Browsing by Author "Mbuli, Reuben Johnson"
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- ItemAdmissibility of confessions in criminal trials(1993) Mbuli, Reuben Johnson; Dlamini, C.R.M.A confession may be defined as an out-of-court statement by a suspect in which he or she voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently acknowledges that he or she committed or participated in the commission of a crime and which makes it clear that there is no defence in law that would make his or her conduct lawful. This is what the appeal court meant in the Becker case when it held that a confession must be defined as an unequivocal admission of guilt by an accused person. There is a need that the stringent requirements for the admissibility of confessions should also govern the admissibility of admissions and exculpatory statements. Confessions and admissions remain proper elements in law enforcement and it has been shown in some reported decisions that some criminal cases are capable of solution only by means of confessions and/or admissions. There are three phases that are important in determining whether a confession is admissible in evidence. The first phase is when a suspect is interrogated by the police. This is a phase of our predominantly accusatorial system of criminal procedure. There is a need to protect a suspect against untoward conduct by the police during his interrogation. Our new constitution has incorporated a Bill of Rights, and our common law also protects most of the interests which • are protected by the Bill of Rights (e.g. a suspect is presumed innocent until proved guilty, the privilege against self-incrimination forms part of our law and the right to legal representation is recognized). The second phase is when a confession is recorded either by a magistrate or a justice of the peace. This is a crucial stage because the "YES" and "NO" answers of a suspect on a roneod confession form and additional questions put to him may satisfy a court of law that a confession was made freely and voluntarily be an accused in his sound and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced thereto. This procedure is unique to our law. The third phase is when the admissibility of a confession is challenged in court in a trial within a trial. If a suspect is undefended, he may not adequately exercise his procedural rights. But, if he or she made a confession to a magistrate, a suspect is presumed to have acted freely and voluntarily etc. and a confession is admitted in evidence on its mere production if his or her name corresponds to the name of the person who has signed the confession and if it appears on the document containing the confession that it was made freely and voluntarily and without his or her having been unduly influenced thereto. It is recommended that before an unrepresented suspect is cross-examined on the contents of his confession where he or she has made this possible, he or she should be warned. If after explaining to him or her what cross-examination means the suspect does not understand, a legal representative should be appointed to assist him or her. It is recommended that evidence of a psychologist who has been nominated by an accused should be led where the latter is charged with a serious crime; that police interrogation be reformed in such a way that no one, whether suspected of committing high treason or any other serious crime, shall be subjected to mental torture; physical torture, assault or inhuman or degrading treatment; that the warning given to a suspect prior to the recording of his confession be reformed as discussed in this thesis; that the shift of onus from the state to an accused under certain circumstances be abolished; that the list of persons who may record a confession be increased as recommended in this thesis and that fundamental fairness during the interrogation of a suspect and during the recording of his confession be adopted as a new criterium for the admissibility of confessions.
- ItemExtenuating circumstances in murder(University of Zululand, 1989) Mbuli, Reuben Johnson; Dlamini, C.R.M.The concept of extenuating circumstances was introduced in South African law in 1935. If a trier of facts finds extenuating circumstances he is conferred with a discretion to impose either the death sentence or any other sentence. This concept applies only to the crime of murder. The introduction of this concept was a welcome development in our law because for the first time a discretion was conferred on a trier of facts notwithstanding the fact that an accused was neither a woman who had been convicted of murdering her newly born child- nor a person under the age of eighteen years. The purpose of this dissertation is to appraise the concept of extenuating circumstances in the light of the case law and legal literature- The traditional factors which figure more often than not in our courts are intoxication, psychopathy, belief in witchcraft, youthfulness, provocation and many others. They were critically analysed in this dissertation. The definition of extenuating circumstances excludes all factors which were not present during the commission of murder. The onus of proof is on the accused. The conclusion reached is that although the.concept was a welcome introduction in our law, its fetters have a negative effect- A judge may impose an appropriate sentence if he has a discretion to do so. Where a discretionary power to impose a sentence according to justice is out of question, there exists^ need to reform the law. A discretion to impose a sentence is not an end in itself but a means to justice and civilization. Several traditional conclusions of the courts and legal writers were criticised in this work. The purpose was to point out areas which need reform- On the whole, the concept of extenuating circumstances is regarded as a compromise between the abolition of the death sentence for murder and its retention. It is recommended that a trier of facts should have a discretion to impose the death penalty on any accused who displayed psychopathic tendencies during the commission of murder- There is no justification for depriving a youthful accused of the benefit of extenuating circumstances even if he killed out of inherent wickedness or inner vice. The danger of retaining the concept of extenuating circumstances is that it may entrench the death penalty for murder because of the three-part enquiry procedure used to establish it. The legislature may not reform the law because it may continue to believe that the concept is satisfactory. In conclusion, a plea is made that death sentences not be carried out until the legislature considers and expresses its views on the argument advanced by the abolitionists.