Regional Supremacy or Coalition? Evaluating South Africa’s Regional Integration Efforts within the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

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2017
DECLARATION

I, Daniel Nkosinathi Mlambo (student number: 201231522) declare that:

i. The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise indicated, and is my original work.

ii. This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Name of candidate:

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As supervisor, I agree to the submission of this dissertation for examination

Dr R.O. Ogunnubi .................................
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family who have sacrificed a lot for me to have a good education, and more importantly to my father Aaron Mlambo (the late). Also, I dedicate this work to the almighty God.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

To have made it through this challenging yet fruitful journey would not have been possible without the influence of several individuals, who played significant roles from day one to finish. Firstly, I would like to thank the tremendous intellectual guidance and robust support of my supervisor Dr Olusola Ogunnubi. Your strong critique, spirit, belief and wealth of knowledge pertaining my research topic have been of tremendous value and I would have not gotten this far without it. Special appreciation also goes to my parents, Aaron Mlambo (the late) and Nombuso Mkhwanazi not only for their vital support, but also for installing in me important life values of hard work, I am positive this will produce positive result moving forward. Special thanks also go to my brothers Victor Mlambo and Simphiwe for their vital support. Not forgetting my grandmother Agnes Mkhwanazi, who has always been a pillar of strength since my pre-school days. Thank you very much for you vital support, prayers and strength. I certainly wouldn’t have gotten this far without you. To my other family members, thank you for your support.

I would like to extend my appreciation to the National Research Foundation for their contribution towards financing my studies since 2016. Special thanks also go to Dr Toyin Adetiba, Ms Zama Zindela, Dr Hakeem Onapajo, Professor Christopher Isike, your contributions along the way has been of utmost importance and is highly valued. I should also thank Dr Gregory Houston from the Human Science Research Council, Dr Pamela Johnson from the University of Fort Hare and Professor Paul Bischoff from Rhodes University for their well-informed input(s) towards my work. To fellow Young African Leadership Initiative (YALI) Cohort 6 participant Odile Mackett from Wits University, special thanks for your encouraging words and support.

Lastly, my gratitude goes to my wonderful friends for their support. Special thanks to Nompumelelo Dlamini, Zamani Zulu, Nhlanhla Simelane, Mandla Mubecua, Nkosinathi Ndimande, Clifford Duma, Siphesihle Mpanza, Siyanda Mfeka, Mxolisi Mnguni, Mnotho Mthembu, Bongani Mchunu and Thulebone Mfuse.

May God Bless You All.
ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD – African Centre for the Constrictive Resolution Disputes
AD – Alliance of Democrats
AFDC – The Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
AFTA – ASEAN Free Trade Area
ANC – African National Congress
APSA – Africa Peace and Security Architecture
ARF – African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund
AU – African Union
BCP - Basutoland Congress Party
BLNS – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
BLS – Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
BNP – Basotho National Party
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAR – Central African Republic
CLM – Congolese Liberation Movement
CM – Common Market
CMA – Common Monetary Area
CODESA – Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COMESA – Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CONSAS – The Constellation of Southern African States
CU – Customs Union

DBSA – Development Bank of Southern Africa

DC – Democratic Congress

DHA – Department of Home Affairs

DIRCO – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

DRC – the Democratic Republic of Congo

DTI – Department of Trade and Industry

DZP – Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EU – European Union

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment

FIB – Force Intervention Brigade

FLS – The Frontline States

FNB – First National Bank

FRELIMO – The Mozambique Liberation Front

FTA – Free Trade Area

G20 – Group of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 20 major economies: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States of America and Turkey.

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNU – Government of National Unity

GPA – Global Political Agreement

HSRC – Human Science Research Council
IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa
ICT – Information and Communication Technology
IDC – Industrial Development Cooperation
IEC – Independent Electoral Commission
IFD – International Financing Division
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IPA – Interim Political Authority
ISDSC – Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
JBCC – Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation
LCD – Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LDF – Lesotho Defence Force
LPC – Lesotho’s People Congress
M23 – March 23 Rebels
MCB – Motor Company of Botswana
MDC – Movement for Democratic Change
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
MFP – Marematlou Freedom Party
MLC – Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NIP – National Independent Party
NP – National Party
OAU – Organization of African Unity
OPDSC – Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PAC – Pan Africanist Congress
PDDF – Project Preparation and Development Facility
PF – Patriotic Front
PFD – Popular Front for Democracy
POA – Programme of Action
PPRD – Peoples Party for Reconstruction and Democracy
PTA – Preferential Trade Area
RCD-Goma – Rally for Congolese Democracy
RCD-ML – Rally for Congolese Democracy Liberation Movement
RCL – Reformed Congress of Lesotho
RISDP – Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RMU – Rand Monetary Area
SAB – South African Breweries
SACU – Southern African Customs Union
SADC – Southern African Development Community
SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SANDF – South African National Defence Force
SAPS – South African Police Service
SARPCCO – Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
SARS – South African Revenue Service
SDI – Spatial Development Initiatives
SNC’s – SADC National Committee

SOE’s – State Owned Enterprises

SWAPO – South West Peoples Organization

UANC – United African National Council

UN – United Nations

WTO – World Trade Organization

ZANLA – Zimbabwe National Liberation Army

ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZAPU – Zimbabwean African Political Union

ZIPRA – Zimbabwe’s People’s Revolutionary Army

ZSP – Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Project
ABSTRACT

Having been disregarded as a pariah state pre-1994 due to the apartheid system that prevailed, South Africa became a legitimate state in 1994 after the first ever democratic elections. In the same year, it was inaugurated as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), where its membership came with a lot of positive and negative reactions in regard to the role it was to play in southern Africa. This was while other SADC states viewed South Africa (because of its robust economy) as a locomotive to spearhead regional integration in the SADC, and others had mixed emotions, wondering whether South Africa was to utilize its vast resources for the benefit of southern Africa, or to enhance its own self-interest.

In light of the above, this dissertation probes the debate on South Africa’s role in the SADC post-1994. The role has been conceptualized within the difference of regional supremacy or coalition. In essence, the study seeks to unearth its perceived hegemonic role through drawing insights from its foreign policy towards southern Africa post-1994. Utilizing both primary and secondary data, the study examines the prevailing assertions of South Africa as a hegemonic state of southern Africa since its re-emergence from its apartheid doldrums in 1994. From an in-depth theoretical analysis of South Africa’s role in the region, the study concludes that South Africa has made significant contributions (development wise) in the SADC since 1994. Pre-1994 South Africa’s relations with other SADC members were largely characterized by its destabilizing tactics towards the region rather than enhancing regional development. Nonetheless, post-1994 South Africa has undoubtedly established better relationship with the SADC region. It has since used its regional integration standpoint to forge healthier partnership through bilateral, multilateral and various peacekeeping initiatives that sought to improve regional development and security. As a result of its level of development, military might, political stability and robust economy, it has ostensibly become an undisputed regional hegemon of southern Africa.

Perhaps more importantly, it has used its regional hegemony for the benefit of southern Africa through vast investments, increased trade military and peacekeeping agreements. Based on these arguments, the study further outlines that South Africa should however allow other SADC states to have access to its large and diversified markets. With that said, South Africa is still poised to play a robust role in future SADC regional integration frameworks.
Key Words: Foreign Policy, SADC, regional integration, hegemon, South Africa
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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Regional integration is an important factor as it brings with it diverse potential gains for its member states. The necessity for regional integration globally is derived from factors such as increased trade opportunities, elimination of tariffs, enticing foreign direct investments (FDI), increased market size, bilateral arrangements, better regional security mechanisms and infrastructural development (De Melo and Tsikata: 2014). After the end of the cold war, regional integration was viewed as a noteworthy mechanism to enhance economic growth of underdeveloped states, not only in Africa but also globally (Cheru: 2002). From an African perspective, regional integration was viewed as a way of redressing Africa's underdevelopment, colonial heritage and dependence on first world nations (Masemola: 2005). Along these lines and throughout the years, major strides have been taken through the arrangement of regional groupings in Africa. By narrowing this to southern Africa, regional integration includes various states, all possessing diverse degrees of development and economies. Here, South Africa's economy is by far the most developed in contrast with other member states. Accordingly, given South Africa's stronger economy in relation to other SADC states, it is bound to take a development lead in southern Africa (Ogunnubi: 2014).

According to Hengari (2014) the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region has always been viewed as a high priority by the South African Government in its foreign policy relations after 1994. The end of apartheid in South Africa generated conditions favourable to regional political and economic cooperation (Alden and Soko: 2005). Through his seminal paper entitled ‘South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy’ in November 1993, former president of South Africa Nelson Mandela emphasised that:

Southern Africa commands a special significance in our foreign policy, we are intimately part of Southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region (Mandela: 1993).

South Africa became a member of the SADC in 1994 and many arguments arose concerning its role in this regional bloc. According to Matlosa (1997) the policies, actions and strategic

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1 Throughout this study, the word ‘region’ is used to refer to southern Africa and not Africa.
interests of influential states in the international system make smaller states vulnerable. The SADC member states saw South Africa’s political and economic hegemony as impacting negatively on the desired goal of regional integration (Molefi: 2003). Looking at the SADC region, regional integration is expected to restore the uneven development among its member states, such that the existence of a hegemonic state has the potential to interrupt the SADC from achieving its envisioned regional integration goals (Chingono and Nakana: 2009). Small states looked at the economically supreme Republic as a danger to their economic survival while others regarded this as enhancing the prospects for regional development (Molefi: 2003). According to Rumley and Chaturvedi (2015) as South Africa possess the biggest economy in southern Africa, such authority may also spill over to the decision making process in the region. There was uncertainty among SADC member states whether South Africa would use its superior power and leadership to promote regional development and peace-keeping or use its authority to inconsiderately endorse its own national interests like shielding its market from the SADC member states (McGowan and Obeng: 1998).

South Africa is regarded as a key player in stimulating development within the region (Molefi: 2003). The Republic’s admission into the SADC corresponded with a time in which the region was embarking on deeper forms of regional integration. According to Wentworth (n.d) as the major economy in the SADC contributing to 60 percent of the SADC’s total trade and about 70 percent of the SADC’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), South Africa was anticipated to play a very prominent role in the SADC’s regional development framework. South Africa was given the task of investments, finance and health after becoming a SADC member, this was due to its strength in these three sectors (Peters-Berries: 2010). South Africa may be labelled as the economic core of the SADC and its strength economically has the prospective to drive or halt regional integration initiatives in southern Africa. Likewise, the realization of the SADC regional integration program relies on South Africa’s determination to support it. South Africa’s membership within international organisations in the post-apartheid era such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN), G20\(^2\) and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) formation have further given it prestige in the region (Alden and Schoeman: 2013).

\(^2\)Is an international forum of 20 major economies that include 19 individual states consisting of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russian, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, The United Kingdom, The United States and the EU.
It is with this background in mind that the study examines South Africa’s regional integration efforts within the SADC since being admitted to the regional bloc in 1994. The study proposes to assess South Africa’s role in a twofold direction, quest for regional supremacy or desire for regional coalition but with specific emphasis on the Republic’s contribution to regional integration within the SADC region.

1.2 Preliminary Literature Review

The SADC originated from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1992. The latter established in 1980 and was merely projected to offer fortification against the apartheid administration that was prevailing in South Africa at the time rather as a means of fostering regional integration (Zacarias: 1996). The transition from the SADCC to the SADC additionally enriched the latter’s importance of facilitating deeper forms of regional integration. The end of the apartheid regime coupled with the 1994 democratic elections offered South Africa the opportunity to freely initiate economic and diplomatic interactions with other African and regional states, and in August 1994, South Africa became the 11th SADC member state (Mandela: 2010). After its admission as a SADC member, the Republic made amendments to its policy in order to cater for the development of the region (Stromnes: 2014). According to Vale and Maseko (1998) South Africa just like Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is regarded as a state that is capable of leading economic growth initiatives in southern African. Hence, Molefi (2003) asserts that the inclusion of South Africa brought into the region a prominent engine for growth and development as it had a vast and diverse economy than other SADC member states. The significance of its modern infrastructure, natural resources, industrialization and integration globally are essential to the SADC’s prospects of regional integration (Zondi: 2012).

From a geopolitical viewpoint southern Africa has always been of key significance to South Africa’s foreign policy post-1994, while the inclusion of South Africa was seen as a progressive step, the main question was whether the SADC would guarantee that South Africa as an economically influential member would not dictate other regional member states (Lalbahadur: 2015; Muller, Chikozho and Hollingworth: 2015). This was because of South Africa’s economic strength and the major inequalities which exist among the SADC states. The argument additionally explored the possibility of South Africa turning its back against the region and trying instead to form relations with the established states of the north
These factors would present mammoth challenges to regional integration and development. Zondi (2012) argues that the South African government further assured the SADC region that it would resist any temptation to become a regional hegemon at the expense of other member states, but would look to construct a fresh formula of economic collaboration with the SADC states grounded on the ethics of joint benefits and interdependence.

According to Bosl et al (2010) South Africa has occupied the principal role within the SADC to forge closer partnerships which comprise of basic infrastructure expansion, human resource development and the required aptitude to foster regional development. Other notable initiatives have been the critical requisite for good governance, reconciliation and democracy to be fulfilled within the SADC. Van Rooyen (1998) further emphasizes that South Africa can become a substantial force for regional integration as its level of development and authority in the international stage are crucial for the SADC’s developmental agenda. Apart from that, other relative advantages include its resource endowment, private sector, financial strength military strength and market size. To Amos (2010) since South Africa became a SADC member, it has involved itself in the SADC activities. The diverse activities of the SADC including Communication and Transportation, Trade, Agriculture, Mining and Energy are mostly spearheaded by South African companies. These companies have continued to penetrate regional markets and are importantly involved in championing the SADC’s regional development prospects. The economies of other SADC member states have profited from skills transfer, employment creation, tax returns and global links as a result of South African driven business activities (Nganje: 2014). Miller (2004) further stipulates that South Africa’s capability to expertise capital and labour flows within the SADC through its multinational and private companies has boosted the region’s economic growth and created notable regional growth. These companies have benefited the region in a number of ways including, enhanced needed job creation, improved telecommunication services, helped facilitate technology transfer and increased regional investments (Lee: 2011). As a result, billions of ZAR³’s has already been spent by the South African government in infrastructure investments, such makes South Africa a vital base for both regional and continental integration programmes (Hazlewood: 2016). The SADC instigated the Regional Indicative

³ Throughout this study, ZAR will represent the official currency of South Africa, the Rand.
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)\textsuperscript{4} as a linear blueprint guide to enhance its regional integration goals. The RISDP indeed is the SADC’s substantial indicator for the quest of deeper integration with the ambition of acquiring a platform of enhancing regional economic growth.

However, the fulfilment and implementation of the RISDP lies on the willingness and support from southern Africa’s prevalent economy of South Africa (Amos: 2010). Upon gaining power in 1994, regional peace and security have been of utmost importance to the South African government. Within the peacekeeping, mediation and reconstruction agenda, South Africa’s role includes three vital pillars: mediation, post-conflict development and peacekeeping. Significant resources, energy and time have been spent in providing assistance to the SADC member states in these areas (Zondi: 2012).

There are however assured aspects to the presence of South Africa’s hegemonic eminence within the region. These are because of the essential resources and factors of production that it possesses which are very much required not only by member states, but also by the region’s quest for economic development which include its technological flow, economy, military capability and manufacturing output(s) (Leonard: 2006). Consequently, scholars such as Malaudzi (2006); Schirmer (2011); Alden and Soko (2005) and Welz (2013), have questioned South Africa’s role in southern Africa. For example, Malaudzi (2006) maintains that the South African government is not liberally intending to improve the SADC regional economy. He supports this by outlining that by prolonging the obligation of state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) namely the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to fund other major and critical projects in the SADC region, the country preserve its hegemonic control over the SADC’s regional development.

He further goes on to state that, South Africa’s ZAR 1 billion rescue of Zimbabwe in 2000 was not taken as an act of sympathy, but was a way of a wider plot to safe guard South Africa’s deliberate self-interests and to position itself as a sub-imperial super power in the region. South Africa’s robust economic influence has been debatable as there is a likelihood of the South African government acting in terms of its own national interest (Schirmer: 2011). A study by Chidaushe (2010) has gone as far as to question the role and intention of

\textsuperscript{4} The RISDP was incorporated by the SADC leaders in 2003 at the Dar es Salam summit. It aims at assisting the SADC with a comprehensive programme for long term economic and social development over a 15 year period which is subdivided into 3 year sections.
South African companies in the SADC region. Almost all goods and products are imported as finalized goods from South Africa, which hampers local production and opportunities, while local minor to medium businesses cannot compete with the robust competition from South African companies. Moreover, strategic management positions are also usually held by South African personal (Chidaushe: 2010).

On the other end, Alden and Soko (2005) have gone as far as to declare South Africa’s contemporary regional leadership as the ‘era of exploitation’, while Welz (2013) argues that under the president Zuma administration, the foreign policy of South Africa has taken a practical turn, concentrating on deeper participation with the BRIC5 countries and the G20. This outlines a reduced attention in economic cooperation with SADC member states. Some SADC regional leaders have become unconvinced of the post 1994 South African government, while others contend that South Africa’s foreign policy lacks clear framework(s) regarding African development (Kingah and Quiliconi: 2016). While South Africa has not willingly specified its hegemonic desires, its standing as a central power, together with international prospects of its role, have left it with no option but to position itself as an influential player in regional and international politics (Games: 2004). It must however, have the aptitude to manage beneficial political, economic, social and security stability and relations with member states in the region.

1.3 Problem Statement

The SADC was born in 1992, after it predecessor, the SADCC member states signed a treaty to establish it. After its formation, the SADC introduced its own policies and blueprints with the view of attaining economic growth and deeper forms of integration in southern Africa. Although deeper forms of regional integration were of importance to the SADC, the regional bloc had also sought to enhance robust regional partnerships, closer cooperation, unity, peace and security among its member states. After decades of struggle and apartheid rule, the first ever democratic elections in South Africa marked a turning point in its history and politics. After emerging from her apartheid regime, South Africa received a lot of attention within the SADC, continentally and internationally as to what role it was going to play in southern Africa (Hadebe: 2015). This was because now that a democratic South Africa was now realized, a dark cloud hung on countries internationally and in Africa on the direction South

5 These are the combined economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China.
Africa was to take in realigning itself in international and continental politics due to its previous apartheid policies. Accordingly, South Africa soon outlined a foundation by which its foreign policy would be executed to the benefit of the African continent, but perhaps more importantly, to the profit of southern Africa.

Consequently, South Africa committed itself to altering polices of the previous apartheid regime by introducing new policies that were to cater for the development of southern Africa. Before joining the SADC, South Africa’s economy was relatively superior to other SADC states, as a result, its vast resources base was to be utilized to spearhead regional economic growth (Borer and Mills: 2011). While the shift from pre to post-apartheid was seen as a positive transition that sought to implement conditions constructive for regional economic growth with South Africa at the fore of this. This positive transition has over the years been doubtful as a result of the African National Congress’s (ANC) lacking clarity and implementation failures in its foreign policy towards Africa. This has led to some scholars (McGowan, Cornelissan and Nel: 2007; Saunders, Dzinesa and Nager: 2012; Kingah and Quiliconi: 2016) questioning the developmental role South Africa has played since 1994, even going as far as to label its foreign policy to the SADC as lacking vision and execution. These views present worrying and denting arguments for a country that was expected to offer significant development to southern Africa post-1994.

The study attempted to probe the characteristics, polices of regional hegemons (in this case South Africa in the SADC) in demonstrating effective regional leadership qualities (both positively and negatively) particularly post-1994. Of importance to this study therefore, is a need to clearly interrogate South Africa’s regional position (developmental wise) as a result of its economic strength and whether this mounts to regional supremacy or regional coalition in the SADC. This is critical in determining the stance of regional hegemons within a specific bloc.

1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of the study are:

1. To assess South Africa’s foreign policy objectives towards southern Africa.
2. To probe the extent to which South Africa has helped facilitate regional integration in the SADC.
3. To investigate whether South Africa has in anyway used its regional integration standpoint to further (un)-official hegemonic intents or build a stronger regional coalition.

4. To proffer possible recommendations on the roles South Africa can play in future regional integration agenda in the SADC region.

1.5 Research Questions

The study seeks to address the following research questions

1. What are South Africa’s foreign policy, goals and objectives towards southern Africa?
2. How has South Africa assisted to facilitate regional integration within the SADC?
3. To what extent (if any) has South Africa used its regional integration standpoint to further hegemonic intents or facilitate regional coalition?
4. What role can South Africa play in furthering regional integration goals in the SADC region?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The main intention of this research is to analyse South Africa’s role in the SADC since its inauguration to this regional bloc in 1994. This emanates from the fact that since becoming a SADC member, South Africa’s role in the SADC has brought with it many questions and concerns among regional states and the continent at large. Importantly, since the ushering in of the ANC government in 1994, South Africa was viewed as the core to the SADC’s development endeavours. Hence, the aim of this study is to critically examine South Africa’s foreign policy towards the SADC, while further extending its influence to entrench its perceived regional role and hegemonic perspective in southern Africa. This study will assist in shedding light on South Africa’s regional role, more precisely, whether this role has assisted other SADC member states or whether South Africa has merely used its hegemonic position to enhance its own self-interest. It will also undoubtedly assist in offering a sound appraisal on South Africa’s role in southern Africa since its democratic dispensation in 1994.
1.7 Research Methodology

This section elucidates the method employed for the study’s data collection and analysis, particularly how the required information was retrieved and techniques used for the analysis of the data.

The study adopted a qualitative methodology by relying on both primary and secondary sources to collect required data on the topic under study. With regards to primary documents, statements and speeches of the president(s), minister(s) and diplomat(s) together with government documents and those from the SADC secretariat relating to the topic being studied were scrutinized. With respect to secondary sources, the researcher exploited relevant published works from books, journals, newspapers, published and unpublished articles such as dissertations and thesis together with credible and reliable online sources of applicable organizations dealing with and monitoring regional integration in the SADC. The dependence on secondary sources enabled a robust and wider clarification of the topic under investigation. Of further importance, in a bid to supplement existing data on the subject under analysis, the researcher interviewed key academics from different institutions of higher learning and research centres, (see appendix, A, outlining set of research questions). These included one on one interviews with key respondent(s) from the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) in Durban, and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution Disputes (ACCORD) also in Durban. In addition, telephonic interviews⁶ were conducted with other key respondent(s) from the University of Fort Hare and Rhodes University⁷.

The selected academics and researchers are included in the survey due mainly to their expert knowledge in the field of regional integration and also because they gave critical insights with regards to South Africa’s regional integration role within the SADC regional bloc. Evidence unpacked from this range of data sources enabled the researcher to respond to the research questions of the study. Furthermore, the reason for choosing these participants for in-depth one on one interview, in Kwazulu-Natal, is based on a number of considerations including financial constraints, time frame to conduct the research and proximity of the

⁶ All required information that were requested by the interviewees via email before the telephonic interview, i.e., proof of registration, ethical clearance certificate, set of interview questions, details of supervisor and University/research institute affiliation were emailed to them in advanced.

⁷ Preliminary attempt was been made (in consultation with the supervisor) to identify some of these key respondents for one on one and telephonic interviews.
interviewees. In order to alleviate these constraints, the researcher ensured that extensive interviews were conducted in each case.

All data retrieved through primary, secondary sources and key respondents was subjected to comprehensive qualitative analysis through the use of content analysis. Content analysis is a systematic approach to qualitative data analysis that identifies and summarises message content. In essence, it makes use of acute reflection and analysis of primary and secondary data collection. It refers to the analysis of books, brochures, written documents, transcript, news reports, conference reports and visual media (Neuendorf: 2002). This method helped in analysing and reacting from articles from diverse sources.

1.8 Outline of the Study

This dissertation is sub-divided into five chapters. This chapter aims to lay the framework of the argument through conceptualizing the study. Chapter two deals with the appropriate literature on regional integration, while further aiming to account for South Africa’s foreign policy towards southern Africa. In addition, the chapter looks at the triad theories of hegemonic stability, regionalism and the systems theory that assist in the prognosis of the study.

The third chapter unearths the history of regional integration initiatives in southern Africa by probing the motive behind their establishments, policies and treaties introduced, amendments to these and importantly, what led to some of their failure(s). The fourth chapter presents the crux of the argument pertaining South Africa’s engagement with southern Africa post-1994, the chapter evaluates South Africa’s role in the region through observing its investments, trade, military and peacekeeping undertakings in southern Africa. More significantly, the chapter ponders whether South Africa has acted as the perceived regional hegemon or instead formed better coalition arrangements with the SADC region, therefore offering a sound appraisal on its perceived hegemonic standpoint in the region. The fifth chapter offers a summary of the dissertation and concludes by summing up what has been derived and analysed from the study.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

A big limitation encountered by the researcher was the unavailability of required funding to personally travel to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in
Pretoria and the DBSA in Midrand. On the other end, the respondents that were initially earmarked by the researcher were at the time of conducting interviews, either busy, had travelled, were busy with data collection for their own studies or relocated for personal or work related matters, while the researcher would have also loved to interview diplomats from other SADC states based in Pretoria but this was not possible. These limitations are important in the sense that the interviewer would have interviewed key DIRCO officials who are at the fore of South Africa’s role and policy in southern Africa. Moreover, diplomats of other SADC states would have offered their views on South Africa’s relations with their countries. With regards to the DBSA, the researcher could not retrieve significant annual reports from pre-apartheid to 2003, and was told by the bank that in order to get these, the researcher would have to travel to Midrand to their library as they are not made public.

To lessen these limitations, the researcher had to rely on other avenues, which included government websites, online resources such as YouTube, primary and secondary data in order to attain the required information. Moreover, the researcher relied on other interviewees from other universities and research institutes based outside the province, through communicating with them via email.

1.10 Ethical Considerations

A proper ethical procedure was followed by the researcher when dealing with the participant(s). Before the interview commenced, the researcher briefed the participant(s) on the information required from them, the time frame of the interview, why the information was required and how the data would be utilized. Guidelines to be followed include informed consent (the researcher explained the essence of the research being conducted and the signing of the constant agreement form), voluntary participation (the respondents had a choice of responding to the questions or opt out at any time of the interview and participation was optional). Furthermore, confidentiality was assured as, the researcher explained to the participant(s) that all information (data retrieved, contact details) and any other information deemed personal will remain to be stored appropriately and will not be divulged in any manner considered inappropriate. Lastly, there were no incentives as motivation for participants to take part in the interview and all required data retrieved from the respondents were to be treated as confidential.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to review the contributions of relevant literature on the following themes, conceptualising regional integration, the rationale for regional integration in southern Africa and types of regional integration frameworks. The chapter further critiques South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy towards southern Africa. It will aim to address the principle and values that directs the republic’s foreign policy in its relations with the SADC region. Broadly, the review offers an in-depth enquiry into scholarly arguments on the rationale for and perspectives on regional integration. In the latter section, the chapter highlights the theoretical frameworks that support the study. Regionalism and hegemonic stability theory are two theories that provide a useful theoretical background underpinning the study.

2.2.1 Conceptualising Regional Integration

Generally regional integration became an essential phenomenon after the end of the Cold War and ever since there has been a proliferation in the formation of regional integration schemes globally (Heinonen: 2006). Such an increase of regional groups has been as a result of the importance of trade and politics in the global arena. Molefi (2003) argues that integration is seen as a way of overcoming limitations of member states within regional blocs.

According to Wong and Rae (2011) integration as a terminology basically means to bring portions of an item into a complete whole. In economic terms, it outlines the organization of economic undertakings within a state with the aim of fostering the development and growth of a nation (Mutharika: 1972). To Hass (1961) integration is the procedure whereby state actors within diverse national settings are influenced to alter their loyalties, potentials and state actions towards a new centre. Integration thus is the process whereby geographically contiguous nations engage with one another with the aim of forging closer unity (Heinonen: 2006).

As Wallace (1990) argues, integration is also a twofold dimension and consists of formal and informal integration. In his view a state led integration is known as formal integration and
encompasses political activities that include the constructions of institutions and policy establishments. With regards to informal integration it is where non state actors are mostly active with no formal or authoritative intervention in place (Wallace: 1990). Biswaro (2003) adds that regional integration is driven by two critical components, the implementation of joint institutional mechanisms and shared sovereignty.

Mattli (1999) posits that the term regional integration has been in existence for a long period of time yet a precise meaning is not easy to articulate. It tends to mean different things to different people. Generally the term means an alliance of nation states into a whole (Dosenrode: 2010). Furthermore, regional integration may be understood as a process that involves a state’s readiness to share or merge into a larger whole (Madyo: 2008). It includes some cooperation within member countries but with the overall aim of enhancing the general quality of the populace of those member countries.

According to van Ginkel and van Langenhove (2003) regional integration is the method by which states within a specific area increase their level of collaboration with regards to economic, security, political, social and cultural affairs. Therefore, it is the uniting of individual states within a region into a larger whole. According to Van Langenhove (2011) the amount of interaction lies upon the eagerness and assurance of sovereign states to share their sovereignty.

In De Lombaerde and van Langenhove’s (2007) argument, regional integration initiatives should fulfil at least eight essential roles, namely:

- The reinforcement of trade integration in the region
- The formation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector investment
- Development of infrastructure programmes to support economic growth and regional integration
- Implementation of robust public sector institutes and good governance
- The decrease of social rejection and the development of a comprehensive civil society
- Support for peace and security in the region
- The building of environment programmes at the regional level and,
- The strengthening of the regions collaboration with other regions globally.

Fundamentally, the purpose of regional integration is to encourage the interests of all member states. De Lombarde and Van Lagenhove (2007) claim that regional integration aims to bring
regional groupings of bordering countries into a coalition and create an association or community where they work collectively in achieving a set of objective(s) such as economic development and partnerships in different areas.

2.2.2 The rationale of regional integration in southern Africa

According the African Union (n.d) the SADC region (see Figure 2.1) is one of eight recognized regional economic communities within Africa and is situated in the southern tip of the African continent.

Figure 2.1: Map showing the SADC region and its fifteen member states

Source: SADC (2012)

Qobo (2007) asserts that the shift from the SADCC to the SADC propelled the importance for regionalism in southern Africa. Masemola (2005) implies that member states in the SADC region followed an arrangement towards regional integration that has been obvious since the early 1990’s and it has always been perceived by numerous policy makers locally and abroad

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8 At the 37th SADC summit of Heads of States held in Pretoria from 19 to 20 August 2017, under its chairperson, current South African president Mr Jacob Zuma, the SADC admitted the Union of Comoros as the 16th SADC member state.
as a significant policy mechanism which is particularly accurate for developing countries (Masemola: 2005). Regional integration was perceived as a locomotive to improve economic growth in southern African and redeem some independence that was mislaid due to globalization (Gwynne, Klak and Shaw: 2014).

This crucial role of regional integration is further maintained by Molefi (2003) who indicates that the emergence of globalization introduced the agenda for regional integration within many regional blocs globally and within southern Africa. In southern Africa, member states were lacking the capacity to contest the damaging forces of globalization as they possess inadequate economic diversification. This is shown by the SADC member states persistent dependence on the export of primary commodities within the mining and agricultural sector (Molefi: 2003). Such hinders the SADC region to make a noteworthy impact in the global arena. The participation in the global market from southern African nations is from a fragile and disadvantaged perspective (Hough: 1999) which further signifies the rationale of regional integration to unite the position of southern Africa within the African continent and in relation to more advanced global competitors.

Regional integration is pivotal in the sense that it aids the creation of necessary infrastructure, telecommunications, water resources, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and transport networks that numerous poor nations with low levels of development and limited resources are unable to construct on their own (Ansah: 2013). Brumerhoff (2002) argues that the prominence and need for regional integration in southern Africa is noteworthy as:

- a) Self-reliance is what member nations are aiming for
- b) Being industrialised and modernised is what economies are targeting for and
- c) Nations aim at generating higher investments opportunities locally and abroad.

Viewed from a developmental perspective, the evidence of regional integration is understandable within the SADC. Low per capita incomes, lack of essential and necessary resources, not being solid enough to compete on themselves in the world market are some elements observed in some southern African states (Chingono and Nakana: 2009). According to Kennes (2000) in order to decrease the cost of individual operations to doing business as a regional bloc, there was a need to integrate available resources together. Oden (1996) contends that major questions concerning the formation of regional integration are: Why
should the SADC member states be attracted to increased regionalisation? Would regional integration be a healthier tactic than, for example, countries individually trying to forge links with first world countries of the north? He then argues that larger markets tend to be more attractive for foreign and domestic investors. This is one of the classical theoretical arguments for the need of regional integration (Oden: 1996).

Tau (2003) further stresses that regional integration is vital in southern Africa as it aims at fostering faster economic growth that is retarding development in some nations, attract more FDI and achieving higher standards of living. States may also enjoy access to the international markets not as individual nations, but as a larger unit hence profiting from improved bargaining power in negotiations. This can further amend fundamentals such as skewed integration, uneven development and trade inequality. A report by the African Development Bank (2014) considers regional integration to be a strategic means for southern African states to raise broad and inclusive growth. Some states within the region possess minor and disjointed domestic markets, are often landlocked and sometimes conflict-driven such that belonging into a regional bloc may assist in decreasing such burdens (African Development Bank: 2014).

Chingono and Nakana (2009) offered another important argument for the rationale for regional integration in southern Africa as the certainty that there is strength and power in numbers together with unity as such may speed the pace of development while enhancing security. Landahl (2004) notes that the belief in regional integration will enable weaker nations within the SADC region to strengthen their voice in global affairs and merge their minor markets with other more competitive ones which will consequently allow them the platform to compete with other assembled regional markets. Furthermore, even if member states do not have similar challenges, they may still need and benefit from regional arrangements. Therefore the benefits of regional integration can be larger economic space which promotes economies of scale and thus foster faster growth mechanisms and competitiveness (Chingono and Nakana: 2009).

2.2.3 Types of regional integration arrangements

According to Radelet (1999) regional integration also consists of regional integration arrangements and these are aimed at decreasing discrimination among member states with regards to factors of production, foreign and domestic goods and services. According to the
Economic Commission for Africa (2004); Salami (2016) and Madyo (2008) types of regional integration arrangements include:

2.2.3.1 Preferential trade area, PTA

In this type of arrangement member states reduce or remove tariffs in imports manufactured by other member states but maintain any level of trade barriers for non-member nations (Economic Commission for Africa: 2004). According to Won et al (2006) such an arrangement increases trade capacities among the involved member nations. For instance, Lakshmanan and Anderson (1999) assert that the North American free trade arrangement (NAFTA) aimed at increasing trade between Canada, Mexico and the United States of America while also abolishing all tariffs including import licenses. Here the United States enhanced its imports of vegetables and fruits from Mexico and again changed its textile trading partners of India and China and imported textile from Mexico (Won et al: 2006). Myers (2016) though asserts that the abolishment of tariffs within NAFTA fully came into effect in 2008. Since being implemented the NAFTA has eliminated most trade obstacles to free trade among these triad states and has improved trade, investments, economic growth and wider selection of consumer goods within member nations.

2.2.3.2 Free trade area, FTA

This arrangement is realized when involved members have signed a free trade treaty. Tariffs among member states are generally eliminated although member nations may determine their own tariffs on imported goods from non-member states (Salami: 2016). According to Madyo (2008), generally an FTA is a treaty forecasted at progressively abolishing all trade restrictions while objectively aiming to attain impeccable competition between industries of member states. An example of this is the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) established on the 1 of January 1993. The initial AFTA arrangement outlined that tariffs on all manufactured goods consisting of an ASEAN content of at least 40 % were to be reduced to a 0-5 percentage rate (Bowles and MacLean: 1996). The regional bloc has been able to remove all import and export related duties among its member nations (Myers: 2016). Another notable regional formation was the pacific alliance regional grouping established in 2012 which agreed in 2014 to abolish tariffs by up to 92% of trade between its member nations who are Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (Villarreal: 2016). The aim was to enhance the already existing bilateral trade arrangements between these nations while further integrating their
economies and allow free flow of goods, capital, people and services (Knight, Castro-Rea and Ghany: 2016).

Basically one of the significant components of the FTA is to increase bilateral trade amongst the involved participants (Bowles and MacLean: 1996).

2.2.3.3 Common Union, CU
A custom union (CU) is possible where tariffs are abolished and free movements of components of production like (capital, technology and labour) are permitted to move through national borders within the integration jurisdiction (Economic Commission for Africa: 2004; Salami: 2012). The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) exemplifies the necessary characteristics of a CU. It eliminates quantitative restrictions and duties on the importation (within the customs region) of products developed, produced or manufactured within member nations (Van der Merwe: 1991).

2.2.3.4 Common Market, CM
According to the SADC (2012) a common market (CM) is when two or more nations enter into an arrangement to abolish all trade barriers among themselves. They also introduce mutual tariffs and permit for the free movement of labour, services and capital among themselves. Salami (2016) asserts that a CM has all the components of a CU. An example of a regional community that features these components is the European Union (EU). Within the EU there is free movement of goods, services, capital and labour (Lenz: 2016).

2.2.3.5 Economic and Monetary Union
This is a CM with combined fiscal and monetary policies and a mutual currency. Within this arrangement member states intend to fully harmonize national economic policies by also having free flow of capital together with fixed exchange rates (Economic Commission for Africa: 2004). According to Fink and Salvatore (1999) European countries in 1991 approved a treaty on the EU (the Maastricht treaty) deciding that Europe would adopt a single currency in the 21st century. Thus, the EU is a perfect illustration of a regional body that employs this form of arrangement. The use of a single currency (the Euro) in Europe came into effect in
1999 (Car Baugh: 2014) which today is being shared by nineteen EU members⁹ (AR chick: 2016).

2.2.3.6 Political Union

This is where national governments concede sovereignty over social and economic policies to a supranational authority (Economic Commission for Africa: 2004). According to Peters-Berries (2010) this level has proven to be the most difficult to attain within the global arena. A regional body that has come closest to achieving it is the EU though treaties to implement it were foiled at national levels. The EU has embraced several features of a political union though not attaining it entirely. It possesses all the components of an economic union, political structures of a political union such as regional institutes, the European parliament and parts of a regional government and administration (Peters-Berries: 2010). Member nations may decide to begin with any of the aforementioned arrangements, but many start by removing impediments to trade among themselves (Economic Commission for Africa: 2004).

Tau (2000) concludes with the view that the importance of regional integration is that nations unite with the trust that it will gradually improve their economic and political conditions and further assist in achieving gains from new trade opportunities, larger market access, political stability and increased competition. Member states may add contribution in different forms which may result in the growth of free movement of people, goods and services, increase investment prospects and a superior market pool for all member states. The implementation of integration may also be of political issues, like the motive to close ranks on a common threat, increase a state’s bargaining power and have more power in global affairs (Tau: 2000). And in various instances integration results in increased returns on investments, enable larger investments, encourage multinational industries to relocate and also oblige governments to increase bargaining power (Economic Commission for Africa: 2004).

2.3 Impediments to regional integration

It is acknowledged that the establishment of regional blocs has been necessitated by the desire to improve the level of economic development while also integrating the economies within the respective regions. However, there are also pitfalls that hinder the successful realization of regional integration attempts.

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⁹ These members comprise of Belgium, Germany, Republic of Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined in 2009, 2011, 2014 and 2015 respectively (European Commission: 2016; Kahn: 2008).
According to Saco (2006) successful realization of regional integration is still hampered by conflicts within some nations continentally. Within the SADC region, a nation that is at times affected by such is the DRC. Conflict prone regions limit the level of a nation’s development, confine the chance of acquiring external FDI, damage the already limited infrastructure, and restrict economic activities and the flow of trade. Kimunguyi (2006) further asserts that, these conflicts also affect neighbouring nations as they may find it challenging to export or import products to and from a country that is conflict driven. Within the DRC, some areas remain ungovernable as a result of such conflicts and being controlled by rebel groups (Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott: 2016).

Other prominent fundamentals here include high transaction expenses caused by inadequate transportation services, lack of commitment by leaders and partial administrative resources (Khandelwal: 2004). According to Kimunguyi (2006) because of such difficulties, small nations are the ones more affected by trade engagements with better industrialized nations. The SADC region’s overambitious objectives has also hampered its regional integration endeavours. The SADC had set targets which it failed to implement within its stipulated time frame. For instance, after signing the trade protocol in 2001, it sought to loosen 85% of trade regionally by 2008, 100% of regional trade by 2012, implement a Customs Union (CU) by 2010 and a monetary union in 2016. All these targets were missed by the SADC (Mapuva J and Mapuva LM: 2014). Overlapping memberships have also created a daunting task for the SADC to fully implement its regional integration programmes. The SADC region has regional members who also belong to other regional formations (Tau: 2000). According to Mays and DeLancey (2002) there is the SACU, consisting of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, who are also members of the SADC. Eight SADC nations also hold membership to the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), while there is also the Common Monetary Area (CMA) which comprises South Africa, Lesotho Namibia and Swaziland. These nations also partake in the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF). Such is an obstacle to successful regional integration as it creates conflict of interest. Khandelwal (2004) further asserts that this brings with it added costs, such as administrative costs and membership fees.

10 Is a framework that intends to simplify cross border commercial movement by abolishing obstacles to cross border flows of goods, services, capital and labour (Mutai: 2003).
According to Mapuva J and Mapuva LM (2004) these different groupings may have different approaches to regional integration that may result in confusion and drafting of inconsistent policies. As such this has hindered some of the development of the SADC as other SADC and SACU members have in various instances explored other available economic opportunities with other regional groups. Different levels of development with the SADC members may be viewed as another pitfall to successful attainment of regional integration. This is because stronger nations like South Africa use their level of superiority to dictate to other members in the region, as the Republic plays a vital role in the decision making processes both within the SACU and the SADC. Being a highly developed nation within a regional bloc grants you such leverage over other member countries (Mahao: 2006).

South Africa’s economy is able to attract diverse trading partners globally and has not as perceived, shown a stronger commitment to regional integration within the region. Such inequality tends to promote unfairness in the distribution of gains from trade towards the larger nations regionally (Proff: 1998). With these elements trade imbalances will continue to fluctuate tremendously which will lead to wider economic gaps among regional members. South Africa within the SADC and Nigeria within ECOWAS will thus continue to dictate the pace of economic growth and intra-regional trade within their respective regional bodies. Vast imbalances (infrastructure, finance, technological advancement and GDP) allow larger members to flout protocols without much objection from other regional members (Mapuva J and Mapuva LM: 2014).

Realizing the full benefits of regional integration within the African continent has not been easy and is still far from being achieved. The continent is still hampered by corruption, political instability, economic volatilities, high poverty levels, and limited infrastructure (Gwala: 2014). Furthermore prosperous regional integration necessitates significant quantity of dedication and obligation from all member nations involved irrespective of their level of development to realize the full potential of the process in the long run. According to Kimunguyi (2006) African leaders and regional formations should implement an African model of integration that links to the challenges and realities faced by the continent. These include among other things major inequality gaps among nations, political instability, corruption, poor infrastructure, high levels of HIV/AIDS endemic and rapid unemployment. Likewise regional institutions need to be less ambitious and set more realistic and attainable
objectives for integration, while taking into account the economic gaps that exist among member countries (Mistry: 2000).

2.4 An overview of South Africa’s foreign policy towards southern Africa

This section aims to highlight South Africa’s foreign policy perceptions about southern Africa in the post-apartheid era. The aim is to unpack the dynamics of the Republic’s foreign policy right from the Mandela administration. This is pivotal in the sense that, the year 1994 marked the moment where Pretoria launched ambitious plans to outline its commitments to the African continent in terms of continental and regional growth. Some of these were to invest in economic growth and development, promote peace and forge closer links with other African nations (Marthoz: 2012). The intention here is to unveil whether these initially outlined fundamentals have been successfully implemented by Pretoria and if so to what degree of consistency.

According to Marthoz (2012) it has been a long way from the apartheid era where South Africa was regarded as a pariah nation that had a destructive foreign policy that primarily aimed at defending the white minority rule. After the abolishment of the white minority rule in 1994, the Republic’s foreign policy was rooted on the notion of curbing the imbalances of the past (pre-1994). Fundamental to these were rectifying Pretoria’s fragile relations with its African neighbours and to be a key player within continental development endeavours (Alden and Le Pere: 2004). To Stephen (2005) South Africa’s foreign policy may be drawn from two historical segments. The first segment from 1948 – 1994 was under the leadership of the National Party (NP)11 while the second segment was that of the ANC since 1994. The transition period from 1990 – 1994 is also covered under the second period. Pfister (2000) outlines that because of the Republics strong military, its apartheid policy towards the southern African may be termed as being dominant. The apartheid regime relied on aspects such as restriction of transportation routes and trade so its neighbours may be reliant on it. There was huge hostility against South Africa’s foreign policy from the international community, European countries and other African states during apartheid period (Stephen: 2005).

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11 Founded in 1915, the NP was the governing party of the Union of South Africa. It came into power in 1948 until 1994 and dispersed in 1997. Among its policies included the segregation arrangement of apartheid and the promotion of the Afrikaner Party (Ramutsindela: 1997).
According to Rizzi and Schutz (2014) when South Africa became an independent state in 1994 after the ANC won the first ever democratic elections with a majority of (62.65%), it also received the platform to alter its apartheid foreign policy that had branded the Republic as a racist and authoritarian state. It had to integrate more aspects of unity, security, human rights, development and ensure a robust working relationship with other southern African regional members (ANC: 1994). Against this context the post 1994 foreign policy of South Africa was viewed by the ANC as a strategy to enhance further development within the Republic’s geographical area and the southern African region.

A year earlier to South Africa gaining independence, former president Mr Nelson Mandela had already uttered numerous principles that would support the Republic’s prospect foreign policy (Mandela: 1993). According to Le Pere (n.d) when the ANC distributed a full foreign policy manuscript titled “Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa” it contained seven principles that were to monitor the comportment of South Africa’s new foreign policy. These were:

- A notion in and concern regarding human rights that spreads beyond politics but embraces economic, environmental and social proportions.
- A notion that just and long-term solutions to the troubles of humankind may simply come via the promotion of democracy globally
- A trust that justice and international law must monitor relations among states
- A belief that global peace is the aim that all states must aim for
- A belief that the foreign policy of South Africa ought to replicate the importance of Africa
- A notion that the economic development of South Africa relies on the rising regional and international economic cooperation and
- A notion that the foreign affairs of South Africa must emulate a deep pledge to the consolidation of its democracy (ANC: 1994).

Alden and Le Pere (2004) further maintain that South Africa’s foreign policy is evaluated in its regional context and with regards to uphold regional conflict and the promotion of development. According to the ANC (1994) South Africa shares a superior bond with the populace of southern Africa, many of whom witnessed suffering because of the Republic’s apartheid regime but not only that, as observed by Le Pere (n.d) but also for the fact the southern region aided and endured the Republic’s battle for liberation while also offering
material support. The South African foreign policy sees the SADC a priority in its
development endeavours (Hengari: 2014). Mills (n.d) further outlines that the SADC region
make up a significant precedence in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy through the
promotion of democracy, justice, security, trade and human rights.

According Alden and Le Pere (2004) the ANC and numerous South African corporations
assumed greater working partnerships which would prove vital for efforts to trigger growth
and development between southern African and South Africa in general. South Africa has
made the pursuit of economic development blueprints through regional integration an
important aspect of its foreign policy in the region (Mill: n.d). With regards to regionalism in
the region the Republic emphasized on an integration based on democratic ethics (Mkalipi:
2002) and ensuring that democracy is enhanced by economic development. This would be
achieved by drawing a foundation favourable for the realization of human rights, peace and
equity (ANC: 1994). South Africa was to offer the SADC region how transformation may be
achieved by offering prominence on development of industrial policies, trade and
infrastructural development in the region while also viewing itself as an advocate and role
player in industrialization in the region (Hengari: 2014).

South Africa was to further commit to promoting healthier harmony with all the populace of
southern Africa. Philosophies that were going to drive the reconstruction of post-apartheid
South Africa specifically towards southern Africa included:

- The enhancement of a fresh regional partnership that will be based on shared venture
  with the southern African population which won’t be executed by additional regional
  forces or self-proclaimed regional power.
- Regional security and co-operation that imply aggressive approaches will have no part
  in the restoration of the southern African regional relations. A peace and development
  driven method to regional cooperation should be implemented.
- A democratic South Africa that would relinquish all hegemonic desires within the
  southern African region. It would further avoid the use of force to be the region’s
  “regional power” at the expense of its neighbours but would look to produce a
  programme of collaboration in southern Africa driven by shared benefit and
  interdependence (ANC: 1994).
South Africa opted for a need, plan or outline that seeks to endorse improved integration and co-operation in the SADC region so as to rectify the severe inequities of the past (ANC: 1994). With regards to its foreign policy in southern Africa, DIRCO (2015) in its latest strategic plan states that southern Africa is still the main agenda for South Africa’s policy and action to realize development and regional integration within all developmental related sectors. DIRCO further entails that South Africa’s policy within the region is constructed on three pillars which are (a) to strengthen, maintain and reinstate political concord and cohesion in the region, (b) realizing deeper economic integration and (c) to expand and increase regional infrastructure.

The new democratic South Africa had outlined various principles to guide it post 1994 foreign policy. According to Pfister (2000) despite the Republic’s determination to undertake the leadership role in the region, such is far from being realized. Mkalipi (2002) for instance points to the Lesotho situation in 1998 where the tiny landlocked nation experienced political instability following its elections. After weeks of political mayhem and unsuccessful negotiations by South Africa, war was imminent as a military coup was about to materialize on 22 of September 1998. It is only then that South African troops with their Botswana counterparts intervened in Lesotho under the guidance of the SADC initiative in peacekeeping (Mkalipi: 2003). Pfister (2000) observes that such a blunder shows a lack of rationality in the Republic’s foreign policy towards neighbouring nations in the region as the political crisis in Lesotho was observable as early as July 1998 but the Republic did not take any action.

Prior to the political instability, South Africa’s diplomatic role was frail as the Langa Commission accountable for carrying out an audit on the 1998 Lesotho elections failed to release the report on time. Mkalipi (2002) points to another incident in the DRC in 1997 between the national government and the rebels which was more serious than that of Lesotho. South Africa decided not to dispatch the army but tried a diplomatic path and negotiated a settlement to the dispute. This also signals that lack of coherence in the Republic’s foreign policy framework since 1994 (Mkalipi: 2002).

Prys (2012) draws in another factor in the failed foreign policy of South Africa in the SADC with the case of Zimbabwe. This is reference to the power sharing negotiations between the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF). South Africa failed remarkably to be the chief negotiator in these
negotiations and this demonstrated the little influence the Republic has in southern Africa. Furthermore, as noted by Prys (2012) South Africa’s incompetence to resurrect Zimbabwe’s economy, political violence between ZANU-PF and the MDC, the nation’s standard of living together with the Republic’s failing to meet international expectations to curb this hindrance within the southern African region further demonstrates South Africa’s sluggish approach when rectifying some of these complications within its neighbours. Dr Pamela Johnson\textsuperscript{12} opines about South Africa’s foreign policy in the region as she says it seems to be:

Pragmatic and unambitious. There are no plans to undertake bold steps that would transform the region in terms of forming a strong bloc headed by a clearly defined hegemonic project.

So far it rightfully seems as if the Republic has somewhat been unsuccessful in fully executing its declared idealistic foreign policy, it has proven to be more challenging than theoretically explained. Alden and Le Pere (2004) further hold the view that the Republic’s failure to accomplish conflict resolution in southern Africa pinpoints hindrances in its experiences in achieving its foreign policy aim on regional security.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

Regionalism, Hegemonic Stability and the Systems Theory are three main theories to conceptualize the dynamics of my research. These theoretical frameworks share the essential assumptions about building multilateral institutions, closer cooperation, cross border trade, power, dominance, force, exploring the interconnectedness and relationship of different actors within a particular system and rules between states within the regional and international system (Soitros: n.d).

2.5.1 Regionalism

To Hettne and Sodertaum (1998) regionalism is a complex mixture of attitudes, loyalties and opinions that concentrates the minds of the people upon what they ascertain to be regional. Regionalism becomes politically inspired when cross border trades and the perceived need for closer cooperation are acknowledged by member states, and when government reacts to these internal and external forces by means of trying to find a trans-national level of governance. The word region is derived from the Latin word ‘regio’ that pertains to an area

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or wider geographical jurisdiction recognized by similar features. According to Gochhayat (2003) regionalism is a philosophy and political motion that aims to encourage the origin of regions. To Nye (1968) a region is comprised of a determined number of nations associated by a geographical connection. A level of common interdependence and regionalism results from the creation of regional associations on the basis of regions. Regionalism is also multidimensional as it concerns political, social and economic activities between nations.

The occurrence and flow of regionalism was mainly observed after the end of the cold war\(^\text{13}\) (Hanggi, Roloff and Ruland: 2006). According to Borzel (2011) regional formations seemed to gain strength after the war as they were seen as a mechanism in which states could cooperate to gain peace, constancy, social justice and wealth. The formation of the UN created a dispute on whether regional establishments would be more suitable than global organizations to resolve disagreements and conflicts amongst geographically adjacent nations (McCandless and Karbo: 2011). According to Ferabolli (2015) regionalism is an effort by a group of states that intend to advance their political, economic, social or cultural collaboration. These might be classified in the form of regional integration, regional cooperation, development integration and market integration. Yi (2007) asserts that regionalism may also be related with policy programmes (objectives to be attained) and strategies (ways and mechanisms through which objectives should be attained). Regionalism in Africa may be traced back to the pre-independence era where the regionalist desire found expression in Pan-Africanism\(^\text{14}\) (Otobo: 2004). Otobo (2004) further implies that although this period was during the colonial era, few regional formations were created. One prominent example of such an establishment is the SACU established in 1910.

Regionalism by African leaders was perceived as a respected approach to unite the continent both economically and politically (Asante: 1997). Regionalism has the capacity to convert minor market spaces of individual states into a bigger monetary, economic and trading arena (Otobo: 2004). The global economy is extremely competitive and the likelihood of African states surviving on their own is tough. In southern Africa regional integration was grounded on the philosophy that regionalism could be a functional and realistic influence to economic

\(^\text{13}\) This was a state of political resentment that occurred from 1945 to 1990 between Nations controlled by the Soviet Union and Nations controlled by the United States of America.

\(^\text{14}\) Has its foundation in the struggles of the African people against enslavement and colonisation. It is founded on the certainty that harmony is vital to economic, social and political growth and aims to unite and improve individuals of African origin (Kinni: 2015).
development (Chingono and Nakana: 2009). According to Borzel and Risse (2016) material gains are the core drivers for regionalism, as nations anticipate obtaining benefits by transacting with each other. Such benefits embrace reduced transaction costs, economies of scale, technological transfer and innovation, improved FDI and more exposure to international markets (Boas: 2001). Therefore the formation of the SADC may be interpreted as an institutional body fixed on a process of regionalization intended at increasing the security of the region through a variety of initiatives aimed at promoting economic growth and development.

The research will utilize this theory as a basis to explain cooperation within southern African states in the formation of the SADC as the expression of regionalism as member states had a common interest of personality and their purpose was also in line with one another. The theory is significant in the explanation of the motive behind the establishment of the SADC regional grouping. Moreover, this theory is useful in the study as it assists in informing the rationale as to why states formulate policies to strengthen closer working relations and collaboration in diverse aspects such as trade, security and investment opportunities.

2.5.2 Hegemonic Stability
According to Yilmaz (2010) the word ‘hegemon’ emanates from the Greek word ‘Hegemonias’ which basically articulates dominant and oppressive status of one component in the structure over another. A hegemonic nation is one that has the essential authority (military, political and economic) in a precise region or international system (Puchala: 2005; Ogunnubi: 2014). Snidal (1985) asserts that a hegemon has the position, competence and influence to alter the procedures and norms of a region or international system centred on one’s specific inspiration or desire.

On the origin of the concept of hegemony, the most renowned work can be credited to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci in his series on Prison Notebooks written between 1929 and 1935 (Adamson: 1980). He introduced this word from studying the works of Francesco Gucciardini and Nicollo Machiavelli. Gramsci’s work derived from the Prison Notebooks is drawn from the failures of Italian Communist Party to halt Benito Mussolini and his fascists party from acquiring power (Gramsci: 1971). From a broader perspective it was constituted from the failure of the German revolution and other unrests in Europe which paved the “pessimism of the intellect”, appearing to support the irresistible authority of middle-class philosophy, institutions and relative weakness of the working class in its capability to
overthrow capitalism (Gramsci: 1971). Gramsci sought to understand the effects that yield the stability of power relations within politically structured societies maintained by a nation. He further argued that the hegemon demonstrates its power within suitable procedures and the lower classes become adapted to their position of political and social demotion and economic victimisation (Hoare and Smith: 1999). According to Bozdaglioglu (2009) the reason for the study of hegemon by theorists is that the concentration of supremacy by a single state has the implications of amending the sequence of interstate political relations.

Hegemony outlines how a superior middle-class uses its preponderance over other classes in a way that forces them to comply with its economic and political plan (Ake: 1981). To Stoddart (2007) hegemonic supremacy acts to persuade social classes and individuals to pledge to the standards and norms of an integrally exploitative system and such power is always challenged and always incomplete. Web and Krasner (1989) argue that international economic openness and constancy are likely when there is a single leading nation. This is the most perceptible technique used by numerous political analysts to enlighten models of economic relations amongst the progressive capitalist countries since 1945. According to Gramsci (1971) the middle-class possesses a method of ideological hegemony above the rest and its strength is both central within state setup and also disseminated via family traditions, society and the media. Such hegemonic thoughts are from the ruling class which are forms of inequality and oppression.

Joseph (2002) states that there are two methods social groups utilize to demonstrate their influence and these are by domination and by intellectual and moral leadership. For the ruling class to maintain its hegemony, it is required to occasionally distribute its philosophies within the society. Hegemony is forever developing and not stagnant and for the dominant group to maintain the support of its subordinate from which it depends, it needs to restructure its philosophy from time to time. The theory also explains the historic eras of the end of the 19th century and the end of the cold war (Podliska: 2007). Podliska (2007) further asserts that this was when Great Britain in the 19th century and the United States at the end of the cold war prospered in revolving the anarchic global political environment to a stable and peaceful one while also enhancing global economic growth. Basically the theory was a theoretical modification of a mutual observation in post-war within international relations. After 1945, the United States supremacy was the cornerstone of the successful global capitalist economy. During the late 1940’s the United States possessed
unequalled influence and respect (Milner and Moravcsik: 2009). To Kindleberger (1973) the leading state must deliver public goods in order to uphold constancy in the international arena. A hegemonic state not only can revoke current rules or avert the acceptance of rules that it disputes, but can also play the leading role in creation of new ones the either suit or benefit it. (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner: 1998). Raw materials must also be controlled by the hegemon, together with sources of capital, markets and competitive advantage in the manufacturing of extremely valued goods. The hegemon has a means of leadership over other economies through the regulation of financial capital, particular technologies and natural resources (Gilpin: 1987).

Factors of a hegemonic power may be determined in material forms and classified in four phases.

- The first is the military. The hegemon must possess sufficient and latest military power and have the ability to assure the security measures of the whole geographical region. This entails the need for appropriate forces that are adequately skilled, equipped, prepared for duty and capable of being successful in any arising dispute within the region.

- The second material factor is the dominance over production. The hegemon must have a diverse production industry and produce a high volume of goods in relation to its member states. It must also have ultimate control of sources of raw materials, energy, food and usage of approaches of managing and administration that adds to its dominance over other states. Such is supported by its logistical dominance that offers it the platform to intervene and ascertain the movement of international trade, transportation and storage.

- The third factor in finance. Finance gives the hegemon the platform over credit decisions on where investments must occur and allows access to capital ownership and foreign exchange investing and price control.

- The last factor is the technological power. The hegemon must possess the latest and advanced technological machinery. In needs this power in order to be ahead of other states and invent new products and processes and thus also giving security forces the latest weaponry and communication devices (Augusto and Faria: 2003).

Generally, the theory undertakes that the international system or region is expected to remain constant when a lone nation state is the dominant world power or hegemon. When a hegemon
demonstrates leadership via coercion, diplomacy or persuasion, it is essentially deploying its prevalence power (Agnew: 2005). This is termed hegemony as it refers a nation’s capacity to solely control the procedures and measures of international politics and economic relations.

Hegemonic stability can be used to explain why a group of nations in the emerging world have established to creation of a regional cooperation agreement. Emerging countries have no competences of featuring in the global environment by themselves (Volz: 2011). A developing nation has the authority to influence its regional neighbours but not the international system. Regional hegemons aim at continually increasing their influence and negotiating abilities via other nations or regional groups by placing in action strategies for their national growth and making regional cooperation treaties (Molefi: 2003).

In contrast, a hegemonic state aims at continually accumulating its power and its negotiating aptitudes towards other states by placing in action procedures for their national development while also producing regional cooperation arrangements with them (Podliska: 2007). South Africa plays the role of hegemon in southern Africa. The republic possesses all the resources to be viewed as a hegemon (Mandela: 2012). Its economy, technological, resources, financial strength and military strength have helped facilitate and contribute to the SADC regional integration agenda. The Republic’s constant inner political environment post-apartheid in relation with the internal instability of many member states and the more internationalized position of South Africa has given the country the power to control the process of regional integration within the SADC (Oden: 1993).

The theory rightfully posits that for a precise region to function and uphold its status in the international arena, it necessitates the presence of a hegemonic and dominant nation. The theory relates to the study as it assists in assessing South Africa’s regional integration intentions with the SADC. Furthermore it will assist in evaluating if South Africa has in anyway used its regional integration opinion to further its hegemonic intents. Such is crucial to the study as it explains the role being played by South Africa in the SADC regional bloc.

2.5.3 Systems Theory

According to Laszlo and Krippner (1998), in the 1960’s systems thinking was viewed as an ideal attempt at scientific experimental integration and theory formation within the interdisciplinary field. Renowned scholars of the system theory include Alfred North Whitehead, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth Boulding, Paul Alfred Weiss, Ralph Gerard, Kurt Lewin, Roy Grinker, William Gray, Nicolas Rizzo, Karl
Menninger and Silvano Arieti (Vancouver: 1996). The system theory has been utilized by governments for more than thirty years (McKinney and Howard: 1998). The most celebrated contribution of this theory particularly in the field of Public Administration was by David Easton (McKinney and Howard 1998). The theory considers:

- A system to be viewed as a complicated element, cooperating as an organized unit
- The dependence of the segments is important as the adjustment in one may impact the other and
- There has to be a stream of information within the system (Cunningham: 2005; McKinney and Howard: 1998).

The significance of involving system thinking within development initiatives is critical, mainly due to the reason that the parties involved in such initiatives like the public sector, private sector, and civil society are regarded as part of a complex and sophisticated system. The systems theory may also assist in interpreting the experiences whereby outlined mediation within systems end up not functioning as projected and why unanticipated effects arise (Cunningham: 2005). The general view of the theory is to explore the interconnectedness, complexity and wholeness of different segments of systems with regards to alliance with one another. Such may assist involved parts in becoming fragmented due to the inadequacy on interaction which may entail one part of the system to disrupt another. According to Tamas (2000) integration and development initiatives mainly comprise of setting development goals, outlining plans to achieve such goals, executing frameworks to attain such goals and evaluating and monitoring the success of targets. Pointedly the theory will be significant in providing crucial insight for the study in relating diverse components involved in regional integration which importantly involves decision making, policy formations, public-private partnerships and execution of development projects. Furthermore the critical elements of the theory is significant in its theoretical positioning for narrating and analysing the relatedness of government, SOE’s, private sector and civil society in the context of their collective role towards regional development within the SADC region.

The triad theoretical frameworks assist in the logical prognosis of the study as firstly they enlighten the motive for nations wanting to formulate policies to enhance closer cooperation on aspects such as trade, politics and security and to further advance their relevance within their continent or regional bloc. Secondly, the selected theoretical frameworks provide in part some understanding regarding why some states are more dominant than others in their region.
and the degree to which such dominance impacts on the regional development and closer cooperation in that precise geographical area. Perhaps more importantly, these theories further demonstrate how different segments with a particular system relate, connect and work together to achieve specific targets.

2.6 Conclusion

Basically this chapter was divided into four sections. The first section offered the rationale for regional integration in southern Africa. This was done by reviewing scholarly articles on the prominence of regional integration within the region. The second section highlighted the impediments of regional integration within the African continent though with a particular emphasis on those hindering the SADC region. The chapter further depicted on South Africa’s foreign policy towards southern Africa in the post-1994 era with the intention of addressing the principles and values that direct Pretoria’s foreign policy relations with its adjacent neighbours. Lastly, the three theories underpinning this study (regionalism and hegemonic stability and systems theory) were highlighted in the latter segment of the chapter while offering the aspiration for their utilization.

The chapter elucidates that regional integration is viewed as a locomotive by member states to tighten and enhance beneficial trade, economic and developmental relations while also attracting foreign investment(s). While belonging to a regional group such as the SADC has gradually assisted some member states economic growth endeavours, various barriers are still impeding on the regions development progress moving forward. In this case, these include internal conflicts like in the DRC, unrealistic targets projected by the SADC and the unreliability of South Africa’s foreign policy to southern Africa. These regional barriers could perhaps be strengthened if economically robust regional states such as South Africa realign its foreign policy instrument(s) towards the region for it to be more rigid and reliable as this will be vital in the future development of the SADC. Since the dawn of a democratic South Africa, its foreign policy towards the SADC has thus far been ambiguous. Likewise, the SADC as a regional body should set realistic blueprint targets that are reasonable and attainable in the required time frame. These should however take into account that southern Africa is characterised by states that possess limited resources.
CHAPTER THREE
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

3.1 Introduction

The overall aim of the previous chapter (two) was to review relevant literature pertaining to regional integration in the SADC region. Moreover, it intended to evaluate South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994, particularly with an emphasis on its policies towards the southern African region. After being inaugurated as the first black South African president in 1994, former South African President Mr Nelson Mandela outlined that southern Africa will enjoy significant importance in Pretoria’s foreign policy while also promoting democracy and human rights regionally (Mandela: 1993). Lastly, the chapter evaluated the theories on regionalism and hegemonic stability, as analytical framework for the study. Both theories provide substantial explanation and fundamental aspects as to why nations engage in building and enhancing closer cooperation, trade and bilateral agreements. Moreover, the theories offer nuanced understanding as to why other states utilize force, power and domination and the extent to which these factors hinder a region’s development process. From a southern African perspective, regionalism aimed at improving economic growth ventures through political, economic, social and cultural collaboration. As for the hegemonic stability theory, it correctly shows that for a region to remain constant and sustain its prominence globally, there is the necessity for a regional power in that specific regional bloc.

Moving forward, this chapter draws from primary and secondary data to provide a historical account of regional integration initiatives in southern Africa and to consider factors that have contributed to successive regional frameworks and protocols. Discussion on the evolution and background of regional integration in southern Africa will be drawn from as early as 1910 with the formation of the SACU. Furthermore, the chapter examines the formation of other regional integration establishment sequel to the SACU which include the Frontline States (FLS), the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), the SADCC and the SADC. Analysis is also provided on the justification for their formation, failure and amendments to existing treaties. The chapter further offers an insight into the role played by the DBSA in terms of offering financial and advisory assistance on enhancing regional infrastructure development in the SADC. Since being initiated in 1983 as an organization for the South
African apartheid regime, the bank has translated itself to a prominent self-financing development finance institute. It has specifically been dedicated to regional infrastructural development by providing basic amenities, improving human capacity within the Republic and the broader southern African region (DBSA: 2010). After being authorized in 1998 to include the southern Africa in its financing and investment policies, the DBSA has undoubtedly been very prominent in encouraging regional integration. Its role in the regional integration efforts within the region is further explained within the chapter.

Historically, regional formations in Europe, America and Africa have demonstrated a regulatory attempt to a form of capital expansion (Chingono and Nakana: 2009). In the African context, regional trading blocs are not a new phenomenon. African nations realized that not affiliating themselves within a regional bloc would further hamper future mutual development and forming closer trade arrangements with other continental states. Furthermore, as their economies were minor, they had a limited voice in regional and continental policy formations. Regional formations in southern Africa were influenced by initiatives towards enhancing regional progression taken by state leaders combined with other developments and proceedings globally (Dinka and Kennes: 2007). The creation of regional blocs was given further impetus by the regions’ experience of anti-colonial struggle that triggered substantial economic damage. Hence, regional formations were seen as a locomotive of enhancing development, fostering cross-border trade and development policies with the aim of rectifying regional challenges (Hartzenberg: 2011). The SACU was established in the 19th century and is globally regarded as perhaps the oldest regional integration regime.

3.2 The Southern African Customs Union, SACU 1910 – To Date

As an initial effort, regional integration in Africa was administered in southern Africa in 1910 with the establishment of the SACU (Watson: 2004). Though officially recognized in 1910, the implementation of the SACU may be traced back to 1889 through the Customs Union Convention set up between the British Colony of Cape Good Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic (SACU: 2012). By 1895, the SACU had developed to extend to the entire geographical area of what is now South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. Despite being a minor regional formation, it later became productive in encouraging trade and investments among member states (Molefi: 2003). The aim of the SACU was the enhancement of economic development through the regional coordination of trade (SACU
Another objective of the SACU was to implement free movement of goods transportation across southern Africa and particularly in the SACU member nations. Initially, the SACU comprised of four nations: the South Africa Union and the so-called BLS states of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland. Namibia became the fifth member after gaining independence in 1990 (Volz: 2011).

Generally, the SACU aimed at achieving the following prerequisites for its members:

- Ensuring continuous economic development to the SACU as a customs union.
- To assure that its arrangements help foster economic development to the least developed member nations within the customs union and
- Diversify member states economies and ensure that all member nations gain from trade within the customs union and from other nations not within the union (SACU Treaty: 1969).

With regards to the SACU’s 1910 arrangement, all member nations utilized a similar percentage of import duties which was set up by the Union of South Africa (Wang et al: 2007). The Union of South Africa administrated the customs income pool and disseminated it among member nations on a skewed percentage which allocated the Union of South Africa a share of 98.7%. The Union of South Africa was the major donor and administrator thus it was entitled to a bigger share while the other SACU members shared a small percentage (Gathil: 2011). Furthermore, the 1910 arrangement produced a shared external tariff on products imported into the region from non-member nations, goods produced within the SACU enjoy free movement within the region minus and duties nor restrictions.

Despite the SACU’s initial success, the BLS states were mainly reliant on the economy of South Africa. These countries are landlocked and depend heavily on South Africa’s infrastructure networks thus making them economically dependent on the South African economy (Volz: 2011). The BLS states regarded the SACU as an organization meant to improve their economic growth and income. In the period of 1960 to 1970 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were allocated 3.9% of the revenue portion and 96.1% went to South Africa while South Africa still exported more that it imported from all three of these nations (Molefi: 2003).

In the end, it came down to the BLS wanting a renegotiation of the 1910 SACU agreement (Baker, Boraine and Krafchik: 1993). They (BLS) argued for an improved approach to
protecting their minor economies from that of the more developed South Africa. The members also wanted to be able to access unrestricted goods from South Africa’s market including shared negotiations on other matters such as customs, sales duties and other related matters concerning fiscal policy (Mahoa: 2006). The 29 June 1910 agreement lasted until 1969 after which an amendment was proposed (Gathil: 2011).

3.2.1 The 1969 SACU Treaty
On the 11 of December 1969, a new SACU arrangement was signed by Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa and came into operation on 1 March 1970. As a result of none of the BLS nations having robust income formula, the new revenue procedure from customs was welcomed by the BLS members and perceived as a source of state revenue (Peters-Berries: 2010). This 1969 SACU treaty outlined the following amendments:

- The new method re-configured the revenue on the foundation of the entire imports together with excisable goods.
- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland shared 42% of the SACU’s collection in order to reimburse their loss of fiscal autonomy and the remainder of the percentage was distributed to South Africa.
- An agreement was reached that minor manufacturing corporations in the BLS members would be safeguarded from contending with goods from South Africa for a duration of eight years.
- BLS members would keep sharing a joint monetary policy with South Africa.
- Until a new agreement was agreed upon in 1974, the ZAR was to be utilized in all three member countries (SACU Treaty: 1969).

The protection of minor industries within the BLS members was well acknowledged from these nations. The BLS countries had just gained their independence with colonialism having impacted negatively on their development. Thus they had to source external funding to improve their situation (Mahoa: 2006). Another improvement was achieved in 1977 when a “stabilized income rate” was announced that assured members of an equal 17% of the overall value of the SACU imports and excisable value to the BLS nations as a grouping. When Namibia became a SACU member in 1990, it also profited from the method of distribution of the SACU income (Peters-Berries: 2010).
In 1974 the BLS nations were then invited by the South African government to join the Rand Monetary Union (RMU) that was to attach their national currencies to the ZAR (Grandes: 2003). At the time, Botswana’s economy had become robust enough to survive and endure on its own, which led to its eventual exit from the RMU in 1976 (Peters-Berries: 2010). The usage of the ZAR by the BLS nations was of importance until the time when their economies were robust and sufficient enough to establish their own currencies\(^{15}\) (Mahoa: 2006). However, there were still complications concerning the 1969 agreement as South Africa still enjoyed greater influence over customs agreements. The 1994 democratic transition in South Africa led to the SACU members wanting to renegotiate the 1969 treaty and these negotiations got underway in November 1994 (Gathil: 2011). The 1969 treaty remained active until 20 October 2002 when a new arrangement was agreed upon.

3.2.2 The 2002 SACU Treaty

The new SACU agreement was signed on the 21 of October 2002, but only entered into force on the 15 of July 2004 (McGowan, Cornelissen and Nel: 2006). In its article 2, the aims of the 2002 SACU treaty were to:

- Enable cross-border movements of goods and products among districts of member nations.
- Produce efficient, vibrant and democratic bodies which will certify reasonable benefits to all member nations.
- Promote and provide surroundings of unbiased completion among members in the common customs area.
- Enhance and encourage economic development, industrialization, diversification and competitiveness of member nations.
- Assist member nations to participate in the world economy via enriched trade and investments.
- Promote equal sharing of income generated from customs and excise duties and
- Develop and enable common policies and strategies among members (SACU Treaty: 2002, Article 2).

Additionally, this new SACU agreement outlined the protection of minor businesses in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS nations) and products arriving from

\(^{15}\) This was when the Swazi Lilangeni (1974), the Maloti (1980) and the Namibian dollar (1993) were introduced by Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia respectively as their official currencies (Grandes: 2003).
South Africa would have to pay tariffs (Mahoa: 2006). This latest SACU agreement appeared to be more radical than the latter one of 1969. It introduced with it equal decision formulation methods in which each member nation had a say in the formation of a new policy in diverse areas including competition, agriculture and industry (Gathil: 2011). It led to the SACU being more democratic. The common revenue pool in the new agreement was to be supervised by South Africa for a conversion period of 24 months. Afterwards, a member nation or a SACU institutional body would be selected by the council to administer the pool (Gathil: 2011). The reality that South Africa agreed to the creation of regular management structure to administer the institute and permitted other members to contribute in its daily undertakings was significant as other members could witness how the organization performed. Moreover, the managing hierarchy would alternate amongst member nations (Mahoa: 2006).

Another significant introduction in the new 2002 treaty was the creation of six new SACU institutions which comprised of:

- The council of ministers as the highest resolution making figure,
- The Tariff Board that included specialists from member nations who pass on references to the council of ministers on tariff stages and other trade connected matters,
- The Commission, whose role is for the execution of the SACU treaty together with verdicts for the council,
- The Secretariat based in Windhoek, Namibia who is accountable for the administration task of the SACU,
- Technical Liaison Committees within the area of trade & industry, agriculture, technical affairs and transportation which aid the Commission,
- An ad hoc Committee, which is there to resolve any originating quarrels in the SACU (SACU Treaty: 2002: Article 7).

Additionally, a new method of income dispersal was decided upon in the 2002 agreement. From the sharing of a static percentage among the BLNS members, the new method took into concern the members’ socio-economic performance and developmental requirements (Peters-Berries: 2012). The development element of the 2002 agreement was in support of the less developed members and this agreement signified that South Africa as a more industrialized nation was prepared to permit other members an opportunity to progress and develop (Mahoa: 2006).
The South African apartheid government opted to introduce what was to be known as the CONSAS. Towards the end of the 1970’s, the Republic realised that its regional hegemony and security could be assured by uniting the Bantu homelands with the CONSAS grouping (Zacarias: 1999). The CONSAS was envisaged to permit the Republic’s neighbours more access to Pretoria’s economic system, such that this would have restrained these nations from assisting liberal movements from South Africa or those fomenting military attacks towards Pretoria (Bender, Coleman and Sklar: 1985).

3.3 The Constellation of Southern African States, CONSAS 1965-1981

In 1965 Dr H.F Verwoerd\textsuperscript{16} first introduced the idea of a Southern African Commonwealth whose objective was to form a sphere of friendly nations between South Africa and other states in southern Africa, particularly those neighbouring the Union of South Africa (Christopher: 2001). South Africa was to be a dominant player within this regional setting. Furthermore, there would have been an agreement that stipulates non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs (Glickman: 1990; Hanlon: 1986). This arrangement specified that other states within southern Africa would not in any capacity offer support to the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)\textsuperscript{17}. In April 1979 South African Prime Minister Mr P.W. Botha\textsuperscript{18} proposed the formation of the CONSAS at the South African parliament (Hanlon: 1986; Williams and Hackland: 1998).

Botha urged entrepreneurs within vital sectorial divisions of the economy to be enthusiastically involved in strengthening and promoting economic relationships between South Africa and southern Africa as a region (Barber and Barret: 1990). There was another invitation by Prime Minister Botha in November 1979 at the Carlton conference (Johannesburg) to the BLS nations and business executives of the region (Onslow: 2009; Hanlon: 1986). Here Prime Minister Botha recommended to the invited guests to join South Africa, the independent nations and South West Africa (now Namibia) in a regional economic confederation termed the CONSAS (Onslow: 2009). The independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda had already agreed to be part of Prime Minister Botha’s CONSAS grouping at their meeting in Pretoria on 23 of July 1980 (Geldenhuys:

\textsuperscript{16} Dr Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd was prime minister of the Republic of South Africa from 1958 to 1966.

\textsuperscript{17} The ANC and PAC were the national liberation movements fighting for the revolution of white minority rule in South Africa.

\textsuperscript{18} Mr Pieter Willem Botha was prime minister of the Union of South Africa from 1978 until 1984. In the same year (5 of September 1984) he became the first executive state president of the nation (Williams and Hackland: 1998).
1981). Botswana together with Lesotho and Swaziland stated that they would not be associating themselves with the CONSAS as long as the Republic complied with its racial strategies. These three states were members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and opposed the apartheid policies of South Africa, hence had no aspiration to extend their links with the Republic with regards to the political and security sectors (International Institute for Strategic Studies: 2006). The aim of CONSAS was to pursue strictly regional resolutions to political, economic and security complications among its member states while also diverting its members away from the West (Geldenhuys: 1981). The South African apartheid regime assumed it would achieve peace and stability in southern Africa by coordinating efforts within the political and security divisions and forging closer links with regional members. The three Bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Venda) and the Republic of South Africa were to make up the CONSAS together with Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South West Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi (Williams and Hackland: 1998).

The CONSAS also aimed at promoting regional economic integration that was to further generate growth among its members. The NP of South Africa wanted a regional integration administered by the CONSAS to increase the country’s political influence over other regional members as the Republic realized that its regional neighbours were dependent on its economy (Libby: 1987). The Republic saw itself as the region’s most influential nation. The CONSAS economic activities mainly focused on three objectives:

i. Encourage regional economic integration among its members
ii. Institute a Development Bank of Southern Africa and

Prime Minister Botha had aimed to foster regional economic development and cooperation between regional businesses and the South African government. Botha hoped that further enhancing business cooperation would assist in improving order and regional stability. Prime Minister Botha had appealed to local companies to invest and enhance economic development in the region. Private sector investment was also seen as a pivotal element in stimulating regional development (Geldenhuys: 1984). In its original formation, the CONSAS was motivated by its regional polices pertaining to economic growth and development. Two significant public-private sector enterprises were created as part of the CONSAS’s vision for regional advancement. These were the DBSA and the Small Business Development Corporation (Geldenhuys: 1984). The DBSA was started in 1979 by Prime
Minister Botha but officially launched in 1983. He envisaged the bank to be in the forefront in promoting sector financing and development in southern Africa. Moreover, the bank was viewed as a good strategy in fascinating foreign investments. Projects to an amount of ZAR 1.5 billion had already been processed by the bank in its first three years in operation. The South African government had noticed that the southern African region was experiencing slow economic growth patterns due to high levels of unemployment. With a view of rectifying this, the promotion of small businesses was seen as a vital option by Prime Minister Botha. In November 1980 a Small Business Development Corporation was established by the private and the public sector with an initial starting capital of ZAR 100 million. Half this amount coming from the South African government and the other half from the private sector (Green: 1980).

What the apartheid regime envisaged was that by creating the CONSAS initiative, it would allow itself to develop better relationships with the other black nations within the SADCC, while improving foreign relations (Geldenhuys: 1981). Though the CONSAS had already gained support from the independent homelands, Prime Minister Botha still depended on other regionally events for his CONSAS group to be robustly fulfilled.

3.3.1 The Failure of the CONSAS

The 1980 independence elections in Rhodesia held the ultimate key to the success of the apartheid regime’s CONSAS future stability (Onslow: 2009). The South Africa regime assumed that the United African National Council (UANC) spearheaded by Bishop Abel Muzorewa would be victorious in the 1980 elections to such an extent that the South African government channelled vast financial and other resources to the UANC months leading to the election (Onslow: 2009; Barber and Barret: 1990). In 1978 the South African government had already sponsored Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC party to an estimated ZAR 800,000 in funds for campaign purposes (Jaster: 1989). Moreover, the Republic was hopeful that even if the UANC failed to win the independence elections in Rhodesia, a split judgement within the elections would occur between Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC and Joshua Nkomo’s19 Zimbabwean African Political Union (ZAPU) that would result in power being shared in Rhodesia (Barber and Barret: 1990).

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19 Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo was the president of the ZAPU of Zimbabwe.
In Barber and Barret’s (1990) view, the split judgement within the elections would have also benefited the South African government. Jaster (1989) adds that even when the CONSAS was proposed it was not capable enough of succeeding in its desired plans within the region. Chimanikirere (1990) for instance classified the CONSAS as being unsophisticated as it was constructed on two fabricated expectations: first that the UANC would be victorious in the Zimbabwean elections and secondly that: South Africa’s regional neighbours shared the concern of a communist attack. The ZANU-PF and the emergence of the FLS further dashed the CONSAS’s structure and survival (Sithole and Makumbe: 1997).

On the 1 of April 1980, Zimbabwe opted to join the FLS rather than CONSAS (Chimanikire: 1990) and another setback emerged when Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland affirmed that they would not be linking up with the CONSAS as long as South Africa continued with its racial strategies (Geldenhuys: 1981). The arrangement was also inconsistent as there was a lack of meetings with potential members concerning the alliance’s form or readiness to contribute. Furthermore, it was observed that proposed members expected to be part of the CONSAS were not even approached with regard to the groupings immediate plans and future blueprint outlines (Jaster: 1989). While the South African government implemented its CONSAS strategy in 1979 both internally and within neighbouring states, in 1975 another regional integration movement to be known as the FLS was formed.

3.4 The Frontline States, FLS 1960 – 1994

Another endeavour towards regional integration in southern Africa was the founding of the FLS. The FLS materialized from a perspective of conflict and colonialism in southern Africa (Moma: 2009). The FLS was a significant organizational structure to arise in the mid-1970’s that had in its conferences numerous liberation movements and national governments from southern Africa and from Africa (Masemola: 2005).

The Mulungushi Club20, which was an informal setting to address southern African matters, was the precursor of the FLS. Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzanian Mwalimu Julius Nyerere briefly oversaw the creation of the FLS within the Mulungushi Club (Moma: 2009).

20 Was a club made up of leaders of the Republic of Tanzania (Julias Nyerere), Uganda (Milton Obote) and Zambia (Kenneth Kaunda). The former leader of the ANC during apartheid, Oliver Tambo used to also avail himself at meetings within the club while in exile in Zambia. The club focused on the liberation of southern Africa while also aiming at providing a platform for coordinating efforts towards liberating states still experiencing white domination and colonial rule within the region. As it was a minor club, it was able to meet more often (Mukwena and Sumaili: 2016).
The FLS was created to liberate regional states still under colonial rule while promoting cooperation between member nations in both the political and economic spheres. South Africa utilized force and threats together with economic sanctions as dominant policy drivers within the region. Originally the grouping had five members namely Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia (Stanford: 1997). Zimbabwe upon attaining its independence became the sixth FLS member in 1980 while Namibia joined in 1990 (Masemola: 2005).

One of the objectives of the FLS was to protect the southern African region from the destabilizing policies of the Republic of South Africa (Likoti: 2003). The FLS also aimed to counteract the Republics CONSAS initiative that had already been proposed by Dr H.F Verwoerd in 1965. During the apartheid regime, South Africa possessed a very robust military capability which it often deployed against its neighbours, hence often fuelling rebellion, regional damage and economic turmoil (Evans: 1984). This was because for many years the Republic’s apartheid regime was the main source of regional insecurity and instability. The FLS was to enhance cooperation amongst its member nations while excluding the Republic as a result of its apartheid policies. The FLS sought stability in the context of South Africa’s apartheid regime and its mutual regional liberation (Evans: 1984).

Other priorities of the FLS were regional cohesion, black majority rule and fostering of regional economic institutions to lessen their dependency on South Africa. However, the most significant aspect of the FLS was the opposition of minority regimes (Moma: 2009). The FLS mainly addressed political issues and military troubles amongst the liberation movements but had also formulated a security substructure named the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)\(^2\) (Masemola: 2005).

Essential material, logistics, strategic and political backing was distributed by the FLS to nationalist groups battling for the salvation of Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa (Bhebe: 2015). At the time, White minority rule was still very much active in these aforementioned nations (Moma: 2009). The FLS also offered bases for liberation fighters in these nations for safety reasons. During apartheid, the ANC fighters mainly used Angola, Mozambique and Zambia as safe havens and to launch their military attacks against the apartheid regime that prevailed in the Republic of South Africa (Bhebe: 2015). Likewise,

\(^2\)The ISDSC was founded in 1975 by Mozambique, The Republic United of Tanzania and Zambia to deal with anticipated security risks and also to recommend and implement decisions and resolutions of the FLS summit meetings (Gebrewold: 2007).
Zimbabwe’s fighters belonging to the Zimbabwe’s People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) were given military bases in Tanzania, Zambian and Mozambique (Bhebe:2015).

The FLS was to some extent fortunate in its obligation of achieving liberation in southern Africa (Molefi: 2003). Through continuous use of force and sanctions from the FLS and the International Community, Namibia in 1990 was liberated from white minority rule while the Republic of South Africa followed in 1994. After the dismantling of minority apartheid rule, South Africa temporarily joined the FLS in 1994 (Mukwena and Sumaili: 2016) before the FLS was dissolved later in the same year having accomplished its primary objective of liberating southern Africa from colonial and apartheid rule (Bhebe: 2015).

The FLS grouping was established for the purpose of attaining political freedom in southern Africa (Hentz: 2005). Through the FLS the region was able to organize its efforts, tactics and resources to assist liberation movements in southern Africa (Chimanikire: 1996). The existence of the FLS directly counteracted the apartheid led South African government’s 1979 CONSAS strategy. Thereafter, regional leaders saw the need to further counter the Republics planned formation of the CONSAS establishment. This led to the signing of the Lusaka Declaration on Economic Liberation in 1980. During this meeting, regional leaders also agreed on the establishing of the SADCC (Yusuf: 1999). The formation of the SADCC was seen as a good strategy to further counter the apartheid regime.

3.5 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, SADCC 1980-1992

From 1977 regular consultations were undertaken by the FLS representatives which ultimately led to a meeting of foreign ministers of member states in May 1979 in Gaborone, Botswana (Likoti: 2003). States present at the seminar included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. A consensus was reached to assemble an international conference in Arusha, The United Republic of Tanzania in July 1979 (Mays and DeLancey: 2002). At the July 1979 meeting, for the first time, governments and international agency representatives from around the globe were brought together to debate regional cooperation in southern Africa (SADC: 2005). Endorsed at this seminar was the establishment of an official structure to harmonize efforts and encourage collective action in the southern African region (SADC: 2005). Nine southern African nations formed the SADCC in 1980. These
included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Makagwe: 2013).

The SADCC became a reaction and opposing instrument to South Africa’s planed political economy, the CONSAS (Masemola: 2005). At first, the SADCC was not introduced as an integration structure but to offer support to the FLS. Thus its initial aim was to assist its member nations to redirect their transportation and communication routes within southern Africa and avoid those of the Republic of South Africa. Masemola (2005) states that leaders in the region recognized that not working together undermined their importance, which would in turn give South Africa more power in the region. One of the intentions of the SADCC was to centre on regional cooperation and development (Makagwe: 2013).

3.5.1 The SADCC’s Programme of Action

A Programme of Action (POA) was approved by the SADCC that recognized economic activities and development ventures to be undertaken. This SADCC POA was a project-based method where each member state accepted accountability for a particular sector (SADC: 2005). This approach mainly focused on improving member nations, development initiatives rather than regional economic development strategies. Basically, the SADCC programmes were decentralized (Buzdugan: 2007). Each SADCC member was granted a particular sector like transport and communication (Mozambique), food security (Zimbabwe), agricultural research (Botswana), fisheries, wildlife and forestry (Malawi), soil and water conversation (Lesotho), manpower development (Swaziland), industrial development (Tanzania), energy conversation and development (Angola) and mining (Zambia) (Raheem: 1996). A number of development efforts were coordinated by the SADCC. The grouping was able to foster a number of minor specialized and cultural organizations to further unite member nations. Member nations were able to meet frequently to debate matters of the region and coordinate a number of their undertakings with external contributors (Odin: 1993). A sum of US$ 2.5 billion had already been sourced by the SADCC to sponsor 5000 projects in sectors consisting of communication, energy, transportation, food supply, training and research in agriculture and rehabilitation of railways and ports (Falola: 2002). Through its political affiliate - the FLS and the SADCC became a driver for liberation and nations including Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa benefited from the SADCC’s fight for regional liberation (Molefi: 2003).
The SADCC was to some extent successful at attaining foreign aid from its international donors but could not reverse its members’ dependency on South Africa (Amos: 2010). The developed economy of South Africa made it impossible for other regional members to separate themselves from the Republic. Landlocked nations such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland relied on South Africa’s ports and railways to move their trade within the region and abroad (Molefi: 2003). Six out of ten SADCC member nations are landlocked which made their dependency on apartheid South Africa obvious (Amin, Chitala and Mandaza: 1987). The SADCC merely relied on funding from external donors and received funding in access of US$5 billion annually. The SADCC countries were well-off in energy, mineral and agricultural resources but due to underdevelopment and technological advancement, these resources were not utilised to their full potential.

The SADCC’s primary aim of a cooperative region was unproductive; thus the group had to manoeuvre to a more economic integration driven initiative (Leonard: 2006). The SADCC through its POA had achieved vast growth in a number of projects and its imminent restructuring was merely to accommodate new trends in the global economy and economic realities in the region (Schoeman: n.d). Basically, it necessitated a new tactic to enforce development strategies. As the SADCC had been a loose organization with no accurate framework, Namibia after its independence on 21 March 1990 became a SADCC member in the same year and a new framework was approved at a conference in Windhoek in 1992 where the SADC was formed (Hegner: 1998). While the SADCC aimed at coordinating economies of member nations, its successor the SADC was to incorporate them into solidarity whole (SADC: 2005).

Basically the SADCC was driven by two components. First, was the aim to aid its member nations to resist their dependence on apartheid-ruled South Africa. Secondly, the SADCC sought to encourage development initiatives through the implementation of its POA. Major inequalities were still visible among member nations which further dented the SADCC’s ability to further develop and integrate the southern African region. As a result, the need to restructure the organization was imminent (Masemola: 2005). The political changes in the 1990’s, which included Namibia gaining its independence and the apartheid transition period in South Africa further necessitated the desire to implement a much more deeper form of integration (Saurombe: 2009). Thereafter members of the SADCC (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe)
signed a treaty\textsuperscript{22} converting the SADCC to the SADC. Regional leaders envisaged the SADC to promote the social and economic development in southern Africa by intensifying regional integration programmes (Hentz: 2014). The overarching aim of converting the SADCC to the SADC was to enrich deeper integration and rectify factors that hindered economic growth and development in the region (SADC: 2005).

3.6 Birth of the Southern African Development Community, SADC 1992-To Date

After the treaty was signed by the ten SADCC members, the SADC was born, thus redefining the basis of cooperation among member nations from a loose association into a legitimately binding arrangement (Molefi: 2003). The signing of the Windhoek treaty was a positive change towards regional integration and human development that required sectorial cooperation and integration.

The treaty further extended the possibility of regional integration. There is a binding agreement in the treaty together with its decisions and policies (Matlosa and Lotshwao: 2010). A number of intentions were set out in the treaty geared towards growth and economic development and aspects such as trade, peace and security (Hegner: 1998). The treaty additionally committed member nations to fully involve the populace of southern Africa and non-state actors in regional integration programmes. Moreover, sanctions may be imposed on any members who do not conform to the terms and conditions of the treaty (SADC Treaty: 1992, Article 23). The SADC had the original ten member nations (from the SADCC) at its launch in 1992. Mauritius and South Africa joined in 1994. The DRC and Seychelles joined in 1997 and Madagascar in 2005 (Gray: 2013). The Seychelles excused its membership from the SADC in 2004, re-applied in 2007 and re-joined the regional group in 2008 (Mays: 2015).

An expanded political, economic, development, integration and security agenda were outlined in the 1992 treaty as the driving force of the SADC. The following objectives were outlined in the 1992 treaty in Windhoek:

- Enhance the lives of the population of Southern Africa through regional integration and development activities
- Initiate economic, cultural and social links in Southern Africa through the involvement of people and institutions in the region.

\textsuperscript{22} This treaty was signed on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek.
• Implement instruments to gather resources to implement the desired SADC activities.
• Implement strategies aimed at eliminating hindrances to the open movement of goods, capital, labour, service and people through Southern Africa.
• Promotion of regional human development and technological transfer.
• Improving management and performance in the region
• Enhance international relations of member countries and assistance in mobilizing of financial resource (SADC Treaty: 1992, Article 5).

The SADC’s regional integration principles consist of four core pillars:

• Sovereign equality of all member nations
• Regional integration to realize development, promote growth and alleviate poverty,
• Security cooperation to enhance defence, state safety and human safety measures,
• Political integration to foster respectable governance, democracy, human rights, law and diplomatic settlements of disagreements (SADC Treaty: 1992, Article 4).

Since its implementation, major efforts have been attained by the SADC with respect to regional development and integration in southern Africa. The restructuring from the SADCC to the SADC sought to enhance a developed and thriving and peaceful southern African region (Kapinga: 2015). According to Mufune (n.d) the SADC opted for a development integration system that categorizes the political and economic diversities of regional member nations which include their production structures, trade patterns, resource endowments, development initiatives and resource provision mechanisms. It addresses numerous production infrastructure and the obstacles arising from the underdevelopment of the region.

In pursuit of its intended regional integration agenda, the SADC has since its inception in 1992 agreed and signed various protocols\(^2\), memoranda and charters on various matters ranging from trade, mining, finance and investments (see Table 3.1). Once a protocol has been developed by the SADC in collaboration with its different sectoral actors, it is sent to the SADC’s legal unit to be analysed and thereafter submitted to the council of ministers for endorsement. After being endorsed by the council of ministers, it needs to be signed by the summit heads of states. Upon being signed, it then needs to be ratified by two-thirds of member nations before it actually comes into force (Isaksen and Tjonneland: 2001). A

\(^{2}\) A Protocol is viewed as a legitimately binding instrument that pledges member nations to collaborate, coordinate, complement and integrate policies and approaches in one or more sectors.
member nation may recommend a modification to be made on the protocol to the SADC’s executive secretary for initial attention by council after informing all member nations (SADC: 2015).

### Table 3.1 Ratified SADC Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Protocol</th>
<th>Date Signed</th>
<th>Date of entry into force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of the SADC</td>
<td>17 August 1992</td>
<td>30 September 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol to the treaty establishing SADC on immunities and Privileges</td>
<td>17 August 1992</td>
<td>30 September 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol on Mining</td>
<td>8 September 1997</td>
<td>10 February 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol on Wildlife Conversation and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>14 August 1999</td>
<td>30 November 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol on Health</td>
<td>18 August 1999</td>
<td>14 August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure</td>
<td>7 August 2000</td>
<td>Not yet implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol on Tribunal and Rules thereof</td>
<td>7 August 2000</td>
<td>14 August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol on Legal Affairs</td>
<td>7 August 2000</td>
<td>1 September 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses</td>
<td>7 August 2000</td>
<td>22 September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment Protocol on Trade</td>
<td>7 August 2000</td>
<td>7 August 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security</td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>2 March 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other related materials of the SADC</strong></td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>8 November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Fisheries</strong></td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>8 August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Culture Information and Sport</strong></td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>7 July 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol against Corruption</strong></td>
<td>14 August 2001</td>
<td>6 August 2003</td>
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<td><strong>SADC Agreement Amending the Protocol on the Tribunal</strong></td>
<td>3 October 2002</td>
<td>3 October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Extradition</strong></td>
<td>3 October 2002</td>
<td>Not yet implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Forestry</strong></td>
<td>3 August 2002</td>
<td>17 July 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters</strong></td>
<td>3 October 2002</td>
<td>1 March 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons</strong></td>
<td>18 August 2005</td>
<td>Not yet implemented</td>
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<td><strong>Protocol on Finance and Investment</strong></td>
<td>18 August 2006</td>
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<td><strong>Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Protocol on Gender and Development</strong></td>
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<td>22 February 2013</td>
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<td><strong>Protocol on Trade in Services</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Protocol on Employment and Labour</strong></td>
<td>18 August 2014</td>
<td>Not yet implemented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Trade Law Centre (2017)

The protocols are viewed by the SADC as a crucial element in the regions community building and integration procedure. When a protocol has been implemented, member nations have to naturalize and incorporate them into public legislations (SADC: 2005). Deeper integration and community development are achieved when protocols are turned into public laws.

While the SADC has made notable progress towards regional integration since 1992, there have been challenges encountered. Such include lack of institutional improvements for effective change from the SADCC to the SADC. Another being the required pledge to implement programmes desired for community building and integration (SADC: 2005). With
the aim of responding to these challenges, the SADC launched a programme of rearranging its institutions with the aim of enhancing productivity and efficiency of the SADC’s policies and programmes.

On 9 March 2001 at the extraordinary summit held in Windhoek, the SADC heads of state and governments agreed to the restructuring of the SADC institutions (See figure 3.1). Approved were four sectors which included the Summit, Council of Ministers, Standing Committee of Officials and the SADC Secretariat, while the sub-sectors comprised of the SADC tribunal, Integrated Committee of Ministers, Organ of Politics, Defence and Security, SADC National Committees and the SADC Troika (SADC: 2005). These were done with the view of enhancing coordination and communication at the different SADC structures.

**Figure 3.1: Showing Organizational Structure of the SADC**

Source: SADC (2005)

**3.6.1 Summit of Heads of State**

The Summit Heads of State comprises of the heads of states from all of the SADC member nations. It is the ultimate decision-making body of the SADC. The Summit is accountable for rectifying resolutions pertaining to the SADC, outlines the structure of the SADC together with any changes that may arise and assigns functions to the executive of the SADC (Peters-Berries: 2010). Any decisions that are taken by the Summit are therefore binding. The
Summit normally holds its meetings twice in a year\(^{24}\) during August and September in a chosen member country, but can in emergency cases meet more than twice yearly (Kapinga: 2015). Another important role of the summit is admitting new members to the SADC (subject to article 8 of this treaty) (SADC Treaty: 2015, Article 10). The Summit is a pivotal institution in the sense that it also has to approve policies before they are executed which means that it plays a pivotal role in the SADC regional integration decision-making process.

3.6.2 The Council of Ministers

This is the second highest decision-making body of the SADC after the Summit. The Council has one national minister from each SADC member state (particularly those accountable for foreign affairs (SADC Treaty: 2015, Article 11). Its mandate is also to manage the effectiveness of the SADC while certifying that all agreed policies are implemented (Kapinga: 2015). It normally meets four times within a year where its duty is also to advise the Summit Head of States before its meeting. The budget for the SADC institutions which include those of the secretariat is also approved by the council of ministers (SADC Treaty: 2015, Article 11), resolutions taken by the council shall be consent. As the Summit Heads of States holds its meetings twice yearly, it is pivotal for the Council of Ministers to keep the Summit up to date with the latest regarding regional integration in the region.

3.6.3 The Troika

The Troika was established at an extraordinary summit held in Maputo, Mozambique in 1999. The troika consists of the chair, incoming chair and outgoing chair. Its role is to enable the SADC to implement tasks while also assisting in providing policy guidelines amongst the SADC’s institutions before major meetings are held (SADC Treaty: 2015, Article 9A). It operates at the level of the summit, the organ of politics defence and security, council and the standing committees of officials. Offices at the troika are held for a period of 12 months, while the troika of each institution has the power to create committees on an ad hoc basis.

3.6.4 The SADC Integrated Committee of Ministers

The Integrated Committee of Ministers comprises of at least two ministers from each SADC member nation who are responsible to the Council of Ministers. The responsibility of the Integrated Committee is to oversee the key regional integration areas as identified by the SADC in the region. These include trade, industry, finance, investments, infrastructure and

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\(^{24}\) The 36th SADC summit was held in Lozitha, Swaziland from the 22-31 August 2016. Its theme was: ‘Resource Mobilisation for Investment in Sustainable Energy Infrastructure for an Inclusive SADC Industrialisation for the prosperity of the region’.
services, food, agriculture, natural resources and environment, politics, defence, security, legal affairs, judicial matters, health, HIV/AIDS, education, labour employment and gender related issues. Another mandate is to monitor the RISDP and offer policy advice to the council (SADC Treaty, 2015, Article 12).

3.6.5 Standing Committee of Officials
The standing committee of officials comprises of one secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each member state (SADC Treaty 2015, Article 13). It is responsible for making recommendations to the council of ministers who in turn pass these recommendations to the summit (Kapinga: 2015). Their meetings are held at least four times a year while it also reports and is responsible to the Council of Ministers (Saurombe: 2011). Decisions that are taken by the committee are done so by consensus.

3.6.6 The SADC Secretariat
Located in Gaborone, Botswana and headed by an Executive secretary, the SADC Secretariat is responsible for the strategic planning, coordination and management of the SADC programmes (Saurombe: 2011). It was established in 1981, after which it underwent restructuring in 1992 and in 2001. Since 2001 it has become the implementing agency of the SADC economic development programmes (Peters-Berries: 2010). Moreover, it is tasked with executing the resolutions of the summit and council (Saurombe: 2011). These include among others the implementation of the FTA, CU and CM, representing and promoting the SADC continentally and globally. Other mandates that are the responsibility of the secretariat are those of managing and organizing the SADC meetings, promoting gender mainstreaming, monitoring regional policies and programmes, managing projects, undertaking research on community enhancement and integration processes (SADC Treaty 2015, Article 14).

3.6.7 The SADC Tribunal
The SADC Tribunal was tasked with adhering to and proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC treaty, subsidiary instrument and adjudicating disputes referred to it (SADC Treaty: 1992, Article 16). Furthermore, any decision implemented by the tribunal was binding. However, through a decision taken at the Windhoek Summit in 2010, the tribunal was suspended (Saurombe: 2011) where a review on its obligation and authority was appointed.
3.6.8 The SADC National Committees, SNCs
The SNCs consist of key stakeholders notably from government, civil society and the private sector such that each SADC member state is obliged to create a SNC that consists of these stakeholders (Kapinga: 2015). The general aim of these stakeholders is for them to have a voice with regards to policy formulation and implementation within the SADC regional integration agenda (SADC Treaty 2015, Article 16A). Each SADC national committee meets at least four times a year where available reports are submitted to the secretariat at a specified time.

3.6.9 Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, OPDSC
The OPDSC’s mandate is to oversee the maintenance of peace and security regionally (Kapinga: 2015). It was established in 1996 in Gaborone during the SADC summit (Peters-Berries: 2010). It is the summits responsibility to elect a chairperson and deputy chairperson of the OPDSC where the maximum term of office is one year while the chairperson reports to the Summit. Furthermore, the OPDSC consists of ministers who in general are responsible for (a) foreign affairs, (b) defence, (c) public security, (d) state security or (e) police. They are drawn from each SADC member state and shall be responsible for the coordination of the work done by the OPDSC and its structures. The secretariat is responsible for providing its services to the OPDSC and any decisions that are taken by it shall be taken by consensus (SADC Treaty 2015, Article 10A).

3.7 The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Plan, RISDP
Members of the SADC met in Windhoek in 2001 to amend the 1992 treaty. In addition to its treaty, the SADC in 2001 formulated the RISDP as a regional integration framework aimed at achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Tekere: 2012). The RISDP may be regarded as the SADC’s blueprint for regional integration. Member nations, business organizations, civil society and trade unions all had inputs in its early stage of formulation (Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott: 2016). The SADC (2005) asserts that the RISDP identifies intervention areas that are critical for the attainment of deeper integration. These are ICT, environment and sustainable development, private sector and statistics, trade, economic liberalization, sustainable food security, social development, science and technology and equality and development.
The SADC’s RISDP is a guiding document for its regional integration and development activities over a 15 year period (2005-2020). It offers an outline within which member nations, SADC institutions, regional and international stakeholders will incorporate attempts to link guidelines and programmes designed for achieving the region’s major aim of relieving poverty (Trade Law Centre: 2012). The RISDP was adopted and approved by the SADC leaders in August 2003 at the Dar es Salam, Tanzania summit (Wolff: 2010) and launched on 12 March 2004 in Arusha, Tanzania. This strategic plan provided the SADC with an inclusive framework for regional integration and development while aiming at rejuvenating development policies (Wolff 2010; Nhamo and Inyang: 2011). The RISDP rearranged sectoral tasks under a new array of directorates which included trade, finance and investment, industry, infrastructure and services, natural resources, food agriculture, social and human development and special programmes. The RISDP oversees refining the SADC’s tactical direction towards decent political, economic and corporate governance anchored in a philosophy of consensus, full involvement by the general populace and respect. Furthermore, it realizes the private sector as a strategic driver through which the SADC aims to achieve its regional integration objectives.

An internal desk assessment was conducted by the SADC Secretariat in 2011 with regards to the initial RISDP and the objectives the SADC intended to meet from this policy in the period of 2005 to 2010. The SADC deputy executive secretary (Jaoa Caholo) responsible for regional integration was quoted as saying “various SADC developmental objectives are not realistic; hence the SADC RISDP is being reviewed” (The Herald: 2013). The aforementioned statement was made in Lilongwe, Malawi during the SADC’s 33rd Summit of Head of States and Governments in August 2013. Hindrances such as capacity constraints and narrow resources have hindered the member nations and the SADC institutions from adequately implementing the RISDP programmes (Trade Law Centre: 2012). In responding to the results and the suggestions brought forward in the 2012 independent mid-term review done by Trade and Development Studies of Zimbabwe, an appeal was submitted by the Summit to draft a revised RISDP (Barlow: 2015). The policy had to be re-examined and coordinated, with new threats and emerging matters deterring regional integration in the region (The Herald: 2013).

While apartheid prevailed in South Africa, there was a proposal from the apartheid government to establish a development finance institution. This institution was to assist in
enhancing economic growth and development within South Africa, its adjacent regional members and the Bantu homelands. Hence, with the intention of realizing these two core themes, the apartheid government decided to establish what was to be known as the DBSA.

3.8 The Development Bank of Southern Africa, DBSA

The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was formed to replace the Corporation of Economic Development (formerly called the Bantu Development Corporation) (Konczacki, Parpart and Shaw: 2013). In 1983 the DBSA was put into motion featuring South Africa along with the Bantustans as representatives. Currently, the DBSA’s headquarters are based in Midrand, and it is wholly owned by the South African government. As a development finance institution, the DBSA focuses on large scale infrastructural projects within the public and private sector. At its initial formation, the bank’s major focus was on projects within South Africa, but it updated its mandate to include the southern African region (Monyae: 2011). Post-apartheid, the bank has been a pivotal financier of infrastructural projects both regionally and continentally through providing loans and funds which assist in promoting regional integration and economic growth (DBSA: 2013). Regional integration itself is an important element in the bank, such that the bank has a unit called the International Financing Division (IFD), whose role is to oversee regional development strategies outside of South Africa (DBSA: 2013). The bank’s major focus area is infrastructure in critical areas such as energy, transportation (roads, bridges) water and ICT (Coetzee n.d). The bank does in some cases go into partnerships with other SOE’s and the private sector in financing infrastructural projects both domestically and regionally.

Regionally projects partially financed by the DBSA include the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), the Mozal Aluminium Smelter in Mozambique, the Mozambique to South Africa gas project and an N4 toll-road that formed a portion of the Maputo Corridor (Buhlungu et al: 2007). A Tanzanian paper mill was a recipient of a US$ 9.5 million loan, US$10 million was loaned to the Development Bank of Zambia, another US$ 10 million to Zambian state-owned electricity utility ZESCO and US$ 6 million to the DRC’s national power utility (Buhlungu et al: 2007).

The bank has also assisted in funding the Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital in Maseru, Lesotho by granting the building consortium a US$ 100 million loan (Netcare Limited, 2014) while the hospital opened its doors in October 2011. Recent projects that have profited from
the DBSA’s funding include the upgrading of the Ohorong centre plant in Namibia, Zambia’s utility provider Lunsemfwa IPP, the Kariba North Bank Hydro Power project in Zambia (the SAimag: n.d). Moreover, the bank has collaborated with the EU to launch a multi-billion infrastructure development project. The deal was approved as part of the EU’s annual action programme for 2012. The programme aims at providing grant funding for pivotal projects within South Africa and the region (DBSA: 2013). In May 2015 the bank through its SADC Project Preparation and Development Facility (PPDF) approved a US$ 3 million agreement towards the development of a regional Interconnector Transmission Line. South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are the nations anticipated to benefit from this project. The aim of the project is to construct and operate a 400kV to 500kV voltage transmission covering a distance of about 935km through South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (DBSA: 2015).

As the analysis in subsequent chapter will show, South Africa through its financial institutions like the DBSA has played a significant role in further stimulating large scale investments with the aim of enhancing regional (economic) growth and development. Clearly, member states of the SADC have benefited immensely through the bank’s loans and grants, which undoubtedly underscores the bank’s role as a pivotal institution for future regional integration agenda.

3.9 Conclusion

In the colonial era, regionalism was seen as a developmental approach that aimed at enhancing the lives of the general populace in southern Africa through various developmental driven mechanisms (Buzdugan: 2007). The SADCC initially created with the intention of diverting its members’ reliance on South Africa and loosening the country’s economic stranglehold in the region, did have better policies on matters of regional integration than the FLS and the CONSAS. The change from the SADCC to the SADC was aimed at introducing deeper forms of regional integration in the region. The SADC introduced robust developmental initiatives such as the SADC protocols and its RISDP developmental blueprint to further push and realize the regions quest for a smooth and transparent regional integration agenda.

This chapter has provided a historical overview of the origin and evolution of regional integration in southern Africa and considered factors that have contributed to successive regional frameworks and protocols. Discussions on the evolution of regional integration in
southern Africa were drawn from as early as 1910 beginning with the formation of the SACU. The chapter went further to review other regional formations that have emerged in southern Africa since the SACU which included the CONSAS, the FLS, the SADCC and finally the SADC. The chapter further analysed regional integration blueprints and protocols that were introduced by these regional formations and envisaged to drive regional integration processes. Some of the regional frameworks discussed in the chapter included the 1910 SACU agreement, the 1969 SACU treaty, the 2002 SACU treaty, the SADC’s POA, the SADC protocols and the SADC’s RISDP. These were introduced at different stages by the SACU and the SADC respectively. In a nutshell, the chapter also discussed the significant role played by the DBSA in the SADC, in respect of providing the necessary expertise and funding for investing in high-level infrastructural projects regionally which have indeed benefited the SADC states.

This analysis offered a nuance historical evaluation of regional integration formations in southern Africa during and after the demise of colonialism. Importantly, it assists by providing empirical reasons for their establishments, vision, goals and what led to some of their collapse.
CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA’S REGIONAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS
WITHIN THE SADC POST-1994

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter (three), I examined regional integration formations in southern Africa from a historical perspective. These regional integration initiatives were traced back to 1910 beginning with the formation of the SACU. The chapter explored other regional integration attempts after the SACU, which included the FLS, CONSAS, the SADCC and lastly the SADC. The chapter also discussed the critical financing role played by the DBSA in the SADC region with respect to providing assistance in financing vital large-scale infrastructural development projects. A significant aspect that may be drawn from the previous chapter is that during colonialism and apartheid, regional integration in southern Africa was seen as an approach to improve economic growth within member nations. The chapter established that the mandate of successful regional integration efforts was defined by existing political-economic dynamics within the region at a given time. Hence, over the years leading to many SADC states gaining their independence, a number of regional formations emerged within the region. These initiatives further introduced diverse policy frameworks, treaties and protocols within their regional blocks with the vision of consolidating regional development. What is also evident is that some regional formations were established with the intention of diverting other regional members’ links away from the apartheid regime that prevailed in South Africa at the time. The overall idea was the establishment of regional partnerships with the objective of encouraging regional economic growth.

Moving forward, the underlying aim of this chapter is to probe South Africa’s role and the ambiguity of its perceived reputation in the SADC. Specifically, the chapter examines whether such a role amounts to regional coalition or a subtle promotion of hegemonic supremacy. The first section of the chapter analyses the extent to which South Africa has assisted the region in three vital themes which include observing the Republic’s investment patterns within the SADC, its intra-regional trade with other SADC states post-1994 and lastly, its (military/peacekeeping) contribution within the region. The second section unearths South Africa’s perceived hegemonic role towards its southern African neighbours and examines whether the country promotes hegemonic intent in the SADC for achieving its
national interests or that of the region. In addition, the chapter systematically investigates the Republic’s efforts in forging firmer regional coalition efforts with other southern African states since becoming a SADC member over two decades ago. The fundamental factor is to critically unpack key prevailing arguments pertaining to the perceived role of the Republic’s agenda in the SADC post-1994 comprising of the positive and negative insights about its stance within southern Africa. Through this nuanced evaluation, Pretoria’s role in the region is outlined in order to allow for a critical appraisal of the dynamics of South Africa’s alleged dominance within the SADC’s regional integration framework.

The inclusion of a newly democratic South Africa to the SADC grouping represented the fulfilment of the region’s quest for encouraging economic growth and development among member states. As outlined by the ANC upon gaining power in 1994, closer working ties were to be developed by Pretoria as a tool to profit the entire region (ANC: 1994). Since 1994 South Africa’s regional role has been characterised by different interpretations (Alden and Le Pere: 2009). This is largely attested to the fact that, as the most developed state in the SADC, the Republic is expected to be in the driving seat concerning the SADC’s regional integration agenda. On the other end, its regional standpoint is viewed as one that is more concerned about promoting its national interests rather than that of the region (Molefi: 2003). South Africa is widely acknowledged as a significant source of investment in southern Africa as it has over the years continued to make the SADC region a significant destination for its outbound investments. In essence, this has been driven by factors such as regional demand for goods coupled with Pretoria possessing a vast resource base and geographical privilege (Madziwa: 2011).

Through years of destabilization policies during the apartheid era, post-1994, South Africa was viewed by other regional members and within the continent as a regional state capable of spearheading the process of ending regional conflicts and political instability in the SADC. This view was expressed due to the relative advancement of the Republic’s military capability in relation to its regional member states. However, with such rapid investments in the SADC, it is also crucial to analyse the degree, characteristics and conduct of South African business investments in the SADC as at times these can also be viewed as being controversial by other regional members (Berkowitz et al: 2012). It is in this regard that, the subsequent sections of this chapter unpack South Africa’s regional role in the SADC. These will be first unpacked from observing the Republic’s SOE’s and its large business investment
penetration in the region. Secondly, the chapter delves into South Africa’s trade relations with other SADC states with the aim of interrogating Pretoria’s skewed trade statistics with other SADC nations and how this has been beneficial to other regional states. Additionally, the third part of the section critically analyses the Republic’s military contribution in the region. For the purpose of this study, this analysis will be drawn from Pretoria’s military, peacekeeping and diplomatic intervention initiatives in Lesotho, the DRC and Zimbabwe. The closing section of the chapter reflects on South Africa’s perceived regional standpoint in the SADC. Overall, the chapter also considers whether this varied standpoint has over the years benefited the region through regional coalition or conveyed a self-imposed dominance on South Africa.

4.2 South Africa’s investments within the SADC

Since 1994, South Africa has sought to establish itself as a noteworthy role player both continentally and more importantly in the region. This process is to be achieved through forming robust coalition policies with other regional member-states in diverse sectors (security, trade, tourism and investments) spearheaded by the Republic’s foreign policy in southern Africa (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation: n.d). To echo this point, in 1996, the South African government published a policy paper entitled A framework for cooperation in southern Africa that basically identified southern Africa as to be an essential project in Pretoria’s regional integration initiatives moving forward (Masters et al: 2015). Thus, Creamer (2015) points out that in 1995, South African multinational companies had already contributed the sum of US$ 15.6 billion in African outward investment. This to some extent shows that South Africa was to utilise its already strong government resources (human and capital) to foster and fast-track regional integration efforts in the SADC (Nganje: 2014).

Sidiropoulos (2007) further asserts that Pretoria’s engagement with the SADC states may be drawn from three core pillars. These include (a) enhancing regional institutions, the SADC and the SACU through active cooperation and support in these institutes, (b) providing necessary backing to the continents socio-economic development blueprints, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the SADC’s RISDP and (c) strengthen bilateral arrangements, which include assisting in regional stability and peace. South Africa has made great strides in promoting intra-regional investments. This has been aided by the Republic’s private sector and SOE’s such as the DBSA (discussed in chapter 3) who have
provided vast capital mechanisms in the region (Fundira: n.d). Diverse South African sectors including those of tourism, retail, mining, construction, telecommunications and financial services, together with other medium sized industries had already shown firm desires and motives to invest in the SADC (Millers, Saunders and Oloyede: 2008). Hence, South Africa’s investment crusade is largely evident in most SADC states.

In a five-year period (1997-2001), the South African capital investment in Africa stood at ZAR 96 billion with the SADC being the recipient of about 80% of this share (Blaas and Becker: 2007). From 1994 to 2003, a total of ZAR 22 billion in FDI was invested by South African investors in Mozambique, while in 2012, the trade volume between Mozambique and the Republic was valued at ZAR 29 billion and ZAR 43.9 billion in 2014 (Tshivhidzo: 2015; South African Government: 2015). More than 300 of the Republic’s private and state owned companies have had business dealings with Mozambique such that these cooperation’s had already spearheaded 83% and 73% of FDI inflow and loans respectively to Mozambique making it amongst Pretoria’s top five trading partners regionally (Blaas and Becker: 2007).

The Republic’s engagement within the SADC’s regional markets has brought with it a better collective working partnership with other SADC nations. This has, in turn, stimulated other foreign investors to further invest in the region (Scholivin: 2016). The idea of the ‘African Renaissance’ remains one of the ideologies driving the Republic’s developmental investments in the continent (Games: 2004). South Africa is in a position to become an integral role player in terms of regional integration in the SADC, as the region relies on its level of development and its significant positioning within the international community (Nabers and Godehardt: 2011).

Fresh from being an outcast in the continent, the Republic’s immense economy has greatly assisted by being at the forefront in terms of increasing the SADC’s economic growth perspectives. South African companies have involved themselves in major SADC projects including those of trade, mining, transport and communications. More than US$._75 billion has been paid by Pretoria in respect to regional infrastructural projects. This further signifies South Africa’s substantial contribution towards regional integration in the SADC (Vilakazi: 2009). Other noteworthy regional investments from South African companies have included of US$ 94 million by Vodacom in the DRC, US$ 1.2 billion in the Sasol pipeline in

25 This was an initiative by former South African president Mr Thabo Mbeki and driven by the motive to place South Africa as the vanguard with respect to resolving continental challenges. Part of its objective is to formulate integration and cooperation within Africa.
Mozambique, US$ 75 million by Nampak in Angola and US$ 80 million by Shoprite in the DRC (Games: 2011). These investments are largely attributed to South Africa’s SOE’s and private sector companies. Critical components such as transmitting of skills, the creation of employment opportunities and international linkages have been achieved by the SADC as a basis of Pretoria’s regional integration ventures regionally (Nganje: 2014).

Located within the DBSA and spearheaded by the South African Government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI) is another notable programme projected to enhance the Republic’s regional development goals. This initiative has since its establishment in 1996 gained support from the SADC, the NEPAD and African Union (AU) (Vickers: 2012). Some important aspects of the SDI are to enhance geographic precincts which possess economic potential by pulling investments into large-scale projects. An example of such projects is the Maputo Development Corridor and the BHP Billiton Mozal aluminium smelter between the Mozambican and South African government.

Nonetheless, other regional investments include those driven by South Africa’s banks - First National Bank (FNB) and Standard Bank and food and homeware stores Pick n Pay and Massmart. According to its 2013 annual report, FNB (a division of First Rand Bank Limited) operates in nine SADC nations, which comprise of Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Lesotho, Tanzania, Mauritius and Angola. According to Standard Bank (2014), apart from its operations in South Africa, it is also active in twelve SADC countries. The Bank often operates as Stanbic Bank in some of these countries. The expansion of South African supermarket chains is normally viewed as offering enormous opportunities for local suppliers (manufacturers and farmers) in host nations (Emongor: 2008). This is seen as a platform for them to supply their products to these markets. Massmart Holdings Limited is another South African-based company that has its footprint in SADC countries (Mkhabela: 2013). Formed in 1990 Massmart operates within the wholesale and retail sector. As shown in Table 4.2 there are four divisional operations that house other brands within their divisions (MassMart: 2013).

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26 These countries are made up of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, the DRC, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Table 4.2: Showing brands under four Massmart divisional operations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MassCash</th>
<th>Massbuild</th>
<th>Masswarehouse</th>
<th>Massdiscounters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jumbo Cash &amp; Carry</td>
<td>Builders Warehouse</td>
<td>Makro</td>
<td>Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shield</td>
<td>Builders Express</td>
<td>Fruitspot</td>
<td>DionWired</td>
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<td>CBW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhino Cash &amp; Carry</td>
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<td>Trident</td>
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<td>Saverite</td>
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Within these divisional brands, Massdiscounters and Masscash are the most noticeable in the SADC region. Masscash has operations in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland while stores under Massdiscounters, that is most notably represented by Game is active in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia. Massbuild stores may be found in Botswana and Mozambique (Massmart: 2013). South African supermarkets in Zambia normally source their products (vegetables and fruits) from their local farmers, while the same cannot be said for Namibia and Botswana due to inadequate local production. Hence, they normally import these products from South Africa (Emongor: 2008). In Zambia, Foodcorp, a South African company has invested in the country by processing fruits and vegetables into finished products. In addition to this, another South African company Bokomo has invested in Botswana with the aim of solely producing for the Botswana market. This has assisted Botswana as its local supermarkets source from local producers instead of importing from South Africa (Emongor: 2008).

While it is evident that the expansion of major South African banks and supermarkets regionally is to some extent positive, there have been some profound contestations associated with this rapid form of investments, mainly within host countries. For instance, there have been concerns about how South African companies tend to undermine the manufacturing capacities of the host countries (Mkhabela: 2013). Some of the South African companies have seemed to be too focused on profit making without any consideration of assisting host countries in terms of boosting their economic growth (Chidaushe: 2010). With very low development growth patterns in the region coupled with fragmented markets, some South African companies have been motivated by the large market share rather than assisting in
spearheading regional growth in host countries. A significant point that may be drawn here is that low levels of regional development, large market access and required FDI has granted South African companies easy access to most SADC states. In return, these companies have gained dominance in these SADC states by developing extensive markets and bringing intense competition to local firms especially those that are minor and cannot compete with the ones from South Africa (Mkhabela: 2013).

For instance, a negative drawback at times has been the sourcing strategies utilized by some South African supermarkets in host nations. Local farmers within these host countries feel that they are excluded in terms of supplying their products to South African owned businesses within their countries. In turn, some South African businesses tend to import their products from South African suppliers rather than from suppliers from where they are located (Chidaushe: 2010). This is largely associated with the fact that, substantial South African suppliers can generally supply large quantities of goods at constant and required timeframes. Hence, with minor production structures, local farmers and food processors in host countries fail to meet the essential demands when required (Emongor and Kirsten: 2009). As a result, this seems to exclude local farmers and manufacturers in the production process. In an interview, Dr Gregory Houston27, opines about the penetration of South African companies in the region:

Perhaps one of the disturbing things is the penetration of South African corporations – from Vodacom and MTN to Shoprite – in the region, which many citizens of the various member states view as disturbing. South Africa’s economic power relative to theirs is visible through the presence of these companies.

From the above statement, one may deduce that while South African corporations enjoy massive growth in other SADC states, the same cannot be said of other SADC companies trying to penetrate the South African market. The likes of MTN, Vodacom, Eskom, Multichoice, Shoprite, Southern Sun and Pick n Pay have invested heavily in the SADC but there are vastly limited (if any) SOE’s or businesses from other SADC nations having immense business footprints locally. For instance, Mandrup (2013) concludes that South Africa has been unwilling to allow other firms and products from other SADC states to enter its markets. At the same time, South African companies enjoy better market access,

27 Dr Gregory Houston is a Chief Research Specialist within the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Department at the Human Science Research Council (HSRC). He is also a Research Fellow in the History Department at the University of Free State.
technology and superior marketing methods than their counterparts in host countries. To exemplify this, large supermarkets such as Melissa from Zambia, Eloolo value supermarket, Woerman Brock from Namibia and Payless and Choppies from Botswana cannot be found within South Africa\(^{28}\). Observed from a different angle, this may be as a result of South African companies already occupy a stable, dominant position and huge market share in the country. Likewise, these South African companies possess considerable purchasing power and may regulate pricing structure(s) (das Nair and Chisoro: 2016). In essence, the effect of this is even lesser possibilities that other SADC supermarkets or other businesses may have business footprints in South Africa.

Melissa, Eloolo, Woerman Brock, Payless and Choppies have over the years, received stiff competition from large South African supermarket chains such as Shoprite and Pick n Pay. While it is safe to proffer that South Africa’s advancement is of importance to the region due to the large economy it possesses and the opportunities this brings with it, regional growth and investment should be between all involved parties hence sharing the gains from intra-regional investments. The South African government had outlined that it ought to enhance regional cooperation between South Africa and the SADC, though, at the current rate, robust regional cooperation seems to be a work in progress. The environment for other SADC companies to invest in South Africa seems to be either difficult or inexistent. By allowing other nations’ the freedom to invest locally, the Republic may also gain through regional FDI from its neighbours. Hence, a study by Amos (2010) maintains that goods sold at these supermarkets (Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Woolworths, Checkers and so forth) are in most cases exclusively South African further demonstrating how local producers and farmers are isolated from the supply chain. Moreover, at some instances, basic produce such as fruits is also imported from the Republic when they can be easily accessible from local suppliers. This situation raises fundamental questions about why South African companies with investments in other SADC nations fail to endorse and utilize products from these countries (Amos: 2010).

Competition becomes rife, as locally made products now have to compete with those from South Africa, which on its own is a huge task and often overlooked. It often results in local businesses that cannot compete being forced to shut down due to fierce competition and restrictions from the Republic’s companies which include South African companies

\(^{28}\) This may also be attested to the fact that the South Africa economy is monopolistically driven, but perhaps more importantly, still vastly in the hands of white minority.
introducing their own price structures irrespective of those existing in host countries. Companies such as South African Breweries (SAB) have often been accused of using questionable means in some SADC nations to establish its dominant position within the brewery sector (Games: 2004). While one may argue that, the South African economy in terms of its monopolistic attitude towards African businesses is another significant burden for the SADC companies to invest regionally. What may be drawn from the above analysis is that South Africa’s rapid investment capital, marketing, technological advantage, cutting-edge infrastructure and human resources have made its companies to at times exploit business opportunities both within the continent and the SADC (Soko: 2007). The Republic’s institutions (banks, hotels, supermarkets and SOE’s) are increasingly playing a dynamic role in shaping the development of the SADC. This affirms the point made by Houston that:

Significant investments have flowed from South Africa since 1994 that have the primary objective of stimulating and generating economic growth in the region as a whole, which does conform to expectations that South Africa would play a major role in stimulating growth. South Africa is a major investor in the region, as well as a leading force in promoting regional infrastructure development that ought to lead to greater intra-regional trade.

Further, echoed in the above statement is the sense that regional integration aims to unite member states into a coalition and create an association or community where members work cooperatively to achieve set objectives. These may include economic development and partnerships in various sectors. Hence, it is critical to reiterate the important role the Republic has played in this part. South African driven investments have indeed been crucial and decisive in enhancing regional development and therefore contributing to the SADC’s regional integration agenda. Pretoria has been at the forefront of further stimulating regional integration in the SADC through its robust role in supporting the regions developmental blueprints such as the SADC’s RISDP. In general and irrespective of the dominant role played by South African companies, the SADC has profited from diverse business opportunities offered by South Africa post-1994.

4.3 South Africa’s trade relations with SADC members since 1994

This section examines Pretoria’s role in stimulating intra-regional trade in the SADC. As explained earlier, intra-regional trade within the SADC may be traced back to as far as the early 1900’s through the formation of the SACU as a motive to enrich trade among its
members (Kuphuka: 2015). Whereas trade arrangements between African countries remain low, intra-regional trade in goods remain vital as it enables trading nations to gain from each other’s diverse products. Intra-regional trade arrangements continentally are generally spearheaded by three objectives, (a) to enhance market integration, (b) to stimulate regional infrastructure and (c) to enhance stability and transparency towards regional governance (National Planning Commission: 2011). To Tjemolane (2011) South Africa views trade as an important aspect of its Africa relations, seeing trade as a mechanism to further stimulate economic growth in the continent. Makgetlaneng (2003) rightly observes that South Africa’s robust standing within the continent allows it to utilize enormous economic and trading agreements with its SADC regional neighbours. Post- 1994, South Africa has made the SADC a priority in many diverse sectors including increasing trade in products between regional members. Its robust infrastructure, economy and capital make it a good trading partner with other SADC members. What further boosted South Africa’s regional and continental trade and its investment triumph is that from 1996, the South African government opted to permit more private sector involvement in its economy (Mahembe: 2014).

Within the SACU, there is free flow of goods without any tariffs; however, intra-regional trade within the SADC is relatively low. Most SADC member’s nations are still far behind in terms of industrialization, hence, intra-regional benefits from trade are still far from realized. In most cases, South Africa has been in the driving seat in terms of enhancing intra-regional trade through exports ranging from agriculture and locally made or assembled products (National Planning Commission: 2011). South Africa has been utilizing three strategies for its trade policy which are: (a) import substitute industrialization, (b) the development of strategic industries (oil, arms, coal) and (c) the development of mineral related exports (Fundira: 2011).

In 2011 South Africa was ranked number forty-one (41) in world exports, the largest in Africa at the time, second to it from the SADC was Zambia ranked number ninety-five (95) in global exports (Sandrey: 2013). Yet again in 2011, trade exports among the SADC members were US$ 209.7 billion with South Africa contributing 46.2% of this trade further highlighting the importance of the Republic’s trade arrangements with the SADC (Sandrey: 2013). As of 2014, South African regional exports to the SADC stood at USS 24.6 billion (South African National Treasury: 2015). South Africa’s transportation networks have also played a significant role by linking the region’s particularly landlocked nations such as
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Malawi and the DRC (Makgetlaneng: 2003). To exemplify this recently on 21 April 2017, a Chinese vessel MV Sinchai offloaded 4127 tons of cargo at the port of Richards Bay, South Africa. The offloaded cargo was destined for Zambia to build a new cement mill in Lusaka (Zululand Observer: 2017). Zambia is one of the several landlocked nations that rely heavily on South Africa’s ports for its products.

One of the most successful trade routes within the region is the Maputo corridor that connects South Africa, Swaziland and south-western Mozambique with the port of Maputo. This project has further improved trade relations between South Africa and Mozambique. In addition, it has also enhanced Mozambique’s continental and global trade through significant infrastructural improvements in the port of Maputo (National Planning Commission: 2011). Hence, this perhaps explains why Mozambique is one of Pretoria’s top five trading partners in the SADC, accounting for trade in the region of ZAR 39 billion in 2015 (South African Government: 2016).

The Republic’s trade and investment patterns with the SADC states may be attested by the view that it intends to deepen the regional integration process (Walaza: 2014). Furthermore, it has promoted and held workshops on monetary awareness in some regional member nations, such that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has also assisted in training reserve bank officials of the DRC (Braude, Thandrayan and Sidiropoulos: 2008). By observing these trade and investment statistics, it is apparent that Pretoria is very much still going to be a driving force in terms of intra-regional trade and advancing FDI to the SADC in general. More importantly, through its National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030, Pretoria aims to further boost intra-regional trade in the SADC. While present levels of trade stand at roughly 7%, Pretoria plans to increase this to 25% by 2030, to be achieved through robust infrastructural investment on rail, road and port development in the region (Gwala: 2015). Alder et al (2014) further claims that South Africa’s current membership in various continental and international groupings allows it the platform to further enhance regional development. Generally, this goes on to show that the SADC occupies a special place in South Africa’s continued economic progress. With its advanced roads, ports and infrastructure, Pretoria is a convenient connecting port to the region’s land locked states and a significant hub for trade in the region. Clearly, South Africa is poised to play a leading role in the SADC’s regional integration framework through support in intra-regional trade.
However, with intra-regional trade an important aspect to stimulating regional growth in the SADC, there are still imbalances of trade in the region. These imbalances are as a result of Pretoria benefiting more in terms of intra-regional trade than its other trading partners. This is significantly down to South Africa possessing the technological expertise, resources, trading routes and human resources. South Africa is a middle-income nation compared to other SADC states, so trade imbalances are more likely to be expected (Tjemolane: 2011). In essence, trade imbalances will be common as a result of these aspects, and because of regional states not possessing the required resources, technology, trade routes and capital as South Africa. As such, the Republic may be regarded as playing a partnership role in not only exporting its diverse products to other SADC members, but by also utilizing its trade routes and capital to spearhead intra-regional trade. The objective here was for the SADC to improve its level of trade among its regional states. The South African Government (2011) will further aim to enhance relations with other SADC states by addressing trade hindrances and constraints.

4.4 Settlement of disputes and peacekeeping efforts

As previously alluded to in chapter two, when South Africa became a SADC member, there were great expectations in terms of its contribution to the region. Such was not only through investments driven policies within the SADC but also through fundamental contributions such as providing and enhancing regional security. Regionally, South Africa has always boasted a stronger security regime (military) presence than other SADC member nations during both pre and post-apartheid. Pre-1994 this military capability was often used for instigating violence in the SADC. The inauguration of a newly democratic government in 1994 was seen as a positive step in rectifying the apartheid regimes regional tendencies. Overall, South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy thus inspired and influenced it to be actively involved in security and peacekeeping missions regionally and continentally (Nibishaka: 2011).

As outlined in the ANC’s 1994 foreign policy document, peacekeeping\(^29\) was another regional priority driving the Republic’s developmental commitment with its SADC members (Martinelli and Pirozzi: 2015). During the apartheid era, most of the SADC member states were hostile to South Africa’s apartheid regime that prevailed at the time. Post-1994 South

\(^{29}\) Kibasomba (2002) argues that peacekeeping is correlated with military engagement (utilization of military power) with the aim of imposing or enforcing peace (truce and peace negotiation) or apply the terms of the peace accord (reconstruction and peace building).
Africa sought the implementation of a common security initiative regionally where the SADC member nations would rearrange their structures, namely those of security, politics and defence by collaborating with one another. This was because a country’s domestic or internal threat may also have a negative effect on its neighbours and the region at large. Common security collaborations were therefore considered as a way enhancing collaboration in sharing, resources, knowledge and early warning of significant threat(s) (South African Government: 1996).

Soon after it became a SADC member, South Africa showed the willingness to participate in the SADC activities, including security collaboration through the building of effective security mechanisms. Miti (2012) for instance asserts that there are two dynamics driving South Africa to be at the core of conflict resolution on the continent. First is that continental instability hampers the pace of development, causes the death of civilians, causes population displacement, damages the already limited infrastructure and prevents FDI inflow from other parts of the globe. Secondly, it is what the South African government refers to as a Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) mechanism that portrays South Africa as a role player in terms of conflict management continentally. The Republic’s military schedule possesses three essential cores of conciliation, post-conflict progression and peacekeeping (Miti: 2012). Ample amounts of capital, energy and time have been utilised by the South African government in granting support to countries within the SADC in these core areas (Zondi: 2012).

The Republic also fully avails itself to the SADC’s security institutions most notably the ISDSC and the southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO), who both are regulated by the protocol on politics, defence and security cooperation within the SADC (Cawthra, Du Pisani and Omari: 2007). As of December 2013, the contribution from the Republic to peace and missions stood at roughly 2190 individuals (police and military) sent to the UN’s Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC (Hendrick: n.d). Post-conflict intervention by South Africa has included the signing of peace agreements between opposing parties, the formation of transitional governments, assistance in peacekeeping, elections overview, post-conflict monitoring and security reform (Hendricks: 2015). Given its level of development and influence continentally and globally as an active role player in peacekeeping projects, the Republic’s superior military and negotiation expertise has to some degree been significant in reducing regional conflict and
political instability (Miti: 2012). The Republic has since championed regional peacekeeping assignments in both the AU and the SADC, while also playing a crucial part in implementing peace and security mechanism. To South Africa, human rights are a significant agenda, hence, through its foreign policy, the Republic vowed to be deeply involved in preventing continental and regional conflicts (Tjemolane: 2011). In the SADC, most cases of political instability are evidenced in clashes amongst governments’ opposition parties and rebel led militia groups.

The subsequent case studies of political volatility in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC are used to demonstrate South Africa’s military and diplomatic intervention in these member states in the region. In general, the idea is to unpack some of the vital intervention strategies deployed by Pretoria with the objective of ending political instability in these member countries. These three SADC states have in the past experienced significant political catastrophes that have in general hampered their level of development, economic growth and caused severe internal problems.

Political violence is not something new in Lesotho. There has always been some sort of political instability in the tiny Kingdom during pre and post-election events (Motsamai: 2015). Right from the onset since gaining its independence in 1966 from the United Kingdom, Lesotho has experienced vast amounts of political instability. These have often occurred during and after the elections in 1974, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2007, 2012 and 2014. Motsamai (2015) further opines that as a result, the country has since 1966, witnessed several military coups that have ultimately had disastrous internal effects. Since its formation, the SADC has often collaborated with other regional member states, particularly South African and Botswana when trying to stop political instability within the Kingdom.

The subsequent section analyses the political unrest(s) that has over the years been witnessed in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC, which undoubtedly left these SADC states at crossroads. More importantly, it brings into light the critical role South Africa has played (particularly post-1994) in ending political instability in these member states.

4.4.1 South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho

Lesotho is a landlocked state in the southern tip of Africa, and is wholly enveloped by South Africa. Being one of the smallest nations in the world (with a current population of about 2.2 million inhabitants), it has since gaining its independence from Britain in 1966, witnessed an
array of political instability. Therefore, its political stability has over the years remained fragile and uncertain.

In unpacking the political turmoil that has hampered Lesotho in recent years, the first instance will be drawn from as early as 1993 from the country’s first general elections since 1970, which were won by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The following year, 1994, a coup was orchestrated by King Letsie III (Vhumbunu: 2015). This coup led to the assassination of Selometsi Boholo who was deputy prime minister. Though victorious in the elections, the king refused to recognize the BCP as a new government (Motsamai: 2015). This ultimately led to relentless consultations overseen by the SADC Troika (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana). The consultations eventually led to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that was finally agreed upon among the parties involved, which eventually led to peace. More importantly, the BCP was reinstated as the government of the country (Mothibe: 1999).

While for the first time within the country, there was a democratic government for a five-year period, more political drama was to ensue leading to the 1998 general elections. Mmutle (2007) asserts that South Africa played a role by diplomatically trying to negotiate the political disputes in the tiny kingdom and dispatching the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to monitor the situation in the country. Problems in Lesotho had started with the 1998 elections when the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) was this time declared winner in the general elections with a majority of 79 seats compared to the BNP’s 1 seat. Although affirmed to be free and fair by observers from the continent and abroad, other national parties from Lesotho including the BCP, Basotho National Party (BNP) and Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) refused to accept the results claiming that they were somehow rigged. In addition, after these parties had lost their appeal at an appeal court of Lesotho, what followed from 10 August 1994 to 17 August 1994 was political mayhem in Maseru (Mothibe: 1999). South Africa at first distanced itself from the crisis but eventually intervened following pressure from civil societies, other regional nations and more importantly after being summoned by the SADC (Mmutle: 2007). Former president, Mr Nelson Mandela was accompanied by his deputy Mr Thabo Mbeki, the late South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and Defence Minister Joe Modise as part of the mediation team that was to tackle the situation in the Kingdom (Mothibe: 1999). By becoming a SADC
member, South Africa had vowed to involve itself in regional political and military interventions, thus, the importance of unpacking its historical involvement in Lesotho.

To Mmutle (2007) the Republic’s involvement was to bring to the negotiation table the national parties of Lesotho and the government in an attempt to resolve the internal political crisis and claims of vote rigging. Justice Pius Langa, who was deputy president of South Africa’s constitutional court, was to chair the team that also comprised of individuals from Zimbabwe and Botswana (Mothibe: 1999). South Africa had played a vital part leading to the breakthrough, as through its South African Police Service (SAPS), SANDF and negotiation team over the course of the Lesotho mayhem, it had used its vast resources to bring internal order to the kingdom with the assistance of Botswana and Zimbabwe. These negotiations eventually had a breakthrough that led to four vital resolutions being agreed, which were:

- New elections were to be contested within a time frame of 15 to 18 months
- An arrangement was reached on the reformation of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to make sure it was capable of rendering its obligation
- To endorse free and fair political activity for involved parties and
- A treaty on joint working initiatives to re-establish stability within the country.

Furthermore, South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho paved way for the creation of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). In 2001, the two countries (South Africa and Lesotho) then signed the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC). This agreement outlined South Africa’s contribution to improving its relations with Lesotho and further outlined its pledge to improving economic relations with other African nations (Mmutle: 2007). Tau (2000) points out that the political damage had cost Lesotho more than ZAR 30 million in damages.

The latest political turmoil to hit the tiny kingdom was in August 2014. This is when a discharged commander of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) with plans to oust Prime Minister Thomas Thabane orchestrated another coup, ultimately forcing him to seek refuge in South Africa. With the aim of returning the kingdom to constitutional normality, South African president Mr Jacob Zuma who was the new chair of the SADC OPDSC decided to invite Lesotho’s coalition leaders to Pretoria. Here, an undertaking was given by the coalition leaders to restore law and order in the country (Weisfelder: 2015). On 1 September 2014,

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30 This was a body that was going to host the next elections in the country, it was to consist of two members of each involved party.
right after the coup had taken place, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, who make up the SADC Troika on Defence met in Pretoria to plot a way forward (SADC: 2015). Yet again, the Republic was given the task of resolving the problems within the kingdom and to deploy security personal to the country (Motsamai: 2015). At this gathering, the dialogue came up with what was known as the Pretoria Declaration. This meant Pretoria was to deploy the SAPS and SANDF to Maseru, who were to work alongside the Lesotho Police and provide full time protection to Thomas Thabane (Motsamai: 2015). In November 2014, 140 SAPS members were deployed to Lesotho as part of the SADC observer mission.

South African Deputy President Mr Cyril Ramaphosa was appointed as the mediator to oversee the dialogue between the concerned parties of Lesotho (Vhumbunu: 2015). He was to be supported by an observer team known as SOMILES that comprised of politics and security personnel who were to monitor the political and security situation in the kingdom (SADC: 2015). Support was offered to Ramaphosa through the SADC’s OPDSC mission, which included personnel from Namibia, Malawi, Botswana and Angola. In an effort to reduce the political pressure that was escalating in Lesotho and produce beneficial environment for political dialogue, SOMILES came up with the Maseru Security Accord. It provided that lieutenant General Tlali Kamoli, lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao and commissioner of police Khotatso Tsooana who were three police chiefs vacate Lesotho through a leave of absence (SADC: 2015). With the assistance of Ramaphosa, the dialogue concluded with the agreement of the Maseru Facilitation Declaration on 2 October 2014 (Weisfelder: 2015). In addition, a consensus was reached to reopen Parliament on the 17 October 2014, and hold new elections in February 2015 on a date that was to be determined by King Letsie III and which were to be overseen by the IEC (DIRCO: 2014).

The 2015 elections were expected to restore stability and peace in the Kingdom, through a new government (Daily maverick: 2017). Pakalitha Mosisili of the Democratic Congress (DC) was victorious in these elections. Nevertheless, without receiving the outright majority he had to form a coalition government31 with smaller parties (Lesotho times: 2015). Lesotho was a recipient of vast resources from the Republic in order to bring stability to the Kingdom, consequently leading to the relentless dialogues sessions. On 27 February 2015, the Republic

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31 This featured the LCD, MFP, BCP, National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho’s people’s Congress (LPC) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD).
through its African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF)\textsuperscript{32} contributed ZAR 18.2 million to the SADC Secretariat. This fund was to assist in the deployment of a SADC organ observation mission to the Kingdom (DIRCO: 2016). Political trouble has continued to follow the tiny kingdom. While Mosisili had been on the reigns from March 2015, to March 2017, his coalition led government received a vote of no confidence in parliament, leading to it being disjointed (Ngatane: 2017). Rather than handing over the reins, he (Mosisili) instructed king Letsie III to disband parliament and hold fresh elections in three months. As a result of these elections held on 3 June 2017, Thomas Thabane’s All Basotho Convention (ABC) were victorious, attaining 48 of the 80 constituencies, while his rival Mosisili won only 16 seats (Peta: 2017). Again, by not attaining the necessary required threshold of votes, Thabane formed coalition government with three other parties, the Alliance of Democrats (AD), BNP and the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL).

With recent events, political turmoil in Lesotho seems to be far from over, so is South Africa’s and the SADC’s intervention. Just recently, days after Thomas Thabane’s inauguration after his success in the 2017 elections, his estranged wife Lipolelo Thabane was assassinated in Masana, further portending more political trouble for the troubled nation (Mohloboli and Toyana: 2017). While South Africa has undoubtedly played a massive role in attempting to resolve Lesotho’s internal political woes thus far, there have often been questions associated with its involvement within fellow SADC member states. Fundamentally, other states tend to become involved in internal politics of others for numerous reasons, which may draw the question as to why has South Africa over the years seemed to be so heavily involved in Lesotho’s instability? While the first might be that as Lesotho is entirely surrounded by South Africa, the Republic is seen as the first SADC state responsible of reacting to any conflict in the Kingdom. However, there may be other reasons related to this. One might be that a politically instable Lesotho, may also become a burden for the South African economy and security, as this might force Basotho nationals to flee into South Africa. Moreover, smuggling of illegal goods and weapons might also affect the Republic (Williams: 2014). Nevertheless, over the years, there has been a link between South Africa’s intervention in the Kingdom and water, precisely the Katse Dam (Weisfelder: 2014).

\textsuperscript{32} The ARF was to assist African states through funding by strengthening socio-economic development, help in preventing conflicts, humanitarian support, promote human resource development, contribute in on-going political dialogues while additionally enhancing good governance and democracy (Flemes: 2010). It had dismantled the Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund (Act No. 68 of 1968) that was utilized by the South African apartheid regime. Other regional states to have benefited from the ARF include Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius.
This may be traced back to 1986; when South Africa had played a role in ending a military coup in Lesotho. Thus, a few months later, there was an agreement between the two states about the LHWP. In essence, the LHWP has over the years been of importance to South Africa, especially its economic hub of Gauteng province. It has, since the agreement between South African and Lesotho, been essential in supplying South Africa with water and hydroelectric power (Daily maverick: 2017). Hence, South Africa’s involvement in the Kingdom might also be significantly viewed with a sense that, any political turmoil in Lesotho, and more importantly any disturbance within the LHWP, may significantly also bring with it major hindrances to its economy, as this might undermine the LHWP project.

Throughout all the conflict that has been witnesses in the Basotho nation, Pretoria’s assistance has been visible through pivotal dialogue engagements and diplomatic mediations. This has ultimately led to restoring order in the Lesotho nation. However, with current events, it undoubtedly seems that meaningful political stability in Lesotho is far from being realized. As long as the country’s political elites cannot forge beneficial coalitions for the benefit of the Basotho population, South Africa and the SADC still have further roles to play in the Kingdoms political turmoil moving forward.

4.4.2 South Africa’s diplomatic intervention in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, once an economic powerhouse of the SADC region has over the past 15 years or so seen its economy shrink at a very fast pace. This was mainly due to political disorder in the country (Mlambo and Raftopoulos: 2010). Over the years, Zimbabwe’s political unrest has mostly been based on contestations between the country’s ZANU-PF and the MDC, the latter being formed in 1999 by Morgan Tsvangirai. While the ruling ZANU-PF has been the most dominant party in general elections in recent years, the establishment of the MDC brought with it more fierce competition for the ruling ZANU-PF.

South Africa’s involvement with its SADC member may be traced back to the early 2000’s where Zimbabwe’s political woes had started after the ruling ZANU-PF had sought for a constitutional referendum that took place on 12 and 13 February 2000 (McGregor and Primorac: 2010). This was to permit the taking of land (particularly from white farmers) with no compensation, grant the president (Robert Mugabe) more power while additionally adding twelve more years to his presidential tenure. The MDC sought to oppose this latest draft constitution of which it succeeded in doing (Mlambo: 2014). Furthermore, a very good showing in the general elections in the year 2000 by the MDC made ZANU-PF realise that
the MDC was a serious threat to its governance in Zimbabwe (Miti: 2012). From the year 2000, serious internal complications in Zimbabwe arose consisting of sanctions, cessation of aid, embassies of European and other countries being closed down coupled with a twelve-month suspension from the commonwealth (Miti: 2012; Alao: 2012). These factors ushered in South Africa as a negotiator to try to rectify the political and economic complications that were causing immense internal problems in Zimbabwe. It was former South African president Thabo Mbeki; 1999-2008, in conjunction with Australia and Nigeria (the Commonwealth Triad) that had the task to rectify these political woes.

In 2007, leading up to the country’s general elections, the political situation intensified. This was when the MDC structures were attacked by what were deemed to be ZANU-PF associates. In the same year, 11 March 2007 precisely, Morgan Tsvangirai and Lovemore Madhuku were also beaten and arrested by the police. Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) asserts that in March 2007, at an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of States in Tanzania, the Republic was again mandated by the SADC to facilitate a dialogue between the ZANU – PF and the two structures of MDC (T) and MDC (M)\(^{33}\). Through rigorous mediation from South Africa, the ZANU – PF and the two MDC formations, the president (Robert Mugabe) set the date for the elections, which was to be 29 March 2008. In these elections, the MDC (T) was considered to have been victorious obtaining 47.9% to ZANU-PF’s 43.2%. Hence, with neither of them obtaining the required 50 % majority, a run-off was scheduled to take place on 27 June 2008 (Cawthra: 2010).

However, citing the continuous abductions, beatings and torture of MDC supporters, Morgan Tsavangirai decided to withdraw from the election run-off (Shakespeare and Petra: 2015). The SADC then asked South Africa to intervene urgently in the Zimbabwean crisis. The MDC were not entirely satisfied about South Africa facilitating the dialogue. This was mainly due to the relatively close ties between the ANC and the ZANU – PF that dates back to the colonial era (Zondi: 2012). To Shakespeare and Petra (2015) apart from his government strategies, Robert Mugabe is still one of the most respected presidents in the SADC region. In addition, there is some sort of unity between most revolutionary parties in southern Africa. These include the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the ANC, the Patriotic Front (PF) of Zambia and Namibia’s South West People’s Organization (SWAPO). Their relations may be drawn from the

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\(^{33}\) The MDC had split into two. The MDC (T) was run by Morgan Tsvangirai while the MDC (M) was that of Professor Arthur Mutambara.
colonial era, more notably to the formation of the FLS. Hence, one significant reason may be that the MDC was unhappy that South Africa was one of these parties ushered in to facilitate the dialogue between itself and ZANU-PF. Nevertheless, Thabo Mbeki was tasked to mediate a dialogue between all involved parties. In handling the situation, Mbeki sought for a diplomatic intervention rather than a violent approach as Pretoria had thought that a forceful intervention might lead to even tougher political suppression in Zimbabwe (Zondi: 2012).

The country was already experiencing high stagflation rates, with its inflation at 231 million percent in 2008 (Berger: 2008). The dialogue between Mbeki, his team of facilitators, ZANU – PF and the MDC was conducted in different locations in southern Africa which took several months of intense negotiations between the involved parties (Zondi: 2012). On 17 September 2008, a breakthrough was achieved when an agreement was reached in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which became the foundation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (Miti: 2012). The GPA included arrangements on constitutional, security, legal and economic improvements, as well as in power sharing and reconciliation. In addition, the agreement resulted in the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai becoming prime minister and Arthur Mutambara his deputy, while Robert Mugabe retained his presidency (Cawthra: 2010). South Africa had already spent huge amounts of money in rectifying Zimbabwe’s internal problems, such that between 2008 and 2009, Pretoria had already contributed ZAR 613 million from the ARF to Zimbabwe.

South Africa attracted a lot of attention in the region particularly from Zimbabwe after it introduced the Zimbabwean Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) in 2014, which is to be active until December 2017, much to the dissatisfaction of many Zimbabweans living in South Africa (van Wyk and Chiumia: n.d). The ZSP is the successor to the much-criticised Dispensations of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) that was introduced in 2009. Basically, upon its introduction, for a Zimbabwean individual to apply for the ZSP, he or she must possess a

34 Signed in September 2008 and effective from February 2009, the GPA was an accord between Zimbabwe’s three main political parties, the ZANU-PF and the two MDC structures (Human Rights Watch: 2010). It was a power-sharing agreement between these parties that aimed to address internal challenges (political and economic) facing Zimbabwe.

35 In essence, this means that individuals who fail to meet the December 2017 deadline, together with those who have pending application(s) face the possibility of deportation back to Zimbabwe. In addition, if granted the ZSP, you do not qualify for permanent resident within South Africa.

36 The fundamental aim of the DZP was at creating a database of Zimbabweans staying in South Africa, moreover, to track Zimbabweans that were living in South Africa without the required documentations together with those obtained through fraudulent processes. The South African DHA officially ceased the DZP on 31 December 2010. Though the expiry dates of DZP holders was moved to 31 December 2014 together with those that were due to expire beyond December 2014.

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Zimbabwean passport, proof of employment or study in South Africa, and have no criminal record of which a police clearance certificate is needed as proof (Rietveld: 2014). Moreover, the ZSP is only valid for 36 months and after which an individual has to re-apply. This has to be done at the country of origin, in this case in Zimbabwe at the cost of ZAR 870 for adults and ZAR 800 for a minor.

Unpacking the above arrangement, this policy does not seem to enhance better immigration frameworks for the region through observing the way it is structured. For example, with the aim of implementing a better-suited policy in West Africa, centred towards immigration and movement of people, ECOWAS introduced a simpler and better-structured framework that catered for all its member-states. This was by abolishing Visa entry and introducing the ECOWAS passport so people may move and enter freely in other ECOWAS member states. Likewise, individuals may stay in member states countries for up to 90 days, subject to availability of required travel documents (Udeoji: 2013). In essence, just like ECOWAS, the SADC is made up of different member states. While there are bilateral agreements (trade, security and infrastructural development) between South Africa and other SADC nations. Maybe South Africa should (in collaboration with other regional states) try to formulate a regional policy that accommodates all SADC members, rather than formulating one for each country, as this further unearths debates about the logic of its foreign policy on southern Africa and African states. Thus, ECOWAS has made significant strides in free movement of individuals in its geographical area.

The South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) simply explained that the project was for Zimbabweans to re-apply for their status in South Africa. Nevertheless, it is unclear why there are two immigration policies for the same country in an 8-year period. It is however also critical to understand that the application for the ZSP is not a free service. In contrast, the majority of Zimbabweans living in South Africa fend for themselves, meaning through being street vendors, gardeners, security guards, care guards, domestic workers and so forth. In addition, the first step of applying for the permit has to be done online, thereby creating another burden for those living in rural areas, as help desks were only set up in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, the Western Cape and Limpopo. This means that most Zimbabweans will be marginalized from the system. Hence, it does not seem that the South African government considered all these factors before implementing the programme. It seems to accommodate the better working class of Zimbabwe, who can rightfully afford all the hassles and expenses
it comes with. It is within this perspective that, some Zimbabwean nationals have gone as far as saying that the South African government is simply trying to export them out of the country for good (van Wyk and Chiumia: n.d). In his announcement of the ZSP project in 2014, Minister of the DHA, Malusi Gigaba outlined that:

We are committed to manage immigration in a way which treats all visitors humanly, in an efficient manner and according to our own deeply embedded human right ethos

Drawing from the above statement, while a sovereign state has every right to implement and amend policies it sees fit for its regional, continental, international relations and political stability, this immigration policy from South Africa towards Zimbabwe seems off course. An important question here is, why not implement a SADC or continental immigration policy? Just like the ECOWAS passport that is utilized in West Africa, this is critical given that there are many diverse foreign internationals from not only the SADC but also other African states living and working in South Africa. At the other end and rightfully aware of political tensions in Zimbabwe post-2000, South Africa should have introduced better immigration policies for Zimbabweans and other SADC and African individuals fleeing their countries to South Africa. Foreign relations are important and should be driven by robust polices to the benefit of all parties involved. On the other end, South Africa has also benefited from educated individuals from Zimbabwe including academics, doctors, teachers and so forth. Significant revamp is needed within the South African immigration system, as primarily, no matter what policies are introduced, it has over the years been easily altered due to high levels of corruption in the South African immigration and border system (Hammerstad: 2011). Over the years, many foreign nationals have been able to attain fraudulent documents because of the corruption loophole. Primarily, that is where the chunk of the problem that needs to be solved lies, at key South Africa departments and state owned departments including those that operate within national borders such as the Department of Home affairs, SAPS, SANDF and the South African Revenue Service (SARS).

Nevertheless, there seems to be progress made by the South African government towards implementing better immigration policies particularly centred towards international students (the SADC included) studying at institutions of higher learning in South Africa. International students are of importance to South Africa as they assist in the shortage of skilled workforce the country is currently faced with. With this in mind, South Africa will now allow international students to apply for permanent residency in the country upon completion of their degrees. However, these degrees must be aligned to critical skills sector needed by the South African economy (South African Government: 2016). Although those not wanting the permanent residency may in turn apply for the critical skills visa if they intend to be employed or start a business in South Africa.
4.4.3 South Africa’s military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC

The DRC has over the years had relatively high cases of internal political instability. Since its independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC has been hindered by massive amounts of in fighting which undoubtedly has had a major impact on the country’s economic growth prospects (Chapanyi: 2015). In May 1997 with backing from Rwanda and Uganda, the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo – Zaire (AFDL) removed Mobuto Sese Seko, a long-time dictator in the DRC. While in geographical terms, the DRC is relatively far from the Republic, there have been vast peacekeeping initiatives taken by South Africa in the country. Hence, Pretoria’s involvement in the DRC began in 1997, when the Republic tried to broker a deal between Mobuto Sese Soko and Laurent Kabila (Molemane: 2015).

When Mobuto’s reign ended in 1997, it brought with it huge levels of violence amongst the rebels particularly those in support of Kabila. When President Thabo Mbeki came into office, one of his many tasks was to solve the situation in the DRC. Thus, he started negotiations for a ceasefire in June 1999, which was held in Lusaka, Zambia. First, to enter into the dialogue were state parties and later on Congolese fighters. Here, a consensus was reached in a form of the Lusaka Accords. Through Mbeki’s mediation a deal was agreed upon between the DRC and Rwanda, known as the Pretoria Accord of July 2002 that led to Rwanda withdrawing its 20,000 troops from the DRC (Ndahiro, Rwagatere and Nkusi: 2015). At the other end, Angola through its mediation assisted in persuading Uganda to also withdraw its troops from the DRC, in what was better known as the Luanda Accord of 2002. With the withdrawal of troops from Uganda and Rwanda, this laid the basis of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue38 (Vicencio, Nantulya and Savage: 2015) where the future and leadership of the country was to be deliberated. Pretoria was to contribute 50 % of the required funds for this dialogue to be held in Sun City, South Africa. In February 2002, South Africa chaired the dialogue where 360 delegates attended. More so, 70% of those in attendance signed the peace agreement. The dialogue, which was held for 52 days, cost ZAR 37 million at Pretoria’s expense (Zondi: 2012). In essence, the dialogue was an arrangement on transformation in the DRC, which included critical issues such as power sharing, the establishment of a new army, the

38 The dialogue was to bring to the negotiation table all concerned stakeholders from the DRC. These were to include representatives from Government, Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD-Goma), Congolese Liberation Movement (CLM), Political Oppositions, Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), RCD Nationale (RCD-N), civil society and the Mai-Mai militia groups (Apuuli: 2004).
organization of the country’s general elections and an interim constitution that was to govern the country in the transition period (Rogier: 2003).

Basically, it sought to provide a pivotal chapter towards the road to peace and stability in the country. The agreement contributed to a power-sharing arrangement that approved Joseph Kabila as president while being supported by four vice presidents. They were to be supported by a multiparty national assembly (Shillinger: 2009). After South Africa’s involvement in the signing of the inclusive political agreement in Pretoria on December 2002, it would be heavily involved in supporting its implementation, more importantly in the first two years leading to the DRC’s democratic elections (Zondi: 2012). In 2003 at a presentation in the South African parliament, Thabo Mbeki explained that that Pretoria’s participation in the UN’s Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) had already cost the Republic ZAR 819.6 million (Shillinger: 2009). Apart from this, while leading towards the elections in 2006, Pretoria’s support was immense and spearheaded by both the SANDF and IEC. These were to be the third elections in the DRC since gaining independence (Hengari: 2016). The IEC was to assist in the election through logistical and technical support and was to deploy in all 11 provinces in the country, 128 electoral individuals and 118 observers (Shillinger: 2009).

Leading to the election, the IEC recruited and trained staff who included IT technicians. These elections were to feature over 25 million registered voters (Shillinger: 2009). The elections were to be heavily contested by Joseph Kabila and Jean – Pierre Bemba. While the elections of 30 July 2006 were deemed to be fair, there was no outright winner as no leader went above the 50% mark (Mullins and Rothe: 2008). Kabila had gained 44.81% while Bemba received 20.03%. Hence, this led to a run-off election that was scheduled for 29 October 2006 (Kisangani and Bobb: 2010). After the election run off Kabila received 9,819,822 votes or 58.05% with Bemba gaining 6,819,822 votes or 41.95% (Mueni and Martin: 2009), leading Bemba to appeal the results in court, where ultimately he lost his appeal. This led to violence breaking out between Bemba’s security forces and government forces. Again, Pretoria was drawn to the negotiation table after being summoned by the AU.

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39 President Kabila was also to be the commander of the armed force. His deputies were Azania Ruberwa who was to chair the Political Commission, Jean – Pierre Bemba the chair of the Economic and Finance Commission. The remaining two included Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the chair of the Reconstruction and Development Commission and Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma who chaired the Social and Cultural Commission (Rogier: 2003).

40 Joseph Kabila and Jean – Pierre Bemba were respective leaders of the Peoples Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) and Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC).
Despite all the political instability that has unfolded in the DRC post-1997, the general elections were perceived as a progressive step moving forward, hence, these were the first elections that were considered to be free and fair in four decades. On 6 December 2006, Kabila was sworn in as the president of the DRC. As a result, in 2007 at the South African parliament, president Kabila offered his gratitude on the Republic’s significant work in his country to stimulate peace and security (Shillinger: 2009).

Again, pertaining the aid and resources leading to the country’s 2006 elections, both South Africa and the DRC had two years prior to the elections (2004) formed the South African – DRC Bi – National Commission as a blue print plan to stimulate business cooperation between the two states. These were to be in health, defence, diplomatic consultation and public administration (Shillinger: 2009). When the Accord was signed, the SANDF participated in monitoring further political violence in the DRC. As a result, more than 1,300 soldiers were deployed by Pretoria in 2013 as part of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to repel and counter attack the March 23 Rebels (M23) insurgent group in eastern DRC (Chapanyi: 2015). With military backing from Malawi and Tanzania, the M23 rebel were defeated and entered into a peace agreement with the Congolese government. In addition, the SANDF had assisted significantly in transporting ballot papers and other vital products from South Africa to the DRC (Molemane: 2015). Through the Republic’s ARF, the DRC in 2008 was a recipient of ZAR 101 million (Landsberg and van Wyk: 2012). The Sun City and Pretoria agreement of 2002 both established a basis for a conceivable peace agreement hence paving the way for a post-war restoration in the DRC. It is worth mentioning that, the conflict in the DRC is far from being completely over, especially in the strong rebel-controlled eastern part of the country. Pretoria has over the years contributed immensely to reducing the political damage through soft and hard power approaches, further revealing that, it is still going to be heavily involved in spearheading military intervention in the DRC through the SADC in the future (Gbaya: 2015).

In 1994, South Africa had through the newly elected government of Nelson Mandela made it clear that part of their post reconstruction mandate would be its participation in peacekeeping initiatives authorized by the SADC and its OPDSC (Khobotlo: 1998). Pretoria’s foreign policy has made mediation a vital tool for security and resolving regional conflicts in the SADC while at the same time intended at investing in approaches directed at limiting political hostilities (Soko: 2007). Through its 2015 South African defence review, South
Africa affirmed that it will continue championing matters such as preventing regional and continental conflicts, assisting in post-conflict monitoring, peacekeeping in collaboration with multinational forums such as the UN, AU and the SADC (Martinelli and Pirozzi: 2015). Hence, the UN ranks South Africa in its top 14 troop contributing nations (Bellamy and Williams: 2013). Through observing a loophole in terms of conflict engagement regionally, South Africa assisted in implementing the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which sought to ensure the prevention, management of conflict threats, post-conflict reconstruction and development continentally (Kok: 2015).

It is worth pointing out that apart from the SADC, South Africa has been at the forefront in military and peacekeeping missions elsewhere continentally in countries like the Central African Republic (CAR), Eritrea, Mali, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Burundi and even in Nigeria where its mercenaries were initially involved with the fight against Boko Haram. Former commander of the South African Defence Force (now SANDF) and member of the South African security forces in the apartheid era, Colonel Eben Barlow led these mercenaries\(^{41}\) in the fight against the Nigerian insurgency group (Freeman: 2015; Barlow: 2017). This additionally signifies that South Africa does not intend to assist only the SADC region when it comes to military and peacekeeping missions, but also goes beyond the SADC borders to offer assistance to other African states.

When observing South Africa’s military contribution to the SADC since becoming a member, it is clear that the country will continue to play a substantial role in trying to intervene in regional conflicts on invitation or to protect its national security. Again, Pretoria has been in the driving seat in terms of forming more robust partnerships in the region through on-going military dialogues between concerned parties at conflict. Post 1994, South Africa has aspired to form a more united southern Africa, unlike the predecessor apartheid government, through deeper working ties in terms of regional security mechanisms. Hence, it is somewhat safe to conclude that in terms of military contribution, Pretoria has made solid contributions to the SADC’s regional integration framework of a peaceful and prosperous region. Clearly, its military and political involvement in the region has solidified a subtle hegemonic standpoint, which indeed has equally benefited the SADC region in terms of military involvement and regional coalition attempts in this regard.

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\(^{41}\) Although this was not part of the SADC mandate.
4.5 South Africa’s role in the SADC: Regional partner or hegemon?

As stated before in this study, South Africa’s democratic shift in 1994 brought with it many accusations as to whether the Republic would work collectively with other regional members, or just pursue its own self-interest (Hadebe: 2015). These have been caused by various reasons including some viewing South Africa’s rapid regional investment as a threat to their nations businesses (Mulaudzi: 2006) and the historical apartheid legacies between Pretoria and the SADC region. During the apartheid regime, South Africa was known to utilize its military power in neighbouring nations with the aim of destabilizing the region. While this has changed drastically in the post-apartheid era, where Pretoria has focused on a more investment-oriented policy for the SADC, the Republic is still perceived as a regional hegemon owing to its economic growth credentials. Strong realistic foundations pertaining to economic, military and political stability have given Pretoria prestige in the region (Geldenhuys: 2008, Hadebe: 2015). Hence, there has always been an on-going argument about Pretoria’s role in the region, as to whether it pursues cooperation with its neighbours in the guise of a regional hegemonic ambition fascinated about pursuing its own regional agenda (Tjemolane: 2011).

For instance, Amos (2010) asserts that South Africa has over the years tried to balance its local needs and responsibilities with regional, continental and international expectations. In international fora, Pretoria is viewed as a leader in Africa’s development agendas, but continentally and regionally, the Republic’s credentials are at times viewed with ambiguity (Alden and Schoeman: 2015). As defined in more detail in chapter 2 of this study, regional hegemons are regional leaders who in their region are considered superior because of their economic, political and military assets (McGowan and Obeng: 1998). By judging a nation because of these three vital traits, South Africa may well be considered a regional hegemon within the SADC. Hegemons in most cases possess greater influence over other regional states in that particular regional bloc.

Since 1994, Pretoria has developed a capability of downplaying its hegemonic stance in the SADC (Lee, Taylor and Williams: 2006). However, by viewing South Africa’s hegemonic ambition in a positive manner, it may be significant to mention that the Republic has somehow demonstrated a benign hegemonic attribute at the regional level. This could be attributed to various developmental and economic growth initiatives relative to its economic status, while at the same time, Pretoria has been pivotal in enhancing institutions aimed at
improving the African continent in general. Moreover, South Africa has shown the desired responsibility in assisting the region to accomplish economic growth and development driven frameworks. South Africa was instrumental in forming the African Renaissance concept spearheaded by former president Mr Thabo Mbeki, and being in the forefront in stimulating the NEPAD initiative. Likewise, it has played a key role in institutions such as the AU and taken initiatives in intervening through military peacekeeping initiatives within the SADC. Pretoria’s private and public sectors have additionally taken the lead in expanding the regions infrastructural development (Habib: 2003). Nevertheless and without controversy, this hegemonic aspect has also at times been utilized unproductively.

The SACU members represent the most obvious case(s) of how Pretoria has at times displayed its hegemonic attitude. Tracing South Africa’s hegemonic powers from as early as 1995, the Republic ostensibly used its hegemonic position to one-sidedly revoke provision 311 of the SACU treaty. This treaty would have allowed the BLNS nations to access imported goods outside of the SACU borders that were mainly going to be raw materials for textile production. These were because the Republic’s producer of these raw materials could not meet the SACU demands hence the SACU members had to find other alternatives (McGowan and Obeng: 1998). In neighbouring Botswana, automobile companies Volvo and Hyundai had to shut down their operations in Gaborone amid pressure from the South African government. This was in 1999, when the Republic in collaboration with its trade unions and employing their negotiating power forced these two companies to move out of Botswana and to South Africa. Vehicles that were being assembled in Gaborone were largely meant for the large South African market. With the aim of adding more pressure, the South African government then decided to increase tariffs on vehicles imported from Botswana (Good and Hughes: 2002). When it emerged that, more vehicle manufacturing companies might relocate to Botswana because of the availability of cheap labour, South Africa’s trade unions joined with anti-Hyundai allies to influence workers in Botswana in order to avoid being employed by the Motor Company of Botswana (MCB). This *modus operandi* by the South African government resulted in about 450 job losses in the Botswana motor industry (Good and Hughes: 2002). When observed from a financial context, the currencies of the SACU members are all tied to the South African ZAR, basically meaning that not one of the BLNS nations can independently exercise fiscal policy without first consulting or receiving assistance from Pretoria (Alden and Soko: 2005).
Also, when negotiations for the SADC FTA were underway, South Africa decided to negotiate on behalf of the SACU without consultation with the SACU members (Lee: 2003). It is the same manner that South Africa took the decision to negotiate trade policies with the EU without again consulting its SACU partners (Hulse: 2016). Such examples have led to some SADC states accusing South Africa of promoting its self-interest rather than those of the entire region. Fundamentally, the FTA agreement was tailored to accommodate the interest of the South African business community while aiming to open regional markets for South African products and at the same time shielding its own agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Amos: 2010).

However, its role as a regional player is at times hampered by its own prevailing internal economic problems (unemployment, HIV/Aids, job creation and economic growth). This sometimes makes the Republic to (as it should) pursue and prioritize its own national interest with the view of rectifying these hindrances, while also having to deal with regional issues and providing its resources and assistance to the region (Habib: 2009). For instance, Molefi (2003) argues that South Africa’s hegemonic role is crucial as components such as technological and manufacturing outputs, military superiority and skilled workforce are in comparison to other regional states titled in favour of South Africa. These are significant drivers underpinning Pretoria’s hegemonic role and privileged position in the SADC, therefore the region is prone to resist its hegemonic posture. Without a doubt, South Africa’s economy is of importance to the SADC. However, the long term regional integration and development results of the region are further associated to the stability, economic growth and health prospects of other regional states (Muchie et al: 2016). As long as South Africa does not utilize its regional hegemonic advantage, significant goals including those of security, stability, developmental programmes and human rights will not be attained easily without a regional hegemon being at the fore of the process (Gwala: 2015). With that said, Pretoria has very well utilized most of its hegemonic attributes (economically, military and politically) for the benefit of the region and not entirely otherwise, while its foreign policy has shown commitment and desire in tackling regional and continental issues (Prys: 2009).

Without discrediting South Africa’s perceived hegemonic role within the region, it is safe to assume that South Africa’s perception as a hegemonic nation is purely drawn from its sophisticated and large economy coupled with its relatively superior military power in the region. This is ultimately reflected in the Republic’s economy being a key driver for regional
economic growth particularly post-1994 and after its re-emergence from being a pariah state. Since then, South Africa has not only become a crucial player in African politics, but has been a major political player in international groupings\(^42\) (Mwiti: 2015). These continental and international formations have undoubtedly further given South Africa the platform to spearhead regional integration through political and economic framework(s) within the region. As the only African state within the BRICS\(^43\) formation since 2010, it makes the Republic a noteworthy link between Africa and other international emerging economies (Gwala: 2015). Hence, its regional standing is of significance in the regions current and future development policies. Clearly, whether South Africa has utilized its robust economy for its own interest or that of the entire region remains a never-ending argument.

Following from the above, two noteworthy questions that may be derived here are, what has the southern African region gained from a democratic South Africa post-1994? More importantly, how can Pretoria’s leadership stance in the SADC be characterized? However, what must be observed here is that the SADC is characterised by different levels of development patterns among regional states. As a result, Pretoria’s role in the region will therefore forever differ, as it may never satisfy all involved states, stakeholders and non-state actors. What is apparent so far is that South Africa through its former presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and currently Jacob Zuma has played a crucial role in enhancing the region’s integration framework. Moreover, while South Africa’s foreign policy has over the course of the years been dubbed as being skewed (as discussed in more detail in chapter 2), it has however since the ushering in of a democratic government placed the region as a priority in its African Agenda.

While it is essential to explain that, its regional business crusade has not always been viewed as pivotal due to the perceived self-interest doctrine. These business undertakings have however been vital in enhancing regional growth. Yet, it is well acknowledged that over the years, the Republic’s businesses have enjoyed access to the SADC markets. These firms have enhanced job opportunities, improved intra-regional trade and increased host country’s level of GDP. Hence, it can sometimes be misplaced to condemn South Africa as a nation driven

\(^42\) These include the BRICS, G20 and India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) groupings. In addition, as a member of the IMF, AU, WTO and UN.

\(^43\) In 2013, South Africa played host to the fifth BRICS summit held in Durban. A BRICS assembly that aimed at the BRICS member states playing a substantial role in endorsing Africa’s development blueprint endeavours (DIRCO: 2014).
purely by its self-interest in the SADC, when over the years it has taken and made great strides in stimulating development in southern Africa.

Evidently, from the birth of democratic South Africa, South Africa has through its foreign policy tried to forge a united SADC while ultimately playing a peace-making role. It has (however not always possible) tried to align its regional involvement to its foreign policy doctrine to spearhead closer working ties in the region for a united and conflict free southern Africa. For instance, Houston shared the sentiment of South Africa’s contribution to the SADC’s regional integration framework by affirming that:

Regional integration is seen as an important step to ending the marginalisation of the region, while encouraging economic growth, peace and stability and human development. From the outset, South Africa played a significant role in facilitating closer regional ties, beginning with the Mandela government’s support for the Abuja Treaty of 1991 (signed in 1997) which identified regional integration in the SADC region as the first step towards continental integration. South Africa has taken a leading role facilitating progress in the development of the SADC as a regional economic community as a first step in this process.

While on the other end, Professor Paul Bischoff further opines that:

South Africa can only become more engaged in changing Southern Africa, if SADC member states change their structures of governance towards greater popular participation and involvement and begin to look to South Africa as the leading constitutional democracy for leadership. This will also help reconfirm and strengthen South Africa’s democracy. It is only in the general context of a democratising region that regional integration and open regionalisation promoting Pan-Africanism, can happen.

In all, and to add to the above statements, it can therefore be argued that there is evidence to support the argument that South Africa plays a significant part to further the SADC’s regional integration agenda. South Africa’s regional presence is of significance to the SADC’s regional integration blueprints. As a result, for the Republic’s own survival and prosperity, regional integration remains a fundamental aspect to its foreign policy. Pretoria will thus continue to support and be a key player in the SADC’s regional integration future framework(s) (South African Government: 2011). South Africa’s political stability, military might and strong economy (until recently) has undoubtedly granted it the platform to

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44 Professor Paul Bischoff is associated with Rhodes University in the Department of Politics and International Studies. His research focus dwells on foreign policy studies, international and regional organizations, African – China relations and election observation.
spearhead south-south cooperation (Chidaushe: 2010). Agreeably, South Africa does have to use its hegemonic trait in a progressive manner. What is evident is Pretoria cannot be held back by the SADC member’s lack of development. Still, most SADC states have a long way to go in terms of economic growth and should utilize South Africa’s level of superiority to their advantage as a means to enhance and improve their own economic standings. South Africa has undoubtedly utilized its regional integration standpoint to enhance regional growth coupled with regional solidarity among regional member states in the SADC.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed South Africa’s regional integration efforts in the SADC. Specifically, it unpacks whether the country’s involvement in the region amounts to regional supremacy or coalition. The Republic’s regional integration role was analysed through scrutinizing three thematic areas. These consisted of its investments in the SADC, the intra-regional trade with the SADC states since-1994, and lastly its military contribution within the region particularly in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC.

What has been observable within the chapter is that no doubt, the SADC region has benefited immensely through Pretoria’s regional investments and resource. This has occurred through various driven initiatives, consisting of South African SOE’s, private companies (supermarkets and banks), military and peacekeeping missions, infrastructural development and trade. The region has therefore been at the forefront of these regional integration initiatives from South Africa. South Africa is still a young democratic nation at over 20 years old. Nevertheless, it has made quite significant strides in forming a robust regional alliance in the SADC. This has been achieved through bilateral and multilateral investments drives and military interventions and dialogues in various SADC states. The point is, its regional investments and military intervention have been firmly rooted in its foreign policy which is aimed at improving and spearheading economic growth in the region. Clearly, one of its foreign policy doctrines since the demise of the apartheid regime has been to entrench closer working partnerships with other SADC member states. Again, through its foreign policy focus for the SADC, South Africa has enhanced and supported regional integration, by being more involved in the SADC’s developmental programmes, blueprint’s and military undertakings. These have pertained to improving regional trade, promote FDI inflow to the region, political security while also representing the SADC in international fora. Post-1994, numerous ANC policy documents have positioned the SADC at the fore of Pretoria’s
economic growth and military undertakings. These have included the 1996 white paper on
defence, the 1998 defence review, the 2011 white paper on South Africa’s foreign policy, the
2011 NDP vision 2030, the 2012 defence review and the 2015 defence review. Clearly, it is
necessary to state that South Africa has opted for a kind of partnership and coalition role
amongst regional states rather than the perceived regional dominance.

What is evident is that Pretoria still has a major role to play in the SADC’s regional
integration agenda moving forward. However, states in the region should perhaps consent to
Pretoria’s benign hegemonic leadership in the region as it has thus far played a crucial middle
power role in further stimulating regional economic growth prospects. What South Africa
must do is to continue to make the SADC its preferred investment destination. More
importantly, is for Pretoria to open its diverse markets for SADC products from other
regional members. Thus, notwithstanding South Africa’s increasing regional role and
undeniable importance, it is essential for other SADC states to have a share of the Republic’s
large and diversified markets. More robust regional integration frameworks require all
member states to be fully involved in each other’s markets to lead the process. While South
Africa has done a relatively great job in spearheading regional integration and cohesion in the
SADC, other regional states need to feel that they also have a part to play in the process.
Perhaps more importantly, this would increase their trade and export to the large South
African markets. From various arguments presented in this chapter, it is noticeable that since
the birth of democratic South Africa in 1994, its government has aimed to strengthen the
region albeit at the cost of accusations of being a regional bully. With that said, regional
integration remains of significance to South Africa and the SADC, more so, to the benefit of
smaller SADC nations with small markets and limited trade routes. South Africa as an
economic hub remains a driving force to further provide leadership with regards to this
diverse and sophisticated process of regional integration. Without doubt, South Africa’s
foreign policy towards the SADC region and its leadership stance looks unlikely to alter both
in the short and long term. What is sure is that, Pretoria’s foreign policy remains committed
to representing and enhancing the SADC region and its development endeavours.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

The study set out to explore South Africa’s regional integration efforts in the SADC and to understand whether its involvement within the SADC since the post-apartheid era has amounted to regional supremacy or cooperation. This concluding chapter outlines a collection of arguments unpacked from the study. Basically, it presents the findings gathered and analysed in the study.

The study offered various debates pertaining to South Africa’s perceived role in the SADC grouping upon its joining the regional bloc in 1994. Fundamentally, as it was now a democratically recognized state with immense resources, its foreign policy had to be somehow aligned with the development priorities of the continent and the region. It is within this context that the study offered an in-depth analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy towards southern Africa. Furthermore, the study discussed numerous initiatives driven by the South African government aimed at regional economic growth. With that said the study again unearthed Pretoria’s hegemonic undertakings with the region, and how this has made other SADC states to view its role in the region.

5.2 Summary of Findings

With the view of unpacking South Africa’s regional integration efforts in southern Africa, this study was divided into five chapters, including this one. The first chapter set the framework of the argument through conceptualizing the study.

Chapter two of the study utilized available literature on regional integration for deepening the analytical purview of the study. The chapter showed that African states are underdeveloped, are confronted with low per capita income and tend to be isolated from international markets. As a consequence, regional integration is seen as a way to overcome these hindrances while improving economic growth of member states and regional trade. Perhaps more importantly, it raises the imperative for regional member states to form and enhance bilateral and multilateral partnerships arrangements with one another. This is with the view of increasing regional economic growth through increasing their market size, enhancing productivity,
attracting FDI and securing robust regional security measures. In terms of South Africa’s foreign policy, the study argued that, although it has not lived up to expectations since 1994 and at times its focus on the region seems skewed, South Africa has nevertheless made notable strides in its foreign policy trajectory in the region compared to the one adopted by the apartheid government. The chapter showed that with regards to the apartheid administration, policies were merely rooted on dominance and greed rather than mutual cooperation driven by developmental, bilateral and multilateral working relationships. South Africa has through the inception of the newly elected government of Nelson Mandela in 1994 and later through Mbeki and the current Zuma administrations continuously revised its policies towards the African continent and more importantly, on the economic growth of the southern African region. This goes on to show that post-1994, South Africa’s foreign policy goals and objectives are that of a state which intended to play an integral part in the development and growth of the SADC. The SADC region is fundamental in South Africa’s various foreign policy blueprints centred towards regional trade, security and economic growth. This demonstrate that the SADC remains an important structure in South Africa’s foreign policy moving forward as attested in important policy documents such as the National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030.

Through its foreign policy, South Africa has aimed at revoking the inequalities of the past (pre-apartheid) by implementing robust policies and protocols with a view of improving regional cohesion and economic relations. These policies focus on aspects such as limiting regional conflict, promoting development and essential features such as democracy, justice, and endorsing human rights. Nevertheless, South Africa’s foreign policy has some ambiguities. What has often been put on paper has not been at times implemented, hence, it is a foreign policy that still exhibits schizophrenic gaps and in general, seems to be still a work in progress. To conceptually and analytically represent this argument, three theories were utilized by the study; regionalism, hegemonic stability and systems theory. The theories offered a sound appraisal on why states form bilateral and multilateral agreements, how diverse regional systems work collectively to achieve a specific objective and the extent to which a regional hegemon hinders or spearheads regional integration within a region. The point here was to lay down the theoretical premises that assisted in the contextual prognosis of the study. Regionalism showed that factors such as trade, gains from trade and security lead states to form coalition agreements and work together as a mechanism to enhance their specific goals. On the other end, the hegemonic stability which linked South Africa and its
hegemonic role in the region, laid the groundwork by providing a solid appraisal on the positive and negative effects hegemonic states may have not only on other regional members, but also on the overall development of the region. With regards to the system theory, it provided intellectual scrutiny on how different systems work collectively to achieve a precise goal. The SADC is a diverse organisation, heavily reliant on multiple systems to integrate and enhance the regions developmental blueprints. These include all involved member states, the economically supreme South Africa, its SOE’s and other regional non-state actors.

The third chapter explored regional integration attempts in southern Africa by unpacking a historical transition of these events. These were drawn from as early as the 19th century through the establishment of the SACU in 1910. The chapter further went on to illustrate some significant factors that brought about the formation of other regional bodies in southern Africa after the SACU, which included the CONSAS, the FLS, the SADCC and the present SADC. Of significance, the chapter formed a noteworthy appraisal (political and economic) as to what led to their creation, challenges which ultimately contributed to them not only introducing and rectifying their treaties and POA’s, but also their collapse. Again, what is evident in this chapter is that these regional groupings individually did not possess the same ideas and vision for southern Africa’s development (in this case promoting regional cohesion, economic growth and development). One may exemplify this by observing the policies of the South African planned CONSAS, whose general idea was to further destabilise the region with its projected and planned destabilising policies. The foreign policy agenda at the time was to further promote and allow white minority rule in South Africa and its neighbouring states. The SADCC though did promote some sort of developmental mechanism. However, one of its main interest areas was to divert regional member states reliance on apartheid-ruled South Africa. Although development wise, the SADCC steered in a sense of solidarity and introduced new POA’s with the aim of utilizing sector based developmental projects that aimed at increasing a member states economic growth, to some extent, the SADCC was successful in its POA spearheaded projects as these POA’s introduced a sense of unity and a collective working mechanism the SADCC member states. With that said, there were two factors that triggered the demise of the SADCC. One was the fact that it was heavily reliant on foreign aid for its survival, which ultimately in the years leading to independence in countries such as Namibia and South Africa started to decrease. While secondly, its goal to have the SADCC member states divert their interest in South Africa did not bear the required results. There were huge economic and growth gaps, thus member states had no choice but to
be dependent on the Republic for various development reasons (which included its ports, roads and its vastly big economy).

The SADC was formed when it was clear that the SADCC was (1) ineffective and (2) needed restructuring. The SADC intended to form deeper form(s) of regional integration. It is obvious that such forms of deeper integration were rooted in the formation of new treaties guided by deeper procedures of good governance intended to vigorously move the organization and the region forward. The chapter carefully showed that the SADC formed blueprint treaties such as the various sector protocols (although some are yet to be implemented) and the RISDP blueprint envisages the SADC’s plan for a more robust form of regional integration. In addition, the inclusion of a democratic driven South Africa further showed positive signs of the SADC achieving its regional development goals. This was largely due to South Africa possessing a large economy and robust military base, hence, these were seen as significant advantages the South African government was to utilize as a mechanism to enhance regional growth.

In chapter four, the study probed South Africa’s regional integration efforts in southern Africa. It offered an in-depth analysis to some of these efforts which were unpacked from observing its regional investments, trade and military interventions particularly in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC. After the democratic elections in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has been vastly different from its predecessor apartheid government and has made quite significant strides towards enhancing economic development in the SADC. Thus, as the chapter showed, post-1994, South Africa opted for an outward driven economic and trade policy, where it sought to integrate its private sector and SOE’s in the economic growth of the region. Essentially, this was done through engaging in diverse multilateral forums with the view of forming partnerships, collaboration, regional development and joint benefits. The ANC government has introduced better cooperation mechanisms with an intention of rectifying the country’s apartheid tendencies and has made vital contributions to the SADC’s economic growth prospects. South Africa has been at the forefront in tackling regional trade, investments and peace and military agreements. In this light, South African businesses have been able to invest heavily in the SADC community, while the region has undoubtedly benefited immensely from these initiatives. It is obvious that the SADC needs South Africa just as much as South Africa needs the SADC.
For example, South Africa’s trade is mostly directed at the region than other African states. This has been evident since the early days of the SACU in 1910. The chapter showed that, since 1994, the South African government regarded trade among SADC states as a significant locomotive of promoting regional growth. On the other end, the SADC is heavily reliant on South African products and the Republic is the highest contributor of exports in southern Africa. As the chapter revealed, this is particularly true for landlocked states such as Lesotho, Zambia and Swaziland, who rely on South Africa’s major ports and road networks for transportation of their goods. Ultimately, this has increased trade among regional states and South Africa has over the years tried to expand its own transportation networks and that of other SADC states such as Mozambique for improved and broader trade routes. The Maputo Corridor is a perfect example of this, as it enhanced corridors to simplify regional routes and trade while also improving the port of Maputo.

Another important analysis shown in the chapter is the level of military and peacekeeping efforts that South Africa has taken part in since 1994. As one of its foreign policy doctrines rightfully posit that peacekeeping and military interventions are vital for a prosperous southern Africa, South Africa has from the onset in 1994 been a very hands-on state in tackling regional political instabilities. It has availed itself in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, the DRC and even beyond to countries like the CAR and Nigeria. While it is evident in the chapter that political instability in Lesotho and the DRC is far from over, South Africa has nonetheless taken part in military peacekeeping and dialogues in these states at numerous times since 1994. The chapter shows that the Mandela right up to the current Zuma administration have played a significant role in peacekeeping and military efforts in the SADC through vital assistance from the DIRCO.

Another notable analysis unpacked in the chapter is how South Africa has portrayed itself in the region after becoming a SADC member in 1994. Its inclusion in the SADC grouping brought with it different views and scrutiny regionally, continentally and internationally with regards to the role it was going to portray in the SADC. The chapter showed that South Africa has undoubtedly used its hegemonic stance for the benefit of the region. What brought about so many interpretations and analysis of its regional role after its apartheid dispensation is the fact that, (a) it had a huge economy, vast resources, robust military and (b), regional states simply wondered whether South Africa was still going to maintain the apartheid regimes destabilization policies. Contrary to this, South Africa utilized its ample resources for
the benefit of southern Africa through diverse regional developmental projects. However, the chapter showed that if observed through Antonio Gramsci’s hegemonic stability theory, South Africa through its robust military, politics and economy is indeed a regional hegemon.

While the region and the continent expected South Africa to use its supremacy in the region to mainly promote its own self-interest, it has however, used its economic, political and military power to form cooperation initiatives attempts through economic growth plans and trade spearheaded by bilateral and multilateral agreements. Perhaps an important factor presented in the chapter is that there have been instances where South Africa has portrayed its hegemonic side towards southern Africa. This is visible through the SACU where it single-handedly dismantled 311 of the SACU treaty, while the SACU currencies are all tied to the ZAR. Another noteworthy trait shown in the chapter is the level of influence South African trade unions had in Botswana by forcing Volvo and Hyundai to close their plants in the country. While over the years the South African government has repeatedly rejected its hegemonic stance, instances like these further cast doubts about its regional motives.

Nonetheless, the chapter concludes by outlining that since South Africa joined the SADC, it has placed the region at the fore of its foreign policy and had shown considerable will and desire in refining regional development and supporting the SADC’s regional integration projects. South Africa has immensely devoted its vast resources to aid in facilitating regional integration in the SADC post-apartheid, this has been driven by various developmental agreements between South Africa and the SADC member states. It is somewhat evident to point out that South Africa’s facilitation of regional integration in the region has been successful due to its robust economy and ample resources. The hegemonic posture associated with it is purely drawn from its large economic base and military power in southern Africa. South Africa’s private sector and SOE’s have played an integral part to the economic growth in the region driven by its regional foreign policy. Predominantly in the post-1994 era, South Africa’s foreign policy has often been portrayed as skewed as a result of it not executing what the ANC government had espoused upon gaining power. However, it has shown immense commitments to improve the infrastructural and economic conditions of the SADC region. Hence, the study shows that South Africa has not purposely used its regional integration standpoint to further hegemonic intents since becoming a SADC member in 1994. While there are instances where such issues have occurred, as mentioned elsewhere in the study with regards to the revoking of the SACU 311 treaty. The bulk of South Africa’s interaction
with the SADC post-1994 has mainly been entrenched on facilitating regional coalition and development in the region rather than be a regional bully. Nevertheless, South Africa still has a major role to play in the SADC both presently and in future. While sufficient amount of progress has been attained thus far, as a regional hegemon, South Africa is viewed as a catalyst for regional development and an important state in championing regional integration. Given its strength in the SADC, South Africa should also offer all necessary support to the SADC’s blueprint plans such as the SADC protocols. For the further development of the region, it must further utilize its (unofficial) hegemonic status to manage mutually beneficial political, economic, social and security stability, including the continued aim of forging more beneficial relations with regional states of the SADC community. Moreover, South Africa should let other SADC states feel and play their part in regional integration by allowing these states access to its large and sophisticated markets. This will undoubtedly further boost and increase intra-regional trade and development in southern Africa. Perhaps more importantly, key developmental policy documents like the NDP and the 2011 white paper on defence further attest the importance of the region to South Africa’s foreign policy, further pointing out South Africa’s commitment in the SADC regional integration framework moving forward.

5.3 Conclusion

On the basis of the analysis and arguments presented in this study, I argue that South Africa, being a regional power and hegemon within the SADC, has brought with it some undeniable and valuable degree of development in southern Africa. Ostensibly, the regional supremacy that it has come to be associated with is predominantly derived from the prevailing view of its huge and sophisticated economy within the African continent and more precisely the SADC region. As the study has argued, this is not necessarily due to South Africa using its positional leverage (economy, technology and military) to bully other SADC nations as it did under apartheid. However, this is based on the viewpoint of South Africa being a pivotal state in the region that has since the demise of apartheid used its regional power and hegemonic stance to the benefit of southern Africa.

The SADC community and regional states view South Africa’s dominance merely as a locomotive for it (South Africa) to be more of a springboard to further development in the region. While pre-apartheid its foreign policy towards southern Africa was that of dominance, after the end of apartheid, South Africa sought to amend its foreign policy to benefit the
African continent, more notably southern Africa. However, post-1994, South Africa’s foreign policy towards the region has suffered from skewedness and loopholes. As it has over the years failed to live up to the expectations portrayed by the South African government upon taking office in 1994. Nevertheless, while the study showed that South Africa’s foreign policy towards the region seems to be still under construction, it has not withheld it from playing an important role towards regional integration in the SADC since it joined the regional grouping in 1994. Since then, South Africa has used its robust economy, technology and military expertise for various economic development and peacekeeping initiatives in southern Africa and beyond. While not all SADC states have benefited equally from South Africa’s regional integration efforts, it has however laid a solid groundwork on the role it is portrayed to play as (1) the most developed state in the region and (2) the regional hegemon of southern Africa. Moreover, while the study depicted on the mixed views that arose from other SADC states concerning the role South Africa was to portray in the SADC grouping as a results of its apartheid policies. It has however utilized its regional integration standpoint somewhat positively in the region.

Through, notwithstanding the fact that it has at times used its economic power to influence its own authority in other SADC states. As the study showed with regards to the SACU 311 treaty, South Africa’s trade unions in Botswana and the behaviour of some of its companies in host SADC states. With this said, both in policy and rhetoric, South Africa has an acknowledged leadership role in Africa and in the SADC in particular. It is somewhat safe to conclude that it has continued to positively shape the development of the SADC region post-1994.
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Dissertation(s)/Thesis


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Questions for one on one interview with key respondents

Q1: How in your personal evaluation is South Africa perceived by other regional member nations in southern Africa?

Q2: What do you think the SADC member states expected from South Africa (development/growth wise) after attaining its democratic status in 1994?

Q3: How would you rate South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy towards southern Africa?

Q4: How do you think South Africa’s foreign policy towards southern Africa is perceived by other SADC regional members?

Q5: Do you think South Africa’s foreign policy has been true to its aspirations towards southern Africa post 1994?

Q6: Would you argue that South Africa is well resourced to play the leadership role in southern Africa?

Q7: From your perspective, has South Africa since 1994 contributed to the SADC’s regional integration framework?

Q8: In what way(s) if any has South Africa inspired regional integration in southern Africa?

Q9: Do you think South Africa has in any way used its foreign policy focus on the SADC to further a hegemonic interest within the region?

Q10: From the arguments/answers you have generated, what would be your closing conclusion with regards to South Africa’s position and role in the region.
APPENDIX B

Participant informed consent declaration

(Recipient)

Project Title: Regional Supremacy or Coalition? Evaluating South Africa’s Regional Integration Efforts within the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Daniel Nkosinathi Mlambo (name of researcher/person administering the research instrument) from the Department of Public Administration, University of Zululand has requested my permission to participate in the above-mentioned research project.

The nature and the purpose of the research project and of this informed consent declaration have been explained to me in a language that I understand.

I am aware that:

1. The purpose of the research project is to Evaluate South Africa’s regional integration efforts within the SADC.
2. The University of Zululand has given ethical clearance to this research project and I have seen/may request to see the clearance certificate.
3. By participating in this research project I will be contributing towards evaluating South Africa’s regional integration position in the SADC by assessing its foreign policy, goals and objectives towards Southern Africa, together with its hegemonic eminent and future role(s) the Republic may play in the SADC regional integration framework (state expected value or benefits to society or individuals that will arise from the research)
4. I will participate in the project by being interviewed by Mr. Daniel Mlambo through being asked a set of 10 questions and giving precise answers where possible and Mr. Mlambo will take notes and also use audio recording (state full details of what the participant will be doing)
5. My participation is entirely voluntary and should I at any stage wish to withdraw from participating further, I may do so without any negative consequences.
6. I will not be compensated for participating in the research, but my out-of-pocket expenses will be reimbursed. (Should there be compensation, provide details)

7. There may be risks associated with my participation in the project. I am aware that
   a. the following risks are associated with my participation: ………… (state full details of risks associated with the participation)
   b. the following steps have been taken to prevent the risks: ……..
   c. there is a …………% chance of the risk materialising

8. The researcher intends publishing the research results in the form of ………………………………… However, confidentiality and anonymity of records will be maintained and that my name and identity will not be revealed to anyone who has not been involved in the conduct of the research.

9. I will not receive feedback/will receive feedback in the form of a written email attachment regarding the results obtained during the study.

10. Any further questions that I might have concerning the research or my participation will be answered by University of Zululand’s Research and Innovation Office at 035 902 6273 (provide name and contact details)

11. By signing this informed consent declaration I am not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies.

12. A copy of this informed consent declaration will be given to me, and the original will be kept on record.

I, …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. have read the above information / confirm that the above information has been explained to me in a language that I understand and I am aware of this document’s contents. I have asked all questions that I wished to ask and these have been answered to my satisfaction. I fully understand what is expected of me during the research.

I have not been pressurised in any way and I voluntarily agree to participate in the above-mentioned project.

…………………………………….. ………………………………………..

Participant’s signature Date