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A NODE FOR AFRICAN THOUGHT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-2008

SIMANGELE MONICA MAPHUMULO

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THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-2008

By

SIMANGELE MONICA MAPHUMULO

Student Number: 201440767

Email: monicasimangelemaphumulo@gmail.com

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Supervisor: Dr M.Z. Shamase

External Examiners: Prof. Lere Amusan (Northwest University, RSA)

Prof. Felix M. Kiruthu (Kenyatta University, Kenya)

Supervisor: Prof Morgan Ndlovu

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QUOTATIONS

"*Whatever position I occupied, it was the result of colleagues-of my comrades in the movement-who had decided in their wisdom to use me for the purpose of focusing the attention of the country and the international community on me."*

"Where globalization means, as it so often does, that the rich and powerful now have new means to further enrich and empower themselves at the cost of the poorer and weaker, we have a responsibility to protest in the name of universal freedom." **-Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela**

"*We will continue to count on your unwavering support and commitment to working with leaders of our continent in bringing about the desired renaissance of Africa."*

"I' don't imagine Heads of Government would ever be able to say I'm not an economist therefore I can't take decisions on matters of the economy; I'm not a soldier I can't take decisions on matters of defence; I'm not an educationist so I can't take decisions about education." **-Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki**

APPROVAL

APPROVAL

This dissertation has been read and approved in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the Degree of Masters' in the Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, South Africa.

29/11/2019

…….. **Date……..**

Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase

SUPERVISOR

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation **"International Relations policies of South Africa since 1990-2008"** represents my own work and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and properly acknowledged for future reference.

By…..…….

Student Name: Simangele Monica Maphumulo

Student Number: 201440767

Email: monicasimangelemaphumulo@gmail.com

DEDICATION

This research work is proudly dedicated to my late mother Londekile Venantia Maphumulo. May your soul rest in eternal peace, till we meet again!

Mashimane!

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The successful completion of this dissertation is attributed to a phalanx of individuals, institutions, officials and public bodies. Among all of them I wish to record my sincere gratitude to the following for their invaluable support:

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I would love to give thanks to my partner whose name I will not mention, my strongest supporter and sternest critic through the long gestation.

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ABSTRACT

This study aimed at examining the issue of participatory, or "democratic," international relations' policy making through the lens of International Relations Policy Analysis (IFPA), a theoretical approach that helped provide the definitional framework for the study. Various regime types and leadership characterised and shaped South Africa's international relations policies during the epoch in question. This necessitated a theoretical and empirical exposition of the various thrusts and narratives of South African government's international relations policies during crucial epochs in the country's history. The 1948-1989 era saw the rule of National Party until the unbanning of the ANC. This was characterized by South Africa's efforts to counter its growing international isolation and find friends wherever they could be solicited. Key problematizing issues included withdrawal from the Commonwealth; growing international isolation; strained ties with the United Nations; growing estrangement from the United States and traditional allies in Europe; growing ties with other global pariahs; clandestine propaganda and sanctions-busting efforts; and Pretoria's efforts to build ties with African states. The period 1994-1999 witnessed the culmination of South African re-engagement efforts and saw the country, still basking in the afterglow of its successful transition under the rule of the African National Congress, play an active and outsized role in the international arena. However, South African international relations' policy during this period also was marked by significant difficulties in balancing its idealist aims with more "realist" considerations. No longer was a global pariah, South Africa was ultimately compelled to make difficult geopolitical choices. The epoch 1999-2008 endorsed efforts to bring peace, democracy, and prosperity to the rest of Africa while positioning Pretoria as an influential actor both globally and on the continent. South Africa's growing prioritization of the developing world; its global diplomatic expansion; Pretoria's efforts to "punch above its weight" in the international arena, on such issues as reform of global governance structures; and its shift from a human rights focus in the early period to more "pragmatic" policies. What served as justification for this study is that these developments advocated the need to "democratize" international relations' policy making, making it more participatory and open to inputs from broader society as well as ensuring legislative oversight to prevent the executive from policy unilateralism. This was best be demonstrated by delving into varying Presidencies on International Relations' Policy Making and Ruling Regimes in perspective; international Relations' Policy in the Period of Transition; as well as international Relations in the pragmatic era, disaggregating a plethora of protagonists involved in the process—both from the influencing and decision-making sides of the coin— analyzed their individual roles in the process of international relations' policy democratization until 2008.

Keywords: *African Renaissance; Commonwealth; geopolitics; Idealism; intergovernmental organisations; international relations; isolationism; multinational corporations; pragmatism; realism*

NGOKUFINGQIWE

Lolu cwaningo luhlose ukuhlola udaba lokwenziwa kwenqubomgomo yokubamba iqhaza, noma “yentando yeningi,” yobudlelwano bamazwe ngamazwe ngokusebenzisa ilensi ye-International Relations Policy Analysis (IFPA), indlela yetiyori eyasiza ekuhlinzekeni ngohlaka oluchazayo locwaningo. Izinhlobo ezahlukene zemibuso kanye nobuholi buphawule futhi bulolonge izinqubomgomo zobudlelwano bamazwe ngamazwe zaseNingizimu Afrika phakathi nenkathi okukhulunywa ngayo. Lokhu kwadinga ukuvezwa kwethiyori nokunobufakazi kwemibono nezindaba ezehlukene zezinqubomgomo zobudlelwano bamazwe ngamazwe zikahulumeni waseNingizimu Afrika ngesikhathi sezinkathi ezibalulekile emlandweni wezwe. Isikhathi sika-1948-1989 sabona ukubusa kweNational Party kwaze kwaba yilapho i-ANC ivalwa. Lokhu kwabonakala ngemizamo yeNingizimu Afrika yokulwa nokuhlukaniswa kwayo okukhulayo namazwe ngamazwe kanye nokuthola abangani noma kuphi lapho bengabacelwa khona. Izinkinga ezibalulekile ezifaka izinkinga zihlanganisa ukuhoxiswa ku-Commonwealth; ukuhlukaniswa kwamanye amazwe okukhulayo; ubudlelwano obuqinile neNhlangano Yezizwe; ukuhlukana okukhulayo okuvela e-United States kanye nabalingani bendabuko eYurophu; ubudlelwano obukhulayo namanye amalungu omhlaba; inkulumo-ze eyimfihlo kanye nemizamo yokunqanda unswinyo; kanye nemizamo yePitoli yokwakha ubudlelwano namazwe ase-Afrika. Isikhathi sika-1994-1999 sabona umvuthwandaba wemizamo yokuxoxisana kabusha neNingizimu Afrika futhi sabona izwe, lisagcwele ukukhanya okungemuva koguquko lwalo oluyimpumelelo ngaphansi kokubusa kwe-African National Congress, lidlala indima ebonakalayo nenkulu kakhulu endimeni yamazwe ngamazwe. Kodwa-ke, inqubomgomo yobudlelwano bamazwe ngamazwe eNingizimu Afrika ngalesi sikhathi nayo yaphawulwa ngobunzima obukhulu ekulinganiseni izinhloso zayo ezinhle nokucatshangelwa “okungokoqobo” okwengeziwe. Yayingaseyona inkundla yomhlaba wonke, iNingizimu Afrika yaphoqeleka ukuthi yenze izinqumo ezinzima ngokwezwe. Inkathi ka-1999-2008 yagunyaza imizamo yokuletha ukuthula, intando yeningi, kanye nempumelelo kuyo yonke i-Afrika ngenkathi ibeka iPitoli njengomdlali onethonya emhlabeni jikelele nasezwenikazi lonke. Ukubeka eqhulwini kweNingizimu Afrika emazweni asathuthuka; ukwanda kwawo kwezombangazwe; Imizamo yePitoli “yokugqilaza ngaphezu kwesisindo sayo” emkhakheni wamazwe ngamazwe, ezindabeni ezifana nokuguqulwa kwezinhlaka zokubusa emhlabeni jikelele; kanye nokusuka kwayo ekugxileni ekugxileni kwamalungelo abantu esikhathini sakudala kuya kuzinqubomgomo “ezisebenzayo” kakhulu.

Okwasebenza njengesizathu salolu cwaningo ukuthi lezi zenzakalo zikhuthaza isidingo “sokwenza intando yeningi” ukwenziwa kwenqubomgomo yobudlelwano bamazwe ngamazwe, okwenza kube nokuhlanganyela okwengeziwe futhi kuvuleke imibono evela emphakathini obanzi kanye nokuqinisekisa ukwenganyelwa komthetho ukuze kuvinjelwe iziphathimandla ekubeni nenqubomgomo eyodwa. Lokhu kuboniswe kangcono ngokuhlola ubuMongameli abehlukene bokwenziwa kweNqubomgomo yoBudlelwane baMazwe ngamazwe kanye Nezimiso Zokubusa ngendlela efanele; Inqubomgomo Yezobudlelwano Bamazwe Ngamazwe Ngesikhathi Soshintsho; kanye noBudlelwane bamazwe ngamazwe enkathini ye-pragmatic, ukuhlukanisa inqwaba yabalingiswa ababambe iqhaza ohlelweni-kokubili kusukela ezinhlangothini ezithonyayo nezithatha izinqumo zohlamvu lwemali-bahlaziye izindima zabo zomuntu ngamunye ohlelweni lokubusa ngentando yeningi yamazwe ngamazwe kuze kube ngu-2008.

Amagama angukhiye: I-African Renaissance; I-Commonwealth; i-geopolitics; Idealism; izinhlangano ezisebenzisana nohulumeni; ubudlelwano bamazwe ngamazwe; ukuzihlukanisa; izinkampani zamazwe ngamazwe; i-pragmatism; iqiniso

ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	American Democratic Party
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
AP	Afrikaner Party
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BDF	Botswana Defence Force
BLP	British Labour Party
BNCs	Bi-National Commissions
BNP	Basutoland National Party
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CMB	Chase Manhattan Bank
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CP	Communist Party
CPSA	Communist Party of South Africa
DDG	Deputy Directors-General
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DG	Director-General
DIA	Department of International Affairs
DIP	Department of Information and Publicity
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme

SANDF	South African National Defence Force
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
UDF	United Democratic Front
UN	United Nations
UNIP	United National Independence Party
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The field of International Relations can be defined as the study of how authority and/ or power is used to organise and manage trans-border relations between actors, and how this contributes to the establishment, maintenance and transformation of order in the world system. These relations may involve states, in any combination of two or more, or may exclude states, or may involve states such as intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). This study thus delved into South Africa's international relations' policy making processes before and mostly during the period in question; varying Presidencies on International Relations' Policy Making and Ruling Regimes in perspective; international Relations' Policy in the Period of Transition (1994-1999); as well as international Relations Policy in the Epoch of Pragmatism (1999-2008).Various actors involved in the process were disaggregated —both from the influencing and decision-making sides of the coin—analysed their individual roles in the process of international relations' policy democratization until 2008.

The 1948-1989 era saw the rule of National Party until the unbanning of the ANC. This was characterized by South Africa's efforts to counter its growing international isolation and find friends wherever they could be solicited. Key problematizing issues included withdrawal from the Commonwealth; growing international isolation; strained ties with the United Nations; growing estrangement from the United States and traditional allies in Europe; growing ties with other global pariahs; clandestine propaganda and sanctions-busting efforts; and Pretoria's efforts to build ties with African states.

The period 1994-1999 witnessed the culmination of South African re-engagement efforts and saw the country, still basking in the afterglow of its successful transition under the rule of the African National Congress, play an active and outsized role in the international arena. However, South African international relations' policy during this period also was marked by significant difficulties in balancing its idealist aims with more "*realist*" considerations. No longer was a global pariah, South Africa was ultimately compelled to make difficult geopolitical choices.

The epoch 1999-2008 endorsed efforts to bring peace, democracy, and prosperity to the rest of Africa while positioning Pretoria as an influential actor both globally and on the continent. South Africa's growing prioritization of the developing world; its global diplomatic expansion;

Pretoria's efforts to "*punch above its weight*" in the international arena, on such issues as reform of global governance structures; and its shift from a human rights focus in the early period to more "pragmatic" policies. What served as justification for this study is that these developments advocated the need to "*democratize*" international relations' policy making, making it more participatory and open to inputs from broader society as well as ensuring legislative oversight to prevent the executive from policy unilateralism.

Examined here was the degree to which the NP and ANC—as distinct entities apart from government—influenced South Africa's international relations policy debate while they were ruling parties. This was done by looking at how, and to what extent, parties weighed in on international relations policy as separate entities from government, examining whether party structures had the facility and interest to make independent inputs on international relations policy, how they were made, and whether the debate was broad-based within the party. The ANC's pre-1994 governance and international relations policy structures were also examined at some length so as to determine how and to what extent they changed after 1994.

The idea of an African Renaissance emphasised the centrality of the African continent in South African international relations policy, and outlined the critical role of South Africa as an intermediary between the African continent and leading foreign powers in the rest of the world. With regard to the promotion of an agenda for South and the development of an equitable global system, the South African government identified a number of issues that would be considered as the country's main concerns. These entail the OAU/African Union (AU) and SADC's restructuring; there form of regional and international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Common wealth; South Africa's hosting of major international conferences; efforts at promoting peace and security in Africa and the Middle East; and an analysis of how South Africa's international relations policy priorities and goals were shaped and influenced by its bilateral relations.

In the process of transforming South Africa's international identity from a pariah state to a respected international player, some scholars contend that South Africa's international relations policies during the epoch 1994-2008 were informed by two contrasting theories of International Relations (IR), namely, idealism and realism, respectively. Such analysis was drawn in this study in order to identify some of the principles that underpinned them. South Africa's response to the 'two Chinas' question and 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe were

employed to highlight apparent irregularities with the country's perceived general policy thrusts.

Map 1: **Pre- 1994 Map of South Africa**



Map 2: **Post- Apartheid Map of South Africa showing Provinces and Major cities**



CHAPTER ONE

AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Governments around the world make decisions about their international relations, be they related to bilateral or multilateral issues. The means by which they make these decisions differ drastically both in terms of constitutional frameworks and common practices. Overall, there is a global tendency for the making of international relations' policy to be an "*elite*" domain, dominated by senior governmental decision-makers. The degree to which extra- governmental actors can influence international relations' policy differs across and within countries. Even among outsiders, influence also tends to be elite in nature, with the relevant issues often little understood outside of specialist areas in government, academia, and civil society.

Public opinion is generally most concerned with domestic affairs, although issues like warfare (as in the United States during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars) and regional integration (as in Europe today) can on occasion resonate with voters, affecting their daily lives. This study thus delved into South Africa's international relations' policy making processes before and mostly during the period in question; varying Presidencies on International Relations' Policy Making and Ruling Regimes in perspective; international Relations' Policy in the Period of Transition (1994-1999); as well as international Relations Policy in the Epoch of Pragmatism (1999-2008).Various actors involved in the process were disaggregated —both from the influencing and decision-making sides of the coin—analysed their individual roles in the process of international relations' policy democratization until 2008.

1.2 Literature Review

The concept of international relations policy has been defined differently by various authors. Vale and Mphaisha for example, see international relations policy as:

> "*the sum total of all activities by which international actors act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders*."[1]

Landsberg on the other hand argues that international relations policy is a course of action that is planned and includes strategies that are carried out by policy-makers towards another state or multilateral agencies in international affairs.[2] International relations policy, Landsberg continues and in congruence with Holsti, is directed

[1] P. Vale & C.J. Mpaisha. *Analysing and Evaluating Foreign, Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Text Book for Africa,* p.89.

[2] C. Landsberg & A. Venter. *Foreign policy-making and implementation in post-settlement South Africa, Government and Politics in the new South Africa,* pp. 250-251.

towards foreign actors whether they are state or non-state actors, with the aim of safeguarding countries' political, economic and social interests.[3]
What is more, Modelski maintains that international relations policy

> "*is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.*"[4]

Additionally, Hughes takes the view that international relations policy comprises of a variety of actions carried out by different divisions of the government of a state and directed towards other organs operating on the international arena, with the aim of advancing national interests. [5]

States are often confronted with the reality that the actions they take in the international fora have the capability of bringing about favourable results for other states, while leading to negative effects for some states. Given this, the challenge for many governments is creating international relations policy that will maximise those favourable results while suppressing negative effects. States therefore balance this equation by relying on skilled policy makers.[6]

Modelski highlights the importance of the community (citizens of a country) in the making of international relations policy. He sees policy-makers as agents of the community who should at all times have their loyalties in their communities. In his work Modelski associates the importance of the community in international relations policy, with the buyers in the commodity market. Citing Ahmed, He notes:

> "*the public share in policy decisions may be compared, with important qualifications, to a market. It buys or refuses to buy the 'policy products' offered by competing elites.*"[7]

Similarly, he emphasises the importance of the community in international relations policy by drawing similarities between the policy- makers and lawyers. [8]
Lawyers work according to instructions given to them by their clients. They must ensure that they meet the demands of these clients by negotiating with the third party in a manner that is favourable to the former. Similar to lawyers, Modelski argues, a policy-

[3] O. Holsti. *Public Opinion and Foreign policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus, International Studies Quarterly,36 (4),* pp.439-466.

[4] G. Modelski. *A Theory of Foreign policy*, p. 6.

[5] T. Hughes, Composers. *Conductors and Players: Harmony and discord in South African policy making,* p.7.

[6] G. Modelski, Op. Cit, p.3.

[7] A, Ahmed, '*The Role of Parliament in South Africa's Foreign policy Development Process: Lessons from the United States Congress', South African Journal of International Affairs, 16 (3),* pp. 291-310.

[8] Ibid. p.5

maker must cooperate with his community which he is representing and with the outside world, in order to alter this world to be in line with the interests of his customer (community).[9]

However, policy-makers do not act alone in making international relations policy. Modelski argues that policy making includes all those people in the community with inputs that are relevant to the making of international relations policy. The actions taken by these actors should have an end because they are expected to bring about a favourable gesture by an outside state, that would not have occurred had that action not have been initiated. These actions must be made under certain norms and values which will serve as guiding principles for that country's international relations policy.[10]

The environment in which a country's international relations policy operates is also important. Modelski holds the view that the international environment remains the most important environment in the making of a country's international relations policy.[11] In this environment what remains important are international relations policies of other countries, especially those policies that a state wants altered.

Vale and Mphaisha depart from Modelski's view that the international environment is the only important environment that determines policy making. Vale and Mphaisha maintain that international relations policy is also made within the domestic arena, the psychological and the bureaucratic (organisational) environments.[12]

Vale and Mphaisha lend support to Modelski with regard to the importance of the domestic environment in the making of international relations policy. While Modelski recognises the centrality of the community in making policy, Vale and Mphaisha argue that international relations policy is influenced by the public's role and maintain that;

> "*the public opinion has controlled international relations policy in all democracies*."[13]

International Relations policy makers can however be influenced by the public which is literate and aware of the international environment. The participation of the public in international relations policy has been made possible by bodies such as universities, think-tanks and the media.[14]

Apart from this, when making international relations policy within a psychological environment policy-makers cease to look at matters which are entirely alien but prefer

[9]Loc. Cit

[10] G. Modelski, Op.Cit. p.3.

[11]Ibid. p.10-11.

[12] P. Vale and C.J. Mphaisha. *Analysing and Evaluating Foreign policy, Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Text Book for Africa,* p. 91.

[13]Loc.Cit.

[14]Ibid.

to look at the realities surrounding them. When viewing these realities, policy-makers are influenced by their attitudes which determine whether they view other governments as trustworthy or friendly. In this study it is argued that these attitudes determine the international relations policy goals which policy-makers have towards other governments. What is more, international relations policy actions are taken based on the notion of values. Values assist in setting standards against which policy-makers measure their actions and responses towards other governments.[15]

Additionally, Vale and Mphaisha argue that the bureaucratic environment plays an important role in the making of international relations policy. These authors are of the view that this environment is best explained by Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision,* which looks at how the United States government decided to impose a naval blockade against Cuba in 1962.[16] Within the bureaucratic environment, government officials charged with making international relations policy can consider two conceptual models, namely: the rational actor model and the bureaucratic model.[17]

On the one hand, there is the rational actor model which consists of policy-makers with a list of goals to be achieved, and a defined pathway of achieving them. This model, however, poses challenges to policy-makers since there are a variety of competing alternative options which have to be rationally evaluated. Against this backdrop, a government must follow a certain procedure if it is to make international relations policy actions.

The government, in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders, ought to identify an international relations policy problem.[18] When this is done, goals must be put in order of importance, with relevant policy alternatives. Policy-makers must be able to predict consequences and ready to note alternatives which carry with them costs and benefits, and select a policy that maximises benefits. This model has however been dismissed as unreliable and simplifying the process of decision making.[19]

The second model propounded by Allison concerns bureaucratic politics, which takes into consideration that the government does not work alone in making decisions. This model suggests that in making decisions there develops an arena where there is the "*pushing*" and "*pulling*" of interests, since different bodies within government want to ensure that international relations policy actions taken maximises their interests. Allison as a result argues that:

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[15]G. Modelski. A *Theory of Foreign policy*, p. 94.

[16] G. Allison. *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, p. 34.

[17]P. Vale & C.J. Mphaisha. *Analysing and Evaluating Foreign policy, Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Text Book for Africa,* p.95.

[18]Loc. Cit.

[19]Ibid. p.9.

> *"the bureaucratic politics model sees many actors focusing on many diverse intra-national international relations policy problems, with each player holding different conceptions of national, organisational and personal goals*."[20]

Hughes on the other takes the view that international relations policy making is influenced by values and beliefs.[21] Similar to Modelski and Vale and Mphaisha, Hughes argues that international relations policy is guided by values and beliefs, and not only made for securing countries' real interests. Hughes bases his argument on the three types of beliefs brought forward by Goldstein and Keohane. According to the latter, beliefs can be classed into three categories, namely: beliefs as pertaining to world views, principled and causal beliefs.[22]

The first category of beliefs relates to people's religions and cultures, which affect the manner in which they think and converse. The principled beliefs on the other hand, are derived from norms which set a standard of determining what is wrong and right. Essentially, principled beliefs:

> "*mediate world views and particular policy conclusions; they translate fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary human action*."[23]

Human rights form a good example of principled beliefs. The last category noticed by Goldstein and Keohane is that of causal beliefs, which provide guidance on how people ought to achieve their objectives. The causal beliefs seek to make clear the relationship between a cause and its effects and come from consensus by elites.[24]

Goldstein and Keohane go further and highlight the impact that ideas have on policy making. Ideas as these authors have noted, assist in ordering the world and thus setting agendas that can influence outcomes. Given this, Goldstein and Keohane have noted that ideas can be utilised as road maps. To be more precise, ideas prompt individuals to closely study the effect of their causal relationships underlying their goals and the political strategies of reaching those goals. Secondly, ideas are seen as contributing to outcomes where there is an absence of a unique equilibrium. Here, ideas are seen as serving as:

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[20]Loc.Cit

[21] T. Hughes. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and discord in South African policy making,* pp. 7-11.

[22]J. Goldstein & R. Keohane. *Ideas and Foreign policy: An Analytical Framework, Ideas and Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change,* pp. 8-11.

[23]Ibid. p. 9.

[24]A. Adebajo. *The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War,* p. 35.

> "*focal points that define cooperative solutions or act as coalition glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular groups – which may even prevent agreement on a wider basis*."[25]

Lastly, policy can be made using precedence provided by earlier road maps or past agreements. In this way, ideas which form the foundation of institutions can make specifications in the absence of innovation.

For the purpose of this research, the literature review will be considered from two different perspectives: the school of thought that articulates that Pretoria should position itself as:

> "*a conductor of the orchestra, not just a page turner or a pianist.*"[26]

On the other hand, there is a school of thought that argues that South Africa should not flex its economic and political muscle to bring about stability in the region (and in Africa), since this can hamper the country's ability of achieving its national interests.[27] South Africa's international relations policy according to Moeletsi Mbeki is based on the fact that the African National Congress (ANC) government often misses the opportunity to address the challenges brought about by Pretoria's international relations policy choices.

The topic of democratization of international relations policy making has a long history in FPA and broader political science literature. Alexis de Tocqueville's famed 1835 *Democracy in America* was one of the earliest works in the political science canon to address the issue; he notably dismissed broad-based participation in international relations policy making as a dangerous concept. Such opinions remained the dominant paradigm through the 1960s, with "realist" thinkers like Morgenthau advocating that governments should steer the international relations policy views of their citizenries, not vice versa.[28]

Another prominent realist, Max Beloff, wondered in print in 1955 whether:

> "*the whole search for a truly democratic international relations policy is based upon an illusion as to its possibility?*"[29]

He further emphasized his opinion on the matter by stating,

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[25] A. Adebajo. *The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War,* p. 12.

[26]K. Dlamini. *South Africa's Foreign policy since 1994, South African Yearbook of International Affairs, South African Institution of International Affairs,* p.3.

[27]Ibid.

[28]H. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* p. 147.

[29] M. Beloff. *Foreign policy and the Democratic Process,* p. 26.

> "*I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles*".[30]

Pahre later characterized the fears of the realist school as revolving around the concept that an:

> "*uninformed public may make unreasonable demands on international relations policy makers, harming international relations policy effectiveness. These demands may be impractical, may fail to consider trade-offs among several goals, or be time-inconsistent in that they do not anticipate the effects of today's demands on tomorrow's policy choices*".[31]

However, from the 1970s onward, critics began to question the realists' skepticism of broad- based participation on the grounds of principle—particularly on the grounds of Abraham Lincoln's assertion that democracy is "government of the people, by the people"—but also on the grounds of efficacy.[32] The leading proponent of this idea was George, whose "*multiple advocacy*" argument is perhaps the nearest definition to "*democratic*" international relations policy as proposed by this study. Multiple advocacy, according to George, was formulated in response to his assertion that international relations policy blunders are made by leaders' inattention to or ignorance of dissonant opinions and seeks to ensure:

> "*that all views held by individuals within the analytic system will be granted serious attention*".[33]

Rather than focus on participation from the angle of the public writ large (in fact George is vague in identifying the pertinent actors beyond the executive), he focuses on the actors who have inputs to make into the international relations policy debate and advocates that they all should have a voice in the policy making process.

Multiple advocacy, as proposed by George consists of three elements designed to promote a balanced, open, and managed process of debate, so that no relevant assessments will be submerged by unchallenged premises or the bureaucratic strength of opposing officials:

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[30]Ibid.

[31]R. Pahre. *Conclusion: Democracy and Foreign policy, in Democratic Foreign policy Making: Problems of Divided Government and International Cooperation,* p. 87.

[32]Z. Masiza. *Silent Citizenry: Public Participation and Foreign policy- making,* p. 2.

[33] A. George. *The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign policy, 66,* pp.751-785

> *"--All actors being granted equal weight; provided relevant information, competence, and analytic capacity; and having equal powers of persuasion.*
> *--Head of state participation in the policy making process, ensuring he or she hears all relevant opinions.*
> *--Time for adequate debate and give-and-take*."[34]

George's proposal to ensure that the executive hears all relevant voices in the international relations policy arena before making a decision is the crux of the idea of "*democratic*" international relations policy, as proposed here. However, it also raises the necessary question of whether multiple advocacy, as proposed by George, is a realistic goal in a democracy, a pre-cursor to the larger question of whether a truly "*democratic*" international relations policy is possible. The latter two principles are not unrealistic in theory, but difficult to systematize—how does one compel a head of state to spend a certain amount of time on international relations policy, much less identify a specific group of actors who must be engaged?

The first principle, however, is most problematic. All actors in international relations policy debate are not created equal.[35] An External Affairs Minister, a political science professor, and a member of international relations policy advocacy group do not have the same information except in exceptional, controlled settings. And once again, no one can force a head of state to treat all of the same, giving their views and advice equal weight.

The principles of multiple advocacy offer an idealized version of what a truly democratic international relations policy might look like, particularly in regard to its very basic premise that leaders should listen to pertinent international relations policy actors.[36] Its particulars, of course, display the complexities and difficulties associated with such a paradigm, but both principles and practice provide a useful perspective for assessing South African international relations policy making.

If there is a common thread that runs through the discussion of literature to this point, it is the overwhelming dominance of European and—primarily—American perspectives on international relations policy making.[37] This creates valid questions about the applicability of such studies. What do Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, and

[34]A. George. *The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign policy, 66,* pp. 751-785.

[35]P. Vale and C.J. Mpaisha. *Analysing and Evaluating Foreign policy, Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Text Book for Africa,* p. 89.

[36]A. George. *The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign policy, 66,* pp. 751-785.

[37]P. Vale. *Starting Over: Some Early Questions on Post-Apartheid Foreign policy,* p.5.

Margaret Thatcher have in common with, say, Jan Smuts, PW Botha, and Thabo Mbeki?

Does the activist US Congress have any areas of congruence with the South African Parliament? And how do the levels of engagement on international relations policy among South Africans—both in relation to the white public pre-1994 and the entire populace thereafter—match up with those of the American public? These questions have received some attention from South African scholars; Nel, van Wyk, and Johnsen note that American public opinion studies could prove applicable to South Africa, on the grounds that it should not be assumed the:

> "*US public has some in-built superior ability to deal prudently with international relations policy issues*".[38]

For the most part, however, these issues have been understudied in a South African context.

Prior to 1994, there were relatively few academic accounts of international relations policy making process in South Africa, with the notable exception of American academic Ned Munger's 1965 Notes on the *Formation of South African International relations policy* and Deon Geldenhuys' 1984 *Diplomacy of Isolation;* in Afrikaans, Gerrit Olivier's *Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid* (South Africa's International relations policy) ranks among the few volumes covering the topic.[39] Peter Vale noted in 1990 that with few exceptions, "*theoretical concerns have not engaged South African scholars*," while Anthoni van Nieuwkerk in 2006 wrote that FPA analyses of South Africa have been limited, noting that existing studies are largely descriptive and "*tend to avoid methodological sophistication*".[40]

Two excellent compilations from the past decade—*Democratizing International relations policy? Lessons from South Africa, (2004), edited by Philip Nel and Janis van der Westhuizen, and South Africa's International relations policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy* (2001), edited by Jim Broderick, Gary Burford, and Gordon Freer—made valuable contributions to the examination of the "democratic" nature of South Africa's international relations policy, but focused on a narrower conception of relevant actors (particularly with focuses on public opinion and Parliament) while not examining others of interest for this study.[41]

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[38] P. Nel et al. *Democracy, Participation, and Foreign policy Making in South Africa, in Democratizing Foreign policy? Lessons from South Africa,* pp. 52-53.

[39] G. Oliver. *Ideology in South African Foreign policy 25 (2),* pp. 168-182.

[40] P. Vale. *Starting Over: Some Early Questions on a Post-Apartheid Foreign policy, Southern Africa Perspectives, Center for Southern African Studies,* p. 7.

[41] P. Nel, J. Van Wyk & K. Johnsen. *Democracy, Participation, and Foreign policy Making in South Africa, in Democratizing Foreign policy? Lessons from South Africa,* p. 54.

At the end of the day, however, a survey of South African literature leaves the reader wanting more. While certain actors (particularly the executive and Parliament) have received attention in works during the past two decades, other actors (academics, bureaucratic actors, and advisory groups, for example) have been largely ignored. Also, no author since Geldenhuys has taken a comprehensive look at how all of the various actors involved in the policy process interact with one another in the shaping of policy.[42] This is a notable oversight, particularly in light of the 1994 transition, and one that this study, in a small way, hopes to address.

1.3 Problem Statement

Various regime types and leadership characterised and shaped South Africa's international relations policies in the period 1948-2008. This necessitated a theoretical and empirical exposition of the various thrusts and narratives of South African government's international relations policies during crucial epochs in the country's history. The 1948-1989 era saw the rule of National Party until the unbanning of the ANC. This was characterized by South Africa's efforts to counter its growing international isolation and find friends wherever they could be solicited.

Key problematizing issues included withdrawal from the Commonwealth; growing international isolation; strained ties with the United Nations; growing estrangement from the United States and traditional allies in Europe; growing ties with other global pariahs; clandestine propaganda and sanctions-busting efforts; and Pretoria's efforts to build ties with African states.[43]

The period 1994-1999 witnessed the culmination of South African re-engagement efforts and saw the country, still basking in the afterglow of its successful transition under the rule of the African National Congress, play an active and outsized role in the international arena. However, South African international relations' policy during this period also was marked by significant difficulties in balancing its idealist aims with more "*realist*" considerations.[44] No longer was a global pariah, South Africa was ultimately compelled to make difficult geopolitical choices.

The epoch 1999-2008 endorsed efforts to bring peace, democracy, and prosperity to the rest of Africa while positioning Pretoria as an influential actor both globally and on the continent. South Africa's growing prioritization of the developing world; its global

[42] D. Geldenhuys. *The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, in Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to de Klerk,* pp. 56-59

[43] P.J. McGowan, S. Cornelissen & P. Nel. *Power, wealth and global equity: An international relations textbook for Africa,* pp.119-135.

[44] Ibid.

diplomatic expansion; Pretoria's efforts to "*punch above its weight*" in the international arena, on such issues as reform of global governance structures; and its shift from a human rights focus in the early period to more "pragmatic" policies.[45]

What served as justification for this study is that these developments advocated the need to "*democratize*" international relations' policy making, making it more participatory and open to inputs from broader society as well as ensuring legislative oversight to prevent the executive from policy unilateralism.

This was best be demonstrated by delving into varying Presidencies on International Relations' Policy Making and Ruling Regimes in perspective; international Relations' Policy in the Period of Transition; as well as international Relations in the pragmatic era, disaggregating a plethora of protagonists involved in the process—both from the influencing and decision-making sides of the coin—analyzed their individual roles in the process of international relations' policy democratization until 2008.

1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study

To examine the issue of participatory, or "democratic," international relations' policy making through the lens of International Relations Policy Analysis (IFPA)[46], a theoretical approach that helped provide the definitional framework for the study. Thus, this study had the following as its objectives:

1.4.1 Analysing South Africa's international relations' policy making processes since 1948.

1.4.2 Interrogating the constitutional and legalistic framework of South Africa's international relations' policy making process.

1.4.3 Evaluating the degree to which South Africa's international relations' policy making was democratic and open to outside participation.

1.5 Research questions

1.5.1 What was the nature of South Africa's international relations' policy from the rule of the National Party in 1948 until the banning of the ANC in 1990?

1.5.2 How and to what extent could South Africa's constitutional and legalistic framework of international relations' policy making be assessed?

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[45] Nkoana-Mashabane. *Speech by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on the occasion of the Heads of Mission Conference, in Sandton 13 August 2009,* pp. 9-11.

[46] P. J. McGowan, S. Cornelissen & P. Nel. *Power, wealth and global equity: An international relations textbook for Africa,* pp.119-135.

1.5.3 Was South Africa's international relations' policy making democratic during transition epoch, and to what extent was it open to outside participation?

1.6 Theoretical Framework

1.6.1 International Relations Policy Analysis Actor Specific Theory

This study used the theoretical construct of International Relations Policy Analysis and to a certain extent the Actor Specific Theory. Understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them, was central to the inquiry of social scientists, including those in International Relations. Thus, international relations policy analysis is characterized by an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.[47]

Most contemporary theoretical work in IR gives the impression that whatever decision-making unit is involved, be it a state or a human being or a group, that this unit can be approximated as a unitary rational actor and therefore be made equivalent to the state. With its assumption that human decision makers acting singly and in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations and that such decision makers are not best approximated as unitary rational actors equivalent to the state[48], FPA is positioned to provide the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-general theory and its social science foundation.

Defining IRPA is no simple task, due to the breadth of the topic, but it can be explained most generally as the study of how and why states (and in some cases non-state actors) make International Relations policy decisions, with a specific focus on the decision-making processes of the actors involved. The need to focus on the decision maker was summed up by Frankel in his seminal 1963 study on International Relations policy making in noting that,

> *"State decisions' are not made by states but on their behalf, by individuals and by groups of individuals*".[49]

Breuning provides another useful definition, noting that IRPA

> "*assumes that individual decision makers, either alone or in groups, make International Relations policy decisions. It also*

[47]M.V. Hudson. *Foreign policy Analysis: Actor- Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations, Foreign policy Analysis,* pp. 1-30.

[48]Ibid.

[49]J. Frankel. *The Making of Foreign policy: An Analysis of Decision Making,* p. 2.

> *assumes International Relations policy decisions are usually determined by a complex interplay of multiple factors*".[50]

Unless one understands the motivations, constraints, biases, and influences on the decision maker (or makers), one cannot understand the rationale behind the final decisions. Having such knowledge is not only important for those looking backward (like historians), but also for analysts looking forward, as such an understanding is critical for predicting future state behaviours where the same actors are involved. As noted by leading IRPA scholar James Rosenau:

> "*the field does have a central focus – the plans and actions of national governments oriented toward the external world*".[51]

IRPA scholarship seeks to understand how these plans and actions are formulated, and it is in applying these questions to the South African policy environment that will allow us to assess the degree to which the International Relations policy sphere was democratized after 1994.

Although authors and historians have long written about the role of human actors in the context of state decision making, a structured study of IRPA as a discipline did not begin until after World War II.[52] Up to that point, most analysis of international relations viewed states as unitary actors, largely ignoring the role of human decision makers and domestic actors in the formulation process. The predominant realist constructs of international relations theory reinforced this notion in that its overarching focus on the interests of states in the international arena minimized the focus on the domestic actor.[53] After the war, however, some scholars began to take a more nuanced approach to this issue, with the understanding that the domestic actors, ranging from heads of state to the broader public, had an impact on such things as the conceptualization of national interest and the ordering of International Relations policy priorities.

The goal was to get inside the "black box" of state decision-making behaviour and better understand how it worked. The first serious attempt to understand these dynamics was undertaken by American academics Snyder, Bruck, and Sabin in their 1954 article "*Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*" and their

[50]M. Breuning. *Foreign policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction,* p. 21.

[51]J. Rosenau. *Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign policy, in New Directions in the Study of Foreign policy,* p. 8.

[52]V. Hudson. *The History and Evolution of Foreign policy Analysis, in Foreign policy: Theories, Actors, Cases,* p.12.

[53]V. Hudson. *Foreign policy Decision- Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the 21st Century, in Foreign policy Decision-making,* p. 2.

subsequent 1962 book International Relations Policy Decision-Making. In the article, they laid out their theoretical approach as follows:

> "*We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, but we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision-makers are viewed as operating in a dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision- makers. Hitherto, precise ways of related domestic factors have not been adequately developed*".[54]

Despite the fact that IRPA scholarship has branched out in many different directions (to be discussed below) since this first piece was published, the article entrenched the notion of a need for a "bottom up" approach to international relations, whereby the human actor remains central to the discussion.

1.6. 2 *IRPA and International Relations Theory*

In relating to the larger field of International Relations (IR) Theory, IRPA is in many ways like a square peg in a round hole. The dominant paradigms within IR Theory—including realism, liberalism, and constructivism—do, like IRPA, seek to explain how states interact within the broader international system. However, these paradigms generally do not delve into the micro level issues surrounding decision making, rather taking a more macro perspective that still largely takes a state-centric perspective. They do little to delve into domestic politics that drive the International Relations policy debate. As an example, Morgenthau's discussion of "*national interest*" makes it sound as if such interests were self-evident; rather, there exist extensive debates within governments and within societies around the world about what at the end of the day ultimately is a state's "national interest".[55]Hence, the need to move away from the classic realist "billiard ball" view of the state as a unitary actor in the international system is quite necessary.

Hence, the relationship between IRPA and IR Theory is a complex one, and it is not entirely clear how IRPA fits into the broader IR Theory picture. As Engstrom has noted, IRPA "*simply deals with those things IR cannot explain*," further noting that IR theories' big picture, macro focus means it can only deal with long-term trends in a

[54] R. Snyder et al. *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Foreign policy Analysis Project Series,* p. 53.

[55]H. Morgenthau. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* p. 147.

very general fashion.[56]

Hermann and Kegley add that what sets IRPA apart from more mainstream IR is this insistence that, as they put it, "compelling explanation (of International Relations policy) cannot treat the decider exogenously".[57] In theory, IRPA analysis can be applied to existing IR theoretical approaches and such an approach is quite necessary to put analytic "meat" on their theoretical skeletons.

1.6.3 *IRPA as a Subset of Public Policy Studies*

IRPA can also, and more convincingly, be viewed as a subfield of public policy studies. Probably the best definition of public policy comes from Dye, who wrote quite simply that, "*Public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not do*"[58] Another definition that perhaps adds more detail to the discussion comes from Eulau and Prewitt, who note,

> "*Policy is defined as a 'standing position' characterized by behavioural consistency and repetitiveness on the part of both those who make it and those who abide by it*".[59]

This raises the important element of public participation in the process, which in democracies goes beyond the simple election of governments, as citizenries around the world remain engaged on policy issues even between election cycles. As Parsons notes,

> "*The idea of public policy presupposes that there is a sphere or domain of life which is not private or purely individual, but held in common*".[60]

Public policy studies also have common ground with IRPA in the sense that both are heterogeneous theoretical approaches. There is no grand theory associated either with public policy or IRPA; rather, both examine the individual elements of the policy making process and seek to explain the interrelationship of the involved actors. "*No one theory or model is adequate to explain the complexity of the policy activity of the modern state*," wrote Parsons in his 1995 study of public policy.

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[56]P. Engstrom. *Theories of International Relations, Power point lecture*, http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/staff/engstrom/tir2008wk11.ppt.

[57]M. Hermann & C. Kegley. *Rethinking Democracy and International Peace, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,* p. 7.

[58]T. Dye. *Understanding Public Policy,* p.2.

[59] H. Eulau & K. Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Bureaucracy,* p. 465.

[60]W. Parsons. *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis,* p.3.

> "*The analyst must accept the pluralistic nature of the inquiry, both in terms of the interdisciplinary quality of investigation and the need for a hermeneutic tolerance of diversity. The analysis of public policy therefore involves an appreciation of the network of ideas, concepts and words which form the world of explanation within which policy making and analysis takes place*".[61]

There has been increasing recognition in recent years of the pertinence of International Relations affairs to the public policy debate. South African scholar Dirk Kotze, referring specifically to South Africa but also more broadly, noted:

> "*In the past, policy studies concentrated on domestic policies such as housing, health issues, education, environmental matters or immigration. International Relations policies were treated as the domain of diplomacy and diplomats, the Presidency and officials in the Ministry of International Relations Affairs, who were solely responsible for them*,"[62].

Furthermore, he adds,

> "*Many International Relations issues involve trade, cultural exchange, immigration, military or health policy matters. In this course public policy is therefore not limited to domestic policy matters*".[63]

Given these congruencies, IRPA certainly can be viewed as a meaningful subset of public policy studies, and in a more clearly pertinent way than as a subset of IR theory.

1.7 Research Methodology

1.7.1 Research Design

This study combined both quantitative and qualitative methods. The methodological triangulation provided richer data by exposing information that might remain undiscovered if a single approach would be employed. According to Babbie and Mouton, qualitative research distinguishes itself from quantitative research in terms of the following key features:

(a) *Research conducted in the natural setting of social actors.*

[61]W. Parsons. *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis,* p.73.

[62] D. Kotze. *Politics and Public Policy: A Study Guide,* p. 10.

[63] Ibid, p.11.

(b) A focus on process rather than outcome.
(c) The actor's perspective (the 'insider' or 'emic' view) is emphasised.
(d) The primary aim is in-depth ('thick') descriptions and understanding of actions and events.
(e) The main concern is to understand social action in terms of its specific context (idiographic motive), rather than attempting to generalize to some theoretical population.
(f) The research process is often inductive in its approach, resulting in the generation of new hypotheses and theories.
(g) The qualitative researcher is seen as the 'main instrument' in the research process.[64]

Based on the above, the qualitative approach was considered the most appropriate method to extract data from 30(10 in Pretoria, 10 Cape Town, 5 in Bloemfontein and 5 in KwaZulu-Natal ranging from politicians, government officials, academics and civil servants) respondents in the identifiedareas of South Africa. The study used focus group interviews to gather data from the above respondents.

With the intention of observing how South Africa manifested its international relations policy objectives within its multilateral activity and behaviour, this research study made use of secondary and primary material.[65] Secondary material consisted of scholarly writing on the subject of apartheid South Africa's international relations policy. Primary material consisted of government policies, speeches from key international relations policy role-players within the South African government.

Policies and speeches were analyzed to determine trends in South Africa's international relations policy orientation during the period under study. Further, a simplified use of historical/comparative data analysis was undertaken with regards to South Africa's international relations policies through an examination of official documents such as charters and policy statements.

A final aspect of analysis entailed an investigation of the change in international relations policy between 1990-1999 and 1999-2008 period, and how that affected the country's international relations behaviour. This form of trend study - noting change in the pursuit of international relations policy objectives at different times –enabled conclusions to be drawn about the intentions and positions of major individual political figures, and the ramifications these bore.

[64] E. Babbie. *The Practices of Social Research,* p.271.

[65] Nkoana-Mashabane. *Public Lecture at the University of Limpopo, on October 16 2009.*

1.7.2 Population and sampling

According to Babbie and Mouton[66], a population constitutes the entire collection of elements or groups in respect of which inferences must be drawn.

The 30 (10 in Pretoria, 10 Cape Town, 5 in Bloemfontein and 5 in KwaZulu-Natal ranging from politicians, government officials, academics and civil servants) respondents in the identified areas of South Africa were selected based on equitable population distribution of the identified areas, irrespective of gender, race, doctrine or party/political affiliation. This means that the area under survey was divided into equal zones/sections from which equal representation of informants was randomly selected. The minimum age was limited to 23 years old. These respondents were selected for the focus group interviews.

Fifteen (15) respondents from the identified Provinces or key cities were also administered with questionnaires. Proportional Representation (PR) Civil Servants and government officials were part of the fifteen (15) targeted respondents. Out of the fifteen (15) respondents, only seven (7) were politically-affiliated. This was due to the fact that PR Civil Servants were primarily accountable to the political party to which they were affiliated.

They were the elected representatives acting as links between the government and society. In addition, five (5) senior management in the administration of International Relations Ministry were administered with questionnaires as part of quantitative research. There were also four (4) Deputy Directors-General (DDGs) who were given questionnaires since they were also responsible to run or manage South Africa's International Relations Department Branches.

The 30 (10 in Pretoria, 10 Cape Town, 5 in Bloemfontein and 5 in KwaZulu-Natal ranging from politicians, government officials, academics and civil servants) respondents in the identified areas of South Africa were randomly selected for the purpose of the focus group interviews, which form part of the qualitative study.

Thus, the qualitative research methodology was the most appropriate for the purpose of this group. Semi- structured interviews were guided conversations where broad questions were asked, which do not restrict the conversation and new questions were allowed to arise as a result of the discussion. Five questions were formulated and put to each of the focus groups in this category. The Minister and the Director-General in the International Relations Department were chosen as members of the empirical survey.

1.7.3 Data collection instruments

Before the fully-fledged questionnaire was implemented, a pilot study was undertaken, using a convenient sample in order to enable the researcher to eliminate any ambiguous areas or questions, to refine the questionnaire, and to gauge the standard of the questions.

[66]E. Babbie. *The Practices of Social Research,* p. 100.

1.7.3.1 Questionnaire

Data for the study was collected through a self- administered questionnaire consisting of the following two main sections:

Section A: Biographical particulars of the respondents, including occupational categories, educational qualifications, mother tongue, age and gender.

Section B: Pertaining to administrative and institutional capacity to promote public participation and the level of public participation in decision-making, involvement in the International Relations Policy budgeting processes, public participation initiatives and programmes, and the resourcing thereof. Use was made of both close-ended and open-ended questions. Data was extracted in terms of the focus group interviews. Themes were identified from the group interviews.

1.7.3.2 Documents reviewed

The researcher reviewed a number of documents for the purpose of this study. These entailed relevant books, journals and other publications on International Relations Policy Making processes. A review and analysis of a variety of 'developmental' international relations legislative prescriptions were also embarked upon.

Legislation consulted, included but was not limited to the White Paper on International Relations Policy (1998), the Batho Pele White Paper, Public Finance Management Act 66 of 2003, and the 1996 Constitution.[67] Lastly, a review of applicable periodicals, theses, published and unpublished material, newspaper articles, and other key municipal documents, as well as internet searches were undertaken.

1.7.3.3 Data analysis

The data interpretation and analysis undertaken consisted of the following:

(a) Determining relative values pertaining to the established criteria that emerged from the literature study and empirical survey and transforming such data into codified form and capturing it in a computer database;

(b) The qualitative data analyses involved thematic content analysis whereby a software package was used. A qualified statistician from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Durban) was approached to assist with data analysis and interpretation.

1.8 Conclusion

The study sought to contribute to the academic synergy of key priorities and common focus areas of International Relations policies, interpretations and implementation requirements thereof from national to provincial and eventually to local government.

[67] D. Van Niekerk, G. Van Der Waldt & A. Jonker. *Governance, Politics and Policy in South Africa,* p. 18

This is where it impacted on the lives of the people. The study further contributed to participatory, or "*democratic*," international relations' policy making through the lens of International relations policy Analysis (FPA).

A political Map of South Africa

***Source**: http://ontheworldmap.com/south-africa/south-africa-political-map.html*

CHAPTER TWO

NASCENT NARRATIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' POLICY

2.1 Introduction

Before examining the role various actors have played through the years in shaping South African international relations policy, one must first explain the various thrusts and narratives of South African— government and exiled ANC—international relations policy throughout the country's history. While the detailed discussion will focus on the "how" and the "why," one cannot delve into these discussions without an overview of the "what," the broader external aims of both the South African Government and, pre-1990, the ANC in exile. To this end, this chapter is subdivided into six parts that will provide an overview of the international relations policy priorities of the South African Government and the ANC during the past century, albeit with a focus on the post-1948 period:

This section will briefly discuss the origins of South African international relations policy, both pre-Union and in the 1910-1948 periods. This will cover South Africa's involvement in the two World Wars and the impact of the Balfour Declaration on developing South Africa's independent international relations policy competency. The National Party's rule until the unbanning of the ANC was characterized by South Africa's efforts to counter its growing international isolation and find friends wherever they could be had. Key issues to be addressed include withdrawal from the Commonwealth; growing international isolation; strained ties with the United Nations; growing estrangement from the United States and traditional allies in Europe; growing ties with other global pariahs; clandestine propaganda and sanctions-busting efforts; and Pretoria's efforts to build ties with African states.

ANC foreign engagement goes back to the organization's foundation in 1912, although this section mostly will focus on the ANC's post-1960 attempts to seek international legitimacy as the true representative of South Africa's people; establish representation around the world; raise money; raise awareness of and shift international opinion against apartheid; and increasingly isolate the government in Pretoria. This section will discuss the dominant issues of the transitional period, particularly the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) discussions on South Africa's future international relations policy priorities and diplomatic infrastructure. It will also examine South Africa's reemergence on the global stage.

Nelson Mandela's 1994-1999 administration saw the culmination of South African reengagement efforts and saw the country, still basking in the afterglow of its successful transition, play an active and outsized role in the international arena. However, South African international relations policy during this period also was marked by significant difficulties in balancing its idealist aims with more "realist" considerations. No longer a global pariah, South Africa was finally forced to make difficult geopolitical choices. South African responses to crises in Nigeria and Lesotho also will be examined here.

Lastly, this section will examine Thabo Mbeki's efforts to bring peace, democracy, and prosperity to the rest of Africa while positioning Pretoria as an influential actor both globally and on the continent. South Africa's growing prioritization of the developing world; its global diplomatic expansion; Pretoria's efforts to "punch above its weight" in the international arena, on such issues as reform of global governance structures; and its shift from a human rights focus in the early period to more "*pragmatic*" policies in the late 1990s all will be scrutinized here. South Africa's policy toward Zimbabwe, probably the most prominent international relations policy issue since 1994, will merit particular examination, both here and in chapters to come.

2.2 South African International relations policy to 1948

Although the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State from the 1840s signed treaties with other countries and sent diplomatic representatives to Europe and the United States, South Africa had no independent international relations policy decision-making competency until the Balfour Declaration of 1926 granted Great Britain's Dominions equal and autonomous status under the new Commonwealth.[68] Although the Declaration stated that most international relations policy responsibility would remain in London, it allowed for autonomous Dominion diplomatic services; South Africa's Department of External Affairs was set up later that year.

External affairs were generally a low priority for South Africa for most of the 1920s and 1930s, but this changed with the coming storm in Europe. The march to war raised questions about the country's autonomy in the event of war, with the two main governmental leaders—Prime Minister- JBM Hertzog and Deputy Prime Minister Jan Smuts—divided over South Africa's obligation to back Great Britain in a conflict with Germany.[69]

Matters came to a head with Germany's 1 September 1939 invasion of Poland, which brought Great Britain into the war two days later. A neutrality motion put forth by Hertzog was defeated by 80 votes to 67, while a Smuts motion urging cooperation with Great Britain passed by the same margin. South Africa was at war. Despite inheriting a tiny Defense Force totally unprepared for conflict, Smuts—who emerged as Prime Minister—turned the South African force into a valuable partner for the Allies. In all, 334,000 men volunteered for service in the South African Army (including 123,000 non-white members of support units); nearly 9,000 were killed in action. At war's end, Smuts served as South Africa's representative at the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations, drafting the preamble to the UN Charter. Smuts' heightened international profile, however, did him few favors at home. In the run-up to 1948 elections, the National Party attacked Smuts and

[68] A. Vandenbosh. *South Africa and the World: The Foreign policy of Apartheid,* p. 58.

[69] J. Spence. *Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign policy,* pp. 8-9.

his United Party for being soft on racial segregation and more focused on global statesmanship than problems at home.

Although the NP and its Afrikaner Party allies only took 42 percent of the vote to the United Party's 49 percent, their support in smaller rural constituencies allowed them to win 79 of 153 seats. DF Malan assumed the Premiership, and the era of apartheid and isolation began.

2.3 The Diplomacy of Defiance, 1948-1990

The National Party government's resistance to international pressure to reform or abolish its system of apartheid underscored South Africa's international relations policy between 1948 and 1990; maintenance of white rule in South Africa (and Southwest Africa) was the overarching goal. As a former director of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) succinctly observed, "The South African Government's policy abroad is to seek to maintain apartheid at home".[70]

To this end, Pretoria engaged in an increasing sophisticated, multi-headed approach that at first utilized legalistic tactics, diplomatic overtures, and economic incentives to win friends and rebuff enemies. However, as anti-South Africa attitudes hardened by the mid-1960s, these policy options expanded to include covert action, the development of a nuclear deterrent, and the use of conventional and unconventional military force—all elements of the "*Total Strategy*," which will be explained below—to show its opponents that South Africa had no intention of capitulation. The Nationalists effectively played up the communist threat to South Africa from- the Soviet-backed ANC to maintain consistently high levels of domestic support and win anti-Communist friends abroad.

South Africa's international relations policy during the Premierships of DF Malan (1948-1953) and JG Strijdom (1953-1958) was characterized by attempts to maintain close ties with the West, not alienate Great Britain, and establish South Africa as a player in a rapidly decolonizing Africa, all the while showing voters they would not be cowed by external pressure.[71]

Pretoria had some luck with the former two. The escalation of the Cold War helped South Africa maintain good standing with the West, as did the South African Air Force's participation in both the 1948 Berlin Air Lift and the Korean War, although Malan's efforts to make South Africa an "*auxiliary*" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the southern hemisphere came to naught.[72] For avowed republicans, Malan and Strijdom also retained surprisingly strong relations with Great Britain and dismissed calls for withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Economics was key to this; Commonwealth trade

[70] R. Stevens. *South Africa and Independent Black Africa,* p. 32.

[71] J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 1.

[72] W. Speenkamp. *Aircraft of the South African Air Force,* p. 34.

preferences, security cooperation, and access to British capital all made continued membership highly desirable.[73]

Efforts to improve South Africa's standing in Africa, however, had less luck. In the run-up to decolonization, Malan was taken with the idea of an "*African Charter*" aimed at preserving colonial rule by stopping Asian immigration, keeping out Communism, and ensuring the continent remained non-militarized.[74] South Africa would play a central role in this charter, offering assistance and cooperation to colonies across the continent, but European colonial powers paid it no heed. [75] Malan's attempt to acquire control from Great Britain of the British Protectorate states—Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland—on South Africa's borders, the independence of which he found abhorrent, similarly found no success.

Strijdom, on the other hand, took a more pragmatic approach to the continent, with a focus on maintaining white rule where tenable but recognizing that independence for much of the continent was a reality. He emphasized the need for cooperation and the "*hand of friendship*" between South Africa and black-ruled states, and to that end established several organizations to advance technical and agricultural cooperation.[76] Strijdom even sent senior diplomats to Ghana's independence ceremony, although he drew the line at exchanging diplomats with a black-ruled country.[77] Unsurprisingly, Ghana and other new states showed little outward enthusiasm for close ties, although Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah was slow to cut trade ties with Pretoria, stating in 1957 that Ghana would not interfere in a South African internal matter.[78]

Hendrik Verwoerd's ascension to the Premiership in 1958 after Strijdom' s death marked a significant shift in style from his predecessors. While both Malan and Strijdom had tried to maintain ties to South Africa's traditional allies and remain a respected member of the international community, Verwoerd was far more comfortable with a "*go it alone*" mentality, one that would permeate the foreign relations of his eight-year tenure. Verwoerd was firmly committed to the establishment of a South African republic, although this republicanism was not necessarily based on the assumption that South Africa would leave the Commonwealth.[79] However, Verwoerd's refusal to offer any concessions on its racial policies—or even accept diplomats from newly independent African Commonwealth

[73]P. Henshaw. *Britain, South Africa and the sterling Area: Gold Product Capital Investment and Agriculture Markets 1931-1961,* p. 223.

[74] R. Southall. *South Africa in Africa: Foreign policy Making During the Apartheid Era,* p. 7.

[75]D. Geldenhuys. *The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations,* pp. 252-253.

[76] J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 3.

[77]J. Barber. *South Africa's Foreign policy 1945-1970,* p. 7.

[78]J. Barber. *South Africa's Foreign policy 1945-1970,* p. 7.

[79]N. Stulz. *The Politics of Security: South Africa Under Verwoerd 1961-1966. The Journal of Modern African Studies 7(1),* p. 9.

members, calling them a potential "*center of agitation*" for attacking apartheid—raised tensions to the point of South Africa's 1961 withdrawal. The pullout was met by great consternation among English-speaking South Africans and businessmen, who feared the loss of Commonwealth trade preferences, although economic fears proved unfounded.

Pretoria's relations under Verwoerd with the increasingly vocal United Nations, however, proved more difficult. Ties to the UN were by no means cordial under his predecessors; perceived meddling in South Africa's affairs led both Malan and Strijdom to suspend South African participation in various UN bodies at points during their tenures.[80]

Nonetheless, relations worsened notably under Verwoerd, with both the 1960 Sharpeville massacre and the explosion of independent African states—16 in 1960 alone—leading South Africa to face unprecedented pressure in the body. The General Assembly in 1962 for the first time called on a trade and diplomatic boycott of South Africa, and the following year voted in favor of a voluntary arms embargo.[81] Verwoerd responded with open contempt of the United Nations, blaming a "*Communist bloc*" for attacks on South Africa, although he stopped short of total withdrawal. Verwoerd skillfully used the bugbear of communism in an effort to maintain close ties with the West, although he was unafraid to upset potential allies over matters of principle. Despite rapidly increasing US investment, particularly in the mining sector, Verwoerd scrapped the planned 1965 visit of the USS Independence aircraft carrier to Cape Town on the grounds that its racially mixed crew was unacceptable.[82] He also blocked US plans to open a satellite tracking station in South Africa on the same grounds.

In Africa, Verwoerd's policy reiterated Strijdom' s partnership rhetoric but also emphasized binding newly independent states in the sub region to South Africa. Although he expressed concern about the rapidity of African decolonization, Verwoerd was clear that he did not begrudge African states choosing independence and emphasized the "*civilizing*" potential of South Africa in regard to technological and economic cooperation.[83]

Although he sought at first, like Strijdom, to incorporate the Protectorates, Verwoerd by 1964 dropped these efforts and instead focused on binding them closely to South Africa through economic cooperation.[84] He showed no qualms about meddling in the political affairs of South Africa's soon-to-be independent neighbors.

Seeing a potential ally in Basutoland chief Leabua Jonathan, Verwoerd allowed him and his Basutoland National Party (but not other parties) to campaign among Basotho residents

[80] J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-1999,* p. 59.

[81] J. De St. Jorre. *Introduction: Setting the Scene in Robert Jaster, Molesti Mbeki, Morley Nkosi and Michael Clough, Changing Fortunes: War, Diplomacy and Economics in Southern Africa,* p. 9.

[82] R. Massie. *Losing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa In the Apartheid Years,* p. 76.

[83] W. Verwoerd. *Viva Verwoerd? Kronicke van'n keuse,* p. 1vi.

[84] B. Davidson. *South Africa and Portugal, A Journal of Opinion 4(2),* p. 10.

in South Africa before 1965 elections, and South Africa later that year donated 100,000 bags of grain to alleviate famine gripping the newly independent state. Verwoerd later spent three and a half hours with Jonathan on 3 December 1966—four days before his assassination—discussing prospects for closer ties.[85]

Taking office after Verwoerd's 1966 assassination, new Prime Minister John Vorster inherited a government coming under increasing attack in the United Nations, with few meaningful links to newly independent African states, and was starting to come under pressure from the political "*left"* in Western countries over its racial policies. More a pragmatist than an ideologue like Verwoerd, Vorster was determined to address this situation, and his "*outward policy*" was crafted as a means to build relationships on the continent, keep doors open in Europe and the United States, and bolster trade and diplomatic links around the world.[86] Although opposed by certain *verkrampte* (conservative) elements within the National Party, who viewed any accommodation with black Africa as a betrayal of apartheid principles, this movement was supported by an increasingly self-assured, wealthy, and urbanizing Afrikaner community that recognized the danger of being isolated from the rest of the world.[87]

Building ties in Africa was paramount to Vorster's international relations policy, with James Barber and John Barratt describing it as being conducted outward on the basis of three concentric circles— "*greater South Africa*", southern Africa, and the rest of the continent—with different motivations and tactics for each.[88]

Closest to home, Vorster sought to bind the newly independent Protectorates—Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland—tightly to South Africa to ensure that they remained dependent on South African assistance for their economic development and political survival, using a 1969 renegotiation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and 1974 creation of the Rand zone to this end. [89] In the region, Vorster's main focus was to ensure the security of white-ruled states, particularly up through Portugal's 1975 withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique. Although Portuguese frostiness toward Pretoria limited South African assistance there, Vorster—with significant support from the white electorate—maintained consistent military and economic support for the breakaway Rhodesian government until the mid-1970s.

With regard to black-ruled states, Vorster engaged in a continent-wide charm offensive through the mid-1970s that primarily used economic incentives in an effort to win political support in African capitals. These efforts met with some success, particularly up to 1975. Provided significant economic aid, Malawi went so far as to establish formal diplomatic

[85]A. Hepple. *Verwoerd,* pp. 194-195.

[86] J. De St. Jorre. *South Africa: Up Against the World Foreign policy,* p. 58.

[87] C. Dacaton. *Vorster and the Politics of Confidence 1966-1974,* p. 172.

[88]J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search of Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 126.

[89]R. Davies and D. O'Meara. *Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978, Journal of Southern African Studies 11(2),* p. 182.

ties with Pretoria in 1967 and would remain one of the apartheid government's most reliable defenders for the next two decades.[90] Pretoria's approaches also were well received in several Francophone countries—notably Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic—while Liberia, Ghana, and Kenya represented Anglophone states that showed a willingness to hear out South African approaches.[91]

This diplomacy, conducted by Pretoria in utmost secrecy and spearheaded by the Bureau of State Security and Department of Information, culminated with Vorster visiting Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny and Senegalese President Senghor in 1974, as well as Liberian President Tolbert the next year.[92]

Although Pretoria's "*wins*" were more symbolic than substantive, South Africa's liberation movements, particularly the ANC, viewed them with concern; one ANC diplomat in 1975 said that the organization feared exclusion from every sub- Saharan state because of Pretoria's outreach.[93]

With memories of Sharpeville fading and the anti-apartheid movement still nascent in the West, Pretoria in the 1960s and early 1970s was able to maintain strong ties in the West. Pretoria's sophisticated (and well-funded) lobbying and propaganda efforts helped paint South Africa as a useful bulwark against communism, which particularly appealed to conservative governments eager to cooperate on defense matters. Pretoria tied itself more closely to NATO with its 1973 construction of the Silvermine surveillance center near Cape Town, which provided invaluable coverage of Soviet naval operations in the South Atlantic.[94]

Pretoria also built ties to other "*pariah*" states around the world, such as military governments in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, although neither side received many tangible benefits. [95] Relations with Taiwan and the Shah's Iran were more substantive, with South Africa benefiting from access to Iranian oil—up to 90 percent of its imported crude by 1979—and Taiwanese military technology and training.[96] Most important, however, were South Africa's burgeoning ties with Israel from 1973 onward, resulting in military cooperation that was essential to the development of South Africa's nuclear weapons program.[97]

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[90]L. Bowman. *South Africa's Outward Strategy: A Foreign policy Dilemma for the United States,* p. 8.

[91]J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search of Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 146.

[92] E. Nyangone. *South Africa's Relations with Gabon and Ivory Coast: 1969-1994,* p. 88.

[93]J. Sanders. *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service,* p. 102.

[94]W. Cobbertt. *Apartheid's Army and the Arms Embargo, in War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa,* p. 226.

[95]D. Fig. *Theorizing South Africa's Foreign policy: The Case of Latin America,* p. 20.

[96]Y. Dadoo. *Relations with the Middle East and Arab World, in Change and South African Foreign Relations,* p. 176.

[97]S. Polakow-Suransky. *The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa,* p. 6.

However, Vorster's limited progress began to disintegrate with Portugal's April 1974 coup that brought down the Caetano government. Initiated in large part by military disgruntlement over being forced to fight unwinnable wars in the country's African colonies, it led to the 1975 independence of Angola and Mozambique, putting hostile governments on the borders of South Africa and Rhodesia. Although Vorster tried to maintain his *détente* efforts with black-ruled states, including by gradually pulling back support for Salisbury, South Africa's August 1975 invasion of Angola—undertaken to support Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement against the Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA prior to that country's November independence—scuttled any chance that they would succeed.

Operation Savannah saw approximately 3,000 SADF troops move to within 200km of Luanda, turning over captured territory to UNITA en route, but by November, the invasion led to the insertion of Cuban troops and Soviet materiel that ultimately repulsed the South African advance. Most importantly, South Africa's intervention irreparably damaged its standing on the continent, forcing all but the most slavishly devoted countries (like Malawi) to turn their backs (at least publicly) on Pretoria.[98]

The 1974-1978 periods also saw Pretoria lose support further afield. The UN General Assembly suspended South Africa in 1974, a ban not lifted for 20 years, while the June 1976 Soweto massacre and 1977 death of Black Consciousness Movement activist Steve Biko in police custody had even more crippling effects, galvanizing global opinion against South Africa and ushering in UN adoption of a 1977 mandatory arms embargo. This growing international isolation had the effect at home of bolstering the position of the defense establishment in the international relations policy arena; whereas Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), and Information focused on winning friends, Defense, under Minister PW Botha, was oriented toward intimidating and undermining enemies. Interdepartmental infighting reached fever pitch by the late 1970s, but Vorster—ailing and faced with mounting political pressures—was unable to address it, leading to muddled policy making. However, the 1977 breaking of the "*Muldergate*" information scandal—which revealed political malfeasance in the Information Department's secret operations—quickly brought down Vorster and his allies, opening the door to Botha's ascension to the Premiership. Henceforth, the military's primacy in the international relations policy field would be unchallenged.

The cantankerous PW Botha assumed the job of Prime Minister in September 1978 determined to bring a new muscularity to South Africa's foreign engagement, if no significant shifts to the policy aims. While still using "*carrots"* to incentivize greater regional and African cooperation with Pretoria, Botha's avid use of "*sticks*" like regional military intervention, continued development of nuclear weapons, and covert action was meant to show the region and the world that South Africa did not intend to be bullied. The Prime Minister (State President from 1984) mustered state resources behind his

[98] R. Pfister. *Apartheid South Africa and African State: from Pariah to Middle Power,* p. 49.

"*TotalStrategy*," in the process giving the military and Defense establishment a predominant position in international relations policy formulation. Perhaps even more so than his predecessors, Botha was avowedly anti-Communist and was quick to use the "*red menace*" to ameliorate Western pressure.

Botha's finger-wagging isolationism, however, would prove unsustainable by the end of the 1980s. Once sympathetic Western governments, banks, and businesses—under pressure from citizenries increasingly aware and critical of apartheid— enacted sanctions, withdrew investment, and refused to roll over loans. Meanwhile, huge increases in state spending, particularly on the military, combined with external economic pressure left the South African economy on the brink of collapse by 1989.

Botha entered office committed to taking forward Verwoerd and Vorster's ideas of promoting greater partnership in southern Africa and on the continent, such as his 1979 proposal for a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) that would provide up to ten regional states "*a common approach in the security field, the economic field, and the political field".*[99]

However, Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe's 1980 election killed the concept before it could get off the ground; instead nine regional states formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) later that year in an effort to oppose South African imperialism and reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Botha continued earlier efforts to use economic incentives to win over hostile African states, but again these met with limited success.

Given the failures of these overtures and growing concerns about ANC presence on South Africa's borders, Pretoria increasingly turned to outright military destabilization in the region to intimidate, rather than coax, its neighbors. South African incursions and attacks were to have a devastating economic effect on the region, causing an estimated $90 billion in damage between 1975 and 1988.[100]

These included periodic incursions into Angola through 1988; cross-border raids on Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe; support for RENAMO rebels in Mozambique; and economic pressure throughout the sub region.[101] Pretoria also ramped up its use of unconventional operations during this time, to include often-successful assassination attempts against ANC leaders and supporters. South Africa also continued work on developing its nuclear weapons program—in close cooperation with Israel—and in 1983 initiated its chemical and biological weapons program, Project Coast.[102]

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[99] J. Hanlon. *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa,* p. 15.

[100] A. Conchiglia. *South Africa and its Lusophone Neighbours: Angola and Mozambique, in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era,* p. 237.

[101] R. Davies. *The SADF's Covert War Against Mozambique, in War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa,* p. 105.

[102] H. Purkitt and D Burgess. *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction,* pp. 148-149.

Building the capacity to carry out these operations, however, was unbelievably costly. Upon Botha taking office in the 1978/1979 fiscal year, South Africa spent R1.5 billion on defense; in 1988/1989, his last year, this had reached R10 billion.[103] In 1982/1983, defense spending accounted for 22.7 percent of the national budget and over 5 percent of GDP; it would account for at least 15 percent of the budget and 4 percent of GDP through 1990. However, this is merely the Defense budget; if non-military internal security, intelligence, and secret projects (like the nuclear program), some estimate "*real*" security spending to have represented as much as 30 percent of the budget and 9 percent of GDP by 1990.[104] Given that real economic growth had dropped to just 1.5 percent per year on average during the 1980s, this spending was unsustainable.[105]

International pressure also began to exert meaningful economic pressure on the government. Western governments and banks continued to deal with South Africa through the early 1980s— US support was crucial to South Africa receiving a $1.1 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1982—but by 1985 public pressure to disengage from South Africa was mounting in the United States and throughout Europe.[106] Botha's August 1985 "*Rubicon*" speech—which disappointed after being hyped by Pik Botha and others beforehand as a significant step toward ending apartheid—led Chase Manhattan Bank to cease rolling over South Africa's short-term debt and stop further lending, causing a collapse of the rand and a government moratorium on taking on further international debt.

Moreover, Western investors were disinvesting in droves, driven by growing public anti-apartheid sentiments and drive to boycott business and banks doing business in South Africa; between 1984 and 1989, as many as 555 foreign multinational firms left South Africa. Botha's fervent anti-communism could no longer be counted on to preserve South Africa's standing among even conservative governments. The 1986 US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, a sanctions regime passed despite the veto of President Reagan, was perhaps the clearest sign that the tide of international opinion had turned irrevocably against it.

This growing pressure, in addition to fatigue from the military stalemate in Angola, finally brought Angolan, Cuban, and South African parties together in London in 1988 to settle the future of Southwest Africa/Namibia. They agreed to the Brazzaville Protocol that December, an agreement that led to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South Africa turning over Southwest Africa to UN control, in advance of elections and independence in 1990. PW Botha, however, would not remain in office to see it. In January 1989, 73 year-old PW Botha suffered a stroke and the following month resigned as leader of the National Party.

[103]G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalization,* p. 238.

[104]D. O'Meara. *Forty Lost Years,* p. 354.

[105]R. Schrire and D. Silke. *Foreign policy: The Domestic Context, in Change and South African Foreign Relations,* p. 6.

[106]K. Danaher. *In Whose Interest: A Guide to US-South Africa Relations,* p.7.

Although Botha in his final months showed that his government was able to make hard decisions on issues like Namibian independence, but he could not make the ultimate tough call. Although he had met with Nelson Mandela and National Intelligence was talking with the ANC in exile, Botha could not to pull the trigger on the only decisions that mattered: releasing Mandela, unbanning the ANC, and finishing off apartheid. With the Berlin Wall fallen and the Soviet Union collapsing, those decisions would fall to Botha's successor, FW de Klerk.

The forthcoming substantive chapters will provide greater context in regard to the degree to which international relations policy making was open to outside participation during the apartheid era, from the broader public to various government departments. However, it can be noted up front that this period was characterized by a high degree of executive domination, with relatively little room for inputs from outside government, or even outside a selected inner circle within government.

A significant part of this was constitutional in nature; the South Africa Act of 1909, Republican Constitution of 1961, and Tri-Cameral Constitution of 1983 all vested extensive power in the executive (the Prime Minister to 1984, State President thereafter) for making major international relations policy decisions—making war and peace, accrediting diplomats, concluding treaties, and so forth. The Foreign Minister in this dispensation was ostensibly entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of external relations, although his powers ebbed and flowed based on the whims (and trust) of the Prime Minister or President.

Constitutional precepts were not the only limit to broader participation in international relations policy making. Also quite significant was the general lack of widespread engagement on external affairs, as well as the implicit trust placed in government by the white (and particularly Afrikaner) citizenry, few actors with vested interests in the international relations policy process sought to influence the process, at least until the 1980s. The broader public generally showed little interest in foreign affairs, even with the country increasingly isolated internationally. This disinterest bled into the print media, which devoted relatively few resources to foreign affairs, given reader disinterest.

Pressure groups were few in number. Academics were few in number during this period; some had contact with government officials, but their impacts were limited. Business, despite growing difficulties operating outside South Africa's borders, was a minor player. And Parliament—as well as the broader NP structures—displayed blind loyalty to its leadership on international relations policy, as it was not an issue with much relevance or interest to its constituencies. In sum, the apartheid era was closed to broader participation in international relations policy making, both due to barriers from above and disinterest from below. The coming chapters will tease out the extent to which this changed after 1990.

2.4 ANC International relations policy to 1990

The ANC's pre-1990 international relations policy can be divided into two phases. The first, from its founding until its banning in South Africa in 1960, consisted of constant—if

disjointed—attempts to win friends abroad, particularly in western Europe but also, in concert with its domestic Communist Party allies, among Eastern Bloc governments. The exiled organization at first focused on survival. However, by the late-1960s, the ANC had expanded its diplomatic efforts to ensure it was viewed internationally as the sole legitimate representative of the South African people; raise necessary funds; and bring increased pressure on the apartheid government through lobbying governments and raising popular awareness of the evils of apartheid.

An elitist organization with little broad popular support for its first two decades, the ANC had a strong internationalist component from its 1912 foundation. The ANC sent a delegation to Great Britain in 1914 to voice dissatisfaction with the 1913 Native Land Act, which restricted black land ownership, but its protests were ignored.[107] A subsequent delegation to Great Britain and to the Versailles Conference in 1919 that demanded an end to the color bar in South Africa was similarly ignored, despite ANC support for the war effort.[108] Efforts to build ties with the Soviet Union, forged through the congress's burgeoning ties to the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), showed more promise.

In 1927, ANC Natal leader Josiah Gumede followed a European tour by traveling to Moscow, where he was received by Stalin and toured the republics. He came away convinced that the Soviet Union—with its multinational citizenry, rural poverty, and underdeveloped capitalist system before the revolution—offered a model for South Africa's political and economic development. He returned to South Africa energized, telling crowds, "*I have seen the world to come…I have been to the new Jerusalem*," and later that year won the Presidency of the ANC on the grounds that the party must take a more militant stance against white rule and work on concert with Communists.[109] This cooperation, however, would prove short-lived; a conservative faction skeptical of Soviet ties ousted Gumede as President-General in 1930, and relations with Moscow were uneven through the 1950s.[110]

The 1939 outbreak of war saw latent tensions between radicals and conservatives in the ANC come to a head over whether to advise blacks to support the war effort. The latter ultimately won the day, with the movement supporting the war effort but calling for all South Africans to be given equal rights of citizenship. The unstated hope was that this loyalty would pay benefits after the war, but these were quickly dashed; a lobbying effort by ANC President (1940-1949) AB Xuma to the newly formed United Nations against the proposed incorporation of Southwest Africa into South Africa embarrassed Smuts but paid no discernable material benefits .[111]

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[107]M. Rall. *Peaceable Warrior: The Life and Times of Sol Plaatje,* p. 138.

[108]F. Meli. *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC,* p. 49.

[109] S. Ellis and T. Sechaba. *Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile,* pp. 75-76.

[110]K. Somerville. *The USSR and Southern Africa Since 1976,* p. 99.

[111]J. Barber. *South Africa's Foreign policy, 1945-1970,* p. 24.

Still, the post-war period saw a more internationally active ANC, particularly in regard to its ties with global anti-colonial movements. The 1955 Freedom Charter spelled out the Congress's international relations policy tenets, notably a commitment to African self-determination and to peacefully settling international disputes, and the movement was able to send its activists abroad, where leaders like Walter Sisulu and Duma Nokwe were able to build the organization's international profile, although not necessarily material support.

The ANC's foreign orientation and tactics changed with its April 1960 banning, as now its external wing would have to carry the burden of keeping the organization alive and building international support.[112] This Herculean task was given to deputy president Oliver Tambo, who escaped the country in 1960 to establish the external mission tasked with raising international awareness of the South African situation, fundraising, prosecuting the armed struggle, and establishing links to newly independent African governments and other liberation movements.[113] Tambo had to do this with no existing support structures and limited guidance from the movement in South Africa, particularly after the 1963 Rivonia arrests led to the detention of the movement's internal leadership.

Unsurprisingly, this was a difficult task, and Tambo found limited success through the mid-1970s. Western governments and populaces showed little enthusiasm for the anti-apartheid movement, and even in those Western capitals where the ANC was able to establish a presence, it made little impact.

African governments provided it little material support, generally preferring to back the more radical PAC while focusing on liberation movements with more near-term potential, as in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies.[114]

Even allies like Zambian President Kaunda, who hosted the ANC's headquarters from 1967, were subject to South African pressure that limited the extent of their support.[115] In addition, its efforts at armed struggle were almost non-existent, with the sole significant effort—the 1967 Wankie campaign—a disaster that led, at the ANC's 1969 Morogoro conference, to one of the most serious attacks on Tambo's leadership.[116]

A sole bright spot during these years was the ANC's ability to attract Soviet backing, fostered by its South African Communist Party (the CPSA assumed this new name after it was banned and went underground in 1953) allies. This support included funding,

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[112]R. Pfister. *Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(1),* p. 53.

[113]S. Thomas. *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Since 1960,* p. 26.

[114]R. Pfister. *Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(1),* pp. 51-53.

[115] H. Macmillan. *The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: The Culture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964-1990, Journal of Southern African Studies 35(2),* p. 317.

[116]H. Barrell. *The Turn to the Masses: The African National Congress Strategic Review of 1978-1979, Journal of Southern African Studies 18(1),* p. 70.

educational and military training and military materiel—was crucial to keeping the movement alive during this time.[117]

However, events in Portugal and South Africa in the mid-1970s would provide the movement a much-needed spark. The 1974 coup in Portugal that brought down the authoritarian Caetano government—touched off by a military fed up with fighting unwinnable wars in its African colonies—led to Angolan and Mozambican independence by the end of 1975, opening up two invaluable fronts to the ANC.

Then, in June 1976, the Soweto riots opened the world's eyes to the human rights abuses of the South African Government and for the first time galvanized global opinion against apartheid. The ANC was quick to take advantage of both events. The movement established diplomatic and military presences in both Angola and Mozambique after independence, utilizing the former primarily for military training camps and the latter for infiltrating cadres into South Africa. Oliver Tambo leveraged Soweto to address the UN General Assembly in October 1976 on apartheid, the first time an ANC leader had been afforded that opportunity.

The UN thereafter, even in the face of Western truculence, would prove forward leaning in seeking to isolate the apartheid government and aid the liberation movements, even voting in 1979 to provide the ANC and PAC funds for their New York offices.[118]

From the late 1970s, the ANC saw its international support blossom on all fronts. Although many African states continued to show affinities toward the PAC, African support for the ANC grew after Zimbabwe's 1980 independence left only one white government on the continent; in 1983 the OAU recognized the ANC as the "*vanguard of the national liberation movement*".[119]

The Non-Aligned Movement, once cold toward the ANC, gave Tambo a prime speaking slot at the 1979 Havana Conference, and the ANC expanded its ties in places like south East Asia and Latin America.[120] Fundraising also took off, particularly given that the ANC's budget topped $50 million a year by the end of the 1980s. [121] Support from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies remained key, particularly for military training and materiel.[122] However, the movement diversified its sources of support in the 1980s.

[117]V. Shubin. *The "Hot" Cold War: The USSR in Southern Africa,* p. 241.

[118]S. Thomas. *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Sine 1960,* p. 124.

[119] M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* p. 374.

[120] L. Callinicos. *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains,* p. 482.

[121]S. Thomas. *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Since 1960,* p. 153.

[122]V. Shubin. *The Soviet Union/ Russia Federation's Relations with South Africa with Special Reference to the Period since 1980, African Affairs 95(378),* p. 15.

Scandinavian governments—Sweden in particular—became major donors, accounting for half of its non-military aid in the 1980s.[123]

The ANC's major coup in the 1980s, however, was its expansion and deepening of its ties with Western governments, particularly the United States and Great Britain. Recognizing the "*fantastic possibilities*" that could result from American support, Thabo Mbeki—then head of Information—prevailed on ANC leaders to allow a US television program to shoot a documentary on the ANC in 1978, a program that portrayed the ANC as a responsible movement with viable grievances. [124]

This effective image management helped the ANC in the early 1980s begin to engage regularly with Western elected officials on both the left and right; by the end of the decade Tambo had met with both US Secretary of State George Shultz and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.[125]

The ANC also was effective in building grassroots opposition to apartheid in Europe and the United States; the latter's African-American community emerged as a particular base of support.[126]ANC lobbying efforts were effective in effecting unofficial boycotts of South African goods, corporate disinvestment, and ultimately government sanctions. The growing international profile of the imprisoned Nelson Mandela also helped to raise money and attention to the cause.

By the late 1980s, the ANC—through sheer survival but also the skilled international outreach of its leadership—had come to be viewed as a government in waiting, its ultimate success inevitable.[127] Already engaged in secret talks with proxies of the South African Government, the movement was starting to prepare for this transition, even producing a paper called "*The International relations policy of the Future South Africa*" that elucidated a strongly anti-imperialist international relations policy in concert with the ANC's socialist allies.[128]

However, as Mbeki and many senior party leaders have recounted, the ANC was nonetheless caught off guard by FW de Klerk's 2 February 1990 speech that unbanned it. The next four years would prove some of the most challenging in South Africa's history,

[123] T. Lodge. *State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976, Third World Quarterly 9(1),* p.13.

[124]R. Pfister. *Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(1),* p .59.

[125] P. Lyman. *Partner of History: The U.S Role in South Africa's Transition to Democracy,* p. 53.

[126]T. Lodge. *State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-1986, Third World Quarterly 9(1),* p. 17.

[127]G. Evans. *South Africa in Remission: The Foreign policy of an Altered State, The Journal of Modern African Studies 34(2),* p. 253.

[128]V. Shubin. *Flinging the Doors Open: Foreign policy of the New South Africa,* p. 2.

and the shaping of a new international relations policy—and new international relations policy architecture—for a democratic South Africa would prove particularly vexing.

2.5 The International relations policy of Transition

FW de Klerk's 2 February speech and Mandela's release nine days later sparked a period of negotiation toward a new, democratic dispensation that would last to the eve of So0uth Africa's 27 April 1994 elections. While the focus of these negotiations was on the shape of South Africa's domestic dispensation, South Africa's future international relations policy was also a topic for debate and discussion in talks between the ANC and government. The two sides, particularly until 1993, engaged in divergent, competitive international outreach aimed at winning over international support for their respective domestic positions.

De Klerk during this period took advantage of his newfound stature and the global attention being paid to South Africa to travel the world and push for a repeal of sanctions, build support for free market principles, and advocate for minority rights.[129] These efforts met with some success; the European Community started rolling back restrictions in late 1990, while President Bush agreed to rescind the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act the following July. De Klerk's 1989 decision to end South Africa's nuclear program and South Africa's 1991 accession to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty also were praised by the West, both for ending Pretoria's nuclear pariah status and—more quietly—for ensuring an ANC government would not have a nuclear option. Even Russia showed a surprising willingness to deal with Pretoria.[130]

These successes galled the ANC, which in particular was opposed to early rollback of sanctions. Nevertheless, despite its slow start, the ANC also engaged in robust international diplomacy, utilizing Nelson Mandela's global "*rock star*" status to gin up money and support.

Mandela visited 49 countries from his release through 1992 (compared to de Klerk's 32), on which he was met with massive public acclaim and largely afforded the same honors due a head of state. [131]Visits by Mandela and other top ANC officials helped slow the pace of sanctions rollback, tying them to continued progress from Pretoria, and limited visits from foreign leaders to South Africa.

Most important for the ANC, however, was Mandela's unparalleled ability to raise money, which was in short supply following with the withdrawal of Eastern Bloc support and a drawdown of Scandinavian funding—90 percent of its $27 million budget in 1990 came from foreign sources.[132] These big numbers—$10 million from the Taiwanese and

[129]C. Landsberg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition,* p. 8

[130]Ibid.

[131] R. Pfister. *Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(1),* p. 65.

[132]C. Landsberg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition,* p. 106.

Indonesian governments, $5 million from Malaysia, several million from India, and countless more from private Western sources—helped the party stay afloat and later finance its 1994 election campaign.[133] The ANC's Department of International Affairs (DIA)—headed by Mbeki since 1989—also began formulating the principles of a post- transition international relations policy based on multilateralism and demilitarization in accordance with South Africa's domestic interests.[134]

International relations policy initiatives and discussions between the government and ANC began to see greater convergence by 1993. International relations policy discussions in the concluding months of the transition shifted to the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was established in December 1993 as a precursor to the Government of National Unity and for the first time brought the ANC and government together formally for discussions on post-transition policy formulation.

While most of the TEC's activities dealt with the domestic arena, three sub-councils—Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Defense—dealt with international relations policy issues. While it did not have the power to make or implement policy—those competencies still lay with government—the Foreign Affairs Sub-Council was able, through conferences and regular meetings and conferences, to start shaping South Africa's new international relations policy architecture, in particular the integration of ANC, PAC, and homeland foreign affairs infrastructures into the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).[135]

Ultimately, this transitional period—which came to a close with Mandela's 10 May 1994 inauguration as President—was a time of reassessment of South Africa's international relations policy priorities and reengagement with the outside world. In the words of Deon Geldenhuys, the "*diplomacy of isolation*" was replaced by the "*diplomacy of participation*".[136]

2.6 The Era of Idealism (1994-1999)

Nelson Mandela's 10 May 1994 inauguration ushered in South Africa's re-admittance into the global community of nations. By the end of 1994, South Africa joined or was re-admitted to 16 multilateral organizations (including the Commonwealth, G-77, OAU, Southern African Development Community, Non-Aligned Movement, World Trade Organization, and several specialized UN agencies), concluded 86 bilateral treaties, and acceded to 21 multilateral treaties and conventions. In 1990, Pretoria had only 30

[133]A. Sampson. *Mandela: The Authorized Biography,* p. 413.

[134]T. Mbeki. *South Africa's International Relations: Today and Tomorrow from Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994,* p. 204.

[135] F. Paruk. *The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) As Transitional Institution to Manage and Prevent Conflict in South Africa 1994,* p. 134.

[136] D. Geldenhuys. *The Foreign policy of Transition in South Africa, Foreign policy Issues in a Democratic South Africa,* p. 43

diplomatic missions around the world; by 1996, this had mushroomed to 124, while governments around the world flocked to open missions in Pretoria.

Pretoria also established bi-national commissions (BNCs) with several countries from both the global "*north*" and "*south*", including the United States, Germany, China, India, and Nigeria to deepen relations. However, this reengagement meant South Africa, so long insulated from these global realities by its isolation, now had to make hard choices and take sides, a process complicated by the complex post-Cold War environment and divergent views on policy direction within the country.

Mandela and his under capacitated foreign affairs team, led by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, were forced to balance a highly "*idealist*" international relations policy platform—undergirded by an explicit commitment to human rights—with political realities and loyalties to old friends that ran counter to its policy goals. This would prove a delicate balance throughout Mandela's presidency, and one not fully resolved to this day.

As previously noted, the ANC from the late 1980s deliberated internally and engaged with academics and other actors in debating a post-apartheid international relations policy for the country. In international relations policy documents issued in 1991, 1993, and 1994—as well as a late 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs* credited to Mandela—the ANC laid out a post-apartheid international relations policy vision based broadly on principles of multilateralism, human rights, promotion of democracy, international law, peace, and African interests.[137] However, these broadly "idealist" goals were balanced by "*realist*" considerations, particularly on the economic front.

While Pretoria sought to expand its trade linkages with the global south, its main trading partners remained the United States and Europe. To balance these considerations, Pretoria adopted a position of "*universality*," best summed up by Deputy Foreign Minister (1994-2008) Aziz Pahad said; South Africa's policy was one of "*being very nice to the rich and powerful, nice to the potentially rich and powerful, and kind to old friends who are neither*".[138]

While associating itself with the global South, and calling for an overhaul of the global economic system, Pretoria at the same time operated within the neo-liberal constructs of the WTO, accepting the so-called "*Washington consensus*," and seeking out trade and investment from the North.[139]

Africa and in particular the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were the main focus of South Africa's international relations policy during the

[137]A. Nzo. *Foreign Minister's Budget Vote Address, 4 March 1994, South African Journal of International Affairs 6(2),* p. 223.

[138]P. Bischoff and R. Southall. *Early Foreign policy of Democratic South Africa, in African Foreign Policies,* p. 156.

[139]I. Taylor. *Stuck In Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post- Apartheid Foreign Relations,* pp. 162-163.

Mandela administration, particularly in regard to regional peacemaking and expanding economic linkages. As the ANC's 1994 international relations policy document noted, "*we have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid*."

The trick for Pretoria, however, was how to move the relationship forward without being seen as a regional "*bully*" in the same way as the apartheid state; as Aziz Pahad noted in 1996, "*we must carry our relations with the region in a way that is not a big brother relationship. This means that because of our relative strength we don't simply impose ourselves*".[140]

This would prove easier said than done, particularly in the conflict resolution realm. Suspicions of South African intentions and jealousies of the international attention paid to the country meant South Africa was often viewed as an unwelcome interloper.[141] Angola—galled by Pretoria's decision to invite UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi to Mandela's inauguration— paid little heed to Mandela's efforts to mediate the conflict there, preferring to resolve the situation through force (which it successfully did in 2001).[142]

In 1997, Mandela's efforts to avert war in Congo-Kinshasa (which joined SADC that year) were similarly thwarted by Laurent Kabila's judgment that he could take power in Kinshasa by force, and its peacemaking efforts after full-blown civil war broke out the following year were again ignored, with SADC members Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola all readily intervening against Uganda-and Rwanda-backed rebels. Mandela's sole notable success—in concert with Zimbabwe's Mugabe and Botswana's Ketumile Masire—was in peacefully returning the democratically- elected government of Lesotho to office in August 1994 after it was illegally ousted by the King, although this success would be overshadowed by a less successful intervention in that country four years later.

Mandela's attempts to promote democracy in Nigeria and save activist Ken Saro-Wiwa from execution in 1995 displayed the difficulties South Africa would face on the continent in projecting its influence. After taking power, Mandela focused intently on getting military dictator Sani Abacha—who had seized power the previous year—to release his political prisoners and make democratic reforms.[143] These efforts bore some fruit, such as the commutation of death sentences for top political opponents (including once and future President Olusegun Obasanjo), although Abacha avoided additional reforms.

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[140] C. Landsberg. *In Search of Global Influence, Order and Development: South Africa's Foreign policy a Decade After Political Apartheid, Policy: Issues& Actors 18(3),* p. 10.

[141] J. Cilliers. *An Emerging South African Foreign Policy Identity? ,* p. 10.

[142] C. Landsberg. *In Search of Global Influence, Order and Development: South Africa's Foreign policy a Decade After Political Apartheid, Policy: Issues& Actors 18(3),* p. 16.

[143] D. Geldenhuys. *The Diplomacy of Isolation South African Foreign Policy Making,* p. 99.

In October 1995, the Nigerian Government arrested environmental and political activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others on trumped up murder charges, seemingly fomented by the Shell Oil Company; they were quickly found guilty in a sham trial and condemned to death, igniting a global uproar.

Despite South African efforts to free them, Abacha had them executed on 10 November. Mandela, upon hearing the news, was furious, stated that Abacha was "*sitting on a volcano, and I'm going to blow it up under him*," and calling for Nigeria's immediate suspension from the Commonwealth, demanded economic sanctions, and recalled South Africa's High Commissioner from Lagos, the only African country to do so.[144]

The muted African response to Mandela's call clearly demonstrated how little political capital South Africa had on the continent. The OAU dismissed Mandela's call for sanctions as "*not an African way to deal with an African problem*," while a December SADC meeting to discuss the problem determined the region would take no further action on Nigeria.[145]

This lack of support forced Pretoria to back down; by June 1996 Foreign Minister Nzo announced that South Africa was abandoning its hard line against Nigeria, saying it breached "*the norms of African solidarity*". [146] While continuing to engage on Nigeria through Abacha's 1998 death and the country's 1999 return to civilian rule, South Africa shifted its efforts to the multilateral—and specifically African—arena, liaising with the OAU and SADC on common positions. As Mbeki, then Deputy President, later noted:

> "*This issue [Saro-Wiwa's execution] highlighted the potential limits of our influence as an individual country…and the need to act in concert with others and to forge strategic alliances in pursuit of international relations policy objectives*".[147]

An even more striking example of South Africa's inability to project influence, even on its borders, came with its botched 1998 intervention in Lesotho, which further laid bare shortcomings in South African policy coordination mechanisms and displayed the perils of underinvestment in the security sector. After failed attempts to mediate a political crisis, South Africa sent 600 troops (alongside 200 from Botswana) to stabilize the country, at the invitation of Lesotho's Prime Minister.

The intervention, the first foreign military excursion of the post- apartheid government, was a disaster; underestimating Basotho resistance, 11 South African National Defense Force (SANDF) troops were killed, and large parts of central Maseru were destroyed. Inter-agency coordination, particularly between Defense and DFA, was almost non- existent; a

[144] C. Landsberg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition,* pp. 176-178.

[145]C. Alden and G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy From Reconciliation to Revival,* p. 22.

[146]A. Van Nieuwkerk. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Decision-Making on African Crises,* p. 144.

[147]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle of the Soul of the ANC,* p. 178.

failure to inform Home Affairs of the intervention even resulted in the brief detention of BDF troops at the South African border on their way to Maseru.

Although they defended its rationale, Mandela and Nzo subsequently acknowledged the intervention had been poorly handled and planned, although they did not address the degradation in SANDF capabilities since the early 1990s, an issue that would remain problematic through Mbeki's tenure.

Pretoria had more success in expanding its economic influence throughout the region, although it too was met with limited enthusiasm by its neighbors. Between 1994 and 1999, South African invested R3.5 billion in the region, with an emphasis on the construction and retail sectors, a figure that accounted for nearly 30 percent of all foreign direct investment into SADC.[148] By 2001, total South African investment in SADC was estimated at close to R15 billion, dwarfing Great Britain, the runner-up at just R4 billion.[149]This picture was repeated further afield on the continent, with total African trade rising from R11 billion in 1994 to over R28 billion by 1999.[150]

However, despite the benefits of this investment, other African states bristled at what they characterized as aggressive South African business intervention that crowded out local entrepreneurs and let South Africa establish economic hegemony in the place of military or political dominance.[151]

Nigeria epitomized South Africa's broader difficulties in translating its stated human rights agenda into action; as Aziz Pahad stated, there had to be "*interaction between theory and practice*" in translating a human rights emphasis into diplomatic relations, something easier said than done.[152] Even a relative "*idealist*" like Raymond Suttner, chair of Parliament's Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PCFA), wrote in 1997 that,

> "*The promotion of human rights and democracy in international relations policy is easy to state as an aspiration. It is however,*

[148] P. Alves et al. *Deeping Integration in SADC: South Africa- SADC's Economic Engine,* p. 73.

[149] C. Alden and M. Soko. *South Africa's Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents, Journal of Modern African Studies 43(3),* p. 374.

[150]F. Ahwireng- Obeng and P. McGowan. *Partner or Hegemon: South Africa in Africa, in South Africa's Foreign policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy,* p. 73.

[151] A. Mlambo. *Partner or Hegemon? South Africa and its Neighbours, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/2001,* p. 69.

[152]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* pp. 198-199.

difficult to implement. There are no easy answers as to how it should be done".[153]

Weapons sales were a particularly thorny topic in this regard. Armaments manufacture was (and remains) a big business in South Africa, which in 1994 was the world's tenth-largest arms producer, with an industry employing 50,000 people that boomed after the transition.[154] Although government policy was that it would act as a "responsible arms seller," South Africa in the late 1990s sold weapons to human rights abusers and countries waging wars in Africa and elsewhere.[155]

In addition, the ANC government backing for "old friends" who supported the ANC during the struggle and the transition—including those with less than stellar human rights records—was another contentious issue. Mandela made clear that South Africa had no intention of abandoning long-time allies like Libya's Muammar Gadhafi, Cuba's Fidel Castro, or the Palestinian Liberation Organization's Yassir Arafat, despite Western pressure.[156] These friendships sometimes undermined Pretoria's effort to act as an honest broker in negotiations, such as its efforts to intervene in the Middle East peace process; Israeli distrust of South African motives undermined South African negotiation efforts.

That said, South African ties with Libya proved useful when Mandela convinced Gadhafi —after several years of dialogue—to hand over two suspects in the Lockerbie bombing to Great Britain in exchange for the dropping of UN sanctions, the first step in normalization of relations between Libya and the West.

Of course, even friends could be jettisoned if Pretoria's conception of national interest so dictated, as with the South Africa's late 1996 decision (enacted the following year) to recognize China instead of Taiwan. Despite its longstanding support for the old government, Taipei donated R35 million to the ANC's 1994 election campaign, invested heavily in South Africa— both in terms of aid and business interests—and intensively lobbied the ANC to retain recognition during the transition.[157]

Moreover, Taiwan was also undergoing a period of democratization in the mid-1990s and had a respectable human rights record, both of which should have aligned it with South Africa's stated international relations policy principles, particularly in comparison to post-

[153]R. Stunner. *South African Foreign policy and the Promotion of Human Rights, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1997,* p. 300.

[154]C. Alden and G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy from Reconciliation to Revival,* p. 24.

[155] M. Muller. *South African Diplomacy and Security Complex Theory,* p. 592.

[156]L. Benjamin. *South Africa and the Middle East: Anatomy of an Emerging Relationship, in South Africa's Foreign policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy,* p. 159.

[157]P. Bischoff and R. Southall. *Early Foreign policy of Democratic South Africa, in African Foreign Policies,* p. 165.

Tiananmen China. However, the lure of trade relations with a blossoming China, particularly after it took control of Hong Kong in 1997, was too great to dismiss. China's potential to assist South Africa in seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat were also was a consideration in its favor.[158]

2.7 The Epoch of Realism (1999-2008)

--Mbeki and the African Agenda; Thabo Mbeki's assumption of the national Presidency in 1999 meant little change to South Africa's international relations policy priorities, given that he had dominated ANC international relations policy making from the early 1980s and had played the role of *de facto* Foreign Minister and Prime Minister under Mandela. A focus on Africa under the auspices of an "*African Renaissance*," a push to reform global governance institutions, and a preference for extended dialogue to resolve conflict all remained at the forefront during Mbeki's Presidency.

He also emphasized the need for solidarity among developing countries, as such unity was necessary to reorient global power relations between them and the West, particularly in regard to reforming global trade regimes and institutions like the UN, IMF, and World Bank. [159] In terms of implementation, this period was marked by greater inter-agency coordination driven by the Presidency, a translation of domestic priorities into international relations policy action, and pragmatism in terms of what could be reasonably achieved. As Selebi noted in 1999, Pretoria sought to make South Africa's international relations policy more "predictable," ensuring that it was proactive and not "*colliding with events*".[160]Yet, despite its best efforts, South Africa was forced to respond to one notable event—Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis—that arose during Mbeki's tenure.

Africa, as before, was the overarching focus of South Africa's international relations policy thrust. Originally mentioned by Mandela at a 1994 OAU summit, Thabo Mbeki first used the term "*African Renaissance*" in a 1997 speech outside of Washington DC to potential investors in the continent, and the phrase would in time come to dominate any discussion of the President's—and therefore the country's—international relations policy priorities.[161] While South African leaders had long emphasized the importance of Africa rhetorically, Mbeki was the first to devote significant financial resources toward promoting good governance, economic development, peace, and security on the continent.

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[158]C. Alden. *Solving South Africa's Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign policymaking and the Two Chinas Issue, in South Africa's Foreign policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy,* p. 132.

[159]C. Landsberg and D. Monyaye. *South Africa's Foreign policy: Carving a Global Niche, South African Journal of International Relations 13(2), p. 142.*

[160]G. Mill. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalization,* p. 300.

[161]T. Hughes. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South Africa Foreign policymaking,* p.79.

For Mbeki, promoting the African Renaissance was no hollow assertion; in the words of one Mbeki confidante, the President was "*emotionally and intellectually committed to prove Afro-pessimism wrong*".[162] Mbeki was clear about the need to improve governance on the continent, broadly critical of African elites who acted like a "*parasite on the rest of society*," calling them the source of the continent's underdevelopment and calling for governments to be accountable to their populaces.[163]

In another speech, he said Africa had:

> "*no need for petty gangsters who would be our governors by theft of elective positions, as a result of holding fraudulent elections, or by purchasing positions of authority through bribery and corruption*".[164]

To promote his good governance agenda, Mbeki was a leading proponent of sweeping pan-continental initiatives, such as the 2002 formation of the Africa Union, its African Peer Review Mechanism, and Pan-African Parliament, set up in 2004. However, Mbeki's New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), unveiled in 2001, and was his crown jewel.

NEPAD was designed as a compact between Africa and the developed world, by which African states would commit to good governance, conflict resolution, and sound economic policies, while in exchange international donors would accelerate debt relief, increase assistance levels, bolster African peace support capacity, and open their markets.[165] Implicit in NEPAD and Mbeki's broader vision for the continent was that Africa had no hope of economic development without good governance and stability. He also pushed for African states to hasten regional economic integration initiatives to boost development, although Pretoria's propensity to go it alone in trade negotiations, South Africa's skewed balance of trade with the continent, and the growing footprints of South African firms in Africa roused suspicions and allegations of South African hypocrisy across the continent and particularly in the region.[166]

Mbeki was unafraid to put South African money on the table for his African initiatives. South Africa footed a sizable portion of the bill for NEPAD and the Africa Union, for

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[162]P. Vale and S. Maseko. *South Africa and the African Renaissance, International Affairs 74(2),* p. 285.

[163] R. Ajulu. *Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a Globalizing World Economy: The Struggle for the Soul of the Continent, Review of African Political Economy 28(87),* p. 34.

[164]A. Feinstein. *After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC,* p. 88.

[165]C. Landsberg. *South Africa and the Making of the AU and NEPAD: Mbeki's Progressive African Agenda, in South African in Africa: The Post – Apartheid Era,* p. 202.

[166] I. Taylor. *Contradictions in South African Foreign policy and NEPAD, In Full Flight: South African Foreign policy After Apartheid,* p. 171.

instance, while South Africa also emerged as a donor on the continent; in 2004, its external assistance to Africa (including peacekeeping expenditures) reached $1.6 billion, more than the 0.7 percent of GDP targeted for developed countries.[167] However, nowhere was this commitment of resources more notable than in Mbeki's commitment of South African forces to African peacekeeping.

By the time of Mbeki's September 2008 resignation, South Africa had— largely at its own expense—close to 3,500 troops deployed across the continent, mostly in Congo-Kinshasa, Sudan, and Burundi. It also played a leading role in establishing the African Standby Force and provided most of the needed financial and logistical support to the SADC Brigade. This is particularly striking considering that South Africa had almost no troops doing peacekeeping when Mbeki took office, and Defense planning documents oriented the SANDF toward domestic operations, with few resources devoted to peacekeeping.[168]

South African involvement in African peace processes was not just through the deployment of peacekeepers; Mbeki and his international relations policy team were intimately involved in trying to solve some of the continent's most intractable conflicts. There were notable successes. In Congo, Mbeki in 2001 pushed President Joseph Kabila to the negotiating table alongside rebel leaders to seek a peace settlement, culminating in the March 2003 signing of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that led to 2006 elections. Pretoria was closely involved throughout the Dialogue.

Although Mbeki had little personal involvement in Burundi, former President Mandela and Deputy President Jacob Zuma were able to see through an often-difficult peace process, ginning up Western support for the process and facilitating civil society efforts to train and reintegrate combatants.[169] Mbeki also involved South Africa in efforts to resolve conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan, although a lack of commitment to peace processes by combatants in those countries hindered South African efforts.[170]

South Africa during Mbeki's Presidency also continued its efforts to reform global governance institutions and promote conflict resolution around the world, although these efforts met with little success. Pretoria's attempts to promote its dialogue-driven transition as a model for solving other global conflicts largely failed, with actors it was seeking to

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[167] C. Landsberg. *South Africa and the Making of the AU and NEPAD: Mbeki's Progressive African Agenda, in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era,* p. 202.

[168]Defense White Paper, Department of Defense 1996 and Defense Review, Department of Defense, 1998 South Africa Act of 1909.

[169] H. Solomon. *The Poverty of Pretoria's Preventative Diplomacy in the Great Lakes Region, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/2003,* p. 141.

[170]C. Maroleng. *Cote d' Ivoire: Perils and Prosepects, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2005,* p. 33.

influence viewing South Africa as either unwelcome or irrelevant.[171]Despite Pretoria's continued efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflagration, Israel showed little interest in engaging, viewing South Africa as an unwelcome interloper that viewed Israeli-Palestinian through the lenses of apartheid and anti-imperialism.[172]

South Africa's 2007 abstention in the UN on a US- led motion to investigate political killings in- Lebanon further undermined Pretoria's attempts to portray itself as an unbiased, honest broker. Pretoria's efforts to avert the 2003 Iraq invasion were even more quixotic. Pretoria in 2002 hosted Iraqi Deputy President Tariq Aziz on a state visit, during which then-Deputy President Zuma called on the UN to drop all sanctions against Baghdad. As the march toward the US invasion gained steam, Pretoria dispatched Aziz Pahad to Iraq with a seven-member team ostensibly tasked with checking for weapons of mass destruction. These efforts, as well as strong South African criticism of the subsequent invasion, made no impact.

Pretoria's controversial tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007- 2008, the first term in the country's history, was perhaps the clearest demonstration of Pretoria's difficulties in projecting its influence on the global stage. Pretoria struggled to balance its stated human rights agenda and desire to be a global normative leader with its efforts to rebalance relations between the developed and developing world. Pretoria was quick to reject what it viewed as inappropriate (and hypocritical) pressure from the West on human rights issues, which Mbeki framed as a pseudo-imperialist "*tool*" by Western countries to achieve their own political aims, prompting domestic and international criticisms that it was ignoring legitimate issues to please old friends and allies.[173] Pretoria during its tenure on the Council voted against a Security Council resolution urging Burma's junta to free political prisoners (alongside only Russia and China); voted to discontinue scrutiny of human rights abuses in Iran; and blocked efforts to raise discussions of sanctions against Zimbabwe and Sudan.[174]

Even on the Human Rights Council—which Pretoria claimed was a more appropriate venue for such discussions—South Africa opposed resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Uzbekistan and Iran.[175]Mbeki's inability to make progress toward solving the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe will go down in history, rightly or not, as the dominant

[171]C. Landsberg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition,* p. 163.

[172] E. Jordaan. *Barking at the Big Dogs: South Africa's Policy Towards the Middle East, Round Table 97(397),* p. 555.

[173]R. Roberts. *Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki,* p. 168.

[174] A. Van Nieuwkerk. *A Critique of South Africa's Role on the UN Security Council, South African Journal of International Affairs 14(1),*p.71.

[175]The Economist. *The See-No-Evil Foreign policy 2008.*

international relations policy issue of his tenure, given that none of his other initiatives—many of which were successes—generated the same sort of international and domestic attention or criticism. While the roots of Zimbabwe's crisis date to the early 1990s, growing public discontent over corruption, misgovernment, and poor economic conditions gave rise to growing labor-led protest later in the decade.

This anti-government coalition of urbanites, labor, civil society, and white business interests in 1999 coalesced into the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party. In a shock to the government, the MDC and its allies successfully defeated a draft Constitution in February 2000 that would have consolidated power under the President, a result that foreshadowed the results of parliamentary elections that June, in which the MDC took 57 of 120 elected seats, decimating the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) hold on that body.

The referendum loss and near parliamentary upset set off a wave of government-instigated violence against MDC supporters that would leave hundreds dead—and thousands more tortured or displaced—between 2000 and 2008, peaking in the run-ups to 2002 and 2008 parliamentary elections and the 2005 presidential poll. It also sparked Harare's policy of expropriating commercial land from white commercial farmers, which annihilated the commercial farming sector (one of Zimbabwe's biggest export earners), undermined food security, and forced agricultural workers out of jobs.

This helped set off the country's spectacular economic collapse; the IMF estimates that the country's economy contracted by 40 percent between 2000 and 2007. With a mass exodus of skilled workers (up to 3 million Zimbabweans in total are estimated to have left the country) and withdrawal of foreign investment in the face of nationalization threats, Zimbabwe's tax base withered, forcing Harare to survive by simply printing more money, leading to hyperinflation that reached an unfathomable 89.7 sextillion percent before the US dollar was adopted in early 2009.[176]

Zimbabwe's economic collapse also had a significant impact on the region; one 2003 report estimated the loss of potential investment in the region at close to $36 billion.[177] The direct economic impact on South Africa, however, is more difficult to measure. South African parastatals Eskom and Sasol lost hundreds of millions of rand on unpaid bills for electric and fuel supplies to Zimbabwe while Pretoria also has been forced to deal with the cost of processing, deporting, and securing its borders against millions of refugees.[178]

[176] S. Hank. *RIP Zimbabwe Dollar,* p. 2.

[177]T. Hughes. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African Foreign policy Making,* p. 113.

[178]D. McKinley. *South African Foreign policy Towards Zimbabwe Under Mbeki, Review of African Political Economy 31(100),* p. 359.

These refugees also increased social pressures, sparking periodic outbreaks of xenophobic violence against foreign workers, Zimbabwean and otherwise. However, there also were benefits. Despite fears of a collapse in trade, South African exports to Zimbabwe in 2009 topped R13 billion, up from less than R5 million in 2000, and Pretoria maintained a massive trade surplus.[179] The influx of Zimbabwean farm workers benefited commercial farmers, who utilized them (often illegally) for cheap labor, while the influx of skilled Zimbabwean workers to South Africa helped address the domestic skills shortage. One 2007 report estimated the impact of these immigrants was at worst neutral and perhaps slightly beneficial to South Africa's economy.[180]

Given this economic and political collapse, Mbeki and his government came under intense pressure at home and abroad to address the Zimbabwe situation. A broad swath of domestic actors—including the political opposition, churches, press, and civil society—spoke out loudly against what they viewed as inaction by Pretoria toward the situation in Zimbabwe.[181] The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the ANC's partner in the ruling tri-partite alliance, was a particularly vociferous critic, with union leaders condemning Mugabe's land redistribution program from the beginning and backing its Zimbabwean labor allies. Although they did not couch their public arguments in such a way, concerns about the government's inability to address the influx of cheap Zimbabwean labor clearly were an area of concern to the federation.

Even within the ANC, prominent figures like Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota and Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs chair Pallo Jordan broke with party practice in publicly calling for a firmer line in Zimbabwe, although they were quickly reined in by the party and warned not to buck the consensus, at least in public.[182]Mbeki had no great affinity toward Mugabe, who—jealous of the attention paid to South Africa—continually sought to undermine South African initiatives on the continent from 1994 and dismissing Mbeki's African Renaissance vision as "*political nonsense*".[183] However, Mbeki opted not to take a confrontational approach toward Zimbabwe, choosing instead a behind-the-scenes process that came to be known as "*quiet*" diplomacy in order to cajole Mugabe toward reform rather than publicly attack him.

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[179]M. Schoeman and C. Alden. *The Hegemon That Wasn't: South Africa's Policy Toward Zimbabwe, Strategic Review for Southern Africa,* p. 17.

[180] P. Honey. *African Migrants: Fewer Than Was Thought,* p.3.

[181]T. Hughes. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African Foreign policymaking,* p. 138.

[182]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC, p. 294.*

[183] J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-1999,* p. 190-191.

The roots of the policy date to South Africa's failure in Nigeria in 1995, where overt criticism—in Mbeki's view—hindered South Africa's ability to influence Abacha. As Mbeki himself noted in 2002:

> *"We could have invaded Zimbabwe as some people suggested—but what would this have achieved? You must remember what happened to us (at the Auckland Commonwealth meeting in 1995) …We suddenly found that we were the only ones who condemned the planned hanging. As a result we learnt a valuable lesson that, especially in Africa, you cannot act alone because you will find yourself isolated and in a position similar to that of the apartheid government*".[184]

The reasons and justifications for "*quiet*" diplomacy were myriad. Resignation was part of it; a simple understanding that no one could force Robert Mugabe to make changes he did not want to make. Mbeki admitted as early as 2001 that Pretoria's strategy was not yielding results, while Pahad acknowledged the following year that South Africa had run out of ideas on how to move things forward.[185]

Strategic concerns clearly played a role. Mbeki's 2002 comments reveal one of the more significant reasons behind his refusal to take a "*harder line*" toward Zimbabwe, namely that a tough stance there could undermine his efforts to reshape continental political and economic governance.[186]

Despite Zimbabwean antagonism toward his African Renaissance ideals, Mbeki was actively seeking continental and regional support for NEPAD when Zimbabwe's crisis arose, as well as pushing his neighbors for a reform of SADC's Security Organ.[187] Maintaining stability at home was another justification for not pushing harder, as any push toward sanctions because of the belief that such a move would make the political and economic problems in Zimbabwe worse, thereby exacerbating refugee flows.[188] Hence, as Aziz Pahad acknowledged to a group of academics in 2004, "*quiet*" diplomacy may not

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[184]M. Prys. *Regions, Power and Hegemony: South Africa's Role in Southern Africa,* p. 10.

[185]T. Hughes. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African Foreign policymaking,* p. 117.

[186] C. Landsberg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition,* p. 174.

[187]M. Shoeman and C. Alden. *The Hegemon That Wasn't: South Africa's Policy toward Zimbabwe, Strategic Review for Southern Africa,* p. 5.

[188]K. Dlamini. *Is Quiet Diplomacy an Effective Conflict Resolution Strategy? South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/2003,* p. 176.

have been a perfect option, but it was the one most conducive to ensuring continued stability in Zimbabwe.[189]

There were also ideological reasons for this stance. While these have been overstated in the press, Mbeki and the ANC were also motivated to an extent by struggle-era loyalties to ZANU- PF, which did assist the ANC in the 1980s. In addition, many in the ANC did not care for the MDC alternative. Mbeki did not rate Tsvangirai's leadership acumen highly, and ANC leaders were critical of the MDC's confrontational approach with ZANU-PF and suspicious of both its ties with the West and its labor roots.[190]

Zimbabwe policy was clearly shaped by an *anti*-imperialist worldview that shone through in Mbeki's public statements. Mbeki appeared to believe that the only reason Western countries and white South Africans cared about Zimbabwe was because white people were affected.

> "*A million people die in Rwanda and do the white South Africans care?" he asked in 2002, further stating that everyone wanted to talk about Zimbabwe "because 12 white people died*".[191]

South African decision makers frequently stated that they would not be dictated to by the West in how they dealt with their northern neighbor; as spokesman Bheki Khumalo noted, "*We'll do things because we believe they're correct and right," and not to "appease the G-8 leaders*".[192]

Whatever the motivations behind it, Pretoria's stance toward Zimbabwe changed very little throughout Mbeki's presidency. The South African Government endorsed elections in 2002 and 2005 as free and fair despite critiques of their conduct by local and international observers, but Mbeki and his deputies—notably Pahad and Local Government Minister Sydney Mufamadi— remained involved with shuttle diplomacy there throughout Mbeki's second term. South Africa, through SADC, did criticize the June 2008 second round of the Zimbabwean presidential election—boycotted by the MDC in the face of government intimidation—as not representing the will of the Zimbabwean people, but it remained engaged behind the scenes. South African mediation proved essential to the 15 September 2008 signing of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement (GPA), which still holds (if barely) at the time of writing. The GPA proved a fitting coda to Mbeki's presidency—just five days later, Mbeki, under fire at home, announced his resignation.

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[189]A. Van Nieuwkerk. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy Decision-Making on African Crises,* pp. 188-189.

[190] W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 187.

[191] M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* p. 440.

[192]R. Roberts. *Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki,* pp. 177-178.

Thabo Mbeki's ouster as ANC president at the December 2007 Polokwane conference and his subsequent resignation as President cannot be tied specifically to his handling of international relations policy; such issues generated relatively little heat within the ruling party. However, the widespread view that Mbeki was a "*international relations policy President*" and criticisms of his frequent travel did not help bolster the President's populist credentials, particularly in the face of a challenge by someone like Jacob Zuma.

Although Mbeki from the start of his term tasked his international relations policy team with reconciling domestic and external priorities, his government was never able to translate his foreign agenda—particularly his continental good governance agenda—into something that translated at home.[193]Public opinion polling consistently showed issues like unemployment, crime, service delivery, and HIV being the public's main priorities; nothing in the foreign affairs realm generated that sort of interest.[194] Mbeki's affinity for the "*high*" politics of the international scene perpetuated and deepened the stereotype that he was out of touch with South African realities. This alone did not lead to his ouster, but it certainly played a contributing role**.**

2.8 Conclusion

South Africa's international relations policy—and in particular the global and regional context in which it makes those policies—saw a massive shift after the advent of majority rule in 1994. No longer was Pretoria a pariah struggling to find friends in the world; it was now fully and completely embraced by the community of democracies. As shown, under Mbeki, South Africa embraced this reengagement and sought to take a far more active and engaged role on the international stage than it ever did under white rule. The question that will be explored for the remainder of this study is *how* Pretoria shaped its international relations policy; with an eye toward determining what actors had influence in the process and whether it was more "democratic" than under the apartheid regime.

[193] C. Alden and G. le Pere. *Strategic Posture Review: South Africa,* p. 28.

[194] M. Mbeki. *Towards a More Productive South African Foreign policy, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/2003,* p. 18.

CHAPTER THREE

VARYING PRESIDENCIES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' POLICY MAKING

3.1Introduction

The 1961 republican Constitution vested the State President with the power to declare war and make peace; enter into international treaties; accredit diplomats; and command the military, although in reality these powers were given to the Prime Minister due to the ceremonial nature of the State President.[195] The 1983 Constitution, which eliminated the Prime Minister position and gave the State Presidency real teeth, included almost identical language about the powers of the President, although it diminished Cabinet oversight of the decision-making process.[196] The 1996 Constitution provides for greater oversight from Parliament, at least on paper, but gives the executive similar powers in the international relations policy arena, including the "*negotiating and signing of all international agreements*".[197]Less clear, however, is how each of these leaders used that power. For example, to what extent did these leaders dominate the decision-making process versus delegating on issues of international relations policy? Did they have an interest in international relations policy, or were they more focused domestically? Did they rely on any particular advisors on foreign affairs? And, most importantly, are there any trends and patterns that can be discerned?

To answer these questions, this chapter examined each post-1948 national leader with an eye toward better understanding their involvements in the international relations policy process. Specific issues examined (where information is available) included the degree of interest they showed in foreign affairs; their respective world views; their experience in the international arena, either through travel or policymaking; and their individual decision-making styles: closed versus consultative, micro-managing versus delegating, discouraging or encouraging of debate. A study of each leader helped determine the degree to which personal characteristics of South African leaders—particularly on the issues of interest and openness to consultation—have had an impact on whether international relations policy has been open to outside inputs, as well as whether this has ebbed and flowed overtime.

3.2 DF Malan (1948-1953)

National Party leader DF Malan assumed the Premiership from Jan Smuts in 1948 determined not to make the same mistake as Smuts—a renowned internationalist—in

[195]1961 Constitution of South Africa, Section 7.

[196]1983 Constitution of South Africa, Section 6.

[197]1996 Constitution of South Africa, Section 84 and 231.

being seen as prioritizing international issues ahead of domestic ones.[198]Despite retaining the position of Foreign Minister—possibly to frustrate Eric Louw, South Africa's leading diplomat but a man with whom Malan had a contentious relationship—Malan did not show any great public interest in foreign affairs. Although committed to the idea of a South African republic, he took no steps during his premiership that would have isolated South Africa and hoped that it could remain part of the Commonwealth.[199]

He travelled abroad (notably as the first foreign leader to visit independent Israel), but with now here near the frequency of Smuts.[200] He was open to inputs from Cabinet ministers like Finance Minister Nicolaas Havenga, and—to the surprise of many diplomats in that very "*English*" department—from External Affairs. At first, recalled long time diplomat Donald Sole,

> "*He was very suspicious, but what changed him was Mrs. Malan, who told him*, '*These people have grown up in the British mandarin tradition. They serve the country, not the government, and you can trust them*'".[201]

Malan became particularly close to Foreign Secretary DD Forsyth, who was key to convincing Malan to enter the Korean conflict alongside UN forces.[202]Nevertheless, Malan did on occasion make unilateral international relations policy pronouncements, if not always well-informed ones.

Malan had a particular interest in Africa, and was the driving force (without input of External Affairs officials or Cabinet members) behind the concept of an "*African Charter*" that aimed to keep the continent Christian, anti-Communist, and non-militarized, an idea that got little traction. [203] He also strongly (but unsuccessfully) advocated for the absorption of the High Commission territories on South Africa's borders, against the advice of External Affairs.[204]

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[198] D. Geldenhuys. *The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, in Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to de Klerk,* p. 255.

[199]P. Nel. *A Soviet Embassy in Pretoria?* ,p. 2.

[200]J. Adams. *The Unnatural Alliance,* p. 5.

[201]D. Sole. *This Above All: Reminiscence of a South African Diploma ,* p. 143.

[202]Ibid.

[203]D. Sole. *South African Foreign policy from Hertzong to de Klerk, South African Journal of International Affairs 2(1),* pp. 106-107.

[204]D. Geldenhuys. *The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, in Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to de Klerk,* p. 255.

Despite this interest in Africa, he displayed little knowledge of its politics or geography; in a 1955 conversation with Malan, academic Ned Munger found that the former Prime Minister "*made it only too clear that he believed Ghana was east of Nigeria*".[205]

D. F. Malan, leader of the NP from 1934 until 1953
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Party_(South_Africa)

3.3 J. G Strijdom (1953-1958)

JG Strijdom's brief tenure as Prime Minister was the period in which the South African executive had the least personal influence on the international relations policy making process. A small town lawyer from the rural northern Transvaal, Strijdom was the least worldly South African leader, having practically no foreign exposure before becoming Prime Minister, either through his Cabinet responsibilities (he had been Minister of Lands) or travel.[206]As Sole recalled,

> "*Strijdom had little interest in foreign affairs and saw his task in South Africa as maintaining the identity of the white man*".[207]He further adds, "*I was overseas for most of Strijdom' s tenure. When Foreign Minister Eric Louw decided to reduce representation at the UN and I came back, he took me in to have a chat with Strijdom. He wasn't the least bit interested*".[208]

[205]E. Munger. *Foreward, The Afrikaners,* p. 5.

[206]D. Geldenhuys. *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign policy Making,* p. 21.

[207]D. Sole. *South African Foreign policy from* Hertzog to de Klerk, South African Journal of International Affairs 2(1), p. 108.

[208]Ibid.

The only issue with an international relations policy connection in which Strijdom showed any interest was in regard to South Africa becoming are public, although he did not press the issue during his premiership, leaving it to his trusted successor, Hendrik Verwoerd. Strijdom was the first Prime Minister to delegate the Foreign Affairs portfolio, and he was content to let Louw, a close ally, dominate that policy sphere.

J. G. Strijdom, leader of the NP from 1953 until 1958
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Party_(South_Africa)

Strijdom, a leading proponent of *baaskap* (white domination) with little respect for blacks, did not even bat an eye- at Louw's attempts to build nascent relations with independent black states, a clear display of his disconnectedness.[209]

3.4 Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-1966)

Although a mild surprise to succeed Strijdom, Verwoerd during his Premiership dominated his Cabinet, party, and the broader South African state like no other national leader, before or since. He was an unapologetically authoritarian figure who "*over ruled ministers on departmental matters and in general created the impression that he alone was making all the decisions*".[210]He often understood his ministers' portfolios better than they did and treated them like "*schoolboys*".[211]

In the same vein, he often introduced legislation without seeking the inputs of appropriate

[209]J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy; The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 29.

[210]H. Adam and H. Giliomee. *Ethic Power Mobilized Can South Africa Change?* , p. 202.

[211] D. O'Meara. *Forty Lost Years,* p. 112.

ministers or those of the broader NP caucus.[212] A workaholic who would put in 16 to 18 hour days, Verwoerd had an almost superhuman certainty in his decision making, with even his wife acknowledging that he would not make concessions once he had made a decision.[213]

Once he had made a decision—which he tended to do quickly—Verwoerd would tolerate opposition from neither supporter nor critic.[214]If his logic did not prevail over his opponents, he would simply talk them into the ground, sometimes speaking for hours to the point where his confused audiences would go along with his reasoning, no matter how abstruse.[215]

Dr H.F. Verwoerd
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Party_(South_Africa)

Although Verwoerd is best remembered for his conceptualization of separate development and work to codify apartheid, he retained an interest in foreign affairs, particularly after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre began focusing global attention on South Africa. He took a keen interest in matters around Namibia, endorsing DFA's ultimately successful fight between 1961 and 1966 to fend off an International Court of Justice challenge to the legality of South Africa's occupation.[216] Future Foreign Minister Pik

[212]N. Stulz. *The Politics of Security: South Africa Under Verwoerd, 1961-1966, The Journal of Modern African Studies 7(1),* p. 15.

[213]D. Graaff. *Div Looks Back: The Memoirs of De Villiers Graaff,* p.186.

[214]F. Barnard. *13 Years with Dr. HF Verwoerd,* p. 18.

[215]A. Hepple. *Verwoerd,* p. 110.

[216]D. Sole. *South African Foreign policy from Hertzog to de Klerk,* p. 109.

Botha, then a lawyer on the case, recalled,

> "*because of the importance of this case, we had direct access to Verwoerd. He wanted weekly roundups of what was going on to keep track of the case*".[217]

Botha's recollection hints at Verwoerd's predilection for micromanagement, poring over diplomatic reports and seeing fit to involve himself in matters dealt with by junior diplomats. Long time diplomat Tom Wheeler noted,

> "*I as a junior officer in 1961 would put up a memo on something like the Red Cross, and it would come back awhile later with marginal notes by Verwoerd on it. That's the extent to which he was involved*".[218]

Verwoerd's conduct of international relations policy was a microcosm of his overarching decision-making style, famously taking the decision to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth without consulting either Cabinet or Parliament.[219]

This authoritarianism led Munger to famously state in 1965,

> "*If one were to list the most important people making international relations policy, the names might well run: 1. Dr. Verwoerd 2. Dr. Verwoerd 3. Dr. Verwoerd 4. Foreign Minister Muller 5. The Cabinet and 6. Secretary GP Jooste, Brand Fourie, Donald Sole, and one or two other professionals*".[220]

Verwoerd lacked senior international relations policy advisors, freezing out Eric Louw as Foreign Minister and largely ignoring his successor, Muller. While Jooste, Sole, and his Africa envoy Albie Burger generally had good access to Verwoerd, even they were ignored if they did not agree with the Prime Minister. "*Verwoerd just didn't listen if he didn't agree*," recalled Sole.[221]

Verwoerd's stance toward external affairs throughout most of his tenure was exemplified by his "*block of granite*" position, refusing to be cowed by Western criticism or to be flexible in South Africa's application of apartheid, once even banning his MPs from

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[217]Ibid.

[218]Ibid.

[219]D. Geldenhuys. *The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations, in Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to de Klerk,* p. 263.

[220]E. Munger. *Notes on the Formation of South Africa Foreign policy,* p. 85.

[221]D. Sole. *South African Foreign policy from Hertzog to de Klerk,* p. 109.

attending diplomatic mixed-race functions. However, by the end of his tenure (and life) Verwoerd began to show a greater appreciation for the nuances of foreign relations. He took a cool stance, for example, toward Rhodesia's November 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, placing pragmatism above any racial solidarity with Rhodesia's whites.[222]

Verwoerd also held talks in 1966 with Lesotho's new Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan, and appeared to be moving toward normalizing relations with that newly independent neighbor. In fact, on the morning of 6 September 1966, Verwoerd told his caucus that he would be making an important international relations policy announcement in his speech in Parliament that afternoon.[223] However, parliamentary messenger Dimitris Tsafendas stabbed Verwoerd to death before he could make that speech; not one to use notes, one will never know what he would have announced that day.[224]

3.5 John Vorster (1966-1978)

John Vorster, Verwoerd's Justice Minister and successor as Prime Minister, was in terms of personality and vision drastically different than his predecessor: plain-spoken, deliberate, intelligent but by no means intellectual.[225]Whereas Verwoerd had an overarching (if not always clear) vision for the country, Vorster was reactive, a counter-puncher not wedded to any particular ideology. Perhaps as a result of his legal background, Vorster seldom took snap decisions, considering all permutations before making decisions.[226]

Whereas Verwoerd was an imperious micro-manager, Vorster saw his role as more of a "*chairman of the board*," making decisions when necessary but generally allowing his ministers to run their own portfolios, seeking consensus wherever possible.[227] However, while Vorster's style of governance may have been politically wise and allowed capable ministers to thrive, it lacked any effective coordinating mechanism, and Vorster—who lacked Verwoerd's long-term vision—did not provide structure or any overarching strategy.

Hence, ministers operated their departments like independent fiefdoms rather than inter connected entities, and Vorster's administration was characterized by the most

[222]D. Sole. *South African Foreign policy from Hertzog to de Klerk,* p. 109.

[223]J. Botha. *Verwoerd is Dead,* p. 49.

[224] P. Wolvaards et al. *From Verwoerd to Mandela: South African Diplomats Remember, 1(3),* p. 102.

[225] H. Gelliomee. *B.J. Vorster and the Sultan's Horse,* p. 3.

[226]J. D' Olivera. *Vorster the Man,* pp. 265-266.

[227]R. Rotberg.*The Process of Decision Making in Contemporary South Africa, in South African in Transition: To What?* p. 12.

significant inter-departmental competition ever seen in South Africa.[228]

Although Vorster had no international relations policy experience before becoming Prime Minister, he developed an interest in and strategic understanding of the pertinent issues, evidenced by his attempts at *détente* with the continent and his taking hard line toward Rhodesia, which he thought would help ameliorate Western pressure on South Africa.[229]In making his international relations policy choices, Vorster relied on the advice of a small group of influential advisors, both inside and outside government, toward whom he showed unshaking loyalty.[230]

BOSS chief Hendrik van den Bergh was clearly first among equals in providing advice, although DFA Director-General Brand Fourie and Information Secretary Eschel Rhoodie also were among his trusted advisors.[231]Late in his administration, Foreign Minister Pik Botha moved into this inner circle. "*He treated me like a younger little brother. I could discuss anything with him…He gave me complete freedom to undertake negotiations on Rhodesia*," recalled Botha.[232]

John Vorster
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Party_(South_Africa)

However, Vorster's management short comings prevented the country from developing

[228] D. O'Meara. *Forty Lost Years,* p.206.

[229]E. Munger. *Foreward, The Afrikaners,* p. 5.

[230]H. Gelliomee. *B.J. Vorster and the Sultan's Horse,* p. 3.

[231]J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 113.

[232]Ibid.

a coordinated; overarching international relations policy and would come to have deleterious consequences for his administration. As noted in the previous chapter, DFA was caught flat-footed by Vorster's choice—after much deliberation—to intervene in Angola in 1975, a decision largely driven by Defense Minister PW Botha that ultimately derailed Vorster's *détente* efforts.[233]

Similarly, Vorster kept Foreign Affairs and other departments largely in the dark about Information's secret projects, which was largely responsible for bringing his premiership to an end in 1978.[234]It also effectively ended the career of Information Minister Connie Mulder, long the favorite to succeed Vorster, who lost out to the Minister from whose departmental funds Information's moneys originated, Defense's PW Botha.

3.6 P. W Botha (1978-1989)

PW Botha showed from the start of his administration in 1978 that it would be a far more disciplined one than that of his predecessor, with decision making codified and all ministers singing off the same hymn sheet, a style described by academic Kenneth Grundy as more "*forceful managing director*" than "*chairman of the board*".[235]Cabinet was given a proper secretariat (which for the first time would take detailed notes and provide proper agendas for meetings), the State Security Council was bolstered, and the 1983 Constitution's establishment of a State Presidency further consolidated executive power.[236]By the time he left office in 1989, the Office of the State President would have over 500 employees that served a coordinating and implementing role. These structures combined to ensure that all departments worked together toward a common goal, with Botha able to monitor progress along the way.

The creation of structures was not, however, the only means by which Botha maintained control over his government and Cabinet—he also used intimidation. Botha's aloofness from his Cabinet and the NP caucus resembled that of Verwoerd, but whereas Verwoerd's intellect awed his ministers into silence, Botha's ministers simply feared him. "*If he went to Cabinet determined to get approval for something, he would get it*," said Trade and Industry Minister Dawie de Villiers.[237]

Interviewees had countless stories of Botha's thuggish and belittling behavior toward his Cabinet ministers, even those considered among his confidantes. FW de Klerk in his

[233]K. Grundy. *The Militarization of South African Politics,* p. 88.

[234]L. De Villiers. *Secret Information,* p. 74.

[235]K. Grundy. *The Militarization of South African Politics,* pp.34-35.

[236]F. De Klerk. *FW de Klerk, The Lat Trek-A New Beginning,* pp. 66-67.

[237]Ibid.

memoirs said Botha in Cabinet meetings:

> "*sat at the head of the elongated oval cabinet table and presided over proceedings sometimes like a benevolent father and sometimes like a great bird of prey…His style did not encourage free and open debate. Ministers who were imprudent enough to embark on courses that did not please him were very quickly, and often quite brutally, cut down to size*".[238]

Given the paucity of free and open debate, Cabinet and SSC meetings tended to be peremptory, with decisions either made by Botha directly or offline with the counsel of a handful of key advisors. Describing the proceedings, long time Cabinet Secretary Jannie Roux retorted that, "*PW would listen to two or three ministers and say, ok, enough discussion, here's the decision*".[239]That said, while many of his ministers lived in fear, they also had a great respect for Botha's loyalty and consistency. "*He could be nasty…boy, there were times when he was nasty*," argued Magnus Malan, Botha's Defense Minister and close confidante in his memoirs.

Mr. Botha outside court during his trial in 1998 for refusing to appear at Truth Commission hearings. He was found guilty of contempt but the conviction was overturned.

Source: Sasa Kralj/Associated Press

However, "*if he gave you the green light you could depend on him—not like other politicians. He's a man's man, he's a hell of a good friend to have, but he's a nasty*

[238]F. De Klerk. *FW de Klerk, The Last Trek-A New Beginning,* p. 67.

[239]Ibid.

enemy".[240] Many noted that one had to learn how to approach Botha, particularly he became even more erratically temperamental after a stroke around 1982.[241] As Military Intelligence chief Tienie Groenewald noted,

> "*You had to learn to know him. If he was in a bad mood, you did what you had to do and got out. If he was in a good mood, you could sometimes spend a lot of profitable time with him. He took a lot of advice; people don't realize that…He'd listen when you speak sense*".[242]

While Botha may have appeared to have made hasty decisions in formal structures, they were undergirded by extensive research, consultation, and contemplation. Once remarking, "*Remember what King Solomon said: 'The more advisors you have the wiser decisions you will make,*" Botha appointed commissions of inquiry on a host of issues, seeking out the best minds in the country to sit on them.[243]

While impatient, Botha was not unapproachable; as Donald Sole described in his memoirs, he was always "*ready to listen as long as he was satisfied that I was not wasting his time*".[244] While it happened rarely, Cabinet ministers and government officials' could stand up to him and change his mind, although Pik Botha noted that in making arguments, "*Everything needed to be supported*".[245]

Botha relied on a small inner circle of trusted advisors in decision making, although he was not as close to any of them as Vorster was with van den Bergh. Press secretary Jack Viviers, private secretary Ters Ehlers, and Cabinet secretary Roux all were cited as being part of this inner circle, with Malan, Barnard, and Constitutional Development Minister Chris Heunis considered the most influential Cabinet-level figures.[246]

However, Roux—who was frequently described as Botha's "*gate keeper*" in contemporary accounts—contends that their influence should not be overstated.[247]"*I*

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[240] M. Malan. *My Life with the South African Defense Force,* p. 91.

[241]H.Giliomee. *The Rubicon Revisited,* p.130.

[242]Ibid.

[243]B. Pottinger. *The Imperial Presidency: PW Botha, the First Ten Years,* p.354.

[244]D. Sole. *This Above All: Reminiscences of a South African Diplomat,* p. 483.

[245]Ibid.

[246]A. Seegers. *The Head of Government and the Executive, in Leadership in the Apartheid State: From Malan to de Klerk,* p. 60.

[247]D. O'Meara. *Forty Lost Years,* p. 278.

always said, the guy who is going to be the power behind PW's throne has yet to be born; PW was the power behind his own throne…he was his own man" . Roux painted a picture of Botha as an isolated figure, both personally and professionally. He said:

> "*PW didn't leave friends; he didn't care about it. I predicted he would die a lonely man, and he died a lonely man. He had some friends, but they weren't strong-minded people who could change his mind on important things*".[248]

The characteristics of Botha's decision making—process orientation trust in the security apparatus, the utilization of a small group of advisors, and even his short temper—all were reflected in his conduct of South Africa's international relations policy. Botha's 12 years as Defense Minister certainly gave him experience in the world of international relations policy, but he was not widely traveled (not leaving the region during his premiership, save for a 1984 trip to Europe) and according to most observers, he lacked a sophisticated worldview. In the view of US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (1981-1989), Chester Crocker, Botha was deeply suspicious of American "*constructive engagement*" efforts in southern Africa given his "*very African penchant for believing that distant foreigners were the source of his problems and could become his deus exam china*".[249]

Botha's perceptions of the outside world were also shaped by his proclivity for not being seen as succumbing to pressure, from within or outside the country. Botha's handling of the 1985 "*Rubicon*" speech—in which he scotched Western expectations of a reformist speech, severely damaging the country's economy in the process—reflected this defiance.[250]

A second stroke in 1989 finally led Botha's long-cowed Cabinet to take him on, forcing him out as party leader and, soon thereafter, as State President. The world was changing—Namibia was moving toward independence, the Soviet Union was collapsing, and Botha was even holding talks with Mandela.

However, most of his Cabinet colleagues doubted that he would have had the courage to take the final steps of unbanning the ANC and freeing Mandela. He was of a different, bygone era. Barnard argued:

> *"Remember one thing when talking about PW…it was like taking Truman or Eisenhower to the late 1980s. PW started his career in 1948 in Parliament. In 1948, Truman was still President. Always take that into account*".[251]

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[248]Ibid.

[249]C. Crocker. *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood,* p. 316.

[250]H. Giliomee. *The Rubicon Revisited,* p. 125.

[251]Ibid.

Instead, that responsibility would fall to his successor, former Education Minister FW de Klerk.

3.7 FW De Klerk (1989-1994)

The tendency of the NP caucus to elect Prime Ministers with drastically different personalities, biases, and preferences from the predecessors continued with the elevation of FW de Klerk. Despite having a "*conservative*" reputation, de Klerk—a lawyer by training—was more of a consensus seeker than Botha and respected by his Cabinet colleagues for his intellect.[252]His brother, respected journalist Willem de Klerk, described the new President in a biography as "*a team man who consults others, takes them into his confidence, honestly shares information with his colleagues, and has a knack for making people feel important and a tease*"[253] Even-tempered and phlegmatic, de Klerk had no propensity for Botha's temper tantrums, which was much welcomed by Cabinet colleagues who had walked on egg shells for years.[254]



F W de Klerk, State President of South Africa from 1989 till 1994, who ended the apartheid system. From 1994 till 1996 he was deputy State President of South Africa under Nelson Mandela

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F._W._de_Klerk

Contrasting de Klerk's style with that of his predecessor, Dawie de Villiers said:

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[252]J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-1999,* p. 41.

[253]W. De Klerk. *FW de Klerk: The Man in his Time,* p. 74.

[254]D. Geldenhuys and H. Kotze. *FW de Klerk: A Study in Political Leadership, Politikon 19(1),* p. 36.

> *"FW on the other hand was a good lawyer, good listener…he could be very argumentative, and if he had a point he wouldn't let it go. But as a lawyer, he'd say, can we work it this way. He has strong views, but was an open and considerate man*".[255]

De Klerk quickly changed the style of decision making at the top. The full Cabinet became the forum for debate and discussion; as de Klerk noted in his autobiography,

> "*there was no place for inner circles and no by-passing the Cabinet. All important decisions were taken by the Cabinet, which was given full access to all the facts that could influence its decisions*".[256]

In practice, "*FW didn't really have a kitchen cabinet*," said diplomat Dave Steward, de Klerk's close advisor and Cabinet Secretary from 1992.[257]Cabinet participants noted that the change was quite drastic. "*FW would let the debates continue. In PW's time, we never had Cabinet meetings longer than 09h00 to 13h00. With FW we sat until 19h00 or 20h00at night*," retorted Roux, who remained Cabinet Secretary until 1992.[258]

Compared to Botha, said Finance Minister Barend du Plessis—who unsuccessfully challenged Klerk for the party leadership:

> "*FW was much more democratic, encouraging open discussion and free exchange of ideas. He was a very good chairman, highly intelligent, and he could really summarize a thing well…If you had something to say to PW, he regarded it as an interruption, whereas FW welcomed it*".[259]

Pik Botha, citing de Klerk's legal training as an influence, noted that he was "*very objective, listening, giving everyone a chance, and then giving a resume of what was a fair reflection of the mood*".[260]

De Klerk took a personal interest in international relations policy; "F*W took foreign affairs,*

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[255]Ibid.

[256]F. De Klerk. *FW de Klerk, The Last Trek-A New Beginning,* pp. 153-154.

[257]Ibid.

[258] Ibid.

[259]F. De Klerk. *FW de Klerk, The Last Trek- A New Beginning,* pp.153-154.

[260]Ibid.

particularly repairing SA's image abroad, very seriously," said Steward.[261]However, the demanding nature of his job, given the negotiations process, and his emphasis on letting ministers control their portfolios meant that he left a relatively small personal footprint on international relations policymaking. As Steward noted:

> "*Cabinet took decisions, and ministers were responsible for their portfolios. Pik took decisions on foreign affairs, so to a large extent, FW would rely on Pik's advice. He would do so critically and not accept everything, but there was no doubt Pik was Foreign Minister…Pik was thrilled about this; after all these years he could do his job!*"[262]

3.8 Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1994-1999)

Few leaders around the world assume their country's top job while already a statesman of international renown; Nelson Mandela was a notable exception. In the four years between his 1990 release and his 1994 election, Mandela had scoured the globe to build support for the negotiation process and raise money for the ANC, establishing him-self as a global celebrity. Adding to the mix his travels around Africa in the early 1960s, he was easily the most traveled leader in South Africa's history.

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, first democratically elected President of South Africa (1994-1999)
Source: Sasa Kralj/Associated Press

However, despite his international renown and although he maintained a robust travel schedule throughout his Presidency, Mandela could not be described as a "*international*

[261]F. De Klerk. *FW de Klerk, The Last Trek-A New Beginning,* pp. 153-154.

[262]Ibid.

relations policy" President, focusing most of his time and attention on issues of national reconciliation, state stability, and service delivery. "*There were only two international relations policy issues on which Mandela took a hands on approach—on others he had a watching brief—they were Lockerbie and East Timor*," claimed his Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad.[263]

Although Mandela lacked a consistent interest in the international relations policy realm, he could be a forceful, unpredictable, and decidedly unilateral actor when his interest was piqued. Neither Mandela's public expressions of outrage over Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha's killing of Ken Saro-Wiwain 1995 nor his 1996 announcement that South Africa would recognize China over Taiwan were coordinated with DFA or Cabinet in advance.[264] Pahad said both decisions surprised him.

> *"I don't think he consulted us in Foreign Affairs," notes Pahad about Mandela's Nigeria stance, which he knew would not be popular on the continent. "He took that decision. We then had to pick up the pieces, because we knew there would be no oil sanctions in place, that many African countries would see that position as either mad or not in their interests, or that of the continent*".[265]

These and other examples—like announcing South Africa would continue to sell arms to Rwanda on the day DFA was to announce its cessation, or his premature announcement of Zaire peace talks in 1997—led to criticisms in South Africa that Mandela's personal statements made international relations policy.[266]

In conducting his foreign relations, Mandela relied on a small coterie of trusted officials and ministers to act as his personal envoys. His use of Director-General in the Presidency, Jakes Gerwel, as his lead inter locator with Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi to convince him in 1999 to extradite the Libyan suspects in the 1986 Lockerbie bombing was perhaps the best-known example, although there are many others.[267] Mandela dispatched Sydney Mufamadi, then Safety and Security Minister, to Mozambique in 1994 and Lesotho in 1998 to defuse tensions in those countries.[268]

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[263]C. Alden. *Solving South Africa's Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign policymaking and the Two Chinas Issue, in South Africa's Foreign policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy,* p. 133.

[264]Ibid.

[265]Ibid.

[266]P. Schraeder. *South Africa's Foreign policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance, Round Table (359),* p. 236.

[267]I. Jhazbay. *South Africa's Relations with North Africa and the Horn: Bridging the Continent, in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era,* p. 77.

[268]I. Jhazbay. *South Africa's Relations with North Africa and the Horn: Bridging the Continent, in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era,* p. 77.

In managing his Cabinet and government writ large, Mandela's personal authority loomed large. However, Mandela was generally too focused on "*big picture*" issues, like national reconciliation, to weigh in on fine policy points, while his office was too small to effectively playa policy-crafting role.[269]While deeply respected by his Cabinet, he rarely presided over its bi-weekly meetings and seldom inserted himself into detailed policy discussions when he did.[270]

Hence, in terms of the mechanics and detail of policymaking, both foreign and domestic, Mandela delegated most of this responsibility to his Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, who acted as a "*virtual Prime Minister*" from the very beginning of his Presidency.[271]Mandela even went so far as to say on television before leaving office that "*Thabo Mbeki is already de facto President of the country*".[272] Mbeki's domination of policy was particularly noticeable in the foreign affairs realm, where he (and Aziz Pahad, his most trusted advisor) took the reins in crafting the tenets of South African international relations policy. Mandela could still make waves with his statements and actions, but these were only distractions to Mbeki's construction of the underpinnings of a comprehensive policy.

3.9 Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki (1999-200*8)*

South Africa's second post-transition President became the subject of countless press profiles and at least a half dozen biographies, but yet Thabo Mbeki remained a divisive and mysterious figure. His critics savaged him as a bully and an autocrat who surrounded himself with yes-people and refused to listen to divergent viewpoints. They attacked him for intellectual arrogance, for refusing to acknowledge that his preconceptions could have been wrong—a predilection they claimed cost hundreds of thousands of lives in his refusal to accept the link between HIV and AIDS.

However, his closest advisors (and even some of his political rivals), painted a different, more nuanced picture of an exceptional listener who encouraged debate—albeit with inset parameters; of a world-class intellect who was able to skillfully bring about subordinates to his worldview; of a workaholic whose intensive research convinced (and sometimes intimidated) ministers and party principals to support his stances.

All of these qualities, they noted, were magnified in the international relations policy arena, where his experience and expertise was unsurpassed. Of course, neither damnation nor hagiography accurately portrayed Mbeki (or any leader); this section attempted to tease out the true nature of Mbeki's decision-making personality, particularly in determining 1) the

[269]P. Fabricius. *Virtuosity Versus Bureaucracy, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000,* p. 221.

[270]A. Sampson. *Mandela: The Authorized Biography,* p. 502.

[271]C. Landsberg. *South African Foreign policy Formulation 1989-2010,* p. 16.

[272]A. Sampson. *Mandela: The Authorized Biography,* p.533.

degree to which Mbeki drove the international relations policy process, 2) the role of his "*inner circle*" of advisors in making international relations policy, and 3) how he processed information and what this meant for the decision-making process.

One topic that needed no debate was Mbeki's clear and unflinching interest in international relations, one that—as noted previously—dates back to his days as an ANC representative and principal in its Department of International Affairs. During the transition period, he dominated ANC proceedings that discussed the direction of South Africa's international relations policy—even when he was not physically present, party participants recognized his authority.[273] As Deputy President, he retained his primacy in the foreign affairs arena, with Mandela only intermittently interested in external issues and Department of Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo having little policy making impact.



Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded Nelson Mandela as State President of South Africa in June 1999
Source: Antonio Milena/ABr. 27.Oct.2003. - History of Apartheid in South Africa

Regarding Mbeki's office making a decision on a disarmament issue in the mid-1990s, Tom Wheeler said: "*We asked if perhaps the President should weigh in on this, and she said, 'No, that's irrelevant*. *'That indicates Mandela was the iconic figure head, not the decision maker*".[274] So, from at least the early 1980s to his departure from office in 2008, Mbeki was clearly the leading international relations policy figure in the ANC and, from 1994, in government.

Mbeki was the first South African leader to bring a distinct and overarching ideology to South African international relations policy, one that emphasized solidarity with the

[273]P. Vale. *Thabo Mbeki and the Great Foreign Policy Riddle, in Mbeki and After,* p. 246.

[274]Ibid.

continent and broader "*global South*" in an effort to bring about prosperity and equality with the developed world. As academic and businessman Vincent Maphai asserted, Mbeki "*takes Africa seriously and he is emotionally and intellectually committed to prove Afro-pessimism wrong*".[275]

Taking advantage of the global attention focused on South Africa, Mbeki used his platform to advocate for the developing world (and Africa in particular) having a greater say in global economic governance.[276] His formulation of the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) exemplified this commitment, as well as his preference for establishing structures that would address and correct the continent's under development.[277]

Mbeki's unquestioning alignment of South Africa with the rest of the continent and "*global South*," as well as his refusal to criticize human rights abuses and misgovernment in those countries, however, led to criticisms that such commitment was detrimental to South Africa's interests, particularly given that its economic relations straddled north and south.[278]In the eyes of most observers, Mbeki set the frameworks for international relations policy discussions, with subsequent debate taking place within those clearly defined boundaries.

As academic Maxi Schoeman described the process, "*Mbeki takes the lead, sets the guide lines and indicates what he wasn't and where he wants to take the country* (and the continent)." [279] Debate tended to be about modalities, not the decision itself.[280] As another academic described him, "*Mbeki is a difficult chap to engage academically. First and foremost, you must agree with him, and if you don't, there's no discussion*".[281]Mbeki also saw little need to bring others along while formulating his grand ride as; with NEPAD, for example, even his closest advisors were not informed of it before the project' launch in 2001.[282]

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[275]P. Vale and S. Maseko. *South Africa and the African Renaissance, International Affairs 74(2),* p.285.

[276]G. Oliver. *Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Savior? International Affairs 78(4),* p. 815.

[277]C. Landsbeg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition, pp. 159-160.*

[278]G. Oliver. *Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Savior? International Affairs 78(4),* p. 822.

[279] M. Schoeman. *Objectives, Structures and Strategies: South Africa's Foreign policy, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2001/2002,* p. 83.

[280]G. Oliver. *Ideology in South African Foreign policy, Politeia 25(2),* pp. 180-181.

[281]Ibid.

[282]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 134.

Mbeki's personal stamp on policy formulation, foreign and domestic, was greater than that of any South African leader before him. He would stay up until the late hours of the evening researching and drafting speeches and other documents, like his weekly ANC letters. *"Long before us, President Mbeki perfected these computers*," said Aziz Pahad:

> "Y*ou can see the speeches he wrote himself, and those speeches other writers wrote. I told people, you can give him a draft, and the next morning it will be a totally different document*".[283]

This personal touch also applied to his research, as—according to biographer Mark Gevisser—Mbeki did not trust others to filter his information, preferring to seek it out from the source and come to his own (sometimes erroneous) conclusions.[284]"*Mbeki, if he wants to know something he gets on the Internet. He just reads it*," noted Pallo Jordan. "*You give him a report and walk away; he'll call you back to discuss if he wants to*".[285]

Mbeki's personal stamp on policy and the fact that he personally drove many policy initiatives (particularly in the international relations policy arena) led to wide spread allegations that he behaved as a "*dictator*" or a "*Stalinist*," shutting down necessary debate that might undermine positions. "*There was a tighter system under Mbeki…a shutting down, a closing off discussion, an insider/outsider perspective*," claimed veteran ANC MP Ben Turok.[286]

Other accounts indicate that many in the ANC parliamentary caucus were cowed into silence during debate because they feared backlash from the President.[287] His cold, often "*closed-off* "personality did not help matters. He was noted as devoid of the warmth and bonhomie of Mandela in his interpersonal dealings. Whereas many interviewees described Mbeki as jovial and warm during his time in exile, they noted that he became increasingly distant—and at times hostile—after returning to South Africa, particularly after becoming Deputy President. "*Mbeki is a very strange guy. Rather self-contained, self-sufficient. He didn't need other people all that much*," said Turok.[288]

Although he lacked the temper of a PW Botha, Mbeki could be similarly brusque and impatient with colleagues or subordinates who were not living up to his expectations,

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[283]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 134.

[284] M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred,* p. 734.

[285]Ibid.

[286]R. Johnson. *South Africa's Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since the End of Apartheid,* p.99.

[287] Ibid.

[288]Ibid.

something that did not help bolster his popularity with them.[289]As an intelligence official told Gevisser, "*He wants to engage with you as an equal, and if you're useless, he'll tell you. He's not going to protect you or soften things for you*," a sentiment echoed by several ANC veterans.[290]"*He doesn't suffer fools gladly*," noted Pallo Jordan:

> "*If you come to him and what you are saying is self-evident, he'd brush you off. And the person who wouldn't be listened to would think, 'He's not even going to weigh what I have to say, how dictatorial.' But I don't think he was dictatorial*".[291]

Jordan further argued that Mbeki differed from Oliver Tambo in that he was not as patient with people who were fools. Mbeki might not say it, but he would make it clear. Tambo, according to Jordan, was much more accommodating.[292]

Mbeki's adherents claimed many anti-Mbeki criticisms originated from subordinates 'bitterness about their inability to persuade the better-prepared (and sometimes rude) Mbeki to adopt a policy position. As former Minister Sydney Mufamadi noted:

> "*If you say, 'Mr. President, my department wants to do this,' and the President says, 'Motivate me,' and the Minister can't do that, [Mbeki] disagrees. So you go back to your department, and you say the suggestion was shot down by the President!*"[293]

Woe betided a minister or advisor who was not as prepared on their topics as the President. As Aziz Pahad noted:

> "*You had to be very prepared if you go into a debate with him. In lekgotla (extraordinary Cabinet meetings),we'd be very happy not to go first, because for the first three presentations, he would pick them apart…If you wanted to influence, you had to make sure you came in with new information, not things he already knew"*.[294]

Defense Minister (1999-2008) Mosiuoa Lekota echoed Pahad's points:

> "*It was always extremely difficult to find better researched views*

[289]A. Hadland and J. Rantao. *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki,* p. 92.

[290]M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred,* p. 700.

[291]Ibid.

[292]Ibid.

[293]R. Calland. *Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power?,* p.43.

[294] Ibid.

> *on positions on issues. I think [the reason] a lot of people who became hostile to him, especially his peers, is that he always found much more evidence, and they didn't do as much research work as him. And they lost. In due course, they said he was a dictator. He was not a dictator. He did better research than the man did more thorough work*".[295]

According to participants, Mbeki was open to discussion in Cabinet and small groups, synthesizing and critiquing the conversation rather than dominating it. "*Mbeki followed the OR [Tambo] tradition*," said Aziz Pahad. "*He never intervened until the end*" of Cabinet meetings.[296]

His goal, according to Gevisser, was to let debate occur rather than dictating a position, amalgamating the submissions of each participant in the summation to ensure that each felt included in the ultimate decision. "*Before he takes a decision, Mbeki synthesizes thoroughly*," said former ANC spokesman and party presidency head Smuts Ngonyama:

> "*He puts it back to you. He'll say, 'People are saying A B C D, others are saying this,' and he'll ask the question, 'Chief, did you consider A B C D? I agree with you on A and C, but did you consider these other things.' It makes you think. You can't come to Mbeki with an issue that has not been thought out thoroughly*".[297]

Nevertheless, he would on occasion ask what Calland described as an "*arrow-like question that invariably goes to the heart of the matter*," both with ministers and civil servants.[298]

From his time as Deputy President, Mbeki relied on a small group of advisors on international issues who were given varying responsibilities in the formulation and conduct of international relations policy. A handful of senior Department of Foreign Affairs officials—most notably Aziz Pahad, but also Jackie Selebi and UN Ambassador Dumisani Khumalo—were part of this inner circle, assisting in the formulation process but also acting as links to DFA, ensuring that policies were carried out.

Other advisors in the Presidency included his legal advisor Mojanku Gumbi, who was a key envoy to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue; PCAS and GCIS head Joel Netshitenzhe; economic advisor and later head of the NEPAD Secretariat Wiseman Nkuhlu; Presidency Director-General Frank Chikane; and Provincial and Local Government Minister Sydney

[295]R. Calland. *Anatomy of South Africa: Who Holds the Power?,* p.43.

[296]Ibid.

[297]M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred,* p. 247.

[298]Ibid.

Mufamadi.[299]Minister in the Presidency Essop Pahad—perhaps Mbeki's closest personal friend—also was a key advisor, serving as a "*gate keeper*" and "*fixer*" throughout his administration, although he was not much involved in making international relations policy.[300]

The question, however, is what role these advisors played—were they praise singers or did they provide critical advice? Were they formulators or implementers? Many in the ANC alleged that Mbeki had surrounded himself with "*yes men*" as advisors since the late 1970s, while others questioned the quality of the brain power around Mbeki. As one leading ANC official notes, "*you can't see them being equals to him…If you're looking for a number two, I don't think there was one*".[301]One anonymous member claimed that people like the Pahad brothers and Mufamadi were incapable of standing up to Mbeki and that Mbeki "*needs a devil's advocate, not a praise singer*".[302]

Former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein—no fan of Mbeki's—asserts in his book that, "On the whole, Mbeki's advisors are intellectually inferior to him and do not challenge his views vigorously. Like all national leaders, he lives in an artificial world, insulated from daily reality".[303]One academic familiar with Mbeki compares his openness to counsel with that of Mandela, questioning whether Mbeki ever had the depth of friendship to receive tough advice:

> *'Thabo is very complex. He's only had two friends, Essop and Aziz…Thabo's character was that he overwhelmed the relationships around him. And because of that, he didn't have the kind of advisors who would tell him things honestly, which was very different from Mandela. You could go in and talk to him. He gave you space, and I saw that personally. He would never make a final decision without coming to Walter [Sisulu]. You'd come home and see them on the stoop, and you knew it was an important decision. It was interesting to see them interact. Walter would tell Mandela if he shouldn't do something. I don't think Thabo had that relationship with anyone*.'[304]

[299] D. Lecoutre. *South Africa's Mediation Efforts in Francophone Africa: Assessment of the Case of Cote d'Ivoire in the Context of a Stylistic Divide between Anglophone and Francophone Africa, in Africa's Peacemaker: Lessons from South Africa's Conflict Resolution,* p. 159.

[300]M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred,* p. 247.

[301]Ibid.

[302]A. Hadland and J. Rantao. *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki,* p. 102.

[303]A. Feinstein. *After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC, pp. 115-116.*

[304]A. Feinstein. *After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC, pp. 115-116.*

Those around Mbeki, however, discounted the criticism that they were weak and could not disagree with the President. "*Mbeki loves debating issues. Not publicly. He likes testing ideas*," said Aziz Pahad.[305] While most acknowledged that they could not change Mbeki's mind on the broad thrust of policy, one could influence him on how to implement them. Aziz Pahad noted:

> "*You saw tactical shifts in China and Zimbabwe, on the day to day approach. On Zimbabwe, when they came for that loan of$2 billion, he set up a committee and listened to advice on how you could not give that loan without conditions or guarantees*".[306]

Mbeki's questioning stance was particularly noticeable in debates on Zimbabwe, where rather than stifling debate, he used it to win support for his stance toward Mugabe. "*He clearly wanted a solution in Zimbabwe; he was unhappy with how Mugabe was doing things*," said Department of Foreign Affairs Director-General (1999-2002) Sipho Pityana. "*On the other hand, he felt somewhat constrained*" by potentially negative African opinion (as with Nigeria in 1995) and a need to keep SADC united, particularly in the light of Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Namibian intervention into Congo.[307] Pityana added "*when we came to power, we were haunted by the Rwandan genocide. There was a very strong fear of a repeat of that. That's why South Africa had to operate within SADC*".[308]

Hence, while many in Cabinet and government viewed Zimbabwe as a singular issue, Mbeki viewed it as a piece of a vaster puzzle in which peace and security in the Great Lakes was paramount. Mbeki's intense study of Zimbabwe made it difficult for his Cabinet and other international relations policy actors to trump his arguments. "*It's very difficult to argue against Zimbabwe because he is very, very sharp*," noted Essop Pahad:

> *"He says, 'Ok, this is the land issue, this is what happened under British colonial rule, this is how the land was redistributed, these are the whites who bought the land, this is what happened under Smith, here's the land that was- taken—you can't argue you don't need land reform'".*[309]

Mbeki also was highly cognizant of the inter-play within the Zimbabwean government and the ruling ZANU-PF, arguing that forcing out Mugabe could play into the hands of

[305]A. Hadland & J. Rantao. *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki,* p.102.

[306]Ibid.

[307]A. Feinstein. *After the party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC,* pp. 115-116.

[308]Ibid.

[309]A. Hadland & J. Rantao. *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki,* p.102.

hardliners. Smuts Ngonyama argued that Mbeki would manage debate within the ANC NEC to win support for his stance toward Zimbabwe. He said:

> *On Zimbabwe, one or two people would actually say we're a bit slow on this and so on. We're slow in intervening, or we're soft. And he would ask the question, "What is it comrades are suggesting we do in Zimbabwe?" Then we'd start scratching our heads. Nobody would stand up. One or two people would stand up and say "quiet" diplomacy is ok, but we must make sure the Zimbabwean government doesn't abuse our position and we don't strengthen Mugabe. Mbeki would genuinely ask the question of what we need to do now to prevent that from happening. So we'd resolve that the position of the ANC was that we should respect the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and help Zimbabweans solve their own problems. That wasn't coming from Mbeki; that was from the NEC.*[310]

3.10 Conclusion

South African leaders were of wildly different stripes in regard to how they made international relations policy, making generalities difficult. Thus, South African leaders who had significant personal interest in international relations policy (Verwoerd and Mbeki in particular) played a far more dominant role in the making of international relations policy than those who were not. On the other hand, the head of government with the least personal interest, Strijdom, was by a long shot the leader who most directly delegated international relations policy. On a more formalized level, the creation and building of bureaucratic structures (like the SSC under Botha and PCAS under Mbeki) correlated with strong control of the national leader over international relations policy. Such structures had less to do with the formulation of policy than its implementation. They ensured that all government departments were on the same page and were working toward the same goals. It could also be argued that the importance of "*kitchen cabinet*" advisors and decision-making delegates (like Foreign Ministers) was amplified in situations where leaders had little interest in foreign affairs or (like Mandela, with Mbeki) competing priorities for their time.

What did this reveal about Thabo Mbeki's role in South Africa's international relations policy debate and what this meant for its democratic nature? Judging by the above criteria, Mbeki clearly dominated South African international relations policy, in a way that only perhaps Verwoerd and before him Smuts did in South African history. As noted in the previous chapter, Mbeki was not particularly receptive to inputs from international relations policy actors outside of government, particularly when these visions clashed with his own view of the world. The accounts of those closest to Mbeki did not paint the picture of a dictator in the international relations policy arena, particularly in regard to his inner

[310] Ibid.

circle of advisors. Mbeki could be regarded as a domineering figure when he did not find his interlocutors' research up to his standards, but he was not a bully in the same vein as Verwoerd or Botha. Furthermore, the changes in South Africa's post-1994 dispensation meant that Mbeki could not dominate the international relations policy debate to the same degree as some of his predecessors.

Arguably, Mbeki had to contend with more active and involved outside actors like the press and academia; Parliamentary oversight (if spotty) from the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs; and a far larger government international relations policy apparatus than any of his predecessors. Unlike, say, Verwoerd, Mbeki's international relations policy could not escape press notice, academic analysis, or business consternation. Mbeki certainly did not have time to peruse the memos of junior officials, given the expansion of South Africa's government international relations policy apparatus. Overall, Mbeki may not have come across as the most "*democratic*" leader in regard to international relations policy, particularly given his predilection to dismiss inputs he found insufficiently supported—or markedly contrary to his worldview—but he, and the system he inherited, nonetheless allowed them to be heard.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' POLICY AND RULING REGIMES

4.1 Introduction

Ruling parties, however, occupied unique ground. They were decidedly not outsiders, as the political decision-makers in government in almost all cases came from their ranks. However, in the South African context, the apartheid-era National Party (NP) and the post-transition African National Congress (ANC) existed as entities technically separate from the government with independently functioning structures. Party policies were intended to inform those of government, although there was no legal mandate for elected officials to follow party orthodoxy lockstep. Of course, as Thabo Mbeki learned when he was ousted as ANC leader in 2007, upsetting the party by not appearing to abide by its principles could have disastrous political consequences for an elected leader.

Examined here was the degree to which the NP and ANC—as distinct entities apart from government—influenced South Africa's international relations policy debate while they were ruling parties. This was done by looking at how, and to what extent, parties weighed in on international relations policy as separate entities from government, examining whether party structures had the facility and interest to make independent inputs on international relations policy, how they were made, and whether the debate was broad-based within the party. The ANC's pre-1994 governance and international relations policy structures were also examined at some length so as to determine how and to what extent they changed after 1994.

4.2 The National Party and International relations policy

The National Party from 1948 to 1994 had, as a distinct entity, almost no influence on South Africa's international relations policy and no real means of exerting such influence. Debate on international relations policy outside government, such as it existed, came from NP-affiliated entities like the *Broeder bond* and Dutch Reformed Church, or by NP Members of Parliament. That said, as previous chapters have shown, international relations policy debate was quite limited even in these organizations.

The NP's biggest limitation as a policy actor on all fronts was its provincial nature. A federal party, the party's four provincial organs were autonomous entities in regard to organizational matters, each with its own constitution, and were in competition with one another (particularly the Cape and Transvaal) over policies and patronage.[311]

Provincial party structures would hold annual congresses, but at a national level, the party only met through rare federal congresses (only two held between 1941and 1984) or on the federal council, which consisted of representatives of the provincial

[311] J. Basson. *State of Nation: As Viewed from the Front Bench in Parliament 1969-1981,* p. 107.

structures.[312] The council was a forum for raising contentious issues, but it had no real power over the provinces. Former Natal administrator and NP national information officer Con Botha recalled that the federal council "*could make no binding decisions; it could recommend [policies] but these only became official policy once the four provinces had ratified them*".[313]

At a provincial level, the party did assign a member of its information team to handle international relations policy issues and write briefs if necessary.[314]However, foreign affairs were not a top priority among provincial party members, and, as in Parliament, they largely deferred to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on these issues; "*international relations policy was never ``under pressure*" within the party, noted former Trade and Industry Minister Dawie de Villiers.[315]

Provincial and federal meetings were more concerned with political horse-trading and domestic policy than international issues. Of course, political jockeying could have an impact on the personalities making or influencing government international relations policy decisions; Niel Barnard, for example, acknowledges that his appointment was in large part due to PW Botha owing the Free State NP for backing his successful run for the party leadership.[316] Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the NP's influence on international relations policy was so minor as to be all but non-existent, with—as will be shown—most power lying within government structures and the President or Prime Minister in his capacity as a governmental rather than party leader.

4.3 ANC Decision-Making Structures in Exile

Before examining how the ANC made international relations policy decisions after 1994, one first had to understand how the exiled movement operated in regard to its decision-making processes. Upon taking power in 1994, the ANC morphed from a liberation movement seeking to topple the old political system into a political party now determined to govern that system and, by effectively doing so, retain power. However, as an entity inexistence since1912, it already had long-established decision-making structures and traditions in place upon becoming government, and it is necessary to comprehend how the ANC's leadership made decisions before its 1990 unbanning to understand how they did so after assuming the reins of power.

Specific attention was paid on the ANC's conduct of international diplomacy and its formulation of international relations policy, particularly the structures involved in

[312]D. O'Meara. *Forty Lost Years,* pp. 48-49.

[313]Ibid.

[314]J. Barber and J. Barratt. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* p. 117.

[315]Ibid.

[316] Ibid.

making and implementing those decisions; its ability and willingness to make those decisions in abroad-based, "*democratic*" fashion; and the interpersonal and intra-structural dynamics that shaped those decisions.

Oliver Tambo's 1960 flight into exile meant that he had to constitute a movement outside the country essentially from scratch, including re-establishing the movement's decision-making structures in a fashion that ensured the broadest possible participation while being cognizant of security concerns and infiltration. Keeping cadres informed, particularly those outside of the movement's home base, and giving them opportunities to participate in decision making would prove difficult for the next 30 years. Questions regarding policy shifts or the election of new leadership required consultative conferences, which were held periodically during the movement's exile years.

The movement's new external mission held its first consultative conference in August 1962 in Dares Salaam, while the broader movement—including the domestic underground and representatives of the affiliated South African Communist Party (SACP)—met in Lobatse in the then Bechuanaland protectorate that October.[317] Although the broader movement met twice more in 1965 in Tanzania, many elements of the party—particularly from the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) armed wing—remained dissatisfied with the leadership over what they viewed as a lack of communication, incompetence, and a propensity toward luxurious living while they struggled.[318]

This growing dissent led to a week-long consultative conference being held in April 1969 at Morogoro, Tanzania, attended by 70 ANC and allied organization members, in an effort to mollify concerns and determine how to better coordinate the armed struggle.[319] Tambo addressed the complaints head on, he admitted that the leadership of the external mission was "*not organizationally geared to undertake the urgent task of under taking people's war*" and announcing the immediate dissolution of the NEC.[320]

The conference also decided that non-black South Africans could join the ANC (if not yet the NEC); shrunk the NEC from 23 members to a more manageable nine; affirmed Oliver Tambo as the movement's president (he had previously been acting); and replaced the increasingly in effective Duma Nokwe with Alfred Nzo as the ANC's

[317] F. Meli. *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC,* p. 151.

[318] N. Ndebele & N. Nieftagodien. *The Morogoro Conference: A Moment of Self-Reflection, in The Road to Democracy in South Africa (1),* p. 587.

[319] S. Ellis & T. Sechaba. *Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile,* p. 55.

[320] T. Lodge. *State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-86. Third World Quartely, 9 (1),* p. 300.

Secretary General.[321]It would, however, prove the last consultative conference until a meeting at Kabwe, Zambia in 1985, the last before the ANC's unbanning.

Given the in frequency of broad-based decision-making conferences, day-to-day decisions were taken by a small leadership cadre at party headquarters—particularly the NEC—with little regular external consultation. "*It wasn't a very democratic system…and it would beam is take to think that the ANC consulted up and down the way we do now*," noted Ben Turok, then editor of the ANC's *Sechaba* magazine and based in London.[322]

Internal democracy was undermined by a need to keep its communications covert—particularly given the security threats faced by South African Government forces—and a growing Soviet influence in the movement that emphasized secrecy.[323] The lack of secure communications meant that movement cadres outside Lusaka generally had little opportunity to influence decisions in advance of them being made. "*Most of those day to day, month to month type of decisions would have been made by ANC officials, without a great deal of participation of the members*," argued ANC stalwart Pallo Jordan, who asserts that Tambo, Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, and Treasurer-General (from 1976) Thomas Nkobi were dominant figures.[324]Aziz Pahad supported this point: "*Policies came from Lusaka and we had to implement them where we were*".[325]

While the undemocratic nature of ANC decision-making rankled many party cadres, Oliver Tambo's pain staking commitment to consultative leadership and outreach to members around the world helped him hold the movement together. NEC members recall Tambo as staying above the fray when chairing the committee, facilitating free-flowing discussion and ensuring that all members agreed on a decision before implementing it.[326] Jordan, a NEC member since 1985, notes that Tambo usually would allow the member with primary responsibility for the issue at hand to chair the pertinent NEC meeting:

> *''He intervened as was necessary; he never wanted to dominate discussion. He would usually allow a lot of debate. What endeared lots of people was that even if it were known that OR disagreed with*

[321]S. Ellis & T. Sechaba. *Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile,* p. 61.

[322] Ibid.

[323] X. Mangcu. *The Democratic Moment: South Africa's Prospects Under Jacob Zuma,* p. 44.

[324]Ibid

[325] Ibid.

[326]L. Callinicos. *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains,* p. 450.

> *a viewpoint, he would encourage the person with that viewpoint to air it so it could be discussed. And then, usually at the end, he would intervene, drawing the threads together. At the end of the meeting, unless it was a very exceptionally divisive issue, everyone came out thinking that their viewpoints were weighed and included in the consensus. Everyone felt ownership in the decision.*''[327]

Tambo also made efforts to consult with other cadres whenever possible, either at headquarters or on trips abroad, meetings that helped party leaders keep abreast of international dynamics. "*The decision center was Lusaka, but there was room to influence in centers where there was a flow of information*," retorted future Department of Foreign Affairs Director-General Sipho Pityana, then a young exile in London. Turok said:

> "*Tambo was passing through London every now and then, as was Thabo [Mbeki] and [Johnny] Makatini.Invariably, there would be sessions and discussions around a range of issues*".[328]

Turok also remembered London as a key meeting point for the ANC's Lusaka-based leadership and its cadres based elsewhere in the world, adding that he would meet privately with Tambo whenever he would visit.[329]

Oliver Tambo speaking at an ANC solidarity event

Source: https://amandladurban.org.za/oliver-reginald-tambo/

From 1960 onward, the goals of the ANC's international outreach included raising awareness of the human rights abuses committed by Pretoria and the unjust nature of

[327]L. Callinicos. *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains,* p. 450.

[328]Ibid.

[329]Ibid. p. 451.

the apartheid system; raising funds to allow the movement to operate and to facilitate the armed struggle (a budget that reached $50 million per year by 1990, not including military operations); increasing Pretoria's international isolation; and establishing the ANC as the "s*ole legitimate representative*" of South Africa's liberation struggle.[330]

These goals proved challenging for the first two decades in exile; in reality, the movement through the mid-1970s was focused on survival above all else.[331]However, by the late 1970s—particularly after the 1976 Soweto riots—ANC efforts started to payoff, with the movement able to generate growing mass support for the anti-apartheid struggle as well as increased Western public pressure for the release of Nelson Mandela.[332]This pressure, in conjunction with the broader international anti-apartheid movement and allies like the United Democratic Front back home, was essential to pushing previously skeptical Western governments to put pressure on Pretoria to make reforms.

While the ANC's international relations policy in exile was under girded by a commitment to solidarity with other oppressed people, it never lost sight of its overarching goal—the toppling of Pretoria's apartheid government. "*What it always boiled down to in the end was what was going to help our movement...Any debate would always end there*" noted Jordan on how the movement determined its stances on international issues.[333]While these decisions generally were not contentious within the ANC, there was debate over various approaches. Jordan argued;

> "*For example at the height of the Vietnam War, what was our stance on participating in the protests worldwide against the war*? T*he decision was that we would have to support the struggle against the war in Vietnam, because the Vietnamese were waging a liberation struggle, even though such a stance would not endear the ANC to skeptical Western governments supporting the war.'*"[334]

Essop Pahad recalled other debates about how to best align the ANC with black leaders in the United States; although many in the movement supported the more radical views of Malcolm X and the Black Power movement, the dominant view—supported by Mbeki, among others—was that overt support for a more strident movement would undermine the ANC's standing among most Americans, thereby undermining its

[330] S. Thomas. *The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC Since 1960,* p. xxi.

[331]H. Macmillan. *The African National Congress of South Africa in Zambia: The Culture of Exile and the Changing Relationship with Home, 1964-1990, Journal of Southern African Studies 35(2),* p. 317.

[332] L. Callinicos. *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains,* pp. 519-520.

[333] Ibid. p. 521.

[334]Ibid.

chances of building broader support.[335] Reaction to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was another issue that sparked debate among ANC and SACP cadres.[336]

Even closer to home—given the ANC's significant presence in Great Britain—was the question of how to treat the increasingly active IRA in the late 1960s. "*In Britain1969, you had the beginnings of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, and in the1970s the IRA reviving*," said Jordan:

> "*Now, where does that put you? Here, the oldest anti-colonial struggle against the oldest colonial power; what do you do?*" [337]*The ultimate conclusion was to support principles of equal rights and attack British authorities for violations of civil liberties like detention without trial—"they were doing exactly what Vorster was doing".*[338]

However, the need to maintain good ties with the British government meant that the ANC would not openly support IRA attacks—even though the IRA assisted the ANC with reconnaissance for the 1980 Sasolburg attack, according to Kader Asmal.[339]Fortunately for the ANC, its good relations with official Sinn Fein allowed them to escape pressure; they "*understood our position and never pressed us*".[340]

4.4 Policy Decision Making and Implementation

While building international support was a tenet of the ANC's efforts to topple the apartheid government, it was not an issue on which the party leadership devoted extensive time and energy. "*On a day to day basis, you didn't have to make many radical decisions in those days*," noted Pallo Jordan, a NEC member from 1985.[341] NEC meetings—irregular through the mid-1980s—generally did not focus on international outreach, although certain events, like the signing of the Nkomati Accord, would raise issues like regional outreach for discussion.[342]

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[335]F. Meli. *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC,* p. 151

[336]L. Scholtz. *The ANC/ SACP and the Crushing of the 1968 Prague Spring,* p. 360.

[337] Ibid.

[338]Ibid. p. 361.

[339]K. Asmal & A. Hadland. *Politics in My Blood: A Memoir,* pp.65-67.

[340]Ibid.

[341]Ibid.

[342]G. Gerhart & C. Glaser. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa (6), challenge and victory 1980-1990,* p. 536.

Conferences similarly did not prioritize external affairs; Morogoro or Kabwe, for example, primarily focused on organizational issues that would make the ANC better able to wage the armed struggle in South Africa. However, they were not ignored altogether. Several conference resolutions at Morogoro referenced other international anti-colonial struggles and thanked the OAU for its support, while out going Secretary-General Duma Nokwe presented a paper on international affairs.[343]Similarly, several resolutions related to building international solidarity were introduced at Kabwe.

One outcome of Morogoro—the creation of formal departments within the organization—would come to play a significant role in the party's international efforts. Before Morogoro, writes Pallo Jordan, the movement had less-formal "*desks*" to which specific people were assigned but without supporting infrastructure.[344]Now tasks would be carried out more formally, and the new Department of International Affairs (DIA) would from 1969 be responsible for the movement's international efforts.[345]DIA, which was attached to the President's office, operated as the pseudo "*foreign ministry*" of the ANC, managing the movement's missions around the world and coordinating its outreach to the United Nations and other countries.[346]It would, however, take time to get up to speed; although established on paper at Morogoro, it suffered from a lack of funding and disorganization under its first head, ousted Secretary-General Duma Nokwe, who served as its head from 1969 to his death in 1978.Only after Josiah Jele was elected to replace him that year would DIA's operations become more structured.[347] Jele would stay in that job until 1983, replaced by the ANC's representative at the United Nations in New York, Johnny Makatini. Thabo Mbeki succeeded Makatini after his 1988 death.

By the time of the ANC's 1990 unbanning, DIA in Lusaka coordinated the operations of and communicated with the ANC's 43 exile missions around the world (more than the South African government had at the time), but it remained a relatively small and *ad hoc* organization. "*We must not pretend it was exceptionally strong*," noted Aziz Pahad, who would serve as DIA's deputy head from 1990.[348]

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[343] N. Ndebele & N. Nieftagodien. *The Morogoro Conference: A Moment of Self- Reflection, in The Road to Democracy in South Africa (1),* p. 592.

[344]Ibid.

[345] R. Pfister. *Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(1),* p. 56.

[346]T. Lodge. *State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-1986, Third World Quarterly 9(1),* p.5.

[347]Ibid.

[348] T. Lodge. *State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-1986, Third World Quarterly 9(1),* p.5.

A January 1989 report on the state of the organization following Makatini's death described the department as having nine members (organized into six geographical desks and a research desk) who would meet bi-weekly to plan and discuss reports ("*ANC State of Organization*", 1989). DIA's working-level officials acted much like desk officers in a foreign affairs department, managing the flow of paper and dealing with administrative matters; one 1988 document, for example, details DIA efforts to mollify Zambian officials upset by drunken ANC cadres shooting Zambian citizens.[349]

DIA was not, it should be noted, the sole ANC entity dealing with external affairs. The MK, by dint of its operations throughout southern Africa, was an important actor whose leadership took a significant interest in the ANC's external orientation, specifically in regard to how those foreign ties affected its ability to wage the armed struggle.[350] Another, even more important, group was the movement's Department of Information and Publicity (DIP), also founded at Morogoro and tasked in part with building international support for the ANC.

Although primarily aimed at propagandizing for the ANC within South Africa and educating citizens about the ANC's activities, DIP had a strong international component, producing press statements, fact sheets, memoranda, and newsletters aimed at winning support around the world.[351] Much of this effort was specifically aimed at winning support in the West, where, notes Jordan, support early on tended to be weak.[352] DIP's role in relation to the international arena grew more significant from 1978, when a young aide to Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, took charge of it.

Thabo Mbeki was 36 years old when he was named as head of DIP, but he was not without significant international experience. After going into exile in 1962, he had spent eight years studying and working for the ANC in Great Britain; had undergone training in the Soviet Union; and served as an ANC representative in Botswana, Swaziland, and Nigeria. [353]Close to Tambo from his time in London and an NEC member since 1975, Mbeki briefly served as the ANC's political secretary after returning to Lusaka from Nigeria in 1977, but moved shortly thereafter to head DIP, a position he would hold until taking over DIA in 1989.

At DIP, Mbeki emerged as the dominant figure in directing the ANC's international

[349] ANC Memorandum, 1988.

[350] R. Pfister. *Gateway to International Victory: The Diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994, Journal of Modern African Studies 41(1),* p. 58.

[351] S. Ndlovu. *The ANC's Diplomacy and International Relations, in The Road to Democracy in South Africa (1),* p. 634.

[352]Ibid.

[353] M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred,* p.385.

outreach, expanding the movement's outreach to the West and rolling back its culture of secrecy, moves that would both increase pressure on the apartheid government and open doors to discussion with Pretoria. Mbeki's first major coup was his successful 1978 advocacy—at the urging of Johnny Makatini and with the support of Tambo—for the ANC to cooperate with an American documentary about the ANC, which gave Western audiences the first in-depth look at the movement and helped dispel notions of its "*terrorist*" nature.[354]

Whereas the ANC's diplomacy through the late 1970s was heavily Africa-centric, specifically in seeking to counter South African outreach on the continent, Mbeki throughout the1980s focused significant attention on winning support for the ANC and the broader anti-apartheid movement in the West, particularly the United States and Great Britain. [355] "I*t was clear that we needed to work with the Americans and British, because they were the powers in the world*," remembered Essop Pahad, who was working for the ANC and SACP in London during the 1980s.[356]

Mbeki also recognized the need to expand the ANC's base beyond the African-American population, organized labor, American Democratic Party, and British Labor Party. As Pahad retorted:

> "*Mbeki said to me once that he had come to London, and the CIA Station Chief saw him and said, 'Listen Thabo, you're going to America. When you go, don't only meet your friends,'" urging him to reach out to Republican leaders, particularly moderates. "Interestingly enough, Thabo struck up a good relationship with [conservative Georgia Republican] Newt Gingrich. Very interesting…of all people. I used to say, 'What? Good grief! 'He'd say, 'Listen you, how do you think we're going to make a breakthrough if we don't develop good personal relations with people like Gingrich?"*".[357]

This lobbying would prove key to the1986 passage of sanctions in Congress and the subsequent congressional override of Republican President Reagan's veto.[358]Mbeki's pragmatic courtship of the West was not universally popular within the movement, particularly among cadres associated with the MK and SACP, but Mbeki had a core group of allies that helped him overcome internal opposition. Nzo, Makatini, and Aziz

[354]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 38.

[355]Ibid.

[356]P. Lyman. *Partner to History: The U.S Role in the South Africa's Transition to Democracy,* p. 53.

[357]P. Lyman. *Partner to History: The U.S Role in the South Africa's Transition to Democracy,* p. 53.

[358]Ibid.

Pahad shared and supported his pragmatic tendencies, although no ally was more important than his friend and mentor Oliver Tambo.[359]

The ANC President fully bought into Mbeki's efforts to expand the ANC's support base, himself meeting with Western officials (like US Secretary of State George Shultz) and business leaders to state the ANC's case.[360] The two men had a symbiotic relationship. Tambo's protection allowed Mbeki to ignore his critics in the party, while Mbeki proved a useful lightning rod for absorbing attacks that might otherwise be made against Tambo.[361] Tambo's trust in and affection for his protégée helped ensure Mbeki's emergence as the movement's *de facto* "*foreign minister*" by the late 1980s and one of the party's emergent leaders after it was unbanned in1990.

4.5 The ANC and policy Making Since 1994

Before delving into the ANC's international relations policy making process since its 1990 unbanning, one must first explain the executive structures by which the ANC has made its policy decisions and governed itself in that time. These processes are similar, although not identical, to how the movement operated in exile, with small tweaks in its party constitution since 1991:

--The ANC's *National Conference*—held every five years, last in 2007—was the "*supreme ruling and controlling body*" of the ANC, according to its constitution.[362]Conference adopted resolutions that set the policy program of the party until the next conference. Conference also elected the party's leadership, including the "*top six*" of President, Deputy President, Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General, Treasurer, and National Chairperson. The President of the ANC was tasked with acting as the party's spokesman and led only under the supervision of the National Executive Committee.[363]

--Conference also elected the ANC's *National Executive Committee (NEC)*, whose membership consisted of the "*top six*" and 80 elected members (60 until 2007). The NEC was tasked with leading the party between conferences interpreting the (often vague) conference resolutions as it saw fit.[364] The full NEC, normally helmed by the National Chairperson, was supposed to meet at least every three months. Nearly all

[359] C. Landsberg. *The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition,* p. 47.

[360]A. Sampson. *The Anatomist: The Autobiography of Anthony Sampson,* p. 224.

[361] M. Gevisser. *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred,* p. 402.

[362]ANC Constitution Rule 10.

[363]ANC Constitution Rule 16.1.

[364] ANC Constitution Rule 12.

ANC Cabinet ministers were represented on the NEC during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations.[365]

--The NEC subsequently elected a *National Working Committee (NWC)* from its ranks, which dealt with the day-to-day operations of the party. It included about a quarter of the NEC's members; there was no set number. Although the constitution did not specify how often it would meet, members noted that it met about bi-weekly during the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies.[366]

--Members of the NEC were divided into *NEC subcommittees* that broadly mirrored government departments and dealt with those issues.[367] These subcommittees—which had no prescribed meeting schedule—generally included appropriate ministers, deputies, parliamentary committee chairs, and other ANC officials with expertise and interest in the appropriate issue. Subcommittees also could second non-NEC members.

--Lastly, the ANC had *departments* within its Luthuli House headquarters in Johannesburg to manage the function of the NEC subcommittees and intervene on substantive issues where appropriate. By the end of the Mbeki administration, full- and part-time ANC officials numbered about 500.[368]

Foreign affairs from the ANC's unbanning to the end of Mbeki's party presidency in 2007 were, in general, a low priority for all levels of the party. At the top, ANC conferences from 1991 to 2007 devoted some time to international relations policy, passing several—mostly vague and innocuous—resolutions on external matters that largely mirrored government policy, but this discussion paled next to that of domestic concerns.[369]

In the NEC and NWC, international relations policy issues also were lightly covered except in the case of significant global events, like the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks or the2003 invasion of Iraq; domestic issues like service delivery took up far more time.[370] Debate and discussion of foreign affairs was even less robust at the branch and provincial levels of the party. Although conference resolutions since 1991 have

[365]S. Booysen. *Transitions and Trends in Policy Making in Democratic South Africa, Journal of Public Administration 36(2),* p. 133.

[366]Ibid.

[367]Ibid.

[368] A. Butler. *How Democratic Is the African National Congress? Journal of Southern African Studies 31(4),* p. 729.

[369]E. Sidiropoulos. *Post- Mbeki, Post-Transition: South African Foreign policy in a changing world. South African Journal of International Affairs, 2008/2009,* pp. 7-8.

[370]Ibid.

emphasized the need to build greater grassroots capacity to discuss and debate international relations policy, this never came to pass. Little sub-national party debate on foreign affairs existed under Mandela and Mbeki, with only two provincial structures—Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal—establishing party international relations committees as prescribed by Conference resolution.[371]

With little interest and attention paid by the top and bottom sections of the party, day-to-day responsibility for ANC debate and discussion of international relations policy fell to two linked entities: the ANC's Department of International Relations (successor to DIA) and its NEC Sub-committee for International Relations.

After the ANC was unbanned in 1990, DIA emerged as a key-actor in the debate over South Africa's post-transition international relations policy. DIA head Mbeki, Aziz Pahad (by then his deputy), and other leading figures participated in discussions with the Department of Foreign Affairs and academics (see Chapter6) on both the broader principles of a democratic South Africa's international relations policy, as well as the more mundane matters of staffing and departmental transformation.

Several of its members participated in the Transitional Executive Council Sub-Committee on International Affairs, which set the stage for the integration of ANC, PAC, and home land foreign affairs entities into DFA.[372]The 1994 transition, however, left DIA—like other ANC entities—severely short of capacity, turning the Department into what Aziz Pahad described as a "*paper structure*" due to the fact that most of its officials (like Pahad himself) were either absorbed into DFA or deployed elsewhere within the party and government.[373] Long-time ANC representative in Canada Yusuf Saloojee succeeded Mbeki as DIA head in 1994, but he was more or less a one-man operation until he left in 1997.

Recognizing this weakness, the 1997 ANC National Conference called for the department to be re-launched as the Department of International Relations.[374] The department was tasked with monitoring international developments; making policy recommendations to the NEC and Conference; and managing relations with foreign political parties with which the ANC was aligned, according to Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, who succeeded Saloojee in 1997 and stayed in that position until 2007 (when

[371]T. Hughes. *Composers, conductors and players: Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making,* p. 30.

[372]F. Paruk. *The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) As Transitional Institution to Manage and Prevent Conflict in South Africa (1994),* p. 30.

[373]Ibid.

[374] T. Hughes. *Composers, conductors and players: Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making,* p. 25.

she was succeeded by Ebrahim Ebrahim).[375]She also chaired the NEC Subcommittee on International Relations and would represent it at meetings of the National Working Committee when the need arose.

However, in regard to its influence on international relations policy, most observers and participants agreed that the Department did not play a meaningful role; at best it acted as a sort of secretariat for the NEC subcommittee, managing the flow of paper to the NEC and arranging meetings. The department also was too small—only four full-time officials at most—to develop its independence and internal infrastructure, although Myakayaka-Manzini notes that it drew upon ANC expertise across government and in academia.[376]

While the department dealt with the intricacies of managing the party's foreign affairs and debates on policy, the NEC Subcommittee for International Relations acted as a debating chamber where leading party members would determine which issues merited further discussion in the broader NEC. "*We would normally prepare documents for discussion for the broader NEC, and that's where the serious debate would take place,*" argued subcommittee member Pallo Jordan.

The subcommittee, according to Myakayaka-Manzini, generally consisted of between 15 to 20 members and would meet at least once a month, and sometimes more.[377]Its composition changed but generally included the Foreign Minister (either Alfred Nzo or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma), Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the chair of Parliament's Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, and other ANC members in government international relations policy jobs.[378]

Some interviewees questioned whether the subcommittee played a meaningful role in driving government international relations policy; former PCFA chair Raymond Suttner, for example, went so far as to say "*it had no influence at all*" on the international relations policy debate.[379] Most participants, however, disagreed with this characterization, describing the subcommittee as a vibrant center for debate. While most issues were not contentious, some provoked robust debate within the senior party ranks.

During the Mandela presidency, participants described the questions of recognizing

[375] Ibid.

[376]Ibid.

[377]T. Hughes. *Composers, conductors and players: Harmony and discord in South African Foreign policy making,* p. 29.

[378] Ibid.

[379] R Suttner. *One China and Taiwan's part to fit,* p. 4.

China and Western Sahara as being frequently discussed; according to long time PCFA and subcommittee member Fatima Hajaig, subcommittee debate helped convince Mandela to not recognize Western Sahara.[380]Former Defense Minister (1999-2008) and National Chairperson (1997-2007) Mosiuoa Lekota cited relations with Angola as another issue that sparked heated debate, particularly balancing the party's desire to end conflicts and seek negotiated solutions with its hopes to maintain old ties with the MPLA, its ally during the struggle.[381]

Zimbabwe, obviously, was another major topic of debate in the subcommittee during the Mbeki presidency, with party leaders split over how to criticize Mugabe's abuses of human rights while maintaining dialogue with the ZANU-PF government. Pallo Jordan, one of the more critical ANC voices toward Zimbabwe, described "*heated debate, and interesting debate*" about Zimbabwe in the subcommittee after the 2002 elections there, noting that a majority of subcommittee members wanted President Mbeki to support Mugabe at the forth coming Common wealth Summit; "*Go there, Mr. President, and say 'Right on, Bob*!'" was the prevailing sentiment, he noted.[382] Lekota, another critic of Pretoria's Zimbabwe policy, said that Zimbabwe "*caused a lot of unease amongst us*" within the party and probably was the most debated international relations policy issue of the Mbeki presidency.[383]

He further argued that ANC members who had been in exile, like Mbeki, tended to be "*more accommodating*" towards Mugabe and ZANU-PF, whereas those who had been inside South Africa during the struggle were much more critical, particularly given Mugabe's massacres of ANC-aligned ZAPU sympathizers during the Matabeleland massacres of the early 1980s.[384]

Debates within the subcommittee generally were bounded by broadly accepted party principles, particularly in regard to solidarity with other liberation movements and oppressed peoples around the world. "*If you look at our relationship with Cuba,*" argued subcommittee member and PCFA chair Job Sithole, "*you can argue whether we should be doing more or less. But you'll never win an argument saying cut the ties with Cuba*".[385] Discussion was about tactics more than underlying philosophy. On Palestine, for example, Essop Pahad recalled that "*some wanted more militant statements."*

[380] Ibid.

[381] R. Suttner. *One China and Taiwan's part to fit,* p. 12.

[382]A. Hadland & J. Rantao. *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki,* p. 23.

[383]J. Herbst. *Mbeki's South Africa, Foreign Affairs 84 (6),* pp. 93-94.

[384] Ibid.

[385]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 138.

[Intelligence Minister] Ronnie [Kasrils] felt very strongly about things like sanctions:

> *"We'd debate that and ask him, 'Why are you calling for sanctions when the PLO isn't?' There would be those kind of discussions. There was never in my time any kind of fundamental difference of opinion in how one understands something".*[386]

Sithole supported this point:

> *"When the ANC says it will support the Palestinian struggle, we may differ how we do it. We may debate that difference. But the policy position remains*".[387]

Participants in NEC subcommittee discussions stated that while they were open to all viewpoints, once a decision was reached, members were expected to adhere to it and not question the decision. "*Oncethe majority had taken a decision, it becomes the decision of the ANC. You can't say it's any more contentious*," noted Myakayaka-Manzini, who further recalled that very few international relations policy issues were contentious within the ANC.[388]

Job Sithole made a similar point:

> "*You have freedom of speech in the ANC to say anything under the sun, but once the position is arrived at, there's an expectation that your argument, as good as it was, the conference has spoken on the matter. People tend to shelf their own personal views*".[389]

Revealing dissenting opinions outside the organization, particularly in the press, was strongly frowned upon; as long-time PCFA member Mewa Ramgobin emphasized, "*disciplined*" members "*share disagreements in the portals of the ANC itself...not through the media.*"[390]

Thabo Mbeki's 1997-2007 presidency of the ANC was widely characterized as a period in which power was consolidated and tightly controlled by his office, with the consensus-based approach of the NEC being disregarded or, at best, given lip service. Gumede, among others, argued that this "*presidentialization*" of the ANC under Mbeki undermined the NEC and weakened the party as a whole, both as a bureaucratic entity

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[386] Ibid.

[387] G. Oliver. *Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Savior? International Affairs 79 (4),* pp. 815-816.

[388] G. Oliver. *Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Savior? International Affairs 79 (4),* pp. 815-816.

[389] J. Herbst. *Mbeki's South Africa, Foreign Affairs 84(6),* pp. 93-94.

[390] Ibid.

and as a democratic body.[391]

On the whole, the evidence to this effect was compelling. Mbeki strengthened the president's office at Luthuli House and took control of the ANC's appointment structure that placed party cadres in government positions, taking that responsibility from branches and provincial structures.[392] This tight control of the party clearly rankled many cadres and helped spark the uprising that led to his ouster as party leader at the 2007 Polokwane Conference in favor of Jacob Zuma. However, Mbeki's tighter grip on the party did not happen in a vacuum. His leadership was affirmed at both the 1997 Mafikeng and 2002 Stellenbosch conferences, with no significant objections raised about his greater control.

Mbeki's grip on the party and long standing interest in foreign affairs would lead one to expect that he ran the ANC's international relations policy discussions in a similarly tight-fisted fashion. According to participants in the party's international relations policy debates, however, this was not the case. Members of the subcommittee (in which Mbeki did not participate) and broader NEC described Mbeki—who normally did not chair NEC meetings, deferring to Lekota as National Chairman—as generally taking a back seat in international relations policy discussions and not dictating his views to other NEC members. Much like Tambo, he would absorb all views and then speak last. According to Essop Pahad:

> "*There was this view that Mbeki imposed a view, but by and large he just stepped back. On Zimbabwe, just once he spoke out up front about his position on Zimbabwe, when he was coming under attack for it"*.[393]

Myakayaka-Manzini echoed this view, claiming that because of the collective nature of ANC decision making, no decision could be attributed solely to Mbeki: "*If that was the case, our international relations policy would have changed by now. And it hasn't changed.*"[394]

Pahad and Myakayaka-Manzini's views must be viewed with somewhat jaundiced eyes, given that both were considered close allies of Mbeki. However, Pallo Jordan—one of the party's more independent voices on international relations policy and, in some ways, a long-time rival of Mbeki's—also said Mbeki was open to debate and discussion during his tenure. He recalled one incident in 2002 when a woman was sentenced to death by stoning in northern Nigeria for adultery:

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[391]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 135.

[392]Ibid.

[393]A. Hadland & J. Rantao. *The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki,* p. 27.

[394] J. Herbst. *Mbeki's South Africa, Foreign Affairs 84 (6),* pp. 94-95.

> *Mbeki was like, "Well, it's Nigeria, be careful, ethnic problems, etc. And these characters who wanted to stone this woman were justified under sharia law, so we have to be mindful of that. "But we insisted; we said, "BS, man, you can't come here with laws elaborated in the 7th century and use it for pretext for doing barbaric things. "We cannot possibly condone an African state stoning a woman, and he had to shift. I'm sure he felt the same way deep down, but he was balancing the political issues. But he said, fine, fine chaps, you're absolutely right*.[395]

Hence, while Mbeki as party president certainly dominated the ANC and stamped his imprint on the party, his reputation as an "*autocrat*" on international relations policy issues could be regarded as over blown.

4.6 Conclusion

In examining the relative roles of the ANC and NP as ruling parties in influencing government international relations policy, this was almost no comparison, with the ANC's post-1994 structures having far more input than the moribund NP had before 1994. Renier Schoeman, who had a unique perspective from serving as Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister under FW de Klerk and later as an ANC member, noted:

> *"on the foreign affairs structure in the ANC, there's a lot of engagement. I think the policy is closer to the party as an organization. The inputs are far more significant than under the NP"*.[396]

This greater influence of the party could be chalked up to several factors, including the ANC's well-developed international relations policy apparatus developed in exile, its better developed party structures, and its national rather than provincial character, which allowed its top national leadership to meet on a regular basis. Differentiating the role of the party from that of government in making international relations policy was difficult in the post-transition dispensation. ANC international relations policy structures included nearly all of the relevant government international relations policy makers, providing them a forum for debate that other-wise would not exist. "*The NEC members are there, the Minister is there, and we can engage on the issues*," argued Sithole in describing subcommittee meetings.[397] The proverbial "*hats*" were rearranged as well. The ANC in this context eliminate drank and title in its proceedings, allowing

[395] G. Oliver. *Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Savior? International Affairs 79 (4),* pp. 816-817.

[396] M. Schoeman. *Objectives, Structures and Strategies: South Africa's Foreign policy, South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2001/2002,* pp. 73-85.

[397] Ibid.

participants to weigh in on the issues as equals (rather similar, in fact, to the *Broederbond* in this context). Mluleki George, Deputy Defense Minister under Mbeki and a member of the subcommittee, retorted:

> "T*he conversations would flow smoothly, because they were conversations of comrades. Your position in government does not matter in organizational matters—you're all the same."*[398]

This cross-fertilization made it difficult at times to tell whether policy positions originated with "*government"* or "*party*. "Nevertheless, while party structures did weigh in on international relations policy debates, the question also arises as to what degree they were "*democratic*" in being representative of the broader ANC. While participants took pains to emphasize that Mbeki did not run an autocracy on international relations policy debate, the subcommittee in particular can still be described as an oligarchy where, in the words of Jeffrey Herbst, "*decisions are debated and decided with in an extremely limited circle*".[399]However, even if an oligarchy, it appears to have been an oligarchy by consent; there were no impediments to broader participation beyond members' disinterest. International relations policy was a minor component of Conferences since 1991 while generating little interest at the branch and provincial levels.

Furthermore, the most (but not all) members of the NEC subcommittee for International Relations were elected at ANC elective conferences as the leading representatives of the party, another boost to the subcommittee's democratic credentials. While the party's Department of International Relations was strapped for funds and lacked capacity, there is no indication that this was because of a concerted effort by ANC leaders to limit its influence. It could be concluded that all party departments suffered from the same shortages. In the end, the ANC's inputs on international relations policy might not have encapsulated the views of all of the party's members, but the outputs did come from a democratic process and were very influential in shaping South Africa's international relations policy.

[398]W. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,* p. 140.

[399] J. Herbst. *Mbeki's South Africa, Foreign Affairs 84(6),* p. 96.

CHAPTER FIVE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' POLICY IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

5.1 Introduction

After World War I, South Africa evolved towards a position in which it enjoyed the capacity to enter in to relations with other states free from the control of Britain. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, it was decided that the British dominions should acquire international status. Following this, South Africa (at the time the Union of South Africa) became a member of the League of Nations. One year later, it was appointed as mandatory power over South West Africa with direct accountability to the Council of the League. At the 1926 Imperial conference, the dominions were recognized as autonomous nations within the British Empire, equal in status to Great Britain, and in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs.[400]Thus, free from Britain, South Africa created in 1927 its own Department of External Affairs which became the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1960 and proceeded to establish diplomatic missions in many parts of the world.[401]

From 1919 to 1948, many efforts were made by successive South African governments in their respective foreign policies to improve the country's position in the international arena. Mills [402] declares that before 1945 the then Union of South Africa was a highly respected member not only of the British Common wealth, but also of the League of Nations. Under Field Marshal J.C. Smuts' leadership, the country even enjoyed a reputation of being one of the most important actors of the international community. In addition to his earlier contribution to the formation of the League of Nations at the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Smuts, then Prime Minister of the Union (1937-1945), played an important role in drawing up the preamble to the UN Charter.

5.2The Pre-1994 South Africa's Policies

Conscious of its status as the most important African country in terms of its economic and military strength, South Africa began to entertain the notion of itself as a great power having a role to play in the independent African territories. The triumph of the National Party (NP) in the parliamentary election of May 26, 1948, definitely marked the break from the past in South Africa's international relations policy. The NP made racial policy the chief issue in its campaign, using for the first time the term apartheid to describe their

[400]J. Dugard. *International Law: A South African Perspective,* p. 85.

[401] R. Pfister. *Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961-1994,* p. 13.

[402]G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalisation,*

policy of segregation. Upon assuming office, the new Prime Minister, who was also minister of external affairs, D.F. Malan, in a nation-wide broadcast (June 4, 1948), outlined his government's international relations policy. The interests of South Africa, he said, would always be placed first.[403]The term apartheid (from the Afrikaans world for apartness or separateness) was used as a political slogan of the NP in 1948. The rules of apartheid dictated that people be legally classified into racial groups (Black, White, Coloured, and Indians) and also separated from one another on the basis of legal classification and unequal rights.

Until 1945, the international law was largely concerned with states and their relationships with one another. The prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs of states, enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations, was respected as a guiding principle.[404] In this regard, the manner in which a state treated its citizens was generally not regarded as a factor to be considered in deciding whether or not to admit state to the community of nations. As a result of this, neither the League of Nations nor any state raised objections to South Africa's racial policies when it became a member of the international community. South Africa's policy of apartheid was simply regarded as an internal affair.

After World War II, the question of human rights became a concern of international law. The enormity of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime radically changed the nature of international law. This experience compelled statesmen to accept the need for the new world order in which the state was no longer free to threat its own nationals as it pleased. This new order was proclaimed by the Charter of the United Nations, which recognised the promotion of human rights as a principal goal of the new world organisation, and by the London Charter of 1945.[405] Subsequently, South Africa began to face strong criticisms on the part of the international community.

Locally, the implementation and enforcement of apartheid rules were accompanied by the creation of anti-apartheid movements. These movements–including the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the South African Communist Party (SAPC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Non-European Unity Movement, the Black Consciousness, and many others had one purpose in mind: use all necessary means to draw the international community's attention on South Africa's racial policies. They all had faith in world public opinion and international organizations to help bring about change in South Africa. They believed that the UN would act on their behalf because of the Charter's commitment to equality and justice. Overall, these movements provided an organization through which the frustrations of those whose rights had been restricted could

[403] V. Amry. *South Africa and the World: The Foreign policy of Apartheid,* p. 130.

[404] J. Dugard. *International Law: A South African Perspective,* p. 309.

[405] Ibid.

be channel led, but their actions sometimes met with strong reprisals on the part of the government. As a result, violence and counter-violence spread within and outside the country.

The Sharpeville crisis of March 1960 marked a new stage in the Union's deteriorating international position. The banning of the ANC and PAC, together with the imprisonment of their leaders, undermined South Africa's political allies who were prepared to support Pretoria's claim that it was a major force in the maintenance of political order and democratic values in the subcontinent. In 1961, the country was forced to with draw from the British Common wealth. From that year on wards, South Africa's internal policies were also considered to be a possible threat to world peace by the Security Council. Consequently, it stood condemned by numerous resolutions adopted by both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

As one of the fifty-two founding members of the UN, South Africa had seemed destined to play an important role in its development. Instead, there was a steady deterioration of its relations with the UN, due to the issue of South-West Africa, the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa and the whole question of apartheid. In 1974, South Africa was suspended from taking it seat in the General Assembly.[406] By 1977, while allies in the West decided to distance themselves from Pretoria and called for mandatory sanctions on arms sales.[407]

The late 1970s and 1980s were decades characterized by political turmoil unparalleled in South African history. Riots and concomitant repression intensified, and the international community reacted by tightening the sanctions.[408] The growing international pressure together with the dramatic events that followed in the country forced the government , under President F.W. de Klerk, to renounce its racial policies. Recognizing the fact that South Africa's international position could not be improved without internal accommodation, President de Klerk embarked on the most radical period of political reform yet seen in South Africa.

President de Klerk brought a very different political style to Pretoria, breaking fundamentally with the apartheid ideology of his National Party. In the domestic arena, he presented himself as the reformer, symbolized by the remarkable unbanning of liberation movements, the release ultimately of all political prisoners and, very importantly, the freeing of Nelson Mandela after 27 years of imprisonment.[409] The subsequent negotiations

[406] J.A. Kalley. *South Africa's Treaties in Theory and Practice, 1806-1998,* p. 113.

[407] J. Barber & J. Barret. *South Africa's Foreign policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* p.115.

[408] J. A. Kalley. *South Africa's Treaties in Theory and Practice, 1806-1998,* p. 73.

[409] R. Pfister. *Apartheid South Africa and African States: from Pariah to Middle Power, 1961-1994,* p. 125.

between the government and the ANC led to the first democratic elections in 1994, which brought into power Nelson Mandela.

5.3 Policy in a democratic dispensation

In 1994, following the first non-racial elections of April, South Africa emerged from decades of international isolation due to the apartheid policies. On assuming power:

> "*the ANC faced the formidable task of translating the gains of liberation diplomacy into a pragmatic and principled international relations policy. It also had to stamp its own philosophical imprimatur on international relations policy and refashion in its own image the institutional architecture inherited from successive apartheid regimes"*.[410]

Not surprisingly, the defence and assertion of human rights figured prominently in the preliminary debates in the early declarations of South Africa's future international relations policy.[411] After all, as Spence points out, the new South Africa was in part the creation of a massive human rights campaign waged by a host of non-governmental organisations, and the anti-apartheid movement in particular, governments in the Third World and their representatives in a variety of international organisations, most notably the United Nations, on behalf of the peoples whose rights were restricted. Thus, "*South Africa felt morally obliged to help secure universal adherence to basic human rights, to help ensure that people are not threatened by arbitrary and oppressive rule"*.[412]

Prior to the 1994 elections, in his well-known article entitled "*South Africa's Future International relations policy*", the then leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, set the tone for the shape and conduct of South African diplomacy in the aftermath of apartheid. The pillars upon which South Africa's international relations policy would rest were the following:

- That issues of **human rights are central to international relations** and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;

- That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the **promotion of democracy worldwide**;

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[410] C. Alden & G. Le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy From Reconciliation to Revival?* p. 11.

[411] J. Spence. *South Africa's Foreign Policy Concerns,* p. 4.

[412] A. Sharpe. *Taking The high ground,* p. 26.

- That considerations of **justice and respect for international law** should guide the relations between nations;

- That **peace is the goal for which all nations should strive**, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;

- That the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our international relations policy choices;

- That economic development depends on growing **regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world**.[413]

Within this frame work, special recognition was therefore given to a number of themes; namely human rights, democracy, the rule of law; peace; and cooperation between states. The ANC leader wanted to infuse the practice of international affairs with an orientation towards the promotion of civil liberties and democratization because for him and his movement, the struggle for an apartheid-free South Africa was a struggle for fundamental human rights. It was no coincidence, therefore, that once the ANC was in power, human rights became an important leitmotif in its international relations policy. The ANC's approach was also informed by a desire to make Africa and Southern Africa in particular the primary theatre of South African activism, to promote regional development and to participate constructively in multilateral institutions.[414]

Translated into the language of IR theory, the approach adopted by the ANC could be classified as '*idealism*'.[415]Idealist adherents are motivated by the desire to prevent wars and build a peaceful world. They concentrate on what '*ought to be*', and in doing so seek to change what '*is*'. As Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham[416] stated, idealism stresses the importance of moral values, legal norms, internationalism and harmony of interests as guides to international relations policy making, rather than the considerations of national interest and power. Idealists, they add, emphasize the need for peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes; they believe that peace is both achievable and indivisible; they have faith in reason and con science as sources of international behaviour; and they are advocates of collective security. The points outlined by Mandela prior to the 1994, as

[413]N. Mandela. *South Africa's Future Foreign policy, in Foreign Policy Affairs 72(5),* p.87.

[414]C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Aparheid Foreign Policy From Reconciliation to Revival, p.12.*

[415]J. Barber. *Mandela's World:The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-1999,* p. 92.

[416]J. Barber. *Mandela's World:The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-1999,* p. 92.

highlighted above, clearly constituted almost an idealist blue print.

The logic behind the idealist approach to international relations is that the conditions within a state can be projected into international politics; that the values and principles of their own society can be replicated elsewhere.[417] This is in stark contrast to the realist belief that domestic and international politics are distinctly separate spheres of activity. By adopting these principles, the ANC

> "*reasoned that as it had achieved a settlement with the apartheid regime, it could do business with anybody. In that spirit, it declared itself ready to establish links with all members of the international community, through the policy of universality*",

which "*was an attempt to de- ideologise international relations policy so that relations could be establish 'with all countries without implying support for their internal or external policie*s".[418]

As the above suggests, at the international level, the Mandela administration's objectives were to influence world politics, to help ensure that the world is more secure, peaceful, democratic, humane, equitable and people-centred.[419] In so doing, it allied itself– rhetorically at least-closely with the idealist way of thinking and reasoning about world politics. In light of this, we now turn to a case study of Mandela's international relations policy to determine whether it was in line with the idealist logic.

5.4 Policy Test on 'Two Chinas' Question

Among all the international relations policy dilemmas that the government of national unity (GNU) faced since it came to power in 1994, the '*two Chinas*' question is one of those which has generated a huge number of debates regarding South Africa's international relations policy formulation. The '*two Chinas*' question represents a good case for this particular study because it shows that, although South Africa's international relations policy was mainly idealist driven under Mandela's presidency, Mandela did not act accordingly to idealist principles without fail. In fact, in this specific case, he acted in a realist way, which was contrary to the values that he was supposed to promote. As Daniels [420] correctly noted, the dilemma was both a moral and an interests-based one. The economic interests at state were clearly enormous and dominated the debate, but the human rights issues involved were worthy of serious attention for in its pre-election blue

[417]Ibid.

[418] Ibid. p. 93.

[419]A. Sharpe. *Taking The high ground,* p. 26.

[420] J. Daniel. *One China or two? South Africa's Foreign policy Dilemma in The Taiwan Experience: implications for South Africa,* p. 158.

print the ANC clearly declared that it will "*canonize human rights in our international relations*".[421] The way South Africa handled this dilemma provides a clear indication of which factors were primarily driving South Africa's new international relations policy. The '*two Chinas*' policy along with the so-called '*quiet diplomacy*' towards Zimbabwe, the two of many examples illustrated the classification of Mandela as an idealist and Mbeki as a realist reflect simplistic understandings of the perspectives that in form these two statesmen.

In 1999, Hu Jintao, who was then vice president of PRC, paid a state visit to South Africa. [Photo/ifeng.com]

When President Nelson Mandela suddenly announced on 27 November 1996 that South Africa would no longer recognize the Republic of China (ROC), but would open official diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead, he caught the world by surprise:

> "*In what was a fittingly bizarre end to a situation that continued to defy all expectations, the post-apartheid government made its first significant international relations policy decision. The remarkable level of public debate, the inter-departmental conflicts, the role of interest groups and party politics which accompanied the decision to switch recognition gave the South African government and the public as a whole its first exposure to the vagaries of conducting international relations policy in a democracy*".[422]

[421] ANC. *Foreign policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa,* pp. 5-8.

[422] C. Alden. *Solving South Africa's Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign policymaking and the Two Chinas Issue, in South Africa's Foreign policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy,* p. 119.

What factors influenced President Nelson Mandela's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China? Established in 1912, the Republic of China (ROC) covered much of main land China. In 1945, at the end of World War II (1945), the Republic of China added the island groups of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) to its authority. Four years later, the Chinese revolution began. This revolution was accompanied by significant political changes. The first of them was the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland by the Chinese Communist Party led by Chairman Mao. The second biggest change was that the revolution saw the defeated Kuomintang (Nationalist) forces flee to the island of Taiwan where they maintained jurisdiction over Taiwan, Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu, and numerous other islets, and declared them-selves to be the rightful ruler of the whole of China. Since then, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been governed as separate territories and developed separate identities.

From the beginning of the Cold War until the early 1970s, the ROC was recognized by most Western countries as the sole legitimate government of China, though it ruled only over Taiwan and outlying islands (Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu). Taipei's argument was that the ROC established on the mainland in 1912, with its seat in Nanking had only temporarily moved its government to the island province of Taiwan following the communists' illegal seizure of power in 1949.[423] Subsequently, the ROC occupied the seat for China in the United Nations and the United States seventh fleet stood in the way of any attempts by the PRC to complete their revolution by uniting Taiwan with the rest of mainland China.[424]

In the 1960s, upset by the rule of the mainland minority, some native Taiwanese began to call for independence from China. From there, their focus shifted from reclaiming the mainland to developing the island itself. It was also at the same period that the United States and other Western countries began to improve their relations with the PRC as a way to prevent Soviet expansionism. As a result, the ROC began to lose these recognitions in favour of the PRC. Furthermore, in 1972, the United Nations expelled Taipei's nationalist government in favour of Beijing's. Eight years later, the United States formally recognised the PRC, severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[425] In so doing, they accepted Beijing's '*one China*' mandate and abandoned, at least officially, their defence pact with the island.[426] Following the United States, many other Western countries also turned their back on the island.

[423]D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A case for Dual Recognition,* p.7.

[424]R. Suttner. *A Brief Review of South African Foreign Policy Since 1994,* p.

[425] D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A case for Dual Recognition,* p. 7.

[426]M.L. Lasater. *U.S. Policy towards China's reunification: The Reagan years, 1980-1986,* pp. 100-101.

Divided since the end of a civil war in 1949, Beijing and Taipei have battled for political influence in the international arena. But after the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971, a number of countries have ceased to recognize its sovereignty. In 1996, only 30 countries in the world maintained their recognition of Taiwan, South Africa being politically the most important.

The ROC established diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1977 when both were regarded as pariah states by the international community, with Taiwan having been kicked out of the United Nations in 1971, South Africa having suffered the same fate earlier because of its racial policies. Since then, Taiwan had provided substantial assistance to South Africa and its firms continued to invest in business ventures. It also made direct contributions to the ANC as a political organisation in the struggle against apartheid.

The end of apartheid brought South Africa's long years of international isolation to an end. A number of states were now keen to enter in to official relations with the new democratic South Africa. Among them was the PRC on the mainland. However, until that time, no state had succeeded to maintain diplomatic links with both the PRC and the ROC; Beijing insisted that a choice be made.[427] Hence, South Africa, like many other countries before, had to choose between maintaining its ties with the ROC, a product of their commonest racism, and recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate government of the entire China, Taiwan being a part of it.

According to John Daniel,[428] the "*nuts and bolts*" of the dilemma at the Government of National Unity was facing ran along three lines:

- Should South Africa retain its official ties to an old ally (albeit one linked to the previous apartheid regime) with whom it had since 1990 developed a close and economically advantageous relationship; anally which, moreover, had in the last decade, like South Africa itself, undergone dramatic and far-reaching democratization process?

- Or should it abandon, or rather downgrade, its ties to that ally in favour of a government with a wretched (and deteriorating) '*human rights*' record but which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and home to someone-fifth of all humanity and therefore a market of immense proportions, made yet more important by the fact that its economy is currently the world's fastest growing?

- Or was there perhaps a third way, namely, that of dual recognition?

When President Mandela came to power, his message with regard to the 'two Chinas'

[427]D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition,* p. 4.

[428] J. Daniel. *One China or Two? South Africa's Foreign policy Dilemma,* pp. 35-49.

question was one of tolerance, pragmatism and in the spirit of universalism. He laid emphasis on the importance of existing and future economic links, and added that the ANC would not abandon its friends who helped during the days when we needed assistance.[429] At the same time, President Mandela also made it clear that, as the government, the ANC would never turn its back on Beijing. "*It's unthinkable*", he told a press conference, "*that we can abandon relations with the People's Republic of China*".[430]

Taking this in to consideration, one could surmise that for President Mandela, the best way to deal with the '*two Chinas*' question was that of dual recognition. Barber comments that President Mandela thought that South Africa could succeed where other states such as Burkina Faso had failed, because of its special status from the struggle against apartheid; the political miracle at home; its powerful position in Africa, and the international standing both of the government and Mandela himself. However, the PRC insisted that they would not countenance a dual recognition policy. For them, there was only one China: the PRC, with Taiwan being a part of it which would in time be fully reintegrated into it.

As already mentioned above, the relationship between South Africa and Taiwan had been forged in adversity, as they were drawn together by their pariah status. For the National Party government, there had been nothing to lose and something to gain in the relationship. There was no possibility of the PRC establishing relations with the apartheid regime, whereas, in contrast, Taipei was excited to create links, and was prepared to offer substantial economic benefits in return. In 1993, it was South Africa's sixth largest trading partner; their total trade amounted to R6,1 billion, with a surplus of R2,3 billion in South Africa's favour, compared with 1,6 billion for the PRC. By 1994, it had already invested some R1,4 billion in South Africa, creating over 40000 jobs in over 280 factories. Taiwanese trade mission concluded agreements for trade, investment, technical cooperation and financial assistance totaling R1,1billion, with the prospect of more to come, including support for the petro-chemical plant at Mossel Bay.[431]

Repeating the ANC's commitment to universalism, President Mandela maintained his position and stated that it would be immoral to cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In February 1995, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, confirmed the links with Taipei and added that: "*This was a matter which should be resolved by the Chinese themselves*". [432] However, as Barber affirmed, the dual recognition never gained whole-

[429]J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99,* p. 106.

[430]Ibid.

[431] D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition,* p. 14.

[432]J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99,* p. 107.

hearted support either in the ANC, or the government, even at cabinet level. Its opponents believed that the policy was against South Africa's interests. They pointed to the PRC's great size and potential power, to the already strained relations with it, and to the hurdles it would create for Pretoria's future ambitions.

As an example, they stated that if South Africa had hopes of playing a prominent role in the UN, it could not afford to offend the PRC, one of the 'big five' in the Security Council. Supporters of the switch also stressed the fact that the economic equation was changing in favour of the PRC. In the long term, they added, the PRC, with its vast population, its recently impressive economic growth and its increasing participation in global activities, had the potential to become a major world economic player.

At this stage, South Africa-PRC relations were semi-official with each country operating through informal representative offices in the other's capital. Despite their low-key nature, a two-way trade and aid relationship had developed involving, on the South African side, such major actors as Volkswagen, South Africa Breweries and ISCOR, China being its most lucrative market for iron.[433] Furthermore, the PRC had reached agreement with Britain to take over control of Hong Kong from July 1997. This was very important for the GNU because Hong Kong already had long-standing links with South Africa. In terms of trade, for example, even though these were smaller than those with Taiwan, when added to those with the PRC they were greater.

Already in 1995, their combined total made them South Africa's fifth most important trading partner (R6,478m), while Taiwan was eighth (R5,774m). Also important were Hong Kong's investments in South Africa, which, following Japan, were the second largest from Asia.[434] Advocates of the switch position argued that this represented no more than a drop in the ocean and that the lack of full diplomatic relations was hampering the full development of South Africa's trade potential with China.

In his report to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, Raymond Suttner[435]mentioned the concerns of the South African Consul-General in Hong Kong and his anxiety that South Africa's relations with Hong Kong be regularized in order to safe guard South African interests with regard to trade, landing rights and the future of the consulate. Yet President Mandela seemed unmoved. In October 1996, he restated that it would be immoral to break ties with Taiwan. In the language of IR theory, therefore, promoting a strongly idealist

[433]J. Daniel. *One China or Two? South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemma,* p. 161.

[434] J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99,* p. 107.

[435]J. Daniel. *One China or Two? South Africa's Foreign Policy Dilemma,* p. 173.

position by insisting on the importance of morality in international relations.

The surprise came in November 1996 when President Mandela abruptly announced that in a year's time, Pretoria would cut its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish formal relations with Beijing. According to a number of commentators, Mandela's decision to break off diplomatic relations with the ROC was motivated by material interests. One of these commentators was Barber who stated that Mandela's change of direction came about because the PRC's unflinching stand forced him to recognize that South Africa's interests were best served by abandoning the old policy, that is dual recognition.[436] Beijing, he said, made clear that when it took over from the British those who did not have full diplomatic relations with the PRC could expect no sympathy in negotiating their links with Hong Kong. The triumph of pragmatism over principle is just a confirmation of what the then deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, had previously said. He once declared that the country's international relations policy would be:

> "*pragmatic and interest-driven, and that its international priorities would be dictated by the need to ensure the success of the government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) by securing foreign resources as swiftly as possible*".[437]

The evidence of this is given by Barber[438] who revealed that three weeks before the transfer of power in Hong Kong, the Chinese agreed, in negotiations with Aziz Pahad, that Pretoria could retain its mission in Hong Kong, that South African citizens could visit there without visas, that South African Airways could both retain its landing rights and in future could over fly mainland China to shorten the flight to Japan.

South Africa-Hong Kong relations represented an important factor that, according to Daniel,[439] influenced President Mandela's decision. Writing two years before the announcement, Daniel believed that the dual recognition was both the morally correct position in human rights terms as well as, conveniently, the one in South Africa's best economic interests, given the importance of Taiwan-South Africa trade relations, and also the fact that at the time Hong Kong was separated from the PRC. But, as he pointed it out, that could change if the PRC were to put the squeeze on South Africa by making all

[436]J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99,* pp. 107-108.

[437]W. Breytenbach. *The Chinese Dilemma: Dual Recognition is the Ultimate Solution in South African Journal of International Affairs 2(1),* p. 55.

[438]J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99,* p. 107.

[439]J. Daniel. *One China or Two? South Africa's Foreign policy Dilemma,* pp. 172-173.

economic transactions subject to political criteria, i.e., recognition.

As already explained above, the PRC made clear that those who did not have full diplomatic relations with them could expect no sympathy in negotiating their links with Hong Kong when it took over from British. Taking this into consideration, Daniel concluded that there could be no getting away from the fact that if South Africa reversed its position over the two Chinas, it would, under the present political circumstances in the two countries, represent a triumph of pragmatism over principle; moral principles would have been subordinated to hoped-for material gains. This is confirmed by Alden and le Pere[440] who asserted that:

> "*when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited South Africa in 2000, official government statements focused only on bilateral trade and commercial interests, and that Pretoria and Beijing form one of South Africa's closest relationships with an on-African country through active engagement in process such the China-Africa Ministerial Forum and substantive investment in each other's economies*".

The above suggests that in the 'two Chinas' question, President Mandela was more concerned about South Africa's interests than anything else. In doing so, he acted in a characteristically realist way. There a list approach to international relations is, as we saw in chapter two, based on the assumptions that, within an anarchic international system, states are the main actors, and power the central concept. Although other actors are involved, for realists states remain the dominant players, and although they vary greatly in size, strength and capacity all pursue their national interests in a constant search for security and prosperity .[441]

Realism emphasises states' demands for more power, security and the dangers to states' survival. Material power is the most important thing in international politics.[442]In neorealist theory, power is defined as a combined capability of a state[443], which includes not only its military force, but also its economic and techno logic strength. Seen from this angle, material power and the pursuit of material interests become very important because they both affect national power and capability. The point made by them is that states are self-interested oriented and will cooperate with other states only to increase their interests

[440] C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy- From Reconciliation to Revival,* p. 21.

[441] J. Barber. *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99,* p. 93.

[442]R. O. Keohane & J. S. Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,* p. 247.

[443] K. N. Waltz. *Realist thought and neorealist theory,* pp. 15-33.

and power.

Taking into account the above, one can assume that in choosing the option which allowed South Africa to strive for material power and influence in the international system, President Nelson Mandela seemed to have acted in a realist manner. The pursuit of economic interests is confirmed by Spence[444]who declares that during the last years of Mandela's presidency a strong force of pragmatism ran through the formulation and conduct of international relations policy. A major preoccupation of Mandela administration's international relations policy, Spence added, had been to weld the country's economy into a global market which rewards liberalization and deregulation and penalizes rigidity, inflexibility in the labour marked and continued state control over particular assets. South Africa then realized that its international relations policy should demonstrate a commitment to an economic strategy that conformed to external expectations, leading to the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR).

By behaving in a pragmatic manner in the case of the '*two China*s' question, President Mandela acted in a way that was contrary to South Africa's stated international relations policy principles, which, as stated above, were clearly idealist driven. While it is true that it makes no sense for any country to deny the *de jure* existence of a great power that holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has the world's largest population, possesses a nuclear capability, and boasts one of the fastest growing economies in the world,[445] respect for international law and human rights, and the promotion of democracy world-wide were some of South Africa's international relations policy principles that, if respected, could have helped the GNU to handle the relations with the two contending Chinese states and, therefore, prevented President Nelson Mandela for being criticized for a lack consistency.

In the interest of emphasizing the point, a plethora of reasons could be tabled to demonstrate that the way President Mandela chose to handle the *'two Chinas*' question was incompatible with South Africa's idealist international relations policy principles. Firstly, Mandela's decision was in sharp contrast to the respect for human rights. In its international relations policy blue print, dated December 1994, the ANC declared that it would "*canonize human rights in our international relations*", and that South Africa "*should and must play a central role*" in a "*worldwide human rights campaign*". Furthermore, South Africa under ANC rule would be neither selective nor afraid "*to raise human rights violations with countries where our own and other interests might be negatively affected*".[446]

[444]J. Spence. *South Africa's Foreign Policy Concerns,* pp. 4-5.

[445] D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A case for Dual Recognition,* p. 4.

[446] D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A case for Dual Recognition,* p. 5.

China, in contrast, had a human rights record that remained an injury to all those who fight for the respect of human dignity around the world. By deciding to recognise the PRC, President Mandela turned his back on what constituted the cornerstone of his international relations policy, namely human rights. The shift in South Africa's international relations policy was confirmed in March 1997 when President Mandela, during his first official tour of South east Asia, refused to abjure ties with countries that had poor human rights records, stating that South Africa's international relations policy would not be influenced by the differences which exist between the internal policies of a particular country and ourselves…There are countries where there are human rights violations, but these countries have been accepted by the United States, the Common wealth of Nations and by the Non-Aligned Movement. Why should we let ourselves depart from what international organizations are doing?[447]

Secondly, with regard to democracy, even though Taiwan's political system had been undeniably authoritarian and dealt harshly with opposition, it lacked the brutal totalitarian features of the PRC's communist order. In 1987, the ROC initiated a process of political liberalization with the lifting of martial law (declared in 1949). This ended the ban on the formation of new political parties and abolished various other restrictions on free political activity. These changes preceded the so-called third wave of democratization unleashed by the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War.[448] Geldenhuys concluded that, contrary to the PRC, which is one of the few remaining communist dictatorships in the world, the ROC already possessed many of the attributes that are commonly associated with a stable liberal democracy, such as a high literacy rate, a high standard of living and a largely homogeneous population.

As has been outlined above, a principled commitment to democracy and respect for human rights was the essence, if not the totality, of President Mandela's international relations policy.[449] In the case of the '*two Chinas*' policy, these principles were clearly not allowed. This was, however, not the only instance during Mandela's presidency where there appeared to be an inconsistency between his international relations policy rhetoric and actions. Alongside the '*two Chinas*' policy are other examples of inconsistency. They include South Africa's controversial arms acquisition programme, which entailed the purchase of warships and air craft at the cost estimated at R30 billion(US$5.2billion) in 1998, and its arms sales to Syria and Indonesia.[450]

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[447] South African Press Association, 6 March 1997.

[448] D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa and the China Question: A case for Dual Recognition,* p. 9.

[449] L. Nathan. *Consistency and inconsistency in South Africa's foreign policy, in International Affairs 81(2),* p. 364.

[450] J. Spence. *South Africa's Foreign Policy Concerns,* p.77.

Part of that were programmes at odds with its holistic approach to security and the pacific foreign posture it was supposed to follow. This also entailed the military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho in September 1998, which was incoherent with Pretoria's preference for pacific forms of conflict resolution. Furthermore, the government's slowness to deal with the wide spread xenophobia in South Africa which targeted mainly people from other African countries, attitude that was contrary to its emphasis on Africa.[451]Lastly, South Africa's ties with countries with a record of human rights violations such Libya and Cuba, relations that altogether were in clear contrast with the respect of human dignity that it was supposed to promote.

In their analysis of South Africa's international relations policy under Mandela, Alden and le Pere, Johnston, Hamill, and Kodjo furthered these inconsistencies. Alden and le Pere [452] declared:

> "*in the implementation of international relations policy, financial, commercial, political, and defence interests supplanted the new government's cautiously crafted ethical dimension…More often than not, this produced realist and pragmatic responses where a critical and principled position might have been more prudent*".[453]

The examples they cited to illustrate this included conflict between East Timor and Indonesia; South Africa's relations with Malaysia; the political crisis in Zaire in 1997; the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998; and the controversial arms sales. In all of these cases, Mandela acted in a realist manner, privileging national interests and the use of force. For Spence,

> "*the major preoccupation of the post-apartheid international relations policy has been to weld South Africa's economy into a global market place which rewards liberalization and deregulation and penalizes rigidity, in flexibility in the labour market and continued state control over particular assets"*.[454]

This, Spence explained, was due to the fact that the post-apartheid government was facing many economic challenges, including battered sanctions, negative rates of growth, high unemployment and a never-increasing large burden of public debt. The new regime had therefore to find ways to create an environment that could help it to further its economic

[451]L. Nathan. *Consistency and inconsistency in South Africa's foreign policy, in International Affairs 81(2),* p.370.

[452]C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy- From Reconciliation to Revival,* p. 19.

[453]Ibid.

[454]J. Spence. *South Africa's Foreign Policy Concerns,* p. 5.

interests in order to reverse the situation in which it found itself. This idea was also shared by Kodjo[455] who argued that South Africa's desire to cooperate with its neighbours and other African countries was motivated by its desire to further its economic interests.

Thus, President Nelson Mandela became a kind of representative of South African farmers and businessmen in Africa. Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan[456] seemed to corroborate this hegemonic role in their article entitled "*Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa*". Johnston also questioned the Mandela government's commitment to issues involving a human rights dimension. He noted that while the South African Government's *Discussion Document on International relations policy* raised issues of human rights and democracy with salience, it provided neither adequate justification nor an explicit framework for the management of such issues in practice.

Hamill's skepticism came from the contradiction existing between the principles and the culture prevailing in the ANC-led administration. To illustrate this contradiction, he cited the Defence Ministry. In the early years of the post-apartheid regime, Hamill declared, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) hierarchy and its political masters stressed the need for strong armed forces equipped and ready to meet a conventional military threat from within the region.

The then Defence Minister, Joe Modise, stated in 1994 that *'Peace is the ideal situation but ideal situations are hard to find in the real world.'*Modise's statement followed the one made by President Nelson Mandela himself two weeks after his inauguration, when he proclaimed that he saw nothing wrong in arms sales which, according to him, were for the purpose of defending the sovereignty and the integrity of the country. For Hamill, these two statements were clearly based on the realist principle of self-defence which is contrary to the collective defence advocated by idealists.

Although the general trend of his international relations policy was idealist, President Mandela clearly did not consistently act according to idealist principles. This, however, is not to say that under his presidency South Africa's actions at the international level were consistently inconsistent with its international relations policy principles. A number of examples do show that on several occasions President Mandela tried to stick to these principles. One of them was his call for sanctions to be imposed on the dictatorship regime in Nigeria in 1995.

The political crisis in Nigeria in 1995 was, as Alden and le Pere [457] declared, one of the most serious and potentially explosive challenges to confront the new South African

[455]E. Kodjo. *L' Afrique du Sudetla cooperation interafricain,* p. 184-185.

[456] F. Ahwireng- Obeng. & P.J. McGowan. *Partner or Hegemon?* p. 100.

[457] C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy: From Reconciliation to Revival,* p. 21.

government, testing the ANC's international relations policy ideals and objectives in a very palpable and public way. The crisis began in 1993 when the head of the regime, General Ibrahim Babangida, annulled the results of the presidential elections which the opposition candidate Chief Moshood Abiola was widely believed to have won. One year later, Abiola was jailed for treason by General Sani Abacha, Babangida' s dictatorial successor.

Worse still in November 1995, without warning, Sani Abacha executed KenSaro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni minority-rights activists. These events put South Africa in a complicated situation. The GNU had to choose between allying itself with Nigeria's regime from which the ANC received a lot of support during its struggle against apartheid or in the name of *'African Solidarity*' and disapproving it to be in line with two of its international relations policy principles namely democracy and the respect of human rights. President Mandela chose the second option. He expressed his indignation at a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Auckland, New Zealand, and called for tougher measures including the expulsion of Nigeria from the Common wealth and the imposition of an oil embargo.

5.5 Conclusion

From the above, it could be concluded that those who portrayed South Africa's international relations policy during transition (1994-1998) as idealist are advancing a simplistic understanding of what was a much complex, at times contradictory international relations policy. It is true that during transition, particularly under Nelson Mandela's presidency, Pretoria did have a international relations policy that was on paper idealist-driven. However, a closer look at some of his actions such as the' two Chinas' policy revealed a number of inconsistencies which made the classification of him as either idealist or realist difficult. Addressing the seemingly contradictory international relations policy priorities became an overriding objective of the epoch of pragmatism.

CHAPTER SIX

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLICY DURING THE EPOCH OF PRAGMATISM

6.1 Introduction

While the initial period after the South African election of April 1994 might be viewed with hind sight as something of a honeymoon phase in the Republic's relations with the international community, the need to develop a cogent international relations policy more reliant on process than personalities and driven less by single events than broad trends became increasingly acute[458] The post-apartheid dispensation was aware of the fact that '*five years after the miracle*' of transition, things that concerned a largely impoverished and somewhat disillusioned but patient electorate exercising democratic rights for only the second time in their history were overwhelmingly domestic. Jobs, housing, public utilities, education, health, and crime were the matters that South African scared about now that the high political questions of state legitimacy and constitution-making had been resolved.[459] These and other factors have since then, as le Pere and van Nieuwkerk[460] declared exacerbated a number of negative social trends, such as a spiraling crime and corruption as well as serious social disparities not only between black and white, but also between the newly enriched black middle class and a poor, mostly uneducated black minority, as well as between urban and rural households.

6.2 A coordinated approach to globalization

Though domestic issues dominated the June 1999 elections, South Africa's international relations would have a direct bearing on the ability of Pretoria's second post-apartheid administration to deliver its electoral pledges. As Evans[461] pointed out, "*global economic enmeshing had proceeded at such a pace that what goes on outside the territorial boundaries of the state of ten conditions what can be achieved with in them*". Incoming president Thabo Mbeki was aware that five years down the road from apartheid, the inescapable priority for South Africa was domestic reconstruction and economic growth allied to internal social and political stability. For that specific reason, South Africa's international profile over the next five years had to generate tangible material pay-offs.

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[458] G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalisation,* p. 299.

[459] G. Evans. *South Africa's Foreign policy after Mandela: Mbeki and his concept of an African Renaissance in The Round Table 352 (1),* pp. 621-622.

[460] G. le Pere & A. van Nieuwkerk. *South Africa and crafting foreign policy in a complex global order: change and continuity,* pp. 287-288.

[461]G. Evans. *South Africa's Foreign policy after Mandela: Mbeki and his concept of an African Renaissance in The Round Table 352 (1),* p. 622.

Tracing the evolution of the ANC's international stance from its founding in 1912 to the 1994 elections, and exploring the international relations policy positions open to the Mbeki's administration, Evans predicted that the Mbeki's administration would have to embrace the repertoire of *real politik*, that is to say a realist international relations policy which gives special importance to material gains.

In his address to the ANC national conference in Mafikeng on 15 December 1997 Thabo Mbeki, talking to outgoing ANC president, Nelson Mandela, declared: *"I will never, ever be seen dead in your shoes, because you always wear ugly shoes*" (address to the ANC national conference, 15 December 1997). Coming from the new head of ANC, this message indicated that the incoming president was determined to create his own image. Both at home and internationally, the need to separate himself from his larger-than-life predecessor became one of the driving forces of Mbeki's reign.[462]

A state's international relations policy should produce a climate both at home and abroad in which its people can feel at ease with themselves and their country's role in world affairs.[463] Throughout the presidency of Nelson Mandela, the general critiques of his administration converged around the strategic ambiguities and uncertain approaches underpinning South Africa's international relations policy. As was highlighted in the previous chapter, there was a palpable tension between prioritizing its perceived commercial, trade and political interests and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of global human rights and democracy.[464]

However, as lePere and van Nieuwkerk observed, following the second post-apartheid election in June 1999, which saw President Mbeki securing over whelming political control in the hands of the ANC, with himself and a close circle of colleagues at the helm of policy-making, this ambiguity and uncertainty was replaced by a stronger sense of purpose and vision.

Upon taking office, President Mbeki and his cabinet approved a new integrated planning framework to guide the strategic national priorities identified by the executive. This framework resulted from an International Relations, Peace and Security strategic plan that emerged from a DFA Heads of Mission conference held in February 2001.The document highlighted four mutually reinforcing themes representing the South African government's key foreign-policy objectives, namely: South Africa's domestic interests; the objectives of the African renaissance; promoting an agenda for the South, and developing an equitable

[462] W.M. Gumede. *Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC,* p. 63.

[463] J. Spence. *South Africa's Foreign policy Concerns,* p. 9.

[464] G. le Pere & A. van Nieuwkerk. *South Africa and crafting foreign policy in complex global order: change and continuity,* p. 34

global system.[465]

The idea of an African Renaissance was not new, it borrowed from several earlier calls for an African revival from leaders such as Nkwame Nkrumah from Ghana, Julius Kambarage Nyerere from Tanzania, and Kenneth David Kuanda from Zambia.[466] Since its appearance in

Thabo Mbeki's parliamentary address in June 1997, the idea of an African Renaissance has increasingly assumed an iconic status in South African public life. Mbeki, then deputy president, reminded his audience of the obligation to contribute to the common African continental effort, at last; to achieve an African Renaissance, including the establishment of stable democracies, respect for human rights, an end to violent conflicts, and a better life for all peoples of Africa.[467] Since 1999, this idea has become an important pillar of Mbeki's international relations policy and a key orientation of his administration. This international relations policy principle emphasised the centrality of the African continent in South African international relations policy, and outlined the critical role of South Africa as an intermediary between the African continent and leading foreign powers in the rest of the world.[468]

6.3 International Relations Policy Principles

With regard to the promotion of an agenda for South and the development of an equitable global system, President Mbeki identified a number of issues that would be considered as the country's main concerns. These include the OAU/African Union (AU) and SADC's restructuring; there form of regional and international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Common wealth; South Africa's hosting of major international conferences; efforts at promoting peace and security in Africa and the Middle East; and an analysis of how South Africa's international relations policy priorities and goals were shaped and influenced by its bilateral relations. At the same time, President Mbeki stressed the importance of South Africa's relations with the G8 group of states, and envisaged a '*G8 of the South'*, new strategic partnerships with selected African states and improved cooperation.[469]

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[465] C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy: From Reconciliation to Revival? pp. 31-32.*

[466] P. Vale & S. Maseko. *South Africa and the African Renaissance, in International Affairs 74(2),* p. 286.

[467] T. Lodge. *South African Politics since 1994,* p. 96.

[468] P. J. Schraeder. *South Africa's foreign policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance,* p. 233.

[469]C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy: From Reconciliation to Revival?* p. 32.

In order to achieve these international relations policy goals:

> "*South Africa's international relations policymakers had to reach a general understanding of the issues on which decisions would be based. In bureaucratic terms, this meant the establishment of a clear chain of command in which there would be an acceptance of South Africa's role in the international community, and of the evolving nature of that community*".[470]

In this logic, President Mbeki made several changes to the existing national bureaucracy, which, altogether, resulted in the centralization of the international relations policy decision-making body in the president's office.[471]

These modifications in South Africa's international relations policy have led to the conclusion that Mbeki's international relations policy was driven by realist principles. This view is found in papers written by a number of commentators, including Butler, Hlela, Williams, and Hughes. The former declared that under Thabo Mbeki's tutelage, external strategy has embraced a more pragmatic and limited conception of international politics.[472] Butler argued, when he came to power in 1999, President Mbeki acknowledged the fact that the central problem facing all African states was their progressive marginalization in the international economy.

> "*Economic development elsewhere had lifted hundreds of millions out of the despair of poverty in the past two decades, and could continue to improve the lots of still more numerous millions in China, India and Latin America in coming decades. To prevent this from happening in their borders, African leaders had to adopt policies that could help them to participate in this economic order, to attract investment, to trade, and to become part of the value adding supply chains that makeup the international economy*".

In Butler's opinion, the Mbeki government's actions implied that it had registered this priority and that it had fully embraced the fundamental role of international relations policy, namely advancing business interest. This seems to suggest that for Butler, Mbeki's international relations policy was formulated only in the pursuit or advancement of the country's national interest rather than in the pursuit or advancement of beliefs and core

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[470] G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalisation,* p.300.

[471]G. le Pere & A. van Nieuwkerk. *South Africa and crafting foreign policy in a complex global order: change and continuity,* p. 289.

[472]T. Hughes. *Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and Discord in South African Foreign policymaking,* pp.156-157.

values.[473]

National interest was, according Hlela,[474] the main focus in South Africa's international relations policy under the apartheid regime. At that time, the country's international relations policy also served to further the interest of the West in Africa. When South Africa was emancipated in 1994, the emphasis in Pretoria's international relations policy shifted from Europe to Africa and away from the distant power blocs of the northern hemisphere to the neighbouring states of the southern African region. Accordingly, the government developed an international relations policy reflective of its new political dispensation, an international relations policy that could help it work with, and integrate itself with the rest of Africa. Upon assuming office, Thabo Mbeki adopted the same philosophy as his predecessor. For him, not only was South Africa expected to lead and inspire a renewal of continental fortunes, but it was also expected to play a major part in projecting the cause of the developing world in the Non-Aligned Movement and elsewhere.[475]

Despite these aspirations, though, South Africa's international relations policy under Mbeki was, according to Hlela, still formed by national interest as it was under the apartheid regime.[476] For him, the Mbeki administration's dedication to becoming a real partner in Africa and supporting regional economic development process was purely motivated by economic logic and political solidarity. It was true, he admitted, that there had been instances when South Africa's international relations policy was characterised by in decisiveness, but this, he maintains, could be attributed to different assessments of the country's national interest, assessments which reflect the divergent needs of the component parts of the South African political economy.

Hlela's view point echoed what Mills said. Mills declared that while the Mandela presidency was characterised by the need for reconciliation, transformation, policy development and the blanket policy response of universalism, Mbeki's tenure needed to display less prevarication and more policy implementation.[477] In an era of increasing demands on their time and energies, leadership needed to concentrate their efforts and resources to pursue those issues which best could serve the national interest. In other words, leadership needed to develop an interest-based international relations policy, an international relations policy aimed primarily at economic growth and reducing

[473]A. Butler. *How Democratic Is the African National Congress, Journal of Southern African Studies 31(4),* pp.719-736.

[474] N. Hlela. *Domestic constraints and challenges to South Africa's foreign policy in Africa,* p. 163.

[475]G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalisation,* p. 308.

[476] N. Hlela. *Domestic constraints and challenges to South Africa's foreign policy in Africa,* p. 164.

[477] G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalisation,* p. 350.

unemployment.

The achievement of such goals demanded, as Mills explained, the implementation of strategies geared to taking maximum advantage of South Africa's strengths in the global and regional economies. In the global arena, this amounted to securing access to economic resources and arguing for preferential trade and investment/aid terms. Regional interests hinged on the potential economic value to South Africa of the continent. Knowing that none of these ambitions could be achieved in an environment characterised by instability and economic decline, the new international relations policy making body adopted a new mission statement. This entailed enhancing South Africa's international capability to ensure its sovereignty and security and promote its policies aimed at furthering the African renaissance.

It also included the creation of wealth and the improvement of the quality of life of all its citizens. In this process of revival, President Mbeki underscored the importance of foreign investment and the need to establish conditions enabling long-term investments in the continent. In this way, Mills concluded, rather than relying on African standards and (past) excuses, the renaissance was about making African economies competitive in a global context; it was about making the continent safe to do business. The government's adoption of 'security and wealth creation' as the DFA's new leitmotif and fundamental purpose seems to confirm this belief.

The promotion of '*security and wealth creation*' is amongst the reasons put forward in classifying Mbeki's international relations policy as realist. The primary political dilemma of the ANC involves balancing their commitments to domestic transformation with the pressures of an increasingly globalised economy where the sanctions for stepping out of line ideologically are severe.[478] Integrating South Africa's international relations policy with domestic policies and capabilities was one of the hall marks of the search for a post-Mandela approach to international relations. Although the country dominated the Southern African region economically, in global terms however it remained a middle-income economy with a medium human-development ranking on the UN Development Programme's index. Moreover, since 1994, unemployment rates have grown, social problems such as crime and corruption have increased, and there are serious disparities between the population groups.[479]

In response to these domestic socio-economic challenges, the government adjusted its earlier Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which focused on poverty reduction and meeting basic needs of those most disadvantaged. This led to the adoption in 1996 of a new economic policy named Growth, Employment, and Redistribution

[478]P. Williams. *South African Foreign policy: getting critical, Politikon 27(1),* p. 73.

[479] C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy: From Reconciliation to Revival?* p. 28.

Programme (GEAR). GEAR was aimed to attract foreign investors, stimulate 6% annual growth, and create 400000 jobs a year. In 1999, on coming president Mbeki and his cabinet endorsed the GEAR programme as frame work to deliver their electoral pledges. *"We are absolutely committed to the implementation of the plan, simply because there are no viable alternatives"*, Mbeki said.[480]

The shift from RDP to GEAR had significant implications for South Africa's international relations policy, since getting the economic fundamentals right implied to improve global competitiveness and export efficiency as well as inspire confidence amongst foreign investors.[481]These two authors comment that under Mbeki, the government decided to engage more earnestly and vigorously with the forces of globalisation as a means of improving economic growth, generating employment and addressing in equality. In this sense, GEAR was seen as key for achieving the developmental goals that, for a variety of reasons, the RDP had failed to deliver.

Towards this end, the DFA distilled the government's commitments down to two primary objectives: security and wealth creation. The former was to be achieved through the promotion of compliance with international law and active engagement in conflict resolution, the latter through a co-ordinated approach to globalisation, the enhancement of South Africa's image abroad, and vigorous pursuit of trade and investment (Department of Foreign Affairs, Thematic Reviews/Strategic Planning.[482]As the Director-General of foreign affairs, Jackie Selebi, argued in 1999, the idea was to make South Africa's international relations policy "predictable" and not one that suggested we collide with events.[483]The promotion of 'security and wealth creation' by the DFA is viewed by Paul Williams as the government's approval of the principles enshrined in the realist paradigm. He points out two main reasons to justify his position. First, related to security, Williams[484] observed the remained notable reliance on the '*national interest*', '*regional threats*', and a militaristic approach to peace keeping and conflict resolution.

Against this back drop, there remained, as Williams remarked, a heavy emphasis on addressing, and preparing for, military combat. From Williams, one can conclude that the government's approach to security was based on the realist principle of self-help. As mentioned in chapter two, realists believe that the anarchic character of international system leads to a competition of one against all. Considering the survival of the state as the most

[480]T. Corrigan. *Mbeki: His time has come. An introduction to South Africa's new President,* p. 42.

[481]C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy: From Reconciliation to Revival?* pp. 28-29.

[482]Ibid.

[483] G. Mills. *The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign policy and Globalisation,* p. 300.

[484] P. Williams. *South African Foreign policy: getting critical, Politikon 27(1),* p. 78.

important thing, they maintain that material power, particularly military force, should be the main concern of the state.

With regard to wealth creation, Williams argued:

> "*official appeals to focus on wealth generation have been widely interpreted as meaning that international relations policy makers should listen more intently to the voices of (both foreign and local) big business than other groups. The positions advocated by South Africa's largest corporations and their numerous intellectual apologists have often been interpreted as being synonymous with the best route to wealth creation*".[485]

This suggested the general trend amongst the new international relations policy makers was to view international relations policy as interest-based. This was confirmed by Hlela[486] who maintained the business community too played a significant role under President Mbeki in the formulation of international relations policy.

As an example to illustrate this, he citeted the case of the DRC:

> "*DFA had to walk the tight rope of not appearing to compromise its role as a disinterested peace facilitator, but still to give South African companies...the necessary back-up to secure their interests*".

This is furthermore stressed by Moeletse Mbeki and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos[487] who declared that in today's world of global interdependence, the national interest (to make a better life for all and more specifically in the South Africa case to create more jobs, more prosperity and less poverty) was about the pursuit of economic interests at the regional and international level. In the South African context, economic interests, they concluded, manifest themselves as the interests of business–both big and small.

An understanding of South Africa's international relations policy under Thabo Mbeki also requires an understanding of the institution in charge of its formulation. Hughes[488] declares that one of the defining issues of the Mbeki presidency, and one that was core to an

[485] Ibid. p. 79.

[486] N. Hlela. *Domestic constraints and challenges to South Africa's foreign policy in Africa,* p. 166.

[487] E. Sidiropoulous. *Post-Mbeki, Post-Transition: South African Foreign policy in a changing world,* p. 2.

[488] T. Hughes. *Composers, conductors and players: Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making,* p. 15.

understanding of the conduct of key areas of South Africa's international relations policy, was the strengthening of the office of the State President. As noted above, in order to achieve the country's new goals, South Africa's international relations policy makers had to reach a general understanding of the issues upon which decisions would be based. This necessitated the establishment of a new international relations policy team. Towards this end, President Mbeki made a number of changes that resulted in the centralisation of the international relations policy decision-making body in the president's office.

It could be argued that the above seems to suggest that the general trend amongst analysts was to view Mbeki's international relations policy as mainly pragmatist-driven. This justifies an attempt to address the question whether the policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' towards Zimbabwe confirmed this view.

6.4 Interpreting 'Quiet Diplomacy' Policy towards Zimbabwe

The economic and political crisis that Zimbabwe is facing currently has reached a nun bearable point. More intolerable has been South African former President Thabo Mbeki's refusal to express disapproval of Robert Mugabe's growing authoritarianism and escalating violations of human rights. This raises questions related to how can one explain President Mbeki's policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' towards Zimbabwe and whether this policy was in line with the general thrust of his pragmatist-driven international relations policy.

Thabo Mbeki and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe at a rally in Harare
Source: Antonio Milena/ABr. 27.Oct.2003. - History of Apartheid in South Africa

The occupation by war veterans of white-owned farms in February 2000 initiated a series of events leading up to the elections in June 2000. The outcome of the March 2000 referendum on constitutional reforms also contributed to events leading up to Zimbabwe's

troubled election. After the referendum, a series of economic and political crises erupted.[489] Upset and fearing for his power, President Mugabe turned to violence. Since then, the country descended into decay, reducing the electorate to poor, starving, desperate people; easy to manipulate and overwhelm. The desperate population was mobilized into hate and destruction. Freedom was no more and violence on the farms increased.

Democracy was trodden under the feet of people, a '*third force'*, resourced and directed to inflict crude justice, by kidnapping, beating, killing, torture, harassment of civilians or anybody who did not support and shout praises for Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF. Poverty, a destroyed economy, hunger and a bleak future drove many out of the country, including investors, doctors, nurses and professionals in all fields. Sovereignty became a license to force Zimbabwean people into subjugation, using *'third force'* operating under the police, army and CIO (Central Intelligence Organisation).[490]

In 2002, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Common wealth on charges of its human rights abuses. This decision, however, was not supported unanimously. South African President, Thabo Mbeki, appealed to the Common wealth to end Zimbabwe's suspension. Instead, President Mbeki and his cabinet opted for what they called '*quiet diplomacy* 'to deal with the political situation in Zimbabwe. Since then, South Africa's image has suffered because of its alleged failure in respect to the situation in Zimbabwe. This brings us to the question of how to interpret Mbeki's policy of '*quiet diplomacy'* towards Zimbabwe.

South Africa's decision to pursue a policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' should be understood within the context of Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance. Under President Mbeki, the idea of the African Renaissance became an important pillar of South Africa's international relations policy and a key orientation of his administration. As a international relations policy principle, Schraeder[491] declared, the African Renaissance stressed the centrality of the African continent in South African international relations policy, and outlined the critical role of South Africa as an intermediary between the African continent and leading foreign powers in the rest of the world.

Of all the crises facing southern Africa, that in Zimbabwe most directly affected South Africa's immediate interests and longer-term ambitious for continental leadership. Bound by geography, history and economics, the mounting political and economic calamities in Zimbabwe challenged the government in Pretoria to a greater degree than any other international relations policy issue. Pretoria's policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' was designed to induce Mugabe to change his policies. It was informed by the principle of '*constructive*

[489] J. A. Van Wyk. *Quiet Diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument: South Africa's response to the Zimbabwe issue,* p. 95.

[490] L. Zunga. *Farm Invasion in Zimbabwe Democracy?* p. 7.

[491] P. J. Schraeder. *South Africa's foreign policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance,* p. 233.

engagement'.[492] The principle of '*constructive engagemen*t' assumed that governments were more likely to reform if they were treated with a mixture of contact and limited sanctions, rather than a blanket boycott or embargo. [493]

In this logic, in 1998, answering a question about the conferral of honors on foreign leaders whose human rights records were allegedly dubious, President Mbeki said:

> "*The government is of the opinion that the most effective and constructive way to address human rights issues is to develop a result-oriented policy that promotes critical dialogue and not confrontation*" .[494]

With regard to the Zimbabwean crisis, his foreign minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, declared:

> "*Zimbabwe remains of great concern to us. We have to continue to engage the Zimbabwean government whilst pointing out firmly and frankly where we disagree with them. We have a responsibility to avoid complete collapse and not to make things worse for ordinary Zimbabweans. All of us can help to appoint but it is the Zimbabweans that must surely take final decisions…South Africa must continue to act in a way that maintains that flickering hope of transforming dreams into reality rather than get short term praise that does not solve the problem. In the same way that Lockerbie impasse was unlocked by engaging the Libyans and not condemning them. We were condemned at the time but we persevered until a solution was found*".[495]

Despite its limited leverage over Zimbabwe, the South African governments ought to mobilize diplomacy and economic instruments to bring about a resolution to the crisis. Isolating and acting against Mugabe, whose behavior as a rogue player within SADC threatened the organisation's unity, was not seen by Mbeki to be a viable option.[496] Towards this end, Alden and le Pere added, the Mbeki administration

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[492]C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post- Apartheid Foreign policy: Reconciliation to Revival?* p. 48.

[493]A. Johnston. *Democracy and Human rights in the Principles and Practice of South Africa,* p. 21.

[494] T. Corrigan. *Mbeki: His time has come: An introduction to South Africa's new President,* p. 42.

[495] J. A. Van Wyk. *Quiet Diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument: South Africa's response to the Zimbabwe issue,* p. 111.

[496]C. Alden & G. le Pere. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign policy: Reconciliation to Revival?* p. 48.

> "*ensured that the Zimbabwean economy continued to function through, for example, extra ordinary extensions of credit in key sectors such as power, where its parastatal company, Eskom supplied the bulk of Zimbabwe's needs. Pretoria also acted as intermediary between the Bretton Woods institutions and Harare, and represented the concerns of both the government and business*".

However, the various attempts made by South Africa to promote dialogue between ZANU-PF and the MDC turned out to be unsuccessful. Zimbabwe plunged further into state-sponsored anarchy. As food shortages climbed and the potential for widespread famine increased, Zimbabweans became more and more frustrated over what they perceived as South Africa's complicity with Mugabe's government.[497] Moreover, Zimbabweans perceived South Africa's acceptance of the 2002 presidential elections as a tacit endorsement of Mugabe's violent actions.[498]Mbeki's failure to publicly condemn Mugabe and his public appearance, standing hand-in-hand with him, raised questions about the exact goals of South Africa's policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' and also strengthened domestic and international opinions that Mbeki was condoning Mugabe's actions.[499]

In order to attempt an understanding of Mbeki's policy of '*quiet diplomac*y', the constructivist approach to international relations could be employed. Arguably, norms were to be afforded an important role to the understanding of the world. They helped define situations and hence influence international practice in a very significant way. Constructivism would help us to comprehend the situation that South Africa was facing, with regard to the political crisis in Zimbabwe. The introduction of new norms such as the respect of human rights and democracy, which originated from western culture, went against some of the well-established norms in Africa, namely sovereignty and the fact to '*not speaking out against each other*'[500] ,or the idea of African solidarity.

This, in turn, placed South Africa in a very difficult situation and undermined President Mbeki's efforts to handle the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Framing new norms was essential to overcoming extrinsic and intrinsic constraints , but, as Vander Westhuizen[501]

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[497]Ibid.

[498]J. Hamil. *South Africa's Regional Security,* p.56.

[499] A. Johnston. *Democracy and Human rights in the Principles and Practice of South Africa,* p.78.

[500]J. Vander Westhuizen. *How Not To sell Big Ideas: Argument, Identity, and Nepad,* p. 30.

[501]J. Vander Westhuizen. *How Not To sell Big Ideas: Argument, Identity, and Nepad,* p. 40.

pointed out, the minimum extrinsic requirement was that an argument be heard (securing an audience and assuring the credibility of the institution that advocates the norm), and intrinsic barriers included the fit with dominant belief systems, notions of identity and social institutions. This explained why constructivists believed that international organizations were important vehicles for teaching and diffusing norms that help constitute the national interests of states that adopt these norms.[502]

African leaders' failure to condemn President Mugabe's growing authoritarianism and human rights abuses is a testimony that Africa, on the whole, is not ready yet to adopt these new norms of human rights. This could also explain why President Mandela's call for tougher sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria in 1995 was not heeded; instead, his failure to galvanise support from other African leaders damaged the country's prestige and national pride, and cast it as 'pro-Western' and 'un-African' in the eyes of other African states.[503]

As van der Westhuizen[504] noted, "*new norms will be adopted only if (the) proposed norm better fits with the kind of people that they are or would like to see themselves as*". The case of Zimbabwe, together with many others, shows that the African states still have along way to go before they accept the respect of human rights and democracy as principles of governance.

Seen from this perspective, Mbeki's policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' towards Zimbabwe appears to have been totally in contradiction with the general thrust of his pragmatist-driven international relations policy. International relations policy issues such as Zimbabwe occupied a particular significant place for business given its investment in the region, especially given the impact of the Zimbabwean contagion effect and the fact that business was itself constantly questioned about South Africa's policy towards Zimbabwe by their international counter parts.[505] Under Mbeki, the view of business was not always taken into consideration. With regard to the crisis in Zimbabwe, for example, the South Africa Foundation issued a press release in which it declared the following:

> "*The South Africa Foundation calls for the unequivocal condemnation of the violent and destructive economic and political policies of the government of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe…As host of the UN Summit and co-founder of*

[502] E. Adler. *Constructivism and International Relations,* p. 103.

[503] G. Oliver & D. Geldenhuys. *South Africa's Foreign policy: From Idealism to Pragmatism, Business and the Contemporary World 9(2),* p. 372.

[504] J. Vander Westhuizen. *How Not To sell Big Ideas: Argument, Identity, and Nepad,* p.30.

[505] T. Hughes. *Composers, conductors and players: Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making,* p. 39.

> *NEPAD, South Africa must dissociate itself clearly and unambiguously from the disastrous policies being applied in Zimbabwe and reaffirm the rights and values enshrined in our own constitution. It is now clear that no external engagement with the government of Zimbabwe has prevented the implementation of catastrophic policies under the guise of land reform. Following the appeal by UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, concerted action is now required, in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe, the region as a whole and in order to enhance the goals of NEPAD*" .[506]

In Hughes's opinion, this statement represented evidence of the fact that the business view point was not positively responded to or that Mbeki's policy of '*quiet diplomacy*' towards Zimbabwe was fundamentally at odds with the views and interests of South African business. By issuing this press release, Hughes went on, the South Africa Foundation wanted to put pressure on Zimbabwe, but also, and more importantly, on the South African government and the President in particular to seize the moment, set a precedent and distance the country from the policies of the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government.

6.5 Conclusion

It could be concluded that South Africa's international relations policy during the epoch 1999-2008 was far from being pragmatist-driven as it seemed at first glance. The primary political dilemma facing the ANC during the epoch 1999-2008involved balancing their commitments to domestic transformation with the pressure of an-increasingly globalized economy. In order to guarantee the country's interests internationally and provide good service delivery at home, the post-Mandela government adopted in 1999 a new integrated planning framework to guide the strategic national priorities identified by the executive. This resulted not only in the formulation of the DFA's vision and mission statement, but also in the organization of the institution in charge of international relations policy formulation. Altogether, these transformations led to the conclusion that South Africa's international relations policy was mainly pragmatist-driven. As highlighted by the Zimbabwe case study, however, a closer look at some of his actions reveals that President Mbeki's actions can also be conceived through a constructivist lenses.

[506]T. Hughes. *Composers, conductors and players: Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making,* p. 40.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

With the intention of observing how South Africa manifested its international relations policy objectives within its multilateral activity and behaviour, this research study made use of secondary and primary material. Secondary material consisted of scholarly writing on the subject of apartheid South Africa's international relations policy. Primary material consisted of government policies, speeches from key international relations policy role-players within the South African government.

Policies and speeches were analyzed to determine trends in South Africa's international relations policy orientation during the period under study. Further, a simplified use of historical/comparative data analysis was undertaken with regards to South Africa's international relations policies through an examination of official documents such as charters and policy statements.

A final aspect of analysis entailed an investigation of the change in international relations policy between 1990-1999 and 1999-2008 period, and how that affected the country's international relations behaviour. This form of trend study - noting change in the pursuit of international relations policy objectives at different times –enabled conclusions to be drawn about the intentions and positions of major individual political figures, and the ramifications these bore.

South African leaders were of wildly different stripes in regard to how they made international relations policy, making generalities difficult. Thus, South African leaders who had significant personal interest in international relations policy (Verwoerd and Mbeki in particular) played a far more dominant role in the making of international relations policy than those who were not. On the other hand, the head of government with the least personal interest, Strijdom, was by a long shot the leader who most directly delegated international relations policy.

It could be concluded that those who portrayed South Africa's international relations policy during transition (1994-1998) as idealist advanced a simplistic understanding of what was a much complex, at times contradictory international relations policy. It is true that during transition, South Africa did have an international relations policy that was on paper idealist-driven. However, a closer look at some of his actions such as the' two Chinas' policy revealed a number of inconsistencies which made the classification of him as either idealist or realist

difficult. Addressing the seemingly contradictory international relations policy priorities became an overriding objective of the epoch of pragmatism.

The primary political dilemma facing the ANC during the epoch 1999-2008 involved balancing their commitments to domestic transformation with the pressure of an-increasingly globalized economy. In order to guarantee the country's interests internationally and provide good service delivery at home, the post-Mandela government adopted in 1999 a new integrated planning framework to guide the strategic national priorities identified by the executive.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire initiated at: _____

Questionnaire completed at: _____

INTRODUCTION

This questionnaire is in respect of a study whose purpose is to interrogate the international relations policies of South Africa till 2008, the constitutional and legalistic framework of international relations' policy making, assessing to what extent South Africa allowed for broad-based policy inputs.

The study is to be conducted by *Simangele Monica Maphumulo* of the History Department, Faculty of Arts at the University of Zululand. *Miss Maphumulo* is conducting this study towards a Master of Arts Degree. Thus, responses to this questionnaire will help in providing concrete information on the subject matter.

You are asked to complete this questionnaire because you are a citizen /residence in the area of study (South Africa). Your participation in this research questionnaire is voluntary but of great importance to its success. Your decision about whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher. Answering these questions will help you identify some tedious issues besides giving you the opportunity to state your opinions.

Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you give will be confidential. Note, however, that there are no rights or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Before we begin do you have any questions?

Section A:

1. Province of Origin _____
2. Province of Residence_____
3. Area of Residence _____

4. Sex: Male Female

5. How old are you? _____

6. What is your highest formal education attained?

    a) Primary School
    b) High School
    c) Collage
    d) University
    e) Others specify _____

7. What is your present occupation?

    a. Farming
    b. Civil servant
    c. Trading
    d. Business men/women
    e. Others Specify_____

8. What is your marital status?

    a. Married
    b. Single
    c. Divorce
    d. Widow

Section B:

1. What do you understand by the concept ‘international relations’?

Answer:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

2. Do you understand the differences between external affairs and international relations?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

3. What do you understand by South Africa's International Relations' Policy during the Period of Transition (1994-1999)?

_____
_____
_____
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_____
_____

4. Share your views on South Africa's International Relations in the Epoch of Pragmatism (1999-2008).

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

5. How would you describe South Africa's International Relations during varying Presidencies since 1948?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

6. Would you endorse a view that various regime types and leadership characterised and shaped South Africa's international relations policies since 1948?

    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. Not so sure
    d. Not at all

7. Do you think that the period 1994-1999 witnessed the culmination of South African re-engagement efforts?

    a. Yes
    b. No

c. Not so sure
d. Not at all

8. What was the nature of South Africa's international relations' policy from the rule of the National Party in 1948 until the banning of the ANC in 1990?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

9. Was South Africa's international relations' policy making democratic during transition epoch, and to what extent was it open to outside participation?

a. Yes
b. No

10. If yes, please explain

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Thank you.

APPENDIX B

Similarity Index	Similarity by Source
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Turnitin Originality Report

The International Relations Policies of South Africa, 1960-1990

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   " Foreign policy in a New Democratic South Africa: A Discussion Paper, ANC Department of International Affairs, (October 1993)"
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    Venter, D., (2001), "South African Foreign policy Decision-making in the African Context," in African Foreign Policies, Power and Process, edited by Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
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    http://smeonline.biz/boi-to-provide-traditional-support-for-smes-operators/
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APPENDIX C

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
(Reg No: UZREC 171110-030)

RESEARCH & INNOVATION
Website: http://www.unizulu.ac.za
Private Bag X1001
KwaDlangezwa 3886
Tel•. 035 902 6731
Fax: 035 902 6222
Email: DlelanaM@unizulu.ac.za

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

Certificate Number	UZREC 171110-030 PGM 2019/41							
Project Title	THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-2008							
Principal Researcher/ Investigator	Simangele M. Maphumulo							
Supervisor and Cosupervisor	Dr M.Z Shamase							
Department	History							
Faculty	Arts							
Type of Risk	Med Risk — Data collection from people							
Nature of Project	Honours/4th Year		Master's	x	Doctoral		Departmental	

The University of Zululand's Research Ethics Committee (UZREC) hereby gives ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project, The Researcher may therefore commence with data collection as from the date of this Certificate, using the certificate number indicated above.

Special conditions:

(1) This certificate is valid for 1 year from the date of issue.
(2) Principal researcher must provide an annual report to the UZREC in the prescribed format [due date-24 September 2020)
(3) Principal researcher must submit a report at the end of project in respect of ethical comptlance.
(4) The UZREC must be informed immediately of any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the documents that were presented to the meeting.

The UZREC wishes the researcher well in conducting research.

APPENDIX D: PARTICIPANT INFORMED CONSENT DECLARATION

Project Title:

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-2008

Simangele Monica Maphumulo, from the Department of History, University of Zululand, has requested my permission to participate in the above-mentioned research project.

The nature and the purpose of the research project and of this informed consent declaration have been explained to me in a language that I understand.

I am aware that:

1. The purpose of this research is to: (a) examine the issue of participatory, or "democratic," international relations' policy making through the lens of International Relations Policy Analysis (IFPA), a theoretical approach that will help provide the definitional framework for the study. (b) analyze South Africa's international relations' policy making processes between 1990 and 2008, (c)

2. The University of Zululand has given ethical clearance to this research project and I may request to see the clearance certificate.

3. By participating in this research project I will be contributing towards: (a) understanding (with empirical evidences) the constitutional and legalistic framework of South Africa's international relations' policy making process. (b) the degree to which South Africa's international relations' policy making was democratic and open to outside participation.

4. I will participate in the project by: (a) employing 'historical research methods' which will facilitate an intelligible account on South Africa's international relations' policy making process during the period in question. (b) making observations through the use of interview sheets. (c) observing oral interviews with selected individuals.

5. My participation is entirely voluntary and should I at any stage wish to withdraw from participating further, I may do so without any negative consequences.

6. I will not be compensated for participating in the research, but my out-of-pocket expenses will be reimbursed.

7. There are no risks associated with my participation in the project.

8. The researcher intends publishing the research results in the form of a dissertation/academic article(s), or as a conference paper(s). However, confidentiality and anonymity of records will be maintained and that my name and identity (should I request so) will not be revealed to anyone who has not been involved in the conduct of the research.

9. I will/may not receive feedback regarding the findings of the research.

10. Any further question that I might have concerning the research or my participation will be answered by:

Researcher: Simangele Monica Maphumulo, Department of History, University of Zululand: +27746210260 SA; +27359026769;

monicasimangelemaphumulo@gmail.com

Supervisor: Dr. M.Z. Shamase, Department of History, University of Zululand: +27727676764; shamasem@unizulu.ac.za

11. By signing this informed consent declaration I am not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies.

12. A copy of this informed consent declaration will be given to me, and the original will be kept on record.

I, ... have read the above information and I am aware of this document's contents. I have asked all questions that I wished to ask and they have been answered to my satisfaction. I fully understand what is expected of me during the research.

I have not been pressurised in any way and I voluntarily agree to participate in the above-mentioned project.

....

Participant signature Date