

**UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND**



**TITLE:**

**A TECH-CENTRIC BORDER AS A STRATEGY IN MANAGING ILLEGAL CROSS BORDER  
MIGRATION AND CROSS BORDER CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON  
THE KOSI BAY AND GOLELA BORDER POSTS**

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Administration (Public Administration) in the Faculty of Commerce, Law and  
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## **DEDICATION**

To My Mother, Nombuso Mkhwanazi and Grandmother Agnes Mkhwanazi

These Women made me!

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For the accomplishment of this work, I am extremely grateful to many people who have been there from the beginning.

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Finally, to my family, the world is a better place with you by my side. To my mother Grandmother and my two brothers Nkosinathi and Sphiwe, I say Thank you.

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that this Thesis is my own work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Administration in Public Administration, in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa Campus. It has not been submitted for any other degree or examination at any other university.

Signature :

Date :

## ABBREVIATIONS

SA-	South Africa
BMA-	Border Management Authority
SANDF-	South African National Defense Force
SAPS-	South African Police Service
DHA-	Department of Home Affairs
SADC-	Southern African Development Community
SARS-	South African Revenue Service
UAV-	Unmanned aerial vehicle
US/USA-	United States of America
UN-	United Nations
GDP-	Gross Domestic Product
UNICEF-	United Nations Children's Fund
DRC-	Democratic Republic of the Congo
SADF-	South African Defense Force
SAP-	South African Police
BCOCC-	Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee
DOH-	Department of health
DOT-	Department of Transport
DTI-	Department of Trade and Industry
SSA-	State Security Agency
DPW-	Department of Public Works
DEA-	Department of Environmental Affairs
DA-	Democratic Alliance
SARIG-	South African Radar Interest Group
COPRI-	Conflict and Peace Research Institute
CBM-	Coordinated Border Management
DHS-	Department of Homeland Security
WB-	World Bank
WCU-	World Customs Union
CCTV-	Closed-circuit television
ACFTA-	African Continental Free Trade Area
LDC-	Least Developed Countries

UNCTAD- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
COPRI- Conflict and Peace Research Institute  
ODI- Overseas Development Institute  
FRONTEX- European Border and Coast Guard Agency

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## **ABSTRACT**

South Africa's Kosi Bay and Golela Border posts, just like other land border posts in South Africa, have continued to suffer from increasing volumes of illegal migration and cross-border crime. Globally, trends in managing similar challenges include the introduction of tech-centric borders (technology/surveillance in borders). A sample of 15 experts who have researched extensively on migration and border security in South Africa and beyond was used to investigate whether tech-centric borders were feasible and necessary for the two borders and if this would amount to border securitisation and militarization. Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were used to collect data and thematic content analysis was done on Nvivo 12 as part of data analysis. The first theme identified the benefits and need for tech-centric borders including crime, corruption detection and prevention as well as increased human resources efficiency. The second theme centred on challenges in implementing smart border technologies, namely financial and resources challenges, technology-related challenges and notions of community relations among Africans. The third theme was border management issues related to illegal migration and cross border crime. These include logistics, corruption and policy management. The fourth theme was the need to address the roots of illegal migration vis-à-vis cross border crime as against focusing on border securitization as all-encompassing solutions. The study recommends an integrated framework that includes not only the implementation of a tech-centric border but also resolving internal weaknesses in border control entities (corrupt behaviour, low staff commitment, limited knowledge on immigration policies and misaligned immigration policies). The framework also addresses geopolitical, economic and trade imbalances as root causes of illegal migration and cross-border crimes and recommends increased collaboration between South Africa and regional bodies in immigration management and cross-border crime prevention.

**KEYWORDS:** Tech-centric border, Securitization, Illegal migration, Cross-border crime, South Africa

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## CHAPTER 1: ORIENTATION

### 1. Introduction

South Africa has underestimated the positive role that can be played by technological innovation in dealing with everyday border challenges such as cross-border crime and cross-border migration. Pansters (2012) contends that 10 years after the introduction of a tech-centric border (virtual border) in the United States/Mexico border, violent crimes and illegal cross-border migration decreased by over 35 percent helping to improve border safety and security as well as economic activities within areas near the border. Longo (2017) argues that South Africa has not prioritized the development and adoption of a tech-centric border system mainly because the country has over the past 20 years relied heavily on traditional ways of border management including the militarization of the border through the vast deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the South African Police Service (SAPS) members.

The use of unmanned flying vehicles (UAV's), infrared cameras, long-range cameras and motion detectors among other technological systems have greatly aided border agencies in the United States and European Union states in dealing with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. Baker & Jordaan (2010) state that it is simply inadequate to entrust the South African army and police to effectively manage a land border stretching more than 4100 kilometres, hence the urgent need for the use of technology, new innovations and automated systems. Basse & Oshita (2010) argue that managing cross-border migration and cross-border crime in South Africa has become a matter of urgency since traditional methods have failed and that the implementation of a tech-centric border has become imperative given its success in the United States/Mexico border and in parts of Asia and Europe. Glatzer & Rueschemeyer (2004) argue that globalization has brought countries closer, hence the increase in illegal migration and cross-border crime, a situation that warrants the adoption of technological systems/innovations for more effective border management. However, in the face of increasing illegal migration and cross-border crime in South Africa, the government has been slow in rolling out a tech-centric border. It is within this context that this study aims to explore the use of a tech-centric border to manage illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime in South Africa specifically at the Kosi Bay and Golela border posts.

## **2. Problem statement**

Since the end of apartheid in South Africa, the country's borders have become hot spots for cross border crime syndicates and illegal migrants. Borders and their association with corruption have become frequent subjects of debate and there have been increasing calls within South Africa's political discourse for alternative approaches to border management. According to Dodson (2000), South Africa's borders are simply in total disarray, and that existing border management policies do not reflect the changing patterns of migration and cross border crime. For some analysts, this shows that border authorities are failing to cope with the avalanche of border challenges hence the increasing calls for South Africa to follow global examples of implementing border technology to combat illegal migration and cross border crime. Shavinina (2003) contends that in the 21st century, technological innovation in many countries (especially in Europe & North America) has brought with it new ways and methods to deal with everyday border challenges. Kingsbury (2003) argues that countries like the US, Canada, Australia, and those in the European Union (EU) have deployed a wide range of cutting-edge technology to deal with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. These technologies include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sea, land and air motion sensors, as well as infrared cameras and sound and image sensors.

Crush & Tevera (2010) argue that while South Africa remains a preferred destination for migrants and cross-border crime syndicates from all over Africa, past and present governments in South Africa do not seem to have not invested significantly in modern technologically advanced border management systems. However, there are different arguments as to whether such systems are successful or not. For example, Shah (2007) contends that a tech-centric border reduces the level of corruption as everything becomes mostly automated, thus reducing the effect of the human 'factor'. However, it may be noted that while tech-centric borders may reduce crime and illegal migration but they cannot stop these processes as they are evolving phenomena. Nevertheless, the main motivation of calls for tech-centric borders in South African borders is the notion that it can enhance the management of border threats and complement existing border management systems.

South African borders are porous, lack sufficient personnel and lack coordination between the many existing departments and agencies in the border. This has indirectly contributed to cross border crime and illegal migration. Sadly, little has been done to highlight the role of technology in border management in identifying, and possibly reducing cross-border crime and illegal cross-

border migration, while at the same time enhancing effective management of border security and stability.

Against this backdrop, the study intended to understand whether a tech-centric border in South Africa (Kosi Bay and Golela border post), would contribute significantly to reducing cross-border migration and cross-border crime, considering the ever-increasing inflow of illegal immigrants entering the country illegally and the increasing rates of cross-border crime.

### **3. Aims of the study**

The study aims to explore whether a tech-centric border can be a strategy in managing illegal cross border migration and cross border crime in South Africa's Kosi Bay and Golela border post.

#### **3.1 Objectives of the study**

The study was carried out with a view of meeting the following objectives:

- To examine the challenges affecting immigration officials in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross border crime;
- To examine the effectiveness of the existing strategies (if any) aimed at managing illegal cross border migration and cross border crime;
- To evaluate whether technological systems via a tech centric border (virtual border) would significantly contribute to a reduction in cross border crime and illegal cross border migration;
- To determine the challenges faced by South Africa in implementing a tech centric border management system in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts;
- Where possible, to understand the advantages and disadvantages of installing tech-centric borders inat South African border posts.

### **4. Research questions**

The following are the research questions that the study seeks to answer:

- What are the challenges faced by immigration officials while trying to curtail illegal cross border migration and cross-border crime?

- How effective are the existing strategies aimed at managing illegal cross border migration and cross-border crime at Golela and Kosi Bay border posts?
- To what extent would a tech-centric border contribute to a significant reduction in cross-border crime and illegal cross border migration?
- What are the challenges faced by South Africa in instituting tech-centric borders and to what extent has this hampered border security?
- What are the possible advantages and disadvantages for South Africa in instituting tech-centric borders?

## **5. Intended contribution to the body of knowledge**

The study will undoubtedly shed light on the current challenges faced by border authorities in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross-border crime in the border posts under consideration. Furthermore, the researcher acknowledges that there are related studies that have been undertaken by scholars such as:

- E Hennop - 2001 - The challenge to control South Africa's borders and borderline
- Institute for Security Studies - An Overview of South African Border Control: 1994-2004
- J Stienburg -2005- Drug Smuggling and Border Control at Johannesburg International.
- S Khumalo – 2004 - Unlocking South African cross-border transport challenges: a case study of Beitbridge Border Post, etc.

All these studies have been undertaken to understand how government can equip border authorities to deal with illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime. However, no study has been done to examine the challenges facing border authorities in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts in dealing with illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime and whether existing strategies are effective. Furthermore, previous studies have not considered the role of technology, in border security. The study will therefore contribute significantly in this regard. Finally, the study will generate valuable information on current issues being experienced by border immigration services in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts which will undoubtedly add to the on-going debate regarding cross-border crime and illegal cross border migration. It may inspire technological investments in managing not only these two border posts but also in others.

## **6. Feasibility**

This study was conducted and completed within the required timeframes. The financial resources to carry out the research study were provided for, and this enabled the researcher to complete the study within the expected time frame.

### **7. Intellectual property**

As a researcher, I did not expect any special intellectual property rights to emanate from the research. All academic information was accessed through the library and internet sources and through face to face interviews.

### **8. Knowledge dissemination**

The researcher researched to contribute to the field of Public Administration and the overall understanding of migration and border studies. The research results were to be presented at national and international conferences. Furthermore, three papers were to be published in DHET accredited Journals. Additionally, the researcher will ensure that results are presented to communities in and around the Kosi Bay and Golela border posts.

### **9. Report structure**

The research report produced from the study contains 5 chapters shown in Table 1.1 below:

**Table 0.1: Research structure**

Chapter 1	Orientation
Chapter 2	Literature Review
Chapter 3	Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Chapter 4	Data Analysis and Discussion
Chapter 5	Findings, suggestions and conclusion

The first chapter introduced the study and outlined its aims and objectives. The second chapter is the literature review and the third chapter presents the study's research methodology and theoretical frameworks. In the fourth chapter, the data is analyzed and discussed. The conclusions and recommendations discussed in Chapter 5.

## **10. Conclusion**

This chapter is introductory and discussed the main phenomena under study and the problem statement. The chapter also touched on the objectives, research questions and briefly presents its potential contribution to the body of knowledge. It also included notes on feasibility, intellectual property, knowledge dissemination and chapter division.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: ILLEGAL CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION, CROSS-BORDER CRIME AND BORDER TECHNOLOGY**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Undeniably, in the 21st century, there have been many calls for the infusion of technology into border security management to help states deal with cross-border crime, illegal cross-border migration and other risks that emanate from borders. These issues have been identified as severe threats to the economic, political and social wellbeing as well as the security of nation-states. This study seeks to examine the challenges of cross border crime and illegal cross border migration at South Africa's Golela and Kosi Bay border posts, both of which are located in northern KwaZulu Natal neighbouring Eswatini and Mozambique respectively. Illegal migration and cross border crime have become well-documented issues today, especially in a globalized era and where states have begun to emphasize the need for territorial sovereignty and the need to neutralize threats that emanate from borders. Therefore, it becomes imperative for this study to delve into these debates, discussions and arguments to ascertain the extent to which they reflect or explain the issues at the above-mentioned border posts.

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Subsequently, much focus has been directed towards border technology (UAV's, long-range cameras, thermal imaging software and motion sensors) as key to tackling cross-border crime

and illegal cross-border migration. South Africa, over the years, has deliberated on the idea of using technology in borders to protect itself from what it deems to be threats to its territorial sovereignty. However, such debates have been met with doubt and uneasiness and have been underpinned by one main question: Does South Africa need tech-centric borders? Or does it need to pursue a more policy orientated approach involving neighbouring states towards the management of its borders rather than unilaterally assuming that technology is the answer? The common narrative in South Africa is that border management is riddled with corruption and maladministration, hence the need to review the way borders are managed. But is technology the answer? The literature review is organized as follows: first, the concepts of migration and cross-border crime are defined. Secondly, illegal cross border migration and cross border crime during and after apartheid South Africa is examined. Finally, the literature on the potential use of technology to tackle crime and illegal migration in the Golela and Kosi Bay border post and extension other South African land borders is discussed. The literature review, apart from the definition of concepts, is therefore categorized into 3 main themes. While the discussion focuses on South Africa, it is acknowledged that South Africa does not operate in isolation and that migration and border management laws are part of regional, continental and international treaties which are taken into consideration in the review. In addition, cross-border crime, illegal cross-border migration and the use of technology in borders are not isolated debates taking place in South Africa only but are subjects of debate throughout the world. The study will use examples that fit into the context of the objectives of this study. However, since the focus of this research is on cross border crime, illegal cross-border migration and the use of technology in borders in South Africa, these will not be reviewed in detail and will only be referred to when appropriate. The review of literature in this study is guided by the Royal Literary Fund which argues that a literature review should survey the literature, synthesize the information into a summary and critically analyze the information gathered by identifying gaps in current knowledge and delineating areas for further research.

## **2.2 Illegal migration and cross-border crime as concepts from a South African perspective**

Migration as a concept is still very much debated and contested. Kok (1999) defines it as the crossing of a boundary of a predefined spatial unit by one or more persons involved in a change of residence. Similarly, Kok et al. (2014) state that migration involves the movement of a person (a migrant) between two places for a certain period. Demko et al. (1970) describe migration as a change in residence but does not put any emphasis on the length of this change. Illegal migration

on the other hand for Baldwin-Edwards (2008), is migration that occurs outside of the legal-institutional frameworks established by states. The traditional view towards the functions of a border is to protect the nation-state from threats that may emanate beyond its borders. Those listed as others are also excluded by the border mentally, through the creation of classifications of us and those, ie borders are used as a barrier within this physical struggle (Hassner & Wittenberg, 2015). However, For Kok et al (2006), Kalitanyi & Visser (2010), Castles (2013) & Facchini et al. (2013), the major cause of migration are growing inequality in incomes and human security between more- and less-developed countries. Another factor is uneven economic development. From a South African perspective, the need to address the phenomenon is premised on the need to curb xenophobia, cross border crime, corruption at the borders and the need to explore alternative ways of reinforcing borders. Such needs, however, have mainly been observed from the ideological differences of political parties. Sadly, though, these differences have failed to reflect on why South African borders are failing in the first place. Conversely, the current political discourse in South Africa has seen the emergence of two main schools of thought. One advocates for tighter border security while the other argues that South Africa's unilateral border approach is flawed and that the country needs to foster regional cooperation to manage issues that emerge from borders more efficiently. Either way, both views agree that South Africa's borders have become a playground for crime syndicates and illegal migrants.

This reinforces the urgent need to strengthen South Africa's borders with technology that will reduce illegal migration. In the USA, border technology was implemented after the various departments responsible for border management were merged to form the Department of Homeland Security. In essence, border management needs to be effective as a prerequisite for the implementation of tech-centric borders. But in South Africa, this is currently not the case, therefore, raising questions about any urgency in implementing tech-centric borders.

Needless to say, these debates do not reflect the need for South Africa's policies on migration and border management to encourage regional integration that will help promote inter-regional interests, security and sovereignty. The study argues that South Africa does not operate in a vacuum and cannot control the migratory patterns of neighbouring countries and therefore need policies that foster regional cooperation. However, even though South Africa has appealed for SADC states to do more in regulating irregular border crossing, such calls for cooperation have not been heeded. In this regard, Nsereko (1997) has noted that South Africa's quest to tackle irregular migration cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the states in the region and

that there is an urgent need for regional police agencies to engage in joint cross-border and cross-continental operations.

Organized crime or cross border crime has become more diverse, complex and global and without a doubt, it will remain a considerable challenge for law enforcement agencies. Some of the problems include money laundering, terrorist activities, drug trafficking, human trafficking, corruption and bribery of public or party officials. Just like migration, cross-border crime is a contested idea. As a concept, it was first defined by the United Nations in the 1970s as criminal activities that are connected and coordinated across the borders of two or more countries (Khan & Singh, 2014). Bassiouni et al. (2010) define cross-border crime as law-breaking whose commission, effect and impact involve more than one country while Boister (2003) defines it as illegal activities that have an actual or potential effect across national borders as well as crimes that are intrastate but violate fundamental values of the international community. The extent of cross border crime in South Africa has become a highly debated subject. For example, Shaw (1998) recalls a SAPS assessment in June 1997 which estimated that 192 organised crime syndicates were operating in South Africa with a combined total of 1,903 primary suspects. At least 32 syndicates were assessed to be operating internationally while the criminal activities of 150 were restricted to countries in sub-Saharan Africa, However, today, the numbers have increased considerably. Arguably, such contestations have been premised on the perceived inability of current legislation to tackle this highly politicized issue, hence the increasing call for new and alternative methods to enhance the capacity of border authorities.

According to Dodson (2000), South Africa's weak border controls are an indication that the government is weak and without a plan. However, Nsereko (1997) argues differently, noting that while South Africa's borders are characterized by some form of operational deficiency, cross border crimes are a regional issue that goes beyond South Africa's current legislation. He laments the fact that in SADC, very few joint operations take place between police agencies and these seem to only focus on motor vehicle theft and the destruction of cannabis plants whereas foreign and transnational organized crime syndicates are engaged in many other criminal activities.

Given its transnational nature, illegal migration cross border crime cannot be dealt with within South Africa alone. Criticisms of the perceived ineffectiveness of South Africa's border management framework, therefore, presents a narrow view of a complex situation. The implementation of a multilateral approach is however hindered by several factors. For example, Nathan (2012) points out the absence of common values among SADC member states – some

are democratic and some authoritarian. There are also divisions between pacific and militarist orientations in the foreign policies of states in the region. This has inhibited the development of common policies on peace and security as well as political and foreign affairs, and it has hampered SADC's ability to contribute effectively to cooperation on cross border issues.

The section to follow dwells on illegal cross border migration and cross border crime during the apartheid era. While that period is not the main focus of the study, South Africa's current border approaches are, to some extent, inherited from the apartheid era. And although the contexts of Illegal migration and cross-border crimes may be different today, the study needs to examine how the apartheid regime addressed these challenges.

### **2.3 Illegal cross-border migration and cross border crime in South Africa during apartheid**

Apartheid called for the separate development of the different racial groups in South Africa. On paper, it appeared to call for equal development and freedom of cultural expression, but the way it was implemented made this impossible (Mhlauli, Salani & Mokotedi, 2015) Racial segregation was instituted by many laws including the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act which imposed segregation in all public facilities including post offices, beaches, stadiums, parks, toilets, cemeteries as well as buses and trains (Mhlauli, Salani & Mokotedi, 2015). The Population Registration Act of 1950 required people to be registered according to their racial groups. The Group Areas Act of 1950 mandated the physical separation between races especially in urban areas (Mhlauli, Salani & Mokotedi, 2015). The Act also called for the removal of some groups of people into areas set aside for their racial group and the promotion of the Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959 which forced different racial groups to live in different areas. With regards to dealing with internal and external migration, however, the Aliens Control Act 1991 (later amended) was the vanguard of how migration ought to be handled (Mhlauli, Salani & Mokotedi, 2015). The Act enforced control and deterrence at the expense of newcomers' rights. It deprived undocumented migrants of basic rights through unlawful arrests and detentions (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001).

It is important to debunk the notion that illegal immigration did not take place during the apartheid era. However, it was a structurally and systematically regulated process. Immigration took place through a "two-gate" policy (Lennepe, 2019). The "front gate" welcomed certain "desirable" white migrants that did not constitute a threat to "European culture" while the "back gate" tolerated "undesirable" and often clandestine African migrants for temporary periods, to satisfy the labour demands of mining and agriculture (Lennepe, 2019). The Bantu Laws Amendment Act no 76 of

1961 facilitated labour migration from some countries while at the same time prohibited population movements from others (Tati, 2008). During the apartheid regime, South Africa's land borders were fortified with electric fences, regular army patrols and auxiliary civilian commando units. This was intended to establish what officials called a 'tripwire' against infiltration by guerrillas from the anti-apartheid movement (McMicheal, 2012).

At the core of this fortification was the need to ensure that Africans who were ideologically sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement were kept in the country at all costs. But this came at huge expense, especially the flagrant disregard for basic human rights including frequent torturing and killing of people at the borders (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001).

South Africa came under increasing foreign criticism and isolation beginning in the 1960s. Black liberation movements based in bordering countries launched several acts of terrorism within the country which drove the regime to securitize South Africa's borders. However, it can be argued that this approach missed the point by focusing too much on restricting entry into South Africa. The attempts to promote white supremacy across frontiers were marked by a blurring of the lines between the police and military as well as the foreign and domestic missions (McMicheal, 2012). Therefore, the focus on the borders allowed internal resistance movements to weaken the regime through unorthodox tactics. Additionally, the regime's failure to grasp the consequences of its human right violations contributed to its downfall (Hyslop, Vally & Hassim, 2006). During apartheid, one of the main ways that the international community showed their rejection of apartheid was through boycotting South Africa in various spheres. But while these measures were aimed at putting pressure on the regime, they were deemed to be insufficient given the support the regime received from some western countries (Crossan, 2013). According to Reddy (1974), the cold war militated against any effective external pressure on the apartheid government and its racial policies. Afterwards, the nationalist government used the cold war to garner international support by increasing its military contacts. It also offered to participate in Western-led alliances in return for equipment and political support. Subsequently, because of its alliance with one side, South Africa was able to garner military equipment to protect itself from future attacks from hostile regional forces. At least this was the plan until the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the decolonization period of African states in the 1960s. During this time, calls for decolonization and the growing resistance against apartheid in Africa grew.

The developments in Africa strengthened South Africa's black resistance. The regime failed to realise that its destabilization of neighbouring countries economically and politically by supporting

anti-government rebel movements would eventually prove counter-productive. It led to a growing continental push back against apartheid as African states established funds and committees on liberating South Africa's black population. But it is not that the regime was blind to these changes. Rather, the fear of losing power and the unpredictability of what would happen afterwards were major reasons which made it reluctant to change its racial policies. According to Kynoch (2013), the main reason for apartheid was fear, as in South Africa, white people are in the minority, and many were worried they would lose their jobs, culture and language. This was not a justification for apartheid but explained how people were thinking.

However, as argued above, there was disunity within the context of international pressure that was applied to the regime. Despite the array of initiatives designed to pressure or encourage the South African government to abandon apartheid, they did not relent. These measures failed because of the hypocrisy of some Western countries as argued by Robinson (2018). Today many countries in the west often highlight international campaigns they undertook to discredit apartheid, but are mute on the strong military and financial support they gave to the racist regime throughout the Cold War.

The need to secure borders was seen as an important element in the regime's quest to consolidate its power and ensure enemies of the regime are kept at Bay. But how were borders secured under apartheid? What strategies were used and how successful were they? As argued earlier, the fortification of borders was meant to keep out the 'other' out and reduce cross border crime which was growing due to the smuggling of weapons for resistance fighters. Before discussing these approaches, it is important to consider two things. First, attempts at border fortification during apartheid were failing in the 1970s already as hundreds of young Africans slipped across South Africa's northern borders in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising and volunteered to fight as guerrilla soldiers against the regime (Byrnes, 1996). Secondly, the borders that were fortified to keep migrants out and combat cross border crime were also used by the regime to traffic and smuggle weapons into South Africa to crush the growing rebellion. Finally, the over-emphasis on fortifying borders, the deliberate political and economic destabilization of neighbouring countries, international pressure and the failure of the regime to recognize growing opposition to apartheid eventually weakened it. Moreover, the security apparatus required to maintain racial segregation; monitor borders and mobility, catch, detain, and deport activists, protect white neighbourhoods became highly costly and ultimately unsustainable.

Just like illegal migration, clamping down on cross border crime was seen as key to the apartheid regime. However, cross border crime, unlike migration, is often more coordinated and well planned. Under apartheid, South Africa's fortified borders frustrated any possible cooperation between third countries which was seen as a threat to the regime given that it saw neighbouring states as bases for those who were plotting to destabilize it. For this purpose, apartheid security forces were often deployed to pursue brutal counterinsurgency warfare across the Namibia-Angola border (Kynoch, 2013).

The apparent focus on borders as means to reduce cross border crimes may have inadvertently increased it as the regime failed to strengthen its regional ties with states which were becoming overwhelmed with these crimes. Shaw (1998) argues that critical to the growth of organized crime is the inability of the formal economy to absorb and regulate the economic activities of citizens. Failure to do so results in the formation of parallel and competing economies. Shaw also argues that apartheid segregation policies failed to absorb the socio-economic activities of the country's majority black citizens and that, more importantly, it did not contribute to the development of black people nor see them as people who could contribute the country's development.

To what extent did cross border crime play a role in the demise of apartheid? Mariotti and Fourie (2014) correctly argue that apartheid contributed to its downfall, but do not show how or whether cross border crime was a contributory factor. It is argued in this study, as do Reitano and Shaw (2013) that apartheid failed to understand the relationship between the strength of the state and the strength of cross border crime. For example, was the rise of internal cross border crime syndicates a result of the regime's racial policies and disregard for blacks in terms of its development policies? Was it a result of the regime's seeming lack of interest in socio-economically including blacks? Did this then indirectly give rise to cross border crime syndicates in the country? One can therefore posit that the focus on securitizing borders was one way of combating cross border crime, but the neglect of the internal factors that gave rise to cross border crime syndicates eventually rendered such securitization ineffective.

Although border securitization enhanced the fight against cross border crime, it also had sinister motives. As pointed out by Steinberg (2005), the apartheid state had another interest in borders, in the context of a hostile international community that had restricted trade in military and other industrial goods with South Africa. The state had a vital interest in facilitating the surreptitious movement of goods across borders and was extensively involved in illicit international trade. South Africa's covert intelligence agencies thus had a permanent and powerful presence in the

sphere of borders (Steinberg, 2005). This was key as the apartheid government promoted organized crime in townships by supporting gangsters to limit the activities of the anti-apartheid movement and to promote drug use. Outside the townships, the apartheid state was involved in a variety of organized criminal activities including, but not limited to, corruption, money laundering, smuggling and wildlife crime. Border securitization was thus a pretext for smuggling in weapons to help the state consolidate its power. Unsurprisingly, to ensure the inflow of weapons needed to suppress the liberation movement, border control was highly militarized.

#### **2.4 The South African Defence Force and the South African Police in land border protection**

As argued earlier, borders under apartheid were linked into a wider repressive architecture which joined domestic clampdowns by the military and police with combat deployments, cross-border raids and covert operations in neighbouring frontline states (McMicheal, 2012). At the core of this repressive architecture was the use of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South African Police (SAP) in borders. On the surface, the primary objective of the SADF and the SAP was to prevent the enemy infiltration of South Africa borders but covertly it was to safeguard the smuggling of weapons for the regime. While armed forces, in particular, are seen as the primary protector of the nation-state against external threats, during apartheid, the SADF was ill-equipped and not appropriately trained for law enforcement, crowd control and restoring of general public order and so it was not expected to protect South Africa's borders effectively (Kynoch, 2013).

Nonetheless, despite growing resentment of the regime, the SADF, at the time, had access to almost unlimited personnel and budgetary resources. Its access to the general personnel resources of the apartheid state, through the system of conscription, provided the military with access to very specialist resources which professional armies often found difficult to access. However, despite such support, it became evident that border challenges were becoming complex and sophisticated and the SADF was compounded by several issues including quasi-military activities such as sabotage, ambushes and frequent guerrilla attacks. Just like the SADF, the SAPS security policy under apartheid was to maintain the system of minority rule against domestic resistance and international pressure. While on paper their roles differed, they were interlinked in the need to ensure obedience to white minority rule and work hand in hand to secure the country's borders at all costs. By the early 1990s, the South African police had acquired a reputation for brutality, corruption and ineptitude. Police organisations were militarized, hierarchical, and ill-equipped to deal with ordinary crime (Choudhary, 2009).

There are a few key points from the above. First, the policy of fortifying borders was based on a false narrative that threats to the regime mostly emanated from borders. According to Kynoch (2013), the apartheid regime failed to take into consideration the different contexts and factors that were driving the resistance. It failed to ascertain whether the threats to the security of the country emanated from outside its borders or whether they were the consequence of internal vulnerabilities and disorder. Secondly, the racial policies aimed at segregation entrenched feelings of hate and resentment towards the regime which contributed to rebellion and resistance internally. The focus on border deflected attention from the internal problems which eventually gave way to large scale resistance to the regime. Sauerman & Ivković (2015) posited that while the SAP was focused on delivering law and order in white areas, black townships had increasingly become unregulated, violence and lawless which the SAP was completely unprepared for became frequent. Finally, South Africa's land borders were fortified with electric fences, manned by the SADF and the SAP, however, the literature neglects to explain the shortcomings of the SADF and SAP in their quest to secure the borders. For example, it is argued that countries such as Zambia & Tanzania assisted in the liberation of South Africa by not only hosting exiled members of the resistance but were also supplying weapons and other materials needed to end apartheid. This reflects that the presence of SADF and SAP did not result in an impenetrable border, hence the neglect of such critique presents a view that borders under the apartheid were without challenges in their quest to maintain the status quo of the regime. Further pointing this out, Besteman (2019) argued that it became clear that the over-emphasis on the SADF and SAP in border protection was unsustainable over the long term and incredibly destructive in the short term. Nonetheless, by the 1980s the apartheid system was beginning to weaken. It could no longer keep black people in their Bantu homelands or remove them from the white cities. In the 1990s, the apartheid government was feeling the pressure both from external and internal resistance and eventually, the institutionalized system of racial segregation, came to an end in the early 1990s in a series of steps that led to the formation of a democratic government in 1994. The end of apartheid was meant to usher in new approaches toward border management, in part, an inclusive system, emphasizing the importance of cross border cooperation. The next section, therefore, looks at how borders were managed in post-apartheid South Africa with regards to illegal cross border migration and cross border crime. As a point of departure, the study argues that after 1994, it was hoped that South Africa would become a true rainbow nation, have respect and courtesy for their fellow Africans, more especially looking at the role played by neighbouring states in the fight against apartheid.

## **2.5 Illegal migration and cross border crime in post-apartheid South Africa**

In post-apartheid South Africa, there have been differing debates and discussions as to how South African borders ought to be managed. Central to these arguments has been the notion that early post-apartheid literature appears to accept that South Africa suffered from increases in transnational crime and illegal migration (Goga, 2014), this was coupled with the growing sophistication of locally organized crime groups and the increase in corruption at South Africa's land borders. Additionally, weak borders result in the illicit trade in arms and weapons, and this has been an increasing issue in the SADC.

Unsurprisingly, extensive discussions revolved around whether the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) should be used as the primary agency in border management (especially relating to neutralizing border threats). Arguably, African states did not expect a free South Africa to carry on the process of fortifying borders, there were renewed calls for openness, friendly relations with regional states and integration of South Africa within a continental perspective. However, achieving this called for South Africa to demilitarize its borders. Subsequently, in 1994, the South African government put in place a policy for a gradual withdrawal of SANDF from the border areas. In 2003, President Thabo Mbeki's administration instituted a policy in which the South African Police Service (SAPS) would take over the functions of SANDF over five years with the final transfer of functions slated for 2009 (Steinberg, 2005). However, Steyn (2004) argued that the removal of the SANDF at the border had adverse effects, although South Africa's emerging non-racial democracy has been internationally acclaimed, global integration has also brought its problems. One such problem is the escalation in the number of illegal immigrants entering the country. Additionally, Shaw (1998) lamented the observation that the growth in organized crime has caught South African law enforcement agencies unprepared. The policing agencies of the South African state were struggling to make the conversion from authoritarian control to democratic forms of policing. The SAPS and other state law enforcement institutions do not yet have the resources or technical expertise to cope adequately with organized crime. The study contends that while South Africa needed to reciprocate in kind to regional states that helped liberate the country; this was in no way an appeal to countries to let go of their responsibility towards illegal migration and cross border crime. The study, argues that South Africa failed to take into cognizance that immediately after the fall of apartheid, it was seen as economically stable, hence there was a need to put place measures to protect the country's borders while at the same time allowing for regional integration through cross border cooperation. There was

pressure for South Africa to open up its borders and consolidate its newfound freedom, however, this soon resulted in major problems as put by Modi (2003), it was hoped that South Africa would become a true rainbow nation, have respect and courtesy for their fellow Africans, more especially looking at the role played by neighbouring states in the fight against apartheid. But soon after, intolerance, rooted in xenophobia, and anti-immigrant attitudes became entrenched, and even today South Africa has been seen as an unwelcoming country for black Africans. The study argues that the government has been reluctant to further reinforce border security, underpinning this fear, is the interpretation that regional countries might deem this as reminiscent of the ideological stance pursued by apartheid. For the study, such interpretation would be devoid of current realities in South African land borders, moreover, South Africa has a moral duty to protect its citizen's pointed by Fjäder (2014) nation-states primarily hold obligations towards citizens, and control of immigration is typically seen as a domain of vital importance for securing the needs and interests of citizens, nevertheless, the extent to which the principle of sovereignty can give legitimate nation-states discretionary power to decide in migration matters needs to be addressed. However, can such be applicable from a South African perspective? Can the country take a firm stance on its border security? Arguably the study observes little prospect of this materializing. Central to this doubt is the observation that there are numerous policy gaps compounding border management in the country, i.e, South African borders are chronically underfunded and are riddled with corruption and lack extensive human capital. Home Affairs employees themselves have estimated that as many as 85% of staff members participate in corrupt practices, (Mbiyozo, 2018), this corruption leads to the inconsistent and obtuse application of immigration policies, such that even lawyers and government officials themselves struggle to interpret and apply them.

These policy gaps raise the question of whether the current debates to introduce border technology in South Africans borders are informed by current realities or there is a need to revisit border operational policies that regulate how South African borders are regulated. Departing from the current debates of the need to introduce technology in borders, this study argues that while technology in borders may complement existing approaches, however technology looking at the contextual setting of the Golela and Kosi Bay posts would be difficult to implement, protect and provide adequate policy support for its operation. Rather managing cross border crime and illegal migration in these borders requires clear cut policies (anchored on robust implementation and monitoring) which speak to the current border realities and more importantly, policies that support the need for cross border cooperation. Nevertheless, the study cannot narrow its argument with a pessimistic view regarding the introduction of technology in the border as they have been global

examples where technology has indeed assisted border authorities' better respond to border threats. However, the context and types of border threats are different and unique in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts and holistically implying technology is key misses the point of other important considerations, such as cross border cooperation and the need to re-configure policy gaps within South Africa's border management framework. Moreover, today, threats emanating from borders have become complex in their operations and overall establishment, hence there is a need to explore the introduction of technology within South African borders to ensure supplement the resources available to the SANDF (Stojkovic et al. 2014).

Therefore, it becomes imperative to examine the underpinnings of these current debates. Moreover, the question of who should determine South Africa's border management approach? What legislation should government prioritize to address cross border crime and illegal migration? What are the regional considerations? Is there a need for technology in borders and more importantly are there alternatives to technology with regards to the urgent need to address cross border crime and illegal migration in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts.

## **2.6 Illegal migration in post-apartheid South Africa**

Duncan (2012) acknowledges that migration as a growing trend brought with it increased crime and threats to nation-states. Black et al. (2006) also argue that today, the causes of migration can be traced to the past. Structured inequality within the context of the north-south divide has increased migration flows in developing nations. Moreover, the world's response to irregular or "illegal" migrants is, with a few exceptions, getting ever harsher (Donato & Massey, 2016). Around the world, borders are militarized and irregular migrants criminalized, often with scant regard for the humanitarian consequences (Mcmichael, 2012). These policies are a testament to the way immigration policy has become tightly linked to claims about territory and by extension terrorism. In South Africa, the end of apartheid resulted in a plethora of legislation that aimed not at securitizing migration but rather regulating it within the confines of the law. Additionally, these laws ought to make provisions for refugees and asylums seekers, an element that didn't matter to the apartheid regime. These legislations were namely: 1995: Aliens Control Amendment Act; 1998: Refugees Act; 1997: Green Paper → 1999: White Paper → 2000: Draft Bill → 2002: Immigration Act; 2004: Immigration Amendment Act; 2005: Immigration Amendment Act; 2011: Immigration Amendment Act → 2011: Refugees Amendment Act. Nonetheless, these acts were designed to regulate and perhaps improve South Africa immigration policy, sadly, they failed to take into consideration that it is the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts (by extension all South

Africa's land borders) that needs to be reinforced as weak borders have become an observable challenge as put by Maharaj (2002) the undocumented entry of illegal immigrants into South Africa in recent years as a result of the political and economic instability in the region has had huge socio-economic and political implications for the country. Nevertheless, this assertion failed to reflect that apart from political and economic instability in the region, corruption and maladministration are other elements indirectly facilitating illegal migration within South Africa borders. This was reinforced by Steinberg, (2005) who contended that all borders and ports were severely understaffed, ports and border posts were poorly designed, the flow of humans and freight traffic was not proportioned to effective border control, border control was not valued as a specialized field and personnel were not recruited in line with rigorous integrity and criteria in a field prone to corruption and finally border control exhibited a disjointed structure. This begs the question, is technology the key to challenges that seem to be exacerbated by a lack of policy direction? For Simelane (2019), South Africa has inadequate immigration policies and very limited resources to combat immigration problems that have increasingly plagued the country since the advent of democracy.

The study contends that the urgent calls for technology in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts are not born out of reality, rather politicians have for long argued that the source of South Africa's problems is weak borders, even though this weakness is underpinned by weak policy execution. While the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts are characterised by dilapidated infrastructure and in need of investments in modern technological systems, to ensure such investments became realizable, migrants have been used as scapegoats. Echoing the above Joly (2016) argued is that the government and the media have been using migrants as scapegoats when deliberating issues associated with border security. The existence of a large number of illegal migrants has been used to benchmark the magnitude and rate of investments the government ought to make in border security. The observation of migrants as a threat is a deeply flawed observation. For Mbiyozo (2018) treating migrants as high risk distracts from true threats. Expanding South Africa's limited security resources on non-security threats will do little to close gaps in the existing and proposed systems for criminals to exploit. Migration management is important, but should not be confused with national security risks without clear associations.

Contrasting the assertion by Mbiyozo, the study argues that this assertion failed to take into consideration that the political landscape has changed since 1994, South Africa, confronted with poverty, inequality and unemployment has seen the welcoming posture drastically change.

Migrants today are seen from the realms of the 'other' who do not share South African values and are involved in crime, this has justified the need to reinforce border security through technological investments. Building on the insights of Nsereko (1997), the study argues that a collective approach towards border management in the SADC would better facilitate migration rather the unilateral technological development. Arguably, the lack of consensus on border management in the region necessitates individual countries to devise methods to ensure their territorial sovereignty through reinforcing border controls. In South Africa, the need to reinforce borders has been informed by an array of factors and debates. For the Parliamentary monitoring group (2019), undocumented migrants used municipal services without proper billing, and brought undocumented workers, adding to overpopulation, and unfair competition with locals for limited municipal opportunities and limited resources. Foreign nationals sold expired and counterfeit goods. They engaged in unfair trading competition, with excessively low prices. Be that as it may, clustering all migrants within the realms of crime and thuggery does not factor in that there is no evidence that migrants are an elevated security risk or justify heavy-handed military or criminal responses. Instead, they pose a management challenge.

Policymakers and politicians alike have argued that strengthening border capabilities will likely reduce those illegally entering. However, achieving this throughout South Africa's bureaucratic border management frameworks may be difficult. For example, the Department of Home Affairs is riddled by corruption and disorganisation and has caused an immigration system failure, followed by violence and tragedy (Madia & Phakgadi, 2019). South Africa's Beitbridge border in Limpopo, Kosi Bay and Golela border posts in KwaZulu-Natal have been characterized by huge rates of illegal migration and increased rates of cross-border crime within areas located in the vicinity of these border posts (Kabwe-Segatti, 2008). For example, within the Golela Border post which links South Africa with Eswatini, numerous drug busts worth millions were undertaken in 2017. Worryingly for the country, police and border officials have been implicated in these crimes, mainly through their alleged facilitation and participation in corrupt activities. Therefore, with the above, before hastily observing technology as key to border solutions, the immediate question is why irregular migrants don't enter the country through legal means? For many, the process of obtaining documentation poses logistical and financial problems, and it is not necessarily clear what would be required of them. Hence the bureaucratic nature of South Africa's immigration policies has a direct influence on illegal migration patterns. Restricting the movement of people can be dangerous as argued by Laine (2018), walls, whether on paper or on the ground may seem effective, but seldom are: once a wall is erected, people will soon try to cross it. According

to the author, this creates fencing self-referential – a vicious cycle – which feeds itself. Sentiments in South Africa with regards to illegal migration have mirrored those of the EU; the focus has now been on keeping migrants out. Challenging assumptions about irregular migrants often exposes a different angle on problems. For instance, there is a misperception that irregular migrants place a heavy burden on South Africa's social services; sadly, these assumptions have been consolidated by politicians. This rhetoric has even found itself within the discussion of many political parties, who in turn argued that South Africa's borders are weak and that there is a great need to ensure immigrants are kept out of the country by improving the country's border security (Heleta, 2019). The blame placed on migrants is unsupported by the data at hand, and their involvement in organised crime is not statistically established. Yet, because they tend to be associated with unknowns, irregular migrants do fuel the public view that they represent a security threat. Just like migration and cross border crime have been seen as a menace in South Africa.


## **2.7 Cross border crime in a post-apartheid South Africa**

South Africa has struggled with the growth of cross border crime, and the mainstream narrative has often been one of corruptible, underequipped, under-informed law enforcement, unable to deal with a rising tide of dangerous, sophisticated, cross border criminals (Goga, 2014). In the mainstream media, South Africa has been described as a 'haven for cross border crime. The roots of organized crime as we see it today can be traced back to the apartheid system that criminalized and marginalized the majority of the population. Along with the new democratic dispensation in South Africa, a new threat emerged (Goga, 2014). Transnational organized crime syndicates identified the country as an untapped market for their criminal activities. This became evident in the sudden influx of drugs, the greater incidence of prostitution, money laundering, and the sudden increase in organized crimes, particularly violent crimes like vehicle-hijackings and cash-in-transit robberies. For example, Tati (2008) explained that the Beitbridge border post, the Golela Border Post and the Kosi Bay border post-experience some of the heaviest traffic in terms of the movement of people and trading activities. Despite the huge traffic in these borders, investment in infrastructure and modern border security systems has been low. Kekana (2018) argues that South Africa has underinvested in its border security and thus the national security of the country is at risk, especially considering increasing terror threats within the region. Moreover, Kekana (2018) recommends that there is a great need for South Africa to secure its borders with modern border technology to complement the existing border security apparatus. The study, however, argues that the emphasis on technology in borders fails to reflect that there is a general lack of

coordination between the many agencies/departments that are present in South Africa's land borders. The consequences of this inefficient and ineffective border management approach often lead to poor services being rendered to traders and travellers, while also creating a breeding ground for corruption. Moreover, before rushing to implement technology in borders, regional cooperation bottlenecks ought to be addressed, for example, there is a lack of cooperation between the police and the customs of each country and this has made it hard for South Africa to focus on combatting crime within its borders. Moving forward, there is a need for South Africa to ask itself whether legislation aimed at curbing cross border crime speaks to the current realities within South Africa borders, furthermore, the country should acknowledge that cross border crime has become complex and characterized new methods which seek to circumvent existing border security approaches. Nonetheless, it is difficult to accurately determine the levels of organized crime anywhere, and South Africa is no exception, however, the increasing arrests that have been taking place within South Africa's land borders, the increase in drug busts and the constant involvement of police officers in corrupt border activities signals that there is an upwards trend in cross border crime. The Golela and Kosi Bay border posts have also been witnessing an upward increase in cross border crime and illegal migration.

Figure 2.1 below shows the location of three high-traffic border posts. These are the Beitbridge Border Post, The Kosi Bay Border Post and the Golela Border Post.

**Figure 2.1: Beitbridge, Kosi Bay and Golela Border Posts**



Source: Generated by author

### 2.7.1 Golela Border Post

Like most borders in South Africa, the Golela Border Post is exposed to various forms of cross-border criminal activity (Nyoka, 2017; Charlton, 2018). These include human trafficking and drug trafficking among others. In 2018, a suspect was nabbed while trying to smuggle 200kg worth of heroin into the country via the Golela Border Post. The street value of the illicit product was a massive R100 million (Charlton, 2018). In 2017, 8 police officers stationed in this border were arrested because of their collusion with cross-border syndicates (Singh, 2017). Because this border is located in a remote area, it is highly attractive to syndicates dealing in drug trafficking, car smuggling, and human trafficking. Furthermore, the limited availability of adequate resources hinders officials from effectively dealing with cross-border crime (Singh, 2017). Nyoka, (2017) opines that the Golela Border Post is targeted by cross border syndicates because they see it as a weak link that easily facilitates the illicit flow of goods into the country. Weapons smuggling is also highly prevalent at the border and with light arms and weapons circulating in huge quantities

in the region, strategies that enhance security are a matter of urgency. Taylor et al. (2013) comment that corruption will always be a problem for South African borders and with little government intervention, cross-border crime has increased drastically in this border as criminals consolidate their grip. The South African Police Service (2016) further stated that syndicates from Mozambique and Swaziland use this border as a transit area to funnel their illicit goods into South Africa motivated by the fact that this border is located in a remote and scarcely-populated area. Illicit cigarette's and counterfeit footwear are prime types of illicit goods trafficked or smuggled to South Africa via this border. Lennep (2019) argues that the border post is insufficiently equipped to deal with the current traffic volumes and risks that have become endemic to South Africa's national security.

### 2.7.2 Kosi Bay border post

The Kosi Bay border post is a non-commercial border. This means the border crossing does not offer customs clearance or agricultural inspection. However, it does have immigration facilities and a police presence. Nevertheless, despite such presence, criminal syndicates have found ways to carry out their crimes, which questions the effectiveness of governments' strategy to tackle cross-border crime let alone illegal migration within the vicinity of this border post. Singh (2018) stated that in November 2018 residents blocked roads in protest over the increasing rates of cross-border crime in the area. The residents decried the fact that the government had not prioritized fighting the increasing rates of car smuggling from South Africa to Mozambique and the fact that border officials are in collaboration with cross-border syndicates in the undertaking of various cross-border crimes. Central to the protest was the fact that cars were being stolen across South Africa and driven to this border post to be smuggled into Mozambique. Authorities have recovered more than 134 stolen vehicles including luxury sedans which were valued at R13 million and more than 122 people have been arrested in the process (Singh, 2018). Crime syndicates operating in this border have dented a blow to the tourism sector as the fear and uncertainty of cross-border crime within areas close to the border has seen a decrease in tourist's numbers (Mavuso, 2018). Singh (2018) explains that lack of cooperation between the South African police and their Mozambican counterparts has fuelled the problem as smugglers can smuggle cars and traffic many types of illicit products knowing very well that limited cross-border cooperation will play to their advantage (DefenceWeb, 2018). DefenceWeb (2018) further alluded that because South African police are not allowed to carry out pursuit of criminals into Mozambique, the situation makes the problem much worse, especially considering the corruption


level in Mozambique's police system. While one may applaud these measures, to ensure security in this border, the government should prioritize the fight against corrupt border officials rather than physical structures aimed at fighting cross-border crime and migration. The above deliberations highlight some important observations; South Africa's quest to reduce cross border crime is hindered by the lack of cooperation among regional states. Consequently, the country needs to establish joint border posts (JBPs) or border liaison offices (BLOs) to increase cross-border communication and sharing of crucial intelligence information as well as to support the installation of surveillance equipment in border regions. While such equipment is usually expensive to procure and maintain, it will be of great benefit to the region's border security apparatus for years to come. South Africa attracts several cross border crime syndicates, buoyed not only by the country's economic footprint but also its weak borders. For South Africa, confidence in the country's border control and border security is critical in ensuring border stability, however, will the introduction of technology in South African land borders bring this much-needed confidence in the country's border control? Even so, the consequences of failed border management include cross-border crime, the exploitation of vulnerable undocumented migrants and human trafficking. The study observes that mixed reactions have arisen as to the current debate of introducing technology in borders. As argued earlier, the study with reservations supports the introduction of technology within the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts, however, greater attention needs to be paid to policy development and implementation, in essence, there seems to be a policy gap in the border management approach in South Africa, as you will observe later in this discussion, addressing policy will lay the foundation of introducing technology and allow it to integrate effectively with existing approaches.

## **2.8 Legislation/strategies to management of South African borders**

Border management in South Africa is currently exercised through multiple government departments and state agencies. Border security and management are undertaken by a combination of government departments and agencies (Department of Home Affairs (DHA), South African Revenue Service (SARS), South African Police Service (SAPS), The Department of Health (DoH), The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), The Department of Transport (DoT), the Department Of Trade and Industry (DTI), South African National Defence Force (SANDF), The State Security Agency (SSA), The Department Of Public Works (DPW) and The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2011). However, the use of many agencies within the context of border management results in the

duplication of tasks, corruption and misalignment of duties. Moreover, such arrangements have proved incapable of addressing the systemic and structural management problems affecting border management and border security in the country as various national intelligence estimates have pointed to significant weaknesses, threats and challenges in South Africa's border management approach. Moreover, these departments and agencies lack a coordinated approach to border management, hence the country needs to have a clear cut approach and policy to manage border operation in which all activities of the different agencies involved would be streamlined (DefenceWeb, 2018). Khumalo (2014) adds that while legislation has been developed, the poor coordination between stakeholders of border security and management means that the success rates of these legislations, therefore, becomes problematic to measure. Taking from the above, there seems to be a disjointed operational mechanism on the approach used to manage South Africa's land borders, therefore, for technology to integrate and work seemingly in these borders, the current disjointed operational mechanism ought to be addressed. Building on the above Lennep (2019) argued that border management in South Africa needs a single operational framework as having too many agencies in the borders results in bureaucracy and inefficiency. Arguably, South Africa's need for technology in the border fails to reflect such challenges, how will the country create the much-needed synergy between current approaches and technology? Therefore, the rush to implement border technology resembles a policy that not been given considerate thought. There is a need to unify border management approaches first, consolidate them and ensure their effective functioning, hence after, technology can be piloted. For example, in Australia, the Australian Border Force (a combination of Australian Defence Force, Australian Fisheries Management Authority, and Australian Maritime Safety Authority) as a unified border approach has achieved great levels of operational efficiency and control, through unifying the different departments that were present at the border (Gerstein et al. 2016). The same can be observed in the USA through the department of Homeland security and in Europe through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). These approaches are meant to reduce maladministration. Surprisingly while South Africa realizes the problematic approach of its current border management, a major internal challenge facing the government is changing the entrenched culture of "departmentalism/territorialism", or operating in 'silos' with narrow departmental self-interests. This lack of coordination militates against the coherence of cross-cutting programs and ultimately compromises the impact of joint programs (Taute, 2007).

## **Figure 2: Structure of border management in South Africa**



Source:

Within the framework of the above, the Department of Home Affairs argued that inland borders specifically, challenges such as security, and agriculture inspection capability, Illegal migration and cross-border crime are major challenges hindering the optimal functioning of land borders in South Africa. However, with the context of migration and cross-border crime, South Africa has the necessary acts, nonetheless, their effectiveness given South African borders and their setting; make it cumbersome for one to effectively conclude as to how successful they have been. However, while all these departments and agencies play an important role in ensuring border security, ultimately, the department of defence through the SANDF is the most important department when it comes to fighting cross-border and illegal cross-border migration.

### 2.8.1 SANDF and border security

In a post-apartheid South Africa, illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime have been categorized as fundamental issues hampering the army's ability to effectively protect South Africa. It became clear that SAPS was poorly equipped to effectively secure the borders, in 2009, the South African government overturned its initial decision and ordered the SANDF to resume the function of border security. The Constitution of South Africa (as per section 205 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 and from the SAPS Act of 1995) alludes that the SAPS has a responsibility to maintain order and fight crime. On the other hand, the SANDF in terms of section (1) of the defence act, its role includes patrolling the land borders by foot and vehicles, establishing observation and listening posts, operating vehicle control points, conducting intelligence operations and conduct roadblocks in conjunction with the SAPS (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). Moreover, the SANDF is responsible for border protection, which is defined as the protection of the international borders of the country against hostile attacks and actions. However, cross border crime and illegal migration have evolved today to become complex processes. The study argues that illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime do not only happen at designated border crossings, however, but they also take place in concealed or hidden spaces where there is a limited presence of authorities and while, it makes sense for the army to be primarily tasked with dealing with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration, however, the SANDF itself has been faced with an ever-decreasing ever-decreasing budget. The chief of the SA army lieutenant –general Lindile Yam, explained that approximately R50 billion was needed by the army otherwise the army will have trouble stopping illegal cross-border migration and fighting cross-border crime and other related threats which emanates from borders, even worse the country will struggle to cope with an invasion, that is how depleted resources are at the SANDF currently (Ndlazi, 2018). The lieutenant argued that the country's borders are weak; thousands of undocumented migrants come and go as they please. The lieutenant surprisingly, also expounded that during the apartheid era, the army was afforded sufficient resources to carry out its functions, however, in a post-apartheid South Africa, and this has not been the case (Ndlazi, 2018). Interpreting the above, perhaps South Africa does not view border issues as a threat to its national security and hence investing significant funds may be seen as unnecessary. For Kynoch (2013) the problem in South Africa is that SANDF is in a "critical state of decline" and is largely incapable of carrying out its constitutional duties. It lacks critical mobility and is "too poorly equipped and funded to execute the widening spectrum of tasks to the desired level. The study argues that the difficulty of the SANDF to carry out its duties is not a strong enough reason for the rapid need to introduce technology on the border. However,

DefenseWeb (2018) argues otherwise and posits that technology is greatly needed as SA borders are in a sorrowful state. However for the Democratic Alliance as cited by Engelbrecht (2009) it is not a lack of technology in borders that is a problem but the lack of leadership, the author explained that we have soldiers without vehicles; we have ships without sailors; we have planes without pilots, and we have military hospitals without doctors, and the real problem with the defence force is not that it is under-funded but rather policy issues are at the core of the inability of South Africa to effectively secure its borders.

The re-introduction of the army to South Africa's border architecture raises fears of border militarization, central to this fear that the militarisation will harm trade and labour movement, hence securitization of the border is not an option, and rather coordination with regional partners is the preferred solution. But the literature argues that there is a shortcoming with regards to this cooperation as regional states seemingly are not committed to the concept of collaboration, thus countries unilaterally enforce their own border policies. Despite the severity of these issues, using the South African army as a strategy to deal with these issues might prove difficult as resources needed to patrol such huge land borders may be hard to come by (Martin, 2018). Furthermore, the situation is exacerbated by the inability of the country to sustain sufficient levels of economic growth as this would ensure the availability of revenue to support the modernization of border security and management (Tati, 2008). Nonetheless, the literature fails to reflect on the changing patterns of migration today, secondly, while the literature takes into consideration how the SANDF is compounded by significant challenges, it neglects to reflect that policy issues and political indecisiveness are at the core of this failure rather than the political rhetoric that South Africa has been overwhelmed by cross border crime and illegal migration. It is with the above that the study ponders as to how will border technology function optimally when there are still observable challenges that need to be addressed within the current border management approaches. This policy gap was further reflected by Mamokhere and Chauke (2020), who contended that, before the technology can be implemented, South Africa should address its policy gaps and loopholes in its current border management framework, in essence, improved multiagency collaboration between the different department/agencies operating within and along the borders would be an effective point of departure. The government should establish effective collaboration among different stakeholders. Additionally, a collaborative border management approach enables border monitoring agencies to work in close cooperation with each other, forming a multi-inter cooperative approach.

### **2.8.2 Border control operational coordinating committee**

The Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee (BCOCC) is a national body responsible for the strategic management of the South African border environment in a coordinated manner. This includes the key components of improved and coordinated security, trade and tourism (Taute, 2007). Control of the border environment is inherently a multi-departmental responsibility, requiring extensive communication and coordination across departments, agencies and provinces, and covering the whole of the South African border environment (Taute, 2007). The committee is part of the justice and security cluster established in 2005. Each of the departments and agencies present at South Africa's borders are very important in contributing to the safety, operation and management of borders in South Africa (Cross border road transport agency, 2016). However, like the SANDF, effectively coordinating the various roles the department/agencies have to perform at the border is very complex and riddled with loopholes. While there is a need for coordination, the BCOCC admitted that the bureaucracy in the borders often suffocates the need for efficiency. This was argued by Steinberg (2005) who communicated that the BCOCC has been challenged in terms of unifying the different operations and activities that are undertaken by the different departments/agencies present at the borders. The challenges of the BCOCC are not in isolation, they are a result of years of neglect of investments in the borders, and before alternative ways of border management and control can be explored these challenges need to be addressed. Therefore, apart from the lack of regional cooperation, the gap in South Africa's border management approach stems from the lack of attention paid to current approaches, their loopholes and how these loopholes ought to be addressed. The BCOCC notes that poaching, illegal migration, cross-border crime, slow and inefficient border crossing, corruption, poor training of staff and insufficient deployment were major challenges affecting the consolidation of better border management in South Africa. As argued earlier, in the USA, the central purpose behind the creation of the department of homeland security was to tackle fragmentation and a lack of strategic coherence. The BCOCC was created to bring about this coordination; however, doing this has been problematic especially judging by corruption and weak governance present in the country's borders. Additionally, it failed to effectively streamline all these actions and activities and this to a great extent questions its success, let alone its effective contribution in fighting illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime. South Africa is not immune to issues such as criminal acts, technical violation, transnational organized crime, terrorist's threats and threats to the integrity of border management, however in the same vein, the BCOCC acknowledged that South Africa often lacked the much-needed coordination in its land borders which gave way to increased cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration.

As pondered earlier while there is increasing calls for border technology, there seems to be little appetite to address the policy gaps that have emerged from the literature. In hope of addressing these challenges, the government established the border management authority (BMA) which would seek to address these problems. Drawing from international countries such as Australia, the USA and the EU where there is a single approach to border management, however, whether such would be applicable in a South African context remains to be seen.

### **2.8.3 The Border Management Authority bill**

It is undeniable that in South Africa currently, there is a great need for a single unified border agency that would streamline the operations and duties undertaken by the multiple agencies currently present at South African borders not only to better deal with threats emanating from the border but to harmonize border operations. To answer this, South Africa proposed the Border Management Agency Bill (BMA). The bill, therefore, argues that the presence of multiple stakeholders' gives way to inefficient and ineffective border management and this often leads to poor services being rendered to traders and travellers at ports of entry, subsequently, creating a breeding ground for corruption, crime and lawlessness (Makhafola, 2017).

The South African government says illegal immigration as a result of porous borders needs urgent attention because it poses a considerable danger to the security of the state, including exposure to terrorism. However, opposition parties have argued that it is full of irregularities and shouldn't come into operation. For example, what is required is a more effective use of our current resources, a reduction in unnecessary spending in the department and an increased investment in immigration affairs. DA MP Hannif Hoosen argued that the estimated cost of the BMA is almost R22 billion, something that SA cannot afford at this time in our country. The country should rather focus on fixing its fence rather than taking up costly projects the country cannot afford. In the same vein, after its announcement, the bill has become rather controversial and criticized not only within political circles but by other government departments, the main argument has been that the bill has been given overarching powers that supersede that of other government departments and agencies (Makhafola, 2017). For example, the BMA envisages collecting revenue in ports of entry in the country, thus contravening the functions which are undertaken by the South African revenue service (SARS), which is constitutionally obliged to do. Additionally, issues included the huge cost involved in setting up the agency, the task of housing all border functions under one entity, with Home Affairs taking the lead, was too big of an undertaking and that its mandate was too broad and all-encompassing (Phillip, 2019). Areas of contention between the national treasury

and the DHA included revenue collection as the role of SARS cannot be legislated away to BMA law, integration of institutions versus integration of systems and operational platforms and whether it is necessary to transfer any staff from SARS, and the impact of any staff transfers on the integrity of the revenue and customs value chain.

Furthermore, the bill argued that law enforcement in ports of entry will be exercised by the BMA, however from a constitutional point of view, it is the only responsibility of the SAPS to prevent combat and investigate crime and uphold the law within borders (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2018). These are a few examples that have made critics of the bill argue that it has overreaching powers. The government through DHA, however, has explained that the primary aim of the bill is to increase efficiency and effectiveness of border operations through the unification of border operations. However, opposition parties articulated that while in support of the need to make South Africa safer, the bill still required extensive consultation and re-working.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) has also argued that given the confusion with regards to the separation of powers within the context of the BMA and the mere fact that the DHA is an ailing department, riddled with corruption and inefficiency, an alternative should be pursued and what was once the BCOCC (and is now the coordinating function of the BMA) should be extracted from the failing BMA framework and resourced sufficiently to address the silo-based approach to border management. This would shift the focus from authority to coordination and from a complete (risky and costly) border management overhaul to fixing the current system which has to a great extent proven ineffective in dealing with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. Furthermore, in his support for the BMA bill, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa while answering questions in the National Council of Provinces expounded the Border Management Authority (BMA) would tighten the ports of entry, "Once established, the BMA will ensure more efficient processing of people as well as goods that move into the republic." Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2018) also argued that the bill did not explain how the issue of refugees will be applied under the new bill, furthermore, which department is mandated to undertake such. The bill also worryingly provides powers to search, seize and arrest with or without a warrant but also does not refer to the criminal act, hence this creates a feeling that migrants and asylum seekers will be mistreated and abused. While the bill has been adopted, it has already created a lot of confusion that need to be addressed especially in terms of its operational capacity.

On a positive note, the bill also envisages the establishment of modern and secure infrastructure, information and communication technology platforms to intensify the effectiveness of border

authorities when dealing with threats emanating from borders. Former DHA Minister Hlengiwe Mkhize, noted that South Africa has 72 ports of entry and the lack of coordination between government departments/agencies at times created conflict and disorganization, hence then this creates room for corruption and the rendering of poor services (Steinberg, 2005).

The decision to establish the BMA was undertaken by the cabinet in 2013, mainly to improve the operation and management of South African borders which are facing increasing threats. South Africa's has become a target for cross-border crime syndicates illegal migrants attracted by the perceived economic opportunities offered by the country. However, the country has been rather slow in responding effectively to these border threats and while the BMA bill envisages the introduction of technology, secure infrastructure, and information and communication technology platforms that meet the universal standards within a border management context, there have been questions as to whether there is a need to fuse technology with the current border management strategy. Despite concerns about funding and personnel, the DHA argued that using its sophisticated technology and surveillance systems, the BMA will help prevent, among others, drug-related crimes, human trafficking, illegitimate movement of goods and unauthorized movement of persons. Illegal immigration and cross-border crime with South Africa's land and marine borders have become a serious challenge for the country; however, one may argue that the inability to reduce these issues has been a direct result of under-investment in border infrastructure.

From a South African perspective, limitations hindering South African laws/policies directed at effectively managing border security come down to implementation and modification of its existing policies. While these policies have been implemented, nonetheless they are being undermined by three major factors. Firstly, the defence and police departments are seriously underfunded; the budget allocations they receive from the government are not enough to ensure border security. Secondly, these departments (SANDF and SAPS) lack skills, and the much needed human capital to ensure authorities understand borders, their function, how to ensure their optimal operation and to complement existing strategies to ensure border. Lastly, South Africa will extremely find it difficult to ensure border security, because historically, the country's borders were heavily securitized, and after the fall of the apartheid regime, the country still does not have a well-planned, coordinated and well-functioning border security apparatus (Ilgit & Klotz, 2014), and measures to ensure to establish a well-coordinated border security mechanism, such as the creation of a border management agency (BMA), will take time to materialize as there are

significant challenges which lie ahead for South Africa especially with regards to economic development.

#### **2.8.4 How effective are the SANDF, BCOCC and the BMA in the borders?**

The SANDF, BCOCC and the BMA are characterized by observable policy gaps and that have given way to their perceived ability to manage borders by extension reducing illegal cross border migration and cross border crime. Border management requires a coordinated policy that is free of bottlenecks and loopholes. From the above discussion, it becomes observable that the lack of a coherent operation and unity within the borders are a result of the many departments and agencies that are present, which often results in inefficiency, which resembles the need for policy intervention. Apart from internal policy shortcoming, Dodson (2000) contends that South Africa's borders with neighbouring countries are in a sordid state, hampering the fight against illegal immigration and cross-country criminal activities, and they are less likely to improve. Regional governments have seemingly given little attention to the potential security threat of illegal immigration and cross-country criminal activities. South Africa's border approaches are also to blame and the country must address these rather than rushing to implement border technology that might speak to the current border contexts. To fix these fragmented border management approaches the DA argued that there is a need for policy development relating to arresting, detaining and deporting those who repeatedly enter our country illegally, ensuring undocumented immigrants are regularised or assisted in leaving the country if they do not meet the criteria for remaining in the country and strengthening our border posts. Through proper control and order, South Africa can create corruption-free and effective border security and control and eradicate the corruption and inefficiency endemic to Home Affairs. In all, the presence and well entrenchment of policy results ineffective border management and control, the study, therefore, argues that is it not a matter of having technology in borders or not, but rather there is a great need to configure existing policy or approaches enabling closure of the bureaucracy gap, disjointed operations and lack coordination in borders. This will enable the restoration of border security without militarizing the border.

However, this is notwithstanding the importance of technology in the border but this technology should not be rushed while current approaches are failing to respond to the current realities and the complex challenges of borders today. Arguably, while the study is supportive of technology, it cannot be implemented at the expense of approaches that need to be addressed; this would, in turn, help better integrate technology with current approaches. Nevertheless, before one looks at

the imminent role of technology in borders, it is important to understand the use of technology in borders from an international overview.

## **2.9 Is Technology a viable option for border security: Lessons for the USA?**

Vallet (2016) explains that perhaps when one speaks about technology and the role it can play in enhancing border security, one immediately thinks of the United States of America. Obama (2011) confirmed that the US has invested billions of dollars in technology that can help it protect its borders, and perhaps this has inspired other countries around the world to also significantly increase their investments in security and stability. The American Immigration Council (2017) maintains that since the overhaul of the US immigration system in 1986, the US government has spent around US\$283 billion on immigration and border enforcement and that as of 2017, 49 000 law enforcement officers were stationed at various borders. The rapid increase in cross-border crime and illegal migration has forced the US to seek new ways to better identify, detect and prevent these growing issues from posing as threats to American interests. Therefore, the United States has prioritized the introduction of technology within its borders, especially within the US/Mexico border. While technology and its introduction to border security will not eradicate the threats of cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration, it will better assist border authorities better manage border security. As a result, there have been significant investments in UAV's, long-range cameras, enhanced biometric sensors, motion detectors, ground sensors and powerful facial recognition programs, all of which are meant to ensure the country can better protect its borders. Bennett (2014) however, agrees that not everyone within America's political circles has welcomed the increasing use of technology in borders. Critics have argued that spending so much on technology is wasteful as migrants and syndicates have found complex ways to circumvent these technologies. Rather, the quest to combat illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime should be directed towards the third-party source and transit countries for both migrants and criminal syndicates. Adamson (2006) further laments that increasing technology within borders would increase border securitization or militarization, suffocating the prospects of cooperation and coordination with third party states in dealing with common threats emanating from borders. Hayworth and Eule (2013) argue that perhaps the biggest threat to the US is illegal immigration as the country is constantly battling to stop the illegal migration from Latin and South America.

Stana (2011) believes that technology will better aid border authorities to better manage everyday issues of security within borders and to ensure effective operation-ability; hence perhaps this is

why countries around the world are increasing their budgets on research and development of border technology Završnik (2015) also argues that when used in right scenarios, technology can contribute to a reduction in cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration, mainly because there will be more abilities to detect, identify and better respond to threats promptly. Flynn (2003) however, argues that while technology may have its downsides, its introduction in the US border security architecture perhaps has had a positive impact as there has been an increase in the ability to detect and neutralize threats. Furthermore, the range of technological equipment's ensures that agents have eyes in places which are impossible for the human eye. Krogstad & Barrera (2018) stated that there has been a decrease in unauthorized immigrants attempting to reach the USA. Between 2000 and 2015, there has been a decrease of more than 1 million illegal immigration cases partly owing to stringent measures put in place by Mexico, which is a major transit and contributing country. Barrera (2016) also makes mention that apprehensions between the US/Mexico border have decreased significantly over the past decade from 1 million in 2006 to 408 870 in 2016. However, Raffer & Singer (2002) also maintain that the economic inequality between the global north and south will be at the centre of facilitating illegal cross-border migration as people seek economic prosperity. Furthermore, in third world countries, corruption, weak governance and patronage will see an increase in cross-border crime as cross-border syndicates emerge and consolidate their presence. Martin (2013) therefore, argues that with this, perhaps technology can better help governments be in a better position to deal with these threats of the 21st century. Bellais (2013) explained that one barrier for developing regions is that technology in borders can be quite expensive and hence only developed nations which have the economic power are in a better place to capitalize on this. For example, 2019 funding for the US customs and border protection equalled US\$14.2 billion, while US immigration and customs enforcement received US\$8.3 billion, totalling around US\$23 billion (Office of the President of the United States, 2018), which is higher than the defence budget of many African countries. This, therefore, motivates one to question whether developing nations can be able to invest so much in border technology.

Another dilemma is that while borders within developing regions are highly porous and weak, rather than investing in expensive technology, it more crucial that governance institutions in developing countries are strengthened. After this has been done, perhaps border technology can then be pursued. Prashad (2007) supports the above and states the huge costs involved in procuring these systems side-lines developing nations and pushes them towards securitization rather than cooperation when it comes to collectively managing border issues. However, there

are some who argue that a tech-centric border, even though expensive to institute, to a greater extent would make it easier to cross borders on land, at ports and in air terminals (Picketing & Weber, 2006). However, these technologies can have drastic results. For example, border control policies that use new surveillance technologies along the US–Mexico border have actually doubled migrant deaths and pushed migration routes towards more dangerous terrain through the Arizona desert, creating what anthropologist Jason De Leon calls a land of open graves. Koslowski (2012) argues that with an increase in cross-border trade among states, such will also be complemented by an increase in cross-border migration, whether illegal or legal, states need to ensure their security border apparatus can be able to handle this increase in trade and cross-border movement. Apart from the question of the effectiveness of border technology, there is brewing conversation and debate within the legal and ethical fields with regard to the use of technology within the border. The fundamental question is how can countries expand their use of technology for screening and enforcement at the border without overstepping already strained privacy rights. The discourse, therefore, according to Evan Greer (deputy director of the digital rights group Fight for the Future) should not end at the wall. The way that this debate has been weaponized has really shut down a big portion of the conversation that states should be having. However, one may argue that border technology and its applicability in the USA or any other developed country will not be similar to those of developing regions. Bender (2012), also argues that smart borders are for the rich countries and that it would be difficult for developing regions (faced with poverty, increasing unemployment and inequality) to invest significant amounts of money in them, only to find that such borders do not reflect migration and cross-border crime patterns in such regions. Park & Käppeli (2017), echo the above and argue that despite the many positive elements associated with border technology, regrettably technologies in the border is still monopolized by developed countries.

Cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration are not only beginning to gain the attention of nation-states today. They have been in existence for decades and it is only now that nations have decided to seek new alternatives to ensure their eventual eradication as they have been associated with numerous threats that pose a danger to the nation-state. Furthermore, the growing economic divide is the major factor driving the increase in illegal migration. Porter (1996) notes that strategies applied to deal with these issues differ from region to region and dealing with such issues has become complex in post-apartheid South Africa.

## **2.10 Technology in South African borders**

From an African perspective, South Africa resembles the US and parts of Europe to a great extent, this is because South Africa attracts a considerable number of illegal immigrants and cross-border crime syndicates who aim to solely capitalize on the economic development of the country (Heleta et al. 2018). Furthermore, from an economic point of view, South Africa presents numerous opportunities for cross-border syndicates who prey on the country's weak and disjointed border management architecture, corruption and the inability to ensure the provision of sufficient resources to better aid border management and operations. For example, Radio2000 (2015) explained that between the SA and Zimbabwe border (Beitbridge in the Limpopo province) an average of 31 000 people per day cross the border each day, yearly, South Africa sees 39 to 40 million people enter and exit the country. However, from the above discussion, looking at how expensive it is to procure border technology, one would argue that South Africa ought to focus on addressing the existing policy gaps in its border management framework rather than opting for expensive which may not integrate effectively, nor respond to the current issues at borders. However, for some, as evident by the current political discourse in South Africa, technology had become a crucial need as pointed out by Engelbrecht, (2009), through the introduction of the Border Management Authority, technology will be key in reducing illegal immigration, smuggling of contraband and the associated loss of customs and excise revenues, human trafficking, wildlife poaching, and the spread of animal-borne diseases across borders. Moreover, for the author, South Africa should learn how technology in the border has helped fellow BRICS member Brazil, which has addressed its own border management challenges in the last decade, using an effective and comprehensive border management solution. Sharing its 17,000km of borders with 10 other countries, Brazil has turned to technology using its Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) (Motoboli, 2020). This network of surveillance radars, sensors, command, control and communication systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is approaching completion of its first phase, expected to be fully operation by 2035.

Meny-Gibert & Chiumia (2016) remark that most internal migrants in South Africa come from SADC countries, while nationals from outside the SADC make up just 7.3 percent of all international migrants. A 2016 community survey undertaken by Statistics South Africa showed that most illegal migrants in South Africa mainly come from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Martin (2018) asserts that the misalignment in border management in South African borders has made it cumbersome to effectively to deal with illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime not only within the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts but throughout South Africa's borders, similar issues persist. For Motoboli (2020), one of the most

important elements of a proper functioning border management system is a reliable surveillance system that could be a blend of land and naval-based radar systems. South Africa currently has some form of technology that is in operation in its land borders. However, this is not suitable for addressing the current realities which South Africa borders are facing. Reinforcing this, Lennep (2019) argued that border posts are insufficiently equipped to deal with the volumes and risks that have become endemic to South Africa's land border. The discourse is plagued with reports of broken fences, power failures, poor ICT systems, the lack of a dedicated truck lane and secure vehicle detention area, separate border-crossing buildings and insufficient security infrastructure (lighting; cameras; vehicle scanners; and SANDF vehicles, access roads, bases, and sensors. Tati (2008) questioning how technology will aid border argues that while cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration have increased significantly in a post-apartheid South Africa, such increases cannot be viewed from isolation, arguably, the lack of coordination between departments had given rise to the inability of the to state address these problems. For the author, there is no institutional mechanism that provides for accountability of the various departments and their agencies, and there is no platform that links their information or IT systems. These further points out that border issues in South Africa stem from policy misalignment rather than the notion that borders have been overwhelmed thus necessitating the introduction of technology.

For Motoboli (2020), once South Africa's BMA has been established, it will be able to turn to some of the world's foremost experts on tactical command and control systems and air surveillance and ground-based air defence, with recognized experience in local conditions, making it possible to achieve maximum effect and efficiency, for the safety and protection of South Africa. However, how will it mitigate through existential challenges which are currently hindering current approaches from succeeding in border management? The study contends that technology itself will not succeed in isolation; it will need support from existing border frameworks hence the need to address current challenges before implementing technology. The Africa Defense Forum (2018) stated that while improving border control might reduce cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration in SA, ultimately a border with more advanced technological systems may better position South Africa to deal with these increasing challenges. Dawson et al. (2016) note that just like in the US, these issues have become complex and sophisticated, both in their planning and undertaking, hence traditional methods for border control may need significant upgrading, warranting the introduction of technology to better increase the ability of the government to protect South Africa and its interests. Martin (2011) asserts that perhaps the existence of a single agency responsible for border operations would result in a clearer and unambiguous border security

structure. Building on the insights of Ackleson (2005), the study argues that in South Africa, significant attention has not been paid to the downsides of technology in border management such as issues relating to ethics and espionage needs to be considered. Arguably, one cannot neglect the notion that in SADC, border management is understood within the confines of national interests and driving such is the lack of cooperation with regards to regional border cooperation. However, apart from the lack of cooperation, introducing technology in border management would require some form of regional collaboration especially because it may lead to border securitization and militarization. Nevertheless, it would be naïve and reckless for regional states to see this as securitization, arguably, the modernisation of South Africa's border control technology will ease the process for people taking cargo across national borders, and making it harder for criminals to dodge the system. For Deloitte, smart borders can help the government get back to basics, empowering public servants, industry and the community to work together to solve the most pressing economic and security problems—from issues affecting local communities to those that transcend national borders.

There have been growing calls among South African lawmakers to ensure stricter border management, and perhaps a solution to this would be the introduction of technological elements within the security architecture of South African borders, as envisaged by the BMA bill. The Africa Defense Forum (2018) explained that Tunisia in 2016 launched a US\$25 million border surveillance program that included, motion sensors, thermal cameras, drones and a centralized monitoring system to better help border security forces managed border security and Tunisia is not the only country investing in technology in borders with an African perspective. Brigadier General Jacobus E Crous, speaking at the South African Radar Interest Group (SARIG) conference, stated that to effectively manage South African borders, the country needed at least 50 radars to adequately protect its borders as the current ground control air defence systems are not sufficient to support airborne border safeguarding. Furthermore, having a few fixed and some mobile radars will not be sufficient as this will leave vast gaps in the border, hence both static and mobile radar systems are needed. For Jacobus E Crous while cross border crime and illegal migration are urgent issues that ought to be addressed, with urgency also, the country needs to assess policy gaps and reinforce the loopholes that exist in the current border management frameworks. The use of technology for tracking and monitoring can be taken from South Africa's national parks, which have begun to use an array of systems to protect rhinos.

In the Kruger national park, rangers use a wide range of surveillance system's known as the Meerket to detect animals and people; however, such systems have not been effectively enforced

and implemented in South African land borders (Martin, 2011). Indeed, agrees that such an introduction of technology in South Africa would benefit the country significantly, especially in terms of better assisting the SANDF to undertake their activities in better responding to challenges and border threats. Erasmus (2012) also stated that with its advanced economy and relatively stable GDP, the country has the financial means to invest in technology especially considering that the country is a victim of cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. The Africa Defense Forum (2018) stated that South Africa is already using satellite technology to track migrants, poachers and trafficking syndicates, however, having such UAV's sensors and other related technology within SA borders would contribute significantly compared to satellites alone. Besides satellites, digital surveillance cameras have become lighter and more affordable, while also offering higher resolution and endurance to extreme weather conditions.

From a global perspective, it is undeniable the movement of people whether legal or illegal cannot be entirely stopped, however illegal migration and cross-border crime have become associated with threats to nation-states and hence countries have begun to increasingly develop technological systems aimed at reducing their impact. However, the study argues that technology at the border seldom achieves the desired results. Reinforcing this argument Molnar (2020) posited that we are seeing an increase in tracking, automated drones, and other types of technologies developed by the private sector purporting to help manage migration and cross border crime, in some cases, increased technology at the border has sadly already meant increased deaths and resulted in people looking for other alternatives to reach their destination which may be even deadlier.

Karanja (2008) explains that borders have become a point of contention between country's as they have been seen as key to protecting one's integrity and sovereignty, thus the justification for the increase in technological investments we are seeing today even if such technology infringes certain civilian liberties. Most importantly, technological solutions do not address the root causes of displacement, forced migration, and economic inequality, all of which exacerbate the issues of cross border crime and illegal border migration. Furthermore, threats emanating from borders have become complex and sophisticated. For South Africa, a country that shares a 4862 km border with 6 countries, one may argue that the need for technology has never been greater, mainly owing to the inability of the SANDF to effectively ensure maximum border protection (compounded by budget cuts and limited resources). However, technological tools can quickly become tools of oppression and surveillance, denying people especially vulnerable the right to safety and protection. In South Africa, the political discourse has argued for urgent attention to be

paid to cross border crime and illegal migration, indirectly this has empowered the state to take action. While emergency powers can be legitimate if grounded in science and the need to protect health and safety, history shows that states commit abuses in times of exception. New technologies can often facilitate these abuses, particularly against marginalized communities and people who engage in peaceful migration. Furthermore, tightening border controls tend to lead people to create increasingly elaborate mechanisms to subvert such controls.

South Africa has numerous room to integrate technology within its border management architecture, however, one must note that such integration alone will not contribute to a significant reduction in cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration unless the operations of other government departments/agencies involved in border operations are streamlined, for example, a single agency. Unifying all other activities and services would significantly increase the effectiveness and efficiency within the border environment. Mandrup et al. (2019) also expounded that technological solutions should and can be a force multiplier. However, it needs to be a cost-effective tool, to secure sustainability. Whilst there is a need for partnerships and cooperation for implementing effective border management in Southern Africa, South Africa has a history of building tailored and adequate technological solutions to assist in surveillance and border management and this should be further developed with the framework of land border security. Additionally, one of the advantages of using local technological solutions is that they are often tailored to function in the African context. Erasmus (2012) concludes that technological innovation would greatly help South Africa deal with issues of cross-border migration and illegal cross-border crime; furthermore, it would better help the SANDF better undertake its duties and complement the existing resources. However, border control agencies lack sufficient staff, infrastructure and funding and criminal networks benefit from this. This calls for cross border cooperation, therefore, before rushing to institute border technology, regional countries could amongst others: consider strengthening cooperation among border control agencies by, inter alia, establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication and adopt similar legislative or other appropriate measures to prevent crime and illegal migration. From the above, there are important highlights to note. Firstly, technology, as a border solution is not perfect, it has its drawbacks. Secondly observing the context of South African borders, it becomes cumbersome to understand how this technology will aid current border approaches who are themselves failing to undertake the task at hand. Thirdly, technology at the border will not stop crime and migration; rather it will allow crime syndicates and migrants to find alternative methods. Fourthly, technology will result in some form of securitization of the borders. Fifthly, the lack of cooperation within the SADC allows for

countries to implement individual measures that ought to protect their sovereignty even if these may not reflect the overall sentiment in the region.

Notwithstanding the above, one ponders as to how effective will technology in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts be, especially considering the above-discussed complex and unpredictable challenges. Apart from these challenges the study observes that there is a role for technology in these borders, for example, border technology has been touted to unify and complement existing border operational approaches. The integration and unification of technology with the existing operational mechanisms of the SANDF may prove to be effective in increasing the capacity of the SANDF to better protect South Africa against cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. Currently, the SANDF uses a mixture of land vehicles and helicopters to patrol the border, however, the introduction of UAV's, long-range cameras and other related technology may prove to be a game-changer in terms of how border security is undertaken, furthermore, this will increase the efficiency and ensure the quick and precise reaction to threats. Additionally, proponents argue that it will increase the capacity to detect and eliminate potential threats. There will be an increased capacity for the SANDF to quickly identify and neutralize potential threats which pose a danger to the nation-state. This will further give the country an added advantage in terms of not only being able to secure its borders effectively but also in terms of being quick to identify and react to potential threats (Alperen, 2017).

However, it is easier said than done, for Haddal et al. (2009) argue that instituting a tech-centric border can be very expensive, partly, because such security networks do not only rely on UAV's, long-range cameras, but the infrastructure needs to be in place, infrastructure that caters for technological systems to be used and regrettably, this can be very expensive to set up and considering the current economic climate in South Africa, perhaps undertaking such may not be sustainable at this point. The USA and EU have set aside billions for border technological systems, Martin (2011) however communicated that given the nature of the border issues faced by South Africa, it would make perfect sense for the country to invest in such, the author states that country may not invest in high tech, top on the line technology, however, there are affordable and effective tech systems at affordable prices, which can accommodate South Africa. Additionally, theft has also been identified as a problem, explaining rather Schwartz (2017) explains that borders (especially in the developing world) are porous and easy targets for crime syndicates, hence instituting a tech-centric border, considering all the relevant systems needed to make it effective, these systems need to be protected from theft and vandalism, for example, long-range cameras mounted on the ground need to be protected from and vandalism and with

South Africa's borders fences in complete disarray, the protection of this expensive equipment would be virtually impossible thus giving rise to theft, resulting in huge loss investments for the country. Just like instituting a tech-centric border can be very expensive, maintaining it can very pricy as well. Levy (2007) argues that technological innovation will always be difficult to maintain and for South Africa which is going through economic difficulties currently, maintaining such systems will require huge amounts of money, which may be difficult to come by. However, with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration costing the country millions yearly, perhaps their reduction after the implementation of a tech-centric border would increase the money available to maintain these systems. Moreover, while indeed technology would be beneficial, it is important to consider the advantages, disadvantages and possible challenges in implementing a tech-centric border within a South African perspective. Moreover, considering South Africa's economic growth one would argue that procuring technology would be unattainable, rather considerate attention would need to be paid to policy development and modification. However, the current political discourse for the integrating of technology in South Africa's border is unlikely to change, hence permitting the study to examine the challenges that South Africa would encounter in this regard.

## **2.11 Challenges in dealing with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration: A South African perspective**

The South African Police Service (2016) identifies the following Challenges in dealing with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration:

### **2.11.1 Corruption**

In many underdeveloped countries, widespread corruption, under-resourced services and weak accountability make borders porous and difficult to control, fuelling various forms of illegal activities such as human and drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, organized crime and terrorism. Chene (2018) noted that several specificities make border activities particularly vulnerable to corruption, including poor external oversight; the level of autonomy and discretionary authority border officials enjoy; high tariffs and complex regulatory frameworks that provide traders with incentives to bribe; the pressure of organized crime networks; inadequate salary and working conditions. The author writes that in South Africa, for example, border posts are understaffed and some even lack basic material resources necessary for effective border policing, such as facsimile machines, a consistent electricity supply, and proper living quarters for border officers, vehicles and proper search and storage facilities. A report by the SAPS revealed that corruption is by far

the biggest contributing factor that is facilitating cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration across South African borders (SAPS, 2016). The report expounded that the scourge of corruption among South African borders cuts across the different disciplines and departments operating within and along with the borderline (South African Police Service, 2016). In Support, Allum & Gilmour (2012) state that because cross-border crime is so lucrative, the appetite for taking bribes among officials is highly likely, which further prolongs the cross-border crime problem. Crush, Williams, & Peberdy (2005) conclude that corruption has been and will always be the main factor behind cross-border crime.

### **2.11.2 Cross border cooperation**

While regional protocols through the SADC have been developed to facilitate cooperation regionally regarding issues of common threats, their applicability and functionality have been rather questionable (Van der Spuy, 2009). Hammerstad (2005) goes on to state that there is practically limited if no cooperation in SADC when it comes to collectively dealing with issues emanating from borders, Rifer (2005) supports this and confines that individual states are more concerned with their internal security matters rather than border threats which may or may not entirely affect them as other nations in the region, and therefore this lack of cooperation then leads to regional borders becoming a breeding ground for crime syndicates and illegal migrants. Nsereko (1997), for example, highlighted that because of weak border control in many SADC countries, huge amounts of drugs consignments in containers ship usually undetected. Moreover, there is also a lack of cooperation between police and customs from a SADC perspective. While there have been protocols established such as the Southern African regional police chiefs' committee, the draft protocol on the movement of persons in SADC and the 1996 protocol on illicit drug trafficking, their effective operation has been greatly questioned. One may conclude that what's missing in SADC is cooperation within the realms of these protocols. Cooperation is limited and state interests supersede those of the region, hence more developed countries attract scores of illegal migrants and criminal syndicates compared to less-developed counterparts. These protocols can only be effective if SADC members are committed to abiding by them as a basis for cooperation on regional threats. Moreover, Mandrup et al. (2019) conceded that for regional border management to be effective there is an urgent need for increased coordination and cooperation beyond the narrow focus of the security cluster. All of the other SADC organs need to get involved in the broader discussion of border management, which is more than merely physical security. One challenge, however, is that SADC member states need to develop a joint

strategy for border management, that amongst other things provides a future vision for regional border management that ensures that a move from being reactionary to being preventive and even pre-emptive. Currently, countries are working on directives, but there is no higher level SADC plan (Mandrup et al. 2019).

### **2.11.3 Weak border management systems**

South Africa has seen under-investment in border security and management and this has impeded the country's ability to manage borders effectively, thus aiding and contributing to the emergence and consolidation of cross-border crime syndicates and illegally cross-border crime. The South African Police Service (2016) asserts that the growing rates of cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration warrant the need for more investments to modernize border systems. The use of the South African army in ensuring border security hasn't really been effective as we have continued to witness an increase in cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. Davis & Snyman (2005) argued that it is imperative for border systems to be effective and well-functioning as they will aid departments operating within South African borders. It is undeniable that in many African countries, border systems are inadequate in dealing with border challenges and South Africa is no different. Mansbach & Rhodes (2012) conclude that as globalization brings countries closer together, hence there's bound to be an increase in migration and crime, furthermore, South Africa is a preferred destination for migrants in Africa, especially from a regional perspective and hence this warrants border systems that will be effective and efficient in helping the country to deal with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration.

These are some of the major issues challenging South Africa from effectively managing its borders, however, the country has/developed strategies to manage border security, however, whether these have been successful or not remains highly questionable as the country still witnesses an increase in illegal migration and cross-border crime. While illegal migration and cross border crime are indeed issues that need urgent attention, it a ruse that they have overwhelmed South African borders. What has been observed is there are policy gaps in how borders in South Africa are managed. Therefore, as the country consolidates the discourse of implementing technology in its borders, such an approach must not neglect the need to address existential policy gaps relating to disjointed, funding issues, infrastructure development and human capital development etc. Arguably, it becomes cumbersome to observe how border technology will optimally integrate within the current approaches if such issues are not addressed.

## 2.12 Is technology the answer?

There is a great need for South Africa to be very mindful before embarking on the need to institute a tech-laden border. The United States and the EU are perfect examples to study to understand the effectiveness of technology in the border. Misra (2019) argued that in the USA, civil liberty groups and academics who have studied the effects of border surveillance are raising alarm—pointing to the inefficacy of past surveillance initiatives and the heightened potential for abuses and migrant deaths as a result of such approaches in the future. The push back against a tech-centric border in the USA is cemented on the notion that without proper safeguards in place that determine how the data gathered by these technologies are used, stored, and shared, there is a great need to discourage funding a smart wall as ubiquitous surveillance technology poses a serious threat to human rights and constitutional liberties. If South Africa was to institute a tech-centric border, there would be a great need to explain how this would affect privacy and how will it not infringe civil liberties. In the same vein, in his paper titled “European border policing: EUROSUR, knowledge, calculation” Jeandesboz (2017) argued that while Europe’s European Border Surveillance System, which is a multipurpose system for cooperation between the EU Member States and Frontex has to a great been able to reduce the number of migrants reaching Europe, but it had found it difficult to reduce the increasing number of trafficking/smuggling syndicates which have entrenched themselves in North Africa.

In echoing the above, Andersson (2016) argued that despite Europe’s smart border systems, surveillance and their mass investments in advanced border controls, people keep arriving along the continent’s shores under desperate circumstances. For example, in European Union, criminal syndicates now have the resources and technology needed to exploit the illicit movements of people, goods and money through the use of computer-based technology and available telecommunications systems (Kaunert et al. 2012). European attempts to ‘secure’ or ‘protect’ the borders have quite hot rock bottom, as politicians themselves increasingly recognize – yet more of the same response is again rolled out in response to the escalating ‘refugee crisis. Femmine (2017) asserts that Europe spent €17 billion on stopping immigration from 2014 to 2016 according to a report by the British Think-tank Overseas Development Institute (ODI). At the core of utilizing this money was to create modern surveillance systems, border fences and cooperation with countries of origin. Theodore Baird, a researcher at the University of Amsterdam argued that just like the borders of USA, European borders have become restrictive, securitized and deadly, and

at the core of this is ensure the reduction of illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime (Femmine, 2017).

Lenep (2019) proposes the current borders should be managed efficiently, in a way that facilitates the movement of desirable goods and people, whilst preventing the movement of the contrary. However, some in South Africa feel a technological border is a right direction. The Democratic Alliance undertook its independent research on the state of South Africa borders and argued that to ensure effective border security, border fences must be fixed and reinforced or supplemented with adequate security (watchtowers, infrared equipment, drones (Lenep, 2019). Moreover, the report noted that there is a critical need for accurate and accessible data (on border-crossing times, illegal migration, cross-border criminality, the state of border post infrastructure etc.), to guide decision-making on resource allocation and to enable departments to provide their mandated services effectively. MacDonald (2014), however, while supporting and acknowledging the role that can be played by a tech-centric border, noted that government would struggle to meritoriously raise the funds needed for its eventual implementation and noted that while in the long term government may see technology as key in its border security apparatus, a short term mechanism would be to have single border control policy document. With a unified strategy in place, various departments can identify their roles and get on with the job of safeguarding the country from cross-border threats.

Ilgit & Klotz (2014) expounded that within the context of the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts, securitization will not have a true effect mainly because of two reasons. Firstly, the author argued that the geographic setting in the vicinity of these borders is characterized by huge stretches of land, the fences are not maintained effectively and these long stretches of the land borders are not manned by sufficient members of the SAPS or SANDF. Moreover, the geographical settings around these borders are characterized by extensive forestation, which over the years have been used by smugglers and illegal immigrants as cover to hide from border authorities, which then makes it difficult to understand how securitization of the border would be effective when the basic requirements for border stability (fences, adequate staff) are not prioritized. Benedicto & Brunet (2018) also asserted that tech-centric border will not reduce securitization, rather if applied effectively and operated by skilled professionals; it will complement existing border security strategies and allow easier management of border operation. Moreover, its, inability to reduce border securitization is rested on the premise that cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration are phenomena's caused by socio-economic conditions, and a tech-centric border does not address those conditions hence should such conditions continue to exists, people all always

seek to cross-border and engage in cross-border crime solely because of the quest to maximize income, hence has been the case for South Africa Kosi Bay and Golela Border Post. Moreover, Wickberg further cited Gronlund et al. (2010) who listed border areas that can benefit through reduced corruption as a result of technology: These areas included: automation of routine activities that are prone to bribery and corrupt behaviours, detection of operation anomalies by individuals and networks; preventative detection of corrupt activities through surveillance and provision of feedback and reporting mechanisms for corrupt activities.

In conclusion, it remains questionable whether a tech-centric border would help better secure South Africa's borders or not, the country must weigh up its options very carefully, moreover, the country must consider that it does not possess the same financial muscle compared to the USA & Europe, therefore technological considerations for its border control must be in line with what the country can afford. For example, South African defence minister, Mapisa-Nqakula said the situation was worsening in terms of funding allocation to the department of defence. The minister communicated that "The defence force is becoming progressively more unsustainable in terms of declining defence allocations and South Africa has now reached the point where it must decide on the kind of defence force it wants and what it can afford." Schneidman & Wiegert (2018) also argued that politically or in terms of influence, South Africa is not comparable to the US or the EU and it would be better for the country to seek cross-border cooperation on issues of cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration rather than unilaterally seek technological border systems which may create tension with neighbouring countries. Günay & Witjes (2016) worry and ponder whether the induction of such technology in SA borders would reduce or increase border securitization, particularly the deployment of soldiers since this has been the strategy used by SA when it comes to protecting the country's borders. Over the last decade, the SADC has overemphasized the need for the region to undertake measures that would de-securitize borders to bolster the movement of labour, capital and trade to accelerate regional economic integration. However, while this is indeed very important for the SADC, the region cannot ignore the increasing threats which are associated with the borders of the region despite wanting to achieve deeper levels of integration (Le Sage, 2007).

Apart from the above, there are considerations that the country needs to consider before going on full-scale implementation of technology on the border. Firstly, the financial cost involved, Maqhina (2019) noted that the budget allocation to the department of defence further hinders their ability to not only secure border effectively but also procure state of the art technological systems of aid illegal migration and cross-border crime not on in the Golela or Kosi Bay border posts but

also within all the borders (land) of South Africa. With South Africa's GDP having declined by 3.2 percent in the first quarter of 2019 (Mathe, 2019), financing a tech-centric border would prove difficult. However, Finn & Wright (2012) estimate that affordable surveillance drones cost roughly US\$ 30000, hence the unaffordability factor can be ruled out however at the same time one cannot ignore that South Africa currently cannot afford the implementation of a tech-centric border as the economic means needed to procure systems that make up such border are unavailable. Secondly, neighboring Southern African states may be sceptical and unsure whether South Africa will solely use the technology for border security or perhaps spy on them (Kouhi-Esfaha, 2019). For example, the Guardian exposed how Chinese border police were secretly installing surveillance apps on the phones of visitors and downloading personal information as part of the government's intensive scrutiny of the remote Xinjiang region. Deeks (2014) also argued that when it comes to Surveillance, International law has little to say about foreign surveillance. Fjäder (2014), explains that the unpredictability of the international system today has given rise to increased threats emanating from borders and traditional methods to manage border security have become redundant as threats become more and more complex and as a result, there has been a renewed use of surveillance on foreign governments but also citizens. The question is, therefore, how South Africa will factor in regional concerns while at the same time effectively using border technology to secure its borders. However, the lack of collective security agreement in the SADC relating to the joint undertaking of border security warrants individual states to take steps to manage their border security, irrespective of the concerns that might be raised by others. Martin (2011), argued that there is no regional security framework on cooperation or collaboration concerning border threats, hence South Africa as a country that is greatly affected by cross-border crime syndicates and illegal migration may undertake whatever means necessary to protect its border and citizens. Van Nieuwkerk (2012) contended that it would be great if the region had a collective security framework which was in operation where cross-border security is jointly managed, perhaps this would ensure that border policies of member states are streamlined and border security is taken under a collective agreement, however, such absence means individual states take unilateral measures to ensure their security. Finally, terrain conditions and government bureaucracy are also important points of analysis. Hennop et al. (2001) & Mitchley (2018) stated that some borders are located in very unpredictable hard to access terrain, (SA-Mozambique border) and effectively patrolling such borders becomes very much difficult, hence illegal migrants and cross-border crime syndicates use these hard to reach areas to carry out their illicit businesses. Newman (2017) alluded that technology is needed for such scenarios, where human eyes cannot reach, technological innovation will aid in reaching those areas. However, with the

unpredictability of border management in SA, bureaucratic issues may impede such, especially concerning the mandate, responsibilities and operation of technological surveillance systems. Therefore, until the operations and duties of the multiple stakeholders present in SA borders are streamlined, the introduction of technological components within the border security architecture may give way to issues of discontent. Africa Defense Forum (2015) concluded that from a South African perspective, the introduction of a tech-centric border would contribute to better border management and most importantly present the SANDF with new and effective ammunition to be used in reducing cross-border migration and cross-border crime, however, the non-alignment of the current policy of managing borders in SA is the issue of bureaucracy that might arise with the numerous agencies involved in border management, furthermore, as the world becomes connected so will the increase in the illegal movements of people and cross-border crime syndicates, countries need to invest in new ways to better manage their security in the face of increasing threats.

### **2.13 Limitations of the Literature within a South African context**

The study argues that while technology in borders (The Golela & Kosi Bay border posts) will not eliminate migration and cross-border crime, nonetheless nations cannot sit idle in the face of increasing border threats, hence are within their rights to take measures to protect their sovereignty. The literature argued that lack of cooperation among states with regards to border issue has driven countries to unilaterally undertake their border management approaches which may contravene regional agreements or inter-state relationships. Central to this is the argument that technology, while it may be effective in borders, there has been growing concern with regards to the ethical use of technology especially with regards to spying and espionage, hence governance and ethics, with relation to the utilization of technology in borders, is gaining momentum in the US and EU. DeSipio & Rodolfo (2015) argue that technology will undeniably remain a significant feature within the domains of border security for decades to come as nations have understood that threats emanating from borders are growing. In South Africa, several loopholes within its border management approach. Firstly, the country has too many departments/agencies present at its borders and while each department/agency undertakes different tasks, this, however, resulted in bureaucracy, task duplication and lack of coherent and efficient operational framework. Secondly, the border infrastructure (border fences etc.), are falling apart, limited investments are being made into their maintenance. Thirdly, the SANDF which is key in tackling cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration has been witnessing

shrinking budget allocations and this has been hindering it from prioritizing border management. Fourthly, corruption within South Africa's borders has given rise to the consolidation of maladministration, subsequently giving way to cross-border crime and unregulated migration. Fifthly, cross-border cooperation within the SADC has been shortcoming, within the statutes of the SADC, cross-border policing ought to be undertaken in collaboration between member states, however, in practical terms, cooperation with regards to border issues has not been convincing regionally. The operational gap within the management of South Africa's borders stems from what and how the government wants borders managed and how border management is undertaken currently. As put by Mandrup, Kleynhans & Blaine (2019) "with the absence of an effective monitoring policy which guides how the management of border operations are to be undertaken, cross-border crime, illegal migration and transport of goods are just some of the consequences of the absence of effective border management". Another irony highlighted in the literature is that South Africa's airports are laden with sophisticated state of the art technology (thermal imaging technology, modern cameras and sensors etc.), additionally, South Africa's game reserves are also exploring technology to better ensure the protection of rhinos and elephants in the face of increased in poaching. However, within South Africa's land borders (which are a prime target for crime syndicates and migrants), such technology has not been fully explored. The border management authority bill argues which is yet to become fully operational has been the only policy/strategy which argues for the introduction of technology to assist in border operations and management. Therefore, while the political discourse in South Africa has been in favour of the introduction of technology in borders, the discourse itself has failed to reflect on how the current challenges in borders will be addressed and how technology will be integrated into border management. In all, from the literature, South Africa borders are not overwhelmed, rather there is a strong need for policy development that will address current border challenges. While technology may be needed to complement current approaches to achieve optimal border operation, at the core however is the need for policy misalignment and effective execution. It with the above that the study argues technology while important is not an urgent need, rather border policy frameworks that incorporate cross border cooperation need to be explored and prioritized. Technology may after this has been done, be introduced, to complement these approaches.

## **2.14 Conclusion**

The chapter aimed to examine the current literature with regards to illegal migration, cross border crime and the role of technology in addressing the issues in the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts.

The study observed the growing voices within South Africa's political discourse for the need to introduce technology in the management and operational framework of the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts. Such calls are underpinned by what politicians and policymakers observe as a need to reduce cross border crime and illegal migration and by extension other threats that emanate from borders. Additionally, the lack of cooperation in the SADC has been seen as another weak link in the regions' quest to combat the increasing entrenchment of cross border crime syndicates. For South Africa, while the literature argued why technology ought to be introduced border, it failed to reflect on how the current challenges ought to be addressed to allow for the seamless integration of border technology. Moreover, illegal cross border migration and crime are driven by weak border management systems, which signals a need to address policy mishaps rather than observe technology as the ultimate solution. What's more, there was a lack of attention paid to cross border cooperation as an alternative to technology in borders. Arguably, the literature failed to reflect that the global north still holds a monopoly over border technology and the costs associated with procuring it sidelines developing regions. Going forward, South Africa should incorporate technology as an element towards border security, but it should not be seen as the only solution, rather areas of contention should be policy development and alignment, addressing the shortcomings of border policies and exploring the concept of cross border cooperation. The study, therefore, argued that while the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts are porous, in most cases such porousness is driven by a lack of cooperation and coordination among the plethora of departments and agencies present in these borders, therefore before one decides on technology, there is need to improve current policy development frameworks.

The following chapter looks at the research methodology of the study. The approaches selected and its justification. Moreover, the theoretical framework of this study is discussed.

## **CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **3.1 Introduction and overview**

This chapter is organized as follows: there is an introduction and overview and then discussions of the research design; target population, sampling size and sampling technique; overview of the information needed to address the research questions; data collection, analysis, presentation and interpretation. There is a discussion of the limitations of the study and finally the chapter conclusion/summary. The study adopted a qualitative research approach as it aimed at constructing meanings out of the experiences of its participants. In addition, issues relating to cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration within the context of the Golela and Kosi Bay border post require descriptive and explanatory information. Engaging with respondents before the actual data collection process allowed the researcher to gain deeper insight into their thoughts and how their participation will contribute to the study. This section is guided by Bloomberg & Volpe (2008) who argue that qualitative research should be presented in a systematic way to allow for ease of reference and must explicitly explain how the research was conducted.

### **3.2 Research design**

For this study, a qualitative, exploratory and descriptive and design was followed using the phenomenological method to explore the thoughts, experiences and perceptions of the selected participants. This research sought to construct meaning out of the experiences of cross border migration experts on the ongoing border issues in the Golela and Kosi-Bay border posts. During the interview, process, the interviews used bracketing (which refers to putting preconceived ideas aside) and intuiting (focusing on the experiences, opinions and perceptions of participants with regards to the subject matter. Interviews were conducted until the data saturation point was reached. In this study, data saturation was reached when the researcher interviewed 15 participants who were well-grounded on borders (South African borders), migration and the use of technology in borders. The interviews were tape-recorded to ensure that the perceptions, opinions and thoughts were captured without error or misinterpretation and to ensure data security. Coding was done by the researcher with the assistance of the researcher's supervisor to safeguard the process so as not to affect the quality of the data.

Burns & Groove (2001), describe exploratory research as research conducted to gain new insights, discover new ideas, and for increasing knowledge of the phenomenon. The study

attempted to gain new insights as to how cross border crime and illegal cross border migration have become serious issues in South Africa's border's security apparatus. Over the years, there have been riots and protests in the areas around the Golela and Kosi Bay borders due to the inability of authorities to clamp down on border crime and illegal migration.

According to Streubert & Carpenter (1999), descriptive research involves direct exploration, analysis and description of the particular phenomena as free as possible from unexplained presuppositions, aiming at maximum intuitive presentation. The fundamental feature of descriptive studies is that they are used to document the phenomenon of interest in the real situation. This study aimed at not only exploring the subject under study but also emphasizing its descriptive aspects. As reflected above, border crime and illegal migration within the vicinity of these borders have contributed to riots and protests. Therefore, describing the underlying causes of these riots would contribute to exploring how these issues can be addressed in real situations and may also contribute to the development of an appropriate policy response.



The phenomenological method was employed in the attempt to understand the thoughts, perceptions and opinions of participants concerning the subject under examination. Phenomenology as a concept emphasizes the individual's constitution of his or her lifeworld, in other words, how the person experiences his or her world. The phenomenological method was used in this study to allow the participants to share their experiences, perceptions and thoughts with the researcher without imposing the views of the researcher. Phenomenology emphasizes descriptions of the phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from unexplained preconceptions and presuppositions (Streubert & Carpenter 1999). The researcher, therefore, approached the interview to understand the attitudes and perceptions of participants in their own world. The illustration below presents the research design of this study.

**Table 3.1: Study research design**

Preliminary research assessment and the identification of the gap



<p><b>Prior</b></p> <p>Literature survey.</p> <p>Contextualizing the problem to be investigated</p> <p>Consulting with Supervisor and experts in the field</p>	<p>Stating the of the problems, the formulation of the research objectives and questions</p>	<p><b>Post</b></p> <p>Noting the shortcomings and gaps in the literature</p> <p>Formulation of research objectives and questions</p> <p>Clearly defining the problem</p>
<p><b>Prior</b></p> <p>In-depth review of literature</p> <p>Clarification of concepts and definition</p> <p>Border management strategies in south Africa</p>	<p>Intensive review of literature review</p>	<p><b>Post</b></p> <p>Clearly identifying the gap in in the literature</p> <p>Alternative solutions to border management in south Africa</p> <p>Shortcomings of the literature</p>
<p><b>Prior</b></p> <p>Research design and prides development</p> <p>Data collection tool development</p>	<p>Research design and methodology</p>	<p><b>Post</b></p> <p>Data collection process</p> <p>Description of the research design process</p>
<p><b>Prior</b></p> <p>Data collection commences</p> <p>Target population Sample size clarification</p> <p>Sources of data</p>	<p>Data collection and interpretation of results</p>	<p><b>Post</b></p> <p>Storage of collected data</p> <p>Data sorting and entry to Atlas.ti and Nvivo</p> <p>Result generation and presentation</p>

<p><b>Prior</b></p> <p>Results discussions</p> <p>Linking with previous studies and literature findings</p>	<p>Findings and Discussions</p>	<p><b>Post</b></p> <p>justification of findings</p> <p>Identifying the meaning behind newly generated ideas and insights</p>
		
<p><b>Prior</b></p> <p>Concluding remarks</p> <p>Reflection on the overall results</p>	<p>Conclusion and recommendation</p>	<p><b>Post</b></p> <p>Areas for future research</p> <p>Recommendations</p>

Source: Compiled by researcher

**3.2.1 Research methodology**

The study adopted the qualitative research method, which according to Neergaard & Ulhøi (2007), focuses on how individuals or groups understand and view the world and then constructs meanings out of their experiences. Jamshed (2014) notes that in qualitative research, one of the methods of collecting data is the use of interviews; similarly, data was collected using interviews in this research. Kim, Sefcik & Bradway (2017) also notes that qualitative studies use a descriptive approach which is similar to the approach utilized in this research. Taking into consideration the background of the study, it's setting, sampling methods and data collection, the researcher concluded that these factors together with the research approach adopted were sufficient in helping the researcher realize the objectives of the study. Furthermore, as argued earlier, border issues revolve around sovereignty and integrity, making the research approach suitable for understanding how cross border crime and illegal migration were feeding into the debates of sovereignty, and integrity within these borders.

The researcher believes that quantitative methods were unlikely to elicit the rich data necessary to address the research objectives and questions. Cross border crime and illegal cross border migration in the vicinity of the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts have resulted in riots and protests, thus descriptive and exploratory perspectives were sufficient in examining the topic under study.

The title and objectives of the study align with understanding the processes by which events and actions take place, developing contextual understanding, facilitating interactivity between researcher and participants and adopting an interpretive stance.

### **3.2.2 Target population, sample size and sampling technique**

The target population of this study comprised of experts (policymakers, academics, senior researchers) who have extensive experience in borders, migration, cross-border or transnational crime and the use of technology in borders as measures to ensure the territorial integrity of nation-states. Sampling refers to when members of a target population who meet specific criteria and are willing to participate in the study are selected (Etikan et al. 2016). Two techniques of sampling are used – probability sampling and non-probability sampling (Acharya et al., 2013). Probability sampling uses randomization to ensure that every element of the population has an equal chance to be selected into the sample (Etikan et al. 2016). Probability sampling is alternatively known as random sampling (Acharya et al. 2013). Methods of random sampling include; simple random sampling, stratified sampling, systematic sampling, cluster sampling and multi-stage sampling (Punch, 2013). The non-probability sampling technique is reliant on the researcher's ability to select elements from the target population (Etika et al. 2016). Components of non-random sampling include convenience sampling, purposive sampling, quota sampling and referral /snowball sampling (Punch, 2013). The purposive sampling technique is based on reasons cited by the researcher concerning the research. Purposive sampling is chosen based on convenience for the researcher (Acharya et al., 2013). In this type of sampling, items for the sample are selected deliberately by the researcher based on their perceived understanding of the phenomenon under examination. This allows the researcher to select cases or subjects using one or more traits of the problem being researched.

A sample size of 15 was selected. Suter (2012) argues that in qualitative research, researchers should be aware of the point of saturation. Moreover, border and migration issues have similar contexts since they revolve around security, better border operations and the need to secure territorial integrity. This is why it became sufficient for the study to seek the opinions of experienced experts as this allowed for the collection of robust data. Sampling criteria are the characteristics essential to the membership of the target population. These criteria are the characteristics that delimit the population of interest (Burns & Grove 2001).

For this study the inclusion criteria were:

- The participants had to be knowledgeable about the Golela and Kosi Bay borders and have to have been engaged in research on the use of technology in borders.
- Extensive academic background and knowledge on borders and immigration, and
- Employed in an academic or research institution.

The sample size also relied on Suter’s (2012) description of two methods of saturation namely, inductive thematic saturation and data saturation. Inductive thematic saturation relates to the development of new codes or themes while data saturation relates to the extent to which new data is repeated by what was previously expressed. Considering the limited number of experts on the subject under study, a sample of 15 was therefore sufficient to obtain rich data and at the same time avoid data saturation. The table below provides a breakdown of respondents.

**Table 3.2: Distribution of study participants**

<b>Respondent(s)</b>	<b>Number</b>
Federal University Otuoke	01
Africa Centre for Strategic Studies	01
Defence Web	01
Thabo Mbeki Institute of Leadership	01
Enhancing Africa’s ability to Counter Transnational Crime (ENACT)	01
Institute for Global Dialogue	01
Institute of Security Studies	02
Mangosuthu University of Technology	01
Parliament of South Africa	01
University of the Western Cape	02
University of Johannesburg	01
University of Manchester	01
University of Zululand	01
<b>Total sample size</b>	<b>15</b>

Purposive sampling was used to select research participants who included experts in illegal cross-border migration, cross-border crime and had an understanding of technology in 21st-century border security. Central to the adoption of the purposive sampling technique was the explanation by Cormack (1991) that due to their in-depth nature and the need for data analysis, qualitative studies usually require small samples. The researcher selected purposive sampling based on two

elements. Firstly, according to Etikan & Bala (2017) note that the willingness of respondents to participate and share information for the study is important in the use of purposive sampling. Secondly, due to limited resources, the researcher targeted experts who were flexible and easily accessible (see Acharya et al. 2013).

### **3.2.3 Overview of information needed**

Perceptual information, demographic information and theoretical information are used in this study. Perceptual information, which refers to participants' perceptions related to the particular subject of inquiry, is the most critical of the kinds of information needed. It relies, to a great extent, on interviews to uncover participants' descriptions of their experiences related to such things as how experiences influenced the decisions they made, whether participants had a change of mind or a shift in attitude, whether they described more of the constancy of purpose, what elements relative to their objectives participants perceived as important, and to what extent those objectives were met. The study used in-depth semi-structured interviews to collect data (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2018). This allowed the researcher to uncover the thoughts, perceptions and overall understanding of experts on the subject matter. Perceptual information is common in qualitative research where interviews are the commonly used tool to collect data.

Demographic information is participant profile information that describes the participants in the study – where they come from, some of their history and/or background, education and personal information such as age, gender, and ethnicity (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2018). While the study did not use all the variables above, education and background were very important. The study aimed at understanding the perceptions, attitudes and opinions of experts on illegal migration, cross border crime and the role of technology in South African border operations so it was important for participants to have a good academic background on the subject matter. Finally, the study employed theoretical information which was important in allowing the study to peruse the already available literature sources to further enrich the study. Theoretical information is important as it supports the methodological approach, provides theories related to the research questions that form the development and ongoing refinement of the conceptual framework and provides support for interpretation, analysis, and synthesis (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2018).

Theoretical information was crucial in aiding the collecting of supplementary data. The below table explains further by linking the research questions to the types of information needed.

**Table 3.3: Linking research questions with the of Overview of Information Needed**

<b>Type of Information</b>	<b>What the Researcher Requires</b>	<b>Method</b>
Perceptual	To understand the opinions of perceptions with regards challenges affecting immigration officials in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross border crime.	Interview
Demographic	To understand more especially the educational background and knowledge of participants regards to the subject under study	Interview
Theoretical	To peruse available literature that will support and aid the study in understanding the phenomenon under study	Literature search through reviewing of documents relating to subject matter.
<b>Research Question 1:</b> To examine the challenges affecting immigration officials in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross border crime.	The study seeks to understand the issues challenges and bottlenecks that hinder immigration officials in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross border crime and how these can be addresses	Interview

<b>Type of Information</b>	<b>What the Researcher Requires</b>	<b>Method</b>
Perceptual	To examine if through the opinions of experts current	Interview

	strategies to manage cross border crime and illegal migration are effective are effective.	
Demographic	To understand more especially the educational background and knowledge of experts with regards to border management strategies in south Africa.	Interview
Theoretical	To peruse available literature that in detail speaks to how borders are managed in south Africa	Document review
<b>Research Question 2:</b> To examine the effectiveness of the existing strategies (if any) aimed at managing illegal cross border migration and cross border crime	To examine if existing strategies aimed at dealing with cross border crime and illegal migration are effective.	Interview

<b>Type of Information</b>	<b>What the Researcher Requires</b>	<b>Method</b>
Perceptual	To garner the Participant's description and perceptions with regards to the role of technology borders and its effectiveness.	Interview
Demographic	To garner the Participant's educational grounding and knowledge with regards to the use of technology in borders.	Interview

Theoretical	To peruse debates and discussion with the literature with regards to the use of technology in borders.	Document review
<b>Research Question 3:</b> To evaluate whether technological systems via a tech centric border (virtual border) would significantly contribute to a reduction in cross border crime and illegal cross border migration.	To understand if experts think a tech centric border would significantly contribute to a reduction in cross border crime and illegal cross border migration	Interview

Type of Information	What the Researcher Requires	Method
Perceptual	To garner the Participant's perceptions as what are the challenges that might face south Africa in its quest to ensure the use of technology in with regards to the role of technology the Golela and Kosi Bay border post.	Interview
Demographic	To garner the Participant's educational grounding and knowledge regarding not only the Golela and Kosi Bay border post but also whether technology can be integrated with South Africa's border management apparatus	Interview
Theoretical	To garner differing opinions, augments and debates with	Document review

	regards to the challenges that countries face when aiming to incorporate technology in their border management.	
<b>Research Question 4:</b> To determine the challenges faced by South Africa in implementing a tech centric border management system in the Golela and Kosi Bay border post	To understand the types of challenges that would hinder South Africa in its attempt to implement a the-centres border at the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts	Interview

<b>Type of Information</b>	<b>What the Researcher Requires</b>	<b>Method</b>
Perceptual	To garner the Participant's perceptions as the possible the advantages and disadvantages of a tech-centric border for south Africa	Interview
Demographic	To examines the educational background, expertise, experience of Participant's with regarding to the pros and cons of a tech-centric border	Interview
Theoretical	To garner differing opinions, augments and debates with regards to the pros and cons of a tech-centric border	Document review
<b>Research Question 5:</b> Where possible, to understand the advantages and disadvantages of	To Understand that advantages and disadvantages that are associated with a tech-centric border and how these would	Interview

instituting a tech-centric border for South Africa	affect south Africa's border management approach.	
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**3.2.4 Data-collection methods**

In qualitative research, data collection involves the selection and production of visual or linguistic material for understanding phenomena (Flick, 2007). In this study, the phenomenon under study is migration, cross border crime and the use of technology in borders. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2011) note that data can be collected from primary sources or secondary sources. The study used a qualitative research method. To collect data, semi-structured interviews were conducted and a documentation analysis under which a review of literature was undertaken. The documentation analysis was undertaken to enable understanding of historical connotations regarding land borders, migration, cross-border crime and border technology.

**3.2.4.1 Semi-structured interviews**

The study used in-depth, semi-structured interviews to collect data. Unstructured interviews take place with a few or no interview questions and often progresses like a normal conversation (Nardi, 2018). Semi-structured interviews use an interview protocol that guides the researcher through the interview process (Longhurst, 2003). Conversational aspects can be included in semi-structured interviews and this is led by the researcher. Longhurst (2003) notes that semi-structured interviews are also referred to as soft interviews. Structured interviews adhere to an interview protocol to guide the researcher. Structured interviews are rigid as only the questions in the interview protocol are asked (Wethington & McDarby, 2015). Opdenakker (2006) argues that there are several benefits associated with semi-structured interviews such as allowing individual participants to share their opinions without bias from other participants. Another advantage is that the completion rate is high (Opdenakker, 2006). Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2011) note that semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to probe answers enabling respondents to build upon their responses. The respondents are unlikely to opt out before completion, especially with in-person interviews.

Saunders et al. (2011) explain that semi-structured interviews are also called qualitative research interviews and are non-standardized in comparison to structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are guided by research questions. The choice of semi-structured interviews was motivated by the context and background of the topic under study. Since the end of apartheid,

there have been growing debates on South Africa's porous borders, crime and illegal migration. Politicians have sought to securitize borders and keep migrants out while at the same time reducing cross border crime. The study, therefore, aimed to collect as much information as possible from participants who are well informed on the subject matter through open-ended questions from semi-structured interviews.

Before conducting the actual interviews, the researcher arranged to meet the participants at their places of work to discuss the outline, the reason for their selection and to clear up any questions participants might have. Upon agreement, interview times were arranged and dates were confirmed. Participants were given an overall background to what the questions will be centred on and what they aimed to uncover. This was done to ensure possible responses align with the objectives of the study. Interviews were undertaken on weekends at 10:00 AM. They were tape-recorded to ensure data security and authenticity. For those participants who were not based in South Africa, Skype interviews were done on weekends at 15:00 PM as this was the suitable times as agreed with the participants. Each interview took approximately 1 hour and the researcher took notes of highlights and what needed further probing. These were then used to explore the phenomenon through follow up questions. The researcher had the interview questions stored on a tablet and was sitting opposite the participants at a rectangular table. The tape recorder was placed in the middle of the table yet close to the participant to ensure that it captures the conversation correctly. For those who were interviewed via Skype, a tape recorder was placed on the sound outlet of the laptop and also the recording function on the software was activated. Interview questions were developed by the researcher in conjunction with the researcher's supervisor.

The researcher, however, acknowledged that a drawback of the semi-structured interview, as noted by Kvale (2006), is that the interviewer tends to dominate the interview. To avoid this, the researcher considered the social interactions that are integral to the interview process and the possible impact these interactions may have on the credibility of the overall study.

#### **3.2.4.2 Documentation analysis (Desktop)**

The study also relied on theoretical information or secondary data. It involves textual analysis of the available literature from books, newspaper articles, journals, reliable internet sources, government policy documentation, speeches and legislation. Cheng & Phillips (2014) note that when studying a global phenomenon that has been well studied over time, desktop analysis is

advantageous as it gives insight into the historical context of the phenomenon. Lopez (2013) asserts that desktop documentation analysis of secondary data saves time and data is accessible. Secondary data analysis is feasible for both longitudinal and international comparative studies leading to the generation of new insights (Lopez, 2013). The use of theoretical information is crucial as the debates on borders, cross border crime and illegal migration have been well documented in South Africa. Several studies have explored how the South African government can respond to border issues and the future role of technology and this information is valuable for answering the research questions.

### **3.2.5 Data analysis and presentation**

According to LeCompte (2000), research data analysis is a process of reducing data to a story and interpreting it to derive insights. The data analysis process helps in reducing a large chunk of data into smaller fragments which makes sense. Three major things take place during the data analysis process. The first, data organization, the second, data reduction, which is done through summarization and categorization and lastly, data analysis takes place, which can be done in both, top-down or bottom-up fashion (Adèr, 2008). Data analysis involves the interpretation of data gathered through the use of analytical and logical reasoning to determine patterns, relationships or trends. In line with the above, this section discusses how the qualitative data collected was analyzed and which processes/software's were employed.

Face to face interviews that were undertaken were carefully recorded to enable transcription. Subsequently, the researcher scrutinized the meanings which were embedded in the responses to enable the understanding of the experiences, thoughts and opinions with regard to migration, cross border crime and border technology. The data was classified and categorized to allow the researcher to generate themes to interpret the results against the main and follow up research questions. In essence, these themes arose from the respondents' views which were clustered together to allow the researcher to establish a comprehensive understanding of their views.

The use of content analysis was informed by its advantages which were described by Kohlbacher (2006):

- Content analysis is more of a hands-on approach to research than quantitative content analysis
- It is appropriate for analyzing qualitative responses to unstructured open-ended questions; and importantly for this study

- For decades, scholars have used content analysis to understand issues relating to migration, borders and transnational crime.

The data was coded and analyzed on Atlas.ti version 8. In vivo coding was used to generate codes that were grouped into sub-classes and then major classes or themes. The use of these computer software's enabled the researcher to store, categorize, retrieve and compare data. The following major themes were generated, each with its own sub-themes:

- Theme 1: Benefits and need for tech-centric borders
- Theme 2: Challenges in implementing smart border technologies
- Theme 3: Border management issues behind illegal migration and crime
- Theme 4: Addressing root factors of illegal migration and border crime

The researcher opted to use direct narrative analysis by which the researcher analyses the stories people create, engaging in an inquiry of asking a given set of questions on the narrative 'texts' for a given purpose (Creswell 2013). This approach helps researchers understand how people are representing themselves, or their experiences, to themselves and others. Therefore, direct quotes were used to determine common threads from the interview responses.

Sutton & Austin (2015) argue that in qualitative research, readers ought to be presented with data that enables them to see what the researcher is talking about at all times. Sufficient data should therefore be presented to allow the reader to see the relationship between the data and its interpretation. In this study, data was conventionally presented by using illustrative quotes, which Corden & Sainsbury (2006) argue to be sufficient for presenting qualitative data as they flesh out the strength of opinion or belief, similarities between respondents, differences between respondents and the breadth of ideas. The discussion section used figures to show the linkage between important elements of the study. This allowed the researcher to present what experiences, thoughts and opinions were derived from the respondents. Codes were generated to group the responses and also ensure alignment with the research objectives and questions.

### **3.2.6 Interpretation of data**

Data interpretation is the process of assigning meaning to the collected information and determining their conclusions, significance and implications of the findings. It is an important and exciting step in the process of research. Ofulla (2013) stated that the interpretation of data refers

to the task of drawing inferences from the collected facts after an analytical and/or experimental study. According to Hwang (2008), Atlas.ti automatically creates graphical illustrations while In-vivo is used to organize, analyze and find insights in unstructured or qualitative data like interviews, open-ended surveys responses, journal articles, documents, social media and web content. Interpretation of data allows the researcher to attach meaning out the data that has been analyzed. According to Ofulla (2013), data interpretation ought to be done carefully and promptly to avoid misinterpretation which could result in a conclusion that is not aligned with the overall objectives and research questions.

An element of analytical inquiry was also incorporated into the study. To achieve this, the researcher fulfilled two essential requirements of data collection. First, situate the data into the context of existing scholarship to determine whether the former corroborates or disputes the latter, or conveys new understandings and thoughts. Second, highlight important aspects of the results to address the main study' research question and aim. Data was derived in respect to the following five areas – challenges faced by immigration officials, existing strategies aimed at managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime, tech-centric border, illegal cross-border and cross-border crime, challenges faced by South Africa in instituting a tech-centric border and possible advantages and disadvantages of a tech-centric border.

Themes were generated in terms of the five objectives of the study. The first objective focused on the challenges, bottlenecks that were hindering border authorities' form effectively ensuring a reduction in cross-border crime and illegal migration. The second examined the effectiveness of the existing strategies to understand if South Africa's existing strategies to deal with illegal cross-border migration and cross border crime were effective or needed to be overhauled or ought to be modified altogether. The third objective was to evaluate whether a tech-centric border would reduce illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime. The fourth objective was to determine the challenges faced by South Africa in implementing a tech-centric border management system in the Golela and Kosi Bay border post and the fifth objective was to understand the advantages and disadvantages of instituting a tech-centric border for South Africa. The interpretation of data concluded at the stage where the researcher was able to draw inferences about the objectives of the study.

### **3.3 Ethical and safety issues**

Throughout the research process, researchers need to ensure that they protect research participants, promote the integrity of research and guard against misconduct and impropriety (Khumar 2018). Issues such as personal disclosure, authenticity, and credibility of the research are important and the researcher adhered to following the code of ethics to ensure that the study is credible and participants are treated fairly:

- The researcher abided by the University of Zululand's Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics and its Policy and Procedures on Managing and Preventing Acts of Plagiarism. Every effort was taken to avoid plagiarism and the avoidance to report false information.
- The researcher abided by the general principles set out in the University's policies and the obligations which obligate the researcher to mitigate any ethical dilemma and risk that might arise during the course of the study.
- The researcher respected the dignity, safety and well-being of study participants their immediate associates.
- Consideration was made of elements that might have appeared sensitive to different cultures, languages, beliefs, perceptions, and customs of persons who participated or were affected by the research.
- All information from interviews was confidential and only accessed by the researcher in time of need.
- The researcher obtained permission letters or consent before conducting interviews and gaining access to institutions.

### **3.4 Trustworthiness**

In order to collect reliable and valid information to ensure quality data collection, several measures were taken. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2015) define validity as the ability of the data collection instrument to measure what it is intended to measure. Reliability on the other hand refers to the ability of the data collection instrument to measure what it is intended to measure consistently (Creswell 2013). Khumar (2018) lists four indicators used to measure reliability and validity in qualitative research namely, credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability.

#### **3.4.1 Content validity**

Content validity refers to the extent to which the data collection instrument adequately responds to the research questions (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2011). Zohrabi (2013) notes that to ensure content validity, data collection instruments should be reviewed by experts in the field under study. Similarly, Khumar (2018) defines content validity as an assessment of the data collection instruments items. In light of this, the semi-structured interview schedule was reviewed by experts in the field of migration, cross border crime and border technology. According to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2011), a thorough review of literature ensures content validity and enables all information relating to the study is adequately covered by the data collection instrument, in this case the semi-structured interview schedule.

### **3.4.2 Credibility**

Khumar (2018) describes credibility in qualitative research confidence that can be placed in the truth of the research findings. The researcher, therefore, strived to produce findings that are believable and convincing to the study participants. Member-checking was employed to ensure participants were able to check for accuracy and resonance with their experiences and how they were captured by the researcher. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2011) note that one of the ways of ensuring the credibility of qualitative research findings is to ensure the researcher remains objective throughout the research process and avoids subjectivity. They emphasize using appropriate research methods and techniques to avoid subjectivity. To ensure credibility and avoid subjectivity, the researcher had the interview guide assessed by the supervisor. Analyst triangulation, which involves using another analyst to review findings, was also done (Creswell, 2013). This is helpful to illuminate blind spots in the analysis process. Other experts with knowledge of the subject matter were afforded the opportunity to comment and identify loopholes or information that was not in line with the research topic and the objectives of the study.

### **3.4.3 Conformability and transferability**

Conformability refers to the extent to which the research can be corroborated by other researchers (Creswell, 2013). In this regard, the researcher used an external researcher who studied the data collected during the original inquiry. Transferability refers to the degree to which the research can be transferred to other contexts (Khumar, 2018). To ensure transferability, the researcher should accurately detail the research steps and procedures to enable other researchers replicate the study in a different setting. This has been done in this study with detailed descriptions of its context and methods.

#### **3.4.4 Dependability**

Dependability is based on whether similar results can be obtained should the original study be replicated (Zohrabi, 2013). To ensure dependability, the researcher explained data collection methods and analysis (Creswell, 2013). Khumar (2018) in support of Creswell notes that to ensure the dependability of qualitative research, there is a need for the researcher to keep accurate and detailed research procedures and methods.

#### **3.5 Limitations of the study**

This study was meticulously undertaken to meet the required ethical standards and concerning credibility, trustworthiness, conformability and reliability. However, the following limitations were noted. First, as a qualitative study, its generalizability may be limited especially since it was not designed to be generalized to a wider population but as a process to gather insightful views from experts in the limited field. The researcher was prevented from sourcing information from border agents and the Department of Home Affairs Department and could not include the Beit Bridge Border Post in the study. Nonetheless, using experts in the subject matter enabled the researcher to generate in-depth and rich information. Another limitation was that the study was not able to interact with border authorities from countries that share the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts with South Africa. However, the information generated from the participants was sufficient to achieve the study objectives.

### **3.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND INTERPRETATION**

#### **3.6.1 Introduction**

This study employed the securitization theory as its theoretical framework with a view of understanding how perceived and actual criminal, security and migration-related threats can or has influenced countries to securitize their borders through various means. In the same vein, however, within the paradigms of inter-state diplomacy, there have been increasing calls to do away with securitization with cross-border collaboration being seen as the preferred approach to border management. The study, therefore, examined the coordinated border management approach as an alternative to securitization and how countries (using state intelligence agencies, inter-state diplomatic relations, etc.) can cooperate on border issues to reach common grounds. The root cause analysis of migration was used to better explain the underpinning causes and


drivers of migration and how these have affected the functioning and operationalization of border security.

### **3.6.2 The concept of security**

Following the end of World War II, security has largely become a synonym for international relations with a prime focus on the military sector (Malec, 2003). With the growing complexity and unpredictability of the international system, threats that may not necessarily rely on military-sector interventions have increased. The world has seen an increase in economic and environmental dangers that threaten the survival of nations. This state of affairs, according to Le Gloannec et al. (2013), requires expanded dimensions of security beyond those defined militarily. With the emergence of new actors in the international political arena, defining security by pegging it to the military has become too narrow, therefore it is imperative to adjust and try to define the concept of security by incorporating the ever-changing global political system.

The concept of security is contested among scholars. In a simplified form, Buzan (1991) defines it as the pursuit of freedom from potential threats while Galeotti (2014) argues that any categorical definition limits the concept and excludes important elements that constitute security (Baldwin, 1997). Baldwin (1997) formulates a series of questions that can guide the definition of security: who is it for; for which values; how much security; for what threats; by what means; at what cost and in what period.

**Figure 3.1: Baldwin's guiding questions to the definition of security**



Source: Baldwin (1997)

Baldwin (1997) like Holliday & Howe (2011) further asserts that the quest to define security has traditionally revolved around the narrowers and the so-called wideners. Narrowers are associated with the realist school of thought and view the concept of security as freedom from an objective military threat to the survival of the nation-states in an anarchic international system. Narrowers believe that because the international system is chaotic, such anarchy bounds the state to undertake whatever means necessary to militarize or securitize its borders to protect its freedoms from threats (Holliday & Howe, 2011).

The wideners, on the other hand, have challenged the view of defining security from an anarchic and military perspective. The wideners believe that the military element should not be the only defining element because challenges in the international system today include political, economic,

societal and environmental factors (Neethling, 2002). Fjäder (2014) argues that a universally accepted definition of security is difficult to achieve since the concept of security is defined according to what individual states view to be security threats, implying that a situation can only be regarded as a security threat because the political elite who have the decision-making powers perceive it to be so. As a result, the politicization of the concept of security further hinders the development of a holistic definition.

The debate between wideners and narrowers was reignited by the new security challenges, risks and threats brought about by the end of the cold war (Šulović, 2010). The central point of the debate was how to broaden and deepen the concept while upholding its core ideas (Newman, 2010). The narrowers were more concerned with the security of the state and analyzed political stability and military powers between the US and the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, wideners were not satisfied with this viewpoint and opined that there were other types of threats that were not in military form that affected people rather than states, for example, environmental threats, social threats and economic threats (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). Buzan (1997) simply states that security is about survival.

Christou et al. (2010) maintain that attempts to re-define the concept of security have been directed not towards the concept as such but instead the agenda, interests and policies of nation-states and this has frustrated achieving universal understanding. Baldwin (1997) & Friedman (2011) state that at times, threats seen as security fears can be biased and informed by the agenda of nation-states rather than their true appearance. This can be dangerous when states respond to what they see as a security threat; basic human rights and civil liberties can be ignored and violated. Baldwin (1997) describes security as an ambiguous and multi-dimensional concept in which military factors receive appropriate attention. He argues that security has to do with the process connected with assigning any kind of threat to the military, even though that identified threat may not pose a security threat. Stone (2009) notes that it is under this pretext that Buzan asserts that security is about freedom from threats and the ability of states to maintain an independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change. According to Stone (2009), there are numerous significant threats to the survival of nation-states that force them to act in a confrontational manner, ignoring cooperation and diplomacy. Baldwin (1997) notes that nation-states often abuse the concept of security and use this term to suppress civil liberties and further their agenda at the expense of collaboration. Similarly, Stone (2009) contends that while we have seen an increase in border securitization, many issues that are classified as threats can

be solved by cooperation and state-level diplomacy, but individual self-interests have meant that states have focused on their own security over regional security.

### **3.7 Securitization theory**

The securitization theory was developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies by Barry Buzan, Ole Wøever, Jaap de Wilde and others. Most of it came from the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen in the 1990s (Taureck, 2006). According to Daft (2017), it argues that security can no longer be reduced only to the military-political relations of the two superpowers (Daft, 2017). In that sense, proponents of the Copenhagen School are seen as wideners.

The philosophical grounding of the theory assumes that to prevent something from becoming a security threat, three elements have to be present namely, the identification of existential threat, emergency action and the effect of inter-unit effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Guzzini & Jung, 2004). The securitization theory seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat that is fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy that is created to tackle the problems (Bourbeau, 2011).

This theory assumes that political situations are constituted as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as dangerous, menacing, and threatening, by a securitizing actor who has the social and institutional power to move the issue beyond politics. Consequently, security issues are not simply out there but rather must be articulated as problems by securitizing actors (McGlinchey et al., 2017). Eroukhmanoff (2018) asserts that central to this theory is understanding the rhetorics of decision-makers when framing issues and attempting to convince audiences to lift the issue above politics through what Buzan (1997) calls the speech act. The securitization theory conceptualizes security as a process of social construction of political threats by the securitizing actor (mostly politicians and business elites), threats are then declared as a matter of urgency that pose a significant danger to the survival of the nation-state and once this rhetoric is accepted by the audience (citizens), it legalizes the introduction of measures above the normal realms of politics to neutralize the perceived threat. Once this is achieved, an issue or a situation becomes securitized and removed from the normal bounds of democratic processes and placed in the panic policies agenda (Wilkinson, 2007).

Stritzel (2007) states that central to the securitization theory is the ability of the securitizing actor to convince the audience that a potential threat ought to be neutralized as it threatens the interests of the state. Approved by the audience gives the actor powers to act, at times even if the identified threat may not necessarily endanger the existence and survival of the state. Securitization as a means of identifying and dealing with potential threats has gained traction and increased usage over the last 40 years. The securitization agenda has grown to include obvious issues such as terrorism and less obvious issues such as cross-border crime, illegal migration, human rights violations, diseases and natural disasters (Charrett, 2009). One may question whether the world has entered an era of securitization obsession. Arguably, security should not be politicized, as the concept is prone to political abuse.


Baldwin (1997) states that security is structured where some actors placed in positions of power can define security threats based on their own political agendas. For instance, migration in some countries has been viewed as a threat to stability and peace by political elites who can shape securitization based on their own interests and political goals as long as their reasons are accepted by the audience. Ellinas (2017) argues that for perceived threats to become securitized, the audience must agree that such is a threat to the state and thus support the undertaking of extraordinary measures. For example, in 2015 when it was falsely reported that migrants in Germany had assaulted women on New Year's Eve, the audience supported the state to take whatever measures necessary to deal with the problem as migrants were identified as threats to German and European values. Once an audience supports such a view, the securitizing actor may apply measures to securitize the problem (Eddy, 2016). Farny (2016) argues that within the debate on the implications of the securitization of migration, in particular, the role of emotions in the process of categorizing migrants as a potential security threat is noticeable.

Crawford (2000) argues that the discipline of International Relations tends to ignore the role that passions or emotions play in international politics. For example, the politics of fear in the European Union and the United States is mainly constructed concerning the differences in one's classification based on appearance: the undocumented migrant; the refugee; the non-European; the Muslim or the Hispanic (Farny, 2016). Today when one needs to understand the increasing securitization of migration in Europe and the USA, one can perhaps, refer to Samuel Huntington's Concept of "Clash of Civilizations", a theory which suggests that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Such an approach promotes a policy of fear against everything that is different and leads to a dangerous generalization of all migrants with extremely negative implications which are then reinforced

through the securitization of the migration process (Farny, 2016). The main problem attributed to the process of securitization is therefore the inability of the securitizing actor to see migrants as individual humans.

The theory sees securitization as dependent heavily on the use of language. According to Taureck (2006), language plays a huge role in convincing the audience that a real threat exists. The securitizing actor, in most cases, exaggerates the urgency to deal with the perceived threat and uses language pointing to a point of no return should the threat not be dealt with, i.e. “if we do not act now, we are all doomed”. The Geneva Graduate Institute (2013) explains that every securitization process is made up of a securitizing actor (who speaks the language of security and calls for the adoption of extraordinary measures) and a political act (a political decision to articulate the threat in such a way that it convinces the audience that securitization measures are extremely necessary) and unfortunately, these two components of securitization and politicization have become very difficult to distinguish. For example, when politicians for political reasons use securitization threats as a means to increase their chances of re-election, it then becomes difficult to understand if a threat does exist or not.

**Figure 3.2: The Securitization Spectrum**



Source: Geneva Graduate Institute. 2013

The Copenhagen School established a spectrum along which public issues can be classified – ranging from non-politicized to securitized matters. Non-politicized issues are those that the state does not deal with and that are not part of public debate. Politicized issues are tackled within the political system and are part of public debate and policy calling for government action. Securitized matters are at the end of the spectrum. They are those which ask for extraordinary means beyond normal political procedures of the state (Geneva Graduate Institute, 2013). According to the Copenhagen School, matters are moved from the politicized into the securitized area of the above-shown spectrum via an act of securitization.

### **3.7.1 Application of the securitization theory: global examples**

Many issues in the 21st century have been viewed as threats that necessitate securitization. Often, political goals and ambitions supersede rationalism where certain issues are seen as threats mainly to further one's political goals at the expense of the states and its values. Furthermore, the growing popularity of the concepts of securitization and politicization has further increased the confusion regarding when issues can or cannot be securitized.

### **3.7.1.1 US war on terror**

The United States has always been viewed as a country of immigrants. Thus, the issue of migration was never deemed or constructed as a threat to national identity as in the case of the European Union. According to Dolinec (2010), the events of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new dimension of the securitization of international terrorism and migration. Charrett (2009) argues that the securitization of international terrorism undertaken by the US relegated human rights, international law and environmental sustainability to the side-lines of the international security agenda. Subsequently, the politics of western aid and international development in general, have become 'securitized' and 'militarized', most especially in those areas that are considered 'hot spots in what has been called the 'global war on terror. Up until 9/11, there had always been a correlation between migration and security in the United States (Tirman, 2006). But it was mainly considered to be a threat to social security, such as jobs and welfare. However, after 9/11, terrorism quickly became the basis for framing the groundwork for discourse and practices relative to migration. The reaction to 9/11 and the subsequent securitization of migration affected in particular Arab and Muslim immigrants (Tirman, 2006). During this time, numerous migrants were affected especially those from Mexico as US politicians began to view the Mexican border as a security threat.

Frensley & Michaud (2004) argue that former US president George W. Bush was able to convince the audience that if terrorism was not severely dealt with, it would only increase in the country and hence extraordinary measures had to be taken to protect not only American lives but also freedoms of the American society. For this to be achieved, international terrorism had to be neutralized. Frensley & Michaud (2004) state that the American audience supported this rhetoric and subsequently the 9/11 events lead to the invasion of Iraq.

Shocked and afraid, Americans supported the words of the securitizing actor to undertake measures above democratic principles to ensure the protection of societal values and freedoms. Security remains largely a private club largely governed by state elites and this institutional

dominance translates into the undertaking of securitization processes which are a product of the politics of exclusion and control and often generates an adverse impact on the global security agenda (Charrett, 2009). For example, ever since the global projection of the US war on terror, acts of international terrorism have increased dramatically throughout the globe adversely affecting the global architecture of security. Guerriero (2014) maintains that just like the EU, the US with its financial power has been able to globally securitize its war on terror. This has largely been evident by the increase in US military bases around the world. For example, At least 34 US military bases are scattered across Africa with high concentrations in the northern and western parts of the continent as well as in the Horn of Africa. In the Middle East, there are also many US bases set up on the pretext of tackling terrorism (Turse, 2018).

Sian (2017) argues that while the US has been able to globally project its war on terror as succeeding, some believe that it has increased acts of terrorism. They thus argue for the de-securitization of terrorism and for states to cooperate diplomatically rather than militarily. Eland (2007) notes that despite much evidence to the contrary, the American foreign policy community—and to a lesser extent, the American public—resist any notion that US actions overseas could result in blowback. As can be noted, the US has been able to convince its allies, especially, in the EU and Asia that securitizing terrorism via militaristic means is the solution to this growing problem. However, one may argue that despite the global securitization of terrorism, this has not stopped terror attacks around the world. Indeed, Kaunert & Léonard (2019) believe that securitization will not stop terrorism; rather it will slow it down as terrorists rethink their strategy on how to circumvent securitization tactics.

Farny (2016) also makes an example of the US war on illegal migration from South and Central America as another securitized matter. The American government has deemed illegal immigration a threat to normal social life and has been able to convince the audience that the increase in drug-related crimes is directly related to increasing rates of illegal cross-border migration. With the support of the audience, borders in the USA have been securitized mainly through the deployment of a large number of troops and border agents to borderline areas. In the securitization of both the war on terrorism and illegal migration by the US, the role of language and political persuasion of the existence of a threat as noted by Baldwin (1997), Taureck (2006) & the Geneva Graduate Institute (2013) among others is demonstrable.

### 3.7.1.2 Illegal migration to Europe

Illegal migration to Europe has grown as a result of an interplay of historical and current factors. Farny (2016) stated that since the 1980s, Europe faced dramatic changes due to globalization, the fragmentation of major states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the construction of the European Union and Schengen area. The political construction of migration increasingly referred to the destabilizing effects of migration and to the dangers it is purported to have for public order. Subsequently, Europe has seen an increase in deportations and the surveillance of immigrants. Karyotis (2007) & Togrul (2011) note that the discourse that links migration to security in the EU has been reinforced in the aftermath of the September 11 events. Ever since migration appears frequently in the discussions on the campaign against terrorism with cross-border crime also becoming a key point of interest.

Therefore, perhaps the best way to understand the theory concerning illegal migration and cross-border crime would be to look at illegal migration to Europe which has increased in the past 8 years. This has been identified as a huge threat to Europe's security and has led to countries establishing control mechanisms to limit or restrict the flow of illegal migrants in Europe. These actions have at times been flagged as unconstitutional but because they have been supported by the citizens of these countries (Visegrád countries for example), they have been deemed legal and ethical for the sake of national security interests (Ferreira, 2018). These policies and actions are shaped by politicians who deem illegal migration and cross-border crime into Europe as an existential threat (Mattsson, 2017). Therefore, one may argue that the main driving factor for securitizing migrants within the EU was the protection of European identity and culture, fostered by the conception of "Fortress Europe" which on one hand is based on free mobility and the elimination of internal borders and, on the other, on restrictive external borders, focusing on exclusion and border management (Farny, 2016). In addition, the notion that immigrants have the potential to threaten the EU's economy served as the legitimizing factor for the development of a restrictive migration policy and for cutting back the rights of third-country nationals.

Karyotis (2012) argues that over the years, the securitization of migrants has rapidly gained traction throughout the world with more migrants being forced to undergo inhumane security and vetting procedures while politicians called for stricter conditions in letting migrants into Europe. Subsequently, more surveillance and stringent checks were enforced with camps being built to house illegal migrants and refugees. In Europe, illegal migration has been greatly linked to terrorism which has been able to shape public opinion on migration. It is this link that has resulted

in Muslims being seen as potential terrorists and this has given rise to Islamophobia inside Europe (Egger & Magni-Berton, 2019). Huysmans (2000) also argues that central to the securitization of illegal migration in Europe has been political action and the media which have been key in constructing these associations between immigration and terrorism, and between immigration and criminality.

The securitization of immigration is both an outcome and a cause of extremist narratives inside right-wing political parties who argue that migrants cannot acclimatize to European cultures. Özerdem & Özerdem (2013), conclude that the EU with its financial power rapidly has begun to externalize its response to illegal migration and cross-border crime. For example, it has funded the establishment of holding centres in Africa to help reduce the outflow of migrants and has increased its investments in border surveillance and more importantly, has used its economic power to persuade African states and those in the Middle East to cooperate in ensuring a reduction of those illegally attempting to reach the continent.

### **3.7.1.3 Nigeria: The Boko Haram dilemma and the uprising in Cameroon's Anglophone region**

The seriousness of the security threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigeria cannot be ignored. The Nigerian state has acknowledged that the insurgent group poses an existential threat to the state hence political elites with the power of securitizing the issue have greatly spoken out about the need to ensure that Boko Haram is neutralized (Gaast, 2016). The crimes which have been committed by the insurgent group in the country, according to Solomon (2015), have prompted Nigerians to support the government in its quest to use whatever means to eradicate the group. Apart from this, the Nigerian government has been able to garner support from the international community to use all available resources to ensure the eventual destruction of the group (Solomon, 2015). In this case, the securitizing actor, the Nigerian government has gained the support of the audience and use whatever means available to it against the group.

However, Carsten (2018) notes that in the process, Nigeria may have committed crimes against humanity, (rape, extrajudicial killings, etc.), but because they have the support of the public such crimes to a great extent may go unpunished. The securitization of the Boko Haram predicament, therefore, goes above the realm of normal politics and democratic processes. Moreover, as the world grapples with increasing international terrorism, international partners have not only supported Nigeria's securitization approach to fighting Boko Haram despite widespread allegations of human right violations, but they have also increased support for the country through

military sales. For example, in 2017, the US confirmed the sale of nearly US\$593 million worth of weapons, including 12 light attacks 'Super Tucano' aircraft, guided rockets and other equipment to help Nigeria fight Boko Haram.

However, the securitization approach has not yielded the results one would have anticipated. Rather, it has increased the footprint of the terror group and also allowed the group to diversify its operations. As argued by Seacey (2019), Boko Haram militants are still roaming the countryside with impunity. Their fighters now have more sophisticated drones than the military and are well-armed after successful raids on the military. Seacey argues that the Nigerian military is demoralized and on the defensive and that some soldiers have complained they have not taken leave in three years and their weapons and vehicles have fallen into a state of disrepair (Seacey, 2019). This generally points towards the view that securitization, even in militaristic situations like the campaign against Boko Haram; do not always progress as planned.

Cameroon is another country that resorted to a securitization approach. Over the past 5 years, Cameroon's English-speaking region has seen a dramatic surge in violence as the minority population accuses the French-speaking government of neglect and deprivation (Mutah & Onubogu, 2018). According to Grandi (2018), the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), the military wing of the separatist movement, waged a series of hit-and-run attacks against the Cameroonian Armed Forces after Yaoundé cracked down on a wave of peaceful protests demanding political representation and cultural rights for the Anglophone minority. With escalating violence threatening to spread to other areas, the Cameroonian government has introduced several states of emergency and curfews to crush the separatists. Troops have also been deployed in the region and the majority of Cameroonian politicians, who are French-speaking, have continuously spoken on the great danger that Cameroon might face should the government not take extra measures to crush the rebellion. French-speaking Cameroonians have supported the government's initiatives and this has legitimized the securitization of the issue. Subsequently, cases of torture, extra-judicial killings and human rights violations taking place in the restive region have often gone unnoticed or unspoken of.

### **3.8 Illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime in South Africa: a security dilemma?**

Given the various debates on securitization discussed above, it is not surprising that South Africa is in a dilemma on whether to securitize its borders or not. According to Maliti (2018), since 1994, South Africa's borders have become porous due to a lack of investments, decaying infrastructure, corruption and a shortage of skilled personnel. Madue (2015) argues that the issue of xenophobia in South Africa has become synonymous with weak borders and the inability of the state to regulate undocumented migration. Omeokachie (2014) & Macheke (2018) observe that cross-border crime, illegal cross-border migration and have been dubbed societal, economic and security threats requiring securitization. Polity (2012) argues that cross-border crime alone costs the South Africa economy billions while illegal migration contributes significantly to social tensions and increases the likelihood of xenophobic outbreaks. According to Mcmichael (2012), South Africa should have long securitized these issues and while the process of border securitization has begun in the country, it might now be too late. Martin (2018) asserts that the failure to sufficiently secure borders increases the likelihood of infiltration.

Former South African president, Jacob Zuma, noted that cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration were serious issues that needed to be dealt with as a matter of urgency (above the normal realms of politics). Such statements have also been uttered by ministers, local authorities and citizens themselves (Sibiya, 2017). The xenophobic rhetoric of South Africa's politicians has always been welcomed by the audience. Some political figures have stated that foreigners in South Africa are stealing jobs, selling drugs and are into prostitution (Landau, 2015). These utterances have increased calls from locals for authorities to take action in dealing with these issues as they feel they are a threat to the social values and economic security of the country. In turn, one may argue that when xenophobic attacks do break out, while perpetrators may be caught, severe punishment usually is not applied, and one may interpret this as indirect support by the state towards the locals that the influx of undocumented foreigners is indeed a direct threat to the societal values of ordinary South Africans.

Such securitization sentiments according to Heleta (2018) can be drawn by the statements made by politicians. For example, Haniff Hoosen, a member of parliament and the opposition Democratic Alliance Shadow Minister of Home Affairs, said that "the employment of illegal and undocumented immigrants has a direct impact on our job creation abilities as a country." The party's stance is that foreigners are the cause of high unemployment rates. They are stealing jobs

from South Africans and this must be stopped, even though research shows something completely different. Former Gauteng Mayor Herman Mashaba also a member of the DA stated that: “Unworthy and unskilled [migrants] are not welcome. They have nothing that South Africa needs. Most of them are criminals, and to stop migrants from coming, South Africa must build a fence so high that the foreigners cannot jump over”. While such remarks lack factual evidence, they nonetheless have been able to garner the support of locals, who view immigrants as criminals and thugs, hence warranting the securitization of migration.

The same rhetorical language has been heard in other areas in South Africa. In Manguzi (a town near the Kosi Bay border post), residents have urged the government to take action against vehicle smuggling syndicates. There have been increasing incidences of car smuggling from South Africa to Mozambique and the community has urged the government to intervene (Singh, 2018). Residents have called for extra measures including increased police and army presence, modern tech infrastructure, excessive prison sentences for corrupt border officials, etc. as it has caused significant economic and social damage. Furthermore, residents have called for the upgrading of the border fence. Former President Jacob Zuma visited the community in the wake of violent protests in 2018 and agreed that cross-border crime in the areas needed to be prioritized using whatever means possible (Singh, 2018).

Besides car smuggling, there have also been increasing incidences of human trafficking from SADC countries especially through the Limpopo/Zimbabwe border post and this has resulted in increasing calls from locals for government to declare a state of emergency as corruption has increased cross-border crime (Irish, 2005). In the Golela Border Post, attempts to smuggle counterfeit footwear, cigarettes, clothing and heroin have increased over the last 10 years and locals living in the vicinity of this border have also rallied the government to increase troops and upgrade border infrastructure (Hennop et al. 2001). While these calls may be dubious, it is clear that illegal cross-border migration and crimes have become issues of increased concern in South African political circles that purportedly pose significant economic and social threats to the country. Such rhetorics, however, are not underpinned by migrants being threats as such, but rather the socio-economic dilemma many South Africans find themselves in i.e. unemployment, poverty and rising inequality.

Shelley & Metz (2017) argue that these issues to some extent, are not as threatening as declared by politicians. However, increasing attempts to smuggle drugs, pharmaceutical products and cigarettes into the country coupled with the increase in foreigners being arrested on drugs charges

and the political rhetoric underpinning the call for securitizing these issues have rallied the public to urge the government to resort to extraordinary measures. This makes it likely that it is just a matter of time before South Africa's borders are militarized and securitized.

The securitization of migration in South Africa is underpinned by three factors. Firstly, it is argued that illegal migration leads to social tensions; secondly, illegal migration leads to an increase in cross-border crime and thirdly, there has been growing consensus among South Africans, especially those who are unemployed that illegal migrants are taking jobs meant for South Africans (Maharaj, 2002). This rhetoric has increased with time and has resulted in violent clashes between foreign nationals and locals. For example, recent xenophobic attacks in the Gauteng province in 2019 claimed 12 lives, over 10 000 undocumented foreigners were deported in the first six months of 2019 and there have been increasing calls from political parties for increased border security to keep out illegal migrants (Madia & Somdyala, 2019).

Ilgit & Klotz (2014) contend that South Africa stands accused of amending legislation that amounts to the securitization of migrants and turning migration into a national security threat. They argue that over the years, South Africa has made several amendments to its Immigration Act amounting to the securitization of migrants. Politicians frame their political agendas in security language (Shelley & Metz, 2017). Vearey (2018) argues that the current development of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and regular migration and the Global Compact on Refugees – agreements that aim to guide global practice – have a securitization agenda at their core. This framing responds to the global moral panics associated with the movement of people across national borders; these increasingly nationalistic and racist panics are dangerous for multiple reasons, and the securitization agendas of the Global Compacts risk is negatively affecting South Africa's reputation of hospitality (Vearey, 2018).

Taylor (2012) argues that to make matters worse, the South African government's unofficial attitude towards migration-related problems is that the country has enough problems of its own – including mass unemployment and poverty, frequent labour unrest and popular uprisings against the state's failure to provide basic services – and cannot be expected to help shoulder the continent's immense burden of migrants. As a result, immigration controls have been tightened significantly in recent years. Reinforcing this view, Moyo (2019) argues that the securitization of the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe has led to human trafficking, which in turn, militates against the goal of free human mobility in the SADC region. With particular reference to Beitbridge Border Post, Moyo argues that the securitization of South Africa's borders through

restrictive immigration policies which are manifest at the border leads to undocumented migration and thus make human smuggling and trafficking necessary.

Best (2010), from a general point of view, argues that while border surveillance, or intelligence as he calls it, has far-reaching benefits, border technology alone will not resolve issues of cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. He argues that for technology to be effective in South Africa's border security objectives, there is the need for the integration of three key components, man, infrastructure and technology. But even if this will not eradicate migration and cross-border crime but could facilitate a quick and timely reaction from border authorities (Best, 2010).

Chavez (2015) argues that one major challenge of using technology is the lack of synergy and cooperation between security agents on one hand (In South Africa's case, the presence of more than 8 departments in borders), and the locals on the other. Chavez (2015) argues that the lack of cooperation between locals and border management agencies hinders effective border management. Locals living within the vicinity of a border tend to know about activities that take place in the border spaces, whether it is smuggling, crime or migration. Creating an operational framework that considers borderline locals perhaps in South Africa's case would go a long way in assisting the country in the management of its border security. Chavez (2015) also posits that within the premise of countries protecting their borders, traditional views of intelligence generally focus on collecting information on traditional activities. However, in today's information age, Gerstein et al. (2018) propose a concept based on collecting information on atypical signals that could indicate suspicious behaviour. Moreover, Gerstein et al. (2018) note that today's security environment is characterized by a large volume and scope of information flow that exceeds the conventional capabilities to process it all, hence states that surveillance systems and technology need to adapt to these new revelations.

Apart from securitizing borders as a way of combating cross-border crime and illegal migration, there have been increasing calls in Southern African politics and within South Africa itself to cooperate on border issues rather than resorting to securitization as this has far more detrimental effects on trade and interstate relations. Central to this call has been the emergence of the coordinated border management approach. Essential to this concept is that cooperation can yield results when it comes to border security and even consolidate interstate relations.

### **3.9 The coordinated border management approach**

Rosenblum et al. (2013) observe that threats associated with borders have increased significantly over the last 50 years and the call for the development of a cooperation framework that could benefit nations in their quest to ensure better border operations has been a common response to these threats. Since the 1990s, there have been growing calls for better coordination between border agencies. These calls led individual states, regional and economic communities to create different versions of coordinated border management (Polner, 2011). The EU created what it calls the integrated border management approach while the World Bank (WB) championed what it called the collaborative border management approach and the Organization for Security and Economic Development has developed what it calls a comprehensive border management approach.

These approaches may seem different but they all advocate the urgent need for border agencies to collaborate and coordinate their activities in dealing with everyday border operations and potential threats (McLinden et al., 2010). There are three broad views of the CBM approach. The first one advocated by Rosenblum et al. (2013) & Payan (2016) involves the cooperation and collaboration of agencies from different nation-states that may or may not have a common border. The second one involves the co-ordination and co-operation of different agencies for the same nation-state as discussed by Van Duyne (1996) among others. This could be through the amalgamation of these agencies into one border management entity. The third view incorporates the first and second views above and involves collaboration between agencies within the same nation-state as well as collaboration across nation-state territories.

In a rapidly globalizing world where the interconnectedness of countries and regions influence economic growth and border stability, policymakers are increasingly realizing the urgency to accelerate the development of a border security framework underpinned by cooperation and coordination (Polner, 2011). The World Customs Union (WCU) advocates for the development of such a framework to bring nation-states closer in terms of cross-border cooperation. This approach is founded on the view that borders are a complex phenomenon and are comprised of various actors who have competing interests as argued by O'Dowd et al. (2004): "borders are places of political and economic opportunity for nation-states as well as a host of other interest groups, legal or illegal."

Shanty (2012) also notes that while globalization brings the world together and presents numerous opportunities for states, it also contributes to increasing threats that emanate from borders including terrorism, cross-border crime syndicates and illegal migration. These groups and activities have contributed to increasing threats internally, thus calling for a more pragmatic approach involving multi-party cross-border cooperation. According to Payan (2016), threats associated with borders have become complex today as exemplified by drug trafficking from Mexico to the US which involves the use of underground tunnels. The cooperation between Mexico and US border enforcement agencies underscores the need for cooperation. Greater collaboration between border agencies within states would also significantly reduce threats while at the same time protecting the interests of states (Doyle, 2010). CBM represents a shared undertaking, where border agencies can collaborate on border issues providing an effective avenue for the government to respond to threats.

At an internal level, even where CBM is not fully embraced, some states have developed their own versions of collaboration to better manage border security and control. For example, before 2001, border functions in the USA were divided among various federal departments and agencies. However, post 9/11 calls for the unification of these departments and agencies into one umbrella border management agency resulted in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) taking over the majority of border management. The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service in December 2008 became the leading border management agency incorporating other departments to ensure efficiency and increased inter-departmental cooperation and coordination. This is also the case in Russia and China (Polner, 2011). The Cross-border Road Transport Agency (2016) argues that internally, CBM enables authorities to recognize that the presence of multiple border agencies can result in bottlenecks and the increased collaboration and coordination between these stakeholders can reduce bureaucracy and incidences of corruption and maladministration. It is therefore a logical way to manage border operations to ensure effectiveness and efficiency without resorting to securitization.

It is fact that illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime create nightmares for policymakers as these problems continue to manifest themselves globally. According to Van Duyne (1996), the need for collaboration has never been greater, especially because borders are not managed in the same way from one country to the other. For example, the DRC has 16 agencies and departments for border security and operation resulting in inefficiencies and bottlenecks that lead to corruption and maladministration. The same can be said about South Africa (Polner, 2011).

### **3.10 Illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime in South Africa: A collaborative approach?**

Mapuva (2014) argues that SADC has since its inception championed the idea of member states collaborating on border issues, especially since the region's borders are porous and characterized by rampant corruption and degraded infrastructure. Gumede (2014) notes that SADC acknowledges that rather than states individually managing their border security, a collective security approach underpinned by cooperation and information-sharing will better serve the social, economic and political security of member states. SADC's Organ for Politics, Safety and Defence encourages members to cooperate on increasing levels of cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. However, member states continue to make border security more a matter of internal policy. This approach, as argued by Mapuwa (2014), has its own weaknesses. Poorer countries in the region may not have sufficient economic resources for investment in border security especially concerning technology, a situation which could be better if handled through collective financial arrangements.

Hennop et al. (2001) argue that South Africa's border management in the post-apartheid era has been lacking in terms of cooperation with its neighbours on border management and infrastructure. The lack of resources and constant reduction in the budget for the Department of Defence are issues that have indirectly contributed to this situation. Moreover, the country experiences a huge influx of illegal migrants and cross-border crime syndicates. Khumalo (2014), therefore, contends that South Africa should champion the idea of cross-border agency cooperation. This view is reinforced by Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014) who report that between 1988 and 2010, South Africa deported approximately 2.5 million people mostly SADC citizens from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, according to Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014), this has not addressed illegal migration challenges for South Africa.

Söderbaum (2007) explains that no matter how massive the process of instituting a collective cross-border security agreement (a SADC version of CBM) is, where there is political will, such an agreement can be eventually implemented. Nye (2004) also states that generally in Africa, many leaders cannot be blamed for focusing on internal problems given the instability of African politics. This tends to affect the timely development and implementation of policies agreed on at a regional body such as SADC. Oucho & Gelderblom (2006) find it shocking that a region can experience so many issues associated with cross-border security, yet regional leaders are slow and perhaps reluctant to develop and implement collective responses. Regional interests are

somewhat disjointed and not aligned to the individual interests of member states hence the lack of political will.

Martin (2011) also argues that South Africa's border agencies need to streamline their operations. Lack of coordination among these units has, over the years, given rise to misalignment of border management processes and corruption. This may imply that it is no use rushing to ensure cross-border agency cooperation while South Africa's agencies and departments are struggling to coordinate their activities. South Africa acknowledges that there is limited cross-border cooperation among SADC states (information sharing, implementation of policies, frequent inter-state communication) on cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration hence the country has prioritized the implementation of its own version of CBM which is the BMA bill which seeks to streamline the operations of its many border agencies. The absence of a collective border framework in the region has indeed enticed states to place border security as a national priority. DefenceWeb (2017) opines that while regional cooperation is missing, nationally, the BMA presents the country with an opportunity to increase collaboration and coordination to better enable border authorities to deal with cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration.


Ideally, a coordinated border approach would effectively facilitate collective responses to cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration. Nevertheless, in today's geopolitical, unpredictable international system, states have resorted to extreme measures to protect their interests with technology and securitization as preferred options. South Africa's land borders have already followed the trend of securitization mainly owing to the perceived threats posed by migrants. Securitization, however, has not resulted in a reduction of those illegally entering the country and by extension cross-border crime which has been on the increase. This is partly because securitization alone will not be an effective tool unless it is complemented by robust management. Sadly, this is not the case for South Africa. Moreover, securitization, buoyed by politicians seeking voters, has removed the element of cooperation with third party states, and thus such an approach cannot be effective as border issues present in her borders can be addressed only by investing in border management and by prioritizing regional cooperation.

### **3.11 The Root Cause Analysis approach to migration**

Root cause analysis (RCA), as a concept and a methodology, originated at Toyoda Industries (Fatima, 2017). The head of Toyoda Industries devised a method to identify and resolve problems in mechanical systems associated with automobiles manufactured by Toyoda. The simplified

version of the RCA known as the five whys method involves asking the question “why” five times to get to the root of the problem. At the fifth level of the question, the root or the cause of the problem will be revealed.

**Figure 3.3: Toyota’s five whys approach to root cause analysis**



Source: Fatima (2017)

In spite of its simplicity, RCA has gained acceptance in different fields including migration policy management (Gent, 2002; Fratzke & Salant, 2018). Its three main characteristics are:

- The approach is reactive and therefore identifies problems and symptoms that should have occurred
- RCA does not offer any solutions but rather identifies symptoms and root problems occurring
- The RCA is centered on the ability to separate problems and symptoms

According to Fatima (2017), RCA also be proactive in identifying foreseeable challenges.

### **3.11.1 Root cause analysis in migration**





RCA became part of European migration policy in the 1990s when the European Community-associated migration with development and therefore identified developmental challenges in countries of origin as the main drivers of irregular immigration (Fratzke and Salant, 2018). According to Fratzke & Salant (2018), in 2015, Europe realized the need to invest in major migrant-sending countries as part of its policy. The lack of development was associated with poverty, unemployment, inequality and security factors pushing citizens out of their countries.

Gent (2002) also traces the use of RCA in migration to the European Union but insists that it was applied solely concerning illegal or irregular migration but is now used to assess challenges associated with all forms of migration.

Justice for Migration (JFM) (incorporating Lee’s push/pull theory of 1966) views migration problems and challenges including illegal crossings as a mere symptom of much bigger problems within both the sending and receiving countries. It classifies the root causes of migration into four factors (namely safety, economic, environmental and social) which create push and pull forces on people. The push forces or factors are what drive or force migrants out of their countries of origin while the pull factors are the perceived solutions of the push factors. In their view, migrants being pushed out of their country by safety factors, specifically the fear of persecution, wars and violence would be attracted by a country without such situations. Migrants fleeing poverty and unemployment would be attracted to or drawn towards a country they believe will offer them better opportunities of escaping poverty (JFM, 2017).

The table below shows push and pull factors that the JFM sees as being instrumental in the current migratory trends from South America to North America.

**Table 3.4: Push and pull factors of migration**

<b>PUSH</b>	<b>PULL</b>
Persecution Violence War	 Safety and Stability Freedom
Poor wages Lack of jobs	 Higher wages Job prospects
Crop failure and famine Pollution Natural disaster	 Food availability Better environment
Limited opportunities Lack of services Family separation	 Family Reunification Better quality of life Availability of services

Source: Justice for Migrants (2017)

The JFM lists safety factors as the preliminary or most powerful push factor of all. This concerns people fleeing from civil and ethnic wars and conflicts, political and religious persecutions (JFM, 2017). Safety factors tend to result in forced migration. They are thus different from societies being pushed by economic challenges whose option to remain in their homes of origin is generally higher. Safety-concerned migrants usually fall in the asylum-seeker and refugee-status category, which are in themselves problematic classes to separate. Persons and societies pushed out of their countries by economic and social factors are generally classified as migrants while those running away from environmental factors can fall within the refugee class or the migrant class depending on the receiving country's classifications and legislation (Fratzke & Salant, 2018). The push and pull factor approach, as part of the broader RCA of immigration, therefore, inspires the debate on the classification of migrants.

In Chapter 1 of this thesis, this confusion regarding differences between a refugee, an asylum seeker and a migrant was highlighted. According to Simeon (2017), a refugee is a person fleeing armed conflicts or persecution and an asylum seeker is a refugee whose claim has not been evaluated. This person would have applied for asylum because returning to his or her country would lead to persecution on account of race, religion, nationality or political beliefs (Stone, 2016). Wang et al. (2019) define a migrant as any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born and has acquired some significant social ties to this country.

Economic push factors have had a considerable effect on migration in the 20th and 21st centuries. Migrants across the globe have been pushed out of countries and regions as a result of poor economic fundamentals that include inflation, unemployment, lack of opportunities among others (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). JFM (2017) asserts that economic factors as push factors tend to warrant the most resistance in receiving countries. This is because receiving countries have a given employment creation capacity. Any number of migrants above this capacity creates a burden on the receiving country that cannot accommodate the surplus migrants into its workforce. As a push and a pull factor, the state of the ecological environment has also been widely discussed. The sudden environmental changes such as floods and other natural disasters and gradual deteriorations associated with pollution and climate change are forcing people to move into regions where ecological risks are perceived to be lower. Flahaux and De Haas (2016) and Murithi (2014) are among many scholars who have discussed environmental factors as being significant drivers of migration in Africa.

According to JFM (2017), persons can be forced to move to reunify with families and communities. The initial separation between communities may have risen from previous episodes of either forced or voluntary forms of migration. Santamaria et al. (2018) discuss how the end of the guest-worker programs between Europe as a receiving region and North Africa and Turkey as sending countries. Families that had been separated by this trend were to some extent forced to migrate towards Europe for reunification.


### **3.11.2 RCA and illegal immigration**

The European Union views poverty and development as greater facilitators of migration, several scholars assert that it is mostly personal aspirations. According to Carling & Talleraas (2016), there is evidence that voluntary illegal migration increased as development increased and that other factors are also at play as root causes. The use of developmental aid as a tool to reduce migration had failed because poverty was not the major cause or root of illegal immigration.

The root cause analysis, as discussed earlier, was primarily directed towards illegal and irregular migration towards Europe (Gent, 2002). Policies that control immigration should emphasize reducing unsuccessful immigration attempts (Alpes & Sørensen, 2015). While safety, economic, political, social and environmental factors may be the root cause for outward migration, the root cause of illegal immigration, at receiving country level was blamed on difficult immigration policies that make it impossible for migrants to cross borders legally. The IOM also recommends effective communication to aspiring migrants regarding opportunities and risks including the possibilities of admittance/refusals in countries of destination. Lack of official communication on the above was identified as one of the root causes or higher-level causes of failed migration attempts (Alpes & Sørensen, 2015). Migration aspirations emanating from miscommunications and misinformation can be addressed through effective communication systems.

The recommendations of the IOM are based on Alpes and Sørensen's (2015) migration model which the IOM believes highlights the root causes of migration namely, personal and community aspirations versus the conditions at home and the prospects of meeting these aspirations. This model is presented below:

**Figure 3.4: Migration mechanisms model**



Source: Alpes & Sørensen (2015)

In the model, individuals and communities have got life aspirations that can be achieved through various forms of change of which migration is one. Individuals who believe that their aspirations are most likely to be met abroad consider migrating and this is a function of their access to migration infrastructure or processes. These may be legal or illegal. Different levels of access to migration infrastructure create successful migrants who would have succeeded in reaching the host country. Unfortunately, it also creates failed migrants who will not succeed to move into host countries and involuntarily immobile individuals and communities. The last group has no ability or access to migration infrastructure and is trapped in environments where conditions and prospects available will perceptually not support the realization of personal life aspirations.

the root cause of migration is more of a relationship between factors (conditions, prospects and life aspirations) rather than a single factor like poverty. Thus some communities may stay put in their poor environments if they hold the understanding that the desire to change may be met through other available options. communications and information as well as less rigid entry policies as important solutions to illegal and irregular migration.

Like with many other theories or concepts, there have been criticisms of the root cause analysis as an approach to migration. Schmeidl (2001) argues that the drawback of the concept is that root causes of migration are too complex to decipher and that there is a risk of oversimplifying

problems and symptoms and churning out solutions that may not work. Gent (2002) is adamant that root analysis will work because it requires countries suffering from net immigration to intervene in the affairs of countries where migrants originate from. This is because root causes originate in countries of migrant origins while their solutions are sought by countries receiving migrants. Gent (2002) also points at limited or lack of political will from receiving countries to resolve problems at home. Loescher (2001), on the other hand, argues that root problems may not necessarily lie in the country of origins but may be part of more complex global political phenomena.

### **3.12 Conclusion**

The main aim of the chapter was to dissect the relevant theories and approaches that guided the study. The securitization theory was discussed in the context of understanding cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration in South Africa. Its applicability to South Africa and how the state is responding was also reviewed. Increased cooperation and coordination have been by SADC. The re-militarization of South Africa's borders began as the country battled to reduce the increasing threats from borders. However, while securitization has been taking place, the army has been short of funds and resources leading to increasing illegal migration and the emergence of cross-border crime syndicates. While cooperation is needed at a regional level, South Africa's own departments/agencies which are present at borders are currently not integrated which increases bottlenecks and corruption. This makes internal coordination necessary before and in addition to regional cooperation on border management. The root causes analysis was discussed in detail as a means of understanding why people migrate, the risks associated with migration and how such risks can be mitigated through communication as proposed by the IOM. Therefore, one may conclude that the securitization theory and the coordinated border management approach will succeed only if the root causes of migration and cross-border crime can be addressed.

## CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION

### 4.1 Introduction

Thematic content analysis was used to analyze data which had been coded and analyzed on Atlas.ti version 8. In vivo coding was used to generate codes that were grouped into sub-classes and major themes as follows:

- Theme 1: Benefits and need for tech-centric borders
- Theme 2: Challenges in implementing smart border technologies
- Theme 3: Border management issues behind illegal migration and crime
- Theme 4: Addressing root factors of illegal migration and border crime

Overall the themes generated contributed to the answering of the study's main research questions which were:

- What are the challenges faced by immigration officials in curtailing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime?
- How effective are the existing strategies aimed at managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime at Golela and Kosi Bay border posts?
- To what extent would a tech-centric border contribute to a significant reduction in cross-border crime and illegal cross-border migration?
- What are the challenges faced by South Africa in instituting a tech-centric border and to what extent has this hampered border security?
- What are the possible advantages and disadvantages for South Africa for instituting a tech-centric border?

### 4.2 Theme 1: Benefits and need for tech-centric borders

Respondent 1 believed that tech-centric borders will be effective in curbing illegal immigration and this will be their main benefit. As said by Respondent 1 and Respondent 14, technology will be more effective in screening immigrants forcing them to comply with the laws to avoid being detected.

*There will be fewer undocumented migrants forcing them to comply because of stringent policies making it impossible to survive without papers such as in countries like Canada. It will also enhance honesty levels of the officials at the border – Respondent 1*

*It will contribute to better border security because it will be more effective in helping border agents to prevent, track, check, curb, and tackle challenges of the influx of undocumented migrants and illicit activities of cross-border criminals - Respondent 14*

Respondent 9, like Respondent 1 also shared the view that tech-centric borders would help to control both illegal migration and border crime. This benefit would however be realized in the long-term rather than in the short-term:

*In the short-term, it would be expensive but in the long run, it would save resources and would be more effective if run properly – Respondent 9*

Respondents 2 and 6 concluded that the government should implement tech-centric borders because of their advantages in curbing both illegal migration and border crime:


*We need this technology. SANDF is also asking for such technology and they are best placed to tell us what they need to do the job – Respondent 2*

*The government should deploy technology and resources. The issue of technologization of the border can help – Respondent 6*

This theme had four sub-themes, crime, corruption detection and prevention; potential positive effect on current human resources efficiency; potential positive effect on private contractor efficiency and economic benefits.

Figure 5.1 shows a word tree with smart borders as its stem. This was used as a general guide for in vivo coding in Theme 1.

**Figure 4.1: Word tree relating to smart/tech-centric borders**



Source: Data analysis

The above word tree shows various codes that were developed into sub-themes under Theme 1. These include the effects of smart borders on crime, personnel supervision as well as challenges and advantages of this kind of a border.

#### 4.2.1 Crime, corruption detection and prevention

Tech-centric borders were seen by some as possible solutions for border crime. Given that some elements of border technology were already deployed by the SANDF at borders, technology could complement their crime-fighting efforts. Additionally, it would reduce excessive dependency on the army in controlling borders:

*If we deploy technology, will this lower the dependency on SAPS and SANDF? Certainly, it will allow the country to better detect crime and illegal movements, and it will certainly complement SANDF – Respondent 2*

Tech-centric borders can be of benefit in curbing human error at borders as well as in detecting and therefore combating corruption. Respondent 9 stated that tech-centric border technology can detect wrongdoing by border officials:

*They can play a major role by detecting the wrong activities carried out by some officials. These technologies could be used in surveillance – Respondent 9*

Respondent 1 also shared the view that increased technology will reduce border crime:

*It will reduce border crimes and illegal migrants and economic relations will be improved – Respondent 1*

Respondent 2 further discussed the view that crime-fighting was made difficult by the long and stretching nature of borders. Human resources alone will not be efficient in ensuring that there are no breaches along the long stretching frontiers. Technology like drones will however make it possible to patrol and monitor these borders:

*Our borders are hundreds of kilometres. It is impossible to guard them by foot alone or horseback for that matter, technology will help with such patrol because and better detect syndicate and irregular movements– Respondent 2*

Respondent 3 had a unique view on crime at borders. The extent of crime at borders especially those that were patronized by black people, was overly misrepresented. The solution was to first resolve the factors that led to such misrepresentation, one of which was an identity crisis issue. Border officials, in Respondent 3's views, associated black people like themselves with criminality:

*Issues such as trafficking, terrorism and illicit trade are also constitutionally constructed. It is fellow Africans who are the main suspects of crime. Whether it is drugs, trafficking etc., some major perpetrators are not even African. If you want to resolve these, you need to resolve the identity crises – Respondent 3*

The above respondent, therefore, saw a need to remove the stigma that African migrants, especially blacks, were potential criminals while migrants of other races were not.

#### **4.2.2 Potential positive effect on current human resources efficiency**

The interviews touched on the issue of human resources adequacy at the borders focusing on SANDF and SAPS personnel as well as contracted private companies. The first matter was that despite many private companies operating at the borders, there were reports of increasing illegal immigration and border crimes. There was therefore a question of whether tech-centric borders would call for more or fewer human resources on the ground. The above sub-theme was therefore built up from response to two questions:

- *If we introduce smart borders, do we compliment the police and the army?*
- *We have about 25 companies working under operation Korona helping the army and the police at the borders. At the same time there is a lot of crime. How is this so?*

Tech-centric borders, as seen by some, will complement human resources deployed there to fight crime rather than increase them. In the views of Respondent 6, with more technology, more human resources may be needed to respond to detected crimes and anomalies:

*In quantitative terms yes. If we have drones, some army groups will be in the camp however if the drones detect a security threat, the dependency on the army will be higher because of the drones detecting threats. You need an integrated system. You do not need the 14 companies; it will be a question of how you need the companies – Respondent 6*

Respondents 4 and 15 however believed that there may be need for fewer army personnel to complement the new technology:

*The technology and the armed forces will work better together. The input from the army will reduce if the technology input is high but generally we do need people – Respondent 4*

*No matter how much technology one has there will always be a need for boots on the ground – Respondent 15*

They will be needed albeit not as the core operators:

*We need to train for them to complement the smart border. We need to capacitate the police through technical training. We cannot deal with SANDF only but they should use supervisory methods for them as well. As long as the supervisory element on humans is there, the technology will go a long way– Respondent 1*

Thus tech-centric borders, in Respondent 1's view, could reduce human resources requirements from the army and the police. More police officers may be necessary than army personnel although there will be a need to supervise army operations so that they are in tandem with the technology-driven operations and that of the police. Respondent 13, however, suggested that border technology could either increase or decrease human resources depending on the nature of the deployed technology:

*It depends on whether the technology available would still require the same number of personnel to operate it. Ideally, it should but in reality, it is a different story – Respondent 13*

In Respondent 13's view, despite a common belief that technology reduces human resource numbers, at times it may lead to an increase in personnel as the operational capacity of technology requires people to operate it.

#### **4.2.3 Potential positive effects on private contractor efficiency**

Respondent 2 believed that without technology more and more human resources will be needed to securitize borders. The respondent stated that even with 15 private companies, border in South Africa were still highly prone to both crime and illegal immigration:

*There were actually 15 private companies which was inadequate. They talked about increasing this number to 22. Twenty-five companies would however be adequate. We need fewer warm bodies at the border and more drones and technology. We also need dedicated young SANDF members and infra-red cameras that allow us to secure the borders – Respondent 2*

In this regard, tech-centric borders could serve as a solution to such a multiplication of resources at borders that, in the end, do not yield the expected result. In contrast, Respondent 11 held the view that the current companies that manage borders may not be enough as the geographical stretch of borders requires a lot of personnel:

*You may have partnerships with private companies but they may not be adequate – Respondent 11*

Some respondents pointed at the ineffectiveness of the current contractors as a challenge rather than at the shortage of technology at borders. Respondent 6 asserted that the reason why so many companies were there was that they were too small and too inefficient to deliver on their contracts:

*It gives the impression that they deal with small companies. Why not deal with one big company whose contract can be terminated if they do not deliver– Respondent 6*

Having so many companies managing border security had several disadvantages including lack of standardized border procedures, confusion to travellers and demotivation of border officials:

*Why do we have so many companies? Why not have one reputable company that can maintain standards. With so many companies you cannot standardize the system. The system becomes confusing for travellers and contributes to the demotivation of border officials – Respondent 6*

Respondent 6 held another view that private companies do benefit from illegal migration and crime at borders. These companies' contracts were only necessary if border crime and illegal immigration were high. As such, they ensured there was always a certain level of illegality at the borders so that they remained relevant:

*There is a vicious cycle. If border security is good and they are successful, then they do not have business and contracts. So they kind of must keep a balance between things so they also remain in business. I am sceptical of such companies – Respondent 5*

Respondent 5 reiterated that this behaviour was not only peculiar to South Africa but was evident in the global immigration and border control industry which the respondent further tagged as a multi-billion-dollar industry. Respondent 1 also stated that tech-centric borders will reduce dependency on private companies that offered compromised security services:

*I refer to the previous answer. We need smart borders which are supervised and sometimes private companies compromise security. There is trusting people in securing borders. With smart technologies, there is the supervision of border officials. There is also the need for human surveillance. The human element compromises border security at times – Respondent 1*

Respondent 12 however held a different view, stating that more human resources were needed at the border despite in addition to the 15 companies mentioned. This was because borders, due to their expansiveness were not manageable by comparatively few people:

*The government alone may not be able to shoulder full responsibility in migration and border security. Private entities and communities may need to be engaged – Respondent 12*

In Respondent 1's views, with tech-centric borders, the role of human resources would be diminished, along with the weaknesses of human monitoring of the same borders. Respondent 1 saw the tech-centric borders as being able to supervise the possible ills of private companies as well as reducing dependency on them.

#### **4.2.4 Economic benefits**

Another benefit that Respondent 1 foresaw because of tech-centric borders was an increase in economic performance in South Africa.

*Increased economic transactions in South Africa will help economic growth – Respondent 1*

Control of smuggled goods will enhance local industry competitiveness and increase tax revenue for the South African government – hence the positive economic impact:

*It will increase revenue for the government. Look at local effects on the local economy. Locally manufactured goods will be used in the country – Respondent 1*

The above sub-theme was not discussed by the other respondents.

### **4.3 Theme 2: Challenges in implementing smart border technologies**

These were discussed by both respondents who believed that tech-centric borders were a solution for illegal immigration and cross-border crime and those who did not. Some of the responses related to the challenges of implementing tech-centric borders came out as respondents responded to the question:

*In your opinion, what is the biggest challenge hampering the development and implementation of a tech-centric border system in South Africa?*

Most challenges however came out in the general course of the interviews. Several classes of challenges were identified and these were classified into sub-themes.

#### 4.3.1 Financial and resources challenges

Almost all respondents talked about financial challenges as a limiting factor in the implementation of tech-centric borders. Respondent 6 and Respondent 1 below believed that finance was one of the two biggest challenges in tech-border implementation along with expertise:

*The lack of resources to fully amend the borders and the technology fully comes to the fore – Respondent 6*

*The biggest challenge is finance and the expertise to implement technology. If you pay for them there is a need to train people in using them and the lack of this finance hampers the implementation of a smart border – Respondent 1*

Respondent 1 linked financial challenges with the need for high overheads for managing the technology, specific skills development and training. Another respondent, Respondent 4, associated the financial challenges that hampered the immediate implementation of tech-centric borders with the general economic situation of South Africa. With a poorly performing economy trying to recover from low growth, channelling resources towards tech-centric borders could be a challenge as many areas were competing for the same financial resources:

*The government has been in economic decline especially during the Zuma years so we are now in transition and resources are deployed away from such project. Current resources are so overstretched -Respondent 4*

Respondents who viewed tech-centric borders as a non-necessity also referred to South Africa's economic situation as less conducive for such changes. Respondent 8 was highly detailed on the need to address other priority areas first:

*South Africa has a ton of competing priorities. According to the WHO and UNICEF, about 2.5 million people in the country lack reliable access to safe drinking water, another, while more than ten times that number (15 million) do not have access to improved sanitation facilities. The country's water infrastructure is in disrepair, (see a paper from ISS), and I probably do not need to go into detail about Eskom. Now, crime is certainly a serious issue in South Africa and I do not mean to suggest that it isn't, but investing in a tech-centric border, along with the investment in personnel that it entails, may be difficult to justify in the face of those other needs – Respondent 8*

In agreement, Respondent 3, who held a strong view that border-centric technology or excessively stringent border control was not a dire need, also believed that available financial resources should be channelled towards communities:

*They do not have the money and we should not preoccupy ourselves with such. Concentrate on providing social services – Respondent 3*

Respondent 2, on the other hand, believed that such technologies can be acquired as a “good” price for the government suggesting they may not necessarily be a drain on resources:

*A lot more is spent on technology we should find good pricing and not having another BOSASA situation – Respondent 2*

Respondent 2 believed that if corrupt and overpricing tendencies associated with the BOSASA scandal are avoided, the systems could actually be affordable.

At the same time, Respondents 2 and 15 also conceded to a common view that the South African government was facing financial resources challenges to implement tech-centric borders:

*Now currently we are facing fiscal challenges in health, education and policing, hence where would we source the funds to go to border security – Respondent 2*

*Government priorities appear to be elsewhere – Respondent 15*

Respondent 15, however, hinted that financial challenges on the part of the government were generally related to lack of commitment to funding tech-centric borders than the unavailability of resources:

*There does not appear to be any willingness to fund (the) acquisition of equipment – Respondent 15*

On financial challenges, two common views were noted. The first one was that tech-centric border implementation was hampered by lack of or limitation of funds. The second one was that it was not a financial priority in comparison to other dire financial needs that South Africa had, particularly those linked directly to providing public service.

#### **4.3.2 Technology-related challenges**

Respondent 8 commented that from the experiences of the developed world, technology at borders had not always worked as planned. The respondent further broadened their view to

technology at large where seemingly flawless technologies eventually gave problems that neutralized the benefits they might have brought to society:

*Now I think the investment in personnel is an underappreciated cost. Technology is, almost by definition, a little complex. Learning how to use it well takes time and there are always hiccups...This is not just in Africa either. Developed countries struggle with adapting to technological change, a case in point being the U.S. – Respondent 8*

Respondent 8 therefore perceived tech-centric borders as part of a technological trend that can have failure repercussions on South Africa. Respondent 8 further discussed that while technology could in some respects be a solution, there were risks in picking technologies that will not be there for long, generally because of the disruptive nature of technology or technologies that will work in the beginning and eventually crash:

*But one also doesn't want to pick fringe technology that may not be around in 5 years. Saving a couple of million rands on a contract in 2020 may sound like a bargain, but if that company is out of business in 3 years when that system crashes, it will cost more than a couple of million rands to fix, I promise – Respondent 8*

In Respondent 5's view, even if effective technology is implemented, there might not be any notable changes to illegal migration. Technology will affect the paths rather than the volumes of migration hence would be ineffective:

*It will not change it. If you put fences around it people will move in another direction. It is expensive. It just changes the direction. We have seen this on the US-Mexico border. It increases irregular migration and those in the country become trapped – Respondent 5*

Respondent 8 also stated that:

*I think if you look at the United States it is clear that no amount of technology can stop illegal border crossings. You can minimize them, but the diminishing returns are incredible – Respondent 8*

Respondents 5 and 8, therefore, viewed the cost of technology as being far too high compared to its little benefit. This was in contrast to Respondents 14 and 15 below who foresaw higher benefits than costs of border technology in the long-term:

*Yes, given the cost-benefit analysis, the benefit of technology driving border security management will outweigh the cost implications of using it in the long-run - Respondent 14*

*Equipment such as sensors and UAVs will provide better and more up-to-date intelligence for soldiers to act on. This will see savings in costs spent on vehicles, fuel and others enabling patrols to go “where the action is” – Respondent 15*

Respondents 6 and 9 held views that technology would only work as part of a well-orchestrated strategy that included personnel on the ground:

*Technology on its own will not work. But from what I said earlier on, people on the ground need motivation. Human cooperation is also needed – Respondent 6*

*Yes. However, it would not be a panacea – Respondent 9*

Respondent 9 meant that technology had its limit and was not the solution to the whole illegal immigration and border crime solution.

Respondent 13 believed that lack of commitment towards technology implementation in general by the government was a challenge on its own:

*Furthermore, the government has not shown its interest in technology development in general. For instance, the government is lagging when it comes to cyber security which is a non-negotiable in the present-day – Respondent 13*

With the government not putting much focus on other technology-related areas including some that are deemed to be more important than border security (as per the respondent’s perception), Respondent 13 doubted its ability to fully support tech-centric borders.

#### **4.3.3 Perceptions of excessive barriers on society**

Respondent 3 believed that stressing on tech-centric borders was putting too much emphasis on the wrong area. Tech-centric borders, apart from being a waste of scarce resources, were a ‘degradation of humanity’. This was because it was excessive monitoring of people and giving no consideration of pre-colonial social relations that have been damaged by borders as artificial barriers.

*This is a degradation of humanity and wasteful. I must write a book on these issues of migration. Even border patrol agents in the USA do not agree to this. Everybody wants to*

*live a better life. Let's not emphasize territoriality but emphasize humanity instead of spending 5 billion on borders – Respondent 3*

*The people at the Beitbridge border between Zimbabwe and South Africa post are the same people separated by an artificial border technology really won't separate these people -Respondent 3*

Respondent 5 also believed that excessive border securitization may affect normal migration as well:

*If a tech border is a fortress, then it is not my area of expertise. Technology can disrupt migration – Respondent 5*

In this scenario, technology would disrupt rather than regulate smooth migratory trends in societies.

#### **4.3.4 Unintended effects of border securitization**

In the sample, there were informative discussions on the possible, unintended consequences of border securitization, including through the introduction of tech-centric or smart borders. Respondent 5 held the view that excessive securitization of borders through smart border technologies can seriously impede the smooth flow of trade. This can have a severe economic impact on South Africa, which constitutes a very large cost to bear for the benefit it will bring:

*It has a huge cost and an economic impact. But South Africa needs trade and to move goods. These are just tiny enclaves they are not the major entry points and we still need trade; you cannot close things down – Respondent 5*

Respondent 10 also mentioned the need to consider the impact of tech-centric borders on trade and integration:

*There has to be a consideration for regional countries, South Africa is in the SADC, and other regional organizations hence that might be a problem to unilaterally implement a tech-centric border, furthermore, maybe a human resource issue and consideration for trade and integration – Respondent 10*

Respondent 5 asserted that too much border control can also result in reduced efficiency at border posts:


*If borders are watertight it becomes a blockade. That slows down trade resulting in the huge lines of waiting trucks you see in Uganda, Kenya. There should be more efficient ways to trade. It's also a discussion in the United Kingdom about the Irish border. The politicians support this but this affects trade – Respondent 5*


Political views, as stated by Respondent 5, were supportive of such a move despite its economic impact. This view is related to previous comments and discussions that political forces sometimes saw advantages in ascribing economic problems to migration. This was discussed by Respondents 3 and 8 as well as Respondent 5 under an earlier theme.

#### 4.3.5 African community related issues

In the sample, it came out that tech-centric borders and the whole discussion of border securitization may not resonate well with South Africa's neighbours, particularly those from the SADC and an AU perspective. The tree word diagrams below guided the identification of in vivo codes under this subtheme.

**Figure 4.2: Word tree diagrams relating to African community related issues theme**





Respondent 3 felt that South Africa’s implementation of tech-centric borders was affected by SADC and AU protocols that generally aimed at increasing free movements of people and goods across countries.

*(Besides that, what else stops implementation?)- Maybe finance and commitment to protocols on SADC and AU on regional migration and integration – Respondent 3*

Increased border securitization to an extent, ran against these protocols. Respondent 3 further discussed the African Union passport which was still in the formulation stages asserting technology will not prevent the coming trends in freer migration and increased country integration:

*No it will not be effective, an African Union common passport is coming into effect soon from 2020, SA has not signed how will any technology curb this? – Respondent 3*

Respondent 7 also talked about regional integration and a dilemma to balance out opening-up borders for trade and people and increasing their securitization at the same time:

*In South Africa, you have to also know that South Africa is in SADC and regional integration ought to be considered. How do you balance the two? The national and regional interests – Respondent 7*

Respondent 6 justified the AU stance of advocating for more open borders as a necessity considering the frustrating and inhumane efforts of searching and monitoring people:

*Given what the African Union is trying to do it is not effective. It is frustrating especially the searching – Respondent 6*

To enhance the view that excessive border securitization is not the solution to crime and illegal migration within a regional context, Respondent 5 gave an example of the European Union below:

*In the European Union there are no borders in Germany and France, just signs that say welcome to Germany or France but you can tell you are in another country because of different education systems tax regimes and administrations. It is about whether you are monitoring the crossing and surveillance of the population. Not about people crossing the line – Respondent 5*

The above respondent, therefore, believed that illegal immigration and cross-border crime were not there as a result of border situations but deeper, root causes.

#### **4.4 Theme 3: Border management issues behind illegal migration and crime**

The sub-themes under this theme were logistical challenges of border management; corruption; commitment to duty problems; border officials' training and policy management issues.

##### **4.4.1 Logistical challenges of border management**

Respondent 8 discussed large volumes of human and goods movement across borders, relative to the size of human resources responsible for managing this movement as a major logistical challenge that made it difficult to control both illegal immigration and cross-border crime.

*A larger volume of people makes it more difficult to cut down on illegal crossings and makes it easier for criminal groups to exploit otherwise normal activity, so yes, I think it has had a large negative impact on SA' s ability to effectively manage its borders – Respondent 8*

Respondent 11 stated that borders were very big to monitor and because of this size issue there are never enough human resources to effectively monitor them:

*The first thing is that borders are very big and too big to be managed by people. Even if you take all the SANDF to borders you will still not be able to ensure adequate border security – Respondent 11*

Respondent 8 further suggested that law enforcement authorities should focus more on curbing criminal crossing rather than immigrant movement as a way of managing resource gaps:

*I think focusing on the criminal element (i.e. organized groups using traffic from conflict-affected countries to go undetected) rather than on the people seeking a better life for their families, will ultimately make it easier on law enforcement to make South Africa safer – Respondent 8*

Respondent 2 also stated that manpower was still inadequate even when private contractors were provided to help law enforcement authorities to curb porosity at the borders.


*They were actually 15 private companies which was inadequate. They talked about increasing this to 22. 25 companies would be adequate– Respondent 2*

From the respondent's view, more resources were needed to manage borders. The respondents saw borders as being deprived of adequate key resources needed to curb cross-border crime and illegal migration.

#### **4.4.2 Corruption**

Corruption was widely discussed as a major reason why various border management strategies and policies were either not working or were not working as effectively as envisaged. Corruption was discussed as existing at many levels and functions within the borders and the immigration system at large. The word tree below guided the identification of in vivo codes relating to corruption.

Figure 4.3: Word tree on corruption as a sub-theme



Source: Data analysis

Respondents 2, 3 and 13 below strongly associated problems of illegal migration and crime activities at the borders with corruption. The respondents cited bribery of visa officials as creating situations where otherwise illegal immigrants and criminals were granted entry into the country:

*I told the deputy general a few years ago about this. Many problems are due to corruption of the immigration agents especially the visa agents. Sometimes they are given 3000-4000 rands for a visa regardless of value added by that person to South Africa- Respondent 3*

*There are instances where immigration officials are complicit in abetting illegal cross-border migration by accepting bribes and allowing the passage of illegal migrants – Respondent 13*

*The challenge is with corruption with some officials taking bribes, especially inland officers – Respondent 2*

Respondent 4 further stated that corruption as a problem was already well known at the borders having researched that area, the research being commissioned by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA).

*I also did research in the area that you are researching some time back and it was commissioned by the Department of Home Affairs and I found the issue of corruption very dominating – Respondent 4*

While this knowledge was shared with the DHA “some time back” the problem still persisted. Respondent 4 believed that there were underlying causes of this corruption and these needed to be identified and assessed. The same respondent and Respondent 11 believed that it could be because of poor remuneration that border officials were corrupt:

*There is also the issue of corruption but there is a need to look at why the immigration officers are corrupt. Is it due to low salaries? – Respondent 4*

*The second problem is resources in terms of how much these people earn. If the border police are earning R100 000 and you give them R200 they will resist. They are not earning enough to be able to resist bribes – Respondent 11*

Respondent 7 on the other hand, believed that efforts to curb corruption would be difficult to implement because the same agents responsible for monitoring and curbing corruption were involved in it. Respondent 7 suggests that they were therefore less likely to take a strong positive stance against it.

*Corruption as well is present and officials are involved in it – Respondent 7*

*How can government deal with corruption if agents are involved in corruption – Respondent 7?*

Both the persons who were responsible for monitoring corruption and their subordinates were involved in it. Respondent 2 took even a wider view of corruption indicating that even governmental interventions, including tech-centric borders, could still be rendered ineffective by corruption. Given that any interventions were most likely to be implemented through tendering processes, these could be corruptly awarded to wrong entities thus further perpetuating corruption:

*The only disadvantage is that the Minister of Defence said this after I mentioned it a week before. A lot more is spent on technology we should find good pricing and not having*

*another BOSASA situation. As corruption always follows, that's why I'm sceptical of the process, it should be transparent SANDF can handle it – Respondent 2*

On a different note, Respondent 11 believed that corruption was a result of highly bureaucratic and restrictive migration processes. Border officials took advantage of the restrictive nature of migration:

*If you make access difficult you create an avenue for people to make money through illegal migration – Respondent 11*

The sample strongly believed that corruption was a major element in illegal migration and border crime. This was at both the border entry-level, visa application level and at a wider governmental level where contracts on who manages borders were given.

#### **4.4.3 Commitment to duty problems**

There were also views that commitment to duty by some immigration officials was a matter of concern as it enabled or facilitated both illegal migration and border crime.

*They are demotivated. What I have seen is they have demotivation issues, like in the past there was news of one official using the phone while they were on duty – Respondent 6*

Respondent 10 also mentioned low commitment to duty by immigration officials and further stated that this was a global problem not unique to South Africa

*For many countries, the individuals manning the border crossings are either not fulfilling their duties in a humane, consistent, or comprehensive manner – Respondent 10*

In agreement, Respondent 4 also stated that personnel at the borders were generally overwhelmed by too much activity. This situation, versus low incentivization, made them, less interested in pursuing border management policies including those that were meant to curb illegal migration and border crime:

*They have to come up with incentive schemes. How can you incentivize the tired people who are not interested? – Respondent 4*

*The problem is therefore inadequate personnel. If you do not have adequate personnel to do the job, have at least adequate resources to pay personnel – Respondent 11*

The above respondent suggested incentivization programs that could help to increase the commitment of immigration personnel towards their work.

#### **4.4.4 Training of immigration officials**

Respondents 4, 10, 13 and 15 believed that immigration officials were not well-trained to handle and contain illegal immigration and border crime. They, in Respondent 4 and 13's views, did not understand the current immigration policies:

*There is inadequate training for immigration officers, lack of supervision, lack of understanding of the immigration policy and its implementation – Respondent 4*

*A shortage of trained personnel and the lack of capabilities such as sensors, UAVs, radar are top of the list. Sadly, there does not appear to be any willingness to fund training– Respondent 15*

*From a South African context, in general, far too many immigration officials/border agents do not have a clear understanding of the international and national laws applicable to their mandates – Respondent 10*

*They have compromised border management hugely especially the issue of policy understanding which has a ripple effect on the economy. This is especially why they need training on the roles and functions of government - Respondent 4*

*There is a lack of specific training with regards to combatting illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime. For example, some officials are unsure of what goods or products are licit or illicit – Respondent 13*

Respondent 6 also stated that better training was needed to enable immigration officers to handle their job well. Immigration personnel needed to be incentivized if they were to be committed to the much-needed training.

*But for the system to function it needs motivated trained people. – Respondent 6*

There were also views that even if smart border technology was introduced, adequate training would be required for all involved stakeholders including the police and the army. Mere implementation without adequate training was noted as a potential recipe for systemic failure:

*We need to train them in order for them to compliment the smart border. Capacitate the police through technical training – Respondent 1*

Respondent 6 also discussed post-implementation training of any smart border technology but critiqued that first, the targeted candidates for training needed to be trainable. Training candidates who may not comprehend the new systems would not help combat illegal immigration and border crime as the trained resources would still remain ineffective in meeting the new challenges brought by technology:

*We also tend to be technophobes due to a lack of knowledge. People are not well trained so putting technology you need to think about these people, are they trainable? And what are you going to do about those who you cannot train? Like I talked about we need a paradigm shift – Respondent 6*

As can be noted, Respondents 4 and 6 dwelt on training and knowledge with Respondent 6 stressing on both training to meet current challenges as well as training to capacitate them for tech-centric border changes. Training as a sub-theme was also associated with policy management and policy comprehension issues among immigration personnel.

#### **4.4.5 Policy management challenges**

The sample discussed various aspects of immigration policy that affected illegal immigration and border crime as well as those that related to tech-centric border systems. Most of the discussion on policy was in response to a common question, “In most borders, these challenges are there, in Africa, what should government do to help and to reduce cross-border crime in terms of policy?” that was presented to respondents. In other instances, policy as an issue came out as part of the general discussion of the causes of illegal migration and border crime.

One view on policy management was that immigration policies and regional co-operation policies were not comprehensive enough to fully address the phenomenon under discussion. Respondents 7, 13 and 10 believed that immigration policy was not a one-country affair but was regional as crossing borders involved more than one country. Any policy that therefore did not address the needs of the second country, therefore, created a void that made the management of illegal immigration and border crime a challenge:

*There is a serious void there. Policy has to be regional. A border does not involve one country. Crossing borders involves multiple countries. We must have robust policies that are regional. Policies must cease to be national – Respondent 7*

*It is also important to remember that South Africa alone cannot deal with securitizing its borders without the help of the countries with which it borders with. There is a need for regional collaboration amongst countries. Cross-border crime is not only a South African problem but a SADC issue as well – Respondent 13*

*To reduce illegal border crossings by migrants, African countries should develop country- and region-specific policies that operationalize a unified approach regarding the movement of citizens within their respective regions to maximize economic, social, and stability benefits - Respondent 10*

Respondent 1 saw the existing policy as poorly structured:

*We also need a structured policy, an actionable policy that ensures the borders are secure – Respondent 1*

Respondent 1 further asserted that the inability of current policies to support the funding and implementation of smart technology in borders was a major exhibit of its poor structure:

*The cost of smart technology is a hindrance and policy does not support this and you need also to look at what are the policy implications and do these policies state the need for smart technologies in the border and capacities thereof – Respondent 1*

Additionally, Respondent 1 also believed that the flaws that existed in the current immigration policy also supported the easy flouting of visa regulations:

*There is a need for a total overhaul of the immigration policy. For instance, the visitor's visa is for 30 days, however, people end up staying for years – Respondent 1*

Overall, Respondent 1 viewed the immigration policy as too weak to curb mostly illegal immigration. Respondent 2 and 3 also shared a similar view that immigration policies were weak. They were however both cautionary of the imposition of strict and rigid policies as a way of addressing any identified policy shortfalls. Respondent 2 gave an example of how immigration policies in the United States resulted in the current construction of a multi-billion dollar wall on the Mexican border. Such policies, even if they could address immigration challenges, were controversial and were generally undesirable:

*I agree it would work but I disagree with building a wall. He (Donald Trump, the US president) needs to remember that the USA was built by migrant entrepreneurs you need a better policy or approach – Respondent 2*

Respondent 3 also cautioned that excessive policy controls on migration may result in too much restriction which was equivalent to impeding free movement in certain social groups:

*They have to start on policy and the government needs to ensure it is followed. You cannot say you are implementing a policy to paddock a particular set of people – Respondent 3*

The two views above therefore suggest that policy itself can be abused or misused in the quest to curb illegal migration and border crime.

Some respondents also held the view that there were adequate policies that governed migration and border security. The challenge was with understanding these policies and effectively implementing them. Respondent 2 believed that poor policy implementation was a result of limited or lack of political will:

*It is the lack of political will, there is a need to work on policy and study other countries. There is always postponement and an attempt to resolve the issue at the last minute like in Manguzi (Where the Kosi Bay border post is located). All ministers must be involved and the government should work to better people's lives – Respondent 2*

Respondent 4 asserted that the problem was that immigration personnel failed to understand the policies in place and therefore were not able to fully and effectively implement them:

*Lack of understanding of the immigration policy and its implementation – Respondent 4*

There were therefore three common views on the effects of policy management on illegal immigration and border crime. These were: policy voids in immigration and border security; policy implementation though a necessity needed to be balanced and the consideration of policies. While policies formulated, they were not fully implemented due to a lack of political will and knowledge.

#### **4.5 Theme 4: Addressing root factors of illegal migration and border crime**

This theme was centred on the views that border securitization; including through tech-centric borders was generally not a solution to a problem but an attempt to address a common symptom. Proponents of this views believed that illegal immigration and crimes at the borders can best be

solved by addressing the core or root causes that forced people to migrate in the first place as stated by Respondent 12 below:


*Two main things come to mind. The first thing is that the question of why we are trying to address cross-border migration. In other words, what are the underlying factors that have resulted in this – Respondent 12 asked*

This theme came with the following sub-themes: addressing geopolitical issues; addressing economic factors; trade imbalances and the need to change perceptions on immigration.

#### 4.5.1 Addressing geo-political issues

Illegal immigration was caused by many factors one of which was the geo-political situation in Africa. These were internal political situations in individual African countries that tended to affect other countries as well. Illegal migration was argued to be a symptom of poor political stability situations in some parts of the continent. The word tree below helped to identify some in vivo codes associated with this sub-theme.

**Figure 4.4: Geopolitical factor-related in vivo codes**



Source: Data analysis

Smart border or tech-centric borders and any other intervention to curb illegal immigration that did not address these geo-political issues would most probably be ineffective as stated by Respondent 3 below:

*Building walls and implementing technologies is useless if you do not deal with the push factors. We appreciate the South African effort in Lesotho, DRC and Zimbabwe but it can do more – Respondent 3*

Respondent 3 was talking about the political crisis in two of South Africa's neighbors – Zimbabwe and Lesotho as well as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These countries experienced difficult political challenges that resulted in mass migration, including to South Africa. While South Africa gave different levels of mediatory assistance to these countries, Respondent 3 believes more needed to be done to bring stability that would consequentially stop illegal immigration. Thus illegal migrants were sometimes pushed out of their countries into South Africa as stated by Respondent 7:

*There are other geo-political issues... Like if you have a civil war in one country. It is a geo-political issue – Respondent 7*

Respondent 8 also mentioned poor governance in some African countries as a push factor that resulted in some migrants preferring to come to South Africa where governance was comparatively better:

*South Africa is a magnet for several other countries in the region with stagnating economies, poor governance and low-quality (or absence of) basic services. South Africa has its problems, all countries do, but comparatively, it is very prosperous, and this attracts people – Respondent 8*

Respondent 8, like Respondent 3, also linked poor governance – a geo-political factor with poor economic environments that pushed citizens of other countries to migrate.

Respondent 7 believed that geo-political issues are also a factor to consider prior to securitizing borders including through the use of tech-centric systems. South Africa being a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) may face a backlash from members who are advocating for more flexible border systems:


*But because of geo-political issues it may have backlash – Respondent 7*

Political relations with neighboring states were therefore a critical factor in Respondent 7's views.

#### **4.5.2 Economic factors**

Economic factors were identified as important determinants of migration amongst migrants. The word tree below was used for the preliminary identification of in vivo codes that related to economic factors.

**Figure 4.5: Word tree for economic factors as a sub-theme**



Source: Data analysis

Respondent 3, who earlier discussed the significant role that geopolitical factors played in illegal immigration, associated economic problems in neighbouring countries with the same geopolitical factors. Political instability created economic challenges that also forced citizens to migrate to other countries both legally and illegally. These economic problems, like geopolitical problems, also required a regional, cooperative approach. Respondent 3 cited an example of the economic challenges in Zimbabwe particularly how they worsened in the first part of 2019 where South Africa did not offer help while Botswana reportedly assisted:

*However, I would like to applaud Botswana who gave Zimbabwe 400 million that's pan-Africanism in action. South Africa refused to give Zimbabwe 1.2 billion yet ZANU PF works in collaboration with ANC. There is a need to identify that the façade of identity –*  
*Respondent 3*

Be that as it may, Respondent 3 also cautioned that the view that migrants would find better economic conditions in South Africa was sometimes delusional:

*Many low skill people come for economic reasons. Many are trying to escape poverty. There is an illusion of South Africa being the America of Africa, that's just an illusion – Respondent 3*

Other respondents also asserted that an economic disparity between South Africa and other African countries was behind migration flows to the country including illegal ones. They also shared a view that unless economic challenges are addressed in Africa, the problems of illegal migration will persist even in the presence of smart technologies managing borders. Thus despite having its own economic problems like those described by Respondent 7, the country was considered economically better off than its neighbours:

*From an economic perspective, there is talk of the economy in recession, the economy not growing – Respondent 7*

In this regard, Respondents 6 and 5 stated that:

*Exactly, the country is regarded as economically stable and South Africa is regarded as an economic tourist destination – Respondent 6*

*South Africa is the best economy in the region. There are economic opportunities. In Southern Africa, there is stability and South Africa is attractive due to its economic position – Respondent 5*

While Respondent 7 also stated that:

*The convergence of geography and politics, especially in terms of a huge difference between the levels of development in countries in a particular region, then you are likely to observe an increase cross border migration and cross border crime – Respondent 7*

Respondent 7's views were slightly different in that they put both illegal immigration and border crime as consequences of economic imbalances between South Africa and its neighbours while other respondents generally considered illegal migration, rather than border crime, as the result.

Thus addressing the logistical side of borders was merely addressing a symptom rather than a cause of the problem:

*We are addressing a symptom rather than a cause. In Zimbabwe and Mozambique there are issues of the economy and stability. There are visible signs of the issue. It is about tackling the crime and tackling the issues – Respondent 5*

Respondent 15 also stated that even with tech-centric borders, as long as economic problems in neighbouring countries persisted, there will always be high volumes of migrants from these countries:

*Given the porosity of South Africa's land borders and the economic situation in neighbouring countries, with the possible exception of Botswana, people are going to continue seeking a better life in South Africa – Respondent 15*

Closely-related to economic stability was the matter of balanced regional trade. This was noted to be a unique sub-theme and is discussed below.

#### 4.5.3 Trade imbalances and illegal immigration

Trade imbalances were an identified root cause of migration. Addressing it was seen as a potential solution to illegal migration and border crime. The word tree below was used to identify the in vivo codes on trade imbalances as a factor behind migration trends towards South Africa.

**Figure 4.1: Word tree for Trade as sub-theme**



Source: Data analysis

Respondent 3 believed that as long as trade was skewed towards South Africa and against its neighbours, these economies would continue to suffer economically, the impact being felt on the

volumes of migration towards South Africa. This was also a root cause that needed to be addressed rather than focusing on its symptoms:

*There are other issues that need prioritizing such as addressing the root causes of continued immigration. South Africa should act in a more beneficial way in Zimbabwe and Zambia and increase trade rather than invest in securing the border - Respondent 3*

Respondent 3 further suggested that South African companies operating in other African countries should work towards improving these trade imbalances as a way of addressing the root cause for immigration:

*Why not let South African companies operating in other African countries act more beneficially in other countries so that all these people coming in do not have reason to migrate and do not become a threat – Respondent 3*

Trade imbalances also created situations where there was a significantly large element of informal trade. Informal trade resulted in movements across borders which were sometimes mistaken to be long-term immigration trends. Respondent 7 asserted that some “migrants” were informal traders who were wrongly identified as migrants by immigration systems:

*Socio-economically and politically people are dependent on the livelihood that migration brings. 30-40 percent of all trade is informal. The implications on development are too much. People import and export goods and it is not big companies that import, it is ordinary people – Respondent 7*

Trade factors discussed by the sample were therefore lack of balanced regional trade and poor classification and therefore unwarranted, negative treatment of cross-border traders.

#### **4.5.4 Changing perceptions of migration**

The interviewing process unearthed views that there was a need to change the general perception on migration rather than to focus on changes on how borders are managed, including prospective changes to smart borders. These bordered on arguments that what is at times regarded as an immigration problem might not in fact be one. These arguments are mainly centered on illegal immigration rather than border crime. Respondent 11 asserted that migration was not a problem and should not be viewed as a challenge to be resolved:

*Now as far as migration is concerned there are far more people who get into borders legally than those who get illegally. Let us establish that from the onset, and when we establish that from the onset let us not see migration as a problem. More people want to get into borders legally but there are restrictions – Respondent 11*

*These restrictions in many cases are bureaucratic and insensitivity to humanitarian factors that drive migration – Respondent 11*

This was because generally there were far more people who were in South Africa legally than those who were in illegally. Respondent 11 further argued that the government should facilitate rather than restrain migration. Government restrictive policies on migration are what eventually cause people to migrate illegally:

*Let me make an example for instance; there is a crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe, or for instance, there was a cyclone in Mozambique. If South Africans do not make it easy for Mozambicans to get into SA, as easy as Mozambicans made it easy for South Africans to enter Mozambique during Apartheid, people will enter illegally – Respondent 11*

Changing the perception that migration is a problem, according to Respondent 9, would go a long way in curbing illegal immigration and would also positively affect government policy on migration.

Respondent 5 below was of the view that the issue of border crime was exploited for political purposes with politicians using it as a scapegoat for political gain and failure to ensure service delivery and the provision of an effective border security apparatus. The respondents stated that this trend was not only noticeable in South Africa but in other countries including in the United Kingdom:

*I think the problem with crime is about political perception. The issues are overplayed. There are deeper issues such as land, housing and equity issues, however, this is where the ANC fails, and then they blame the migrants. It is similar in the United Kingdom with the current austerity measures. They also blame migrants – Respondent 5*

Respondent 8 also asserted that migration legal or otherwise should not be synonymously viewed with border crime. Migration was a common, globally growing trend that was not necessarily attached to border crime.

*I do tend to reject the premise that crime (apart from illegal border crossing/visa violations, which to me are not 'crime' in the typical sense) is necessarily a part of this trend that I'm describing – Respondent 8*

Respondent 3 stated that the perceptions that migrants from Africa or certain African countries were criminals evidently affected how African migrants were treated. Respondent 3 held a view that there should be a stop to the general criminalization of migrants and migration. Respondents 3 referred to an earlier presentation:

*At one point, the then minister of Home Affairs Malusi Gigaba said we must not nationalize criminals; a criminal is a criminal in and out of their country of origin – Respondent 3*

In Respondent 3's experiences, the views that African migrants were criminals also resulted in them being treated differently from migrants from other continents as exemplified by the situation cited below:

*If you are in Paris, you are not recognized as Tanzanians or Nigerians but Africans. For example, at one point at the Swaziland border, a German tourist and a Swazi national who asked for assistance in crossing the border were treated differently. The gentleman from Swaziland was asked a lot of questions and harassed whilst the German tourist was allowed to cross the border with ease – Respondent 3*

There were also tendencies to stereotype traders as criminals resulting in the exaggerated perceptions that there were too many criminal elements crossing borders into South Africa:

*Informal traders should not be stereotyped as drug traffickers. In Western Africa for example, this is a multi-billion-dollar trade that isn't be criminalized – Respondent 3*

In Respondent 3 and 5's views, this kind of sentiments affected policy suggestions on controlling and curbing immigration. The respondents also cited a lack of proper metrics that justified harsh border control interventions. The Department of Home Affairs was cited as not being able to quantify the extent of the problem:

*I question that metric of a large number of illegal migrations. It is political, the numbers are really disputed and the Department of Home Affairs' figures are inaccurate – Respondent 5*

*I'm not sure anyone does though. For one, how much cross-border crime is there in South Africa? We can estimate based on police seizures and some fuzzy number of what levels*

*of traffic we think it indicates (say 5-10 percent), or else we can use survey data to estimate the amount of crime. Both of these are hugely flawed – Respondent 8*

The two respondents above shared a view that both perceptions on migration and border crime and policies required to curb these could be negatively affected by inaccurate metrics. These generally tended to exaggerate the extent of the problem creating justifications for costly policy changes – smart borders being an example of one.

Respondents 12 and 14 stated that migration policies and perceptions did not accommodate the fact that the political borders brought about by colonialism split societies. As societies that were set apart by colonialism attempted to reconnect migration patterns emerged and some of these are classified as illegal:

*Overlapping border communities, 'artificiality' of colonial borders - Respondents 14*

*A lot of these borders are not a direct decision of the people who live in these border communities. These are artificial and inserted by colonialism. The Somali/Kenyan border and many other borders in Africa are examples – Respondents 12*

Thus there was a need to accommodate this view in migration debates, decisions and policies.

## 4.6. DISCUSSION

### 4.6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the themes that were identified in the data analysis are further discussed

### 4.6.2 Overview of findings

The data analysis process conducted for the study produced four themes and 18 sub-themes as follows:

Theme 1: Benefits and need for tech-centric borders

- Crime, corruption detection and prevention
- Potential positive effect on current human resources efficiency
- Potential positive effect on private contractor efficiency
- Economic benefits

Theme 2: Challenges in implementing smart border technologies

- Financial and resources challenges
- Technology-related challenges
- Perceptions of excessive barriers on society
- Unintended effects of border securitization
- African community related issues

Theme 3: Border management issues behind illegal migration and cross border crime

- Logistical challenges of border management
- Corruption
- Commitment to duty problems
- Training of immigration officials
- Policy management challenges


Theme 4: Addressing root factors of illegal migration and cross border crime

- Addressing geo-political issues

- Economic factors
- Trade imbalances and illegal immigration
- Changing perceptions on migration

From the data analysis, it was noticed that there are three major viewpoints on illegal immigration and cross border crime. The first view is the pro-tech-centric border view. This is a perception that border securitization through increased technology is the major solution that will possibly curb illegal migration and cross-border crime. This is presented in the diagram below:

**Figure 4.7: A tech-centric border view**




Source: Generated by the researcher

Cross-border crime and illegal migration come with secondary problems or challenges, specifically the need for more effective border management and migration policy alignment. These problems are also exacerbated by secondary factors, namely corruption among border officials, lack of operational training relating to the management of everyday border issues and low commitment among the same officials. Tech-centric borders were argued to be a solution to the illegal immigration and border crime problems and most of the secondary problems. Tech-centric borders could thus solve both illegal immigration into South Africa and border crime, a view also shared by DeSipio & Rodolfo (2015). At the same time, it would be a solution for corruption because of its surveillance effect and reduced dependency on humans as argued by Wickberg (2013). The second view aligns with the root cause analysis. Holders of this view believed that border crime and illegal immigration were not a problem but rather a symptom of a

greater, underlying problem. To remove these symptoms, solutions for the major problem must be sought and these do not necessarily involve increased border securitization – including through the use of tech-centric means. The second view is represented in the diagram below:


**Figure 4.8: A pro-root cause analysis view**



Source: Generated by the researcher

As noted above, tech-centric borders were perceived to work at symptom level where they were directed firstly to the major symptom of illegal migration and secondly to the secondary symptoms that included poor border management logistics, corruption, low skills and commitment issues among border officials as well as poor migration policy alignment matters. According to the holders of this view, tech-centric borders would only affect the symptoms of illegal migration and cross-border crime and not address the root cause of the problem. Holders of this view, therefore, did not see any long-term value in tech-centric borders. The third and last major view that came out of the study is that border-related problems were not real problems. Rather, they were either perceived problems or overemphasized situations.

**Figure 4.9: Perceived vs. Real Problems**




Source: Generated by Reseacher

Under this view, there was a concern that both illegal immigration and border crimes were not scientifically measured processes resulting in a lot of room for political misrepresentations on the matter. Secondly, illegal migration was more of a perceptual issue that centred on common negative sentiments that South African systems held against fellow African nationals. A change of perceptions and better realignment with regional policies was thus seen as a solution to how society viewed illegal immigration and border crime. The above view was strongly hinged on two subthemes: changing perceptions on migration and African community-related issues. The implications of the above views are further discussed in the sections to follow. But before this, the next section examines the findings from the four themes. Where possible, these are compared and contrasted with findings and views from other scholars and institutions.

#### **4.6.3 Findings versus theoretical framework**

The securitization theory states that for a phenomenon to be viewed as a threat to national security, it must exhibit three features namely, existential threat, emergency action and the effect of inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Guzzini & Jung, 2004; Taureck, 2006). The diagram below attempts to reconcile the three features of the Securitization theory to findings in the study.

**Figure 4.10: Three features of the securitization theory**



Source: Generated by the researcher

The existential threat, as shown above, is the safety and security of South Africa that is purportedly jeopardized by illegal immigration and border crime. The emergency situation is mostly based on the view that the existential threat is rapidly growing, thereby requiring more emergency measures to curb it. The securitization theory seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat that needs to be fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy that is created to tackle the problems (Bourbeau, 2011; McGlinchey, Walters & Scheinpflug, 2017).

In the study, based on the views of the first approach or the pro-tech-centric border approach, the following can be noted:

**Security character of the problem:** illegal migration and border crime are described in the study as a security threat to South African communities and the country's economic interests. The highest threat level discussed in the sample was terrorism – albeit there is not much reference to it in the literature.

**Social commitments resulting to collective acceptance:** There was a view that the social commitments to manage illegal immigration and border crime as threats included the noted increase of military resources to manage the border and the engagement of private contractors to help the government in enhancing border safety and security. The sample also discussed communities' expectations of government to act on the "threat" as well as strong political views from prominent politicians also encouraging increased border control.

**The possibility of particular policy:** Respondents perceived tech-centric border management as a possible way to contain the threat.

Using, Bourbeau's views (2011) the question of illegal immigration and border crime can therefore be classified as a security threat as it meets the three political features of such a threat. The view, therefore, justifies increased security at the borders as a solution to a growing threat. According to Stritzel (2007) & McGlinchey et al. (2017), the securitization process requires the actions of a "securitizing actor" who is a political promoter who sells security needs and policies to an audience. In the study, the securitizing actor can be identified as some sections of the government. Key political figures were cited by one of the respondents as being justifiably behind the need to secure borders, these included Mmusi Maimane, the former leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Additionally, another respondent believed that the army was selling the securitization idea as a solution to border logistics management. Part of the sample that justified tech-centric borders, therefore, believed that there was political will power to move along with the project. Views by Hennop et al. (2001) that border securitization was being called for by South African communities were also reiterated in the sample and from a securitization theory perspective, these acts demand emergency measures to an existential threat. Shelley & Metz (2017) however say that while the political threat posed by both illegal immigration and border crime was low, the perception that these were major problems was easy to sell to society.

The above views put the existential threat to safety and security within the 'politicized' realms of the securitization spectrum by the Geneva Graduate Institute (2013). Thus the sample, despite


advocating for securitization of borders generally dwelt within the 'politicized' realm where border security would be managed within the ambits of current laws although some policies under such laws may need to be changed. Tech-centric borders were therefore not within the extreme or securitized section of the Geneva Graduate Institute (2003) securitization spectrum. At the same time, it was noted that some political forces were reluctant to fully support securitization and therefore sell it as a solution to South Africa. This was mainly because of South Africa's relations with SADC and AU counterparts who were, in contrast, advocating for open and inclusive border management and migration policies.

Overall, a section of the respondents, therefore, saw an existential threat and a need for emergency measures posed by illegal immigration and border crime as well as a need for tech-centric borders as a solution. It must be noted, however, that a section of pro-tech-centric border proponents believed the tech-centric borders may reduce securitization as fewer military personnel and resources may need to be deployed to secure the same borders. This also justifies the views that tech-centric borders put border control within the "politicized" rather than the "securitized" spectrum of the Securitization spectrum such as argued by scholars such as Wickberg (2013), Završnik (2015), Barrera (2016).

#### **4.7 The root analysis theory**

By contrast, some respondents advocated for a root-cause analysis approach to illegal immigration and border crime. These were respondents who believed that border problems were a symptom of geopolitical and economic situations. The hierarchical chart below shows a logical flow of views from the sample viewed from a root-cause analysis theoretical perspective.

**Figure 4.11: Root-cause analysis theoretical perspective.**




Source: Generated by the researcher

In the above example, root causes related to push factors that forced people to move towards South Africa. Root causes can also be identified for the other secondary problems such as corruption and according to the theory; these must be addressed in tandem with the main problems. The root-cause view of some respondents generally considered situations where tech-centric borders and border securitization changed the patterns and directions of illegal migration without reducing volumes of the problem. The root cause was supported in the literature by Flynn (2003), Stana (2011) & Bennett (2014) among others who did not see increased technology as a lasting solution for border control. Advocates of the root-cause approach were generally adamant that political will to manage and address root causes of illegal migration existed. In a similar view, Gent (2002) states that the root cause approach was often criticized for demanding extensive efforts from many stakeholders, a situation which was not easy. Countries, therefore, found it easier to implement border management measures that were in their realm of control even if these did not address illegal migration and border crime root causes.

## 4.8 The integrated approach

In an attempt to reconcile the various views discussed in both the literature and the study, a more integrated approach that takes note of the root causes of illegal immigration, the facilitating factors or secondary problems as well as tech-centric borders as a solution is proposed. This view is presented as a diagram below:

**Figure 4.12: An integrated approach combining root causes of illegal immigration, facilitating factors and tech-centric borders**




Source: Generated by the researcher

If the problem of illegal immigration is to be addressed, the root causes of migration needed to be addressed. However, as argued earlier, these required a more integrated and cooperative approach and was therefore not a short-term solution. Tech-centric borders addressed the immediate border management situation, despite not addressing the long-term root causes of illegal migration and border crime. Integrating the two approaches can result in a sustainable solution to the problem. Both approaches can also have a positive effect on secondary problems of illegal immigration and border crime specifically corruption, logistical challenges and policy issues. For instance, reduced illegal migration as a result of addressed root causes can reduce corruption at borders as migration tendencies go down. Further to this, tech-centric borders can contribute to reducing corruption as a result of a reduction in having to depend on human personnel and abilities to effectively monitor corrupt anomalies. The sections to follow compare the four themes of the study to previous findings from the literature.

## 4.9 Benefits and need for tech-centric borders

The first theme, *Benefits and need for tech-centric borders* presented views on why it was deemed important to implement tech-centric borders and the benefits these would bring to South Africa – specifically the control of illegal immigration and border crime. Figure 7 below recaps the four sub-themes under Theme 1.

**Figure 4.13: Benefits of a tech-centric border**



Source: Generated by the researcher

The sub-themes are discussed in the next four sub-sections.

## 4.10 Crime, corruption detection and prevention

A section of the sample believed that border crime and illegal migration can be curtailed using technology. Their views are similar to those of Flynn (2003), Završnik (2015), Barrera (2016) and Krogstad & Barrera (2018) who saw the benefits of border technology in curbing illegal migration and border crime. Flynn (2003) comments that border technology resulted in the improvement of border control and security within the USA thereby assisting in crime reduction. Flynn (2003) & Završnik (2015) state that technology helps to proactively identify potential threats as well as to

detect infringements. In the study, the expansive nature of South Africa's borders was mentioned as one factor that affected border security and control. The Africa Defense Forum (2018) asserts that technology can be useful in reaching places that human resource cannot easily reach. The respondents' views, particularly the pro-tech-centric view discussed earlier, resonate with the Africa Defense Forum's view.

Under the same theme, tech-centric borders were seen as a solution to corruption at the points of entry. Wickberg (2013), like the pro-tech-centric respondents in the sample, believe that border technology was a potentially strong solution to border corruption. Wickberg identified the surveillance and the transparency effects of technologies such as infra-red cameras (also mentioned in the study) as being a deterrent to corrupt activities at borders. Wickberg further cited Gronlund et al. (2010) who listed border areas that can benefit through reduced corruption as a result of technology: These areas include:

- Automation of routine activities that are prone to bribery and corrupt behaviors
- Detection of operation anomalies by individuals and networks
- Preventative detection of corrupt activities through surveillance
- Provision of feedback and reporting mechanisms for corrupt activity

Among respondents, tech-centric borders were reported as having a potential effect on routine activities, the detection, prevention and reporting of corruption. The scope in terms of the use of technology to combat corruption – the provision of feedback and reporting mechanisms was however not discussed or highlighted by the sample. Nonetheless, the findings, therefore, confirm that the views held by Transparency International and by some of the sampled South African experts that technology at the border could be beneficial to some extent.

Like Crush, Williams and Peberdy (2005), Rawoot (2011); Allum & Gilmour (2012), the researcher observed that there was therefore a strong view among respondents that corruption was a key facilitator of illegal immigration and border crime. Notably, the above scholars generally viewed corruption as a result rather than an antecedent factor of border crime and illegal immigration. They were therefore slightly inclined towards a view that if corruption is controlled, the identified problems could be reduced albeit not fully resolved. This perception in the above-cited scholar's hints at the need for a root-cause approach to the matter

#### **4.11 Potential effect on human resources and private company efficiency**

This study also asks whether tech-centric borders would result in reduced dependency on the army and the police. Generally, respondents expressed varying views, one being that technology may increase detections resulting in a need for more forces on the ground. In the literature, there were views that technology might indeed increase efficiency, resulting in the need for few personnel at the border. Accenture (2016), in agreement with the findings, asserts that border technologies can increase the efficiency of border management personnel, suggesting that this might result in a decrease in personnel at borders. Going by a view that fewer military and police resources may be needed, technology might therefore be a solution rather than a cause for border militarization and therefore the intensity of securitization. Furthermore, the view that increased technology could support security resources that were not able to cope with border crime as presented by Stojkovic et al. (2014) and DefenceWeb (2018), was supported in the study. This view, unlike the above, suggests that technology might indeed increase border militarization as more military resources may need to be deployed. This view, to some extent, resonated with the securitization theory discussions presented earlier.


Another group of resources at South African borders were private companies. There was the view that they would not be needed so much at the borders if technology is enhanced. There was a negative sentiment at how private border management contractors operated. They, according to the views of respondents, were neither effective nor efficient in their work. One respondent also suspected these entities of deliberately contributing to border crime and illegal migration. Interestingly, not much is written about these companies in the literature – as far as the researcher could find.

There was a view that illegal immigration and cross border crime control through border technology could have a positive effect on economic development in South Africa. In the literature, however, this view is commonly discussed. Rumley et al. (2016) show the negative effect of smuggling on trade in affected countries. Harms (2013) & Daniel (2018) demonstrate how the illegal cigarette trade negatively affected South Africa's tax revenue. The South African Revenue Services (SARS) has also found that illegal clothing imports resulted in both losses of tax revenue and job losses. These views suggest that despite being less discussed in the interviews, controlling border crime through tech-centric or smart border systems, among other measures, could have some benefits on economic growth.

#### 4.12 Challenges in implementing smart border technologies

The second theme of the study was, *Challenges in implementing smart border technologies*. Five subthemes were identified in the second theme and these are presented in the diagram below:

**Figure 4.14: Challenges of implementing a tech-centric border**



Source: Generated by the researcher

The first subthemes, financial and other resources challenges are strongly supported in both the study and the literature. Oucho & Gelderblom (2006) cite financing challenges as crippling the implementation of border management technologies that could reduce cross border crime and illegal immigration. Technology-related challenges mentioned include the fact that technology might not necessarily address illegal immigration and border crime due to its limitations. This view is strongly related to the root cause approach with respondents stating that it was better to address the root causes of the problem than the implementation of new technologies. Stana (2011) is of the view that technology cannot fully eradicate illegal immigration and border crime but has however improved the border management efficiency. The United States-Mexico border and the Morocco-European frontier are cited by respondents as examples of how technology can fail to


control the identified activities by respondents in the study. At the same time, Krogstad & Barrera (2018) also hold a contradictory view that the US-Mexico border conditions have improved as a result of technology measures. Lisle (2018), on the other hand, cites how border technologies within the European context had failed to identify border threats effectively resulting in undue monitoring and restrictions on all kinds of travellers and goods. The study, therefore, captured the commonly debated views on whether border technology was a solution to illegal migration and border crime with both views from the literature being represented and supported.

Another challenge associated with tech-centric borders, as discussed by the sample, was that they were viewed as amounting to excessive border securitization that infringed the rights to free movement. This view was widely shared in the literature by Günay & Witjes (2016). While border securitization is seen as a challenge by some, to others it was a necessary evil owing to increasing threats on South Africa's security that were associated with illegal border activities (Esterhuysen, 2019). The views expressed by some of the respondents that tech-centric borders would go against current SADC and AU interests to enhance free movement of people and goods were also common in the literature. There were however strong suggestions that both the SADC and the AU had not developed any comprehensive border management co-operation frameworks among members. This, therefore, left tech-centric borders as an open option in the region, especially considering increasing cross border crime and illegal immigration (Martin, 2011; Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Kaunert, Léonard & Pawlak (2012) also argue that regional integration in the EU increased cross border crime and illegal immigration and this subsequently necessitated increased control on migration and trade. This is contrary to one of the views that the same integration observable in the EU is proof that border technologies were not a dire necessity in controlling borders but commitment within a regional integration perspective was.

#### **4.13 Border management issues behind illegal migration and cross-border crime**

The third theme dealt with factors that facilitated increased border crime and illegal immigration. These factors are presented as sub-themes shown in Figure 9 below:

**Figure 4.15: Issues facilitating illegal migration and cross-border crime**



Source: Generated by the researcher

The above sub-themes were discussed as secondary problems that would be addressed through tech-centric borders by respondents who subscribed to the pro-tech-centric border view. Within the root-cause view or approach, these were just secondary symptoms rather than problems to be addressed. They, therefore, did not cause illegal immigration and cross border crime but just facilitated it. Several scholars agree that some of the above factors facilitate illegal immigration and border crime (Shaw, 1998; Esterhuysen, 2019; McMichael, 2012 & Wickberg, 2013). Pickering & Ham (2017), Stana (2011) & DeSipio & Rodolfo (2015), like some respondents, point to logistical challenges, especially managing large volumes of migrants and goods as well as long border frontiers, as contributors to illegal immigration and border crime. Others, specifically the training of border officials and their commitment to duty, are not widely discussed in the various sources that the researcher consulted. Policy challenges were however widely covered.


In the study, the view that regional policy is critical in combating illegal migration and cross border crime strongly came out. This view resonated with earlier views and findings that the SADC as well as the AU as major regional blocs that South Africa belongs to did not have effective policies on migration and border crime control (Martin, 2011 & Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). Some respondents

are of the view that the problem is that South Africa was finding it difficult to implement its legislation and policies that can curb illegal immigration and border crime (see also Khumalo, 2014, Steinberg, 2005, Martin, 2011 & DefenceWeb, 2018).

#### 4.14 Addressing root factors of illegal migration and border crime

Theme 4 was *Addressing the root factors of illegal migration and border crime*. The subthemes associated with this theme are reiterated below. This theme strongly aligns with respondents who believed in the root-cause approach as a solution to illegal immigration and border crime.

**Figure 4.16: Initiatives to address illegal migration and cross-border crime**



Source: Generated by the researcher

The study also confirmed common views that economic factors were drivers of immigration especially from comparatively poorly performing economies. This is echoed by many scholars including Kok et al. (2006); Kalitanyi & Visser (2010) Castles (2013) & Facchini et al. (2013). The geopolitics of Southern Africa and that of sub-Saharan African countries appear to be reflected in views expressed by respondents. These include the wars, political persecutions, and poor governance forcing societies to migrate (Heyer, 2017). According to Hyndman (2012), these geopolitical factors made it less appealing to define immigration as purely personal decisions that cannot be explained by nations and regions as geographical and political systems. In the study as well, respondents were able to identify immigration volumes and trends from particular

geographies, these being ascribed to political forces at play. Zimbabwe and Lesotho came out as common points of reference. The study's findings on geopolitical factors, therefore, resonated with findings and views from the literature.

There was a view among respondents that trade imbalances between South Africa and its neighbours are a cause of illegal immigration. Neighbouring economies with restricted trade access have not effectively developed their economies and created jobs and their citizens ended up migrating in search of employment. This is well documented in the literature. According to the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (2018), increased trade reduced the need to migrate, all things being equal. UNCTAD states that as trade increased between and among nations, there is a transfer of capital that supports the development and compensation of labour among trading partners. Countries with trade deficiencies who exported less benefited less from capital inflows. Migration was a reactionary tendency of unequal factors of production, namely labour to seek employment and income. UNCTAD, therefore, believes that trade and migration are inversely proportional - as one increases, the other one decreases.

The UNCTAD report also cites a study by Romalis (2007) that shows that trade tends to improve socio-economic conditions in both destination and origin countries. This reduces the propensity to migrate due to economic reasons. As noted in the literature and in the study, economic immigration is comparatively high in South Africa owing to the country's large economy and its higher prospects for employment and business opportunities (Kabwe-Segatti, 2008; Sidimba, 2017). At the same time, trade openness, which is considered to be a solution to economic immigration, is associated with long-run negative economic growth (Guei & le Roux, 2019). As economies open to trade, the potential effect of imports can reduce the need for capital formation reducing employment and economic growth in the process. This results in a dilemma for some countries that have to decide whether they should consider opening up their economies as a way of dealing with economic emigration or restricting trade openness considering that it could potentially lower economic growth.

#### **4.15 Changing perceptions of migration**

Three respondents argued that negative perceptions associated with illegal migration and border crime are to an extent unjustifiable by evidence. One respondent believes that the negative views that some South Africans have of fellow Africans resulted in the association of migration with crime and the labelling of migrants from certain parts of Africa as criminals. This created situations

where African migrants were treated less favourably than European ones – as a comparison. Alfaro-Velcamp & Shaw (2016) also argue that there has been a general criminalization of migration in South Africa, noting that the state has played a role in this criminalization despite the existence of constitutional forces meant to protect and uphold the rights of migrants. This perceptual criminalization has resulted in the view that migrants are a threat to be confronted. As a respondent said, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw believe that this view was mostly held against fellow African migrants and to some extent migrants of East-Asian origin.

#### **4.16. Conclusion**

Data analysis using thematic content analysis yielded the following four main themes – 1) Benefits of, and need for, a tech-centric border; 2) Challenges in implementing smart border technologies; 3) Border management issues behind illegal migration and crime, and 4) Addressing root factors of illegal migration and cross-border crime. Overall the themes point towards the view that tech-centric borders did have some potential benefits for South Africa. However, some challenges could either detract from their effectiveness or make their implementation a problem. At the same time, other operational, non-technological factors need to be addressed such as corruption, low training and poor commitment towards duty among officials. There was also a need to go beyond the border problems and address the root causes that made people migrate illegally in the first place as well as a need to change perceptions of migration, particularly the view that it was a negative phenomenon.

The discussion section provided interesting insights into the identified themes. From the discussions, it can be noted that there is much debate on whether a tech-centric border would be a solution to cross-border crime and illegal immigration challenges that South African borders are exposed to. In the discussion, it was noted that most views that the sample presented had been discussed somewhere in the literature. Despite these discussions in the literature, scholars and institutions alike seem not to have reached a consensus on the necessity of border securitization, tech-centric borders, migration, border crimes and other thematic topics of interest to this research. The discussion, most importantly, summarized the broader views that the sample held into three perspectives that can be used to make policy recommendations. These views were that there was a pro-securitization through tech-centric borders view and a root cause analysis view. The integrated view provides a compromise that recognizes the need for immediate solutions to ever-increasing challenges of border management while at the same time acknowledging the need to dig deeper into the root of these challenges. As will be noted in the chapter to follow,

which is also the study's concluding chapter, this integrated approach forms the crux of the research's recommendations.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the conclusion of the study based on findings from its empirical investigations and the literature. The chapter reconciles the themes established in the data analysis chapter and discussed in the discussion chapter with the study's research objectives and research questions. Summaries of the different chapters and the study's overall findings are presented before conclusions to the five research questions of the study are made.

### **5.2 Research objectives**

The study's main objective was to determine the perceptions, opinions and thoughts of experts on whether tech-centric borders could be an effective and acceptable strategy in managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime in South Africa particularly at the Kosi Bay Border Post and Golela Border Post. Kosi Bay Border Post links South Africa and Mozambique and the latter links South Africa and Eswatini.

The sub-objectives of the study were as follows:

- The challenges faced by immigration officials while trying to curtail illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime;
- The effectiveness of existing strategies aimed at managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime at and around Kosi Bay Border Post and Golela Border Post;
- The extent to which a tech-centric border could contribute towards significant reduction in cross-border crime and illegal immigration;
- The challenges faced by South Africa in instituting a tech-centric border and the extent to which this has hampered border security;
- The possible advantages and disadvantages that a tech-centric border could have for South Africa.

### **5.3 Research questions**

The research objectives above were reduced to five research questions:

- What are the challenges faced by immigration officials while trying to curtail illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime?

- How effective are the existing strategies aimed at managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime at Golela and Kosi Bay border posts?
- To what extent would a tech-centric border contribute to a significant reduction in cross-border crime and illegal cross-border immigration?
- What are the challenges faced by South Africa in providing tech-centric borders and to what extent has this hampered border security?
- What are the possible advantages and disadvantages of creating tech-centric borders in South Africa?

## **5.4 Summary of the study**

### **5.4.1 Summary of Chapter 1**

In Chapter 1, the study's title, objectives and research questions were presented. The chapter identified the research problem as the need to find potential solutions to curb illegal immigration and cross-border crime around the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts.

### **5.4.2 Summary of Chapter 2**

Chapter 2 is titled "Illegal cross-border migration, cross-border crime and border technology: a global, continental: Regional and local perspectives". It was the first of the two literature review chapters of the study. In the chapter, illegal immigration as a concept was discussed in terms of its links to political instability, the bureaucracies of migration policies, economic instability and social links between people in different nations separated by borders. There is a general view that illegal immigration, as a trend, was on the rise and was mostly directed towards economies that were perceived to hold better employment and business opportunities. The literature revealed that weak border management systems, corruption, porous borders, manpower shortages and poor coordination among border management agencies were major challenges that affected the effectiveness of border security and control at the Golela and Kosi Bay borders.

Overall, it came out that cross-border crime and illegal migration were two closely related phenomena with the former rising as the latter increased. It was also noted that current border and crime management systems were overwhelmed although tech-centric systems particularly in the United States had to an extent helped to reduce both illegal immigration and cross-border crime.

### 5.4.3 Summary of Chapter 3

In Chapter 3, the research methodology of the study was discussed in detail. The study was guided by interpretivism which enables the researcher to get various, subjective views or perceptions from the sample. The study used a secondary research or desktop research design together with an exploratory research design. In the first design, data was collected from existing sources and analyzed and presented in two chapters. In the exploratory aspect, data was gathered from interviews with 15 individuals from research institutes as well as institutions of higher learning who had researched cross-border crime, illegal immigration and border management processes incorporating border technology. These individuals were selected through purposive sampling with a sample of 24 being initially targeted. In Chapter 4, the data analysis processes are also discussed. Data was analyzed using thematic content analysis on Atlas.ti.8. The goal was to bring out themes and subthemes that could effectively answer the research questions enabling the study to meet its objectives.

Ethical matters, particularly ethical considerations made in the processes of the research are also discussed in Chapter 4. These included abiding by the University of Zululand's 'Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics' as well as its 'Policy and Procedures on Managing and Preventing Acts of Plagiarism'. Matters of participant confidentiality, informed consent and protection from harm were also noted. Finally, the chapter discussed data quality management issues. The reliability of the study was to be protected by ensuring credibility, conformability and trustworthiness and external reliability in the study's results.

Also in chapter 3, the theoretical framework of the study and its interpretation was discussed. The theoretical framework of the study was the theory of securitization or the securitization theory attributed to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The philosophical grounding of the theory assumes that to prevent something from becoming a security threat, three elements have to be presented and these are Identification of existential threat, emergency action and effect of inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Guzzini & Jung, 2004). The securitization theory as discussed by various scholars including Boudreaux, (2011) seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat that is fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy that is created to tackle the problems.

In the chapter, a further review of whether South Africa's border security and illegal immigration situation warranted a securitization approach as discussed in the theory was done. A group of scholars among them McMichael (2012), Omeokachie (2014) & Macheke (2018) view the border situation as warranting a securitized intervention. Another approach that was reviewed in detail in Chapter 3 was the coordinated border management approach (CBM). This approach involved a more collaborative approach among entities that could be countries, regional blocs or regions to manage both cross-border crime and illegal immigration.

Proponents of this approach included McLinden et al. (2010) and Rosenblum et al. (2013) & Mapuya (2014). Mapuya (2014) argues that from a regional perspective, the SADC has since its inception, championed the idea of member states collaborating and coordinating their immigration policies. Some scholars such as Hennop et al. (2001), Mapuya (2014) and Khumalo (2014) believe that South Africa could improve its border management through a collaborative approach. Overall, a gap that was noted in the literature was whether South Africa could benefit more from a securitization theory-based approach or from a more collaborative approach in managing cross-border crime and illegal immigration.

#### **5.4.4 Summary of Chapter 4**

In Chapter 4, the presentation, analysis and interpretation of data were undertaken. Thematic content analysis was used in this analysis and data was presented by themes and subthemes. In vivo codes were used to generate subthemes that were then grouped into themes. These were also guided by word trees that were generated to guide the in vivo code development processes. Four main themes emerged from the analysis each with various subthemes under it. These are Theme 1: Benefits and need for tech-centric borders; Theme 2: Challenges in implementing smart border technologies; Theme 3: Border management issues behind illegal migration and crime and Theme 4: Addressing root factors of illegal migration and border crime. These findings are then compared and contrasted with what was found in the literature. The discussion includes building models that could explain the themes established in Chapter 5.

The four themes were further decomposed into three broad views, the first of which is that tech-centric borders are a solution to illegal cross border migration and crime. The second is the need to assess and address their root causes and the third is that border-related problems are not real problems but are either perceived problems or exaggerated. The first view resonates with the securitization theory discussed in the study's theoretical framework. The second view is closely related to the root cause analysis approach. The discussion ended with an attempt to reconcile

the above views into an integrated approach which proposes that combining the securitization view with the root-cause analysis can provide solutions to the problems of illegal migration and cross-border crime. Securitization of borders can result in a short-term decline in both problems while the root-cause analysis can result in a long-term solution. Combining the two could theoretically yield both short-term and long-term solutions.

#### **5.4.5 Chapter 5: Summary**

In Chapter 5, the research report's chapters were summarized and conclusions and recommendations were made. The limitations to the study were also pointed out.

#### **5.5 Summary of findings**

As stated earlier, four broad themes emerged from the data analysis and interpretation and they are summarized as follows.

##### **5.5.1 Theme 1: Benefits of, and need for, tech-centric borders**

The first theme relates to the various benefits that tech-centric borders are expected to bring to South Africa. It has four sub-themes namely, crime, corruption, detection and prevention; potential positive effects on current human resources efficiency; potential positive effects on private contractor efficiency and economic benefits.

###### **5.5.1.2 Crime, corruption detection and prevention**

Tech-centric borders were seen by some as possible solutions for cross border crime. Given that there were already deployments of SANDF personnel at borders, technology could complement their crime-fighting efforts. Additionally, it would reduce excessive dependency on the country's security apparatus – the SAPS and SANDF. Tech-centric borders could also be of benefit in curbing human error at borders as well as in detecting and therefore combating corruption. This view is corroborated by Okumu (2011) who argues that with Africa facing increasing threats emanating from borders, technology can enhance border operations despite its drawbacks. Moreover, the EU argues that the control and surveillance of borders are essential to monitoring and reducing cross-border crime and migration, hence investments in technology is crucial to better border management. The Democratic Alliance, South Africa biggest opposition party, has also argued that South Africa's borders with neighbouring countries are poorly managed and that

this hampers the fight against illegal immigration and cross-country criminal activities. They, therefore, argue for the government to increase its investment in technology to complement existing border operations.

There was also a different view that the level of crime at borders – especially those borders used by black people – were exaggerated. The proposed solution was that the reasons for such misrepresentations be explored and one of these was the identity crisis among black Africans.

#### **5.5.1.3 Potential positive effect on current human resources efficiency**

Tech-centric borders, according to some respondents, could compliment personnel in crime-fighting and make it unnecessary to increase their numbers at the borders. Other respondents however believe that there may even be the need for fewer army personnel to complement the new technology. Respondent 13 however suggested that border technology could either increase or decrease human resources including the army, depending on the nature of the technology deployed.

#### **5.5.1.4 Potential positive effects on private contractor efficiency**

Some participants were of the view that without technology more and more human resources will be needed to securitize borders. As was revealed, even with 15 private companies, some of the borders were still highly prone to both crime and illegal immigration. In this regard, a tech-centric border was seen as a solution to such a multiplication of resources that did not yield the expected result. Some respondents asserted that the ineffectiveness of the current contractors leads to the duplication of tasks. Having many companies managing border security had several disadvantages including lack of standardized border procedures, confusion among travellers and demotivation of officials. The view was expressed that private companies do in fact benefit from illegal migration and crime at borders and are therefore enablers and perpetrators of inefficiencies for their own benefit. With reference to Europe, Wanrooji (2019) argues that there is a correlation between the growth of the security and surveillance industries and the escalating migration crisis with big businesses raking in huge profits from such projects as border surveillance, holding centres, policing, and drone deployments. While the huge costs are naturally borne by taxpayers, the profits go to major multinational companies, suggesting that the increase in private contracts in border management can sometimes result in conflicting interests.

#### **5.5.1.5 Economic benefits**

One of the participants holds the view that effective border management through tech-centric border regimes could have many economic benefits for South Africa. This was because of a potential reduction in smuggling-related crimes. This view was also shared by various scholars in the literature. Control of smuggled goods will enhance local industry competitiveness and increase tax revenue for the South African government. This is supported by a study by the Directorate of Intelligence (2011) which finds that smuggling denies poor countries critically needed revenues and foreign exchange. In many African countries whose economies are mostly dependent on agricultural exports, i.e., Ghana, Uganda, Senegal and Ethiopia, 20 to 30 percent of the crops are commonly exported illegally for higher prices and harder currency. In Angola and Nigeria, revenues are lost to the illegal smuggling of petroleum products. Smuggling which is tied to corruption in many African states has eroded government power and its legitimacy (Directorate of Intelligence, 2011). According to the report, the flow of smuggled goods across borders can strain relationships between countries. As noted earlier, the illicit cigarette trade reportedly cost South Africa R8 billion in taxes in 2018 despite commitments from the South African Revenue Service to curb it. Therefore, there is a great need to enhance local industry competitiveness through the reduction of smuggling.

## **5.5.2 Theme 2: Challenges in implementing smart border technologies**

### **5.5.2.1 Financial and resources challenges**

Almost all respondents talked about financial challenges as a limiting factor in the implementation of tech-centric borders. On financial challenges, two common views were noted. The first was that tech-centric border implementation is hampered by a lack of or limitation of funds. This is reinforced by Muller (2019), who argues that over the past decade, South Africa's public finances have come under strain due to the economic legacy of apartheid and the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, judging from the above, it becomes clear that South Africa does not have the money to invest in expensive technology as the government has directed its budget towards issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality. The second factor was that it was not a financial priority in comparison to other dire financial needs of South Africa particularly those linked directly to providing public services such as health, education and welfare.

### **5.5.2.2 Technology-related challenges**

Participants expressed the view that the new technologies did not always deliver and that this could be the case with tech-centric borders. Technological innovations that seem to work perfectly at the outset could develop glitches after some time such that their initial benefits become neutralized. There are also risks associated with implementing technologies that could soon become redundant. Other participants believed that some borders that were converted into smart borders or tech-centric borders still recorded high volumes of illegal immigrants and crime. Technology might only affect the paths rather than volumes of migration and might therefore prove ineffective. This is in line with Topak, Bracken-Roche, Saulnier & Lyon's (2015) argument that in Europe, the use of technology at borders has forced migrants to find riskier routes. They also argue that smugglers are only the consequence of the EU's expanding border surveillance regime and not the cause of migration and that the EU should concentrate on saving migrants rather than securitizing migration.

#### **5.5.2.3 Perceptions of excessive barriers on society**

Some participants believe that focusing on tech-centric borders was putting too much emphasis in the wrong place. They suggest that these borders are not only a waste of scarce resources but also a "degradation of humanity". This is because it was excessive monitoring of people and giving no consideration of pre-colonial social relations that have been damaged by artificial borders and barriers. They say excessive border securitization poses a threat to normal migration as well and that technology could disrupt rather than regulate smooth migratory trends among societies.

#### **5.5.2.4 Unintended effects of border securitization**

Participants felt that one of the possible unintended consequences of border securitization include seriously slowing down the smooth flow of trade and this could have a severe economic impact on South Africa's economy and hamper regional integration. This could have unintended consequences for SADC as well as South Africa's regional power and interests.

#### **5.5.2.5 African community related issues**

It emerged that tech-centric borders and the whole discussion of border securitization may not resonate well with South Africa's colleagues and neighbours particularly from a SADC and an AU perspective. Increased border securitization to an extent, runs against the trade and migration

integration strategies of these bodies. Tech-centric borders create a dilemma for regional integration and national security. Moreover, with the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade (ACFTA) Area which seeks to deepen regional integration, South Africa's securitization of its borders, from a diplomatic point of view, will ruffle feathers within the continent. This means that despite the need to ensure the country's borders are protected, there is also a great need to consider continental interests.

### **5.5.3 Theme 3: Border management issues behind illegal migration and crime**

The sub-themes under this are logistical challenges of border management; corruption; commitment to duty problems; the training of border officials and policy management issues.

#### **5.5.3.1 Logistical challenges of border management**

The large volumes of human and goods moving across borders, compared to a relatively small number of officials managing these movements are identified as a major logistical challenge that makes it difficult to control illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Participants believe that manpower is inadequate even with the addition of private contractors and they suggested that government law enforcement authorities should focus more on curbing criminal crossing than immigrant movement as a way of managing resources.

#### **5.5.3.2 Corruption**

Corruption was widely discussed as a major reason why various border management strategies and policies were either not working or were not working as effectively as envisaged. Participants believe that corruption exists at many levels within the borders and the immigration system – at the border entry, visa application and elsewhere where contracts on who manages borders were given. Addressing the causes of corruption, one of which is the low remuneration of border officials was also suggested as a potential solution to most border-related challenges. This resonates with Chene's (2018) argument that in many countries, widespread corruption, under-resourced services and weak accountability makes borders porous and difficult to control, fuelling various forms of illegal activities such as human and drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, organized crime and terrorism. With South Africa having more than 60 border posts, shared with Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia, the need to ensure the reduction or elimination of border corruption has never been greater.

### **5.5.3.3 Commitment to duty problems**

Participants also commented on what they view as a lack of commitment to duty by some immigration officials who facilitate illegal migration and cross-border crime. But this problem is not unique to South Africa. This situation, in addition to poor incentivization, compromises border management policies including those meant to curb illegal migration and border crime. Participants suggested incentives to enhance the commitment of immigration personnel. In this regard, McLinden & Durrani (2013) have argued that the combination of difficult working conditions, little probability of detection and low remuneration makes it difficult for officials to resist soliciting bribes to supplement their incomes.

### **5.5.3.4 Training of immigration officials**

Some respondents believe that immigration officials are not well-trained to handle and contain illegal immigration and border crime and that they require more and better training and incentives. There was also the view that even if smart border technology was introduced, adequate training would be required for all stakeholders including the police and the army. Attempting to implement tech-centric borders without addressing these issues is seen as a potential recipe for systemic failure.

### **5.5.3.5 Policy management challenges**

Participants stated that policies on immigration and regional co-operation were not comprehensive enough. They suggest that South Africa's immigration policy is lacking in terms of its alignment with regional policies and this has created challenges for cross-border operations for managing illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Also, respondents said the inability of current immigration policies to support smart border technology is a sign of its weakness. Overall, there are three common views on the effects of policy management on illegal immigration and border crime: policy weaknesses in immigration and border security.

## **5.5.4 Theme 4: Addressing root factors of illegal migration and border crime**

This theme focuses on respondents' views that border securitization including through tech-centric borders was generally not a solution to the problem but an attempt to address a mere symptom. Proponents of these views believe that illegal immigration and crimes at the borders

can best be solved by addressing the root causes of migration. These include wars and other forms of political instability, natural disasters and poverty emanating from poor economic policies. This theme has the following sub-themes: addressing geopolitical issues; addressing economic factors; trade imbalances and the need to change perceptions on immigration.

#### **5.5.4.1 Addressing geo-political issues**

Illegal immigration is caused by many factors, one of which is the geopolitical situation of Africa. Addressing geopolitical crises in neighbouring African countries is noted as a potential solution mainly to illegal immigration. For example, ever since the start of the economic and political instability in Zimbabwe, millions of Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa in search of safety and economic prosperity.

#### **5.5.4.2 Economic factors**

Economic factors are identified as an important cause of migration. Many respondents asserted that economic disparities between South Africa and other African countries were behind the migration flows into the country. They also shared the view that unless economic challenges are addressed in Africa, the problems of illegal migration will persist even in the presence of tech-centric borders.

#### **5.5.4.3 Trade imbalances and illegal immigration**

Trade imbalances are an identified root cause of migration. African countries that have large net trade deficits in their trade with South Africa are at high risk of high unemployment and low economic growth. This creates economic desperation in their citizens, some of whom consider migration – legal or illegal as a solution while others resort to crime. Addressing trade imbalances was advanced as a potential solution to illegal migration and border crime.

#### **5.5.4.4 Changing perceptions on migration**

Interview respondents express the view that there is the need to change general perceptions of migration rather than to focus on how borders ought to be managed, including prospective changes to smart borders. These bordered on the arguments that at times, what is regarded as an immigration problem might not in fact be one. These arguments mainly centre on illegal immigration rather than border crime. Some respondents asserted that migration was not a

problem and should not be viewed as a challenge to be resolved but a phenomenon to be managed and controlled.

## **5.6 Conclusions to research questions**

The section below gives the final answers and conclusions to each of the study's five research questions.

### **5.6.1 Research question 1**

What are the challenges faced by immigration officials while trying to curtail illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime?

From the study, it can be concluded that the challenges faced by immigration officials when trying to curtail illegal immigration and cross-border crime were manpower and efficiency challenges associated with dealing with large volumes of activity, inability to fully comprehend immigration policies and corrupt tendencies as well as a low commitment to duty by some officials.

### **5.6.2 Research question 2**

How effective are the existing strategies aimed at managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime in Golela and Kosi Bay border posts?

It can be concluded that the current strategies applied in managing illegal cross-border migration and cross-border crime at the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts are not very effective as noted by respondents. The current strategies highlighted in the study include collaboration with private security and border management companies, deployment of the army and use of security measures such as closed-circuit television (CCTV). To an extent, the current strategies were noted as effective as they reduced the need for excessive militarization.

### **5.6.3 Research question 3**

To what extent would a tech-centric border contribute to a significant reduction in cross-border crime and illegal cross-border immigration?

Tech-centric borders are seen as a possible short-term solution to illegal migration and cross-border crime. It is believed however that cross-border criminals and illegal immigrants would find new ways to get into the country after a while. It also came out that tech-centric borders could fail

to achieve their objectives because they cannot address the root causes of the problems such as economic problems, political instability and trade imbalances. Focusing on tech-centric borders could therefore be an attempt to address a symptom rather than the main problem. There was also the view that tech-centric borders could be a full-scale solution to the problem and would also result in reduced deployment of the army and personnel at borders, reduced corruption, reduced human error and a lesser need for private border management entities.

#### **5.6.4 Research question 4**

What are the challenges faced by South Africa in instituting a tech-centric border and to what extent has this hampered border security?

The main challenge faced by South Africa in instituting tech-centric borders is the lack of financial resources as this is a major cash-intensive venture which seems currently unaffordable for the government. This is particularly so given the many competing pressing needs for public funds such as public housing and sanitation. Financial challenges are therefore an impediment to the implementation of tech-centric borders to a greater extent. Other challenges include the perception that tech-centric borders could be seen by South Africa's SADC and AU partners as increased border controls and a move towards border securitization at a time when these regional entities were trying to ease migration and trade by opening up borders. There is also the problem of whether the new technology would meet its objectives and whether it would be user-friendly and resilient enough.

#### **5.6.5 Research question 5**

What are the possible advantages and disadvantages for South Africa in instituting a tech-centric border?

The possible advantages of a tech-centric border would be reduced corruption, reduced human error at borders, reduced dependency on the army (lower militarization); reduced dependency on private contractors to manage borders and increased border management efficiency. Ultimately, tech-centric borders would reduce both illegal migration and cross-border crime. The possible disadvantages of a tech-centric border are as follows: they require a significant financial commitment; they may fail to achieve the targeted levels of efficiency and may therefore be a waste of resources; they may be prone to technology disruption processes; they may be

perceived as increased securitization of borders and may also result in increased deployment of the army at borders. These are the conclusions of views expressed by the interview participants.


## 5.7 Recommendations

The main recommendations of this study are captured in a framework that takes into cognizance two main views that came out of the data analysis. This study applies a framework approach as part of its recommendations on how tech-centric borders may be implemented.

### 5.7.1 Taking an integrated approach

The study recommends a tech-centric border implementation system that takes cognizance of the need to address signs and symptoms of illegal immigration and border crime as well as major causes as discussed under the pro-root theory approach. The approach, therefore, combines both the pro-root cause approach and the pro-tech-centric border approach into a possible plan of action that could reduce border crime and illegal immigration.

**Figure 5.1: An integrated approach to border management**



Source: Generated by the researcher

The framework recommends that a tech-centric border should be implemented as part of a broader strategy to address illegal immigration and cross-border crime. Implementation of a tech-centric border as the only strategy will, as discussed earlier, however not address the root causes of the problem and will not be effective in the long term.

#### 5.7.2 Addressing internal challenges

Internal border management challenges that have resulted in the porosity of the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts should be addressed as they may reduce the effectiveness of the tech-centric border. These were identified as corruption, low staff commitment to duty and poor knowledge and understanding of immigration policy. These problems mostly emanate from staff actions and therefore a human resources management approach is required. This includes assessing the causes of inappropriate behaviours and implementing corrective measures such as:

- Training and staff development,
- Transfers, terminations and other disciplinary measures
- Better motivation and remuneration
- Whistle-blower policies
- Improved supervision and monitoring of staff.

These measures would reduce and curtail many staff-related challenges identified in the data analysis.

#### 5.7.6 Addressing root causes

The most challenging part of the framework is addressing the root causes of illegal immigration and cross-border crime. These require long-term approaches considering the limited power that South Africa might have in influencing other countries. Collaborating with regional countries can increase the ability of local law enforcement to follow up on regional criminal syndicates including those with bases outside South Africa. This can also decrease the infiltration of illegal immigrants who may be intercepted in their countries of origin. Addressing political and economic problems in neighbouring countries as recommended may appear to be far-fetched. This depends on the collaboration of foreign political institutions whose will to rule is generally much stronger than the will to address the plight of their citizens especially on migration and border control issues.

Nonetheless, South Africa can have a considerable effect on political and economic issues in neighbouring countries such as Lesotho. In some cases, this influence can be indirect yet considerable via the SADC and AU as discussed in the data analysis section of the study. Thus, while the root cause analysis approach has a strong theoretical appeal, it might be difficult to implement in practice. This, therefore, calls for the deployment of tech-centric borders albeit in more cautious ways that first address issues of human resources and efficiency.

### **5.8 Limitations of the study**

The generalizability of this study may be limited as it was not designed to be generalized to a wider population but as a process to gather insightful views from immigration and border technology management experts. Moreover, the study experienced hindrances while seeking information from border agents and the Department of Home Affairs

### **5.9 Recommendations for further studies**

The following is recommended as a way of expanding the body of knowledge on tech-centric borders, immigration and cross-border crime.

- Studies that compare South Africa's immigration and border security policies versus those of SADC, AU and the major countries of origin of migrants;
- Perceptions on the levels and degrees of border securitization that are deemed acceptable by the general South African population;
- Approaches that can be adopted by South Africa to address political challenges in its neighbouring countries as well as in the countries of origin of most immigrants coming to South Africa.

### **5.10 Contribution to the body of knowledge**

Chereni (2018), Klotz (2000), Amit & Kriger (2014) & Maharaj (2002) all agree that South Africa's borders in the post-apartheid era have become porous and are in urgent need of new investments. These studies amongst others acknowledge that cross-border crime in the post-apartheid era has become rampant and the government's responses have been undermined by a weak and poorly funded border security apparatus. Skilled migration, for its part, has contributed considerably to South Africa's socio-economic development, but unskilled migration has had a detrimental effect

on social cohesion and integration. Moreover, Xenophobia and Afrophobia have been directly linked to an increase in illegal migration which itself has been linked to a weak border management system.

Yet, many scholars have argued for effective border management, increased deployment of the army and the police officers, build new infrastructure platforms and rooting out corruption through effective policy monitoring and evaluation. However, in the era of digitization and the rapidly growing use of technology in borders, it can be argued that South Africa needs to explore the use of technology to enhance border management despite its challenges.

The literature review also discussed how South African politicians from different political parties have called for the implementation of technology to assist the SANDF. However, when it comes to policy drafting, technology is seen as an additional element rather than a need. There are now growing calls within political and security studies for the introduction of technology or surveillance at the borders. Existing studies on the use of technology in borders in South Africa do not explore the role of technology at land borders making this study an important contribution to understanding the feasibility of technology at the Golela and Kosi Bay border posts.

The following are the key research implications of this study. First, South Africa's border management approach is not geared towards addressing current border threats, owing to a plethora of internal challenges. Secondly, the lack of attention paid to addressing these challenges makes the introduction of technology difficult. Thirdly, the lack of regional cooperation will impede South Africa's unilateral efforts. Some of the questions that require exploration include: is there a need for more than 8 departments and agencies to be involved in border management? How can their operations be streamlined? Will technology enhance this streamlining? If these are not addressed, the introduction of tech-centric borders in South Africa may fail to produce the desired results and may lead to a waste of scarce public funds. The study offers an argument (the integration of technology within South Africa's border management structure) that has not been thoroughly explored in South Africa despite increasing calls from politicians. The study is, therefore, able to generate new and original ideas which will contribute immensely in the fields of public administration, migration and border studies in terms of the pros and cons of technology in borders as well as a greater understanding of South Africa's border management and the options open to the country in this regard.

## 6. Conclusion

The study was able to answer its main research question captured in its title. It concludes that tech-centric borders are a possible solution to illegal immigration and cross-border crimes at the Kosi Bay and Golela border posts. It however emphasizes that tech-centric borders are bound to work effectively if certain issues at the borders are addressed. These issues are corrupt behaviour among border officials, low levels of staff commitment to the ethos of border management as well as limited knowledge on immigration policies among immigration officials and immigration policy challenges. Furthermore, tech-centric borders would work effectively if the root causes of illegal immigration and cross-border crime are also addressed. It is concluded that while addressing these root causes would be the ultimate solution to border problems, South Africa's ability to influence its regional neighbours is limited and this makes tech-centric borders a more appealing option.

The study's strengths are in its ability to draw the views of well-researched experts who were able to give insightful views that not only answered the research questions but also provided an important basis for the management of tech-centric borders in South Africa. The sample of 15 experts, some of which had studied border management systems and immigration challenges in major illegal immigration hotspots, gave the study the critical mass to make meaningful, practical recommendations that can help South Africa manage illegal immigration and cross-border crime. The study was also able to draw information from various sources on immigration and cross-border crime and integrate these into discussions that led to the development of its recommendations.

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## Appendix 1: Letter requesting permission to conduct (Sample)

University of Zululand  
Department of Public  
Administration  
Private Bag X1001  
KwaDlangezwa  
3886

(Participants address)

Date: .....

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Dear Sir/Madam

### RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

I am a registered PhD student in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Zululand. My supervisor is Dr T C Adetiba. The proposed topic of my research is: "A tech-centric border as a Strategy in managing illegal cross border migration and cross border crime in South Africa with special focus on the Kosi bay and Golela border posts". The objectives of the study are:

- To examine the challenges affecting immigration officials in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross border crime.
- To examine the effectiveness of the existing strategies (if any) aimed at managing illegal cross border migration and cross border crime.
- To evaluate whether technological system's via a tech centric border (virtual border) would significantly contribute to a reduction in cross border crime and illegal cross border migration.
- To determine the challenges faced by south Africa in implementing a tech centric border management system in the Golela and Kosi bay border post
- Where possible, to understand the advantages and disadvantages of instituting a Tech-centric border for South Africa?

I hereby request permission to interview three experts of this institute.

Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor.

Our contact details are as follows:

Dr T C Adetiba AdetibaT@unizulu.ac.za / 035 902 6092

Mr. H. V Mlambo (halavico@yahoo.com)

Upon completion of the study, I undertake to provide you with a bound copy of the thesis. I hope my request will meet your favorable consideration.

Yours Sincerely

Halalisani V. Mlambo

## **Appendix 2: Interview questions**

Semi structured interview questions for experts in the chosen institutions/agencies

### Theme 1: Introductory questions

1. What is your name and how old are you?
2. Where do you reside?
3. What is your position in this organization?
4. How would you overall describe your experience in this particular position?

### Theme 2: Questions on Illegal cross border migration and cross border crime and the role of Technology

1. From a global context? What do you think are the challenges that are facing immigration officials/border agents in dealing with illegal cross border migration and cross border crime?
2. In your opinion, how have these challenges impeded effective border management and security?
3. From your personal point of view, How do you think governments around the world can better aid immigration officials/border agents better perform their duties, especially in terms of resources availability?
4. In some African countries, there are strategies such as (24 hour patrols, having more army personnel present, deploying more police officers, having a combination of more than companies patrolling borders), in your opinion, do you think these strategies have been effective in reducing cross border crime and illegal cross border migration within the continent? If not why?
5. Policy wise, what do you think African states can do to ensure the effective management of border posts?
6. Hypothetically, let's say the above mentioned existing strategies to manage illegal cross border migration and cross border have been successful, how then would you explain the increasing rates of illegal cross border migration cross border crime in the continent?
7. From your understanding of border technology, What role do you think can be played by technological systems (drones, long range cameras, motion detectors, biometric systems etc) to aid border agents (including South African National Defence Force(SANDF) and

South African Police Service (SAPS) to better deal with cross border crime and illegal cross border migration?

8. In your opinion, how effective would a tech-centric border be in enhancing security and stability For South Africa?
9. Illegal cross border migration and cross border crime have been persistent issues for South Africa, why do you think the country has not accelerated the development and implementation of a tech-centric border?
10. In your opinion, what is the biggest challenge hampering the development and implementation of a tech-centric border system South Africa?
11. Over the last couple of years, we have been seeing an increase in the deployment of the SADF and SAPS in the borders, do you think perhaps border technology would lessen the dependence on these two elements when it comes to border security.
12. While border technology would help South Africa better manage their borders, traditionally the country has relied on securitization (Having a lot of army and police personnel present at the borders) as mean of ensuring stability, do you think this is an effective strategy to deal with cross border crime and illegal cross border migration?
13. Over the last couple of years, we have been hearing how advantageous a tech-centric can be especially in dealing with issues like cross border crime and illegal cross border migration, what do you think would the advantages and possible disadvantages of instituting a tech centric border in South Africa and would this by any chance contribute to better border security??

**End.**