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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quotations</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsakure</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1

## CHAPTER ONE: AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction            5
1.2 Literature review       7
1.3 Problem statement       29
1.4 Aims and objectives of the study 29
1.5 Intended Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 29
1.6 Theoretical Framework   30
1.7 Research Methodology    33
1.8 Ethical and safety issues 34
1.9 Resources               34

## CHAPTER TWO: THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT, BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 Introduction            35
2.2 Historical Background, 1959-1963 36
2.3 Rivonia                 39
2.4 "A Rope of Strength"    41
2.5 Britain’s "special interests" 43
2.6 "A Safety Net" 44
2.7 Nigeria’s Special Request 46
2.8 Economic Sanctions 47
2.9 From hope to disillusionment 50
2.10 The Seventies 52
2.10.1 Stopping the Springboks 52
2.10.2 Constructive Engagement vs Disinvestment 53
2.10.3 Building a mass base 54
2.10.4 Students 54
2.10.5 Unions 54
2.10.6 Churches 55
2.10.7 AAM activities in the late Seventies 55
2.11 The Eighties 56
2.11.1 The Thatcher Government 57
2.11.2 The Tide Turns 58
2.11.3 Hitting the South African Economy 59
2.11.4 Focus on Repression 60
2.11.5 The Free Mandela Campaign 61
2.12 The Nineties 62
2.13 Conclusion 63

CHAPTER THREE: THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES’ POLICY RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Introduction 66
3.2 The Anti-apartheid Movement Reacts to the Sharpeville Massacre 67
3.3 Post Sharpeville 69
3.4 The Anti-apartheid Movement Solidifies 70
3.5 The Pan Africanist and New Left Movement 71
3.6 The Civil Rights Community 71
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOVIET UNION (USSR) AND THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE

4.1 Introduction 129
4.2 Relations between U.S.S.R. and South Africa before 1960 129
4.3 Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards South Africa since the 1960s 135
4.4 The impact of Soviet’s anti-apartheid struggle 140
4.5 Conclusion 145

CHAPTER FIVE: UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST APARTHEID

5.1 Introduction 146
5.2 Coalition Against Apartheid 146
5.3 Overview of Action Against Apartheid 148
5.4 UN International Campaign Against Apartheid 151
5.4.1 Role of the Liberation Movement and of International Solidarity 154
5.4.2 The Strategy 155
5.4.3 Growing support from Nordic and other smaller Western States 156
5.4.4 Partial Measures 157
5.4.5 Challenging the Legitimacy of the Pretoria Regime 159
5.4.6 Cooperation with Anti-Apartheid Organisations 159
5.4.7 A Historic Achievement 163
5.5 Conclusion 163

CHAPTER SIX: THE OAU AND THE FRONTLINE STATES AGAINST APARTHEID

6.1 Introduction 165
6.2 The OAU and the Isolation of the Apartheid Regime in South Africa 165
6.3 The Frontline States Take Common Stand 174
6.4 Rival Strategies: (CONSAS) versus (SADCC) 177
“I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” – Nelson Mandela, 1964

“The brutality of the racist regime and the complicity of external forces can be countered only by enormous sacrifices and heroism of the South African people, supplemented by persistent efforts to mobilise governments and peoples to isolate that regime, force its allies to disengage from apartheid, and assist the liberation struggle.” – Oliver Tambo, Lagos Conference, 1977
APPROVAL

This Doctoral thesis has been read and approved in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, South Africa.

…………………………………………..                                        Date…………………………………………

Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase

PROMOTER
DECLARATION

I declare that this Doctoral thesis: “The Role of the International Community Towards Dismantling the Apartheid Regime in South Africa: 1960-1990” represents my own work and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and properly acknowledged for future reference.

By.................................................................

Student Name: Nasir Abba Yusuf

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Email: nasseeray@yahoo.com
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my dear parents Alhaji Abba Yusufu and Hajiya Fatima Musa, my elder brother Yusuf Abba Yusuf (Sabo), my loving wife Fatima Atiku and our children; Ahmad, Abubakar (Ameer), Fatima and Habiba.

It's been a long walk and each one of you has played his/her own part, like a perfect symphony.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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My heartfelt thanks to officials of the United States, British, Russian and Frontline States’ Embassies in South Africa and in Nigeria, for furnishing me with vital information on the topic in question; staff at the South African Media, University of the Free State in Bloemfontein for helping me gain access to newspaper articles relevant to my research topic and the period thereof; librarians at the Universities of Zululand, Pretoria, and Cape Town for helping me gain access to the relevant sources; University of Zululand Department of History staff for the encouragement, motivation, guidance and support; and Miss Frances Msomi of the Department of African Languages, University of Zululand, for a professionally and meticulously typed document.

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This research study delves into the role of the international community towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa during the period 1960-1990. It argues that racial discrimination in apartheid South Africa came into being gradually over the centuries of white settlement that began when the Dutch East India Company founded a colony on the Cape in 1652. Dutch settlers were joined by English colonials who fought and won control of South Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. White control followed independence from Britain and the descendents of Dutch setters regained political power when the Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP), which governed South Africa until 1994, won all-white elections in 1948. One of the National Party’s main goals was to codify centuries of de facto white domination. The legislative cornerstones of apartheid – including the Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 (prohibiting marriage between people of different races), the Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act, both of 1950, the Reservation of Separate Amenities and Bantu Education Bills both of 1953 – constructed distinct racial categories, and sought to ensure that racial groups were kept physically separate; and that black, Asian, and coloured South Africans receive inferior education and remain weak in political and economic terms. This research study posits that collective action against apartheid came out of, and involved, a number of different historical experiences, related to different historical processes and structural contexts. The reaction of the outside world to the development of apartheid was widespread and posed a sustained challenge to the South African regime, which, facing myriad internal and external threats, eventually capitulated to make way for a new, democratic dispensation during the 1990s. Central to the argument in this research study is that while countries throughout the world took various measures to weaken and topple apartheid, it was particularly the anti-apartheid movements in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), support from the Soviet Union, pressure by the United Nations (UN), the OAU and the Frontline States that mounted the most serious of these challenges to the apartheid state.
**TSAKURE**

### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Anti-Apartheid Movement (Britain)</td>
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<td>AAAM</td>
<td>Australian Anti-Apartheid Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOA</td>
<td>American Committee of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTSA</td>
<td>Action for Southern Africa</td>
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<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>The American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<td>AGIS</td>
<td>Africa Groups in Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BCC</td>
<td>British Council of Churches</td>
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<td>BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement</td>
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<td>BM</td>
<td>Boycott Movement</td>
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<td>BoSS</td>
<td>Bureau of State Security (South Africa)</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Black People’s Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Committee of African Organizations (Britain)</td>
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<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<td>CCETSA</td>
<td>Canon Collins Educational Trust for Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CCHA</td>
<td>Consultative Committee of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Committee for Fairness in Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Christian Institute (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (USA)</td>
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<td>CLAAG</td>
<td>City of London Anti-Apartheid Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONCP</td>
<td>Conférence das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguêsas</td>
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<tr>
<td>COREMO</td>
<td>Comité Revolucionário de Mocambique</td>
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</tbody>
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COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPC  Coloured People’s Congress
CSM  Church of Sweden Mission
DN  Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)
FLN  Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
FNLA  Frente Nacional para a Libertacao de Angola
FPU  Folkpartiets ungdomsförbund (Liberal Party Youth League in Sweden)
FRELIMO  Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICFTU  International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IDAF  International Defence and Aid Fund
IGO  Inter-Governmental Organization
ILO  International Labour Organization
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organization
ISAK  Isolera Sydafrika-Kommittén (Sweden) (Isolate South Africa Committee)
IUEF  International University Exchange Fund
JSAK  Jönköpings Sydafrika Kommitté (Sweden)
LO  Landsorganisationen i Sverige (Swedish Trade Union Confederation)
LP  Labour Party (Britain)
MCC  The British Cricket Council
MCF  Movement for Colonial Freedom
MK  Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the armed wing of the ANC and the SACP
MP  Member of Parliament
MPLA  Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>Nordic Africa Institute</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NF</td>
<td>National Forum (South Africa)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NP</td>
<td>Nationalist Party (South Africa)</td>
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<td>NSM</td>
<td>New Social Movements</td>
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<td>NTA</td>
<td>National Tennis Association (Sweden)</td>
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<td>NUSAS</td>
<td>National Union of South Africa Students OAU Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCG</td>
<td>Revolutionary Communist Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMT</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACOD</td>
<td>South African Congress of Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACTU</td>
<td>South African Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>South African Indian Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN-ROC</td>
<td>South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASO</td>
<td>South African Student’s Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society (USA)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
SEK  Swedish Kronor
SIDA  Swedish International Development Agency
SMOs  Social Movement Organizations
SSU  Sveriges Socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund (Youth League of the Swedish Social Democrat)
STST  Stop the Seventies Tour (Britain)
SvD  Svenska Dagbladet (Sweden)
SWAPO  South West African People’s Union
TCO  Central Organization of Salaried Employees/Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (Sweden)
TGWU  Transport and General Worker’s Union (Britain)
TRC  Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TUC  Trade Union Congress (Britain)
UDC  Union of Democratic Control
UDF  United Democratic Front (South Africa)
UM  Unity Movement
UN  United Nations
UNITA  União Nacional para a Independência total de Angola
UPI  United Press International
WAY  World Assembly of Youth
WCC  World Council of Churches
WFTU  World Federation of Trade Unions
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People’s Union
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Collective action against apartheid came out of, and involved, a number of different historical experiences, related to different historical processes and structural contexts. The reaction of the outside world to the development of apartheid was widespread, and by the 1980s posed a sustained challenge to the South African regime, which, facing myriad internal and external threats, eventually capitulated to make way for a new, democratic dispensation. While countries throughout the world took various measures to weaken and topple apartheid, it was the anti-apartheid movements in the United Kingdom (UK), Holland and the United States of America (USA) that mounted the most serious of these challenges to the apartheid state, the UK’s perhaps being the most effective of all such organizations throughout the world. By the late 1980s the UK’s Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) had unleashed a wide range of campaigns and established branches throughout the country. From small beginnings, the AAM developed a campaign that became one of the most powerful international solidarity movements in history, a model that has subsequently been used to weaken or displace many other dictatorial regimes. The AAM developed links with political parties and other powerful forces to put in place and reinforce effective measures to destabilise every aspect of apartheid structure, mounting economic, cultural, trade and sports boycotts which resulted in sanctions campaigns supported by governments throughout the world.

By its nature, the AAM was a co-ordinating machine – unable itself to achieve its goals, it persuaded individuals, organizations, political structures and governments to take whatever actions would be necessary to achieve the isolation and weakening of the apartheid state. It’s function was to make powerful actors – such as governments, political parties, trade unions and union federations or the United Nations, but also masses of individuals acting in concert – take significant decisions that had material and, often, historic effects. The success of the AAM was to slowly, over three decades, bring awareness of the issues to the British public, and to pressure the British and other governments to eventually throttle the apartheid machine by stopping trade, cutting off oil supplies and access to arms, and isolating white South Africa to the point that it was forced to dismantle its oppressive regime.

With nothing more than three, four or five paid staff working out of tiny offices, but hundreds of volunteers and a range of contacts from the highest echelons of power to the everyday citizen, the AAM went a considerable way towards bringing down one of the most repugnant systems in the 20th century. Britain took over the Cape in 1795 and, after relinquishing control, recolonised the territory during its war with France in the early 19th century. British capital controlled the diamond and gold mines discovered in the late 19th century. After vanquishing the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 (now referred to as the South African War), Britain granted dominion status to the Union of South Africa in 1910. By the late 1950s, Britain was one of South Africa’s most significant trading partners, with more than 30 percent of South Africa’s imports coming from the UK, and 28 percent of South Africa’s exports going to Britain. Besides the economic relationship, Britain enjoyed close relations with its former colony, and between 1946 and 1959, 113,000 Britons had settled in South Africa.
However, other aspects of British culture eventually worked against white domination. Since the 19th century, London became home to exiles from every part of the world, notably to Karl Marx, who wrote his most famous and influential tome, Das Kapital, in the British Library. Similarly, South Africans fleeing from apartheid in the early 1950s settled in the increasingly cosmopolitan capital of the British Empire, and set up structures that took on a life of their own. Vella Pillay, Tennyson Makiwane, Abdul Minty, Yusuf Dadoo, Kader Asmal, Oliver Tambo and later Thabo Mbeki and the Pahad brothers (Aziz and Essop), among many others, all settled in England for periods and used it as a base from which to conduct the struggle against apartheid. It was Vella Pilay and Tennyson Makiwane who first established the germ of the Anti-Apartheid Movement on British soil. They began holding meetings in the 1950s and planned the first boycotts of South African products, which eventually culminated in the highly influential AAM.

Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, the United States orchestrated a foreign policy which related to South Africa primarily in terms of economic and military/gee-strategic interests. Moral concern for apartheid was, historically, a non-issue as far as the foreign policy agenda was concerned. It was not until the 1960's that the United States took a public, substantive, stand against apartheid. Problem, political and policy stream changes preceded elevation of concern for apartheid to a more central location on the governmental agenda during the Kennedy administration, and then the decision agenda with passage of the arms embargo against South Africa. This new definition of the South Africa situation persisted on the policy agenda during the Johnson years. Despite renewed rhetoric over apartheid and policy developments such as the Kennedy arms embargo, this redefinition of the South Africa problem actually deviated only slightly from the Truman and Eisenhower era, however. Economic and military interests continued to reign supreme in the Sixties. Criticism of apartheid was appropriate as long as it was convenient and inconsequential. This analysis considers how Anti-apartheid activists attempted to affect problem, political and policy streams in the Sixties, and also considers how these streams eventually shaped the definition of the South Africa problem on the policy agenda in the Sixties.

During the Seventies, the anti-apartheid movement was able to build a solid foothold among its traditional constituents, consolidate its resources, and mount successful campaigns throughout the United States. The Movement strategized to economically isolate the Pretoria regime. Movement constituents pursued this goal by targeting a diverse group of institutions to which they had African-Americans targeted national policy-makers, religious groups targeted corporations. Students targeted universities and colleges, community activists targeted local, county, and State-level governments. Regardless of the forums, the anti-apartheid movement rallied for divestment and disinvestment.

The United States foreign policy agenda toward South Africa fluctuated between Nixon's policy of constructive change and Carter's human rights policy. Despite the policy differences, however, both presidents ascribed primary concern to economic and military interests rather than moral interests when dealing with South Africa. This was evident in the rhetoric of individual legislators, bills considered by Congress, in the issues relevant to the presidential contests in Nixon and 1976, and in Carter's early entanglements with the Vorster
regime in 1977. The Eighties was a period in which the Executive branch and the Legislative branch of national government clashed over priorities for South African policy. Set against renewed violence in South Africa and a rapidly mobilizing social movement, Anti-apartheid policy shifted from comity with constructive engagement to enmity with economic sanctions. By 1986, the interests of the domestic anti-apartheid movement became codified as politically innovative law. In some senses, these interests were the same as those espoused by marginal Pan-Africanist activists in the early part of the twentieth century. By the 1990s anti-apartheid sentiment had truly moved from the margins to the mainstream of public opinion. This analysis dissects the problem, political and policy streams prevailing in the Eighties.

In the late 1950s the Soviets, under Nikita Khruschev, began to foster stronger ties with Africans, beginning with Egypt, Ghana and Guinea. The Soviet public was exposed to the idea of internationalism, and African-American singer Paul Robeson was a well-known figure in the country. Peter Abrahams 'book Path of Thunder, was prescribed for students of English at some Russian schools. A book on South Africa, Union of South Africa After World War II, by I Yastrebova, was published in the USSR in 1952, but in general the public knew little about the country. When the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat, the precursor of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), asked its various committees to send a message of greeting to the ANC on the eve of its annual congress in 1959, the Soviets asked the African Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies for information about the ANC. Researcher Appolon Davidson acceded to the request by writing a short paper on the ANC. The African Department was expanded in 1962/3 to become the Africa Institute, a body that was to play a crucial role in the USSR’s relations with the continent and her struggle against apartheid.

Though racial discrimination in South Africa was on the agenda of the United Nations since 1946 – and apartheid since 1952 - it had been difficult for many years, because of the resistance of Western Powers, to secure a condemnation of apartheid or any sanctions against the Pretoria regime. The position began to change in the 1960s with the cycle of repression and resistance in South Africa, the anti-colonial revolutions in Asia and Africa, the establishment of the Organization of African Unity and the growing public opinion against apartheid all over the world, including the Western countries. The near-unanimous adoption of the resolution of October 11, 1963, was a tribute to the tireless work of anti-apartheid movements and other organizations which helped persuade the reluctant governments to join with the vast majority of Member States in condemning the brutality of the apartheid regime.

Since its founding in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) identified the Republic of South Africa as one of their main targets in the fight against racial discrimination. At its inception, the Addis Ababa conference had dealt principally with this question of race (apartheid). One reason for the OAU’s stand on South Africa was its common abhorrence of racial discrimination which they regarded as racist and inhuman. The conference therefore called for, among other things, “the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the imposition of economic sanctions against South
Africa.” The perpetuation of apartheid in South Africa was condemned by many independent African states.

By 1963, the independent African states, through the OAU, had become more determined in their opposition to apartheid. Since the new regional balance resulting from the independence of Angola, Mozambique and later Zimbabwe was created, South Africa had pursued an aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours coupled with a repressive internal policy. On the basis of the increasingly converging interests of South Africa and its imperialist allies, the Pretoria regime had articulated a policy that, with respect to its neighbours, alternated political, economic and military pressures, and overtures. Thus, this chapter delves on the OAU’s and the Frontline States’ (FLS) role towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Nearly every theoretical argument about the potential impact of sanctions on a target was made with respect to South Africa. South Africa’s mixed economy (based on industry, agriculture, and mining raw materials) enables the evaluation of the impact of sanctions on different economic sectors. Various types of sanctions – strategic, economic, and social – were levied against apartheid South Africa. Multiple tools of influence were used, besides sanctions, in the effort to change South Africa’s foreign and domestic policies. Specific to South Africa is the paradigm case of constructive engagement – the effort to change another government’s policies by embrace rather than isolation. In addition, international diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation were used in an effort to promote democratic reforms within South Africa, halt South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, and end its war in Angola.\(^1\) Moreover, sanctions and diplomacy were only part of a larger anti-apartheid strategy. The African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party, trade unions, religious groups, and literally hundreds of other activist organizations inside South Africa waged a determined struggle for change over the course of several decades while guerrilla movements and South Africa’s neighbours used military force to resist South African aggression and to force domestic restructuring.

CHAPTER ONE:

AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

“In South Africa, since the earliest days of white rule, our people have not had the opportunity of being heard by the tribunals of State, by the people who formulate the policies of that country, by the people who make laws determining the nature and character of the lives we are expected to live in that country.” – Oliver Tambo, New York, October 29, 1963

1.1 Introduction

Apartheid, an Afrikaans name given by the white-ruled South Africa’s Nationalist Party in 1948 to the country’s harsh, institutionalized system of racial segregation, came to an end in the early 1990s in a series of steps that led to the formation of a democratic government in 1994. Years of violent internal protest, weakening white commitment, international economic and cultural sanctions, economic struggles, and the end of the Cold War brought down the white minority rule in Pretoria. U.S. policy toward the regime underwent a gradual but complete transformation that played an important conflictual role in Apartheid’s initial survival and eventual downfall.

Although many of the segregationist policies dated back to the early decades of the twentieth century, it was the election of the Nationalist Party in 1948 that marked the beginning of legalized racism’s harshest features called Apartheid. The Cold War (the hostile yet non-violent relations between the former Soviet Union and the United States, and their respective allies, from around 1946 to 1989) then was in its early stages. U.S. President Harry Truman’s principal foreign policy target was to checkmate Soviet expansion. Despite supporting a domestic civil rights agenda to further the rights of black people in the United States, the Truman administration chose not to protest the anti-communist South African government’s system of Apartheid in an effort to maintain an ally against the Soviet Union in southern Africa. This set the stage for successive administrations to quietly support the Apartheid regime as a stalwart ally against the spread of communism.

Inside South Africa, riots, boycotts, and protests by black South Africans against white rule had occurred since the inception of independent white rule in 1910. Opposition intensified when the Nationalist Party, assuming power in 1948, effectively blocked all legal and non-violent means of political protest by non-whites. The African National Congress (ANC) and its offshoot, the Pan African Congress (PAC), both of which envisioned a varsity different form of government based on majority rule, were outlawed in 1960 and many of its leaders imprisoned. The most famous prisoner was a leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, who had

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2. L, Graham, “South Africa: No Easy Path to Peace”, p.68
become a symbol of the anti-Apartheid struggle. While Mandela and many political prisoners remained incarcerated in South Africa, other anti-Apartheid leaders fled South Africa and set up headquarters in a succession of supportive, independent African countries (frontline states), including Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, and neighbouring Mozambique where they continued the fight to end Apartheid. It was not until the 1980s, however, that this turmoil effectively cost the South African state significant losses in revenue, security, and international reputation.

The international community had begun to take notice of the brutality of the Apartheid regime after white South African police opened fire on unarmed black protesters in the town of Sharpeville 21\textsuperscript{st} March 1960, killing 69 people and 186 others. The United Nation led the call for sanctions against the South African Government on 1 April 1960. This made the Security Council of the UN, in its first action on South Africa, adopted resolution 134 deplored the policies and actions of the South African government in the wake of the killing of 69 peaceful African protesters in Sharpeville by the police on 21 March. The Council called upon government to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination. Fearful of losing friends in Africa as de-colonization transformed the continent, powerful members of the Security Council, including Great Britain, France, and the United States, succeeded in watering down the proposals. However, by the late 1970s, grassroots movement in Europe and the United States succeeded in pressuring their governments into imposing economic and cultural sanctions on Pretoria. After the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, many large multinational companies withdrew from South Africa. By the late 1980s, the South African economy was struggling with the effects of the internal and external boycotts as well as the burden of its military commitment in occupying Namibia.

Proponents of Apartheid regime both inside and outside South Africa had promoted it as a bulwark against communism. However, the end of the Cold War rendered this argument obsolete. South Africa had illegally occupied neighbouring Namibia at the end of the World War II, since the mid-1970s, Pretoria had used it as a base to fight the communist party in Angola. The United States had even supported the South African Defence Force’s effort in Angola. In the 1980s, hard-line anti-communists in Washington continued to promote relations with the Apartheid government despite economic sanctions levied by the U.S. Congress. However, the relaxation of Cold War tensions led to negotiations to settle the Cold War conflict in Angola. Pretoria’s economic struggle gave the Apartheid leaders strong incentive to participate. When South Africa reached a multilateral agreement in 1988 to end its occupation of Namibia in return for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, even the most ardent anti-communist in the United States lost their justification for support of the Apartheid regime.

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\textsuperscript{6} H, Giliomee and B, Mbenga, "New History of South Africa", p.376
\textsuperscript{7} D. Venter, "South Africa and the Comity of Nation: From Isolation to Integration". p.10
\textsuperscript{8} A.L. Bannett, "International Organizations: Principles and Issues". p.128
\textsuperscript{9} P. Levy, "Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?" pp.417-419
The effects and the internal unrest and international condemnation led to dramatic changes beginning in 1989. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha resigned\(^{10}\) after it became clear that he had lost the faith of the ruling National Party (NP) for his failure to bring order to the country. His successor F.W. de Klerk, in a move that surprised observers, announced in his opening address to parliament in 1990 that he was lifting the ban on the ANC and other black liberation parties, allowing freedom of the press, and releasing of political prisoners\(^{11}\). The country waited in anticipation for the release of Nelson Mandela who walked out of prison after 27 years on February 11, 1990. The impact of Mandela’s release reverberated throughout South Africa and the world. After speaking to throngs of supporters in Cape Town where he pledged to continue the struggle, but advocated for peaceful change, Mandela took his massage to the international media. He embarked on a world tour culminating in a visit to the United States where he spoke before a joint session of Congress. After Prime Minister de Klerk agreed to democratic elections for the country, the United States lifted sanctions and increased foreign aid, and many of the U.S. companies who disinvested in the 1980s returned with new investments and joint ventures. In April 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected as South Africa’s first black president.

The world stood united in its condemnation of the South African Government and its policy of Apartheid. Governments, universities, churches, trade unions and civil society formations stood in opposition to Apartheid. As a result, anti-Apartheid organizations were formed in nearly every country around the world. This became the role of international community towards the dismantling of the South Africa’s apartheid regime.

1.2 Literature review

In their 2008 studies, T, Lodge, M, Shain and R, Mandelsohn made a careful observation on factors that led to the Sharpeville massacre and the event that followed thereafter. The study posits that the Sharpeville incidence led to an outbreak of mass riots/protest across most parts of South Africa. In reactions to this development, however, the apartheid regime responded by banning the leading anti-apartheid political organizations – the ANC and the PAC. As such, the study argued that there was the intensification of politically related violence which led to the loss of lives and destruction of properties.

In line with the above, the leadership of the ANC and PAC went underground and most of their leaders were either imprisoned or forced to go on exile. As such, the armed wing of the ANC *Umkhonto we Sizwe* and *Poqo* under the leadership of the PAC continued with various acts of sabotage against the regime. The subsequent arrest and conviction of Nelson Mandela and his fellow comrades led to the popular Rivonia trial between 1963 and 1964. This political development attracted the attention of the international community which led to the global economic and political isolation of the apartheid government. This study will contribute to the current research particularly in our understanding of the major political and economic development that took place during the apartheid regime.

\(^{10}\) H, Giliomee and B, Mbenga, *“New History of South Africa”*, p.393

\(^{11}\) Ibid
Despite the existence of this literature, it appears that the study did not provide an in-depth analysis into the role of the international community towards the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The current research seeks to unearth and properly document the existing historical vacuum as a contribution to knowledge.\textsuperscript{12}

In his 2005 study, Adrian Guelke, revisit the foundation of apartheid in South Africa. As such, the author made a considerable assessment of the nature of various apartheid policies and their impact on the people of the country. In doing so, the study takes into consideration how the apartheid regime managed to endure internal and external pressures up to 1990. In addition, the study takes into cognizance the role played by FW de Klerk and other whites liberals in dismantling apartheid.\textsuperscript{13}

The above study has provided the current research with vital information particularly on the rise and fall of apartheid regime in South Africa. Although, there was lack of in-depth analysis on the repercussions of apartheid racial laws and how they attracted the attention of international community which led to the imposition of both political and economic sanctions on the apartheid government of South Africa. As such, the current study seeks to address and bridge the existing academic lacuna. This is hoped to be achieved by providing empirical analysis on the roles played by international community towards the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa.

Kevin in his study explores into the history of the organizational structure of the South Africa’s intelligence services.\textsuperscript{14} The study is divided into three different epochs. First, it studies the various methods that were employed by the various South African security agents in gathering security and intelligence information between 1948 and 1990. The second part, deal with the transitional period (i.e from apartheid to the advent of democracy) covering the periods 1990 to 1994. The study posits how the apartheid government secretly supported and authorized its security forces towards curbing anti-apartheid political movements in South Africa. Finally, the study scrutinizes the transformation of the South African security system in the post apartheid era. The study restricts itself on the intelligence activities of the apartheid government; it also incorporates the organizational structure of intelligence services and the modus operandi of the prominent opposition political organizations.

The study further explains the role of the police, the military and other secret agents played in compiling intelligence information throughout the period in study. It also observes the intricate and nature of the apartheid regime’s bureaucracy and mode of operations. It also reveals how dissemination of intelligence services helps in reshaping the scenery of South African foreign relations principally with Israel. In addition, the study posits that real intelligence service in South Africa commences in the year 1961. This was the period when ANC and PAC resorted to the use of arms and guerrilla warfare as the last resort of their quest of political liberation of the South African people. This study provided an in-depth


\textsuperscript{13} A, Guelke, "Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid", pp. 1-238.

\textsuperscript{14} A.O.B, Kevin, "The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005", pp.1-236
analysis on the system of gathering and execution of various apartheid intelligence operations; even though, it failed to discuss the roles played by the International Community towards stopping this brutal act of the South African security agents. The study also shunned to account the source of their weaponry. The current research will attempt to cover the existing gap.

The Chairman Special Committee against Apartheid, Leslie O. Harriman, in the 1977 United Nations press release on the withdrawal of Polaroid Corporation from South Africa, reports that Polaroid workers’ committee in Boston demanded the termination of its operations in South Africa and their demand was supported by the special committee. Harriman reports further that the corporation, however, objected to their withdrawal and came up with an “experiment” that will enhance the living conditions of black workers. In addition, the company stopped the supply of its products to the apartheid government so as to cripple the implementation of the hated pass laws. Harriman further reveals that a staff of Frank and Hirsch Polaroid agents in South Africa, named Mr Indres Naidoo, exposed the breach of the corporations’ “experiment” and uncovered the secret supply of its products to the South African Military headquarters and the Bantu Reference Bureau. He adds that this eventually led to the cut off of all shipments to South Africa, effective from 21st November, 1977. This press release provide useful information to the study because it highlights the U.S. disinvestment policy in South Africa, shows the effectiveness of the U.S. anti-apartheid measures in weakening the regime, and further explains the roles that the international community played towards crushing the apartheid regime. This document reported the withdrawal of only one corporation, as such, this study would unveil most of the companies that boycotted South Africa and highlight the impact there withdrawal had on the apartheid government.

Charlene Smith, in her study, discusses how the apartheid political oppositions were imprisoned in Robben Island with particular reference to Nelson Mandela. It also examines the brutalities and dehumanization mated on the prisoners. The study posits how deprivation and the abuse of civil liberties changed into an avenue for reconciliation, forgiveness, hope and liberation. It further examines the evolutionary stages of the RIP from a social mail station to a place of exile, and, to a military defence post then to a maximum prison and finally to a world heritage site.

The study, explains various escape bravados and the creativeness of new methods of communication and survival tactics among the prisoners. An observation is equally made on how the RIP changed the prisoners into having a strong bond of brotherhood, empathy and comradeship with a high spirit of willpower against the apartheid policies. The study further observes how RIP served as one of the nerve centres of both social and political engineering against the apartheid regime. This study will contribute towards exposing the harsh policies deployed by the apartheid government in terms of imprisoning anti-apartheid champions

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thereby silencing their struggle. This research will try to identify the external pressures that led the apartheid government to release its apartheid prisoners from RIP.

Christos Theodoropoulos in his submission described the legal and political premises of the United Nations human rights approach to the question of eradicating apartheid as shaky which did not reflect the historical, political and economic realities of Apartheid South Africa. He further challenged the legality of state recognition extended to the settler colonial union in the mid-war period and described it as highly questionable and voidable.

Although Theodoropoulos’ judgement of United Nations efforts towards the dismantling of Apartheid regime in South Africa could be said to be swift, an increasing number of studies and scholarship findings really cast considerable doubt as to the correctness or appropriateness of United Nation human right approach with regard to the situation in South Africa. These studies and findings demonstrated that the human rights approach was the result of a wrong assumption and construction which both related to the legal status of the Republic of South Africa (RSA); the false assumption that the RSA was a legitimate non-colonialist state under international law, and the wrong construction that RSA was the state of all inhabitants of South Africa, colonisers and colonised as well.

It has become a cliché to observe that the global anti-apartheid movement was one of the largest, most widely supported, longest sustained, most significant, and most successful transnational movements of the twentieth century. The movement was surprisingly little researched while apartheid in South Africa continued, but since South Africa’s first non-racial democratic elections in 1994, there has been a steady trickle of studies on the struggle against apartheid outside South Africa itself. That trickle is rapidly becoming a flood: in particular, doctoral dissertations on the subject are proliferating, though many of those already completed have not—or not yet—been published. The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid by Rob Skinner and Gordian Knot by Ryan Irwin are two of the first of these recent dissertations to have been published as monographs.

Whereas a high proportion of earlier studies of external anti-apartheid activism were written by former participants, Irwin and Skinner are from a generation of scholars who did not themselves participate in the events and movements they analyze. Both books are representative of an emerging stream of more detached and more critical scholarship on the global anti-apartheid movement. Moreover, whereas earlier studies of the external anti-apartheid movement usually adopted a national frame of analysis, studying action against apartheid by or within a single state, Irwin’s and Skinner’s studies reflect the recent “international turn”: both are based on multi- archival research on three continents—Africa,

Europe, and North America—and are focused on the international and/or transnational connections and activities of those who sought to contribute to ending apartheid from outside South Africa.

Beyond these similarities The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid and Gordian Knot differ in their chronological focus, their analyses of the strategy and ideology of the external anti-apartheid movement, and the actors they choose to study. Each of these issues is ripe for re-examination: this essay addresses each in turn, highlighting the ways in which Irwin’s and Skinner’s ground-breaking studies advance the study of the external anti-apartheid movement and the avenues for future research that they suggest.

Strikingly, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid and Gordian Knot are both centrally concerned with periodization. Indeed, Irwin has represented his project as

“a plea for historical specificity—an attempt to read the past forwards rather than backwards and return attention to how political pathways opened and closed in real-time for historical actors.”

In their concern for historical specificity, both analyses contrast with much of the existing literature on the external anti-apartheid movement, which has generally been characterized either by narrative descriptions or by thematic or topical approaches that tend to obscure the significance of change over time.

Skinner’s primary thesis is that the “foundations of anti-apartheid” of his title were laid in the 1950s, the period that was the focus of his doctoral dissertation and that remains at the heart of the published monograph, even as the chronological frame has been extended back to the early twentieth century. “The ideological and tactical framework of anti-apartheid,” Skinner argues, “was established in the late 1950s and early 1960s.”

In contrast, Irwin’s work, tightly focused on “the postcolonial decade” after 1960, represents a direct riposte to Skinner’s thesis of ideological, organizational, tactical, and strategic continuity from the early years of the decade onward. Gordian Knot pivots on the “watershed” of 1965–66, the moment when it became clear that the United Nations General Assembly would be unable to pressure the Western permanent members of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, and when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its ruling that Ethiopia and Liberia had insufficient “legal right or interest” to challenge South Africa’s administration of South West Africa under a League of Nations Mandate. The UN and the ICJ were, Irwin suggests, core elements of the “international system based . . . on legal structure and multilateralism” that the United States had constructed after the Second

21 Ibid.
World War to underpin its global hegemony. This system “opened a range of pathways for Third World activists in the years surrounding decolonization,” as the entry of newly independent African states transformed the membership of the United Nations.23

The failure to achieve mandatory sanctions through action either at the UN or at the ICJ, however, represented the effective closure of two of the primary political pathways through which opponents of apartheid outside South Africa had sought to pursue their struggle in the first half of the 1960s. Out of that watershed moment, Irwin has suggested, “emerged a much different sort of [anti-]apartheid movement—the one we associate with the 1980s.”24 For Irwin, that difference manifested itself in shifts in the strategy, ideology, and composition of the movement—all elements that Skinner implies remained largely constant from the early 1960s.25 Like Skinner, Irwin thus tends to flatten the period following that on which he focuses his own research. Political pathways, however, continued to open and close over the next two decades: the external struggle against apartheid in the 1970s and the 1980s—the latter the decade in which the scope, diversity, and complexity of anti-apartheid activity reached its zenith—represents fertile ground for future research animated by the same concern for historical specificity that motivates Irwin and Skinner.

These complexities are evident in the two authors’ respective analyses of anti-apartheid strategy. One of the core “foundations of anti-apartheid” that emerges from Skinner’s study is the advocacy of the isolation of South Africa from international contact of various kinds. From the early 1960s, support for such isolation became one of the primary means by which the self-defined “anti-apartheid movement” defined and demarcated itself. Indeed, advocacy of isolation became such a defining feature of the anti-apartheid movement that it has largely become naturalized in existing understandings of the international struggle against apartheid.26 In both the popular and the scholarly imagination, the specific forms in which external opposition to apartheid were manifested (and which subsequently other international campaigns have often sought to reproduce) are frequently treated as if they were self-evident, natural, and obvious reactions to apartheid—and therefore not requiring explanation. Thus, for example, although Gordian Knot is focused on the implementation—and eventual defeat—of the “distinct strategy” of attempting to use the General Assembly and the ICJ to push the Security Council to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, Irwin never explains precisely why the newly independent African states adopted this strategy, nor why they believed it represented the best way of confronting apartheid.27 One of Skinner’s most significant contributions is to initiate the process of denaturalizing the forms that external opposition to apartheid came to take and to show instead the contingent and contested way they emerged.

24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
Skinner shows, for instance, that one of the earliest proposals calling for the United Nations to coordinate the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa was made in 1953 by Trevor Huddleston, a British priest then serving in Johannesburg. Although India had broken off trade relations with South Africa in 1946—the same year the Indian government had formally complained to the UN about South Africa’s treatment of its Indian minority—India does not appear to have attempted to persuade other states to follow suit and did not call for the UN to recommend or impose economic sanctions.28 Huddleston’s private proposal for UN-coordinated multilateral sanctions thus broke new ground. But as Skinner shows, “a coherent and unified call for sanctions” emerged only gradually. Huddleston’s suggestion was rejected by its recipients, the executive of the Africa Bureau, the London-based body founded in 1952 and directed by Michael Scott, another British Anglican priest who had served in South Africa in the 1940s. Many of the Bureau’s executive members were “taken aback” by Huddleston’s proposal and were strongly critical of it (156–58).29

However, Scott himself—as well as Canon John Collins of St Paul’s Cathedral in London, the founder of what would become the Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa—were more sympathetic to Huddleston’s ideas for isolating South Africa through UN sanctions and/or nongovernmental consumer and cultural boycotts.

Initially, their sporadic advocacy of economic isolation had little impact. Only in 1959–60 did discussion of and advocacy for an international economic boycott of South Africa begin to become a significant feature of the international apartheid debate. The analysis of how and why this occurred in The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid is ground-breaking but narrow in focus.30 Skinner’s doctoral dissertation was an analysis of “the emergence in Britain during the 1950s of Christian opposition to apartheid” and though in the published monograph the scope of his analysis has been significantly widened, Skinner’s focus remains above all on the “small group of [British] Anglican priests”31 who were his original objects of study. How did the early advocacy for boycotts and/or sanctions by Huddleston, Scott, and Collins that Skinner’s research has revealed relate to the simultaneous discussions of using economic pressure such as trade sanctions or denying loan credit to South Africa that were taking place in the 1950s in the Caribbean and in the United States? Or to the various boycott initiatives taken by others around the world between 1958 and 1960; the 1958 All-African People’s Conference in Ghana; the Committee of African Organizations, an umbrella group of Africans in Britain; the prominent Kenyan labour leader Tom Mboya; the Jamaican government; and—perhaps most important of all for the internationalization of the boycott—the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the non-communist labour international? Skinner mentions these various initiatives in passing, but their relationship to the earlier advocacy by his British “liberal humanitarians” remains unclear.32

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29 Ibid.
31 Rob Skinner, “Foundations of Anti-Apartheid”, p. 137
32 Ibid.
Most strikingly, the call for an external boycott campaign by the African National Congress (ANC) itself in 1959 seems almost to come out of nowhere in Skinner’s final chapter (161–62). This was a crucial moment, for it encouraged and gave legitimacy to the various boycott initiatives already being taken outside South Africa and ensured that isolation would become established as one of the “foundations” of anti-apartheid activism for the subsequent three decades. But how did such action fit into the ANC leaders’ strategies for ending apartheid at the end of the 1950s, and what role and degree of significance did they assign to it? Skinner’s account suggests that the answers to such questions are likely to be considerably more complex than has often been assumed. The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid hints at a process of dynamic interaction between the ideas and strategies of Skinner’s foreign liberal humanitarians and those of the ANC leadership.

Although, as Skinner shows, those liberal humanitarians increasingly came to understand opposition to apartheid in terms of support the ANC in the 1950s, it is also evident from his account that they were at the same time engaged in a process of experimentation and innovation with regard to how that support could best be expressed abroad. Contrary to most popular and academic assumptions about the nature of anti-apartheid solidarity, Skinner’s anti-apartheid pioneers were not simply responding to requests made by the ANC; the flow of strategic influence was not unidirectional. Indeed, Skinner’s account suggests that it was precisely Huddleston’s pessimism about the likelihood of success of the ANC’s strategy in South Africa that caused him to place increasing emphasis on the need for international action: he concluded in the wake of the government’s legislative clampdown on civil disobedience in 1953 that South Africa was becoming a totalitarian state where internal criticism would become increasingly difficult and that, consequently, “the only thing which might shake our Government is determined hostility from the rest of the world”. This was not a perception shared at the time by the ANC leadership, which continued for the rest of the decade to focus on internal campaigns.

Undoubtedly, however, members of the ANC leadership became much more interested in the potentialities of forms of external pressure from 1960, especially after the Sharpeville Massacre and the subsequent banning of both the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had broken away from the ANC the previous year. Indeed, Skinner and Irwin both imply that from 1960 onward both South African liberation movements came to believe that change in South Africa could only be achieved through international action. Like most scholars of external anti-apartheid activism, both authors thus overemphasize the significance of international action in the strategies of leading South African opponents of apartheid, and both underplay the centrality of violence to those strategies after 1961. In terms of anti-apartheid strategy, the most important development in the period after Sharpeville was the “turn to violence” by the PAC, the ANC, the ANC’s increasingly close ally the South African Communist Party (SACP), and other smaller groups.

33 Rob Skinner, “Foundations of Anti-Apartheid”, p.18–39
34 Luli Callinicos, “Olive Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains”, p.20
In his early and influential study of ANC strategy, Howard Barrell argued that it was in this period that within the ANC:

“armed activity came to be viewed not only as the primary means by which eventually to overthrow the South African state but also as the major means by which to advance in each phase of escalation towards that goal.”  

A vibrant and rapidly expanding literature now exists in South African historiography on the subject of the ANC’s “armed struggle.” In declining to engage with this literature, Skinner and Irwin not only give an incomplete impression of the nature of strategy of the liberation movements in the 1960s but also miss an opportunity to bring international history and South African history into productive dialogue. International historians have much to contribute. Historians of South Africa have generally followed Barrell in exhibiting “limited interest in the ANC’s broad range of strategies” after 1961, and in focusing on their violent dimension. To a significant extent, therefore, the question of the precise role and significance attributed to various forms of international action by ANC and PAC leaders—themselves by no means united on strategic questions—remains largely unanswered.

The significance of the turn to violence after 1960 qualifies Skinner’s thesis of strategic continuity from the late 1950s. While some elements of the tactical repertoire of the external anti-apartheid movement were developed then, the strategies into which those tactics were fitted shifted dramatically and repeatedly over time. Ideas about the relative significance of, on the one hand, various modes of external anti-apartheid activity, and, on the other, various forms of action inside South Africa did not remain static. Within leading component bodies of the global anti-apartheid movement—such as the exiled ANC, the American Committee on Africa, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in Britain, or the governments of leading African states—there were significant shifts over time in ideas about precisely how apartheid might ultimately end, and about the relationship of various modes of external anti-apartheid activity to various forms of nonviolent internal resistance (such as strikes, civil disobedience, or domestic boycotts) and various strategies of sabotage or guerrilla warfare in bringing about that end.

One of Skinner’s most striking insights is that for two of the earliest advocates of the economic and cultural isolation of South Africa, the British priests Huddleston and Collins, that advocacy was based on the long-standing belief of white liberal Christians in South Africa that social change would come about through a “change of heart” on the part of white South Africans. Even as Huddleston and Collins broke decisively with white liberals and the

37 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
Anglican Church establishment over the means by which such a change of heart could be brought about, Huddleston’s 1955 call for “the Christian conscience” abroad to be “so aroused as to find expression in the isolation of South Africa—until she repents” was thus still ultimately, Skinner argues, “an intensified version of the liberal Christian faith in the transformative potential of Christianity.”\(^{41}\) This important insight begs the question of the extent to which this “narrative of white redemption as the pathway to social justice”—based on a psycho-logical or spiritual understanding of racism as a problem of individual conscience rather than, say, as a systemic problem of political economy—continued to underpin subsequent efforts by anti-apartheid activists to isolate South Africa.

Skinner and Irwin both suggest that by the early 1960s those who advocated economic sanctions did so because they believed that sanctions were “a means to exert pressure on the South African government” or to “modulate Pretoria’s approach and eventually bring black Africans to power”.\(^{42}\) The idea that the global struggle against apartheid was always driven by this model of change has gained considerable traction in recent years from the fact that it roughly approximates to the process that did occur in South Africa between 1990 and 1994, when the National Party government did indeed open negotiations with the opponents of apartheid, abolished apartheid laws, and ultimately agreed to a transition to non-racial democracy.\(^{43}\) To assume that such a model of change had always been pursued by the global anti-apartheid movement, however, is to lose sight of the contested and shifting strategies of an amorphous and multipolar movement, presenting instead a retrospective picture of imagined coherence and homogeneity across time. Boycotts and sanctions were conceived by different advocates at different times as operating in a multiplicity of ways, from, for instance, causing economic hardship that would lead white voters to elect a more liberal alternative to the National Party, to weakening the state’s capability to resist a guerrilla onslaught.\(^{44}\) One of the most striking things about the emergence of economic isolation as a foundational characteristic of anti-apartheid activism was that it subsequently proved attractive to such an extraordinary range of opponents of apartheid with diverse ideas on how apartheid might be ended and on the role that isolation might play.

Just as ideas about the relationship of external anti-apartheid activity to internal action changed over time, ideas about the significance of various modes of external anti-apartheid activity relative to each other likewise did not remain static. Skinner suggests, for example, that “the anti-apartheid movement was perpetually pulled in two directions simultaneously: towards interaction with political institutions [such as lobbying for governmental economic

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\(^{42}\) Ibid.


sanctions] and popular mobilisation [such as consumer boycotts]. But rather than the two being in

“perpetual” tension, Irwin demonstrates convincingly that the balance in the significance attached by leading actors to external anti-apartheid activity at state and non-state levels shifted crucially over time. The failure to achieve mandatory sanctions through action either in the General Assembly or at the ICJ by the mid-1960s brought about a “strategic change,”

Irwin shows, premised on a widely held “more restrictive vision” of the UN, as “efforts at the United Nations began to shift from the sanctions fight to propaganda activities” and to encouraging and legitimizing anti-apartheid action by non-governmental actors. In contrast to the optimism of the early sixties—when policymakers in the newly independent African states had placed much faith in the UN and other international institutions as means of achieving their goals—African diplomats by the end of the decade “were publicly renouncing the [UN’s] capacity to deliver post-colonial justice”. As Irwin has noted, his account thus complicates Matthew Connelly’s influential argument that the 1954–62 Algerian war of independence was a harbinger of “the post-Cold War era.” Algeria’s independence may, as Connelly argues, have been “a diplomatic revolution” because “its most decisive struggles occurred in the international arena.” But only a handful of years later revolutionaries at the other end of the African continent had recognized that the potential of the UN was much more limited than they had initially believed or than the Algerian precedent might have suggested.

The effective defeat in 1965–66 of the African states’ campaign for UN sanctions, Irwin argues, led the ANC to adopt an approach “based on fighting South Africa not at the United Nations but through the pathways that existed around, between, and within the nation-state system.” In Irwin’s account, the ANC believed that it would overcome apartheid, “not because [it] possessed conventional military and economic strength, but because it possessed people power, or the ability to shape how individuals outside the corridors of government discussed and debated the apartheid issue. If the organization embraced these information tactics and took the long view in its fight against Pretoria, victory would emerge organically from the imperatives of globalization.” That this was their strategy would have come as surprising news to the ANC’s leading strategists in the late 1960s, a period when their attention was focused—in the words of the strategy document the ANC formally adopted in 1969—on guerrilla warfare as “the special, and in our case the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched,” and on “the future all-out war which would eventually

lead to the conquest of power." But Irwin is nevertheless surely correct that as state-based political pathways at the UN and ICJ were closing, “post-colonial globalization” meant that “pathways beyond the purview of national power were proliferating rapidly, providing new outlets for non-state organizations.” It was in precisely this period, the late 1960s and early 1970s, that there was a proliferation of anti-apartheid campaigns focused on the role of nongovernmental bodies—especially multinational corporations and sports organizations. The addition or new emphasis on these modes of anti-apartheid activity within the repertoire of action of the global anti-apartheid movement offers much scope for further research.

Alongside their analyses of strategy, a second major issue that emerges from a comparison of Skinner’s and Irwin’s work is that of the identity and ideology of the global anti-apartheid movement. Together with advocacy of isolation, a second core “foundation of anti-apartheid” that emerges from Skinner’s study is “solidarity” with African nationalist resistance to apartheid, as embodied by the ANC and later also the PAC. It was in the 1950s, Skinner argues, that such solidarity was established as “the key component of the movement’s identity”. The early chapters of The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid show how earlier in the twentieth century metropolitan white humanitarians’ paternalistic concern with the protection of “native welfare” in South Africa manifested itself in support for the system of territorial segregation through the creation of “native reserves.” And throughout the first half of the century, these British “friends of Africa” continued to follow the lead of white South African liberals and missionaries, with their emphases on promoting the social welfare (rather than the political power) of Africans, on gradual reform, and on improving race relations through white-led interracial “cooperation” with moderate African leaders.

Some external groups and individuals did, of course, align themselves more explicitly with black South African opponents of apartheid in the period before the 1950s. Indeed, Skinner devotes significant attention in his earlier chapters to the radicalization of the African American activist Max Yergan and to the anticolonial and anti-apartheid activism of the New York–based Council on African Affairs (CAA) that Yergan founded with Paul Robeson in 1937. But, in line with a long-established trend in the historiography of this topic, Skinner emphasizes the suppression and marginalization in the red scares of the 1950s of such earlier manifestations of radical anti-colonialism among African Americans. It was in this context, he argues, that “a new generation of liberal activists . . . came to the forefront of anti-apartheid activity.”

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51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
54 Rob Skinner, “Foundations of Anti-Apartheid”, p. 137
Skinner emphasizes how in the 1950s liberal white Christians such as Scott, Huddleston, Collins, and the American Methodist minister George Houser—the founder and executive director of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA)—came gradually (and at different speeds) to challenge the previous alignment with white South African liberals that had initially shaped their own approaches and those of many other external critics of apartheid. Instead they aligned themselves in support of the ANC. In so doing, they helped lay the groundwork for the subsequent alignment of many other white liberals in Britain and the United States with African nationalism in South Africa, despite the prevailing Cold War atmosphere of anticommunism and the widespread suspicion in the West of the liberation movements.

Skinner’s account of this development is one piece of a much larger puzzle—in this case the story of the radicalization of African nationalism throughout Africa in the 1940s and 1950s and how various groups throughout the world responded to that development. The response of influential individual white Christian liberals in aligning themselves with African nationalism undoubtedly played an important role in establishing “the foundations of anti-apartheid,” as Skinner shows. But so did the response of several other constituencies. The 1950s were also the period when, in Britain at least, radical anti-colonialism, explicitly aligned with the demands of anti-colonial nationalists in the British Empire, grew rapidly in strength, influence, and organization. This development had its clearest manifestation in the formation of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) in 1954 by the left-wing Labour Party MP Fenner Brockway, and in the MCF’s rapid eclipse of the more gradualist Fabian Colonial Bureau. In the United States, although the radical anti-colonialism associated with the CAA may have been suppressed, recent research by Carol Anderson and others has emphasized the vitality of liberal anti-colonialism among African Americans in this period, showing that the liberal leadership of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) was more supportive of foreign anticolonial nationalists and less exclusively focused on domestic discrimination than many scholars had earlier assumed.

Finally, it was also in the course of the 1950s that the Soviet Union and the international communist movement decisively threw their support behind bourgeois-dominated nationalist movements in the colonial world—including the ANC in South Africa—on the basis of the theory that a “national democratic revolution” could establish the basis for a subsequent transition to socialism. This development made possible the increasingly close alliance in the 1950s of the ANC and the underground SACP and established the basis for the

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55 Rob Skinner, “Facing the Challenge of ‘Young Africa’: Apartheid, South Africa and British Decolonisation,” South African Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 2005), pp.109, 201
56 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
subsequent support the ANC in exile received both from Western communist parties and from the governments of the Eastern Bloc.

This widespread shift to solidarity with African nationalism in the 1950s had crucial consequences. For three decades after 1960, even as the two South African liberation movements’ fortunes waxed and waned, and as their ideologies and strategies shifted, the idea that opposition to apartheid was synonymous with support for the ANC and/or the PAC exerted a powerful hold over external opponents of apartheid. Though always contested by those opposed to the two liberation movements’ communist links and/or their violent strategies, that hold helps to explain the cautious, ambiguous, and in some cases hostile response of many foreign critics of apartheid to the emergence of new movements opposed to apartheid inside South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, including the black consciousness movement and the independent trade union movement. After the suppression of the ANC inside South Africa in the early 1960s the simple physical survival of the organization was by no means inevitable. The external support the ANC received from liberals, socialists, and communists around the world helped sustain it in exile and thus assisted its eventual re-emergence inside South Africa in the 1980s and its subsequent ascendancy over the internally based resistance movement and accession to power in 1994.

In the early sixties, the transnational linkages and networks of support that Skinner shows had developed in the 1950s outside Africa for the ANC specifically also helped ensure the organization was able to establish itself internationally and remain a significant player in external action against apartheid at a time when many newly independent states within Africa strongly favoured the PAC. (Although most anti-apartheid bodies outside Africa officially followed the practice of the Organization of African Unity and recognized both the ANC and the PAC, in practice many—including the AAM in Britain and ACOA in the United States—favoured the ANC, in part because of the relationships established between ANC leaders and international supporters before the PAC’s formation in 1959.) Skinner’s research thus qualifies Irwin’s argument that “the ideology of [racially exclusive] African nationalism animated the anti-apartheid movement in the early 1960s.” For Irwin, the ANC was “isolated ideologically” by its commitment to multiracialism and consequently “toiled at the periphery of the apartheid debate” in the first half of the postcolonial decade. The PAC’s brand of more racially exclusive African nationalism, in contrast, made it much more ideologically compatible with African nationalists elsewhere on the continent. Despite the PAC’s subsequent troubled exile history and decline, Irwin argues that initially this ideological affinity meant that “the PAC’s path abroad was much easier after the Sharpeville

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62 Ibid.
63 Rob Skinner, “Facing the Challenge of ‘Young Africa’: Apartheid, South Africa and British Decolonisation,” South African Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 2005), pp. 109, 201
Massacre” than the ANC’s, as the PAC quickly found favour with the African states that also led the anti-apartheid campaign at the UN (44–46, 154).64

Although Irwin is too quick to dismiss the support the ANC enjoyed beyond Africa in the early sixties, his emphasis on the international prominence of the PAC in this period is a necessary corrective to the teleological temptation to assume that the ANC’s leading role in the struggle against apartheid to have been constant over time, and the consequent tendency to devote less scholarly attention to other non–ANC-aligned South African anti-apartheid bodies, including the PAC.65 The PAC’s international successes were, however, short lived. The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966 deprived it of its leading external backer, and it ended the decade ideologically adrift, deprived of resources, and wracked by splits and internal dissension. For Irwin, these declining fortunes of the PAC were symptomatic of a major shift in the terms in which opposition to apartheid was expressed after the defeat of the campaign for UN sanctions in the mid-1960s and the discrediting of the African nationalist diplomats who had spearheaded it. After that watershed,

“liberation organizations throughout southern Africa were building relationships with groups beyond Africa, supplanting the ideological bonds of postcolonial nationalism with broader discourses that emphasized human rights, Third Worldism, and Marxist internationalism.”66

Successfully pursuing this approach, the ANC was able by the end of the decade to “reposition itself at the vanguard” of what Irwin characterizes as “the post-nationalist anti-apartheid movement”.67

Even if Irwin’s portrayal of this transition is overly stark, he nevertheless reveals an important shift in the struggle against apartheid in the course of the decade from the dominance of anticolonial discourses (whether or not animated by racially defined African nationalism) to that of anti-imperialist ones that privileged emphasis on apartheid’s relationship to capitalism and thus portrayed the “apartheid crisis [as] bigger than Africa.” By the late 1960s the struggle against apartheid was increasingly under- stood by the liberation movements and many of their Western supporters as part of “a shared Third World Struggle” against American imperialism, characterized in one ANC discussion paper Irwin quotes as the “main enemy” of the South African people (178, 131, 176).68

The relationship of human rights ideas to this shift is perhaps more complex than Irwin suggests, however. Irwin convincingly demonstrates that, following the impasse on sanctions at the UN, E. S. Reddy, head of the UN Special Unit on Apartheid and the leading UN

65 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
official concerned with the issue, adopted a classic venue-shopping approach in which his unit sought to bring more non-state organizations into the struggle against apartheid by encouraging them “to engage in great activity at their own level and according to their own policies,” whether such efforts were “purely humanitarian” or “pacifist or limited to specific aspects, etc.” From the mid-1960s, humanitarian and human rights questions thus came to be foregrounded in the UN bureaucracy’s proliferating propaganda initiatives against apartheid.69 Whether the ANC itself really “seamlessly married multiracial solidarity and human rights with labour unity and Leninist anti-imperialism,” as Irwin suggests, is less clear. ANC propagandists undoubtedly recognized the power of humanitarian appeals to mobilize moral and material support in the West, but the ANC’s self-conception as a revolutionary moment rather than a “civil rights movement content with superficial changes and cosmetic reform” tended to lead the organization to avoid framing opposition to apartheid in humanitarian or human rights terms.70 Overall, Irwin’s evidence does little to undermine the thesis recently advanced by Saul Dubow that the ANC’s “embrace of human rights” did not occur until the mid-1980s—and even then was a gradual and contested process.

The differences in Skinner and Irwin’s analyses of the ideologies animating the anti-apartheid struggle are attributable in large part to the different actors on which they focus. A third major issue that arises from their accounts is thus the question of what the anti-apartheid movement was. Addressing this issue, E. S. Reddy, the UN official who was a central nodal figure in the global anti-apartheid movement, has commented:

“I think of the “anti-apartheid movement” as a coalition of anti-apartheid organizations and individuals, as well as a growing number of governments, which in the 1960s was able to secure the active involvement of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and many other international organizations. This was a coalition which encompassed the world and consisted of international, regional, national and local bodies.”71

In practice, most scholars have adopted a much less capacious approach. Because previous studies of anti-apartheid campaigning in the West have tended to focus on anti-apartheid activity within a single country, they have usually analyzed the anti-apartheid movement as a non-state phenomenon. Even as Skinner seeks to expand his analytical frame to encompass the anti-apartheid movement beyond a single state, he sticks closely to this approach. His

70 Scott Couper, “Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith”, p.20
emphasis on the anti-apartheid movement as consisting of “transnational networks”\textsuperscript{72} appears by definition to exclude the possibility that states could be part of that movement.

Irwin has been justly praised for adopting a more encompassing approach to defining the anti-apartheid movement. As another reviewer puts it,

\begin{quote}
\textit{“The interests of activists, archivists, and writers have resulted in a skewed focus on the antiapartheid activities of American and British activists . . . Gordian Knot thus provides an important analysis of the crucial role of African states and actors.”}\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

In an explicit riposte to previous scholars of this topic, Irwin argues trenchantly that in the first half of the 1960s the anti-apartheid movement was “defined not by Western liberals, church leaders, or civil rights groups in the United States but by African nationalists from the Third World”.\textsuperscript{74} For Irwin, the watershed ICJ decision in 1966 subsequently had the effect of “redefining” the anti-apartheid movement, as “political momentum within southern Africa . . . shifted definitively to leaders in the non-governmental realm,” creating “a less discrete and more pervasive anti-apartheid movement”.\textsuperscript{75}

In his account of the first half of the sixties, Irwin’s positioning of the newly independent African states at the center of his analysis provides a necessary corrective. But his portrayal of a shift from a state-based to a non-state anti-apartheid movement is again overly stark: while undoubtedly the global anti-apartheid alliance was never again as singly fixated on state action against apartheid as it was in the early 1960s, African states continued to play a variety of significant roles in external anti-apartheid campaigning, from the African boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics to the confrontations between African states and the British government of Margaret Thatcher at Commonwealth summits in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{76} Even in the early 1960s, moreover, as Skinner shows, nongovernmental actors played an influential role in shaping the framework within which the struggle against apartheid occurred. Indeed, the period of years during which African decolonization occurred—and on which Irwin focuses—offered opportunities for non-state actors to exert an unusual degree of influence. Many of those anticolonial nationalist movements that had already taken control of new states continued to cooperate closely both with nationalist groups that had not yet achieved that objective in their own territories and with other non-governmental organizations that had assisted them in their own earlier struggle for statehood.\textsuperscript{77} These alliances with non-state

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Saul Dubow, “The African National Congress”, p. 106
actors took on particular significance at a time when many new states lacked extensive foreign affairs apparatuses of their own.

To take just one example, the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa in London in April 1964, with which Skinner closes his account, exerted a significant influence on the debates at the United Nations on which Irwin focuses. The papers from the conference were widely circulated among UN delegations and were quoted extensively in Security Council debates and in the April 1964 report of the “Group of Experts” that had been appointed by the Security Council “to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa.” The conference was a striking example of the fluidity of relations between state and non-state actors in this period. It was organized under the auspices of the nongovernmental British AAM, funded by several African states, and attended by a mix of South African exiles, “official” delegations of state representatives from independent African and Asian states and some Communist states, and “unofficial” delegations of nongovernmental organizations from Western states, all of whom interacted on a basis of formal equality.

Just as they focus on different anti-apartheid actors, Skinner and Irwin likewise differ in the targets of anti-apartheid activity whose responses they study. That both authors include such targets in the analyses at all is relatively unusual. The impact of the actions of the global anti-apartheid movement either within South Africa or on the intermediate bodies through which it sought to exert influence—Western governments, multinational corporations, sports organizations, and so on—has so far been the subject of surprisingly little scholarly research. Most studies of the global anti-apartheid movement have kept their focus firmly on the activist opponents of apartheid and have little concrete to say about the impact of anti-apartheid activities, which is often assumed or implied rather analyzed.

In contrast, Skinner and Irwin devote considerable attention to the impact of anti-apartheid campaigns on, respectively, British and American government policy in the 1960s. For most of The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid the UK government is not a significant actor, but in his final chapter, on the period from 1960 to 1964, Skinner incorporates a detailed analysis of British government policy toward South Africa, and in particular of the government’s attitude toward the anti-apartheid movement’s emerging sanctions campaign. That policy has received remarkably little scholarly attention in the past, and Skinner’s account is among the first archival-based studies of this specific issue. Similarly, although there is a much richer literature on U.S. foreign relations with South Africa, there has traditionally been a clear historiographical separation of studies of the anti-apartheid movement on the one hand, and of U.S. governmental policy on the other. Irwin’s work represents one of the first attempts to

79 Rob Skinner, “Facing the Challenge of ‘Young Africa’: Apartheid, South Africa and British Decolonisation,” South African Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 2005), pp.188, 192
80 Ibid.
focus explicitly on the question of how that policy was influenced by the international campaign against apartheid.

As Irwin suggests, in the 1960s both the South African government and its opponents

“accepted that the great powers, with their military strength, economic influence, and Security Council authority, were the arbiters of South Africa’s fate, with the power either to punish the Union for its policies or insulate it from international criticism”.

Skinner and Irwin’s differing choices on which of the “great powers” to focus on reflect their strikingly different analyses of who in the international system wielded greatest power over South Africa in this period. For Irwin, the early 1960s “marked the highpoint of America’s geopolitical predominance in the world”; the United States was an “unquestioned hegemon”. In contrast, Skinner’s focus on the “imperial networks” that had long linked Britain and South Africa—and on the British government’s ongoing determination not to allow those networks to be disrupted—leads him to attribute primary external influence over South Africa to Britain. For Skinner therefore, “The determination of the British government to preserve relations with South Africa . . . appeared to show that there was little that the international community could do that would have an influence over the direction of apartheid policy” during the 1960s.

These two accounts, counter-posing post-1945 American Cold War dominance with the ongoing legacies of British imperial authority in parts of the world formerly under British control are complementary, more convincing when read in conjunction than either is alone. Skinner shows that the anti-apartheid movement’s campaign for sanctions had minimal effect on UK government policy (though British officials “paid close attention” to the 1964 International Conference on Economic Sanctions and prepared detailed refutations of the papers presented). Cognizant of the United Kingdom’s significant economic interests in South Africa, British policymakers were prepared to veto any Security Council resolution on sanctions. But it is clear from Skinner’s account that British officials were nevertheless deeply concerned that the U.S. government might waver in its opposition to sanctions, and that they devoted considerable energy to trying to prevent this. Irwin’s research suggests that they were right to be worried. Sensitive to pressure from the African states demanding Western action against apartheid, the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, led by Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen “Soapy” Williams, came to “embrace” sanctions.

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83 Rob Skinner, “Facing the Challenge of ‘Young Africa’: Apartheid, South Africa and British Decolonisation,” South African Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 2005), pp. 188, 192
84 Ibid.
Irwin argues. Although the Bureau was always opposed by the Pentagon, the CIA, and other elements within the Department of State—all of which continued to place more emphasis on avoiding any risk to U.S. Cold War strategic interests in South Africa—the Bureau’s arguments gained increasing traction in the early years of Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Before the 1966 ruling by the ICJ, State Department officials anticipated that the Court would rule against South Africa, and—under pressure from the African states demanding Western action against apartheid—“many felt that sanctions against Pretoria would eventually become unavoidable” if the United States wanted to avoid destroying the legitimacy of the Americentric liberal world order built on institutions such as the Court and the United Nations.

Irwin may be exaggerating when he suggests that, on the eve of the ICJ’s judgment in the South West Africa case in mid-1966, “Having just passed legislation that ended Jim Crow in the American South, [Johnson] appeared poised to implement symmetrical action against apartheid” through Security Council enforcement of the anticipated ruling against South Africa. Certainly, as British officials quoted by Irwin observed, it seemed:

“almost inconceivable that the Americans would be prepared to cast their first [Security Council] veto in favour of the White man in southern Africa, let alone veto an attempt to uphold the rule of law which had been flouted by the White minority.”

But Johnson’s comment in a meeting immediately before the ruling that “even a blind hog may find an acorn” highlighted that American policy continued to rest on the hope that the United States could avoid ever being presented with such a stark choice. (U.S. policymakers’ first hope was that through quiet diplomatic pressure they would be able to convince the South African government to comply sufficiently with an ICJ ruling concerning the status and administration of South West Africa as to render irrelevant the question of enforcement measures. Moreover, Irwin’s claim that “Western inaction” if enforcement of an ICJ ruling against South Africa became necessary “was almost unthinkable” ignores the British government’s on-going willingness to veto a Security Council sanctions resolution, as emphasized by Skinner.

Even if the likelihood of Western-backed mandatory UN economic sanctions was not as great as Irwin implies, he convincingly demonstrates how desperately concerned the South African government was throughout the first half of the 1960s that the African states’ campaign for

87 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Rob Skinner, “Facing the Challenge of ‘Young Africa’: Apartheid, South Africa and British Decolonisation,” South African Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 2005), pp.188, 192
sanctions at the UN and ICJ might ultimately threaten the survival of the apartheid regime. Indeed, Gordian Knot represents one of the first archival-based attempts to analyze how the South African government perceived and responded to external campaigns against apartheid. As South Africa became increasingly isolated within the UN, Irwin shows, the South African government responded to the African states’ sanctions campaign not only directly, at the UN itself, but also by launching a propaganda “counter-offensive” in the West intended to influence both political decision makers and influential nongovernmental actors such as foreign investors.

That one element stressed in South Africa’s propaganda campaign was “multi-nationalism” (in 1962, in an effort to align apartheid with the new prevailing norm of self-determination, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced plans for the “independence” of the Transkei bantustan) highlights that apartheid itself was a moving target over its four-decade duration. Irwin’s relatively brief analysis of this phenomenon, and Skinner’s decision not to investigate how the South African government perceived and responded to the emergence in the 1950s of the transnational anti-apartheid networks that are the focus of his study, in part reflect the different frames of analysis through which the international struggle against apartheid can be viewed. Scholars have assessed the significance and impact of external action against apartheid on at least three interlinked but distinguishable levels. First and most obviously, there is the significance of such action to South Africa itself: the impact of that action on South Africa’s political, economic, and social order, on the nature of the apartheid regime, and ultimately on the country’s transition from apartheid and minority rule to non-racial democracy. Skinner and Irwin both make nods in this direction: The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid opens with a meditation on the end of apartheid, while the conclusion of Gordian Knot begins with a description of Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in 1990. But although it is at this level that the significance of the global anti-apartheid movement is most commonly understood, both popularly and in the academy, scholarly research on the role of international factors in the end of apartheid is in its infancy.

Indeed, elsewhere Skinner has argued forthrightly that the significance of the British AAM “is not located in the birth of a democratic South Africa” and has criticized other scholarship whose assessment of the AAM’s impact is overly “determined by the priorities of the movement itself.” Skinner’s work on external anti-apartheid activism tends to focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the second level at which that impact has been studied: the significance of external movements against apartheid for understanding the politics,

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93 Ibid.
95 Rob Skinner, “Facing the Challenge of ‘Young Africa’: Apartheid, South Africa and British Decolonisation,” South African Historical Journal 54, no. 1 (January 2005), pp.188, 192
97 Rob Skinner, “Foundations of Anti-Apartheid”, p. 137
society, and culture of the states within which they operated. In his work on the British AAM, Skinner has argued that the Movement’s significance is located in the various ways it embodied the shifting nature of political activism in Britain and the relationship between domestic and global political culture: “Anti-apartheid represents an emerging phenomenon of contemporary political activity: a movement operating simultaneously in both a national and global political space . . . [It] provides a key example of the ways in which post-war political participation has stretched the definition of organized political activity—in terms of both form, and the arena in which it operates.”

Even as Skinner widens his lens beyond Britain in The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid to incorporate anti-apartheid networks in the United States, it is this perspective that continues to underlie his work: “anti-apartheid was an integral part of a shift in British civil society,” he argues in the final chapter.

Skinner’s argument that one element of that shift was the integration of national civil society with an emerging “global civil society” points to the third level at which external action against apartheid has been understood: its significance for understanding international or global politics. This is Irwin’s primary concern. For Irwin, though the “apartheid debate” was not the most important issue of the 1960s, its history is a means to analyze the “unmaking” after the watershed in the middle of the postcolonial decade of the “liberal world order,” as actors on all sides of the apartheid debate disengaged from the international institutions on which that order had been established by the United States after the Second World War, and in which newly independent states had initially invested their hopes.

The relative importance to be assigned to these three levels for assessing the significance of the anti-apartheid movement depends entirely on perspective. As heuristic devices, the levels are, moreover, interlinked in complex and fascinating ways, as the work of both Skinner and Irwin suggests. Gordian Knot and The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid represent significant and complementary advances in our understanding of the external struggle against apartheid. In their differing approaches to periodization, strategy, and ideology, and in the different actors on which they focus, they make major contributions with which all future analyses of this topic—at whichever level they focus—will engage.

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98 Rob Skinner, “Foundations of Anti-Apartheid”, pp.189-197
101 Ronald Segal, (Ed.), “Sanctions against South Africa”, p.96
1.3 Problem statement

This in-depth research study delved on the role of international community towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa (1960-1990). The International Community has come a long way since 1948 when it was impossible to even adapt the mildest resolution in the United Nations’ General assembly. The brutality of the Apartheid regime became apparent when police open fire on defenceless black protesters in the town of Sharpeville in 1960, killing 69 unarmed protesters and wounding 186 others. This led to the global condemnation of Apartheid regime. The internal unrest and the global condemnation of the regime led to dramatic changes beginning in 1989. This led to the unbanning of the ANC and the subsequent release of Mandela in 1990. The research was geared towards unravelling the activities of the International Community during the 1960-1990 era. This study proposed to fill the gap in literature by providing a different perspective in understanding the underlying role of the international community towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa during the period in question.

1.4 Aims and objectives of the study

The aim of the study was to analyze the role played by the International Community towards dismantling the Apartheid regime in South Africa from 1960 to 1990. In pursuit of this aim, the main objectives that formed the focal point of the study were:

1.4.1 To examine the role of International Community during the South Africa’s Apartheid era

1.4.2 To identify and evaluate policy measures strategy and institutional composition for the coordinating and implementation of anti-Apartheid strategy

1.4.3 To discover and explore the methods employed by the International Community towards the dismantling of the Apartheid regime

1.4.4 To evaluate the success and failures of the International Community towards the dismantling of the Apartheid regime

1.5 Intended Contribution to the Body of Knowledge

The role of the International Community towards the dismantling of the Apartheid regime has not been appropriately explored in the existing South African and global literature. Thus, this study sought to analyze the nature of the relationship that existed between South Africa and the International community from 1960 to 1990. The study bridged the academic lacuna on the existing literature of the Apartheid regime. The study was envisaged to be of great benefit to researchers, students, and general public keen in knowing the role played by

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103 Audie Klotz, “Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid”, p.95
people, organizations, government, and pressure groups outside South Africa, towards dismantling the Apartheid regime.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical postulation that informed this research is the functionalist theory of international relations as first propounded by Professor David Mitrany and subsequently clarified by other scholars.

It should first, however, be noted that functionalism of Mitrany is distinct from functionalism in other fields such as sociology, or in biology. Secondly, this theory formed the bedrock of other theories of international organization and international relations. Thus, the strength of functionalism theory is not only in its endurance as the basic theoretical convention of studying international organization but also in the conviction that it remains a useful basis for understanding international community.

To put this theory in the perspective of what this research seeks to investigate, it will be necessary to summarize its principal tenets; indicate the more tenable challenge to it, outline the little modifications to it and then situate the research within these perspectives.

The essential starting point of functionalism, according to Mitrany, was to concentrate in the first instance upon the particular task, problems or function, and to attempt to exclude from this analysis the distorting elements of ideology, dogma or philosophical system. Mitrany was convinced that it was possible to discover a kind of irreducible set of relations ‘between things’, which were distinguishable from relations suggested by a constitution, and which if left to themselves, would suggest the ideal geographical extent in which the problem could be tackled, and the most appropriate and administrative arrangements to be put in place. And that functionalism unlike the traditional approach could cope with change.

But in the manner of most theories in politics which claim a comprehensive relevance, Mitrany did not hesitate to infuse his description with perspective elements: he added to the view that some social forces which may be inimical to an effective functionalism where in fact overwhelming the plea that they should be encouraged to continue to stay. There were advantages in terms of world peace, and a better society, in choosing to work in welfare problems and thus harnessing the pressure which they generated. Men should respond positively to these by developing structures and procedures which allowed ‘form’ to follow ‘function’. By doing this, long standing problems could be solved in a new way.

He said since all the claims of political democracy were to control government, the answer to this difficulty was to develop stronger representative institutions in areas of activity which directly touched upon the lives of the people.

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105. Ibid.
Mitrany prescribed that this particular aspect of ‘form’ should follow from the new ‘functions’ of peace maintenance. Other aspects of the method of obtaining effective control and efficient management should be adjusted to the nature of the function: some functions needed strong, rapid direction with the possibility of later corrections; others needed to be decentralized in relatively strong regional offices, or, conversely, concentrated in more highly decentralized ones; the composition and responsibilities of the committee of management could also vary with the function.\(^{107}\)

In the application of international community, functionalism is an extension of the above argument as it is conceived as relevant to circumstances within states and among them. In fact, even the theory of origin of war is implied by Mitrany’s view about the value of concentrating upon ‘relations between things’. The essential point (one which is very often misunderstood) is that functionalism sees the solution of a problem not in the specific unchanging conditions but in the dynamic ‘process’ elements between one condition and the next. It is the case that war may be caused by particular circumstances (deficiencies) but the solution to war is not simply a correction of such deficiencies: it is the process of dealing with such deficiencies within organizations which, it is believed, produces the new dynamic of peace.\(^{108}\) Therefore, the cause may be a constant or a condition, the solution, however, is a process of involving people in organizations devoted to the improvement of their circumstances and situation.

On this premise, the functionalists suggested two main ways of solving the problem of war and, by implication, the maintenance of peace and international security under the platform of international community or organization. These are, first, changing attitudes of people involved in the organization and experiencing the benefits derived from their cooperation; and second, the development between states in economic, technical or welfare areas of a widening range of interdependencies which are seen to ‘enmesh’ governments which could in turn make war less likely.\(^{109}\)

These two aspects of attitude change and enmeshment are core elements in the functionalist view of international integration. The process starts when international institutions are set up in the area where they might act most efficiently, which is suggested by the nature of the task or role. The immediate initiative for such steps could be either private groups or individuals or national governments. Once established, the international institutions would set in train pressures for further institution: a number of people would be directly involved, and it was expected, convinced of the benefits of cooperation increased, would suffer if it were restricted in favour of autarchic nation states.\(^{110}\) There would, therefore, be set in motion a process of gradually changing attitudes as a result of perceived benefits of international community and organizations and these would be shaped into an international socio-psychological community reflecting a cooperative ethos which would push for further international organization and help ‘form to follow function’ across national frontiers. At the

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\(^{108}\) Ibid.
\(^{110}\) Ibid.
same time, fanatical loyalties to the nation-state would be softened as international understanding increased.

It was partly because of this stand that most scholars tend to see functionalism as an indirect approach to the problems of war and peace maintenance. Some critics even go the extreme of qualifying the theory as utopian or teleological in its view of international integration. One must however consent to the fact that the theory stresses central principle in the attainment of a more effective ‘working peace system’. The functionalists see international community as being made up of an increasing number of international institutions with competence in particular functional areas the territories of which overlap and intersect with each other and that no ideology or political scheme must be allowed to impose co-extensiveness upon these territories: the function must prevail.

Yet, however, Paul Taylor posits that in the evolution of the contribution of functionalism to our understanding of international organization, it is appropriate to reemphasize the two aspects of the approach which seemed central to it, namely attitude change and enmeshment. Although other critics have doubted the possibility of attitudes being by involvement in international organization or by experiencing the effects of international institutions, evidence have however pointed out that whenever people do things together, it would lead them to greater involvement with each other to full participation in common institutions. And within the state, it seems these methods are one of the steps towards the improvement of relations between groups which are mutually suspicious of each other as in the attempt to solve the problem in Northern Ireland in the 1970s.

At the international level, however, the evidence which is collected in the face of considerable research problems, is somewhat inconclusive: there is as yet little evidence to suggest that international institutions are capable of becoming the focus of loyalties at the expense of the nation state, even though there are evidence of a softening of attitudes towards each other who work in international organizations.

Further, on the criticisms of functionalism, Claude has questioned the viability of the functionalist approach when he asks whether it is possible to segregate a group of problems and subject them to treatment in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves only with the cooperative use of the tools of mutual interest.

Another criticism is that the development of systems of transnational transactions which functionalism recognizes and fits into a strategy of peace does not trap states in interdependencies or confine them with cooperative framework.

112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
Despite these criticisms, however, scholars still regard functionalism as a useful framework for the study of international organization and international society. And that is why Paul Taylor concludes that although the theory has certain weaknesses; it nevertheless remained a starting point for studies about the subject and prospects of international community and organization.

Based on this premise, this study attempts explore and investigate the role played by the international community towards the dismantling racist apartheid regime of South Africa.

1.7 Research Methodology

The study, by its very nature, placed importance on the exploration of both primary and secondary sources adopting qualitative approach. The method in qualitative research prompted the researcher to unavoidably dive deep into the subject or event under study. Consequently, in this method, rich forms of data or information were collected and thoroughly examined through a variety of perspectives or from different people. The data collected, was interpreted to ascertain and enrich an extensively important perspective.

This research employed a comprehensive study and evaluation of archival materials - both inside and outside South Africa- coupled with other relevant primary documents. Thus, the use of confidential oral interviews with some relevant personalities knowledgeable on the topic in question were conducted, e.g. Mr FW De Klerk, Bishop Desmond Tutu, Mr Pik Botha, Mr Thabo Mbeki, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Mr Roelf Meyer, Rev Frank Chikane to mention but a few. In addition, interviews with retired diplomats (former NP and Liberation Movements) and the present officials of relevant foreign offices added to the value of a balanced research and analysis of the study. Stake holders in the foreign policy making process were also interviewed.

The information was disseminated to interviewees through soliciting their physical addresses and either telephone or cell-phone contact numbers. Secondly, their physical addresses were sought together with their email addresses. The Interview sheets were sent to interviewees prior to eyeball-to-eyeball conversations. The secondary data collection used in this study involved the use of print and electronic sources such as books, journals, pamphlets, dissertations, government publications, reviews, diplomatic correspondences, official government letters, diaries, Memorandum of understanding and other relevant manuscripts.

In line with above, materials from archival libraries and public libraries both within and outside South Africa were visited. As such, visits were made to F.W de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki foundations for additional consultations. Visits were equally made to some selected foreign offices who actively participated in the anti-apartheid struggle. Contacts were also made with the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) secretariats.

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117. Ibid.
118. R. Bodgan and S.K. Biklen, “Qualitative Research for Education”, p.32
The data/information gathered from these sources was arranged, recorded and finally synthesized using qualitative approach. Although data collected varied in strength and weakness, as such, the researcher was careful by applying objective analysis in the interpretation of the information gathered.

1.8 Ethical and safety issues

Having read the University’s Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics and Policy covering acts of plagiarism, I strictly undertook to adhere to them. My supervisors and I had considered and discussed ethical issues involved in this study. This research did not fall into any category of special ethical obligations. It did not generate any conflict of interest, real or perceived. I therefore undertook to abide by the general principles set out in the University’s research policies. I discussed with my supervisor on any special ethical issue that arose. Any action taken in the event of that was aligned with the University of Zululand’s guidelines.

1.9 Resources

This kind of research was an extensive one and thus called for additional institutional resource allocation. I travelled to some important places inside South Africa and beyond. For example, there was need to visit the National libraries of South Africa, in Pretoria, Cape Town, Bloemfontein and Pietermaritzburg. The researcher visited F.W. de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki foundations to conduct some research and interviews. Foreign offices (embassies) were useful source of information gathering for this research. I visited foreign offices of some countries that played major roles towards the anti-Apartheid struggles of South Africa. For example, the British, American, Nigerian embassies to mention but a few. Freedom Museum of Apartheid in Pretoria was also an important place for this research. Finally, the researcher intended to visit the United Nations (U.N.) and the African Union (A.U.) secretariats located in New York and Addis Ababa respectively. These two organizations played an important role in terms of decision-making during the Apartheid struggle. However, Due to limited travel costs, intended visit to the United Nations (U.N.) and the African Union (A.U.) secretariats located in New York and Addis Ababa were replaced by couriering interview sheets to respective offices.

SANROC button calling for the rejection of Apartheid in sport. Source: African Activist Archive
CHAPTER TWO:

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT, BRITAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA

“The history of the anti-apartheid struggle provides an important historical case for the analysis of present-day global politics. It has become evident that the present mobilisation of a “global civil society” in relation to economic globalization and supra-national political institutions like WTO, IMF and the World Bank, has historical links to the post-war, transnational political culture that the anti-apartheid movement was part of.” - Dr. Håkan Thörn, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

2.1 Introduction

The reaction of the outside world to the development of apartheid was widespread, and by the 1980s posed a sustained challenge to the South African regime, which, facing myriad internal and external threats, eventually capitulated to make way for a new, democratic dispensation. While countries throughout the world took various measures to weaken and topple apartheid, it was the anti-apartheid movements in the United Kingdom (UK), Holland and the United States of America (USA) that mounted the most serious of these challenges to the apartheid state, the UK’s perhaps being the most effective of all such organizations throughout the world. By the late 1980s the UK’s Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) had unleashed a wide range of campaigns and established branches throughout the country. From small beginnings, the AAM developed a campaign that became one of the most powerful international solidarity movements in history, a model that has subsequently been used to weaken or displace many other dictatorial regimes. The AAM developed links with political parties and other powerful forces to put in place and reinforce effective measures to destabilise every aspect of apartheid structure, mounting economic, cultural, trade and sports boycotts which resulted in sanctions campaigns supported by governments throughout the world.

By its nature, the AAM was a co-ordinating machine – unable itself to achieve its goals, it persuaded individuals, organizations, political structures and governments to take whatever actions would be necessary to achieve the isolation and weakening of the apartheid state. It’s function was to make powerful actors – such as governments, political parties, trade unions and union federations or the United Nations, but also masses of individuals acting in concert – take significant decisions that had material and, often, historic effects. The success of the AAM was to slowly, over three decades, bring awareness of the issues to the British public, and to pressure the British and other governments to eventually throttle the apartheid machine

120 D. Austin, “Britain and South Africa (London: Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford U. P.), p 196.
by stopping trade, cutting off oil supplies and access to arms, and isolating white South Africa to the point that it was forced to dismantle its oppressive regime.

With nothing more than three, four or five paid staff working out of tiny offices, but hundreds of volunteers and a range of contacts from the highest echelons of power to the everyday citizen, the AAM went a considerable way towards bringing down one of the most repugnant systems in the 20th century. Britain took over the Cape in 1795 and, after relinquishing control, recolonised the territory during its war with France in the early 19th century. British capital controlled the diamond and gold mines discovered in the late 19th century. After vanquishing the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 (now referred to as the South African War), Britain granted dominion status to the Union of South Africa in 1910. By the late 1950s, Britain was one of South Africa’s most significant trading partners, with more than 30 percent of South Africa’s imports coming from the UK, and 28 percent of South Africa’s exports going to Britain. Besides the economic relationship, Britain enjoyed close relations with its former colony, and between 1946 and 1959, 113,000 Britons had settled in South Africa.

However, other aspects of British culture eventually worked against white domination. Since the 19th century, London became home to exiles from every part of the world, notably to Karl Marx, who wrote his most famous and influential tome, *Das Kapital*, in the British Library. Similarly, South Africans fleeing from apartheid in the early 1950s settled in the increasingly cosmopolitan capital of the British Empire, and set up structures that took on a life of their own. Vella Pillay, Tennyson Makiwane, Abdul Minty, Yusuf Dadoo, Kader Asmal, Oliver Tambo and later Thabo Mbeki and the Pahad brothers (Aziz and Essop), among many others, all settled in England for periods and used it as a base from which to conduct the struggle against apartheid. It was Vella Pillay and Tennyson Makiwane who first established the germ of the Anti-Apartheid Movement on British soil. They began holding meetings in the 1950s and planned the first boycotts of South African products, which eventually culminated in the highly influential AAM.

### 2.2 Historical Background, 1959-1963

The late 1950’s and early 1960’s were years of hope for Africa south of the Sahara. By 1960, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria had already been granted their independence while the rest of the African colonies were either negotiating with their metropolitan powers or engaging in wars of liberation. Even in South Africa, the most highly developed industrial country in Africa, the prospects of liberation from White minority rule seemed a very real possibility.

During the 1950’s, the South African liberation movement had grown into a mass movement under the leadership of the Congress Movement (a non-racial anti-apartheid front which included the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), and was supported by the

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underground South African Communist Party (SACP)) through mass protests, stay-at-homes, and passive resistance. As the South African Government retaliated with increasingly repressive measures by outlawing all forms of political protest and arresting or placing bans on all the opposition leaders, in the late 50’s the ANC turned to boycott.

In April 1959, the ANC President Chief Albert Luthuli called for an economic boycott of the products of the Nationalist-controlled firms which was to start on 26 June (known as South Africa Freedom Day). As fewer and fewer options remained open for the continuation of the struggle, the ANC and the other liberation movements were increasingly aware of the importance of international support for the domestic fight. In its report to the Annual Conference of December 1959, the ANC National Executive Committee stated:

"The economic boycott in South Africa has unlimited potentialities. When our purchasing power is combined with that of sympathetic organizations overseas we wield a devastating weapon".

In the UK, campaigning against apartheid had been going on in the 1950’s as part of the wider support for the anti-colonial movements. Decolonisation helped to throw into even greater prominence the plight of the non-White population of South Africa. The Committee of African Organizations (CAO), provided a platform bringing together various bodies such as Fenner Brockway’s Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF, formed in 1954), the Africa Bureau (1952), and Christian Action (1946), as well as prominent churchmen (e.g. Trevor Huddleston, Michael Scott of the Africa Bureau, Canon John Collins of Christian Action), and a growing number of South African exiles (e.g. Vella Pillay, Rosalynde Ainslie, Abdul Minty, Tennyson Makiwane - who later played a prominent role in the founding of the AAM). Pickets outside South Africa House and meetings in Hyde Park were held, funds were raised for the defence and the families of the people arrested during the Defiance Campaign of 1952 and later for the accused in the Treason Trial. Several Labour Party constituencies and Labour MPs, the TUC and the British Communist Party were also involved in the campaigning.

In response to Chief Luthuli’s appeal, the CAO organized a 24-hour vigil outside South Africa House followed by a meeting at Holborn Hall on June 26, 1959. In the next months, a Boycott Sub-Committee continued the campaign through poster parades, pickets and the distribution of leaflets (listing the South African goods to be avoided) outside shopping centres. The campaign, however, was only partially successful as it failed to gather enough support. Although some individual Labour constituencies decided to back the boycott, the Party did not consider anti-colonialism an important issue in the October 1959 election.

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124 African National Congress, “South Africa on trial: Behind the “Rivonia” case” (St Mary Cray, 1963), pp.6-12.
campaign. Mobilising Conservative support for the boycott proved to be an even more difficult task.

The following year the Committee launched a "Boycott Month", scheduled for March 1960 and coinciding in South Africa with major anti-pass demonstrations led by the ANC and the PAC. International outcry over the Sharpeville shootings of 21 March 1960, meant that this time the Boycott Movement in Britain took deeper roots. After its third consecutive electoral defeat, the Labour Party proclaimed 1960 "Africa Year" and, joined by the TUC, readily supported the March Boycott Month, thus adding a vital impetus to the campaign.128 The Conservative Party, on the other hand, felt that they too had to formally condemn apartheid. Yet, despite Harold Macmillan’s speech to the South African Parliament on February 3, 1960, about a "wind of change" sweeping all over Africa, "attempts which are being made in Britain today to organise a consumer boycott of South African goods" were strongly rejected.

The Boycott Movement, however, managed to attract the support of a few individual members of the Conservative Party, such as Lord Altrincham and Humphrey Berkeley MP, who became sponsor of the AAM in 1962. After March 1960, it was decided that the Boycott Movement should carry on as the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Its aims were:

"to continue the boycott of South African goods; to support the South African United Front’s [created abroad by members of the ANC, the PAC, SAIC and South West Africa National Union in June 1960] calls for economic and other sanctions on the South African Government; to promote regular propaganda against apartheid; to react to special situations in South Africa".129

While boycotts had outlived their usefulness in South Africa, where the outlawed liberation movement turned to sabotage as the first step towards armed struggle, in Britain they acquired a new significance as part of a strategy to cripple the apartheid economy from the outside.

In the first few years after it was founded, the AAM was facing some financial and organizational problems. Abdul Minty (Honorary Secretary, 1962-65) recalls: "we had no budget, not even five or ten shillings".130 The first AAM office at 200 Gower Street was a room in the basement of Dr David Pitt’s (an AAM member) surgery. In March of 1961, the building was set on fire; through the NUS, the AAM found another place at 15 Endsleigh St. In October 1964, the AAM moved once more to Charlotte St, where it remained until 1983. Dorothy Robinson, who became Administrative Secretary in 1962, was, until the fall of 1964,

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the only paid (and, still, part-time) worker in the organization. Nevertheless, thanks to the dedicated commitment of its individual members and to the support of the MCF, the CAO and other friendly organizations and sympathisers, the AAM managed to survive.

After Sharpeville, the AAM, together with Afro-Asian and Caribbean countries, concentrated its efforts on the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth. In March 1961, Labour MP Barbara Castle (who became the AAM Honorary President in the first half of 1962) was very helpful in organising a 72-hour vigil outside the Commonwealth Conference in London. Pressures for South Africa to leave the Commonwealth eventually led to the first major success when, after the proclamation of the Republic in May 1961, Verwoerd (South Africa’s Prime Minister) withdrew South Africa’s application for renewed membership. The AAM also campaigned for an end to the export of armaments to South Africa and to expose the growing links between the three White supremacies in Southern Africa.

In 1962, it published Rosalynde Ainslie’s The Unholy Alliance booklet "so that the phrase 'unholy alliance' now leaves no doubt that it refers to Verwoerd, Salazar and Welensky". In 1962, Abdul Minty represented the AAM and Dennis Brutus’s SANROC at the Olympic Conference in Baden Baden, and material about racialism in South African sport was sent to the International Olympic Committee thus securing the exclusion of South Africa from the Olympics. However, it was the Rivonia trial which boosted the fortunes of the movement by transforming it from an organization responding to events in South Africa to a self-inspiring movement.

2.3 Rivonia

After Sharpeville, the ineffectiveness of non-violent methods of struggle had led some African leaders to embark on a path of violence. In December 1961, after careful consideration, some ANC and SACP members announced the birth of Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) as "an independent body under the overall political guidance" of the "national liberation movement". The turn to violence was explained as a strategic necessity:

"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom".

Since the time was not yet ripe for guerrilla activity, selective sabotage was chosen as "a new road for the liberation of the people" of South Africa. Meanwhile, as preparations were being made for the beginning of armed resistance, Nelson Mandela (Commander in Chief of Umkonto) travelled throughout Africa in 1962 to secure the help of the independent African states for the training in guerrilla warfare.

On July 11, 1963, the South African police raided the headquarter of Umkonto We Sizwe at a farm in Rivonia, a suburb outside Johannesburg. A huge amount of evidence was confiscated, including a document, "Operation Maybuye" (Come Back), which outlined a plan for guerrilla war and violent revolution. Three months later 11 men, representing virtually the whole of Umkonto High Command, were on trial in Pretoria. The accused, among whom Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela (who had been in prison since November 1962 serving a five-year sentence for leaving the country illegally and organising the three-days stay-at-home of May 1961), Govan Mbeki, Dennis Goldberg, Ahmed Mohamed Kathrada, Lionel Bernstein and Raymond Mhlaba, were charged with 222 acts of sabotage, committed between August 1961 and August 1963, and for inciting to commit sabotage in preparation of guerrilla warfare, armed invasion of the country and violent revolution in South Africa.

Under the 1962 Sabotage Act, the accused faced the death sentence. The accused pleaded not guilty and refuted that the decision had been made to start a guerrilla had been made; they admitted, however, of being members of Umkonto. Although the ANC was struggling to minimise the seriousness of the arrest by claiming that it would "lead to a redoubling of the efforts to bring down the Verwoerd regime of repression, plunder and tyranny". Rivonia was a major setback for the underground liberation movement. As Anthony Sampson reported:

"The ANC is certainly not dead. But the individual African leadership which has been prominent for the past ten years is now effectively incapacitated inside the Republic".

The Rivonia trial and the smashing of the underground transformed the ANC into an organization in exile; the External Mission, which had been set up by the ANC Deputy President Oliver Tambo after March 1960, assumed the leadership for the entire ANC. The mobilisation of international support was now crucial if the lives of Mandela, Sisulu and the others were to be saved. On October 8, 1963 (the day the Rivonia trial began), Oliver Tambo addressed the UN General Assembly with these words: "I cannot believe that the United Nations can stand by calmly watching what I submit is genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilised dispensation of justice".

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138 Ibid.
139 African National Congress, "South Africa on trial: Behind the "Rivonia" case" (St Mary Cray, 1963), pp.6-12.
Three days later, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, by a vote of 106 to 1 (South Africa), condemning the South African Government’s apartheid policy and calling for the end of all political trials and the unconditional release of political prisoners. Britain, the US, France and Australia, however, abstained on the operative paragraph requesting the abandonment of the "arbitrary trial now in progress".141

2.4 "A Rope of Strength"

In November 1963, World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners (WCRSAPP) was set up in London under the auspices of the AAM as a separate but attached committee. Its purpose was "to organise support for the implementation of the [October] UN resolution".142 Jeremy Thorpe (Liberal MP) was Secretary, Humphrey Berkeley MP (who had played an important role in the long-running campaign for the abolition of capital punishment in the UK) was Chairman, and Dick Taverne (Labour MP) was Treasurer. The World Campaign Committee included representatives (as well as from the AAM) from the Africa Bureau, the Defence and Aid Fund, the MCF, Christian Action, the Society of Friends, the United Nations Association; Amnesty International, two South African refugees (Sonja Bunting and Harold Wolpe), the SAIC and the ANC also participated as observers. Similar committees were established abroad.

At a time when the internal opposition in South Africa had been severely hampered, the AAM played a crucial role in keeping the apartheid issue alive by organising international pressure. The Rivonia campaign represented, as ANC activist Ruth First put it to the AAM National Committee, "a rope of strength to people in South Africa".143 Throughout the spring and summer of 1964, the AAM and the WCRSAPP worked to ensure that the Rivonia trial received the widest possible publicity. 197,387 signatures were collected for a world-wide petition demanding the release of political prisoners and presented at the UN. Solidarity messages were sent to the accused and their families by British MPs and other personalities. Lobbies of Parliament and Early Day Petitions were organized so that the matter would be debated in the House of Commons. AAM members who were MPs at the same time (e.g. Barbara Castle, Jeremy Thorpe, Humphrey Berkeley)144 played a good role in the House as they were not afraid to exert their pressure inside the government.

In March, Tambo appealed to the UN Special Committee on Apartheid (established in November 1962) to express the "feeling that not enough is being done at the international level to challenge the South African Government".145 His appeal was followed by a WARSAPP memorandum to all the major governments and the Special Committee, who were asked "to consider how best, by diplomatic, political, economic and other pressures"

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142 African National Congress, “South Africa on trial: Behind the "Rivonia" case” (St Mary Cray, 1963), pp.6-12.
144 J. Crawford, "The Creation of States in International Law", p. 179.
they may exert their "influence to save the lives of brave opponents to apartheid". In particular, the UK and US governments, "whose pressures would be felt most strongly in South Africa", and "who themselves voted for an end to the Rivonia trial and the release of all South African political prisoners", were implored "to use their great influence and prestige".

In May, the AAM wrote a letter to the British Prime Minister and representations to the Government were also made to express concern about the outcome of the trial. An AAM delegation led by AAM President Barbara Castle MP, and including Lord Gardiner QC, Eric Lubbock MP, Abdul Minty, and Vernon Kunene (from the ANC), met the Minister of State at the Foreign Office on May 19 to present yet another memorandum on the question of what the British Government could do, should do, and had done about the Rivonia trial. The memorandum solicited the Government to act by making clear to the South African Government that the passing of death sentences "would seriously imperil the relations between the two governments", by requesting "the cancellation of all the death sentences imposed on political prisoners and the release of political detainees", and by offering asylum to the Rivonia accused and all other political prisoners.

As the trial drew to a close, the campaign was stepped up. Fifty British MPs, led by Berkeley, marched from the House to the South African Embassy to present a petition signed by over 100 MPs. A three-day vigil was held outside the Embassy during the days preceding the sentence. On June 11, 1964, Justice Quartus De Wet found eight of the defendants guilty and the following day they were sentenced to life imprisonment.

When he pronounced his verdict, the South African judge referred to the unprecedented international action around the trial. Indeed, the AAM had succeeded in activating a mass national and international campaign so that it could "with justification claim that the worldwide support for the men on trial contributed to the fact that they were not given the death sentence". Moreover, for the first time, thousands of people had become involved in the activities of the Movement, whose work had been "internationally recognized by the press and speeches in the UN Security Council as a major factor in the outcome of the trial". But as far as the British Government was concerned, the Rivonia Campaign had failed, at least on the surface, to break its "ignoble silence". Before turning to the Government’s behaviour during Rivonia, the reasons underlying this silence will be examined next.

148 Ibid.
2.5 Britain’s "special interests"

The British Government’s strong concern with South Africa’s stability stemmed from what Sir Alec Douglas Home called "our special interests" in the Republic. In economic terms, they consisted of over 900 million pounds worth of investment and of an annual volume of export trade of some 250 million pounds, including "invisibles".

Britain was also "mindful of the intimate relationship to the Republic of the High Commission Territories, which are dependent to a great extent upon South Africa for their economic life", and which represented a potential area of conflict because of their strategic position - being outside South Africa’s political and police control and within the area of Greater Southern Africa at the same time. Strategically, South Africa was important to Britain’s defence requirements because of the facilities Britain enjoyed at the Simonstown naval base. The 1957 Simonstown military treaty gave Britain overflying and staging rights at the base in peacetime and war, even when South Africa was not belligerent. Moreover, the sea route around the Cape represented a key communication link with the Middle East and the Far East to Western defences against Communism, especially as Egypt was so hostile.

Under the Simonstown agreement Britain was also supplying weapons to the South Africans, although pledging at the UN not to provide weapons which could be used for internal repression. Finally, the perennial "kith and kin" feeling was a further factor bringing Britain and South Africa together. British policy accordingly had to balance Britain’s short against its long-term interests. Britain’s economic stake, strategic interests, and its position in the High Commission Territories meant that it could not afford to break off relations with South Africa. At the same time, Britain should try not to convey the impression that its "association with Dr Verwoerd’s Government is particularly warm or close" because of the harmful consequences it would have on Black African opinion and of the possibility that, in a not too distant future, political power might pass to the African majority of the population. "Indeed", as Sir Alec Douglas Home suggested in his guidelines on UK policy to the new Ambassador in June 1963,

"we must make clear that we disagree fundamentally with the Nationalist policies and are using what influence we have, and what means we can legitimately employ, to persuade the [South African] Government to respond to world opinion".

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Nevertheless, Britain had to face the fact that it could not "go beyond a certain point without risk of grave damage to [its] special interests".157

2.6 "A Safety Net"

Throughout the Rivonia trial, demands for the intervention of the British Government were dismissed under the pretext that representations to the South Africans would be negatively received by them thus prejudicing the chances of commuting the sentences after the verdict was reached.158 As Minister of State Mr Peter Thomas explained to the AAM delegation to the Foreign Office in May 1964, while South Africa was already fully aware of the Government’s concern and of the very deep feelings held in Britain about the Rivonia trial, nothing could be done until the end of the trial for representations might be resented by the South African Government as an attempt to interfere with the court. What was holding back the British Government, however, was most likely the fear of South African retaliation.159 As domestic and international pressure around the trial mounted and South Africa’s isolation increased, Britain’s position became more and more uncomfortable.

Following Tambo’s second appeal to the UN and the WARSAPP memorandum, the Special Committee on Apartheid presented its report to the Security Council in April. The report suggested that the Security Council should require the South African Government to desist from all measures against persons who opposed their radical policies. If South Africa did not comply with this within a brief time limit, the Security Council should take new mandatory steps. The Special Committee also urged all the Heads of State to intervene with the South African Government to prevent the death sentences to be passed on the accused in the Rivonia and other political trials.

Discussions for sanctions against South Africa at the UN centred on the contention that South Africa represented a threat to international peace. If so designated, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, international action would no longer be regarded as interference with the internal affairs of a country and the Security Council could order mandatory measures.160 While Afro-Asian and Socialist states (which were the prime movers on the question of economic sanctions and of a total arms embargo) described the situation in South Africa with Chapter VII language to persuade the Security Council to impose sanctions, the three major Western powers, Britain, the US and France, consistently refused to accept this argument.

On June 9, 1964, just two days before the final verdict was reached, the UN Security Council passed a resolution urging the South African Government to end the trial in progress and grant amnesty to the defendants and all other political prisoners already sentenced to death. Britain, together with the US, France and Brazil, abstained. In the months preceding the Security Council debate Britain had been working with the US for a moderate UN resolution, which, while criticising South Africa’s apartheid policy, would fall short of defining the

159 C. Brickley et al, “South Africa: Britain Out of Apartheid”, p. 27.
situation in South Africa as a danger to international peace. A common British-American stand increased their chance of directing the course of events in the UN negotiations with the Africans. By gaining the initiative, Britain (and the US) wanted to avoid a situation in which it would have to react to an unsatisfactory African draft putting the question of apartheid in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter. Another reason why the British Government was keen on getting the US involved in the South African question was that they did not want to find themselves "alone in doubtful company [i.e. South African]" if they had to defy participation in international action.

Although the British and US Governments agreed in principle on the fact that no support could be given for immediate sanctions, or for sanctions within a fixed time scale, British opposition to any such plan was even stronger than that of the Americans'. First, there was a difference in the British and American approach to sanctions. The US, in fact, consented to the idea of a Security Council study group on the logistics of sanctions as a device to gain time, at least until the judgement of the International Commission of Jurists on South West Africa (where South Africa was accused of acting illegally). But the British Government was wary of getting embroiled in any discussion of sanctions as they feared it would imply a willingness to impose them - if not immediately, at some later stage. Rather, Britain thought it would be safer to stick to the line of principle that sanctions could not be used to change the political complexion of any country, be it Cuba, China, South Africa or any other.

Secondly, Britain was prepared to veto a Security Council resolution which contained the language of Chapter VII of the Charter in order not to give up its economic, strategic and trade interests in South Africa. The Americans, on the other hand, although willing to stretch things as far as they possibly could, were reluctant to use their veto (which would upset African opinion), and would have probably tried to shelter behind a British veto. During a parliamentary debate on June 15, 1964, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs R. A. Butler explained that Britain's reasons for abstaining at the UN had been the timing and the possible adverse effects on the verdicts. Britain's actions had, according to Butler, been governed entirely by what was in the best interest of the convicted men themselves.

Commenting on Butler's statements in the House of Commons, The Guardian wrote:

"Wherever plans are discussed to end the subjection of Black South Africans, Britain counsels delay, restraint, vacillation. To the rest of the world, and doubtless to the South African Government as well, Britain appears to be engaged in a

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163 AAM Archive, Executive Committee Report to the National Committee, 24 July 1962.
164 A. Wotz, “Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid”, p.34.
165 PRO: 371/177036, Record of a meeting between the Minister of State and a delegation from the WCRSAPP, March 16th, 1964.
prolonged fighting defence of South African interests, with never a point conceded until it has been overrun.\(^{167}\)

At the heart of British policy, which appeared to the opponents of apartheid as that of a "safety net under the [South African] Government",\(^{168}\) lay a "sharpening dilemma" between "keeping on terms with the regime on the one hand, and avoiding outrage to Black African opinion on the other".\(^{169}\)

2.7 Nigeria’s Special Request

Britain was very anxious about the reactions of Black African states to its policy towards South Africa. Because of its economic links with African countries (especially those of the Commonwealth, to whom British exports were "much larger than to South Africa") and its colonial past, Britain was particularly vulnerable to African opposition to South Africa. Indeed, "the African countries of the Commonwealth could, if they chose, inflict much harm to [British] economic interest".\(^{170}\)

Moreover, if there was a breach with the African Commonwealth countries, to whom Britain provided the bulk of aid, the US would probably step in to fill it. Nigeria represented the main danger to Britain.\(^{171}\) Through its leading position in Africa it could organise coordinated retaliation, undermine British interests in Nigeria itself, or turn to other Western states (e.g. the US) to exert its influence on Britain. Impatience with "the compromise of British policy towards South Africa" had also created the feeling that unless Britain broke off trade relations with South Africa, Nigeria would withdraw from the Commonwealth.\(^{172}\)

In mid-April, the Nigerian Foreign Minister F. M. Wachuku spoke to the British Ambassador in Lagos to express Nigeria’s concern over the fate of the accused in the Rivonia trial (from whom the Nigerians had received an appeal). Although the Nigerian Government was still hoping for a peaceful settlement in South Africa, they could not do anything themselves as they had no diplomatic contacts with the South African Government. So, they made a special request to the British Government to try to arrange for influence to be brought to bear on the South African Government. A similar request was made to the US Government.\(^{173}\)

A few days later, the Foreign Office reached the conclusion that Sir Hugh Stephenson, the UK Ambassador to South Africa, should approach the South African Government on the Nigerian request. (The British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home commented on this matter in a personal note, enquiring why, if the Nigerians had asked them, they had not yet acted).\(^{174}\) So far, the British Government had refused to intervene, either officially or

\(^{167}\) The Guardian, 9 June 1965, p.18.
\(^{168}\) A. Wotz, “Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid”, p.36.
\(^{169}\) Ibid.
\(^{170}\) AAM Archive, Executive Committee Report to the National Committee, 24 July 1962.
\(^{171}\) Ibid.
\(^{173}\) J. Garba, “Diplomatic Soldering”, p. 102.
privately, despite pressures from the AAM and other anti-apartheid bodies in Britain and abroad. The Nigerian request significantly prompted them to make a move, though a cautious one. On April 23, Stephenson met Dr Muller (South Africa’s Foreign Minister) to convey the Nigerian message that the execution of Mandela and the others would greatly weaken the position of those like the Nigerian Government who tried to counsel moderation. However, the South African reaction to the British informal representation, led the Ambassador to remark:

"If we let it be known that we have made any sort of representations to the South African Government on this subject, we shall gravely prejudice the chances of their commuting the death sentences".175

Therefore, Britain’s official attitude remained, until the end, that it would not be appropriate to take any action while the trial was in progress and the matter was sub judice; the news of the British representation never leaked outside the Government’s ranks.

2.8 Economic Sanctions

The UN debate on economic sanctions had been paralleled in Britain by an escalating campaign led by the AAM, especially since the November 1962 General Assembly resolution calling for economic and other sanctions against South Africa. In the summer of 1963, a Steering Committee, with Ronald Segal (a South African, editor of Penguin African Library) as Convenor and the AAM as sponsor, was set up in view of an international conference on sanctions to be held in London in April 1964.176

The aim of the Conference was to work out the practicability of economic sanctions and their implications on the economies of South Africa, the UK, the US and the Protectorates. Knowing that the strongest opposition to the application of sanctions came from the West (and within the West, Britain), the Committee made every effort to attract as wide and varied a number of speakers and participants as possible so that the Conference findings would be regarded as objective. Through the ANC, whose representatives were involved in the work for the Conference, the Steering Committee was able to access many African Governments, a number of whom agreed to become patrons. Representatives from those Governments in the forefront of the campaign for sanctions as well as from all the major political parties in countries opposing sanctions, several youth organizations, and trade union federations were all invited to participate.177

The International Conference for Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, convened by Segal under the sponsorship of the AAM, took place in Friends House, on Euston Rd,

between the 14 and the 17 April. The Conference had a list of well-known international personalities as well as governmental delegations from thirty countries and unofficial representatives from fourteen others. The Tunisian Foreign Minister Mr Mongi Slim acted as Chairman. The Conference established the necessity, the legality and the practicability of internationally organized sanctions against South Africa, whose policies were seen to have become a direct threat to peace and security in Africa and the world. Its findings also pointed out that in order to be effective, a programme of sanctions would need the active participation of Britain and the US, who were also the main obstacle to the implementation of such a policy.178

The AAM was quite enthusiastic about the outcome of the Conference, which was perceived as a major success because of "the new seriousness with which the use of economic sanctions against South Africa is now regarded".179 The Conference was also significant because of the international recognition the AAM received. For the first time, the AAM leaders met a delegation of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid, and a long-lasting working relationship was then established between the two organizations. During an AAM public meeting held at the end of the Conference, Mr Diallo Telli, the Special Committee Chairman, acknowledged the AAM as "in fact one of the most active and effective factors in the general international struggle against the dangerous and criminal racial policy" of the apartheid regime.180

Britain’s response to the Conference was partly shaped by the Government’s opinion of its organisers, and partly by its potential consequences on the UN debate about South Africa. Despite the Steering Committee’s endeavours to avoid being associated with particular political influences, this was what occurred. John Wilson described Segal, the Conference Convenor, as, although a "man of substance", someone "for our own information suspected of being a Communist sympathiser"; the AAM, on the other hand, was, to put it quite simply, "under Communist control".181

Although it was decided that no official observers should attend the Conference, the British Government was taking a keen interest in it. The main reason for such interest was that the Conference papers were to be circulated as a UN document and used by the Special Committee on Apartheid in its forthcoming report. The most likely effect of the Conference was to reinforce the already strong pressure at the UN for action against South Africa in the context of the Rivonia trial or of South West Africa. The countries that were pressing for sanctions at the UN hoped that if South Africa was put in the position of defying the International Court of Jurists over South West Africa, the great powers could be persuaded to take part in sanctions. "The American disposition to fall with this view" meant "that it must be

179 A. Wotz, “Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid”, p.38.
180 AAM Archive, Minutes of the National Committee, 25 March 1964.
181 Ibid.
taken seriously". Therefore, the Government felt they had to "be prepared to comment in a convincing and properly informed manner upon any [of the Conference] conclusions." 

Through some of its "friendly contacts" the Foreign Office managed to get hold of seven of the papers to be discussed at the Conference beforehand. Special attention was given to Worswick’s paper on the effects of sanctions on the British economy. If his arguments were accepted by the UN or if they were not effectively criticized, they would "apply a fortiori to the case of Cuba", thus making it more difficult for the British Government "to resist American pressure to cease exporting goods to Cuba". 

The papers were studied in detail and a draft on points of rebuttal was produced. For instance, the effects of a possible blockade to enforce sanctions, the time it would take to bring the South African Government to its knees, and what would happen next were questioned. In the end, the British Government concluded that the Conference was unlikely to convince the opponents of sanctions in the UN. Britain, for its part, remained firm in its view that the imposition of sanctions would be unconstitutional,

"because we do not accept that this situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security and we do not in any case believe that sanctions would have the effect of persuading the South African Government to change its policies".

The British Government’s suppositions about the impact of the Conference on the UN proved to be correct, and during the Security debate in June Britain managed to avoid the question of mandatory sanctions through its collaboration with the US. Nevertheless, indignation of world public opinion over Rivonia forced Britain to give in on the idea of a UN study of possible measures to end apartheid, although the UK representative at the UN made clear that this did not in any way mean that Britain entertained any support for sanctions should it be found that they were practicable. On June 18, 1964, Britain and the US voted in favour of the establishment of an Expert Committee of Representatives of each member of the Security Council to "undertake a technical and practical study and a report to the Security Council as to the feasibility, effectiveness and the implications of measures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the Security Council under the UN Charter".

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183 AAM Archive, Minutes of the National Committee, 25 March 1964.
185 Ibid.
186 PRO: FO 371/177036, Record of a meeting between the Minister of State and a delegation from the AAM held at the Foreign Office, May 19, 1964.
187 Ibid.
188 AAM Archive, Report of the Executive Committee to the National Committee, July 6, 1964.
For the AAM, one of its future tasks would be to ensure that "by the time this matter is again before the UN there is no doubt that public feeling in this country is in support of sanctions against South Africa".189

2.9 From hope to disillusionment

"The present climate of public opinion and the enormous support generated by the Rivonia Campaign, encourage us to believe that apartheid can emerge as an important election issue, and that our members and supporters have it in their power to insist that the next Government is ready to act to help end apartheid".190

The above remark by the AAM Executive Committee is indicative of the feeling, within the AAM, about the October 1964 General Election in Britain. In the first half of 1964, the AAM distributed a pre-election questionnaire among the candidates in order to bring the question of apartheid into the election debate. Candidates were asked to state whether they would be prepared to support, if elected, collective sanctions against South Africa through the UN, a total arms embargo, the exclusion of white-only teams in international sports, and the campaign for the release of political prisoners.191 The majority of the Labour and Liberal candidates who agreed to reply, answered affirmatively, while a number of them acknowledged the questionnaire and expressed their support for the AAM without though answering the individual questions.192

Labour support for the AAM and statements by Labour leaders while in opposition suggested that, if elected, the Labour Party would take positive steps for an ending of apartheid. On 17 March 1963, Labour Party leader Harold Wilson had spoken at an AAM "No Arms for South Africa" rally in Trafalgar Square pledging that "a Labour Government, through the UN and elsewhere, will do everything in our power by international action" to cease the supply of arms to South Africa for "as long as apartheid continues".193 Wilson’s statement led the AAM to believe that with the election of a Labour Government it would not be long before a complete embargo on arms supplies to South Africa became a reality. Moreover, the valuable support received in the past "from the Labour Movement and the broad sympathy of the new Labour Government with the anti-apartheid struggle" offered "the opportunity of real advance for [the AAM] policy in 1965". The aim for 1965, then, would be "to convert official sympathy into concrete acts".194

191 PRO: FO 371/177065, Telegram from J. E. Killick, Washington, to J. Wilson, 8 June 1964.
192 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
When Labour assumed power in October 1964, however, the Labour Party’s commitment to anti-apartheid had already started to erode. During the April Sanctions Conference, Wilson told a press conference in London that the Labour Party was

"not in favour of trade sanctions partly because, even if fully effective, they would harm the people we are most concerned about - the Africans and those white South Africans who are having to maintain some standard of decency there".\(^{195}\)

Oil sanctions, on the other hand, were regarded "as an act near war, to be contemplated only if there were something in the nature of aggressive action by South Africa".\(^{196}\)

Despite the Labour Party’s opposition to sanctions, the AAM still hoped that the new Labour Government would be more sensitive to the demands of public opinion than the previous Government. The Labour Government, however, continued to disagree with sanctions. After Rivonia, Britain had come to the conclusion that Verwoerd’s Nationalist Party would continue to be in power for some time. Indeed, the Nationalist Party’s dominance within South Africa appeared even more secure than it was a year earlier. And since the British commercial and economic stake in South Africa and its importance to Britain’s balance of payments was unlikely to diminish, South Africa was rather confident that Britain, under whatever administration, could be relied upon to resist the application of sanctions.\(^{197}\)

On November 17, 1964, the Labour Government announced the imposition of an arms embargo, though only in the sense that no future contracts or export licences would be authorized. The existing contracts were to be fulfilled "on the grounds that their cancellation would be liable to entail serious financial and commercial consequences and might endanger [Britain’s] staging and overflying rights in South Africa".\(^{198}\) A few days later the Government decided that the shipment of 16 Buccaneer aircraft (and the necessary spare parts), ordered and partly paid by South Africa during the Conservative Government, should also be allowed. As the aircraft were not needed by Britain and no alternative foreign purchasers could be found, to cancel the contract would have involved "the loss of an export of 25 million and the liability to pay compensation to the South African Government".\(^{199}\) In 1965, Britain supplied the Buccaneer aircraft, spares and maintenance equipment and continued the shipment of Land Rovers and Saracens. In November 1964, the AAM issued a statement to express its dismay and concern at the exclusions of the embargo and to ask the Government to end the export of all arms, spares and military equipment.

The new Government also refused to join in rendering support to South Africa’s political prisoners through the UN recommended Defence and Aid Fund, mainly because of the fear

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\(^{196}\) Ibid.

\(^{197}\) PRO: CAB 128 CC. 8 (64), Minutes of a Cabinet meeting on the question of arms for South Africa, 12 November 1964.

\(^{198}\) Ibid.

that it would deteriorate British-South African relations. In November 1964 Canon John
Collins asked the Government for funds on behalf of the Defence and Aid Fund. Barbara
Castle (who had reigned from her position as AAM President in October 1964 because of her
appointment as Minister of Overseas Development in Wilson’s Government) and Lord
Gardiner also personally wrote to the Foreign Office to recommend the Government’s
participation in the fund. Because of the Fund’s association with the ANC and the AAM,
the Foreign Office eventually decided against a contribution on the grounds that the persons
designed to help had been convicted for attempting the violent overthrow a Government with
whom Britain had diplomatic relations. The fact was that "the Communists have to a
considerable extent taken control of both the ANC and the AAM" and although the Defence
and Aid Fund "is a respectable and liberal organization it does include Communists who of
course seek to use it for their own purposes".

By the end of 1964, it was quite obvious that having a Labour Government had not made any
real difference. As the South African Minister of Defence Mr Fouch had said in reaction to
the news of the British elections, although there would be some added pinpricks in British-
South African relations, Britain’s interests in South Africa remained the same.

2.10 The Seventies

In the early Seventies, the ANC was at its lowest point, but the AAM began the decade with
its most successful campaign ever, ‘Stop the Seventy Tour’. When the Labour Party came to
power in 1974, the AAM found that despite promises and expectations, the party was unable
to throw its weight behind the movement. The AAM then went on a drive to cultivate a mass
base among students, unions and churches. The AAM had also at its 1967 annual
conference decided on measures that would make the sanctions campaign more practical: it
began to focus on disinvestment, putting pressure on specific companies to pull out of South
Africa. The Seventies saw this aspect of AAM activity take off.

With more and more political trials underway in South Africa, the AAM worked with the
International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) and in 1973 set up Southern Africa the
Imprisoned Society (SATIS) to draw attention to the plight of political detainees. When the
Black Consciousness leaders were arrested and banned in 1974, the AAM mounted
campaigns in support of the South African Student Organization (SASO).

2.10.1 Stopping the Springboks

With the Springboks due to play a series of 23 games throughout Britain, the AAM’s Hugh
Geach and SANROC’s Dennis Brutus established the ‘Stop the Seventy Tour Committee’
(STST), with Peter Hain as the committee’s spokesperson. Under the umbrella of the AAM

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200 The Anti-Apartheid Movement: A 40-year Perspective Symposium, South Africa House, London 25-6 June
1999.
201 Ibid.
202 A. Minty, "The AAM - What kind of History?", Paper presented at the AAM 40-year Symposium, South Africa
204 Ibid.
and the STST, scores of organizations in each region arranged mass protests in concert with direct action tactics (such as pitch invasions) over the three months of the tour (from 30 October 1969 to 2 February 1970). \(^{205}\)

The protests were massively successful, with thousands turning out at the games to protest while the STST used direct action tactics to disrupt whichever games they could. A planned cricket tour soon after drew an even more intense series of protests. Virtually every sector of British society was involved, from the Labour and Liberal parties to the Afro-Caribbean communities, the churches, unions, students and the British aristocracy. \(^{206}\) African countries threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games to be held in Edinburgh in July 1970 and the government, facing an election, ordered the Cricket Council to call off the tour. The tours and protests received huge coverage in the British press, and the issue of apartheid was condemned from every quarter.

The Conservative Party won the elections and announced that it would end the embargo and resume sales of military equipment to South Africa. The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) urged Prime Minister Ted Heath not to break the UN Security Council resolution by selling arms to South Africa. The AAM organized a rally at Trafalgar Square which was attended by 10,000 people, and a declaration in favour of the embargo was signed by 100,000 people. \(^{207}\) Abdul Minty flew to Singapore to present the declaration to the Commonwealth heads of state conference. The Conservative government sold only a few helicopters to South Africa, although it never officially reversed its position.

2.10.2 **Constructive Engagement vs Disinvestment**

In the early 1970s, proponents of a less radical approach to dismantling apartheid began to gain ground when arguments were made for ‘constructive engagement’, which proposed that aid and trade would more effectively dissolve apartheid and that economic growth would bring a share of the cake to all. \(^{208}\) Instead of disinvestment, these critics proposed that British firms be called upon to raise the wages of their Black workers and provide training and upward mobility.

Meanwhile Vorster’s policy of détente – an attempt to woo African leaders and neutralise possible enemies – was yielding results: Malawi’s Banda visited South Africa, as did leaders from various other African countries. In contrast, the AAM’s disinvestment campaign sought to show how British firms profited from apartheid policies, and called on sympathetic forces such as trade unions to withdraw any investments they might have in the South African economy, and persuade the government to halt new investments. When it was discovered that


Barclays Bank had a tiny investment in the Cabora Basa dam project in Mozambique, the AAM targeted the bank, which had thousands of branches throughout the UK.\(^{209}\)

2.10.3 **Building a mass base**

The failure of the Labour Party to support the AAM’s most important campaigns led to disillusionment with parliamentary politics and prompted a shift in the AAM. The movement now began to cultivate students, unions, church groupings, women’s organizations and other sectors in an attempt to build a mass base that would ensure the success of its campaigns.

2.10.4 **Students**

At the 1970 spring conference of the National Union of Students (NUS), the students passed a resolution that they would support the armed struggle against apartheid. The union’s president, Trevor Fisk, who had met with the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) leaders on a trip to South Africa, went against the AAM’s cultural boycott when he supported the idea of academics taking up work at universities in South Africa.\(^{210}\) The students voted him out, and Jack Straw was elected in Fisk’s place, marking a radicalisation of the student union, which called for a total cultural, sporting and academic boycott.

The infrastructure of the NUS, with branches at every university in the UK, became a resource for the AAM, and students became the largest sector of the AAM’s membership. The two organizations joined forces in September 1971, and joint conferences were held annually from July 1972.\(^{211}\) Scottish students launched their own network in May 1973, and were especially active.

2.10.5 **Unions**

The AAM also began to build a base among unions. Some unions had supported the movement since its formation, however, the Trades Union Congress, which had strong links with the conservative, white-dominated TUCSA in South Africa, turned down an invitation to attend the AAM’s national committee in 1961.\(^{212}\) The TUC continued a policy of constructive engagement, and became a battleground as more unions began to forge links with the AAM, many trying to radicalise the TUC’s policies and get the federation to support the AAM.

In 1971, 14 unions were AAM affiliates. It took the 1976 Soweto uprising to bring a flood of affiliates, and by 1980 35 national trade unions were affiliates. More and more unions began to refuse to handle South African goods, and the International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) asked workers to observe a week of action in November 1976.\(^{213}\) An

\(^{209}\) Ibid.


\(^{211}\) Ibid.


International Labour Organization (ILO) conference in 1977 also proposed a week of action, during which the Union of Postal Workers asked its members to stop telephonic communication and not handle post to and from South Africa.

2.10.6 Churches

Churches in the UK generally took a conservative position, although he British Council of Churches (BCC) called on the Labour government in 1964 to impose an arms embargo and supported sports boycotts. Yet, the council withheld support for more radical measures, such as a World Council of Churches (WCC) call for international corporations to withdraw from South Africa. Most churches followed the policy of constructive engagement, but the Methodist Church and the Church of Scotland tended towards a more radical policy towards South Africa.214 During the 1970s the churches fostered links with the Black Consciousness Movement rather than the ANC, SACP or PAC. The Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU) and the Black People’s Convention (BPC) members attended seminars organized by the British Council of Churches and the Church of England’s Board for Social Responsibility.215

After Beyers Naude’s Christian Institute was banned in 1977, the British churches began to take more radical positions. Manas Buthelezi preached at Westminster Abbey in 1977 and Desmond Tutu participated in events on British soil in 1978. A shift occurred at the BCC’s general assembly in 1979, and the council accepted a policy of ‘progressive disengagement’216 in place of the constructive engagement it had practised. The move rendered the churches more susceptible to closer ties with the AAM.

2.10.7 AAM activities in the late Seventies

When Angola and Mozambique achieved independence in 1975, the geopolitics of the region took a dramatic turn, and South Africa was isolated more than ever. Nevertheless, it was the unrest in Soweto in 1976 that changed the country and started a process that would lead to renewed resistance and eventually negotiations.217 The AAM, which had always had a special relation to the ANC, now had to contend with new forces in the liberation movement, and the re-emergence of the trade union movement in 1973 brought yet another aspect to the struggle.

SATIS launched an emergency campaign in May 1976 after Joseph Mdluli was killed in detention in March 1976. When Steve Biko was killed in 1977, the AAM called for an inquiry, a call that received backing from many groups.218 Labour’s foreign secretary David Owen attended an IDAF-organized memorial service for Biko at St Paul’s Cathedral. In 1977 the Commonwealth governments endorsed the Gleneagles Agreement, an informal measure

218 Ibid.
to ‘take every step discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organizations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa’.\textsuperscript{219}

The new Labour government, elected in 1974, terminated the Simon’s Town Agreement, but continued to hold joint naval exercises. The AAM exposed NATO collaboration with the apartheid government in Project Advokaat, a secret underground naval surveillance system, and in March 1975 organized a mass rally against joint naval exercises and collaboration with the apartheid state.\textsuperscript{220} In 1977, reports confirmed that South Africa was set to test a nuclear bomb, and despite warnings from Western governments not to go ahead, the regime exploded a nuclear bomb in the south Atlantic in October 1979. The AAM linked up with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in a drive to ‘Stop the Apartheid Bomb’.\textsuperscript{221}

After June 1976, the government became more willing to heed the AAM. In May 1977 the government announced that it was no longer supplying South Africa with NATO codification data. Labour’s Foreign Secretary, David Owen, proved to be more receptive than any other minister had ever been, and twice met with the AAM in 1977, agreeing to investigate transgressions of the arms ban.\textsuperscript{222} The government even dropped its veto at the UN and voted for a mandatory arms embargo, something no previous British government had done. Labour’s NEC took a more radical line than the government, and pushed for a freeze on new investment. But the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 meant that the AAM could rely even less on the British government to back its campaigns.\textsuperscript{223}

\textbf{2.11 The Eighties}

The success of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party in the first democratic election in Zimbabwe in March 1980 left South Africa exposed as the only racist regime remaining in Africa, and freed the badly stretched AAM to focus its scarce resources on its South African campaigns.\textsuperscript{224} In its attempts to isolate South Africa, the AAM sought to influence the UN, the Commonwealth and the European Economic Community (EEC) to pressure the new Thatcher government to support international sanctions.

In the sporting field, the AAM worked with SANROC to compile a list of sportsmen and women who broke the boycott – more than 700 had visited South Africa between 1980 and 1987. Rugby was the biggest challenge, and the British Lions tour of South Africa went ahead in 1980.\textsuperscript{225} The Rugby Football Union sent another team in 1984, but pressure from the AAM and ministers ensured it was the last to do so.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{219} J. Barber, “The Uneasy Relationship”, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{221} S. Thomas, “The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress Since 1960”, p.98.
\item \textsuperscript{222} J. Barber, “The Uneasy Relationship”, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{225} J. Barber, “The Uneasy Relationship”, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p.10.
\end{itemize}
The revolution in Iran in 1979 saw South Africa’s main source of crude oil cut off, and the UN Special Committee, together with the Holland Committee on South Africa and the church initiative Kairos, organized a seminar which called for an oil embargo against South Africa. The AAM launched a campaign against multinational companies, especially Shell and BP, which were involved in the oil trade with South Africa. Other organizations involved in the oil trade also came under the spotlight, and the AAM pressured the British government to cut South Africa off from benefitting in any way from North Sea oil. After an ILO conference in 1983, maritime unions joined in the action, and the cost of oil became much more expensive for South Africa.

The cultural boycott, endorsed in a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1980, was reinforced with the drawing up of a register of entertainers who had performed in South Africa. Tom Jones, Shirley Bassey and David Essex, who had performed at Sun City, pledged that they would not return to South Africa. Local authorities, such as the Greater London Council, took action against anyone on the register and anyone who refused to make the pledge. When the president of Equity (the British drama association), Derek Bond, announced that he would break the boycott, members of Equity voted to ban members from performing in South Africa. Bond was forced to resign.

Visits to Britain by black South African artists were difficult to target, and the group Bahamutsi performed in England, as did a group from the Market Theatre. Paul Simon’s work with black South African musicians for his Graceland album came under fire, although the album hit the charts in the UK. The academic boycott proved difficult to implement, even though the Association of University Teachers voted in 1980 to boycott all links with South African universities. However, other initiatives were more successful. The rebel cricket tour by a team captained by Mike Gating in 1990 was forced to cut short the tour.

2.11.1 The Thatcher Government

From the beginning Margaret Thatcher’s opposition to apartheid was steeped in reluctance. The Pretoria regime, seen as an ally in the Cold War, enjoyed a kind of covert support from the new Conservative government. Unable to openly side with a racist regime, and publicly expressing abhorrence of apartheid, Thatcher used every loophole to oppose sanctions, preferring ‘dialogue, steady pressure and exploitation on SA provided by our economic involvement there’. According to Christabel Gurney:

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230 Ibid.
‘At the moment when the AAM was at last succeeding in building a coalition of support for the isolation of apartheid, it was confronted by a prime minister who was implacably opposed to sanctions.’

Nonetheless, it is a testament to the AAM that even a government as conservative as Thatcher’s was forced to take steps against Pretoria that eventually pushed it to the negotiating table. The fact that Thatcher was positioned to the right of most of her cabinet meant that certain forces within the Conservative Party were more receptive to the call to end apartheid.

In the face of widespread scepticism towards PW Botha’s Tripartite Parliament that persisted in the exclusion of Black South Africans, Thatcher refused to condemn the constitutional makeover of apartheid, preferring to give it ‘the test of time’. When Botha tried to garner international acceptance for his new scheme by touring Europe in June 1984, the British government was the only Western power to extend an invitation to Botha. The AAM ensured that Botha got a frosty reception, and a wide range of groupings protested at his visit. So effective was the anti-Botha lobby that Thatcher was forced to meet with the leaders of the AAM – in the first and only such occasion. After talks with Trevor Huddleston and Abdul Minty, Thatcher issued a statement recommitting the British government to the arms embargo and the Gleneagles Agreement. On the day of the meeting between Botha and Thatcher, 50,000 people marched to an AAM rally in Hyde Park. British opposition to Thatcher’s increasingly conservative rule resonated with an anti-apartheid ethos, and opposition to Thatcher naturally morphed into opposition to apartheid.

2.11.2 The Tide Turns

By the mid-80s, the AAM had mobilized a vast network and succeeded in largely overwhelming opposition to sanctions. Local authorities, trade unions and churches now came on board in an unprecedented and sustained attempt to force the Pretoria regime to the negotiating table. Local authorities throughout the UK took concrete steps in support of the AAM’s agenda: Sheffield; London’s Camden Council; London boroughs Brent, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Scotland’s huge Strathclyde Regional Council; all expressed opposition to apartheid in concrete measures. According to Gurney,

‘By 1985, more than 120 local authorities, representing 66 percent of the British population, had taken some form of anti-apartheid action.’

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235 Ibid.
Britain’s huge union federation, the TUC, previously at arm’s length from the AAM, now came out in full support of UN sanctions. In 1981, at its annual congress, it passed its first resolution calling for sanctions. General secretary Len Murray met with an AAM delegation in June 1982, in a first for the TUC’s highest official. The TUC rallied to the side of African workers fired by Wilson-Rowntree in South Africa, and in 1985 passed a resolution calling on unions to support the AAM’s boycott campaigns.236

Against the advice of the AAM, the TUC’s new general secretary, Norman Willis, and Ron Todd, chair of the federation’s international committee, visited South Africa in July 1986. Nevertheless, the visit impressed on the duo the horrors of apartheid and prompted them to take effective measures. Todd was appalled by the realities of apartheid, and when the pair visited a family in Alexandra township, hippos descended on them and they were arrested.237 From then on the TUC made South Africa a priority, even producing a film promoting the boycott, which was seen in cinemas throughout the UK.

Churches, invited by the South African Council of Churches, attended the launch in 1985 of the Kairos document, which called on Christians to recognize the period as one calling for unprecedented interventions. In 1986 major church bodies called for targeted sanctions.238 The AAM’s campaigns throughout the subsequent period were supported by huge swathes of British citizens, and international measures required less effort to persuade partners and governments, although the Thatcher government always needed to be cajoled.

2.11.3 Hitting the South African Economy

The AAM’s campaign against Barclays Bank came to a dramatic end when, in November 1986, the bank pulled out of South Africa. With students throughout the UK closing their Barclays accounts, the bank admitted: ‘Our customer base was beginning to be adversely affected.’239

Between 1986 and 1988 as many as 55 British companies sold off their subsidiaries in South Africa and a further 19 reduced their investments. The number of British companies investing in South Africa fell by 20 percent. Standard Chartered, the second largest bank in South Africa, also pulled out, as did insurance companies Norwich Union and Legal & General, and arms manufacturer Vickers.240 When Chase Manhattan Bank decided it would not roll over its loans to South Africa, the government in August 1985 announced a moratorium on the repayment of foreign loans. Foreign exchange markets and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were temporarily closed, and other banks followed the lead of Chase.241

236 S. Bosgra, ‘From Jan Van Riebeeck to Solidarity with the Struggle: The Netherland, South Africa and Apartheid”, SADET, p. 7.
238 S. Bosgra, ‘From Jan Van Riebeeck to Solidarity with the Struggle: The Netherland, South Africa and Apartheid”, SADET, p. 9.
239 Ibid.
With the re-election of Thatcher’s Conservative Party in 1987, the AAM began to focus on public support for sanctions instead of putting all its efforts into getting the government to impose sanctions. The AAM launched a ‘People’s Sanctions’ campaign, asking ordinary members of the public to boycott South African goods.\(^\text{242}\) It targeted the largest supermarket chains, Tesco and Sainsbury’s, urging them to stop buying products from South Africa. The People’s Sanctions campaigns were remarkably successful – a Harris poll found that 51 percent of Britons were in favour of some form of sanctions.

In various ‘days of action’ activists piled up South African goods onto trolleys and then refused to pay for them, causing blockages and inconvenience, while a ‘Boycott Bandwagon’ toured the country and spread the message.\(^\text{243}\) The AAM produced a film, The Fruits of Fear, promoting the boycott. New targets were identified: gold, coal and tourism. In conjunction with End Loans to Southern Africa (ELTSA), the ANC and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the AAM set up the World Gold Commission to look into the issue of gold sanctions.\(^\text{244}\) The movement also joined with the UK’s National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) to set up an embargo of South African coal, while tour operators were targeted in the campaign to stop Brits from holidaying in South Africa.

Anti-apartheid movements from other countries, in particular Holland and the US, focused on oil giant Shell, which jointly owned one of the largest refineries in South Africa and had interests in coal mining and petrochemical industries. The AAM joined in these efforts, and launched a total boycott of Shell products in the UK.\(^\text{245}\) Some local authorities moved their heating oil contracts from Shell, and the company’s Annual General Meeting (AGM was broken up by protesters.

### 2.11.4 Focus on Repression

With the declaration of the state of emergency in July 1985, activists inside South Africa were increasingly coming under harsh laws: detentions, political trials and, for some, death sentences. The AAM urged churches, trade unions and students to draw attention to the plight of detainees. SATIS convened a UDF Treason Trial Campaign Committee in 1985, calling for the withdrawal of charges. Trevor Huddleston launched a petition, ‘Free All Apartheid’s Detainees’,\(^\text{246}\) in June 1987, which 300,000 people signed, and a campaign was launched to oppose the repression of trade unionists, who were being targeted by the apartheid state.

Solomon Mahlangu was hanged in April 1979 despite a UN Security Council appeal, and 14 other activists were condemned to death over the next 14 years. Because of international pressure, seven of them were spared the death sentence. The AAM and Southern Africa: the Imprisoned Society (SATIS) held vigils outside South Africa House. Women’s groups took up the case of Theresa Ramashamola, one of the Sharpeville Six accused, while other AAM

\(^{242}\) Ibid.


\(^{246}\) Ibid.
activists drew attention to the Upington Seven. The AAM met with Thatcher’s foreign minister, Lynda Chalker, and eventually Thatcher was pressured into voicing her concerns to PW Botha and, in the case of the Sharpeville Six, an indefinite stay of execution was announced in July 1988.

2.11.5 The Free Mandela Campaign

After the launch of the Free Mandela campaign in South Africa in 1980, the AAM also took up the cause, which had already been underway because of the efforts of ES Reddy, the secretary of the UN Special Committee. Together with the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF), the AAM produced a film about Mandela, called South Africa’s Other Leader, which was watched by millions during PW Botha’s visit to the UK in 1984. Mandela was awarded the Freedom of the City of Glasgow in August 1981, and similar awards were made by 50 councils and local authorities over the next decade. The street in which the AAM had its offices was renamed Mandela Street. The AAM urged Britons to send postcards to the jailed leader, which they did in their thousands.

The AAM set up the Free Nelson Mandela co-ordinating committee in 1983 to liaise with the many organizations that called for his freedom. Musicians were especially responsive to the call to free Mandela, and several artists and bands released songs making the call, including The Sussed and The Special AKA, which recorded Free Nelson Mandela, written by Jerry Dammers. Hugh Masekela played at a ‘Festival of African Sounds’ in 1983 at London’s Alexander Palace, commemorating Mandela’s 65th birthday. Dammers linked up with Dali Tambo (son of Oliver Tambo) to form Artists Against Apartheid, which organized a rock concert on Clapham Common in July 1986. Thabo Mbeki spoke at the festival, which was attended by 250,000 people.

The AAM’s ‘Freedom At 70’ campaign, lasting more than a month, began with a concert and ended with a rally five weeks later. Dammers worked with the AAM to organise a huge concert at Wembley to kick off the campaign. Held on 11 June 1988, the concert featured Simple Minds, Peter Gabriel, Whitney Houston, Stevie Wonder and Sting, among scores of others, and 72,000 people attended the event. The event was screened live by the BBC over nine hours, and the broadcast was made available to TV stations in 63 countries. Headlined ‘Nelson Mandela: a 70th Birthday Tribute’, the concert was a huge success, and made Mandela a household name in the UK as well as elsewhere.

The day after the concert, Oliver Tambo and Trevor Huddleston addressed a rally in Glasgow, attended by 15,000 people. Twenty five marchers, each representing a year of

249 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
Mandela’s 25-year incarceration, then set out on a walk to London, stopping along the way at 40 towns and cities where events were held to call for Mandela’s freedom. The marchers arrived in London on the eve of Mandela’s 70th birthday, 17th July 1988, at a rally at Hyde Park. The next day, Tambo gave each of the marchers a bust of Mandela.

The success of the campaign was reflected in the findings of a poll, which revealed that 70 percent of respondents thought Mandela should be freed, and 58 percent thought Thatcher should do more to get Mandela out of prison. It was also reflected in a near doubling of the AAM’s membership, from 8,500 in 1986 to 19,410 in March 1989. Even Thatcher was swayed by the campaign, and she assured Huddleston: ‘We raise his (Mandela’s) case regularly with the South African government.’

### 2.12 The Nineties

FW de Klerk announced the unbanning of the liberation organizations on 2 February 1990, and on 11 February Mandela walked out of prison in Cape Town. His freeing was greeted with spontaneous celebrations throughout the UK, with thousands descending on Trafalgar Square and other sites throughout the country. The AAM was caught in a strange predicament: almost everything it had fought for was now a reality, and the movement had to re-assess its role and, indeed, its very reason for existence. Rather than dissolve itself, the AAM continued to monitor developments in South Africa. Membership numbers fell, but a core of activists remained to see through the last mile in the struggle against apartheid.

The AAM decided on three key issues: it would continue to call for sanctions until majority rule was a reality; it would encourage the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations; and it would only endorse one outcome – a united, non-racial South Africa. Already, Thatcher was moving to undo the sanctions. On 2 February she announced that the ban on cultural, academic and scientific links would be relaxed, and on 10 February she declared that she would lift the voluntary bans on new investment and the promotion of tourism. The AAM stepped up its People’s Sanctions campaign, and worked with European groups to stop the European Community from lifting sanctions. The ANC called for sanctions to be maintained until a transitional executive council was in place, and the AAM endorsed the ANC’s call. However, there was confusion when the ANC allowed a South African rugby team to tour the UK in 1992.

In April 1990, convinced that FW de Klerk was trying to stall negotiations and renege on agreements, the AAM met with foreign secretary Douglas Hurd to draw attention to the continued imprisonment of hundreds of political prisoners, many of them on death row, but Hurd refused to intervene. The AAM initiated a mass letter-writing campaign, with letters

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254 A. Wotz, “Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid”, p.35.
256 Ibid.
being sent to De Klerk and Lynda Chalker.\textsuperscript{257} The AAM was horrified when ‘Third Force’ violence spread from KwaZulu-Natal to Johannesburg. De Klerk, on his third visit to the UK in October 1990, was met by the AAM’s emergency campaign. Its letter to Thatcher, was headed: ‘Tell De Klerk: stop the violence and repression.’\textsuperscript{258} When the AAM got news of the Boipotong Massacre, Huddleston demanded that the government consult with the European Union and the Commonwealth to find ways to monitor the violence. AAM protesters held a vigil outside South Africa House. Mike Terry and Huddleston flew to South Africa, and Huddleston addressed crowds at the funeral of the victims.

On his return, Huddleston organized an international hearing, where delegates from 27 countries heard eye-witness accounts of the killings. The British government changed its stance at the UN, and gave its support for UNSC resolution 772, which authorized the UN to send monitors to South Africa.\textsuperscript{259} Observer missions were then established by the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community.

\textbf{2.13 Conclusion}

The 1960s were decisive years for the international struggle against apartheid. On the one hand, the Rivonia trial gave a harsh blow to the underground resistance. While Sharpeville had forced the liberation movement underground, the clamp down of the South African Government in 1963-64 severely disabled the internal opposition. Indeed, it would be another decade before the covert opposition inside South Africa could regroup and reorganize itself to pose an effective challenge to the apartheid regime. On the other hand, by the time the Rivonia trial ended in June 1964, the issue of apartheid had been successfully projected onto the international level.

Since its birth in the spring of 1960, the AAM’s role had been to campaign against apartheid in every possible field, and to inform the public about apartheid and its implications. In the first few years after it was founded the AAM principally functioned in response to events in South Africa. As the situation in South Africa deteriorated, especially after the Rivonia arrests, the AAM was able to offer an extraordinary response by pulling together enormous strength and resources.\textsuperscript{260} The major achievement of the Rivonia Campaign was to mobilize, on an unprecedented scale, domestic and world public opinion around the trial, which is what helped to save the lives of Mandela, Sisulu and the others. The AAM also made every effort to press the British Government into adopting an enlightened policy towards South Africa, especially at the UN, and into exerting its influence on the South African Government to prevent the imposition of the death sentences on the accused. Real politik concerns, however, prevailed over anti-apartheid rhetoric in the making of British policy.

\textsuperscript{257} “Umkonto We Sizwe”, flyer “issued by the command of Umkonto We Sizwe” appearing on October 29, 1991, Cf. Karis and Gerhart, (eds.), Challenge and Violence, p. 540.


Faced with the dilemma of protecting Britain’s economic and strategic interests in South Africa without alienating the African states or damaging "irreparably the prospects of future co-operation with an African Government", the British government was at pains to try to dissociate itself from South Africa’s apartheid policies whilst at the same time "maintain[ing] a reasonable working relationship with the present government". Pressure from the Nigerian Government eventually convinced Britain to make an unofficial representation to the South Africans. The unfavourable South African reaction to this timid move immediately led Britain to retreat to its position that any kind of intervention would not be in the interest of the Rivonia accused themselves. What the British Government probably had in mind, though, were Britain’s "special interests".  

Campaigning around the Rivonia trial also gave impetus to the question of sanctions. The International Conference on Sanctions, organized, in large part, by the AAM, represented a major breakthrough in the development of an international sanction-based strategy. The Conference, however, failed to persuade the main opponents of sanctions, namely Britain and the US. At the UN, Britain consistently refused to accept that the situation in South Africa fell under Chapter VII of the Charter. Instead, in collaboration with the US, it worked for a carefully worded appeal on the Rivonia and other political trials to try to appease Afro-Asian countries and public opinion at home and abroad; by early 1965 the issue of sanctions had lost momentum.

Labour support for the AAM created the expectation, when the Party assumed power in October 1964, which the Labour Party would translate its commitment to the anti-apartheid cause into action. The ample loopholes in the arms embargo (which allowed for the continued export of arms), opposition to sanctions, and the denial to support the Defence and Aid Fund were indicative of a high degree of continuity, rather than change, in British policy towards South Africa. In the early 1970s, proponents of a less radical approach to dismantling apartheid began to gain ground, but the anti-apartheid movement began to cultivate students, unions, church groupings, women’s organizations and other sectors in an attempt to build a mass base that would ensure the success of its campaigns. Nevertheless, it was the unrest in Soweto in 1976 that changed the country and started a process that would lead to renewed resistance and eventually negotiations. The AAM, which had always had a special relation to the ANC, now had to contend with new forces in the liberation movement, and the re-emergence of the trade union movement brought yet another aspect to the struggle.

The decade of the 1980s ended with the formation of the Southern African Coalition (SAC), a grouping made up of churches, trade unions, NGOs, local authorities and development agencies. SAC, in which the AAM was a key player, arranged a huge parliamentary lobby, with 4000 representatives from every part of the country, which called for sanctions against South Africa. The AAM’s last mass rally was held at Trafalgar Square on 20 June 1993,

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where Walter Sisulu demanded that an election date be announced. When the date was announced on 2 July 1993, Huddleston once again appealed to the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community to send observers to monitor the elections, and the subsequent deployment constituted ‘the world’s largest ever international election monitoring operation’, according to Gurney.

The AAM’s last campaign, ‘Countdown to Democracy’, launched in January 1994, appealed to Britons to donate money to the ANC, which had initiated a ‘votes for freedom’ appeal. Throughout the UK, people cast symbolic votes and donated money to the ANC, the trade unions alone raising £250,000. On Election Day, 27 April 1994, the AAM witnessed hundreds of South Africans cast their vote at South Africa house, many of them activists in exile or ordinary South Africans living in the UK. When Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first president of the new, democratic South Africa on 10 May, a live video showing Mandela taking the oath of office was witnessed by the gathering at South Africa House, marking the close of a long chapter in international solidarity.

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CHAPTER THREE:

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES’ POLICY RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

“To list extensive economic relations of the great powers with South Africa is to suggest a potent non-violent path. The time has come fully to utilize non-violence through massive international boycott which would involve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany and Japan. Millions of people can personally give expression to their abhorrence of the world’s worst racism through such a power plan boycott...The time has come for an international alliance of people of all nations against racism”

– Martin Luther King Jr, 1962.265

3.1 Introduction

Throughout the 1940’s and 1950’s, the United States orchestrated a foreign policy which related to South Africa primarily in terms of economic and military/gee-strategic interests. Moral concern for apartheid was, historically, a non-issue as far as the foreign policy agenda was concerned. It was not until the 1960’s that the United States took a public, substantive, stand against apartheid. Problem, political and policy stream changes preceded elevation of concern for apartheid to a more central location on the governmental agenda during the Kennedy administration, and then the decision agenda with passage of the arms embargo against South Africa.266 This new definition of the South Africa situation persisted on the policy agenda during the Johnson years. Despite renewed rhetoric over apartheid and policy developments such as the Kennedy arms embargo, this redefinition of the South Africa problem actually deviated only slightly from the Truman and Eisenhower era, however. Economic and military interests continued to reign supreme in the Sixties.267 Criticism of apartheid was appropriate as long as it was convenient and inconsequential. This analysis considers how Anti-apartheid activists attempted to affect problem, political and policy streams in the Sixties, and also considers how these streams eventually shaped the definition of the South Africa problem on the policy agenda in the Sixties.

During the Seventies, the anti-apartheid movement was able to build a solid foothold among its traditional constituents, consolidate its resources, and mount successful campaigns throughout the United States. The Movement strategized to economically isolate the Pretoria regime. Movement constituents pursued this goal by targeting a diverse group of institutions to which they had African-Americans targeted national policy-makers, religious groups targeted corporations. Students targeted universities and colleges, community activists targeted local, county, and State-level governments. Regardless of the forums, the anti-apartheid movement rallied for divestment and disinvestment.

The United States foreign policy agenda toward South Africa fluctuated between Nixon's policy of constructive change and Carter's human rights policy. Despite the policy differences, however, both presidents ascribed primary concern to economic and military interests rather than moral interests when dealing with South Africa. This was evident in the rhetoric of individual legislators, bills considered by Congress, in the issues relevant to the presidential contests in Nixon and 1976, and in Carter's early entanglements with the Vorster regime in 1977. The Eighties was a period in which the Executive branch and the Legislative branch of national government clashed over priorities for South African policy. Set against renewed violence in South Africa and a rapidly mobilizing social movement, Anti-apartheid policy shifted from comity with constructive engagement to enmity with economic sanctions. By 1986, the interests of the domestic anti-apartheid movement became codified as politically innovative law. In some senses, these interests were the same as those espoused by marginal Pan-Africanist activists in the early part of the twentieth century. By the 1990s anti-apartheid sentiment had truly moved from the margins to the mainstream of public opinion. This analysis dissects the problem, political and policy streams prevailing in the Eighties.

3.2 The Anti-apartheid Movement Reacts to the Sharpeville Massacre

Throughout the 1950's, the United States public was becoming more sensitive to racial injustice and African affairs. This sensitivity was underscored by the volume of international attention paid to the Sharpeville Massacre, a horrific incident of state violence perpetrated against blacks challenging the apartheid system in South Africa. The racial policies of South Africa commanded international attention on March 21, 1960 when South African police fired randomly into a crowd of thousands of blacks protesting national pass laws. Mass demonstrations followed in South Africa and the government declared a state of emergency, arrested thousands of activists and banned the main opposition organizations—the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC).

This incident became known worldwide as the Sharpeville massacre. It functioned to instruct people, almost overnight, about the depth of racial politics fostered by the South African regime. As one author noted, "It was the Sharpeville massacre, in which seventy blacks lost their lives, which changed the terms of the debate overnight". The events of Sharpeville provided a concrete organizing focus for anti-apartheid efforts in the United States. The massacre was adopted by activists in the United States as a symbol of the violence and immorality upon which apartheid is founded. Anti-apartheid activists tried to seize the moment by publicly condemning South Africa and educating the United States public about the evils of apartheid. There was an increase in reporting of Anti-apartheid activity at the

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269 Ibid.
time of the massacre-March, 1960. Anti-apartheid activity peaked just after the massacre, and continued at a relatively high level through June, 1960.

The anti-apartheid movement was dominated at this time by challenger groups such as Anti-apartheid organizations and member groups such as the clergy. Labour also had an active presence at this time and according to The New York Times, labour did not play a very visible role in the movement after this period. The primary Anti-apartheid organization at the time was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). One and a half weeks after the Sharpeville Massacre, ACOA ran an advertisement in The New York Times titled, “The Shame of South Africa”. They solicited emergency donations from the Africa Defense and Aid Fund. Also, in 1960, the American Committee on Africa continued to expand the scope of mobilization by initiating a fund-raising drive for the victims of Sharpeville and organizing a conference on South Africa featuring Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC.

Additionally, ACOA attempted a leverage manipulation strategy by launching a boycott against South African goods. The American Committee on Africa also played an instrumental role in encouraging labour to protest apartheid. Labour had been involved with protesting apartheid for some time. Just prior to the Sharpeville massacre, the AFLCIO Executive Council voted to urge their 12 million members to boycott all raw materials and manufactured goods coming into the U.S. from South Africa. Immediately after Sharpeville, with ACOA’s support, the International Longshoreman’s Union in New York and San Francisco voted to boycott the unloading of ships carrying South African goods for one day in symbolic support of economic sanctions against South Africa.

The religious community had been involved in anti-apartheid activity prior to Sharpeville. Following Sharpeville, the following religious group actions as reported in the media: notably Evangelist Billy Graham publicly cancelled a South African tour in protest of apartheid and The National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church voted to send $5,000 to the South Africa Anglican church to support the victims of Sharpeville. After June 1960, anti-apartheid movement activity receded from the headlines. It was not to be revived again until the period between 1962 and 1963. However, the Sharpeville incident did help to legitimate the importance of the anti-apartheid issue. For the United States movement, the massacre symbolized the violence and hatred associated with apartheid. Also, by 1960 it was clear that the anti-apartheid issue was no longer only a challenger issue. Some member group interests also adopted the issue for an organizing focus.

274 Ibid.
275 United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, The Development of South Africa’s nuclear Capability, p. 9.
3.3 Post Sharpeville

According to news stories in The New York Times, once the Sharpeville massacre receded from the headlines, Anti-apartheid activity was basically non-existent in 1961, then somewhat active between 1962 and 1964. Activity between 1962 and 1964 was dominated by Anti-apartheid organizations like the American Committee on Africa and by the voices of Civil Rights activists. Actually, ACOA emerged as the predominant voice of anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States. George Houser, Director of ACOA. Was interested in raising the issue to the policy agenda but was concerned with actively broadening the base of opposition to U.S. policy regarding South Africa. Houser worked to garner support for African issues within the more mainstream black-civil rights community. He assembled a conference in 1962 with the specific objective of transforming the mainstream domestic civil rights agenda into an international program.

From this conference, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) was born. Civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Whitney Young, A Philip Randolph and Roy Wilkins, representing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, the Congress on Racial Equality, and the Urban League, respectively, were in attendance at the founding conference. ANLCA quickly became "the prime institutionalized expression (of black American concerns with African affairs) during the first half of the 1960s".

At its founding conference, ANLCA resolved to lobby President Kennedy to support economic sanctions against South Africa. ANLCA also resolved to support liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and South West Africa. One week after the conference, ACOA and Martin Luther King announced their intention of initiating a campaign on Human Rights Day (December 10, 1962) to urge the United States government to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. Also at this time, Anti-apartheid sentiment was flaring once again at the United Nations. Member nations of the United Nations had been passing resolutions which condemned racial discrimination in South Africa as a violation of human rights for quite some time. Now, with the highly publicized massacre at Sharpeville and the defiance of the South African regime to world opinion, third world member-nations tried to move the United Nations to take an increasingly more forceful position on apartheid.

The definition of the issue shifted, especially in the General Assembly, during the post-Sharpeville period to declarations that the South Africa situation posed a threat to international peace and was, therefore, a legitimate issue for the United Nations to act upon. Third world nations eventually pushed the United Nations to endorse the liberationist position as the solution to apartheid in South Africa. This position endorsed the legitimacy of the

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279 Ibid.
internal movement to overthrow the South African regime. In November 1962, the United Nations General Assembly called for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa and established the Special U.N. Committee on Apartheid as a monitoring agency. Also in 1962, the U.N. Security Council called for member-nations to support a voluntary embargo against sales of military items to South Africa. The United Nations brought clarity to the apartheid issue both in terms of instructing people about the moral implications of apartheid and in legitimating a strong, liberation-oriented response as a policy solution.

Following the pace established at the United Nations, activists and organizations throughout the world were inspired to mobilize against the South African regime. It is during this period (early to middle 1960's) that anti-apartheid sentiment begins to gain a solid foothold within a broader set of member interests in the United States. And, it is the liberationist position being promoted at the United Nations which these interests advance.

3.4 The Anti-apartheid Movement Solidifies

After 1960, there were no Sharpeville massacres for the emerging United States anti-apartheid movement to exploit. The 1964 Rivonia trials against black leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu made it clear, however, that avenues of protest within South Africa were being continuously choked off. Reform of apartheid appeared as far away as ever. Despite the absence of a particular crisis in South Africa, anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States continued to build in the middle 1960's due to the mobilization of new constituents and the reactivation of old constituents. Anti-apartheid sentiment was largely driven by civil rights and other black organizations in the middle 1960's, then broadened from to include continuous involvement from the religious community and the student community in the latter 1960's.

Between 1965 and 1969, the anti-apartheid movement began to target tangible institutions in the United States as part of their organizing campaigns. Whereas just after Sharpeville, anti-apartheid sentiment was broadly directed at United States policy abroad, by 1965, according to New York Times, a campaign against the financial community's credit arrangements with South Africa took hold in the United States. By the end of the 1960's, sustained campaigns against corporations, universities and colleges were being waged.

Three factors present in the Sixties-sustained activity, multiple constituents, and persistent campaigns against tangible targets—indicate that the anti-apartheid movement was no longer driven by external events; instead it was able to engage in proactive organized opposition to apartheid and its collaborators. The resource base of the movement grew during this period and political opportunities changed in such a way that the movement perceived itself as able

to achieve significant gains through this new direction.\textsuperscript{286} By the end of the decade, the tide of lobbying government officials for economic sanctions was replaced with campaigns to challenge the right of institutions to invest their monies freely, without regard for public consequences. This is a rather radical turn in the direction of the movement as it came to challenge one of the fundamental principles of capitalism—the right to private control of investments.\textsuperscript{287}

3.5 The Pan Africanist and New Left Movement

Anti-apartheid activity was fuelled in the mid to late 1960's by a social milieu that encouraged a more militant critique of society and which motivated people to organize and participate in political issues. Militant white and black activists framed their concern with apartheid in more radical, anti-racist, anti-capitalist terms. This position is perhaps best identified with activists who tried to push the civil rights movement into the realm of a more radical black power movement. Leaders such as Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and H. Rap Brown enunciated the “liberationist perspective of African events as a context for the struggle for civil rights at home.”\textsuperscript{288} Frequent reference was made by Malcolm X and leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to the relationship between liberation struggles in South Africa and other African nations, and issues facing black Americans.

The white, student-based, New Left movement articulated this position as well. African liberation struggles lent a tangible focus to the New left’s critique of Western imperialism and the call for participatory democracy. Students for a Democratic Society (SOS) used South Africa as a focus for organizing during a brief period of time. SOS activists mobilized demonstrations between 1965 and 1966 to challenge the financial support received by the South African regime from banks such as Chase Manhattan and First National City, and prestigious Universities such as Princeton.\textsuperscript{289} However, SOS virtually abandoned its South Africa focus after the escalation of United States involvement in Vietnam offered a more concrete focus to its organizing efforts.

3.6 The Civil Rights Community

By the middle 1960's, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, the voice of more moderate civil rights leaders on African affairs, organized itself primarily around South African issues. The organization's South Africa position reflected the tenor of the civil rights movement. ANLCA stood for "stronger U.S. action against South Africa, including prohibition of future investment, discouragement of the continuance of subsidiaries of plants owned by Americans, American support for U.N. sponsored economic sanctions, imposition


of an oil embargo, rigid adherence to an arms embargo, and abandonment of the practice of excluding blacks from the U.S. diplomatic mission to South Africa.\textsuperscript{290}

For the most part, ANLCA and moderate civil rights leaders only took limited action toward challenging apartheid. They essentially vocalized an anti-apartheid perspective but never chose to mobilize people around the issue. Martin Luther King, for example, gave the issue a high profile in his speeches. As he travelled to Oslo, Switzerland to receive his Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, he repeatedly included South African issues in his speeches. To his credit, King did do some fundraising in 1965 to support the efforts of six Zulus seeking asylum in the United States.\textsuperscript{291} But, unlike the Pan-Africanists and the New Left, ANLCA and the mainstream civil rights leaders never invested resources into a large education or mass organizing. This prompted George Houser of the American Commune on Africa to label their actions as a "rather elitist, non-movement approach to Africa". Despite this criticism, ANLCA's activity accounted for an upswing in civil rights participation in campaigns against anti-apartheid. This activity also largely accounts for the government as target of the anti-apartheid movement between 1960 and 1965. The American Committee on Africa continued to push the anti-apartheid movement in a more proactive direction as the 1960's progressed. In league with New Left groups like SDS and students in New York City schools, ACOA initiated, during the mid-1960, what Metz calls "the first major anti apartheid effort in the U.S."\textsuperscript{292} This campaign targeted financial institutions. The goal of the campaign was to force Chase Manhattan and First National City Banks to stop lending money to the South African government.

The campaign began in 1966 when students at Union Theological Seminary and Columbia ACOA broadened this effort in late 1966 by organizing the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid with A. Philip Randolph as co chair.\textsuperscript{293} The Committee's goal was to halt a $40 million dollar credit arrangement held by Chase Manhattan, First National City and a consortium of eight other banks with the South African government. The initiation of this campaign is reflected in the increase in student involvement in the anti-apartheid movement. as recorded in The New York Times between 1965 through 1969 and in a new focus on the national community as a target of movement activity.

The bank campaign received significant publicity at the time. It had the consequence of bubbling over into other realms of activity. One specific direction this campaign took was that the Students of Union Theological Seminary used the bank campaign to draw attention for the first time to their university's investments in banks such as Chase Manhattan and First National City, and in corporations with operations in South Africa.\textsuperscript{294} Students' concern for their university's investments continued to expand over the next few years into a major tactical campaign for anti-apartheid activists. Students protested at Cornell University, The

\textsuperscript{292} Steven Metz, "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics", pp.379.
\textsuperscript{294} H. Barnes and C. Fantu, "A History of ICCR Resolutions on South Africa", p. 99.
University of Wisconsin, Princeton University, and Barnard College. Demonstrations turned to sit ins at Princeton and violence occurred at Cornell University during the latter 1960's.

This university activity fits clearly into a broader cultural and intellectual awakening developing on campuses during the late 1960's to early 1970's. South African investments were raised as a way of accusing universities and colleges for lacking sensitivity to race issues on campus and abroad. Investments were also used to challenge the university's place within a broader world capitalist system. Thus, the South Africa issue contributed vigour to the agendas of various groups on campus, particularly civil rights groups, black militants, and New Left activists. By the end of the 1960's, university and college administrations began to respond to Anti-apartheid protests on their campuses. Cornell reacted by partially divesting some stock holdings from corporations involved with South Africa, Princeton rejected divestment, though it did pledge to not make new investments in companies with primary operations in South Africa. Princeton also established a faculty-student committee to overcome racism on campus, and in South Africa.

The growth of student activism on university and college campuses is illustrated by its strong presence in the data set of articles from The New York Times, particularly during 1968 and 1969. This activity is especially noteworthy because the targets of these campaigns began to respond, concretely, to protester's demands. There were greater opportunities for students, as a marginal group, to leverage their way onto university and college agendas, than for them to secure access to agendas of other institutions, such as within the financial community.

3.7 Religious Groups

Just as The American Committee on Africa's bank campaign spun off into campus protests, it also spun off into a shareholders' campaign, first against financial targets, then against corporate targets. These campaigns were, for the most part, promoted by the religious community. Religious/stockholder activists were visible from 1965 through 1969. The financial community was a target of movement activism between 1965 and 1969, and corporations were a target of activity between 1967 and 1969. The first stockholder resolution involving financial relationships with South Africa was raised in 1967 by James Foreman, former Director of the Congress on Racial Equality, at the national meeting of Morgan Guaranty Trust. Morgan Guaranty Trust was one of the banks participating in the consortium of financial institutions which held a $40 million credit arrangement with South Africa.

George Houser, the Director of ACOA at the time, said this about the implications of the shareholders' tactic:

“Considerable publicity was given to the annual shareholders’ meetings of both Chase and First National City Banks. Some depositors and shareholders went to the meetings, or gave their proxies to ACOA representatives, to protest the loans to South Africa. This was the beginning of an effort which rapidly expanded to include investments not only in banks but in large American corporations doing business in southern Africa, particularly South Africa.”

Of all American institutions, the churches were the most receptive to this campaign. They were subjected to pressures, particularly from their black membership, to withdraw their investments from those corporations involved significantly in South Africa. This led to organized efforts within the denominations to look into their investments, and to take actions which could influence corporate policy. In the period of the formation of these committees, ACOA played an important role. Resolutions dealing with credit arrangements were expanded to include corporate responsibility for any economic relationship with South Africa. At first, anti-apartheid activists in ACOA and other organizations conducted investigations into the economic links between U.S. corporations and South Africa investments. Activists then used this information to publicize corporate deeds through testimony before the United Nations, and in shareholders meetings.

As indicated by Houser, church groups were very receptive to this campaign. It is well worth noting that church groups have a long history of involvement, primarily as missionaries, with the continent of Africa. The United States churches in particular have been rather sensitive to race issues in the post-World War II period. They played a visible role challenging Nazism and fascism during the War, as well as challenging segregation in the United States between the Fifties and Sixties. The World Council of Churches brought the issue of racism to the forefront of church debate with the establishment of the Program to Combat Racism. During the middle 1960’s, churches began to place consideration of racism in South Africa on their own agendas. The executive council of the Episcopal Church, for example, called on all Episcopal dioceses and parishes to consider "the moral dilemma" they face by profiting from church investments in South Africa. Consideration of the moral implications of apartheid characterized the church campaign against corporations. In the words of Rev. W. Sterlling Cary, president of the National Council of Churches:

“The United States companies have made huge profits there (in South Africa) while paying their black workers pitifully inadequate wages. They have provided products for the white government and military, thereby strengthening white control They have helped create a

302 Ibid.
flourishing economy - for whites, Church organizations responded to this moral challenge by banding together to wield their large portfolios and raise the issue of apartheid within the board rooms of the corporations themselves. The Board of Missions of the Methodist Church voted to remove a $10 million investment portfolio from First National City Bank in 1967 and the United Church of Christ voted to remove $2 million of investment in other participating banks. 304

As the 1960's ended, the anti-apartheid movement maintained a solid base within both challenger interest and member interest constituencies. Although each constituency approached the anti-apartheid issue from a slightly different angle, in general, there was increased support for directly challenging those institutions economically collaborating with South Africa. The next portion of this chapter examines the changing status of South Africa with respect to the foreign policy agenda of the United States. 305 In this section, U.S. policy interests as well as the changing complexion of policy in the 1960’s are investigated.

3.8 Government Activity

Federal policy makers became rather active around South African issues during the 1960's. This activity was marked by two peaks: one in 1963 and one in 1966. If legislative and executive levels are distinguished from one another, it becomes clear that the 1963 peak is driven by executive level activity and the smaller 1966 peak is driven by legislative activity. During the Sixties, federal activity around South African issues is linked to greater sensitivity to the problems associated with apartheid in South Africa. 306 This sensitivity was encouraged by events both at home and abroad. But, this sensitivity had its limits. Policy in the Sixties illustrates the willingness of federal policy makers to criticize apartheid despite their clear unwillingness to act in ways that might jeopardize the stability of U.S. economic and military interests in South Africa.

This section tackles an in-depth look at federal-level policy activity throughout the 1960's. For purposes of clarity, this section is divided into two parts, each reflecting the periods surrounding peaks of federal government activity.

3.8.1 The Early to Mid-1960

The Sharpeville massacre provoked an immediate response in the United States not just from the community of activists already sensitive to the issue of apartheid but from policy-makers in Congress and the Executive Branch as well. Immediately following Sharpeville, the State Department "expressed regret" over the events and supported international efforts to have the apartheid issue placed on the United Nations Security Council agenda. But governmental concern with Sharpeville was short-lived. 307

306 Ibid.
According to the data set of events recorded in The New York Times, there was an immediate flurry of federal government activity just after the Massacre (March, 1960) and virtually no activity for the rest of the year. Once South Africa restored order in their nation with repressive measures, the urgency of the situation appears to have faded away. It was not until the Kennedy administration was inaugurated in 1961 that a more substantive reconsideration of African policy was initiated. Whereas the Eisenhower Administration paid little attention to African events, the Kennedy Administration seemed more sensitive to the limitations of United States policy toward South Africa. Kennedy had previously chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and in that role spoke out against American duplicity in the region. Referring to Africa, Kennedy said,

"We have deceived ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and displeased no one with this head in the sand policy—when in truth, we have earned the suspicion of all."

Concern for South Africa benefitted Kennedy's campaign as well since domestic racial concerns also played a major role in presidential politics during 1960. Kennedy counted civil rights interests and tore them away from the Republican Party, their political home since the era of Lincoln and the Civil War. Kennedy understood the importance of bringing African-Americans into the New Deal coalition. He brought them in by demonstrating acute sensitivity to their concerns, Africa being one of them. But Kennedy's concern for Africa was still overshadowed by his support for economic and military interests in the region and by his fervent anti-communist stance. While Kennedy was more attentive to the internal politics of African nations, he still grappled with defining an appropriate balance between his dislike for apartheid and support for "the national interest".

Once Kennedy was in office, South Africa took on a relatively low priority for his administration. Kennedy was overwhelmed by other foreign policy issues including Cuba, Berlin, Vietnam, and the Congo during his short tenure as President. In the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre (1960), however, public opinion about United States policy toward South Africa had shifted. The Kennedy administration perceived a broad consensus over the undesirability of apartheid and the issue now was what to do about it. Facing domestic and international pressure for substantive action, the Kennedy administration stepped up its verbal denunciations of apartheid. International pressure was mounting within the United Nations. On a verbal level, the United States was critical of apartheid; substantively, however, the United States resisted acting upon that criticism with diplomatic or economic sanctions. Within three weeks of asking the United Nations to condemn South Africa in 1962, the

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United States voted against a General Assembly call for economic sanctions against South Africa.

By 1963 the United Nations was moving closer toward imposing economic sanctions against South Africa, and the United States was prodded by domestic and international pressure to see if its action would finally match its rhetoric on this issue. Responding to its critics, but also to avoid the embarrassment of appearing to be pressured into action, the Kennedy administration declared that the United States would unilaterally halt all of South Africa from the United Nations and the call for sanctions. This policy of verbal condemnation without substantive sanctions is also captured in “U.S. Asks U.N. to Condemn South Africa’s Race Policy,” regarding military sales to South Africa just days before the United Nations voted for an arms embargo. This was the first significant anti-apartheid action undertaken by the United States government.

Excerpts from a statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, on this issue reveal the Kennedy administration’s sensitivity toward racial concerns at home and abroad which fuelled this decision on arms sales:

“It is all too true that there is scarcely a society of the world that is not touched by some form of discrimination. In my country too many of our Negro citizens still do not enjoy their full civil rights because ancient attitudes stubbornly resist change in spite of the vigorous official policy of the Government. But such indignities are an anachronism that no progressive society can tolerate, and the last vestiges must be abolished with all possible speed. Just as my country is determined to wipe out discrimination in our society it will support efforts to being about a change in South Africa.”

On a rhetorical level Ambassador Stevenson paid homage to mounting pressures on the Kennedy administration to directly tackle racial issues. On a policy level though, Danaher believes that Kennedy's arms embargo was more symbolic than concrete. Danaher notes that Stevenson included the following proviso in this speech:

"There are existing contracts which provide for limited quantities of strategic equipment for defense against external threats, such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines. We must honour these contracts."

This quote was drawn from the excerpts of Adlai Stevenson's speech reprinted in the "U.S. Tells U.N. It Will Halt Arms Sale to South Africa," The New York Times, August 3, 1963.

This caveat allowed the Kennedy administration to honour a previously negotiated contract allowing the United States to maintain a space tracking station in South Africa in exchange for American weapons. Despite the United Nations arms embargo, South Africa was able to continue expanding its military capabilities. Kennedy's position, while lacking in substance, allowed the Administration to symbolically appear to support isolating South Africa from participation in the international community while continuing to protect United States economic and military interests in the region.\(^{317}\) In essence, during the early to mid 1960’s, President Kennedy continued to walk the line between economic and military interests, and moral concern for apartheid, established by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Forces external to the Administration—particularly activity within the United Nations and domestic pressure from civil rights leaders and public opinion—were able, however, to shape the policy debate surrounding foreign policy relations with South Africa.

3.8.2 The Johnson Administration Takes Over

Between 1964 and 1969, President Kennedy's definition of concern for South Africa (i.e. criticize apartheid while protecting military and economic interests in the region) persisted on the governmental and decision agendas. President Johnson essentially extended Kennedy policies in the region. South Africa remained a lucrative marketplace for U.S. corporate activities throughout the Sixties.\(^{318}\) During this period, United States investments in South Africa continued to expand and yield a consistently bigger rate of return—between 179 & and 23%. Business leaders in America actually expressed support for apartheid as a political system legitimately working to solve South Africa's problems.

But there was increasing momentum within the United States to isolate South Africa as Johnson entered office. The President was unable to devote significant energy to this problem, however, as his resources were largely expended protecting civil rights and battling black militants at home, funding and fighting a tactical nightmare in Vietnam.\(^{319}\)

Johnson officially continued to condemn apartheid while maintaining an amicable relationship with the South African government. Over time, though even the symbolic denunciations of apartheid became standard operating procedure and non-threatening, Johnson did extend Kennedy's arms embargo to cover additional military products such as materials used to construct weapons.

The Johnson administration also followed the lead of President Kennedy by continuing to participate in United Nation's debates on South Africa. The United States even pushed symbolic condemnation of South Africa a bit further in 1964 by supporting a United Nations resolution to study the practical legal and economic consequences of imposing sanctions on South Africa. And in 1967, U.N. Ambassador Goldberg denounced apartheid as "one of the


greatest offenses against human rights still existing in the world". One year later, Vice-President Humphrey called for self determination in South Africa.

3.8.3 Congress Becomes Involved

Throughout the 1960's, United States foreign policy toward South Africa was largely driven by Presidential initiatives. According to events recorded in The New York Times, Congress was not an active participant in the policy debate during the first half of the decade. Congressional voices were beginning to be raised by 1965 however, with a peak of activity in 1966. Aware of the Administration's weak substantive position regarding apartheid, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa held its first hearings into United States policy interests in South Africa during the middle Sixties. These hearings were designed mostly to serve as information sessions. As a legislative body, Congress gave no indication that it was willing to get involved in making foreign policy.

The boldest signal of legislative interest came from one individual: Senator Robert Kennedy. Kennedy announced in 1965 that he would travel to South Africa in 1966 as an invited guest of the National Union of South Africa students. During his internationally publicized trip, Kennedy labelled apartheid "one of the evils of the world" and likened it to serfdom in India, mass slaughter in Indonesia, and the jailing of intellectuals in the Soviet Union. The New York Times said Kennedy's speech was "one of the most important by a visitor to South Africa." For all the rhetoric, however, Kennedy still put forth a pro-corporate perspective of South African events. Upon his return to the United States, Kennedy applauded South Africa's economy as "the greatest force in breaking apartheid. He adamantly opposed any cut-off in United States trade with South Africa. Senator Kennedy encouraged big business to maintain their ties to South Africa and to offer racial equality in the workplace. While Kennedy brought more public attention to the issue of apartheid; he also helped to defend United States' economic and military interests in the region, as traditionally defined.

In summary, the policy agenda regarding South Africa changed somewhat during the Sixties. It became more important to criticize apartheid rather than to ignore it. Importantly though, this criticism continued to be tempered by the government's concern for economic and military interests in the region. Despite the development of a broad-based anti-apartheid movement challenging institutional investment patterns (sometimes successfully), the national government continued to maintain a primary interest in protecting the United States alliance with South Africa, with only a distant secondary interest in raising concerns about the apartheid system.

321 Ibid.
3.9 The Anti-Apartheid Movement: Consolidation and Expanding Influence

The anti-apartheid movement continued to flourish throughout the Seventies, according to events recorded in The New York Times. Other than in 1970 and 1975, movement activists maintained a visible presence in the media. There was a peak of activity recorded in The New York Times in 1978. The anti-apartheid movement was sustained largely by religious groups conducting stockholder campaigns in the early to mid-Seventies, and by civil rights/black organizations and students in the latter Seventies. Campaigns against financial institutions had ceased by 1972.326 An anti-corporate focus largely dominated the movement in the 1970's and there was a peak of anti-university/college activity during 1978 and 1979.

This section divides the Seventies into two periods corresponding with the pace of anti-apartheid movement activity during the decade. Movement activity between 1970 and 1975 is first examined, then activity between 1976 and 1979 is developed.327 In addition to the nature of Movement activity-the composition of actors and their targets-this section focuses on the consolidation of movement resources, shifting definitions of the apartheid problem within the Movement, and changes in the policy solutions it preferred.

3.9.1 Consolidation and Conflict: 1970 to 1975

The political and social context of the early 1970's was influenced most clearly by an explosion of social movement participation: The Anti Vietnam war movement, the Civil Rights movement, and the Black Power movement. Other social movements were also being spawned as the United States entered the Seventies: The Ecology movement, the Women’s Rights movement, and the Gay and Lesbian rights movement.328 This social milieu combined with President Nixon's reversal of the Kennedy/Johnson position on South Africa propelled the anti-apartheid movement to higher levels of mobilization in the United States.

The primary actors in the anti-apartheid movement continued to be many of the groups active during the Sixties: shareholders, religious groups, civil rights and other black activist groups. As the Movement grew during this period, there was increasing support for the consolidation of scarce resources. New organizations, such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Trans-Africa, and The Washington Office of Africa, were founded to offer better coordination of movement efforts.329 Unlike the diversity of foci during the Sixties however, during the Seventies, the anti-apartheid movement also became more unified in its anti-corporate focus. As the Movement grew and began sharing resources, it reformulated its position with respect to the best strategy for effectively attacking the apartheid system. Two examples of anti-corporate efforts by anti-apartheid movement activists during the early Seventies follow. These examples illustrate not only the importance of the anti-corporate focus to the Movement, they also illustrate the shifting understanding of the best strategy to effectively challenge apartheid.

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327 Ibid.
3.9.2 The Corporals' Shareholders' Campaign

The anti-corporate strategy was designed to bold corporations directly accountable for the consequences of their operations and investments in South Africa. It was a strategy which emerged from a growing understanding of the important relationship between economic activity in South Africa and support for apartheid. During the Seventies, this strategy was pursued largely by institutional investors such as church organizations. As one important church leader put it, If our corporations make some of the highest profits in the world while doing business there (in South Africa) and we as institutional investors benefit from those profits, we then directly profit from apartheid. The contemporary corporate responsibility movement was kicked off in 1971 with an Episcopal Church-sponsored shareholder resolution asking General Motors to withdraw from South Africa. This resolution was "an early, active expression of the 2.8 million member church's opposition to apartheid".

Investor representatives attended stockholder meetings and directly raised the anti-apartheid issue to the corporate agenda by introducing anti apartheid resolutions for consideration by the full voting body. These efforts constituted the cutting edge of the anti-apartheid movement between 1971 and 1975. In 1971, Protestant churches involved in shareholders' campaigns and working with the National Council of Churches consolidated their resource base and established the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). According to ICCR's current Director of South Africa programs, Donna Katzin, ICCR's mission was "to coordinate the work of our members in promoting corporate responsibility in the areas of priority which our members have selected...The top priority area is South Africa. Other top priorities are militarism, equal opportunity and alternative investments..."

Church groups were not unfamiliar with the use of stockholder resolutions as a means of creating a voice in the consideration of broader social goals. Churches first became aware of their investment power during the efforts to challenge U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the latter Sixties. Dow Chemical, for example, was the focus of many church sponsored resolutions because of their production of Napalm for use in the jungles of Vietnam. Since its inception, ICCR was responsible for researching social profiles of corporations, exploring alternative socially-conscious investments, and assisting church groups in the filing of shareholder resolutions. Early church participants involved in challenging corporate activities in South Africa included the American Baptist Churches, The Protestant Episcopal Church in the USA, the United Methodist Church, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A and the Unitarian-Universalist Association, as well as the National Council of Churches, the Methodist Church, and the Roman Catholic Franciscans.

During the early 1970's, shareholder resolutions sponsored by coalitions of these church groups were raised at the national meetings of Chase Manhattan Bank, Fidelity Trust Bank,

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331 Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, (Eds), "Interest Groups Politics", pp. 191-216.
332 Ibid.
General Motors. AMAX corporation, AT & T Union Carbide, General Electric, Ford, Goodyear, Kraft, Polaroid, Sears-Roebuck, Xerox, Burroughs, Exxon, and Mobil. In 1975, a coalition of 14 Protestant church groups and Roman Catholic orders representing $9 million of stock brought a proposal to the IBM shareholders meeting asking it to stop selling or leasing computers to the South African Government.

During the early Seventies, stockholder resolutions typically fell into two categories: fact-finding resolutions and limited disengagement resolutions. Fact-finding resolutions called upon corporations to either disclose their full range of operations and investments in South Africa or called upon corporations to establish special committees to investigate the implications of their investments in South African projects, paying special attention to employment conditions for black South Africans. The second, less frequently invoked, category of resolutions proposed that corporations cease from directly supporting the institutional apparatus enforcing apartheid in South Africa. Sometimes this included ending sales of equipment to police, and other times this included totally shutting down manufacturing operations in South Africa.

The results of the church-based stockholder campaign were mainly symbolic at the time, but significant nonetheless for potentially influencing national problem and policy streams. First, churches firmly committed themselves to a public, moral stand, not just against apartheid, but against racism in South Africa. They educated millions of lay people about the economic linkages between consumer-oriented, business-as-usual in the United States and support for the apartheid regime. Church-based resolutions effectively legitimated concern about apartheid for a broad middle-class public in the United States.

A range of policy solutions including economic sanctions, divestment and disinvestment were suggested by this activity. Second, the church-based shareholders' campaign put the anti-apartheid issue squarely on the corporate agenda. Corporate leaders were forced into the position of having to support the moral goals of the churches' battle against racism while simultaneously having to defend their firms' investments in South Africa. Corporate leaders ultimately responded to this challenge by denying the relationship between corporate investments in South Africa and the continuation of apartheid. They stated very clearly that they were in business to make money, not foreign policy. Some tried to characterize their investments as bettering conditions for their black employees. This excerpt from a newspaper story about General Motors illustrates this point:

"While General Motors recognizes the complex issues that result from race restriction in South Africa, its employment record is an indication of the progressive change which has occurred over the years. The corporation is convinced that its

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337 Ibid.
operations in South Africa are helping to build a climate in which desired social changes can be further implemented”.\textsuperscript{339}

Thus, for the first time, the anti-apartheid movement employed leverage manipulation to manoeuvre corporations into a position where they had to defend their investments in South Africa. Public pressure against corporations intensified. General Motors was especially embarrassed, in 1971, when the newly appointed African American member of their Board of Directors, Reverend Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia, voted in favour of an Episcopal resolution calling for G.M. to close its plants in South Africa. Of course, the corporate rhetoric opposed apartheid, as David Rockefeller said while defending Olase Manhattan's economic activity as a shareholders' meeting:

"None of us at Chase Manhattan holds any brief for the South African Government's policy of separation of the races”.\textsuperscript{340}

This was said David Rockefeller while defending Olase Manhattan's economic activity in South Africa at a shareholders' meeting. But the reality of the corporate position in the Seventies is illustrated by this excerpt from The New York Times:

“Following the growing debate in the last year on American business involvement in South Africa, several United States companies operating in this country have increased pay and improved working conditions for their black employees. But recent investigations also show that, out of some 300 subsidiaries or affiliates of United States corporations in South Africa, only a few-probably fewer than 10 per cent -are attempting to improve the lot of their black workers. The rest are largely content to slouch behind a curtain of apartheid restrictive labour laws that limit opportunities for black advancement in white industry.”\textsuperscript{341}

Perhaps the most significant development to come out of the shareholders' resolutions campaign was that the anti-apartheid movement was, for the first time, able to construct a national, widely publicized campaign around the connection between corporate behaviour, institutional investments and apartheid politics. Anti-apartheid activists used this tactic to demand that the public consequences of private investments-such as the impact of support for racism-be publicly scrutinized.

\textbf{3.9.3 The Polaroid Workers’ Campaign}

Just as more militant anti-apartheid activists in the sixties were frustrated with the moderate approach taken by civil rights leaders, some elements of the anti-apartheid movement were frustrated by the moderate approach of using resolutions to challenge corporate activity in


South Africa. They wished to make a more direct assault against corporate operations.\textsuperscript{342} This frustration is best symbolized by a highly publicized campaign which directly attacked corporate policies at the Polaroid Corporation. This campaign was orchestrated by workers at a Polaroid Plant working in collusion with the American Committee on Africa during the early Seventies. This effort was called the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement (PRWM)

In reaction to public attention on South Africa, Polaroid had previously announced that it would initiate a pilot project to improve black South African salaries, job opportunities and education for its employees. The PRWM launched a public campaign to expose the duplicity of this policy.\textsuperscript{343} They argued that Polaroid's pilot program ultimately supported the continuation of apartheid because it failed to address underlying problems facing blacks in South Africa (e.g. their inability to participate in political and legal structures).

The Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement wanted to initiate a worldwide boycott of Polaroid products. While the PRWM was unable to ever mount an effective international boycott against Polaroid, the controversy drew substantial attention from the mass media.

Why was this campaign significant? First, Polaroid publicly committed itself to a policy of opposition to apartheid and it acknowledged the importance of trying to change apartheid through company action. Second, this event signalled the entrance of the black community into the corporate responsibility debate.\textsuperscript{344} And third, this entrance pushed the debate about corporate responsibility beyond the church position of responsibility through reform. It raised the policy solution of total corporate disengagement from South Africa as a method for ending apartheid.

This debate of reform versus disengagement pierced through both the black and religious anti-apartheid communities during the early 1970's. In 1972, the World Council of Churches moved toward the more militant approach by "liquidating its financial stake in all corporations doing business with white-ruled African countries."\textsuperscript{66} This action, including approximately $3.8 million in corporate stock, was designed to serve as an example for the Council's 250 Protestant and Orthodox member churches.\textsuperscript{345} It took until the latter half of the Seventies for other churches to begin totally divesting their own assets from corporations involved in South Africa.

This conflict over policy preferences within the anti-apartheid movement does not overshadow the unity experienced by the Movement during the early Seventies with respect to defining the apartheid problem in both moral and economic terms.\textsuperscript{346} The Movement was able to reach out to a large number of people during this period, some consolidation of resources took place, and the Movement moved toward defining the problem with apartheid more forcefully in economic terms.

\textsuperscript{342} Russel J. Dalton, "Citizen Politics in Western Democracies", p.88.
\textsuperscript{344} A. 0. Hero and J. Barratt, (ed), "The American People and South Africa", pp. 103-121.
\textsuperscript{345} Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, (Eds), "Interest Groups Politics", pp. 191-216.
\textsuperscript{346} A. 0. Hero and J. Barratt, (Ed), "The American People and South Africa", pp. 103-122.
3.9.4 Movement Mobilization: 1976 to 1979

Up to the mid-1970's oven political resistance to apartheid in South Africa had been driven underground in by the Pretoria regime. During the late 1970's, however, a cultural movement among South African blacks began to fill the political vacuum that had been created during the 1970's. This movement—the Black Consciousness Movement—was particularly popular among urban black intellectuals in South Africa.\(^{347}\) Political resistance within the urban townships was kindled by internal pressures such as the rapid urbanization of the black population in response to rural poverty and an overwhelmed urban bureaucracy.

Turmoil in the South African townships came to a head when the South African government tried to enforce cultural hegemony through the Bantu Education Act. This policy decreed that black children would be educated in the language of Afrikaans, a Dutch dialect, not in their native Bantu language. Urban areas exploded in June 1976 under the weight of township pressures and the Afrikaans language policy. Most notable of these explosions was the Soweto uprisings. Six hundred lives were lost when these uprisings were violently suppressed by the South African police. This "marked the culmination of black consciousness as a political force.\(^{348}\)

The 1976 uprisings brought renewed international attention to the apartheid regime. The depth of the apartheid problem was made apparent when Steven Biko, a popular leader of the Black Consciousness Movement was illegally detained, then tortured and murdered by the South African police in 1977. It was against this background of renewed repression in South Africa that the United States anti-apartheid movement surged in activity between 1976 and 1978.\(^{349}\) This surge was reflected in The New York Times coverage of United States anti-apartheid movement events. The movement consisted of more ardent activity from its traditional political constituents: the religious community (shareholders), students, and the civil rights community. Some neighborhood/community-based activity also emerged during this period. The anti-apartheid movement primarily targeted the government in the 1976 to 1977 period, corporate targets in the 1977 to 1979 period, and universities and colleges between 1978 and 1979.\(^{350}\)

3.9.5 The Civil Rights Community

Between 1976 and 1979, moderate civil rights organizations rallied strongly around the apartheid issue. As in the 1960's and early 1970's, traditional black leaders avoided a mass-based mobilization strategy and instead pursued a conventional lobbying campaign. Prominent leaders of the now diminishing Civil Rights movement focused their individual and group pleas on political leaders.\(^{351}\) This was the case, for example, in 1976 when Rev. Ralph Abernathy, President of the SCLC, and other black leaders appealed to Secretary of State Kissinger not to meet with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

\(^{349}\) Ibid.
\(^{351}\) Russell J. Dalton, “Citizen Politics in Western Democracies”, p.90.
The election of President Carter and Carter’s subsequent appointment of Andrew Young as Ambassador to the United Nations was interpreted by the African-American community as a symbol of greater access to the foreign policy-making process. This effort brought renewed anticipation to the civil rights community and it continued to encourage leaders concerned with apartheid issues to pursue an "inside" strategy more closely associated with the power of member interests rather than an "outside" strategy that challenger interests must follow. Black leaders continued to appeal to President Carter to leave “no stone unturned” in the fight against apartheid.

Civil rights participation in apartheid issues expanded, and became more radical, when the National Action for the Advancement of Coloured People’s (NAACP) Task Force on Africa was mandated to develop a meaningful policy position toward South Africa. The reports of this committee in 1978 whole-heartedly endorsed corporate divestment and economic sanctions. In 1978, the NAACP membership passed a resolution at their national meeting calling for the total pull-out of U.S. businesses from South Africa. Later in the year they called for a wide range of sanctions to be imposed on the Pretoria regime.

Renewed civil rights action was also visible at a conference of black religious leaders in New York City. Jesse Jackson emerged as an outspoken opponent of apartheid in 1979. The New York Times first recorded his participation in the issue when he and other African-American leaders lobbied Sonny Werblin to stop a boxing match arranged with a South African fighter. Later in 1979 Jackson toured South Africa and met with blacks in squatter camps and U.S. corporate executives operating in South Africa. While more activist in orientation, Jackson still pursued insider tactics (i.e. lobbying elites) in his efforts.

The insider strategy of civil rights leaders on this issue is perhaps best typified by the role played by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) on African issues. In 1976, the CBC organized the Black Leadership Conference on Southern Africa. This meeting brought together 120 black leaders from major civil rights organizations, business, labour, religion; civic associations and public office. One of the most important developments of this conference was the African-American Manifesto which represented a consensus within the black community for condemnation of United States political and economic support of apartheid and South Africa.

Another important development produced at this meeting was a new organization-Trans-Africa. Trans-Africa was initiated as the black American lobby for African and Caribbean issues. Randall Robinson was appointed executive director of the organization. Trans-Africa’s expressed purpose was to "influence the US Congress and Executive branch of Government to fashion progressive and enlightened policies toward the black Third World; National Council of Churches, and the Board of Global Ministries/United Methodist

353 Ibid.
Church.\textsuperscript{356} Its goal was to generate elite support and to lobby key public figures in Congress and the Executive branch on issues of importance to the African-American community. Tactically, it pursued this goal with cocktail parties, annual dinners, direct lobbying, and testimony at Congressional hearings.

Trans-Africa focused primarily upon Rhodesian sanctions throughout its first two years of operation. During this period, Randall Robinson testified several times before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and met with President Carter and Secretary of State Vance on various occasions.\textsuperscript{357} It may be argued that Trans-Africa could claim some credit for the firmness of the Carter administration on sanctions against Rhodesia in 1979-1980. By 1980, Trans-Africa set to work almost exclusively on South African policy issues.

The formation of Trans-Africa in 1976 represents a consolidation of resources and institutionalization of the "insider strategy among the African-American civil rights community in the United States."\textsuperscript{358} Interestingly, it was public officials who facilitated formation of Trans-Africa in order to promote the voice of black Americans in foreign affairs. At this time, the civil rights community identified its interests more as a member of the polity rather than as a challenger of the polity. It responded to prevailing opportunities by avoiding mobilization tactics.

Metz reviews the conditions which fostered this state of affairs:

\begin{quote}
"The increase in the number, seniority, and political skill of black congressmen, along with the affinity of the Carter administration for the anti-apartheid program, appeared to create the proper conditions for inside strategies..."\textsuperscript{359}
\end{quote}

This shift to inside strategies, however, took place under very special circumstances. Not only did the anti-apartheid movement have a valuable ally within the administration in UN Ambassador Andrew Young, but it also had the sympathy of the President and the Secretary of State. And perhaps even more importantly, the Soweto riots of 1976 in South Africa and the government crackdown on black opposition to apartheid in the fall of 1977 greatly increased public awareness of the situation in that nation.\textsuperscript{360} This meant that the anti-apartheid movement could spend less time on public education and mobilization and more on direct lobbying and legislative activity.

### 3.9.6 The Shareholders' Campaign

Religious organizations vigorously renewed their attack on the corporate role in South Africa with stockholder resolutions during the late Seventies. According to the Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility, the number of proposed resolutions quadrupled between 1975 and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{356} C. Coker, "The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985", p.79.
\item \textsuperscript{357} "Current Situation in South Africa." Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, September 6, 1979. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.
\item \textsuperscript{358} James E. Anderson, "Public Policy-Making", p.97.
\item \textsuperscript{359} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
1979. Fact-finding resolutions of the early Seventies gave way to more militant demands for corporate disinvestment in South Africa.\textsuperscript{361} During Spring, 1979, a coalition of Roman Catholic and Methodist Church groups brought a resolution to the General Electric meeting asking GE to discontinue their South African operations until apartheid ended. A similar resolution was brought to the annual meetings of Manufacturers Hanover, General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and Goodyear. The United Church of Christ also sent out a broad appeal for corporations and banks to withdraw from South Africa. The National Council of Churches, representing over 30 million parishioners, urged their member churches to divest their portfolios of investments in corporations and financial institutions operating in South Africa.\textsuperscript{362} Local church groups were also encouraged to take independent action with their own investments.

Realizing the potential power of Anti-apartheid activists, corporations seized upon a response that allowed them to seemingly support movement concerns while not harming corporate profit margins. Corporations attempted to co-opt movement efforts by supporting a set of fair labour practices devised by Reverend Leon Sullivan, the black Minister sitting on the General Motors Board who voted in favour of the 1971 church-based resolution to close company plants in South Africa.\textsuperscript{363} The Sullivan Principles emerged in March, 1977 as a result of Sullivan's own frustrating efforts to encourage General Motors to leave South Africa. These principles included equal pay for equal work, non-segregation in the workplace, and development of training programs for black workers.

The Sullivan code caught on. In the wake of the Soweto uprisings and the rapid expansion of the divestment movement in the United States, American businessmen had grown apprehensive about the safety of their investments in South Africa. By the end of 1978, there were 105 signatories to the Sullivan principles. One year later, there were 135. The Sullivan plan for fair employment practices received nothing but praise from official circles. Written in consultation with U.S. business leaders, the Principles were hailed by the State Department as a potentially major force for change in South Africa "and given the strong support" of the United States government.

The importance of the Sullivan Principles should not be underestimated. Since shareholders' campaigns were first initiated, corporations and banks tried to delegitimize claims made by anti-apartheid activists and defend their financial interests in South Africa. These institutions disavowed any relationship between their operations in South Africa and the system of apartheid. However, the rapid rate at which corporations affirmed their adherence to the Sullivan principles signalled two new developments.\textsuperscript{365} First, by pledging to improve

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid.
conditions for their South African workers, corporations accepted the anti-apartheid movement’s claim that they bear responsibility for the consequences of their activities in South Africa. Second, quick adoption of the Sullivan principles affirmed the mounting power of the anti-apartheid movement. The movement was having more success influencing corporate agendas vis-a-vis the power of investment portfolios, than it was having influencing national foreign policy vis-a-vis lobbying tactics.

The anti-apartheid movement was also able to win other tangible successes in the battle against corporate operations in South Africa during the late Seventies. Polaroid, the company which initiated a pilot program to better conditions for black workers in its South African plants, stopped shipping its products to South Africa after learning that its film was being used by the South African police for passbook identification.366 Also, Control Data, a computer company, cited repression in South Africa as a reason for adopting a policy of non-expansion in that nation. On the other hand, the Sullivan Principles offered a method for multinational interests to substitute reformism for the more militant disinvestment orientation of the anti-apartheid movement. This corporate tactic seems to have been effective since by 1978 the stockholder’s campaign became a less important component of the anti-apartheid movement. By 1977 to 1978, students were defining the cutting edge of anti-apartheid movement activity.367

3.9.7 The Student Movement

Primarily through experiences with the Vietnam War and civil rights struggles, a culture of protest, so to speak, had developed on college and university campuses in the United States. By the late Seventies, students knew that protest was an effective vehicle for promoting strongly held concerns. They had the knowledge and experience to assure that their protest campaigns would be effective. Against this background, student protesters once again became involved in campus-based Anti-apartheid activity in 1977 and 1978.368 Students campaigned to encourage colleges and universities to divest their portfolios of investments in businesses operating in South Africa.

According to Stevens and Lubetkin the South African issue tapped into the growing belief, initially by some students and faculty and later by administrators and trustees, that universities did not exist independently from the country's economic system and that by virtue of their ownership of corporate securities they were inextricably involved in the actions of the corporations in which they held investments.369 In 1977, Anti-apartheid protests were held at the University of Massachusetts, The University of California at Berkeley (400 arrested), and at Smith College. The student movement picked up steam in 1978 with protests at Stanford University (294 arrested), Ohio University, Princeton University, Brown University, Miami University, Harvard University, Williams College, Rutgers

University, Tufts University, Phillip Exeter Academy, University of Michigan, Hampshire College, Brandeis University, and Columbia University. The New York Times reflected on student Anti-apartheid campaigns in 1978 with the headline "South Africa is New Social Issue for College Activists." Campus protests engendered a variety of outcomes. In some rare cases, such as at the University of Massachusetts, institutions voted for total divestment. More frequently, institutions rejected divestment as was the case with the California Board of Regents in 1977. The most typical reaction by higher education institutions in the late 1970's was a mid-level response. Like corporations, universities and colleges often acknowledged that apartheid was a problem, but, based on financial constraints (or simply a lack of resolve on the issue), they approved resolutions only to endorse investments in corporations which supported the Sullivan Principles. In some cases, schools partially divested themselves of stocks in companies which refused to sign the Sullivan Principles or in companies which refused to adequately respond to inquiries about their South African operations. Such was the case at Smith College and Rutgers University.

The Student campaign experienced rapid growth in 1978. But, this campaign was significantly different from other anti-apartheid activities taking place in the late Seventies. The major difference was that the students had more access to the decision-making structures at colleges and universities than shareholders did at corporations, or African-Americans did with policy-makers. The result was a greater rate of success at promoting their interests and moving the issue onto the agenda of targeted institutions. Between 1978 and 1979, 26 higher education institutions divested approximately $87 million of stocks in corporations involved in South Africa. And, campus divestments were on the upswing as the Seventies ended.

The successes of the student campaigns in the late 1970's infused the movement with a sense of empowerment. They brought widespread media attention and public awareness to the apartheid issue. College and university divestments symbolized the power of the public to influence even the direction of investment monies. Pressure was increased on corporations to leave South Africa and on policy-makers to respond to apartheid.

3.9.8 The Community-Based Movement

The turn toward local, grassroots action was reflected in another direction of the anti-apartheid movement during the late Seventies. At the very end of the 1970's, a community-based, neighbourhood movement began organizing for divestment at local, county, and state levels of government.

This campaign was born in 1979 when Berkeley Citizens' Action, a white, activist organization blending New Left politics with Alinsky-style organizing, placed a binding referendum before voters on city investments in corporations involved in South Africa. This

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371 Ibid.
successful initiative, the first of its kind, called upon the city to withdraw $10 million in city funds from banks with loans to South Africa. Another measure, passed at the same time in Berkeley, prohibited city investments in banks that make "indirect" loans by lending to corporations operating in South Africa.374 Sean Gordon of Berkeley Citizens' Action stated that the measures were intended "to stimulate similar initiatives elsewhere in the country.

This grassroots organizing approach proved at the end of the Seventies to be an effective tactic for building local support for opposition to apartheid. It is important to note, however, that this campaign for local divestments first took hold in University dominated towns where the on campus movement had already been strong or in progressive states with historically liberal governments.375 In 1980, Cambridge, Massachusetts and Davis, California passed ordinances prohibiting new investments in firms operating in South Africa; and, Michigan passed a law prohibiting the deposit of state funds in banks making loans to South Africa.

As the Seventies closed, the anti-apartheid movement was thriving. Vigorous protests were taking place in a wide array of arenas by a diverse group of actors: African-Americans were lobbying national policy-makers for economic sanctions, religious groups were raising divestment resolutions at shareholders' meetings, students were protesting and getting arrested on college and university campuses, community-based organizations were combining elements of protest, lobbying, and electoral politics to encourage local, county and state level divestments.376 The trend at this time was squarely in the more militant camp of ending economic collaboration with South Africa. Successes were being won within the arenas which offered the greatest opportunities for access to policy by Anti-apartheid activists.377 The next section of this chapter refocuses attention to national foreign policy developments taking place in the United States during the Seventies.

3.10 Government Activity

The US national government maintained a relatively stable level of involvement with South African affairs throughout Seventies. Brief peaks of activity correspond to the Soweto massacre (1976) and the inauguration of Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy initiatives (1978). Government activity is largely driven by the Executive branch activity between 1970 and 1979.378 As this section demonstrates, presidential initiatives and events in South Africa had more influence over the national foreign policy agenda during the Seventies than did anti-apartheid movement activity. While anti-apartheid policies did move to the governmental agenda briefly during the Seventies, they did so at the behest of legislative entrepreneurs.

Their efforts did not garner enough support, however, to effectively challenge presidential initiatives in the area of South African relations. The Seventies began with policy-makers giving a low priority to South African issues vis-a-vis the governmental agenda. Although

375 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
President Nixon undertook a policy review of the U.S. relationship with South Africa when first elected in 1969, once his policy course was established (by 1970), the issue took on less importance. The national legislature attempted to consider the U.S. role with respect to South Africa in 1971 but, by 1973, South Africa was off the governmental agenda. It was left to the Ford administration in 1974 and 1975 to revive concern for the policy area.379

Upon entering the White House in 1969, President Nixon ordered his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to review major foreign policy issues confronting the new administration. South Africa was included on this list. In December 1969, National Security Study Memorandum 39 was presented to the National Security Council.380 It outlined the contradictory nature of United States interests in South Africa and assessed the substance of previous South Africa policy choices. This report said:

“The aim of present policy is to try to balance our economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states with the political interests of disassociating the U.S. from the white minority regimes and their repressive racial policies. Decisions have been made ad hoc, on a judgment of benefits and political costs at a given moment. But the strength of this policy-its flexibility-is also its weakness... [U.S.) objectives are to a degree contradictory-pursuit of one may make difficult the successful pursuit of one or more of the others. Moreover, views as to the relative priority among these objectives vary widely...But the range of feasible policy options is limited.”381

Kissinger’s policy review concluded with a list of options. These options ranged from the U.S. improving its relationship with South Africa to the U.S. disassociating itself from the white regime.382 Coker summarizes these options:

1: Closer association with the white regime in order to better protect America’s economic and strategic interests. It assumed that the United States could have no significant impact on events in South Africa, and that the political costs of underwriting the status quo would not be excessive.

2: Closer association with Pretoria in an effort to persuade it to reform the political system. It assumed that black violence would be unavailing, even counter productive. Constructive change could only be brought about by the acquiescence of the whites themselves.

3: Strictly limited cooperation with South Africa in an attempt to safeguard its interests while at the same time adopting a posture acceptable to world opinion. Such a posture need not entail giving up its material interests.

380 Ibid.
381 National Security Study Memorandum 39 was presented to the National Security Council, December 1969.
4: Dissociation from South Africa and closer relations with the black nationalists. Since the interests of the United States were not vital, this seemed a reasonable price to pay.

5: Dissociation from both sides in an attempt to limit American involvement. The racial conflict in Southern Africa was unmanageable and potentially dangerous and would grow worse despite any efforts the West might make.\textsuperscript{383}

It is believed that Kissinger recommended Option 2. This option assumed that "the whites are here to stay" and the blacks have "no hope" of achieving political rights through violent means. Option 2 encouraged President Nixon to work for "constructive change by dropping the rhetoric about racial injustice in South Africa and by encouraging reform of apartheid through friendly support of the white regime. President Nixon ultimately adopted Option 2 It was, in essence, an extension rather than a challenge to the middle road policy established by previous presidential administrations.\textsuperscript{384} It embodied recognition of the comity of United States and South Africa economic and military interests. But, while Nixon's South Africa policy shifted the balance of policy more in favour of the interests of the white regime, the administration simultaneously recognized the importance of not isolating the United States from the international community-specifically black states in Africa-that opposed apartheid. To solicit the support of these black nations, Nixon offered economic assistance to the Southern Africa region.\textsuperscript{385} He was able to justify his South Africa policy in terms of protecting United States interests abroad while working with the South African regime to reform apartheid restrictions.

According to Kissinger:

\begin{quote}
"We can by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial polices [sic] and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states help to draw the growing together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change."
\end{quote}

Attempting to encourage the Pretoria government, the Nixon administration offered "positive sanctions to South Africa. These sanctions were intended to lure South Africa toward reform rather than to reward South Africa for reforms after completion.

Positive sanctions came primarily in two forms: relaxation of credit restrictions established during the Johnson administration and gutting the arms embargo levied by President Kennedy. In the first example, Johnson had authorized Export-Import credit restrictions on South African loans during his administration. The political benefit of this for Johnson, according to Danaher (1985), was to minimize U.S. involvement with the South Africa

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{386} C. Coker, "The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985", p.84.
\end{flushleft}
economy and to resist further domestic and international pressures to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. These restrictions were revoked by the Nixon administration.

Nixon also eased arms embargo restrictions against South Africa. President Nixon authorized the selling of "dual-use items to the South African military. These items, mostly aircraft, could fall under either civilian or military use categories. President Nixon also allowed items specifically designed for military applications to be sold to civilian buyers with approval from the Departments of Commerce and State. Nixon's role in the United Nations during the early Seventies also reflected his general strategy of backing away from publicly criticizing South Africa while trying to maintain an image of not supporting apartheid. The United States abstained from a 1970 vote in the United Nations to tighten arms embargo restrictions and, for the first time, the U.S. cast a negative vote when the annual anti-apartheid resolution was considered in the General Assembly.

In the final analysis, the means of "positive sanctions" quickly became separated from the ends of reforming apartheid South Africa benefitted from a more liberal United States policy stance without offering anything in return. By 1971, Nixon's South African policy was in place. He was now able to push the issue aside and devote more attention to pressing problems in Southeast Asia and to building a detente-based relationship with the Soviet Union. Throughout the rest of Nixon's tenure, his administration gave low visibility to the issue and the policy agenda remained stable. Nixon's policy of "benign neglect" is reflected in the lack of news articles about Nixon's role in South Africa appearing in The New York Times between 1971 and 1973. But while Nixon was trying to minimize publicity on South African affairs, some legislators and candidates in the 1972 presidential election pushed to have South Africa considered on the foreign affairs agenda.

3.10.1 Legislators and Candidates Attempt to Become Involved

The Executive branch of government (the President, Secretary of State, the State Department) has traditionally had sole charge of defining and implementing United States policy toward South Africa. Congress has historically acquiesced to this situation. After a series of questionable foreign policy adventures (the Bay of Pigs, the Toakin Gulf incident, troop escalations in Vietnam, the secret war in Laos), however, legislators, in the early Seventies, tried to position themselves so that they could be more involved with foreign policy issues. With Anti-apartheid sentiment clamouring in the streets, in corporate boardrooms, as well as in college and university hallways, a number of legislators began to raise questions about the United States' role in South Africa and brought their concerns to the governmental agenda.

Nixon's policy of "constructive engagement" outraged an already mobilized social movement during the early Seventies and motivated individual Congresspersons such as Senators Kennedy and McGovern, and members of the Black Congressional Caucus, to speak out against U.S. policy toward South Africa. This voice was registered in The New York Times

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388 Ibid.
where a rise in legislative activity can be observed between 1970 and 1972. Anti-South Africa legislation moved to the governmental agenda of Congress for the first time in 1971. In that year, legislation to extend the Sugar Act of 1948 for three years came before the legislature. Bills to cancel the South African sugar quota, which committed the United States to importing a quota of 60,000 tons of South African sugar a year, were introduced into both the House and Senate. Efforts to prohibit sugar imports from South Africa were eventually rejected by both chambers in 1971.

Those opposed to cancelling the South Africa quota believed that the United States should not involve itself in the internal affairs of its friends. This position sounded very similar to United States attempts during the Fifties to define apartheid as an internal problem not subject to United Nations action. Responding to the Senate bill which was introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Russell Long said that South Africa was a dependable supplier of sugar and "if we undertook to say that we were not going to trade with somebody unless we agreed with their domestic policies about segregation or other matters, we would find difficulty trading." The House version of the Anti-South Africa legislation was sponsored by Representative Charles Diggs, then Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and member of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The CBC was formed in 1971 to unite African-American members of Congress and to multiply their respective power. The Senate defeated the Kennedy bill 45-47 in one form, and then 42-55 when the issue was brought up again. The House never voted directly on deletion of South African quotas from the Sugar Bill. Instead, House members attempted to defeat the closed rule with which the Sugar Bill was reported out of committee. Under the closed rule, amendments such as the deletion of South African quotas were barred from consideration. The closed rule was adopted by a vote of 213-136.

From the outset the CBC was particularly concerned with representing the agenda of African-Americans. One of these issue areas was United States policy as it affected Africa. Once organized, the CBC quickly moved to apply pressure on the Nixon administration to take a stronger position challenging apartheid in South Africa. During February, 1971, Representative Diggs and Representative Ron Dellums, another member of the CBC, joined three white Representatives for a House Subcommittee on Africa trip to South Africa. Diggs returned to South Africa in August, 1971 for a fact-finding tour investigating working conditions for blacks in American corporations.

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391 "Divestment Action on South Africa by US College and Universities", The Africa Fund, February 1, 1977, p.44.
392 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
396 Alfred O. Hero and John Barron (Eds), "American People and South Africa", pp. 93-110.
The Congressional Black Caucus attempted to shape South Africa into an election issue for the 1972 Presidential election. The Caucus issued a "Black Bill of Rights" which they defined as non-negotiable demands for African-Americans to support the Democratic nominee. Included in the list was the demand that American business investments in South Africa should be discouraged. Following the 1m Democratic convention, the Party nominee Senator George McGovern-established a study group on Africa to outline his African policy positions.\(^{397}\) McGovern's position was very critical of Nixon's African policy for putting the United States in "league with racist and oppressive forces in Africa."\(^{398}\) In addition to standing against colonial forces in Africa, this report stated that a McGovern administration would end the system where corporations and individuals are given income tax credits for any payments made to South African authorities.

Thus, despite Nixon's conciliatory policy initiatives toward South Africa, entrepreneurial Black legislators, liberal white legislators, and, generally speaking, the Democratic Party, brought anti-South Africa sentiment into legislative and campaign politics during the early Seventies. The fact that legislative involvement arose suddenly in 1971 and vanished just as suddenly by 1973, and that the anti-apartheid movement (especially the shareholders' campaign) was waxing in strength at the same time, indicates that the anti-apartheid movement was only tangentially involved in the issue reaching the governmental agenda at this time.\(^{399}\) The movement may have indirectly created a context within which entrepreneurial legislators drew some support, but the dynamics of the issue reaching the governmental agenda suggest that individual legislators acted out of personal concern, or to promote personal gain or institutional gain in a foreign policy battle with the President, rather than as a response to the demands of mobilized constituents.\(^{400}\)

### 3.10.2 The Ford Years

The policy agenda concerning South African affairs remained rather constant once Gerald Ford became President in late 1973. Henry Kissinger remained as Secretary of State and the policy direction pursued by President Nixon remained in place. By 1974, however, Portugal's withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola together with escalating racial conflict in Rhodesia put United States policy toward southern Africa into a crisis-management phase of operation during the remainder of the Ford administration.\(^{401}\)

Liberation efforts in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau had been organized for more than a decade. United States policy-makers neglected to recognize the importance of these movements until it was too late. Once colonial powers were cast off, the U.S. government was left without a base of support among these newly emergent black nations. The Rhodesian conflict was also erupting at this time.\(^{402}\) To preserve national interests in the region (i.e.
economic links between Africa and the West), the United States tried to mediate between Frontline states, Britain, and South Africa.

In April 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger actively engaged in shuttle diplomacy by visiting Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia and Senegal. He also met with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. With this meeting, Kissinger became the highest ranking United States official to visit South Africa. Kissinger reportedly offered Vorster "incentives" for South Africa to make concessions on Rhodesia. These "incentives" included more “liberal” International Monetary Fund credit arrangements, in addition to the symbolism of the public meeting. Responding to African-American pressure to lend greater visibility to African issues, Kissinger initiated meetings with black leaders such as Jesse Jackson and Judge William Booth, Chairperson of the American Committee on Africa, and with organizations such as the National Urban League in 1976 to "sell" Ford's African position.

Danaher describes the substance of these meetings:

“Although Kissinger initiated these meetings on southern Africa, the black leaders brought their own agenda. They demanded that: Washington communicates to Pretoria in strong terms its opposition to the race policies that had precipitated recent rioting; Kissinger discloses the content of his talks with Prime Minister Vorster; the U.S. grant political asylum to South African refugees; and an official black American fact-finding team visit South Africa.”

The black politicians and civil rights leaders also suggested that Washington pressure American corporations to improve working conditions for their black South African employees. By the end of 1976, new conditions forced a shift in the United States policy agenda once again. Urban uprisings and the Soweto Massacre in South Africa forced policymakers to reconsider the relationship that the United States was procuring with South Africa. This new agenda development meshed with the Human Rights initiatives of the Carter administration.

3.10.3 The Carter Administration: Human Rights or Rhetoric?

The Carter administration came to office with a new foreign policy team. This team was more sensitive to the internal dynamics of African affairs. It was also more committed to human rights as a guiding principle of foreign policy. Government activity surrounding South Africa exploded in 1977 and this explosion was driven almost exclusively by Executive branch reaction to the Soweto Massacre and Carter’s new human rights agenda.

The Soweto uprising coincided with the timing of the Presidential primaries in 1976. South Africa was thrown, once again, into presidential politics. The Democratic Party accepted

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404 Ibid.
platform statements affirming an anti-South Africa position at its national convention during summer, 1976. The Democratic Party adopted all the South Africa-related positions put forward by the leadership of the civil rights community at its national convention, Summer 1976.\textsuperscript{408} These positions reflected the policy solutions defined by the anti-apartheid movement in the early Seventies and signalled an emerging consensus that the United States government needed to condemn apartheid in stronger terms.

The Party specifically called for:

\begin{itemize}
  \item An Africa-centred policy and not a corollary of the kind of anti-Soviet strategy that produced the Angola fiasco;
  
  \item Increased participation of black Americans in the formulation of foreign policy;
  
  \item Strengthening the arms embargo against South Africa; and,
  
  \item Denial of tax advantages to all U.S. corporations in Rhodesia and South Africa who support or participate in apartheid practices and policies.\textsuperscript{409}
\end{itemize}

Democratic Party sensitivity to the African-American agenda on African affairs was further concretized when Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States in November 1976. Jimmy Carter moved into the White House in 196 with moral concern for human rights issues. He immediately nominated Andrew Young, an outspoken veteran of the Civil Rights movement as Ambassador to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{410} Before the new administration was sworn in, Young signalled that a shift in the South African policy agenda would be taking place. This shift was to be expressed both in foreign policy and in the positions adopted by the United States at the United Nations.

Carter assembled a foreign policy team that was quite aware of the track record of "containment," the foreign policy principle justifying intervention in affairs of other nations in order to contain Soviet influence around the world. This track record included humiliation in Vietnam and loss of support among independent African nations.\textsuperscript{411} Political leadership in the United States had also been discredited by Watergate and the reports of Central Intelligence Agency abuses revealed in the Church Committee hearings. Carter's foreign policy team consisted of "a new generation of assistant secretaries and bureau directors, most of whom were critical of the preceding administration's conduct of foreign affairs" (Study Commission of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981:356).\textsuperscript{412} They supported a "regionalist" perspective rather than the "globalist" perspective of the traditional foreign policy establishment. The regionalist perspective recognized that problems in world affairs tend to have local roots in the political, economic, and social affairs of nations. This perspective respects the principles of self-determination and human rights.

\begin{footnotes}
  \footnotetext[408]{"Divestment Action on South Africa by US College and Universities", The Africa Fund, February 1, 1977, p.44.}
  \footnotetext[409]{Ibid.}
  \footnotetext[410]{Kevin. Danaher, "The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa", p.98.}
  \footnotetext[411]{Alfred O. Hero and John Barron (Eds), "American People and South Africa", pp. 93-110.}
  \footnotetext[412]{Paul. Burstein, "Discrimination, Jobs and Politics", p. 27.}
\end{footnotes}
Carter quickly announced his intention to take a tougher stance with South African affairs. According to Danaher:

“The regionalists distinguished their strategy from Kissinger’s by claiming that whereas the previous administration had let Pretoria off the hook regarding apartheid and Namibia in return for cooperation on Rhodesia, the Carter administration would press for reforms on all three fronts. Pretoria would be expected to assist Washington in bringing about a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian conflict, but would also be pressured to reform the grosser aspects of apartheid and cooperate with an internationally acceptable transition to independence in Namibia.”

But what did this mean beyond the rhetoric: composed for public consumption? How far was Carter willing to go in pushing for the reformation of apartheid? At the outset, Carter came racing out of the starting gate. The Carter administration verbally condemned South African President Vorster’s regime in harsh terms. Within three months of coming into office, Ambassador Young labelled reports of people detained by the South African police and then "jumping" out of windows as savage incidents. He also chastised Britain as "a little chicken" in facing up to racial issues in South Africa, and created quite a stir by condemning South African rule as "illegitimate."

Vice-President Mondale met with South African Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna during May 1977. The two leaders clashed in this meeting over the role of black Africans in the South Africa's future. The New York Times captured the tone of this meeting:

“Vice-President Mondale said today that he had warned Prime Minister John Vorster that unless he undertook a 'progressive transformation' of South Africa's white supremacist policies leading to full political and social equality for the black majority, the United States would be forced to undertake diplomatic steps against that nation.”

This meeting was quite significant because it was the first interaction between South Africa and the Carter administration. It was also unprecedented for a high-level United States official to call for full political participation on the part of blacks and an end to discrimination in South Africa. For the first time, Mondale used the concept of 'one-man-one vote' to describe the preferred future for South Africa's political system (Danaher, 1985:157). Mondale said the meeting "cleansed" the United States of the "moral blemish" created by past administration policy toward South Africa. Andrew Young then rubbed salt in South Africa's wounds when he followed Mondale to that nation. On the day of Mondale's meeting with

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Vorster, Young was in South Africa espousing use of the civil rights tactic of nonviolence and economic boycotts against the Vorster regime.

Though Carter came on strong in the beginning of his administration, looking good on the race question to the American public, the problem, as Danaher points out, was that "lost in the verbiage was the fact that the Americans planned no specific actions to back up their demands." An administration review of United States policy toward South Africa came up with these potential actions: (1) withdraw the U.S. military attaché from Pretoria; (2) end exchanges of intelligence information with South Africa; and, (3) reduce Export-Import Bank guarantees for investments in South Africa.

These options ranged from symbolic to punitive, but they did not include options which matched the intensity of the Carter administration rhetoric. Nor did these options reflect the systemic agenda of African Americans. At a time when corporate involvement in South Africa was soaring to new heights—totaling approximately $2 billion in 1976—Carter's policy initiatives did not create room on the policy agenda for the anti-apartheid movement's concern with the linkages between U.S. corporate interests and complicity with racism in South Africa. Also, Carter offered no support for black activists fighting apartheid from within South Africa.

Following the September 12, 1977 death of Steve Biko in South Africa and the government's repressive crackdown on leaders of the black opposition, Carter did support a mandatory United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. However, The United States negotiated to limit the embargo to six months. And, at the same time that he was supporting the arms embargo, Carter vetoed an African-sponsored resolution calling for a ban on foreign investments and credits for South Africa. Beyond the rhetoric, economic and military constraints severely crippled the impact of Carter's human rights position with respect to South Africa. Though sensitive to the agenda of African-Americans, Carter offered the anti-apartheid movement no substantive inroads into the making of South African policy. President Carter and Ambassador Young ultimately abided by the position that corporate interests could act as a progressive force within South Africa. Corporations were, as Ambassador Young told business leader in South Africa, the key to change in that country.

By the end of his administration, President Carter began backsliding on his South African policy. President Vorster of South Africa strategically undertook a counter-offensive to 'Western meddling', during South African elections using a platform of anti-Washington rhetoric and political reform. Vorster's National Party won the election with the largest margin of support in its history.

418 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
globalists among the foreign policy elite began to edge out the regionalists for influence. Carter's position swung back to a position of acquiescence as far as apartheid was concerned. From 1978 to 1980 official U.S. policy preferred to rely upon the idea "that enlightened capitalism would bring international harmony and contribute to the eventual demise of apartheid in the same way that it had allegedly undermined entrenched racism in the American South."\(^423\)

At the end of his term, Carter put his energies into aggressively supporting the Sullivan Code for fair employment practices in South Africa. However, he refused to make the code mandatory and in 1980 refused to link Export-Import credits to observance of this code. Carter maintained a reformist stance at the same time that the anti-apartheid movement was moving toward consensus over the importance of challenging economic linkages between the United States and South Africa and as anti-apartheid issues were moved on to the governmental agenda by a small group of concerned legislators.

Between 1978 and 1979, a core group of national legislators attempted to bring anti-apartheid policies to the governmental agenda. Their efforts reflected the increasing ability of senior liberal, white and black Representatives in Congress to influence the policy agenda. Events in South Africa, cues emitted from the Carter administration, and the increasing popularity of the anti-apartheid movement motivated their actions.\(^424\) Following the October, 1977 crackdown in South Africa, the House of Representatives passed a bill (347 to 54) condemning the South African regime and called upon President Carter to take effective action. While Carter did temporarily recall the U.S. envoy to South Africa, the Congressional Black Caucus unsuccessfully pressed for more stringent measures: recalling embassy attachés, terminating tax credits for U.S. business with investments in South Africa, downgrading the status of the United States embassy in South Africa, and supporting United Nations resolutions against the Vorster regime.\(^425\)

Congress continued to explore new responses to Pretoria throughout the Carter presidency. In January 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on Africa released a report on U.S. corporate activity in South Africa and found corporate racial policies to be abysmal. Members of the committee urged Carter to do his best to discourage investments in South Africa. Later in the year, members of the Congressional Black Caucus met with Carter to express their support of complete economic sanctions against South Africa.\(^426\) These initiatives, set against the rising tide of anti-corporate resolutions and divestment activities on campuses around the nation, implicitly suggest that this core group of legislators had adopted the economic linkage argument put forth by the anti-apartheid movement at the time.

Punitive sanctions against South Africa were considered by Congress during 1978. This issue emerged during consideration of the Export-Import Bank extension bill, a vehicle that was

\(^{425}\) Ibid.
used to punish South Africa during the Johnson years and then to reward South Africa during the Nixon years. This time, the bill became a "Christmas tree for a variety of legislative ornaments" including provisions related to trade with South Africa. Anti apartheid policy items made it not only to the governmental agenda but, briefly, to the decision agenda during 1978. The final version of the bill reported by the House and Senate prevented the Export-Import bank from supporting any export to South Africa which might contribute to the enforcement of apartheid policies, prevented any exports to the South African government unless the President could certify that South Africa was making significant progress toward eliminating apartheid, and prevented exports to any South African purchasers unless the Secretary of State could certify that the purchaser had adopted fair employment principles. Carter signed this bill into law during November 1978.

A small group of legislators committed to ending apartheid maintained whatever legislative attention they could to the issue of apartheid. These legislators included members of the Black Congressional Caucus, such as Rep. Charles Diggs, Jr., Rep. Stephen Solarz, Rep. Julian Dixon, Rep. William Grey and white liberal members of Congress such as Rep. Howard Wolpe. These House members used the House Subcommittee on Africa as their forum. While the South African situation had been discussed in committee hearings during the Seventies, until 1978 critical discussions were limited to technical aspects of U.S. policy which resulted in the measures documented earlier: foreign and military assistance, and Export-Import bank policies.

Formulation of self-styled anti-apartheid legislation (that is, legislation which directly challenged apartheid politics in South Africa and was designed to reshape U.S. foreign policy interests in that area) did not begin in Congress until 1978. The year 1978 began with the Chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Rep. Charles Diggs, calling together a hearing to listen to the testimony of Donald Woods, a white South African journalist, former editor of the East London (South Africa) Daily Dispatch. Mr. Woods, one of six whites banned on October 19, 1977 by the South African government, had recently escaped from his country.

Rep. Stephen Solan first introduced a bill calling for economic sanctions against South Africa in January, 1978. His bill (H.R 1246.3) prohibited all new investments and loans in South Africa and established a fair employment code of conduct for U.S. corporations operating in South Africa beyond 1978. Three additional bills targeting apartheid in South Africa were also introduced in 1978. The strongest of the three bills (H.R 13272), introduced by Rep. Charles Diggs, was similar to Solarz' bill. It called for a ban on all new loans and investments until the President, concurring with Congress, could determine that substantial progress had been made toward ending apartheid. The mildest of the three bills (H.R. 13262), introduced

430 Ibid.
by Representative Jonathan Bingham, would use fair employment practices as a condition for continued corporate and financial activity in South Africa.

In his testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade, Randall Robinson of Trans-Africa threw his organization's support behind the stronger bill because it would "cause a gradual disinvestment of corporate capital" thus "reducing American corporate support to the Apartheid regime. Hearings continued to be held in 1979 and 1980 to consider U.S./South Africa political and economic relations, the current status of apartheid, South Africa human rights violations, and consideration of the efficacy of the Sullivan principles. Stephen Weissmann, Staff Director of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, argues that the authors of anti-apartheid bills felt the mood of Congress was such that economic sanctions legislation would not pass at this time. Therefore, they diluted their bills and continued to search for consensus among other legislators.

Three new South Africa bills were introduced into the House of Representatives during the 97th Congress. These bills were designed to establish fair employment standards for U.S. corporations in South Africa, to ban the importation of South African Kruggerands, and to ban U.S. bank loans to the South Africa government (H.R 3008); to require the President to issue regulations prohibiting new U.S. Investments in South Africa (H.R. 3597); and to prohibit the sale of nuclear-related materials to South Africa in advance of South Africa compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (H.R. 7220).

Throughout the late Seventies, consideration of fundamental elements of the U.S. policy role in South Africa did not go further than the subcommittee level. Crocker (1981) correctly argues that other than during periods of crisis (e.g. the death of Steve Biko) Africa was not an issue which captured the interest of the whole body of Congress. It remained more within the purview of a small number of African specialists and issue entrepreneurs. However, what Crocker overlooks is that the anti-apartheid issue was planted firmly on the governmental agenda as the Seventies came to a close. The foundation for a continuing battle over South Africa policy was in place as the Seventies ended. Testimony regarding H.R. 3008 and H.R. 3597 was presented during "U.S. Corporate Activities in South Africa hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, and the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 24, October 15,22, 1981, May 18, June 10, 1982. Testimony regarding H.R. 7220 was heard during "Controls on Exports to South Africa", hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, and the Subcommittee on Africa, House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 9, December 2, 1982.

433 Ibid.
3.11 The Anti-Apartheid Movement Undergoes Rapid Mobilization

Between 1980 and 1983, anti-apartheid movement activity was not very visible. During this period, according to events recorded in The New York Times, the anti-apartheid movement experienced its lowest level of mobilization since 1960. For the broad African-support network, this period was most consumed with the emerging visibility of hunger in Africa, especially in Ethiopia and the Sudan.

Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and his agenda priorities for South Africa policy were quite clear. Reagan, like Richard Nixon, strongly favoured friendly persuasion, rather than confrontation, as a way to move South Africa toward reform. The appointment of hard-line conservatives like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Chester Crocker to Reagan's foreign policy team, curtailed any influence the anti-apartheid movement may have hoped to have over the foreign policy. Looking more carefully at patterns of mobilization between 1980 and 1983 as revealed in events recorded in The New York Times, it is clear that civil rights groups like Trans-Africa continued to work on South African issues during the early Eighties, as did anti-apartheid groups like the American Committee on Africa, and religious groups like the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. Their work was mostly behind the scenes, however. These organizations were rethinking tactics rather than deploying resources to further organize the mass public at this time.

The churches provided perhaps the most visible source of opposition to apartheid within the United States between 1980 and 1983. By the end of 1980, most major churches in the United States had adopted policy statements condemning apartheid and endorsing economic pressure against South Africa. The list of these churches includes The American Baptist Church National Ministries, United Presbyterian Church, South Africa, The American Friends Service Committee, The United Methodist Church, Reformed Church in America, The United Church of Christ, The Lutheran Church in America, The Episcopal Church, and the American Lutheran Church.

Though anti-apartheid activity was ebbing from 1980 through 1983, campus and community-based divestment activities continued. During that four year period 18 colleges and universities divested more than $69 million dollars in stocks from businesses operating in South Africa, including partial divestments at Harvard University, Rutgers University, Oberlin College and Williams College. Four states and 12 cities and counties also passed either divestment or selective purchasing agreements during the early Eighties. Thus, while the movement was ebbing from a national focus, local divestment activity continued throughout the nation during this period.

Beginning in late 1984, the anti-apartheid movement in the United States began to experience rapid mobilization, which continued through 1985 and 1986. The catalysts for this

438 Ibid.
mobilization were the rise of state sponsored violence in South Africa and an organized campaign, initiated by Trans-Africa, to redefine the South Africa issue as a national civil rights concern. The first factor, state sponsored violence in South Africa, eroded U.S. public confidence that Reagan's policy of constructive engagement would successfully encourage reform efforts in South Africa.\(^442\) The second factor, the Free South Africa protests, refocused anti-apartheid movement energies toward pressuring Congress for national Anti-apartheid legislation. In the following section, these factors are explained in greater detail.

### 3.11.1 South Africa Erupts

During the mid-Eighties, as in previous decades, events in South Africa inspired United States anti-apartheid movement activists to more vigorously oppose apartheid. In early 1983, the military arm of the African National Congress initiated a campaign of urban guerrilla warfare in South Africa. In August of the same year, regional anti-government organizations from throughout South Africa created an umbrella organization, the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF quickly became a powerful, nationally visible coalition of 650 civic, religious, union, women and cultural groups embodying "the greatest upsurge in black politics since ...the early 1950's" The formation of the UDF was a national response to "the reign of terror" blacks in South Africa had been living with since 1980.\(^443\) This terror took a particularly brutal turn during 1983 when 90 people were killed by state authorities trying to suppress a bus boycott in Ciskei (South Africa in the 1980's).

The United Democratic Front allied itself with the trade union movement in South Africa and mobilized blacks against a new constitution designed to create a tri-camera]. Ethnically-based, legislative system. This proposed legislative structure would give minimal representation to mixed race people and people of Indian descent, and once again deny representation to the black majority. The UDF attacked this plan as a Pretoria reform effort to divide and conquer racial opposition in South Africa.\(^444\) Between 1980 and 1985, the South Africa government responded to internal opposition with extraordinary brutality. By 1985, Pretoria authorities killed 700 anti-apartheid protesters. In 1986, South Africa declared a State of emergency which effectively denied opposition groups the right to protest and allowed the regime to undertake extreme efforts to root out opposition leaders from society.

The other major South African event to enhance U.S. anti-apartheid movement mobilization efforts was the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Reverend Bishop Tutu, Anglican Archbishop of Johannesburg, for his persistent opposition to apartheid.\(^445\) When Tutu's 1984 award was announced, the world's eyes turned toward South Africa. Bishop Tutu was in residence at a church in New York City at the time the announcement was made. Tutu immediately assailed President Reagan's posture toward South Africa and an exchange between Tutu and Reagan was initiated. Tutu accused Reagan of backing the South African


regime by soft-pedalling United States criticism of apartheid. Reagan responded by denouncing apartheid as repugnant but standing firm with his policy of constructive engagement. Reagan and Tutu met one month later (December 7, 1984) and publicly disagreed about the effects of Reagan's policy. Bishop Tutu successfully shifted public attention to the inadequacies of constructive engagement. Alan Karcher, President of the New Jersey Assembly and author of New Jersey's $3 billion divestment bill, identified this event as one of the major factors lending impetus to divestment in New Jersey.

Other than token denunciations of the violence in South Africa, President Reagan remained firm on the South Africa question. Reagan was quickly becoming out of touch, however, with public opinion in the United States. Anti-apartheid protesters in the United States saw this as an opportunity to increase their efforts to challenge constructive engagement, and force the United States government to publicly, and substantively, opposed to apartheid.

3.11.2 The Free South Africa Movement

Trans-Africa-initiated, civil-disobedience campaign involving celebrity arrests at the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. This campaign, dubbed the "Free South Africa" campaign was inaugurated immediately after a House-passed economic sanctions package failed to successfully proceed through the Senate. It was an effort not only to focus attention on South Africa sanctions legislation; it was a conscious attempt by civil rights leaders to renew public interest in their social agenda.

The re-election of Ronald Reagan and Senator Jesse Helms, the failure of Jesse Jackson's presidential bid to garner tangible gains for blacks, the Democratic Party's attempts to refocus its priorities in an attempt to win back the support of white males, and continuing cuts in the social programs were all counted as political defeats by the black leadership. It was clear that something was needed to rejuvenate black political morale and activism, and the apartheid issue, because of its emotional impact, provided the perfect opportunity. On November 21, 1984, just after the 1984 General Election and following years of failed legislative initiatives for economic sanctions against South Africa, Randall Robinson, Director of Trans-Africa, Walter Fauntroy, District of Columbia Representative to Congress and former civil rights activist, and Mary Frances Berry, Professor of History and member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, were arrested for sitting-in at the South African Embassy in Washington, DC.

Three days later, Trans-Africa announced the formation of a national campaign called The Free South Africa campaign to protest apartheid in South Africa from a domestic civil rights perspective. This movement organization was formed with the modest goals of (1) having all

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448 Ibid.
black leaders imprisoned in South Africa since 1961 released; (2) encouraging dialogue between black South Africa leaders and the South African government over power sharing; and, (3) abandoning Reagan's policy of constructive engagement. For the next year, civil rights leaders, labour leaders, religious leaders, legislators and other public officials, movie stars and other celebrities protested apartheid, and were arrested, at the South African Embassy every day.\footnote{451} By the first week of December, the Free South Africa campaign extended protests to South African Embassies in New York City, Boston, Olicago, Los Angeles, Houston, and Seattle.

Within five months, more than 1800 people had been arrested at the Washington, D.C. embassy, and another 1000 had been arrested in South Africa protests around the nation. Like the lunch counter protests spearheaded by students in 1960, civil disobedience campaigns flourished throughout the nation. "It seems as if we struck a chord,"\footnote{452} said Cécile Counts of Trans-Africa. South Africa was back in the headlines. The Free South Africa campaign revived the traditional civil rights coalition and focused their energies on opposing apartheid. In so doing, apartheid became a metaphor for social problems in the United States. Blacks in South Africa were denied a voice in public affairs, and African Americans as well as other minorities in the United States were denied a voice under the Reagan administration.\footnote{453}

Constructive engagement promoted, rather than challenged, apartheid; so too, Reagan's domestic agenda advanced social and political inequality in the United States. Reagan's stubborn attachment to constructive engagement paralleled the inability of African-Americans and other minorities to alter the course of policy. Civil rights leaders reconsidered their strategies and reverted back to the tactics of the Civil Rights Movement. As Metz argues, the complexion of support for the Washington sit-ins reflected the elements of the old civil rights coalition.\footnote{454} Prominent Civil Rights movement figures such as Jesse Jackson, Coretta Scott King and Ralph Abernathy, sat in at the Embassy with prominent white liberals such as Senator Edward Kennedy and Reverend William Sloan Coffin. Leaders of the Women's movement such as Gloria Steinem sat in with labour leaders. Endorsements poured forth from national Jewish organizations such as the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

In recasting opposition to apartheid as a civil rights issue and in refocusing anti-apartheid movement energies toward national legislation, Randall Robinson and other leaders of the Free South Africa campaign strategically presented the issue in consensual, moralistic terms. They focused on the immorality of apartheid without venturing to endorse militancy in South Africa or daring to define "the" solution for America to take with its South Africa policy. The movement pursued sustained activity at the Embassy, rather than at the White House, as a calculated way of maintaining a noncontroversial position on the issue. There was also an

\footnote{452} Ibid.
attempt to maintain a clean-cut, non-militant appearance to the protests.\textsuperscript{455} The tactic of sitting-in was a throwback to the nonviolent campaigns against segregation during the Civil Rights Movement. The nonthreatening character of the protests even encouraged elite liberals such as Rutgers University President Edward Blumstein to participate in the protests and be arrested. Free South Africa campaign leaders were able to successfully focus the protests and abundant media coverage on the need for a national economic sanctions package to send a signal to South Africa that the United States abhors apartheid in no uncertain terms. Public pressure turned on Congress to challenge President Reagan and deliver an economic sanctions package.\textsuperscript{456}

\textbf{3.11.3 Protests Continue}

While the Free South Africa campaign reinvigorated the anti-apartheid movement beginning in 1984, the movement was sustained in 1985 and 1986 by the work of other constituents, most notably students and community-activists. The American Committee on Africa, in particular, channelled resources into grassroots protests in 1985 and 1986. The media coverage of Embassy protests created opportunities for students to wage renewed divestment campaigns against their schools' South Africa-related investments. During the first week of April, 1985 students at Columbia University blockaded Hamilton Hall to publicize their demands for total divestment.\textsuperscript{457} Five hundred students at Rutgers University initiated a blockade of their own student centre in a similar effort one week later.\textsuperscript{458} The student movement soon escalated. One hundred fifty eight students were arrested at the University of California, Berkeley after hearing Mario Savio, a leader of free speech protests in the Sixties, address a rally.

By the end of April there had been sit-ins and demonstrations at Cornell University (330 arrested), Princeton University, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Wisconsin, University of Massachusetts, and Grinnell College, in addition to a number of other institutions. Coalitions of diverse, ideologically-Left, campus groups and causes came together to support the "National Anti-Apartheid Protest Day" on April 24th.\textsuperscript{459} This event was coordinated by the American Committee on Africa. Demonstrations, sit-ins, the construction of Shanty towns to represent the living conditions faced by black South Africans continued through Spring of 1986.

By the end of 1986 more than 125 schools had divested approximately S3.9 billion in investments. Community coalitions, including Labour, civil rights and religious constituents, also came together to work for Local, county and state wide divestment actions. Divestment actions, measured in terms of amounts divested, took a quantum leap in 1985 and 1986. Sixteen state resolutions supporting either selective purchasing agreements or divestiture,

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid.
with a combined value of more than $13.5 billion were passed during this period.\textsuperscript{460} Another $1.6 billion was divested by 105 cities and counties between 1985 and 1986. When the total of all state, city, and county and campus divestments were added together, the anti-apartheid movement could claim direct responsibility for mobilization of public influence, to force the divestment of more than $20 billion of public and private investments between 1977 and 1986.\textsuperscript{461}

Anti-apartheid influence goes even beyond this, however. Between 1984 and 1986 the movement directly targeted corporations involved in South Africa through stakeholder resolutions, public protests and national boycott campaigns. Corporations attempted once again to invoice the Sullivan Principles in their defense. This defense was not well received, however. By the mid-Eighties, according to Rob Jones, Projects Director for the American Committee on Africa, the general public instead supported the economic linkages argument put forth by the anti-apartheid movement. In Jones’ words:

“It took a long time for people to understand economic links between companies that they knew and bought things from and were part of their lives and apartheid. The concept that these companies were doing something that would help keep apartheid running is a difficult one to get through... (Now you have) fifteen years of divestment movement (activity) behind you such that people on a state and local level understand that ‘Yes, these companies are doing business with South Africa, that they are profiting from apartheid. No, we don’t want to be involved in doing business with them.’”\textsuperscript{462}

As violence increased in South Africa and an unstable business climate prevailed in that nation, as public municipalities and universities divested themselves of corporate stocks, as the media highlighted apartheid for an extended period of time and public opposition to apartheid mounted, and as economic sanctions moved to the decision agenda by the mid-Eighties, many corporations began to rethink their role in South Africa. By the end of 1986, a large number of corporations had pulled their operations out of South Africa.\textsuperscript{463} Some like IBM, Honeywell, and Coca-Cola sold their South Africa operations to local managers and continued to be the primary suppliers of merchandise. This tactic offered the appearance of pulling out of South Africa without affecting profit margins. Other corporations, such as Kodak, withdrew from South Africa and refused to continue marketing their items in that nation. General Motors, for instance, currently refuses to sell trucks to the South African police.\textsuperscript{464}

Thus, the eruption of violence in South Africa and the Free South Africa campaign protests in the mid-Eighties put the anti-apartheid movement on the trajectory of rapid mobilization

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid.
between 1984 and 1986. The Movement successfully fought for billions of dollars worth of divestments on campuses around the nation, and in city, county, and state governments. Corporations were on the defensive as the mass public accepted the Movement's argument about the importance of economic linkages between corporate activity and support for apartheid, and as concern for apartheid became redefined as a domestic civil rights issue. The stage was set in the middle 1980's for Anti-apartheid legislation to move from the governmental to the decision agenda of Congress.

3.12 Governmental Action: Congress vs Reagan

President Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and, like the Presidents before him, exercised near-total control over relations between the United States and South Africa. He redesigned U.S. foreign policy to reflect accommodation, rather than confrontation, with South Africa. Reagan adopted Nixon's policy of constructive engagement.

At the same time, a historical battle over foreign policy had been brewing between Congress and the White House since the early Seventies. One articulation of this battle was over the relationship between the United States and South Africa. The pace of Executive and Legislative branch action surrounding South African policy can be observed in the data set of events reported in The New York Times. According to this data set, government activity surrounding this issue had been on the incline since 1980. After a peak of activity in 1981, there was a slight unease between 1982 and 1984. This was followed by a rapid climb in activity in 1985 and 1986.

The incline in 1981 is mostly rooted in Executive branch activity. This corresponds to the first year that President Reagan held office. As with previous administrations, there was a brief flurry of activity as new policy initiatives were put into action. The rise in government activity between 1982 and 1984 is rooted more in legislative behaviour according to The New York Times data set. It was during this time that economic sanctions legislation made it to the decision agenda in Congress and neared passage. A closer examination of the particular legislative actors confirms this assertion. By 1982 legislative activity was not just rooted in the behaviour of a handful of entrepreneurial legislators; instead, Congress, as a legislative body, is involved with debating sanctions legislation. The rapid rise in government activity from 1985 to 1986 involves all three government branches. The legislature and the Reagan administration are battling over the complexion of policy at this time, and the judiciary becomes involved when it begins to prosecute the large number of protesters arrested at anti-apartheid rallies.

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466 Ibid.
3.12.1 President Reagan Initiates Constructive Engagement

South Africa was an issue that divided the candidates in the 1980 campaign for President: the Democrats were critical of apartheid, the Republicans supported accommodation. Once Ronald Reagan was elected, he put the Republican perspective into immediate action. As was true with past Presidents, Reagan was able to exercise significant control over United States-South African relations. Although President Carter moved, during his administration, toward a more conciliatory tone on South African issues, Carter ultimately agreed with Ted Kennedy during the 1980 Democratic presidential primary to include a policy plank in the party platform urging all institutions to divest from South Africa. In marked contrast, a top foreign policy aide to candidate Ronald Reagan said he would urge Reagan to end the arms embargo and to support South Africa if elected President.

Once Ronald Reagan was sworn into office, "constructive engagement" with South Africa became the policy buzzword once again. This time, the policy was authored by Chester Crocker, an Associate Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and Reagan's new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Constructive engagement was a repudiation of the Carter approach. Instead of threats and empty rhetoric, constructive engagement recognized South Africa for its geostrategic importance as a bulwark against regional communism. The globalists triumphed over the regionalists to elevate Anti-communism as a central tenet of southern African policy.

Crocker's policy centred around two additional principles. One principle was the belief that reform, rather than revolutionary change, was the more likely scenario in South Africa. The other principle was that positive support for the Pretoria regime would do more to encourage internal changes than would external incrimination. Quiet diplomacy was considered a better approach to dealing with apartheid because it did not put South Africa in a defensive position. Officially, Cracker's position was that the United States "opposes apartheid but remains neutral in the conflict between blacks and whites." A major component of constructive engagement was a tacit agreement between South Africa and the United States that the U.S. would undertake diplomatic initiatives to seek withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia in exchange for United States efforts to resurrect South Africa's status as a full member of the Western alliance of nation. President Reagan agreed that the United States should work with President Botha's government to create the appearance of an on-going commitment to internal reform in South Africa. Within the first month and a half of taking the oath of office, President Reagan publicly praised the South African regime during a television interview with Walter Crocoite. Reagan asserted that the Botha government was committed to reform and should be helped along in this process.

473 Ibid.
One week later, five South African military intelligence officers illegally entered the United States for meetings with officials from the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and Congress. United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick met with these officers, though she later claimed to not know of their affiliation with South Africa’s military. Danaher characterized this incident as marking “a clear break with traditional U.S. policy of no visits by South African military officers, and was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the U.N. arms embargo.” Danaher further commented that this visit by high-ranking military officials was to be the first in a long series of exchanges that would mark a new level of US-South African collaboration. Shortly thereafter, Reagan met with South African Foreign Minister R. Botha to discuss South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. This meeting was termed "friendly"....

Toward the end of 1981, Reagan expanded sales of items to the South African police, military and nuclear agencies including medical equipment and supplies, and crime-fighting equipment. In February, 1982, the Reagan administration relaxed an export ban, imposed by the Carter administration, on sales to the South Africa police and military by removing licensing restrictions for many non-military items such as computers. Perhaps the most heinous symbol of the alliance between President Reagan and South Africa came when the Commerce Department approved the sale of 2,500 hi-voltage shock batons to the South African police for crowd control. When confronted with the fact that this sale violated a prohibition of sales to police and military authorities in countries with repeated violations of human rights, the Reagan administration apologized by calling this a “simple mistake”.

Big business supported constructive engagement with a flow of investment dollars to South Africa. In 1981, U.S. investment in South Africa rose by 13.3% to $263 billion according to the United States Department of Commerce. Danaher notes that these figures only reflect direct investment. Considering indirect investment by U.S. subsidiaries based in third world countries, short-term bank loans to South Africa, and South African stocks owned by Americans, the level of economic engagement was upwards of more than $14 billion by mid-1983. As this quote from The New York Times makes clear, constructive engagement created a positive business climate for investments in South Africa:

“There is little doubt, however, that the interest of American companies in South Africa would have been more muted were it not for Washington’s current policy of "constructive engagement" toward this nation. Things certainly have improved under the Reagan administration.”

This was said Clark Else, director of the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa. But constructive engagement was not without its critics. Simultaneous to the imposition of constructive engagement and a renewed alliance between the United States and South Africa, the anti-apartheid movement was mobilizing and anti-apartheid legislation was on the governmental agenda of Congress, and moving quickly toward the decision agenda.

3.12.2 Congress Responds to the Reagan Agenda

During the Seventies, a core group of legislators was able to put anti-apartheid legislation on the governmental agenda of Congress. While small policy gains were made during the Carter years, such as the limitations upon Export-Import Credit placed on South Africa, Congress as a legislative body, was not particularly interested in African policy. Economic sanctions legislation remained on the governmental agenda throughout the early Eighties.481 As the political climate changed, more support was generated in the House of Representatives for sanctions legislation. Presidential accommodation with South Africa, continuing violence in South Africa, combined with regressive social policies at home created the opportunity for legislators to move sanctions to the decision agenda and challenge the Reagan doctrine.

It was the convergence of forces in late 1984 which moved sanctions legislation toward final passage: violence in South Africa; Tutu winning the Nobel Peace Prize; the failure of constructive engagement to achieve apartheid reforms or a reduction in violence in South Africa; redefinition of the issue as a civil rights concern; and a shift in national public opinion toward support for economic sanctions against South Africa.482 These events shaped Congress' desire to make a statement about where the U.S. stands on apartheid. By 1983, President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement was under attack as violence raged in South Africa. Congressional leaders (Democrats and Republicans alike) began to question whether U.S. policy actually encouraged violence rather than reform.483 Legislators wanted their opposition to apartheid to go on record and they turned to a policy innovation, economic sanctions, as the vehicle to express their opposition.

Sanctions had been on the governmental agenda since the late Seventies, but between 1983 and 1984 they moved to Congress' decision agenda as increasing violence in South Africa, particularly state-sponsored violence, made relations with South Africa a 'hot' policy issue. Legislators knew they had to respond to events in South Africa, and at home, in some way.484 The momentum was not strong enough at this time to carry sanctions legislation to passage, however, an economic sanctions package passed through the House in 1983, but failed in the Senate as 1984 came to an end. Representative Julian Dixon, Chairperson of the Black Congressional Caucus, described the situation confronting legislators in 1983:

“The (Reagan) administration is duplicitous when it winks at UNITA or the anti-government rebels in Mozambique, while inveighing against the ANC and SWAPO. It is deceitful when it avoids the

483 Ibid.
international arms embargo against South Africa and licenses the sale of equipment on the State Department munitions list to that outlaw nation. It is naive if it supposes that constructive engagement has had any discernable positive impact within South Africa's borders..."485

In sum, the United States alone cannot eliminate apartheid. It must be pragmatic, though, and attempt to deal with all the panics in the conflict, especially the groups that are clearly the most important to black South Africans. The US by pursuing this course, could bring about real and lasting progress. With events in South Africa erupting and the domestic anti-apartheid movement reviving itself, a consensus emerged by 1983 for Congress to challenge President Reagan and make an unequivocal statement against apartheid.

Five new bills were introduced into the 98th Congress (H.R. 1693, H.R. 2761, H.R 3008, H.R 3231, and H.R. 3597). Serious hearings were only held on Representative Solarz's bill-H.R 1693.486 The provisions of this bill were similar to those Solarz raised in the late Seventies: require U.S. companies in South Africa not to discriminate against black workers; prohibit U.S. bank loans to the South African government unless the money is for desegregated education, health or housing facilities; and, prohibit the: importation of Kruggerands. In 1983, six Democratic Presidential candidates helped create momentum for this bill by endorsing its passage." This was the first anti-apartheid economic sanctions bill to be passed out of Congressional committee."487

Another bill containing anti-apartheid provisions-H.R. 3231-was also reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Rules Committee in 1983. This bill extended the Export Administration Act of 1979 for two additional years. The Export Administration Act authorized the President of the United States to restrict exports for national security or foreign policy reasons. Some House members wanted to use this bill to weaken the President's ability to control South African exports. Representative William Gray (D-PA), a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, proposed an anti-apartheid amendment to this bill.488 This amendment included restrictions on United States business activities in South Africa. The Gray amendment contained these provisions:

- Bar all new investment by U.S. firms and individuals in South Africa;
- Ban U.S. banks from lending money to the South African government Loans to educational, housing and health facilities open to members of all groups were exempted;

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486 Ibid.
• Require all U.S. companies in South Africa that employed more than 20 people to establish fair employment practices. These practices included equal opportunity for employment, equal pay, a minimum wage, and improvements in workers living conditions such as housing, schooling, transportation, recognition of labour unions, and fair labour practices;

• Prohibit imports of Krugerrands and other gold coins minted by the South African government;

• Permit the president to waive the fair employment provisions of the bill if compliance would harm U.S. national interests. A waiver could be overridden by enactment of a joint resolution disapproving the action; and,

• Permit the ban on all new investment in South Africa to lapse if the president determined-and Congress passed a joint resolution supporting the presidential findings-that the South African government has made substantial progress toward the full participation of all the people of South Africa in the social, political, and economic life in that country and toward an end to discrimination based on race or ethnic origin.489

The Gray amendment to the Export Administration Act was adopted by the entire House of Representatives. Presence of the amendment became a major issue when House and Senate conferees clashed over whether it should be included in the final bill. Ultimately the conferees were unable to come to an agreement. Moderate Senate Republicans like John Heinz supported the bill but Senator Jake Garn, Chair of the Conference Committee, refused to report it out of committee with his signature. The Senate tried to salvage the Export Administration Bill by offering a five year extension of the 1979 Act excluding the South African loan ban and another controversial provision which would increase Defense Department controls on licenses for high-technology exports.490 The House moved one day later-October 11, 1984-to renew the South African ban. The final House vote was 269-92 with Democrats 172 to 12 and Republicans 96 to SO in favour of the South African ban.

Other anti-South Africa measures were also raised in the 1983-1984 Congress. The House and Senate considered a reauthorization for International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. The Black Congressional Caucus took a stand favouring a provision requiring that United States representatives to the IMF oppose loans to South Africa. The House supported this provision. The Senate compromised and supported a weaker provision stating that the U.S. actively opposed South Africa loans unless the Treasury Secretary could certify that the loan would benefit the majority of people in South Africa and reduce labour constraints in that nation.491

490 Ibid.
Also in 1983, serious consideration was given to The Mandela Freedom Resolution (H. Res. 430). This resolution declared that South Africa should release Nelson Mandela from prison and revoke the banning order on Winnie Mandela. The House also considered H. Con. Res. 122 which proposed that South Africa should cease its policy of forcibly removing and relocating black South Africans from their ancestral lands, and H. Con. Res. 42 proposing that the State Department should refuse to approve the opening of honorary South African consulates in the United States.492

The 1983-1984 legislative session was significant because antiapartheid legislation moved to Congress' decision agenda during this period. A bi-partisan consensus to push South Africa further and faster toward reforming apartheid was forming. This consensus is illustrated by a letter jointly written by the ranking Democrat and Republican on the House foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa-Representative Howard Wolpe and Rep. Gerald Solomon. This letter to President Botha warned that relations between the U.S. and South Africa would never be normalized until segregation and repression ended in South Africa.493 Though the Gray Amendment to the Export Administration Act did not ultimately succeed through the legislative labyrinth, its significance should not be underestimated. It was the first piece of legislation calling for economic sanctions to be levied against South Africa that successfully passed through the House of Representatives, and also seriously considered by the Senate.

The support that the Gray Amendment garnered indicated a growing consensus, in both the House and the Senate, that Reagan's policy of constructive engagement was a failure. Constructive engagement appeared to assure the South African government that they need not fear international condemnation, rather than encourage them to move away from apartheid. Congress needed to make a statement against apartheid, and that statement had to be a significant departure from President Reagan's position.494 Senator Nancy Kassebaum, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Africa when sanctions legislation was being debated, put it this way:

"I think they (South Africa) misread and clearly believed that with President Reagan's help that we were going to continue to be a partner. They (South Africa) misread the signals and we just weren't tough enough at that point in clearly indicating, I think, the firmness of the position that we had."495

Legislators sought to use economic pressure as the means for making this statement. The Gray amendment targeted U.S. corporations by constraining their current activity with Sullivan-like principles, and limiting future investments in South Africa until such time as South Africa was certified to be making progress toward the elimination of apartheid. 1983 was the first year that economic sanctions were endorsed, not just by African specialists and

issue entrepreneurs, but by bi-partisan support in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Despite rejection, it was clear that sanctions legislation had made it to the decision agenda and would be raised again.

3.12.3 The Year of Sanctions: 1985

Following the failure of economic sanctions to pass through Congress in 1984, the Free South Africa campaign was initiated and the anti-apartheid movement began to undergo rapid mobilization. During this period, a different milieu surrounded consideration of economic sanctions. Congress was under the public spotlight on this issue as the Ninety-ninth Congress got under way; legislators seized upon the surge of anti-apartheid activism and the broad base of support accompanying the redefinition of the issue as a domestic civil rights concern, as a mandate for economic sanctions.496

1985 began with Senator Edward Kennedy spending 11 days in January touring South Africa, speaking to black South Africans and to South African government officials throughout his trip. Later in the year Kennedy testified to the increasing polarization between blacks and whites in South Africa and the radicalization of blacks. Testifying about his sponsorship of a new economic sanctions package, Kennedy had this to say:

“My brother, Roben Kennedy, visited South Africa in 1966. At that time the United States was looked on as a model a way in which those that had been oppressed by apartheid in South Africa could achieve equal opportunity even in South Africa because of the success of the civil rights movement here in the United States where we had courageous church leaders, such as Martin Luther King and many others, who believed in nonviolence. When Roben Kennedy visited South Africa, the United States was recognized as a role model for millions of whites and blacks alike for being able to achieve some of the most basic and fundamental rights. The United States had faced this issue, and we had really set an example for the world. That concept and model has been crushed, dashed, and destroyed, Mr. Chairman. The United States now is thoroughly and completely identified with the policy of constructive engagement which is, as Bishop Tutu has stated, an unmitigated disaster...The hostility to the United States is increasing dramatically. And the United States, I fear, Mr. Chairman, is in a dangerous position. We have not only lost the rightful position as a moral leader on the questions of rights and liberties, but also we endanger our position in South Africa for the future. South Africa will be free some day and, make no mistake about

Kennedy introduced legislation calling for the United States to levy economic sanctions against South Africa. His bill (co-sponsored by Senator Lowell Weicker) contained provisions for a ban on new investments and bank loans to South Africa, prohibition of computer sales to security agencies, and a ban on the importation of Kruggerands. Several other anti-apartheid bills were also introduced during this legislative session. These bills ranged from a call for a total trade embargo and divestment proposed by Representative Ronald Dellums, to a call for implementation of the Sullivan principles by companies new to South Africa from 1987 onward, introduced by conservative Republicans Roben Walker and Newt Gingrich. Other anti-apartheid bills were introduced by Representatives William H. Gray, Stephen Solan and Howard Wolpe. The consensus for sanctions seemed unanimous when Senator Richard Lugar, Republican Chairpelson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and friend of President Reagan, and other key Republican Senators introduced their own sanctions package in late April. By late June, 1985, both Houses of Congress supported sanctions packages with bipartisan votes: 29-6 in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 295 127 with 56 Republicans supporting sanctions on the floor of the House of Representatives, 16-1 in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and SG-12 on the Court of the Senate.

The House package called for:

- A ban on new loans to South Africa;
- An end to the sale of computers to Pretoria agencies which administer apartheid; and,
- Prohibition on the importation of Kruggerands.

The provisions of the Senate package included:

- Banning new loans to South Africa;
- Banning sales of computers to agencies that enforce apartheid;
- Banning sales of goods used in nuclear production; and,
- Requiring American companies to employ more the workers in South Africa must abide by the Sullivan Principles of fair employment.

House and Senate Conferees agreed on a sanctions package by the beginning of August. The final package included provisions for:

498 Ibid.
• Banning the importation of Kruggerands;
• Banning exports of goods used in nuclear production;
• Banning the sale of computers to South African agencies,
• Banning bank loans to the South African government, and
• Mandatory Sullivan principles for U.S. companies employing more than 25 people in South Africa.501

The House of Representatives immediately supported the conference package, but the Senate hesitated. Several conservatives in the Senate, including Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Robert Dole (R-KS), sought to delay Senate consideration before legislative recess in order to give President Reagan time to reassess its South Africa policy, and redeem himself on the issue. Republicans did not want to embarrass their President by reversing one of his major foreign policy positions.502

The Reagan administration responded to increasing legislative resolve against South Africa by stepping up its rhetorical condemnation of apartheid while continuing to implement constructive engagement and denouncing sanctions legislation. But Congress was determined to condemn South Africa in no uncertain terms. To co-opt this anti-apartheid fervour, President Reagan mandated mild sanctions against South Africa in 1985 with an Executive Order. The Reagan administration was savvy enough to know that, despite its ideological attachment to constructive engagement, it had to respond to the anti-apartheid consensus emerging in the United States. Commenting on protests in the United States and the flurry of legislative activity, Secretary of State George Schultz made this comment:

“We simply cannot afford to let Southern Africa become a divisive domestic issue-tearing our country apart, rendering our actions haphazard and impotent, and contributing to the ugliest and most violent outcome.”503

Increasingly, the Reagan administration tried to nurture a public image of opposition to apartheid. Immediately prior to the Congressional conference committee meeting to work out a compromise sanctions package, the United States asked the Pretoria regime to lift the state of emergency in South Africa. The United States also called for talks between Prime Minister Botha and Bishop Tutu. Just after the conference committee reported a compromise package, Reagan denounced sanctions.504 Yet, at an August 9th meeting between senior White House and State Department officials and South African officials in Vienna, the United States

warned South Africa that its political climate will have a direct impact upon relations with the United States.  \(^{505}\)

On August 12th, the White House and State Department called on South Africa to end the violence and give political rights and equality to blacks in South Africa." Also, as part of the Reagan tactic of escalating rhetoric, the U.S. criticized South Africa at the end of August for halting internal reforms and called on Pretoria for a clear cut policy to end apartheid, including talks with the African National Congress.  \(^{506}\) The Reagan administration tried whatever manoeuvres were available to appear responsive to anti-apartheid criticism and to prevent Congress from passing a sanctions package.

On September 9, 1985, after the House passed the compromise sanctions package and just prior to the Senate commencing debate on the package, Reagan reversed his long-standing opposition to sanctions and imposed limited economic sanctions on South Africa with an Executive Order containing these provisions:

- A ban on sales of computers to South Africa security agencies;
- Barring most loans to the Pretoria government;
- A ban on importation of Kruggerands pending consultation with trading partners; and,
- A prohibition on most exports of nuclear technology.  \(^{507}\)

In his call for sanctions, Reagan said that America's view of apartheid is simple and straightforward: "We believe it is wrong. We condemn it and we are united in hoping for the day when apartheid will be no more."  \(^{508}\) Schultz followed this policy up with statements calling for political accommodation in South Africa. He also suggested that Nelson Mandela be freed from jail as a symbol of good faith by the Pretoria government.

Thus, President Reagan maneuvered to co-opt legislative interest in shaping South Africa policy. The goal of Reagan's Executive Order was to remove South Africa from Congress' decision agenda and to salvage his own policy initiatives in the area. In the wake of President Reagan's Executive Order, the Senate Republicans blocked a vote on the 1985 joint House-Senate sanctions package.  \(^{509}\) The Republican leadership was so committed to supporting their President at this time that they removed the official copy of the bill from the Senate chambers to block further voting. Though temporarily derailed, the call for anti-apartheid sanctions had not abated. Economic sanctions remained on the decision agenda of Congress through 1986.

As 1986 began, the state of emergency order continued in South Africa coupled with an almost total ban on press coverage. Archbishop Tutu toured United States again in January

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\(^{506}\) Ibid.


\(^{509}\) Merle Lipton, "Capitalism and Apartheid South Africa, 1910-84", p.119.
renewing his call for further economic sanctions. During May 1986, the world was stunned when the South African military carried out attacks against African National Congress guerrillas based in the capitol of independent nations: Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. By this time, the anti-apartheid movement had succeeded in redefining the issue not just as Anti-apartheid," but as a civil rights issue.\textsuperscript{510} Constructive engagement symbolized collusion with racists. Members voting against sanctions also risked the potential of being labelled "racist." Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-NY) noted in the 1986 sanctions debates, "If we are going to stand up against repression in Central America and terrorism in the Middle East, then I think it is time to stand up against racism in South Africa."\textsuperscript{511}

On June 10, 1986 the House Foreign Affairs Committee favourably reposed out a bill designed to strengthen Reagan's sanctions. The bill, authored by Rep. William Gray (D-PA), received a 27-14 vote in the Committee with three Republicans joining the Democratic forces. The provisions of this bill included:

- Barring new U.S. investments and loans in South Africa;
- Quitting off imports of South African coal, uranium and steel;
- Stopping U.S. participation in South Africa energy development; and,
- Threatening to halt all American computer sales to South Africa unless the Pretoria government initiated negotiations with black leaders and freed political prisoners.\textsuperscript{512}

In a surprise gamble, conservative Republican House members tried to defeat the Gray bill by allowing a strongly worded sanctions bill to stand as a substitute package on the House Floor. This bill, authored by Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-CA), was similar to the Dellums bill introduced and defeated in 1985. This bill called for a comprehensive trade embargo against South Africa, with the exception of strategic minerals if the president certified their need for military purposes.\textsuperscript{513} The Dellums bill also required all 284 U.S. companies operating in South Africa to leave within 180 days of enactment, called for a permanent ban on sales of Kruggerands in the United States, and denied landing rights to South African airlines.\textsuperscript{514}

The Republicans reasoned that the Dellums bill would prematurely end House member's plans to strengthen economic sanctions. Steven Weismann, Director of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, also argued this bill reached the floor as a test of the rhetoric being espoused by legislators leading the anti-apartheid call. The Dellums bill passed the House by voice vote on June 18, 1986.\textsuperscript{515} The vote was a bold ascension of House opinion regarding South Africa and, coming on the heels of the re-imposition of a state of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Merle Lipton, "Capitalism and Apartheid South Africa, 1910-84", p.121.}
\end{footnotes}
emergency and sweeping press restrictions in South Africa on June 12, was interpreted as a major rebuke to Pretoria and apartheid.

Senator Edward Kennedy introduced another sanctions bill into the Senate. Debate resumed in the middle of July with wide support for the measure. In a major foreign policy speech on July 22, President Reagan reaffirmed his rejection of sanctions and called for a timetable for ending apartheid. But, given events in South Africa, Reagan had lost all credibility on the issue by now. Bishop Tutu and Congressional leaders immediately rejected Reagan’s statements. Just two days after Reagan’s speech, Senator Lugar, Chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, drafted a sanctions package milder than both the Dellums and Kennedy bills. Interestingly, just one week later, President Reagan’s envoy to South Africa had the first official U.S. meeting with representatives of the African National Congress, the outlawed black opposition group in South Africa. On August 1, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved strict sanctions against South Africa in a 15-2 vote with only conservatives Jesse Helms (R-NY) and Lany Pressler (R-SD) in opposition. This bill called for:

- Banning new loans and investments by American businesses;
- Banning coal and uranium imports;
- Denying landing rights for South Africa airlines;
- Granting the President the authority to deny visas for South Africans;
- Encouraging the President to sell gold reserves to undermine the South Africa economy; and,
- Banning the use of American owned banks by Pretoria and its state-owned companies.

The Senate rejected the Dellums bill but passed Lugar’s version of the Anti-apartheid Act of 1986, with amendments on August 15, by a 84-14 vote. All "No" votes were cast by Republicans. The Senate version called for no new investment in South Africa companies, restricted trade embargo on products from government owned companies, barred coal, uranium and textile imports, cancelled landing rights for South Africa airlines, and restricted the use of American banks by Pretoria. House Democratic leaders accepted the Senate version of the Anti-apartheid bill. The House passed the bill on September 12 by a vote of 308-n.

Anticipating a presidential veto, Senator Richard Lugar warned President Reagan that he would personally lead the fight to override it. Despite that, Reagan vetoed the bill, as

expected, on September 26, claiming that the bill would hurt those it was intended to help—the black majority in South Africa. The House voted to override Reagan's veto on September 29 by a 313-83 vote with 81 Republicans voting to override Reagan, and the Senate similarly voted for an override on October 2, 1986, 78-21 with 31 Republicans voting against their president.520

The final law (P.L 99-440) contained these provisions:

- A Ban on new corporate investment in South Africa and new loans to government agencies;
- A prohibition on U.S. banks from accepting deposits from any South African government agency;
- A ban on loans to South African government agencies;
- A prohibition on nuclear trade with South Africa;
- A ban on imports of steel iron, uranium and coal;
- A ban on the importation of Kruggerands;
- A ban on textile imports;
- A ban on imports of agricultural products;
- A ban on computer exports to South African agencies enforcing apartheid;
- A prohibition on petroleum or crude oil exports to South Africa;
- A prohibition on cooperation with the armed forces of South Africa;
- An end to landing rights in United States for South Africa Airways; and,
- A call for release of Nelson Mandela from prison.521

The significance of this legislation was noted by Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1986:359) which labelled this vote "the most serious defeat Reagan had suffered on a foreign issue and one of the most stunning blows of his presidency." Congressional Quarterly also pointed out that this was the first override of a presidential veto on a foreign policy issue since 1973.522

President Reagan underestimated how deeply anti-apartheid sentiment was felt in Congress and among the wider United States public. As Bob Dole, Republican President of the Senate in 1986 said, economic sanctions was as much a "domestic civil rights issue" as it was a foreign policy issue. Though Dole was critical of the issue as a "feel-good-vote, he was

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abreact in identifying the symbolism this issue had not just for the anti-apartheid movement, but for the mass public.\textsuperscript{523} The redefinition of the issue as a civil rights concern was especially important for swaying Senators and Representatives-Democrats and Republicans-representing large black constituencies, particularly in the South. It is also apparent that Republican Party leaders wanted to avoid offending potential supporters within the black community.\textsuperscript{524} In the words of Howard Wolpe, Chairperson of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa:

“A lot of folks, I think, voted for sanctions not because they believed in them or believed they'd make any difference but because they didn't want to be perceived as not sufficiently hostile to apartheid. That's the reality. A lot of folks, in other words, bought into it because they saw the vote being interpreted in civil rights terms rather than foreign policy terms and they didn't want to be on the wrong side of that issue.”\textsuperscript{525}

A vote against economic sanctions became vote for racism. And, Reagan's intransigence on South Africa was interpreted as a mirror reflection of his intransigence on domestic civil rights concerns. Anti-apartheid activists, public opinion, and congressional leaders were seeking a method for repudiating constructive engagement.\textsuperscript{526}

Comprehensive economic sanctions were the anti-thesis of Reagan's policy, and served this purpose well. As such, the sanctions legislation was a political innovation signifying a large-policy break with past United States relations with South Africa.

3.13 Beyond the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986

The economic sanctions against South Africa were of great symbolic and material significance. Economic sanctions are traditionally reserved as a foreign policy tool to be used against hostile nations. The Reagan administration levied sanctions against Libya and Nicaragua, two nations considered by President Reagan to pose serious threats to the interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{527} On a symbolic level, sanctions, as political innovation, signalled the reversal of the long-held alliance between South Africa and the United States.

Sanctions created an appearance that the United States government was critical of apartheid and concerned with condemning apartheid practices in harsh terms. Sanctions also sent a message to South Africa that the United States considered the black opposition to have legitimate grievances with the Pretoria regime. Economic sanctions were also an act of political innovation which signified the ability of Congress and the public to successfully


\textsuperscript{524} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{526} Ibid.

challenge the Reagan agenda. For Congress, the passage of economic sanctions reflects the elimination of a two decade battle for influence over the foreign policy-process, with respect to South Africa. For the anti-apartheid movement, passage of sanctions seemed to indicate that ordinary people can work together to influence the policy.

The legislation, however, had a deleterious effect on the United States anti-apartheid movement, because of the perception that something is being done about apartheid. The Movement has not been able to mobilize at a level near that demonstrated in 1985 and 1986. Nor have stronger divestment packages, such as the Dellums bill, been able to move out of Congressional committee since 1986. Though supporters of total sanctions remained optimistic, the prospects of levying additional trade restrictions against South Africa appear dim.

But were the benefits of sanctions purely symbolic? Was this simply a ruse to quell disturbances around the nation? The answer to this question is "No; the rewards of sanctions have not been solely symbolic. Important material consequences have accompanied sanctions as well. At the time sanctions were passed, South Africa was a major supplier of diamonds, gold, Strategic metals, and military arms to the world market. CL South Africa did not have a fragile economy like other countries facing sanctions, such as Nicaragua.

While economic sanctions have not been as destructive to South Africa's economy, they have had an impact nonetheless. Economic sanctions sent a signal to major corporations that the United States considered South Africa to have an unstable climate for future investments and the United States would no longer protect corporate investments in the nation. Major corporations, such as Mobil, cited U.S. economic sanctions as the reason they were totally pulling out of the South Africa economy. Corporate pull-outs, declining investments, negative publicity from within the United States and abroad, contributed to the economic and political problems felt by the South African government under pressure from a declining resource base, the Pretoria regime became overextended fighting internal opposition movements and illegally occupying foreign territories.

By 1989, the South Africa government seemed to reconsider its priorities. In 1990 it negotiated a pull-out and agreed to free elections in Namibia, a neighbouring country which South Africa was illegally occupying against a United Nations mandate. President Botha, a hardliner, was replaced by President F.W. de Klerk. President de Klerk appeared to be taking a more reformist approach toward apartheid. He relaxed many provisions of apartheid, released opposition leaders Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu from 27 years of

530 Ibid.
imprisonment, unbanned the African National Congress, and suggested the possibility of discussing power-sharing arrangements with the opposition. It would be far too early in 1990 to assess the success of these reforms or to speculate about an end to apartheid.

3.14 Conclusion

It could be concluded that problem streams surrounding South Africa policy were most profoundly influenced by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. This crisis severely dramatized the violent base upon which apartheid politics was founded. The massacre captured the attention of the world and altered the terms of debate that persisted throughout the Sixties. The anti-apartheid movement seized upon the Massacre and tried to use it as a means for educating the U.S. public, but also as a means of legitimating its own existence and establishing a more solid base for the anti-apartheid movement within a broader network of interests. Antiapartheid sentiment was previously a challenger group interest promoted mostly by supporters of Pan-Africanism. By the Fifties, more mainstream civil rights leaders began addressing the issue. Labour and religious groups (members of the civil rights coalition) also supported these efforts.

The Sharpeville massacre renewed energy within the movement for continued action. It helped motivate mainstream civil rights leaders to internationalize the civil rights agenda between 1962 and 1964, and it helped motivate labour organizations, religious groups, and students-a mixture of challenger and member interests-to solidify their involvement in Anti-apartheid issues by the middle Sixties. Sharpeville also enraged third world member nations in the United Nations. These nations proceeded to invest energy into calling for United Nations' condemnation of South Africa. The United States was already sensitive to its international reputation regarding its stance toward racial issues. It was also sensitive to how other African nations, recently emerging into independence, perceived the role of the United States in African affairs. Kennedy later responded to U.N. anti-apartheid activity. Thus, the Sharpeville massacre, as a major problem stream, indirectly influenced foreign policy in the United States. It encouraged political stream development by reinvigorating anti-apartheid action by intensifying international condemnation of apartheid and initiating United Nations debates, and by swaying public opinion against South Africa.

Political streams are the essence of politics because they involve the "balance of power." These streams are defined by the state of conflict between contending forces. Political streams are influenced by elections, public opinion, media, the interests of public officials, and resources. The anti-apartheid movement attempted to influence political streams in the Sixties by broadening its base of support and deepening its constituent level of commitment to battling apartheid. The movement continued to pressure President Kennedy into acting against South Africa. Though Kennedy did raise criticisms of apartheid to a more central location on the policy agenda, it was not a direct response to anti-apartheid movement activity per se, as much as it was a response to broad-based concerns of African-Americans, pressure from public opinion, and antiapartheid action at the United Nations.

Anti-apartheid activists seized upon the Sharpeville Massacre to renew their call for economic sanctions against South Africa. Within a short period of time (1962 to 1964), anti-apartheid sentiment gained solid footing within the mainstream Civil Rights movement camp. Civil rights leaders lobbied President Kennedy for economic sanctions. When the movement was able to expand the scope of mobilization by reaching out to religious groups and students, the anti-apartheid movement took a new tact. This mix of challenger and member interests organized mass mobilizations to attack credit arrangements held by financial institutions with the South African government, corporate operations in South Africa, and college and university portfolios with South African-related investments.

But, despite growing levels of mobilization, the anti-apartheid movement was bereft of direct influence in political streams which might promote criticism of apartheid to the governmental agenda and decision agendas. The political stream developments of major influence in this process were the election of John Kennedy to the Presidency, the role of African-Americans in this election, and the state of civil rights in the United States. The Executive Branch traditionally controls the character of foreign policy. Such was the case with South Africa policy in the Sixties. When President Kennedy came to office in 1961, he was already sensitive to African affairs. This coupled with the fact that African Americans played a major role in delivering the Presidency to Kennedy, insured that there would be a new sensitivity to African issues at the White House. Thus, anti-apartheid sentiment was influential at this time in that it resonated with the agenda of African-Americans, not because the anti-apartheid movement was able to create leverage within the political system and manipulate public officials into taking a stand against apartheid. At the same time, the United States was being maneuvered into an embarrassing position by the United Nations. Given domestic racial problems in the early Sixties, the U.S. was interested in appearing sensitive to racial concerns among its international allies. It had to support United Nations actions, or fear being branded as a racist nation. The United States' international reputation was important as well because of the rising tide of African independence movements. Kennedy did not want to be labelled as insensitive to African issues and shut out of having influence on the African continent. Thus, it was problem and political stream developments-the election of Kennedy and pressures he faced-that primarily drove criticism of apartheid to the governmental agenda. But it took policy stream developments before the issue moved to the decision agenda, preceding imposition of an arms embargo against South Africa.

Policy streams contain the range of available policy solutions. This range can be affected by scholars and think tanks which research policy areas and make recommendations, or they can be affected by the accumulation of new knowledge by policy-makers. The anti-apartheid movement tried to affect prevailing policy streams in the Sixties primarily by promoting anti-apartheid policy solutions which lacked a place on the governmental agenda. For the most part, activist initiatives never reached the governmental agenda during the Sixties. Instead, President Kennedy did respond to apartheid with a policy solution raised at the United Nations. The anti-apartheid movement promoted economic sanctions as their preferred solution to apartheid during the early Sixties when the Movement was dominated by civil rights leaders. When more militant voices were raised within the Movement (The New Left,
Black Militants), institutional economic relationships with South Africa were challenged. The Bank Campaign targeted financial institutions which provided revolving credit to the South African government. This Campaign evolved into the Stockholder's Resolution Campaign which directly challenged corporate investments in South Africa, and divestment campaigns on university and college campuses. The movement had moved to a more confrontational position by the end of the Sixties. Activists called for severing economic relationships with South Africa as a means of isolating that nation from the international community. Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson accepted this policy solution. Instead, Kennedy seized the moment in 1963 and unilaterally called for an arms embargo to be levied against South Africa. This policy solution was initially raised at the United Nations. Kennedy instituted the embargo just prior to the United Nations forcing a vote on the issue. By imposing an arms embargo prior to this vote, Kennedy appeared to be sufficiently critical of apartheid without having been pressured into this position, and without jeopardizing U.S. strategic interests in the region. Anti-apartheid activity was, at best, driven by external events in the early Sixties. Activists were able to use the Sharpeville massacre for educational and organizing purposes and they were able to draw strength and legitimacy from the United Nations debates condemning South Africa.

The anti-apartheid movement strategically chose to confront investment practices of institutional investors (and thereby confront principles of capitalism), a tactic that was moderately successful in the Sixties. The more radical anti-apartheid movement position of severing economic collaboration with South Africa did not move from the systemic agenda to the governmental agenda; however, it is important to note that this position did move to the institutional and decision agendas of various colleges and universities, a precedent that may have helped to shape later governmental events and policy decisions. Throughout the Sixties, foreign policy was driven by Presidential politics. Legislative entrepreneurs like Senator Robert Kennedy tried to present a more forceful position on the issue, but Congress never seriously became involved in the making of South Africa policy. The liberationist position was raised in the United Nations, and endorsed by anti-apartheid activists in the United States. The Kennedy administration pre-empted this effort by raising a reformist solution-the weapons embargo—to the decision agenda. Because of this development, United States policy appears to have shifted against the South African government during the Sixties. In reality, symbolic appeals won out as the Kennedy administration was able to continue conducting business-as-usual with South Africa as an economic and military ally.
CHAPTER FOUR:

THE SOVIET UNION (USSR) AND THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE

“It is not only in internal politics that we count communists as amongst those who support our cause. In the international field, communist countries have always come to our aid. In the United Nations and other Councils of the world the communist bloc has supported the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism and often seems to be more sympathetic to our plight than some of the Western powers.”

- Nelson Mandela, Rivonia Trial, April 20, 1964

4.1 Introduction

In the late 1950s the Soviets, under Nikita Khruschev, began to foster stronger ties with Africans, beginning with Egypt, Ghana and Guinea. The Soviet public was exposed to the idea of internationalism, and African-American singer Paul Robeson was a well-known figure in the country. Peter Abrahams’s book *Path of Thunder*, was prescribed for students of English at some Russian schools. A book on South Africa, *Union of South Africa After World War II*, by I Yastrebova, was published in the USSR in 1952, but in general the public knew little about the country. \(^{534}\) When the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat, the precursor of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), asked its various committees to send a message of greeting to the ANC on the eve of its annual congress in 1959, the Soviets asked the African Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies for information about the ANC. Researcher Appolon Davidson acceded to the request by writing a short paper on the ANC. The African Department was expanded in 1962/3 to become the Africa Institute, a body that was to play a crucial role in the USSR’s relations with the continent and her struggle against apartheid.

4.2 Relations between U.S.S.R. and South Africa before 1960

Before the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, relations between the USSR and Africa was insignificant. The Russians were pessimistic about the possibility of securing for themselves, influence in Africa due to the fact that to them, the African states being under the pressure of western colonialism had no right, but to practice capitalism \(^{535}\). However, during the reign of Nikita Khrushchev the African continent was engulfed by the waves of nationalist movement for self-government in different African states. This development therefore, triggered the deep rooted interest of the USSR to play its role in Africa and that was possible by supporting such independence movements in Africa. According to Jeremy:

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\(^{535}\) K. Giles, “Russian Interest in Sub-Saharan Africa”, p. 3.
In 1955, the Soviet Union made its first major arms transfer to an African country, Egypt. Within ten years, the Soviets had established diplomatic ties with newly independent Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Morocco, and Libya. These Soviet allies, referred to as the ‘Casablanca Bloc’ after they had held their first summit in Casablanca, Morocco, were invited to attend the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow in 1961.

Various reasons compelled the USSR to shift its focus at that material time to Africa, which include its strong passion to contest for a global power, influence, as well as Southern Africa’s economic potentialities for long term economic plan. Therefore, the quest for USSR economic and political interest not only in South Africa, but in the entire African continent was fuelled by the flame of the Cold War which had been an ideological conflict between capitalism and communism. This struggle emerged subsequently after the Second World War. The USSR’s Cold War relations with Africa in general and South Africa in particular revolved around social and cultural ties purposely put in place to strengthen the ideological struggle against western imperialism.

During this period, some Africans were sponsored to study in Russia especially in the 1950s specifically to influence the ‘hearts and minds’ of young Africans. To set the ball rolling, Russians were also sent to various African countries including South Africa as visitors, students, workers, etc. As such, visiting Russians were sent to render technical and military advice to countries like Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Mali and Angola, so were they sent not only to South Africa, but to Southern Africa to support liberation movements in a number of ways. These activities were executed through USSR’s foreign policy of ‘Alliances of Convenience’ as stated in its relationship with Africa because to them, Soviet Union was not a colonizer, but instead, contributed to decolonization efforts on the continent with special support for national liberation struggles as enshrined in the Soviet Constitution.

According to O.R. Daniel:

Cold War intervention in Africa by the USSR was largely driven by ideology and the Kremlin’s at imperialist stance. However, as time progressed, Soviet policy came to be

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538 S. Mazvov, ‘Soviet Policy in West Africa: An Episode of the Cold War, 1956-1964’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: The Three Centuries of Encounter, p.295.
539 M. Matuserich, ‘Introduction: Africa and Russia: An Invisible Link’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 4.
540 A. Blakely, ‘African Imprints on Russia: An Historical Overview’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa. The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 38.
541 M. Matuserich, ‘Introduction: Africa and Russia: An Invisible Link’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 4.
underscored more by pragmatism than ideology, as few African countries tendered to embrace communism directly. Moreover, part of allure during the Cold War for newly independent states as well as liberation movement in Africa was that, in the space of about twenty years, the USSR had gone from a backward and predominantly agricultural country, to an industrial giant, thereby representing an alternative development model for countries of the ‘Third World’...The relationship with developing countries changed after the introduction of Perestroika in the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Union began to seek closer ties with the west and distance itself from the ‘Third World’ 543.

This Russian presence in Africa was honoured by General Murtala Muhammad, the former most popular Nigerian Head of State in which said:

We are all aware of the heroic role which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have played in the struggle of the African people for liberation. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers of arms to resist oppression, and to fight for national liberation and human dignity 544.

Heretofore, as far back as 1897, the USSR government had opened its consulate in Pretoria or Johannesburg and by that time, about eight hundred thousand Russian subjects, mostly of Jewish origin, had settled in the Transvaal 545. Similarly, in the 1950s, the South African ANC maintained a cordial relationship with the USSR through which they acquire weapons for their military wing and pieces of advice for the successful anti-apartheid campaign.

Brian and Sonia Bunting, members of the South Africa Communist Party (SACP), visited the Soviet Union in March 1954 as the guests of the All-Union Society of Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, and were followed by Ruth First, who was a guest of the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women. However, there is no indication that these visits were part of attempts to establish inter-party relationships. This was also the case with Sam Kahn, a Member of Parliament (MP), who visited the USSR in the 1950s while he was living in England 546.

Walter Sisulu, secretary general of the ANC, and Duma Nokwe, president of the ANC Youth League, went to the USSR after attending World Youth and Student Festival in Bucharest,

Romania, in 1953. The duo spent several weeks in the country, and also went to Azerbaijan and Beijing, China. Moses Kotane expressed misgivings about Sisulu’s visit, as he thought it ‘would open himself to all kinds of criticism by visiting a communist country’.547 In London Colin Legum, a journalist and former member of the Labour Party, told Sisulu there was ‘great hostility’ in South Africa to his trip.

When the ANC held its annual conference in 1954, a motion of no confidence was proposed against Sisulu, but the motion was defeated and Sisulu retained his position. Later, Sisulu and Nokwe both joined the SACP. In 1955, Helen Joseph invited Lilian Ngoyi, President of the ANC Women’s League, and Dora Taman, national secretary of the Federation of South African Women, to visit the USSR.548 The essence of this visit as members of the ANC once expressed was to solicit Soviet support towards dismantling apartheid. V. Shubin while commenting on the nature of this kind of visits argues that:

Visits of the ANC leaders to the USSR followed two patterns. They were guests of the CPSU congresses, usually convened once every five years, or at other official celebrations. The others were regular visits to Moscow to discuss the evolving situation and the needs of the movement. These visits acquired additional importance when they followed dramatic developments such as the Morogoro Conference in 1969. Soon after the conference, the ANC leadership, supported by the SACP, requested a meeting in Moscow.91 The delegation, which included Oliver Tambo, Duma Nokwe and Joe Matthews, briefed their Soviet counterparts on the results of the conference, especially renewed concentration on internal work, including the return home of the trained military personnel. Another topic was the consequences of the Lusaka Manifesto.92 The leaders of these states reiterated that the liberation of southern Africa was their aim. However, they proclaimed their readiness to normalise relations with the colonial and racist regimes in Lisbon, Pretoria and Salisbury, and expressed willingness to urge the liberation movements ‘to desist from their armed struggle’ if those regimes recognized ‘the principle of human equality’ and the right to selfdetermination.93 This document was not received well in Moscow and the Soviet delegation to the United Nations (UN) expressed a number of reservations, emphasizing that the eradication of the colonial and racist regimes in southern Africa did not require talks and persuasion, but concrete and effective action.94 Indeed, there was good reason for adopting

548 V. Shubin (n.d). ‘There is no Threat from the Eastern Bloc’, p. 988.
such an attitude. At best, the manifesto was untimely: Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon were not ready to make concessions and compromises. On the other hand, President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and some other African leaders used the moderate tone of the document to enter into a so-called dialogue with apartheid South Africa.

Helen’s letter was passed on to a messenger at a meeting in Geneva to be delivered to her two African friends as mentioned. Nathi Mthethwa, the South African Minister of Arts and Culture while commenting on South Africa’s relations with the Soviet in the realm of history argues:

> When we look at our common histories and how the Russians helped shape our political destiny...when the ANC was listed as a ‘terrorist’ group by many countries including the U.S—it was the Soviet Union that supported our struggle unequivocally. The Russian people offered unconditional support through educational opportunities to political activists, providing military training to ANC cadres and financial support to the liberation movement...the ANC’s representatives even held a diplomatic status in Russia while many countries were turning their backs on its struggles, especially because of its close relations between Russia and her people.

The impact of those sponsored to study in Russia was very profound. Among ANC activists sponsored to study in Lenin School in Moscow were Moses Kotane and Max. These two people were later elevated by the ANC through their selfless involvement in the Defiance Campaign in the 1950s. In response to their participation, Max was banned under the famous ‘suppression of communism Act’.

The Soviet Union did not only support the South African struggle against apartheid government monetarily, or through training military cadres of the ANC, but also gave South African exiles food, clothes, musical instrument and vehicles.

It was only after the Sharpeville Massacre and the banning of the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) that more formal relations began to be established between anti-apartheid movements and the USSR’s official agencies. Yusuf Dadoo and Vella Pillay visited Moscow in July 1960 and held talks with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), informing them of developments in South Africa. They also requested funding for the operations of

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the SACP, ANC and for taking care of detainees and their families in the wake of Sharpeville. The Soviets responded with a donation of $30,000 to the SACP.

Dadoo again went to Moscow at the end of 1960, accompanied by SACP theoretician Michael Harmel and Joe Matthews, a member of the SACP and ANC. They attended the International Meeting of the Communist and Workers Parties, with Matthews delivering the first speech. The meeting took place while Sino-Soviet relations were headed towards a breakdown, but the SACP maintained a non-partisan stance in the conflict. Eventually China stopped support for the ANC and began fostering ties with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).\(^{554}\)

Discussions at the meeting revolved around the state of resistance in South Africa, as well as the question of boycotts and the isolation of the apartheid regime. The Soviets assured the delegation that they would cease all trade with South Africa, despite certain difficulties – including the role of De Beers in the diamond industry. The Russians also agreed to beam radio broadcasts into Southern Africa, and the Soviets set up the African Service of Radio Moscow, which had English and Zulu programmes.\(^{555}\)

Dadoo visited Moscow again in October 1961, accompanied by Moses Kotane, who had studied in the country from 1931 to 1932, and participated in discussions in the Comintern in 1936. Invited to take part in the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, they discussed for the first time the use of violence in the struggle to liberate South Africa.\(^{556}\)

Their discussions were with officials of high rank, including Vitaly Korionov, deputy head of the International Department. On 18 November they met with Boris Ponomarey, who would liaise with the SACP for the next 25 years. Just elected international secretary, Ponomarey took up the issue of the openness of the party and the question of the use of violence. Kotane gave the Soviets a document he had written, titled ‘Notes on Some Aspects of the Political Situation in the Republic of South Africa’, and he argued cautiously for the use of limited forms of violence, such as picketing and sabotage of communications infrastructure. Ponomarey promised them that the CPSU would give them a response, and discussed the possibility of using the territory of African countries such as Ghana and Guinea to render assistance to the ANC and SACP.\(^{557}\) Ponomarey reported to the CPSU and the secretariat gave its reply four days later, endorsing the use of violence – but only as part of a broader strategy combining other forms of struggle. It cautioned that the move required circumspection.


\(^{556}\) Francis Meli, “South Africa Belongs To Us: A History of the ANC”, p. 29.

4.3 Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards South Africa since the 1960s

The USSR’s foreign policy as regards not only South Africa, but the entire Southern Africa has taken a new dimension in the second half of the 20th century due to a number of reasons. This step was taken as argued by the Russian president, Nikita Khrushchev to develop African countries in order to bypass the influence of capitalism and in turn, advance continuously to socialism espoused by the USSR\(^{558}\). However, during that time, the Soviet failed to properly comprehend the workings and complexities of local realities inherent in the African continent. It should also be noted that attempts made by the Soviet to insight revolutions in a number of states towards the USSR no doubt had a negative repercussion on its credibility\(^{559}\).

Furthermore, the hitherto established relations between the USSR and some African countries were shocked intermittently by the strong wind of coups and counter-coups which tend to overthrow pro-Soviet leaders as in the case of Algeria (1965), Ghana (1966) and Mali (1968)\(^{560}\). Speaking on the same vein, K. Giles argues that:

> Following the late 1960s, Soviet policy goal shifted economic relations with some African countries were now aimed at commercial benefits without ideological riders, while maintaining the aim of furthering Soviet global influence. Simultaneously, Soviet sponsorship of military and ‘terrorist’ confrontation with, the colonial powers and later, Rhodesia and South Africa absorbed considerable Soviet resources. Following the Portuguese Revolution in 1974, which gave communist countries freedom of operation in the newly, and unexpectedly, independent Angola and Mozambique, the extent of Soviet –backed support for terrorists and guerrilla operations against Rhodesia was such that a border area opposite Mozambique ironically became known among the Rhodesian forces as ‘the Russian Front’\(^{561}\).

During this time, the USSR’s massive support for the South African activists especially the Umkhonto We Sizwe, the military wing of ANC became more intensified.

In 1961, Vella Pillay asked the Soviets to take in 10 students for academic training, and on 16 September nine students travelled to Moscow to begin their studies. Among them were Anthony Mongalo, who trained as an oil engineer in Baku, and Eduardo dos Santos, later to become the president of Angola. In December 1961, the Soviets decided to re-establish the International Lenin School as a permanent facility to train people from other countries. More

\(^{558}\) K. Giles, “Russian Interest in Sub-Saharan Africa,” p. 3.

\(^{559}\) J. Bervoets, ‘The Soviet Union in Angola’, p. 3.


than 60 parties were invited to send students to the new school in 1962, and the SACP sent Ruth Mompati, Flag Boshielo and Alfred Kgokong.

The SACP’s Arthur Goldreich and Vella Pillay went to Moscow in December 1962 and Ponomarev received the duo. They discussed the draft plan of Operation Mayibuye, which called for the training of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres on African soil – by 1963 a camp was set up in Tanzania. Goldreich also conferred with technical specialists, marking the first time that the Soviets assisted MK. The question of using ships to land supplies in South Africa was proposed but ultimately rejected.

While Moscow assisted the ANC through the mediation of the SACP, the Soviets were keen to establish more direct contacts with the liberation organization. Tennyson Makiwane was probably the first ANC representative to hold direct talks with Moscow when he went there in May 1961, although he was also a member of the SACP.\(^562\)

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee was the organization tasked with dealing with African and Asian affairs, giving support to various liberation movements from the early 1960s onwards. Based at a large house at 10 Kropotkina Street, the site became a rendezvous for African activists. The body was first convened as the Asian Solidarity Committee in 1956, but was relaunched as the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee after the 1958 AAPSO conference in Cairo, where it had a permanent representative. The ANC’s Mzwandile Piliso was in daily contact with the Soviet Solidarity Committee in Cairo, where he dealt mainly with Latyp Maksudov.\(^563\)

In February 1962, Piliso requested that the Solidarity Committee provide modest financial assistance for Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Robert Resha, who were attending a conference of writers from Asian and African countries. The funding, in the region of 100 roubles (about $111), was the first instance of direct Soviet financial support for the ANC. Before this the Soviets had been giving the ANC financial support via the SACP, which was allocated $50,000 in 1961, and $112,445 in 1962.\(^564\) Much of this money was sent to lawyers representing ANC people on trial, and was used to help with their families and legal costs.

When the Soviets opened an embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1962, more direct links between the Soviets and the ANC were cemented. The embassy, formally through the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, invited Oliver Tambo in December 1962 to visit the USSR for a period of rest. Tambo went to the country in March 1963, accompanied by Moses Kotane. Tambo presented an overview of events in South Africa, and met with the CPSU. On 5 April 1963 Tambo and Kotane had talks with Ponomarev, which was the beginning of a long relationship between the men. Tambo set out radical plans for the overthrow of the apartheid regime, using armed and political struggle. He also talked of the urgent need to

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\(^{564}\) N. Macflane, ‘Russia, Africa and the End of the Cold War’. In Russia and the Third World in the Putin’s Russia, pp. 14-17.
train ANC cadres in the USSR. Tambo’s request for military training was approved by the Soviet government, and in Summer of 1963, two groups of 20 cadres arrived in Moscow to begin studies at the Northern Training Centre. The recruits underwent training in guerrilla warfare, military strategy and tactics, topography, drilling and the use of firearms.

A year later Chris Hani arrived and spent a year in Moscow. He would later become the MK Chief of Staff and the General-Secretary of the SACP. One group was headed by Barney Desai, president of the SA Coloured People’s Congress. Desai soon withdrew from the programme, and merged his group into the PAC. Tambo visited the USSR again in October, and because the number of recruits had increased significantly, training was moved to a larger facility in the city of Odessa in the Ukraine. The first group arrived in November 1963, and they were joined by a larger group that included Joe Modise (known as Thabo More) and Moses Mabhida, who was recalled from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) headquarters in Prague. Between 1963 and 1965, 328 cadres were trained at Odessa.

Leaders of the ANC and SACP also underwent aspects of military training, including Oliver Tambo, Moses Kotane, Duma Nokwe, Joe Slovo and Ambrose Makiwane. Tambo led another delegation to the USSR in August 1965, accompanied by Joe Modise. Some attempts were made by the newly trained MK cadres to infiltrate South Africa, and Josiah Jele was one of the first to engage in this exercise, but his mission failed. Other cadres took part with Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) fighter in the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns. After the latter campaigns, the leaders realised that they needed more trained medical personnel, and a group was sent to Kiev to be trained as nurses.

The ANC and SACP briefed the Soviets whenever major policy decisions were made, and after the Morogoro Conference in 1969, Tambo, Modise and Nokwe met with their Soviet counterparts and delivered reports. After the Lusaka Manifesto was drawn up, the Soviets were also briefed, and the Soviets did not take kindly to the resolutions to foster warmer relations with the colonial powers in Lisbon and Southern Africa. However, these resolutions were abandoned at the regional conference held in Khartoum in January 1970.

The early 1970s saw the ANC ranks becoming depleted, and those who had undergone training were advancing in age, many of them were in their late thirties, becoming too old to conduct military operations in South Africa. A particularly depressing episode began when the Tanzanian government, believing that some ANC members were involved in a plot to overthrow the government of Julius Nyerere, expelled the ANC from its territory. The ANC was given 14 days to move all its troops out of the Kongwa camp.

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569 Ibid.
The ANC could find no other country on the African continent that would allow it to establish a camp and house its troops. It fell to the Soviets to fly the troops to the USSR. In 1970, fearing that the troops had no alternative destination, JB Marks asked the Soviets to allow the cadres to remain in the country until other arrangements could be made.

One of the schemes to return the cadres to Southern Africa was Operation J, a plan to use a ship to transport arms and men to the coast of South Africa, but after spending enormous sums of money on the plan, the project fell through. Eventually relations between the ANC and the Tanzanian government improved, and most of the cadres returned to the country, although some went to Algeria.\(^{570}\)

While the Black Consciousness period was unfolding within South Africa, the ANC was undergoing a decline, and Tambo admitted to the Soviets that the ANC had not played a decisive role in the political resistance of the early 1970s. It took the June 1976 Soweto Uprising to replenish the ranks of the ANC, after thousands of students left the country and joined the ANC and MK.\(^{571}\) By the end of July, some 400 new recruits were living in ANC camps in Luanda. The ANC sent groups of these students to the USSR and, between 1976 and 1978, 140 new recruits were trained there.

During the annual ANC visit to Moscow in October 1978, Oliver Tambo stressed that the West was beginning to accept that the majority rule in South Africa was inevitable, and they were beginning to look for ways to secure a regime that would be partial to the West. In the process, the US was making things difficult for the ANC, isolating the movement from developments inside South Africa, making things difficult in neighbouring countries, and cutting off sources of aid.\(^{572}\)

Now Tambo, on the advice of Jorge Risquet, the Cuban military leader in Angola, asked the Soviets to help train new recruits in Angola instead of the USSR, and military advisers began to arrive on African soil in October 1979. In line with the new policy of training cadres on the African continent, Tambo asked the Soviets for help in running the newly established Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Tanzania.

From 1979 to 1991 more than 200 Soviet advisers and interpreters were engaged in training in Angola. By 1982 the ANC units were shaping up into an efficient army, capable of regular and guerrilla warfare. A mutiny by ANC cadres was a cause for much concern among both MK and Soviet leaders. Chris Hani told Vladimir Shubin that they suspected that Pretoria’s agents had infiltrated MK ranks and were busy stirring up discontent in the wake of losses in battles against UNITA.\(^{573}\)

\(^{571}\) N. Macflane, ‘Russia, Africa and the End of the Cold War’. In Russia and the Third World in the Putin’s Russia, pp. 18-19.
\(^{572}\) A. Blakely, ‘African Imprints on Russia: An Historical Overview’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa. The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 40.
\(^{573}\) N. Macflane, ‘Russia, Africa and the End of the Cold War’. In Russia and the Third World in the Putin’s Russia, pp. 14-17.
The ANC delegation to Moscow in December 1979 placed special emphasis on the armed struggle. Led by Oliver Tambo, the group included Joe Modise, Thomas Nkobi, Mzwandile Piliso, and Cassius Make. More prominent ANC leaders began to go for training to the USSR. Andrew Masondo, released from Robben Island and banned, left the country and travelled to Moscow to undergo training.\(^ {574}\) Appointed as the national commissar of MK, he played a significant role in expanding the liberation army. Other leaders followed, including Alfred Nzo, Joe Gqabi, John Nkadimeng, and Henry Makgothi.

The 1980s saw the state making increasingly desperate attempts to suppress widespread rebellions and revolutionary struggle, and the struggle against apartheid began to look like a war that could be won. MK’s attacks on South African installations were evidence that the years of training were beginning to have real weakening effects on the power structure.

The first such attack - and one of the most successful and spectacular MK operations - was the bombing of the Sasol plant on 1 June 1980. The attack halted the operation of the plant, and sent shudders through the apartheid regime.\(^ {575}\) Further attacks on army installations followed. The Vaalfontein Army Base near Pretoria came under attack on 16 June 1981, the fifth anniversary of the Soweto Uprising, in a spectacular fashion. The use of Soviet limpet mines, although not all of them detonating as they were intended to, saw the Soviet training used to directly confront the apartheid army on its own territory.\(^ {576}\)

The attack on the South African Air Force Headquarters, and the building used by Military Intelligence on 20 May 1983, reinforced the government’s perception that they were entering a new phase of the war. The South African press fixed on Joe Slovo’s role in the operations, alleging that he was sending his charges into dangerous operations from the safety of his home in London. In fact Slovo was in Moscow at the time, engaged in SACP deliberations on trade unions.\(^ {577}\) In 1985, after the ANC’s Kabwe conference, General Siphiwe Nyanda went to Moscow with a group including Charles Nqakula and Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula to study military combat work.

By 1986 there was an intake of 60 South Africans every year. By the latter half of the decade Joe Modise was asking the Soviets to train MK cadres for taking up positions in a regular army – by now negotiations were envisaged and a political settlement was beginning to be seen as a real possibility.\(^ {578}\) In 1986 ANC members began a three-year course for motorised infantry officers in Perevalnoye, and the next year many were to embark on five-year courses to become helicopter and jet pilots, flight engineers or naval officers.

\(^ {574}\) T. Delch (ed.) “Africa in the Foreign Policy Priorities of Russia (Trans.)”, p. 59.

\(^ {575}\) A. Blakely, ‘African Imprints on Russia: An Historical Overview’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa. The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 40.


\(^ {577}\) T. Delch (ed.) “Africa in the Foreign Policy Priorities of Russia (Trans.)”, p. 60.

\(^ {578}\) K. Giles, “Russian Interest in Sub-Saharan Africa,” p. 4.
4.4 The impact of Soviet’s anti-apartheid struggle

The SACP was far from welcome in many countries of the African continent, exceptions to this hostility being Angola and Mozambique. Because of this suspicion of the organization, the SACP held many meetings in the Soviet capital, and the Russians provided generous aid to the organization throughout the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, covering all the costs including air travel. The SACP was also invited to take part in meetings of the CPSU and other important communist gatherings.

They were invited to the CPSU Central Committee meeting in November 1984 at Volonskoye, where they were joined by South Africans studying at the International Lenin School, bringing together many cadres who seldom had the opportunity to see each other in such great numbers. At the suggestion of Ronnie Kasrils, the meeting became the occasion for the SACP’s Sixth Party Congress. Moses Mabhida was re-elected general secretary, and Joe Slovo was made party chairman. Slovo then went to report to Oliver Tambo, who was receiving medical treatment at Barvikha Sanatorium 20km from their venue.

With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the USSR began to experience a profound process of restructuring (perestroika) and political liberalisation (glasnost). There was concern that the new dispensation would alter the policy of support for the ANC and other liberation forces, especially since the Soviets were now embarking on a thaw in Cold War relations and a rapprochement with the United State (US) and the West in general.

Shubin and other analysts divide the Gorbachev period into two phases: during the first, perestroika is seen as successful in terms of achieving socialist ideals; but during the second phase, the CPSU went into decline and the USSR was eventually dissolved.

In February 1986 the ANC, represented by Alfred Nzo and Joe Modise, and the SACP, represented by Joe Slovo and Eric Mtshali, attended the 26th Congress of the CPSU. They listened to Gorbachev deliver his report, and were impressed. Gorbachev proposed that regional conflicts should be settled politically. In May, at a dinner in honour of Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Gorbachev said:

‘There exists a reasonable and realistic alternative to bloodshed, tension and confrontation in Southern Africa. It presupposes an end to aggression against Angola and other liberated states, the speedy granting to Namibia of independence – but of genuine independence, not fictitious independence, as the USA and RSA would like – and finally, the liquidation of the inhuman apartheid system.’

579 A. Blakely, ‘African Imprints on Russia: An Historical Overview’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa. The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 40.


582 Ibid, p.1038.
When Tambo cancelled a meeting with the Soviets, scheduled for July 1986, Shubin flew to Berlin to discuss the reasons for the pull-out. Envisaged as a joint meeting between a wide range of stakeholders, including the Cubans, SWAPO, the Angolans and the Soviets, Tambo was afraid that information would be leaked after such a general consultation with so many participants. There was also nervousness with regard to a conference in Paris at which the West was expected to announce a new regime of sanctions against South Africa.

Shubin reveals that it was at this meeting that Tambo for the first time talked of the possibility of a political settlement with Pretoria, and he mooted the possibility of a suspension of the armed struggle. Joe Slovo then raised the possibility of a meeting between Tambo and Gorbachev, and the meeting took place on 4 November 1986 in the Kremlin. Tambo, having attended the funeral of Samora Machel in Maputo, led the ANC delegation to Moscow to meet with the Soviet leader.

The meeting, according to Shubin, ‘can be regarded as a pinnacle in Moscow’s relations with the ANC’. They issued a joint communiqué, and Tambo appealed to Gorbachev to set a date for his visit to Southern Africa, which, he said, would transform the situation in the region. Gorbachev also revealed to Tambo that PW Botha had been making attempts to forge relations with the Soviets.583 They announced in their joint communiqué that a political settlement in South Africa could be achieved if three conditions were met: that Pretoria ceases its acts of aggression against African states; that it grants independence to Namibia; and that the apartheid regime is removed from power.

Tambo issued a statement after the meeting:

‘We emerged from that meeting strengthened by the knowledge that the Soviet Union stands firmly with it in the struggle for a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa, an independent Namibia and a peaceful region of Southern Africa. We draw immense satisfaction and inspiration from the fact that the Soviet Union is resolved to contribute everything within its possibilities and, within the context of our own requests, to assist the ANC, SWAPO and the peoples of the region to achieve these objectives. The Soviet Union is acting neither out of consideration of selfish interest nor with a desire to establish a so-called sphere of influence.’584

The next day, the ANC delegation met with General Valentin Varennikov, the first deputy head of the General Staff, to discuss military matters. They were assured of the Soviet Union’s full support for the ANC. After the meeting the ANC opened a mission in Moscow, a move designed to facilitate increasing bilateral relations between the ANC and Moscow. The intent was announced in January 1987, and the mission, with full diplomatic status, was

583 V. Shubin (n.d). ‘There is no Threat from the Eastern Bloc’, p. 1040.
opened in November, and was headed by Sipho Makana. The ANC timed the opening of the mission with the establishment of missions in various other centres, including one at the United Nations.

During September 1987, the ANC held trilateral talks with Moscow and the Cubans, to discuss the shape of the expected political settlement in South Africa. The ANC delegation, led by Oliver Tambo, included Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Alfred Nzo, and Thabo Mbeki. The Cubans were represented by Jorge Risquet, and the Soviets by Anatoly Dobrynin, who had become the replacement for Boris Ponomarev.

In April 1988, Joe Slovo and Chris Hani led an SACP delegation to Moscow to discuss the political settlement and Soviet contacts with anti-racist forces, and they were advised to work out their own formula for overcoming the apartheid regime — this meant a particular combination of diplomacy and armed struggle.

The Soviets provided support for Operation Vula, which the ANC launched in 1988 to create an armed underground network within South Africa, to reinforce its strength at the negotiating table and in general in the event that negotiations might fail. The Soviets helped to infiltrate Mac Maharaj, Ronald (Ronnie) Kasrils and Siphiwe Nyanda, among others, into the country. The operation was begun in 1988 and continued until February 1990.

The Soviets also embarked on a drive to forge relations with anti-apartheid organizations inside South Africa, and invited prominent figures, including journalists, to visit Moscow. Bishop Desmond Tutu went to Moscow in June 1988, and was followed by Alex and Jenny Boraine from Idasa. Journalist Allister Sparks went to Moscow in August 1988.

However, by now the Soviet Union was entering into the second phase of Gorbachev’s reign, and a profound realignment was taking place. At the CPSU Central Committee’s session in November 1988, the Old Guard was being replaced by a new set of leaders, and Andrey Gromyko and Anatoly Dobrynin were removed from their positions. Dobrynin was replaced by Alexander Yaklovlev as the international secretary, and Gorbachev was elected as the USSR President in 1990. The project to ‘perfect socialism’ was giving way to the restoration of capitalism.

Now Joe Slovo noted that there was an impression that ‘even in the Soviet Union there was a bias towards pushing for a negotiated settlement’. In March 1989 Tambo led a delegation of ANC leaders to Moscow, at the invitation of the CPSU CC and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Tambo drew a picture of the situation in Southern Africa, which was rapidly changing, and discussed the implications of Namibian independence and the withdrawal of

589 A. Blakey, ‘African Imprints on Russia: An Historical Overview’. In Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa. The Three Centuries of Encounter, p. 40.
the South African Defence Force (SADF) from Angola. He stated that Pretoria wanted to enter into negotiations with the ANC but was hamstrung by the success of its own portrayal of the liberation organization as a terrorist threat.

The Soviets, represented by Antoly Lukyanov, assured Tambo that attempts by Pretoria to draw the Soviets into a new relation with the apartheid regime had been rebuffed. Tambo issued a statement afterwards expressing his happiness at the Soviets’ continuing support for the ANC and its policies. Yet, at the same time, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that a ‘secret’ meeting had taken place in England between Soviet, South African and British academics. After one participant claimed that the Soviets did not want to see the ANC in power, Andrey Gromyko, the head of the Soviet delegation, stated that the media in South Africa and Britain had distorted the discussions at the meeting, and regretted that the British had ignored the Soviets’ insistence that ANC representatives attend the meeting.

An Idasa delegation to the Soviet Union in April 1989, led by Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, helped to set things right. The delegation announced that it had found no evidence to suggest that Soviet policies, with regard to the ANC, had changed in any way. Yet the fluidity of the Soviet situation lent credence to the idea of a change in Soviet policy towards the ANC and South Africa.

In September 1989 Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs, pledged at the United Nations ‘to oppose resolutely all kinds of violence, no matter what had caused or motivated it’, effectively denying South Africans the right to fight apartheid. Nevertheless, before he arrived in Namibia for the country’s independence celebrations, Shevardnadze met with Alfred Nzo, Joe Slovo and Thabo Mbeki, and reassured them that the Soviets would continue to support the ANC’s ‘revolutionary work’. Mbeki advised that they wanted the Soviets to be seen by South Africans as leaders of anti-apartheid forces.

Nonetheless, the Soviets’ desire to normalise relations with previous enemies also saw Shevardnadze secure the permission of the ANC for a meeting with FW de Klerk and for the possibility of establishing a diplomatic office in South Africa, to which Moscow and Pretoria agreed, on 26 February 1991. The new office was headed by Alexey Markov, who had acted as an interpreter with the first MK group in Odessa in the USSR.

With the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, and his visits to many capitals of the world, the possibility of his visit to Moscow became an issue with both the ANC and the Soviets. Yet, Gorbachev, according to Shubin, was overly cautious about being seen to

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expand communism while he was wooing the West. Gorbachev extended an invitation to Mandela but somehow the two sides never agreed on an appropriate date.

While some in the Soviet Union saw it as a high priority for Mandela to visit, many agreed with Gorbachev’s position, although Shubin points out that by that time, no-one would suspect the Soviets of nefarious intent. Indeed relations between the ANC and the Soviets continued at the highest level, and Walter and Albertina Sisulu were invited to the USSR. Gorbachev himself introduced Sisulu at the reception, and assured the latter that the Mandela visit would be welcome.

The last official delegation to the USSR in December 1990, which included ANC deputy secretary general Henry Makgothi and Rashid Patel (Aboobaker Ismail, of the MK’s High Command), held talks with Gennady Yanaev, a member of the Politbureau and international secretary of the CPSU. Yanaev assured the delegation that the Soviets were in full support of the ANC and its policies.

Four months later, Joe Slovo went to Moscow on the last high-level SACP meeting with the Soviets. On 23 April 1991, Slovo met with Vladimir Ivashko, Gorbachev’s deputy in the CPSU, and they held discussions on a wide range of issues. Shubin attended the ANC national conference in Durban in July 1991, and Mandela met with the Soviet delegation on 3 July. According to Shubin, Mandela was ‘worried about the delays to his visit to the USSR’. In August, Soviet deputy foreign minister Valery Nikolaenko was sent to South Africa to reassure Mandela, confirming Gorbachev’s invitation.

In the meanwhile, the Soviets decided to stop all military training for all foreigners, and although a letter from the CPSU was sent to Gorbachev asking him to make an exception in the case of the ANC, history decided the issue when Gorbachev was seemingly ousted in an abortive coup on 19 August 1991. Although Boris Yeltsin mounted a counter-coup, Gorbachev never again assumed full power as president, and a situation of dual centres of power became the de facto reality.

The remaining MK troops were sent back to South Africa, and Pik Botha visited Moscow on 7 November, restoring consular relations with the Soviets two days later. Then FW de Klerk announced his intention to visit Moscow, but before he arrived the USSR was dissolved on 8 December 1991. Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev in the Kremlin, and immediately courted the West in a search for loans and investments. He established diplomatic relations with

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598 Ibid.
599 “End of the Cold War” at www.schoolhistory.co.uk
600 Ibid.
Pretoria in February 1992 and cut off all financial support for the ANC, and received de Klerk in Moscow in May 1992.

Still, the Co-ordination Council of the Opposition maintained Soviet policy with regard to the ANC. The ANC victory in the 1994 elections reversed Yeltsin’s policy, and the pro-Western faction of Yeltsin’s party were defeated in the Russian elections soon after.\textsuperscript{602}

4.5 Conclusion

The Soviet Union has been acknowledged as the ANC’s most important benefactor, providing military support in the form of hardware, as well as training some 2,000 MK cadres. Other forms of support were equally forthcoming, and many of the ANC’s leaders, including Thabo Mbeki, received degrees from universities in the USSR. The Soviets helped the ANC maintain structures that came under enormous pressure, especially through the slump in the 1970s. These same structures were then replenished by new recruits fleeing South Africa after the Soweto Uprising in 1976. After that, MK cadres trained in the USSR launched devastating attacks that added to the pressure bringing apartheid leaders to the negotiating table.

\textit{Sting was one of many artists at the AAM organized concert to pressurize the Apartheid government to release Mandela. Source: iconicphotogalleries}

CHAPTER FIVE:
UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST APARTHEID

“We stand here today to salute the United Nations Organization and its Member States, both singly and collectively, for joining forces with the masses of our people in a common struggle that has brought about our emancipation and pushed back the frontiers of racism.” South African President Nelson Mandela, Address to UN General Assembly, 3 October 1994

5.1 Introduction

Though racial discrimination in South Africa was on the agenda of the United Nations since 1946 – and apartheid since 1952 - it had been difficult for many years, because of the resistance of Western Powers, to secure a condemnation of apartheid or any sanctions against the Pretoria regime. The position began to change in the 1960s with the cycle of repression and resistance in South Africa, the anti-colonial revolutions in Asia and Africa, the establishment of the Organization of African Unity and the growing public opinion against apartheid all over the world, including the Western countries. The near-unanimous adoption of the resolution of October 11, 1963, was a tribute to the tireless work of anti-apartheid movements and other organizations which helped persuade the reluctant governments to join with the vast majority of Member States in condemning the brutality of the apartheid regime.

5.2 Coalition Against Apartheid

To persuade world governments to move beyond verbal condemnation of apartheid repression to meaningful action to assist the South African people to eliminate apartheid – particularly to impose comprehensive sanctions as requested by the liberation movement – required a protracted and difficult struggle during which a powerful and growing coalition emerged. It encompassed, already by 1963, the governments and peoples of non-aligned and third world countries and Socialist States, as well as large segments of people in the Western countries and other trading partners of South Africa. It included inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and its family of agencies, the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, and the Organization of African Unity, and numerous non-governmental institutions and organizations such as trade unions, churches, organizations of students and youth, sports bodies etc., as well as many writers, artists, musicians, sportspersons and other individuals. Oliver Tambo, President of the exiled African National Congress, used to stress that they were all “partners in the struggle”.

Anti-apartheid movements, especially in major Western countries, which mobilized the people to confront and press their governments to abandon their collaboration with apartheid South Africa and join the rest of the world in support of a democratic South Africa, played a very significant role in this coalition. The Anti-apartheid Movement in Britain, as well as the American Committee on Africa and Trans Africa in the United States, deserve particular mention because of the scope of their activities in the two countries which, because of their economic and strategic interests in South Africa, were crucial for the international efforts to dismantle apartheid.

The movement reached a new level after the United Nations decided on an international campaign against apartheid and took active steps to promote a world-wide campaign. The Special Committee against Apartheid of the United Nations (assisted by the Centre against Apartheid), the Organization of African Unity and the anti-apartheid movements led the efforts to broaden the coalition against apartheid. As a result of their diplomatic and political action, most of the smaller Western countries, led by the Nordic States, began to support sanctions against the apartheid regime and to provide substantial assistance to the struggle for freedom.

In the United States and Britain, while the Reagan and Thatcher administrations persisted in protecting the Pretoria regime from United Nations sanctions, public demands for action greatly increased. Many States and cities, as well trade unions, churches, universities etc., imposed “people’s sanctions” against South Africa, ultimately forcing the national governments to fall in line.

This movement grew into the strongest international solidarity movement of the twentieth century. It spread to all regions of the world, thanks to the efforts of the United Nations and other international bodies.

The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., speaking in New York on Human Rights Day in 1965 on action against apartheid, had called for “an international alliance of peoples of all nations against racism”. Referring to the “international potential of non-violence” which had not yet been employed, he suggested that the people utilize non-violence through a massive international boycott. This was achieved by the peoples of the world by overcoming the strong resistance of the allies of apartheid.

The contribution of international solidarity to the liberation of South Africa has been recognized by the African National Congress. In his opening speech to the International Solidarity Conference in Johannesburg on February 19, 1993, Oliver Tambo said:

“To those of the participants who have come from outside South Africa, we say you are here today because by your actions you have brought the system of apartheid to its knees... 

“...this broad movement against apartheid struck a mighty blow against the system of apartheid, gave enormous strength to our liberation movement, sustained and helped to free those who were in prison, maintained those who were in exile... and has brought us to the point where we can now say that victory is in sight”\textsuperscript{610}.

Mention must be made of the crucial contribution of Oliver Tambo to the development of this movement. He embodied the vision of a non-racial, democratic South Africa built by a united struggle of people of all racial origins.

By his integrity, vision and statesmanship, he earned the respect and confidence of numerous people in governments and in public life.\textsuperscript{611} He was most persuasive in conveying the message that the struggle against apartheid deserved the participation of governments and peoples all over the world. The post-apartheid government in South Africa to institute an “Order of Oliver Tambo” to recognize the leaders of the solidarity movement\textsuperscript{612}.

5.3 Overview of Action Against Apartheid

It is essential to recall the development of the people’s movement against apartheid, as it preceded and inspired the United Nations to launch an international campaign. Before the Second World War, there was hardly any media attention or public concern in the world for the brutality of racism in South Africa.

Dr. W.E.B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey, the great African-American leaders, had denounced racist oppression in South Africa and assisted representatives of the African National Congress, as did Fenner Brockway, leader of the anti-colonial movement in Britain.\textsuperscript{613} But even massacres of Africans in South Africa went unnoticed by the mainstream press.

The United Nations did not undertake any information activity against apartheid or establish contacts with anti-apartheid groups until the Special Committee against Apartheid began its

\textsuperscript{611} P. Dan, “America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged A Peace”, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{612} I. Akira, “Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{613} P. Dan, “America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War II and Forged A Peace”, p. 168.
work in 1963. No representative of the liberation movement or anti-apartheid movements was heard until then by United Nations bodies.

But a number of groups were formed around the world since 1946, by people inspired by the non-violent mass struggle in South Africa, to inform the public about the situation in South Africa and promote sympathy for the oppressed people and their freedom movement. They included many pacifist churchmen and others who had been active in support of the freedom of India and other colonies.

Some of the pioneers of this movement included Reverend Michael Scott, Father Trevor Huddleston, and Canon L. John Collins in Britain; Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, Paul Robeson, George Houser and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in the United States; and the Reverend Gunnar Helander and Per Wastberg in Sweden. The Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, established in Cairo in 1957, and its national affiliates were active in promoting support to the liberation movement in African, Asian and Socialist countries. The government of Egypt provided offices for the liberation movements.

Racial oppression in South Africa received international attention in 1946 with the Indian passive resistance movement against the “Ghetto Act,” which was supported by the African National Congress and attracted volunteers from all racial groups, and the complaint by the government of India to the United Nations. The Council on African Affairs in New York, led by Paul Robeson, redoubled its activities on this issue and a South Africa Committee of members of Parliament was formed in London by the India League, with Julius Silverman, M.P. as Chairman.

The Campaign of Defiance against Unjust Laws in 1952 led to the establishment of other groups to promote information on the situation in South Africa and sympathy for the oppressed people. Americans for South African Resistance (later renamed the American Committee on Africa -ACOA), led by the Rev. George Houser, was formed in New York to support the Defiance Campaign. Christian Action in London, led by Canon L. John Collins, was also active in support of the Defiance Campaign and later set up funds to help political prisoners and their families. Solidarity spread to Nordic countries where, for instance, Olof Palme, as a student leader, played a significant role.

After the mass arrests of the leaders of the freedom movement in 1956 and the staging of a treason trial, Canon Collins, the ACOA and Nordic groups began fund-raising for the legal

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defence of the accused and assistance to their families. While raising substantial funds from the public, the fund-raising helped in informing the public about the situation in South Africa.

About the same time, there were moves to boycott the South African racists and isolate them. Father Trevor Huddleston called for a cultural boycott of South Africa. The International Table Tennis Federation, led by Ivor Montagu of Britain, expelled the racist South African team. A boycott movement was formed in London on June 26, 1959. Renamed the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 1960, it was to play a leading role in public anti-apartheid efforts until the establishment of a democratic government in South Africa.

The Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960, led to action in many countries around the world, including mass demonstrations, boycotts of South African goods and ships and the setting up of anti-apartheid groups. African States, which emerged into independence and attained membership in the United Nations, pressed for sanctions against the South African regime. Action against apartheid was initiated by trade unions, churches, and other non-governmental organizations. People’s boycotts of South Africa and governmental sanctions against South Africa became the focus of anti-apartheid activity.

The work of anti-apartheid groups and the deterioration of the situation in South Africa had an influence on the attitudes of Western governments. For instance, the Nordic States which had been hesitant to condemn apartheid changed their attitude. The United States criticized South Africa after the Sharpeville massacre. The representative of Britain, which had been the staunchest supporter of South Africa in claiming that apartheid was an internal issue of the country, declared in the UN General Assembly on April 5, 1961, that his government “regarded apartheid as being now so exceptional as to be sui generis”.

Public action in support of the liberation movement again greatly increased in 1963 when the Pretoria regime resorted to the mass detention and torture of prisoners, and charged Nelson Mandela and others in the Rivonia trial under laws which denied due process and provided for the death penalty.

Oliver Tambo had arrived in London in 1960 to establish an external mission of the ANC and a number of other leaders of the liberation movement came out subsequently to join the mission. They provided guidance to the anti-apartheid groups and encouraged the establishment of groups in other countries. They were able to acquaint the public of the situation in South Africa and the development of the liberation struggle, and explain the moral, political and material assistance sought by the liberation movement. Nelson Mandela’s statement from the dock in April 1964 was a powerful inspiration.

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The United Nations began actively to encourage and support the movement against apartheid since the Special Committee against Apartheid began its work in April 1963. There followed a rapid expansion of anti-apartheid groups and the range of their activities.623

The boycott of apartheid sports teams involved millions of people and demonstrated world revulsion against apartheid. Cultural boycott also had a great impact. Moreover, artists, writers and musicians reached millions of people with the anti-apartheid message.624

Campaigns against investments in South Africa – persuading by local bodies and the public to take action where national governments were recalcitrant – exerted strong pressure on corporations involved in South Africa. South Africa was excluded from numerous professional and other public organizations and conferences. No international movement had ever engaged in such a range of actions as the movement against apartheid.

The people’s movement against apartheid comprised thousands of organizations – anti-apartheid and solidarity movements, peace movements, trade unions, churches, organizations of students, youth and women and many professional bodies.625 It included pacifists, socialists, communists and even some conservatives. Among its ranks were some of the greatest intellectuals of the time – artists, writers, musicians etc. There was no central direction, but parallel actions resulting from a common loyalty to the cause of freedom and human rights.

The United Nations General Assembly has often commended the anti-apartheid groups. On December 12, 1979, it adopted a resolution on the role of NGOs in international action against apartheid.626 Public action reinforced the efforts of the United Nations, the OAU and the liberation movements, and contributed greatly to forcing the Pretoria regime to negotiate with the genuine representatives of the great majority of the people.

5.4 UN International Campaign Against Apartheid

The United Nations efforts to promote public information and public action against apartheid began with the establishment of the Special Committee against Apartheid. A decision was made on the establishment of the Special Committee by resolution 1762 (XVII) of November 6, 1962, sponsored mostly by African States, which recommended a series of

625 Ibid.
sanctions by Member States against South Africa and requested the Security Council to take measures, including sanctions and the suspension or expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. The Western Powers refused to accept membership of the Committee – the first committee to be boycotted by them.\textsuperscript{627}

While most observers expected that the Special Committee would be totally ineffective in dealing with a “perennial” issue, it took advantage of the boycott of the Western Powers to become a dynamic action-oriented committee. While it was established merely to keep the situation in South Africa under review between sessions of the General Assembly,\textsuperscript{628} it decided that its function could not be to produce more documents but to promote widest international action for the elimination of apartheid.

It approached Member States to encourage imposition of sanctions recommended by the General Assembly and obtained information on action taken by a great majority of States, some at great sacrifice, though not by the Western States and other major trading partners of South Africa. A month after its first meeting, it submitted a report drawing attention to the grave new developments in South Africa and made a series of recommendations for action.\textsuperscript{629} Its recommendations were fully endorsed by the founding Conference of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa (May 1963) which called for discussion of the situation by the Security Council and deputed four Foreign Ministers to represent Africa. The Security Council adopted, on August 7, 1963, a resolution recommending an arms embargo against South Africa; Britain and France abstained on the resolution and the United States voted in favour. That was the first action by the United Nations to exert pressure against the apartheid regime.\textsuperscript{630}

During the next year, the Special Committee worked tirelessly to secure a strengthening of the arms embargo, to promote international action for an end to the Rivonia trial and the release of all political prisoners, and to encourage humanitarian aid to political prisoners and their families through the Defence and Aid Fund and other bodies.\textsuperscript{631}

The Special Committee recognized from its inception the primary role of the national liberation movement of South Africa\textsuperscript{632} and the significant contribution of organizations and individuals in the rest of the world opposed to apartheid. Brushing aside doubts as to its competence to grant hearings to South Africans, it heard several South Africans and anti-apartheid activists. Between May and July 1963, it heard an ANC delegation (Duma Nokwe,}

\textsuperscript{627} UN Action in the Field of Human Rights 1948-1978 (1974), 25\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, p. 206.
\textsuperscript{630} Yusuff Maitama-Sule, Alhaji. “Time for Sanctions Against Apartheid South Africa is Now: Statements. United Nations Centre Against Apartheid”, p.82.
Robert Resha and Tennyson Makiwane) and Patrick Duncan of PAC, as well as Ms. Mary Benson, a South African writer; George Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa; Professor Leslie Rubin, a founder member of the South African Liberal Party; and Ms. Miriam Makeba, South African singer.633

In October 1963, on its recommendation, Oliver Tambo and Bishop Ambrose Reeves were heard by the General Assembly’s Special Political Committee, a committee of the whole, which discussed the problem of apartheid. The officers of the Special Committee held a reception in their honour at the United Nations Headquarters, thereby setting a precedent which the Committee and the Centre were to follow on many occasions.634 They treated representatives of the liberation movement and the anti-apartheid organizations as honoured guests and associates in a common struggle.

A delegation of the Special Committee visited London in April 1964 to attend the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa organized by the Anti-Apartheid Movement and held extensive discussions with the movement. While the Special Committee was soon able to make apartheid recognized as one of the main issues before the United Nations and secure some progress in action against apartheid, it became clear by 1965 that a virtual deadlock had been reached on sanctions against South Africa.

Britain announced an arms embargo against South Africa in November 1964,635 but France remained uncooperative and became the main supplier of military equipment to the apartheid regime. None of the three major Western Powers were prepared to move any further. The smaller Western countries took no measures against South Africa but for an arms embargo, arguing that action by them would be ineffective without decisions by the Security Council binding on all Member States; it was well known that three permanent members636 would veto any such proposals in the Council.

Considering this situation, the Special Committee proposed, and the General Assembly endorsed, in 1966, an “international campaign against apartheid”, under United Nations auspices, as a means to overcome the impasse through a comprehensive programme of action involving the United Nations, governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and individuals.637 While continuing to press for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions by the Security Council and to point to the grave responsibility of the major Western Powers and other trading partners for the perpetuation of apartheid, the campaign would try to secure progress on measures which could be adopted by the General Assembly and implemented by governments and the public such as boycotts, assistance to political

635 S. M. Wolseley, “Sanctions Against South Africa: the Changing Context”, p. 82.

153
prisoners and their families, scholarships and other assistance to South African refugees, as well as moral, political and material assistance to the national liberation movement.

It is not possible in a short paper to review the numerous initiatives taken by the Special Committee on a wide range of actions for almost thirty years. Reference will be made only to the strategy and to some of the features of the campaign.

5.4.1 Role of the Liberation Movement and of International Solidarity

The Special Committee always emphasised that while the United Nations had a vital interest in the eradication of apartheid, the role of the United Nations and the international community was supportive and secondary. As the Chairman of the Special Committee, Achkar Marof of Guinea, declared in 1967:

"...the main role in the liberation of southern Africa should rightfully go to the oppressed people themselves. The international community can assist them and help create conditions in which they can secure the liberation with the least possible violence and delay, but it cannot aspire to deliver liberation to them. The efforts of the international community should only complement the efforts of the oppressed people...

"The struggle for freedom in South Africa is certainly the right, the responsibility and the privilege of the people of South Africa. They have not abdicated their struggle or asked for freedom as a gift from the rest of the world. Whatever we do at the international level - whether as governments or in anti-apartheid movements and other popular organizations - we need to recognize in all humility that our role is but secondary. We do not aspire to liberate - which would be tantamount to substituting ourselves to the South African people - but to assist the liberation, as that is our duty if we are loyal to our own convictions. We can discharge this duty only if we avoid any pity or paternalism and remain at all times responsive to the needs and desires of the liberation movement." 639

The Special Committee, therefore, treated the liberation movement with respect and always paid great attention to its views and requests. It often acted, in effect, as the lobby for the liberation movement.

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5.4.2 The Strategy

The Special Committee shared the view of the liberation movement that apartheid was sustained by the military, economic and political cooperation of a few Western Powers – the United Kingdom, the United States, Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy in particular – and Japan, which were the main trading partners of South Africa.\(^{640}\) They had the capacity to exert effective pressure on the Pretoria regime. Sanctions by them would be of great assistance to the liberation movement and would enable it to achieve a non-racial democratic society with a minimum of violence.

But these Powers, because of profits derived by their corporations from apartheid and their strategic calculations in the context of the cold war, were obstructing any action against the apartheid regime. When the General Assembly adopted a resolution on sanctions in 1962, none of the Western Powers voted in favour. It was, therefore, essential to wean the smaller Western Powers from this block, isolate the main collaborators with apartheid and thereby exert pressure on them to cooperate in international action against apartheid.\(^{641}\)

The anti-apartheid coalition had to be extended from its base in the Movement of Non-aligned States and the Organization of African Unity, as well as the nascent anti-apartheid movements, to include all States except the few major collaborators and, at the same time, obtain maximum support from public opinion even in those countries with a view, hopefully, to persuade them to impose sanctions against the apartheid regime. Any moves by the United States, Britain and other governments to view the liberation struggle in South Africa through the prism of the “cold war”\(^ {642}\) had to be countered.

This required diplomatic action by the committed States, the utilization of the potentials of the United Nations and other international organizations, and the encouragement of the anti-apartheid movements and other NGOs to mobilize the people in solidarity with the liberation struggle.

Second, apartheid affected every aspect of life in South Africa. Action against apartheid had to be conducted on many fronts. Arms embargo, economic sanctions and boycotts were crucial, but they had to be complemented by imaginative action on matters relating to trade union rights, health, education, sports, status of women, academic freedom, prison conditions, etc. Benefits of international cooperation had to be denied to all institutions and organizations based on apartheid.\(^ {643}\)


Third, recognizing the primary role of the liberation movement, the Special Committee sought to promote assistance needed by it in its just struggle – from assistance to political prisoners, their families and refugees to direct assistance to the liberation movement for its political and social activities as well as armed struggle.\textsuperscript{644} It helped set up United Nations programmes for humanitarian and educational assistance but decided to encourage direct assistance to the liberation movement by Governments, the United Nations family of agencies and NGOs.

5.4.3 Growing support from Nordic and other smaller Western States

In 1965, several Nordic and other smaller Western States responded generously to an appeal by the Special Committee for contributions to the Defence and Aid Fund and the World Council of Churches for assistance to the political prisoners and their families in South Africa. This reflected growing public sentiment in those countries against apartheid, promoted by anti-apartheid groups, as well as their loyalty to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{645}

In the same year, the Chairman of the Special Committee and I initiated consultations with Nordic delegations on the formulation of the General Assembly resolution on apartheid with respect to sanctions. Taking into account the views of their governments that only the Security Council can decide on sanctions, the Special Committee agreed on the following formulation which was endorsed by the General Assembly:

\textbf{“Draws the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security, that action under Chapter VII of the Charter is essential in order to solve the problem of apartheid and that universally applied economic sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution”}.\textsuperscript{646}

In subsequent years almost all the smaller Western States subscribed to this formulation, thereby isolating the major Western Powers. After Soweto massacre of 1976, Sweden and Norway began to implement unilateral measures against South Africa, especially the prohibition of new investment in South Africa.

The Nordic States made very generous contributions for legal assistance to the political prisoners and assistance to their families and to refugees. They contributed well over half of the $50 million received by the UN Trust Fund for South Africa and gave much more in direct grants to the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. Many other Western

\textsuperscript{644} George W. Shepherd, (ed.). \textit{Effective Sanctions on South Africa: the Cutting Edge of Economic Intervention}, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{646} United Nations Department of Public Information, \textit{The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994}, p.94.
countries made annual contributions to the UN Trust Fund. Sweden and Norway also gave substantial assistance to the liberation movement for non-military activities, and their example was followed by a few other Western countries.

The Special Committee’s cooperation with these countries developed rapidly. From 1984, several smaller Western countries sponsored resolutions on “Concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid” recommending a series of measures against the apartheid regime and in support of the struggle against that regime. These resolutions were adopted by overwhelming majorities. As sponsors of the resolutions, they accepted the moral commitment to implement their provisions. The participation of these countries in the anti-apartheid coalition was particularly helpful in reinforcing the non-racialism of the liberation movement and in resisting the intrusion of the “cold war” into southern Africa.

5.4.4 Partial Measures

While the Special Committee favoured comprehensive sanctions against apartheid and full support to the liberation movement in its struggle, it recognized that some governments and public organizations could only go part of the way. It encouraged them to do their best in measures they approve and this often resulted in progress in commitment.

In 1970, the General Assembly discontinued the practice of one resolution on apartheid and began to consider separate resolutions on various aspects of international action. This enabled countries which had reservations on some proposals to support other resolutions.

The resolutions demanding the release of political prisoners, calling for clemency to freedom fighters, appealing for assistance to political prisoners and their families or denouncing the Bantustans and their fake “independence” received virtually unanimous support, thus demonstrating world condemnation of apartheid. Resolutions on the arms embargo and sports boycott received an overwhelming majority of the votes, while resolutions condemning the collaboration of some governments with the apartheid regime or supporting the right of the liberation movement to undertake armed struggle received fewer, though a substantial majority of, votes.

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The votes on these resolutions reflected the progress of diplomatic efforts and public action in securing a consensus for universal action for the replacement of the apartheid regime by a government elected by all the people of South Africa.

Of special significance were declarations on the objectives of international action. They were in conformity with the policies of the liberation movement and received almost unanimous support. For instance, the Declaration on South Africa, adopted without a vote on December 12, 1979, stated:

“Reaffirming that apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind;

“Convinced that the United Nations must take the lead in concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid;...

“Recognizing the significant contribution of the struggle for freedom and equality in South Africa to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations...

1. All States shall recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial society guaranteeing the enjoyment of equal rights by all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

2. All States shall recognize the right of the oppressed people of South Africa to choose their means of struggle.

3. All States shall solemnly pledge to refrain from overt or covert military intervention in support of or defence of the Pretoria regime in its effort to repress the legitimate aspirations and struggle of the African people of South Africa against it in the exercise of their right of self-determination...

7. All States shall demonstrate international solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa and with the independent African States subjected to threats or acts of aggression and subversion by the South African regime”.

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653 UN Declaration on South Africa. “General Assembly resolution 34/93-O, 12 December 1979.”
5.4.5 Challenging the Legitimacy of the Pretoria Regime

A major contribution of the United Nations was the challenge to the legitimacy of the Pretoria regime and recognition of the liberation movement as the authentic representative of the people of South Africa.\(^{655}\)

The credentials of the South African delegation were challenged by a number of countries from 1965. The General Assembly decided in 1970 not to accept the credentials; the President ruled that this was a very solemn warning to the South African regime, though its delegation would continue to be seated.\(^{656}\)

In 1973, the Assembly decided, on the recommendation of the Special Committee, that the South African regime had no right to represent the people of South Africa, and that the liberation movements recognized by the OAU were “the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people”.\(^{657}\) It requested all intergovernmental organizations to deny membership to the South African regime and to invite the liberation movements to participate in their meetings.

The following year, the General Assembly excluded the South African delegation. And in 1975 it declared that “the racist regime of South Africa is illegitimate”.\(^{658}\) Though many of the Western countries voted against or abstained on these decisions, they contributed to the growing isolation of the Pretoria regime in the international community.\(^{659}\)

Representatives of the ANC and PAC not only began to participate in the debates on apartheid in the General Assembly but, as observers in the Special Committee, participated in the drafting of the resolutions on apartheid.\(^{660}\)

5.4.6 Cooperation with Anti-Apartheid Organizations

One of the most important activities of the Special Committee was its cooperation with the anti-apartheid movements and other organizations engaged in actions against apartheid – and this developed into a virtual alliance which was unprecedented in the history of intergovernmental organizations.\(^{661}\)

\(^{655}\) UN Declaration on South Africa. “General Assembly resolution 34/93-O, 12 December 1979.”


\(^{659}\) UN Declaration on South Africa. “General Assembly Resolution 34/93-O, 12 December 1979.”


The Special Committee recognized the crucial importance of these organizations and individuals in breaking the impasse on international sanctions and ensuring ever more effective action against apartheid.\(^{662}\) It established close relations with anti-apartheid movements, especially after a session in Europe in 1968.

It invited leaders of the movements on many occasions for consultations on action. It organized many seminars, conferences and other events – with the participation of governments, liberation movements and non-governmental organizations – for discussion of the campaign against apartheid, and development of programmes of action.\(^{663}\) It set a precedent by electing leaders of anti-apartheid movements as officers of United Nations seminars and conferences. It also co-sponsored conferences and seminars planned by anti-apartheid groups and provided them modest financial assistance.

These events helped anti-apartheid movements to consult on internationalizing campaigns against apartheid, to develop cooperation not only with the United Nations but with the specialised agencies of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and individual governments, especially in Africa.\(^{664}\)

The Special Committee ensured that suggestions made by the anti-apartheid movements, in the light of their experience, were incorporated in resolutions of the United Nations.

Many of the publications of the Centre against Apartheid were commissioned from leaders of the liberation movement and anti-apartheid groups, and were widely circulated through the extensive network of United Nations offices. The Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa, which helped greatly in enforcing the sports boycott, was based on information provided by Sam Ramsamy, Chairman of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC).\(^{665}\) Mike Terry, executive secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, contributed to the companion register of cultural contacts.

The Special Committee, for its part, benefited greatly from its contacts with anti-apartheid groups. The work of these groups facilitated its consultations with governments to promote action against apartheid. On its many missions to governments, the Special Committee met with the anti-apartheid groups and welcomed their advice on matters to discuss with the governments.\(^{666}\)

It established contacts with numerous non-governmental organizations opposed to apartheid, irrespective of their ideological and other differences, and was able to bring them together.

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\(^{662}\) Ibid.  
For instance, international trade union conferences against apartheid, with the participation of the three international confederations of trade unions, were possible only because of the efforts of the Special Committee and the cooperation of the International Labour Organization.

The Special Committee was able to play an unusually activist role because of its composition. The Chairman was authorized to issue public statements and appeals on its behalf without prior approval by the Committee. Through his statements, the Committee could respond promptly to developments in South Africa throughout the year and appeal to governments and organizations for appropriate action. It sent messages of support to the campaigns of anti-apartheid groups, emphasizing that they, not the recalcitrant governments, had the support of the United Nations and the overwhelming majority of humanity. The cooperation of the United Nations, OAU and committed governments with the anti-apartheid groups took anti-apartheid action to a new level.

For instance, on the sports boycott, the anti-apartheid movements initiated mass protests in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and other countries. The boycott was extended when governments and the United Nations took complementary action. African governments encouraged their sports bodies to press for the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympics and international sports federations. They asked their sports bodies to boycott the Montreal Olympics in protest against New Zealand’s collaboration with apartheid sport. Under pressure from African governments, the Commonwealth adopted the Gleneagles declaration on boycott of apartheid sport. African and other governments prohibited sportsmen who played in South Africa from playing in their countries.

Reference must be made to the valuable cooperation of anti-apartheid groups in monitoring the implementation of United Nations resolutions. In 1977, the United Nations Security Council decided on a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and set up a committee to monitor its implementation. The committee could do little as governments – especially Western governments - provided no information to it of any violations of the embargo.

In 1979, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, with the encouragement of the Special Committee, established the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, with Abdul S. Minty as Director. The Special Committee kept in close contact with the World Campaign which was able, with the help of anti-apartheid groups, to obtain

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669 Rogers, Barbara and Bolton, Brian. "Sanctions Against South Africa: Exploding the Myths", p.81.
valuable information. It drew the attention of the Security Council Committee to the work of the World Campaign and arranged for Mr. Minty and others to be heard by the Committee. This led to the strengthening the implementation of the embargo.

A non-governmental organization in Antigua discovered that the Space Research Corporation on the United States-Canadian border was shipping weapons systems through Antigua to South Africa. The Special Committee arranged for its leader, Tim Hector, to be heard by the Security Council Committee. That led to the closing of one of the major loopholes in the arms embargo.

In 1980, the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and Working Group Kairos set up, with the support of the Special Committee, a Shipping Research Bureau in Amsterdam. Its work helped in monitoring and strengthening the implementation of the oil embargo against South Africa.

The Special Committee and the NGOs tried to relate their activities to movements inside South Africa. For instance, in 1963-64 when torture of political prisoners was widespread, and prison conditions were inhuman, there were protests by democratic whites in South Africa. The Defence and Aid Fund in London publicized the situation. The Special Committee published a number of affidavits from prisoners and called on the International Committee of the Red Cross to take action. It also referred the matter to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights which set up a Working Group to investigate the situation. As a result of these initiatives, the Pretoria regime was obliged to improve the treatment of sentenced prisoners, though regrettably the ICRC delegates were not permitted to see detainees and awaiting trial prisoners.

In the early 1970s when there was an upsurge of African unions in South Africa and an exposure by NUSAS of wages and working conditions in multinational enterprises in South Africa, pressure on the corporations by trade unions and anti-apartheid groups in Western countries greatly increased. The campaign for the withdrawal of investments in South Africa drew wide support. As a result of these actions, supported by the Special Committee, the Pretoria regime was obliged to legalize African trade unions.

The United Nations and anti-apartheid groups carried on a persistent campaign for the release of prisoners, especially since 1963. In that connection, they publicized the life and statements of Nelson Mandela. In 1976, there was an impressive observance of the sixtieth birthday of Nelson Mandela by governments, organizations and individuals. Soon, with the encouragement of the United Nations, numerous awards and honours were bestowed on

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678 A. Roberts, “United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations”, pp. 75-81
Nelson Mandela, making him the most honoured political prisoner in history and the symbol of the liberation struggle.679

In 1980, after the independence of Zimbabwe, Percy Qoboza, editor of Sunday Post in Johannesburg, launched a campaign for the release of Mandela and it received wide support in South Africa. The Special Committee commended that campaign and took further action internationally to develop the “Free Mandela” campaign. The campaign became a major component of the struggle against apartheid, thanks to the actions of anti-apartheid movements and the United Nations.

5.4.7 A Historic Achievement

The liberation of South Africa from entrenched tyranny was a historic achievement of a global alliance of governments and peoples in support of the liberation struggle. In the 1950s when the apartheid regime enacted a series of repressive laws and the Congress Alliance led a mass non-violent resistance, many observers feared that the situation might lead to a “race war” with incalculable international repercussions.681

With the example of the Algerian revolution, a revolution in a country with a million European settlers which led to the loss of well over a million lives, one shuddered to think what a similar revolution in South Africa could entail. The vision of the leaders of the liberation movement, and the support it received from all corners of the globe, ensured that the struggle in South Africa succeeded with a relatively small number of casualties.682

5.5 Conclusion

The movement against apartheid demonstrated people’s power. It showed that the United Nations can become a powerful force when it forges an alliance with public movements for peace and justice. It also showed that it is possible to overcome the obstruction of a few governments insensitive to the legitimate aspirations of people by building an alliance of all other States with public organizations, especially in the States opposing progress, and utilizing the possibilities which exist in the United Nations despite the misuse of the veto in the Security Council. But the alliance against apartheid did not succeed in eliminating racism in the world. Apartheid was based on the premise that it is not possible for people of different races and cultures to live together in amity. Even as the new South Africa was proving this wrong, there emerged many ethnic and other conflicts in the world causing enormous suffering and loss of life. Meanwhile the world was also faced with many old and new problems which caused enormous misery to peoples. President Thabo Mbeki suggested, in his State of the Nation address in May 2000, that “perhaps the time has come for the

681 Asian-African States in the UN General Assembly in 1952, “the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa”.
emergence of a united movement of the peoples of the world that would come together to work for the creation of a new world order”. After the endorsement of the suggestion by the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) on 16-17 September, he wrote:

“The NEC analysed the emerging world order, which is increasingly characterised by the dominance of a single world power and grossly uneven economic and social development. It is a world order characterised by terrorist activity, illegal wars of 'pre-emption' and 'regime change', suicide bombings, and extra-judicial killings. This is taking place alongside the weakening of multilateralism and a disregard for the United Nations and the established principles of international law.

"The principal challenges of this age - tackling poverty, Underdevelopment and human misery - are becoming ever more neglected as powerful and wealthy nations pursue, at a massive cost to world peace and stability, their own narrow material interests....

"Among other things, the movement would need to unite all those across the world who are committed to a more just, more democratic human and caring world which will guarantee peace and security for all irrespective of size, power, class, religion or nationality. It would need to campaign on the basis of the common good and common interests of humanity. The movement should mobilize civil society organizations and social movements, as well as multilateral institutions and governments."683

What was envisaged was an international alliance of governments, organizations and individuals to overcome the few governments and vested interests which sought to impose a “right wing agenda” on the world at the cost of massive human suffering, and to bring about a new world order. The rich experience of the international solidarity movement for the liberation of South Africa provided valuable lessons for developing such an alliance.

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CHAPTER SIX:
THE OAU AND THE FRONTLINE STATES AGAINST APARTHEID

“Foreign financial and commercial support for the South African economy through investment and trade enables the totalitarian regime of South Africa to maintain a firmer grip over its own destiny and therefore impedes fundamental change in the status quo…” (Memorandum from the American Committee on Africa, 1969).

6.1 Introduction
Since its founding in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) identified the Republic of South Africa as one of their main targets in the fight against racial discrimination. At its inception, the Addis Ababa conference had dealt principally with this question of race (apartheid). One reason for the OAU’s stand on South Africa was its common abhorrence of racial discrimination which they regarded as racist and inhuman.684 The conference therefore called for, among other things, “the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.”685 The perpetuation of apartheid in South Africa was condemned by many independent African states.

By 1963, the independent African states, through the OAU, had become more determined in their opposition to apartheid. Since the new regional balance resulting from the independence of Angola, Mozambique and later Zimbabwe was created, South Africa had pursued an aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours coupled with a repressive internal policy. On the basis of the increasingly converging interests of South Africa and its imperialist allies, the Pretoria regime had articulated a policy that, with respect to its neighbours, alternated political, economic and military pressures, and overtures.686 Thus, this chapter delves on the OAU’s and the Frontline States’ (FLS) role towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa.

6.2 The OAU and the Isolation of the Apartheid Regime in South Africa

The OAU was a vital source of support for all the liberation movements in Africa. In May 1963, the summit of independent African states in Addis Ababa, which established the OAU, resolved to speed up the liberation of African peoples still under foreign or white rule. One of the first OAU structures was the Liberation Committee, responsible for coordinating assistance from African states and managing a special fund set up for that purpose. The committee included representatives from Algeria, Ethiopia, Congo- Kinshasa, Guinea,

Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, United Arab Republic and Tanzania, but none from the liberation movements themselves.\(^{687}\)

Not all African countries supported the OAU policy on South Africa. For example, throughout the 1960s Malawi, led by Hastings Banda, adopted a formal policy of rapprochement with the South African government. Banda’s attitude was that ‘African states north of the Zambezi must stop thinking that they can solve the problems of South Africa by shouts and threats in Addis Ababa, London or New York’.\(^{688}\) In 1969 Banda was still vociferously defending Malawi’s relationships with both South Africa and Portugal, publicly castigating those who ‘shouted about’ South Africa but had never been there, and dismissing members of the liberation movements in exile as professional refugees.\(^{689}\)

Even after the OAU was formed, African leaders spoke with many voices on the question of liberation for southern Africa. Some states, like Tanzania and Zambia, were consistently optimistic and committed, to the point that both the ANC and ZAPU paid homage to ‘the contempt with which these two nations have dismissed threats from Smith and Vorster’ as exemplary and commendable.\(^{690}\) France, which had vested economic interests in South Africa, exerted pressure on Francophone states not to support the OAU’s Liberation Fund.

A complicating factor was the situation in Congo after Mobutu Sese Seko’s military coup in November 1965. The question of his government’s legitimacy divided African leaders.\(^{691}\) Nkrumah, for example, urged that Congo- Leopoldville should be used as a training base and argued that there was every reason to accept the offer from the Congolese government to make available offices and accommodation for members of the Liberation Committee. In his opinion, freedom fighters in Tanzania had been exposed to espionage, intrigue, frustration and disappointment as a result of ‘entrusting [their] training to … an imperialist agent’.\(^{692}\) Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere responded to what he referred to as Nkrumah’s ‘curious accusations’ by pointing out the unstable political conditions in Congo, and noted: ‘If the Liberation Committee should have been housed in Leopoldville, imagine what the consequences could have been.’ He contemptuously dismissed the implication that Tanzania was an imperialist state and took particular exception to Nkrumah’s reference to ‘an imperialist agent’.\(^{693}\)

In July 1964, at a meeting of OAU heads of state, Nkrumah lambasted the performance of the Liberation Committee, describing it as ineffective and lacking in positive action.

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\(^{692}\) Africa Research Bulletin, July 1964, C 122.

\(^{693}\) Africa Research Bulletin, July 1964, C 126.
Shortcomings of the military aid and training facilities offered to freedom fighters and unsatisfactory conditions at training camps in northern Africa, particularly Ethiopia, were severely criticized. Nkrumah complained that ‘under the Liberation Committee set up at Addis Ababa, the freedom fighters had no real security, and were not provided with instruments for their struggle, nor were food, clothing and medicine given for the men in training’.694 Nyerere responded angrily:

Since these accusations are made by a country, the only country that has not paid a single penny to the [Liberation] Committee since its establishment, I do not propose to pay much attention to them. The non-payment of the sum for the liberation of our brethren has nothing whatsoever to do with the alleged inefficiency of the Liberation Committee. The decision not to pay was made before the committee began its work, and the reason was extremely petty. The decision ... was made at Addis Ababa as soon as the conference committed the unforgivable crime of not including Ghana on the committee and of choosing Dar es Salaam as its headquarters. Those who are not ready to join actively in the task should at least refrain from undermining the effectiveness of the liberation movement.695

In the latter part of the 1960s, however, the ANC and ZAPU also had harsh words about what was perceived as ineffective and limited support from the Liberation Committee. In a joint statement sent to the OAU heads of state meeting in September 1967, the ANC and ZAPU said:

This is the moment when the Organization of African Unity must either carry out its obligations of giving firm support to the efforts of smashing and destroying its worst enemies, or be responsible for the reversal of the glorious African Revolution. There can and should be no equivocation and no wavering.696

The organizations argued that the material support and facilities provided by the OAU fell far short of a liberation struggle’s demands. There was a major discrepancy between what was promised, and what the liberation movements actually received. For example, according to Tandon, during 1967-8 the ANC was promised $80 000 but was given only $3 940; $40 000 was pledged to the PAC, but only $4 600 was received. The shortfall had left the ANC with little choice but to rely increasingly on Soviet funding. The Liberation Committee was

695 Ibid, B 126.
bedeviled by corruption, and several member states accused the Tanzanian executive secretary of mismanaging the funds.697

On 6 September 1969, the future of the committee was the main item on the agenda at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa. Some members wanted the committee reduced from 11 to eight members, drawn in equal numbers from French and English-speaking countries, while others supported the existing structure, which included representatives of only four French-speaking states.

Suggestions that four arms depots be set up close to the borders of countries in which liberation struggles were being waged, were vigorously opposed by states that bordered on the Portuguese colonies, on the grounds that both Rhodesian and Portuguese forces would launch swift reprisals against them. The same countries had previously rejected proposals by both the UN and the OAU that an ombudsman be appointed to control the flow of arms and ammunition through their territories. Countries on which the liberation struggle had the least direct effect, voted for the committee to remain unchanged.698

Despite endless problems with the Liberation Committee, relations between the ANC and the OAU were sound. The annual meetings of heads of state tended to adopt resolutions favouring the ANC, which were then forwarded to the UN General Assembly for formal adoption.699 In 1970, the seventh OAU assembly adopted the Council of Foreign Ministers’ resolution condemning France, West Germany and Britain for selling, or intending to sell, arms to South Africa. Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger and Rwanda abstained, while the Congo (DR) and Tunisia expressed reservations.

The rising number of coups d’état in Africa led the ANC to consider various strategic options. James Hadebe insisted on the need to maintain a West African office, firstly because of the danger that the OAU was heading for difficult times, and secondly, due to the instability of African governments, including some in the countries where the ANC operated. Intensification of the armed struggle would require increased material assistance from the External Mission, but because of the seething intergovernmental disputes and disagreements within the OAU, there was a very real danger that such aid would not be available, just when the struggle needed it most.

Hadebe cited disputes such as that at the 1966 Conference of Foreign Ministers over the Ghanaian delegation’s status; the strengthening of regional groupings such as OCAM; the possibility of a split in the OAU along revolutionary and reactionary lines. All these factors could rock the very foundations of the OAU and lead to contributions to the African Liberation Committee drying up, Hadebe cautioned.

While the OAU was still comparatively united, Hadebe urged:

697 Tandon, 1972; Cervenka, 1969; Shubin, 1999; interview with Winston Ngcayiya, SADET Oral History Project.
The ANC should establish its own relations with independent West African states and ‘recognize the force produced by the violent winds of coup d’État which are blowing over the occidental African states – weak and strong alike’. The organization should prepare itself for hard times, even if these would be only transitory, so that when political stability returns to these countries, it must find the African National Congress having prepared for it. After all, we do not know how long East and Central Africa regions in which we are going to carry on delicate operations, will remain unaffected by this wind.

The fifth conference of East and Central African heads of state, held in Lusaka from 14-16 April 1969 under the chairmanship of Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, grappled with the question of collaboration, peace and negotiations with South Africa. The 13 governments represented, including Tanzania, Congo, Somalia and Kenya, issued a joint statement, the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. The manifesto was later endorsed by the OAU and subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly. The manifesto was based on a genuine desire to find a peaceful solution through negotiations with white-ruled southern African countries, and Clause 12 stated that African leaders had...

... always preferred to achieve it [liberation] without physical violence. They prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. They did not advocate violence, but advocated an end to the violence against human dignity, which was being perpetuated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle, even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.

The enemies of the liberation movement construed this to mean that Tanzania and Zambia no longer supported the armed struggle in southern Africa. Even then, Nyerere was conscious of the danger of despairing too much about reaching the grand objective of immediate liberation of southern Africa countries from white rule. He and his Zambian counterpart decided to support a call for negotiations and peace at the expense of the armed struggle, in order to placate his colleagues from Malawi and Congo, the chief protagonists in the accommodatory stance underpinning the Lusaka Manifesto. However, both South Africa and Portugal rejected any talks with the liberation movements.

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700 J Hadebe, memorandum, Notes on the West African Mission, May 1966, ANC Morogoro Papers, Box 1, ANC Archives, UFH.
701 'Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa’, Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, C 41-C 45.
Six months later, Nyerere adopted a different position on the Lusaka Manifesto’s call for peaceful negotiations. Addressing an audience at Toronto University on ‘Stability and Change in Africa’ on 2 October, he expressed serious disquiet about the situation in South Africa and strongly defended the right of liberation movements to wage an armed struggle, arguing:

"If the door to freedom is locked and bolted, and the present guardians of the door have refused to turn the key or pull the bolts, the choice is very straightforward. Either you accept the lack of freedom or you break the door down. In such a situation, the only way to get freedom is by force. A peaceful end to oppression is impossible. The only choice before the people is organized or unorganized violence ... by a people’s war against their government. When this happens, Tanzania cannot deny support, for to do so would be to deny validity of African freedom and African dignity. We are naturally and inevitably allies of the freedom fighters. We may recognize the fact that we cannot arm freedom fighters. But we cannot call for freedom in South Africa, and at the same time deny all assistance to those who are fighting for it, when we know, as well as they do, that every other [avenue] of achieving freedom has been excluded by those now in power."  

Meanwhile, the South African government had launched its own diplomatic offensive in Africa, described variously as an ‘outward-looking policy’ and ‘dialogue’. Various factors led to this approach. The objective was to establish normal relations between South Africa and the rest of the continent. Pretoria offered trade, tourism, investment capital and development loans to African states that would pledge to curtail their opposition to apartheid. Vorster stated, ‘we wish to avoid the dangers of neo-colonialism in any patterns of assistance which may be agreed upon, but we expect in return a recognition of our own sovereignty within our borders’.

What his government wanted was to halt the support of African states for liberation movements, stop the criticism of South Africa’s policies and end its international isolation. Authors Brian Bunting, Sean Gervasi, Martin Legassick and Ben Turok argued that if Vorster’s expansionist policies succeeded, they would not only lead to southern Africa becoming increasingly dependent on the apartheid state, but would also expand South

Africa’s sphere of influence to vast areas on the African continent. In October 1969, South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, boasted to the UN about existing bilateral and multilateral dialogues with African states that ‘would grow in future, despite the Republic’s policy of separate development’.

Economic development projects in compliant African states were controlled by the South Africa Foundation, which also sponsored a sub-project, the National Development and Management Foundation. Accompanying propaganda described this scheme as a catalyst in the development of South Africa’s neighbouring states, starting with education, vocational training and health services.

South Africa continued to assist the former protectorates in the fields of medical services, agriculture, education, broadcasting and other technical areas, and to ‘lend’ public administrators to the fledgling governments of Lesotho and Botswana. A new Customs Agreement more than doubled each former protectorate’s share of customs revenue, and South African companies funneled investment capital into many southern African countries. Anglo American and Swanepoel Construction, working in partnership with Japanese interests, moved into Congo-Kinshasa to develop virgin copper fields at Musishi, near the Zambian border, and to construct a rail link from the mines to Lubumbashi. A 40-member South African trade mission visited Madagascar, Reunion and Mauritius and announced that it would be fostering trade with South Africa.

In November 1969, South African Airways introduced a new service between Johannesburg, Madagascar and Mauritius. Gabon also cooperated with the South African government, but attempts to woo Zambia into South Africa’s ‘good neighbour’ sphere failed. As a result, all direct flights between Zambia and South Africa were stopped at the end of 1968. While the Chinese were building a rail link between Zambia and Tanzania, Kaunda’s government made an effort to cut back dramatically on trade with South Africa by bringing imports by road from Tanzania. Dockworkers in Dar es Salaam refused to handle South African goods and Nyerere’s government would not allow South African goods to cross his country in transit.

Vorster’s outward policy was unexpectedly boosted by a fresh wave of military coups – 28 in 17 African states by 1970. Most of the radical first-generation leaders were toppled, including Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Ben Bella and Modibo Keita. Southern Africa’s first coup took place in January 1970 and was staged by Leabua Jonathan in Lesotho after his party had lost the general election. Western countries rejoiced, and the Soviet Union was forced to reformulate its approach to independent African states after discovering just how fragile they were.

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In June 1971, the OAU heads of state roundly rejected future dialogue with South Africa, largely thanks to intense lobbying by Nyerere and Kaunda. The ANC, too, was vehemently opposed:

“Particularly alarming, and from our point of view even more dangerous, is the reported urging by the leaders of the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, and Madagascar for negotiations with the Vorster regime. What a slap in the face this is for those men of vision who held such high hopes in the 1960s for the total liberation of the African continent. Our movement badly needs friends, particularly in Africa, where lies not only our political base but also our African identity. [African] states that urge negotiations with South Africa are doing a great disservice to our cause”. 707

On the military front, the South African government was getting stronger. In 1969, Tanzania and Zambia were constantly on high alert for the presence of South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese agents on their soil. A number of sabotage incidents occurred during that year, the most serious being the blowing up of a pump station on Zambia’s crucial oil pipeline to Dar es Salaam. Zambia depended entirely on this pipeline for its petrol supply, having cut all oil imports through Rhodesia. Later in the year, an unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up a strategic bridge in Tanzania, across which a large portion of Zambia’s imports travelled. Zambia and Tanzania ascribed these incidents to agents of the South African and Mozambican governments, 708 and ultimately took the measures the South African government wanted. As Shubin wrote:

“Because of such security pressures, the ANC was given unexpectedly short notice to leave Tanzania. In July 1969 the ANC was informed that it had to vacate the Kongwa camp within 14 days. An ‘emergency’ trip to Moscow for further training was hastily arranged with the help of the Soviet Union, and it was not until 1972 that the cadres returned to the reopened camp.” 709

Besides the role of Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Liberia, Libya towards dismantling the apartheid regime, and apart from some frontline states like Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia no other nation took the cross of the struggle against apartheid like Nigeria. Nigeria led the campaign against apartheid at the continental and global levels. Nigeria mobilized sister nations who got self rule in the early sixties and at the OAU level to fight for

708 Africa Contemporary Record, 1969, B 291.
freedom of blacks in Southern Africa. Through such efforts a special committee was established at the continental body with Nigeria as its permanent chair. The country also mounted fierce campaign at the Commonwealth of Nations clubs and United Nations. Nigeria was again given the position of permanent chair of committee to fight apartheid.\textsuperscript{710} From June, 1965 to May, 1966 Nigeria’s contribution, through UN Special Committee, towards dismantling the apartheid regime amounted to US$12,067.29

Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister in Gen. Murtala/Obasanjo’s regimes narrated the quantum of fortune the country sank in liberation of South African states. In many instances, the country went solo by picking the bills of programmes associated with the struggle. Thousands of South African youths were given scholarship to study in the country’s Universities, nursing schools, polytechnics and colleges of education. In 1966, Nigeria adopted the policy of boycott dealing with dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa. This entailed, among other things, closing down the Portuguese mission in Lagos. Nigeria blocked the South African whites and the Portuguese from obtaining visas to Nigeria.

On his release from prison, President Nelson Mandela came on a courtesy visit to Nigeria and stated in Kaduna that Nigeria was the first country to make the highest donation to his liberation in the sixties. (Mandela’s Speech on 13th May 1990 in Murtala’s Square Kaduna). Even in the 1960s Mandela enunciated Nigeria’s dedication to the struggle against Apartheid in a speech delivered at the conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa in 1962. Mandela has this to say:

“...At the international level, concrete action against South Africa found expression in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth. These were Ghana, Nigeria and Tangayika (although the latter had not yet achieved its independence). Nigeria also took initiative in moving for the expulsion of South Africa from the international labour organization....”.\textsuperscript{711}

The struggle took a more dramatic turn during the regime of Gens. Murtala/Obasanjo from 1975-1979. The struggle was so strong that domestic awareness was mounted to the degree that many tertiary institutions formed clubs like Youth Solidarity on South Africa. Apart from creating domestic and mobilizing public opinion, young Nigerians contributed from their little pocket monies to the struggle. At some level, the then head of State Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo threatened to use all means available to fight down this evil system- including invoking blackman’s power.

It’s esoteric if not impossible to know the quantum of Nigeria’s financial commitment to the struggle against apartheid because apart from official commitment by government which was in different layers, individuals also committed resources into the struggle in diverse channels.

\textsuperscript{710} J. Garba,” Diplomatic Soldiering: p.17.

\textsuperscript{711} Nelson Mandela “Address at the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa” 1996
Nigeria succeeded in getting South Africa expelled from the International Labour Organization. For this reason, Nigeria was given a special position as regards the chairmanship of the UN Special Committee against apartheid. Obasanjo’s government allowed the South African Liberation movement to open up offices in Lagos, its capital.

6.3 The Frontline States Take Common Stand

Before a discussion on the role of the FLS in the isolation campaign is given, it is also necessary to analyse the circumstances surrounding the formation and function of the FLS, the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), and SADCC. These three groupings had assumed great importance in political, economic and diplomatic issues of the Southern African region.

The FLS were those countries which, because of geographical proximity and for diplomatic, political and security reasons, were involved in efforts to achieve majority rule in South Africa. Since 1975, African influence on Southern African affairs had been formally exerted by the leaders of Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. This group, referred to as the Front Line States, crystallized in its form in 1974. Founded on the principles enunciated in the Lusaka Manifesto, President Seretse Khama, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Samora Machel and Augustinho Neto began to meet regularly in Lusaka in order to formulate an African strategy with regard to the problems of Southern Africa. A process of détente between these ‘frontline’ states and South Africa was initiated at the same time. The group soon evolved into a formal committee as it became more entangled in the details of the South African issue, and at every stage in the search for a solution to that issue it was to play a prominent role.

Although the FLS were recognized by the OAU in July 1976, their emergence as a sub-grouping in Africa can be traced as far back as 1969. In April that year, some countries of East and Central Africa, meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, issued a Manifesto on the future of Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular. This document marked the emergence of certain countries of East and Central Africa, notably Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana as a sub-system in OAU politics and diplomacy.

It can therefore be argued that in relation to South Africa, the alliance of the FLS came into being in 1974 and it had since become a quasi-institution of the OAU. The role of the frontline presidents had been to ponder over and advise on strategies and tactics to be employed at various stages in the liberation effort. However, it can still be argued that the challenges posed by South African aggression were some of the factors which contributed to

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the emergence of the FLS. Although their crisis management role on behalf of the OAU was the main objective, the need to close ranks and act in concert on regional affairs, including the question of security, was another factor.\textsuperscript{718}

The FLS were so called because they gave active moral and material support to liberation movements fighting to end apartheid rule in South Africa and to free Namibia which was ruled by Pretoria.\textsuperscript{719} They bore the brunt of South Africa’s cross-border raids and destabilization policy. Because of their traditional dependence upon South Africa’s transport routes, job markets, trade and wide range of commodities, they had been threatened with retaliatory measures should sanctions be imposed.\textsuperscript{720} One of the frontliners, Angola, was at war with the UNITA rebels who were supported by South Africa.

In 1976 the frontline leaders collectively demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners and the lifting of the ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). They condemned the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and ‘unprovoked aggression against Angola’.\textsuperscript{721} Of the frontliners, only Tanzania did not share a land border with South Africa. It did not have any direct trade, air or consular links with South Africa. Its part of the bargain was to provide landlocked Zambia, Zimbabwe and neighbouring Malawi with the alternative rail, road and sea routes. Tanzania was the first of the FLS to reach full independence in 1961. The ‘front line’ moved southwards when Zambia came to independence in 1964, on the break-up of the settler-ruled central African Federation which had been created by Britain, the colonial power.\textsuperscript{722}

The other two states freed from the federation, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Malawi, took different political paths. The Smith regime in southern Rhodesia, wanting to maintain the political supremacy of the white settlers, unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965, thus prolonging the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle for majority rule, and strengthening the country’s links with South Africa.\textsuperscript{723} Independent Malawi established diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967. Malawi’s particular relationship with South Africa meant that it was not a member of the FLS alliance.\textsuperscript{724}

Of the former British High Commission territories, Botswana and Lesotho came to independence in 1966, and Swaziland in 1968. In 1963, having failed to incorporate these territories with a view to including them in the ‘homelands’ design,\textsuperscript{725} South Africa proposed instead to establish a Southern Africa Common Market – a regional political and economic

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\textsuperscript{722} A.M. Chakaodza, “International Diplomacy in Southern Africa: from Reagan to Mandela”, p.70.


\textsuperscript{724} Ibid.

\end{flushleft}
institution with South Africa as the dominant member. Although this proposal fell through, it was the early conceptual forebear of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONAS).\textsuperscript{726} Instead, once independent, these countries were incorporated into the Rand Monetary area, from which Botswana subsequently withdrew, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which ensured that South Africa had considerable economic leverage over them.\textsuperscript{727}

Until the mid-1970’s, however, South Africa was well insulated from proximity with its independent, anti-apartheid neighbours by a buffer-zone of colonial territories. While this buffer-zone was in place, South Africa’s regional policy centred on efforts to reinforce the protective barrier by forming alliances with colonial governments of these territories.\textsuperscript{728} The regional outlook changed dramatically from 1974 onwards. South Africa’s ‘buffer-zone’ suddenly began to disintegrate when Angola and Mozambique became independent in 1975. Mozambique and Angola joined the FLS alliance. South Africa became militarily involved in Angola in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from becoming the independent country’s first government.\textsuperscript{729}

The southwards march of national independence also helped the ANC and the PAC. On joining the FLS alliance, Mozambique and Angola set about extending support to these liberation movements. Independent Angola offered refuge and military bases to the ANC. Mozambique offered military rear-base support and hospitality to the ANC, although its headquarters remained in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{730} With the electoral victory of Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) in 1980, South Africa lost the last bastion of white minority support and became isolated in the region. Faced with this situation, South Africa tried to exert pressure on the FLS in two respects: economically and militarily. Both were part of its destabilization policy.\textsuperscript{731} It not only intensified its aggression against Angola, it attacked Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, thus showing its determination to destabilize the whole region systematically. However, the FLS made it their absolute duty to continue to help the liberation movements in South Africa and they called for its total isolation.\textsuperscript{732}

The formation of the FLS grouping was thus one of the most significant political developments to have taken place, not just in Africa, but in the Southern hemisphere. The independent states of Southern Africa realised that they had used the weapons of unity and cooperation to defeat apartheid. On their own, those countries were weak and could not

\textsuperscript{728} H. Muller, “Toespraak deur dr Higard Muller, Suid Afrikaanse Minister van Buitelandse Sake, tydens die Natalse Nasionale Party-Kongress (13 August 1976” (Southern Africa Record, No. 6, September 1976), p.18.
\textsuperscript{731} Ibid.
withstand the might of the South African Army. Their unity was an expression of the common will to destroy apartheid and build new and different societies in Africa.\textsuperscript{733}

In many ways the frontline leaders, joined by President Mugabe of Zimbabwe in 1980, constituted a unique ‘club’ in African politics. No other joint commission of African heads of state had acted with such cohesion, had exhibited such a degree of permanence and had enjoyed so much respect as the frontline presidents. The strength of their influence on African affairs, particularly on issues relating to the so-called ‘liberation of Southern Africa’, was without equal.\textsuperscript{734} Very few decisions had been taken on Southern Africa and South Africa in particular, by either the OAU or the UN without prior consultation with them.

Their collective view on these issues had been corroborated, more often than not, by the rest of black Africa.\textsuperscript{735} The frontline group had been recognized as an \textit{ad hoc} committee of the Assembly of Heads of State of the OAU and the frontline presidents had come to be regarded by officials of this organization as the custodians of the OAU and of the interests of black Africa on the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{736} Thus, it can be seen that there was a strong desire amongst Southern African states to cooperate with one another regarding regional affairs. Although motives may have differed from country to country, the desire for cooperation was strong and in the years to follow this desire would lead to real and meaningful cooperation.

\textbf{6.4 Rival Strategies: (CONSAS) versus (SADCC)}

As Pretoria strove to buttress white power against external and internal challenges by using an army of economic pressures against its neighbours, so those countries tried to reduce South Africa’s economic hegemony by increasing cooperative efforts among themselves and expanding their options. The dramatic events of the 1970’s, which culminated in Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, brought the dividing line between black and white ruled states in the region down to the Limpopo River, which flows along Zimbabwe’s and Botswana’s borders with South Africa and reaches the sea through Mozambique. The political shape of the region had indeed changed, but the historical pattern of economic and infrastructural links between the countries of Southern Africa was virtually undisturbed. The balance of power and control was till weighted heavily, although not exclusively, in South Africa’s favour.\textsuperscript{737}

As the countries of the region digested the new geopolitical realities, rival economic strategies emerged. South Africa was the first in the field with its blueprint for a ‘Constellation of Southern African States’ (CONSAS), which was an attempt to draw its closest neighbours into a loose but formal economic grouping under its control.\textsuperscript{738} The black

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\item \textsuperscript{736} A.M. Chakaodza, “International Diplomacy in Southern Africa: From Reagan to Mandela”, p.65.
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\end{footnotesize}
states, however, had been devising their own economic strategy with the aim of reducing their inherited dependency on South Africa and coordinating development of their own economies. While South Africa’s constellation never went much further than the drawing board, the black states’ Southern African Development Coordination Conference, launched in 1980 and significantly strengthened by the newly independent Zimbabwe’s membership, established firm roots and became a relatively successful model for modest but pragmatic regional planning. Before an analysis of the FLS’s strategy of economic liberation is given, it would be useful to highlight on CONSAS as the FLS’ strategy was basically in response to it.

6.4.1 Botha’s Regional Strategy: CONSAS

In the wake of the momentous changes resulting from the decolonization struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the growth in domestic opposition to South Africa’s apartheid policies, the South African government sought a new formula for managing regional relations. Building on earlier diplomatic efforts, such as Vorster’s détente initiatives, P.W. Botha proposed the idea of a constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in September 1978.\textsuperscript{739} CONSAS was obviously meant to be qualitatively more advanced, subtle and sophisticated than the Vorster policies. It was also meant to have far-reaching non-economic results.

The essence of CONSAS was the creation of a formal grouping of states in Southern Africa based on South Africa’s economic centrality in the region and the importance of its transportation infrastructure and past development.\textsuperscript{740} CONSAS was intended to consist of all states to the South of the Kunene and Zambezi rivers.\textsuperscript{741} Pointing to the need for such grouping, Botha said:

\begin{quote}
  \textit{We, and the other countries of Southern Africa are…confronted by the challenge and the opportunity to consolidate, in an evolutionary way, the undeniable economic inter-dependence between us to each other’s mutual advantage and towards a logical economic grouping}\textsuperscript{742}
\end{quote}

Several writers have shown that Pretoria envisaged the constellation concept to include three interrelated components, i.e. the creation of a new strategic political umbrella in Southern Africa; the movement toward nominal devolution of domestic power; and the intensification of economic cooperation with independent states in the region.\textsuperscript{743} The second aspect of the constellation fitted nearly into South Africa’s scheme of granting independence to its homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. In Pretoria’s thinking, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{740} R. Davies, “South Africa joining SADCC or SADCC joining South Africa,” (South African Review, No. 6, 1991), pp.44-45.
  \item \textsuperscript{742} R.F. Botha, “Address by the Honourable R.F. Botha, South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, to members and Guests of the Swiss – South Africa Association in Zurich, on 7\textsuperscript{th} March 1979, (Press Section, South African Embassy, Berne), p.17.
  \item \textsuperscript{743} “Southern Africa, Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa,” (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1978).
\end{itemize}
constellation would ideally include those homelands plus the African states of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{744}

The formal institutionalization of a grouping of this type would represent a major breakthrough for South Africa’s domestic policies. The constellation would entail, at a minimum, the indirect recognition by at least some black African states of the independence and sovereignty of the South African homelands; and Pretoria hoped that this acknowledgement would promote international approval of its policy of separate development. In the final analysis, the creation of a constellation would be a significant step in accomplishing what had eluded South Africa’s nationalist government for the past 25 years – some international acceptance of apartheid’s grand political design.\textsuperscript{745}

Botha also tried this regional strategy to South Africa’s growing dissatisfaction with Western intervention in Southern Africa, particularly the promotion of independence in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia. Expressing their displeasure with Western intervention, South African policy makers began to emphasize the importance of regional actors finding solutions to their own problems. For example, in a March 1979 policy statement in Zurich, Foreign Minister Pik Botha stated that South Africa would in the future adopt a neutral, non-aligned posture in East-West conflicts. Calling for an ‘impregnable free and prosperous family of nations and states in Southern Africa’, he appealed to leaders in the region to come together, in constellation and trust, to negotiate the future of all in the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{746}

Closely related with Pretoria’s disillusionment with the West’s role in Rhodesia and Namibia was the perception that moderate states in Southern Africa faced a Marxist threat and could no longer rely on Western support. According to South Africa’s 1979 White Paper on defence, while Marxist influence actively threatened the moderate states, Western powers were resorting to a selective human rights policy to ingratiate themselves with the Third World.\textsuperscript{747} In the light of alleged inability of the West to stand up to the Soviet threat to the region, Pik Botha indicated that members of the constellation could ‘undertake joint responsibility for the security of the region’, which would mean ‘a joint decision to keep communism out of southern Africa’.\textsuperscript{748} Non-aggression pacts and other instruments of cooperation would thus flow out of CONSAS.

Despite its rhetorical overkill, Pretoria saw the policy of distancing itself from the West as serving two primary aims: first, South Africa would regain Western approval by demonstrating that it could maintain peaceful relations with its neighbours; second, it could consolidate that approval by showing that such relations did not invalidate its status as a bulwark against Communism. Price argued that the establishment of a constellation would

create an international environment conducive to better relations between South Africa and the West on Pretoria’s terms.749

Apart from security considerations, South Africa hoped to broaden its economic links with independent states in the region to embrace trade, agriculture, health, and scientific as well as technological development. To encourage those states to participate in CONSAS, Pretoria offered a wide range of economic incentives, particularly development assistance, export credits, and easier access to South Africa’s transport network.

To consolidate the constellation scheme, Botha appointed one of the leading South African economic experts, Gerhard de Kock, as chairman of a ‘Special Constellation Committee’, embracing government and business leaders, to work on a regional programme for monetary arrangements, a multilateral development bank, related fiscal and financial arrangements, and a regional development plan for both industry and agriculture.750 In its economic dimension, the stated objective of CONSAS was to promote regional integration based upon the ‘growth generating potential of the South African economy to be realised throughout the region and beyond’751

P.W. Botha underscored the potential benefits from a South African-led regional grouping. He said:

“"It would be a fatal blunder if the states of Southern Africa, because of other differences, refuse to co-operate as a constellation of states...We in the Republic of South Africa are prepared to work for that co-operation. We are prepared to fight for that peace and protect it....I see this venture as the most effective counter to the peril of Cuban and Russian Marxist intervention in Africa. Southern Africa can and must become a bastion of hope to the free world””.752

South Africa matched the promise of economic incentives to neighbouring states with threats to those states that did not acquiesce to Pretoria’s perception of regional peace and security. To this end Botha thus observed:

“I believe you can only follow a policy of regional détente from a position of strength and not of weakness”753

In advancing the concept of CONSAS as the core-piece of Pretoria’s regional policy, South African officials recognized that its success hinged on the future of internal settlement of

753 Rand Daily Mail, 29 May 1979, p.4.
regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia.\textsuperscript{754} When Botha launched his idea, it appeared that in Rhodesia the internal settlement would bring about a conservative African-led government under Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa, who was heavily dependent on the white settlers of Rhodesia and the White regime of South Africa. With such ‘success’ in Rhodesia, a similar future could be envisaged in Namibia. South Africa and its independent homelands could then constitute the initial constellation. After the Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979, South Africa did not hide its fear of losing a core ally in the constellation scheme. A South African Broadcasting analysis underscored what was at stake in Rhodesia on the eve of the March 1980 elections:

\textit{“The Frontline States in Southern Africa appear to be trying desperately to steer Rhodesia in the same disastrous course which they have adopted. What President Nyerere wants is that Rhodesia should become a Frontline State against South Africa. He is not proposing an association of states for the purpose of economic progress, but for the purpose of war against Africa’s most powerful country. The democratic forces in Rhodesia offer the opposite. Peaceful progress in association with South Africa… Vote for the Marxists and you join the ranks of the poverty-stricken who have no objective than a futile and disastrous war against South Africa. Vote for the democratic forces, and South Africa and the entire Western World will assist Rhodesia to enter a period of unprecedented economic welfare.”}\textsuperscript{755}

However, the failure of the South African-backed bid for power by Muzorewa in Rhodesia doomed Pretoria’s efforts to expand its political influence in Southern Africa through the constellation idea.\textsuperscript{756} Although Botha still expressed interest in ‘co-operating with an independent Zimbabwe, particularly within the context of a constellation of states’, Mugabe made it plain that Zimbabwe had no intention of playing the key role South Africa had reserved for it in a constellation.\textsuperscript{757} Subsequently, Zimbabwe became the sixth member of the FLS, this time, in their attempt to form a new economic grouping aimed at reducing their dependence on the South African economy and transport and communication network.\textsuperscript{758}

Viewed in purely economic terms, the constellation had clear attractions for many of the Black States, but none of them showed the slightest interest in it. Pretoria’s gambit turned out to rest on a number of misconceptions. One was simply a wrong guess about the sort of government that would emerge from Zimbabwe’s elections. As it has already been indicated,

\textsuperscript{754} Rand Daily Mail, 29 May 1979, p.4.
\textsuperscript{758} Rapport, 09 March 1980, p.7.
South Africa believed that Bishop Muzorewa, who they viewed as moderate and malleable, would prevail; instead Robert Mugabe, Pretoria’s ‘worst-case scenario’, won decisively.

Another miscalculation was the belief that however critical African leaders might be of South Africa in public, they would, when it came to hard policy decisions, put economics before politics. Perhaps South Africa’s leaders were so used to controlling the region and getting their way that they could not conceive of a rejection. Or perhaps it was psychologically impossible for those in authority in Pretoria to grasp that apartheid was highly offensive to all Africans and that blacks would make significant economic sacrifices in defence of their principles.759

The crux of the matter was that the political and ideological divisions between South Africa and Black African states were such that these states were bound to be unwilling to formalize relations with the Republic further and least of all, to formalize them in the political and military spheres. In addition, there was no possibility of internationally recognized black states and thus members of the OAU, joining a formal association with non-recognized former ‘Bantustans’, Rhodesia, and South Africa-controlled Namibia, as their full and equal partners. It was therefore not surprising that even Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland served notice that they would not consider joining a constellation for as long as South Africa adhered to its racial policies.

The dilemma posed by the FLS’ political hostility to South Africa on the one hand, and their economic dependence on it on the other, had already alerted them to the need for defining a collective relationship. Thus, while the finishing touches were being put on the constellation in South Africa, the FLS were laying the foundations for their own regional economic alliance. Formally established on 01 April 1980, it was called the ‘Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), sometimes dubbed ‘counter-constellation’

6.4.2 The Frontline States Strategy: SADCC

This search for an economic counterpart to the organizational framework of the CONSAS alliance entailed not only strengthening the existing economic and political solidarity in strengthening the campaign to isolate apartheid South Africa, but also the expansion of regional relationships to embrace all independent states in Southern Africa. More fundamentally, given their economic dependence on South Africa, particularly in transport and communications, the FLS envisaged SADCC as a potential institutional conduit for the mobilisation of external assistance in the process of disengaging from South Africa.760

Before Zimbabwe’s formal independence in April 1980, the FLS had begun to seek ways of transforming their informal political alliance into an economic grouping designed to foster economic liberation. Like the independence of Mozambique and Angola, Zimbabwe’s independence changed the pattern of relations in Southern Africa, presenting new possibilities and new options or countering South Africa’s regional dominance. Apart from lifting the

buiidens of war from the economies of the FLS, this turn of event dramatically brought the entire independent transport network and options for improving it within the reach of the FLS. As the hub of the transportation network north of the Limpopo River, Zimbabwe was the key to the success of any serious endeavour to promote economic liberation from South Africa.\footnote{S. Jenkins, “The Great Evasion, South Africa: A Survey,” The Economist, 21 June 1980), p.21.}

Emboldened by their remarkable solidarity during the Zimbabwe liberation process, the FLS sought to expand and to institutionalize their informal cooperation, with a view to preempting not only the constellation vision, but also one of the more immediate objectives of South Africa’s regional policy, the maintenance and strengthening of economic ties with independent African States. These efforts to create SADCC became a critical element in Kaunda’s and Nyerere’s shared vision of a transcontinental belt of independent and economically powerful nations from Dar-es-Salaam and Maputo on the India Ocean to Luanda on the Atlantic.\footnote{R.S. Jaster, et al., “Changing Fortunes: War, Diplomacy, and Economics in Southern Africa, p.75.}

It was these five FLS, namely Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, that initiated the formation of the ‘counter-constellation’, SADCC, in 1979. Consequently SADCC was formed in Lusaka on 01 April 1980.\footnote{Die Vaderland, 20 April 1980, p.5.} The emergence of SADCC should be seen against the background of the close economic ties which black Southern African states maintained with South Africa. In most instances, it was a dependency relationship of black states on the Republic; a situation of economic interdependence existed only in a few cases. There were, generally speaking, three major areas of economic interaction between the black states in the region and South Africa, namely, trade, transport and labour.\footnote{G.M. Khadiagala, “The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975-1993, p.220.}

The measure of dependence reflected these states’ individual economic weakness relative to South Africa. This had probably brought the black states to the realisation that the best way of trying to strengthen their respective economies would be to pool their limited resources and their efforts, rather than each acting unilaterally. Lessening their heavy economic dependence on white-ruled South Africa had, of course been a long-standing objective of independent black states in the region. For example, Zambia went even further, having publicly committed itself to limit trade with South Africa to the minimum. Numerous African political leaders had also stated that political independence could never be complete in a situation of heavy economic dependence.\footnote{R.H. Green, “Constellation, Association, and Liberation: Economic Co-ordination and the Struggle for Southern Africa, p.33.}

Apart from these considerations, it has to be conceded those black states’ endeavours to curtail their economic dependence on the Republic were related to her racial domestic policies. That these states were so visibly dependent on white-ruled South Africa, whose apartheid policies had made it an international outcast, obviously gave their efforts an added political dimension. The black Southern African states’ economic moves away from South Africa had not been merely coincidental. On the assumption that mandatory economic sanctions would in due course be imposed on South Africa – a punitive action with which
they would sympathise – the black states might well have reasoned that they should make timely arrangements to lessen their economic dependence on the Republic by pooling their resources and strengthening their economies in order to be better able to handle the adverse economic consequences they would suffer. 766

In the Frontline grouping of states, which emerged in 1974, a political vehicle was at hand to organize these economic actions. In a sense, SADCC was an expanded version of the Frontline grouping, which was expanded in composition to include four other countries, namely, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe, in addition to the original five Frontline States, which were Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. The Banda regime of Malawi was obviously included in the FLS grouping in an attempt to foster a partial understanding with that regime. As one Zambian official explained:

“Kamuzu Banda is South Africa’s ally in the region. Over the years, Malawi has benefitted from South Africa’s economic and technical assistance. But in terms of communications, Malawi has no option other than to be on good terms with Mozambique, through which Malawi’s two main rail outlets to the sea pass. The other possible outlets would be in Tanzania. It was therefore to his (Banda’s) advantage that he should join SADCC. Thus, rather than treating him as an outcast, we showed our goodwill by inviting him to join SADCC. Like the prodigal son, we told him: ‘come back home’. 767

The Frontline grouping was therefore expanded in scope to deal not only with political but also with economic matters. In addition, SADCC, unlike the Frontline grouping, had been institutionalised. 768 The timing of moves to establish SADCC was probably related to South Africa’s constellation initiative. At least some of the black states perceived an urgent need to counter Pretoria’s constellation moves for fear it would formalize and deepen their economic dependence on South Africa and further enhance the latter’s economic domination with obvious political implications. President Kenneth Kaunda made this point:

“South Africa is to become the king-pin of all of us, and all of us...are going to be satellites or puppet states of South Africa”. 769

The moves to create SADCC, although preceding the independence of Zimbabwe, were undoubtedly given a major boost by the emergence of the new Republic under Mr Robert Mugabe’s premiership.

To enhance flexibility within SADCC, the FLS maintained that participation could not circumscribe other bilateral or multilateral relationships that members determined to have in their interest. This provision was particularly important because Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland belonged to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and Lesotho and Swaziland to the Rand Monetary Union (RMU). When the nine states formally adopted the Lusaka Declaration for Economic Liberation on 01 April 1980, there was a consensus to create a regional economic organization that would bind the members together, harmonise their policies, and minimize the impact of South Africa’s hegemony. Specifically rejecting Botha’s constellation as the foreign policy of apartheid, they emphasised SADCC’s role as a short and long-term vehicle for fostering development in the region. In the words of Simba Makoni, then SADCC’s Executive Secretary:

“The basic issue of dependence and domination, although a function of politics, is also very strongly economic. It would be equally unacceptable tomorrow when the ANC is in power in South Africa for the nine states which constitute SADCC at the moment to be as dependent on South Africa as they are today. We have made it clear that the relevance and validity of SADCC will not end the day that the people’s flag is raised in Pretoria”

Embracing the goals and strategies of SADCC the Lusaka Declaration underscored the determination of small states in Southern Africa to begin a process of creating independent regional alternatives to economic dependence through coordination of joint efforts. In their attempts to meet the goals of economic development and disengagement from South Africa, the founders of SADCC sought to avoid the shortcomings of prior regional integration schemes in Africa, particularly the defunct East African Economic Community. Since these experiments faltered essentially because of a lack of political will, over-ambitious development programmes, and inequities in the distribution of benefits, SADCC deliberately retreated from them by establishing a limited and flexible regional organization. SADCC was characterised by two distinctive features: the emphasis on sectorial coordination and the primacy conceded to national decision-making.

At a meeting in Blantyre, Malawi, in 1981, SADCC assigned each state its own sector for coordination. Angola was responsible for energy; Botswana, the Secretariat, crop research and animal control; Lesotho, soil conservation and land utilization; Malawi, fisheries, wildlife and forests; Mozambique, transport and communications, Swaziland, manpower; Zambia, mining; and Zimbabwe, food security. Export for the major sectors – transport and

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communications, food security, and energy which SADCC founders assigned to countries on the basis of resource endowment, there was no logical or consistent rule for allocation.

In choosing a decentralised and limited regional organization that reflected the economic and political diversity among the nine states, SADCC’s approach more critically took into account the asymmetry of economic power between them and South Africa. Recognition of the structures of dependence on South Africa among the SADCC states was the most compelling factor in their choice of a selective disengagement strategy. The developments discussed above had indeed left South Africa with no other option but to amend some of its ideas on a constellation and to reduce an initially grandiose design to what was then essentially a device to restructure relations between Southern African states and South Africa. What remained of the original CONSAS idea amounted to an inner constellation, with the outer or wider constellation rendered unfeasible by the prevailing political climate in South Africa. This was recognized by Prime Minister P.W. Botha. In June 1980 he said:

“It is true that a number of centrifugal forces, not at least of which are of a political nature, are at present working against closer development co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours”

In its reduced shape, CONSAS had been formalised between South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. In this shape, it was a far cry from what the South African government initially envisaged. It was indeed an impossible dream.

There is no doubt that the formation of SADCC represented a setback to the South African government’s plans for the region on many different fronts. As regards membership, not only had the FLS refused to join CONSAS, but they were also quick to join its political and economic rival SADCC. As a result CONSAS went ahead on a very limited scale which fell far short of South Africa’s original plan for a regional organization. An analysis of the establishment of SADCC reveals the FLS’s open intention to transform the existing economic order in defiance of South Africa’s regional economic domination.

SADCC’s first priority was to reduce the region’s transport dependency on South Africa by strengthening regional alternatives. Thus, regional economic cooperation became a key factor as the South African government’s regional behaviour grew distinctly more aggressive and coercive. Its plan to shape regional relations through CONSAS was blocked. Its buffer

zone had been finally replaced by the FLS. There was mounting pressure and resistance to apartheid, all of which stimulated international censure against South Africa.\(^780\)

Thus the collapse of CONSAS, the strengthening of the FLS by the membership of Zimbabwe and the ability of the frontline diplomatic coalition to found SADCC, represented, for South Africa, the most shattering regional political defeat since the foundation of the then Afrikaner Republic in 1961.\(^781\) In addition, the CONSAS’s failure reinforced a creeping international perception of South Africa as a helpless giant unable to translate her military and economic might into regional diplomatic supremacy despite a decade of initiatives and schemes.\(^782\)

Certainly, the Republic remained the economic and military colossus of the sub-continent, but her diplomacy had again faltered. Southern Africa was then almost uniformly ideologically hostile and politically antagonistic towards Pretoria.\(^783\)

This then was the security challenge the FLS posed for South Africa, and inevitably the question arises: How did South Africa react to this challenge? Initially there was some hesitation in Pretoria as to how to proceed in the face of this new sub-continental economic and security environment created by the FLS. From first regarding SADCC as a somewhat nebulous concept, South African policy makers moved to woo the FLS away from their economic grouping through a series of economic incentives, or failing that, cause maximum dislocation to their economies to prevent the type of economic coordination that would nullify Pretoria’s economic leverage.\(^784\)

A key feature in South Africa’s destabilization policy was the disruption of the FLS’Ss transport system in an attempt to maintain their dependence on trade routes through South Africa. Beginning in 1981, South Africa targeted the transport links to the ports at Beira, Lobito, Maputo, and Nacala. The aims were, and remained, simple:

"Smash the stability of the FLS and blunt development of SADCC while simultaneously striking at the ANC and its host nations"\(^785\)

The result had been a deadly brew of offensive counter-revolutionary warfare, tactical escalation, economic bludgeoning and the utilization of proxy forces such as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) commonly known as (RENAMO) in Mozambique, National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), the Zambian Mushala gang and various Zimbabwean dissidents such


\(^{785}\) R.H. Green, “Sanctions and the SADCC Economies,” p.115.
as Gwesela. SADCC estimated the cost of this economic sabotage and military destabilization by South Africa from 1980 to 1984 to about thirty million American dollars. That expenditure exceeded total foreign grant and loan aid to the region, and constituted 40 percent of exports from SADCC states and 10 percent of their GDP for four year period.

Various disincentive measures were also employed. These include the limiting and obstructing of the utilization of South African rail and harbour facilities, for example, Zimbabwe in 1981; limiting or banning migrant labour, for example Lesotho and Mozambique in 1983; controlling access to and movement through South Africa, economic blockades, such as those instituted against Lesotho in 1983; restricting imports from and exports to neighbouring states, e.g. Zambia maize imports in 1980 and Zimbabwe oil imports in 1982, and the withdrawal of technical personnel, such as those withdrawn from Mozambique in 1981.

Thus, South Africa imposed sanctions against her neighbours. This trend illustrates the point that while the international community’s sanctions had not been effective enough, the South African sanctions against its neighbours were tightened and effective, given the states’ dependence on South African trade, investment, food supplies, employment, transport and communication, and energy supplies. It is conservatively estimated that South African sanctions against its neighbours cost them well in excess of US $20 billion. The regional objective for imposing these sanctions was obviously ‘to maintain a dependence that will be economically lucrative and politically submissive’, and to act as a bulwark against the imposition of international sanctions against apartheid.

Besides the sanctions, South Africa’s economic relations with its neighbours were sustained mainly by the threat and reality of overt economic strangulation and military attack, but the fact was as long as the apartheid system remained in place, the relationship would, and could not be mutually beneficial. At best, as Green and Thompson put it, the ‘partnership’ sought was that of ‘a white rider on a black horse’. Initially, SADCC responded to South Africa’s aggression by stressing the non-political character of the organization. In 1983 for instance, an SADCC report noted that;

“SADCC is an economic not a political organization. SADCC is not organized to threaten anyone...self-reliance and co-

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ordinated action in pursuit of common interests, not economic sabotage and aggrandisement, are its goals.\footnote{795}

As South African pressure increased, however, SADCC states began to appeal to Western countries to pressure Pretoria on their behalf. At the July 1983 summit in Maputo, for example a communiqué released by the Secretariat urged the West to check South Africa’s aggression against SADCC, ‘since it is clearly irrational for such countries to invest in regional infrastructure only to see such resources wasted by South African sabotage’\footnote{796} However, the strategy of mobilizing Western support for confrontation with South Africa met with little success. Dependence on Western assistance certainly did not provide SADCC with the leverage to force the West’s disengagement FROM South Africa. In the final analysis, SADCC had to contend with Western, especially British, implacable hostility toward pressure on Pretoria. Consequently, without any leverage on this score SADCC’s role remained, in Nyerere’s words, ‘to embarrass the west in its relations with South Africa’\footnote{797}

Finally, deducing from the preceding discussion, it is quite evident that the FLS threatened South Africa’s racial system simply by existing, let alone prospering through SADCC. Their ideological appeal threatened to increase the already burning impact of black consciousness in South Africa. It threatened the stability of the South African labour force and, in consequence, the entire economic infrastructure, including the military – industrial complex. In short, the powerful Africanist ideology of the FLS added to the strength of the ANC as the symbol of Black South African aspirations and was profoundly destabilizing to the apartheid regime.\footnote{798} Given the powerful forces that ranged against it, the main impact of SADCC on regional relations from 1980 to 1984 was its symbol as a collective endeavour by the FLS to strengthen their structural position in the region.

It is against this background that the role of the FLS in the campaign to isolate South Africa must be understood. Despite their vulnerability to South Africa’s military and economic power, they never wavered in their resolve to fight against apartheid. Their ability to cooperate in unity and understanding gave them a certain amount of reassurance that only concerted pressure on South Africa would perhaps one day force her to abandon apartheid. An appropriate comment on the FLS strategy against South Africa is to be found in this interview of Kaunda with Africa when he remarked:

“...we have always understood the challenge of liberation...we accepted the consequences of our participation in assisting the oppressed masses in their armed struggle. We are deeply involved...”\footnote{799}
6.5 The Nkomati Accord and its implications for the Frontline States and South Africa

One final example of conflict being caused within SADCC was the signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa. Although other SADCC members had tried to understand why Mozambique signed the agreement with South Africa, there can be little doubt that the signing of the accord was a major blow for the prestige of the organization. It is much easier to pass judgement, for or against, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government’s decision to enter into an agreement with South Africa than to analyse dispassionately the reasons for such a decision and to examine its consequences.

Nkomati Accord came as a shock to most, but, upsetting as it was, it was in fact foreseeable. In 1983 the situation in Mozambique left its leaders with only two choices: either to risk total immolation at the hands of South Africa and the RENAMO for the sake of remaining true to isolation principles, or to enter into negotiations with Pretoria to establish a new code of good neighbourliness. Even raising the possibility of President Samora Machel coming to an agreement with Pretoria was so surprising and disagreeable that it bore a great deal of criticism. But the questions to be examined here are: Why did Mozambique and South Africa conclude the Nkomati Accord in 1984? Was this agreement a deviation of the principles of isolation? What was the reaction of the OAU member states to the signing of this agreement?

In its first four years of existence (1984), SADCC showed encouraging evidence of modest but steady progress in achieving its long-term objectives. Faced with these signs of success, South Africa had countered with a calculated campaign of economic and military destabilization, which, combined with the crippling drought, global recession, and some deficiencies in domestic policy, proved devastating. In March 1984, President Samora Machel of Mozambique – in many ways, the key country in SADCC – finally felt compelled to sue for peace. The resulting Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness, formally bound South Africa as well as Mozambique to a mutual commitment to ‘refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.’ In practice, however, the pact represented a Pretoria ‘diktat.’ This obvious subjugation of Mozambique had had profound economic implications for SADCC as an institution. But why did Mozambique sign the Accord since the OAU position concerning collaboration with South Africa was well known?

Ever since the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) took power on 25 June 1975, Mozambique had been subject to military attacks by a counter revolutionary force sponsored by South Africa and other remnants of the Portuguese colonial administration. This force, which was known as the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) or RENAMO, was initially the brainchild of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and was created in 1976 in order to gather intelligence concerning ZANU infiltration into Zimbabwe. At the time ZANU used Mozambique as a launching pad for armed

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struggle against the Smith regime. Ken Flower, then Director-General of Rhodesian’s CIO, described the objectives of the MNR thus:

“The objectives of the RENAMO were essentially to provide the opportunity for Rhodesia to deal with ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) in Mozambique without doing so directly, and to perpetuate or create instability in areas of Mozambique...The RENAMO gave a cover for Rhodesian operations and from initial intelligence gathering operations, moved on to getting recruits and then to the offensive, disrupting road and rail links and making it harder for FRELIMO to support ZANU.”

However, when Zimbabwe attained its independence, the RENAMO, commonly known as bandits in Mozambique, moved to South Africa from where it carried out its attacks against Mozambique. Thus, RENAMO became South Africa’s convenient tool for destabilizing Mozambique because the latter supported the ANC, whose infiltration into South Africa through Mozambique was often used as pretext for Pretoria’s retaliation against this former Portuguese colony. The war South Africa was sponsoring in Mozambique was similar to its counterpart in Angola. Although no regular units operated inside the country, Pretoria’s strategy contained the same principal elements. Firstly, Pretoria sought to cut off the external sources of support that had been made available to the ANC, the main nationalist movement in South Africa itself.

Secondly, Pretoria aimed to destroy the existing nine-nation economic grouping within and on the borders of South Africa – SADCC. Thus, SADCC, as Cowrie puts it, was such a grouping without Pretoria, although its leaders emphasized that the creation of their organization was not a declaration of war on South Africa. It was simply an attempt to coordinate their development on their powerful neighbour. That was exactly what South Africa did not want. The reopening of the Mozambique trade routes to Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe meant those countries could become increasingly independent of South Africa.

Thus, while the activities of the ANC infiltration into South Africa from Mozambique gave Pretoria the pretext to intervene militarily or through its surrogates, the RENAMO, it was one of Pretoria’s overriding objectives to enforce Mozambique’s continual dependence on that apartheid regime. Hence the destruction of economic targets, the ravaging of crops leading to the prevention of their cultivation. The aim was to force the Mozambican government to divert manpower and money to a costly and protracted conflict.

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The increase attacks by the RENAMO in the Mozambican provinces of Zambezia, Tete and Sofala towards the end of 1984 seemed to suggest that Pretoria had added a fourth and more ambitious objective, which overrode the rest. The ambition – cooperation with Alfonso Dhlakama, leader of the RENAMO bandits, was to replace the FRELIMO government in Maputo either by overthrowing it outright or by pressing it to accept a coalition government with the RENAMO. But, like UNITA in Angola, the RENAMO, as already mentioned, was dependent on South Africa for supplies, partly air-lifted from South Africa, but increasingly brought in by boat from the Indian Ocean. Training and logistics were organized by Pretoria and South African military advisers had been seen with RENAMO bands.806

The Mozambican government never accepted the South African claim that Mozambique had any guerrilla bases in the country and firmly declined to close the ANC administrative office in Maputo. To Mozambique the sole issue was South Africa’s backing for the RENAMO campaign which was bleeding the country. However, addressing a mass rally in Inyembane in March 1982, the late President Machel told the crowd that the working people of Mozambique had not only defeated Portuguese colonialism but had to fight against the Smith regime of Rhodesia. He then continued:

“Now we are called to war once more, this time to liquidate the armed bandits who are the agents of the racist and minority regime in Pretoria, the agents of international imperialism...Let the South Africans come themselves. We don’t want the agents, we want the boss. Let’s fight against the organ-grinder, not the monkey.” 807

Indeed, the South Africans eventually did come. On 16 March 1984, President Machel and P.W. Botha signed the ‘Agreement on non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness’ which subsequently came to be known as the ‘Nkomati Accord.’ The Accord stipulated, among other things, that either state was not to allow its territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against the other state. The Accord also recognized the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and forbade and prevented the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, in their respective territories.808

But the Nkomati Accord left much to be desired. For many of the members of the FLS, and thus of SADCC, the Accord was less than acceptable. Despite their reluctance to break ranks publicly, they remained acutely apprehensive that Nkomati could seriously undermine SADCC’s mandate, and perhaps compromise it fatally. Moreover, if Pretoria failed to live up to its obligations fully and faithfully, the outlook could be even bleaker.809 President Kaunda, being frustrated by the Accord had this to say, ‘...we will be less than honest if we did not

admit that the Nkomati Accord was a setback. Of the Frontline and other border states, only Botswana and Lesotho were in any sense critical of Samora Machel's decision, and doubted its necessity or wisdom. Nevertheless, they joined with all the other in saying that they understood and accepted Machel's reasons for doing what he did. However, they all disagreed with him over his style in making a great occasion of the signing of the Accord, and showed their disagreement by refusing his invitation to be present on the occasion.

Machel's motive for wishing to make the signing ceremony into a great event was because he did not want to appear that he was going to surrender to South Africa; he wished to appear before the world as a proud and independent African who was scoring a victory for his cause. One of his closest presidential aides responded to this gesture by saying that it was always wrong to try and disguise a defeat and to dress it up as a victory. However, Frontline leaders’ main concerns were how to rescue the ANC from their new predicament; and whether the Pretoria regime could be trusted to carry out its side of the bargain, which they strongly doubted.

To most Frontline leaders, however, the Nkomati Accord represented a Mozambican surrender to superior South African military and economic power and pressure. The fact that Maputo had little alternative to submission did not make the Accord any less of a ‘diktat.’ In the words of the Economist, ‘Nkomati was little more than a gun held at President Machel’s head.’ However, the depth of Mozambican feelings and the universal respect in which Machel was held by his fellow Frontline heads of state blunted most public expressions of concern.

Nevertheless, the announcement of Nkomati left them stunned, perplexed and initially in a state of disarray. President Nyerere, for instance, then leader of the country farthest from the Frontline in Southern Africa, even flew to Maputo in a futile last-minute endeavour to talk Machel out of the deal. President Quett Masire of Botswana went even further.

Referring to the FLS, he charged Pretoria with:

“bullying us all into signing accords like this. The Nkomati pact was not entered into because both states saw it to their mutual advantage. It was more out of fear.”

However, since the signing of the Accord certain members and other parties had tried to justify the Accord and show that it could be to the advantage of SADCC as a whole. Similarly, in a cautiously-worded and carefully-balanced communiqué, issued after a meeting in Arusha, the Frontline heads of state ‘reaffirmed their total and unqualified commitment to

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812 Economist, 30 March 1985, p.25.
813 Financial Times, 17 April 1984, p.1
the liberation struggles’ in Namibia and South Africa. At the same time, they supported ‘Mozambican actions aimed at the total elimination’ of the ‘vicious’ Pretoria-sponsored armed ‘bandits,’ masquerading as the RENAMO. The meeting also ‘expressed appreciation of Mozambique’s commitment to continued moral, political and diplomatic support for the ANC’. The basic argument was that if the Nkomati Accord led to stability in Mozambique and other FLS members, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Malawi and Swaziland, would benefit because the normal SADCC trade routes could be resumed. As Anglin put it;

“The end of armed aggression by South Africa, if it does end, will facilitate implementation of many critical SADCC projects, especially in transport and energy”817

Economic aggression against the FLS and thus SADCC members had however continued throughout 1984, even after the signing of the Accord. The Nkomati agreement had not led to the return of peace in Mozambique. It had become evident that South Africa had no intention of fulfilling its side of the bargain.818 Guerrilla activity in Mozambique continued unabated since its signing. Perhaps the principal victim of Nkomati was the ANC. Even before Pretoria’s duplicity became apparent, the shock of the Accord left the party devastated. ANC leaders made comradely attempts to ‘understand’ Mozambique’s painful dilemma, to overlook Maputo’s failure to consult them, and to dismiss the Accord publicly as merely ‘a temporary setback’ Nevertheless, they found it difficult to hide completely their fury and sense of betrayal.819

Inside South Africa, the perception of Nkomati as a humiliating Mozambican surrender was widely shared by black and white alike. The government was particularly ecstatic as it confidently awaited the demise or decline of SADCC as a serious rival to its own pet project for a CONSAS. ‘I have a vision,’ P.W. Botha exuded at the signing ceremony, ‘of the nations of South Africa co-operating with each in a veritable constellation of states’820 Similarly, the Financial Mail – the organ of big business in South Africa – predicted the ‘inevitable dissipation of SADCC’s fragile economic initiative’ and proposed its replacement by an enlarged South African dominated rand monetary zone embracing all SADCC members except Angola and Tanzania.821 As Presidents Machel and Kaunda noted following their meeting on 5 February 1985; South African aggression against Mozambique was ‘aimed against SADCC’822

Nkomati Accord had undoubtedly taken its toll on SADCC by laying bare the economic weakness and vulnerability to penetration of the region. However while the commitment to the long-term goal of economic liberation might have been weakened, in the short-term, the

820 Financial Mail, 27 April 1984, pp.31-32.
political resolve of member states to press ahead energetically with closer regional cooperation appears to have been strengthened. Nevertheless, against all odds, the FLS were determined to find their way forward in enforcing the isolation of South Africa and this materialized in campaigning for economic sanctions and disinvestment by the international community through the OAU and the UN.

6.6 Conclusion

The OAU indeed provided the most important form of support to the racially oppressed and grossly struggling people of South Africa. Opposition to apartheid in South Africa had prompted the OAU to pass resolutions that condemned apartheid and thus creating conditions that enabled the oppressed people of South Africa to advance their cause of liberation outside the borders of their country. In its efforts to advance the cause of liberation in South Africa, the OAU had indeed placed almost the entire territory of independent black Africa at the disposal of the South African liberation movements.

The OAU provided Africa with a single voice in condemning apartheid. These were no mean achievements, and it would be wrong to minimize their value or their impact on apartheid South Africa. It would, however, be equally wrong to over-estimate the OAU’s achievement, or its capacity for effective action. To say the least, the OAU was not deterred by South Africa’s military and economic power from identifying itself with the cause against apartheid. As long as the white minority regime continued to deny citizenship to black South Africans and tried to relegate them to impoverished labour reserves, there was no excuse for the OAU to abandon its role as a defender, patron and guardian of the struggling people of South Africa.

The Frontline states and the OAU were engaged in a war of attrition that slowly gained ground. It required increasingly strong efforts of them and created unexpected strains. If apartheid were to be dismantled in South Africa, they would have to pool their resources and lay down a policy all would follow. Unfortunately, the brief resolution of the Addis Ababa Summit Conference was not a strategy but a list of tactics. It included all means – propaganda, diplomatic and economic sanctions, political action and moral and material support for the liberation movements without providing priorities. Although the African states did not repudiate the basic principles and aims of the OAU, most were not willing to apply its resolutions and policies. They agreed with the ends; but not the means. Whatever the merits of the case, more flexibility on the part of the OAU was required.

The Frontline states, despite extremely wide variety of challenges they faced such as transport and trade, never wavered in their role as the critics of the racist policies of South Africa. They were consistent in their struggle towards dismantling apartheid, despite their vulnerability to South Africa’s economic and military power. They were not, as a group, prepared to weaken their resolve and determination to fight against apartheid for immediate economic gains. As a result they rejected all offers of economic cooperation from South Africa. They also took the lead in international sanctions, despite the fact that most of their economies were weak and therefore vulnerable to possible South African retaliation.
CONSAS and SADCC accentuated the political and ideological divisions between South Africa and the Frontline states. In some respects the development of CONSAS and SADCC had moreover, as argued, led to a kind of stalemate situation which effectively limited the chances of violent conflict. The stalemate of course did not apply to the military sphere, where South Africa was undeniably superior to the military strengths of the Frontline states. There was likewise no economic stalemate in the sense of SADCC and CONSAS being of roughly equal strength. The new regional stalemate manifested itself primarily in the improbability of either grouping extending its membership, except for Zimbabwe and Namibia joining CONSAS; and in the likely inability of SADCC countries to contribute in any profound, material way to what they described as the ‘liberation of South Africa’ by overthrowing the political order that existed in South Africa.

Button of the Free Mandela Campaign produced by the Anti Apartheid Movement. Source: African Activist Archive.

CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPACT OF COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA

“In the 30 years between 1960 and 1990, South Africa was subject to a complex and evolving set of sanctions aimed at influencing the South African government to dismantle the apartheid system... The resulting diplomatic, cultural and economic isolation confirmed the apartheid government’s pariah status” (Catherine Barnes, 1990).

7.1 Introduction

Nearly every theoretical argument about the potential impact of sanctions on a target was made with respect to South Africa. South Africa’s mixed economy (based on industry, agriculture, and mining raw materials) enables the evaluation of the impact of sanctions on different economic sectors. Various types of sanctions – strategic, economic, and social – were levied against apartheid South Africa. Multiple tools of influence were used, besides sanctions, in the effort to change South Africa’s foreign and domestic policies. Specific to South Africa is the paradigm case of constructive engagement – the effort to change another government’s policies by embrace rather than isolation. In addition, international diplomacy, mediation, and negotiation were used in an effort to promote democratic reforms within South Africa, halt South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, and end its war in Angola. Moreover, sanctions and diplomacy were only part of a larger anti-apartheid strategy. The African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party, trade unions, religious groups, and literally hundreds of other activist organizations inside South Africa waged a determined struggle for change over the course of several decades while guerrilla movements and South Africa’s neighbours used military force to resist South African aggression and to force domestic restructuring.

7.3 Debates on The Use of Sanctions

Outside South Africa a consensus slowly emerged that apartheid was wrong and ought to be eliminated; as Meg Voorhes, Nomazengele Mangaliso and David Black argue in this volume, the social movement and campaigns for sanctions helped increase the global awareness of apartheid and reinforced the pressures for greater sanctions. So, South Africa gradually became a pariah in the international community because of its policies of racial discrimination, political disenfranchisement, human rights abuses, and international aggression. The sanctions against South Africa, an embargo by India of exports to South Africa undertaken in July 1946, were followed by a range of economic, social, and political sanctions. A variety of actors – international organizations, states, corporations, universities,
municipalities, unions, and individuals – gradually imposed sanctions, implementing a
diverse range of voluntary and mandatory restrictions on relations with South Africa.825 By
the late 1980s, there was a near consensus in the international community that at least some
sanctions against apartheid South Africa were warranted and that the alternative was not
partial reform, but truly democratic government.826

Economic sanctions began to take shape slowly in the late 1940s, the first being India’s
comprehensive trade embargo against South Africa in 1946, which was followed by
increasing diplomatic isolation in the 1950s and 1960s.827 At their height in the late 1980s,
international sanctions touched nearly every facet of South African society from sport, to
travel, to restrictions on technology transfer. Sanctions were not only undertaken by national
governments and international organizations, but were also imposed by municipalities, small
businesses, religious organizations, universities, international institutions, unions, and
multinational corporations. The chronology at the end of this volume, compiled by the
chapter authors, includes many key sanctions events.828

There were two principle policy aims of international sanctions against South Africa.829 The
primary policy goal was of course to force white South Africans to end apartheid. Mentioned
much less frequently by sanctioners, the secondary goal was to end South Africa’s regional
aggression, including its occupation of Namibia.830 In line with the primary goal, the
conditions for lifting sanctions were actions by the South African government toward the
easing of the harshest elements of apartheid and the initiation of negotiations for a new
democratic dispensation. UN Security Council Resolution 182 of December 1963, which
called for a voluntary arms embargo, called on South Africa to end discrimination and
repression, release political prisoners and move toward a peaceful transformation.831 In
Resolution 418 of November 1977, the Security Council recalled the South African
government’s aggression in the region and its “massive violence against and killings of the
African people” and called on South Africa “urgently to end violence against the African
people and to take urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination.”832 In 1985,
the Commonwealth Group called on the apartheid government to declare that the system of
apartheid would be dismantled, end the state of emergency in South Africa, release those
imprisoned or detained for their opposition to apartheid, lift the bans against political parties,
and initiate “a process of dialogue... with a view to establishing a non-racial and

825 R. Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy, p.104; A. Klotz, Norms in
International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid, p.99.
Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? pp. 29–42.
827 M. Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade, p. 45; E. S. Rogers,
832 Ibid.
representative government." The US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, passed over President Reagan’s veto in 1986, was “designed to bring about reforms in that system of government that will lead to the establishment of a non-racial democracy.” The Act outlined six measures that it encouraged the government of South Africa to undertake:

1. Repeal the present state of emergency and respect the principle of equal justice under the law for citizens of all races;
2. Release Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, black trade union leaders, and all political prisoners;
3. Permit the free exercise by South Africans of all races of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the political process;
4. Establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws;
5. Negotiate with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa the future political system in South Africa; and
6. End military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighbouring states.

The sanctions campaign against South Africa was, at its inception, a grassroots and later an international effort that drew inspiration and direction from the anti-apartheid movement. To focus only on United Nations or individual government actions would miss much of the anti-apartheid activity. And in addition to sanctions, philanthropic foundations and many of the organizations that sanctioned South Africa provided financial and organizational assistance to the anti-apartheid movement. While the character of the South Africa sanctions campaign was ad hoc, it was part of a larger peace, justice, and democracy movement that mobilized millions all over the globe through the late 1970s to the early 1990s. The fact that the movement for sanctions against apartheid was linked to these other movements (e.g. European Nuclear Disarmament, Solidarity, Charter 77, Democracy in China, support for the Sandinistas, and the Nuclear Freeze) enabled organizers to reach broader audiences and allowed them to increase education and mobilization for further sanctions against South Africa.

The anti-apartheid sanctions regime was, in addition to being a patchwork of both voluntary and mandatory prohibitions undertaken by a multitude and variety of actors, extremely “leaky” — goods still found their way into and out of South Africa and many white South

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Africans were able to retain their individual contacts with the rest of the world. For example, though the US, Denmark, and France prohibited imports of South African coal in 1985, South Africa’s coal exports grew overall and South Africa became the major supplier of coal imports to the European Economic Community in 1986. This was also the case with regard to other commodities such as gold – while sanctioned by some, South Africa was sometimes able to sell other buyers, though they were often forced to sell at an “apartheid discount.” Overall, though South African trade fell dramatically with some trading partners (trade with Britain fell by 15 percent in 1986; trade with Germany fell 25 percent; 1987 trade with the US fell by 40 percent that same year) trade with others grew (trade with Japan increased 20 percent in 1987). And though some countries prohibited air travel with South Africa, many South Africans were able to fly via other countries. In addition, several important mineral commodities, considered strategic in the West, were never sanctioned to any significant degree. So, sanctions never completely isolated South Africa or white South Africans.

The end of sanctions was also gradual: some sanctions were relaxed after the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. The UN Security Council ended sanctions, including the arms embargo, only in May 1994 a month after the successful completion of all-race multiparty elections in South Africa. Because the South African government and political elites often had warning before sanctions were imposed – in some cases years of discussion preceded their imposition – they also had time to prepare for and react to any boycotts and restrictions. The length of time that sanctions were considered and imposed is one of the most important factors in understanding the consequences of sanctions in this case: the South African government and industries had time to reform their practices in response to sanctions and also to engage in resistance or sanctions busting.

When de Klerk freed Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and unbanned political parties in 1990, the NP government continued a process of reform and secret negotiations that had begun under P. W. Botha. Over the next several years, negotiations among South Africans for a new Interim Constitution, the democratic vote, and the procedures for transition, stopped and started, coinciding with continued government repression and the activities of a shadowy group of military and police attached to a “third force” of provocateurs. Even after the elections of April 1994 where all South Africans could vote for the first time, white resistance to democratization continued, and some parts of the government controlled by true believers in apartheid put up roadblocks to reform. What explains the character of this long, and still incomplete transition? Why did the apartheid
government begin along the road to reform and ultimately the handover of power via the vote? Given the massive violence that many expected, why was the transition relatively peaceful?846 And, given the many forces for change at work in this complex situation, what role did sanctions play?

Taking the long view, Robert Price has argued that change is due to industrialization and a “trialectic”: “the interaction of three elements – growing domestic opposition to racial rule, efforts of the state to preserve white minority control, and international pressure – gave rise to a process of debilitating economic crisis and intensifying political conflict that placed immense pressure on the South African state.”847 The engine of black politicization was, according to Price, industrialization:

“Since the end of World War II, the South African system of white supremacy has been increasingly undermined by fundamental incompatibilities built into its system of racial rule. As the country’s economic system became increasingly industrial, it came to depend on an ever larger and more urbanized black proletariat. In South Africa as in every other society, the social conditions of industrial production and urban life create a milieu conducive to collective organization and political activism. Thus everywhere that industrial modernization has occurred, erstwhile peasants have shed their passivity and launched ever more effective demands for political inclusion.”848

Herman Giliomee has argued that demographic factors did not favour continued white dominance in every sphere. Giliomee notes that throughout much of the twentieth century, until 1960, whites were about 20 percent of the total population of South Africa. By 1960 whites were in relative decline and by 1985 the white portion of the population had fallen to about 15 percent. “An acute shortage of white manpower began to develop in both public and private sectors. By the 1970s the shortage of whites increasingly forced employers in the private sector to breach the industrial colour bar to meet the need for skilled and semi-skilled manpower.”849

Timothy Sisk argues that the negotiated transition occurred because the anti-apartheid movement was able to create the conditions for a “hurting stalemate.” Moderates among the two sides were forced to cooperate because neither could win outright: the anti-apartheid movement and the NP had an interest in negotiations toward a more peaceful order. Sisk says

849 Ibid. p.7.
the determinant of change was the recognition by all of their interdependence and the shift in power to relative parity between the black majority and the government.850

Others argue that change was only possible because reformist elites rose to prominence in the NP during the late 1980s: most could hardly imagine the hardliner “securocrats” who dominated the NP government until the late 1980s making a public opening toward the ANC, PAC, and Communist Party.851 Jung and Shapiro note numerous reasons why reformers may become prominent in authoritarian governments:

“A list would include sanctions and other external pressures, finances within their own ranks (perhaps as the result of the collapse of their legitimating ideology), the growth of a normative commitment to democracy among members of the government, intractable economic problems, and civil unrest that threatens to spiral out of control.”852

South Africa was certainly subject to these forces. And as several scholars have noted, once authoritarian elites begin down the path of reform, it is often difficulty to control the reform process.853

The anti-apartheid activists emphasized their own role in winning democracy for South Africa. In their view, whites were forced to give up apartheid. Anti-apartheid activists stress the determined action of many groups over decades – not only the ANC but communists, the white feminists in the Black Sash, rent boycotters, trade unionists, and young lions in the townships engaged in mass action.854 The ANC saw sanctions as a tool of limited but important utility and sanctions thus became one of the four pillars of the ANC struggle against apartheid – a supplement to mass action, armed struggle, and diplomatic isolation.855

While sanctions were underway, there were diverse interpretations of their potential and actual impact on South Africa’s domestic and international behaviour. Most in the anti-apartheid movement favoured sanctions and endorsed the call by ANC President Albert Luthuli for sanctions in 1958.856 Despite the difficulty of polling a population on the question of sanctions in a context where advocating sanctions was sometimes a criminal offense, there were some studies of South African’s attitudes toward sanctions. In general, surveys showed

853 S. P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”, p.91.
855 R. E. Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations, p. 7.
that black South Africans had support for sanctions, though only a minority supported sanctions if they resulted in “serious” unemployment.857

By the late 1980s, most of the anti-apartheid movement regarded sanctions as crucial. The ANC office in London dedicated resources to coordinating and encouraging sanctions against South Africa, with the effort headed by important ANC office.858 ANC leader Oliver Tambo, in a communication to Nelson Mandela regarding his secret negotiations with P. W. Botha in the 1980s, told Mandela to go ahead with the talks. Tambo said,

“Look, there is only one problem: don’t manoeuvre yourself into a situation where we have to abandon sanctions. That’s the key problem. We are very concerned that we should not get stripped of our weapons of struggle, and the most important of these is sanctions. That is the trump card with which we can mobilize international opinion and pull governments over to our side.”859

Of the anti-apartheid groups, only the Inkatha Freedom Party, founded in 1975, took a strong anti-sanctions position in the mid-1980s. Inkatha’s leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi argued:

“Without a means for survival – because blacks in South Africa are cash-dependent – their grinding poverty and degradation will continue unabated.... Divestment will not help the struggle for liberation; it will hinder it.”860

Some governments (including members of the OAU and the majority of the General Assembly) felt sanctions were essential and that they would probably be effective, and others (for instance the governments of the US and UK) felt that a policy of constructive engagement would bring about change. Andrew Young, US Ambassador to the UN under President Carter, argued that:

“Economic sanctions looked like an easy answer, but South Africa is one of the most self-sufficient nations in the world. It could get along without us. . . If we cut off investments, we would lose jobs in this country and we wouldn’t necessarily help Blacks in that country.”861

859 A. Sparks, “Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution”, p.65.
Opinion about sanctions among white South Africans was also divided. In the late 1980s, a majority of white South Africans tended to see sanctions as a serious problem that would have a very harmful effect on the South African economy, though a somewhat smaller portion also tended to believe that South Africa could cope with sanctions. Surveys of white South Africans in 1986, 1988, and 1990 showed that a majority thought the South African economy was not “strong enough” to prevent economic sanctions from hurting. In a survey of white South Africans in 1992, 92 percent of respondents said the South African economy had been hurt by sanctions.

The apartheid power structure, and the intellectuals who supported it, discounted sanctions and in general tended to argue that sanctions would not work or would have a limited effect on South Africa, and they produced numerous studies to prove how sanctions would only impoverish black South Africans. They argued that sanctions would jeopardize economic growth in South Africa and that:

"it is only continued industrial growth and the widening of black economic empowerment, that such growth involves, which will make the desired and needed political change possible at all."

Those whites who led the long negotiations with the ANC and other groups who sought to end apartheid, have little reason to deviate from that position: to acknowledge the coercive effect of sanctions diminishes their claim to a benevolent and voluntary movement toward conciliation.

Tshidiso Maloka argued that estimates of the possible employment consequences of sanctions made inside South Africa during the sanctions era were highly politicized and predicted severe job losses, on the order of millions of workers. This was not an insignificant fear since overall unemployment was already growing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1986 South Africa’s Federated Chamber of Industries predicted that “medium intensity” sanctions would lead to increasing unemployment by over 200,000 in few months to two years and 685,000 over five years, while comprehensive sanctions could lead to increased unemployment of over 300,000 in the shorter term going up to 1,135,013 jobs lost over financial years. In 1987, Bethlehem argued that intensification of sanctions in the late 1980s would lead to an...
increase of two million unemployed workers, mostly in the category of unskilled labour (since import substitution industries would create higher skilled jobs) by the year 2000.868

Studies of sanctions undertaken while apartheid was still in place suffered from both a scarcity of information and the biases induced by strong political and ethical commitments. Scholars also faced the problem of doing their analysis midstream – before the processes of change had come to conclusion.869 Tom Lodge made one of the most interesting analyses of the potential political effect of sanctions. He argued in 1989 that:

“Total economic embargo would leave the vital decisions in the hands of armed bureaucrats on the one side and world statesmen on the other, and be a more costly and less beneficial measure than an attritional and cumulative process of partial though severe sanctions.”870

Partial sanctions, according to Lodge, held a better prospect of facilitating a peaceful and democratic political transition. Lodge’s argument regarding “severe but partial sanctions” bears quoting at length:

“With continuing gold and mineral sales, South Africa would continue to have access to the foreign currency increasingly necessary to evade sanctions on vital imports. . . . South Africa would remain dependent on limited forms of foreign economic relationship. The fear of jeopardizing these might serve to dissuade the administration from instituting a complete clampdown on internal opponents, as well as curbing large-scale military interventions in the region; at least as far as Commonwealth states are concerned. Trade unions might also benefit in the short term from whatever employment is created by labour intensive import substitution, as well as maintaining the loyalties of their following through defensive struggles over conditions and job security. . . . Political divisions within the National Party’s upper echelons could be important, in that a sanctions-induced import-substitution boom might enhance the political leverage of reformist business circles. Diplomats would continue to have a strategic importance in arresting, delaying or evading the application of further sanctions. All this could help check the development of a hegemony of soldiers and policemen. The radicalization of the National Party’s white liberal opponents could gather momentum, and help to sustain the presence of a socially conciliatory local black leadership

869 M. Voorhes, Black South Africans’ Attitudes on Sanctions and Divestment, pp.20-25.
(however difficulty it might be for it to control its mass constituency). . . Sanctions will enhance the importance of external actors in the securing of black liberation. Many of these actors will direct their efforts at the promotion of compromise and negotiation.”871

On the other hand, Heider Ali Khan argued that reform would be the result of internal political decisions and other domestic factors and she argued that “continued incremental sanctions seem unlikely to unseat the government, and more likely to impede rather than to accelerate reform (i.e. deracialization).”872 Lipton believed sanctions could doom South Africa to increased polarization:

“If sanctions have their intended effects, economic decline could erode those economic bonds that have drawn together the diverse people of (what has become) South Africa, and strengthen the tendencies, thus making more possible partition, against a background of growing violence throughout the region.”873

Still others argued that sanctions were ineffective since the embargoes and boycotts of South Africa were not total. While passions have cooled and there is more information, evidence is still only partially available since many documents from the apartheid era have disappeared.874 Academic assessments of sanctions following the transition to majority rule in South Africa in 1994 have generally been more favourable than Lipton’s, though there is still disagreement on exactly how sanctions worked.875

7.3 Economic Sanctions

US universities, pension funds, local governments, and other institutions faced ethical pressures to sell off their investments in companies doing business in South Africa. These demands originated with the campus divestment movement, which concentrated almost on 150 or so highly endowed colleges and universities.876 This anti-apartheid activism began in the mid-1960s, accelerated after the Soweto rebellion and its aftermath, and peaked in response to the South African state of emergency imposed in 1985.877 A growing number of state and local governments in the US also added their weight to the divestment campaign from the late 1970s onward. By 1993, 40 of the top 50 colleges and universities (ranked by

873 M. Lipton, Sanctions and South Africa: The Dynamics of Economic Isolation”, pp.14-23.
875 M. Lipton, Sanctions and South Africa: The Dynamics of Economic Isolation”, pp.14-23.
size of endowment) had some sort of divestment policy, as did the governments and pension funds of more than 100 states, counties, cities, and US territories.\textsuperscript{878}

Activists claimed that divestment would send a clear signal to companies operating in South Africa, to policymakers, to the broader public, and to the people of South Africa. But like most popular movements, the divestment campaign comprised a broad range of actors with varying viewpoints, sophistication and strategies. Students and their faculty allies called for total divestment from companies doing business (generally defined as having assets or employees) in South Africa.\textsuperscript{879} At least initially, administrations generally resisted these demands. Many institutions eventually developed corporate codes of conduct as well as guidelines for communicating their anti-apartheid concerns through correspondence with companies and by voting on shareholder resolutions.\textsuperscript{880} Thus the movement embraced more than students and city councillors pressing for total divestment. Endowment and pension fund administrators also shaped the campaign to encourage companies to improve their labour practices, to step up their actions in opposition to apartheid, and to limit their sales or operations in South Africa.\textsuperscript{881}

US and South African businesses took note of these pressures and policies. The divestment campaign, including student protests, shareholder resolutions, or meetings between corporate executives and representatives of institutional shareholders, moderated the policies of US banks and corporations.\textsuperscript{882} However, divestment had no direct economic impact on companies. Those corporations that did pull out by 1985 responded, by their own admission, to the increasing number of selective contracting policies adopted by local governments.\textsuperscript{883} More fundamentally, divestment and shareholder activism increased US public awareness of apartheid, creating a political environment conducive to Congressional sanctions against South Africa. Furthermore, the movement received extensive international media coverage, heartening many South African anti-apartheid activists.\textsuperscript{884}

The first wave of US anti-apartheid activism began in 1965, when members of Students for a Democratic Society demonstrated at Chase Manhattan’s headquarters on Wall Street to protest its loans to the South African government; 17 were arrested. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, student protesters urged administrations at Cornell, Princeton, Wesleyan, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and Union Theological Seminary to sell their South African holdings.\textsuperscript{885} Some responded by selling off securities in particularly controversial companies, but most resisted. Rather, the divestment debate prompted many

\textsuperscript{880} M. P. Mangaliso, "Disinvestment by Multinational Corporations," pp. 48–63.
\textsuperscript{883} Ibid.
administrations and faculty to consider their responsibilities as ethical investors and to develop appropriate guidelines.  

This examination resulted in publications, primarily by academics at Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, which concluded that universities should follow certain principles as socially responsible investors. The Ethical Investor, published in 1972, proved particularly influential. Although recognizing that a shareholder does not cause “social injury in the same sense [as] the manager who fashions corporate policy,” the book argued that a shareholder still “bears responsibility for harm resulting from corporate business practices,” because of proximity to, and capability to influence the corporation. Moreover, if a shareholder fails “to seek to bring about corrective action by the shareholders as a group, that individual shareholder contributes – however fractionally – to the continuation of the corporate wrong.” Not voicing objections “amounts to participation in the injurious practice.” That said, the authors cautioned against the sale of securities for ethical rather than economic reasons, except “where the company is committing grave social injury and where all methods of correcting these policies have failed or appear doomed to failure.”

In response, many universities established committees to advise trustees on investment and shareholder issues. One of the first formed at Harvard in 1972, had equal representation from faculty, students and alumni, a pattern similar to the composition of committees formed at other universities (although some included administration, staff or even community representatives). By 1979 more than 30 of the 89 universities polled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) had established advisory committees on investments involving South Africa. Thus, by the 1970s, a significant number of administrations had accepted a responsibility to exercise influence as shareholders when corporate activities caused “social injury.” The basis for divestment had been established.

The Soweto uprisings and Steve Biko’s death in detention provoked another wave of anti-apartheid activism on US campuses. In early 1977, more than 700 students were arrested in various protests; at Stanford University, one protest alone led to nearly 300 arrests. The student-led South African Catalyst Project, headquartered at Stanford, coordinated actions throughout the country. In response, several colleges and universities adopted total divestment policies.

893 Ibid.
divestment policies, including Antioch, Hampshire, Howard, Michigan State, the University of Massachusetts, Ohio University, and the University of Wisconsin.895

By and large, however, most administrations, following the reasoning of The Ethical Investor, argued that divestment would be a premature step. Although sensitive to student demands, they defined ethics and responsibilities differently. Many administrations remained unconvinced that a corporation’s presence in South Africa constituted social injury, or they thought that the social injury could be corrected if the company modified its behaviour.896 Rather than divest, these universities sought to persuade companies, through correspondence and by voting on shareholder resolutions, to implement exemplary labour practices and philanthropic activities, to lobby against apartheid laws, and to ban sales to the South African security forces. They claimed that divestment either would not send a signal (because someone else would buy the stocks) or would deprive them of a means of conveying signals (because they would no longer vote at corporate annual meetings).897

These arguments received powerful support from the development of the Sullivan Principles. Developed by Rev. Leon Sullivan, a civil rights activist and a director of General Motors, in concert with representatives of other leading US corporations, the code called on companies to promote equal pay and opportunities within the workplace, and to improve the quality of life for their black workers outside the workplace through social investment projects.898 Announced in 1976, this voluntary code of conduct gave legitimacy to the position that corporations could act as a force for progress within South Africa. Many university advisory committees developed guidelines for voting on shareholder resolutions dealing with South Africa. In some cases, universities and colleges sponsored or cosponsored shareholder resolutions.899 As a general rule, these colleges and universities supplemented their votes on shareholder resolutions with direct communication with the company to elicit information and to explain their policies. By the early 1980s most schools with South Africa-related investment policies voted in favour of resolutions that requested companies to sign the Sullivan principles.900 A smaller number also favoured resolutions restricting sales of goods to the South African government, especially its security and apartheid-enforcing agencies. Several schools, including Brandeis, Carleton, and Macalester, forbade investment in companies that were involved in strategic sectors of the South African economy (such as computers or oil) or that sold to the South African military or police.901

Many administrations accepted that they should divest from companies that failed to respond to queries or refused to counter the social injury caused by their presence in South Africa.

900 Ibid.
901 Ibid.
The Sullivan Principles also made it more justified to sell shares in companies that failed to comply. By early 1983, at least 34 colleges and universities had developed policies that required them to sell off securities, or to forego purchasing additional shares, in companies that did not measure up. More than a dozen schools, including Cornell, the University of Pennsylvania, Wesleyan, and Yale, announced that they would not hold stock in companies that failed to adopt the code of conduct.

Some universities also adopted policies calling for divestment of stock in companies that refused to disclose information on their operations or labour practices. From 1978 to early 1983, schools sold more than $80 million in investments. But most continued to oppose resolutions calling for corporate withdrawal from South Africa. These administrations generally viewed such resolutions, as they did divestment, as a step to be taken only if all other remedies failed. Meanwhile, several state, county and city governments adopted similarly mixed policies. First, Connecticut passed a partial divestment law in 1982. In January 1983, Massachusetts banned all investments by its pension funds in companies doing business in South Africa. The city council of Madison, Wisconsin, agreed in 1976 to avoid contracts with companies that have “economic interests in South Africa.” In 1978, Cotati, California, became the first US jurisdiction to prohibit the investment of its funds in corporations with business ties to South Africa. Berkeley and the Oakland University School District, in May 1979, restricted their relationships with banks that retained ties to South Africa. These increasingly tough restrictions set the stage for the next wave of pressure for more comprehensive divestment.

The third and most intensive wave of US divestment activism started in the 1984/85 academic year, sparked by the increased turmoil in South Africa that was covered extensively by US and international media. As part of escalating global anti-apartheid mobilization calling for comprehensive economic sanctions, demands for US companies to withdraw from South Africa increased. Divestment proponents also hoped that campus activism would educate the broader public about apartheid and galvanize a larger sanctions movement. Jerry Herman, working with the American Friends Service Committee, advocated divestment as “an extremely effective tool to get people moving on South Africa. People need and want something to do on South Africa, and divestment provides them with such an opportunity.”

Student blockades of administration buildings at Columbia, Rutgers, and Berkeley in April 1985 galvanized similar actions across the country. Protests reached unprecedented numbers and caught many college administrations by surprise. More than 1000 Cornell students
clashed with police, while those at Columbia blockaded Hamilton Hall for three weeks.910 At the University of California at Berkeley, 650 students were arrested in a series of demonstrations, and 3000 boycotted classes to join rallies.911 The following October, about 130 Wesleyan University students were arrested while blocking entrances to administration buildings, 1200 Berkeley students once again convened, and at least two protesting Cornell students were arrested every weekday. Overall, more than 20 campuses across the country experienced rallies, sit-ins and marches.912

To these proponents of total divestment, corporations – whatever their intentions or actions – could not be a net force for good in South Africa. As Stanford University’s public affairs summarized this argument,

“By their very existence in South Africa, US companies contribute to the continuation of the apartheid system. They pay taxes, enhance economic stability and lend credibility to the racist government in South Africa, and thus they strengthen the system of apartheid.”913

There could be no distinctions between companies, since efforts to ameliorate apartheid were doomed to failure. Activists equated holding securities as encouraging companies to remain in South Africa and, therefore, as signalling support for apartheid. In the words of Professor Peter Walsh, a member of the University of Notre Dame’s Ad Hoc Committee of the Board of Trustees on South African Investments, “to encourage corporations to remain in South Africa in these circumstances, is to abdicate moral responsibility.”914

Some activists theorized that if enough institutions adopted total divestment policies, the stock prices of the targeted corporations would be deflected, making it more difficult to find new stock issues and to resist hostile takeovers. But most conceded that divestment would have little, if any, direct economic impact on the targeted companies; the economic pressure argument, therefore, did not feature prominently in debates. Some activists also said their universities should divest as a signal to its immediate community of students, faculty and alumni that it rejected apartheid.915 However, few divestment proponents argued that their universities should follow through in the interests of moral purity by refusing to purchase supplies or to accept gifts from companies operating in South Africa. One respondent to a survey by the University of Pennsylvania’s Committee on University Responsibility to the Trustees captured the views of many divestment advocates by suggesting that “Investors, as

owners, are accountable for the behaviour and location of companies in a way that consumers and gift/grant beneficiaries are not.916

By the mid-1980s, institutional investors proved far more willing to adopt total divestment policies. Nearly half of the 49 institutions which implemented new South Africa-related policies opted for total divestment. By early 1986, 40 of the 100 top schools (by size of endowment) chose partial divestment policies and seven had total divestment policies. Anti-apartheid investment restrictions tightened further throughout the rest of the decade.917 From April 1986 through the end of 1989, another 19 US colleges and universities, most of which were among the 100 most highly endowed schools, adopted total divestment. These included the University of Pennsylvania, Bowdoin College, Colgate University, Duke University, New York University, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Rochester, and Tufts University. By 1992, 15 of the top 50 US colleges and universities (by size of endowment) had total divestment policies and 25 had partial divestment policies.918

Similarly, at the local government level, pension funds increasingly adopted partial or total divestment policies. In 1984 and 1985 alone, 13 state and city governments or agencies adopted partial divestment provisions, and 38 adopted total divestment policies; others joined the trend throughout the late 1980s. Even more significant major municipalities restricted their purchases of goods and services from companies doing business in South Africa.919 In 1985 and 1986, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Oakland, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Washington adopted such provisions. More than 70 localities had adopted selective contracting laws restricting their procurement of goods and services from companies with South African business ties by 1993.920

Even institutions and pension funds that still resisted total divestment now voted in favour of resolutions that called on companies to withdraw from South Africa. For example, TIAA-CREF (the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association–College Retirement Equities Fund), one of the largest US institutional investors, remained unpersuaded about the virtues of divestment but did sponsor stockholder resolutions asking companies to withdraw.921 In 1987, with the New York State Common Retirement Fund, it sponsored shareholder resolutions asking companies to cut economic ties with South Africa; they pursued the campaign through late 1991.922 This shift, by two of the country’s largest single institutional investors, ensured that virtually every US company with operations in South Africa received

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916 Press release issued by Wesleyan University of Public Information, 7 January 1985.
918 Ibid.
921 Ibid.
a shareholder resolution asking it to end those operations, which required the directors or top executives to formulate responses.

Similar resolutions received record levels of more than 12 percent overall support, on average, at each company to which they were submitted in 1987 and 1988 – nearly double the 6.6 percent such proposals received, on average, in 1986. Another by-product of student anti-apartheid activism was the formation of a consortium of colleges and universities under the initial sponsorship of Wesleyan University in early 1984. Over the next ten years the consortium commissioned research papers to help members refine their investment and shareholder voting guidelines, and to develop scholarship and faculty development programs aimed at black South Africans. On two occasions, the consortium engaged collectively in political lobbying. In January 1985, members urged the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa to more actively oppose apartheid. Several months later, 20 university presidents signed a letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole urging the passage of sanctions strong enough “to demonstrate the depth and sincerity of this country’s disapproval of apartheid.”

One reason for the growing acceptance of total divestment (and sanctions) was the situation on the ground in South Africa. In the context of violent unrest and the South African government’s harsh response, investors had difficulty defending the role of corporations in promoting peaceful change. Even Leon Sullivan admitted, in May 1987, that his code of conduct had not eliminated apartheid and called for economic sanctions. Within few months of Sullivan’s dramatic shift, five colleges and universities adopted total divestment policies, and the governor of Connecticut signed a law imposing a total divestment policy on its pension funds that superseded its 1982 partial divestment policy.

Another factor making total divestment more acceptable to institutional investors was the dramatic exodus of corporations from South Africa. Previously, institutions had argued that fundraising responsibilities should temper divestment. Similarly, many schools had softened any divestment motivated by non-financial reasons, in an effort to avoid retaliation by the target companies in the form of decreased donations and research grants. But in contrast to the early 1980s, when nearly 300 US companies had investments or employees in South Africa, by 1991 the number had fallen to 104. Total divestment no longer seriously restricted portfolio managers.

Ethical investment policies that stopped short of total divestment proved cumbersome. They tied up the time of investment policy committees, treasurers, and trustees in case-by-case reviews of individual companies’ activities, in letter-writing campaigns, and in deliberations

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923 Ibid.
925 Ibid.
927 Ibid.

213
over shareholder resolutions. Many university administrations recognized that all this activity still failed to satisfy total divestment proponents or to restore calm to their campuses.

Student activism slowed after the 1985/86 academic year, in large part because of the anti-apartheid movement’s success. Not only had corporations begun to divest; from 1985 on, the divestment movement was supplemented — and even superseded — by the adoption of selective contracting laws by US municipalities and the imposition of economic sanctions by the US federal government. The question remains, then, how the divestment campaign affected South Africa.

The significant consequences of the US divestment movement became most evident starting in 1985. Two dimensions are worthy of attention. First, the campaign contributed to popular mobilization in the US for anti-apartheid sanctions, thus contributing indirectly to any results of international pressure on South Africa. Activism focusing on corporate investments and practices also bolstered the psychological effects of sanctions on business and political elites in South Africa. Overall, the divestment campaign was most noteworthy for its ability to signal international rejection of apartheid and to warn of the likelihood of more stringent economic measures on the horizon.

The divestment movement hoped that publicity would reach the attention of South Africans, both black and white. It did. Campus anti-apartheid activism in the US quickly got picked up by South Africa newspapers. For example, during the second wave of campus activism, fairly broad circulation English-language South African newspapers, such as The Star, Sunday Tribune, Rand Daily Mail, and The Citizen reported on divestment activity from 1977 to 1979, as did the annual survey of the South African Institute of Race Relations. One American, who travelled throughout South Africa on a fellowship in the 1984/85 academic year, recalls that “every grunt, whisper and sneeze of the US anti-apartheid movement was covered breathlessly — and derisively — by the South African media.”

The college divestment movement captured the attention, too, of South Africa’s growing and increasingly influence black trade union movement. An article in the South Africa Labour Bulletin, examining trade union options with regard to sanctions, heralded divestment as:

“part of the broader campaign for disinvestment, which involves also putting pressure on companies by means of, for example,"

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930 Ibid.
934 Ibid.
Thus developments on US college campuses heartened sanctions supporters in South Africa, who recognized that US public opinion was changing and hoped that US policymakers would react. Even anti-apartheid campaigners who opposed sanctions welcomed the campus movement as a message to Pretoria that the American people condemned apartheid.\textsuperscript{937}

South African businesses also absorbed and reacted to these signals. In the mid-1980s, leading corporations and their associations began to speak out about the need for major political reforms, openly acknowledging the role of overseas pressure. Michael Rosholt, executive chairman of Barlow Rand, identified two reasons for businesses to voice opposition to influence control and forced removals: these policies created tensions within the black community, and they were “probably the one single issue most likely to ensure the success of the US disinvestment lobby.”\textsuperscript{938}

However, before 1985, the US divestment movement had little direct impact on the South African government. Certainly, government officials were aware of the campaign because of the South African media coverage, the related decisions by leading US banks to stop lending to the South African public sector, and US companies signing the Sullivan Principles.\textsuperscript{939} While the divestment movement may have embarrassed and annoyed government officials it did not disable government functions.

But after 1985, the exodus of US companies increased the psychological pressures on South African officials and increased the perceived costs of repressive measures. For example, Geoff Budlender, for many years an attorney with the Legal Resources Center (an organization that defended clients against apartheid and worked to get many of these policies repealed), believes that the Sullivan Principles combined with the growing threat of disinvestment “had a very significant impact at a particular moment”\textsuperscript{940} in the mid-1980s. Signatories’ support of the Legal Resources Center, he said, along with the government’s “genuine concern about the possibility of further withdrawals” by US companies, to some extent discouraged the government from pursuing forced removals of black communities and from enacting repressive legislation.\textsuperscript{941}

Overall, then, the divestment campaign was one component of increasing economic pressures. Its psychological impact, as a signal of harsher measures to come, weighed more


\textsuperscript{941} W. F. Moses and M. Voorhes, Corporate Responsibility in a Changing South Africa, p. 27.
heavily than its actual costs on South African business or political leaders. These signals also galvanized the resistance movement.

Grassroots divestment activism, and media attention to it, helped to persuade major US corporations to reduce their involvement in the South African economy. Business leaders also joined in publicly condemning the economic and social practices of apartheid. The success of divestment and shareholder activism can be traced to its public nature – campus demonstrations and annual meetings of major US corporations – which sparked concerns among executives about their public images.\textsuperscript{942} Ironically, the divestment movement would have had much less impact had administrators immediately and quietly divested their portfolios, obviating the need for divestment proponents to hold rallies and other public protests.

The visibility of the global condemnation of apartheid, further more, enabled the divestment movement to play a more significant role in South Africans’ minds than its (small) economic impact would imply. An ever-increasing threat of corporate withdrawals and Congressional sanctions played a role in both persuading South African businesses to lobby against apartheid legislation and South African government officials to refrain from certain repressive actions. Similar patterns of activism in Britain and other European countries supplemented the power of anti-apartheid mobilization in the United States. As the anti-apartheid movement understood early on, the global public wanted to do something about South Africa; divestment offered a highly visible and low-cost method.

The role of divestment as a political signal underscores the interrelationship between various components of anti-apartheid sanctions. Without the threat of escalating pressures, divestment alone may not have substantial effects on the economic or political leaders in the target state. Grassroots mobilization appears essential – but not sufficient – for the effective use of sanctions, at least when countries initially have friendly strategic and economic ties.

7.4 The Political Economy of Sanctions

By the mid-1980s, a seemingly unstoppable tide of strikes, boycotts and other protests threatened to make South Africa ungovernable, while the international community simultaneously increased the campaign for sanctions. Already weakened by anti-apartheid pressures from shareholders, consumers, and governments in the 1970s and 1980s, and a US Congressional amendment blocking International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans since 1983, domestic and foreign investors’ confidence in the economy plunged in the wake of the state of emergency declared in July 1985.\textsuperscript{943} Chase Manhattan Bank decided neither to extend (“roll-over”) credit nor to provide new loans to South Africa. Other bankers and investors immediately moved to switch their funds out of the country, leading the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to decline rapidly and the rand to plummet on foreign exchange markets. In an attempt to stem capital flow the South African government quickly imposed a moratorium on debt repayments to public and private creditors, suspended foreign exchange dealings, and

\textsuperscript{942} D. Hauck, Can Pretoria Be Moved? The Emergence of Business Activism in South Africa, p.8.
temporarily closed the JSE. As this crisis unfolded, the international anti-apartheid movement called for intensification of sanctions.

The short-term nature of South Africa’s foreign debt between 1985 and 1990 created exceptional opportunities for sanctioners, international bankers, and domestic business leaders to pressure the government to eliminate apartheid. The complex relationship between politically motivated restrictions on lending and market-induced investment decisions by international bankers becomes crucial for understanding why South Africa became unusually susceptible to demands for political reforms. A host of external economic inflow including the price of gold, exchange rates, and country-risk assessments by investors affected decisions and the South African economy. To unravel the specific role of “bankers’ sanctions” in the process of political change, we place South Africa’s vulnerability in historical context. Attempts to manage the debt crisis between 1985 and 1990 reveal the economic and perceptual importance of sanctions, as international bankers and the domestic business community increased direct demands for political reforms. After a series of ineffectual attempts to placate its opponents with minor changes, the government conceded major reforms by the end of the decade.

South Africa’s economic vulnerabilities had roots in the nature of its incorporation into the world economy. Historically an exporter of primary products, the country has always maintained international links. For over a century, since the discovery of diamonds and gold, foreign capital has played a critical role, in mining and later in manufacturing. Like many developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa pursued import-substitution policies, which fostered local manufacturing by raising tariff barriers. The resulting high costs of production undermined significant export growth. In addition, the country’s highly skewed; racially based income distribution exacerbated the limitations of a small domestic market, foreclosing more autonomous economic development. Since industry remained critically dependent on imported technology, machinery, and transport equipment, an expansion in local production of intermediate and consumer goods spurred the need for foreign capital. By the 1980s, capital goods comprised over 40 percent of imports. Any growth in the domestic economy, therefore, increased the demand for foreign exchange, which the country could acquire either from exports or inflows of foreign investment.

Thus for South Africa, like many newly industrializing countries, sustained economic growth hinged on a healthy balance of payments. Lacking a competitive manufacturing base, South

949 Ibid.
Africa paid for many imports with proceeds from mineral, agricultural, and other raw material exports. Primary products comprised over 80 percent of total exports in the 1980s, with gold earning over 40 percent of South Africa’s export trade and over 50 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from trade in the 1980s. Through the 1960s, foreign direct (productive) and indirect (portfolio) investment influence supplemented the country’s capacity to import capital goods. Most South African foreign loan liabilities entailed medium- to long-term debt, borne mainly by the government and parastatals underwriting the expansion of infrastructure. The IMF supported such lending, and large foreign banks, such as Citicorp, National Westminster, Barclays, Deutschebank, and Credit Suisse, viewed South Africa as politically stable.

The exception to this picture followed the 1960 Sharpeville killings, when, in an attempt to forestall capital flow the government established a two-tier exchange rate. This “firand” system devalued capital exports and rewarded capital inflow. Combined with repression that quieted domestic unrest, the government’s policies calmed investors’ concerns over the political situation, and capital influence soon resumed.

In the 1970s, capital inflow became significant as a result both of market forces and of reactions to apartheid. First, the US went off the gold standard in 1971 (creating sharp and unpredictable price swings), followed by two global oil shocks. But gold cushioned the South African economy. For example, following the first petroleum price increase in 1973, investor enthusiasm for South Africa spurred lending to the private sector. Then, in the wake of the 1979 oil shock, gold soared as investors feared defaults by other countries. South Africa once again profited, with global capital flowing to public and private borrowers.

Downturns, however, tempered these peak investment periods, most notably in the wake of the Soweto riots in 1976 and South Africa’s military strikes into Angola in 1977, when medium- to long- term loans to South Africa dried up almost entirely. South Africa switched from being a capital importer to an exporter. For example, in 1976 the country recorded a net of R501 million, but the next year this reversed to negative R552 million and continued to slide to negative R2.472 billion in 1979. In 1985, South Africa exported R10.4 billion.

Anti-apartheid sentiments as well as risk assessments contributed to this capital reversal. Various governments, including the Nordic states and Switzerland, either limited or completely banned loans, while the US placed restrictions on import–export credits. Japan had already banned direct investment by 1964 and loans in 1975. Some private banks, such as the Bank of Boston and Citicorp, also halted loans to the South African government in 1978.
and many extended these restrictions to private sector loans by early 1985. Multinationals began shifting from equity to loans, converting direct investment to portfolio holdings. In addition, the end of the petrodollar boom created a global capital shortage, manifest in market volatility and an emerging global debt crisis (notably the threat of Mexican default in 1982).

Volatility in international commodity markets affected gold in particular, with prices falling from a peak over $800 in the late 1970s to a low near $300 by 1984. Rising import prices and declining currency earnings put severe pressure on South Africa’s balance of payments. After the government abolished the rand and lifted some exchange controls in February 1983, non-residents quickly reacted to declining returns on investment and increased risk by selling stocks and shares, and transferring proceeds abroad. Rising domestic double-digit inflation, expanding money supply, low personal savings, and high interest rates spurred the search for lower rates abroad, particularly through short-term loans. The Reserve Bank, furthermore, encouraged foreign borrowing.

In the past, South Africa had turned to the IMF for bridging loans during such periods of temporary recession and balance-of-payments difficulty. A founding member, South Africa borrowed from the Fund in 1957, followed by a series of additional payouts in the mid-1970s (91.2 million Standard Drawing Rights [SDRs] in 1975, SDR 390 million in 1976, and SDR 162 million in 1977), which made it the third largest borrower. In November 1982 the IMF granted a controversial $1.1 billion (SDR 902.2 million, R1.24 billion) loan. Unexpected increases in the price of gold early in 1983 further bolstered the economy. The Minister of Finance calculated that a $100 increase in the price of gold produced a R2 billion change in the balance of payments and a R1 billion increase in government revenue. Price increases also enabled marginal mines to stay in operation, propping up employment, and contributing to government revenues. Yet international investors still preferred the dollar to gold, thus limiting the extent to which South Africa’s gold boom could translate into imports of dollar-based goods or ease current account pressures.

Then in an unprecedented move, the IMF refused to grant additional funds to South Africa in 1983, as a result of a US anti-apartheid initiative led by the Congressional Black Caucus. Adding an amendment to a House of Representatives bill authorizing contributions to the Fund, this group of African-American legislators (at that time, all Democrats) proposed banning loans to countries practicing apartheid. Irate Republicans objected because their

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958 Ibid.

219
previous similar attempts to block IMF loans to communist countries had been rejected. In the midst of this domestic controversy, the Fund released a report that apartheid was an economic impediment and not solely a political problem, thus undermining conservative objections to anti-apartheid restrictions. A series of political compromises between the House, the Senate, and the Reagan Administration resulted in a law tightly restricting loans to South Africa. The US was charged to use its preeminent power in the IMF to “actively oppose” loans to South Africa unless the Secretary of the Treasury certified that the money would economically benefit the majority population and reduce constraints on labour and capital markets. Although technically not forbidden from borrowing, the South African government ceased to apply for loans in order to avoid additional discussion of apartheid in Congress and embarrassment for its friends.

Although these anti-apartheid sanctions did not prevent South Africa from securing private international loans, the absence of IMF approval made foreign finance more expensive (generally at a 1 percent premium) and precluded access to bridging loans from the Bank of International Settlements. In addition, in the wake of the Mexican crisis, international access to debt generally became more difficulty with short-term loans becoming the preferred tool to service emerging market demand. Thus, the absolute levels of South Africa’s foreign liabilities grew substantially, with short-term debt amounting to $14 billion by 1985, while longer-term outstanding loans came to $10.3 billion. The proportion of South Africa’s short- to long-term debt (66 percent) grew even higher than other developing countries (44 percent), involving even greater risks that any drop in the value of the rand would increase the debt burden in dollar terms. Pressures by sanctioners exacerbated South Africa’s growing financial difficulty.

While incomplete, trade boycotts imposed additional costs on the economy, including “sanctions busting” strategies. At the same time, intensified pressures from the disinvestment campaign combined with declining profit encouraged many to leave. Between 1984 and 1990, over one-third of all foreign companies, especially those based in the US, departed. Disinvestment provided a few South African conglomerates, notably Anglo American, Barlow Rand, Sanlam, and Gencor, with windfall gains as they bought out departing finance at discount prices. Although foreign multinationals frequently maintained licensing, franchising, and trademark agreements, trade sanctions and disinvestment further

undermined already precarious business confidence. Repatriating earnings from these sales (before the imposition of the rand) placed additional pressure on South Africa’s balance of payments.

Decisions by the South African Reserve Bank and other financial institutions aggravated the situation. In an attempt to counter high influence the Reserve Bank raised prime lending rates to 25 percent, thereby increasing the search for short-term international loans offering lower rates. Nedbank in particular borrowed heavily in New York and London. Lacking adequate reporting and information systems, the Reserve Bank failed to keep track of the dramatic rise in accumulating debt as well as its maturity structure.\(^{974}\) This spate of uncontrolled borrowing became so serious that by mid-1985 South Africa’s external finances were being described as chaotic.\(^{975}\)

Simultaneously, the price of gold and the value of the rand both dropped, causing the dollar value of the loans to soar. In 1980, $16.9 billion of debt converted to R12.6 billion (20 percent of GDP); by 1984, it climbed to $24.3 billion, valued at R48.2 billion (46 percent of GDP). Further depreciation boosted the debt to 50 percent of GDP by 1985, far above the 30 percent which analysts generally consider to be dangerous. The Reserve Bank responded by using gold swaps and partially paying the mines in rands rather than dollars. The Bank of England and Citibank, among others, expressed concern about the country’s level of short-term debt.\(^{976}\)

This bleak picture, compounded by the wave of political unrest by civic, student, youth, and worker organizations, made foreign lending to or investing in South Africa difficulty to justify.\(^{977}\) The self-reinforcing nature of the deteriorating economic and political situation became so acute that the government recognized the need for political change to control the economic malaise. Seeking to repeat previously successful repressive moves to restore law and order, which had improved investor confidence and reversed capital outflow following Sharpeville and Soweto, it declared a (partial) state of emergency on 20 July 1985.\(^{978}\) This time, however, the situation appeared intractable. Within one week of the imposition of emergency measures, the market value of shares on the JSE fell by R11 billion and the flow of money out of the country pushed the rand exchange rate down almost 18 percent. The gold mines share index fell to a three-year low, despite recent net increases in foreign buying. The French government added a ban on investments.\(^{979}\)

While once again gold partially counterbalanced other economic pressures, it could not completely protect South Africa from the fears of foreign commercial lenders.\(^{980}\) On 31 July, Chase Manhattan announced that it would call in its short-term loans and freeze new credit. As other banks quickly followed suit, South Africa faced a liquidity crisis.\(^{981}\) With R43.3 billion debt due within a year, net reserves of R784 million and a current account surplus for the first half of the year at R5 billion, South Africa was in no position to meet its obligations.\(^{982}\)

As a large portion of South Africa's foreign liabilities came due at the end of August, hopes rose that President P. W. Botha would announce major reforms to ease investors' concerns. In his speech on 15 August, however, he failed to "cross the Rubicon." The following morning, the rand fell by an additional 20 percent, and it became clear that the debt due at the end of the month would not be rolled over. The situation deteriorated dramatically as the rand reached a record low and capital flow accelerated. In addition, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Gerhard de Kock, failed in his attempt to negotiate debt relief in international banking capitals, in part because of hostile public opinion.\(^{983}\)

Criticism of the government increased, including calls in the financial press for Botha's resignation. South Africa's main business organizations, the Association of Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Urban Foundation, as well as Gavin Relly, the chairman of Anglo American, called on the government to eliminate apartheid and negotiate with black leaders. Similarly, the US Corporate Council on South Africa, a group presenting over 80 US companies, took out newspaper ads in both the US and locally.\(^{984}\) In September 1985, furthermore, Anglo American sent a delegation to meet with the exiled African National Congress, and numerous other business leaders followed in the "trek to Lusaka" in subsequent months (and years). Even de Kock, a strong National Party supporter, claimed that the drop in the value of the rand was caused by the government's social policies, not economic factors. Despite disagreements over the extent of constitutional changes, both business and government recognized that solving the debt crisis would require significant political reforms.\(^{985}\)

The combined effects of dependence on foreign capital and technology imports, persistent actual and potential capital flow, volatile gold earnings, anti-apartheid sanctions on investments and loans, rising debt, a depreciating rand, and a marked rise in the proportion of debt due within one year, created an unsustainable balance of payments situation. On 27 August 1985, the South African government announced a moratorium on repayment of


\(^{984}\) Economist, 2 February 1986, p. 58.

$13.63 billion of its total debt (57 percent of $23.72 billion) due at the end of the month. Simultaneously, it suspended all trading on the JSE and foreign exchange markets until 2 September. In an attempt to stabilize the exchange rate, reduce capital flow and create a dollar pool for leverage against lenders, on 1 September it reintroduced the rand with exchange controls. Foreign bankers decided to reduce their exposure. In the end, private international bank loans which appeared to free the government from political conditions turned into a fundamental source of vulnerability: the short-term nature of expanding debt set the stage for increased political leverage.

The South African state increasingly confronted challenges to its legitimacy and hegemony. Anti-apartheid pressures on banks and the IMF’s refusal of bridging loans from 1983 contributed substantially to the country’s economic and political crisis in the 1980s. Government strategies to meet its debt obligations, such as curbing imports and restricting capital exports, combined with burgeoning unrest, undermined already precarious levels of business confidence, itself a cause of capital flow and economic stagnation. Politically, sanctions sharpened divisions within the white oligarchy and strained the alliance between business and the NP, further exacerbating the government’s weakness in the face of all types of international pressures. Sanctions, in this context, denied South Africa policy space within which to address the roots of its economic and political malaise.

The usefulness of “bankers sanctions” beyond South Africa, however, will depend on the particular nature of the economic and political vulnerability of the target. South Africa remained less vulnerable to strains than most developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s because of its gold production and the sophistication of its domestic capital markets. Many other countries would not have the mitigating strength of a resource base that increases in value during times of global economic turbulence or the institutional capacity to oversee a two-tiered exchange rate.

Some of the specific measures that enhanced leverage over the apartheid government may be exceptional, particularly because of coincident proliferation of short-term loans with countrywide political upheaval in the mid-1980s. Yet many other countries face similar vulnerabilities at times of attempted transitions to democracy. Globalizing markets, furthermore, will only increase susceptibility to international political constraints. With such a wide range of tools available, including restrictions on trade credits (in the short term) and direct or portfolio investments (over the long term), sanctioners should be able to adapt to a particular country’s weaknesses.

The South African experience also indicates that sanctions are more likely to offer direct bargaining leverage, as panic easily sets in when bankers fear default because once one bank

refuses loans, others quickly follow for fear that they will be the only ones not getting repaid. Capital and technology shortages, meanwhile, will undermine growth, contributing to indirect political pressures in the medium to long run. But the dynamic is different for trade, where suppliers have an incentive to stay in sanctioned markets. One implication, therefore, is that “bankers’ sanctions” can be enforced by market mechanisms, whereas trade sanctions are more difficult to implement because they require government restrictions on the economic incentives to profit from being the only supplier. Debt repayment offers immediate possibilities for reclaiming good standing, thus increasing incentives to bargain. Combined, financial sanctions offer more opportunities than trade sanctions to work with, rather than against, market forces.

Another question related to bargaining leverage is whether or when political conditions will be linked to a crisis. As the anti-apartheid experience demonstrates, social movements can influence economic actors. Some governments, notably the US, were more responsive than others to anti-apartheid protests. Congressional restrictions on loans to South Africa legally bound banks and other investors, while US corporations allow for a substantial degree of shareholder activism, unlike those in Europe. Thus the adoption and consequences of sanctions depend considerably both on the strength of domestic concern and the relationship between governments and banks. For example, in Germany and Japan, sanctions can be tools of central governments, rather than pension funds, city councils, and other grassroots activists.

The resulting bargaining dynamics between sanctioners (either governments or bankers) and the target will depend in part on these variations of government control. We should also expect the degree of political conditionality to vary. In the South African case, for example, political pressures intensified because anti-apartheid measures proliferated in the one country, the US, whose bankers held the greatest proportion of short-term loans. Swiss or Hong Kong banks, in contrast, remained less concerned about political conditions.

Clearly, tools of pressure influence the South African government and domestic economic elites. Yet these measures also did not live up to their full potential. Similar pressures are likely to be effective against more vulnerable targets or in pursuit of less ambitious goals than total social, economic, and political transformation. The successful application of these types of sanctions requires a sophisticated understanding of the political economy of the target, as well as the global market conditions which will create incentives (or disincentives) for adoption of international political demands.

990 Southscan, 6 September 1991, p. 274.
7.5 The Military/Arms Embargoes

Apartheid South Africa depended on military force to survive at home and to promote its regional policies. South Africa occupied Namibia with military force until 1990, and was until 1990 persistently engaged in several military conflicts with its neighbours, including Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. South Africa invaded Angola several times after 1975 and occupied portions of southern Angola until 1989. South Africa provided weapons and military equipment to its ally Rhodesia, which was itself under embargo until 1980, and to contra-like armies in Angola and Mozambique through the 1980s. Moreover, besides its police force, South Africa used the army and military equipment inside the country for repression, and in the 1980s, the military increasingly occupied black townships.

In response to South Africa’s behaviour, the United Nations and individual states gradually restricted the arms trade with South Africa. The UN Security Council adopted a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa in August 1963. Resolution 181 referred to South Africa’s apartheid policies, noting the “recent arms build-up” and that South Africa “is seriously disturbing international peace and security.” It called upon all states to “cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa.” Resolution 181 was followed a few months later by the more strongly worded Resolution 182. Both resolutions called upon South Africa to release all those imprisoned or interned because of their opposition to apartheid.

In 1977, UN Security Council Resolution 418 condemned South Africa for its “acts of repression” and “attacks” on its neighbours and made the embargo mandatory:

“the military build-up by South Africa and its persistent acts of aggression against the neighbouring states seriously disturb the security of those states.” It declared that the “acquisition by South Africa of arms and related matériel constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.”

The mandatory embargo prohibited exports to South Africa of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary and police equipment, and spare parts, while also prohibiting granting licensing arrangements to manufacture military equipment in South

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Africa. In 1982 the UN urged an embargo on purchasing South African armaments. The South African Defence Force moved into the townships in the mid-1980s and regional military aggression increased.\textsuperscript{1000} UN Security Council Resolution 558, in December 1984, requested all states to refrain from importing South African produced arms, ammunition, and military vehicles; and in November 1986 the UN expanded the scope of items embargoed from export to South Africa to spare parts and police equipment.\textsuperscript{1001}

These UN resolutions never included precise and exhaustive military equipment, nor a list of items to be embargoed. Individual nations were left to decide just which equipment and technology contributed to conventional or nuclear capabilities. National legislation was often more precise. In some cases, such as the United States, unilateral restrictions included procedures for certifying that exports to South Africa were not for military purposes. But South Africa was still able to maintain, through much of the embargo era, significant ties to British and French military industries.\textsuperscript{1002} The UN Security Council lifted the import and export arms embargoes on 25 May 1994 and unilateral restrictions were eased at varying points, with the US lifting its embargo in late February 1998.\textsuperscript{1003}

Though South Africa produced military equipment for Western allies during World War II, including tanks, aircraft, and ammunition, arms production essentially halted at the end of the war. By the 1950s the only military production – run by the government – was for small arms and ammunition.\textsuperscript{1004} Thus the SADF in the early 1960s was almost entirely dependent on imports for weapons and military equipment, much of it supplied by the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{1005} While UN resolutions declared South African behaviour a threat to international security, South African officials described the arms embargo as part of the “total onslaught” they more generally perceived as being directed at them by the “enemies of the Republic of South Africa,” the international community.\textsuperscript{1006} South Africa’s resistance to weapons sanctions was multifaceted, consisting primarily of import-substitution industrialization but also of clandestine arms purchases.

Import substitution began years before the United Nations’ 1963 call for a voluntary arms embargo. During the early 1960s, South Africa was successful in acquiring licenses for the production of military equipment and armaments and in 1961 acquired 127 such licenses.\textsuperscript{1007} South Africa moved to develop an indigenous military production base, establishing an

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1003} S. Landgren, “Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa’s Military Industry”, p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{1004} K. Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, p. 13.
  \item \textsuperscript{1007} T.U. Mozia, “Chronology of Arms Embargoes Against South Africa,” in G. W. Shepard, Jr., ed., Effective Sanctions On South Africa: The Cutting Edge of Economic Intervention, pp. 97–108.
\end{itemize}
Armaments Production Board in 1964 under the Armaments Act later reorganized and renamed the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa (Armscor).

Armscor was actually several companies owned by the state, and a large number of partially state-owned and private companies, all coordinated by Armscor to ensure that the weapons needed by the SADF were produced by South African industries or procured from abroad.\footnote{M. Brzoska, “South Africa: Evading the Embargo,” in M. Brozska and T. Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World (London: Taylor and Francis, 1986), pp. 193–214: 194–5.} In addition, Armscor made clandestine deals to purchase military equipment, technical expertise, and component upgrades for existing weapons systems. In the mid-1970s, South Africa increased its procurement schedule in anticipation of the mandatory UN armaments embargo. The 1977 Defence White Paper declared:


In addition, after 1978, Armscor ran South Africa’s nuclear weapons program – which itself cost as much as R700-800 million.\footnote{G. Simpson, “The Politics and Economics of the Armaments Industry in South Africa,” in Cock and Nathan, eds., Society at War, pp. 217–31: 221.} By the late 1980s, South Africa was able to cut its dependence on imports by more than half. Armscor consisted of research, development, and test facilities as well as of companies directly owned and operated by the government, known as subsidiaries, which engaged in the assembly of military equipment.\footnote{R. Matthews, “The Development of the South African Military Industrial Complex,” p. 10; RSA, Briefing, p. 66.}

To promote self-sufficiency by the late 1970s nearly all weapons research, in addition to production and acquisition, in South Africa was controlled by Armscor. The government increased the resources put into military research, which since the 1950s had been coordinated by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), and its National Institute for Defence Research.\footnote{RSA, White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973, p. 17.} Armscor indicate that in 1983, 14.5 percent of total spending on research and development was for military research, accounting for 28.7 percent of engineering R&D. By 1989, military-related research and development accounted for over 32 percent of all R&D spending by the government and accounted for 64.4 percent of spending on engineering R&D.\footnote{Begg, “SAAF and the Arms Industry,” Ad Astra, 10 (1989), pp. 11–14.}

Armscor was integrated into South Africa’s private sector. The government made an effort to put an increasing share of the money it invested in arms into South Africa’s private sector, with 50 percent in 1973 going to private companies and 80 percent directed to the private sector in 1990.\footnote{S. Jones and A. Mullen, The South African Economy, 1910–1990 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992), p. 231.} By 1973 the Armaments Board was working with “approximately 200 contractors (and subcontractors) in the RSA, who in turn make use of several hundred of
By the mid-1980s Armscor worked with over 2000 private contractors and subcontractors inside South Africa who were wholly or in part dependent on government contracts, in the mid-1980s "at least 400 of these [contractors] being unable to survive without defense contracts." By 1990, in addition to state-owned companies, 975 private South African contractors were directly engaged by Armscor. Further, thousands of companies serving as subcontractors fed components to contractors and Armscor subsidiaries. Armscor acquisitions policy was that "only those items which, for technological reasons, cannot be manufactured in the Republic of South Africa at this stage or which should not be manufactured in the Republic of South Africa for economical reasons" were imported.

Despite South Africa’s huge R&D investment, much of its engineering and technical knowledge, as well as important equipment, was still derived from abroad through contacts with the hundreds of foreign engineering within South Africa, foreign equipment purchases, and study abroad by South African scientists.

South Africa also depended on foreign supplies of machine tools since they were unable to develop their own suppliers. For example, the CSIR sent a team of scientists to France in 1964 to learn about air-to-air missile guidance. After the embargo tightened, new weapon designs were often based on knowledge procured clandestinely from foreign producers, or by copying the weapons South Africa purchased or captured on the battlefields.

It is unlikely that the clandestine purchases of armaments and the budget were also supplemented by the resale of weapons South Africa acquired on the black market. Thus, this should be seen as illustrative of South Africa’s domestic procurement for the period of 1967–89. The share of the military budget spent on procurement grew from under 15 percent in 1961 to about 65 percent in the years just prior to the embargo, and hovered at just over 40 percent during the early 1980s. By the late 1980s the share of the military budget spent on procurement was back up to nearly 60 percent.

Growing from almost nothing in the late 1940s, by the 1980s the scale of Armscor in relation to South Africa’s industrial economy was enormous. Despite the UN embargo on purchasing South African produced weapons, by 1987 Armscor was South Africa’s single largest

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exporter of manufactured goods, valued at $900 million in that year.\textsuperscript{1023} The ripple effects of developing a large arms industry were substantial and contributed to developments that both undermined strict apartheid, brought different, in some cases, more liberal, white business people from private industry into contact with the government, and facilitated black organizing, especially in trade unions.\textsuperscript{1024}

While South Africa was already industrialized before sanctions, manufacturing grew during the embargo era. In 1961 agriculture and mining together accounted for just over 25 percent of South Africa’s GDP and manufacturing was just over 19 percent; in 1988 agriculture and mining accounted for under 18 percent of GDP and manufacturing was responsible for 24.5 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{1025} Military industry, and the industries that fed components to Armscor subsidiaries, were probably the leading sector of industrial growth in South Africa as resistance to the embargoes proceeded.\textsuperscript{1026} Perhaps in part to justify the expense, the South African government stressed the effects of the arms industry on the local economy. For instance, in 1973, the Defence White Paper stated:

“A considerable fund of know-how and skill has been built up locally, and, in a material sense, the economic growth of the RSA has been stimulated by the local manufacture of armaments.”\textsuperscript{1027}

In 1986 the South African government argued that military spending, especially on the arms industry, was “one of the primary driving forces of the economy.”\textsuperscript{1028} Indeed, the 1986 Defence White Paper devoted a “model” and several pages of discussion to the benefit of arms production to the South African economy which it estimated at 5.42 percent of GDP in 1982.\textsuperscript{1029} Armscor trained thousands of workers each year.\textsuperscript{45} The White Paper also referred to manpower training and “a leakage of personnel to other sectors as a result of personnel turnover.”\textsuperscript{1030}

Arms industry employment grew dramatically; in fact, armament employment grew while overall manufacturing employment declined 1 percent from 1980 to 1985, while the entire South African economy suffered a recession.\textsuperscript{1031} The 1986 White Paper estimated that “Armscor and its main contractors provided work for an average of 34 700 people annually

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[1023]RSA, White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply, 1986, p. 35.
\item[1030]RSA, White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply, 1986, p. 35.
\end{thebibliography}
for the past fi years” the majority of whom were skilled workers. By the late 1980s, Armscor, its subsidiaries, and various contractors and subcontractors probably employed about 160,000 people, though the output of subcontractors was certainly not entirely devoted to military production.

While government reports of jobs directly associated with Armscor are disputable, defense economist Peter Batchelor has compiled some figures based on official Armscor documents and interviews for the period of most intense armaments production. Batchelor estimates that:

“as a rule of thumb, 1 job in ARMSCOR supports approximately 5 jobs in the private sector defence industry. Therefore in the late 1980s about 150,000 people [were] employed in the defence industry.”

Economic reforms were crucial for rapidly developing an arms industry large enough to support South Africa’s use of force in Angola and Namibia. With white workers comprising a relatively small portion of potential workers in South Africa, apartheid barriers to black worker education and employment had to be relaxed. In the late 1970s, P. W. Botha moved to incorporate the business sector more fully into the total national strategy by meeting with important English and Afrikaner business leaders in South Africa and forming a Defence Advisory Board of leading businessmen.

Prime Minister Botha urged private industry to continue to help implementing the total strategy at the late 1979 Carlton Conference of 250 leading South African businessmen. Thus government had to strike a delicate balance: maintaining apartheid while reforming and reorganizing apartheid labour relations and public policy:

“What was required was a means of containing black resistance to white domination and policies that would permit the more effective use of the black work force. To reinforce measures to this effect the reformist wing of the NP proposed the recognition of black trade unions, some form of political representation for blacks living outside the homelands, the establishment of homelands as viable economic and political units, the eroding of job reservation, the promotion of methods for training black

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1034 Peter Batchelor, personal communication, 26 February 1996.
Military industrialization increased pressure to relax apartheid. To facilitate the labour of “non-whites” in white areas, laws about the number and location of Africans in urban areas, “influence control” had to be abandoned in the early 1980s. This was particularly ironic because part of the original impetus behind the apartheid legislation of the late 1940s and early 1950s was to halt and reverse the flow of Africans to urban areas that resulted from the industrialization spurred by World War II.

In the late 1970s, even as demand for African workers grew in the urban areas, the government articulated a strong commitment to influx control and increased enforcement, but by the mid-1980s increased white emigration and the growth of industrial capacity meant that even more “non-white” workers were necessary to skilled labour positions. Urban “gray areas” where people of all races could live together were increasingly tolerated until control was abandoned in 1986.

Armscor had an incentive to treat all race groups well: “the greatest threat to this sensitive industry is an inefficient and/or disloyal employee corps.” Thus, “Armscor’s personnel policy is structured to offer good and similar working situations and conditions of employment to all its employees, irrespective of race or sex. . . .” So, military industrialization “meant blacks had to be trained for these skilled jobs, which in turn, meant upgrading their education and admitting them to previously whites-only technical institutes and universities.” From 1980 to 1988 there was a nearly 435 percent increase in the number of black students in technical colleges and technikons, while for the same period white enrolment grew less than 1 percent. Moreover, there was a 240 percent increase in the number of black students in teacher training and universities from 1980 to 1988 while during the same period there was a 30 percent increase in the number of whites in universities and teacher training.

Unfortunately, there is no publicly available breakdown of the composition of employment in arms manufacturing by race and gender, nor a breakdown of wages and salaries for the arms industry in comparison to other manufacturing industries. General manufacturing statistics suggest that white employment was consistently between 20 and 24 percent between 1975 and 1993. While white workers’ wages remained roughly constant, and always much higher than workers from other population groups, wages for black workers in the manufacturing sector nearly doubled during this period. If employment patterns in the arms industry were similar to those of the South African military, where women, Asian, colored, and black

1039 RSA, Briefing, p. 69.
1040 A. Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, p. 314.
personnel began to play an increasing role over the last decades of apartheid, then it is likely that the arms industry became increasingly integrated.  

Further, military industrialization increased spending on research and development, with military research accounting for “more than 30 percent of government’s total research spending.” Investment into R&D for military technology benefitted various sectors of the economy.

“A burgeoning new sub-division of the engineering industry involved the manufacture and repair of various types of weapons and military equipment: aircraft, armoured vehicles, tanks, personnel carriers, guns, rifles, bombs, missiles, ammunition, etc. . . . These developments, in turn, helped to stimulate the local electronics industry, which had been in its infancy in 1960.”

Though it probably would have been more efficient to stimulate these industries directly, they did grow under the arms embargo. In sum, the South African government’s import substitution boosted the overall level of industrialization. While mining remained an important part of the South African economy and South Africa continued to be a primary product exporter (e.g. of gold, diamonds, coal, uranium, and platinum), manufacturing grew: in 1949 slightly more people were employed in the mining than manufacturing sectors, but by 1990 there were over twice as many employed in manufacturing. Moreover, military industrialization stimulated overall industrialization.

To make military industrialization work, more liberal industrialists were brought closer to the state, and South Africa’s apartheid business practices were modified to facilitate the efficient use of black labour. Even if whites took the most skilled and highest paying jobs in the military industries, skilled black workers still had to fill in the skilled jobs abandoned by white workers employed in other sectors, and skilled black workers were also needed to work in the industries created to feed military industries. Increased education and employment opportunities stimulated by military industrialization, along with black unionization, helped sustain the anti-apartheid movement inside South Africa.

Notwithstanding a large investment in import substitution, South Africa was never able to achieve self-sufficiency in armament production. So, while embargoed, South Africa secretly purchased military designs and equipment from abroad. And even after the 1982 UN embargo on purchasing South African-made weapons South Africa nevertheless managed to sell arms to about 30 countries. So, at its peak in the 1980s South Africa was the seventh or

eighth largest arms producer in the world; on the eve of the 1994 elections the South African arms industry was still the world’s tenth largest weapons producer.\textsuperscript{1049}

Many of the details of the apartheid government’s clandestine arms trade may never be known. Managed by Armscor, the import trade included contact with black market arms merchants and about 140 front companies South Africa set up all over the world.\textsuperscript{1050} South Africa’s covert purchases of military equipment were costly at a mark-up of between 20 and 100 percent.\textsuperscript{1051} Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates of South African spending on military imports show an overall decline; but, despite a near decrease, South Africa continued to spend large sums importing weapons, averaging $452 million per year from 1973 to 1977 and $92 million from 1978 to 1992.\textsuperscript{1052} Much of this money was spent acquiring upgrades and designs for weapons the South African military industry found expensive or impossible to design and/or produce (such as the Israeli modification of the British Centurion tank which enabled South Africa to find a main battle tank, the Olifant). Armscor subsidiaries, contractors, and subcontractors, made extensive use of the technology and knowledge they acquired from transnational corporations outside and based in South Africa.\textsuperscript{1053}

A flow of the clandestine trade was revealed in 1994 and 1995 when the new South African government investigated the clandestine weapons trade undertaken by Armscor after the new government came to power.\textsuperscript{1054} Exposure of an attempted arms shipment to Yemen – despite the pledge by President Mandela and Armscor head Tielman de Waal that weapons would not be shipped to countries in the midst of war\textsuperscript{1055} – led the ANC government to open an official inquiry, headed by Judge Edwin Cameron, into Armscor dealings which exposed even greater past and present illegalities and questionable dealings.\textsuperscript{1056} The Cameron Commission “exposed a world of freewheeling and idiosyncratic characters; of intrigue, deception and subterfuge; of lucrative and often extravagant commissions and of high living . . . .” which it said had roots in the embargo era.\textsuperscript{1057}

Primarily restricted to the post-apartheid arms exports, the Cameron Commission nevertheless shed light on apartheid era arms import transactions. For example, P. C. Smith, Armscor’s general manager for import and export, produced a written report to the

\textsuperscript{1054} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1057} Ibid.

233
Commission detailing purchases of 3,500 AK47 rifles from 1976 to around 1986 from Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria at an average cost of between R200 and R300 via arms dealers and agents. South Africa purchased 20,000 G3 rifles from Portugal for R70 to R80 each from 1978 to 1980. From 1985 to 1989, Armscor purchased an additional 35,000 AK47 rifles from the People’s Republic of China at an average price of approximately R100. Smith reported that

“The G3s were purchased on behalf of SAAF [the air force] as Armscor could not deliver sufficient quantities of RI rifles due to production limitations.”

Military consequences of arms embargoes should be a gradual decline in relative military capabilities of the embargoed state if its adversaries are not embargoed. This decline ought to be most marked in those arms or military components where it is difficulty to develop an indigenous capacity for innovation and production, and where innovation by adversaries is comparatively quick and difficulty cult to counter by changing military organization or operations. The arms embargo against South African illustrates this effect and two other significant military consequences of arms sanctions. First, to the extent that material, financial and human resources were devoted to arms manufacture and the purchase of weapons on the black market at embargo-influence prices, these resources were not available to be used directly in South Africa’s wars in Angola and South West Africa. Second, the South Africans were less fluent in their ability to acquire and deploy weapons and resources. This was clear by the mid-1980s and mentioned in official discourse.

“Due to the changing nature of the threat, there has been a sharp decline in the demand for certain arms during the past 3 years and an increased need for others. . . . Where there were sudden massive increases in demand, it was important to satisfy the needs without investing additional capital in greater production capacities, capacities which perhaps could be underutilized again later on.”

Despite the best efforts of Armscor, South African weapons gradually became obsolete. This is most clearly illustrated with regard to combat aircraft, probably the sector of conventional (non-nuclear) armaments that requires the most sophisticated primary and secondary production capacities including advanced electronics, engines, and weapons. Combat aircraft, in addition to providing the ability to deliver bombs to distant areas, also protect one’s own troops by keeping other aircraft away from them or by providing support of ground

operations. Thus aircraft are versatile in many offensive military roles, in addition to their ability to provide reconnaissance information and assist in the transport of equipment and troops. South African inventories of all types of aircraft suffered after the embargo went into force. Perhaps most significant was the fact that, after 1977, South Africa was unable to continue licensed production of its most modern ground-attack aircraft, the French Mirage, and found it difficult to produce new platforms.

The embargo thus increasingly limited South Africa’s ability to wage war in Angola as the Angolan military acquired more advanced military equipment, including more sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, from the Soviet Union and Cuba. As Soviet weapons were delivered to Angola, particularly air-defence radars that enabled Angolan forces (supplemented increasingly in the mid-1980s by Cuban forces) to shoot down South African war-planes, the South African government recognized that their investment in indigenous production was inadequate.

“A major problem is that some of the most reliable main armaments are obsolescent. More modern armaments available to our enemies contributed toward this process of obsolescence.”

So, despite an ability to acquire some designs from abroad, and an enormous investment in military R&D, South Africa was still not able to produce an attack helicopter, nor a new ground-attack aircraft. South Africa was almost entirely limited to retrofit existing airframes and modifying the designs of aircraft they had acquired before the embargo.

The embargo also made it difficult to acquire some spare parts and this also affected the ability to keep existing aircraft. Of the few (less than 70) sophisticated French Mirage aircraft in the South African arsenal, in the late 1980s more than half of the aircraft were grounded due to the lack of spare parts. South African Air Force (SAAF) Colonel Willcock argues that they became quick and innovative with repairs for most contingencies but “it was the smallest, strangest” things that the repair crews were sometimes unable to fix and that led to longer groundings.

These three factors – limited spare parts, difficulty innovating or getting more advanced equipment, and the adversary’s military upgrades – gradually changed the air superiority
equation (the ability to operate aircraft without much challenge over a combat area). In the early years of the war with Angola, South Africa had air superiority. Still, in June 1980 South Africa lost four Impala aircraft to surface-to-air missile in Angola.\textsuperscript{1070} By the mid-1980s, South Africa had lost its ability to overfly Angola with impunity and had even begun to suffer the loss of more difficulty to replace aircraft. During Operation Askari of December 1983, South Africa lost five or six Mirage aircraft in Angola.\textsuperscript{1071}

Declining air superiority and reduced aircraft inventory was evident in the 1988 battle for Cuito Cuanavale in Angola when the SADF attempted to take an Angolan military stronghold. While their pilots were able to bail out, South Africa lost domestically produced Impala aircraft in southern Angola as the war progressed.\textsuperscript{1072}

Accounts of the activities of the SAAF in Angola indicate that the South Africans primarily relied on the Mirage ground-attack aircraft for difficulty offensive action.\textsuperscript{1073} The SADF never had more than 20 Mirage FIAZ ground-attack and Buccaneer bombers deployed in southern Angola in early 1988, and of these there were probably no more than 12 Mirages deployed in any one mission. The SAAF was apparently at times “pinned down” by Angola’s use of Soviet-made fighter and ground-attack aircraft by late 1987 the Angolans had deployed 18 MiG-23 and 13 MiG-21 ground-attack aircraft to the area.\textsuperscript{1074} South Africa lost at least 2 Mirage fighters during the efforts to take Cuito Cuanavale – one shot down, and another apparently lost due to equipment failure in February and March, in addition to the Mirage piloted by the then Captain Arthur Piercy, shot by MiG-23s in September 1987.\textsuperscript{1075}

Declining air superiority forced operational changes. The SAAF also developed a stand-off bombing capacity of 20 km and longer-range aircraft, Buccaneer and Canberra bombers, from South Africa. In addition, South African Mirage pilots moved toward quicker raids, timing their runs so that they were out of range before Angolan and Cuban pilots could scramble. Loss of air superiority also altered the conduct of major ground operations and perhaps helped push South Africa to begin negotiating seriously for an end to the war with Angola.\textsuperscript{1076}

By January 1988, South Africa began to lose air superiority. An SADF analysis made then argued that it was possible to take Cuito, but that it would entail the loss of up to 300 white troops, along with some 2 000 SWATF [black South West African Territorial Force] and an unspecified but large number of Unita troops.\textsuperscript{1077} The substantial losses were deemed

\textsuperscript{1070} J. Geldenhuys, A General’s Story: From an Era of War and Peace (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995), p. 222.
\textsuperscript{1071} Financial Mail, “Public Sector Corporations,” p. 251.
\textsuperscript{1077} T. Deen, “Pretoria Arms Policy Upsets UN,” Inter Press Service, 3 June 1994.
unavoidable by the SADF strategists, since the massive land assault required to take Cuito Cuanavale would not enjoy much air cover from the SAAF as a result of the introduction of advanced anti-aircraft missiles, radars and MiG-23/Su-22 for the defence of the town. The plan to take Cuito through infantry assault was shelved.\footnote{N. C. Crawford, “South Africa’s New Foreign and Military Policy: Opportunities and Constraints,” Africa Today 42 (1995), pp. 88–121.}

Instead Pretoria opted for a drawn out artillery battle. In sum, since South Africa was unwilling to use its six nuclear weapons, declining conventional military capabilities were significant cant. Ultimately, the arms embargo meant that South Africa was far enough behind in military technology to help turn the balance in Angola’s favour. This shift in military capabilities was also only possible because Soviet weapons and thousands of Cuban military forces were pumped into Angola at the request of the Angolan government.\footnote{D. Silverberg, “The New Armscor,” Armed Forces Journal International (May 1994), pp. 45–8. Financial Mail, “Public Sector Corporations,” p. 251; “Survival of the Fittest,” p. 30.}

Thus, it was the combination of South Africa’s relative military isolation and the increase in quality of Angolan equipment that led to the shift in the balance of forces. If South Africa had been able to modernize, more Cuban and Soviet aid might have been sent, further escalating international involvement.

Arms industries persist after embargoes, and the incentive for arms exports grows as domestic demand falls and competition with other suppliers provides increased incentive for a reduction in unit costs.\footnote{Willott, Open Arms for the Prodigal Son: The Future of South Africa’s Arms Trade Policies (London: British-American Security Information Council, 1994), p. 6; Ohlson, “The Cuito Cuanavale Syndrome,” p. 182.} At the same time, with the protection of the embargo ended, local arms industries may be less robust and competitive than other weapons manufacturers, potentially leading to substantial job losses. Further, the tight relationship between the state and arms industry may persist, perhaps prompting continued government subsidy of arms industries. Events followed this scenario in South Africa.\footnote{Ibid.}

In April 1992 Armscor was reorganized into a procurement agency, and the original Armscor divisions were subsumed under a quasi-commercial structure known as Denel (Den for Dentron or 23 divisions and el for electronics) under control of the Ministry of Public Enterprises.\footnote{D. Silverberg, “The New Armscor,” Armed Forces Journal International (May 1994), pp. 45–8. Financial Mail, “Public Sector Corporations,” p. 251; “Survival of the Fittest,” p. 30.} With assets of R3.84 billion in March 1994, Denel’s net income grew after the lifting arms embargo, while Armscor’s net income declined 87 percent between June 1994 and June 1995 from R40.2 million to R5 million.\footnote{L. Birns, “Chopper on the Block,” South Africa: The Journal of Trade, Industry and Development (February/March 1995) 26–30.} In 1993 and 1994 Denel’s net income was R335 million and R239 million respectively, and R260 million in 1995. The most profitable elements of the armaments industry were thus privatized by the de Klerk government.

Armscor executives aimed to double or perhaps quadruple South Africa’s arms export business and worked to increase exports. Anticipating the end of the embargo, Armscor
began showing its military equipment at international arms shows.\textsuperscript{1084} After the UN lifted the embargo against purchasing South African made weapons in May 1994, South Africa moved immediately to capture a larger share of the international market in which it had already made over $225 million a year.\textsuperscript{1085} Still, after it made peace with Angola and ended its occupation in Namibia, South Africa’s weapons demands decreased and employment in the arms industry fell, as did the number of companies involved in military production. Armscor’s Executive General Manager Tielman De Waal said that 70 000 people were employed by Armscor (80 percent in the private sector) in 1994 and that about 20 000 more jobs were expected after the UN arms embargo lifted.\textsuperscript{1086} But, despite these optimistic projections, downsizing continued in the arms industry as South African spending on weapons procurement fell; despite a jump in exports, and manufacturing (Denel) employed 15 000 people in 1994, but this fell to 14 000 in 1995.\textsuperscript{1087} And in 1996 there were about 700 companies engaged in military production – down by over 200 companies since 1990.\textsuperscript{1088}

Direct military effects of the arms embargo against South Africa – denial of weapons and spare parts and declining military capability vis-à-vis adversaries – were not felt until years after its imposition. South Africa’s military-industrialization effort managed to put significant weapons and ammunition in the hands of the SADF, the clandestine arms trade was partially successful, and military innovation by adversaries can take many years.\textsuperscript{1089} But South Africa did eventually face a problem on the battlefields as its weapons stocks diminished or technology became obsolete.

The indirect effects of the arms embargoes were perhaps more immediate, substantial, and long lasting. Import substitution imposed opportunity costs, taking resources that the state could have spent directly on repression or on promoting economic growth. Military industrialization also, paradoxically, promoted growth, and because it became the leading manufacturing sector in South Africa, it stimulated the incorporation of black workers into the skilled-labour portion of the economy.\textsuperscript{1090}

Would industrialization have occurred at a faster pace without sanctions? This is difficult to know. But, given the structure of the domestic economy under apartheid – with the majority impoverished and the much richer white population comprising less than 15 percent of the population – it is likely that there would have been little demand for massive import substitution since the majority population lacked the purchasing power to fuel such an expansion. Moreover, though there would have been some industrialization, South Africa

\textsuperscript{1084} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1087} Financial Mail, “Public Sector Corporations,” p. 251.
\textsuperscript{1090} Ibid.
could have remained attractively oriented and postponed integration. The desire to produce military equipment to arm the SADF provided an immediate demand for import-substitution industries (along with the demand to replace oil imports). In addition, until the reforms instituted to promote industrialization for military and other industries, the education policies of the apartheid government were the opposite of those of a government interested in promoting the skilled workforce necessary for producing the capital goods necessary to fuel industrialization.  

The long-term consequences of the arms embargoes were mixed. South Africa had a high-tech arms industry that its government and society were ambivalent about and whose place in foreign policy was ambiguous. While arms manufacture provided high technology, foreign exchange, and much-needed jobs, there was an intense debate inside South Africa about whether non-military industries would do better at providing these benefits. And the relationship between the state and military-industrial capital remained close after the transition to democracy. At the same time, through the Cameron Commission the new government grappled with the problem that the weapons it sold might decrease regional security.

In sum, from the perspective of sanctioners, the tighter an arms embargo obviously the better. But, even if they are leaky, embargoes can “work” through their indirect effects. Arms embargoes do not work quickly and it is probably unreasonable to expect immediate results in either military or economic spheres. Sanctions can decrease military capabilities; they also tend to increase the share of military spending that goes toward procurement (an opportunity cost), and they tend to provoke import substitution and clandestine trade. Military industrialization will likely be frustrated by a carefully constructed embargo, and embargoed producers may be unable, even with a significant black-market arms trade, to keep pace with the military-technical innovations of non-embargoed states.

Sanctioners wishing to further complicate import-substitution industrialization ought to focus on halting high technology and machine-tool transfers. Further, military industrialization has wide implications for the economy, politics, and social relations of the target state, tending to promote either minor or major economic restructuring depending on the pre-existing level of industrialization; this may in turn help anti-government forces within the target to resist the state. Over the long run, military industrialization alters relations between the state and capital, and increases incentives for the embargoed state to export its weapons. The end of an

arms embargo, because it halts externally imposed protectionism, will likely lead to job losses in military industries.

7.6 Sports Sanctions

With a favourable climate and a lifestyle which created ample opportunity for recreation, white South Africans developed a culture in which sport held great prominence, and international success was highly prized. Recognition of the potential for social and political influence through sport began to crystallize in the minds of anti-apartheid activists in the 1950s. Trevor Huddleston wrote in Naught for Your Comfort (1956) that;

“because the Union [of South Africa] is so good at sport . . . isolation would shake its self-assurance very severely. Fantastic though it may sound, it might be an extraordinarily effective blow to the racialism which has brought it into being.”

In 1958, anti-apartheid activists formed the South African Sports Association to promote non-racial sports bodies as alternatives to “establishment” (racially constituted) organizations. They then launched the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) in 1962, with the ultimate aim of displacing the white South African Olympic and National Games Association (SAONGA) as the officially recognized affiliates of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The emerging South African non-racial sports movement confronted both the predominant white establishment organizations and their subordinate African and “Coloured” affiliates.

The South African Government responded by banning SANROC’s leading members, including its formidable spokesman, Dennis Brutus. After several years of quiescence, however, the organization re-emerged fully operational in London. By 1966, SANROC became a leading force in the transnational campaign to isolate South African sport, retaining that role for the next 25 years. In the early 1970s, the non-racial sports movement regrouped inside South Africa, consolidating under the leadership of the South African Council of Sport (SACOS) from 1973. The third key component of the anti-apartheid sports movement was newly independent African states and their national sporting authorities.

Unlike their Western counterparts, African leaders quickly recognized the potential influence of international sports boycotts as a weapon against South Africa’s deeply offensive racial order. Their unwavering opposition to any form of intercourse with representatives of white South Africa, supported by allies throughout the Third World and the eastern bloc, drove the

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international boycott forward. Thus, the general contours of the politics of sport sanctions had emerged: the exiled SANROC at the centre of a transnational sport boycott movement, most active in the West; African governments and sports organizations promoting the boycott in international and transnational organizations; and South African non-racial sports organizations challenging establishment bodies at home.

The campaign’s major success was barring South Africa from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics based on SAONGA’s failure to comply with the egalitarian principles of the Olympic Charter. In 1966, the same year SANROC became fully operational in exile, the African bloc formed the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa (SCSA). The SCSA quickly emerged as an implacable opponent of apartheid sport. According to Shayne Quick, “the creation of SCSA was the single most important factor in wrestling the initiative over South Africa away from the IOC.” It mobilized opposition to the IOC’s attempt to reinstate South Africa for the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games by threatening a boycott. The resulting rescission of South Africa’s invitation to the Mexico Games and the 1970 expulsion of SAONGA from the Olympic Movement were highly visible blows to white South Africa – an early landmark in mounting international isolation.

In the wake of the IOC’s decision, international sports federations associated with the Olympics steadily isolated South Africa from membership and competition. The South African Government, in response, initiated a long process of “reform” whereby it explored formulas aimed at winning reacceptance into international competition while conceding as little as possible of the essence of segregation. Establishment sports bodies, too, undertook organizational and policy changes in pursuit of international rehabilitation. Yet even as white South Africa sought to put a more enlightened face on its sporting practices, it undermined itself through galling instances of racism. Perhaps the most celebrated of these was the “D’Oliveira Affair.” A talented “Coloured” cricketer who had left South Africa for England in 1960 to pursue his playing career, Basil D’Oliveira was belatedly chosen for the English side due to tour South Africa in 1968 – not long after the country had been forced out of the Mexico Olympics. His selection precipitated Prime Minister John Vorster’s decision to cancel the tour. Adrian Guelke argues that this episode did more than any other to bring about South Africa’s isolation in international sport.

Yet sporting isolation was never total. Some of the most resilient gaps in sanctions included individual professional sports. Both tennis and golf were very popular in South Africa but

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1104 City Press (South Africa), 31 March 1991, p. 26 featuring an interview with leading African sports and Congolese Cabinet Minister Jean-Claude Ganga.
hard to tackle politically because tournaments for individual professional athletes were not
beholden to national sporting authorities.\textsuperscript{1108} The most important gaps, however, were in the
team sports of cricket and rugby. These two arenas of South Africa’s most treasured rivalries
became major battlegrounds in the sport sanctions campaign of the 1970s and 1980s.

Key moments in this campaign included the protests which dogged the South African
Springbok rugby tour of Britain in late 1969 and the resulting cancellation of the Springbok
cricket tour scheduled for 1970.\textsuperscript{1109} Even larger demonstrations greeted the rugby Spring-
boks in Australia in 1971, again precipitating the cancellation of a cricket tour scheduled for
later the same year. The African boycott of the 1976 Olympics was precipitated by the
presence of New Zealand, whose rugby All Blacks had just toured South Africa in the midst
of the Soweto upheavals. The Montreal boycott significantly widened the sanctions
campaign, which henceforth targeted not only South African teams and athletes but also
representatives of third countries that maintained links with South Africa.

The 1977 Commonwealth Gleneagles Declaration became another key landmark and lever,
urging member governments to apartheid by “withholding any form of support for, and by
taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with
sporting organizations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa.”\textsuperscript{1110} A particularly decisive
moment in this escalating campaign was the 1981 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand over
a decade. The drama of a storied rivalry at the pinnacle of world rugby was heightened by the
fact that this was the New Zealand tour to be televised live in South Africa.\textsuperscript{1111} Sport and
television has a peculiarly powerful affix.

Rob Nixon stresses that as a result, television creates unprecedented opportunities for social
movement activism to convert politics into “telegenic theatre” because of “its ability to
concentrate a vast, anonymous community around an event devised to arouse nationalist
passions.” \textsuperscript{1112} In the case of the 1981 tour, dedicated Bok supporters witnessed a New
Zealand cleaved by the presence of their beloved team. “At their most intense,” Nixon
observes, “the confrontations between [anti-apartheid] protesters and police [in New
Zealand] assumed apocalyptic dimensions. . . .”\textsuperscript{1113} South African sports correspondent Dan
Retief noted that,

\begin{quote}
“clearly, if an objectionable form of apartheid still exists in South
Africa when a Springbok tour is again at issue, the Boks will not
be seen in New Zealand, or Britain for that matter.”\textsuperscript{1114}
\end{quote}

With the exception of the England rugby tour of 1984, the remainder of the decade saw no
further major official (versus “rebel”) tours to South Africa and no South African tours

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1109}{Macintosh, Cantelon, and McDermott, “The IOC and South Africa,” pp. 385–8.}
\footnote{1110}{R. Nixon, Homelands, Harlem and Hollywood, pp. 145, 148.}
\footnote{1111}{Ibid.}
\footnote{1112}{P. Dobson, Doc: the Life of Danie Craven, pp. 178–81.}
\footnote{1113}{Kidd, “From Quarantine to Cure,” p. 40; P. Hain, Don’t Play with Apartheid, p. 71.}
\footnote{1114}{D. Retief, “Curtain is Drawn on Overseas Tours,” Cape Times, 12 September 1981 p.12.}
\end{footnotes}
abroad. The sport boycott movement concentrated on tightening the cordon sanitaire around South African sport through this period, with considerable success.\footnote{D. Macintosh, D. Greenhorn, and D. Black, “Canadian Diplomacy and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games,” Journal of Sport History 19 (1992), pp. 26–55.} In 1989, the International Cricket Conference completely banned participation by players who had competed in South Africa. The International Tennis Federation, motivated by a desire to achieve full Olympic status, suspended the South African Tennis Union and eliminated South African events from the Grand Prix tennis tour. Within South Africa, the non-racial sports movement achieved its greatest success in 1990 when it transformed a high profile “rebels” cricket tour from England into a major failure.\footnote{K. R. Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1989); and Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).}

As the global momentum for sanctions generally ebbed in 1990, lifting the sport siege sparked additional controversy. The first public step toward sporting rehabilitation was taken when South African Rugby Board kingpins Danie Craven and Louis Luyt met with officials of their non-racial rival, the South African Rugby Union, and ANC leaders in Harare.\footnote{G. Jarvie, Class, Race, and Sport in South Africa’s Political Economy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 6.} This October 1988 meeting yielded an agreement to establish a single non-racial controlling body for rugby. The ANC agreed to use its good officials to ensure that non-racial South African rugby re-joined world rugby, implying that it would accept South African participation in international sport before the establishment of majority rule.\footnote{J. Hofmeyr, “The Impact of Sanctions on South Africa: Whites’ Political Attitudes (Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, March 1990), pp. 30–1.} This marked a strategic departure from the SACOS principle of “no normal sport in an abnormal society.”

Organizational changes in the non-racial sport movement followed. Within South Africa, a new National Sports Congress (later the National and Olympic Sports Congress), formally launched in July 1989, championed the new strategy. This precipitated a split in the non-racial sport movement, with a minority remaining faithful to the uncompromising SACOS line. Similarly, London-based SANROC split, with the majority supporting Sam Ramsamy and the new National Sports Congress.\footnote{T. Monnington, “Politicians and Sport: Uses and Abuses,” in Allison, ed., The Changing Politics of Sport, pp. 125–50} Thereafter, the process of rehabilitation moved rapidly, nowhere more so than in relation to the Olympic Movement. Following a study visits, the IOC recognized the National Olympic Committee of South Africa in July 1991, leading to the participation of an integrated team in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics.\footnote{W. A. Munro, “The State and Sports: Political Maneuvering in the Civil Order,” in W. James, ed., The State of Apartheid, p. 19.}

South Africa’s relations with other international sport governing bodies also improved in some cases, even before readmission to the Olympics. Its cricketers toured India in November 1991 as “less controversial” emergency replacements for Pakistan, and in March
1992 participated in the Cricket World Cup in Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{1121} In January 1993, it was announced that South Africa would host the 1995 Rugby World Cup, signalling rehabilitation in the most controversial of South African sports.

Some argue that the ANC and its non-racial allies acted precipitously in compromising on sport, foregoing the opportunity to use it to promote societal “transformation.” What is clear is that they opted for the more pragmatic, reformist path of negotiated transition, in sport as elsewhere.\textsuperscript{1122} However, the question remains: how, and how much, did the highly successful campaign to isolate South African sport add to the overall dynamic of change? Sport, I argue, significant contributed in three ways: punishment, delegitimation, and precedent.

Kim Nossal has argued that a principal purpose of sanctions is to punish the target for an act of wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{1123} Based on this understanding, sport sanctions were particularly effective since much of the white (particularly male) population of South Africa suffered an acute sense of pain and loss on their account. Moreover, those opposed to and oppressed by the apartheid state generally took comfort and encouragement from these measures. Indeed, black South Africans could not be much hurt by the loss of that which they had been largely denied! It is in this sense that sport sanctions had, in the words of Peter Hain, a “phenomenal impact”; according to Helen Suzman, they “really [hurt] South Africans where they feel it.”\textsuperscript{1124} Public opinion poll data support these assessments.

For example, according to a study published in 1990 by the Investor Responsibility Research Center, 29 percent of whites considered the impact of the sport boycott to have been “very strong,” and a further 45 percent considered it to have been “strong.” These totals were marginally higher for Afrikaners versus English-speakers.\textsuperscript{1125} In this light, persistent efforts of the National Party to maintain international sporting contacts with traditional friends, while maintaining the essence of apartheid, were presumably motivated at least partly by a desire to prevent pain and unhappiness among its white electorate. Politicians not infrequently attempt to capitalize on international sporting triumphs; conversely, international defeat – let alone denial of the opportunity to play the game – can be a political liability.\textsuperscript{1126}

Thus, the South African Government responded to growing isolation in international sport with a series of reforms. In a 1967 policy reversal, Prime Minister Vorster announced that South Africa would be prepared to host racially mixed touring sides from traditional friends,

\textsuperscript{1123} K. R. Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1989); and Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
\textsuperscript{1125} Ibid.
specifically to accommodate a New Zealand rugby side including Maoris.\textsuperscript{1127} Even this minimal concession stirred controversy within the National Party, leading directly to the open split in the Nationalist front marked by the emergence of the Herstigte Nationale Party in 1970.\textsuperscript{1128}

The Vorster government then introduced a new “multinational” sports policy in 1971, which permitted visiting teams to include matches against black South African teams. Black sportsmen were also allowed to participate in “open international” competitions in South Africa so long as they were members of sports bodies affiliated with white federations, that is, not associated with non-racial sports bodies. Integration was still not permitted at provincial or club levels, however.\textsuperscript{1129} Thus South Africa presented itself to the world as permitting multiracial competition, while preserving apartheid at home.

The sporting world was not persuaded. As a result, “multi-nationalism” was extended down to the club level in 1976, albeit in an incoherent and inconsistent manner. The Government wished simultaneously to adhere to the requirements of racial separation and the promotion of Afrikaner identity at home, while being seen to be moving “intelligently toward a normalization of [race] relations” in the eyes of the international sporting community.\textsuperscript{1130} Finally, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Government adopted a policy of “autonomy” for sport. It abolished the Department of Sport and Leisure in 1982, replacing it with a Directorate of Sport Advancement within the Department of National Education. It also amended the Group Areas Act, the Liquor Act, and the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act to exclude sporting events from apartheid restrictions. “In effect,” as an Australian Department of Foreign Affairs report put it, “decisions about racial segregation were shifted from the Government to local authorities, private bodies, and individuals.”\textsuperscript{1131}

These modifications nonetheless fundamentally failed to alter the racial balance of opportunities in sport. In the wake of the radicalizing events of 1976, SACOS at home and the sport boycott movement abroad rejected these reforms. They encapsulated their demands in the phrase, “\textit{No normal sport in an abnormal society},” and called for the continuation of sport sanctions until the dismantling of apartheid in society as a whole. As noted above, the boycott movement maintained this position until the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{1132}

It is important to note that the potency and precise social impact of the punishment influence by the denial of international competition varied considerably by sport, underscoring the need to disaggregate the hurts influence by different sanctions. Each major sport has its own socio-

\textsuperscript{1130} M. A. Tarr, Progressive Federal Party spokesman on sport, in the South African Hansard, 16 April 1986, p. 3449.
cultural identities and meanings.\footnote{1133} Even within the realm of sport, then, complex interrelationships and particular points of vulnerability emerge which a sophisticated sanctions strategy should consider. For example, whites could rationalize away the Olympic boycott through their implacable anti-communist ideology because of its Third World and eastern bloc instigators.\footnote{1134} Isolation in cricket and rugby proved more painful and harder to accept, given the dominance of traditional Western allies in these sports. And cricket, though popular, could be sacrificed ahead of rugby in light of the influence of the West Indies, India, and Pakistan and its traditional identification as an “English” sport.

Rugby’s prominence in (male) Afrikaner nationalism and popular culture, and the white Western clique dominating the International Rugby Board (Australia, England, France, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales), made it a particular point of socio-psychological vulnerability and a focus of boycott advocates.\footnote{1135} The ugly and derogatory behaviour of white rugby fans which accompanied renewed international competition in 1992 provided strong evidence of the extent to which sport sanctions had hurt. In an historic August test match against the New Zealand All Blacks at Johannesburg’s Ellis Park Stadium, white rugby fans greeted the call for a minute’s silence in memory of the victims of the Boipatong Massacre with a lusty rendition of Die Stem, apartheid South Africa’s national anthem, and throughout the match defied the new flag and hoisted the old South African flag while vilifying the ANC.\footnote{1136}

This was a disturbing and traumatic moment. But this type of outburst was not repeated at subsequent sporting internationals. With the future of renewed sporting contacts in the balance, cooler heads and more appropriate behaviour prevailed. Now keenly sensitive to its traditional image as the sport of the oppressors and fearing a loss of national stature relative to cricket, rugby has significant strengthened its development effort and adopted new action principles for its youth sides.\footnote{1137} The point is that sport-based identities and meanings can be reconstructed over time, in relation to each other and to changing historical dynamics.

The psychic and punitive power of sport is also evident in the controversies surrounding sporting symbols. During the transition period, the non-racial sports movement demanded the abandonment of symbols associated with the old order – the apartheid anthem, and the Springbok. Cricket complied quickly, adopting the Protea flower as its new symbol. But the idea of dropping the Springbok created stormy controversy among white South Africans in general, and rugby fans in particular. In an important compromise, the Bok remained for the

\footnotetext{1135}{D. A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31 (1989).}
In sum, sport has been a powerful source of emotive, symbolic meanings and identities, holding the power to both punish and reward. As a form of punishment, these sanctions were “smart” due to sport’s hierarchical governance and thus their high degree of enforceability, targeting specific sports and direct socio-psychological pain on key white groups, with low costs to both the non-white majority and the sanctioners. Conversely, the sport boycotts gave encouragement to non-racial opponents of establishment sport.

Sanctioners hoped to promote change as well as to punish, however. Sport boycotts contributed to the delegitimation of the apartheid order, paving the way for profound social change. Efforts by the Government and establishment sport to reverse the tide of isolation cumulatively undermined the ideological basis of white rule. In this way, the boycotts’ sustained attack on some of white South Africans’ most treasured cultural practices eroded their will to resist other forms of pressure.

This argument draws theoretically on the Gramscian insights that political power is most stable when it rests on broadly based consent throughout state and civil society (the “historic bloc”), and that such a “hegemonic” order is embedded and maintained “through the ordinary experiences and relationships of everyday life.” From this perspective, culture and ideology are integral to the process of maintaining class, race, and state power. Moreover, struggle in the cultural and ideological realms is crucial to successfully challenging hegemonic power and constituting a “counter-hegemonic” alternative to prevailing structures.

Sport as a cultural practice may be particularly valuable in hegemonic order because it creates “uniquely gratifying” shared practices and identities, and because it is widely viewed as “non-serious” and therefore not warranting critical scrutiny. Insofar as South African sport reflected and reinforced racist norms and structures, it “normalized” them — rendering them part of social common sense. By disrupting this everyday realm of activity, then, the sport boycott challenged the normative basis of apartheid, ultimately helping white South Africans prepare for the inevitability of change. As Government sport policies attempted to deny their racist basis, and as establishment sport bodies portrayed themselves (however disingenuously) as advocates — indeed champions — of racial reconciliation, it became harder and harder to justify racist social, political and economic structures.

In addition to the public policy reforms already discussed, establishment sport bodies modified their structure and practice in an effort to win international reacceptance. Leading

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1139 Ibid.
1142 Ibid.
the way was cricket, which established a fully non-racial constitution and a unified
administration in 1977. In the first season under this new structure (1977–78), many cricketers
previously associated with the non-racial body joined teams under the auspices of the newly
“integrated” South African Cricket Union. By the second season, however, many returned
to the non-racial South African Cricket Board because “they had not found the playing
opportunities they had expected and were revolted by the racism they had encountered.”

The Cricket Union also took a relatively early and proactive approach to the establishment of
development programs in black townships. Although these steps did not win a reprieve from
isolation, cricket did position itself well for transition and led the way in renewing
international sporting contacts. More generally, many athletes and administrators embraced
the notion that sport was in the vanguard in breaking down societal barriers, as reflected in a
1987 South African Sports Illustrated editorial:

“Sport has led the way in dismantling apartheid laws and
breaking down artificial barriers and it is our duty to continue
this line. It is every sportsperson’s duty to ensure that every
single sportsman has an equal opportunity to fulfil his/her God-
given potential.”

Simultaneously, establishment sport bodies also responded defiantly. A series of “rebel”
tours in the 1980s provided a substitute for international events, and challenged the credibility
and legitimacy of the boycotts. Corporate sponsors, including South African Breweries,
the Yellow Pages, and the National Bank, generously financed the tours. Rebel cricket and
rugby players came from England, the West Indies, Sri Lanka, Australia, and New Zealand.
Yet these tours could not mask South Africa’s isolation and ultimately became counter-
productive. As one opposition member of parliament opined,

“I am sure all members will agree with me on this . . . we all
look forward to the day when we can welcome an All-Black
team, an Australian team or Welsh team, inter alia, as teams
fully representative of their own countries, instead of
their...some clandestine way of coming into the country. How
we long for that day!”

Thus, when the costs of maintaining white domination mounted during the 1980s (evident in
declining prosperity and increasing personal insecurity), an intellectual or normative defence

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1144 D. A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31
(1989).
37.
37.
3449.
of the “South African way of life” had already been severely compromised. A wide cross-section of South Africans, including the editors of South African Sports Illustrated, had become used to asserting that apartheid must end. In most cases, their meaning fell considerably short of what their opponents had in mind. Nevertheless, there was a large constituency in white society that supported the idea of a process of change, and this opening ultimately paved the way for the transition. Sport sanctions thus fostered the preconditions for the transition. Moreover, during the uncertain and violent years between 1990 and 1994, renewed sporting contacts stood as a beacon of the rewards awaiting post-apartheid South Africa in other areas.

It is very difficult to weigh precisely the influence of sport because culture and norms are largely immeasurable. Yet perhaps one reason so many seasoned South African experts failed to anticipate F. W. de Klerk’s dramatic reforms is precisely that they did not appreciate the corrosive effects of cultural isolation – most importantly in sports. Nor was the impact of sport sanctions limited to individual or collective consciousness of white South Africans. In at least three ways, sport boycotts set precedents for other forms of sanctions and encouraged advocates of external pressure on the apartheid state. Thus, in Crawford and Klotz’s terms, they contributed indirectly and externally to pressure for change.

First, the Olympic boycott established that South Africa’s domestic racial policies were sufficiently offensive to warrant the imposition of international sanctions. Because of the entrenched resistance to any such measures in the West, this precedent marked South Africa as “sanction-worthy,” making other measures easier to contemplate. Seen as relatively unimportant and “apolitical,” sports sanctions met little resistance from powerful interests. Yet the symbolism proved potent: if South Africa violated norms even in the “untainted” and relatively trivial realm of sport, then surely it deserved punishment in economic and political arenas too.

Moreover, the Afrikaner political elite recognized – and feared – the sport precedent. For example, a 1975 communication from the Broederbond executive to its membership asserted that, “international ties, especially in rugby and cricket, have serious implications at this stage for our country, regarding international trade, national trade, military relationships and armaments, and strategic industrial development.” Although overstated, this assessment shows the inner circle’s sensitivity to the sport boycott and explains its relatively rapid adoption of sport policy reforms.

The sport boycott also bolstered the anti-apartheid movement, both transnationally and domestically. Prompt reforms by the South African state and establishment organizations undermined the conventional view that sanctions would not work. None of these changes


went far enough, but they pointed to the influence of external pressure and added impetus to the international campaign to isolate South Africa. Especially in traditional rivals such as Britain, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand, protests over South African tours turned into mass mobilizing events, dramatically heightening the profit of the apartheid issue and the anti-apartheid movement. These popular groups, in turn, became determined lobbyists of their own governments for broader sanctions. (This effect is more difficulty cult to appreciate from North America, where sporting links with South Africa were relatively limited.) The sport boycott campaign thus catalyzed the momentum for stronger international pressures.

A third dimension of the precedent-setting importance of sport sanctions was the clear demarcation of criteria for rehabilitation. Specific conditions were set for re-launching international competition and exchange, in particular:

"the creation of single, democratic, non-racial, and non-sexist governing bodies actively committed to the eradication of inequality [thus implying an active sports development program]; that is, establishment sport must join with the non-racial movement to build unified federations in every sport."  

The ANC and its internal allies saw in the manipulation of whites’ craving for a return to international competition an opportunity to demand full non-racialism and integration at the organizational level, and a tangible commitment to development for disadvantaged South Africans. The ANC also hoped to signal that there were immediate and tangible benefits to be gained by accepting change, in this case the renewal of international sport. Change could thus be linked in the minds of white South Africans not just to danger and loss, but to renewal and opportunity. The most explicit use of sport in this manner was, ironically, by F. W. de Klerk and other proponents of negotiations during the 1992 whites-only referendum.

Proponents of reform skillfully exploited South Africa’s success at the Cricket World Cup to promote the benefit of negotiations. As Rob Nixon succinctly summarizes:

"With the opportunism that has characterized his political performance, de Klerk temporarily commandeered the boycott issue as an electoral weapon, wielding it against the extreme right, to whom he dealt a sport-aided trouncing . . ."  

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1156 South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa and Sanctions: Genesis and Prospects, pp. 88-94.
Lifting the boycott followed a shift in strategy, described at the time as the “uncoupling” of sport from the overall campaign against apartheid. In fact, however, sport and the wider process of change had not been uncoupled; rather, the order of their rehabilitation had been reversed. The setting and meeting of these aforementioned requirements for rehabilitation – however superficial in practice – powerfully reinforced the norms of acceptable social behaviour for a “new” South Africa. Sport sanctions thus reinforced normative change and signalled directly to white South Africans the positive opportunities associated with the ending of apartheid. In their removal, as with their imposition, sport set a highly visible precedent.

Sport sanctions influence significant socio-psychological pain on the dominant (white) elite, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the South African racial order and strengthening new norms of behavior. They also heightened the susceptibility of white South Africans to other external and internal pressures for change. While the influence of sport should not be overstated – apartheid did not crumble in direct response to sport boycotts – one cannot understand either the sanctions campaign as a whole or the South African transition without an appreciation of the role played by the sport boycott.

A number of implications flow from this analysis. First, success in the South African case indicates that if the principal aim of sanctioners is punishment, sport sanctions are likely be particularly effective. They can impose a painful “hurt” without causing significant deprivation either to “ordinary citizens” in the target or to powerful interests in the sanctioning country. Of course, some athletes suffer, so these sanctions should not be imposed lightly.

But where important principles or interests are at stake, sport boycotts should be given serious consideration. Moreover, while there are obviously situations in which this form of pressure would work more and less well, depending on the degree to which societies are as “sports mad” as the South Africans, a good many societies are “mad” about one sport or another, and therefore potentially vulnerable in this area.

The bigger obstacle to the more routine use of sport sanctions is the entrenched commitment of international sports organizations to the principle of universalism. There is probably no higher priority for organizations such as the IOC than to maximize participation in events under their authority. They will, therefore, resist any efforts to limit competition. What distinguished South Africa, then, was not its vulnerability but the coalition of forces that precipitated the imposition of sanctions in this area. But as sport becomes ever more heavily commercialized, emulating the long-established patterns in tennis and golf that so frustrated sports activists, the strategic opportunity created by its hierarchical governance structures is being eroded. As a result, it may become all the more difficulty to mobilize a coalition that

1160 R. Edgar, ed., Sanctioning Apartheid, p.44.
can overcome the weight of entrenched interests to successfully deploy the “sports weapon.”1162

Second, where the goal of sanctions goes beyond punishment to the precipitation of change, sophisticated sanctions strategies should also incorporate culture in general and sport in particular. I do not mean, however, that sanctioners should seek to isolate the target society in these areas in an undifferentiated manner. Rather, targeted cultural isolation can catalyze and reinforce the impact of other pressures, and can influence the direction of social change. Moreover, lifting cultural sanctions can provide incentives for reform, while other coercive pressures are maintained. The incorporation of culture thus expands the range of tools the sanctioner can deploy and, if deftly used, can multiply the impact of the whole ensemble.

However, the South African case also suggests that such a sophisticated, multifaceted strategy will most likely require a substantial time period to work. It may take years for the corrosive effects of cultural isolation to be felt and for their delegitimizing consequences to become apparent. This is not to say that one must anticipate a 25–30 year process (roughly the time between South Africa’s banning from the Tokyo Olympics and the beginning of the “end game” in 1990).1163 But one of the political challenges for would-be sanctioners is that a comprehensive strategy must be (able to be) sustained over a significant period of time.

Finally, the wider point hardly new but worth reiterating because it defied conventional wisdom – is that influence is exercised on an issue-specific or contextual basis.1164 In this case, through sport, an improbable coalition of South African exiles, Western activists, and newly independent African governments was able to induce telling pressure on an entrenched and determined South African regime. Thus, there are often openings for agency by those whom most conventional views dismiss on account of “weakness.”

7.7 Conclusion

It could be concluded that studies of sanctions undertaken while apartheid was still in place suffered from both a scarcity of information and the biases induced by strong political and ethical commitments. Scholars also faced the problem of doing their analysis midstream – before the processes of change had come to conclusion.1165 The divestment campaign was one component of increasing economic pressures. Its psychological impact, as a signal of harsher measures to come, weighed more heavily than its actual costs on South African business or political leaders. These signals also galvanized the resistance movement.

The role of divestment as a political signal underscores the interrelationship between various components of anti-apartheid sanctions. Without the threat of escalating pressures, divestment alone may not have substantial effects on the economic or political leaders in the

target state. The South African state increasingly confronted challenges to its legitimacy and hegemony. Anti-apartheid pressures on banks and the IMF’s refusal of bridging loans from 1983 contributed substantially to the country’s economic and political crisis in the 1980s. Politically, sanctions sharpened divisions within the white oligarchy and strained the alliance between business and the NP, further exacerbating the government’s weakness in the face of all types of international pressures. Sanctions, in this context, denied South Africa policy space within which to address the roots of its economic and political malaise.

The long-term consequences of the arms embargoes were mixed. South Africa had a high-tech arms industry that its government and society were ambivalent about and whose place in foreign policy was ambiguous. While arms manufacture provided high technology, foreign exchange, and much-needed jobs, there was an intense debate inside South Africa about whether non-military industries would do better at providing these benefits. The Olympic boycott established that South Africa’s domestic racial policies were sufficiently offensive to warrant the imposition of international sanctions. Because of the entrenched resistance to any such measures in the West, this precedent marked South Africa as “sanction-worthy,” making other measures easier to contemplate. Seen as relatively unimportant and “apolitical,” sports sanctions met little resistance from powerful interests. Yet the symbolism proved potent: if South Africa violated norms even in the “untainted” and relatively trivial realm of sport, then surely it deserved punishment in economic and political arenas too. The sport boycott also bolstered the anti-apartheid movement, both transnationally and domestically.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

It could generally be concluded that the 1960s were decisive years for the international struggle against apartheid. On the one hand, the Rivonia trial gave a harsh blow to the underground resistance. While Sharpeville had forced the liberation movement underground, the clamp down of the South African Government in 1963-64 severely disabled the internal opposition. Indeed, it would be another decade before the covert opposition inside South Africa could regroup and reorganise itself to pose an effective challenge to the apartheid regime. On the other hand, by the time the Rivonia trial ended in June 1964, the issue of apartheid had been successfully projected onto the international level. Since its birth in the spring of 1960, the AAM’s role had been to campaign against apartheid in every possible field, and to inform the public about apartheid and its implications. In the first few years after it was founded the AAM principally functioned in response to events in South Africa.

As the situation in South Africa deteriorated, especially after the Rivonia arrests, the AAM was able to offer an extraordinary response by pulling together enormous strength and resources. The major achievement of the Rivonia Campaign was to mobilize, on an unprecedented scale, domestic and world public opinion around the trial, which is what helped to save the lives of Mandela, Sisulu and the others. The AAM also made every effort to press the British Government into adopting an enlightened policy towards South Africa, especially at the UN, and into exerting its influence on the South African Government to prevent the imposition of the death sentences on the accused. Real politik concerns, however, prevailed over anti-apartheid rhetoric in the making of British policy.

Faced with the dilemma of protecting Britain’s economic and strategic interests in South Africa without alienating the African states or damaging "irreparably the prospects of future co-operation with an African Government", the British government was at pains to try to dissociate itself from South Africa’s apartheid policies whilst at the same time "maintain[ing] a reasonable working relationship with the present government". Pressure from the Nigerian Government eventually convinced Britain to make an unofficial representation to the South Africans. The unfavourable South African reaction to this timid move immediately led Britain to retreat to its position that any kind of intervention would not be in the interest of the Rivonia accused themselves. What the British Government probably had in mind, though, were Britain’s "special interests".

Campaigning around the Rivonia trial also gave impetus to the question of sanctions. The International Conference on Sanctions, organized, in large part, by the AAM, represented a major breakthrough in the development of an international sanction-based strategy. The Conference, however, failed to persuade the main opponents of sanctions, namely Britain and the US. At the UN, Britain consistently refused to accept that the situation in South Africa fell under Chapter VII of the Charter. Instead, in collaboration with the US, it worked for a carefully worded appeal on the Rivonia and other political trials to try to appease Afro-Asian...
countries and public opinion at home and abroad; by early 1965 the issue of sanctions had lost momentum.1170

Labour support for the AAM created the expectation, when the Party assumed power in October 1964, which the Labour Party would translate its commitment to the anti-apartheid cause into action. The ample loopholes in the arms embargo (which allowed for the continued export of arms), opposition to sanctions, and the denial to support the Defence and Aid Fund were indicative of a high degree of continuity, rather than change, in British policy towards South Africa. In the early 1970s, proponents of a less radical approach to dismantling apartheid began to gain ground, but the anti-apartheid movement began to cultivate students, unions, church groupings, women’s organizations and other sectors in an attempt to build a mass base that would ensure the success of its campaigns. Nevertheless, it was the unrest in Soweto in 1976 that changed the country and started a process that would lead to renewed resistance and eventually negotiations. The AAM, which had always had a special relation to the ANC, now had to contend with new forces in the liberation movement, and the re-emergence of the trade union movement brought yet another aspect to the struggle.

The decade of the 1980s ended with the formation of the Southern African Coalition (SAC), a grouping made up of churches, trade unions, NGOs, local authorities and development agencies. SAC, in which the AAM was a key player, arranged a huge parliamentary lobby, with 4000 representatives from every part of the country, which called for sanctions against South Africa.1171 The AAM’s last mass rally was held at Trafalgar Square on 20 June 1993, where Walter Sisulu demanded that an election date be announced. When the date was announced on 2 July 1993, Huddleston once again appealed to the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community to send observers to monitor the elections, and the subsequent deployment constituted ‘the world’s largest ever international election monitoring operation’, according to Gurney. The AAM’s last campaign, ‘Countdown to Democracy’, launched in January 1994, appealed to Britons to donate money to the ANC, which had initiated a ‘votes for freedom’ appeal. Throughout the UK, people cast symbolic votes and donated money to the ANC, the trade unions alone raising £250,000. On Election Day, 27 April 1994, the AAM witnessed hundreds of South Africans cast their vote at South Africa House, many of them activists in exile or ordinary South Africans living in the UK.1172 When Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first president of the new, democratic South Africa on 10 May, a live video showing Mandela taking the oath of office was witnessed by the gathering at South Africa House, marking the close of a long chapter in international solidarity. Problem streams surrounding South Africa policy were most profoundly influenced by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. This crisis severely dramatized the violent base upon which apartheid politics was founded.

1172 Ibid.
The massacre captured the attention of the world and altered the terms of debate that persisted throughout the Sixties. The anti-apartheid movement seized upon the Massacre and tried to use it as a means for educating the U.S. public, but also as a means of legitimating its own existence and establishing a more solid base for the anti-apartheid movement within a broader network of interests. Anti-apartheid sentiment was previously a challenger group interest promoted mostly by supporters of Pan-Africanism. By the Fifties, more mainstream civil rights leaders began addressing the issue. Labour and religious groups (members of the civil rights coalition) also supported these efforts.

The Sharpeville massacre renewed energy within the movement for continued action. It helped motivate mainstream civil rights leaders to internationalize the civil rights agenda between 1962 and 1964, and it helped motivate labour organizations, religious groups, and students—a mixture of challenger and member interests—to solidify their involvement in Anti-apartheid issues by the middle Sixties. Sharpeville also enraged third world member nations in the United Nations. These nations proceeded to invest energy into calling for United Nations' condemnation of South Africa. The United States was already sensitive to its international reputation regarding its stance toward racial issues. It was also sensitive to how other African nations, recently emerging into independence, perceived the role of the United States in African affairs. Kennedy later responded to U.N. anti-apartheid activity. Thus, the Sharpeville massacre, as a major problem stream, indirectly influenced foreign policy in the United States. It encouraged political stream development by reinvigorating anti-apartheid action by intensifying international condemnation of apartheid and initiating United Nations debates, and by swaying public opinion against South Africa.

Political streams are the essence of politics because they involve the "balance of power." These streams are defined by the state of conflict between contending forces. Political streams are influenced by elections, public opinion, media, the interests of public officials, and resources. The anti-apartheid movement attempted to influence political streams in the Sixties by broadening its base of support and deepening its constituent level of commitment to battling apartheid. The movement continued to pressure President Kennedy into acting against South Africa. Though Kennedy did raise criticisms of apartheid to a more central location on the policy agenda, it was not a direct response to anti-apartheid movement activity per se, as much as it was a response to broad-based concerns of African-Americans, pressure from public opinion, and anti-apartheid action at the United Nations.

Anti-apartheid activists seized upon the Sharpeville Massacre to renew their call for economic sanctions against South Africa. Within a short period of time (1962 to 1964), anti-apartheid sentiment gained solid footing within the mainstream Civil Rights movement camp. Civil rights leaders lobbied President Kennedy for economic sanctions. When the movement was able to expand the scope of mobilization by reaching out to religious groups and students, the anti-apartheid movement took a new tact. This mix of challenger and member interests organized mass mobilizations to attack credit arrangements held by financial institutions with the South African government, corporate operations in South Africa, and college and university portfolios with South African-related investments.
Despite growing levels of mobilization, the anti-apartheid movement was bereft of direct influence in political streams which might promote criticism of apartheid to the governmental agenda and decision agendas. The political stream developments of major influence in this process were the election of John Kennedy to the Presidency, the role of African-Americans in this election, and the state of civil rights in the United States. The Executive Branch traditionally controls the character of foreign policy. Such was the case with South Africa policy in the Sixties. When President Kennedy came to office in 1961, he was already sensitive to African affairs. This coupled with the fact that African Americans played a major role in delivering the Presidency to Kennedy, insured that there would be a new sensitivity to African issues at the White House. Thus, anti-apartheid sentiment was influential at this time in that it resonated with the agenda of African-Americans, not because the anti-apartheid movement was able to create leverage within the political system and manipulate public officials into taking a stand against apartheid.

At the same time, the United States was being maneuvered into an embarrassing position by the United Nations. Given domestic racial problems in the early Sixties, the U.S. was interested in appearing sensitive to racial concerns among its international allies. It had to support United Nations actions, or fear being branded as a racist nation. The United States' international reputation was important as well because of the rising tide of African independence movements. Kennedy did not want to be labelled as insensitive to African issues and shut out of having influence on the African continent. Thus, it was problem and political stream developments—the election of Kennedy and pressures he faced—that primarily drove criticism of apartheid to the governmental agenda. But it took policy stream developments before the issue moved to the decision agenda, preceding imposition of an arms embargo against South Africa.

Policy streams contain the range of available policy solutions. This range can be affected by scholars and think tanks which research policy areas and make recommendations, or they can be affected by the accumulation of new knowledge by policy-makers. The anti-apartheid movement tried to affect prevailing policy streams in the Sixties primarily by promoting anti-apartheid policy solutions which lacked a place on the governmental agenda. For the most part, activist initiatives never reached the governmental agenda during the Sixties. Instead, President Kennedy did respond to apartheid with a policy solution raised at the United Nations. The anti-apartheid movement promoted economic sanctions as their preferred solution to apartheid during the early Sixties when the Movement was dominated by civil rights leaders. When more militant voices were raised within the Movement (The New Left, Black Militants), institutional economic relationships with South Africa were challenged. The Bank Campaign targeted financial institutions which provided revolving credit to the South African government. This Campaign evolved into the Stockholder's Resolution Campaign which directly challenged corporate investments in South Africa, and divestment campaigns on university and college campuses.

The movement had moved to a more confrontational position by the end of the Sixties. Activists called for severing economic relationships with South Africa as a means of isolating that nation from the international community. Neither President Kennedy nor President
Johnson accepted this policy solution. Instead, Kennedy seized the moment in 1963 and unilaterally called for an arms embargo to be levied against South Africa. This policy solution was initially raised at the United Nations. Kennedy instituted the embargo just prior to the United Nations forcing a vote on the issue. By imposing an arms embargo prior to this vote, Kennedy appeared to be sufficiently critical of apartheid without having been pressured into this position, and without jeopardizing U.S. strategic interests in the region. Anti-apartheid activity was, at best, driven by external events in the early Sixties. Activists were able to use the Sharpeville massacre for educational and organizing purposes and they were able to draw strength and legitimacy from the United Nations debates condemning South Africa.

The anti-apartheid movement strategically chose to confront investment practices of institutional investors (and thereby confront principles of capitalism), a tactic that was moderately successful in the Sixties. The more radical anti-apartheid movement position of severing economic collaboration with South Africa did not move from the systemic agenda to the governmental agenda; however, it is important to note that this position did move to the institutional and decision agendas of various colleges and universities, a precedent that may have helped to shape later governmental events and policy decisions. Throughout the Sixties, foreign policy was driven by Presidential politics. Legislative entrepreneurs like Senator Robert Kennedy tried to present a more forceful position on the issue, but Congress never seriously became involved in the making of South Africa policy. The liberationist position was raised in the United Nations, and endorsed by anti-apartheid activists in the United States. The Kennedy administration pre-empted this effort by raising a reformist solution—the weapons embargo—to the decision agenda. Because of this development, United States policy appears to have shifted against the South African government during the Sixties. In reality, symbolic appeals won out as the Kennedy administration was able to continue conducting business-as-usual with South Africa as an economic and military ally.

The Soviet Union has been acknowledged as the ANC’s most important benefactor, providing military support in the form of hardware, as well as training some 2,000 MK cadres. Other forms of support were equally forthcoming, and many of the ANC’s leaders, including Thabo Mbeki, received degrees from universities in the USSR. The Soviets helped the ANC maintain structures that came under enormous pressure, especially through the slump in the 1970s. These same structures were then replenished by new recruits fleeing South Africa after the Soweto Uprising in 1976. After that, MK cadres trained in the USSR launched devastating attacks that added to the pressure bringing apartheid leaders to the negotiating table.

The movement against apartheid demonstrated people’s power. It showed that the United Nations can become a powerful force when it forges an alliance with public movements for peace and justice. It also showed that it is possible to overcome the obstruction of a few governments insensitive to the legitimate aspirations of people by building an alliance of all other States with public organizations, especially in the States opposing progress, and utilizing the possibilities which exist in the United Nations despite the misuse of the veto in
the Security Council. But the alliance against apartheid did not succeed in eliminating racism in the world.

Apartheid was based on the premise that it is not possible for people of different races and cultures to live together in amity. Even as the new South Africa was proving this wrong, there have emerged many ethnic and other conflicts in the world causing enormous suffering and loss of life. Meanwhile the world is also faced with many old and new problems which cause enormous misery to the peoples. President Thabo Mbeki suggested, in his State of the Nation address in May 2000, that “perhaps the time has come for the emergence of a united movement of the peoples of the world that would come together to work for the creation of a new world order”. What was envisaged was an international alliance of governments, organizations and individuals to overcome the few governments and vested interests which sought to impose a “right wing agenda” on the world at the cost of massive human suffering, and to bring about a new world order. The rich experience of the international solidarity movement for the liberation of South Africa provided valuable lessons for developing such an alliance.

The OAU indeed provided the most important form of support to the racially oppressed and grossly struggling people of South Africa. Opposition to apartheid in South Africa had prompted the OAU to pass resolutions that condemned apartheid and thus creating conditions that enabled the oppressed people of South Africa to advance their cause of liberation outside the borders of their country. In its efforts to advance the cause of liberation in South Africa, the OAU had indeed placed almost the entire territory of independent black Africa at the disposal of the South African liberation movements. The OAU provided Africa with a single voice in condemning apartheid. These were no mean achievements, and it would be wrong to minimize their value or their impact on apartheid South Africa. It would, however, be equally wrong to over-estimate the OAU’s achievement, or its capacity for effective action. To say the least, the OAU was not deterred by South Africa’s military and economic power from identifying itself with the cause against apartheid. As long as the white minority regime continued to deny citizenship to black South Africans and tried to relegate them to impoverished labour reserves, there was no excuse for the OAU to abandon its role as a defender, patron and guardian of the struggling people of South Africa.

The Frontline states and the OAU were engaged in a war of attrition that slowly gained ground. It required increasingly strong efforts of them and created unexpected strains. If apartheid were to be dismantled in South Africa, they would have to pool their resources and lay down a policy all would follow. Unfortunately, the brief resolution of the Addis Ababa Summit Conference was not a strategy but a list of tactics. It included all means – propaganda, diplomatic and economic sanctions, political action and moral and material support for the liberation movements without providing priorities. Although the African states did not repudiate the basic principles and aims of the OAU, most were not willing to apply its resolutions and policies. They agreed with the ends; but not the means. Whatever the merits of the case, more flexibility on the part of the OAU was required.
The Frontline states, despite extremely wide variety of challenges they faced such as transport and trade, never wavered in their role as the critics of the racist policies of South Africa. They were consistent in their struggle towards dismantling apartheid, despite their vulnerability to South Africa’s economic and military power. They were not, as a group, prepared to weaken their resolve and determination to fight against apartheid for immediate economic gains. As a result they rejected all offers of economic cooperation from South Africa. They also took the lead in international sanctions, despite the fact that most of their economies were weak and therefore vulnerable to possible South African retaliation.

CONSAS and SADCC accentuated the political and ideological divisions between South Africa and the Frontline states. In some respects the development of CONSAS and SADCC had moreover, as argued, led to a kind of stalemate situation which effectively limited the chances of violent conflict. The stalemate of course did not apply to the military sphere, where South Africa was undeniably superior to the military strengths of the Frontline states. There was likewise no economic stalemate in the sense of SADCC and CONSAS being of roughly equal strength. The new regional stalemate manifested itself primarily in the improbability of either grouping extending its membership, except for Zimbabwe and Namibia joining CONSAS; and in the likely inability of SADCC countries to contribute in any profound, material way to what they described as the ‘liberation of South Africa’ by overthrowing the political order that existed in South Africa.

Studies of sanctions undertaken while apartheid was still in place suffered from both a scarcity of information and the biases induced by strong political and ethical commitments. Scholars also faced the problem of doing their analysis midstream – before the processes of change had come to conclusion. The divestment campaign was one component of increasing economic pressures. Its psychological impact, as a signal of harsher measures to come, weighed more heavily than its actual costs on South African business or political leaders. These signals also galvanized the resistance movement. The role of divestment as a political signal underscores the interrelationship between various components of anti-apartheid sanctions. Without the threat of escalating pressures, divestment alone may not have substantial effects on the economic or political leaders in the target state. The South African state increasingly confronted challenges to its legitimacy and hegemony. Anti-apartheid pressures on banks and the IMF’s refusal of bridging loans from 1983 contributed substantially to the country’s economic and political crisis in the 1980s. Politically, sanctions sharpened divisions within the white oligarchy and strained the alliance between business and the NP, further exacerbating the government’s weakness in the face of all types of international pressures. Sanctions, in this context, denied South Africa policy space within which to address the roots of its economic and political malaise.

The long-term consequences of the arms embargoes were mixed. South Africa had a high-tech arms industry that its government and society were ambivalent about and whose place in

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foreign policy was ambiguous. While arms manufacture provided high technology, foreign exchange, and much-needed jobs, there was an intense debate inside South Africa about whether non-military industries would do better at providing these benefits. The Olympic boycott established that South Africa’s domestic racial policies were sufficiently offensive to warrant the imposition of international sanctions. Because of the entrenched resistance to any such measures in the West, this precedent marked South Africa as “sanction-worthy,” making other measures easier to contemplate. Seen as relatively unimportant and “apolitical,” sports sanctions met little resistance from powerful interests. Yet the symbolism proved potent: if South Africa violated norms even in the “untainted” and relatively trivial realm of sport, then surely it deserved punishment in economic and political arenas too. The sport boycott also bolstered the anti-apartheid movement, both transnationally and domestically.

Demonstration at Trafalgar Square organized by the Anti Apartheid Movement. Source: Museum of London and Henry Grant.


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APPENDIX 1:  CRONLOGY OF SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID*

1944: Prime Minister Smuts joins the Manhattan Project’s search for uranium.

1946: Newly founded UN considers South African domestic discrimination (against Indians); this agenda item expands in the 1950s to include apartheid. India withdraws its High Commissioner (ambassador) from South Africa.

1948: Malan’s National Party defeats Smuts’ United Party and institutes policies of apartheid. UN adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

1954: India formally severs diplomatic ties, and other countries follow, especially newly independent African states (from the late 1950s). Father Trevor Huddleston pleads for the international community to boycott South Africa. First crude oil refinery opens in Durban.


1958: ANC President Albert Luthuli calls for sanctions. The (non-racial) South African Sports Association is formed.

1959: Select ANC members go into exile in London and launch the Boycott South Africa movement in Britain.

1960: Sharpeville killings produce international outrage. African states call for sanctions. The Anti-Apartheid Movement founded in London; American Committee on Africa begins sanctions campaign in US. South Africa institutes fírand system.

1961: After Sharpeville, many opposition leaders are banned, jailed or go into exile. South Africa withdraws from the Commonwealth, in the face of anti-apartheid pressures. Luthuli receives Nobel Peace Prize. US company Allis Chalmers contracts to build South Africa’s fí experimental nuclear reactor, SAFARI-1.


1963: UN Security Council adopts voluntary arms embargo (resulting in varying degrees of compliance); US announces end to military sales to South Africa. At its founding, the OAU excludes South Africa and supports sanctions. Many other international organizations reject South African participation.

1965: UN establishes its Trust Fund for South Africa and the Education Programme for South Africans. Artists and actors sign the “We Say No to Apartheid” pledge. Students in the US demonstrate at Chase Manhattan’s headquarters to protest its loans to South Africa, starting a wave of divestment movement. Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence and resulting sanctions (including a UN arms embargo) increase attention and pressure on South Africa.

1968: South Africa excluded from Mexico Olympics.

1970: South Africa expelled from the Olympic Movement. Throughout the 1970s, some banks and governments ban investments in and loans to South Africa.

1971: Rev. Leon Sullivan advocates the withdrawal of General Motors from South Africa.

1972: The Ethical Investor urges university administrations to follow principles of socially responsible investing; numerous universities divest throughout the decade.

1973: UN General Assembly recognizes the liberation movements as “authentic representatives” of the South African majority. The Zulu version of Macbeth, uMabatha, boycotted in New York City. The Arab oil embargo adds to South Africa’s energy problems, spurring nuclear power and coal-to-oil developments.


1976: Soweto uprising; number of exiles dramatically increases. Banks and governments increase restrictions on loans. Africans boycott Montreal Olympics. Transkei declares independence but is not recognized internationally. Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei meet a similar response in 1977, 1979, and 1981, respectively. Israel signs an agreement to increase scientific cooperation with South Africa.

1977: US increases efforts to restrict nuclear technology transfer; in August, the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid urges states and fi to cease all assistance and cooperation enabling South Africa’s acquisition of nuclear capability. South Africa removed from IAEA governing board. Israel supplies South Africa a small quantity of tritium in exchange for shipments of uranium. Commonwealth adopts Gleneagles Declaration against apartheid in sport. Second wave of large US student protests; more colleges and universities adopt divestment policies. Sullivan Principles announced as a guide to corporate conduct in South Africa, with 12 initial US endorsers. New York performance of the musical Ipi Ntombi is boycotted. UN Security Council adopts mandatory arms embargo in November.
1978: European and Canadian codes of corporate conduct established. US tightens restrictions on support to military and police in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia.

1979: UN General Assembly, in January, calls on the Security Council to consider measures that prevent South Africa from developing nuclear weapons. SADCC is established to counter South African destabilization and economic dominance in the region. Iran halts oil exports to South Africa; South Africa opens an oil storage facility in Saldanha Bay. US satellite detects what is thought to be a small nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic on 22 September; South Africa denies it conducted a nuclear test.

1980: The UN General Assembly calls for a total cultural boycott. Sasol II opens in Secunda.


1983: US Congress passes Gramm Amendment, blocking IMF loans to states practicing apartheid. Sir Richard Attenborough, director of the film Gandhi, cancels plans to attend its showing in South Africa, in support of the cultural boycott. UN General Assembly adopts in December a Programme of Action against Apartheid which urges all governments to refrain from nuclear technology transfer, nuclear cooperation, delivery of reactors and fissile material to South Africa.


1985: In response to township violence, South Africa declares a state of emergency and rules out significant power-sharing with blacks. In July UN Security Council resolution 569 urges all member states to prohibit new nuclear-related contracts with South Africa. Chase Manhattan and other international banks refuse to “roll over” their loans in July; in August South Africa declares a moratorium on repayment of some of its commercial debt. Australia, in August, bans exports to South Africa of weapons and computer equipment that could be used for security purposes and banned imports of South African arms. A month later, Britain bans imports of South African-made
weapons. The Commonwealth passes an initial package of economic sanctions in October, including a ban on purchases of South African uranium and Commonwealth exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Australian and Japanese codes of corporate conduct established. The US Corporate Council on South Africa representing 100 US corporations is formed to oppose apartheid from within South Africa. The third and most intensive wave of US student anti-apartheid activism begins; divestment increases; group of university presidents also urge sanctions against South Africa. Several major cities adopt selective contracting provisions. The record album and video Sun City is produced and aggressively publicized by US anti-apartheid activist artists. US, European Community, and other countries implement additional sanctions measures. Anglo-American and other South Africa business leaders begin talking with the ANC in exile.


1989: Mobil and Goodyear – the largest remaining US companies – withdraw from South Africa. Third Interim Agreement on debt repayment reached in October, covering through December 1993, just prior to the Commonwealth summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur. National Sports Congress formed; split within non-racial sport movement. De Klerk succeeds Botha and announces his intentions to repeal several key apartheid laws, to release select political prisoners, and to unban some political organizations.
1990: Nelson Mandela released after 27 years in prison. ANC and other opposition groups are unbanned; the process of return from exile begins. South Africa orders end of its nuclear weapons program and dismantling of existing weapons.


1992: Whites-only referendum validates de Klerk’s reforms. South Africa participates in Cricket World Cup and returns to the Olympic Games at Barcelona. South Africa selected as host of the 1995 Rugby World Cup. UN shifts its focus to providing educational opportunities within South Africa. South African government begins destruction of 12 000 documents (including blueprints) and sensitive components.

1993: In March de Klerk admits that South Africa acquired nuclear weapons. Mandela calls for end to some economic sanctions. In October, UN General Assembly lifts sanctions.

1994: Mandela elected in South Africa’s first democratic national elections, calls for end to remaining sanctions eight days after his inauguration on 10 May. US colleges and universities repeal divestment policies. South Africa begins the process of re-joining international organizations and re-establishing diplomatic ties.
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SHEET

(Dismantling apartheid regime in South Africa)

Interview initiated and completed at:

_____________________________________________________

Interview with:

___________________________________________________________________________

Interview Date:

___________________________________________________________________________

This interview is in respect of a study whose purpose is to interrogate the role of International Community towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa, unravelling the activities of the International Community within the stated period (1960-1990) up to the dismantling of the regime.

The study is to be conducted by Nasir Abba Yusuf of the History Department, Faculty of Arts at the University of Zululand. Mr. Yusuf is conducting this study towards a Doctoral Degree. Thus, responses to this interview will help in providing concrete information on the subject matter.

You are asked to complete this interview because you are a citizen/residence in the area of study (South Africa). Your participation in this research interview is voluntary but of great importance to its success. Your decision about whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher. Answering these questions will help you identify some tedious issues besides giving you the opportunity to state your opinions.

Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you give will be confidential. Note, however, that there are no rights or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Before we begin do you have any questions?
Section A:

1. Province of Origin ______________________________
2. Province of Residence ____________________________
3. Area of Residence ________________________________
4. Sex : Male □ Female □
5. How old are you? _________________________________
6. What is your highest formal education attained?
   a) Primary School
   b) High School
   c) Collage
   d) University
   e) Others specify ______________________

7. What is your present occupation?
   a. Farming
   b. Civil servant
   c. Trading
   d. Business men/women
   e. Others Specify ______________________

8. What is your marital status?
   a. Married
   b. Single
   c. Divorce
   d. Widow
Section B:

1. Who are the International Community?
   Answer:
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

2. How long has apartheid in South Africa been in existence?
   Answer:
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

3. But are you anti-white or not?
   Answer:
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

4. Did you regard all whites as oppressors?
   Answer:
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________

5. Who did you include? Did you include leftists in your indictment?
   Answer:
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
   __________________________________________________________
6. How long did the International Community’s support for the oppressed in South Africa last?

Answer: ____________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________

7. Why couldn’t the apartheid regime cope with the demand of the struggle in South Africa?

Answer: ____________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________

8. Do you think the International Community still adheres to the liberation philosophy and political standpoint?

Answer: ____________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________

9. What is your attitude to the apartheid regime and its policies?

Answer: ____________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
10. Given the political dynamics in South Africa in the post-apartheid era, do you still regard the ruling regime (ANC) as an alternative to the apartheid regime?

Answer:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

11. How did the International Community help to dismantle the apartheid regime in South Africa?

Answer:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

12. Briefly share with me the forces or factors that determined or conditioned the International Community’s role in dismantling apartheid in South Africa.

Answer:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

13. What was the role of the International Community towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa during the era in question?

Answer:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
14. Why did the International Community involve itself in the political affairs of South Africa?

Answer:
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

15. Were there any vested interests in the International Community’s challenge of the apartheid policies?

Answer:
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

16. Could the role of the International Community be compared to any of the other groupings/bodies that opposed apartheid in South Africa?

Answer:
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

17. Did the International Community develop a military strategy and how did it evolve?

Answer:
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
18. What was the nature of the relationship between the International Community and political leadership of the liberation movement in South Africa?

Answer:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

19. What comparisons can be drawn between the International Community’s opposition to apartheid in South Africa and resistance against racism elsewhere in the world?

Thank you

______________________________
Nasir Abba Yusuf

______________________________
Date:
APPENDIX 3: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
(Reg No: UZREC 171110-030)

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

Certificate Number: UZREC 171110-030 PGD 2017/168
Project Title: The role of the International community towards dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa: 1960-1990
Principal Researcher/Investigator: NA Youf
Supervisor and Co-supervisor: Dr MZ Shamase
Department: History
Faculty: Arts
Type of Risk: Low Risk – Desktop Research
Nature of Project: Honours/4th Year

The University of Zululand’s Research Ethics Committee (UZREC) hereby gives ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project. The researcher may therefore commence with data collection as from the date of this Certificate, using the certificate number indicated above.

Special conditions:
1. This certificate is valid for 3 years from the date of issue.
2. Principal researcher must provide an annual report to the UZREC in the prescribed format [due date=01 June 2018]
3. Principal researcher must submit a report at the end of project in respect of ethical compliance.
4. The UZREC must be informed immediately of any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the documents that were presented to the meeting.

The UZREC wishes the researcher well in conducting research.

Chairperson: University Research Ethics Committee
Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research & Innovation
18 July 2017

CHAIRPERSON
UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (UZREC)
REG NO: UZREC 171110-30

25-07-2017

RESEARCH & INNOVATION OFFICE
APPENDIX 4: TURNITIN

The Role of the International Community Towards Dismantling the Apartheid Regime in South Africa, 1960-1990

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