

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

**THE REIGN OF KING MPANDE
AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF NATALIA
AND ITS SUCCESSOR,
THE BRITISH COLONY OF NATAL**

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NATAL**

BY

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DECLARATION

I declare that: The Reign of King Mpande and his Relations with the Republic of Natalia and its Successor, the British Colony of Natal, is a product of my effort, both in conception and execution, and all sources I have used have been appropriately acknowledged.

Mz Shamase31-10-1999

M.Z. SHAMASE

KWA-DLANGEZWA

QUOTATION

“A vision in ignorance is a vision unaccomplished. A vision in ignorance is a vision doomed for failure. A person with a vision does not talk the walk, but walks the talk. The future is for those who believe in the beauty of their dreams.”

Pastor Ezekiel Mathole, Soweto, 28 November 1998.

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Finally, I would like to humble myself before the Almighty God of the Heavens who in Eternity knew that such a one as Maxwell Zakhele Shamase would one-day walk on the face of this earth. The Book of Joshua 1:8 – 9 from the Holy Bible's New International Version is the reason why I have gone this far: "Do not let this Book of the Law depart from your mouth; meditate on it day and night, so that you may be careful to do everything written in it. Then you will be prosperous and successful... Be strong and courageous. Do not be terrified, do not be discouraged, for the Lord your God will be with you wherever you go."

ABSTRACT

King Mpande Ka Senzangakhona was the third in succession in the dynasty of "martial" Zulu potentates whose military valour transformed small clans into a single powerful nation. The evolvement of the ideal of nationhood among the Zulu people ruled by Mpande had its origin in the praises of his father Senzangakhona Ka Jama.

When the specialist declaimer of praises said that, "a cord of destiny let us weave, O Menzi scion of Jama, That to universes beyond the reach of spirit-forms, we may ascend"¹, he was indicating that Zulus were people whose destiny was to traverse the universe and transform the human being into a conscious citizen of the cosmic order (in South-east Africa). King Shaka, Mpande's half-brother, adopted the ideal of this court-poet as the main inspiration of the revolution which he led after the death of Senzangakhona. It was the ideological blueprint on which he built the Zulu nation.

Born in about 1798 Mpande was the son of Senzangakhona and queen Songiya of the Hlabisa clan. The Zulu lineage largely begotten by

¹ Dingizwe: "Zulus were welded together by spear and blood", Cf. Sowetan, 16 January 1984, p.4.

Mpande, the first king to have children, became a royal group with high status. Mpande decreed that all children begotten by members of the Zulu royal family be referred to as abantwana (princes and princesses).

Nevertheless, Mpande began on a very precarious footing. In his youth he was plagued by umchoboka (skin dermatitis). His predecessors and contemporaries viewed him as indolent, inept, obese and even cowardly. Most historical accounts referred to Mpande's inferior genealogical status, cowardice, physical and mental deficiencies.

On the contrary, Mpande was a recruited warrior and had been incorporated into the regiments on the death of Senzangakhona in 1816. He retained a submissive role during the next few years, thereby creating an impression that he would not contend for the kingship.

The source of Mpande's strength could be traced from his name. It comes from a Zulu word impande meaning "root". The symbolic meaning of a root is that it is a source of life. In Senzangakhona's calculations Mpande was to be the source, strength and growth of the nation. This bore truth in that Zulu potentates whose genius earned the nation dignity and pride, descended from his direct line. It could be that Senzangakhona had a premonition of his son's reign by naming him Mpande. King Shaka also gave Mpande the responsibility of fathering a

son. This could be viewed as an underlying factor in Mpande's becoming a natural successor to the Zulu throne.

By 1837, Mpande had built up a substantial personal following living with him at Mlambongwenya homestead of his father in the Eshowe district. Here he lived a peaceful life fearless of possible invasion from adversaries. It also precluded his half-brother Dingane from embarking upon the same kind of purges as he did against his other half-brothers and potential rivals.

Mpande became king of the Zulu nation in 1840 and while he reigned during the epoch that was devoid of full-scale conventional wars, he had to live through times when sporadic attacks were the rallying point of relations between members of the Nguni-speaking communities such as Xhosa, Swazi and Mpondo. Unlike his progenitors Mpande waged few wars abroad. He dispatched Zulu regiments to raid the cattle of the Swazi, Bapedi, Hlubi, AmaNgwe and AbakwaNkosi. Mpande also intervened in a succession dispute in Maputoland.

The style of Mpande's military expeditions was not different to that of his predecessors. His campaigns were followed up with a re-vitalization of the Shakan amabutho (regiments) control system and building of new

amakhanda (establishment erected and occupied by the amabutho, containing in addition a harem) around his palace of Nodwengu. In the late 1840's the success of Mpande's military campaigns was restricted by sporadic interference by both the Voortrekkers and the British of Natal.

Relations between Mpande and the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia began on 15 January 1839 when Mpande met the Voortrekker leaders on the banks of Thukela River. The head of the Volksraad, Andries Pretorius engaged in cordial conversation with Mpande. Pretorius realised that declaring Voortrekker friendship with Mpande would ensure their security against possible invasion from the north of Thukela. Such declaration laid the foundation for the battle of Maqongqo hills, which took place on 29 January 1840. In that war, the regiments of Dingane were defeated by those of Mpande.

After a protracted battle at Maqongqo, (29 January 1840) Andries Pretorius and some members of the Volksraad arranged a meeting with Mpande. They met Mpande on 10 February 1840 and installed him as king. This happened after the Zulu nation had already crowned him king on 5 February 1840. He was persuaded to take an oath before the Volksraad, acknowledging the supremacy of the Volksraad, undertaking to rule KwaZulu in peace and maintaining cordial relations with the

Voortrekkers. Mpande was then honoured with a praise name, "Prince of the Emigrant Zulus". In acceptance of the terms of friendship and defence between himself and the Voortrekkers Mpande said, "If one would do anything to your disfavour or disadvantage, you can only let me know and be assured that I will hurry to your assistance with my whole army and I will sacrifice my last men for you."²

On 14 February 1840 Pretorius issued a proclamation whereby the territory from the sea next to the Black Mfolozi River, where it ran through the double mountains, close to the origin and then next to Hooqe Randberg in a straight line to the Drakensberg, St. Lucia Bay inclusive was declared as border between KwaZulu and the Republic of Natalia.

On the banks of the Klip River the Voortrekkers received about 36 000 head of cattle looted after the Maqongqo battle. They received an additional 15 000 head of cattle from Mpande as a token of allegiance.

The Voortrekkers, convinced of Mpande's cordial disposition, agreed not to interfere with his domestic affairs. This was with the proviso that Mpande keep to the agreements regarding humanitarian principles aimed at preventing unnecessary bloodshed.

² H. Stander: "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872", p.256; De Zuid Afrikaan, 17 April 1840, p.6.

During Mpande's kingship a plethora of Zulu refugees flocked to Natal south of Thukela. About 3 000 displaced Zulus and other Africans stayed in the vicinity of the harbour before the arrival of the Voortrekkers. The Voortrekkers grouped them into no less than six regional reserves. They were defecting from Mpande's rule and refused to go back to KwaZulu. With the increase of Zulu homesteads in Natal it became imperative for the Volksraad (Legislative body) of the Republic of Natalia to threaten to inflict capital punishment on those who refused to be sent back to KwaZulu.

The second British occupation of Natal (1842) took place before the Republic could execute its plan. The Voortrekker plan included moving Zulu refugees to an area opposite Mzinyathi or between Mthamvuna and Mzimvubu Rivers. They could rule themselves, but as subjects of the Republic and a Voortrekker agent would oversee their affairs.

The Cape Governor George Napier argued that the territory between Mzimvubu and Mzimkhulu Rivers had been ceded by inkosi (Chief) Faku of the Mpondo to the British sovereign. He regarded it as their special task to protect the Zulus to whom he pledged "every conceivable virtue" against the Voortrekkers whom he thought intended evil due to their previous unauthorised emigration from the colony and subsequent clashes

with Mzilikazi and Dingane. Napier had to strengthen the bond between the Natal colony and Natal Zulus through special agents and missionaries. He received authorisation from Imperial Minister, Lord John Russell to resume the military occupation of Natal.

The negotiations, which the Voortrekkers entered into with Napier, were challenged by the proclamation of 2 December 1841. It announced the British re-occupation of Natal and claimed that the Voortrekkers were actually British renegade subjects. The proclamation also contained accusations of Voortrekker maltreatment of Mpande's subjects in Natal. The conflict between the Voortrekkers and the British had an adverse effect on relations between Mpande and the Republic of Natalia. The Republic of Natalia was subjected to Colonel A.J. Cloete on 15 July 1842. The Voortrekkers were compelled to surrender to the British due to Mpande's promise of future assistance to the British. Cloete gave Mpande the impression that the British occupation of Natal was the defeat of the Voortrekker power to which the Zulus owed their vassalage. Mpande appeared to be pleased with the British occupation of Natal. In 1842 Mpande concluded a border agreement with the British to settle land claims from the sources of Mzinyathi (Buffalo) to its junction with the Thukela.

In June 1843 Mpande realised that the influx of Zulu refugees into Natal weakened his authority. He requested the British to send the refugees and their cattle back to KwaZulu. The British ignored Mpande's plea and the request by the Voortrekkers that Zulu refugees be kept in locations. Next Mpande turned to the Voortrekkers who still remained in Natal and both parties agreed that Zulu refugees caused displeasure for their administrations. In 1840 there were only about 2 000 – 3 000 Zulu refugees in Natal, but by 1843 they had increased to no less than 50 000. The Zulu king denied that he had given up the area between Thukela and Mzinyathi Rivers to the British.

Mpande wanted to pursue a moderate and more peaceful diplomacy. He welcomed the Voortrekkers as a buffer between his kingdom and the British. To determine the border between the Voortrekkers and the Zulus, Mpande sent a few of his headmen to the Voortrekkers. It was agreed that the whole area up to the Mzinyathi River would be occupied by the Voortrekkers. However, the British lieutenant governor Benjamin Pine viewed Mpande as a monarch with a double-agenda. He believed that Mpande promoted his own case with the ulterior object of creating dissension between the Voortrekkers and the British. Mpande wished to enter into a defensive military treaty with the Voortrekkers. This was prompted by Zulu refugees in Natal who wanted Mpande deposed and

incriminated the British authorities of indifference to Mpande's alleged persecution of Zulus in KwaZulu. Mpande was also infuriated by the prolonged protection the British gave to Zulu refugees.

Thus, Mpande gave permission to some Voortrekkers to occupy land strategically situated at Klip River and Utrecht to resist possible British military offensives. Simultaneously he pledged allegiance to the British colonial establishment in Natal by denying co-operation with the local Voortrekkers. This brought about conflict between the British and the Voortrekkers. William Harding, the British Surveyor-General, concluded that Mpande had practiced the grossest deceit towards the British government and that his proceedings with reference to the Voortrekkers amounted to the crime of deliberate fraud.

But, Mpande extended a hand of friendship to the British colonial establishment in Natal. He diplomatically refused to give the British military assistance during the conflict with the Voortrekkers in 1842. Mpande said: "No, you are now fighting for the upperhand, and whichever gains must be my master"³. The Zulu king did not assist either party, but as soon as the British troops proved themselves to be in power he sent emissaries to Colonel Cloete to say that he was about to march against the Voortrekkers.

Mpande objected to British hunters and traders entering KwaZulu. He also pressed for the return of cattle that Zulu refugees took when they left his kingdom. Mpande's emissaries argued that the British had promised to return the cattle, but that only a hundred had been delivered. Mpande further expressed his need for firearms and the British troops to check Swazi provocations in the north of KwaZulu. The colonial establishment in Natal promised to ensure that no one interpose between the Zulus and the British. The British pleaded ignorance of the arrangement regarding cattle, but conceded the necessity to regulate traders entering the king's domains.

The British Imperialists regarded the Zulu kingdom as a menace, but were hamstrung when Mpande reaffirmed his loyalty to them. Mpande also abandoned plans for an alliance with the Voortrekkers. By pledging his support to the British, Mpande also did not necessarily cease his encouragement of the remaining Voortrekkers south of the Thukela. He hoped that keeping alive British-Voortrekker enmity would serve his own interests.

The encounters between Mpande and various Christian missionaries were presaged by sporadic attacks on mission stations by his predecessor

³ G.M. Theal: The Republic of Natalia, p.39.

Dingane. Mpande was not unfavourably disposed to missionary work. He gave the American Board of Commissioners, English Wesleyan Methodist Society, Norwegian Mission, Berlin Mission, Hanoverian Mission, Church of England and Roman Catholic Mission permission to settle in KwaZulu to present the Christian gospel to the Zulu people. The strategy of winning the Zulu nation en masse to Christianity through Mpande's court did bear positive fruits. The fundamental ethical, metaphysical and social ideas of the Zulu people were disputed by doctrines preached by the missionaries. Probably to monitor their activities, Mpande repeatedly and earnestly requested that at least one missionary should reside near his headquarters, but this did not materialise.

During Mpande's reign, the colonial establishments were viewed by the missionaries as super-exploiters of the Zulu people. The attitude of the Voortrekkers towards Zulu Christian proselytes (amakholwa) was negative. This antagonism of the Voortrekkers was prompted by the political ramifications that evangelization had on them. The proselytes demanded exemption from the legal liabilities the colonial authority at Pietermaritzburg had imposed on the Zulu people. These factors, however, did not deter Mpande's attempts to use missionary connections to keep colonial threats of invasion in check.

Mpande's skilful diplomacy in handling different colonial establishments proved ineffective in forging unity between his hostile sons. This also stigmatized his dignity as the reigning monarch. He was the reigning monarch, but political matters in the 1850's led to challenges by the two claimants Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo. The question of Mpande's heir remained unsettled. The government of the Transvaal Republic (ZAR) maintained that Mpande regarded his son Cetshwayo as successor to the Zulu throne. At his palace, he whispered that Mbuyazi was heir, because his mother was presented to him by king Shaka. The British exploited Mpande's preference of Mbuyazi as his successor to the throne instead of Cetshwayo.

The majority of the Zulus, however, preferred Cetshwayo as their future king, whilst the British viewed him as unacceptable due to his alleged antagonism towards White people. Internal strife culminated in the battle of Ndongakusuka on 2 December 1856. During the battle some of the British traders were compelled to leave their cattle behind on an island in the Thukela River. After the war, Mpande sent a message to Lieutenant-Governor Scott that Cetshwayo had expressed willingness to compensate traders who lost property at Ndongakusuka. The subsequent Zulu civil war of 1856 demonstrated a decline in Mpande's power and influence within the Zulu kingdom. From 1857 until his death in 1872, the Zulu

kingdom and her relations with foreign powers were effectively run by Cetshwayo and Prime Minister ("Ndunankulu") Masiphula Ntshangase of Emgazini. Nevertheless, Mpande's earlier relations with both the Voortrekker and the British colonial establishments in Natal proved him a skilful diplomat rather than a warrior. Contrary to being a generally known obese Zulu potentate, Mpande possessed the skills and actions of a shrewd politician.

OPSOMMING

Koning Mpande Ka Senzangakhona was die derde agtereenvolgende koning in die vorstehuis van militêre Zulu heersers. Hulle heroïese visie het klein groepies soldate saamgesnoer tot een enkele magtige nasie. Die ontplooiing van die ideaal van nasieskap in die Zulu gemeenskap tydens die bewind van Mpande, het sy oorsprong in die lofprijsing van sy vader, Senzangakhona Ka Jama, gehad.

Toe die pryssanger gesê het: "Laat ons 'n band van bestemming inmekaar weef, o menzi, afstammeling van Jane, sodat ons kan uitstyg na wêreldse buite bereik van geestelike vorme", het hy aangedui dat dit die bestemming van die Zulu nasie was om die heelal te deurreis en die mense te verander in geesbewuste burgers van die kosmiese orde (in Suidoos-Afrika).

Koning Shaka, 'n half-broer van Mpande, het die ideaal van hierdie hofdigter aanvaar as hoof inspirasie van die revolusie, wat hy gelei het na die dood van Senzangakhona. Dit was die ideologiese bloudruk waarop hy die Zulu nasie gevestig het.

Gebore in ongeveer 1798, was Mpande die seun van Senzangakhona en koningin Songiya van die Hlabisa stam. Die Zulu afstammelinge, wat grootliks deur Mpande verwek is as, die eerste koning om kinders te hê, het 'n koningshuis met hoë status geword. Mpande het bepaal dat na alle kinders wat verwek is deur lede van die koninklike Zulu familie, verwys moes word as abantwana (prinse en prinsesse).

Nietemin, het Mpande op 'n baie onsekere grondslag begin.

In sy jeug het hy gely aan umchoboka (vel dermatites). Sy voorgangers en tydgenote het hom as traag, onbekwaam, oorgewig en selfs lafhartig beskou. Die meeste geskiedkundige verslae verwys na Mpande se minderwaardige stamboom, sy lafhartigheid, fisiese en verstandelike gebreke. Maar in teenstelling heermee was Mpande 'n gewerfde krygsman wat in die impi's ingelyf is die dood van Senzangakhona in 1816. Gedurende die volgende paar jaar het hy 'n onderdanige posisie vervul en het daardeur die indruk geskep dat hy nie sou wedywer vir die koningskap nie.

Die bron van Mpande se sterkte kan nagespeur word in sy naam. Dit kom van 'n Zulu woord impande wat 'wortel' beteken. Die simboliese betekenis van wortel is dat dit 'n bron van lewe is. Volgens Senzangakhona se beplanning moes Mpande die oorsprong, krag en groei

van die Zulu nasie wees. Dit is bewaarheid deurdat die latere Zulu konings wie se vernuf groot roem en eer vir die nasie ingeoes het, sy direkte afstammelinge was. Dit is moontlik dat Senzangakhona 'n voorgevoel gehad het van sy seun se heerskappy en hom dus Mpande genoem het.

Koning Shaka het Mpande ook die verantwoordelikheid gegee om die vader van 'n seun te wees. Dit kan beskou word as 'n onderliggende faktor wat veroorsaak het dat Mpande die natuurlike troonopvolger moes wees.

Teen 1837 het Mpande 'n aansienlike persoonlike gevolg gehad wat saam met hom gewoon het in sy vader se stat Mlambongwenya, in die omgewing van Eshowe. Hy het hier onbevrees gewoon vir enige inval van teenstanders. Dit het ook sy halfbroer Dingane verhinder om enige onheilighede teenoor hom aan te pak soos wat hy teenoor sy ander halfbroers en potensiele teenstanders gedoen het.

Mpande het in 1840 koning van die Zulu nasie geword. Hy het regeer in 'n tydperk vry van grootskaalse konvensionele oorloë. Maar hy het tog ook tye beleef van sporadiese aanvalle tussen lede van die Nguni-

sprekende stamme soos die Xhosa, Swazi en Mpondo, was. Anders as sy voorsate, het Mpande min oorloë teen ander lande gevoer. Hy het Zulu impi's gestuur om vee van die Swazi, Bapedi, Hlubi, AmaNgwe en AbakwaNkosi te buit. Mpande het ook tussenbeide getree in 'n opvolgings-twis in Maputoland.

Die aard van Mpande se militêre ekspedisies was geensins anders as dié van sy voorgangers nie. Sy veldtogte is opgevolg deur die herlewing van Shaka se amabutho (regimente), beheerstelsel en die bou van nuwe amakhandu (nedersettings opgerig en bewoon deur die amabutho, wat ook 'n harem bevat het) rondom sy paleis te Nodwengu. In die laat 1840's is Mpande se militêre ekspedisies se sukses bemoeilik deur sporadiese inmenging deur beide die Voortrekkers en die Britse administrasie van Natal.

Verhoudinge tussen Mpande en die Voortrekkers van die Republiek van Natalia het op 15 Januarie 1839 begin toe Mpande die Voortrekker leiers op die oewer van die Thukelarivier ontmoet het. Die leier van die Volksraad, Andries Pretorius, het 'n hartlike gesprek met Mpande gevoer. Pretorius het besef dat vriendskapsbande met Mpande sekuriteit vir die Voortrekkers sou verseker teen moontlike invalle vanaf die gebied van

noorde van die Thukela. Sulke verklarings het die grondslag gelê vir die slag by die Maqongqo heuwels op 29 Januarie 1840. In daardie veldslag is Dingaan se impie's verslaan deur dié van Mpande.

Na langdurige slag by Maqongqo, het Andries Pretorius en lede van die Volksraad Mpande op 10 Februarie 1840 ontmoet en hom as koning bevestig. Dit het gebeur nadat die Zulu nasie hom alreeds as koning gekroon het op 5 Februarie 1840. Hulle het hom oorgehaal om 'n eed voor die Volksraad af te lê waarvolgens hy die opperheerskappy van die Volksraad erken het en onderneem het om KwaZulu in vrede te regeer en vriendkapsbande met die Voortrekkers te handhaaf. Mpande het daarna die erenaam "Prins van die Emigrante Zulus" ontvang. By die aanvaarding van die ooreenkoms van vriendskap en verdediging tussen homself en die Voortrekkers, het Mpande gesê: "As iemand enigiets teen u sou doen, of tot u nadeel, kan u my net laat weet en dan verseker wees dat ek en my hele leër sal kom om u te help. Ek sal tot my laaste krygsmanne vir u opoffer."

Op 14 Februarie 1840 het Pretorius 'n proklamasie uitgereik waarvolgens die gebied "vanaf die see, tot by die Swart Mfolozirivier, waar dit deur die dubbele berge gaan naby die oorsprong, en dan langs

die Hooge Randberg in 'n reguit lyn na die Drakensberg, St. Lucia-baai, insluitend" verklaar is as grens tussen KwaZulu en die Republiek van Natalia.

Die Voortrekkers het, op die oewer van die Kliprivier, ongeveer 36 000 stuks vee wat na die Maqongqo-slag gebuit is, ontvang. Daarna het hulle 'n verdere 15 000 stuks vee van Mpande ontvang. Die Voortrekkers, oortuig van Mpande se vriendelike gesindheid, was vasbelote om nie in sy huishoudelike sake in te meng nie. Dit was met dié voorbehoud dat Mpande sal hou by die ooreengekome menslikheids-beginsel om onnodige bloedvergieting te vermy.

Gedurende Mpande se koningskap het 'n vloed van Zulu drosters na Natal, Suid van die Thukela, gestroom. Ongeveer 3 000 ontwortelde Zulus en ander Swartes het in die omgewing van die hawe van Port Natal geskuil vóór die aankoms van die Voortrekkers. Die Voortrekkers het hulle in nie minder nie as ses lokasies gegroepeer. Hulle het van Mpande se heerskappy gevlug en botweg geweier om na KwaZulu terug te keer. Met die aanwas van so baie Zulu nedersettings in Natal, het dit vir die Volksraad van die Republiek van Natalia noodsaaklik geword om Zulus

wat weier om na KwaZulu teruggestuur te word, met die doodstraf te dreig.

Die tweede Britse besetting van Natal (1842) het plaasgevind voordat die Republiek sy plan van aksie ten uitvoer kon bring. Die Voortrekker-regering wou onder meer Zulu-drosters na 'n gebied oorkant die Mzinyathi, of tussen die Mthamvuna en Mzimvubu rivier, te verskuif. Daar sou hulle dan self-regering geniet, maar onderdane van die Republiek bly met 'n Voortrekker-agent om toesig oor hulle sake te hou.

Die Kaapse Goewerneur George Napier, het aangevoer dat die gebied tussen die Mzimvubu en Mzimkhulu rivier deur die inkosi (opperhoof) Faku van die Mpando aan hulle afgestaan is. Hy het dit as hulle spesiale taak beskou om die Zulus te beskerm aan wie hy "elke denkbare deug" toegeskryf het in teenstelling met die Voortrekkers se verdagte bose voornemens vanmeë hulle vroeëre onwettige verlating van die Kaapkolonie en botsing met mzilikazi en Dingane. Napier moes die band tussen die kolonie Natal en die Natalse Zulus versterk deur spesiale agente en sendelinge. Hy het magtiging van Lord John Russell, die Britse minister van koloniale sake, ontvang om die militêre besetting van Natal te hervat.

Die voorlopige onderhandelinge wat die Voortrekkers met Napier gevoer het, is weerspreek deur die Britse proklamasie van 2 Desember 1841. Daarvolgens is die Britse her-besetting van Natal aangekondig en te kenne gegee dat die Voortrekkers eintlik afvallige Britse burgers was. In die proklamasie is ook beskuldigings vervat van beweerde Voortrekker-mishandeling van Mpande se onderdane in Natal. Die twis tussen die Voortrekkers en die Britse owerheid het 'n nadelige effek op die verhoudinge tussen Mpande en die Voortrekkerleiers van die Republiek van Natalia gehad. Die Republiek van Natalia is op 15 Julie 1842 op aandrang van Henry Cloete aan Britse gesag onderwerp. Die Voortrekkers was verplig om te swig omdat Mpande plegtig inderneem het om voortaan die Britse owerheid te steun. Cloete het by Mpande die indruk geskep dat die Britse besetting van Natal die Voortrekker-bewind beëindig het, aan wie hy onderhorig was. Die het voorgekom asof Mpande tevrede was met die Britse okkupasie van Natal. In 1842 het Mpande 'n grondeise-ooreenkoms met die Britse owerheid gesluit waarvolgens die grens tussen Natal en KwaZulu sou strek vanaf die oorsprong van die Mzinyathi (Buffelsrivier) tot by die ineenvloeiing met die Thukela.

In Junie 1843 het Mpande besef dat die instroming van Zulu drosters na Natal sy gesag ondermyn het. Hy het die Britse owerheid versoek om die

drosters en hulle vee na KwaZulu terug te stuur. Die Britse owerheid het Mpande se versoek geïgnoreer, asook die Voortrekkers se versoek om die Zulu drosters in lokasies te vestig. Daarna het Mpande die Voortrekkers wat nog nie Natal verlaat het nie, genader om hulp. Hulle het ooreengekom dat die drosters vir hulle probleme veroorsaak. In 1840 was daar slegs ongeveer 2 000 – 3 000 Zulu drosters in Natal, maar teen 1843 het hulle toegeneem tot nie minder nie as 50 000 vlugteling. Die Zulu koning het ontken dat hy die gebied tussen die Thukela en Mzinyathi (Buffels) rivier aan die Britse owerheid afgestaan het.

Mpande wou 'n gematigde en meer vreedsame diplomatieke beleid havig. Hy het die Voortrekkers verwelkom as 'n buffer tussen sy koninkryk en die Britse owerheid. Om die grens tussen die Voortrekkers en die Zulus te bepaal, het Mpande 'n paar van sy hoofmanne na die Voortrekkers gestuur. Daar is besluit dat die hele gebied tot by die Mzinyathirivier deur die Voortrekkers beset sou word. Die Britse Luitenant-Goewerneur, Benjamin Pine, het egter Mpande as 'n monarg met dubbele agenda beskou. Hy het geglo dat Mpande sy eie saak bevorder het deur verdeelheid tussen die Voortrekkers en die Britse owerheid te veroorsaak. Mpande wou 'n defensiewe militêre ooreenkoms met die Voortrekkers sluit. Dit is aangemoedig deur Zulu vlugteling in

Natal wat graag wou hê dat Mpande onttroon word. Hulle het die Britse owerheid beskuldig van afsydigheid teenoor Mpande se beweerde vervolging van Zulus in KwaZulu. Mpande was op sy beurt ontstoke oor die langdurige beskerming wat die Britse owerheid aan die Zulu drosters verskaf het.

Mpande het gevolglik toestemming verleen aan sommige Voortrekkers om plase te beset in die strategiese gebied by Kliprivier en Utrecht met die doel om moontlike Britse aanvalle op KwaZulu te voorkom. Terselfdertyd het hy ook 'n belofte van trou aan die Britse koloniale nedersetting in Natal gemaak deur sy samewerking met die plaaslike Voortrekkers te ontken. Dit het tot konflik tussen die Britse owerheid en die Voortrekkers gelei. William Harding, die Britse Landmeter-Generaal, het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat Mpande die ergste graad van bedrog teenoor die Britse Regering gepleeg het en dat sy handeling met betrekking tot die Voortrekkers opsetlike bedrog was.

Maar Mpande het 'n hand van vriendskap na die Britse koloniale besetting in Natal uitgereik. Hy het op diplomatieuse wyse in 1842 geweier om militêre hulp aan die Britse owerheid teen die Voortrekkers te gee. Mpande se woorde was: "Nee, julle veg om die oppergesag te behaal, en wie okk al wen, sal my meester wees."

Die Zulu Koning het nie een van die partye gehelp nie, maar toe dit blyk dat die Britse magte die oorhand kry, het hy gesante na Kolonel Cloete gestuur om te sê dat hy op die punt gestaan het om met sy impi's teen die Voortrekkers op te trek.

Mpande het beswaar gemaak teen blanke jagters en handelaars wat KwaZulu binnegekom het. Hy het ook daarop aangedring dat die drosters sy vee wat hulle saam met hulle geneem het, moet terugstuur. Mpande se gesante het met die Britse amptenare geargumenteer dat hulle onderneem het om die vee terug te stuur, maar slegs 100 stuks vee is aan hulle teruggegee. Mpande het verder sy behoefte aan vuurwapens, bekend gemaak en die Britse owerheid besoek om Swazi vergrype in die noorde van KwaZulu te monitor. Die Koloniale administrasie in Natal het onderneem dat niemand toegelaat sou word om in te meng tussen die Zulu-monargie en Britse owerheid nie. Die Britse owerheid het onkunde oor die vee-teruggawe voorgegee, maar die noodsaaklike kontrole oor handelaars se toegang in KwaZulu bevestig.

Die Britse imperialiste het die Zulu Koninkryk as 'n bedreiging beskou, maar Mpande het hulle weer eens van sy lojaliteit verseker. Mpande het ook afgesien van sy plan om 'n verdrag met die Voortrekkers te sluit. Deur sy verklaarde steun aan die Britse owerheid, het hy nie sy

aanmoediging van agtergeblewe Voortrekkers suid van die Thukela beëindig nie. Hy het gehoop om, sy eie belange te bevorder deur vyandskap tussen die Britte en Voortrekkers wakker te hou.

Die kontak tussen Mpande en verskillende Christen-sendelinge is voorafgegaan deur sporadiese aanvalle op sendingstasies deur sy voorganger Dingane. Mpande was nie negatief teenoor sendingwerk nie. Hy het die Amerikaanse Raad van Kommissarisse, Engelse Wesliaanse Methodiste Vereniging, Noorweegse Sending, Berlynse Sending, Hanoverse Sending, Anglikaanse Kerk en Roomse Katolieke Kerk almal toestemming verleen om hulle in KwaZulu te vestig om die Zulus te leer van die Christendom. Die strategie om massas Zulus tot die Christendom te bekeer deur Mpande se hofhouding, het vrugte afgewerp. Die fundamentele etiese, bo-natuurlike en sosiale idees van die Zulus is deur die Christilike leerstellings van die sendelinge bevraagteken Mpande het telkens ernstig versoek dat daar ten minste een sendeling naby sy hoofkwartier gevestig word, moontlik om hulle werk te monitor, maar dit is nooit uitgevoer nie.

Gedurende Mpande se bewind het die sendelinge die Britse administrasie van Natal as super-uitbuiters van die Zulu nasie beskou. Die Voortrekkers se houding teenoor die Zulu Christen bekeerlinge (Kholwa)

was negatief. Die antagonisme wat die Voortrekkers jeens dié bekeerlinge gehad het, het voortgespruit uit die politiese uitwerking wat evangelisasie op hulle gehad het. Die bekeerlinge het aangedring op kwytskelding van wetlike verpligtinge wat die koloniale regering van Pietermaritzburg die Zulus opgelê het. Hierdie faktore het egter nie Mpande se pogings beperk om sy verbintenis met die sendelinge te gebruik om dreigemente van moontlike aanvalle uit die Natal-kolonie te troef nie.

Mpande se bekwame diplomاسie met die hantering van die verskillende koloniale owerhede was egter ondoeltreffend om samehorigheid tussen sy vyandige seuns te bereik. Dit het ook sy waardigheid as regerende monarg aangetas. Hy was die regerende koning, maar politieke verwickelinge in die 1850's het tot eise van twee aanspraakmakers op die troon, Mbuyazi en Cetshwayo, gelei.

Die kwessie van 'n troonsopvolger vir Mpande is nie opgelos nie. Volgens die Voortrekkers van die Tranvaalse Republiek (ZAR), het Mpande Cetshwayo as sy opvolger beskou. By sy paleis was fluisteringe dat Mbuyazi sy opvolger sou wees aangesien sy moeder deur Shaka aan Mpande as vrou gegee is. Die Britse owerheid het Mpande se voorkeur aan Mbuyazi as sy troonsopvolger terdeë uitgebuit.

Die meerderheid Zulus het egter vir Cetshwayo verkies. Die Britse owerheid het Cetshwayo negatief beoordeel, veral oor sy beweerde antagonisme teenoor die blankes. Interne twis het gekulmineer in die slag van Ndondakusuka op die 2 Desember 1856. Gedurende hierdie slag was sommige van die Britse handelaars genoodsaak om hulle vee agter te laat op 'n eiland in die Thukelarivier. Na die oorlog het Mpande 'n boodskap aan Luitenant-goewerneur Scott gestuur dat Cetshwayo gewillig was om die handelaars wat hul eiendom verloor het te vergoed. Die daaropvolgende burgeroorlog van 1856 het 'n afname in die mag en invloed van Mpande in die Zulu-koninkryk getoon. Vanaf 1857 tot sy dood in 1872, is die Zulu-koninkryk, asook die verhouding met buitelandse magte, doltreffend behartig deur Cetshwayo en sy Eerste Minister Masiphula Ntshangase van Emgazini. Desnieteenstaande, het Mpande se vroeëre verhoudings met sowel die Voortrekkers as die Britse koloniale owerheid, getoon dat hy eerder 'n bedrewe diplomaat as 'n krygsman was. In teenstelling met die feit dat hy algemeen bekend gestaan het as 'n plompe Zulu potentaat, was Mpande in werklikheid 'n baie bedrewe, soepel en uitgeslape staatsman.

DEDICATION

To my four twinkle little stars:

Philisiwe

Khwezi

Nkanyezi and

Nonkululeko

May God give them four things:

Wisdom of Solomon

Humility of a Dove

Brevity of Samson

Cunning of a Snake

ABBREVIATION

The following abbreviation particularly relates to some sources given in the footnotes throughout this work.

- A.B.C. : Archives Book Collections
- B.P.P. : British Parliamentary Papers
- C.O. : Colonial Office
- G.H. : Government House
- J.S.A. : James Stuart Archives, Durban
- K.C. : Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban
- N.A. : Natal Archives/Native Affairs Collection
- P.R.O. : Public Record Office
- SAAR.: N : South African Archives Records: Natal / Natives
- S.N.A. : Secretary for Native Affairs
- S.P. : Shepstone Papers

INTRODUCTION

AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The period 1840 – 1872 forms a watershed in Zulu political history. It was the epoch that witnessed the rule of the longest reigning monarch in the history of the Zulu Kingdom, Mpande Ka Senzangakhona.¹ The increasingly altered circumstances under which Mpande had to rule, however, were foreshadowed by British colonial and Voortrekker establishments and intervention. The consolidation of European domination over most of the subcontinent and the subsequent White settlement in Natal, exacerbated problems that Mpande had to face.

1. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

In this introductory analysis of King Mpande and his relations with colonial establishments in Natal, it is imperative to take cognisance of the concepts “aims” and “objectives”. By aims we understand a more general, broader statement of intention. Aims fulfil an important function in that they direct and orientate a person’s thought and

¹ C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 1, pp. 46 – 47.

intentions about a specific area, activity or field of knowledge, even if these are vague and across a broad front.²

Furthermore, aims usually involve long-term goals and have a greater measure of performance. Objectives are short-term goals. They are the results to be achieved to a certain standard.³ In this study the aims and objectives are to:

- give an exposition of the reign of Mpande, the longest reigning monarch in the history of the Zulu Kingdom;
- establish a general view of a dynasty of martial kings whose genius transformed and consolidated simple people into a nation of warriors;
- highlight the underlying factors for the accession of Mpande;

² J.Cawood and J.Gibbon: Educational Leadership – staff development, p.152. Cf. M.Z. Shamase: A Comparative study of the aims, structure and strategies of the National Party and Inkatha, 1975 – 1985, p.25.

³ ibid., p.25.

- identify major protagonists during the reign of Mpande;
- analyze the varying impact of colonial establishments on Mpande's rule in KwaZulu;
- indicate failures and successes of the reign of Mpande;
- expose and evaluate the reaction and influences of Mpande's subjects and neighbours on his reign;
- table, interpret and evaluate all agreements between Mpande and Colonial authorities during the period in question;
- analyze and evaluate the influence of the missionaries and mission stations on Mpande;
- establish convincingly that Mpande had effectively applied the skills of a politician and diplomat.

2. METHODOLOGY

Historical methodology may be defined as a systematic body of principles and rules designed to aid effectively in gathering the source-materials of history, appraising them critically, and presenting a synthesis of the results achieved.⁴ More briefly it may be defined as a “system of right procedure for the attainment of (historical) truth.”⁵ Gottschalk defines historical methodology as a process of critically examining and analyzing the records and survivals of the past.⁶ This study, however, is analyzed within a qualitative methodological framework. It is sufficient to say that the qualitative approach utilized in this study make use of data gathering methods, such as documentary methods; participant observation and inferential methods which include grounded theory, analytical induction and historical analysis.

Analysis in most chapters of this study is interspersed with oral traditions in the form of izibongo (praise-poems). Praise-poems can be of use to the historian in a plethora of ways. As a form of poetry they constitute concentrated and rich historical texts. They provide

⁴ J. Delanglez (Ed): A Guide to Historical Method, p.33.

⁵ R.F. Clarke: Logic, p.462.

⁶ L. Gottschalk: Understanding History – a primer of historical method, p.48.

the final solution as to what the people of the time thought of the king.⁷ Praise –poems were at once a form of history in which the world view of the rulers was expressed, and a vehicle for the expression of social disaffection.⁸ They were at the same time the chronicles of individual lives, of both rulers and commoners, for praises were not confined to the scions of royal houses. The linguist, White argued that praise-poems:

“...are the record of power, a catalogue of success. On behalf of those who maintain and manipulate and occasionally usurp authority, they lay claim to legitimacy. They are not, in the last resort, important as a form of entertainment, and opportunity for performance; they are the annals of the ruling group.”⁹

The object of praise-poems in the case of the heroes (amaqhawe), was to inspire and infuse the army with wrath. Krige, an ethnographer, observed:

“When a warrior giya's (dances) the spectators shout out his praises, and in a military life like that of the Zulu's, where praises had to be won by brave deed in battle, these praises led to great emulation. They were an encouragement,

⁷ S.C.L. Nyembezi: “Historical background to the izibongo of the Zulu military age.” *African Studies*, Vol. 7, p.174.

⁸ K.C., Stuart Papers, file 58, Notebook 17, Evidence of Mtshapi, 11 May 1918, p.17.

⁹ L.White: “Power and the Praise Poem”, p.4; J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Mtshapi, 10 May 1918, p.95.

not only to the man who had won them, but to others who had not yet distinguished themselves. In view of all this publicity, the position of a coward, who would have no-one to praise him if he dared to giya, must have been invidious."¹⁰

The Zulu people of Mpande's time had specialist declaimers of praises (izimbongi) as an important order of their institutions.¹¹ Thus, the position of royal specialist declaimers of praises (imbongi) was a jealously guarded and highly valued appointment, carrying with it immense status. Mpande's most renowned specialist declaimers of praises were Magolwane Ka Mkhathini Jiyane and Mshayankomo Ka Magolwane.¹²

Magolwane Ka Mkhathini was killed at his homestead (umuzi) at Ntabankulu on Mpande's orders. He used to call out to the king:

*"Weh, Mpande! Weh, Mpande!
The cattle are leaving you"*¹³

He meant that there should be war. The specialist declaimer of praises might bellow at night or get up at dawn and bellow, leaving

¹⁰ E.J. Krige: The Social System of the Zulus, pp. 58 – 61; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mkebeni, 17 September 1918, p.198.

¹¹ R.C. Samuelson: Long Long Ago, p.253.

¹² K.C., Stuart Papers, file 58, Notebook 17, Evidence of Mtshapi and Ndube, 11 May 1918, J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mgidhlana, 7 June 1921, p.108.

¹³ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 14 May 1914, p.30.

off only for meals, and go on all day long till sunset. He would bellow right at the upper end of the cattle enclosure and close to the royal house.¹⁴ In an attempt to give him a break, Mpande would call on some well known warrior to come and dance.¹⁵ Nxozana Ka Moni of the Qungebeni clan was Mpande's specialist declaimer of praises when cattle for the royal household were slaughtered.¹⁶

This study is based on a mixture of oral testimonies and other forms of oral evidence. The most important of these for this study, has been the extensive James Stuart Archives. They are housed in the Killie Campbell Africana Library in Durban. Stuart (1868 – 1942), a fluent Zulu linguist, worked for the greater part of his life in KwaZulu and Swaziland in the colonial administration.

In that period he strove to record as much as he could of the history, language, oral literature and social customs of the people amongst whom he worked. Stuart sought out well-informed persons and interviewed them. The near-verbatim transcripts of his discussions, along with the details of his informants, circumstances and dates of the interviews, make up the core of this collection. Use has been

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.30.

¹⁵ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 9, Notebook 3, Evidence of Hoyo, 15 September 1921.

¹⁶ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence fo Mandhlakazi, 7 January 1921, p.188.

made of both the printed archive and the unpublished collection in this study. To date, four volumes of the projected "six volume James Stuart Archives" series have emerged, containing the testimonies of almost a hundred informants.

Both the printed and the unpublished collection has been refracted through the twin prisms of the contemporary circumstances of each informant, as far as they are known, and the contemporary circumstances, interests and motivations of Stuart himself.

Although elusive, the latter have been illuminated by means of the questions which Stuart selected to address to his informants, through a comparison of his interviews with the work of other scholars known to have interviewed the same informants, and by his own writings.

3. CONCEPTS AND CHAPTERS

An explanation of terms used in this study is necessary. Colonial establishment refers to a sizeable settler minority that serve as ruling groups or cycles of any institution or a country. Generally, an establishment is a settled military, naval or civil organisation with

existing code of laws with permanence in view.¹⁷ It has to be noted that major colonial role players in this study are the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia and the British of Natal. The reason is that the Voortrekkers enthroned Mpande with the designation: "Prince of Emigrant Zulus" in October 1839, while in 1842 Mpande offered to assist the British in taking over Natal from the Voortrekkers. The term dynasty is used to refer to a family, or "House", which possesses hereditary right to reign over a particular territory or group of territories. The adjective "dynastic" usually refers to the politics or diplomacy practiced by the strong monarch of the sixteenth through the eighteenth to the mid-19th centuries.¹⁸

In the phrases "Zulu chiefdom" and "Zulu kingdom", the term Zulu refers to the genealogically heterogeneous groups of lineages which recognised the rule of Senzangakhona, and later Shaka. The geographical limits of the "Zulu chiefdom" and the "Zulu kingdom" were constantly shifting in the period analyzed in this study. Thus the term KwaZulu is used simply as a geographical designation for the area between the Phongolo and Thukela rivers, while that of Natal is

¹⁷ C.L. Barnhart and R.K. Barnhart (Eds): The World Book Dictionary, Vol. 1, A – K, p.725.

¹⁸ ibid., p.657

used to refer to the area between the Thukela and Mzimkulu rivers.¹⁹ “Zulu” is also used in this study to refer to those lineages which claimed to be directly connected to the line of Zulu kings, and who laid claim to the clan-name of “Zulu.”²⁰ In this sense, the term usually occurs in the forms “Zulu clan”, “Zulu ruling lineage” “Zulu royal house.” These distinctions should indicate that the use of the term Zulu in no way endorses the idea of a Zulu ethnic identity.

In this study, the term clan is used to refer to a group of lineages, which claimed descent from a common ancestor who could be very remote. Lineage is used to refer to all the descendants of a common ancestor in the male line, amongst whom very exact connections were traceable.²¹ The term chiefdom is used to refer to a political unit occupying a territorial area, under an independent or semi-independent inkosi (chief).²² As opposed to kingdom, chiefdom tended towards a greater degree of genealogical homogeneity. The Zulu kingdom ultimately came to contain within itself an enormous range of genealogically heterogeneous clans.

¹⁹ J. Guy: The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp. xvii – xviii.

²⁰ C.S.L. Nyembezi: “Historical background to the izibongo of the Zulu military age.” African Studies, Vol. 7, pp. 17 – 20.

²¹ C.L. Barnhart and R.K. Barnhart (Eds): The World Book Dictionary, Vol. 1, L – Z, p. 1215.

²² Ibid., p. 1156.

Chapter One attempts to give an outline of Zulu dynasty, from the earliest rulers to Mpande. The central proposition of the first chapter is that the Zulu kingdom which Mpande inherited in 1840 began as a chiefdom subordinate to the Mthethwa chief, Dingiswayo. King Shaka brought together people from different clans as one mighty sovereign nation who took on the clan-name of king Shaka to give it a collective identity.²³ The succession of Dingane as king and his ultimate fall are also traced.

Utilizing the methods for the analysis of oral traditions outlined in this introduction, Chapter Two goes on to look at the formative years of Mpande, from his early life to his inauguration as king of the Zulu nation. This is imperative in the light of scurrilous accounts on his life and career. One such controversial account was that Mpande was not supposed to be king because he was an umsizi ²⁴ At a certain point in the annual umkhosi ceremonies, the king, daubed with powdered medicines (umsizi), was required to spend the night in a specially prepared hut in the royal headquarters. There he would be attended by a selected wife, or a girl from the royal seraglio, with

²³ M.G. Buthelezi: King Shaka Day-Speech, Glebelands Stadium, Durban, 23rd September 1984, p.2.

²⁴ J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mgundeni ka Matshekana, 11 July 1918, pp. 123 – 125.

whom he might have sexual intercourse.²⁵ A child born of such a connection was held to be of inferior rank in the royal family and therefore not supposed to be heir. Presumably Mpande was conceived and born under such circumstances.

Chapter Three gives an exposition of Mpande's military campaigns, highlighting the ambiguous role played by outside powers. The chapter also pays homage to the control system of the amabutho (regiments) inherited from Shaka and Dingane. Chapter Four examines Mpande's relations with the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia and in particular, the agreements he concluded with the Volksraad (the supreme legislative body).²⁶ Chapter Five looks at British imperial ties and permission Mpande gave to the British at Natal to occupy land. Central in this chapter is the diplomacy Mpande displayed in handling colonial establishments in Natal.

Chapter Six looks at the acquaintances Mpande made with the Christian missionaries. What is highlighted in this chapter is the flexibility of Mpande in the light of sporadic squabbles and the

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 123 – 125.

²⁶ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 30.

impact of Christianity on the Zulu kingdom.²⁷ Chapter Seven examines the wrangles in the royal house of Mpande, its causes being controversial and still a bone of contention among scholars of Zulu history. This chapter also highlights the role of colonial establishments in the civil war between princes Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo (Mpande's sons) culminating in the battle of Ndondakusuka in 1856.²⁸ A conclusive Chapter Eight gives an evaluation of the legacy of King Mpande, his relations with both the Voortrekker and the British colonial establishments in Natal, acquaintance with the missionaries and the impact of the civil war on his relations with colonial establishments.

²⁷ R. Sales (Ed): Adventuring with God – the story of the American Board Mission in South Africa, p. 17.

²⁸ F.E. Colenso: The Ruin of Zululand. Vol. 1 – an account of British doings in Zululand since the invasion of 1879, p. 355.

CHAPTER ONE

AN OUTLINE OF THE ZULU DYNASTY

Mpande Ka Senzangakhona was the third in succession in the dynasty of “martial” kings in South-east Africa whose military genius transformed simple and servile clans into a powerful Zulu nation. Before the formation of such a nation, each clan was bound together by an affectionate reverence for its inkosi (chief).¹ It could be said that under such circumstances people were devoid of bellicose tendencies and lived much more in peace and content. The Zulu clan was one of about 100 small clans scattered over the land under separate amakhosi (chiefs).²

The Zulu clan had its genesis from the north of Mhlathuze river and were not originally part of the “Nguni” people. They were called amaNtungwa by the Qwabe clan because they remained in the north.³ The Zulu people used to arrive in the Qwabe clan with indungulu (*hyparrhenia hirta*) and ikhathazo (malaria preventative) medicines, and say on arrival, “ofe

¹ R.J. Mann: *The Zulus and Boers of South Africa - a fragment of recent history*, pp. 30 - 66; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mkebhini, 17 September 1921, pp. 198-9; J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Mtshayankomo, 11 January 1922, p. 115.

² *Ibid.*, p. 30, 198-9, 115.

³ K.C., Stuart Papers, file 61, Notebook 45, Evidence of Mabhonsa, 20 December 1900, pp. 2 - 3.

mkozi", speaking of themselves as amaNtungwa.⁴ The Khumalo, Zulu, Mambatha and abakwaKhanyile were all amaNtungwa while the Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, Qwabe and amaChunu were Nguni.⁵

Amongst the Zulu, a common historical origin was claimed by all the groups which had been assimilated by the Zulu in the earliest phase of expansion, that of amaNtungwa. It was their common identity as amaNtungwa, which provided the ideological basis of the social cohesion of a highly heterogeneous group.⁶ Thus, at the apex of Zulu society there emerged a high aristocracy made up of members who could demonstrate genealogical links with the Zulu royal line. However, the privileged, ruling echelon of Zulu society was not confined to the Zulu clan and their relatives, but embraced a wider category of people politically aligned with the Zulu aristocracy.⁷ Although this wider group could not demonstrate precise genealogical links with the royal house, they claimed to have the same historical origins, to share certain cultural traits through a common identity, as amaNtungwa.⁸

⁴ Ibid., pp. 2 - 3.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 10 - 24.

⁶ J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Ndambi, 25 March 1909, p. 176.

⁷ C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 3, pp. 23-4.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 23-4.

The origin of the name amaNtungwa was best described by Ndambi KaSikhakhane, John Stuart's informant:

*"I have asked the amaNtungwa people the origin of their name, and they said that it originates from the intungwa grass (entungweni yo tshani). This grass will stick in clothes and prick one. That is, the name arose from the grass used for thatching huts. Grain baskets (izilulu) were also made of intungwa grass."*⁹

Phakade KaMacingwane spoke of his Chunu clan as "AbaNguni of the Mngeni" and the Qwabe as "AbaNguni of the place of the people of Yeyeya (Lelela) - who would destroy a person by beating him down with words."¹⁰

The first Zulu inkosi was Malandela who was born round about 1597.¹¹ Nothing is known about his reign except that he lived and died on the Mhlatuze valley in 1691. Malandela begat Zulu who moved to the valley of the Mkhumbane stream where he died about 1709.¹² Bryant asserted that Zulu was buried at Mkhumbane under the umganu (sclerocarya caffra tree).¹³ Zulu begat Phunga and Mageba. Phunga ruled from 1709 until he

⁹ J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Ndambi, 25 March 1909, p. 176; Cf. C. Hamilton: Ideology, oral traditions and the struggle for power in the early Zulu Kingdom, p. 290.

¹⁰ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 44, Evidence of Mabhonsa, 15 February 1903, pp. 23-4.

¹¹ C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 3, p. 100.

¹² C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 16; A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 36.

¹³ Ibid., p. 36.

died in 1727 without an heir. Phunga's widow was inherited by Mageba who ruled the Zulu chiefdom from 1727 until his death in 1745.¹⁴ Mageba built the Emakheni (the perfumery place) homestead which was not far from the subsequent site of king Dingane's harem of Mgungundlovu. The Emakheni homestead played a significant role in the early Zulu chiefdom and became a meeting place where matters of national importance were decided on.¹⁵

The early Zulu chiefdom had no visible tales of military prowess except during the reign of Ndaba, Mageba's son, who had amaNkankane and amaGwadlu regiments.¹⁶ During times of military offensives Ndaba danced before his regiments to a song:

*"uNdaba u-y-inkosi.
[Ndaba is a king.]
Oho! O!
Ha! Oye!
Jijiji! Ajiji!"¹⁷*

While his predecessors had left no word of iziBongo, Ndaba had the following:

"Ndaba ozingela amahlathi,

¹⁴ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 9, Notebook 3, Evidence of Mtshayankomo, 11 January 1922.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 38; C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 75.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 38.

[Ndaba who hunts forests]
Athi gqigqi gqigqi gqigqi,
 [Saying gqigqi gqigqi gqigqi]
Nonyaka akunyamazane.
 [The year has unnumbered bucks]
Amlandulela ngentshintsho yempunzikazi.
 [Denying him through suckles of antelope]
Uhlakanyana obanga izulu ukubalela,
 [The slab that causes sunshine]
Unamanga kodwa, hlakanyana; ulibangile"¹⁸
 [You are lying, Slab, you caused it]

Cope, however, gave the best description of Ndaba's praises:

*"He who hunted the forests until they murmured,
 Until eventually they cried: "Enough! Isn't it?"
 Who when he lay down was the size of rivers,
 Who when he got up was that of mountains,
 Precious little amulet of our people, of Gcabashe."*¹⁹

Ndaba was succeeded by Jama in 1771 who built his homestead, Nobamba (the place of unity or binding together), near the Mpembeni stream.²⁰

Jama had two wives, the chief of whom was Mthaniya, daughter of Manyelela of the Sibiya clan. Mthaniya begot twin girls, i.e. Mkabayi and Mmama, as well as a boy named Senzangakhona and finally a girl, Mawa.²¹ The three daughters of Jama became heads of harems in the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁹ T. Cope: *Izibongo - Zulu praise poems*, p. 72.

²⁰ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 9, Notebook 3, Evidence of Mtshayankomo, 11 January 1922.

²¹ A.T. Bryant: *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, p. 40.

Zulu chieftdom and evinced aversion to matrimonial bonds, preferring to remain queens.²² Mkabayi headed the ebaQulusini (where they push out buttocks); Mmama ruled the Osebeni (on the river bank) homestead, while Mawa reigned over king Shaka's eNtonteleni military homestead.²³

Jama's military valour was best demonstrated by his offensives against the Kwafakazi clan of Mhlabangubo near the present day Vryheid.²⁴ While he is said to have refrained from publicising his prowess to his country's aggrandisement, Jama's praises indicate that he was by repute a valorous warrior:

*"Jama is not deceived to the slightest extent,
Even on the point of a spear he can be at ease,
Even on branches he can hold tight.
He who was solid like a rock of Zihlalo,
Which could be commanded by those who carry
barbed spears."*²⁵

Jama presented his half-brother, Mhlaba, with a bride he had already impregnated. This led to the birth of Sojiyisa (he who thickens).²⁶

²² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²⁵ T. Cope: *Izibongo - Zulu praise poems*, p. 77.

²⁶ C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): *James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples*, Vols. 3 - 4, pp. 163 - 164, 210, 265.

Sojiyisa called his homestead KwaMandlakazi (the place of the mighty seed, or power). Sojiyisa begot Maphitha who begot Zibhebhu who played a major role in the history of KwaZulu. The description of Jama as inkosi with a fiery temperament and fierce in the fray was noted in his other praises:

"Isiduli esiphahlwe ngamakhand' amadoda,
 [A salt-rock surrounded by men]
Uboqolo o'makhandakhanda, nabalimi
bangawusiphula,
 [A multi-headed bush, even farmers can uproot it]
uJama kabongwa ngabalandakazi, ubongwa yinjenje
 [Jama is not bellowed by women, but praised by men]
yasemQekwini,
 [of mQekwini]
Imbaba yakoSonomo mninginingi
 [The obstinate one of Sonomo, mninginingi]
Ngibe ngiyabiza kusabel umLacuba wakwaMagalana,
 [Even when I call mLacuba of Magalana responds]
Kusabel umBebe kaMahamba – simuke,
 [Only mBebe of Mahamba responds – we go]
Abanye basemhlane, abasiquzi ngabawoNkobe.
 [Others are on the back, the brave of Nkobe]
Ujama kalutwana kangakanani,
 [Jama is thin and short]
Nasenhlamvini yomkhonto angase ahlale.
 [He can rest even at the tip of the spear]
Ugabagaba, umthondo umajiya esiswini."²⁷
 [The long, entangled penis in the stomach]

Jama died in 1781 and due to the minority of Senzangakhona, his heir, Mkabayi became regent. When Senzangakhona assumed to reign in 1787

²⁷ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 14; K.C., Stuart Papers, File 81, Notebook 42, evidence of Mgidhlana, 7 June 1921, p. 108; S.N.A. 1/1/7, N.A.: Minutes of the Executive Council, 28 November 1848.

his names increased. The name Untiti (master frail-boy), posing as a remote progenitor of Senzangakhona, indicated in reality Senzangakhona himself. Some of his other numerous nicknames were uGxebe (sweetheart); Menzi (the doer); and Mjokwane (the little-long-thing).²⁸ The expressions uZulu KaMdlani, uZulu KaMandlana, uZulu KaMdlamfe are all alike merely iziBongo, not of a person, Zulu (much less are they his parents' names), but of the Zulu nation when at the height of its power (in Shaka's time) and signify respectively:

*"The Zulus, of the vigorous contestant,
The Zulus, of the fairly strong man,
The Zulus, of him who lives on the
enemy's sugar-cane (imfe) as they pass (in war)"*²⁹

Senzangakhona had fifteen wives, the first and chief of whom was Mkabi (she of the ox, or cattle), the daughter of Sodubo of the Nzuza clan.³⁰ Mkabi did not have an heir and her only daughter's name was Mzinhlanga. Other wives of Senzangakhona were Fudukazi (big tortoise) of the Cele clan; Nandi, king Shaka's mother and daughter of Bebe of eLangeni clan; Langazana (most earnest-longing), mother of Magwaza (who died at the battle of Ncome on 16 December 1838) and daughter of

²⁸ J. Peires (Ed): Before and After Shaka, pp. 49 - 74; A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 46.

²⁹ J.F. Holleman: "Die twee-eenheidsbeginsel in die sosiale en politieke samelewing van die Zulu, pp. 31 - 75; P. Bonner: "The dynamics of later eighteenth century, early nineteenth century northern Nguni society - some hypothesis", pp. 75 - 80.

³⁰ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 46.

Gubeshe of the Gazu Sibiya; Mzondwase, mother of Mhlangana; Mpikase, mother of Dingane and daughter of Mlilela of the Qungebeni clan; Magulana (little milk gourds), daughter of Ntshongolo of the Nene, sub-clan of the emaNgadini; Bibi, mother of Sigujana and daughter of Sompisi of the Ntuli clan; Songiya, mother of Mpande and daughter of Ngotsha of the Hlabisa clan; OkaSondaba, daughter of Sondaba of the Buthelezi clan; Ncaka, mother of Kholekile (who also died at Ncome in 1838) and daughter of Mncinci of the Qwabe clan; Mehlwana, daughter of Ntopho of Ntshwankeni KaNdaba; Khishwase; Mjanisi and Mangcengeza.³¹

Several of Senzangakhona's wives were associated with the great wife, Mkabi. Nandi, Langazana and Bibi were junior wives associated with Mkabi.³² The mothers of Dingane, Mhlangana and Mpande were the only heir-bearing wives who were not affiliated to the great house. The fact that they all belong to the left-hand section, helps to account for their subsequent alliance against Shaka.³³

According to Cope, Senzangakhona's praises were:

³¹ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidi, 15 June 1920, p. 210; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Baleni, 24 October 1904, p. 265; A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, pp. 51 - 53; J.F. Holleman: "The Structure of the Zulu word", pp. 109 - 133.

³² A. Kuper: "The house and Zulu political structure in the nineteenth century", p. 481.

³³ Ibid., p. 482; K.C., Stuart Papers, File 59, Notebook 30, Evidence of Magidi, 15 June 1920.

*"Menzi son of Ndaba!
Variegation like a multi-coloured animal,
Like that of Phiko at Bulawini
Buffalo that goes overlooking the fords,
He is like Mzingeli of the Mfekana people"*³⁴

One may argue that the evolvement of the ideal of nationhood among the Zulu people had its genesis in Senzangakhona's praises. When the imbongi (court poet or praise-singer) to Senzangakhona said:

*"A cord of destiny let us weave,
O Menzi, scion of Jama,
That to universes beyond the reach
Of spirit-forms, we may ascend."*³⁵

He was indicating that Zulus were people whose destiny was to traverse the universe and transform the human being into a conscious citizen of the cosmic order (in South-east Africa). King Shaka adopted this imbongi's ideal as the main inspiration of the revolution which he led after his father's death. It was the ideological blueprint on which he built the Zulu nation.

Nevertheless, a point which is often missed is that during the reign of Senzangakhona, the Zulu and the Buthelezi clans lived cheek by jowl in

³⁴ T. Cope: Izibongo - Zulu praise poems, p. 74.

³⁵ Dingizwe: "Zulus were welded together by spear and blood", Cf. Sowetan, 16 January 1984, p. 4.

what is today the Babanango district.³⁶ There were friendly rivalries in battle exercise between the two clans in which the Buthelezi clan always excelled. Thus the reference in Senzangakhona's praises:

*"Even if the Buthelezis came to us
like fog we will smash them."*³⁷

It was during Senzangakhona's rule when a family dispute forced two Buthelezi brothers, Khoboyela, father of Klwana, and Ngqengelele to flee in fear for their lives. They crossed the Mankankaneni valley to seek refuge with the Zulu clan.³⁸ By the time Shaka was born, the two Buthelezi brothers had long been part of the Zulu clan. Ngqengelele and Klwana had married and their sons distinguished themselves during the famous battle between Shaka's army and the renowned Ndwandwe clan.³⁹ Somalume, the eldest brave and famous son of Ngqengelele, was killed on Shaka's orders. He had laid offensive and extravagant claims to the spoils of war, which he claimed he deserved as a reward for his prowess in that war.⁴⁰

Ngqengelele, however, remained close to king Shaka as a close confidant and advisor for many years.

³⁶ M.G. Buthelezi: King Shaka Day - Speech, Glebelands Stadium, Durban, 23 September 1984, p. 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Senzangakhona had nominated Bhakuza as heir apparent. Bhakuza was killed by Dingiswayo about 1816.⁴¹ Senzangakhona next nominated Sigujana as his heir, but was shortly afterwards killed by Shaka after the death of Senzangakhona in 1816. Shaka's successful plot to drown Sigujana while he was at the river was recorded in his praises:

"Isiziba esiseMavivane
[A shallow lukewarm stream]
Esiminzis' umuntu ethi uyageza,
[That drowns a person while bathing]
*Waze washona nangesicoco."*⁴²
[He drowns even with headring]

Bryant identified Shaka's ascension to the Zulu leadership as a political watershed:

"The passing of Senzangakhona marked the end and the beginning of two distinct periods in East-Nguni political history. On that day a long past of patriarchal rule was tolled to its grave and the tocsin sounded of a new era of autocracy to be inaugurated by his son. The primordial system of numberless clans and independent chieftains would, amidst much wailing and bloodshed, be gradually demolished, and upon and out of its ruins would

⁴¹ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 55.

⁴² A.T. Cope: Observations arising from Rycroft's study of the praises of Dingane", pp. 296 - 301.

*be built up a grandiose nation ruled
by a imperious despot.*"⁴³

This justifies a general consensus amongst historians that the beginning of the 19th Century witnessed the transformation of clan-based chieftaincies into stratified, centralised kingdoms. The emergence of kingdoms entailed not simply an increase in the size and in the degree of militarisation of political units, but also comprehensive changes in the nature of political, social, ideological, and to some extent, economic relations between rulers and ruled.⁴⁴

Thus, the Zulu domains as a kingdom began with Shaka who reigned between 1816 and 1828. He was able to apply his military and political genius fully.⁴⁵ It was he who brought together the people from different clans as one mighty sovereign nation with the clan name of king Shaka as a collective identity.

⁴³ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, pp. 70 - 71; J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 13 May 1914, p. 28; K.C., Stuart Papers, file 57, Notebook 7, Evidence of Mgidhlana, 23 February 1912, p. 5.

⁴⁴ J. Wright and C. Hamilton: "Traditions and transformations: the Phongolo - Mzimkhulu region in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Cf. A. Duminy and B. Guest (Eds): Natal and Zululand - from earliest Times to 1910, pp. 49 - 82.

⁴⁵ M.G. Buthelezi: King Shaka Day - Speech, Glebelands Stadium, Durban, 23 September 1984, p. 2.

It has to be accentuated, however, that Shaka grew to maturity as a warrior in the army of the Mthethwa inkosi, Dingiswayo, who had made himself paramount over most of the clans of KwaZulu.⁴⁶ This scenario fostered the growth of an ambitious and aggressive nature inherited from his mother, Nandi, and from his great-grandfather, Ndaba, whose following praise he inherited:

*"He lives in a rage with his shields on his knees."*⁴⁷

For this reason he and his mother were exiled from the Zulu clan. Shaka's praises gave evidence to this:

*"Udlungwane kaNdaba,
[Dlungwane of Ndaba]
Udlungwane womBelebele,
[Dlungwane of mBelebele]
Odlung' emanxulumeni,
[Who shook the homesteads]
Kwaze kwas' amanxulum' esibekelana."*⁴⁸
[Homesteads whispered to one another till dawn]

Shaka eventually succeeded to the Zulu leadership through Dingiswayo's support. The Mthethwa incorporation into the Zulu kingdom under Shaka, however, had a marked impact on the Mthethwa oral record. When Shaka assumed the mantle of Dingiswayo's rule, the Mthethwa chiefdom was reeling under the defeat and losses sustained during their

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 2 - 3.

⁴⁷ T. Cope: *Izibongo - Zulu praise poems*, p. 88.

⁴⁸ C.S.L. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, p. 19.

battle encounter with the Ndwandwe.⁴⁹ Shaka replaced Dingiswayo's heir with his own appointee, resulting in numbers of Mthethwa leaving the Zulu kingdom.⁵⁰ Tradition also record that many important Mthethwa individuals joined Shaka, from which it can be inferred that an even larger segment of the polity probably transferred direct allegiance to the Zulu.⁵¹

One of Shaka's greatest trials of strength was the conquest of the Buthelezi clan under the leadership of Phungashe.⁵² His first conquest, however, was the Qwabe clan under Phakathwayo. Zulu was a younger brother of Qwabe, and the Zulus were consequently far less in number and importance than the Qwabes. Tradition depict the Qwabe chief, Phakathwayo, as a particular rival of Shaka.⁵³ He scorned the numerically inferior Zulu forces and insulted the person of the Zulu king as:

"The little Nguni who wears as a penis-cover the fruit-shell used for snuff-boxes. Where did he get an impi from? Is the impi from up-country like the rain? It is nothing but a little string of beads that doesn't

⁴⁹ C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 1, p. 200.

⁵⁰ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 65, Notebook 4, Evidence of Nhlekele, 10 October 1903, p. 8; K.C., Stuart Papers, File 53, "The life of Tshaka", by Stuart, Fynn, Diary, p. 13; J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Mahashahasha, 8 May 1910, p. 107.

⁵¹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 65, Notebook 4, Evidence of Nhlekele, p. 16; J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Jantshi and Ndukwana, 16 February 1903, p. 200; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Ndukwana contained in the testimony of Mlando, 9 August 1902, p. 162.

⁵² C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 4, pp. 277, 285, 292.

⁵³ T. Cope: Izibongo - Zulu praise poems, p. 83; C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 38.

even reach the ears... The Nguni, who, when mixing food, held it in his left hand and the spoon in his right and had to hit the dog with his head."⁵⁴

Thus, the subjugation of the Qwabes by the Zulus was a conquest of great significance.

Shaka's taxing trials of strength came in 1818 when he encountered the mighty Ndwandwe under Zwide.⁵⁵ Zwide had vanquished Dingiswayo, and Shaka's conquest was therefore both a revenge and triumph, for Zwide was, after Dingiswayo, the most powerful inkosi in the country.

The Ndwandwe onslaught saw the Zulu embark on a desperate tactical withdrawal south, towards the forest fortresses of the eDlize and Nkandla in the Qwabe territory, razing the ground as they went and burying grain where they could.⁵⁶ The scorched-earth policy which effectively weakened the Ndwandwe amabutho (regiments), and the Zulu tactics in the famous "kisi battle" enabled them to survive. The last mentioned referred to the Zulus who slipped in amongst the Ndwandwe under cover

⁵⁴ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Jantshi, 11 February 1903, p. 180; J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Makuza, 6 March 1921, p. 168; J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Mandhlakazi, 22 May 1916, p. 177; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mmemi, 12 October 1904, p. 241.

⁵⁵ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 10 May 1914, p. 17.

⁵⁶ C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 1, p. 103.

of dark, using “kisi” (yes, I caught you) as the password to distinguish friend from foe. Thus many Ndwandwe were killed as they lay sleeping.⁵⁷

The conquest of Zwide earned Shaka the following praises:

*“Umxoshi womuntu amxoshele futhi,
[The one who chases a person repeatedly]
Ngimthand ‘exosh’ uZwid’ ozalwa nguLanga,
[I like him chasing Zwide of Langa]
Emthabatha lapho liphuma khona,
[Taking him from where it rises]
Emsingisa lapho lishona khona;
[To where the sun sets]
Uzwide wampheq ‘amahlonjan’ amabili.”⁵⁸
[Breaking two of Zwide’s breasts]*

Other clans that Shaka conquered, thereby earning his kingdom respect that transcended the boundaries of KwaZulu, were the Bomvana under Gambushe, Mpondo of Faku and Msane under Nxaba.⁵⁹ A strange characteristic of Shaka was that having conquered all clans in KwaZulu (which included what later became known as Natal), he did not treat them as aliens, but embraced them as brothers.⁶⁰ It is typical of the wisdom of his strategy that this kind of treatment made them loyal citizens of the Zulu kingdom.

⁵⁷ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Mangati, 15 June 1920, p. 209; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mmemi, 25 October 1904, pp. 270-71.

⁵⁸ C.L.S. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, p. 34.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 38 - 39.

⁶⁰ M.G. Buthelezi: King Shaka Day - Speech, Glebelands Stadium, Durban, 23 September 1984, p. 3.

At the zenith of his power, Shaka made acquaintance with the colonial forces when in 1824 he permitted a coterie of English traders and adventurers to form a settlement around the bay of Port Natal.⁶¹ This was the first permanent European settlement in Natal, and it was engaged primarily in trading. This, however, did not disturb Shaka's further wars of incorporation. But, before his campaigns could be completed, Dingane, Mhlangana (his half-brothers) and Mbopha KaSithayi (Shaka's chief councilor), conspired with Mkabayi KaJama (Shaka's aunt) to kill him. Thus, on 24 September 1828 Shaka's rule was terminated, but his influence continued.⁶² He had left a permanent mark in that in twelve brief years of power he had brought together a plethora of clans to form a single kingdom. Within one decade he set an example of unequalled nation building and ingenuity. He became a legend during his lifetime, and for subsequent generations.

When Dingane took over the reins in 1828, he consolidated his position internally. He was, however, faced with challenges from several important royal abantwana (princes and princesses) and regional factions and

⁶¹ A.J. Christopher: Natal - A Study in Colonial Land Settlement, p. 45.

⁶² C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 52, J. De Villiers: King Shaka - An Historical Perspective. Cf. Cecil Skotnes: The Assassination of Shaka, N.P.

chiefdoms whose loyalty to Shaka could not be transferred to him.⁶³

Ballard perceived this phenomenon:

*"While the amabutho had initially acquiesced to Dingane's authority there were substantial regional factions and chiefdoms which were unreconciled. The reasons for this was that loyalty to the central government was directed to the person of the monarch and not to the institution of monarchy itself."*⁶⁴

He thus killed almost all potential challengers from those amakhosi whom he suspected of disloyalty. Within KwaZulu, Dingane eliminated most of his rival abantwana, with the exception of his half-brothers, Gqugqu and Mpande KaSenzangakhona.⁶⁵ He did not regard these last mentioned half-brothers as a threat due to their assumed feeble appearance. Notable among the princes murdered by Dingane were Ngwadi, Mhlangana and Ngqojana.⁶⁶ This was well recorded in Dingane's praises:

*"Ithol' elinsizwa lakokaDonda,
[The strong heifer of Donda]
Elihambe liwakhahlel 'amany' amathole.
[Which trodded, kicking other heifers]
Umvus' omnyama wawoSikhakha,
[The black arouser of Sikhakha]*

⁶³ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mpande Ka Senzangakhona 1798 - 1872", Cf. C.C. Saunders: Black leaders in Southern African History, pp. 40 - 47.

⁶⁴ C.C. Ballard: The Transfrontiersman: the career of John Dunn in Natal and Zululand, 1834 - 1895, p. 85.

⁶⁵ J. Pridmore: The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn: 1883, Vol. 1, p. 41.

⁶⁶ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, pp. 52 - 54.

*Ovusel 'abant' ukuhlathwa.*⁶⁷

[Who aroused people to be slaughtered]

The first to rise in open revolt against Dingane's rule was Nqetho, inkosi of the Qwabe clan. Nqetho demanded the release of a clanswoman from the royal seraglio and this was rejected by Dingane.⁶⁸ Fearing punishment for his insubordination Nqetho rallied his clan and fled southwards across the Thukela River.

After the assassination of Shaka there were hopes of having a period of peace, but Dingane began punishing clans for real or imagined slights. In 1831 Dingane massacred almost the whole of the Cele clan.⁶⁹ In 1837 the Qadi clan was attacked for seditious tendencies. Thus, desertion from Dingane's own ranks became widespread. This, however, did not deter Dingane from further strengthening his kingdom. He waged some wars against the Swazi, Bheje of the Khumalo at Ngome, the San, Mzilikazi, and the Voortrekkers.⁷⁰ The latter campaign was of historic significance both to the Zulu kingdom and Zulu relations with colonial establishments in Natal. A number of Voortrekkers, led by Piet Retief, was ensnared and

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 53 - 54.

⁶⁸ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Jantshi, 11 February 1903, p. 180; M.M. Fuze: The Black people and whence they came - a Zulu view, pp. 43 - 48.

⁶⁹ C.C. Ballard: The Transfrontiersman: the career of John Dunn in Natal and Zululand, 1834 - 1895, p. 87.

⁷⁰ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, pp. 54 - 56.

killed by Dingane's amabutho at Mgungundlovu in February 1838.⁷¹ The names of some of those killed were mentioned in Dingane's praises:

"Owadi' uPiti kumaBhunu,
 [Who devoured Piet among Boers]
Wamudla wamtshobotshela;
 [He completely obliterated him from the earth's face]
Odi' uMzibhelibheli kumaBhunu,
 [Who devoured Mzibhelibheli among Boers]
Wadi' uPhuzukuhlokoza kumaBhunu,
 [You devoured Phuzukuhlokoza among Boers]
Wadi' uHwahwini kumaBhunu,
 [You devoured Hwahwini among Boers]
Wadi' uJanomude kumaBhunu,
 [You devoured Janomude among Boers]
Wadi' uJanejembuluki kumaBhunu,
 [You devoured Janejembuluki among Boers]
Wadi' uMazinyansakansaka kumaBhunu,
 [You devoured Mazinyansakansaka among Boers]
Wadi' oSisini kumaBhunu..."⁷²
 [You devoured Sisini among Boers...]

Nevertheless, Dingane's reign eventually ended tragically when Mpande, his half-brother, formed an alliance with the Voortrekker leader Andries Pretorius in January 1840.⁷³ This alliance staged a landslide victory against Dingane's amabutho (regiments) at the battle of Maqongqo (although actual Voortrekker participation remained equivocal).⁷⁴

⁷¹ C.C. Ballard: *The Transfrontiersman: the career of John Dunn in Natal and Zululand, 1834 - 1895*, p. 88, G.S. Preller: *Voortrekker Mense*, p. 8.

⁷² C.S.L. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, p. 49.

* The Zulu praise-singers or court poets did not know the names of the Voortrekkers and they named them in Zulu.

⁷³ P.A. Kennedy: "Mpande and the Zulu kingship," *Journal of Natal and Zulu history*, Vol. IV, p. 29.


⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

Dingane himself then fled and was murdered by the Nyawo people who were helped by the Swazi.⁷⁵

Mpande's colonially-based support in the dynastic struggle symbolised a turning point in the domestic affairs of the Zulu kingdom. This renders it imperative for one to take cognisance of and analyse Mpande's rise to power and all its implications.

⁷⁵ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 31, Evidence of Ndukwana, 17 May 1903, J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mpatshana, 24 May 1912, p. 301; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Melaphi, 28 April 1905, p. 76; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mmemi, 16 October 1904, p. 248.

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THE BATTLE OF MAQONGQO, C 1840

CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE AND REIGN OF KING MPANDE


Born in about 1798 Mpande was the son of inkosi (chief) Senzangakhona and queen Songiya, daughter of Ngotsha of the Hlabisa clan (isizwe).¹ Besides Mpande, Shaka, Dingane and Mhlangana, Senzangakhona had many other sons from different wives. These sons, like most Zulu princes, distinguished themselves in battles and laid down their lives in defence of KwaZulu.²

The Zulu lineage largely begotten by Mpande, the first king to have children, became a royal group with high status. Mpande decreed that all children begotten by members of the Zulu royal family should be referred to as abantwana (princes and princesses).³ They lived in imizi (homesteads) consisting of a circle of izindlu (huts) around a central cattle-fold. Each homestead was inhabited by a group of male heads with

¹ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 20; P.A. Kennedy: "Mpande and the Zulu kingship", Journal of Natal and Zulu History, p. 24.

² J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidi, 18 April 1905, p. 210; A. de V. Minnaar: Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu – a historical perspective, pp. 3 – 6.

³ M. Gluckman: African Political Organisation, Bantu Studies, 1940, pp. 110 – 112.



King Mpande KaSenzangakhona c.1848

(British Museum): Zulu Potentates, p. 40.

their wives and children and other dependents.⁴ All the inmates of the homestead were under the authority of family head who was the heir.

In Mpande's youth days a plethora of neighbouring homesteads were related to one another, though here and there among them would be matrilineal or affinal relatives or some stranger.⁵ At the head of each group of homesteads would be a lineage-head, who with other similar lineage-headmen came under the chief of the clan, the heir in direct line from the founder of the patrilineal eponymous clan which was the core of the clan group.⁶ These clan groups were established throughout KwaZulu. They could, except in times of draught, make an adequate living in the fertile hills and valleys of KwaZulu.⁷

For time immemorial and during Mpande's youth all males and females were organised and socialised into age-sets called amabutho (regiments). They learnt the life of the Zulu chiefdom and had to conform to acceptable behaviour of the Zulu community irrespective of rank of the individual age-grades.⁸ Further, they adhered to factions, requirements and orders which emanated from the king's royal palace and these were

⁴ M. Z. Shamase: Zulu Potentates – from the earliest to Zwelithini KaBhekuzulu, p. 41.

⁵ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, pp. 76 – 78.

⁶ I.S. Kubheka: "A preliminary Survey of Zulu Dialects in Natal and Zululand", pp. 10 – 15.

⁷ J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mpatshana, 28 May 1912, pp. 316 – 320; K.C., Stuart Papers, Notes on the life of Henry Fynn, pp. 24, 30; G.M. Theal: The Republic of Natalia, p. 4.

⁸ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 31, Evidence of Ndukwana, 17 May 1903, pp. 3 – 4, 6 – 8.

very stringent and proper. Referring to males in particular, Samuelson asserted that:

*"They also heard the history of their ancestors, the sagas of the lands with respect to kings and heroes; war songs and regimental war songs, and imbibed them, some better and some worse than others and were fired with the desire to emulate those heroes of yore and to do and die for their native land. They were thus built up to be brave and loyal citizens of their country."*⁹

The youths, however, were treated with an expectation of unequivocal obedience to the elders. Any youths who had not yet had their ears incised were made to do so that their ears would be "open" that they might "hear" the commands given to them.¹⁰ Their loyalty to the ruler was constantly emphasised, as was the developing notion of the new Zulu clan.

Thus, Mpande also underwent all the stages of development as a member of a regiment, including a stage of ukukleza (to drink milk directly from the udders of cattle).¹¹ The youths who did ukukleza were all post-pubescent, and they did ukukleza for a number of years until they were

⁹ R.C. Samuelson: Long, Long Ago, pp. 355-56; M.Z. Shamase: Zulu Potentates – from the earliest to Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, p. 41.

¹⁰ I.S. Kubheka: "A Preliminary Survey of Zulu Dialects in Natal and Zululand", pp. 1 – 5.

¹¹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 31, Evidence of Ndukwana, 1 May 1903, pp. 3 – 4; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mpatshana, 29 May 1912, pp. 316 – 318.

about eighteen years of age. The period of ukukleza was thus the key training period which occurred over a long time, when boys were taught to use weapons and were apprised of fighting techniques.¹²

Mpande grew up under the economic scenario based mainly on izinkomo (cattle); goats and sheep, which were traditionally tended by boys. Milk was the main food product and some cattle would be slaughtered at festivals for meat, while the horns and skins were used for ornament, clothing and defence.¹³ The cattle constituted the major form of wealth surplus and the king, as the new ruling lineage, controlled these resources. The ukusisa (loaning cattle) system acquired a new form as the monarchy lent out cattle to ensure socio-economic and political loyalty.¹⁴

In spite of the above, however, Mpande began on a very precarious footing. In his youth he was plagued by umchoboka (skin dermatitis).¹⁵ His predecessors and contemporaries viewed him as indolent, inept, obese and even cowardly. A plethora of European historical accounts have referred to Mpande's inferior genealogical status, cowardice, physical and mental deficiencies.¹⁶

¹² K.C., Stuart Papers, File 41, "Historical Notes", Evidence of Socwatsha, 16 March 1907, p. 96; J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Mandhlakazi, 23 May 1916, pp. 181 – 182.

¹³ Ibid., p. 96, 181 – 182.

¹⁴ P. Bonner: "The dynamics of late eighteenth century, early nineteenth century northern Nguni society – some hypothesis", pp. 75 – 80.

¹⁵ Minutes of the Natal Volksraad, 15 October 1839, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 535 – 537.

¹⁶ A. Duminy and B. Guest: Natal and Zululand – from earliest times to 1910, p. 95.

On the contrary, Mpande was already a recruited warrior when Dingane, his half-brother, became king in KwaZulu. This was endorsed by Mpande himself in his meeting with the Voortrekkers in 1839.¹⁷ He had been incorporated into the regiments on the death of his father in 1816, but retained a submissive role during the next few years because he was an umsizi prince.¹⁸

At a certain point in the annual umkhosi ceremonies, the inkosi (chief), daubed with powdered medicines (umsizi), was required to spend the night in a specially prepared indlu (hut) in the isigodlo (harem). There he would be attended by a selected wife, or a girl from the harem, with whom he might have sexual intercourse. A child born of the connection was an umsizi and held to be of inferior rank in the royal family and therefore not supposed to be heir.¹⁹ An umsizi child was never made chief, but always lived and brought forward when the principal house had no heirs. Mpande was allowed to live because of his being an umsizi, and therefore one who would not contend for the chieftaincy.²⁰ It was for this reason that Mpande was sent as a youth to live amongst the Cele south of Thukela. In Mpande's youth the umsizi custom was retained to give the king an imposing aura, so that he should be regarded with awe.

¹⁷ J. Pridmore: The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn – 1883, Vol. 1, p. 41.

¹⁸ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidigidi, 8 May 1905, pp. 88 – 89.

¹⁹ M.Z. Shamase: Zulu Potentates – from the earliest to Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, p. 44.

²⁰ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidigidi, 8 May 1905, p. 88 – 89.

Contrary to the above, Mpande is alleged to have given another reason to the Voortrekker leader, Andries Pretorius, for his not becoming king after Shaka. He said:

*"I was deployed by Shaka to attack Soshangane. On my return I found Dingane king, having murdered Shaka and almost all children of the harem."*²¹

This is understandable as he could not tell strangers about the umsizi custom.

It could be argued that in spite of his being an umsizi prince, the source of his strength could be traced from his name, "mpande". It could also be that Senzangakhona had a premonition of his son's reign by naming him Mpande. His name comes from a Zulu word impande, meaning "root".²² A root could be of a plant or nation. The symbolic meaning of a root is that it is a source of life. The growth of a plant or nation is entirely dependent on the root or roots.²³ It could thus be argued and said that in Senzangakhona's calculations Mpande was to be source, strength and growth of the nation. This bore truth in that through his household there emerged kings whose genius earned the Zulu nation dignity and respect.

²¹ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 34.

²² M.Z. Shamase: Zulu Potentates – from the earliest to Zwelithini KaBhekuzulu, p. 42.

²³ Ibid., p. 42.

While Mpande ruled during a period that was devoid of full-scale conventional wars, he had to live through times when sporadic attacks were the rallying point of relations between members of the Nguni-speaking communities such as Xhosa, Swazi and Mpondo.²⁴ Besides being an umsizi, it was rumoured that king Shaka had given Mpande the responsibility of fathering a son.²⁵ This could be noted as an underlying factor in his becoming a natural successor to the Zulu throne.

By 1837 Mpande had built up a substantial personal following living with him at inkosi Senzangakhona's Mlambongwenya homestead in the Eshowe district. Here he lived a peaceful life anticipating no invasion from adversaries. It also precluded Dingane from embarking upon the same kind of purges as he did against his other half-brothers and potential rivals.²⁶ Dingane's plots against Mpande were aborted by Ndlela Ka Sompisi, his Ndunankulu (Prime Minister) and inkosi of the Ntuli clan.

Ndlela argued:

*"Your Majesty, why do you want to denigrate yourself by killing a weakling?"*²⁷

²⁴ Minutes of the Natal Volksraad, 15 October 1839, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, p. 539.

²⁵ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mpande Ka Senzangakhona, 1798 – 1872." Cf. C.C. Saunders: Black leaders in Southern African History, p. 47.

²⁶ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 23.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

However, the planned assassination of Mpande remained uppermost in Dingane's mind. In July 1837 Dingane sent two of his emissaries, Mathunjana and Nxagwana to present Mpande with cattle.²⁸ According to Dingane's plan Mpande would be assassinated on arrival to express his gratitude at Dingane's palace. Mathunjana was persuaded by Ndlela to admonish Mpande not to come to Dingane.²⁹

Although Ndlela's sympathy towards Mpande seems perturbing, Colenbrander assumed that this could be based on the fact that "the Ntuli domain lay close to Mpande's homesteads."³⁰ Dhlomo, however, attributed this to the fact that Mpande was the only prince who fathered his own children, thereby producing heirs.³¹

In Dhlomo's version Ndlela is said to have whispered the following to Mathunjana:

*"Mpande is a guarantor to the continuity of the Zulu kingdom. He is producing heirs while the king does not father his own children. Mpande's death will result in the extinction of the entire nation."*³²

²⁸ S.N.A. 1/4/23 CR 19/1911: Mpande to Cloete, 23 and 29 October 1843; C.T. Msimang: Kusadliwa Ngoludala, p. 388.

²⁹ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidigidi, 8 May 1905, pp. 88 – 89.

³⁰ P. Colenbrander: The Zulu Kingdom, 1828 – 1879. Cf. A. Duminy and B. Guest: Natal and Zululand – from earliest times to 1910, p. 95.

³¹ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 25.

³² Ibid., p. 25

Mpande's survival was therefore largely attributed to Ndlela's "cunning" moves. After Mathunjana had conveyed Ndlela's message to Mpande, he immediately moved his household and adherents from the Mfemfe site at Eshowe across the Thukela River.³³ Dhlomo pointed out that Mpande crossed with about 17 000 people and about 25 000 cattle.³⁴ He settled about 8,05 km's from Mill Drift in the subsequent Mvoti district.³⁵

The consequences of the conflict between Dingane and the Voortrekkers at Blood (Ncome) River on 16 December 1838 consolidated Mpande's position. Following that conflict the Voortrekkers incinerated Dingane's royal palace at Mgungundlovu.³⁶ Dingane fled northwards, building himself another royal headquarters (isigodlo) north of the Vuna River.³⁷ He then resolved to recoup his strength for further (apparently inevitable) conflict with the Voortrekkers by attempting the conquest of the southern Swazi people of KwaNgwane.³⁸ This proved futile, because Dingane's regiments (the Dlambedlu and Zinyosi) suffered crushing defeats due to the impenetrable forts of KwaNgwane.³⁹

³³ S.N.A. 1/4/23, N.A.: Despatch relative to the management of the Natives, 25 May 1844.

³⁴ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 26.

³⁵ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidigidi, 1 July 1918, p. 200.

³⁶ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Udingane Ka Senzangakhona, p. 16.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

³⁸ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 22.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

On 1 January 1839 Dingane appealed to Mpande's most powerful ibutho (regiment), the Hlomendlini (home guards).⁴⁰ Mpande's refusal to release the Hlomendlini and to personally command it infuriated Dingane to such an extent that he again plotted to assassinate him. Ndlela again admonished Mpande of the planned punitive expedition of Dingane.⁴¹ Frustrated by the defeat of his army at Blood (Ncome) River and his futile Swazi campaigns, Dingane thought of sending a delegation to solicit closer ties with the British traders who settled at Port Natal (Durban).⁴² This prompted Mpande to visit the Voortrekkers at Khangela (a Zulu name for Durban).⁴³

The eminent Zulu historian Dhlomo concurred with Lapping, Christopher, Lindemann and Bryant that Mpande crossed the Thukela River in 1839. They agreed that he went straight to the Voortrekkers to seek military assistance against Dingane.⁴⁴ Kuper further asserted that Mpande was

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴¹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 65, Notebook 4, Evidence of Nhlekele, 31 December 1913, pp. 84 – 86.

⁴² S.J.R. Martin: British Images of the Zulu, c.1820 – 1874, p. 46

⁴³ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Mazinyana, 22 April 1905, p. 272.

⁴⁴ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 26; P.H. Lapping: Influence Mpande had on the early settlement of Natal, 1843 – 1856, pp. 34 – 40; A.J. Christopher: Natal: A study in colonial land settlement, pp. 26 – 40; W.H. Lindemann: Mpande and Natal, pp. 34 – 36.

prepared to "pay homage to the colonial establishment of the Voortrekkers south of Thukela."⁴⁵

But these historians erred. On the contrary Mpande crossed the Thukela already in 1837 and settled in the Mvoti area after Ndlela had tipped him of Dingane's plot to obliterate him from the face of the earth.⁴⁶ Before he crossed the Thukela River he was living in inkosi Senzangakhona's Mlambongwenya (or Mfemfe) homestead at present day Eshowe.⁴⁷ Thus, when Mpande met the Voortrekkers at Khangela (Durban) on 15 October 1839 he had long been south of Thukela.

Given the military valour of the Zulu regiments in the face of any adversary at that time, Mpande could not prepare himself for an asylum to the "Voortrekker republic of Natalia". Furthermore, Mpande had crossed the Thukela with numerous adherents and 25 000 cattle.⁴⁸ It could thus be argued that Mpande was powerful enough to confront Dingane's warriors, in spite of rumours by Dingane's defectors that Mpande would be attacked by Dingane in collaboration with the British settlers of Port

⁴⁵ A.Kuper: *The house and Zulu political structure in the 19th Century*, Vol. 34, p. 105; A.T. Bryant: *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, p. 81.

⁴⁶ S.N.A. 1/4/23 CR 19/1911: Mpande to Cloete, 23 & 29 October 1843; C.O. 879/2/5: *Papers on Native Affairs*, p. 121.

⁴⁷ K.C., *Stuart Papers*, Notes on the life of Henry Fynn, 1 May 1903, p. 24.

⁴⁸ J.S.A., Vol. 2, *Evidence of Magidigidi*, 8 May 1905, p. 201; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Mpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 26.

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⁴⁵ A.Kuper: The house and Zulu political structure in the 19th Century, Vol. 34, p. 105; A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 81.

⁴⁶ S.N.A. 1/4/23 CR 19/1911: Mpande to Cloete, 23 & 29 October 1843; C.O. 879/2/5: Papers on Native Affairs, p. 121.

⁴⁷ K.C., Stuart Papers, Notes on the life of Henry Fynn, 1 May 1903, p. 24.

⁴⁸ J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Magidigidi, 8 May 1905, p. 201; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 26.

Natal.⁴⁹ The notion that Mpande found asylum in the Republic of Natalia is somewhat misleading. In 1839 the republic of Natalia was not yet in existence. The Voortrekkers officially proclaimed the Republic of Natalia to Mpande only in 1840 after the battle of Maqongqo.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, Mpande's exodus from KwaZulu in 1837, which became known as the "breaking of the rope", and his visit to the Voortrekkers at Khangela (Durban) on 15 October 1839, heralded the beginning of his heroic praises and reign.⁵¹ In this light, it becomes imperative to take cognisance of Mpande's military campaigns.

⁴⁹ S.J.R. Martin: *British Images of the Zulu, C. 1820 – 1874*, p. 46.

⁵⁰ H. Stander: "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872", p. 256.

⁵¹ F.M. Hallows *et al*: *Thuthuka – Zulu Readers*, pp. 14 – 16; J.A.W. Nxumalo: *Umcebo Wolimi LwesiZulu*, p. 71; R.R.R. Dhlomo: *Umpande Ka Senzangakhona*, pp. 11 – 13; C.S.L. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, pp. 63 – 65; C.T. Msimang: *Kusadliwa Ngoludala*, pp. 387 – 389.

CHAPTER THREE

MPANDE'S MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

Mpande ruled at a time when the development of new institutions of new institutions of domination, notably the amabutho, facilitated the emergence of a form of centralised authority and gave to chiefs a new coercive capacity. Unlike his progenitors, Mpande waged few wars abroad. The style of his military expeditions, however, resembled that of his predecessors. After his campaigns a re-vitalization of the Shakan amabutho control system took place. New amakhanda were built and occupied by the amabutho, including a harem around his isigodlo (palace) at Nodwengu.¹

Mpande's system of regiments was a key aspect of state formation in south-east Africa. The dominance of the Zulu ruling group was closely associated with its control over the amabutho. Military units of Shaka, Dingane and Mpande were initially based at Esiklebheni or at Nobamba

¹ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mpande ka Senzangakhona – 1798 – 1872". Cf. C.C. Saunders: Black leaders in Southern African History, pp. 52 – 54.

military imizi.² Esiklebheni assumed the significance and ideological weight of an ancestral establishment, and became an evocative and sacred site. It was at Esiklebheni and Nobamba that the new recruits to the Zulu army spent the first period of their training.³ These establishments reorientated new recruits towards the idea of a Zulu nation united under a Zulu king.

The training period created the opportunity for non-Zulu recruits to come to identify with the Zulu king and ancestors.⁴ An important symbol of the unity of the amabutho and their intimate connection with the king, however, was inkatha (a coil of grass and medicine plastered with the vomit and body waste of the men of the amabutho).⁵ Inkatha was the legitimacy of the king's authority and the power to construct an inkatha was vested on him alone.

The first experience of many of the recruits to the Zulu amabutho was gained between the ages of thirteen and sixteen as udibi (carriers) for the men of the amabutho. Others amongst the ranks of the udibi had been

² K.C., Stuart Papers, File 9, Notebook 3, Evidence of Xubu; K.C., Essay Papers, "Zulu Royal Regiments," 2 February 1912, p. 128; J.S.A., Vol. 2, p. 253, Evidence of Mayinga, 9 July 1905; A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 642.

³ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 31, Evidence of Ndukwana, 1 May 1903, p. 3; J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mpatshana, 28 May 1912, p. 316.

⁴ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 10 May 1914, p. 21; K.C., Essay Competition, "Some Places of Historical importance in Natal and Zululand", 1942 (by Thomas Dlamini).

⁵ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 41, "Historical Notes", Evidence of Socwatsha, 16 March 1907, p. 11.

taken as captives in war, and entered the Zulu military establishment as udibi, later to become izinsizwa.⁶ As udibi, the young boys became acquainted with amakhanda life and gained a taste of campaigning, although they were kept well in the rear of any battles. On campaign, they carried food, mats, karosses, wooden pillows, gourds of water, spoons, and chamber pots.⁷ At the amakhanda they collected firewood and cleaned the huts of the men for whom they carried. They also laboured in the gardens of the ikhanda, and participated in the ritual life of the establishment.⁸ They absorbed the military ethos of Zulu society from an early age, and many subscribed to the social values of heroism.

Mpande thus built his harem at Nodwengu although his children were born at Mphenqaneni homestead.⁹ With the assistance of Masiphula KaMamba of eMgazini as his undunankulu (prime minister), Mpande began restructuring the Zulu army by forming his own amabutho. He had 21 amabutho named after his palaces, namely isaNgqu, iNgulube, amaPhela, uThulwana, iNkonkoni, iNdlondlo, uDlokwe, uMbonambi, uNokhenke, uKhandampemvu, iNgobamakhosi, Mdumezulu, Nodwengu,

⁶ K.C., Stuart Papers, file 60, Notebook 28, Evidence of Tununu, p. 19; J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 17 May 1914, p. 41.

⁷ J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mkando, 10 August 1902, p. 163.

⁸ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 31, Evidence of Ndukwana, 1 May 1903, pp. 3 – 4.

⁹ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, p. 47; K.C., Stuart Papers, File 41, Notebook 51, Evidence of Socwatsha, 16 March 1907, p. 96; J.S.A., Vol. 2, Evidence of Mandhlakazi, 23 May 1916, pp. 181 – 182.

Mlambongwenya, Zwangendaba, Dukuza, Ndabakawombe, isiKlebheni, uMbelebele, Nobamba and uDlambedu.¹⁰

Mpande's great izinceku (attendants in a king's household responsible for the performance of certain domestic duties, and for private services for the king) were Vumandaba kaNtethi of the Biyela; Mfinyeli kaNguzalele of the Xulu; Mzwakali kaCicazana of the Mthimkhulu; Phakathwayo kaSogodi of the Khanyile; Mvunyelwa of the Dhladhla; Sijulana kaMcikwana of the Buthelezi; Mzilikazi kaNgqengelele Buthelezi; Magamudele kaKlwana Buthelezi; Nomnombela kaMfaba of the Dunge; and Dazukile kaDhlakadhla of the Sibiya.¹¹

Mpande's izinduna (civil or military officials appointed to positions of authority or command) were Baleni kaSilwana; Ndungundungu kaNonkokhela of the Zulu; Fokothi kaMaphitha and Fokothi kaMgulugulu of the Magwaza people; Fokothi kaSiwangu of the Mthethwa; Tshemane kaNgwadhla; Hhoye kaMqundane; Mbonambi kaDidi of the Biyela; Bantubensumo kaKlwane of the Buthelezi; Magwala kaMqundane of the Zulu; Makhubalo kaNhliziyo of the Mbatha; Manqandela kaNkabana of the Zulu; Fokothi kaDhlegebene of the Sibiya; Madhlodhlongwane kaJaja of the Dhludhla; Nhlanganiso kaNyokana of

¹⁰ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, pp. 108 – 109.

¹¹ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 12 May 1914, pp. 24 – 26.

the Dhludhla; Mbune kaSomaphunga of the Ndwandwe; Mswazi kaNtokontoko of the Zulu; Mahlaphahlapha kaNombobo of the Mancwabe; Tshovu kaMagula of the Xulu; Tshemane kaNyathi of the Mgazi; Nhlokotshane kaNtshiba of the Qwabe; Sidubele kaMakedama of the Ntombela; Hhoye kaMadwala of the Thembu; Balisa kaMqundane of the Zulu; Mlamba kaNtatha of the Zulu; Mahwanqa kaNkayishana of the Ntshali; Fada kaMaphitha and Zibhebhu kaMaphitha of the Mandhlakazi.¹² They played a major role in recruiting, structuring and training amabutho. They were, however, accountable to uNdunankulu Masiphula Ntshangase.

Mpande and his amabutho had izinyanga (diviners or traditional healers) who lapha'd (performed the act of healing) them on the eve of the war. Those were Zibanto kaMdhluli of the Makhubalo; Bhecwa kaMatshoni of the Sikhakhane; Ntutho kaVumbi of the Sikhakhane; Nondo kaMlotshane of the Sikhakhane; Jiyane kaMqalana of the Buthelezi; Ntuku kaNondumo of the Nzuza; Manyelindlela kaKhondhlo of the Mazibuko; Manembe kaDumisa; Mqedi of the Nkwanyana and Magonondo kaKhondlo of the Mazibuko.¹³

Having enlarged his amabutho, Mpande was also determined to reassert

¹² Ibid., pp. 24 – 26.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 24 – 26.

Zulu authority over the outlying chiefdoms. This, however, was preceded by a precaution of ridding himself of any possible claimants to the throne. Thus in 1843 Mpande murdered his only surviving half-brother, Gqugqu.¹⁴ Gqugqu had built his homestead beyond the Black Mfolozi river on the eSigubudu hill.¹⁵ Gqugqu kaSenzangakhona had a stronger genealogical claim to the throne than Mpande. He had also amassed his own amabutho and isigodlo, in addition to support he received from important personalities such as the Nxumalo lineage head Sothondose; Mangena of the Nyandwini; Ncaphayi of the Ndlovu; the Ndwandwe inkosi then already under the control of Malanda Mkhwanazi of Mpukunyoni and Mawa kaSenzangakhona.¹⁶

To Mpande's surprise, the murder of Gqugqu triggered an exodus of his subjects to Natal. In addition to the above adherents of and sympathisers with Gqugqu, Mpande's own undunankulu, Nongalaza kaNondela of the Nyandwini, crossed the Thukela to pay homage to the colonial establishments in Natal.¹⁷ It should be noted that the flight of these and other subjects of the kingdom became an issue in Mpande's relations with the colonial establishment at Port Natal. When the British Commissioner

¹⁴ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, pp. 50 – 55.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁶ P.A. Kennedy: "Mpande and the Zulu kingship", Journal of Natal and Zulu History, Vol. IV, p. 32; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, pp. 53 – 55.

¹⁷ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 54.

Henry Cloete met Mpande in October 1843 an agreement was reached that the subjects of the kingdom who had become refugees in Natal would remain in that Colony and that all cattle they had taken, should be returned to Mpande.¹⁸ By 1845 there were about 75 000 Zulus between the Thukela and Mzimkhulu rivers. This figure increased to 305 000 by 1872.

Mpande's first military expedition after securing his position at home was against the Swazi in July 1847. Mpande's campaign against the Swazi was motivated by his need for more cattle and military honour. He deployed isaNgqu, iNkonkoni, uDlokwe and uNokhenke amabutho to seize cattle from king Mswati of Swaziland.¹⁹ The Swazis concealed their cattle and themselves in caves while soliciting the support of the Voortrekker forces stationed at Ohrigstad.²⁰ Eventually the total annihilation of the Swazi people was only averted by Mswati's alliance with the Voortrekkers. These allies of Mswati were promised a huge tract of land in the eastern Transvaal (Mpumalanga), stretching from the Olifants river in the north to the Crocodile river in the south. This was secured by a treaty signed on 26 July 1846 between Mswati and the

¹⁸ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mpande KaSenzangakhona, 1798 – 1872. Cf. C.C. Saunders (Ed) Black leaders in Southern African History, pp. 51 – 52.

¹⁹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 68, Notebook 9, Evidence of Ngangaye, 14 May 1904, p. 12; J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mswati 11 C. 1826-65." Cf. C.C. Saunders (Ed): Black leaders in Southern African History, p. 66.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 66.

Ohrigstad Voortrekkers. Against this Mpande's amabutho could make little impression and had to return empty-handed shortly after.²¹

Izibongo that Mpande earned from the first Swazi expedition were of great historical significance:

*"Inhlehlanyovane kaNdaba,
[The backslider of Ndaba]
Ihlehlele futhi ngoBulawayo,
[Backsliding through Bulawayo]
Ihlehlele' izinkomo zamaSwazi."*²²
[Retreating from Swazi cattle]

In 1849 the continuous struggle for succession in Swaziland once again provided Mpande with an opportunity to reassert his authority over the Swazis. Malambule, a regent to the throne in the minority of Mswati, refused to surrender cattle seized from Fokoti (his rival brother) to Mswati.²³ Malambule was in control of a chiefdom near La Vumisa, south of Swaziland from which he could mount a rebellion. During the Zulu civil war Malambule and his adherents appealed to Mpande for assistance. This event was well recorded in Mpande's praises:

*"Isimemezane sikaNdaba,
[The yellor of Ndaba]
Simenyezwe ngamaSwazi,
[Yelled by the Swazi people]*

²¹ Minutes of the Natal Volksraad, 15 October 1839, Bird, Annals of Natal, 1845, pp. 537 – 545.

²² C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 74.

²³ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mswati 11 C. 1826 – 65". Cf. C.C. Saunders (Ed): Black leaders in Southern African History, p. 65.

Athi zaphel' izinkomo nguMswazi.
 [Saying Mswazi devours cattle]
Lalelani low' omemezayo,
 [Listen to the one yelling]
Umemeza sengath' uyakhala,
 [Yelling as if he is crying]
Sengath' ukhal' isililo:
 [As if he is mourning]
Umalambule banoSidubelo,
 [Malambule and Sidubelo]
Banonina kaPhenduka,
 [with Phenduka's mother]
Bamemeze behlez' eMfihlweni,
 [They yelled seated at Mfihlweni]
Bathi godl' ekhwapheni ²⁴
 [Saying hide it under the elbow]

The Izinyathi (Buffalo) ibutho of Mswati was feared among the local clans, but proved unable to withstand the Zulu amabutho, invariably retreating into the cavernous precipices and mountain strongholds of its land. The Zulu onslaught forced the Izinyathi to flee to the caves and gorges.²⁵ The reason was that the Zulu discipline and tactics proved to be highly effective and could not be neutralised by traditional Mswati offensives.

IsaNqqu, the only Zulu ibutho of many in the force which remained unexhausted, proceeded to raid the cattle of Fabase, an inkosi of the Sotho clan. This was also recorded in Mpande's praises:

²⁴ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 75.

²⁵ R. Cope: "The Zulu Kingdom, 1824 - 1879." Paper given at a conference on the Anglo-Zulu War, University of the Witwatersrand, 1979, pp. 2 - 5.

*"Lukhozi lukaNdab' olumaphikw' abanzi;
[The eagle of Ndaba with large wings]
Lufulel' oSomhhashi noFabase,
[Encompassing Somhhashi and Fabase]
Lufulel' uNdengez' ezalwa uMayibuka"*²⁶
[Engulfing Ndengezi born of Mayibuka]

In 1851 isaNgu and iNgulube amabutho attacked Sikwata kaThulwana of the Bapedi clan.²⁷ The seizure of cattle was the main aim of this campaign. Although this campaign was a failure, Mpande was praised:

*"Wamudl' uMtshikila kubeSuthu bakwaPhahlaphahla.
[You devoured Mtshikila among the Phahlaphahla
Sotho]
Othukuthele wawel' uBhalule ngemvula yezinyembezi'
[In wrath you crossed Bhalule with rain of tears]
Way' engabeni kaSikwata kubeSuthu."*²⁸
[You went to Sikwata's seraglio among Sotho's]

These had justification in that praise-singers or court-poets were also required to recite the praises of the king (Mpande) on all occasions to continually reaffirm the legitimacy of the ruling house.

Mpande's amabutho returned from Sikwata operations during the weeding season in 1854 and were immediately ordered again to attack the Swazis.²⁹

Mpande had just enrolled the amaMboza ibutho of which Cetshwayo (his son) was a recruit. He deemed it necessary to allow

²⁶ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 75.

²⁷ J. Cobbing: "Zulu amabutho and production – some preliminary questions", pp. 2 – 8.

²⁸ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 76.

²⁹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 81, Notebook 42, Evidence of Ndukwana, 1 May 1903, p. 11.

amaMboza to accompany the most experienced amabutho like umKhulutshane, inDabakawombe, isaNgqu, umDlenuvu, iHlaba and iziNgulube. Thus the campaign became known as the ukufunda kwamaMboza (the experience of the amaMboza)³⁰

Mswati took the precaution of immediately removing his cattle over the border into Ohrigstad territory and of withdrawing Izinyathi into the caves of the Mdimba Mountains. The amaMboza ibutho collected huge piles of wood and old hide shields to fill the mouth of the caves and set the whole on fire.³¹ Few Swazi people were killed but a number of cattle was seized.

With this 1854 campaign Mpande's imbongi bellowed:

*"Inzingelezi kaNdaba,
[An encircler of Ndaba]
Emabal' azizinge,
[Who wears spotted colours]
Sengath' abekwe ngabomu;
[As if deliberately done so]
Inzingelezi kaNdaba,
[An encircler of Ndaba]
Ngokuzingelez' izinkomo zikaMswati kaSobhuza."*³²
[For encircling Mswazi and Sobhuza's cattle]

Mpande's Swazi expeditions were terminated due to pressure exerted by the colonial government in Natal. Zulu devastation in Swaziland instilled fear of a massive in-flow of refugees into Natal.³³ The Natal government

³⁰ J.S.A., Vol. 1, Evidence of Baleni, 12 May 1914, p. 34.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

³² C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 77.

³³ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 81, Notebook 42, Evidence of Ndukwana, 1 May 1903, p. 36.

ordered Mpande's amabutho to refrain from any further depredations among the Swazi.³⁴

Thus Mpande's thrust into Swazi territory ended in a fiasco. The north-western part of the kingdom, across the upper Phongolo, remained open for Zulu expansionism. That part was occupied by small chiefdoms like those of the Magonondo, amaNgwe, and Shabalala. In 1847 Mpande quarreled with Phuthini, the amaNgwe inkosi, and when he failed to obtain the compensation he demanded, he sent his amabutho to seize the cattle.³⁵ This campaign failed because the amaNgwe managed to send their cattle away through the Hlubi country, across the Mzinyathi, into Natal Colony.³⁶

Given Mpande's nascent enthusiasm to expand his authority over the Mzinyathi – Phongolo marshes, it was only a matter of time before the Zulus and Hlubi came into conflict.³⁷ During the early 1830's the Hlubi were in a process of re-formation within the Zulu kingdom, firstly under Dhlomo, Mthimkhulu's heir, and then under Langalibalele. The Hlubi under Langalibalele re-established their homes at the confluence of the

³⁴ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: "Mpande KaSenzangakhona, 1798 – 1872. Cf. C.C. Saunders (Ed): Black leaders in Southern African History, p. 69.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

³⁶ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 59, Notebook 30, Evidence of Ndukwana, 1 May 1903, p. 33.

³⁷ Ladysmith historical society: The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand and Natal – a history, p. 33.

Mzinyathi and Ncome rivers.³⁸ At that time, Langalibalele had formed eleven amabutho in comparison to two known in Mthimkhulu's time and none in the period of Bhungane, Mthimkhulu's father.³⁹

Mpande launched an offensive against the Hlubi in March 1848 with the pretext that he was pursuing the amaNgwe cattle. The Hlubi, however, were forewarned of the attack and managed to hide their cattle in the caves and behind boulders'. On their desperate retreat, Mpande's amabutho burnt many Hlubi homesteads and destroyed their ripening crops.⁴⁰

Mabhonsa, an elder of the Hlubi interviewed by James Stuart in 1909, described Mpande's attack on the Hlubi as follows:

"The impi came and bivouacked on the south side of the Mzinyathi. A certain two men of our tribe, Mangobe and Mganuko, were driving goats, having come from Chief Jobe of the Sithole people at iLenge. They got to a precipice, and some way below, heard the Zulus calling to one another in the dark. They grasped the position at once, and made straight off to our kraals, giving the alarm everywhere. Fires were lit in every direction; the whole country was ablaze. I was ordered to drive the cattle, together with some old men. We got away before dawn, and rushed the

³⁸ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 59, Notebook 30, Evidence of Mabhonsa, 15 February 1903, p. 8; J.B. Wright: "Pre-Shakan age-group formation among the Northern Nguni", Natalia, No. 8 (1978), p. 11.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 11; A. Manson: "A people in transition – the Hlubi in Natal, 1848 – 1877", Journal of the Natal and Zulu History, Vol. 2, pp. 13 – 16.

⁴⁰ CSO, 44 No. 37, Statement of Hadebe to T. Shepstone, 21 March 1848.

*cattle up northwards. The Zulus were too late. There was a certain amount of fighting. I remember this affair well, for I was a boy who had reached the age of puberty. The Zulus got quite tired out, and many of them were killed by our people. Only two of our people were wounded, and non killed. A few of our cattle were seized, including Langalibalele's oxen that had no horns (izithulu), 100 of them"*⁴¹

In the wake of Zulu attack Langalibalele sent an urgent message to the colonial establishment in Natal to plead for permission to move his people into the colony. The colonial authorities were alarmed and angered by the Zulu incursion over the Mzinyathi and promptly sent envoys to warn Mpande against making further attacks on the Hlubi and amaNgwe.⁴² Mpande assured the Natal authorities of his co-operation, but in May 1848 he sent emissaries to Langalibalele's residence with the following message:

"Plait yourself a rope that will raise you from the earth to avoid the king's vengeance, but so long as you remain on its surface you cannot avoid him. You may think of assistance from the frogs (meaning British) but his hope is also a vain one, as you will find to your cost. Your destruction is inevitable. Your rocks and caves will not save you. Your cattle which you have sent away for safety shall become the

⁴¹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 59, Notebook 30, Evidence of Mabhonsa, 15 February 1903, pp. 8 – 10.

⁴² Ladysmith Historical Society: The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand and Natal – a history, p. 34.

inheritance of those to whose care they are entrusted when you shall be no more."⁴³

Thus, in August 1848 Langalibalele gathered his people and crossed the Mzinyathi into Natal. A few weeks later they were followed by the amaNgwe. The Hlubi and amaNgwe arrived in Natal at a time when the colonial establishment was still fledgling and no drastic measures were taken against either Mpande or Langalibalele.⁴⁴

Mpande intervened to settle the succession dispute in Maputoland to his advantage. This was viewed as expression of Zulu determination to maintain its hegemony over an area of great strategic and economic importance. In 1854 inkosi Makhasana, died at the estimated age of 97 years.⁴⁵ He had named as heir his second eldest son, Noziyingili, after his first born, Hluma, had died. Makhasana's brother, Nonkatsha, had acquired a considerable amount of autonomy and a powerful following in Maputoland and usurped the throne. Noziyingili fled to KwaZulu and requested Mpande's support in reclaiming his inheritance.⁴⁶

Mpande dispatched seven amabutho to Maputoland. The Zulus were checked by Nonkatsha's forces in a clash at the Nondaka stream. Mpande

⁴³ CSO, 44, No. 37, Statement of Hadebe to T. Shepstone, 21 March 1848.

⁴⁴ Ladysmith Historical Society: The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand and Natal – a history, p. 37.

⁴⁵ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 293.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 306.

rushed reinforcements to his mauled forces, and eventually Nonkatsha and many of his adherents were caught and slain. Noziyingili returned to Maputoland as undisputed king and ruled from 1854 until his death in 1886.⁴⁷ By armed intervention Mpande increased his tributary grip over the Tsonga, and Noziyingili paid homage to the Zulu kings.⁴⁸ His throne had been saved by Zulu intervention and as long as tribute was paid annually, his position was underpinned and his power enhanced through his links with the Zulu kingdom.

Of all Mpande's campaigns the most successful in its outcome was one against Mlotshwa KaSiwele, head of the abakwaNkosi junior branch of the senior Khumalo house.⁴⁹ Mlotshwa was much more famous as the crackbrain mentor of his clan, to whom black oxen were regularly sent as propitiatory sacrifices to the clan ancestors. His realm comprised the country round the iziMpondwana hill on the northern side of the upper Mkhuze. The iziMpondwana hill stood as a rugged and solitary mass amidst an extensive plain. Whenever invasion was feared, the mountain summit was, as a precautionary measure, provisioned and the cattle moved there for safety.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ C. Ballard: Trade, Tribute and Migrant labour – Zulu and Colonial Exploitation of the Delagoa Bay Hinterland, 1818 – 1879. Cf. J.B. Peires (Ed): Before and After Shaka, p. 105.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴⁹ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p. 602.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 603.

In 1840 Mpande found Mlotshwa defiant as ever within his unassailable mountain fortress. Mpande's iziNyosi, uDlambedlu and uMkhulutshane amabutho succeeded in ferreting him out. They overtook and routed him beyond the Phongolo, seizing about 2 000 head of cattle.⁵¹

In the late 1840's, Mpande was prevented by H.F. (Frank) Fynn from attacking Faku in Pondoland. Fynn was placed as a British Resident with inkosi Faku for three years until he returned to Natal in 1852.⁵² He succeeded in convincing Mpande to abandon his planned military offensive against the amaMpondo. He argued that the land they occupied belonged to the British government in Cape Town, and that Faku had an alliance with both the Natal and Cape colonial forces.⁵³ The land was surrendered by Faku himself when he said:

*"I have no country, it belongs to the Govt.,
they are my refuge. I shall appeal to Smith
and his mouth shall direct me..."*⁵⁴

It is claimed that Fynn's experience in Natal suited him for the task of improving relations between Mpande and the colonial establishment.

Governor Sir H.G.W (Harry) Smith wrote:

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 604.

⁵² Fynn papers, Vol. 6, Smith to Mackinnon, 3 April 1848.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Fynn Papers, Vol. 4, Fynn to Southey, 29 July, 1848.

*"Mr Fynn is so well from previous experience acquainted with the duties imposed upon him, I send him no instructions, but rely with confidence on his discretion for he has previously, both with Faku and the Zulu king, ably done his duty."*⁵⁵

Mpande also attempted to destroy the position of Phakade Ka Macingwane Ka Lubhoko Mchunu. Phakade was an inkosi (chief) of the Chunu in Natal from the late 1830's until his death in 1880.⁵⁶

He lived for a time in the Zulu kingdom after his father's (Macingwane) chiefdom had been broken up by King Shaka. During the battle of Maqongqo in 1840 Phakade seized many of Dingane's cattle and crossed into the bush country of the Mpofana (Mooi) river.⁵⁷ The Mpofana river rises in the foothills of the Drakensberg near Giant's Castle and flows into the Thukela east of the present-day Tugela Ferry. Thus in 1848 Mpande demanded the return of the cattle Phakade had seized from Dingane. Phakade defied Mpande and the iziNyosi and the Dlambedlu amabutho were dispatched to route him out.⁵⁸ The Chunu then settled in the country about the confluence of the Thukela and Mpofana (Mooi) rivers. In the

⁵⁵ Fynn Papers, Vol. 6, Smith to Mackinnon, 3 April 1848.

⁵⁶ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 36, Evidence of Mbovu Ka Mshumayeli, 7 February 1904.

⁵⁷ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand, pp. 263, 271-2; C. Webb and J. Wright (Eds): James Stuart Archives of recorded oral evidence relating to the history of the Zulu and neighbouring peoples, Vol. 2, p. 55.

⁵⁸ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 58, Notebook 18, Evidence of Mini Ka Ndlovu, 9 April 1910.

1850's Phakade, together with other Natal chiefs, expressed willingness to provide levies against Mpande.

It could be argued that the colonial establishment in Natal was devoid of resources to completely subdue the powerful state which Mpande had inherited from his predecessors, but sought to extend its influence over the Zulu kingdom by gaining a hold on its ruler. Mpande welcomed them as allies. He needed to secure his position against any threat of war, but also sought to exploit their conflicting objectives to preserve his own independence. This makes it imperative to analyse relations with the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

MPANDE'S RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF NATALIA

The Voortrekkers crossed the Drakensberg (Khahlamba) and arrived in KwaZulu Natal in late 1837 and settled in the upper Thukela basin.⁵⁹ There followed two years of uncertainty while they attempted to pacify the Zulus and gain recognition for the occupation.⁶⁰ During this period the condition of the country was unsettled and the Voortrekkers tended to congregate in central laagers in times of hostilities.⁶¹ After the battle of Blood (Ncome) River in December 1838, however, more widely spread Voortrekker settlement was considered possible in much of the region south of the Thukela River.

Relations between Mpande and the Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia had its origin on 15 October 1839 when Mpande met the Voortrekker leaders on the banks of Thukela River.⁶² It is for this reason that his praises referred to him as:

⁵⁹ Annual Report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, 22 June 1872, Bird, Annals of Natal, I, pp. 54 – 56; Missionary Herald (1846), p. 5.

⁶⁰ J. Beall *et al*: Conceptualising Natal – implications of a regional political economy, pp. 1 – 5.

⁶¹ H. Stander: “Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, pp. 213 – 215.

⁶² Resolution of the Volksraad, 2 August 1841, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 644-5.

"Umsimude owavela ngesiluba
[The high pillar of smoke who
emerged in feathered head-dress]
Phakathi kwamaNgisi namaQadasi,
[Between the British and Voortrekkers]
Inkonjan' edukele ezulwini,
[The hawk that flew towards Heaven]
*Umwela muva wawoShaka"*⁶³
[The last-to-cross of Shaka]

The first Voortrekker he met was Johan Hendrik (Hans Dons) de Lange who was hunting for the hippopotamus (izimvubu) on the banks of Thukela.⁶⁴ De Lange informed the Volksraad, the supreme executive and legislative authority in the Republic, about Mpande's presence and loyalty to the Voortrekkers.⁶⁵ Some of the Voortrekker officials were not convinced and suggested that he be assassinated. This did not materialise, probably due to the numerical preponderance of Mpande's adherents (about 17 000) and large numbers of cattle (about 25 000).⁶⁶ The issue of numerical preponderance of Mpande's followers had evidence in his praises:

"Isikhukhulane sika Ndaba,
[The flood of Ndaba]
Esakhukhul' omame sabetshatha,
[That flooded women and left with
them]
Saye sabalahl' ezinkwazini,

⁶³ C.T. Msimang: *Kusadliwa Ngoludala*, p. 387; J.A.W. Nxumalo: *Umcebo Wolimi LwesiZulu*, p. 71

⁶⁴ R.R.R. Dhlomo: *Umpande Ka Senzangakhona*, p. 30.

⁶⁵ Napier to Glenelg, 30 November 183, *Bird, I. Annals of Natal*, pp. 423-4.

⁶⁶ M.M. Fuze: *Abantu Abamvama*, p. 31; H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, pp. 215-18.

[Only to place them at the estuaries]
Ezinkwazini zomfula,
 [Estuaries of the river]
Ezinkwazini zoThukela. ⁶⁷
 [Estuaries of Thukela River]

The leader of the Volksraad, A.W.J (Andries) Pretorius, engaged in cordial conversation with Mpande. He was aware that king Dingane (Mpande's half-brother) had suffered defeat against the Swazi and that Mpande had refused to help him raise new reinforcements.⁶⁸ Thus, Mpande's presence before the Volksraad was based on his request to be left alone to settle between Mhlali and Mvoti Rivers.⁶⁹ When asked why he did not rule the Zulu nation after the death of king Shaka, he replied:

*"I was heading a punitive expedition against chief Soshangane. On my return I found Dingane in power, having killed Shaka and all children of the harem."*⁷⁰

Pretorius realised that declaring Voortrekker friendship with Mpande would ensure their security against a possible Zulu invasion from north of Thukela.⁷¹ Such declaration laid the foundation for the battle of Maqongqo hills which took place on 29 January 1840.⁷² In that war

⁶⁷ C.S.L. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, p. 63; J.A.W. Nxumalo: *Umcebo Wolimi LwesiZulu*, p. 71.

⁶⁸ Extract, Minutes of the Executive Council, 20 March 1840, *Bird, I, Annals of Natal*, pp. 315-6.

⁶⁹ Napier to Glenelg, 30 November 1839, *Ibid.*, I, pp. 613-4.

⁷⁰ R.R.R. Dhlomo: *Umpande kaSenzangakhona*, pp. 31 - 38.

⁷¹ Napier to Glenelg, 30 November 1839, *Bird, I, Annals of Natal*, pp. 316-7.

⁷² J. Stuart: *Ubaxoxele (Incwadi Yezindaba za Bantu ba KwaZulu, naba se Natal)*, pp. 7 - 10.

Dingane's regiments were completely crushed by those of Mpande. This was well recorded in Mpande's praises:

*"Laduma lazithath' izihlangu zomBelebele,
[It thundered and devoured the shields of
Mbelebele]
Lazithath' izihlangu zikaBulawayo,
[It devoured the shields of Bulawayo]
Lazithath' izihlangu zeZinyosi,
[It devoured the shields of Zinyosi]
Lazithath' izihlangu zoDlambedu,
[It devoured the shields of Dlambedu]
Lazithath' izihlangu zikaNomdayana,
[It devoured the shields of Nomdayana]
Lazithath' izihlangu zoMgumanqa
[It devoured the shields of Mgumanqa]"*⁷³

It is imperative to state that while Mpande had entered into a military alliance with Andries Pretorius against Dingane, his army led by Nongalaza ka Nondela Mnyandu fought those of Dingane, led by Ndlela ka Sompisi Ntuli without any Voortrekker military involvement.⁷⁴ Before the two powerful factions converged at Maqongqo, Dingane heard of the alliance and sent two unarmed emissaries, Dambuza (alias Nzobo) Ntombela and Sikhombazana to Andries Pretorius.⁷⁵ Their mission was to conclude a peace treaty with the Voortrekkers. After a strict hearing the Voortrekkers captured and killed them.⁷⁶ They were pointed out by

⁷³ C.S.L. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, p. 65; C.T. Msimang: *Kusadliwa Ngoludala*, p. 388.

⁷⁴ R.R.R. Dhlomo: *Umpande ka Senzangakhona*, p. 39.

⁷⁵ H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 257.

⁷⁶ A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*. Cf. *Archives Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1942, pp. 145 – 146.

Mpande's adherents as the main instigators responsible for the murders on Retief and at Bloukrans and Moordspruit during the reign of Dingane.⁷⁷

The killing of Dambuza and Sikhombazana was something unequalled in European legal or Western diplomatic terms. They were unarmed emissaries whose mission was to conclude a truce. In Western society, killing emissaries constituted a criminal act (though not necessarily leading to prosecution).⁷⁸ Emissaries facilitated communication between two combatants and in African tradition such killings were viewed as cowardice. On the other hand Stander argued that the main prosecutor was Mpande himself who was part of the court martial, named on 31 January 1840 near the Black Mfolozi (iMfolozi eMnyama) River.⁷⁹ Dambuza admitted guilt on all charges and in the light of all evidence, the military court resolved to execute both emissaries, as there could only be more murders should they go back and advise Dingane.⁸⁰ The fact that they were killed on Mpande's orders had justification in his praises:

“Usongo lwensimbi yakoNdikidi,
[An iron coil of Ndikidi]
Elidl' uDambuza beno Sikhombazana.
[That ate Dambuza and Sikhombazana]
Inzingelezi kaNdaba,
[The entanglement of Ndaba]

⁷⁷ De Zuid Afrikaan, byvoegsel 10 April 1840, dagverhaal, 22 – 31 January 1840, p. 5.

⁷⁸ R.R.R. Dhlomo: *UDingane Ka Senzangakhona*, p. 34.

⁷⁹ H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 256.

⁸⁰ G.S. Preller: *Andries Pretorius*, p. 125; A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*. Cf. *Archives Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 145.

Emabal' azizinge,
[With multi-coloured appeal]⁷⁸¹

The Voortrekker forces of Pretorius were on the banks of the Black Mfolozi when they heard that Mpande had defeated Dingane at Maqongqo.⁸² After a protracted battle at Maqongqo, Pretorius and some members of the Volksraad arranged a meeting with Mpande. On 5 February 1840, five days before the meeting, Mpande was installed as king of the Zulu nation in accordance with Zulu tradition.⁸³ This was done in the presence of the most powerful chiefs in KwaZulu, Klwana Buthelezi and Maphitha ka Sojiyisa.⁸⁴ They pledged their loyalty and support to the new Zulu king.

Andries Pretorius met Mpande again on 10 February 1840 at Pietermaritzburg and appointed him as king.⁸⁵ The fact that Mpande had already been crowned king by the Zulu people on 5 February 1840 was relegated to the background. Mpande was persuaded to take an oath before the Volksraad, acknowledging the supremacy of the Volksraad, undertaking to rule KwaZulu in peace and maintaining cordial relations

⁸¹ C.S.L. Nyembezi: *Izibongo Zamakhosi*, pp. 66 – 67.

⁸² H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 256.

⁸³ Minutes of the Natal Volksraad, 15 October 1840, *Bird, I, Annals of Natal*, pp. 536 – 539.

⁸⁴ R. Cope: *The Zulu Kingdom, 1824 – 1879*, pp. 2 10; R.R.R. Dhlomo: *UMpande ka Senzangakhona*, p. 31.

⁸⁵ H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 256.

with the Voortrekkers.⁸⁶ Mpande was then honoured with a praise name, "Prince of the Emigrant Zulus".

The Voortrekkers accentuated that Mpande was temporarily stationed between the Mhlali and Mvoti Rivers. They admonished him against killing refugees whom traditional healers (izanuse) had condemned to death.⁸⁷ It was explained to Mpande that victory over Dingane in 1838 was an act of Providence. The Voortrekkers were only instruments in the hand of God to halt the atrocities of the former Zulu potentate.⁸⁸ In acceptance of the terms of friendship and defense between himself and the Voortrekkers Mpande said:

*"If one would do anything to your disfavour or disadvantage, you can only let me know and be assured that I will hurry to your assistance with my whole army and I will sacrifice my last man for you."*⁸⁹

On 14 February 1840, the Voortrekkers hoisted the national flag of the Republic of Natalia in the presence of king Mpande and his headmen. Andries Pretorius issued a proclamation whereby the territory between the Thukela and Black Mfolozi was rendered to the Voortrekkers as

⁸⁶ R.J. Mann: The Zulus and Boers of South Africa – a fragment of recent history, pp. 40 – 44.

⁸⁷ R.R.R. Dhlomo: UMpande ka Senzangakhona, p. 42.

⁸⁸ R.J. Mann: The Zulus and Boers of South Africa – a fragment of recent history, pp. 44 – 46; Minutes of the Volksraad, 15 October 1842, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 539-46.

compensation for the expenses incurred on different expeditions against Dingane.⁹⁰ According to this proclamation the borders of the Republic of Natalia were:

*"From the sea next to the Black Mfolozi River where it goes through the double mountains, close to the origin and then next to Hooge Randberg in a straight line to the Drakensberg, the St. Lucia Bay inclusive."*⁹¹

The contents of the proclamation was read to Mpande and his advisors. Greeting this with 21 salute shots, the Volksraad of Natal was declared the paramount power between the Black Mfolozi and Thukela, the sea and the Drakensberg.⁹² On the banks of the Klip River the Voortrekkers received about 36 000 head of cattle looted after the Maqongqo battle. They further received 15 000 head of cattle from Mpande and 8 000 from chiefs Jobe and Matiwane as ransom and fine for assumed crimes committed against the Sotho of queen MmaNtatisi.⁹³ Thus the end of February 1840 marked a new era for the Voortrekkers in Natal and the Zulus under

⁸⁹ H. Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 256; Die Zuid Afrikaan, 17 April 1840, p. 6.

⁹⁰ P. Colenbrander: The Zulu Kingdom, 1828-79, pp. 50 – 56.

⁹¹ Government Notice, 24 October 1842, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 539-48; A.R. Hatterseley: More Annals of Natal, pp. 52 – 57.

⁹² R. Mael: The Problems of Political Integration in the Zulu Empire, pp. 80 – 84.

⁹³ Minutes of the Volksraad, 15 October 1840, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 536 – 550; A.J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia. Cf. Archives Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1942, p. 147.

Mpande north of the Thukela. The Voortrekkers attempted to ensure for themselves a peaceful land with rich promises.⁹⁴

The Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia established a regular government and settlement. The previous tyrannical Zulu potentate had been replaced by Mpande, whom they perceived as not so bellicose and overbearing.⁹⁵ The area south of the Thukela became populated by Voortrekkers in a very short time. The policy of the Republic's Volksraad was to keep the area between the Thukela mouth and Mzinyathi reserved for security reasons, "for compensation of damage inflicted by the Zulus of Dingane that were not yet paid."⁹⁶ The Republic east of the Drakensberg was divided into three magisterial districts: Pietermaritzburg, Port Natal and Weenen. Pietermaritzburg became the capital city and seat of the parliament.⁹⁷

The Voortrekkers, convinced of Mpande's cordial disposition, resolved not to interfere with his domestic affairs. This was with the proviso that Mpande kept to the agreements regarding humanitarian principles aimed

⁹⁴ T.S. van Rooyen: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal*, p. 74; G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, pp. 120 – 121.

⁹⁵ J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, pp. 32 – 33.

⁹⁶ W.R. Ludlow: Zululand and Cetshwayo, p. 201.

⁹⁷ A.P. van de Merwe: Die Voorgeschiedenis van die Republiek Lydenburg, p. 9; G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, pp. 127 – 128.

at preventing unnecessary bloodshed.⁹⁸ His foreign policy, however, would be subjected to the censorship of the Volksraad.

In the meantime the Voortrekkers gave Mpande permission to prosecute all foreign intruders who violated his borders. He was warned, however, that killing innocent people was totally unacceptable. White people who broke the law had to be handed over to the authorities of the Republic.⁹⁹ To protect Mpande against unscrupulous Whites, trade with his subjects was to be under government supervision at regular times. An overseer from the Republic was to ensure that no alcohol, arms or horses were sold to the Zulus.¹⁰⁰ The Voortrekkers regarded trade in arms with the Zulus as a serious offence. This was to prevent any possibility of future mass killing of people or possible military attack on Voortrekker settlements. Anyone found guilty would be fined heavily with the first and second offences and thereafter all their possessions would be confiscated.¹⁰¹ No white people were allowed to trade cattle in KwaZulu without the written permission of the Volksraad. A copy of the Republic's hunting regulations was sent to Mpande. It gave him permission to charge and

⁹⁸ M. Nathan: The Voortrekkers of South Africa – from the earliest times to the foundation of the Republics, p. 285.

⁹⁹ J.J. van Heerden: Die Kommandant – Generaal in die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, p. 65.

¹⁰⁰ A.J. du Plessis: "Die Republiek Natalia." Cf. Archives Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1942, p. 141.

¹⁰¹ J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, pp. 45-6.

punish Whites breaking regulations or damaging Zulu property.¹⁰² Such friendly actions of the Republic of Natalia created a good impression on the Zulu people as well as other inhabitants of Natal.¹⁰³

Before the advent of the British two events took place which nearly soured relations between Mpande and the Republic of Natalia. The first was when Mpande, without consulting the Volksraad, settled an old dispute between himself and chief (Inkosi) Jobe by killing a number of men, women and children indiscriminately.¹⁰⁴ The Volksraad sent Field Commandment C.P. Landman and J. Prinsloo to Mpande to:

“op een zachtzinnige wijze onder het oog te brengen en te trachten als Christenen hem zonder bloedstorting tot zijn plicht te brengen.”¹⁰⁵ [to bring to Mpande's attention, in a gentle and Christian manner, that it was not necessary for bloodshed.]

Mpande was reported to have said that it was within his power as an independent Zulu king to do so. Secondly, field-cornet Jan Meyer reported that Mpande was planning to launch a military offensive against the Swazi king Sobhuza II to claim back the cattle Dingane had taken

¹⁰² A.J. du Plessis: “Die Republiek Natalia.” Cf. Archives Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1942, p. 149.

¹⁰³ De Zuid Afrikaan, 7 August 1840, pp. 1 – 2. Cf. H. Stander: “Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872”, p. 262.

¹⁰⁴ W.J. Leyds: Die Eerste Annexatie, p. 164.

¹⁰⁵ H.B. Thom: Die Geloftekerk, p. 79; J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, p. 31.

when he fled.¹⁰⁶ The Commandant-General (i.e. Pretorius) investigated this and resolved to send Field Commandment H.S. Lombaard and L.P. Badenhorst to admonish Mpande against attacking Sobhuza II.¹⁰⁷ The Volksraad would rather itself persuade Sobhuza II to surrender the cattle, but if failing they would join Mpande to attack the Swazi.

In the opinion of the Volksraad, it was not Mpande who was responsible for disturbances, but his unruly subjects. Both field-cornet C.J. Labuschagne and landdrost J.P. Zietsman were convinced that Mpande would never provoke the Voortrekkers.¹⁰⁸ According to them the Zulu king himself said:

"'ik ben in vriendskap met de menschen en veel eer zal de steenen van de bergen vergaan dan ik eene assegaaij zal laten trekken tegens hun.¹⁰⁹ [I have a good friendship with these people and would rather see stones from the mountains perish before I lift a spear against them]"

Stander argued that Mpande's loyal actions were not strange, given the way the Voortrekkers treated Zulu orphans after the battle of Maqongqo

¹⁰⁶ G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, pp. 121 – 122; De Zuid Afrikaan, byvoegsel, 7 August 1840, p. 7.

¹⁰⁷ H. Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 263.

¹⁰⁸ T.S. van Rooyen: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal, pp. 76 – 78.

¹⁰⁹ A.J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia, p. 149; A.P. van der Merwe: Die Voorgeschiedenis van die Republiek Lydenburg, pp. 10 – 12.

in 1840.¹¹⁰ Numerous Zulu orphans were taken to the magistrate who officially “booked them in” as apprentices, similar to a system previously applied in the Cape Colony during punitive commandos.¹¹¹ Thus, the magistrate accepted responsibility for the boys up to the age of 25 and girls up to the age of 21 years.¹¹² This apprentice system had malpractices, which the landdrosts fiercely resisted. Illegal “booking-in” and sale of children by traders outside the borders of Natal took place.¹¹³ Serious transgressions of the apprenticeship law prompted the Republic of Natalia to re-register the children. The primary objective was to provide shelter for the abandoned children.¹¹⁴ Zulu refugees in Natal trusted the system that when parents lost their cattle and belongings through theft, they simply took their children to the Voortrekkers to be apprenticed.¹¹⁵ Zulu children were provided with clothes and taught responsibility by their masters. After the termination of their service contract many preferred stayed with their masters and worked for a wage.¹¹⁶ Some British

¹¹⁰ H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 264.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

¹¹² A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*, p. 158; *De Natalier*, 31 May 1844, p. 2.

¹¹³ W.J. Leyds: *Die Eerste Annexatie*, p. 164.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹¹⁵ A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*, p. 160.

¹¹⁶ W.J. Leyds: *Die Eerste Annexatie*, p. 165.

missionaries, however, condemned it as slavery in disguise and soon the Republic was in disfavour with the philanthropic world.¹¹⁷

During Mpande's kingship a plethora of refugees flocked to Natal. About 3 000 displaced Zulus and other Africans stayed in the vicinity of the bay of Port Natal before the arrival of the Voortrekkers.¹¹⁸ The Voortrekkers grouped them into no less than six reserves. Important among them were the reserves of Jobe, Matiwane, MmaNtatisi in the northern corner of Natal, Fodo in southwest, on the Mpondo borders and the reserves of Ndabankulu and Nodada in the Klip River area.¹¹⁹

Numerous smaller sub-divisions of clans stayed on farms in family clusters where they became labour tenants. They defected from Mpande's rule and refused to go back to KwaZulu (north of the Thukela). With the increase of Zulu homesteads in the Natal republic, it became imperative for the Volksraad to inflict capital punishment on those refugees who refused to be sent back to KwaZulu.¹²⁰ Large tracts of unoccupied land in Natal without Voortrekker settlements further encouraged the Zulu influx.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ De Zuid Afrikaan, byvoegsel, 19 March 1841, p.3; De Natalier, 21 March 1841, pp. 3 – 4; M. Nathan: The Voortrekkers of South Africa – from the earliest times to the foundation of the Republics, pp. 290 – 293; H.B. Thom: Die Geloftekerk, p. 79.

¹¹⁸ E.A. Walker: Lord de Villiers and his times, p. 235.

¹¹⁹ G.M. Theal: History of South Africa, p. 397.

¹²⁰ J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, p. 34.

¹²¹ De Natalier, 31 May 1840.

The first precautionary measure to curb the influx was taken in February 1840 when the Volksraad resolved, on the recommendation of landdrost J.P. Zietsman, that all roaming Zulus and other natives should be grouped in five families each and settled as farm labourers.¹²² The Commandant-General would, assisted by a commando, ensure the implementation of the resolution and defaulters caught would be sentenced to six months hard labour. The co-operation of the Zulu king was obtained to curb the influx. This resolution was also aimed at controlling cattle theft and loafing.¹²³

On 2 August 1841 the Volksraad resolved that all Zulus within the Voortrekker republic, who were not employed on farms, be moved to an area opposite the Mzinyathi or between Mthamvuna and Mzimvubu Rivers.¹²⁴ Those areas had enough grazing for their cattle and ample firewood. They could locally rule themselves, but as "subjects" of the Republic. A Voortrekker agent had to oversee their affairs.¹²⁵ Shortly before the execution of this plan, the second occupation of Natal by the British took place. It was this intended move of the Zulus which was used as a pretext for the prompted British occupation of Natal. According to Governor Sir George Napier, this re-settlement of Zulus would threaten

¹²² G.M. Theal: History of South Africa, p. 398; C. Jepp: The Kaleidoscopic Transvaal, pp. 37 – 42; H.B. Thom: Geloftekerk, p. 86.

¹²³ G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, pp. 128-30; J.A.I Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, p. 128.

¹²⁴ De Natalier, 5 February 1840, p. 4; G.M. Theal: History of South Africa, pp. 398-99.

¹²⁵ J.R. Sullivan: The Native Policy of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, p. 19; W.M. MacMillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton – the making of the South African native problem, p. 179.

the area belonging to chief Faku.¹²⁶ The British imperialists claimed that the territory between the Mzimvubu and Mzimkhulu Rivers had been ceded by Faku to Great Britain.¹²⁷ Stander argued:

*"Faku had no claim on land north of the Mzimvubu River and admitted it to the Boers with whom he entered into a friendly agreement. He acknowledged this river as border between the Boers and his people."*¹²⁸

The move would have the same effect on both the Voortrekkers and Mpande. While the Voortrekkers would be assured of a constant workforce for their farms, Mpande would at least have peace and tranquility. Critical of British relations with Xhosa and other Nguni in general, du Plessis pointed out that lack of firm, uniform action and an ever changing system of experimental legislation, modified by particular views of each succeeding governor, plunged the Cape Colony in several eastern frontier wars during the nineteenth century.¹²⁹

The British accusation that the Voortrekkers maltreated Mpande's Zulus was disproved by their influx into Natal. Napier admitted that the treatment of the Zulu people by the Voortrekkers "has not been, generally

¹²⁶ M. MacMillan: Bantu, Boer and Briton – the making of the South African Problem, pp. 179-80.

¹²⁷ C.O. 48/407, P.R.O.: Grey to Newcastle, D.10, 9 February 1861; S.P.S.: Newcastle to Grey, D.262, 4 May 1861.

¹²⁸ H.Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 266.

¹²⁹ A.J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia, p. 142; H.B. Thom: Geloftekerk, p. 87.

speaking, characterised by flagrant injustice.”¹³⁰ Sir Benjamin Pine, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, refuted such incrimination as “very exaggerated statements made under the influence of national or sectarian prejudices.”¹³¹

The British regarded it as their special task to protect the Zulus to whom they ascribed “every conceivable virtue” against the Voortrekkers whom they thought intended evil.¹³² Governor Napier and some British missionaries suggested that the Voortrekkers aimed at enslaving all Zulu children. They tried to gain chief Faku’s co-operation and convinced him to request British protection against the Voortrekkers.¹³³ Consequently, Captain T.C. Smith was sent with 200 men to Faku’s land to pressurise the Voortrekkers.¹³⁴

Napier welcomed malevolent reports about the Voortrekkers from British missionaries. He exploited the opportunity in August 1841, when the Natal Volksraad resolved to re-settle Zulus of Natal to the area between the Mthamvuna and Mzimkhulu Rivers.¹³⁵ The Colonial Office gave him

¹³⁰ Napier to Lord J. Russell, 22 June 1840, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, p. 611.

¹³¹ C.O. 179/16, P.R.O.: Pine to Smith, D.34, Confidential, 27 November 1851, encl. in Smith to Grey, 16 December 1851.

¹³² J.A. Froude: Two lectures on South Africa, pp. 15 – 16; G.W. Cox: The Life of John William Colenso, p. 54.

¹³³ J. Prinsloo and J.J. Burgar to G.T. Napier, 7 April 1841, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 624 – 625.

¹³⁴ F.R. Statham; Blacks, Boers and British, p. 107.

¹³⁵ M. Nathan: The Voortrekkers of South Africa – from the earliest times to the foundation of the Republics, pp. 302 – 305.

permission to render protection to Zulu refugees who wished to be under British control. Napier had to strengthen the bond between the Cape Colony and Natal Zulus through special agents and missionaries.¹³⁶ Under duress, he received authorisation from Lord John Russell to resume the military occupation of Natal. This was on condition that he did not interfere with the Voortrekkers, unless the British colonists or Zulu “friends” of the British were attacked.¹³⁷

With the latter as a pretext, he informed the Colonial Office that executing Russell’s decision would cause an influx of Zulus over the Cape eastern borders which would threaten peace.¹³⁸ He further argued that the Voortrekkers planned to move Zulus to an area belonging to Faku without his consent. Therefore he found it necessary to order Captain T.C. Smith who was already in uMlazi to annex Port Natal. Napier instructed Smith to refrain from interfering in the civil concerns of the Voortrekkers, whose internal arrangements were not to be abrogated or disturbed.¹³⁹ He was to intervene only when the Voortrekkers organised a commando against the Zulus on pretence of recovering stolen cattle.¹⁴⁰ After thorough investigation of facts, he would allow such a commando and accompanied by an “adequate military force” of the British. He also had to ensure that

¹³⁶ J. Russell to G. Napier, 17 April 1841, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, p. 640.

¹³⁷ V.C. Malherbe: What They Said, 1795 – 1910 History Documents, pp. 79 – 83.

¹³⁸ F.R. Statham: Blacks, Boers and British, p. 109.

¹³⁹ J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, p. 145.

Zulu women and children were under no circumstances captured by the Voortrekkers.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, a Proclamation of thirteen articles was sent by Napier in which the terms of Voortrekker allegiance to the British were explained.

The agreements reached during the negotiations of the Voortrekkers with Napier's representative were included in the proclamation of 2 December 1841 signed by Sir George Napier. It announced the re-occupation of Natal and declared the Voortrekkers were British subjects.¹⁴² The proclamation also contained accusations of Voortrekker maltreatment of Mpande's renegade subjects in Natal. On 21 February 1842, the Secretary of the Volksraad, J.J. Burger, refuted accusations against the Voortrekkers in the proclamation.¹⁴³ He argued that the planned removal of Zulus from the "White area" was not cruel, but humane action as animosity and bloodshed would be avoided.¹⁴⁴ In his letter, the Secretary emphasized that the Voortrekkers were not willing to bow under foreign rule, not because of a cancerous acrimony against the British, but due to their desire to rule themselves.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ R72/41: Volksraad to Governor Napier, 14 January 1841. Cf. Voortrekker – argief stukke, pp. 117 – 120.

¹⁴¹ D.W. Krüger: *Die Weg na die See*. Cf. Archives Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1949, pp. 68 – 70.

¹⁴² W.B. Cloete: The History of the Great Boer Trek and the Origin of the South African Republics, pp. 133 – 136.

¹⁴³ G.M Theal: History of South Africa, pp. 441 – 445.

¹⁴⁴ J. Stuart: De Hollandsche Afrikanen en hunne Republiek in Zuid-Afrika, p. 151.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 151; Lord Stanley to G.T. Napier, 10 April 1842, Bird. I. Annals of Natal, pp. 701, 703.

Napier was not distracted by the letter from the Secretary of the Volksraad. On 12 May 1842 the British land forces under T.C. Smith reached the harbour and informed Pretorius that they were sent to protect the Zulu refugees.¹⁴⁶ Colonel A.J. Cloete from whom the Voortrekkers confiscated approximately 700 oxen, joined Smith on 24 June 1842. He allegedly encouraged local Zulus in Natal to attack the Voortrekkers.¹⁴⁷ Subsequently, besides plundering Voortrekker farms, the Zulus confiscated Voortrekker cattle at Mhlanga. When Pretorius complained about these incidents, Cloete argued that they were the result of events which:

*"You and your unfortunate, misguided people brought about by your acts of determined hostilities towards Her Majesty's Government and Troops."*¹⁴⁸

Cloete sent messengers to calm the local Zulus in a bid to normalise the situation. His conscience, however, incriminated him for using the local Zulus against the Voortrekkers. On 3 July 1842, Cloete thus wrote to Napier:

"If England will not put down the Boers by her own legitimate means, it were better to abandon the project altogether, and submit even to the insult we have received, than

¹⁴⁶ C.J. Uys: *In the Era of Shepstone*, p. 21.

¹⁴⁷ Cloete to Montagu, 10 November 1843, *Bird, I, Annals of Natal*, p. 611.

¹⁴⁸ C.O. 48/246: Cloete to Pretorius, 4 July 1842, p. 43.

adopt the degrading process of enlisting the savage in our cause, or call upon the Zulu assegais to commit all the atrocities of indiscriminate bloodshed and spoliation."¹⁴⁹

The conflict between the Voortrekkers and the British had an adverse effect on Mpande's relations with the Republic. The Republic of Natalia was subjected to Cloete on 15 July 1842.¹⁵⁰ The Voortrekkers surrendered to the British mainly due to Mpande's promise of assistance to the British. The Voortrekker delegates, Van Aardt and Solomon Maritz, went to Cloete and found Mpande's emissaries there.¹⁵¹ To them this proved Mpande's support for the British course.

Cloete gave Mpande the impression that the British occupation of the Republic of Natalia meant the defeat of the Voortrekker power to which his Zulus owed vassalage.¹⁵² Mpande appeared to be pleased with the British occupation of Natal. Years later, his son Cetshwayo commented perceptively that:

*"... he did not trust the latter [i.e. the British] and was always in fear that they would turn on him and make further demands."*¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ W.C. Holden: The Colony of Natal, p. 141; Cloete to Napier, 3 July 1842, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, p. 618.

⁹² H. Cloete to J. Montagu, 14 June 1844, Bird, II, Annals of Natal, p. 397.

⁹³ G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1939, 161.

⁹⁴ Journals of Adulphe Delegorgue and P.H. Zietsman, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, pp. 553-99.

⁹⁵ C.O. 879/1, P.R.O.: Evidence of Cetshwayo, minutes of 7 July 1881 and additions and notes on evidence, pp. 523-4.

The British renegade and adventurer, John Dunn, kept the Zulu king up to date about the struggle between the British and the Voortrekkers. When informed about the surrender of the Voortrekkers, Mpande expelled some of them from KwaZulu and destroyed all homesteads under their control.¹⁵⁴ This re-kindled the flight of his subjects to Natal in large numbers. The British did not prevent the Zulu influx into Natal. Instead, T.C. Smith announced that:

*"the Kaffirs are to be permitted to remain unmolested on the land they presently occupy, no force is to be used against them for procuring the restitution of the cattle taken by them during the period when the Emigrants were in rebellion..."*¹⁵⁵

It should be noted, however, that Smith's announcement also applied to Africans already in Natal. It is not proof that the British were not prepared to prevent a Zulu influx.

Because the annexation of Natal in 1842 first had to be confirmed, Napier allowed the Republic's Volksraad to continue to function. All suggestions of this council in lieu of the Natal Zulus were obstructed and disapproved.¹⁵⁶

⁹⁶ G.S. Preller: Voortrekkermense, p. 38; G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, p. 162.

⁹⁷ G.T. Napier to T.C. Smith, 19 August 1842, Bird, II, Annals of Natal, pp. 95 - 96.

⁹⁸ F.R. Cana: South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union, pp. 12 - 15.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete presented the proclamation of 12 May 1843 to the Volksraad in Pietermaritzburg. The proclamation stated that there would be legally no difference between colour, origin, language or religion. No aggression against the Zulus and no slavery would be tolerated.¹⁵⁷ The British laws disregarded all agreements the Voortrekkers previously concluded with Mpande. The Voortrekkers were called upon to present their views regarding the judicial and other local institutions introduced by the British.¹⁵⁸ They requested that Zulu refugees be moved to the area north of the Thukela, except those who wished to work in White areas.¹⁵⁹ Cloete made it clear to the Volksraad that the British were not prepared to differentiate between Whites and Blacks.¹⁶⁰

The British were determined to curb Voortrekker advance to the east coast. They realised that the possible harbour at St. Lucia estuary was situated in the area Mpande had previously promised to the Voortrekkers in payment of the commando costs against Dingane.¹⁶¹ The Voortrekkers did not regard St. Lucia Bay as part of the British annexation of the Republic of Natalia. While negotiating with the British Commissioner, they excluded St. Lucia.¹⁶² They mentioned that the Republic's Volksraad

⁹⁹ Cloete's Final Report, 30 May 1844, *Bird, I. Annals of Natal*, pp. 529 – 532.

¹⁰⁰ V.C. Malherbe: *What They Said, 1795 – 1910 History Documents*, pp. 79 – 83.

¹⁰¹ A. Cloete to Napier, 4 July 1842, *Bird, I. Annals of Natal*, pp. 40 – 42.

¹⁰² J. Beall et al: *Conceptualising Natal-implications of a regional political economy*, p. 31.

¹⁰³ C.J. Uys: *In the Era of Shepstone*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

had sent Hans de Lange previously to investigate St. Lucia as a potential harbour.¹⁶³

The British authorities regarded the stabilisation of the relationship between Natal Colony and the kingdom of Mpande as of crucial importance. Cloete had to determine borders in accordance with the Zulu king, aiming at securing British the possession of St. Lucia Bay.¹⁶⁴ Cloete viewed St. Lucia Bay as a pre-requisite in finalising the annexation of Natal Colony. He argued:

*"So long as the Emigrant farmers beyond the Drakensberg still continue in an insane struggle for independence, and are (I grieve to think) encouraged by a few wicked and desperate characters, who are still allowed to reside within this territory, and as long as they indulge in hopes of being provided with ammunition and other necessities... by keeping open some communication with the sea, it will be impossible to expect the inhabitants of this colony to be entirely free from the contamination and excitement prevailing around them."*¹⁶⁵

On 18 September 1843, Cloete visited Mpande at his Nodwengu headquarters. The Voortrekkers in his company were taken along to prove to Mpande that they had yielded to the British rule.¹⁶⁶ Cloete

¹⁰⁵ S.N.A. 1/1/11: H. Cloete to J. Montagu, 29 October 1843.

¹⁰⁶ G.M. Theal: History of South Africa, p. 454.

¹⁰⁷ H. Cloete to J. Montagu, 29 October 1843, Bird, II, Annals of Natal, p. 302.

¹⁰⁸ G.M. Theal: The Republic of Natal, p. 9; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, pp. 31 – 36; G.M Theal: History of South Africa, p. 455.

suggested to Mpande that he transfers St. Lucia Bay to the British. He assured the Zulu king that this would benefit both KwaZulu and Natal Colony because England would exclude all other European powers from this Bay.¹⁶⁷ According to a statement made before landdrost J.C. Kock in 1885 by D.C. Uys, who accompanied Cloete, Mpande refused to do this.¹⁶⁸ Cloete then asked the Zulu king to sign his name on a piece of paper to prove that he did visit KwaZulu.¹⁶⁹ D.C. Uys added that when Cloete introduced the British as Mpande's protectors and the Voortrekkers as adversaries of the Zulu nation, Mpande responded that "de Boeren zijn beschermers waren [the Boers were his protectors]."¹⁷⁰ Four years later Mpande ceded this area to the Voortrekkers. This proved that it was unlikely that Mpande intended to hand over this region to the British.¹⁷¹

In June 1843 Mpande realised that the influx of Zulu refugees into Natal

weakened his authority. He requested T.C. Smith to send the refugees and their cattle back to KwaZulu.¹⁷² Smith ignored Mpande's plea as well as the request of the Voortrekkers that Zulu refugees be kept in locations.

¹⁰⁹ S.N.A. 1/1/11: H. Cloete to J. Montague, 29 October 1843.

¹¹⁰ W.J. Leyds: Het Insluiten van de Boeren-Republieken, p. 64.

¹¹¹ C.J. Uys: In the Era of Shepstone, p. 42.

¹¹² G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, p. 474; W.J. Leyds: Het Insluiten van de Boeren-Republieken, pp. 64-5.

¹¹³ F.A.F. Wichmann: Die Wordingsgeskiedenis van die Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek.

Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. 11, 1941, pp. 258-61.

¹¹⁴ S.N.A. 1/1/11: T. Smith to G. Napier, 26 June 1843.

The fast diminishing herds of cattle in KwaZulu was of great concern as Mpande slowly lost authority.¹⁷³ This was further exacerbated by the actions of the Swazi king Sobhuza II. He attacked Mpande's outposts and looted all the cattle.¹⁷⁴

Subsequently Mpande informed the Voortrekkers of his planned retaliation against the Swazis. The Voortrekker Commandant General A.H. Potgieter assured Mpande of their neutrality in any battle between Zulus and Swazis.¹⁷⁵ However, he warned Mpande that the murder of Swazi women and children would be unacceptable to the Voortrekkers. He further stressed that the Voortrekkers and the Swazis retained friendly relations.¹⁷⁶ Whilst the relations between the Voortrekkers and Mpande were cordial, Zulu refugees caused displeasure for both parties. In 1840 there were some 2 000 or 3 000 Zulu refugees in Natal and by 1843 they increased to 50 000.¹⁷⁷ Five years later this number doubled.

In December 1845, many dissatisfied Voortrekkers left for the interior, causing great concern to the local British administrators.¹⁷⁸ In May 1846, Sir Peregrine Maitland, the Cape Governor, advised the Natal authorities

¹¹⁵ G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, p. 477.

¹¹⁶ J.R. Sullivan: The Native Policy of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, p. 55.

¹¹⁷ J.J. van Heerden: Voortrekker Wetgewing, p. 61; A.J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia, p. 146.

¹¹⁸ G.M. Theal: History of South Africa, p. 457.

¹¹⁹ A.J. du Plessis: Die Republiek Natalia, pp. 151 – 152.

¹²⁰ E.H. Brookes: This History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the present day, p. 81.

to prevent further Voortrekker emigration by complying to Voortrekker claims to permanent ownership of farms.¹⁷⁹ He wrote:

*"If any reasonable arrangements as to the grants of Land better suited to their feelings and wishes could be devised, than that which was before made by the Government, I think it would be wise to relax the existing Regulation, and make this attempt to check the emigration."*¹⁸⁰

However, Maitland was not willing to act against the renegade Zulus within Natal Colony because no British military reinforcements were available. He suggested that problems with Mpande be avoided at all costs.¹⁸¹ The Lieutenant-Governor Martin West brushed aside the advice of Maitland and attempted to place Zulu refugees in locations. On 31 March 1846 Martin West, applying his previous experiences on the Cape Eastern frontier, instituted a location Commission.¹⁸² This Commission was to be chaired by the Surveyor-General, W. Stanger with Theophilus Shepstone and missionary Adams as members.¹⁸³ The Commission had to place all Zulu refugees in locations in such a manner as would best prevent any collision between their interests and those of the Voortrekkers.¹⁸⁴

¹²¹ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection* (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 21

¹²² B.P.P.: Maitland to Gladstone, D.130, 12 August 1846.

¹²³ C.O. 179/29, P.R.O: Minutes, regarding Gladstone to Maitland, 3 July 1846.

¹²⁴ S.N.A. 1/1/2: *Memoirs and writings of Sir Theophilus Shepstone*, Jan – August 1847.

¹²⁵ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection* (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 24.

¹²⁶ W.P. Morrell: *British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell*, p. 146.

The plan was approved by the Voortrekkers and Pretorius warned West that the Zulu people were generally somewhat obedient, but that Mpande kept them in their place. If Mpande should disappear things could turn worse.¹⁸⁵ In such an instance all Zulu refugees in Natal Colony would unite with their fellowmen across the Thukela and ignore the British authorities. To prevent this and gain the confidence of the Voortrekkers they had to be put in locations.¹⁸⁶

Andries Pretorius suggested adequate space and localities for these locations to be developed. He was in favour of small locations the inhabitants could be used as a buffer against any adversaries from outside. The number of locations had to be limited to five in order to keep the costs low.¹⁸⁷ Zulu occupants had to be disarmed and trade in arms to be discontinued. According to Pretorius the stay of Voortrekkers in Natal Colony depended on implementing these conditions.¹⁸⁸ West became abdurate and the Location Commission appointed received little Voortrekker support. Two million acres were eventually allocated to the

¹²⁷ G.S. Preller: Voortrekkermense, pp. 207, 212; M.M. Behn: The Klip River Insurrection (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 27.

¹²⁸ H. Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 283.

¹²⁹ G.S. Preller: Voortrekkermense, pp. 219 – 229; W.P. Morrell: British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell, p. 149.

¹³⁰ C.O. 179/5, P.R.O.: A.W.J. Pretorius to Martin West, 6 March 1846; G.S. Preller: Voortrekkermense, p. 225.

Zulus for re-settlement and many Voortrekkers left Natal Colony.¹⁸⁹

Pretorius argued that:

"It is by far preferable to live amongst wild and ravenous animals than in the midst of such sly monster of cruelty.¹⁹⁰ [i.e. the British authorities]"

Some Voortrekkers proceeded with all their earthly possessions north and west of the Drakensberg (Khahlamba) mountains. Another group remained on their farms south of the Thukela inspite of the Zulu influx. There were also Voortrekkers who still regarded the area between Thukela and Black Mfolozi as their territory; separate and independent from the part of Natal occupied by the British.¹⁹¹ Their claim was later legitimised by Sir Theophilus Shepstone's memorandum of 18 November 1878. It argued that the rights of the Voortrekkers to that area were not made worthless by subsequent agreements or occurrences. The proclamation of 14 February 1840 was never specifically withdrawn or set aside.¹⁹² Both Mpande and the Voortrekkers felt offended by the British inclusion of this area in the Colony of Natal.¹⁹³

¹³¹ A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*. Cf. *Archives Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1942, pp. 151 – 153.

¹³² C.W. de Kiewiet: *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics*, pp. 207-9.

¹³³ W.R. Ludlow: *Zululand and Cetshwayo*, pp. 202 – 204; W.J. Leyds: *Het Inluiten van de Boeren-Republieken*, pp. 316 – 317.

¹³⁴ F.L. Cachet: *De Worstelstryd der Transvalers*, p. 226; W.J. Leyds: *Het Inluiten vand de Boeren-Republieken*, pp. 316 – 317.

¹³⁵ C.O. 179/50, P.R.O. A.T. Spies to W. Harding, 27 September 1847.

In 1847, there were already 70 families in the area where A.T. Spies, C. van Rooyen, J. de Lange, N. Smith, J. Meyer and D.C. Uys promoted friendly ties with Mpande.¹⁹⁴ Andries Spies, Gert van Niekerk, Isak van Niekerk and Lodewyk de Jager, accompanied by a Zulu interpreter Mkhonto (alias Assegai), at this stage went to Mpande who told them that his area stretched up to the Thukela.¹⁹⁵ The Zulu king denied that he had given up the area between Thukela and Mzinyathi (Buffalo) Rivers to the British.¹⁹⁶


Mpande wanted to pursue a "milder and more peaceful" diplomacy. He welcomed the Voortrekkers as a buffer between his kingdom and the British. To determine the border between the Voortrekkers and the Zulus, Mpande sent a few of his headmen to the Voortrekkers.¹⁹⁷ It was agreed that the whole area up to Mzinyathi River would be occupied by the Voortrekkers. Spies first wanted to ensure that the land did not belong to

¹³⁶ A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 214; J.F. van Oordt: Paul Kruger en de opkomst van de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, pp. 53 – 56.

¹⁹⁵ C.O. 179/50, P.R.O.: A.T. Spies to W. Harding, 27 September 1847.

¹⁹⁶ M.C. van Zyl: Luitenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 – 1849, p. 135.

¹⁹⁷ T.J. Lucas: The Zulus and the British Frontiers, pp. 109 – 110; B.P.P: *Statement – T. Shepstone – installing Cetshwayo*, August 1873, pp. 5 – 7.



Cf. S.N.A. 1/6/2, P.R.O.: Lieutenant Governor to Mpande, January 1847

the British.¹⁹⁸ He only accepted it after the headmen and Mpande had given him repeated assurance. The deeds of distance determined that the area situated between Mzinyathi and Thukela Rivers was given to the Voortrekkers for an amount of 1 000 riksdaalders.¹⁹⁹

Mpande further accepted Spies as Zulu "headman" and awarded him an emblem. These Klip River Voortrekkers felt safe and independent. Instead of the vague and rather annoying government of foreigners, they had set up governmental machinery, to their liking and suitable in their peculiar position.²⁰⁰ They could take their own safety precautions, register their own farms without the regulation and restrictions of the British.²⁰¹ The arrangement with the Klip River Voortrekkers was of great significance to Mpande. Lieutenant-Governor Pine viewed him as a monarch with a "double-agenda". He argued that Mpande promoted his own case "with the ulterior object of creating dissension between the Voortrekkers and the British."²⁰² Mpande was perceived as applying a policy of division and profiting indirectly from this situation.

¹⁹⁸ T.S. van Rooyen: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1951, pp. 47 – 48.

¹⁹⁹ G.E. Cory: *The Rise of South Africa*, pp. 84 – 85.

²⁰⁰ M.M Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertaiton, Natal, 1932), p. 12.

²⁰¹ R.J. Mann: *The Colony of Natal*, pp. 25 – 26, G.E.Cory: *The Rise of South Africa*, pp. 84 – 85.

²⁰² L.Young: *The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal, 1850 – 1855*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. II, 1951, p. 215.

Mpande wished to enter into a defensive military treaty with the Voortrekkers. This was further prompted by Zulu refugees in Natal who wanted Mpande deposed and accused the British authorities of indifference to Mpande's alleged persecution of Zulus in KwaZulu.²⁰³ Mpande was also infuriated by the prolonged protection the British gave to Zulu refugees, while Andries Spies and his Klip River government exercised strict control over visits of instigators against Mpande.²⁰⁴ The Zulu monarch maintained cordial ties with the Voortrekkers in the Klip River area and those to the west of the Drakensberg. He even asked them to send representatives to him, though no clear agreement existed regarding the border between the Transvaal Republic and KwaZulu.²⁰⁵ In his negotiations with Spies, it was decided that the Mzinyathi should be border, but the source of this river was not the Drakensberg.²⁰⁶ It took a sharp curve in the north east and the Transvaal Voortrekkers infiltrated through this area up to KwaZulu.²⁰⁷ In this way they easily established contact with the Klip River Voortrekkers.

The British authorities in Natal were unaware of the existence of the Klip River area as an independent state until four months after Mpande had

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 216.

²⁰⁴ J.S.A., Vol. 3, Evidence of Mankazana, 19 April 1905, p. 211; G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, p. 81.

²⁰⁵ J.D. Huyser: Die Naturelle-Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, p. 92.

²⁰⁶ C.W. de Kiewiet: British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848 – 1872, p. 105.

²⁰⁷ G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, p. 84.

surrendered the land to the Voortrekkers.²⁰⁸ They were under the impression that this area formed part of Natal Colony and after the death of P.C. Scheepers, one of the residents of the area, sent an auctioneer (P. Ferreira) to sell his farm "Renosterfontein."²⁰⁹ Andries Spies and other delegates of the "Klip River Republic" protested violently against the British interference. Ferreira had to return to Pietermaritzburg with no result. They argued that no one had a right to interfere with a country they bought from Mpande.²¹⁰

The British authorities rejected the independence of the Klip River Voortrekkers and their friendship with Mpande. They feared that the Klip River Voortrekkers, in cahoots with the Zulu king, could invade Natal.²¹¹ In a desperate attempt to subject these Voortrekkers to British power, two Natal Zulus (Zashuke and Nomzwezwe) were sent to Andries Spies with a letter and a few copies of a document which indicated the borders of Natal, including the Klip River area as part of Natal Colony.²¹² Spies returned the documents unopened with the message:

²⁰⁸ M.C. van Zyl: Lurtenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 – 1849, p. 156.

²⁰⁹ J.D. Huyser: *Die Naturelle-Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek*, p. 92.

²¹⁰ C.O. 179/50, P.R.O.: P. Ferreira to D. Moodie, 21 May 1847; C.W. de Krewiet: *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848 – 1872*, pp. 100-2.

²¹¹ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 13 – 15.

²¹² J.S.A., Vol. I, Evidence of Zashuka and Nomzwezwe, 12 May 1914, p. 27; S.N.A. 1/1/9, N.A.: A Spies to Shepstone, 4 June 1847.

*"It is out of my power to circulate them because they came too late."*²¹³

Further, Spies expressed hopes that the British would leave the Klip River area. On the other hand the British authorities enquired why Mpande had repudiated the 1843 border regulation. The British rulers requested details with regard to his dealings with the Voortrekkers.²¹⁴

To avert the danger of an attack from Klip River and KwaZulu, the British in their turn decided to drive a wedge between Mpande and the Klip River Voortrekkers.²¹⁵ As first step Lieutenant-Governor West notified Mpande that his pre-meditated attack on the Swazi had been of no concern to them, as long as he showed himself anxious to maintain good relations with the British.²¹⁶ The Zulu king accepted the British message and West was confident that this gesture of friendship would bear results.

West's next step was to send a Zulu messenger Yenge to Mpande. He had to enquire about the demarcation of the Mzinyathi River as border between Natal Colony and KwaZulu. He wished to know about his

²¹³ S.N.A. 1/3/8: A Spies to Shepstone, 15 June 1847; M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 14.

²¹⁴ C.O. 879/2/5: M. West to the Cape Governor, NoteBook 4, 28 June 1847; G.E. Cory: *The Rise of South Africa*, p. 83.

²¹⁵ C.O. 879/1/xxiii: Ngoza to Shepstone, 1 July 1847; G.E. Cory: *The Rise of South Africa*, p. 85.

²¹⁶ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 15 – 17.

relationship with the Voortrekkers under A.H. Potgieter at Ohrigstad.²¹⁷ Although Mpande did not want to accept the Cloete agreement (1843) as binding, he declared himself willing to accept the Mzinyathi as border between himself and the British, except at the upper course of the river where some of his people had settled.²¹⁸ The Zulu monarch also admitted that he, Mvundlana and Nongalaza had entered into an agreement with A.T. Spies, but said the contents were not explained to them.²¹⁹ Mpande also denied that he had communicated with the Voortrekkers of Ohrigstad.

In the meantime the British sent Archbell to Klip River to distribute copies of the proclamation of 1845 in which the borders of Natal Colony were indicated and to obtain information about their attitude.²²⁰ The Voortrekkers of the area treated him with hostility. They declared that they received the land from Mpande and would rather live under the Zulu king whom they could trust and would protect them against any British aggression.²²¹ Further, they informed Archbell that Mpande only acknowledged the territory which king Dingane had previously granted to Piet Retief as British possession. Thus the Voortrekkers in the Klip River

²¹⁷ S.N.A. 1/3/22: West to Mpande, 10 June 1847; M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 18.

²¹⁸ J.D. Huyser: *Die Naturelle-Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek*, p. 94.

²¹⁹ C.O. 48/395, P.R.O.: M.West to Mpande, 10 June 1847, reply from Mpande, 9 July 1847.

²²⁰ SAAR: N, Message by Archbell, 15 July 1847; G.E. Cory: *The Rise of South Africa*, p. 86.

²²¹ S.P.G.: Yenge to M. West, 9 July 1847; G.E. Cory: *The Rise of South Africa*, p. 87.

area openly declared their inclination not to honour any proclamation from the British, because they committed themselves to Mpande.²²²

Spies assured Archbell that the Klip River Voortrekkers would be willing to enter a treaty of peace and commerce with the British, provided they acknowledged their territory as independent Republic.²²³ Spies made Archbell to understand that they had accepted Mpande as their king and relied on him for support in any problem with either the British authorities or Natal Zulus.²²⁴ Under these circumstances Archbell suggested to the Lieutenant-Governor not to make any arrests of Klip River Voortrekkers.²²⁵ This could "result in a rupture" between Mpande and the British colonial establishment of Natal.

Walter Harding, the Natal public prosecutor, suggested that a military force be sent to Klip River to enforce unqualified submission and to prevent the Voortrekkers from conspiring with Mpande against Natal.²²⁶ Harding believed that reports sent by Mpande to Natal had been false and that the Zulu king collaborated with "obstinate" Voortrekkers. He warned Mpande that unless he was prepared to provide information regarding

²²² C.O. 48/408, P.R.O.: A Spies to Archbell, 15 July 1847.

²²³ S.N.A. 1/7/4, N.A.: A Spies and C Scheepers to Archbell, 15 July 1847.

²²⁴ C.O. 48/408, P.R.O.: A Spies to Archbell, 15 July 1847.

²²⁵ SAAR: N, Message by Archbell, 15 July 1847: G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, p. 87.

²²⁶ M. C. van Zyl: Luitenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 - 1849, p. 159.

arrangements he had made with the Voortrekkers, he would forfeit British friendship.²²⁷ Harding argued that measures should be adopted to depose the Zulu king and destroy his authority. This could be accomplished by means of Zulu refugees in Natal Colony. Mpande could then be replaced by a British Resident.²²⁸

Lieutenant-Governor West's different view was of opinion that Mpande's deposition would compel the Voortrekkers to leave Natal. This could result in the weakening of the Natal borders.²²⁹ Mpande could use the opportunity to invade Natal Colony. In the meantime Yenge, the Natal messenger, returned to Pietermaritzburg with news that Mpande was still loyal to the British. This gave the Natal authorities the impression that Mpande no longer had such good relations with the Klip River Voortrekkers.²³⁰ Captain W.D. Kyle was delegated to buy gifts of £15 for Mpande and to persuade him to accept the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) River as Natal border.²³¹ He pleaded with Mpande for four months and even threatened him that a snub answer could spoil relations with the British.²³²

²²⁷ C.O. 179/50, P.R.O.: West to Mpande, 16 July 1847; SAAR: N, Stanger to the Volksraad, 16 July 1847.

²²⁸ M.C. van Zyl: Luitenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 - 1849, p. 159.

²²⁹ M.M. Behn: The Klip River Insurrection, 1847. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 25 - 27.

²³⁰ E.A. Walker: The Great Trek, p. 361.

²³¹ C.O. 179/29, P.R.O.: Martin West to Mpande, 10 June 1847.

²³² S.N.A. 1/7/3, N.A., Interviews with Mpande's messengers, 3 August 1847.

Mpande and his Council emphasised that the treaty of 1843 had left the boundary open and they could not be persuaded otherwise.²³³

At that stage the British authorities learnt that Mpande and the Voortrekker representatives were negotiating about the area between the Mhlathuze and Thukela Rivers with the purpose of granting the Voortrekkers a free sea-passage.²³⁴ This would connect Ohrigstad with St. Lucia Bay and ensure an offensive-defensive treaty with Mpande.²³⁵ On 3 September 1847 the British issued a proclamation whereby the whole area proclaimed as Natal territory in 1845, remained as such. The Voortrekkers living in the area would not forfeit their land claims, provided they personally register their land properties in Pietermaritzburg before 1 October 1847.²³⁶

The contents of the proclamation came as a complete surprise to the Voortrekkers. J. Uys insisted that the British send someone to Klip River to determine who had been outmaneuvered by the Zulu king - the Voortrekkers or the British.²³⁷ He argued that the Voortrekkers acquired

²³³ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 21.

²³⁴ E.A. Walker: *The Great Trek*, p. 363.

²³⁵ J.Bird: *The Early Days of Natal*, p. 84.

²³⁶ C.O. 179/37, P.R.O.: Proclamation – M. West and D. Moodie, 3 September 1847.

²³⁷ H.C. Lugg: *Historic Natal and Zululand*, p. 48.

land through legal negotiations with Mpande. He was convinced that they would leave the area if the new British proclamation was implemented.²³⁸

On 27 September 1847 West sent Harding to the Klip River area to conduct the investigation. The Voortrekkers gave their co-operation to Harding.²³⁹ Spies and Hans de Lange sent an invitation to Mpande requesting him to send his delegates. Two emissaries, Sigagela and Vobo, came with a message from Mpande that he had granted the Klip River country to the Voortrekkers.²⁴⁰ Mkhonto also confirmed that Mpande had previously told Shepstone and Kyle that the Klip River area had never been given to the British.²⁴¹

Harding argued that no value could be placed on statements uttered by the delegates of Mpande. He concluded that Mpande:

*"has practised, and is practising the grossest deceit towards the British Government and his proceedings with reference to the Boers, amounts to the crime of deliberate fraud."*²⁴²

²³⁸ G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, p. 79.

²³⁹ M.C. van Zyl: Luitenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 - 1849, p. 162.

²⁴⁰ M.M. Behn: The Klip River Insurrection, 1847. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 28 - 30.

²⁴¹ C.J. Uys: In the Era of Shepstone, p. 37.

²⁴² J.J. van Heerden: Die Kommandant-Generaal in die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, p. 86.

He accepted the evidence that the Voortrekkers only applied for the area after Mpande had denied on several occasions that he had given the area to the British. In spite thereof, Harding concluded that the Voortrekkers in the Klip River area were criminal trespassers.²⁴³ He suggested, however, that they should not be criminally prosecuted as it would lead to the departure of the Voortrekkers in Natal.²⁴⁴ The country between the Thukela and Mzinyathi could be totally abandoned and this could have an injurious political effect on the mind of Mpande and his counsellors.²⁴⁵ Harding agreed that Zulu refugees in the Klip River area and in Natal Colony should be placed in locations. Leniency to the Voortrekkers was based on the doubtful fact that they had been lured by attractive propositions of Mpande.²⁴⁶

Harding's report did not persuade Lieutenant-Governor West who rejected the assumption that Mpande had played a dubious role regarding the British establishment in Natal Colony. West argued that Mpande's alleged denial of previous border agreements relied only on Voortrekker witnesses.²⁴⁷ According to West the aim was to ignite conflict between

²⁴³ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 37.

²⁴⁴ J.A. Farrar: *Zululand and the Zulus*, pp. 48 – 52.

²⁴⁵ J.J. van Heerden: *Die Kommandant-Generaal in die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek*, p. 88.

²⁴⁶ A.P. van de Merwe: *Die Voorgeskiedenis van die Republiek Lydenburg*, p. 51.

²⁴⁷ A.J. du Plessis: *Die Republiek Natalia*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1942, p. 215.

Mpande and Natal Colony. He was willing to accept that the Voortrekkers should be pardoned for their past freedom actions, on condition they took an oath of allegiance to the Natal authorities.²⁴⁸ Surveyor-General Harding viewed Mpande as a monarch who wished a discord between the Voortrekkers and the British.²⁴⁹ The Executive Council in Pietermaritzburg resolved that Mpande had to be approached by a delegation to strengthen the treaty "avoiding, however, anything that may afford him a plea for a rupture at a time when the British Force in South Africa is fully occupied elsewhere."²⁵⁰ Four days later Mpande's emissary Mhlehle came to West with a contradictory message. The Zulu king, according to Mhlehle, accepted the border agreements as presented by Kyle.²⁵¹ It was, however, too far from the Zulu territory and the Thukela River had to serve as border. Mpande further wished to settle some of his subjects in the vicinity of the Mzinyathi to prevent refugees from crossing over into Natal Colony.²⁵²

West carried out his plan to compel the Klip River Voortrekkers to take an oath of allegiance and to name J.N. Boshoff as Resident Magistrate of the

²⁴⁸ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 37 – 39.

²⁴⁹ A.P. van der Merwe: *Die Voorgeschiedenis van die Republiek Lydenburg*, p. 53.

²⁵⁰ F.A.F. Wichmann: *Die Wordingsgeskiedenis van die Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. II, 1941, p. 121.

²⁵¹ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 38 – 39.

²⁵² M.C. van Zyl: *Luitenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 – 1849*, p. 165.

territory.²⁵³ A military post, proposed by Harding for the protection of the Voortrekkers could be established in that region. On 16 November 1847 Boshoff arrived on the farm of Abraham Spies to help taking down the oaths. But the Klip River Voortrekkers were prepared to rather leave the area immediately, instead of taking oaths. This they were prepared to do even if it meant leaving their harvests on the fields.²⁵⁴ They notified Mpande about their decision through Gert van Niekerk and made him to understand that they were compelled to take oaths to the British.²⁵⁵

Boshoff viewed the mission of Gert van Niekerk in a serious light and was convinced that the influence of Klip River Voortrekkers such as Spies and de Lange on Mpande was much bigger than the Natal authorities had realised.²⁵⁶ The Magistrate became even more upset when van Niekerk returned with a message from Mpande that the king loathed the British actions and was preparing an army to clear the country between Klip River and the Mzimvubu.²⁵⁷ It upset Boshoff so much that he summoned a military force of 100 men to prevent any attack. He made arrangements to have A.T. Spies apprehended.²⁵⁸ The situation worsened when

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

²⁵⁴ S.N.A. 1/3/22: J.N. Boshoff to Moodie, 20 November 1847.

²⁵⁵ C.O. 179/20, P.R.O.: J.N. Boshoff to Moodie, 24 November 1847.

²⁵⁶ M.M. Behn: *The Klip River Insurrection, 1847*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 43.

²⁵⁷ W.C. Holden: *The Colony of Natal*, p. 158; C.O. 179/20, P.R.O.: Umbokwama to T. Shepstone, 1 December 1847.

²⁵⁸ H.Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 300.

Voortrekkers in the Klip River area moved into laagers and sent out letters to encourage other Voortrekkers to do likewise.²⁵⁹

To prevent the danger of a Zulu attack on Natal Colony, Boshoff suggested that Mpande should be persuaded to validate his friendship with the British. He argued that the Voortrekkers who had instigated Mpande against the Colony, should be arrested.²⁶⁰ On the contrary, the Board Members reacted negatively to Boshoff's suggestion. They proposed that the British should evacuate Natal Colony completely or limit their territory to the Port Natal harbour and surrounding areas.²⁶¹ This would eliminate the danger of a Zulu attack on Natal Colony. A Zulu menace could only be countered by the presence of a strong armed force of civilians mounted with firearms.²⁶² The situation could be salvaged by the granting of the Klip River area to the Voortrekkers. These people could then assist to defend the colony against any Zulu invaders or other north-eastern clans.²⁶³

In the meantime Mpande's plans to attack Natal Colony progressed smoothly. To assemble the strongest possible military force for this

²⁵⁹ W.C. Holden: The Colony of Natal, p. 159; C.O. 179/20, P.R.O: J. N. Boshoff to Moodie, 24 November 1847.

²⁶⁰ G.E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, p. 78; H.C. Lugg: Historic Natal and Zululand, p. 48.

²⁶¹ C.J. Uys: In the Era of Shepstone, p. 40.

²⁶² J.F. van Oordt: Paul Kruger en de Opkomst van de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, pp. 56 - 57.

²⁶³ R133/48: A.W.J. Pretorius to M. West, 26 January 1848; H.C. Lugg: Historic Natal and Zululand, p. 48.

purpose, not only an invitation was sent to the Voortrekkers in the Free State, but also a letter written to the Ohrigstad Volksraad.²⁶⁴ They were informed that Mpande was on the verge of cleaning Natal of British authority and that conditions of the Voortrekkers at Klip River called for keeping the Cape Colony always in conflict with native clans on their eastern borders.²⁶⁵

Andries Pretorius sent Hans de Lange, accompanied by Mkhonto, to Mpande with the message:

*"We are now assembled as you (Panda) told us to wait and see whether the British Government will take possession of that country or not, now declare yourself, assemble your arms, come to us and let us see each other as this business is your question."*²⁶⁶

It was made clear to Mpande that he was the reason of the conflict and therefore compelled to assist the Voortrekkers. Mpande agreed and undertook not to send his army to the Voortrekkers at Platberg in the Klip River area as requested, but to invade Natal Colony southwards.²⁶⁷ In spite

²⁶⁴ G.S.Preller: Andries Pretorius, p. 119.

²⁶⁵ C.W. de Kiewiet: British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848 – 1872, p. 54.

²⁶⁶ H.Stander: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872, p. 302.

²⁶⁷ C.W. de Kiewiet: British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848 – 1872, pp. 55.

of his solemn undertakings, the Zulu king had no plans to co-operate with the Voortrekkers.²⁶⁸

The reason was that the chances of success were limited for a small group of Klip River Voortrekkers, surrounded by unco-operative Zulu refugees to conquer the British forces. Mkhonto also played a double role and convinced Mpande to give up the contemplated invasion. He assured the Zulu king that the British were more powerful than the Voortrekkers and then left for Pietermaritzburg to tell everything to the British.²⁶⁹ This resulted in Mpande's complete change of attitude. In January 1848 the king sent a delegation consisting of Gebhula, Tshatsha, Mahhubulwana, Mtshelwana and Madala to Theophilus Shepstone (Diplomatic Agent) in Pietermaritzburg to keep him updated with the plans of the Klip River Voortrekkers.²⁷⁰ They told Shepstone that Mpande wished to live in peace and friendship with the British. The Voortrekkers in the Laagers at Doornkop concluded that negotiations with Mpande were unsuccessful. They then prepared themselves to move over the Drakensberg to a free territory in the interior.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ G.S. Preller: Andries Pretorius, p. 120.

²⁶⁹ M.M. Behn: The Klip River Insurrection, 1847. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), pp. 49 – 53.

²⁷⁰ M. C. van Zyl: Luitenant-Goewerneur Martin West en die Natalse Voortrekkers, 1845 – 1849, p. 172; C.J. Uys: In the Era of Shepstone, p. 28.

²⁷¹ B.P.P. – M. West to T. Shepstone, 3 January 1848; S.N.A. 1/1/2: D.C. Tooney to D. Moodie, 28 December 1848; C.J. Uys: In the Era of Shepstone, p. 28.

The British colonial establishment in Natal sent messages to Mpande threatening him with deposition if he kept on antagonising the Colony.²⁷²

The Voortrekkers were simultaneously notified that the British would supply firearms to the Zulus in the event of being attacked by any group of people.²⁷³ But Mpande was not playing in British hands, he allowed C. Van Rooyen and other Voortrekkers to stay in the Hlubi area. This later became known as the district of Utrecht. Van Rooyen was later appointed as official ambassador of the Voortrekkers to Mpande.²⁷⁴

In April 1852 Andries Pretorius sent van Rooyen, Mbopha and Mkholomba to Mpande with the message that he had named his son, M.W. Pretorius as his successor. They applied to Mpande for a piece of land that stretched eastwards up to the sea. The land would stretch from the Drakensberg via Blood (Ncome) River and the Bhalule mountains up to the banks of the White Mfolozi, from where it stretched up to the sea, including the whole coastal area between the Mhlathuze and Thukela Rivers.²⁷⁵ The Voortrekker deputation arrived at Nodwengu in August 1852 and Mpande signed the official deeds and was assisted by three of

²⁷² L. Young: The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal, 1850 – 1855. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. II, 1951, pp. 218 – 220.

²⁷³ S.N.A. 1/6/2, P.R.O.: Lieutenant Governor to Mpande, 15 June 1848; M.M. Behn: The Klipriver Insurrection, 1847. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Natal, 1932), p. 56.

²⁷⁴ S.N.A. 1/6/2: Tojo and Hemulawa to Mpande, 28 August 1848; S.N.A. 1/6/7: Memorandum No. 13, J. Rorke, 3 May 1870.

²⁷⁵ G.J. Reynecke: Utrecht in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal tot 1877. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Pretoria, 1956), pp. 8 – 9.

his headmen (izinduna).²⁷⁶ Andries Pretorius received a copy of the treaty with Mpande and tabled it before the session of the Volksraad at Scheerpoort on 27 December 1852. It was resolved that a commission consisting of A.W.J. Pretorius, W.F. Joubert and J. Grobler be sent to Mpande to clearly determine the demarcation of the area.²⁷⁷

The Voortrekkers obtained this territory from the Zulu king after the Sand River Convention of 1852. The final transaction of this land, and proper beaconing were left unsettled by the sudden death of Andries Pretorius.²⁷⁸ Mpande eventually changed his mind and was unwilling to give land to the Voortrekkers as far as the sea. In the wake of the death of Andries Pretorius with whom he retained close relations, the Zulu king abandoned the idea of allowing the Voortrekkers an independent harbour.²⁷⁹

M.W. Pretorius succeeded his father and at the Volksraad session of 19 to 28 September 1853 at Lydenburg, he appointed a Commission to further negotiate with Mpande the line from the Drakensberg to the east coast sea.²⁸⁰ Initially the Commission met on the farm of C. Gouws on

²⁷⁶ S.N.A 1/6/7, N.A.: J. Rorke to Mkholomba, 29 February 1870; Natal Mercury, 31 August 1852, p. 4.

²⁷⁷ J.D. Huyser: *Die Narturelle – Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Pretoria, 1936), p. 94.

²⁷⁸ F.A.F. Wichmann: *Die Wordingsgeskiedenis van die Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. II, 1941), p. 173.

²⁷⁹ G.J. Reynecke: *Utrecht in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal tot 1877*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Pretoria, 1956), pp. 18 – 20.

²⁸⁰ D.W. Kruger: *Die Weg na die See*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1938, p. 58.

15 January 1854 to iron out strategies. The meeting with Mpande was postponed.²⁸¹ On 15 March 1854 the Volksraad at Potchefstroom instructed C.F. Potgieter and H.T. Bührmann to compile terms of reference for a commission to negotiate land with Mpande.²⁸² The Commission consisting of Commandant-General W.F. Joubert, M.W. Pretorius, A.T. Spies, J.H. Grobler with Field Cornet J. Middel as secretary, was given the following instructions:

- to enquire from Mpande whether he still accepted his earlier agreement with the Volksraad of Pietermaritzburg.
- To find out whether Mpande would agree to, either through voluntary ceding or sale, surrender land to the Transvaal Republic.
- To pulse Mpande regarding the ceding of St. Lucia Bay, a piece of land that would stretch from the Bay to the border of the Republic, and establish how far Mpande was willing to safeguard the area for the Republic.

²⁸¹ J.D. Huyser: *Die Naturelle-Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek*. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Pretoria, 1936), p. 96.

²⁸² D.W. Kruger: *Die Weg na die See*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1938, p. 154.

- To keep the mission to Mpande a secret.²⁸³

If the Zulu king accepted his earlier agreement with the Voortrekkers, his copy had to be checked in order to renew articles which had become ineffective through changed circumstances. If Mpande's copy could not be found, a new agreement had to be drawn up.²⁸⁴ Mpande's consent to either sale or cede land to the Republic was to be confirmed by an official deed of sale or letter of submission ensuring that no land within British borders would be included.²⁸⁵ Therefore it was imperative for the Voortrekkers at the Mzinyathi River to establish peace with Mpande.

Mpande was surprised because the Commission applied for a smaller area than expected, viz. an area unoccupied by most Zulus, with the exception of a few huts of the Hlubi and Ngwe.²⁸⁶ The Zulu king admitted that he had given the land to A.W. Pretorius in 1852 and was not willing to negotiate with anybody except M. W. Pretorius personally.²⁸⁷ Mpande said:

"The land has already been given to the gentleman Pretorius, I can not sell it again. I talk only once... the line is already there... all water going to the

²⁸³ J. Stuart: De Hollandsche Afrikanen en hunne Republiek in Zuid-Afrika, p. 219.

²⁸⁴ G.J. Reyneke: Utrecht in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal tot 1877. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Pretoria, 1956), pp. 13.

²⁸⁵ H. C. Lugg: Historic Natal and Zululand, p. 72.

²⁸⁶ R655/54: J.C. Klopper and C. van Rooyen to M.W. Pretorius, 25 June 1854.

²⁸⁷ T.S. van Rooyen: Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. II, 1955, pp. 205 – 207.

Mzinyathi river you can drink, water going to the Blood River, must be left lots on the opposite is still... of land I gave to the old Mr. Pretorius."²⁸⁸

Therefore an urgent call was made to M.W. Pretorius by the Voortrekkers from Mzinyathi River area to clinch the deeds of transfer which they had long been waiting for.²⁸⁹ The deeds of transfer were formally interpreted by Stuurman to Mpande. The borders were clearly described as stretching from the Drakensberg via Blood (Ncome) River and the Phongolo mountains up to the banks of the White Mfolozi, from where it stretched up to the sea including the whole coastal area between Mhlathuze and Thukela Rivers.²⁹⁰ The actions of the Utrecht Voortrekkers towards Mpande strengthened their position in the area. They gave the Zulu king an assurance that they would deliver Zulu refugees to him.²⁹¹ Mpande gave M.W. Pretorius the assurance that he would never allow the British to interfere with matters across the Thukela.²⁹²

The Republic under M.W. Pretorius was anxious to retain Mpande's positive attitude towards the Voortrekkers. When disparity among the

²⁸⁸ S.N.A. 1/6/7: Memorandum No. 13, J.Rorke, 3 May 1870; D.W. Kruger: Die Weg na die See. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. I, 1938, p. 158.

²⁸⁹ R655/54: J.C. Klopper and C. van Rooyen to M.W. Pretorius, 25 June 1854.

²⁹⁰ G.J. Reynecke: Utrecht in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal tot 1877. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Pretoria, 1956), pp. 8 - 9

²⁹¹ L.Young: The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal, 1850 - 1855. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. II, 1951, p. 329.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 329.

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
²⁸⁹ R655/54: J.C. Kloppe and C. van Rooyen to M.W. Pretorius, 25 June 1854.

²⁹⁰ G.J. Reynecke: Utrecht in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal tot 1877. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Pretoria, 1956), pp. 8 - 9

²⁹¹ L.Young: The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal, 1850 - 1855. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. II, 1951, p. 329.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 329.

Mpande's Cession to the Utrecht Settlers, September 1854



Cf. S.N.A. 1/6/7, Memorandum No. 13, J. Rorke, September 1854

Voortrekkers of Utrecht subsequently threatened relations with KwaZulu, M.W. Pretorius did not hesitate to intervene.²⁹³ On 9 March 1858 he instituted a Commission consisting of J.H. Visser, J.C. Steyn and Christiaan Klopper to visit Mpande.²⁹⁴ The Commission had to reinforce the long existing friendship and good relations with the Zulu nation and remove misconceptions that might have developed.²⁹⁵ By sending the Commission to KwaZulu, M.W. Pretorius also wanted to demonstrate his influence on Mpande. Mpande was friendly towards the Commission and declared in the presence of all his headmen (izinduna), particularly his Prime Minister (uNdunankulu) Masiphula Ntshangase, that he and the Zulu nation were subjects of the Voortrekker Republic.²⁹⁶

On 19 July 1858, three months after the Commission had left KwaZulu, Mpande sent emissaries to Theophilus Shepstone in Pietermaritzburg to report about his dealings with the Voortrekkers.²⁹⁷ The emissaries conveyed to the British authorities Mpande's denial that he had made any land session to the Voortrekkers. They argued that Mpande could not

²⁹³ J.P. Blignaut: *Die Ontstaan en Ontwikkeling van die Nieuwe Republiek* (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, UNISA, 1943), pp. 143 – 144.

²⁹⁴ T.S. van Rooyen: *Die Verhouding tussn die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. II, 1955, p. 48.

²⁹⁵ D.W. Kruger: *Die Weg na die See*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. I, 1938, p. 159.

²⁹⁶ F.A.F. Wichmann: *Die Wordingsgeskiedenis van die Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek*. Cf. *Archive Yearbook for South African History*, Vol. II, 1941, p. 224.

²⁹⁷ S.N.A. 1/1/8: D.C. Toohey to T. Shepstone, 25 July 1858.

comprehend why the Voortrekkers wished to edge themselves in between him and the British colonial establishment.²⁹⁸ Mpande's emissaries who went to Theophilus Shepstone were Gambushe, Mthelwana, and Gebhula.²⁹⁹

In the meantime, the representatives of Utrecht met with the representatives from the Republic of Lydenburg at Utrecht and entered Voortrekker into negotiations with the aim to bring about unity between the two areas.³⁰⁰ The issue of land given to Utrecht Voortrekkers in 1854 did not feature in the deliberations. A strong factor which promoted unity was Mpande's sympathetic attitude towards the adherents of M.W. Pretorius and the disturbances in KwaZulu in December 1859.³⁰¹ KwaZulu's border was threatened with a fraternal discord which would be fatal because Mpande's health was deteriorating and his power taken over by his son and heir-apparent, Cetshwayo.³⁰² With Mpande's consent the area was proclaimed as new district of the Transvaal Republic (Z.A.R.) in

²⁹⁸ C. W. deKiewiet: British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848 – 1872, pp. 109-12.

²⁹⁹ J.A. Farrar: Zululand and the Zulus, p. 58.

³⁰⁰ J.D. Huyser: Die Naturelle-Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Pretoria, 1936), pp. 97 – 98.

³⁰¹ F.A.F Wichmann: Die Wordingsgeskiedenis van die Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. II, 1941, p. 226.

³⁰² J.D. Huyser: Die Naturelle-Politiek van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Pretoria, 1936), p. 99.

November 1859 and the union of Lydenburg and the Transvaal Republic was approved on 4 April 1860.³⁰³

It could be argued that while Mpande's actions towards the Voortrekkers in Natal Colony were perturbing, he had limited resources to resist them. The Zulu king acknowledged the military capabilities of the Voortrekkers and, given the manner in which he ascended the Zulu throne, the only option he had was to be diplomatic and succumb subtly to Voortrekker terms. Any meaningful resistance would be necessitated by complete loyalty from the influential chiefs throughout KwaZulu.

The flock of Zulu refugees into Natal gave evidence to the fact that Mpande did not have overall control in KwaZulu. An English newspaper, the Natal Witness (21 January 1961), branded the action of the Voortrekkers in KwaZulu as an act of gross imperialism. It is for this reason that an analysis of Mpande's ties with the British colonial establishment in Natal must now follow.

³⁰³ G.J. Reynecke: *Utrecht in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal tot 1877*. (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Pretoria, 1956), p. 59.

CHAPTER FIVE

MPANDE'S TIES WITH THE BRITISH AT NATAL

The relations that existed between king Mpande and the British colonial establishment at Natal were not strange to the Zulu royal harem and the kingdom in general. The first penetration of the Zulu state by forces of colonialism was through the agency of traders, missionaries and hunters in 1824.¹ Trade, however, did not fundamentally disrupt the economic and social organisation of the kingdom. This remained so despite the fact that the area in which Zulu kings continued to rule was later reduced first by Voortrekkers and then by the British occupation south of the Thukela River.²

When the first British traders landed at Port Natal in 1824, king Shaka had already established his frontier to south of the Mvoti River and had built a military homestead (ikhanda) or outpost there, at a spot still referred to as "Shaka's Kraal."³ Through presents and messengers the

¹ J. Beall et al: Conceptualizing Natal – implications of a regional political economy, pp. 1 - 3.

² B.P.P: Statement by Gardiner, 9 and 11 1836, Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines, session 4 February to 20 August 1836, printed for Parliament, 1836, vii, pp. 461 - 73.

³ R.J. Mann: The Zulus and Boers of South Africa – a fragment of recent history, p. 17.

British settler leaders, Lieutenant George Farewell, Lieutenant Henry King and Mr H. Francis Fynn, entered into negotiations with Shaka to obtain permission to establish a trading station at the landing place.⁴ It could be mentioned that presents of marvellous objects (e.g. mirrors, earrings, bracelets) had a subtle power, which no Zulu king could withstand, and Shaka accepted them and at times turned a blind eye on the actions of the traders.

Dingane, Shaka's immediate successor had quasi-friendly relations with the British. After the assassination of Shaka in 1828, he sent emissaries to the British at Natal to announce his succession to the Zulu throne.⁵ The British local leaders at Natal showed scant recognition of the position of the Zulu potentate. The British also disobeyed Dingane's summons to Henry Francis Fynn to advise him on a contemplated military expedition against the Swazi kingdom northeast of his domains.⁶ Hostility toward Colonial establishments, however, was always a characteristic feature of Dingane's reign. The wars he launched led to the social dislocation of some clans and refugees increased, seeking a haven in inaccessible areas.

⁴ Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 September 1836; Gardiner to Smith, Cape Town, 8 March 1837, Bird, I. Annals of Natal, p. 313.

⁵ C.O.48/483: Minutes, regarding Frere to Carnarvon, secret and confidential, 21 July 1877.

⁶ N.A.: Herbert to Shepstone (private), 6 December 1887, Shepstone Papers Vol 25; C.O. 879/13/150: Hicks Beach to Shepstone, Confidential, 13 March 1878.

A substantial number of these were increased by traders, missionaries and hunters at Natal.⁷

Mpande was devoid of the aptitude for martial exercises which manifested in Shaka and Dingane. When the British colonial establishment superceded that of the Voortrekkers, Mpande extended a hand of friendship to the local British settlers.⁸ Such ties, however, led to conflict between the British and Voortrekkers of the Republic of Natalia. In 1840, Mpande permitted the Voortrekkers to occupy the area between the Thukela and Black Mfolozi Rivers while concluding a boundary agreement with the British, stretching from the sources of Mzinyathi to its junction with the Thukela.⁹ These terms were influenced by the flow of Zulu refugees and the increasing power of Mpande.

Following such gestures the British Commissioner Henry Cloete later entered KwaZulu with traders D.C. Toohey and Henry Ogle to convince Mpande that the British had established complete control of the Colony of Natal.¹⁰ Mpande pledged to resettle all Zulus living south of the

⁷ A. de V. Minnaar: Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu-historical perspectives, p. 5.

⁸ R.R.R Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, pp. 80-98.

⁹ Report of the Landdrost of Thukela, October 1839, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, 1497 – 1845, pp. 253-4.

¹⁰ Dispatch of the Secretary of State, 25 May 1844, Bird, 1, Annals of Natal, 1888, p.533.

boundary in KwaZulu after the harvest. In return, Cloete promised to discourage the flow of refugees, return renegade cattle, but not refugees themselves.”¹¹

This alarmed the Volksraad of the Republic of Natalia. It feared the return of British rule over the Voortrekkers. Thus, on 14 February 1840 Andries Wilhelmus Pretorius, then President of the Volksraad wrote to the British governor at the Cape, Sir George Napier laying claim to Natal:

“Whereas the Volksraad of the South African society, on account of the unprovoked war which the Zulu king, or Zulu nation, has commenced against the South African society was compelled to incur an expense of Rds 122 600 for horse and wagon hire, and other expenses of war: and whereas the Zulu king, according to all appearance and information, has deserted his territory and crossed the Pongola, I do hereby declare and make known, that in the name of the said Volksraad of the South African society, I seize all the land from the Thukela to the Black Umvaloos, where it runs through the Double Mountains near to where it originates, as so along the Randberg (the ridges) in the same direction to the Drakensberg (or kwahlamba Mountains), including the St. Lucia Bay...”¹²

¹¹ Two treaties, both 5 October 1843, Ibid., II, p 293; Cloete to Montagu, 23 & 29 October 1843, Ibid., II, pp. 290-9, 301-3.

¹² V.C. Malherbe: What They Said, 1795-1910 History Documents, p. 68; Zietsman to Zuid Afrikaan, 5 January 1841, Bird, I, Annals of Natal, p 623.

This created unfriendly relations between the Volksraad and the British, especially because Mpande had given permission to the British to control St. Lucia Bay.¹³

The British also brought into question the system of land grants authorised by the Volksraad.¹⁴ As early as June 1840 Lord John Russell, Secretary of State for Colonies, instructed Napier to resume possession of Natal and soon afterwards he indicated he would like to see Natal settled as a British colony, as long as the conquest of the territory did not require too much expense.¹⁵ The idea that the Native policy of the Voortrekkers might endanger peace and British interests came towards the end of 1840 when Pretorius led a commando south of the Republic to punish Zulus whom he suspected of stealing cattle.¹⁶ On its return the commando killed several Zulus and carrying off "seventeen children, 3000 head of cattle and 250 sheep".¹⁷ Whatever was the explanation, the suddenness and severity of the attack appeared indefensible in the eyes of the British colonial establishment.

Although the Voortrekkers had achieved a satisfactory settlement with Mpande on the northern frontier, it soon had to deal with large numbers

¹³ Letter of D. Lindley, 12 March 1840, *Missionary Herald*, 36 (1840), pp. 384-5.

¹⁴ V.C. Malherbe: *What They Said, 1795-1910 History Documents*, p. 70.

¹⁵ N.A.: Reply to Mpande, n.d., instructions for Lieutenant Armstrong and William Cowie, 12 February 1846, enclosure.

¹⁶ V.C. Malherbe: *What They Said, 1795-1910 History Documents*, p70

¹⁷ J.A.I., Agar-Hamilton: *The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers*, p140

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¹⁶ V.C. Malherbe: What They Said, 1795-1910 History Documents, p70

¹⁷ J.A.I., Agar-Hamilton: The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers, p140

of refugees from Mpande's kingdom and elsewhere who settled in their midst.¹⁸ As these were in excess of labour requirements, the Volksraad decided to transfer them to a large reserve between Mthamvuna and Mzimvubu rivers to the south.¹⁹ The announcement of this intention, though little was done at the outset to carry it out, caused consternation among the Cape colonial authorities who feared disturbances on their eastern frontier.²⁰ In December 1841 Napier issued a proclamation announcing the intention of his government to resume the occupation of Port Natal. It should be mentioned, however, that the proclamation was preceded by a letter to Lord John Russell, Secretary of State for Colonies.²¹ It read:

"My Lord, -I have the honour to transmit a translation of some resolutions passed by the Council (at Pietermaritzburg) which, although not furnished to me by their President, contain, I am inclined to believe from corroborative evidence, authentic indications of the measures which they intend to pursue in regard to the removal of the remnant of the native tribes located in the country to which the emigrant farmers lay claim.

Such line of proceeding is so opposite to the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and to the instructions I

¹⁸ B.P.p.: Maitland to Gladstone, D.130, 12 August 1846,

¹⁹ V.C. Malherbe: What They Said, 1795-1910 History documents, p71

²⁰ B.P.P.: Maitland to Stanley, D.63, 13 March 1846.

²¹ Napier to Lord John Russell, Government House, Cape of Good Hope, 6 December 1841, Bird, Annals of Natal, I, 1845, p530

have received from your Lordship, to afford the native tribes of Africa the protection of the British arms against the aggressions of Her Majesty's subjects, ...I have felt it necessary no longer to delay in announcing to the emigrants by a Proclamation, of which I enclose a copy, my intention to resume military occupation of Port Natal."²²

In the proclamation, however, Napier stated that the British would tolerate no aggression against the Zulus in Natal unless acting under the immediate authority and orders of the establishment at the Cape.²³ In May 1842 a force under Captain T.C. Smith arrived at Port Natal and the first battle between the Voortrekkers and the British took place at Congella.²⁴ Smith's force was besieged by the Voortrekkers, but rescued at the end of June following the epic ride of Dick King and Ndongeni, a Zulu, to Grahamstown.²⁵

When Smith was in almost desperate circumstances he in vain called upon Mpande to come to his assistance. Mpande gave what one could convoke a diplomatic reply:

" No, you are now fighting for the upperhand, and whichever gains must be my master."²⁶

²² *Ibid.*, p. 530

²³ V.C. Malerbe: *What They Said, 1795-1910 History Documents*, p.77

²⁴ Napier to Russel, 6 December 1841; Stanley to Napier, 10 April & 6 May 1842, *Bird, Annals of Natal*, 1, pp.660-6, 700-3.

²⁵ J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton: *The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers*, pp.140-144.

²⁶ G.M.Theal: *The Republic of Natal*, p.39.

Mpande refused to aid either party, but as soon as the troops proved themselves the strongest he sent messengers to Colonel Cloete to say that he was about to march against the Voortrekkers.²⁷ However he abandoned the project when he was informed not to do so.

In his necessity Colonel Cloete called upon the Zulus living round the bay to bring him all the horses and cattle they could get, and they, interpreting this order into a general plundering licence, commenced to ravage the nearest farms.²⁸ Three Voortrekkers, named Dirk van Rooyen, Theunis Oosthuizen, and Cornelis van Schalkwyk, were murdered in cold blood.²⁹ This compelled the Voortrekkers on 15 July 1842 to consent to the following conditions of surrender:

- "1. *The immediate release of all prisoners, whether soldiers or civilians.*
2. *The giving up of all cannon, those taken as well as others, with the ammunition and stores belonging to them.*
3. *The restitution of all public and private property seized and in possession.*"³⁰

²⁷ Report of Colonel Cloete to sir George Napier, 3rd July 1842, Bird. I. Annals of Natal, pp.513-516.

²⁸ A Cloete to Napier, 4 July 1842, ibid., I, pp.40-1

²⁹ Cloete to Montagu, 14 July 1844; Smith to Napier, 18 September 1842, ibid., II, pp.397, 100-2.

³⁰ M. Wilson and L. Thompson: The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. 1, p.370.

These conditions were signed by Mr. Boshof and eleven other members of the Volksraad, and with a declaration of their submission to the authority of the Queen, comprised all that they engaged to do.

They said:

*"We the undersigned, Members and Representatives of the Council, having taken into consideration the proclamation of His Excellency the Governor, dated the 12th of May last, declare hereby to have agreed to accept the conditions therein contained."*³¹

The document was signed by J.S. Maritz, President, M.G. Potgieter, P.F.R. Otto, P.H. Zietsman; B Poortman, W.S. Pretorius, S.A. Cilhers, G.Z Naude, G R Van Rooyen, C.P. Botman, L.J. Meyer, E.F. Potgieter, P.R. Nel, A.F. Spies, P.S. Human, J.A. Kriel, W.A van Aardt, G.C. Viljoen, Gerrit Snyman, H.S. van den Berg, A.L Visagie, M. Prinsloo, C.A. Bothma, and N.J.S. Basson.³² It should be stated, however, that some of the Voortrekkers denounced in bitter language those who they said had betrayed the cause of liberty by their submission to the British. The ultimate annexation of Natal was necessitated by Lord Stanley, the new Secretary of State for Colonies.³³ Stanley annexed Natal largely

³¹ G.M. Theal: The Republic of Natal, pp. 55-56.

³² V.C. Malherbe: What They Said, 1795 – 1910 History Documents, pp. 79-83.

³³ J. Beall et al: "Conceptualizing Natal – implications of a regional political economy", pp. 10-18.

because he was convinced that the independence of the Voortrekkers was reconcilable neither with order nor with humanity.³⁴ In announcing this decision to Napier in December 1842, Stanley instructed him to send a special commissioner to Natal. The Commissioner, A.J. Cloete was to invite the Voortrekkers to express their own views about the form of the institutions of local government which were to be established in Natal, and to warn them that Britain would not pay for the expenses of Natal, except those needed for providing military protection.³⁵

Cloete on another visit read the terms of the proclamation for the annexation of Natal to Mpande. This was done through the help of an interpreter, Joseph Kirkman.³⁶ The terms of the proclamation read:

iii. *"That the district of Port Natal, according to such covenant limits as shall hereafter be fixed upon and defined, will be recognised and adopted by Her Majesty the Queen as a British colony, and that the inhabitants thereof shall, so long as they conduct themselves in an orderly and peaceable manner, be taken under the protection of the British Crown.*

iv. *That Her Majesty's said Commissioner is instructed distinctly*

³⁴ M. Wilson and L. Thompson: The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. 1, p.372.

³⁵ S.N.A. 1/6/2; Minutes of the Executive Council, 20 October 1847; SAAR: N, II, West to Mpande, 13 September 1847.

³⁶ Cloete's final Repot, 30 May 1844, Bird, I. Annals of Natal, 1845, pp. 529-532.

to declare that the three next mentioned conditions ... are to be considered as absolutely indispensable to the permission which it is proposed to give the emigrants to occupy the territory in question, and to enjoy therein a settled government under British protection:

1st: *There shall not in the eye of the law be any distinction of colour, origin, language, or creed, but that the protection of the law, in letter and in substance, shall be extended impartially to all alike.*

2nd: *That no aggression shall be sanctioned upon the natives residing beyond the limits of the colony, under any plea whatever, by any private person or any body of men, unless acting under the immediate authority and orders of the Government.*

3rd: *That slavery in any shape or under any modification is absolutely unlawful, as in every other portion of Her Majesty's dominions... " 37*

Whether Mpande comprehended the implications of the British annexation of Natal in relation to the sovereignty of his kingdom remain equivocal. Cloete, however, treated with Mpande, whom he recognised as the independent ruler of the Zulu kingdom north of the Mzinyathi-Thukela, except for St. Lucia Bay, which he annexed in case it had

³⁷ V.C. Malherbe: What They Said, 1795 – 1910 History Documents, p. 77.

potential as a port.³⁸ Cloete accepted the Thukela as the boundary with the hope to convince his superiors that the treaties should be amended to include KwaZulu's eventual incorporation into Natal.³⁹

In forwarding the treaties to Sir George Napier, the Cape Governor, Cloete argued that the Zulu territory north of the Thukela was "fertile" and "healthy". He considered it fit for immigrants, and it could not be expected that such extensive territory could long remain unnoticed by other European powers.⁴⁰ He further explained that the Thukela would not serve as an adequate boundary, and there was nothing to prevent the Voortrekkers from occupying other portions of KwaZulu.

The British government would not authorise the extension of its commitment. Doubting whether Cloete's treaties would be approved in London, the Cape Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, forwarded Cloete's recommendations to Britain with an explanation that the home government should at least approve Mpande's cession of St. Lucia Bay.⁴¹

Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, instructed Maitland to inform the Zulu king that the British government did not

³⁸ Two Treaties, both 5 October 1843, Bird, II, Annals of Natal, pp. 299-300

³⁹ P.A. Kennedy: The Fatal Diplomacy: Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the Zulu Kings, 1839-1879 (PhD Thesis, California, 1976), p. 55.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.55.

⁴¹ Stanley to Maitland, D.66, 25 May 1844, Bird II, Annals of Natal, pp.379-86.

intend to form a settlement at St. Lucia Bay.⁴² He insisted on prohibiting British subjects from leaving the colony and wanted Maitland to ensure that Zulu aggression was not provoked.

On 7 December 1846 Mpande objected to the number of white hunters and traders entering KwaZulu. He also pressed for the return of cattle which Mawa, Mpande's aunt, took to Natal.⁴³ Mpande's emissaries argued that Smith and Cloete had promised to return the cattle, but that only a hundred had been delivered. They further announced Mpande's need for guns and British troops to check Swazi provocations in the north of KwaZulu.⁴⁴ The Lieutenant-Governor Martin West promised the emissaries that he would ensure no one interposed between the Zulus and the British. He pleaded ignorance of the arrangement regarding Mawa's cattle, but conceded the necessity to regulate the traders.⁴⁵ In August 1847 Mpande sent two of his emissaries, Gebhula and Gambushe, to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Martin West, to advise him of the Zulu intention to occupy the territory between the Thukela and Mzinyathi (Buffalo) Rivers.⁴⁶ Gebhula and Gambushe insisted on the return of

⁴² Minute of the Import of Mpande's Message, received 7 February 1846, "Encl. Maitland to Stanley, D.63, 13 March 1846, pp. 44-5.

⁴³ C.O. 48/246: Maitland to Stanley, D. 63, 13 December 1846, printed for Parliament, July 1848 (980), pp. 44-5.

⁴⁴ Reply to Mpande, n.d. instructions for Lieutenant Armstrong and William Cowie, 13 March 1847, *Ibid.*, pp. 45-7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-7.

⁴⁶ SAAR: N, West to Smith, D-20, 9 May 1848, printed for Parliament, 3 May 1849 (1059), p9.

Mawa's cattle and that Mpande no longer honoured the Cloete treaties.⁴⁷ Instead of addressing Mpande's concerns, West pleaded with the Cape Colonial establishment for augmentation of British military forces and an increase of arms and ammunition. In reply to the Zulu emissaries, however, West promised to send an envoy Yenge to KwaZulu to ascertain Mpande's true intentions. Consequently, Captain H.D. Kyle of the 45th Regiment and interpreter and agent John Shepstone were sent to Mpande on 9 August 1847.⁴⁸ Shortly afterwards Mpande also received Mawa's cattle. Mpande reaffirmed his loyalty to the British Colonial establishment in Natal. He also abandoned his plans for partnership with the Voortrekkers.⁴⁹ By pledging his support to the British, Mpande also did not necessarily cease his encouragement of the Voortrekkers. He hoped that keeping alive British-Voortrekker enmity would serve his own interests.

In January 1848 the British Colonial establishment in Natal learnt that Mpande was communicating with the Voortrekkers at Klipriver to attack Zulu refugees loyal to the British authorities.⁵⁰ They were residing near the Bushman's River and abandoned their location for fear of a

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pp 9-10.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Kyle to Moodie 15 August 1847, encls in Pottinger to Grey, D.201, 6 December 1847, printed for Parliament, July 1848 (980), pp. 181-3.

⁴⁹ S.N.A. 1/6/2: West to Mpande, 6 January 1848; SAAR: N, West to Mpande, 20 January 1848, II, pp. 127-8.

⁵⁰ C.O. 179/5, P.R.O: Government Notice, 30 December 1847, encl. in Smith to Grey, D. 119, 17 July 1849.

Voortrekker attack. The lieutenant – governor became suspicious of Mpande and the Voortrekkers. He despatched the trader D.C. Toohey to Nodwengu, Mpande's palace. Before Toohey could report, Mpande's emissaries arrived in Natal to reconfirm the king's loyalty to the British. They admitted that the Voortrekkers had asked for Zulu support against the British, but claimed that Mpande had steadfastly refused.⁵¹

In an attempt to stave off the crisis, West made it illegal to incite or assail the Zulus. In further attempts to woo Mpande, the Lieutenant-Governor forbade all British subjects from supplying Zulus outside Natal with firearms and ammunition.⁵² All chiefs (amakhosi) within Natal were urged to maintain their adherents in readiness and were instructed to send those with firearms to Pietermaritzburg.

Meanwhile, the Lieutenant-Governor West informed Mpande of the military alert, warning that if he were to become an adversary of the British colonial establishment, he would no longer be acknowledged as the king of the Zulus.⁵³

⁵¹ Diary of Theophilus Shepstone, 3-7 January 1848, Uys Collection, UNISA; West to Governor Cape of Good Hope, D.1, 17 January 1848, p. 29.

⁵² C.O. 179/5, P.R.O., Proclamations of 4 & 13 January 1848, encls. in Smith to Grey, D. 119, 17 July 1849.

⁵³ S.N.A. 1/6/2, N.A., Message to Panda, 15 January 1848.

Assured of Mpande's co-operation, West attempted to convince the Colonial Office in London that the Voortrekkers had provoked the crisis. He again appealed for reinforcements to defend Natal against possible future invasion.⁵⁴ Unfortunately, the new Cape Governor and High Commissioner, Sir Harry Smith, was less willing to co-operate. He viewed the affairs of Natal in the light of their potential to disrupt the Cape Colony. He rather thought conciliation of the Voortrekkers and Mpande would be the best policy.⁵⁵

Smith accomplished conciliation between Mpande and the Voortrekkers by travelling overland to assume personal command. He proclaimed the repeal of the Voortrekkers' loyalty oath and made provisions for the Voortrekkers to receive full legal title to their Natal farms.⁵⁶ Regarding Zulu invasion, Smith refuted it as unfounded rumour. He sent a delegation to express his apologies to Mpande and thanked the Zulu king for the amicable and friendly relationship he maintained with Natal.⁵⁷

Smith's overtures towards Mpande did not bring the perceived Zulu menace to an end. The Lieutenant-Governor, Martin West, limited the

⁵⁴ G.H.: West to Smith, D.I, 17 January 1848, encl. in Smith to Grey, D. 147, 23 August 1848, printed for Parliament, 3 May 1849 (1059), pp. 31 - 2.

⁵⁵ Natal Witness, 21 January 1848, pp. 2 - 3.

⁵⁶ G.H.: Smith to Grey, D.17, and Smith to Mpande, both 10 February 1848, printed for Parliament, July 1848 (980), pp 211-3, 216.

⁵⁷ SAAR: N, Notices of 18 February 1848, II, pp. 214-5; Smith to West, D.2, 27 March 1848, II, pp. 287-90; Reply of Mpande, 8 March 1848, encl. in Smith to Grey, D. 56,30 March 1848, p.223.

interference of the High Commissioner by instructing Natal's Diplomatic Agent, Theophilus Shepstone to organise Natal's Africans into an effective military force. He pushed for more Imperial troops and for more European immigrants.⁵⁸ In April 1848 the British colonial establishment in Natal received reports that Mpande had violated borders and purged his kingdom of rivals. West instructed the Diplomatic Agent to organise a Zulu police force of about one hundred men.⁵⁹ In June and September Mpande was again reported to have violated the boundaries. West did his best to meet the Zulu challenge. He asked Mpande, through Gebhula and Gambushe, never again to violate Natal's borders.⁶⁰ He instructed Theophilus Shepstone once again to organise Natal's Zulus into a formidable military force. In September 1848, Shepstone had seven divisions of troops, each comprising of 1300, men ready for action.

The Lieutenant-Governor West reminded Smith of his long-standing request for a military increase. He also communicated Shepstone's view that the "tyrannical" Zulu potentate was considering a full-scale invasion.⁶¹ Smith replied that Natal already had the means to thwart a

⁵⁸ SAAR:N: Shepstone to Moodie, 22 April 1848, II, pp. 298-300; Diary of Theophilus Shepstone, March 1848, Uys Collection, UNISA

⁵⁹ Moodie to Shepstone, 8 June 1848, Ibid., II, pp. 307-8.

⁶⁰ S.N.A. 1/1/1, N.A.: Shepstone to (Moodie), 2 August & 6 September 1848.

⁶¹ C.O. 179/5, P.R.O., West to Smith, D. 46, 1 December 1848, encl. in Smith to Grey, D. 119, 17 July 1849.

Zulu invasion. He contended that Mpande had no intention of invading the British establishment in Natal.⁶² Smith explained:

"If he be treated fairly, his interest is to maintain an amicable relationship".⁶³

Nevertheless, West did not receive reinforcements and only half of the 73rd Regiment landed at Port Natal. Late in October 1848 West chided Mpande's emissaries for border violations. He affirmed his pledge to surrender renegade cattle, but the recent Zulu use of force left him with no alternative but to keep the remaining cattle of the recent refugees.⁶⁴ Mpande's emissaries, Gebhula and Gambushe expressed the king's hope for friendly relations with the British. They argued that Mpande never intended to invade Natal. Gebhula admitted that armed parties had crossed into Natal on three occasions, but that this had been done without Mpande's approval.⁶⁵ He added that John Shepstone, Sir Theophilus Shepstone's brother, was a man to whom the Zulu king could tell all his mind and be sure it would not be perverted. Mpande's emissaries

⁶² SAAR: N, West to Smith, D, 20,0 May 1848, II, pp. 296-7.

⁶³ G.H. (1059), West to Smith, D.31, 30 September 1848, printed for Parliament, 3 May 1849, p54.

⁶⁴ SAAR: N, Mpande to West, 28 November 1848, II, pp 360 -1.

⁶⁵ C.O. 179/5, P.R.O., West to Smith, D.41 & 42, 8 & 17 November 1848, encls. In Smith to Grey, D. 119, 17 July 1848.

affirmed that great advantages might accrue from making John Shepstone a British resident in KwaZulu.⁶⁶

The Voortrekkers previously had stationed officials across the Thukela River - before the British annexation of Natal. By allowing a British Resident in KwaZulu Mpande believed that future traders would be regulated.⁶⁷ West's first response was the return of the cattle of the newly arrived refugees from KwaZulu. He also assured the Zulu king that John Shepstone would at the first opportunity go to KwaZulu to discuss the arrangements.⁶⁸ The British colonial establishment in Natal, however, could not impinge on Mpande's authority.⁶⁹ West therefore decided against positioning an official within or at the borders of Mpande's kingdom. The purpose of the Resident would be to completely replace the authority of Mpande.⁷⁰

West, before he died in August 1849, wanted a firmer control on the affairs of the Zulu people. Mpande expelled white traders from KwaZulu. He was particularly infuriated by D.C. Toohey for

⁶⁶ SAAR: N, Mpande to West, 28 November 1848, II, pp. 360-1.

⁶⁷ C.O. 179/5, P.R.O: West to Smith, D. 46, 1 December 1848, encl. In Smith to Grey, D.119, 17 July 1849.

⁶⁸ S.N.A. 1/6/2, N.A: West to Mpande, 1 December 1848.

⁶⁹ SAAR: N, Sentiments of the Crown Prosecutor, Council, 16 July 1849, II, p. 130.

⁷⁰ G.H. (1292), Ordinance. No 4, 26 December 1848, encl. In Smith to Grey, D.55, 15 March 1849, printed for Parliament, 14 August 1850, pp. 25-7.

encouraging the Mthethwa revolt against the Zulu authority.⁷¹ West, to ensure good relations with Mpande and control of arms in KwaZulu, issued a regulation requiring the licensing of all traders. He also threatened to revoke Toohey's title to his Natal farm.⁷² West adapted to changed circumstances and asked Smith for permission to position a British Resident in KwaZulu. Besides serving as a check on Mpande's power, he argued, an agent could limit the number of refugees entering Natal.⁷³ After West's death, the Executive Council informed the Cape Governor that it had postponed the Resident scheme.

It could be argued that the British Colonial establishment in Natal regretted losing an opportunity to end the perceived Zulu menace. At the time of border violations Sir Theophilus Shepstone had argued that Natal's position would remain precarious so long as refugees continued to cross the border.⁷⁴ He suggested that the only solution would be to topple the arbitrary power of the Zulu king. For Shepstone, the Resident had to be the vehicle through which this could be achieved.⁷⁵

⁷¹ SAAR: N, West to Smith, D.2, 12 January 1849, encl. in Smith to Grey, D. 36, 5 February 1849, III, pp. 95-6.

⁷² C.O. 179/5, P.R.O.: West to Smith, D.36, 5 February 1849, pp. 18-8.

⁷³ SAAR: N, West to Smith, D.4, 22 February 1849, II, pp. 292-3.

⁷⁴ S.N.A. 1/1/11, N.A.: Moodie to Bird, 7 September 1849, encl. in Bird to Shepstone, 11 September 1861, Minutes of the Executive Council, 9 August 1849 – message to Mpande, 17 October 1849, Ibid, p.26.

⁷⁵ SAAR: N., Shepstone to Moodie, 22 February 1848, II, p.293, Evidence of Theophilus Shepstone, 25 November 1852, Proceedings of the N.N.C., 1852-3, II, p27.

Shepstone believed that the future prosperity for Natal depended on its security. He perceived that his superiors would one day agree to a lasting solution to the Zulu menace. He lamented:

*"The only addition made to the troops, that I am aware of since the establishment of a Government here, was the temporary stationing here of a few companies of the 73rd foot. So far we have upheld the Zulu power by returning to Zululand the refugees' cattle. I am convinced that the moment this order is suspended the Zulu power will fall."*⁷⁶

In January 1851 the British Colonial establishment in Natal was locked into yet another crisis. Refugees from all quarters along Natal's southern border resisted to pay the hut tax. The hut tax was instituted to compel Zulu people to work for money in order to pay taxes. Thus they became economically involved in the Colonial commercial community without political or social integration. There were reports that Mpande intended to support a Natal resistance with his own regiments.⁷⁷ The new Lieutenant-Governor, Pine, failed to organise a force. He consequently re-initiated the plan for a Zulu Resident. Pine asked for Mpande's permission to position a British government official across the Thukela.

⁷⁶ Evidence of Theophilus Shestone, 25 November 1852, Proceedings of the Natal Native Commission, 1852-3, II, p27.

⁷⁷ K.C. Stuart Papers, Folio 19, p. 21FF, Interview with John W. Shepstone, 1912; G.H. (1209): Message to Mpande, 3 May 1850.

He explained that with the assistance of the Zulu regiments, such a Resident would be able to turn back would-be refugees.⁷⁸ In an attempt to consolidate these arrangements, Pine offered to provide a wagon to meet with Mpande's representatives at the Thukela.⁷⁹ The deliberations between Mpande and Pine in 1851 were contained in Pine's correspondence with the Governor-General, Sir H. Smith. Pine said:

*"I opened diplomatic communication with Panda, whose sentiments I had reason to believe were friendly towards this Government. The result of this proceeding was, that the Zulu king sent the five chief councilors of his empire to confer with me as to various subjects affecting our common interests. These chiefs were instructed to offer Her Majesty, as your Excellency is already aware, the use of Panda's army against the rebels on the frontier, and to discuss the expediency of establishing a resident agent in some part of his dominions, with the view of regulating the trade between Her Majesty's subjects and his own. Panda also expressed a wish to meet me, if possible, on the frontier of the district. I need not inform your Excellency that this friendly intercourse between myself and Panda had a great effect upon the minds of the natives of this district, and went far to extinguish any latent sparks of disaffection which might have been smouldering in their breasts."*⁸⁰

⁷⁸ C.O. 179/16, P.R.O: Pine to Smith, D. 13, 4 July 1851, III, pp. 281-95.

⁷⁹ Natal Witness, 31 January 1851. Cf. Le Cordeur: Relations, p. 262.

⁸⁰ B.P.P: Extract of a despatch from Lieutenant – Governor Pine to Governor-General Sir H. Smith, No. 3, dated Government House, Natal, July 4, 1851, No. 13 – (Received 20 October 1851) (Answered, No. 710, 3 December 1851).

Mpande wanted the friendship of the British Colonial authorities in Natal, as repeatedly confirmed by Pine to Henry Smith and the Secretary of State, Earl Grey. The Zulu potentate, he argued, agreed to accept a Resident and offered the services of the Zulu regiments.⁸¹ In July 1852 Pine appointed John Shepstone as Zulu Resident Agent. Mpande built two military strongholds near the Lower Thukela Drift to aid the resident in preventing refugees from entering the Natal Colony.⁸² In accepting the kind of relations the British had with Mpande, the Secretary of State, Sir John S Pakington said:

*"Sir, I have received our Despatch of 14th August last, No. 33; and I have to convey to you my approval of the arrangements made with Panda, king of the Zulus, and of the appointment of Mr. John Shepstone as agent with that chief..."*⁸³

Pine described the decision to appoint John Shepstone as a solution to the perceived Zulu threat. This also reconciled Pine and Theophilus Shepstone in that they began to work together. Theophilus Shepstone wrote thus to Pine:

⁸¹ C.O. 179/23, P.R.O., Pine to Smith, D. 13, confidential, 4 February 1852.

⁸² C.O. 179/20, P.R.O., Minutes by Barrow, Merrivale, Desart and Pakington, 11-18 May 1852, regarding Pine to Smith, D.20, 27 February 1852.

⁸³ B.P.P: From the Right Hon. Sir John S. Pakington to Lieutenant – Governor Pine, No. 21 Dowling Street, 23 October 1852.

*"I desire to express to your Honour my sincere thanks for your having complied with Panda's wish to have my brother, Mr John Shepstone, appointed as resident agent of this government on the Thukela. It is a double satisfaction to me, because, although such an appointment has been long felt to be necessary by Panda, as well as by your Honour's Government, the difficulty has been the obvious danger arising from placing such a functionary in the Zulu territory. The present arrangement avoids this difficulty, and will, I have no doubt, tend to prolong a good understanding between us and Panda, and the appointment of this officer as presiding member of a court, to be composed of himself and two or more of the Zulu chiefs, for the adjustment of disputes between British subjects and Zulus, will remedy what Panda has long felt to be a grievance of too serious a nature for him to attempt to remedy himself."*⁸⁴

John Shepstone left Pietermaritzburg on 23 August 1852 to reside in the neighbourhood of the Lower Thukela Wagon Drift.⁸⁵ His principle duties, besides being a Resident Agent, were to retrieve all cattle brought into Natal by refugees from Mpande, and to discourage by every means in his power the entering of refugees into Natal.⁸⁶ This, however, was to

⁸⁴ B.P.P.: From Sir Theophilus Shepstone to the Lieutenant Governor BCC Pine, Encl. 1 in No. 21, Pietermaritzburg, 19 August 1852.

⁸⁵ G.H (1697): Gordon to J.W. Shepstone, 11 August 1852, encl. in Pine to Pakington, D. 33, 19 August 1852, pp. 73 - 4.

⁸⁶ B.P.P.: Pine to Mpande, Encl. 3 in No. 21, 26 July 1852, received by Gebhula and Gambushe, encl. 4 in No. 21, 11 August 1852.

be with the understanding that he was not required, except by the express authority of the Lieutenant-Governor, to return them to Mpande. John Shepstone was also to be the normal medium of communication between Mpande and the British Colonial establishment in Natal.⁸⁷ He had no authority to interfere with internal Zulu affairs. Pine stressed that John

Shepstone was not to be the counterbalance of Mpande.⁸⁸

By 1853 relations between the British Colonial establishment in Natal and Mpande were unsatisfactory. In a letter to Pakington, Pine stated two main grounds for anxiety on the part of Natal, arising from his contiguity to Mpande's kingdom. He put them as follows:

"1st. The vast influx of subjects of that potentate which is constantly taking place into this district which already possesses within its borders a larger number of natives than is consistent with its ultimate peace and security.

*2nd. The danger which always exists of the traders from this district in Panda's country involving us in quarrels with that chief, by their lawless or inconsiderable proceedings."*⁸⁹

⁸⁷ SAAR: N, Minutes of the Executive Council, 23 June 1853, IV, pp 8-9; G.H. (1696): Pine to Cathbart, D. 3, 27 May 1852, encl. in Pine to Pakington, D.33, 19 August 1852, pp. 73 - 4.

⁸⁸ G.H. (1697): Gordon to J.W. Shepstone, 11 August 1852, encl in Pine to Pakington, D. 33, 19 August 1852, pp. 73 - 4.

⁸⁹ B.P.P.: From Pine to Pakington, 19 August 1852, No. 21 (Received 18 October 1852 (Answered, No. 41, 23 October 1852) p.132.

Pine also mentioned a third cause of anxiety, which was the large quantities of gunpowder and firearms which were constantly conveyed by the British traders into Mpande's country for sale. Delagoa Bay was the source of distribution and this endangered the safety of Natal.⁹⁰ To exercise control over commerce beyond the boundaries of Natal and to check an illicit trade in gunpowder between the British traders and Mpande's subjects, Pine and John Shepstone made the following arrangements with Mpande:

"1st That all persons visiting his country should be furnished with a passport from this Government.

2nd That such passports should be countersigned by a Government agent, stationed on his borders.

3rd That such agent should examine all persons crossing the borders, and their wagons and goods, in order to see that they were not violating any law regarding trading beyond the boundaries.

4th That Panda should station a few chosen troops near to the frontier, to prevent the influx of natives into this district, and to apprehend criminals flying from either Government, and that such troops should be under the general orders of the agent of this Government.

⁹⁰ G.H (1697): Message of 26 July 1852, encl. in Pine to Pakington, D.33, 19 August 1852, pp. 72-3.

5th *That the Government agent should be presiding member of a court, to be composed of himself and two or more of Panda's chief men, for the purpose of determining disputes arising between Her Majesty's subjects and those of Panda, which should sit within the territories of that chief.*"⁹¹ Pine had no doubt that would prevent a large number of persons from coming into Natal. Although it was doubtless true that many subjects of Mpande fled from KwaZulu to escape death, the large number of such persons came to Natal for the purpose of being free from control, and joining their own clans which were broken up by Shaka, and which they were anxious to re-organise within Natal.⁹²

Having completed his part of the arrangement, Mpande was desirous that it might be completed on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor.⁹³ Regarding refugees and cattle, Pine was of the view that it might at first opinion appear improper to take any measures for discouraging the subjects of king Mpande from seeking an asylum in Natal.⁹⁴ Apart from all considerations of policy, and the preservation of Natal from being

⁹¹ B.P.P.: Lieutenant – Governor Pine to Pakington, No. 21, 19 August 1852 (Received 18 October 1852) (Answered, No.41, 23 October 1852, p. 132' Ibid, From Governor – General Smith to Earl Grey, No. 24 in encl. No. 6, 10 October 1851.

⁹² C.O. 179/20, P.R.O.: Minutes by Barrow, Merivale, Desart and Pakington, 11-18 May 1852, regarding Pine to Smith, D. 20, 27 February 1852.

⁹³ B.P.P.: Lieutenant – Governor Pine to Pakington, 19 August 1852, No. 21-(Received 18 October 1852) (Answered, No. 41, 23 October 1852), p. 133.

⁹⁴ G.H. (1697): Pakington to Pine, D. 41, 23 October 1852, Preston to Pakington, D.7, 1 February 1853, pp. 131-3, 87-89.

overwhelmed by a large Zulu population, it had to be considered that to hold out constant encouragement to the subjects of a kingdom, in which every man was a warrior, to flee from his kingdom, was really to encourage desertion.⁹⁵ This was likely to prove a source of perpetual irritation to its ruler. Pine reminded his fellow British that by Zulu Law, which out of their territories at all events they ought to recognise, all the possessions, especially the cattle of every person, was considered as the official property of the king.⁹⁶ Thus, removing cattle out of the territories of the king without his consent, was regarded in Zulu Law as theft. Recognising that law, Pine's predecessors tried their best to return to Mpande any cattle brought into Natal by refugees from the Zulu country. However, limited means at their command prompted them to only partially effect that object.⁹⁷ John Shepstone was not precluded from permitting persons to enter Natal, provided they did not bring their cattle with them. He only had twenty constables and a white Superintendent to patrol the length of the Thukela.⁹⁸

While Mpande had ceased to violate Natal's borders and the threat of a

⁹⁵ L. Young: "The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal, 1850-1855," Archives Year Book for South Africa History, Vol. II, 1951, pp. 326-9.

⁹⁶ C.O. 179/6, P.R.O.: Pine to Smith, D, 34, Confidential, 27 November 1851, encl. in Smith to Grey, 16 December 1851.

⁹⁷ L. Young: "The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal, 1850-1855," Archives Year Book for South African History, Vol II, 1951, pp. 330-4.

⁹⁸ SAAR: N, J. W. Shepstone to Acting Secretary to Government, borders of the Zulu Country, 14 January 1853, II, pp 83-85.

Zulu-Voortrekker alliance abated, Pine wondered if more refugees would enter Natal. He was worried that Zulus from Mpande's kingdom might again pursue refugees across the border. In March 1853 John Shepstone surrendered his Resident Agent duties to Joshua Walmsley, having accomplished very little.⁹⁹

Pine's relations with Mpande was affected by the Sand River Convention of January 1852. Two British Commissioners, Charles Owen and William Hogge, concluded a treaty with the Voortrekker leader Andries Pretorius.¹⁰⁰ The treaty recognised the independence of the Voortrekkers north of the Vaal River. Pine, with the exception of the new Cape Governor, Sir George Cathcart, was not informed about the treaty. Pine's main concern was that the Voortrekkers beyond British control could occupy land within KwaZulu.¹⁰¹ The terms of the treaty could place the Voortrekkers in a position of annexing the Zulu kingdom. Pine's fear was they could cause Mpande to be antagonistic towards the British at Port Natal.¹⁰²

As Pine expected, many Natal Voortrekkers left their farms for the future

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.

¹⁰⁰ G.H. (1697): Pine to Cathcart, D.3, 27 May 1852; encl; in Pine to Newcastle, D. 38, 3 June 1853, pp. 108-9.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp 108-9.

¹⁰² L.Young: "The Native Policy of Benjamin Pin in Natal, 1850-1855", Archives YearBook for South African History, Vol.III, 1951, pp. 84-88.

Transvaal Republic. Andries Pretorius informed Mpande that his adherents would occupy part of northern KwaZulu.¹⁰³ Before Mpande could respond, some Voortrekkers established farms on unoccupied land across the Mzinyathi River in the vicinity of Blood River.¹⁰⁴ Pine appealed to the Secretary of State by citing Mpande's message in which he expressed concern about the Voortrekker encroachments. He maintained that Mpande expected a conflict with the Voortrekkers. On 30 July 1853 the permanent Under-Secretary, Herman Merivale remarked to the Secretary of State that Pine had misunderstood the terms of the Sand River Convention.¹⁰⁵ Merivale explained that the treaty guaranteed the continued independence of the "Native" states.¹⁰⁶

In September 1854 Pine inaugurated a program for the apprenticeship of Zulu refugees to white farmers. Some African chiefs on whose location the refugees camped refused to surrender cattle to Mpande.¹⁰⁷ In August 1855 Mpande threatened them with war. This threat of war prompted Theophilus Shepstone to arrange for the return of about 500 head of cattle

¹⁰³ G.H. (1697): Pine to Pakington, D. 55, 28 September 1852, printed for Parliament, 19 August 1853, pp. 78-81.

¹⁰⁴ G.H. (1697): Pine to Smith, D. 24, 10 October 1851, encl. in Smith to Grey, D. 4, 12 January 1852, pp. 18-9, 30-8, S.N.A. 1/6/7, N.A., Memorandum by James Rorke, 3 May 1870, and encl., statement of Mkulumba, 24 February 1870.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ C.O. 179/29, P.R.O.: Minutes, Merivale and Newcastle, regarding Pine to Newcastle, D. 38, 3 June 1853.

¹⁰⁷ S.N.A. 1/1/5, Draft, Circular to Magistrates, 17 August & 15 September 1854.

to KwaZulu.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Pine and Shepstone detailed Natal's continued insecurities to both the Cape Governor and British Secretary of State for Colonies. They pleaded for additional cavalry to no avail.

During the 1856 civil war in KwaZulu two of Mpande's sons, Mkhungo and Sikhotha as well as their mother, Monase escaped to Natal Colony.

Mkhungo became a useful pawn in the hands of Theophilus Shepstone.¹⁰⁹

On 6 June 1857 accompanied by Pine, Shepstone rode to Bishopstowe and formally handed Mkhungo to Bishop John Colenso as guardian and trustee.¹¹⁰ Colenso had a clear understanding of the implications of this move. He commented upon it in the following terms:

*"If ever the British Government interferes, as I imagine some day it must, in the affairs of Zululand, a youth like this, civilised, and Christianised, would surely be the person whose claim would be most likely to receive our support, more especially as he is even now regarded, both by friends and foes, as the rightful successor to Mpande's authority."*¹¹¹

Shepstone was convinced that the British at Natal could easily break the

¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Pine and Shepstone detailed Natal's continued insecurities to the Cape Governor and Secretary of State. They pleaded for additional cavalry to no avail.

¹⁰⁹ C.O. 179/37, P.R.O: Sir George Grey to Earl Grey, D.5, 24 March 1855, encl. Pine to Grey, 23 March 1855, encl. Pine to Grey, 23 March 1855, R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 103.

¹¹⁰ W. Rees: Colenso – Letters from Natal, p. 42; C.O. 179/50, P.R.O.: Colenso to Gray, 9 October 1858, D.5, 17 July 1859.

¹¹¹ S.N.A. 1/6/3, N.A.: Colenso to Grey, 8 August 1857; S.P.S. Colenso to the Secretary, 8 August 1857, p.334.

authority of Mpande. Britain could weaken Zulu power by not allowing Zulu refugees to enter Natal. The civil war had caused several thousand of Zulus to seek asylum in Natal Colony. Shepstone feared worse consequences if Cetshwayo (Mpande's heir) became king.¹¹² If the would-be king murdered Mpande, the British at Natal would support the succession claims of either Mkhungo or Sikhotha. Shepstone also heard that Cetshwayo was plotting to kill Mkhungo and Sikhotha.¹¹³

In late June 1857 the British fears of the Zulu power continued, particularly when the civil war resumed within KwaZulu. A British trader north of Thukela, E.F. Rathbone, reported that Cetshwayo had assembled his Usuthu army to attack his cousin Hamu Ka Nzibe of Ngenetsheni.¹¹⁴ During the 1856 civil war Hamu had supported Cetshwayo against iZigqoza of Mbuyazi. His growing support and influence prompted Cetshwayo to drive him into Natal Colony. By 11 July 1857 the number of refugees was estimated at 4 000 men, women and children and 10 000 cattle.¹¹⁵ John Bird, Surveyor-General, reported

¹¹² S.N.A. 1/3/6, N.A.: Memo on Succession in Zulu Society, February 1850, V., p. 78.

¹¹³ S.N.A. 1/7/7, N.A.: Williams to Shepstone, 30 June 1857, enclosing Rathbone to Williams, 26 June 1857.

¹¹⁴ S.N.A. V3/6: Williams to Shepstone, 30 June 1857, encl. Rathbone to Williams, 26 January 1857.

¹¹⁵ S.N.A. 1/8/6: Shepstone to Williams, 3 July 1857.

that following the outbreak of the Zulu civil war Natal absorbed between 10 000 and 15 000 new Zulus.¹¹⁶ Shepstone accepted that Natal would accept the refugees, but announced their apprenticeship to white farmers. He could only notify KwaZulu's white traders that it was unsafe for them to remain in Zulu country.¹¹⁷

In an attempt to placate the British and to frustrate Hamu, Cetshwayo sent emissaries to present Scott with a gift of 200 oxen. The emissaries announced that the would-be king had gathered all the cattle to compensate the traders, and that he wanted a British Resident to reside with him.¹¹⁸ They also claimed that such a Resident could convey messages and give advice to Cetshwayo. At the same time Mpande's emissaries reported to Shepstone that Cetshwayo was plotting his death.¹¹⁹ As a result, Shepstone intensified his support for Mpande. He declined Cetshwayo's gift of 200 oxen and signalled that he recognised Mpande as the sole Zulu authority.¹²⁰ Shepstone said nothing about the requested "White Chief", but chided Cetshwayo for driving thousands of Mpande's subjects into Natal. He claimed the cattle offered to the traders were

¹¹⁶ S.N.A. 1/1/7: Shepstone to Resident magistrate Durban, 10 August 1857.

¹¹⁷ S.N.A. 1/3/6: Blaine to Shepstone, 29 July 1857; S.N.A. 1/1/7, N.A., Shepstone to Resident Magistrate Umhlali, Thukela Division, County Victoria, 13 August 1857.

¹¹⁸ S.N.A. 1/6/3, N.A., Message from Cetshwayo, 17 July 1857.

¹¹⁹ S.N.A. 1/6/2: Message from Mpande, 20 July 1857.

¹²⁰ S.N.A. 1/1/7: Reply to Mpande, 20 July 1857, S.N.A. 1/6/3, N.A., Reply to Cetshwayo, 17 July 1857.

insufficient.¹²¹ To further threaten Cetshwayo, Shepstone sent Jojo, a Natal chieftain, to Nodwengu to proclaim the British support for Mpande.

In November 1857, however, Mpande and Cetshwayo reached a formal reconciliation. The would-be king agreed to end all fighting in return for Mpande's pledge to share power.¹²² Cetshwayo informed the British as follows:

*"It was ruled that Panda was still competent to think, but that he was now too old to move. Thenceforth, therefore, Panda was to be "the head" of the nation, and Ketchwago "the feet". All important matters of State were first to be carried to Masiphula (the Prime Minister) and Ketchwago; and then to be referred to Panda for final sanction".*¹²³

In early January 1858 Mpande's emissaries, Gebhula and Gambushe informed the British that Masiphula reportedly told Mpande either to renounce his throne or face death. Masiphula was reported to have demanded that Mpande divide his kingdom into three parts, granting Mkhungo the area closest to Natal, himself the middle and Cetshwayo the north.¹²⁴ At the king's palace Hamu and other princes were reported to have proclaimed Cetshwayo king. These allegations and reports

¹²¹ S.N.A. 1/6/3: Memo by Shepstone, N.D., 20 July 1857.

¹²² S.P.G.: Colenso to Hawkings, 5 April 1861, Letters Received, Natal 1860-7; S.N.A. 1/7/3, N.A., Memo by Shepstone, 24 August 1857.

¹²³ S.N.A 1/6/2, N. A., Messages 5 & 6 January 1858; R.J. Mann: The Colony of Natal, p. 31.

prompted Shepstone in February 1858 to insist on compensation for the traders. He informed the would-be king that he expected a settlement as speedily as possible.¹²⁵ Such moves were strengthened by an instruction to John Dunn to collect the cattle. Shepstone's problem was not only to gain reinforcements, but to persuade Natal's overseers to accept the idea of a British-controlled KwaZulu.¹²⁶ This depended on support from the High Commissioner and Secretary of State.

In March 1859 the civil war resumed in KwaZulu when chief Sihayo of Qungebeni attacked the adherents of Mazungeni and Dikida for having assisted Mkhungo's flight to Natal.¹²⁷ Shepstone had always believed that Mpande lived only because of the presence of Mkhungo and Sikhotha in Natal. Many of the Zulus loyal to Mpande sought refuge in the Klip River District. With the assistance of Cetshwayo, Sihayo led his regiments to the banks of Mzinyathi.¹²⁸ Natal's security was threatened as refugees organised for a counter-attack. White colonists in the vicinity of

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* Message of 6 February 1858, encl. In Kelly to Shepstone, 6 February 1858.

¹²⁵ S.N.A. 1/1/8, N.A. Dunn to Shepstone, 26 February 1858, S.N.A., 1/6/2, Mpande to Scott, 25 February 1858.

¹²⁶ D. Welsh: *The Roots of Segregation*, pp. 121-4; S.N.A. 1/8/3, N.A. Shepstone to Secretary of State for Colonies, 9 February 1858, encl. in Scott to Labouchere, D. 8, 10 February 1858.

¹²⁷ C.O. 179/50, P.R.O.: Scott to Lytton, D. 77, 6 December 1858, enc. Extract, minutes of the Executive Council, 20 November 1858.

¹²⁸ S.N.A. 1/1/9, N.A., J.W. Shepstone to Shepstone, 16, 18, 22 & 24 April and 4 & 7 May 1859.

Mzinyathi fled to the Drakensberg (uKhahlamba), while the Utrecht Voortrekkers retreated to a laager.¹²⁹

Shepstone took defensive steps by ordering the Resident Magistrates to exercise the strictest surveillance over all refugees. He made arrangements with the Border Agent, Walmsley, to send spies across the Thukela to ascertain Cetshwayo's intentions.¹³⁰ Shepstone, he claimed, was not to threaten the would-be king, but to stop border violations. Cetshwayo withdrew into the interior and prepared his own invasion force.¹³¹ Shepstone admitted that he could not prevent the would-be king from resuming hostilities. The British Colonial establishment in Natal lacked the means to control Cetshwayo's offensives. The High Commissioner, Sir George Grey, was incensed that the British had even considered becoming entangled in Zulu matters.¹³² He cautioned Natal authorities to merely exert their influence in KwaZulu without running risks of incurring responsibilities or being drawn into extra-territorial hostilities.¹³³ In June 1859 Cetshwayo apologised to the British in Natal

¹²⁹ S.N.A. 1/3/8: Rorke to Kelly, encl. in Kelly to Shepstone, 11 April 1859.

¹³⁰ S.N.A. 1/8/7, N.A., Walmsley to Hepstone, 9 May 1859, encl. Shepstone to Walmsley, 19 May 1859.

¹³¹ C.O. 179/5, P.R.O.: Shepstone to J.W. Shepstone, 11 April 1859.

¹³² S.N.A. 1/1/9, N.A.: J.W. Shepstone to Shepstone, 13 & 19 May and 3 June 1859.

¹³³ Le. Cordeur: Relations, p. 88; S.N.A. 1/1/9, N.A., Grey to Scott, 23 December 1858.

for the disturbances that he and Sihayo had caused. This was prompted by the fact that Mpande had asked Scott to stop Cetshwayo's belligerency.¹³⁴

The would-be king alluded to the reports that:

*"the Governor had determined and actually given orders for an armed force to cross into the Zulu country to destroy Cetshwayo."*¹³⁵

Cetshwayo offered a gift of ten oxen and requested an interview with the Secretary for Native Affairs at the frontier. Shepstone accepted Cetshwayo's gift, sending word to Mpande that he was considering:

*"a mere visit for the purpose of acquiring information and facilitating the settlement of pending disputes in a peaceful manner."*¹³⁶

In late October 1859 Bishop Colenso and Rev. Robert Robertson visited both Mpande and Cetshwayo. They were from visiting Natal's Umlazi mission and Cetshwayo gave them permission to establish a mission at KwaMagwaza.¹³⁷ This convinced Colenso of the absurdity of Mkhungo and Sikhotha's claims to the kingship. The Bishop had mistakenly

¹³⁴ C.O. 48/395, P.R.O.: Scott to Grey, 9 June 1859, encl. in Grey to Lytton, D.66, 30 June 1859.

¹³⁵ S.N.A. 1/7/4, N.A., Message from Cetshwayo, 9 June 1859.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, Reply to Cetshwayo, 17 June 1859; *Ibid.*, memo by Shepstone, 18 June 1859.

¹³⁷ S.P.G.: Colenso to Hawkins, 6 September 1859, Letters received, Natal, 1853 - 9.

thought that Mkhungo had a legitimate claim to the kingship. After making acquaintances with Cetshwayo, the Bishop realised that supporting Mkhungo was counter-productive.¹³⁸ He wrote thus to his brother-in-law:

*"As the whole strength of the Nation lies with Cetshwayo, my efforts will be directed to try to bring the old King to acquiesce in the wish of the Nation. With Cetshwayo king, then much may be done, under God, for the advancement of the whole Zulu people."*¹³⁹

In September 1860 Grey arrived in Natal Colony to support a scheme to broaden Natal's influence in Zulu affairs. He did not detail in writing specifically what he had in mind, but acknowledged conferring with Shepstone at length.¹⁴⁰ Grey delayed to discuss his ideas with Scott who was in England until February 1861. Grey asked the Colonial Office for permission to partition KwaZulu into three separately ruled areas.¹⁴¹ He proposed that Shepstone take control of Zulu territory closest to Natal Colony. In terms of this proposal Shepstone would also govern Natal's Zulu population. The rest of KwaZulu was to be divided between

¹³⁸ N.A.: Colenso to Bunyon, 8 November 1859, Colenso Collection.

¹³⁹ S.P.G.: Charles S. Grubbe to Hawkins, Bishopstone, 7 February 1860, V, ES, Missionary Reports.

¹⁴⁰ C.O. 48/408, P.R.O: Grey to Newcastle, separate, 21 July 1861; S.P.G.: Colenso to Hawkins, private, 7 September 1860.

¹⁴¹ S.P.G.: Colenso to Hawkins, 10 October 1860.

Mkhungo and Cetshwayo.¹⁴² Grey expected Mkhungo and Cetshwayo to collaborate with the British officers to adopt a system of taxation and police. In reality this was an imperialistic attempt to extend British Colonial territories.

Grey also proposed to extend the dominion of the Cape Colony as far north as Mzimkhulu River. This infuriated Scott because the territory between Mzimvubu and Mzimkhulu Rivers had already been ceded to Natal by the Mpondo chief Faku.¹⁴³ Scott realised that Grey intended to support the KwaZulu scheme only in return for Natal's support of the Cape frontier proposal. Nevertheless, the new Secretary of State for Colonies, the Duke of Newcastle, warned against an extension of territory and pressed for a review of any definitive arrangements.¹⁴⁴

Newcastle's ruling meant the end of Shepstone's hopes for KwaZulu. His claims about Mkhungo and Colenso's support had nearly brought success. It was apparent that the Colonial Office would not co-operate. In early March 1861 Shepstone lamented:

"Sir George Grey seems to have now given up all idea of coming up here, and I am very much inclined to think all his

¹⁴² C.O. 48/407, P.R.O: Grey to Newcastle, D.10, 9 February 1861.

¹⁴³ S.P.G: Newcastle to Grey, D. 262, 4 May 1861; C.O. 48/407, P.R.O.: Grey to Newcastle, D.10, 9 February 1861.

¹⁴⁴ Le Cordeur: Relations, pp. 95 – 6; C.O. 48/407, P.R.O: Newcastle to Grey, D.262, 4 May 1861.

plans for the Zulu country will go to the wall."¹⁴⁵

On the other hand the would-be king had become suspicious of the intentions of the British in Natal. His confidential emissary inquired at Pietermaritzburg about the reports that Natal intended to seize some parts of KwaZulu.¹⁴⁶ The envoy expressed Cetshwayo's desire to remain on friendly terms and asked for Shepstone to come to KwaZulu to arrange a settlement between himself and Mpande.¹⁴⁷

It could therefore be argued that the British in Natal got into the ambit of Zulu politics in May 1861 when a message was sent to Mpande advising that he should take measures to formally recognise the succession of Cetshwayo.¹⁴⁸ The historian R.J. Mann argued that the British Colonial establishment had no wish to interfere with the internal arrangements of the Zulu people, but conceived that time had at length arrived when a better state of relations with the would-be king might be established to its advantage.¹⁴⁹ In the prosecution of this view Theophilus Shepstone was

¹⁴⁵ K.C.: Colenso to Allnutt, 5 March 1861, Folio 5, Colenso Papers; Colenso, *First Steps*, *passim*.

¹⁴⁶ S.P.G.: Robertson to Colenso, 31 October & 6 December 1860, *Missionary Reports*, 1860, V.E., p. 7.

¹⁴⁷ S.N.A. 1/3/6, N.A.: Fynn's "Diary", 13 & 27 April 1862, C.O. 48/462, P.R.O: Message from Cetshwayo, 11 March 1861, encl. In Barkly to Kimberley, D.130, 29 November 1872.

¹⁴⁸ R.J. Mann: *The Zulus and Boers of South Africa – a fragment of recent history*, p. 45.

¹⁴⁹ C.O. 179/59, P.R.O: Scott to Shepstone, 15 April 1861, encl. In Scott to Newcastle, D.43, 5 July 1861; R.J. Mann: *The Zulus and Boers of South Africa – a fragment of recent history*, pp. 47 – 48.

sent to Mpande and an assembly of the nation was called to the royal palace of Nodwengu where Cetshwayo was formerly announced heir-apparent.¹⁵⁰ This, however, did not dethrone Mpande as king of the Zulu people. Zulu tradition had it that a potentate could not be crowned while his father was still alive. While Shepstone was accompanied by his headmen Ngoza Ka Ludaba Majozi and Zashuka ka Mbeswa Ngubane, Mpande's consent to Cetshwayo being declared heir-apparent was witnessed by the royal councillors, Masiphula ka Mamba of Mgazini, Ntshingwayo ka Mahole Khoza and Sekethwayo ka Nhlaka Mdlalose.¹⁵¹

These circumstances confirmed Mpande as the most enduring of the Zulu kings. He showed the ability to grasp the changing realities of his position as head of the Zulu nation. As a diplomat he aimed at maintaining the reputation for friendship to colonial establishments by which he had been distinguished at the time of his elevation after the defeat of Dingane in 1840.¹⁵² Kennedy perceived this kind of diplomacy as follows:

"He [Mpande] pretended to be loyal to several White settler groups at the same time... At least, he manipulated Voortrekker groups and the British

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 47 – 48.

¹⁵¹ K.C.: Statement of Xubu son of Luduzo, 27 January 1912, Folio 40, Item 26; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, pp. 80 – 90; S.N.A. 1/7/5, N.A.; Memo by Shepstone, 21 November 1861.

¹⁵² R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, pp. 80 – 90; S.N.A. 1/7/5, N.A.; Memo by Shepstone, 21 November 1861.

against their better interests, while instilling the erroneous impression that the Zulu kingdom survived only through their specific support."¹⁵³

Another view could be put that Mpande's maintenance of cordial ties with the British was aimed at protecting his wives and sons who had been given asylum at Natal.¹⁵⁴ The British then exploited their presence to obtain cattle from Mpande. Nevertheless, Mpande's diplomacy helped to allay the British colonial fears of the Zulu kingdom. The years of Mpande's reign marked an era of co-operation and interdependence between the Zulu kingdom and the British at both Natal and the Cape Colony.

¹⁵³ P.A. Kennedy: "Mpande and the Zulu kingship", Journal of Natal and Zulu history, Vol. 4, p. 71.

¹⁵⁴ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande Ka Senzangakhona, p. 104.

CHAPTER SIX

MPANDE'S ACQUAINTANCE WITH CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES

The encounter between Mpande and Christian missionaries was presaged by sporadic attacks on mission stations by Dingane in 1838. After the Retief massacre, Dingane grew strong in audacity and hatred of the White people.¹ He sent his numerous warriors (*amabutho*) to Natal where the American Board Mission was stationed. The Rev. David Lindley, the only one of the Americans remaining, sought refuge in a ship in the harbour - The Comet.² During this raid every house at the Port was destroyed by fire and all the dwellers banished or killed, including the missionaries at Umlazi.

On 16 December 1837 the Zulu amabutho in battle array attacked the Dutch "laagers" or defences - the first at Ncome and subsequently at Weenen and Blaauwkrantz.³ The Dutch were victors and as they had vowed that if they gain victory, they would build a house to the Lord, the

¹ M.W.T. Gray: Stories of the early American Missionaries in South Africa, p. 23.

² Ibid., p. 23.

³ Ibid., p. 23.

Dutch Reformed Church in Pietermaritzburg was eventually erected in fulfilment of this vow.⁴ It is now being used as a Voortrekker museum. The 16th of December was kept as a holy anniversary of a remarkable victory, and was for a long period known as “Dingaan’s Day” in South Africa.

The battle of Ncome on 16 December 1838 enfeebled the Zulu power for a whole generation. As the Zulu amabutho receded, the Christian missionaries returned.⁵ From one point of view the omens were propitious. Dingane’s successor, Mpande, was not negatively disposed to missionary work. He gave Aldin Grout permission to settle near the royal village of Inkanyezi, but this favour was capricious and short-lived.⁶

The early Christianisation of the Zulu people and other Africans living in Natal, however, may largely be attributed to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.⁷ They were more familiarly known as the American Board. The Board began to look to Africa as a field for

⁴ D.J. Kotze: The work of the American Board in Zululand. Cf. Archive Yearbook for South African History, Vol. XXI, 1, 1958, pp. 203 - 259.

⁵ E.H. Brookes: A Century of Missions in Natal and Zululand, p. 3.

⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

⁷ R.Sales (Ed): Adventuring with God: the story of the American Board Mission in South Africa, p. 11.

missionary work in 1825.⁸ At its annual meeting the American Board passed a resolution authorising the Prudential Committee to:

*"Admit dependants of Africa into the foreign Mission School with a view to their preparation for missionary labours on the coast of Africa."*⁹

At the same meeting recommendations were made for the establishment of a foreign mission school with the object of educating African youth in order that they might qualify to become useful missionaries, physicians, schoolmasters, surgeons, or interpreters. They were also to communicate to the non-believers, the so-called "heathen", such knowledge of agriculture and the arts, as might prove the means of promoting Christianity and Western civilisation.¹⁰ This recommendation did not materialise, because experience showed that it was impossible to attempt such education away from the African environment.¹¹ The school was therefore short-lived.

At the close of 1848, however, the mission numbered eight stations, i.e. Umlazi, or rather Amanzimtoti, Umvoti, Inanda, Imfume, Umsunduze,

⁸ J.D. Taylor: One Hundred years of the American Board Mission in South Africa, 1835 – 1935, p. 17.

⁹ M. Whisson and M. West (Eds): Religion and social change in Southern Africa – anthropological essays in honour of Monica Wilson, pp. 165 – 170.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 169.

¹¹ R. Sales (Ed): Advertising with God – the story of the American Board Mission in South Africa, p. 12; J. Du Plessis: A History of Christian Missions in South Africa, p. 78.

AmaHlongwa, Ifafa, and Umkhambathi (Table Mountain). There were similarly eight ordained missionaries, i.e. Rev. Dr Newton Adams, Aldin Grout, Daniel Lindley, Alfred Bryant, Lewis Grout, Martin Kinney, James Rood and Samuel Marsh.¹² The missionaries were subsequently increased by the addition of Rev. John Ireland in February 1849 and Messrs. Abraham, Tyler and Wilder in July of the same year. Abraham was appointed to commence a new station at Maphumulo. Mr. Wilder was designated to the charge of the printing press at Umbilo.¹³ In September 1850, however, he took charge of a new station at Umthwalume, about 120,75 km southwest of Port Natal.¹⁴ The spread of Christianity at that time had the full blessings of Mpande and the council of Chiefs (amakhosi). It must be mentioned that not all missionaries necessarily got Mpande's approval. Mpande hoped to make them a buffer between his kingdom and the Colonial establishments in Natal.

It could be argued, however, that the establishment of the Christian church had been the foremost responsibility of the early missionaries. As early as 1836 Rufus Anderson of the American Board, along with Henry Venn of the Anglican Church Missionary Society, had enunciated a motto of mission policy, the three-selves theory:

¹² L. Grout (Rev.): Zululand, or life among the Zulu Kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, p. 219.

¹³ Ibid., p. 219

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 219

*"Self-support; self-government; self-propagation."*¹⁵

This was the mandate of the mission, but in KwaZulu, as in many other mission fields, the goal often seemed to be receding rather than approaching. This became apparent in the annual report of the American board's mission for 1860.¹⁶ Mr. Bridgeman reported:

*"Though we had no success, that would not diminish our obligation, or relieve us of our duty, to preach the gospel. Though there had been no converts, though our discouragements were increased a hundredfold, though the heathen were, if possible, more depraved than they now are, so long as we have the command, 'Go ye into all the world...' we would desire cheerfully to continue our work and leave results with God."*¹⁷

Contrary to the above statement one could argue that there were, though intermittent, Zulu converts (known as Amakholwa) of the same mission and others as early as 1845. The strategy of winning the Zulu nation en masse to Christianity through Mpande's court did bear fruits. The following table represents the average size of the Sabbath audiences, of

¹⁵ R. Sales (Ed): Adventuring with God – the story of the American Board Mission in South Africa, p. 89.

¹⁶ L. Grout Rev.: Zululand, or life among the Zulu Kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, pp. 225 – 226.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 225 – 226.

the schools and churches at several American Board mission stations in the Colony of Natal and KwaZulu about 1845:

| | Sabbath Congregations | Learners | Church Members |
|----------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Amanzimtoti | 120 | 40 | 47 |
| AmaHlongwa | 36 | 07 | 02 |
| Esidumbini | 45 | 14 | --- |
| Ifafa | 40 | 10 | 03 |
| Imfume | 77 | 32 | 30 |
| Inanda | 82 | 16 | 51 |
| Maphumulo | 40 | 12 | 01 |
| Table Mountain | 14 | --- | 02 |
| Umvoti | 210 | 40 | 50 |
| Umsunduzi | 50 | 16 | 51 |
| Umthwalume | 85 | 32 | 15 ¹⁸ |

While the fundamental ethical, metaphysical and social ideas of the Zulu people were disputed by doctrines preached by the missionaries, Mpande repeatedly and earnestly requested that at least one missionary reside near him.¹⁹ Much as one might concur with the fact that the Zulu people were devoid of organised religion which might prove a bulwark against the evangelisation process, Mpande's acceptance of the missionaries was

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 225

¹⁹ G.E. Cery (Ed): The Diary of the Rev. Francis Owen, M.A., Missionary with Dingaan in 1837-8.

mainly diplomatic. He could not display bellicose tendencies while still at an embryonic stage of consolidating his kingdom. Aldin Grout of the American Board Mission wrote of his new location:


*"In travelling from Natal (Durban) to Umlambongwenya by two different routes, I have neither seen nor heard of a place where so great a population is accessible as here. Thirty-seven villages are near enough to be collected for worship upon the Sabbath. The country here is one which the Natives like to occupy... I will only say that I am, single-handed, about a hundred miles from a fellow labourer, and the same distance from anybody that I can call civilised, in the midst of a nation which, if it does not ask for teachers, will not throw the least obstacle in their way."*²⁰

Aldin Grout, however, had little respect for Mpande whom he felt the people laughed at, but he was mistaken to think that Mpande was feeble. It was Grout's own feelings about Mpande that might have contributed to the distrust in which Mpande began to hold him. He boasted:

*"Some Zulus say openly that if Mpande does not treat them well, they will just walk off, or move their village upon my place, taking it for granted if they are upon the station, they are out of the way of Zulu authority."*²¹

²⁰ M.W.T. Gray: Stories of the early American Missionaries in South Africa, p. 22.

²¹ L. Grout Rev.: Zululand, or life among the Zulu kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, pp. 228 – 230., A.E. Cubbin: Empangeni Annals – aspects of the 19th Century, Vol. ii, pp. 15 – 17.



MISSION STATIONS IN MPANDE'S TIME, C. 1871

Grout appeared to have miscalculated on the nature of Mpande's authority in KwaZulu and his (Grout's) own influence over the local Zulu population. From the king downward, he thought that the Zulus stood in perfect fear of the white people.

Rev. Grout expressed repugnance to polygamy and witchcraft practised by the Zulu people. To the northeast of the Thukela inkosi Mfungumfu Dube embraced Christianity while his sons, Siyazana and Mqiko abhorred its spread in KwaZulu.²² They objected to Grout's vehement opposition to the traditional modus vivendi of the Zulu people. This further contributed despondency between Mpande and Grout. Suddenly, on the night of 25 July 1842, uDlambedu ibutho from Mpande surrounded and attacked the nearest Zulu dwellings at the mission stations.²³ Grout watched in astonishment and then gathered a minority of Zulu converts to flee with him southwards beyond Thukela river. They eventually settled on the northern banks of the Umvoti.²⁴ With this episode ended the American Board's work in KwaZulu north of Thukela. Following the mission of the American Board in KwaZulu, the oldest and largest was the Wesleyan Methodist Society. In 1849 they had five mission stations in the field: Rev. Holden at Port Natal, Henry Parkinson

²² Missionary Herald, 1943, p. 77

²³ Ibid., p. 78.

²⁴ R. Sales (Ed): Adventuring with God – the story of the American Board Mission in South Africa, p. 17.

at Pietermaritzburg. Rev. Thomas Jenkins at Palmerston (among Faku's people in Pondoland), Indaleni and Verulem.²⁵ Mpande did not object to the evangelization of Africans south of Thukela. Many converts also abandoned Zulu law and customs. These Africans were not necessarily part of the Zulu kingdom.

The Norwegian Mission was commenced by Rev. Hans Schreuder in 1845 near the present town of Empangeni. Not fully contented with the prospects of this field, and finding Mpande opposed to his evangelisation mission in KwaZulu, he left in 1847.²⁶ In 1854 he came back and commenced a new station at Ntumeni, among the sources of the Matigulu, about 40 kms from the sea. Rev. Ommund Oftebro had opened a station at Empangeni, a branch of the Mhlathuze river.²⁷ Of all missionaries who came to KwaZulu in Mpande's time, the Norwegians sought closer ties with the Zulu royalty. Their principal aim was to meet the audience with what represented the most essential points of their Christian message, namely the gospel of a new life and salvation in Christ.²⁸ In 1854 Rev. Schreuder met queen Langazana at Esiklebheni palace of Mpande.²⁹ He reported:

²⁵ L. Grout Rev.: Zululand, or life among the Zulu Kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, pp. 238 – 239.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 240.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 241.

²⁸ Natal Witness, 27 March 1852, p. 14.

²⁹ Queen Langazana was Senzagakhona's wife and king Mpande's step-mother.

*"... My visit to her was used, as usual,
through conversation to present to her
and her companions the path of truth..."³⁰*

When he visited Mpande's Nodwengu palace shortly afterwards, Schreuder recorded that:

*"... as usual there was, at the royal kraal,
no lack of opportunities to speak with
individuals of any rank of the thing
necessary..."³¹*

Contact between members of Mpande's household and the Norwegian missionaries took place on three main categories of situations, i.e. public preaching, instruction and conversation. This was either in private or in the presence of the council of chiefs (amakhosi).³²

In a number of ways different members of Mpande's household took an interest in the religious preaching. This was often motivated mainly by a wish for better knowledge of what the missionaries stood for.³³ The principles of autocratic rule as practiced by king Shaka had, at the time of Mpande, become more pliable, and the king's freedom to make decisions depended on approval from the council of chiefs (amakhosi) and

³⁰ Missionary Herald, 5 May 1854, p.15; K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 53, Evidence of Mqayikana, 12 November 1897, pp. 66 - 69.

³¹ P. Hernaes and J. Simensens: The Zulu kingdom and the Norwegian Missionaries, 1845 - 1880, pp. 6 - 9; Natal Witness, 27 May 1854, p. 10.

³² C.O. 879/2/5: Papers on Native Affairs, p. 122.

³³ S.N.A. 1/3/9: Alland to Shepstone, 30 July 1860.

conformity with traditional usage.³⁴ In the 1840's Rev. Schreuder discovered that the most compact resistance to his requests came, not from Mpande personally, but from his council of chiefs.³⁵ Rev. Schreuder gave a report to the home constituency in early 1846 stating that:

*"... they (the Chiefs) and other great men of the country originally were the ones to make the most resolute stand against the proclamation of the Gospel in their country."*³⁶

Although the Norwegian missionaries pervadingly enjoyed a good measure of freedom to preach in Mpande's palaces, they were, when it came to the effects of their preaching, by no means granted free scope. From time to time, and with a few of the royal family, however, a more active interest in the message of the missionaries arose.³⁷ In the case of Mpande himself, his most positive period appeared to have been the tense years from the 1856 battle of Ndondakusuka until prince Cetshwayo, by the mid 1860's seemed to have secured his position as heir apparent.³⁸ This positiveness was expressed in willingness to comply with many of the missionary requests, but there are few indications auguring that he

³⁴ K.C. Stuart Papers, File 89, Notebook 34, Evidence of Nkukwana, 1 October 1900, pp. 2 - 6.

³⁵ ABC 15:4:7: Schreuder to Oftebro, 27 November 1853.

³⁶ Rev. H. Schreuder: Nogle Ord til Norges Kirke om christelig Pligt med Hensyn til Omsorg for ikkechristne Medbrodres Salighed, p. 249.

³⁷ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 9, Notebook 3, Evidence of Xubu, 29 November 1909.

³⁸ C.O. 179/43, P.R.O.: Schreuder to Walmsley, 21 November 1856, encl. in Scott to Labouchere, D.9, 16 December 1856.

was more seriously attracted by the message itself.³⁹ As far as the last seven to eight years of his reign are concerned, Mpande's relationship to the missionaries should be representatively illustrated by the following abstract from a letter by Rev. Schreuder written in March 1865:

"... Three times Wetlergreen and I saw the king. And with the king's consent I left to Wetlergreen the continual medical treatment of some wounds on one of the king's feet. The well-being of the king's soul also weighs heavily and intensively on my mind. There was a time of my knowing him when his heart was more like an open gullet of teeth of ferocious animals and like a hard unascendable rock. What a different man he is now when you can speak the truth to him; - he apparently listening calmly and docilely. When, after ending the conversation I bade him farewell, I said I would pray for him. He seemed so grateful and repeated empathically: "Yes, pray to God for me..." Poor, powerless Mpande! How often has he not heard the Gospel since my last seeing him in April 1863! But even on this occasion I only managed during the conversation here and there to scatter something of the truth in Christ..."⁴⁰

With other members of the Zulu royal house the missionaries occasionally experienced more distinct expressions of an interest in their

³⁹ D.H. Spohr (Ed): The Natal Diaries of Dr. W.H.I. Bleak, 1855 - 1856, p. 59.

⁴⁰ Rev. H. Schreuder: Nogle Ord til Norges Kirke om christelig Pligt med Hensyn til Omsorg for ikkechristne Medbrodres Saligheid, p. 258

message. Thus, Rev. Schreuder already in 1854, reported from a visit with queen Monase at Nodwengu, at which the missionary message was presented not only by preaching or discussions, but also by singing:

"...Umunase was, as usual, friendly, entertaining, interrogative, and pretty begging. And I gave her of my supplies, i.e. the truths of the Word of God. We had rainy weather on the day of my visiting her, and therefore we stayed in a big hut in which several of the royal children, servants and the personnel from the kraal came to gather. The queen recounted much of what I some 11/2 years ago had taught them in her kraal, Ekulweni, and asked for some information wanting also to listen to our songs again. I therefore started to sing some hymns, which I had to repeat until all the audience started to sing along and we eventually formed a real chorus. First I recited the words, and made the meaning clear to them, and then we sang together."⁴¹

On the same occasion Rev. Schreuder also reported having conversed with some "grown-up" royal princes who came to him daily and were his attentive listeners.⁴² These representatives of the Zulu royalty are known to have worshipped on the mission stations or to have come to receive instruction there.

⁴¹ Missionary Herald, 20 July 1865, p. 14; S.N.A. 1/1/6, N.A.: Shepstone to Schreuder, 26 December 1856.

⁴² C.O. 48/380, P.R.O.: Shepstone to Scott, 8 December 1856, encl. in Grey to Labouchere, D.4, 16 January 1857.

Not least, the message of the missionaries seemed to have gained the ear of some of the female members of Mpande's household.⁴³ For instance, in 1860 Schreuder reported from a visit to the palace of Mpande's mother, queen Songiya:

*"...One day when I visited the king's mother, Usongiya, in the kraal of Umlambongwenya, a group of people soon gathered in her big house, among whom were also several of the princesses. A religious discussion soon developed and questions were asked (notably by one of the princesses) on the issues of death, resurrection, and what is therewith connected..."*⁴⁴

Some months later he wrote thus about his visit to the same palace:

"...Usongiya, the king's old mother, who is the head of this kraal has, since my first stay in this kraal some nine years ago, changed as much as it is possible for a person who is not yet converted in point of listening to the preaching of God's Word. Also two of the princesses who, for long, have been attentive listeners as often as the Word has been preached in this kraal, seem inclined to accept the Gospel and to believe... These two princesses, Usigagayi and Ubekiwe, of very, one could almost say, beautiful

⁴³ Natal Mercury, "Proceedings of the Natal Missionary Conference, Durban, 1878", 4 November 1878, pp. 25 - 6.

⁴⁴ R.L. Cope: Christian Missions and Independent African Chiefdoms in the 19th Century, p.51; Natal Witness, 27 May 1860, p.8.

appearance are hereby committed to your warm and continual prayers... "45

Among the male members of Mpande's household, the reports of the Norwegian missionaries from this period give the names of only three princes who took an extraordinary interest in contact with the missionaries and their message.⁴⁶ The first was prince Shingana of Cetshwayo's Ondini palace of whom Rev. Ommund Oftebro wrote in 1864:

"...Several of the young princes - there were, I think, six of them present - proved especially attentive, and afterwards they wanted to discuss what they had heard. One of them in particular, uShingana, proved not only to possess a knowledge of the basic tenets of Christianity which highly surprised me, but he spoke of it with such earnestness that one would think he not only knew the Word of God, but was also affected by it... "47

A prince whose interest in the missionaries seemed to have been aroused more by their knowledge in reading and writing than by their religious message was Mgidlana. In 1869 Rev. H.K. Leisegang wrote:

⁴⁵ Rev. H. Schreuder: Nogle Ord til Norges kirke om Christelig Pligt med Hensyn til Omsorg for ikkechristne Medbrodres Salighed, p.263.

⁴⁶ Renegade royal princes in Natal were not included.

⁴⁷ Natal Witness, 27 October 1864, p.18; J. du Plessis: A History of Christian Missions in South Africa, pp. 79 - 84; ABC 15:4:8: Hance to Clarke, 10 September 1868.

"...Also a younger prince (Umgidlane) showed, in the first months of this year, a particular interest for the book... He even came with a group (of 6 - 8 mates of the same age) saying that he wanted to funda (be taught)... Again and again he came back in order to learn. And when I once came to him in the kraal of Umdumezala [sic] in order to celebrate Sunday, he regretted that his hut could house only a few. But when having become greater himself he would build a bigger house to have services in. Unfortunately my contact with him was discontinued when he, in April, was called to Ondini. But several times he was sent friendly greetings to me saying that he was still fond of books asking also for one for repetition..."⁴⁸

Prince Dabulamanzi represented the most distinct expression of a positive attitude to the gospel exerted by Zulu princes. He was Mpande's son whose homestead was not far from Entumeni mission. In 1871 Schreuder rendered a rather detailed report of his relation to the missionaries and their message.⁴⁹ He said:

"...Our neighbour, prince Udabulamanzi, seems lately to have taken a most peculiar attitude to the truth in Christ. This, in particular, became visible when I, on my way home from Umbonambi and Empangeni in early September, visited the prince's kraal of Undi in which I also met this prince. In connection with two longer

⁴⁸ N.A. Norwegian Papers, Folio 4/3: Schreuder to Oftebro, 19 August 1868; Missionary Herald, 28 October 1870, pp. 12 - 16.

⁴⁹ C.O. 179/43, P.R.O.: Schreuder to Walmsely, 24 November 1871.

*sermons of mine - relating to the grief in the royal house because of the deaths of prince Usilwane, Ukekjwayo's full-brother, and his mother Unkumtaze, and dealing with death, judgement and resurrection to felicity or eternal damnation, he in the presence of chiefs and queens expressed himself in the most peculiar and unexpected way... a whole company of us went over to his main kraal Ezulwini to experience there what has probably never been seen or heard of here in Zululand, - i.e. an abdicated Zulu of the royal house shedding tears when conversing of God and the matters of His kingdom - a conversation in which the prince himself took a most independent part. None of the other royal children understand him except Ubatonjile."*⁵⁰

During the period of Mpande's reign the Norwegian missionaries in KwaZulu referred to two of Mpande's daughters as displaying an extraordinary interest in and a positive attitude to the missionary message. These were Bathonyile and Nokwenda.⁵¹ They were queen Monase's daughters and full-sisters to prince Mbuyazi. The two were among the royal children gathered in queen Monase's palace in order to listen to Schreuder's preaching and singing. In 1868 Wetlergreen wrote a letter from Mahlabathini which described Bathonyile's positive attitude to the missionaries. He stated:

⁵⁰ Rev. H. Schreuder: Nogle Ord til Norges Kirke om Christelig Pligt med Hensyn til Omsorg for ikkechristne Medbrodres Salighed, p. 263.

⁵¹ N.A. Norwegian Papers, Folio 4/3: Schreuder to Oftebro, 19 August 1868; Missionary Herald, 28 May 1869, p. 13.

"...The name of Batonjile, the King's daughter, will be one of the best known from here. I suppose she will be on the list of those referred to in his time by the Right Reverend the Bishop Colenso as the first in the royal family to lend a more open ear to the Word of God than usual... Almost always she has shown me her interest in speaking of God's Word although this wish often has been rather subdued. For a long time she has declared she no longer believes in amathlozi..."⁵²

Princesses Bathonyile and Nokwenda had regular instruction by the missionaries at Mahlabathini. This took place in Mpande's palace and on the mission station.⁵³ In 1870 princess Bathonyile uttered a wish "to come and live on the station... She would no longer pay heed to the king. It is fear of the Prince (Cetshwayo) that binds her..."⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the Norwegian missionaries were disappointed in their hopes. Bathonyile finally got married off to an inkosi (chief) of the Mthethwa clan.⁵⁵ As a widow she is known to have lived for some years not far from Eshowe where Rev. Stavem went to see her on several occasions. Stavem recorded:

⁵² M. Whisson and M. West (Eds): Religion and social change in Southern Africa - anthropological essays in honour of Monica Wilson, pp. 170 - 177.

⁵³ ABC 15:4:7: Wilder to Anderson, 27 November 1862.

⁵⁴ S.N.A. 1/3/9: Allard to Shepstone, 30 July 1869.

⁵⁵ Natal Mercury, "Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafirs in the District of Natal, 1853", 30 July 1854, pp. 13 - 15.

"... that she still loved the Word of God, but she had now become so dull and was no longer able to make any definite decisions..."⁵⁶

Mpande appreciated the medical expertise of the Norwegian missionaries.

They helped him cure his sporadic gout sickness.

The Berlin Mission in the Colony of Natal and KwaZulu dates from the year 1847 when two missionaries of that society, Rev. Döhne and Posselt, came from the interior over the Ukhahlamba and commenced operations in KwaZulu with permission from Mpande.⁵⁷ They founded two stations, one called Emmaus, at the Ukhahlamba, at the sources of the Thukela; and another, called New Germany near Pinetown, close to 20km from Port Natal.⁵⁸ The Hanoverian Mission had its origin (under Providence) in the zeal and energy of the pious pastor Harms at Hermannsburg, on the sources of the Inhlimbithi, one of the eastern branches of the Umvoti.⁵⁹ The Hanoverians, having obtained permission from Mpande, subsequently built six additional mission stations at Sterk Spruit, Ehlanzeni; Ethembeni on the Mpofana, Inyezane on a northeastern branch

⁵⁶ S.N.A. 1/3/9: Annual Report of Resident Magistrate Windham 1859; USPG folio D25: Callaway to Hawkins, 6 February 1863.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 242.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 243

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 243.

of the Matigulu, another on the Umlalazi, and another at Landela, near the Umkhumbane, a branch of the White Mfolozi.⁶⁰

The Anglican Mission in the Colony of Natal and KwaZulu began with the arrival of Bishop John Colenso on 20 May 1855. It could be argued that this was not their first attempt because in 1835 Capt. Allen F. Gardiner of the Royal Navy, got permission from Dingane to commence missionary operations.⁶¹ In 1856 Mpande recognised them and the Church of England Mission opened a station on the Umlazi with Dr. Adams as a missionary. In 1859 it established a station at KwaMagwaza, on some of the higher branches of Umhlathuze, between that and the Umfolozi, a place which Mpande gave the bishop for that purpose.⁶² The mission also had two other stations - one between the Ilovu and Umkhomazi, near the sea; the other, at Ladysmith, in the northern part of the Colony.⁶³

The Roman Catholic Mission was situated to the south-west of the Umkhomazi, and formed a centre from where the Roman Catholic, Dr. M.J.F Allard, and two or three priests were making some efforts to introduce their faith among the Zulus.⁶⁴ Mpande also permitted them to

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 246.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 247.

⁶² Ibid., p. 252.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 252.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 253.

start missionary work among the Zulu people. Common among all missionaries who came to KwaZulu were dreams of converting the Zulu nation en masse to Christianity.

But during Mpande's reign the Zulu people mostly adhered to traditional norms and values, believing that the spirits of the dead live long. Ancestral honour and the worship of the Supreme Being called Umvelinqangi were pre-eminent and education of children was merely informal, based on imitation and observation.⁶⁵

It could be argued, however, that while Mpande thought that missionaries might strengthen his political position, ordinary Zulus were frightened by the gospel that evoked terrors of damnation and hell. They were told that non-believers in Christianity would be thrown in a fiery furnace where they would burn eternally.⁶⁶ Zulus who became proselytes of the missionaries were pestered to recant by their neighbours.

Among the individuals who became proselytes was Mbulasi Makhanya, a widow, in 1845. She, together with Dr. Adams established the Amanzimtoti church.⁶⁷ She contributed to the rapid spread of Christianity in that she led prayer meetings and visited homes. This also hastened the

⁶⁵ G.R. Hance: The Zulu Yesterday and Today – twenty-nine years in South Africa, p. 112; Texts on Zulu Religion: traditional Zulu ideas about God. African Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 374.

⁶⁶ S.N.A 1/3/9: Annual Report of Resident Magistrate Windham, 1859.

⁶⁷ Missionary Herald, 1843, p. 77.

growth of a group of Zulu Christian proselytes called amakholwa (the believers).⁶⁸ Eleven months later Nembula, her 20-year-old son, was baptised at Amanzimtoti.⁶⁹ On 1 May 1847 Ntaba KaMadunjini was baptised. He was one of those who fled with Rev. Grout from Mpande's wrath in 1852. He became the first school teacher near Umvoti and used to visit homes on Sunday evenings to question them on the sermon.⁷⁰ They were joined by his wife Titisi and Mciko who broke with his family to join the Christian community. It could be stated that towards the end of the nineteenth century Rev. Grout had built the first school in the area known as Aldinville, which catered for primary education of Zulu Christian proselyte children. On completion they were allowed to proceed to Amanzimtoti school at Adams Mission of the American Board.⁷¹

In Mpande's time the Colonial establishments were viewed by the various Christian missionaries as super exploiters of the Zulu people.⁷² The attitude of the Voortrekkers towards Zulu Christian proselytes was best described by Rev. Grout who, in his report, said:

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 77.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

⁷⁰ Natal Witness, 27 March 1852, p. 4; J.D. Taylor: One Hundred Years of the American Board Mission in South Africa, 1835 – 1935, pp. 26 – 28.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 4; 29.

⁷² K.C.: Miscellaneous Missionary Papers, F. Owen, copy of an unaddressed letter, 26 April 1838, p. 288.

*"The Trekkers granted Umlazi and Imfume as places for mission stations, but they are now getting sick of it as they say the people on their places will always be leaving them that they may stop on the station and there be free (I would not speak it aloud enough for them to hear, but that seems to show what they want and intend, they want slaves)."*⁷³

One may argue and say that the antagonism of the Voortrekkers towards the proselytes was prompted by political ramifications evangelisation had on them. The proselytes demanded exemption from legal disabilities the colonial establishment at Port Natal imposed on the Zulu people.⁷⁴ In 1863 at Pietermaritzburg Johannes Khumalo retorted:

*"We have left the race of our forefathers; we have left the black race and have clung to the whites. We imitate them in everything we can. We feel we are in the midst of a civilised people, and that when we became converts to their faith we belonged to them..."*⁷⁵

These attitudes, however, seemed not to have deterred Mpande's attempts to use missionary connections to keep Colonial threats of invasion in check.

⁷³ ABC 15.4.2: A. Grout to Anderson, 2 September 1840, p. 332.

⁷⁴ S.N.A. 1/3/9: Allard to Shepstone, 30 July 1860.

⁷⁵ Natal Witness, 27 March 1863, pp. 2 – 5.

Negatively, it could be argued that a packaged Christianity in liturgy presentation, hymnody and organisation brought about ecclesiastical alienation among the Zulu people in Mpande's time. This largely frustrated all efforts at ecclesiastical indigenisation by the Zulu potentate, Mpande.⁷⁶

During the 1860's, in forms of religious expression the Christian Western 'civilisation' received greater considerations than the potential of the Zulu people and their traditions. With the emergence of the Zulu converts and the influence of Rev. Grout, Mpande's people stomached Christianity in spite of the differences between the Zulus and the Christian missionaries in approach to conversion. Rather than doctrine, the Zulus accentuated the existential value of the Christian message in their specific situation. One may conclude that Christianity had a deep Colonial disposition in as far as it became the "servant" of the British imperialists to facilitate colonial expansion. This manifested itself after Mpande's death in 1872 when Cetshwayo, Mpande's heir, succeeded as king.

⁷⁶ Missionary Herald, 1848, p. 70.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MPANDE AMIDST THE CIVIL WAR

A decade after Mpande had assumed power, there developed an unfortunate set of circumstances which resulted in the outbreak of what could be called the second "civil war" in KwaZulu in 1856. The question of Mpande's heir had not yet been settled.^{1*} This was symptomatic of many clans within KwaZulu and Natal.

The genesis of the wrangle in Mpande's palace has been a bone of contention among historians. J.Y. Gibson (1911); R.C.A. Samuelson (1929); Brookes and Webb (1965); B. Roberts (1974); Jeff Guy (1979); and C. Ballard (1980) concurred with R.R.R. Dhlomo (1951) and S.J. Maphalala (1985) that the main rivals to the succession were Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi.² King Shaka had a wife named Monase, the daughter of Mntungwa of the Nxumalo clan.³ He suspected Monase of being

¹ C.o. 48/380: Statement of John Dunn, 6 December 1856, encl. in Grey to Labouchere, D.4, 17 January 1857; W.C. Holden (Rev.): History of the Colony of Natal, p.247.

*"The first Zulu civil war took place in 1840 between Dingane and Mpande at Maqongqo"

² S.J. Maphalala: The participation of White settlers in the battle of Ndongakusuka, 2 December 1856, and its consequences up to 1861, pp.1 - 4.

³ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSensangakhona, pp. 59 - 60.

pregnant and presented her to Mpande. This was Shaka's tendency whose real motives could only be a matter of speculation. Thus, Monase became Mpande's honoured but not chief wife. She begat a son of Shaka called Mbuyazi, and gave birth to the following sons of Mpande, viz. Mkhungo, Mantantashiya and a girl named Bathonyile.⁴

Shortly afterwards Shaka sent a delegation to Tshana, chief (inkosi) of the Zungu clan to pay ilobolo (cattle given to girl's parents before wedding) for his daughter Ngqumbazi to become Mpande's first order wife. She begat Cetshwayo.⁵ Thus, Cetshwayo became heir to Mpande's throne according to Zulu customary law. In accordance with Zulu custom Monase was a commoner and her first born son, therefore, could not normally become heir. That honour was reserved for the eldest son of the king's 'Great Wife' whom he would choose later.⁶ In Mpande's case, however, Ngqumbazi was his first order wife and a princess. This eventually justified Cetshwayo's contention that he was entitled to claim the rights of succession.⁷

A few years later Mpande married Nomantshali kaSiguyana Ntuli of the Bheleni. She begat Mthonga and Mpande loved her more than his other

⁴ Ibid., p. 60.

⁵ Ibid., p. 61

⁶ F.N.C. Okoye: "The Zulu Now and Then", Journal of African history, Vol. 32, p. 93; K.C., Stuart Papers, "Notes on the life of Henry Francis Fynn", pp. 24 – 26.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 93, 24 – 26.

wives, including Ngqumbazi who was held in high esteem by the Zulu people.⁸ Mthonga, realising that his mother was perceived as Mpande's favourite, thought that the realities about succession were likely to favour him.⁹ Thus, Mpande had three sons who, because of his vacillation, posed as possible claimants to the throne.

To the Voortrekkers of the Transvaal Republic (especially in the Utrecht region) Mpande regarded Cetshwayo as his rightful successor.¹⁰ At his harem publicly announced that Mbuyazi was the heir because his mother was presented to him by Shaka.¹¹ On the other hand, according to oral tradition, Mpande whispered the name of Mthonga, Nomantshali's son.¹² The fact that Mpande had not yet named his 'Great Wife' (equivalent to Queen) complicated matters.

The progression of that state of incipient estrangement in the harem led to the organisation of an antagonistic faction favouring Mbuyazi. It was called iziGqoza.¹³ The word iziGqoza originated from Mbuyazi's adherents' war cry:

"laba! Laba! Laba bayoze basibone!"

⁸ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, p. 61.

⁹ F.N.C. Okoye: "The Zulu Now and Then", Journal of African history, Vol. 32, p. 95.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

¹¹ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Ucetshwayo, pp. 7 – 8.

¹² A.F. Hattersley: More Annals of Natal, p. 31; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, p. 61.

¹³ S.J. Mapthalala: The Participation of White Settlers in the battle of Ndongakusuka, 2 December 1856, and its consequences up to 1861, p. 1.

[These! These! These we shall fix them
up!]¹⁴

These words were accompanied by clattering of assegais and pointing in the direction of the “enemy”. Cetshwayo, enjoying a fairly large following of hot-blooded young men, assembled his adherents called Usuthu. The Usuthu faction got its name from beautiful cattle captured from Swaziland in 1852. Because Cetshwayo had fought bravely in that campaign these cattle were associated with him and became a symbol of Zulu pride.¹⁵

Nevertheless, Mpande’s skilful diplomacy displayed in handling Colonial establishments proved ineffective in forging unity among his envious sons. This also stigmatised his dignity as the reigning monarch. A king he was, one may argue, but political matters in the 1850’s were practically tabled before his sons Mbuyazi and Cetshwayo. Dhlomo argued that Mpande’s extrication from public affairs was also due to his ‘endless love’ for his wife, Nomantshali, with whom he spent long hours.¹⁶ Mtshapi, one of James Stuart’s informants pointed out that the abantwana (princes) were set on to fight by the king himself, who said:

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁶ R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, p. 63; S.N.A. 1/7/3, N.A.: Messages 21 November 1855 to 26 May 1856.

*"Makhasana rejoices; let him see his
rams butting each other."*¹⁷

Then he set them on by cutting war-shields for them from the hide of a slaughtered beast. For Mbuyazi he cut a shield from the side with the wounds in it; for Cetshwayo he cut one from the opposite side. This infuriated Cetshwayo. In November 1856 Mpande gave Mbuyazi and his adherents territory on the Thukela southern boundary of the kingdom.¹⁸ Pridmore said this was an attempt to gain support from Natal for his recognition of Mbuyazi.¹⁹ While Mbuyazi appealed to the colonial establishment in Natal, Cetshwayo enjoyed considerable support from the royal amabutho and the leading amakhosi (chiefs) Masiphula kaMamba and Maphitha kaSojiyisa of the Mandlakazi.²⁰ They saw in the conflict a chance to set up Cetshwayo as their own candidate for the throne. Upon this Mpande said:

*"Wewu! Go, Mbuyazi, cross the river
and go to the country of the English. I too
was brought to power by them."*²¹

Mbuyazi went and crossed the river at Dhlokweni. When he had reached the other side his brother, Mantantashiya turned and said:

¹⁷ J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Mtshapi, p. 61.

¹⁸ J. Pridmore: The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn – 1883, Vol. 1, p. 46.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

²⁰ P. Colenbrander: "Some aspects of the kingship of Mpande", pp. 6 – 7.

²¹ J.S.A., Vol.4, Evidence of Mtshapi, p. 61.

*"Why are you running away from one who is the same age as you? Is it because you listened to your father, who told you to go to the country of the English, saying that he too had been brought to power by the English? Are you going to become king by hiding among the English?"*²²

Mbuyazi turned back, for he listened to the word of Mantantashiya that he had been afraid and was running away from his brother Cetshwayo, and rejected the advice of his father. He turned back across the Thukela and went up the Ndulinde ridge.²³

Mbuyazi, however, realised the hopelessness of his position and moved towards the Thukela with the entire IziGqoza faction. Such a move was based on two reasons, i.e. a conflict was imminent and he hoped for a measure of support from the Colonial government of Natal, as Mpande had advised. Secondly, he would have placed his adherents within the reach of safety should the battle turn unfavourable for them. An emissary from Mbuyazi, on his way to Natal, informed Rathbone that Mpande had instructed Mbuyazi to solicit the assistance of the Colonial establishment and traders.²⁴ Mpande apparently felt that the traders, at least, were under an obligation to him for the protection which they had previously

²² S.N.A. 1/6/2, N.A.: Mpande to Scott, 20 July 1857; A.T. Bryant: *The Zulu People*, p. 421; G.M. Theal: *History of South Africa*, p. 251; J.Stuart and D. McK. Malcolm (Eds): *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, p. 79.

²³ J.S.A., Vol. II, Evidence of Mangoya kaMgejana, pp. 223-4.

²⁴ S.N.A. 1/1/5: Statement by E.F. Rathbone, 9 January 1857, p. 72.

received from him in KwaZulu. Mbuyazi had also previously been to Colony of Natal to visit Captain James Walmsely, whose Zulu name was Mantshonga (the man who walked rather strangely).²⁵ Walmsely was the British Border Agent.

Thus, the role of the Colonial establishment in Natal in the Zulu imbroglio could not be relegated to the background. Maphalala argued that the battle of Ndongakusuka which took place on 2 December 1856 between the IziGqoza and Usuthu factions was ignited by the Natal Colonial establishment.²⁶ The Colonial administrators entered the succession issue in an attempt to provide the Colony with additional land between the Thukela and Mhlathuze rivers. Maphalala said:

*"In 1855 the Natal government was faced with a problem of overcrowding in its 'native reserves'. In order to find an outlet for approximately 50 000 Zulus, it looked to the south of its colony... The Natal government subsequently focussed its attention on the greener pastures of Zululand [KwaZulu], ... This tract of land had long been the focal point of Whites from Natal."*²⁷

²⁵ S.J. Maphalala: The Participation of White Settlers in the battle of Ndongakusuka, 2nd December 1856, and its consequences up to 1861, p. 3; S.N.A. 1/1/5: Report of Commission to investigate the traders' claims, 17th January 1857.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

The Natal government therefore exploited Mpande's preference of Mbuyazi as his successor to the throne instead of Cetshwayo.²⁸ But Cetshwayo was preferred by the majority of the Zulus, while being negatively viewed by the Natal government, especially because of his avowed antagonism towards Whites.²⁹ On 15 November 1856 a meeting took place at Rathbone's house near the Msunduze river, where a delegation from Mpande reported that Masiphula kaMamba was Mbuyazi's adversary.³⁰ Rathbone suggested that Mbuyazi's delegation hold discussions with Captain Walmsley for possible military assistance. These talks ended in John Dunn "Jantoni" leading a contingent of 135 men in support of Mbuyazi.³¹ John Dunn was Captain Walmsley's interpreter and constable. Assured of military aid Mbuyazi went back to KwaZulu accompanied by John Dunn's men armed with Enfield rifles.³²

Maphalala argued:

*"It was hoped that the force from Natal with the advantage of superior weapons would boost the morale of the iziGqoza faction which was numerically smaller than Cetshwayo's forces."*³³

²⁸ G.H. 1055: The Natal Mercury (cutting), 31 March 1880, p. 134; S.N.A. 1/6/2, N.A.: Mpande to Scott, 20 July 1857.

²⁹ C.O. 179/43: Shepstone to Scott, 4 p.m., 2 December 1856, encl. in Scott to Labouchere, D.9, 16 December 1856.

³⁰ G.H. 1055: The Natal Mercury (cutting), 31 March 1880, p. 134.

³¹ Ibid., p. 134.

³² Ibid., p. 134.

³³ S.J. Maphalala: The Participation of White settlers in the battle of Ndongakusuka, 2 December 1856, and its consequences up to 1861, p. 6.

Thus, the battle of Ndondakusuka took place on 2 December 1856. It started close to the homestead of Nongalaza kaNondela near the Mandeni stream. This was between the Ndulinde ridge and the Thukela River.³⁴ The Usuthu faction was given the order to advance at a bush at Ndulinde by Cetshwayo, assisted by Mnyamana Buthelezi. First the Ndabakawombe regiment was sent up the Mandeni stream. It was followed by the Dhlambedlu regiment of Mpande and subsequently the isaNgqu, the iziNgulube, then the Sihlambisinye (i.e. the Mdlalose, Manqondo, amaNcube and the Dhloko) – so called because Cetshwayo forced them to join him by attacking homesteads were situated in the country that had been given to Mbuyazi by Mpande.³⁵ Cetshwayo and his adherents camped on both sides of the Mhlathuze, high up. That was where the Sihlambisinye subsequently joined him. This was near Nomveve (a locality in the Mhlathuze valley, northwest of the present day Eshowe).³⁶

The first clash took place west of Nongalaza's homestead (Nongalaza was dead by the time of the battle). A younger brother of Mbuyazi,

³⁴ J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Mvayisa KaTshingili, p. 165.

³⁵ C.O. 179/43, P.R.O.: Schreuder to Walmsley, 21 November 1856, encl. in Scott to Labouchere, D. 9, 16 December 1856; O. Stavem: The Norwegian Missionary Society, pp. 3 – 5; J. Rutherford: Sir George Grey, 1812 – 98, pp. 348-59.

³⁶ S.N.A. 1/6/2, N.A.: Proclamation, 22 April 1857, encl. in Scott to Labouchere, D. 38, 5 May 1857.

Tsonkweni, supported him militarily. His ibutho was the iziMpisi.³⁷ The Mandhlakazi faction was Cetshwayo's "left horn" and they launched an offensive southwards along the beach. They defeated the iziGqoza on the left horn of the battle array. They clashed with the iziGqoza "right horn". The other iziGqoza, who had defeated the Ndabakawombe, Dhlambedu, isaNgqu and iziNgulube began to retreat on seeing their "right horn" defeated by the Mandhlakazi.³⁸ They killed all women and children, saying:

*"(Sibond' isijingi) We are mashing up
porridge"³⁹*

In Zulu warfare women were normally never allowed to escape due to the fact that they bore fighting men.

The Mandhlakazi fought the Mkhweyantaba, Khinya, and Thukela amabutho of Mbuyazi's iziGqoza.⁴⁰ Maphitha ka Sojiyisa defeated them and started retreating in planned order. This mode of orderly withdrawal continued until they reached the Thukela. They could see that the Mandhlakazi had defeated the other "horn". Cetshwayo's "right horn"

³⁷ C.O. 179/43, P.R.O.: Schreuder to Walmsley, 21 November 1856, encl. in Scott to Labouchere, D.9, 16 December 1856.

³⁸ S.N.A. 1/1/7, N.A.: Minutes of the Executive Council, 28 November 1856.

³⁹ C.O. 48/380, P.R.O.: Statement of Andreas Gouws, 5 December 1856, encl. in Grey to Labouchere, D.4, 17 January 1857.

⁴⁰ S.N.A. 1/1/6, N.A.: Shepstone to Schreuder, 26 December 1856; C.O. 48/380, P.R.O.: Shepstone to Scott, 8 December 1856, encl. in Grey to Labouchere, D.4, 16 January 1857; O.H. Spohr (Ed): The Natal Diaries of Dr. W.H.I. Bleak, 1855 – 1856, p. 27.

action took place to the west of Nongalaza's homestead, near Sithebe (today Mandeni).⁴¹ This is where one ibutho after another was defeated by the iziGqoza, viz. the Ndabakawombe, Dhlambedlu, isaNgqu, and iziNgulube. In the meantime, Maphitha, on the left, had caused Mbuyazi's "right horn" to retreat. Only those warriors unable to keep up with the rest, were killed by Cetshwayo's Usuthu until various places on the Thukela were reached. Many iziGqoza tried to escape and were eventually killed by the Usuthu.⁴² The river carried their bodies away to the sea. Then Cetshwayo caused the ingomane to be sounded. Ingomane was the noise made by the amabutho beating on their shields with their assegais.⁴³ Mbuyazi was killed at Ndondakusuka together with five other sons of Mpande. These were Shonkweni, Mantantashiya, Somklawana, Mdomba, and Dabulesinye.⁴⁴ In fact, Cetshwayo's imbongi bellowed:

*"Wadl' uShonkweni, obezalwa wuMpande,
[You devoured Shonkweni son of Mpande]
Amakhubal' adliwa uyena kwabakaMpande;
[Medicines were eaten by him from Mpande]
Wadl' uMantantashiya, obezalwa wuMpande,
[You devoured Mantantashiya son of Mpande]
Amakhubal' adliwa uyena kwabakaMpande;
[Medicines were eaten by him from Mpande]
Wadl' uSomklawana, obezalwa wuMpande,
[You devoured Somklawana son of Mpande]
Amakhubal' adliwa wuCetshwayo son of Mpande;*

⁴¹ S.N.A. 1/7/5, N.A.: Memo by Shepstone, 7 December 1861.


⁴² S.N.A. 1/1/6, N.A.: Shepstone to Fynn, 13 December 1856.

⁴³ J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Mtshapi kaMoradu, p. 62.

⁴⁴ C.S.L. Nyembezi: Izibongo Zamakhosi, p. 90.

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THE BATTLE OF NDONDAKUSUKA, 2 DECEMBER 1856



BATTLEFIELD AS SEEN FROM THE SOUTH BANK OF THUKELA RIVER
1856

- Mbuyazi's iziGqoza faction
- *** Drowning regiments
- ⊗⊗⊗ Cetshwayo's Usuthu and Mandlakazi faction
- xxxx Encounter sites on Ndongakusuka
- Clans compelled to join Cetshwayo's Usuthu faction
- ▲▲▲ Regiments in their strongholds

[Medicines were eaten by Cetshwayo son of Mpande]

Wadl' uMdomba, obezalwa wuMpande,

[You devoured Mdomba, son of Mpande]

Amakhubal' adliwa uyena kwabakaMpande;

[Medicines were eaten by him of Mpande]

Wadl' uDabulesinye, obezalwa wuMpande,"⁴⁵

[You devoured Dabulesinye, son of Mpande]

When Cetshwayo's Usuthu faction came to Mpande he reproached it, saying:

*"So you have killed my children? Why didn't you bring me back something of Mangenendlovini (Mantantashiya)?"*⁴⁶

The izinduna, Masiphula and Mfusi, argued with Mpande:

*"What are you saying? For did you not in fact point Cetshwayo out to the White people, and did they not cut a distinguishing mark on his ear?"*⁴⁷

Morris painted a rather dismal picture of the battle of Ndongakusuka:

*"The stream at Ndongakusuka was marked for decades by a great white smear of skeletons, and was forever after known as the Mathambo – 'the place of bones'."*⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 – 91.

⁴⁶ J.S.A., Vol. 4, Evidence of Mtshapi kaMoradu, p. 62.

⁴⁷ S.N.A. 1/3/6, N.A.: Tonnessen to Walmsley, 2 February 1857.

⁴⁸ D. Morris: The Washing of the Spears, p. 196.

During the course of the battle E.F. Rathbone and other Colonial settlers organised a military force responsible for the protection of White women and children, cattle and wagons, near the Thukela.⁴⁹ In the initial stages of the battle the settlers under John Dunn fired heavy rifles at the Usuthu. This had little effect and they were compelled to retreat.⁵⁰ John Dunn accused the Afrikaner part of the Colonial forces of "cowardice". The commissioners examining the complaints of the traders regarding their loss of cattle during the war, however, made the following comment:

*"It seems certain that had Mr. Dunn's party not crossed the Tugela, Umbulazi (Mbuyazi) would have retreated nearer this colony against the banks of the Tugela... A most dire calamity might have occurred to this colony if Mr. Dunn's presence had not kept Umbulazi's army and the battle 10 miles beyond the Tugela."*⁵¹

During the battle some of the traders were compelled to leave their cattle behind on an island in the Thukela. Some of Cetshwayo's amabutho took these cattle away with them.⁵² The Colonial establishment feared that the removal of these cattle might lead to further complications to the strained

⁴⁹ G.H. 1055: The Natal Mercury (cutting), 31 March 1880, p. 134.

⁵⁰ S.J. Maphalala: The Participation of White Settlers in the battle of Ndondakusuka, 2 December 1856, and its consequences up to 1861, p. 9.

⁵¹ S.N.A. 1/1/5: Report of Commission to investigate the traders' claims, 17 January 1857, p. 85.

⁵² C.O. 48/381, P.R.O.: Scott to Grey, D.4, 9 March 1857, encl. in Grey to Labouchere, D.32, 14 March 1857.

relations between Natal and KwaZulu. This was endorsed by Alexander Forbes, one of the traders:

*"The wagons were plundered and the cattle stolen from an island in the river which being much nearer the Natal bank than the Zulu country would be British territory. I am quite certain that unless some notice is taken of our losses the peace of the colony will be endangered both from Zulus and our native kaffirs. Their ideas of right and wrong are not sufficiently clear and they will attribute our silence to fear and will become bold accordingly."*⁵³

Mpande sent a message to Lieutenant-Governor Scott that Cetshwayo had expressed willingness to compensate traders who had lost property at Ndondakusuka. Cetshwayo had already attended to the complaint of a trader (Johnstone), near Rev. Schroeder's mission station, and ordered compensation for his losses.⁵⁴ The commissioners had agreed with the views expressed by some traders, viz. that the safety and peace of the Colony of Natal was likely to be endangered if no notice was taken of the loss of cattle.⁵⁵ What could be noted as dramatic, however, was John Dunn's change of allegiance to Cetshwayo and moving into the Zulu

⁵³ *Ibid.*: Statement by Alexander Forbes, 13th January 1857, p. 79; S.N.A. 1/6/2, N.A.: Second letter, Fynn to Shepstone, 3 February 1857; W.B. Tayler: "Sir George Grey, South Africa and the Imperial Military Burden, 1855 – 1860", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XIV, p. 590.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Mpande to Scott, 11th February 1857, p. 88.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Report of Commission to investigate the traders' claims, 17th January 1857, p. 85.

kingdom in 1857 as his adviser and trader.⁵⁶ Cetshwayo accepted Dunn and assisted his assimilation into Zulu society by offering him a number of royal wives and land at uNgoye.⁵⁷ Cetshwayo thus received some kind of semi-official recognition and support from. Cetshwayo, however, appealed to the Colonial establishments in Natal and Transvaal to recognise his claims to the kingship.⁵⁸ Maphalala described Cetshwayo's overtures towards John Dunn and some settlers after the battle as follows:

*"The lives of the whites... were spared. This benevolence was not unique: after the battle of Maqongqo hills between Mpande and his Voortrekker alliance, no white man was interfered with."*⁵⁹

Cetshwayo realised that as a future Zulu potentate, he needed John Dunn to advise him on his relations with the two White establishments that flanked KwaZulu, i.e. the British in Natal and the Voortrekkers in the Transvaal.⁶⁰

Although the battle of Ndongakusuka could not directly be linked to Mpande, it clearly demonstrated his declining power and influence in KwaZulu. This was confirmed in 1857 when the Zulu nation sought to

⁵⁶ C.C. Ballard: John Dunn – The White Chief of Zululand, pp. 61 – 62.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 63 – 65.

⁵⁸ P. Colenbrander: "Some reflections on the kingship of Mpande", p. 18.

⁵⁹ S.J. Maphalala: The participation of White Settlers at the battle of Ndongakusuka, 2 December 1856, and its consequences up to 1861, p. 12.

⁶⁰ P. Colenbrander: "Some reflections on the kingship of Mpande", p. 19.

settle the question of authority in the government of KwaZulu.⁶¹ While the nation continued to regard Mpande with respect and held his person to be sacred, it felt that he was too passive and too infirm.⁶² In 1857 at the meeting of isizwe (nation) it was resolved that Mpande should continue as the "head" of the nation because he was quite competent rationally, but the nation also wanted "feet" added to the "head". Cetshwayo was then recognised as the "feet" whenever action or movement was required. Thus, all important matters were settled by Cetshwayo and Masiphula, Mpande's principal councillor (or Prime Minister). Such matters would then be ultimately referred to Mpande for final sanction.⁶³ This arrangement was given the blessing of the Colonial authorities in Natal in 1861 when Shepstone officially installed Cetshwayo as Mpande's successor.⁶⁴ This heralded a decade of placidity in the relations between KwaZulu and the Natal Colony. Such complacency, however, was shaken by Cetshwayo's growing antagonism and hostility towards Natal after the death of Mpande in 1872. It is evident that Mpande throughout his reign exercised a restraining influence on the martial character of the Zulu kingdom.

⁶¹ H. Brookes: Natal - A History and description of the Colony, p. 246.

⁶² R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande KaSenzangakhona, p. 63.

⁶³ H. Brookes: Natal - A History and description of the colony, p. 247; R.R.R. Dhlomo: Umpande kaSenzangakhona, pp. 63 - 64.

⁶⁴ T. Cope: "Shepstone and Cetshwayo", pp. 7 - 10.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LEGACY OF MPANDE AN EVALUATION

Mpande became an ambiguous and contested metaphor for both genealogical inferiority and skillful diplomacy which, within historically shaped limits, could be used and reworked by different commentators in a range of different circumstances.

The genealogical inferiority of Mpande dated back to his youth. He was plagued by skin dermatitis disease (umchoboko) and his Zulu contemporaries and predecessors (the colonised) ridiculed him as cowardly, inept, indolent and even obese.¹ The colonisers of his time gave scant recognition of his credentials. They referred to Mpande's physical and mental deficiencies.² He was a prince born of the umsizi (powdered medicines) connection and held to be of inferior rank in the royal family and therefore not supposed to be heir.³ An umsizi prince was never made king, but always lived and brought forward when the principal house had no heirs.

¹ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 61, Notebook 31, Evidence of Ndukwana, 17 May 1903, pp. 6 - 8; A. Duminy and B. Guest: Natal and Zululand - from the earliest times to 1910, p.95; M.Z. Shamase: Zulu Potentates - from the earliest to Zwelithini ka Bhhekuzulu, pp. 40 - 44.

² K.C., Stuart Papers, File 41, Historical Notes, Evidence of Socwatsha, 16 March 1907.

³ M.Z. Shamase: Zulu Potentates - from the earliest to Zwelithini ka Bhhekuzulu, p. 44.

Mpande was incorporated into the Zulu army on the death of Senzangakhona (his father) in 1816, but retained a submissive role during the next few years. This convinced king Dingane (his half-brother) that Mpande was a royal persona non grata (undesired person) and therefore no serious threat to the kingship.⁴ By maintaining a submissive posture he was able to satisfy the royal scrutiny, and shortly before the assassination of king Shaka in 1828 he was allowed to marry at what was in Zulu kingdom a relatively early age, being presented with his first wife by the king himself.⁵

Mpande exercised a fair degree of autonomy over his adherents in inkosi Senzangakhona's Mlambongwenya (or Mfemfe) homestead at Eshowe. He built up a substantial support base, especially among the semi-autonomous amakhosi (chiefs). This precluded Dingane from embarking upon the same kind of purges as he did against his other half brothers and potential rivals.⁶

Mpande was blushed aside by Dingane until the early 1830's when he became recognised as a potential candidate for the kingship.⁷ In 1832 Dingane made an unsuccessful attempt on Mpande's life. In 1837

⁴ R. Edgecombe (Ed): Bringing forth Light - five tracks on Bishop Colenso's Zulu Mission, pp. 47 - 50.

⁵ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: Mpande kaSenzangakhona, C. 1798 - 1872. Cf. C.C. Saunders: Black Leaders in Southern African History, p. 45.

⁶ K.C., Stuart Papers, Notes on the life of Henry Fynn, 1 May 1903.

⁷ A. Kuper: The house and Zulu political structure in the 19th Century, Vol. 34, p. 105.

Mpande failed to comply with Dingane's demands for regiments to take part in a proposed raid on king Sobhuza II of Swaziland. But Mpande sensed that this could be a plot of his half-brother to get rid of him and therefore gave feeble excuses for not complying. Mpande was confidentially advised by Ndlela ka Sompisi Ntuli to move southwards with his followers. He crossed the Thukela and settled in the Mvoti area. In 1839 Mpande sought closer ties with the Voortrekkers in preparation for a military showdown against Dingane.⁸ The external and colonial-based military assistance rendered to Mpande in the dynastic struggle signified a turning point in the internal affairs of the Zulu kingdom. King Shaka as well as Dingane had tried to attain white trader support from Port Natal through direct participation or firearm supplies.⁹ Mpande's decision to seek an alliance with the Voortrekkers symbolised the likelihood for future agreements and appeals. This could be mutually profitable - Mpande gaining protection and the Voortrekkers close knowledge of the Zulu Royal House and traditions. It also underlined the need for rival groups within KwaZulu to appeal to external powers for support.

⁸ W.F. Lye: The Ndebele Kingdom south of the Limpopo river, *Journal of African History*, ix, I, 1969, p. 11.

⁹ A. Kuper: The house and Zulu political structure in the 19th Century, Vol. 34, p. 105.

The decade of the 1840's was then initiated by a joint effort of the Voortrekkers and Mpande's Zulu faction to crush the power of Dingane.¹⁰ It is imperative to note that while Mpande had entered into a military alliance with Andries Pretorius against Dingane, his army led by Nongalaza ka Nondela Mnyandu fought those of Dingane, led by Ndlela ka Sompisi Ntuli without any Voortrekker military involvement.¹¹ The Voortrekker forces of Pretorius were still assembling and preparing on the banks of the Black Mfolozi when they heard that Mpande had defeated Dingane at Maqongqo in January 1840.¹²

Mpande was installed as Dingane's successor and king over the Zulu nation without the same independent sovereignty as his predecessors. Magema Fuze, a Zulu chronicler of events gave a rather laconic expression of the event:

*"...That was done by Potolozhi
(Pretorius)..."*¹³

The British soldiers had, however, abandoned Port Natal before the campaign against Dingane. With their back free, the way was open for

¹⁰ H.C. Lugg: *A Guide to the Zulu social system*, pp. 162 - 168.

¹¹ R.R.R. Dhlomo: *Umpande ka Senzagakhona*, p. 39.

¹² H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, p. 256.

¹³ M.M. Fuze: *The Black People and whence they came*, p. 85.

the Voortrekkers to proclaim Mpande's kingship under vassalage of their established Republic of Natalia.¹⁴

Mpande began on a very precarious footing. His reign was restricted not only by the Voortrekkers' terms, but also by the need to retain the approval of the more powerful chiefs (amakhosi) who had assisted in deposing Dingane.¹⁵ Such move later gave rise to the notion of Mpande as feeble-minded and vacillating, controlled primarily by subordinate chiefs and external forces.¹⁶ During Shaka's reign loyalty was to the person of the monarch, not to the institution of the monarchy itself. On the contrary, Mpande's era was marked by loyalty to the institution of the monarchy; not to the person of the monarch.

The ambiguity about Mpande could also be attributed to the fact that this study re-assesses his relegation to being a harmless and feeble-minded potentate who exercised little real power. Mpande was king in KwaZulu from 1840 until his death in 1872.¹⁷ He maintained his position as head of one of the most powerful states in Southern Africa. He possessed considerable diplomatic qualities and succeeded in manoeuvring both internal and external forces to his own gain.¹⁸ None of Mpande's

¹⁴ M. Wilson (Ed): *Oxford History of South Africa*, Vols 1 - 2, pp. 370 - 374.

¹⁵ P.A. Kennedy: *Mpande and the Zulu kingship*, *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, Vol. 4, 1981, p. 4.

¹⁶ S.N.A. 1/7/3, N.A., Interviews with Mpande's messengers, 3 August 1847.

¹⁷ G.S. Preller: *Voortrekker Wetgewing*, *Notule van die Natalse Volksraad*, pp. 4 - 42.

¹⁸ P. Maylam: *History of the African People of South Africa*, p. 70.

predecessors had faced challenges of similar complexity, and there was no indication in his early days that he possessed qualities necessary to deal with them. Throughout his reign Mpande struggled to consolidate Zulu power in the face of pressures emanating from respectively the Voortrekkers, British Colonial establishment and the Christian missionaries in Natal.¹⁹ Saunders argued that:

*"In the event he proved an able enough leader to preserve the integrity of his kingdom through a period longer than the reigns of the three other Zulu kings combined."*²⁰

Representing the British authorities in the Natal Colony, Sir Theophilus Shepstone viewed the rule of Mpande as a menace to British Imperialist expansion.²¹ At the time of border violations he argued that the position of Natal Colony would remain precarious so long as refugees continued to cross the border.²² He suggested that the only solution would be to topple the assumed arbitrary power of Mpande. For Shepstone, the office of the British Resident in KwaZulu had to be the vehicle through which this could be achieved. Mpande survived due to the reluctance of

¹⁹ C.O. 48/246: Maitland to Stanley, D. 63, 13 December 1846, printed for Parliament, July 1848 (980), pp. 44 - 46.

²⁰ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: Mpande ka Senzangakhona, C. 1798 - 1872. Cf. C.C. Saunders (Ed): Black Leaders in Southern African History, p. 45.

²¹ S.N.A. 1/1/11, N.A.: Moodie to Bird, 7 September 1849, enclosure in Bird to Shepstone, 11 September 1861.

²² K.C., Stuart Papers, Folio 19, p. 21 FF, Interview with John W. Shepstone, 1912.

Lieutenant-Governor Pine to organise a military force.²³ This rendered Mpande unique in his own right and times.

Mpande fitted well in the royal continuation of Shakan Zuluness. While Zulu society in Mpande's time was by no means unchanging, it remained based on the institutions evolved during the reign of Shaka. The crucial figure of the new political order was Mpande himself whose direct or indirect influence came to regulate an ever growing part of the individuals' lives and actions.²⁴ He performed the same functions as administrator, judge, leader of the military apparatus and supreme protector. A significant difference was that the field of Mpande's domain included a greater number of different clans and not only that of his own.²⁵

Shaka's royal court presented first hand testimony of how every individual was totally subjected to the personal conceits and whims of the potentate. His absolute form of personal government founded on and secured by a military machinery directly under his control, soon roused a rather widespread discontent and resistance which Mpande and later Zulu kings could not ignore.^{26*}

²³ SAAR: N. Shepstone to Moodie, 22 February 1848, 11, p. 293, Evidence of Theophilus Shepstone, 25 November 1852, Proceedings of the N.N.C, 1852 - 3, 11, p. 27.

²⁴ M. Gluckman: *The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa*, p. 34.

²⁵ M. Wilson: *Oxford History of South Africa*, Vols. 1 - 2, pp. 355 - 364.

²⁶ J. Stuart and D. Mck Malcolm (Eds): *The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn*, pp. 83 - 86. * This information given by Fynn may be biased and should be handled with caution.

Thus, during the reign of Mpande the personal authority of the king was not exercised by the same rigour as in the case of Shaka, even though no structural changes of the political organisation were carried out. What took place could rather be described as a change of political profile, where Mpande was compelled to introduce some sort of new ruling style. The personal role of Mpande was counterbalanced by a stronger attention paid to traditional Zulu concepts of stable and benevolent rule.²⁷ Europeans like A.F. Gardiner visited Mpande's palace of Nodwengu late in 1847 and left descriptions of how political decisions were made at the king's court.²⁸ The fact that the personal power of Mpande during the time of national independence remained extensive, however, cannot be disputed. As "the father of all the nation" protecting and ruling all its land and his umuzi (homestead), the political institution of Mpande may be characterised as the nucleus around which the different other threads of social life within his kingdom were bound up.²⁹

It is essential to emphasize that the personal authority of Mpande was absolute only as far as it coincided with the customary norms and general attitudes of his subjects.³⁰ Mpande was obviously not free to introduce

²⁷ P. Bonner: The dynamics of the late eighteenth century northern Nguni society - some hypothesis, pp. 75 - 80; J. Pridmore: The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn - 1883, Vol. 1, pp. 41 - 46

²⁸ A.F. Gardiner: Narrative of a Journey to the Zoolu Country in South Africa, pp. 136 - 140.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 138 - 140.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 139 - 140.

new practices and ideals for his people merely on the basis of personal choice. While the will of the people drew up some ultimate limitations for what might be resolved at Mpande's palace, vestiges of a somewhat democratic element could be observed.³¹

The limitations to Mpande's personal authority as represented by his council and the general attitude of his people, do not, however, contradict the fact that his royal court was the forum in which all important decisions for the nation were actually taken.³² Neither were these limitations of such a kind as to prevent the repercussions from the centre of power around Mpande from being experienced all over his domain. In fact the socio-political units of different kinds throughout the kingdom, were highly dependent upon the decisions made at the king's court.³³

As the political and social revolution of Nguni society - carried out by Shaka in the 1820's and maintained by Mpande - was effectuated by force, the military system was one of the basic pre-suppositions for this process of development.³⁴ Occupying a considerable part of a Zulu man's time and labour from puberty to the age of about thirty five, the military apparatus was probably the political institution within the new national

³¹ H.C. Lugg: A Guide to the Zulu social system, p. 23.

³² Ibid., p. 24.

³³ E.J. Krige: The Social System of the Zulus, p. 219.

³⁴ J.D. Omer-Cooper: The Zulu Aftermath - A nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa, p. 207.

system to have the greatest influence upon the concrete life of a Zulu individual.³⁵

In Mpande's time military service was a common duty to all male members of the Zulu society. To serve in Mpande's army became a matter of indirect as well as of direct force. It was a matter of honour to serve in the army.³⁶ This fact argues for the supposition that the national system of military service by the time of Mpande had achieved a fairly firm and undisputed position.³⁷ But the result was similar to Shaka's time. As during the period of Dingane every man in Zulu society was drafted into some regimental service for some twenty years.³⁸

The day to day sovereign power of Mpande applied along the same lines as the administrative and military organisation. In fact it was the very same administrative and military apparatus which also exercised the judicial and legislative functions of Mpande's people.³⁹

No accurate distinction existed between judicial and administrative regulations in the Zulu society. It was all looked upon as expressions of the absolute will of the king to which no disobedience whatever was tolerated. Regulations applicable to all the nation were generally

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

³⁶ P. Lautenschlager: De Sozialen Ordnungen bei den Zulu und de Marianhiller Mission 1882 - 1902, p. 133.

³⁷ S.N.A. 1/4/23 CR 19/1911: Mpande to Cloete, 23 and 29 October 1843.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 23 and 29 October 1843.

³⁹ C.O. 879/2/5: Papers on Native Affairs, p. 121.

proclaimed at the royal palace either by Mpande himself or by his Prime Minister Masiphula Ntshangase.⁴⁰ Such regulations appeared as the final outcome of discussions held in Mpande's supreme court.

The royal council in Mpande's reign filled both a legislative function and acted as the principal court of the kingdom.⁴¹ Severe crimes and disputes, especially such regarded as offences against royal and national interests, were brought directly to the royal council for trial. Intricate cases also came to the royal council on appeal from local chiefs (amakhosi).⁴² The proceedings of judicial trial leading up to the proclamation of a verdict, were in principle the same as the proceedings leading up to the proclamation of some law, administrative ordinance or official message.⁴³ Disputes were dealt with and settled by local, regional chiefs or military officials. The local chiefs were, however, bound to judge according to laws issued by Mpande, and they were enjoined to give reports of the cases to him.⁴⁴

The collective perspective as a basic framework around all Zulu thought and practice in Mpande's time also influenced the people's ideas of right

⁴⁰ M. Gluckman: *The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa*. Cf. M. Fortes: *African Political Systems*, pp. 25 - 55.

⁴¹ S.J.R. Martin: *British Images of the Zulu, C. 1820 - 1874*, pp. 47 - 52.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 49 - 50.

⁴³ H. Stander: *Die Verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872*, pp. 256 - 259.

⁴⁴ C. de B. Webb: *A Zulu king speaks - statements made by Cetshwayo ka Mpande on the history and customs of his people*, p. 74.

and wrong. In the same manner as the prosperous endeavours of an individual involved the interests of the entire homestead, the social unit to which a person belonged, was also responsible for his or her misdeeds.⁴⁵ Principally such responsibility rested with the homestead head, but the consequences of the misdemeanour were to be endured jointly by all inmates of the homestead. This collective understanding of justice was also to be observed by the fact that a son might be prosecuted for crimes committed by his father.⁴⁶ By the death of the father the son came to inherit his debts as well as his possessions.⁴⁷

It is essential to emphasize that in Mpande's reign the notion and practice of justice were based on two major pillars, viz. custom and the personal will of the king. Even though no written laws existed, knowledge about what was right or wrong was presupposed with every individual in the kingdom on the basis of custom.⁴⁸ Actual regulations were made known to the people through messengers or through officials being in regular contact with their superiors.⁴⁹ It was a duty enjoined upon everybody to keep informed about customary behaviour and actual resolutions.

⁴⁵ E.J. Krige: The Social System of the Zulus, p. 228.

⁴⁶ P. Lautenschlager: De Sozialen Ordnungen bei den Zulu und de Mariannhiller Mission 1882 - 1909, p. 130.

⁴⁷ E.J. Krige: The Social System of the Zulus, p. 223.

⁴⁸ K.C., Stuart Papers, File 9, Notebook 3, Evidence of Xubu, 29 November 1909.

⁴⁹ A.T. Bryant: Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, pp. 642 - 648.

During his reign Mpande instituted a fixed, customary procedure known to all Zulus for the trial of crimes and disputes.⁵⁰ The basic principles of this procedure were probably to be traced back to pre-Shakan times as a part of the common cultural inheritance of social order among the Nguni clans.⁵¹

Mpande distinguished between offences against authorities and offences against commoners, the first considered to be the most serious. It appears too categoric, as E.J. Krige and P. Lautenschlager indicated, to state that all offences against the chief or king-horn ever trivial - were punished by death.⁵² The sources used by these two authors apply to the times of king Shaka, and under his rule people were exterminated in great numbers for minor offences. At the time of Mpande the ruling and judicial practice was obviously not so harsh. The attempted murder of a headman (induna), for instance, would not be punished by death, but by a fine of cattle.⁵³ At the height of his power Mpande welcomed Christian missionaries from Natal Colony to the Zulu kingdom.⁵⁴ The missionaries were not overtly imperial agents, but acted as informants on affairs within the kingdom for the benefit of the British Colonial establishment in Natal.

⁵⁰ C. de B. Webb: A Zulu king speaks: statements made by Cetshwayo ka Mpande on the history and customs of his people, p. 75.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 75 - 76.

⁵² E.J. Krige: The Social system of the Zulus, p. 228; P. Lautenschlager: De Sozialen Ordnungen bei den Zulu und de Marianhiller Mission 1882 - 1909, p. 128.

⁵³ J. Bird: The Annals of Natal, 1495 - 1849, Vols. I - 2, p. 120.

⁵⁴ P. Hernaes and J. Simensens: The Zulu kingdom and the Norwegian Missionaries. 1845 - 1880, pp. 3 - 5.

Missionaries did not assist the monarchy in the internal disputes of the kingdom, and remained neutral in the civil upheaval that erupted in 1856.⁵⁵

It is imperative, however, to note that when Mpande granted the Christian missionaries admittance to KwaZulu, the Zulu people had already been in continual contact with White people who had settled in and about Port Natal for nearly three decades.⁵⁶ As time went by these Europeans came to populate great parts of the countryside as regular farmers. Both the Voortrekkers and the British faction of them had proved readiness to protect their interests in the country by military force.⁵⁷ This fact had already put its marked seal upon destiny of the Zulu people.

Mpande's subjects had also learnt that some of the White people appearing in their country called themselves missionaries. The court of Mpande had been exposed to the particular aim of their presence.⁵⁸ In some areas even ordinary people had been acquainted with these particular representatives of Colonial establishments.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ A. Winquist: Scandinavians and South Africa - their impact on cultural, social and economic development before 1900, pp. 94 - 97.

⁵⁶ Rev. L. Grout: Zululand, or life among the Zulu Kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, p. 219.

⁵⁷ M. Whisson and M. West (Eds): Religion and Social change in Southern Africa - anthropological essays in honour of Monica Wilson, pp. 165 - 170.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 171.

⁵⁹ R. Mael: The Problem of Political Integration in the Zulu Empire (Unpublished PhD Thesis, California, 1974), pp. 115 - 168.

Though Mpande did not encounter the missionaries with a programmed policy as clear-cut as theirs, he came to play a highly active and determining role in the process of interrelation with them. Mpande's policy towards the missionaries was shaped by and founded upon his own world of experience and is to be seen within the framework both of his indigenous social tradition and of what he had learnt about Europeans through his contact with them.⁶⁰

The different groups of the growing number of Colonialists in Natal represented different sorts of challenges to Mpande. His policy to them could be seen as a response to these challenges which, as a result of increased knowledge, became more and more differentiated.⁶¹ Mpande's way of handling the "Colonial problem" could thus be described as a taking of precautions by which the utilitarian value of the different Colonial groups was to be exploited at the same time as measures were taken to protect himself against damaging consequences of their influence.⁶²

The way in which the Norwegian missionaries were admitted to KwaZulu is in line with the above observations. On two occasions Rev. Hans Schreuder visited Mpande in his Nodwengu palace to apply for

⁶⁰ M.W.T. Gray: Stories of the early American Missionaries in South Africa, p. 29.

⁶¹ E.H. Brookes: A Century of Missions in Natal and Zululand, pp. 3 - 8.

⁶² G.E. Cory (Ed.): The Diary of the Rev. Francis Owen, M.A. Missionary with Dingaan in 1837-8, p. 70.

permission to start missionary work in the hinterland of KwaZulu and to present the basic aims of his missionary enterprise.⁶³ On both occasions Mpande and his council gave their arguments for not giving Schreuder admittance to their country.⁶⁴ These arguments consisted, according to Schreuder's report, of the following two elements: On the one hand, Mpande and his council expressed that they had been convinced of no utility in having missionaries residing with them. Their question was:

*"...Of what use could the missionaries be to them; their people did not know how to be taught the accomplishments of the missionaries; they solely knew... how to walk on their feet, to erect fences just as their ancestors and big men of the past had done. They were black people and how then could the knowledge... and behaviour of the Whites penetrate them...?"*⁶⁵

On the other hand, the Christian mission, by this time, was already considered to represent a significant peril to undermine Zulu political system.⁶⁶ With reference to their experience with missionary Grout earlier, Mpande and his council argued that they:

⁶³ Missionary Herald, 1843, p. 17; R. Mael: The Problem of Political Integration in the Zulu Empire (Unpublished PhD Thesis, California, 1974), pp. 169 - 172.

⁶⁴ G.E. Cory (Ed.): The Diary of the Rev. Francis Owen, M.A. Missionary with Dingaan in 1837-8, p. 71.

⁶⁵ Rev. H. Schreuder: Nogle Ord til Norges Kirke om Christelig Pligt med Hensyn til Omsorg for ikkechristne Medbrodres Salighed, p. 241.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 242.

"...had taken fright at having any missionaries staying in their country; they were afraid and cried for the king and the royal seat because people would join the mission, abandon the king, and leave the royal seat desolate. This is what had happened with missionary Grout. The people had left [the king]... and... gone to him..."⁶⁷

In spite of a negative response to Schreuder, Mpande revealed on these occasions that the missionaries represented certain qualities which he could utilise on his own premises. Already during his first visit, Rev. Schreuder was ordered to pray for rain, to which he consented.⁶⁸ The fact that rain poured down the following night and day did not, however, change Mpande's decision.⁶⁹

Later in 1850 a new situation arose in which the preconditions for Mpande's previous negative response to Schreuder changed. Mpande had, from time to time, been beset by gout attacks.⁷⁰ He learnt that Schreuder might contribute a beneficial means against the "evil" that had struck him. A successful treatment of not only the king, but also his Prime Minister Masiphula Ntshangase, a princess and other great people

⁶⁷ Rev. L. Grout: Zululand, or life among the Zulu Kaffirs of Natal and Zululand, pp. 238 - 239.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 240

⁶⁹ Rev. H. Schreuder: Nogle Ord til Norges Kirke om Christelig Pligt med Hensyn til Omsorg for ikkechristne Medbrodres Salighed, p. 248.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 249.

turned out to be a releasing factor as to why Mpande and his council changed their attitude.⁷¹

Faced with such evil as the one that had been striking the king in person and which had proved impossible to be mastered by their own traditional doctors, the option of risking having a missionary staying with them became preferable to the risk of seeing the royal seat becoming desolated.⁷² Mpande was ready to give the missionaries a chance where their services were regarded to be in accordance with the Zulus' own needs. The missionaries were not given complete authority to convert individuals as they pleased; the king expected some recognition from them.⁷³

In his policy towards the missionaries Mpande, in comparison with other African rulers in southern Africa, represented a rather typical example even though the results of the interaction with missionaries in other places might be different.⁷⁴ As a general feature, Mpande's way of evaluating the missionaries by and large was in conformity with the estimation of missionaries by other African potentates in Southern Africa.⁷⁵ During the process of interrelation between Mpande and the

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁷² R.L. Cope: Christian Missions and Independent African Chiefdoms in the 19th Century, p. 51.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷⁴ M. Wilson: Rituals of Kingship among the Nyakyusa, pp. 131 - 167.

⁷⁵ B. Hutchinson: Some social consequences of the nineteenth century missionary activity among the South African Bantu, Africa, Vol. 27 (1957), p. 160 - 175.

Christian missionaries, the latter's objectives in general coincided rather badly with the expectations of the encounter on the part of the former. Thus, interaction between Mpande and the missionaries in general was one of cross-purposes.

The 1850's witnessed the beginning of a decline in Mpande's power. The 1856 Zulu Civil War (second) during the reign of Mpande unequivocally presents the possibility of a king that failed to establish and develop a peaceful government.⁷⁶ This affirms an earlier reference to him as infirm and vacillating, controlled primarily by external powers. Mpande's reign was somewhat viewed as a "paradox" in that he was supposedly ineffectual, yet endured the longest of all the Zulu potentates.⁷⁷

Mpande was incriminated for not intervening in the dispute to avert a civil war. He was prepared to chance a military encounter as a means of deciding the issue, because a political solution was impossible without weakening his power.⁷⁸ Mpande also hoped to secure the intervention on his side of the British Colonial establishment in Natal. The British authorities in the Natal Colony exploited Mpande's abulia and entered the succession issue in an attempt to provide the Colony with additional land

⁷⁶ P. Maylam: History of the African people of South Africa, p. 70.

⁷⁷ J.B. Wright and D.R. Edgecombe: Mpande ka Senzangakhona, C. 1798 - 1872. Cf. C.C. Saunders (Ed): Black Leaders in Southern African History, p. 45.

⁷⁸ R. Cope: Political Power within the Zulu kingdom, Journal of Natal and Zulu History, Volume 8 (1985).

between the Thukela and Mhlathuze rivers.⁷⁹ Here were vestiges of effective demonstrations of the external British power-performance in Zulu affairs. While Mpande was clearly more than a mere figure-head, Cetshwayo's powers were in excess of those normally wielded by the heir to the Zulu kingship.⁸⁰ The external Colonial power-control of Zulu affairs reached its pinnacle when Sir Theophilus Shepstone presided on Cetshwayo's coronation as king after the death of Mpande in October 1873.⁸¹ As early as 1857, however, Cetshwayo had accepted John Dunn and assisted his assimilation into Zulu society by offering him a number of royal wives and land at uNgoye.⁸²

Mpande was obviously not the best potentate the Zulu people might have had, but he was competent and his diplomatic skills enabled him to maintain peace with the Voortrekkers and the British while playing them off against each other to his own advantage.

It could thus be concluded that the departure of Mpande from KwaZulu in 1837 which became known as the "breaking of the rope" in the wake of threats of assassination by his half-brother Dingane; his visit to the Voortrekkers at Khangela (Durban) on 15 January 1839, heralded the

⁷⁹ S.N.A. 1/1/5: Report of Commission to investigate the traders' claims, 17 January 1857.

⁸⁰ C.O. 179/43: Shepstone to Scott, 4.p.m., 2 December 1856, enclosure in Scott to Labouchere, D.9, 16 December 1856.

⁸¹ P. Colenbrander: *Some reflections on the kingship of Mpande*, p. 18.

⁸² C.C. Ballard: *John Dunn - The White Chief of Zululand*, pp. 61 - 62.

beginning of his heroic praises and reign. In fact, his colonially-based support in the dynastic struggle symbolised a turning point in the domestic affairs of the Zulu kingdom.

Having come into power in 1840 and styled his military expeditions along Shaka's regimental control system, Mpande could not easily be subdued by colonial establishments in Natal. Instead of invading the Zulu kingdom, they sought to extend their influence by gaining a hold on its ruler. Mpande welcomed both the Voortrekkers and the English as allies he needed to secure his position against any threat of war, but also sought to exploit their conflicting objectives to preserve his own independence.

While Mpande had controversial relations with the Voortrekkers, he was devoid of the necessary machinery to resist their diplomatic manoeuvres. The Zulu monarch acknowledged the military capabilities of the Voortrekkers and, given the manner in which he came to power, the only option was to be diplomatic and succumb to colonial terms in a subtle way. Any meaningful resistance would be necessitated by complete loyalty from the influential chiefs (amakhosi) throughout the Zulu kingdom. The flock of Zulu refugees into Natal gave evidence to the fact that Mpande did not have overall grip of power in the Zulu kingdom. An

English newspaper branded the action of the Voortrekkers in KwaZulu as an act of gross imperialism.

The handling of the issue relating to Zulu refugees, cattle, borders between KwaZulu and the Republic of Natalia and the British at Port Natal as well as succession dispute, qualified Mpande as the most enduring of the Zulu kings. He showed the ability to grasp the changing realities of his position as head of the Zulu nation. As a diplomat, Mpande aimed at maintaining the reputation for friendship to colonial establishments by which he had been distinguished at the time of his elevation after the defeat of Dingane in 1840. Kennedy perceived this kind of diplomacy as follows:

*"He [Mpande] pretended to be loyal to several White settler groups at the same time... At least, he manipulated Voortrekker groups and the British against their better interests, while instilling the erroneous impression that the Zulu kingdom survived only through their specific support."*⁸³

Mpande's diplomacy helped to allay the British colonial fears of the Zulu menace. In fact, Mpande's reign marked an era of co-operation and

⁸³ P.A. Kennedy: Mpande and the Zulu kingship, Journal of Natal and Zulu history, June 1987, Vol. 4, p. 71.

integration between the Zulu kingdom and the British in both the Natal Colony and the Cape Colony.


While the missionaries came to KwaZulu as agents of the British government, Gospel and western way of life, Mpande used missionary connections to keep colonial threats of invasion in check. During Mpande's reign, the Zulu people adhered to traditional norms and values, believing that the spirits of the dead live long. Ancestral honour and worship of the Supreme Being (Umvelinqangi) were pre-eminent and education merely informal, based on imitation and observation. At the time when Mpande thought that the missionaries might strengthen his position, ordinary Zulus were frightened by the gospel that evoked terrors of damnation and hell. They were told that non-believers in Christianity would be thrown in a fiery furnace where they would burn eternal of infinity. Zulus who became proselytes of the missionaries were pestered to recant by their neighbours.

A packaged Christianity in liturgy presentation, hymnody and organisation brought about ecclesiastical alienation among the Zulu people in Mpande's time. During the 1860's, in forms of religious expressions the Christian Western "civilisation" received greater considerations than the potentialities of Mpande's people and their inheritance.

Mpande's people stomached Christianity in spite of the differences between the Zulus and the missionaries in approach to conversion. Rather than doctrine, the Zulus accentuated the existential value of the Christian message in their specific situation. Therefore, Christianity had a deep colonial disposition in that it became the servant of the British Empire to facilitate colonial expansion.

Mpande exercised a restraining influence on the martial character of the Zulu kingdom. This, however, was tarnished by the development of an unfortunate set of circumstances in KwaZulu culminating in the outbreak of the civil war on 2 December 1856. Rivalry for succession to the Zulu throne between princes Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi rendered Mpande's diplomacy equivocal. Although the civil war could not entirely be attributed to his actions, it clearly displayed his declining power and influence within the Zulu kingdom. This was confirmed in 1857 when Cetshwayo and Mpande's ndunankulu (Prime Minister) were given the role of settling important matters. Such matters would be referred to Mpande for his final sanction. The arrangement was given the blessing of the British colonial establishment in Natal in 1861 when Shepstone officially installed Cetshwayo as Mpande's successor. This heralded a decade of placidity in relations between the Zulu kingdom and the colonial establishments in Natal. Nevertheless, Mpande's relations with

both the Voortrekkers and the British colonial establishments in Natal proved him a skilful diplomat and rather than a fighter like king Shaka and Dingane, Mpande had skills of the politician.



NORTHERN NGUNI CLANS IN MPANDE'S TIME, C 1854

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
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APPENDIX

ONE

GENEALOGY OF THE HOUSE OF MPANDE



- Cited from: Zulu Potentates – from the earliest to Zwelithini ka Bhekuzulu by M.Z. Shamase, S.M. Publications, 1996, p. 52.

APPENDIX

TWO

TRANSLATION OF MPANDE'S PRAISES (IZIBONGO)

The high-pillar of smoke who emerged
in feathered head-dress,
Between the British and the Voortrekkers.

The hawk that flew towards Heaven;
The last-to-cross of Shaka.

Mdayi! Who responded overland;
Elderly women were left on sites;
Elderly men fell by the wayside.

The flood of Ndaba,
That flooded women and left with them,
Only to place them at the estuaries,
Estuaries of the River
Estuaries of Thukela River.
Ndaba who crossed near Dlokweni.

But avoided drinking its water.
Only waters remained amazed;

Mouths of hippopotamus were wide-open,
Crocodiles survived by climbing mountains.

Mnguni sat down
Soothesaying difficult matters,
Spoken in his household of Malandela.

He made war-shields,
Making them on wild-banana hedge.
He built houses with seeds of grass,

He built huts with grass.
He asked for Mpofana and Ndaka Rivers,
He said that Mzinyathi River

I will ask for it from Silevu
You were enraged between two months,
Between May and June,
And went through Dlinza forest and Eshowe,
Stems of trees went up-side-down.

You survived between Mpehlela and Maqhwakazi mountains
Stems of trees went up-side-down.

A star that shone and animals told one another,
Ikhwezi and Silimela stars told one another.
Run through all ways and paths,
To tell Maphitha and Tokotoko,
And say we are not calling for war,
Say it is called by Mpande,
He is one of us of Malandela.
He surrendered cattle,
He gave them to men (Voortrekkers),
To pay homage to them,
Saying they are a place of refuge,
Saying it is like Dlokweni,
Saying it is like father and mother,
Saying it is Nongogo.
The yellow of Ndaba,
With only one egg,
It is one of Ngotsha.
A silver blade,
That survived from other blades.
Our household members are incriminated
For not showing a stream to the king,
They let him cross the one of hippopotamus and crocodiles.

The bush that thundered on Thokazi mountains
And Gudunkomo ones also burnt.

A storm that thundered on both Maqongqo hills,
It thundered and devoured the shields of Mbelebele;
It devoured the shields of Bulawayo;
It devoured the shields of Zinyosi;
It devoured the shields of Dlambedlu;
It devoured the shields of Nomdayana;
It devoured the shields of Mgumanqa.

The back-slider of Ndaba,
Back-sliding through Bulawayo,
Retreating from Swazi cattle.

The yellor of Ndaba,
Yelled at by the Swazi people,
Saying Mswazi devoures cattle.

Listen to the one yelling,
Yelling as if he is crying,
As if he is mourning.

Malambule and Sidubelo,
With Phenduka's mother,

They yelled seated at Mfihlweni,
Saying hide it under the elbow
The eagle of Ndaba with large wings;
Encompassing Somhhashi and Fabase,
Engulfing Ndengezi born of Mayibuka.

You devoured Mtshikila among the Phahlaphahla Sotho,
In wrath you crossed Bhalule with rain of tears,
You went to Sikwata's seraglio among Sotho's.
Cattle repeatedly went to Hluhluwe,
They came back with Swazi flower.
Cattle ascended from the South even with horns,
Descending from the North even with horns.
You came with two female hostages,
One like Nomampo (Mpande's wife),
The other like Noziqubu (Mpande's other wife).

You came with Malambule from Sobhuza;
You came with Sidubelo from Sobhuza;
You came with Thekwane from Sobhuza;
You came with Mgidla from Sobhuza;
The Swazis stopped idolising Somhlola,

They took a Zulu oath

Inside Nodwengu.

The thunder is like a storm,

That thundered like a lightening stroke.

The flood that is like waters of Mkhuze River,

We crossed Mkhuze in a haste

The adorning of feathers in waterfalls,

Feathers shine with crowns till dawn.

An iron entanglement of Ndikidi

That ate Dambuza and Sikhombazana

The entanglement of Ndaba

With multi-coloured appeal.

As if deliberately done so.

An encircler of Ndaba,

Who wears spotted colours

An encircler of Ndaba,

For encircling Mswazi and Sobhuza's cattle,

You encircled the cattle of Jobe of Gece.

The path of wagons,

The great slider,

Followed by a person,

Until he reaches Hlathikhulu.

You attacked at midday to Mdletshe,

You attacked at midday to Fabase,

You attacked at midday to Sikwata,

And unleashed the well of rain;

We were unable to see rain

We of Malandela.

Spirited beverage

Was not taken by anyone of Malandela,

It was drank by flocks of antelopes.

The one who seeks refuge on paths of the leaving and settled,

The settled say

They will start fire.

The back of a mother

Let us go overland,

Where people there

Are like flocks of antelopes.

The news I heard overland,
The Malandela's said
The land is in turmoil,
Other loads went to Vuma,
Others went to Nyawo.
The mamba that caught the valleys
And went up through Vuna River,
Flocks of goats hit the road;
Those of Tokotoko hit the road,
Those of Maphitha also hit the road.
You who devoured all Phalane's cattle,
Those of Mbelebele went with the wind.

The strong catcher, he is the lion.
The tobacco tree of mBelebele,
It was cut by Klwana of Mbongombongweni
Axes completely failed.
The hunter not infuriated by the shield,
While the elders got infuriated.
You were the seeker of the north,
The seeker of the south.
The bird of Ndaba,

Who has long been laughed at by Zulu people.

Cattle bellowed

And went to the Whites.

An isolate like the sun

That stands alone in the sky.

The one who reigned while being despised.

The gleamering cow of Nodwengu.

The cow of Ndaba.

That grew up being hated.

Like the young of the antelope.

The yellor,

Yelled at by the Swazis,

Saying cattle are devoured by Mswazi

They cut their tails,

Seeing their fatness.

Mpande does not like cattle

That have signs written on them,

Because those belong to the Voortrekkers.

He has gone to Somcuba,

Before he even get washed,

While seated with Nongalaza and Sondoda,

He picks up his shield and declares war,

Because he is the king of the shield.

Hasten, the snake of Ndaba,

You will find houses at the periphery,

They are Dambuza's of Ntombela,

They are Ndlela's of Sompisi.

You find people sitting in the house

Building walls and pillars

You stab women,

You stab men,

By the time you reach Hlathikhulu

It is dust.

Mdayi runs away from the wrath of Ntuli

And that of Ntombela;

They destroy the house of Ndaba,

Saying it is given to them,

Given to them by Phunga,

Given to them by Mageba.

The one who rebukes and build like Heaven.

Somnandi of Ndaba,

Come, let me kiss your mouth.

You were infuriated and crossed Bhalule

With showers of tears,

To the castle of Sikwata of the Sotho.

* Cited in Zulu from: Izibongo Zamakhosi by C.S.L. Nyembezi, Shuter & Shooter, Pietermaritzburg, 1983, pp. 63 – 70.