THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A FRAMEWORK OF VALUES FOR EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE
IN A PLURALIST SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

BY

MANDLA PATRICK MNCWABE

Submitted in Fulfiment of Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the
Degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

in the Department of Philosophy of Education
at the
University of Zululand

Date Submitted: May 1987

Supervisor: Professor P.C. Luthuli
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I wish to express my gratitude and indebtedness to the following people for their indispensable help and contributions:

1. To my promoter, Professor P.C. Luthuli, the Head of the Department of Philosophy of Education, University of Zululand, who has from the beginning of this study, given me invaluable guidance and encouragement at every stage. I tender my sincere thanks and appreciation.

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M.P. MNCWABE
KWADLANGEZWA
MAY 1987
DECLARATION

I, MANDLA PATRICK MNCWABE do hereby declare that this thesis represents my own work in conception and execution and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my two sons MUSAWEKOSI and SIBONISO and my daughter NOMANDLA. May this be a reminder that proper education leads to emancipation and that hard work and perseverance are outlets to success.
One of the great issues of the present time in the Republic of South Africa is the problem of all members of the school-going population securing equal educational opportunities. All pupils basically have the freedom to learn. However, pupils cannot reach their full development when denied equal educational opportunities. Education, positively acknowledges both the communal factors and the diversity of religious and cultural life-styles and languages of the inhabitants. These diversities in the different cultural groups in South Africa are presently receiving structural prominence. The problem, however, justly raised is whether sufficient prominence is being given to commonalities. Very little binding exists between, the heterogenous cultural groups in the R.S.A. Serious polarisation exists and this is apparent in many fields including education. In education in particular this alienation, distrust and anomalous behaviour is examplified by disruption of school programmes in many ways.

The question of how education may fulfil a more constructive binding function in such a heterogenous divided society was therefore a problem necessitating problem solving research.

The aim of the study was therefore to discover educationally acceptable values of promoting understanding for, and empathy towards one another among R.S.A. cultural groups. To seek communal factors in the establishment of identity and individual cultural identity and, finally, to seek the achievement and maintainance of common high standards of educational provision in respect of schools, and other educational institutions, and support services.
QUOTATIONS

"The diversity which throws into daily juxtaposition varied beliefs, attitudes, and approaches to living can be an enriching force in society . . . . Major intellectual, social and other developments have often occurred when there has been creative tension among competing ideas and approaches to life." (Australian Commonwealth Education Portfolio, 1979, paragraph 2.10)

HENCE

"The conceptual trick is to acknowledge diversity of cultures within the society but assume that culture deals mainly with styles and cooking recipes and has relatively little impact on ambitions, moral judgements and public goals." (C.H. Enloe)

THUS

"A society is a group of unequal beings organised to meet common needs . . . . The just society . . . is one in which sufficient order protects members, whatever their diverse endowments, and sufficient disorder provides every individual with full opportunity to develop his genetic endowment, whatever that may be." (Robert Ardrey)
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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is the study of man in his total context of being, in terms of eternal questions of What, Why and How. It is ultimately concerned with matters of ontology (reality) axiology (values) epistemology (knowledge). It considers views of man and related moral and social issues. None of its propositions is necessarily final, but some may find more legitimacy than others in a particular society. Philosophy deals with matters of life and death. It seeks to ask and to answer questions that are the most stubborn, baffling and disturbing in the history of human race. Yet they cannot be avoided. So long as cultures are confronted with perplexities, obstacles, choices, men must think as well as they are able, and they must act in terms of their thinking.

Education too, shares these perplexities, obstacles, choices. In some form, education is infused with all phases of culture, simple and complex alike. Therefore it could no more escape philosophy than cultures could escape it. Philosophy is brought to bear upon the problems of education.

In other words there is the use of philosophical instruments, the application of philosophical methods to questions of education, as well as the relation to education of the relevant results of philosophical thinking.
Many philosophers have argued that an attempt to solve educational problems without utilising the wisdom and the power of philosophy is inevitably doomed to failure. Practice unguided by theory is aimless and wondering, inconsistent and inefficient (just as theory that is not ultimately translatable into practice is wild and wasteful, confusing and perhaps even useless). The successful resolution of problems in education as elsewhere, always requires critical reflection and deliberative action. Clearly then, education and philosophy are inextricably related in any society, for education is essentially a sociophilosophical enterprise. As a philosophic enterprise education must be based on the root epistemological assumption that it is possible to have knowledge - to know and to learn - and the root axiological assumption that it is better to know than to be ignorant. The inseparability of philosophy and education in society is readily apparent in the Republic of South Africa.

The problems of education are the problems of philosophy, and these two are inseparable because the end of education is the end of philosophy - wisdom, and the means of philosophy is the means of education - inquiry. The artificial separation of philosophy and education inhibits inquiry and frustrates wisdom. Short of such an intellectual catastrophe, philosophy and education cannot be separated, either in theory or in practice, although they can be distinguished.
That is why philosophy of education is a distinct but not separate discipline from either philosophy or education yet gets sustainance from philosophy. It takes its problems from education and its methods from philosophy, and philosophising about education requires an understanding not only of education and its problems but of philosophy as well.

1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION TO THIS STUDY

The background information to this study can be categorised into four sources, namely the South African Government’s White Paper (1983), the National Policy for General Education Affairs Act (1984), official debates and speeches, and, finally, the press.

In the White Paper of November 1983 the Government set out its official response to the recommendations of the Education Working Party (EWP) based on the De Lange Report of 1981. The De Lange Report contained eleven principles for the provision of education which the Government accepted subject to certain qualifications given in the Interim Memorandum of October 1983. The De Lange Report intentionally made no reference to issues of race and colour, but the Government specifically re-affirmed that each population group should have its own schools and education authority.
"Freedom of choice" by parents and learners is placed within this context. The Government's response on the White Paper is explicitly linked to the new constitutional dispensation in terms of which education is divided into "own" and "general" affairs. In the White Paper the Government has interpreted that to mean that all educational matters that relate solely to the specific group, are "own affairs" of the population group concerned, but aspects of education which affect all groups, such as financial norms and standards, salaries and conditions of employment of staff etc., will be handled as of "general affairs" by new fifth Ministry of Education. By establishing the Fifth Ministry and re-affirming racial separation, the Government rejected perhaps the single most important recommendation of the De Lange Report - a single Ministry of Education of all groups in the Republic of South Africa. Symbolically, equal education was linked by many and especially Blacks to a unified administration. Consequently, the Government's failure to establish this has been viewed as a grave symbolic loss. The most important principle of the De Lange Report was the first: "equal opportunity for education including equal standards in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the State" (p 14).
In the White Paper the Government commits itself to pursuing equal standards in education and applying comparable procedures in supplying resources to the system. This would seem to be a commitment on the part of the Government to equal financial provision for all groups. However, nowhere does the Government say exactly that, and in fact in the White Paper, it leaves a number of loopholes for itself (for example, "it appears that the State can be expected to ensure that there are equal opportunities and equal standard for all, although it will depend on the community concerned to what extent education of equal quality does in fact develop from this basis" p 28). In the light of the past the Government has come a long way in its educational policy. Whereas in 1948 its stand was "separate and unequal" now it can be characterised as "separate and equal" (with some qualification). Voices from the past, however, can still be heard in the White Paper. The influence of the conservative Afrikaner philosophy of education, Christian National Education can be detected in certain areas: in the wording of the White Paper the Government's emphasis on "moulding" citizens and its re-iteration of the "Christian" and "National" principle of South African Education.

The National Policy for General Education Affairs Act (1948) gave statutory effect to the Government's intentions regarding general educational affairs in the White Paper and it was the educational expression of the constitutional dispensation.
The first part of the Act incorporated the eleven principles of the De Lange Report, but the wording of the Principles, 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9 was altered, and in many instances the original intention of these principles has been significantly weakened or narrowed in scope — in accordance with the qualifications of the Interim Memorandum and the White Paper. The General Affairs Act does not supersede previous education acts. All existing educational legislation remains. Educational policy is thus firmly rooted in the racially separate mould of the past, and the previously determined educational principles, like the "Christian" and "National" principles, and mother tongue instruction remain in force. The Act established a Minister of General Educational Affairs. It was stated in the White Paper that the other four Ministers of "own" education affairs will not be subordinate to the Minister responsible for the general education matters. However, since this relationship in the Act is clearly based on the loose concept of "consultation and advice" the General Affairs Minister in effect is ultimately empowered to determine the general policy which is binding on the "own" affairs ministers. His role therefore is potentially a powerful one. The definition of general educational affairs in this Act clearly comprises the key educational policy areas. The machinery of real power appears therefore to be highly centralised with the decade of the autonomy provided for "own" racially separate group.
The Act further establishes a number of advisory bodies such as the South African Council of Education (SACE), the Committee of Educational Heads (CEH), the Universities and Technicians Advisory Council (UTAC) to advise "General" affairs and "own" affairs ministers. These are all multi-racial committees constituted in an advisory and not a decision-making capacity. This is also innovative in the sense that for the first time joint multi-racial consultation and shared responsibility for the defined general spheres of education will occur and expressed by way of general legislation. The forum for debate about education has been widened.

During many education debates over the years, important speeches have been made by Government spokesmen. Most of these have referred back to the White Paper. It is significant that the qualification of equal education in the White Paper was re-iterated in parliament - namely, "the extent to which education of equal quality does in fact develop will depend on the community concerned". During the debate on the education budget Barend du Plessis, the then Minister of Education and Training, showed a sensitive appreciation of the main problems in Black education and a willingness to consult with all groups. The promising development was short-lived: he was moved to the Ministry of Finance and the Minister of National Education, Dr G Viljoen took care of both education portfolios until the new constitution could be implemented. He is now called the Minister of Education and Development Aid.
During the last ten years there have been seven different Ministers of Education and Training and du Plessis was the third appointment to the post in an eighteen months period. This lack of continuity, while being of no help to the functioning of the department, has also made it very difficult to gauge Government's policy on Black education. The constant changing of ministers of Black education would seem to indicate that the Government is not sufficiently aware of the importance of the position.

Newspaper articles have provided and still provide other perspectives on Government's educational policy. Newspapers present different ideological interpretations of Government policy depending on editorial opinion and the "public" that it represents. The English newspapers were divided in their attitude to the White Paper. The more "liberal" papers like the "Star" and "Rand Daily Mail" were critical of the White Paper, regarding it as entrenching separate education and rejecting the key De Lange Report recommendation of a single ministry of education. The Post (4 October 1981) commented

"The Government's apparent rejection of the bulk of the proposals, however, has disappointed a wide range of people from educationists to politicians ...... The fact that the Government has rejected the recommendation of a unitary body shows that there is still a conflict about the direction of change." p 4
The Star (24 November 1983) also expressed the same opinion of the disappointment at the outright rejection by the Government of one Ministry of Education and the editorial added:

"It is doubtful whether the rigidly separate education departments laid down in the new deal will enhance the acceptability of education. It is also questionable whether the various Ministers of Education will be able to diffuse deep-seated dissatisfaction about education among Blacks" p 5

The more conservative English newspapers supported the White Paper as a break through for education. The Afrikaans newspapers generally seemed to support the Government's stand in the White Paper, although in "Rapport" for instance, its "pros" and "cons" were discussed. It seems that none of the newspapers took a definite stand on the general Education Affairs Bill. The reporting of the Bill in the press was very general and factual, although the position of different political parties with regard to the Bill were clearly given. For example, Dr Alex Borraine, PFP chief spokesman on education described the Government's response to the recommendation as desperately disappointing and unbelievably negative:

"Their response is timid, ......, and tentative. Afraid of the right-wing reaction, they have clung to the worn-out framework of the past."
Afraid of dashing hopes of educationalists and others, they have stalled for time. "(Mercury, 4 October 1983).

But Dr Gert Viljoen replied that the vast number of constructive non-controversial recommendations on the report were being ignored by the PFP for political ends:

"It is naive of the Opposition to have expected that the Government - simply on the basis of the appointment of an inquiry - would throw overboard the principles on which it had only recently fought an election and won a mandate." (Mercury 4 October 1983).

The impression which emerges from all this background information above is that, firstly, the General Affairs Act did not remove the present segregated education structure; it merely built an "umbrella" structure above it. However, by bringing the key policy issues into a wider forum of multinational consultation and consideration, the General Affairs Ministry effectively will encroach in the long term on the autonomy of the separate executive departments. The executive departments will retain control over the implementation of policy, teacher training, their teaching force and educational programmes and methods.
Secondly, voices from the right and the past in the White Paper and the right-wing reaction to the General Affairs Act made it clear that conservatism is still a powerful force in political and educational circles and the Government is aware of this. On the 18 October 1981, the Sunday Tribune wrote that growing right-wing resistance to crucial recommendations of the De Lange Report is drawing support from within the Afrikaans Reformed Churches. These churches played a role in the Afrikaans cultural and political establishment and they have traditionally given high priority to educational issues particularly in securing the Christian National basis of white education. It was for this reason then that:

"Afrikaans churchmen ..... generally welcomed the government's cautious response to the report in which it was made clear there would be no dilution of racial separation in schools." p 18.

The Government may be on the reform path, but in the eyes of many, especially the Blacks, it has not come far enough.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
"One principle of education which those men especially who form educational schemes should keep before their eyes is this - children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possible improved condition of man in future, that is, in a manner which is adopted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man." (Kant: on Education).

The question of the young in society has been a source of interest and continuing discussion throughout most societies and all ages. Socrates in his day asked: "what kind of awful creatures will they become when they grow up?" To know what youth is and what we are aiming at with the young constitutes an important universal problem.

In educational spheres it has nowadays become common knowledge to regard adulthood as the ultimate aim of all education; that is, to view the child's life as an unrelating progress towards adulthood. It is also a generally accepted fact that every child is born into, grows up and becomes an adult member of a particular cultural group. The child is, therefore, born into a given situation of cultural-historical origin, and becomes a personality shaped by and for his particular socio-cultural context.
Since the child is taught to accept, value and reproduce the behaviour and sentiments of the society into which he is born, his behaviour, attitudes, ideas and ideals are likely to differ fundamentally from one social group to another. One can expect to find that child-rearing, education and socialisation take very different forms in a heterogenous and technologically complex society from those found in a homogenous, conservative and technologically unprogressive society.

Every child is born into a world of people, objects and things. Every child, by virtue of the fact that he is a human being, wants to come to an understanding of all objects, things and people he finds in his world. Although he neither verbalises nor formulates it, the child has to orientate himself by attaching meaning, by interpreting and by forming a network of relationships with the people, objects, ideas and values, he finds in his world.

This network of relationships, meanings, and interpretations pertaining to the people, objects and things in his society (his world) constitutes the child's life-world. It should thus be obvious that children growing up in different societies (cultures) will form different relationships, that is, will have different life-worlds. However, all societies share an ideal that their children should grow up and become mature adults.
One of the great issues of the present time in the Republic of South Africa is the problem of all pupils securing equal educational opportunities. All pupils basically have the freedom to learn. However, pupils cannot reach their full development when denied equal opportunities. The denial of equal educational opportunities heeds a vicious circle whereby most members of the White minority are opposed to one or single education policy and integrated schooling, while at the same time there is a beration of the group(s) whose opportunities they have denied for failing, for example to hold a job, or rise out of poverty.

The nature of the aims of education in South Africa is:

- prevailing aims entrench ethnically separate education;
- vocational and career education is limited even among white pupils, and hardly exist among Black and Coloured pupils.
- because success is measured in terms of mainstream White culture, career aspirations among Black parents (for their children) are usually very ambitious and unrealistic in terms of the opportunities available.
- non-formal education is generally very neglected.
job reservation and restriction on mobility impose obvious limitations on educational aims. (There is however an unrushed move to relax laws enacting these issues).

- divided control, which is ultimately very expensive, is generally unacceptable to Black South Africans .... (Buthelezi Commission Vol. II, 1982 : 267 - 268)

The struggle for equality of opportunity began with the emergence of the modern era at the time of the French Revolution when great scholars like Condorcet and d'Alembert wrote in the Encyclopedie: The law assumes me an entire equality of rights, but I am denied the means of knowing them. I should be subject only to the law, whereas my ignorance makes me subject to everything around me.

These champions of the Enlightenment spoke in a society which was itself deeply divided into rigid classes and in which there were deep rifts between the different sections of the population. They boldly declared the conviction that Christianity teaches: "men are born and remain equal". This was an appeal to higher justice, the natural law.

True education cannot divide and separate. Education should unite nations spiritually and socially by the propagation of reason. Black pupils' call for an end to separation in education in 1976 and 1980 was a major reason for commissioning the De Lange investigation.
The Government, by rejecting, the Reports call for unitary education system has ignored the problem. The creation of a single ministry of education is still of highest symbolic significance. It remains the only basis for legitimacy of the entire system in the eyes of the majority of the users. Press reports reveal that black leaders and student groups continue to regard their education as inferior. The Government's present stand of "separate but equal" poses the crucial question for Black Education: if you are probing to achieve equality, can you have separateness? The answer from Blacks is "no". If the system has alienated Blacks, the majority of its users, then the future prognosis for education in South Africa is bleak.

Because of the fragmentation of the educational system, there is a lack of a national perspective on the main problems. For instance the problems of teacher supply, quantity and morale are not tackled as a national problem in terms of the need of the country as a whole. Education within the borders of South Africa is not looked at in its totality: divisions abound between education in homelands and "White" areas, education in rural and urban areas, and education in the four provinces and in the different population groups. The education system generally seems to be inflexible and resistant to change.
Blacks have been alienated from the education system by the historical neglect of their inferior, separate education and the Government's refusal to establish a single education ministry and policy for education. They reject their unequal, separate education as a reflection of the apartheid system. Their alienation is expressed in student unrest at schools and universities and in the poor morale of Black teachers. The new education structure has left most of the Blacks "out in the cold" - they have been given only token representation on most educational bodies and more than half of all Black pupils in the homelands have been excluded from its effect. Education is an emotionally charged issue for Blacks - for them it is "the way out of the predicament they find themselves in". With education so important to improving their life chances there is a very real threat that if the education system continues to alienate the majority of the users of the system, the unrest which has become endemic in the Black system may well become an epidemic again as in 1976. Even the present "crisis management" of Black student unrest points to the general lack of management skills in the formal education system.

The crucial factor in the provision of equality education has been identified as the teaching corps. The problems of its morale, supply and quality seems insoluble even in the long term. In the absence of a well planned, co-ordinated innovative national strategy for improving the quality and quantity of Black teachers, in particular, the existing efforts in this field have little hope of reaching a critical mass.
As long as the quality and supply of teachers remain poor, the vicious cycle of poor teaching, a high dropout rate, few graduates and too few well-qualified teachers will continue. Because of lack of quality education, vast numbers of Black pupils continue to drop-out of school and fail the matriculation examination. There is every indication that the Black matriculation pass rate may continue to fall in the short term, particularly if a single examination is introduced. Blacks who have struggled in the system as far as matric have had their hopes raised of securing a certificate which will open avenues to tertiary institutions and the world of work. In the near future these hopes of more than half the black matric pupils will be dashed. Because of the vast numbers involved this situation continues to be a serious social, economic, and political threat. Accreditation and evaluation seem to be the powder-keg issues of the future and their problems loom over the formal and non-formal sectors of education. In the formal system the examination system has been shown to be unreliable, invalid and open to abuse.

If education is viewed from the perspective of the private sector there are serious problems. The education system is not meeting the immediate or long-term interest of the private sector. The private sector is already making a significant contribution to education and clearly it cannot solve all South Africa's ills.
Sonn, on the paper entitled "Equal Opportunity in Education in South Africa delivered on the National Education Conference: The De Lange Report, retorts:

"The critical shortage of skilled manpower in South Africa has perhaps highlighted the South African dilemma more than anything else. Experts concerned primarily with economic growth emphasize the need for all of South Africa's people to be trained to take up the jobs waiting to be filled in commerce and industry. They insist that this must be done on the equal basis to each according to his ability and production." p 10

"Separate but equal" has been proven to be a contradiction in terms. Equal educational opportunity therefore only appears possibly within a political system where all people participate fully in a just sharing of power. Therefore, the process of redistributing educational resources and creating equal educational opportunity must take place either concurrently with political change in South Africa or must lead the way to a just society. The three Black population groups in South Africa have consistently demanded that they want one education department for everybody because they realise that they are never going to get equality of provision if their education departments are separate. Thembela (1982: 14) states that this view is supported by the American experience in the following words of Judge Warren in the famous case of Brown Vs Board of Education 347 US 483(154)
"To separate (Black children) from others of similar age and qualification solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."

In educational terms, there are legitimate and illegitimate reasons for educational differentiation. Entwistle (1978:8) provides the following checklist:

"...equality of educational opportunity implies that no-one should be prevented through social or economic impediment from getting the best possible schooling from which he can benefit. Irrelevant matters to do with social class, economic status, nationality, sex, ethnic origin, religious affiliation, race or geographical location should have no bearing upon access to schooling ..... demonstrable differences in intelligence, achievement, talent, interests or tastes, may justify differential educational provision. Everything hinges on this distinction between differences which are educationally significant and those which are educationally irrelevant."

Educational diversity based on educationally irrelevant factors is discrimination; educational diversity based on educationally valid factors is differentiation.
"Equal" education may ignore the need for differentiation because of the slogan of "equality" and so may discriminate by seeking to treat all in the same way. Conversely, the South African education system discriminates while it claims to be differentiating.

1.4 THE AIM, SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

The debate about equality of educational opportunity has tended to flounder because of the lack of a shared understanding amongst those involved in the debate. The argument for educational equality rests on a particular understanding of ways in which all persons are equal, or are entitled to certain rights. The concept of equality of opportunity has also a strong Christian buttressing: "So there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and freemen, between men and women; you are all one in union with Christ Jesus." (Galatians 3:28)

Education is the most important vehicle for the process of socialisation. With equality of educational opportunity it is hoped that pupils will learn tolerance and find their place in an imperfect world in which they must work for improvement of their own status and of society at large. When young people are left to choose to be together and from an early age learn to accept one another, they will have little difficulty in getting on in an economic environment based on the principles of free association and equal opportunity.
If however, the converse occurs, i.e. there is an apartheid education, it is quite clear that the process of stereotyping, intolerance and hatred will increasingly become a hallmark of education in South Africa. When, then these products of apartheid education meet in the labour field they will distrust one another and view each other through the spectacles presented to them by education in an apartheid society. Commerce and industry, therefore, will have, at a very late stage to take over the essentially educational function of socialising people for an environment in which equality of opportunity exists and where merit is the criterion. If South Africa is going to attempt to integrate the economy while at the same time segregating education, there is a grave doubt whether the attempt will work and succeed.

The aim and significance of this study therefore lies in the achievement and maintenance of a common high standard of educational provision (in respect of schools and other educational institutions, teacher-pupil ratios, teacher qualifications, salaries, support services and extra-curricula facilities). While it is true that the various ethnic groups are at different stages of educational development, the problems are fundamentally the same. South Africa needs the "whole" thinking about the education of her people.
The Buthelezi Commission (1982: 256) stated that historical, political, social and other factors have contributed to the present tremendous backlog in educational opportunity, resources and provision. Vast numbers of adults lack basic education or, despite having had it, are functionally illiterate. Multiple control (by six departments of education) creates problems. If, amongst other factors, political ones are also responsible for educational backlog in South Africa, political change is therefore an important prerequisite for educational change. The aim and significance of this study further lies in the fact that a new formula for the redistribution of resources among all South Africans must be established, and it should provide a broad policy framework under which all South Africans of all race groups will gain complete political equality in a unitary or federal state. Furthermore the plan should seek to advance alternative proposals aimed at bringing about changes in the existing policies relating to the following issues:

- equitable apportionment of land between Blacks and Whites in South Africa as a prerequisite for;

- total elimination of racial discrimination in the country;
- introduction of an equitable system of education such as is being envisaged by the HSRC Report; and

- total involvement of Blacks in the political system and decision making structures in South Africa.

With full attention given to these issues equality in education for all in South Africa will be a reality.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

A research project normally requires the use of one or more methods. The following methods have, therefore, been used in this research.

1.5.1 LITERATURE STUDY

A careful study of literature with a view to deriving a conceptual framework and a theoretical background within which the problem could be investigated was undertaken. This literature study provided an understanding of the factors common in the problem. Literature study entails going to written sources and gathering items of information which relate to the topic.
The researcher, having decided exactly what information he was seeking, studied documents - textbooks, periodicals, journals, research works and other materials - that had some bearing on the subject.

1.5.2 PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

Pedagogical research is undertaken to arrive at "inzicht in het wezenlijke van de geheln van "betekenis - relaties in de uitgroei naar de volwassenheid". (Stoop, 1958 : 63)

A prominent consideration then of pedagogical research is grounded on growth to adulthood of the not-yet-adult, and the outcomes of the investigation will only become relevant and significant when it relates to the educand in the educative situation. The teaching and educational task of the school is related to the typical ontic structure of the school. The educator, working in a school-typical educational environment is pedagogically active in order to introduce the educand to the various aspects of cosmic reality. Seeing that in pedagogy cosmic reality is revealed to the educand within a pedagogical situation the pedagogical researcher should, himself, be grounded in pedagogical theory.
Pedagogical research aims at the definition, analysis and interpretation of the practical pedagogical situations and the delineation of the ideal situations so that the course of action of the educator in his task of helping and guiding the educand on his way to adulthood is brought to light. The situation is thus evaluated with respect to the manner as to whether or not the realization of the image of adulthood is harmoniously attained in a becoming and properly accepted cultural milieu. Cognisance should be taken of values, mores, ethics and dictates of a given culture. Norm-centricity of education can never be ignored.

The total educational context of a given object of research is taken into consideration. To grasp this image of totality the educand should be seen as a being-in-the-world, as what he factually is and his existence in which he takes up a stand in respect of his actuality. He should be seen as a being who stands in a specific relation to the world and life. His being time-bound as to past, present and future should be highlighted in educational research:

"da ik ten dele ga kennen in zijn verleden, in zijn huidige bestaan en in zijn denken, hopen en verlangen in verband met een toekomst." (Beets, 1952 : 18)
The research method that guides the educational researcher in his investigation is the phenomenological method. Phenomenology has the primary objective of direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation, and as free as possible from unexamined preconceptions and presuppositions. This is a method by which the researcher succeeds in seeing the essence or being of the phenomenon. The method used by the educational scientist enables him to know, to explain and to understand the phenomenon in question.

The phenomenological method avoids any influence exerted by any external principle or knowledge upon the phenomenon investigated, and it takes great pains to avoid the scientist's life and world-view having any effect on the scientific work done by him. (Van der Walt, 1981).

Phenomenology is not a particular philosophical system, but a way of thought - it is the scientific attitude that allows the phenomena to speak for themselves. In the first half of the twentieth century two new and closely related philosophical movements emerged. They were phenomenology and existentialism. Their influence transcended philosophy to fields such as literature, art, sociology, law, anthropology, theology, psychology and education. The term phenomenology is derived from the Greek words "phainoma" meaning "I appear" or "I reveal myself" and "legoo" which means "I speak".
Phenomenology then relates to the basic attitude of seeing and listening to that which phenomena desire to impart. Gunter (1974) explains this approach succinctly when he says that the phenomenological concept of phenomena refers to the data as they manifest themselves in this original event of appearance, and phenomenology is the methodical laying-bare of the data of our experience in their original appearance as meaningful data. This means that phenomenology then is the study of phenomena as experienced by man. The primary emphasis is on the phenomenon itself exactly as it reveals itself to the experiencing subject in all its correctness and particularity.

Giorgi et al (1973) views the phenomenological method as comprising basically of three processes: intuition, reflection and description. Intuition means that the researcher must first concentrate as thoroughly as he can on what is being given or experienced. The main pre-requisite for thorough intuition is to adopt what is called a transcendental attitude. This phrase comes directly from Husserl’s phenomenology. This actually means that the researcher attempts to suspend or put in abeyance his preconceptions and pre-suppositions regarding what he is investigating. This is also called bracketing. What happens in bracketing is that one transcends the natural attitude to a world of pure phenomena.
It is only after this bracketing process that essences can be intuited in all their richness and premordiality. The phenomenologist lets the data emerge as it is rather than selecting those aspects of it that he wishes to see or manipulate or defining the phenomenon in terms of his manipulations.

The second state of phenomenological method is reflection. As the phenomenologist does the intuited of essences he reflects on them in the most sincere manner, without, at this stage, imposing any meaning on the data that is emerging. It is a refusal to tell the phenomenon what it is, but a respectful listening to what the phenomenon speaks of itself (Colaizzi in Valle and King, 1978 : 52).

The third process involved in phenomenological research method is description. According to Martin Heidegger (Valle and King, 1962) phenomenological description is to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. A statement is then given in words of the phenomenon analysed so that other researchers can understand what it is and what its nature is. (Wesenachau) - study of general essences. Recollection in imagination and judgement must help the researcher ascertain whether decisions which have been made about the phenomena are universally and generally valid. The essence is that identical something that continuously maintains itself during the process of variation.
The researcher should thus limit himself to the unchangeable and ultimate nature of the phenomenon. It is only then that consciousness may be directed to the eidos (i.e. the true nature of things) without any impediments. This is eidetic reduction.

Wesenszusammenhange - understanding of essential relationships between the essences. Analysis should lead to the detection of certain essential relationships between the essences. This is known in German as Wesenszusammenhange. The researcher should ascertain if the component belongs to the essence, or is part of the essence, or is in the nature of it. Relationships may either be within a separate essence or between essences.

The phenomenological method is an intricate approach. Husserl himself stated that we should set aside all previous habits of thought, see through and break down mental barriers which these habits have set along the horizon of our thinking, these are hard demands to learn to see what stand before our eyes, to distinguish, to describe, calls for exacting and laborious studies.
1.6 CONCLUSION

Differentiation in South Africa rests purely on the basis of race, or colour which cannot be regarded as relevant for inequality of treatment. Examples of this are the treatment of different race groups in the distribution of education in terms of per capita expenditure, proportion of qualified teachers, quality and quantity of facilities such as buildings, equipment and sport facilities. A further example is where admission to educational institutions is regulated mainly on a racial basis. The result is that an individual, owing to his being a member of a particular racial group, does not or cannot receive his rightful share in the provision of education. In countries overseas the doctrine of education being distributed in such a way that everyone will receive a rightful share regardless of race, colour, socio-economic context, ethnic context, religion, sex or geographical location is probably regarded as self-evident and beyond debate even if not everywhere in practice fully realised. However, as it has never been the accepted policy in South Africa, it is good to hold it up high for acceptance now and, this alone will be a tremendous step forward, provided the way along which implementation is attempted does not thwart or reduce its realisation.
CHAPTER TWO

PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION
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2.7 CONCLUSION
2.1 INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is generally defined in ways which imply a certain totality, generality and ultimateness of both subject matter and method. With respect to the subject matter, philosophy is an attempt to comprehend — that is, to gather together the varied details of the world and of life into a single inclusive whole, which shall either be a unity or, as in the dualistic systems, shall reduce the plural details to a small number of ultimate principles. On the side of the attitude of the philosopher and of those who accept his conclusions, there is an endeavour to attain as unified, consistent and complete an outlook upon experience as is possible. This aspect is expressed in the word "philosophy" — love of wisdom. Whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life. Witness the fact that almost all ancient schools of philosophy were also organized ways of living, those who accepted their tenets being committed to a certain distinctive modes of conduct; witness the intimate connection of philosophy with the theology of the Roman church in the middle ages, its frequent association with religious interests and at national crisis its association with the political struggles.

Realizing that there are probably as many definitions of philosophy as there are philosophers; it is still accurate to note that the three areas of interest that have been characterized by intense philosophic interest
are metaphysics, axiology and epistemology. To say this does not, however, exhaust the meaning or content of philosophy nor does it make clear the process of philosophising; but it is sufficient for the purpose of suggesting the general nature of the subject matter called philosophy.

The significance of philosophy in the solution of educational problems becomes apparent when there is a trial to define education — such a definition largely depends upon some set of prior philosophic convictions about the nature and human nature, man, and society. The problem of course is that since there is a multiplicity of philosophic viewpoints, there is no one clear, concise agreed-upon definition of education. Some of the definitions most widely agreed upon have the greatest number of meanings, and possibly the least meaning as a consequence. For an example, is education the process of drawing out of children ideas that lie implicitly embedded in their minds? Is it the process of developing the abilities that are innately part of everyone's human nature? Is it the process of activating the brain so as to acquire, record and store organized bodies of fact and value? Is it the process of uniting and reuniting social experiences on the tabula rasa of the individual? Is it the process of raising children to adjust to and live in a certain kind of society — be it the society of man, or of God or both? All these queries arise from various philosophical stresses propounded by various exponent philosophers of education.
These questions each of which implies somewhat differing conceptions of education, suggest three conclusions:

- education cannot be all of these things, for some of them are contradictory and thus cannot co-exist with each other to form an adequate definition;

- whatever education may or may not be, it is evidently a process, for this is a concept common to each of the alternatives; and

- a more careful inspection of these alternative definitions reveal at least two basic and apparently fundamentally different approaches to the process of educating — drawing out and building upon internal abilities as the process of assimilating information external to the child and injecting it into him.

2.2 THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

If people lived today in a precise, simple and uncomplicated world where everything could be set forth in categories neatly labelled black and white, good and bad, right and wrong, there would perhaps be no need of philosophy. If such a world ever existed then time is long past. Today people find themselves living in a complex world and they sometimes feel like the King of Siam in the musical play THE KING AND I, who complains about the complexities of ruling a modern nation. The king says plaintively that when he was a boy, some things were simply so and others were not so. Now, he
says, the trouble is that some things are nearly so and others nearly not. It is this area of the "nearly so and the nearly not" that confronts the philosopher of today whether his field be that of traditional academic philosophy or philosophy applied to a special field such as education.

The question at hand is what the concerns of philosophy are as a distinct field of study. There is an old clinche about philosophy being according to its literal roots in the Greek language, the "love of wisdom", and the philosopher being one who, therefore, is a lover of wisdom or a pursuer of wisdom. This is perhaps an adequate definition of philosophy etymologically; but it does not answer very many practical questions. Many people can complacently assume that they are lovers of wisdom, and that — at least when they are not too busy doing something practical — they could enjoy devoting a little time to loving wisdom. But to describe philosophy only in terms of root meaning of the word itself is not enough.

Many dictionaries define philosophy as "the study of the ultimate nature of existence", while others offer the definition "any specified system of thought", but Burrow (1981:4) defines it as:

"the examination of logic and meaning"

He says an important part of the philosopher's task is to be continually probing and querying whether steps are logical. For example, the philosopher contemplating the question of God's existence might well be driven to ask himself what kind of evidence would constitute a good reason for believing in His
existence e.g. is it logical to treat the appearance of design in the universe as evidence? The moral philosopher might question the validity of trying to base evaluative conclusions on exclusively factual premises — e.g. is it logical to draw conclusions that the classless society is good from the mere fact, if it is a fact, that it is inevitably coming?.

In short doing philosophy, being a philosopher or philosophising involves minimally both a concern that all reasoning, whether one's own or another's should be logical in the broad sense of rational, and that it should be assessed from that point of view, and also, intermittently, a more specific attempt to consider what would constitute good reasons or logical steps in particular kinds of cases.

Cass (1974: 1-2) maintains another view. Before he looks into the essence of philosophy he warns:

"Definitions are notoriously dull, dangerous, misleading and necessary. They are necessary because we must agree on the use we are making of various terms if we are to communicate with any efficiency. They are dangerous because they have a tendency to be logically circular, substituting one undefined word for another. This may go on endlessly .......... and so become a threat to one's mental health".

He, however, defines philosophy as representing the study of the fundamental beliefs of a culture. These fundamental beliefs have to do with what the culture
traditionally believes to be real, to be good and to be knowable. This is to say that philosophy studies the matrix of fundamental beliefs about existence in a culture. The study of beliefs about reality forms one important area of the philosophic study. Burrow (1981:16) agrees to this and adds that in actual fact a philosopher might happen to end up committed to a set of particular conservative beliefs. But if he does, in so far as he is a philosopher and not just claiming to be one, he must be presumed to have committed himself to them only after trying to turn them and all other beliefs inside out and outside down, in an attempt to gain a fuller understanding of them and to establish their relative plausibility.

Ayer (1973) contends that the question: What is philosophy? is difficult to answer even for a professional philosopher, and the fact that it is so difficult is indicative. It brings home to philosophers how peculiar their subject is. For one thing, it aims at yielding knowledge; or, it comprises propositions which their authors wish people to accept as true. Yet it seems to have no subject matter.

A possible answer is that being a subject with many branches philosophy has not but many objects of study.

So it may be said, "metaphysics investigates the structure of reality, ethics the rules of conduct, logic the canons of valid reasoning: the theory of knowledge discovers what it is in our power to know". (Ayer: 1973:1).
Traditionally, in order to proceed in an orderly fashion, philosophers have divided the field into three general areas with a number of sub-areas. These three major divisions of philosophy are: ontology (the study of beliefs about reality), axiology (the study of beliefs about values), and epistemology (the study of beliefs about knowledge).

The synthesis of what could be said to be the nature of philosophy is therefore that philosophy has as its chief concern the study of the fundamental problems of reality, truth, and value. More specifically, philosophy is concerned with the very nature of the world itself and of the cause (whether God, or science or natural law) that created and continues to sustain the workings of the world. Wheelwright, in Thomson, (1971:7) contends

"Philosophical inquiry may be directed towards anything whatever, but its aim will always be to behold and understand the object of inquiry

1) in its whole character and

2) in relation to man's most enduring and most deep-rooted interests".

In other words all philosophy is an endeavour to obtain a self-consistent understanding of things observed. Thus its development is guided in two ways. One is the demand for a coherent self-consistency and the other is the elucidation of things observed. The essence of philosophy lies in the connected vision of the totality of things, maintaining in every point the subordination of every element and factor to every other element and factor as conditioned by the totality. It includes the direct contemplation — the valuation — of the whole spectacle of life.
Ward (1983:3) sees philosophy as a persistent attempt to understand the universe in which human beings find themselves and of which they are part. Therefore philosophy is a persistent attempt to see things through. The characteristic attitude of the philosopher is, or ought to be patient and open-minded inquiry in serious, disciplined and ambitious effort to find the general traits of reality, the significance of human experience and the place of man in the universe as a whole. Philosophy is a vigorous attempt to think about the ultimate questions that are usually "answered" by our emotions and vague hopes and fears. It is a reasoned effort to see facts and ideals, emotions and truths, man and the universe in such a way that they will, when taken together make more sense than when taken piecemeal. This suggests that in both its aspects of synthesis and analysis, philosophy is a search for meaning.

Philosophy is concerned with man and society — not primarily individual instances of specified man or specific societies but with the whole broad concept of mankind in this world. This is true whatever the nature of the world may be. Philosophy is concerned with the truth, whether truth be thought of as an abstract and absolute quality, or as a series of separate, detailed, but interlocking facts brought together into some sort of comprehensive whole that we can call knowledge. Philosophy is concerned with what makes things good or evil, ugly or beautiful, or wrong, valuable or worthless.
All these are broad questions with which philosophy deals. It will be a mistake to assume that philosophy, as a special field of study has any exclusive patent on certain methods of inquiry and reasoning. Hansen (1960:9) maintains that philosophy offers no special royal road to understanding reality, truth, and value, but it does use some definite methods which can help bring about such understanding, such as rational inquiry, questioning of assumptions, logic, analysis and synthesis, creative thinking, breadth of view, and devotion to ideas and their consequences.

These methods of philosophy are not really so much different from the methods of other kinds of inquiry and thinking except that they are perhaps broader in their scope, deeper in their probing, more searching in their self-criticism and productive of a greater degree of personal commitment to a cause of action.

Finally, according to Kneller (1971) philosophy as an activity manifests itself in three modes: the speculative, the prescriptive and the analytical. Speculative philosophy is a way of thinking systematically about everything that exists. It is the search for order and wholeness not only to particular items of experience but to all knowledge and all experience. Prescriptive philosophy seeks to establish standards for assessing values and judging conduct. To the prescriptive philosopher some forms of behaviour are worthwhile and others are not. Philosophy is analytical when it seeks to clarify speculative and prescriptive statements by focussing on words and meaning.
2.3 THE PURPOSE OF PHILOSOPHISING

Hansen (1960: 10-11) points out that non-philosophers sometimes take a rather skeptical view of the necessity of philosophy. They grant that it may be a pleasant way of spending one's time and a sort of harmless pursuit for those who are interested — like a kind of intellectual chess game, the outcome of which really makes no difference. Burrow (1981: 17) immediately dismisses this claim and argues:

"Philosophy is in fact indispensible. Of course the cynic will say that it takes a philosopher to say that and that no doubt the sociologist holds much the same opinion of sociology. No doubt he does, and no doubt the cynic has a small point: we do have a predisposition to value our particular interests. But to assume that, because a philosopher is known to have a vested interest in saying that philosophy is indispensible, what he says is not true and cannot be ignored, is to provide an instance of precisely the fallacious sort of reasoning that philosophy is out to destroy".

By philosophising the aim is to improve the quality of thinking and discussion so that provided the premises are well-founded and there is no ignoring of relevant factors, true conclusions can then be arrived at. The premises themselves, of course, may also be scrutinized in turn for their coherence and plausibility. Nothing is more extraordinary than that philosophy is widely thought of as being a subject irrelevant to practical concerns, or as not being of much use or
value from the point of view of social welfare. The point of philosophy is to rid our minds of hazy generalizations, ambiguous slogans, inarticulate ideas and half-truths and to create circumstances to detect, and demolish them in the reasoning of others, and then in their place; to cultivate the thinking and communicating of precise, discriminatory, and clearly expounded truths or steps in reasoning.

Philosophy enables the resistance and seeing through the catch-phrase, package-deal thinking or ideology, unnecessary or meaningless coined jargon and gimmickry. It renders people to be sceptical of all that is not presented to them simply and clearly. The trouble is that travelling by the philosophical road is obviously a slow, painstaking business. This road requires stamina and discipline. It requires deep thinking and abstractions which are not easy to acquire for many people. It requires that one recognises inadequacies in one's thinking which is hard to admit to. For the ancient Greeks "philosophy" meant any attempt to solve theoretical problems by theoretical methods. "It is through wonder" said Aristotle in the first book of the metaphysics, "that men now begin and originally began to philosophise". Wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities; and then by gradual progression raising questions about the greater matters too e.g. about the changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe.

Burtt (1967) says that if a question like: What is the philosopher really good for? be put on the philosopher himself, he will reply:
"Philosophy is one of the greatest liberators of man. It saves him from folly, prejudice and confusion; it guides him into a richer and more stable world. Without philosophy man's life and thought are in bondage to dark forces from which with it, he can become free. But to achieve this liberation it must at times appear easy at times even fanciful, to those who are not philosophers" p.1-2.

Since philosophy springs from wonder and wonder is aroused by awareness of difficulties, by the need to understand. Then the difficulties which frequently put mankind into the province of philosophy are the problems they meet in the attempt to live their lives intelligently and with discrimination. What makes life worth living? What goals shall I choose? What is the meaning of failure and evil and suffering? What is my place in the scheme of things? What is the nature of knowledge, and how can I identify truth and distinguish it from what is false?

Philosophy is constantly called upon to reflect the richness and variety of daily experiences. It helps in deciding how to behave by clarifying issues. In private moments there is wonder about how happiness can be achieved, or the most worthwhile existence and this sort of problems particularly interests the ethicist and moralist.

Ewing (1951:10), in answering the aforementioned question says that there is no doubt that one of the most important sources of happiness for those who can
enjoy it at all is the search for truth, and the contemplation of reality, and this is the aim of the philosopher.

As human beings become aware of other persons and groups around them they realize the need for developing communities, designing governments and all this is the task of political philosophy. Even as people extend their thinking beyond themselves or even beyond their communities, they often wonder how they fit into the larger setting of the world, and even beyond. To deal with questions about man's ultimate destiny is the task of metaphysics and the philosophy of religion.

Philosophy has constantly had a very important indirect influence on the lives even of those who have never heard of the subject. For, indirectly, it filters down through the teachings of parents, sermons, literature, newspapers, and oral traditions. It also profoundly affects the whole general thoughts or spectrum on life and the world. The Christian religion for example, was made what it is to a considerable extent, through the influence of philosophy. Ideas that have played such an important role in general thought even down to the popular level, as the idea that each person should be treated as an end in himself and never merely as a means or that government depends on the consent of the governed, are owed originally to philosophy. In the political sphere the influence of philosophical ideas has been especially great. The American constitution, for an example, is to a very considerable extent an application of the political ideas of the philosopher.
John Locke. The ideas of Rousseau are also admitted to have played an enormous part during the French Revolution in 1778. The writings of Marx in making Russia a super-power today are philosophical in nature.

The enormous development of science with its consequent practical benefits depends, for its possibility, a good deal on its philosophical background. The whole development of civilization could be traced to changes in the idea of causation i.e. from the magical to the scientific, and the very idea of causation, so fundamental in the natural sciences, is rooted in the subject-matter of philosophy.

The success of modern science would probably never have been achieved if the scientist had not taken from the philosopher certain assumptions on which to base his whole enterprise, or if he himself could not transcend into philosophical world. For questions like what is science, physics, demonstration, proof, evidence etc are all philosophical and not scientific questions. The mechanistic view of the world, for example, which paved the way for the birth of modern science, is derived chiefly from the philosopher Rene Descartes. The whole study of the heavens which now belongs to Astronomy was once included in philosophy. Newton's great work was called "The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy".

The need and point in philosophising also lies in the habit of forms for impartial judgement, for lighting up an idea from all sides, for weighing all evidence for
knowing what to look for and expect in an argument or proof. This offers a significant check on emotional bias, hasty generalizations and a host of fallacies studied in logic. The habits and skills developed in philosophizing are of inestimable value in all fields of enquiry, but perhaps most backing and needed in political debate. If all conflicting parties looked at political questions from a philosophical perspective, it is difficult to imagine how there could ever be war or how there could be uprising in a society. There can be no successful government till general education inculcate a genuine philosophical outlook.

The value of philosophy is in fact to be sought largely in its very uncertainty or absence of dogmatism. Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value through the greatness of the object that it contemplates and the freedom from narrow and personal and sectional aims resulting from such contemplation. The point in philosophising is worth for its own sake. Philosophy aims primarily at knowledge, but the kind of knowledge it aims at gives unity and system to the body of the sciences and is the kind that results from a critical examination of the grounds of the people's convictions, prejudices and beliefs. It is exclusively among the goods of mind that the value of philosophy is to be found, and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that philosophising is not a waste of time. (Russel, 1978: 90).
Finally human beings can avoid the critical examination of their ultimate beliefs and basic assumptions but they cannot have ultimate beliefs and basic assumptions unless they manage somehow to stop thinking. (Thompson, 1961:48)

2.4 PHILOSOPHY AND THE CULTURE

Philosophising is a universal experience. Every culture has its own world view. Philosophy seeks to establish order among the various phenomena of the surrounding world. It traces unity of these various phenomena by reducing them to their simplest elements. These phenomena are things, facts, events, an intelligible world, an ethical world and a metaphysical world. On this subject Onyewuenyi (1976:519) contends:

"The various phenomena of the surrounding world are the same in all cultures and societies. The themes dealt with in philosophy are universal. How each culture traces the unity of these themes, synthesizes, or organizes them into a totality is based on each culture's concept of life, namely the interrelationship between objects and persons and persons themselves. Hence it is that the order or unity the people of a culture establish is their own order relative to their own conception of life in which everything around them becomes meaningful. No culture has the order or the last word. Hence the establishment of various truths of a spontaneous, logical, ethical, aesthetical, and metaphysical nature, not one of them being of absolute or universal validity".
It is now commonly accepted that philosophy is a universal category of culture. That is to say, in any particular social heritage there is a philosophy which is transmitted from one generation to the next just as a certain type of family, cooperative patterns, and technological skills are part of the culture of any society. The admission of a category to the dignity of a cultural universal is usually founded deductively and inductively, but even if the latter reasoning is emphasized the former is clearly more convincing. Maquet (1972: 13) illustrates:

"From a certain conception of the nature of man and society, it is deduced that any society, if it is to survive must encompass in its culture a certain "aspect" or "compartment", for instance, the organization of the distribution of consumer goods. Such an organization being what is usually defined as an economic system, it is concluded that economy is a universal category. Then it is added, we could reach the same conclusion inductively, as all the societies studied up to now present indeed an economic organization"

The affirmation that any people has a philosophy rests upon the same kind of reasoning, but here the inductive confirmation can hardly exist, as many of the societies know up to now, particularly the nonliterate ones, are devoid of any expressed philosophy. This however does not mean that they have no philosophy. The deductive reasoning goes somewhat along the following lines. Rules of behaviour are set by any society for its members in order to regulate their interpersonal
relations; people have traditional ways of dealing with their physical environment; rituals are built around birth, puberty, death; members of a particular group exhibit patterned attitudes when confronted with disease, natural catastrophes, sorcery, and so on. All these observable phenomena must be explained, justified, and supported by a system of ideas concerning the world, the place of man in the world, his destiny, the nature of reality and the ultimate values. This system of ideas is a philosophy or a world view. It is so in the sense that it attempts to determine what human, social and physical reality mean. However crude and critical it may be, it is knowledge: to observe data, — external or internal, but distinct from the observer — and say what they are.

Up to this point, it is postulated that the phenomena observed — behaviours and objects — make sense for the culture bearers only because they correspond and are in harmony with their knowledge of man and nature. If philosophy is a universal compartment of culture; it must be further postulated that no society could survive without a system of explanation. This amounts to the assertion that there is in human society a natural need to understand. This affirmation is not always clearly stated, but it seems necessary if one wants to postulate a priori the universality in culture of the philosophical category.

The context within which philosophy functions and from which it draws its sustenance is therefore the culture the people live. Rosen (1968: 5) concludes:
"Since the existing wisdom is part, and since the means of searching for wisdom are culturally determined, it will be seen that there exists a close relationship between the culture and philosophy. Philosophy is a man-made system of thought which is shaped by the culture.

But it must be said that philosophy is more than this. It must also be the cutting edge of progress; the blade against which a culture tries itself. Philosophy is both the shaped and the shaper. It is the refiner and refined. If a culture does not move ahead, if it does not change it must soon grow static and eventually die. But a culture can change only to the degree that people in it bring about change. This is, in part, the function of the philosopher. It is the active role of philosophy and for many the role of the philosopher as a change-agent is his most important function.

2.5 PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

Philosophy when coupled or related to education in the most general sense is the application of philosophy and the methods of philosophy to problems of education. What "education" should mean is a point of inquiry. Provisionally it can be said that education is a purposive activity towards ends which are (rightly or wrongly) deemed to be good. One can, of course speak of education which just happens to a person. Experientia docet. However, for the purpose of this discussion the writer has in mind education as directed intentionally by agents (parents, school teachers,
university personnel) for the good of other people, the pupils — though it is of course quite possible that the educator and the pupil may be united in person: one may educate oneself. This is not meant to be a precise or complete definition of education, which ought to take account of physical and social and cultural influences often unconsciously absorbed. Reid (1962: 17) says "But on the whole, to attempt to educate is to do something intentional and purposive, and towards what is believed to be good. This good is complex. It contains many aims, such as the acquisition of skills, the passing on of the culture and traditions of a society in the form of norms or values and beliefs. It is the development of character and personality along the "right" lines, and so on".

Some ends or aims of education are universally agreed upon; others are more controversial, though amenable to discussion. About some aims there seems to be irreconcilable differences. Most scientific humanists, for example, sincerely believe that religious education is a mistake (except, perhaps in so far as it is information about a cultural tradition). On the other hand Christian philosophers believe religion to be essential, with equal sincerity. Communists propagate communism. The examples are infinite. One of the most important aspects which philosophy of education has to accomplish is to dig deep and bring out into the light for critical examination the assumptions (some of which are concealed or at least taken for granted) which are made about education. It is important too to discover whether or
how far conflicting claims can be rationally discussed and even rationally altered. Or putting it in terms of general discussion of philosophy, how far can philosophy applied to educational matters help us to deeper insights and better practice by the display of assumptions, the examinations of the language and concepts employed in educational discourse, the thinking of educational ideas together in relation to one another, as well as to the major ideas about man, his values, his universe. In other words, how far can analysis, criticism ethical thinking, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, help the educationist to put his thought and work into better and truer perspective?

This last question prompts two further distinct yet related questions. They are: What generally ought philosophy (or the philosopher) of education to aim at doing? and, what ought a teacher of philosophy of education, specifically addressing students, to aim at doing? These two questions, although they overlap, are not the same. It may be part of the duty of a teacher of philosophy of education to do something which is not itself philosophy at all, or part of the direct business of philosophy. Education and teaching are the very practical business which when done well are done in a certain spirit and manner and with certain inspiration. It may very well be that the philosophical teacher of teachers has an obligation to do something more than teach them philosophy. But it is important to distinguish this from the first question, which is, "what ought philosophy of education as an intellectual enterprise to be considering and
aiming to do?" This of course can only be adequately answered by complete and exhaustive treatment of philosophy of education (see Section 2.6.2) Philosophy of education should also show the implications for education of one's assumptions about three different kinds of factors: beliefs about the ends or purposes of education - or more generally beliefs about values; beliefs or disbeliefs about religion; and, beliefs about knowing.

2.5.1 BELIEFS ABOUT VALUES

Axiology, the last major branch of philosophy, is a term including the study of beliefs about value. It is sub-divided into three fields, in each of which values are predominant: moral conduct; esthetic expression; and, socio-political life. Problems of each of these fields have been treated ordinarily by three special disciplines: ethics, esthetics and socio-political philosophy.

These have one denominator in common - that of value itself. Brameld (1955:33) states:

"The problem of axiology is to clarify the criteria of principles by which we determine what is good in human conduct, what is beautiful in art, what is right in social organization, and, finally, what these have in common as well as what distinguishes them from one another. The significance for
axiology for education is, then, to examine and integrate these values as they enter into the lives of people through the channels of the school".

Beliefs about values are of the most obvious importance in educational thought and practice. "Obvious" however, is a relative term. What may come to be seen as obvious after reflection, may have to be discovered through very hard mental work, work which has to be carried out sometimes against strong emotional resistance. The following are examples which seem obviously at first sight to affect education. The values of political totalitarianism have very direct and marked effects on or upon education. Nazi ideas, for instance, were directly implemented in teaching about freedom, truth, justice. Freedom for an individual person to grow - which is regarded as important - did not exist; truth became sub-servient to propaganda, justice became identified with the interests of the political power. Again in states where military values are extolled (as in ancient Spartan or pre-war Japan) the virtues instilled from childhood are those of obedience to rule, self-sacrifice, the subordination of oneself to the state. Humility here is at a discount (except in a very restricted sense); the Christian values of gentleness and love are regarded with contempt. Again, the content of the curriculum is strongly influenced by values of practical
success and utility. The effect of such values as these upon education is obvious enough. But there are some educational values which take for granted at first sight as desirable and which take on a different look when we force ourselves to reflect upon them.

The philosophical reflection about the values of education, is therefore in itself important for the practice of education. Phenix (1958: 59) emphasized

"The central problem in all education is that of values. The educator must choose the direction in which he believes the student's growth may best proceed. He can make no decision whatever without a conviction that in that instance one way is preferable to all other possible paths. Now beliefs about what is best or preferable imply a scale of values. Hence all educational activity drives one to the question of underlying values."

The curriculum is a schedule of proposed instruction embodying the preferred direction of student development. It rests upon and manifests a certain system of values. These values constitute the aims, objectives or purposes of education, and the curriculum is the means by which the aims are achieved, the objectives realized and the purposes fulfilled.
2.5.2 BELIEFS ABOUT RELIGION

Religion is similar to synthetic philosophy in its concern for the whole and for the highest values. It is less closely related to the analytical types of philosophy. Philosophy is intellectual in character because it furnishes some rationale for beliefs. Religion, on the other hand, may be primarily emotional or practical, with little concern for intellectual justification of belief. In philosophy the primary goal is understanding; in religion the goal is faith. Religion and faith, however, have many different meanings. Phenix (1958: 452) speaks of the conception that religion is a substitute for knowledge when he says:

"It is said that some things are established by the application of intelligence, while other things are to be taken "on faith", these latter beliefs constituting the special province of religion."

He goes on to give a number of examples one of which is: though it is possible by the scientific study of the earth's crust to explain the process of geological formation, one may choose to accept on faith, at face value, the account of the world's creation given in the Bible. In this and many other cases religion is used as a short cut to results which would otherwise require the disciplined pursuit and application of knowledge. Faith here means belief, in the sense of accepting as true what is not known but could be investigated. This
kind of religion runs contrary to the entire rational and scientific concern in education. It discourages the pursuit of knowledge and nurtures attitudes and methods quite opposed to those of intelligence. Such religion also tends to create a barrier between those who live by faith and those who live by reason and between religion and science. Growth in knowledge tends to reduce the province of religion, and each time a believer extends his understanding about matter of faith his faith diminishes to that extent. A view of religion as a substitute for knowledge therefore not only appears unfavourable to rational education but also to the permanence and security of faith itself.

In this country, South Africa, the talk of the education assumes (not always necessarily in practice) what may be already called a humanist outlook. By humanism here is meant an attitude which is marked by a case and concern for human beings as persons. Reid (1962: 22-23) contends:

"A humanist in this sense believes that the welfare, betterment, fullness of life, true happiness of human persons (including, of course, children) is a matter of prime concern. This kind of thing is continually advocated in writings on education, as it undoubtedly affects much of our practice of it".
It is fair to say that the outlook on education in this country is strongly tempered by humanism and that the great majority of the teachers are ready to agree and co-operate about human ends in education. Nevertheless, there are deep differences between kinds of humanism which amount in the end to deep differences about religion. It is worthwhile looking broadly at the effects upon educational outlook and practice which may be occasioned by these differences about basic assumptions.

There are two sorts of humanism: secular humanism (of which scientific humanism is one kind) and religious humanism (of which Christian humanism is the other kind). Secular humanism and religious humanism, used with due caution, the logical distinction is important, as are its implications for education. Both views insist on the importance of human beings. But for secular humanism, personality is the highest form of being that is known.

There is no supreme mind, no supreme being, no creator of nature and man, no God. Man is the measure of all things, and man's life has been evolved over an immense period of time by entirely natural causes. In time human life will disappear from the face of the universe and be as nothing. The days of man's life are as grass: the mind passes over it and it is gone.
These are the psalmist's words but for the secular humanist they have a finality for the human race which the psalmist did not intend.

For the religious humanist, the Christian humanist, for example, the transitory life of man has an external setting. God created nature and created man in His own image; man did not mere evolve, but was made by God for His own purposes which were revealed to be that he should love God wholly and his neighbour never as himself.

Christian humanism shares with a secular humanism the care for human persons, and the sense of human importance. But for the Christian humanist these things turn on man's dependence upon God. Both these views have logical implications for education.

2.6 THE CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHISE ABOUT EDUCATION

Brubacher, in Park (1963: 35) asks a questions which he immediately answer himself:

"What is the reason for this greatly augmented interest in educational philosophy? Perhaps the simplest answer is the use of "progressive education" as a cause " celebre".

At first the newer educational procedure of this movement were a protest against the rather formal educational practices inherited from the nineteenth century. As the protest gained momentum, people began
to see that the newer educational practices were not just an amendment to traditional practice but involved a fundamental departure from it. In the early phases of the movement progressive education met no more opposition than the inertia of convention. While the progressive concepts had difficulty in overcoming this inertia in practice, the advocates of reform won easy victories over such opposition in the field of theory during the 1920's. As theoretical victories led to more and more victories in the field of practice, the differences of traditional and conventional education finally took pen in hand to defend their own practices and even took offence to attack progressive education during the 1930's. Brameld (1955:89) states:

"Progressivism has been and still remains a vastly important point of view — enriching, exciting, controversial"

The war intervened, causing an interlude in the strife of educational systems and all energies were mobilized to resolve the international strife of political and economic ideologies. In the interlude after the war there began the conflict of educational ideologies again and the challenge to philosophize about education was even greater.

2.6.1 PHILOSOPHISING IN EDUCATION AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHY TO EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Philosophising in education entails a quick glance at philosophical and educational heritage which helps to assess what adjustments and improvements in educational practices are needed
to meet the challenge of new technological, social, economic and political developments. Phenix (1955) contend that philosophising in education entails:

"the application of philosophic method and outlook to the area of experience called educational".

This includes such things as the search for concepts which will co-ordinate various aspects of education in a comprehensive scheme, the clarification of meanings in educational terminology, the exhibiting of basic premises or assumptions upon which statements about education rest and the development of categories which relate education to other areas of human concern.

Many benefits accrue from the philosophic study of education. First and most fundamentally, there is the reward simply of understanding better what it means to be engaged in the process of education. No person who is intellectually alive can fail to be inquisitive about basic human activities, especially ones in which he is himself intimately involved. Second, philosophising in education ought to enable one to see the educational task in its wholeness and in relation to other aspects and concerns of life. One product of philosophy of education should be a kind of exhilaration and satisfaction in seeing one's own work as integral and contributory, not only to the grand
scheme of education in all its phases but also to the far grander human and cosmic drama. Philosophizing in education provides the means for recognizing and eliminating conflicts and contradictions in the theory and practice of education. Through discussion about educational experience, concepts are clarified and criticized so as to yield adherent schemes of interpretations. It is also the faith of the philosopher of education that dialogue between persons of different persuasions about the subject will yield progressively more mutual understanding if not agreement.

Another product of philosophizing in education is the suggesting of new lines of educational development, research and action. From any comprehensive and critical scheme of interpretation it is possible to deduce certain theoretical consequences which may be tested in practice.

Finally, it entails repeating that the main business of philosophy and philosophising in education is not so much to give answers as to raise questions and awareness. One fruit of philosophising in education should be the development of the attitude, capacity and taste for asking questions. No student of any subject ought ever to be content merely to accept standard ideas and programmes in education. He should always want to inquire about them: Why?
On what grounds? Within what context? On the basis of what assumptions? He should never be satisfied with the purely habitual or traditional modes of thought and conduct in education. He should be alert to alternative possibilities which can be tested and compared with the existing patterns. It is only with such a seeking, questioning, and examining attitude that education can be a vital and growing enterprise and that those who are its practitioners can fulfill their own potentialities as reflective persons.

2.6.2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOOLING

There is an affinity between philosophy and education. The two have the same means and ends, inquiry and wisdom. Educational problems have philosophic roots. The problems of education are the concern of philosophy and the latter and education are mutually reconstructive. While philosophy of education has become a distinct discipline it is not separate from either philosophy or education. For it uses philosophic methods to deal with educational problems. Philosophy of education deals with the problems of education and with the problems of philosophy as expressed in education. Philosophy of education brings together the beliefs about reality, the nature
of man, the theory of knowledge, the theory of value, and the countless philosophic attitudes and judgements into a consistent body of thought. This consistent body of thought directs educational choices and that these choices are conditioned by the views of the people themselves.

Philosophy of education really comes into its own as a distinctive branch of philosophy with the work of men such as Richard Peters and Israel Scheffler in the 1950's. Prior to that philosophers had naturally often taken an interest in education. Some, as early as Plato and as prominent as John Dewey in America, had even devoted philosophical attention to educational issues. Though more often as in the case of John Locke and Immanuel Kant philosophers seemed to set aside their philosophising and to revert to less disciplined speculation when they considered education.

A great deal of philosophy of education in the last decade or so has seemed insubstantial to many. This is largely because its practitioners have failed to distinguish the conceptual from the verbal and have shown a certain lack of judgement in situations like that of the biscuit and shortbread. It has too often been assumed that any ambiguous word must represent a vexed concept and that it can therefore proceed to asking questions about the use of the words
which are bound to the philosophically interesting. Burrow (1981: 25) contends:

"Perhaps it should also be said that one weakness of philosophy of education recently has been the unexpected and undesired way in which the ideas and thoughts provoked by the new approach have become for some a new orthodoxy, to be rote learned in just the uncritical manner that had previously been accorded to the ideas of a Plato, a Quintilian or a Cormenius".

Hansen (1960:3) justifies the assertion that educational problems have philosophical roots, when he states that the main aim of the school is to teach the fundamentals. In a time when academic learnings and good, sound hard, basic education are again becoming popular, almost everybody seems to agree that the schools ought to teach the fundamentals. Fundamentals presumably would mean those things which are in themselves the foundations of other readings. This definition would lead us to believe at once that reading, writing, arithmetic, knowledge of some of the basic principles of science and at least a fair outlines of chronology of the history of Western civilization. If these are basic and fundamental in Western civilization but not in other parts of the world, say in Africa, then it must be that what is fundamental depends not on the nature of learning itself but on the social context in which it is learned, valued and used.
Broudy (1954:19) sees philosophy of education as the systematic discussion of educational problems on a philosophical level, i.e. the probing into an educational question until it is an issue in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic and aesthetics, or to a combination of these. In as much as education aims at something called the good life, it is in ethics, metaphysics and epistemology that people should find it. It is picking a philosophy and see what kind of education to bring that kind of good life about. One model of this type of approach is, of course the Republic of Plato. There he asks: If justice is what I have found it to be then that what kind of state does it imply? and what educational system will produce the individual that will make such a state possible? Another example of this is that of John Dewey who begins with a theory of knowledge and translates it into a theory of learning and education.

Luthuli (1971:7) also sees philosophy of education in the same eye and adds that its main functions is the use of philosophical instruments, the application of philosophical methods to questions of education as well as the relation to education of the relevant results of philosophical thinking.

By philosophical method here is meant:
Analysis of the problem into its presuppositions and implications,

Examination of a problem in education with an eye to detecting inconsistencies in the arguments adduced for or against it,

The clarification of meanings, definitions, and terms used in educational discussions,

Unifying data from many sources into a synoptic view of education, and

Comparing critically various views on a problem including the tracing of their historical bases. (Broudy, 1954:18)

From the foregone exposition of philosophy of education an important factor emerges distinctly clear that philosophy of education is not to be regarded as a discipline in its own right, possessed of its own particular and distinctive techniques of enquiry. It is to be seen as an area of philosophical concern continuous with other areas of philosophical concern in that, broadly speaking, the same techniques, aimed at clarification and critical evaluation, operate (Woods, 1972: 29-30).

An attempt to explicate the nature of philosophy of education necessarily involves the explication of the nature of philosophy itself as a major component in that attempt. Philosophy of education is then to be distinguished from other "philosophies of -----" in that it is about educational discourse where
the precise nature of "about" is defined by reference to the pre-occupations of philosophers in general: clarification of meaning; concern with types of justification, validity, validity of arguments and so on. Philosophy of education is concerned with the clarification of concepts such as education, teaching, indoctrination, conditioning, training, socialization, intelligence, needs, interests, creativity, understanding, motivation, authority, punishment, discipline, growth, and development. Additionally it is concerned with the critical evaluation of arguments employing these concepts and others like them, arguments directly related to the practices and procedures of education.

Woods (1972:30) states that in pursuit of these twin objectives mentioned above educational philosophers will need to be familiar with the work of philosophers in other fields. For instance all that differentiates the philosopher of mind, say from the educational philosopher interested in concepts analysed by the philosopher of mind is that the educational philosopher will be seeking to relate his overlapping enquiries to his primary interest—the practices and procedures of education.

Johnston (1963: VIII) reminds that a good many years ago Martimer Adler warned that:

"To know the truth in the philosophy of education ——— depends upon almost the
whole of philosophy. There is no shortcut worth taking. If anyone has not the time, patience or willingness to study philosophy in its entirety, let him resign himself to being ignorant of philosophical truths about education....."

Philosophy of education is the philosophical study of the making of man. Ward (1963:11) support this when he says:

"In the enterprise of educating, what is the most important factor? What has most of all to be taken into account? Man, of course ---- and man already created and knowing and wise, is the creature to be co-created, through education".

This same man, is an ideal meaning of "man", is the model or pattern on which the educator constantly has his eye as he educates and that ideal "man" is the number one formal cause of the educational work being done. And, of course man is the matter being shaped by education: man is being made into full man. Philosophy of education is therefore a region of philosophic work addressed to educational practices (Scheffler, 1973:19).

Philosophy attempts to understand reality as a whole by explaining it in the most general and systematic way. Like general philosophy, Philosophy of education also known by other names as Fundamental Pedagogics or Philosophical
pedagogics, or Foundations of Education is an attempt to find answers to the fundamental questions about education. It seeks to comprehend education in its entirety and to consider such general philosophical problems as the nature of good life to which education should lead; the nature of man himself because it is man who is educated; the nature of society because education is a social process, and the nature of the ultimate reality which all knowledge seeks to penetrate (Kneller, 1971:5).

As man reflects on the purpose and significance of his life so will he reflect upon the aim and significance of his education. Education is ultimately bound up with a philosophy of life. The question "what is education?" can be answered by also answering the question "What life is for?" Jeffrey Ottaway, 1960:7) writes:

"Education is in fact nothing other than the whole life of the community viewed from the particular standpoint of learning to live that life".

Redden and Ryan (1956:10) say that, therefore, in its simple meaning, philosophy of education is the application of the fundamental principles of a philosophy of life to the work of education. If a mistake is made in the answer to the question concerning the nature of man, his society and his destiny education is started on the wrong path.
Brubacher (1962:308) suggests that there are three major philosophies of education. In the first place there is the philosophy of secularism which while it has a theory of moral education, has no religious point of view at all unless secularism itself be regarded as a religion. The secularist philosophy limits itself to the here and now, to the nature and to the judgement of human experience. Morals are simply the conduct patterns which men in association with other men over centuries have found most productive of human happiness and welfare. Hence in a school dominated by secularism, children learn to find the warrant for moral character in their own adult experience.

In the second place there is the religious philosophy of humanism. The humanist is not satisfied that secularism gives as complete an account of education as it is possible to give. There is much of which man remains ignorant of and is likely to remain ignorant even after the best education has been given to the best intellect. The humanist turns to a search for God for the inclusive and ultimate meaning of his educational efforts. Yet, though he orients himself to God, he is sceptical of the traditional supernatural approach to God. He constructs a social theory of religious education. Religious as he is, he puts his confidence in man and man's experience.
In the third place there is religious education dominated by theology. The theological educatory recognizes the role of man in nature but is convinced on the basis of reason and revelation, that there is more of human education than can be learned from human experience. In stead of a God who is merely immanent in the educational process, he worships a God who transcends it as well. Regarding God as Creator and man as Creature, the theologian makes his whole philosophy of religion and moral education centre around this relationship.

Like general philosophy, philosophy of education may adopt a speculative, prescriptive and analytical approach. It is speculative in its approach when it seeks to establish theories of the nature of man, society and the world. It is prescriptive when it specifies the ends that education ought to follow and the general means it should use to attain them. It is analytical when it scrutinises educational ideas and the ways in which they are distorted by loose thinking. (Kneller, 1971).

In its speculative approach educational philosophy makes an endeavour to put the various parts together into some synthesis or mosaic (Brubacher, 1962:6). Some philosophies actually succeed in achieving a unitary or monistic point of view of synthesis, as for instance, the totalitarianism of fascist or socialist education. Other philosophies paradoxically find unity in diversity and achieve a dualistic point of view.
2.7 CONCLUSION

In its critical phase philosophy of education subjects the terms and propositions undergirding educational thought and practice to vigorous scrutiny as to the form in which they are stated. The educator wants to be assured not only of the substance of the programme of the schools but of its formal validity as well. In one direction, critical philosophy examines the logical premises on which educational conclusions rest. In another, it closely examines the language used to be sure its meaning is clear and unambiguous. In still the third direction, critical philosophy takes a penetrating look at the kind of evidence which will be acceptable for confirming or refuting statements or, facts about education.
CHAPTER THREE

SCHOOLING: ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE
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3.10 CONCLUSION
3.1 INTRODUCTION

The etymology of the word "school" derives from the Latin "Schola" which in turn comes from the Greek "oxoh" (schole). (Burrow, 1981: 32). Originally, "oxoh" meant "leisure". The typically Greek love of argument led to a shift in meaning to "the employment of leisure for disputatibn", then to "lecture" and then to "school", in something like the sense of the Latin "schola" and of course our own "school". The basic sense of "school" today is "an establishment in which boys or girls or both receive instruction" or more generally, "an institution in which instruction of any kind is given (whether to children or adults)". The verb "to school" has long since covered a range of activities including "to send to school", "to chastise", "to educate", "to train", "to discipline", and "to instruct". In short "schooling" is a general term that implies little more than the imparting of some lesson to others by some means or other while the word "school" adds only the implication of a location set aside for the purpose.

Good (1973:512) defines the school as an organized group of pupils pursuing defined studies at defined levels and receiving instruction from one or more teachers, frequently with the support of other
employees and officers such as the principal, various supervisors of instruction and a staff of maintenance workers; usually housed in a single building or a group of buildings. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (19:1013) sees the school as an institution for educating children or giving instruction of more elementary or more technical kinds than that given at a university. The afore-mentioned definition is related to Duminy and Sohng's definition of the school as that institution which has been set up for the purpose of educative teaching and learning to know. (1980:5). Van der Stoep (1973:41) contends that the school as a lasting and continuous institution is basically the product of cultural development as revealed in history, and its function is to develop and form the knowledge or the vocational skill of young people, to enable them to acquire the necessary cultural forms and contents and to integrate these forms and contents into their own form of living.

3.2 EDUCATION AND HUMAN NATURE

Since education is a process of directing the development of persons, it follows that the nature of persons is a matter of central importance for the philosophy of education. On first thought it might seem that of all things our knowledge of human nature should be the most reliable, and certain, for it has to do with ourselves, who we constantly, directly, and most intimately experience, and with others of our own kind, whom we also regularly encounter in our common life in a great variety of ways. In reality, this
anticipated assurance about the nature of man is not warranted. Actually nothing is more puzzling, nothing prompts such difficult questions as man himself. This perplexity partly reflects the extra-ordinary complexity of human beings. This perplexity about human nature is a stimulus to philosophic reflection. The philosophy of education therefore requires reflection about human nature, not only because education is concerned with the development of persons but also because the understanding of man is the key to every experience about which man as a mirror of the world may reflect. Phenix (1958:471-481) mentions the distinctive features of human nature as the following: brain capacity, relatively few instinctive patterns, long dependency, culture, language, symbols, reason, imagination, memory, anticipation, self-transcendence and spirituality.

Education is often regarded as a means to help persons grow, and the value and success of education are commonly measured by growth achieved. By growth is meant enlargement, accretion, patterned co-ordination and qualitative improvement. (Greene (1973:69-70) contends that the teacher must, therefore,

"personally intend to bring about certain changes in students' outlook; he must mean to enable them to perform in particular ways to do particular tasks, to impose increasingly complex orders upon their worlds".
The teacher's intentions will inevitably be affected by assumptions he makes regarding human nature and human possibility. Many of these assumptions are hidden, most have never been articulated.

There is a whole spectrum of visions with man as an animal at one end, man as a paragon or god figure at the other. At each point in the spectrum there is a distinctive approach to education, usually derived from a definition of man or a definite vision of man-in-the-world. Most of these approaches share the conviction that no matter how sacred that child or how close to the divine, something specific has to be done to enable him to become a true human being — to enculturate him. They also have in common a prejudice against stasis and inertia — the idea that the living creature must be awakened if he is to learn.

Plato, for an example, defined man in terms of what he conceived to be his perfection: to be fully human was to exist in a condition of love, or pure, unalloyed rationality. Hence education could only be a process of helping people actualize their latent power to discern the fixities in the fluid world they inhabited, and by that means, to attain the recognition of the Real. No attention was devoted to the practical arts or the manipulative arts; no attention was given to the understanding or valuing specific, concrete phenomena or to controlling the direction of earthly change. Greene (1973:72) in support of Plato's essence of man states,
"The fully realized person had better things to do. And that person still remains in the background for teachers today. He may be fading somewhat; he may be only a blurred image. But with his lofty pre-occupations and his complete intellectual purity, he is still a kind of rallying symbol. He still makes normative demands.

An analysis of the true human essence leads to conception of aims and methods. For instance, a philosophical — religious idea of man deals with the essential and intrinsic, though not visible or tangible character, and with the intelligible destiny of that being we call man. Educationists who hold this view would then argue that the sciences cannot direct the course of education adequately because they ignore man's nature and destiny in favour of what can be measured and observed. A modern Aristotelian, Jacques Maritain, says that if man is seen from a philosophical — religious perspective, then education should be concerned with the more than animal nature of man; it must involve the respect for the soul as well as for the body of the child, and a sort of sacred and loving attention to his mysterious identity, which is a hidden thing that no techniques can reach. Education then should be devoted to the promoting exercises of the will and the intelligence, which can draw the child toward the infinite realm of Truth. If the human being is regarded as a spiritual organism, in the sense that his spiritual aspirations draw him towards perfection, then education should stress character building and
growth toward intelligible reality. Again if the human being is considered to be essentially rational then education should concentrate on the devices and subject matters that will put reason to work.

On the other hand, if man is thought of as first of all a natural being then life itself should become the business of the learning process. Rousseau once stated that life is not just breathing, it is action, the functioning organs, senses, faculties, every part of us that gives the consciousness of existence. This means then that learning involves both physical and mental activity, but if that activity is to be natural (for Rousseau this meant reasonable, temperate and healthy) it must be deliberately guided because an unguided person is likely to become the most mishapen of creatures. The individual is a maleable creature, susceptible to the attractions and artificialities of social life; in consequence his teacher must remove him from social life and place him in a benevolent, serene natural environment. Reared according to nature, the student is expected to balance his desires and his capacities to become attuned to his true (his natural) self. All this, of course, is a function of the eighteenth century view of Nature as well as an eighteenth century rebellion against artifice and rigid authorities. It has already been noted how the image of the natural man seems to haunt the imaginations of such reformers as John Holt and even Ivan Illich. To them, quite simply the school puts children (all born free) in chains; and the only way to educate humanely is to follow nature, to permit children to pursue
their interests, to learn what they desire and not what society imposes on them. Ivan Illich (1970: 47-8) complains.

"Classroom attendance removes children from the everyday world of --- culture and plunges them into an environment far more primitive, magical and deadly serious. School could not create such an enclave within which the rules of ordinary reality are suspended, unless it physically incarcerate the young during many successive years on sacred territory. The attendance rule makes it possible for the school room to serve as a magic womb, from which the child is delivered periodically at the schoolday's and school year's completion until he is finally expelled into adulthood life".

There have been other, frequently conflicting paradigms. Kant, acknowledged that each human being was born with the desire to be free but without the knowledge needed for freedom. Therefore the individual requires discipline which must consistently be imposed on him until he is old enough and rational enough to will what is right.

The development of experimental and functional psychologies in the nineteenth century presented the philosopher with new problems in defining man. Darwinism and other theories of evolutionary development were bound to make a difference, even to those who preferred to set aside the scientific nature of man. Dewey was influenced by Darwinian ideas about development and change and by inquiries that showed the self to be a function of society.
Now the teacher is not asked to build theories about human nature, but questions of definition thereof arise in the context of his day to day work. They may arise when he tries to clarify the relationship between judgements he makes about particular children and certain definitions he may have accepted from tradition.

Three kinds of general definition exist: stipulative, descriptive and programmatic. (Scheffler, in Greene, 1973:77). A stipulative definition exhibits some term to be defined and gives notice that it is to be taken as equivalent to some other exhibited term or description within a particular context. A descriptive definition attempts to explain the defined terms by giving an account of their prior usage. To treat a definition as programmatic is to be prepared to keep evaluating it to discover its consequences for teaching and learning. The teacher may not have to concern himself with the logical implications to be drawn for action from propositions about human nature. Nevertheless, he has to have sufficient knowledge of how to think about human actions so that he can make practical judgements in his teaching. He requires some familiarity with the methodology of the behavioural sciences and with the constructs they have made available. He also requires some ability to use the technique which has been called "the particular experiential form in which common sense thinking takes cognizance of the social cultural world".
The teacher, therefore, no longer relying on slogans or abstractions, will have to decide how to conceive man. He will have to decide if and when he can take the risk of dialogue while intentionally working to help pupils to learn. But in the course of making such decisions, he will become more intensely conscious of himself as person and as teacher. Only as he acts and makes his choices, does he confront the ever open question: What is man?

3.3 EDUCATION AND SOCIETY

Morrish (1972:203) explicitly retorts:
"Society is not composed of a number of institutions in complete isolation from one another, although it is true that some tend to be more isolated than others. Equally the school is not to be seen in isolation from the rest of society, although some schools and some types of schools will be more involved with the total community than others".

The above pronunciation echoes the necessary relationship between education and society, where education should be seen as an activity of society. Man is born a potential member of the society, and through education he progressively becomes conscious of the way of life of his society and of his rights and duties in that society. It is one of the tasks of the society, through education, to mould, guide and direct its potential members to enable them to take their places in the society. A youth becomes a full member
of society when his behaviour is in accord with that of old members who have full social consciousness. It is thus correct to conclude that there is a very close relationship between man, society, education and adulthood.

Schools exist to transmit culture traits of continuing value to the young. Smit and Cox (1929:13) contend:

"While all institutions share this transmission task, the schools bear a major burden. Moreover, schools are expected to perform their part of the task in a systematic way".

In a society with many cultural universals, few specialities and no radical alternatives, this task would be fairly simple. Such does not appear to be the case with South Africa, for an example. Rather, this society is pluralistic in a thorough going way. Different groups have different and conflicting political, economic, religious, racial, age, philosophical, sectional, ethnic, sexual, and occupational loyalties. There seem to be many alternatives and specialities and few, if any, universals. In a pluralistic society the choice of values, mores, traits, taboos and skills to be transmitted systematically in schools may arbitrarily favour one group over others. Further more, this is a conflagrant society fed by rampant industrialization, racial conflicts, and urbanization. The most cherished institutions and values appear suddenly to be transforming. The traditional traits believed once to have continuing value begin to lose popularity to emergent traits once believed to have only expedient value.
Schools are always socially contextual: that is, the purpose schools are to serve must be extracted from the society in which they exist. Luthuli (1982:27) emphasizes:

"The fact that whatever is practised at school ought to be a natural reflection of and ought to be determined by a philosophy of a people, necessitates a people-oriented education and school practice."

The aims of the curriculum, for an example should stem directly from the concept of the aims of education held in esteem and cherished by that particular society. Society wishes these aims to be continued, to be passed on from generation to generation. They must of necessity, also be held in esteem and cherished by those who design the curriculum. However, when the society is pluralistic the problem of identifying purposes for schools becomes very complex indeed.

There are some values which most Africans accept. As such they seem likely candidates for influencing school purposes. These values affirm the fundamental dignity and worth of the individual (White, Indian, Coloured or Black). However the worth of the individual is not affirmed free of obligation. Because the quality of the society is dependent on the quality of the individuals within the society, the individual is expected to achieve the optimum development of his own personality. Functionally, the individual's personality develops only as he extends and applies his knowledge and understanding, expands his ability to assess and evaluate, and increases his capacity to
interact with others. Although the personality of the individual is dependent upon his interactions with others, personality development is best provided for under political arrangements where all individuals should be protected from excessive demands or deprivation from each other and from the government.

Many observers of the South African society have long noted that a creed referring to the dignity of the individual, the equality of, and the rights of freedom, justice and fair opportunity is not the foundation of the South African life. The groups making up the pluralistic South African society have no actual consensus on value core. Moreover they reach consensus on anything with greatest difficulty. Evidence of the lack of consensus is found in the authoritarian alternatives to the previously mentioned creed. The society is fundamentally split in its interpretation of values. This position comes close to allowing schools not only to ignore any specific commitment to the individual's development, but it also denies the schools any purpose related to the welfare of the society. Another view has it that it is possible for this pluralistic society to function only because strategic institutions negotiate most of the profound value disagreements among conflicting groups. An elaborate system of allowable compromises, negotiations, and payoffs ordinarily prevents the occurrence of explosive public confrontations between groups with conflicting interpretations of value core. Shipman (1975:3) contends
"Education is the organized part of the process through which each successive generation learns the accumulated knowledge of a society. This cultural transmission is necessary so that people can fit into the existing pattern of life and associate with others in a predictable efficient and human way."

The involvement of education as a social activity, in the process of converting children into useful, responsible adults, means that it is never concerned solely with knowledge as preparation for occupation. Inevitably it has to ensure that each generation shares a common set of values, the same ideas of right and wrong. This moral education must be accompanied by social training in appropriate behaviour. Its objectives is a disciplined as well as an informed adult. Inevitably, this has involved religious teaching, for this reinforces and sanctions social training. Mallinson (1957:2) agrees with this and adds:

"Education then is a social force in the sense that any educational system must reflect closely the ethos of the people it is called upon to serve. To know what we want from education, we must know what we want in general, and in this sense our theories of education must derive from our philosophy of life."

Within the educational system of a race or people, the accomplishments of the past civilization are preserved; its spiritual life is propagated; and its heritage of language; literature; philosophy; and institutions is transmitted to youth. Whatever the dominant
characteristics of any civilization may be, religious, social, aesthetic, political, economic, or geographical, each of the dominant characteristics will be found reflected in its system of education. The truths, ideals, values, customs, morality and other elements that are recognized as indispensable to the next generation, commonly described as the social heritage, are passed on from one generation to another through education. Redden and Ryan (1955:16) emphasize that:

"It should be clear then that every system of education is an outgrowth of, and an attempt to perpetuate, a specific philosophy of life".

Every system of education, therefore, is based on a philosophy of life. All education properly so called is based on a complete philosophy of life. All true education is based on the true philosophy of life. A system of education might be scientifically adequate and very efficient, the principles underlying it might be sound in so far as their application would lead to the desired end, yet the whole spirit and trend of the system might be fundamentally wrong because they are derived from a false philosophy. Paisey (1983:15) states:

"Education is concerned with people and developing societies --------- A dynamic equilibrium should exist between education and the community it serves, constantly changing but always in balance. If this balance is lost the community loses confidence in its schools and a vacuum can be created, possibly to be filled by the more dangerous extremes of the society intent on usurping power".
Preparation for, and regulation of social life determines the content of education. Schools are agencies of socialization operating alongside the family, religion, the social services, and the local community. In a complex society, however, there is no guarantee that these will share common values, and pupils and staff may experience conflict as they play their parts in each of them. Because schools are frequently trying to transmit values which are not all shared by other influences on their pupils, they work against, as well as with, other agencies of socialization.

Most people would probably agree that a school should generally reflect the society, or more accurately, the standards adopted by it as enshrined in its institutions. The society is, however, continually changing and many people would not wish to see the status quo perpetuated indefinitely. Consequently the social factors affecting the school should be concerned with reflecting the society on the one hand and reforming the society on the other. Societies have evolved into larger and more complex forms. Shipman (1975:5) attributes this phenomenon essentially to the increased division of labour whereby each person plays different roles in many different institutions. Each of these roles tends to be one part in the whole organization and involves learning only part of the total culture. In a small-scale societies near subsistence level, each man must know all the technical and social skills to enable him to approach
self-sufficiency within his family. In modern societies, men work, worship, and take their leisure in large-scale organizations of which only a small part is visible to the participant.

There has been structural differentiation in such fields as government, administration, communication, religion and social welfare, and this has also produced the school as it is known today. This indispensable existence of a vital relationship between education and society is a life-long phenomenon. That education must foster the attitudes desired or regarded as desirable by the society in need of well-groomed manpower dates back to as early as the Industrial Revolution when there was a demand for free mass education to meet the manpower needs of industry. Even today this fundamental principle is still of tremendous significance. No wonder in development analysis and speculation such concepts as:

"Education and socio-cultural change"
"Education and economic development"
"Education and politics"

and others are not uncommon, especially in educational forums

Education is "gold" by which the community purchases its very existence and survival. Education is an integral part of culture of the community and is an indispensable channel through and by which the adults purposefully and systematically concern themselves with
life: nor is it clear whether the object of it should be to improve the reason or to rectify the morals. From the present mode of education, there can be no determination with certainty to which man incline, whether, to instruct a child in something which will be useful in life, or in what tends to virtue, or what is excellent; for all those things have their separate defenders.

Since education involves directing the development of persons, it follows that the central problem of education is the choice of directions, or of aims. The aims of education are the directions in which educators seek to guide the development of those under their care. General aims have functional value and it is for this reason that they are so essential. The functions of aims may be stated as the following:

- to give direction to the processes through which desirable changes are to be realized,
- to give proper sequence to educational activities,
- to serve as guards to activity through which desirable changes may be produced,
- to guide in the selection of the content to be taught, and
- to serve as means of evaluating the effectiveness of the educational process.

Speaking generally, aims give direction to all activities involved in the educational process. Aims are source of experience for the teacher, for they bring a sense of destiny and a challenge to persevere when the going is difficult.
"The aim of education is to lift the mind out of blind alleys.
"Education is the transmission of life by the living to the living".
"Education is securing for everyone the conditions under which individuality is most completely developed".
"Education is the process of training the industry of man, in its manifold varieties, and in its organized totality, to the highest pitch of excellence it is capable of attaining".

When one studies and analyses the above mentioned educational aims, it becomes apparent that the problem of educational aims is the problem of values. Phenix (1958:549) argues:

"Because education requires the selection of direction, it is deeply concerned with the values. Value concerns preferences, dissermination in favour of one possibility as against other possibilities. To choose one direction of development rather than another requires a scale of values whereby the relative worth of the two ways may be assessed. There is a problem of values because one cannot always take a neutral position with respect to alternatives. Only if everything were equally acceptable or unacceptable, would there be no need for choice and hence no scale of values".

When it comes to deciding between competing values — and this is essential in the determination of educational aims — the problem of the status of values at once arises. The problem of the status of values is crucial in education.

Castle (1965:134) claims that:
"There is no better general definition of the aim of education than the ancient African belief that education is a preparation for life. By this definition we think of education as a preparation for every part of living: for the satisfaction of our material needs, for the growth of our personal talents as well as for the formation of our personality and character. This definition also requires us to think of education as a preparation for loyal service in our local and national communities. It thus includes the claims of the individual person and also the claims of society". Joly (1965:739) agrees with Castle and adds that education prepares the individual for mature human living. There can be no difference between the end or purpose of education and human life itself. Whatever enables man to live most properly as a human being will enable him to achieve his true destiny as a human being. To supply norms and values that determine the aim of education is one of the functions of the true philosophy of education. Philosophy should determine and evaluate, the proximate or secondary objectives essential to the attainment of the ultimate aim. It is obvious that the ultimate aim of education must be the same as the ultimate aim of life.

Redden and Ryan (1956:99) contend:

"The ultimate end of education, as of life, cannot change with time, place or persons. It must be formulated in terms of eternal values which, of necessity, are unchanging and unchanged".

They go on to say that many answers have been given to the question, "What are the aims of education". Some answers have been definite and of positive value;
others have been exclusive, because they are based of false interpretations of man's nature, his final end, and the functions of the educative process. The diversity of answers has begotten uncertainty, confusion, and bewilderment in education.

Determining educational aims is a fundamental step in the operation of any school programme. Broadly speaking, educational aims and objectives give a long range perspective and an overall sense of direction; but very practically they also determine where things should start at any given moment and what steps will be taken to solve specific educational problems. Educational aims are therefore both highly theoretical and extremely practical determiners of educational policy and practice.

Hansen (1960:111) elaborates:

"Every question of choice among different educational practices, ways of teaching, kinds of curriculum, or specific classroom activities comes down ultimately to a question of educational aims. But because aims and objectives do seem so grandiose, so far removed from actuality, so theoretical, educators usually like to phrase their questions about educational aims wholly in terms of specific practices. That is, though we recognize that broad educational aims are important, we prefer to have them masquerade under the guise of questions that can be considered in a practical fashion".

Before a discussion is undertaken on how the educational aims are determined an exposition is worthy of the two categories of educational aims — individual
or community. Some educators believe that a choice should be made between education that puts the individual first and that which puts the community first. The view which puts the individual first maintains that the development of individuals is more important than the claims of the society. This is clearly demonstrated by the existentialist such as Kierkegaard, Buber and Heidegger. The protagonists of this view maintain that educators should concentrate on making good persons, because nothing good enters human society except through the lives of men and women. In the practice of education supporters of this view emphasize the present needs of children, the cultivation of their individual gifts, self-expression, the encouragement of original ideas. Briefly, they say education is to make a man.

Critics of this view maintain that such education will not make the right kind of man. They believe that such education will create selfish individuals who care little for their social responsibilities.

The view which maintains that the community comes first is supported by Hegel et al. This philosopher claims that children should be trained only to serve the nation even if this interferes with their individual development. Recently Karl Marx brought this very effectively to the Russians. School subjects would be selected to serve the economic needs of the society. There would be a tendency to shape the ideas of young people to a single pattern so that they would all think alike. External discipline would be strict; the emphasis would be on producing a future citizen of a
certain type, not on the present needs and development of individual children. The ideal citizen would be the one who obeys rather than one who thinks, and one whose self-disciplines were dependent on a few well-learned rules of conduct. Critics of this view say that citizens should not all think alike because society needs men and women of different opinions if it is to be vigorous and healthy. Clearly, there is a value in each point of view. Now the question is: is it possible to have a form of education which at the same time develops individual personality and also produces good citizens? Can there be avoidance of the dangers of each type of education? The answer may be that there can be avoidance of the extremes of each kind of education.

Hansen (1960:113) contends that it would be satisfying to the philosopher to be able to maintain complacently that he is the one who establishes educational aims. Actually this is not so. Educational aims in any society are determined much less categorically than might be satisfying to the philosopher of education. They are, in most cases, determined informally rather than formally; they are determined more by factors outside of than within the scope of formal philosophy.

The same author (Hansen) further maintains that the educational aims are determined culturally rather than legalistically; unconsciously, not consciously; and, experientially not experimentally. Phenix (1958: 552-558), in analysing the nature of aims of education contends that aims can be looked at as directions (directions for growth); as goals (destination to be
reached); as ends (end of the process); and there are immediate, mediate and ultimate aims; relative and absolute aims; varialbe and constant aims; immanent and transcendent aims; one or many aims; and, implicit or explicit aims. On the other hand Ward (1963:131-132) maintains that the philosophy of ends in education may be expressed in the three following points:

- Philosophy of ends in education has not a ghost of a chance to stand, by itself,
- Ends in education are determined in part by nature and in part by man, and
- So far as determined by man, ends are determined by some person or by groups.

Mayer (1963:13) says that the main aims of education can be summarized under fifteen headings and naturally these objectives are tentative. There are: reflective thinking; appreciation of culture; development of creativity; understanding and appreciation of science, contact with great ideas; moral and spiritual values; fundamental skills; vocational efficiency; effective education; effective citizenship; physical and mental health; change of personality; permanent interests; achievement of peace; and, perpetual renaissance of man.

Luthuli (1981:12) claims:

"From a phenomenological point of view there is one central and universal aim in all education, viz. ADULTHOOD — for in reality every child's life is progress towards adult life".
He goes on to clarify that the simple fact of human existence is that a child grows up and becomes a mature person. Accordingly, adulthood as the aim of education represents an image of man, that is, it stands for the ideal adult person, parent, teacher as educator. This image of adulthood is a social value, a collective view of man, understood and defined in terms of the philosophy of life of the society concerned. Philosophy should determine objectives essential for the attainment of the ultimate aim of education, that is, adulthood. It must be observed that the particularized proximate, secondary and ultimate objectives of education will differ according to the varied philosophies of life on education.

This is confirmed by Horne (1932:134) who maintains that whether there be a central and universal aim of education; or the aims be determined from an individual or community point of view, they all must be an outgrowth of existing conditions, flexible and should lead to a freeing of activities.

3.5 THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING

It might seem natural, even mandatory to begin with a definition of the concept teaching. A good many philosophers, especially of the analytic persuasion, have set out to construct such a definition, with the praiseworthy objective of clarifying educational discussion. Israel Scheffler (1973:67) says

"Teaching may be characterized as an activity aimed at the achievement of learning, and practised in such manner as to respect the student's intellectual integrity and capacity for independent judgement".
This definition brings about a number of questions. Is it true that teaching must be aimed at the achievement of learning? Cannot a human being teach uncousciously, by his example. On the other side is it enough, if an activity is to count as teaching, for it to be aimed at the achievement of learning? The word "teaching" like most other words in regular daily use, does not have sharply defined limits. So it looks as if Scheffler is right: to teach is to "aim at the achievement of learning". but not necessarily to achieve it. "Teaching", it would seem, sometimes meaning "aiming at achieving learning" and sometimes meaning "actually achieving learning", is sometimes an attempt word and sometimes a success word. Teaching in fact, is a deeply-rooted word, with a long history; it has a multitude of idiomatic applications; these cannot be summed up in a definition which will give the essence or the real meaning of teaching.

Perhaps, there should be freedom to use the phrase "successful teaching" which Mursell (1954:1) defines as "teaching that brings about effective learning". Confusion certainly might arise out of the fact that the word "teaching" is sometimes used in such a way that any attempt to get someone to learn something counts as teaching and sometimes in such a way that only those who are successful in getting someone to learn can properly be describe as teaching. Mursell (1954) claims that the ultimate criterion for success in teaching is -- results. When the question arises: By what kind of results should the success of teaching be judged? Mursell is ready to answer that: The
common sense answer to this question is that teaching should be judged by results that last and that a learner can and does actually use in his life. Teaching may also best be defined as the organization of learning, so that the problem of successful teaching is to organize learning for authentic results. This definition appears realistic; it applies to teaching of all kinds and varieties and of all degrees of excellence from very good to very bad. So that when it is said that teaching is the organization of learning, there is a clear cut formulation of what goes on in any teaching situation. One may think of teaching as the establishment of a situation in which it is hoped and believed that effective learning will take place. That situation is complicated and is made up of many constituents. Or, again one may think of teaching as setting up a range of activities in the lives of a group of human beings with the teacher as the focal point of the complex. These activities, again, are very varied and complicated.

If teaching is the organization of learning then it follows that a teacher is essentially an organizer. The task of any organizer is to enable a group and the individuals in it to function effectively together for the achievement of a common purpose. This is precisely the role of the teacher.

3.6 THE CONSERVATIVE FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOL

By far the oldest theory of the mutual relations of the school and the social order, and the one most widely
honoured in practice, is that the school should conserve the existing social order and culture. This culture was won only at a great cost of time and suffering. Confronted with the enigmas of life, mankind has only laboriously and at great sacrifice accumulated a stock of solutions. It would, obviously, be a great pity if any of these were to be lost through chance failure to teach them to the oncoming generation. Moreover, except as culture patterns are conserved through the school, there is no way to shorten the period of trial and error which is incident and precedent to social progress. Especially it is important for the school to perform this conservative function if other social institutions neglect to do so. Formally each institution like the family, church and state tended to perpetuate its own mores. Latterly, however, these mores have become too complex for informal transmission, and these institutions have become too busy to attend to their educational duties adequately. Hence the evaluation of the school as a residual institution to catch up and preserve social patterns otherwise in danger of loss or neglect. It is perhaps not too much to assert that nearly all educational philosophers agree that, to some extent at least, the school must be conservative in function.

Even after conceding that conservation is indispensable, it must at once become evident that in advanced civilization the school cannot conserve the whole social heritage through instruction. Brubacher (1969:12) emphasizes:

"The total social culture is far too extensive to be crammed into the short span of years that even
advanced students spend in school, to say nothing of the short period of compulsory attendance. And even if this were possible, it would probably be undesirable for the curriculum to mirror impartially both the good and the bad in racial experience. The school must exercise a normative function coincident with its conservative one.

What Brubacher talks about at the end of this quotation may take several directions. In the first place the culture of an advanced civilization is not only overwhelming in quantity, but is also baffling in complexity. One of the things that the school will have to do, therefore, is to simplify what is to be presented to the immature. Furthermore, not only will it have to simplify, it may also have to balance it.

The conjunction of time and place at which a child is born inescapably causes accidental limitations. Fortunately, he need not be wholly at the mercy of his epoch or locality, for the school can compensate for this disadvantage through balancing the diet of the curriculum. Especially can the school transcend both time and place through such studies as history and geography. The more diverse the elements to which the school introduces the child, the more will there be need for yet another service from the school, that of co-ordinating the various pulls which different environments make upon him. Co-ordination, however, implies some system of values. This leads to the last and perhaps most controversial aspect of the normative function of the school, that of purifying the cultural heritage. Ward (1963:152) states:
"Education is turning toward values. It is for values — it has to be. As soon as we delete values, we delete education. No values, no education, and where there is real education, there are genuine human values".

It requires but a moment's reflection to realize the tremendous improvement which could be brought about through sifting out those culture patterns which are unworthy to be perpetuated.

3.7 THE PROGRESSIVE FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOL

Conservatives offer little or no objection to the normative function of the school so long as it seeks to approximate a more purified form or ideal of the existing situation. Nevertheless, there are liberals and progressives who think that the school is not just a residual institution to catch up and maintain things as they are but a vehicle by which to forge changes ahead as well. To them it is absurd to think that education can preserve civilization from decaying as it is to think that the science of medicine can keep one from dying. Rather, education must be the source of new ideas, of a social programme that is constantly undergoing reconstruction. In other words, they think that the normative function of the school may also involve originating major changes, changes possible in the norm or frame of reference itself. Brameld (1966:12-13) contends:

"Meanwhile, as we learn to transmit the culture to others, we equally learn how to modify it. We
learn how to effect gradual or sometimes even quite
abrupt changes in the habits, skills, and customs
we have acquired. We never merely transmit the
same cultural process we have acquired from the
preceding generations. Always, in some light
degree at least, we modify through our ability to
improve upon older ways, to meet new problems and
conflicts."

What Brameld indicates here is that the educative
process seen in the anthropological context of
organized ways of life is invariably a bipolar process,
or, better said, a complementary process. On the one
hand, it is a process of stabilizing, of transmitting,
of guaranteeing continuity to the culture. On the
other hand, it is a process of connecting, improving
and altering the acquired characteristics of past
generations.

From a progressive point of view, then, the normative
function of the school is creative rather than
conservative. It introduces, therefore, the second
outstanding theory on the relation of the school to
social order, namely, that it is the duty of the school
to take some initiative and responsibility for social
change and progress. Among the supporters of this
time there are two very distinct sub-divisions of
opinion. One is content to have the school an
independent critic of the status quo, with any social
progress an indirect or incidental outcome of critical
instruction. The other would be much more direct,
purposeful, and aggressive. It would have the school
form a definite conception of the better social order
and then work with might and strength to bring it into
being. Brubacher (1969:13) states:
"First to regard the school as a pioneer of social progress were the organizers of the "progressive" education movement. Usually taking a dynamic, changing universe as their frame of reference, they attempted to gear education to it. Since nothing can be accepted as final in a world ruled by flux, they taught children not so much what to think as how to solve problems which this flux presented. Children learned to regard conclusions from their problem solving as tentative and subject to amendment in the light of future events. In the struggle to meet a contingent future "progressive educators" laid great store by individual differences among pupils in the hope that out of this rich variety of talent successful adaptation to the precarious quality of a dynamic universe would more likely occur".

What actually become the apparent results of what Brubacher has stated above is that by introducing such ideas in the school, progressive education could hardly avoid creating a ferment in the social order. Yet, although progressive educators kept sharp watch for signs indicating the probable future direction of social change, they did not identify themselves with any particular political and economic programme or party. Instead of aligning the school with any single reform group, they took the view that the school should be a place where all sorts of social programmes would be studied no matter how varied or contradictory they might be. They tried to institutionalize the continuous reconstruction of social theory and practice.
What the supporters of this view seek, is not an alienation of the school from life, but protection in a freedom to study life independently. If freedom were the settled policy of the schools no matter what faction commanded a political power, the educational policy of the schools should not suffer convulsions when political power changes hands.

From the objections to the school's attempt to give direction to social progress, it would be unfair to infer that the objectors think that the school has no role to play in social progress. On the contrary, they assign a very important part to the school. This part is to complete and consolidate changes in social policy once they have been decided upon. In this view the school is the servant of social change, not its master.

But many adherents of this more moderate position will admit that it would be unfortunate indeed if educational policies and programmes were to shift with every variation in the social and political weather. Certainly the school must be more than a weather vain or cork. Yet, if the school could even slightly modify the great elemental forces of society, it should exercise its influence to reduce the extremes of social oscillation. In times of rapid change, they feel that the function of the school is to stabilize the period of transition, rather than to accelerate the flux of disturbing forces. It is a time to emphasize the fundamental values which have maintained their position of eminence in the cultural heritage over long stretches of time. This, however, does not mean that
they favour a rigid static social order, but rather that they would prefer stability to instability, security to insecurity. They would make haste slowly, realizing that one of the most puzzling of all social problems is how to build new institutions out of old ones and yet keep the old institutions open for business during alterations.

Brameld (1955:14) states that in contradistinction to all the criticism which has been labelled against progressivism their critique centres on one thesis:

"Progressivism is a philosophy of transition between two great cultural configurations. It is the major rationale of culture that is (1) shifting rapidly away from those ways of living that culture has achieved in the past and (2) shifting rapidly toward new ways of living that are still to be achieved in the future. In brief, progressivism is a transitional philosophy, standing between cultural patterns that are increasingly obsolescent and cultural patterns that still wait an opportunity to prove their desirability and practicality".

3.8 THE NEUTRAL FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOL

Seeing that it is no easy task for society to be at one and the same time stable and progressive, free and secure, and seeing that the community may vent its wrath on the school if it dislocates or even threatens to dislocate the status quo by its teaching, many
educators think it advisable that the school take the high standard of neutrality on controversial social issues. To some of these educators neutrality means a strict aloofness not only from politics but also from the market place. They claim that the school should not be interested in useful knowledge or the practical clash of philosophic systems. Brubacher (1969:19) adds:

"They rather think it the auster role of the school, standing high above these temporal concerns, to pursue eternal values and to master universal truths. Governed by such laws and principles, education, they think, is the private possession of the individual the esoteric art of an initiated intelligentsia".

Other neutralists concede that the school must be concerned with the affairs of men and exclude such problems from the curriculum only when they are so controversial that their discussion would divide the community and endanger its wholehearted support of the school. This is the only consistent position to take, they claim, in a pluralistic culture, where the public school belongs to all people.

If the possibility is conceded of achieving neutrality by the teacher or the school, there are still criticisms to surmount. On the one hand, there is the misfortune that, if the controversial issues are left out, some of the best places in the curriculum will have to be left blank. On the other hand, if the teacher seeks to weigh the pros and cons of some
controversial issue impartially, the students may come to suffer a kind of academic paralysis. He may come to think either that the pros and cons are so evenly balanced that it is impossible to come to a decision or that one argument is about as good as another so that he is disinclined to commit himself to act.

Again there is the grave moral criticism against the neutral school that it paradoxically becomes the unwitting partisan of the existing situation and circumstances. For anyone to stand on the side lines and refuse to take sides is a negative or implied approval of things as they are. Thus a failure or refusal to think or act on social alternatives has moral consequences just as definitely as a willing commitment to thought and action.

3.9 THE SCHOOL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Clarke and Kadis (1971:37) states:

"Change is in the air, as always, but the wind is blowing faster these days because of the groundswell for action now".

In view of the above retortion the argument has so far proceeded on the assumption that social change and progress would take place in an orderly fashion. It has been assumed that children and adults could learn to discuss alternative social policies and come to some rational conclusion as to a plan of action. To effect social progress, however, is not always so simple a matter. There are many times when, after the most elaborate study of an issue the parties cannot agree on
what action to take. Parties are willing to use the
slower processes of education to effect the changes
they have in mind, but they will not hesitate to
abandon them for more forcible measures if the results
are not quick and striking. Such an occasion may arise
when there is some obstruction to the usual orderly
process of social change.

Wilbert Moore, in Kneller, (ed, 1963:348) states that
contemporary social change has these characteristics:
- For any given society or culture, rapid change
  occurs frequently or constantly,
- Changes are neither temporally nor spatially
  isolated — that is, they occur in sequential
  chains rather than as temporary crises followed by
  quite period of reconstruction, and the consequences
  tend to reverberate through entire regions or
  virtually the entire world.
- Thus, since contemporary change is probable
  everywhere, and its consequences may be significant
  everywhere, it has a dual basis.
- The proportion of contemporary change that is either
  planned or issued from the secondary consequences of
  deliberate innovations is much higher than in former
  Accordingly, the range of material technology and
  social strategies is expanding rapidly and its net
  effect is additive or cumulative despite the
  relatively rapid obsolescence of some procedures.
- The normal occurrence of change affects a wider range
  of individual experience and functional aspects of
  societies in the modern world — not because
  societies are in all respects more integrated
  but because virtually no feature of life is exempt
  from the expectation or normality change.
Moore, emphasizes both the normality and interdependence of change in modern societies while pointing out the hazards of social life in an age when procedures that are appropriate for today become obsolete tomorrow. In the light of these characteristics of society, many of the pressures and counterpressures on the school become more understandable. Because of their dual functions as agents of both innovations and social control, schools occupy a central position in a developing society. Educational institutions have had forced upon them the task of preserving a delicate balance between stagnation and chaotic change. The school is expected to train members of the society to think creatively and to provide them with the skills necessary to continue to create change, while inculcating a cultural heritage based upon adherence to existing norms and traditions.

At the same time the school finds itself the centre of a social order in which demographic changes, alterations in family structure, and basic shifts in the structure of interpersonal relationships create new demands on education.

3.10 CONCLUSION

Education is the organized part of the process through which each successive generation learns the accumulated knowledge of the society. This cultural transmission is necessary so that people can fit into the existing pattern of life and associate with others in a predictable, efficient and human way. The baby is
converted into a social being by his parents and near kin. However, haphazard this action, the achievements are complex, particularly the learning of language. After this initial training, societies differ in the organization of further learning, not only in the content and length of education but in the agencies involved.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATURE AND ESSENCE OF VALUES
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4.8 CONCLUSION
As late as 1944, John Dewey expressed concern about discouragement over discussions about values. His concern was not that he doubted his own conclusions about values, but that there seemed to be little headway toward a consensus among philosophers about such a fundamental issue. The problem recognized by Dewey had been a part of philosophic discourse before him, but the evidence today still shows little progress in philosophical circles toward finding workable solutions for these problems. One of the basic difficulties seems to be that there can never be certainty that "value" has the same meaning for all involved.

In rapidly changing world, schools are required to develop new educational roles and perspectives. More than ever before they pay attention directly or indirectly, to the social, political, and economic conditions of the larger society. In this new era, education is considered to be an investment in national development. Equalitarian principles increasingly provide the basis for educational policies. Many factors determine to a large extent the educational environment needed to generate in children a motivation to learn, to think critically and to develop defensible ideas about themselves and society.

Consciously or unconsciously teachers impart norms of the individual's role in society. Regardless of their subject of instruction, teachers have, for example, the potential for performing a political socialization
function. They are in a position to convey to children knowledge about and attitudes toward the political system. Children begin, at a very young age, to internalize the political norms which characterize the system e.g. participation, social trust, political efficacy etc. It is not presumptuous to reaffirm that mankind's future largely depends on the quantity and quality of education of the youth. The essence of education and values lies in the understanding of:
- the functions of education as a social agency and its interrelations with other social agencies,
- the historical roles of the schools and changes in these roles resulting mainly from changes in values as a result of urbanization and industrialization.
- the role of education both as an institution and as a process, as it affects personality formation, socialization, cognitive development and the self-concept of the individual.
- the impact of education on the social, economic, political and intellectual development of a nation
- the influence of education on human values — their formation, justification and adjudication.

It has been frequently observed that many people are today living in an age in which vast technological changes have wrought widespread transformations in social and cultural conditions. The dislocations following in the wake of such changes have eroded some cherished values of the past and brought about conflicts and uncertainties in others. The effects of all this have generated feelings of apprehension and
instability. Some have sought a sense of security by immersion in the group in an attempt to regain their identity; others have rushed headlong toward any doctrine or ideology that offered certitude and a panacea for the affliction besetting the human condition.

The state of education has not left education unscathed, for all too frequently the uncertainties and conflicts in the larger society are reflected in its educational institutions. The pace has quickened in the search for new ways to bring about improvements in educational conditions. Considerable energy is currently being expended in the study and implementation of a multiplicity of devices and programmes by educational technologists; unfortunately educational values have not received the same degree of attention. Since all areas of education are undergirded by values, and since the most basic decisions that must be made with regard to the future of education are value decisions, values are neglected at the peril of the society.

4.2 THE PROBLEM OF VALUE AND THE FIELD OF STUDY

Man does not merely contemplate reality. He not only sees it, he also evaluates it; he finds this reality agreeable or hateful, good or evil, pleasant or unpleasant, noble or common, sacred or profane and so on. By and large life is determined by evaluating and values.
"Theory of value" is the name for a set of problems common to a group of studies known as the value sciences. These include ethics, aesthetics, some phases of logic and theory of knowledge, economics, political science, anthropology and sociology. Specialization has more and more separated and insulated these studies from one another. Pepper (1958:7) contends:

"Theory of value is a movement in the opposite direction, drawing out a core of problems in which they all share. The movement is relatively recent, but the problems it deals with are very old. They are problems of good and the bad".

Philosophers from the time of Plato had discussed a variety of questions under such headings as the good, the end, the right, obligation, virtue, moral judgement, aesthetic judgement, the beautiful, truth, and validity. In the 19th century the conception was born or reborn, because it is essentially to be found in Plato -- that all these questions belong to the same family, since they are all concerned with value or what ought to be, not with fact or what is, was, or will be. All these questions, it was believed may not be grouped under the general headings of value and valuation but are better dealt with and find a more systematic solution if they are thought of as part of a general theory of value and valuation that includes economics, ethics, aesthetics, jurisprudence, education, and perhaps even logic and epistemology. Gilbert, in Edwards (ed, 1967: 229) states: "This conception matured in the 1890 in the writings of Alexins Meiniong and Christian von Ehrenfels, two Austrian followers of Franz Brentano".
Through them and through others like Max Scheller and Nichalai Hartmann, two twentieth-century German followers of Husserl (himself influenced by Brentano), the idea of a general theory of value became popular on the continent and in Latin America. It had some influence in Great Britain, in the works of Bernard Bosanquet, W.R. Sarley, J.M. Mackenzie, John Saind, and N.J. Findlay, but rather less than elsewhere, for, on the whole, British philosophers have held to more traditional terms like "good" and "right". But it received an excited welcome in the United States just before and after World War I. The idea was introduced by Hugo Munsterberg and W.M. Urban, John Dewey, D.H. Parker, D.W. Prall, E.W. Hall and others and later refurbished by S.C. Pepper and Paul W. Taylor. This wide-ranging discussion in terms of "value", "values" and "valuation" subsequently spread to psychology, the social sciences, the humanities, and even to ordinary discourse.

The first problem in the problem of value and the field of study is how to bring order and clarity into this apparently heterogeneous mass of subject matter about value and valuation. Pepper (1958:73) mentions three methods:

"Three principal ways have been employed singly or in combination by most writers on the subject. The first is to seek for a common trait or set of traits that runs through some or all of the suggested examples of value. This is the method of generalization. The second is to identify value
proper with some conspicuous example of value and to attempt to reduce some or all other items to this one. This is the method of reduction. The third is to select some items or items as "real values" or as value according to the writer's stipulated definition, and find reason for excluding other items as unreal or mistaken or simply outside the writer's interest as indicated in his stipulated definition. This is the method of exclusion".

Each of these methods can be used in arbitrary ways that actually produce distortive descriptions of the field. But if these methods are held to the empirical evidence, and the aim of investigating the whole common sense field is steadily kept in mind, they can bring order and clarity into the field without descriptive distortion. For they include the regular inductive procedures of classification, correlation, definition and hypotheses.

The nature, essence and meaning of value becomes the next area of concern.

4.3 THE MEANING OF VALUE

Schofield (1972:204) in trying to define the concept "value" begins by saying:

"In the case of education and, indeed, in the case of values, the terms remain nebulous because we know "vaguely" or "roughly" what they mean, and, as a result, never discipline ourselves to ask exactly what they mean".
What Schofield says instigates as great a challenge on the definition of value as to its precise meaning. Fischer and Thomas (1965:48) believe that though the term "value" is commonly used there is much disagreement concerning its meaning, and further provides one guideline that any discussion of values must clearly follow to distinguish them from mere likes and preferences. They then defines the value as:

"--- a belief representing a preference which an individual -- after examining the probable consequences of this preference and of alternative preferences he may have adopted -- considers important enough to be maintained, supported and perpetuated".

This definition points to the fact that preferences may represent values, or they may not, and that, therefore, the distinction between the desired and the desirable makes a difference between preferences and values. An individual's preferences are generally more inclusive than his values. His values are among his preferences, but not all preferences are his values. Presno and Presno (1980:4) have the following to say about the meaning of value: Whenever something is judged for its value, it is judged in terms of a concept of it.

"The most general definition of value, then, is that whenever a thing fulfills or matches or corresponds to our idea of it, then it has value. If it lacks some qualities of our idea, then to some extent it lacks value. Language has many terms that are used to express value or lack of it: good, valuable, no good, bad, not valuable, worthless, and so on".
According to this definition the connotation is that something that has worth or value completely conforms to the full idea of that thing. When a person, group, or object is fully what it is, it has value. In other words value is the fulfilment of concepts or ideas. Gilbert (1973) begins by admitting that the uses of "value" and "valuation" are various and conflicting even among philosophers but may be sorted out as follows:

"(1) "Value" (in the singular) is sometimes used as an abstract noun (a) in a narrow sense to cover only that to which such terms as "good", "desirable", or "worthwhile" are properly applied and (b) in a wider sense to cover, in addition, all kinds of rightness, obligation, virtue, beauty, truth, and holiness. The term can be limited to what might be said to be on the plus side of the zero line; then what is on the minus side (bad, wrong, and so forth) is called disvalue".

One can interprete Gilbert's definition to mean that "value" is also used like "temperature" to cover the whole range of scale -- plus, minus, or indifferent; what is on the plus side is then called positive value and what is on the minus side, negative value. Therefore in its widest use "value" is the generic noun for all kinds of critical or pro and con predicates as opposed to the descriptive ones, and is contrasted with existence or fact. The theory of value, or axiology, is the general theory of all such predicates including all the disciplines mentioned above.
Values, in and by themselves, had ceased to be a major concern in Sociology and Anthropology, for instance towards the end of the 1960's when the earlier promise of the multi-disciplinary cross-cultural faded. Harvard Values Study Project (begun in 1948) faded in the general critical reaction to the functionalist assumptions involved in most of the constituent studies. Though the published work which resulted from the project (F. Kluckholm and Strodbeck 1961; Vogt and Albert 1966) produced a good deal of solid comparative ethnography, and some valuable refinements to Peronian value theory (Spates 1983:32) these achievements were not enough to keep the topic in the forefront of mainstream research which, following major paradigm shifts, eventually left values and values research in a relatively quiet backwater.

Publications on values since the 1960's, although fairly numerous, have been largely isolated and idiosyncratic (Spates 1983:39-42). What has kept interest alive, has been the assumption and the hope that values influence behaviour. For an example, Rokeach (1971) who developed a complex and subsequently much used scale for measuring values turned his later attention to this topic. Similarly the "hidden agents" to which Inkeles and Smith (1974) refer in introduction to their mammoth study of individual personality change in five developing cultures, together with the work such as that by Kohn (1977) and Schooler (Kohn and Schooler, 1969) on value orientations and class, indicate a clear behaviour orientation.
In the hey-day of values research (1930 - 1960s) anthropologists and sociologists marched largely together. Functionalism was the dominant paradigm and values were seen as a controlling factor in social life and action. Both Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn were active in the values research field for some 20 years, and the former designated values as "conceptions of the desirable" which influence human choice. He offered a systematic definition of values as follows:

"A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action". (Clyde, 1951:395)

Inlow (1966:2) agrees with the above when he states:
"Values ------ are the behaviour determiners of men and social groups. These, for instance, predispose individuals or groups to conform or not to conform, love or hate, be radical or conservative, obey laws or break them, be bigoted or not be bigoted, vote for or against a given cause. Collectively values determine what the life style of a given culture will be. In a given individual, they determine what he will be as a man".

Kluckhohn also stressed that values were internalized by the actor and could only be inferred by the observer who notes regular behaviour which he (the observer) explains as the result of choices made in terms of the
actor's values. Thus A (values) causes or affects B (behaviour) and may even exist for that purpose. In its extreme form this functional view of values and behaviour was typical of Parsons and his followers who claimed that values or value-orientations (systems of linked values) could ideally produce completely harmonious (and changeless) social action (Parsons 1951; Parsons and Shils 1951). To quote them:

"The values, if followed in such a situation of full institutionalization, will lead to perfectly articulated, conflictless action on the part of several actors. These rules possess their harmonious character by virtue of their derivation, by deliberation and less conscious process, from common value-orientations which are the same for all members of the community"


This type of theory was not to go long uncontested. It was, however, by no means only sociologists who found it attractive. Anthropologists with their background of working in fairly small communities were not far behind as the following quotation from Radcliffe-Brown (1952:157) writing on "Religion and Society" shows

"----- an orderly social life amongst human beings depends upon the presence in the minds of the members of a society of certain sentiments, which control the behaviour of the individual in relation to others. Rites can be seen to be the regulated symbolic expression of certain sentiments. Rites can therefore be shown to have specific social function when, and to the extent that, they have
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for their effect to regulate, maintain and transmit from one generation to another sentiments on which the constitution of the society depends".

Here one has the anthropological equivalent of the Parsonsian stand that values underlie social life and the continuity of social reforms.

Radcliffe - Brown following Durkheim was, of course, positing a mechanism (other than Parsons and Shils' deliberation or unconscious processes) by which socially important values were inculcated. e. ritual and symbolism. Some of his followers went fairly far in attempting to demonstrate this connection (Radcliffe - Brown, 1922; Richards, 1956; Wilson, 1957; Turner, 1967). A younger generation of anthropologists were to suggest that at least some and often all of the values which were inculcated in ritual stem from an essentially economic and even an ecological base (Piddoche, 1955; Rappapart 1971, Friedman 1974).

Although extremely fashionable in South African anthropology at one time (West, 1979; Pauw, 1980) most current English-speaking anthropologists would be wary of so all-encompassing a view of values, ritual, and behaviour as that exemplified in the quotation from Radcliffe - Brown given above. Many however, would be willing to accept that symbolism and ritual do indeed tend (if not function) to conceptualize and make easily manifest a wide range of cognitive models and ideas. It is the simplistic link between values, ritual and behaviour.
In the writing of certain psychologists the positive connection between values and behaviour is relatively happily accepted. In the open University's notes to accompany a third level course in Social Psychology, Elms (1976:84) writes:

"A person's beliefs tell us what he thinks is true (or at least probably true). A person's values tell us what he desires to be true. Here we are moving from Plato's cognitive faculty to the affective faculty, from knowledge to emotion, from cue properties to motivational properties" (my underlying)

Elms does, however, add a note of caution when he points out in respect to value scales like that devised by Rorkeach that there is no certainty whether it is behaviour which has led to a subject's choosing particular values, rather than values producing behaviour.

Values may be applied to many fields of human activity. Specific value types - such as social value, ethical value, economic value -- originate by applying the idea of value to different areas of life. This is what is called values realm.

Gilbert (1973) says of this that those who take the wider approach sometimes distinguish realms of values and he goes on to mention that, for example Perry and Taylor list eight of these realms: morality, the arts, science, religion, economics, politics, law and custom or etiquette.
Though several meanings are attached to the concept of value, Smith et al (1957:16) derives the following functions of a value system:

- It supplies the individual with a sense of purpose and direction.
- It gives the group a common orientation and supplies the basis of individuals action and of unified, collective action.
- It serves as the basis for judging the behaviour of individuals.
- It enables the individual to know what to expect of others as well as how to conduct himself.
- It fixes the sense of right and wrong, fair and foul, desirable and undesirable, moral and immoral.

4.4 VALUE, VALUING AND THEORIES OF VALUE

The philosophers generally agree that the problems associated with theory of value are not extremely important but some of the most difficult ones man has faced in his history. Even the most elementary aspects of the concern with value remain ambiguous. The problem of meaning, a starting place in any study, is so thorny with ambiguity and vagueness that at any point investigations threaten to break down under the sheer weight of the alternative. The first step towards clarification should be an attempt to delineate the terms "value", "valuing" and "theory of value". "Value" and "valuing" have already been touched in the previous section (4.3) and they will only be a by the way here.
Value theory is concerned both with the property of value and with the process of valuing. (Bowyer 1970:60). About the former, it asks various questions. What is its nature? Is it a quality or a relation? Is it objective or subjective? Is it a single property, or is it several properties, value being an ambiguous term? Is its presence in a thing dependent on or reducible to the fact that the thing is valued by someone? About the latter it also has various questions. Is it a mere feeling or desire? Or does it involve judgement and cognition? And if so, is this a cognition of a value already there independent of the act of valuing or of knowing?

Value theory is concerned with questions about the existent (value), and about the process (valuing). A theory of value makes a statement about those things which are held to be true, about the laws and principles of values and valuing.

Gilbert (1973:230) contends "Philosophical theories of values and valuation whether conceived in the wider or in the narrow manner and whether formulated in the traditional or in the newer "value" vocabulary, have been of two sorts. Normative theories make value judgements or valuations; they tell us what is good or what has value, what is bad and so on. Metanormative theories analyze value, valuation, and good; they neither make value judgements in this way nor tell us what is good or has value. Instead they define what goodness and value are and what it means to say that something is good or has value".
Perhaps it might do some good to look at the above two sorts of theories (according to Gilbert) with some detail before one concentrates on experimentalist and emotive theories of value.

4.4.1 **NORMATIVE THEORIES**

In the broader conception, a normative theory of value must show, at least in general outline, what is good, bad, better, and best, and also what is right, obligatory, virtuous, and beautiful. In the narrow conception, normative theories of value have usually addressed themselves primarily to the question of what is good in itself or as an end or what has intrinsic value. They ask not what goodness and intrinsic value are but what the good is, what has value for its own sake, what is to be taken as the end of our quest or as the criterion of intrinsic worth.

Some theories have answered that the end or the good is pleasure or enjoyment or, alternatively, that the criterion of intrinsic value is pleasantness or enjoyableness. More accurately, they say that only experiences are intrinsically good, that all experiences which are intrinsically good are pleasant and vice versa, and that they are intrinsically good because and only because they are pleasant. Gilbert says
these are the hedonistic theories of value, held by such thinkers as Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, Sidgwick, von Ehrenfels, Meinong (at first) and Sharp. There are also quasi-hedonistic theories in which the end or the good is said to be not pleasure but something very similar, such as happiness, satisfaction. Examples are to be found in the writings of Dewey, Lewis, Parker, P.B. Rice and perhaps Brand Blauhard.

Anti-hedonistic theories are of two kinds. Some agree that there is, in the final analysis, only one thing that is good or good-making but deny that it is pleasure or any other kind of feeling. Aristotle says it is eudaemonia (excellent activity); Augustine and Aquinos, communion with God; Spinoza, knowledge; F.H. Bradley, self-realization; Nietzsche, power. Others such as Plato, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Saird, Scheler, Hartman, and Penny, are more pluralistic, holding that there are a number of things which are good or good-making in the themselves. They differ in their lists but all include two or more of the following: pleasure, knowledge, aesthetic experience, beauty, truth, virtue, harmony, love, friendship, justice, freedom, self-expression. Of course hedonists and other monistic thinkers may also regard such things as intrinsically good but only if and because they are pleasant, self-realizing, or excellent.
The scope of metanormative theories may also be inclusive or limited but both kinds will pose similar questions and offer similar answers. Their questions and answers have been variously stated in the formal or material mode, or the linguistic or non-linguistic, but they will not be classified here. Gilbert (1973:231) says, of the metanormative theories:

"One question or group of questions posed by metanormative theories concerns the nature of value and valuation: what is goodness or value? what is the meaning or use of "good"? what is valuing? what are we doing or saying when we make a value judgement?"

A sub-question here may be what moral value and evaluation are, and how they are distinct from non-moral value and valuation, if at all they are. Another question or set of questions has to do with the justification or validity of value judgements and normative theories: can they be justified or established with any certainty by some kind of rational or scientific inquiry? Can they be shown to have objective validity in any way? If so, how? What is the logic of reasoning in these matters, if there is one? Here a sub-question is what is the logic of moral justification or reasoning, if there is one, and is it in any way distinctive. Beyond this there is an even more "meta" level of
questioning: what is the nature of a metanormative theory, and how can it be defended? This last problem, as well as the sub-question just mentioned, has frequently been discussed in the twentieth century and earlier.

In reply to the first question or group of questions, some philosophers have held that terms like "value" and "good" stand for properties; that in value judgements we are ascribing these properties to objects or kinds of objects (including activities and experiences); although we may also be taking pro or con attitudes toward them; and that therefore value judgements are descriptive or factual in the sense of truly or falsely ascribing properties of things. They are therefore cognitivists or descriptivists in value theory. Of these the naturalists add that the property involved is a natural or empirical one, which can be defined. For instance, Aristotel, von Ehrenfels, and Perry claim that value is the relational property of being an object of desire or interest (an interest theory of value); Parker, claims that it is the satisfaction of desire (another interest theory of value); Lewis and Rice as well as the early Meinong, claim that it is the quality of being, enjoyed or enjoyable in some way (the affective theory of value).

Other cognitivists add that value or goodness is a metaphysical property which can neither be observed by or in ordinary experience nor made;
an object of empirical science. Examples of metaphysical definitions are being truly real (Neo-platonists), being ontologically perfect (Hegelian idealists), or being willed by God (theologians). Still others assert that intrinsic goodness or value is an indefinable non-natural or non-empirical quality or property different from all other descriptive or factual ones (they even 'describe it as being non-descriptive or non-factual). These philosophers are called non-naturalists or intuitionalists (Plato, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, Saird, Scheler, Hartmann, and perhaps later Meinong). They all hold that value belongs to objects independently of whether we desire, enjoy, or value them, and even independently of God's attitude toward them -- as some metaphysical theories and naturalists also do. Meinong, Scheler, Hartmann, and Hall contend that value is intuited through the emotions even though it is objective; Sidgwick, Ross, Saird and others contend that it is an object of intellectual intuition.

In recent decades many writers, both analytical philosophers and existentialists, have taken the position that value terms do not stand of properties, natural or non-natural, and that value judgements are not property -- ascribing statements but have some other kind of meaning or function. These writers have therefore been called non-cognitivists or anti-descriptivists.
Their positive theories are varied. Some argue that value judgements are wholly or primarily embodiments or expressions of attitude, emotion, or desire, and/or instruments for evoking similar reactions in others (Ayer, Bertrand Russel, Charles Stevenson). Others maintain that this account of value terms and judgements is inadequate and that value judgements are to be thought of as prescriptions, recommendations, acts of grading, or simply as valuations, not something else (Hare, Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, Patrick, H. Noel-Smith, R. W. Sellars, and J. O. Unuson) (more of this on Section 4.5. of this chapter).

4.5 VALUE JUDGEMENTS AND VALUE PREDICATES

Margolis (1971:19) states:
"There are two fundamental issues bearing, narrowly, on moral philosophy and, more widely, on value theory that, since the appearance of G.E. Moore's Principa Ethica, have been more or less confused one with the other. One is the issue of the objectivity of value judgements, that is, the issue of admissible grounds for the public confirmation of value judgements; and the other is the issue of the so-called Naturalistic Fallacy, that is, the issue of the differences among predicates like "good" and "yellow".

In the formulation of the two issues, a sketch is already made of their signal logical distinction. For the issue of objectivity concerns judgements and the
issue of the Fallacy concerns predicates. Very much lands on this. A glance at the history of meta-ethics shows at once that as with A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, and R.M. Hare, the rejection of Moore’s non-naturalistic account of “good” goes hand in hand with serious doubts about the objectivity of moral judgements; the recent recovery of the objectivity of moral judgement, most prominent perhaps in a variety of utilitarian doctrines, suggests and even at times celebrates the fallacy of the Naturalistic Fallacy.

The importance of these two matters lies, very simply, in their strategic position in any comprehensive scanning of truth claims possible in the moral domain and other domains of value. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to exaggerate this importance; for the issues mentioned concern only the logical features of certain judgements and certain predicates and leave relatively untouched whatever may be questioned regarding putative knowledge of values as such. The restriction promises a certain economy in as much as value judgements in all domains of interest exhibit the logical properties of two basic, alternative sorts. Further more the signal differences among value judgements discriminated as medical, legal, moral, aesthetic, and the like, have—apart from differences bearing on the relationship between judgement and conduct—more to do with the grounds on which particular sets of values are posited than with the logical differences to be considered.
Consequently, it will be very useful to isolate, at the very start, the formal features of value judgements and then to complicate, in the appropriate way, the account of the actual setting in which these several kinds of judgements are used — with an eye both to cognitive issues and to issues regarding relations between judgement and conduct. The result is that conclusions drawn in the present setting must be construed in a correspondingly restricted way: in particular, to speak about certain value judgements as factual judgements is to speak, provisionally of no more than of certain formal similarities.

4.5.1 VALUE REALMS AND WAYS OF COMPARING VALUES

It has previously been stated that the word "value" substantively employed may mean, in the broadest sense, any object or state of affairs which satisfies desire, which gives pleasure or satisfaction of any kind. This is a purely matter-of-fact, descriptive sense of value; it may be called for convenience "fact-value". In this use there is no distinction between "lower" and "higher", "bad" or "good". Accepting that there is value in the purely factual sense, it is clear that there may at once be the comparing, and sometimes contrasting, of different values with one another. Taylor in Smith (ed, 1970: 49) contends:

"What it means to classify values according to the points of view to which they belong has been examined ----. The realms of
value that emerge from such classification are universes of normative discourse corresponding to the different points of view. In all civilized cultures there are eight points of view (or realms of value) that may be designated as "basic". We call them basic because of two factors. First, they pervade the culture, in the sense that the conduct of any given individual in the culture is always subject to a value system belonging to at least one of them and is usually subject to value systems belonging to more than one of them. Second, they are the dominant points of view in a culture, in the sense that they set the values of the major social institutions and activities which carry on the civilization of the culture.

These major social institutions and activities are the moral code, the arts the pure and applied sciences, the religion or religions, the economic, political, and legal systems, the customs and traditions, and the educational institutions. The eight basic points of view corresponding to these institutions and activities are the moral, the aesthetic, the intellectual, the religious, the economic, the political, the legal, and the point of view of etiquette or custom. There is no single point of view corresponding to the educational institutions of a society, since education is a
process which may take place within any point of view. Thus there is moral education, aesthetic education, intellectual education, religious education and so on.

Value systems belonging to the eight basic points of view are embodied in the organizations and institutions of a society. Thus the purpose of a social organization may be to fulfill standards which belong to one or another of them. Or else it may be governed by rules which belong to one or another of these points of view, and to carry on the organization's activities is to follow these (practice-defining) rules.

It must, however, also be stated that in addition to the eight basic points of view or realms of value, every culture includes many non-basic points of view or realms of value. Each of these corresponds to a particular group interest in the culture.

Reid (1962:44-45) distinguishes three ways of comparing values namely: good and bad (positive and negative values); higher and lower values, and; comparison of values with one another without judging that some are either better or worse or higher or lower than others.
4.5.1.1 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE VALUES (GOOD AND BAD VALUES)

Broudy (1954:142) contends:

"it seems odd to speak of a negative value, but aversion, dissatisfaction, and displeasure are as real as their opposites. Negative values are experiences we should prefer not to have and perhaps would give something to avoid".

Values may be compared in a morally normative way in which things morally good are opposed to things which are morally bad: positive opposed to negative. In this sense human kindness is opposed to cruelty, the conservation of one's health is good while drug-addiction is bad. Generosity, the pursuit of truth and beauty are judged good, or better while their opposites -- greed, error or lies, ugliness -- are regarded as bad, or worse. Generally speaking there is a belief that one set of values ought to be cultivated and others ought to be avoided.

Taylor, in Smith (1970:51) regards the moral point of view (moral code) as applicable to all organisations of a given culture. He argues:
"When we make value judgments of the second type (i.e. evaluating the activities and policies of an organization from a standard point outside the organization), there is one point of view that is applicable to all organizations, namely the moral code which is concerned with the welfare of the individuals in the culture; and since the activities and policies of every social organization affect, for the better or worse, the welfare of at least some individuals in the culture, the culture's moral system is applicable".

What is not so obvious is that the moral point of view is relevant to all social organizations even when there is restriction to the first type of evaluation (i.e. judging the activities of an organization within the framework of its group interest). For the activities and policies of any organization are at least in part moral activities and policies. They are moral as far as the furthering of the organization's purposes affects the welfare of individuals who are members of the organization and who participate in its activities.
Broudy (1954:142) agrees and adds that by combining the intrinsic instrumental dimension with the positive-negative one the following combinations would be derived:

- Intrinsically positive — instrumentally positive e.g. the eating of a flavourful nutritious food, the reading of a book that is both interesting and instructive.

- Intrinsically positive — instrumentally negative, e.g. the delights of drug addict, the alcoholic, betting on horse races (at least for those who lose consistently) ... and over-indulgence of the appetites.

- Intrinsically negative — instrumentally positive e.g. a pain warning that medical treatment is needed; the bitter pill or painful surgery that improves health; the failure that inspires greater effort.

- Intrinsically negative — instrumentally negative e.g. all instances of unnecessary and preventable suffering, painful incurable illnesses, cruelty, malice, envy.
In general, men yearn for the first class of values, often succumb to the second, endure the third and hate the fourth.

4.5.1.2 HIGHER AND LOWER VALUES — A PROBLEM OF HIERARCHY

There is also a comparison of pairs of values in which they are not opposed as good versus bad but (in some sense) as higher or lower values.

Reid (1962:44) concurs in the following words:

"It is said, for example, by the Catholic Neo-Thomists, that values of the "spirit" are "higher" than those of the intellect, and those of the intellect "higher" than those of the body".

While Broudy (1954:143) maintains:

"In common usage the religious, intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and some of the social values are often referred to as the "higher" values, whereas the material and bodily ones are called the "lower" values".

He goes on to say that the quotation marks indicate that higher and lower are not self-evident in their meanings.
Reid, on the other hand, on his mentioned classification of values on this section says that we may think that this classification is vague, or arbitrary but we should be probably agreed that the values of cultivating the arts -- music, literature, and so on -- are higher than the values of passive amusement, and the satisfaction of science and philosophy higher than the satisfaction of eating and drinking, playing games, pugilism. It would also be thought that the value of responsibility is high than the value of purely external obedience to authority.

Generally speaking, the higher values are deeper, more far-reaching, stretching human capacity, making for personal growth. The contrasts, however, in this case are not the same as the contrasts between good and bad. If the arts, science, philosophy, responsibility are higher in one's scale than eating, and drinking, amusement, playing games, that is not at all to say that these items in the second list are in any way bad. The distinction between higher and lower is a general one and gives no particular rule for conduct. Underpinning the
common judgement of lower and higher is a metaphysical belief that those activities which exercise the faculties peculiar to man or are most developed in man are real than the activities which are shared with the brutes. There also lurks the assumption that what is less common is more precious, so that excellence in the aesthetic, religious, and intellectual fields is more to be esteemed than bodily vigour and physical pleasures.

Such convictions may be sound, but it is difficult to see how one could prove them to a sceptic's satisfaction if that sceptic chose to argue that what we share with the animals is, on the whole, more necessary and more pleasureful than what we enjoy as human beings. He might argue that the rare is the monstrous deviation from the type endangers it, and is, therefore less valuable than the common, the average and the plentiful.

But Broudy (1954:143-144) believes that another way of justifying the common use of higher and lower values is to argue that;
The aesthetic, religious, moral and intellectual values are more self-sufficient than the others; they are, on the account higher. Although truth, beauty, holiness, and good character do depend on money, health, and friends, they can if necessary, be cultivated and enjoyed with a minimum of such dependence. These values wear well over the long pull. Physical vigour and bodily delights wane with age. One can assert that the higher values - the values of the mind or of the spirit — pervade life more completely than do the lower ones.

Whether value judgements are susceptible to being justified, or proved, and, if so, how, depends very considerably on the position taken in answer to the questions regarding the meaning of "good". Some value judgements are derivative — for instance, the conclusion of the following inference:
What is pleasant is good.
Knowledge is pleasant.
Therefore knowledge is good.

The real question is about the justification of basic or non-derivative value judgements. According
to the intuitionist such judgements cannot be justified by argument, but they do not need to be, since they are intuitively known or self-evident. According to the naturalist they can be established either by empirical evidence or by the very meaning of the terms involved (analytically or by definition). According to the metaphysical and theological axiologist, they can be established either by metaphysical argument, or by divine revelation, or by definition. Non-cognitivists, being of many persuasions, have various views about justification. Some extreme emotivists and existentialists assert or imply that basic value judgements are arbitrary, irrational and incapable of any justification (Ayer and Jean-Paul Sartre). Others believe that there are inter-subjectively valid conventions like "What is pleasant is good" which warrants arguing from certain considerations to conclusions about what is good (Toulmin). Still others contend, in different ways, that attitudes, recommendations, commitments, conventions, and, hence, value judgements may be rational or justified, even if they cannot be proved inductively or deductively (Hare, Taylor, Findlay, and up to a point, Stevenson)
4.6 VALUE AND REALITY

Bowyer (1970:71) mentions that, ultimately, both value choices and the way they are verified are matters for individual considerations. There are no "right answers" for valuational problems that can be gleaned from textbooks or taught in class, and it depends upon the individual to acquire methods of orderly inquiry and to develop the considered judgment that facilitates a reconstruction of individual patterns of meaning. Broudy (1954:143) calls the process of selecting among value alternatives deliberation.

He says this process

"uses knowledge already acquired, knowledge of both fact and value, and although it may prompt us to seek knowledge that is needed but not yet acquired, that is not its primary purpose".

Attention to philosophic theory can help tremendously toward the clarification of own ideas and toward an understanding of the sort of reasoning that is necessary for making rational decisions. Indeed it would be a serious mistake to assume that the value theories men have developed since the times of Socrates are unrelated to the practical decisions one is called upon to make every day, for the models of the past provide excellent example of how man has tried to structure his moral experiences. At this point the investigation of some of the valuational ideas that wise men of the past have advanced will be undertaken together with the consideration of their methods of developing moral judgement. There shall be a consideration of three examples of how value and
valuing function within the context of a philosophical system. This will begin with Plato who is a classic example of the systematic philosopher. St Augustine is a philosophical descendant of Plato, but his philosophy reveals a different type of reality and some attention shall be given to the similarities and contrasts between the two thinkers. Finally, John Dewey represents a view that recognizes value discussions as independent of prior metaphysical considerations, and an attempt will be made to show significant differences that exist as a result of the view. These examples prepare a way for the discussion of contemporary views about the relevance of value for the future of the individual, society and education.

4.6. PLATO (427-347 B.C.)

Interest in value theory invariably begin with a study of Plato, even though his discussion of the Good presupposes a prior analysis of metaphysics and epistemology. The discussion here will concentrate only upon those aspects of Plato's philosophical system which are necessary to see "value" in its proper setting.

This discussion will refer to a number of the Platonic dialogues, but for several reasons The Republic will be used as the main source. The Republic is generally considered to be one of the most complete and systematic of Plato's dialogues and might very well serve as a single textbook for an introductory course to the basic problems of philosophy. Other dialogues
such as *Saches*, *Charmides*, and the *Euthyphro*, are discussions of a particular problem -- courage, self-control, or piety -- whereas the study of The Republic can lead to an understanding of major philosophical views about reality, knowledge and value. Finally The Republic is Plato's best expression of the connections among education, the individual and the role of the individual in society.

Broudy (1970:72) states:

"Scholars agree that the main theme of The Republic is an attempt to analyze the concept of Justice in order to determine if it is a universal principle which can operate in the lives of men and in society".

The Republic is composed of ten books. It begins with some current views about justice that Socrates attacks for being either inadequate or false and concludes with a discussion of the rewards of justice in this life and after death. It is systematically demonstrated, not only that a just state of just men is the ideal situation, but that it is a possible goal in this world, and the only reasonable one. The concern in The Republic is primarily the analysis of the Platonic soul which is found in Book IV, the two worlds of Form and appearance as described in Book V, the demonstration of the four stages of cognition by means of line in Book VI, and finally the famous allegory of the cave which is found in Book VII. The discussion in these Books reveal that the Good has relevance for the individual and that it is the pinnacle of value in Plato's philosophy.
According to Plato, to refer to the individual is to speak about the soul of the individual. Preceding the analysis of the soul it has been demonstrated that there are three distinct social functions in the just state — deliberative and governing, executive and productive. It follows, according to Plato, that since the state is a composite of individuals the three corresponding elements are found in each soul. The three parts of the soul are the rational which is the higher part of man, and the spirit and the Appetite which represent the sexual and other biological desires.

One of the foundation stones of Plato’s philosophy is his metaphysical postulation of two worlds, the world of Form, or what some scholars call the world of Idea, and a world of appearance. Bowyer, (1970:74) says:

"The world of Forms represents the realm of universals, essences, absolute perfection. The Forms are not things in the ordinary sense, nor yet ideas in the mind — infinite or finite. They are quite outside of time and space, are self-caused and are completely rational".

Plato was in no way propounding a mystical doctrine for the occult, for it is one of the purest rationality. Only through rational processes could one apprehend the Forms, especially the highest Form, the Good.

The concept of two worlds is manifest in Plato’s discussion of the four stages of cognition where he uses the device of a divided line into two unequal
parts. The lower part represents the visible order, or the world of appearance. The upper part of the line represents the intelligible order. Next, each of the parts is again divided in the same proportion in order to symbolize the degrees of comparative clearness or obscurity. The lowest segment of the line stands for images, shadows, or reflections, and the second segment stands for the actual things that are reflected. The third segment stands for those things which had images in the visible world, and the final segment stands for the world of Forms. A movement up the line represents the ascent of the mind from images, to visible things, into the intelligible world where a study of mathematics is necessary but not sufficient for true understanding of the Forms, and finally into the world of Forms where no use is made of the images that were used in the other segments and where inquiry is made only by the means of Forms.

Plato's ideas of the two worlds is even more explicit in his allegory of the cave which Socrates relates to Glaucon in order to illustrate how the nature of man is enlightened or unenlightened. Socrates tells Glaucon to imagine human beings living in an underground cavern which has a wide mouth, the width of the cavern, reaching up to the light. The inhabitants of the cavern are all seated, facing the back wall, chained so that they are unable to move and can only look straight ahead. Behind and above the inhabitants is a flaming fire and in front of the fire is a raised platform extending like a wall along the width of the
cave. Men who carry vases, statues and all kinds of figures fashioned from a variety of materials parade in a continuous file along the wall - like walk before the burning fire. Some of the men speak, and others are silent.

The inhabitants of the cave, chained as they are, can only see the figures as they are cast on the back wall of the cave by the light from the fire. The voices of the men carrying the figures resound against the walls of the cave, and it seems to the chained inhabitants that the voices came from the shadows which they take to be real. At this point the inhabitants of the cave represent man in the first stage of cognition — images. It is easy for Glaucon to see how the prisoners take the shadows for the truth, and Socrates continues the allegory to illustrate the pain and confusion the prisoners suffer when their chains are removed and they are forced to turn around and walk towards the light. At first the prisoners insist that the shadows are more real than the objects that caused the images or shadows. At this point they represent man in the second stage of cognition, visible things. The inhabitants of the cave are forced up the steep incline out of the cave and into the intelligible world, the third stage of cognition. When they first look directly at the sun, which represents the Forms, they are blinded by its brightness. In this manner Socrates makes the point that the cave is the world of appearance where the fire is the only source of light. The climbing out of the dark cavern represents the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world where the sun represents the source of all Good.
Thus, according to Plato, in the world of knowledge the idea of Good appears last of all and with the greatest effort. Good is the highest Form and is the pinnacle of the intelligible world. The allegory is a classic, not only for the magnificence of language, but because the simple analogy can be extended to clarify much of the complexity of Platonism. This argument of the Good is good but if it were near truth it would hamper man from struggling to know more. While it is an ideal idea it tends to be an end on its own, which has serious limitations, particularly for educational philosophy. Here it is used as an illustration of a variety of Platonic concepts such as knowledge, virtue, reason, and the Good, which is the ultimate goal for Plato.

4.6.2 SAINT AUGUSTINE (354-430)

Saint Augustine, the second philosopher to be presented in this discussion of theories of value is a complex figure. He relates many of his early experiences in his CONFESSIONS where there is an expression of his inner strivings and his efforts to seek the good and the true. He shifts from paganism, to skepticism and to Manichaeanism and ultimately to Christianity. His religious views provide the base for his ideas about value and education.

Saint Augustine was able, for the most part, to synthesize the traditions of paganism as exemplified by Plato and the Neo-Platonists,
with the early medical views which tended to suspect the use of reason in matters of truth. His synthesis was weighted toward Christianity, however, for he accepted only those ideas and ideals that were in accord with the principles of Christianity. Bowyer (1970:78) states:

"--- he was critical of the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul because the view was incompatible with Christian doctrine".

Oates (1948:824) says that he was also opposed to the concept of recollection of knowledge for his religious principles told him that

"--- we ought rather to believe that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see those things which by the disposition of the Creator are sub-joined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of a unique kind".

Such a belief unquestionably conditioned Augustine's ideas about the theory of value, and while there might be an expectation to find notable differences, it is clear that Augustine relied heavily on Platonic thinking.

Both Plato and Augustine believed in a supernatural creation of the soul, but where Plato credited this creation to one of the several gods -- a Demiurge (creative god,) Augustine believed in the one supreme God, the creator of all things. It has been noted that
Plato thought all of the souls were created at one time and that each soul could inhibit a number of different bodies in this world. Augustine's view about the manner in which the soul was created is not as precise. On the one hand he was inclined to favour the idea of Traducianism, where all souls were created in Adam's soul so that each would be handed down by the parent. He was inclined to this view philosophically, for it would explain the concept of the original sin as a transmitted stain on the soul, but he could not accept the materialistic view of the soul that was logically involved. Augustine was adamant on the point that the soul is an immaterial principle which gives life to the body. He was also firm in his refusal to allow that the soul is punished for its pre-earthly errors by being placed into an earthly body.

Plato made no distinction between the individual and the soul, but Augustine implies a difference when he says that, since the soul is superior to the body it inhabits, it cannot be acted upon nor altered by the body. According to Augustine, the soul is aware of bodily changes caused by external stimuli and can use the body as an instrument. Augustine's terminology is similar to Plato's when he describes the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, but Augustine is credited with
positing five parts to the soul, rather than three. Intelligence and will, Augustine says, are rational aspects of the soul, and memory, sense, and appetite are irrational aspects of the soul. Augustine uses methods similar to Plato's to prove the immorality of the soul but he does it without affirming the pre-existence of the soul. Augustine says that the soul is an immaterial principle and is therefore assured of immortality and that, since it apprehends indestructible truth, it is also indestructible. He also argues from the soul's desire of beatitude and perfect happiness.

The Augustinian theory of knowledge also relies heavily upon Platonic thought, but again there are distinct differences. Bowyer (1970:79) say: of this:

"Rather than four levels of cognition, Augustine speaks in terms of the levels of: 1) sensing; 2) judgements about sense objects; and 3) the ability to contemplate eternal things".

The first level is common to all animals, but only man is endowed with the reason that enables him to judge or question sense objects, and only man has the ability to contemplate eternal things. Augustine's prime concern is the soul's orientation to God, but he does not deny that we do learn by the bodily senses, even though corporeal things are not the proper objects of human intellect.
posing five parts to the soul, rather than three. Intelligence and will, Augustine says, are rational aspects of the soul, and memory, sense, and appetite are irrational aspects of the soul. Augustine uses methods similar to Plato's to prove the immorality of the soul but he does it without affirming the pre-existence of the soul. Augustine says that the soul is an immaterial principle and is therefore assured of immortality and that, since it apprehends indestructible truth, it is also indestructible. He also argues from the soul's desire of beatitude and perfect happiness.

The Augustinian theory of knowledge also relies heavily upon Platonic thought, but again there are distinct differences. Bowyer (1970:79) say of this:

"Rather than four levels of cognition, Augustine speaks in terms of the levels of: 1) sensing; 2) judgements about sense objects; and 3) the ability to contemplate eternal things".

The first level is common to all animals, but only man is endowed with the reason that enables him to judge or question sense objects, and only man has the ability to contemplate eternal things. Augustine's prime concern is the soul's orientation to God, but he does not deny that we do learn by the bodily senses, even though corporeal things are not the proper objects of human intellect.
De Magistro, a dialogue between Augustine and his son Adeodatus, is primarily concerned with questions of knowledge as focused on the origin of ideas in man. Although true ideas are in the soul of man and do not come from an external source, Augustine does not desert the sense world entirely, for he recognizes that the senses are necessary for man to learn about the world in which he lives. Words and sense objects, according to De Magistro, function as cues or prompts that remind rather than teach. Oates (ed, 1948:389 Vol I) says that Augustine states

"------- it is the truest reasoning and most correctly said that when words are uttered we either know already what they signify or we do not know; if we know then we remember rather than learn, but if we do not know, then we do not even remember though perhaps we are prompted to ask".

Both Plato and Augustine deprecate sense objects in comparison with immaterial realities, but the Augustinian goal is the achievement of a personal God, rather than of an impersonal Good.

The eternal truths that Augustine speaks of are similar to the Forms in Plato's thought, but for Augustine they exist as examplers, or ideas in the divine mind, and serve as patterns for the
creation of the earth and the heavens. They are beyond human understanding and thus are in the realm of faith. The distinction that Augustine made between understanding and believing was that human beings believe what they understand, but are not able to understand all that they believe. Human beings may not understand the eternal truths, but they (eternal truths) are made visible to the mind by divine illumination. The ultimate purpose of knowledge and faith is a supernatural vision and possession of God.

Augustine's *City of God* contains the best description of his views about the two worlds, the "Godly" and the "earthly". Those who choose to love God and shun the earthly pleasures of self have chosen religion and merit residence in the City of God. Those who choose to love self have turned away from God and will probably merit punishment. The choice is an important one, for without the true religion there can be no justice or virtue among men. A just society depends upon religion, for knowledge without faith does not assure justice. Oates (1948:431) writes that Augustine states:

"--- the highest good, than which there is no higher, is God, and consequently He is unchangeable good, hence truly eternal and truly immortal".

Augustinian value (good) is infused with religious meanings. The standard is still an absolute one, unchanging and eternal, and man
look to it and use it to insure personal goodness and a good society. Since religion should be dominant in the life of an individual, education must be religiously oriented. Curtis and Boulton (1958:86) emphasize:

"Education does not consist in the accumulation of facts. In is an illumination of the soul, a turning of the eyes of the mind towards the light".

This is not too far removed from Plato, yet sufficiently removed to demarcate the classical mind from the theological. It is a giant step from this point to the thinking of John Dewey.

4.6.3 JOHN DEWEY

A legend in his own time, John Dewey lived to see his philosophical writings become the battleground for liberal social reformers and conservative subject matter specialists. Dewey's philosophy may properly be called a living philosophy, for it is primarily concerned with man in relation to society. It is concerned with the ability of man to realize his potential and to develop as fully as possible within the framework of his society. It is a philosophy that does not lead man on a flight from experience into the aura of either a metaphysical Good or a theological God. Platonic metaphysics becomes anathema for men of
Dewey’s persuasion. Dewey had studied the history of man’s struggle and had witnessed his survival through crusades, holy wars, inquisitions and scientific and commercial revolutions. Through it all, man had been able to transform his world from a simple primitive one to the complexities of the metropolis. Dewey believed such a transformation has come about through men working together in this world.

It can readily be noted that Dewey’s views will differ markedly from those of Plato and Augustine, and there is an expectation of rejection of the beliefs previously expressed by these men. This is indeed the case. When one reads Dewey one has to keep in mind his belief in the principles of naturalism, process, and continuity, and his belief that there is no hierarchy leading to an unexperienceable value. To Dewey, (1925:400)

" --- values of some sort or other are not traits of rare and festal occasions; they occur whenever any object is welcomed and lingered over, however it arouses aversion and protest; even though the lingering be but momentary and the aversion a passing glance toward something else.

In one of Dewey’s major writings EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, he discusses his attitudes concerning the meaning of the term soul (Dewey, 1925: 293-297). The term is interpreted naturally and is stripped of any mysterious meaning, for it refers simply to the
"... properties of sensitivity and of marvelously comprehensive and delicate participative response characterizing living bodies."

Such a description of the term reveals Dewey's attachment to the ordinary life experiences of man, the realities designated in idiomatic speech, and to his refusal to desert natural phenomena. Here, the soul is no longer the source of knowledge, nor is it caught up in the split between the purity of the soul and the impurity of the body. Simply put, when the soul is free, moving and operative, initial as well as terminal, it is Spirit. In the same place Dewey admits that possibly the words "soul" and "spirit" may have to be given up because of the traditional mythology attached to them.

"One World," a phrase borrowed from the political campaign of Wendell Willkie, although not a happy political doctrine, aptly describes Dewey's view of existence, for he rejects the division of existence into the natural and the supernatural. Dewey believed that the search for absolutes takes man away from the looming world of experience and reduces his chances of fulfilling the need and the desires of the finite being. The infinite should be left to the infinite mind, whatever that might be. Dewey (1925:67) stated:
"A philosophy which accepts the denotative or empirical method accepts at full value the fact that reflective thinking transforms confusion, ambiguity and descrepancy into illumination, definiteness and consistency. But it also points to the contextual situation in which thinking occurs. It notes that the starting point is the actually problematic, and that the problematic phrase resides in some actual and specifiable situation".

The problem of knowledge is naturally raised by the above quotation. Dewey's world is one of continuity, and knowledge is of the world and continuous with the world. Dewey saw knowledge as being limited to the phenomenal world and felt that any other realm was the province of the individual and must be contacted through faith. Knowledge is not a matter of divine illumination or of recalling or remembering things already known but is the ordering of sense data that can be tested. Knowledge involves the scientific task of verifying relations, facts, and events within a natural order. What is known must be understood. The "doer" in this natural order is an individual mind reconstructing its own experience. There is nothing mystical about it, and the mind is not postulated as an entity but as a process.
The conclusion is that Dewey relates existence and value. He deplores a situation in which philosophers create a realm of values and then set about trying to relate that realm to the one of experience. Dewey felt that such an exercise missed the point of value discussion entirely. A means of discriminating among the possibilities of experiences and actions on the basis of their consequences seemed far more relevant and the scientific method functioned for Dewey even in value determination. It cannot be overemphasized that there is nothing metaphysical or mystical in his view.

Dewey affirmed an immediacy of experience, a liking or disliking, an approval or disapproval, of things that either are or are not. Values can be reflected upon as a basis for forming judgements, but the judgements, like the values, must continually undergo change. Judgement must be constantly reconstructed about values in order to deal with issues of value as they develop. Value judgements require the highest degree of intelligence, for values are created by man and cannot act as a standard above man. Society will disintegrate if individual desires, strivings, loves, and hates proceed haphazardly, and intelligence is the only guide that will assure value choices that are effective for the betterment of human condition.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, people express two kinds of beliefs. One has reference to what a given set of circumstances actually is, or was; the other, to what it ought to be or ought to have been. The first of these is usually referred to as facts; the second as valuations, judgements, opinions. In their valuations people express their beliefs both as to what the facts are and their sense of what is right, honest, fair, desirable, most worth while - what is their values.

Smith et al (1957: 59-60) puts it this way:

"Their values are frequently expressed as maxims such as "honesty is the best policy" and "treat thy neighbour as thyself". In short, the values of people are the rules of conduct by which they shape their behaviour and from which they derive their hope".

People do not render opinions, however, purely on the basis of the rules. In order to apply a rule, something must be known or believed about the situation. Statements that refer to what an actual situation is, or was, are usually called factual statements, even though they may not be true. Factual statements whether true or false are used to indicate what is believed to be reality. If they are true it means there is an accurate picture of the situation. If they are false, the people's view of the situation is erroneous.
On the other hand, statements such as the rules of conduct in a society are propositions about what ought to be or what ought to have been. In their judgment and opinions, people always express both what they believe the situation to be and their understanding of the rules. Man generally wish to be rational in their opinion and evaluations of events and persons. Consequently, their judgments usually conform to their perception of both the rules and the facts. But it does not follow that these judgments are always dependable. Today people are often misinformed about the true state of affairs and about the meaning of the rules. Indeed, they are frequently uncertain about what rules they should accept. The value system serves its functions only to the degree that its rules are mutually adjusted and compatible. If new rules are introduced that are in direct contrast to the old ones, and conflicting behaviour is thereby involved the individual may feel that the game of life can no longer be played without confusion and conflict.

4.7.1 THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

It has been noted that value refers to something that has either fixed or relative existence; that values represent certain social or absolute ideals; that valuing is the process of judgment about values, and that the source of valuing may be emotional, intuitive, or intellectual. In terms of theory of value, whether one is a naturalist, a non-naturalist, or a non-cognitivist, one nevertheless
deals with the experiences in the world which sustain and enhance life, for such experiences indicate those things which are valued by the individual.

Webster's Seventh new Collegiate Dictionary defines

"something having monetary value, something that is highly useful or serviceable; a precious possession; those things which are valued". p361

Granted that one's theory of value may be related to the things he deems valuable, it would be a mistake to confuse worldly possession with value structure. It is said that man is a social animal. The individual members of any group are subject to any manner of disagreements and differences, and out of these differences individual theories become articulated. If it were not for the differences; the individual would be engulfed by a society operating as one collective organism with little change or progress. In the final analysis, the responsibility for the continuance of human society resides in the individual. If a society is composed of reluctant individuals, it is most likely that the social structure will not survive, for a reluctant member of a group is apt to feel resentment. His activities may therefore tend to destroy rather than to enhance and promote the continuance of the social structure which he feels holds him captive. On the other hand, individuals who band together
for their mutual benefit strive for the same reason to preserve their unity. They recognize that in order to achieve this end there must be allowance for individual differences and that issues must be resolved by consensus. Bowyer (1970: 83) states:

"Historically, the attempts to weld societies by gaining the allegiance of individuals have been varied, but the attempts which placed primary emphasis on the group to the exclusion of individual human rights have been doomed to failure. Hitler's plan was to fashion the individual desires and aspirations of all men to conform with the ideals of a mythical supremacy for the glory of the state. Stalin tried to foster the supremacy of the state in a different way".

If the state were prosperous, the citizens would realize individuals economic prosperity. In both cases the state was supreme. The primary function of the individual was to serve the state, and individual values were measured only in terms of such service. Actually, Plato's ideas for a just state as expressed in The Republic are not as far removed from these concepts as one might think. There are obviously many differences, but in each case the individual would be educated to love and respect the state, and all men would therefore work together for the common ideal of a just state. There have been societies, and there are
groups and individuals within the society, who have a high regard for the worth of the individual but who feel that the society would be far better if all individuals felt allegiance to a higher order. According to Augustine's thinking all values should be uniformly derived from absolutes, in which case any inequalities or injustices would be solved in eternity. Dewey, whose attitudes were shaped by evolutionary and democratic principles encouraged the free play of the individual value system, as he recognized a vast difference between conformity and harmony.

A society can grow and improve only in relation to individual growth, and by definition it would not be individual growth if there should only be one purpose, one goal, one means of achieving the desired ends. Many things contribute to individual growth, and it is far more to the point to recognize the variety of influences than it is to attach an untoward amount of blame for failures to anyone of them. Perhaps education is most often the scapegoat, because it plays a major part in individual development.

4.7.2 CORE VALUES AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

Most societies attempt to perpetuate their concept of good life by transmitting their most basic and dominant value orientation from one
generation to another. Hence, the goal of education as a major means of cultural transmission is closely connected with the prevailing value system of the society. It is for this reason that there is a need to examine the concept of core values in relation to cultural identity. Morris & Pai (1976: 411-12) contends:

"While attempting to deal with its daily problems, each society develops certain patterns of behaviour and attitudes that are useful in meeting human needs and resolving conflicts between individuals and groups. When these patterns become well defined (and even institutionalized) and accepted by the dominant group within a society they constitute what anthropologist George Spindler calls the core values of a culture".

Core values can be regarded as forming one of the most fundamental components of a group's culture. Smolicz (1979:57) elaborates:

"They generally represent the heartland of the ideological system and act as identifying values which are symbolic of the group and its membership. Rejection of core values carries with it the threat of exclusion from the group. Indeed the deviant individual may himself feel unable to continue as a member".
Core values have been singled out for special attention because, within the theoretical framework, they provide the indispensable link between the group's cultural and social systems; in their absence both systems would suffer eventual disintegration. Indeed it is through core values that social groups can be identified as distinctive religious, scientific or other cultural communities.

Core values are generally assumed to fit into the category of ideological values. In principle, however, there is no one to one correspondence between core values and an ideological system. Systems of thought, and affiliated norms of conduct, may form part of a group's ideological system, without necessarily representing its core values. It is also important to note that some core values may appear to fall outside the normal scope of a group's ideological system. In this instance one has in mind ethnic groups in which solidarity is not principally engendered by allegiance to a political institution; nor by some social charter, whether written or unwritten; nor by an all-embracing system of philosophy (either with or without religious/spiritual implications). Instead such a core or pivot, of both the group's solidarity and the individual's loyalty towards it, may reside in language, a particular type of social structure, or some other such phenomena. There
is no doubt, however, that when a language or social norm acquires the status of a core value it assumes an ideological meaning. The use of such core values for the purposes of evaluation signifies their inclusion in the ideological system both at personal and group level. At the same time it should be noted that activation of some core values may require the involvement of some other systems e.g. a linguistic or social system. Also in considering the nature of core values in a particular culture it is important to remember that more than one core value may be involved, and that it may be possible to establish a relative hierarchy of importance among them.

4.8 CONCLUSION

Being human means having many desparate, and sometimes conflicting attributes. To be human is not only to be self-conscious and aware of oneself in the world, but to value. For man is a creature who values. If one is to be distinctively human other than just a vegetable devoid of striving, searching, and choosing, he must be aware of himself in the world and make choices that shape his future. These choices are made by reflectively assessing the situations one confronts in life. Man does not just value and strive to make decisions. He also yearns for some great value perspective which will unify and give meaning to his struggle. Some seek such perspective in religion, others in a political ideology.
All men, irrespective of the road they choose to travel or the system of truths with which they identify strive for the good life. But good life has been envisioned in many ways and it is highly doubtful that men will ever reach unanimity in their depiction of it; moreover one may even wonder whether such unanimity would be desirable. What is important, however, is that to be human, to value, to strive for good life, each human being must define good life for himself. Perhaps this is where education comes in. Education can provide a broad cultural understanding as well as sharpen people's ability of reflective thinking.

Each person is born into a culture permeated with values, many of them conflicting, and he dies in a culture -- usually though not the same one. Each person, therefore, is born, lives, and dies within a cultural matrix of competing values. The attitudes he takes and the decision he makes in reference to these values will determine the quality of his life. Any person who aspires to live his life on an especially high level will probably have to have values higher than those of his culture.

There are many of those who choose not to be fully human, lose their individuality by accepting values ready-made from a source outside themselves, from some ideological dogma that promises certainty in return for unquestioning loyalty. But those who choose the lifelong quest for the answer to the question, "What does it mean to be human?" will be buoyed in their adventure by their efforts to become fully conscious, aesthetically sensitive and morally autonomous as they seek their construction of the good life.
CHAPTER FIVE

VALUES AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE
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5.4 CONCLUSION
5.1 INTRODUCTION

The pervasive effects of science and technology on the family, on the community, on occupational life and on the economic system are noticed in most developing societies, together with the problems these effects create in the realm of curriculum development. These effects in themselves produce severe drains on the capacity of people to readjust their habits of conduct. But the impact of science and technology does not end with these alterations. The acids generated by these twin elements trickle down into the society's system of values, dissolving fundamental ideals and leaving the entire system in a state of confusion. The core of universal values which supplies the culture with its vitality and stability becomes smaller and smaller relative to the alternative and the specialised elements. People no longer become certain about such significant components of their culture. Some of these factors are how to rear children, what ends the economic system should serve, how much control should the government exercise over the activities of individuals and groups, what should be left to local initiative, and what should be the limits of sovereignty of nations.

The breakdown in the system of values is reflected in uncertainty about the purpose of formal education. The breakdown also manifests itself in the controversies about the content and methods of education. Persistent demands are heard for more discipline in the fundamental processes, more stress on the intellectual virtues, more time to vocational training, more time to religious and moral instruction, more emphasis upon the scientific method of thinking, more stress upon social discipline, and more time to the cultivation of the powers of self-expression and self control.
These contrasting claims frequently leave a teacher in a state of confusion as to what direction he should follow. They underscore the need for commonly accepted standards by which to choose among them. Few things are as important in the curriculum development - and, indeed, in society generally - as a body of universal values on the basis of which important decisions can be made with the confidence that they will be favourably reviewed. Therefore the questions to be explained in this Chapter are the questions of value conflicts, and therefore some problems for the school; and the influences of values on education.

5.2 VALUE CONFLICTS AND VALUE CONFLICTS RESOLUTION

At any point in history, the popular and technical literature of the times present a wide sample of conflicting prescriptions for the youth of the nation. The schools are given a prominent place in these statements, for they are used by society as instruments to change children and youth in the directions the culture considers desirable. To assert that something is desirable is to assert a value held.

Values and value system, to the extent that they are well developed and organised, provide a conceptual road map for human conduct. Fischer and Thomas (1965: 50) adds:

"It is also true that repeated choice of the same or similar alternatives tends to develop in an individual (or even in a group) a certain attitude or psychological set to continue making the same choice. In this sense an attitude is a predisposition to acting in a certain way, to me a certain decision rather than another one."
Value conflicts, however, occur in all cultures particularly in a multicultural set up. A value conflict is present in any situation where persons or groups of persons have arrived at two or more value positions which lead to incompatible consequences. When one group for an example agrees that property taxes must be maintained at present levels and another group is convinced that more funds are needed to operate local institutions that derive their revenue from taxes on real property, there is a clear example of a conflict in social values. In a highly pluralistic culture, such as that of the Republic of South Africa, organised groups are found representing alternative, conflicting positions on most, if not all social values. Sharp illustrations of this fact can be found around election times, both in the speeches of candidates and in the voting on the many proposed courses of social action facing the voter and the non-voter, at the local, provincial and national level.

More homogeneous, traditional - oriented cultures have fewer value conflicts than the pluralistic ones. This is true, almost by definition. However, value conflicts are never completely absent in any culture. Members of highly tradition - oriented culture for instance might have to face the conflict of abandoning the land of their ancestors, which they have inhabited for many generations, or of learning new ways of making a living, giving up time - honoured occupational patterns. Or they may have to choose between lucrative opportunities in the employ of members of another group or continue their earlier ways at a near - starvation level. How are these other value conflicts resolved?
First of all it is to be realised that not all conflicts get resolved. It is possible for institutions to function and do daily business in the midst of vigorous disagreement. One such example of what seems to be a perennial conflict in social values - a conflict that has continued to demand the attention of serious men at least since the time of Aristotle - is the disagreement over the proper aims of education. It was in Athens, about 300 B.C. that Aristotle expressed this note of concern in Book VIII of Politics:

"There are doubts concerning the business (of education) since all people do not agree in those things which they would have a child taught, both with respect to improvement in virtue and a happy life; nor it is clear whether the object of it should be to improve the reason or rectify the morals. From the present mode of education we cannot determine with certainty to which men incline, whether to instruct a child in something which will be useful to him in life, or what tends to virtue, or what is excellent; for all these things have their separate defenders."

Disagreement on the aims of education will be with us into the indefinite future. Although substantial agreements have been reached on the local and even on the national scene, vigorous disagreement and conflict continue. It is often tautologous to propose that any value conflict is difficult to resolve. It is also well known that the machinery for the peaceful solution of value conflicts has often failed.
One may offer as examples for such failures the many civil wars in the history of man; wars between and among nations; bloodshed in labour - management disputes etc.

Wars and other forms of naked force besides, various means, have been employed for the resolution and adjudication of value conflicts. In order to understand these variations and current difficulties, there should be an indication briefly of the differences that are likely to be found between the traditional, homogeneous cultures and the more complex, heterogeneous ones. Members of a homogenous culture tend to rely either on tradition or on the decision of a power figure or group to resolve conflicts in social values.

In a pluralistic culture, the process or processes for the resolution of conflicts in social values become amazingly complex. When there is a consideration, for an example, of the conflicting social values to be found in cultures such as those of the Whites, the Blacks, the Coloured and the Indians in South Africa, the demands placed upon those who seek peaceful resolution of conflicts become awesome.

The democratic process of resolving value conflicts requires that one make a genuine effort to put himself in the other fellow's shoes, to try to understand the conflicting alternatives and strive for consensus.
5.3 THE RELATION OF VALUES TO THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Fischer and Thomas (1965: 57) begin this discussion by saying:

"Whether we look at education in the broadest sense, as occurring constantly everywhere, or in its narrow sense of schooling, we cannot overstate the importance of values in the educational process."

Important questions relating to the above quoted statement are: Why do we have schools? What should the schools teach? What are the goals of education? Who shall be educated? Should all children study the same courses and materials? How much of the tax rand will be spent on education? Should we teach foreign languages? To whom? Why? Who is the gifted child? What shall be done to him? None of these questions can be thoroughly explored and answered without running into some serious value questions. There are countless other questions that could be raised, but the foregoing sample should suffice to illustrate that the educational process is fraught with questions and conflicts involving social values.
Ward (1963 : 152) re-iterates this fact and declares

"Education is a turning towards values. It is for values - it has to be. As soon as we delete values, we delete education. No values, no education; and where there is real education, there are genuine human values."

Each of these declarations by Ward says the same thing. The idea expressed may for a moment seem striking, but on second glance it is obvious and platitudinous. The idea does have points in its favour. First, it is absolutely true, and second, all philosophers, all educators and all citizens, when they come to think of it, are in perfect accord and accept it. Besides, it summarises all chapters on education. The idea that education is for values is going for ends, and, as a phenomenon to be contemplated or studied this going for values falls within the teleological and end-seeking datum of all nature and all art. Furthermore, education for values summarises chapters on the teacher and the student which say that education means bringing the child up, and the simple word "up" means nothing in the present context if not the child's development within himself and in act with society.
Brubacher (1939: 97) noted that:

"Few problems stand so persistently at the educator's elbow as do those involving questions of value. Directly or indirectly, questions of value are involved in nearly every decision which the educator makes. Education is directly concerned with values at a number of points. Most obvious, of course, are points such as instructional aims, instruction, and marks or grades."

To state one's aims of education is at once to state his educational values. It is through such a statement that the purpose of a teacher and the school system are derived. These or other aims, when accepted by the pupil, constitute the values which motivate him at his study of the curriculum. The educator on the other side is constantly in the position of having to choose between this and that educational policy, between this and that educational practice. He should decide in the first instance, on a consistent set of policies, a philosophy of education, if put otherwise, in the light of which to decide details of practice. Most of the judgement the educator makes, he makes in terms of the best practice he knows and the experience he has had with it. That is, he settles the values empirically.
Brubacher (1939 : 97) states that too few educators, however, have any underlying theory of values which they can consult to give them some degree of consistency in handling their succession of varied duties. Or perhaps they have a theory but it is only vaguely formed and they are not consciously aware of it. They are probably no more consciously aware of the theory of knowledge on which they operate than they are of their value theory. Yet, important as it is to have a conscious theory of the truth, it is more frequently important to have a conscious theory of the good.

In the previous chapter (4) it has been seen that the values held by Plato, Augustine and Dewey are clear cut and distinct. Logically, it should be expected to find marked differences between the educational directives of the three. Such is the case, although there are fewer differences between the views of Plato and Augustine, both of whom looked to absolutes for their source of values. The primary difference between the Platonic and Augustinian views about education is a matter of emphasis, which is governed by the difference between the ultimate goals.

Bowyer (1970 : 86 -87) illustrates this thus:

"The purpose of education for Plato was to achieve and maintain a state of justice. Ideally, each person would be educated according to his particular function in the ideal state. But where Plato would educate for the love and the good of the state, Augustine would educate for the love of God in all things. In both cases the system would be authoritarian. Conflicting opinions would be excluded through rigid censorship, and there would be no vacillation of aim, no confusion of the purpose. In each case the purpose of education would be to implement the truth."
Coming to the method, the Platonic method would emphasize the dialectic in order to recall knowledge from the soul, and the Augustinian method would stress catechism for the moral and spiritual regeneration of the individual. Plato believed in educating the whole child and realized the importance of a healthy body, but Augustine, believing that the flesh is the source of evil, placed no special emphasis on physical fitness. Plato stressed Mathematical subjects as way to gain entry to the Forms.

Although Augustine made numerous references to the power of numbers, he emphasised those subjects in the liberal arts which he thought provided the means by which God's works could be known and appreciated. Of this Bowyer (1970: 87) maintains that in both cases there would be no critics to disturb the status quo of the educational systems that would be founded on an authoritarian value structure. Critics persist only when there is freedom of learning and inquiry, and there would certainly be justifiable reason for disagreement with an absolute truth such as Plato and Augustine maintained.

The basis for Dewey's value structure, as already seen was neither metaphysical nor religious, for he referred to experience and to the knowledge gained from that experience for his source of values. Value thus becomes a matter of choosing among experiencable alternatives, and the ground for choices is an intelligence developed through the process of education which continues as long as one lives.
A philosophy that denies absolutes does not exhibit any rigidity in the curriculum. According to Dewey, flexibility of the subject matter leads to the development of self-concept and self-discipline. The child becomes central in the educational process, and through the development of this intelligence it is assumed he will choose to promote the good of the society.
5.3.1 THE SCHOOL AND THE VALUE NORMS

Broudy (1954: 126) states:

"Whenever we choose to perform an act, we do so because (1) we have decided that it is the right thing to do; it is what we ought to do; it is a claim which we acknowledge; or (2) we choose it because of all available alternatives it is the best thing to do; it will lead to more satisfying consequences."

The following questions are therefore based on the above statement: Where does the school get its norms? Where should it get them? Does it make any difference where it gets them? Has it any choice in the matter? What makes the choice of norms as difficult for the school? The answer to these questions may for some people lie in the statement by Ward (1963):

"Look at education as something that helps the child to grow into a man. Education is not something existing in a vacuum, but something strictly subordinate to the growth and development of man. So far as it helps man to grow and to be, it is - considered as a process and technique - an extrinsic or instrumental human value: it helps man to be, and it helps him just so far."
In this sense education is good for and is a value of an instrumental, contributory or extrinsic kind. Considered as a state of the child's or man's being, education is something inside man and is an intrinsic value. As an intrinsic value, education is primarily a means. It is integral to the child and substantial with him. It is not good for, but good in and the good of. It is the bonum honestum and simply good; it is good with no strings attached; it does not have to serve any other end in order to be a good. It is an end, and it is as if the end."

(p 155 - 6)

For others the answers to those questions lie in the following (Broudy, 1954: 127-8)

- Custom bluntly defines the right and the wrong, the better and the worse. "This is the way we always have done it" is the first line of justification in any society. It is expected, therefore, that the school would get a good share of its norms from custom, tradition and the morals of the group.

- What society cannot safely entrust to custom, it enacts into law. The law of the land proclaims a set of norms standards and evaluations stipulating what the citizen shall and shall not do and after specifying what will happen to them if they disobey.
There is a type of standard that is more obligatory than customs and less formal than law. It is a custom that has been affected or infected by the notion of public welfare. Tribal feelings, vague in shape and, but strong in tone, accompany the mores, but in general they are the most powerful of the standards.

The beliefs of a group about its relation to the Divine generate almost simultaneously a set of demands of the Divine upon men which can be as strong as mores. They define the right and the wrong, the better and the worse, and often describes the rewards and punishments for obedience and disobedience. It would be surprising indeed if a school did not in some way reflect these standards.
5.3.2 SOME DIFFICULTIES

All the standards mentioned above can be called cultural demands. They are relatively fixed at any given time, however, much they may change in the course of time. The question that is now raised is: how do these demands ever come to be doubted, questioned and defied. The analysis of the above mentioned four points give the following three answers to this posed question:

- When a sufficient number of people in a group are miserable, or when the group seems to lose its power in relation to the other group there may arise a dissatisfaction with the standard by which they have been living. It is said "may" rather than "must" because in every civilization certain standards that make the group members miserable nevertheless persist.

- The more obviously a standard is man-made, the more vulnerable it is. Laws are questioned more readily than mores, and civil laws more than religious ones.
When one set of cultural demands is juxtaposed to a different one no less powerful, the question inevitably arises as to whether one is more rooted in the nature of things than the other, or whether either of them is.

In modern society all three conditions have been fulfilled sufficiently so that two typical but inconsistent reactions can be distinguished. One is that all standards are regarded as relative (subjective) to the history of a particular cultural group. The other is that there is a true set of standards and "our" group has it. The first reaction is found in many theories about values; the second is manifested in the actions of man.
There is the necessity for human subjects to participate in the realisation of values in order for them to achieve them and enjoy them. If this be true, persons or societies must be actively engaged in its actualisation or they cannot possess it and enjoy it for themselves, then value realisation is an educative process and necessarily involves people in a growth and development which is educational at its heart. It might be said that this is an educational dimension which is indigenous to axiology as such. There is a necessary relationship between educational objectives and value theory. Any objectives which can be convinced for any phase of life are an expression, consciously or unconsciously of value judgements. And when objectives are proposed for education whether general or specific, same answers to value problems are implicit in these objectives.
CHAPTER SIX

CULTURE, ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION

MULTICULTURALISM IN A PLURAL SOCIETY
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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of multi-ethnic nations is not primarily a post-second war phenomenon. They have existed for centuries in many parts of the world. Many different ways of dealing with ethnic and cultural diversity have been tried ranging from annihilation, persecution, benevolent neglect to granting of autonomous status. As means of communications improved, people, instead of migrating to neighbouring countries began to migrate to distant continents. Political and economic upheavals and the consequent refugee movements across the globe created new minority groups. For instance, the manpower needs of the Western nations in the sixties brought people from the third world into the West upsetting the nation of homogenous nation-states in many parts of Europe. All these factors have led to the emergence of multi-ethnic societies in many parts of the world.

The first response of many societies to this multi-ethnic reality was to attempt to assimilate the new groups into the old. The melting pot ideology provided the philosophical justification for the cultural and linguistic assimilation of minority groups. The school served as the main institution for acculturation of children of immigrants and openly taught contempt for their cultures. Non-Whites or visible minorities were seen as "unmeltable" and, therefore, were relegated to the fringes of mainstream society.
Because of rapid social and economic change minority groups began to question their conformity to majority norms and instead started to demand recognition of their contribution towards building of societies to which they belonged, as well as an appreciation of their cultural heritage. They demanded that the multi-ethnic nature of their societies should be reflected in their institutions. Since the school had been perceived as the main socialising agency, considerable pressure was put on schools to change course and reflect the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural nature of the societies. This in many countries eventually resulted in development of a number of multi-cultural education programmes in schools namely mono-ethnic courses, multi-ethnic studies and multicultural education.

6.2 ETHNICITY AND CULTURE

The possession of a distinct culture provides one of the most important identifying characteristics of an ethnic group. Gold et al (eds, 1977: 13) contends:

"Each ethnic group has important traditions that mark its cultural identity....... They include language, religious beliefs and practices, family structures and roles of family members, forms of artistic expression, and dietary customs."
Within each ethnic complex, however, there are variations of these cultural elements from one sub-group to another. Some of these variations may be traced to contrasting conditions and customs in different regions of the homeland of the family's forebears. In the enormous land area of China, for example, there are contracts between people living north of the Yangtze River and those of the south easterly regions in physical appearance and in aspects of daily life, such as dietary habits. Chinese, Americans whose progenitors lived in Northern China and those whose forefathers came from South East China may reflect those differences.

Culture is not peculiar to the individual, but depends on sharing, participation and transmission within a group. This does not mean that all members of the same ethnic group are completely identical in their ways of thinking and acting: social class, family and, above all, individual differences, always exist. Nevertheless, membership of an ethnic group implies sharing patterns of living with other participants. The actions and attitudes of each individual members are therefore likely to bear a "family resemblance" to one another.
Concerning ethnicity and culture, Smolicz, in Megarry et al (ed, 1981 : 17) notes:

"In many ethnically plural societies, a further distinction needs to be made between the ethnic group that holds the dominant position through its numbers, early settlement or impact upon the main political and economic institutions, and minority or subordinate groups that have much less influence on policy-making and limited access to resources."

In societies where there is one distinct majority group, and a number of minority ethnic groups, there have been attempts to relegate ethnic cultures to sub-sets of the culture of the majority. Cohen and Manion (1983 : 13) supports:

"Ethnocentrism is in-group glorification; that is a process of invidious comparison in which the symbols and values of one group become objects of attachment and pride while the symbols and values of another become objects of disparagement and contempt."

It must be recognised, however, that ethnic minority cultures have their own independent historical continuity, and although they may interact with other cultures in a plural society, this does not make them a mere facet of the dominant group's tradition.
In this sense ethnic cultures cannot, for instance, be equated with working class sub-culture, teenage pop "culture", or gay life-style - all of which may be regarded as variants on each of the majority and minority ethnic cultures in a society, since they relate only to a slice of the group's life. To use a musical metaphor, such slices or segments of culture represent variations upon a theme, while ethnic cultural pluralism refers to the different themes in a composition, rather than to variations upon any one of them. This is not to say that cultural analysis should be limited to the discussion of multiculturalism in relation to ethnic minority groups alone.

An analysis of other cultural differentiation, especially in relation to class and other specialised styles of life, is also important, but this should be done in terms of sub-cultures which are but sub-sets of the parental cultural stock. By their relegation to the level of a sub-culture ethnic minority cultures are implicitly made part of the dominant culture. Cohen and Manion (1983:13-14) note that this in actual fact describes

"an ideology of racial domination and exploitation that (i) incorporates beliefs in a particular race's cultural and/or inherent biological inferiority and (ii) uses such beliefs to justify and to prescribe inferiority or unequal treatment for the group."
Such cultural reductionism, has, however, for example, not occurred in the plural societies of Asia, such as India, Malaysia or Singapore, where ethnic groups are often of substantial size and have managed to preserve their cultural distinctiveness over many generations.

6.3 DOMINANT MONISM

Once different ethnic groups have appeared within a given society, be it through conquest or other movements of population, the question arises as to their ultimate fate, in relation to the majority group. Does government policy generally, and the education system in particular, work to eliminate, modify or encourage the cultural diversity they introduce?

In some instances the ideal of a mono-cultural state has remained unquestioned and has been forced either by coercion or by all-pervasive ideological orientation of assimilation, or DOMINANT MONISM. Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981) observes of America and Australia:

"In America and Australia, for example, this was manifested in prevailing social pressure for Anglo-conformism .......... All individuals, no matter what their ethnic origin, were expected to adopt the norms of the dominant Anglo culture (which derived from the British Isles), and to give up their own cultural heritage. Schools were consciously seen as one of the most effective instruments of achieving the cultural assimilation of ethnic children, not only through "immersion" in the ways of the majority, but also by elimination of their native cultures."
In several countries assimilation policies are now regarded as both outmoded and as failures. There is, however, a tendency among those who still favour assimilationist and monistic outcome to adopt the multi-cultural phraseology but to attempt to achieve their ends by relegating ethnic cultures to residues. Through the breaking of such cultures into fragments, their impact upon the majority is reduced, while at the same time the transmission to the next generation is made less likely. This type of reductionism is characterised by a policy of discouraging ethnic or minority languages, since in many cultures the loss of the native tongue represents a prelude to their disintegration. Under the guise of multi-culturalism, the goal of assimilation can then be brought nearer without incurring the odium of denying cultural rights to the minorities.

6.4 HYBRID MONISM

Theoretically, it is possible to conceive of the emergence of another form of cultural uniformity throughout society. Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981) says:

"Under the ideological orientation of cultural blending or synthesis ....... all the different cultures present in society would be welded together in some mix or hybrid, containing elements of each, in different proportions and combinations." p19
This means that the society would thus eventually become monistic, with a single culture. The new generation growing up, or perhaps, its children, would come to the point where different cultural heritages would have little bearing on its current activities, since all would share instead the newly-evolved hybrid culture.

It is not clear, of course, which elements of each culture would be retained or in what form, nor who would decide these issues. What language, for example, would be used? In literate societies with standardised written forms, it is difficult to envisage the evolution of some new kind of jargon, creole or patois. It seems likely, therefore that this approach would result in children being brought up to communicate in the language of the dominant group, and that alone. Hence, at least within the linguistic sphere, the situation would be that of dominant rather than hybrid monism.

6.5 CULTURAL PLURALISM

A new recognition of the world’s diversity and an awakened interest in the ethnic roots of its peoples have received widespread attention in the past years. Conceivably this awareness and interest sprang from the urgent demands of minorities for acceptance and recognition; conceivably they also arose from a new focus on cultural backgrounds and social history.
In any case attention to the fundamental diversity that marks most of the world's populations is a welcome universal of the time honoured view of the multicultural countries as the "melting pots" which were expected to mould all of a country's ethnic varieties into a single common amalgam. Racism, unfortunately, has played a devastating role in the history of multi-ethnic populations, from conquest to enslavement, discrimination and even exclusion. Culturalism here will look into two of its types namely separatism and multiculturalism.

6.5.1 SEPARATISM

When ethnic cultural differences persist in society, at least two main types of pluralism may be distinguished. One form is the co-existence of distinct cultures within the same society, but almost in separate compartments and with every little interaction between them. Smolicz, in Megarry, et al (eds, 1981: 20) illustrates,

"For example, if this kind of pluralism were to develop in the Australian, New Zealand Canadian settings, it would imply the existence of two main categories."
Individuals labelled "Anglo-Australian" would speak nothing but English and follow exclusively British cultural traditions. Such people would collectively represent the majority of dominant group in this country. The other category would be made up of various "minority ethnics" who adhered to their native traditions and ignored the majority culture as far as possible. Some of their children might reject their ethnic culture and might try to join the majority group. Alternatively, it would be possible for these minorities to maintain and develop their heritage into the second and future generations and thus perpetuate cultural separation."

Under this arrangement, separate government agencies and school systems would be established to ensure that children had maximum immersion in their home culture, with little consideration being given to interaction with children from other ethnic groups. Thus, even though society as a whole would be pluralistic, the members of the various dominant and minority backgrounds would remain largely within the confines of their own ethnic cultures.
Those belonging to minority groups would become involved in the culture of other groups only in so far as it was necessary for economic and political existence.

The underlying assumption behind this theory is that of cultural separatism. Individuals are considered to be immersed either in the Anglo or in the ethnic cultural tradition. Society is pluralistic, but not at the individual level, since each person has to cope with only one language and only one cultural tradition. The concept of this type of separatism within the confines of one state is not a purely theoretical one, but must be viewed as a possible outcome in a number of societies (such as Great Britain and West Germany) which until some decades ago had mainly homogenous populations and which received "injections" of new arrivals from vastly different cultural or racial resources.

Another form of separatism in a culturally plural situation is the kind stemming from racism and prejudice. Cohen and Manion (1983: 14) say that racism manifests itself at three levels:
The continuing racial discrimination by numerous institutions of society represents the structured aspect of racial ideology. This is referred to as institutional racism.

The existence of informal group norms that serve to re-inforce occasional collective acts of racial discrimination and this is referred to as collective racism.

The belief of a particular person about the cultural and/or biological inferiority of minority group and his discriminatory behaviour towards members of that group, and this is called individual racism.

A casual glare at the literature on race relations shows the confusion surrounding the use of terms such as race, ethnicity, racism, ethnocentrism and prejudice. A confused and differential notion of race as used by human biologists, social scientists, lawyers, demographers, and the man-in-the-street; a blurred distinction between racial and ethnic, and a confusion between criteria of colour, geographical origin, national origin, religion, culture and ethnic affiliation. It hardly needs saying that the category race is a human invention and that the designation of race is quiet an arbitrary matter.
Because racial groups are distinguished by socially selected physical traits, definitions of race vary widely according to the perceptions and the expectations of those doing the defining. (See chapter 7) Some authorities for example, have chosen to recognise as many as 30 races while others identify only three.

There are also many definitions of prejudice in the literature on race relations. First, prejudice is an intergroup phenomenon which is negatively oriented and is something undesirable. Second, prejudice is an attitude and as such is acquired, rather than innate, behaviour. Sociologists account for racial discrimination and prejudice in terms of social-stratification theories. One explanation, for example, argues that race relations problems arise when conquerors use those whom they subjugate to exploit newly-acquired lands and resources. In such circumstances a social structure begins to emerge in which different racial groups constitute separate classes, lower-status racial groups being debarred from almost all forms of social interaction with members of the dominant group.

Social psychologists approach the problem of prejudice from a rather different perspective. They see prejudice as a matter of conforming to social norms.
Here, explanations centre upon the basic ethnocentrism of every group, the argument being that ingroup glorification is functionally related to group formation, cohesion and intergroup competition. It must, however, be stated that no one theory provides an adequate explanation of racial prejudice.

6.5.2 MULTICULTURALISM

According to the second interpretation, cultural pluralism is seen to be a characteristic not only of society as a whole, but also of its individual members. In a society where one group predominates, members of minority groups would come to acquire the dominant culture up to the level appropriate to their personal needs and aptitudes. Smolicz (1981: 20) says

"What multiculturalism means, however, is that these same minority group members would be allowed and even encouraged to maintain and develop their native languages and cultures alongside the dominant one."

The best example of such bilingual individuals is provided by a balanced bilingual who can switch from one language to another with ease. Oksaar, in Husen and Opper (eds, 1983 : 17) however, contends that:
"We can look at multiliguisum and multiculturalism from at least three different perspectives: from the perspective of languages and cultural systems, from the perspective of the individual and from the perspective of a group or society."

Bilingualism is, however, only one facet of biculturalism, because other aspects of the heritage and family relationships may also be involved.

In such a society, multiculturalism would also entail at least some members of the majority groups acquiring aspects of minority cultures and internalising them for their own special purposes. As the example of several South East Asian countries suggests, biculturalism can be accepted as a perfectly natural phenomenon in society. It is the monocultural individual who is regarded as unusual rather than vice versa.

Multiculturalism as defined here implies that individuals from both majority and minority backgrounds would have the opportunity to make use of more than one culture in their everyday lives, be it in language, family life, social manners, ideology or the higher spheres of cultures such as literature and arts.
Smolicz (1979:4-5) states that in a modern multicultural state pluralism is regarded as the only viable alternative to the policy of absorption of minority cultures. He says:

"The end result of the process of Anglo-assimilation would be the increasing standardization of life patterns according to a model which had been worked out by one cultural group in some distant past and in a certain highly specific historic circumstances, which may no longer obtain."

This would of course stifle any chance of transcultural comparisons which are of such value in re-thinking and re-interpreting the patterns of one's native culture. One of the most significant routes to cultural novelty would then be lost.

This multiculturalism approach does not assume that every individual is a bicultural, as in the case of the balanced bilingual although the greater the number of such individuals the better. It is assumed, however, that everyone is positively disposed towards an idea of a multicultural society and participates in it to the extent that his ability and desire permit. Such a multi-cultural orientation may also be termed internalized cultural pluralism (or dualism) since the cultures concerned are internalized within one and the same person.
The discussion on this type of "internal" multiculturalism shows that cultural diversity need not be divisive. It is assimilated at the most intimate, personal level, through being reconciled with each individual and transmitted by him in his daily life. Such biculturalism may create tensions but as T.S. Eliot has pointed out, the greatest creativity often takes place at the "friction-edge of cultures."

6.6 SHARED VALUES IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

In countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and many others, multiculturalism has been internalised within many individuals, although ethnic diversity is manly concentrated in domestic and family life and within neighbourhood and friendship networks, youth and folklore organisations and social clubs.

However, in the sphere of political, economic, legal and educational affairs, mainstream national institutions exist which act as unifying forces in society. Underpinning such institutions and giving them meaning are shared values to which members of all ethnic groups generally subscribe (Smolicz 1979: 15 – 17)
These provide a kind of ideology umbrella which is especially important in a democratic society, since it is only such an agreement upon fundamentals of life that can guarantee stability and cohesion in a culturally plural setting. Authoritarian societies can manage their affairs by coercion, but they usually search for some set of shared beliefs, be they religious or political, to reinforce their rule. One of the most important of such supra-ethnic or universal values is commitment to the political unity of the state.

It may be that the supra-ethnic values concerned were originally shared by members of only one of the ethnic groups and that in the course of time the group concerned managed to have its values accepted by all the others. However, the origin of shared values is of lesser importance than their acceptance by all the ethnic groups. The nature of such shared values differs in various societies. Smolicz, in Megarry et al (1981:22) makes an example:

"... the Spanish and Byzantine Empire transmitted the acceptance of Christian religious values (Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox respectively) as fundamental for all peoples within their reach. The USSR has formally accepted the doctrines of Marxist Lennism as applying to all its constituent republics and nationalities. In Islamic countries it has become expected that all citizens will observe religious codes."
Likewise, Britain saw itself as guardian of Western style democracy and succeeded in maintaining and strengthening this value in territories peopled by European immigrants, many of them from its own shores. It may be said that this ideal is now entrenched as a shared value in countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States of America. Other shared values which are held by the populations of these countries, irrespective of background, include a belief in opportunity for all the individuals to better themselves economically and socially, according to their own ability and resourcefulness. The freedom of the individuals to pursue their own private lives within legal and political constraints is also acknowledged. In addition the English language is accepted as the common means of communication for all Australians, Americans and New Zealanders. All ethnic groups in those countries recognise the importance of English as the national language and lingua franca that is necessary for communication and for the political, economic and legal activities of society. In a society of this type, however, the acceptance of England by all ethnic groups must be taken as conditional on the understanding that, for those who wish to preserve their mother tongue, English represents an additional language, rather than the sole and unique means of communication.
Of the various supra-ethnic values mentioned above the desirability of multiculturalism itself is still insufficiently understood and appreciated in many societies. It is this value that needs special emphasis in the future. Indeed, without the acceptance of cultural diversity as a shared value by the majority group and by society as a whole there can be no multicultural society. Otherwise, the way is left open for the pitfalls of assimilation and separatism.

6.7 CORE VALUES AND ETHNIC CULTURAL RETENTION

Most societies attempt to perpetuate their concept of good life by transmitting their most basic and dominant value orientation from one generation to another. Hence the goal of education as a major means of cultural transmission is closely connected with the prevailing value system of the society. Morris and Pai (1976: 411 - 412) observe:

"While attempting to deal with its daily problems each society develops certain patterns of behaviour and attitudes that are useful in meeting human needs and resolving conflicts between individual and groups. When these patterns become well defined (and even institutionalised) and accepted by the dominant group within a society they constitute ...... core values of a culture."
Though these core values are accepted by the majority of the mainstream culture, they are often surrounded by other, alternative (minority) patterns, which often challenge the validity of the core values of the dominant group. Consequently, the possibility of realizing cultural pluralism in many societies depends on the extent to which the dominant group will permit the alternative patterns to exist and grow.

Core values can be regarded as forming one of the most fundamental components of a group's culture. Smolicz (1979 : 59) contends:

"They generally represent the heartland of the ideological system and act as identifying values which are symbolic of the group and its membership. Rejection of core values carries with it the threat of exclusion from the group. Indeed the deviant individual may himself feel unable to continue as a member."

Core values are singled out for special attention because within the theoretical framework, they provide the indispensable link between the group's cultural and social systems. In their absence both systems would suffer eventual disintegration. Indeed, it is through core values that social groups can be identified as distinctive ethnic, religious, scientific or other cultural communities.
Core values are generally assumed to fit in the category of ideological values. In principle, however, there is no one to one correspondence between core values and an ideological system. Systems of thought, and affiliated norms of conduct, may form part of a group's ideological system without necessarily representing its core values. It is also important to note that some core values may appear to fall outside the normal scope of a group's ideological system. In this instance there is reference to ethnic groups in which solidarity is not principally engendered by allegiance to a political institution; nor by some social charter whether written or unwritten, nor by an all-embracing system of philosophy (either with or without) religious/spiritual implications. Instead such a core or pivot, of both the group's solidarity and the individual's loyalty towards it, may reside in language, a particular type of social structure, or some other such phenomena. There is no doubt however, that when a language or social norm acquires the status of a core value it assumes an ideological meaning for group members. The use of such core values for the purpose of evaluation signifies their inclusion in the ideological system. This is true, both at personal and group level. At the same time it should be noted that the activation of some core values may require the involvement of other systems e.g. a linguistic system or social system.
In considering the nature of the core values in a particular culture it is important to remember that more than one core values may be involved and that it may be possible to establish a relative hierarchy of importance among them.

Smolicz, in Megarry et al (1981 : 23) says :

"Census data and empirical studies from a number of ethnically plural societies demonstrate variations in the degree to which ethnic minority groups adhere to their native tongue at the first and subsequent generation stages. (Fishman, 1966; Clyne, 1972, 1976; Smolicz and Harris, 1977)."

He gives an example that, for instance, it was found that in Australia, Greek Australians maintained their native language to a greater extent than other ethnic groups, while Dutch-Australians relinquished it most.

In this connection the relationship between the ideological orientation of the dominant group and that of a given minority may help to explain why children of some ethnic groups are more likely to retain their ethnicity than members of others. The concept of "ethnic tenacity" has been suggested to account for this phenomenon. This implies that some minority groups are more insistent than others on preserving their cultural integrity in any plural society.
However, the concept of ethnic tenacity is not satisfactory on its own, because it does not take into account the relationship between the culture of the minority group and that of the majority.

When examining the relationship between the cultures it is useful to postulate the existence in each culture of certain core values which are characteristic of a particular culture and which cannot be abandoned without endangering one's membership of the particular ethnic group (Smolicz, 1979 and 1980). Such core values can thus be regarded as characteristic of the cultural group in question. In a plural society, the relationship between the core values of different groups helps to account for variations in the degree of ethnic cultural maintenance and assimilation. The basic division in this respect is between language-centred cultures - cultures for which the native tongue constitutes a core value - and other cultures which are based upon family, religion or some other ideals - political, historical or structural. Most European cultures appear to be language-centred, for example, Polish, French and Greek cultures. In these cultures language has become equated with affiliation to the group. Such close ties between ethnicity and language can have various origins; in the Polish case, these are historical and relate to the language persecution during most of the 19th century by the neighbouring occupying powers.
Frequently a culture is served by more than one core value, though one of them usually appears as of outstanding importance. One of the most interesting values is the group's orientation to other ethnic groups in the same society. Thus, for some groups, preservation of cultural purity has been elevated almost to the dimension of a core value, while in others the acceptance of cultural interaction, including the absorption of elements from other cultures, has been accepted positively.

6.8 LANGUAGE CENTRED MINORITY CULTURES

The concept of core values makes it easier to understand the varying degrees of ethnic tenacity shown by various minority groups. In Anglo-dominated societies, for example, there has been, for at least half a century or more, a well developed tradition of religious pluralism. Minority groups with religion at their core have thus had a much greater chance of survival and development than groups centred on language, for example.

Cultural maintenance in each group must be studied in relation to the core values of the culture concerned, the mechanism adopted for the preservation of one culture may not be suitable for another.
As far as education is concerned, courses in ethnic languages are more necessary for the maintenance of language-centred cultures than they are for cultures with non-linguistic cores. For the latter groups, courses in heritage would assume greater importance than language. Taft, in Husen and Opper (eds, 1983 : 8) mentions:

"One variant of bilingual programs worth a special mention in the context is what Fishman and Lovas (1970) called "partial bilingualism" in which immigrant children study their own heritage and language in segregated groups, either as part of the curriculum of general schooling or outside of school hours in their own "ethnic schools", but their main school instruction is in the host language together with the other students who are not subject to bilingual education."

For a language centred culture, the loss of the native tongue usually heralds a cultural shift to the periphery. Ethnicity may still be maintained by appeal to the group's folk-lore, the preservation of the family cohesion and in group marriage. When such a shift occurs, however, the intellectual aspect of culture evaporates. In these circumstances, the cultural transmission chain tends to weaken in later generations. What is more, in its residual form, an ethnic culture is not very effective in interacting with the majority culture, at any other than domestic and folk levels.
When such a shift occurs, however, the intellectual aspects of culture evaporates. In these circumstances, the cultural transmission chain tends to weaken in later generations. What is more, in its residual form, an ethnic culture is not very effective in interacting with the majority culture, at any other than domestic and folk levels. Significant cultural interaction can never occur on terms of equality, and the remaining pockets of ethnicity merely sustain structural division. It is only when ethnic cultures have been reduced to such residues that they come to be associated with other variables like social class, religion or some other life-styles.

This is not to denigrate the importance of folk-lore, or family bonds as a supporting value, nor is it to disregard the importance of such values in helping to retain ethnicity at a time when external pressure could extinguish it, before it has time to re-assert itself in a cultural sphere. But cultures cannot be maintained in their integral form if their core values are lost. For language-centred cultures, this means that ethnic languages must be preserved as the vehicles or carriers of those cultures. In this case there is no substitute for linguistic pluralism. In educational terms, this means the necessity of teaching minority ethnic languages, either in a bilingual situation or in an ethnic language programme. Rist, in Husen and Apper (eds, 1983: 43) observes:
"Public policy and public perceptions within the immigrant countries vary widely as to the permanence or impermanence of different linguistic and cultural groups."

6.9 ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN A SOCIALLY COHESIVE SOCIETY: A BALANCE BETWEEN CORE AND SHARED VALUES

Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981: 25) contends

"Although core values must be preserved if cultures are to retain their integrity, one cannot expect, say, European or Asian cultures to be incorporated in toto into societies such as those of Canada, Australia, or United States."

The implications for this is that national cultures are concerned not only with languages or life-styles, but also with institutional aspects that are of political, economic or legal significance. It is these institutional aspects that are of political, economic or legal significance. It is these institutional aspects that all cultures must shed in a plural society in favour of the shared or supra-ethnic values that are acceptable to ethnic majorities and minorities alike.

Within such a shared structure or framework, ethnic cultures may flourish although the term "ethnic" carries an implication that a certain part of the culture has been surrendered towards the common values for the whole society - and that this process of sharing concerns not only the minority, but the majority group as well.
However, the ethnic entities remain as cultures rather than as cultural residues or sub-cultures so long as they retain their cores. If and when such cores are lost, ethnicity is gradually reduced to a sub-cultural or residual level.

The loss of certain ethnic institutional forms in a plural society is inevitable since, if each group retained its political, legal and economic structures, there would be no society, but a loose confederation of states. However, such an acceptance of shared institutions by all the groups, and consequent modification of the culture of each group, is of an entirely different order from the excision of core values that are fundamental to its survival and development. These values constitute the boundary between accommodation to plurality and assimilation to the dominant majority.

Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981: 26) states:

"The balance between maintenance of an ethnic culture and its growth and interaction with other cultures is, therefore, an extremely complex and sensitive process. On the other hand .... some institutional aspects of each culture must be merged into a single shared value system that enjoys the consensus of all the groups."
Still on this, on the other hand, the adjustment process must not be so severe as to prune away the heart of a culture. Once the core value boundary is crossed the cultures disintegrate into residues and the essence of cultural pluralism is lost. This model of multiculturalism therefore stresses both the preservation of ethnic cultures and their adjustment to the shared values of society as a whole.

6.10 **EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES**

In plural societies, fears are often voiced that ethnic groups could become stratified on the basis of level of education and occupational status achieved by their members. Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981 : 26) illustrates.

"This would lead to differential access to power and resources on the basis of ethnic group membership. Those immigrants who came to America and Australia from Southern Europe, for example were for the most part peasant farmers, many of whom had not completed primary schooling. They swelled the numbers of the urban unskilled workers at the bottom end of the socio-economic hierarchy."
It has then been argued that if the children of such immigrants were to retain their minority languages and cultures, they would not be able to learn properly those aspects of the dominant culture that are necessary for high educational achievement and occupational status. It has been further claimed that ethnicity may become a social and occupational handicap because it provides a label which could be used by the dominant group to discriminate against the minorities. The assumption is that equality of opportunity in life is only possible in a society that is culturally monistic, that in a plural society ethnicity retention and socio-economic advance are incompatible. This, it has been argued, is the ethnic dilemma faced by members of minority groups (Gilmour and Sandsbury, 1978; Glazer, 1979; Kringas, 1980).

To insist on the inevitability and universality of such a dilemma is to ignore the possibilities of equality of treatment for minorities in a multicultural society. A framework of shared values in economic and political life means that the cultural background of individuals is discounted in economic and civic relations. In the occupational realm, for example, individuals are judged on their capacity and performance as workers, be it at the manual, clerical or professional level. Unless ethnicity is in some way directly involved in work effectiveness, what matters is whether the people concerned have the appropriate skills for their respective jobs. Both the retention of the ethnic culture (including ethnic identity) and the acceptance of this state of affairs by minority and majority, are quite compatible with equality of opportunity in political and economic life.
The condition is that ethnic groups be accepted as equal partners in society, and that the bicultural individual be recognised as being, if anything, **BETTER** equipped to handle many important jobs in society because of his ability to make use of the cultural resources of more than one group.

There is yet another reason why the so-called "ethnic dilemma" is false. The loss of core elements in an ethnic culture does not in itself guarantee equality of treatment in occupational and social life. Even if the education system could be made successful in overlaying most aspects of ethnic minority behaviour, it is not likely to obliterate all traces of ethnic origin such as physical looks, a parent's accent and mannerisms, ethnic affiliations, or deeply engrained ways of thinking and feeling. These cultural residues are often sufficient to single out an individual as not belonging to the majority group, even though he may have tried valiantly to embrace the dominant culture in its entirety.

Gordon (1978: 207) has observed:

"Members of minority ethnic groups have frequently sacrificed much of their culture without achieving equality of treatment. American Negroes have lost most traces of their African cultural past but this has not made them any more acceptable to the dominant group."

Other minorities may not be so physically distinctive, not so strongly discriminated against, as Black Americans have been in the past, but cultural as well as physiological difference usually single them out.
Indeed if a dominant majority wishes to exclude a minority and refuses to share certain kinds of jobs with it, it can continue to do so, no matter how culturally assimilated the group might become. In some instances the dominant majority may even alter its speech patterns to make sure that it is not confused with the minority as the latter tries to "catch up" and acquire standard speech patterns.

6.11 MINORITY ETHNIC IDENTITY AND SUPPORT FOR ETHNIC IDENTITY

Greeley, (1971) and Novak (1972) have observed that, over the last decade, the degree of ethnic consciousness among minority groups has been rising steadily throughout the world. The phenomenon has been observed (with some surprise) in the United States, where in the not too distant past ethnicity has been equated with backwardness and low class, and has provoked bigotry and old-fashioned insular prejudices that had no place in modern American society. The ethnic revival movements have more recently rocked such apparently culturally monolithic and centralised societies as those of France and Spain. In Britain itself, the success of the Welsh and the Scottish nationalists have taken the English by surprise. Ethnic identity, long assumed to be dormant, is reasserting itself, and this has not been limited to places where it has been accepted as a recurrent problem, like Belgium, Quebec, the Baltic States or Northern Ireland.
Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981 : 28) says:

"The question of identity in an ethnically plural society has raised much controversy. Some commentators have assumed that dual or multiple identity inevitably creates conflict, in that the individual is forced to choose which ethnic group and culture to identify with. When this approach is adopted, attention is concentrated on the traumas of changing allegiance from one group to another, and on the high risk of the loss of identity, which involves temporary or even permanent alienation from both groups."

Other writers maintain that an individual may identify with more than one group. Much of the confusion can be traced to a failure to distinguish between political commitment to a state and its institutions and cultural affiliation to an ethnic group. In a mono-cultural nation, allegiance to the state and identification with the cultural traditions shared by all its people usually merge into one overall national identity.

Anglo-Saxon people, for instance, with a long established unitary culture and single identity (apart from regional and social class variations), have expected to be able to maintain this tradition in the plural societies of America and Australia. On the other hand, it has been generally assumed that it is impossible to be both Irish and American, Ukrainian and Canadian, Italian and Australian.
There are many and various factors that operate to maintain and strengthen minority ethnic identity, if not in its highly evolved form, then at least as an enduring social phenomenon. Research findings in both Australia and America (Smolicz and Secombe, 1981; Myerhoff and Simic, 1978) suggest that ethnic identity is usually anchored and sustained by the ethnic family with all its extended ramifications of grand parents, cousins, relatives and very close friends. The ethnic family and a galaxy of other ethnic primary social relations, represent the bedrock for the maintenance of ethnic identity. Such ethnic primary clusters are also subject to change through interaction, but research shows that, although many minority ethnic children have only a limited command of their ethnic language, their primary relationships, centred on family and friends, often remain exclusively ethnic. General observation supports the research findings that it is only when children become estranged from their parents and the rest of the family that their ethnicity comes into question. (Simic, 1979)

In addition, various ethnic organisations such as dancing and other folk-lore ensembles, scout groups, choirs, Sunday schools, neighbourhood clubs and cultural organisations possess a dual function. One of these functions is to manifest, namely that of furthering the activity for which they were founded, and the second is latent, namely that of furthering ethnic friendships and primary relationships and hence, ultimately, intra-ethnic marriage.
It is the continued existence and flourishing of this structural factor, in the form of close familial and primary relationships, that helps to ensure the survival of ethnic minority identity.

Smolicz, in Megarry et al (eds, 1981 : 30) contends

"By themselves, however, ethnic families and organisations cannot alone ensure the cultural underpinning of minority ethnic identity. In separatist plural societies each ethnic group, whether majority or minority, has a wide range of cultural and structural supports. One of the most important of these is the school system, which allows individuals to achieve literacy in their mother tongue and to develop intellectually within their native culture."

In a multi-cultural society with a set of shared values that includes a positive evaluation of ethnic diversity, the national government is expected to provide this sort of educational support for all ethnic groups within society. The public education system, is thus responsible for making courses in ethnic languages and cultures available to all interested pupils. It should be noted that state schools do not limit themselves to the teaching of shared values but that they already provide this type of instruction for the majority group. What is essential in a multi-cultural society is the extension of this educational provision to minorities, in so far as numbers and concentration permit.
In practice, however, in those societies where the Anglo-ethnic group is dominant, minority ethnic identity has been maintained largely, without the state's institutional and educational underpinning. As a result, young people from minority ethnic groups have been denied the opportunity of learning to read and write in their native tongue and to study the more intellectual aspects of their culture. Ethnic languages, in particular have suffered. Studies reveal that there has been a marked decline in levels of literacy and language usage among young people of minority ethnic background (Fishman, 1966; Beardsmore, 1977)

The retention and strengthening of ethnic identity, accompanied by the denial of the means for its cultural expression, represents a potential threat to social cohesion. Failure to provide support for individuals to maintain and develop their own cultural heritage does not result in their increased identification with the state. Instead it leads to frustration, perhaps conflict, and structural separatism. However, Canadian surveys provide evidence for the opposite view, namely that increased identification with an ethnic group is reflected in increased identity with Canada as a permanent homeland (Richmond, 1974). This suggests that conflict and division arise not out of difference, but rather out of denial of the right and opportunity to be different.
Young people of ethnic minority backgrounds are now realising that although their ethnic identity is secure in the sense that it is not likely to disappear overnight, such identity is not culturally complete but only partial, incomplete and truncated. This is so because it lacks the necessary cultural support for full development. If an identity derived from a language-centred culture is divorced from the core value of that culture, its integrity is undermined, and the individual is subjected to stress.

In contrast to this dissention, minority groups can act as a cohesive force in society, provided that their ethnic identity and cultural diversity are supported structurally by national rather than separatist ethnic institutions. Each ethnic identity and culture is then accommodated within one overall framework of shared values that are acceptable to, and upheld by, members of all ethnic groups.

6.12 IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

The educational programmes adopted by schools reflect the ideological orientations that prevail in a plural society as a whole. Where dominant monism is upheld, this orientation is transmitted to ethnic children via the peer group, the school, the mass media, and even through their own ethnic family which itself may succumb to the cultural dominance of the majority group and accept the elimination of its native language and most aspects of its culture.
In this situation, schools teach only the language and cultural heritage of the dominant group, in order to ensure that all children, whatever their ethnic origin, master its rudiments, and that minority languages are excluded from the curriculum and hence from the students linguistic repertoire. In addition, there is often - consciously or unconsciously - an attempt to devalue ethnic minority cultures. In its milder form this devaluation is seen in the assumption, displayed by teachers and peers, that the minority cultures are relics from the past which are irrelevant in the present society. This attitude may even apply to those aspects of culture such as language and social manners that the school itself has not bothered to transmit.

There may be a more insidious form of devaluation, that seeks to persuade minority ethnic children and their parents that the continual use of their ethnic language at home is harmful to children on both personal and intellectual grounds, since it is deemed to hinder their cognitive development, confuse them and isolate them socially from their peers. Probably the most potent weapon that the majority group can use to subjugate a minority group is to persuade it of its cultural and social inferiority. Schools, for an example may lead many ethnic parents to believe that ethnic cultural diversity is harmful and that they have to make a choice between their children's economic and educational advance, on the one hand, and the retention of their ethnic culture on the other.
Cultural monism of this kind may also be effectively implemented through the adoption of transitional multicultural education programmes. Where cultural separatism is accepted by all groups in society, independent ethnic school systems exist, often at tertiary as well as at primary and secondary school levels. Such structures may prove most efficient in safeguarding the cultures of numerically weaker groups, but they carry with them a disadvantage, in that they greatly reduce the chances of cultural interaction and confine the culture concerned to its parent group.

6.13 CONCLUSION

A democratic society is necessarily pluralistic (culturally, politically, intellectually and socially) because it is founded on a belief in the intrinsic worth of individuals and their unique capacities to become intelligent human beings. In this sense, the unique qualities of individuals or groups become assets rather than hindrances. Accordingly, there is no physical acid which has the corrosive power possessed by intolerance directed against persons because they belong to a group that bears a certain name. Bigotry and ethnocentrism are anathema to democracy.
A social corollary of the belief that each person should be treated as an end is that a society must provide the equality of opportunity that will enable individuals to develop their capacities to the fullest possible extent. The demand of ethnic minorities to preserve and develop their own cultural patterns stems from the firm belief in the democratic principle which regards the uniqueness of individuals and equal opportunity for their development as intrinsically good.
CHAPTER SEVEN

RACE, EDUCATION AND IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
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7.1 INTRODUCTION

In the history of mankind every major proposal for education embodies a comprehensive philosophy of life, and every philosophy incorporates cherished ideas about man and the universe.

These proposals are given names which characterise their central themes. These philosophies have been systematically thought out and organised into an overall system with its own distinctive characteristics, providing vitality and possible extensive social changes. Many such philosophies have seen the light of day and have formed the bases of discussions over the ages. Realism, idealism, theism and many other ISMS have been questioned, threatened and in many instances set aside in matters educational. The question then arises: Is there any major proposal in Black education with a radical reflection on the aspirations, expectations, frustrations, success and failures in which the Black child is immersed.

The quest for equality has been, in one form or another, the dominant activity of the Black man throughout his history in South Africa. The Black man has always been seeking full participation in all aspects of South African life.
The goal has not been achieved, for through means sometimes subtle and sometimes direct the minority racial group in South Africa has managed to deny the Black man full citizenship.

This has been true especially in the area of education, which the Black man has through the years perceived as the gateway to a better life, even in a race conscious society. The denial of equal educational opportunity has led to feelings of frustration and hopelessness, it has also led to challenges to authorities, and the rise of a general militancy demanding better education and equal education for South Africa's Black population.

No attempt is made here to review the sweep of history that has led to the sense of frustration and hopelessness of many Black people and is reflected in the current militant attitude of some Blacks. It should be noted, however, that the search for education has, for the Black man, always been a struggle won by comparatively few.

7.2 THE IDEA AND CONCEPT OF RACE

The fact of human ethnic variation is an elementary one, obvious to any child as soon as he first observes a person of notably different skin colour or hair type or nose shape. The pale unevenly coloured skin and rather sharp face, the narrow nose and thin lips of the European, are as markedly different from the features of his parents that the African child cannot fail to note them; and vice versa.
But what the child does not know, and what even many educated adults do not seem to know, is that it is quite impossible to mark off mankind into a few simple and clearly delienated groups on the basis of such physical differences.

This concept of, "race" originating in this recognition of obvious physical distinctions between different human groups has been developed by Anthropologists as a device for classifying populations. Lightfoot (1978 : 88) contends

"Race is unanimously regarded by anthropologists as a classification device that provided a framework within which the various groups of people can be arranged, as well as means by which studies of evolutionary processes can be facilitated. From a purely anthropological sense, the word race should be reserved for groups possessing well developed and primarily heritable physical differences."

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the word "race" was used in English primarily in the sense of "lineage" or line of descent. Banton, in Verma and Bagley (eds, 1979 : 17 ) explains
"Both here (Britain) and in France it acquired a certain political impress from controversies about the right of kings and nobles and commoners, in which the parties claimed political rights, by insisting that they were in the line of descent from groups that had enjoyed such rights .......

This is the original idea of race, and a point to notice is that it does not originate in the encounter between White men and Black so much as in the growing self-consciousness of European peoples. These were centuries in which there was a general inclination to explain the differences between things by tracing them back to their origins. Until at least the 1820's race was a literary and not scientific term. The naturalists wrote in Latin, classifying specimens in terms of classes, orders, genera, and species and using words which could be turned into English without recourse to the word "race". The notion of type was convenient because it helped the student identify a combination of characters without having to take up any definite position on the rank to be ascribed to it in the general classification.
As the scientific orientation gained confidence and the authority of the Old Testament declined, so explanations in terms of origin gave less satisfaction and people looked for a more systematic understanding of the present nature of things. In this intellectual climate, "race" changed over from designating a historically defined group to designate a zoologically defined one. The beginnings of this change were noticed by the man then considered the world's greatest authority on human variation. This was James Cowles Prichard, the Bristol physician who in the 1836 edition of his *Physical History of Mankind* included a warning which is worth considering carefully. Races, he said,

"are properly successions of individuals propagated from any given stock; and the term should be used without any involved meaning that such a progeny or stock has always possessed a particular character. The real import of the term has often been overlooked, and word race has been used as if it implied a distinction in the physical character of a whole series of individuals. By writers on Anthropology who adopt this term, it is often tacitly assumed that such distinctions were primordial and that their successive transmission has been unbroken."
If such were the fact, a race so characterised would be a species in the strict meaning of the word, and it thought to be as termed." Verma and Bagley (1979 : 18).

There were writers at this time who held that mankind was a genus consisting of several species, but Prichard contended that physical variations in man such as types of skull shaded into each other by insensible gradations. Prichard's great concern was to support the authority of the Old Testament; he insisted that in respect of both physical and psychological characters the evidence showed mankind to be one species.

The attack on this position came almost simultaneously in Britain, France and United States. Books published in these countries between 1848 and 1854 expounded a doctrine of racial topology that had four features:

- First, that variations in the constitution and behaviour of individuals were to be explained as the expression of different underlying biological types of a permanent kind;

- secondly, differences between these types explained variations in the cultures of human populations;
thirdly, the distinctive nature of the types explained the superiority of Europeans in general and Aryans in particular;

- fourthly, friction between nations and individuals of different types arose from inmate characters.

It will be apparent that the word "type" was then used in a sense different from that of modern Zoological nomenclature. It was the key concept in the comprehensive doctrine. But even by contemporary standards it was scarcely a satisfactory theory for by the mid-nineteenth century the evidence of evolution was considerable despite the difficulty of accounting for the mode of change.

The central objective of the topologists was to elucidate the whole history of mankind, and an important motivation was their irritation over the credulous use of the Bible as an orbiter of questions open to rational investigation.

One reason why the doctrine of racial topology has attracted little discussion is that its foundations were demolished so quickly and the focus of attention switched so dramatically in 1859. Darwin's ORIGIN OF SPECIES made it clear not only that types were not permanent but why they were not. Mixed races, instead of being seen as confused deviations, became more interesting than the supposedly pure types from which they deviated because the cause of change would reveal the direction of evolution in HOMO SAPIENS.
The identification of race with enduring types, and its evaluation as a principle for explaining human affairs has bothered sociologists no end. Verma and Bagley (1979 : 25 - 26) state:

"They (sociologists) could not set about teaching in their subject without first dealing with the consequences of a mistake made in quite another field. But since in some countries people defined certain categories as racial, and believed their members to be different in fundamental respects, some writers tried to solve the difficulty by advancing a concept of social race as a social classification grounded in the shared beliefs of particular cultures. I believe one of the sociologists main problems is conceptual. He has to find a way of using the available terms, and possibly some new ones, so as to achieve a more systematic understanding."

In recent years there has been a tendency to see the social use of the "race" idea as a way of drawing a boundary and defining a minority. One can then generalise the problem and regard race as one among several modes of boundary definition. A minority is best defined in numerical terms. It may be objected that a numerical majority, like the Blacks in South Africa, may be able to deploy less power within the political framework than a minority.
It seems legitimate to resolve this difficulty by pretending that people can quantify political power and by calling the South African Blacks a political minority. Lightfoot (1978:88) maintains that humans can be and have been classified in varying ways by anthropologists. Most agree to classify people into at least three large units which may be called major groups. Verma and Bagley (1979:19) support:

"1848 saw the publication in London and Edinburgh of Charles Hamilton Smith's book THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES in which he outlined the history of the three types which he called the woolly-haired or Negro; the beardless or Mongolian; and the bearded or Caucasian."

Such a classification does not depend on any single physical characteristic for example, skin colour by itself does necessarily distinguish one major group from another. Furthermore, as far as it has been possible to analyse them, the difference in physical structure that distinguish one major group from another gives no support to popular notions of superiority or inferiority that is sometimes used in referring to these groups.

Most anthropologists do not include mental characteristics in their classification of humans.
Studies within a single group have shown that both innate capacity and environmental opportunity determine the results of tests of intelligence and temperament, although their relative importance is disputed. When intelligence tests, even non-verbal, are made on a group of non-literate people, their scores are usually lower than those of more civilised people. It has been recorded that different groups of the same race occupying similar high levels of civilisation may yield considerable differences in intelligence tests. When the two groups have been brought up from childhood in similar environments, however, the differences are usually very slight. Moreover, there is evidence that, given similar opportunities, the average performance (that is to say, the performance of an individual who is representative because he is surpassed by as many as he supposes) does not differ appreciably from one group to another. Lightfoot (1978 : 89) contends:

"Even those psychologists who claim to have found great differences in intelligence between groups of different racial origin, and who have contended that such differences are hereditary, report that some members of the group of inferior performance surpass not merely the lowest ranking member of the superior group, but also the average of the members."
In any case, it has never been possible to separate members of two groups on the basis of mental capacity. It is possible, though not proven, that some types of innate capacity for intellectual and emotional responses are common in one group than in another, but it is certain that, within a single group, innate capacity vary as much as, if not more, than they do between different groups. The scientific material available at present does not justify the conclusion that inherited genetic differences are a major factor in producing the differences between the cultures and cultural achievements of different peoples or groups. It does indicate, to the contrary, that a major factor in explaining such differences is the cultural experience that each group has undergone.

In general terms several clear-cut statements can be made about race and racial prejudice based upon overwhelming scientific evidence. Unesco (1967: 68-72) state:

- All living persons belong to the same species and descend from the same stock.

- The division of the human species into groups is partly conventional and partly arbitrary and does not imply any hierarchy whatsoever.
Current biological knowledge does not permit us to impute cultural achievements to differences in genetic potential. Differences in achievement of different peoples should be attributed solely to their cultural history. Racism grossly falsifies the knowledge of human biology.

The human problems arising from "race relations" are social rather than biological in origin.

Racism tends to be cumulative. Discrimination deprives a group of equal treatment and presents that group as a problem. The group then tends to be blamed for its own condition, leading to further elaboration of racist theory.

Bibby (1959:6), in recognition of most of the points mentioned just above states:

"The native African and the native European, the native of China and the aboriginal native of Australia, differ sufficiently to warrant their being placed in distinguishable sub-groups of the human species; and provided that one does not imagine that the boundaries between them are hard and fast, these great sub-groups may not be too inaccurately called "races". Children are not ostriches, and honest recognition of biological variation is not intolerance."
Therefore, as often as it happens when a concept is extended beyond its original range, the development of the idea or race has produced many difficulties. As mentioned previously some anthropologists distinguish few races, others distinguish many; and it is hard to find two anthropologists who completely agree in their classifications. Moreover, the popular idea of racial classification is so out of touch with the biological facts of human variation that some people would prefer to abandon entirely the use of the word "race" in connection with the human species.

Unfortunately, the word seem well too established for abandonment; and alternatives such as "ethnic group" or "genetically distinguishable populations" are too cumbersome for general acceptance into common speech.

Important changes in the social structure of any society that may lead to the elimination of racial prejudice and discrimination require decisions of political, social, economic and educational nature, and the following points are basic facts to be understood regarding the inter-relationship of race and culture:

- All people of the earth are a single family and have a common origin: Homo sapiens.

- Biological differences of skin, colour, hair, eyes, and cultural differences do not denote superiority or inferiority.
Race is only a biological term. It describes people only according to physical characteristics. Most people of the world fall into one of the three groups, according to the shape of the nose, hair, skin and colour. Variations within any of these groups are greater than those between groups.

All human blood is the same.

There are no pure races. People have mixed and produced children from the beginning. All people are members of the same species.

Race means nothing in terms of psychological or intellectual functioning. After classifying races, Anthropologists ask what race means, an issue that has been the subject of scientific experiments over the last about 60 years. Results to date have been completely negative. It has nothing to do with intellectual quotient, personality, aggressiveness, introversion or extroversion.

There is the same wide range in every group. There are individual differences in children, but these seem to have nothing to do with race.
There are no pure cultures, just as there are no pure races. People have been wandering over the face of the earth for a long time. Culture refers to everything one gets from the society.

Culture has nothing to do with race. It is a historical development, not a biological one. Degree of development depends on geographical factors. All cultures tend to be ethnocentric. Dominant cultures assimilate sub-cultures. Few cultures allow total cultural pluralism.

There is no group that cannot take on the culture of another group. There is nothing in one's physical make up that prevents people from taking a culture and making a contribution to it.

Race does not determine emotion

Race inferiority is taught in society and reinforced by major social institutions. Feelings of hate or superiority or inferiority must be learned. Lightfoot, (1978 : 91 - 92)

The idea of "race" is a very complex one with elements belonging to biology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, geography and history; and it is quite impossible to give any short account of it without running the risk of dangerous over-simplification. However, it is possible to clear away fairly quickly some of the lumber of myth and fallacy which obscures the essential facts.
The question of racial inequality then becomes the next point of attention.

7.3 THE IDEA OF RACIAL PREJUDICE AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

The main concern of this sub-division is that if all people of the earth are a single family and have a common origin: Homo sapiens, and that race is purely a biological term describing people only according to physical characteristics, then how does the idea of racial inequality come into operation. Verma and Bagley (1979: 26) states:

"Whenever there are established minorities there are usually some forces of exclusion within the majority which tend to set the minority aside, and some forces of inclusion within the minority which work to bind its members together. The majority and minority draw different boundaries though they partly coincide. Where the forces of exclusion are strong an involuntary minority is created...."

One notes that racial classification has in social affairs been used primarily to magnify differences and to exclude other peoples from the institutions of the dominant groups. On the other hand, nineteenth century nationalism was a movement which assumed that people of similar nationality wished to identify with one another.
Ethnic minorities resemble national minorities except that their members are content to remain as citizens in states in which other groups have greater influence. They claim common descent and associate involuntarily with one another; but lives of descent divide into segments and there are usually ethnic minorities within ethnic minorities. Thus for instance, a Pakistan in Britain who has not obtained British citizenship is likely to be a member of a national minority, a religious minority, a racial minority, and an internally divided ethnic minority. The Englishman, may, for instance, see him as a member of a homogenous Pakistan community, but he is likely to see himself as a Mirpuri, a Punjabi or a Campbellpuri, and then as a member of small groups that are sections of larger ones. Each minority, like the geneticist's population has to be studied statistically as something constituted by the actions of many individuals acting independently but subject to similar general influences.

On the origin of racial inequality Bibby (1959 : 51) states:

"Although today few will be found to justify the grosser forms of racial discrimination and exploitation, there is still a fairly widespread feeling that "coloured" people are in some way inferior to "white" people."
And such is the power of the pre-conceptions of the predominant group that many "coloured" people themselves share this idea of their inferiority. It is a feeling rather than a belief, vague and ill-defined rather than clear cut and definite, based on prejudice rather than on reason. There is, in fact, as we have already said, no very useful sense in which it may legitimately be said that one ethnic group is inherently superior to another."

Deep-seated prejudice cannot be quickly removed merely by factual evidence and logical argument; but this does not mean that facts and arguments are powerless.

The intelligent person faced with the testimony to human unity given by the great religious and great philosophers, will naturally wonder why in the past there has been so much racial intolerance. And, learning that most of the chief nations and the chief international organisations assert the equal rights of all ethnic groups, he will wonder why still today there is so much racial discrimination. Racial prejudice and therefore racial inequality is not inherent in the nature of humanity but emerges and gathers strength only in certain social conditions. It is, of course, a common observation that members of any "in-group" tend to be prejudiced against members of an "out-group" - but this does not mean that inter-group tensions are unavoidable.
It is also a fact that colour prejudice may be exhibited by those whose skins are yellow, or brown or black, as well as those whose skins are white, but this does not mean that colour prejudice and therefore inequality on the basis of colour is innate. Indeed, infants of different religions and different colours will commonly play unself-consciously together, only learning prejudice gradually from their elders.

The matter of racial superiority is essential fallaciousness. Superiority is a measure of value, and without a specified scale of values the word "superior" is without meaning. When for an example, a statement is made that "People A is superior to people B" a list of possible meanings emerge. The list will begin sometimes like this:

- People A has a high cultural level than B
- People A is in physical character further removed from our pre-human ancestors than people B
- People A is endowed with a more efficiently functioning body than people B
- People A is innately more intelligent than people B
- People A is innately more moral or more temperamentally balanced than is people B
And so the list might continue. Once the complexity of the original apparently simple statement is seen, doubts will begin to emerge on the matter and as each of the possible meanings of the statement is considered, critically, calmly and dispassionately with the relevant evidence presented, eventually the sheer prejudice will have to be forced in its shameful nakedness.

The first criterion, that of cultural level needs to be clarified. It is true that the White people during the past centuries have in general reached the high level of civilisation (certainly of technological achievements) than the browns and yellows and blacks, but history shows that it has not always been so. Bibby 1959 : 52) illustrates:

"The English child learning about the invasion of his land by the legions of Julius Ceasar, is usually told that his forebears were stained with woad and roughly clad in animal pelts, but he may be surprised to learn that Cicero advised Athicus not to buy British slaves since "they are not so utterly stupid and incapable of learning." European children and those of the European descent, might learn that during earlier centuries, when the lands that are now Germany and France and Scandinavia were backward and ignorant, there was a brilliant flowering of Hellenistic culture in the North African city of Alexandria and that in the Arab states the lamp of learning burnt brightly."
One can go on to mention that in the Middle Ages, Marco Polo travelled the territories of Tartary and chronicled the wanderings that met his eye, and West Africa had its Ghana kingdom so admired by Arab voyagers. Before the 15th century, the African state of Benin was producing its little masterpieces of bronze and ivory, in the 16th century one of the great centres of Moslem culture was the University of Timbuktu; in the 17th century across the globe in China, there was the exquisite civilisation of the early Manchu dynasty.

Cultural achievement at any moment in history, therefore, is no evidence of innate superiority, but depends upon all sorts of economic, social, political and geographical conditions. The idea that only the White peoples are capable of high culture cannot withstand for a moment the ineluctable facts of history.

7.4 THEIDEOLOGY OFHUMAN EQUALITY, AND THE CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY AND EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

The theme and essence of the ideology of human equality is that all people of the earth are a single family and have a common origin: Homo sapiens. On the 10 December 1948 the main nations of the world adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to endorse this notion of human equality.
The Declaration states among other things:

"Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood ......

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion national or social origin, property, birth or other status ..... .

Article 27 (1). Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community ......

(Unesco, 1953 )

The above quoted text gives the notion that the great world religions, or the major philosophies of history, the constitutions of the great powers or the declarations of the United Nations, the manifestos of man of goodwill whatever their political affiliations have seen the same vision. The vision is of a world in which all men are equal in human value, in which ethnic origin is an irrelevance in considering political and social rights.
Concerning the concept of equality Bowie (1970: 140) contends:

"One of the most influential appeals in disputes concerning distributive justice is the appeal to the value of equality. However, the concept of equality is one of the vaguest concepts in social philosophy and philosophical discussions of equality are notorious for their ambiguity."

For Aristotle, the equality principle was quite fundamental, for justice was necessarily dependent upon its proper formulation. His formula was that equals must be treated the same and unequals treated differently. Conversely, injustice occurs when equals are treated unequally and unequals treated equally. Many societies have knowingly accepted these pitty premises and have organised themselves according to them. Other societies who could not have known of them can be understood in their terms. Implicit in these equations, however, is that there is some "good" which a society can, will or must dispense to its members. Distributive justice involves the appointment of these goods equally to equals, unequally to unequals. However, the "good" has to be established and equals have to be distinguished from unequals. Nicholas (1983:176) states that three profoundly difficult problems are then encountered when the "good" must be established and the equals distinguished from the unequals:
"First, the provision of adequate definitions of what counts as "the good"; second, justifications for propriety of the criteria used to differentiate as between people; third, the identification of who, or what, is to do the distributing."

It follows that various societies have, and do, set about these analytical steps in many different ways. A few examples seem appropriate.

The criterion of birth governed the ascriptions "freeman" and slave in ancient Greece; holiness of birth controlled the more complex Asiatic caste system; kinship and blood, sometimes augmented by age were used in African, North American and Anglo-Saxon tribalism. In European feudalism, while birth was the major consideration, exceptions to it were found to be necessary. So, for an example kings could sometimes be disposed and serfs freed. Specificity and significance of function within, and on behalf of, the general structure were supplementary reasons for particular ranks. European colonialism distinguished by nationality. In oriental mandarism merit was paramount. Nicholas (1983 : 176 - 7) says:

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"In each of these cases the crucial criteria were always justified. Things were said to be as they were on such propositional grounds as "by God" and thus by faith or belief; or "by Nature", and thus by example; or even "by Science". So the good, whether it be wealth, health, freedom, or the law could be disproportionately distributed between people thus categorised."

It follows that all these societies were heavily stratified, with people occupying clearly delineated positions of hierarchised status or rank, which in turn provided highly differentiated access to such things as power, freedom and wealth. Again the intentions behind such stratifications have varied. In some the design had the common good of all in mind, with differentials of responsibility or duty in direct proportion to those of power. Many societies thus founded and formed remained viable and stable for centuries, for they rested on very powerful, almost immutable legitimising rationales which few could, or wanted to challenge.

What Aristotle produced then, was not in fact a formula, but a concern..... which has subsequently been worked and reworked in many different ways because it has not as yet been amenable to total, objective, timeless solution.
A different point of view is that of Lucas (1977:255) who states:

"Equality in the present age has become an idol, in much the same way as property was in the age of Locke. Many people worship it and think that it provides the key to the proper understanding of politics, and that on it alone can a genuinely just society be reconstructed. This is a mistake. Although, like property, it is a useful concept, and although, like property, there are occasions when we want to have it in practice, it is not a fundamental concept any more than property is, nor can having it vouchsafe to as the good life."

He, however, admits that there are some tributes of men where questions of equality can be raised without any conceptual strain.

Strike and Egan (1978:170) contends:

"Equality is relationship between two things, a dyadic relationship. To say that something is equal without specifying something else (or in the often trivial case, itself) to which it is acclaimed to be equal, does not make any sense."
Kleinig (1982: 117), Lucas (1977: 225) and Bowie (1970: 140) agree that it is in the mathematical context that equality finds its home. Numbers, lengths, angles, vectors, tensors can be said to be equal to one another without any trace of metaphor. Kleinig (1982: 117 - 8) states:

"There, "A is equal to B" is equivalent to "A is identical with B" or "A is the same as B". If this is transferred to the social sphere and made a principle of treatment it might be understood as involving identical treatment for all to whom it applies. Now, as both conservative and radical writers have been quick to observe, the operation of this principle - particularly if given some overriding significance - would be disastrous."

However, the main question/problem is why do people say things like "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights"? People are born of parents and into societies that from the moment of birth offer them far from equal rights. The idea that there is one almost infinitely short moment at birth when they are free and equal before they are affected by the fact that they are born of particular parents into a particular society is unreal. Even then they could hardly be said to be equal, for their genetic endowment has already been unequally determined.
Yet phrases like the one quoted just above from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly mean
something and something important. What is this
something about human equality? Elvin (1977: 113)
oberves:

"Taking the word at its face-value it is easy to
demolish such a statement, to discuss it as mere
rhetoric. Yet the commitment of so many people
over the centuries to the ideal of Equality cannot
be understood unless we ask what it is that moves
them and what its rationale and explicable basis
is. This seems to me a necessary pre-requisite
for understanding the demand for equality in
education in some sense that is important and not
nonsensical."

There can be no putting aside the urge to find a
rational and explicable basis for this passionate
belief in what people call equality. It may not be
held by the majority of mankind, at least in an
explicit way. It has been held by some of the rarest
and the finest spirits, and it has been obscurely put
and strongly felt by great masses of mankind who have
not been treated equally. What is this sense? Common
humanity. Those who make common humanity a more
positive principle and a universal one are more likely
to invoke the general concept of equality.
The philosophical basis of the belief in a right to equality is Kantian, the categorical imperative to treat all individual men and women not merely as means but as ends in themselves. This does not mean that all men are of equal wealth in terms of utility to society or that there may not be some situations in which they may be considered as means to an end. But that they are not to be treated merely as means and have an equal right to be considered as ends in themselves is basic to the concept of equality. It is in this that they are equal.

Hobhouse, in Benn and Peters (1959:78) an exponent of the argument for equality based on common humanity states:

"As a matter of the interpretation of experience, there is something peculiar to human beings and common to human beings without distinction of class, race or sex, which lies a deeper than all differences between them. Call it what we may, soul, reason, the abysmal capacity for suffering, or just human nature, it is something generic, of which there may be many specific, as well as quantitative differences, but which underlies and embraces them all. If this common nature is what the doctrine of equal rights postulates, it has no reason to fear the test of our ordinary experience of life, or our study of history and anthropology"
What all men share is simply the human condition and, unlike other species, consciousness of it. What basic equality implies is, not identity of treatment but equality of concern for every person.

From the time of Plato down to the present, men have attempted to effect integration in their lives. Glennerster, in Rubinstein (ed, 1979 : 44) states:

"We live in a society characterised by substantial inequalities in income, status and power. These inequalities have proved resistant to change. What role can and should education play if that is the case?"

One of the most persistent themes in the long history of education in South Africa is the ideology of equal educational opportunities. The quest for equality in education is an old and ceaselessly vital theme. As a philosophic ideal, few would offer alternatives or profess strong disagreement. Yet in actual practice this theme tends to be a shallow echo of an ideal that everyone desires but realistically knows is not practised in schools. As one surveys the social foundations of education and views the inequalities that exist in the schools, one cannot but realise the potency of social class membership in determining and setting these inequalities.
Kleinig (1982:124) says the following, concerning the principle of equal opportunity:

"It would be fair to say that this principle, or some variant of it, is the most frequently invoked in discussions of schooling."

He then makes an example that the 1960 Unesco "Recommendation Against Discrimination in Education" stated that "The Member States should formulate, develop and apply a national policy which will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education." Strike and Egan (1978:170) observe:

"In discussion of equality of educational opportunities we are often interested in relationships between groups, so one might wonder how such a dyadic relationship fits groups, since it is individuals, not groups, that have educational opportunity."

One way to express this interest is to look at average or representative individuals for each group and see whether their educational opportunities are equal. This does not mean to suggest a mathematically precise way of reducing the problem about individuals; it only indicates a general approach.
As a first approximation, one might say that two groups have equal educational opportunity just in case a pair of average numbers, one from each group, have equal educational opportunity. Alternatively one might pair comparable children of various sorts and see whether the educational opportunities of the pairs are equal.

As mentioned in chapter one, the debate about "equality of educational opportunity" has tended to flounder because of the lack of a shared understanding among those involved in the debate. The concept has no long history in South Africa, but perhaps a survey of current popular education proposals for Blacks might be helpful:

"A programme whereby equality of education for all population groups can be attained" (One of the four points mentioned by the Prime Minister P.W. Botha when announcing HSRC Commission of Enquiry into Education in the RSA on June 13 1980.)

"It is clear ..., that vigorous and innovative programmes in teacher training must be introduced .... by raising the quality of the present teachers and also the staff who train teachers." (Urban Foundation Submission to the HSRC, 1981)

"Equal Opportunity for education including equal standards in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the endeavour of the state."

- "I would like to have ....... the institution of equal education .......... All we ask are the provisions of equal opportunities ......." (D Pillay, then chairman of the South East Lenesia Consultative Committee, October 23, 1983)

- "Establishment of one education department to provide equal opportunities for all racial groups." (a five-men delegation of the African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA) - in Conference with the Minister of Education and Training, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, October 25, 1984)

These statements and many others reflect the present mood in Black circles to have equality in education. Attention has already been drawn to the concept of "equality" which arouses notions of "sameness" or "similarity" and cognates such as "equality of educational opportunity" and "equality in education".

The conception of "equality of opportunity" as contained in these statements, embodies a number of interpretations. First this can mean that each individual must receive an equal share of the educational resources, that is, expenditure per pupil, school buildings, equipment, and other similar quantitives, which is to say that all schooling should be of standardised form.
The question may be asked: Why are there inequalities in South Africa? Why are the education systems of different quality? The Report of the Welsch committee on Native, an engagingly frank report if there ever was one said:

"... it seems clear that there still exists opposition to the education of the Native on the grounds that (a) it makes him lazy and unfit for manual work; (b) it makes him "cheeky" and less docile as a servant; and (c) it estranges him from his own people and often leads him to despise his own culture.......... the aim that most critics have at the back of their minds is that we must give the native an education that will keep him in his place." Some seem to think of "place" in terms of status."

(Rose and Tunmer pp 231 - 2)

"When I have control of Native Education" said Verwoerd, "I will reform it so that Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them". In 1980, however, Prime Minister P.W. Botha requested the HSRC to "produce a programme for making available education of the same quality for all population groups"

The thrust towards educational equality has occurred on three major fronts:

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In Western Europe, where it is associated with the movement towards the comprehensivisation of schooling; behind the Iron Curtain, where the various states have consistently declared themselves in favour of equality of all kinds; and in the USA, where the issue arose out of the Civil Rights movement and attempts to destroy racial segregation.

The question that arose was, in what sense are all people deemed to be "equal", so that they may rightfully expect "equality in education? Eysenck (1975) dismisses the possibility as

"politically impossible, philosophically meaningless, and biologically absurd." p. 51

Lucas (1975) reminds that

".... if we ..... say that all men are equal, in respect of their humanity, it is easy to forget that this is a mere tautology, misleadingly expressed .... " p.39

He demonstrates the danger of the argument by substituting "numbers" for "men" in the equation:

"All numbers are numbers. Therefore all numbers in respect of numberhood are numbers. Therefore all numbers are equal."
The argument for educational equality rests on a particular understanding of ways in which all persons are equal, or are entitled to certain rights: Lucas (1975: 60) says

"It is difficult to fight equality (for) Egalitarianism is, not so much a doctrine as a temper of mind."

It has also strong Christian buttressing as stated in Chapter one that there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and freeman, between men and women. People are all in one with Christ Jesus (Galatians 3: 28).

In this sense all persons are entitled to an equal allocation of whatever it is that is to be allocated, unless there are factors that legitimately allow for an unequal allocation of resources. Warnock (1975: 13) says:

"Each person should be treated as having a right, according to the rule ...... each gets what the rule allows."

This is, equality-in-the-light-of-justice or what the De Lange Report, and Dawie (1970) call "distributive justice."
On this basis, the formulation of the rule becomes crucial. In educational terms, there are legitimate and illegitimate reasons for educational differentiation. It has been clearly stated in chapter one that educational diversity based on educationally irrelevant factors (and these were mentioned) is discrimination; educational diversity based on educationally valid factors is differentiation. Education may and must differentiate; education may not discriminate. "Equal education" may ignore the need for differentiation because of the slogan of "equality", and so may discriminate by seeking to treat all in the same way. As already indicated previously, conversely the South African Government discriminates while it claims to be differentiating.

In America strategies for achieving educational equality went through various phases. The first was equality of access - that all persons should be allowed to enter educational institutions. Equality of access was really based on the "input" model of educational equality - that all educational institutions of a particular level or type of education should have basically equivalent facilities often represented in highly quantifiable terms. This ignores the variable inputs to the school by each child; what is more, says Coleman (1975:28) is that,

"equality defined according to inputs is inattentive to the effects of schooling which is the whole purpose of public schooling."
The failure of the "input" model led, then, to an "output" or "effects" or "outcome" model of educational equality, which recognised that individuals "input" are equal, and that the school must correct or compensate for these deficits as people should not suffer educationally for factors beyond their control. This argument tended to be linked to the "human capital" argument: Educational expansion was an investment resulting in economic growth through a better educated, skilled and adaptable workforce. Entwistle (1978:13-14) points out a difficulty:

"the notion of equal results or benefits is very difficult to concretise educationally or socially. Equality of outcomes implies that in some sense people should become equal as a result of their schooling ....... what would count as equal learning for the school population within a given society?"

One attempted solution was posited by Green, in Entwistle (1978 : 15 - 16) who argued that:

"It can be set down as a kind of definition that any society will have attained a condition of equal educational opportunity when firstly the range of the distribution of benefits and, secondly, their distribution within that range is approximately the same for each relevant social group within the student population ....... not .... that everyone must reach the same level of attainment."
It means only that the range of achievement and the distribution within that range should be about the same for each social groups."

But as Entwistle (1978:16-17) says:

"From a humanist point of view it is not clear why vast inequalities between the individuals within social groups should be more acceptable than similar inequalities between human beings across social groups."

One response to the definition that each person "gets what the rule allows" is that two groups deviate from the norm and have the right to an unequal portion of the education cake. The "educationally deprived" have a right to extra attention. This assumption produced "compensatory" education programmes in USA and elsewhere. Similarly it could be argued that those who display the greatest potential have the right to unequal treatment. This argument links with High Level Manpower arguments as in Entwistle (1978:6-7)’s statement that:

".. if ... the social system requires the maintenance of inequalities of wealth, status, and power these privileges should be rewards for qualities and skills which are relevant to social efficiency ......... Hence equality of opportunity, requiring removal of hindrances to the development of individual talent, has to be engineered through the educational system."
The attempts to eradicate educational inequality met with limited and ambiguous success. Coleman (1968:21-22 argued that schools are too weak an agency to put right the ills of society.

"complete equality of opportunity can be reached only if all the divergent out-of-school influences vanish."

He goes on to say that schools cannot compensate for society and a proper formulation would use the term "reduction in equality" rather than "equality" It became clear that inequality was multi-causal and had been understood too narrowly.

There was a shift from a deficit model of the pupil to a pathology model of the school; the school, as an agent of the political establishment, was more likely to consolidate inequality and to attempt to legitimise it than the reverse: Bourdieu (1974 :42) maintains:

"By giving individuals aspirations strictly tailored to their position in the social hierarchy, and by operating a selection procedure which, although apparently formally equitable, endorses real inequalities, schools help both to perpetuate and legitimise inequalities. By awarding allegedly impartial qualifications .... for socially conditioned attitudes which it treats as unequal "gifts", it transforms de facto inequalities into de jure ones and economic and social differences into distinctions of quality, and legitimates the transmission of the cultural heritage."
It is pointless - so this argument goes - to tinker with educational systems while living unchanged the society within which education operates.

The De Lange Report basically accepts the definition of educational inequality presented by Entwistle (p. 209). The Report also recognises that unilaterally determined racial classification and the enforced segregation of schooling on the basis of that classification must result in educational inequality.

It also concedes the need for higher education institutions to decide who should be admitted as students, and yet retreats from the logic of its own arguments by not stating that racially segregated schooling is inherently unequal, for it states support for

"the following approach as a point of departure: the reduction and elimination of demonstrable inequality in the provision of education available to members of the different population groups" De Lange Report, 1980: 211; (emphasis added)

There seems to be the return to the point of separate but equal education.
The Report seems far more concerned to make proposals aimed at producing the necessary manpower than at achieving (pp 20, 32)

A common interpretation of South African education is that the schooling for Blacks should produce workers with the appropriate job skills and attitudes, unless of course, "gabs" exist which cannot be filled by Whites. The Report betrays this pre-occupation in the statement that "Since the contribution that whites can make would seem already to have been utilised to a large extent, that of the non-white groups will necessarily have to increase rapidly" (p.23)

The report stresses the need for the "user" to accept the educational system, (p. 27). But educational improvements for manpower reasons or "career-oriented" education developments within a racially segregated school system, with the White school sector remaining largely academic is certain to be rejected by anderkleuringes. In the end it is a matter of legitimacy of the bona fides of the State. This is, in fact, recognised in the Report, (p. 90)

A population confident that its Government firmly intends to do the best it can for all the people, will tolerate inequality in education and will appreciate the financial and other constraints that exist.
Schools have not been burnt down solely because they are inferior, but because they are considered to be physical manifestations of a Government's illegitimate intentions. This is why education has to be understood as essentially political, and why educational reforms by themselves will not be sufficient. Equal education is a fiction in an unequal society. This is true when the inequality is enforced by the minority group with self interest.

Because an "input" model of equality is not a sufficient model in the USA does not mean that equality of facilities is not to be aimed at in South Africa - it is simply to say that equality of input is not enough. Where educational institutions have become flashpoint within a society in conflict, education must not create expectations that education itself cannot meet. Dalin (1978 :3) reminds:

"It is mainly in promising equal opportunity that education has failed to come up to expectation ..... Caught in this dilemma were educators who never promised the sure delivery, but were left accountable at the end."

To accuse an educational enquiry of "going beyond its brief" by pointing out to government that education cannot compensate for society, is to misunderstand the essentially political nature of educational provision.
Programmes for educational equality in South Africa must not be based on the "White model", i.e. trying to replicate for all persons what has been made available in the most advantaged educational sectors. South Africa cannot afford this. Too much has been spent on White education with too little effect; a less costly and more effective approach is essential. Programmes for equalising education have to face the problems of the use of the existing expensive buildings found almost exclusively in White group areas. The question of "standards" in the construction of equal education is also one subject to the risks of ideological domination by one group and one raising the danger of a perpetuation of inequality by means of policies of gradualism based upon White determined standards.

7.5 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF QUALITY AND EQUALITY IN EDUCATION

A review of research indicates that the serious inadequacies experienced in school by disadvantaged children, especially most of the Blacks have their origins primarily in pre-natal damage, impoverished home environment and dysfunctional patterns of child rearing. In the case of an integrated classroom, these inadequacies present problems, not only to the Black child but also to his White companion, who is exposed to the contagion of disorganised and anti-social behaviour.
Findings of social psychology research call for a counter strategy of active involvement in work with disadvantaged children, and the results are seen as benefitting not only the disadvantaged but also the advantaged child by providing him with needed training in actual behaviour consistent with the democratic values of human dignity and social responsibility.

The costs of quality and equality in education calculated, as they usually are in rands and cents - invariably turn out to be higher than expected. Bronfenbrenner, in Stoff and Schwartzberg (1969 :99) has observed:

"Not infrequently the public is unwilling to pay the price and even when it does so, it is often with reluctances, pain and resentment, toward both those who impose the payment and those who receive the benefits."

The reasons for resistance are well known. Personal financial resources are slow to acquire, the needs invariably exceeds the means and what little people have is urgently needed to provide for themselves and their families.

The sobering burden of this sub-section is to show that all these considerations apply with even greater force when the costs of quality and inequality are reckoned in psychological rather than economic terms.
Here too the price tends to be greater than expected, but the available resources are even more limited. The needs of self and family are more pressing and the pain and resentment at having to pay the price for more is acute. Yet these costs will have to be met, for unless they are, no increase in school budget, however generous, no regrouping of pupils, however, democratic, no new curriculum, however adopted to the child's environment, can bring either quality or equality in education to those who do not have them. To understand why this is so, people must come into terms with an unwelcome but nonetheless inexorable reality. Whatever their origin, the most immediate, overwhelming and stubborn obstacles to achieving quality and equality in education now lie as much in the character and way of life of the Black as in the indifference and stubbornness of the governing minority.

The enlightened leadership of Blacks in South Africa and their supporters operate on the tacit assumption that once the Black child finds himself in an integrated classroom, with a qualified teacher and adequate materials, learning will take place. In this situation the deficiencies of the Black child, and the feeling of inferiority will be erased.

Regrettably this is not the case. Neither the scars of poverty which the Black child still bears nor the skills and self-confidence of his White companion rub off merely through contact the same classroom.
Bronfenbrenner, in Stoff & Schwartzberg (1969: 100) explains:

"This is not to imply that integration is impotent as an instrument of change. On the contrary, it is a desperately necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Objective equality of opportunity is not enough."

The Black child must also be able to profit from the educational situation in which he finds himself. This he cannot do if he lacks the background and motivation necessary for learning. Enough evidence indicates that these essentials are often conspicuously absent.

In emphasising the point that equality of educational opportunity alone is not enough to solve the problems of education in South Africa, Thembela in a paper entitled "Equality in Education - An Idle Dream, delivered at the Conference of The Future of Education in South Africa, held in Grahamstown, states:

"The point that needs to be emphasised is that we must attend to all the internal factors within the school system and the external factors outside the school system in order to bring about not only internal and external efficiency but also interactional harmony between them. It will help little for instance, to bring in efficient teachers (cf HSRC p. 59), adequate supportive service (HSRC p. 186) etc, if some people came from overcrowded, filthy, crime-ridden slums with no prospects of getting out of this situation."
If even those who go through the school system in spite of these conditions do not have the political climate within which to actualise their potential, then equality in education is an idle dream even at the output point."

This means that until there is attention to all the socio-economic and political problems of this country, equality in education at all points is an apocalyptic promise. Giving a person economic privileges in Soweto without the benefits of political freedom in the rest of the country is an idle dream. In the same way, giving a person political freedom without the benefits of economic viability and educational efficiency is not enough.

There is an eloquent testimony to the crippling psychological costs to the black child of the inequality imposed upon him by poverty and its contemporary economic and social heritage.

Though the black infant is not biologically inferior at the moment of conception, he often becomes so shortly thereafter. The inadequate nutrition and pre-natal care received by millions of Black mothers result in complications of pregnancy which take their toll in extra-ordinarily high rates of pre-maturity and congenital defect. Bronfenbrenner, in Stoff and Schwartzberg (1969) add:
"Many of these abnormalities entail neurological damage resulting in impaired intellectual function and behavioural disturbances, including hyperactivity, distractibility, and how attention span of particular relevance is the significant role played by paranatal and pre-natal factors in the genesis of childhood reading disorders."

Organic debilities, of course, result not only in intellectual dysfunction but also in discouragement. In this manner, they play a part in evoking the expectations of failure, the readiness to give up in the face of difficulty and the low level of aspirations observed to most of the black child.

7.6 CONCLUSION

There are two major challenges in the world in which human beings live:

- learning to live together in peace through the conquest of inhumanity, prejudice and self-interest;

- learning to cope with everyday economic needs through the conquest of food shortages, poverty and unemployment.
Both will be best met if education enables individuals to make the most of the abilities and qualities with which they are endowed, if it encourages them to keep learning throughout their lives and if it prepares them to "live themselves out" in society and to contribute to its well-being.

Education, therefore, in its purpose must have a primary concern for the kind of people which emerge from the formal schooling process. At this stage of its history South Africa has need, in this order, of

- warm, compassionate, caring people liberated from fear and hate, for whom life has sense and purpose;

- thinking critical people, capable of independent judgement and of coping with new ideas and change;

- skilled, competent, knowledgeable people capable of coping in a modern political economy in Africa and elsewhere, citizens who respect the rule of law, the democratic process, but are not subservient to the arrogance of power, who do not believe in "my country right or wrong" but always want the best for it, including the right of criticism and protest, and who in the end accepts that "above all nations stands Humanity."
But the purposes of education must also be concerned with the kind of society in which people have to live and work, in which education systems and processes have to work, and for which education should prepare young people. The creative aspect of education must have more emphasis than the conserving. Education, more than ever is a "futures" activity and must make its contributions towards change in society, rather than being used as at present as a policy instrument to maintain the status quo.

The aims and purposes of education should be concerned first and foremost with people, with their relations with others in society. Education should concern itself with liberation of the human spirit in the individual, the family, work, worship and leisure.

These are among the fundamental issues in education which underlie all the discussions and decisions about policy, structures, finance, teacher education, curricula and syllabuses - all the things that need to be done in building a post-apartheid education system.
CHAPTER 8

THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE FORMULATION OF EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA
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8.1 INTRODUCTION

Education is dependent on philosophy for correct orientation and continuous guidance. In ordinary usage philosophy implies the activity which investigates the most general facts and principles of reality; of human nature and its conduct. Specifically, philosophy is a science which comprises of logic, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the theory of knowledge.

Applied to education, philosophy embraces well reasoned beliefs about education, its power and qualities that make it a worthwhile activity. Philosophy attempts to answer questions: What is the nature of educational experience? What is there about education that makes people spend their lives and subsistence trying to get?

The practice of education requires great enthusiasm and inspired teaching. A sound philosophy of education lightens the work of the teacher because a body of underlying beliefs about education and an enduring faith in its worth give inspiration and guidance. In fact all teaching is the application of the philosophy of the teacher as a representative of a people. If this is vague, his efforts will also be vague, unfocussed and inconsistent. A well formulated philosophy serves as a source of principles and helps him to decide whom to teach, what to teach and how to teach it.
The aims of education, the curriculum content, the methods and administration are all a direct reflection of the basic philosophy held first of all, by the community as interpreted by the educator. Now starting from the premise that a philosophy of education in general is any reasonable coherent set of values and fundamental assumptions, it is necessary to clarify these and articulate them precisely so that they can be borne in mind and used in planning, organizing and controlling the education of the people. These philosophical assumptions serve as a basis for guiding and evaluating educational practice. If it is assumed that in any human society, education is practiced for the purpose of improving the human condition and thus improving the quality of life of all the citizens in that society, there must be analysis of this human condition. Man has physical, intellectual, ethical, aesthetic potentialities which must be developed if that human condition is to be improved.

The education system needs to operate as perceived by the people and should also meet the needs and aspirations of people for whom it is intended. Philosophy of education cannot therefore afford to operate at the periphery of social problems.
The engaging suggestion is sometimes made that philosophy of education ought to concern itself solely with education, leaving matters of politics, religion, economics and sociology and all related but educationally peripheral areas to the purview of their separate disciplines. Hansen (1960 : 191), states that if that be the case:

"The problems of the educational philosopher would, assuredly, be much simpler if education could be considered apart from the social problems of a given era. If it were possible ...... then education itself would be a much simpler task."

In actuality it would not be education but some kind of special knowledge. Thembela, on a paper entitled 'The Role of Philosophy of Education in Planning a People's Education', tried to bring this home when he writes:

"Formal education can only be provided for adequately once __________ economy is put right. Economics will be put right once politics has been put right. Anyone who wants to discuss any of these issues in isolation is crazy."
The problems of contemporary societies point directly to the need for a consistent, acceptable, satisfying and flexible philosophy of education to guide the education system, and all people directly concerned with the education system towards the solution of these social problems. Not that they can really be solved, of course; but since the education system is so directly an agency of society set up to serve the needs of society in their broadest aspects in any given time, it does not seem possible for the education system to dissociate itself from social problems.

If the education system cannot dissociate itself from these problems it needs philosophy of education that will relate it directly to them (social problems).

Philosophy serves best in the area of education when it helps provide not only an analysis of the problems and issues involved but in addition provides a definite sense of direction. The philosophy of education underlying specific differences of opinion about how the education system should deal with or ignore certain social issues is, as already pointed out, not one that can lend itself to direct systematic exposition.

The basic problems of philosophy are also the basic problems of society, and of education. Hansen (1960: 209) illustrates:
"How one views man as good, evil, or morally neutral affects his view of how the schools should deal with man as a social creature in society that is also good, evil, or morally neutral. How one views the concept of God - as a fundamental reality, a complete superstition, or as an hypothesis that has more possibility for human and social betterment than does any other - affects his concept of the role of education in society."

If one sees human reason as the chief distinguishing feature that separates man from the animals, he will view the function of the education system quite differently than as if he views reason as merely one of man's specialised ways of behaving in an experiential setting. The value systems and the ultimate goals which a person holds to be of highest worth will direct not only his personal life but his social and his philosophy of education - and direct also his viewpoint and his actions as an educator.

It will be seen that all the problems of philosophy, then, are also matters that have educational implications. Unless education is viewed as a completely dichotomized aspect of human experience, all of these philosophical questions will have social implications as well.
If philosophy is to give a sense of direction to education, it must be inclusive enough to help give a sense of direction also to the society which the educational programme serves. Certainly the educational enterprise is not the only worthwhile social enterprise. Just as certainly, education provides only one frame of reference for an understanding of the problems of any time. It cannot be expected to cope with or solve all of these problems. So there must be search for clues to a philosophy that will help determine what the limits of education necessarily are.

8.3 THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY AND ITS RACE RELATIONS

The ethnic composition of the population of South Africa is extremely complex, constituted, generally, of the Whites, Coloured, Indians and Blacks. Richmond (1955 : 82) states:

"Each of the four major racial groups can be further sub-divided on the basis of language, religion, economic status and the urban or rural residence."
The Blacks belong to the Bantu-speaking tribes which can be divided into five major groups. The different dialects are not mutually intelligible. The Whites and Coloureds are divided between those whose mother-tongue is English or Afrikaans or one of several European languages. Among Indians, also called Asians, languages include Tamil, Hindu, etc. As far as religion is concerned there are a number of African religions among which forms of ancestor worship are common, but a large proportion of Africans have been converted to Christianity and may belong to any one of a variety of denominations, including separatist movements of their own. Among the Whites, the main religions are the Christians and the Jewish, but the Christians are divided between the Dutch Reformed Church, the Roman Catholics and a number of Protestant denominations. Among the Indians the most religious are Hindu, Mohamedan and Buddhist.

The origins of race consciousness thus the omnipresent racialism or race relations in South Africa can be traced to the 1650s. From shortly after their arrival at the Cape in 1652 the European Dutch, through superior force of arms were in a position to dominate the indigenous Hottentot population. As a direct result of this situations the resultant socialisation process, in terms of the allocation of roles and status between the two groups, lay primarily in the hands of the Europeans.
Asheron, in Bowker and Carrier (1976: 62) state:

"However, in this early period of South African history, this "naming" of roles and status was defined by the European primarily in terms of religious belief rather than skin pigmentation. Non-literate coloured races were seen by the European either as "little lost souls", to be rescued and converted to Christianity or, alternatively, as "pagans" who had no soul to lose and were therefore borne to slavery."

Movement into the interior brought the White man into contact with the Xhosa, Sotho, and Zulu sections of the Black people. This produced results which, in important essentials, were similar to those noted among the Hottentots.

The development of the ideology of race in South Africa, based on the historical, political, and sociopsychological legacies arose in its overt form as a result of three fundamental and interlocking factors. Firstly, the late 19th century rise of Afrikaner nationalism in opposition to British Imperialism. Secondly, the acceptance by British Imperialism, through the mine-owners of the already existing racial master-servant social fabric. Thirdly, due to 20th century industrialisation, the competition of Black and White for urban employment.
Afrikaner nationalism developed out of the Afrikaner's need both to re-establish their identity, and to create a group homogeneity through which they could ultimately rectify and overcome the humiliations and defeats which they had suffered since the events leading up to the Great Trek of 1836 - events which culminated in their pacification by the British in the Boer War of 1899 - 1902.

The discussion of race relations in South Africa is a problem. Vilakazi, in Lind (1954: 313) states:

"The subject of race relations in the Union of South Africa is one which is rarely discussed dispassionately or with scientific objectivity. Much of the discussion is charged with emotion and shows an amazing display of selfishness, arrogance, and prejudice."

Ngubane, in Adam (1971: 1) is of the same opinion when he charges:

"Most White South Africans elect to regard their country's colour crisis as a racial clash. This has obvious interlocking advantages. It emotionalises discussions of a problem which, in the best of situations, does not readily lend itself to objective treatment. This in turn often creates deadlocks which surrender the initiative to influence events to the advocates of Apartheid."
The Whites who are the dominant minority, have arrogated to themselves the right to decide what the pattern of race relations shall be. In so doing they have altogether overlooked the fact that there are other ethnic groups in the Union - the Africans (who are numerically proponent over the other groups and outnumber the whites by four to one), the Coloureds, the Indians - who also have right to decide how they shall live in South Africa. When the non-whites become articulated and complain loudly enough for people with moral consciences to hear, they are generally discredited by the assertion that they are agitators or Communists. Asheron, in Bowker and Carrier (ed, 1976 : 66) observes:

"The contemporary omnipresence of racialism in South Africa is upheld through social and penal sanctions which intertwine to affect the socialisation process whereby race differentiation is embedded in and defines the white man's "social definition or reality", his "common sense view of the world"; his expectations of others, particularly the non-white; his future desires and hopes."

The depth of this embeddedness of race consciousness in South Africa's socio-political structures and her very way of life must be comprehended if the fatuity of the reformist's optimistic belief in the "withering way" of race discrimination and prejudice before the exigencies of economic rationality is to be fully appreciated.
Race relations problems in South Africa arose as a direct result of the juxtaposition of the Whites and Blacks;

"two strong people who differ widely as to racial origin, culture and standard of civilization and religion." (Vilakazi, in Lind, ed. 1954 : 313)

There are people in South Africa who advocate the policy of what is generally called "integration". It is a matter of common knowledge that cultural and economic integration is going on very rapidly today, although such integration is not the deliberate policy of the country. On the other hand there are people in South Africa who advocate for the policy of separation (apartheid) or segregation. According to apartheid supporters, the policy of integration contains a grave threat to racial harmony and to the security and survival of the White population, and the only logical policy is one which makes provision for the free and separate development of the racial groups. Richmond (1955 :83 - 84) puts it:

"These facts give an air of reality to a morbid fear which persists among Europeans in South Africa. It is widely feared that if the African is allowed to emerge from his subordinate role and associate on a basis of equality with Europeans, then so-called "White civilisation is doomed to disappear."
In South Africa, racial discrimination has become detached from its original historical conjunction with manual labour, conflict over land, and general economic deprivation and capitalist exploitation. Furthermore, and more crucially, racial discrimination in its mythical or ideological form has become detached from its original extreme proselytizers, the previous and the present day (Nationalist) political elite; that is, in so far as the White electorate firmly and intrinsically holds white superiority/non-white inferiority to be true, despite functional explanations to the contrary. Now in as much as racial ideology has become detached from its functional origins, so it has become a relatively autonomous but real entity. The upshot of which is that in its consequences it has unintended sequels for its initiators and their successors. This has vitally important repercussions for any political analysis of South Africa and her future development.

Ngubane, in Adam (ed, 1971 : 13) contends:

"South Africa's race problem may be seen also as a conflict between two moralities: that of fulfilment which is historically committed to freedom, and that of survival, which upholds the supremacy of the white skin. The group-consciousness and intolerance of the latter morality single it out as belonging primarily to that side in the West which attached maximum importance to the group and sought to narrow down the area of freedom for the person."
The policy of separation, promoted by this morality, is trying to reverse the historical processes set in motion by the coming of the Whites to South Africa. Inherent in this process are the awakening of the Blacks into a new economic destiny, the rise of the Coloured, and the emergence of a syncretic culture which, while African in origin is Western in orientation. These changes cannot be reversed without grave danger to the polity as a whole. However, the morality underlying separation is too concerned with considerations of White survival and dominance for the real implications of this fact to be grasped. Until very recently the White experience did not have a real tradition of liberal thinking on the race question. For a long time it gave the impression that it thrived on punishing a person for being the child of his parents. It used the noun "humanist" as a swear word and on the specific issue of race relations between black and white it worked for limiting the African's freedom and for reducing, however, possible, his potential to be a better person.

Let it be said, in conclusion, that three main factors interacting together provide the foundation of racial conflict in South Africa. They are the ethnic composition, of the population, the wide differences in cultural background between the various groups and the fact that Whites are so heavily outnumbered by Blacks.
The result of cultural contact between the diverse elements making up the population has been to set in motion a chain of events, culminating in the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of the African population. These rapid changes have, in their turn, caused further conflicts and created a great deal of maladjustment, which is not limited to African population or even to non-Europeans. The attitudes and behaviour of the large majority of Whites exhibit their singular failure to adjust to the reality of the situation in which they find themselves. They are in fact trying to escape from a conflict situation by a number of repressive measures and by segregating the ethnic groups, in an abortive attempt to retard the processes of change that have already been set in motion.

Complicated as the race question is, it remains a human problem. Its complexity suggests that continued efforts to bring the two sides to conference table hold out some hope of a solution – perhaps the only hope. The next line of interest, perhaps in the racial situation as projected above is what then is the philosophy underlying educational practice in South Africa:
8.4 THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

Within the total system of education in South Africa there are separate sub-systems, or education authorities, all of which are based on race. For Whites there are five departments. There is one for Coloureds, one for Indians and one for Blacks. There are separate departments in the "national states" and in territories given a form of independence by the South African government. The Department of Education and Training controls the education of Blacks outside these areas and offers professional help to the non-independent national states. The independent states budget for their own education system because there is no special financial assistance for education from the South African government:

The sub-systems

The sub-systems are as follows:

The five White sub-systems

a) The Department of National Education
b) The Transvaal Department of Education
c) The Free State Department of Education
d) The Cape Department of Education
e) The Natal Department of Education.
The Ten Black Sub-systems

a) The Department of Education and Training outside the National and Independent States. This is for African Education in proclaimed White areas.

b) The Department of Education and Culture for Gazankulu

c) The Department of Education and Culture for Lebowa

d) The Department of Education and Culture for KwaZulu

e) The Department of Education and Culture for Basotho

The following are independent territories:

f) The Department of Education and Culture for Bophuthatswana

h) The Department of Education and Culture for Venda

i) The Department of Education and Culture for Transkei

j) The Department of Education and Culture for Ciskei
The Coloured sub-system

a) The Department of Internal Affairs. This was changed to the Department of Education and Culture in November 1984.
The Buthelezi Commission (1980, Vol II p. 264) states:

"The topic of philosophy of education in the Republic of South Africa has been the concern of numerous books, articles and conferences. By definition, the philosophy of education in any country is that which is entrenched in the legislation providing for education and which finds expression in the educational goals. Because of the constitutional features of South Africa, the relevant legislation is made by one group, for all."

It may reasonably be expected that in a democracy, the ideology underlying education reflects the attitudes or wills of the people. This situation is not necessarily true of the Republic of South Africa with the following outcomes:

- While a certain stage of consultation has been reached in decision-making, participation does not really occur in educational control.

- The ideology underlying education does not find universal acceptance;

- The ideology tends to become reified and vast numbers of people come to feel alienated from the system.
It is clear that in a complex society such as that of the Republic of South Africa, a very broad basis of philosophy of education is necessary. To date a less individualistic one than would seem to be appropriate finds expression in the educational systems of the country. Because of the vast ranges in the South African population, extending from peasants society to a stage of post industrialism, no one philosophy of education could be appropriate for all.

Certain factors emerge as significant determinants of the prevailing philosophy of education finding expression in all current legislation for education in South Africa. In broad terms, the determinants are:

- **Christianity**: Only in the Act concerning education for the Indian South Africans, is Christianity not specifically mentioned. In all Acts, religious freedom is guaranteed but in religious educational syllabuses, school assemblies etc Christianity takes precedence. Education is seen to take its inspiration from religion, and the Teachers' Council Act (concerning only White teachers) decrees that "education is founded on the Bible."

- **National feeling**: It is, of course, not unusual to stress national feeling through education systems. In the USA, a common Americanism is stressed through ritual - mainly to help in the assimilation of minority groups. In the Republic of South Africa, problems arise when woolly thinking leads to a confusion between "state", "nation", and "government."
Mother-tongue instruction: Basic education through the medium of vernacular would seem to be educationally sound; this is supported by research, minority groups in England and America are currently agitating for vernacular instruction. However, in this country, insistence on the mother tongue has led to conflict because, English is seen as more worldwide language providing greater success.

Other points are parental involvement in decision making. This from Blacks to Whites, and for Whites, from province to province, and for Black Africans from school to school; deviance—implying a particular definition of personal autonomy, the vesting in the school a considerable amount of authority; and autonomy.

Intrinsic to the philosophy of education in this country, is a belief in education as cultural transmission. Culture, however, tends to be defined in racial rather than in broader (e.g. social class) terms. The philosophy of education of this country is in part the reinforcement of the perpetuation of a stratified unjust society.
8.6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA

No thoughtful educationist can deny the patent truth of the most serious, if not the most vaciferous, criticism that has been urged against South African education.

Education does not exist in a vacuum, but in a social, economic and political context. Education reflects political and economic realities, and fundamental change in education is dependent upon changes in society's politics and economic life. Hartshorne, on a paper entitled: Post Apartheid Education for and in a New South Africa delivered at the University of Natal Graduation Ceremony in Pietermaritzburg in 1986 declared:

"Education as it exists in present does not offer equal opportunities to all South Africans, and cannot do so as long as it is racially segregated: "equal but separate" will simply not work. Damaging and destructive as apartheid education has been for Black South Africans, in the long term it has also failed privileged White South Africans." p. 4

This is elaborated on by Thembela on a paper entitled: Socio Economic Changes in Education for Liberation, delivered at the NATRECO Conference on the 11 June 1986 in Johannesburg in which he says:
"The whole history of Black education has always been that of under-provision, inadequacy and inefficiency." ....... The government and the educational authorities have always spent most of their time, energies and even money on racial and ethic matters which (as De Lange only mentioned in 1981) were educationally irrelevant."

As early as 1968, Bloom, in Weinberg (ed, 1968 :345 - 346) summarised the objections to Bantu Education as follows:

"There has been a steady drop in the per capita expenditure.

There has been a steady dwindling of Africans going on to advanced technical and professional education, in proportion to their population.

Bantu education promotes tribalism and makes it increasingly difficult for an African to participate in the industrialised world of the modern economic system as an equal with the Whites in South Africa."
The increase in university enrolment is misleading: It is largely because of the increase in non-degree correspondence classes being followed and does not reflect any increase in Africans studying for the specialised skills of a modern economy.

Bantu education (coupled with political and social repression) has forced many young Africans to live their country to seek higher education, specialised training and better opportunities, with a long-term dangerous lowering of the general level of education, and ultimately endangering the economic and social advance of a potentially wealthy country."

Some of the ills of Bantu education enumerated by Bloom above have been partly corrected but the education system of South Africa still leaves a great deal to be desired.

The education of Africans is inferior in quality and in quantity to that of other groups, yet there is a trickle of Africans who have managed to go beyond primary schooling to complete university or professional courses. There has been a steady (though grossly inadequate) increase of the total amount spent on Black education; yet per capita cost is very low (R146, R498, R711, & R1211 for Black, Coloured, Indian & White respectively) (Sached, 1985 : 98) and the heavy wastage after the early stages of primary schooling is tolerated. South Africa is short of skilled and professional people, yet there is a mass of laws and customs that effectively bar all but a tiny number of Africans from higher occupations.
White supremacy in South Africa, coupled with subjective feelings of white group consciousness, reveal that there is the assumption that Africans are racially different from Whites. Eiselen, one of the main architect of apartheid, argued that the African

"is a person of a different type" between whom and the whites there are such sharp and deep biosocial differences that 'no understanding between the groups can ever exist (Eiselen, 1960).

The terms of reference of the Commission on Native Education (headed by Dr Eislen) included:

"the formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherited racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude (sic), and their needs under overchanging, social conditions are taken into consideration."

Bantu education was introduced in 1953, and was based upon the realistic and separatist principles of the Nationalist Government's ideology. The new system placed African education directly under the state control, and moreover not under the central educational authority but under the political control of the department concerned with African affairs.
According to Dr Verwoerd in 1954 as a government spokesman, the defects of the old system were that the schools

"were unsympathetic to the country's policy ...... by ignoring the segregation or "apartheid" policy ..... By blindly producing pupils trained on a European model, the vain hope was created among Native that they could occupy posts within the European community. .... This is what is meant by the creation of unhealthy "White Collar Ideals."

Later in the same speech, Dr Verwoerd specified the requirements of Bantu Education including the following:

"The school must equip him (the African) to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose upon him."

"The Bantu teacher ...... must learn not to feel above his community, with a consequent desire to become integrated into the life of the European community. ...... He tries to make his community dissatisfied because of such misdirected ambitions which are alien to his people."
"Care will now be taken that the Native population in the cities will no longer be privileged in educational matters .......

"The Bantu must be guided to serve his community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour."

"...... Education should start with both feet in the reserves and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society."

"Above all, good race relations cannot exist when education is given under the control of people who ...... believe in a policy of equality."

Within the framework of separate schools for the different racial groups, namely White, Indians, Coloured and Blacks, in that order, but one economy and one geo-political space, Blacks are at the bottom of the hierarchy. Even the Black school leavers with more relevant technical and other educational skills, are unlikely to possess credentials earned in Black education having the same market value as those earned in the systems of education for the other racial groups.
"If we look at the education system in South Africa, it's obvious that things aren't equal. There are different education systems for different population registration groups - in fact there are fifteen different education departments. The facilities, like school buildings, classrooms, libraries and laboratories are not of equal quality. Much more money is spent on schools for white children. So they have better facilities. White children have at least ten years of free compulsory schooling. Black children certainly do not have that. The drop out rate in schools for Black children is much higher than in schools for white children - so people do not get equal amounts of education. Teachers in different schools aren't equally qualified. Even at university level there are inequalities. We could go on listing these sorts of differences."

The question is why are there such inequalities in South Africa? Why are there education systems of different qualities? At first, these look like questions about education only. But, in fact, education systems are part of the wider society.
As a result of the socio-political order, Black education as a separate structural entity, lends itself to a labelling process in which employers interpret Black school leavers as not having been sufficiently socialised into norms, values and styles of thinking which they (the employers) value in a certificate. Some employers believe that the standard of Black education is not comparable to that of the other racial groups. How can they be if everything is separate and unequal? Deep concern is expressed about rote learning, lack of broadening of the mind, lack of encouragement given to pupils to develop initiative and skills of independent thinking. Pupils have limited opportunity for problem solving and thus they concentrate on abstract theory and verbiage for examination purposes. The system itself is examination oriented inspite of a huge failure rate which leaves two thirds of the candidates who write the standard 10 examinations frustrated. Even those who pass standard 10 are viewed by employers as overly compliant, docile and too dependent on structures of authority. This has been the average perception of the products of the school system for Blacks in South Africa.

What is worse, within the provisions for Black education, there is a huge number of left outs and the push-outs (Thembela 1986 : 7). This has created a mass of utterly frustrated individuals who have no hope for the future.
The South African society rejects them and calls them all sorts of names. These begin to revenge against society in various ways. Under the present crisis, these are the people who have not developed the moral, and the social conscience and they will destroy life and property without any qualms at all. Many Blacks and a handful Whites assumed that if all children were given an equal opportunity this would lead to an open and a free integrated society where there would be no discrimination. Hartshorne (1986: 4) supports this view and says:

"Only a common education system can serve the needs and aspirations of all South Africans. This does not mean the co-option or absorption of everyone into the existing White type educational model, but rather the creation of a new cross-cultural mainstream S.A. education system. Whereas in the past education has been a divisive force, in future it need to serve the purpose of national unity. Education based on a commitment to a common purpose could be a powerful agent for societal change."

Blacks thought that education would lead to social, economic and political liberation. When this did not seem to be happening the idea of "liberation first and education afterwards" was born.
The present education system for Blacks (apart from the large numbers of left-outs, drop-outs and push-outs) produces a small minority of elites who are supposed to be capable of providing leadership and guidance to the less privileged of their kind. This group spends a lot of time trying to live up to the norms of the ruling classes. These norms worship materialistic standards of living, urbanisation, industrialisation, and a bureaucratic form of government. This group benefits from the existing structures of society. That is why this group is called collaborators with the system. Those who try to identify themselves with the masses get into one sort of trouble or another.

The second effect of the present arrangement in education is that it is a skill-producing instrument. It provides training for new vocational skills required by the modern economic sector. Kallaway (1948 :8) states:

"In South Africa Blacks are both "colonised men" and workers in an advanced industrial state with increasingly sophisticated manpower requirements"

because central to the consideration of schooling in a capitalist state is a theory of the reproduction of labour. The reason for this arrangement in education and its effect is that there are no longer sufficient numbers of Whites to do the jobs that were reserved for them for so long.
The point that emerges here is that the present education system is geared to the needs of the capitalistic society in the benefits of which a great majority of Blacks are not benefitting, and indeed, by which they feel exploited.

Therefore, it is no longer enough for the government to say they put in more money or make better provision or train and upgrade the quality of their teachers. It is no longer acceptable to Blacks to be assisted to become better slaves and more efficient workers in their own country the policies of which they do not participate in determining.

Hartshorne, in an article *Education Beyond Apartheid: Steps to a New Classroom Order*, states

"Education policies, systems and values in any country reflect its political options, its history and traditions, its values and moves and most important its conceptions of the future."

The trap has to be avoided of searching for a purely educational answer to a problem that has social, economic and political as well as education aspects. Education systems are effective when users of that education have the same broad agreement with the view of man and society.
It is this "broad agreement" which has to be sought and negotiated in South Africa, a commitment to a common purpose in education and society, without which, the question of control, power and "excess ideological baggage" will continue to dominate education to its detriment— and that of its users.

It was interesting to hear Minister Gerrit Viljoen during his speech in the House of Representatives in May 1986, expressly admitting that the policy of inferior education for Blacks was from the onset totally unacceptable and anathema to the country's Blacks. The irony of the matter is that the Minister said this in the house of representatives for Coloureds because he had no legislative platform for Blacks in which to say it. What is more ludicrous is that by their own definition education is an "own affair", but we have no "own affair" Black Minister. Let alone the fact that arrangement in itself, is not acceptable and was not negotiated with Blacks. In any case, Blacks perceived the system of Bantu education as designed to make them hewers of wood and drawers of water, and they have been protesting ever since it was erected. Black universities have been a scene of continuous protest and now the schools have taken the matter to crisis proportions. Schoeman (1982) observes:
"From the analysis of the current states of affairs regarding education it becomes overwhelmingly clear that the status quo can no longer be tolerated, that radical change has become a conditio sine quo non for future stability and progress on educational scene in this country."

In conclusion, it is to the credit of Minister Viljoen that he rejected in unequivocal language most of Verwoerd's policies. Whites must accept, however, that since their own government has accepted and committed itself to political reform, the days of their privilege (education included) are a thing of the past.

8.6.1 EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Because of the great variety of cultures in the world, obviously there must also be a great variety of education systems. No two will be identical, since they are individual and peculiar to the culture from which they spring. They are therefore both particular and general. How are we to apply this in the South African situation, where there is a plethora of cultures and a multiplicity of languages? It is assumed that education systems are for particular cultures in particular times and places, though all have the same pedagogic purpose, which is the education of the child, and each is an integral part of the indigenous culture from which it springs.
There must therefore be common principles that they share, though they are particularised by each educational system against the background of its national culture and environment. This is the theoretical basis of the Apartheid system.

Exponents of Fundamental Pedagogics believe that each culture has ground motives which are peculiar to that culture. They are defined by Stone as: "the spiritual roots of community life" (Stone, 1981 p. 103)

These are what determine the character and development of each particular system. They are active in all education systems. They create the individuality of a particular education system and spring from the needs and culture of a particular society. Stone puts it thus: "the way in which each individual community expresses or realises these possibilities differs considerably because of the differences of ground motives and so called determining factors operative in each community" (Stone, 1981 p. 103).
The ground motives are realised in a very particular way in South Africa, and they have a strong influence on the education system and the policy of Apartheid. In Stone's terms this means that "behind the unique character of every individual system unseen motive powers lie hidden. As these driving forces differ, so do education system" (Stone, 1981, p. 102).

They are the driving force of the Afrikaans people; they spring from their deepest convictions about what they believe to be necessary and right. They do not spring merely from the personal beliefs of one person; but they are, as Ashley (1984) observes, historical, and essentially the motives of the whole Afrikaans community. They are the spiritual roots of their community life and they are expressed in their feelings, morals, customs, beliefs and faith.

8.6.2 CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

Separatism is entrenched in education in South Africa, where the society comprises many cultural groups and peoples. The Apartheid system separates the cultures so that there is no direct interaction between one culture and another. Great pain is taken to ensure diversity and separation.
This is a fundamental political preoccupation of the ruling Afrikaner Nationalist Party. In South Africa schools cannot act on their own initiative because, apart from private schools, they are rigidly controlled by the state. There is no question of having cosmopolitan schools, since political considerations assume overriding importance. The result of this is a cultural bias in favour of Christian Nationalism and the White ruling minority. This has particular relevance in both White and Black schools, where the laws prevent a normal social interaction and where Christian National Education is decreed for the community as a whole. Integration would mean that all pupils would be offered the same opportunity to acquire an understanding of and become part of the wider environment and its diversity. In education in South Africa, the only gestures in that direction are to provide a dual-language programme (English and Afrikaans) and to introduce Black languages to pupils in White schools. Pupils are separated and educated in schools that are a part of their own race and culture. The argument for this put forward by Stone (1981) is that a cosmopolitan school system condemns pupils of different racial groups to failure and loss of dignity. Educationists such as Mphahlele (1983), believe that one of the main causes of the present crisis is that Blacks receive their education in schools of their own cultural grouping, which in reality pay little heed to their own culture.
Rather it ensures that they adjust themselves to an allotted position in South African society and therefore only able to absorb from white culture, what little is compatible with their own. The Committee of South African Students (COSAS) consideres that young Black people are being educated to fulfil their cultural mandate as the white ruling minority perceives it in multi-racial South Africa, and that many problems arise because there is a deep chasm between the Black child's educational attainment and his cultural development.

Moreover, the Group Areas Act, the Influx Control and Pass Laws and the laws that forbid the mixing of races at all levels of South African society promote diversity rather than integration. There is no choice for the bulk of the population, and the only thing they have in common is their physical occupation of the same country. The fact remains, however, that all the peoples in South Africa, regardless of colour, race, or creed, share a common destiny and are all dependent on one another.

Among the more conservative elements of the Afrikaner population, the feeling, that cultural integration is totally unacceptable is evident, though this is by no means true of the population as a whole.
Coetzee is an academic who is out-spoken and provocative on this subject:

It is necessary for us to take all the measures to ensure the diversity and separate development of different ethnic groups in future. All factors which may still exist to foster a growing together and an integration into greater unity in this country must be systematically removed, otherwise we shall not avoid a process of fusion ....... The Whites still have a calling in South Africa. There are millions of underdeveloped people of different ethnic groups in the country who are dependent on the help and guidance of the Whites. But we can only give this, if we see it ourselves, that we do not descend into the sewer of integration. (Coetzee, 1983, p12)

In recent years pressure has been exerted on the government to change. Recent developments indicate a greater integration, evident in the common exercise of sport, in the churches, in labour relations and in other important areas of life.
Intelligently made decisions are always based upon beliefs. Educational decisions are no different. How intelligently people make educational decisions will in large measure depend upon what they believe about education and how they base their decisions on those beliefs. This sub-section of the study concerns itself with an examination of the way in which the rationality of the educational decisions is based upon and otherwise related to the beliefs of the people who make them. This is then followed by the analysis of some of the different kinds of beliefs people have about education. In the broadest sense of the phrase these beliefs comprise what is often called a philosophy of education.

There need to be an identification of the fundamentals of rational, intelligent decision-making through logic because it is only through the knowledge of logic that the nationality and reasonableness of decision-making can be checked. Decision makers need a grounding in the formal knowledge necessary for making intelligent educational decisions and for determining how intelligently others have made their decisions. Only when decisions have been made according to the above exposition will they go through the test of moral judgement and become morally acceptable. Fitzgibbons (1981:11) as the following to say concerning educational decisions and beliefs:
"In any society, three basic educational issues must be confronted: What should the outcomes of education be? What should be taught? How should it be taught? The ways in which these issues are resolved determined the educational complex of the society. Even a cursory consideration of education in the modern world is sufficient to show that decisions on such matters are unavoidable."

Any rational decision has a base in the beliefs of the person who makes the decision. First, since any decision involves deliberation about alternatives the decision-maker must believe that certain alternatives exist. For obviously no one could seriously deliberate which alternative to pursue unless he/she believed that there were indeed at least two alternatives. The second way in which beliefs form the basics for rational decisions has to do with the rationality of the decisions. In order to make a decision rationally there must be some reasons for it. Any reason that one has, however, must also be one's beliefs. For if one did not believe them, one would not count them as reasons for one's decision. That is, they could not be one's reasons unless one believed them. The third way in which beliefs are fundamental to making rational decisions involves the relevance of the reasons given for each decision.
In addition to having reasons for one's decisions, one should also believe that those reasons support one's decisions. That is, offering reasons in this context would be pointless unless one believed that they in some way or other supported one's decisions. In fact, it would be contradictory for one to sincerely say that one had certain reasons for one's decisions but that they did not in anyway at all support those decisions.

Making educational decisions is unavoidable. Parents, politicians, teachers, and school administrators are each in their own way regularly called upon to make such decisions. With regard to these decisions there are three major types: those concerning the outcome of education, those concerning the matter of education, and those concerning the manner of education. In order to make an educational decision intelligently one needs to examine various alternatives and choose one of them rationally. And to make an educational decision rationally, one must have some reasons for deciding upon a particular alternative. But it must be emphasised that rationality in making a decision will be a good one or that it is better than some other decisions one could have made. It does, however, increase the probability that it will be a good decision Fitzgibbons (1981:19) contends:
"If we are to seriously entertain any hope of improving education, the very practical educational decisions that confront us must be made rationally. How rationally and intelligently those decisions are made, in turn depends upon the beliefs of the people who make them, for beliefs form the basis of any attempt to make rational educational decisions."

It must, however, be stated that in South Africa there is a conflict of beliefs in as far as educational decisions and policy making are concerned between the Whites and the Blacks. Perhaps the first question is are the aims and purposes of education in South Africa different from those of the rest of the world, or more importantly, should they be? Secondly, can and should the aims of education be the same for everyone in South Africa? Do we believe in the same values? Can there be one philosophy of education for all of the people of South Africa? What do they hold in common? Dewey's cautionary note should always ring in any honest educationist's mind:

"It is well to remind ourselves that education as such has no aims. Only persons, parents, teachers and others have aims, not an abstract process like education." (1916: 125)
Increasingly, the attempt of human society to shape, train, or mould its young, to bring them up, in the way they should go and according to its own ideals of life, has been taken over by the State, and more particularly, by whatever political organisation controlling the machinery of State at any specific time. It is the power base in society, the establishment that now tends to make the decisions on the purposes, objectives and intentions of the education system. These decisions may be open as in public statements of educational policy, legislation and regulations, but purposes and objectives may also be hidden and achieved rather through the persons placed in positions of power in the education system.

It must also be remembered that when the authority exercised by the establishment is not regarded as legitimate by, or acceptable to, some of the clients of the education system, those clients may well have their own hidden aims and purposes which, to the extent they are able, they use the systems to achieve. As one example of this one might point to the aims of the Bantu Education Act, as put forward in the parliamentary debates of 1953 and the outcomes as reflected in the events of Soweto 1976.
In general, the universal debate on the aims and purposes of education revolves around the relative emphasis to be given on the one hand to what it is intended to achieve for the individual and on the other for the society of which he is part. Yet these cannot be separated.

The conflict of beliefs about education in South Africa produced an education system which among other aspects is characterised by the following:

- The failure of the present education system to cope with the economic developmental needs of South Africa. Two main issues need to be highlighted: the need for an effective educational base for further education and training, and the need to attach much more importance to technical, vocational, careers education.

- Grave dissatisfaction throughout the teaching profession, not only over salaries and conditions of service, but also in the inadequacy of teachers' participation in educational decision-making at all levels.

- A growing unease among parents and community bodies because of their very limited say in the education of their children, accompanied by a growing bureaucratic arrogance expressed in a "we know best" attitude.
Finally, there is the rejection of the education system (with all that it implies) by large sections of the community, who perceived the education system as being based on ideological separation and therefore entrenching isolation and discriminatory practices, and also failing to meet the needs and aspirations of the people it was set up to serve.

South Africa is a country divided against itself, in which goodwill and trust are rapidly being dissipated. It is a country in which fear, hatred and bitterness are in danger of taking over. South Africa is a country in which the quality of life of millions of citizens is in constant reproach. It is a country in which poverty and preventable disease have not been conquered. It is a country where there are grave limitations on freedom of expression, individual liberties and the rule of law in which there is growing uncertainty and insecurity. It is a country with tremendous potential, with rich material and human resources, much of them still untapped with the capacity, if it only gave itself the opportunity, to cope with the human and social problems that now bedevil it and sap its strength.
If this is the state of the nation what then should be regarded as the aims and purposes of education under these circumstances? Firstly, the purposes of education must have as their concern the kind of people being produced by the educational process now and in the future. Above all South Africa has a need of warm, compassionate, caring people. (See De Lange Report, p 208 (e)). It also needs thinking people, capable of making independent decisions. Does Black education measure up to these demands?

South Africa also needs skilled, competent, knowledgeable people, capable of earning their own living and maintaining an independent livelihood, and therefore able to contribute to society and its general welfare; capable of responding to change.

The aims and purposes of education should be concerned with the kind of society that young people are prepared for, what Kant called "a possibly improved condition of man in the future". Does anyone seriously believe that the kind of society in the year 2000 in South Africa, at which point those children now in school will be young adults, will not be very different from the one in which we now live. It would seem there is a recognition of this, for example, in the eleven basic principles postulated by the HSRC Committee. An illustration from the first three principles will highlight this:
Is it not possible to continue with a society in which discrimination continues and privilege is protected if equal opportunities, norms, and standards are to be achieved (Principle I).

A society in which freedom of choice is exercised will be very different from the closed, authoritarian society today; it will have to be open and flexible and certainly not a society in which the State tries to enforce its own stamp on every one (Principle 3).

A society in which there is recognition both of what is common and what is diverse would be on the one hand a society in which people had greater freedom to follow their own heritages, traditions and aspirations, but at the same time a society of greater unity, a greater oneness over the fundamentals of common humanity and common South Africanism. (Principle 2). (See also 5.21, p 206 of Main Report. What cannot be preserved is an education the main purpose of which is to preserve and maintain the status quo. More than ever before education has become a futures activity. Tensions will inevitably arise in the search for the right balance between creativity and conservation. The De Lange Report, for example, is firmly committed to an education relevant to an "improved condition of man in the future". It recommends "a system of education that will remain sensitive and responsible to changes (social, economic and political)..... so that it contributes positively to the creation of the society in which equality of opportunity becomes increasingly attainable." (Main Report: 4.17.1 (d) p 194)
One of the main purposes of education must be to place those who have been discriminated against in the past, as quickly as possible in a position where their educational background will enable them

- to compete on an equal basis in the market place and to make their contribution to the economic welfare of South Africa;

- to take their place freely in society and to contribute to its richness and diversity;

- to share in the decision-making process of the country at all levels, in education as in the wide range of other human activities — social, economic and political;

- to live as citizens with their fellow citizens in a common South Africa and to share the same regard and affection for the country because it commands that regard by the quality of the human state that it has made possible.

In South Africa a very particular and special responsibility rests upon education, a responsibility to the great majority of the children of this country:
to right the wrongs of the past
- to restore the fairness and justice
- to open up to them the opportunities that only some of the children of South Africa have had in the past, and
- to provide education that is relevant to their needs and responsive to their aspirations (Hartshorne, 1982).

8.8 THE MORAL WORTH OF EDUCATIONAL DECISIONS

It should be stated that an educational decision may be considered and questioned from the point of view of its moral worth. This point has an important consequence. From the point of view of its moral worth a decision is made rationally only when one has some good reason for believing that the decision is a morally good one or that it is morally better than any other decision one could have made.

If one did not have such a belief or if one did not have some reasons to support the belief, then from the point of view of its moral worth, one would not have made the decision rationally. Moreover, when one's decision is considered from the point of view of its moral worth it would make no sense to claim that one made the decision rationally but believed that it was a bad decision.
For if one believed it was a bad decision, the fact in itself would have been a reason for not making it. Similarly, it would be no sense to claim that one made the decision rationally, but believed that there was a better decision one could make. For if one knew a better decision one could make one (and ignored) a good reason for not making the decision one did not make. And hence, one did not make one's decision as rationally as one could have. The serious question is:

Does Black education have any moral worth. Bloom, in Weinberg (ed, 1968: 345) answers this question by another question:

"Is Bantu education "education for success" as the government describes it or is it "education for barbarism"?

Hartshorne looks at the immorality of the South African education system from the point of apartheid education and white children. He says:

"Not only has it separated them from Black children, it has also divided white children into separate camps. It has been authoritarian in nature, influenced strongly by Christian National principles with an underlying philosophy of the "moulding of good citizens to fit into ordered society" and to be obedient to the state and the values of the existing order."
It has been marked by strong and often arrogant bureaucratic control, with little freedom for parents, teachers or pupils to exercise much "say" or influence." (1986 : 5)

Its overall effect has been that generations of white children have been conditioned to privilege, to accepting separation as a natural order, to undue respect for authority and the status quo. They have not been given a fair chance to learn to understand, work and live with their fellow citizens, other South Africans, to find out that they have much in common. Instead, they have had to fall back on stereotypes of their fellow citizens.

Thembela (1986 : 1) says:

"... we have been pointing out that the education systems in South Africa must pursue the goal of social transformation. Instead, the education systems in this country have been reinforcing the perpetuation of a stratified unjust society. We now have been overtaken by events."
The problems that are spoken of are peripheral to the core issues of education. Black education, because of its underlying philosophy, still lacks elementary facilities such as writing materials, desks, finances, and properly qualified teachers. The phenomena of underqualified teachers, poor teaching, high drop-out rates, high failure rates, overcrowding all add up to a situation in which Black schools are functioning at a very low level of productivity.

The historical development of school education for Blacks in South Africa created a situation of cultural and social conflict. This conflict made it difficult for education to proceed smoothly. The South African socio-political arrangements place Blacks at the bottom of the social structure and is rigidly kept there by constitutional and legal constraints. This creates tremendous obstacles for Blacks which make it difficult for them to do well at school. The conditions which exist in Black schools make effective transmission of knowledge, proper development of skills and the acquisition of understanding and insight by pupils, difficult to attain. The lack of internal efficiency in the schools for Blacks makes these schools to function at a very low level of productivity. The absence of a proper home and school environment within which to develop wholesome attitudes and appreciations; the absence of means and lack of capacity by teachers to develop in their pupils the qualities of creativity, reasoning powers and originality, all add up to a situation where it can be said that Blacks face serious obstacles to advancement.
The result is that, with a few exceptions, Black education is not producing adequately educated individuals who can hold their own ground in the commercial and technical world.

8.9 THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN MAKING EDUCATIONAL DECISIONS

Fitzgibbons (1981: 22) says:

"..... having a philosophy of education and studying philosophy of education are both important. .... each is necessary for increasing the degree of rationality with which educational decisions are made."

Philosophy of education implies the application of philosophy to education by utilising the methods, tools, techniques and such, of philosophy in investigating problems of formal schooling. Akinpelu (1981: 8) contends:

"This way of looking at philosophy of education has great prospects for improving education because it is a method of raising questions for philosophy from the inside of education and finding solutions to educational problems in the process of doing philosophy."
This modern mode of doing philosophy is understandably irritating to the layman or the unphilosophical mind, and even to the policy-maker who is seeking suggestions for a problem in hand or for a better system of education. A philosophy of education is a set of beliefs about education. It is from the policy-maker's set of beliefs about education - their philosophy of education - that they draw their reasons in any attempt at making rational educational decisions. And since this is the case, it is important to recognise that policy-makers in education should have a philosophy of education if they are to make their decisions rationally.

A philosophy of education, however, is not comprised of just any beliefs. Rather, a philosophy of education is the set of beliefs regarding what should (and should not) be done in education and what the outcomes of education should (and should not) be, together with any other beliefs taken as reasons supporting these beliefs.

In other words, a philosophy of education is a specific sub-set of the set of all of that, education policy-maker's beliefs.

In general, there are two basic (but not infallible) ways of determining what beliefs are included in policy-maker's philosophy of education. The first is to identify the educational decisions they make and ask them what reasons they have to support those decisions.
Assuming that they can and will answer truthfully, the reasons they give will be part of their philosophy of education. The second way is just to ask them what they believe should be done in education and what they believe the outcomes of education ought to be. Then ask them what reasons they have for these beliefs. All of these beliefs together will be included in their philosophy of education.

Philosophy of education usually contains two distinct kinds of beliefs: empirical beliefs and philosophical beliefs. Fitzgibbons (1981:24) defines the empirical belief as

"a belief that in principle can be confirmed by reference to data derived from observation and/or experimentation."

and the philosophical beliefs

"characterised as metaphysical, epistemological, logical, or normative." p 28

An empirical belief is a belief that describes or explains a state of affairs, with the presupposition that the description or explanation can in principle be confirmed by exclusive reference to the data derived from observation and/or experimentation.
When policy-makers make decisions concerning the manner, matter and outcomes of education, their empirical beliefs often play a significant role. For example, because of the confusion that is going on in South African education, there is in some circles controversy whether schools should "return to basics." This controversy revolves in part around different beliefs regarding what the consequences of such a "return" would be. Some advocates of the "back to basics" position hold the empirical beliefs that such a change in curriculum would more effectively prepare children for various adult roles. Many opponents believe that a return to the "basics" would retard the development of creativity and sensitivity in children who would then be less prepared for adult roles. Of course, there are many other areas of disagreement among the parties to this dispute. However, the point of this example is to show disagreements about the truth of certain empirical beliefs especially those having to do with the effectiveness of producing certain consequences.

There are, however, many cases in which the empirical beliefs that enter into policy-maker's educational decisions are not concerned principally with effectiveness; their main concern is theory - psychological, sociological, or the like.
For example, some people hold the theoretical belief that all learning results from experience. On the basis of this belief, many teachers attempt to structure their teaching so that children are actively involved in and directly experience what they are suppose to learn.

Clearly, most people have very many empirical beliefs concerning education. And just as clearly, these empirical beliefs range over many different areas: psychology, sociology, biology, economics, history, the effectiveness of various teaching methodologies, and so on. The point that needs to be recognised here is that if policy-makers use any empirical beliefs as reasons for educational decisions, then those beliefs are part of their philosophy of education.

Coming back to philosophical beliefs, generally, they deal with questions concerning reality as a whole, in other words they are about all that exists, not just a particular part of what exists. Fitzgibbons (1981:81) says that the distinction between theories concerning all that exists and theories concerning part of what exists may be further be clarified as follows:
"Many people believe that everything that exists is comprised of matter and hence that only material things are real. Anything else is illusory and unreal. Many other people disagree. They believe, for example, that the human being is not merely a material body but a unique combination of body and non-material soul. Such a belief is a direct contradiction of the assertion that everything is material. Implicit in this belief is the position that being in itself cannot be correctly characterised as being exclusively material, since there are some aspects of Being, namely souls, that are non-material."

This implication suggests a familiar metaphysical theory.

Philosophical beliefs also include epistemological beliefs, that is, beliefs concerning the nature, limits or conditions of knowledge. What is to know something? How does knowing differ from believing and having an opinion? How is knowledge acquired? Must something be directly perceived through one of the five senses in order to be known? Or are some things knowable without sense experience? These and similar questions concerning the nature of knowledge and the status of knowledge claims are epistemological questions. The various answers to them are epistemological beliefs.
A third kind of philosophical beliefs typically found in policy-maker's philosophy of education are logical beliefs, beliefs about the criteria for strong reasons. If a person thinks that he has strong reasons for a decision, he must have some beliefs about what makes those reasons strong ones. If a person has no idea what the criteria for strong reasons are, he cannot rationally claim that a particular reason is a strong one. It is fairly obvious how logical beliefs are included in a teacher's philosophy of education. In the first place most teachers attempt to teach their students how to think logically. Consequently, they must have some beliefs concerning what logical thinking is. Secondly, teachers, sometimes make a critical examination of their own beliefs and decisions. They ask whether they themselves are thinking well or poorly or whether they have strong reasons for what they believe. And when they do this they use some logical beliefs.

Logical beliefs are intimately involved in any attempt at making a rational educational decision. A necessary condition for making the rational decision is that a person must have some reasons that the beliefs support his decision. And the belief that his reasons support his decision is a logical belief.
Finally, perhaps the most apparent, distinctively philosophical beliefs included in policy-maker's philosophy of education are normative beliefs, beliefs that something is good or bad, right or wrong, or ought or ought not to be done or occur. It should be clear that particularly any one connected with education will have some normative beliefs concerning its manner, matter and outcomes.

8.10 CONCLUSION

Although philosophy of education ordinarily means a person's set of beliefs about education, there is another sense of the phrase that is also important. This notion of philosophy of education is an activity of jurisdiction, that is, the activity of trying to prove or confirm the truth of philosophical beliefs that are relevant to education. When one is engaged in the activity of philosophy of education one is philosophising about education or simply thinking philosophically about education. In general, thinking philosophically about education involves doing one or both of the following:

- trying to show (by giving reasons) that a philosophical belief relevant to education is true;
critically examining reasons that are offered in support of philosophical beliefs relevant to education.

Many, possibly most, people think philosophically about education by giving reasons for certain of their philosophical beliefs concerning education. But it is equally important to critically examine the reasons that are given. Do these reasons support that philosophical belief? How well do they support the belief? Are there stronger reasons for thinking that the belief is true? Are there perhaps any reasons for thinking that it is false? Merely offering reasons for one's philosophical beliefs is not enough. One must also critically examine them to determine how well they support one's beliefs. Similarly when one makes an educational decision rationally, one must have reasons for that decision. In particular one must have reasons for thinking that pursuing the alternative one decides upon is better than pursuing some other. One must also critically examine those reasons. And doing this will involve one in the activity of philosophy of education. In other words one cannot avoid thinking philosophically about education if one is to make rational educational decisions.
Like other activities, however, thinking philosophically about education can be done well or poorly. One person may be able to support certain philosophical beliefs much better than some one can. That is, one person may hold those beliefs more rationally than the other. Thinking philosophically about education is also like other activities in that one can improve one's skills through practice.
CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SUMMARY OF CONTENT

9.1 INTRODUCTION
9.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
9.3 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 INTRODUCTION

In the statement of the problem for this study the writer mentioned that one of the great issues of the present time in the Republic of South Africa is the problem of all pupils securing equal educational opportunities. This argument arises from the fact that all pupils basically have the freedom to learn. However, pupils cannot reach their full development when denied equal educational opportunities. In recent years the education system in South Africa has come under close scrutiny and has become a cause of great concern to those directly involved in education, and to those in commerce, industry and the professions.

Education positively acknowledges both the communal factors and the diversity of religious and cultural life—styles and languages of the inhabitants. The diversity in religious and cultural life—styles and the languages of the different cultural groups in South Africa is presently receiving structural prominence. The problem which was, however, justly raised at the beginning was whether sufficient prominence is being given to commonalities.

This study has revealed that very little binding exists between the heterogenous cultural groups in South Africa. Serious polarisation exists and this is apparent in many fields including education. In education in particular, this alienation, distrust and anomalous behaviour is examplified by disruption of school programmes in many ways.
The inadequacies of the education system of South Africa, particularly, the black education system, have given rise to much debate at educational forums such as the De Lange Commission, The Senate Special Lectures in 1978 of the University of Witwatersrand on *South Africa's Crisis in Education*. There has since been great concentration and discussion on the core problems and on the direction to be taken to solve them. It has emerged clearly that the education of the indigenous black peoples of South Africa is probably the most critical and immediate problem that confronts the South African society; because a very serious crisis exists, which if not satisfactorily resolved will lead to great discord and political and economic instability in the years ahead. The crisis in black education was forcibly and distressingly brought home to the South African Government by the Soweto riots on the 16 June 1976. It was estimated by the Cillie Commission that nearly fifteen thousand black school children rioted and went on rampage of vandalism and wanton destruction. Mphahlele, a prominent black educationist, argues that there are deeper reasons into these riots:

"If there is any lesson to be learned as a result of the violent outbreak of June 16, 1976 and its aftermath, it is that Bantu Education has sought to ped the limits of human intelligence, and set up structures to contain those limits."
The human intelligence had, after 20 years in a straight-jacket, busted the barriers and hollered to be free ....... Consequently that intelligence hurled itself against guns and tear gas and batons and finally took out its fury on the physical symbols of authority like buildings and alas, on its own self." (Nphahlele, 1983 : 73)

It needs no prophet to predict that black education will be in a state of crisis as long as its quality is low.

9.2 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What has emerged in this study, which is also the opinion now expressed by educationists and academics of all racial groups is that despite the debates, reports and talk about reform, as long as apartheid, ideological separation and racial discrimination are entrenched in the education system provided, there can be no genuine reform, since the system fails to satisfy the needs of the people it is supposed to serve. Until quality is given the same emphasis as quantity, the educational dispensation will be regarded merely as provision of more of the same. The present crisis, unrest and school boycott seem to indicate that such pessimism may well be justified and that the situation will persist until the perennial flash-points of Apartheid have been abolished.
"Virtually all humanity, except a few diehard South African racialists in Government, and to the right of Government, regard apartheid as being abhorrent, immoral and insupportable...." (Dalling, The Star, 16/2/85)

There is little doubt that there are certain fundamental features of the educational dispensation in South Africa that contribute substantially to the present crisis. As already mentioned, education in this country is unavoidably and inextricably bound up with the politics of apartheid, the fundamental of which is self-development through the separation and segregation of the various races on ethnic, cultural and language differences. The South African society embraces a wide variety of cultures, but it is controlled by a white minority that prescribes education for all of them. There is thus an intrinsic pattern for conflict, because the black majority believe that they are being educated to fill a particular place in the South African society; and not only have they no say in the education provided, they regard the education provided as discriminatory, irrelevant to their aspirations and attuned not to their own needs but to the needs of the dominant white minority.

".... Blacks have always had an educational environment which was attuned not to their needs but to those of the whites." (Mphahlele, 1983 : 73)
The cry from most corners is that the answer to the
problems in South Africa lies in the education that
each South African receives, whether he is white or
black. Only as a homogeneous group can problems be
solved and a stable future be ensured. At present the
education system does not adequately serve even the
minority group responsible for formulating the policy.
Educationists of all racial groups are aware, that bold
steps in education are urgently needed, but that there
can be no change as long as the racial groups are by
law required to live and be educated in isolation from
one another.

The present educational system, is embedded in the
ideology of Apartheid and Christian National Education,
which facilitates social control of the majority
through differential access to educational resources
and opportunities, through a curriculum which
propagates the values of the minority, and through
denial of chance for the majority to participate in
decision making about educational policy.

It would, however, be impossible for this country,
except in a very long term, to extend the present
expensive schooling pattern to all sections of the
community, assuming that the education provided for the
White population is accepted as an ideal. Corke
(1978:101), arguing against those who believe that a
satisfactory education can be provided for all along
the lines of the separate and independent systems for
the four population groups say:
"... to achieve four independent systems, each similar in scope to that of the existing white model, would involve increasing total expenditure on education from the present R 950 million per annum (R650 million on the white system) to around R4.700 million per annum."

The fiscal system in South Africa could not bear such expenditure. The government therefore now finds itself in a dilemma to which there seems to be no permanent solution. Yet the segregated system is relentlessly maintained, even though the conviction persists among Blacks that despite vast material improvements, segregation implies differences in quality, content and expenditure, and that no matter what else is done if the dominant white minority is truly committed to educating all the inhabitants of South Africa, regardless of colour or race, it must create an educational system free from discrimination that recognises the intrinsic worth of each individual. Apartheid could have no place in this, for it is seen by many educationists as a recipe for social and economic disaster and the root cause of the present crisis in South African education.

The South African government believes that since education is the transmission of culture, it should therefore then be an "own affair". Of this Marrow (1986:245) points out:
"... the belief that education is an "own affair" is likely to be ideological, at least in part, but that it is, nevertheless, historically significant, and that arguments about whether it is right to have some role to play. The argument about whether the belief is right moves through a consideration of the view that education is the transmission of culture."

Arguments throughout this study have implicated that education is not merely the transmission of culture and therefore it is incorrect to believe that education is an "own affair". Education is to be distinguished from upbringing and is related to emancipation. To think that education is an "own affair" means that education is to be understood, and pursued, within particular social groups and it implies that it is wrong for members of one group to interfere with the education of another group, for one group to impose its view of education on to members of another group.

The ideological belief that education is merely the transmission of culture and therefore an "own affair" is in the interest of the dominant group in South Africa as it provides a plausible rationale for the reproduction of the current relations of domination and exploitation. There is no special problem about why the oppressed of the society come to accept the ideology, this is called maintaining hegemony, and hegemony is maintained by all the organs of the state.
from the media, through the school (which reproduce the ideology by their organisation and content), to the intellectuals (who with great sincerity and seriousness argue that it is a "scientific" truth that education is an "own affair").

Schooling has economic, social and political functions. Schooling selects and prepares people for positions in the occupational, social and political hierarchies of society. Thus schooling is one of the principal agencies for the distribution of the "goods" of society, including access to the exercise of power. In any case in which "different" schooling is provided for "different" people, some advantages and disadvantages are being prepared for. It is unjust for a schooling system to be used to advance the interests of a particular group in a society, thus it is wrong to think that education is an own affair when education is thought of as equivalent to schooling. There is a great deal that needs to be unpacked in this argument. This argument is conclusive against most of the uses in South Africa's political and academic world of the idea that education is an own affair. One way in which defenders of this idea try to escape from the conclusion is to deny that South Africa should be regarded as a single "nation" or society. South Africa is still saddled with the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act and there has been more than thirty-five years of propagation that South Africa is not a single "nation" but a collection of "nations" which should each have its own hierarchies of power.
Once there is thought that there is an intimate link between education and culture and that the former is the transmission of the latter, then in a society in which there are different cultures (there are echoes from all sides that South Africa is such a society), two exclusive possibilities seem to present themselves:

- There should be different education for each of the different cultures, which there are (in official rhetoric this is the traditional South African solution) or

- One of the cultures will dominate education (and the other cultures will be suppressed, distorted, ignored, colonised or in some other way undermined). This might be called Cultural Imperialism or Mono-cultural education.

It should be noted that, the extent to which the opposition between these two possibilities, conceived of as the only alternatives, has provided the framework for argument about schooling policy in South Africa. But there are two strong objections to both these alternatives. The first alternative leads to a kind of cultural exclusiveness which not only hinders the development of culture (each of the cultures becomes stultified in its own forms) but also does little to prepare people for the world in which they live their lives (people of South Africa do not live only in the cultural richness of South Africa but also in the "global village"). Furthermore, such a view underwrites schooling policies which lead to polarisation of cultural groups, mutual misunderstanding and unresolvable conflict.
The second alternative is based on disrespect for other cultures, and the unjustifiable assumption of the superiority of one culture. The idea that all people should be assimilated into a single, dominant culture fails to take into view the detailed fabric of people’s day to day lives and how precious that fabric is even in people’s own self-concepts. Once that fabric is torn people’s self identity is at risk and anomie and demoralisation are not far behind.

Finally, there ought to be a serious consideration of the conceptual link between education and emancipation. To become educated is to escape from blind adherence, to the common convictions and prevailing practices of one’s social group. Paradoxically, one of the central thrusts of Phenomenology was to encourage people to render problematic "common sense" and the "take-for-granted" everyday life world. To be able to do so is one of the characteristic achievements of being educated.

One can make these same points using the word "culture". An educated person is one who has escaped from embeddedness in a particular culture. This is a person who has achieved a critical understanding of how much is simply conventional in the cultural group within which he happened to have been raised. This does not imply that an educated person is one who rejects the convictions and practices of his cultural group. The idea is that a person is educated to the extent to which he is capable of reflecting critically about his life circumstances, the influences which formed his fundamental beliefs, and the customs and habits which constitute the framework of his daily life.
If this is correct, then it is not correct that education and culture are intimately linked in a way which makes it correct to think that education is the transmission of culture, thus an "own affair".

9.3 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

According to Unesco (1972) a programme of strategies for educational change should include:

- identifying, stimulating and experimenting with innovation;
- the administration and management of educational system;
- the search for means of financing education.

Drawing up a new strategy necessarily presupposes an overall diagnosis of the state of education. The following recommendations are an effort to bring about workable solutions for education in South Africa in the future.

1. There must be a full commitment by the South African Government to uphold fundamental human rights in a free, open and just society. The problems underlying education in South Africa are not merely educational, but are also political, predominantly because of the inequality and exclusivity of an ideology of apartheid.
Unless there is a fundamental commitment by the Government to bring about a fair, equal and open education system, Blacks will once again be denied the equality and dignity which are the rights of every man, woman and child. Only the Government can ensure that education will be financed equally. Only legislation can bring about removal of discrimination, thereby making an open education system a distinct possibility. Without this shift in Government policies educational unrest will continue.

2. An open education system must be brought about which will allow any child free access to any public education institution in South Africa. South Africa is unique in its insistence on racially exclusive schools and departments, and is universally condemned for this. As early as 1955 a Freedom Charter was adopted by South African Blacks which viewed education as follows:

"... education shall ... teach the youth to love their people and their culture, to honour human brotherhood, liberty and peace. Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children. The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education shall be abolished."
Today the Joint Council of Teachers' Association of South Africa (JOCTASA), an association of 80,000 Black teachers, also commits itself as a matter of fundamental belief to the principle of non-racialism in education. Differentiation based on race or colour cannot be regarded as relevant grounds for inequality.

3. A single ministry of education characterised by a policy of cultural diversity, should be implemented with the utmost speed and urgency. One uniform system of education for South Africa would be the most tangible movement away from a racially divided system and its outright rejection by the Black Communities. However, there are a number of diversifications which such a uniform system will have to consider:

a) the different languages which are prevalent in South African society;
b) differences in culture and historical heritages;
c) differences of first world against third world orientation.

South Africans must be careful not to fall will-nilly into a melting-pot ideology in which it is hoped to blend all South Africans in a superior culture.
There are many Black groups who are very proud of a cultural heritage which they would like to retain, although they also strive towards a common national culture, as fully fledged citizen. A uniform educational system should not alienate youths from their various cultures, but should help them acquire the skills and abilities needed to function within a mainstream South African culture. In the USA reference is made to multi-

cultural or multi-ethnic societies and the various cultural and ethnic groups share a universal culture while not relinquishing cultural characteristics which are unique to their own group. The demand and support for education that is multicultural can be construed as basically a moral and ethical issue.

It is totally unacceptable, however, to use cultural differences to endorse racial discrimination. I want to be quite clear that my plea for a multicultural school programme includes a socio-political aim; to acknowledge the right of all groups to exist culturally and to share status and power in South African society. Even though obstacles to implementing multicultural programmes seem formidable, vigorous support for them should be continued. They will improve the environment of the classroom and will break down the prejudices of suspicion and mistrust between children from various racial and cultural groups.
4. The principle of equality of opportunity must not only be introduced with immediate effect in education, but positive efforts must be made to eradicate the historic backlogs and disadvantages prevalent in Black education. Equality in education is a term that is often used in the current South African debate. In South Africa the average standard of living as well as the availability of skills related to education of the Whites is practically equal to that of the average of the United States. That of the Africans corresponds more or less to what he would call the under - or partially developed countries. The Asians and the Coloureds may be classified in between as semi-advanced and partially-developed respectively. This analysis clearly portrays the disparities and inequalities of the South African education scene.

According to Malherbe, state expenditure on the education of the four population groups varies roughly in proportion to their taxable capacities, which in turn are largely dependent on their incomes. Statutory and conventional restrictions placed on the earnings and productivity of Blacks as they climb the educational ladder, result in lower taxable capacities of non-Whites, which in turn leads to a limitation of the amount of money devoted to their education. There is sufficient evidence to show that where the association between education and earnings is based on social privilege instead of productivity, money spent on education becomes a poor investment and will tend to decelerate economic growth and not accelerate it.
The per capita expenditure on education for the different population groups in South Africa shows the enormous disparity between Whites and Blacks. An equalisation programme of expenditure, having also to overcome the historic backlog of Black education, could be economically impossible. Perhaps the economic level of White education is an artificial luxury that this country can no longer afford. We will have to fix a realistic expenditure level which will enable all children to be treated equally.

Many educationists believe a programme of compensatory programmes must be launched to change personal characteristics of "culturally deprived" or "disadvantaged" students to enable them to compete in open schools. But, compensatory programmes are basically designed to make the attitudes and behaviour of minority and lower-class children more like those of middle class Whites. We are not so much dealing with culturally deprived children as with deficient children but to alter and transform the atmosphere and operations of the schools to which we commit these children. Only by changing the nature of the educational experience can we change the product.
Democratic participation of local parent communities in education should be actively pursued in a new education system. Democratic rights in education mean the guaranteeing of opportunities to participate in the management of education and in the definition of its policies. Parent-Teacher Associations have long been viewed as adequate models for citizen participation in the schools, but they encourage the parents of school children and no one else in the community to work in co-operation with a school staff. Their programmes were narrow and in the main supported the school programme.

How should a community participate in the future? Community committees, preferably elected, should function along with the professionals at significant stages in the education structure. A mere advisory role will not do. In "Community Control of Education", Marilyn Gittell suggests that there are four main areas of involvement critical to full participation by the community: curriculum, personnel, pupil policy and budget. The writer particularly wants to stress the third area. Establishing new codes of behaviour for our youth appears to have been placed squarely upon the shoulders of classroom teacher, but their role has become much more difficult in this time when societal norms have undergone rapid change.
Efforts should be made for both the community and the school to work together in establishing acceptable pupil policies. This could reduce the turbulence that often accompanies periods of rapid change. Community participation in education can be viewed as difficult and often highly complex. School people, uneasy lest a wrong decision be made, often view community participation as a risky endeavour, or as useful only in times of crisis. Yet, whatever, the efforts needed to maintain active participation, creating full community participation can serve only to strengthen the role of our schools.

6. It is of utmost importance that a continuous series of educational innovation and change be maintained, and for this reason the writer would like to recommend the setting up of a national education development centre (or other similar organisation) to ensure a "perpetual reform" of education. Recent educational history has shown that educational reform can no longer be effected through scattered initiatives. Development centres could co-ordinate educational innovation in a positive and orderly way. It is important that some co-ordinating educational body exists in order to implement the best features of the proposed new system.
There are two conditions for the structuring of a favourite climate for change:

a) a proper knowledge of the deficiencies of the status quo, and

b) a meaningful preparedness to support essential reforms.

History has ensured that the best tradition of the past has been preserved in education while simultaneously introducing innovations. It is of the utmost importance that visual and meaningful educational innovation be implemented as soon as effectively possible.
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