THE TRANSFORMATION OF KWAZULU HOMELAND
FROM A PRIMARY AGRARIAN TO A MORE INTEGRATED POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENTITY,

By

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SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ARTS IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE D. PHIL. IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

PROMOTER: PROF. J. de VILLIERS

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In compliance with the regulations of the University of Zululand I declare that this thesis, unless specially stated to the contrary in the text, is my work.

S.H. NTULI

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# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgement</th>
<th>1-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>Historical background and the Establishment of KwaZulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two</td>
<td>KwaZulu’s Financial position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three</td>
<td>Agricultural progress in KwaZulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four</td>
<td>Commerce and Industry in KwaZulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five</td>
<td>Townships and Urbanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six</td>
<td>Education in KwaZulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven</td>
<td>Health and Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Light</td>
<td>Political Development in KwaZulu:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) Inkatha and Political Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Violence and the Application of Law and Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>197-204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>General Published Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Unpublished Dissertations and Theses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Occasional Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Official Government Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Primary Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Speeches by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe. (Arranged Chronologically)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>Other Primary Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>Debates in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Official Government Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>Journals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Specific Journal Articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# MAPS & GRAPHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAPS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. KwaZulu Areas and Magisterial Districts, 1972</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRAPHS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agricultural Transformation and Rural Development in KwaZulu during 1972-1994</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Black Versus White Employees of KwaZulu, 1974</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgement

It is the historian’s demanding task to research and write the authentic history. In order to authenticate the historian needs to immerse or plunge him or herself as fully as possible in the available primary sources. I wish to thank my promoter, Prof. Johan de Villiers, who encouraged me to rely chiefly on primary sources. He motivated me to give archives first preference in the collection of data for this work. However, I was disappointed to find that archival repositories do not necessarily provide sufficient contemporary information. Nevertheless, over the four year period of research, I have been fortunate in the help provided by the dedicated staff of various archival depots. First and foremost was Pieter Nel of the Pietermaritzburg Archives, who suggested important persons and source material to be consulted.

Research for this thesis required an initial stay of more than eight months in Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Ulundi, where the local archival depots are located. My expeditions to these places were exciting and fruitful, though sometimes frustrating. For example, in Pietermaritzburg a certain official denied me the chance to explore sources that were said to be reserved for parliamentarians. However, people like Zenzele Makhaye of the Natal Society Library (Pietermaritzburg) generously gave me much of his time and access to relevant library resources. Other sources of information included parliamentary debates, acts of parliament, journals, interviews with historians, written reports, official summaries, volumes of the KwaZulu Legislator (LRC), and the South African Institute of Race Relations.

Assistance away from home also came from Ntwe Mafol of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Ulundi. More that any other person consulted, Mafole was most hospitable. I would like to thank him for his assistance,
especially with the speeches presented by Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi as recorded in *Clarion Call* and a host of other journals, newspapers and unpublished material. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Ulundi Municipal Library. They mainly provided assistance in the form of access to documents, especially the Buthelezi Commission, Volumes I and II.

I soon came to realize that some of the sources consulted were biased. This was most common among, for example, speeches recorded in *Clarion Call* and other journals. However, I tried my utmost to maintain objectivity, as proved by the questions and analysis contained in the body of this work. Nevertheless, I welcome any positive criticism and furthermore hope that this work will encourage popular involvement in research and in the writing of contemporary history.

As far as research of oral opinion is concerned, I wish to thank all those who assisted me. Their views enabled me to decide which interpretation to question or accept. I believe that it would be of enormous benefit to our history if historians would not ignore oral sources of history and the opinions that they provide. Oral evidence, especially as provided by former members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, has played an important role in the compilation of this thesis.

I wish to record my gratitude to the staff of the Killie Campbell Africana Library at the University of Natal, Durban. In particular, I'd like to thank Bobby Eldridge, Hloni Dlamini, Nelly Somers, and Nomsa Bhengu. I must also pay tribute to the assistance provided by the University of Zululand, especially to Mrs. Ocholla for her newspaper cuttings. I would also like to thank Nomsa Mngadi, secretary in the Department of History for her dedication and patience. I'm extremely grateful to the Head of Unizul's Department of History, Prof. Johan de Villiers, who is my promoter. I thank him for his guidance, but also for criticism that helped
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Acknowledgement would be incomplete without special reference to my grand-mother, Selina Ntuli, my fiancé Charlote Zondi, and my children – Nqaba, Nqobile and Slindile. They are ones who have had to bear the burden of my constant mental abstraction and frequent physical absences. For their almost unfailing patience and understanding, I thank them with true sincerity.
Introduction

Having long been interested in the history of the KwaZulu homeland (1972 – 1994), it soon became clear to me that few publications acknowledge the low-keyed but nevertheless significant role played by the Chief Minister's Office in the development of KwaZulu during the period in question. Therefore my main purpose in this thesis is to attempt to present a critical understanding of how KwaZulu and its people changed and developed under the abnormal and sometimes mysterious conditions of the apartheid era. As the discussion continues, I will further demonstrate the challenges posed by apartheid, poverty and violence. I will indicate how these factors harmed the people of KwaZulu at the time and attempt to provide clarity with regard to dubious issues that caused historians and political analysts to regard KwaZulu as the home of South African politics. Lastly, the relationship between members of the royal family, especially between his Majesty King Goodwill and KwaZulu Chief Minister, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, will be scrutinized. In short, the prominent goal in my thinking is to bring to the foreground a broad perspective regarding the role of the Chief Minister's office in the transformation of KwaZulu from an agrarian territory to an industrialized area, which resulted in a social and economic process that has effectively integrated the various population groups of the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) as we know it today into a unitary economic system. For the Zulu, this has resulted in a breakdown of the traditional social system, the alienation of tribal land and the loss of traditional local autonomy.

At the general election of 1948, the National Party (NP) won the majority of seats. One of the major issues of its election platform was "die swart gevaar", the black danger. The period 1949 – 1951 was marked by the government’s initiating legislation to create a greater separation between races, or the beginning of its apartheid policy, which was later to
crystallize into a policy of separate development. The National Party argued that apartheid was a realistic alternative to what they called the dangerous option of integration. The period 1959 – 1961 was one of turmoil in South Africa. In a spirit of hope, the African leaders pressed on with their defiance campaign and used all means at their disposal to thwart the racist policy of divide and rule. They clung to their South African citizenship and refused to sell their birthright. It seemed as though the government was responding in an uncompromising way to the challenge presented to them. The Government’s response was positive only in so far as it changed the emphasis of its apartheid policy from trusteeship to separate development in subsequent years.

The NP Government argued that the latter was a sincere and genuine plan to enable the various black nations to pursue their own interests or affairs along their own lines of common culture, language, customs and traditions. This system was not viewed as repression or exploitation, but as a means of economic progress over and against poverty. Eventually, the Government set aside ten reserves known as the “Homelands” and declared four of them as “independent”. While the law authorized the establishment of new territorial boundaries and the formation of a new local Government setup, there was neither sign nor hope of equality. The policy of separate development envisaged the territorial partitioning of South Africa into an axial white-controlled heartland and a constellation of black homelands.¹

KwaZulu and its institutions were the outcome of the detailed blueprint for the area provided by the South African Government in accordance with its policy of separate development. Having been forced to accept what was called the “dubious benefits” of separate development, which

the people of KwaZulu had never asked for, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly remained skeptical of what partial independence would yield. From the outset the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly seriously questioned the nature of an independence which would allow the Pretoria Government to indirectly control trade, foreign relations, defense and internal security. Economists expressed the opinion that KwaZulu would remain a mere “Labour Farm” for white South Africa. Functions of the KwaZulu Government were to be carried out by Zulu Cabinet Ministers who were assisted by white officials seconded by the Pretoria-based Government. The KwaZulu authority was thus subject to limitations in law and constraints in the exercise of delegated powers. KwaZulu remained effectively subject to the central Government of South Africa. Some historians maintained that KwaZulu was never a true homeland in any meaningful way.

The inauguration of independence in KwaZulu was not an auspicious occasion. At its first session the KwaZulu Government learnt that the budget for 1972 – 3 was R32 million – an amount that was obviously insufficient to cover its various needs. Buthelezi, head of the Buthelezi clan in the Mahlabathini district, pointed out that since 90% of Zulu inhabitants were agriculturist, the fiscal allocation of a little under R3 million for agriculture was insufficient. It was estimated that at least R50 million was needed to procure the technical service, research training and development that KwaZulu needed.2

Beside the financial problems that the KwaZulu Government encountered, divergent views about independence culminated in conflict among the prominent leaders of KwaZulu. Initially, plans for the creation of a “Zulustan” were supported by the Zulu King Cyprian ka Bhekuzulu,

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whose view was that “We must work with the Government, without them, we can do nothing”. However, at a meeting of 200 Amakhosi (Chiefs), Buthelezi opposed the system because of its basis of "divide and rule". He maintained that the chiefs alone were not competent to take decisions without consulting urban dwellers. Buthelezi's view prevailed. He wished to see the effects of the system in operation before committing himself to it. However, the Chief Bantu Commissioner for Natal in 1969, J.O. Cornell, said: "All we ask is for you to recognize the system."³

A leadership crisis was clearly looming in KwaZulu. A rift had developed between Buthelezi and some members of the royal family. Buthelezi blamed the Pretoria Government for the crisis.⁴ The Pretoria Government took an enormous risk in pushing Zululand too far and too fast. The acceptance of the government policy by Zulu people was compulsory and not optional. A bitter debate ensued between Government officials and Zulu leaders at Nongoma, the regional headquarters. Many Zulu leaders expressed the opinion that unless the Territorial Authority, which was established by the Pretoria Government, was led by Buthelezi, "it would not be done properly."⁵ The Territorial Authority was to be replaced by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and this happened in 1972. Under such conditions Buthelezi became the Chief Minister. Buthelezi's response to the Pretoria Government varied and in some cases gave rise to Nationalism among the amaZulu. The Zulu people began to question the morality of the social and political order which denied them racial equality.

Accordingly it was decided that the personal representative of Zulu King Cyprian ka Bhekuzulu was to remain a member of the Assembly while

⁵ Natal Mercury, 20 March 1971, p.34.
the King himself should be kept out of party politics. This resulted in a power struggle between Buthelezi and the new King, Goodwill Zwelithini. An element of distrust was thus attached to the observation of various traditional functions and duties that are performed according to protocol.
CHAPTER 1

Historical Background and Establishment of KwaZulu

The location, size and fragmentation of the former KwaZulu were the results of processes that began during the nineteenth century and legislatively confirmed in the twentieth. A brief reference must be made to two specific acts on which the geography of the homeland was based, those of 1913 and 1936. Attention will also be given to the Tomlinson Commission, as it remains one of the most important commissions ever appointed by the National Party Government, and its report provided the theoretical basis for the transformation of the dispersed remnants of the Zulu Kingdom into the new "State of KwaZulu". Inevitably a discussion of the establishment of KwaZulu becomes also a discussion of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi; therefore, this chapter will inter alia discuss the founding of KwaZulu, and in the end make an evaluation of Buthelezi's role. The relations between him and the king will also be scrutinized.

In 1913 the Native Land Act was promulgated.1 It did not allocate additional land for blacks although the population increase was marked. The main purpose of the act was to segregate. It did not emerge out of a desire to provide a territorial base for a separated society. It arose as a response to the undistinguished desire of white farmers for the continued access to cheap labour. Additions to the land were to be determined by the Beaumont Commission appointed for that purpose in 1916.2 The recommendations of the Beaumont Commission encountered much opposition from the farmers of Natal. The same fate befell the report of local Committees in 1918, and the position remained unchanged until the passing of the Native Trust and Land Bill of 1936.3

The Native Land Act of 1936 prescribed the acquisition of land in existing reserves by any person other than a native. Until 1913 blacks had been legally entitled to acquire land from whites in part of the country outside the reserves in accordance

with the undertaking given by the Zululand Delimitation Commission. The 1913 Act prohibited this.

The 1936 legislation set up a South African Native Trust primarily to eliminate competition for land between whites and blacks. In areas scheduled to be transferred, whites were to be compelled to sell land to the native trust for inclusion in the reserves.4 "Blacks spots", namely land acquired by blacks prior to 1936 in the "white areas", were to be eliminated. The process of returning land from whites to blacks was, however, delayed as Natal farmers remained opposed to the extension of the Natal reserves and impeded further acquisition.

Development in the black reserves received little Government aid. Effective extension and improvements were only undertaken after the passing of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, when development became a policy. After 1948 and the accession to power of the National Party, attention was focused on this lack of development in the reserves and on the migration of black workers to the towns. In 1950 a commission under the chairmanship of Professor F.R. Tomlinson was appointed to investigate the situation in the reserves and the possibility for their socio-economic development, with a view of reversing the flow of blacks to white areas.5

The Commission conducted a far-reaching survey and the findings it presented were to exert profound influence. In brief, its recommendations were as follows: The separate development of South Africa's two main racial groups, and not their integration. The Bantu (previously known as Natives) areas, which should be consolidated on the basis of historic-legal homelands of the principal ethnic groups, should be comprehensively developed. Such development should comprise a fully diversified economy in which the Bantu would be prepared to occupy all posts and every facet of human endeavor, including social welfare, education and health. A Bantu farming class and a true urban population should be established, while

security of land tenure based on private ownership should apply in both rural and urban areas.\textsuperscript{6}

The Tomlinson Commission envisaged a de jure population of the Bantu areas of ten million within a period of 25-30 years. Of these, 8,000,000 should be wholly supported by activities in the white sector. It pointed out that if the Bantu areas were not developed, the white sector would have to accommodate 170,000 Bantu by the close of the century. To assist the Native Affairs Department in the envisaged development programmes, the Commission recommended the establishment of a development council for research and planning and a development corporation for the promotion of Bantu enterprises and enterprises on its own account for eventual transfer to Bantu ownership. It recommended that the South African Native Trust should be relieved of executive functions and become merely a Trust Fund and Central Treasury for the Bantu. It estimated that the first 10 years of the development programme would require R104,000,000 of which 55,000,000 would be privately obtained, interest-bearing and recoverable. Of this, R49,000,000 would be of a socio-economic nature and presumably non-recoverable.\textsuperscript{7}

The Commission projected the total population growth until the year 2000 as follows\textsuperscript{8}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1951 census</th>
<th>Year 2000</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2643 000 (20, 9%)</td>
<td>4588 000 (14, 7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>8538 00 (67, 5%)</td>
<td>21361 000 (68, 4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1103 000 (8, 7%)</td>
<td>3917 000 (12, 5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiatic</td>
<td>367 000 (2, 9%)</td>
<td>1382 000 (4, 4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 646 000 (100, 1%)</td>
<td>31248000 (100.0%)</td>
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However, a demographic study in 1972 shows a population increase undreamed of by the Tomlinson Commission.\textsuperscript{9}

The Commission was concerned at the great speed at which urbanization was occurring and which would be attributed, in large part, to the insufficient


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 39.

remuneration opportunities for blacks offered in rural areas. It noted that the black and white population groups had become increasingly interwoven, politically and economically. It feared that the end result of such a process, if it was not controlled, would be racial assimilation leading to the creation of a new biological entity.\textsuperscript{10} It faced the dilemma confronting South Africans, namely that of a white population determined to maintain its identity and right of self determination, and the growing conviction among blacks that they were entitled to a greater share in the wealth of the country and in its control.\textsuperscript{11}

The Commission took its stand in support of a policy of segregation and concluded that the process of integration, with its social and political consequences, must be restricted and the economic structure of the country re-orientated on a comprehensive scale. It argued that proper development of Bantu areas would render them adequate in size for their population and that the development of “border industries” would enable them to support increased population.

The Commission defined the advantages of separate development.\textsuperscript{12} For the African, advantages included his own inalienable territory, national development and the opportunity to take charge of his own affairs. It meant economic opportunity and the possibility for realizing individual potential within a new social order. And for the whites, the policy was presented as an opportunity to ensure an unfettered future provided there was a willingness of the necessary action and sacrifice. A development programme was presented as essential from three points of view: as a means of implementing separate development for the welfare of the Bantu themselves in their areas and for the general good of South Africa. A prerequisite was the development of a Bantu farming class on units of land large enough to accommodate a family, and an urban society with means of an assured livelihood in secondary and tertiary industry. Industrial development rested on the provision of essential facilities and training opportunities. A pace of development was suggested which would achieve a population of 9 million in the reserves by 1981.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p.25.
Of these, 7 million would depend solely on the Bantu areas for their support and two million would live on the earnings of migrant workers.\textsuperscript{13}

Land tenure was one of the difficulties faced by homeland development. The Commission differentiated between communal tenure, that is, land occupied by the tribe as a whole, an adaptation of the traditional system and individual tenure. The former is the more common.\textsuperscript{14} A system which allows no private ownership was considered one of the reasons for the determination of the Bantu reserves. The Commission therefore regarded a revision of this system as essential for the stabilization of land and full economic development.

The Commission recommended a division of the population into a genuine agricultural class who live exclusively from farming, and others who would support themselves in other operations.\textsuperscript{15} It furthermore recommended that land in towns and villages and land used for agricultural purpose be granted freehold title conditional on good farming practices. It recommended abolition of the principle of one-man-one-lot, and provision instead of holdings large enough to ensure the utilization of progressive farming techniques. It also recommended special technical and agricultural services and a revision of the traditional attitude to stock-owning, which emphasized quantity and not quality and which resulted in overgrazing and widespread soil erosion. A “betterment” scheme for all land within the Bantustan areas was projected: each betterment area to be divided into residential, arable and grazing areas that would be subject to strict control. The Commission estimated that such intensive cultivation as was envisaged could, in time, support about 51% of the 1951 population. The other half of the population would have to earn a livelihood by activities other than farming.\textsuperscript{16}

A programme of industrial development, both primary and secondary, occupied a central position in the general scheme of Bantu areas. The siting of industries was controversial and the Commission was not unanimous. It recommended the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 69-71.
selection of white areas, adjacent to Bantu areas, to be known as “Border Areas”. These would offer the Bantu employment nearer their homes, obviate distant travel, alleviate the social and political problems of having large numbers of Bantu in distant white industrial cities, ease the pressure of population on agricultural resources in Bantu areas and provide additional sources of income.17

The establishment of such border industries, it was anticipated, would be cheaper and would avoid the need to have white settlements in Bantu areas. However, the disadvantages of border development were acknowledged. Such development schemes would remain in white areas and legal restrictions on Bantu working in them would apply. This would prevent Bantu development to its full extent and would not necessarily stem the tide of integration with whites.

At the same time, industrial development in Bantu areas was to remain an integral part of the overall economy. Such development was to be undertaken by Bantu entrepreneurs. The latter would, however, not receive permanent land in these areas. Only those industries in which a large, white labour force would not be necessary were to be encouraged. A minority of the Commission however feared that granting concessions to white to establish industries in Bantu areas might lead to claims for rights and privileges contrary to the concept of separate development. They accordingly opposed the establishment of industries in Bantu areas by persons other than Bantu and bodies controlled by the state.18

The Commission recommended the establishment of urban centres – none of which existed in Bantu areas. It was estimated that 1,5 million persons would have to abandon agriculture and make a living in other ways, and in these towns Bantu would enjoy the same rights and privileges that whites enjoyed in their towns. Three types of urban centres were suggested – rural settlements were seen as the transitional stage between rural and urban life and as part of agricultural planning. The commission recommended the establishment of 34 Bantu townships in Natal to be sited adjacent to white centres.

In terms of the Bantu authorities Act, the Bantu themselves were to exercise administrative functions in their respective areas as soon as they were able to do so. A period of ten years was regarded as an approximate “commencing” period for development, which was estimated at a cost of R104,486 million, a figure which was believed to be doubled in the following years. The Commission believed that the possibilities for political expression which the scheme offered the Bantu would provide the driving force for progress. They would progressively assume control over the village boards, municipalities and eventually all functions of the Government in their own areas in accordance with a system similar to the present provincial system in South Africa.  

In 1956 the Government published a White Paper in which it defined its attitude to the Tomlinson Report. It accepted the main recommendations, namely the acceleration of agricultural development, but rejected the substitution of tribal land tenure with individual tenure based on purchases in the Bantu areas. With regard to industrial development, Bantu enterprise should develop in the Bantu areas influenced by white competition or financial help. The Government preferred to appoint a special officer in the Department of Native Affairs rather than a Development Council or Development Corporation as was recommended by the Commission.

The Government nominated the Department of Native Affairs as the instrument for providing planning, encouragement and the financial assistance that Bantu industrialist would require. It strongly favoured the development of border industries and made clear its intention to create the desired conditions that would attract industries to such areas. It accepted the Commission’s recommendation in regard to urban development and in general was sympathetic to the recommendations regarding Social Welfare, Health, Education and Religious Affairs. The government accepted the principle that territorial authorities be founded on ethnic basis but would not commit itself to detailed boundaries. Nor it was prepared to fix the amount of money needed for the various projects, though it accepted the fact that large sums would be needed.

Although the Government and the Commission differed in some aspects of the Commission’s recommendations, the Commission provided the basis for the Separate Development Policy. The Commission did not accept the land tenure system recommendation, and as a result it was not possible to implement the proposal. The consequence was that the old tenure system was nationalized in a “betterment scheme”, which it was hoped would effect the necessary improved agricultural methods. Similarly, fear of creating “white spots” in Bantu areas as expressed in the minority views, precluded white-owned industries contributing to industrial development in the reserves on which hinged, in part, the provision of the proposed 50 000 jobs per annum.

Despite these qualifications to its success, the Tomlinson Commission was not without success in its attempt to “bridge the ideological rhetoric of apartheid” and the need for positive action to deal with economic conditions in reserves.21

The Tomlinson Commission has simply been vested with powers to investigate, report and recommend. The implementation of a policy of separate development depended on the legislative entailments and administrative decision of the Government. In terms of section 147 of the South African Act 1909, and of the Bantu Administration Act of 1927, as amended, the Governor General was Supreme Chief of all blacks in the Union.22 He was empowered to legislature by proclamation in all Bantu areas, subject to modification or repeal if parliament so decided. The 1927 Act authorized the Governor General to define the areas of the various tribes, determine rights to the occupation of land in Bantu areas, appoint Bantu Authorities and Chiefs, and generally, regulate Government in Bantu areas. New legislation was needed to give effect to the concept of separate development, and before the Commission had even reported, the National Party majority in parliament passed the necessary legislation.


The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 abolished the Native Representative Council in favour of the Bantu Authorities system. The objective of this system was the restoration of the prestige and authority of Native Law and Custom through the provision of executive, administrative and judicial powers to the Bantu Authorities. At the lowest level there would be tribal authorities headed by chiefs, followed by regional authorities created by two or more tribes, communities or a combination of tribes and communities, and finally the “apex of that pyramid” would be territorial authorities under African control. Detailed provision for these territorial authorities was to be provided in the 1959 legislation, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government.

In 1951, Bantu Authorities were established in many parts of the country. This happened during Buthelezi’s period of employment with the department of Native Affairs. The scheme, however, met with opposition in some areas on the grounds that it reinforced tribalism, enhanced the powers of chiefs, divided the people into separate ethnic groups and made little provision for commoners to participate in the elective process in the constitution of the authority. While the Government sought to promote acceptance of Bantu Authorities, black leaders were opposing it. So intense was resistance in Zululand that King Cyprian, who had accepted the system, had to flee to Swaziland when Zulu peasants from the Thokazi district of Nongoma threatened to kill him for siding with the Bantu Authorities and its so-called “Betterment Scheme”. Even Buthelezi’s own mother, Princess Magogo, participated in a demonstration against the extension of passes to women (which was the extension of this act) and found herself arrested at Nongoma.

In 1956 a conference sponsored by the Interdenominational African Ministers’ Federation rejected the Tomlinson Commission Report on the grounds that a policy of separate national homes was intended to deprive blacks of rights in the rest of the country. They concluded that the Government was not acting in the interest of the blacks. Chief Albert Luthuli rejected the policy and pointed out that the system would make chiefs, quite straightforwardly and simply, into minor puppets

26 Statement by the all – in African Conference held at Bloemfontein, 4-6 October 1956.
and agents of the “Big Dictator”. Accordingly, Chiefs would become “official mouthpieces”. At the time of the Zulu people’s resistance, Luthuli was summoned by the Secretary of Native Affairs, Dr. WWM Eiselen, and given an ultimatum either to stop his political activities or be deposed from chieftainship in terms of the Native Administrative Act of 1927. Luthuli took a principled stand and chose to be deposed rather than become a servant of the apartheid Government.

In 1958 Dr. Hendrik French Verwoerd became Prime Minister and in 1959 one of the most important bills in South African history was introduced in parliament. This became the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, and with its acceptance, the area of “full political and partial territorial separation” in South Africa was under way. In speeches made at the time, the Prime Minister made it clear that although large numbers of blacks would live in towns for many years to come, the white man would retain domination of his part of the country and the Bantu would be compensated by receiving full rights in the areas allocated to them. In the course of the debate on this bill it became clear that its purpose was to enable the Government to embark on a policy of race relations that would make it possible for the major Western powers to support South Africa in the United Nations and, in particular, in its South West Africa stand.

The term “Bantustan” appears to have been first used in a speech made by Dr. Verwoerd in 1959, in which he elaborated on the aims of complete separation and, in so doing, said there was no reason why South Africa should not follow Britain’s example, as in the case of Protectorates, of creating “Bantustans” within the South Africa. In a speech made in parliament, the Prime Minister said: “My belief is that the development of South Africa in the basis of homelands for black people will create so much friendship, so much gratitude, so many interests in propulsive development that there will be no danger of hostile Bantu states, but there will arise what I call Commonwealth, founded on common interests and linked together by common interests in this Southern part of Africa”. He furthermore said: “It is our aim to survive and to prosper as a white nation... We wish to separate races so

that each individual can enjoy all rights and opportunities among his own people, and where possible, in his own territory. Its objective is friendly, born out of goodwill. Yet the outside World... is not prepared to accept this... They go out of their way... to say apartheid is oppression, born out of race hatred".31

The White Paper, in dealing with the intention behind the recognition of the Bantu areas, discussed setting aside areas for blacks, thereby ensuring that each community would retain such land. In keeping with this aim, “homelands” were created for the major black peoples.32 This would appear to be the origin of the use of the word “homeland” for the “Native areas” or “reserves”. The Government explained its action as “a realistic approach to the expectations of black and their demands for self determination and political rights, which was in line with objects of the world at large”.33

The debate made it clear that whatever differences of opinion existed among the white electorate of South Africa, there was basic agreement on the necessity of maintaining white supremacy. Nevertheless, a great deal of cynicism manifested itself in regard to the Government’s real intentions and the ultimate objectives of Bantustan policy. There was patent incredibility that Government really intended partitioning South Africa “without prior consultation with natives” as speakers articulated the dangers they saw inherent in a fragmented country. Members of the opposition showed concern for a white economy that would be dependent on foreign labour and noted the inherent military insecurity in a situation in which black states extended, in “shape of a horseshoe” from Bechuanaland to most of the Eastern seaboard.34 Moreover they were alarmed by the possibility of direct relations between South African and Communist states, and the chance that the former would evolve into vehicles for the propagation of foreign ideologies in South Africa.

Dr. Verwoerd, however, left little doubt that he would pursue the course on which he had set out. Nor was there ambivalence on the issues of additional land for

33 Ibid., p.161.
black areas and consolidation within regular boundaries. It was clearly enunciated
that any further land allocation would be made in strict accordance with the 1936
legislation and that no other land would be purchased. This remained a
contentious issue.

Transkei under the leadership of Kaizer Mathanzima was the first homeland to
follow the course set for it by the South African Government. In a speech delivered
in the 1960’s, Chief Mathanzima said “Separate development offers black people the
opportunity to getting their land back... We must revert to the old system where
the land belonged to the people with the Chief as their trustee... We don’t want to
mix with whites... blacks must be able to buy properties in the towns of the
Transkei. That is why I support the Government. They have offered us land. Dr.
Verwoerd is a friend of the black people. Luthuli and the African National Congress
have brought misery to their people”. Transkei’s acceptance of independence in
October 1976 was an important historic step with far reaching consequences for
the territory itself and for South Africa as a whole. By the Transkei Constitutional
Act of 1963, as amended, the “African” part of the Transkei became a separate
territory.35 Its citizens were to be blacks born in Transkei or legally domiciled there
for at least five years, and those outside the territory who derived from, or were
members of tribes resident in Transkei. The Government White Paper on the
Tomlinson Commission Report had rejected recommendations that private white
capital be utilized for development in the homelands. However, Chief Mathanzima
and Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu went abroad for financial assistance and returned
with promises of aid which it was hoped would help alleviate the lack of non-
agricultural wage employment opportunities.36

The independence of Transkei was a major landmark in South Africa’s policy of
separate development, the central philosophy of which had always been that all
blacks in South Africa would eventually become citizens of one of the African
homelands.37 The conflict between Kaizer Mathanzima and the South African

Government had unforeseen repercussions for KwaZulu. Pretoria’s dilemma was to respond aggressively without destroying the entire experiment by exposing the illusory nature of the Transkei’s independence. Mathanzima’s dilemma was to display his independence without provoking a show of its frailty. KwaZulu, watching, had to evaluate its role in the experiment.

In 1968, the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development, M.C. Botha, outlined certain prerequisites necessary for a homeland to attain full independence. It had to have administrative experience in the management and control of Government departments, show reliability in all actions, especially in the control of finance and budgeting, and display integrity of purpose in public affairs. It had to pursue a democratic way of life, have a sense of responsibility and a desire for a peaceful co-existence at home and with its neighbours. Furthermore, there had to have been some economic development with a displayed ability to provide jobs for homeland citizens.

Two years later this statement was qualified to the extent that homelands did not necessarily have to be economically self-supporting to obtain independence. In 1972 Prime Minister B.J. Vorster emphasized that economic viability was not a condition for commencing independence negotiations. He went further by emphasizing that economic underdevelopment in the homelands areas was not a convenient excuse for denying independence. According to Vorster, economic underdevelopment in the homeland areas was a means by which continuing dependence on white South Africa would be assured. Moreover it represented devolution of problems as much as power to the homeland leadership.

Government plans for the creation of a “Zulustan” were supported by the Zulu King Cyprian Bhekuzulu, whose view was that “We must work with the Government without them we can do nothing”. However, at a meeting of 200 Zulu Chiefs (Amakhosi) called in the early 1960’s on the advice of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development to discuss a Territorial Authority in

38 House of Assembly debate, cols. 665-666, 28 May 1968.
39 Ibid., col. 668.
Zululand, Buthelezi opposed the system because of its basis of “divide and rule”. He maintained that chiefs alone were not competent enough to take decisions without consulting urban dwellers. There was also a feeling that the area of jurisdiction of any Territorial Authority should embrace the whole of Zululand and include white farming areas and crown lands. Buthelezi’s view prevailed. He wished to see the effect of the system in operation, before committing himself to it.\textsuperscript{41}

In 1964 a letter from the Director of the Bantu Affairs Department made it clear to Buthelezi and his officials that opposition to a Zulu Homeland was no longer a matter of choice and that the Zulu did not have the right to accept or reject the system.\textsuperscript{42} The Chief Bantu Commissioner for Natal Province at the time, J.O. Cornel, said: “All we ask is for you to recognize the system”.\textsuperscript{43} Buthelezi’s response was that “it will be in the interest of all if the system is adopted here in KwaZulu – as far as I am concerned we must obey the Government ... the only alternative is a revolution”. Interest in Government plans at that time was aroused by the Transkei developments and was reflected in “train and bus” talks through phrases such as “half a loaf is better than none”, “If you cannot beat them, join them”, and “Is it wise to reject something we have not even tried”?\textsuperscript{44}

In 1968 the Government, apparently losing patience with the Zulu people, secretly summoned the Zulu King to talk with Minister M.C. Botha and other top officials.\textsuperscript{45} It was hoped that a joint statement would result from the meeting which would indicate that Zululand had requested the establishment of a Territorial Authority. Press comment at the time suggested that the Pretoria Government was taking an enormous risk in pushing Zululand too far and too fast.

Shortly after the visit, the King died and the Government produced a letter signed by him requesting the establishment of a territorial authority. Buthelezi said the letter was authentic.\textsuperscript{46} Prince Israil Mcwayizeni, Cyprian’s sibling brother, was installed as the Regent King pending the coming of age and marriage of the direct

\textsuperscript{41} Sunday Times, 18 June 1963, p.18.
\textsuperscript{42} The Citizen, 12 March 1964, p.17.
\textsuperscript{43} Daily News, 28 April 1964, p.30.
\textsuperscript{44} Natal Mercury, 23 July 1965, p.14.
\textsuperscript{45} Daily News, 13 August 1968, p.10.
\textsuperscript{46} A. Mlondo, Emabnyeni, 11 December 2003.
heir, Prince Goodwill Zwelethini Zulu, and he declared his intentions of continuing with plans to establish a Territorial Authority. Buthelezi had, in 1968, become the head of the Mashonangashoni regional authority. His attitude was that the Bantu Authorities Act was passed without the consent of the black people who were thus under no obligation to express their acceptance of or rejection to, the proclamation of the regional authority. They had learned from experience that their feelings were irrelevant and that acceptance of Government policy was compulsory, not optional.  

A leadership crisis was looming in Zululand. A rift had developed between Buthelezi and some members of the royal family e.g. Prince Mqwayizeni Zulu. Buthelezi blamed the Pretoria Government for the crisis. Plans for the establishment of a Zulu Territorial Authority continued despite the opposition of many Zulus to a Zulustan that was not a solid, single territorial entity. A bitter debate ensued between Government officials and Zulu leaders in Nongoma, the royal headquarters. Many Zulu expressed the opinion that unless the Territorial Authority was led by Buthelezi “it would not be done properly”, since there were too few Zulu with his insight and training in Zulu Affairs.

KWA-ZULU AREAS
AND MAGISTERIAL
DISTRICTS, 1972
Finally, a Zulu Territorial Authority was constituted and on 9 June 1970, Buthelezi was unanimously chosen as Chief Executive Officer. His acceptance of the Authority was apparently attributed to events in Transkei and its enhanced status and to pressures from his own people, including a considerable number of Zulu intellectuals whom were of the opinion that more attention should be paid to development matters including employment, health and education.\textsuperscript{50}

The Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act no. 26 of 1970 provided for every black in the Republic who was not a citizen of a self-governing territory to become a citizen of one or other territorial authority. In international relations an individual would continue to have the status of citizen of the Republic, but franchise rights would be available to him only in his own territory. This Act defined a “Bantu person” as ethnically a black individual who meets one or more of the following characteristics:

- Born in South Africa
- Domiciled in South Africa
- Speaking a “Bantu language”, e.g. Nguni, Sotho, Venda, Tswana
- Culturally and racially associated with any part of the black population.\textsuperscript{51}

An explanatory memorandum issued with the Bantu Homelands Constitutions Act of 1971 confirmed the Government’s intentions to lead each individual nation to self-government and ultimate independence. The act applied to all Bantu areas except Transkei, in terms of common interest issues peculiar to particular areas, such as that, in Transkei’s case, the constitution of the legislative body would be determined by the State President, after consultation with the territorial authority concerned. Legislative Assemblies were to replace Territorial Authorities. Some matters were not to be transferred to a Legislative Assembly, even after self-government was granted. These included defense, foreign affairs and questions of peace and security, postal, telephone and related services, immigration of non-citizens, currency and banking and customs and excise.

In the early stages of development there would be considerable state control, even in matters transferred to legislative assemblies, for example, laws applicable to

\textsuperscript{50} Daily News, 8 May 1970, p.20.

\textsuperscript{51} M. Horrell: The African Homelands of South Africa, p.50.
homelands citizens who resided outside its area, the establishment of factories, the appointment and dismissal of chiefs, or educational matters. Even in the second stage of self government matters transferred to legislative assembly would require the State President’s approval and could not be inconsistent with an Act of Parliament. An Executive Council would be constituted and at a later stage, cabinets. Various departments would be created, subject to revenue funds available to the controller and Auditor-General for this purpose. Public servants from the Republic would be seconded to assist in the administrations of the new homelands, up to the stage where they were entitled to have their own flags with the State President’s approval and their own national anthems.52

Matters not controlled by the legislative assemblies could be legislated for the proclamation of the State President of the Republic. An amendment to the South African Constitution Act in 1963 recognised an African language as an official additional language in any “Bantu area” (English and Afrikaans were already entrenched). The Constitution Amendment Act no.1 of 1971 substituted the words “Bantu Territory” for Bantu areas and Act no 23 of 1972 provided for the establishment of public holidays in substitution for those in white areas.53

In 1972 a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was created to replace the existing Territorial Authority.54 At first its membership consisted of those serving in the Territorial Authority and it was granted “first stage” powers as provided for in the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act. A constitution was drafted in which the members of the Legislative Assembly, having refused to swear allegiance to the South African Government, were required to swear allegiance to the State President and the Paramount Chief (King). Accordingly, the personal representative of the King was to remain a member of the Assembly, but the King himself was required to remain outside party politics. The Chief Executive Councilor was to have a considerable voice in the election of other Executive Councilors. The King was to personify the unity of the Zulu nation. He was to be kept informed of business

52 House of Assembly debate, cols. 477-486, 8 January 1971.
pending in the Executive Council and could meet with Councilors for discussion, if he desired. He could also address the house on request.

Subsequently, a power struggle became imminent between Buthelezi and the new King, Goodwill Zwelithini. Many observers believed that a South African Government campaign to promote the King at the expense of Buthelezi was being launched. Certain Government officials were said to have been disappointed by the failure of an attempt to have the King instead of Buthelezi made Prime Minister, apparently because there was a hope that the King would be more docile and compliant than Buthelezi. The King, however, denied attempts to cause rifts between him and Buthelezi. The KwaZulu Constitution was unique in that the Zulu were the only South African people governed under homeland law who had a King. In this sense they were similar to the people of Lesotho, where the King also had a history of conflict with the Legislative Assembly.

The Constitution was finally approved by the Authority and the Republican Government and was gazetted as Proclamation R69 of 30 March 1972. It created a Legislative Assembly composed of members of the Territorial Authority with Buthelezi remaining Chief Executive Officer. A new Assembly would come into being at a date to be determined by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development at the request of the Executive Council. The Assembly would comprise the personal representative of the King, 3 chiefs appointed from amongst its members by every regional authority (there were 22 regional authorities at the date of Proclamation which would thus appoint 66 representatives), the chief of each tribal authority (3 such bodies then existed), and 55 members to be elected by the voters of KwaZulu.

The electoral division for the election of the 55 members would be the areas of regional authorities and representatives would be elected in proportion to the estimated total number of citizens of KwaZulu over 18 years of age, domiciled in

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any electoral division or whose district of origin or those of their antecedents were in such areas. Each voter would cast as many votes as there were members to be elected in the electoral division concerned, but only one vote in respect of any one candidate was allowed. Those standing for elections would have to be citizens of at least 21 years of age. A term of imprisonment or a conviction for corruption, or illegal practice under laws governing election, served as a disqualification. The Legislative Assembly would run for 5 years and it was obligatory to hold at least one ordinary session annually, although special session could be held if necessary.58

The Commissioner-General for the Zulu was eligible to attend meetings and to address the Assembly. Freedom of speech and debate would apply and sittings would be open to the public. The Executive Council would consist of the Chief Executive Councilor, who was to be a chief, and 5 members of the Assembly to be elected by secret ballot, of whom 2 were to be Chiefs. The Chief Executive Officer, elected first, would nominate 10 candidates for the other seats of which half were to be Chiefs. No debate was to be allowed prior to the vote. The Chief Executive Officer might be removed from office by resolution of the Legislative Assembly and other councilors by resolution of the Assembly but on the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer. The Assembly operated from Nongoma and Pietermaritzburg, but later on moved to Ulundi.

The Constitution for KwaZulu came into effect after the territory had held its first elections. This occurred in February 1978 and all constitutional details began to operate. Buthelezi initially insisted that election purposes had been abolished and had been replaced by conventional citizenship cards.59 In response to criticism that he was stalling and thus did not hold office as a result of democratic election, he agreed to proceed with the use of reference books.

From the outset the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly became skeptical about its independence. It seriously questioned the nature of an independence which would allow the Pretoria Government to control trade, foreign relations, defense and

internal security. Economists expressed the opinion that KwaZulu would remain a mere “Labour Farm” for white South Africa. Functions of the KwaZulu Government were to be carried out by Zulu cabinet Ministers who were assisted by white officials seconded by the Pretoria Government. The KwaZulu Authority was thus subject to limitations in law, and constraints in the exercise of delegated powers. KwaZulu remained effectively subject to the Central Government of white South Africa.\textsuperscript{60}

The start of independence in KwaZulu was not auspicious, i.e. at its first sitting the KwaZulu Legislature learnt that the budget for 1972 – 1973 was R32 million. This amount was insufficient for the various needs of KwaZulu. Buthelezi pointed out that since 90% of the Zulu were agriculturists, the fiscal allocation of a little under R3 million for agriculture was insufficient. It was estimated that at least R50 million was needed to procure the technical services and research training and development that KwaZulu needed.\textsuperscript{61}

As much as it is vital to indicate that the homeland policy was generally unpopular among blacks, it is also important to note that it was not simply imposed from above by the Government. The policy worked, because it won support from three important groups of people in the reserves. These were many of the Chiefs, the black officials who replaced white officials in Government and businessmen who attained their businesses from white owners.\textsuperscript{62}

In 1968, before the KwaZulu authority had been formally established, Buthelezi justified his participation in the Bantu Authorities system, saying that “co-operation was not acceptance of the apartheid system”. When he opened the first session of the Zulu Territorial Authority in 1970, Buthelezi pointed out that “essentially” the Zulu people had co-operated “as subjects with whichever Government... in power”. At the time of the promotion of the Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) Buthelezi wrote to a white political friend: “I have stated at

\textsuperscript{60} J.K. Nkumane: \textit{An African Explains Apartheid}, p.39.
\textsuperscript{61} B. Rogers: \textit{The Bantu Homelands}, p.61.
public meetings in the presence of my tribe that it would seem that the best thing would be to co-operate with it (the Bantu authorities Act) since my cousin who is the paramount Chief has done so. The people have not rejected the Act as far as I am aware. All that they have said is that I am trying to rush them despite the choice given by the Government – that they are watching it in operation, in the Usuthu ward (that of the Paramount Chief). I am not the person standing in the people's way to acceptance. I am prepared to abide by the Act passed by parliament. Parliament has chosen to make this particular one permissive. My suggestion is that it should be compulsory like Bantu education and other acts of Parliament”.63

Buthelezi saw it worthwhile to participate in the system because he would have a platform from which he could draw attention to the inequities and inequalities of the system. A second claim was that participation would offer some hope for the Zulus if a “Zulu Homeland” was effectively led.64 Buthelezi believed that his abstaining could have a destructive effect on the Zulu Homeland Government.65 Buthelezi’s justification for enrolment firstly in the Bantu Authorities and then the next stage of the apartheid structure is captured in his first report to the Zulu Territorial Authority in 1972.

“We as a people need development more than any other race group and for this reason, we say to those who have these reservations that a negative attitude will deprive us of the development that is available to our people within the framework of this policy. Let us, therefore, unite as a people as whites are united and glean whatever development is allowed as in our lifetime, for the benefit of the posting. What will be more gratifying to us as we close our eyes on our deathbeds than to think that we did our best in the circumstances and to the very limit of what was possible...? Let us make mistakes and learn by them instead of folding arms”.66

66 G. Hamilton and G. Mare: An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Royal Resistance, p.32.
Some historians argue that there was no difference between simply living in South Africa as a black person, and actively participating in the structure of that society. To call those who opted for participation “puppets” is, according to this argument, totally wrong. But there was a very big difference between groups living in apartheid South Africa – carrying passes, attending schools, living in group areas set aside for different races, and in becoming part of the structure that had been set up for the maintenance of society in this form. Becoming part of an ethnically fragmented Bantu Homeland administration, running an ethnic police force, fighting battles with other ethnically defined units over resources, was a far cry from doing those things that apartheid society enforced.

Another justification for participation was in terms of the continuation of pre-capitalist political and cultural traditions.67 This is probably the most frequently used explanation why Buthelezi had chosen the path of “separate development”, not because it was primarily the historical continuity of “Zulu” society and of Buthelezi himself.

Buthelezi stated this position in an article written after the referendum results in 1983: "I was the traditional Prime Minister to my first cousin, King Cyprian, for 16 years long before there was any KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. I never thought that the Prime Minister was so politically illiterate to the extent of him being unaware that I am not a Chief Minister of KwaZulu by the grace of the National Party Government".68

Buthelezi also wrote "I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu legislative Assembly or to Pretoria; King Shaka never owed his political eminence to any colonial power. The solidarity of the Zulu people was not dependent on white-created institutions when they defeated the might of the British army. White South Africa observes a so-called Day of the Vow as testimony to the fact that the people I

68 Sunday Tribune, 6 November 1983, p.16.
now lead have their own sense of destiny. An act of history made us South African and South Africans we are and will remain.⁶⁹

Buthelezi assumed a moral position against apartheid, criticizing it in speeches and newspaper articles. This was when the South African Government began to consider him unreliable, particularly as a result of his refusal to accept the “independence” of KwaZulu, unlike the Transkei. There was even an occasion when the then Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, called Buthelezi to Pretoria for a person-to-person discussion, in the process of which Vorster criticised Buthelezi’s excess in criticizing apartheid as well as warning him against meeting undesirable persons during his trips abroad.

At one stage Pretoria even went so far as to plot to have opposition parties organised against Buthelezi in KwaZulu. The question then arises as to how could all this happen if he was a cut-and-dried “puppet”?⁷⁰ Some analysts who have hitherto assessed Buthelezi, particularly those with a critical disposition towards him, have tended to characterise him as a “bantustan puppet”. As Nxumalo noted, the reality is more complicated than that. Buthelezi is on record as saying that he would not join P.W. Botha’s National Council (an advisory body of Africans to the white parliament) unless Nelson Mandela was released.⁷¹ To a larger extent, it was in response to these Government pressures on him that Buthelezi decided to establish Inkatha. Through Inkatha, Buthelezi sought to stand out not only as a Zulu, but also as a South African.⁷² It was precisely through the instrumentality of Inkatha that he hoped to frustrate any attempt by the South African Government to impose independence on KwaZulu.

Although Buthelezi’s relations with the Pretoria Government were sometimes sour, a number of questions remained: how did a bantustan leader, having to work closely with the oppressors of his people, ensure his credibility as a leader of those

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⁶⁹ M. G. Buthelezi: “We Struggle to Build Nation”, Presidential Address to the General Conference of the National Cultural Liberation Movement, Ulundi, 9 July 1976.


⁷¹ N. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi – A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.7.

people? How did he strive for a democratic society when his very position has been
der democratically determined? How did he speak for an ethnic constituency and
still claim to be a nationalist? How did he become part of the system of apartheid
violence and still maintain a non-violent character?73

To counter these accusations of his working within the system, Buthelezi argued
that his agreement to work within the system was no less evil than the
participation of great patriots such as Chief Albert Luthuli and Professor Z.K.
Mathews in the Government-created Native Representative Council (NRC)
established in 1936. He said, all black people in South Africa were willy-nilly
working within the system, whether as teachers in Bantu Education schools or
merely as inhabitants of the townships set up by apartheid laws. Moreover he is of
the family traditionally responsible for providing Prime Ministers of Zulu Kings, and
therefore his position of leadership among the Zulu people has not been a creation
of a bantustan system.

In 1972 a constitution was drafted for KwaZulu which contained aspects of
executive political power. In this regard, Buthelezi and others strongly advanced a
view worth mentioning, namely that the King had to be “downgraded” to a
figurehead position. Prince Mcwayizeni Zulu, the regent king, had previously told
the Pretoria Government that the royal family would like to see a form of Zulu
Government in which the future King, Zwelithini, would only perform ceremonial
functions, and should hold himself aloof from party politics because the King must
personify the unity of the Zulu nation and be kept out of the heat and dust of
politics. That view prevailed and was reflected in the final constitution gazetted on
30 March 1972. Buthelezi tried to delay the installation of Goodwill as King of the
Zulus.74 This was interpreted by some as a tactic to get the constitution for the
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly passed first, with its clauses defining non-executive
rights for the King. This, of course, did not make for good relations between the
heir, Zwelithini, and Buthelezi. The preparation for King Zwelithini’s coronation
was made without the participation of Buthelezi. He was away on one of his

73 N. Nxumalo: Getails Buthelezi — A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.8.
74 G. Hamilton and G. Mare: An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and Politics of Royal Resistance, p.43.
periodic trips to the United States to continue the investment campaign for KwaZulu. However, when he learned of the coronation, he came back immediately in the hope of participating in the preparatory events. On his arrival in South Africa news spread that he was to be the Master of Ceremonies at the coronation itself.75

Actually a decision to that effect had been taken. It was a responsibility that would give him great prestige among the tens of thousands of Zulus who were expected to attend the coronation, and it would help confirm his claim that he was the Prime Minister. However, the manner in which the royal family treated Buthelezi showed that they did not see him as such. This became evident when Prince Herbert Zulu was chosen by the royal family to replace Buthelezi as the Master of Ceremonies. As Tempkin notes, ‘for Buthelezi, the days preceding the coronation of the young King were very trying.76 The word ‘trying’ was an understatement. According to reports, King Zwelithini refused to accept a golden crown said to have been chosen for him by Buthelezi.77 On coronation day, the tension between the King and Buthelezi was made worse by a number of events. First, with the Chief marching at its head, the Buthelezi regiment was snubbed when it tried to advance towards the King to salute in homage. Then, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, M.C. Botha told the audience that precautions should be taken to ensure that their King was not relegated to a mere figurehead.78 Thereafter, the outgoing regent, Prince and Minister Mcwayizeni, announced that a Royal Council would be informed to assist the King. The Council would be constituted personally by the King on the advice of senior princes. There seemed little doubt that Buthelezi would not be among its members. To make matters worse, soon after the coronation the new King sent a delegation to Swaziland to study that country’s constitution and how King Sobhuza exercised power in relation to the Swazi parliament.79

75 G. Hamilton and G. Mare: An Appetite for Power. Buthelezi’s Iskatha and Politics of Royal Resistance, p.43.
76 B. Tempkin: Gatsha Buthelezi, Zulu Stateman, p.143.
The real showdown with King Zwelithini began in 1975 when Buthelezi accused him of having involved himself in party politics on several occasions. This accusation was made publicly and in the presence of the King. Later the KwaZulu Government decided that all invitations to the king must first be scrutinised by the cabinet and any visits which the King might wish to make outside of the Nongoma Tribal Authority must first get cabinet clearance.

In 1979, dissatisfaction with the King’s activities was revealed in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly following Buthelezi’s allegations that the King had advocated requesting Frelimo’s assistance because talking to whites was a waste of time, and that the King had referred to Buthelezi and the KwaZulu Government as the ‘lackeys of the whites’. Buthelezi had also alleged earlier on that a member of the royal entourage, Mzamo Zulu, had threatened to shoot him.

The King was involved in attempts to form opposition parties with the help of members of the Zulu royal house antagonistic to Buthelezi, and opponents of Inkatha. At the Nongoma celebrations of the King’s fourth year as paramount chief, to which Buthelezi’s cabinet had not been invited, a white official employed by Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor), where members of the royal house had been employed, collected a large sum of money for the occasion. Buthelezi referred the matter to the Security Police of the Central Government.

The KwaZulu Government also learned that the King and close relatives had conspired with a certain employee of the Iron and Steel Corporation to form a political party, the Inala Party. According to Buthelezi, the aim of the party was to give the King greater political power so that he would have the right to appoint the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. To counter these moves, Buthelezi summoned a national council of Inkatha and it prevailed upon the King to sign a declaration pledging the cessation of political activity.

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10 Natal Mercury, 17 September 1979, p.28.
11 Post, 3 August 1979, p.11.
In 1980, Buthelezi once again announced that the King would no longer be permitted to give interviews on his own to the press. In future, he said, the King’s private secretary, S.G. Mkhize, and the KwaZulu Minister of Justice, J. Mthethwa, would make all arrangements for press interviews and would also attend them. This decision to muzzle the King was apparently taken after he had told Pace magazine that he had been ‘showing the way’ in practical fashion to his people, but that the contribution of the KwaZulu Government politicians ‘unfortunately sometimes consists only of rhetoric’. These were new times in Zululand. Never before in the history of the Zulu had their King been subject to the control of a chief. Yet the Bantustan system was able to make this possible.

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84 Sunday Tribune, 3 February 1980, p.31.
CHAPTER 2
KwaZulu's Financial Position

According to Tempkin, in the beginning, KwaZulu was almost completely dependent on Pretoria Government finances: The income for the homeland is made available through the Republican Government's own budget.1 Very little was generated within the homeland. Although agriculture was the foremost activity, it was of the subsistence type, and largely non-commercial. Commerce was still insignificant and industrialization had hardly commenced. These factors meant that the main source of budget for KwaZulu would be the treasury of the Republic of South Africa. Unfortunately the homeland Governments were neither invited nor consulted when the allocations were made. At one stage a move was made that such consultation should be provided for, but the Pretoria Government rejected the suggestion on the grounds that such a concession implied giving black Governments a say in the affairs of the Republic.2

This unfair arrangement culminated in the inequitable use of funds, sometimes not because of injustices amongst office bearers but because of the lack of proper contact. For example, when asked about the over expenditure in 1977, Mr Johns (an office bearer from the Treasury) responded as follows: “The main over-expense was an amount of R509 000. This was due to an increase in pension allowances for which provision was not made. It is very difficult to determine the number of pensioners approved annually. These figures are not available to us and we have to calculate this on a percentage basis over a three year period. There are 26 districts throughout KwaZulu, with each magistrate recommending new pensions. I think things will be much better when we have our own computer here in KwaZulu”.3

1 B. Tempkin - Gatsha Buthelezi - Zulu Statesman, p.183. For more information see the following, The Sessional Committee on Accounts of KwaZulu Government for the Financial Year 1974-75, p.7; The Sessional Committee on Accounts of KwaZulu Government for the Financial Year 1976-77, pp.1-3.
2 House of Assembly debate, cols. 332-335, 10 February 1975.
At the conference ‘Towards Comprehensive Development in Zululand’, held in Durban in February 1972, Buthelezi in his opening speech stated that white South Africa should remember the contribution made by the blacks to the economic development of South Africa. “As much as we have made such a substantial contribution towards the production of white South Africa’s wealth, white South Africa is morally bound to channel our share of the wealth towards the development of underdeveloped areas, which they have decided unilaterally to apportion to us. At the same time a portion of overseas capital and expertise which have played such a vital role in developing South Africa, should play an equal role in the economic development of KwaZulu,” he told the listeners.4

Buthelezi said that his own thinking was along the lines of the statement issued by a United Nations panel on the promotion of foreign investment that met in Amsterdam in 1969. After a visit overseas (University of Salem, USA) on 4-9 July 1972 he called for the right of his homeland Government to negotiate loans directly with overseas agencies, bypassing the agency of the South African Government in order to avoid accusations that the foreign Governments concerned were, by aiding KwaZulu, furthering the policy of apartheid. This, according to Tempkin, was not done in an effort to bypass the South African Government’s machinery for such investment but rather to bring to the attention of overseas investors that KwaZulu was an underdeveloped area that was bypassed for development largely because it was inhibited by blacks. Buthelezi also believed that development investment, by definition, should be made up of finance and expertise. If people were serious about setting up industries in KwaZulu, then they should make their expertise available not only for the establishment of the industries but to get them off the ground.

In 1972, Buthelezi presented his first appropriation Bill to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and stated that the expenditure for the six departments of the assembly was R31, 9 million made up as follows:5
- Authority Affairs and Finance: R0, 5 million
- Community Affairs: R6, 7 million
- Works R13, 5: million

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Education & Culture: R 7, 9 million  
Agriculture and Forestry: R 2, 7 million  
Justice: R0, 6 million

Buthelezi explained the functions of his two departments, namely Finance and Authority Affair. He mentioned discussions he had had overseas and in South Africa on the economic development of KwaZulu. In doing so, he did not try to disparage the Bantu Investment Corporation, which was doing its utmost to improve the economic development of the homeland, but out of sheer common sense. As he explained, it was clear that, with due respect to the Corporation and to the Government’s resources, it was impossible for any Government agency to develop about ten African nations economically.

Although Buthelezi received no formal reply from the South African Government regarding his request for KwaZulu be allowed to receive foreign capital, the question was answered in an indirect manner. Responding to Helen Suzman’s question, R Raubenheimer, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said, “I can only say to her that the question of foreign capital about which Chief Buthelezi and others have spoken is very clear. Such money can be brought in. They have not yet submitted any formal representation for any type of capital they can obtain. If the law did not allow them we will make a law in this connection. In any case they can bring money in and there are no problems.” In replying to a further question from Mrs. Suzman as to whether there would be strings attached to the bringing in of money, Raubenheimer replied, “Yes. All we want is that it should take place in a planned manner”. In 1973 the Pretoria Government responded with the Bantu Laws amended Act which empowered home land Governments to raise public loans from external sources.

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On 16 August 1973, Buthelezi met the chairman of the Bantu Investment Corporation, Prof. S. du Toit Vijoen and members of his board. It was an important meeting in that the corporation and Buthelezi had been critical of each other for some time. Buthelezi, however, immediately extended the hand of friendship and said that “many cordial relationships are forged through the furnace of strife”. He then made a number of bold suggestions which he said might appear wild to some people. First he asked that 50% of the Bantu Investment Corporation’s beer profits be given as an outright gift to the KwaZulu Government. “It would be a marvelous idea,” he said, “If we have few Rand to use to develop our agricultural schemes and also in some of our projects in education”.

In his second visit to the United States of America in 1973 Buthelezi spoke about economic problems faced by blacks in South Africa. He told the audience that more than 80% of the gross national product went to 20% of the population of South Africa. This meant that the 80% black majority were economically underdeveloped. In the homelands, basic development was needed. He pointed out how little money was available in the light of these problems.

While overseas, Buthelezi pleaded for development capital: “We welcome private sector investment in our area. We have a new growth point at Isithebe, some 70 miles north of Durban. Water, power, rail services have been provided. Furthermore, the future capital of KwaZulu at Ulundi is to rise in due course from bare veld. Here, too, infrastructural facilities will be provided. We will be delighted if the foreign firms would come and set up factories here as well”. He asked those who already had investments in South Africa to improve their training facilities and added that private enterprises would be encouraged in KwaZulu. This initiative received a warm welcome amongst his overseas friends.

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Expenditure in KwaZulu rose from R73 141 311 in 1974/1975 to R 101 669 300 in 1977/1978 and in every department there was steady growth. The areas in which most expansion occurred were works and education. In the former, the increase was due to the establishment of the townships, although this was a controversial area. Townships were related to the resettlement policy which aimed to reduce the number of black on white farms and in common areas. Many blacks were resentful of what, to them, was undue expenditure in pursuit of an analogy. The result was a conflict over developmental priorities. Because employment opportunities were scarce, the majority of the able-bodied workers looked for employment in the white sectors i.e. industries, factories, firms, and a subsistence economy was sustained in the main by women, dependent males and the elderly. Wages from the commuter and migrant labour constituted a greater portion of income from homeland citizens. Over three-quarters of Zulu income came from absence labour, which accounted for the low level of development and productivity within the homeland. 13

Comparisons of KwaZulu expenditure with South African expenditure indicated the magnitude of discrepancies in South Africa between amenities available to whites and those available to blacks. The KwaZulu Government imposed a per capita tax of R3 which was collected for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly by the Government of the Republic from absent persons. This personal tax and township rental constituted significant sources of internal revenue. Remaining income came from licensing fees and income from small charges for public services undertaken by Government departments. 14

Until 1975/1976 the Republic's contribution to KwaZulu's budget was composed of a statutory grant based on the cost of services at the time of their transfer to the homeland Government, and additional grants determined annually and drawn from the consolidated fund. In addition, the Department of Plural Relations paid a

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supplementary amount representing general overhead expenditure such as the salaries of the white officials.\textsuperscript{15}

Homeland leaders, in particular Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Mangope of Bophuthatswana, demanded greater fiscal security and recognition of their claim to certain sources of income which they considered to be their due. In 1974 a change in formula whereby funds were allocated to the homelands partly met this demand. The change involved the transfer of some indirect taxes such as customs and excise, sales tax on goods consumed by blacks, and taxes paid by companies in the homelands and in border areas, whether controlled by blacks or not. The changes were incorporated in the Bantu laws amendments Act of 1975. The overall effect was the raising of the regular amounts which were paid to the homeland and the discretionary additional grant.\textsuperscript{16} This new arrangement helped to reduce homeland dependency, but it did not empower the homeland Government to tax South African companies operating within homeland boundaries. These companies continued to be taxed by the South African Government.

Addressing his Cabinet at Ulundi, on 3 May 1975, Buthelezi pointed out that KwaZulu did not have enough instruments of its own through which to develop economically and had to rely on the Bantu Investment Corporation. He explained that the Bantu Investment Corporation (B.I.C.) derived its funds from the SA Bantu Trust, which in turn received its money from the Treasury of the Republic. He presented a schedule reflecting that by 31 March 1974, the total investment by the B.I.C. in KwaZulu was R21, 73 million while 3 025 employment opportunities had been created for blacks and 172 for whites.\textsuperscript{17} He made a proposal that KwaZulu should have its own Development Corporation which would eliminate friction between the KwaZulu public and the Corporation in operation.


\textsuperscript{16} B. Tempkin: Gatshe Buthelezi: Zulu Statement, pp.188-190.

\textsuperscript{17} Natal Mercury, 15 May 1975, p.27.
At Ulundi Buthelezi suggested that the new corporation would concentrate not only on employing Zulu but also on providing more loan finance to black entrepreneurs. Black businessmen had problems in raising loans from commercial banks because they could not offer security. Since they did not own the land on which their business stood, they had no security to offer. Interestingly, the B.I.C. made loans in spite of this problem.

Together with the other bantustan leaders, Buthelezi became an opponent of sanctions against South Africa. Buthelezi raised the question of the suffering of black people if sanctions were imposed on South Africa. He was more concerned about the people of KwaZulu who were in desperate need of jobs. His main argument was that sanctions would hurt black people most and disturb his foreign plans about investments in KwaZulu. He said "I can not bring myself to say to the poor and suffering of this country that I am working for the cessation of foreign investment in South Africa. Investment means increased prosperity and it means jobs for the unemployed, clothes for the naked and food for the hungry – but above all it means finances for the KwaZulu Government".

The KwaZulu Department of Finance formulated the financial policies of the KwaZulu Government. It also regulated financial administration and dispensation of Government Departments. This Department consisted of three main branches, namely Treasury, Accounts and Transport. The Transport branch was transferred from the Department of Works to the Department of Finance as from 1 April 1983. Since April 1972 the Treasury functions of KwaZulu were performed by the Secretary for Corporation and Development. These functions were transferred to the KwaZulu Government Service on 1 December 1980. In order to enable the Treasury to fulfill its purpose and functions, as stipulated in the Exchequer and

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14 Minutes of Conference of Eight Black Leaders with B.J. Voster, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, and M.C. Boba, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Cape Town, 22 January 1975.
17 The Star, 4 December 1980, p.17.
Audit Act, this branch was established with effect from 1 April 1981 to which the following functions were allocated:

- Authorize Financial dispensation
- Co-ordinate and finalize budgets of Departments
- Management, planning and accounting of revenue
- Render secretarial service to the Tender Board.\(^{23}\)

The purpose of the Financial dispensation embraced, inter alia, the following:

- Handle submissions and reports in connection with stores.
- Authorize expenditure for the creation of post
- Comment on proposed new legislation and regulations
- Determine financial policies.\(^{24}\)

The main aim of Budgeting division was to co-ordinate the budget of Departments and its functions were to:

- Consolidate estimates from Departments
- Handle virement applications
- Handle applications for new services
- Promulgate financial legislation
- Arrange for issue of warrants by Chief Minister
- Maintain and control exchequer account.\(^{25}\)

The purpose of the Revenue division was to manage the planning and accounting of all KwaZulu revenue. It was also responsible for analyzing income statement, compile tax assessments, and formulate instructions and give guidance. This division operated from offices situated at Prince Mshiyeni Memorial Hospital in


Umlazi. In 1984 this division was also responsible for managing the income of KwaZulu.26

The main function of the State Buyer division was to render secretarial service to the Tender Board which:

- Handled matters regarding the calling for and acceptance of tenders
- Arranged contracts
- Determined policies in respect of purchase.27

The purpose of the Accounts branch was to maintain orderly public accounts. Its main functions were:

- Internal financial control
- Maintain a proper bookkeeping system
- Handle all expenditure transactions
- Control the computer bureau.28

The Account branch administered five main accounts, namely,

- The Revenue Account
- Exchequer Account
- Paymaster General’s Account
- Tribal Levies and Trust Account
- Deposit Account.

The KwaZulu Revenue Fund in terms of the provisions of section 6 of the Black States Constitutions Act of 1971 derived income from the following sources:

- An annual statutory grant from the State Revenue of the South African Government determined in accordance with a fixed formula
- An additional sum of money appropriated by the South African Parliament for the due performance of

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27 Killie Campbell Collection, Ref 233: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1983, p.117.
services and duties assigned to the KwaZulu Government.\textsuperscript{29}

The Revenue branch consisted of the following divisions:
- Internal control
- Bookkeeping
- Expenditure
- Computer bureau.\textsuperscript{30}

The purpose of the Internal Control division was to exercise internal financial control with the following functions:
- Financial and stores inspection
- Follow-up inspections
- Investigate anomalies and irregularities.

The aim of the Bookkeeping division was to maintain an orderly bookkeeping system. Its main functions were:
- Examination of district returns
- Record financial transactions in five main accounts and suspense accounts.\textsuperscript{31}

The Expenditure division was responsible for handling all expenditure transactions. This included salary payments and all expenditure from voted monies.\textsuperscript{32}
The main purpose for Computer bureau was to render a Computer bureau service with the following functions:
- Compile and maintain programmes
- Data processing
- Data control
- Data capturing
- Develop new system.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{29} Business Day, 14 March 1984, p.15.
\textsuperscript{30} Natal Mercury, 17 May 1984, p.21.
\textsuperscript{31} Natal Witness, 6 October 1985, p.18.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p.24.
\textsuperscript{33} Kifle Campbell Collection, Ref. 293: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1985, p.118.
The main aim for Transport branch was to exercise control over KwaZulu Government transport matters. Its functions included the following:

- Provide transport
- Keep records of vehicles
- Handle transport accounts
- Handle technical and inspection services.  

This branch consisted of five divisions to deal with the above mentioned functions. The functions of each division were as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Functions:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport Provision</td>
<td>- Prepare estimates</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Relocate vehicles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Handle subsidized vehicles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Arrange public auctions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Handle theft, irregular and unauthorized use.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle Records</td>
<td>- Keep distribution register</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Check log sheets</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Calculate and record depreciation of vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Accounts</td>
<td>- Prepare fuel and repair vouchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Do correspondence on accounts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Advise garages of authorities for repairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>- Deal with accident matters</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Handle third party claims</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide typing and registry service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection Services</td>
<td>- Control transport technical matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Plan and control transport maintenance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 Daily News, 9 September 1985, p.32.

- Promote road safety
- Render driving services.

Given the limited resources available to promote development and because of the quantitative importance of public sector expenditure in KwaZulu, the KwaZulu Government had in 1977 established an advisory committee to plan and co-ordinate the development effort within KwaZulu. This became known as the Planning, Co-ordinating and Advisory Committee (PCAC) which consisted of Secretaries of each of the KwaZulu Departments and various experts co-opted onto the committee because of their specialized knowledge. The PCAC was chaired by the Chief Minister.

The planning process consisted of the formulation of a perspective plan entitled: Towards a Plan for KwaZulu (1978), which led to the publication of a White Paper on Economic Development. Since 1979 various important events occurred to the planning of development in KwaZulu. These included the following:

- The publication in 1982 of the report of the Buthelezi Commission
- The new regional development policy which was negotiated with and accepted by the KwaZulu Government in 1982
- The transfer of the full industrial development function to the KwaZulu Development Corporation in 1984.

The increasing attention the KwaZulu Government was paying on developmental matters were reflected in the increase of the activities of the Technical Subcommittee of the PCAC. In order to cope with the growing demands and necessity

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38 Kullie Campbell Collection, Ref. 295: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1985, p.121.
for consideration of the many developmental needs of KwaZulu, the Technical Sub-Committee of PCAC met at monthly intervals instead of three monthly intervals as it used to.39

With the creation of the Development Bank of South Africa, the Department of Economic Affairs was appointed as the designated agent of the KwaZulu Government. This meant that all dealings between the Development Bank and the KwaZulu Government and related agencies would be channeled through the Development Planning division of this Department.40

The KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation Limited (KFC) was a statutory financial institution governed by Act No.46 of 1968, as amended by the KwaZulu Corporation Act, Act No.14 of 1984.41 The function of the KFC was to accelerate development within the region of KwaZulu. This would enhance the quality of life of KwaZulu inhabitants by stimulating free enterprise and by fostering entrepreneur’s skills, so creating job opportunities, wealth and socio-economic stability.42

Chief among the mechanisms used to achieve these ends were the provision of loan finance, the operation of profit making subsidiaries to generate development and operating capital; and the provision of practical training and education in technical, financial and managerial skills.43

At the beginning of the 1987/88 financial year, the KFC employed 2 200 people the bulk of whom were employed in productive enterprises.44 In June 1988 the KFC assets exceeded R330 million, and the Corporation had annual budget of more than R100 million.45 These resources were generated, administered and channeled into the development of the region through the 6 departments of the KFC, namely,

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38 The Star, 2 October 1986, p.25.
39 Ibid., p.27.
40 The Citizen, 20 May 1988, p.27.
41 Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 544: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1988, p.137.
Development, Investment, Operations, KwaZulu Training Trust, Executive Director and Finance.\textsuperscript{46}

The Development Department provided loans and other inputs to agricultural, commercial and small industrial undertakings. The range of commercial ventures supported by the KFC covered general dealers, bottle stores, butchers, restaurants and many others. Goods from plastic bags and ice, to garments and burglar guards were manufactured in small factory units rented out to industrialists by the KFC.\textsuperscript{47} Agricultural loans were mainly seasonal, covering crops as diverse as cotton, assaba, sorghum, beans and maize. Poultry production was also a growing area of investment with clients ranging from small backyard operations to sophisticated multi-broiler complexes.\textsuperscript{48}

The Investment Department was primarily responsible for the administration and expansion of the KFC- owned decentralized industrial estate at Ezakheni (near Ladysmith), Madadeni (outside Newcastle) and Isithebe (midway between Durban and Richards Bay). In 1989 the KFC's assets in these estates accounted for half the Corporation's total portfolio. In January 1991 more than 30 000 jobs were created in the production of a wide range of commodities, from prefabricated homes, through steel castings to packaging, clothing, domestic appliances, brake linings, truck-trailers and shoes.\textsuperscript{49}

The KFC adopted a policy of recruiting industries that would be viable and beneficial to the region in the long term, particularly from foreign investors.\textsuperscript{50} These industries created job opportunities and produced valuable foreign exchange. The Investment Department also offered a comprehensive and highly professional advisory and support service to prospective industrialists. The operation of Tri-Partnership companies in which shareholding was divided among KwaZulu

\textsuperscript{46} Ulundi Archive Collection, Ref 544: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1988, p.139.
\textsuperscript{47} Natal Witness, 2 June 1988, p.31.
\textsuperscript{48} Financial Mail, 13 September 1988, p.17.
\textsuperscript{50} Natal Witness, 27 November 1989, p.11.
residents, the KFC and national companies which were able to provide specific skills, was also the preserve of this department.51

The Operation Department controlled the KFC’s revenue-earning companies, such as the sorghum beer and malt operations, transport interests, a construction division, holiday resort and furniture factory.52 The emphasis in this section was on the production of revenue which would be channeled back into development through the other departments. In 1991 the sorghum operations of the KFC were controlled by the Sorghum Industry Management Board, a wholly owned subsidiary company of the KFC.

The KwaZulu Training Trust (KTT) was established as a non-profit company based at Umgababa and directed by an independent Board of Directors under the chairmanship of Dr. O.D. Diomo. Its main function was to foster technical and business skills through a technical training centre for artisans and adult education programmes.53 The Department of the Executive Director encompassed the personnel, secretarial and public affairs functions under the incumbent, Dr. Marius Spies. Apart from holding overall executive authority for all KFC operations, the Executive Director also acted as an advisor to the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and his cabinet.54 The Finance Department controlled the financial, internal audit, business systems and administration functions of the KFC.55

Although the KFC controlled a number of companies, and had interest in many more, two subsidiaries were considered significant in the development of the region, viz, the KwaZulu Housing Company (KHC) and the Ithala Savings Bank.56 The KwaZulu Housing Company was established as means of channeling private sector capital on to the black housing market. This was done by attracting investments at market related interest rate from companies and institutions wishing to help their

54 Ibid., p.39.
56 Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 554: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1990, p.141.
employees secure housing. The KHC initiated a number of housing projects in
KwaZulu to satisfy the needs of the employees of investor-companies.57

Ithala Savings Bank took over from the defunct Corporation for Economic
Development early in 1984.58 It provided facilities to small investors in Umlazi,
Durban, KwaDabeka, Mpumalanga, Madadeni, Vryheid, Ulundi, Ezakheni,
Greytown, Esikhawini, Stanger, KwaMashu and Pietermaritzburg.59 The KFC’s head
office was located at Umlazi. Its activities were carried out through seven branch
offices situated at Umlazi, Pietermaritzburg, Ezakheni, Madadeni, Ulundi,
Ngwelezane and Isithebe.60

While economic trends in the country as a whole were negative from 1972 to 1994,
KwaZulu experienced particular economic hardship as a result, inter alia, of its
high population concentration, limited employment opportunities and inadequate
economic growth, as well as disasters such as droughts and floods.61 Limited
transfers of public funds from the former South African Government to the region
further exacerbated its economic difficulties.62

According to the Development Bank of South Africa, KwaZulu and Natal had in
1993 the largest concentration of the people in South Africa. Its population, at
8,5m, was considerable greater than that of any other region, including the
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area, which had a population of 6,8
million.63 According to the Development Bank of South Africa unemployment in
KwaZulu was the highest in the country and showed a significant increase from
1980-1991. However, KwaZulu, for many years, received the third smallest share of
revenue from the National fiscus. Its share of revenue was low relative to its
population, the size of its economy, and the level of taxes it levied.64 The

58 Ibid., p. 21.
60 Natal Mercury, 29 January 1993, p.17.
63 J. Braam: South Africa’s Nine Provinces, p.81.
64 A.J. Jeffery: The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict, p.5.
Development Bank of South Africa estimated that the annual growth rate in the area was 3.08% in the period 1975-1980, declining to 2.57% from 1980-1984, and rising slightly to 2.81% from 1984-1988. Reflecting this limited growth, per capita disposable income in 1994 was R5 124 per annum, as was the fourth lowest in the country as a whole.

In spite of economic hardship mentioned above, the period 1972-1994 witnessed economic growth in the KwaZulu Homeland. This was attributed, inter alia, to the administrative control of finances (collecting and spending of funds). This ensured that funds were spent for the purposes voted by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and that income was collected and funds were expended in the most efficient way.

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CHAPTER 3

Agricultural progress in KwaZulu

Agriculture was the basis of the KwaZulu economy and its practice was the central feature of the national life. However, the area was crippled by malnutrition and poverty.1 In the Tomlinson Commission Report on the viability of the African reserves, it was found that agriculture in particular was in a sorry state. Poor farming methods aggravated the problems that had been created by overcrowding of people on the land and the overstocking of cattle. Much of the blame was laid on lobola, an incorrect view, since Africans did not only amass cattle purely for lobola, it was their store of wealth and it also played an important role in traditional rituals.2

In KwaZulu, agriculture was mainly employed for subsistence purposes, with minimal production of cash crops for the market. In contrast to white agricultural practices, there was evidence of only a small proportion of commercial live stock sales, inefficient methods of agriculture and low yields. Although more than 30% of black South Africans were working on white farms, their exposure to modern techniques had little benefit on their own areas. Low productivity and stagnation in agriculture was attributable in the main to inadequate modern inputs and poor infrastructure, to obstructive land tenure and labour practices and to shortcomings in teaching programmes and the absence of their extension to the farming population.3

To overcome problems of poverty and malnutrition, the KwaZulu Government recommended, inter alia, training programmes which would acquaint farmers with skills and knowledge of scientific farming; ways to control overgrazing and erosion; the establishment of advisory committees and the funding of large-scale agricultural projects. Amongst the obstacles to the new programmes was the resistance of many Zulu people to the new approaches to agricultural planning and

to the propagation of improved methods aimed at the promotion of productivity.\textsuperscript{55} Other impediments included the lack of capital and credit facilities; the absence of developed markets for produce; and a lack of transportation. Above all, the absence of male labour had a negative effect on farming in KwaZulu.\textsuperscript{5}

The incompatibility between the tribal system of land tenure and the requirements of progress became very obvious. Holdings became so subdivided that the application of modern techniques was rendered almost impossible. Resistance came from the chiefs, and from tribesmen who opposed the chiefs. Many of them lacked confidence in Government officialdom and modern techniques. Chiefs who feared to lose authority were reluctant to co-operate with each other. The result was opposition to the KwaZulu Government’s attempts to pay for expertise, to form buying co-operatives, and to pool experience, efforts and costs. Thus, although traditional and anti-modernistic factors were involved, there were national motivations which hampered improvement of agriculture.\textsuperscript{6}

The Zulu regarded arable cultivation as traditionally the work of women, ploughing being the exception. With no marketing system and selling taking place on the roadside as well as from house to house, production was aimed at the support of the family, regardless of the suitability of the soil or climate. Primarily, the farmers cultivated what would contribute to the family’s staple diet.\textsuperscript{7} It is also essential to mention that some KwaZulu homeland areas were relatively arid and unproductive, which made agriculture very difficult. Government settlement schemes increased serious problems of overpopulation.

In terms of agriculture, the priority in KwaZulu was training, and this culminated in the construction of the Cwaka Agricultural College near Empangeni in 1973.\textsuperscript{8} It was designed to train conservation extension officers and it was also intended to start agricultural schools to enable boys to matriculate in agriculture. Other formal

\textsuperscript{4} Natal Mercury, 29 June 1974, p.28.
\textsuperscript{5} O. Sithole, Policy Speech of Policy Statement – Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Ulundi, 28 March 1997.
\textsuperscript{6} J.S. Hadebe, Esikhawini, 10 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{7} B.E. Mthethwa, Msinga, 13 January 2005.
\textsuperscript{8} E.T. Xolo, Policy Speech of Policy Statement – Minister of Works, Ulundi, 19 May 1977.
training centers, to which men and women went for short courses in husbandry, mixed farming, sugar culture, irrigation, and selected other fields, were also established. These centers were staffed by Zulu and the cost was met by the KwaZulu Government. But KwaZulu complained that the shortage of finance and shortage of skilled manpower to undertake meaningful agricultural training within KwaZulu created an imbalance of training effort between KwaZulu and Natal.

Secondly, KwaZulu was disadvantaged in one of the most basic elements of development, namely, access. This alone made the continued separation of the Natal and KwaZulu administrations work to the disadvantage of the latter, and this had a negative effect on agricultural progress. Since KwaZulu had many areas that were inaccessible by road and since it had the largest share of the province’s population with a general shortage of basic needs, the bargaining powers of the KwaZulu Government were curtailed by the lack of natural location advantages. The physical differences between KwaZulu and Natal alone established the basis for a co-peripheral relationship between the two areas.

There was no equity in terms of the distribution of resources between KwaZulu and Natal. It was vitally important that legislation affecting farmers was streamlined and equally applied. A crucial example was the Soil Conservation Act. There was an urgent need to apply the incentives and constraints of this Act both in KwaZulu and Natal. There was no need of applying it in one area without doing the same in the other. Resources available to farmers in KwaZulu and Natal were substantially different. There was a serious need to develop the agricultural potential of KwaZulu because it was under-productive.

Nevertheless, general schemes were devised by the Corporation for Economic Development for improving the quality of stock and the setting up of marketing facilities. By the mid 1970’s there were two major irrigation schemes in operation. One was in the Msinga district of the Mooi River, the other was the Bululwane

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11 Ibid., p. 145.
scheme in the Nongoma district. A third scheme, the Jozini scheme was the subject of controversy and was not yet in operation. This scheme would be fed by the Strijdom Dam which closed a gorge between the Lebombo and Ubombo mountains.\textsuperscript{13} The area to be irrigated was occupied only by blacks, but the consolidation plans made public in 1972 suggested that the area be divided between white and black. In the consolidation plans represented to the South African Parliament in 1975, it was agreed that Jozini would be a black area.\textsuperscript{14}

Although until 1975, farming in KwaZulu was still for subsistence, progress was made in improving yields of the staple crop, maize, and the standard of livestock was being raised. The most important cash crop was sugar, the value of which was closed to four million rand in 1974. In 1978 the South African Sugar Association did much to assist black cane-growers and initially made five million rand available in loans for this purpose. Unfortunately some farmers could not benefit from such arrangement due to politics of that time.\textsuperscript{15}

In order to improve soil usage in Northern Zululand, sisal and phormium tenax were grown more widely. Cotton was becoming an important cash crop and cashew nuts were also grown. Drift lands were reclaimed on the coast and increasing attention was paid to forestry.\textsuperscript{16}

KwaZulu had good agricultural potential supported by the rainfall and the fertile soil. For this reason the Republic looked to the province for an increase in food production and greater productivity in agriculture generally. However the KwaZulu areas were under the greatest stress from overpopulation and it was precisely in these areas where the potential for increased production was greatest.\textsuperscript{17} A massive rural development program was required along with planned urbanization in order to increase agricultural productivity and reduce the population pressure on the

\textsuperscript{13} Zululand Observer, 16 March 1976, p.13.
\textsuperscript{14} B. Temkin, “Gasha Buthelezi : Zulu Stageman,” p.182.
\textsuperscript{15} Killie Campbell Collection: Paper Presented by Chief Minister of KwaZulu to the Urban Foundation Workshop, 10 August 1978, p.15.
\textsuperscript{16} Zululand Observer, 10 September 1979, p.21.
\textsuperscript{17} The Buthelezi Commission – The Requirement for Stability and Development in KwaZulu and Natal, vol. 1, p.149.
land. Critically important in rural development was the provision of infrastructure and services to back up the development of human potential.

In his Annual Report (1981 – 1982), the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry pointed out that the previous year was fairly disappointing due to the drought conditions that prevailed. However there was a remarkable improvement on the 1980/81 period in terms of climatic conditions. The Department’s budget had to be revised to provide additional water supplies for both human and stock consumption. “We relied on private contractors to help out with the drilling program: This was due to the Departmental drilling team being unable to cope with the drastically increased demands”, 18 he said. In 1982 the KwaZulu Water Development Fund provided invaluable assistance by drilling and equipping some 60 bore holes.

The KwaZulu Cane Growers produced more than one million tons of sugarcane. In times of optimum conditions these growers had the potential to improve on this yield by a significant margin. 19 The department continued with the construction of dams, irrigation systems and communication infrastructure. Remarkable improvements were made in the Msinga district and various cane growing areas. Development work of the department was hampered by lack of funds and trained staff. Additional skilled staff and finance were needed to alleviate this problem.

In 1982 the Department of Agriculture and Forestry facilitated its administrative control in KwaZulu by dividing the area into four regions, each region under the control of the Regional Director. 20 The regions were further divided into districts controlled by senior officers. The regions in question were Umzansi, Ogwini, Mabedlana and Empangeni.

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20 The Post, 16 February 1982, p.22.
DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE IN KWAZULU, 1980-1981
The Umzansi Region had a regional office in Pietermaritzburg. Its districts were Izingolweni (South Port Shepstone/Harding) Umzumbe (Umzinto/north Port Shepstone), Umbumbulu (Umzinto/Isopo/Highflats) and Hlanganani (Bulwer /Impendle/Himeville).

The regional office for the Ogwini Region was at Eshowe. It comprised the following districts: Ndwedwe, Maphumulo, Inkanyazi (Eshowe), Ongoye (Mthunzini), Enseleni (Empangeni/Mthonjaneni) and Nkandla.

The Mbedlana Region had a regional office in Nongoma. It comprised Mahlabathini, Nongoma, Hlabisa, Ubombo, Ingwavuma and Simdlangentsha (Paul Pietersburg/Piet Retief) districts.

The regional office for the Mpandleni Region was in Pietermaritzburg. Its districts were at Emnambithi (Ladysmith), Okhahlamba (Escourt/Bergville), Madadeni (Newcastle) Nquthu and Msinga.\(^2\)

The various divisions within the department were Agriculture, Agricultural Engineering, Veterinary Services, Forestry, Nature Conservation and Training. As pointed out above, the Department also had the Cwaka Agricultural College near Empangeni which offered diploma courses in Agriculture, Nature Conservation, Animal Health and Home Economics.

Whereas the KwaZulu Government budget increased by 32, 5% the Department’s budget increased by only 18, 1%. The following table summarizes changes in the budget from the years 1980 - 82.\(^2\)

**Allocation of Departmental funds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budget year 80/81</th>
<th>Budget year 81/82</th>
<th>81/82% of total expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries, wages &amp; allowances</td>
<td>4 932 134</td>
<td>6 246 400</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural planning &amp; development</td>
<td>2 705 089</td>
<td>2 691 430</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) S. Khanyile, Durban, 23 January 2005.

| Forest management & utilization | 328 208 | 359 400 | 1,9 |
| Agricultural engineering services | 2 089 492 | 2 261 770 | 11,7 |
| Flora & fauna (nature cons) | 67 764 | 65 000 | 0,3 |
| Training centres | 147 506 | 182 000 | 0,9 |
| Machinery /equipment & tools | 4 233 696 | 4 977 000 | 25,6 |
| Transport | 1 151 664 | 1 380 000 | 7,1 |
| Drought relief | 413 332 | - | |
| Other | 362 732 | 1 249 500 | 6,4 |
| **TOTAL** | 16 431 617 | 19 413 200 | 100,00 |

**This represented 6% of the total budget**

In 1982 the Department of Agriculture and Forestry had 934 posts, 69 of which were still filled by seconded officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development. One noteworthy change was that in previous years the seconded staff numbered 90, the reduction allowing for more Zulus to fill the posts. Commendable strides were made in the agricultural field as far as staff was concerned. There were eight principal agricultural officers compared to four in the previous years. In the forestry division, a Zulu Regional Forester in the Umzansi Region had taken over from a seconded officer.23

Two Zulu professional officers were sent to the United States to attend the Humphrey Fellows Program through Scholarship awarded by the American Consulate. After completing the course, one of them enrolled in a Masters degree in Public Administration at the West Virginia University. One Stock Inspector was granted a scholarship by the Berea College in Kentucky USA to do a B. Agricultural degree. A Zulu Senior Technician of the Department returned from Bari in Italy, where he obtained a Specialist Postgraduate Diploma at the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies – his results being very good.24

In 1983 the Department sent a professional officer to study for a veterinary (MBVCH) degree, having obtained good results for his BSc. (Agric) degree. There was a good chance that he would be successful and thereby become the first Zulu Veterinary Surgeon. Six students at Fort Hare University also studied for degrees in


Agriculture. Apart from the four Agricultural officers already mentioned, the following promotions were made: 1 person to senior stock inspector, 1 person to stock inspector grade 1, 8 people to stock Inspector grade II, 10 people to agricultural officer grade 1, 49 people to agricultural officer grade II, 6 people to forester grade I, five people to forester grade II, 3 people to senior clerk and 4 people to clerk grade I.\(^\text{25}\)

Drought was experienced throughout the Mabedlana region in 1982, resulting in the majority of crops producing well below average yields. The average rainfall for the whole region was approximately 555 mm for the year. The rainfall in the Umzansi region was also below average. Severe drought conditions prevailed in the Umgeni and Umkhomazi valley where no crops were harvested. The majority of the remaining areas were able to reap crops but this was as a result of early planting and better management practices. Mpandleni had sufficient rainfall, especially in the high lying parts in the summer months. The result of good rains was made visible by improved crops yields. The Ogwini received very little rain in the summer months when rain was needed most.\(^\text{26}\)

In 1982 production estimates relating to various crop types found in KwaZulu are presented in the following table:\(^\text{27}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>DRYLAND</th>
<th>IRRIGATED LAND</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>Yield (1000 kg)</td>
<td>Area (ha)</td>
<td>Yield (1000 kg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>140 000</td>
<td>105 000</td>
<td>1 600</td>
<td>1 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>26 000</td>
<td>6 600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry beans</td>
<td>16 500</td>
<td>6 500</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low peas</td>
<td>2 846</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njungo beans</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>6 200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet Potatoes</td>
<td>3 800</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>2 660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madumbe</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>15 642</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1 800</td>
<td>22 600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground nuts</td>
<td>3 200</td>
<td>1 800</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineapple</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1 734</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{27}\) Annual Report 1981-1982, KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, pp.5-6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Produce</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>130 000</td>
<td>9 900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilet</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>2 600</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>695 495</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>45 400</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24 152</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1 255</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>93 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phormium</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>63 040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wattle</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>8 640</td>
<td>175 189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1 425</td>
<td>175 189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1983, KwaZulu had three co-operatives, namely, the Nala, Ikhwezi and Dellville. Mismanagement and lack of advice in the Nala co-operative resulted in poor functioning. For example, by December 1983 the deficit in the balance sheet of R 9 500 as at June decreased by a net trading surplus of R6 000 for six months, namely June to December. The financial position was precarious with relatively large sums owed to creditors. Contrary to Nala, the Ikhwezi co-operative saw a vast improvement with sales of R96 000 and an improvement in the net current assets of R5 000. The Dellville co-operative did not have such a large turnover during 1983 as in 1982. The sales fell by a relatively small R37 000 and the net surplus remained the same with the net current assets increasing five-fold. Dellville co-operative became the first black homelands co-operative to declare a dividend to its members. An amount of R10 000 was paid out. There were two other new co-operatives to be registered in December 1983, namely Zenzeleni in the Simandlangentsha district near Paulpietersburg and Thembalethu in the Nquthu district. These co-operatives promised to render valuable agricultural services to the community.

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GRAPH SHOWING AGRICULTURE TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KWAZULU DURING 1972 - 1990
The 1983 drought had a negative impact on agricultural progress in KwaZulu. The area was plagued by water shortages, with the result that resources were stretched to the limit in an attempt to meet the demands. To add to the problem, cholera broke out, firstly in Ngwavuma and then spread southwards. Safe water supplies assumed higher priority. In order to try and satisfy the water needs, bore hole drilling continued unabated. More than 200 boreholes were drilled and equipped on contract whilst the departmentally owned and operated drilling machine also had considerable success. In the northern areas, where the water table is relatively near the surface, teams of departmental personnel and local people were digging wells, which were then concrete-lined and fitted with hand pumps.

In 1984 the agricultural division received good assistance from the KwaZulu Water Development Fund, which drilled and equipped more than eighty bore holes. This division and the fund administrators worked closely together in order to coordinate efforts for maximum efficiency. An alarming fact brought to the attention of the divisional heads, was that certain groups of people were washing themselves as well as their clothes in drinking water reservoirs. A further distressing fact was that people were lifting manhole covers and throwing refuse into the reservoirs. These deplorable actions were carried out in spite of the efforts made by staff in the agricultural engineering division and the Department of Health and Welfare. Such incidents were not the rule but they occurred frequently enough to be of concern. It should be pointed out that more time devoted to attending these problems, the less time was available for providing more facilities.

Although in 1984 climatic conditions improved in many parts of KwaZulu, there were many districts that were badly affected by the drought, e.g. Madadeni, Msinga and Nquthu. Cattle in these areas were in poor health, with conditions becoming worse in winter. As far as diseases were concerned, there were two causal problems, namely rabies and sheep scab. Due to the good response with regard to rabies, there was a marked drop in the numbers of positive cases, except in the Ogwini region and in the Msinga district. Sheep scab presented a problem in spite

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of all kinds of disciplinary actions being taken.\textsuperscript{30}

As pointed out above, for most of the KwaZulu areas, there were very few positive cases of rabies except for Eshowe and Msinga districts. To make matters worse, people in these areas were reluctant to bring their dogs in for inoculations. Rabies simmered in the Eshowe district in spite of a very good response to the inoculation campaign.\textsuperscript{31}

The Department of Veterinary services was responsible for foot and mouth disease control along the international boundary and along the Ingwavuma Maputo Internal Fence. This control covered a distance of 132 km, which was patrolled by 28 guards who maintained the fence and guarded the gates. Cattle sold at the Bhambanana and Pelindaba sale kraals adjoining the fence area were quarantined for 30 days after the sale. Damage to the fence by migrant elephants remained a problem.\textsuperscript{32} Although there were no cases of anthrax reported inoculation figures remained unsatisfactory.

In KwaZulu horses were used less as a means of transport than in other parts and these animals therefore played a very small part in the spreading of diseases. No cases of dourine were reported. Cases of lumpy skin disease were reported but there were no serious outbreaks. Sheep scab appeared to be a perennial problem within many parts of KwaZulu. Due to the fact that sheep were kept for meat and not wool, dipping campaigns would not be successful unless the chiefs co-operated and punished the owners for not dipping. Unfortunately scab-infected sheep were introduced to the Izingolweni district from the adjoining Transkei district and as a result a serious outbreak was reported. In 1985 scab was also reported in Madadeni district. Unfortunately its origin could not be determined.

White scours, coccidiosis and parathyroid were widespread. Malnutrition was one of the causes of these problems. Calves were competing with owners for milk and as a result were usually undernourished. This reduced their resistance to sicknesses

\textsuperscript{30} S. Ngobese, Empangeni, 2 March 2005.
\textsuperscript{32} P. Khumalo, Ndumo, 11 January 2005.
such as worm infestation. Many cows showed photosensitization as a result of eating Lantana. This occurred in spite of plenty of grazing. Internal parasites remained a problem amongst calves, lambs and kids. The use of acaricides reduced the problem of ticks in KwaZulu.33

In spite of problems encountered, good progress was made in the forestry section. The establishment of wood lots as demonstration plots was started in the early 80s, but due to goats not being kept out, extensive damage was caused. The wattle survey progressed reasonable well. A long term pine pulpwod contract was negotiated with SAPPI (a paper industry at Mandini near uThukela River) which provided for annual negotiations regarding price revision. Another contract was signed with the Natal Co-operative Timber Co. for the purchase of the pulp wood at Manzengwenya and Mbazwana. A mining timber contract for Eucalyptus Grandis was also negotiated.34

Due to lack of rain in many parts of KwaZulu, reforestation and regeneration were severely curtailed. Although rainfall was sufficient in a few isolated areas, the dry conditions did not give rise to serious fires. The few small fires that occurred were quickly contained. Black contractors continued to present considerable problems at Sokhulu and Nhlabane. A number of these contractors worked well, but then suddenly disappeared, leaving felled timber in the burnt areas. Among the opened tenders, black contractors were the lowest, but often failed to provide any form of guarantee despite an extension of time.35 The treating plant at Mbazwana was plagued by a pump problem which was eventually sorted out. Due to an inadequate electricity supply, two generating units were on order. The swuarthop plant also experienced problems, thus preventing it from being fully operational. The sawing timber sold to Bulwer Timbers exceeded the estimated volume in 1983. The wattle survey in black areas was satisfactory but time was wasted due to the izinduna and growers not keeping appointments.

33 The Citizen. 21 May 1983, p.31.
34 S. Mhlyane, KwaSokhulu, 9 January 2005.
No problem was encountered in obtaining labour, with the exception of Qudeni, where the turnover of labour was high at the time. The Department, unfortunately, had little choice when selecting candidates for the forestry diploma as the number of applicants were minimal. B Sc. Forestry candidates were non-existent due to the fact that mathematics and science were pre-requisites for enrolment. In as far as safety was concerned, serious efforts were made to minimize danger, but unfortunately two accidents occurred in 1986. At Bulwer a tree fell on a labourer, causing him to break a leg, whilst a chainsaw operator cut his hand at Mbazwane, causing him to lose flexibility in one of his hands.

Access roads to all Zululand plantations were in poor condition. The only solution to this problem was to employ private contractors to effect major repairs to these roads. The postal and telephone services remained extremely poor in almost all centres. A new short wave system was installed in 1984 with the hope of improving the long distance communication. Solar chargers were also purchased for charging lookout tower batteries. Although the tractor position remained satisfactory, the number of usable vehicles remained unsatisfactory. Long delays were experienced before vehicles were replaced.

Arrangements were made for study leave for staff members to attend universities and technikons. The number completing an agricultural degree course in the forestry section at Fort Hare University was very low but there was hope that the University of Zululand would introduce such courses. In 1982 one staff member had completed a course in co-operative management at the University of Zululand. Close liaison was maintained with the training section of the Public Service Commission in Ulundi. Training records of all staff were updated on the Kalamazoo system for easy reference.

In one selected area of Nkandla, Thalaneni, a system of community development projects was instituted with 40 farmers. This project, based on an
area of 3 hectare (2 hectare maize and 1 hectare potatoes), proved a great success. In 1982 over 30 tons of potatoes were harvested and sold as seed, and nearly 4 tons per hectare of maize was harvested. The whole community was involved and this worked so well that four additional projects were planned in the Inkandla district for the following season.\textsuperscript{39}

Visits were made to field staff within the work situation and a system of work forecast programmes was introduced in all four regions. This enabled the officer to plan his work in advance in order to obtain a clear idea of his extension objectives. All five training centres and four regional officers were equipped with slide projectors and tape recording machines to enable them to produce their own slide programmes. A new resource centre was under construction at Cwaka Agricultural College to produce material for all regions.

With the help of the Agricultural Division, crop calendars were drawn up and printed for use by all field staff. Supervision manuals for induction as well as courses were printed together with three volumes on various aspects of training for KwaZulu. Radio programmes were rescheduled and improved. Later on they included instructive talks on farming in addition to farming discussion programmes. A weekly agricultural news broadcast later became part of the programme.\textsuperscript{40}

The Cwaka Agricultural College continued with its two year diploma courses in agriculture, animal health, agriculture home economics and nature conservation. The total number of students up to December 1981 was 139. All 64 of the second-year students succeeded in obtaining their diplomas.

Details are as follows:-

- Diploma in agriculture: 23
- Diploma in Agricultural Home Economics: 20
- Diploma in Animal Health: 19
- Diploma in Nature Conservation 02

\textsuperscript{39} Annual Report 1981-1982, KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, p.34.
\textsuperscript{40} S. Ngobese, Empangeni, 2 March 2005.
This was the first year in which female students completing the course in Agricultural Home Economics qualified. Of the 75 first year students, 24 failed to pass in the second year for various reasons.41

Early in 1982, the State Veterinary Officer, Dr. H. Dayson, left the Cwaka College to take up an appointment in the Transvaal, leaving Dr. P. Benningfield of the Civic Action to look after the Veterinary Division of the College. These officers made their mark by starting off a new development in KwaZulu, namely the introduction of livestock clinics in the adjacent areas of Cwaka, thereby doing a great deal to help farmers. Mrs. S. Ndlouv, formerly Miss S. Mtshali, joined the division of Agricultural Home Economics at the College in March 1981 as professional officer but unfortunately left again in December 1981 to join the staff of Ongoye University (the University of Zululand). According to Mr. J. Hadebe of the Cwaka College, this was a great loss to the institution. The Agricultural Home Economics Division at the college was later also joined by Miss M. Mathemjwa, a former student of the college. Mr. D.I Xulu, Professional Officer: Animal Husbandry joined the General Agriculture Division of the College in January, 1982.42 These are a few amongst many lecturers who made the remarkable contribution to the college.

The lecturing staff did not confine their training to college students only. They made a great contribution to visiting schools (Primary and Secondary) in the whole of KwaZulu by lecturing to pupils on various topics in Agriculture. Schools involved in excursions included those that offered Agricultural Science in their syllabus as a subject. A total of seven schools with a total number of 1 008 pupils visited the college in 1983.

The 20 students who graduated in Agricultural Home Economics in 1981 became the agricultural officers in Home Economics. At the beginning of 1982, twenty nine students were accepted for the second course to be run. Two of the qualified diplomats became lecturers. Home Economics advisors continued their good work

41 J.S. Hadebe, Esikhawini, 10 May 2004.
42 S. Ngobese, Empangeni, 2 March 2005.
in various regions, for example:
UMzansi: Mrs. B. Ndlovu and Mrs. P. Shangase
Ogwinini: Miss. S. Buthelezi and Mrs. C. Hawes
Mabedlana: Mrs. Z. Mthembu.\textsuperscript{43}

Their work consisted of working with people at grassroots level and included visiting various women's clubs. The club members, in turn, taught other club members by means of lectures and demonstrations in subjects such as nutrition, food preparation (cookery), health and hygiene, budgeting, needlework and other handicrafts. Shows on both district and regional levels were organized and were always very well supported by the local people.\textsuperscript{44} The major problem of the rural women seemed to be a lack of a market for the sale of their products.

Another group of qualified Diplomats from the College started working as extension officers throughout the four regions in KwaZulu, each region having four or five officers. The newly qualified officers had a slightly different function. These agricultural officers trained in Home Economics encouraged the formation of community vegetable gardens and taught the rural women about matters such as vegetable growing, poultry-keeping etc. In the home economics part of the work, the emphasis shifted to nutrition and cookery (food preparation) and away from needlework and handwork.

The rural women showed tremendous enthusiasm for the combined agricultural and home economics services. Their response was so good that the Department of Agriculture was requested to train more officers at a quicker rate, and the Cwaka College had to play a pivotal role in this regard.

In 1986 more than R2 million was paid to growers in KwaZulu for the timber they supplied. This record was attributed to the success of the Project Grow, which encouraged the planting of trees in rural areas of KwaZulu. Project Grow was a combined effort of the Gencor Development Trust, Sappi and the KwaZulu

\textsuperscript{43} Zululand Observer, 13 April 1983, p.15.
\textsuperscript{44} P. Mkhwanazi, Mabhuyeni, 30 September 2005.
Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The first tree seedlings were planted in 1983 on an area of land 8 hectare in extent. Since then, more than 400 people in KwaZulu rural areas, all with their own woodlots, participated in Projects Grow. About 600 ha of land was involved by the end of 1987.

Sappi sent an extension forester to liaise with the Amakhosi and potential growers in an effort to recruit more growers. The forester inspected their lands and taught the how to prepare for the growing and planting of the seedlings. The participants in Project Grow were financed through loans at various stages. Buthelezi, expressed sincere appreciation to Gencor and Sappi for monitoring Project Grow. At a meeting with Gencor executives at Ulundi, he said, “the poorest of the poor frequently are so desperate, they want instant gratification. Project Grow demonstrates that the poor can be involved in gratification which is not instant”.

Livestock auction sales in KwaZulu improved remarkably, with cattle to the value of R486 790 offered for sale during 1987. According to the Market Liaison Officer of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry who specialized in livestock, Mr. Mahaye, the purpose of the Auctions was to make farmers aware of the economic advantages for proper animal breeding. “Properly-bred animal bring in good money”, he said. Auctioneering company KwaZulu Stockowners was appointed by the Department to sell the cattle on behalf of owners. The company consisted of the tri-partnership of the stockowner, KwaZulu citizenship and the KFC. The farmer or the sellers benefited from selling at auctions due to the following reasons:

- They were protected from speculators who do not pay
- Stock sellers attracted large numbers of buyers which ensured a good price
- Police were present to prevent theft
- In KwaZulu, the buyers paid a commission of six percent whereas at white auction sales paid the commission of four percent

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45 *Umnoxi*, vol. 1, 1988, p.22. “Money to be made on trees”.
46 Ibid., p.23. “Livestock sale encouraged good breeding”
• In addition to the selling and buying of livestock, the auction served as a social
gathering, attracting people from far afield.47
Improved agricultural production had to be accompanied by the availability of
marketing channels and other essential or auxiliary services. The KwaZulu
Development Plan had recommended the establishment of buying and marketing
coop-eratives and the training of Zulu farmers in the aims, methods and
procedures of agricultural co-op-eratives. Another recommendation was for the
establishment of a land bank which would finance the long term requirements of
the Zulu farmers.48 At the grass root level there was a need for savings clubs and
credit unions which would encouraged savings among rural people and also
mobilize these savings so as to provide them with capital for short term needs, such
as loans.49 In this connection it is encouraging to learn that one of the churches in
KwaZulu was already training Zulu peasants in methods and philosophy of savings
club and credit unions in 1985.50 Also the Inkatha Yenkulu-leko Yesizwe sent two
young man to the Coady International Institute at Canada to learn about credit
unions and co-op-eratives.51 On their return these young men made a huge
contribution in the rural areas of KwaZulu.

In 1989 a group of Christians operating under the auspices of the African Co-
op-erative Action Trust (ACAT) in agricultural development in KwaZulu, came
forward to offer its assistance to the KwaZulu Government.52 Among other things
ACAT wanted to introduce, promote and control savings clubs throughout KwaZulu
in order to enable people to improve themselves and develop their community.53
The KwaZulu Government agreed that ACAT be permitted to work in the KwaZulu
areas provided that it liaises with the Department of Agriculture and Forestry.54

Assistance also came from the National Co-operative Dairies Limited who agreed

47 P. Mzolo, Mhubatube, 5 March 2005.
48 Killie Campbell Collection, Ref 293: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1985, p.74.
50 Sunday Times, 21 June 1986, p.16.
51 Killie Campbell Collection, Ref 293: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1985, p.79.
52 Financial Mail, 13 June 1989, p.17.
53 Natal Mercury, 28 September 1989, p.11.
54 M.G. Buthelezi: Policy Speech, Fifth Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1989, p.27.
to form a tripartnership with the KwaZulu Development Corporation and KwaZulu citizens. Its objectives were as follows:

- To take over and develop the existing Clover Dairies activities in KwaZulu.
- To assist its dairy farmer members through the provision of trading and extension services.
- To assist the KwaZulu Government in any project involving the establishment of a primary Dairy Industry in KwaZulu.
- To make available to Zulus the know how and expertise built up by the National Co-operative Dairies Limited over the years through the creation of employment opportunities coupled with appropriate training.  

In September 1989 the South African Sugar Association created a fund of R20 000 000 for the purpose of providing financial assistance to small Zulu cane growers in order to improve and develop their efficiency and productivity. This fund was called the Small Cane Growers Financial Aid Fund and was administered by the Association’s Small Cane Growers Affairs Department. The fund was operated on a revolving credit basis. This means that financial assistance to individuals was made available on a loan basis only, in order that interest and redemption might be utilized to provide further assistance. The Sugar Association’s financial aid scheme for small Zulu cane growers received the approval of the KwaZulu Cabinet and the active co-operation and assistance of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry.  

There were two main Agricultural Development projects in Maputaland and the Makhathini flats in the northern areas of KwaZulu. One project was for the large scale production of sugar cane and the other project was for the production of cassava. Both products were used to manufacture ethanol. These projects were labour intensive as regard to field cultivators, the cartage of sugar cane and cassava, as well as the processing at their respective mills. The sugar cane and

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cassava projects in the northern areas of KwaZulu provided an excellent opportunity for a model of rural development in KwaZulu.\textsuperscript{59}

KwaZulu had resources and raw materials for the making of dairy product such as cheese, butter, varieties of jam, canned beef and product from horns and skin and for the milling of grain.\textsuperscript{60} Within KwaZulu areas there were suitable climatic and soil conditions whereby the raw materials for these agro-industries could be produced.\textsuperscript{61} In order that these industries could get started and be maintained, capital investment and managerial personnel would have to come from the private sector on the basis that would be agreed upon between the white entrepreneurs and the KwaZulu Government.\textsuperscript{62}

In order to ensure optimum use of available agricultural resources, tribal areas which accepted planning were divided into residential, arable and grazing areas, using a natural resource as a data base.\textsuperscript{63} In 1991 Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi pointed out that the objective of such planning was to obtain economically viable agricultural production.\textsuperscript{64}

In 1993 the female agricultural officers in KwaZulu were endeavoring to improve the general standard of living of the Zulu people, through better food production, and nutrition. They taught female farmers by demonstrating poultry keeping, budgeting, preparing and presenting food. The officers further demonstrated cheap and nutritive ways of preparing food, care of the family and handicraft.\textsuperscript{65}

It should be emphasized, however, that agriculture could not provide a solution to KwaZulu Homeland development problems in the period 1972 – 1994, not because Zulu peasants were bad farmers, but because of the fundamental issue of highly

\textsuperscript{59} Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 554: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1990, p.134.
\textsuperscript{60} Zululand Observer, 22 May 1990, p.24.
\textsuperscript{62} Natal Mercury, 20 July 1991, p.17.
\textsuperscript{63} Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 554: KwaZulu Government Diary, 1990, p.179.
\textsuperscript{64} M.G. Buthelezi: Policy Speech, Third Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1991, p.39.
\textsuperscript{65} Natal Witness, 14 May 1993, p.19.
unequal distribution of the land in South Africa. The shortage of land and capital
was a threat to agricultural progress in KwaZulu Homeland. The KwaZulu cabinet
was alert to this fact. It was to initiate and sponsor a financial aid programme for
farmers, which entailed making Agriculture compulsory subject in all schools and
establishing a number of agricultural technical high schools in the Homeland.
Unfortunately some of these dreams and promises were never fulfilled. However,
the KwaZulu Government was successful in developing several pilot schemes in
many areas and managed to provide roads, water supplies and other facilities that
benefited agriculture.
CHAPTER 4
Commerce and Industry

It was realized that development of the homelands could not depend exclusively on the agricultural sector. As a result, the Corporation for Economic Development was established in 1959 to encourage homeland industrial and commercial development. The Corporation soon assumed various responsibilities, including the granting of loans to blacks in order to enable them to establish themselves in businesses of various kinds. Loans were granted to manufacturers, operators of bus services and dealers, including butchers, café proprietors and bottle store owners. Applications were carefully investigated since loans were granted with limited security and, in spite of official guidance and advice, the risk was high.¹ Such scrutiny caused homeland leaders to complain about the control over homeland development maintained by the Government-appointed corporations.

The Tomlinson Commission’s recommendation that white entrepreneurs be allowed into the homelands to assist in establishing industries there and on their borders was finally acceded to in 1968 with the passing of the promotion of Economic Development of Homelands Act, No.46 of 1968. This act enabled white investors to set up concerns in the homelands on an agency basis, and concessions available in homeland growth points were slightly more advantageous than those offered in border industrial areas. In KwaZulu the main selected growth point was Isithebe, near Mandeni, situated about half-way between Durban and Richard’s Bay, where key white personnel were housed. In 1973, the Minister of Plural Relations and Development, Mr M.C. Botha indicated that large sums of money had been allocated to the area. In 1975 it was reported that Isithebe had been partly developed by the Bantu Investment Corporation at a cost of R3 million, while a lesser amount was supplied by foreign investors.²

In his policy speech to the Legislative Assembly in May 1976, Buthelezi had the following to say about KwaZulu industrial development: “At Isithebe industrial area,

12 industries providing employment for 61 whites and 883 blacks have been established. This industrial estate is being increased four-fold so as to accommodate more industries in the near future. In the rest of KwaZulu, 8 industries providing employment for 23 whites and 1,152 blacks have been established. Ezakheri, near Ladysmith, has been approved as an industrial growth point and more industries will in due course arise there. Other growth points are being investigated. The development of industries in KwaZulu is essential to provide employment and incomes for the Zulu people. It was anticipated that Ulundi, the new capital, would provide industrial potential in the heart of KwaZulu, together with the new railway line that linked it to Richard's Bay 144 kilometers away. The port, which cost Pretoria R252 million, was officially opened on 1 April 1976. In a speech in New York, Buthelezi spoke briefly about industrial development in KwaZulu. He remarked as follows at the time: “We will be delighted if foreign firms will come and set up industries at Ulundi, the new capital. In this way you will help to uplift our black people by generating rising per capital income and work opportunities for them.” Unfortunately no industries developed at Ulundi.

On 9 August 1974, Buthelezi opened the Empangeni Brick and Cement Works, a new enterprise which had been built in the KwaZulu area. In the course of his address, he mentioned some aspects of economic development and private investment in KwaZulu and posed the question: “Why should white South Africa assist KwaZulu with its economic development?” He answered the rhetorical question as follows: “The simplest answer to the question is a moral one: that it is only right for those who have to share with those who have not.”

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KwaZulu did not have a department of Industry and Commerce, and control over industrial policy rested with white authorities, particularly with the corporations. KwaZulu had little influence over corporate decisions, except in granting of trading rights to enable Africans to establish businesses. Buthelezi was concerned about this: “We find it difficult,” he explained, “to have a corporation if it is not going to have industrial and agricultural functions”.6 Viewers at that time pointed out that Pretoria was against homeland control of industrial development on an agency basis, and also against homeland control of agricultural and transport development. The reason given for this related to an apparent insufficiency of experts in these fields, which, in turn precluded the homeland from having its own expert officers and advisors. Control then would remain with Pretoria and the homeland would take over the functions of the Corporation of Economic Development. This implied that it would arrange housing loans and loans to businesses in tripartite agreements. It would have control only over commercial enterprises and small-scale endeavours. Buthelezi was reluctant to accept such a compromise and believed that the KwaZulu homeland deserved greater control over development.7 He believed that the claim of insufficient expertise to assist the homeland was an example of politically-motivated thinking, and that he could find the developers to do the job if only he had more control. He believed that developers could be brought in from elsewhere, perhaps even on short-term contracts.

On 1 April 1978, the KwaZulu Development Corporation came into operation.8 It had an R18 million budget for its first year. Although the KwaZulu Government had no shares (the South African Bantu Trust was the only shareholder), it appointed 50% of the board members. All the Zulu were the members of the Legislative Assembly. Decisions made for KwaZulu in the past by the Corporation for Economic Development would now be taken by the local board, without reference to Pretoria. The KwaZulu Corporation would derive its money from the Bantu Trust, from funds generated by itself, and from loan capital. Its functions would be largely

7 The Post, 16 March 1976, p.11.
8 Natal Mercury, 7 April 1978, p.15.
commercial but would include the establishment of small-scale industries and the financing of small farmers. The 3 major spheres of development, namely transport, agriculture and establishment of large-scale industry, continued to be controlled by the Pretoria-based Corporation for Development which allocated R27 million in 1978 to these projects.

Buthelezi issued a press statement in which it was disclosed that the KwaZulu Economic Liaison Committee had been established. Serving on the committee were the President of the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, together with two members of that body, as well as the tutorial manager of the Bantu Investment Corporation and one of his staff. The main object of this committee was to ensure that the KwaZulu business community would be informed timeously of what the Bantu Investment Corporation was doing. If there was anything to which they wanted to object, or any project in which they wished to participate, they would have the information to act in time.9

Information about KwaZulu Transport Holdings, presented a problem to Buthelezi in regard to transport development.10 Existing private companies were given shares in this holding company and new companies became subsidiaries. Shareholding was restricted to Zulu, Zulu citizens, black businessmen other than Zulu resident in KwaZulu, while the Corporation for Economic Development retained the majority of shares in what Buthelezi called his “transport conglomerate”. Development plans in KwaZulu included the acceptance of tripartite agreements between the KwaZulu Government, black shareholders and the South African retail companies. These companies were to operate in KwaZulu in conjunction with the KwaZulu Government and the KwaZulu Investment Corporation. This was approved by the Minister of Plural Relations and Development and was accepted by the Inkatha Liberation Movement.11

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11 Sunday Tribune, 24 August 1975, p.36.
Tripartite companies brought a rapid change to development, as KwaZulu was enabled to generate its own business community. In 1977 the KwaZulu cabinet approved 20 tripartite projects and 46 companies were already in operation in 1978. These schemes offered several advantages, including job opportunities and training, from counter hands to managing and company directors. The first tripartite agreement was signed in Pretoria on 26 July 1976 by Buthelezi, Dr Adendorff of the Corporation for Economic Development, and three large business houses. The contract made provision for a phasing out of white interests in a tripartite company over a period of time mutually agreed to, usually about 10 years. Buthelezi made a valid political statement in replying to criticism on the tripartite issue: “I want one thing to be understood,” he said, “I do not believe there will ever be an all-Black KwaZulu. People all over the world are interdependent, and there will always be people of different race groups in KwaZulu”.

Land tenure was one of the problems encountered by entrepreneurs in KwaZulu. Land was allocated for unspecified periods by the chief and headmen. This was at variance with the requirements of a developing industrial country. The KwaZulu Executive Committee appointed a Commission on Land Ownership and Utilization to study the land tenure system with the view of finding an acceptable compromise. Regarding the land tenure in growth points, the KwaZulu Government preferred to consider an agency agreement of 99 years as opposed to 25-year agreements signed by the Department of Plural Relations.

The Government’s final blueprint for territorial boundaries of black homelands involved more than 1 million hectares. It also entailed moving more than 200 000 people from land they were occupying for settlement within boundaries determined for them. This affected and traumatized the lives of the people, but nothing

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15 KwaZulu Government Service, Department of Authority Affairs and Finance: Third Session for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, File 6/5, 1978.
16 S.H. Ntuli: History of the Mthiyane People who were removed from Richards Bay to Nyamitshane (Unpublished B.A. Honours Dissertation, University of Zululand), pp.10-12.
mattered as long as the state achieved its goals of establishing industries for its own benefits. For example, the economic potential of Richards Bay (originally called Madlanzini) resulted in the founding of modern harbour and the establishment of many industries. Yet, this was accomplished at the expense of the Mthiyane people, who were moved from this area to the arid land of Ntambanana reserve. This removal was one of the largest undertakings in bringing industrial development to Richards Bay.

It is worth noting that white entrepreneurs were encouraged to establish factories on the borders of the black Homelands. A border industrial area was defined as an underdeveloped area situated near black area recommended for development so that black workers could maintain their homes and families in their own areas, commuting daily or weekends between work and home. The main purpose for this programme was to stop the flow of black workers to the white centres. Various concessions were offered to industrialists to develop industries, which would preferably be labour-intensive and not too highly mechanized.

Concessions made to encourage border industries included the offer of services, power, transport, financial assistance, housing for African employees, wage differentiation justified on the basis of an assumption of lower productivity of labour and cost of living in the areas, as well as tax concessions. These did not apply to all the regions, since industrialists needed no persuasion to establish themselves on the borders of reserves near to Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Black areas in KwaZulu and Natal were so widely scattered that the whole province became virtually a border area.

GRAPH DEPICTING BLACK VERSUS WHITE EMPLOYEES IN THE BORDER AREAS OF KWA-ZULU, 1974

HAMMERSDALE LADYSMITH NEWCASTLE PMB R/BAY

BLACK EMPLOYEES
WHITE EMPLOYEES
In 1974, industries in the white border areas of KwaZulu provided employment as follows:

Hammarsdale – an establishment 5 940 blacks and 363 whites.
Ladysmith – an estimated 2 885 blacks and 205 whites
Newcastle – an estimated 2 207 blacks 172 whites
Pietermaritzburg – an estimated 2 267 blacks and 418 whites
Richards Bay – an estimated 1 192 blacks and 413 whites

Industries thus established in the decentralized industrial areas through the mediation of the Bantu Investment Corporation created work opportunities, as at 31 March 1974, for an estimated 20 187 blacks. Of these (4, 9%) worked in KwaZulu, the rest in the white border areas.

In April 1965, the Industrial Development Corporation invited Swiss Aluminium Smelter to investigate the feasibility of an aluminium smelter in South Africa. An agreement for the construction of the smelter by Alusaf was concluded in Johannesburg in 1966. In the very same year a decision was also taken to construct a commercial harbour at Richards' Bay, in Zululand, and this became the largest bulk export harbour in South Africa. A new railway line linking the Witbank area with Richards Bay via Vryheid, was also planned. KwaZulu's first modern city, Esikhawini on the shores of Indian Ocean, 20 kilometers from Richards Bay, was to be constructed to accommodate the black workers of these industries. Buthelezi said that the city would eventually be the size of Pietermaritzburg and accommodate about 400 000 people in 22 residential communities.

Buthelezi was opposed to the principle of border area industries but he recognized their value as training ground for homeland industries. “In principle I am opposed to border industries,” he explained, “but while the Zulu were not exploited, the KwaZulu Government would maintain the cordial relations with them, and since

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23 S.H. Nudi : The History of the Mthiyane People who were removed from Richards Bay to Ntambanana (Unpublished B.A. Honours Dissertation , University of Zululand) , p.10.
industrial development, through the agency of foreign investment in the homeland, cannot for years yet supply sufficient work opportunities for Zulu people of KwaZulu, the Zulu will continue to seek work in the border industries."  

Buthelezi accepted that people should acquire skills and know-how by working in these industries, and he thought that people should be free to seek their skills where they wished.

Buthelezi found himself facing two problems. On the one hand, his independent stance led to a degree of victimization of KwaZulu. For example, Transkei, in its first year of independence, received a grant from the Republican Government of R324 million, yet KwaZulu, with a larger population and additional responsibilities, was allocated only R84 million from the Central Government. On the other hand, with regard to his development schemes, he was accused of giving legitimacy and respectability to apartheid. Replying to these accusations, Buthelezi stressed the point that he could not allow his people to starve in the interest of an ideology.

Buthelezi had stressed a preference for an economy based on a blend of free enterprise and African communalism. African communalism or socialism, according to him, should not be confused with communism. It emanated originally from Tanzania and was later adopted by Zambia. While not discouraging free enterprise, he wanted to ensure that people as a whole had some stake in the wealth of their own land. This would be attained through state-owned organizations which would have controlling interests in all main economic enterprises. The profits earned would be for the nation and would be ploughed back into their own country for development rather than for the enrichment of the individual.

One of the problems encountered was that a number of people employed in the labour force originated from outside the borders of KwaZulu. If KwaZulu's

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21 A.J. Jeffery, Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict, p.5. Also see The Star, 17 September 1979, p.11.
development philosophy were to be based on the elimination of unemployment, poverty and inequality, it would be important for it to create, within its own borders, productive employment for as many people as possible. More over the responsibility of losing trained manpower to Natal Province was always high, because Natal required trained African artisans for its industries and wages in Natal were higher than in KwaZulu Homeland.

The South African Government issued a series of labour proclamations in the early 1970's giving the right to industrialists in the Bantu Homelands to pay sub-minimum wages far below those in other industrial areas. These proclamations excluded Bantustans from all the provisions of the Labour Relations Act (then called the Industrial Conciliation Act). Proclamation R84 of 1970, as amended, repealed the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 in regard to the black workers in the Bantustans. It also repealed minimum wages and conditions of service measured applicable to black workers in South Africa. By excluding Bantu Homelands, black workers employed in these territories were left at the mercy of their employers. For example, a 1984 press report revealed that workers in the Bantu Homelands clothing industry worked a 45-hour week as compared with a 40-hour week in the main urban areas. Until 1986, the minimum hourly wage at Isithebe's Henred Fruehauf Industry in KwaZulu was only 80c per hour compared to R1.80 in other plants of the same company operating outside KwaZulu.28

Isithebe was KwaZulu's main industrial growth area, housing by 1980 a total of 62 factories. In that year, when the Metal and Allied Workers’ Union (MAWU) was organizing at the Vickers Lenning, F.A. Poole and Henred Fruehauf plants at Isithebe, the employers in these companies stated that they were willing to recognize MAWU unions in KwaZulu Homeland only on condition that they did not seek parity in wages with plants outside the Bantustans.29

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29 C. Cooper: Bantustan Attitude to Trade Unions, p.165.
It is pivotal to indicate that attempts by trade unions to press for improved wages and working conditions brought them into direct conflict, not only with the employers, but also with the Bantu Homeland administrators, whose investment strategy relied on the existence of a docile and cheap workforce. In addition, since Bantustans were ethnic political entities based on tribal structures and undemocratic, authoritarian practices, they inevitably came into conflict with the national character of trade unions with their democratic structures. The state harassed trade unions with security legislation, detaining members and leaders, or even banning them altogether. For example, in Bophuthatswana, trade unions could function only on condition that they recognized its independence. The Transkei banned all trade union activity within its borders, and workers had no right to strike.

KwaZulu, however, was the only Bantu Homeland to officially support and even encourage selected trade union activity. When KwaZulu reached the stage of self-government in February 1977, it was able to replace the South African industrial laws with its own legislation that provided for the registration of black trade unions and for the establishment of an industrial court which would administer judgement on reported unfair labour practices. Nevertheless, records prove that until 1983 no trade union had been registered in KwaZulu; no industrial court had ever sat and no judge had ever been appointed. Only in 1984 did the Natal Sugar Refining and Allied Industries Employees Union (NASRAIEU) become the first union to affiliate to Inkatha.

Speaking at a meeting with the AFL-CIO in June 1983, Buthelezi explained that Inkatha had always adopted a stance of support for the workers' movement in South Africa, and that it had explicitly avoided, and would continue to avoid, any attempt to take over the role of trade unions. However, he added, some formal interaction was needed between Inkatha and the unions, since Inkatha wished to

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30 T. Mzinela, Empangeni, 26 February 2005.
31 The Star, 22 May 1984, p.31.
have trade union interests presented on its Central Committee. At the same time, he insisted, Inkatha hoped that trade unions would in due course reciprocate and establish the possibility for Inkatha's presence on their decision making bodies. This link, Inkatha believed, would make it possible to plan effective strategies, which would amount to the right degree of pressure on employers and authorities to force industrialists to discharge their wider responsibilities.

With regard to the policies to develop the small business sector, the Buthelezi Commission reported that the small business sector had contributed to the development of KwaZulu and that it should be seen as a safety value to unemployment in the region. Buthelezi once said in support of the commission's report: "the small business sector has served and will continue to serve as a breeding ground for businessmen." In order to improve the position of small business the commission recommended that all legislation applicable to business should be reviewed with a view to simplifying and decentralizing it. Consideration was given to establishing new and inexpensive sites from which small business enterprises could operate. In this regard, care was exercised to ensure that such sites were correctly located.

The newly established Small Business Development Corporation was made aware of the existing situation in regard to small business activities in KwaZulu, and was requested to render financial assistance to entrepreneurs operating viable business enterprises in the formal sector with a view to making them part of the formal sector. In this respect the Commission hoped that the activities of the Small Business Development Corporation would include the provision of an ongoing programme of advice and assistance for small business that operated in a similar manner to the agricultural extension service administered through the various Departments of Agriculture. It also hoped that once the Corporation was

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33. Ibid., p.81.
35. Ibid., p.206.
operational it would seek to decentralize its services and form a good working relationship with the KwaZulu Development Corporation.

Commercial and Industrial developments in KwaZulu were also backed or supported by His Majesty, King Goodwill Zwelithini. Speaking at the opening ceremony for the RV Food Enterprises Factory at Isithebe in 1988, the King said: “Industrialists and manufacturers who locate here choose to do so for many reasons. I like to believe that it is not only hard-headed economic thinking that brings new ventures to Isithebe. I believe it is a place where we want to develop and where we are prepared to contribute towards development by doing our share.” RV Food Enterprises at Isithebe was a small factory with 40 black workers in 1988. It hoped to double the number of black employees the following year. This factory was the sole packer and distributor for Co Mix, which manufactured two products, namely, blended tea and filter coffee – both including the required amount of powdered milk and sugar. His majesty appealed to all Amakhosi (Chiefs) to make land available to employers so that they could build houses for their employers. He appreciated the fact that the Mathonsi Tribal Authority had always been co-operative in making land available for the expansion of development at Isithebe. “I do not like the sight of the squalor of the squatter camps in which my people around here are living. Therefore, land must be made available so that we may challenge these companies which have not yet housed their employees, or have not helped to house them, to do so,” he said. In line with the ideas of the king, Buthelezi stressed the importance for commerce and industry to make a significant contribution to assist with developing black housing as millions of blacks were migrating to the cities.

Officially opening the R20 million Drakensberg Sun Hotel in August 1988, Buthelezi praised the tourism industry for its contribution to a non-racial South Africa, and blamed apartheid for hampering tourism development. He criticized

31 Umxoxi, vol. 1, 1988, p.19, “Factories welcomed in KwaZulu, says the King”.
restrictions to tourism development in areas such as KwaZulu. "Our opposition to so-called apartheid in KwaZulu has resulted in our being penalized with further restrictions by the South African Government". He particularly referred to the role of casinos, and the potential of KwaZulu in this regard: “When I look at realities around me I see the imperative necessity to do whatever can be done to provide the jobless with jobs and to generate the kind of wealth which reserves the massive backlogs in housing, health services and education in black areas. I believe that any missed opportunity of increased business activity is unforgivable.” He added that South Africa, especially KwaZulu, had potentially more to offer international tourism than virtually any country in the World. “We have everything,” he said.

In 1990 tourism was identified as the major economic resource in KwaZulu/Natal. Studies by South Africa Tourism depict that tourists come to South Africa for four principal reasons, namely, the scenic beauty, the wild life, the history and culture and for business and conferences. KwaZulu fulfilled all the above mentioned requirements. The splendour of the Drakensberg or Ukhahlamba, the game reserve of Northern KwaZulu, the battle fields, the KwaZulu culture and conference facilities made KwaZulu a prime tourist destination. Development of tourism was therefore a priority. Because of its close relationship with the environment, its management became the responsibility of the Bureau of Natural Resources. In 1991 the main thrust of the tourism section of the bureau was the planning and management of tourist facilities at Lake Sibaya, the Maputaland Coast and at Kosi Bay.

In August 1991 the management responsibilities of the bureau were extended over the whole of KwaZulu and related primarily to the development and proper control of:

- Proclaimed game and nature reserves
- Tribal nature reserves

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35 Umxoxi, vol. 1, p.18. “S A hotels hailed for anti - apartheid victories”.
-Indigenous forests
- The coastal areas.\textsuperscript{35}

In order to achieve this, an appropriate staff structure was developed and in-service training given to staff at all levels. In addition, a two year diploma course was developed for nature conservation course at Cwaka College. In 1992 the management division developed the five regional areas comprising KwaZulu. These were referred to as Patrol Areas and were extended from Maputoland to the Drakensberg.\textsuperscript{46} The Bureau of Natural Resources believed firmly in conservation by consensus. In 1993 it rejected isolationist and island mentality concept as unworkable in a third world situation.\textsuperscript{47}

Commerce and industry had played an instrumental role in uplifting the KwaZulu Homeland’s economy during the period 1972 – 19974. While the economy growth was high in certain years, it plummeted in others. However, the long term trend was upward.

\textsuperscript{46} Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 592: \textit{KwaZulu Government Diary}, 1992, p.145.
CHAPTER 5

Townships and Urbanization

The Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 provided that every African in South Africa would become a citizen of one or other territorial authority area established in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1957. Accordingly, blacks had no official ownership of property in urban settlements. However, a number of factors contributed to the rapid growth of the black urban population. These included the rapid urban industrial development, the inability of the undeveloped homelands to absorb and provide for their expanding populations, and the need to live in developed, modern urban areas. To meet these demands, township development commenced. Townships were either in white areas or inside black homelands. In either case, they were usually placed adjacent to white towns. Financial responsibility and control of developing townships were handed over to the homeland governments. The administration and control of townships in black areas, and of those in urban black townships in white areas, differed in many important respects. For the latter, development was extremely quick, while for the former, progress was relatively slow.¹

In KwaZulu, Umlazi became the largest African township, situated south west of Durban, and was developed by the Trust in co-operation with the Durban Corporation in 1965. It had an hotel [The Executive], hospital [Mshiyeni], educational institutions [e.g. Mangosuthu Technikon and Umlazi Technical], recreational facilities [e.g. King Zwelithini Stadium] and shopping facilities [e.g. KwaMyandu Shopping Centre, Umlazi Shopping Complex]. KwaMashu, north west of Durban, was developed by the Durban City Council and was close to the homeland. Contrary to Umlazi, facilities provided in KwaMashu were poor, e.g. there were no hospitals, no hotels, and although a number of schools existed, there were no tertiary institutions. In 1975 the boundary of the homeland was extended to include KwaMashu. Yet, two years later a number of problems erupted with

¹ M. Horrell : The African Homelands of South Africa , pp.142-144.
regard to administration and responsibility that were instrumental in causing increased chaos and poor facilities that existed there.²

A number of townships, including Nseleni, KwaMsane, Gezinsila, Ngwelezane, Esikhawini, Hambanathi, Dilini, Nkotshane, Sundumbili, etc., were created within the boundaries of the homeland. Population concentrations, coupled with housing shortages in these townships, led to large squatter settlements.³ Some townships within the homeland were close to the suburbs of white industrial areas. Others were situated more distant from towns or cities and people had to travel long distances. This added the problem of commuting, both in cost and time. Blacks living in homeland townships were not as restricted as were the urban township dwellers.⁴ Heads of families, including women, could buy sites or houses for which the Corporation for Economic Development made loans available, or they could lease houses.

Most townships within the KwaZulu homeland lacked the normal modern amenities provided by the larger, local authorities in urban townships. There were few proper roads and little or no drainage, electricity (and hence, street lighting), household water supply, community halls, sports fields, playgrounds, libraries, recreational services or clinics. Lack of transport made it very difficult for inhabitants to visit urban shops where prices were invariably lower. In addition, in any emergency it was difficult to contact a doctor, and the nearest telephone, hospital or police station was a considerable distance away with no transport services available to make life easier for dwellers within the homeland, when compared to their urban counterparts.

Blacks living in white-controlled black urban residential areas were subject to many more restraints than their homeland counterparts. For example, women were unable to buy or lease a house, even if they had dependents living with them.

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² L. Mithethwa, KwaMashu, 31 December 2004.
legally. Only in very few circumstances could a house be transferred to a woman who was deserted, divorced or widowed. The Bantu (urban areas) Consolidated Act stipulated that in order to be eligible, a man should have been born in the town concerned or had worked there continuously for one employer for 10 years, or had lived there lawfully and continuously for 15 years, and in all three instances had to have lived uninterruptedly in the town.

Following discussions between Prime Minister B J Vorster and homeland leaders in January 1975, it was promised by Government that certain matters relating to urban blacks would receive priority consideration. A decision was announced, on 1 May 1975 in the Legislative Assembly, that blacks were to be allowed to buy houses on land belonging to administration boards or to lease vacant plots of land on which they could build their houses. This announcement offered a form of home ownership on a 30 year lease basis to urban blacks. They were given the right to sell their houses although the sites would remain municipal property. Other details of home ownership were subsequently announced by the Secretary of Plural Relations and Development in 1976. He announced that those wishing to own houses would have to become citizens of a homeland and would be required to produce certificates of citizenship when they applied for ownership. This proviso was opposed by urban blacks. The Minister of Plural Relations and Development, after talks between homeland leaders and the Minister of the Central Government, shortly after the Soweto riots of 1976, was obliged to remove this qualification. He announced that urban blacks would henceforth be able to build their own homes in urban areas without having to take out homeland citizenship.

In 1978, the Central Government disclosed its intention to give blacks permanent occupation rights in urban areas. Blacks were to be granted full property rights in all urban, as well as rural townships. They were given the right to buy, sell and bequeath property in perpetuity. The actual title to the land itself would not be transferred, but in practice blacks would receive all advantages of ownership.
including security of tenure and full rights to negotiate loans. This development was a significant advance on the previous situation when a 30 year lease provided the maximum tenure. However, few months later, many blacks were disappointed when Dr. Connie Mulder, then Minister of Plural Relations and Development, explained that blacks would not be allowed freehold title to land, because that would give them a basis for also demanding political rights in South Africa.

Urban businessmen were subject to many restrictions imposed by the Central Government. For example, an applicant seeking to establish a company had to be a bona fide breadwinner and qualified to remain in the area. He could possess no trading rights elsewhere. His trading permit was subject to annual renewal and no companies could be established. Traders were not allowed to erect their own buildings or to alter leased shops without permission. Professional men and women were unable to rent consulting rooms or offices in urban townships unless they qualified to remain in the specific area. The intention of these restrictions was to encourage black business people to establish themselves in the homelands.

General dissatisfaction about these restrictions resulted in the Government announcement of trading concessions. Traders were permitted to deal in a wider range of commodities in urban areas and to establish more than one type of business as well as to enter into partnerships. Medical practitioners and other professional people were given the right to possess their own consulting rooms and offices in black residential areas. People with businesses in the homelands were no longer prevented from owning a business in an urban area.

In KwaZulu, urbanization produced serious problems for Buthelezi. Urban leaders demanded the recognition of their residential rights in the urban areas where they lived and worked, and not in a remote homeland. Buthelezi rejected this division between urban and rural blacks and never made the mistake of not intervening in urban affairs. He did not see the interests of rural and urban blacks as being separate issues. In this regard he emphatically stated that all Zulu people “want

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the same things, a just society in which there is equal opportunity for all”. These ideals were reconcilable aims, because “National identification does not mean exclusion from a common South African society”.12

The intervention of the Zulu King in a strike of migrant workers at a brick manufacturing company in Durban in 1972 was criticized by the KwaZulu leadership. However, the King’s action motivated the KwaZulu leadership to consider its role in urban labour disputes. The first major contact between KwaZulu and the black urban labour movement occurred in 1973 when waves of strikes began in Natal Province. Buthelezi, speaking in Durban at the opening of the South African Congress on Mission and Evangelism, said: “We are called upon to realize that the wealth of South Africa belongs to all God’s children and to resist the temptation of those soul-destroying vices called greed”.13

In Richards Bay, more than 1 700 Zulu workers went on strike for higher pay at the Alusaf Aluminium Refinery in 1975. The strike was broken down when 100 white army trainees went on shift to maintain delivery of aluminium. The strikers were ordered to return to work or to be dismissed.14 Following this, Buthelezi commented: “I thought South Africa had outgrown this sort of tactic...only a few weeks ago we were applauding the restraint shown by police during the strike in Durban”. He added: “Now South Africa is showing her teeth again”.15 Buthelezi sent a telegram to the Minister of Labour, Marais Viljoen, to express his concern at the use of troops. And, while troops continued to assist at the industrial smelter plant, the black workers paid no heed to the management’s ultimatum of a R3 a week increase or dismissal. Barney Diadla, the KwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, addressed workers at Alusaf and told them that there was nothing wrong with demanding more money, as whites did similarly elsewhere. No person could live without money.

The Minister for Indian Affairs and Tourism, Senator Owen Horwood, warned Diadla and Buthelezi not to interfere with matters “outside their homeland”. Addressing a National Party meeting near Durban, he said: “It is we and not Buthelezi or Diadla who will decide what goes on there”. Buthelezi himself urged all Africans to boycott the Alusaf Aluminium Smelter. He said any workers who replaced the strikers would be figuratively cutting their own throats in terms of the struggle of black people in South Africa.

Diadla’s claim that it was within the framework of South African policy for a homeland’s government to have control over its own labour supply to white South Africa, was refuted by the Department of Plural Relations and Development. The Department rejected the right of the KwaZulu Government representative to negotiate for Zulu labourers in urban areas and favoured the intercession of the Department of Plural Relations and Development instead of the Durban envoy. It was felt that the envoy should channel grievances to the KwaZulu Government which would then negotiate on an inter-governmental level. Buthelezi supported Diadla’s view, urging that it was an obligation of the KwaZulu Government to protect the interests of its citizens. Workers returned to work when the management announced that there would be R4,50 increase per week, but negotiations continued because workers were not yet satisfied.

KwaZulu Homeland continued to play a role in labour negotiations. Thus in Madadeni, the township of Newcastle, where a bus boycott was provoked by an increase in fares in 1978, Walter Khanya, the successor of Diadla, exhorted boycotters not to resort to violence and threats, but rather to be guided by the KwaZulu Government. This action was in line with Buthelezi’s guidance when, in 1974, responding angrily to the comments of a white trade union leader that he did not want anyone from the homelands telling an industry how to run itself, said: “This is just white arrogance. We will be involved whenever our people are. We cannot abandon them”.

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16 The Star, 29 September 1975, p.15.
17 Sunday Tribune, 2 December 1973, p.15.
According to National Party objectives, it was contemplated that all blacks would be back in their ethnic areas by 1980. In view of its ideology it came as a surprise, therefore, when T. Janson, Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, told delegates to the Transvaal National Congress in 1975 that “Africans would be in urban areas for more than 50 Years”. This sentiment was endorsed at the Party’s Cape Congress, when J.J. Loots, Minister of Planning, rejected a resolution calling for an end to servant squatters in white areas and said that the Government would rather see more facilities made available for servants in white areas. At a Free State Congress (of the NP) a resolution was passed urging the Government to scrap the law preventing black wives from joining their husbands in urban areas. Addressing his cabinet ministers on the illegal dwellers in urban areas in 1979, Prime Minister P. W. Botha had this to say: “Let's face it, we can't throw them out. These people have families to support”. These remarks were completely contrary to traditional Verwoerdian National Party policy with regard to black urban dwellers.

However, the KwaZulu Government was shocked when it received a letter from the Secretary for Bantu Administration in which Homeland leaders were informed in 1979 that they had no legal powers to intercede in labour disputes regarding black urban dwellers. In response, Buthelezi appealed to the leaders of urban councils and the leaders of all black organizations to give Homeland leaders as much information and as many views as possible with regard to urban blacks. These would be presented to the Prime Minister in subsequent meetings. He said: “We do not need these views, because we do not know what to say, but we do feel that our views should be representative of various viewpoints, particularly from those who are involved in the problems from day to day”.

In 1982 the KwaZulu Government planners reckoned that if the agricultural potential of KwaZulu was to be fully exploited, it would be necessary to bring to the
rural population of 2 million down to 100,000 families which represented a population of 750,000 persons. Reducing the rural population would require that surplus population would move to KwaZulu’s existing towns and lived from non-rural activities. It was anticipated that in these towns people would be provided with modern shops, better homes, churches, schools, cinemas, better roads, telephone services, clinics, police stations, and other community services. The establishment of such community would provide opportunities for the introduction of home crafts and intermediate technology.

The KwaZulu Department of Works was responsible for the delivery of the above mentioned services in the townships. This was done on a regional basis by the Regional Director and his staff. Approval of each project on a priority basis was the responsibility of the KwaZulu Cabinet. Submissions for such approvals were based on the joint recommendation of the Secretaries of all Departments of the KwaZulu Government service and the Treasury. It was the policy that as far as possible, work had to be done departmentally in order to provide job opportunities for KwaZulu citizens. In many projects KwaZulu contractors were employed. Private consultants and contractors were also employed for the design and construction of most major projects. The construction and maintenance of roads and bridges in the townships was also vested in the Department of Works which was also responsible for all engineering survey work.

The overall control of the Department of Works was vested in the Secretary for Works who was also the Accounting Officer of the Department. He was in turn assisted by four Chief Engineers, a Deputy Secretary and Assistant Secretary. For organization and administrative purposes the Department had five regional offices which served the whole of KwaZulu. The regions were as follows:

-Northern Region: Nongoma

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22 Sunday Times, 30 October 1990, p.16.
24 Ibid., p.185.
26 Ibid., p.43.
-Coastal Region: Gezinsila
-Southern Region: Mpumalanga
-Midland Region: Ezakheni
-Ulundi Region: Ulundi

Each region was under the direct control of the Regional Director of Works. Oversight of the Northern and Midland Regions was vested in one Chief Engineer and that of the Southern and Coastal Regions in another of the Chief Engineers referred to above. The Ulundi Region had a Chief Engineer of its own. The Regional Directors were also responsible for maintenance and upkeeping of all buildings and services in KwaZulu.

Despite many problems encountered, KwaZulu witnessed the rapid growth of urbanization in the 1980's. The average annual growth rate in functional urbanization rose from 3% to 3.9% in the early 80's. Between 1985 and 1989 the functional urbanization rate in KwaZulu (primarily in those parts bordering the main urban areas) rose to 5.7% representing the highest percentage increase for any area in South Africa, except KwaNdebele. It is worthy mentioning that in most cases urbanization was neither planned nor provided for, largely as a result both of financial constraints and of apartheid ideology that regarded blacks as temporal sojourners in white cities. This resulted in mushrooming of shack settlements on the outskirts of towns and cities.

The majority of these informal settlements were without services, e.g. no water, electricity, sewerage, roads, clinics, schools or recreational services. Most of the dwellings were small, one or two roomed homes, constructed from scraps of metal sheeting, wood or plastic. In 1993 it was estimated that close to 3 million people were living in informal settlements in KwaZulu and Natal. Overcrowding in these settlements was acute, many of the two roomed structures housing eight to ten people or more.

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34 Sunday Tribune, 13 September 1989, p.28.
Rapid urbanization had profound social consequences for the people living in these informal settlements. Because of the lack of common history, there was little sense of community in these areas. There was a pervasive uncertainty above the future, accompanied by the constant movement of people in search of scarce resources. Accompanying this massive population dislocation was a breakdown in family life and a loss of traditional values, a growing anomie and alienation of individuals.\textsuperscript{34}

Additional stress came from the transition from traditionalism to modernism and from clash of social orientation. This, too, deprived the individual of his sense of identity and place within society, and had led him to look elsewhere to gangs, for example for a feeling of identity, support and belonging. For many of the people living in these condition life was poor, nasty, brutish and short.\textsuperscript{35}

Amongst the interesting aspects of this study is the rapid pace at which urbanization occurred in the KwaZulu Homeland (1972-1994). This had both advantages and setbacks. The most important advantage was that townships met many of the needs of modern people. This ranged from job opportunities and income to residencies and services, security and safety, recreation, personal fulfillment and nearly everything associated with quality of life. However, townships in the KwaZulu Homeland had to cope with special problems. Roads and services were often inadequate for the high concentration of population. Pollution of water supplies and of atmosphere was increasing and uncontrolled urban growth had resulted in people having to travel far from their homes to their places of work.

\textsuperscript{34} A.J. Jeffery : \textit{The Natal Story : Sixteen Years of Conflict}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p.4. Also see \textit{Sunday Tribune}, 13 September 1989, p.28.
Chapter 6

Education in KwaZulu

In 1949 the National Party Government tasked the Eiselen Commission with the responsibility to formulate the principles of education for Africans as an independent race. The Commission pointed out that the African child is conditioned by African culture and values, which should dictate the contents and methods of the child’s early education. Answering the question “Why Bantu Education” the Commission had this to say: “Educational practice must recognize that it has to deal with the Bantu child, that is, trained and conditioned in Black culture, endowed with a knowledge of Bantu language and imbued with values, interests and behaviour patterns”.1 Furthermore, “these facts” must dictate the extent and content and methods of the child’s early education.2

Dr. H.F Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, was of the opinion that good race relations could not exist when education was under the control of people who created wrong expectations among blacks. He maintained that if education had to train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, as the Eiselen Commission had propounded, and in terms of Government policy there was no place in white communities for blacks above the level of certain types of labourers, Bantu education had to be rooted in the reserves and limited to the opportunities then deemed necessary and suitable. It had to be orientated towards African society and lacked provision for professional opportunities.

The Eiselen Commission’s declaration of aims caused great antagonism amongst Zulu people who maintained that economic and social realities demanded assimilation of Western techniques and values.3 Serious misgivings arose from the realization that the homelands, by the nature of South African society, could never become galvanizers of African values as expected by the architects of apartheid.4 As long as economic opportunities existed in the cities, which were also centres of

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2 Ibid., p.20.
science, culture, entertainment and technology, the urban areas (and not the homelands) would be the galvanizers of African values. Because of this emphasis on the importance of African culture in education, Africans suspected an attempt to retard African participation in economic progress. Their suspicions were increased since the Government spent only limited funds on African education. There was a resultant lack of teachers and, while school education was not compulsory, the parents had to bear the extra cost of educating their children. Prior to 1954, control of African Education was divided between the Central Government and the Provincial Administration and Missionary Societies. In 1953 the Bantu Education Act transferred control of African Education to the Central Government and in 1958 the Department of Bantu Education was established. As Homeland Governments were created, they set up their own education departments, assisted by white officials, and these were responsible for the equipment, the construction and maintenance of school buildings, the employment of teachers and the control of school boards and hostels. However, they exercised little control over the educational budget policy, which remained subject to white Parliament, although educational finance flew through Homeland Governments.

The Bantu Education Department, subsequently converted to the Department of Education and Training, was responsible for black university education throughout the country and for black schooling in areas not under authority of a Homeland Government. The Department gave professional guidance to, and conducted all examinations in academic schools. It was responsible for the formulation of educational methods and the maintenance of standards, as well as for the development of syllabi and the issuing of certificates. Within the Homelands, specialized training, such as required for agricultural officers, was conducted by the Department of Plural Relations. The Department of Education and Training was responsible for primary and secondary schooling and for teacher and vocational training. The Corporation for Economic Development was responsible for management and business training and the universities for academic and professional training. In-service training needs were addressed by private firms.

KwaZulu Government Planning Committee, established by the Homeland Government and consisting of Buthelezi, six directors of KwaZulu departments, representatives of Government development corporations and consultants from outside the Central Government, was intended to oversee economic education and social planning. Its scope, however, had been limited to educational and training programmes under the jurisdiction of the homelands.  

While the black African population in South Africa rose by 61% and student enrolment tripled from the mid-1950s to the 1970s, facilities did not keep pace with the expansion. Shortages of teachers seriously affected the quality of education, especially in black high schools. This contributed to the high failure and drop-out rate. The total output of teachers for the whole of KwaZulu in 1977 was only 104 new educators. Due to the university unrest of 1976, no secondary school teachers were produced during that year. Difficulties ranged from overcrowded classrooms to teacher poverty. The pupil to teacher ratio was high, and furniture such as desks, chairs and benches, were at a premium. A pool of teachers was required to teach double shifts, often without extra pay.

In 1977 the Minister of Education for KwaZulu announced that 2 000 additional teaching posts had been created to improve the staffing situation and to reduce the incidence of double session schools, which was planned to be eliminated within five years. The Department was able to double the allocation for building subsidies for schools in the 1976/1977 financial year. Progress, in the form of five additional schools and the provision of laboratories and classrooms for territorial schools and for schools in townships, was reported all over KwaZulu. In addition to this, an improved allocation for furniture reduced the shortage of seating accommodation in the classrooms.

In September 1977 KwaMashu Township was included within the boundaries of KwaZulu Homeland and the KwaMashu education system, formerly under control

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of the Department of Bantu Education, became the responsibility of the Homeland education department. The KwaZulu education system was thus augmented by two inspectors, twenty lower primary schools, two senior secondary schools and 439 teachers. This put an additional burden on an already over-extended budget. The total number of teachers in KwaZulu increased to approximately 13,464 in 23 circuits. The education financial allocation for education in the KwaZulu Estimate of Expenditure for the year 1978 amounted to R31,833,000. In 1976/77 it was merely R24,558,280. Expansion of education in KwaZulu remained dependent on Government money allocations. In September 1978, it was reported that KwaZulu schools were short of 3000 teachers and 527 classrooms. Nine hundred classrooms were unfurnished.

Growth in the school population during 1976/77 required for 194 new schools to be registered. These included:

- 108 lower primary schools
- 9 combined and higher primary schools
- 72 junior secondary schools
- 1 industrial school
- 1 apprenticeship institution
- 1 training college
- 2 senior secondary schools

The total number of schools in all categories of KwaZulu Homeland in March 1977 was 1963. Twenty-eight schools wrote the Form V examinations in 1975, 34 schools in 1976, 40 schools in 1977 and 48 schools in 1978. The KwaZulu Homeland Government allocated R50,000 for bursaries for the year 1976/77 and 387 students benefited from these awards.

The medium of instruction in primary schools was isiZulu and in higher primary schools it was English. Afrikaans was also taught, but no other language.

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14 The Post, 16 March 1976, p.16.
15 Natal Mercury, 7 April 1978, p.17.
Mathematics and Science were inadequately taught, due to the fact that there were only a few well-trained teachers available in these subjects.\textsuperscript{16} Classes were too large to allow for individual attention being paid to learners and the drop-out rate between standards was high. There were a total of 226 junior and senior secondary schools registered in 1976. These were staffed by 1,718 teachers and attended by 89,697 pupils. The ratio of pupils to teacher was about 52:1. Textbooks were often not available and a lack of transportation and accommodation in some areas provided problems for both teachers and pupils.

A total of 2,254 pupils were enrolled in trade and industrial training schools of all kinds in March 1975.\textsuperscript{18} The number of candidates who qualified to teach in 1975 was 925 new educators. A KwaZulu Institute of Technology was established in Umlazi and technical training was offered at the Edendale Technical College as well as at the Umlazi Trade and Technical High School. However, training was unsatisfactory at both institutions. Trade and vocational education were available at Edendale, Nongoma, Umlazi and at Amanzimtoti, and an apprentice School was planned for Madadeni. Three more trade and industrial schools were also planned for Esikhawini, Ezakheni, and Gamalakhe, Ntuzuma and Enzeleni. The KwaZulu Minister of Education, in his policy speech at Ulundi in 1977, reported that the Africanisation of personnel had begun and was expected to receive encouragement.

At that time, homelands were already eroded, overgrazed and badly farmed and yet there were only four black agricultural high schools in the Republic in 1977. The situation in KwaZulu Homeland was somewhat better, viz James Nxumalo at Ulundi. Agriculture was offered as a subject in standard 8 at many schools, but it appeared that more effort was needed to inculcate a love for the soil.

In 1977 the Department of Bantu Education issued reading books in various home, as well as two official languages on the basis of 1 book to two pupils in the primary schools. Other books and all stationery were to be bought by parents, who also had to bear all additional costs related to schooling, including examination fees. Later


\textsuperscript{17} Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 58: KwaZulu Annual Report (Department of Education and Culture), 1976, p.8.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p.12.
on, this arrangement improved to the extent that free text books in 6 subjects of the curriculum were supplied by the Department from standard 3 to Form V. All text books in 6 subjects in the curriculum were supplied by the Department from Standard 5 to Form II, although books specified for particular courses of study were excluded in Form I and II. With the exception of prescribed works, books were supplied in full from Form III to Form V. Pupils were not allowed to take text books home as it was suspected that they would not handle them with care.

The decision to initiate and implement free and compulsory education for the Zulu Nation was taken by the KwaZulu Homeland Government in 1975. This was a step with far reaching consequences. G.J.M. Coetzee of the Department of Education and Training estimated that compulsory education for all African children between 7 and 15 years of age would cost the Central Government R245 Million. It would cost at least R400 million to bring education facilities to a teacher-pupil ratio of 1 to 30. In 1974, 3.6 million African children between ages 7 and 15 were taught by 63 000 teachers at 11 800 schools at a cost of 131 million. This represented 75% of children in the age group. If all children of that age attended school, it would need 84 000 teachers to instruct 4.8 million pupils at 15 800 schools. Hence the total of R 245 million.

There were also other factors which inhibited black education. Malnutrition, which limited learning capacity, was rife among black communities. The Government’s policy of job reservation limited skilled and semi-skilled job opportunities. While wages were low and there were little incentives for blacks to better themselves, hundreds of black teenagers asked aggressively: “Why should I get my Matric – look at my brother, he can’t get a job. He has been looking for a whole year. How will my Matric help me get a job that merits a Matric, with my black skin”?

Some observers saw Government insistence on mother tongue language as an impediment to constructive education. Many Zulus decided that they wanted their

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19 In that time classes in primary schools were referred to as standards, and in secondary and high schools as forms.
21 Ulundi Archives Collection, Ref 64: KwaZulu Annual Report (Department of Education and Culture), 1977, p.31.
children to be educated in English. Whereas a white child received all his basic instruction from school entry in his mother tongue, a black child learned in Zulu up to and including standard two in the black areas. After standard three the Zulu children were taught examination subjects in Zulu, English and Afrikaans. The basic Senior Primary and Secondary instruction was therefore in three languages. This anomaly was the result of a disagreement between the Departments of Bantu Education in Pretoria and the KwaZulu Government at Ulundi. The KwaZulu Government wished all education from standard two to be provided only in English, unfortunately according to the Central Government this could only be permitted from standard 5 in white-controlled black areas.

KwaZulu Homeland had one University (the University of Zululand), established in 1959, dependant on the Central Government, where specialized tertiary training was available. Extramural courses could be taken through the University of South Africa, with regard to those courses not available at Unizul. Medical students attended the University of Natal's Medical School in Durban. The Government of KwaZulu did not influence the running of the University and for a long time the University Council had no Zulu members. In 1975 the South African Government took a decision to phase out black students from the University of Natal Medical School, at that time the country's only black medical school. This was done in order to establish a new medical University (subsequently MEDUNSA) for blacks at Garankuwa, near Pretoria. Buthelezi expressed concern at the establishment of such a new black medical school in another homeland which could, at some stage, take independence. He believed that there was ample room for the two universities to co-exist, but expressed concern with regard to the possibility of the University of Natal School ceasing to cater for black students. In such a case, the position of Zulu students in a foreign state could become tenuous and the Zulu students

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might even be denied entry. Replying to a question on the education vote, he
said that the proposed black medical school should not be in any homeland. When
the project was first broached, he suggested Soweto as the best location.

Problems at tertiary level in KwaZulu Homeland, related partly to the isolation of
the University College of Zululand from contact with the expertise and knowledge of
Western academic systems and technology. The newly-fledged University of
Zululand was like an "academic oasis" in the desert of underdevelopment that was
KwaZulu Homeland. Buildings rose out of the veld near Empangeni in the
KwaDlangezwa area. University education for blacks was designed to produce
Zulus, who had degrees.

In 1976 the University of Zululand had only two black professors on its staff as
compared to 24 whites, 4 black senior lecturers and 47 whites and 17 black
lecturers as against 24 whites - a total of 23 black and 95 white academic members
of staff. Although a small minority of blacks continued to oppose University
apartheid, the majority had no alternative but to accept the institution, and
enrolment grew. In 1977 the Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Dr A. P.
Treurnicht, declared that applications from blacks for admission to Universities for
whites would be considered only in respect of courses that were not offered at black
Universities.

One of the disadvantages of Homeland Universities was that if, for any reason, a
black student was not acceptable to the University of his or her ethnic group, he or
she had no other University to go to and their professional ambitions could be at an
end. This became apparent in the 1976 academic year when 200 students were
refused admission after unrest at the University of Zululand. In June, part of the
buildings of the University of Zululand was destroyed, cars were set on fire and
whites had to flee for their lives when rioting broke out on the campus. The
destruction took place in order to express sympathy with the Soweto student riots

27 M. Maphumulo, Stanger, 6 January 2005.
and the University was closed for the rest of the year. Buthelezi reported in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in March 1977 that attempts were made by the KwaZulu Government to get those students who had been expelled from the University of Zululand either readmitted or admitted elsewhere. Owing to the unrest there were no graduates at all from the University of Zululand in that year.28

Previously, in May 1976, students at the University demonstrated against the “Bantustan system” at a graduation ceremony when an Honorary Doctorate of Law was conferred upon Buthelezi. His car was stoned, and a clash ensued between some students and some Buthelezi supporters. The main cause of the confrontation was Buthelezi’s acceptance of an honorary degree from a perceived Bantustan institution.29

As mentioned above, the University was not controlled by the Homeland Government, but from Pretoria. Buthelezi feared that this could cause indigenous orientation to be muted or missing. He compared the situation to that of the Afrikaner struggle for liberation from British colonialism at a time when such an orientation was an important element.30 However, in March 1977, steps were taken towards greater autonomy for black universities. Legislation contemplating this move was introduced in the Senate by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Education. Observers were of the opinion that the policy of Senate development would not, without adjustments, ensure harmony and orderly progress in South Africa. Government assumption and white attitude led Justice J.H Snyman to conclude that, although the militant black student organisation SASO and the rise of black consciousness could be blamed for anti-White hostility, “There was no doubt that the causes are rooted in the broad patterns of life of both white and black in South Africa”, and were not solely the responsibility of leftist agitation.31

The beginning of the 1980’s in KwaZulu and Natal witnessed a deepening of progressive political consciousness among black people in general, and among

29 Rand Daily Mail, 10 May 1976, p.21.
30 Daily News, 6 March 1975, p.27.
students in particular. As in 1976, the system of Bantu education had become the prime focus of attention criticized by political leaders and educationists alike. Students demanded the immediate abolition of ethnic education as they perceived it as devised to school the recipients for perpetual inequality. They called for an unconditional opening of all education institutions to all races as well as for free and compulsory education for every child of school-going age up to and including high school. In short, they demanded a single, non-racial, compulsory and free education system.32

Since 1976, the state had done little to initiate a more equitable and relevant educational system for South Africa’s blacks. State expenditure revealed a grossly discriminatory pattern in favour of the white minority. By 1980 even industrialists were expressing their dissatisfaction with the system of Bantu Education, criticizing it for failing to provide the skills required by South African industrial economy and for alienating black students from society. As John Parsons put it: “The demand for skilled workers was rising much faster than the white population’s ability to meet it”.33 For this reason training opportunities would have to be made available to Africans on a greater scale.

In 1980, black students in schools and Universities decided on other boycott campaigns to protest against what they perceived as inferior education. The call for the boycott of classes by COSAS was successful with students in all major urban centres throughout the country. In the KwaMashu and Umlazi townships of Durban over 6 000 students abandoned their studies despite concerted police action to break the protest. The Minister of National Education threatened to dismiss all teachers who supported the campaign, alleging that only agitators were behind the boycott. But instead of diminishing, boycott participant numbers grew, reportedly to more than 100 000 students, barely two months after the campaign had begun. Police preventative action stepped up against demonstrators. When teargas failed against these aggressive or violent resisters, police resorted to firearms.34 In the deepening crisis, Prime Minister P.W Botha decided to intervene.

34 N. Ncumalo: Gasha Buthelezi – A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.124.
He held talks with the Union of Teachers Associations of South Africa (which represented coloured teachers) and announced his recognition that teachers had justifiable grievances. He suggested that an inquiry into the desirability of a single education system for all races be instituted.35

Meanwhile in KwaZulu, Chief M.G Buthelezi ordered students in the two townships KwaMashu and Umlazi, under the administration of the KwaZulu Homeland, to return to school. The students defied him openly. The press interpreted this as a demonstration that students had become disenchanted with Bantustan leaders.36 Despite instructions in an Inkatha-designed course intended to produce disciplined citizens who would shy away from participating in strikes and boycotts, students in Natal Province proved to be as politically active as others in the rest of the country. A total of 36 schools within KwaZulu Homeland alone joined the protest. The Inkatha programme originated in 1979, included all schools under the KwaZulu Homeland. The subject, simply known as Inkatha, was taught as a compulsory (although non-examinable) part of the school curriculum for one hour per week at all levels. It dealt with various themes, e.g. the aims and achievements of Inkatha, discipline and conduct of Inkatha members, homelands and their future, the significance of the family, traditions and beliefs, African economic development and the need for African and modern rituals, roadwork and self defense.37

In the light of the students' defiance of his authority and the continuation of the schools boycott, Buthelezi in his Presidential address to the Inkatha Conference in 1980 complained that "Our teachers have failed to inculcate in our youth the right attitude to our struggle".38 He condemned the boycotts as protest politics and attacked elitists groups for manipulating school children. He issued a special warning to the Indian community to stop interfering with KwaZulu schools or face the consequences.39 In the face of the school boycott, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly adopted a resolution stating that Inkatha had a clear strategy for

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35 N. Nxumalo: Gwamba Buthelezi – A Chief with a Double Agenda, p 126.
37 Ibid, p 507.
liberation and that boycotting classes and damaging school buildings was not part of that strategy. Attacking certain lawyers in Natal for encouraging students to continue their boycott, Buthelezi charged evil political forces with thinking that they could attack Inkatha by mobilizing children. He provided a total onslaught against Inkatha, and asserted, that the boycotts had been engineered to show that the youth were spurning his leadership. He then called for the creation of vigilante groups which would shoot to kill if they found anyone interfering with school buildings. This step, he said, should be seen against the background of violence which some people were prepared to commit against him and members of his Legislative Assembly of KwaZulu.

In 1980, Buthelezi maintained that he wanted to train an army to keep order, to prevent the destruction of schools and to control riots. Training camps would be established and every Inkatha region would have its own para-military corps. Inkatha, he said, was committed to eradicate disorder in black politics. In 1980/81 Buthelezi, however, failed to contain the school boycotts and to control the undisciplined students.

Some Inkatha members quickly organized themselves in armed groups of warriors wielding spears and sjamboks. They began to intimidate and disrupt meetings of students planned to proceed with the boycott. At a meeting in the KwaMashu sports stadium addressed by Buthelezi, a KwaMashu religious minister, Rev. W.B. Mbambo, was severely injured after being attacked by 200 warriors, for allegedly being one of those urging the school boycott. In response to a statement on the necessity for warrior groups to be established to maintain law and order, a Minister of the KaNgwane Homeland warned of the dangers of a proliferation of private armies among blacks and said that the Inyandza National Movement in KaNgwane would reconsider its affiliation to the Inkatha-led South African Black Alliance (SABA) if the proposed warriors acted against the students. The creation of these warriors, he said, would result in collaboration with the white Central Government.

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in suppressing the often valid protests of students. He expressed dismay over the alleged assault by Inkatha warriors on students in KwaMashu.\textsuperscript{43}

Oscar Dlomo, Inkatha General Secretary in 1981, replied: “We must not be blamed for any action we take against those who are not in school on Monday. We must not be blamed if we lose patience”.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1982 clashes between Inkatha warriors and students had become daily occurrences, with students being attacked indiscriminately in the streets. In various subsequent court cases, students described how they were abducted, beaten, handcuffed by certain prominent Inkatha officials, and taken to Ulundi, capital of the KwaZulu Homeland. Some women also signed affidavits to confirm that Inkatha members had beaten them in their homes, while some students complained that their homes had been burnt down.\textsuperscript{45}

Concluding that Buthelezi now took the same position as the apartheid regime with regard to their grievances, students in the Durban townships began to organize branches of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), which campaigned against the indoctrination of students by the Inkatha syllabus. It called for democratically elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs) and the linking up of students’ grievances with other national political demands in the country. This indicated that the Inkatha Youth Brigade had lost support, especially as more and more students found their aspirations articulated and defended by COSAS. In response to this, the Inkatha Youth Brigade set about establishing contact with right-wing Afrikaner parties and student organizations. They met with the enlightened SRC of the Stellenbosch University and attended the annual congress of the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) in Potchefstroom.\textsuperscript{46}

Responding to the growth of COSAS in Natal, Chief Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that it was formed as a front organisation for the ANC’s

\textsuperscript{44} The Star, 13 September 1980, p.16.
\textsuperscript{45} Institute for Black Research: Special Report: Unrest in Natal, p.84.
\textsuperscript{46} Institute of Race Relations: Annual Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1980, p.506.
mission in exile. This allegation led to the detention of COSAS members by the security police. Inevitably the students took this to mean that Buthelezi, far from fighting oppression, was instead assisting the very regime which the people were opposing.47

During this period unrest had also flared up at the University of Zululand. With a graduation ceremony pending, a student body meeting adopted a resolution calling on Buthelezi in his capacity as a Chancellor of the University, to restrain Inkatha warriors from attending the ceremony in their uniforms and demanded that both the University Administration and Buthelezi should not allow the graduation ceremony to be turned into an Inkatha rally. On graduation day, 23 May 1980, students attempted to prevent armed Inkatha warriors from entering the campus. The police were called in by the University authorities to disperse students assembled at the entrance gates. Shots were fired by the police and teargas and trained dogs were used to disperse the students. Fifteen students were arrested before a large armed Inkatha regiment arrived in a massive show of force.48

The arrival of these Inkatha warriors initiated an assault on the students. In the violence that ensued the student hall, a science laboratory and dining hall were burnt down, causing damage estimated at R50 000. The following day the entire student body staged a sit-in, and police were again called in by the administration to break it up. Buthelezi warned that he would close the University if it did not serve the people.49

The tendency to employ violence against demonstrating opponents of Inkatha took a step further in 1981 when Buthelezi established the first Inkatha parliamentary training camp near Ulundi, known as the Emandleni Matleng camp.50 It was referred to by Buthelezi as the youth service corps for reconstruction. Musa Zondi, then chairperson of the Inkatha youth brigade, stated that the camp was

established in order to prevent prevailing militancy in the schools.\textsuperscript{51} Buthelezi frequently visited the Inkatha Youth camp. The trainees wore their own uniforms and were subdivided in sections, brigades and companies. Five sections constituted a brigade, and four brigades formed a company. Physical training took place between 04:00 and 07:00 each morning. The rest of the day was spent on lectures covering various topics, the gist of which comprised the Inkatha syllabus for KwaZulu schools. Because most of the youths in the camps were so-called school dropouts, the courses included vocational training with emphasis on bricklaying, elementary mechanics, plumbing and other such trades. To the vast numbers of unemployed and starving youths in the KwaZulu Homeland, these camps served as refuge where they could obtain free meals.\textsuperscript{52}

Reporting back to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly after attending the annual conference of the “Natal Society of Inspectors” of the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture in 1984, Buthelezi said that “besides the problems created by the Bantu Education Act, community schools contributed very little towards solving the problems of black schools”.\textsuperscript{53} At this conference the inspectors recommended that the community schools should be converted to government schools with all the facilities needed and that adequate staffing and upgrading courses, as well as in-service centres and further education centres be made available to the teachers so that they would be able to better equip themselves for their work.\textsuperscript{54}

The President of the society, W. Mhlambo, said that the Department was trying its best to help teachers to upgrade themselves. A new in-service centre was planned for Madadeni (the township of Newcastle) and construction was due to start. According to Mhlambo, changes which had been made in education included the following: Firstly, the establishment of homelands Governments with their own departments of education which led to the removal of school boards and mother tongue instruction in standards three to six. Secondly, the clash over the use of

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Daily News}, 27 May 1984, p.11.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Natal Mercury}, 14 September 1984, p.32.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Umxoxi}, vol. 1, 1988, p.36. “Low metric pass rate under microscope.”
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in certain subjects in primary schools which culminated in riots of 1976, led to the removal of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction and the change of the name of the Department of Bantu Education.55

The inspectors were of opinion that poor teaching, poor school buildings, under-qualified teachers and political overtones necessitated improvements in the machinery of black education. They also spelled out other problems that jeopardized black education, such as the leaking of examination papers and inadequate funding. Mhlambo spoke about the significance of the removal of apartheid's shackles.56 He said that this would provide a master key to unlock the citadel of the ideal education in the post-apartheid era, thereby bringing about a uniform system of education under the umbrella of a common ministry to alleviate plurality of education systems and departments. He also spoke about uniformity, which would ensure a confluence of ideas, values, knowledge and action. Lastly, he advocated a re-definition of the education system based on common collective effort in establishing the agenda for the future, which would encompass inter-racially recognized responsibility to design schools for the future.57

In line with the school inspectors, in 1989 Dr. Buthelezi laid down his expectations of the post-apartheid era. He said that the IFP's primary goals in education were to raise the levels of literacy and numeracy, and to promote technical, vocational and analytical skills. The state should ensure equal access to educational opportunities by establishing an enabling environment in terms of skills and resources. The state should not be the sole provider of education. Dr. Buthelezi maintained that education is an extension of the primarily social and training function of the family. Therefore parents and communities must be the primary custodians of the education system. The state, the church, parents, communities, and employers should assume joint responsibility for education.58

55 Umfxozi, vol. 1, 1988, p.29. “Low matric pass rate under microscope”.
In 1990 the KwaZulu Government issued its manifesto outlining its stance on education and the role that KwaZulu Homeland expected to play in a post-apartheid South Africa. In keeping with the IFP federal approach, the provision and management of education were regarded as a provincial matter. All schools and colleges had to be regulated in terms of provincial legislation. The role of the national Department of Education was to monitor compliance with essential universal norms and standards. Teachers would be employed by the provincial administration on the recommendations of principals and governing bodies. Apart from legislative competence over primary and secondary schools, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly took the view that provinces should also enjoy legislative and executive powers over tertiary education, including teacher training colleges.59

Education would be financed from the State’s budgetary allocations. However, state allocations should be strengthened by private sector donations and grants, which should be tax deductible. In addition to the basic form of funding, schools serving disadvantaged communities, should receive money from a redress fund, which would be used to improve grounds, buildings other infrastructure and equipment. The IFP did not believe in uniform or nationally determined teacher/pupil ratios being implemented. In 1992 they argued that such ratios were a conclusive determinant of quality, thereby justifying their enforcement. Under IFP policy, however, school authorities would obviously be strongly encouraged to move closer to the average pupil-teacher ratio, depending on budgetary affordability and sustainability.60

The KwaZulu Government believed that one of the most important tasks in education was to improve the quality of education. Excellence in the teaching profession was encouraged by rewarding teachers who had improved their qualifications. In particular, the quality of school principals was one of the most significant elements in an educational system that achieved excellence. In February 1994 school principals were encouraged to master a much wider range of skills than teachers, since they had major managerial and leadership responsibilities.61

Hence, it was foreseen that a special college should be established, dedicated to the training of principals. It should function to provide both full-time and part-time training of teachers who wished to acquire the more diverse skills expected in effective principals. These included administrative, co-ordination, planning, community, interaction, negotiation and fundraising skills. Such training would be regarded as a strong recommendation in the promotion of teachers to the rank of principals.\(^{62}\)

The IFP strongly advocated the policy of a well structured in-service training programme for most practicing teachers. The approach compensated for low levels of expertise at the operational level of many teachers. In order to improve teacher participation rates in in-service training programmes, a system of incentives would be explored and implemented. Consideration could be given to the awarding of certificates of attendance which would count in the teacher’s favour in merit assessment. A culture of learning, responsibility and authority had to be promoted in schools, while discipline and orderly classrooms should also be maintained.

Hence, pluralism characterized the fundamental principles of the IFP’s vision for post-apartheid South Africa. This implied recognition of culture diversity, which should be maintained. Pluralism would also support a range of different institutions which would cater to the specific needs and desires of communities and civil society. Adherence to pluralism is believed to be a philosophy of nation building, meaning that the organization of society should be organized from the bottom up, as opposed to the imposition of structures from the top down by the central state.\(^{63}\)

The principle of pluralism in education, according to Buthelezi, has two major and parallel implications. Firstly, matters should be governed and administered by the lowest levels of government capable of performing the particular functions, and secondly, the maximum scope should be allowed for voluntary initiatives by the communities themselves in their own governance and administration. Education is

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viewed as a function which is most appropriately organized at levels which are closest to community tiers of government. The IFP believed very firmly that effective school education should depend on legitimate, accountable and effective school governing bodies. In these bodies, parents would constitute 75% of the membership. Representatives of the scholars should be drawn from those in standard 8 or higher. The powers of school governing bodies should be embodied in the departmental regulations.

In spite of the major problems encountered in 1972, viz the shortage of human and material resources, illiteracy was overcome in the KwaZulu Homeland with the result that more than 85% of the population could read and write in 1994.
CHAPTER 7

Health and Welfare

In KwaZulu the Department of Health and Welfare had as its main aim the task to improve and maintain the health and social welfare of the citizens of KwaZulu.¹ Health services were improved in this homeland with the provision of additional clinics. None the less, the quality of health care remained low and unsatisfactory. The reasons for this state of affairs were, inter alia, poor financial planning, inadequate attention to the infrastructural implications of new policies, personnel dissatisfaction, insufficient attention to training and a confrontational approach of individuals and / the authorities in general to the private health care sector.²

The history of the provision of health and welfare services in KwaZulu Homeland was one of overlap, duplication, gaps and wastage of resources through the division of the geographical area occupied by KwaZulu and Natal into separate politico-administrative units, and through the segregation of services on a racial basis, thereby involving the multiplication of departments and organizations concerned with health and welfare needs in the region of KwaZulu Homeland and Natal Province.³ Often several departments or authorities were involved in the same area, whereas other areas were virtually a kind of 'no man's land' where no one in particular seemed to be responsible and where, consequently, little if anything was done.

It is interesting to note that Edendale Hospital in the Pietermaritzburg Metropolitan area, which served a large Zulu population, used to function under the auspices of Natal Province, but was transferred to KwaZulu Homeland Government, whereas King Edward VIII Hospital, which was an even bigger hospital in Durban, resorted under the Natal Provincial Administration. The reason no doubt was that Edendale was classed as part of the KwaZulu Homeland, whereas Durban was physically part of Natal Province and King Edward Hospital was located in a white urban area.

There were also areas where the provision of services was made available for one group exclusively, while people of other racial groups, living just across a boundary, did not have access to these medical services. They therefore had to go kilometers in an opposite direction in order to obtain the services provided for their own particular racial group. For example, within the greater Durban metropolitan region, as far as Zulu people were concerned, the nearest large hospital serving KwaMashu Township was King Edward VIII Hospital under the Natal Provincial Administration. KwaMashu fell under KwaZulu Homeland authorities. In such a situation, there would obviously be a need for separate regional hospitals to be provided in the Inanda/KwaMashu area for black South Africans. This was obviously not a practical solution, given the scarcity of resources and the high cost of building such hospitals. Apart from the cost factor, the staffing of such hospitals was extremely problematic given the racial variety and related complications.

Another example in the field of health provision is the fact that the towns of Estcourt and Ladysmith had Provincial hospitals, but that there were no hospitals exclusively for Zulu citizens in the adjoining KwaZulu area. There were talks of the need to provide KwaZulu Homeland with hospitals, but it was also realized that great expenditure would have to be incurred in order to achieve, at best, a duplication of existing services. One hospital for the whole Ladysmith area and another for the whole Estcourt area would have been quite adequate if they were served by an extensive primary health care service. Given the shortage of doctors and the high cost of hospital services, the Republic of South Africa and KwaZulu Homeland could not afford the duplication and wasteful usage of limited resources which the provision of facilities on a politically and racially segregated basis would require.

KwaZulu had no private profit-oriented hospitals and as mentioned above, there was a shortage of doctors, which was most serious in the isolated rural areas. The shortage was due to the fact that too few doctors were being trained, and because their background and training attracted them to urban areas. This shortage was

\[4\text{ R. Mashibela, KwaMashu, 11 March 2005.}
\[5\text{ Post, 11 January 1977, p.34.}
worsened by the fact that resources provided for health care in the KwaZulu
Homeland were inadequate and maldistributed. Too much money and too many
staff members were involved in high technology and expensive hospitals, in
comparison to the urgent need for primary health care, namely the promotive,
preventive, basic curative services of health centres and clinics needed by the
greatest number of Zulu people.

In 1981 Larsen and Ross, in their memorandum on Health Services, pointed out
that not only were the numbers of doctors being trained inadequate, but those that
were trained, tended to gravitate to city posts due to the following reasons:

“Most Medical Students were from cities, since cities had the schools that
were equipped to produce the high educational qualifications required of
health care workers. Trainees became accustomed to the advantages of city
life while they were being trained. Rural practice could not compete with
urban conditions of medical practice because facilities might not match their
expertise and rural services were often neglected in favour of city services,
which were favoured by administrative authorities.”

It may be added that the financial rewards of urban medical practice were probably
significantly higher on the average than those for rural practices.

At the opening of the R3 285 million wing of the Madadeni Hospital in the year
1984, Dr. D. Hackland, Secretary of the Department of Health in KwaZulu, spoke
vigorously about the shortage of doctors in the rural areas of KwaZulu. In line with
Dr. Hackland, Buthelezi added that during his travels abroad, he often appealed to
different Governments to send more doctors to South Africa, in particular to
KwaZulu, as their contribution to the black liberation struggle. “I often tell them
that we have only one doctor for every 90 000 blacks in South Africa,” he said.
“The Italian Government is the only Western Government which has responded by
sending us specialists”, he added. Three of the Italian specialists worked at
Madadeni, namely Dr Kozma, who was a specialist Obstetrician, Dr Norzi, a

1 T. Gwala, Ngwelezane Hospital, 12 March 2005.
specialist Paediatrician, and Dr Rottega, a specialist Anaesthetist. Some of their colleagues were posted at other hospitals such as Ngwelezane and Edendale. Dr. Hackland, in turn, named two hospitals in KwaZulu Homeland, viz. Mbongolwane at Eshowe, and Nkonjeni at Ulundi, which did not have fulltime doctors. It appeared that overseas doctors were reluctant to work in rural areas and many of them were discouraged by the political unrest in South Africa, especially in KwaZulu and Natal where violence became endemic.

However, plans were made to offer more contracts to overseas doctors. In 1988, for example, only 39 of the 62 fulltime doctors in the rural hospitals were South African citizens. "The Department of Health is very grateful to have an Italian organization, FATE BENE FRATELL, (Benefit of Society), for the provision of seven specialists in various disciplines. These doctors are doing magnificent work at Edendale, Ngwelezane and Madadeni, where the services have been upgraded",9 said Buthelezi.

Furthermore, the follow-up of patients became rather like an "Alice in Wonderland" exercise when one was forced to criss-cross boundaries. In Durban for instance, a man injured at work might live in KwaZulu (say in uMiazi or KwaMashu) and work in Natal (in an industrial area in Durban). He may then be treated by the Natal Provincial Administration Hospital in Durban (King Edward VIII Hospital) and when discharged, he may move out of the jurisdiction of the NPA hospital to KwaZulu Homeland, where he actually lived! It might well be that the clinics there were not able to provide the adequate follow up care. Strictly speaking, and probably in practice too, the Natal Provincial Hospital could not follow up the case, which would then become a case of KwaZulu Homeland, unless and until the man could go back to work and become indisposed again in order to be sent back to the Natal Provincial Hospital.10

In the welfare field, a social worker from the Department of Internal Affairs' Coloured Affairs section might be required to travel all the way from Durban up to

9 Natal Mercury, 4 September 1984, p.17.
Nongoma in order to consult with a Coloured client. This would involve several hundred kilometers of travel from the regional office. On arrival, the light skinned client might turn out to be a person registered under the population registration Act as either a Coloured person or perhaps a Zulu. In the first instance there would be a problem in helping and keeping an eye on a client at a long distance. In the second case there could be the question of a fruitless day-long journey just to find out that the client should be the responsibility of KwaZulu. This could happen in spite of the fact that a black social worker was available and within easier reach of the client. The burning problem was centred in the fact that the black social worker belonged to the wrong Department (namely KwaZulu).11

The following case history illustrates the above mentioned point:

Mrs. C. was a Coloured (Zulu-speaking) woman living at Nongoma. Her husband was an alcoholic in need of rehabilitation. The problem precipitated a great deal of stress at family level. The husband’s placement in a rehabilitation centre, together with the preceding investigation and the subsequent aftercare, were technically the responsibilities of the social workers employed in Durban by the Department of Internal Affairs (Coloured Affairs). However they were able to visit the case in the Nongoma area only once a month or less frequently. By contrast, there was a black social worker at Nongoma, but technically speaking he/she was not authorized to intervene or render services, despite being on the spot. Such a situation represented an illogical and irrational use of scarce human resources.12

Added to the type of problem illustrated above, was the one of low professional standards of care consequent upon a policy of having social workers of the client’s race group only available once a month or even only once in six months (as was the case in some of the remote areas), in spite of the fact that a qualified social worker of another race group (and so another department) lived and worked in the area. In this way professional standards were often sacrificed because of a preoccupation with racial identity. The social services working group believed that clients should

have the right of access to the services and counselling skills of the nearest social worker.13

Another kind of case further emphasizes this point,

“The Department of Health, Welfare and Pensions of the South African Government realized that it could not provide foster care facilities in the rural areas, because of the problem of supervision, and so the children were brought in to urban areas and placed in foster care. This had the disadvantage that they might be removed some considerable distance away from their biological parents. Again, in rural areas social workers from another department were probably available to keep an eye on the children and provide the necessary foster care, which would allow the children to be fostered near their biological mothers”.14

The working group noted that generally, as far as welfare services were concerned, the services available to all population groups of the metropolitan areas and major towns in KwaZulu Homeland and Natal Province were either inadequate or non-existent. This situation was further exacerbated by the arrangement whereby services were rendered on a segregated racial basis.

School Health Services, as far as whites in the Natal area were concerned, fell under the province, and were organized through the Department of Education. With regard to schools in KwaZulu Homeland, they fell under the KwaZulu Department of Health and Welfare. In addition to health services mentioned above, private practitioners also provided medical care. Medical aid societies also played a role in spreading the cost of such care, but these services were very largely limited to Natal Province, and mainly involved the white population.15

In a preliminary report on school health services in the Natal, the Department of Community Health at the University of Natal in 1980 undertook a survey of school health services as well as the health status of pupils in three magisterial districts of

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KwaZulu. The findings indicated that school health services were vestigial in these areas. This situation was associated with the separation of school health services from the comprehensive clinic services provided in the other areas. While the health status, including the nutritional status, of the pupils was found to be generally satisfactory, dental disease was markedly prevalent. However, it was found that the environmental circumstances in respect to the provision of water and toilet facilities were generally very poor. Apart from recommending that school KwaZulu health services be integrated with health services, the investigators recommended in addition that attention should be directed to the inclusion of formal health education in the school curriculum and that dental services should be regarded as an important aspect of health care for children, including those attending school.16

Another problem in regard to the provision of health and welfare services in KwaZulu was the reliance, both in spheres of medicine and welfare, on highly trained personnel. Doctors, and to a lesser extent social workers and nurses, were expensive to train and even more expensive to maintain. In KwaZulu Homeland little use had been made of community health workers and welfare auxiliaries. If even the United States of America, one of the richest countries in the world which then spent 9% of its gross national product on health care, turned to medical auxiliaries, then there was no wonder as to why a small, but increasing number of voices raised the question “Why not also in South Africa”?17 The final problem was associated with the incompleteness or even absence of the readily available statistical material to gauge the nature and extent of health and welfare problems in KwaZulu.

The provision of health and welfare required a considerable degree of rationalization due to the highly fragmented nature of KwaZulu and the arbitrary basis of boundaries shared with Natal Province. Rationalization was also necessary due to limited resources of manpower, facilities and money within the KwaZulu Homeland and Natal. Such rationalization also included a co-ordinated scheme between the

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KwaZulu and Natal authorities. The provision of medical services called for a single unitary structure for the delivery of health, welfare and other community services, including education, to this Homeland. The goal of this single, unitary structure was to maximize the use of limited manpower and resources, by avoiding wasteful overlaps, bureaucratic multiplications, and avoiding gaps in services.\textsuperscript{18}

Social and health services in the KwaZulu Homeland cannot be viewed as merely individual patient or client-oriented casework, but as services which were mainly community orientated, designed to build new, socio-cultural institutions which would enhance regional social, economic and moral (in the broader sense of the term) development. Evidence suggested strongly that a community base approach could be more effective than an individual based approach.

Training and education of the community for development and social change, including urbanization, had to be part of such an integrated programme for social and economic development. Workers in the broader field of community services, including health and welfare, were to be specially trained to organize a range of community outreach programmes. The training of community leaders also formed a vital part of planned development and change in KwaZulu Homeland.

The concept of primary health care received high priority in planning. KwaZulu experienced various problems with regard to an infrastructure base in hospital services. This did not lend itself to adopt the principle of primary health care. Restructuring and reallocation of available resources and priorities were necessary in order to allow medical staff at grassroots level, many of whom had already attended symposia and workshops on primary health care and community health work, to start implementing these ideas.\textsuperscript{19}

In its resolution of 29 May 1980, the KwaZulu Government established the Buthelezi Commission to enquire and report, inter alia, on the provision of social services, amenities and community facilities available to the people of KwaZulu and


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Clarin Call}, vol. I, 1984, p.7. “Primary health care should be given priority”. 
to make recommendations to suggest improvement of such services and in regard to appropriate forms of community development and the role of various authorities in such development.20

In its Report, the Commission recommended the establishment of a Social Services and Development Committee for each local region and district within KwaZulu Homeland. If a coordinated, unified approach was not possible, the Committee suggested either a joint KwaZulu/Natal committee, a parallel regional and district committee, or parallel regional and district committees. One of the main purposes and functions of these committees were to determine the needs of the local Regions in terms of healthcare and welfare. A further need was to determine available resources of manpower, medical facilities and existing programmes, and then to plan a strategy for the provision of services and for community and district development, with community and leadership education for development and change as a priority.21

According to these recommendations the district committee was appointed in 1981 by the Social Economic Commission in consultation with the local communities in a district. The composition of a particular committee was largely determined by local needs. One third of its members were from Government Departments and two thirds from the community, drawn from various groups such as churches, voluntary organizations, farmers’ associations, school committees, chambers of commerce and industry, etc. Initially community members were to be appointed, but once the system was operating they could be elected. Community participation and representation were vital; therefore unnecessary large committees, be avoided in KwaZulu Homeland.

Each district committee included the following senior personnel:
- The Medical Manager of the district (this could be a Community Physician, who was responsible for managing, coordinating, and evaluating total health care at district level, viz which would normally be a Health Ward)

21 Ibid., p.415.
- The Magistrate or his representative
- The Superintendent of a hospital (where the district had its own hospital)
- The Senior Nurse in the district
- The Senior Social Worker in the district
- A Representative of Educational Services in the area
- An Agricultural Officer.22

Following Larson and Ross, the central head office was situated in Pietermaritzburg, because of its central position in terms of a communication network in KwaZulu and Natal. Regional offices were established at Ulundi, Newcastle, Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Port Shepstone.23 The major function of each regional office was to integrate the planning and the provision of district health services and to monitor activities at the regional level in order to ensure a degree of quality control. It also supervised the collection and regular recording of necessary medical statistics.24

The KwaZulu Homeland aimed at total community development through integrated delivery of health, welfare and other services, particularly in underdeveloped rural districts. A fundamental aspect of the scheme for providing integrated services was the training and use of community workers, whose task, inter alia, was not merely to educate and help people at grassroots level in regard to health and welfare, but also to involve them in community decision-making and the heightening of morale and community commitment for development and change.

The type of model provided by the Manguzi Methodist Hospital, under the direction of Dr. D Prozesky, was highly relevant. The approach of this hospital, with its outreach into the surrounding district, was more and more for the provision of primary health services and education in third world countries. The community workers were utilized as educators and as the first line of provision for simple medical services, and the screening of patients for referral to specialist attention. Tied in with the provision of primary health care were the provision of safe water,

24 J.V. Larsen : " The need for integration of services", Journal for Hospital Medicine, 1982, pp.128-129.
and the hygienic disposal of human and other waste. This in turn linked with the border issues of community and rural development. It was envisaged that a multi-disciplinary team of health workers, welfare workers, agricultural advisors, educationalists, and others should be the spearhead of a programme of integrated rural and also urban community development in KwaZulu Homeland.\textsuperscript{25}

Amongst the recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission, was that KwaZulu needed to have improved social welfare and health legislation. Black social workers in KwaZulu Homeland lacked security of professional registration. It was recommended that KwaZulu had to adopt the Social and Associated Workers Act (no.110 of 1978) of the Republic of South Africa, by means of an enabling Act. Secondly, it should adopt the Fund Raising Act (no 107 of 1978) and the National Welfare Act (no 100 of 1978). It was recommended as a desirable long-term goal that a single Welfare Board is created to for all population groups in Natal Province and KwaZulu Homeland as one unit. The working groups were of opinion that it was highly desirable to remove the extensive bureaucratic multiplication involved by the provision of a multiplicity of authorities for welfare in KwaZulu Homeland and Natal Province.\textsuperscript{26}

Health legislation empowered certain categories of health and welfare workers, such as community health workers, to enter any private property for routine primary health care inspection and education, and for welfare purposes, particularly with regard to workers. This was particularly relevant for rural workers not brought into continuous contact with primary health care and other community welfare workers. The working group recommended the need for “an integrated, comprehensive, accessible, acceptable and accountable Health Act, where accountability was to be in terms of the effectiveness of services”.\textsuperscript{27} In speaking and writing about health matters, the term “community health worker” was to be preferred to the sometimes more frequently used term “village health worker”. The former term covered a community-base approach in both rural and urban areas, whereas the term “village health worker” appeared to refer to the rural areas only.

\textsuperscript{25} D. Prozesky : Memorandum on Community Health Workers in Mangazi Methodist Hospital , 1980 , p.45.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.425.
In 1988 the KwaZulu Government encouraged nurses to upgrade their status. Accordingly enrolled nurses (staff nurses) became registered nurses (sisters) by undertaking a new two year training programme which was offered by the Nursing Council.28 Announcing this, Mrs. Dlomo, then a head of Nursing Services of the KwaZulu Government, said the training programme had been introduced in an effort to alleviate the shortage of registered nurses. She emphasised that this did not mean that staff nurses who failed this additional training would lose their jobs, but that they would be encouraged to undertake the course, available only for ten years.29

This meant that enrolled nurses were given ten years to upgrade themselves. However, enrolled nurses with standard eight first had to obtain Metric exemption before being allowed to register for the programme.30 Those who did not take the course remained in the Nursing Council.

In 1988 the Senior Nursing Service Manager in the KwaZulu Department of Health, Mrs. E.C Buthelezi, returned from Britain after completing her Masters Degree in Health Facility Planning at the North London Polytechnic. She was asked to use her knowledge and assist in the establishment of a Health Services and Health Planning Unit.31 She said it was a policy of KwaZulu Homeland to increase the number of the clinics in the territory. Mrs. Buthelezi was a nursing veteran. She started her general nursing training in Baragwanath Hospital in 1955 and after completing her training in 1958, continued to work at Baragwanath for another year. In 1961 she joined the staff of Hlabisa Hospital and in 1962 she was transferred to Ceza Hospital. In 1962 she was also promoted to Senior Sister and was transferred to Nkonjeni where she became assistant matron in March 1974. In August that year she became the first Zulu matron at Nkonjeni. She worked as a

senior matron until 1984 when the Department of Health seconded her to become Nursing Service Manager.\textsuperscript{32}

In the welfare field, D.C. du Plessis was appointed Secretary of the National Department of Welfare and Pensions. He took up his position on January 1988 after leaving his position as Director of the Department of Development Administration in Pretoria. Born in Harrismith, he matriculated at Elliot in Transkei in 1960 and started working in the Elliot Magistrates' offices. In 1962 he was transferred to Pretoria where he joined the Department of Justice as a reviser of documents. He resigned in February 1963 and registered at the University of the Orange Free State he graduated in 1965 with a BA. He then worked for the black local authority in Welkom until 1971. In 1972 (the year in which KwaZulu Homeland was formed) he worked as an assistant for Black Affairs in the Vryburg Municipality. In 1973 he became National Director of housing and labour. Du Plessis felt at home in KwaZulu as he knew the Zulu culture and regarded it as an honour to serve the Zulu people. Lastly, he was prepared to use his vast experience in working tirelessly for the benefit of the Zulu.\textsuperscript{33}

The new ideas inculcated new practical steps and progress in the health care services in the KwaZulu Homeland between 1972 and 1994. The KwaZulu Government ensured that the poor people were at least able to satisfy their minimum needs. This was regarded as social security. Large amounts of money were spent on the physically disabled and other disadvantaged groups each year. Social services, including free hospitalization, family allowances, unemployment insurance, medical services and subsidized pension services were made the priority. These services were provided because the KwaZulu Government was held responsible for the well-being of its people.

\textsuperscript{32} Daily News, 13 October 1988, p.17.
\textsuperscript{33} Natal Mercury, 30 November 1988, p.31.