summit 2009). Without this reform, the authenticity of the IMF and World Bank is at any rate hazardous since they pitifully speak to the developing weight of BRICS and other developing countries (Joint Statement by second Summit 2010; fourth Summit 2012 and fifth Summit 2013). For a similar reason BRICS need to give a central role for the G20 instead of G7 in global economic governance (Joint Statement by second Summit 2010 and third Summit 2011).

BRICS interest for the reform of the UN is because the UN is the central institution for multilateral diplomacy and it ought to have a central role in managing global challenges (Joint Statement by first Summit 2009; second Summit 2010 and fifth Summit 2013). From a Russian point of view there is no genuine option for the UN yet UN reform is required all together as "it could step by step adjust to changing global political and economic realities" (Russian FP 2008, 5).

An intriguing viewpoint with regards to the BRICS summit reports is despite the fact that the UN reform is on the agenda nothing is said about the UN Security Council. At the same time BRICS members request a progressively equitable and democratic based international order and they are committed to the advancement of international law (Joint Statement by second Summit 2010 and fifth Summit 2013).

The reform of international institutions is by all accounts the most significant shared goal for BRICS. Notwithstanding, it is likewise a legitimate concern for every one of the members to censure terrorist militant acts in all forms and manifestations (Joint Statement by first Summit 2009; second Summit 2010; third Summit 2011; fourth Summit 2 2012 and fifth Summit 2013). BRICS nations likewise concede that climate change is a serious threat that requires strengthening global action (Joint Statement by second Summit 2010). In this regard BRICS give their support to the improvement and utilization of renewable power sources (Joint Statement by third Summit 2011).

Conventional non-renewable energy is one fundamental source for the CO₂ emission and energy will be an essential resource for improving the standard of living for people in the BRICS countries. In this manner BRICS resolve to extend the utilisation of perfect and renewable energy sources to satisfy the expanding need of their economies and individuals and to react to climate concerns (Joint Statement by second Summit 2010 and fourth Summit 2012). Additionally, reducing the negative effect of climate change is significant for BRICS for food security (Joint Statement by second Summit 2010). This is significant additionally in light of the fact that BRICS are key importers and exporters of agricultural products (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 265).

In most of the Summits progressing conflict have additionally been on the agenda. BRICS are worried about progressing conflict however in explaining the contentions, freedom, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the countries concerned must be respected (Joint Statement by fourth Summit 2012). According to BRICS members each nation has the privilege to choose its very own way of social, financial and political advancement (A Shared vision 2008 and Russian FP 2008, 6). Further on BRICS are worried about the poorest countries and they present themselves as a voice of all emerging developing countries (Joint Statement by first Summit 2009 and third Summit 2011).

All things considered BRICS summit reports tell that BRICS collaboration is firmly associated with an understanding that the world is experiencing essential and dynamic changes as the Russian foreign policy report (2008) indicates. In any case, BRICS does not appear to have any answers at present for tackling global issues. Neither does BRICS appear to point to reform of the current international order. What they guarantee is the reform of various international institutions for

giving a legitimate place and voice for developing countries in characterising the standards and norms of the international games.

In any case, it is anything but difficult to concur that the reform of international institutions challenges the dominant position of the USA and the entire West in international relations. At the same time it is in BRICS' interest to stick to traditional Westphalian values, most importantly the sovereignty of each country. Although that is in their national interest they simultaneously favour the stability of the existing international order (see for example Russian FP Report 2008, 5). For advancing their objectives BRICS plans to support and widen participation among the member countries (Joint Statement by first Summit 2009 and second Summit 2010). To extend and deepen economic, trade and investment collaboration among BRICS individuals is a basic objective (Joint Statement by third Summit 2011 and fourth Summit 2012). BRICS' Academic forum (2012) emphasised the advancement of social collaboration and connectivity between BRICS countries.

2.4 Diversity in BRICS

In the introduction it was already mentioned that one precondition for an organisation to be successful is cohesion. Then again an organisation can be helpful for its members in the event that individuals some way or another complement each other politically and economically. In the following section, the extent of diversity within BRICS is discussed. This will not be an intensive and detailed analysis of BRICS member countries. Rather a few highlights of the member countries will be displayed based on BRICS report from 2012 and Goldman Sachs 2007 report and additional aspects will be raised from already existing studies.

Brazil is displayed as a country specialising in farming and agriculture (Cameron 2011, 3). Brazil has 60 million hectares of arable land and the potential cultivable land is more than 400 million hectares (BRICS Report 2012, 3, 106). This implies among the BRICS that Brazil is viewed as an exporter of agricultural products particularly to China (Harris 2005, 23). Associated with agriculture, biofuel is likewise observed as a significant Brazilian item. The Brazilian aviation enterprise Embraer is displayed as an innovation zone of advancement where Brazil is ahead of BRICS. On a global scale Embraer comes directly subsequent to Boeing and Airbus (BRICS Report 2012, 117). Embraer has as of now a joint endeavour with China Aviation Industry Group

(Harris 2005, 23). Further the development of Brazilian economy is based on domestic demand (BRICS Report 2012, 5).

China is presented as the manufacturing workshop (BRICS Report 2012, 3; Pieterse 2008, 708 and Cameron 2011, 3). This should tell that in industrialisation China is much ahead of all BRICS economy and China's economy is export oriented (BRICS Report 2012, 5). "China likewise has around 12% of world's mineral resources" (BRICS Report 2012, 3). In any case, it isn't sufficient for China's developing economy to rely upon resource import. An intriguing aspect with regards to China is its aging population: "China will turn into an aged society by 2027" (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 47) and it may limit China's future development.

In the case of India its strong service sector is emphasized (BRICS Report 2012, 3 and Cameron 2011, 3). Among the BRICS India is a software powerhouse (Pieterse 2008, 708). In any case, the Goldman Sachs Group (2007, 13-4) present India as a quick industrialising nation in the manner that industry is turning into a development drive and by 2020 more than 100 million new individuals will enter the labour force. Associated with industrialisation there will be rapid urbanisation in India. By 2020, 140 million individuals will move to urban areas (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 19). Still contrasted with different BRICS, India will stay as a low-income country for several decades (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 25). India's development depends on domestic demand (BRICS Report 2012, 3).

Among the BRICS Russia is displayed as an energy resource base. Russia has around 20% of the world's gas and oil resources (BRICS Report 2012, 3). In addition, Russia is specialised in commodities (Cameron 2011, 3). Be that as it may, Russian prospects are as bright as those are for the different BRICS. Russia should confront a dramatic population decrease from the current 140 million to 109 million by 2050 (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 37). Due to its energy resources, Russia is export oriented (BRICS Report 2012, 3).

South Africa has a large mineral base and is one of the leading rare mineral producers (BRICS Report 2012, 3, 5 and Pieterse 2008, 708). That makes it of interest to China as well as to industrialising India. For both China and India water scarcity will become a problem. Already now agriculture draws 68% of total water usage in China and 86% in India and irrigation increases further water withdrawals (Goldman Sachs Group 2007, 105, 107).

Even in a political and cultural sense emerging BRICS are diverse. China and Russia are authoritarian states. Brazil, India and South Africa are, at least formally, democratic states. Already this makes it problematic for the BRICS to rally around shared values (Cameron 2011, 3). China and India are rather civilizational states than nation states in the Westphalian sense. Russia is somewhere between and Brazil and South Africa are nation states (Schwengel 2008, 768). China is pretty much a Confucian society and India is a Hindu society. Both are alien to the West although India sees itself to be “the most Western and liberal among the non-Western powers” (Nonalignment 2, 0, 2012, 31).

It seems to be hard to find a common denominator of what would make BRICS a solid international organization. However, in the economic sense the diversity makes BRICS economies complementary and there is a great potential for increasing cooperation for the benefit of BRICS members. BRICS could develop into a trading block. They all have chosen an indigenous way towards modern societies. (Kupchan 2012, 86-145) And BRICS, even the democratic ones, diverge from the liberal vision of Western nations (Laidi 2011, 2). Be that as it may, BRICS individuals are doubtful of each other for different reasons (Sino-Russian and Sino-Indian contention) (Laidi 2011, 2).

2.5 What is BRICS for its members?

For Brazil being in BRICS is associated with its enthusiasm for expanding South – South trade particularly with developing economies like India and South Africa (Kliman 2012, 58). From a Brazilian viewpoint it is possible to understand the membership in BRICS as a channel to alternative financing. Although before BRICS formally existed China and Brazil had already agreed on 4 billion USD for investments, development and to extend the improvement of Brazilian railroads, roads and ports (Harris 2005, 24). Furthermore, in a more extensive sense for Brazil, BRICS is an intermediary political installation between the West and especially the United States and Latin America (Laidi 2011, 11).

For China, BRICS allows an opportunity "to share its sovereigntist approach" (Laidi 2011, 10). Generally China has the capacity to act on its own as a global power dissimilar to the other BRICS members. In the BRICS setting India has joined the block of emerging powers what in all likelihood increases India's weight in global negotiations (Kliman 2012, 59). Be that as it may,

India isn't committed just to BRICS. India should simultaneously explore other avenues of strategic engagement like the Indian Ocean locale (Nonalignment 2.0 2012, 35). For India it could be feasible to establish multiple bilateral free trade areas with all the countries which currently contribute the greatest amount to global growth; in addition BRICS members including Turkey, Indonesia and Nigeria (Nonalignment 2.0 2012, 26).

Although BRICS was established by a Russian initiative, Russia is the least typical BRICS member. It is not an emerging power, but a former superpower keen to maintain some political status that it lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Russia is still considered as one of the main states in the world with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Russian FP 2008, 5). BRICS is a coalition that enables Russia to associate itself with a wider group "when interacting with the West" (Laidi 2011, 7). But then again Russia has not received much support from other BRICS members beyond sovereignty issues.

Russia assumes that BRICS will progress toward becoming "one of the key pieces on the global chessboard" (Lavrov 2012, 1). Therefore, Russia supports BRICS as another model of global relations overriding the old East-West and North-South divide and BRICS will be, for Russia, a key foreign strategy priority (Lavrov 2012, 2). Russia additionally takes it pretty much for granted that all BRICS share common interests in reforming international monetary and financial systems (Lavrov 2012, 2-3). Thus, BRICS members should achieve another dimension of cooperation. Yet, it is additionally possible to state that for Russia BRICS is a means to accomplish a strong position in the global community and a channel for flexible participation in international structures (Russian FP 2008, 1, 3).

To improve its role in world politic issues, BRICS isn't the only route for Russia. The Asia-Pacific region has increasing significance because of the way that Russia is a part of that region geopolitically (Russian FP 2008, 14). In this way a trilateral format or Russia-India-China Troika is also significant for Russia (Russian FP 2008, 5-6, 14). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has a special space in Russian Asian policy. It allows for the growth of friendly relations with China and India after India got an observer status in the SCO (Russian FP 2008, 14). Russia also plans to build a vital strategic partnership with China. It likewise needs to build up its relations with Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and other driving leading regional states (Russian FP 2008, 14).

Although in Latin America, Russia looks to set up a key strategic partnership with Brazil it also has an interest to "expand its political and economic cooperation with Argentina, Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela" (Russian FP 2008, 15). Every one of these interests supports the argument that BRICS is more a strategic tool for Russia in keeping up and improving its position in global political issues than to transform the entire global order. For South Africa, BRICS is the continuation of the historic Bandung Conference (SA in BRICS 2013, 3). In this sense it speaks to the South – South participation against the control and domination of the West. Joining BRICS increases and expands the prestige of South Africa particularly in the African context. Furthermore, with regards to BRICS South Africa has defined its role to guarantee that the rest of African continent will gain from its BRICS participation (SA in BRICS 2013, 1). This clarifies the way that the theme of BRICS Durban summit was 'Africa' and the summit gave its support for the African integration process (Joint Statement by fifth Summit 2013).

While looking at some of the particular interests of BRICS individuals it is possible to conclude that BRICS as an institution is utilised for advancing and progressing traditional national interests of the members. BRICS is more for "individual gain than for progressively equitable, reasonable and fair global order" (Brütsch and Papa 2012, 2). Furthermore, BRICS isn't really the main priority in the member's external or global policies. In any case, BRICS cooperation advances the relevance of each of its members however as per Cameron (2011, 2) "it's anything but a strong cohesive group in major political, security, economic or trade issues". As Laidi (2011, 1) has stated, the BRICS structure is a heterogeneous alliance of often competing power that shares one common interest: "to dissolve Western hegemonic claims".

2.6 BRICS in the changing international order

It is very clear that the rise of China and India has effectively changed something in imagining the international system: "the rise of Brazil, South Africa or South East Asia isn't introduced as a second era of economic tigers [but rather] as the first generation of emerging powers" (Schwengel 2008, 770). The issue isn't any longer of small or medium size capitalist success stories but rather about states which have additional potential for political control or influence and which are not satisfied with their present role in the international order. For the emerging powers the current international order with a set of rules and regular practices is forced by predominant states of the

past (Barma et al 2009, 527). BRICS has been introduced as an organization interested in changing the current global order.

In any case, it is expected that BRICS will build an elective global order while progressively organising themselves with one another (Barma et al 2009, 526). The emergence of an alternative or shadow order will undermine the position of the dominant state. This again may influence in the manner that order and stability will reduce while the current hegemony declines at any rate in the relative sense (Barma et al 2009, 540). What's more, the combination of rising powers and declining authority can have an essential and at some point even rough impact on international politic issues (Barma et al 2009; 525)

2.7 Does BRICS challenge the current world order?

In the economic sense there is no uncertainty that the global order is evolving. China, India and Brazil are expected to continue rising. Middle range powers like South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Iran and South Africa are becoming progressively significant. What's more, into the great beyond Africa and Latin America may encounter fast development while Japan and Europe will decline and the USA will have quite slow growth. (Nonalignment 2.0 2012, 31; Kupchan 2012) For example Turkey has moved as of late "toward an aspiring regional and even global role" (Kliman 2012, 60).

In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms China is anticipated to take control over the USA as of now in 2017 and in market exchange rate terms in 2027. India follows behind yet is expected to turn into the third 'global economic giant' by 2050 and at some point after that Brazil will move to the fourth spot in front of Japan. At the same time Russia could overtake Germany as biggest European economy in PPP terms by 2020 and at a market exchange rate by around 2035. Further rising economies, "Mexico and Indonesia can be bigger than UK and France by 2050, and Turkey bigger than Italy". (PwC Report 2013, 1).

The changing ranking order of national economies challenge the role and the influence of currently leading powers however it doesn't really change the system itself. However, there are signs about expanding South – South trade connections. Effectively more than "40% of the South's global trade is represented by intra-South trade" (Pieterse 2008, 709). According to Barma et al rising powers have discovered each other as increasingly more significant trading partners in the most recent 25

years. What's more, China and India have turned out to be significant accomplices for smaller rising powers. (Barma et al 2009, 532)

Brazil has exchange settlements with India and South Africa so as to reduce the impact of traditional industrial nations (Harris 2005, 22). For South Africa, trade with other BRICS has allowed it to expand its chance to diversify the negative trade balance (SA in BRICS 2013, 5). At the same time the role of the US dollar as a reserved currency of central banks has been in decline. In 2002 still 73% of reserve currency forms were in dollars however in 2006 it was 60% (Pieterse 2008, 709). According to Pieterse the role of the IMF has been in decline. Still in 2003 IMF lending was 70 billion USD and in 2006 it was just 20 billion USD (Pieterse 2008, 710). The USA isn't any longer self-obviously the overwhelming force in the world economy.

2.8 Conclusion

It is easy to agree with Schwengel (2008, 770) that the USA is no longer the sole guarantor of the global market and as the Pacific and Atlantic power it is not anymore the globally accepted hegemon, “neither by the elites nor by the common people”. An interesting aspect in the current situation is that the major dividing line is between two different kinds of capitalism (Pieterse 2008, 716) overlapped with civilizational divide. But it is far from evident whether BRICS as an organization is the factor to challenge the US dominance and able to construct the future international order.

It is less likely that BRICS currently has much more in common than the “size, growth prospects and mutual animosities” (Brütsch and Papa 2012, 3). And there are also scholars like Sharma (2012) who are sceptical about the continuous growth of BRICS. Sharma relies on the historical experience of the Asian Tigers as well as to some other cases which were not able to sustain high growth for more than just two decades. The ability of BRICS to change the international order is connected with economic prospects and diversity within the BRICS.

Common for all BRICS is a fast growing economy, interest in multipolarity, antipathy against the US hegemony but that is not necessarily enough to make a coherent and influential institution. On the other hand Brazil, Russia and South Africa are more in the West than China and India. China and India represent a different civilization and therefore they can be challengers of the existing international order.

The diversity within BRICS makes it possible for the USA or the North Atlantic axis to divide BRICS and continue to rule the world. For Brazil, Russia and South Africa, reform of the institutions vital to the governance of the current international order could be enough. This is one factor that undermines the potential power of BRICS as an international arrangement. The other factor is the Sino-Indian rivalry. This rivalry makes it possible for the USA to use India in the emerging Sino-US game for the leading position in the future international order.

It is still difficult to see the BRICS as an institution that would seriously challenge the existing international order. It is rather an institution for advancing diverse individual national interests of the member states. Part of the BRICS countries might be satisfied to increase their voice and role in global politics and in regional structures. This would democratize international regimes but not necessarily change the order and its value base even in the case that further modernization of rising powers would be more an indigenous process and therefore increase plurality in the global system.

Finally, how peaceful or violent the transition process will be depends first on how possible reforms will be accepted by rising and declining powers. First of all, will the declining powers be ready to adapt to the new realities after the existing order has been understood as normal for some two hundred years? The other concern is whether the reform accommodates the rising powers enough that they would be satisfied. Reforms might be enough for the USA, Brazil, Russia and South Africa but not necessarily for China and India.

It is more complicated to think of hegemony change simultaneously with the change of the whole global order. In that case it is not BRICS but China as the potential New Middle Kingdom we have to consider. On the other hand there are currently many states in the global South which are ready to bandwagon with China but at the same time less interested in Chinese hegemony in the global system.

Chapter Three:

Research Methodology

3. Introduction

This chapter describes in depth the methodology employed for data collection and data analysis to be able to address different questions. For the purposes of this research secondary data was collected, fused and used in a complimentary fashion to get a clear picture of the situation in the researcher's main areas of investigation. In any research project, the researcher is accountable for his/her methods, findings, and applications. Schwandt (2001), states that 'the ultimate value or research is dependent upon the methods, procedure, and techniques used. The method is of particular significance because it 'provides a rationale for the way in which a researcher goes about getting knowledge.'

The qualities and shortcomings of any study depend for the most part on its methodologies. For any study to be acknowledged, it is essential that the technique utilized is appropriate. The subject or topic to be researched ought to provide guidance to the procedure or methodologies to be adopted. The onus is on the researcher to clearly elucidate the techniques to be utilized. The justification of the research methodology decision ought to identify with the hypothetical viewpoint that supports the research. Ponterotto (2005), says that a decision of exploration strategies to be utilized in any study ought to be 'dictated by the exploration inquiries' and nature of the study', not by the inclination of the researcher. A decent approach to picking the best research system for any study is to take a gander at the way of the examination, topic, and exploration addresses to which the study plans to reply.

On the off chance that the examination inquiries are more exploratory and investigative, asking how or what, they are typically best replied with subjective or blended techniques. In the event that the exploration question shows a speculation or an announcement that should be legitimized or wrong, then a quantitative technique would, for the most part, be utilized. Research is equally important to social scientists for analysing social relationships and seeking explanations to various social problems. It gives the intellectual satisfaction of knowing things for the sake of knowledge. It also possesses the practical utility for the social scientist to gain knowledge so as to be able to

do something better or in a more efficient manner. Research in the Social Sciences is concerned with both pieces of knowledge for its own sake and knowledge of what it can contribute to solve practical problems.

In more details, in this chapter, the researcher has outlined the research methodology utilized in this study, explained the sample selection, described the procedure used in designing the instrument and collecting the data and provided an explanation of the analysis of the findings. The chapter on research methodology painstakingly argued for, and justified each, a decision that was taken when arriving at the way in which the research was to be organized. Every time the researcher made a choice from a number of options, it was stated what each of these were and why they made the choices they did.

3.1 Definitions of Research

A number of definitions of research have been proposed by various scholars and researchers, working in different fields. According to Grinnell (1993), ‘research is a structured inquiry that utilizes acceptable scientific methodology to solve problems and creates new knowledge that is generally applicable.’ Whereas Lundberg (1951), draws a parallel between the social research process, which is considered scientific and the process that we use in our daily lives. According to him, scientific methods consist of systematic observation, classification, and interpretation of data. Now obviously, this process is one in which nearly all people engage in, in the course of their daily lives. The main difference between our day-to-day generalizations and the conclusions usually recognized as scientific method lies in the degree of formality, rigorousness, verifiability and general validity of the latter.

Kalof, Amy & Thomas (2008), defines research as ‘a systematic investigation to find answers to a problem’. Jovanović (2011) argues that ‘scientific research is a systematic, controlled empirical and critical investigation of propositions about the presumed relationships between various phenomena.’ Hood (2006), defines research as an original contribution to the existing stock of knowledge making for its development. The systematic approach concerning generalizations and formulation of a theory is also researched. As such the term ‘research’ refers to the systematic method consisting of enunciating the problem, formulating a hypothesis, collecting the data,

analysing the facts and reaching certain conclusions either in the form of solutions(s) towards the concerned problem or in the certain generation for some theoretical formulation.

According to Greenfield, research is an art aided by skills of inquiry, experimental design, data collection, measurement, and analysis, by interpretation, and by the presentation. A further skill, which can be acquired and developed, is creativity or invention. Also, Hammersley (2018), believes that research is, in essence, an investigation into processes. Therefore, research is the finding of answers related to the questions. It is a systematic search for truth and finding new knowledge about our world through the combination of ideas and facts. Redman and Goodwin & Horowitz (2002) define research as a 'systematized' effort to gain new knowledge. Research methodology is basically a portmanteau. It is the correlation of the two that make up a significant part of the most important field of scientific research and technology.

Research is the quest for knowledge, to weigh, evaluate and observe facts in order to explain opaque proceedings. It is a systematic investigation delving into an unknown scientific process, whereas methodology is the system of methods followed in a particular discipline. Research has been defined as the process of intellectual discovery which has the potential to transform people's knowledge and understanding of the world. The definitions above clearly state, that the word 'research' refers to the systematic way of investigating and providing answers to the topic in question. Research is equally important to social scientists for analysing social relationships and seeking explanations to various social problems. It gives intellectual satisfaction of knowing things for the sake of knowledge. It also possesses the practical utility for the social scientist to gain knowledge so as to be able to do something better or in a more efficient manner.

The research in the Social Sciences is concerned with both knowledge for its own sake and knowledge for what it can contribute to solving practical problems. This is a part of the dissertation where the author justifies the processes by which the research questions, which were derived from an analysis of the relevant literature, were answered. It is not sufficient to say, for example, 'suitable respondents were sampled using a snowball sampling technique and then purposive using postal interview sheets' and then leave it at that. It might well be the case that, given the problem(s) to be investigated, such a choice of research methods is entirely appropriate. The term 'methodology', particularly when employed in the social sciences, does not just mean method, but also the governing philosophy behind the methods employed.

3.2 Research Method

Polit and Hungler (1999), in their work, argue that the methodology refers to ways of obtaining, organising and analysing data. Methodology decisions depend on the nature of the research question. Methodology in research can be considered to be the theory of correct scientific decisions. In this study, methodology refers to how the research was done and its logical sequence. The main focus of this study was the exploration and description of the concept, of an exposition of BRICS political and economic governance: towards a new balanced and global order. Research methodology is defined by Mills (2003), as ‘the general approach the researcher takes in carrying out the research project’. Mills (2003), concur with Babbie and Mouton that research methodology refers to the researcher’s general approach in carrying out the research project. Mouton views research methodology, as focusing on the research process and the kind of tools and procedures to be used.

The point of departure was the specific task (data collection) at hand, the individual steps in the research process, and the most ‘objective’ procedures to be employed. In essence, as Carter and Little express, methodologies justify methods, which produces data and analyses, and methods produce knowledge, so methodologies have epistemic content. The current study adopted a qualitative research methodology and rely on a multi-disciplinary approach. The reliance on this method is because a qualitative research method enables the researcher to collect data in a natural setting and thereby provide insight into the phenomenon of “interest”. While defining qualitative research, Danzin and Lincoln (2005) argue that a qualitative research methodology is guided by a process which includes field notes, oral interviews, photographs, and recording. In essence, the qualitative method enables the researcher to examine issues based on their natural settings and interpret events in terms of the meanings people give to them. This study was guided by the following research questions:

- How do the politico-economic traditions vis a vis regional and international norms and standards in the BRICS nations inform economic development?
- What is the nature and extent of governance across the BRICS member states?
- How does the geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government inform good global governance and transparency?
- Is BRICS a developmental model to challenge the Western led world order?

The research explored the exposition of BRICS political and economic governance towards a new and balanced global world order. The focus was to understand intra-BRICS power relations at all levels of government, both internally and externally vis a vis regional and international entities toward sustainable economic growth and cooperation, good global governance and transparency. Des Vos et al. (2005) in their study stated further that the qualitative methodology is important because it gives rich information. In addition to the fact that this methodology is so comprehensive that it helps the researcher to develop a full understanding of the information being investigated.

The data for this study was obtained from an extensive review of the relevant literature taken from scholarly research, books, popular articles, and writings published by the alternative press that deal with specific areas in the field of international relations. The research will use secondary data as it is already available and easily accessible. To add value to the subject presented, the researcher will consciously select informed persons on the issues related to Political Systems, Legal Traditions and Economic Development across BRICS and will conduct structured qualitative interviews to acquire data to add knowledge on the subject. In this case the researcher will consider the experience and qualifications of the interviewees. These will include experts, such as university lecturers, writers, government officials (policy makers) related to the topic, Researchers from various institutions, and government officials dealing with international relations matters.

In keeping with Martin Marshal's stipulations, the nature of this investigation necessitated that Qualitative Research Methodology be employed rather than a quantitative research methodology. According to Rossman and Rallis, Qualitative research is a broad approach to the study of social phenomena: the approach is naturalistic and interpretive, and it draws on multiple methods of inquiry. This study has addressed the topic in question largely based on Qualitative Research Method though it required the use of a variety of methods and techniques to suit the sources to be used. The qualitative research method made the researcher dig deep into the subject or event under study. Accordingly, in this method, abundant forms of data or information were collected and thoroughly examined through a variety of perspectives or from different people. The data collected was interpreted to ascertain and enrich an extensively important perspective.

Atkinson describes qualitative research as a form of social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their experience and the world in which they live. It presents information with words, in a descriptive narrative. It attempts to understand phenomena in natural settings. The aim of qualitative studies is to provide illumination and understanding of complex psychosocial issues and is most useful for answering humanistic ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. Qualitative research presents data as a descriptive narration and attempts to understand phenomena in the natural setting.

Qualitative research is mostly associated with words, language, and experience rather than measurements, statistics and numerical figures. As a result, qualitative research allows the researcher to ‘study selected issues in-depth, openness, and detail as they identify and attempt to understand the categories that emerge from the data’. In qualitative methods, data is collected through spoken language or written format and also observations that are documented so that the data can be thematically analysed. In this study, qualitative methods were utilized to collect the data. Qualitative research involved investigating how people give meaning and interpret their surroundings based on their experiences and interactions. The study findings can provide a starting point when little or no preliminary research has been done on the subject matter.

Holloway argues that qualitative research is characterised as developmental and dynamic, and does not use formally structured instruments. It involves the systematic collection and analysis of subjective narrative data in an organised and intuitive fashion to identify the characteristics and the significance of human experience. The study also employed a qualitative approach. Qualitative research means a deeper understanding of the subjects being studied, since qualitative methodology means that one gets access to peoples’ personal experiences and realities in their everyday interactions. Qualitative research also allows the researcher to generate rich data in the form of words through comments and statements unlike quantitative research where data is in the form of statistics. Through qualitative research, the researcher is able to see the social world through the eyes of the people they study. One is able to get peoples’ own interpretations and understanding of the world in which they live.

Qualitative research gives the researcher an opportunity to find out the positions that people take in relation to different social phenomena. Qualitative research also helps the researcher get access to peoples’ personal experiences towards the phenomena that are being studied.

This type of methodology, on the other hand, assisted in the exploration of phenomena by providing descriptions and explanations through the employment of various qualitative methods. Rabie and Cloete describe how the qualitative methodology approach has become increasingly popular because of the way in which it can enrich the results of a study by gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomena of interest. A qualitative methodology they say aims to answer the why and how questions and is ideal when non-causal questions make-up the premise for the assessment, when contextual values, knowledge and perspectives are sought after to arrive at a comprehensible conclusion in the exploration of a phenomena. The focal point of qualitative research is on the exposition of a phenomenon and it emphasises on the process and interpretation of the outcome.

Qualitative research methods can be considered as key instruments of the research process itself. They double as a means to an end and also an end in themselves as they seek to bring out the depth, richness, and texture in understanding the complexities of various human phenomena. Qualitative research processes are often inductive and exploratory in approach and may produce new theories and hypotheses in the analysis, interpretation and explication of data. Barbour (2001) describes how qualitative research has a distinctive ability to harness perceptions and experiences of individuals, allowing a research question to be examined from various angles. It was necessary for a number of reasons to use a combination of qualitative methods. Firstly, some qualitative methods are complementary as they enhance, support and validate the applicability of the information gained from this exploratory study.

3.3 Area of the study

The study was done in South Africa in different provinces which include Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. This study consciously selected informed persons on the issues related to Political Systems, International relations, Legal Traditions and Economic Development across BRICS and conducted structured qualitative interviews to acquire data to add knowledge on the subject. In this case the researcher considered the experience and qualifications of the interviewees. These included experts, such as university lecturers, writers, government officials (policy makers)

related to the topic, researchers from various institutions, and government officials dealing with international relations matters.

3.4 Data collection and analysis

Due to the nature and objectives of the study, data was drawn from secondary data collection. Herrnson (1995: 453) demonstrates that secondary data collection avoids data collection problems and provides a basis for comparison. Secondary data was collected from various sources, which include, but are not limited to: books, magazines, research papers, websites, published reports, television, radio, newspapers, journals and publications. In this particular study, academic books, journal articles, occasional papers, academic articles, conference papers, reports, government and other organisations' publications, theses and dissertations, newspaper reports and other relevant literature were used (McDowell, 2002).

The researcher prepared interview sheets and made use of digital tape recorders for the purpose of interviews which were transcribed. This method enabled the researcher to save time by obtaining the information on digital tape recorders which aided in the preservation of the information for further research. Reliance on digital tape recorders did not stop the researcher from utilising a semi-structured interview. There were instances where the researcher could be seeking specific information gathered from other informants which needed to be cross checked for proper precision of the idea.

Semi-structured interviews are suited for eliciting personal or sensitive information by providing a forum to share such experiences. In support of this, Steward makes the point that unlike structured interviews, semi-structured interviews allow for new questions to be asked during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says in order to test his or her perceptions of how things are or how they ought to be. The interviewer does not stick rigidly to the questions but is able to improvise and formulate follow-up questions and further delve into meanings and areas of significance or interest that crop up during the interview. Semi-structured interviews also enable the interviewer to gather information on the context and to explore meanings in a way that other methods of study do not enable.

The researcher will also use desk-top inquiry. Dawson (2002) opined that desk-top research is comprised of the examination of existing literature to help situate one's current study within the

context of existing evidence. This involves collecting secondary evidence which assists researchers in arguing for their own study and finding evidence from existing literature

The people who took part in the interviews were purposively selected as the population to be placed under study as they were considered to have in-depth knowledge of the issues at hand. According to Kawulich (2011), purposive sampling is a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions taken by the researcher concerning the participants to be included in the sample are based upon a variety of criteria. Babbie and Mouton (2001), define purposive sampling as “a type of non-probability sampling useful in qualitative research that permits the scholar to use their choices to identify the most important or representative interviewees.”

Appropriate interviewees may include individuals who meet a certain criterion and possess specialist knowledge of the research issue, capacity and willingness to participate in the study and individual participants who would be most likely to contribute suitable data, both in terms of relevance and depth. The researcher began with purposive sampling, where one participant was chosen who was known to have knowledge on the topic of the study. The researcher then adopted snowball sampling, where the participants or informants with whom contact had already been made used their social networks to locate other people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study. Snowball sampling was used to find and recruit hidden participants.

These perspectives help to construct a comprehensive understanding of the outcomes and experiences within a specific context. Babbie (1966), points out that qualitative research methods seek to study social phenomena in its natural environment by presenting an understanding of social actions in terms of specific contexts. This is because in human life, different individuals or groups have diverse perspectives and different circumstances even though they exist in the same place or environment. This involves collecting secondary evidences which assist the researcher in arguing their own study and finding evidence from existing literature. Through the analysis of the secondary data, the researcher had made an observation that there was insufficient literature written on the study area of BRICS.

3.5 Research process and ethical considerations

In all cases the researcher must ascertain the extent of existing knowledge, define their own area of enquiry, collect data and analyse it, and draw conclusions. Therefore, the researcher defines

research strategy as the plan that the researcher develops on how to conduct the study. Relevant primary data pertinent to the study was also obtained through semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews were administered to a purposively selected group of twenty-five people in total. The semi-structured interview questions were broadly constructed by the researcher and affirmed by the supervisor. Given the fact that English is the medium of instruction in at most universities in South Africa, the qualitative interviews were conducted on both willing and available people: which included experts, such as university lecturers, writers, government officials and policy makers related to the topic, researchers from various institutions, and government officials dealing with international relations matters.

The information regarding the study and the intended use of the data was also outlined in the informed consent form. The information was provided in a written format so that it was clear and transparent. This was done for them to make a valid decision on whether they wanted to voluntarily participate in the interview or not. The aim of the research was also briefly verbally explained and no incentive was provided to stimulate participation.

3.6 Sampling

When conducting research many types of sampling are possible, although qualitative research usually uses relatively small samples (Lyell, 1998). Research participants are generally selected because they are able to provide rich information of their experiences and are willing to articulate their experiences (Crabtree & Miller, 1992; Wilson, 1991). The researcher used purposive sampling to interview participants that were identified for the study.

Department or Organisation	Number	Justification for Selection
Department of International relations and cooperation. (DIRCO)	3	The Department of International Relations is the custodian of South Africa's foreign relations with other countries, and since BRICS is an international model of development, their input would be vital for the study.

South Africa BRICS Think Tank	5	This think tank is imperative in coordinating South Africa's involvement in BRICS and hence it will add valuable knowledge regarding the BRICS model in relating to development and ushering in a new world order.
Department of Economic Development (KZN)	2	The Department of Economic Development in KwaZulu-Natal has welcomed the involvement of the country within the BRICS models as it has been touted as a clear path towards development, hence their input will be valuable.
Business forums	5	These are business forums that have an interest in South Africa being in BRICS, particularly for trade and investment purposes.
Academic experts on BRICS	5	Academics have spoken out regarding the involvement of South Africa in BRICS, hence their contribution would be significant for the study.
South African Institute of Foreign Affairs	5	The institute undertakes various research relating to development and growth in South Africa, and has published numerous articles on BRICS, hence their expertise will also be valuable for the study.

Each respondent was given a consent form prior to the scheduled interview which had all the details of the study and a copy of the questions to be asked in the interview. The participants were also informed that their participation would not bear any positive or negative consequences. The purpose was to ensure that all participants did not feel coerced to participate in the study. These efforts were made in order to respect the independence of all the participants. With the consent of the participants, the interviews were recorded using an audio recorder. The recording of the interviews allowed the researcher to concentrate on the interviews as they progressed.

The researcher made use of a digital tape-recorder for the purpose of recording interviews which were transcribed. This method enabled the researcher to save time by obtaining the information on a digital tape-recorder and aided in the preservation of the information for further research. The reliance on a digital tape recorder did not stop the researcher from utilising semi-structured interviews when the need arose. There could be instances where the researcher could be seeking specific information gathered from other informants which needed to be cross checked for proper precision on the idea.

The interviews were conducted for seventy minutes each on a one-on-one basis. The interviews began by first ascertaining the identity, age, race of the respondent, their job title, qualifications, level of experience and the time period they have been working at the institution. Interviews gave the researcher the opportunity to ask questions which may never have been probed in the past and also opened new areas of study. Lastly, the respondents were asked to provide information on the extent of governance across the BRICS. The interviews aimed to elicit responses of the general perceptions, opinions and feelings. The data obtained through the semi-structured interviews allowed for an in-depth exploration into the experience of research. The data was the subjective opinion of the participants.

The interviews were held in a conversational manner to make it as natural as possible so as to put the respondents at ease while they talked about their own perceptions, experiences and expressed their views. The friendly yet somewhat professional tone helped to make the interview a relaxed and open space for sharing information. The interviews covered several basic questions of the research. By going through the first questions other questions were answered before the researcher asked them. This allowed the researcher to come up with more exploratory questions to keep the conversation going. Respondents were informed that all information received would be confidential and solely for this study. The identities of the research participants were protected and therefore they had neither the motivation nor incentive to provide false data. The researcher also

aimed to establish a good relationship with participants enabling them to express barriers and obstacles that the researcher had perhaps failed to identify.

A challenge the researcher faced in carrying out this research was the problem of time. Time was a notable disadvantage in terms of scheduling interviews. The researcher had to make repeated appointments to obtain an interview with some respondents due to the busy nature of their work. The opportunity to use the snowball technique as a means of accessing the sample population and collecting the much-needed data was utilised. Snowball sampling is most commonly used when the researcher would have difficulty in finding participants who might otherwise not be identified easily. Snowball sampling often allows the inclusion of several views or experience. Snowballing, as a referral method in which a respondent links the researcher to others he or she knows would be interested and or helpful proved very useful. Through this method, some of the research participants enabled connections with their colleagues who shared a similar interest in the research area and this made it easier to access informants who were ready to help.

The researcher read the University's Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics and its Policy and Procedures on Managing and Preventing Acts of Plagiarism, and understood their content. The supervisors and the researcher considered and discussed the ethical issues that arose from this research. This research did not generate any real or perceived clash of interest; the researcher wishes to also state that there was no involvement of any project or activity that would become the subject matter of the study. The researcher did not have any direct or indirect financial interest in the study nor did any of my close friends or associates. The production of this dissertation was guided by the University's policies and ethics. The researcher respected the confidentiality and anonymity of all interviewees and their dignity and safety, and that participants in the research were not forced, coerced, bribed or induced in anyway, and that they participated of their free will without intimidation.

This study seeks to contribute to the academic synergy of key priorities and common focus areas of BRICS Political and Economic Governance towards a New and Balanced Global World Order. The study will further contribute to understanding intra-BRICS power relations at all levels of

government, both internally and externally vis a vis regional and international entities toward sustainable economic growth and cooperation, good global governance and transparency.

With the exception of the supervisor's guidance, all work in this study was the product of my effort. My supervisor and I used the text-matching software (Turnitin) to check all texts used in the thesis. In circumstances that impacted upon ethical obligations, I disclosed them to my supervisors and we took appropriate action in terms of the relevant University policies.

3.7 Analysis and Interpretation of Data

Marshall and Rossman describe data analysis as the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data. It is described as messy, ambiguous and time consuming, but also as a creative and fascinating process. Broadly speaking, while it does not proceed in linear fashion, it is the activity of making sense of, interpreting and theorising data that signifies a search for general statements among categories of data. It could be concluded that data analysis requires some sort or form of logic applied to research.

The researcher employed a qualitative approach in interpreting the data from interviews. The data was analysed inductively and manually, using the important activities of qualitative data analysis which is reviewing and scrutinizing the data for common themes and propositions and lastly gaining an understanding of the data in the context it was collected. The thematic analysis was focused on BRICS political and economic agenda towards a new global order.

The data was analysed using content analysis as the researcher created themes in order to make findings of the collected data once analysed. Therefore, in essence, themes were created to categorise information collected during the study.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has reflected on procedures and strategies that the researcher considered when planning the research. The planning included sampling which was the selection of participants, the population where the sampling was chosen, data collection where the researcher collected relevant information from willing participants in the form of interviews, and data analysis where information from those interviews was analysed to form a constructive and credible research study.

The researcher also made sure that the research ethics relevant to this study were kept up to date to prevent any emotional harm.

Chapter Four

BRICS Cooperation: Economic Prosperity for Sustainable Development

4 Introduction

Prior to the inclusion of South Africa in 2010, the concept of BRIC was introduced in the year 2001 by Jim O'Neill, then chairman of Goldman Sachs, one of the biggest investment management companies in the world. According to one of the earliest reports (2001) on emerging and dynamically growing economies by Goldman Sachs - Brazil, Russia, India and China were suggested to merge into that special "economic union". The presented research took into account the total land area of BRIC members, population, potential of the consumer markets as well as influence within their respective regions. In the next 50 years, "Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRICS economies) are projected to become a much larger force in the world economy. Using the latest demographic projections and a model of capital accumulation and productivity growth, we map out GDP growth, income per capita and currency movements in the BRICS economies until 2050" (Goldman, 2003). In the year 2003 Goldman Sachs experts predicted that within the next five decades the centre of global economic gravity would move towards BRICS countries.

The relative importance of the BRICS as an engine of new demand growth and spending power may shift more dramatically and quickly than many expect. Higher growth in these economies could offset the impact of growing populations and slower growth in today's advanced economies (Goldman, 2003). On the whole, it was predicted that the weight of BRIC GDP would grow significantly (led by China) and their total economic performance would reach and exceed the level of G7 countries' economic performance. Using PPP and prices as a measure the research showed that BRICS share of world GDP was set to rise in future decades and that the countries were expected to take their place among the top world economic players. This statement has also triggered debate regarding the subsequent shift in global economic impact, engendering changes in global political influence.

This chapter is based on studies by recognized economists and analysts - such as J. O'Neil, J. Lin and R. Baldwin - who are concerned with problems regarding BRICS. Informative and statistical database has been formed on the basis of materials posted by the UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO,

Goldman Sachs, and other presented sources. This chapter focuses on the time interval from BRICS group formal emergence since 2009. Since then additional economic surveys have become available. However, the researcher will select only particular years in order to depict the changes occurred. The researcher also used the year 1990 as a baseline to show the development rate of BRICS countries.

This chapter is analysed by using systematic analysis allowing the interaction processes between BRICS countries to be considered in detail. Systematic analysis is routinely used by large market subjects for the purpose of strategic planning; in particular, by such subjects concerned with development planning as well as the generation of administrative influences designed to keep the subject on an established path of development. As research tools, the following methods were employed: scientific induction and deduction, economic and statistical analysis, comparison, tabular and graphic techniques of fact presentation.

4.1 Global financial crisis

The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 proved the comparative strength and resilience of BRICS economies. Undoubtedly, the financial crisis hit the emerging economies severely in addition to the developed countries. However, the recovery after the crisis in BRICS countries occurred much faster than in the rest of the developing world. The global economic shock after the financial crisis encouraged the idea of an alternative to the existing world order. During that period BRICS used different ways of macroeconomic management and succeeded to perform with significant results. The crisis did not slow down the dynamics of the Chinese and Indian economies in terms of GDP annual growth. Brazil and South Africa suffered a short stunting, but very soon got back on the growth path. Russia was the only BRICS country that experienced a strong decline during the crisis with a relatively quick subsequent recovery. The demand in emerging markets has helped the affected economies in making the first steps towards recovery.

4.2 Exposition of BRICS economies

BRICS group as a whole have made a great economic breakthrough during the last two decades. This fact has gained lots of attention, at least because the group member countries belong to the top seven geographically largest countries in the world. BRICS countries occupy more than 25% of the world's land area, unites around 40% of the world's population and its share in global GDP

grows annually. Each of the BRICS countries has some competitive advantages and large potential for development. This group of countries is highly engaged in agriculture and rich in raw materials, furthermore its outsourcing of IT services and related products manufacturing potential is highly promising.

There is a high potential that BRICS countries can support each other very well in different areas: China and India prevail in services and manufacturing; Brazil and Russia are rich in raw materials together with large agricultural lands and food supplies, as well as gas and oil. South Africa also has large rare minerals reserves like gold, iron ore and more. Gradually, BRICS economies are maximizing their importance as international economic players in terms of GDP and PPP growth, demographic indicators, international trade, FDI inflows and outflows. At the same time, economic development is accompanied with the improvement of internal social or living conditions. Comparison and analysis of BRICS countries shall be done in accordance with selected indicators.

4.2.1 Gross Domestic Product

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often regarded as a major indicator of economic growth. With regards that BRICS contains over 40% of world population, growth of GDP rates may encourage increased demand. All five countries have experienced significant positive economic changes during the period from 1990 to 2017. As it is shown in Table No. 1, GDP has increased several times, whereas China made the greatest leap. GDP per capita has also grown significantly, which may indicate that life standards in BRICS countries were improved in some ways.

Table No. 1. Difference of BRICS GDP and PPP in 1990 and 2017

Year	GDP, US\$ billion		GDP per capita (PPP), current US\$		GDP based on PPP share of world total (%)	
	1990	2017	1990	2017	1990	2017
Brazil	465,004	2,245,673	5,263	12,340	3,316	2,802
Russia	516,814	2,096,777	3,485	18,670	3,941	2,988
India	327,274	1,876,797	0,883	4,060	3,212	5,668

China	390,279	9,240,270	0,796	10,011	3,839	14,738
South Africa	111,998	350,630	5,458	11,750	0.848	0.693

Source: World Bank data, 2017; Economy watch, 2017.

Table No. 2 displays the share of BRICS and G7 countries in world's total GDP over the two decades. It indicates that BRICS showed slow economic progress in the 1990s contributing some 6% to world turnover. Nevertheless they experienced rapid economic growth in the first decade of the 21st century, when their collective GDP had almost reached a ¼ the of world's share. As for G7 economic performance, Table No. 2 shows the sustainable economic dominance in world GDP share over the 1990s and a visible decline in recent years, where the share of the worlds most developed countries decreased by approximately 20%.


Table No. 2: Nominal GDP for BRICS and G7 in countries in selected years

BRICS countries, US\$ billion				G7 countries, US\$ billion			
YEAR	1990	2000	2013	YEAR	1990	2000	2013
ECONOMY				Economy			
Brazil	402 137	644 729	2 250 370	Canada	592 028	739 451	1 819 563
China	404 494	1 192 836	9 318 901	France	1 246 571	1 328 943	2 740 566
India	326 796	467 788	1 924 452	Germany	1 714 447	1 886 400	3 629 850
Russian Federation	-	259 446	2 144 146	Italy	1 138 150	1 104 009	2 070 461
South Africa	112 014	132 878	352 475	Japan	3 103 698	4 731 199	4 932 312
World	22 603 849	32 857 937	74 600 701	United Kingdom	1 019 349	1 493 559	2 533 429
				United States	6 011 887	10 358 908	16 911 086
				World	22 603 849	32 857 937	74 600 701
GDP percentage in world share	4%	8%	22%	GDP percentage in world share	69%	67%	47%

Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UN DESA Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, 2017.

The illustrated process was forecasted by Goldman Sachs experts in 2001 and was one of the reasons for BRIC concept creation. In the year 2050, BRIC is expected to reach 40% share of global GDP. The researchers emphasize a high potential of emerging markets in general. Charts A and B compared real GDP annual growth rates for G7 developed countries and BRICS group for the period 1990-2017.


Chart A: Real GDP growth rates for G7 countries.



Source: UN DESA Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, 2017.

Chart A presents the economic growth volumes of G7 developed countries in two decades. The growth rates vary between 0,5% and 3,5% until the year 2005. During the last decade, due to the unstable economic situation and its consequences, the dramatic decline in common real GDP growth is indicated, with Italy having negative indicators.

Chart B: Real GDP growth rates for BRICS countries.



Source: *UN DESA Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, 2017*

Chart B indicates the significant growth of BRICS countries GDP in comparison with developed countries of the G7 group. Chart No. 8 shows that the leading economy here is China, where the average annual real GDP growth was the highest in the 1990s and within the last decade stably presents around 10% on average. India presents high growth indicators, as well as all five countries performed sustainable and rapid growth. Russia seems to be the economy with the most unstable growth rates among the group members, which is caused by the highest “vulnerability” during the global economic crisis in 2009. Annex No. 6 presents a detailed overview of annual GDP growth for each country separately.


4.2.2 Foreign Direct Investments

In the following analysis reference is made to the concept of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI is an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest in and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) of an enterprise resident in a different economy. FDI inflows constitute a stable part of annual capital formation for each country. According to many analysts, FDI nowadays are one of the key development factors for many dynamic countries such as the BRICS group. Jordaan (2005), states that: “... FDI leads to the introduction of new industries and products in the host-country economy and to an increase in knowledge about demand and world markets and how the host country can find the place in a worldwide allocation of intermediate steps in global production. Finally, inward

direct investment is associated with faster economic growth, both through productivity effects and through the introduction of new products.”

The economic interconnection during the last two decades made BRICS countries the object for intensive capital inflows. The number of investing countries together with FDI is growing gradually, which reflects high economic potential as well as hopes and trust assigned. Chart C shows the FDI inflow and outflow within selected periods from 1990 to 2017. The beginnings of the 21st century, together with its economic reform policies and political outcomes have boosted inward investment inflows, which allowed the BRICS countries to considerably increase its investments into other economies, but primarily into each other.

Chart C: Inward/outward FDI from/to BRICS in 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2017.



Source: UNCTAD, Division on Investment and Enterprise, 2017.

The high jump of FDI inflows into BRICS are indicated since the beginning of the 21st century until the present time, when FDI were directed mainly to China - increased by 3 times and currently

present some 8% of FDI world share; Russia - within one decade FDI grew from 0,5 % to 6% of FDI world share; and Brazil - slight FDI decrease is indicated at the beginning of BRICS functioning, however, by far FDI has doubled and presents some 4% of FDI world share. FDI into India and South Africa were also slightly increased. As per outward investments, China and Russia account for the lion's share of it. Within the past few years South Africa has also intensified its FDI. Further, it is necessary to indicate which countries were allocating their FDI into BRICS most actively, and in which directions the BRICS group allocated their investments. It is important to analyse these investment flows because this process determines the major interest of a particular country in a designated market.

Table No. 3: Top three destinations for outward FDI from BRICS and inward FDI into BRICS for the end of 2012 (% of total FDI).

	Inward FDI into BRICS (%)			Outward FDI into BRICS (%)		
	1st	2nd	3rd	1st	2nd	3rd
Brazil	Netherlands, 27%	USA, 16%	Spain, 11%	Austria, 28%	Cayman Isl., 16%	Virgin Isl., 0%
Russia	Cyprus, 30%	Netherlands, 12%	Bermuda, 10%	Cyprus, 37%	Netherlands, 16%	Bermuda, 11%
India	Mauritius, 26%	UK, 16%	USA, 15%	Singapore, 27%	Mauritius, 14%	Netherlands, 4%
China	Hong Kong, 46%	Virgin Isl., 15%	Japan, 6%	-	-	-
S. Africa	UK, 45%	Netherlands, 19%	USA, 7%	China, 18%	UK, 13%	Mauritius, 10%

Source: International Monetary Fund Combined Direct Investments Survey, 2017.

Based on presented facts, the investment flows into BRICS mainly come from developed economies, whereas the outward FDI are largely directed to offshore financial centres, and at the lower range, again into developed countries. South Africa presents the major intra-BRICS investment stock directed to China. Therefore, FDI flows within BRICS remain very limited.

4.2.3 Foreign Exchange Reserves

Foreign exchange reserves or FX reserves are reserves of foreign exchange and gold. They compare the dollar value for the stock of all financial assets that are available to the central monetary authority for use in meeting a country's balance of payment needs as of the end-date of the period specified. The monetary institutions, holders of FX reserves, may use it to fight inflation of their own currency. As shown in Table No. 4 below, BRICS countries dispose of large foreign currency reserves with China being the world's dominant holder and Russia (6th), Brazil (8th) and India (11th) being at the top 11 holders at the end of the year 2017. The accumulation of international reserves can serve not only as an instrument to fight another global economic crisis; it also increases the share in global trade under GDP growth conditions.

Foreign exchange reserves and gold are another important indicator of BRICS significance to the world economy and its financial power. Based on data published by the CIA World Fact book, indicated in Table No. 4, most of BRICS countries (excluding South Africa) are placed at the leading positions in amount of FX reserves on hold, accounting for roughly 40% of the world's total. In this regard, China is a world leading country which several times surpasses Japan, the second largest FX reserves holder. For contrast, the FX reserves of developed countries are indicated.

Table No. 4: BRICS Foreign exchange reserves incl. gold in current US \$.

Country	Rank in the World	FX reserves, US \$
Brazil	8	\$ 358,816,426,347
Russia	6	\$ 509,692,081,493
India	11	\$ 298,092,483,487
China	1	\$ 3,880,368,275,099

South Africa	42	\$ 49,708,176,471
European Union	3	\$ 863,800,000,000
Japan	2	\$ 1,266,851,419,539
United States	19	\$ 448,508,967,142

Source: World Bank Data. Total reserves including gold in current US\$, 2017.

Emerging economies performed a significant GDP growth and gained weight in the global economy. As Table No. 4 shows, BRICS holds vast foreign exchange assets which can be invested into the development of emerging markets. In addition, due to the fact that BRICS countries have relatively low and stable public debt levels, the investment banks are more likely to offer their funds, which once again prove the strong position of BRICS from a macroeconomic perspective.

4.2.4 Trade

BRICS countries are gaining influence in the field of international affairs, especially by means of international trade. Moreover, since the beginning of the 21st century each BRICS country has joined the World Trade Organization, which has introduced a homogeneous rule-based system, brought trade liberalisation and had a positive impact on industries, goods and services delivered by the countries. The International Competition Conferences are held annually among BRICS representatives to ensure the effective competitiveness and appropriate legislation.

Based on WTO trade profiles, in the year 2017 BRICS countries accounted for more than 27% of the world's total exports and 28% of import covering merchandising trade and commercial services. As it is reflected in Table No. 4 below, China is a world leading exporter and second largest importer of merchandised goods and it has the largest capital (in US\$) turnover. India and Russia are also in the top 20 list of world's largest exporters and importers with the highest annual percentage change, which concurrently indicates their status as developing countries. According to its annual percentage rate Brazil also shows dynamic growth from year to year, however its low capital turnover testifies certain interim isolation. In comparison with the other group members, South Africa has relatively low performance, however it is one of the highest in in the Sub-Saharan region.

Table No. 5: BRICS trading profile 2017.

	Merchandise Trade								Commercial Services Trade							
	Import				Export				Import				Export			
	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.
Brazil	2	17	1,25	223,4	22	11	1,32	242,5	17	19	1,87	77,7	29	14	0,87	38,1
	2															
Russia	1	15	1,8	335,4	6	12	2,88	529,2	14	16	2,5	104	22	16	1,33	58,2
	7															
India	1	19	2,63	488,5	19	17	1,61	296,8	7	15	3,08	128,1	6	16	3,32	145,6
	1															
China				1.949,9								280,1				
	2	16	9,7	9	1	15	11,1	2.209,007	18	19	6,7		8	14	4,3	190,4
				2												
South Africa						-										
	3	11	0,68	127,1	41		0,57	99,9	43	5	0,41	17,1	54	4	0,34	14,7
	2															
1. Rank in the World (incl. EU)				2. Annual change 2005-2017 (%)				3. Share in World total (%)				4. Total in US million \$				

Source: WTO Statistic Database 2017, Trading Profiles

Table No. 4 reflects that BRICS countries (with the exception of South Africa) have intensified their merchandise trading and commercial service relations with the rest of the world. That fact indicates a continuously growing importance of trade and straightening of BRICS position at the global market. The cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, know-how and people associated with international production networks – call it “supply chain trade” for short – has transformed the world (Baldwin, 2012). Indeed, economic relations, based on dynamics of international trade define to a large extent the cooperation patterns between the countries. This is why in this chapter the researcher will attempt to draw up and analyse the intra-BRICS trading profile and its proportion in a view of overall trading with the rest of the world. After that the researcher will concentrate on sectoral analysis, separately mentioning the diverse goods complexes, such as capital, consumer, intermediate goods and raw materials. That will provide this study with a better understanding of the nature of trading relations within the BRICS group - is it a case of interdependence, mutual assistance or compromise.

4.2.5 WTO and Doha Round

BRICS countries are important WTO members. As it is shown in Table No.12, together they account for roughly 15% of world merchandise exports and 17% of import. In August 2012 Russia has entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which determined the full partnership of BRICS as a group with the Organization. China is also a young WTO member, as they joined the Organisation in 2001. At the same time the Doha Development Agenda, so called Doha Round, was launched. It presents the latest round of trade negotiations among the WTO members that aims to reform the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules. The membership enables BRICS to promote its interests redirecting the Organisation’s focus towards developing economies and fight against protectionism in WTO. Contrariwise, WTO brings into BRICS its enforcement mechanisms, institutions and coherent trading policies.

It is necessary to emphasise, that each BRICS country is very specific in its field of trade and has different priorities for their international trading policies. At the international market they compete against each other - BRICS countries are often involved in litigation processes. For instance, the large numbers of complaints from Brazil are directed against China. Indeed, without appropriate regulations China is able to flood Brazilian and other developing markets with is relatively cheap

goods as well as to supersede Brazilian goods from the international markets; Brazil also finds Indian steel and software products as a threat to their market and Russia competes with Brazilian agricultural exports. China was focused on international trade during the last three decades. One of the reasons for China to enter WTO was to protect its export at the international market. The socialist principles of planned economy had to be synchronised with the market economy model.

This economic institutionalisation also has stabilised relations with trading partners. While China and Russia are focused on international trade intensification, India, Brazil and South Africa are more concentrated on their domestic markets. India and South Africa have opened their economies for international trade relatively recently, since 1990. South Africa is an active participant of the Doha Round negotiations. The country is presented in WTO through its membership in such Southern coalitions as NAMA-11 and the Africa Group. South Africa calls for help with access to the market support for developing economies and trading policies revision. Activities of BRICS countries within WTO are determined by their priorities in international trade. Cooperation among the countries is characterised by competition in many areas and economic tension. Therefore, BRICS will have to hold much negotiation to agree on mutually beneficial policies.

4.2.6. Intra-BRICS trade overview

The tables below are based on the World Bank and its World Integrated Trade Solutions data. They intend to describe and analyse BRICS trading relations within the group and with the rest of the world. The left part of the table presents intra-BRICS trading relations - percentage of total exports of the given country to other group members; further, for the better understanding of the nature of trading relations among BRICS the major trading category (a) and main product sector (b) are presented. Exports volume is expressed in percentages from overall exports (a) and in percentage from the main product sector (b). The right part of the table defines the top four markets for BRICS and their major exporters. As indicated in Table No. 5, the major trading partner for Brazil is China. Its exports there perform almost 50% of all raw materials and minerals extracted in the country. Further, sectoral analysis shows that vegetables and animals are also exported. The second most important trading partner for Brazil is the USA. In comparison with large export volumes with Argentina - Brazilian regional partner and other developed countries, Brazil has a relatively modest share in intra-BRICS trading, exporting mainly raw materials, fuels to India, food products to Russia, capital goods and transportation to South Africa.

Table No. 6: Brazil, trade profile.

Export to BRICS (%)			Top intra-BRICS exports by product category (a) and sector (b) (%)		Top import and export partners			
					Top exporters (%)		Top markets (%)	
Brazil	Russia	1,2%	Raw materials	68%	China	15,5%	China	19%
			Animal	59%				
	India	1,3%	Raw materials	61%	USA	15,1%	USA	10,2
			Fuels	50%				
	China	19%	Raw materials	84%	Argentina	6,8%	Argentina	8,1%
			Vegetable	38%				
	South Africa	0,7%	Capital goods	34%	Germany	6,3%	Netherlands	7,1%
			Transportation	22%				
					a			

Source: World Bank data, World Integrated Trade Solutions 2014.

The Russian Federation, being a very specific member of the BRICS group, is not attached to the same extent to trading relations with other member countries. According to World Bank data shown in Table No. 6, the main destination for exports from Russia is the Netherlands, however, China is still the major trading partner with respect to exports of Russian fuels and raw materials and imports of such capital goods as machinery and electronic devices. Further, Russian products are directed largely to G7 members. Brazil, India and South Africa are mostly supplied by fuels, raw materials and intermediate goods, mainly chemicals.

Table No. 7: Russia, trade profile.

Export (%) to BRICS			Top intra-BRICS exports by product category and sector (%)		Top exporters and import			
					marketsTop (%) exporters		Top markets (%)	
Russia	Brazil	0,3%	Intermediate goods	86,4%	Netherlands	13,1%	China	16,8%
			Chemicals	78,4%				
	India	1,3%	Miscellaneous	64,2%	Unspecified	12,7%	Germany	12%
			Capital goods	22,2%				
	China	16,8%	Fuels	70,6%	China	6,7%	USA	5,3%
			Raw materials	70%				
	South Africa	0,05%	Raw materials	43,5%	Italy	5,5%	Ukraine	5%
			Vegetables	43,5%				

Source: World Bank data, World Integrated Trade Solutions 2014.

Table No. 7 indicates that the major trading partner for India with regards to imported goods is China and Middle East countries. The largest amounts of goods from India are directed to the United States, United Arab Emirates and China, which together with Hong Kong SAR accounts for more than 8% of exports from India. India exports raw materials and intermediate goods such

as textiles and clothing to China. Brazil receives fuels and chemicals; Russia also procures consumer goods such as chemicals or vegetables in India. However, the overall volumes of intra-BRICS trading for India do not reach the level of ten percent. In comparison with other BRICS members, significant amounts of goods, presented largely by fuels and transportation, are exported to South Africa.

Table No. 8: India, trading profile.

Export partner share to BRICS			Top intra-BRICS exports by product category and sector (%)		Top exporters and markets import			
					Top exporters (%)		Top (%) Markets	
India	Brazil	1,8%	Consumer goods	60,4%	China	11%	USA	12,4%
			Fuels	49,2%				
	Russia	0,7%	Consumer goods	47,8%	Saudi Arabia	7,8%	UAE	10%
			Chemicals	30,6%				
	China	4,8%	Intermediate goods	49,3%	UAE	7%	China	4,8%
			Textiles, clothing	30,9%				
	South Africa	1,7%	Consumer goods	70,9%	Switzerland	5,2%	Hong Kong	4%
			Fuels	34,8%				

Source: World Bank data, World Integrated Trade Solutions 2014.

The giant economy of China is a top exporter for other BRICS members, as well as for the many countries of the world. China's main trading partner and long-term consumer of Chinese goods is the USA, which procures massive amounts of machinery, electronics and textile goods from there. Further, China is active in trading with G7 countries. The other top markets for China are situated

in East Asia where China is a leading supplier for consumer goods, machinery and electronics. Based on Table No.16 below, China provides Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa with capital and consumer goods, once again largely represented by relatively cheap machinery and electronics or textiles and clothing. Russia is in the 8th position of top destinations for Chinese export, and India is in 10th.

Table No. 9: China, trading profile.

Export partner share to BRICS (%)			Top intra-BRICS exports by product category and sector (%)		Top exporters and markets import			
					Top exporters (%)		Top (%) markets	
Brazil	1,6%	Capital goods	43,8%	Korea Rep.	11%	Hong Kong	17,4%	
		Machinery and electronics	41,4%					
Russia	2,2%	Consumer goods	51,4%	Japan	7,8%	USA	16,7%	
		Capital goods	30,4%					
India	2,1%	Machinery and electronics	42,1%	China	7%	Japan	6,8%	
		Capital goods	42%					
China	0,7%	Consumer goods	47,1%	Other, Asian region	5,2%	Korea Rep.	4,1%	
South Africa		Machinery and electronics	32,3%					

Source: World Bank data, World Integrated Trade Solutions 2014.

As China is an unambiguous top exporter to BRICS, it is important to look deeper at the import consistency from the group members to China: imports from Brazil have 2,7%,10th place, share of total merchandise trade with raw materials and minerals; South Africa is in 12th place with

2,4% of total import share mainly delivering miscellaneous goods to China; Russia follows in 13th place importing 2% of goods to China, led by fuels and raw materials; India has the lowest volume of imports to China with 0,8% of overall import share and represented mainly with raw materials, textiles and clothing goods. Based on the findings above it is difficult to consider BRICS countries as key trading partners for China. China operates actively at the various markets in various regions of different development levels. Based on Table No. 8, China is the key trading partner for South Africa, where minerals, fuels and rare metals are exported. Sub-Saharan and Eastern Asian markets are also very important for South Africa in terms of exporting goods. India and Brazil (to a lesser extent) also purchase metals, minerals, fuels and chemicals. The small percentage of goods exported from South Africa to Russia is represented mostly by raw materials and vegetables.

Table No. 10: South Africa, trading profile.

Export partner share to BRICS (%)		Top intra-BRICS exports by product category and sector (%)		Top exporters and import Markets				
				Top exporters (%)		Top markets (%)		
South Africa	Brazil	0,6%	Intermediate goods	69,5%	China	15,4%	China	12,6%
			Chemicals	29,3%				
	Russia	0,4%	Raw materials	49%	Germany	10,3%	Unspecified	7,5%
			Vegetables	38,5%				
	India	3,1%	Raw materials	76,5%	Saudi Arabia	7,7%	USA	7,2%
			Fuels	53,4%				
	China	12,6%	Raw materials	79,2%	USA	6,3%	Japan	5,8%
			Minerals	66,6%				

Source: World Bank data, World Integrated Trade Solutions 2014.

The data indicated above provides an overview of intra-BRICS trading relations and, to a certain extent, describes trading ties with the major partners for BRICS members. China is the major trading partner for Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, where the shares of export varies between some 19% and 5%. These countries are exporting primarily raw materials to China and India in particular exports textile and clothing, whereas its exports of metals and minerals to China are slightly smaller. China exports goods - mainly machinery, electrics and textile - to the rest of BRICS members in relatively equal proportions with regards to the size of each other economy. India is the second largest partner for the other countries within intra-BRICS cooperation. Russia has the smallest shares of trading with the other BRICS members.

4.3 Sectorial analysis

For better understanding of trading patterns within the BRICS group it is important to look at economic sectors for each country separately. This research provides sectorial analysis for BRICS countries divided in sectors of agriculture, industries and services. The analysis presents GDP share, share of employment, composition, exports and imports for each sector. This overview provides an idea of whether the trade between the countries is complementary and on which sector the particular country is most focused. Attachment No. 4 shows that Brazil, Russia and South Africa are predominantly raw material suppliers, while India and China are dependent on raw materials import. On the other hand, India and China are exporting and importing intensively the goods of industrial sector, employing relatively low shares of labour force for that; both are advanced in consumer goods exports as well.

All five countries are active in trade with goods, but show significant deficits in services. Due to its richness in natural resources, Brazil is one of the key suppliers of raw materials, such as steel, tin or iron ore. It is also the most active BRICS country in exporting various agricultural goods, even though this sector performs only 5,5% of the country's GDP with a relatively small employment of labour force. Industries, such as machinery, textiles or chemicals do not employ a substantial part of the labour force, but industrial goods are exported and imported very intensively. The highest share of GDP and employed labour comes from the service sector, although the highest share of it is imported. Russia confirms its status of key energy producer and raw materials exporter. Industries that largely consist of mining and extractive industries, oil production, gas, and coal contributed over 1/4 of overall GDP. However, the largest part of GDP

consists of income from the service sector employing 2/3 of the workforce; above that, 1/4 of the service sector is imported.

Capital goods, such as machinery and equipment of vehicles are largely imported, performing over 1/3 of overall imported goods. Despite large lands, agriculture in Russia contributes the least to the overall countries' GDP and workforce employment. India is a leading country among BRICS in exported services. It is caused by the international services outsourcing trend (mostly in IT area) to educated, English-speaking and low-cost Indian labour. The agricultural sector remains very important in India. A large part of the population lives in rural areas, therefore almost half of the workforce is employed in agriculture. However, it contributes roughly only 1/4 of the countries' GDP. Export and import of industries are both extensive; crude oil is the largest constituent of imports to India, on the other hand it widely exports precious stones, chemicals, textiles and leather.

Being an economic giant, Chinese export and import is largely dependent on international trade. The labour is equally divided between three sectors, where industries and services contribute almost half of the country's GDP each. The most export and import activities are performed within the industrial sector. The major surplus is derived from exports of consumer goods. Capital goods, such as electrical and other machinery, their components or special equipment were the other solid subject for exports and imports in equal proportions. It is noticeable, that China is highly dependent on raw material imports, which is necessary for the production of the most exported consumer and capital goods.

The size of the South African economy is the smallest among the members of the BRICS group. However, it is still an important trading partner and one of the most dynamic economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The services sector contributes to the GDP the most and employs almost 2/3 of the working population. The country exports actively intermediate goods and capital goods, whereas the imports of same goods remain insignificant. Raw materials, which are exported primarily to China and India, make a considerable part of the countries' profits.


4.4 Catch-up process and transfer of industries

During the last decade, technological progress and international financial liberalisation have facilitated an easier interaction and lowered transaction costs, which significantly stimulated

economic growth. According to the theory, the beneficial effects to the global economy through trade and financial flows, most importantly the dynamic growth of the new poles will provide golden opportunities for industrialisation in lower income countries (Mike & Fessehaie, 2014). Thus, access to technologies and know-how are the key factors for the structural changes. Another author points out, that “international sourcing and the spatial division of sub-stage production processes accelerated the transfer of technology and facilitated developing countries’ participation in global production sharing networks (Chen, 2012).

Particularly, the current economic integration is no longer restricted to OECD countries, but also involves large emerging global players like the BRICS”. Figure No. 9 below reflects the share of manufactured products in world exports by technology. In the Figure we can follow the growth of high and medium technology industries starting from the mid-70’s and a decline trend in resource-based and low-technologies products. With the intensification of technology-based exports the recipient country becomes a subject for international investments. This process accumulates improvements in the sphere of infrastructure, education and social security.

Figure No. 3. Share of manufactured products in world exports by technology, 1976-2000.



United Nations Conference on Trade and development, “Technology for Development Series”, 2011.

According to J. Lin and the theory “From flying geese to leading dragons” presented in the theoretical part of this research, the moving power of growth for a developing economy is an upgrade of technology structure through technology-intensive activities. Under conditions where the new technology is imported to the developing country Research and Development (R&D) is very important:

“Formal R&D assumes increasing significance with industrial maturity, even in developing countries that have not reached the "frontiers" of innovation. As more complex technologies are imported and deployed, R&D is vital in order to absorb their underlying principles.

... A growing base of R&D capabilities also permits better and faster diffusion within the economy of new technologies, lowers the cost of technology transfer, and captures more of the spill over benefits created by the operation of foreign firms.”

Further, we can follow the third and final stage of catching-up process described by J. Lin - the changing nature of exported goods and relocation process of industries across countries - from advanced to developing (Lin, 2016). Table No. 10 shows the dynamics of BRICS investments into R&D and volumes of high technologies exports for each country. The table indicates that during the last decade China has doubled its investments into domestic R&D, at the same time its export volumes for high technology products has increased almost two-fold. Further, Attachment No. 5 shows, that Chinese high technology exports are 1/3 higher than worlds average; Brazil and Russia show slight growth in R&D expenditures and negative patterns in high technology exports; India and South Africa are stable during the time interval.

Table No. 10: R&D expenditures and high technology export in BRICS, 2000 - 2012.


Year	R&D expenditures (% of			High technology exports (% of manufactured exports)		
	2000	2005	2012	2000	2005	2012
Brazil	1,02	0,97	1,21	19	13	10
Russia	1,05	1,07	1,12	16	8	8
India	0,74	0,81	0,81	6	6	7
China	0,90	1,32	1,98	19	31	26
South Africa	-	0,90	0,76	7	7	6

Source: World Bank data.

4.5 Manufactured goods specialisation, skill level

Chart No. 20 presents manufactured goods specialisation index focused on the technology-intensive skill level applied for manufactures production. Such a specialisation index is used to measure the degree of specialization in the production/consumption of goods through trade. It is calculated for each production level group. It compares the net flow of goods (exports minus imports) to the total flow of goods (exports plus imports). This is also known as normalised trade balance by product and it is suitable to make comparisons across countries and product groups by removing the bias due to size of economy. The range of values is between -1 and 1, the positive value indicates that an economy has net exports (hence it specialises in the production of that specific product) and negative values means that an economy imports more than it exports (net consumption). Moreover, the research shows, that since the year 2000 China, as the only BRICS member, starts to implement production of new technologies moving to the level of high skill technology intensive manufacturers.

Chart D: Manufactured goods specialisation index by degree of production skill level, 1995 - 2017.



Source: UNCTAD calculations, based on UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Merchandise Trade

Chart D shows, that from the perspective of technology-intensive skill level for manufacture production all five BRICS countries are rather net consumers, importing more sophisticated manufactures than they produce. Such performance is anticipated from emerging markets at that stage of development. The common feature is a clear prevalence of low-skill and technology intensive manufacture exports. China, and to a lesser extent Brazil, tend to increase the skill-level: it shows the major specialisation on medium and high skill electronics production since the mid-nineties. Further, since the year 2000, higher production levels of other medium skill products (excluding electronics) can be followed. It is reflected, that the Chinese economy starts to catch-up and produce more sophisticated products of middle and high-skill level such as parts and components for electronics manufacturers. That fact suggests that during the past decade production facilities in China were modernised and new manufacturing technologies applied.

Market demand accelerates innovation processes. That is where the principle of the catch-up process lies: assembly and part production for medium and high-skill products provide a space for dynamic export activities which comes along with creation of more professional work places and wage increase. This process will also attract investors, but will require higher automation and purchase of new technologies. At that stage low-skill production can be transferred to the “follower geese”.

4.5 Conclusion

The BRICS group will experience significant growth and influence on both, the global economic and political scene. Based on the research presented, it is clear that this assumption is ambiguous, it is necessary to divide the issue into its political and economic dimensions. From an economic perspective, the BRICS member states have achieved tremendous growth rates during the past two decades and have enormous economic potential: while in the year 2000, just before the concept of BRIC was created, the aggregate GDP of the five countries accounted for only 8% of the world share, by the year 2017 it already accounted for 22%.

The countries also exhibit an increased activity in terms of purchasing power. The group currently holds over 42% of global currency reserves—a very important factor for global economic stabilisation. Indeed, these facts and numbers demonstrate that BRICS countries to carry significant weight in the international economy.

However, there are many obstacles on the way towards economic success and the journey is far from over. Viewed from a different perspective, BRICS countries show significant heterogeneity in terms of per capita income - Russian citizens have the highest income of almost US \$ 19 thousand per year, whereas Indians have some US\$ 4 thousand per year. The yearly income in China, Brazil and South Africa varies in range from US\$ 10 to US\$12, 5 thousand per year.

The growth dynamics and patterns in each country also differ to a large extent. It is necessary to point out that over the past two decades, the BRICS countries have shown impressive annual growth rates varying from 6% to 14% in China—the growth leader of the group; ranging from 8% to 2% in Brazil; remaining in the range of 5% to 10% in Russia, growing gradually from 4% to 10% in India and increasing from 2% to 6% in South Africa.

Today, the economic growth of the BRICS countries has slowed down. Growth rates have declined after the global financial crisis. Although it is true that BRICS countries (with the exception of Russia) were among the least affected by the crisis and achieved a relatively fast recovery, their growth rates decreased. The BRICS countries have not managed to regain their pre-2009 economic growth rates.

In contrast with their amplitude growth during the past years, the countries have more recently exhibited a declining trend. In the year 2017, the annual growth performance was 2.2% in Brazil, 2% in Russia, 4.8% in India, 7.3% in China and 1.8% in South Africa. Moreover, due to the current conflict with Ukraine, Russia is experiencing a new circle of economic crisis and political confrontation – primarily with the Western world.

In terms of political influence, the BRICS countries are large and important regional and global players. All together they cover roughly 25% of the earth's surface and account for 40% of world population which, in turn, forms a large and relatively cheap labour force creating a vast consumer demand. This explains the intention to have a stronger presence in the sphere of international relations, in order to take their place among the current global policymakers. BRICS members thus far have exerted regional influence within the framework of IBSA.

Based on the facts presented above, it can be concluded that due to its population, vast territory and large and growing economy, the BRICS group is an influential player on the international scene. However, the economic growth of the countries is not sustainable and it has even declined

since the financial crisis in 2009. Undoubtedly, the BRICS countries have a large share in global economic growth today and to a certain extent they will continue growing in the future. However, in order to ensure sustainable growth, BRICS will still have to overcome many internal challenges, such as large-scaled modernisations as well as adjust to internationally accepted standards.

Russia, India, China and South Africa are very different in terms of their political, social and economic development. On the one hand, they have many reasons to cooperate; on the other hand, their internal arrangements and development policies are markedly different. The countries will most likely not be able to cooperate on a deep level due to their conflicts of interest. In addition, Russia does not fit into the BRICS format.

BRICS are a heterogeneous group, covering countries of different geopolitical, cultural and economic backgrounds. There is no single unifying commonality between them all, as opposed to for example the EU. The political structures in the five countries also differ to a large extent. Brazil and India are vibrant democracies of western type. Russian democracy is relatively young: it has yet to shed the remnants of the past. China on the other hand is a single party communist state. South Africa is a democracy dominated by a social democratic party.

Economic structures also differ: Brazil and Russia are the main energy producers, whereas China and India are its major consumers. South Africa depends on its mineral reserves. China and India build on the input of their low- priced labour pool and resources. China, India and South Africa face a wide range of severe social problems such as poverty, unemployment, human rights violations, corruption, healthcare shortcomings, ecological problems, and regional underdevelopment. To a lesser extent, Brazil and Russia also suffer from the above mentioned issues. Relatively high rates of poverty, unemployment and corruption are typical for all five BRICS countries.

Each BRICS country has its specific motivations for membership. From the perspective of international prestige, Brazil and India are seeking improvement of their international status and transformation from regional giant to a global actor. The two countries seek to gain the status of a permanent UN Security Council member and to ensure the security of marine communication in the southern hemisphere. BRICS for Russia is a tool for realising the idea of multi-polarity as well

as being a good argument for diplomacy in direction of the West. Russia gains more stability for its positioning on the global stage.

China is the most self-sufficient group member which is very careful with new commitments. This communist state has experienced a fast economic rise and it currently faces the need to adjust its existing political regime to better fit its dynamic economic environment. Therefore, through BRICS cooperation, China seeks to create a more favourable external environment for its course towards "openness and reform", China's emergence as a modern country with a developed economy and high standard of living. Its BRICS partners are interesting for China as an influential group for lobbying processes and in terms of possible reforms to the global financial system.

South Africa is seeking strong partners (mainly in a South-South direction) to follow on its recently embarked path towards structural transformation. Trade is one of the most decisive factors in BRICS cooperation. This chapter presented a comprehensive trade research. The research suggests that China—as the world's top exporter of and second world's importer of merchandised goods—is interested in the development of economic cooperation, first and foremost with the Asia - Pacific region and the USA.

Brazil benefits the most from trade with China and the USA – more than 30% of its exports and imports are directed to or from these countries. While Russia is focused on its trading relations with EU countries, China is nevertheless the major market for Russia's raw materials—making up nearly 17% of its overall imports. India is among the top ten world exporters and importers of commercial services and a significant importer of merchandised goods. Based on the composition of its major trading partners, India is primarily interested in the development of economic relations with Southern Asia and the USA, which is its major market.

China is also a major market for South African imports and exports. Other important markets for South Africa are in the Asia - Pacific region and the USA. It is also important to look at BRICS cooperation from the perspective of foreign affairs. As previous passages indicate, China is the new global economic power and one of the major trading partners for other BRICS members. However, not everyone benefits from relations with that country. Despite the fact that China provided large investments into Brazilian infrastructure, the Brazilian government is concerned

about cheap Chinese commodities intruding in their market, thereby undercutting their competitiveness with domestic products.

Russia shows some migration issues with China, although the recently signed agreement on long-term gas supplies and infrastructure investments between the two countries appears to ensure better bilateral relations. The relations between India and China are the most controversial within the BRICS group. The countries have historically unsolved issues, such as the Kashmir conflict or the Sino-Indian conflict in Tibet. There also remain more modern geopolitical issues in Asia and the Indian Ocean caused by the fast and relatively simultaneous economic rise of these two regional giants.

Regardless of the past, India tries to maintain good connections with China—the major market for its own exports. In addition to its extensive trading relations, South Africa also receives large investments from China. At the same time, however, the purchase of 20% of Africa’s largest bank—the Standard Bank—has made South Africa more cautious regarding further Chinese investments.

Brazil, India and South Africa cooperate successfully in a smaller, IBSA-format, fighting for human rights, enforcing healthcare and social programs in developing countries. One of the compatibility issues is a by-product of economies of the size of BRICS member countries and is evident when looking at South Africa—a country with an average economy size. Nevertheless, the different “starting points” of BRICS countries does not preclude complementarity among them: such a complementarity can be manifested in the desire to overcome existing social, economic and technological shortcomings through more intensive commodity exchanges, cooperation in sphere of innovations and mutual humanitarian assistance.

In this context, much depends on the political will of the countries’ leaders to cooperate, as well as on domestic and international public to support such a unique project. BRICS—as rising economic giants—are the most dynamic economies in the world, consequently growing interdependence between them are to be expected. BRICS cooperation will support sustainable and rapid economic growth of the BRICS members. China will become a “leading dragon” for the BRICS economies.

The process of globalisation and international financial liberalisation has facilitated the interaction between producers and consumers. This process has lowered transaction costs and significantly stimulated economic growth. The catch-up theory by J. Lin primarily suggests that: “most importantly the dynamic growth of the new poles will provide golden opportunities for industrialisation in lower income countries”. International sourcing and division of sub-stage production processes accelerate the transfer of technology and facilitate developing countries’ participation in global production-sharing networks.

BRICS countries have the advantage of being latecomers, which gives them an opportunity to adopt already elaborated “tailored” strategies of structural transformation, innovation and enhancement of standards of living. The catch-up process and development in BRICS can be observed on the basis of per capita GDP and HDI index growth, which reflects the population’s improved living standards. Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) are additionally important growth factors. From the perspective of FDI, increased interest in the BRICS members since 2000 can be observed.

FDI into China, Russia and Brazil increased by 8%, 6% and 4% of world share, respectively. The investments were directed from developed countries and major trading partners, with an exception of China, where almost half of inward investments were made by Hong Kong SAR. As per FDI directed from BRICS countries, over the period from 2005 to 2017, China and Russia were the most active investors increasing their outward FDI from some 0.2% in 2000 to over 7% of world share in 2012.

However, these investments were directed to “tax haven” zones, such as the Cayman Islands or Cyprus. The growth of the research and development (R&D) sphere is another important factor for the catch-up process. During the last decade, China has doubled its investments into domestic R&D, at the same time its export volumes for high technology products have increased by one third. So far, Russia and Brazil have also slightly increased their investments into R&D since the year 2000, while export volumes of high-tech products decreased. The progress of India and South Africa in this area remains at the same level as in 2000.

Since the end of the twentieth century, BRICS countries—led by China and India—are maintaining their continuous growth and are significantly ahead of the US and G7 countries’ growth rates. This

growth was largely due to their cheap low-skilled labour pool. The high- income countries, attracted by a cheap labour force, were gaining the comparative advantage by low- skilled technologies and know-how outsourcing to the developing countries. This chapter has presented the evaluation of the technology-intensive skill level growth in BRICS countries. Based on the presented research outcomes it can be concluded that the BRICS members are rather net consumers, importing more sophisticated manufactures than they produce.

The common feature is a clear prevalence of low-skill and technology intensive manufacture exports. China, and to a lesser extent Brazil, tend to increase the skill-level: it shows the major specialisation on medium and high skill electronics production already starting in the mid-90s. Moreover, the research shows that since the year 2000, China is the only BRICS member that has started to implement production of new technologies moving to the level of high-volume, high-skill technology manufacturers. Russia, India and South Africa show a declining trend in this respect.

Each BRICS member experiences the catch-up process in their own way. Brazil caught-up in aircraft and motor vehicle production. The competitiveness of these state-owned industries remains strictly protected by the government. In addition, Brazil develops unique sectors, such as bio-fuel production. Russia, in the author's opinion, does not fit the catch up terminology. It has its own developmental trajectories which are above all focused on domestic industries. India, thanks to its educated English speaking and cheap labour force enjoys long-term demand for its services, mostly in the area of IT.

The country also has a dynamically developing pharmacological sphere, which is largely invested in by US, French and increasingly Chinese companies. As presented above, China so far has performed catch-up processes on the largest scale. With the continuous growth of the indicator presented China has, in pursuit of its comparative advantage, established a good chance of becoming a "Leading Dragon" for low-income countries, e.g. as it has shown by directing large investments into Brazilian and South African infrastructure.

The level of production portfolio in China is changing, and wages and demand are growing. Similar to both Russia and Brazil, South Africa is a natural-resources oriented economy. The country engaged in low-skill production processes and has a dynamically growing machinery

industry. Yet, the country is still preparing for its catch-up by first aiming to solve numerous internal issues.

The facts presented above indicate that during the past decade, BRICS countries have undergone a process of fast growth. To some extent China, Brazil and Russia have shown investment capacities, improvement of technologies and skill-level in the area of manufacturing. This can be considered as a successful start on the road to development; at the same time, the countries have just begun their journey and this performance is still not sufficient in order to support sustainable growth among BRICS members.

China has shown the most impressive performance among the group members. In my opinion, it may possibly become the “leading dragon” for South Africa, India and Brazil—if their political and economic issues are resolved. Russia might benefit from trading in natural resources or some shared industries, but with its higher income levels this will not involve transfer of technologies. Lastly the BRICS group will transform into an economic union with its own financial mechanism in order to confront the influence of the US dollar as well as global American economic influence in general.

Today, the BRICS group does not have a precise format: It exists more as an international club of developing countries. It is not supported by a single unifying institution. Despite the fact that trade volumes between the member states are growing rapidly, a single free trade agreement has yet to be signed between the countries. The reason for this could be fear of losing competitiveness, mainly against cheap Chinese commodities.

Beyond the simple economic growth concept as suggested by Goldman Sachs, the idea of BRICS was that of the formation of an alternative model for global governance. One of the most pressing issues for BRICS members has been the enforcement of reforms of the global financial system. The target of this reform would be to push US dollar from the perspective of a single accounting unit of wealth in the world. This could possibly lead to a division of the global market into several currency areas, where the US dollar, guaranteed mainly by the military power of USA, would lose its status as a major global currency, becoming but a regional one. The US dollar would no longer be the hegemony factor in a unipolar world.

Driven by this goal, the countries established a BRICS Development Bank, with quota increases for the emerging markets in international financial institutions, in addition to the formation of a currency reserve pool and ensuring the conversion of intra-BRICS transactions into national currencies. During the G20 summit in Washington, BRICS countries presented their intention to reform the Bretton Woods institutions. As an outcome, Washington summit participants have decided to increase participation of developing countries in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).

Indeed, emerging powers are calling for more influence at the international level and looking to protect their increasingly expanding global interests. BRICS countries increasingly contribute to international public goods, global GDP and IMF financial resources. To achieve their goal, they will have to cooperate on a large scale with international and Western-led institutions, such as the UN, IMF and WTO. Therefore, in one's opinion, mutual benefit can be achieved through the advancement of policies and process of norm adoption. In this context, much depends on the political will of the countries' leaders to cooperate, as well as on domestic and international public support for this unique project. The BRICS countries are the most dynamic economies in the world– the rising giants and increasing interdependence between them is to be expected.

Chapter Five:

Governance across the BRICS

5. Introduction

Governance should be conceived of as a regime in which various stakeholders realise their ambitions through an interactive process, facilitated by a complex of rules and institutions. This framework is most effective when the state plays a central role and state actors encourage good governance through their political will. That said, the extent of the state will vary in each jurisdiction. Understanding governance requires an understanding of each actor in society. Part of this process requires determination of who has a say and how they should decide in any given instance. Government is central to understand the rule of law in a country. It encompasses the entire way the state is run and ensures that all the relevant stakeholders are adequately and equitably included. BRICS countries share a mutual goal that supports their formation as an entity, that of attaining a global governance structure that reflects the new developments in the global, political and economic scene based on the principle of multipolarity. The collaborative effort of the BRICS countries will likely have a significant and enduring impact on global governance and economies.

All the BRICS countries perceive themselves as existing outside the current global governance structure to more or less the same extent and have, on many occasions confronted the representative of the old power, the so called West in general and the USA in particular. Russia and China have long been fighting Western interests within the Security Council and in other international arenas. Brazil has confronted the USA on the Free Trade Area of America (FTAA) and other issues. India still recalls the West support of Pakistan although the new relationship between the USA and India decreased any bitter sentiments, while South Africa defends its region's sovereignty against Western interference in African issues. This chapter aims at providing an overview of the discourses of the term "governance" used by policy makers and multilateral agencies. It also delves into a comparative review of governance structures in each of the BRICS economies. The purpose is to analyse the governance challenges faced by each of the economies on the road to economic development.

5.1 Evolution of the term “Governance”

The rise of BRICS has fuelled a new round of debates concerning the sustainability of transatlantic norms, ideas, and institutions, which have dominated global governance. The BRICS are seen to represent a new force in defining the “rules of the games” (North 1990) of global governance and have changed the agenda and approach of global institutions. Since the international system notoriously lacks hierarchy and government, the fuzzier word ‘governance’ is used instead (Finkelstein 1995: 368). Governance is employed to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private (Weiss 2000, 795). The term ‘global governance’ can refer to a wider number of organisations that help to coordinate international action. It can also refer to a number of international norms that determine how nation states and nongovernmental actors interact with each other.

Thus, global governance can be understood as the creation of rules and norms on a global scale by international organisations, which establish the conditions for ordered rule and collective action (Stoker 1997;17). The constructivists argue that each state is differentiated by a specific role, and that differentiation constitutes national identity. Over time, the interaction of states (population flows, trade, etc.) might develop some form of collective identity that extends beyond state borders and includes other states or the population of other states. Thus, in situations where there are layers of collective identity, this may include multiple different states and exclude others. Therefore, by developing a group and by extension, excluding other states, an alternative is formed.

5.2 The functioning of “Governance”

As the BRICS rise and become institutionalised, they begin to affect the rules and norms that underpin the wider system of global governance. Within the context of global governance, they adopted an alternate role in the liberal model of development. Therefore, the role has meant that the rise of BRICS has reduced the promotion of liberal-democracy values and has also defeated the position of the sovereignty state at the centre of global governance decision making (Keeler 2011; Stuenkel 2013; Laidi 2012). It is in the era of global economic governance where the role the BRICS has adopted has had the greatest impact on the rules and norms that allow for collective action (Gray and Murphy 2013).

5.3. Assessing governance across the BRICS

5.3.1 Regime or political form and separation of powers

Brazil - Federal system

Like the U.S, Brazil is a federation of 26 fairly independent states and the Federal District, where its capital Brasilia is located. Each state can create their own laws, as long as they don't conflict with federal legislation. There are three levels of government: federal, state and municipal. Each level is divided into three independent branches: executive, legislative, and judiciary. Citizens elect their representatives for the executive and legislative branches, while judges are chosen through open competitive examinations or political nominations, for higher courts.

Executive Branch

Mayors, governors, and the president are elected in an absolute majority with a run-off system. It means that if no candidate gets more than 50% of votes during the first round, the two best-voted candidates will face off to decide who gets elected. The system allows multiple parties to contend with a real shot at winning.

In a mayoral race, the run-off stage can only take place in cities with more than 200,000 voters (92 of the country's 5 570 municipalities). In smaller cities, the system is "first-past-the-post." The head of state will serve a four-year term, and can hold office for up to two consecutive terms. After this, he or she must step down for four years before running for the same office again.

Legislative branch

Brazil's lawmakers are elected through a proportional system. In theory, if a party gets 20% of votes for city council or state or National Congress, it should get 20% of the seats. But Brazil's system allows for legislative coalitions. It means that multiple parties can join forces to form a "super party." It creates a myriad of small, unimpressive candidates with no political skills who merely parrot clichés, valued only because they could be a "vote magnet."

National Congress

The Brazilian Congress is formed by two chambers: House and the Senate. The former is supposed to be the people's direct representation in the government. Meanwhile, the Senate is the

representation of each federative unit. That's why each state has a number of representatives based on its population while they all have the same number of senators, three each.

Brazil's House of Representatives has 513 members. The number of seats per federative unit varies according to the state's population with a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 70 each. That creates an overrepresentation of small states, like Roraima and Amapa, with less than 1 million inhabitants each, and an underrepresentation of Sao Paulo which concentrates almost a quarter of the Brazilian population. The Senate, on the other hand, is formed by 81 members (three per state). Unlike representatives, senators are voted in through a first-past-the post system. While all other positions are occupied over a four year terms, senators are elected to serve for eight years, due to some of their extra obligations. Since senators are responsible for approving (or blocking) Supreme Court nominations, and trying the president in the case of an impeachment process, they are granted a long term, in order to give more stability to the institution. Every four years, part of the Senate is renewed.

Russia – Federation

Russia's constitution sets out the country as a federation and semi-presidential. The president of the Russian Federation is the head of state, he is the guarantor of the constitution of the Russian Federation and of human and civil rights and freedoms. The president of the Russian Federation, in compliance with the constitution of the states and the federal law, determines the basic guidelines of the state's domestic and foreign policy. The president, in his or her capacity as head of state, represents the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations. The president is elected for four years by the citizens on the basis of voting.

Executive Branch (White house)

The president is the Head of State appointed by the majority of votes. The prime minister is the Head of Government and is appointed by the president. Cabinet is the government of Russia; the prime minister is the leader of the cabinet members they also get appointed by the president. The cabinet consist of thirty-two ministers.

Judiciary branch

The Judiciary of Russia is defined under the Constitution and law of Russia with a hierarchical structure with the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Supreme Court of Arbitration at the apex. As of 2014, the Supreme Court of Arbitration has merged with the Supreme Court. The

district courts are the primary criminal trial courts, and the regional courts are the primary appellate courts. The judiciary is governed by the All-Russian Congress of Judges and its Council of Judges, and its management is aided by the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Qualification Collegia, the Ministry of Justice, and the various courts' chairpersons. There are many officers of the court, including jurors, but the Prosecutor General remains the most powerful component of the Russian judicial system.

Regional Governments

All subjects have their own governments, led by a mayor in the federal city of Moscow, heads of administration in ethnic republics and governors everywhere else. Yes, the head of St. Petersburg, also a federal city, is a governor, not a mayor. All heads of subjects are elected locally, but only from those approved by the regional parliaments. And because these parliaments are all controlled by the ruling party and, as a consequence, by the government and the Presidential Administration, this system doesn't differ much from the previous one, when all heads of subjects were appointed from Moscow. The parliaments of federal subjects are unicameral.

India

India was colonised by Great Britain. They came under British rule in 1858. They grew a feeling of nationalism under Mahatma Gandhi who was the leader of anti-British civil disobedience in 1920. In 1947 British rule ended and India's constitution was created in 1947. For this study, it is important to understand the Indian Political System and the role of High Political office in India and of alternative moral and ethical frameworks for interpreting and evaluating contemporary political discourse

The executive- The head of the state is the President.

The president is in power for a five year term of office; he or she is the commander of armed forces and can put India in a state of emergency. He or she oversees ceremonial functions similar to royalty in Great Britain. The president signs all the bills and cannot reject them. The vice-president has a five year term of office and is elected by the Electoral College. The vice-president is the Chairman of the Council of State. The prime minister is chosen by the political party that is in power. He or she is known as the "chief advisor" to the president, but is actually the head of the government, with the most powerful position and picks the Council of Ministers.

Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is the supreme governing body which consists of cabinet members and ministers of the State. The president approves them and they must be members of parliament and their duties are to help the president and the prime minister exercise their powers.

Council of States (Rajya Sabha)

The upper house of the Indian State it is elected by the state parliament it consists of 250 members and 12 members that are assigned by the president. Members have a six-year term of office.

The People's Assembly (Lok Sabha)

The lower house of the Indian State is elected directly by the people consisting of 545 members that are selected from the states and two of its members are selected by the president. They get elected after every five years

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has one chief of justice and thirty other judges. The Supreme Court's primary purpose is to protect the rights of its citizens and also settle disputes between governments in India.

States and Territories

India has twenty-eight states and seven union territories State governors are appointed by the president and they serve a five-year term of office. States have their own parliaments; they oversee education, agriculture, local government etc. The federal government has power over anything not assigned to the states.

China - Communist

The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state power in the People's Republic of China. According to Article 59 of the Constitution, the NPC is composed of deputies elected from the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government and special administrative regions and of deputies elected from the armed forces. All minority ethnic groups are entitled to appropriate representation. The structure of the states mainly includes the National People's Congress (NPC), President of the PRC, State Council, people's court and people's procuratorates. They have different roles and functions to deal with legislative executive and judicial issues.

National People's Congress

The NPC is the highest organ of state power. It can amend the constitution, enact laws, elect the President, decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council, elect the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and decide on the establishment of the special administrative regions and the systems to be instituted there. The NPC are elected from the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government and special administrative regions as well as those elected from the armed forces. All minority ethnic groups are entitled to appropriate representation. The Standing Committee of the NPC is the permanent body of the NPC.

Duties of the NPC

- Amends the Constitution.
- Also decides on choices of principal officials of the president and premiers are nominated.
- The NPC is the highest organ of state power and is responsible for the appointment or removal of top officials of the judiciary and the executive.
- There are also NPC deputies to ensure that people representing different sectors should have opportunities to participate in the exercise of state power for the demonstration of fairness.

President

The president of the PRC is elected by the NPC. According to the decisions of the NPC and its Standing Committee, the president of the PRC promulgates statutes, appoints or removes states officials such as the premier of the State Council, confers states medals, issues orders of special pardons, proclaims a state of emergency or a state of war, etc. The term of office for the president of the PRC is the same as that of the NPC. The president of the PRC shall serve not more than two consecutive terms.

Duties of the President

- The president conducts state affairs and receives foreign diplomatic representatives on behalf of People's Republic of China.
- He or she appoints or removes states official according to the decisions of the NCP and the Standing Committee of the NPC.
- He or she nominates the candidate for the premier of the State Council.

State Council

The State Council, that is the Central Peoples Government, is the executive body of the highest organ of state power; it is the highest organ of state administration. The premier assumes overall responsibility for the work of the State Council. There are many ministries and commissions under the State Council. The State Council is responsible for directing and administering economic affairs and urban and rural development, affairs of education, science, culture, public health, civil affairs etc., and drawing up and implementing the state budget. The term of office of the State Council is the same as the NPC and it shall not serve more than two consecutive terms.

Duties of the State Council

- Draw up the plan for national economic and social development
- Exercise unified leadership over the work of local organs of state administration at various levels throughout the country.
- Adopt administrative measures, enact administrative rules and regulations, issues decisions and orders.

Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate

The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ. The Supreme People's Procuratorate is the highest procuratorial organ. Both of them are responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee. They initiate public prosecution after investigation.

South Africa – Democratic System

Since the overthrow of apartheid in 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated South Africa's politics being a ruling party in the national legislature, as well as in eight of the nine provinces. South Africa is a constitutional democracy with a three-tier system of government and an independent judiciary. The national, provincial and local levels of government all have legislative and executive authority in their own spheres, and is defined in the constitution as distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. The constitution is the highest law. No person can go against it, not even the president. Parliament cannot pass any laws that go against it. The courts and the government must also make sure that what they do is constitutional. The constitution guarantees democracy through giving every person over 18 the right to vote and ensuring one voters' roll for all adult citizens, regular elections, and a multi-party system of government. These important parts of the constitution can only be changed if 75% of the members of the National

Assembly and six of the nine provinces agree. All aspects of how our democracy works are explained in the constitution.

The government

The political party that wins the majority of seats in an election for parliament (more than 50%) has the right to form the government. It is called the majority or ruling party in South Africa and is currently the African National Congress (ANC). The other parties are called minority parties or opposition parties. The government is not permanent - the citizens give it the right to rule the country for five years. The constitution explains that the president is elected by parliament after an election. He or she forms the government by appointing the deputy president and the cabinet. The cabinet is made up of the president, the ministers and the deputy ministers. Each minister leads a government department. For example, the Minister of Finance leads the Department of Finance.

The Executive (Cabinet)

The president, deputy president and the ministers make up the executive branch of the national government. The president and ministers are the members of parliament who are appointed by the presiding heads of the various government departments. The president is not directly elected by parliament from its members. The constitution limits a president to serve a maximum of two five-year terms.

The National Assembly

The lower house of the parliament of South Africa is called the National Assembly. It consists of 400 members who are elected every five years using a party-list proportional representation system where half of the members are elected proportionally from the provincial lists and the remaining half from national lists so as to provide an overall allocation of seats which is proportional to the votes cast for each political party. Parties decide whether they want to set up both national and regional lists.

The National Council of Provinces

The upper house of the Parliament of South Africa is called the National Council of Provinces. It consists of ninety members with each of the nine provincial legislatures electing ten members.

Each provincial delegation consists of six permanent delegates, who are nominated for a term that lasts until a new provincial legislature is elected and for special delegates. One of the special delegates is the provinces' premier, or another member of the provincial legislature designated by the premier, and the other three special delegates are designated by the provincial legislature.

Provincial Government

There are nine provincial governments. Some provincial laws are approved by legislatures in each province. The legislature also passes a provincial budget every year. Legislatures are elected in provincial elections that are held with national elections, every five years. A premier is elected by the legislature and appoints Members of the Executive Council (MECs) to be the political heads of each provincial department. The MECs and the premier form the provincial executive council cabinet.

Provincial departments employ directors and civil servants to do the work of government. Most of the civil servants in the country fall under provincial government – these include teachers and nurses. The provincial MEC and Department of Local Government are responsible for co-ordination, monitoring and support of municipalities in each province.

Local Government

The whole of South Africa is divided into local municipalities. Each municipality has a council where decisions are made and municipal officials and staff who implement the work of the municipality. The council is made up of elected members who approve policies and by-laws for their area. The council has to pass a budget for its municipality each year. They must also decide on development plans and service delivery for their municipal area. The work of the council is co-ordinated by a mayor who is elected by council. The mayor is assisted by an executive or mayoral committee, made up of councillors. The mayor, together with the executive, also oversees the work of the municipal manager and department heads.

The Judiciary

The South African judicial system consists of the Constitutional Court which is the highest court, Supreme Court of Appeal, High Court and Magistrate Court. The Judicial Service Commission appoint judges.

State Institutions supporting democracy

- Public Protector
- Human Rights Commission
- Commission of Gender Equality
- Auditor-General of South Africa
- Independent Communications Authority of South Africa

Operating at both national and provincial levels are advisory bodies drawn from South Africa's traditional leaders. It is a stated intention in the constitution that the country be run on a system of cooperative governance.

5.4 Political forms and the link to Economic Development among BRICS

5.4.1 Brazil -Recent history

Emerging from decades of military rule in the 1980's, Brazil experienced severe economic and political difficulties in its transition to democracy. Facing problems of hyperinflation and the difficult task of subduing the military under civilian rule, it was not until the 1990s that some degree of political and economic stability was achieved. During the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso steps were taken to restore Brazil's international credibility and to strengthen the country's democratic institutions. Cardoso, who had also been Minister of Treasury under former President Itamar Franco, managed to curb inflation by introducing a new currency, the Real, and provide political stability, while spending much of his presidency abroad on diplomatic missions. In 2003, current president Luiz Inácio da Silva, or Lula, was elected. He is the first president to represent the left-leaning Workers Party (PT) and also the first president to have been raised in poverty. Brazil has achieved slow but steady economic growth under his rule, and Lula has been credited with sensibly maintaining the reforms initiated by his predecessor while adding a few of his own.

5.4.2 Economy

Being included in the illustrious group of BRICS countries, one would assume that Brazil's economic performance over the past decade would be characterised by high growth rates and

massive optimism. In truth, it is not certain whether Brazil should be in BRICS at all considering its paltry economic growth rate. The annual average growth rate in the years 2000-2006 was only 3,1% below the global average and significantly lower than the rates achieved by the other BRICS. Even Goldman Sachs researcher, Paulo Leme, admits that Brazil has underperformed both relative to the initial expectations of Goldman Sachs, but also relative to the other BRICS. There are, however, other factors to be taken into account on this issue. Brazil's "China moment" was the post-World War Two period as the annual growth average between the mid-1940's and the mid-1970's was 7,4%, and in the years 1968-1973 Brazil had a remarkable annual growth rate of 10,6%.

Although economic growth has been comparatively low since then, it is unfair to compare the growth rate of the less developed BRICS with nations that, like Brazil, acquired an industrialised economy already in the 1970s and 80s. This can also be seen by the percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) produced by different sectors in Brazil, where the share of agriculture is only 7%, industry at 28% and services at 65%. Compared with other BRICS, such as China and India, Brazil has a modern economy which is reflected in the large share that services have in the economy and the relatively low share of agriculture. The real reason for Brazil's recent underperformance, Paulo Leme of Goldman Sachs contends, is multi-faceted. Most important perhaps, is that the Lula administration has in recent years focused on implementing a stabilisation programme in order to achieve macroeconomic stability.

While not producing spectacular growth themselves, these policies have laid the foundation for long-term economic growth by prepaying external debt and keeping inflation at a minimum. Because of this, macroeconomic conditions are better now than they have been for a long time. With this in mind, Paulo Leme predicts that Brazil will be able to achieve a growth rate of about 3,5% and could even manage growth rates of about 5% if certain economic reforms are implemented, such as further openness to trade and investment. These estimates correlate well with World Bank projections, putting Brazil's annual growth average at 3,7% for the years 2007-2011. Brazil's economy is still relatively closed, with trade only making up 24% of GDP in 2008. Its prospects are however, heavily linked with global commodity prices, and if the course is set for economic growth involving increased trade, then Brazil can expect to be more heavily integrated into the global economy in the future.

5.4.3 Brazil's international and regional clout

Situated in South America, Brazil has, in recent times, not had any natural enemies on its borders. The absence of a direct security threat has meant that Brazilian foreign policy has mostly been characterised by trade policy and “soft power”. The emphasis of Brazilian presidents has usually been, first and foremost, centred on the relations with their immediate neighbours in South America. Integral to these policies and co-operation is MERCOSUL (MERCOSUR in Spanish-speaking countries), a regional common market initiative, formalised in 1991, originally consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. The initiative proved successful by helping to maintain political and economic stability in the region, and has expanded its operations since then.

Former president Cardoso oversaw the expansion of MERCOSUL as all South American countries became either full members (Venezuela) or associate members (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). Cardoso's aim was to promote a consensus-style of leadership in South America, discreetly promoting policies that suited Brazilian interests. He also sought international co-operation by making his country a full member of the World Trade Organization, WTO. His successor, Lula, has proceeded with many of the same policies, albeit in a different style. Shortly after his election, Lula said that Brazil was ready to assume its greatness on the world stage and become the natural leader of the region.

These grand words symbolise how Lula's Brazil has sought to dominate the region in a more direct way than before. These ambitions have however, not gone unrivalled, as Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela and a member of the MERCOSUL after being invited to join by Brazil in 2006, has often challenged the notion of Brazil's important position on the continent. By offering a distinctly different approach as to how South America's interests are best served, Chávez's Venezuela, with its statist approach and anti-western stance, provides a stern challenge to Brazil's western-friendly institutional approach. In addition to the problem posed by Venezuela, the USA has always favoured its own initiatives when it comes to regional co-operation. With the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) already in place, ensuring free trade between the US, Canada and Mexico, the US was keen to initiate its own organization for co-operation in the Americas.

A project called FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) was intended to replace the MERCOSUL but the attempt proved to be unsuccessful and was eventually put on hold by former

President George W. Bush in 2007. Instead, the US began making bilateral trade agreements with several South American states (it had only had such an agreement before with Chile) in order to increase trade. Underlying this conflict of institutions was a fundamental disagreement on trade. The US, with its advanced economy and heavy agricultural subsidies, did not share the same interests as Brazil, which relies partly on a highly competitive agricultural sector. This conflict is also very much apparent in the seemingly ever-lasting 'Doha round' of trade talks under the WTO. Most recently, Brazil has become an integral part of the G20, a group which was widened out from the G8 to include China and more southern-hemisphere countries, such as Brazil's neighbour Argentina, in order, in the immediate term, to deal with issues thrown up by the worldwide financial crash and recession.

There are already signs that as the G20 establishes itself it will address a wider range of economic and trade issues, and calls have been made there (for instance) for the abolition of agricultural subsidies in rich countries. When discussing Brazil's influence, it must be reiterated that its power is mainly exerted through "soft" power. Soft power does not result from the possession of superior military or economic resources, but the ability to persuade others to do what you want. It is cultural, ideological and normative, and can be exerted through participation in international institutions. In terms of military strength, Brazil is relatively weak compared to the other BRICS. In 2007, Brazil spent 15.477 million US dollars on the military which comes to a 1,5% of GDP. This is considerably less, both in relative and absolute terms, than any of the other BRICS countries.

However, compared to its neighbours, the South American countries, Brazil easily dominates the military scene. Its closest competitor in terms of military spending on the regional scene is Colombia, which spends less than half the amount that Brazil does and expends most of its efforts on internal conflict. Brazil also contributes a significant number of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (1344) which is more than Russia (365) but a lot less than China and India (2136 and 8757 respectively). It can be said that Brazil has no need for a larger military as it has no territorial ambitions, and whatever objectives its foreign policy may have, they can be achieved through diplomatic means.

After the re-democratization process that took place in Brazil and Argentina, as indeed in other parts of the continent in the 1980s, the two countries scrapped their WMD development programmes, which had been initiated by the previous military junta regimes, and decided to

adhere to international treaties. This process did much to ensure stability and decrease military spending on the continent. Brazil's soft power is more difficult to measure as there are no direct spending figures to be examined. Rather, it can be said that Brazil's increased presence in international and regional institutions, and its participation in UN peacekeeping missions, illustrate its willingness to exert its influence. The roots of this power can be found in the re-democratisation process that took place in the 1980s in Brazil, as subsequent presidents gained more confidence to act on the international scene.

By having a stable democracy with strong institutions Brazil is able to act confidently and influentially in international relations. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, Brazil is ranked as the 44th most democratic country in the world. The only BRICS member state that is in higher placed is India, in 35th place, while Russia and China have significantly lower rankings, 107th and 136th respectively. Brazil also scores higher than all but one of the other BRICS in the UN's Human Development Index (HDI), and is ranked at 75th place (Russia 71st, China 92nd, India 134th while South Africa occupies 113th position).

Lastly, an interesting aspect of soft power that will become more apparent in the coming years relates to environmental power. Brazil's government has to a large extent been able to stop and reverse the deforestation that characterised the environmental policy of previous decades. In addition to having vast rain forests with immense diversity of life, Brazil receives only about 10% of its energy from fossil fuels while 87% of its energy comes from hydro-power. With a global climate regime being a hot topic for discussion, it can be assumed that Brazil will play a leading role due to its experience and expertise in environmentalism. Since the 1970s, Brazil has developed a large biofuel industry which centres on the production of ethanol from sugar cane. While the programme was initially heavily state-subsidised, the industry today replaces approximately 40% of the gasoline that would otherwise be consumed by delivering a highly competitive product.

Much of Brazil's ethanol is exported, most notably to the EU and the US, but has been the subject of some controversy as the US has imposed tariffs on Brazilian ethanol in order to encourage its own ethanol industry. While being generally considered as an environmentally friendly way of producing fuel, ethanol production has come under criticism for being land-intensive and having negative environmental side-effects. To sum up, Brazil is a country that has been able to establish a stable democracy in the past 25 years. Its economy currently has a significantly lower growth

rate than the other BRICS, but the explanation is that it is already more advanced than most BRICS, and has recently undergone a period of macroeconomic stabilisation. It can be expected to achieve higher growth rates in the years to come as sound economic policies yield their benefits. Brazil's power in international relations consists mainly of “soft” power, and derives from the country's strong position as a democratic state intent on exerting influence through regional and international institutions, as well as its strong environmental profile which will become more important as the global battle against climate change continues.

5.4.4 Russia -Recent history

As mentioned earlier, Russia can hardly be described as an emerging power. Following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Russia experienced a tumultuous transition, which can arguably, be described as a decline relative to the Soviet Union's former status as a superpower. The new Russian Federation was greatly reduced in land- area and population, even if it inherited all the USSR's nuclear forces, institutional positions and international legal obligations. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) Russia went from being a heavily centralised country with a plan economy to having a free market economy and a new constitution that set up a strong presidential system. These changes have often been labelled a “shock”- treatment to Russia's economy which saw it undergo immense changes in a short period of time.

This liberalisation created an economic vacuum that enabled a small number of people to build up great wealth. This group of tycoons is often called “oligarchs” and has had a significant impact on both the economic and political sphere in Russia since the 1990's. Facing elections in 1996, Boris Yeltsin seemed unlikely to get re-elected, with the opposition communist party jousting for power. Yeltsin could however, count on help from the oligarchs. Following a government programme in late 1995 which allowed businessmen to acquire shares in large state-owned companies in return for loans to the federal budget, Yeltsin was able to muster support from the oligarchs who, to a large extent, financed his election campaign the following year.

Yeltsin won the election. The oligarchs have had an impact on Russian politics ever since. Prior to his resignation from office in 1999, Yeltsin eventually named Vladimir Putin as his successor. Putin's focus, in the beginning, was to strengthen and stabilise both the state and the economy, correcting many of the flaws that the erratic leadership of his predecessor had brought. Putin's time

in office has however, not done much to strengthen democracy in Russia. His term as president came to an end in 2008, when he assumed the position as Prime Minister, with the dubious election of his successor, Dimitriy Medvedev, who has come under suspicion for simply exerting Putin's will.

During his tenure, Putin, who is a former KGB official, relied on security and military elites to consolidate power while trying to control and exploit the oligarchs, a trend that is analogous to the old Soviet methods. Putin however, has pursued it in the name of national strength rather than ideology. Now serving as PM, Putin is widely thought to be holding the strings in the Kremlin and is tipped to continue to dominate the Russian political scene either by seeking re-election, or by maintaining influence in the background.

5.4.5 Economy

Russia's economy is, perhaps, the BRICS economy that relies most heavily on one sector: the oil and gas industry. In 2009, Russia became the world's largest exporter of both oil and natural gas which make up about 20-25% of GDP. Mainly due to its massive oil and gas reserves, Russia was able to sustain an average annual economic growth of 6,8% between 2000 and 2007. This economic growth enabled income levels to rise and a new middle class began emerging. Russia's heavy reliance on the commodity prices of oil and gas came at a significant cost, however, which became painfully evident in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.

As oil prices plummeted from about 140\$ per barrel to about 35\$ per barrel before stabilising at about 70\$, Russia saw its oil revenues decrease drastically, contributing to the estimated decrease in GDP of 8,5% in 2009. In early 2009, the Russian stock market had lost about 80% of its value and the ruble had fallen by a third. Moscow responded by spending as much as a third of Russia's foreign currency reserve, which were estimated at about US \$600 billion before the crisis, to slow the fall of the ruble and stabilise the economy. Being the only BRICS that has experienced a fall in GDP in the financial crisis, Russia will have to show that it is able to bounce back. The economy began to show signs of recovery in mid-2009 and the IMF predicts that GDP will grow by 3,6% in 2010.

The crisis goes to show, however, that when oil and gas prices fall, the Russian economy suffers and this will be one of the biggest challenges facing Russia's leaders. Both Putin and current president Medvedev have publicly acknowledged the weakness of the Russian economy in that it is over-reliant on oil and gas revenues. Despite their overt intention to diversify the economy, their initiatives remain unsuccessful. The need to diversify, while not urgent in good times, will become more apparent in the next years as oil prices are expected to remain at lower levels than they have been in a long time. Russia's Finance Minister, Alexei Kudrin, said recently that oil prices may not go much over \$70 per barrel in the next decade which will see the share of oil and natural gas in Russian GDP decrease to about 14%.

If Russia is to be called a BRICS with justification in the near future it will need to find a way to strengthen other sectors of its economy so that it can cope with falls in oil and gas prices as it is, by far, the BRICS country that has performed the worst in the financial crisis. This seems to be a big challenge for Russia as it has struggled to ensure foreign investment. With the Russian economic and legal systems being infamous for lawlessness and corruption, investments in Russia have been perceived as a poor prospect as property rights are not properly entrenched compared with most other countries, and certainly with the other BRICS.

Another factor which is unlikely to do much to help Russia's prospects economically is its hesitation to join the WTO. On its own, Russia had worked with the West to eliminate many obstacles to joining the organisation; but it has more recently refused to do so declaring, in a somewhat bizarre move, that it would only join along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which are unlikely to be able to join for quite some time. Russia's internal fragility when it comes to legal frameworks and its insistence on maintaining strong links with many former Soviet countries, which mostly weakens its own position, will be obstacles that it will have to deal with if its economy is to live up to the standards of the other BRICS.

5.4.6 Russia internal, regional and international issues

Russia's international relations are complex and of a very different nature to that of Brazil. Being the geographically largest country on the planet, stretching over two continents, Russia has many neighbours and a legacy of influence inherited from the former Soviet Union. Seen as the natural successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia assumed its permanent seat on the UN Security

Council. That is not to say, however, that Russia today could be regarded as a superpower in any capacity. Being a shadow of its former self, Russia suffered a deep economic depression during the 1990s.

The government's attempts to stabilise the economy and bring inflation under control were undermined by their tendency of erratic behaviour and internal conflicts. In order to provide funds, the government began what nearly became a wholesale privatisation of the economy in the mid-1990s which, in turn, led to the rise of the oligarchs, the newly rich owners of former state enterprises. There were thus, many issues facing the new president, Putin, when he came to power in 2000.

The oligarchs had gained political influence under the Yeltsin administration and wished to continue to have a say on policy matters. Putin wished to promote the power of the state and, therefore, fend off any challenges from the oligarchs, most notably when he successfully squelched the attempt of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky to pose a challenge to state authority.

The outcome of this conflict led to an informal agreement that required oligarchs to stay out of politics in return for being allowed to keep the property they seized during the privatisation in the 1990s. It can be said that Putin managed to restore stability and centralise power within the state which he used to initiate badly needed reforms and establish a framework for politics. On the regional level, Russia has been very active in the past decade. Differently from Brazil, Russia has not been in a situation where it has been able to exert “soft” power. Due to limitations in the attractiveness of its identity and ideological agenda, which is mainly caused by a lack of shared domestic consensus on values and identity as well as its vulnerability to criticism about its poor human rights record and authoritarian governance, Russia has leaned towards a more traditional view of international relations which relies on the sovereignty and rights of states and which uses military capabilities and economic resources for leverage very much in a ‘realist’ style.

In the 2000s, Russia has been involved in a number of conflicts with its neighbours. The conflicts have varied from traditional military conflicts, e.g. the civil war in Chechnya and the South Ossetia war of 2008, to cyber wars, e.g. the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008 in connection with the South Ossetia war, to conflicts where Russia has used its leverage in energy exports to achieve its goals, e.g. in the repeated threats and cut-offs of Russian oil and gas by the

partly state- owned Gazprom in the mid-2000s to Ukraine. All these conflicts involve direct and unilateral measures that are exerted in order to protect Russian interests and its grip over at least the more strategically sensitive parts of its former Soviet empire.

Having overseen a modernisation of the military and an increase in military spending (Russia now spends \$38.238 million, 3,5% of GDP on the military), presidents Putin and Medvedev clearly view the military as an essential part of pursuing their foreign policy objectives. Throughout most of the 1990s, Russia had its hands full in maintaining its internal sovereignty, illustrated by the Chechnyan civil wars (1994-96 and 1999-2005) which highlighted the terrible state of the Russian military. Russia's relations with its neighbours and other nations were erratic as there was no coherent foreign policy pursued by the Yeltsin administration, while the frameworks set up for continuing cooperation between former Soviet republics – notably the Commonwealth of Independent States – soon proved weak in face of other states' resistance and Russia's own divide-and-rule tactics.

Putin's foreign policy objectives, as well as his domestic ones, were characterised by restoring order and the power of the state. Although his style is often referred to as 'assertive', it was still different from the other BRICS in that he was not managing a rising curve of power but rather seeking to reclaim some of Russia's losses and secure it a more tolerable place in the new world order. While initially recognising the USA as the world's only "superpower", Putin set the course for Russia's foreign policy in 2000 by declaring that Russia would seek a multi-polar system of international relations.

This policy goes hand in hand with Russia's status as a BRICS and it has embraced the BRICS group as of late as an alternative to more traditional groups, such as the G8, by hosting the first official BRICS summit in the city of Yekaterinburg in the summer of 2008. It is likely that Russia will do its part to strengthen the co-operation between the BRICS in the future as it sees its interests better served in a world where the BRICS have an increased say in global affairs. Further, as the rising power of China is ultimately an even more disturbing strategic challenge for Russia than the expansion of western institutions in Europe, the BRICS framework offers another way – alongside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – for Moscow to monitor and 'manage' its mighty neighbour's growth in a peaceful and predictable framework.

5.4.7 India - Recent history

After several decades of low growth and inward-looking state-interventionist policies, India entered the 1990s with a nearly bankrupt state that had to be bailed out by the IMF. Following India's crisis the government, headed by V. Narasimha Rao and with Manmohan Singh as finance minister, initiated a wide range of economic liberalisation policies which set off a period of high economic growth that is still ongoing today. Despite successful economic reforms, India has witnessed tumultuous periods in the last two decades. Conflicts between Hindus and Muslims dominated the scene in the 1990s with bursts of communal violence. In 1999, India was involved in an armed conflict with its neighbour Pakistan in what has been called the Kargil War.

This conflict was characterised by, in addition to territorial disputes in the Kashmir province, terrorism as several Indian cities suffered from terrorist attacks in connection with the conflict. The 2000s have, however, proved to be more peaceful as India has maintained political stability which in turn, has contributed to the rapid economic growth that has come to define the country in recent years. Manmohan Singh was elected prime minister in 2004 and his recent re-election signalled a vote of confidence in his policies, which while cautious have enabled a strong economic growth widely benefiting the Indian people.

5.4.8 Economy

India has experienced economic growth of more than 5% since the early 1990s and managed an astonishing 9,7% average annual growth of GDP in 2006 and 9% in 2007. Predictions for the next few years vary: the IMF estimates that GDP growth will be about 7,7% in the coming years while the World Bank puts it at 8,5%, but it is clear that India is not showing any signs of slowing down. According to Goldman Sachs reports, India's economy is currently roughly about the same size as those of Brazil and Russia. It does however, have immense potential as Goldman Sachs predicts that India can grow at an annual average rate of 8% until 2020. These predictions are more optimistic than previous reports indicated and if everything goes as planned, India's economy will be bigger than the US economy in 2050. The lofty estimates are however, subject to a number of reservations which Goldman Sachs considers to be important to overcome in order to maintain future economic growth.

The desiderata include various reforms, such as trade liberalisation, improving education, increasing agricultural output and improving infrastructure. India's newly re-elected Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, is now in a position where he can effectively push through desired reforms as his Congress Party won a decisive victory in the 2009 elections, freeing them from the need to compromise with socialist coalition partners as in the previous term. It is therefore expected – and probably rightly so - that in the coming years India will pursue market- friendly reforms with renewed enthusiasm.

India's economic growth has had the biggest impact on the service sector, where the country's expanding IT industry has flourished. According to a recent report, IT accounts for 35% of India's exports. The industry's total revenue has grown rapidly from 3,3 billion in 1998, to a massive 87 billion in 2008. Being the area where India has been most successful in competing globally it is likely that the IT sector will be instrumental for India's future economic growth. What will be, perhaps, a greater challenge is to ensure that economic growth favours the population as a whole and not just the wealthy few. Compared with the other BRICS, India outperforms them in the GINI coefficient index, an index widely used to measure income dispersion within countries and is arguably, a decent measurement tool for equality.

With the most recent scores being from the middle of the 2000s, India had a rating of 36,8, while China, Russia and Brazil had 41,5, 42,3 and 56,7 respectively. Overall, India, the BRICS with the least unequal income dispersion, is placed at number 79 in the world. This goes to show that inequality is an area where the BRICS could do better, and that India's strong socialist tradition has perhaps, helped to ensure that its economic growth has helped more people than has been the case in the other BRICS. With poverty still being a dominating aspect of Indian society - according to the UN 41,6% of India's population lived below the one dollar a day (PPP) poverty line in 2005 - India's economic growth is immensely important for the country's development and poverty reduction.

5.4.9 India on the international stage

India's regional situation is complex as its borders stretch all the way from Myanmar in the East to Pakistan in the West. India and Pakistan have had a history of conflict ever since they were formed as separate states with the ending of British rule in 1947. A further bloody war led to the

breakaway of what is now Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971. India's conflicts with Pakistan are potentially serious because of both sides' possession of nuclear weapons since the 1990s, and have traditionally centred mostly on the Kashmir and Jammu regions in the north. The last major conflict in this area was the Kargil war of 1999, where a Pakistani offensive, which sought to foment public unrest in order to achieve its objectives, failed mainly because Pakistani-sponsored terrorism and militancy alienated the people of those provinces.

Today, the situation is different, as Pakistan has recently experienced a period of unrest involving a change in government and a vicious conflict with militants in its tribal regions. While major terrorist attacks have still occurred against India - most notably the recent bombing of a Mumbai hotel - the Indian and Pakistani governments have avoided the urge to escalate and can claim to some extent to be fighting a common terrorist enemy in Afghanistan and on Pakistan's borders. The Afghanistan connection has also led the US and other engaged Western powers to work harder in recent years for cooperation with both Pakistan and India and for peace in their mutual relations. Also, the end (at least for now) of civil war in Sri Lanka has removed another potentially destabilising factor as there had earlier been concerns about India intervening there to protect its Tamil brethren.

Finally, the Maoist insurgency, performed by a group known as the Naxalites, in India's eastern states is a major security issue which claimed 998 lives in 2009 and has to be tackled with strength in order to prevent further violence and instability. What adds a whole other dimension to India's foreign policy is the issue of nuclear weapons. India's nuclear stockpile has historically mainly served as a deterrent towards Pakistan, which also has nuclear weapons. There is some debate as to the usefulness of India having nuclear capabilities. Bharat Karnad, an Indian strategic thinker, contends that India should maintain her nuclear arsenal in order to provide a counterweight to China and pariah nuclear states such as North Korea, while the Indian Foreign Secretary, Shivshankar Menon, has indicated that India would welcome nuclear disarmament, or at least a halt in production of nuclear weapons, in co-operation with its nuclear neighbours, Pakistan and China.

What is clear, however, is that the issue of nuclear weapons will be an important aspect of Indian security in the years to come, with India's leaders perhaps, standing at a crossroads. India's last regional issue that will be discussed here is the relationship it has with Myanmar. In 1993, the

Indian government adopted a new policy towards Myanmar known as the “velvet policy” which has shaped relations between the two countries ever since. The policy is characterised by a cautious approach which contrasts to India's former policy of condemnation of Myanmar's authoritarian regime. The “velvet policy” was adopted to pursue India's objectives in the region which included increasing trade and establishing influence, and was in accordance with India's general “Look East Policy” of the 1990's where it emphasised developing stronger ties with its neighbours to the east.

India's stance towards Myanmar has been much criticised, however, both due to the limited results of the “velvet policy” and also due to its willingness to ignore Myanmar's authoritarian ways and scant regard for human rights. On the international stage, India's behaviour has, at times, been puzzling in the past decade. While being a wholehearted participant in international endeavours such as UN peacekeeping missions, where it contributes more personnel than any other BRICS, it has a habit of saying no when participating in international talks. India's erratic behaviour includes both holding back from existing treaties – e.g India has reversed its support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty since its own nuclear break-out - and being reluctant to accept new treaties (the 2008 Doha round of trade talks broke down mainly due to India's intransigence), all of which may go far to explain why its wish to gain a seat on the UN security council has remained unfulfilled.

This might yet change, as a reorganisation of major international institutions has been much discussed following the recent global financial crisis, and India has already gained a place in the G20. Being a credible democratic state, India has been able to pursue its foreign policy objectives in several ways and perhaps most importantly has aligned itself, along with Brazil, as friendly towards the US: a relationship most notably symbolised by the recent bilateral nuclear cooperation treaty of 2008. Thus, even if India's role in the international system is difficult to read at present, the outlook indicates that India will try to establish itself further as a stable and credible partner as it seeks to expand its influence and get a bigger say in the policy-making process of important international institutions.

5.4.10 China - Recent history

Following Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the instatement of Deng Xiaoping as leader of China's Communist Party in 1978, China was put on a course of economic reforms which triggered rapid economic growth that is still very much going on today. Averaging an annual GDP growth rate of 9,6% from 1978 to 2004, China has become an economic powerhouse. Politically, China has faced several challenges over the past few decades. Most notable is the Tian'anmen Square uprising of 1989 where the Chinese government resorted to military power to quell the resistance, losing much of its international reputation in the process. Following the protest, Deng Xiaoping withdrew from the public domain but remained an influential figure during Jiang Zemin's tenure as party leader (1989-2002). In the 1990s, both Hong Kong and Macao, colonies of the UK and Portugal, were returned to China although they largely kept their governing structures intact.

China managed to maintain its immense economic growth throughout the decade despite the difficulties of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and was admitted to the World Trade Organisation in 1999 which increased China's attractiveness to investment and foreign capital. 2002 saw a change of leaders as Hu Jintao was confirmed as President of the Communist party and Wen Jiabao as Premier, the latter being credited with helping China maintain her economic policies throughout the 1990s and negotiating China's WTO membership. The 2000s have seen China maintain very high rates of economic growth and an increase in China's presence on the international stage. Difficulties remain however, both at home and abroad with the issues regarding Tibet and North Korea, along with Sino-American relations and the related question of Taiwan being the most pressing.

5.4.11 Economy

China is widely seen as being the BRICS country that really defines the group as it is a vast country (the 3rd largest in the world) with the world's largest population (over 1, 3 billion) and with a positive economic growth trajectory over the last few decades that is unique and record-breaking. China did better than expected during the financial crisis and maintained an annual average GDP growth rate of over 8% in 2008 and 2009. This performance is impressive, particularly considering the Chinese economy's usual reliance on Western demand which has fallen dramatically in the crisis. Projections for economic growth in the coming years point to an increase in annual average GDP growth rate with IMF estimates for 2010 and 2011 being 10% and 9,7% respectively.

This massive rate of growth will do much to cement China's place internationally as its economic performance dwarfs those of other big economies. Relying primarily on exports to advanced economies to fuel economic growth, China has become a manufacturing giant with industry making up roughly half of its economy. By some estimates, China's economy is the world's second largest in GDP terms although the country's GDP per capita rate is a mere \$6,500 which is lower than both Brazil (\$10,200) and Russia (\$15,200) but higher than India (\$3,100).

Chinese leaders have, for some time, begun to realise the problems facing the Chinese economy. Although prospects might look rosy at present, there are many factors that could, and in some cases already do, pose problems to the economy. Firstly, China's sustained economic boom has relied primarily on its manufacturing industry which has taken advantage of the low wage levels and quantity of both skilled and unskilled labour. In the long term, China might face a problem related to a growing middle-class with higher wages who are increasingly likely to demand conditions that will reduce China's competitiveness. In the shorter term, China must take into account the fact that its manufacturing industry is heavily dependent on natural resources, fossil fuel, cheap labour and extensive investment.

In order to sustain economic growth it will be vital for China to diversify its economy and this has been the policy of China's leaders in the past decade. By emphasising the importance of creating a "knowledge economy" and by initiating some relevant policies around the turn of the century, China is beginning to see a marked change in its development. More college graduates than ever before are entering the workforce, particularly in the fields of science, technology and management. Compared with the other BRICS, China spends more money, both in relative and absolute terms, on research and development (1,43% of GDP) than any of the other three (Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa spend 0,9%, 1,1% and 0,7% and 4.58% respectively).

This indicates that China is tackling the modernisation issue with some success and may very well in the future base its economy on sectors other than cheap labour manufacturing. An issue which will, however, be more difficult to do something with in the short term is of a demographic nature. China famously introduced the one-child policy in 1977 in order to stem the large population growth in the country. Still in effect today, though not in all of China, the one-child policy has reduced the size of Chinese families and enabled, according to Goldman Sachs, the government to

increase spending per capita and thus improve levels of education and the quality of the labour force substantially.

The downside is that a large proportion of the population will grow old at the same time, putting great pressure on the economy to provide for this part of the population. The Goldman Sachs research team argues, however, that the positive consequences deriving from the increased quality of the labour force will, to a large extent, mitigate the problems caused by an ageing population. All in all, China's economy is looking good. With its excellent growth projections and increased emphasis on modernisation it seems likely that China has the ability to tackle the challenges that it faces in the coming years and decades. There is some debate about whether China's economy is a bubble that is bound to burst due to over-investment, and so it will be up to the Chinese government to show that China's growth model is sustainable.

5.4.12 China and the rest of the world

While China's economy may not be an area of immediate concern for the Chinese government, there are several politically hot topics that dominate China's situation on the international stage. Internally, China faces some potent movements of unrest, most notably the Uighurs in the West of China and the seemingly ever-present issues of Taiwan and Tibet. The Uighurs, a large, and overwhelmingly Muslim Turkic ethnic group in the Xinjiang province who have a history of pursuing separatism with religious rhetoric, resorted to protests, mainly directed at the perceived unfair dominance of Han Chinese in the province, in the summer of 2009.

Beijing responded by cracking down hard on the protesters by using military force which, in turn, resulted in hundreds of casualties. The conflict showcased the nature of Chinese security attitudes, which seem to have altered little since Tian'anmen in 1989, and the nature of its government. Obsessed with unity of control and pursuing a policy of assimilation and cultural uniformity, China's authoritarian socialist one party state is led into actions against internal unrest, particularly in Tibet, that bring down international criticism upon it and do not seem to solve the problem either.

China's sensitivity over Tibet and Taiwan, which it sees as historically Chinese and an integral part of the country, also causes frequent diplomatic incidents with the Chinese government reacting angrily to meetings between the Dalai Lama and state leaders of Western countries.

Regionally, China's situation has been undergoing some changes over the last decade. Whereas the US was the clear hegemon of modern times in the Asia-Pacific region, China's new found strength has put it in position where it can credibly rival Western influence. In addition to traditional unilateral initiatives, China's increased involvement in ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) may result, although there is some debate on this, in increased regional influence. On January 1st 2010, China formally entered the ASEAN agreement making it the largest regional institution in the world, by population, although the scope and depth of the organisation's trade and co-operation remain limited.

Internationally, China has been increasing its presence significantly in the last few years. With China's economy at present, being highly dependent on natural resources and fossil fuels, it has been forced to look outside its borders for access to these materials. It has recently begun to look to its neighbours in the west, lending billions of dollars to Turkmenistan to help them develop a large gas field and undertaking joint ventures worth billions of dollars in Kazakhstan. To strengthen its position, and ready its access to resources, in Central Asia, China has also lent 10 billion dollars to the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), a security organisation made up of China and Russia plus four Central Asian states, to help members tackle the global financial crisis.

The SCO is also of significance as a way for China and Russia to preserve peaceful cooperation between them while in practice the balance of power between them is steadily tilting in China's direction. Another interesting turn in Chinese foreign policy has been that the country has increasingly looked to Africa in order to fulfil its ever-growing need for resources. In a recent conference in Beijing with African leaders, China pledged that it would double its development assistance to Africa, to 5 billion dollars in 2009, in a bid to become Africa's single largest trading partner.

In return, Chinese companies have been able to establish a growing presence on the continent by building infrastructure and running mines and oil fields. This policy has received a mixed reception with many African countries embracing the assistance whole-heartedly while many Western countries criticise China for lending money to repressive regimes with no conditions for human development. China's relations with the US are a big part of China's foreign policy as the US is one of the largest markets for Chinese exports and more generally, perhaps the most important

actor in international relations. While relations between the two are ordinarily of a friendly nature, and the story of the global economic crisis has underlined their complex interdependence in terms of finance, currency management and investment, there have also been some hiccups recently.

The global climate talks in Copenhagen serve as an example, with the US and other Western countries blaming China for the failure to reach a comprehensive global treaty while China insists that it is taking a highly responsible approach to climate issues but in its own style. Another ongoing and potentially explosive issue between the two countries has to do with Taiwan. China claims that, as an integral part of China, Taiwanese foreign and security policy should be run from Beijing and that the only ultimate solution is reunification, while the US has, by law, an obligation to protect Taiwan's independence. A recent 6 billion dollar weapons deal agreed between the US and Taiwan has caused much furore in Beijing, thus cooling Sino-American relations.

It is worth mentioning that China's leaders have claimed on a regular basis that China's rise to prominence is of a peaceful nature and that it does not intend to pursue any military objectives besides protecting Chinese territory, which itself is disputed. Most recently, a government spokesman said that China's military budget will rise by a mere 7,5% in 2010, the first annual growth rate below 10% since 1989. Speculation about this decrease has centred on three possible explanations. First of all, there is the possibility that China simply wishes to reiterate its peaceful intentions. Secondly, it has been contended that China's exceptional economy-boosting expenditure caused by the recession has eaten into the defence budget. Third and last, an explanation might be that since defence spending revolves much around the acquisitions of large military hardware systems, a single year's percentage drop may not be of much importance as it could simply indicate that the government is not buying such hardware this year.

5.4.13 South Africa - Recent history

South Africa's membership in the BRICS should be viewed in the context of "recasting" South Africa's international relations after decades of isolation during the apartheid era as a pariah state. Cognisant of the shared historical bonds of solidarity in the fight against oppression and colonialism among like-minded countries, notably from the African Continent as well as other regions in the world, the 1955 Bandung Conference laid the seeds of South-South cooperation. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 and of the G77 and China in 1964 was

underpinned by this partnership and South Africa's shared objective for a different global template that is more responsive to the interests of developing countries. Subsequently, various other initiatives were multiplied from this progressive impulse. This is an important history to draw upon, but the South African government is also conscious that history has marched on.

The age of globalisation urges South Africa to elevate these partnerships to a different level, building on the ties of solidarity and the shared objective to generate mutually beneficial economic relations. These shared historical ties make it much easier to share lessons about pursuing development paths based on South Africa's common understanding of the kind of challenges faced by developing countries. The outdated "zero-sum game" paradigm framed in adversarial terms is being recast through progressive groupings such as the BRICS as an opportunity to strengthen collective global responsibility and achieve developmental gains for developing countries, and obviously from South Africa's perspective, Africa in particular. It is therefore clear why key tenets of South Africa's international relations policy pertain to advancing the African Union's (AU) agenda as well as strengthening South-South and North-South relations.

On March 27, 2013, South Africa hosted the Fifth BRICS Summit and assumed the Chair of the BRICS for 2013 through 2014, which required her to provide strategic direction to the BRICS agenda. In addition, the Fifth Summit completed the first cycle of Summits and presents an opportune moment to reflect on the achievements of the BRICS thus far. The BRICS have developed into a significant catalyst for global change that has captured the imagination of the global community in a comparatively short period of time. In the eThekweni Declaration of 2013, BRICS Leaders clearly articulated their vision for the BRICS to provide solutions to global problems and to champion a new paradigm for international relations: "We met at a time which requires that we consider issues of mutual interest and systemic importance in order to share concerns and develop lasting solutions.

We aim at progressively developing BRICS into a fully-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics. The prevailing global governance architecture is regulated by institutions which were conceived in circumstances when the global landscape in all its aspects was characterised by very different challenges and opportunities." BRICS provides an amplified voice to the interests of emerging players to participate in formulating global agendas. South Africa's membership has enhanced the political

component of BRICS deliberations since she was invited to attend the Sanya Summit. South Africa has also received support from her BRICS partners for African peace, security, and development issues which notably feature on the agenda of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The Fifth BRICS Summit was also the first BRICS Summit hosted on the African continent and coincided with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the AU. Hence, South Africa proposed the theme of “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization” for the Fifth BRICS Summit. The South African Cabinet adopted a BRICS Strategy in 2012 which informs her engagement with this grouping.

South Africa’s BRICS membership is aimed at four levels of engagement: 1) the domestic level to strengthen political and economic relations; 2) on the regional level to enhance the African agenda and to promote Africa’s sustainable development with emphasis placed on continental and regional infrastructure development programs; 3) to pursue global governance reform and 4) to strengthen intra-BRICS cooperation from a more organisational perspective. South Africa’s domestic drivers for BRICS engagement address her apartheid legacy’s triple challenges of poverty, inequality, and job creation through key growth areas identified in our New Growth Path (NGP).

5.4.14 Economy

It is well recognised by the UN and Bretton Woods Institutions that the world economy is undergoing a profound structural shift in economic power, with the emergence of new sources of global economic growth, trade, and investment flows, which are re-defining global economic geography. The BRICS countries are at the centre of these changes. In broad terms, there is a relative shift in the locus of economic power from the North and the West to the South and the East. The South African banking group, Standard Bank, in its 2013 insight analysis pointed out that the BRICS’ world trade amounted to an estimated US\$5.6 trillion in 2012, making up nearly 16 percent of total global trade, compared to 10 percent in 2008, clearly constituting the new engines of global growth.

The BRICS evolved into a dialogue platform and diplomatic association between the member States on issues of common interest, notably regarding international economic and financial cooperation. The BRICS are also increasingly discussing and making statements on political and

other issues of global interest, holding common positions on multilateralism and international law and the central role of the UN in decision-making. While South Africa's economic links with traditional trading partners remain important, the country's prospects for growth and development will depend increasingly on diversifying and strengthening economic links with these dynamic economies of the South and with Africa. The expansion of South Africa's trade and direct investment with the countries of the South, notably our BRICS partners, continues apace, with China and India at the forefront.

The share of BRICS in South Africa's total trade grew from 10 percent in 2005 to 19 percent in 2012. Since 2009, China has been South Africa's largest bilateral trading partner, while India ranked fifth in 2012. By comparison, the share of the European Union (EU) in South Africa's total trade has declined from 35.7 percent in 2005 to 25 percent in 2012. South Africa also continues to attract substantial diversified investment from the BRICS. For the period April 2011 to December 2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) markets have been able to track 31 projects from 25 BRICS companies with a potential investment of R12.6 billion in the South African economy.

There are strategic economic considerations that anchor South Africa's participation in the forum. First, South Africa seeks to use the forum to build stronger economic linkages with the world's fastest growing and most dynamic economies. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) latest forecast for 2013 indicates that emerging market and developing economies would grow by 5.3 percent in 2017, compared with growth of 1.4 percent in advanced economies. South Africa's prospects for growth and development will depend increasingly on diversifying and strengthening our economic links with BRICS economies and with Africa. Second, the forum provides a platform to address some of the challenges that arise from the rapid growth in intra-BRICS trade.

A core concern for South Africa is the structure of trade, whereby her exports to China, India, and Brazil continue to be dominated by low value-added products. One of the priorities for South Africa's term as BRICS chair was to coordinate a joint study to explore ways to promote more value-added exports that will support South Africa's industrial development objectives. Third, there is an historic opportunity for the BRICS countries to champion a new paradigm for collaboration for more sustainable, equitable, and mutually beneficial development which should involve closer cooperation among the BRICS countries to support BRICS growth, development, and poverty objectives and avoid inter-country competition.

As the BRICS Chair, South Africa played a key role in shaping the agenda for economic cooperation. The third meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers on the 26th of March 2013 in South Africa adopted a BRICS Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework, which placed the activities of the Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI) established at the New Delhi Summit (2012), as a key platform for BRICS Members to exchange views on a range of economic, trade, and investment related issues, in a longer term framework for enhanced coordination and possible joint action. South Africa identified two priorities for its Chair, namely 1) a Joint Trade Study, which identified ways of promoting more value-added exports among BRICS Members and which were presented to BRICS Trade Ministers at the next summit in Brazil in 2014 and 2) a seminar on investment agreements in order to share BRICS policy experiences and perspectives on investment regulation, including Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS).

Interactions amongst BRICS members began to bear fruit at a more practical level. At the Sanya Summit (2010), in line with the Member Countries' commitment to strengthen cooperation amongst BRICS development banks, the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism was signed by the member banks which included South Africa's Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA). Following the conclusion of further agreements at BRICS recent Summit on Multilateral Infrastructure Co-financing in Africa and Multilateral Cooperation and co-financing for Sustainable Development, these banks explored the establishment of bilateral agreements aimed at establishing cooperation and co-financing arrangements that ensured mutual benefit. In this case, a common sense of purpose on minimising exchange rate risks and the associated transaction costs accelerated the process towards practical bilateral engagements. These agreements enhanced intra-BRICS trade.

5.4.15 South Africa and the rest of the world

Regional: In Africa, it is estimated that more than US\$90 billion is required to improve infrastructure, whilst US\$17 billion can be achieved from spending efficiencies. African countries, predominantly middle and low income countries, do not have the fiscal capacity to build the kind of infrastructure needed to support their economies. The BRICS countries are already deeply involved in Africa's economic transformation process and their presence is growing significantly. This is reflected in rapidly growing trade and investment flows, as well as economic cooperation

activities across a range of sectors. According to Standard Bank, BRICS total trade with Africa reached US\$340 billion in 2012, representing a more than ten-fold increase over the course of a decade. The BRICS countries can contribute to Africa's development by increasing support to build infrastructure and industrial capacity and importing more value-added manufactured products from the continent.

International: The BRICS countries have a shared interest in pursuing the reform of multilateral institutions for global governance to give greater voice to developing countries in these institutions and, thereby, enhance the legitimacy of the institutions themselves. BRICS Leaders at the Fifth Summit called for the reform of International Financial Institutions in order to make them more representative and to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries and expressed concern with the slow pace of the reform of the IMF. Leaders reiterated the urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010 IMF Governance and Quota Reform and urged all members to take all necessary steps to achieve an agreement on the quota formula and complete the next general quota review by January 2014.

BRICS have further strengthened coordination in the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Doha Round to defend and champion a development outcome as well as in other forums where trade and investment issues arise. With regard to the recent selection process for a new Director-General of the WTO, BRICS Trade Ministers called for the appointment of a candidate who "demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and to enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of the WTO including through a commitment to support efforts that will lead to an expeditious conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda." Brazil's candidate, Ambassador Roberto de Azevedo, was subsequently elected as the new WTO Director-General from the 1st of September 2013, and South Africa warmly welcomed his appointment.

Organisational: While the BRICS countries have their unique individual political, economic, and social profiles, each country's experiences provide invaluable lessons for the other members and all five nations ought to use the group as a platform for sharing experiences and best practices. For its part, South Africa has a number of its own positive experiences to share with BRICS. South Africa's financial service sector has been globally recognised as sophisticated and highly competitive, ranked second in the world in terms of soundness of banks by the recent World Economic Forum's World Competitiveness Report. This is especially important as BRICS

economies continue to grow and attempt to modernise their financial service sectors. This capacity suggests that South Africa has a sound investment environment and has been a source of increasing interaction with BRICS nations.

5.5 Assessing approaches to growth and development

5.5.1. New Development Bank

The BRICS group has gained momentum notably since the launch of the project of the New Development Bank of BRICS to help finance the group infrastructure project. NDB can be of great relevance in world politics since it has the ambition to counter “Western” institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. From a long-term development perspective, the establishment of the NDB is designed to pool the financial resources of the BRICS and promote common development within the group and beyond. Moreover, the NDB will simplify future cooperation among emerging market economies and developing countries (EMDCs) and other regional development banks. Thus, the setting up of a development bank aimed at providing financial resources for EMDCs and managing them independently not only signifies further cooperation among EMDCs, but also reflects an endeavour by the emerging economies to construct a new order in the international economy. Early in 2011, BRICS countries agreed to establish the NDB. This was officially proposed in 2012, but had to wait until to the 21st of July 2015, when it came to fruition.

In addition, the first loan was only issued a year later in April of 2016. According to the Fortaleza Declaration, the NDB will have US\$100 billion in initial authorised capital at its disposal. The BRICS countries will initially underwrite half of that amount – US\$50 billion – with each putting forward equal contributions of US\$10 billion. The remaining capital will be supplemented according to their economic strength and the amount of their international trade and reserves. The NDB also welcomes other countries, multilateral institutions and investment banks as bank shareholders. The power of the NDB is carefully allocated: its headquarters are located in Shanghai, with a regional centre in South Africa. The rotating presidency of the bank will go first to India, with Brazil chairing the bank’s first board of directors. Russia, for its part, will chair the first board of governors.

Regarding the capital contribution and power distribution, the NDB tries to be egalitarian and avoids any superpower, which guarantees that the quotas and financing needs are equally allocated.

The Fortaleza Declaration specifies its initial subscribed capital as US\$100 billion, with China contributing the largest share of the funding at US\$41 billion. Brazil, Russia and India will each provide US\$18 billion, with South Africa supplying the balance of US\$5 billion. Hence the voting rights reflect the contributions; China holds a commanding 39.95% vote compared to 18.10% each for Brazil, Russia and India, and a 5.75% vote for South Africa. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) does not mean that foreign exchange reserves will be exchanged directly; merely that when certain conditions are met, and countries put in an application, other member countries will provide funds through a currency swap.

So the criterion for applying for the contingent reserve is the urgent issue to be specified. The disparity in contributions and voting rights will make it tremendously difficult for BRICS to agree on even basic principles, such as who they will lend money to and on what terms, as well as the amount. In addition, as BRICS countries have consolidated their position as the main engines for sustaining the pace of the international economy and have played a bigger role in global governance, intra-BRICS financial cooperation will encounter interventions from Western countries, which may be a significant obstacle to the cooperation process. For example, the 2010 IMF quota reforms agreed to shift more power to developing and emerging market economies; however, these reforms have not been reflected in the US Omnibus Appropriations Act of the 2015 fiscal year.

Finally, apart from the difference in economic interests, BRICS countries have a diverse history and cultural tradition, as well as regional strategy choices, which impede the set-up of a centripetal force among BRICS in global governance. For example, the views of BRICS countries did not reach consensus in the IMF 2011 election; China and India have disagreements in terms of boundaries; other countries worry about China as a superpower and they ask for RMB appreciation by Brazil and India and so on, all of which will become an impediment to further cooperation among BRICS countries.

The establishment of the NDB could help BRICS countries make better use of their foreign exchange reserves. At present, China, Russia, Brazil and India rank in the top ten countries with the largest foreign reserves around the world, which amounted to US\$5.02 trillion in 2014 and accounted for 75% of the world reserves. For many years, low-yield US Treasuries were the first choice for developing countries when using their foreign exchange reserves. The setup of the NDB

could not only shift their investments in the direction of higher return-rate choices, but also contribute to rebalancing the global economy. Moreover, the NDB will benefit trade and capital flows among the BRICS, expand the field of financial cooperation and accelerate the internationalisation of their currencies. So far, the Chinese and the Russian currencies are already tradable.

Rand merchant bank (RMB) settlement of cross-border trade between China and Brazil, as well as between China and Russia has also started, which is favourable for the bilateral trade between China and its two partners. This could act as a model for the internationalisation of BRICS currencies. The New Development bank (NDB) will also expand the financing channels for EMDCs. At present, the World Bank (WB) is the main lending resource for EMDCs; however, in recent years, the total loans they obtain from the WB is decreasing, shrinking from US\$50.23 billion in the 2010 fiscal year to US\$44.4 billion in the 2014 fiscal year. Besides, the New Basel Capital Accord obliges commercial banks to raise their solvency ratio progressively from an average of 4 per cent of total liabilities to 7 per cent, which may reduce the amount of their long-term loans and even further narrow the financial channels for EMDCs.

In the circumstances, loans from the NDB that do not have harsh conditions attached will help to finance infrastructure, as well as more environmentally sustainable projects in EMDCs. Early in 2016, the NDB announced its first batch of loans, providing US\$300 million to Brazil, US\$81 million to China, US\$250 million to India and US\$180 million to South Africa. All of the money is financing sustainable energy projects, such as solar power and hydropower. Moreover, the NDB is set to issue its first Yuan-denominated bonds and is eyeing future funding for infrastructure projects. As a complement to, and not a substitute for, existing financial institutions, the NDB will integrate the resources of BRICS countries and improve the quality of their investment-driven economic growth modes.

5.6 Political Challenges among BRICS states

5.6.1 Challenges faced by Brazil

Brazil is the most promising of the BRICS states in terms of current key policy trends and the quality of its governance capacities. South America's largest country remains affected by the legacy of its past decades-long military leadership and continues to labour under the pressure of

problems such as poor infrastructure and high levels of social inequality. Yet the country has been quick to recognize the signs of the times and in recent years implemented important reform measures that the current administration has elected to continue. Thus, in parallel with economic diversification, substantial improvements in the country's social development have been made. In the last decade, the incidence of extreme poverty has been reduced by half, and about 20 million Brazilians have climbed successfully into the middle class.

Both developments speak to the success of the new social measures, of an active minimum wage policy and of the "Bolsa Familia" reform program begun under President Lula. These reforms have focused on the formalisation of labour relations and on a significant increase in social and income transfers. A pioneering step was taken by linking social transfers to children's school enrolments. During the first legislative session of Lula's presidential term, real minimum wages rose by a third. These developments in Brazil show that the fight against poverty and social inequality through systematic policy reform may be a protracted one, but that progress is definitely possible.

Brazil's most pressing need for further reform is in the area of education policy. The country's education system underperforms considerably in international comparison, as attested to by the country's PISA results in recent years. Despite progress made, Brazil managed to climb only eight slots from 2000 (53rd) to 2009 (65th) on the PISA ranking. President Rousseff has declared overcoming social disparities in education a key political goal, and educational expenditures have risen accordingly in recent years.

Unlike the oil-importing countries of China and India, Brazil has the advantage of oil autonomy, and nearly half of its energy profile is made up by renewable energy sources. Hydropower alone satisfies 15% of Brazil's energy needs, and accounts for 80% of the country's electric power generation. Despite the extensive land usage and resulting environmental problems, Brazil's environmental policy is judged as being relatively positive, particularly in comparison with the land-rich countries of Russia and China. Future environmental performance will depend on the new government's ability to take effective measures against deforestation of the tropical rain forest, and whether, as announced by President Rousseff, clear-cutting of the Amazon region can in fact be successfully reduced by 80% by 2020.

Brazil's challenges without question remain significant. However, a look at the country's governance capacities also suggests that it can maintain its previously positive development trend. This said the government should strengthen its steering capability further. In direct comparison with other BRICS countries, Brazil lags somewhat behind in terms of strategic planning capacity, although institutional arrangements have been continuously improved over the last several years. RIAs are still not required today, but a strengthening of this type of instrument can be observed in recent years. A number of other quite good approaches to successful inter-ministerial coordination and policy steering are evident, particularly in the president's Office of the Chief of Staff.

In comparison with the other BRICS, Brazil's government also performs very well in terms of the quality of policy implementation. However, performance does depend on the specific policy area. While the country has been particularly successful in the area of social policy, it lags somewhat in terms of infrastructure and industrial policy. The government also failed to win National Congress approval for a tax reform proposal. Nonetheless, it is notable that despite many good approaches and developments, the governance capacities of the Brazilian executive are still hampered by the predominance of short-term politics over long-term interests. This leads to shortcomings in terms of solid planning, and undermines the stability of governance structures that might otherwise better resist various political influences and permit greater institutional efficiency and transparency. While implementation quality is critical, the need to strengthen the government's bargaining capability vis-à-vis the National Congress is perhaps even more urgent.

Like South Africa and India, Brazil already has a very considerable body of sustainable governance preconditions in place today. The Lula government provided an impressive demonstration of the potential that lies in actively involving civil society during a time of comprehensive transition. Stakeholders in society have thus gained significant influence in recent years. This influence is stronger in the periods when elections are near, as is common in other democracies. However, in Brazil their influence has climbed continuously over a course of years, even independently of elections. Thus the institution of free, periodic elections is no longer the only means through which the Brazilian government remains accountable to societal interests. Rather, an everyday democratic practice seems to be cautiously developing, in which the government consults with and seeks to involve societal stakeholders during the legislative session.

It is notable this practice is strongly dependent on the level of engagement shown by individual governments and their members. The new government under Dilma Rousseff would do well to maintain this openness towards civil society. According to the country experts, “On balance, however, the trend is a positive one, as Brazilian governments have been seeking to modernise government structures and bring them in line with international standards targeting a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to regulatory quality, improved intra-governmental cooperation and strategic planning.

5.6.2 Challenges faced by Russia

A closer look at the findings, Russia clearly shows that the country’s current economic growth derives almost exclusively from an extensive exploitation of natural resources. The country has failed to diversify its economic structure, investments in infrastructure are long overdue, and – of particular concern – there is no long-term economic strategy in place. A development trajectory that relies not only on rich natural resources would reduce exposure to global economic fluctuations, while at the same help reign in Russia’s rising levels of environmental pollution. At the same time, growing inequality within Russian society is giving greater impetus to the country’s burgeoning political protest movements. The political, economic, social and environmental challenges for Russia are thus immense. However, Russia’s current governance capacities are not well suited either to addressing these problems effectively or to producing long-term solutions.

Indeed, the country paints a rather bleak picture of its political reform capacity in comparison to the other BRICS. Throughout the entire category of the government’s steering capability, it is evident that Russia has considerable catching up to do when compared to the other BRICS countries, with the country showing significant weaknesses in each of the category’s individual aspects. Putin’s regular, direct intervention and influence (“manual control”) detracts from the central government’s strategic capacity and the efficiency of interministerial coordination. To be sure, Russia’s political system has shown a few individual developments toward greater government efficiency, for example through the introduction of regulatory impact assessments (RIA).

However, in light of political patterns that are often fragmented and clientelistic (featuring considerable levels of patronage), a lack of consultation with independent experts or stakeholders within society, and an often contradictory communications policy, forward-looking policy making

in the sense of sustainable governance hardly appears possible in Russia today. These massive problems are echoed in the government's capacity to effectively implement its policies. Here too, Russia is ranked in last place in comparison with the other BRICS countries. Russia's government performs particularly poorly in the case of policies with broad impact, which are absolutely dependent on implementation by a number of ministries and their subsidiary agencies. Nor does the medium term offer much hope of improvement here; Russia also shows the BRICS states' lowest performance on the criterion of "organisational reform capacity," which addresses the issues of institutional self-monitoring and adaptability. It is difficult to note any systematic, critical stance toward existing institutional arrangements.

Finally, structures for genuine civil society engagement and participation remain weak in Russia, detracting further from the sustainability of governance. To be sure, the government did respond to the massive popular political protests following Putin's re-election as president, initiating certain reforms. At best, this may lead to more political competition and a weakening of the inefficient vertical pattern of government that has existed to date. However, the inertia of the bureaucratic elites is substantial enough that the outcome and long-term effect of these tentative steps toward reform is very uncertain.

In examining the BRICS group's current status quo in terms of participation and government accountability to citizens, parliament and civil society organisations, only China performs more poorly. Given the state influence over the media, a Duma with weak de facto oversight powers, and the government's failure to integrate stakeholders within society, it is difficult to speak of an effective public and democratic sphere of oversight. Should these overall conditions and governance shortcomings persist, the prospects that Russia will successfully be able to address the core problems outlined above are poor.

5.6.3 Challenges faced by India

The outlook for India, by contrast, is somewhat more ambiguous. The country's economic prospects are positive, thanks to favourable demographic development. If one believes the Goldman Sachs projections, India will see stronger long-term growth than China, achieving annual growth rates of more than 5% over the next four decades. By the year 2034, India's population is expected to exceed that of China, making it the most populous country in the world (cf. GMS 2012: 49). It is argued that these optimistic growth projections for the subcontinent will depend on

its ability to overcome enormous social disparities, modernise its infrastructure as a basis for industrial development, and make progress in the health and education sectors. Without substantial progress in these areas, the coveted urban white-collar jobs will in the future remain out of reach for the vast majority of India's population.

The dynamic economic development of recent years, along with successes in the education and health sector, particularly in the country's economic centres, cannot hide the fact that a very large proportion of India's population still lives in abject poverty. Compared with the other BRICS countries, the share of the population with a college degree is also rather low. However, it is cause for optimism that India, fares comparatively well in terms its governance capacities and enjoys considerable reform capacity. There is a favourable evaluation of the Indian central government's directive capacity (at the national level). India's top position on the criterion of strategic capacity can be explained in part by the strategic role played by the cabinet, the technical expertise and strong coordinating function of the Prime Minister's Office, the active exchange between scholars and the government, and consultation with societal groups that is to some extent institutionalised for important policy proposals.

The quality of implementation exercised by India's government has also enabled tangible progress with respect to the previously noted political challenges, earning it the number two ranking on this issue, after Brazil. Primary achievements according to UNECDOC (2014), include "massive increases in school enrolment at every level, the near-elimination of the gender gap in education and the growing provision of technical and vocational training (though starting from a very low base)." Other specific policy implementation successes include "the new initiative providing health insurance for the poor, the countrywide implementation of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), a program to generate employment in rural India) and overall, a far better realization of planned expenditures than ever before" (Kareemulla, Reddy, Rama, Kumar & Venkateswarlu, 2009).

Like China, however, India features a certain geographical disparity in the quality of implementation. Some individual states such as Kerala have achieved goals in areas such as health care, education or political participation significantly more quickly than others. Furthermore, task funding at the subnational level is a serious problem. India has at least established a system of central-government grants and an interstate tax-revenue sharing system, with the aim of improving

state-government finances. However, this often remains inadequate to needs, particularly in rural areas.

In the area of governance, the government must strengthen the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms in order to combat rampant corruption. Among such measures would be a functioning ombuds mechanism and a stronger audit office. Expanding the capacities of such institutions will be necessary in order to avoid further risking a loss of trust on the part of the population and of foreign investors. India's current credit rating, as assessed by the major rating agencies, is only a little over the level of "junk." The mass protests following in the wake of corruption scandals paint a vivid picture of just how paralyzing and destabilising it can be when popular trust in the performance of the political system is endangered.

5.6.4 Challenges faced by China

China's classification in comparison with the other BRICS is also somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the country experts note that it retains considerable unexploited potential even after the rapid economic growth of recent years, and important economic policy weaknesses have already been addressed. However, the continuation of China's growth trajectory cannot be taken for granted, and is predicated on far-reaching reforms being taken in central policy areas as well as within the governance system itself. A number of factors threaten sustainable economic development in China. The high levels of inequality, especially between the urban and rural populations and between the coastal provinces and the western regions, are of particular importance. Migrant workers, who are effectively excluded from the social welfare and health care systems, now number 200 million.

Demographic change and the closing of the demographic window due to the decades-long one child policy are taking place at a speed as impressive as that of recent years' economic growth. This development will place the labour market, infrastructure, education and social systems under enormous pressure. The state-controlled financial system is also greatly in need of reform. Growing environmental problems and an emerging housing bubble raise further questions as to the sustainability of the political leadership's current course. Corruption and inadequate legal certainty also figure prominently as potential sources of citizen unrest. In fact, the number of annual violent protests has increased to 100,000, according. Unresolved conflicts in Tibet, Inner

Mongolia, and the provinces of Xinjiang and Yunnan pose serious risks to political stability in the People's Republic.

It is not at all clear whether China will prove able in the long run to provide long-term sustainable policy solutions to these problems. In comparison with the other BRICS countries, China's system of governance shows varying levels of performance. On the one hand, the country stands out for its particularly strong focus on long-term strategic policy planning, which is reflected in detailed planning documents and multiyear policy agendas. The hierarchically driven inter-ministerial coordination also functions quite effectively. But it is unclear to what extent the government consults genuinely independent academic expertise, which is an important undertaking, given the complexity of problems at hand. The same applies to the targeted involvement of civil society stakeholders in the sense of societal consultation; here, too, the government fails to secure long-term support for its policies.

For these reasons, China's steering capability receives nothing more than a middling rank in BRICS comparison. Like India, China's multi-level political system suffers from severe regional disparities in terms of the quality of governance. This is manifest most clearly in terms of the poor public services on offer in peripheral regions. Regions are largely dependent on their own income for implementation of the central government's agenda. This results in significant differences in the quality of implementation between economically and fiscally strong (often urban) areas and the primarily agricultural interior. In the fight against corruption, China lacks both a free media system and a civil society sector independent of the state, either of which might otherwise play a watchdog role. Courts in China also lack independence from the executive. Exacerbating this problematic state of affairs is the absence of opportunities provided for civil society leaders to exact any genuine influence on policy.

For the last three decades, China's government has distinguished itself through a high degree of adaptability and flexibility. The question for the future will be whether China's leaders can retain this adaptability, and – particularly with an eye to the rapidly closing demographic window – engage in the necessary social reforms. Opposition and power struggles by influential interest groups within the Communist Party of China (CPC) have to date prevented any reversal of these profoundly negative trends. Any future Chinese leadership is bound to inherit a considerably

difficult set of challenges that will be hard to tackle in a context of increasing demographic pressures and slowing growth.

5.6.5 Challenges faced by South Africa

South Africa's democratic consolidation has made substantial progress, and the principle of the rule of law is becoming widely accepted by political actors. Despite high levels of state debt inherited from the apartheid era, South Africa has since successfully restored macroeconomic stability, reduced state debt, strengthened the welfare state and generated notable levels of economic growth. However, the growth of recent years has not had a positive impact on the labour market needed to combat social disparities effectively. Poverty and extreme social inequality continue to represent enormous problems. South Africa has the highest levels of social inequality within the BRICS group, and the legacy of its apartheid past continues to weigh heavily on the present. A focus on employment-intensive growth is therefore absolutely essential in order to combat structural poverty and unemployment.

In comparison to Brazil, Russia, India and China, the SGI country experts rate South Africa as showing the worst policy performance in terms of labour market and education policy. In the area of infrastructure development as well, South Africa faces enormous challenges. In recent years, the high demand for energy has led repeatedly to power grid overloads and devastating power outages, a situation partially attributable to the dominant position of the state-owned Eskom power company (cf. Gu et al. 2013:12). Moreover, the tax-based financing of welfare state benefits is far from sustainable. It is difficult to assess whether South Africa's reform capability is sufficient to meet these political, economic and social challenges. In terms of governance capacities, South Africa currently holds a middling position within the BRICS group.

Interpreting the middling position held by South Africa within the BRICS group in terms of its governance capacity requires a closer look because of how this rank masks the discrepancies between individual dimensions of analysis. On the one hand, recent developments point to an improvement in reform capacity, though several severe shortcomings persist. On the other hand, in more encouraging developments, the government has recently made important changes to its institutional arrangements, thereby enhancing its strategic capacity. Academic expertise is used by the government, and civil society actors and interest groups are in general successfully involved

in the policy-making process. However, in this area it appears that the political dominance of the ANC party means that trade-union-associated interest groups are given preference.

Overall, South Africa's performance in the area of consultation with stakeholders in society is on par with that of the other BRICS democracies, India and Brazil. However, the South African government shows clear potential for improvement in its communication policy and to some extent in its inter-ministerial coordination as well. The government's ability to effectively implement policy objectives also falls somewhat short. Despite certain successes in the implementation of social programs, glaring weaknesses are evident in the key areas of education and the labour market, a heavy burden for the country to bear. The growing strength of political camps within the ANC (associated with a growing factionalism) and the considerable levels of patronage within the party undermine effective decision-making and implementation.

In addition, finances at the subnational and local levels are not used effectively enough, as the bureaucracies at these levels often lack the necessary competencies and abilities to spend the funds allocated to high-impact projects wisely. In this context, the high levels of corruption and nepotism represent an enormous problem. South Africa does benefit from the positive and constructive role played by civil-society actors, an aspect in which it shows parallels with India and Brazil. In this respect, the democratic regimes of India, Brazil and South Africa are significantly better positioned for the future than are Russia and China. South Africa even performs best in this area among all the BRICS states. Yet this development must without question be further strengthened.

The mediocre level of political knowledgeable citizens show today should be counteracted through better media and educational offerings. Moreover, these offerings must be made accessible to the entire population, regardless of social or geographical origin. In addition, South Africa should expand the parliament's de facto executive oversight powers, and eliminate any remaining inefficient structures. This may prove a particularly difficult task, given the longstanding majority position held by the ANC.

5.7 Difficulties for the New Development Bank (NDB)

The biggest obstacle to the NDB's rise to be the number one rival of the World Bank is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), another financial institution initiated by China in December of 2015 that counts China, India, and Russia as its top three shareholders. It also plans

to have \$100 billion in capital, but unlike the NDB, members will not contribute to that amount equally and the voting shares allocated to each country will be unequal as well. Already 30 countries have signed and ratified the AIIB's Articles of Agreement, and another 27 countries have signed the articles and are pending ratification. Consequently, the AIIB has had a much easier time raising its capital and could very well reach its \$100-billion-dollar goal by the time it issues its first loan in mid-2016, while the NDB only hopes to reach the \$100 billion mark over time.

So has the NDB been made irrelevant before it has had a chance to prove itself? Not just yet. Kamath (2015), is optimistic that the two institutions can co- exist and even co-operate:

Infrastructure and project needs are very large, so we will collaborate with everyone.... We have partnerships that we will forge with the AIIB, the national loan banks and indeed, the exiting market loan banks.

He is correct that there is enough need for development in the world, but they will have to fill different roles. The exact relationship between the NDB and the AIIB depends, to a certain extent, on whether Brazil and South Africa decide to ratify the Articles of the AIIB as non-regional parties. This is more likely than not as they are both signatories to the agreement already. In such an instance, the NDB may end up working in parallel with the AIIB, and may be the bank through which the BRICS countries could fund projects that they prefer but could not win a majority of AIIB votes. In the long run, co-existence with the AIIB may not be the worst thing for the NDB or the global market for infrastructure funding.

There is enough need to go around, and a greater diversity of lenders can only be good for developing countries. Perhaps the AIIB will focus on Asia, and the NDB will focus on Africa after its regional office in Johannesburg. Also, the BRICS countries have an incentive to invest in the NDB so that they can use it to balance the power of the AIIB. Though the size and rapid growth of the AIIB may prevent the NDB from becoming the primary alternative to the World Bank, it will not necessarily threaten the survival of the NDB. Together, China, Russia, and India will have 60% of votes in the NDB and about 40% of votes in the AIIB, so if they cooperate they should be able to make the two organisations complement each other.

However, there are some real threats to the existence of the NDB. Because it only has five members as of now, it is more exposed to economic volatility than the World Bank or the AIIB, both of

which have dozens of members. The shaky economic conditions in Russia, Brazil, and South Africa will combine to put serious strain on the BRICS collaborations. The ruble has lost over half of its value relative to the US dollar since the beginning of 2014, and the combination of low oil prices and continuing sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union over the Russian invasion of Crimea suggest that recovery for Russia is a long way off.

Meanwhile, since 2009, South Africa's debt-to-GDP ratio has risen from 26 percent to 45 percent, and unemployment has risen to over 25 percent. The Economist predicts that unless conditions improve, credit rating agencies may downgrade South Africa's from its current BBB- status to BB+ within the next eighteen months. Such a demotion would have an especially deleterious effect on the South African economy, as BB+ is considered a "junk" rating and many investment funds have policies against holding such potentially risky debt. The upshot will be a divestment of South African bonds, and the price the South African government will have to pay to service its growing debt will rise. This very process is underway in Brazil, as Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings downgraded Brazil from BBB- to BB+ in September 2015 and December 2015, respectively.

Both downgrades triggered overnight depreciations in the real, which has lost half of its value against the dollar over the past five years. Much more could be said about the economic challenges facing these countries, but in the context of the NDB it means that the bank is unlikely to reach its goal of \$100 billion in capital anytime in the near future. It also means that Russia, Brazil, and South Africa will probably end up turning to the NDB to fund infrastructure projects that might be prohibitively expensive should they attempt to fund them by selling bonds.

5.8 Conclusion

As BRICS broadens its internal understanding of issues, it will solve a broader range of issues. BRICS is largely understood as a force with the capability to discipline the global political order, mainly the inequitable distribution of economic and political power at international level that favours the western powers. The relic of western imperialism remains visible in the constitution of multilateral organisation like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and in international trade arrangements. Simply put Western nations like the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, etc. continue to dominate the world order, leaving a trail of despicable injustices in their wake. The BRICS formation has largely shaped up

as an effort to rectify these persisting geopolitical injustices. As a collective the BRICS nations are unhappy with, and critical of Western dominance of multilateral institution, this is because they have for many years been on the margins.

They are also dissatisfied with the perceived refusal of the West to share global power. In that understanding, BRICS takes an offensive posture, focused on disciplining the imperialistic forces. BRICS has promised to challenge an unfair global economic system. By building a network of economic alliances across continents, the BRICS may take the lead in shaping global economic integration against the backdrop of waning integration impulses in the developed world. All countries that are partners of the BRICS in these regional integration arrangements may form what might be termed as the BRICS Plus circle that becomes open to flexible and multiple modes of cooperation not exclusively via trade liberalization on bilateral or regional basis.

Thus, rather than expanding the core set of BRICS members, the BRICS plus initiative seeks to create a new platform for forging regional and bilateral alliances across continents and aims at bringing together the regional integration blocks, in which BRICS economies play a leading role. It will not be enough for BRICS to seek to correct uneven power relations in the global sphere without addressing socioeconomic vulnerabilities within the BRICS states themselves, for these countries to have appeal and project soft power, they must also be seen credible. The power of their voice in global governance processes should echo their transformative action domestically.

The NDB should not repeat the tragic mistake committed by the Bretton Woods institution to concentrate only on economic issues in their operation decisions at the expense of social, human rights and environmental factors this behaviour can undermine the BRICS. BRICS should advocate equitable, open, all-round, innovation driven and inclusive development to achieve sustainable development in its economic, political dimensions in a balanced and integrated manner. BRICS should make international order more just and equitable and also make economic globalisation open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all, build an open world economy. BRICS is indeed a good sign of some positive change in world economics. The bloc has emerged on the back of the rising significance of developing economies to world trade.

The numbers speak for themselves, representing about 40% of the world's population BRICS bloc has become a key driver of global economic growth. Clearly the world needs a new champion for

inclusive development which can only be achieved through BRICS. South Africa's interest in BRICS supports domestic level objectives whereby the BRICS partnership may link sources of finance for infrastructure development, intra-BRICS trade and investment will contribute towards delivering economic growth. The global political and economic system is in poly-crisis. The dearth of strategic leadership creates the very real possibility that humanity can stumble into a meltdown. There should be frequent consultations between BRICS leaders devoting significant effort and political capital to managing their bilateral relations effectively. This suggests that economic cooperation and strengthening bilateral ties is on all BRICS members' agendas.

Chapter Six:

Conclusion and Recommendations

6. Introduction

This chapter presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations relating to the data which was collected during the course of the research. It is no doubt that the global recognition of the economic powers of BRICS has led to the group gaining greater global economy and political influence. It has also reinforced the regional leadership standing of these nations. The aforementioned chapters have elaborated in detail on how the BRICS members are working hard to impose their states' political and economic agenda to reinforce their position on the global stage moving forward for more integration and cooperation with the world. The previous chapters have also looked at the effect that BRICS have together they can achieve a lot because they contribute 23% of the global economy. They still remain a very powerful combination that can take decisions on behalf of all developing countries regarding their infrastructure, indebtedness and development financing. In reality, with the constant increase in demand for an alternative solution against the Western countries there is no doubt the BRICS mission needs to be breaking the glass ceiling for developing countries.

The world remains a nasty place for the masses in the developing world and the BRICS represent hope for positive change. The primary aim of the study was to undertake an intrinsic examination of the BRICS Political and Economic Agenda. To this end, focus was on understanding intra-BRICS power relations at all levels of government, both internally and externally vis a vis regional and international entities toward sustainable economic growth and cooperation, good global governance and transparency. To achieve this aim, as a point of reference, the study focused on two BRICS agendas, namely, the political and economic agenda. The study drew conclusions based on the information derived from these particular agenda. The study also had to answer the following research questions.

- How do the politico-economic traditions vis a vis regional and international norms and standards in the BRICS nations inform economic development?
- What is the nature and extent of governance across the BRICS member states?

- How does the geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government inform good global governance and transparency?
- Is BRICS a developmental model to challenge the Western led world order?

To recap, the primary question of this research was answered by undertaking an intrinsic examination of the BRICS Political and Economic Agenda. How do we understand intra-BRICS power relations at all levels of government, both internally and externally vis a vis regional and international entities toward economic growth, good global governance and transparency? This chapter discusses the various view that come from the sample's attempts to answer the above questions. Four themes emerged from the discussions that were held with the research's participants. These were:

- The Politico-economic tradition vis a vis regional and international norms and standards of BRICS nations.
- The nature of governance across the BRICS.
- Geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government informing good global governance and transparency.
- BRICS in transforming the global order.

The themes were mostly guided by the broad questions that were presented to the sample. The discussions below are guided by the above themes.

6.1 The Politico-economic tradition vis-a-vis regional and international norms and standards of BRICS nations.

6.1.1 Political interference/non-interference

In the sample, there was a view that one notable BRICS standard that defies regional and international bloc norms, particularly the Western-formulated blocs was non-interference. BRICS countries as opined were more focused on enhancing their economic dominance without necessarily imposing political standards firstly on each other and secondly on other states outside the BRICS. They were thus described as being more developmentally, rather than politically focused. In the literature, this view is both upheld and debated by scholars. For instance, Kornegay (2014) and Mathur and Dasgupta, (2013) put regional, if not international dominance as one of the

driving focus behind the formation of BRICS. This set of scholars, contrary to the view from the research, believes that the developmental aspect of the BRICS nations cannot be divorced from the need to enhance their global dominance including through neutralising the power of the west in other countries. They also see the trade and developmental aspects of BRICS being more promotable in circumstances where they have control over trade and trade protocol in other developing countries outside the BRICS. Montenegro and Medquita (2017) already refute the view that BRICS countries had non-interference in the political affairs of other countries as a common norm. As an example, they cite India as a country with a strong desire to interfere, dominate and control countries within its geopolitical region including Bangladesh.

6.2 Influence on global and economic development

In the sample, there were basically two views on whether the BRICS, as a norm had significant impact and control on regional and global economies. There were arguments that: 'The politico-economic tradition and international norms and standard in BRICS does not really inform economic development within a global perspective'. BRICS was viewed as lacking in terms of informing any meaningful global economic development. The reason put forward was that as a bloc, it did not have many resources compared to the competing western blocs. As a result, BRICS' economic influence was limited to smaller, mostly neighbouring developing economies. In the literature, however, there are views that BRICS' assertion over regional economic development is in line with the bloc's aspirations (MacFarlane, 2006). MacFarlane (2006) sees the BRICS coalition as being driven by the need to control the hegemony of the west, not in the world but in respective regions of interests to the BRICS. Another set of scholars, Sotero and Armijo (2007) also believe that Brazil as a BRICS country was mostly motivated by the need to control regional economic aspects of Latin America including trade. Montegra and Mesquita (2017) further argue that BRICS countries, despite global perceptions to the contrary, viewed themselves as regional economic powers. These views agree with the findings of this study but differ from the point where the study findings assert that BRICS countries were driven by the quest for global, rather than regional economic dominance.

6.3 Potential for positive regional economic influence

In the study, like in the literature, it was discussed that access to flexible funding under less restrictive terms is a major source of strength for the BRICS countries. Prior, excessive dependence on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for funding generally impeded economic freedom and growth for the BRICS. As discussed by Willy (2018) the establishment of the National Development Bank (NDB) as an alternative funding mechanism for developmental, emergency and economic stabilisation purposes creates a potential for increased economic strength and reduced dependence on the west – both factors which signify global strength among BRICS countries. Similarly, in the study, one respondent stated that the BRICS had the potential of imposing a significant control on the global economy in the long-run.

6.4 Lack of shared standard and norms

In the study, one participant described the BRICS as a bloc that did not have commonly shared traditions and standards that held the group together:

They don't share the traditions and regional international standards within BRICS inform the principles that hold the grouping together as well as the global agenda for the G20, the change they are trying to enforce within the World Bank and IMF. The impact of economic development is minimal.

The above view is also widely discussed in previous studies. Willy (2019) stated that the only standard that seems to hold BRICS countries together was their dislike of western hegemony: “Their only real shared interest is their common opposition to the ‘Euro-American club’”-(Willy, 2018:1). Overall, these countries had:

Highly-divergent trajectories being pursued by the different BRICS countries, reflecting their differing histories, cultures, current stages of development, and levels of human capital (Willy, 2018:1)

Willy (2018) however believed that the BRICS countries, despite its divergences can have a considerable impact on international economics in the long-term. In the research, a different view was held by the participant who raised the divergence point. The total impact of lack of shared

interests in the BRICS, according to this participant, was a low influence on both regional and global economies.

6.5 The nature of governance across the BRICS

From the study, there were views that the BRICS countries employed different governance systems with India and South Africa being renowned democracies and Russia and China on the other hand being centralised systems. Willy (2018) also took note of Brazil's extremely poor reputation on democratic governance citing how this creates potential rifts in the promotion of democracy within the bloc – with some members like South Africa and India being pro-democratic and the likes of Brazil being not. Nonetheless, the differences in these governance systems were not viewed as a threat to commonality. BRICS countries, despite holding different political philosophies found common ground as a bloc. While Onic and Gencer (2017) assert that the BRICS was expected to act as a role model for democracy, there is a view in that research that this should not be the case.

In the study, the BRICS' different governance systems were openly distinct from European forms of democracy but were considered acceptable enough to perpetuate sovereignty-focused governance and co-operation among members. This was in contrast to the view by Onic and Gencer above that a mixture of liberal democracies and centralised systems might result in governance dilemma for the bloc. From the study, there was a view that the BRICS as a bloc will support a different form of governance from current Euro-centric systems:

BRICS should not be expected to display a homogenous position towards issues on hand, BRICS will not institutionalise a strict bureaucratic system, such as the European Union. (research participant)

From the study, it was also argued that despite China being a “dictatorship” this was not seen as stifling economic growth within China and therefore potentially within the BRICS. The mixture of democracies and “territorialists” was not seen as a major issue impeding the effective operation of BRICS. As commended by one research participant, the BRICS were able to set up structures that balanced-out the different governmental systems. The NDB was given as an example in the study.

6.6 Geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government informing good global governance and transparency

The sample discussed five factors as affecting geopolitics and economic growth within the BRICS. These were different growth levels amongst BRICS countries, inequality or lack of inclusive growth and lack of transparency as factors that may impede common groups in the BRICS. Positive factors that can perpetuate growth were large critical mass of the countries in terms of population and market size and their collective co-operation based on different individual strengths. Governance and transparent matters, mainly in relation to the democratic or non-democratic nature of governance in the BRICS was discussed in the previous theme. In the literature, Brawley (2007) discussed similar views on how inequality in the BRICS could translate into a factor that could impede sustainable growth in the region. Inequality within BRICS countries particularly South Africa, Brazil and India was heavily protracted such that economic growth may fail to translate into poverty reduction.

Willy (2019) also cites how Brazil's economy had substantially grown while poverty and racial inequality still remained relatively high. Willy (2019) also associated inequality with crime citing Brazil as one of the most violent countries in the world. South Africa, like Brazil, was put in the same scenario with Brazil where crime, as an outlet for inequality, could destabilise growth. In the sample however, crime was not explicitly discussed as a potential impediment to economic growth. Unequal growth in BRICS countries was seen as a threat to economic growth in the BRICS. China was noted as getting a bigger chunk of the BRICS benefits because of a comparatively larger economy and market by part of the sample. South Africa, on the other hand, was seen as struggling economically with a smaller trade advantage and therefore fewer growth prospects than China. In the literature, by comparison with G20 countries, it can be noted that the growth rates in the BRICS countries are much more variant. In 2015 for example, South Africa recorded a 0.5% GDP growth while India had a 6.7% GDP growth rate.

Al-Jafari (2018) made findings that economic size in the BRICS had a different influence on economic growth. Technically, the economies in the BRICS cannot be expected to grow at the same pace because of their different sizes. Al-Jafari encourage supporting smaller BRICS economies to catch-up so that they too can benefit more meaningfully from BRICS total economic

growth. There was a view that inside the BRICS, there was lack of transparency on policies and strategies employed by governments. This view was shared by one respondent who further cited that whatever is planned within the BRICS remains the privilege of leaders:

BRICS countries are not transparent with how they ensure economic growth. The policies and discussions are closed and only opened to head of states from BRICS nations.

In the literature, transparency in the BRICS was discussed on a different level. BRICS countries had very low transparency indices, factors which were seen as threats to inclusive growth. Kurakin and Sukharenko (2018) state that there was a need for transparency in government dealings within the BRICS as well as in the private sector. The forms of transparency discussed were however different from policy directions communications to the public as discussed in the study. The sample was therefore generally sceptical on BRICS' capacity to influence good governance and transparency. The first reason for this was because of their different and almost diametrical views of good governance. Russia and China for instance were authoritarian systems, Brazil was a democracy that had a bad reputation on political and human rights and South Africa and India were more liberally democratic. It was seen as almost impossible for these countries to come up with a common standard of governance and transparency.

6.7 BRICS in transforming the global order

The sample expressed different views on whether BRICS countries were transforming the global order or not. There were two views that came out of these expressions. The first one was that the BRICS countries had the potential to transform the global order in the future and the second one was a total opposite. In the first view, it was argued that if the BRICS countries were able to transform their goals into achievements, they would be able to have a considerable impact on world order transformation. As it were, BRICS was currently struggling with neutralising the power of the west particularly the international monetary system as asserted by one participant. Another reason why it may fail to bring about such a transformation was that the BRICS, unlike the western-oriented blocs, was mostly centred around its members (was inward-looking). This limited its ability to have a considerable influence on non-members. The third reason they may fail to transform the world order was that they, as a bloc, had failed to co-operate effectively. Countries

were too focused on national priorities which they put ahead of collective interests. Ineffective co-operation therefore threatened the groups' influence in the world.

Respondents therefore placed BRICS capacity to influence a new global order as being conditional on its ability to address the above challenges. In the literature, just like in the study, there were also contesting views on BRICS' capacity to transform the global order. While global transformation was viewed as a future possibility in the sample, in the literature, Jash (2017) sees it as having already occurred – to an extent. Jash asserts the BRICS establishment of multilateral institutions to directly rival the IMF and the World Bank were testimony of a shift power from the west-controlled financial institutions towards more accessible blocs. Jash also explains the growing dominance of BRICS in the world using economic growth figures. BRICS now commands 25% of global GDP, up from 10% in 1990, an indication that it was shifting the global economic balance against the west.

As highlighted, the interviewed South African experts did not share this view that BRICS was now exerting a major impact on world economics. This might be explained by Willy (2019) who earlier asserted that growth and dominance in the BRICS were not mutually felt. China was seen by Willy as driving BRICS and benefitting from it more than its counterparts. The growing hegemony of the BRICS and its influence on a new world order might therefore be felt unequally amongst members.

In summary, the sample discussed four themes: The Politico-economic tradition vis a vis regional and international norms and standards of BRICS nations; The nature of governance across the BRICS; Geopolitical nature and economic growth in relation to spheres of government informing good global governance and transparency and BRICS in transforming the global order. There were diverging views both within the sample and within the literature on these themes. The BRICS were viewed by some as being composed of countries that had diverging political and governance systems. This was noted as a potential challenge in the BRICS being a role model for positive political governance. The different levels of economic growth and inequalities in the countries was viewed as a threat to its economic growth. There were also contrasting views that the BRICS had been able to find a balance among the political and governance systems of member countries.

6.8 Conclusion and Recommendation

BRICS is comprised of a heterogeneous group, covering countries of different geopolitical, cultural and economic backgrounds. There is no single unifying commonality between them all, as opposed to for example the European Union. The political structures in the five countries also differ to a large extent. Brazil and India are vibrant democracies of western type. Russian democracy is relatively young it has yet to shed the remnants of the past. China on the other hand, is a single party communist state. South Africa is a democracy dominated by a social democratic party. Economic structures also differ: Brazil and Russia are the main energy producers, whereas China and India are its major consumers. South Africa depends on its mineral reserves. China and India build on the input of their low-priced labour pool and resources. China, India and South Africa face a wide range of severe social problems such as poverty, unemployment, human rights violations, corruption, healthcare shortcomings, ecologic problems, and regional underdevelopment. To a lesser extent, Brazil and Russia also suffer from the above-mentioned issues.

Relatively high rates of poverty, unemployment, and corruption are typical for all five BRICS countries. Nevertheless, it could be concluded that since it was established, the BRICS alliance has been instrumental in establishing platforms to help balance power between the developed and the developing world. The BRICS countries have turned out to be a source of global economic development essential for future generations. The centre of global economic activity is shifting from industrialised nations to emerging nations.

6.8.1. Recommendations

- It will not be enough for BRICS to seek to correct uneven power relations in the global sphere without addressing socioeconomic vulnerabilities within the BRICS states themselves. For these countries to have appeal and project soft power, they must also be seen as credible. The power of their voice in global governance processes should echo their transformative action domestically.
- NDB should not repeat the tragic mistake committed by the Bretton Woods institution which was to concentrate only on economic issues in their operation decisions at the expense of social, human rights and environmental factors. This behaviour can undermine

the BRICS. It should also support making the IMF more accountable to countries affected by its operations, this could be done by demanding that the IMF create an independent accountability mechanism as it is the only multilateral financial institution without one.

- The prevailing world order has failed to recognize this need for change as developing nations remain grossly under-represented in multilateral institutions which feeds into unfair trade relations driving inequality and poverty which remains a fixture of the developing world.
- BRICS should advocate equitable, open, all-round, innovation driven and inclusive development to achieve sustainable development in its economic, political dimensions in a balanced and integrated manner.
- BRICS should make the international order more just and equitable and also make economic globalization open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all to build an open world economy.
- BRICS is indeed a good sign of some positive change in world economics. The bloc has emerged on the back of the rising significance of developing economies to world trade. The numbers speak for themselves, representing about 40% of the world's population, the BRICS bloc has become a key driver of global economic growth.
- Clearly the world needs a new champion for inclusive development which can only be achieved through BRICS.
- South Africa's interest in BRICS supports domestic level objectives whereby the BRICS partnership may link sources of finance for infrastructure development and intra-BRICS trade and investment will contribute towards delivering economic growth.
- There should be frequent consultations between BRICS leaders devoting significant effort and political capital to managing their bilateral relations effectively. This suggests that economic cooperation and strengthening bilateral ties is on all BRICS members' agenda.
- There is a gap between the rich and the poor in the world so the BRICS should come up with strategies on how the gap can be closed.
- BRICS should plan to put economic interaction into action and make it a serious fashion.
- Since China has military strength, all the states should have military exercise to show how powerful countries are.

- BRICS should provide alternative solutions to the oppressive and exploitative systems of the Western countries.
- Some of the big BRICS projects are being sabotaged e.g. nuclear power which will bring electricity in cheaper abundance. The reason for this is that is where Western countries take money from other countries, where South Africa introduced the term unbundling of Eskom, strategies to combat this sabotage should be planned and implemented. By this there should be a sufficient awareness in the cadreship of the African National congress (ANC) which is a ruling governing party.
- There should be sufficient information sharing particular black African intelligentsia, ANC academics about BRICS issues and understandings of how the West operates.
- There ought to be more writing and talking about BRICS to make sure people are aware, but the ANC as an organisation has to come back and debate BRICS and take resolutions about BRICS, the problem at hand now is that they were pushing it in government supported by the ANC, if it is being challenged it can't show a particular resolution on BRICS because problems were unforeseen otherwise ANC should have campaigned for it. This means the ANC should go back and work harder, to lead in the ANC and also working harder on planning, thinking and strategizing they will never fail by doing so.
- Radical Economic Transformation resolution which was championed by former President of the ANC and of the country President Jacob Zuma talks about the BRICS and also how cadres should be clear and articulate issues, they could begin a process to raise the BRICS issue to the level where people will see it as the salvation of the country from the West.
- Areas of communication should be dealt with and people's minds should be clarified as fact should be presented.
- During these difficult times the BRICS face some of the heads of state are no longer championing the BRICS mandate they are not convinced about its approach but the declarations and decisions taken on the annual summit should continue to be implemented.

7. Bibliography

- Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground:: Constructivism in World Politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3), 319–363.
- Alden, Chris. *China in Africa*. London: Zed Books, 2007.
- Al-Jafari, M. K. (2018). Determinants of Economic Growth in BRICS Countries: A Panel Data Analysis Approach. doi:10.5296/ijaf.v8i3.13372
- Almond, Gabriel/Verba, Sidney. *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. An Analytic Study*. Boston, 1965.
- Anderson, M. & Crittenden, M. (2010): IMF Board Votes to Expand Power of Emerging-Market Economies. In: *Wall Street Journal*, Nov 5, 2010.
- Armijo, Leslie Elliott. “The BRICS Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?” *Asian Perspective* (31) 4: 7–42, 2007.
- Armijo, Leslie Elliott. “The BRICS Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and
- Armijo, Leslie Elliott/Burges, Sean W. (2010). “Brazil, the Entrepreneurial and Democratic BRIC.” *Polity* (42) 1: 14–37, 2010.
- Arrighi, G. & Zhang, L. (2011): *Beyond the Washington Consensus: A New Bandung? Forthcoming in Globalization and Beyond: New Examinations of Global Power and Its Alternatives*. Penn State University Press.
- Babbie E (ed.) 2001. *The practice of social research (11th Ed.)*. Belmont, Cape Town: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Babbie E and Mouton J (ed.) 2000. *The Practice of Social Research*. Cape Town, Oxford University Press
- Babbie, E. and Mouton, J.M. (2001) *The practice of social research*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Babbie, E. R. (1966), “The Third Civilization,” *Review of Religious Research* (Winter), 101–102.

- Baldwin, E. R. (1997). *Towards an Integrated Europe*. London: Centre for Economic and policy Research.
- Baldwin, R. (2012), *Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going*
- Bardhan, Pranab (2010). *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay. Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India*. Princeton/Oxford, 2010.
- Barma, Naazneen, Giacomo Chiozza, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2009), *A World Without the West? Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Implications*. *Chinese Journal of International Politics*
- Betz, Joachim/Aurel Croissant/Ujjwal Kumar Singh. *Country Report India. Sustainable Governance in BRICS, 2012*. www.sgi-network.org/brics
- Bharadwaj, Prashanth N. "BRICS Countries – A Competitive Analysis." *Journal of Global Competitiveness* 14 (2006): 52-54.
- Bloom, W. (1991). *Personal identity, national identity, and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011b). Joint
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). BRICS foreign ministers' meeting. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saiba-mais-bric/documentos-emitidos-pelos-chefes-de-estado-e-de-bric-ministerial-ommunique/view>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010a). Joint declaration: The second summit of heads of state and government (BRIC). <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saibamais-bric/documentos-emitidos-pelos-chefes-de-estado-e-de-comunicado-ii-cupula-bric/view>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.

- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010b). Moscow declaration of BRIC agriculture ministers. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saiba-mais-bric/documentos-emitidos-por-altasautoridades/moscow-declaration-of-bric-agriculture-ministers/> view. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014a). BRICS perspective on international investment agreements. <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/227-brics-perspective-on-international-investment-agreements>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014c). Communiqué of the meeting of trade ministers on the eve of the VI summit <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/225-communique-of-the-meeting-of-trade-ministers-on-the-eve-of-the-vi-summit>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). BRICS foreign ministers' meeting. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saiba-mais-bric/documentos-emitidos-pelos-chefes-de-estado-e-de-bric-ministerial-ommunique/view>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010a). Joint declaration: The second summit of heads of state and government (BRIC). <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saibamais-bric/documentos-emitidos-pelos-chefes-de-estado-e-de/comunicado-ii-cupula-bric/view>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2010b). Moscow declaration of BRIC agriculture ministers. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais-informacoes/saiba-mais-bric/documentos-emitidos-por-altasautoridades/moscow-declaration-of-bric-agriculture-ministers/> view. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011a). BRICS – meeting of leaders: Sanya Declaration. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas-mais->

informacoes/saiba-mais- bric/documentosemitidos-pelos-chefes-de-estado-e-de/sanya-declaration-iii-brics-summit/view. Accessed on December 17, 2014.

Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014a). BRICS perspective on international investment agreements. <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/227-brics-perspective-on-international-investment-agreements>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.

Brazil. Ministério das Relações Exteriores/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014c). Communiqué of the meeting of trade ministers on the eve of the VI summit <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/225-communiqué-of-the-meeting-of-trade-ministers-on-the-eve-of-the-vi-summit>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.

Breslin, S. (2013). The ‘China Model’ and the global crisis. *International Affairs*, 87(6), 1323–1343.

Bretton Woods Project (2011): What are the Bretton Woods Institutions? Bretton Woods Project, 8 December 2011.

BRIC leaders (2009): Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders. Kremlin, 2009/06/21.

Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Brink HIL (ed.) 1996. *Fundamentals of research methodology for health care professionals*. Cape Town: Juta.

Brusis, Martin/Jörg Siegmund. “Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011. Concepts and Methodology.” In *Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011. Policy Performance and Governance Capacities in the OECD*. Gütersloh, 2011.

Brütsch, Christian and Mihaela Papa (2012), Deconstructing the BRICs: Bargaining coalition, imagined community or geopolitical fad? *CRP Working Paper No. 5* October 2012. Cambridge: Centre for Rising Powers, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge.

- Burges, Sean W. "Building a Global Southern Coalition: the competing approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chávez." *Third World Quarterly* 28 (2007): 1343-1358.
- Burns RB (ed.) 2000. Introduction to research methods (4th Ed.). Australia: Longman.
C2001-980327-3. Available on: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>
- Cai, G. K. (2010). *The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional Integration in East Asia*. London: UK. Palgrave Macmillan Publication.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, Fraser (2011), *The EU and the BRICs. Policy Paper 3*: February 2011. Brussels: EURussia Centre.
- Cantir, C., & Kaarbo, J. (2012). Contested roles and domestic politics: Reflections on role theory in foreign policy analysis and IR theory. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 8(1), 5–24.
- Carlsnæs, W. (2002). Foreign policy. In W. Carlsnæs, R. K. Thomas, & B. A. Simmons (Eds.),
- Chafetz, G., Abramson, H., & Grillot, S. (1996). Role theory and foreign policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation. *Regime Political Psychology*, 17(4), 727–757.
- Chatterjee, B.P., Jena, C., & Singh, S. (2014). *Intra-BRICS trade and its Implications for India*, Discussion Paper. Jaipur: CUTS International.
- Chen, L. (2012), *THE BRICS IN THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: AN EMPIRICAL NOTE*. *Cuad. Econ.* vol.31 no.spe57 Bogotá June/Dec. 2012
- CHEN, Lurong. "The BRICS in the global value chains: an empirical note." *Cuadernos de Economía*, 31(57) No. Especial, (p. 225).
- China as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?" *Asian Perspective* 31 (2007): 7-42.
- Chirot, D. & Hall, T.D. (1982): *World-System Theory*. In: *Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 8, pp. 81.

- CHUAN, L. “What Are Emerging Markets?” The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development. February 2011. Available on: http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/faq/faq_docs/emerging_markets.shtml
- Clifton, Judith/Díaz-Fuentes, Daniel. “The OECD and Phases in the International Political Economy, 1961–2011.” *Review of International Political Economy* (18) 5: 552–569, 2011.
- Clouds, I. (1946). *Swords into Pollow Shares*. London: Golden University of Press.
- CO-CHAIR, Gareth Evans. CO-CHAIR, Mohamed Sahnoun. “The Responsibility to Protect”. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa, 2001. p. 7.
- Communique´ on the occasion of the meeting of deputy ministers of foreign relations of the BRICS countries regarding the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
- Cooper, C A. & Massell, B F. (1965). Cooper, C. A., & Massell, B. F. (1965). Toward a general theory of customs unions for developing countries. *Journal of Political Economy*, 73(5), 461-476.
- Copelovitch, M. (2010): *Reforming Global Financial Government: Opportunities and Challenges for the BRICS*. Documents: Copelovitch, 11 November 2011.
- Country Report Russia. Sustainable Governance in the BRICS, 2012. www.sgi-network.org/brics
- Croissant, Aurel/Heilmann, Sebastian/Huang, Yasheng/Schmidt, Dirk. Country Report China. Sustainable Governance in BRICS, 2012. www.sgi-network.org/brics
- Crossette, Barbara. “The Elephant in the Room.” *Foreign Policy* 177 (2010): 29-30.
- Dahlman, Carl J. *The World Under Pressure. How China and India Are Influencing the Global Economy and Environment*. Stanford, 2012

- Daniels, P. J., & Van Hoose, D. D. (2011). *Global Economic Issues and Policies*. 2nd edition. London: Rutledge Publishers.
- DE LA TORE, Augusto. "MIC Forum: The Rise of Middle Class". World Bank. Available on: <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/MIC-Forum-Rise-of-the-Middle-Class-SM13>.
- De Vos AS and Fouché CB (ed.) 1998. *General introduction to research design, data collection methods and data analysis*. Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria.
- De Vos AS, Strydom H, Fouche CB and Delpont CSL (ed.) 2005. *Research at grass roots (3rd Ed)*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.
- De Vos AS, Strydom H, Fouche CB and Delpont CSL (ed.) 2011. *Research at grassroots: A primer for the social science and human professions*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- De Vos, A.S. (2005), Scientific theory and professional research. In De Vos A.S., Strydom, H., Fouché C.B. & Delpont C.S.L. *Research at the grass roots for the social sciences and human service professions*. 3 rd ed. Pretoria: JL Van Schaik Publishers.
- Denzin NK and Lincoln YS (ed.) 1994. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (2005) *Handbook of qualitative research*, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Desker, Barry. "New Security Dimensions in the Asia-Pacific." *AsiaPacific Review* 15 (2008): 56-75.
- Dierckx, S. (2013). After the crisis and beyond the new constitutionalism? The case of the free movement of capital. *Globalizations*, 10(6), 803–818.
- Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union. (2012). *The role of BRICS in the developing world*. European Parliament's Committee on Development.
- DONNELLY, Shawn, "Institutional Change at the Top: From the Financial Stability Forum to the Financial Stability Board". Available on: http://www.utwente.nl/bms/pa/staff/donnelly/ch11_donnelly.pdf

- Doran, C. F. (1991). *Systems in crisis: New imperatives of high politics at century's end*.
- DORNBUSCH, Rudi. "Keys to Prosperity: Free Markets, Sound Money, and a Bit of Luck", *The MIT Press*. New York, 2003. p. 342-343. ISBN: 978-0-262-04181-2.
- Doty, RL. (1993). *Foreign policy as social construction: A post-positivist analysis of*
- Driscoll, D. (1996): *The IMF and the World Bank How Do They Differ?* IMF External Relations Department Publication Services, 20 November 2011.
- DROGOBYTSKIJ, Igor. "Systematic analysis in economy", *Finances and Statistics*, Moscow, 2009. p. 14.
- Duggan, N., & Naarajärvi, T. (2012). *China's position toward global food security governance*. Study presented at *China and the G20: Chinese Contributions to New Global Economic Governance*, Fudan University, December 2–4.
- Duggan, N., & Tiberghien, Y. (2013). *Existing and emerging powers in the G20: The case of East Asia*. *Asien (The German Journal on Contemporary Asia)*, 128, 1–15.
- E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 311–378). New York: Random House.
- Stuenkel, O. (2013). *Rising powers and the future of democracy promotion: The case of Brazil and India*. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(2), 339–355.
- Egretau, Renaud. "India's Ambitions in Burma." *Asian Survey* 48 (2008): 936-957.
- Eichengreen, Barry/Gupta, Poonam/Rajiv, Kumar (eds). *Emerging Giants. China and India in the World Economy*. Oxford, 2010.
- Elgström, O., & Smith, M. (Eds.). (2006). *The European Union's roles in international politics: Concepts and analysis*. London: Routledge.
- European Affairs (2011). "If U.S. And Europe Stick Together, the IMF's Next Head Will Be European" *The European Institute*, December 8, 2011.
- European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), 341–370.
- European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2), 197–222.

- FAWCETT, Louise. "Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present" *Nomos*, Baden-Baden, 2008. p. 11.
- Finkelstein, L. S. (1995). What is global governance? *Global Governance*, 1(3), 367–372.
- Germain, R. (2009). Financial order and world politics: Crisis, change and continuity'. *International Affairs*, 85(4), 669–687.
- FISHLOW, Albert. "Alexander Gerschenkron: A Latecomer Who Emerged Victorious", MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 3.
- Flores, Renato. "Brazil Country Report." In *Managing the Crisis. A Comparative Assessment of Economic Governance in 14 Economies*. Gütersloh, 2010.
- Flores, Renato/Nolte, Detlef/Renno, Lucio/Stolte, Christina/Thiery, Peter. *Country Report Brazil. Sustainable Governance in the BRICS*, 2012.
- Foreign Policy Analysis*, 8, 71–90.
- Fourth BRICS Summit, Delhi Declaration. 2012. www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhideclaration/
- FRISCHTAK, Claudio. "Chinese Investments in Brazil from 2007-2012: A review of recent trends." *Brazil Business Council*. June, 2013. Available on: http://www.cebc.org.br/sites/default/files/pesquisa_investimentos_chineses_2007-2012_-_ingles_1.pdf
- Fritz-Krockow, B. & Ramlgan, P. (2007): *Its Functions, Policies, and Operations*. In: *International Monetary Fund Handbook.*, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. p.1---75, 7 December 2011.
- GABAS, Jean-Jacques.(2008) "Emerging Countries and International Cooperation. The Emerging States: The Wellspring of a New World Order". Hurst & Company, London. 335 p.
- Gehring, T. (1996). Integrating integration theory: Neo-functionalism and international regimes. *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations*, 10(3), 225-253.

- GERCSHENKRON, Alexander. “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective”. Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Gill, S., & Law, D. (1988). *The global political economy: Perspectives, problems and policies*.
- Gil-Pareja, S.R., Vivero, L., & Martinez-Serrano, J.A. (Eds.). (2012). Trade Effects of Continental and Intercontinental Preferential Trade Agreements, *Transformations in Business and Economics*, 11(1).
- Glosny, M. A. (2010): China and the BRICS: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World, 11 November 2011.
- Goldemberg, José.(2008) “The Brazilian biofuels industry.” *Biotechnology for Biofuels*
- Goldman Sachs.(2012) BRICs-Kompass. Theorie & Praxis – Geldanlage in den BRICs. Frankfurt am Main,
- Goldman, S. (2003), Dreaming with BRIC’S: The Path to 2050. Available: <http://projects.mcrit.com/foresightlibrary/index.php/megatrens2/economy-sp-988843696/scenarios/672-dreaming-with-brics-the-path-to-2050>
- Gonthmaker, Evgeny/Makarenko, Boris/Pleines, Heiko/Schröder, Hans-Henning. Country Report Russia. Sustainable Governance in the BRICS, 2012. www.sgi-network.org/brics
- Goodwin, J. and Horowitz, R. (2002), Introduction. The methodological strengths and dilemmas of qualitative sociology. *Qualitative Sociology* 25 (1): 33–47.
- Gore, C. (2000): The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries. In: *World Development* Vol. 28, No. 5.
- Gray, K., & Murphy, C. N. (2013). Introduction: Rising powers and the future of global governance. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(2), 183–193.
- Green J. Michael and Daniel M Kliman (2011), China’s Hard Power and the Potential for Conflict in Asia. *SERI Quarterly*, April.

- Greene, Benjamin P.. Review of *India's Nuclear Policy* by Bharat Karnad. *The Journal of Military History* 73 (July 2009): 1015-1016.
- Greenfield, T. (ed.): *Research Methods- Guidance for Postgraduates*. Arnold, London, 1996.
- Griesgraber, Jo Marie. "Reforms for Major New Roles of the International Monetary Fund? The IMF Post-G-20 Summit." *Global Governance* 15 (2009): 179-185.
- Griffiths, M.: *Educational Research for Social Justice- Getting off the Fence*. Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998.
- Grinnell, R.M. (ed.): *Social Work and Evaluation*. IL. FE Peacock, Itasca, 1981.
- Grinnell, Richard M. (1993), *Social work research and evaluation*. National library of Australia, Trove
- Gu, Baochang/Cai, Yong. "Fertility Prospects in China, Expert Paper No. 14." United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. New York, 2011.
- Gu, Xuewu/Mayer, Maximilian. "Global Players in Research, Innovation and Knowledge: The BRICS." In *Change Ahead? Sustainable Governance in the BRICS*. Gütersloh, 2013.
- Gu, Xuewu/Mayer, Maximilian. "Research, Innovation and Knowledge Power of the BRICS." In *Change Ahead? Sustainable Governance in the BRICS*. Gütersloh (forthcoming in 2013).
- Guriev, Sergei and Andrei Rachinsky. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19 (2005): 131-150
- Haas, B. E. (1964). *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Haas, B. E. (1975). *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*. Berkeley CA: Berkeley University. Institute of International Studies.
- Haas, P. (1990). *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Halsell, P. (1997): Summary of Wallerstein on World System Theory. In: Modern History Sourcebook, Wallerstein, 2 December 2011.
- Hammersley, M. (2018), What is ethnography? Can it survive should it? *Ethnography and Education* 13 (1): 1–17.
- Handbook of international relations (pp. 331–349). London: Sage.
- Hansen, D. R. (1969). *Regional Integration: Reflections on decade of Theoretical Efforts*, *World Politics*, 21(2), UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Harnisch, S. (2001). Change and continuity in post-unification Germany foreign policy. *German Politics*, 10(1), 35–60.
- Harris, J. (2009). Statist globalization in China, Russia and the Gulf states. *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 8(2), 139–163.
- Harris, Jerry (2005), *Emerging Third World powers: China, India and Brazil*. *Race & Class* 46(3): 7–27
- Hartmann, Christof/Jan Hofmeyr, Jan/Schmidt, Siegm. Country Report South Africa. Sustainable Governance in the BRICS, 2012. www.sgi-network.org/brics.
- HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. “Lectures of the philosophy of world history: Introduction”. Translated by Johannes Hoffmeister. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Helleiner, E. (2010): A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007-2008 Crisis and the Future of Global Finance. In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 3, pp. 619---636.
- Henderson, J., (2008)., “China and the Future of the Developing World”. World Institute for Development Economic Research, United Nations University, May 2008.
- Hoekman, M. B., & Kostecki, M. M. (2009). *The Political Economy of World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond*. 3rd edition. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffmann, S. (1996, Summer). *The Fate of the Nation-State*. Daedalus: VC.

- Hollis, M., & Smith, S. (1990). *Explaining and understanding international relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Holsti, K. J. (1970). National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233–309.
- Hood, J. C. (2006), Teaching against the text. The case of qualitative methods. *Teaching Sociology* 34 (3): 207–223.
- Hopewell, K. (2015). Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the world trade organization. *Review of International Political Economy*, 22(2), 311–338.
- HSRC Press, Pretoria, 1988.
- Huang, S. (2011): Zhu's Appointment a Small but Meaningful Change at IMF. *Opinion*, 8 December 2011.
- Ikenberry, J. G. (2011). The future of the liberal world order. *Foreign Affairs*, 90, 56–62.
- IMF (2011e): *System in Crisis (1959-1971). Money Matters: An IMF Exhibit—the Importance of Global Cooperation*. *Opinion*, 20 November 2011.
- IMF (2011f): *World Economic Outlook Database*. IMF Data and Statistics, September 20, 2011.
- India. Prime Minister's Office. (2010). Memorandum on cooperation among Banco Nacional De Desenvolvimento Econo[^]mico E Social (BNDES), China Development Bank Corporation, Export–import Bank of India, and State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (VNESHECONOMBANK).
- India. Prime Minister's Office. (2012). Fourth BRICS summit - Delhi declaration, India. Prime
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). “Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” edited by M.L. Parry. In *Climate Change 2007. Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Cambridge, UK; New York, 2007

- Jacques, Martin (2012), *When China Rules the World. The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*. London: Penguin Books.
- James, H. (2009): A discussion of the importance of BRIC nations in the current world. Ivory research, 11 November 2011.
- Jann, Werner/Seyfried, Markus. “Democratic Governance: The Strategic Capacity of the Core Executive and Social Groups.” In *Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011. Policy Performance and Governance Capacities in the OECD*. Gütersloh, 2011.
- Jash, A. (2017). The Emerging Role of BRICS in the Changing World Order. *IndraStra Global*, 003(3), 1-11.
- Joerißen, Britta/Steinhilber, Jochen. “Die Fantastischen Vier und die Großen Sieben. Schwellenländer in der globalen Ökonomie.” *BrasilInfo* 8/2010. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. São Paulo, 2008.
- Joint Statements of the BRIC/S Countries Leaders:
- Jordaan, J.C. (2005), FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND NEIGHBOURING INFLUENCES
- Jovanović, G. (2011), Toward a social history of qualitative research. *History of the Human Sciences* 24 (2): 1–27.
- Kahler, M. (2013). Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’. *International Affairs*, 89(3), 711–729.
- Kalof, L., Amy, D., & Thomas, D. (2008). *Essentials of social research*. London: Open University Press.
- Kappel, Robert. “Deutschland und die neuen Gestaltungsmächte.” *GIGA Focus Global* (2). Hamburg.
- Kappel, Robert. “On the Economics of Regional Powers: Comparing China, India, Brazil, and South Africa.” *GIGA Working Papers* (145). Hamburg, 2010.

- Kareemulla, K., Reddy, S., Rama, CAR., Kumar, S. and Venkateswarlu, B., (2009), Soil and Water Conservation Works through National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in Andhra Pradesh – An Analysis of Livelihood Impact. *Agricultural Economics Research Review* 22(2009)
- Kawulich, B.B. (2011). Gatekeeping: An ongoing adventure in research. *Field Methods Journal*, 23(1), 57-76.
- Keeler, C. (2011). The end of the responsibility to protect? *Foreign Policy Journal*. <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/12/the-end-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Kemath, K.V. (2015), New Development Bank's first loan will be in Chinese currency:KV Kamath. *The Economic Times*. Available: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/new-development-banks-first-loan-will-be-in-chinese-currencykv-kamath/articleshow/48199704.cms?from=mdr>
- Keukeleire, S., Mattlin, M. H., Bas, B., Timo, J., Juha W., & Mikael Konoenko, V. (2011). The EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers: Objectives and strategies. Ad hoc Study for the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union.
- Khilnani, Sunil, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan (2012) *Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century*. New Delhi: National Defense College and Centre for Policy Research.
- Kimball, Daryl G. "Toward a Nuclear Freeze in South Asia." *Arms Control Today* 39 (2009): 3.
- Kindle Berger, C. P. (1973): *The World in Depression 1929-1939*. London, Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, pp. 56--61; p. 304.
- Kindleberger, C. (1981). Dominance and leadership in the international economy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 25(2), 242–254.
- Klecha-Tylec, K. (2017). *The Theoretical and Practical Dimensions of Regionalism in East Asia*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Kliman, Daniel M. (2012): The West and Global Swing States. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 47 No. 3: 53-64
- Klotz, A. (1995). Norms reconstituting Interests: Global racial equality and US sanctions against South Africa. *International Organization*, 49(03), 451–478.
- Kohli, Atul/Mullen, Rani D. “Democracy, Growth, and Poverty in India.” In *Markets and Just Growth. Development in the Twenty-first Century*, edited by Atul Kohli, Chung-in Moon, and Georg Sørensen. Tokyo, 2003.
- KOJIMA, Kiyoshi. “The “flying geese” model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional policy implications”, *The Journal of Asian Development*, Tokyo, 2011. p. 376. Available on: <http://ejournal.narotama.ac.id/files/model%20asia.pdf>
- Krasner, S. D. (Ed.). (1983). *International regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Krugman, R. P., & Obstfeld, M. (2004). *International Economics: Theory and Policy*. London: UK. Pearson Education.
- Kuchins, Andrew C. “Europe and Russia: Up from the Abyss?.” *Current History* 108 (2009) 138-139.
- Kupchan, Charles A. (2012), *No One’s World. The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*. New York; Oxford University Press.
- Kurakin, A., & Sukharenko, A. (2018). *Anti-corruption in the BRICS countries*. doi:10.21684/2412-2343-2017-5-1-56-77
- KUZNETS, Simon, “Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and production Structure”, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1971. ISBN: 978-0-674-22780-4.
- La’idi, Z. (2012). BRICS: Sovereignty, power and weakness’. *International Politics*, 49(5), 614–632.
- Laidi, Zaki (2011), *The BRICS Against the West? CERl Strategy Papers N° 11 – Hors Série*, November 2011.

- Lake, D. A. (1993). Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: Naked emperor or tattered monarch with potential? *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(4), 459–489.
- Lavrov, Sergei (2012), *BRICS: A New Generation Forum with a Global Reach*. Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Leal, A. R. (2008). How will the EU approach the BRIC countries? *Future Trade Challenges*, 2(4).
- Mau, H. W. (1990). Germany and Japan: The new civilian powers'. *Foreign Affairs*, 69(5), 91–106.
- Lechner, F. (2001): *Globalization theories: World-System Theory*. Emory University. 8 December 2011.
- Leme, Paulo. "The 'B' in BRICS: Unlocking Brazil's Growth Potential." in *BRICS and Beyond*, edited by Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 73-85. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs, 2007.
- Levi-Faur, David. "From 'Big Government' to 'Big Governance'." In *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, edited by David Levi-Faur. Oxford, 2012.
- Li, X. (2007): *Paradigm Shift: From the 'Washington Consensus' to 'Beijing Consensus'*. In: *Afro-Chinese Relations: Past, Present & Future*. ed. / Kwesi Prah. Cape Town, South Africa: The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2007. p. 101-125.
- Li, X. 2011, "World system theory and its impact on development studies and international relations", lecture notes distributed in *Political Change and Development Theory* at Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark on 26 September 2011.
- Liang, Hong. "China's Investment Strength is Sustainable." In *BRICS and Beyond*, edited by Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 59-73. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs, 2007). (10th March 2010).
- Lin, J.Y. (2016), *From Flying Geese to Leading Dragons: New Opportunities and Strategies for Structural Transformation in Developing Countries*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5702. 42 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

- LIN, Justin. "From Flying Geese to Leading Dragon", World Bank, WIDER lecture. Mozambique. May, 2011, p.4.
- Lipsey, R. G. (1957). The theory of customs unions: trade diversion and welfare. *Economica*, 24(93), 40-46.
- Lundberg, G. (1951). *Social research: A study in methods of gathering data*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co
- Lyman, P. (2005): *China's Rising Role in Africa*. Council on Foreign Relations, Presentation to the US-China Commission.
- MacFarlane, S. Neil. "The R in BRICS: is Russia an emerging power?" *International Affairs* 82 (January 2006) 41-57.
- MacFarquhar, Rory. "Russia: A Smooth Political Transition." In *BRICS and Beyond*, edited by Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 29-43.
- MADDISON, Angus. "Contours of the World Economy 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History". (p.304). Oxford. Oxford University Press UK, 2007. ISBN: 978-0-199-22720-4
- March, James/Olson, Johan P. *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York, 1989.
- Martinez Vela, C. (2001): *World Systems Theory*. Notebook: World System, 2 December 2011.
- MARTYNOV, Boris. "BRICS: Dawn of a new era, or business as usual?". *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security*. Routledge, London. July, 2011. p. 74. Available on: [http:// www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/12/13832378420.pdf](http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/12/13832378420.pdf)
- Mattli, Walfer. (1992). *The Logic of Integration Europe and Beyond*. London: UK. Cambridge University Press.
- Maxwell, Simon. "Is the G-20 a temporary sticking plaster or a full organ transplant?" In *A Development Charter for the G-20*, edited by Overseas Development Institute, 26-27. London: ODI, 2009.

- May, C., & Nolke, A. (2013). Capitalism in large emerging economies and the new global trade order? Study presented at the 54th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, April 3–6, San Francisco.
- McCourt, D. (2012). The roles states play: A median interactionist approach. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 15, 370–392.
- Menon, Shivshankar. “BRIC in the New World Order.” In *BRIC in the New World Order. Perspectives from Brazil, China, India and Russia*, edited by Nandan Unnikrishnan and Samir Saran. New Delhi, 2010.
- Mike, M. and Fessehaie, J. (2014), The industrialisation challenge for Africa: Towards a commodities based industrialisation path. Volume 1, Issue 1-2, December 2014, Pages 25 - 36
- Mills, G.E. (2003). *Action research: A guide for the teacher researcher*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Merrill Prentice Hall.
- Minister’s Office. <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/19158/Fourth+BRICS+Summit++Delhi+Declaration>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- Ministry of Finance, Government of India. “The BRICS Report. A Study of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with Special Focus on Synergies and Complementarities.” New Delhi, 2012.
- Mitchell, B. Ronald. (1994). Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. In Martin, L.L. & Simmons, B.A.(Eds.), *International Institutions: An international organization*
- Mitzen, J. (2006). *Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security Dilemma*.
- Mlachila, M., & Takebe, M. (2011). *FDI from BRICS to LICs: Emerging Growth Driver*, IMF Working paper WP/11/178.
- Modelski, G. (1988). *Long cycles in world politics*. London: Macmillan.

- Montegra, R., & Mesquita, R. (2017). Leaders or Loners? How Do the BRICS Countries and their Regions Vote in the UN General Assembly. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 11(2). doi:org/10.1590/1981-3821201700020005.
- Morgenthau, H. (2005): Politics Among Nations. 6th edition, Beijing: Peking University Press.
- Morrison, W. M. (2011): China's Economic Conditions. Notebook: 8 December 2011.
- Mouton, J and Marais, H.C.: Basic Concepts in the Methodology of the Social Sciences.
- Narlikar, A. (2010). New powers in the club: The challenges of global trade governance. *International Affairs*, 86(3), 717–728.
- National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*. Washington D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2008.
- Neuman, W.L.: Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Goldman Sachs, 2007.
- Niu, Z. (2010): Analysis and Evaluations of Hegemonic Stability Theory. In: *World Economics and Politics*. Vol. 10, pp. 22-27.
- Nölke, Andreas. “The Rise of the ‘B(R)IC Variety of Capitalism’ – Towards a New Phase of Organized Capitalism?” In *Neoliberalism in Crisis*, edited by Henk Overbeek and Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. Houndsmill, 2012.
- Noltingk, B.E.: “The Human Element in Research management”, third Printing. Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1965.
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nye, Jr. Joseph S.(2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
- O'Neill, J. (2001). Building better global economic BRICs, Goldman Sachs, <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/building-better.html>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.

- O'NEILL, Jim. "Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Paper No. 66" Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Website. November, 2001. Available on: <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf>
- O'Neill, Jim. *The Growth Map. Economic Opportunity in the BRICs and Beyond*. London/New York, 2011.
- OECD. "Perspectives on Global Development 2010. Shifting Wealth." Paris, 2010.
- OECD. "Perspectives on Global Development 2012. Social Cohesion in a Shifting World." Paris, 2011.
- OLIVEIRA, Glauce. : Industrial determinants of anti-dumping in Brazil – Protection, competition and performance: An analysis with binary dependent variable and panel data". *Economia*, Volume 15, Issue 2. August 2014. p. 206–227. Available on: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1517758014000228>
- O'Neill, Jim, Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman and Anna Stupnytska. "How Solid are the BRICS?." *Goldman Sachs Global Economic Chapter 134* (1st December 2005): 1-24.
- O'Neill, Jim. "Building Better Global Economic BRICS." *Goldman Sachs Global Economics Chapter 66* (November 30th 2001): 1-16.
- Onis, Z., & Gencer, A. (2017). Democratic BRICS as role models in a shifting global order: inherent dilemmas and the challenges ahead. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(9), 1791-1811.
- Organski, A. (1958). *World Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf.
- Organski, A. F. K. (1958). *World politics*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1980). *The war ledger*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor (1990). *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge.

- Overbeek, H. (2012). Sovereign wealth funds in the global political economy: The case of China. In O. Henk & B. Van Apeldoorn (Eds.), *Neoliberalism in crisis* (pp. 138–160). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pal, P. (2008). regional trade agreements and improved Market access in Developed countries: the evidence. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 83-92.
- Palat, Ravi Arvind (2008), A new Bandung? Economic growth vs. distributive justice among emerging powers. *Futures* 40: 721–734
- Palmer, N.D. (1991). *The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific*. Lexington: MA: Lexington Books.
- Pant, Harsh V. (2010), *The China Syndrome. Grappling with an Uneasy Relationship*. Noida: Harper Collins.
- Patton, M.Q (2002): *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* (3rd ed.): Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.
- Pentland, C.C. (1990). *Integration, Interdependence, and Institutions: Approaches to International Order*. Toronto: Canada. Harcourt Jovonovich.
- Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union. (2014). 6th BRICS summit in Brazil (15–16 July 2014): Russian vision. www.russianmission.eu/en/news/6th-brics-summit-brazil-15-16-july-2014-russian-vision.
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen (2008), Globalization the next round: Sociological perspectives. *Futures* 40: 707–720
- Poddar, Tushar and Eva Yi. “India's Rising Growth Potential.” In *BRICS and Beyond*, edited by Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 9-27. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs, 2007.
- Polit, D.F., Hungler, B.P. (1999) *Nursing Research: Principles and Methods* 6th ed. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
- Polonsky, M.J. and Waller, D.S (2014): *Designing and Managing a Research Project: A Business Student's Guide*, Response Books. Sage Publications, United States of America.

- Ponterotto, J. G. (2005), Qualitative research in counseling psychology: A primer on research paradigms and philosophy of science. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 52 (2), 126-136.
- Pravda, Alex. "Introduction: Putin in Perspective." In *Leading Russia: Putin in Perspective, Essays in Honour of Archie Brown*, edited by Alex Pravda, 23-37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- PwC Economics (2013), *World in 2050: The BRICs and beyond: prospects, challenges and opportunities*. London. January.
- Qiao, Helen. "Will China Grow Old Before Getting Rich?" In *BRICS and Beyond*, edited by Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 45-59. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs, 2007. readers, (pp. 103-136). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Redman, L.V. and Mory, A.V.H.: *The Romance of Research*. The Williams & Wilkins Company, the University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1933.
- Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J (2003): *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. SAGE Publications, London.
- Rossmann, G. B. and Rallis, S.F.(2003): *Learning in the field: An introduction to qualitative research (2nd Ed.)*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, Thousand Oak, CA.
- Rothstein, Bo. *The Quality of Government. Corruption, Social Trust and Inequality in International Perspective*. Chicago, 2011.
- Rühmann, Florian. *BRIC, BrIC oder BIC? – Russlands Platz im internationalen System und seine Rolle als global aufstrebende Wirtschaftsmacht*. Munich, 2011.
- Russett, B.M. (1967). *International Regions and International System: A study in Political Ecology*. Chicago: USA. Rand McNally Company.
- Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1994.

- Sanya Declaration. (2011). Sanya declaration on BRICS, 13 April 2011 - BRICS Leaders Meeting, Sanya, Hainan, China, April 2011.
- Sartori, Giovanni. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *The American Political Science Review* (64) 4: 1033–1053, 1970.
- Sawyer, W. C., & Sprinkle, L. R. (2009). *International Economics*. 3rd Edition. Pearson Prentice Hall Publishers.
- Schirm, S. A. (2010). Leaders in need of followers. *Emerging powers in global governance*.
- Schmalz, Stefan/Ebenau, Matthias. *Auf dem Sprung – Brasilien, Indien, China. Zur Gesellschaftlichen Transformation in der Krise*. Berlin, 2011.
- Schrooten, Mechthild. "Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika: Starkes Wirtschaftswachstum – große Herausforderungen." *DIW Wochenbericht Nr. 37+38*. Berlin, 2011.
- Schwandt, T.A. (2001). *Dictionary of qualitative inquiry* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Schwengel, Herman (2008), *Emerging powers as fact and metaphor: Some European ideas. Futures* 40: 767–776
- Shameem. C.C. (2014). *Bricking the BRICS: A Case of Interdependence in Globalized Era*. Trivandrum: Siansu Publications
- Sharma, Ruchir (2012), *Broken BRICs. Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec2012, 91 (6); 2-7
- Sharma, S.K., & Kallummal, M. (2012). *A GTAP Analysis of the Proposed BRICS Free Trade Agreement*. Working Paper. GTAP. Purdue University.
- Shih, C.-y. (2012). *Assigning role characteristics to China: The role state versus the ego state*.
- SIIS (n.d.).(2011) "Major Challenges to International Financial System" *Shanghai Institutes for International Studies*.
- Simon, Dennis Fred and Cong Cao (2009) "China's Future: Have Talent, Will Thrive." *Issues in Science & Technology* 26.

- SkakK, M. (2011). The BRIC power as actors in world affairs. Soft balancing or...? Aarhus. <http://saopaulo2011.ipsa.org/sites/default/files/studys/study-528.pdf>. Accessed on December 17, 2014.
- South Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). Fifth BRICS summit declaration and action plan 2013, South Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.brics5.co.za/fifth-brics-summit-declaration-and-action-plan>.
- Sotero, Paulo and Leslie Elliott Armijo. "Brazil: To be or not to be a BRICS?" *Asian Perspective* 31 (2007): 43-70.
- SOULE-KOHONDOU, Folashadé. "The India-Brazil-South Africa Forum A Decade On: Mismatched Partners or the Rise of the South?". Global Economic Governance Programme. Working Paper 2013/88. University of Oxford. November. 2013. Available on: <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/Soule-Kohndou%20GEG%20Working>
- South Africa in BRICS (2013): BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Pretoria.
- Sperlich, Y. (2015, October). From Power Transition to Economic Integration Theory: A Review of the BRICS literature. Working paper Series (WPS 15-10-1). Switzerland: Geneva School of Economic and Management. University of Geneva.
- Steele, B. J. (2008). *Ontological security in international relations*. New York: Routledge.
- Stephen, M. D. (2012). Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa. *Global Society*, 26(3), 289–309.
- Stephen, M. D. (2014). Rising powers, global capitalism and liberal global governance: A historical materialist account of the BRICs challenge. *European Journal of International Relations*, 1–27.
- Stoker, G. (1997). Public-private partnerships and urban governance. In J. Pierre (Ed.), *Public-private partnerships in Europe and the United States*. London: Macmillan.
- Strange, G. (2011). China's post-Listian rise: Beyond radical globalization theory and the political economy of neoliberal hegemony. *New Political Economy*, 16(5), 539–559.

- Strauss-Kahn, D. (2011): Global Challenges, Global Solutions. Speeches
- Stryker, S., & Statham, A. (1985). Symbolic interaction and role theory. In G. Lindzey
- Tammen, R, et al. 2000. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Seven Bridges Press
- Te Velde, Dirk Willem et. al.(2010) “The global financial crisis and developing countries.” *Overseas Development Institute Working Chapter* 316 1-77.
- Thakur, K. A., & Chandramohan. B.P. (2012). Regionalism and Multilateralism. New Delhi. Deep & Deep Publication.
- Tharoor, Shashi (2012), *Pax Indica. India and the World of the 21st Century*. New Delhi: Allen Lane.
- The American Journal of International Law*. “Congress Approves Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India.” *The American Journal of International Law* 103 (2009): 163-164.
- The BRICS Report. A Study of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa with special focus on synergies*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2012
- The Economist (2011b), “BRICS in Search of a Foundation,” Economist: emerging economic powers, December 8, 2011.
- The Economist*. “Brazil takes off.” 12th November 2009.
- The Economist*. “By fits and starts.” 4th February 2010.
- The Economist*. “Crumbs from the BRICS-man's table.” 18th March 2010.
- The Economist*. “Ending the red terror.” 25th February 2010.
- The Economist*. “Ethanol Tanks.” 22nd October 2009.
- The Economist*. “Riches in the near abroad.” 28th January 2010.
- The Economist*. “Singh when you're winning.” 21st May 2009.

- The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation*. Approved on 12 July 2008. Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The Goldman Sachs Group (2007), *BRICS and Beyond*. New York: Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group.
- The theory of Economic Integration. New York: Rutledge Revivals.
- Thies, C. G. (2010a). State socialization and structural realism. *Security Studies*, 19(4), 689–717.
- Thies, C. G. (2010b). Role theory and foreign policy. In R. A. Denemark (Ed.), *The international studies encyclopedia* (pp. 6335–6356). West Sussex: Wiley- Blackwell.
- Thorstensen, V., & Oliveira, I. T. M. (Eds.). (2014). *BRICS in the world trade organization: Comparative trade policies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa*, Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA).
- THORSTENSEN, Vera, OLIVEIRA, Ivan, (2014) "BRICS in the World Trade Organization: Comparative Trade Policies". Institute for Applied economic Research, Brazil. pp. 20-21. Available on: <http://blogs.uct.ac.za/index.php>
- U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines. (2014). *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(3). Duggan, N The rise of China within global governance. In B. Dessein (Ed.), *Interpreting China as a regional and global power nationalism and historical consciousness in world politics* (pp. 249–270). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- UNECDOC (2014), National EFA 2015 review report (Mauritius)
- Van Wie Davis, Elizabeth (2008). "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 35 : 15-26.
- VANDERMOORTELE, Milo, BIRD, Kate. "Building blocks for equitable growth: lessons from the BRICS", ODI, Working Paper 365, p. 17. January, 2013. Available on: <http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8196.pdf>

- Viner, J. (1937). *Studies in the Theory of International Trade*. London: Allen and Unwin Publishers.
- Viner, J. (1954). *The Customs Union Issues*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Volz, U. (2011). *Regional Integration, Economic Development and Global Governance*. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
- Wade, R. H. (2011): *Emerging World Order? From Multi-polarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF*. In: *Politics & Society*, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 347---378.
- Walker, S. G. (1987). *Role theory and foreign policy analysis: An evaluation*. In S. G. Walker (Ed.), *Role theory and foreign policy analysis*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Walker, S. G., & Simon, S. W. (1987). *Role sets and foreign policy analysis in Southeast Asia*. In S. G. Walker (Ed.), *Role theory and foreign policy analysis*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The modern world system: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the sixteenth century*. New York: Academic.
- WALTER, Carel.(2011) “Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise”, J. Walter & Sons. Singapore.
- WANG, Feng,(2010) “China’s Population Destiny: The Looming Crisis”. Article on Brookings web.
- Wang, X. (2011): *BRICS Target Global Economic Reform*. China Daily.
- Wang, Y. & Yao, Z. (2011): *BRICS Summit Agenda, Participants’ Positions and Policy Suggestions for China*. In: *International Economic Review*.
- Wansleben, Leon (2012), *Dreaming with BRICs. Innovating the classificatory regimes of international finance*. *Journal of Cultural Economy* (DOI:10.1080/17530350.2012.756826)
- Wei, L. (2010): *Brazil and China in BRICS: An Analysis of Sino-Brazil Bilateral Trade*. In: *Contemporary Finance & Economics*, pp. 21-25.

- Weiss, T. G. (2000). Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual and actual challenges. *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5).
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiener, A., & Puetter, U. (2009). Quality of norms is what actors make of it critical constructivist research on norms. *Journal of International Law and International Relations*, 5(1), 1–16.
- Wike, R. (2011): *From Hyper-power to Declining Power*. Pew Global Attitudes Project,
- Willy, C. (2018). *Breaking BRICS: More Differences Than Similarities?* Retrieved November 22, 2019, from <https://blog.bti-project.org/2018/07/24/breaking-brics-differences-similarities/>
- Wilson, Dominic and Anna Stupnytska.(2007) “The N-11: More Than an Acronym.” in *BRICS and Beyond*, edited by the Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group, 129-151. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs,
- Wilson, Dominic/Purushothaman, Roopa. “Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050.” *Global Economics Paper No 99*, 2003. Goldman Sachs. www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf
- Wilson, Dominic/Trivedi, Kamakshya/Carlson, Stacy/Ursúa, José. “The BRICs 10 Years On. Halfway Through the Great Transformation.” *Global Economics Paper No 208*, 2011. www.theloadstar.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Goldman-Sachs-Global-Economics-Paper-208.pdf
- Wines, Michael and Jonathan Ansfield (2010). “China Says It Is Slowing Down Military Spending.” *New York Times*
- Winkler, Harald.(2009) *Cleaner Energy, Cooler Climate. Developing Sustainable Energy Solutions for South Africa*. Cape Town,
- Wirtschaftswachstum – große Herausforderungen.” *DIW Wochenbericht Nr. 37+38*. Berlin, 2011.
- World Bank Group (2011): *About Us – The World Bank Operations*. World bank,

- Xu, J. (2010): Center-Periphery Theory and American Standard. In: The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute, vol. 11, no. 2
- Yang, J. (2011): International Financial System Reform: Assessment and Outlook. In: World Outlook, vol. 14 No. 5
- Yang, X. & Wang, D. (2005): Analysis on the Trade Complimentary between China and Russia. In: World Economy Study
- Yianni, A., & De Vera, C. (2010). The return of capital controls? Law and Contemporary Problems, 73(4), 357–371.
- Yu, Jianxing/Guo, Sujian (2012). Civil Society and Governance in China. New York.
- Zhang, Y. (2011): Build a Synergy for Win-Win Cooperation. Speech at Presentation on India China Trade & Investment Opportunities. .
- Zhao, Tingyang (2006), Rethinking empire from a Chinese concept “All-under-Heaven” (Tian-xia). *Social Identities* 12(1): 29–41.
- Zhao, Tingyang (2009), A political world philosophy in terms of all-under-Heaven (Tian-xia). *Diogenes* 56(1): 5–18.
- Zimmern, A. (1945). The League of Nations and Rule of Law. London: UK. Macmillan Press.

Websites

www.britanica.com

www.busman.qmul.ac.uk

www.die.gdi.de

www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends

www.garnet-eu.org

www.helsinki.fi

www.hesta.org.au.

www.ideaswebsite.org.

www.journals.cambridge.org

www.saceps.org

www.thebricspost.com

www.uir.unsa.ac.za

www.unique.ch

www.unu.edu

www.zei.de