CHAPTER 8
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN KWAZULU

Prior to 1970, the Zulu people were under the Kingship, put in place since the days of King Shaka, yet also controlled by the Pretoria Government. The King had absolute powers over his people, e.g. he could dictate the terms, but was unable to meet the needs of the large majority of the Zulu population. Some Zulu members, especially the elite, were critical about this. Influenced by the winds of change that was blowing through the African Continent, these members saw a need to be politically represented. Such views coincided with Buthelezi’s own aspirations of establishing Inkatha.

I. Inkatha and Political Mobilisation

Before looking at the kind of organization that was created in 1975, it is necessary to scrutinize the immediate reasons for its creation. The process that led to the formation of Inkatha during the 1970s is not all that clear as there are several references to the existence of a body called Inkatha that predate its official formation in March 1975.

The early 1970s witnessed a difficult period for Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He found himself under serious political attack from many quarters, particularly militant black youth and students in Saso. In order to bolster his increasingly challenged national political role, Buthelezi decided to create an organizational power base with which to confront critics of his political position.1 While trying to project a national political role, he was again forced back to his political roots and to the only political constituency readily available to him – the Zulu people. In order to do this effectively, Buthelezi revived an organization, which could accommodate all Zulus in a single cultural movement and to which every Zulu could feel an attachment. This was Inkatha ka Zulu, originally set up in 1922 by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu.

Langner argues that Inkatha was founded after a meeting between Prime Minister Vorster and eight Bantustan representatives in 1974. According to Langner, after a meeting in 1975, it was reported that Vorster had not agreed to any of the major requests made by the Bantustan representatives, although minor concessions were made, such as the inclusion of blacks on the boards of Bantustan development corporations. According to Langner, Inkatha was founded in KwaZulu eight days after a report-back meeting that was addressed by Buthelezi in Umlazi. This might be stretching the events somewhat, as it is known that a process of reforming Inkatha was already well underway at that stage. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the frustration of the Bantustan leaders that dated back much further, would have influenced the decision to go ahead with the formation meeting that was held at KwaMzimela near Melmoth. Langner maintains that the motivation for Inkatha lay in an attempt, first, to oppose the decisive effect of the apartheid policy, and, second, to stimulate self-reliance in the Zulu people.

Among the most sacred articles of the Zulu, of which the King was a custodian, is Inkatha, a sacred coil symbolizing the unity of the people, the circular power of which is believed to be able to round up all traitors and disaffected subjects and join them together with the rest of the nation in its affection for the King. Tradition has it that should Inkatha be destroyed the King and his family would suffer illness and misfortune until a new one was made and consecrated since it was believed that a King and a nation without an Inkatha angered the spirits. Inkatha was used on all great occasions, for example, on his coronation the King stood in the centre of the Inkatha, while izimboni (praise poets) sang his praises and called upon ancestors to be with the King and nation. Even when the King was ill, he was made to sit on the Inkatha while izinyanga (traditional Zulu doctors) treated him. By using the name, Inkatha, Buthelezi evoked a deeply rooted cultural sentiment among the Zulu people. By linking a cultural symbol to political action it created in people’s minds, particularly those in rural areas, the idea that to be against

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3 Ibid., p.34.
4 N. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi: A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.119.
Inkatha was to turn ones back on one's nation and culture. Buthelezi made it clear that Inkatha was first and foremost a cultural movement for the Zulu people, and that it would serve as a centre around which the Zulu people were to be organized. According to him the main aim of reviving Inkatha was to foster a spirit of unity among the Zulu people of KwaZulu and throughout Southern Africa. It was agreed that the organization would help to promote and encourage the development of the people of KwaZulu, spiritually, economically, educationally and politically.\(^5\)

Nxumalo argued that if Inkatha was to be seen as continuing the tradition of Zulu culture after which the organization was named, then a role within it had to be fashioned for the Zulu King. With the King and Buthelezi in conflict with regard to the Legislative Assembly at the time, Inkatha provided a cultural tool for reconciliation as its social meaning was precisely centred in the idea that all quarrels must be buried for the sake of unity. Buthelezi therefore needed the King's support for this organization.

In 1975 King Zwelithini welcomed the formation of Inkatha, perhaps because he saw it as a means whereby his own position could be properly organized. However, the Inkatha constitution ensured that the King would not be anything beyond 'Patron-in-chief' of the organisation. The constitution also limited the king to an advisory role to the president, as well as only allowing him to address meetings on any national issue other than purely controversial political matters. The implication here is that, as a cultural organization, Inkatha's President would logically be regarded as the cultural head of the Zulu people. In terms of traditional custom, the King is the traditional head of the Zulu. Therefore just as the KwaZulu Bantustan constitution had reduced the traditional political status of the King, Inkatha's constitution extended that to the King's traditional cultural standing.\(^6\)

When Inkatha was discussed in the KwaZulu Legislative assembly for the first time during April 1975, Buthelezi made the claim that the organization was the "base from which to plan our liberation. I said in the past, we need liberation even from

\(^6\) N. Nxumalo : Gatsha Buthelezi : A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.119.
such things as ignorance, poverty and disease. It was for this reason that I announced that we are reviving Inkatha".7 At a press conference held in Melmoth, Buthelezi said: “Inkatha plainly declares itself to be an instrument of liberation. The business of black liberation is our business. The important thing I wish to stress here is that it is absolutely vital in our struggle for liberation for every organization which emerges among blacks to make possible unity with other black organizations. Division and the chewing of the end of mutual recrimination have been the bane that has thwarted our struggle for far too long".8

When Buthelezi re-emphasized that Inkatha was not a political party he said: “all members of the Zulu nation are automatically the members of Inkatha if they are Zulus. There may be members who are inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or she is a member of Zulu nation”.9 The message was clear; to oppose Inkatha was to oppose the Zulu nation, to form any other organization was to break the unity that Inkatha gave, and to criticize Inkatha and its leadership was to meddle in the Zulu nation. The first National Council and general conference meeting of Inkatha held in July 1975, accepted Buthelezi as the unchallenged leader of the four and half million (4.5 million) Zulus in their struggle and he was empowered to speak on behalf of all Zulus.10

In 1975 Buthelezi told the KwaZulu Legislative assembly that the first Inkatha was something that King Solomon KaDinziulu had “dreamed-up” to promote economic development of the Zulu people.11 He stressed that what he was talking about was not a political party but a national movement. He continued: “As Chief Executive Councillor I would like to propose that this ‘Ibandla’ is not a party when we call ourselves ‘Inkatha kaZulu,’ so that whosoever has ambitions will be outside this Inkatha kaZulu”.12 In 1973 Buthelezi distributed the 1928 constitution to the

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1 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Second Session of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 1 April 1975, p.134.
2 N. Nxumalo: Gasha Buthelezi: A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.120.
3 Ibid., p.121.
5 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Second Session of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 1 April 1975, p.10.
6 Ibid., p.11.
members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. He repeated an earlier reason for the revival of Inkatha, namely, economic upliftment. "We should not stop to do anything to improve our situation. Once we have a measure of economic power our battle will be half won. That is why we should all support movements such as Inkatha KaZulu and the Black Bank".

Inkatha was formed in 1975 within the KwaZulu Bantustan and it is clear that whether as a matter of strategy or less self-consciously, it defined its issues at that stage within the Bantustan. It was clearly necessary for gaining membership that an appeal should be made to the most immediate constituency, that over which administrative responsibility had already been accepted. However, there seemed to be a similar inevitability about the politization of tribalisation that went hand in hand with this mobilisation. Inkatha rose as a Zulu organization inextricably tied to the Bantustan structures of KwaZulu and has never been able to escape this part in any significant way. As a Zulu body it was able to mobilize readily, and as a Bantustan movement it had been protected from state action. Langner claims that by the time the first copies of the Inkatha constitution were published, "Inkatha yakwaZulu" was altered to read "Inkatha yeSizwe" ("Inkatha of the nation", rather than "Inkatha of the Zulu people"). This ambiguity of being caught between the Zulu nation, on the one hand, and national aspiration on the other (including implications of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) at a later stage) continued to haunt this movement. For Buthelezi, Inkatha had a special function to perform: it had to heal internal divisiveness and to mould the Zulu people into one cohesive force. Addressing a meeting in Soweto in January 1976, he said: "Inkatha had been formed because Africans could not wait until the parliament in Cape Town falls before the Zulu achieve the dignity which comes from self-help". He accepted that as a movement progressed from question to demand, there was a danger of it being misunderstood.

15 M.G. Buthelezi : "On this Approaching Hour of Crisis", Address to Africans, Soweto , 14 March 1976 , p.32.
By creating a popular power base, Buthelezi believed he stood the greatest chance of overcoming white oppression without resorting to Marxist methods of achieving unity, self-reliance and discipline that he believed were prerequisites to liberation. “Before we can do anything we need to organize ourselves into a disciplined society”, Buthelezi told a Soweto audience in 1976.17 This implies that as much as Inkatha was a reaction to white oppression, it was also a defensive step against the appeal of Marxism and the imposition of a Marxist style and ideology on those seen as “authentic” liberations by countries to the North, especially Mozambique, which borders KwaZulu and had a potential as a guerilla base.18 Responding to the question, “Why have you established Inkatha”? Buthelezi said, “When I set about gathering leaders together to establish Inkatha in 1975, I set about doing so with the clear intention not of subverting the ANC mission in exile but of proving to them that democratic opposition to apartheid and non-violent tactics and strategies were still possible”. Buthelezi said he believed that if the ANC mission in exile had understandably opted for violence, then it was incumbent on black South Africans to prove that democratic opposition could be productive. He wanted to avoid the prospect of the military failure of the ANC mission in exile which would inevitable result in them turning towards “bloody and destructive” civil war. I rallied black South Africa under the national colours of black South Africa – black, green and gold. I brought together a very considerable constituency, which had provided the old ANC with grass roots support while it was in the country. We sang old freedom songs and in every possible way identified with the ANC mission in exile. I told my people we had sent them there: that they were our brothers and sisters and that we should wage a struggle in harmony with them”.19 Buthelezi explained that on every possible occasion he kept in contact with the ANC mission in exile and he liaised with their offices in Swaziland. His emissaries had frequent meetings there with the ANC mission in exile personnel. “I sent emissaries abroad charging them to argue the merits of a multi-strategy approach with them, and to co-operate in those

17 M.G. Buthelezi: “On this Approaching Hour of Crisis”, Address to Africans, Soweto 1976, p.33.

projects where Inkatha’s aims and objectives coincided with the ANC mission in exile aims and objectives, and where tactics and strategies were not mutually hostile”, Buthelezi concluded.

Although Buthelezi averred that Inkatha was not a political party, Tim Muil, in assessing it, concluded that it would in effect be the government of Zulu nation. The movement’s massive and complex constitution ensured that no person would be selected as a candidate unless he or she was a member of the movement. Buthelezi went further by asserting that all Zulus would automatically be members of Inkatha. He objected to the claim that he was thinking of the Zulu as distinct from other African brothers in South Africa. He made the point that there was no Zulu freedom apart from the comprehensive black freedom in South Africa. Buthelezi told a conference on Race Discrimination in 1976: “We have a common destiny even with our white countrymen; these are the implications of a just and non-racial society. I do not view whites as expendable; they come from the very soil of South Africa. This is the land of their birth and they have a right to be here. There is no solution in which they are not active parties”.

Inkatha was, however, a distinctively black, if not exclusively Zulu movement. This emerged in its concerns as well as in its strategy. The constitution, for example, enjoined its members to refrain from criticizing publicly the national movement or any of its members in relation to activities in the movement. Members were, however, allowed to criticize the movement’s shortcomings at its meetings. The Zulu took Inkatha very seriously and in Legislative assembly the debate was frequently drawn to leaders who ignored instructions from the Inkatha command to establish branches in their areas. Failure to do so was regarded as a serious breach of instruction and strong words were invariably directed at the culprits.

The constitution stipulated that the Inkatha President had to be the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. Patrick Laurence, writing some years after the change in the constitution in 1979, argued that this clause was intended to guard against the contingency of an unprincipled opportunist taking over as Chief Minister and that it signified independence from Pretoria.24

This may be viewed as one of the many features confirming that the Inkatha movement grew out of, and within, the KwaZulu Bantustan. In 1983, Inkatha Secretary General Dr. Oscar Dlomo published an article entitled “The strategy of Inkatha and its critics”.25 Dlomo’s presentation of the Inkatha strategy formed the basis of what Inkatha offered its members as policy. Firstly, he distinguished between a strategy of survival and an organizational strategy. The strategy of survival was justified with Mao Tse Tung’s, dictum: “The basic principle of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy”, and that the wise general would let his soldiers die only at that moment when there is nothing else left for them to do.26 This approach dictates that Inkatha participated openly in politics in South Africa, hiding nothing from the security police, holding rallies, quoting banned leaders and meeting with the ANC, at least until 1979. It also demanded constituency politics, in which various interests such as workers, professionals, youth, are brought together under a basic common goal. This goal being the total liberation of black people in South Africa.27

The organizational strategy had several elements. The first was black unity, which, according to Dlomo, was a unity that recognized diversity and was based on a respect for the right of everyone to present his or her views to the masses and to attempt to establish a movement with aims and objectives in support of his or her contention. Dlomo was referring to the Black Unity Front and the South African Black Alliance, but also to informal contact with the ANC and the black consciousness organization during the 1970s. He said that Inkatha called for black

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26 Ibid., p.36.
27 Ibid., p.38.
unity from a position of immense strength and that any political solution in South Africa would have to include Inkatha.

Secondly, the strategy of non-violence was probably the most often repeated element of what Inkatha stood for. Dlomo wrote that Inkatha's strategy of pursuing non-violence was pragmatic. According to him, this strategy was adopted because violence had never been propagated by a movement operating inside the country, for which the example of the ANC was given. This argument rested firmly on Inkatha's views that the ANC was purely a mission in exile and that the policy of an armed struggle did not carry the support of the majority of black people.28

Another stated reason was that no country bordering South Africa had an interest to make its territory available from which to launch attacks.29 Logistical violence, therefore, was not feasible as a secure base would be essential for effective armed struggle. Armed struggles had partly contributed to the liberation of countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, but these had been expectations on the African continent. This view was commonly shared by Inkatha leaders. South Africa was exceptional in that the white ruling population was larger and more entrenched than anywhere else in Africa. The oppressors commanded the most lethal military machine and the most vibrant economy in the Southern hemisphere. Inkatha would therefore not allow Africans to be hired into a position where they would have to fight from weakness, being unarmed.

Inkatha was convinced that there were more effective non-violent means of crippling the South African Government and that these were preferable to armed struggles.30 Dlomo then referred to the "soft underbelly" of the economy and worker and consumer power that could be used to force the South African Government to capitulate. This was what Buthelezi himself had referred to as active non-violence

whereby, for instance, people would disrupt services, etc., and show
disobedience. However, Buthelezi's stand on economic sanctions, consumer
boycotts, and stay-aways did not tally with active non-violence. As far as this non-
violent strategy was concerned, Buthelezi, in his presidential address to the 1979
Inkatha conference said, "If the time ever came when I was forced at the point of a
gun to take Transkeian type independence, non-violence for me would cease to
noble".32

Again in 1979 he told the Women's Brigade that Inkatha might have to turn to
violence at some point as the ANC had done.33 In 1980, speaking at the unveiling of
King Cetshwayo's tombstone, Buthelezi told about 5 000 applauding people that
the Zulu people had to spill a lot of blood in defense of their heritage and their
country.34 In 1983 Buthelezi warned that, in the new political dispensation, he
would be "...answerable almost exclusively to my black constituency in which there
will be hardening attitudes and an ever increasing demand for the kind of politics
in which I have not yet been involved".35 "Inkatha will review its attitude to violence
at the end of this decade".36 This was the message of an Inkatha position paper in
1983.

In the short time Inkatha had operated it enjoyed considerable success. In
February 1977 the membership roll stood at 90 000; by March 1978 it stood at 130
000, and by July 1978 there were reportedly 150 000 paid up members.37 An
analysis of Inkatha's membership suggests that its major support came from rural
KwaZulu. The fact that membership was structurally located in rural areas of
KwaZulu explained many other observations about membership. For example, it
accounted for the disproportionate number of females who were members since a
vast number of the economically active males were absent as migrant workers. This
also explains the high number of members drawn from particular economic groups

32 Natal Mercury, 2 July 1979, p.17.
and occupations, such as the support witnessed among the economically inactive sectors of KwaZulu, particularly from school children and among those economically active sectors which either administer or work with the KwaZulu bureaucracy, such as teachers and civil servants and among members of the professions and business who service their own community in KwaZulu.\textsuperscript{38} Southall thinks that Inkatha had little support among either the stable black working class or among trade unions.\textsuperscript{39}

However, it is deemed incorrect to suggest that Inkatha had no support among the stable urban proletariat. In a sample of members from the urban township of KwaMashu, it was found that the movement was successful to some degree in mobilizing support among the black working class and highly educated groups.\textsuperscript{40} In 1977 there were about 10 branches in the township of Umlazi with about 200 members per branch. Examples of smaller urban townships with some organization were Makhutha, South of Umlazi (1 branch of about 500 members), Magabheni, near Umkholomazi (1 branch of about 500 members), Madadeni, near Newcastle (about 1000 members), and Osizweni, near Madadeni (about 500 members).

Pietermaritzburg had no established branches but had about 100 members in the urban complex. Ngwelezane, the township at Empangeni, had 100 members while at Gezinsila, at Eshowe, there was uncertainty in regard to numbers.\textsuperscript{41} In the rural areas, Msinga had about 4000 members and Mnambithi, near Ladysmith, had 1000. In the Bergville tribal area there were six branches, comprising about 1500 members. One factor that impeded growth was the lack of paid organizers.

The task of organizing branches was part of the commitment of the 28-member Central Committee, so the level of activity varied in accordance with enthusiasm and available time. Motivation for joining the movement was articulated in “The Statement of Belief”. This was issued in 1977 and formed the basis for the strategy.

\textsuperscript{38} A. Mkhize, KwaMashu, 7 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{40} P. Mkhwanazi, Makhubu, 30 September 2005.
that would be acceptable to most black people, while it also gave direction to branch programmes. Membership enrolment usually followed the holding of rallies. These were brought to the attention of inhabitants of both rural and urban areas through the distribution of pamphlets, announcements over Radio Bantu, and mobile loudspeakers, which toured areas where meetings were scheduled to be held. Dr S.M.E. Bhengu, Secretary General at the time, attributed Inkatha’s growth, in part, to its in attracting large numbers of black intellectuals – among them, youth who had become alienated from “straight” homeland politics.

Membership was voluntary and open to all blacks, both on an individual and on an affiliate basis. Affiliated membership consisted of organizations with interests consistent with Inkatha’s objectives. Adults paid an interest of R3 and an annual subscription of R2, and youth paid an inclusive 50 cents. Chiefs paid an entrance fee, and an annual subscription of R11, while an annual levy of R20 was payable by professional people such as doctors and lawyers. All members of the Legislative Assembly and certain high-ranking officials were expected to make a monthly contribution of 5% of their salaries.42

Inkatha operated at several levels and was structured as follows: a branch was the basic unit and consisted of less than 30 paid-up members. Branches met at least once a month and their activities consisted mainly of the organizing and recruitment of new members, fundraising and the compilation of financial and membership returns. Each branch had a project of activity, such as communal gardens or the provision of scholarships. The Women’s Brigade concerned themselves with family matters, children and care. The organization of rural and township branches differed. Urban branches conformed, for convenience sake, to ward structures of the township or administration boards. Rural branches dispensed chiefly upon organization. A Chief’s area was subdivided into smaller areas, each under the jurisdiction of an Induna. Each Induna’s area thus became a branch of Inkatha.43

The General Conference was held annually and was attended by National Council and by delegates from regional and affiliated organizations. It elected 20 members to the central committee, the other 5 on the committee being the President of the movement, the Secretary-General and 3 people nominated by the President. The President of Inkatha was its sole candidate for Chief Minister, and only persons over 35 years of age were eligible for this position. The King was patron and had access to the President, to whom he could convey his advices and opinions.44

The movement had the potential for being authoritarian. One of the most important aspects of Inkatha's constitution, which was revealed by Buthelezi to the Legislative Assembly at Nongoma in 1975 provided that the movement's Central Committee would have the power to overrule the KwaZulu cabinet. This was amended, under pressure, to declare that in the event of a clash on matters of policy, the cabinet would seriously consider the views of the central committee before arriving at a decision. Crucial to this amendment was the provision that the President of Inkatha would be the sole candidate for election to the office of Chief Minister and would receive the support of the entire movement.45

The announcement that Inkatha had created six departments to deal with defense and security, political, constitutional, legal and foreign matters, economics and finance, social and cultural affairs, elections, publicity and strategy, and appointment and discipline, confirmed that Inkatha was intended to become the dominant power in Zulu politics. Buthelezi did not dispel this suspicion; indeed he made it obvious that the national council would be the most powerful political body in the nation. Inkatha acquired a political image at this point in its history, although it was not officially considered a political party. However with the advent of the elections, it was used to institutionalize Buthelezi's appeal to the Zulu people and to mobilize votes behind an official state. Inkatha's candidate became the official candidate in the contest, with the result that no opposition parties survived

in KwaZulu. Of the 130 members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, only 55 were elected to their seats. The rest, mainly chiefs, were nominated.46

The general election commenced on 27 February 1978. For a week voters cast their votes in favour of candidates of their choice at 400 polling stations set up in magistrate courts and in the offices of Bantu affairs commissioners throughout the country. There was a sharp contrast in attitude between educated and uneducated people. On the one hand it was often necessary for electoral offices to guide voters in voting procedures and to supply information on candidates prior to handing over ballot papers. This applied particularly to the uneducated, mostly partially-urban Zulu, who were aware of the implications of the election.47

According to Dr. Dennis Madide, KwaZulu’s Minister of the Interior at the time, the election involved a population within KwaZulu of about 2.5 million. The main platform was the rejection of independence and its 8 classes left no doubts as to what Inkatha’s priorities were.48 On the independence issue Buthelezi had this to say at the De Wet Nel stadium in Umlazi. “Mr Vorster has stated in parliament that Zulu people will accept this so called independence in spite of my attitude. By the manner you vote in this election we will see whether you agree with Mr Vorster that the Zulu are such nincompoops that they will, on their own, walk into Vorster’s snare with their eyes wide open”.49

The priorities of the elections were as follows: the rejection of independence, the rejection of apartheid and support of a peaceful transition to majority rule, the holding of a national convention of all people of all races, payment of the rate for jobs, the formation of trade unions, the introduction of a free and compulsory education, the development of KwaZulu comprising all Natal and not just the areas officially demarcated, and the release of all political prisoners.

The Inkatha victories had not been unqualified triumphs. Several allegations of threats and intimidation came in the wake of the election from various constituencies. The KwaZulu cabinet ordered an investigation into these accusations as well as into other alleged irregularities. For example, the independent candidate in Umlazi accused Inkatha members of interference in their campaign, of wrecking their meetings and of threatening Umlazi voters with the loss of their houses if they did not vote for Inkatha candidates. Some voters believing that Buthelezi owned Umlazi voted for official candidates.50

The independent candidate from izingolweni also reported a number of irregularities in his election contest, including the bribing of the Chief to stay out of the nomination contest, and claimed that many school principals directed pupils to tell their parents to vote for Inkatha candidates. Frightened pensioners in this constituency were arriving at the polls long after the elections were over. They claimed they had been warned that they would lose their pensions if they did not vote according to the instructions of their chiefs.51 A statement was issued that those standing as independent candidates were against the leadership of Buthelezi. One of the independent candidates from uMlazi declared that the election was not a true election but a matter of life and death. He said, “People have a right to say yes or no and be governed not dictated to”.52

Despite the opinion of Inkatha's leadership that opposition to the movement was diminishing, it must be recorded that there remained a section of the Zulu people who opposed and who could not be persuaded that any good could come from Buthelezi's operation within the Separate Development system. They refused to vote in the KwaZulu-Natal election. It is alleged that in some instances, white officials discouraged potential members from joining Inkatha. It was believed that teachers at one stage withheld support from Inkatha. In fact one of the irregularities

reported to Buthelezi was that teachers were influencing voters to vote for Inkatha candidates.53

Black students in Natal were beginning to show support for Inkatha despite earlier reluctance attributed in part to campaigns of the opposition and intimidation of student radicals. Buthelezi termed the radical opposition of the young a treacherous stance that could set the Zulu youth on a collision with the Zulu mainstream. In July 1976, only 26 students accepted an invitation to a training course at Mahlabathini sponsored by Inkatha. In 1977, 400 students from all over South Africa attended a similar course and a youth rally at Ulundi in 1978 attracted more than thousand students. At this stage Inkatha was dominating in KwaZulu, and according to Buthelezi the KwaZulu legislative assembly and Inkatha were to play a pivotal role in South African politics, in particular in the struggle for black liberation. Yet the liberation movement, from its very outset, took the opposition in the words of Dr Pixley Seme, that “We are one people. These division, these jealousies, are the cause of all our woes and all our backwardness and ignorance today”.54

In 1980, a campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners was launched in South Africa. In response to the campaign, Buthelezi complained that the names of ANC leaders were being built at his expense. He said that no one had approached Inkatha to support the campaign. In any event, had he been approached at the time, he would have cautioned against it since he had been conducting private negotiations with the South African government on the issue.

At a public meeting in Soweto in April 1980, Buthelezi admitted that he had told Inkatha not to support the campaign because some were using Mandela’s name to create political capital for themselves. In the same speech he also accused the ANC of using Mandela’s name in an attempt to destroy his political leadership and

54 Sunday Times, 26 February 1978, p.32.
credibility. The resolution adopted by the Inkatha National Council in 1980 stated that the training of youth in physical preparedness should be stepped up to pre-empt a situation where unscrupulous people took advantage of the non-violent stance of the movement to bully its members. Inkatha had, in its actions and by means of numerous resolutions and statements, committed itself to the struggle of black workers.\textsuperscript{55} It supported the free enterprise system, not out of sentiment but out of pragmatism.

Commerce and industry had in fact thrived on the exploitation of black labour. Nevertheless Inkatha remained convinced that only the free enterprise system could salvage South Africa from the kind of poverty which led to social and political decay and ultimately to revolutionary and counter-revolutionary ferment. It believed that it was only the free enterprise system which appeared to be capable of producing the jobs and the infrastructure that the country so desperately needed.

While adamantly committed to the eradication of apartheid, Inkatha was not committed to a socialist one-party state.\textsuperscript{56} It regarded participation in trade unions as part and parcel of free enterprise and of multi-party democracy. According to the Inkatha report, when blacks were granted trade union rights, Inkatha did not affiliate itself to the movement, although some individual members had done so. According to Buthelezi, trade unions had their own important tasks to perform just as political movements also had their own responsibilities. In other words, those unions that were not political movements were not unions. He maintained that some trade unions were being used more for political agendas than for worker agendas. Buthelezi asked workers to guard against being used by people who wanted to carry out their own political programmes by standing on the back of the workers.

Inkatha did not believe in creating chaos in South Africa where rational negotiations would become impossible. Rather, it felt that once the economy was


ruined, it would be almost impossible to restore it to its normal state. Chief
Buthelezi told a mass meeting of workers: “It is easier to promote anarchy and
bloodshed if the country is destabilized and the economy is in ruin. I therefore
appeal for commonsense and wisdom whenever workers feel that they should use
their prerogative to go on strike. Whoever rules South Africa in another decade or
two will need the wealth, which can only be created through a stable economy. Let
us not destroy the future of our children and of their children’s children”.
Although Inkatha supported the formation of the United Workers’ Union of South
Africa (UWUSA), it stated that it believed in adhering to the principle that Inkatha
should not interfere in the affairs of trade unions while performing its job in the
interests of its members. For this reason, office-bearers in Inkatha who became
officials of Uwusa were asked to resign their formal Inkatha positions. “I do not
want to be accused of breathing down the neck of Uwusa’s leadership”, Chief
Buthelezi said.

Inkatha believed that constituency politics rallied people to the cause and
emphasized the fact that this was the only way the oppressed people in South
Africa could be mobilized. Dr Oscar Dlomo, pointed out that Inkatha’s brand of
constituency politics served to increase the cost to the state in case it attempted to
act against a liberation movement by way of either banning it or banning its
leaders. Inkatha strove to ensure through constituency politics that if the state
should act against its leaders then the masses themselves would see to the
propagation of the ideals of the movement even though the leaders had been
removed. It was convinced that the ideal of constituency politics was best served
by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which would have
its own specific objectives, but a basic common goal. For Inkatha this basic
common goal was the total liberation of black people in South Africa.

Inkatha with its clearly defined policy of nonviolence and multi-strategy approach
towards the attainment of black liberation offered a hand of friendship to numerous
organizations; it saw black unity as a crucial factor. Buthelezi and Dr Oscar Dlomo, as President and Secretary-General of Inkatha respectively, telephoned the President and Secretary-General of the ANC, offering to meet its leaders anywhere and at any time.

According to Buthelezi and Dlomo there was no response to the communication. Responding to the perception that Inkatha was hostile to the external mission of the ANC, Buthelezi said: “We are a host of freedom fighters each using the means at his disposal for the destruction of apartheid. Inkatha bears the ANC no ill will.” Critics of Inkatha both in South Africa and abroad misunderstood and misinterpreted Inkatha’s strategy of black unity. For instance, Inkatha’s eagerness to co-operate with any organization whose main goal was black liberation in South Africa was sometimes interpreted as a sign of weakness. According to Buthelezi, the fact was that Inkatha called for this co-operation among black liberation movements in South Africa from a position of immense strength. At that time, according to Buthelezi, Inkatha was the largest black liberation movement in South Africa and it had a unique capacity to mobilize people on a large scale, therefore there could never be any political solution in South Africa which would exclude Inkatha.

Another misunderstanding arose when Inkatha spoke in support of alliances with movements such as the external mission of the ANC. Some observers felt that Inkatha was attempting to gain credibility by using the ANC. The fact was that the external mission would benefit from any political alliances with Inkatha for the simple reason that Inkatha was in total contact with the oppressed masses in South Africa on a day-to-day basis. Similarly Inkatha would benefit from the external mission which was more recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Organization (UNO).

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60 M.G. Buthelezi: Policy Speech, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 30 March 1987, p.41.
62 A.J. Jeffery: The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict, p.34.
Inkatha’s position on the question of power-sharing was quite clear: there could be no negotiations about negotiations with the white minority regime until all leaders and all political parties were free to contribute to the democratic process which would then build up its own momentum. Black South Africa would not abandon the struggle until the country was united in a non-racial democracy. “I have again and again raised the kernel that black South Africa will never accept an apartheid rendition of power-sharing”, proclaimed Buthelezi in the mid 1980’s. He added, “I have also again and again reiterated that we urgently and desperately need to take the necessary steps to avoid violent confrontation between black and white which flow from social, economic, political and constitutional discrimination”.64

In referring to Government attempt to get him to participate in the National Council, Buthelezi often used the following analogy: “What they are doing is like asking me to board a train. The trouble is I don’t know its destination, what the fare will cost, where it is going to stop along the way, how long it is going to take, who it is going to pick up, or where the conductor is going to kick me or any other passenger off at any time”.65 Buthelezi and Inkatha would participate in the working of the council if they were convinced that there were real prospects of succeeding in establishing a new dispensation in which there would be the granting to black South African citizens a voice in the process of government. He added, “I and a great other black leader will find it impossible to join the National Council if we have to extract ourselves from the black South African body politic in order to do so”.66 According to him, the new constitutional dispensation which the Bill talked about would be a myth unless categorical statements were made about the slope of South African Government willingness to reconstitute South Africa.

According to Inkatha, negotiations would only get off the ground when the tri-cameral parliament was scrapped. “When I demand the scrapping of the present

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64 The Star, 24 January 1987, p.17.
constitution I am no more than demanding the minimum conditions under which real negotiations can take place. Blacks can not and will not negotiate within the present constitution”, said Buthelezi. Buthelezi had stressed time and again that it was crucial that all black leaders should be free to choose to participate in constitutional development. While Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners remained incarcerated in jail they did not have this right. Their lack of freedom curtailed and thwarted Buthelezi’s freedom as well as the freedom of every black leader.67

The era of political prescription in which whites could dictate to blacks had passed. Inkatha excluded itself from negotiations because the State President, P.W. Botha, was still persisting in regarding South Africa as a country of minorities. In 1985 Buthelezi put forward an example of the kind of declaration of intent needed from the government before meaningful talks about power-sharing and reconciliation could commence.

He wrote a letter to 5 000 influential South Africans asking them to respond to his initiatives and thoughts regarding the role of KwaZulu and the need for the South African Government to make the kind of declaration of intent which would have the effect of joining black and whites together in a determined effort to move purposefully into a new future. He was inundated with thousands of replies. 68

At that time Buthelezi rejected P.W. Botha’s invitation to discuss matters of mutual concern in an informal Non-Statutory Forum, one of the bodies set up before the National Council. He added that the State President needed to go beyond a forum in which blacks had to undertake to talk about the future in terms that were totally unacceptable to the vast majority of ordinary Africans. P.W. Botha later told Buthelezi that he was not prepared to issue such a declaration.69

At a public meeting held in Benoni, October 1988, Botha launched what the press termed a scathing attack on Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He said, "I have up to now been very patient with him, because I believe he is often being misled and misused by people who do not have South Africa's best interest at heart. Over the years he has on numerous occasions been invited to negotiations together with Black leaders, but usually he refused to attend such meetings." Buthelezi could not meet P.W. Botha because there was nothing to negotiate about. Negotiations only become negotiations when there is a defined objective ahead.

In a speech delivered on the opening session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1989 the Minister of Constitutional Development and planning, Chris Heunis, outlined his Government's approach to political reforms, which he said he preferred to call political progress. Mr. Heunis was committed to negotiate political progress and he called upon political leaders to become involved in the progress. There was a worldwide growing spirit for reconciliation, which opposed confrontation and called for compromise. There were signs that this spirit was growing in South Africa and people were reaching out to each other on all levels in all spheres of society. The leaders of Inkatha had declared themselves in favour of negotiations against violence but had encountered impediments on the way to the negotiation table. They had formulated the items found to be obstacles into preconditions to be fulfilled before negotiations could start. The Government acknowledged the existence of important obstacles and recognized the circumstances creating these obstacles. The committee was then appointed to identify and address the obstacles and to identify common grounds.

Mr Heunis said that the Government was working for negotiated democratic, political dispensation, acceptable to all, in which everyone would participate in decision-making from local to national level and where minorities would share power in national affairs but would also have maximum control over matters affecting their own groups most intimately. In his reply to Minister Heunis, Buthelezi said he believed that it was vitally important that the National Party

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70 City Press, 30 October 1988, p.34.
approached the white electorate for a new and a far-reaching mandate which would shed past ambiguities. He hoped that when the time came for Mr. P.W. Botha to retire, Afrikanerdom would produce leaders who would carry Afrikaans across new horizons of dynamic politics. "We cannot negotiate a new South Africa into existence without the South African Government and the National Party being part to negotiations", Buthelezi emphasized. He added, "The Government is wrong; it is not representative; it is not democratic, but it is the government of the day which must be salvaged from the consequences of its own actions". Democracy alone could ensure the survival of democratic ideals and democratic ideas cannot be preserved by dictators or by fascist governments.

The central committee of Inkatha decided to enter into preliminary negotiations with the South African Government about negotiations. This followed months of talks between a joint committee of the KwaZulu Government and the South African Government identifying obstacles to negotiations, which resulted in a document being prepared for the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, Dr M.G. Buthelezi; and the newly elected State President, F.W. de Klerk. A working document of the KwaZulu Government was earlier presented to the joint committee in which the KwaZulu representatives outlined obstacles they had identified. It was clear from the views expressed that negotiation politics could not succeed if the major issues were not addressed and resolved. Inkatha and KwaZulu believed in the creation of a United South Africa with one sovereign parliament and, hopefully, the reunification of South Africa with the so-called independent states rejoining and taking their place in the post-apartheid development of the country. This was paramount and was based on a belief in a democratic, non-racial and multi-party system that afforded freedom, justice and the protection of individual and minority rights. Thirdly, the free enterprise system depended upon a vibrant economy, with the disadvantaged section being given maximum opportunity to fully participate. Lastly, freedom of association needs to be for all, regardless of race or creed.

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72 Clarion Call, vol. 1, 1989, p.17, "Time for a new mandate".
73 City Press, 30 October 1988, p.29.
The following obstacles impeded the above-mentioned goals:

- The South African Government’s attitude of unilaterally prescribing negotiations and a forum within its own parameters and including and excluding individuals and groups on Government terms without considering the wishes of the majority in the country.
- The continued incarceration of Dr Nelson Mandela and the other political prisoners.
- The existence abroad of individuals and organization unable to return to South Africa and lawfully consider participation in negotiations.
- The legal restrictions placed on these individuals and organization, which prohibited them from openly consulting with their supporters in South Africa.
- The banning and restriction of these and other individuals and organization within South Africa.
- The state of emergency and on-going detention of numerous South Africa citizens held without trial.
- Discriminatory laws including
  - the Population registration act.
  - Group areas act
  - The separate amenities act
  - The land act of 1913 and 1936
- The continued rigidity of the government in attempting to prescribe that negotiation should be race-based.
- The tri-cameral parliament system and the constitution which entrenched apartheid and racism.\(^{75}\)

The Central Committee of Inkatha then set out its belief in the kind of constitution it believed South Africa should strive for. It called on all parties in the country to ensure that Negotiations were not unnecessarily delayed.

The following are the resolutions passed by the Central Committee at a meeting on November 12, 1989:

“We the members of the Central Committee of Inkatha state our conviction that the time to negotiate a new constitution has arrived and we urge all parties so to behave and to encourage their members that negotiations are not unnecessarily delayed. We particularly call on black parties not to let any delays be laid at our political doors”.76

The Central Committee also declared, “In the urgency of the time, Inkatha will do everything it can to facilitate final negotiations by facilitating talks about talks, talks about negotiations and negotiations about negotiations.77

At this stage Inkatha was very much confused about the stand of the ANC, as Chief Buthelezi put it: “There is nothing that has yet persuaded me that the ANC is even thinking of taking up its place at a negotiating table as an equal. At this stage of development, one can hope for the ANC’s inclusion but I am quite sure that politically they intend coming either with a recognized veto right or with a departure to wreck if necessary”.78

Addressing journalists at the annual dinner of the foreign correspondents associations in Johannesburg, the State President, F.W de Klerk, said, “An irreversible process has started in South Africa in which the country is inexorably moving to a new dispensation which will include all South Africans”. Mr. de Klerk regarded the process of negotiating as the beginning of one of the most decisive periods in the history of South Africa.

Dr Buthelezi was delighted when he received news about the release of eight political prisoners. It was good news for South Africa and he congratulated the State President, Mr. de Klerk, for his step forward. “It is clear we are dealing with a different leader than previous leaders of the National party”, he said. Accordingly, Dr Dlamini-Lozzi considered this outcome to be a result of long, drawn-out discussions.
that were initiated by Dr Buthelezi, which included the all-important release of
Dr Mandela along with other prisoners, as evident in his remark: “By the time we
concluded our discussions the government had already accepted our submission
that no negotiations were possible without the release of Dr Mandela”.
In fact, the
KwaZulu negotiating team expected Dr Mandela to be released with other
colleagues and not later. His continued imprisonment remained an obstacle to
negotiations. Dr Dlomo’s personal wish was that the liberated political prisoners
should waste no time in contacting Dr Buthelezi to discuss possibilities for a
common approach to South Africa’s political problems.

According to Inkatha, no one had to be excluded from the process of shaping a new
and a democratic South Africa. This included banned organizations as well as
imprisoned and exiled leaders. Inkatha believed that violence as a political strategy
was counter-productive and should be abandoned. It furthermore stressed that
no credible black leader would sit at the negotiation table and argue about whether
or not apartheid should be abolished. Black leaders would sit at the table to argue
about elements of a new democratic constitution for South Africa. Inkatha
reassured the Government that it would not invent new obstacles once these had
been addressed.

The change of leadership in the National Party coupled with the 1989 elections
aroused expectations and rekindled hopes in various sectors of South African
society. Some sections of the South African press described the De Klerk era as
South Africa’s version of Russia’s troika. It is true that the new President made
positive statements about change and negotiations in South Africa. It is also true
that he made a welcome shift from the tendency of slavishly using the excuse of
“security” (or the lack thereof) as a basis for formulating South Africa’s political
future. Inkatha appreciated all these moves.

80 S. Ntshangase, Ulandi, 12 December 2004.
At a special convention in 1989, an "Imbizo" was called by King Goodwill ka Bhekuzulu in Durban. The Zulu monarch invited the released ANC and PAC leaders to sit down with him and Buthelezi to promote peace and reconciliation between black and black and between black and white in South Africa. More than 75,000 people gathered at King's Park Stadium in Durban and unanimously applauded the King's call to his nation for peace and unity. The King noted that his people were spurned when he was excluded from the public meeting held in the Transvaal to welcome the released political prisoners, including Sisulu, Katrada, Motsoaledi, Mhlobo, Mkwati, Mpetha and Masemola. "I know of no single person who has campaigned for the release of Nelson Mandela and the Rivonia trialists more than my uncle, the leader of Inkatha and Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Dr M.G. Buthelezi", he said. The King added, "Mr. Mandela acknowledged this many times, even in letters, yet when his fellow prisoners are released not a word is uttered to acknowledge the campaign for their release by the Chief Minister of KwaZulu".

Soon after the King's address, the former ANC Secretary General, Walter Sisulu, was reported as saying that talks between KwaZulu and newly released ANC leaders would be highly welcomed. The King had emphasized in his speech that he was not a party political King. "No party could ever own the Royal throne of KwaZulu", he said. Accordingly the throne stands aloof and independent and it stands above all party politics.

The King said he endorsed wholeheartedly the view that the Prince of KwaPhindangene, Dr Buthelezi, had expressed that reconciliation should be established in the process of bringing change. "If we do not become reconciled now we must know that it will be a lot more difficult to become reconciled after apartheid has been eradicated," he said.

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83 Ibid., p.21.
The King expressed the opinion that there was nothing wrong with a people with their own identity having their own region in which that identity was forged by history. He said he strongly believed that there would be no major change in South Africa without the support of the Zulus and, indeed, no successful negotiation with the South African Government by any black group if they tried to ignore the Zulu nation. In conclusion, the King made the point that the Government could not move forward without Buthelezi and the Zulu nation.

After the King's address, Buthelezi, who was standing on the left hand side of his majesty, made an appeal to the ANC, UDF and Cosatu to drop all words that led to wars and death. He said, "We must stop the talk that precedes killing and we must stop destroying black power capable of bringing about a just society." After this gathering, Buthelezi announced that the name "Inkatha" would be transformed to "Inkatha Freedom Party", but stressed that the movement would retain its philosophy, aims and objectives. Henceforth, the name "Inkatha Freedom Party" (IFP) will be used to designate Inkatha.

In a statement released to the media after the ANC / SACP alliance had been made known, Buthelezi said that it came as no surprise to the IFP since he had long predicted that the ANC would do this. The leadership of the IFP accused the ANC / SACP alliance of playing games with the people of South Africa. According to Buthelezi, the ANC wanted to keep the pot boiling for its own benefit. He maintained that the ANC would be held responsible for every incident in its campaign for violence. "The Inkatha wants peace desperately. We are sick and tired of the ANC's bully-boy tactics", said the angry Buthelezi.

The IFP called for the ANC to really talk peace with the Government, Inkatha and all who had a positive contribution to make in saving lives and creating lasting peace and reconciliation. The IFP furthermore warned F.W. de Klerk that any political reliance on the ANC during negotiations would lead to a situation in which

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the ANC would “throw its toys out of its cot” every time it became frustrated and would then go to street corners to play brinkmanship – which could lead to a violent disaster.88

The ANC / SACP decision to pull the talks followed on its earlier ultimatum to the Government to dismiss Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok and Defense Magnus Malan and to take action against a section of the police and security forces. It also called for an outright ban on traditional weapons. In a speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Buthelezi said that the ANC/SACP alliances’ demands had attempted to crash the politics of negotiations into politics of an abyss.89

In 1991 Buthelezi warned bluntly that the negotiation process which included the Government, the IFP and ANC/SACP alliance was no longer on track. The IFP leaders made it clear that there would be no negotiations of any national consequences which would involve only the Government and ANC/SACP alliance. Buthelezi called on the international community to bear down on the ANC/SACP alliance in order to rip out of it the cancer of its own lust for power and its refusal to become involved in black political development in which it was simply participating as one Party amongst others.

In her visit to Ulundi, the former British Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, warned that investments would flow back to South Africa only once a genuinely democratic constitution was put in place, backed by a free market economy and sensible economic policies. She stressed that violence remained a major stumbling block to progress and that it was a discredit to black society.90 Emphasizing that there was no way out except negotiations, Mrs. Thatcher said all leaders had to shoulder the responsibility and that they had to lead their supporters.

89 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly debate. Third Session of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly , Ulundi , 14 May 1990 , p.44.
Thatcher praised the IFP leader, Buthelezi, for his resistance to sham independence for KwaZulu over the years and for his commitment to non-racial, multi-party democracy. Thanking Mrs Thatcher in reply, Buthelezi said the IFP had pledged itself to the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of a fair society through non-violence and reconciliation.

Buthelezi warned the State President, F.W. de Klerk, that any kind of deal that the NP and ANC attempted to author privately, would be turned down piece-by-piece and tramped upon. He also insisted that KwaZulu had to have a place at the negotiation table, as KwaZulu, in its own right. On 3 May 1991, opening the third session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, President de Klerk had warmly endorsed Buthelezi as the man who had been the torchbearer for democracy in South African politics through the years of apartheid oppression. In September he insisted that there was no reason to believe that he was involved in any secret deals with other groupings.

According to Buthelezi, it would be futile to believe that KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and the people of KwaZulu were going to stand back while others wrote the future of South Africa without taking into account Zulu realities. “There will be no negotiations. I will most certainly be there as the leader of Inkatha Freedom Party. I place also on record that KwaZulu will be at the negotiating table in its own right as KwaZulu,” said Buthelezi.

Referring to the question of devolution of power, Buthelezi emphasized the importance of regionalizing power structures. He said KwaZulu-Natal formed a natural regional second tier structure, which was to be put in place in the new South African democracy. He, along with the KwaZulu Government, would see to it that this was negotiated into existence. The issue of local authority structures was also part of the debate. This was a people’s matter, said Buthelezi, and a matter for local communities. The people of KwaZulu had to have a say in the matter.

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KwaZulu was disappointed about the lack of consultation on the future of KwaZulu and local authority structures.

On 2 October 1991 F.W. de Klerk, in what was a clear endorsement of the IFP’s long-held commitment to a multi-party democracy in South Africa, said what was then needed was the collective spectrum of all the country’s leaders across a broad political spectrum, who would actively participate in the process leading up to the drafting of a constitution. The Government invited all political leaders to become part of the process of negotiation. This implied involvement and participation, joint planning and joint decision-making about the foundation on which the new South Africa was to be built.

The proposed agenda for a multi-party conference would include the composition, functioning and logistics of the negotiating forum and seeking agreement, as far as possible, on the main principles on which a new constitution would be based. President de Klerk firmly rejected the winner-take-all model in decision-making. “Minorities rebel if they feel they have not been accommodated properly”, he said. He made it clear that the concept of an interim government (as was demanded by the ANC / SACP alliance) was not acceptable.

President de Klerk praised the role played by the Zulu people, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and Inkatha in normalizing South African politics over the years. In a glowing tribute to the IFP President, Mr. de Klerk said, “the political torchbearer over the years was Buthelezi. It is to your credit that you campaigned continuously for the introduction of a true democratic system in the broader South African context as well as in the KwaZulu Natal area”. In a direct reference to Buthelezi’s assertion that KwaZulu was going to be at the negotiating table as KwaZulu, President de Klerk hinted strongly that KwaZulu’s right to its own identity during the talks on South Africa’s future would be recognized. Referring to

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94 Ibid., p.32.
96 Ibid., pp.13-14.
the traditional leadership, de Klerk said he did not believe it would be possible to
govern the new South Africa without the help of traditional leaders as heads of
natural socio-political entities in their communities.

With only a remnant of statutory apartheid to be abolished, South Africa was
moving closer to the dream of a truly democratic society. But fierce debate was
raging on how a new constitution for South Africa would be formulated. The
ANC/SACP alliance argued that this had to be done through the mechanism of a
Constituent Assembly. The Inkatha Institute Director, Dr Gavin Woods, pointed out
that this route was fraught with pitfalls and loaded with potential for conflict.97

Inkatha argued that those proposing the Constituent Assembly mechanism
appeared to ignore the concepts of negotiations connoting compromise and of give
and take bargaining. According to the IFP, successful negotiations suggested a win-
win scenario rather than one characterized by a win-lose result. A Constituent
Assembly would limit such vital multi-party negotiations because a Party
dominating the Constituent Assembly would dominate the writing of the
constitution, and such negotiation would minimize the scope for compromise and
consensus.

The IFP feared that the Constituent Assembly would ignore critical realities such as
the balance of power. The idea that one could legitimize a new constitution as
technically democratic before it was written, and on the basis of members alone,
was dangerously shortsighted. The KwaZulu Government endorsed the view that all
shades of political opinion, large and small, should be represented on a negotiating
forum, which should be brought into being as a matter of urgency. It insisted that
it would be at a negotiating forum because it had never lost its sense of identity as
an independent sovereign kingdom. Furthermore, KwaZulu had never regarded
itself as a construct of apartheid. KwaZulu said that it had pride in its historic role
in shaping the pre-1910 South Africa, in the backing it gave to the establishment
of the original African National Congress in 1912, as well as in the black liberation

struggle ever since. It declared it would be a building block in the new South Africa, either on its own, or in association with the Province of Natal.98

The IFP proposed that Central Government power be reduced by devolution of power both downwards and outwards to give greater decision-making autonomy to the second tier level of government. It also called for group rights to be negotiated in the context of the redistributed power that devolution would make possible. In support of its call for devolution of power, KwaZulu said there was a need for a second tier amalgam of KwaZulu and Natal to form a single rationalized second tier level of government. It said it would commence negotiations on such a second tier, using the Buthelezi Commission reports and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba constitutional proposals as starting points.

The IFP believed that general elections should be based on proportional representation or on electoral models promoting cross-cutting cleavages. It also acknowledge the need for a transitioning period during which certain fears would be dealt with in a temporary, as opposed to a permanent fashion – as a stepping stone towards a fully normalized society.99

II. VIOLENCE AND THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER

The roots of the political conflict in South Africa, to be seen as separate from criminal problems and conflict that arose from socio-economic factors, especially in Natal, should be tracked back to 1979, the year in which Inkatha held formal talks with the African National Congress in London.\(^1\) The talks foundered when Inkatha made it clear that it did not support the so-called armed struggle and would not act as an ANC surrogate within South Africa. From that time onward Natal, and Durban in particular, became the target of an increasing number of bombings and other acts of sabotage as well as of unrest related incidents.

However, Nicholas Haysom’s study of the emergence of violence in South Africa, based mostly upon affidavits from townships residents, shows that the South African Government, through its security and administrative organs, played a key role in the emergence of vigilantes.\(^2\) The Government, utilizing the session of Bantustan authorities and problems in the urban community, unleashed death squads in a terror campaign against progressive organizations and persons in many parts of the country. The use of vigilantes was the South African State’s response to the breakdown of its authority structures in the townships, particularly in the community councils, where the structures of authority were replaced by revolutionary organs of people’s power in the form of street communities.

The Inkatha Institute provided some valuable insights into the root causes of violence. A position paper prepared by Mr. Gavin Wood produced revealing information. Among others, the paper states that more than 90% of township violence was perpetrated by black youths

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\(^2\) N. Haysom: Apartheid’s private army: The rise of the right wing vigilantes in South Africa, p.11.
between the ages of 15 and 24, and it also found that the anti-social attitudes of black youth were directly linked to poverty. There was no discernable economical growth in the townships, especially in the informal settlements, in spite of the high birth rate and rate of urbanization. In fact, the population growth only served to aggravate township poverty, especially in the informal settlements.

Nxumalo argued that the declaration of a State of Emergency in 1986 by the South African Government set the stage for a reign of terror for millions of South Africans. The security forces were given sweeping powers of arrest, and the right to search and seize property, to impose curfews, to seal off areas and use whatever force they deemed necessary against anyone disobeying their orders. Townships were cordoned off and thousands of armed soldiers marched shoulder to shoulder in townships streets, raiding houses of suspects, tearing blankets off sleeping occupants and forcing them at a gunpoint out of beds.

The above mentioned situation added to the root causes of violence, which stemmed from decades of institutionalized apartheid that had left a legacy of bitterness, poverty and deprivation. However, the media tended to dismiss this in favour of blaming violence on the Inkatha/UDF war. This was a dangerous oversimplification, because it obscured the many fundamental causes of violence.

Research conducted at KwaMashu, a township of Durban, attempted to determine, among others, the truth of the allegation that the UDF/Inkatha conflict was really a prime and dominating factor in the outbreak of violence in Natal and KwaZulu. It set out to discover the basic causes that led to the crisis. Both former UDF and Inkatha

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3 **Clarion Call**, vol. 1, 1988, p.7. "Violence: What lies behind it?"
4 **Ibid.**, p.7.
members were interviewed and confirmed that the chief cause of violence was unemployment and frustrations in this regard.\textsuperscript{7} This seems to be a logical conclusion, since unemployment was endemic in the townships at the time, as was violence.

It is therefore incorrect to regard Inkatha/UDF clashes as the prime causes of violence in Natal and KwaZulu. Some of the incidents reported at the time had nothing to do with these organizations. The mass killing at Ongoye (University of Zululand) in 1983 is a case in point. The University of Zululand, by virtue of its geographical location within the territorial boundaries of the KwaZulu Bantustan, was the main source from which the Bantustan Homeland drew its civil servants, professionals and even ideologists of its main political line. Inkatha, however, had never been a popular organization among Ongoye students. Highly militant and radicalized through the years of struggle, these students were fully aware of the inter-relationship between their own campaigns and those of the black community in the rest of the country. They had on more than one occasion rejected Buthelezi’s leadership and the so called pivotal role of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in the struggle for liberation.\textsuperscript{8}

Towards the end of 1983, rumours began to circulate at the University of Zululand that Buthelezi was to address a campus rally to commemorate the centenary of King Cetshwayo’s death. By then students knew from their own experience that wherever Buthelezi went, armed Inkatha bodyguards accompanied him. In an effort to prevent him from coming on to campus, some students approached the university administration for help, but were brushed aside.\textsuperscript{9} Their fears about the armed Inkatha bodyguards were regarded as unfounded. During the week prior to the

\textsuperscript{7} T. MaziBuko, KwaMasha, 2 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{8} M. Ngubane, University of Zululand, 6 June 2004.
\textsuperscript{9} N. Nxuma, Jo: Gatsha Buthelezi: A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.141.
rally, some students were told by cleaning staff on the campus that the local headman (Inkosi Mkhwanazi) had been contacted and told to instruct Inkatha men in the surrounding areas of Nseleni, Dlangezwa, Ngoye and Mthunzini to arm themselves and to go to the campus on the morning of Buthelezi’s address. Professor A.C. Nkabinde, Rector of the University at that time, was warned by the University security guards to leave the campus as violence seemed inevitable.  

On Friday, 28 October 1983, the day before the rally, students boycotted lectures to protest formally against the intended Inkatha rally and they made a desperate plea to Buthelezi to cancel the rally as they feared that large armed Inkatha regiments would be among those in attendance. They staged a march and the Rector called in the police, who dispersed the demonstrators with teargas and batons. Eleven students were arrested.

On Saturday, 29 October 1983, the early morning mist had hardly lifted when Zulu men in traditional attire, armed with spears, cowhide shields, kieries and battle-axes entered the campus grounds chanting and singing. Unaware of the impending terror, students were enjoying a leisurely Saturday breakfast when the quiet morning was shattered by the sound of sticks being struck rhythmically against shields and war cries as the Impis (Zulu troops) swept through the streets on campus. In response, most students ran to the closest hostels and barricaded themselves in bedrooms, before the troops stormed inside to break down doors and attack the barricaded students. Five people were killed during this rampage.

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12 *Sunday Times*, 6 November 1983, p.27.
Violence also erupted at the King Bhekuzulu Hall when some of the students, presumably opponents of Inkatha, started shouting insulting names at Buthelezi and threw stones at the Inkatha supporters who responded violently by attacking the male students' residence, “New York”, with fatal consequences.\(^{13}\)

Mthwaluboshiwe Maphumulo, a student at the time, claims that although Inkatha warriors were attacking students indiscriminately, they were also looking for specific people. For example, one of the five persons killed was Fumane Marivate. Oscar Dlomo, Secretary General of Inkatha and KwaZulu Minister of Education and Culture, subsequently singled out Marivate because of the important role that he had played in disrupting his seminar on “Black Political Thought” shortly before the commemorative event on Campus. According to C. Mbuyazi, who witnessed the event, Marivate was assaulted in the hostel until he was unconscious. He was then dragged out and hung from a tree by his legs. In this position, he was beaten until he died.\(^{14}\) The events at the Ongoye Campus of Unizul provoked widespread comment and according to some, Buthelezi as President of Inkatha, had to either accept responsibility for the actions of the bloodthirsty militants that ran wild at Ongoye or admit that Inkatha militants were beyond his control.\(^{15}\)

Responding to the accusations, Buthelezi said, “I was surprised by the press reports of student opposition to the event taking place and I was shocked by the incident on the 28th of October when students tried to burn down the office of Mr. J.S. Maphalala, a member of the Inkatha Central Committee who teaches at the University. Quite clearly, on the day before the event was to take place, a clique among the students attempted to create the kind of chaos which would prevent the function

\(^{13}\) Zululand Observer, 30 October 1983, p.6.

\(^{14}\) M. Ngobane, University of Zululand, 6 June 2004.

\(^{15}\) N. Nxumalo: Buthelezi: A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.152.
from taking place. Subsequently, the joint academic staff association of the University of Natal called on Buthelezi to resign the Presidency of Inkatha or the Chancellorship of the university of Zululand. This was turned down by both Buthelezi and the University Council.

According to Hysom, the South African Government had in 1979 established community councils as a new structure for the local administration of Africans in urban areas. They represented the government's attempt at revamping the old urban Bantu Councils that had collapsed after a sustained boycott against them.

Black people rejected the setting up of community councils in urban areas since they were not allowed participation in either the central organ of state power or in Bantustan structures within their rural orientation. Community councils were not considered to be a just reply to their political demands. Their acceptance would have meant recognition that whites had the sole rights to participate in parliament while blacks were granted limited managerial responsibility in the shadow of white city councils. The very severely restricted authority of community councils underlined the Government's policy of treating blacks as temporary inhabitants of white areas. The collapse of the community councils in 1984 therefore represented a blow to the Government's strategy for urban blacks. It led to the declaration of the State of Emergency and the immediate occupation of the township by the army and the police in an attempt to stem the tide of revolt.

The collapse of the community councils brought about a new balance of power in the townships. Local power effectively moved from the apartheid state to the alternative organs of people's power. In these semi-liberation

16 KwaZulu Legislative Assembly debate. Second Session of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 2 June 1983, p.44.
17 Rand Daily Mail, 17 November 1983, p.16.
18 N. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi: A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.140.
zones, people no longer took their complaints to the police and instead set up people's courts and other organs for settling disputes among them. People stopped paying rents and saw this as part of the process of liberating themselves from apartheid structures. Alternative education was brought into schools as a substitute for Bantu Education. Under these conditions the South African state needed to regain its lost grounds. With the army and police unable to restore the old civic order, it began mobilizing vigilantes from among the old community councils and their supporters. These were reinforced by contingents of police out of uniform as well as by criminals under the promise that if they successfully eliminated members of UDF, their sentences would be set aside.19

The security forces exploited the unfortunate situation of certain unemployed people in order to recruit them as vigilantes. This was confirmed by the confession of Sibusiso Luthuli, an 18-year-old youth from Durban, who after being convicted on a charge of house breaking, was released from prison in exchange for agreeing to work as a police informer. He was later recruited as a vigilante. Luthuli, who was captured by township residents after participating with the police and other vigilantes in firebombing, was presented at an UDF meeting. He confessed to participation in certain attacks against UDF activities.20

In some of these attacks innocent people were burnt to death. Luthuli was paid R100 for his services and promised more for the elimination of certain dangerous activists. Towards the end of 1986 the Government trained thousands of "kitsonstabels" (instant cops) who, after a three-week training programme, were set loose on the townships to operate in vigilante style. Many of these kitsonstabels were recruited from among

19 The New Nation, 1 October 1987 , p.11.
20 N. Nxumalo: Gatsha Buthelezi: A Chief with a Double Agenda, p.171.
vigilante activists and sent to special camps where they received training as uniformed or plainclothes contingents of the state security forces.

Propaganda by the state media projected vigilantes as ordinary township residents or as older people fed up with the intimidation of youth. Attempts were also made to portray the vigilantes as the moderates in the community defending themselves against radical comrades. In this way the state hoped to distance itself from the atrocities committed by the vigilantes.

In 1983 Inkatha was participating actively in community council elections and in the KwaMashu and Umlazi township, the councils consisted predominately of Inkatha members. Furthermore, Inkatha dominated official political life in these townships as the South African Government allowed it to operate freely, whereas leaders of organizations such as the Umlazi residents' association were detained. Against the background of the call in 1984 by the ANC to render South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable, Inkatha found itself in a very difficult position. Its options were either to join the people's campaign and abandon dummy institutions, or continue its participation and thus be part of the forces making South Africa governable and apartheid workable. From the angle of the democratic movement, whose strategy was to demolish all community councils, Inkatha occupied a structure that people wanted to demolish.

Responding to the 1984 call, the residents of Lamontville set up a number of organizations to represent the people of the area. The most prominent of these were the Joint Action Committee (JORAC), the Joint Commuters' Committee (JCC) and the Lamontville Parents' Education

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22 Institute for Black Research, Unrest in Natal, 1985, p.41.
Committee. Through these organizations, the people of Lamontville fought rent increases and other related issues. JORAC assumed the leadership role in the community to conduct a campaign against the incorporation of a township into KwaZulu and against the community councils, which inevitably led to conflict with Inkatha. A series of incidents occurred in Lamontville which JORAC members believed were aimed at creating a communal decision and at diverting the people's attention away from the actual problems of the community. One such incident was the attack on JORAC chairperson, the Reverend Mcebisi Xundu, whom Buthelezi described as a Xhosa who was misleading Zulus in Lamontville.\textsuperscript{24}

In October 1984 the mayor of Lamontville, Mrs. Nxasane, called a public meeting to be addressed by the community councilors and Inkatha Central Committee members. This was interpreted as a way of asserting Inkatha's presence at Lamontville, promoting enthusiasm for community councils and mobilizing support for the incorporation into KwaZulu. The event was accompanied with violence as Inkatha warriors rounded up residents from S.J Smith Hostel and marched provocatively through the streets of the township. Clashes occurred. In the process a young girl was shot dead, several people were injured and seven KwaZulu Government cars were burnt out. The conflict was inevitable because the majority of the Lamontville residents rejected incorporation into the KwaZulu Homeland.\textsuperscript{25}

Inkatha vigilantes also arrived during the unveiling of Msizi Dube's tombstone. He was a member of the UDF. Members of Inkatha came from as far as Empangeni, Mzumbe and other outlying areas. Led by Chief Calalakubo Khawula, they entered the church where the people

\textsuperscript{25} M. Sticliffe and P Wellings: \textit{The Widening Rift: Buthelezi, Inkatha and Mainstream Black Opposition Politics}, p.34.
assembled to honour the deceased member of Jorac. As the crowd gathered round the graveside, the vigilantes went to Mayor’s house, Mrs. Nkasabe, where they fetched stored weapons. In an effort to avert conflict, the organizers of the unveiling ceremony directed the crowd away from the usual route to the cemetery, which passed the mayor’s house. At the cemetery the vigilantes prevented people from going to the tombstone, alleging that they were insulting Buthelezi. They then attacked the crowd, who retaliated and killed four vigilantes. Some of those captured by the crowd said they had been recruited to kill, while others said they had been told they were going to the funeral of an Inkatha member. Alarmed at the considerable opposition to the community councils and Inkatha in the township, Buthelezi announced that he had planned to hold a rally in Lamontville to which Inkatha members from as far away as Johannesburg would come. Community leaders, however, chose to believe that the true intention of the rally was an effort to of Inkatha to assert control of the area. Some community leaders feared, however, that this might give vigilantes the opportunity to avenge the deaths of fellow vigilantes killed during the Dube tombstone unveiling ceremony.

Fearing that violence would erupt, the leaders of JORAC under the Reverend Mcebisi Xundu met Chief Buthelezi at the Maharani Hotel in Durban. Jorac officials wished to avoid bloodshed. If Buthelezi insisted on the rally, Jorac said, then he should agree to hold his “Peace Rally” outside Lamontville. This meeting ended in a deadlock, with Buthelezi insisting that the JORAC delegation had no right to create a “no-go area” for him and Inkatha.

According to Buthelezi, the ANC message was clear. It was out, in the form of the UDF, to destabilize him and Inkatha. Having failed to persuade Inkatha to compromise its strategy of non-violence and to negotiate in the struggle for liberation, the ANC set out to smash the movement and its leadership. If Inkatha would not defer to the ANC as the sole and authentic voice of black South Africa, it would have to be taught a lesson. The Radio Freedom address in Addis Ababa in November 1986 clearly set out the ANC’s determination to deal with Buthelezi. The broadcast monitored by the BBC called for “the people of South Africa to neutralize Gatsha, the snake who is poisoning the people of South Africa. It needs to be hit on the head”. The report added that the ANC needed to “… perfect and strengthen our organizational capacity, particularly in the province of Natal”.

Buthelezi insisted that the truth was obvious: for years Natal Province and the KwaZulu Homeland were renowned for relative peace and stability – especially compared to the uprisings in Soweto and other regions. Children went to school. Their parents went to work. There was little if any of the bloodshed and intimidation, which characterized black areas in the Transvaal (Gauteng) and the Cape Province in particular. The leaders of KwaZulu and Inkatha were credited by many for the state of affairs that started the rot in KwaZulu. According to Buthelezi, violence in Natal erupted in areas under white control or where the KwaZulu government had no police functioning or instrument to maintain law and order. Buthelezi maintained that it was to KwaMashu that violence owed its origin. “It was here that the first attempt was made to use the weapon of the school boycott for political purposes”, he maintained. At that time KwaMashu was under White control. The Inkatha leadership’s effort to stop the school boycott and to halt the violence cost an enormous amount of money. While trouble simmered for

years, it reduced when the area fell under KwaZulu. The next township that was affected, according to Shenge, was Lamontville, which was another township under white control. From there on, the action moved to Hambanathi where so-called comrades subjected ordinary people to months of brutality and the destruction of their property.

In 1983 an announcement was made that Hambanathi was to be incorporated into the KwaZulu Homeland. The dissatisfied residents joined JORAC and protested against this move. From then on the KwaZulu Government and Inkatha became intensely hostile to the community's attitude. Again the South African Government found an issue through which it could attempt to divide the community and recruit vigilantes from amongst Inkatha members to join the security forces.

A number of incidents occurred in Hambanathi. In July 1984 Mr. Magwaza, who was an executive member of the local branch of Inkatha, had his car burnt. A meeting of the community was held in protest. UDF members participated in the meeting and condemned the act. However, Norah Dlamini, a member of the Central Committee of Inkatha Women's Brigade, insisted that the UDF had been responsible for the attack. Three members of Masakhane Tongathi Youth were arrested and charged with the offence. Sunday 24 August 1984 became known as “Bloody Sunday” in Hambanathi. It marked the day when the Chairperson of the community council, A Majola, led an attack on the homes of several members of the Hambathini Resident’s Association. Two visitors to the township were killed in the attacks. On the same day two buses and two kombis (with Empangeni registration plates) carrying armed men, invaded the township. Accompanied by the South African Police in

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armoured four wheel drive vehicles with flame-throwers, they set houses alight and murdered Alfred Sithole, school teacher and community leader. Weeks of sustained violence followed. Vigilante groups, made up of known gangsters, stopped and searched vehicles at night and forced all men in the township to take part in the patrols. There were repeated attacks on the houses and property of the UDF members. A number of families were made homeless. The Family Welfare Society was forced to suspend its services in the area in the interests of the safety of its staff, which meant that the services of crèche, a pre-school centre, an advice office and all child welfare offices were suspended. Teachers were forced to resign. Leaders of Residence Association were compelled to flee the township.

Mr Manyathi was also attacked by armed Inkatha members. Describing his situation, he said: “A heavily armed Inkatha mob stormed into my house and broke the window and doors. While I was fleeing they hit me with knobkieries, sjamboked me, slapped me and strapped me”. He alleged that all this happened in the presence of Natal Development Board police and the South African Police. When the community council was approached with regard to the predicament of this family, it responded as follows by letter: “In view of the sad situation and our vain attempts to bring about peace, we feel now, in the interests of all, that it would be advisable for them to look for alternative accommodation”.

It is of vital importance to indicate that the attacks did not come from one side. Also, there was retaliation in response to attacks. However, the vigilante activities amounted to a coordinated campaign under the guidance of the army and police. By these means, the South African army authorities hoped to direct the use of the strength of the army and

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the police to a lower level, and to only employ them as a back-up forces, so that with its ostensibly clean hands, it could then, win the hearts and the minds of the black population.\textsuperscript{37}

Unrest in Umlazi, according to Buthelezi, broke out in 1985 when attempts were made to render the township ungovernable. People were forced into handing over cash to be used for the struggle. Youths ran riot, schools were closed, many of them badly damaged, and the violence spread into other areas including Inanda. Those who had cars were forced to hand over the keys. Petrol was drained for the making of homemade bombs. In a span of a few days damage to property amounted to more than R29 million.\textsuperscript{38} Both the police and army moved in but could not contain the lawlessness.

On the night of 7 August 1985, thousands of people were at the cinema in Umlazi attending the memorial service for the murdered UDF leader, Victoria Mxenge. Towards the end of the service, busloads of armed men arrived in Umlazi and marched on to the cinema. An army as more than 200 men split into two columns, one circling the building to block all entrances, and the other moving to the front of the hall where they began smashing taxis and private cars. These men were shouting the war cry “Usuthu” and they started attacking people. They attacked private cars and taxes alike, breaking windows, and slashing tyres. One of the survivors described how he jumped into a taxi in which broken glass and blood was all over the place. The driver was rushing two people with gash wounds to hospital. According to the press, they both died on the way.\textsuperscript{39}

On 24 August 1985, more than 8000 mourners attended the funeral of the eight victims of the cinema attack. The burial itself became the target

\textsuperscript{37} Institute for Black Research \textit{Unrest in Natal}, p.44.  
\textsuperscript{38} Business Day, 28 August 1985, p.10.  
\textsuperscript{39} Sunday Post, 28 August 1985, p.11.
of Inkatha vigilantes. As the funeral drew to a close, Inkatha vigilantes arrived. More then 300 men armed with spears and shields chased the mourners from the cemetery. It was noted that these armed men were led by the members of the Inkatha Central Committee and by KwaZulu MPs. A few days later, speaking in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Winington Sabelo, warned UDF sympathizers to get out of the black township of Umlazi or face the consequences. After Sabelo had spoken, Inkatha resolved to protect Umlazi residents’ lives and homes as well as the property of the KwaZulu Government. Sabelo claimed that the people of the township were fed up with troublemakers, most of whom were known to Inkatha. He promised to “go it alone” in order to get rid of them. From many corners of the country, Sabelo was blamed for fuelling the flames of violence.

By the middle of the 1980’s, violence became endemic in KwaZulu and Natal. Black on black violence, according to Buthelezi, especially on members of Inkatha, resulted in the movement being forced to take the position that self defense is also an inalienable right. In one way or another Inkatha was abandoning its non-violent strategy. Buthelezi, commenting on the brutal political assassination of the wife of an Inkatha Central Committee member, said: “The black civil war I warned about has not materialized”. He continued, “Opponents of violence are eliminated in this process; Inkatha members became the first victims. Car tyres with petrol were placed around the necks of men, women and children and set alight. The necklace claimed the lives of hundreds of black South Africans in a gruesome orgy of human barbarity”. Official figures state that the barbaric necklace claimed the lives of 335 people in South Africa between August 1985 and August 1986. In addition, 269

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41 Ibid., p.15.
43 Ibid., p.17.
people were burned to death by other methods. These figures relate to the ghastly phenomenon of blacks being butchered by blacks. Buthelezi claimed that Eastern Cape, Lebowa, KwaNdebele and Northern Cape were areas where the necklace was used most, but opponents of Inkatha lay the blame for various acts of violence on Inkatha. Yet in these areas, Inkatha had no presence whatsoever.

It is worth noting that until UDF was launched, there were negligible reports linking Inkatha to acts of political violence, but from 1983, especially after the founding of the UDF, violence escalated at an alarming rate. Prior to that Inkatha had eight years of political activity in which its membership sought to propagate their political ideas in a proper and democratic manner. Further, Inkatha had been able to co-exist politically with AZAPO before the emergence of UDF.

In Lamontville Inkatha members had their homes petrol bombed included Mr. Sikhakhane, chairman of Inkatha Ward 2 of Lamontville, and others, including Inkatha member Mrs. May Ngubane, who was assaulted. Since then, according to Buthelezi, Inkatha members there and elsewhere attempted to defend their lives, their homes and their ideals. It should also be noted that UDF violence was also unleashed against AZAPO, for example the bombing of Mr Mavundla’s home (member of AZAPO at Umlazi). Inkatha deplored this violence, however, and maintained that its members had a right to defend themselves.

The following are brief reports highlighting some of the attacks made on Inkatha supporters. B. M. Dlamini, Inkatha member and a councilor in kwaMakhatha died in King Edward VII Hospital on 4 January 1987 after sustaining severe stomach burns following a petrol bomb attack on his
home. Mrs. Sylvia Ntshangase, another Inkatha member, died instantly after her Umlazi home was petrol-bombed on 5 January. Her husband, Hamilton Ntshangase, who was a school inspector based at Madadeni, was injured and admitted to King Edward VII Hospital with serious burns. In the same week another Inkatha member, Ephraim Buthelezi, was shot at kwaMakhutha and his house was petrol-bombed for the fifth time. The kwaMakhutha home of Gideon S.M. Mathe, deputy commissioner of KwaZulu police, was attacked. He alleged in a statement to the Chief Minister that the attacks were carried out by members of the United Democratic Front.59

Youths stoned hundreds of Inkatha members and forced them to abandon an Inkatha Youth Brigade meeting held at the Duduza New Community Hall. The youths also looted a beer hall and shops, barricaded streets with burning tyres and crates, and spilled pots of meat that were to have been eaten by Inkatha members after the meeting.60 The mayor of Umlazi, Mr. James E Ndlovu and his family, were trapped in their home while a mob bombarded it with a hail of stones. His new car was badly damaged.61 In July 1985 Themba and Zakhule Msani fought off a stone-throwing mob of more than 100 people who attacked their Lamontville home screaming “Gatsha is a dog, you are the dogs of Gatsha”.62 Following three consecutive nights of violence, Inkatha supporters Mrs. Tryzina Msomi, Mrs. Phumephi Mnqondo and Mrs Busiwiwe Msomi were photographed by news reporters in their gutted Lamontville home following a petrol bomb attack. In September a bomb exploded in the toilet of the Umlazi Executive Hotel and sprayed shards of glass onto groups of black children. The hotel was owned by a senior member of Inkatha.63 Six people died in clashes in Lamontville

50 Ibid, p.25.
53 Natal Mercury, 30 September 1985, p.11.
following the Shaka Day celebration. Inkatha and non-Inkatha people were involved.\textsuperscript{54} The home of Mrs. Gertie Ngubane, an Inkatha member and Nningizimu Community Councilor for Ward 1 in Lamontville, was stoned and windows were smashed.\textsuperscript{55} Mr. Francis Dlamini, KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member and Inkatha Central Committee member, was brutally gunned down as he fled his petrol-bombed home. Mr. Dlamini died instantly. His wounded son managed to escape.\textsuperscript{56} On October 19, 1985, the Inkatha office in Amsterdam was bombed and furniture and equipment destroyed. An ANC group in Amsterdam claimed responsibility. Two youths were shot after the home of Umlazi councilor and Inkatha official, Mr. Josiah Cele, had been stoned and set on fire by a group of youths.\textsuperscript{57}

The life’s work of Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, secretary of the Buthelezi Commission who was also involved in the Natal KwaZulu Indaba, was destroyed when his office and Centre for Applied Sciences at the University of Natal in Durban was set on fire.\textsuperscript{58} The home of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member and Inkatha Central Committee member, Mr. Winington Sabelo, was petrol-bombed.\textsuperscript{59} Cars and a petrol station belonging to a former member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Mr. Gobizizwe Bhengu, were destroyed when youths went on a rampage.\textsuperscript{60} Two people were killed and more than 40 injured when petrol bombs were thrown at buses carrying Inkatha supporters from a rally in Soweto addressed by Chief M.G. Buthelezi.\textsuperscript{61} The mayor of Ezakheni, Mr. D.D. Nkabinde, was attacked and his trucks, cars and house were petrol-bombed.\textsuperscript{62} The Newcastle home of Inkatha youth brigade member,

\textsuperscript{54} The Star, 30 September 1985, p.23.
\textsuperscript{55} Natal Mercury, 14 September 1985, p.18.
\textsuperscript{56} Daily News, 29 October 1985, p.22.
\textsuperscript{57} Natal Mercury, 19 November 1985, p.16.
\textsuperscript{59} Natal Mercury, 28 April 1986, p.11.
\textsuperscript{60} Daily News, 29 April 1986, p.15.
\textsuperscript{61} The Star, 16 June 1986, p.19.
\textsuperscript{62} Daily News, 30 March 1986, p.22.
Mr V.V.Z. Nkabinde, was petrol bombed in July 1986. The Ladysmith home of Inkatha youth brigade member, Mr Sibusiso Sikhakhane, was set on fire by a mob on 29 July 1986.63

The widow of ANC president, Chief Albert Luthuli, Mrs Nokukhanya Luthuli, said her husband would never have identified himself with the policies of the external bodies of the ANC. In an interview with the Durban daily news at her Groutville home, Mrs Luthuli added that he also would not have condoned the violence which existed in South Africa. “Like my husband, I am sick and tired of violence. Albert worked towards a better South Africa by negotiations, not by the barrel of the gun. It makes me very sad. I am glad my husband has not lived to see what’s happening to the present-day ANC”.64 Chief Luthuli was awarded the Nobel peace price in 1960 and died in 1976 when it was alleged that a train hit and killed him near his home. His death left many questions.

It is equally important, of course, to look at the social forces that were also at work in black South African society. Black family life had, to a very large degree in some areas, disintegrated as a result of the influx control and other restrictions of applied apartheid. Poverty, unemployment and overcrowding had resulted in a lowering of self-esteem and deep-seated feelings of anger, inadequacy and hopelessness.65 As far back as 1975 the then head of the University of Natal’s Department of psychiatry, Professor R. Cheetham, and Mrs. Harriet Sibisi, then a research fellow at the University’s Institution for Social Research, published a paper on the psychiatric problems encountered by the youth, and violence and depression were directly linked to the radical disruption of family life and what they called social

64 Clayton Call, Special Edition, vol. II., 1987, p.17. “Albert would have rejected today’s violence...Mrs. Luthuli”.
disorganization. They noted that the age-set group had disappeared and had been replaced by loose heterogamous groups. This had brought forth aggressive behaviour particularly among young men, formerly known as tsotsis, but later generally known as thugs. These youths posed a serious threat to black communities and were feared because of their utter ruthlessness.

The UDF/Inkatha conflict was not rated highly among those interviewed. The words more often used were not “Inkatha”, “UDF”, “Buthelezi”, or “Gunede”, but “thugs”, “poverty”, “sickness”, “starving”, “no jobs”, “no prospect of work” and “crime”. An old worker who was fired by a chemical factory after 23 years of service summed up the situation as follows: “Now I can feel how having no job is a very bad thing. I know that now people will turn to crime to make ends meet. No jobs, no food, no clothing, no cigarettes. What can the young ones do? For one rand these days, they loot the supermarkets, the outside world say look at these blacks, they loot the capitalists. They don’t know the kids don’t hit the capitalists, they loot the place so they can have something to eat and drink.” The psychological effect of such deadlocked economic stagnation led to what was known as “senseless” violence among groups of young people who were called “thugs”, “gangsters” and “tsotsis” by residents.

Interviews with Pietermaritzburg township residents revealed that a large number of people killed were not political or ideological adherents of either the UDF or Inkatha. A large number of the deaths were the result of a direct attack of young, unemployed people whose only allegiance was to destruction and havoc as a means to a material end. Discussions with both former UDF and Inkatha members showed that many of the deaths, which were supposedly politically motivated, were nothing but revenge.

68 L. Mhethwa, KwaMashu, 31 December 2004.
killings. When a UDF or Inkatha sympathizer had his or her house set alight and he or she was killed, it was inevitable that they would accuse their rivals of the killing. An interviewee, Mr Majazi, who witnessed such an incident, described such an incident. "I was sitting with my friend Eric outside the bottle store. Three of us were drinking there. Eric was dragged by six guys towards the open field. They shot him three times. They took off his trousers, his money, his shirt, even his underpants. They shot him in the head. Eric was not a UDF member, he was more Inkatha, but not really involved. These guys were not UDF, I knew them, and Eric has had some problems with them after they had attacked his brother's shop. I knew who the people were, they were the tsotsis, but UDF was blamed for the killing and revenge was waged. For sure Eric didn't like that.69

Interviews conducted in Pietermaritzburg also revealed that one of the most crucial elements in the advent of violence was the role of criminals in the townships. The comrades (who use this term when referring to themselves) were on the rampage in Pietermaritzburg townships. A large number started their careers as politically conscious youths, linked to either the UDF or Inkatha. Starting off as negating the system of inferior education, they also held uncompromising positions against the police and other instruments of the state.70 With the passage of time and according to various circumstances, they transformed their action into thuggery, hooliganism and indiscriminate attacks and killings. Their former ideologies had lost their appeal as the economic situation in the country generally, and in the townships in particular, worsened.71 The comrades took on a new attitude.

The comrades operated all over the country and used similar tactics and strategies in their deadly game. They killed political persons indiscriminately, but also indulged in murdering ordinary people in the townships so that rival organizations could be blamed for the killings. Interviews, particularly in Pietermaritzburg, revealed that various political murders committed by criminal elements, were carefully planned and that activists of varying political persuasions were killed because it was believed that the murders would destroy any seeds of alliances between various organizations. It is the belief of many people interviewed that the criminal element took strong advantage of the UDF/Inkatha political ideological conflict. In fact, the political killings were only one aspect of their activity. The comrades rampaged in the townships. They were the product of political oppression, which deprived the youth of the country of proper education and employment. Unemployment and starvation had killed all hopes for their future. Comrades had no respect for anybody: not for the State, political organizations, older people or workers. The interviewees acknowledged that Inkatha and UDF had made a truce in Pietermaritzburg but agreed that the basic problem remained. Suggestions were also made that these two organizations were supposed to join the struggle towards a complete elimination of the activities of the thugs. But almost all interviewees failed to respond properly to the vital question: "If this could happen in a place as small as Pietermaritzburg townships – if these youths could not be controlled, disciplined or eliminated or neutralized, what hope existed, especially for the people of KwaZulu Natal, for the overthrow of the apartheid regime which was a billion times stronger and more powerful that these killer youth".

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74 P. Khanyile, KwaMashu, 31 December 2004.
75 Extracted from interviews conducted in Pietermaritzburg, e.g. 27 December 2004.
When asked about the underlying cause of the violence in Pietermaritzburg, Buthelezi responded as follows, “Primarily apartheid. As long as the curse of racist legislation damns this country and shackles black democracy, conflicts of this kind are inevitable. Apartheid has crippled black unity and it has subjugated blacks economically. Therefore the roots of the trouble in Pietermaritzburg are also socio-economic. The area has, for many years, had an extremely high rate of unemployment and crime and I believe it is relevant that for the most part it is a depressed area. Inkatha is attacked because it is strong on the side of a multi-racial democracy. The ANC wants a one party socialist/Marxist state. This characterizes violence across the length and breadth of the country, whether Inkatha is there or not”.

Addressing the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1986, Buthelezi attacked the leadership of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) for producing the Kairos Document,76 which analyzes the violence in South Africa in its correct historical perspective. Buthelezi and Inkatha had been particularly critical of Archbishop Tutu, whom they have accused of being embroiled in party politics and for what they regarded as his open endorsement of the ANC, to the exclusion of Inkatha. He also attacked A. Boesak and S. Naude for having signed a document, of the Dutch Council of Churches criticizing Inkatha. The document accused Inkatha of violence against other blacks and of fitting into the government’s divide and rule’ homeland policy. The document alleged that one can no longer speak of peaceful change in South Africa and that there is a fundamental difference between the primary violence of the oppressor and the counter-violence aimed at the liberation of the oppressed.77 The onslaught on the church also targeted individual priests in Natal such as Reverend Dlamini of Section D in Umlazi, Reverend Kwela of the Lutheran Church in Sobantu and Reverend Mabuza of the Methodist Church in kwaMashu.

76 Clarion Call, vol. 1, 1988, p.13. “Chief Minister speaks to the Press”.
In August 1985 Reverend Kwela was forced to flee Sobantu township after an armed mob invaded the church ground and threatened to kill him and his son, as well as burn down his church, if he failed to leave the township immediately. Reverend Mabuza was forced to endure a terrifying experience at the hands of the vigilantes. In all these incidents members of Inkatha were noted. Dr Oscar Dlomo, then Secretary-General of Inkatha, had to defend them by saying that they were patrolling township streets to restore law and order. Dr Dlomo said that these vigilantes were Inkatha defence units originally set up to protect top Inkatha leaders and now extended to its members and residents of Umlazi and kwaMashu. When confronted by evidence that scores of people had died at the hands of these gangs, Dr Dlomo turned around and denied that Inkatha officially sanctioned the vigilantes.78

As pointed out earlier on, the South African Government strongly blamed the ANC for the occurrences of violence, not only in Natal Province but throughout the country. Therefore strong actions were carried out against the so-called armed terrorists. The success of the police could even be described as dramatic. Various terrorists were eliminated, various acts of terror put down and many cases solved.79 This was attributable to the fact that improved policing methods and techniques and especially directed action and interrogation of detainees in terms of security legislation, resulted in a greater percentage of terrorist crimes being solved. But viewers, especially ANC sympathizers, blamed the activities of the police, saying they were unjust. In a number of incidents the South African Government protected members of Inkatha and the police had never arrested the vigilantes who were associated with Inkatha. Jeremia Khuluse and Sipho Mkhize of the South African Defense Force (SADF) confirmed that the South African Government,

through the activities of the police, supported Inkatha at the expense of the ANC.\(^80\)

Nevertheless, police action against terrorists led to the discovery of huge arsenals of firearms in Natal and KwaZulu. In his report, Mr de Witt Dippenaar who was the Police Commissioner, stated that a great deal of arms and ammunition were confiscated, including RPG-7 missiles, limpet mines, AK-47 automatic rifles, hand grenades and other explosive devices. In addition, it was determined that the ANC had marked certain individuals whom they suspected of betraying the organization or of thwarting its aims as their primary targets. In this way a former terrorist who had been rehabilitated and who had joined the Police force, Constable Leonard Nkosi, was cold-bloodedly shot dead while lying asleep in his home. Furthermore, two ANC terrorists, Sipho Xulu and Clerence Payi, were sentenced to death in the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg in 1984 for their part in the murder of black political activist, Ben Langa.\(^81\)

The report stated that 70% of all acts of terror that had been committed in the country had been solved by the end of 1984. Even in cases where the perpetrators had not been apprehended, the Police were in possession of information on their identities. Those who had successfully fled the country were also known and their movements abroad were closely monitored. The South African Police waited for them in order to arrest them if and when they returned to the country. In August 1984, the country had had to deal with the first large-scale outbreak of political violence since 1976.\(^82\) In the performance of its obligations, the South African Police were again lured to the centre of fire to combat the violence that had been instigated for political reasons in

\(^80\) J. Khuluse, Richards Bay, 9 September 2004; S. Mkhize, Mbonambi, 6 September 2004.
\(^82\) Ibid., p. 713.
the black townships. It obviously placed a heavy burden on the available manpower of the force, since the police force was also expected to perform its duty of preventing or solving crime as it had done in the past.83

The poor economic situation not only contributed to an increase in certain forms of crime, it also had an influence on the functions of the South African Police. While the force had a pressing need for more and better trained manpower, and while it was forced to modernise and adapt its methods of combating crime and violence, it was also expected to contribute to cuts in State spending by limiting its expenses to essential items.84

It did not take the Police force a long time to ascertain that the banned African National Congress/South African Communist party alliance and, to a lesser extent, Pan African Congress, were spearheading the onslaught that threatened the Government. The propaganda onslaught included, inter alia, Radio Freedom broadcasts mainly from Ethiopia and Zambia to the Republic, the distribution of propaganda literature in South Africa and the appearance of subversive graffiti on buildings. The ultimate aim was to politicize and mobilize the masses. The ANC also made a public statement that the Republic had to be made ungovernable, which would obviously lead to a revolution – a full scale uprising – in concert with trained terrorists.85

The struggle against political and other forms of violence also resulted in various branches of security forces, namely the South African Police, the South African Defence Force and the South African Prison Services and Railway Police, having to work more closely together to combat the onslaught. In this way the above services were combined into a tightly

85 Ibid., p. 724.
knit unit from top management right down to members in the lowest ranks, where men and women worked together to achieve their common goal. The white members of the Force were subjected to a great deal of pressure while performing their duties in unrest affected areas, while the non-white members, especially the black members of the South African Police, also had to endure threats of violence and assault on their and on the lives of their families as well a property. Despite this, members remained loyal to their country and to the motto of the South African Police, namely “We protect and we serve”.

Nevertheless, a report on police activities in unrest-affected areas compiled by the South African Council of Catholic Bishops (SACCB) alleged that policemen were guilty of random acts of violence against innocent demonstrators and of damage to property. They were also accused of acting provocatively, using teargas recklessly, and acting inappropriately at funerals. The report left the impression that the South African Police, especially young white policemen, were the main cause of the commotion.

Contrary to the country’s hopes, the lingering unrest that gripped Natal Province and the KwaZulu Homeland did not decrease. Rather, it was clearly escalating and required an increasing degree of involvement by the South African Police, who had to ensure that law and order was enforced. Attendance in areas plagued by unrest was naturally a drain on manpower, with the result that crime started showing an inevitable increase. This placed high demands on the police force as it was expected of policemen to render normal police duties under abnormal circumstances.

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86 L. Mhethwa, KwaMashu, 31 December 2004.
88 Ibid., p. 24.
As a result of the widespread unrest, especially in the black townships of KwaZulu and Natal Province, the Republic of South Africa came under the international spotlight and media representatives from all over the world flocked to the country to report on the events. Unfortunately the reports sent abroad were of such a nature that they contributed to the unrest. Political commentators continually analysed and increasingly alluded to the fact that the daily riots would make the downfall of the South African Government more of a reality. The Security Branch of the Police Force, however, established that, apart from adverse welfare conditions and socio-economic factors, the largest single factor which gave rise to the unrest was the creation of a climate of unrest by the continued propaganda of the ANC and its terrorists partner, the South African Communist Party. The actions of the UDF and its subsidiaries, especially the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), led to serious deterioration and only drastic actions from the authorities could prevent the development of a state of total anarchy and uncontrollability, which according to the media abroad, already prevailed.

The South African Police, in co-operation with the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, the South African Defense Force and Railway Police launched alternative measures to make larger numbers of policemen available in unrest areas for normal policing. This solution created a Local Management for Police Forces (Municipal Police) in terms of the Black Government Act 1982 (Acts 102 of 1982) to perform policing function in black townships. The purpose of these police forces was not to take up the task of the South African Police, but mainly to play a supportive role in the suppression of crime and in the maintenance of law and order.

90 V. Mazibuko, KwaMashu, 31 December 2004.
91 M. de Witt Dippenaar: The History of the South African Police, p.49.
After debates and discussions, a resolution was taken by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that there should be a protective force specifically designed to protect members of the KwaZulu Government. Members of the Government and of the people living in the strife-torn areas had agitated for a greater peace-keeping force and for the founding of the KwaZulu Police Force, in answer to their demands. In 1986 Buthelezi became a Minister of the KwaZulu Police. In the very same year he inspected the passing-out parade of KwaZulu Police.92

The fact that the leader of Inkatha had become a Minister of the KwaZulu Police Force caused a rift between members of the African National Congress and the newly-founded police force in KwaZulu. The ANC (in the form of the UDF) had no trust in the Zulu Police. Relations between the South African Police and the KwaZulu Police were, to a large extent, very poor. Even members of the South African Defense Force failed to establish diplomatic ties with the Zulu Police. Dr Oscar Dlomo, Secretary General of Inkatha, expressed serious reservations about the presence of the army in the townships and said that under normal circumstances Inkatha was against the army becoming involved in the townships. Poor relations among the different Police Forces brought no hope to the people of KwaZulu and resulted in poor policing services.93

The futility of bloodshed and destruction, as being contra-productive to the ideals of cooperation, trust, progress and peaceful society, did not only cripple development in KwaZulu, but also robbed this homeland and people of social, political and economic advantages between the years 1972 and 1994.

92 L. Mhethwa, KwaMashu, 31 December 2004.
CONCLUSION

The overriding conclusion in this thesis is that the main goal of the Apartheid Government in the period 1972 – 1994 with regard to making a homeland of KwaZulu was to obtain the maximum development in the region for the entire benefit of the people living there. This was, to a great extent, practically achieved. Development involved improving the material lot of the people and bringing about their fulfilment, both as members of a group and as individuals. It meant reaching a condition where people could be well fed, rather than hungry; where they could be in good health, rather than being constantly ill, and living longer lives, rather than dying young. It entailed, at the material level, the raising of living standards of the people. Community development involved an increase in the self fulfilment of members of the community and the eradication of ignorance and illiteracy – in short, an improvement in the quality of the lives of human beings to the fullest extent, which includes the question of identity, and the attainment of the fullest possible human stature. Therefore, development in KwaZulu Homeland was far more than mere economic development.

For parts of KwaZulu, development seemed to focus on the urban community, whilst for other people the problem was rather one of rural development. Certainly, for the majority of the black population of the KwaZulu Homeland, whether rural or urban, the problem was one of community development – and here the political climate became tremendously important. The right type of political climate was vitally important to allow viable, integrated development to take place. This entailed a sense of political freedom, a sense of purpose and prospects of fulfillment, so that people could be reassured that they could help themselves and that they themselves had a say in how their communities
were to develop. They needed a political system which would facilitate community involvement and development, where people at the grassroots level would feel that they have a stake and a say. Above all, looking at the total population of KwaZulu-Natal, people of all ethnic groups needed a sense of security that would enable them to work together for the common good for all.

This study reveals that peace in KwaZulu-Natal and in the whole of South Africa was contingent on a radical redistribution of power and the equal sharing of privileges and resources. Such evolutionary change would require the willingness of the South African Government to change its policies and the preparedness of the outside world to allow it to do so.

As far as sovereign independence is concerned, Buthelezi had successfully mobilized the people of KwaZulu to resist it. Buthelezi’s stance was both politically and economically correct, taking into consideration that the kind of independence encouraged by the Pretoria Government would not make homelands sovereign, neither in spirit nor in attitude. This inevitably leads one to perceive the homelands as backward regions that could be expected to tend towards developing into “independent dependencies” of the Republic of South Africa. However, the question arose: if KwaZulu was to become an independent country, what dangers could this create for the rest of Natal Province, in particular, and for South Africa, in general – or would such a development pose no real dangers? Some critics argue that the policy of the development of the homelands towards independence could have eased South Africa’s racial problems significantly. Contrary to this view, others believe that it could have created serious new problems. For example, the homelands could have become hostile black areas, which could have deepened racial conflict in the entire Southern Africa. Moreover, acceptance of independence could disturb Buthelezi’s foreign
investment plans for KwaZulu Homeland, taking into consideration that the outside world would not have officially recognised such arrangements, especially in the light of the clear statements and attitude of the United Nations General Assembly.

It is noteworthy to compare the KwaZulu Homeland to other homelands, especially the Transkei. In many respects KwaZulu comprised geographically a vast area of the province of Natal. This entire homeland resembled a “border area” within a bigger entity. The geographical disposition of KwaZulu Homeland had certain positive effects, e.g. more job opportunities in border industries, integrated infra-structures with the province of Natal and proximity to the entrepot harbours of Durban and Richards Bay. These were positive factors for the citizens of KwaZulu. In the case of Transkei a visible geographically unit seemed much more viable than KwaZulu. This made the final route to proposed independence for Transkei under the leadership of Kaiser Mathanzima much easier, although it remained economically dependent on the Pretoria Government.

Prospects of a possible constellation of Southern African states, resembling an international commonwealth or free market never materialized. Thus the policy of the KwaZulu Government not to follow the final route to sovereign independence seems in retrospect to have been the most pragmatic and realistic under prevailing circumstances.

It is important to mention in this thesis that the apartheid system had proved capable of absorbing skilled black labour, while maintaining racial discrimination. To support this, the absorption of advanced technological skills had led to the full integration of a small section of the African working class into a wage economy. But this group had chosen to sever its links with the rural peasantry for a share of some of the
privileges enjoyed by the new capitalistic elite. This seemed to perpetuate a relationship that was in the interests of advanced technically skilled black labour, rather than in the interests of Zulu people in general.

Buthelezi was aware of the fact that the existence of the homelands had always served the domestic needs of South Africa. In this regard, he cynically observed that progress in the homelands tended to avert a growing international protest over South Africa’s domestic policies.

The American economist, M Friedman, expressed the view that South Africa’s principal problems were likely to be political rather than economic. He saw opportunities rather than problems in separate development, with a large, underdeveloped sector offering great potential for increased productive capacity. However, he also saw obvious political problems. Buthelezi’s attitude was that although he valued the emergence of a Zulu entrepreneur class, he was concerned with the poverty of the masses and was therefore opposed to unfettered capitalism. For this reason he took the position that his government would support the development of free enterprise, which was part of the Zulu cultural system, but would require that it be blended with a pinch of African communalism.

It is worth mentioning that the creation of independent homelands was not viewed as a solution to the problem of white security needs and black demands. The country’s “verligtes” (enlightened ones) increasingly viewed the homelands as a partial solution and not as the final answer to the demands of the urban blacks in the townships. Schalk Pienaar put the matter succinctly: “To think that the creation of the homelands offers a

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solution for urban blacks is nonsensical". His view constituted a complete contradiction of the belief hitherto held by the government, namely that the establishment of homelands, where the urban black would exercise political rights, would remove his desire for political power in the place where he lived.

In the critical phase of its development, the KwaZulu Homeland was subject to organizational splits which became detrimental to progress. These splits were observed in the following: division between rural and urban blacks, the peculiar problems affecting banned and exiled people and organizations, and the question of Buthelezi operating within the apartheid system. These problems were interrelated. One may suggest that the problems that erupted from these splits did not only retard progress in KwaZulu but also delayed democracy in South Africa.

An issue that raised popular concern and which became common fare for every political debate throughout the struggle for liberation in South Africa was Buthelezi's leadership within the apartheid system. It became clear, especially after the KwaZulu election of 1978 that there was no extensive opposition to Buthelezi per se. He, nevertheless, elicited vociferous opposition which was associated with a call for the release of banned and exiled leaders whose claims to leadership were of greater legitimacy than his own. It is debatable whether any form of opposition similar to that of Buthelezi, but outside the framework of apartheid, would have been allowed to continue. He became an instrument in the execution of policies which he hated and was rewarded by the granting of a political platform.

2 Umnoxi vol. 1, 1984, p.17. "Homelands — not the answer to the demands of the urban blacks ". 
Threatened with rejection from his own people, Buthelezi was obliged to manipulate two different systems. He had to maintain his affiliation to the regime or give up his position, and at the same time he had to ensure his acceptance within the African community. He resolved this conflict by complying with the Pretoria Government in essential aspects, yet displaying hostility and independence within carefully defined limits.

Given the seriousness, importance and intricacy of political challenges, there were no problems in KwaZulu which were not problems of South Africa. Equally important, there were no problems in South Africa which were not also problems of KwaZulu. Therefore South Africa, as much as KwaZulu, needed leadership that could set people free. Free not only from apartheid, but free from poverty, ignorance and disease. South Africa had a racist government pursuing racist objectives and the people were crying for leadership that could alter this hideous state of affairs. There were many people who misread the South African situation, thinking that posturing, power-mongering and political point-scoring among the suffering people represented leadership, whereas the very hallmark of leadership is the ability to gather people into a task force which can be directed and deployed on whatever front – thereby demanding immediate attention.

Another reality in the broad political scene was that the struggle for liberation was not only a struggle to eradicate apartheid. It was a struggle to replace apartheid with an alternative system in an altogether new political era. Black leaders were struggling against apartheid not simply because apartheid was morally indefensible, but because it did not make it possible to establish the kind of society needed in South Africa. It is for this reason that the KwaZulu Government decided to force the South African Government to recognize the fact that KwaZulu was
legitimately involved in the black struggle for liberation and that it had a legitimate claim in the national politics.

The KwaZulu Government was shocked when it learnt (in 1992) that the National Party, which had previously imposed the most hideous, systematic form of racism, was talking the same language which Inkatha had been speaking for 17 years when it opposed apartheid. Even more astonishing was the fact that the ANC and its private army, Umkhonto weSizwe, which was calling Buthelezi names and hurling insults at him such as calling him a traitor to the struggle and a snake that deserved death, were posturing in CODESA and grabbing one IFP policy after the other in an attempt to make it their own. In the words of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, this was surprising: “You would have read and heard how the ANC taunted me with being a Government stooge and conniving with the state. Now we are witness to great conniving between the Government and the ANC in CODESA”. Buthelezi lamented the absence of an apology from the ANC, especially when it was doing some of the things that the IFP had always been doing and were speaking the same language as the IFP.

Finally, it is important to mention that political liberation in South Africa had come at the end of the line of African liberation elsewhere. Much has taken place before the South African liberation. Much could be gained from the successes and failures of other African states. There is no magic in political liberation. No manna falls down from heaven simply because people are liberated from racism or alien rule. Joshua Nkomo once said: “A nation can win freedom without its people being free”.

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3 M.G. Buthelezi: Policy Speech, Fourth Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, March 1982, p.44.
Finally, it is clear that political, social and economic progress and failure in the KwaZulu Homeland during the lengthy period under investigation may serve as a unique example of Zulu initiative, perseverance and triumph within a new South Africa born in 1994.

\footnote{City Press, 15 March 1995, p.34.}
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J. INTERVIEWS

Dlamini, P. Interviewed at KwaNongoma on the 26th of February 2004. The seventy year old Mr Dlamini was illiterate but he could set forth his views properly.

Gwala, T. Interviewed at Ngwelezane, 12 March 2005. Mrs. Gwala was a Sister (registered nurse) at Ngwelezane Hospital. Currently she is a pensioner, running a small tuck shop next to her home in Ngwelezane. The old lady provided a useful information especially when it comes to poor health services in KwaZulu in the period predating 1994.
Hadebe, J. S.  Interviewed at Esikhawini on the 10th of May 2004. Mr Hadebe set forth his views properly and gave a useful information on the role played by Cwaka College (Owen Sithole) in encouraging Agriculture in KwaZulu. Currently he is the H. O. D. at Uyengo High School.

Hlophe, P.  Interviewed at KwaMashu, 23 January 2004. He is a worker at the Cement and Brick Supplier in Durban.

Khanyile, S.  The interview with Mr Khanyile was held on the 23rd of January 2005. Currently he is a Government employee (Department of Agriculture-KZN).

Khanyile, R.  Interviewed at KwaMashu, 31 December 2004. Mr Khanyile was the Senior Superintendent of KwaZulu Police. Currently he is an active member of Inkatha Freedom Party.

Kholuse, J.  Interviewed at Richards Bay on 9 September 2004. Currently he is a member of South African Defense Force.

Khumalo, P.  He is the Principal at Namane High School. He was interviewd at Ndumo on 11 January 2005.

Kubheka, K.  Interviewed at Hambanathi on 21 February 2004. He is a former school teacher.

Mafole, N.  Interviewed at Ulundi, 20 March 2004. By then Mafole was a Senior Officer and an Executive member of Inkatha Youth Brigade.

Majozi, S.  Interviewed at Pietermaritzburg on 31 December 2004. Currently he is the church leader at Ashdown Township (Pietermaritzburg).

Makhathini, R.  Interviewed at Umlazi Township on 14 May 2004. He was the UDF Activist in the mid eighties.

Makhaye, Z.  Interviewed at Pietermaritzburg on 27 December 2004. Currently he is a pensioner.

Makhanya, T.  Interviewed on 12 March 2005. She was the member of the Social Working Group in the early eighties. Currently she is the Government Employee (Psychologist) in the Department of Welfare.
Maphumulo, M. He is the School Principal. The interview with him was held at Stanger on 6 January 2005. He vividly gave a useful information on problems that culminated in the suspension of academic activities in the University of Zululand in 1976.

Mathibela, R. Interviewed at kwaMashu on the 11th of March 2005. She is a Social Worker (Senior Officer) in the Department of Welfare, KZN.

Mazibuko, T. Interviewed on 2 May 2004 at KwaMashu. Currently he is an ANC Officer (KwaMashu Branch).

Mbonambi, N. Interviewed at Esikhawini on 19 February 2004. He is the former School Principal and a well known Business man at Esikhawini.

Mbuyazi, T. Interviewed at KwaMbonambi on 22 May 2004. Currently he is the leader of Inkatha in the Area.

Mhlongo, A. Interviewed at Mtubatuba on 17 August 2004. Currently he is the School teacher at KwaHlabisa.

Mkhize, S. Interviewed at Tongaat on 21 February 2004. He is the ANC leader at Hambanathi Township.

Mkhize, S. Interviewed at KwaMbonambi on 6 September 2004. He is a former member of South African Defence Force.

Mkhize, T. Interviewed at Pietermaritzburg on 29 January 2004. He was a strong member of UWUSA. Currently he is the Organiser of Inkatha at Imbali Township, Ward 3.

Mkhwanazi, P. Interviewed at Mabhuyeni on 30 September 2005. Currently he is the School Inspector.

Mkhwanazi, T.Z. Interviewed at Pietermaritzburg on 27 December 2004. He is the member of the ANC.

Mthembu, B. E. Interviewed at Msinga on 13 January 2005. Currently he is the Government employee (Department of Agriculture).

Mthembu, R. Interviewed at Mandeni (KwaSithebe) on 26 February 2005. He was the Worker at Sithebe Henred Fruehauf Plant.

Mthethwa, V. Interviewed at Phathane on 12 June 2003. He was a member of Legislative Assembly. Currently he is a pensioner.
Mthethwa, O. Interviewed at Embabe on 20 February 2004. He is the Senior Adviser and a mouth piece of Inkosi Nitomba Mthethwa. He is familiar with Zulu Ceremonies, especially those that involves the King.

Mthethwa, L. Interviewed at KwaMshu on 31 December 2004. Mr Mthethwa is an ex-police and pensioner.

Mthethwa, S. Interviewed at Phathane 14 May 2004. He is a Business man and a staunch supporter of Inkatha.

Mzimela, T. Interviewed at Empangeni on 26 February 2005. He is the former Chairperson of NEHAWU (Empangeni Branch). Currently he is the Radiographer at Ngwelezane Hospital.

Mzolo, P. Interviewed at Mtubatuba on 5 March 2005. He is a farmer.

Mzolo, T. Interviewed at Owen Sithole College on 3 May 2005. He is a Lecturer in this Institution.

Ncube, M. Interviewed at Umlazi Township on 6 January 2005. He was a Student at the University of Zululand (Ongoye) and became a victim during the 1976 uprisings. Currently he is the Deputy Principal at Nkandla.

Ndimande, B. Interviewed at Richards Bay on 11 January 2004. He is an employee at Alusaf/Billiton.

Nduli, V. J. Interviewed at Uyengo High School on 15 March 2003. Born and bred in KwaZulu, he vividly gave useful information especially when it comes to violence and the application of law and order in Natal and KwaZulu.

Ngcamu, A. Z. Interviewed at Nkanyezi on 17 February 2005. She was the Principal at Nkinyuika C.P. School. Currently she is a pensioner, but very active in community development programmes.

Ngcobo, S. Interviewed at Lamontville on 2 June 2004. He was a member of UDF. Currently he is an active member of the ANC.

Ngobese, S. Interviewed at Empangeni on 2 March 2005. He is a former school teacher.

Ngubane, M. Interviewed at the University of Zululand on 6 June 2004. Currently he is a Chief Administrator.
 Nxumalo, L. Interviewed at KwaMbonambi on 21 January 2005. Currently he is a farmer.

Olifant, S. Interviewed in Durban on 9 March 2005. She is a former School Principal and Lecturer at the University of Natal, Durban.