FACTION FIGHTING IN MSINGA DISTRICT FROM 1874 TO 1906

BY

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A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts in the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS

in the

Department of History

at the

University of Zululand

Kwa - Dlangezwa

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OCTOBER 1994
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A Quotation

"This world is a comedy to those that think, and a tragedy to those that feel."
- Horace Walpole
DECLARATION

I declare that: *Faction Fighting in Msinga District from 1874 to 1906* is a product of my own effort, both in conception and execution, and all sources I have used have been appropriately acknowledged.

B.L. Mthembu

21 October 1994

Kwa-Dlangezwa
CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY AND ABBREVIATIONS:

1. Inkosi - Chief
2. Ubukhosi - chieftainship
3. Isizwe - tribe/nation
4. Umuzi - homestead
5. Indlu - hut
6. Impi - army
7. Umsindo - wedding, marriage ceremony
8. Induna - headman
9. Isigodi - ward
10. Inxiwa - deserted homestead
11. Ubhoko - blocking stick
12. Induku - striking stick
13. Inwumulo - attie

ABBREVIATIONS:

1. AG - Attorney General
2. CNC - Chief Native Commissioner
3. MJ - Minister of Justice
4. MNA - Minister for Native Affairs
5. NP - Natal Police
6. SNA - Secretary for Native Affairs
7. RM - Resident Magistrate
8. Ref- Reference
9. USNA - Under Secretary for Native Affairs
10. UMS - Msinga
11. p. page
ABSTRACT

Faction fighting in Msinga started because of the shortage of land in this division. The oldest residents of the valley, the Sithole, aMachunu and aBathembu lived together very peacefully. Trouble started after the Colonial Government's demarcation of the valley into a reserve. Hundreds of people driven away from various parts of Natal arrived. These people had been removed from their areas because the Government needed those areas for settling white colonists.

This part of Natal is arid, hilly and rocky. As a result, subsistence economy in the form of agriculture declined to a very large extent. The Government had no economic policy for these people. Starvation soon made the izizwe of the valley restless. Their amakhosi could not help them in any way. Eventually, it was a question of everyone struggling for survival.

It was, for instance, not possible for aMabaso to live in peace with aBathembu because their location was completely surrounded by that of aBathembu. Inkosi Mganu Mvelase of aBathembu was not a war-like ruler but his neighbour, Inkosi Thulwana Ndabezitha of aMabaso had many grievances regarding land. In the long run, these amakhosi became enemies. Their izizwe started trying to push each other out of the reserve. When the two izizwe were up in arms against each other, it was the beginning of a tragedy for the whole division. Faction fighting that broke out between the two izizwe gave birth to the rest of the wars and the lamentable system of alliances.
The attitude of the white civil servants towards Inkosi Kula Majozzi worsened the state of the reserve. The enmity between the Sithole and aMaqamu was further aggravated by the partition of aMaqamu location after the deposition and exile of Inkosi Kula. The Government also proved to be inconsiderate of the feelings of aMaqamu by putting some of them under Inkosi Sibindi of aMabomvu. The Government was fully aware of the enmity between the two izizwe. Some of aMaqamu found themselves under Inkosi Bhande Sithole. When Inkosi Kula was reinstated, these people made a lot of noise demanding to be under their own inkosi.

Fighting subsided in 1906, but that did not mean that the Government had succeeded in stopping faction fighting in the reserve. This was proved by the outbreaks of devastating wars between aBathembu and aMachunu in 1922 and 1944.

The main significance of faction fighting is that it affects all aspects of life of the people involved. It is still very difficult to develop these victims economically and even educationally.

The easy availability of guns has made matters far worse, even in the absence of a faction fight. Young men, most of whom with no formal schooling, easily get trapped in hooliganism. Employment chances are always slim. There are absolutely no activities to keep these young people occupied. They openly live by crime. To most of them, stealing is the way of life. They are used as hired killers only to meet the same fate themselves eventually. Even those who have access to arable land, show no interest in
cultivating the soil. These wasted children have no way of making themselves economically productive. They are a burden to themselves and to the Government. Their built-in culture of fighting, has taught them to look down upon any man who does not possess a gun. Such a man is derogatorily referred to as a woman.

When a faction fight breaks out, schools are usually disturbed because boys are bound to join their ward male members. They remain in hiding, preparing for attack or counter-attack, until fighting is over. Should fighting intensify, schools stop functioning altogether. Many boys leave school in such circumstances.

The question that remains now is, who or what will stop the war in Msinga? Unless a solution is found, to remedy the situation and restore dignity to these people, the future of Msinga will remain bleak.
INGQIKITHI
IZIMPI ZEMIBANGO EMSINGA 1874 - 1906


Kwabesekudaleka isimo lapho zonke izizwe zakha imifelandawonye yomhlathi owazanayo. Yawuchitha-ke lapho umuthi inkonyane.


Okuyikhona kusemqoka kakhulu ngezimpi ezingumbelebele, yikuthi zithinta yonke imikhakha yempilo yalababantu. Kuselukhuni kwatshe nanje ukuthuthukisa lababantu ngakwezomnotho nezemfundu.

Ukubayinala kwezibhamu kwasicekela phansi isimo kulendawo. Iningi lamabhungu angakaze alubhade esikoleni, azithola esephenduke


Usamile-ke umbuzo othi ngubani oyoqeda, noma yini eyoqeda impi eMsinga? Ngaphandle kokuba kutholakale ikhambi lokudala isimo esiyiso, nokubuyisela isithunzi kulababantu, kuyohlala kuxabene ubendle eMsinga.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research is not to study faction fighting per se, but to make an effort to identify and reveal some aspects of life that might have been frustrated to such a degree that order was totally upset in this part of Natal.

A planned and systematic approach to the social, economic and cultural life of the inhabitants of Msinga has been a strong recommendation during this study. This would apparently bring about a more meaningful contribution towards introducing acceptable standards of living in Msinga. Various sections of concerned people have made efforts towards improving the quality of life in this district. That should be applauded, but the unfortunate truth is that the inhabitants of Msinga still have their built-in culture of war.

This study tries to show that History as a subject is highly relevant to the life in the community. Every student of History must regard himself as a nation builder who has a heavy task of understanding the future needs of his own nation as well as human nature at large. It is unwise to draw up plans for the future of the people without first studying their origin and identifying the events of the past that have shaped them up. The discussion therefore indicated that faction fighting in Msinga is one of the heritages of a policy made by a government that had little if any respect for a certain section of its population.
The Colonial Rule's highest priority was to settle its white citizens in the most comfortable way. The Zulu people only happened to be a factor affecting the life of the white community. For that reason, they remained subjects rather than citizens of the British Empire. Being people of no value, they were denied any substantial governmental investment for their prosperity.
CHAPTER 1
THE DEMARCATION OF MSINGA AS A NATIVE RESERVE

The name Msinga refers to the Mpofana-Thukela-Mzinyathi Valley. It is derived from Msinga Mountain which lies between the Thukela and Mzinyathi (Buffalo) Rivers. It means a place of open clearness 1). When the Commission of 1846 recommended the division of Natal into eight Magisterial Districts with the so-called Native Reserves, Msinga was made one of those reserves 2). Msinga Division comes from what was initially Mzinyathi and Mpofana Rural Locations formally established in 1849 3).

Before going deep into the life in Msinga, it would be essential to indicate how Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the then Secretary for Native Affairs, was going to govern the Zulu people in the locations. A little amount of light could be shed by showing clearly his system in the colony of Natal as a whole 4). He had to subjugate the Zulu people by employing magistrates who were to control amakhosi. These magistrates were supposed to teach the Zulu people industrious habits 5). The Commission of 1846 had however stated that thousands of Zulu people in Natal were living without any law operating effectively among them.

For this reason, missionaries, teachers and Zulu policemen under the

Sketch map illustrating the beginning of the location system in 1849.

supervision of white officers were needed. This scheme was rejected by the
Colonial Office as it would involve a lot of expenditure on the part of the
government 6). In that way this civilising policy failed before it was even
attempted. The locations that were marked were insufficient because many
Zulu people were driven out of their indigenous territories that were given
to white farmers 7). Crown lands and some farms that were not yet occupied
by white farmers were to be used to settle some Zulu people.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone had to settle these people and find a way of
governing them in a different way from the British law. He formed a pyramid
of authority consisting of a layer of British judicial and administrative
machinery on top of pre-colonial Zulu institutions 8).

"Because they could not be driven out of the country, some provision had to be
made for governing them. A commission which was appointed for that purpose
realized that one system of laws could not be adopted because the Zulus did not
understand British law. And owing to the lack of funds, the commission was obliged
to recommend the recognition of Bantu usages and laws, as well as the restoration
of the authority of tribal chiefs and tribal organization" 9).

That is how D.J.P. Haasbroek puts it.

The problem was that what the authorities regarded as "Native Law" only
meant those common practices of the indigenous peoples of Natal 10). No
magistrate had studied them systematically and they were not even written
down. Izinduna (headmen) were at the lowest level of the pyramid. It was

Natal and Zululand From The Earliest Times to 1910, p.171.

7. Natal Blue Book on Native Affairs 1879-1892, Magistrate's reports Division of Weenen,
1880, p.102.

Natal and Zululand From the Earliest Times to 1910, p. 171. cf. P. Maylam: A History of
the African People of South Africa, p.84.

9. D.J.P. Haasbroek: Natal's Opposition To Separate Representation For Coloureds During

not always clear which cases were to be treated by izinduna, amakhosi and magistrates. One of the major flaws of this system was its autocratic nature, as the Secretary for Native Affairs himself, the Lieutenant-Governor and the Legislative Council made laws by decrees 11). This rule later proved to lead to many irregularities. What white authorities called Native Law was something the Zulu people themselves could not understand.

Economic pressures were also created when the government introduced taxes such as hut tax, marriage registration and divorce fees 12). Taxation was another way of forcing the Zulu people to look for employment on the colonists’ farms. They had been driven out of the arable land that was given to the white colonists 13). They had to come back from the reserves as labourers. In this way the white colonists were sure of labour. That is why the locations came to be regarded as labour reservoirs for white colonists 14). At the same time the white colonists were not satisfied with the location system as they felt,

"Zulus could only be persuaded to work if they were ejected from the locations.” 15).

It was this way of thinking that made them believe that the reserves were too big. They needed more land and more labour for themselves.

“Colonists recommended that the boundaries of the newly created locations be

11. Ibid.
drastically changed in order to provide them with more land and labourers” 16).

Sir Theophilus Shepstone did not share this opinion with the farmers. He was fully aware of the fact that there was already a land shortage among the Zulu people as most land formerly in their possession had been given to the colonists. He was also aware of the chaos the Zulu people could cause by illegally moving from one place to another in search of land. In trying to perfect his administration through amakhosi, Sir Theophilus Shepstone introduced a system of non-hereditary ubukhosi (chieftainship) 17). This was a system by which the government could appoint amakhosi.

“The newly appointed artificial chiefs were essentially intended to serve as agents of the colonial administration. The traditional chiefly powers were severely circumscribed and recalcitrant chiefs could be punished under the Shepstonian System” 18).

That is how,

“Ngoza kaLudaba of the Majozi clan, Shepstone’s chief headman,”

because of his loyalty to Sir Theophilus Shepstone became an inkosi of an isizwe also created by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, aMaqamu in 1869 19).

But.

“Chiefs who did in fact revolt, as Sodoyi and Matyana did in 1857, lost their Chieftainship.” 20).

He wanted all the Zulu people to live strictly under identifiable amakhosi on specified lands. When he was not sure about a certain ubukhosi, he

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17. G.A. Chadwick and E.G. Hobson: The Zulu War and the Colony of Natal, p. 109
19. M.M. Fuze: The Black People and Whence they came, p. 102
20. C.F.J. Muller: 500 Years A History of South Africa, p.216
would promote any commoner loyal to him. This was a very strange system to the Zulu people. That is why these new amakhosi were defiantly referred to as “unborn” amakhosi 21). Sir Theophilus Shepstone did this because he believed that he would get a system whereby any Zulu wishing to move, would be required to obtain a pass signed by the local magistrate 22). Still in this great illusion, Sir Theophilus Shepstone introduced what he called “Tribal Responsibility”. This meant that an inkosi and his own isizwe were to be held jointly responsible for the conduct of a member or members 23). If for instance the inkosi failed to bring the culprit to the Colonial Government for trial, the whole isizwe could eventually endure some form of punishment. These amakhosi did not unite the Zulu people, instead they further fragmented communities. They only made worse the problem of land disputes and faction fighting 24). The magistrates also found it difficult to hold amakhosi responsible for crimes committed by their subjects who lived far away from them.

It was a usual practice that individual people lived in territories belonging to another isizwe, but had come to khonza (ask for a site on which to reside), some were on the land they regarded as their forefathers’ land but did not recognize the local inkosi for many possible reasons 25). Others were in

the habit of moving farther and farther away from their theoretical amakhosi while in search of grazing land, wages and markets 26). Faced with this glaring state of affairs and short of staff, Sir Theophilus Shepstone learnt to ignore many illegal deeds except those that in his opinion, challenged the Colonial Government.

It was under such confusing circumstances that Msinga was declared a reserve. Mzinyathi Location was the area between Mzinyathi (Buffalo) and Thukela Rivers. The area immediately south of the Thukela River was called Mpofana Location 27). The Mzinyathi Location was under the Klip River Magisterial District, while Mpofana was placed under Weenen. This division of the reserve was extremely arbitrary and purely for purposes of administration 28). These izizwe in the reserves were basically the same people (Zulu). They had been in this valley for many years. The main izizwe lived in both locations. According to the arrangement of 1849, the izizwe that formed the Mzinyathi location, were aMabomvu, aBathembu, aMabaso, Sithole and in 1869 aMaqamu (Majozi).

All these people regarded themselves as independent izizwe. Their rulers enjoyed the status of traditional leaders 29). The aMachunu who were

29. Ibid.
regarded as the only residents of Mpolana location, also regarded themselves
as an independent izizwe while at the same time they had a lot of aMabomvu
and aBathembu among them 30). There was really no purpose to be served by dividing this reserve into two,
as far as administration was concerned. Sir Theophilus Shepstone did not
know that clan names consisting of izibongo (surnames) do not reflect the
real composition of izizwe (tribes) 31). He was also under the impression
that Zulu people always lived within strict jurisdiction of their local
amakhosi. It was for this reason that Captain Struben (Situlubezi), Resident
Magistrate of Klip River found it easy to make a rough allocation of land
for all the izizwe in the reserve in 1849 32.) He was only guided by the
numerical strength of the izizwe in that particular area.

For purposes of administration his allocation served very little. The
aBathembu, for instance, were scattered all over the place as one of the
oldest groups in the valley and wielding almost unchallenged political power
33). There was no strict definition of boundaries between the izizwe in the
reserve. The allocation of Captain Struben did however imply boundaries.
His division was as follows:

Sketch map showing Captain Struben's land allocation in 1849.

SNA 1/1/117.
The aMabomvu were to occupy the eastern and southern position 34). The aBathembu were placed on the north western position, while aMabaso were completely surrounded by aBathembu who also greatly outnumbered them 35).

These two izizwe occupied more or less the same area (see map 2). This was the weakest part of the whole structure as it was one of the acts of sowing the seed of trouble for the reserve. The Sithole were to occupy the north-eastern position, later were to be replaced by aMaqamu in 1869 (see map 2), yet another recipe for trouble. Captain Struben did not include the aMachunu in his map. He did that because the 1846 Commission had declared that the aMachunu belonged to a different reserve, Mpofana in the Nobamba Division.

This, later on proved to be yet another mistake of the authorities who were more than eager to divide and define.

Map No.2 shows Captain Struben’s arrangement which was a response to the 1846 Commission’s recommendation. The arrangement was to be challenged by the behaviour of the residents in later years.

The allocation shows many anomalies if the historical background of the izizwe is taken into consideration. The Sitholes were the oldest in this area, they were in fact in control of the whole area that the Colonial Government was turning into Msinga Reserve 36).

According to oral tradition, the area surrounded by uNdi (Biggarsberg) Heights, Thukela and Mzinyathi (Buffalo) Rivers was given to Inkosi Jobe Sithole by King Shaka. Inkosi Jobe had agreed to be King Shaka's vassal. When Amakhosi Ngoza Mvelase and Macingwane Mchunu rose against King Shaka who defeated them easily, they fled with their subjects 37).

King Shaka was highly impressed by the loyalty of Inkosi Jobe. That was the beginning of a deep friendship between the Sithole isizwe and the Zulu Royal family. The Thukela-Mzinyathi valley did not attract the Sithole people. They preferred the northern part of the area. Thus leaving what is Msinga today almost unoccupied. The aMachunu in 1839 and aBathembu in 1850 found it easy to settle in the then spacious Thukela-Mpofana valley 38). Initially, Captain Struben's work did not disturb the Sithole people in the territory they then occupied (see map 2). Trouble started a few years later.

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36. Nsikayezwe kaSigidisaBathembu ka Bhande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole, aged 49, interviewed at his home near Mhlumayo Mountain on 30 May, 1993.
37. Ibid.
It was the escape of Inkosi Matshana Sithole in 1858 that left the Sithole people with the legacy of endless land disputes with aMaqamu. The Matshana affair remained a problem that has not been solved even today. In order to show that Sir Theophilus Shepstone was serious about his principle of Tribal Responsibility, it would be necessary to give a brief account of Inkosi Matshana kaMondise Sithole 39).

Inkosi Matshana was a great friend and admirer of Prince Cetshwayo kaMpande. Two of Inkosi Matshana’s wives were sisters of Prince Cetshwayo 40). Therefore the ties of friendship between the Zulu Royal family and the Sithole traditional leader were even stronger during the reign of Inkosi Matshana. By 1857 the health condition of King Mpande had deteriorated to a large extent. E.H. Brookes says:

“In his later years he was too fat to walk for any distance and when, as a result, he wanted to get into a wagon it was necessary to take off the front wheels. Such a man could inspire limited respect and could arouse no enthusiasm, and although he reigned until 1872 his active rule ceased in 1857” 41).

In 1856 Prince Cetshwayo had gained victory over his rival, Prince Mbuyazi at Ndondakusuka and was therefore the undisputed heir to the Zulu Monarchy 42). The events that were taking place in KwaZulu are mentioned here because they clearly had some influence on Inkosi Matshana’s conduct that

resulted in a bitter quarrel between him and Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1858.

According to oral tradition, a man called Sigatiya Shezi had been accused of practising witchcraft 43). His clan brought him to Inkosi Matshana for a verdict. The inkosi refused to have anything to do with such matters as the Colonial Government had banned the practice of witchfinding. He advised the Shezi people to take the matter to the magistrate. The angry men however, killed Sigatiya as soon as they left inkosi’s umuzi (homestead). This murder angered Sir Theophilus Shepstone to a very large degree. He considered it an execution conducted by the inkosi because he wanted to defy the Colonial Government openly. He ordered the inkosi to bring the murderers to the court. The inkosi however declined, arguing that those killers had done everything on their own therefore the government had to deal with them directly 44).

This behaviour disturbed Sir Theophilus Shepstone and he wanted to punish Inkosi Matshana to make an example to the rest of the traditional leaders 45). He arranged a meeting with the whole isizwé. It was agreed that the

43. Nsikayezwe kaSigidisaBathembu ka Bhande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole aged 49, interviewed at his home near Mhlumayo Mountain on 30 May, 1993.
45. R.N. Currey: Letters and Other Writings of a Natal Sheriff, Thomas Phipson 1815 - 76.
meeting would be a peaceful one and no weapons should be brought along to the inkosi’s umuzi where the meeting would take place 46).

On the appointed day, the Sithole people gathered unarmed at Inkosi Matshana’s homestead. Inkosi Matshana did not entirely trust whites in general, Sir Theophilus Shepstone in particular. Therefore he exchanged attire with one of his subjects 47).

The government’s representatives arrived led by John Shepstone, Sir Theophilus Shepstone’s brother. He did not know the inkosi personally. When the meeting was just about to start, John Shepstone drew a gun and fired a shot, fatally wounding the man in the inkosi’s attire 48). The second shot is said to have slightly wounded the real target. After this incident Inkosi Matshana, in 1858 crossed the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) River with a number of followers. Prince Cetshwayo welcomed his old friend and King Mpande gave him a site at Qhudeni where many Sithole people settled around the umuzi of Inkosi Matshana called Nsingabantu 49). That is how Inkosi Matshana was exiled.

The drama discussed above, might have been considered adventurous by

47. Nsikayezwe kaSigidisaBathembu kaBhande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole, aged 49, interviewed at his home near Mhlumayo Mountain, on 30 May, 1993.
48. Ibid.
some people but Sir Theophilus Shepstone was far from being amused. The Sithole people who remained behind, lived to pay the price. Sir Theophilus Shepstone made it a point that they lost their land without leaving it 50). Mgabo kaSibankwa Sithole of the Khohlo indlu (left house) of Inkosi Jobe took charge of the Sithole in the reserve 51).

Instead of making Mgabo the inkosi of the Sitholes, sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1869 brought his ostler, Ngoza Majozi, with a group of people whose origin never became clear and made him the inkosi in the Sithole territory left by Inkosi Matshana. These new people were called aMaqamu. The aMaqamu with no known history of their own, inherited the land the Sithole people had occupied for many decades. The Sithole people did not recognize aMaqamu as an isizwe or Ngoza as an inkosi, but they did not cause any disturbance immediately.

This form of punishment sustained by the Sithole people for the conduct of one man only, Inkosi Matshana, is still a sensitive issue even today 52).

Places of historical importance to the Sithole isizwe such as the site of the

51. SNA 1/1/298 Ref 3531/02, Letter: H.B. Cawood - SNA, 14 October, 1902.
52. Mzikabani kaMfulathelwa Madondo, Qamu, aged 67, an induna, interviewed in the veld near Lenge Mountain on 14 April 1993.
major umuzi of Inkosi Jobe, Nhlanjana, his grave and the pool where Inkosi Matshana habitually bathed, are all in the territory now legally occupied by aMaqamu 53).

The arrival of aMaqamu and the demarcation of farms caused a lot of confusion to the Sithole people. Some fences were erected but never defined clearly to the inhabitants 54). After the arrival of aMaqamu, for instance, a fence dividing the Lenge (Job's Kop) Mountain into east and west portions was constructed. The purpose of the fence was never clear to the residents of the reserve. The Sitholes, claimed later on that they were told the fence divided the land to form a boundary between the Crown land and the Sithole location. On the other hand the aMaqamu, argued that they were told it was a boundary between the Majozi and the Sithole locations 55). The fence was farther extended southwards until it divided Mhlumayo Mountain into two, leaving a lot of what was then Sithole land in the east 56). The eastern side of Mhlumayo thus fell into aMaqamu territory.

This illustrates how historical pride and land ownership could be affected by rash behaviour, punitive measures and prejudices of the time. As the land no longer belonged to amakhosi and their izizwe, many decisions

53. Nsikayezwe kaSigidisaBathembu kaBande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole, aged 49 interviewed at his home near Mhlumayo Mountain on 30 May, 1993.
54. SNA 1/1/298, Ref. 3331/02, p. 10: Mtunzi’s evidence, Pomeroy, 10 February 1902.
55. SNA 1/1/298 Ref. 3331/02, p. 17: Sikali’s evidence, Pomeroy, 10 February, 1902.
56. Nsikayezwe kaSigidisaBathembu kaBhande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole, aged 49, interviewed at his home near Mhlumayo Mountain on 30 May, 1993.
regarding land were taken with minimum, if any consultation, with the Zulu people 57). The Sithole people who occupied the areas west, north and north-east of Lenge Mountain (Job's Kop), were told those areas had become Crown lands but they were allowed to remain there 58). When the government found white buyers for the land, the inhabitants found themselves occupying what had become private farms.

The farmer would keep them on his property on condition that they were prepared to be his tenants who would offer farm labour when demanded 59). The other alternative was to remove. Many people removed to the Thukela Valley which was already overpopulated as thousands of refugees crossed the Mzinyathi border during the war of the princes in KwaZulu in 1856 60). Sir Theophilus Shepstone did nothing to check the confusion created by his own system. In order to show how much upheaval the Shepstonian System caused, it would be useful to discuss one example.

A farm north of Lenge Mountain (Job's kop), called kwaSomsuka (Somshoek) had the major umuzi (homestead) of Inkosi Bhande Sithole, called Gazini 61). The farm owner wanted the inkosi to do farm labour like all the tenants. The inkosi felt that was beneath his dignity. The farmer was adamant.

60. Bonayiphi ka Mhulwhe Nhlangothi, aged 69 a senior resident of KwaSomsuka, interviewed in his gared on 16 April, 1993.
61. Nsikayezwe kaSigidisaBathembu ka Bhande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole, aged 49, interviewed at his home near Mhitumayo Mountain on 30 May, 1993.
EGAZINI INXIWA (DEserted HOMESTEAD) OF INKOSI BHANDE SITHOLE
Eventually the inkosi decided to abandon his umuzi (homestead) 62). He decided to reside at his minor umuzi called Ntabamhlophe, south-west of Mhlumayo Mountain. He left one of his wives, Mathabede who was also later removed by the farmer to a new site near Busi River. That marked the end of the inkosi's umuzi (homestead) at kwaSomsuka (Somshoek).

The present inkosi of the Sithole people still resides at Ntabamhlophe. The inkosi was allowed to visit his people who chose to remain on the farm but many changes took place 63). Those changes were calculated to curtail the power and influence of the inkosi. The farmer controlled the movement of the residents according to his own needs 64). The political problem, not facing the farmer however, was that some of the new residents still had strong tribal ties with their original traditional rulers. This meant that they had nothing to do with the Sithole inkosi. As this continued, the successive Sithole amakhosi gradually lost the farm as their sphere of influence 65).

Another difficulty, not only at kwaSomsuka (Somshoek) was created by the arrival of new residents with their own amakhosi. If the farmer happened to like that inkosi, he would consider his position 66). The result was that such farms ended up with many amakhosi. Each inkosi had his own reasons for claiming such power there. Each time the Zulu people got frustrated on

62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. R.N. Currey: Letters and Other Writings of a Natal Sheriff, Thomas Phipson 1815 - 76, p. 19.
65. Sambane kaMaphuma Xaba a senior resident of Somsuka, aged about 72 interviewed in his umuzi on 16 April, 1993.
the farms, they flocked into the reserve. There was however no way in which they could generate wealth in the reserve 67). This was a new form of wandering and these wanderers were to remain poor for the rest of their lives.

According to the Sithole inkosi, chaos has always been getting worse on the farms, so much so that he decided to renounce his ubukhosi (chieftainship) over some of the farms that were formerly Sithole soil. He took such a decision because many foreigners had been settled by the farmers and many amakhosi emerged. Those farms are Waaihoek, Vaalkop, Hollywood, Rockcliff, Limehill and Klippoort 68).

It can also be pointed out that the Zulu people in the nineteenth century in the Msinga District, together with their traditional leaders did not really understand that moving about caused problems regarding administration and land ownership 69). The demarcation of land did not check the semi-nomadic tendencies of the Zulu people. Instead it brought more uncertainty and instability. The idea that the Colonial Government inculcated in the minds of the Zulu people, that no land could ever be in their possession, was hopelessly frustrating 70).

67. R. Russel: Natal The Land and Its Story, p. 198
68. Nsikayezwe kaSigdisaBathembu kaBhande Sithole, the present inkosi of Sithole, aged 49, interviewed at his home near Mhlumayo Mountain 30 May, 1993.
In 1895 Mr. S.O. Samuelson, Principal Under Secretary for Native Affairs, stated in no uncertain terms that:

"The land belongs to the Government and Natives ought to learn that they have no proprietary right to it and could not claim such a right either as against the Government or each other." 71.

The behaviour of Inkosi Thinta Zwane of aMangwe illustrates the state of confusion resulting from the absence of genuine ownership of land among the Zulu people 72). Sir Theophilus Shepstone offered Inkosi Zwane a piece of land on the western slope of Lenge (Job's Kop) Mountain in 1857. Inkosi Zwane requested permission to remove from Msinga Division to Newcastle with a number of his subjects. The magistrate explained to him that he would find no location for his people at Newcastle because the land he intended to occupy was privately owned by white farmers. The inkosi insisted until the matter was taken to the Secretary for Native Affairs who ultimately granted him permission to leave Msinga

"on the distinct stipulation that he should give up all rights over those of his tribe who preferred to remain at Jobs' Kop." 73).

An induna (headman), Nondela, was made in charge of the members of aMangwe who chose to remain in the Msinga Division.

It is not clear whether Inkosi Thinta understood the meaning of giving up

71. SNA 1/1/187, Ref. 572/94, p. 4: Secretary for Native Affairs reporting on his debate with Resident Magistrate of Msinga re Land Dispute between aMabomvu and aMachunu 29 April, 1895.


73. SNA 1/1/85, Ref 577/85, p. 6: RM Msinga - RM Newcastle, 26 August 1885.
all rights. From the look of things Inkosi Zwane did not understand the condition as meaning that his ubukhosi (chieftainship) had come to an end as far as Msinga Division was concerned. It was for this reason that in 1885 the inkosi proclaimed his intention of coming back to Msinga unconditionally 74). The behavior of Inkosi Thinta Zwane is quoted only to show how much confusion prevailed during the period in question and that worse trouble was on its way.

In 1874 Msinga became an independent division with Henry Francis Fynn as the first Resident Magistrate 75). The division comprised the counties of Weenen, Klip River and southern portion of Newcastle Division. More and more new residents flocked into the reserve and poverty was growing fast. That was so because most of the people who decided to go to Msinga, had been frustrated elsewhere. Most of them were victims of eviction by the government from the farms where they had lived as squatters 76). The rough and ready method of land allocation earlier made by Captain Struben was to prove its ability to stand the test of time. As the land belonged to the government and not to any particular inkosi, the amakhosi did not control the influx of the people into the reserve 77). Those proclaimed imaginary boundaries, were made irrelevant. White farmers fenced their properties,

74. Ibid.
75. SNA 1/1/117 Ref 885/89, p. 1: RM Msinga - SNA, 19 August, 1889·
77. S. Marks: Reluctant Rebellion, p. 41 - 42.
thus increasing the difficulty for the Zulu farmers to find suitable places for grazing their own stock 78). Some Zulu farmers who settled on fertile parts of the farms, had become wealthy and were reluctant to do farm labour for their landlords. This attitude coupled with the numbers of their cattle quite disturbed the farm owners. The only solution for the landlord was to drive such Zulu farmers away 79). When these people came to Msinga, where farming conditions were extremely poor, they were impoverished within a very short space of time.

From the very onset, Mr. H.F. Fynn found himself faced with the evil of stock theft which he described as very old in Msinga 80). This habit was growing in spite of many efforts made to check it. The habit seemed to be growing with the population increase in the reserve. The difficult physical features of the reserve encouraged this crime, as it was easy for the thieves to hide the stolen animals there. It was often impossible for the rightful owner to retrieve the animals 81). They were driven from far away and abandoned on the Msinga Mountain top. This part of the reserve was a common pasturage for all the inhabitants of the reserve 82). The thief would allow the stolen animal to roam for some time until it was safe to claim it or its offspring.

78. Natal Blue Book, Departmental Reports 1887, Weenen County, p. 64.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
In 1879 a pound was built to keep all stray animals 83). This was one of the ways in which the government combated stock theft. As the reserve population grew, the problem got worse. The social problem, stock theft caused, was that the izizwe suspected one another. This increased tension and the feeling that the government was unable or unwilling to help the people 84).

The accession of Prince Cetshwayo to the Zulu throne in 1873 brought many problems to the reserve. Any event that alarmed the people in KwaZulu, caused them to cross the border. Misunderstanding between the king and the Natal Government kept on growing. Incidents that occurred in KwaZulu were usually exaggerated by the English people who were eager to prove that the young Zulu king was a ruthless monster 85). One such event was the execution of the Ngcugce regiment of girls in 1876. These girls were ordered by the king to marry into the Ndlondlo regiment, but refused. They wanted to marry into the Dlokwe regiment where their lovers were 86).

R.R.R. Dhlomo vividly puts the problem as follows:

"This became a very serious matter to the king, because such a thing had never happened to the Zulu kings, that a king should be defied by a troop of girls." 87).

The incident resulted in a lot of hysteria and consternation. More refugees crossed the border 88). The magistrate of Msinga was not in a position to

83. SNA 1/1/117, Ref 885/89, p. 6: RM Msinga - SNA, 6 December, 1889.
84. L. Schlemmer: Msinga a Challenge to development in KwaZulu p.49.
87. R.R.R. Dhlomo: UCetshwayo, p. 27.
control these events 89).

During this period of confusion, aMaqamu started encroaching on the lands that had been set aside for grazing. They started digging small patches of gardens on the Msinga Mountain top 90). Animals easily damaged the crops. Those animals were stabbed. It was clear to the magistrate that such behaviour was leading to an uncontrollable fighting among the izizwe of the reserve 91). Judging by the amount of tension that had built up, by 1876 the Natal Government had become aware of the fact that the izizwe of the reserve were no longer potential but were real enemies.

Major inter-tribal hostilities did not occur before 1876 but many criminal acts that went unpunished were inclined to give the inhabitants the impression that the Colonial Government was weak, useless or negligent 92). Relations between the Zulu king and the Natal Government were getting worse 93).

Another alarming event was the murder of Sihayo’s wives in 1878. The two victims had been accused of committing adultery with border guards. Mehlokazulu, son of Sihayo, manned a group that captured and murdered these women after they had crossed the Mzinyathi border. The magistrate

89. SNA 1/1/30, Ref. 470/78, p. 3: Report No. 2 from Acting Administrator of Native Law in Msinga Division to SNA, 8 April, 1887.
90. SNA 1/1/117, Ref. 368/89, p. 3: R.M. Msinga - SNA, 19 August, 1889.
92. Ibid.
of Msinga was quite perturbed 94). The Natal Government blamed the deed on the king. Matters were made worse by the refusal of King Cetshwayo to hand over Sihayo’s sons to the Natal Government for trial 95). The authorities were, however, not always sure of what was happening on the border because they depended on what was officially reported to them. That is why the Acting Administrator of Native Law in Msinga in April 1878 said, "The conduct of the Natives up to this date is perfectly satisfactory. There has been no unusual excitement or movement of Natives observed on the border" 96).

The official did, however, mention that some Natives illegally crossed the border. In the same report it was also stated that there was great scarcity of food with a tendency of unsettling them 97).

The judgement of the administrator was correct, but things were not as good as he believed them to be. In Msinga, during the decade between 1870 and 1880, land shortage kept the inhabitants simmering with rage, the result of which was to be clearly seen in the decade between 1880 and 1890. AMachunu and aBathembu being the oldest izizwe in the Thukela Valley were obvious rivals 98). Although no serious trouble had taken place between the two izizwe, latent tensions existed.

In 1879 one event indicated the existence of some ill-feeling between the

96. SNA 1/1/30, Ref. 470/78, p. 2: Report No. 2 from Acting Administrator of Native Law in Msinga Division to SNA re. Border affairs, 8 April, 1878.
97. SNA 1/1/30, Ref 470/78, p. 1 Report No. 1 from Acting Administrator of Native Law in Msinga re Border Affairs 4 April, 1878.
two izizwe 99). During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Zulu people of Msinga were ordered by the British Government to arm against King Cetshwayo. J. Clegg notes as follows:

“All the major tribes in Msinga and Mpofana contributed hundreds of volunteers to assist the British in their campaign against Cetshwayo. At the recruiting station which was the Magistrate's office in Weenen, a huge stick fight broke out between the Tembus and Chunus just before they were about to march to Isandlwana” 100)

Another main feature of the 1870s was the fact that the separation occurred when some people went to live in the reserve. This separation did not mean that tribal ties had been severed. Many people who flocked into the reserve did so because they wished to join their kinsmen or tribesmen 101). Even those who remained on the farms or in KwaZulu for good, were not really cut off from their people in the reserve. As the farm communities consisted of various izizwe, misunderstanding of an inter-tribal nature occurred also among them as the land was becoming scarcer and scarcer. In the Nobamba (Weenen) Division it was common that farmers bought land and rented it to the Zulu people while the owner remained elsewhere 102).

The farm labourers knew which isizwe dominated which farm. This meant nothing to the absentee landlord. This dominance was of great significance to the fellow tribesmen in the reserve. The importance of having contacts on the farm, lay in the fact that during lean years a man could “sisa” (loan

100. J. Clegg: Ukubuyisa Isidumbu Bringing Back The Body, p. 11.
102. Mandlezizwe kaSihlahla Mchunu, aged about 68, a senior resident of Mudun, near Weenen, interviewed at Weenen taxi rank on 1 June 1993. cf. Magistrates report, Msinga district, Natal Blue Book 1883, p. 11.
his cattle) to a friend on the farms where pastures were often richer 103). If it could happen that these friends on the farm got threatened by another isizwe on the same or neighbouring farm, it meant that the fellows in the reserve were to lose their source of help unless they also stood up against the enemy. This tribal cohesion remained and still exists between farms and reserves. If the authorities did not know the strength of this farm-reserve mutualism, they were to learn and understand it in later years when consequent violence shook Native Administration to its very foundations in the Msinga reserve 104).

Over the years a system of alliances was taking shape in the reserve with the farm communities playing an important role. The aBathembu and aMachunu rivalry had its roots in the old history of these izizwe 105). The aMabomvu who were well disposed towards aBathembu were therefore automatically enemies of aMachunu, both on the farms and in the reserve. Inkosi Mganu Mvelase, for instance, had for years been at loggerheads with Inkosi Thulwana Ndabezitha of aMabaso 106). The aMabaso always received sympathy from aMaqamu and aMachunu. Farther north were the Sithole people who never forgave aMaqamu for taking their land in 1869 107).

103. Mcithwa kaNtabeni Hudla, a senior resident of Keate's Drift, aged about 73, interviewed at his son's homestead on 17 June, 1993.

104. L Schlemmer: Msinga a Challenge to development in KwaZulu. p. i.


This was the position in Msinga when the 1880s approached. Land shortage was unquestionably every inkosi's problem. Encroachment on the territory of the neighbouring isizwe was rife. The only way in which each inkosi responded to the cries of his subjects, was to support their cause regardless of the legality of their action 108). In the absence of the ingonyama (sovereign king) who could consider cases objectively and settle all disputes with justice, many disputes remained unsettled 109). The Natal Government was only pressurised by the inter-tribal friction to revise the boundaries where they weakly existed. Where there were no boundaries at all, it was time to define them 110). The question is how could the definition of boundaries solve the land problem without any effort of increasing the reserve itself being made? It was apparently a question of taking a piece of land from one isizwe and giving it to another.


CHAPTER 2
THE BOUNDARY QUESTION

By the 1880s the Natal Government had become familiar with petty inter­tribal quarrels arising from land disputes 1). These disturbances were exacerbated by the drought that had plagued the area since 1876. In 1878 scarcely any crops were reaped in Msinga. The drought had been so severe that even streams had dried up. Many residents had to go out of the location to look for food in other parts of Natal and at times as far away as in the Orange Free State 2). A lot of them exchanged their cattle for food. One beast for a bag of maize was the going rate. As a result many became extremely poor in cattle. The rate of crime rose significantly. Theft and assault were on the increase 3). Such conditions increased land hunger among the izizwe of the reserve.

The aBathembu being larger than aMabaso demanded more land. The aMabaso on the other hand felt that their location was too small. The aMabaso were further angered by the fact that aBathembu had ignored the 1877 agreement which stipulated that aBathembu had to keep west of Sampofu River 4). The aBathembu had however ignored this ruling. The Secretary for Native Affairs stated that removals should be by consent 5).

1. SNA 1/1/48, Ref. 437/81, RM Msinga - SNA, 1 September, 1881.
The Resident Magistrate found himself in a difficult position because aBathembu were not to be convinced in any way that since the definition of the boundary, the land they occupied was no longer theirs. They argued both religiously and historically that the part of the reserve was theirs. Religiously, they maintained that the land was theirs because the graves of their forefathers were there 6). E.J. Krige puts this idea as follows:

“Moving to a new village is a very serious matter, involving as it does the moving not only of the living people and visible objects, but also the ancestors, the spiritual counterpart of the village, without whom it would be impossible to live in safety or repose” 7).

This briefly indicates the importance of a site in the cultural sense. It would be improper therefore for the aBathembu to abandon the graves of their ancestors for the aMabaso to dig gardens around them. Historically, the land was theirs because their late Inkosi Ndodada Mvelase had placed them there when they first occupied the valley 8). For similar reasons those aMabaso on the other side of the official boundary were not keen to remove.

Inkosi Thulwana Ndabezitha of aMabaso complained very often about land shortage. His desire to get more land for his people gave the government little rest. The failure of the 1877 agreement kept him ever discontented 9).

On the other hand Inkosi Mganu Mvelase, found it hard to tolerate the peevish behaviour of his neighbour 10). According to him Inkosi Thulwana

aimed at forcing those aBathembu on the aMabaso side to sever themselves from their own isizwe and join aMabaso.

The aBathembu were certainly not going to do that. If it was true that Inkosi Thulwana tried to force aBathembu to accept him as their inkosi on the grounds that they were in his location, he was surely looking for trouble 11). The aBathembu knew very well that as long as they had not paid valelisa (farewell) fee to their own inkosi, they could not be regarded as the subjects of Inkosi Thulwana. They also knew that there could be no secret arrangement when people were joining another isizwe 12). Forcing them to join his isizwe was a violation of the norms of social organisation. It is not known whether Inkosi Thulwana wanted to treat aBathembu in that manner, but that was Inkosi Mganu’s report to the magistrate.

According to a witness, Mashekana, Inkosi Mganu told the truth 13). Mashekana stated that he was one of Inkosi Thulwana’s victims. He wished to move to a new site still on the aMabaso side of the boundary. Inkosi Thulwana refused to grant him a site instead he told him to find a new site across the Sampofu River or respect him. Mashekana refused both 14). He also accused Inkosi Thulwana of putting imizi of aMabaso so close to those

13. SNA 1/1/48, Ref. 437/81, p. 5: RM Msinga - SNA, 1 September, 1881.
14. Ibid.
of aBathembu that living became uncomfortable. Inkosi also encouraged his own brother, Nkwankwa, to reduce in size aBathembu’s gardens so that they could decide to leave the location demarcated for aMabaso 15). When aMabaso wished to move to new sites, they did so without any difficulty. The importance of a site has been indicated in this discussion but it also has an economic value.

Among the Zulu people the importance of an inxiwa (deserted site) cannot be overemphasised. Once a man has moved to a new site, the old one still remains his, and will be used as an insimu (field/garden in the context of Msinga): It is a heritage for the clan from generation to generation 16). If an umuzi has been standing at one place for a long time, it makes a very productive garden because of large deposits of kraal manure. Therefore shifting to a new site is one of the ways to create a garden. The Msinga reserve with its dire shortage of arable land forced the residents to do anything to get land for cultivation 17). If Inkosi Thulwana could pin aBathembu down to old sites while aMabaso were free to move, he was denying aBathembu the means of obtaining arable land for survival. This was a serious allegation that could lead the two izizwe into a war. Inkosi Mganu testified that thirty of his people had suffered this kind of harassment

15. Ibid.
17. D. Robbins and W. Hartley: Inside the Last Outpost, p. 84.
at the hands of Inkosi Thulwana 18).

In a letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Resident Magistrate indicated his efforts towards maintaining peace between the two izizwe. The magistrate wrote:

"Their own fathers had lived together peacefully during their own lives on the land given to them and undivided, although they were distinct tribes. Their father, the government had given them a loaf of bread (the land) to eat, they had quarrelled over it, and the loaf had been divided" 19).

The Resident Magistrate understood the root of the problem 20). It was that the land occupied by aBathembu on the side of aMabaso location, on the banks of Sampofu River, was very fertile. Inkosi Thulwana was also aware of that. That is why he wanted it. The Resident Magistrate also stated that Inkosi Mganu had done nothing to molest those aMabaso on the aBathembu side of the boundary 21).

The problem then facing the government was that if aBathembu were to be forcibly removed, relations between the two izizwe would deteriorate dangerously 22). On the other hand Inkosi Thulwana had the law on his side. Another problem was that the subjects often took advantage of the poor relations between their amakhosi. Under such circumstances, it was common that some people encroached to satisfy their selfish needs 23).

18. SNA 1/1/48, Ref. 437/81, p. 4: RM Msinga - SNA, 1 September, 1881.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
23. Natal Blue Book, Departmental Reports. 1893 - 1894, Msinga Division, p. 16.
They knew well that their amakhosi were inclined to favour their own subjects without judging objectively. The question was at this stage, how was the government going to teach fairness to the people who were desperately hungry for land 24)?

There was no inter-tribal, physical fighting among all the major izizwe of the reserve up to the end of 1881, but aBathembu and aMabaso were bitter enemies. The aBathembu were in fact looking for an excuse that could be a good reason for launching an attack on aMabaso. Any conflict could result in a physical clash actually aimed at driving aMabaso away 25). Later on Inkosi Thulwana through his lack of caution played into the hands of his enemies.

On 17 June 1882 the magistrate of Msinga informed the Secretary for Native Affairs that Inkosi Thulwana wished to exchange his umuzi, Mkhomazi on the aBathembu side of the boundary with Halijana, a subject of Inkosi Mganu who resided on the aMabaso side 26). This intention of Inkosi Thulwana was interpreted by Inkosi Mganu as a sly effort of driving aBathembu out of aMabaso location so that Inkosi Thulwana could consolidate his location 27). This suspicion angered Inkosi Mganu. The Resident Magistrate would

27. SNA 1/1/48, Ref. 437/81, p. 2: RM Msinga - SNA, 7 September, 1881.
find it difficult to comply with this request even if Inkosi Mganu had no such suspicions 28). If Inkosi Thulwana's request could be complied with, it would result in the aBathembu occupying the fertile piece of land on both sides of the Sampofu River.

The magistrate feared that Inkosi Thulwana was fully aware of that. Once aBathembu were given all the fertile land, Inkosi Thulwana would raise that as a grievance. For this reason, the magistrate requested the Secretary for Native Affairs to instruct all the aBathembu to remove to their legal location and those aMabaso in the west of the Sampofu River to remove to their location as well 29). When aBathembu heard of the step taken by Inkosi Thulwana, they felt it was high time that aMabaso were driven out of the reserve by force of arms. Inkosi Mganu managed to calm them down. The government on the other hand felt that time had arrived to have the boundaries strictly defined and where possible, adjusted.

On 15 September 1882 the Governor, Sir H. Bulwer came personally to treat the boundary question 30). According to the Governor the location of aMabaso was to stand as follows:

Firstly: Northerly, it would stretch up to Nyandu Spruit.

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Map 3

Sketch map showing official boundaries between aMabaso & aBathembu in 1877.

SNA 1/1/55.
Secondly: Westerly, it would stretch up to Nonkukhu Krantz.

Thirdly: Easterly, it would go up to the top of Msinga Mountain to the most southern point of Nyandu Spruit.

Fourthly: Southerly, the boundary would be the Thukela River (see map 3). 31.

The aMabaso were still free to graze their stock in the undivided pasturage of Msinga Mountain top 32). This allocation was a mere emphasis of the old boundaries with the exception of the most sensitive issue in the south. The emphasis of the Thukela as the southern boundary meant that those aBathembu occupying the area would be instructed to remove 33). The aBathembu had occupied the area in question in the days of Inkosi Nodada Mvelase who brought them to the Thukela valley. They occupied both sides of the Thukela River 34). If the Governor meant to force them out, it would mean an immediate war with aMabaso. If he hoped to convince them, they would not move at any stage. That was the crux of the matter. The Governor’s work was not the solution to the problem in any way. Even if the idea of removing these people ever existed, there was a problem of settling them 35). They could not be ordered to cross the Thukela River because that was Mpofana Location in the Nobamba Division, officially set aside for

32. SNA 1/1/55, Ref. 294/82, p. 2: RM Msinga - SNA, 15 September, 1882.
Phakade’s people, aMachunu in its entirety 36). There was already a heavy presence of aBathembu in Mpofana but their occupation had been negotiated by Sir Theophilus Shepstone with Inkosi Phakade.

The magistrate felt that the only way to maintain law and order was to instruct the residents of the reserve to occupy their legal locations 37). The Secretary for Native Affairs differed with him as he had done before. He was against forced removals 38). Therefore no removals occurred and no solution was ever realised.

In 1883 the Acting Magistrate, Mr. W.R. Gordon, induced the Governor to give Inkosi Thulwana for the aMabaso, the triangular block of 26 hectares, taking some from aBathembu 39). There were neither imizi nor gardens on that strip of land. The aBathembu did not object 40). The problem showed itself later when Inkosi Thulwana wanted to make use of the offer, to extend his location farther east.

Between the years 1883 and 1887 Inkosi Mganu got a feeling that the government favoured Inkosi Thulwana 41). On 11 April 1887 Inkosi Thulwana reported to the Resident Magistrate that he wished to erect an
umuzi at Nonkukhu Ridge 42). This spot, being on the border of the two locations, could easily cause friction. The magistrate felt that enough precaution had to be taken. For that reason, he advised Inkosi Thulwana not to start any work there until the spot had been inspected by an official from the government. The magistrate scheduled the inspection for 22 April 43).

Inkosi Thulwana for reasons known only to himself, started his work before the appointed date. A group of aBathembu young men attacked the site and destroyed the frame of the indlu 44). That was the first act of violence solely based on land. The magistrate was duly alarmed as this was indicative of future disturbances which could be worse. He blamed Inkosi Thulwana for having failed to listen to him 45).

When the spot was later inspected, it was discovered that it was about 50-100 metres within the location of aBathembu. When the magistrate called together the two amakhosi with a few of their subjects, it was clear to the magistrate that aBathembu felt that their inkosi was too patient with Inkosi Thulwana 46). They regarded the behaviour of Inkosi Thulwana as an open challenge to them as an isizwe. The aMabaso were equally bitter, regarding their neighbours as being inclined to grab land. With such ruffled feelings

43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. SNA 1/1/99, Ref. 451/87, p. 4: RM Msinga - SNA, 12 May, 1887.
between the two izizwe, only time was to tell whether the Natal Government was capable of maintaining law and order 47).

In 1889 the Resident Magistrate tried to create more space for occupation and cultivation by opening the top of Msinga Mountain as a residential area for aBathembu, aMabaso, aMaqamu and aMabomvu 48). Sites for gardens were also demarcated. This would also help to check the chronic evil of stock theft 49). All the izizwe were represented and the idea was heartily welcomed. This part of the reserve had a reputation of being well watered and it had better harvest than the low-lying thornveld.

In September 1890 the magistrate completed the task of dividing the new settlement among the izizwe in question 50). He made it a point that all the izizwe were fully represented when the land was demarcated. He did this to avoid any possible dispute that could erupt in the future. Inkosi Thulwana was given another small piece of land which had formerly been occupied by aMabomvu 51). The magistrate wanted to make Inkosi Thulwana's location more compact. He further added to the location of aMabaso another part from the eastern boundary of Inkosi Mganu's location. Both the aBathembu and aMabaso approved of the magistrate's donation. Inkosi

47. R.N. Currey: Letters and Other Writings of A Natal Sheriff Thomas Phipson 1815 - 76, p. 182.
49. Ibid.
50. SNA 1/1/112, Ref. 137/90, p. 1: RM Msinga - SNA, 6 December, 1890.
51. SNA 1/1/122, Ref. 137/90, p. 2: RM Msinga - SNA, 6 December, 1890.
Thulwana was very pleased, but it was only for a while 52).

On 5 March 1891 the Resident Magistrate embarked on the task of erecting conspicuous beacons on the boundaries formerly laid down 53). Again he ordered the representatives to put the beacon stones jointly so that they could best understand the boundaries. It was on this day that Inkosi Thulwana upset the order again. He started arguing that his location, according to Mr W. R. Gordon’s allocation, went on and on to the east 54). Mr H. F. Fynn, the magistrate was disappointed at Inkosi Thulwana’s ingratitude. He tried to explain to him how far his location could go 55). The attitude of Inkosi Thulwana made it clear to the representatives of the four izizwe that as long as aMabaso were under Inkosi Thulwana, peace would never be achieved mainly between aBathembu and aMabaso. In 1894 Inkosi Thulwana personally approached the Secretary for Native Affairs to complain that some of his land had been taken by Inkosi Mganu for his people 56). Those aBathembu in the Nobamba County were again extremely enraged 57).

While tension was growing tremendously between aBathembu and aMabaso, another inter-tribal land dispute demanded the government’s urgent attention in June 1894. This started as a petty quarrel between Inkosi Mawele Ngubane

52. Ibid.
54. SNA 1/1/139, Ref. 323/91, p. 2: RM Msinga - SNA, 5 March, 1891.
55. Ibid.
of aMabomvu and his subject, Bhayibhayi Ngubane 58). Bhayibhayi quarreled very often with his neighbour, Thulwana Zuma. Inkosi Mawele felt that Bhayibhayi was the trouble maker. He ordered him to remove to a new site 59). Bhayibhayi refused and told the inkosi that since he was among those aMabomvu in the south of the Thukela River he was not in Inkosi Ma'wele's location 60).

The inkosi became angry and took the matter to the Resident Magistrate of Msinga. To his surprise, the magistrate told him that since Bhayibhayi was in Mpofana location, Inkosi Mawele had no right to remove him. The magistrate further stated that he himself had no right over Bhayibhayi because he was in the south of the official boundary, the Thukela River 61). Bhayibhayi was in the Magisterial District of Nobamba and his inkosi was not Inkosi Mawele but Inkosi Silwane Mchunu.

Inkosi Mawele took the matter to Mr. S.O. Samuelson, the Principal Under Secretary for Native Affairs. Mr. S.O. Samuelson believed that the area was in Msinga Division 62). Messrs. H.F. Fynn and S.O. Samuelson found themselves debating the issue. The two officials realised that only the map of the area could clarify the issue.

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
They were to learn how ignorant they were when the Government Surveyor reported as follows:

“The Trust land between the Mooi River and the Tugela River is known, and was granted, as the Impofana Location, I can find no trace of any correspondence on the subject of the division of the land among different Native tribes. A division has certainly never been made” 63)

In this state of confusion, the two gentlemen went ahead with the case. Mr. S.O. Samuelson insisted that the area was in Mr. H.F. Fynn’s division.

This shows that a lot of irregularities existed even in the government offices. The magistrate tried to explain the complex nature of this matter but the Under Secretary for Native Affairs was a great believer in laying down boundaries 64). He wanted to separate aMabomvu from aMachunu occupying the area, with a boundary line. The magistrate who showed more insight, argued that the boundary was irrelevant because the area in question was in the location of aMachunu but those aMabomvu who were there had gradually encroached by crossing the Thukela River 65). At the same time the two izizwe had lived together for years without any serious inter-tribal trouble. The boundary would therefore only mean that aMabomvu were taking away a piece of land that legally and historically belonged to aMachunu 66).

Mr. S.O. Samuelson called the two amakhosi together and discussed the

63. SNA 1/1/187, Ref. 752/94, p. 4: Surveyor - RM Msinga, 14 August, 1894.
64. SNA 1/1/187, Ref. 752/94, p. 7: RM Msinga - USNA. 1 October, 1894.
65. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, p. 4: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895.
Inkosi Silwane stated in no uncertain terms that the land belonged to his people. He was, however, mindful of the fact that many aMabomvu had settled there for a number of years. He had no intention of driving them out, but he wouldn’t welcome the idea of a boundary.

Inkosi Silwane’s assertion shows a very healthy spirit. But the attitude of the Under Secretary for Native Affairs turned everything upside down. Inkosi Silwane further requested Inkosi Mawele to accept Bhayibhayi’s “valelisa”. After that he would move him to a new site in order to make peace. Inkosi Mawele did accept Bhayibhayi’s “valelisa” but Inkosi Silwane did not order Bhayibhayi to go to a new site immediately. Inkosi Mawele sent messengers to the Under Secretary for Native Affairs to report that Inkosi Silwane had not honoured his promise. This gave Mr. S.O. Samuelson an excuse to go ahead with his boundary idea. He told the messengers to tell Inkosi Mawele that he would make an official visit to “inspect” the area. He advised them to tell nobody else about the visit.

On 12 April 1895 he arrived at Msinga after it had been spread far and wide that the Principal Under Secretary for Native Affairs would come to divide the location of aMachunu in order to legalise its occupation by

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68. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, p. 14: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895
69. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, : Letter: USNA-RM Msinga, 29 February, 1895
70. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, : Letter, USNA - RM Msinga, 27 February, 1895
The rash behaviour of Mr. S.O. Samuelson had disastrous effects. On 13 April 1895 Constable Mabele of aMabomvu was murdered by a horde of aMachunu young men at Manyisweni Neck.

Another man also belonging to aMabomvu was murdered on the same day by a group of aMachunu young men at the top of Msinga Mountain. After hearing of these murders, the Principal Under Secretary for Native Affairs felt more convinced than ever before that the laying down of a boundary was not only advisable but also an absolute necessity. It is surprising that he failed to understand the meaning of the behaviour of aMachunu. These people were opposed to the idea of any boundary there. The killing of those two men was nothing but an expression of anger by aMachunu.

The two izizwe had been staying together quietly and aMachunu had never tried to force the aMabomvu out of what Mr S.O. Samuelson regarded as a disputed territory. The territory was not disputed. The only major quarrel was between Inkosi Mawele and his clansman, Bhayibhayi. If the government could sort that out without involving the question of land ownership, perhaps no trouble could have taken place.

71. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, p. 4: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895.
72. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, p. 8: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895. Cf Justice Department, Magistrate of Mpopana, Annual report 1921, 4/158/22 p. 3.
73. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, p. 8: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895.
75. SNA 1/1/187, Ref. 752/94 p. 6: RM Msinga - USNA, 1 October, 1894.
76. IBID.
Msinga Location

Mr Samuelson's boundary line of 1895 giving land North of the line to aMabomvu.

Land occupied by both aMachunu and aMabomvu but officially belonging to aMachunu

MAP 4

Sketch map showing Mr S.O. Samuelson's demarcation of the aMachunu location to accommodate aMabomvu in 1895.

SNA 1/1/197.
Mr. S.O. Samuelson was more than keen to prove to these people that they did not have any land 77). They knew that, but it was a futile argument to them because it was the same government that had demarcated the land. For him to tell the aMachunu that the government could further divide their location to accommodate another isizwe was really provocative. Inkosi Silwane hated debating with white authorities but the behaviour of his subjects showed clearly that the isizwe of aMachunu felt aggrieved 78).

The Principal Under Secretary for Native Affairs went ahead with his boundary plan 79). The Resident Magistrate, who understood the situation far better, had to yield. It was the first time that aMabomvu were given permission by the government to occupy the area south of the Thukela River as their location. It was also for the first time that Inkosi Phakade’s location was demarcated, autocratically for that matter 80).

Mr. S.O. Samuelson felt proud of his work after giving the area immediately south of the Thukela River to aMabomvu. Those aMachunu north of his boundary line had to remove to the south (see map 4). He had received no opposition but the seeds of trouble he had sown are obvious 81).

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79. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 77/95, p. 18: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
After this event aMabomvu started feeling that the Msinga Resident Magistrate favoured aMachunu over them. They complained that he was ready to imprison them for no good reason. At the same time aMachunu were treated friendly 82).

Amakhosi Mawele and Silwane were bitter enemies. The aMabomvu had lost two men and aMachunu had lost land. The two izizwe were both bitter. The aMachunu were faced with the task of getting their land back. The aMabomvu were bound to protect what had become their property and in addition to that, they were going to avenge the death of their members. The government would obviously never succeed to restore peace and order between the two izizwe 83).

81 Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. SNA 1/1/197, Ref 77/95 p. 25: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895.
CHAPTER 3

THE SCRAMBLE FOR LAND IN THE RESERVE

Inkosi Mganu Mvelase died on 1 March 1896. Even at the time of his death there was no prospect of peace between aBathembu and aMabaso. 1).

At that time aBathembu had paid little attention to another enmity that was fermenting in the north. The young traditional leader of aMaqamu, Inkosi Kula Majozi and his induna, Khwengce, Khanyile, started complaining about the boundary of 1889 on the top of Msinga Mountain. 2). Since its opening for occupation and cultivation in 1889, the top of Msinga Mountain attracted many inhabitants of the four izizwe of the reserve. 3). The reason was that this part of the reserve was very fertile. The mountain top could not accommodate all those who wished to erect imizi and cultivate gardens there.

The result of the scramble was that the inhabitants disregarded the boundaries. 4). In 1896 some minor disturbances between aBathembu and aMaqamu were reported 5). It was for this reason that in June 1896 the resident magistrate, Mr H.F. Fynn and Mr. W. Shepstone, the government surveyor, went to the disputed area to redefine the boundary between

2. SNA 1/1/213, Ref. 1164/96, Telegram: SNA - Attorney General, 29 June, 1896.
3. SNA 1.1.117, Ref. 885/89, p. 4: RM Msinga - SNA, 19 August, 1889.
4. D. Robbins and W. Hartley: Inside the Last Outpost, p. 84.
5. SNA 1/1/213, Ref. 1164/96, Telegram: USNA - Attorney General, 29 June, 1896.
aBathembu and aMaqamu as was stipulated in 1889 6).

The old problem about discussing any boundary with the inhabitants of the reserve was that they always believed that the white authorities were laying down new boundaries and arguments often resulted. Messrs. H.F. Fynn and W. Shepstone had the same problem when they tried to make peace between aBathembu and aMaqamu 7). It was common that one isizwe accused the other of having fiddled with the stones that had been previously put together as a beacon 8). Once some members of one isizwe had established themselves on the other side of the beacon tree, they would deny that the tree was ever the beacon, so it appeared as if a new boundary was being made 9). Boundaries did not form straight lines and they were usually confusing. Should the white authorities try to make use of sketch maps to support their point, it was a waste of time because the residents did not understand maps 10).

By 1896 the population of the reserve had increased tremendously 11). Therefore even if the boundaries on the top of Msinga Mountain were always clear, the inhabitants had no choice but to disregard them because they needed more land. The Shepstonian Policy made no room for such changes,
vital as they were 12).

It failed to cater for future needs of the inhabitants. It is therefore clear that the Colonial Government did not regard these people as part of it's society, otherwise it could have done something for their economic upliftment for its own survival. M.G. Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu puts the matter of survival as follows:

"No government of the future will survive unless the people feel that their lives have improved because of it" 13).

The scramble for the top of Msinga took place simply because it could offer chances of survival to the people concerned. H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer still see no improvement in the South African Government policy and point out that

"While government policy makers were quick to adopt measures intended especially to upgrade white agriculture, even today little major funding or policy making is directed towards a serious attempt to upgrade African farming capabilities 14).

Therefore it is not surprising that Khwengce protested against what he believed was an act of depriving his people of their only means of survival. Mr. H.F. Fynn tried in vain to explain to Khwengce that no new boundaries were being made but it was a matter of revising the old ones 15).

Khwengce was requested to indicate the old boundary of 1889. He said he

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had no idea of that boundary because he was absent on the day of that demarcation 16). He said he only knew the boundary laid down by Captain Struben in 1869.

Khwengce was not telling the truth when he said he was absent in 1889. The records of the magistrate show that he was there 17). It was not true therefore that aMaqamu were not represented when the land was demarcated. The fact is that Khwengce wanted more land for his people regardless of how it was to be obtained. The location was overcrowded and a lot of land could not be cultivated because of its poor state. The Colonial Government had effectively ruined these people both economically and politically 18).

The Argument between Khwengce and the government officials was so hot that the matter had to be reported to the police who started patrolling the area 19).

The attitude of the representatives of aMaqamu indicated that they were no longer grateful to the government that had created them. Starvation had made them quite difficult 20). The authorities had no choice but to temporarily abandon the whole scheme that day. Mr H.F. Fynn's own observation was that a very large harvest of maize and corn had been obtained

17. Ibid.
on the mountain top. There was consequently a lot of beer drinking and a strong ill-will between aBathembu and aMaqamu 21). Trouble could take place after the slightest provocation 22). The aMaqamu felt that their land was given to aBathembu and aMabomvu.

It might be that Khwengce was confusing issues because he could not remember well in 1896 something that happened in 1869 23). It might be that he deliberately lied. The main thing is that because of his age and position, he was regarded by the young men of his isizwe as a great statesman. The aMaqamu were the only isizwe that came in a large group. The young men who believed Khwengce to the last word were ready to fight or even to die for what they had been told was theirs.

The Natal Government had dumped these izizwe into the reserve without having a policy that ensured their economic stability. S.X. Hanekom and C. Thornhill put this dilemma as follows:

"A policy should indicate the broad outline within which community life has to develop in order to promote the general welfare." 24).

In the behaviour of Inkosi Kula and Khwengce, one can read hostility rising from utter despair. The fact that aMaqamu were a special isizwe made by the same government, did not mean that they were not victims of poverty

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22. Ibid.
24. S.X. Hanekom and C. Thornhill: The Functions of the Public Administrator, p. 49.
endured by the rest of the izizwe. They were on the same "dumping ground" 25).

M.G. Buthelezi has argued that:

"Economic expansion alone ensured that blacks escaped the fate of being drawers of water and hewers of wood" 26).

This line of thinking had no room in the Shepstonian System. The growth of the reserve population was not accompanied by the government's efforts to provide for economic growth. According to Hanekom and Thornhill:

"When administrators consider planning, they should bear in mind that economic planning is only one aspect of community development" 27).

In Msinga there was absolutely no economic planning from the time of its establishment.

The mere creation of aMaqamu as an isizwe aimed at making use of the reserve as a dumping ground for more Africans 28). The Colonial Government encouraged petty ubukhosi in the hope that the Zulu people would be better governable in the absence of an ingonyama (sovereign king) as a unifying factor. The events in Msinga proved evidently that nothing could be further from the truth than that 29). The resistant behaviour of Inkosi Kula and Khwengce exasperated the government. Inkosi Kula acted

25. D. Robbins and W. Hartley: Inside the Last Outpost, p. 84.
27. S.X. Hanekom and C. Thornhill: The Functions of the Public Administrator, p. 45.
as if he did not understand the vulnerable nature of his position. The izizwe were not disloyal to the government but they had been ruined and they were struggling for existence.

"What the central consequence of Colonial rule proved to be", writes Davidson, "was not the modern reconstruction of Africa, but the far-reaching dismantlement and ruin of the societies and structures which the invaders had found" 30).

The izizwe of Msinga did not regard the Colonial Government as their father like Mr. H.F. Fynn had stated when Amakhosi Mganu and Thulwana had endless land disputes in 1881 31). They regarded themselves as distinct izizwe, each with its own inkosi and could use or even deceive the government in order to gain territorial expansion at the expense of the other 32).

Long before Msinga Mountain top was opened for occupation and cultivation, aMaqamu encroached upon the area 33). When the area was finally opened for such purposes, aMaqamu never stopped making efforts to gain more of the fertile land.

While the government was engaged in the task of trying to solve the problem encountered from a Bathembu and aMaqamu, another problem was gaining firm roots. That was the intensification of the system of alliances. The fact

32. SNA 1/1/122, Ref 888/90, p. 3: RM Msinga - SNA, 6 December, 1890.
33. SNA 1/1/885,89 Ref 7, p. 3: RM Msinga - SNA, 19 August, 1889.
that aMaqamu accused the government of taking their land to aBathembu and aMabomvu, pushed the two izizwe closer together 34). They had a common enemy. At the same time the Bhayibhayi issue of 1895 had left the legacy of bitterness between aMabomvu and aMachunu. That was the case because aMachunu hated the laying down of the boundary used by S.O. Samuelson to make peace between Inkosi Mawele Ngubane of aMabomvu and Bhayibhayi. The new boundary resulted in aMachunu losing land to aMabomvu 35). It would also be unduly optimistic to expect the Sithole people to forgive aMaqamu who took their land in 1869.

Before his death, Inkosi Mganu had expressed his concern to S.O. Samuelson, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs about the fluid situation between aBathembu and aMabaso 36). Inkosi Mabizela of aBathembu, being a young man might not be as patient as his father had been with Inkosi Thulwana. Therefore something worse than mere disputes could still be expected between aBathembu and aMabaso 37).

On 30 June 1896 Inkosi Mabizela of aBathembu went to Pietermaritzburg to discuss the boundary dispute between aBathembu and aMaqamu. He and his men were told that the government did not intend making new boundaries

35. SNA 1/1/197, Ref 77/95, p. 1: RM Msinga - USNA, 27 February, 1895.
36. SNA 1/1/197, Ref 77/95, p. 18: USNA - SNA, 29 May, 1895.
instead the old ones were being surveyed in order to prevent disputes in future. The government was not in a position to maintain peace by redefining boundaries. Small pieces of land for cultivation could not be sufficient for the inhabitants who had no knowledge of scientific farming. Over and above that:

"Young men could no longer simply obtain a land grant from their tribal chief," writes Nattrass,
"but frequently had to wait until the death of a tribal elder freed the land sought" 38).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the government was aware of the fact that those residents of Msinga who had no access to the fertile patches of the reserve, had to choose between starving to death and fighting for land 39). These people who were already struggling as a result of poor pastures were further hit very hard by the outbreak of severe rinderpest in 1896 and 1897 40). They were also pressed by white colonists from all sides. W.C. Holden vividly painted the following picture:

"But for them to be in the very heart of a British Colony of limited extent, with the white man pressing upon them on every side is a state of things in which the weak must fall before the strong, unless amalgamation can be effected, yet amalgamation there cannot be, where the laws and usages of the two nations are at the antipodes of each other." 41).

Mr. W. Shepstone had completed his work on Msinga Mountain top on 5 July 1896, then after a week the magistrate, Mr. H.F. Fynn, was informed

38. J. Nattrass: The South African Economy p. 69,
41. W.C. Holden: History of the Colony of Natal, p. 180,
cf D. Robbins and W. Hartley: Inside the Last Outpost p. 84.
by S.O. Samuelson, Under Secretary for Native Affairs, that wood and
grazing should be common 42). This was a serious oversight on the part of
the government. Never in the history of the Zulu people has an enemy been
allowed to remain within easy access to the cattle 43). The cultural
importance of the cattle is second to none in the life of a Zulu man. A
suggestion like this one could not be a remedy instead it was fanning more
flames of violence. It was however not the first time that Mr. S.O. Samuelson
made such a ruling. The aMabomvu and aMachunu in 1895 had been told
the same thing 44).

Inkosi Kula was still a young man, approximately 25 years old, yet his
isizwe was the largest in the division. For that reason, he required strong
and reliable izinduna for administration 45). A number of izinduna were
made in charge of various sections of the location. The problem about
izinduna was that they were able to cause trouble either by misleading their
inkosi or by seeking too much power for themselves 46). Nobody could be
reliable to any conceivable extent where bare necessities were glaringly
scarce. C.W. De Kiewiet argues that such crowding of men and beasts placed
a severe strain upon the land that was left 47).

cf C.R. Maclean: The Natal Papers of John Ross, p. 80 - 81 cf p. 86 - 87
44. SNA 1/1/197, Ref 77/95, p. 18: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895
45. SNA 1/1/225, Ref 1169/96, p. 5: USNA - Attorney General, 28 August, 1869.
46. SNA 1/1/225, Ref 43/98, p. 4: RM Msinga - USNA, 5 July, 1899.
47. C.W. De Kiewiet: A History of South Africa Social and Economic p. 80,
The izinduna were appointed by an inkosi and their names were sent to the government for approval. Amakhosi, like the rest of the Zulu people, being aware of their economically weakened state, could be tempted to choose warlike men so as to retain their waning political autonomy 48). The aMaqamu remained opposed to the boundary line W. Shepstone had confirmed. They still maintained that their land had been given to the aBathembu and aMabomvu 49).

On 7 July 1896 an umsindo (marriage) took place between aBathembu and aMabomvu. Inkosi Kula had ordered his young men not to go there as izibukeli (spectators) for fear of faction fighting that might take place 50). They went there in spite of their inkosi's order. A serious stick fight took place when aMaqamu attacked aBathembu who were an umthimba (bridal party) 51).

It is normal practice among the Zulu people that young men attending an umsindo fight with a group of a different isigodi (ward). There is no evil behind this kind of fighting, but it is a way in which young men test their skills in stick fighting 52). Ukungcweka (fencing) normally occurs between two fighters at a time, others look on and eventually push the fighters apart.

50. SNA 1/1/213, Ref 1023/96, p. 3: RM Msinga - USNA, 8 July, 1896.
51. Ibid.
and that is the end of the game 53). It does happen that the two groups get involved in a free-for-all fighting. The main thing is that this kind of fighting has nothing to do with grudges originating from land disputes. What happened in Msinga was totally strange to Zulu culture.

The inhabitants of Msinga were already a disturbed community. In the first place the umthimba is highly respected on such a day. They and the ikhetho (bridegroom's party) only dance and jeer at each other but keep away from any kind of fighting 54). The residents of Msinga made use of any gathering to attack their enemies.

The magistrate thoroughly dealt with aMaqamu young men who according to the government's law were the aggressors. Sentences ranged between ten lashes and fifteen months imprisonment 55). The magistrate was only treating the symptoms of the disease. The aim was not to challenge the law but it was to drive the enemy out of the land 56). Stern measures such as prohibiting young people from attending cultural activities were too strange and artificial to work.

An umsindo could only provide a venue for the hostile parties to meet but

53. Ibid.
55. SNA 1/1/213, Ref 1023/96, p. 3; RM Msinga - USNA, 8 July, 1896.
was not the source of trouble as the magistrate once pointed out 57). Traditionally, men of all ages carry shields and sticks when they attend an umsindo. The carrying of sticks does not imply that they want to fight. It is the only way of conducting a Zulu wedding. The sticks and shields are not traditional weapons but form the complement to the imvunulo (traditional attire). In Msinga, the residents with their unpleasant inter-tribal feelings were tempted to abuse old procedures. Nhlangano kaDabuka Magasela of aMaqamu, born in 1912, vividly remembers that the 1896 survey by Walter Shepstone (Khanda), was followed by a number of hostile events between aMaqamu and aBathembu 58). The aMabomvu were only occasionally involved. His father was still an insizwa (young man) at that time. He told him about land disputes and resultant frictions between aBathembu and aMaqamu.

Khwengce was a great statesman and exercised a lot of influence. He had acted as the spokesman for aMaqamu after the death of InkosiNgoza Majozi. He had inculcated in the minds of aMaqamu that since the departure of Sir Theophilus Shepstone (Somtsewu), aMaqamu were not generously treated by the white authorities 59). His father referred to this faction fighting as Impi Yasebusika ngonyaka kaKhanda (The Winter Battle in the year of Walter

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58. Nhlangano kaDabuka Magasela, 81, a senior resident of Nkalana Hill, interviewed in his umuzi, on 20 July, 1993.
Shepstone). The umsindo came immediately after the unpopular land survey. The survey followed the death of Inkosi Mganu of aBathembu on 1 March 1896 (60).

The general interpretation of Inkosi Mganu's death was that it marked the end of aBathembu power in the reserve.

It was also generally believed among aMaqamu that aBathembu were to be driven away from Msinga Mountain top and finally across the Thukela River for them to be exterminated by aMachunu (61). The respondent's father participated in that fighting but was lucky to escape trial. The aMaqamu had been fuelled by Khwengce's argument with Messrs. W. Shepstone and H.F. Fynn on Msinga Mountain top when the authorities eventually abandoned their plan for the day (62.) That was on 28 June 1896. The aMaqamu felt that aBathembu had the protection of the white men, otherwise they were no match for them. The day of the umsindo arrived while aMaqamu still felt bitter about the work of Mr. W. Shepstone.

They did not just attack aBathembu, but two young men who were izimbangi (adversaries over women) were fighting. When the fight got heated, the

60.  SNA 1/1/216, Ref 276/96, Telegrams:USNA - RM Msinga and Weenen, 3 March, 1896.
62.  Nhlangano kaDabuka Magasela, 81, a senior resident of Nkalana Hill, interviewed in his umuzi, on 20 July, 1993.
man of aBathembu side stabbed his opponent with his ubhoko (the sharpened blocking stick in the left hand). This, being regarded as a foul, challenged the whole group of aMaqamu who all advanced to attack jointly 63). The aBathembu rushed to the rescue of their man. The situation was soon out of control. The aMaqamu were greatly outnumbered. They retreated but kept on coming back. Many people were injured but no death occurred.

The aMaqamu hated the ruling of the magistrate, who failed to understand that the young man of the other side wrongfully injured their fellow man 64). The respondent was requested to justify the act of aMaqamu when they disobeyed Inkosi Kula's order. He said he knew nothing about Inkosi Kula's order but ukubukela (attending weddings as spectators) never required permission from the inkosi.

After the trial and verdict many people were ambushed and injured and cattle were found with stab wounds. These events occurred mainly on the boundary. Imizi on both sides of the boundary were affected. The idea behind this was to push the enemy farther into the interior and when that happened the deserted spots were immediately occupied by members of the other side 65).

65. Ibid.
In Nhlangano's opinion, imisindo could cause no faction fighting in the absence of land disputes. He insisted that aMaqamu were justified to hate aBathembu because they had lost part of their territory. Khwengce knew all the boundaries like he knew his cattle.

Another respondent, Majalimane kaMpinini Zwane of kwaDaklilase near Lenge Mountain, born at the beginning of Impi kaKheiza (1914) argues that Sir Theophilus Shepstone alone should be held responsible for all the trouble in the reserve 66). That is his own opinion. He does not remember any particular battle, but even as a boy he knew that aBathembu and Sithole were old enemies of aMaqamu. He does not blame the Sithole for their bitterness against aMaqamu because the latter were cunningly used by Sir Theophilus Shepstone to punish the Sithole. At the same time aMaqamu had no other alternative, but to take what they were given 67).

The aBathembu pressed against aMaqamu because they sympathized with the Sithole. He complains that even today aMaqamu do not have enough pastures. They graze their cattle on Sithole land. The Sitholes drive them away. The problem will never be solved because more new people have flocked into the reserve. Most of these newcomers cannot identify themselves

67. Ibid.
with any isizwe. Crowding is worse than ever before. Sir Theophilus Shepstone made this arrangement in order to break down the unity among the izizwe of Natal. This disunity weakened their power so that they would never be in a position to overthrow white rule.

On 3 January 1898 Inkosi Kula surprised the magistrate, Mr A.E. Harrington, when he held a big gathering without obtaining permission from the government (68). This was considered an act tantamount to treason. The inkosi argued that no permission was required for such a cultural gathering (69). He reiterated that he wanted to form a new regiment according to Zulu procedure. This was reported to the Secretary for Native Affairs. Inkosi Kula's conduct was viewed seriously by the Natal Government. The magistrate's impression was that Inkosi Kula had very little, if any, respect for the white authorities. He stated that Inkosi Kula was still young. His bad behaviour could be blamed on his uncle and adviser, Mdliwafa (70). The latter had lived in Johannesburg for a long time and allegedly had records of jail sentences (71).

After some investigation, the magistrate learnt that all the local Zulu constables, who were all Inkosi Kula's subjects knew about the gathering.

68. SNA 1/1/279, Ref 4/98, Telegram: RM Msinga - SNA, 4 January, 1898.
71. SNA 1/1/279, Ref 4/98, Minute paper p. 4: RM Msinga - SNA, 5 January 1898.
Their white colleagues were absolutely ignorant of it. The Zulu policemen might have kept quiet about this because it was a cultural gathering, not concerning their white colleagues. The magistrate however did not hold this view. He interpreted this as proof that Inkosi Kula was against white rule 72). This idea was more disturbing to the white people than the faction fights 73). But the fact of the matter was that aMaqamu and their inkosi had never issued any threats to the white community or the government.

The clear implication is that Inkosi Kula hated the idea of being a puppet of the government. He was inclined to disregard the fact that his own isizwe came into being by an arbitrary decision of the same government. He wanted to stand up as an inkosi in his own right. That was exactly what the white authorities feared. Their fear might result in deposing him and scattering his isizwe like Inkosi Matshana kaMondise in 1858 74). He tended to be bold and assertive. His self-confidence perturbed the very architects of his isizwe and would mean self-destruction to him 75).

Inkosi Kula was summoned to appear before the Secretary for Native Affairs. He was informed in no uncertain terms that his apparent reluctance to show respect for the white people in general and civil servants in particular, was

73. SNA 1/1/225, Ref. 1169/96, p. 4: RM Msinga - SNA, 13 August, 1896.
   Cf. R.N. Currey: Letters and Other Writings of a Natal Sheriff Thomas Phipson 1815 - 76 p. 146.
frowned upon by the government 76). He was warned against bad influence he might be getting from such people as Mdliwafa 77).

The Secretary for Native Affairs had been told about Inkosi Kula's association with the Zulu Royal Family. No emphasis was laid on the faction fight that had occurred recently. He had to understand that his attitude towards the white people could threaten his own position.

The period between 1896 and 1901 could erroneously be regarded as a peaceful one, which illusion might have led the government to believe that land disputes were a thing of the past 78).

When no serious cases were brought to the notice of the government, the tendency was to believe that the inhabitants were satisfied and quiet. When some disturbances were reported, the government looked for individual culprits. The real problem was the total absence of the machinery to generate wealth 79). This problem was never addressed.

The inhabitants of Msinga found the imisindo (weddings) to be the only platform for expressing their anger. They did not direct their struggle to the

76. SNA 1/1/279, Ref. 4/98, Report of interview: p. 11: RM Msinga - SNA, 8 February, 1898
77. SNA 1/1/213, Ref. 1164/96, p. 2-3: RM Msinga - SNA, 7 August, 1896
    Cf. Justice Department, RM Mpoana, Annual Report 1921, p. 3
government but fought among themselves 80).

In 1902 at an umsindo (wedding), a huge stick fight took place among Inkosi Kula's own subjects. Two izigodi (wards) of the location, the Ngabayena and Nhlanhleni confronted each other 81). It was a fight between ikhetho and umthimba. It is worth repeating that this is something unheard of among the Zulu people.

Bhusimana of ikhetho, belonging to Nhlanhleni isigodi under Mdliwafu, started the fight. Bhusimana did not hold any political position. Inkosi Kula was present and the Ngabayena isigodi was directly under him 82).

Bhusimana wagiya (performed warlike movements) and spat on the ground at the feet of Inkosi Kula. This contemptuous behaviour angered the Ngabayena isigodi. The young men attacked Bhusimana. The Nhlanhleni group acted promptly and defended Bhusimana. A bloody battle broke out and a number of people of both izigodi sustained bad injuries 83).

It was later disclosed in Maqongqo's evidence that Mdliwafu had instructed the Nhlanhleni group to attack the Ngabayena isigodi at the umsindo in

81. 1/UMS 30, Ref. R 68/02, Maqongqo's evidence, Pomeroy, 8 January, 1902.
82. 1/UMS 30, Ref. R 68/02, Ngangaza's evidence, Pomeroy, 8 January, 1902.
83. 1/UMS 30, Ref. R 68/02, Ndlela's evidence, Msinga, 24 January, 1902.
question 84). Mdliwafa made it a point to be absent from that umsindo to avoid suspicion.

If Maqongqo's evidence could be relied upon, it is clear that Mdliwafa wanted to get Inkosi Kula into trouble. The reason for this might be that Mdliwafa wanted to give the government more grounds on which Inkosi Kula could be proved a failure. If he really did that, he obviously hoped to become the next inkosi, should the government decide to depose Inkosi Kula. The culture of the Zulu people demands proper conduct and absolute respect of one's inkosi 85). Nobody can spit in the inkosi's presence, let alone at him. Spitting at an ordinary person is an insult of the highest order. There was obviously a sombre cloud over Inkosi Kula's head or his location. Inkosi Kula himself was a witness in the court case that resulted 86).

Some of Inkosi Kula's izinduna were aware that he was already in the government's bad books. Making his location ungovernable would induce the government to declare him incapable. That might result in the appointment of one of them as the inkosi of aMaqamu.

On 29 October 1902 Inkosi Bhande Sithole took Inkosi Kula to court
complaining that the Sithole people in inkosi Kula's location were harassed 87). The allegation was that Inkosi Kula wanted those people to join his isizwe or remove to their own location. When the people did neither, they were not allowed to cultivate their gardens 88). The Sithole people argued that the land they occupied was Sithole land long before the arrival of aMaqamu. They said that if Ngoza Majozi was ever an inkosi, he was the inkosi of aMaqamu but they never had anything to do with him. The fence that aMaqamu regarded as a boundary line between them and Sithole was dismissed by the Sithole as the government fence separating the Crown land from their location. They said they had nothing to do with Inkosi Kula 89).

According to the magistrate, those Sithole were in Inkosi Kula's location. They argued that Inkosi Kula only started giving them trouble after his personal quarrel with Inkosi Bhande. Inkosi Kula further stated that these Sithole had a habit of attacking his people during beer drinks 90). He complained that each time the white authorities came to address this problem, the Sithole people would be polite and promise to comply. As soon as the white people left, Inkosi Bhande's subjects would adamantly challenge the legality of the whole issue 91).

87. 1/UMS 30, Ref. 3531/02, p. 2: USNA - RM Msinga 29 October, 1902.
88. 1/UMS 30, Ref. 3531/02, p. 6: USNA - RM Msinga 14 March, 1902.
89. 1/UMS 30, Ref. 3531/02, p. 7: RM Msinga - USNA, 14 March, 1902.
90. 1/UMS 30, Ref. 3531/02, Inkosi Kula's Evidence: Msinga, 26 November, 1902.
91. Ibid.
REMNANTS OF THE CONTROVERSIAL FENCE.
On the contrary, Inkosi Bhande wished to draw the attention of the government to the fact that it was very difficult for his people to abandon the place they had occupied during the lives of four successive Sithole rulers, Inkosi Matshana, Induna Mgabo, Inkosi Sibankwa and himself 92).

Witnesses from the aMaqamu side said the fence between the locations was the boundary between aMaqamu and Sithole. The third Resident Magistrate relied on the evidence given by the disputants. No records could help him. The matter remained unsolved 93). The aMaqamu claimed the land because it was legally given to them by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in his capacity as the Secretary for Native Affairs. On the other hand Inkosi Bhande's people claimed the same land on the grounds that their ancestors had lived there from time immemorial. Even today the remnants of the fence still stand, serving no purpose 94).

By 1902 the inhabitants of Msinga with lots of their cattle dead were thoroughly impoverished. They were ready to quarrel over the smallest piece of land showing some fertility 95). The problem could have been solved if the Natal Government considered the size of the reserve population and allocated land accordingly. This was possible because there was a lot of

92. 1/UMS 30, Ref. 3531/02, Inkosi Bhande's statement: p. 4: SNA, 3 December 1902.
93. 1/UMS 30, Ref. 3531/02, p. 19: RM Msinga closing court case, 10 February, 1903.
land owned by white colonists who did not even live there. The starving people were inclined to resort to crime for survival 96).

The problem of African reserves in general had been noted by M. Legassick as follows:

"In the African reserves, there were also changes, and these changes were usually in the direction of rural under-development, economic decay and pauperization" 97).

It was natural that amakhosi quarrelled time and again over boundaries. Extermination of one isizwe would leave the conqueror with more land to depend on.

If the Colonial Government ever hoped to maintain law and order among these people, it had to start by accepting the fact stressed by R. Palmer and N. Parsons as follows:

"Perhaps by 1900 in some areas the African reserves had been reduced from production of a surplus to subsistence, i.e. they were unable to meet even their bare subsistence needs" 98).

CHAPTER 4

FACTION FIGHTING BETWEEN AMABASO AND ABATHEMBU

Towards the end of 1902, the Natal Government was faced with the tragedy that the izizwe of the reserve were prepared to gain land by fighting or driving away one another 1).

The Sithole people had lost patience with the aMaqamu 2). The aBathembu were convinced that the aMabaso were their perpetual enemies and the only option left was to do away with them. The only origin of this ill-feeling was the fact that the reserves were beyond doubt overcrowded 3).

It still remains doubtful if Sir Theophilus Shepstone was far-sighted enough when he punished Inkosi Matshana by giving the Sithole land to aMaqamu in 1869. If he was aware of the consequences of his punitive measure, his action was extremely morally deficient. If he was not aware, he should be accused of having been exceedingly short-sighted 4).

There was no reason why the Natal Government could hope for peace between the Sithole and aMaqamu. The aMaqamu claimed the land on the

4. SNA 1/1/298, Ref 3531/02, p. 14: Khwengce's evidence, Pomeroy, 10 February 1903.
grounds that it was legally given to them by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in his capacity as the Secretary for Native Affairs 5). The Sithole on the other hand naturally possessed the land because they had occupied it long before the arrival of the white people in Natal 6). The crux of the matter was that the government had no solution to the problem.

The quarrel between aBathembu and aMabaso had by 1902 got worse than ever before 7). As it has been pointed out earlier that imisindo (marriages) had become the only permanent venues for the izizwe to settle their land disputes, aBathembu found that opportunity.

On 12 November 1903, a daughter of Sikhophela of aBathembu, was getting married to Mgadlela of aMabaso 8). According to Inkosi Mabizela Mvelase, Sikhophela had been advised to accompany his daughter all by himself in order to prevent faction fighting 9). The Zulu people have always regarded an umsindo (marriage) as a very important occasion in the life of an individual 10). It was very strange that a man could take his daughter all by himself to another man's umuzi for this occasion. It was also highly artificial that people required permission to attend imisindo. But Inkosi Mabizela was acting within the course of the law, regardless of the culture of these

5. SNA 1/1/298, Ref. 3531/02, p. 17: Sikhali's evidence, Pomeroy, 10 February, 1903.
9. Ibid.
people.

Something more sensitive about this particular umsindo, was that the bride had jilted a man of aBathembu living in the Nobamba County 11).

The aBathembu, mainly those from Nobamba attended. It could not be established whether they came armed with assegais because witnesses coming from both sides claimed that the other party had assegais 12). The aBathembu from Nobamba did not join Sikhophela's group as an umthimba. They stood as spectators on a hill facing Mgadlela’s umuzi. According to Constable Machiteka, aMabaso had brought assegais along to Mgadlela’s umuzi. The aBathembu were too far from him to see whether they were carrying assegais or not 13).

The aMabaso felt threatened and their young men started moving to what they regarded as an impi 14). The fight started when both parties pelted each other with stones. The aBathembu gradually retreated up the hill. The aMabaso moved sideways until they reached the top of the hill. The aBathembu felt powerless and ran down the hill, with aMabaso closely pursuing them until they reached the Sampofu River, when aMabaso returned

12. SNA 1/1/306, Ref. 3601/03, p. 3: Juqu’s statement - SNA, 30 November, 1903.
to Mgadlela's umuzi. Constable Machiteka and his colleagues found three dead men with stab wounds 15). They were all aBathembu.

It is not clear how both sides were armed, but what is certain is that the government had no solution to the problem. Inkosi Mganu had stated in 1895, a few months before his death in 1896, that he felt concerned about the wrath of his people 16). The fight of 1903 had only one origin, the land question between the two izizwe. The aBathembu of Nobamba had an old grudge against Inkosi Thulwana since he reported to the Secretary for Native Affairs that Inkosi Mganu had treacherously taken his land 17). These aBathembu accused Inkosi Thulwana of making false statements incriminating their inkosi 18). The men who led aBathembu spectators were Inkosi Mabizela's brothers, Mbhalo and Mnyamana Mvelase 19).

If aBathembu did carry assegais to the umsindo, they were, in truth, an impi and aMabaso were fully justified to feel threatened. Again if aMabaso did hide assegais while the dance proceeded, they were really expecting a fight on that day. According to Zulu culture, a man carries only a shield and two sticks when he attends an umsindo. These are not traditional weapons but are part of imvunulo (traditional attire). A Zulu man is not fully dressed

15. SNA 1/1/306, Ref. 3601/03, p. 2: Machilheka's evidence Pomeroy, 16 November, 1903.
16. SNA 1/1/197, Ref. 3601/03, p. 19: USNA - SNA, 29 April, 1895.
without his shield in his left and his induku (stick) in his right hand. If the people of Msinga normally carried assegais when attending imisindo, then it can be assumed that Msinga was already engaged in a long war. Two more of the wounded aBathembu were later reported dead 20). The fact that aBathembu being the second largest isizwe of the reserve, had lost five men while aMabaso had lost none, was a source of worry to the government 21). This meant that aMabaso had proved themselves superior to aBathembu on the battlefield. This, in turn was a serious reflection on the courage and skill of the whole isizwe of aBathembu. The authorities therefore had all the reason to fear that aBathembu were going to retaliate to restore their lost dignity 22).

The Colonial Government fully realised that the era of war had begun in the reserve. Since the inhabitants were in the habit of making use of cultural festivities such as imisindo as their rendezvous for faction fighting resulting from land disputes, the government would find it impossible to prevent such disturbances, mainly retaliations 23).

The court case was eventually concluded on 16 May 1904, with the participants on both sides receiving no mercy from the government 24).

20. SNA 1/1/306, Ref. 3601/03, p. 3: Mswe1's statement - SNA, 2 December, 1903.
21. Ibid.
22. SNA 1/1/315, Ref. 2423/04, Telegram: USNA - RM Msinga, 16 February, 1904.
24. Ibid.
The aMabaso were given sentences ranging between 12 months imprisonment or R100 and 15 months imprisonment with no option of a fine. All aBathembu participants were given a fine of R100 or 12 months imprisonment 25).

Both sides were discontented. The aBathembu could only be satisfied after getting a chance of avenging the deaths of their five clansmen 26). The aMabaso on the other hand argued that aBathembu had been obvious intruders in this case. They also complained that the government was unwilling to address their land issue meaningfully. The year 1904 was of no peace for the izizwe and no rest for the government.

In the south of the reserve aMabomvu and aMachunu were openly hostile to each other. In the north aMaqamu and Sithole were surely restless. In the middle of the reserve aBathembu and aMabaso were actually shedding blood 27).

On 2 August 1904, Nhloyile, an induna of aMabaso complained to the Secretary for Native Affairs that the land given to aMabaso by Mr W.R. Gordon in 1883, had been given to aBathembu in 1889 by W. Shepstone

25. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
and H.F. Fynn. He also complained that aMabaso had no real reserve because their location was completely surrounded by that of aBathembu 28). He also reported that Inkosi Mabizela had told aMabaso and their inkosi to evacuate the reserve. According to this induna, Inkosi Mabizela had already forcibly driven out of the reserve ten imizi of aMabaso, without even getting the government's permission to do so 29). Inkosi Thulwana felt that the government did not realise how urgent this matter was. It was for this reason that on 21 October 1904 he sent two more messengers, Nyoni and Zinelana to make a special request to the government to take a particular view of the attitude of aBathembu towards aMabaso 30).

It was not only the conflict between aMabaso and aBathembu that required the government's immediate attention. On 16 September 1904, the government's authority was challenged by the behaviour of a farmer, Mr. J.C. Vermaak who owned a farm near Helpmekaar. The argument between the farmer and the government started when Inkosi Nkukhu Mbatha decided to remove from the farm. Inkosi Nkukhu was in charge of a small isizwe of Sithole on Mr Vermaak's farm 31). He took a few of his subjects to the Zulu Kingdom.

28. SNA 1/1/312, Ref. 1559/04, p. 2-4: Nhloyile's statement - SNA, 2 August, 1904
29. Ibid.
Before leaving, the inkosi called his people together and told them that a man, Gweje Mdunge would be in charge of the remaining members as the induna. The isizwe made no objection. The magistrate also approved of Gweje's appointment but the farmer did not.

The farmer had his own favourite, Hlamvu. The magistrate and the inkosi were both right according to the legal procedure of the time. It was the duty of the inkosi of the particular isizwe to choose his induna and submit the name for approval by the government. The farmer was deviating from the normal procedure when he appointed the induna simply because the isizwe was on his farm. He reiterated that the government did not favour Hlamvu because there had been allegations that he was anti-British.

When the government ignored Mr. J.C. Vermaak's complaints, he turned to Gweje and told him to choose between relinquishing his new position and leaving the farm. Gweje found himself in an impossible situation. The government could only make him an induna but could not prevent his expulsion. His landlord could keep him if he was prepared to remain submissive. He could only remain on the farm on condition that he stepped down. Gweje became realistic and in his distress, he understandably sacrificed his position.

32. SNA 1/1/313, Ref 1932/04, p. 4: RM Msinga - USNA, 15 October, 1904.
33. SNA 1/1/313, Ref 1932/04, p. 3: USNA, 27 September, 1904.
34. Ibid.
35. SNA 1/1/313, Ref 1932/04, p. 2: J.C. Vermaak - SNA, 16 September, 1904.
36. SNA 1/1/313, Ref 1932/04, Gweje's statement - RM Msinga, 15 October, 1904.
37. Ibid.
The significance of this drama lies in the fact that the landlord proved to be above the law. He had more power on his farm than the government. In this case, the land did not belong to the Queen of England but to the farmer. For that reason the law was not strong enough to protect Gweje's rights because his landlord, being white, owned the land unlike the amakhosi of the reserve. The government was not prepared to force Mr. J.C. Vermaak to do things procedurally 38). There was also the danger of the farm community getting divided. Those members of the isizwe who favoured Gweje, might decide to secure his position by killing his opponent, Hlamvu. Again those who were on Hlamvu's side might endanger Gweje's life in order to secure their candidate's position. In both cases the result would be an outbreak of a faction fight that could easily involve the whole reserve. Only the withdrawal of Gweje saved the situation 39).

Inkosi Mabizela of aBathembu died on 6 November 1904 after suffering from scurvy and dysentery 40). He left no immediate heir as his children were still infants. The aBathembu raised the name of Ngqamuzana Mvelase to act as a regent until the late inkosi's son reached majority 41). Ngqamuzana was Inkosi Mabizela's younger brother.

38. Ibid.
39. SNA 1/1/313, Ref 1932/04, Gweje's statement - RM Msinga, 15 October, 1904.
40. SNA 1/1/314, Ref 2240/04, p. 2: RM Weenen - SNA, 30 November, 1904.
41. Ibid.
Ngqamuzana rose to a high position when relations between aBathembu and aMabaso were extremely bad. He was approximately 23 years old 42). The aBathembu were likely to urge him to hasten the attack on aMabaso for having murdered five men of aBathembu in 1903. The government did however rely on Ngqamuzana's quiet temperament 43).

On 2 February 1905, Inkosi Kula of aMaqamu had to appear before the Under Secretary for Native Affairs to explain why he had defied the government's order 44). Inkosi Kula had tried to imitate Mr J.C. Vermaak, but he did not get away with it. He had been ordered by the magistrate, Mr A.E. Harrington to grant Mgazi Khumalo a site for umuzi 45). Inkosi Kula wanted to know more about Mgazi before he could grant him the site 46). Mgazi had been removed by the government from Nobamba County 47). The magistrate hated Inkosi Kula's response. He regarded it as a challenge to the government and so he reported to Mr S.O. Samuelson that Inkosi Kula had refused to comply with the instruction given to him. In his defence Inkosi Kula stated that he had no intention to disobey the government, but he wished to receive the government's assurance that Mgazi was not a bad man 48).

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, p. 1: Interview: USNA - Inkosi Kula, 2 February, 1905.
45. Ibid.
46. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, Tshali's evidence, Pomeroy, 24 February, 1905.
47. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, p. 2: Interview: USNA - Inkosi Kula, 2 February 1905.
48. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, Tshali's evidence, Pomeroy, 24 February, 1905.
Since the magistrate had taken exception of Inkosi Kula’s behaviour, Mr. S.O. Samuelson viewed Inkosi Kula with suspicion. In the same report, the magistrate had made the government aware of the circulating rumour that Inkosi Kula had sent men to King Dinuzulu to work on a scheme to overthrow white rule. The inkosi was further accused of being passively disloyal 49). He escaped a charge only because no evidence could be obtained. On 11 April 1905, the magistrate reported that Inkosi Kula had since complied with the instruction 50).

The two men, Mr. J.C. Vermaak and Inkosi Kula were both concerned about peace among the people they governed. Mr. J.C. Vermaak successfully turned down the application of the man he did not like for the position. Inkosi Kula, in charge of the largest isizwe in the division, was not in a position to reject somebody of allegedly bad character 51). Instead of assuring Inkosi Kula that Mgazi would not be a bad potato in the isizwe, the government only displayed its alacrity to punish any inkosi who dared oppose it. Inkosi Kula’s manner was regarded as insolent 52).

During these years of the early twentieth century, Msinga had fully indulged in what D. Robbins and W. Hartley call: "Underground economy" 53). Even

49. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, p. 2: RM Msinga - USNA, 7 March, 1905.
50. Ibid.
51. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, p. 5: Interview: USNA - Inkosi Kula, 2 February, 1905.
52. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, Mpmpe's evidence, Pomeroy, 24 February, 1905.
as early as 1894, the white authorities had lamented the emergence of deviance in the community of the reserve. In the annual report of June 1894 the magistrate had expressed his concern about the easy availability and frequent use of dagga in Msinga 54). According to this report, smoking of dagga was the worst source of evil in the reserve. He complained that dagga smokers showed unpredictable behaviour. They easily got out of control. They often lost their temper with their oxen and horses and would consequently treat them with amazing cruelty 55).

By merely reading the magistrate's report one gains the impression that dagga smokers made it very difficult for the authorities to maintain law and order in the reserve 56).

The tendency of developing much appetite for meat, after smoking dagga, turned these men into stock thieves. They would just catch other people's goats, slaughter and roast them 57). They committed gruesome murders without remorse. These men knew neither fear nor mercy 58). Amakhosi were reported to be doing the best they could to fight the circulation of the drug. The magistrate hoped that the co-operation of amakhosi would show positive results 59).

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
In 1905 it had become evident that many people in Msinga were living by crime. Cultivation and sale of dagga increased alarmingly year after year. In 1980 when D. Robbins and W. Hartley visited Msinga, they were surprised to learn this truth. D. Robbins expresses his experience as follows:

"It is the most important crop. Some dagga gardens are barely five paces square, yet even these bits of ground can yield the grower R200.00. Small growers tend to barter their dagga for bread, sugar, tea, beans and soap" (60).

Another group of people that became important during these years of growing stress and grief, were traditional healers.

A respondent, Godola kaBhatatata Sithole of Waaihoek, near Indaka (Sundays) River, says the need for intelezi (a mixture of herbs kept in water for some time and then sprinkled on the body of the fighter to give him supernatural powers) made traditional healers invaluable (61). His father told him about the critical years before the uprising of Bhambatha. He states that izizwe of the reserve were up against one another. Intelezi helped (and still does) to give the young men unsurpassed courage. Each warrior goes to the enemy without imagining himself getting hurt. They fight bravely until the last man is down (62). The respondent was born at Sahlumbe near Nobamba (Weenen) in 1914, after the death of King Dinuzulu. The death of King Dinuzulu after a long controversial struggle with white rule, made many Zulu people feel unsafe. Intelezi is there to banish such fears. Bhambatha

62. Ibid.
GODOLA SITHOLE OF WAAIHOEK
had made use of intelezi to thwart the white man's efforts to capture him alive.

There was much lawlessness among the inhabitants of Msinga during the early twentieth century. Cattle thieving took the form of raids. Every man had to fight to protect what belonged to him. Bhambatha's behaviour provoked white rule. White people became suspicious and intolerant. Men feared they could just be imprisoned for nothing unless they used their intelezi 63). From the resopndent's narration it could be deduced that intelezi becomes indispensable when people feel insecure or threatened. At the same time, it is obvious that the use of intelezi gives people undue courage. Many go headlong into danger and suffer the consequences. The belief in the power of intelezi encourages faction fighting to a larger extent than dagga smoking does.

On 14 February 1905 Ngqamuzana Mvelase was officially appointed as the regent inkosi of aBathembu 64). Those aBathembu of Nobamba (Weenen) had not forgiven Inkosi Thulwana of aMabaso for having allegedly made false statements against Inkosi Mganu to the Secretary for Native Affairs in 1882 65). Inkosi Thulwana was said to have complained that Inkosi Mganu

63. Ibid.
64. SNA 1/1/316, Ref 3128/05, p. 1: USNA - Minister for Native Affairs, 30 January, 1905.
had taken some land that officially belonged to aMabaso. This angered Inkosi Mganu because Inkosi Thulwana had never complained to him, but had chosen to approach the Secretary for Native Affairs 66). The only occasion that could give aBathembu the opportunity of punishing aMabaso was an umsindo.

The government knew very well that imisindo were quite notorious but there was no way in which the inhabitants could be forced to do away with such important cultural gatherings 67). The great moment for aBathembu arrived on 22 November 1905. On this day, two imisindo took place at imizi that were four kilometres apart 68). One was at Sikwata's umuzi in the location of aBathembu. The bride was Inkosi Ngqamuzana's sister 69). The aBathembu, mainly those from Nobamba (Weenen) attended well.

The second one was at Madubeka's umuzi, a subject of Inkosi Kula. This umuzi was situated on the aMaqamu - aBathembu - aMabaso boundary 70). The aMabaso, being on friendly terms with aMaqamu, attended at Madubeka's umuzi as spectators. Some of them spent the night drinking beer at aMaqamu's imizi. On the following day, at about midday, 13 aMabaso men left aMaqamu location. On their way home, they went through the

66. SNA 1/1/313, Ref 1932/04, p. 3: USNA, 27 September, 1904.
67. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
The unsuspecting aMabaso were suddenly attacked by a group of about forty men of aBathembu. The aMabaso had to fight in self-defence and a fierce battle broke out. Ntaba, a youth of aBathembu was killed 72). The aMabaso, being evidently outnumbered had to run with the angry aBathembu in hot pursuit.

The outbreak of the real war between the izizwe was the result of a woman's exaggeration. The woman came across Ntaba's body and saw a group of aMabaso running. She started shouting and yelling saying the whole isizwe of aBathembu had been annihilated by a large impi of aMabaso 73). The hue and cry of the woman was enough. The reserve was to experience the biggest faction fighting it had ever known 74).

All able-bodied men of aBathembu armed and crossed the boundary without any waste of time. They destroyed everything they could find in the location of aMabaso. Animals were mercilessly butchered and imizi were burnt to the ground. Most aMabaso managed to escape but three men were captured and ruthlessly slain 75). Within a short space of time chaos governed Inkosi
Thulwana's location.

The aMabaso took refuge at Inkosi Thulwana's Sigumedeni umuzi 76). The impi of aBathembu was literally roaming the whole location of aMabaso. Inkosi Thulwana and his people had to hide in the old stronghold of Msinga Mountain 77).

All this took place on Thursday 23 November 1905 before 15h30. The hue and cry of Thursday had been carried to Nobamba, Mtshezi (Estcourt), Mnambithi (Ladysmith) and Dundee 78). The arrival of the police on Thursday prevented further fighting but they were not enough to cover the rugged and thorny country 79).

On Saturday, 25 November 1905, two more men of aMabaso were murdered while trying to drive their cattle to a safer place 80). Inkosi Thulwana's umuzi, Mkhomazi, near the boundary of aMabaso and aBathembu, was burnt down 81).

Besides Ntaba, aBathembu lost one more man who got injured when an umuzi of aMabaso was attacked. The clash cost seven lives, five aMabaso
and two aBathembu 82). In property, aMabaso lost almost everything as indiscriminate destruction went on and on. It was the best chance for aBathembu to plunder and loot. The magistrate described the condition as more of a turmoil than a mere faction fight 83).

The magistrate of Msinga realised that the system of alliances could start operating, in which case the situation would be aggravated. He confidentially advised the magistrate of Krantzkop to prevent Inkosi Sibindi of aMabomvu from forming a union with aBathembu 84). He also made it a point to contact the magistrates of Nobamba, Mnambithi and Dundee asking them to instruct aBathembu in their divisions to remain in their imizi 85). Inkosi Kula was not contacted as the magistrate believed that the mere mention of the undesirability of a union between aMabaso and aMaqamu, might urge him to join aMabaso in order to worsen the state of chaos 86). Twenty one izindlu of aMabaso were razed by fire 87). The war was not a long one but aMabaso were thoroughly ravaged.

The government realised how difficult it was to govern the people who had been driven by hunger to utter despair. The izizwe, on the other hand had realised that the government would never be in a position to solve their

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82. SNA 1/1/337, Ref 751/06, p. 8: RM Msinga - USNA, 1 March, 1906.
83. SNA 1/1/330, Ref 3137/05, p. 5: RM Msinga - USNA, 26 November, 1905.
84. SNA 1/1/331, Ref 3308/05, p. 1: RM Msinga - USNA, 9 December, 1905.
85. Ibid p. 4: RM Msinga - USNA, 9 December, 1905.
86. Ibid.
87. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 751/06, p. 8, RM Msinga - USNA, 1 March, 1906.
land problem. The habit of driving away members of the neighbouring isizwe and inheriting their land, had become one of the unwritten laws of the reserve 88).

It was extremely difficult for the government to find the culprits who could be prosecuted 89). That was the case because nobody knew who did what. The aMabaso who saw their imizi being destroyed could not identify their attackers as individuals, except that it was the impi of aBathembu. Evidence was sadly lacking and the authorities could hardly succeed even to lay charges against individuals 90). One of the worst habits of the people of Msinga is their refusal to discuss anything concerning faction fighting with any stranger. Even today they are very reluctant to disclose any information. A local police officer of the 1980s was interviewed by D. Robbins. He expressed himself as follows:

"We have a lot of trouble laying charges, and a lot more making charges stick. The local people are reluctant to talk against each other, witnesses disappear, others change their stories in court. I think they do this because they are frightened 91)."

The magistrate was not sure whether he had to open a murder case or to charge aBathembu with faction fighting 92). The two aMabaso victims who were murdered while tending their cattle, were not involved in any fight. He eventually opened two cases against aBathembu - faction fighting and murder 93).

89. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 751/06, p. 9: RM Msinga - USNA, 1 March, 1906-
90. Ibid.
93. SNA 1/1/377, Ref 751/06, Letter: AG - Minister for Native Affairs, 7 April, 1906 .
There was a very strong suspicion that Inkosi Ngqamuzana was behind this disturbance, but in any event evidence was lacking 94). The police could not get anywhere with their investigation because there was always a concerted effort of suppressing evidence. The aBathembu were found to be passively resisting the course of the police in every way 95). The weak evidence gathered was that twenty aMabaso took part in the actual fighting, but they were fighting in self-defence when they were in a besieged position together with their inkosi 96). Unlike their enemies, aMabaso co-operated very well with the police 97).

A suggestion made by the magistrate of Msinga was that Inkosi Ngqamuzana and his induna, Lugubhu Mvelase be fined R25 each for prevarication while giving evidence 98). He also felt that the government should consider cancelling Inkosi Ngqamuzana's appointment as the acting inkosi of the whole isizwe of aBathembu. According to the magistrate, it would be safer to relegate Inkosi Ngqamuzana to the position of a mere induna of those aBathembu in the Msinga Division only 99). This did not happen. Even if this suggestion was put into operation, it remains doubtful if the demotion of Inkosi Ngqamuzana could bring peace to the izizwe whose grudges were very old. There was no unforeseen cause of conflict between the two izizwe.

94. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 751/06, p. 1: Supplementary Report, RM Msinga - USNA, 14 April, 1906.
96. SNA 1/1/337, Ref 751/06, p. 10: RM Msinga - USNA, 1 March, 1906.
97. Ibid.
The crux of the matter was the hatred resulting from land disputes. This hatred had been accumulating over the years (100).

The authorities also sheepishly recommended strict observance of boundaries as a solution to the problem (101). There was no form of boundary that could keep people totally separated (102).

The official estimated loss suffered by aMabaso amounted to R4500 (103). The government decided to compensate aMabaso with a sum of R2250 (104).

The problem facing the government was the fact that the izizwe of the reserve were not in a position to live in peace even in the remote future (105). Since aBathembu had further impoverished aMabaso, stealing for survival would increase. The izizwe of aBathembu was strongly rebuked for having started trouble. Two hundred and five of their men were fined between R15.00 and R30.00. Inkosi Ngqamuzana and Induna Lugubhu were each fined R100. The total fine collected amounted to R1175 (106).

The aBathembu had been waiting for this faction fight which they believed would be instrumental in causing aMabaso to abandon the reserve once and for all. Life in the reserve was based on the principle of the survival of the

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101. SNA 1/1/330, Ref. 3213/05, p. 2: USNA - RM Msinga, 8 December, 1905.
102. SNA 1/1/330, Ref. 3308/05, p. 5: USNA - RM Msinga, 9 December, 1905.
103. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 751/06, p. 11: USNA - RM Msinga, 1 March, 1906.
104. Ibid.
105. SNA 1/1/331, Ref. 3506/05, p. 1: USNA, RM Msinga, 28 December, 1905.
fittest 107). Inkosi Thulwana had repeatedly requested the government to give aMabaso more land. It was, however, unfortunate that he and his isizwe failed to realise that their neighbours, aBathembu were not responsible for the shortage of land. Their failure to understand this made them blame their plight on aBathembu. The aBathembu also regarded aMabaso as the main culprits. It is this belief that made aBathembu wish to destroy aMabaso or force them out of the reserve 108).

Land disputes had cost lives and all those deaths were going to be avenged. Therefore the vengeance ideology had been born and it was to remain the law of the reserve. The ideology is still alive and well. The aBathembu being a larger isizwe than aMabaso were certainly going to rely on their size and would be keener to start trouble. They would rekindle the flames of war time and again for the sake of doing away with aMabaso. The aMabaso had no other location to live in so they would fight for mere survival. The government had to expect more disturbances.

107. D. Robbins and W. Hartley: Inside the Last Outpost, p. 84.
CHAPTER 5
THE EXILE OF INKOSI KULA
AND THE PARTITION OF AMAQAMU LOCATION

The words used by Mr. S.O. Samuelson to Inkosi Kula in 1905 after the latter wanted to know more about Mgazi before granting him a site, indicated that the government was no longer proud of aMaqamu as its special creation 1).

On 16 March 1905, Mr. S.O. Samuelson expressed himself in a harsh and blunt manner when he spoke to Inkosi Kula:

"You are simply a chief by favour of the government. The aim of the government in creating aMaqamu was to have a loyal tribe which would be an example to the surrounding tribes. During the late war your tribe was not found to be an example" 2).

False reports that circulated in the location widened the rift between the white authorities and Inkosi Kula. A man called Jingi was a son of Induna Mtshebelele. He had been spreading false reports, claiming that there was a terrible battle between white residents and Inkosi Kula's subjects. Jingi's lies were calculated to incite aMaqamu to rise against the government. His lies were effective as both population groups were frightened 3).

The white residents believed that many aMaqamu had joined Bhambatha

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1. SNA 1/1/318, Ref. 477/05, p.1: USNA - Native Affairs Department, 25 March, 1905.
2. SNA 1/1/318, Ref 447/05, p. 3: Interview: USNA - Inkosi Kula, 23 March, 1905.
and therefore any white person was a sure target. On the other hand aMaqamu feared that the government was getting ready to arrest any male. They used a lot of intelezi and moved about armed in order to defend themselves in case such arrests were attempted. The sight of armed Zulu men convinced the white residents that a huge attack on them was imminent 4). The white residents pressurised the government to take stern measures to prevent their (imagined) imminent massacre.

On 24 January 1906, aMaqamu had told their inkosi that they were prepared to resist the payment of poll tax. This declaration by aMaqamu did not at first mean much to ordinary white residents, but when Jingi's stories reached them, they felt threatened 5).

Another man who got Inkosi Kula into trouble, was his induna of the eastern part of the location, called Mabulawa. He had been spreading stories resembling those of Jingi. He further encouraged all the people he met at beer drinks to remain armed as the police would come to arrest him and many other people loyal to Inkosi Kula 6). After he had thoroughly complicated issues, Mabulawa went into hiding. When he left, there were already two camps of frightened people, black and white.

Inkosi Kula was ordered to produce Mabulawa within three days 7). He failed. The magistrate told him that the government would have no choice but to consider his conduct 8). Bhambatha's open challenge to the government alarmed the white population to such a degree that they kept on demanding more and more security measures from the government 9). The general feeling among the white people neighbouring the reserve was that Inkosi Kula should be summarily arrested or deposed without delay 10). They had a very strong belief that he had hidden agendas with Bhambatha and King Dinuzulu, for the sole purpose of overthrowing white rule in the whole of Natal 11).

The police, being zealous to find some grounds on which Inkosi Kula could be arrested, instituted spies who attended all meetings held in the location. The spies totally failed to get even one induna quoting the inkosi as saying that his isizwe should challenge or treacherously overthrow the government 12). This failure gave the government a lot of difficulty.

It was not only the white residents that lived in fear during Bhambatha's activities. Many inhabitants of the reserve feared that they might go to jail simply because the police suspected that they were rebels. There were

8. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 828/06, Klass Mbhele's evidence Msinga, 14 March, 1906.
complaints in some parts of the location that many people were tortured by Inkosi Kula's henchmen 13). These alleged victims were said to be loyal to the government. No evidence was ever given in the long run. Those who spread such rumours did so because they wanted to guarantee their own safety against being suspected and consequently arrested. Their stories could end up as rumours but they were instrumental in convincing the government that the white community's fears were not unfounded. Such rumours strengthened the belief that Inkosi Kula was passively resisting the payment of poll tax, which confirmed that he was passively disloyal 14). These loyalists failed to understand that their stories were making life difficult even for themselves.

The timid white civilian population intensified their pressure on the government to demonstrate its power in order to keep its Zulu subjects shivering and submissive 15). This pressure resulted in the Commandant of the Militia announcing a compulsory parade. The announcement called upon all white men between eighteen and fifty years of age residing in the Msinga Division to parade at Freiburg Farm on 17 March 1906. Each man was required to bring with him a rifle together with fifty rounds of ammunition 16). The aim of the parade was to demonstrate the power of the

14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
government to the Zulu people so that nobody could think of challenging it.

The parade, however, did not materialize because the Minister of Justice felt that it would cause panic and worsen the already disturbed state of the district 17). Inkosi Kula's location was in a chaotic condition. While the white residents felt concerned about their safety, aMaqamu were becoming a divided community. Anyone could be labelled either as a spy or a rebel. Members of a family could bear different labels. Both labels were equally dangerous. Anyone labelled as a spy was immediately an enemy of the community. At the same time a rebel faced immediate imprisonment. The result was that many people left their imizi and spent nights in the forests 18). The situation was getting worse day after day. The white community blamed all this squarely on Inkosi Kula and regarded the government as unfeeling 19).

The statement jointly made by Constables Lugedla and Ngalo alarmed the white authorities to a considerable extent. These constables reported that Inkosi Kula had been visited by men who were Mehlokazulu's messengers 20). The purpose of the visit remained unknown but it was strongly believed that it had to do with the rebellion. Mehlokazulu kaSihayo had a reputation

17. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 761/06, Letter: Minister of Justice - Commandant and of the Militia, 12 March, 1906.
of being a formidable opponent of white rule. It was for the magistrate to decide whether to use this as proof of Inkosi Kula's underground scheme to overthrow the government. But the white residents doubted nothing.

On 27 March 1906, the magistrate received a petition signed by 39 white residents. The petition demanded immediate deposition of Inkosi Kula together with Izinduna Mabulawa and Mtheli 21). The izinduna had led men who incited aMaqamu to resist the payment of poll tax. The major problem still facing the petitioners was the absence of evidence to prove the role Inkosi Kula had played. They also suggested that aMaqamu location be divided into four sections with distinct heads 22). With or without proof, Inkosi Kula was regarded as a menace to public safety 23).

On 10 April 1906, Inkosi Kula succeeded to surrender Mabulawa to the magistrate. His arrival with Mabulawa aggravated relations between him and the magistrate. The magistrate complained that the inkosi entered the office unannounced and left without saluting him 24). He expressed his fears in no uncertain terms. He emphasized that Inkosi Kula was passively disloyal 25).

23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
What was generally interpreted as disloyalty was Inkosi Kula's tendency of treating the white civil servants as his equals and colleagues. Nothing else made him so unpopular with the white community. The magistrate felt obliged to warn the minister for Native Affairs against Inkosi Kula's latent dispositions, which, according to him, would soon become patent 26). He was convinced beyond doubts that the inkosi was waiting for the right time to declare war on the government. In the eyes of the white residents Inkosi Kula was as rebellious as Bhambatha, only he was clever enough to conceal his plans to such an extent that it was impossible to take any legal action against him.

While the white authorities paid a lot of attention to Inkosi Kula, the condition was worsening between rebels and loyalists 27). In his letter dated 28 April 1906, the magistrate reported that those loyalists who had given evidence against Mabulawa were threatened with death 28). The purpose of the report was to draw the attention of the Minister for Native Affairs to the fact that aMaqamu did not live in peace. That was a reflection on their inkosi.

It is surprising that the Magistrate failed to realise that many people took
delight in telling hair-raising stories to others. A lot of these stories were
told at beer drinks. People told many stories about Bhambatha's magical
powers. Some would go to the extent of claiming to have met him. Others
would say they were in possession of Bhambatha's intelezi. The magistrate
himself in his letter to the Commandant of the Militia stated that on 3 March,
Mabulawa falsely and purposely intimidated the Rev. Dedekind by telling
him that the whole isizwe was fast getting out of hand 29). The Rev.
Dedekind spread Mabulawa's lies. Those white residents who believed
Mabulawa's lies panicked and abandoned their homesteads. Thieves found
deserted farms and helped themselves. The magistrate interpreted this as
open rebellion for which Inkosi Kula should be held responsible 30).

The white community did not understand that stock thefts and raids were
old among the izizwe of the reserve. They were among the major causes of
faction fighting. The only difference was that the white community had
never been so hard hit by the old evil of Msinga. Thieves realised that their
white neighbours were fear-stricken and availed themselves of the rare
opportunity of stealing from the other population group. People who talked
like Jingi and Mabulawa spread a lot of disorder and confusion irrespective
of whether their inkosi was innocent or not.

30. Ibid.
On 7 May 1906, Inkosi Kula reported to the magistrate that Mtheli had armed his men. This lawful deed, did not improve Inkosi Kula's image in the eyes of the magistrate. It was no longer possible for the white authorities to trust Inkosi Kula. When he showed anger, his behaviour was described as a challenge to the government. When he behaved politely, it was believed he was hiding something more dangerous. For this reason alone Inkosi Kula and a number of his izinduna, including his uncle, Maweni were arrested under Martial Law by the officers in Command of the Militia.

On 23 May 1906, the Minister for Native Affairs wrote to the Attorney General demanding to know the nature of the charge that legalised Inkosi Kula's arrest. He wanted to know from the Attorney General as the legal adviser of the government whether there were any papers indicating and establishing a charge for any indictable offence against Inkosi Kula. Such papers should have been sent to the Attorney General for his information and for his direction in the usual way in criminal matters.

According to the minister for Native Affairs, there was no charge against Inkosi Kula and his izinduna. He also critically singled out the

32. SNA 1/1/341, Ref. 1431/06, Telegram: SNA - Minister for Native Affairs, 9 May, 1906.
34. Ibid.
Bridge.

By J. H. SIMMONS.

The scene is 23 to 1, in the dueller's favour, the time when he puts in the following trick:

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... that the better can happen is that the better Deuce, and even then the dueller's lead may not be out of reach. Bridge would not declare a total, but the set.

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Chief Kula and His Indusks.

Under Arrest at Dunbar Station.

A man whose wife had quarrelled with him and had gone to live with her mother, was met by a friend, who, in apparent sympathy, remarked to him: "Mrs. Brown is an easy thing that your wife has gone on as you." "Well, man," said James, "I don't want that with you. I don't want that at all." "What want can you have than that," asked his friend, anxiously. "She'll never go back," faintly replied James.

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Little Girl: "Please, Mrs. Brown, mother wants to know if she can have a dozen eggs. She wants to put them under her beard!" Mrs. Brown: "Yes, you love get a bit, have you any idea?" I didn't know your mother would want to."

Little Girl: "No, she doesn't, but she wants to be kind to a hen that is going to sell, and that might be of you kind in the case we could find the nest ourselves."
magistrate's comment in the minutes dated 19 May 1906. The magistrate had expressed himself as follows:

"I am pleased Maweni has been sent back and would be equally pleased to see all Kula's headmen returned as I have nothing against them, as Kula is at the bottom of the whole rebellion in this division" 35).

The magistrates statement indicates clearly that he was not in a position to produce any evidence against the inkosi. Like ordinary white residents, the magistrate only believed without evidence that Inkosi Kula was involved in underground movements calculated to uproot the power of the white people in the colony. Sergeant T.W. Stringer of Natal Police in Msinga, in a voluminous report made a similar allegation against Inkosi Kula. The report, in its entirety does not lay any charge against the inkosi, in spite of its being strongly worded 36).

If Inkosi Kula was really involved in a plot to harm his white neighbours or the government, why did all high - ranking officials fail to catch him?

As a man of the law, Sergeant T.W. Stringer should have based his argument on evident facts. But instead, he argued as follows:

"Everything however points to the conclusion that Kula's desire has been to sit on the fence and give us as much trouble in secret as possible, until he considers it safe to stand out openly i.e. in general rebellion" 37).

35. Ibid.
It can also be pointed out that the contents of Sergeant T.W. Stringer's report betray his ignorance of the culture of these people. He could not make a difference between cultural activities and a war. He expressed himself as follows:

"Tribal regimental system appears to be in full force here. Every wedding or gathering of any sort is attended by Natives in full regiments" 38).

What Sergeant T.W. Stringer saw in the location of aMaqamu was something that still exists even today among the Zulu people. It had nothing to do with any rebellion whatsoever. At a traditional Zulu wedding, men of all ages sing war songs and shout war cries without meaning to attack or challenge anyone 39). That is how these people express their pleasure and unity and there is still no better way.

If most white residents and white civil servants had the same notion in their minds, then Inkosi Kula could not have possibly escaped arrest. The last extract from the sergeant's report will indicate the role played by racial prejudice and competition in making it impossible for the black inhabitants to share life with their white neighbours:

"With reference to Kula, this man, up to the time when the troops arrived here, was a bigger man in the Division than the magistrate and was more feared. Any day he comes into Pomeroy natives might be seen rising to their feet and giving him the Royal Salute of "Bayete" and it is given in earnest, for the natives seem afraid of him. The magistrate on the other hand is lucky if he gets a half-hearted "nkosi"") 40.

38. Ibid.
40. SNA 1/1/341, Ref. NP 556/06, p. 11: NP Msinga - NP Dundee, 18 May, 1906.
It was then for the government to decide whether to prosecute Inkosi Kula without a charge or to advise the white residents to remain calm until the enemy could reveal his evil intentions justifying legal action against him.

On 28 May 1906, the Attorney-General wrote a comprehensive report to the Minister of Justice regarding Inkosi Kula's arrest 41). The report is unambiguous. It indicates clearly that he regarded the arrest in question as a glaring miscarriage of justice.

According to the Attorney-General, the magistrate of Msinga had for some time made constant complaints to the Minister for Native Affairs regarding Inkosi Kula's conduct, but at no time had he formulated any specific criminal charge against the inkosi 42). He strongly argued that whether or not Inkosi Kula was a fit and proper person to remain in charge of such a large isizwe as that over which he ruled was purely an administrative question, with which the Attorney-General was not concerned 43). He was supposed to deal with the criminal aspect of Inkosi Kula's conduct.

In March of 1906, Inkosi Kula had been interviewed by the Minister of Native Affairs, he was admonished and cautioned. As late as the 30th day

43. Ibid.
of March of 1906, there was no trace of any criminal charge of any kind against him 44).

The Attorney-General questioned the validity of the Troop Leader's report that only said, as the magistrate entirely distrusted Inkosi Kula, he (the Troop Leader) had decided to send him to the Minister for Native Affairs in order that the inkosi could explain the state of affairs in his isizwe 45).

The magistrate had been requested by the Attorney-General to forward a full report and all depositions involving the inkosi and showing why he was arrested 46). The magistrate's reply was as follows:

"Chief Kula was not arrested by me or by any authority given by me but his removal met with my complete approval" 47)

The Attorney-General also found it disturbing that the Minister of Native Affairs, who had been in close touch with Inkosi Kula's conduct apparently did not know of any specific charge against him. Instead he stated that it was for the Attorney-General to say whether the papers indicated and established a charge for any indictable offence against the inkosi 48).

The Attorney-General's report challenged the magistrate's declaration made after the arrest of the inkosi. The magistrate had said:

44. Ibid p. 1: AG - MJ, 28 May, 1906*
45. Ibid.
46. SNA 1/1/341, Ref. AG 1154/06, p. 2: AG - MJ, 28 May, 1906 -
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
"In my opinion there is overwhelming evidence to show that Kula concealed the arming of his tribe until it was impossible for him to conceal it any longer and that he was carrying on intrigues with Mehlokazulu to rebel against the Government" 49).

On the other hand, the Attorney-General felt that the magistrate had to be asked to formulate specific charges, give particulars thereof, and schedule the legal evidence which he considered overwhelming 50). In going over the papers, the Attorney-General discovered that there were seven depositions all of which taken after 7 May. That was the date on which the inkosi reported that Mtheli was arming. The depositions referred to an alleged message delivered to Mtheli by Mahoyiza 51). Mahoyiza was reported to have delivered the message on 5 May to the effect that it was Inkosi Kula's wish that Mtheli should arm and fight. It was alleged that Mahoyiza spoke as a messenger sent by Inkosi Kula, but there was no evidence to establish Inkosi Kula's connection 52).

Finally, the Attorney-General reported that he could find nothing against Inkosi Kula and his izinduna then detained in custody 53).

Despite the Attorney-General's objection, Inkosi Kula could not be released solely because his detention had relieved the white community of Helpmekaar and Pomeroy. On 28 July 1906, Inkosi Kula's location was

51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
divided into two portions, I and II or West and East. Inkosi Thulwana of aMabaso was given custody of aMaqamu in Location I. Induna Khwengce was to be responsible to him. Location II was given to Inkosi Sibindi Ngubane of aMabomvu. Induna Hanisi was to be responsible to the new inkosi (see map 5) 54).

From that day aMaqamu were to exist only in name as an isizwe, they had been officially fragmented. They had no common inkosi but they were bound to show their loyalty to foreign rulers. That was a particularly sensitive issue mainly in the case of those aMaqamu who were placed under Inkosi Sibindi. The government knew very well that aMaqamu and aMabomvu were old enemies 55). This was just like keeping aMaqamu in captivity for an indefinite period of time.

The "Times of Natal" of 12 September 1906 published Mr. Watt's reply regarding Inkosi Kula's arrest. The extract does not state Mr. Watt's position in the community but the question was directed to him at an election meeting on 11 September 1906 in Dundee 56). Mr. Watt said that the Chief Leaders of the Militia Reserves had wrongly construed the actions and motives of the Government. The arrest of Inkosi Kula had placed the Government in a

54. SNA 1/1/346, Ref. 2441/06, p. 1: NP Pomeroy - PM, 28 July, 1906
55. SNA 1/1/223, Ref. 984/96, p. 3: RM Msinga - SNA, 28 June, 1896
56. SNA 1/1/223, Ref. 1431/06, p. 7: Clerk Executive Council - RM Msinga, 25 September, 1906
difficult position 57). Inkosi Kula had reported to the Government, through the magistrate, that he would be unable to restrain his people. He, however, was suspected of not being sincere, and was told to return to his people, the Government policy being to give him the opportunity of committing some act against the authority of the Government, which would enable the Government to take definite action 58).

Mr. Watt further pointed out that the arrest of Inkosi Kula was not only unjustifiable, but also frustrated the intention of the Government. The summary arrest of Inkosi Kula was wrong at the time, seeing that Inkosi Kula had himself taken a legitimate course by reporting to the Government 59). It was hoped that the Governor would deal with Inkosi Kula under powers vested in him as Supreme Chief, and remove Inkosi Kula to another part of the colony where his influence would not be felt. The audience applauded Mr. Watt's explanation 60).

Mr. Watt's explanation makes it easy to understand that the arrest of Inkosi Kula was only a means to relieve the white community of somebody who regarded them as fellow citizens rather than his superiors 61). If the fears of the white residents were not unfounded, why did aMaqamu keep quiet

57. Extract from the "Times of Natal", 12 September, 1906.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
when their inkosi was thrown into prison without trial? The arrest of the inkosi during such disturbed times should have been effectively used by aMaqamu as a good reason for launching an attack on the government. The absence of an uprising by aMaqamu is clear proof that they, as an isizwe, knew nothing about any form of rebellion otherwise they could have demanded the release of their inkosi. Instead of facing the government they continued their petty quarrels and clashes. Those few radicals such as Mabulawa, Jingi and Mtheli had no considerable influence. But the white community did not know that.

On 5 October 1906, Inkosi Kula was interviewed by the Minister for Native Affairs. The purpose of the interview was to let him know that his detention together with his position had come to an end. It was not the day of trial as he might have expected but it was the day of judgement 62.)

He was officially informed that the government had found him unsuitable for the position he held. He was told that his people during his term of office, had failed to show their loyalty to the government. In the interest of peace and good government, as far as aMaqamu were concerned, the government thought it necessary and advisable that he should be

Sketch map illustrating the partition of amaqamu location in 1906.

SNA 1/1/346.
On the very day, he had to go to the Zwartkop location under Inkosi Laduma of aMampumuza in the Mngeni Division. Inkosi Kula's umuzi comprised 40 izindlu but he had to reduce it to only 10 izindlu. The removal of any further izindlu would be considered later on. The Minister of Native Affairs finalised by advising Inkosi Kula to obey the orders and give no further trouble, if he desired peace.

Towards the end of the year 1906, it became officially known that those who were known as rebels, were a group of only 20 men. One of their victims, Mzuzu Dladla made such a statement to the magistrate of Msinga. They specialised in stealing cattle and goats. One day some of them met him while he was driving his goats. They ordered him to leave the goats alone, when he tried to resist, they threw stones at him. He ran away leaving the goats behind. The men soon disappeared with the goats. They had left their imizi after they had somehow learnt that their names were on the police list of those who intended to support Bhambatha.

Mzuzu's statement contains many childish stories of Bhambatha's magic.
None of these aMaqamu rebels had ever been in contact with Bhambatha or his forces. Those farms were not looted because they belonged to white farmers, but the looters were thieves who were prepared to drive away any animal they came across.

The rebels received a lot of sympathy from their friends and relatives who had escaped trouble because they were away in Johannesburg or any labour centre. When these men came home, they labelled a number of people as spies and they threatened to deal with them. The frightened people needed protection from the government. The government could not intervene without making its own threats to keep the bully fellows checked. Life continued to become tense so that the suspected spies left their imizi for the forests in the same way as the rebels. In what way could the government restore peace among people in this state of confusion?

The government once had an idea of removing the angry men to a locality as remote as possible from their original residences. This proved to be only a dream because there was no other place for these people and no distance could prevent them from carrying out their threats if they so desired.

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68. SNA 1/1/349, Ref. 2677/06, p. 1: Commandant Militia - RM Msinga, 3 August, 1906.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid p. 2: Commandant Militia - RM Msinga, 3 August, 1906.
The exile of Inkosi Kula was not the outcome of faction fighting that was obviously plaguing the Msinga Division. It was only done to calm down the unduly frightened white residents. Inkosi Ngqamuzana Mvelase, for instance, was told by the magistrate that he was not innocent of the faction fighting between aMabaso and aBathembu in 1905. But he got away with it because aBathembu were considered loyal to the government.

Inkosi Kula remained in exile for a decade. In his absence aMaqamu did not rise against the government but petty quarrels among themselves became common and they often resulted in faction fights. He was reinstated in 1916 for no obvious reasons. When he came back, he had little peace as some of his people had been declared to be Inkosi Bhande's subjects. When their inkosi returned they struggled to renounce the Sithole citizenship. The location remained divided into distinct sections. One isizwe had been divided into blocs.

Such arbitrary decisions seldom succeed in achieving peace and goodwill among the people involved. In this case also, the result was the breakdown of tribal cohesion which culminated in the feuding between districts within the same isizwe. This breakdown is intrinsically linked to the increasing

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72. SNA 1/1/337, Ref. 751/06, p. 20: RM Msinga-USNA, 1 March 1906.
74. Ibid.
pressure of overpopulation which generated a fierce competition within the
isizwe over grazing grounds and land for cultivation 75).

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This research has come to the conclusion that faction fighting started as an effort by the Zulu man to maintain his rural economy, after he had been dumped into the reserve by a foreign political system beyond his control. The system responsible for his new environment had done nothing to safeguard his economy. His land was diminishing as a result of overpopulation. The Colonial Government did not solve his problem instead it made it worse by dumping more people into the reserve. The reserve inhabitant had become a subject of the British Empire but had no economic share in its prosperity. The government was clear about the external boundaries, but the internal boundaries remained a mystery.

The izizwe of the reserve found themselves faced with the problem of establishing themselves economically in the new and artificial fatherland. It was during this process of self-help that the vengeance ideology emerged.

Faction fighting did not come to an end in 1906 but large-scale fighting stopped until 1922. The significance of 1906 is that prior to that year, the preliminary wars had been fought and the system of alliances was complete. The government was aware of the existence of the system but had no way of dissolving it. This research has endeavoured to trace the underlying causes of the disastrous war that has managed to outlive three successive governments of this country viz. The Colonial Government, The Union of South Africa and The Republic of South Africa. All these governments have failed shamefully to end the war in Msinga. It has been indicated in
the research that no government can possibly stop fighting among the people who really depend on pushing one another away for survival.

It can be pointed out in this conclusion that sporadic clashes occurred in many parts of Natal but they were always brought under control. No other division has endured the culture of bloodshed like Msinga. No other division has suffered the pressure of land shortage like Msinga. This pressure led to the desire for territorial expansion which no isizwe could embark upon without provoking its neighbour. In this state of affairs inter-tribal hostilities became inevitable. Those members of each isizwe who lost their lives during the struggle for land, were survived by an ideology that is powerful enough to turn the whole division into a large graveyard. The vengeance ideology is an abyss of death and lamentation, ready to swallow the healthiest and innocent young man whose blood must pay, by day or by moonlight, for the deeds of his ancestors. Fighting might seem to be on ebb at times but the fierce ideology lives on.

It would be unduly optimistic to hope that the present or future government will be able to stop the war easily. It is nevertheless strongly suggested that Msinga must be given more attention by the government and private institutions. Economic upliftment can change the behaviour of the residents of this district for the better. This can only be achieved if these people are trained to make use of the natural resources of their own environment.

Agricultural projects such as the one established by the late Neil Alcock at Mdukatshani in 1971, must be supported by the government. The amakhosi
(chiefs) should be given some training in project management. Inkosi Nsikayezwe Sithole plays an active role in promoting agriculture among his people. This is highly appreciated. All izinduna (headmen) must be given at least basic knowledge of scientific farming. Traditional farming methods must of necessity be abandoned. All izigodi (wards) must have a number of people who manage projects in each area. These people must make it a point that every piece of arable land is thoroughly utilised. The involvement of young people of both sexes in locally organised projects will improve the standard of living of these people. This will also help to keep young men busy so that they stay away from crime.

The prosperous white farmers surrounding the reserve must be encouraged to work together with their neighbours in the reserve. Once the residents of the reserve are in a position to produce food for themselves, they will stop stealing from their white neighbours. The government must do its best to unite these people. Erection of fences to separate the people has proved to be a worthless exercise. As long as the reserve is in dire poverty, stealing and fighting will continue.

Many parts of Msinga are inaccessible by road. Even the existing roads are often in a hopeless state. The total absence of roads in many parts of the reserve keeps the residents isolated from the rest of the world. Unless they visit other places, they simply cannot communicate with other people. Good roads will also enable people of the private sector to open businesses in the reserve. Employment opportunities will increase.

At the time of writing, two izigodi (wards) of Waaihoek, under Inkosi Ngoza
Mvelase of aBathembu, were engaged in a serious faction fighting. Those are Mbondwane and Nkomana. There are no clear reasons for fighting but what is clear is that unless these men go to war, they do nothing for seven days of the week. They have been fighting like this for years. Both sides have always found reasons to renew the war.

Electrification of all parts of Msinga will not only attract entrepreneurs, but will also solve the water problem. Keate’s Drift has become fortunate in this respect. Most respondents do not hesitate to blame their suffering on unemployment. The increase of orphans and widows year after year, hinders progress. The starving young orphans steal for survival and eventually become hardened criminals. The result of this behaviour has always been faction fighting.

Anyone is urged to suggest the best solution to this old problem. The author of this document strongly recommends that a way must be found to keep these idle hands properly occupied.

It is hoped that other researchers will be able to reveal more in this field of study.
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