THE POLITICS OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS IN POLITICAL CONFLICTS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

BY

MBHEKISENI ALPHEUS MATHEBULA

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PART COMPLETION OF THE DEGREE OF (MA) MASTER OF ARTS IN THE FACULTY OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

SUPERVISOR : PROFESSOR P S JOUBERT

DATE SUBMITTED : FEBRUARY 1993

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is a true reflection of my own work and that all the sources used and quoted have been acknowledged by means of references.

MBHEKISENI A MATHEBULA

FEBRUARY 1992

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I hereby express my gratitude to all those who assisted me in the completion of this work. I wish to particularly thank the following:

My Supervisor Professor P S Joubert, head of the Department of Political Science, for his guidance and the encouragement he gave me.

The Library personnel of the University of Zululand, University of Natal and the University of Durban-Westville for their co-operation and the availability of resources.

The academic staff of the department of Political Science at the University of Durban-Westville for the groundwork they laid when I was doing my Honours degree. I am very thankful for the openness and political tolerance they demonstrated.

Political organizations such as the ANC, regional structures of the PAC and AZAPO for their co-operation in availing resources and openness in our day to day political activism.

My parents Alinah and William Mathebula for their patience and dedication to my progress, their willingness to take charge of my children, Sibhekile and Thandanani during my years of study.

The typists, Miss A M Khabele and Mrs M Motsei for their sustained assistance in the typing of this work. Mr M G Mahlomaholo for his readiness to make his personal computer available for me.

Lastly, the Almighty God for everything he has done for me.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my children Sibhekile, Thapelo and Thandanani. Their sacrifice has been an inspiration to me.

ABSTRACT

The 1989 general elections which brought Mr F W de Klerk to power could be referred to as the beginning of concrete action in the process of "Reform." Within a few months after this election, Mr de Klerk undertook what was referred to as "Pretoriastroika."* What were supposed to be illegal mass demonstrations were suddenly declared legal. Long feared security prisoners were released and restrictions on banned organizations uplifted. High expectations were raised for the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

In response to this new political development, the African National Congress (ANC) released its conditions for negotiations, the Harare Declaration, which stipulated the necessary steps to create a climate conducive to negotiations.

The central theme in negotiations is the interplay of political forces trying to bargain from their various political positions. This is best demonstrated when the political positions are relative to the power commensurate to their bargaining strength. The process

*Pretoriastroika is a word formulated by the Black Consciousness Movement taken from Perestroika meaning openness.

of bargaining at the negotiating table, especially in the political conflict, does not come about on moral grounds or through human will, it is brought about by circumstances created by the pull and push relationship between political elements in their struggle for dominance.

It appeared that political development in South Africa had reached a stage where change was necessary to keep pace with global political developments, especially in the eastern communist countries, and in most "conflict infected" regions. Change is necessary only if it fits the occasion and is evolutionary, or reformist. Reform implies that the one in the position of power would like to reassert his position to ensure his continuation, i.e., lessening the pressure upon him to relinquish his position of power. A political analyst Dr Chaster Crocker pointed out that:

> "Organisationally, politically, and militarily the anti-racist movement (ANC) is not yet ready to topple the regime and the regime is no longer capable of curbing the growth of resistance."[2]

2. Sunday Times November 26, 1989.

He further noted that;

> "Solutions often emerge when the parties are in some rough power balance in the power equation and when there is a real prospect that the level of mutual pain could increase if no solution occurs."[3]

In order to understand the internal political developments in South Africa, one needs to grasp the manifestation of power relations which moulded the political settlements in neighbouring States and how the political role players manifested themselves in an attempt to resolve regional conflict.

Exploring the prospects for negotiations is not part of this research. However, the investigation is specifically intended to explore forces at play during negotiations or conflict resolution. It is intended to explore how political units bargain at the negotiating table; the interplay of internal and external factors to the conflict.

3.Ibid P7

Reasons for this investigation stem from the following:

- with current political developments in world politics generally, and in South Africa in particular, some misconceptions have been created that political settlements can be brought about by the willingness of those involved in the conflict to resolve the problems amicably. This is not the case in power politics.

- the investigation is designed to demonstrate that the process of negotiation in South Africa will not be an easy exercise in view of the disparity of power distribution amongst those involved; that this power disparity is likely to affect the outcome of the process.

- that the outcome of the current political trends will not come from those directly involved in the actual process of negotiations, but will be determined by what happens on the ground; such as the role of the membership on the ground, sanctions, mass demonstrations, stayaways, boycotts, strikes,

the impact of the "Reform" process, escalation of violence, mass campaigns and various forces at play to mould the final settlement.

SAMEVATTING

Die algemene verkiesing van 1989 wat Mnr. F W de Klerk aanbewind gebring het, kan beskou word as die aanvang vankonkrete aksie in die hervormingsproses. Binne ankele maandena sy verkiesing loods Mnr. de Klerk 'n beleidsrigting warna verwys word as ' Pretoriastroika'. Wat voorheen beskou is as onwettige massabetogings is skielik gewettig. Geswore veiligheidsgevangenes is vrygelaat en beperkinge opverbanne organisasies is opgehef. Hoe verwagtinge is geskep vir die moontlikheid van 'n onderhandelde skikking.

In sy reaksie op hierdie nuwe politieke denkrigting het die ANC sy voorwaardes vir onderhandelinge, die Harare - Verklaring, Vrygestel waarin die nodige stappe vir 'n onderhandelingsklimaat uitgespel is.

Die sentrale tema in onderhandelings is die wisselwerking tussen politieke groepe wat vanuit hul politieke standpunte onderhandel. Dit blyk duidelik wanneer hul poitieke standpunte relatief is tot hul onderhandelingsterkte. Die proses van onderhandeling in politieke konflik ontstaan nie vanuit morele oorwegings of menslike wilsooruitgings nie, maar onstaan uit omstandighede wat geskep word uit die wisselwerking tussen politieke elemente in hul pogings tot dominansie.

Dit wil voorkom of politieke ontwikkeling in SA 'n stadium bereik het waar verandering noodsaaklik is om tred te hou met globale politieke ontwikkeling, veral in die Oosbloklande en ander onstabiele streke. Verandering is slegs noodsaaklik as dit by omstandighede pas en rewolusioner of hervomed is. Hervorming impliseer dat diegene in beheer sy posisie wil herbevestig ten einde in beheer te bly, d.w.s. om die druk op hom om afstand tedoen van gesag te verlig. Ten spyte van die omstandighede wat die SA regering genoop het om tot onderhandelings toe te tree, het sy gesagsinstrumente bebly en sodoende 'n voorsprong teenoor ander partye verseker. 'n Maatskaplike ontleder het "Die anti-rassistiese beweging (AN) is organisatories, polities en militer nie gereed om die regering tot 'n val te bring nie en die regering is nie in staat om die toename in weerstand te beperk nie."

Hy verder dui aan dat:

"Solutions often emerge when the parties are in some rough power balance in the power equation and when there is a real prospect that the level of mutual pain could increase if no solution occurs."

Ten einde die binnelandse politieke ontwikkeling in SA te verstaan, is dit nodig om 'n begrip te he van die magspel wat politieke skikkings in buurstate gevorm het en hoe plitieke rolspelers hulself gemanifesteer het in hul pogings om regionale konflik op te los.

Dit is nie deel van hierdie navorsing om die verwagtings van onderhandelings te bespreek nie. Die ondersoek is eerder spesifiek gerig op 'n ondersoek na die magte wat inwerk op onderhandelings of koflikhantering.Daar word beoog om ondersoek in te stel na die maniere waarop politieke groepe optree by die onderhandelingstafel; die wisselwerking van interne en ekstern magte tot die konflik.

Redes vir hierdie ondersoek onstaan uit die volgende:

-Met politieke verwikkelings in die wereld en in Suid Afrika in die besonder, is daar wanopvattings geskep dat politieke skikkings bereik kan word deur bereidheid van die partye betrkke by die konflik om 'n vreedsame oplossing te vind. Dit is nie die geval in magspolitiek nie.

-Die ondersoek poog om ann te toon dat die onderhandelingsproses in Suid Afrika nie 'nmaklik taak gaan wees nie veral weems die wanbalans in mag tussen die onderhandelingspartye; dat hierdie ongelykheid heel moontlik die resultaat van die proses sal beinvloed.

-Dat die resutaat van die huidige politieke tendense nie deur diegene wat direk betrokke is, bepaal sal word nie, maar wel deur gebeure op die grond; soos bv. die rol van gewone lede om die proses te deinvloed, sanksie,

massaaksie, wegbly-aksies, boikotte,stakings, die impak van die "hervormingsproses", die eskalering van gweld, massabetogings en menigte ander invloede wat die finale ooreenkoms kan vorm.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
CST	Colonialism of a Special Type
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
MAF	Movement of the Armed Forces
NP	National Party
NDP	National Democratic Party
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
RF	Rhodesian Front
SACP	South African Communist Party
SWA	South West Africa
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAP	South African Police

SSC	State Security Council
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations
UNITA	Unicio Nacional para Independencia de Angola
USA	United States of America
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolution Army

CONTENTS

DECLARATION i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii

DEDICATION iii

ABSTRACT iv

ABBREVIATIONS xi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 CONCEPTUAL LEVELS OF COMPREHENSION 1

1.2 POWER POLITICS AND CONFLICT 3

1.3 BARGAINING IN NEGOTIATIONS 14

1.3.1 The Traditional Method 15

1.3.2 Alternative Negotiation 17

1.4 ASSESSMENT 19

FOOTNOTES 28

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN ZIMBABWE

2.1 SETTLER-COLONIAL ESTABLISHMENT 31

2.2 DISEMPOWERMENT OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE 34

2.2.1 The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 35

2.2.2 The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 36

2.2.3 Education 36

2.2.4 Labour Conditions and Job Opportunities 37

2.3 THE SHIFT OF POWER RESOURCES ALLOCATION

2.3.1 Unilateral Declaration of Independence 1964 40

2.3.2 The role of the Frontline States 42

2.3.3 The Portuguese Coup D'Etat in 1974 49

2.3.4 The Armed Struggle 55

2.4 TOWARDS THE LANCASTER-HOUSE SETTLEMENT

2.4.1 The Victoria Falls and Geneva Conference 61

2.4.2 Anglo-American Proposals 62

2.5 ASSESSMENT 66

FOOTNOTES 69

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONFLICT IN NAMIBIA - FROM MANDATED TERRITORY TO INDEPENDENCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION 72

3.2 THE SA MANDATE OVER SWA/NAMIBIA 73

3.2.1 The League of Nations 1919 73

3.2.2 The United Nations 1945 77

3.3 DISEMPOWERMENT OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF SWA/NAMIBIA 80

3.4 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POWERS

3.4.1 The United States of America and Cuba 83

3.4.2 The United Nations 91

3.4.3 The Internal Constitutional Arrangement 95

3.5 ASSESSMENT 102

FOOTNOTES 105

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESPECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SA CONFLICT, APPROACHES AND BARGAINING POSITIONS

INTRODUCTION 108

4.1 APPROACHES AND BARGAINING POSITIONS

4.1.1 COLONIALISM OF A SPECIAL TYPE - ANC/SACP 110

4.1.2 SETTLER-COLONIALISM - PAC 122

4.1.3 RACIAL CAPITALISM - AZAPO 129

4.2 THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER-RESOURCES

4.2.1 Sources of bargaining Strength of the ANC 133

4.2.1.1 The Anti-apartheid Sentiment 134

4.2.1.2 Sanctions and Disinvestment 137

4.2.1.3 Mass Mobilization 140

4.2.2 The Weakening Position of the National Liberation Movement 144

4.2.2.1 The Harare Declaration 144

4.2.2.2 The Groote Schuur Minutes 151

4.5 ASSESSMENT

4.5.1 Power Disparities between the ANC and the Government 162

4.5.2 Peaceful Negotiation and Settlement 168

FOOTNOTES 171

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS A SOURCE OF BARGAINING STRENGTH

5.1 INTRODUCTION 175

5.2 ARMED STRUGGLE AND POWER IN POLITICAL CONFLICTS 176

5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS 181

5.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN SA 185

5.5 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA 196

5.6 ASSESSMENT 197

FOOTNOTES 199

CHAPTER SIX

THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS IN MOTION		201
6.1	The Reform Process	201
6.2	The Struggle Transformed	209
6.3	Reconciliation	217
	6.3.1 An All-Party Conference	218
	6.3.2 An Interim Government and a Constituent Assembly	218
6.2	ASSESSMENT	222
	FOOTNOTES	232

Appendix 1 - 14

Annexure 1

Annexure A & B

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 CONCEPTUAL LEVELS OF COMPREHENSION

Conflict management and conflict resolution are the two most problematic aspects to handle in academic and intellectual circles, both in conceptualisation and in practical terms. The problem is that they involve the behaviour of persons, groups of persons or organizations. They deal with the normative aspect of human behaviour and are therefore unpredicatable. Organizational institutions are mostly designed to facilitate conflict management and conflict resolution but such arrangements do not of necessity achieve what they were originally intended to achieve. Most institutions are there to diminish conflict by providing mechanisms through which conflict could be handled, but they do not sufficiently resolve conflict. Systems and processes in conflict resolution and conflict management emerge from the interplay of forces

within the conflict area, and such systems or processes are usually involved to resolve that particular problem alone and similar problems in future, but they usually produce new areas of conflict, independent of the original confict.

According to William Zartman, conflict resolution is the elimination of the causes of the underlying conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties.[1] An element of compromise and consensus is implied in this definition, whereas conflict management is said to mean the elimination, neutralization, or control of the means of persuing either the conflict or the crisis.[2] Relations during crisis or conflict shift in accordance with the intensification or escalation of the momentum of the crisis. This shift, in turn creates new avenues of resolving the conflict. It is within this frame of reference that power relations in political conflicts play an important role in the resolution of the conflict itself.

1.2 POWER POLITICS AND CONFLICT

The influence of power in politics is generally acknowledged by almost all political analysts and social scientists. Power politics is as hard to define as all other terms in the social sciences, but the underlying impact of power politics is undeniable. The problem with defining concepts is, that the designed meaning reduces or expands the meaning of the concept. Definitions can be moulded to suit the interest of the subject under discussion. Any attempt to define concepts must be grounded upon building a conceptual frame to prove or analyse subjective conditions. Conceptualization is rendered meaningless if it floats above the empirical levels of understanding.

In human activities, power can be observed in the responses of those over whom it is exercised. The response can be positive or negative, for or against, and in that way change the usual tendency or direction of events. The widely accepted definition of power is that it is the ability of one person, group of persons, or a nation to influence through manipulation, persuasion or force, the

behaviour of others, be it an individual, a group, an organization, society or nation.[3] Power means many things at different times, but our idea of power is confined to the area of politics. In describing power politics we actually undertake to analyse the process in which power manifests itself in political conflicts. Samuel H Beer identifies power as a behavioural relationship and he defines it as an influence that one has over the others in such a manner that such a person can induce others to conform to the desired pattern of behaviour.[4] Samuel Beer's definition is too broad to warrant our discussion. What we need are only those aspects of definitions which could assist us in constructing the necessary conceptual understanding of power politics. Carl Becker maintains that "politics is inseparable from power..."[5]

Gramsci gives a much more complex understanding of the influence of power in the general life of society where class formations in society are in contest for dominance. His concept of "hegemony" explains how a class can establish its dominance

culturally, politically or morally, independently or in conjunction with the political power.[6]

It is widely accepted that historical manifestations are subjects of the power struggle and that this power struggle changes with the development of new historical stages as history unfolds. On the other hand, the position of those struggling for power, changes with circumstances and times. Hence in history we speak of the ancient Roman Empire, NAZI Germany, the great powers of the US and the Soviet Union and many power blocs that came and passed with the unfolding of the centuries. Morgenthau descrives political power as a mutual relation of control among the holders of public authority and between the authority and the people.[7] He also describes political power as a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. The psychological relation may be exerted through threats, orders, the authority, charisma or a combination of all these.[8]

It should be acknowledged that the holder of power is not only in a position to impose his will over others, but that he also possesses the power to influence events to suit his purpose. This could be demonstrated by the presence of nuclear threats hanging over nations that have no potential to develop their own.

It should however be noted that power overlaps in all its spheres of activity. There is an inter-relationship between political power and economic power, in that political power is largely expressed in economic terms. Material resources provide the basis for the expression of power. The element of wealth and the distribution thereof are the ingredients of power politics. Nations, states or groups go to war not only on a moral basis, as was the case with the Falklands War between Argentina and Britain, but also on the basis of contesting the materials, requirements and needs of their states. The colonization of Africa started only when there was a demand for material resources, especially raw materials for the survival of Western Europe. It was due to its advanced culture that Western Europe

conquered Africa and exploited her resources, in that way preparing markets for its own needs. While power was expressed in material and economic terms, in this instance, the means used to express it was through arms or war materials, propaganda, manipulation and influence.

Conflict is a specific social phenomenon which probably appears in all aspects of human history. Conflict involves the organization of violent action by collectives, and throughout human history man has been engaged in some kind of violent action. While the purpose of socialization has been to decrease the propensity of conflict, it would seem that the opposite has in fact been achieved. Individuals, groups or communities are by their nature, organized entities involved in some kind of conflict. War is the ultimate manifestation of conflict or its logical conclusion. Michael Howard maintains that war has been an indispensable part of the pattern of society.[9] War is a result of the conflict of interests.

Conflict between political units becomes a natural and integral part of society. It determines one's social position in relation to other groups, and the sphere of influence each group may exert in an attempt to direct the course of events. The state of conflict on the other hand becomes a factor to stimulate change and thereby provoke progress. It was through the state of conflict that political institutions were established and new political ideas arose. Human relations, both in politics and in social aspects, are characterized by their desire to co-operate with others on subjects of common interest and to be in conflict when these interests are threatened. Conflict expresses itself in many forms due to uneven power distribution amongst individuals and amongst political units. This uneven power distribution is brought about by the uneven distribution of resources.

In the political sphere of activities conflict resolution manifests itself in an atmosphere of hostility and as a result of conquest each party in the conflict is out to outmanoeuvre the others.

Man's desire to dominate and to be in power is a natural inclination. The uneven distribution of forces and resources among people manifestly incurs conflict. The distribution of forces reflects differences in strength, power and ability among people and groups, whereas by resources we imply the means available and capability of facilitating the strength, power and ability of people and groups. Conflict, according to J Frank, will remain with man as long as man lives, for it adds zest to life and is the spur to growth and change.[10]

Power, according to Howard, is the raw material of politics and violence is the means to secure power.[11] Accordingly, power between groups tends to produce aggressive policies and in that way generates conditions conducive to war or confrontation. Relations between political units are conducted within a hostile environment in which each group expresses its determination to survive, to maintain its identity, autonomy and independence. The determination to survive is adequately attributed to the pride political units place on their nationhood, either based on colour, race,

culture or shared sentiment, or their jealousy to retain their autonomy and independence. The capacity of political units to defend themselves and their willingness to do so, provides the basic framework within which the business of negotiation is carried on.

J Barling identifies power as distinct forms of force, manipulation, persuasion and authority. He further maintains that the supreme exercise of power is to shape cognitions, emotions, and desires to the degree that subjects are entirely unaware of being influence.[12] The purpose of the holding of power also plays a central role in the distribution of resources. If the power-holder views his promotion as solely to serve the sectional interests of his constituency, those with limited power resources will feel alienated and in that way seek to reassert themselves to increase their power potential.

Negotiations as a concept means many things at different times, but it basically implies a process of arriving at an agreement. This involves bargaining, compromising, conflict, and establishing

common grounds. The purpose of negotiating is to arrive at a settlement which will satisfy either the victor or the loser or both, thus compromising positions and creating shared values. The process of negotiating is manipulative since it involves persuasion, education, seduction, exposition, threats, and sometimes latent coercion to induce the other party to adopt or to confer to a desired response. Political scientists maintain that the process of negotiation, especially in political conflict, involves diplomatic bargaining. However, the process is largely determined by the social setting within which it is conducted.

Anselm Strauss maintains that the choice of negotiation cannot be divorced from the social conditions under which such discussions are made.[13] In his observations over a decade, Strauss identified five aspects of negotiations, namely:

- that any social order is a negotiated order,
- that any specific negotiations seemed contingent of specific structural conditions: who negotiated with whom, when, and about what,

- that products of negotiation have temporal limits because at the end they have to be reviewed and re-evaluated,
- that a negotiated order has to be worked at and the basis of concerted action needs to be continually reconstituted,

- lastly, that any negotiated order has to be perceived as the sum total of the organisations' principles, aims, objectives and policies.[14]

The purpose of negotiating is to get problems solved and to achieve objectives. It is a means to an end, and thus, diminishing the process of negotiations is a tactical means to nowhere. It is more proper to refer to negotiations as a process, since it is designed to achieve, through processing, the desired goals. But, as indicated by Strauss, the whole process takes place within a particular social order which in the very least, influences the very process, and therefore the outcome.

The social order implies the environmental contingent to the process such as the hegemonic nature of the environment and conditions dominant at the time. The concept of social order involves the judgements about the limits of the possibles and the probables, the options opened and closed.

Samuel Lewis as quoted by Herman Gilliomee identifies three pre-conditions that must be in place before a conflict situation is ripe for peace, namely:

- the main antagonists must see the pain and the costs in continuing the struggle as carrying more weighing heavier than the risks and fears associated with reaching a compromised solution,
- the second condition is a belief by the antagonists that compromise is available that could satisfy the bedrock requirements of both,
- thirdly, the leaders must have the ability to carry their supporters with them if a compromised settlement is negotiated.[15]

1.3 BARGAINING IN NEGOTIATIONS

Basically bargaining in negotiations involves a power struggle in which parties attempt to advance their district positions, to dominate the events and thereby achieve most if not all of their objectives. Ron Kraybill povides interesting models in the struggle for power, especially at the negotiating table.[16] He contends that traditional understanding of negotiation basically transcends the battlefield onto the bargaining table. He maintains that two opponents, weary of war, achieve a wary peace through a process beginning with insistent, if not extreme, demands. These are gradually tempered in confrontation, combining posturing, threats, and cajoling. When things are not going well during the struggle around the tables, displays of power away from the table may be employed to "help them see the light."[17] During the initial stages of the process of negotiation, the aspect of compromise is largely diminished.

Kraybill identifies two types of negotiation and bargaining, namely:




CONSTITUENCIES BACK HOME
SUBTERRANEAN NEGOTIATION
HORIZONTAL NEGOTIATION
VERTICAL NEGOTIATION
HORIZONTAL NEGOTIATION
SUBTERRANEAN NEGOTIATION
CONSTITUENCIES BACK HOME

Fig 3


ONAL NEGOTIATION
SOLUTIONS AS EACH
ARTY INSISTS ON THEM
PROBLEMS AS EACH
PARTY DEFINES THEM
ORK AGAINST EACH OTHER
EACH OTHER AS THE PROBLEM



ALTERNATIVE NEGOTIATION
EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS - WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO IMPACT ON BASIC NEEDS
PARTIES WORK JOINTLY TO SOLVE A COMMON PROBLEM

Fig 2

- The traditional negotiation or bargaining
- The alternative negotiation or bargaining

Traditional approaches assume that stability stems from power and an alternative approach assumes that stability is built on more than power, such as mutual trust and interdependence.

Traditional bargaining assumes that it is advantageous to have a weak opponent, and alternative bargaining implies that interdependence is essential and that self-interest calls for a solution which will satisfy all parties.[18]

1.3.1 The Traditional Method

Figure 1 illustrates the arrangement of seating positions around the table. Party A occupying one side and party B the other side. Each party establishes its own distinct position in relation to its demands. Usually such demands are radical in the initial stages and vastly contrary to those advanced by the other party. After having established positions, the parties start engaging in

counter attacks in an attempt to demolish the credibility of the other side's demands.

In this arrangement parties work against each other, sometimes viewing each other as obstacles to progress. This model is often characterized by deadlocked discussions, lack of progress or very slow progress due to pull and push type of discussions, animosity, suspicion and mistrust. According to Kraybill traditional negotiators usually strategise to cause a split in the ranks of opponents by manipulating each other into areas where differences of opinion emerge among members of one party. The aim of any negotiating process is to reach an agreement which will ultimately prove capable of garnering support from the diverse constituencies represented by negotiators.

Fig 3 illustrates the role of constituencies back home, in influencing the process of negotiations. As Kraybill puts it:

> "Each side must pay careful attention not only to internal or horizontal bargaining to maintain unity within its own team, but equally important, each side must attend to 'subterranean' bargaining with its own rank and file back home.[19]

This is important in view of the fact that deviation from established positions could isolate the leadership from the rank and file, and such developments could regress the entire process and escalate the conflict. A constant feedback by negotiators to the rank and file often creates an impression that everybody is involved in the process and in that way agreements and solutions emerging are legitimized. Subterranean negotiation between the constituency and the leadership is therefore essential in crystallizing the relationship.

1.3.2 Alternative Negotiation

This approach is characterized by both parties avoiding setting out demands and positions, and

instead, jointly discussing problems and seeking solutions to common problems. Both parties grasp the dimensions of the problems and propose solutions to those problems. The parties work jointly in mutual trust and seek to bargain around seeking a solution. When common problems have been established, jointly defined and agreed upon, the parties evolve possible solutions. Such solutions are evaluated by both parties and their impact to basic needs elaborated upon. In the process of the evaluation of the solution, a scaling down of all unnecessary or insignificant solutions takes place, until essentials are worked out and agreed upon. Figure 2 illustrates the alternative bargaining process. This is, however, a complex process which demands mutual trust and understanding.

According to Ron Kraybill, the two approaches are based on certain basic assumptions:

- Traditional approaches assume conflict of interests based on the survival of the fittest and an attitude to win what you can at all costs, the win/lose attitude. Whereas the

alternative approach recognises the limitation of resources and therefore applies "situational analysis."

- Traditional approaches assume isolation in relationship, whereas alternative approaches assume interdependency.[20].

1.4 ASSESSMENT

Pierre du Toit and Willie Esterhuyse maintain that for an easy bargaining process, five conditions must exist, namely:

1.4.1 An uneven distribution of resources,

1.4.2 A range of possible bargains, i.e. "contract zone". This implies the possibilities of agreement.

1.4.3 Interdependence between parties. Each party must recognise that its existence depends on the positive response of the other. Each must acknowledge co-operation and competition at the same time. This

implies a reciprocal contingency in relationships.

1.4.4 Each party must ensure that it remains the most profitable source of scarce resources, or that it is indispensable to the entire process.

1.4.5 Each party needs to recognise the need for a realtive co-operation with the other party and that the conflict cannot be won on one party's terms,[21]

Du Toit and Esterhuyse correctly analyse the current phase of the conflict in South Africa. The balance of power resources in any conflict depends largely on the level of the conditions of conflict at the time of a search consensus and settlement. The conditions may change in the event of a continued confrontation which may bring a new balance of power.

The level of conflict which existed in Zimbabwe cannot of necessity be argued along Du Toit and

Esterhuyse perspectives. The national liberation movement in Zimbabwe was convinced that its military strength could achieve its political objectives within two or more years without any resort to a Lancaster type conference. However, the basic acknowledgement of power politics is further sustained in political conflicts. Du Toit and Esterhuyse contend that there is no middle ground in South African politics and that such a middle ground has to be created by the contending parties. Interestingly, du Toit and Esterhuyse contend that for negotiations to get off the ground, a condition of balanced bargaining power should have existed, and such conditions do not exist in South Africa. H W van der Merwe recommends a process of "empowerment" of the weaker party, i.e. the ANC[22]

According to Berger and Godsell, the most important aspect in the National Party offensive is the challenge to woo black participation in the mainstream of government and encourage negotiations with black leaders. But

> "the modal position is a genuine commitment to power-sharing, but within a system in which whites as a group would

retain at least the right to equal co-determination."[23]

The process of bargaining in SA followed the concept of Joint Working Groups, in which committees were set-up to address problems. The basic underlying factor in the respective relations of participating parties in such Joint Working Groups had been co-operation based on concensus. However, even in these relations, organisational clashes had occurred especially in areas of determining policies on the negotiating table.

Working committees had proved effective since the beginning of the process of negotiations. Several working committees had facilitated relations between contending parties. Mike Robertson identified several working committees formed since the beginning of the process of negotiations, namely:

- the Steering Committee formed immediately after the unbanning of political organizations to facilitate the envisaged Groote Schuur Summit which was later held on the 4th May 1990,

- the Working Group on Political Offences, which emerged from the Groote Schuur deliberations to attend to the definition of political offences to pave the way for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles,

- the Armed Action Working Committee to facilitate the suspension of armed action as defined in the Pretoria Minute,


- the Liaison Committee was charged with resolving outstanding differences on arms, arms caches and the demobilisation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK),

- Paragraph Nine Committee, formed to facilitate the Multi/All Party conference,

- the National Peace Committee, the National Peace Secretariat, Regional Dispute Resolution Committees, and Local Dispute Resolution Committees, all set-up to address the escalation of inter-group violence,

- the Working Committee on Negotiations formed to woo in other political groupings in the negotiation process.[24]

Most of these Committees were formed between the government and the ANC as major players in the process. When violence escalated in the townships between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC, necessity arose for the IFP to take part in these committees especially those dealing with the peace accord, as demonstrated below in the graphic on violence by Fiona Krisch below.[25]



The negotiation process in South Africa is characterized by two major levels of political fragmentation, namely:

* It is firstly, a process of reconciling the history of conquest and the history of subjugation. This is a major part of the power struggle, and the fundamental aspect of power relations between the contenders.

* It is secondly, a process of reconciling the material conditions of the oppressor and the oppressed. The aim of this latter process is to arrive at some sort of socio-economic equity which is supposed to guarantee political stability and normalisation of relations in a racially divided society. Jan Gagiano summed it up as a process intended to promote political stability and social harmony through some form of democratisation of the polity, the vigorous growth of the economy coupled with a more equitable distribution of its benefits and an aggressive strategy of nation-building.[26]

In defining the dichotomy in the relationship between the contenders of power, Gagiano maintains that the government (Conservative Reformists) seeks to establish a state, protecting multi-racial and multi-national coalitions of interests as well as state geared to the technocratic management of a capitalist economy while the populist and worker organisations seek to promote the interests of the masses by capturing the resource base of society through the revolutionary destruction of the existing state.[27]

Pierre du Toit describes the struggle for power in South Africa as a struggle between technocratic liberation led by the National Party and people's power led by the African National Congress.[28] Accordingly the process of reconciling technocratic liberation and a people's power depends largely on the common middle ground that exists between the National Party and the African National Congress. Failure to reconcile the two, du Toit argues, will result in state imposition or displacement by means of an "armed struggle" or revolution.[29]

Du Toit maintains that the People's power regime model might be able to displace the present government through a process of bargaining if those who represent the People's power, i.e. the ANC, could succeed in achieving a "negotiated transfer of power." Likewise, the government could also prevail through the same process of bargaining if it could succeed in persuading most South Africans to accept their version of the "broadening of democracy" through the policy of reform.[30] In such a process of bargaining, a winner emerges if he is able to acquire a position of dominant bargaining power over the opponent; or if he is able to outbid the opponent by way of producing attractive offers and counter offers.[31] This results in what Clem Sunter describes as a winner-take-all pie or an acceptance of the concept of a common pie in which the size of the slices is to be negotiated.[32]

FOOTNOTES

1. ZARTMAN, W J : Ripe for Revolution : Conflict and Intervention in Africa. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985) p.8
2. Ibid p.8
3.
4. Sprout and Sprout: Foundations of International Politics. (D van Nostrant Co., Inc., London, 1962) p.136
5. Ibid. p.140
6. James Toll : Gramsci. (Fontana Paperbacks, 1977) p.88-103
7. Morganthau, H J Politics Amongst Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace. (Alfred A Knopf Inc., New York, 5th Ed., 1972) p.27-32
8. Ibid, p.33
9. Sprout and Sprout, Ibid p. 138
10. Ibid p.140
11. Ibid p.140

12. Barling, J Behaviour in Organizations South Africa Perspective. (McGraw Hill Book Co., Johannesburg, 1983)p.33-34

13. Anselm Strauss : Negotiations. (Jossey Bass Publishers, London, 1984) p.2

14. Ibid, p.5

15. The Star, Tuesday December 24, 1991, p.8

16. Leadership Magazine : The Nineties p.13 Vol.7

17. Ibid p.13

18. Ibid p.18

19. Ibid. p.20

20. Ibid. p.20

21. Du toit & Esterhuyse : The Myth Makers : The Elusive Bargain for South Africa's future. (Southern Book Publishers, Halfway House 1990) p.9.

22. Ibid p.13

23. Berger P L : A future South Africa: Visions, Strategies, and Realities. (Human & Rousseau Ltd, Cape Town, 1988), p.37.

24. Sunday Times, September 29, 1991, p.21

25. Sunday Times, September 15, 1991 p.2
26. Du toit & Esterhyse Ibid p.11
27. Ibid p.14
28. Ibid p.63
29. Ibid p.63
30. Ibid p.73
31. Ibid p.74
32. Ibid p.74

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN ZIMBABWE

2.1 SETTLER-COLONIAL ESTABLISHMENT

A settler-colonial establishment implies that a foreign country has established itself through conquest, invasion or war in another territory and that such territory is effectively under the control of the mother country. It further implies that the indigenous people of the colonialized territory have no political social or economic rights in the country of their birth. Throughout Africa, most, if not all former colonized territories had demanded independence from their colonial powers and in most states the concept of the transfer of power from the colonial power to the colonized people always, underlined political settlements of those states.

Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) evolved as a settler-colonial establishment. The principle of the transfer of power from the colonizer to the colonized underlined their political settlements, and Rhodesia was no exception.

As a matter of historical importance, Mashonaland (presently Zimbabwe) was initially invaded by Cecil Rhodes in 1890. Cecil Rhodes was a co-owner of the British South Africa Company. The company had expressed its wish to expand its business interests and to explore the interior, especially because it was rumoured that there was gold beyond the Limpopo River. The company undertook to hire "200 Pioneers" and promised to compensate them by offering them farms, stock and shareholding in the event of gold being found.[1]

During the invasion, a series of "treaties" were concluded between the settlers and the Africans who were hopelessly and militarily incapable of sustaining their defence against the invaders. Rhodes, aware of the presence of gold in the north, felt that the established Boer settlements in the South, i.e. the Transvaal, had to be prevented from acquiring further settlements, especially north of the Limpopo. In his efforts he sought the assistance of the British government. Initially, the British were sceptical of the request, but when

it was learned that some gold had been carried by natives in Mashonaland, Britain developed an interest in Mashonaland and Matebeleland.[2]

The expedition started by conquering parts of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. Although the expedition met some fierce resistance from Lobengula and several chieftains in the region, such resistance could not match the sophisticated weaponry of the invaders. The defeat of Lobengula marked the victory of white settlers in Rhodesia. The rebellion of 1896 heralded the last tribal resistance against white settlement. From the beginning of the expedition up until 1922, Rhodesia was under the direct rule of the Company which led the expedition. In October 1922, a referendum launched to decide whether Rhodesia should join the Union of South Africa or remain an autonomous region under British rule, resulted in the victory of autonom under the direct rule of Britain.[3]

2.2 DISEMPOWERMENT OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE

David Martin and Phyllis Johnson maintain that the arrival of white settlers in 1890 destroyed the political, social and economic development of the African people and forced them

> "into reserves as they expropriated their land, thereby creating a reservoir of cheap labour for the settlers' farms, mines, and developing urban centres."[4]

They alleged that conquest by treaties and war forced Africans to a position of servitude and "slavery." Such treaties were made between illiterate Africans and unscrupulous literate Europeans who were interested in the exploitation of gold and other resources. Martin and Johnson maintain that Africans had to rely on the same white settlers to explain the contents of these agreements. They noted major points which contributed to the disempowerment of the African people in "Rhodesia". Although the disempowerment of the African people took place over a long period

of historical developments, the period between 1922 and 1970 saw specific measures being taken by successive governments in the form of Parliamentary Acts, to effectively bar the African people from direct political and economic control of resources. Certain Acts of Parliament were significant, namely:

a. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930

This act institutionalised racial division of land in so far as the African people were deprived of their traditional land and relocated to reserves called Tribal Trust lands. The objective of the Act was to reserve all metropolitan areas and fertile farm lands for white settlers and it was hoped that Africans would "vanish" into "reserves". Such reserves were prescribed for cheap labour, and African urban centres were transit areas for working people.[5]

b. The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951

This Act was meant to keep Africans within the poverty bracket and to force them to work on white farms and in urban industrial areas. According to this Act, African people were expected to keep only five head of cattle and to sell extra cattle to white farmers who were only prepared to offer their own prices which fell far short of the actual value of the cow.[6]

c. Education was one of the primary sources of African disempowerment

There were few educational facilities provided for black people. The role of missionaries in education could not meet all the demands of the African people and even there, the government imposed many restrictions to curb the assistance provided by missionaries. As a result of this, illiteracy amongst Africans was high compared to the other racial groups. Education was made compulsory in 1930 to all White, Asian and Coloured people but Africans were further excluded. There was a steady

decline in the African enrolment and the per capita expenditure for black children, as compared to their white counterparts. This is clearly illustrated by the government vote in 1971.[7]

Population	Africans	Whites
	4 817 950	252 414
Total Education Vote	821 400 000	20 299 000
Expenditure per population head	85	800

d. Labour Conditions and Job Opportunities

Disempowerment in this respect was highly controlled in a manner to reserve management and skilled jobs for white people. A number of Acts were passed to address job and social equality or inequality, such as the Masters and Servants Act of 1901; the African Labour Regulations Act of 1911; the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, which prevented blacks from being defined as "employees."[8] The unionization of African workers was more of a

control measure than one of providing sound labour relations. Various unions were expected to register, and they were debarred from political affiliation and could only form industrial councils on management's terms.

All these laws and practices were attempts to deny the indigenous people a chance to advance themselves politically, socially and economically.

This is one of the causes of post-colonial mismanagement and maladministration when the Africans took over from the colonial powers. Lack of expertise, professionalism and skilled workers caused most African states to collapse economically and politically after acquiring independence.

2.3 THE SHIFT OF POWER RESOURCE ALLOCATION

A number of significant developments, especially from 1960 onwards, took place in the Zimbabwean struggle which heralded a shift in power resources. Developments such as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the role of the Frontline States, the Portuguese Coup d' Etat (1974); Pretoria

and Detente; changed the propensity of power concentration from the ruling class in favour of the national liberation movements. Coupled with these developments, an increase in economic and diplomatic pressure from the international community played an important role in formulating guidelines towards unqualified majority rule and forcing the Smith government to accept African majority rule. The added advantage of the intensity of the guerilla war, based entirely on achieving African majority rule, had a profound impact during the last stages of the conflict.

The role of the international world, especially economic and diplomatic pressure, is discussed under the role of the Frontline states, whilst guerilla activities will not be discussed contextually as discussed by Paresh Pandya under "Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga; or Martin and Johnson in "The Struggle for Zimbabwe". However, significant guerilla activities will be indicated in passing, where change of strategy affected power disparity between the Rhodesian government and the nationalist movements.

2.3.1 Unilateral Declaration of Independence 1964 (UDI)

UDI signified an important shift in principle, both in terms of majority rule and in terms of a power shift. After a long struggle by Britain and the White Rhodesian establishment to forge a federation between what was then called Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), a new power structure emerged. The last attempt in 1960 under a Federal Review Conference ended in chaos, with Banda, Nkomo and Kaunda walking out of the conference.[9] This was the end of any hope for a federal establishment.

In 1961 Rhodesia embarked on a new constitutional endeavour. The new constitution of 1961 gave Africans only fifteen seats and fifty for Europeans in Parliamentary representation. The franchise system was based on a complex A and B electoral roll system. In the 1962 general election, Whitehead was defeated by the emerging Rhodesian Front of Smith. The coming to power of Smith heralded a new era of

white intransigence. The Rhodesian Front was formed in 1962 in opposition to the new constitution of 1961. The Rhodesian Front policies were largely discriminatory and opposed to Black rule.

The National Democratic Party (NDP), which represented Black nationalists, rejected the new constitution, especially the franchise and representation in Parliament.[11]

The NDP was banned in 1961 due to its refusal to accept the new constitution. The NDP was replaced by the Zimbabwe African People's Union on 17th December 1961. It was in turn, banned in 1962 and went underground rather than appear under another name.[12] When the Rhodesian Front won the general election in 1962, ZAPU was banned and its leadership imprisoned. A splinter group from ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), after being dissatisfied with Joshua Nkomo's leadership. In 1963 ZANU embarked on recruitment for an armed struggle.

The new ruling Party (RF) in Rhodesia came to power on two bases - White domination and exclusivity, and independence from British colonial rule.

Britain would not offer Rhodesia independence under White domination and in this way refused to grant Rhodesia its much cherished desire for independence. In 1965 Ian Smith and his ruling party held a referendum amongst Whites on the question of independence. The White community voted overwhelmingly for independence. On the 11 November 1965 a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was effected despite British disapproval.[13] UDI placed Rhodesia under strenuous isolation both internally by nationalist movements and internationally by Britain and the United Nations.

2.3.2 The Role of the Frontline States

Thompson identified three important roles played by *Frontline States in the struggle for Zimbabwe: The Frontline states provided bases for training camps of ZAPU and ZANU guerillas, logistical support, sanctuaries for refugees, weapons, food,

clothing and medicine. Such assistance was essential for the armed struggle to continue unabated and to sustain it. The proximity of Rhodesia, sharing its borders with hostile neighbours, made it easy for guerillas to return armed without having to move from transit to the other, i.e. from one country to the other before reaching their own destination.

Communication between the liberation movement and its armed wing was made easy by the local people, who could be taught signals of communication and could transmit these signals to regional establishments. Returning guerillas were able to obtain food, clothing and medicine from local people and, of course, sanctuary was possible through educating the local people about the struggle and to keep vigilance for the presence of the Rhodesian security establishment. Sometimes intimidation was used to deter potential informers.

The second form of assistance provided by the Frontline states was the provision of diplomatic bases for the nationalist leadership[15] and support for the independence of Zimbabwe. In most cases the Frontline States solicited support for Zimbabwe from the international community. The United Nations Assembly is largely dominated by Asian and African states. Most, if not all, of these states are colonial legacies of Western Europe and they attained their independence during the period of decolonization. The colonial settlement in Rhodesia could not have survived condemnation by the international world. The Frontline States represented a united front against colonialism in the southern hemisphere. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) used its voting strength in the United Nations to spearhead sanctions against Rhodesia.

Thirdly, the Frontline States kept the nationalists united in their demand for unqualified majority rule. The Patriotic Front which was formed between ZANU and ZAPU was forged through the Frontline States' initiatives.[16]

The role of the Frontline States was critically important in the strengthening of the national liberation movements in Zimbabwe, both in terms of galvanizing their own independence politically and economically, and in terms of the nationalist movement's bargaining strength during the negotiation conference at Lancaster House. The independence of neighbouring states such as Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia opened frontiers of war against the Rhodesian government and subjected the Rhodesian military capability to immense military pressure.

The Coup d' Etat in Portugal in 1974 caused tremendous damage to Western imperialists because it ushered in the independence of Angola and Mozambique and ended Portuguese colonial rule. Mozambique was a sea outlet for Rhodesia, and almost 70% of its exports went through the Maputo harbour. When Frelimo took over in 1974, railway links and routes to Maputo were closed.[17] This new arrangement further weakened the economic strength of Rhodesia. The new socialist order in Mozambique and Angola

further threatened, and in some instances liquidated, the investment interests of the Rhodesian business corporations and capitalist multi-national corporations.

By October 24 1974, the then Prime Minister of South Africa, John Vorster, had to admit that Southern Africa had reached the crossroads where it had to choose peace or escalation of strife. The consequences of the latter were easily foreseeable and the toll of major confrontation would be too high for Southern Africa to pay.[18] It was only when there was a shift in the balance of power that the South African government opened discussions with the Frelimo government in Mozambique, whilst supporting the White establishment in Rhodesia.[19]

One of the factors in the power shift in Rhodesia was the strengthening of relations between South Africa and Rhodesia. Both South Africa and Rhodesia realised the need to seek a political settlement, initially based on their concept of power-sharing and eventually a settlement based on the transfer of power from the White establishment

to majority rule. As it had always been the case, Sir Albert Robinson, former Rhodesian Federal High Commissioner in London indicated that White rule and domination had always missed the opportunity,

> "the policy of conceding too little and too late is the fundamental weakness of the approach to our problems."[20]

The detente was an andeavour to concede something to African demands but something short of African majority rule.

Just before the detente and immediately after an indication of a possible Portuguese coup, de Villiers, who was a close friend of Vorster, briefed the S A Prime Minister that Mozambique had "thrown in the towel-capitulated."[21] Furthermore, a small contingent of Portuguese officers had briefed the Zambian leader of their intended withdrawal from Mozambique and a need for a negotiated settlement.[22] The officers were told that Frelimo would not accept anything short of handing over of power, especially in view of the fact that military victory was in

sight. President Kaunda had already foreseen the possibilities of military victory by Frelimo but was hesitant to acknowledge it, and instead continued to seek a negotiated settlement.[23] Kaunda feared the consequential retaliation by SA and Rhodesia.

It should be noted by this time that all parties both in Rhodesia and Mozambique were convinced of the changed power balance caused by the Portuguese coup d' etat and Frelimo's military advances. All that was needed was a settlement based either on the changed power balance or a face-saving settlement based on mutual agreement. Again the detente was not meant for solving the Rhodesia question but the Mozambiqan problem.

The involvement of South Africa in the whole issue was to protect its interests in a regional context and to keep neighbouring states away from involving themselves in the internal affairs of South Africa. The detente was further aimed at establishing new relations with the new government of Mozambique in the event of failing to sustain the old order. In economic terms, South Africa had to protect its

labour requirements from Mozambique for its mining industry, and a passage for export through Maputo. On political terms SA had to keep ANC "terrorists" at bay and away from the SA borders. South Africa was prepared to do anything to secure its interests, (regional), even if it meant removing Smith from power in Rhodesia.[24]

2.3.3 The Portuguese Coup d' Etat in 1974

The Portuguese Coup d' Etat drastically changed the balance of power in Rhodesia, especially in view of the economic interest Rhodesia had at the time of its crisis on sanctions against it. The military strains caused by the opening up of the eastern frontier for ZANU guerillas in Mozambique created immense military and logistical problems for Rhodesia.

A number of factors caused the overthrow of the Portuguese civilian government by the military; the major ones being the constant defeat of colonial establishments in Africa by nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea Bissau and

Mozambique.[25] Portugal was under economic strains, and being the poorest nation in Europe it could not sustain failing colonial establishments. A military solution in Mozambique was impossible and an attempt to resolve the conflict politically had to be made. Unfortunately, the state of conflict in Mozambique had reached a phase of no-return, in view of the military inroads and successes achieved by Frelimo's military wing. The northern part of Mozambique was directly or indirectly controlled by Frelimo and Frelimo was gaining ground towards the south.

The road and rail lines connecting Rhodesia and Mozambique were under constant attack by guerillas. This, of course, disturbed the flow of essential goods and exports to major harbours such as Maputo and Beira. On March 25 1974, Smith expressed concern at the way events in Mozambique seemed to have changed:

> "We are concerned, as I think the people in Mozambique and Portugal are, at the manner in which the terrorists do seem to have gained ground. However, I am

> satisfied that it is the intention of the Portuguese Government to get on top of this problem and eventually push the terrorists out and we must all work to this end."[26]

This was a reflection of power changing hands in an atmosphere of conflict.

When the Coup d' Etat took place, a month after Smith's reflection on April 25 1974, a change in the Portuguese government brought a complete change or reversal of political approach in the colonial establishment of Mozambique and other Portuguese colonial establishments in general. Events in Lisbon did not keep pace with events in Rhodesia. The Portuguese government immediately recognized the right to self-determination and independence of the colonial people in Africa. Initially, the Portuguese government thought it wise to usher in independence gradually.

This was a ploy to establish a neo-colonial structure to ensure a continual attachment of colonial governments in their former coloners. Spinola insisted that the freedom of colonies must follow a three stage process, the ceasefire, a referendum and then independence. This arrangement was intended to undermine the national liberation movements which had been fighting Portuguese colonial establishments for over thirteen years.

Fortunately the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA), which was in control of the new government, insisted that a political solution had to be achieved and Soares, a socialist leader and later a Foreign Minister, recognized that the democratic and progressive forces were in a strong position to decolonize their countries. [27]

In view of the new situation in Lisbon and its implications for Mozambique, the Rhodesian government had to adapt its strategy and seek new roads, and of course, strengthen its co-operation with South Africa. This sudden change in Portugal

and subsequently, Mozambique, prompted Smith to prepare his White constituency for the inevitable change of political power in Mozambique, especially the coming to power of a Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO. Smith's reflection after meeting B J Vorster demonstrated this change of attitude. They issued a joint statement in May 1974, saying:

> "What we are concerned about is not whether there is a White or a Black government in Mozambique, but that there is a good and stable government."[28]

When Spinola was forced, by the MFA, to drop his federalist approach, he announced to the public on 27 July 1974, the intention of the Portuguese government to recognize the principle of the transfer of power to the colonial people and their right to independence. In June 1975, Mozambique became independent under the nationalist movement, FRELIMO.

The whole power scenario in Lisbon was external to the Rhodesian question but it had a devastating effect on the power shift in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian White establishment had to accept that they could do nothing, both militarily and politically, to sustain the status quo in Mozambique. They were forced to compromise their position in Rhodesia, especially in view of the fact that the coming to power of FRELIMO extended and compounded military, economic and political problems in Rhodesia. A further recognition of the complexities brought on by the Portuguese coup d' Etat was noted by A Grobbelaar, General Secretary of the Trade Union Council of SA, in a speech on September 1st 1974. He pointed out that South Africa could no longer afford to support Rhodesia as a result of the coup in Lisbon, and that while Rhodesia had served as a buffer state to keep terrorists away from the South African frontier, this was no more the case.[29]

2.3.4 The Armed Struggle

The armed struggle changed its course from 1970. The period between 1965 and 1970 was dominated by inactivism or scattered military activism by the ZIPRA guerillas of ZAPU. ZANU was largely a splinter organization trying to recollect its resources and strengthen its organizational structure. As W W Nyangoni puts it:

> "By 1971, ZANU's emphasis was on the political education of the Zimbabwe workers and peasants. The purpose of this was to elicit support from the masses and to recruit more people for guerilla warfare training."[30]

This mobilization and recruitment by ZANU went undetected by the government's security branch for a long period. It was indicated by Prime Minister Ian Smith:

> "... they (guerillas) were able to move backwards and forwards across the border from their so-called base camps and were thereby able to avoid detection for long enough to enable them to subvert pockets of local tribesmen. Thereafter their task was made easy through shelter, food and assistance they received from the locals. This situation has complicated the position as far as our security forces are concerned."[31]

During Ian Smith's radio broadcast to the public on the security situation of the State, he intimated that the security situation was:

> "...far more serious than it appears on the surface, and if the man in the street could have access to the security information which I and my colleagues in government have, then I think he would be a lot more worried than he is today."[32]

Initially, the Security Forces were able to get information of the presence of "terrorists" from the local people in the villages and in that way could crush insurgency at an early stage. However, the underground mobilization and politization of the peasantry by ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU changed the pattern of communication. The local village people would no longer provide information to the security forces, they were unco-operative. Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote:

> "For the first time the Rhodesian Security forces were faced with a seemingly insoluble problem... after carrying out their attacks the terrorists had not gone to ground in bush-camps in uninhabited areas where they could eventually be tracked down... neither had they gone to ground in inhabited areas where information from the local population to the police or special branch had indicated their whereabouts. This time there was nothing, no tracks... no information."[33]

In 1974 the Rhodesian government stepped up military conscription as an attempt to deal with the escalating insurgency. The Minister of Defence indicated that such actions were intended to augment the Army and to eliminate terrorists in the shortest possible time.[34]

It should be noted however, that the escalation of war was prompted by two major strategies employed by ZANU, and ZANLA its military wing. In their political education programme they concentrated on the prospect of the repossession of land and the centrality of the armed struggle to repossess the land.[35] They taught village people of the failure of other means to secure their freedom and the need to arm themselves and liberate themselves. Most political scientists attribute the success of ZANU in the villages to the underdevelopment of these areas. The Rhodesian government neglected these areas for decades and the intensity of "racist attitudes" among farmers was high compared to urban areas. The indigenous people in these remote areas endured more suffering than city people.

The Patriotic Front consolidated the diplomatic position of both ZANU and ZAPU rather than the military bases of the respective movements. Through the Patriotic Front, the liberation movements spoke as one in their demand for Black majority rule. Although the Patriotic Front came late during the struggle, i.e. when the military strength of both movements was gaining ground in the diplomatic sphere, it succeeded in luring Nkomo back into the limelight.

On many occasions Joshua Nkomo was nearly co-opted by Ian Smith and sometimes he failed to read the mood of the moment. Nkomo was occasionally called to order by his colleagues. whenever he appeared to be compromising his position. The Front further consolidated the bargaining position of ZAPU and ZANU during the Lancaster House Conference. Backed by the military performance of the guerillas back home, the Front was in a position to dictate terms with minimum compromise during the conference debate.

2.4 TOWARDS THE LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT

The process of bargaining in negotiation involves discussions, talks about talks, conferences, proposals and agreements. Each step towards a conference reflects the level of bargaining strength and how much could be compromised by the contending parties. A struggle undergoes various stages of consensus and compromise and in the event of a failed stage, a process of recapturing ground on the war front recurs, until one party is on the verge of capitulation, or capitulates altogether. The struggle in Zimbabwe went through various processes and stages reflective of the bargaining strength of the parties at play.

The struggle underwent stages such as the 1961 constitutional proposals, the Geneva Conference, the Anglo-American proposals, the Internal Settlement and lastly the Lancaster-House Conference.

2.4.1 The Victoria Falls and Geneva Conferences

The detente brought about several "talks about talks" conferences in an attempt to bargain in the process of settlement. The first meeting between the Frontline States and South Africa was held at the Victoria Falls in August 1975. Although the objective of the conference was to bring the Rhodesian problem to the fore, it would appear that South Africa was more interested in promoting its image to the international world. The Frontline States were ill-informed about the meeting, Mozambique was not even aware that B J Vorster would be present. While the Frontline States had hoped to address the Rhodesian problem, South Africa was embarking on a diplomatic maneuver to gain a favourable image from the international community as an honest arbiter or broker of peace in the Southern region.

Smith went to the Victoria Conference not yet ready to compromise his initial position to Black majority rule. He refused to give immunity to other members of the nationalist movement who were central to the

success of the conference, such as Sithole and Chikerema. He wanted the meeting to last for only thirty minutes. Although Vorster and Kaunda ultimately met at the Victoria Falls, the meeting enhanced the position of the South African government regionally and internationally but both Smith and the nationalists were poles apart. Martin and Johnson state that the attempt to force the unwilling together to achieve the impossible had failed.[37]

2.4.2 Anglo-American Proposals

Another attempt to come to a settlement was made in 1976. This time, it was an imposition by the United States in an attempt to save face against the USSR inroads in its African relations.[38] It should be noted that by this time the nationalist movement was no longer demanding majority rule on the basis of gradual implementation, but as a matter of urgency. Although Smith was uncompromising on granting Black majority rule at all, he was by this time prepared to consider it in principle. However, as the war intensified, it became impossible for Smith to

resist the pressure imposed on him by the war and the intransigence of the international community. The American involvement in the Zimbabwean conflict was shortlived and opportunist, and it did not yield any results. The significance and relevance of the American involvement was that Ian Smith once more saw no need to compromise White domination in Zimbabwe. It proved that the Rhodesian government had not yet felt the pressure or threat of its refusal to yield to Black majority rule. C B Thompson in his analysis of Anglo-American foreign policy states that:

> "Black faces in the government were acceptable so long as they did not try to take control of corporate domination of the Rhodesian economy."[39]

Another aspect which weakened Ian Smith and his government was a conspiracy between Henry Kissinger, the British and Vorster to replace Smith and establish an interim government.[40] Whilst the conspiracy did not materialise, it created an impression on Ian Smith that his last and only

Western allies were gradually isolating him, and a need for compromise was raised further. However, Smith remained intransigent when he intimated that:

> "the question of quick majority rule is a facile, superficial argument to our own plan."[41]

He rejected a simplified

> "one man one vote or majority rule, which means the counting of heads in the same way as the counting of sheep."[42]

Ian Smith had by 1977, accepted the principle of majority rule but not in the way it has been simplified by democratic pretences or practices. He wanted to qualify the principle of majority rule in order to preserve White domination. The 1978 Malta Conference also failed to resolve the dispute due to the fact that; while the British government, through David Owen, was conducting consultations with Andrew Young (the then American ambassador to the United States), Nkomo of Zapu and Mugabe of Zanu; Smith was

on the other hand signing internal agreements with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau. Such agreements convinced Smith of the acceptability of the internal agreements by Britain in particular. The White referendum which was held in 1979 to approve the internal arrangement and a new constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was voted overwhelmingly by the White electorate. The subsequent internal elections, held under the new constitution, were won by Bishop Muzorewa.[43]

Despite the tentative recognition gained by the Muzorewa government from the Conservative Party which came to power in Britain in 1979, the war in Zimbabwe did not stop. Nkomo and Mugabe intensified the armed struggle with the result that the Conservative government in Britain under Margaret Thatcher conceded under Commonwealth pressure to call for another constitutional conference which was ultimately held at the Lancaster House in September - December 1979.[44] When the Lancaster House Conference started in December 1979, the National Liberation Movements, under the banner of the Patriotic Front, were in a better position to

negotiate their view of the constitutional arrangement, especially in view of their gains in the armed struggle. The subsequent elections were won by Robert Mugabe of ZANU in 1980.

2.5 ASSESSMENT

The struggle in Zimbabwe differed significantly from the struggle in Mozambique. Although both countries shared the basis of the nature of the conflict, i.e., colonial establishment, the process of settlement was determined by various internal and external factors. In Mozambique there was not much inter-organisational conflict until Renamo came into the picture a few months after independence. The situation in Mozambique and later in Namibia was influenced mostly by external forces such as the coup d' etat in Portugal and the conflict in Angola respectively. Contrary to what happened in Namibia, the Mozambique guerilla movement had made significant military inroads against the colonial Portuguese forces and the Portuguese military network had lost its morale.

The South African situation could be compared with the political system in Rhodesia. Both governments and their White establishments believed in a political system based on racial discrimination, and White supremist policies. The South African society, however, is not regarded as a colonial establishment by the ANC, SACP and COSATU formations. The PAC still perceives South Africa as a colonial establishment, whilst the Black Consciousness Movement maintains that it is a legacy of the colonial establishment. The modalities for the transfer of power or power-sharing differ in this respect. Significant lessons have to be learned from the struggle in Zimbabwe.

Firstly, the Liberation Movement in Rhodesia was conditioned by circumstances, realities and developments of struggle to ultimately believe in military take-over as the only primary, feasible and viable means to achieve liberation and freedom.

Secondly, the Lancaster-House conference was a result of political stalemates and a conference of compromises based on a shifted distribution of power forces and resources.

Thirdly, both major liberation movements had to be part of the resolution of conflict and thereby, be part of a settlement (ZAPU and ZANU).

Fourthly, attempts to short-circuit the process of conflict, resolutions and settlements are subject to failure depending on the period, or level of conflict and the interplay of forces. Several attempts have been made to arrive at a settlement, the last one being that of a Muzorewa type of solution, but they all failed.

Fifthly, all parties in the conflict believed that they could win a fair and free election, and the White community had been led to believe that their survival relied no more on holding political power, but on controlling and influencing it.

Footnotes

1. Ranford Oliver : The Rulers of Rhodesia : From Earliest times to the Referendum. The Camelot Press Ltd, London, 1968) p.200.
2. Ibid. p.191
3. Ibid. p.316
4. Martin D & Johnson P : The Struggle for Zimbabwe. (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981) p.37
5. Ibid. p.53
6. Ibid. p.54-55
7. Ibid. p.58
8. Ibid. p.60
9. Ibid. p.67
10. Ibid. p.68
11. Ibid. p.68
12. Ibid. p.69
13. Ibid. p.XV
14. Thompson C : Challenge to Imperialism : The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe.(Westview Press, London 1985, p.2-3.

15. Ibid. p.3
16. Ibid. p.3
17. Ibid. p.3
18. Ibid. p.13
19. Ibid. p.13
20. Martin D & Johnson P. Ibid P.122
21. Ibid. p.128
22. Ibid. p.128
23. Ibid. p.129
24. Ibid. p.135-136
25. Ibid. p.116
26. Ibid. p.115.
27. Ibid. p.118
28. Observer foreign news service No. 32323 May 29 1974
29. Martin D & Johnson P. : Ibid p.122
30. Nyangeni W W : Revolutionary Strategies for National Liberation in Zimbabwe (Paper presented to the African Studies Association Conference, Chicago 31 October - 3 November) 1974, p.10
31. "Zambezi Konfrontasie": African Institute Bulletin Vol.XIII No.2, 1973: p.47

32. As quoted by Wilkinson in his Introduction to M Reaburg. (Julian Friedman, London 1978) p.12-13.

33. Stiff P and Reid Daly R : Selous Scouts : Top Secret War. (Galayo, Alberton, 1982). p.16

34. African Research Bulletin, 1974, p.3144

35. Martin D & Johnson P. Ibid. p.88-89

36. Ibid. p.194

37. Ibid. p.195

38. Ibid. p.272

39. Thompson C B. Ibid. p.145

40. Martin D & Johnson P. Ibid. p.240

41. The Washington Post 28 August 1976

42. Times of Zambia 14 September 1976

43. Martin and Johnson" Ibid. p.290-292

44. Ibid. p.312-315

CHAPTER 3

THE CONFLICT IN NAMIBIA FROM MANDATED TERRITORY TO INDEPENDENCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The German colonial rule over South-West-Africa (SWA) started in 1884, and it was only terminated in 1915, during the First World War, when Germany surrendered SWA to South Africa.[1] In 1920 the League of Nations mandated South Africa to administer SWA on behalf of the British Crown. In view of the League's mandate, South Africa embarked on entrenching White settlement in SWA and developing its infrastructure. A White Legislative Council was established in 1925.[2] Although institutionalized Apartheid had not been effected at the time in South Africa, the practice to structure the political and social systems along racial lines was evident.

When looking at the conflict in Namibia one needs to reflect the role of the League of Nations after the First World War, the nature of the mandate over South West Africa (Namibia), the United Nations in 1945 and the subsequent International Court proceedings in the International Court of Justice.

3.2. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MANDATE OVER SWA

3.2.1 The League of Nations 1919

South West Africa (Namibia) was a German colony as from 1884. As in all colonial establishments of the past, the object of the colonial power was to exploit raw materials for the mother country and to subject the indigenous populations to exploitation. South West Africa (SWA) was no exception. It was noted by the Allied Powers after the First World War when mandating the territory under the League of Nations that:

> "pre-war German colonial policy has been one of ruthless exploitation purely in the interests of White settlement. It had involved provocation of the indigenous

> population to rebellion, followed by genocide, confiscation of land and a labour system that amounted to slavery."[3]

The defeat of Germany in the First World War resulted in the emancipation of its colonies from German colonial domination. The Allied Powers who formed the League of Nations nominated trustees to administer mandated territories on its behalf. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stated that

> "...there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the Covenant."[4]

In the light of Article 22 of the Covenant the task of the trustees was to administer the territories and prepare the people of those territories for independence. The mandate for South West Africa was instituted at Geneva on 17 December 1920 and was

conferred upon his Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa.[5] Under the mandate agreement, Article 2 and Article 7 were of significance in terms of the scope and nature of the mandate.

Basically there were flaws in the way the mandates were phrased by the League of Nations. Firstly, the mandates explicitly contended that the peoples of the mandated territories were backward in terms of Western development and therefore needed guidance towards political autonomy. Article 22 stated that such colonies were:

> "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world."

and that their well-being constituted:

> "a sacred trust of civilization."[6]

This position by the League exposed such territories to exploitation by the Mandatory powers and further draining of their development. South West Africa (Namibia) was no exception to this development. As much as there had been development of the territory, such developments were effected more to serve the Republic of South Africa than the South West African people.

Secondly, South West Africa in particular was to be

> "administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral part of its territory."[7]

Although apartheid was institutionalized in South Africa in 1948 when the National Party (NP) came to power, there was already an informal and formal exploitative relationship between the colonizers and the colonized people of these territories. Article 22 did not distinguish the relations between the White settlers and the indigenous people of the mandated territories. The Article simply presupposed that the White settlers would carry the

mandate without prejudice. When the NP came to power in 1948 the party embarked on institutionalizing its apartheid policies in the territory and sought further to annex the territory as its fifth province.

Thirdly, the insistence of the United Nations to keep the territory under trusteeship despite South Africa's protestation was to prove insurmountable for South Africa. The government of South Africa had to devise ways to sustain its control or to yield to the pressure without losing its influence over the territory. However, international court proceedings and appeals to the General Assembly of the UN did not change the position of the world bodies.

3.2.2 The United Nations

When the UN took over the responsibilities of the League of Nations, it accelerated the independence of Syria and Iraq and put other mandated territories such as SWA (Namibia) under trusteeship of the UN.[8] A Trusteeship Committee of the UN was appointed to

oversee the self-determination of mandated territories. Although South Africa refused to place South-West-Africa under the UN trusteeship because of its desire to annex the territory to South Africa, the UN maintained that SWA was not part of South Africa and therefore remained a mandated territory.[9]

South Africa, however, took advantage of the liquidation of the League of Nations in 1945 and claimed that the newly formed UN had no legal power to carry on a mandate from a defunct League of Nations. In the 1960's, in interested parties, such as Ethiopia and Liberia took South Africa to the International Court of Justice. Despite the fact that South Africa maintained that the International Court of Justice had no jurisdiction over the matter and that the plaintiff had no locus standi, the General Assembly passed a resolution on October 27 1966 terminating South Africa's League of Nations mandate and declaring that

> "South Africa has no other right to administer the territory... henceforth

South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations."[10]

This, however, did not deter South Africa from continuing with its administration of the territory. When the National Party came to power in 1948, the policy of apartheid was also implemented in the territory.

On the 12 August 1969, the Security Council passed a resolution calling upon South Africa to withdraw from Namibia with immediate effect. However, the call for sanctions against South Africa was opposed by the US and Britain. The International Court of Justice was again called upon to clarify the matter and the contradictory reactions to the termination of the Mandate in 1971. The International Court of Justice found that:

- the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and South Africa was under an obligation to withdraw.

- that South Africa remained accountable for any violations of the rights of the people of Namibia. [11]

3.3.2 Disempowerment of the indigenous African people of South- West-Africa

Du Pisani identifies two major aspects of gradual colonialization. Firstly, small groups of missionaries roamed the land as hunters, traders, or prospectors. The indigenous people took no notice of any threat from these missionaries. Gradually the missionaries acted as parishioners, converting some indigenous people to Christian values thus creating divided loyalties among African communities. As time went by, the missionaries became "diplomats-in-residence" and spokesmen for chiefs and councillors. Secondly, the process was gradually marked by small settlement and farming. Du Pisani contends that German colonialism in Namibia took place in three phases.

- The period of protection treaties (Schutzvertrage) signed with various indigenous

population groups and formal colonialization (1884-1894).

- Militarization and the creation of a bureaucracy system of control (1894-1904).

- Colonial oppression against African resistance (1905-1915).[12]

The First World War saw the disintegration of German imperialism throughout the world; South West Africa was no exception. However, SWA virtually fell from one colonial rule to another. South Africa, as a new ruler, embarked on a process of furthering its own interests.

When South Africa took over the administrative powers in the territory as mandated by the League of Nations in 1919, it introduced its own policies of segregation. In 1929 an Executive Committee, an Advisory Council and a legislative Assembly were formed, constituted by the White population of the territory.[13] Several proclamations were promulgated: the Masters and Servants Proclamation of 1920, which

confined Africans to work for White settlers; the Native Administration Proclamation No.11 of 1922, which introduced the pass laws and influx control; and the Curfew Regulations Proclamation No.33 of 1922, which prevented Africans from roaming the streets in White areas.[14]

The 1966 Resolution 2145 (xxi) did not change anything in terms of the SA responsibility to effect development of the territory. South Africa embarked on mass removals of the African population from "white designated areas" to the so-called "reserves." In terms of the Odendaal Report, Africans were allocated land in the reserves. Although the Report was later abandoned, the underlying principles were nevertheless implemented, under the new policies of apartheid which emerged when the Nationalist Party took over in SA in 1948.[15]

When South-West-Africa was handed over to South Africa after the First World war, the League of Nations had accused Germany of brutality in the handling of the indigenous people in its colonies.[16]

Immediately after the hand-over, however, South Africa embarked on expanding White settlements in the territory. Large farms were allocated to White settlers between 1920 and 1926. The Herero and Nama people were resettled on non-arable land called the sandveld. Land resettlements forced the African people to seek employment on white farms and in urban areas. They gradually moved from self-sufficiency to dependency on the so-called "White areas" and largely constituted cheap labour. As happened in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the indigenous people were forced to sell their cattle and stock to White settlers at cheap prices and to seek employment from the very settlers.

3.4 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POWERS

3.4.1 The United States of America and Cuba

American intervention started during the Cold War in which the Communist threat in Africa was countered by American intervention. Initially America had an indirect involvement in the Angolan conflict, by supplying military assistance, logistics, and training of Portugal's military

force. Portugal in turn used this military training, and supplies, in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau against nationalist liberation movements to sustain its colonial domination.

> "Between 1953 and 1961, Washington sent more than $30 million in military aid and $27 million in economic assistance to the Lisbon regime. For 1962-8 the figures stood at $39 million in military aid and $124 in economic aid"[17]

According to Harsch, Angola is Africa's richest country in terms of raw materials such as oil, minerals and agricultural products and the US felt its interests could be safeguarded by maintaining the status quo, thus supporting Lisbon's continued dominance over its colonies.[18] The Portuguese coup in 1974 changed America's perception and strategic approach to the conflict. The overthrow of the Salazar government in Portugal completely changed the balance of power in favour of national liberation movements fighting against colonialism in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau.

The United States realized the inevitable i.e. the national liberation movements' ascendance to power. In an effort to protect its economic interests and preventing communist expansionism, the United States began a programme of supporting anti-communist actions in Angola, or creating such actions in the ranks of the Liberation Movements of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA.

The animosity among liberation movements, and lack of a united front, created a vacuum which the Americans made use of by broadening disunity between the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA.[19] Although several attempts were made to pre-empt the nationalists' take over, such attempts did not succeed. Military equipment and financial aid were channelled to the FNLA and UNITA by the CIA, and an attempt was made to isolate the MPLA, which was largely financed by the Soviet Union. Ernest Harsch found out that:

> "Some of the aid was directly allotted to the FNLA and UNITA ... the White House also gave funds to President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire

> to buy arms for the FNLA and UNITA from various European countries, particularly Belgium."[20]

According to Harsh,

> "The CIA did not limit itself to providing arms and money. In a move reminiscent of its covert operations in Laos in the 1960's the CIA began the recruitment of an undercover army composed of American and European mercenaries to fight in Angola against the MPLA"[21]

The South African Star Weekly of December 6, 1975 reported that

> "Scores of American mercenaries are fighting in Angola and hundreds more are expected to be signed up in the US in the next few days."[22]

In an effort to gain public support in Angola for its covert activities, the US started a propaganda

campaign of Communist threat and the Soviet's aggressive communist expansionism. Kissinger stated in 1975 that the US would not tolerate Soviet "hegemonial aspirations in Angola"[23]. Daniel P Moyniham, the then US ambassador to the UN contended that if Washington did not stop the Soviet Union, the:

> "Communists would take over Angola and will thereby considerably control the oil shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf to Europe. They will be next to Brazil. They will have a large chunk of Africa and the world will be different in the aftermath if they succeed."[24]

Despite America's insistence on imposing itself on the conflict in Angola, events outside its influence worked against it. The coup in Lisbon and the economic strains suffered by Portugal relegated the US interests. Portugal was forced by its own political instability and economic strains to grant independence to its colonies in 1975. This opened the way for SWAPO to establish military bases in

Angola in 1975. The Marxist MPLA government embarked on a course of liberating Namibia by giving logistic support and military support to SWAPO.[25]The withdrawal of Portuguese forces from Angola created a military vacuum of which the FNLA and UNITA forces took advantage. In view of the military threat by the FNLA and UNITA forces, the MPLA government sought Cuban assistance, as a result of which more than 50 000 Cuban soldiers, and military equipment were shipped to Angola. In 1981 the US administration under President Reagan introduced a policy of linkage on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the independence of Namibia.[26]
According to Fraenkel and Murray

> "The overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lisbon on 24 April 1974 effectively released a political log-jam that had been hindering moves towards decolonization in Southern Africa. The impending independence of Angola and Mozambique (brought) revolutionary Black regimes to the borders of South Africa."[27]

The consequences of Angola's independence was that more Namibian refugees crossed the border into Angola, increasing the combat capacity of SWAPO's military wing, PLAN. The border was enlarged by the opening up of the northern border which created compounded problems of border maintenance for South Africa.

> "If progress towards a Namibian settlement were to be measured in terms of resolutions in international fora and declarations of intent by the powers concerned, then independence should belong to Namibia.[28]

But this was not the case, it took almost twenty five years, from 1966 to 1990, for Namibian independence to be realized. The influence of the role players in the struggle left its impact. Walvis Bay remained a possession of the Republic of South Africa. The constitution of the Republic of Namibia entrenched property rights inherited from

the old order. The Constitution remained rigid and cannot be changed under normal circumstances. The strength of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a South African creation, remained intact and it was the DTA which served as a catalyst of the south African government during the election of a Constituent Assembly and the current government in Namibia. The economic options of the SWAPO government in Namibia are restricted and locked-up by the imperialist influence of Western democracies and the capitalist world order. All this would not have been the case if the negotiation process in Namibia had not been determined by the conduct of power relations and struggle.

The same applies to Zimbabwe. According to Fraenkel and Murray:

> "... the combination of a bitter 'bush war' allied with declining White morale and constant pressure towards a settlement by the UN and outside powers was crucial in paving

the way towards internationally supervised elections."[29]

3.4.2 The United Nations

The significance of this section is the role of the Western Contact Group established under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 385, in 1976. This was the only concerted effort by the United Nations to streamline the independence of Namibia. The fundamental principles under Resolution 385 were, inter alia, as follows:

- that South Africa's continued administration of the territory was illegal.

- that all parties in the dispute, i.e., the United Nations, South Africa and nationalist political movments should be involved in the transitional process.

- that Namibia should be granted its independence under the auspices of the South African Government and the United Nations.

- that the peaceful transition should be based on majority rule principle.

- that the support of the Frontline States was crucial to put pressure on SWAPO.[30]

Basically there was nothing new in the noted principles established under Resolution 385. The UN was concretising long-standing overtures espoused by the UN General Assembly over years. The success or failure of the Western Contact Group depended largely on the threat such UN overtures would have held for the South African government, and the political stability in South Africa.

The power resource allocation at the time was still favourable to South Africa and political stability sustainable. The internal efforts by South Africa in settling the conflict in the form of the Turnhalle Conference was still intact and the South African government was still selling the idea to the outside world. The involvement of the Western Contact Group, namely the USA, Britain, West Germany, France and Canada was a result of constant

attacks by African States in the UN General Assembly of their dealings (economically) with the South African Government. Their involvement therefore, was a pre-emptive endeavour to alleviate pressure on them.[31]

Despite the fact that the illegality of the South African Government's presence in Namibia was established by the International Court of Justice and subsequently by the UN General Assembly, South Africa was not at all expelled from the conflict; a solution had to involve them.[32] The UN therefore continued to deal with South Africa from a point of view of appeals and the condemnation of apartheid policies. Any political transition had to appeal to the South Africa Government, both morally and realistically.The South African Government demonstrated its strength by embarking on a military pre-emptive strike in neighbouring Botswana and Zimbabwe during the Western Contact Group's visit.

The Western Contact Group (WCG) nevertheless, consulted with a broad frame of interested parties, such as the South African Government, the Turnhalle

Constitution Committee, the internal leadership of the liberation movement and others. South Africa was under pressure both internally and internationally to abandon its internal constitutional arrangement as noted by the WCG that:

- All Turnhalle Constitutional arrangements be stopped

- Elections be held under the United Nations supervision.

- A caretaker administration be instituted to oversee the day to day activities of government.[33]

The UN was a custodian of the struggle in Namibia in the sense that it was expected to effect the independence of Namibia and at the same time conduct the struggle on behalf of the Namibian people. Through UN Resolutions addressing a variety of relations between itself and the South African government, the UN had to accept that SWAPO was a side-effect in the settlement. The UN had to

counter the South African endeavour to seek its own internal arrangement lest it found itself giving away Namibia to a self-seeking South Africa.

3.3.3 The Internal Constitutional Arrangement

During the Mandate the South African Parliament was the highest legislative authority for SWA. In 1925 the SWA Constitution Act No.42 of 1925 was passed and the Act conferred legislative powers to the territory. In 1949 the new National Party government of South Africa promulgated the South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, No.23 of 1949 which gave the territory more legislative powers and an elected Legislative Assembly, but South Africa maintained its direct representation, through appointing its representive to the SWA Legislative Assembly.[34]

Although this arrangement was a positive gesture in terms of the Mandatory powers, such gestures were, however, dashed by the replacement of these Acts in 1968. The SWA Constitution Act No.39 of 1968 as amended by the SWA Affairs Act No.25 of 1969, was to reverse the process of constitutional autonomy of

the territory since it gave the South African Parliament more legislative powers over the territory. The South African Government had by this time hoped to keep its hold on SWA by sending a message to the world that it was no more prepared to concede to international pressure. Despite the negotiations which preceded the promulgation of these Acts, under protest from the UN, SWAPO and interested parties, the South African government enacted another Act, the SWA Constitution Amendment Act No.95 of 1977 which gave the State President more power to legislate by proclamation.[35]

Despite these legislative wrangles by the South African Government, pressure was put on South Africa by the UN through Resolutions in the UN Assembly to accede to total independence for the territory. The only resultant effect of the pressure was an agreement reached between UN Secretary General and the South African government to establish a Multi-Racial Advisory Council. South Africa had agreed to the principle of self-determination for SWA/Namibia but this was to emerge out of discussions between several interested groups

who had seen the possibilities of arriving at an internal settlement.These discussions were initiated in 1972 by white liberals such as Mr Dirk Mudge. In their deliberations a constitutional framework was established and the proposals were adopted by the SA Prime Minister in September 1974 and later by the SWA Legislative Assembly in November 1974.[36]

The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference was held under South Africa's direct supervision and as an attempt to forge an internal settlement without the support of the international bodies and SWAPO. It signified two important aspects:

- the intransigence of the South African Government to yield to international pressure.
- the acceptance in principle of independence and self-determination of the people of SWA/Namibia.

The conference reflected political pressure exerted by the international community over South Africa. It noted the need for the participation of all those

forces internally who shared the principle of co-existence of groups hence

> "all eleven population groups of SWA/Namibia were represented by elected or appointed delegates."[37]

However, the conference's constitutional deliberations was largely based on race. The first and second tier government were to be constituted on racial and ethnic compositions, each group being represented as an entity. This was an extension of the racial basis of the apartheid system, the very same system which was intended to be abolished. (Refers to annexure B).

According to Prinsloo, the proposed constitution represented a declaration of intent and a commitment on the part of moderate forces who were striving for a peaceful political and constitutional transition, against the militant forces.[38] It is obvious why SWAPO rejected the Turnhalle Constitution. SWAPO's representative Mr Peter Katjevivi was reported in the Rand Daily Mail as having said that elections

should be held on non ethnic lines, UN supervised, and the interim government based on the Turnhalle Conference should be abolished.

It was not only SWAPO which rejected the Turnhalle arrangement, the Western Contact Group also rejected these proposals as reported in the Rand Daily Mail of 10 May 1977:

-that the Turnhalle constitution and the subsequent interim government be scrapped.

- there should be a non-political caretaker administration to run the affairs of the country until independence.

- there should be free elections under UN supervision.[39]

The rejection by SWAPO and the UN of the Turnhalle constitutional arrangement created an environment of pressure being exerted on the South African Government once more to yield to UN demands.

Although this was accomplished later, the conference created another impression.

The constitutional conference was further intended to counter the myth held by the international community, especially the UN and the OAU, that SWAPO was the only authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

Andre du Pisani raised several factors which precipitated developments in South Africa. Amongst them, he noted:

- that Pretoria was compelled to review its policy towards Namibia, since its fundamental premise, i.e. utilizing Namibia as a cordon sanitaire to minimize the impact of political change in South Africa, was challenged by developments in the Southern African arena.

- that the growing degree of economic interdependence in Southern Africa necessitated policy reappraisals to cope with labour supply from neighbouring states.

- that South Africa's industrial growth created the need for new markets.

- that severe dependence of South Africa's balance of payments on foreign markets necessitated the need to explore nearby markets.

- that The change of the South African economy from subsistence to industrial economy necessitated technological development largely obtainable from foreign states.

- Political and security developments in the region. South Africa was enclaved by hostile neighbouring states due to the emergence of national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia (SWA), Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Lesotho.[40]

Although such developments compelled South Africa to reassess its position, such compelling factors were just enough for South Africa to contain changes domestically and to influence changes externally.

The South African Government was not yet that of a defeated state which would capitulate under pressure.

3.4 ASSESSMENT

The process of transition in Namibia should be regarded against the following backdrop:

- that the UN had to broker a process of negotiation in which there was no outright winner in the bargaining process away from the negotiating table.

- that the UN, consisting of diverse nations or states with diverse interests to the conflict could not be expected to deliver options as reflective as those of SWAPO's policies. The UN was in a weaker position to force White South Africa to capitulate without a military option. Again no state could have undertaken to engage South Africa militarily on behalf of Namibia without weighing economic and political benefits of such an option.

- that SWAPO was largely a pressure group just like the UN, in the conflict and it had no significant chance of forcing the White government in South Africa to capitulate militarily. SWAPO's options therefore were to embark on diplomatic manoeuvres to isolate South Africa politically and economically from the international world. Changes, emanating from purely economic and political sanctions, produced minimal results. Such changes are relative to the amount of pressure, and the type of pressure exerted on the other party expected to readjust his policy options. The constitution of Namibia, unlike that of Zimbabwe, does not permit restitution nor is it easily amendable to allow the ruling party to embark on affirmative action of redressing land redistribution. Private land ownership therefore remains in the fold of big business and White farmers.

- that Walvis Bay remained in the hands of South Africa and as part of South Africa. The fact

that SWAPO was not directly involved in the negotiation process, except through the Frontline States, who were weary of war with South Africa in their own states, put SWAPO out of the limelight of effectively demanding Walvis Bay from South Africa or threatening to withdraw from the process of negotiations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Fraenkel P & Murray R: The Namibian. The Minority Rights and (Group Report No.19.) P.1
2. Ibid, p.1
3. Fraenkel P & Murray R: The Namibian. The Minority Rights and (Group Report No.19.) P.7
4. Ibid p.7
5. Ibid, p.7
6. Rotberg, R L : Namibia Political and Economic Prospects. David Philip. Blackshaws Pty (Ltd) Cape Town, 1983.) p.3
7. Ibid p.3
8. Fraenkel P & Murrary R : Ibid, p.8
9. Ibid p.8
10. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (xxi) 1966. (United Nations Resolution)
11. Fraenkel P & Murrary R : Ibid, p.8
12. Du Pisani, A : The Politics of Continuity and Change. Jonathan Bull Publishers, Johannesburg, 1985, p.21.
13. Ibid p.59

14. Ibid p.50-52
15. p.119-121
16. Ibid p.22
17. Harsch E & Thomas T.: Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War (Pathfinder Press Inc. New York, 1976.), p.17
18. Ibid, p.17
19. Ibid, p.19
20. Ibid p.98
21. Ibid p.98
22. South African Star Weekly, December 6, 1975 (As quoted by Harsch) p.99
23. Harsch and Thomas : Ibid, p.101
24. Ibid p.101
25. Ibid p.121
27. Fraenkel P and Murray R Ibid p.10
28. Ibid p.13
29. Ibid p.13
30. du Pisani A Ibid p.336
31. Ibid p.336
32. Ibid p.336
33. du Pisani A : Ibid p.340
34. Fraenkel P and Murray R. :Ibid p.8
35. SWA Constitution Amendment Act No.95 of 1977

36. du Pisani : Ibid p.341

37. Prinsloo, D S : SWA\Namibia : Towards a negotiated Settlement: Study Report, August 1977, No.6) p.13

38. Ibid p.13

39. Rand Daily Mail 10 May 1977

40. du Pisani A : Ibid p.323

CHAPTER 4

RESPECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SA CONFLICT, APPROACHES AND BARGAINING POSITIONS

INTRODUCTION

South Africans are now faced with a rapidly evolving political climate whereby negotiations or negotiated settlement dominates the political scene. One is faced with the problem of locating its relevance, prospects, and its effect in solving the political problems of South Africa. Any attempt to locate the relevance of the present political logjam is faced with the problem of analysis of the political and power positions of the major forces and the feasibility of a negotiated settlement. Very few would argue that liberation movements now stand poised for an imminent capture of state power; on the contrary, it would appear that the initiative for a transformation lies with the South African government and its allies, whilst the liberation movements had been placed on the defensive.

The most important and stimulating aspect in the unfolding of the political scene, is the manner in which a settlement will unfold itself. Would it be an evolutionary process or a revolutionary one? Many implications, solutions, and suggestions have been advanced in an effort to provide answers to the above questions. In an effort to tackle the very questions, the nature of, content, future, and the atmosphere under which such a process will unfold, the historical positions of the contending parties, their ideological power positions, political tendencies and ideological aspirations, need some analysis and investigation. Let it be said right from the beginning that the historical development of liberation movements is only relevant in as far as such development justifies ideological trends. This approach does not, however, ignore the external factors, such as international pressure, both direct and indirect, economic pressure and political expediencies. Such forces have been dealt with in the previous chapters in relation to how they influenced political settlements in Southern Africa.

4.1 APPROACHES AND BARGAINING POSITIONS

There are three perspectives of the social formation in South Africa espoused by different political organisations. The conflict analysis flows from the understanding of the social formations in South Africa, namely:

4.1.1 Colonialism of a Special Type - ANC/SACP Alliance

4.1.2 Settler - colonialism - PAC

4.1.3 Racial - Capitalism - AZAPO

4.1.1 Colonialism of a Special Type (CST)

According to the concept of CST, South Africa is divided into two major colonial blocs, the White bloc and the colonized bloc. The concept contends that the classical colonial establishment of the previous centuries is obscured in the present establishment. The colonial period in other African states was characterised by a foreign colonial power holding the reins of the colonized country through deputation and subjecting the colonized people to

political, social and economic exploitation and oppression. According to the CST

> "the main theme in the South African situation is that the social formation in South Africa exhibits most of the features of the relationship between a colonial power and its colonies but that the relationship occurs within a single social formation.[1]

The concept was originally developed in the 1960's and it has been refined periodically, mostly by Joe Slovo, the ex-secretary-general of the South African Communist Party. The concept claims that within the two major blocs there are three other classes. The White block which consists of an alliance of three classes, namely:

- the capitalist class
- the petty bourgeosie
- the proletariat class[2]

The CST alleges that class contradictions within the White bloc are diminished or limited in the interest of maintaining colonial domination and benefits that

accrue with it. However, the contradiction inherent in the formation, diminishes the Marxist class struggle. As a result the struggle with the white block revolves around issues of strategies and tactics of control rather than a revolutionary class struggle which transcends racial domination.[3] The individual classes within the White bloc are incapable of articulating their interests with the view of overthrowing the established order.

On the other hand, the colonized bloc consists of the colonized mass of the people which is in turn subdivided into three classes:

- the mass of which being the proletariate class
- the semi-proletarianized peasantry
- the petty-bourgeoisie[4]

However, this bloc experiences the same colonial domination in various ways. The white bloc and the colonized bloc derive unequal benefits from the social and economic structures. The White bloc enjoys a dominant privileged status, while the colonized masses are subjected to economic and

social exploitation and subjugation. The various groups in the colonized bloc experience different levels of exploitation, i.e. the petty bourgeoisie in the White bloc is not exposed to the same socio-economic strata as his counterpart in the colonized bloc. The relation is largely characterized by socio-cultural dominance. The relationship between a White worker and Black worker is an example in point. The intensity of exploitation differs in that the White worker is exploited by dictates of the capitalist mode of production whilst the Black worker is over and above, exploited by the apartheid legal and social structures. The two types of workers have different roles in the social organisation of labour; their social positions are colour-defined in relation to the means of production.[5]

The theory presupposes that the White worker is ideologically corrupted by the economic and social concessions he derives from the established order; his interest are best served by the preservation of the status quo, rather than its destruction. On the other hand, the interests of the Black middle class

are automatically linked to those of the Black working class, by virtue of the fact that apartheid constitutes an immediate impediment in the realisation of class objectives.[6]

The SACP/ANC thesis of CST and the "ANC strategy and tactics" maintain that the colonized bloc shows two aspects of consciousness, Racial Consciousness and National Consciousness.[7] The alliance contends further that classes in the colonized bloc identify their social status in racial terms and because their immediate consciousness is racial oppression, the Anti-Apartheid sentiment is stronger than their class differences. Accordingly, colonial domination inhibits class consciousness in a way which race consciousness predominates class struggle. Wolp calls this consciousness a "major/dominant/or principal contradiction" in the social formation of the South African society.[8]

4.1.1.1 The National Democratic Revolution (NDR)

The theory of the NDR is a direct manifestation of the CST theory. The concept maintains that there can be no direct transition to Socialism and that the process of revolution in South Africa cannot follow the classical pattern of Capitalism-Socialism.[9] The rejection of the classical pattern is grounded upon the social analysis propounded by the CST theory which contends that class conflict inherent in the social formation is diminished by racial consciousness. Accordingly, the struggle in South Africa should go through a national struggle, since all classes of the colonized bloc share a common feeling of racial oppression.

The NDR theory originated at a time when the international communist movement was experiencing difficulties in maintaining socialism in a capitalist dominated world; they felt that socialism was being threatened by the productive forces of capitalism. The 7th congress of the Comintern in 1935 realised the need of establishing alliances with liberal movements in capitalist societies and

to promote the interests of liberal movements as these forces had been identified as potential allies during the transitional phase to communism. It was realised that such alliances could promote national democratic principles as a prelude to socialism.[10] The ANC/SACP Alliance felt that conditions in South Africa necessitated an approach based on the NDR. The SACP alleges that the working class alone cannot sustain a struggle aimed at a socialist transformation without the assistance of other classes, therefore, the working class must take along other sympathetic classes to advance their own class interests.

The theory of the NDR is defined as:

> "the gradual creation of political, material, social and cultural preconditions for the transition to building socialism."[11]

The theory attempts to establish an alliance amongst classes with diverse interests, but who share a common desire for a democratic society. However, these interests are not necessarily reconciled, but kept in abeyance for the immediate national struggle. The object of pursuing the nationalistic approach is to broaden, as much as possible, the mass base in order to deny the ruling class its potential allies. It should be noted, however, that a unifying aspect is necessary to facilitate unity amongst the classes. In this case the FREEDOM CHARTER becomes relevant in the ANC's strategic approach.

The SACP/ANC alliance believes that socialist transformation is possible within the attainment of the immediate objectives of the NDR. They view the NDR as an expression of the broad objective interests, not only of the working class, but also those of other classes within the nationally dominated majority. The NDR is therefore a short term imperative for the working class. Slovo puts it thus:

> "The winning of the objectives of the national democratic revolution will, in turn, lay the basis for a steady advance in the direction of deepening our national unity on all fronts... and towards socialist transformation."[12]

The SACP views the NDR as an immediate objective, not only of the working class, but also of other classes in the social strata:

> "It remains true that our National Democratic Revolution expresses the broad objective interests not only of the working class but also of the other classes within the nationally dominated majority including the Black petty-bourgeoisie and significant strata of the emergent black bourgeoisie."[13]

Accordingly this provides:

> "the foundation for a struggle which aims to mobilise to its side all the oppressed classes and strata as participants in the national liberation alliance."[14]

4.1.1.2 The Freedom Charter (FC)

One of the most important documents in the unfolding of the political scene in South Africa is the emergence of the FC. The FC was adopted in 1955 at the Kliptown Congress of the People. It was, however, ironically, adopted by the ANC a year later. The document has been used to facilitate unity amongst progressive organizations of ANC tendencies. The ideological significance of the FC is that it facilitates the theory of the NDR in that it seeks to establish unity amongst classes and allies within the ANC tendencies. The FC promotes neither a socialist nor a capitalist social formation, but it is Anti-Apartheid and broadly serves as a unifying aspect of the CST social analysis.

There are ten major points in the FC:

- The people shall govern
- All national groups shall have equal rights
- The people shall share in the country's wealth
- The land shall be shared among those who work it
- All shall enjoy human rights
- There shall be work and security
- The doors of learning and culture shall be opened
- There shall be houses, security and comfort
- There shall be peace and friendship
- All shall be equal before the law.[15]

According to Hudson:

> "the prism of the theory of national democratic revolution and Colonialism of a special type analysis of South Africa presupposes the existence of contradictory interests and it is not difficult to interpret the principal clauses of the

> Charter as comprising national democratic demands."[16]

The SACP sees the Freedom Charter as a non-socialist document but expressing the demands of all classes:

> "This document is not, in itself, a programme for socialism, even though it can provide a basis for uninterrupted advance to a socialist future"[17]

Peter Hudson views the FC as a "notoriously ambiguous document" because of the various contradictory ways in which it has been interpreted by the left, right, and centre of the political spectrum.[18] It has been referred to as a socialist document by the right, an ambiguous and sell-out document by the far left, and a mixture of socialist and bourgeoisie democracy by the centre and the left. However, the FC is responsible for solidifying the anti-apartheid movement, both nationally and internationally, thus providing the basis for the ANC's strength on the ground, and in the world community.

The FC can, at best, be referred to as a social-democratic document rather than a socialist document. The document seeks to nationalise certain major sections of the economy, such as mines, heavy industries and banks. It also seeks the creation of co-operate farming.[19] It wants to transfer political power from the minority to the majority, to socialise health, education, and social welfare. The FC and the NDR harmonise class differences rather than antagonise them. They both seek to create class alliances based on anti-apartheid sentiment and in that way diminish the Marxist class antagonism inherent in the Marxist class analysis. However, the SACP's programme goes beyond the NDR to a socialist transformation.

4.1.2 Settler Colonialism - PAC

According to the Pan Africanist Congress (PCA), the South African society remains a settler-colonial establishment. The movement regards the White class as an extension of colonialism, which conquered Africa and dispossessed the African people of their

land and all that accrue to it. The organisation espouses African Nationalism in its original form, and according to the movement an African is anyone who owes his only allegiance and loyalty to Africa and who in turn, believes in African majority rule.[20] The movement does not distinguish between Black and White in its definition of an African, except that, the White establishment constitutes a settler-colonial order. Originally the movement made a distinction between the "arrogant and opportunist merchant class" in the Indian community;and it has of late played down this class definition.[21]

The original analysis of the Indian community was based on the fact that the Indian community was largely imported into this country from India, Pakistan, and other Asian countries. They did not constitute a nation and therefore were considered as a group of Asian origin. However among this group, a section perceived themselves as merchants, whose sole interest had been to exploit the economic opportunities available to them. This class of merchants was tainted with cultural supremacy and

"national" arrogance and identified itself with the oppressor in the process of subjugating the Africans to servitude.[22] This view was held due to the fact that most Indians were occupying higher positions compared to Africans and that most Indians could not openly identify themselves with the Africans in the struggle against oppression.

The PAC believes that there is only one race to which all belong, and that is the Human race.[23] Accordingly race is viewed as human nature devoid of political meaning. However, the movement recognises the existence of national groups based on geographical origin within a particular area and sharing a common historical experience. Race is a natural phenomenon with no political meaning and relevance. The Whites are regarded as a foreign minority group which has exclusive control of political, economic, social and military power. It is a group whose race composition has been used to rally support and unity among the different, culturally and ethnically divided communities of Britain, Holland, Germany, Italy, Portugal and many other communities of European extraction.[24]

4.1.2.1 The Pan Africanist Manifesto of 1959

In accordance with the settler-colonial analysis, the movement set up a programme and the modus operandi for its struggle against White domination. The movement's objective is outlined in the "Memorandum on South Africa," submitted to the United Nations. It states that:

> "the freedom of the Africans means the freedom of all in South Africa, the Europeans included, because only the Africans can guarantee the establishment of a genuine democracy in which all men, will be governed as individuals and not as distinctive sectional groups.[25]

It should be noted, however, that the PAC has never advocated a political policy based on "send the White man into the sea," as has been claimed by its opponents. The PAC is vehemently opposed to any form of racism as a frame of political reference. Its opposition to the Charterist tendency is that

charterism is a form of multi-racialism and therefore a perpetuation of race prejudice inherent in the present system.[26]

The memorandum argues that the history of South Africa has fostered group prejudice and antagonism and if it maintains the same group exclusiveness, parading under multiracialism, it would be transporting to the new order the same antagonisms and group conflict. Multiracialism implies proportional representation, irrespective of population figures. In this sense, a complete negation of democracy.[27]

The PAC manifesto, like the FC, stipulates twelve points as bases for their obectives:

- Land robbery and political subjugation. The movement believes that the present White possession of land is based on colonial conquest and that land must be repossessed rather than shared.

- Established by the sword. This implies that White domination was established by conquest and it can be removed by conquest.

- Expulsion of imperialist exploiters. The influence of the imperial forces and their interests must be removed or diminished.

- Decolonialisation demands independence. South Africa, like all African countries, must be decolonised and independence installed on it.

- The liquidation of the forces of oppression. All forms of oppression must be removed.

- The right to shape its own destiny. This provision recognises the right of the indigenous African people to determine and shape their own destiny. South Africa is regarded as a part of the African continent and therefore an inalienable heritage of the African people. Control is therefore their undoubted and unquestionable birth-right.

- No longer aligned within the ranks of the liberation movements i.e ANC. This implies that the ANC has by its conduct excluded itself from the mainstream of the liberation movements.

- White domination without frills and trappings. White domination must cease in all its forms.

- One race. The movement recognises only one race i.e. the Human race.

- Monolithic giant. The movement advocates the establishment of the United States of Africa with one central government.

- Social relations. The movement hopes to instil values of African humanity.

- Africanism. The movement recognises only three social forces in the world i.e. Caucasoids, Mongoloids and Afrinoids.[28]

According to Sobukwe, the first President of the PAC, in 1959:

> "the principle of African majority implies that it is the overwhelming African majority that will mould and shape the content of democracy."[29]

4.1.3 Racial capitalism - AZAPO/BCM

The emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's invoked a new breed of political awareness. The BCM can be referred to as Black psychological empowerment and a consolidating philosophy, since it ushered in a period of self-awareness and self-definition in the political sphere. The Soweto uprisings of 1976/77 was an event invoked by the BCM awareness and at which the BCM philosophy was given its final practical expression. A new breed of political and resistance activists emerged. South Africa was once more put on the front pages of world politics. The government could not suppress this new generation as it did with the PAC and the ANC in the 1960's. The

bannings of 1977/78 could not restore political stability as before.

From 1978/80 it became clear that the state's apparatus of coercion could not alleviate the violent tension. It became imperative for the government to embark on a new approach designed to win the "hearts and minds of the people on the gound"[30] The reform process was initiated by the government to address the grievances on the ground rather than to capitulate to the demands of the liberation movements. The reform process was an attempt by the government to retain control over change.

The process evolved into the 1983 constitutional dispensation, the legalisation of trade union activities, repeal of Laws of Marriage, the Amenities Act, and the Local Government Act. However, the 1976 riots, and subsequent riots, did not only trigger the reform process but it further revived the ranks of the PAC and the ANC in exile. The steady increase, from 1978-1988, of armed activity bears testimony to this revival. Inside

the country, the resistance movement consolidated its ranks by forming civil associations, youth organisations and trade unions. The United Democratic Front constituted the umbrella body of organisations of charterist tendencies, and the Azanian People's Organisation, that of the Black Consciousness tendencies.

The AZAPO/BCM tendencies believe that the social formation in SA is not only characterised by racism but also capitalism. The movement maintains that three forms are characteristic of the national and social problems, viz:

- Racial oppression
- Colonial conquest
- Capitalist exploitation[31]

The movement contends that apartheid is just one of the oppressive policies in our society but that the main problem is Racial Capitalism:

> "Our struggle for national liberation is directed against the historically evolved

> system of racism and capitalism which holds the people of AZANIA in bondage for the benefit of the small minority of the population... The struggle against Apartheid, therefore, is no more than the point of departure for our liberatory efforts."[32]

The BCM rejects the notion that South Africa is a colony, whether the ANC/SACP's colonialism of a special type, or the PAC's settler-colonialsim. The movement acknowledges that the colonial formation is inherent in the society and therefore it is a legacy of the past. However, this formation does not of necessity demand that the White people should be treated as a group distinct from other groups.

Proponents of this theory contend that the most fundamental aspect of this formation is the unique manner in which the structure of racial oppression, forged by colonial conquest, has interacted with the structure of capitalist exploitation which was produced by the dramatic transformation of the South African economy during the past century. According to John Saul this composition and its social

formation bears emphasis, that for extended periods racial hierarchisation and capitalist relations of production have "breathed fresh life into the racial hierarchy,"[33] reinforcing social as well as economic inequalities. The logical conclusion, according to the movement, is the establishment of socialism.

4.2 THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER RESOURCES

4.2.1 Sources of bargaining strength of the ANC

The ANC's power position needs an analysis of its own, given that it is the only liberation movement which has committed itself to negotiation with the government. Using Ron Kraybill's models on negotiations, the ANC'S present approach to negotiation resembles both the Traditional model and the Alternative negotiation model. The ANC and the government have both occupied distinct positions in relation to some demands, while at the same time they worked together or jointly to resolve common problems. Irrespective of the model in use, parties are still locked in the struggle for bargaining in the process. The ANC's position and, vice versa,

that of the government is characterized by the following:

4.2.1.1 The Anti-Apartheid Sentiment

Firstly, it should be noted that the ANC's social formulation of the problem in South Africa i.e. (CST), its model to achieve its objectives (NDR) and the basis of unity, (FC), are largely based on the Anti-Apartheid sentiment as an immediate objective. The sentiment is a source of power in the sense that both national and international opinion have been structured upon the assumption that apartheid is an inhuman system based on racial discrimination and therefore on a superior-inferior relationship, where Whites are perceived as a priviledged group over and above other racial groups, especially Blacks. The ANC built this power resource, not only within the country as a mobilizing element, but also outside and beyond the borders of the country. The internationalisation of the Anti-Apartheid sentiment has not only isolated the South African government

from the rest of the World Community, but it has also rendered the policy of apartheid a heresy.

The Anti-Apartheid sentiment is a legacy of colonial domination. The sentiment is largely perceived as an integral part of colonial expansion. International opinion opposed apartheid policies and seeks to secure its replacement by an internationally acceptable political establishment. Developments since 2 February 1990, have showed an international change of attitude towards South Africa.

The United States of America, Germany, Britain and some African states such as the Ivory Coast, Burundi and Zambia accepted the irreversibility of the reform process, even before the process of real constitutional negotiations had started.

However, such developments were based on the assumption that apartheid was to be replaced or at least, on the way out. Should the contrary be found to exist, it was expected that resistance against apartheid would be sustained.

The ANC struggle for a democratic transformation is therefore dependent upon the eradication of apartheid, and the establishment of a national democracy based on the principle of majority rule. Almost all nations of the world agree that apartheid is an inhuman political system and that it must be eradicated. However, they differ on the modus operandi for removing it. UN resolutions, condemning apartheid have been passed since 1961 when the government clamped down on resistance against apartheid. From 1961 to 1977 there was an intensification of apartheid legislation. In 1979 the Industrial Consolidation Act was passed, allowing Black people to form trade unions.[34] This was followed by the Constitution Act of 1983 which introduced a tricameral legislative system, the repeal of the Immorality Act and Amenities Act and many others as a catalyst to reform.

4.2.1.2 Sanctions and Disinvestment

By and large, the South African economy is dependent on foreign investment. Foreign investment in South Africa had increased from 1965 to 1980.

According to a survey by The Economist of the 30 March 1985, the EEC held 50.2% of investment in SA, followed by 25.1% held by North and South America,12.8% by the rest of Europe and 11.9% by others 11,9% (see Annexure 1).[35] This implies that foreign investment is central to the South African economic survival, and any call for disinvestment will in all respects destabilize the economy. Charts A, B, D of Annexure I indicate trends and corporate holdings in the South African economy.

The Sharpeville shooting of 1960 and the subsequent banning of national liberation movements, such as the ANC and PAC, could be referred to as the starting period for the sanctions and disinvestment call against South Africa. This call, however, was initially ignored by foreign capital and this is indicated by an increase, instead of a decrease, in foreign investment from 1960-1983 and an economic boom in 1982. Chart C indicates the way State

apparatus of power, such as the police, army, airforce and navy have been reinforced by foreign capital and that such State apparatus of power had in turn, reinforced the apartheid system.[36]

The sanctions and disinvestment lobby was aimed at weakening the financial base upon which the apartheid-government relied. Experience in the past had shown that, for as long as the economy had been relatively healthy, the White structure* had found it easy to ignore the plight of the oppressed and it was only when their financial base was hit that there had been talk of Black accommodation in the central organ of government. As a result of sanctions and disinvestment, South Africa has experienced a steady drain of capital, a collapse of the rand's value and this had resulted in an unfavourable balance of payments.[37]

There are problems inherent in the sanctions and disinvestment strategies, such as high unemployment rates, a destabilized economy and social conflict. Appendix 1-13 demonstrate measures taken by the international world from 1985 to 1986.[38]

To some degree sanctions have not succeeded in bringing the government down, as had been the case in Rhodesia, but sanctions have succeeded in conveying the message in a harsh way, to those against whom such measures are applied. While initially such measures have hardened attitudes, at the end of the day they became realities to be considered. As Lipton puts it:

> "The theory underlying the application of economic sanctions is that the costs they inflict on the target country will lead its rulers to react "rationally" by amending their policies so as to secure the removal of the penalties."[39]

The sanctions and disinvestment issues are basically outside the framework of the ANC's control; the international world having much influence on the issues. Most governments are divided on the issue of whether the lifting of sanctions and disinvestment should be used as elements of bargaining on behalf of liberation movements or

elements of encouragement for the initiatives taken by the South African government to further facilitate its reform programme. The EEC resolution on 14 december 1990, to lift sanctions could be viewed as a reward for the State President's initiatives in the reform process.[40] This had created discontentment within the ANC and was a blow to its bargaining strength, given the fact that it had taken the ANC almost 20 years to convince the European Community that sanctions were effective and therefore necessary.

4.2.1.3 Mass Mobilisation

The New Nation (December 14-20, 1990), a pro-ANC newspaper, intimated that:

> "Having suspended the armed struggle and now faced with the prospect of an erosion of sanctions, the only major weapon now left to the organisation will be its ability for mass mobilisation."[41]

Mass action had always been a central terrain of struggle in the ANC's Programme of Action. Mass action involves mass demonstrations, boycotts, industrial strikes and stayaways, defiance campaigns and passive resistance.

From 1912 to 1946 the ANC used delegations and deputations to convey their political demands to the government. It was after the formation of the ANC youth league in 1946 that the movement started to embark on radicalised programmes of action; mass mobilisation being the major aspect. The defiance campaigns of the 1950's saw the ANC occupying a central stage in the political life of South Africa.

Mass action reached its peak in 1960 when the ANC and PAC organised the Anti-Pass demonstrations throughout the country.[42] This culminated in the Sharpeville shootings of the 21 March 1960 and the subsequent bannings of the ANC and the PAC, the trial of ANC leadership and the crushing of Poqo and MK, the respective PAC and ANC military wings.[43] It was only from 1962 onwards that the struggle in South Africa was internationalised and calls for

sanctions intensified. However, from 1962 to 1976 political activism inside the country was almost nil.

The Black Consciousness Movement started to activate political awareness from 1968 onwards which erupted in mass student action and violence in 1976. From 1978 onwards, a period which preceded the legalisation of trade unions, the trade union movement became involved in mass industrial action, in some instances taking up political programmes. The normalisation of political activism, immediately after Mr F W de Klerk's presidential election in 1989, saw an increase in mass demonstrations and related mass actions.This took the form of mass defiance campaigns, marches to city centres and local level marches against high rents, rates and similar programmes.[44]

On 2 February 1990, the South African State President unbanned all political organisations, released most of the imprisoned leadership and opened the door for the exiles to return. This act by the State President was not a direct response to

such mass actions but a combination of all pressures exerted on the apartheid government and out of a need to reform. However, mass action could be said to be an element of bargaining during negotiations; its potential depends on mass participation by the people, without intimidation.

The willingness of the people to take to the streets, stayaways, boycotts or efforts to render the state ungovernable, and the steps taken by the government to remedy the situation, are indicative of the effectiveness of mass action. The reform process came out of the need to reconcile the aspirations of the Black people in particular, and the unacceptability of the apartheid government in general. The aspirations are however not necessarily those expressed by the ANC but by the general mood of the African people throughout years of resistance. The ANC represents a section of this mood.

> The ANC Consultative Conference on the 16 December 1990 reiterated its commitment to mass action, contrary to the contents and

spirit of the Pretoria Minute of which the organisation is a party. (see 4.3.3).[45]

4.3 The weakening positions of the National Liberation Movement

4.3.1 The Harare Declaration (HD)

The aspect of negotiation is central to all political conflicts. Negotiations in political conflicts are conducted with the sole aim of settling disputes between contending parties and in principle, the aspect of negotiating cannot be rejected. However, negotiations, per se, cannot be an arena of struggle, in as much as it is an arena for bargaining from established conditions of strength and power. If the party in the negotiating arena lacks strength or bargaining power, it is unlikely for it to hope to achieve bargaining power around a negotiating table.

The ANC is well-known for its commitment to negotiations or negotiated settlement. The commitment is the result of the need to find a

peaceful solution based on mutual understanding. However, disputes in politics are largely determined by the interplay of power resources. This is a central point in all political conflicts, but the Harare Declaration expresses the same ANC sentiment of the previous decades, a sentiment devoid of the centrality of power politics.

The HD was intended to mobilise international support and to isolate the South Africa government from the rest of the world. The document was adopted by the OAU AD-HOC COMMITTEE on Southern Africa on August 21 1989. The document stipulates five major points:

- The preamble.
- Statement of principle.
- Climate for negotiations.
- Guidelines to the process of negotiations.
- Programme of action.[46]

The last four points are of the utmost importance in that they provide both statements of principles and the procedure of arriving at the solution. The

statement of principles stipulates, among others, the following:

- A commitment to a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.
- Equality and common citizenship.
- The right to participate in the government and administration of the country.
- Freedom of association.
- an independent and non-racial judiciary.[47]

However, the process of negotiation was expected to commence once the following climate for negotiation had been created:

4.3.1.1 Release of all political prisoners and detainees

While political prisoners had been expected to be released unconditionally, this was not to be the case. The government and the ANC had difficulties in defining "political prisoners" under the South African conditions. The joint working group had to suspend and recall its

activities in an effort to arrive at a compromised solution. The government continued to issue conditional indemnities to exiles, and the ANC tentatively accepted, contrary to of the Harare Declaration.

4.3.1.2 The Lifting of all bannings and restricted organisations and people

This aspect was both, in content and spirit, accepted by the government. Since this was the first positive step by the government it threatened to recapture the initiative from the ANC.

4.3.1.3 The removal of troops from the townships

This could not be addressed from an ANC's point of view due to the intensity of violence prevailing at the time. The escalation of violence which the ANC failed to address, forced the movement to respond to the government's own programme. In view of the movement's attempt to put the blame on the government, it was equally responsible, in terms of

the Groote Schuur Minute's established principle of a joint commitment to peace. Paragraph 19.4 which calls for the ending of the state of emergency is largely related to paragraph 19.3 The lifting of the state of emergency, which sanctioned the deployment of troops in the townships, was dependent upon the scaling down of the state of violence. The ANC could not call upon the government to relinquish the state of emergency and the deployment of troops while it could not curb violence in the townships.

4.3.1.4 Cessation of political trials and political executions

Paragraph 19.5 calls for the cessation of political trials and executions. The joint working group established under the Pretoria Minute had to distinguish between political prisoners and political criminals. The government had a monopoly on the procedure and conditions of this aspect, in view of the fact that the issuing of indemnities to political prisoners was at the sole discretion of the government.

While the national liberation movement had hoped to retain the initiative and to sustain control of the process of negotiation, this had not been the case. The broad guidelines to the process of negotiations (Paragraph iv) had not lived up to expectations. The process did not follow the sequence established in the above paragraph, i.e. suspension of hostilities; establishment of principles; mechanism for drawing up of the constitution; the establishment of precedences for the behaviour of the international community; adoption of a new constitution; lifting of sanctions and membership to international and regional bodies.[48]

This sequence failed to grasp the realities of the conditions at play and the potentialities of the political forces in political conflicts. (see 4.2.1.2 p.16, last paragraph). The suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC was an isolated step away from the principle established in paragraph 21.1, which calls for the suspension of hostilities by both sides. In the first place, the government could not commit itself to a ceasefire since it never regarded itself at war with the ANC. The

government had always maintained that the ANC had to be liquidated or marginalised in one way or another, thus maintaining its significance to the equation.

Paragraph v was never accomplished altogether, in view of the contradictions on sanctions. In terms of the Harare Declaration, it was hoped that the ANC would call the tune and that the international community would be expected to respond likewise. This of course, could have been a strong bargaining strength for the movement, but most states seemed to respond in accordance with the momentum of change as effected by the government, contrary to the spirit of paragraph v as a whole.

The Harare Declaration did not address the power disparities between the contending parties, nor did it address the empowerment of the national liberation movement to put it in a bettter bargaining position.

4.3.2 The Groote Schuur Minute

On 4 May 1990 the Government and the ANC met for the first time after almost 30 years.[49] This was in accordance with the spirit established in the Harare Declaration by the ANC and the OAU. The government had by this time softened its attitudes towards the ANC in the sense that it had set no pre-conditions as before, preconditions such as that the ANC had to commit itself to peace before the government could talk to it, or that the ANC had to denounce violence before contact could be established. It would appear that the government had by this time realised that it could get this commitment by unconditinally meeting some aspects of the Harare Declaration, thus forcing the ANC to make some compromises on its stance.

The concept of "Commitment to peaceful means", started with Mr B J Vorster after the 1976 riots and Mr P W Botha carried it along with him in his career as State President. The Harare Declaration in a way, established a precedent which Mr F W de Klerk captured and sought commitment to peaceful means through contact with the ANC. A commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement is different from

commitment to a negotiated peaceful settlement. The former implies that contending parties must first commit themselves to peace and co-operate in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to peace before the process of serious negotiation, (i.e Constitutional negotiations) can begin. All aspects of force and violence must first cease, eg. armed struggle, mass mobilisation (which culminates in violence), war language, and all other kinds of violence.

On the other hand, commitment to a negotiated peaceful settlement does not of necessity demand that aspects of violence or force should stop. It implies that the process of negotiation must take place within an atmosphere of continued resistance. The process of negotiation in the latter stage is a direct product of constitutional settlement and not a by-product of the process.

The preamble of the Groote Schuur Minute commits both the ANC and the government to peaceful means without stripping the government of its right and

responsibility to maintain "law and order" and it reads thus:

> "The government and the ANC agree on a common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations."[50]

The general commitment to peace, as indicated above, does not only presume that the ANC and the government are principal actors on the political scene, it further and specifically calls upon the ANC leadership to

> "assist in bringing violence to an end and to take part in peaceful political negotiations."[51]

While the government was called upon to undertake specific steps to normalise political activism such as reviewing security legislation, lifting the state

of emergency, and establishing joint workshops, the state is also expected to maintain law and order and to retain coercive power. This has created problems in that the government had to lift the state of emergency in some areas and retain it in others in fulfilment of its responsibility as a government. The ANC on the other hand had problems in directly addressing areas of conflict on the ground least it antagonised its constituency, especially its youth, who do not understand the concepts of "joint commitment to peaceful means", and "commitment to peaceful negotiated settlement."

In the Groote Schuur Minute the ANC was called upon to join the government in creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiations in accordance with the Harare Declaration, when in actual fact the onus was upon the government to single-handedly meet the contents of the HD. The Minute was merely an objectification of the call by the government to the ANC to commit itself to peaceful means. All other measures in the Minute are preliminary steps necessary to facilitate the preamble. They could not

be said to be aspects from which the ANC bargained on the table. These steps are:

- the establishment of a joint working group,
- temporary immunity from prosecution
- reviewing existing security legislation,
- lifting the state of emergency,
- curbing violence and intimidation.[52]

4.3.3 The Pretoria Minute

The Groote Schuur Minute was followed by an increase in violence. The Sebokeng Carnage in March 1991 and subsequent violence in other areas threatened the process of negotiations. There are many reasons which could have caused this carnage. Among others that could be cited are:

- there was no substantiative grass roots feed-back by the ANC leadership to explain the implications and items of the Groote Schuur Agreement.

- different interpretations of the clauses in the document, by both the government and the ANC and of course other outsiders, led to mistrust and suspicions.

- while the ANC had jointly committed itself to peaceful means of resolving the political conflict, the movement went about calling for intensification of the struggle at all fronts, contrary to the terms in the preamble of the Groote Schuur Minute. This created a contradiction in terms.

- political rivalry among exra-parliamentary groups increased significantly,(especially between the ANC and Inkatha), partly due to the ANC's approach of isolating Inkatha and Kwazulu, while at the same time forging links with other homeland leaders(especially the Transkei military leadership).[53]

The significance of the Pretoria Minute lies in paragraph three which implies that:

> "In the interest of moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful political settlement and in the context of the agreements reached, the ANC announced that it was now suspending all armed action with immediate effect. As a result of this, no further armed actions and related activities by the ANC and its milirary wing Umkhonto-we-Sizwe will take place."[54]

The position adopted by the ANC was in line with the "joint commitment" established in the groote Schuur Minute.

The Pretoria Minute further stipulated a time-table for the return of exiles; something that was significant in view of maintaining the momentum for the process of negotiation to continue unabated. A working group was set up to facilitate the definition of "political prisoners" and to work out a programme for the release of political prisoners. However, the working group's task was hampered by:

- differing interpretations of the Pretoria Minute document, its spirit and its objectives. While the government perceived the Pretoria Minute as a joint decision-making programme with the ANC, the ANC, on the other hand, saw it as an undertaking by the government to follow up the contents of the Harare Declaration, failing to understand that both the Groote Schuur Minute and the Pretoria Minute had liquidated the HD by introducing "a joint commitment" principle.

- defining "political prisoners" is a very difficult task in view of the fact that definitions exclude others in the process and limit the scope of reference. It is as difficult to class Strydom, who shot pedestrians in Pretoria at random, as it is with Zondo, putting a bomb in a restaurant in Durban and killing innocent people.

The working group has since been aborted by the ANC out of frustration for its lack of progress,

contrary to paragraph three of the Minute which commits both parties to do everything in their power to bring about a peaceful solution as quickly as possible. Furthermore the introduction of the clause noted that no further armed action and related activities by the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto-we-Sizwe, would take place.[55] This included mass action as a related activity, because it had the potentia to create social disorder if not implemented properly and peacefully. The spirit established in the Pretoria Minute was that all parties involved in the conflict had to cease engaging in programmes which had the potential to run contrary to the joint commitment of creating a conducive atmosphere to peaceful negotiations.

After a meeting between Mr Mandela and President de Klerk, the activities of the joint working group were revived after a stalemate of almost six months. The two leaders had to reactivate the process of negotiations and on February 12, 1991 the group reached its historic agreement on several issues related to the armed activities. This included the following terms:

- A clearer definition of the aspect of suspension of armed action was reached, namely.

  i) that there would be no attacks by means of armaments, firearms, explosives or incendiary devices;
  ii) that infiltration of men and material would cease;
  iii) that the creation of underground structures would be stopped;
  iv) that statements inciting violence would cease;
  v) that threats of armed action and training inside South Africa would stop.

- The group further agreed that a democratic process was in principle devoid of any resort to the use of force. This consequently implied that no party or movement should have a private army.

- The group noted that the suspension of armed action and related activities was based on the

presumption that the process would lead to a situation where there would be no return to armed action.

- It distinguished between Umkhonto-we-Sizwe (MK) and the ANC as separate entities. This implied that MK had to relinquish its armed activities which largely constituted its very existence.

- As a matter of formality the group agreed to keep in check the activities of the security forces without disarming them. This was a significant acknowledgement by the ANC of the basic responsibility of the South African security forces, i.e. maintaining law and order, irrespective of the political and ideological orientation of those forces.[56]

The general implications of the Pretoria Minute and in particular the activities and agreements of the joint working group appeared to be major concessions made by the ANC which could amount to capitulation. Significantly the concept of a "joint working group"

had been successfully applied as established by Krybill's concept, as explained in chapter one.

4.4 ASSESSMENT

4.4.1 Power disparities between the ANC and the Government

Van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh contend that the pressure exerted on the White government will not of necessity induce the government to capitulate to change as dictated by the Liberation Movements. The limited pressure will only compel the government to determine, what they term, "the tempo and nature of change", unless there is a large-scale foreign intervention of some type. They both maintain that the government has enough resources to contain the internal and external pressure. They differentiated between two types of options:

- the politics of siege in which the White establishment has control over change.

- the politics of negotiations as an effort to seek consent and thereby legitimacy. This implies that:

> "Unilateral White decision-making is untenable and attempts to establish a common declaration of intent with Blacks in terms of which compromises can be negotiated"[57]

Although Van Zyl Slabbert and Welsh seek to treat the two options separately, the two options are actually mutually reinforcing. The politics of White control over change and the politics of consent have been applied concurrently as circumstaces demanded. The government has used coercive governmental action to suppress unrest in the country whilst on the other hand it has conducted talks with the African National Congress. The Pretoria Minute was conducted under siege during the atmosphere of the Sebokeng shootings. The "iron fist"[58] measures on the Reef, against the riotous

conditions which involved ANC supporters and Inkatha are examples in point.

Negotiations to resolve or seek a solution are part of any political conflict. In principle the aspect of negotiating cannot be rejected. Somewhere along the line, it becomes necessary and inevitable for one to negotiate. However, in political conflicts the timing and the process of negotiation itself determine the nature of the solution. A commitment to a negotiated peaceful settlement is vastly different from a commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement. The latter implies that contending parties must first commit themselves to peace and co-operatively create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. All forms of violence must cease,in order to enable the parties to thrash out problems within an atmosphere of peace. On the other hand, a negotiated peaceful settlement does not of necessity demand that aspects of force and resistance should cease. It implies that the aspects of negotiations must take place within an atmosphere of continued resistance. It is in this context that the forms of bargaining in political conflicts become relevant.

Welsh and Slabbert define the politics of negotiation in the South African context as an acceptance or acknowledgement of the untenability of unilateral decision-making by the White establishment and in which an attempt has to be made to seek an alternative constitutional dispensation through consultation with, in particular, liberation movements or some sections of liberation movements. Both authors distinguish brtween two types of the politics of negotiation, namely:

- Negotiating capitulation which implies that those in control of political power have drawn a distinction between White survival and the monopoly and control of political power.

When the power base of the ruling class, in this case the White establishment and its economic infrastructure, has been weakened in such a way that continued existence of the status quo threatens the survival of the very White establishment a stage is reached, where the process of negotiation becomes a

matter of formality for the transfer of power to the majority rather than power sharing between contending parties. It is in this context that the conflict in Zimbabwe was resolved.

- Negotiating for participation implies that there is a balanced power position and the likelihood of one party dominating the other is diminished. The process of negotiation in this case is concerned with the sharing of power. But it is only possible when both parties see the limitations of their continued intransigence to change.

Ronnie Kasrils of the South African Communist Party maintains that a party to negotiation must seize the initiative and be able to sustain what he calls a "strategic initiative." He contends that a strategic initiative implies two aspects, namely:

- the ability to relate the issues that are being struggled over to the strategic goal of the

movement. Accordingly, the strategic goal is the transfer of power to the people.

- the ability to maintain the initiative i.e. whether the movement is on the offensive and able to determine the timing and the terms of the fight.[59]

Kasrils further states that:

> "the side that has the initiative is able to determine when and on which issues to go onto the offensive, and where to retreat in order to build or protect its forces. The side that loses the initiative will be continually forced to respond to the actions of the other, and never be able to advance and win new positions.[60]

4.4.2 Peaceful negotiation and settlement

The entire strategy of the African National Congress, and the national liberation movements generally, has suffered what is called "Dependency Syndrome". Their strategy has evolved through a process of dependency similar to the Namibian struggle. As indicated before, national liberation movements have pursued four terrains of struggle:

- economic sanctions
- underground operations and mass mobilisation
- armed struggle.
- international isolation

The first two terrains of struggle derive their effectiveness from international sentiment and support. While the culture of isolation was successfully implemented against the South African government, national liberation movements, particularly the ANC pursued ideological strategies based not ony on ideological ambiguity, but also on unpredictable international cohesion and

understanding. An example of this is the reaction of the international community on sanctions, both economic and cultural, which were being lifted unilaterally by individual states. Whilst the ANC had hoped that sanctions would be lifted on terms laid down by it, this had not been the case. Individual states were laying down conditions quite independent from the ANC's programme as laid down in the Harare declaration.

The ideological ambiguity of the Freedom Charter and lack of cohesion in the entire ideological approach of the ANC on economic issues, had obscured the objective of the movement. A "non-racial and democratic South Africa" had no meaning unless spelt out in clearer terms under the prevailing subjective and objective conditions of South Africa. This ambiquity as to the nature of "mixed economy", the nature of the government and the future of "minorities" needed more explanations and deliberations. In view of such ideological ambiquities a large, important, and strategically well-placed section of the South African society

remained uncertain and hesitant to change, whilst it had the potential to do so.

The armed struggle, on the other hand, was not successful, especially in the SACP's point of view of overthrowing the government. However, the symbolic effect of the armed struggle had placed the ANC in a strategic position in the general liberation struggle in SA. In the struggle for power the SA government had in fact, disarmed the liberation movement by removing apartheid from the statute books and diffused institutionalised apartheid which constituted the primary objective of the ANC. The Pretoria Minute committed the ANC to the suspension of the armed struggle. Symbolic as it may be, its significance cannot be overlooked.

FOOTNOTES

1. Africa Perspective No..23, 1983. p.76
2. Ibid p.77
3. Ibid p.77
4. Ibid p.77
5. South Africa - no Middle Road: The theory of the South African Revolution, p.121 (undated)
6. Ibid p.122
7. Africa Perspective No.23, 1983, p.76
8. Ibid p.79-80
9. Hudson P. : Images of the future and strategies in the present: The Freedom Charter and the South African Left 261 (undated (Transformation no.3).
10. Hudson p. Ibid p.262-267
11. Ibid.p.267
12. Slovo J : An Umsebenzi discussion pamphlet (The SACP, undated) p.38
13. Ibid.p.5
14. Ibid.p.5

15. Freedom Charter Document published by the People's Congress of 1955

16. Hudson P. Ibid.p.270

17. Slovo J. Ibid.p.5

18. Hudson P. The Freedom Charter and the Theory of the South African Revolution (Transformation Number 1).

19. Hudson P. Ibid.p.260

20. The PAC Manifesto of 1959, p.3

21. Ibid.p.4

22. Ibid.p.4

23. Memorandum submitted to the UN Expert Group on South Africa by the PAC of South Africa (partially dated December 1959) p.1

24. Ibid.p.5

25. Sobukwe M R : Opening Address of the Pan African Congress. 1959, p.3

26. Ibid.p.2 (Memorandum)

27. Ibid.p.2 (Memorandum)

28. The PAC Manifesto of 1959

29. Sobukwe M R Ibid.p.13

30. Soul John Ibid.p.1

31. South John Ibid.p.1

32. The Azanian Manifesto (undated Pamphlet)

33. South John Ibid.p.1

34. The Industrial Consolidation Act of 1979

35. Frank Talk (undated Journal)

36. Ibid.p.16

37. Merle Lipton : Sanctions and South Africa - The Dynamics of economic isolation. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No.1119, January 1988, UK) p.6

38. Ibid.p.6

39. Ibid.p.6

40. Resolution taken during the Commonwealth Meeting on the 14 December 1990

41. The New Nation. 14-20 December 1990

42. Tom Lodge. Black Resistance from 1945-1980

43. Ibid.p.21

44. Marches took place throughout 1990

45. ANC Consultative Conference Resolution 16 December 1990.

46. The Harare Declaration 1989 (undated Document)

47. Ibid.p.1

48. Ibid.p.2

49. The Groote Schuur Minute , 4 May 1990. This was the result of such a meeting

50. Ibid.p.133

51. Ibid.p.133
52. Ibid.p.133
53. Personal Assessment
54. Pretoria Minutes 06 August 1990
55. Ibid.p.136
56. Sowetan 18 February 1991
57. WIP no. 72 February 1991 Article by Van Zyl Slabbert and Welsh
58. Ibid.p.11
59. Ibid.p.9
60. Ibid.p.10

CHAPTER 5

THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS A SOURCE OF BARGAINING STRENGTH

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is intended to incorporate armed struggle as a common feature of the underlying element of conflict in Southern Africa. In almost all Southern African states the armed struggle evolved in one way or another, with the consequential effects that post-colonial establishments have suffered the defects thereof i.e. banditry, dissident groupings, crime and instability. The armed struggle in all the states under discussion, did not only facilitate the bargaining process during negotiation but it has also had its limitations in political settlements, the results of which are the continuation of violence by dissident groups such as UNITA in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique, the destruction of the economy, weak post-colonial administrations, corruption, and nepotism.

In South Africa, the armed conflict did not reach the level of destruction in which the armed struggle had become the primary means to attain the desired goal. The potential, though, existed. As to whether this was going to succeed or not, depended on circumstances. As it is the case in all armed conflicts, the level of the armed struggle affects the shifting of bargaining power in favour of one party or parties.

5.2 ARMED STRUGGLE AND POWER IN POLITICAL CONFLICTS

The purpose of this section is not to conceptualize on war or armed struggle, but to evaluate the impact of a state of war or armed struggle on political conflict. Basically the centre of the investigation is the armed struggle, and the concept of war is not taken to mean full-scale or conventional war. In the Southern African political conflicts, guerilla wars or armed struggles never reached the stage of conventional war, unlike in Angola where a state of conventional war or civil war started. Most armed struggles in Southern Africa were aborted before they could reach their conclusive stage of full-

scale war. An armed struggle may be undertaken to achieve the following objectives:

- To render the status quo ungovernable, difficult to maintain and costly to sustain, with the object of forcing those in power to negotiate and settle for an alternative, acceptable arrangement. If those in power agree to negotiate, the armed struggle is said to have achieved its objectives and may be suspended, or a ceasefire agreed upon. However, the suspension or cessation of armed hostilities depend on the outcome of the process of negotiation.

- To demolish the established order through building up a revolutionary atmosphere and overthrowing the status quo. The armed struggle in this case is a primary means in the terrain of struggle. The underlying principle is that continued resistance may build up to an armed revolution and may lead to a transfer of political power.

The chapter on conceptual levels of understanding described political conflicts in respect of which the aspects of conflict, bargaining, and settlement were demonstrated. However, what was not mentioned was the fact that political conflicts sometimes encompass what is called "armed conflict". Armed conflict is another level of the conflict and it involves armed struggle or war. Usually this is referred to as the highest level or expression of conflict. According to Malinowski, war is:

> "an armed conflict, between two (sometimes more than two) independent political units, by means of organized military force."[1]

Armed conflict in political conflicts has been a usual or common feature of Southern African political conflicts. There were armed conflicts in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. It has affected the bargaining process and settlements. The most outstanding examples of the impact of armed conflict in political conflicts and settlement are the armed struggle in Angola; Mozambique, and

Zimbabwe. In Angola, the armed struggle can be said to have had consequential effects which did not of necessity resolve the conflict. In Zimbabwe, the armed struggle achieved its relative objective by strengthening the negotiating position of national liberation movements during the Lancaster-House conference. The situation in Mozambique was largely facilitated by the Portuguese coup and the velocity of the armed struggle at home.

Armed conflict, or armed struggle in particular has both advantages and disadvantages in the process of bargaining negotiation and political settlements. One major advantage is that it may strengthen the position of those involved in the process of negotiating, depending, of course, on the performance of the guerillas in the case of the armed struggle or the military in the case of the government. The level of the armed conflict will determine the level of compromise or the choices available in settling the dispute. The purpose of armed conflict is to reshuffle the balance of power and to put one of the negotiants in an unfavourable

position, thus rendering him powerless or putting him in a weaker position.

An armed struggle cannot be waged in isolation; international support is as important as all other factors. Funding, provision of weapons, food, clothing and medical facilities are as important as seeking symbolic support from international public opinion. According to Mao-Tse-Tung, as quoted by Paresh, for an insurgent movement to succeed in an armed struggle against a militarily superior, economically powerful and politically established government, foreign support is most essential.[2] Accordingly, foreign support may take the form of:

- provision of rear base facilities:
- provision of food, clothing and medicines;
- provision of training facilities, equipment and ammunition;
- political support;
- technical facilities such as communication facilities.

According to Von Clausewitz, the aim of war is to disarm the enemy or to put it in a situation which is more oppressive than the sacrifice which it undertakes.[3] An armed conflict is undertaken to achieve a political objective which could not be attained through a process of peaceful or diplomatic means. Clausewitz maintains that a political object is the motive of the war:

> "War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."[4]

5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

In Rhodesia, several attempts were made to resolve the conflict through conferences and consultations between the British government and the Rhodesian government but such attempts failed. Even after the nationalist movement took up arms against the Smith government in Rhodesia, attempts were made to resolve the conflict politically, rather than militarily (Chatper Two).. As Paresh Pandya puts it:

> "When all such attempts had repeatedly failed to resolve the situation through conferences; the Black nationalist movements perceived the light at the end of the tunnel to have been extinguished. They therefore resolved to take up arms in earnest."[5]

When Zanu was banned in 1964, after four months of its legal existence, the central committee formed a Revolutionary Council (Dare-Re-Chimurenga) to execute an "armed revolutionary struggle." In 1966, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was formed. Recruits were sent to China and Ghana for military training and on their return they were sent to Rhodesia to engage the Rhodesian Army in combat. From 1966-1971 the military wing of ZANU, i.e. ZANLA, suffered several military set-backs against the Rhodesian army. The nationalist movement's armed struggle during that period, was more symbolic than concrete and effective. Several reasons could be given for the initial failures of

the armed struggle, of which the following are the most important:

- the guerillas lacked the support of the population they were intended to liberate,

- there was little consolidation of armed activities among the National Liberation Movements and their armies played a more symbolic role than to engage the Rhodesian force with the sole object of overthrowing it,

- the nationalist movement was highly divided and more time was spent on squabbles, faction fighting and allegations and counter-allegations,

- the armed struggle was not yet perceived as a primary and only means to overthrow the established order.

During and after 1971, the Dare-Re-Chimurenga started a new programme after having analysed the conditions on the ground. They sent trained

guerillas to the population, to politicise and mobilize them rather than to engage the Rhodesian defence force. For almost two years, ZANLA forces were avoiding direct contact with the Rhodesian forces in an effort to target the morale of the population. The Mgagao Declaration, which was signed by disillussioned guerillas over the actions of the African National Council (ANC) in Rhodesia, constituted a milestone in the development of the armed struggle. It ushered in a spirit of commitment to the armed struggle as the primary means of struggle. In its concluding remarks the document said that:

> "If the OAU, Tanzania and Mozambique felt unable to support the armed struggle in Zimbabwe, we shall kindly request to be deported back to Zimbabwe where we shall start from throwing stones... the weapons we shall get from the enemy, food we shall get from our masses of the people who have always supported our armed struggle."[6]

The Mgagao further established the leadership of Robert Mugabe.[7] It stated that Mugabe was an outstanding member of the executive who had demonstrated his commitment to the struggle, and he was the only man to be entrusted with the leadership of the movement. When Mr Mugabe took over the leadership, the liberation movement was in disarray, fragmented and unco-ordinated. Mr Mugabe and his colleagues embarked on intensifying the armed struggle which essentially changed the bargaining position of the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster Conference, albeit to a limited extent.

5.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The armed struggle is viewed by both the ANC and the SACP, as another terrain of struggle which emerged out of the "objective" conditions in South Africa which made it difficult for liberation movements to continue pursuing non-violent means; that all avenues of peaceful settlement were closed down by the government. The ANC/SACP Alliance adopted the armed struggle as a complementary form to augment other terrains of struggle such as underground

operations, mass action and mobilization, isolation of the apartheid state and economic sanctions. The Alliance cites a number of reasons which compelled it to subject armed struggle to a level of complementary rather than a primary aspect of struggle. Among them are:

- the lack of an extensive area of classical guerilla terrain,
- the absence of a Black peasantry in most of the countryside,
- the separation of residential areas between Whites and Blacks,
- lack of friendly borders,
- the great mobility and fire-power of the South African military force
- the imperialist support of the South African government.[8]

The SACP believes that the armed struggle can gradually gain momentum through mass action.

> "In mass action, the people create the conditions in which the armed struggle can

> be grounded. It is in these conditions that guerillas can better survive, operate and work among the people."[9]

Initially, the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe was aimed at consolidating the struggle against apartheid, rather than to usurp power from the state. Nelson Mandela stated that the decision came after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation and that it would be wrong and unrealistic for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the government met such actions with force.[10] The adoption of the armed struggle by the ANC/SACP Alliance was a reactionary measure aimed at forestalling violence by the apartheid state. Its ultimate objective was to create an atmosphere whereby non-violent means could be restored.

There is however, a difference between the ANC's approach to the armed struggle and the intentions of the SACP's involvement in its conduct. The SACP'S "Path to Power" clearly illustrates the party's objective to usurp power through the armed struggle.

According to the SACP, an interplay of forces must lead to a revolution which will result in a seizure of power. The party contends that "a consequent crisis" must first arise when subjective conditions merge with objective conditions to cause a revolutionary atmosphere. These subjective conditions involve the build-up of nationwide popular ferment, resistance at all levels of organization, and the presence of people's combat formations. The objective conditions involve the weakening of the "enemy" by circumstances such as deterioration in the economy, intensified external measures, massive vacillation and divisions within the ranks of the power bloc, self-wounding enemy initiatives.[11] According to the SACP

> "the development of a crisis... will not in itself lead to an "enemy" collapse and the people's victory. The seizure of power will only be assured if the revolutionary moment... The call for an insurrection can only be placed on the immediate agenda of the struggle

> if and when a specific revolutionary moment has emerged."[12]

A combination of mass action, working class industrial action, mass defiance, escalation of revolutionary combat, intensified international pressure, a situation of ungovernability, a deteriorating economy, growing demoralization, division, vacillation and confusion are all said to converge and create a revolutionary atmosphere and an insurrectionary breakthrough.

On the other hand, the ANC views the armed struggle as a facilitating measure aimed at forcing the government towards a negotiated settlement. This is in line with the ultimate objective of the ANC, i.e. the emergence of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR), the first stage in the SACP's strategic objective. The object of the armed struggle at this stage (NDR) is largely supportive and symbolic.

According to the Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe issued on the 16 December 1961:

> "The time comes in the life of any nation when there remains only two choices; submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom."[13]

> The position of MK in relation to its stated objectives is to defend the resistance movement and pressurize the government to submit to its objectives of liberty, democracy and equal rights.[14]

While Umkhonto we Sizwe was initially formed by individual members of the ANC as an independent organization, its communist influence has gradually changed the original objectives of restoring peaceful means, shunned by the National Party government during the 1960's. Most communist commentators within the ANC speak of the usurpation of power, or transfer of power should such

circumstances arise. The SACP document "Path to Power" clearly propagates the use of insurrection, sabotage and armed revolution as primary means under conducive circumstances to overthrow the state and its apparatus of power. In view of the fact that Umkhonto we Sizwe has of late largely been under direct control of the SACP and under its direct ideological influence two agendas of the ANC organization emerged:

- The object of restoring peaceful means for the settlement of the conflict. It would appear that under the Pretoria Minute, the suspension of the armed struggle was largely motivated by the State President speech of 2 February 1990 which was interpreted as a milestone of restoring peaceful means of settlement.

- The object of usurping power from the government or transfer of power either through democratic means or through revolution.

The military strength of the ANC, however, was met by the changing nature the SADF'S role in diffending the state.This started emerging

after 1974. Before 1974, the role of the SADF was largely of a symbolic nature and complementary in relation to public affairs. The force perceived itself as custodian of the integrity of the Republic of South Africa within a regional content. The role was defined in traditional terms as a remedy of last resort in cases of insurgency and a deterrent against foreign threat. Most riot related incidents of the 1960's were handled by the South African Police Force. Most of the tasks of the SADF were related to maintaining the borders of South Africa and quelling insurgency from neighbouring states such as its involvement in the Rhodesian conflict and the conflict in Angola and Namibia.

However, when the independence of Mozambique and Angola took place in 1974, it gradually changed the strategic role of the Defence Force, both in conventional and in insurgency needs. The presence of 50 000 Cubans in Angola and the Marxist-Leninist Government of Mozambique increased the need to modernize and re-equip conventional forces and to strengthen the insurgency forces, to cope with the

launching of "large-scale pre-emptive and punitive raids against guerilla bases in neighbouring countries.[15]

The coming to power of Mr P W Botha as Prime Minister in 1978 resulted in the emergence of securocrats to public political affairs. Mr P W Botha had long entrenched himself in the military ranks while he was still Minister of Defence from 1966. He had made significant changes in his department, elevated young military officials to senior positions and when he became the Prime Minister, he reviewed the state Security Council and elevated it to a top decision-making body in the name of "Total onslaught." Joseph Hanlon contends that:

> "The concept of total onslaught equates the 'red peril' with the "black peril" and defence of apartheid with defence of Western Christian values. This formulation of the problem has two important advantages for white South Africa. On the one hand, all criticism of

> apartheid can be dismissed as communist-inspired. On the other hand, it allows South Africa to demand that the West support it as a bastion against communism, despite any distaste for apartheid. When the West attacks apartheid it only aids Moscow."[16]

The concept of 'total onslaught' reinforced the idea of the involvement of the military in top decision-making processes of government.The State Security Council (SSC) tasks ware perceived as important in the light of the escalation of violence in Black townships from 1984 - 1986.

The capacity of the present government to dislodge itself from power, and its capacity to be a vehicle for change - depend largely on the security network it commands. According to Berger and Godsell the composition of the SADF (South African Defence Force) consists of 430 000 full-time, part-time and paramilitary personnel; 62 000 men and women of the SAP (South African Police), 17 000 reserves with an expansion of about 80 000 in a few years. (Sunday

Times 31 May 1987). There are three intelligence agencies, namely, the Security Police; the National Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence. The State Security Council (SSC) is the central organ which co-ordinates security apparatus of the state in collaboration with Inter-departmental Committees and Joint Management Centres.[17]

In comparison with the military strength of the two major liberation movements, the ANC and the PAC, South Africa appears to be enjoying the upper hand. For instance, the ANC is alleged to command roughly 10 000 men and according to Berger and Godsell an estimate of 6 000 is reasonable. These estimates however do not include potentially trained people inside the country. The PAC military strength has been difficult to assess, except, that it is smaller than the ANC'S.Of the utmost importance in the military strength of any liberation movement is the capacity and capability of a small well-trained military movement to gradually build up an atmosphere conducive to a full-scale guerilla war, and ultimately armed revolution. "Path to Power" illustrates the potentiality of such a situation

arising, given the right circumstances. However, the racial composition of the population and concessions from the government to Blacks especially the reform process, have neutralized the emergence of a revolutionary climate.[18]

5.5 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN SA

International support for the struggle in SA, particularly the armed struggle, could be divided into three parts:

- Support emanating from western governments/ bodies/ institutions. Most funding, coming from Western institutions and bodies have had strings attached. Almost all funds from institutions such as the World Council of Churches, Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Denmark) were directed towards medical care, education and administrative needs of the national liberation movements.

- The support provided by African States. The meagre resources available in African states

have had limited impact on the armed struggle. Most neighbouring African states had provided rear bases to liberation movements' armed struggle and sanctuary to the leadership of such movements.

- Assistance provided by communist and socialist States. Socialist states such as East Germany the Soviet Union, China, Libya, Ghana provided ammunition and training facilities for recruits.[19]

5.6 ASSESSMENT

The conditions in South Africa ares generally seen as not being conducive to any armed struggle. This general belief is largely based on unsubstantiated evidence since Eugene Nyati, a political economist pointed out that guerilla wars are even fought in desert areas and that South Africa cannot be an exception to the rule. The objective situation therefore, is that the ANC, with its armed struggle, had all the necessary assistance provided to national liberation movements and that it failed to

consolidate these resources to the fullest in order to engage the South African government in a serious guerilla war. A result of this failure was the weakening of its fighting capacity, thus, weakening its bargaining position on negotiations. However, the symbolic presence of its armed forces serves as a matter of concern to the process of negotiations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rangarajan L N : The Limitation of Conflict : A Theory of Bargaining and Negotiation. (Croom Helm, London, 1985) p.19
2. Paresh Pandya : Mao Tse-Tung and Chemurenga. (Skotaville Publishers, Braamfontein, 1988) p.191
3. Clausewitz, C : On War. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1968) p.5
4. Clausewitz, C : Ibid.p.2
5. Paresh Pandya : Ibid. p.3
6. Martin D. and Johnson P : The Struggle for Zimbabwe. (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981). p.201
7. Martin and Johnson : Ibid, p.202
8. The South African Communist Party : Path to Power (Programme of the SACP adopted at the Seventh Congress, 1989), p.28.

9. The South African Communist Party : Ibid p.129

10. Francis Meli : A History of the ANC: South Africa belongs to us. (Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1988), p.1146

11. The South African Communist Party : Ibid p.129

12 The South African Communist Party : Ibid p.30

13. Francis Meli : Ibid p.214

14. Francis Meli : Ibid p.215

15. Jaster R S : South Africa's Narrowing Options. (IISS, Philadelphia London, 1980), p.27-28

16. Jaster, R C : Ibid p.8

17. Jaster, R C : Ibid p.29

18. Francis Meli : Ibid p.147

19. Paresh Pandya : Ibid p.3

CHAPTER 6

THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS IN MOTION

The process of transition in South Africa was started long before the unbanning of political organizations and the release of political prisoners. Basically the reform process was initiated by Mr B J Vorster and it was carried out by Mr P W Botha and effectively implemented by Mr F W de Klerk. However, the reform process did not only liberalise policy options of the ruling party and its structures, but it also affected and transformed the struggle waged by national liberation movements. The objectives of change were to reconcile the history of conquest, of containment and the history of reconciliation.

6.1 The Reform Process

Political strife in South Africa and the apartheid system had led to the formation of many liberation movements, the ANC, the SACP, PAC, BCMA, AZAPO and the New Unity Movement. Some of these

organizations were banned in the 1960's and their leadership imprisoned.

However, the apartheid system was waning in the process of democratization. This process started during B J Vorster's term of office. Although Vorster did not concretize the reform process, his new approach,his willingness to constructively discuss regional issues with neighbouring states, his involvement in the Zimbabwe conflict, the detente of the early 70's and his willingness to enter into direct conversations with Blacks, Indians and Coloureds slowly began to manifest itself. Under Mr P W Botha the process of consultation led to contact with Blacks, Indians and Coloureds.[1] Mr P W Botha then went to the extent of visiting Nelson Mandela in prison, something which was not typical of the Afrikaner leadership.

In a speech, which seemed to have impressed the world and some people in South Africa, he said:

> "We are moving in a changing world, we must adapt otherwise we shall die."[2]

He went on in a more liberal and somewhat realistic tone, saying that:

> "... the moment you start oppressing people... they fight back... We must acknowledge people's rights and ... make ourselves free by giving to other in a spirit of justice what we demand for ourselves."[3]

Mr PW Botha undertook to repeal petty apartheid laws, such as the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, as well as the Pass Laws.

> In 1983 a new constitution was enacted, the 1983 Constitution Act No.110. This Act introduced for the first time, parliamentary representation for Coloureds and Indians with a separate House of Representatives and a House of Delegates respectively. Notwithstanding its shortcomings by excluding Blacks, the constitutional dispensation reflected a step towards democratization. The Tricameral

Parliament, however, maintained White control in many respects. In an article on, "The Political impact of the rise of mass militancy in South Africa," it is mentioned that the government did not rule out the possibility of adding a fourth Chamber to Parliament prior to the referendum.

Harry Oppenheimer summarized the consequences of the proposed tricameral system by saying that it was a step backwards. He said it should not surprise the White community when Black people bitterly resent and universally condemn the introduction of that constitution entirely. Oppenheimer further pointed out that :

> "...the advantages of Coloured and Indian representation in Parliament is...to be bought at the cost of further alienation of the Blacks...the proposed constitution will not bring the solution."[5]

Mr Botha's intention, therefore, was to take Coloureds and Indians into Parliament: (178 Whites,

85 Coloureds and 45 Indians). This parliamentary arrangement did not only bar Black people from direct representation but it also allowed no chance for the Coloureds and Indians to out-vote Whites in Parliament.[6]

The 1983 Constitution achieved very little in terms of addressing the real problem of participation of the Black people in the controlling organ of government. However, the process of reform created anxiety, not only amongst Blacks but even among White people. When the constitution was established, Black people consolidated themselves against it and formed what was then called the United Democratic Front[7], a conglomeration of civic, youth, professional, workers and community organizations.[7] Its mission was to oppose the tricameral system and to make it unworkable. From 1984 to 1986 there was an escalation of township violence and inter-organisational fighting. This was the result of the frustration and despair among Blacks.

In view of the escalation of violence the state security network was intensified. For the first time since 1960, under State President Botha, the military was brought into the political arena. Security management systems were implemented to monitor township violence and to identify grievances on the ground with the view of attending to them before they spiked violence, and to clamp down on political activists. That was the time when the international sanctions against South Africa had reached the apex[8] .

Mr P W Botha could not politically survive the heavy sanctions against his government, the ungovernable people in the townships, the extra-legal activities of the liberation movements, the illegal activities of the right wingers, the disappointing end of the Namibian issue and the pulling out of foreign investors.

On his return to office after his illness, Mr P W Botha brought, to both the government and the National Party, a big surprise. The surprise was separating the ruling party leadership from the State Presidency. He did so by resigning his powers

and position as the leader of the National Party, while at the same time retaining his powers and position as the State President.

Seemingly, that move was not welcomed by the National Party. F W de Klerk was elected as the new National Party leader after which there seemed to exist a tense atmosphere within the cabinet. It was not long before Botha realized that there were caucuses being held, without his knowledge, by members of the National Party executive, most of whom were members of the cabinet.

That modus operandi was maintained until the climax was reached, when De Klerk visited Lusaka, Zambia, for talks with that country's President, without the consent of P W Botha - the South African State President! (The Head-quarters of the African National Congress, among other things, was in Lusaka). Mr Botha called an emergency cabinet meeting in Cape Town. That evening, after the emergency cabinet meeting, Botha resigned[10].

After Mr P W Botha's resignation, F W de Klerk was elected as the new State President of the Republic of South Africa. Immediately after he came to office, a complete about-turn of the government policy was implemented. De Klerk, among other things, unbanned all political organizations and released some political prisoners, among them Walter Sisulu. De Klerk's speedy reform process reached a climax when he released Rolihlahla Nelson Mandela unconditionally. (Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki were among those who were sentenced to life imprisonment on 11.06.1963 at the Rivonia Trial)[11].

The Harare Declaration, the Groote Schuur Minute and the Pretoria Minute are, inter alia, the components of the preamble leading to peaceful negotiations. In response to the resolutions established under the above-mentioned documents, the government lifted the state of emergency, "depoliticised" the security forces, opened the way for exiles to return under established procedures and conditions, and undertook to repeal the Land Acts of 1936 and 1913, the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas

Act.[12] The ANC, on the other hand, suspended the armed struggle (the only machinery under its direct command).[13]

Donavoir Marais describes the movement of current democratization as a change from what was structured as a changeless situation to an ever-changing movement towards allocating political rights to all groups. It is a movement from a closed to an open society. He suggests that a movement within colour lines has become a movement across the colour line, in fact, it should be across the cultural theological, social, economic and political spheres.[14]

6.2 The Struggle Transformed

When a liberation movement is forced by circumstances to conduct its struggle through negotiation, it must accept that negotiation is a highly complex terrain of struggle in which established positions of strength are put to test. The liberation movements in South Africa were caught unprepared by the government's u-turn. The balance

of power between the two contending parties is largely in favour of the government in terms of economic, and political strength.

Although the day to day activities of the government were running under strenuous conditions in relation to township violence, sanctions, the state of ungovernability and the deteriorating economy, it was still firmly in control of the economy, the security forces, a relatively undivided White community and was largely recognized by the world community; except for the policies of apartheid.

It had been relatively easy for the government to transform its strategy from an established closed Afrikaner's political approach to abrupt drastic liberalization without running the risk of disintegrating the White community. On the other hand the ANC had found it difficult to transform its strategy from an exiled underground operation to above-board political activism devoid of armed confrontation.

While the ANC had hoped to sustain the initiative in the process of negotiations, it lost such initiative to the government in 1990, just after the Pretoria Minute agreement. Three major factors contributed to this, namely:

* waning sanctions against the ANC's persistent appeals to the international community not to lift them,
* suspension of the armed struggle,
* escalating township violence.

In view of these losses the ANC could not proceed with talks, especially on constitutional matters until the movement had regained its image and posture. The April 30, 1991 and May 9, 1991 ultimatums gave the ANC breathing space until the next July congress.

The congress held by the ANC from the 2nd to the 6th July 1991 was the first one inside the country since 1960. The congress was held against a pressing background, such as:

* From underground to overt political activism, the unbannings had activated new demands on the ANC, organizationally and politically. The movement had to contend with a new environment.

* The rush to embark on talks with the government caught the movement unprepared and made it difficult to cope with new rules of the political game, and the essence of power politics.

* The new environment created by the unbannings and the reform process initially had created the impression that the ANC was about to take over the government. However, this was not to be the case, as the process proved later.

The General Secretary of the ANC, Mr Alfred Nzo noted several problematic areas which contributed to the weaknesses of the movement. Amongst others, he noted:

* The Alliance with the SACP had scared off potential members from other communities such as Whites, Indians and Coloureds.

* Factionalism, eloquism and ignorance with an apparent bureaucratic confusion at head office.[15]

A commission of strategies and tactics, in the congress noted the following:

6.2.1 that the movement had not mastered the art of political contest in view of the fact that the government was winning the "image" game.

6.2.2 that the movement had been portrayed as incoherent, disunited, inefficient and leaderless.

6.2.3 that there was a need to establish a stronger position on negotiations. The commission therefore resolved to maintain the "combat readiness of

> Umkhonto-we-Sizwe, the establishment of self-defence units throughout the country and to revitalize mass action to attract more people to participate.[16]

The Congress in general, adopted resolutions which reflected its priorities in keeping the negotiation process on track. Such resolutions involved the termination of violence, the phase-lifting of sanctions on terms and conditions laid down by the movement, the establishment of a Patriotic Front,and the mandate to convene an All-Party Conference.

In an effort to reassert its weakening position on the negotiation front, the movement resolved and acknowledged:

i. Mass organization and mobilization as the centre of its struggle.

ii. Coupling the various demands of various communities throughout the society with the demand for a sovereign interim government and

sovereign constituent assembly and the question of the transfer of power.

iii. Maintained its status as a liberation movement and not a political party, thus broadening its scope of political activities related to mass struggle and mass involvement. With regard to underground activities, armed action and international isolation of the government, the conference acknowledged their significance in the current political climate but fell short of giving any specific direction.[17]

On negotiations, the conference acknowledged that

> "negotiations do not win... freedom, but represent the recognition of the victories we win on the ground."[18]

The ANC perceived the prevailing violence as an attempt by the government to destabilize society and to underme and weaken the ANC and its allies.

The conference therefore felt that violence was an obstacle to negotiations and it was the responsibility of the government to stop it. The resumptionof negotiations,especially constitutional negotiations, depended on the removal of all obstacles, including violence. When these had been removed, the following steps would be taken:

* convening of the All-Party Congress
* installation of an interim government
* election of a Democratic Constituent Assembly
* adoption of a democratic constitution and the election of a democratic parliament.[19]

In general, the ANC undertook to continue the process of negotiations, having noted its weakened position and the forces at play, undermining its influence. It undertook to resume this position from a revitalized National Executive Council which was endowed with the authority to establish a team of chief negotiators, working groups and researchers. Such a position was intended to match the negotiating skills of government negotiators who had thus far manipulated the ANC's negotiating

pattern. The demands expressed by the ANC at its 48th Congress must be viewed in the context of its weakening position, its potentiality to regain its strength, and the viability of it realizing its objectives. Chief amongst its demands is an interim government and a constituent assembly.

6.3 Reconciliation

When speaking of reconciliation, one refers to an atmosphere of reconciling the demands of the ANC and the position of the government. Any state of reconciliation will depend on the consensus and compromise each party will be prepared to undertake. However, such compromises and consensus will be determined by the political strength each party commands and their respective non-negotiables. Both parties believe in a democratic transformation of society and the attainment of a democratic establishment. But they differ on the mechanism for the realization of this objective. It is therefore, not the end result of the process which will determine the strength of each party but the mechanism for the transformation. The following

mechanisms have been suggested by the ANC and the government respectively: an All-Party Conference, an Interim Government, a Constituent Assembly and a Multi-Party Conference.

6.3.1 An All-Party Conference

It is not currently clear as to what the ANC intends to do and to achieve with an All-Party Conference, especially in view of its undertaking to embark on the formation of a Patriotic Front. However, this idea appears to differ very little with the call by the government for a multi-party conference.

6.3.2 The interim government and a constituent assembly

The ANC called for the establishment of an interim government on the basis that the government could not be both a referee and a player in the process of change or transition. Whilst the government had indicated its willingness to consult with the ANC in its daily activities of governance, even to broaden

the cabinet to include Black people as Mr Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development had stated in February 1991, the government had implicitly rejected the concept of an interim government.

The government sees itself as an agent of transitional change especially in view of its legitimacy to the established order. It should be noted however, that the ANC had also acknowledged the legitimacy of the government by calling upon the government to sustain its responsibility to maintain law and order in violence torn areas, accusing the government agencies such as the SAP of negligence, lack of action to arrest culprits of violence, and reluctance to act decisively on violence. [20]

The debate against a constituent assembly and an interim government is that the South African government is based on legitimacy accepted by all states and satisfying all legal requirements for international acceptance. The legitimacy of the South African government was never questioned by the international community, with the exception of the

liberation movements. The ANC contends that South Africa is "a colony of a special type"implying internal colonialism whereas the PAC maintains that it is a settler -colonial establishment. Although the illegitimacy of the South African government can be established within a historical context, such arguments lacked the necessary support in terms of the established order.

Historically, South Africa was a British colony and it was handed over to the White people in 1910 who in turn declared it a republic in 1961. On the other hand, the history of Africans was predominantly characterized by conquest, subjugation and repression. Pheko, as quoted by Ismail Lagardien, sums it up as follows:

> "despite the fact that Africans were an overwhelming majority and the country theirs by right of first occupation earlier than the birth of Christ, the Africans were (historically) reduced to mere spectators." 21

The demand by national liberation movements for a constituent assembly derives from the premise of their analysis of the social order of the South African society. However, the basic sentiment of the international community on the question of legitimacy and illegitimacy by virtue of occupation, layed against the premise of national liberation movements. Most, if not all, states question the legitimacy of the South African government on the basis of the universal common law that all governments should govern by consensus of the governed. Therefore, the demand by national liberation movements for a constituent assembly and an interim government presupposes that the South African government was illegitimate, both by occupation, and by universal common law.

According to Dennis Madide, a central committee member on constitutional matters, of the Inkatha Freedom Party, the demand for an interim government and a constituent assembly poses problems on two levels, practically and theoretically. He argues that such demands are impractical and bound to be

resisted by the government and its allies. At the practical level Mr Madide maintains that it is an

> "absolute certainty that such a demand for an interim government will be vigorously and even violently opposed"[22]

6.4 ASSESSMENT

At the time of writing this research the struggle for political hegemony was still in progress. Several developments had evolved in the process of bargaining, except the process of constitutional negotiations. The bargaining process had established joint working groups as the most effective mechanism for the transition in South Africa. Joint working groups (JWG) between the ANC and the government were established after each meeting between the contending parties from the Groote Schuur Minute, the Pretoria Minute, and the National Peace Commission. These working groups had proved to be effective in areas of establishing common principles, evolving agreements and reconciling peace among fighting groups.

The joint working groups have facilitated mediation between the police and the public, between organizations and political factions, and between the leaderships of all parties. The effectiveness of Joint working groups in monitoring violence and facilitating peace had attracted the attention of other parties who were indifferent to the entire process of negotiations or sceptical as to the motives of some participating groups. Groups, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the Azanian People's Organization and church groups had either joined or given support to J W G.

The process, however, had been characterized by friction, accusations and counter -accusations, violence, prospects and despair, weakening positions and gaining strength in the midst of waning sanctions, suspension of the armed struggle, Inkathagate and numerous phases in the pull and push relations which characterized most political conflicts. The prospects, however, for a negotiated, peaceful settlement remain certain in

the current atmosphere unless such an atmosphere is threatened by future events.

The process has also seen the ANC compromising most of its historic positions, such as:

* seeing itself as the only liberation movement of essence in the struggle and therefore a major player. Many organizations were claiming this position or at least maintaining their significance in the overall political game. Organizations such as Inkatha, homeland-based organizations, PAC, SACP, AZAPO, CP, AWB and WOSA, were all claiming to speak on behalf of significant sections of the South African Society. The ANC has recognized this complexity by establishing working relations with such groups or at least talking to them directly or indirectly.

* The economic policies radicalized over a period of struggle had waned from nationalization to "market economy" with minimized central

control. This aspect however, has not come out clearly yet, the debate is continuing.

* The recognition of groups or minorities is gradually manifesting itself within the ANC, coming closer to the Nationalist Party and Inkatha and thereby establishing common grounds.

* Another eminent compromising area was the call for an interim government and the Constituent Assembly. Although the ANC had called upon the government to cease its monopoly of power and to establish an interim government, the government had conceded to a "transitional arrangement," based on a multiparty arrangement, especially in the light of Inkathagate, to oversee the transitional process whilst the government itself continued to govern. The future of the call for a Constituent Assembly could not be ascertained during the time of this research, however, the government had shown its unwillingness to concede to it then.

> The ANC socialist rhetoric has been highly diminished despite the SACP's strong influence. This is due to the failure of communist parties throughout the world and the attitude of the South African society towards Communism which is said to be an undemocratic and unworkable system.

In the light of the continuing marginalisation of the ANC from its strategic approach and its political programme, the movement could find itself settling for the lesser alternative, reflective of its bargaining strength. The movement would have to merge its radical stand with the realities of the moment, characterized by diversified cultures, traditions, racial composition, and diversified political parties and organizations. For several decades national liberation movements avoided the concept of power-sharing in their struggle. In view of developments and realities which became clear after the unbanning of political organizations, this concept seemed to enter the political scene once more. Moving closer to the NP and Inkatha, which

have long called for power-sharing, the ANC and its alliance had recognized the diversity in the South African Society.

The processes of bargaining is still unclear as to what will happen next. Violent clashes between various groups had escalated and several strategies and mechanisms had been employed to contain the situation. There are, many incidents which could or had the potentiality to derail constitutional negotiations. The chapter on conceptual understanding, especially Kraybill's model, had proved to be essential in the light of joint working groups as a mechanism for transitional change. However, further developments are expected to evolve in the process which can determine the success or failure of negotiations.

The idea of a power-struggle was further proved to be basic to all political conflicts, not only in South Africa, but also throughout the world. It is within the idea of a power-struggle that weakening positions in the midst of political conflict can be witnessed. Initially, it was made to be understood

that the process would be smooth and that power would flow from the "oppressor to the oppressed" without much struggle. This of course, had not been the case.

The chapters on Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique were meant to prove that the nature of conflict determines the outcome of the settlement and such settlements are reflective of the bargaining strength of the contending parties. The theme of the dissertation are chapters four, and five which are based on the political conflict in South Africa. Several conclusions were drawn from these chapters and a general analysis was made in chapter six. However, the process was still continuing at the time of making these conclusions which may account for slight deviations in my conclusions but the essence of the power-struggle remains intact.

The situation in Namibia must be assessed against the background that the Namibian struggle was largely waged by the international community. Resolutions passed by the United Nations Assembly were not as pervasive as compared to those passed

against the apartheid state. Resolutions passed on behalf of the Namibian people stipulated in specific terms, the mechanisms for resolving the conflict, i.e. Resolution 435 and many others. The role of the United Nations was clearlly stipulated. It was therefore, not a question of leaving the conflict in the hands of the internal parties to sort it out. Unlike in South Africa, condemnation of apartheid by the United Nations General Assembly carried no expressed statements of how apartheid should be abolished. For decades, national liberation movements in South Africa concentrated on isolating the apartheid state without pushing, through the UN General Assembly, a programme for the transfer of power. The Harare Declaration was an attempt to do this, but it was too late to expect the world to change overnight despite the fact that it was adopted by the OAU and later by the UN. This adoption was not based on a commitment by the UN; it was a symbolic gesture, by the UN and the OAU of their opposition to apartheid.

The call for a constituent assembly, in particular, has no substance in the South African situation.

Such a call may be the most democratic transitional mechanism available, but due to lack of historical justification and lack of conditions to force the SA government to yield to it, there is no possibility of success. The call for an all-party conference or multi-party conference could yield some results on constitutional arrangement, under current conditions.

The struggle in Mozambique posed few lessons for South Africa. The armed struggle in particular pushed beyond the attainment of a political settlement, created problems for the new government. It scared off foreign investors, destroyed the economy and ushered in dictatorship. The situation in Mozambique saw the Portuguese capitulating militarily and Frelimo imposing itself without the checks and balances inherent in political settlements. There is always a necessity in political conflicts for balanced solutions and such a state of affairs can only be realised if there are few differences in the power disparity between the negotiating parties.

There is something else peculiar to the South African struggle. Most struggles in Southern Africa were rooted in the ethnic group with the largest number. In Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique the party with the largest ethnic grouping took the decisive role in the struggle and during the transition period. Many Zulus are not members of the Inkatha Freedom Party but neither are they members of the ANC; many are politically apathetic. They only rise up when their Zuluism is threatened. Despite the fact that the Afrikaner nation has the same potential (and the resources) as the Zulus, they have not yet demonstrated this potentiality to resist as a unit. The ANC is wide-spread among Black people and beyond ethnic lines, although its leadership-core is predominantly Xhosa. The imbalance amongst the three ethnic groupings would render the process of bargaining very complex and more difficult to resolve.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marais, D : South Africa: Constitutional Development:A Multi-disciplinary Approach. p.244
2. Lipton, M : Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa 1910-1986. (Wildwood House Ltd, England) p.50-51
3. Ibid. p.51
4. Tom Lodge : State of Exile : The ANC of South Africa: 1976-1986 (undated)
5. Laurance P : Rand Daily Mail Extra 12th October 1983, p.1
6. Lipton M : Ibid p.51
7. Lipton M : Ibid p.51
8. Lipton M : Ibid p.52
9. Lipton M : Ibid p.60
10. The Star 18 September 1989
11. State President: Parliament Opening Speech, Cape Town. F W de Klerk, 1991.
12. Ibid, p.245
13. The Pretoria Minute 6 August 1990.
14. Marais, D : Ibid p.245

15. The 48th National conference of the ANC (New Nation 12-18 July 1991).

16. Ibid. p.3

17. Ibid. p.3

18. Ibid. p.3

19. Ibid. p.3

20. Sowetan 10th July 1991

21. Lagardien Ibid.p.6

22. Sowetan 8th July 1991.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

1. Zartman, W.J. : RIPE FOR REVOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1985)

2. Sprout and Sprout: FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(D. van Nostrant Co. Inc. ; London, 1962)

3. Morganthau H.J. : POLITICS AMONGST NATIONS
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
(Alfred A Knopf Inc., New York, 5th Ed. 1972)

4. Barling, J. : BEHAVIOUR IN ORGANIZATIONS: SOUTH AFRICA PERSPECTIVE
(Mcgraw Hill Book Co. Johannesburg, 1983)

5. Anselm Strauss: NEGOTIATIONS
(Jossey Boss Publishers, London, 1984)

6. Du Toit & Esyerhuyse: THE MYTH MAKERS:
THE ELUSIVE BARGAIN FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE.
(Southern Book Publishers, Halfway House 1990)

7. Berger P.L. : A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA: VISIONS, STRATEGIES AND REALITIES
(Human & Rosseau Ltd, Cape Town 1988)

8. Ranford Oliver: THE RULERS OF RHODESIA: FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REFERENDUM.
(The Camelot Press Ltd, London, 1968)

9. Martin D & Johnson P.: THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE
(Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981)

10. Thompson C.: CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM.
THE FRONTLINE STATES IN THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE
(Westview Press, London, 1985)

11. Stiff P and Reid Daly R.: SELOUS SCOUTS: TOP SECRET WAR.
(Galayo, Alberton, 1982)

12. Fraenkel P and Murray R.: THE NAMIBIAN..THE MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP.
(Report No 19)

13. Rotberg, R.L.: NAMIBIA. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
(David Philip, Blackshaws Pty Ltd, Cape Town 1983)

14. Du Pisani, A: THE POLITICS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE.
(Jonathan Bull Publishers, Johannesburg, 1985)

15. Harsh E & Thomas T.: ANGOLA. THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WASHINGTON'S WAR.
(Pathfinder Press Inc, New York, 1976)

16. Prinsloo, D.S.: SWA/NAMIBIA. TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
(Study Report August, 1977 No 6)

17. Rangarajan L.N.: THE LIMITATION OF CONFLICT.A THEORY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION
(Croom Welm, London, 1985)

18. Paresh Pandya: MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHEMURENGA.
(Skotaville Publishers, Braamfontein, 1988)

19. Clausewitz, C.: ON WAR
(Routldge and Kegan Paul, London 1968)

20. Francis Meli: A HISTORY OF THE ANC. SOUTH AFRICA BELONGS TO US.
(Zimbabwe Publishing House ,Harare, 1988)

21. Juster, R.S.: SOUTH AFRICA'S NARROWING OPTIONS.
IISS, Philadelphia, London 1980)

22. Lipton M.: CAPITALISM AND APARTHEID. SOUTH AFRICA 1910-1986.
(Wildwood House Ltd, England)

ARTICLES AND JOURNALS

23. Marais, D.: SOUTH AFRICA. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
A multi-disciplinary Approach. (undated)

24. Tom Lodge: State of Exile: THE ANC OF SOUTH AFRICA
1976-1986 (undated)

25. Rand Daily Mail Extra 12th Oct. 1983.

26. The Star 18th September 1989.

27. The State President. PARLIAMENT OPENING SPEECH,CAPE TOWN 1991 (F.W. DE KLERK)

28. The Pretoria Minute 6th August 1991

29. The 48th National Conference of the ANC
(New Nation 12th-18th July 1991)

30. Sowetan 10th July 1991

31. Sowetan 8th July 1991

32. The South African Community Party: PATH TO POWER.
(Programme adopted at the Seventh Congress 1989)

33. Africa Perspective, No 23,1983.

34. South Africa - no Middle Road. THE THEORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION (undated)

35. Hudson, P.: IMAGES OF THE FUTURE AND STRATEGIES IN THE PRESENT. THE FREEDOM CHARTER AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEFT.
(Transformation No 3)

36. Slovo J.: AN UMSEBENZI DISCUSSION PAMPHLET.
(The SACP, Undated)

37. Freedom Charter Document Published by the People's Congress of 1955.

38. Hudson P.: THE FREEDOM CHARTER AND THE THEORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVOLUTION
(Transformation No 1)

39. The PAC Manifesto of 1959

40. Memorandum Submitted to the UN Expert Group on South Africa by the PAC of South Africa
(Partially dated December 1959)

41. Sobukwe, M.R.: OPENING ADRESS OF THE PAC
(1959)

42. The Azanian Manifesto (undated pamphlet)

43. The Industrial Consolidation Act of 1979

44. Frank Talk (undated)

45. Merle Lipton: SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC ISOLATION.
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No 119, January 1988 UI

46. Resolution taken during the Common wealth meeting on the 14th December 1990.

47. The New Nation 14th - 20th December 1990

48. Tom Lodge; BLACK RESISTANCE FROM 1945 TO 1980
(undated)

49. ANC Consultative conference Resolution 16th December 1990.

50. The Harare Declaration 1989.

51. The Groot Schuur Minute 4th May 1990.

52. Sowetan 18 February 1991.

53. Work in Progress (WIP) No 27, February 1991
article by van Zyl Slabbert.

54. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (xxi) 1966.
(United Nations Resolution)

55. South African Star Weekly, December 6, 1985.
(as quoted by Harsch)

56. South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act No 95 of 1977.

57. Rand Daily Mail 10th May 1977.

58. Observer foreign News services No. 32323, May 29, 1974.

59. Nyangeni W.W.: REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL LIBERARION IN ZIMBABWE.
(Paper presented to the African studiesAssociation Conference,
Chicago, 31st Oct. 1974)

60."Zimbezi Konfrantasie" (African Institute Bulletin Vol. XIII No 2, 1973)

61. As quoted by Wilkinson in his introduction to M. Reaburg
(Julian Fredman, London, 1978)

62. African Research Bulletin 1974.

63. The Washington Post 28th Augst 1976.

64. Times of Zimbia 14th September 1976.

65. The Star Tuesday December 24, 1991

66. Leadership Magazine. The Nineties Vol. 7

67. Sunday Times, September 29, 1991

68. Sunday Times September 15, 1991

APPENDIX 1

UN General Assembly Resolution 40/641 of December 1985: Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid

"The General Assembly

Urges the Security Council to consider without delay the adoption of effective mandatory sanctions against South Africa;

Further urges the Security Council to take steps for the strict implementation of the mandatory arms embargo instituted by its resolution 418 (1977) and of the arms embargo requested in its resolution 558 (1984) and, within the context of the relevant resolutions, to secure an end to military and nuclear co-operation with South Africa and the import of military equipment or supplies from South Africa;

Appeals to all States that have not yet done so, pending mandatory sanctions by the Security Council, to consider national legislative or other appropriate measures to increase the pressure on the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, such as:

a. Cessation of further investments in, and financial loans to, South Africa;

b. An end to all promotion of and support for trade with South Africa;

c. Prohibition of the sale of krugerrands and all other coins minted in South Africa;

d. Cessation of all forms of military, police or intelligence co-operation with the South African authorities, in particular the sale of computer equipment;

e. An end to nuclear collaboration with South Africa;

f. Cessation of export and sale of oil to South Africa;

Appeals to all States, organisations and institutions: To increase assistance to the front-line States and the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference in order to increase their economic strength and independence from South Africa."

APPENDIX 2

UN Security Council Resolution 418 of 1977

"*The Security Council*

Acting therefore under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations,

1. *Determines*, having regard to the policies and acts of the South African Government, that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related material constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security,

2. *Decides* that all states shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies, and grants of licensing arrangements, for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned,

3. *Calls on* all states to review, having regard to the objectives of this resolution, all existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them,

4. *Further decides* that all states shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons,

5. *Calls upon* all states, including non-member states of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions, of this resolution,

6. *Requests* the Secretary General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 May 1978,

7. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate, in the light of developments."

APPENDIX 3

Declaration of the eighth conference of heads of state of government of non-aligned countries, Harare, August-September 1986

"We reaffirm our decision and conviction that the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, remains the only peaceful option to compel the racist Pretoria régime to abandon *apartheid.* Consequently, we endorse the call of the Organisation of African Unity for the early convening of the United Nations Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (CM/Res.1952/XL of the OAU). Pending the adoption of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, we the Heads of State or Government endorse the following measures that have been adopted by certain countries and organisations and commend them to the wider international community for *urgent* adoption and *implementation.*

a. Prohibition of transfer of technology to South Africa;

b. Cessation of export, sale or transport of oil and oil products to South Africa, and of any co-operation with South Africa's oil industry;

c. Cessation of further investments in and financial loans to South Africa or Namibia and of any governmental insurance guarantee of credits to the racist régime;

d. An end to all promotion of or support for trade with South Africa, including governmental assistance to trade missions;

e. Prohibition of the sale of krugerrands and any other coins minted in South Africa;

f. Prohibition of imports from South Africa of agricultural products, coal, uranium, iron and steel etc;

g. Enactment of legislation or adoption of other measures to comply with United Nations Decree No 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia in 1974;

h. Termination of any visa-free entry privileges and the promotion of tourism to South Africa;

i. Termination of air and shipping links with South Africa;

j. Cessation of all academic, cultural, scientific and sports relations with South Africa, and of relations with individuals, institutions and other bodies endorsing or based on *apartheid;*

k. Suspension or abrogation of agreements with South Africa, such as agreements on cultural and scientific co-operation;

l. The termination of Double Taxation Agreements with South Africa;

m. A ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies.

Moreover, we urge all non-government organisations to participate actively in the information campaign to sensitise international public opinion on the realities of *apartheid.*

We also urge all States to increase material and financial assistance to the oppressed and struggling people of South Africa through their national liberation movements to enable them to step up their struggle against *apartheid* and for the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa.

We also take note of the resolution of the twenty-second OAU summit which recommends to all governments and educational institutions to devote the first lesson of the 1986/87 academic year to *apartheid,* and to write on this occasion on the blackboards and comment on the theme, *"Apartheid is a crime against humanity"*. We recommend that this resolution, aimed at sensitising the youth on the question of *apartheid* be seriously considered, during the 1986/87 academic year, by all our States and the world at large.

Front-line and other neighbouring states

We, the Heads of State or Government have reviewed and noted with grave concern the exceedingly serious and volatile situation in southern Africa resulting from the policies of State terrorism, military occupation, blackmail, and the use of armed bandits by the *apartheid* régime to destabilise, sabotage and destroy economic and social infrastructure of the front-line States and other countries neighbouring it with the aim of weakening and subjugating them. Consequently we recognise more than ever before, *the urgent need for concerted international action,* both short-term and long-term, to provide relief to the front-line and other States in the region, to enable them to withstand the effects of retaliatory sanctions by the racist Pretoria régime.

We reject the policy of "constructive engagement" and any attempt from whatever quarters to engage in any dialogue with the racist régime outside the framework of a categorical and irreversible process designed to totally eradicate *apartheid* and to accomplish the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia.

We fully endorse the statement by the twenty-second Assembly of the Organisation (AHG/ST5) (XXII) on the critical situation in Southern Africa as well as the measures contained therein, in particular the following:

'g. Provision of necessary resources to front-line States to enhance their defence capacity;

h. Mobilisation of assistance for the front-line and other neighbouring States to enhance their capacity to withstand the effects of sabotage, economic blackmail and economic aggression by the racist régime;

i. Mobilisation of assistance for the front-line and other neighbouring States to enhance their capacity to withstand the effects of sanctions.'

In this connection, we decide to establish a *Solidarity Fund for Southern Africa* to which we shall contribute generously. The Fund shall be used to provide emergency assistance as well as long-term assistance for infrastructual development in order to lessen their dependence on South Africa."

APPENDIX 4

The Nassau Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa, October 1985

"1. We consider that South Africa's continuing refusal to dismantle apartheid, its illegal occupation of Namibia, and its aggression against its neighbours constitute a serious challenge to the values and principles of the Commonwealth, a challenge which Commonwealth countries cannot ignore. At New Delhi we expressed the view that 'only the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in Southern Africa.' We are united in the belief that reliance on the range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental changes we have sought over many years. The growing crisis and intensified repression in South Africa mean that apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end. We consider that the situation calls for urgent practical steps.

2. We, therefore, call on the authorities in Pretoria for the following steps to be taken in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency:

a. Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfilment of that intent.

b. Terminate the existing state of emergency.

c. Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.

d. Establish political freedom and specifically lift the existing ban on the African National Congress and other political parties.

e. Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

3. We have agreed on a number of measures which have as their rationale impressing on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa. The latter, in particular, demands a process of dialogue involving the true representatives of the majority black population of South Africa. We believe that we must do all we can to assist that process, while recognising that the forms of political settlement in South Africa are for the people of that country — all the people — to determine.

4. To this end, we have decided to establish a small group of eminent Commonwealth persons to encourage through all practicable ways the evolution of that necessary process of political dialogue. We are not unmindful of the difficulties such an effort will encounter, including the possibility of initial rejection by the South African authorities, but we believe it to be our duty to leave nothing undone that might contribute to peaceful change in South Africa and avoid the dreadful prospect of violent conflict that looms over South Africa, threatening people of all races in the country, and the peace and stability of the entire Southern Africa region.

5. We are asking the President of Zambia and the Prime Ministers of Australia, The Bahamas, Canada, India, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe to develop with the Secretary General the modalities of this effort to assist the process of political dialogue in South Africa. We would look to the group of eminent persons to seek to facilitate the process of dialogue referred to in paragraph 2(e) above and by all practicable means to advance the fulfilment of the objectives of this Accord.

6. For our part, we have as an earnest of our opposition to apartheid, reached accord on a programme of common action as follows:

i. We declare the Commonwealth's support for the strictest enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 418 and 558, and commit ourselves to prosecute violators to the fullest extent of the law.

ii. We reaffirm the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977, which called upon Commonwealth members to take every practical step to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa.

iii. We agree upon, and commend to other governments, the adoption of the following further economic measures against South Africa, which have already been adopted by a number of member countries:

a. a ban on all new government loans to the Government of South Africa and its agencies;

b. a readiness to take unilaterally what action may be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands;

c. no Government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs in South Africa;

d. a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by South African military forces, police or security forces;

e. a ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials and technology to South Africa;

f. a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa;

g. a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and paramilitary equipment from South Africa;

h. an embargo on all military co-operation with South Africa; and

i. discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.

7. It is our hope that the process and measures we have agreed upon will help to bring about concrete progress towards the objectives stated above in six months. The Heads of Government

mentioned in paragraph 5 above, or their representatives, will then meet to review the situation. If in their opinion adequate progress has not been made within this period, we agree to consider the adoption of further measures. Some of us would, in that event, consider the following steps among others:

a. a ban on air links with South Africa;

b. a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa;

c. a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa;

d. the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa;

e. the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa;

f. a ban on all government procurement in South Africa;

g. a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies;

h. a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa.

8. Finally, we agree that should all of the above measures fail to produce the desired results within a reasonable period, further effective measures will have to be considered. Many of us have either taken or are prepared to take measures which go beyond those listed above, and each of us will pursue the objectives of this Accord in all the ways and through all appropriate fora open to us. We believe, however, that in pursuing this programme jointly, we enlarge the prospects of an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and peace and stability in the Southern Africa region as a whole."

APPENDIX 5

Summary of measures on South Africa adopted by EC members at the EC ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in September 1986

Restrictive measures:

- A rigorously controlled embargo on exports of arms and para-military equipment to the RSA.
- A rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms and para-military equipment from the RSA.
- Refusal to cooperate in the military sphere.
- Recall of military attachés accredited to the RSA, and refusal to grant accreditation to military attachés from the RSA.
- Discouraging cultural and scientific agreements except where these contribute towards the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in supporting it; and freezing of official contacts and international agreements in the sporting and security spheres.
- Cessation of oil exports to the RSA.
- Cessation of exports of sensitive equipment destined for the police and armed forces of the RSA.
- Prohibition of all new collaboration in the nuclear sector.

Positive measures:

- Code of conduct: adaptation, reinforcement and publicity.
- Programmes of assistance to non-violent anti-apartheid organisations, particularly to the churches.
- Programmes to assist the education of the non-white community, including grants for study at the universities in the countries originating the programmes.
- Intensification of contacts with the non-white community in the political, trade union, business, cultural, scientific and sporting sectors, etc.
- Programmes to assist the SADCC and the Front-Line States.
- Programme to increase awareness among the citizens of Member States resident in the RSA.

APPENDIX 7

Nordic programme of action against South Africa (unofficial translation)

The Nordic Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in Oslo 17-18 October 1985, adopted the following Nordic Programme of Action against South Africa, which is a follow-up and an extension of the 1978 Programme of Action:

1. Introduction

The Nordic countries regard the apartheid system in South Africa as a violation of fundamental human rights as laid down in the United Nations Charter and in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Apartheid is unique in the world as systematic racial discrimination has been made part of the legal foundation of the South African society. The apartheid policy of the South African Government, as well as South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, are serious sources of tension in Southern Africa.

Furthermore, the Nordic countries hold the view that apartheid constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. Consequently, they favour the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of mandatory sanctions against South Africa as a means to achieve a peaceful abolition of apartheid.

Pending mandatory sanctions the Nordic countries have decided to take unilateral measures in order to reduce their economic and other relations with South Africa. They urge other countries to adopt similar measures to increase international pressure on the South African Government and make the pressure more effective. In view of the unique character of the apartheid system lack of agreement in the United Nations Security Council on mandatory sanctions against South Africa should not prevent individual countries from taking measures of their own adapted to their present relations with South Africa.

2. International measures against South Africa

Within the framework of the United Nations the Nordic countries will:

- work actively for the adoption by the Security Council of mandatory sanctions against South Africa, ie in the fields of investment, trade and transport. An effective oil boycott against South Africa would be an important element of such a policy. The Nordic countries will work for an oil boycott and will undertake consultations with other shipping nations with a view to reaching agreement on a joint boycott of oil transports to South Africa,

- work for the implementation by other countries of the measures against South Africa recommended by the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 39/72G on concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid,

- work for strict compliance with Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on an arms embargo against South Africa as well as for an extension and strengthening of that embargo, for example by including exports of equipment to South Africa which can be used for both civilian and military purposes,

- work to ensure that the measures recommended in Security Council resolutions 558 (1984) and 569 (1985) be implemented by other countries and become mandatory.

3. Nordic measures against South Africa

The Nordic countries have adopted the following unilateral measures which they will implement on a national basis:

- prohibition or discouragement of new Nordic investments in South Africa,
- negotiations with Nordic enterprises with a view to restricting their production in South Africa,
- recommendation to Nordic enterprises, which export to or import from South Africa, to seek other markets and suppliers with a view to reducing trade between the Nordic countries and South Africa,
- implementation of those measures recommended in Security Council resolution 558 (1984) on refraining from importing arms, ammunition and military vehicles from South Africa,
- implementation of those measures recommended in Security Council resolution 569 (1985) which have not already been implemented by the Nordic countries, i.e.
  - prohibition of the importation of krugerrands,
  - prohibition of all new contracts in the nuclear field,
  - prohibition of the exportation of computer equipment that may be used by the South African armed forces and police,
- measures to prevent Government procurement from South Africa,
- prohibition of all Government support for trade promotion in relation to South Africa,
- prohibition or discouragement of granting loans, including participation in international loans to South Africa. As long as the apartheid system and its negative effects on the economy of South Africa remain, loans from the International Monetary Fund to South Africa should be discouraged with due regard to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF,
- prohibition or discouragement of leasing to enterprises in South Africa,
- prohibition of discouragement of the transfer of patents and manufacturing licences to South Africa,
- refraining from commercial air services to South Africa,
- further restrictions of relations with South Africa in the fields of sports, culture and science,

- strengthening of the joint Nordic guidelines concerning the administration of visa regulations for South African citizens, with a view to enforcing the measures contained in this Programme of Action,

- increase of the Nordic countries' humanitarian assistance to refugees and liberation movements as well as to victims and opponents of apartheid,

- increase of the Nordic countries' assistance to the Frontline States, to other SADCC countries and to the SADCC co-operation, in order to reduce the dependence of these countries on South Africa and thus increase their ability to withstand South Africa's policy of destabilisation.

The Nordic Working Group on Measures against South Africa will evaluate possible new measures against South Africa.

APPENDIX 8

Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda on apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, September 19, 1986

"1. The Government of Japan, desiring that the problem of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa would be peacefully solved as early as possible, has appealed, in concert with other countries, to the South African Government on various occasions to take steps for fundamental reforms aimed at abolishing apartheid, and to all the parties concerned to begin talks toward a solution.

With a view to conveying to the Government of South Africa Japan's consistent position that fundamental reforms aimed at abolishing apartheid should be made, the Government of Japan has kept its relations with South Africa down to consular, not diplomatic level, restricted investment and financing, limited sporting, cultural and educational interchanges, forbidden the exports of arms to South Africa, refrained from importing arms from that country, prohibited, by applying more strictly existing laws and regulations, the exports of computers which might assist the activities of such organisations as the armed forces and the police which enforce apartheid, and urged all those concerned to cooperate in voluntary halting of imports of krugerrands and all other South African gold coins.

2. However, the situation in South Africa, which shows no sign of improvement, has led to such a serious stage that some steps must be taken.

The Government of Japan, therefore, renews its appeal to all the parties concerned to reach a solution of the problem through dialogue, and it especially requests the South African Government to make a political decision to release unconditionally Mr Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners, to lift the existing ban on anti-apartheid organisations such as the ANC and PAC, and to begin talks with a wide range of black leaders as soon as possible.

The Government of Japan will take, in a spirit of cooperation with other countries, the following additional restrictive measures with a view to conveying its position until the Government of South Africa, taking into consideration those requests of the Government of Japan, demonstrates its concrete will to abolish apartheid;

1. to forbid imports of iron and steel

2. to suspend issuance of tourist visas for South African nationals and to request Japanese people to refrain voluntarily from touring to South Africa

3. to confirm suspension of air links with South Africa

4. to prohibit the use of the international airlines of South African Airways by government officials.

3. It is the intention of the Government of Japan to continue to expand and strengthen its cooperation to raise the social status of the black people of South Africa, aiming at the creation of an environment conducive to the solution of the problem through dialogue. It is also determined to strengthen its economic cooperation with the neighbouring countries which may suffer economic difficulties from the development of the South African situation."

APPENDIX 10

"Beating apartheid" programme of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, April 1985

"Governments should by administrative and legislative action build up the following sanctions:

i. The extension of the arms embargo to include sales by South African subsidiaries of transnational corporations (TNCs), a tightening of the definition of arms sales to include all types of equipment intended for use by South Africa's military, security and police services, sales of machinery to South African arms producing companies, the purchase of South African produced arms and the strengthening of international monitoring to ensure compliance by all major industrial countries.

ii. The ending of investment guarantees, export credits and all trade promotion measures, and steps, product by product, to switch both import and export trade from South Africa.

iii. Prevention of new investment in South Africa by TNCs.

iv. The ending of all contracts for the expansion of the South African nuclear energy and oil from coal programmes.

v. The ending of all commercial operations by TNCs in the so-called "homelands" or "Bantustans".

vi. A stop on bank loans to the South Africa State and publicly-owned companies, and new IMF loans.

vii. Punitive action against the owners of any ships which carry oil to South Africa and against oil companies or oil traders which break or are party to the breaking of the UN oil embargo. This will entail intensified national and international monitoring by governments of shipping traffic to South Africa.

viii. A ban on the sale of Krugerrands.

ix. A ban on purchases of South African coal.

x. A programme of compulsory disinvestment by TNCs operating especially in the armaments, energy, and high-technology sectors in South Africa, and including all those companies which have been identified by the independent black trade union movement as being in violation of internationally-accepted standards of labour practice.

These measures should culminate in the adoption of mandatory UN sanctions to enforce the economic isolation of South Africa."

APPENDIX 11

World Council of Churches Harare Declaration, December 1985

"We leaders of churches from Western Europe, North America, Australia, South Africa and other parts of Africa, along with representatives of WCC, WARC, LWF and AACC met here in Harare, Zimbabwe, from the 4th to the 6th of December 1985, on the invitation of the World Council of Churches.

We have come together to seek God's guidance at this time of profound crisis in South Africa, and have committed ourselves to a continuing theological reflection on the will of God for the Church. We affirm that the moment of truth (KAIROS) is now, both for South Africa and the World Community. We have heard the cries of anguish of the people of South Africa trapped in the oppressive structures of apartheid. In this moment, of immense potentiality, we agree that the apartheid structure is against God's will, and is morally indefensible. The Government has no credibility. We call for an end to the State of Emergency, the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners, the lifting of the ban on all banned movements, and the return of exiles. The transfer of power to the majority of the people, based on universal suffrage is the only lasting solution to the present crisis.

We understand and fully support those in South Africa who are calling for the resignation of the Government. We regard this as the most appropriate and least costly process of change and as a contribution towards such a change. As we await a new democratic and representative government in South Africa,

1. We call on the Church inside and outside South Africa to continue praying for the people of South Africa and to observe June 16th — the tenth anniversary of Soweto uprising — as World Day of Prayer and fast to end unjust rule in South Africa.

2. We call on the international community to prevent the extension, the rolling over, or renewal of bank loans to the South African government, banks, corporations and para-state institutions.

3. We call on the international community to apply immediate and comprehensive sanctions on South Africa.

4. We call on the Church inside and outside South Africa to support South African movements working for the liberation of their country.

5. We welcome and support recent developments within the Trade Union movement for a united front against apartheid.

6. We demand the immediate implementation of the United Nations Resolution 435 on Namibia.

We gathered here, commit ourselves to the implementation of the Harare Declaration as a matter of urgency. We are confident that the liberation of South Africa will be liberation for all the people in the country, black and white."

APPENDIX 12

Statement by Richard L Trumka, United Mine Workers of America, 9 January 1986

"On behalf of the United Mine Workers of America, I am proud to join with the AFL-CIO and the Free South Africa movement in supporting the national education campaign and boycott of Royal Dutch/Shell.

For 96 years the United Mine Workers has fought for social justice and human rights. From our very beginning we have opposed racism and discrimination. Our support of the battle against apartheid represents a reaffirmation of the historic principles on which our union was founded. It is, therefore, fitting, just and proper that I speak out today as a UMWA coal miner.

Royal Dutch/Shell's supply of oil to the South African Government is a strategic pillar supporting the apartheid regime. Without the support of Royal Dutch/Shell and other large transnational corporations, the economic foundation of apartheid will collapse.

Because of this strategic support and Royal Dutch/Shell's union-busting operations in South Africa's coal mines, the National Union of Mine Workers of South Africa, the Miners' International Federation, to which the UMWA is affiliated, and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions have called for worldwide action against this corporation. We are here in response to those calls for solidarity. In calling for a national boycott of Royal Dutch/Shell the Free South Africa movement and the AFL-CIO have given all Americans an opportunity to strike a blow against oppression.

Furthermore, my union, in endorsing this campaign, unashamedly acts in its self-interest. Royal Dutch/Shell exports coal, mined under slave labor conditions, from South Africa. Through its investments in apartheid South Africa, Royal Dutch/Shell hopes to undermine coal mined in North America and to lower the standard of living of coal miners in this country. As a result, through our action here today we are simultaneously helping our black brothers and sisters in South Africa throw off the yoke of oppression and helping ourselves to do the same right here at home.

It's not just coal, however. Other products made in South Africa — from steel to canned fruit — are continuing to flow into this country undercutting American jobs. American transnational corporations have chosen to invest in South Africa for huge profits at the expense of our communities here at home. Thus Americans have two reasons to stop the apartheid system by boycotting Shell. First, apartheid enslaves black South Africans, and, second, apartheid costs American jobs.

It is fitting that organised labor in the United States is united in supporting this important call to action to end apartheid. 1985 marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Committee for Industrial Organisation — the CIO — led by former UMWA president John L Lewis. The founding of the CIO was a watershed event for American organised labor and the march towards justice in this country.

So, too, in South Africa we have recently witnessed a watershed event for organised labor and the struggle against apartheid: the founding of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Cosatu, half a million strong, is South Africa's new CIO. Its president, too, is a mine worker.

Cosatu has boldly demanded the withdrawal of all foreign corporations from South Africa. Our willingness to take action against the multinational corporations, like Royal Dutch/Shell, that exploit black South Africans is a direct show of solidarity with the black unions there who are in the forefront of the struggle for justice and freedom.

So today we call on all Americans: Stop apartheid in South Africa. Protect jobs in the USA. Boycott Shell."

APPENDIX 13

IBM's notice to its customers and associates in South Africa, 1986

"The IBM Corporation has announced plans to sell its South African operation to a new company formed for the benefit of the employees of IBM South Africa.

As Managing Director of this new company, the name of which will be announced at a later date, I wish to give all our customers and associates in South Africa, the following unequivocal assurances:

- A full range of IBM products and services will continue to be available in South Africa through the current sole supplier.
- We are fully committed to ensuring that all our customers continue to get the service excellence which is associated only with IBM products.
- All our commitments to our customers, dealers, agents, employees and suppliers will be honoured.

The new company will hold the sole franchise for IBM in South Africa, and has a supply and service contract with the IBM Corporation. The new company will be an Equal Opportunity Employer, and has bound itself to the beliefs and principles on which IBM is founded. IBM's Social Responsibility Programmes in South Africa will continue as committed.

In making this announcement, I believe our customers will appreciate that there will be no change to the supply of IBM products, that there will be the same standard of excellence in service from the new company, and that the new company will be able to respond to their needs with greater flexibility than a wholly owned IBM subsidiary. In the current international climate, such flexibility will clearly be to our customers' advantage.

Our new company will be a South African Company, owned by South Africans and dedicated to serving the South African community.

We will continue to represent the leader in the information technology industry in South Africa.

J F Clarke
(Managing Director)"

APPENDIX 14

New guidelines on disinvestment by US anti-apartheid organisations, January 1987

"We support an end to all corporate involvement in or with South Africa and Namibia. A corporation is doing business in or with the Republic of South Africa or Namibia if it, its parent, or its subsidiaries:

1. have direct investments in South Africa or Namibia, or have entered into franchise, licensing or management agreements with or for any entity in those countries; or

2. are financial institutions that have not prohibited new investments, loans, credits or related services, or the renewal of existing financial agreements, including those for the purposes of trade, with any entity in those countries; or

3. have more than 5 per cent of their common stock beneficially owned or controlled by a South African entity.

A company with operations in South Africa or Namibia for the sole purpose of reporting the news shall not be considered doing business in those countries.

American Committee on Africa

American Friends Service Committee

Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility

TransAfrica


Washington Office on Africa

ANNEXURE B

PROPOSED

SWA/NAMIBIA GOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK

DURING INTERIM PERIOD



5. THE SOUTH WES


Since its official found
international recognition,
the Anti-Apartheid Move
isations throughout the
political organisations in
movement of the 1950's, I
(OPC) created in 1958
Among the prominent lea
and Andreas Shipanga.
Kerina, transformed the
(OPO) together with Sam
Solomon Mifima and oth
members of the South
among whom were Patric
Goldberg and Brian Bunt

As a result of tribal, p
Owambo and Herero
movements, a largely Her
National Union (SWANI
the leadership of J.F. Koz
intellectual movement a
support from China, in la
as SWAPO.

At approximately the s
to change OPO into a si
Owambo and half Herero
of OPO so that the orga
linked to a particular eth
of SWAPO in June 1960
suggestion of Kerina, was


During the first few ye
non-violence, but as a r
African African Nation
SWAPO soon found itsel
decided to recruit Owa
military training campa
Soviet Union, China, Alg
training. The first group
July 1966 the case agains
Court in The Hague an
initiative, embarked on

Chart A
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
Origin of foreign investment, 1983



Source, *The Economist*, 30 March, 1985

Chart B
U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
(in billions of dollars)



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, various issues

Chart C
FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME IN THE 1970s

South African Government	*State Corporations*	*"Privately" Held Corporations*
Administration	ARMSCOR (military)	Anglo-American Corporation, plus six other mining finance houses
Police	ISCOR (iron and steel)	
Army	ESCOM (electricity and nuclear	Multinational corporations: 40 percent of South African manufacturing
Airforce	SENTRACHEM (chemicals)	
Navy	SAH&RR (harbors and railways)	Multinational corporate banks: 60 percent of 20 largest South African banks
	SASOL (oil from coal)	
	NATREF (state oil refinery)	
	IDC (state development corporation)	
	Etc.	

longer be considered adequate. In this respect, the active use of the stock exchange as a medium for raising investment funds is envisaged. Deliberate policy measures will be taken shortly to increase availability of attractive scrip on the market. Further fiscal incentives to encourage companies to go public and the public to hold shares on and through the Stock Exchange are being considered.

It should however, be stressed at this point that developments stated above should be viewed as consistent elements of broader objectives of capital market development.

K.5 Investment by Small Scale Entrepreneurs

82. There is a perceived large gap for long term financing needs of small to medium scale enterprises and it is recognised that the existing financial institutions may not change their lending attitudes sufficiently enough to address the special needs of start-up businesses. To redress this problem a study on the feasibility of setting up a venture capital company in Zimbabwe has been completed and its conclusions are very positive and its implementation not far off. It is envisaged that a public announcement on this institution will be made soon. The venture capital company will be in addition to facilities already in place (i.e. the Zimbabwe Development Bank Fund and the Small Enterprises Development Corporation).

L. FINANCING THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME

83. Government, on an informal basis, kept potential donors informed about its approach to economic reform. A formal approach will soon be made to various donors, who will be presented with the total package of reforms, and details of the financing requirements of the programme. Funding arising from these approaches will be additional to facilities already granted by the African Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation.

Southern Africa Record
SA Institute of International Affairs
Number 59 & 60 1990

SOUTH AFRICA - THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

TEXT OF THE GROOTE SCHUUR MINUTE

CAPE TOWN - 4 MAY 1990

The Government and the ANC agree on a common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations. Flowing from this commitment, the following was agreed upon:

1. The establishment of a working group to make recommendations on a definition of political offences in the South African situation; to discuss, in this regard, time scales; and to advise on norms and mechanisms for dealing with the release of political prisoners and the granting of immunity in respect of political offences to those inside and outside South Africa. All persons who may be affected will be considered. The working group will bear in mind experiences in Namibia and elsewhere. The working group will aim to complete its work before 21st May 1990. It is understood that the South African Government in its discretion, may consult other political parties and movements and other relevant bodies. The proceedings of the working group will be confidential. In the meantime the following offences will receive attention immediately:

   a) The leaving of the country without a valid travel document.

   b) Any offences related merely to organisations which were previously prohibited.

2. In addition to the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 1 temporary immunity from prosecution for political offences committed before today, will be considered on an urgent basis for members of the National Executive Committee and selected other members of the ANC from outside the country, to enable them to return and help with the establishment and management of political activities, to assist in bringing violence to an end and to take part in peaceful political negotiations.

3. The Government undertakes to review existing security legislation to bring it into line with the new dynamic situation developing in South Africa in order to ensure normal and free political activities.

4. The Government reiterates its commitment to work towards the lifting of the state of emergency. In this context

the ANC will exert itself to fulfill the objectives contained in the preamble.

5. Efficient channels of communication between the Government and the ANC will be established in order to curb violence and intimidation from whatever quarter effectively.

The Government and the ANC agree that the objectives contained in this minute should be achieved as early as possible.

Groote Schuur
4 May 1990

SOUTH AFRICA - THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

THE PRETORIA MINUTE

The Government and the ANC have held discussions at the Presidency, Pretoria today, August 6, 1990.

1. The Government and the ANC have again committed themselves to the Groote Schuur Minute.

2. The final report of the Working Group on political offences dated 21 May 1990, as amended, was accepted by both parties. The guidelines to be formulated in terms of the Report will be applied in a phased manner. The Report makes provision for the formulation of guidelines which will be applied in dealing with members of all organisations, groupings, or institutions, governmental or otherwise, who committed offences on the assumption that a particular cause was being served or opposed. The meeting has instructed the Working Group to draw up a plan for the release of ANC-related prisoners and the granting of indemnity to people in a phased manner and to report before the end of August.

The following target dates have in the meantime been agreed upon:

* The body or bodies referred to in paragraph 8.2 of the Report of the Working Group will be constituted by 31 August 1990.

* The further release of prisoners which can be dealt with administratively will start on 1 September 1990.

* Indemnity which can be dealt with in categories of persons and not on an individual basis will be granted from 1 October 1990. This process will be completed not later than the end of 1990.

* In all cases where the body or bodies to be constituted according to paragraph 8.2 of the Report of the Working Group will have to consider cases on an individual basis, the process will be completed within six months, but the latest date envisaged for the completion of the total task in terms of the Report of the Working Group is not later than 30 April 1991.

This programme will be implemented on the basis of the Report of the Working Group.

3. In the interest of moving as speedily as possible towards a negotiated peaceful political settlement and in the

context of the agreements reached, the ANC announced that it was now suspending all armed actions with immediate effect. As a result of this, no further armed actions and related activities by the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe will take place.

It was agreed that a working group will be established to resolve all outstanding questions arising out of this decision to report by 15 September 1990. Both sides once more committed themselves to do everything in their power to bring about a peaceful solution as quickly as possible.

4. Both delegations expressed serious concern about the general level of violence, intimidation and unrest in the country, especially Natal. They agreed that in the context of the common search for peace and stability, it was vital that understanding should grow among all sections of the South African population that problems can and should be solved through negotiations. Both parties committed themselves to undertake steps and measures to promote and expedite the normalisation and stabilisation of the situation in line with the spirit of mutual trust obtaining among the leaders involved.

5. With due cognisance of the interest, role and involvement of other parties the delegations consider it necessary that whatever additional mechanisms of communication are needed should be developed at local, regional and national levels. This should enable public grievances to be addressed peacefully and in good time, avoiding conflict.

6. The Government has undertaken to consider the lifting of the State of Emergency in Natal as early as possible in the light of positive consequences that should result from this accord.

7. In view of the new circumstances now emerging there will be an ongoing review of security legislation. The Government will give immediate consideration to repealing all provisions of the Internal Security Act that:

(a) refer to communism or the furthering thereof;

(b) provide for a consolidated list;

(c) provide for a prohibition on the publication of statements or writings of certain persons; and

(d) provide for an amount to be deposited before a newspaper may be registered.

The Government will continue reviewing security legislation and its application in order to ensure free political activity and with the view to introducing amending legislation at the next session of Parliament. The Minister of Justice will issue a statement in this regard, inter alia calling for comments and proposals.

8. We are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone on the road to true peace and prosperity for our country. In this we do not pretend to be the only parties involved in the process of shaping the new South Africa. We know there are other parties committed to peaceful progress. All of us can henceforth walk that road in consultation and co-operation with each other. We call upon all those who have not yet committed themselves to peaceful negotiations do do so now.

9. Against this background, the way is now open to proceed towards negotiations on a new constitution. Exploratory talks in this regard will be held before the next meeting which will be held soon.

Pretoria
6 August 1990

The Manifesto

Our struggle for national liberation is directed against the historically evolved system of racism and capitalism which holds the people of Azania in bondage for the benefit of the small minority of the population, i.e. the capitalists and their allies, the white workers and the reactionary sections of the middle classes. The struggle against apartheid, therefore, is no more than the point of departure for our liberatory efforts.

The Black working class inspired by revolutionary consciousness is the driving force of our struggle for national self-determination in a unitary Azania. They alone can end the system as it stands today because they alone have nothing at all to loose. They have a world to gain in a democratic, anti-racist and socialist Azania, where the interests of the workers shall be paramount through worker control of the means of production, distribution and exchange. In the socialist republic of Azania the land and all that belongs to it shall be wholly owned and controlled by the Azanian people. The usage of the land and all that accrues to it shall be aimed at ending all exploitation.

It is the historic task of the Black working class and its organizations to mobilise the oppressed people in order to put an end to the system of oppression and exploitation by the white ruling class.

OUR PRINCIPLES

Successful conduct of the national liberation struggle depends on the firm basis of principle whereby we will ensure that the liberation struggle will not be turned against our people by treacherous and opportunistic "leaders" and liberal influences. The most important of these principles are:

- *Anti-racism, anti-imperialism and anti-sexism.*
- *Anti-collaboration with the ruling class and all its allies and political instruments.*
- *Independent working class organization, free from bourgeois influences.*

OUR RIGHTS

In accordance with these principles the following rights shall be entrenched in Azania:

- *The right to work.*
- *State provision of free and compulsory education for all. Education shall be geared towards liberating the Azanian people from all oppression, exploitation and ignorance.*
- *State provision of adequate and decent housing for all.*
- *State provision of free health, legal, recreational and other community services that will respond positively to the needs of the people.*

OUR PLEDGES

In order to bring into effect these rights of the Azanian people, we pledge ourselves to struggle tirelessly for:

- *The abolition of all laws, institutions and attitudes that discriminate against our people on the basis of colour, sex, religion, language or class.*
- *The re-integration of the bantustan human dumping grounds into a unitary Azania.*
- *The formation of trade unions that will heighten revolutionary worker consciousness.*
- *The development of one national culture inspired by socialist values.*