



**PERCEPTIONS OF ETHEKWINI-BASED TRADE UNION  
LEADERSHIP ON SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE UNDER  
THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY**

**By**

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Master of Administration in the discipline of Public Administration  
in the Faculty of Commerce, Administration and Law at the  
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**30 November 2013**

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree of Master of Administration in the discipline of Public Administration, in the Faculty of Commerce Administration and Law, at the University of Zululand, is my own work and has not been previously submitted by me for a degree at another university.

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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I thank Allah my Rabb, the Creator, Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds for making it possible for me to do what I have done.

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I thank Dr J. Pietersen for professional statistical assistance.

## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Aisha for everything she has been to me and done for me,  
which words cannot express, Thembani and Solly Mashaba for bringing me up,  
Mamakizito and Mzee Juma for their love, and care,  
and Abdul Rahmaan bin Mustafaa.

## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AEC: Anti Eviction Campaign

APF: Anti-Privatisation Forum

BEC: Branch Executive Committee

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

CBO: Community Based Organisation

CCF: Concerned Citizens' Forum

CCG: Concerned Citizens Group

CNETU: Council of Non-European Trade Unions

CODESA: Convention for a Democratic South Africa

COGTA: Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs

COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions

CWU: Communication Workers Union

CWUSA: Creative Workers Union of South Africa

DA: Democratic Alliance

DENOSA: Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa

DF: Degrees of freedom

DITSELA: Educational Institute established by Congress of South African Trade Unions in 1996

DWAF: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry

EISA: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa

e.g.: *exempli gratia*=for example

etc.: *Et Cetera*=And So Forth

ERP: Environmental Resource Program

FAWU: Food and Allied Workers Union

FIFA: Federación Internacional de Fútbol Asociado

FIFA: Fédération Internationale de Football Association

FNETU (SAFNETU): Federation of Non-European Trade Unions

FOSATU: Federation of South African Trade Unions

GEAR: Growth Employment and Redistribution

GNU: Government of National Unity

GWU: General Workers Union

HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

ICU: Industrial and Commercial Union

i.e.: id est. =that is

LPM: Landless People's Movement

LRA: Labour Relations Act

MACWUSA: Motor and Component Workers Union of South Africa

MFMA: Municipal Finance Management Act

NACTU: National Council of Trade Unions

NALEDI: National Labour and Economic Development Institute

NB: Nota Bene=Note Well

NEC: National Executive Committee

NEDLAC: National Economic Development and Labour Council

NEF: National Economic Forum

NEHAWU: National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NMC: National Manpower Commission

NP: National Party

NPO: Non-Profit Organisation

NUM: National Union of Mineworkers

NUMSA: National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa

N. d: No Date

PAC: Pan-Africanist Congress

POPCRU: Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union

p.: page

pp.: pages

PPP: Public Private Partnership

RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme

REC: Regional Executive Committee

RSA: Republic of South Africa

SA: South Africa

SAAWU: South African Allied Workers Union

SACCAWU: South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union

SACTU: South African Congress of trade Unions

SACTWU: South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union

SADF: South African Defense Force

SADNU: South African Democratic Nurses' Union

SADTU: South African Democratic Teachers Union

SAFNETU (FNETU): South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions

SAFPU: South African Football Players Union

SALGA: South Africa Local Government Association

SAMA: South African Medical Association

SAMWU: South African Municipal Workers' Union

SANCO: South African National Civic Organisation

SAPA: South African Press Association

SAPS: South African Police Services

SASBO: Formerly the South African Society of Bank Officials

SATAWU: South African Transport and Allied Workers Union

SATLC: South African Trades and Labour Council

SECC: Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee

SPSS: Statistical Package for Social Sciences

TAC: Treatment Action Campaign

TANs: Transnational Advocacy Networks

TEUs: Twenty Foot equivalents

t.: tons

UDF: United Democratic Front

VANSA: Visual Arts Network of South Africa

VAT: Value Added Tax

Viz.: Videlicet=Namely

WPTPS: White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service

## **ABSTRACT**

The study used collective service delivery violence to appraise President Zuma in the opinions of the eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership. In justification of trade union choice for this purpose, credentials were tabled by portraying the crucial role trade union played in the political process and employment of collective action in South Africa, in pursuing important national issues and championing popular collective objectives like freedom. The trade union collective's leadership selection was motivated by trade union collective's historic leadership of collective action in South Africa, influence on the ANC and government. It was shown that collective service delivery violence became a national problem by giving statistical evidence of the proportions to which it grew, since it started as peaceful protests and turned violent in 2007. Collective action theory was employed to understand collective action in general, different types of collective action and to explain collective action phenomena in South Africa. Collective service delivery violence in particular was explained as social movement type of collective action. After reviewing service delivery legal framework and 2007 service delivery status quo, the study investigated perceptions of the eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership on collective service delivery violence, under the Zuma presidency. A qualitative method was used to determine trade union collective leadership's awareness of collective service delivery violence and a quantitative method was used for data analysis. The study determined what the trade union collective's leadership thought were the causes, consequences, solutions to collective delivery violence and the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union collective leadership's opinion of president Zuma, support and his performance.

## **LIST OF FIGURES**

	PAGE NUMBER
Figure 1: MAJOR COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS	
BY YEAR: 2004 – MAY 2012.....	23
Figure 2: NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS	
PER MONTH: FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011.....	24
Figure 3: COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS BY PROVINCE:	
FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2010.....	25
Figure 4: MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA.....	39
Figure 5: MAP OF ETHEKWINI AND RESIDENCIAL AREAS.....	39
Figure 6: KWAZULUKWAZULU-NATALNATAL COLLECTIVE	
PROTESTS BY DISTRICT: FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011.....	42
Figure 7: GENDER SPLIT FOR THE SAMPLE.....	49
Figure 8: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE’S LEADERSHIP IN THE	
SAMPLE HOLDING EXECUTIVE POSITIONS.....	49
Figure 9: TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP AGE GROUPINGS.....	50
Figure 10: COLLECTIVE PROTEST LEVELS RECESSION MONTHS VS	
CORRESPONDINGPREVIOUS MONTHS’ AVERAGE.....	68
Figure 11: COMPLAINTS OF COLLECTIVE PROTESTORS:	
FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011.....	71
Figure 12: PROPORTION OF COLLECTIVE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT	
BY QUARTER FROM 2007 TO 2011.....	72
Figure 13: PROPORTION OF COLLECTIVE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT:	
WINTER VS REST OF YEAR.....	73
Figure 14: TRADITIONAL LOWER-LEVEL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	87
Figure 15: AN INTEGRAL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	87

Figure 16: POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMERGENCE.....	88
Figure 17: CLASSICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE .....	89
Figure 18: MASS SOCIETY MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE.....	89
Figure 19: STATUS INCONSISTENCY MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE .....	89
Figure 20: COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE .....	89
Figure 21: VARIABLES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	94
Figure 22: TYPES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	96
Figure 23: SOUTH AFRICA COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL.....	99
Figure 24: THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM.....	108

## **LIST OF TABLES**

	PAGE NUMBER
Table 1.2.1: PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION DEPRIVED OF BASIC AMENITIES FROM 1996 TO 2011.....	22
Table 1.2.2: SUMMARY OF PEACEFUL COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30 ACCORDING TO POLICE STATIONS.....	26
Table 1.2.3: SUMMARY OF VIOLENT COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30 ACCORDING TO POLICE STATIONS.....	27
Table 1.2.4: SUMMARY OF PEACEFUL COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30 ACCORDING TO PROVINCES.....	28
Table 1.2.5: SUMMARY OF VIOLENT COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30 ACCORDING TO PROVINCES.....	28
Table 1.9.1: DURBAN PORT VOLUMES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2011/2012.....	40
Table 1.9.2: ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY, GENDER, EMPLOYMENT FOR PERSONS AGED 15 - 65 YEARS IN 2001.....	41
Table 1.9.3: ETHEKWINI POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE IN 2011.....	41
Table 1.10.2.1: THE EFFECT OF SAMPLE SIZE ON THE STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN FOR A POPULATION OF 10000.....	45
Table 1.10.3.1: SAMPLE.....	48
Table 4.2.1.1: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	116
Table 4.2.2.1: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS ON	

CAUSES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	117
Table 4.2.3.1: CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE GIVEN BY TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE’S LEADERSHIP.....	118
Table 4.2.4.1: SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE SUGGESTED BY TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE’S LEADERSHIP.....	120
Table 4.2.5.1: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP’S VIEWS ON IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP’S OPINION OF PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE .....	121
Table 4.2.5.2: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP’S VIEWS ON PERFORMANCE OF THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY.....	122
Table 4.3.5.1: PROPOSITION TESTING.....	124
Table 4.3.5.2: ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP OPINION OF PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE.....	126
Table 5.2.7.1: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES WITH SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	134

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	<b>PAGE NUMBER</b>
<b>1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND</b>	
1.1. INTRODUCTION.....	17
1.2. RATIONALE.....	20
1.3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.....	31
1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.....	33
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	33
1.6. RESEARCH PROPOSITION .....	34
1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....	34
1.8. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY.....	36
1.9. RESEARCH SITE: ETHEKWINI.....	38
1.10. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.....	43
1.10.1. RESEARCH DESIGN.....	43
1.10.2. SAMPLING.....	44
1.10.3. SAMPLE PROFILE OF ETHEKWINI BASED TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE'S LEADERSHIP.....	47
1.10.4. TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA.....	49
1.10.5. RESEARCH INSTRUMENT.....	50
1.10.6. CONSIDERATIONS.....	52
1.10.7. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE.....	53
1.10.8. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS.....	54
1.10.9. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.....	54
<b>2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY</b>	
2.1. INTRODUCTION.....	55
2.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRADE UNION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PROCESS .....	57
2.2.1. THE TRADE UNION ROLE IN THE DEMOCRACY STRUGGLE BEFORE THE 1994 ELECTIONS.....	57
2.2.2. THE TRADE UNION INFLUENCE ON THE ANC AND THE ANC GOVERNMENT AFTER THE 1994 DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS .....	61
2.3. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES AND REASONS.....	65

2.4.	SOUTH AFRICA SERVICE DELIVERY STATUTORY FRAMEWORK.....	74
2.5.	CONCLUSION.....	78
3.	CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
3.1.	INTRODUCTION.....	80
3.2.	COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY.....	82
3.3.	SOCIAL MOVEMENT TYPE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	88
3.4.	SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM TYPE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	90
3.5.	THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA .....	94
3.5.1.	COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	94
3.5.2.	BUSINESS UNION COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	100
3.5.3.	INDUSTRIAL ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	101
3.5.4.	SOCIAL MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	102
3.5.5.	SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA.....	105
3.5.6.	PUBLIC GOOD FROM THE POPULAR SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE.....	108
3.5.7.	COLLECTIVE ACTION LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA .....	108
3.6.	CONCLUSION.....	114
4.	CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS	
4.1.	INTRODUCTION.....	116
4.2.	DATA PRESENTATION.....	116
4.2.1.	TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP’S AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	116
4.2.2.	COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES.....	117
4.2.3.	COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CONSEQUENCES.....	118
4.2.4.	TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP’S SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	119

4.2.5.	IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP’S SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE .....	121
4.3.	DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS.....	123
4.3.1.	TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	123
4.3.2.	COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES.....	123
4.3.3.	COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CONSEQUENCES.....	123
4.3.4.	TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	124
4.3.5.	THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE .....	124
4.4.	SUMMARY OF RESULTS.....	129
5.	CHAPTER 5: RESULTS DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	
5.1.	INTRODUCTION.....	130
5.2.	RESULTS.....	130
5.2.1.	TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE’S LEADERSHIP SAMPLE.....	130
5.2.2.	TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP’S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA.....	131
5.2.3.	AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	131
5.2.4.	CAUSES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	132
5.2.5.	CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	132
5.2.6.	SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	133
5.2.7.	CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE.....	133
5.2.8.	IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE.....	135
5.3.	DISCUSSION.....	136
5.4.	CONCLUSION.....	140

<b>6. BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	
<b>6.1. PRIMARY SOURCES.....</b>	<b>143</b>
6.1.1. INTERVIEWS.....	143
6.1.2. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES.....	143
6.1.3. WEBSITES.....	144
6.1.4. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS.....	146
<b>6.2. SECONDARY SOURCES.....</b>	<b>151</b>
6.2.1. ARTICLES.....	151
6.2.2. JOURNALS.....	153
6.2.3. BOOKS.....	165
<b>7. APPENDICES.....</b>	<b>167</b>
7.1. QUESTIONNAIRE.....	167
7.2. LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT.....	169
7.3. SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA	
FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30.....	170
7.3.1. PEACEFUL SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS BY RESIDENTIAL AREA.....	170
7.3.2. VIOLENT SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS BY RESIDENTIAL AREA.....	195

## **1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

### **1.1. INTRODUCTION**

South Africa has a history of violent mass demonstrations which examples include 1960 Sharpeville massacre and 1976 Soweto riots. However, collective service delivery violence was new and was in response to poor service delivery. Prior to the 1994 democratic elections mass demonstrations, spearheaded by the trade union collective, focused primarily on attaining political freedom. The strategy of mass demonstrations, having worked against the Apartheid regime, to achieve political goals, was being used against the democratic regime to fight for good service delivery. ANC understood the power of mass protests and it was unlikely to allow it to be used against their government at length but would be rather keen to quell it swiftly.

The increasingly popular collective service delivery violence in response to poor service delivery showed that many South African communities, especially in rural areas, were not enjoying basic social amenities. One of the objects of local government is to ensure the provision of basic services to the communities (Republic of South Africa, 1996:87). The lack thereof which resulted to country wide collective service delivery protests and culminated to collective service delivery violence turned the focus not only to municipalities but also to the national government, the ruling party and the performance of the state president. It was against this background that this study investigated the perceptions of trade union collective's leadership on collective service delivery violence. Collective service delivery violence became a national problem and trade union leadership was believed be an actor that could influence the ANC, the government and the president in addressing the situation. It was the legacy of the trade union in fighting injustice and its role within the alliance, in tackling issues of national interest that prompted the study. The view is held that, the policy position and line of action of a collective, is informed by the perceptions of the leadership of that collective and vice versa. The trade union leadership was chosen because it permeates all collectives in South Africa consequently has an influence in almost all collective action in South Africa.

Therefore, the perceptions of COSATU affiliated trade union collective's leadership, on collective service delivery violence, is regarded as an important illumination into the thinking of a major sector of the South African population about collective service delivery violence. It is for this reason that collective service delivery violence was used to appraise President Zuma in the opinion of the trade union collective's leadership. The influence trade union has in the South African political process, started during the Apartheid era when the trade union became the means of broadening the ANC struggle against Apartheid and was conveyor of ANC oppositional ideology of non-racialism (Emery, 2004). While the political organisations were banned in South Africa, the trade union was at the forefront of the political struggle. Also the trade union influence within the ANC began as a relationship and cooperation between the trade union and the political party, in 1985 when COSATU was founded and was solidified by the formal formation of the ANC-SACP-COSATU tripartite. Since the fight against Apartheid, the formation of the alliance, in 1991, the stature, role, and the dominance of COSATU in South African political process on and within the ANC increased significantly (Pillay, 2008:13), hence the importance of the study.

The study is organised in the following manner: Chapter 1: Introduction and Background, Chapter 2: Literature Survey, Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework, Chapter 4: Data Presentation Analysis and Results, Chapter 5: Results Discussion and Conclusion; 6: Bibliography and 7: Appendices. Chapter 1 introduces the study and gives the background to it. Chapter 2 shows the important role played by the trade union collective in the political process, national political and social arena in South Africa, both historically and contemporary, which is why its eThekweni-based leadership perceptions on collective service delivery violence were investigated. This chapter brings to the fore the statutory service delivery framework and service delivery status quo prior to the eruption of collective service delivery violence. The chapter lastly presents collective service delivery violence reasons, causes and statistics during the Zuma Presidency. Chapter 3 gives the theoretical explanation of generally how and why people embark on collective action and the types of collective action. The chapter goes on to demonstrate different collective action phenomena in South Africa and explains collective service delivery violence in terms of a particular type of collective action theory, called social movement unionism.

Chapter 4 presents the collected data, analysis and results on perceptions of eThekweni-based trade union leadership on collective service delivery violence. It presents the collective service delivery violence causes, consequences, solutions and the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union leadership support for President Zuma and his performance, as seen by the eThekweni-based trade union leadership. Chapter 5 discusses the sample composition, biographical data, trade union leadership awareness of collective service delivery violence, what they thought were causes, consequences and solutions to collective service delivery violence. The causes and solutions suggested by the trade union leadership are compared. The impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union collective's leadership's support for President Zuma and their opinion on his performance is statistically quantified and tabled. The results are discussed and the conclusion is made.

The arrangement in the rest of chapter 1 is as follows:

- 1.2. Rationale
- 1.3. Statement of the Problem
- 1.4. Objectives of the Study
- 1.5. Research Questions
- 1.6. Research Proposition
- 1.7. Significance of the Study
- 1.8. Justification for the Study
- 1.9. Research Site: EThekweni
- 1.10. Research Design and Methodology
- 1.11. Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
- 1.12. Conclusion

## **1.2. RATIONALE**

Collective service delivery violence or service delivery violence is the violence that occurs during collective service delivery protests, where and when people dissatisfied with the South African Government's service delivery, engage in peaceful collective service delivery protests that turn violent or directly embark on violent collective service delivery protests. During the service delivery protests, protesters indulge in the physical acts that have a potential to cause harm or cause harm to persons, buildings or property by throwing stones, objects at people motorists, burning of tires, houses, structures, spilling waste bins, littering the streets, blockading the roads. Protesters beat, hurt and kill people and non-protestors during protests. Collective service delivery violence and service delivery violence which are used interchangeably, are caused by violent collective service delivery protests and result to social, political and or economic disturbance.

Perceptions of the trade union leadership on service delivery violence is the awareness, understanding, comprehension, apprehension, foresight, firsthand experience, knowledge, visualisation, mental image, consideration, note taken, rise given, causes, characteristics, costs, solutions, effects, impact of collective service delivery violence caused by collective service delivery protesters dissatisfied with the South African Government's service delivery on the trade union leadership. By perceptions on service delivery violence is meant the 'perceptions on collective service delivery violence' but for the sake of brevity 'perceptions on service delivery violence' is used.

Trade union leadership is the leadership of a specific type of a collective which is the trade union. Trade union leadership means leadership of the trade union collective and comprises trade union leaders whose unions are COSATU affiliates. Trade union leadership and trade union collective's leadership is used interchangeably. The concept also refers to members of trade union organisations who have been elected or appointed into positions of authority in their trade union organisations or in COSATU.

Trade union leadership is inclusive of powerful and influential members of the of trade union organisations by virtue of the positions they hold in trade union organisations, COSATU or COSATU affiliated trade union organisations leaders, whose power and influence can be used formally or informally, both inside and outside the member trade union and or COSATU. These people may be any members of the trade union on the shop floor, inside or outside COSATU leadership. Trade union leadership is seen as, although not limited to, authority and position but also include a complex interplay between trade union members giving rise to new membership behaviour, mode of operating, communication, influence, collective impetus for change or action. It is the ability to influence both the political process and the political players like the political leaders, the president, political parties, government etc. Trade union leadership is also judged to be the mechanism of influencing the processing of information throughout the trade union organisation and enabling action based on this information. In this study 'trade union' and COSATU are used interchangeably.

Collective service delivery violence had become a national problem in South Africa, since 2004, according to the Municipal IQ (2012). As it had been in the past, in South Africa, strikes, demonstrations, go-slows were a means of sending a message to the Apartheid government. Similarly, in the case of Zuma presidency, the collective service delivery protests intensified as the people sent warnings to the Zuma government, that what started as peaceful collective service delivery protests and grew to collective service delivery violence, could converge to an uprising (AllAfrica.com, 2011).

A report by SAPA, on 07 March 2011, based on the survey conducted by interviewing 2000 metropolitan residents, in November 2010 stated (SAPA, 2011) that:

Violence over service delivery is "almost a certainty" with more than 51 percent of metropolitan residents unhappy, according to a survey released on Monday.

The report quoted Neil Higgs, TNS Research Surveys Director, in the Sunday Times Live on March 2011 (SAPA, 2011) as having said:

This figure of 51percent is very high and indicates that violence over a lack of service delivery is almost a certainty.

According to the report there was no much change compared with the figure of 52 percent recorded in February 2010 and it meant that the local government did effectively nothing, in 2009, by way of improving people's perceptions of their service delivery. These figures of percentage deprivation of basic amenities are in agreement with those of Statistics South Africa (2012) in table 1.2.1. The lack of change in the survey percentage shows the acuteness of the problem of collective service delivery violence and the level of unhappiness among the affected communities.

**Table 1.2.1: PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION DEPRIVED OF BASIC AMENITIES FROM 1996 TO 2011**


YEAR	NO FORMAL HOUSING	NO ELECTRICITY FOR LIGHTING OR COOKING	NO PIPED WATER INSIDE THE YARD	NO FLUSH TOILET CONNECTED TO SEWERAGE SYSTEM
1996	34.9	41.8	39.2	---
2001	31.3	30.3	37.4	50.9
2007	29.4	19.9	30.6	45.0
2011	22.4	15.3	26.6	43.0

(Statistics South Africa, 2012)

Statistics South Africa (2012) showed that the percentages of the South African population deprived of formal housing, electricity and water, in 1996, two years after the democratic elections, were 34.9%, 41.8%, and 39.2% respectively, as shown in the first row of table 1.2.1.

These percentages were reduced progressively up to 2007. Although the percentage population, without sanitation (last column of table 1.2.1.), could not be ascertained in 1996 but the figure decreased from 50.9%, in 2001, to 45%, in 2007. There was a general improvement in the accessibility to basic amenities from 1996 to 2007 as the percentage of the deprived population decreased on all four areas viz. housing, electricity, water and sanitation. However these improvements were evidently not enough to stop collective service delivery protests which started in the early 2000s (Rondganger, 2012).


**Figure 1: MAJOR COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS  
BY YEAR: 2004 – 2012**



(Municipal IQ, 2012)

Collective service delivery protests, increased steadily, as shown in figure 1 above, with reported major protests of 469 incidents between 2004 and 2012, which peaked in 2010, with protests reaching a high of 111 the same year (Municipal IQ, 2012). From the fact that collective service delivery protests peaked in 2010, it is evident that despite the improvements in accessibility to basic amenities, from 1996 to 2007, the 2001 and 2007 service delivery figures were not acceptable or did not meet expectations of the South African population.

**Figure 2: NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS PER MONTH: FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011**




[Source: Karamoko, 2011:6]

As it has been pointed out, statistics showed that collective service delivery violence peaked in 2010 and declined from June 2010 to June 2011, the period of decline coincided with the FIFA world cup. Two arguments existed for the decline of collective service delivery protests. One argument was that the decline was as a result of South Africa hosting the FIFA world cup in 2010. The other argument was that the cause for collective service delivery violence had been attended to. The two arguments could only be proved or disproved through research.

There was a steady growth in collective service delivery protests, from 2007 to 2010 that averaged 8.73 per month, in 2007, 9.83 in 2008, 17.58 in 2009 and 10.92 in 2010 (Karamoko, 2011:21). It can be seen from figure 3, table 1.2.4 and table 1.2.5 below, that collective service delivery protests were mostly and constantly prevalent in Gauteng, North West and KwaZulu-Natal, in the period 2009 to 2011.

**Figure 3: COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS BY PROVINCE:  
FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011**



[Source: Karamoko, 2011:24]

**Table 1.2.2: SUMMARY OF PEACEFUL COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS  
OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30  
ACCORDING TO POLICE STATIONS**

REPORTING POLICE STATION GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	PROVINCE
Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg	196	Gauteng
Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho	190	North West
Ccu Unit 09-Durban	167	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria	164	Gauteng
Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong	161	Gauteng
Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)	142	North West
Ccu Unit 14-George	106	Western Cape
Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn	93	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)	75	North West
Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate	67	Freestate
Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield	65	Northern Cape
Ccu Unit 43-Highveld	64	Mpumalanga
Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit	61	Mpumalanga
Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate	54	Freestate
Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela	50	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth	47	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg	47	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 08-Midlands	45	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate	41	Freestate
Ccu Unit 13-East London	37	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi	34	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld	32	Mpumalanga
Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu	31	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 47-Mopani	31	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi	28	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou	27	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town	21	Western Cape
Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia	21	Northern Cape
Ccu Unit 36-Queenstown	14	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha	13	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg	10	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 11-Boland	6	Western Cape
Ccu Unit 51-Karoo	2	Eastern Cape
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2142</b>	

(Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012)

**Table 1.2.3: SUMMARY OF VIOLENT COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS  
OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30  
ACCORDING TO POLICE STATIONS**

REPORTING POLICE STATION GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	PROVINCE
Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho	111	North West
Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit	106	Mpumalanga
Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg	97	Gauteng
Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield	74	Northern Cape
Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate	74	Freestate
Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria	71	Gauteng
Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)	71	North West
Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate	55	Freestate
Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong	52	Gauteng
Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld	51	Mpumalanga
Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth	44	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)	41	North West
Ccu Unit 09-Durban	40	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 43-Highveld	40	Mpumalanga
Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate	28	Freestate
Ccu Unit 14-George	25	Western Cape
Ccu Unit 13-East London	24	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela	18	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town	17	Western Cape
Ccu Unit 08-Midlands	11	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu	8	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn	8	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg	8	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha	7	Eastern Cape
Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou	7	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi	6	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 11-Boland	5	Western Cape
Ccu Unit 47-Mopani	5	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg	4	Limpopo
Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi	2	KwaZulu-Natal
Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia	1	Northern Cape
Ccu Unit 36-Queenstown	1	Eastern Cape
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1112</b>	

(Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012)

The percentage collective service delivery violence contributions, for Gauteng, North West and KwaZulu-Natal, in the same period, were 32%, 11% and 9% respectively (Karamoko, 2011:24). The foregoing view of Karamoko, that collective service delivery protests occurred throughout South Africa and were mostly prevalent in Gauteng, North West and KwaZulu-Natal was confirmed by the official SAPS records, of collective service delivery protests, for the period from 2009 to 2012 as shown in tables 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 above and tables 1.2.4 and 1.2.5 below.

**Table 1.2.4: SUMMARY OF PEACEFUL COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS  
OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30  
ACCORDING TO PROVINCES**

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
Gauteng	521
North West	411
KwaZulu-Natal	353
Limpopo	198
Freestate	162
Mpumalanga	155
Western Cape	133
Eastern Cape	123
Northern Cape	86
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2142</b>

(Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012)

**Table 1.2.5: SUMMARY OF VIOLENT COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS  
OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY SAPS FROM 2009-01-01 TO 2012-11-30  
ACCORDING TO PROVINCES**

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
North West	223
Gauteng	220
Mpumalanga	197
Freestate	157
KwaZulu-Natal	85
Eastern Cape	84
Northern Cape	75
Western Cape	47
Limpopo	24
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1112</b>

(Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012)

The number of service delivery protests increased drastically since President Zuma took office, in 2009, as it can be seen from figure 1, tables 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4 and 1.2.5. The cumulative figures, recorded according to the geographical position of the reporting police stations, show that there were 2142 incidents of peaceful collective protests (from table 1.2.2) and 1112 incidents of violent collective protests (from table 1.2.3), in South Africa, from 01 January 2009 to 30 November 2012. Tables 1.2.4 and 1.2.5 above, show summarised figures per province, of peaceful and violent collective service delivery protests respectively. Respective detailed reports, by residential area, are found in Appendix 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 for peaceful and violent protests respectively. Collective service delivery protests became South Africa wide phenomenon, as it was experienced by all provinces, although at different times and intensities, some provinces had more collective service delivery protests, in terms of intensity and frequency, than others.

Buhlungu and Psoulis conducted a longitudinal study on 646 shop floor COSATU shop stewards, in 1994 and in 1998, the purpose of which, was to account for similarities of continuity of alliance support, opinions and attitudes COSATU members held on the alliance between the ANC, the SACP and COSATU, and the expectations of service delivery promises made by the ANC in its election manifesto (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999:120). The study by Buhlungu and Psoulis proved that the solidarity within the tripartite alliance would continue.

Notwithstanding the proof by the abovementioned study, of continued trade union support for the ANC, one question could be: considering the ousting of former president Mbeki, would the trade union collective's leadership support for the then reigning ANC president, President Zuma, continue untainted by collective service delivery violence? This study would therefore be in part a follow up on Buhlungu and Psoulis' study with respect to support by trade union collective's leadership for President Zuma, the state president and ANC president. The crucial question therefore would be: what would be the opinion of trade union leadership on the performance of President Zuma, in view of poor service delivery, that resulted to collective service delivery violence? In view of the collective service delivery violence, would the trade union stop supporting President Zuma like it did to former President Mbeki but continue supporting the ANC?

The answer to this question would be an indicator of trade union collective's leadership assessment of President Zuma's performance and their support for him, more so because poor service delivery goes against the constitution, section 152 (1) (b) (Republic of South Africa, 1996) and RDP, the COSATU poverty alleviation programme for the poor and the working class. The study intended to partly fill this gap by appraising President Zuma using collective service delivery violence and investigating the perceptions of eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership on collective service delivery violence, under the Zuma presidency.

Prominent figures in South Africa expressed concern about collective service delivery violence. The then Minister for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Sicelo Shiceka, when addressing SALGA on 12 November 2009, said that the government must respond to issues before people take to the streets (Mbola, 2009).

Hellen Zille, the leader of DA, quoted in the Sunday Times Live of 05 February 2011, bemoaned the state of service delivery and called it unreliable (Zille, 2011). Desmond Tutu, the Nobel laureate and Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, stated in The Guardian, on 21 October 2012 (Tutu, 2012) that:

In South Africa, we are experiencing a spate of popular protests – termed "service delivery protests" – many of them characterised by violence, looting and the destruction of property. Eighteen years since the demise of apartheid, people rightly feel it is unfair for them to accept their marginalisation forever.

The former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, argued in The National of United Arab Emirates, of 27 July 2009, that economic growth was the best way of spreading prosperity but the increased inequalities increased resentment, among the poor communities (Mbeki, 2009). President Zuma, in his state of the nation address, in February 2011, also acknowledged the problem of collective service delivery violence by conceding that service delivery should move faster (Zuma, 2011).

Collective service delivery violence, having grown to be a national problem, would necessitate the intervention of national actors, with influence and authority, like the government, the ruling party (ANC), the state president, the trade union etc, to address. One actor, although not having authority but influence and could put pressure on the president to take action on collective service delivery violence, is the trade union collective's leadership. The action of the trade union leadership and subsequently the trade union collective as whole, pertaining President Zuma, the ANC and government would be informed by their perceptions on national issues, such as collective service delivery violence.

### **1.3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

The problem to be investigated was the perception of the trade union collective's leadership on collective service delivery violence under the Zuma presidency. Collective service delivery violence was with regard to the whole of South Africa and the trade union collective's leadership referred to, was limited to eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership. Collective service delivery violence across South Africa was used to appraise President Zuma among the trade union leaders based in eThekweni.

The objective of the study was to first establish trade union collective's leadership awareness of collective service delivery violence and then proceed to investigate what trade union collective's leadership thought were the causes, consequences and solutions to collective service delivery violence. The impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union leadership opinion of the Zuma presidency was to be established. The study aimed at determining if collective service delivery violence had an impact on trade union collective's leadership support for President Zuma and if so what the impact was. The study also intended to investigate what trade union collective's leadership thought of the performance of President Zuma given the collective service delivery violence in the country then?

Actions are informed of perceptions, which actions may either be to verify the perceptions or to directly act on the perceptions. Perceptions of trade union leadership on national issues influence perceptions of trade union collective membership and vice versa. The trade union leadership acts on the perceptions and influence the membership on a position the trade union would take regarding national matters, in line with the leadership perceptions. Hence it would be beneficial and advantageous to the political and societal actors to know the perceptions of the trade union leadership on national issues. The perceptions of the trade union leadership, that the policies of former president Mbeki disadvantaged the working class, led to the campaign within the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance by COSATU, to oust Mbeki as the president of the ANC, in the December 2007 Polokwane conference and replaced him with Zuma (ANC, 2010). Mbeki was subsequently recalled by the NEC of the ANC as the state president.

Incidents of collective service delivery violence under the Zuma presidency increased both in frequency and in intensity, amongst others, the flash point areas were Ficksburg, Zandspruit, Balfour, Rustenburg, Soweto, Western Cape and Gauteng (See Appendix 7.3). One of casualties was Andries Tatane from the Free State. Properties damaged included private houses, libraries, government buildings and infrastructure. Considering the scale of collective service delivery violence and the influence trade union has, the trade union could independently use the two factors in appraisal of President Zuma. This could spark a succession debate within ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance and fuel an early exit from office of President Zuma, similar to that of former president Mbeki. The trade union being the most vociferous, influential and commanding the biggest following within the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance, the knowledge of their leadership perceptions, on collective service delivery violence would therefore be necessary and crucial in establishing the trade union's policy position in relation to the government and the ANC. The trade union policy position, with regards to national matters, like the government's service delivery programme, the performance of the state president, would be a product of perceptions of trade union leadership informed by developments and issues throughout the country, such as collective service delivery violence. It was for these reasons that perceptions of the trade union leadership on collective service delivery violence rendered themselves a researchable problem.

#### **1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The objectives of the study were the following:

- 1.4.1. To determine the perceptions of trade union collective's leadership on the causes and effects of collective service delivery violence in eThekweni.
- 1.4.2. To determine the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union collective's leadership opinion of President Zuma.
- 1.4.3. To determine how trade union collective's leadership thought President Zuma performed in view of collective service delivery violence.
- 1.4.4. To establish what trade union collective's leadership thought were solutions to collective service delivery violence.

#### **1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

- 1.5.1. What are the perceptions of trade union collective's leadership on the causes and effects of collective service delivery violence in eThekweni under the Zuma presidency?
- 1.5.2. What is the impact, if any, of collective service delivery violence on the opinion of trade union collective's leadership on Zuma presidency generally?
- 1.5.3. What is the impact, if any, of collective service delivery violence on the opinion of trade union collective's leadership on the performance of President Zuma?
- 1.5.4. What are the views of trade union collective's leadership in eThekweni on resolving the perennial problem of collective service delivery violence in the municipality?

## **1.6. RESEARCH PROPOSITION**

The proposition would either be proved or disproved by the study. The study was intended to determine the trade union collective's leadership perceptions on collective service delivery violence under the Zuma presidency. The proposition was formulated in line with the achievement of the objective.

### **PROPOSITION**

Collective service delivery protests and collective service delivery violence has affected the popularity of President Zuma negatively amongst trade union collective's leadership in eThekweni.

## **1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The beneficiaries of the study would be the trade union organisations, the ANC, government, the SACP and the South African community. The results of the study would not only influence the policy positions of the individual organisations, viz. ANC, SACP, COSATU towards government, but it would also influence the mutual policy positions to one another. The study would bring to light the thinking of eThekweni-based trade union leadership about collective service delivery violence and consequently how they judged president Zuma and his performance.

Knowing the perceptions of part of the trade union collective's leadership would be informative to the rest of the trade union collective's leadership and the rest of the collective membership and aid in determining trade union's policy position on collective service delivery violence and state's service delivery programme.

The thinking which may be held by part of the trade union leadership could be induced on the whole trade union leadership and the trade union membership. Also, the perceptions of eThekweni-based trade union leadership could be an indicator of the perceptions of the whole trade union leadership and membership. The ANC knew the support and contribution of the trade union organisation in the ANC victories both outside and inside government. It also knew that the trade union had the capacity to mobilise the masses in pursuit of its aspirations (Pillay, 2008:13). As a result the ANC could not afford to be openly at loggerheads with the trade union or let it get out of control but had to constantly keep it in check. This it could only achieve if it were aware of trade union leadership perceptions on issues of importance so as to engage it.

Trade union, through COSATU, is not only known for influencing the choice of the ANC president, consequently the state president but also of crafting an early exit from office of ANC president or state president anyone who the trade union perceived was not supportive of trade union course (ANC, 2010). Therefore the knowledge of trade union leadership perceptions of President Zuma would not be confined to the ANC as an organisation but it is anticipated that the ANC would carry it past the tripartite alliance to the ANC led government so that these entities benefit from such knowledge. The political dynamics were such that the president of the ANC and the ANC led government would of necessity take note of the perceptions of trade union leadership.

In terms of ideology, the SACP is closer to COSATU than the ANC, their ideologies being communism and socialism respectively, rather than ANC which were capitalistic inclined. The other common factor was that both SACP and COSATU are alliance partners and they were both not political parties. They both wanted to influence the ANC and government policies from a similar position. It was this situation that made it imperative for the SACP to be aware of trade union leadership perceptions on national issues if the SACP were to fashion a policy position that would make an impact on the ANC and the ANC led government.

## **1.8. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY**

Normally a change of the state president results in many changes like that of cabinet ministers and other key positions, most importantly government policy positions, all of which affected a host of things including the economy of the country. There was a lot of interest as to whether President Zuma would succeed in running for the second term of office or not, which if not could result to the aforesaid change and jolt many things including the economy.

Factors which influenced the choice of the next president and the position of important role players in the ANC presidential election were among others, perceptions of trade union leadership on national issues and the state president. The trade union leadership perceptions on issues in turn inform the actions of trade union leadership. The trade union greatly influences whether the ANC president could or could not finish his term of office. It also influences who would be the country's next president by influencing the choice of the ANC's next president (ANC, 2010).

An answer to the question popularity and performance of President Zuma could only be obtained after the following ANC electoral conference. However, the results obtained at the conclusion of the research would serve as indicators to these questions. They will also be used in the succession battle for ANC presidential position, to predict the successor of President Zuma and to make predictions about future successions in the ANC presidential position (ANC, 2010).

The idea that the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance was instrumental in ANC's success since the democratic elections and the ANC's strong hold on power for the foreseeable future drove Andreasson (2006: 304) to state that:

Therefore alignments within the Alliance and the ANC leadership are as likely to have a significant impact on future political and policy trajectories as are challenges to the ANC from without.

Marthinus van Schalkwyk, former leader of the defunct NP, stated (Andreasson, 2006: 304) that:

The real debate on the future of the country is within the ANC and not outside.

A longitudinal study based on three surveys of COSATU members conducted by Buhlungu in 1994, 1998 and 2005 shows (Buhlungu, 2005: 716) that:

More than three-quarters of COSATU members are in full support of the alliance and the ANC-led government.

The foregoing showed that COSATU was unlikely to break away from the alliance but would fight its battles within the alliance. Service delivery violence was believed to can be either a cause or a reason for COSATU to go to battle with the ANC within the alliance, hence the study.

It was established from the literature review that the trade union leadership is the only type of collective action leadership that is elected, stable identifiable, and from experience, reachable for research purposes and leads legal collective action. Other collective leaderships like violent collective service delivery protests are not elected, self-imposed, unidentifiable, unstable, and transitory and lead collective actions that sometimes violate the law and hence it is not easy for them to declare their leadership. The trade union collective contributed much towards the achievement of democracy in South Africa (Duran and Yildirim, 2005:229) and it is one of the largest and historically most militant working class collective in the African Continent (Gwisai, 2002). Maree (1998) concurs that COSATU is the biggest trade union federation in South Africa.

As it can be seen in figure 23, the trade union leadership provides leadership to all collectives in South Africa and consequently has an influence in many collective actions in South Africa. Trade union tends to assume *de facto* leadership in pursuance of societal goals as it has done when the UDF was banned (Wood and Harcourt, 1998). The foregoing reasons are the justification for the choice of trade union collective's leadership as the collective's leadership chosen to appraise President Zuma on collective service delivery violence.

It was against the above backdrop that the perceptions of the trade union leadership on collective service delivery violence would be found useful in understanding and predicting the dynamics both inside and outside the alliance. The foregoing background shows that the trade union collective, would fight for her relevancy, her image, the working class rights and political survival both inside and outside the South African political process.

Armed with the support given to Zuma, the ANC, their role in the struggle and mass mobilisation capacity, the trade union would be bound to take up issue with the ANC, within the alliance. The tripartite alliance would be the trade union battle ground to fight for matters affecting the working class, such as service delivery, more so if such matters are unfulfilled electoral promises by the ANC. The results of the study could be used as an indicator of how trade union leadership viewed President Zuma's performance on service delivery, whether President Zuma would have trade union leadership support if he ran for the second term of office and what would be the future political dynamics within the alliance.

## **1.9. RESEARCH SITE: ETHEKWINI**

The research site was the city of eThekweni which is a sea port city situated on the East coast of South Africa, on the Indian Ocean and falls under the eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality, which comprises eThekweni and the neighbouring towns. EThekweni is the third biggest city in South Africa and the eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality is the fourth biggest Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa and the biggest city on the East Coast of the African continent.

The N3 freeway links eThekweni to Johannesburg, in the North and to Cape Town in the South. The city has a large diversified economy, with strong manufacturing, tourism, transportation, finance and government sectors, all together contributing over half of the KwaZulu-Natal province's output, employment and income. Most of the tourists that come to KwaZulu-Natal are attracted by eThekweni.

Its GDP is approximately 55% of the KwaZulu-Natal GDP and the KwaZulu-Natal's GDP is in turn 15% of the South African GDP (EThekwin online Port City, 2012).

**Figure 4: MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA**



(The World Fact Book, 2011)

**Figure 5: MAP OF ETHEKWINI AND RESIDENCIAL AREAS**



(EThekwin world guides, 2011)

The King Shaka International Airport, found in eThekweni, services both domestic and international flights to Dubai, Mauritius and Mozambique. The sea port of Durban, at eThekweni dates back to 1824. It is one the busiest general cargo ports and the largest container terminals in the Southern Hemisphere. The Durban port has a ship repair yard, the only privately owned floating dock in South Africa. The terminals found in the sea port of Durban (Ports & Ships, n. d) are the following:

- Passenger terminal
- Ro-Ro(Roll on roll off) automotive terminal
- Bulk cargo terminal
- Wood chip terminal
- Sugar terminal
- Oil terminal
- Fruit terminal
- Coal terminal
- Bulk terminal

The Durban port volumes, for the different types of cargo, counted in tons (t) and containers, counted twenty foot equivalents (TEUs), are shown in the table 1.9.1.

**Table 1.9.1: DURBAN PORT VOLUMES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2011/2012**

TYPE OF LOAD	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	TRANSHIPMENTS	TOTAL
Cargo tonnage	45,282,995t	25,613,589t	7,204,267t	78,100,851t
Bulk cargo	25,815,759t	8,623,952t	220,296t	34,677,840t
Break bulk cargo	4,330,820t	2,446,560t	220,296t	6,997,676t
Containers	1,121,216 TEUs	1,077,265 TEUs	499,692 TEUs	2,698,173 TEUs

(Ports & Ships, 2012)

The ethnical diversity of eThekweni population, according to the 2001 census figures, race gender grouping and employment are tabulated in table 1.9.2. The population percentage population age structure is tabulated in table 1.9.3.

**Table 1.9.2: ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY, GENDER, EMPLOYMENT FOR PERSONS AGED 15 - 65 YEARS IN 2001**

GENDER	ETHEKWINI POPULATION CATEGORY	BLACK AFRICAN	COLOURED	INDIAN OR ASIAN	WHITE
Male	Employed	236676	13806	128777	66430
	Unemployed	239787	5802	27480	4608
	Not economically active	206239	7617	56656	22433
Female	Employed	187751	13992	79552	55950
	Unemployed	283726	4975	20857	3791
	Not economically active	267877	12804	131678	39649
	Total population employed	1422056	58996	445000	192861
	Grand total employed	2118913			
	Children younger than 15 years and adults older than 65 years	971209			
	Total eThekwini population	3090122			

(Statistics South Africa, 2001)

According to the 2011 census figures, the population of KwaZulu-Natal then was 10819130 (Statistics South Africa, 2011:3) and that of eThekwini municipality was 3442361 (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 9) which equaled 31.82%  $\{(3442361/10819130) \times 100 = 31.82\}$  of the population of KwaZulu-Natal. The area of eThekwini is 2292 square kilometers, thus giving a population density of 1501 people per square kilometer. The eThekwini population age spread shows that the bulk of the population (70.0 %), that largely contributed to the economy of the city, were between the ages of 15 and 64 years (table 1.9.3).

**Table 1.9.3: ETHEKWINI POPULATION AGE STRUCTURE IN 2011**


TOTAL POPULATION IN 2011	AGE STRUCTURE IN 2011		
	<15	15-64	65+
3 442 361	25.2%	70.0%	4.8%

(Statistics South Africa, 2012: 9)

The significance of eThekweni as a research site is that it is one of the eight metropolitan municipalities in South Africa (South African Government Information, 2012). It is also the municipality with the biggest population in KwaZulu-Natal, consisting 31.82% that of KwaZulu-Natal, as was established previously. Its relevancy to trade unionism is that it has the highest number of people employed in one municipality in KwaZulu-Natal (Statistics South Africa, 2001), hence the most unionized municipality in KwaZulu-Natal.

From the service delivery violence point of view, eThekweni was a leading protest municipality in KwaZulu-Natal by 42% from 2007 to June 2010 (Jain, H. 2010:26 ) and the lead increased to 45% in the period February 2007 to May 2011 (Karamoko, 2011:28) as can be seen from figure 6 below. EThekweni had 40 incidents of violent service delivery protests from 01 January 2009 to 30 November 2012 and 167 incidents of peaceful service delivery protests in the same period (Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012).

**Figure 6: KWAZULU-NATAL COLLECTIVE PROTESTS BY DISTRICT:  
FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011**



[Source: Karamoko, 2011:28]

The KwaZulu-Natal province percentage contribution to collective service delivery protests in South Africa was 6%, 12%, 9% and 10% in the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively, averaging 9.18% for the whole period (Jain 2010:22). In terms of percentage contribution to collective service delivery protests, KwaZulu-Natal ranked number 7 in 2007, 4 in 2008, 6 in 2009, 4 in 2010 and 5 in 2011 (Karamoko, 2011:21). During the period February 2007 to May 2011, of all the regions in KwaZulu-Natal, eThekweni Municipality had the highest average percentage collective service delivery protests of 45%, as demonstrated in figure 6. The two regions which had the lowest average percentage, within the same period, were Amajuba and uThungulu. The major contributor of collective service delivery protests in the KwaZulu-Natal was eThekweni Municipality. This is the reason why eThekweni was chosen as the research site of all the municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal province.

## **1.10. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

### **1.10.1. RESEARCH DESIGN**

The study adopted a mixed method approach of research design. The research questions were qualitative and a quantitative method was used to analyse the primary data collected. Collective service delivery violence was used to appraise President Zuma in the opinion of eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership. The method comprised questionnaires administered on the sampled group of eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership. Some questions in the questionnaire were close ended and others were open ended. The research design was of a non-experimental survey type, involving the measurement of the phenomenon at a single instance. There were two variables involved, the 'collective service delivery violence' and 'a perception of eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership on collective service delivery violence'. The former is an independent variable and the latter a dependent variable. The research design was said to be non-experimental because there was no planned intervention after the influence on the dependent variable. It was a survey design because an examination was made on a relationship between two variables, the 'collective service delivery violence' and 'a perception of eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership on collective service delivery violence'.

The influence of the former on latter was not investigated because it was not the objective of the study to determine a causal relation between the independent and the dependent variable. The measurement of the phenomenon was of a cross-sectional design since it occurred once, more or less at the same time, during the Zuma presidency, as opposed to a longitudinal design, where the measurement happens more than once.

### **1.10.2. SAMPLING**

Of the whole population of the union collective's leadership, in South Africa, the eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership was chosen to be the focus group for the study. Hence, the sampling method used was the purposive sampling method. Since the cross section spanning the Zuma presidency was studied, the sample was taken from that period and the cross sectional sampling method used.

The trade union leadership across KwaZulu-Natal was estimated to be 1428. As per the sample size of 461, the eThekweni-based trade union leadership constituted 32% ( $461/1428=32$ ) of the KwaZulu-Natal trade union leadership. The number of responses was 461, meaning that the sample of eThekweni-based trade union leadership constituted 32% of the KwaZulu-Natal trade union leadership. It is worth noting that the population of eThekweni in 2011 was found to be 3442361 (Statistics South Africa, 2012: 9) and that of KwaZulu-Natal was 10819130 (Statistics South Africa, 2011:3) which meant that eThekweni population made 31.82% of KwaZulu-Natal population. The ratio of eThekweni population (3442361) to KwaZulu-Natal (10819130) population was 1:3 (3442361:10819130).

This ratio was the same as the ratio of eThekweni-based trade union leadership (461) to KwaZulu-Natal trade union leadership (1428), which was also 1:3 (461:1428). A big enough sample of  $n=461$  was obtained to compensate for any inaccuracies in the number of both eThekweni-based trade union leadership and KwaZulu-Natal trade union leadership. It was proved that a sample size bigger than 500 was not necessary for the results to be valid for a population of 10000.

This figure was far bigger than eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership that was estimated at 1428. Hence a sample of  $n=461$ , for a population of 1428, would suffice. An increase in sample size resulted to a decrease in standard error of the mean as shown in table 1.10.2.1 (Welman and Kruger, 2001). Ibid, (2001:64) stated that:

An increase in the sample size, in proportion to the size of the population from which the sample is drawn, results in a decrease in the standard error. So, although we must try to draw as a big as possible a sample size, it becomes relatively unnecessary to draw a sample size bigger than 500 (because it has little effect in decreasing the standard error and margin of error).

**Table 1.10.2.1 THE EFFECT OF SAMPLE SIZE ON THE STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN FOR A POPULATION OF 10000**

SAMPLE SIZE (n)	STANDARD ERROR
20	2.24
50	1.40
100	0.99
250	0.62
500	0.44
1000	0.30
2500	0.17
5000	0.10

[Source: Welman and Kruger, 2001:64]

It was determined that a sample size of 384 was required to achieve a confidence level of 95% and confidence interval of 5% (Creative Research Systems, 2011). In the case of this study, a sample size was 461, which was more than enough to achieve the confidence level of 95%.

Based on the foregoing arguments, it is evident that the sample size of 461, for eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership, was statistically sound and was more than representative of KwaZulu-Natal trade union collective's leadership. Consequently the sample of the eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership had the following qualities:

- The standard error of 0.44 and margin of error was negligible.
- The sample size achieved a confidence level of 95% and confidence interval of 5%.
- The sample size of the eThekweni-based trade union leadership was at least 30% of the KwaZulu-Natal trade union leadership.
- The ratio of eThekweni-based trade union leadership to KwaZulu-Natal trade union leadership was the same as the ratio of eThekweni population to KwaZulu-Natal population (1:3).

The sample was a non-probability purposive sample in that it was intended to have a representative sample, having respondents drawn from all trade unions in eThekweni. Therefore some members of the trade union leadership had a zero chance of being included and hence the probability of them being included in the sample was zero.

In the preliminary interviews with some of the trade union leadership, it emerged that the exact number of the trade union leadership and membership could not be divulged for strategic reasons. It was therefore impossible to calculate the number of respondents per trade union organisation, which would be proportionally representative of each trade union organisation, in the sample of trade union leadership. Hence, the trade union organisations were categorised as small, medium and large. The issued numbers of questionnaires for small, medium, large trade union organisations were 30, 40 and 50 respectively. Although the number of the membership of the trade union organisation was included as a research question, so as to establish the representative numbers of respondents per organisation and the frame for the sample (Appendix 7.1, Section A), the respondents were reluctant to answer this question and give a figure. The respondents were leaders of trade union organisations which had offices and or employment premises in eThekweni, under the eThekweni Municipality.

The sample comprised trade union collective's leadership from different trade unions based in the eThekweni municipality. The biographical information section (Section A) includes gender split, whether the respondent held an executive position or not and the age group. Section B explored the trade union collective leadership's awareness of collective service delivery violence. Section C deals with collective service delivery violence causes. Section D comprises data on collective service delivery violence consequences. Section E presents solutions to collective service delivery violence suggested by the trade union collective's leadership. Section F investigated the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union collective's leadership support for the Zuma presidency, his performance and presents those results.

### **1.10.3. SAMPLE PROFILE OF ETHEKWINI BASED TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE'S LEADERSHIP**

On the design of the sample, a certain number of respondents per trade union were intended. The sample was drawn from a total number of 15 trade unions all of which were affiliated to COSATU. Although the target sample was 500 respondents, a total number of 660 questionnaires were issued and responses elicited were from 461 respondents. The name of the trade union and the number of respondents per trade union was shown on table 1.10.3.1 below.

Not all trade unions in eThekweni municipality were sampled. CWUSA, NUM, NUMSA, SADNU and SAFPU could not take part in the survey for various reasons. The reason advanced by CWUSA, for not participating in the research, was that of being apolitical. There was no reason obtained from the office of NUM, for not participating, as it proved impossible to secure a meeting with the officials, who would respond to the request to conduct the research. The permission was granted by NUMSA office to conduct the research but the members were reluctant to participate. Permission could not be obtained from SADNU, when an attempt was made to contact them to conduct the research. SAFPU was found to be prevalent in Gauteng province and their offices were only based in Johannesburg and, thus rendering them to fall outside the scope of the research. The then resultant sample found is shown in table 1.10.3.1 below.

**Table 1.10.3.1: SAMPLE**


UNION ACRONYM	TRADE UNION FULL NAME	NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES ISSUED PER TARGET UNION	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER UNION OBTAINED	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE
POPCRU	Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union	50	49	10.6
FAWU	Food and Allied Workers Union	50	42	9.1
SAMA	South African Medical Association	50	42	9.1
SACTWU	South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union	50	40	8.7
SATAWU	South African Transport and Allied Workers Union	50	36	7.8
SADTU	South African Democratic Teachers Union	50	30	6.5
SASBO	South African Society of Bank Officials	40	35	7.6
SACCAWU	South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union	40	31	6.7
SAMWU	South African Municipal Workers' Union	40	30	6.5
NEHAWU	National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union	40	27	5.9
SASAWU	South African State and Allied Workers Union	40	26	5.6
DENOSA	Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa	40	24	5.2
CWU	Communication Workers Union	30	22	4.8
COSATU	Congress of South African trade Unions	30	21	4.6
CEPPWAWU	Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union	30	6	1.3
NUMSA	National Union of Metal workers of South Africa	30	0	0.0
	Total	660	461	100

The sample was drawn from fifteen trade unions, of the targeted sixteen, listed in table 1.10.3.1 above. NUMSA did not contribute any respondents. The total number of respondents was 461. The respondents per trade union and the respective respondent percentage contribution per trade union are also shown in table 1.10.3.1. POPCRU and SASAWU, which are government workers trade union, contributed 49 (10.6%) and 26 (5.6%) respondents respectively, giving a total of 75 (16.2%) respondents. No apathy was observed in government trade union members, similar to what was observed in NUMSA, which is not a government trade union. CWUSA declined to participate in the research citing reasons of being apolitical. SADNU also declined to participate and cited internal administrative reasons pertaining to organisational transformation and transition.


#### 1.10.4. TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

The profile of the trade union leadership sampled, in terms of gender, percentage holding executive positions and age groupings, is shown in figures 7, 8 and 9 below respectively. The gender split of the sample was 55% male and 45% female, which was indicative of both the political and labour leadership being predominantly male.

**Figure 7: GENDER SPLIT FOR THE SAMPLE**




**Figure 8: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE'S LEADERSHIP IN THE SAMPLE HOLDING EXECUTIVE POSITIONS**



Of the total respondents, in the sample, 34% held executive positions and 66% were non-executive members. The percentages of executive and non-executive leadership, in the sample, depicted a pyramid shape, normally observed in leadership structures, with a small number of executive position holders and a large number of non-executive leadership.

**Figure 9: TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP AGE GROUPINGS**



It can be seen from figure 9 above that the biggest percentage (40%) of the leadership was in the age group of 20 to 30 years and the smallest percentage (10%) was found in the age group of 51 years and above. It could be deduced, from the results of the analysis, that 10% of the trade union collective's leadership was close to retirement age.

#### **1.10.5. RESEARCH INSTRUMENT**

The research instrument was a questionnaire, in Appendix 7.1, designed to collect primary data from the sampled respondents for analysis. The questionnaire was categorised with each section aimed at eliciting particular information from the respondents. The data from the questionnaire were captured into a table.

The SPSS statistical package was used to analyse the captured data. The expertise and services of a professional statistician was employed for the data analysis using quantitative method.

The questionnaire comprised sections A, B, C, D, E and F categorised as follows:

**Section A:** Comprised biographical information including gender, age group, executive or non-executive membership and the question on the membership number of the organisation. The first three questions in this section were closed ended questions except the last question about the number of membership of the organisation, which was open ended.

**Section B:** The aim of this section was to establish the trade union collective leadership's awareness of collective service delivery violence. Four questions were closed ended questions and the last one was open ended.

**Section C:** There was one open ended question with a provision for five answers. The intention was to get as many ideas as possible as to what the trade union collective's leadership thought were the causes of collective service delivery violence without limiting them to those of the researcher.

**Section D:** There was one open ended question with a provision for five answers on what trade union collective's leadership thought were the consequences of collective service delivery violence.

**Section E:** Again, there was one open ended question with a provision for five answers on what trade union collective's leadership thought could be solutions to collective service delivery violence.

**Section F:** There were five closed ended questions. The first three questions were intended to determine the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union collective's leadership support for the President Zuma.

The last two questions were aimed at finding out how the trade union collective's leadership thought President Zuma performed in view of collective service delivery violence.

#### **1.10.6. CONSIDERATIONS**

The following considerations were taken into account in designing the research instrument and the collection of data:

**Validity constructs:** It was ensured that the questionnaire measured what it was intended to measure.

**Type of questions:** Open ended and close ended questions were judiciously selected for each section of the questionnaire.

**Level of literacy:** To cater for all levels of literacy of the respondents the questions were made simple, brief, focused and unambiguous.

**Neutrality:** Neutrality was maintained in all questions and it was ensured that questions were applicable to all the respondents.

**Offensiveness:** Extreme care was exercised to ensure that questions were not offensive.

**Confidentiality:** Confidentiality and the identity of the respondents was preserved by not asking revealing questions.

**Consent:** The consent of the respondent was sought in terms of the letter of consent. The letter of consent found in Appendix 7.2 was attached to each questionnaire. In cases of low level of literacy, where the questionnaire had to be administered, the consent of the respondent was sought in terms of the same letter, which was explained to the respondent, before the questionnaire was administered.

The purpose of the study and how the information would be used was explained to the respondents. The respondents were informed that the participation in the study was voluntary and an informed consent was obtained. They were also informed that the information elicited was only going to be used for the purposes of this study only and that if there was a need to use the information for any other purposes, their permission would be sought. It was conveyed to the respondents that the confidentiality of the information and the anonymity of the respondents was going to be maintained. The information was not to be divulged to unauthorised persons without the consent of the respondents, about all of which the respondents were going to be informed and their prior consent sought.

#### **1.10.7. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE**

The data was collected using questionnaires which were issued to the respondents to fill and were later collected. The respondents were visited personally either in the trade union offices or in their places of work. Respondents, who were comfortable in filling the questionnaire unaided, were given the questionnaire to fill with letter of consent attached.

Those who were not at ease in filling the questionnaire without assistance had the questionnaire administered to them, only after enlightening them about the confidentiality of their identity, the information they would give, the use thereof and securing their consent. The data collection then followed the structured interview format with the questions coming from the questionnaire in Appendix 7.1.

#### **1.10.8. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

The data was presented in the form of tables, charts and in a narrative manner. The statistical reports of the data analysis and the statistical interpretation thereof were given in the statistical format.

#### **1.10.9. LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The focus of the study was eThekwini-based trade union leadership; of trade union organisations affiliated to COSATU, at the time this research. The time frame of the study was the first term of President Zuma. The study was limited to the investigation of the perceptions of eThekwini-based trade union leadership on service delivery violence. The study was not intended to investigate the actions of trade union leadership and or trade union collective membership, based on these perceptions. It was also not the objective of the study to determine a causal relation between collective service delivery violence and perceptions of eThekwini-based trade union leadership on collective service delivery violence.

Normally, the performance of any president would be a function of many variables, spanning a wide range of domestic and international issues. Similarly, the appraisal of a president should be based on this range of issues. The study excluded all other such variables and limited the appraisal of President Zuma, in the opinion of eThekwini-based trade union leadership, to only collective service delivery violence. The results of the study are not general perceptions of the trade union leadership but are the viewpoints of the eThekwini-based trade union leadership that participated in the study by answering questions in the questionnaire.

However, since the sample was big enough and satisfied the statistical requirements of being representative of trade union leadership population in KwaZulu-Natal, the results should be applicable and or extendable to the rest of the trade union leadership in KwaZulu-Natal. Going by the notion that perceptions of the trade union leadership are influenced by those of the membership and vice versa, it could be safely said that the results should also be applicable and extendable to the trade union membership as well.

## **2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY**

### **2.1. INTRODUCTION**

The normal initial and primary purpose of the formation of trade unions is collective bargaining and the pursuance of worker collectives' needs at the workplace. However, the contemporary role and responsibility of the trade union has changed and increased from that of worker collective to that of societal collective. Throughout history, in the world, the trade union has taken on functions outside the work environment; it has played an important role in the political process and in pursuance of class and societal issues. The trade union has assumed the responsibility of championing the course, aspirations, values, bettering the life and conditions of the working class, the poor and the deprived. As a result, the trade union has become a prominent role player in industrial, social, political matters and class struggle. The deprivation of the working class is not confined to the workplace but is also experienced in the social and the political environment. Hence the trade union pursues workers' welfare beyond the place of work. The area of employment serves only as a base for organising, legitimacy and collection of funds for the trade union, to finance its operations.

When the trade union takes on societal issues inside or outside the political process, it is not only doing so on behalf of its members and or exclusively for the benefit of its members but also on behalf of non-members and for the benefit of the society at large. Society is a bigger collective than the trade union and for the purpose for which it was formed. In the quest of societal objectives, the trade union collective cooperates with and or confronts entities like employers, non-governmental organisations, political parties and the state. The trade union also forms linkages or union-entity relations with political parties, based on common views, ideology or objectives. The trade unions' class struggles, cooperation, confrontations, union-entity relations, social and political process roles, are exemplified worldwide and are inexhaustible. The trade union leadership becomes *de facto* leadership of the action the trade union and its members indulge in whether sanctioned or not sanctioned by the trade union leadership.

The issues that trade unions are faced with differ from one country to another and also are influenced by whether the era is liberal, neoliberal, colonial or postcolonial. It is this important role played by the trade union collective and its leadership, in countries' political processes and in tackling issues that plague the society, in the case of this research, South Africa, which rendered significant the knowledge of perceptions of trade union collective's leadership on an issue of national importance such as collective service delivery violence in South Africa.

Perceptions of trade union leadership on national matters are informative of the feelings of the members of the collective they represent, resultantly the collective action of the trade union collective. However, this research does not investigate the action of the trade union leadership as a result of its perceptions of collective service delivery violence.

The evolution of the trade union in South Africa shows the trend of the trade union and its leadership playing roles of firstly championing the goals of worker collective at the work place. Secondly, being a social player fighting for bigger societal collective objectives, outside the political process. Thirdly, being a political player, within a political process pursuing societal benefits. The union-party relation, cooperation and confrontation with government, on national issues, demonstrates the role played by the trade union with regard to social and political matters.

This is evidence that the trade union collective and its leadership were no longer limited to fighting for the rights of the workers at the work place, but had expanded their role to championing the course of the working class, non-trade union members, the poor, in their places of residence and society. This character of the trade union collective and its leadership made it a relevant, important, social and political actor who must be consulted on societal and national issues or at least whose opinion cannot be ignored on such matters.

The chapter maps the important role of the trade union influence on the politics, the political process, the government and the ANC in South Africa both before and after the 1994 democratic elections. It then investigates the collective service delivery violence causes or reasons and closes by reviewing the service delivery statutory framework.

## **2.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRADE UNION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PROCESS**

Like in most countries, the trade union collective in South Africa and its leadership play an important role in the political process. In South Africa, the trade union was instrumental in the achievement of democracy and other social milestones (Duran and Yildirim, 2005:229). The trade union in South Africa does not only fight for the worker's rights in the work environment but it also tackles social problems facing the workers in their home environment as attested to by the argument put forward by Wood and Dibben (2010:82) that:

Many of the problems of the trade union's rank and file mirror those of the marginalised means that the unions are likely to be at the forefront of progressive challenges to the status quo.

When the trade union, obviously led by its leadership, was at the forefront of the anti-Apartheid movement and the struggle for democracy, it was not only fighting for political freedom but for economic freedom as well and emancipation from social problems (Karis, 1987:270), which is an objective of a bigger collective than that of the trade union. The trade union priorities and challenges before the 1994 democratic elections were different from those after democratic elections. Hence, the trade union role in the South African political process, consequently the trade union leadership role in the South African politics, can be said to be divided into two eras, one of before democratic elections and the other of after democratic elections. However, unlike in some African countries, in South Africa, after the democratic elections, there was concertation between the liberation movement government and the trade union (Buhlungu, 2005:709).

### **2.2.1. THE TRADE UNION ROLE IN THE DEMOCRACY STRUGGLE BEFORE THE 1994 ELECTIONS**

The trade union movement, which is as old as the nationalist movement in South Africa, is the African continent's largest and historically most militant working class (Gwisai, 2002). The early trade unions in South Africa were the ICU, formed in the 1919, the SAFNETU (FNETU), formed in the 1928, followed by SATLC in 1930, CNETU in 1947, and SACTU in 1955, formed as the trade union wing of the ANC (Johanningsmeier, 2004). The split of the trade unions according to colour lines occurred in 1947 (Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood, 2008:441).

Webster (1998:44) stated that the South African trade union was a product of three traditions; the nationalist democratic movement (ANC), the nationalist Black consciousness movement (PAC) and the shop floor tradition of the trade union. The ANC, founded in 1912 and the SACP founded in 1921 (Van der Walt, 2007:236), formed an alliance and established a trade union organisation in 1955, called SACTU (Johanningsmeier, 2004). This was where the trade union drew its nationalist democratic movement tradition, the first tradition. The PAC, which was a Black consciousness movement, was formed in 1959 and with it emerged the PAC aligned trade union called the NACTU, which provided the second tradition. The third tradition came from the notion of a movement controlled by workers that was conceived in 1982, to be later known as the shop floor tradition according to Webster (1998).

Maree (1998) argued that, COSATU, the biggest trade union federation in South Africa, on establishment, drew from different traditions, born of approaches to organising the trade union. Maree (1998) referred to the two approaches as the “populists” and the “workerists” traditions. The former emphasised political and community activism and the latter workplace organising.

The banning of the ANC in 1960, dealt a blow to SACTU, the ANC was forced into exile and SACTU and SATLC was compelled to commit to underground operations. From that point onwards, SACTU worked underground with other trade union organisations, amongst them were MACWUSA and SAAWU both based in the Eastern Cape. The trade union provided an area for secret political activity via shop floor structures (Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood, 2008:441). The trade union clandestine political activities became a threat to the Apartheid government and were confirmed as such in the statement by Maree (1998:31) that:

In 1979 a commission of enquiry appointed by the government and chaired by Professor Nic Wiehahn proposed that African trade unions should be recognised by the government as they posed a greater threat outside the formal system of industrial relations than inside it.

By the year 1979 most of the trade unions were affiliated to FOSATU. It could be argued that the difference between FOSATU and SACTU is that the former adopted workerism as an ideology and the latter populism.

FOSATU paved way for COSATU that was formed later and sat in government statutory institutions like NMC, which was established in 1979 according to the statute, the function of which was to advise the Minister of Manpower on matters that were labour related (Wood and Dibben, 2010:71).

In the mid 1980s the trade union political activities were rife in the factories and townships. The UDF was formed in 1983 as an umbrella to all Anti-Apartheid organisations. COSATU was formed in 1985 at the merger of FOSATU, GWU and SACTU (Wood, Dibben, 2010; Webster, 1998).

COSATU endorsed the ANC as the leader in the political struggle, in a meeting of the two organisations, held in 1986, in Lusaka. The UDF and COSATU cooperated in the political mobilisation of workers and community members, which resulted to increased militancy of the two groups. In 1987, after the banning of UDF, COSATU assumed *de facto* leadership role of the movement of national liberation (Wood and Harcourt, 1998:82).

As a result of the legislation benign to trade unions, the recognition agreements between employers and trade unions rose from 5 in 1979, to 406 in 1983. This period saw a marked increase in both frequency and intensity of strikes, consumer boycotts, bus boycotts and rent boycotts. This resulted to the invasion of the townships by the SADF by August 1984 and the detention without trial of about 440 trade unionists, between 1985 and 1989 (Webster, 1998). Similarly, the trade union membership increased from 70 000 in 1979 to 1.1 million in 1989 and 2.7 million in 1991. COSATU's membership jumped from 462 000 in 1985 to 1.26 million in 1991 (Maree, 1998).

In collaboration with business, government and trade union, a social contract forum called National Economic Forum (NEF), which was replaced by NEDLAC after 1994 democratic election, was established. This was the forum where policies pertaining to economy and industry were jointly discussed, by the three parties (business, government and trade union), before they were submitted to parliament (Wood and Harcourt, 1998).

The trade union, led by COSATU, grew in size and stature (Adam and Moodley, 1993). This growth plunged it into foreign territory in terms of topics and concepts it were to participate in the deliberations of, in the NMC and NEF. The need to be armed with information, prompted COSATU to establish a research wing, NALEDI, in 1993 and DITSELA, an educational institute, in 1986 (COSATU, 2009). This need for information was confirmed by Webster (1998: 60) in his statement as he stated that:

But under democratic conditions labour requires an independent research capacity and larger educational resources to prepare its members to participate in these new institutions.

COSATU, together with ANC, UDF, NGOs, CBOs, civic organisations and external forces, like sanctions against the Apartheid government campaign, collectively pressurised government and capital to negotiate with the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance during the Apartheid period, leading to the collapse of the Apartheid (Wood and Harcourt, 1998). The latter part of 1989, saw F. W. de Klerk taking over the reins of the South African presidency from P. W. Botha.

Wood and Harcourt (1998) further stated that in February 1990, F. W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of all political organisations, viz. ANC, PAC, SACP and the release of Nelson Mandela. The *de facto* tripartite alliance of ANC, SACP and COSATU was formalized in July 1991. The same year saw the formation of CODESA. The application by COSATU to participate in the CODESA was refused by the NP, on the grounds that COSATU was not a political organisation. Despite the exclusion from the discussions, COSATU supported and influenced the ANC inside and outside CODESA, by putting pressure on government so that the negotiations should succeed. The strategy of COSATU was that of engagement coupled with mass mobilisation. In November 1991, COSATU organised a strike which lasted for two days, against VAT, which was proposed by the NP government. COSATU again called for mass action in 1992, when CODESA had deadlocked on the insistence of NP to have veto power when the new constitution was adopted. The mass action by COSATU broke the back of the NP government.

An agreement was reached by the parties at CODESA, to form the Government of National Unity (GNU), with the first democratic elections set for 27 April 1994 (Wood and Harcourt, 1998). COSATU conceived a document that would bind the ANC and force it to commit to a programme that would better the lives of the working class in return for the support; the trade union gave to the ANC, during the fight for freedom and on the road to democratic elections (Maree 1998). This was confirmed by Webster (1998:48) in stating that:

In February 1993 the NEC of the ANC agreed that the Government of National Unity should be given a mandate and that mandate should be called the RDP.

Further evidence of the origin of the RDP was found in the statement (Webster, 1998:49) that:

Although the origins of the RDP lie with COSATU's and the SACP's desire to bind the ANC to a radical programme of transformation, its adoption by the ANC had as much to do with electoral politics as it did with transformation. The adoption of the RDP, Gotz argues, was an electoral gambit, rather than an item of faith, adopted in haste without thorough consideration of COSATU's and the SACP's vision of radical change, and it laid the basis for the recasting of the document's meaning in a direction more attuned to the ANC's complicated electoral needs.

The RDP document was adopted in a COSATU congress, in August 1993, after some criticism. At the same congress, COSATU, in both as support for the ANC and as an electoral strategy, resolved to allow twenty members to stand for elections under the ANC ticket (Maree, 1998; Webster, 1998).

## **2.2.2. THE TRADE UNION INFLUENCE ON THE ANC AND THE ANC GOVERNMENT AFTER THE 1994 DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS**

The ANC won the 1994 national democratic elections with a landslide victory. Again, COSATU released a huge number of its leaders to stand for provincial elections and municipal elections, in 1995, under the banner of the ANC. The ANC-SACP-COSATU tripartite alliance and cooperation continued past the 1994 elections and several authors agreed that the alliance would continue (Beresford, 2009; Buhlungu 2005; Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood 2008; Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999 and Webster 1998).

The three factors that give strength to the continuation of the ANC-SACP-COSATU tripartite alliance (Webster 1998:42) are:

Firstly, COSATU is not faced by strong rival competitors for a membership who find it costly to support measures that threaten the living standards of members. Where competition does exist, rival unions are not more militant than their COSATU counterparts. In general, they are more moderate. A second factor strengthening the Alliance is the electoral support of the ANC, which is likely to remain in power after the next general election in 1999. Under these circumstances, COSATU is likely to continue in the Alliance but put pressure on the ANC to change its policies. This is confirmed by a nation-wide survey of the expectations of COSATU members of government conducted shortly before the 1994 elections: between 72 per cent and 90 per cent of those interviewed thought that the government would improve their lives over the next five years by providing them with better housing and public transport, higher wages, clean water, electricity, telephones and access to land.

The third factor is the reliance of the trade union on mass action to force the ANC government to accede to the trade union demands, without having to break away from the alliance. This would enable derivation of maximum benefit for trade union members in return for support the trade union give to the ANC and the social connection that exists amongst members of the alliance. This was evident in a statement by Godongwana, the then general secretary of NUMSA, uttered in 1995 (Webster, 1998:42) that:

There is no reason why I should not pick up the phone and speak to Bernie Fanaroff (an ex-union leader in government) and say, listen, our views on this question are the following.

It seemed the feeling was mutual with the ANC which would not want to openly alienate workers and run the risk of a breakaway workers' party. After winning the elections and becoming the ruling party, the ANC made several maneuvers favourable to the trade union. Six months in its existence, GNU merged the NMC and NEF to form NEDLAC (Wood and Harcourt, 1998:85). This provided the stage for the interaction of social partners. As it has been mentioned before, the participants in NEDLAC were business, trade union and government and its function was to finalize agreements amongst the three parties on social and economic issues before they were tabled in parliament.

The first task of NEDLAC was the LRA, tabled to NEDLAC in February 1995 as Labour Relations Bill and enacted in December 1996. The benefits brought by LRA to the trade unions were:

- a) Provision of rules for dismissal of workers.
- b) Establishment of workplace forums.
- c) The establishment of an independent CCMA, funded by the state, to expedite labour dispute resolutions.
- d) Combined bargaining councils for private and public employees, excluding army and police. Provision of workers' rights, like right to collective bargaining, right to organise, right to strike etc.

(Republic of South Africa, 1995)

The ANC turned the RDP document to an official White Paper and established an office to drive the RDP, after being passed by parliament in 1994 (Republic of South Africa, 1994). The RDP office initially had a fully-fledged Minister who reported to the state president. Its operations were later shifted to the Department of Finance, under the Deputy President Mbeki and eventually closed in March 1996 and was replaced with GEAR (Department of Finance RSA, 1996) which was market oriented and adopted the same year (Thomas, 2007:261).

The foregoing milestones are the product of the continued trade union and political party alliance between COSATU and the ANC. Research indicated that the ANC-COSATU relationship was likely to continue at least for the near future (Buhlungu, 2005: 716). This then excluded the possibility of a divorce between the two parties, in case of a disagreement which begged the question: How will future disagreement on policy and national issues, between the trade union (COSATU) and the ruling party (ANC), be handled? The forming of the ANC-SACP-COSATU tripartite alliance laid a foundation for socio-economic-political transformation. The trade union leadership spearheaded the eliciting of participation of trade union members, non-trade union members and organisations in confronting social issues, injustices and inequality in South Africa both in the Apartheid and neoliberal era (Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood 2008).

The victory against Apartheid was greatly attributed to the collaboration between the freedom movement and the trade union, which fought for the deprived group against the perpetrators of deprivation. Bond (2010:17) and Jain (2010) concurred, that collective service delivery protests, which mostly culminated in collective service delivery violence, were an example of protests against deprivation. Notwithstanding democratic elections and the removal of statutory discrimination, South Africa was still an unequal society with deprivation and injustices abounding beyond the workplace (Mc Lennan 2007:5).

There has been a growth in civil movements in South Africa fighting for civil rights up to 2007. However these movements do not pose any threat to the ANC but their growth went hand in hand with the growth in service delivery protests (Hough, 2011). This shows the need not only to gain political freedom but also to fight societal injustices and inequalities. The trade union led the challenge of the status quo on social issues by employing mass action, the classical example was opposition to GEAR by COSATU.

Other confrontations with the government, by NGO on slow service delivery matters, included LPM, for slow pace of land distribution, TAC for handling of the HIV/AIDS issue, SECC challenging the cutting off of the water and electricity supply, CCG and AEC resistance to eviction of the poor landless communities. It can be seen from the foregoing that the trade union is an advocate of the poor and the working class (Ballard, *et al*, 2005). This was confirmed by research that, COSATU's rank and file membership concerns are a mirror image of the unemployed and socially excluded (Wood and Dibben, 2010). The reason for sustained mass action in South Africa, past the Apartheid era, was that social issues to be challenged were ever persisting and were among the service delivery violence causes, as viewed by the trade union leadership, listed in table 4.2.2.1 and the complaints advanced by collective service delivery protesters as shown in figure 11.

### **2.3. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES AND REASONS**

Collective service delivery protests started in 2004 (Municipal IQ, 2012). Violent collective service delivery protests commenced in 2007 and by the year 2010 it had assumed epic proportions and turned to be a constant feature of the news and was at the lips of most of the South Africans (Rondganger, 2012). At some point it went past the stage of being a problem of those deprived of service delivery and became a national problem. It had drawn the attention of even those who were not affected by poor service delivery but were affected by violent collective protests against poor service delivery. The resource of the state in terms of policing and damage to property were wasted. Business, economy and the image of the country suffered. An urgent attention and solution were needed.

Evidently up to 2010, whatever had been done by government to provide services was not enough to satisfy all communities. One can argue that service delivery improved up to a tolerable level in 2011 for collective service delivery violence to decrease. It could also be said that the improved service delivery, reduced the numbers of aggrieved communities to a number too small for them to can stage meaningful protests. The resultant violent collective service delivery was a combination of many factors a few of which are explored briefly in the next section.

Collective service delivery protests were the consequence of systemic failure to the provision of services to the poor community and the absence of a solution to remedy the situation coupled with the anger thereabout, which generated collective violence (Karamoko, 2011). Hough (2011) pointed out that there were two schools of thought pertaining to collective service delivery violence. One school of thought holds the view that collective service delivery violence can lead to a revolution. The other contends that collective service delivery violence can be contained by establishing policies and framework. Hough (2011: 8) went on to state that:

Poor communication with the communities, lack of transparency, poor governance, ineffective management and political infighting were found to be some of the main factors contributing to the protests.

Councilors were also not playing a proper role as the “voice of the people” to government, and government’s approach that councilors should be the voice of national government to the people, is wrong.

Poor management like, the lack of transparency, unaccountability, translated to poor service delivery, which caused poor service delivery collective reaction, from the affected communities, in the form of collective service delivery violence.

Reasons causal to municipal failure to deliver services to the community (COGTA, 2009:10) were cited as:

- a) Lack of systems to control the resources.
- b) Noncompliance with regulatory structures.
- c) Power struggle between politics and administration.
- d) No distinction between executive and legislative powers.
- e) Inability of councilors to live up to the demands of local government.
- f) No separation of duties between political parties and municipal councils.

Koelble and LiPuma (2010) held the opinion that two thirds of collective service delivery protests were caused by a sequence of institutional deficiencies, among others included the lack of financial controls, skills, technical competencies, transparency and accountability. This view was confirmed by a report commissioned by the South African Government, in 2009, which found that there were two sets of collective service delivery violence causes (Parliamentary Monitoring Group SA, 2009).

One set were the reasons advanced by the protesters and the other set were the reasons found by the investigative team, to be the short comings of the system. The first set of collective service delivery violence reasons, communities gave, all of which pointed to systemic flaws were:

- i. Evictions.
- ii. Nepotism.
- iii. Corruption.

- iv. Unemployment.
  - v. Maladministration.
  - vi. Insufficient housing.
  - vii. Poor communication.
  - viii. Mismanagement of finances.
  - ix. Poor service delivery with regards to water, electricity, sanitation and refuse removal.
- (Parliamentary Monitoring Group SA, 2009:2)


All the above reasons for collective service delivery violence are the same as the causes for collective service delivery violence, found by Jain (2010:30) on investigation and the causes for collective service delivery violence advanced by the respondents, in response to the questions of the questionnaire, in this research.

The second set of collective service delivery violence causes, found by the government investigating team, were that; the municipal systemic failures were caused by:

- 1) Recession.
- 2) Factionalism and nepotism.
- 3) Conflict of interests and non-disclosure thereof.
- 4) Incapacity of the municipalities caused by lack of skills.
- 5) Under spending caused by poor planning because of lack of skills.
- 6) Senior officials are not accountable and they do not hold their subordinates accountable.
- 7) Noncompliance with and violation of controls like Supply Chain Management and MFMA.

(Parliamentary Monitoring Group SA, 2009:3,)

**Figure 10: COLLECTIVE PROTEST LEVELS RECESSION MONTHS VS CORRESPONDING PREVIOUS MONTHS' AVERAGE**



[Source: Jain, 2010:14]

It was also found, through research, that poverty and economy were factors that linked collective service delivery violence to employment and trade unions (Jain, 2010, Karamoko, 2011). An analysis by Jain, (2010:14), shown in figure 10 above, proved that in a year in which there was a recession, collective service delivery protests were more than in the year in which the country was not in a recession. This was evident from the comparison of the number of collective service delivery protests, during the months of the recession, with the number of collective service delivery protests of the corresponding months of the period during which there was no recession. The recession period in this case study was from December 2008 to November 2009. It could also be argued that because of the recession, the government did not have enough resources to deliver the necessary services. The trade union could therefore join the community protests under the claim that unemployment reduced the household income, thus rendered the household incapable of paying for services.

Clearly from the foregoing, causes of collective service delivery violence are a combination of systemic flaws or failure causes and reactions thereto, which are the consequences thereof. The consequences of service delivery systemic flaws were the communities' response thereto, which came after a long period of waiting and arrived in the form of collective service delivery violence. Pons-Vignon and Anseeuw (2009:884) concurred; the waiting period was too long, when they stated that:

Fifteen years after the end of Apartheid, people are indeed still waiting for their living conditions to improve. This situation has led to widespread disillusionment with the ANC and mounting violence.

Ibid, (2009:887) also held the view that, changes in service delivery, if any, did not meet expectations, thus triggered a violent reaction from the community, when they stated that:

Yet, the present political changes and the violence associated with recent strikes and outbursts draw attention to the fact that these changes have not met the social and economic expectations of many poor South Africans.

Ngwane (2009) shared the above view, when he stated that although protests were part of the struggle, however, they were not sufficient to achieve the objective, but transformation that resulted to new form of ownership was necessary.

South Africa had history of use of mass mobilisation to achieve popular needs, which is demonstrated by the workers' action of the 1920s, the defiance campaign of the 1950s, the students' uprising of the 1970s and that of the 1980s. The mass mobilisation by the trade union and social organisations was a product of deteriorating standards of living, experienced by the working class. For the majority of the poor working class, service delivery was fused with poverty alleviation, for which the wait was since the dawn of democracy (Burger, 2005:497). This was confirmed by Mc Lennan (2007:5) when she stated that:

The overwhelming challenges of poverty and deprivation which confront Africa and many developing countries has led to a growing focus, both academically and technically, on the process and mechanics of public delivery.

A wave of collective service delivery protests started in 2004, although it had highs and lows, the trend was increasing. Violent collective service delivery protests, started in 2007 and it peaked in 2010. A worker strike wave mostly seemed to accompany the community service delivery protests. The example was the biggest public sector strike, in 2007, which showed the link between trade union and national social issues. The protesters were discontented, frustrated, angry, and vindictive, the slightest provocation translated to collective service delivery violence, if not worsened it. They enforced submission on anybody who they regarded as being obstructive, resistant or defiant to the course.


Although the problem of collective service delivery violence had been dichotomised into cause and effect above, in terms of systemic failures and consequences of systemic failures, another argument would be that, the real problem was that of deficient democracy and poor governance (Holtzhausen and Naidoo, 2011). Government could be accused of being detached from the communities and not being responsive to societal views and problems.

Notwithstanding other sectors' contributions to collective service delivery violence problem, politics could be a major contributor. A major solution therefore would be contributed by politics. Hence the suggested solution was that of participatory democracy, where the people would have an input into the running of their affairs with regards to service delivery programme.

Collective service delivery protests that were as a consequence of systemic flaws and failures, revealed not only the complaints, as they appear in figure 11, but also the order of priority of the protesters' complaints, which was determined by the highest frequency of the complaint (Karamoko, 2011; Hough, 2011; Republic of South Africa, 2009; Koelble and LiPuma, 2010). From the analysis by Jain (2010:30) and Karamoko (2011:31) as shown in figure 11 below, the top six sources of complaints, determined by the order of frequency, were housing, electricity, water, sanitation, poor service delivery and corruption.

Bond (2010:17) concurred with Jain (2010) and Karamoko (2011) and went on to state that the reasons for collective protests, which were water, the cost thereof, sanitation, electricity and poor service delivery, demonstrated the societal economic disparities.

**Figure 11: COMPLAINTS OF COLLECTIVE PROTESTORS:  
FEBRUARY 2007 TO MAY 2011**




[Source: Karamoko, 2011:31]

Judging by the increase both in frequency and intensity of protests, since the first democratic elections, a great number of South Africans evidently felt their expectations had not been met, eighteen years into democracy and their frustration turned into collective service delivery violence. Collective service delivery violence was embedded in collective service delivery protests. Collective service delivery protests, in turn, nestled in poor service delivery. The service delivery is a responsibility of the government and collective service delivery protests were results of the actions of discontented citizens about service delivery.

However, the primary cause of collective service delivery violence is poor service delivery by government, whether real or perceived which led to collective service delivery protests. The action of the communities or their reaction to poor service delivery could be interpreted as an attempt by communities to bring about good service delivery, by forcing government to deliver service through violent collective protests (Booyesen, 2007). Reddy (2010: 185) identified the growth in the electorate discontent being expressed through violence rather than political forums and averred that:

There is increased social mobilisation of disgruntled citizens who rely on a discourse of violence rather than articulating grievances through political structures... growing popular discontent and political fragility in the face of society's demands and development challenges. A discerning feature of politics has developed in which conflict is increasingly located on the terrain of political society and not, as hopeful democratic political theory postulates, on an ever-evolving civic tradition. Where did the promise of 1994 a constitutional democracy founded on a strong civic tradition run aground? Why has South African society become so difficult to govern in comparison to many third world and particularly African state? At independence the ANC inherited an abundance of popular legitimacy and enviable state capacity. Why has establishing civic order based on effective state capacity and ethical politics proven so elusive?


**Figure 12: PROPORTION OF COLLECTIVE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT BY QUARTER FROM 2007 TO 2011**



[Source: Karamoko, 2011:13]

Most collective service delivery protests started peacefully and later turned violent. When a protest turned violent, it was difficult to know if it was intended to be violent from the beginning or it was initially intended to be peaceful and turned violent later. It is also important to note that the violence could be initiated by the protesters or it could be provoked by the police that were intended to control the protesters. In the case of Andries Tatane' death, at Ficksburg, for example, the protest started peacefully but turned violent at the point of confrontation between police and the protestors, which resulted to the loss of life. Figure 12 above shows collective service delivery protests that turned violent by quarter during the period 2007 to 2010.

**Figure 13: PROPORTION OF COLLECTIVE PROTESTS TURNED VIOLENT:  
WINTER VS REST OF YEAR**



[Source: Karamoko, 2011:14]

The total number of violent collective service delivery protest, in South Africa, from 01 January 2009 to 30 November 2012, amounted to 1112 (table 1.2.3). The breakdown of violent collective service delivery protests, per province, as reported by the SAPS, was shown in table 1.2.5. In the context of this study, collective service delivery protest was regarded as violent if there was violence involved emanating from the protesters.

There is no, distinction made how the protest started, whether violently or peacefully or who was responsible for initiating violence, whether it were the protesters or the police. Proportion of collective service delivery protests that turned violent between 2007 and 2011 are shown in figure 13 above.

Adding to the reasons for collective service delivery violence was the season of the year, rainy or cold weather condition. It was found that there was correlation between collective service delivery protests that turned violent and the winter months. There were more violent collective service delivery protests in winter months than in summer months, as shown in figure 12 and figure 13. This could be attributed to the large number of poor people, who could not afford electricity or who did not have electricity at all and hence became less tolerant in winter than in summer because of the cold in winter. Karamoko (2011) cited the winter rains, consequently flooding, as another contributory factor to the urgent need for electricity demand and the erosion of patience amongst the community members.

#### **2.4. SOUTH AFRICA SERVICE DELIVERY STATUTORY FRAMEWORK**

It is evident from the study of literature that service delivery has two aspects to it, the top down part and the bottom up part. The top down part is the role expected to be played by the government in delivering services to the citizens. The bottom up part, are the actions of the citizens participating in the service delivery programme and the citizens' reactions to the government's service delivery or the lack thereof.

The top down aspect of service delivery is to be executed by government, which when not accomplished would result to communities' dissatisfaction leading to service delivery protests which in turn would lead service delivery violence, as it had occurred. The government's role is in two phases which are firstly the establishment of the framework and policy for service delivery, secondly the delivery of services according to the established framework and policies.

The bottom up part too can be divided into two categories, the desirable, proactive part and the undesirable reactive part. The desirable and proactive aspect of the bottom up part is supposed to be the involvement of the community in the government's planning of the communities' service delivery requirements and priorities.

Ideally the community and government interaction forum should be provided for during the establishment, by government, of the service delivery framework and policy. The undesirable, reactive aspect of the bottom up part which, in most cases is born of the absence of the bottom up community participation, is the communities' reaction to:

- a) The government's service delivery policy and framework.
- b) The absence of provision for community involvement in the proactive aspect of the bottom up approach.
- c) Poor service delivery as a result of both poor planning and implementation of the government's service delivery policy and framework or the lack thereof.

The sum total of the communities' collective reaction to these factors culminated to collective service delivery violence.

The involvement of the communities in the bottom up approach has the following advantages:

- a) The government knows what community needs and priorities are so as to plan and deliver accordingly.
- b) It provides a forum for government and community interaction which keeps both parties informed of progress and problems, pertaining to the service delivery programme, thus preventing the confrontational collective service delivery violence.

After the democratic dispensation the new government inherited a disintegrated national public service, comprising the former provinces and homelands, which had to be combined into a single national public service (Wenzel, 2007).

The nature of the resultant public service was described by Russell and Bvuma (2001:241) that:

Although this task was accomplished rapidly, the resulting Public service was very large, and exhibited many features of traditional bureaucracy, including hierarchical structures, limited automation and IT applications, low levels of training, a poor work culture, language and cultural barriers, and an overall orientation towards inputs and processes rather than service delivery and results.

Thus during the initial years, resources, efforts and time of the new democratic government were concentrated in reforming and centralizing the public service in terms of bureaucracy, regulation, legislation and language. The reformation included a paradigm shift from two former public services to a new single public service. Of the two former public services, one was efficient, delivering good service to a minority two languages group. The other was almost nonexistent offering bad service to a majority of many languages group. The new, single, public service was supposed to render good service to all citizens of South Africa. This was the reason for the state of service delivery, in the democratic South Africa, particularly in the previously disadvantaged communities, to be poor. The situation led to the observed collective service delivery violence that peaked during the Zuma presidency, in 2010 (Hamill, 2010:34).

Several parliamentary acts and departmental documents provide statutory framework for service delivery. It was not the objective of this research to investigate the appropriateness of these documents, policies and procedure nor their implementation. However, reference would be made to them in passing, as evidence to their existence and relevance, without interrogating them or providing an exhaustive list of such documents. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 has the following provisions:

- a) Sections 26 to 29 stipulate that the citizens have a right to adequate housing, health care, food, water, social security and basic education to children, which the state must provide.
- b) Section 152 of the constitution charges the municipalities with the responsibility of delivering services to local communities.
- c) Section 153 stipulates the duties of the municipalities giving priority to the basic needs of the communities. (Republic of South Africa, 1996)

It is notable that the rights of the citizens, stipulated in the constitution, according to which the state must provide services, are among the top reasons for collective protests, as pointed out by Karamoko (2011:31) shown in figure 11. Pursuant to the deliverance of these rights, via service delivery, the White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service (WTPPS) was tabled by government, on 15 November 1995 (Department of Public Service and Administration RSA, 1995).

The WTPPS incorporated Batho Pele principle, which was indicative of the government's intention of giving communities' needs top priority. The WTPPS was one of the first of many service delivery framework legislations that were to follow and was indeed followed in 1997 by Draft White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, the aim of which was to improve service delivery (Department of Public Service and Administration RSA, 1997).

In compliance with sections 26(2), 155 of the constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) and in pursuance of delivering services to the communities, the government passed the Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act 27, on 24 June 1998, to demarcate the whole of South Africa into municipalities (Department of Local Government RSA, 1998). The same year, on 11 December, Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 (Department of Local Government RSA, 1998), was enacted to establish the different categories of municipalities in accordance with sections 155 (1) (a), (b), (c) of the constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 was assented to, on 14 November 2000 (Department of Local Government RSA, 2000).

These acts were to ensure that essential services are accessible to all South Africans irrespective of their background, geographic position and economic status. The Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA) provided a framework for regulating the municipal finances. Section 34 of this Act indicates that the national and the provincial governments should assist the local municipalities financially (Department of Local Government RSA, 2003).

Without attempting to provide a complete list of government acts, impacting service delivery, mention can be made of Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 (Department of Education and Training RSA, 1998) and the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 (Department of Water Affairs RSA, 1997). The Skills Development Act was intended to improve and develop the skills of the public sector work force in South Africa (Department of Education and Training RSA, 1998). On the other hand the Water Services Act was aimed at providing access to basic water supply and sanitation (Department of Water Affairs RSA, 1997).

An endeavour to improve service delivery saw initiatives by the government, like the Public Private Partnership (PPP), of 2000, the promotion of alternative service delivery and an incline towards outsourcing some public service delivery aspects. The abovementioned legislation show that service delivery legal framework was in place. Equally evidently, from the wave of collective service delivery violence that swept the country, since 2007, the expectations and or satisfactions of the communities had not been met. Collective service delivery violence was therefore indicative of some flaw(s), either in the service delivery statutory framework or in the implementation thereof.

## **2.5. CONCLUSION**

The trade union collective in South Africa has not only contributed in shaping the political process before and after the 1994 democratic elections but has also influenced the politics in South Africa both from inside and outside the political process before and after the democratic elections. The trade union was instrumental in dismantling Apartheid in its pursuit of the class objectives. It has continued in the post democratic era, just as it did in the pre democratic era, to tackle issues of national importance. After democratic elections trade union leaders have moved to take up positions in government and the ANC. This resulted to the growth in stature of the trade union collective. Consequently the trade union and trade union collective's leadership in the South African politics has become an important role player that cannot be ignored but must be consulted on matters of national interest and importance.

Collective service delivery violence occurred against the backdrop of existing service delivery statutory framework. There is legislation that lays the foundation for the delivery of services to the communities. Some of the services are guaranteed to the citizens by legislation. Thus the poor service delivery that sparked the country wide collective protests can be attributed to either inadequate legal service delivery framework or delivery. It was found from the literature review that the causes of collective service delivery violence are a as result of both systemic and human short comings.

### **3. CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

Collective action theory encompasses collective service delivery violence phenomenon in South Africa and the collectives' leadership. It distinguishes the types of collective action for use, when, where, how it is used and which collective uses it. The collective action types, found to be in existence, are viz social movement (SM), social movement unionism (SMU), business unionism and industrial action. Collective action theory provides a model that is explanatory, prescriptive, and predictive of the different collectives, their leadership, their action etc. It maps the relationship among all the concepts involved, collectives, collectives' leadership, type, objective, form and collective action types. It shows the interaction of the collective leadership with the members of the collective, nonmembers, and political figures on social, political, economic matters, which are of national and local interest.

The theory demonstrates the collective leadership significance and role in the collective's involvement, in collective action, in pursuance of social, national, international and employment issues using vehicles of SM, SMU, business union and industrial action for both trade union members and nonmembers.

Collective action is a means of confronting social issues ranging from local to international arena by both organised and unorganised individuals who are union members or nonunion members. When trade unions challenge social issues, employing the support of union members, nonunion members and or other organisations, in doing so, they are said to have embarked on social movement unionism (SMU). However, when individuals do the same but not under the banner of a trade union collective, they are said to be involved in social movement (SM). SMU leadership is the same as the trade union leadership and that of SM is drawn from both inside and outside the trade union collective.

Research findings have confirmed that leadership influences members of the collective's willingness to participate in collective action activities. The leaders mold the collective members' perception of the collective and the value the collective attaches to its members. The positive members' perception of the collective leadership in turn becomes a motivating factor for the members of the collective to be involved in group's collective action, be it at the workplace or outside the workplace. The collectives' leadership, especially of the trade union, which is the same as SMU, is listened to and respected by union members, nonunion members, business leaders, academics and political figures.

The belief, trust and confidence nonunion members have in the trade union collective's leadership, as a result of them championing social issues; motivate them to also indulge in SMU, under the trade union collective's leadership. Trade union collective's leadership, which is also SMU leadership, identifies and picks pertinent contemporary social, political, national and international issues that concern trade union members and nonunion members at work and in the living environment, conscientise members and non-members about the said issues and confront them.

This chapter gives the theoretical framework of the study which is collective action. The different types of collective action being social movement and social movement unionism are portrayed. The four variables influencing collective action in South Africa and the four types of collective action are identified. A model of collective action in South Africa is developed. This model is both explanatory and prescriptive of the four types of collective action in South Africa which are social movement unionism, social movement, business union and industrial action. The chapter closes by elucidating the concepts of public good and collective action leadership, from the model, that are most relevant to the study.

### **3.2. COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY**

Collective action can be categorised into routine collective action and non-routine collective action, social movement (SM) and social movement unionism (SMU). Breakdown theory explains 'non-routine' collective action, the contentious type, to be full of civil violence, rebellion and riots, to occur when the social control structures lose their restraining capability. Resource mobilisation (RM) theory explains the 'routine' collective action. Breakdown theory and RM theory explain different types of collective action and are both required to account for the entire spectrum of collective action forms (Useem, 1998).

From the foregoing, collective action does not necessarily require an institution or a formal structure for it to take place, like the operations of a trade union. It is mostly used by the excluded groups against the perpetrator of the exclusion but it is also used by the advantaged groups, opinion-based groups to attain groups' aims and is seen as the core mechanism of social or status quo change. Injustices, group systemic discrimination, status quo are challenged or sought to be prevented by using collective action. Collective service delivery protests in South Africa are the case in point in challenging class deprivation.

Collective action can be seen as an alternative political direction or battle of ideas and is as a result of mobilisation culminating in the group members' willingness to participate and actually participating in collective action (Reshef, 2004:624). The essential requirements for collective action to take place are; a group of individuals, leadership of the group, characteristics of the group and the goal of the group termed 'Public Good' in collective action theory.

Collective action can be launched via SM, SMU, trade union, industrial action by concerned groups. Government is usually the target of most of collective action types and employers are usually targeted by industrial action. A situation unjust to the group is identified, defined and subjected to change by collective action, in unison orchestrated by the group leadership. Historically inflation had forced the trade union into collective action in defense of their salaries.

The skill-based technological change (SBTC), requiring highly skilled labour and the fall of Communist Russia, eroded the trade union survival tenant of ‘elasticity of demand for labour’ and ‘ideological resources available to trade union members’ respectively. The two threats, individually or combined, served as stimuli for trade union to indulge in collective action. Charlwood (2004) concurred with the above and argued that the future of the trade union was dependent on:

- a) Incentive for collective action.
- b) Elasticity of demand for labour.
- c) Ideological resources available to trade union members.

Johnson and Prakash (2007:226) opined that:

Collective action is the study of the conditions under which individuals might cooperate to pursue common goals. Individuals pursue collective action because they believe that pooling resources and coordinating strategies with like-minded actors can achieve certain goals more efficiently.

Other scholars such as Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam, (1990:995); Tajfel *et al*, (1979:45) shared the view that:

Collective action is traditionally defined as any action that aims to improve the status, power, or influence of an entire group, rather than that of one or a few individuals.

The foregoing is in agreement with Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT), which posits that when a group of individuals feel deprived, they would seek to improve their situation by indulging in collective action. According to RDT, deprivation must first be perceived as being group based; secondly it must arouse emotions among the group individuals, for it to predict collective action. On the other hand Social Identity Theory (SIT) stipulates that; firstly there should be in existence a perception, among group members, of an insurmountable demarcation between their deprived group and the other privileged group, preventing them from being members of the latter group. Secondly, the deprivation should be viewed as illegitimate.

Thirdly and lastly there should be a perceived instability of the injustice and inequality but also shedding hope that; the status quo can be changed, thus giving birth to willingness among deprived group members to embark on collective action (Van Zomeren 2009:648).

It is worth noting that; it is not always all the group members that share the sentiments of the group and are willing to indulge in collective action. The intimidation of group members who are not participating in collective action is explained by the phenomenon that the supply and demand of collective action, is in some cases influenced by coercion and power because cooperation is not always voluntary (Moe, 2005). Although not in full agreement with the use of force to gain group members' participation in collective action, Anuradha (2011:415) partly concurred in stating that:

When people in ones' vicinity engage actively in union activities the social link-ages and social pressure lead other non-participants also to participate.

Numerous models of collective action, differing in complexity and the aspects they interrogate exist, but nevertheless two were cited, in figure 14 and figure 15, by way of example, to show the range of models from a simple to a complex one. One model, a three stage model, was advanced by Reshef (2004). The first stage comprises the provision of stimuli by the government, which prompts the leadership of the deprived group to consider collective action. The second stage is the decision by the leadership of the affected group, whether or not to embark on collective action, resulting from a cost-benefit analysis. The third stage is the pursuance of collective action. The group members also go through the same stages as their leadership.

The group individuals make a rational decision to indulge in collective action and the rationality extends from individuals to the entire group, thus yielding collective rationality (Weirich 2007). Disparate views exist as to what motivates collective action; hence researchers have sought to construct models explaining collective action's underlying mechanism.

The assessment of current collective action literature according to Tang (2008) yielded the following:

- i. Theoretical advancements are founded on the assumption of the rationality of human beings and that they base their decisions on the cost benefit calculation to maximize personal gains.
- ii. The definition of public good used does not include good on the different strata in the **personal development of human beings, organisational and societal growth**.
- iii. Most of collective action theories limit the individuals' participation in collective action to influence of external variables e.g. organisation and society, to the exclusion of internal factors like personal development, emotions, religion etc.
- iv. The current literature does not explain the continuation and maintenance of collective action. There is a need for an integral model of collective action that does not only lend better insight to underlying mechanism of collective action but gives antecedents and uses the **holistic definition of public good**.

Tang (2008) set out to correct what he criticized in the collective action literature by firstly, arguing that the individuals' decision to indulge in collective action was not only for the maximisation of personal interests but was also aimed at attaining social recognition and secondly, contributing to the public good. The desire for social recognition and contribution to public good serves as incentives to indulge in collective action. Tang (2008) went on to define holistic public good, personal development, organisational growth and societal growth as below.

**Personal development** definition comprises three levels being:

- a) First and lowest level consisting of gains in material and reputation.
- b) Second level pertains to the attainment of full potential or self-actualisation.
- c) Third and highest level which is above personal material interest is the quest for a relationship that is harmonious with the world.

This definition permits the pursuit of personal development on all the three levels simultaneously. The pursuit of material interests is not in conflict with those of the collective like family, community etc. and also not contrary to religious values.

**Organisational growth's** high level is ethical and spiritual, five levels of which are identified by Mitroff and Denton (1999:90) that:

Five models for fostering spirituality: the religion-based organisation, the evolutionary organisation, the recovering organisation, the socially responsible organisation, and the value-based organisation.

**Societal growth**, like personal development, is seen to be consisting of three levels at which, similarly to those of personal development, growth can be pursued simultaneously.

- a) First basic level is the societal survival entailing satisfaction basic needs e.g. setting up of societal norms, rule, institutions etc.
- b) Second level involves public good for the society like democracy and freedom.
- c) Third highest level is one at which people of the world seek the betterment of the world on their common values ignoring their differences based on race, religion etc.


**Holistic public good** definition must incorporate three aspect of personal development, organisational growth and the betterment of society, as opposed to the traditional definition of public good which limits public good to material benefits enjoyed by the public.

Based on the foregoing Tang (2008) improved the traditional (lower-level) model of collective action, shown in figure 14, to the integral model of collective action in organisations and beyond as depicted in figure 15 and in his words (Tang 2008:255) stated that:

I propose a developmental and integral model of collective action that views people, organisation, and society as experiencing different developmental stages and identifying with and caring about different goals in those stages (Wilber, 2000).


On different levels of development, people are more likely to contribute to different types of public goods.

**Figure 14: TRADITIONAL LOWER-LEVEL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**



[Source: Tang, L., (2008:251)]

**Figure 15: AN INTEGRAL MODEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**




[Source: Tang, L., (2008:252)]

### 3.3. SOCIAL MOVEMENT TYPE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

SM is the concept whereby a group of individuals, which may be trade union organisations, NGOs or NPOs, embark on collective action and or exploit transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to indulge in collective action in confronting social issues on a local, national or international arena either in the absence of a formal political structure or when the matter is too urgent to meander the course of an existing political institution. Alternatively it can be said that the motives of those who take the social movement route, are at variance with those who follow the conventional political process because SM uses informal structures (Shaffer 2011, Ballard et al, 2005)

**Figure 16: POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMERGENCE**



[Source: McAdam, 1982:51]

SM may also be seen as collective endeavours of the excluded individuals or groups, who strive for their collective interests, via noninstitutionalised means. The classical model of social movement has many variations based on the causal antecedents. McAdam (1982) gives various unique, irreplaceable models of SM starting with the political process model of SM emergence, in figure 16 above, followed by a classical model, in figure 17 below.

**Figure 17: CLASSICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE**

Structural strain —————> Disruptive psychological state —————> Social movement

[Source: McAdam, 1982:7]

A list of SM antecedents comprises amongst others, mass society, collective behaviour and status inconsistency, the models of which are given figures 18, 19 and 20 below respectively. A sequence is initiated by a flaw in the societal structure and completed at the prevalence of conditions sufficient to spark social movement emergence (McAdam, 1982).

**Figure 18: MASS SOCIETY MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE**

Social isolation —————> Alienation and anxiety —————> Extreme behaviour  
(i.e., Social movement)

[Source: McAdam, 1982:7]

**Figure 19: STATUS INCONSISTENCY MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE**

Severe and widespread status inconsistency —————> Cognitive dissonance —————> Social movements

[Source: McAdam, 1982:8]

**Figure 20: COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMEREGENCE**

System strain —————> Normative ambiguity —————> Social movement

[Source: McAdam, 1982:9]

Klandermans and Oegema (1987) concurred with Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010) on the four step model towards participation in SM that follows below:

- i. Becoming part of the SM by sympathizing with its political or strategic objective(s).
- ii. Becoming target of mobilisation attempts by the SM.
- iii. Becoming motivated to participate in SM activities.
- iv. Overcoming constraints (e.g. time, money etc.) to participating in SM activities.

### **3.4. SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM TYPE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**

Trade union organisations can be dichotomised into business unions and social movement unions. Business unions are exclusive, uncritical and provide services only to their members in terms of collective bargaining. When a trade union organisation indulges in SM, which is one kind of collective action, the resultant collective action is SMU. Social movement unions are inclusive and critical of the economic and political status quo. They advance SMU objectives by means which are not necessarily reliant on conventional processes and electoral politics. SMU employs both formal and informal structures in pursuance of its objectives. Formal structures comprise political process, trade unions, NGOs, NPOs etc (Lopez, 2003).

SMU is viewed by some scholars as being democratic and a tool to exploit the strength of numbers, drawn from social, political and class sectors, to fight for deprived communities (Schiavone, 2007:281). It is when trade union organises the unorganised, to indulge in collective action and regard themselves as part of the bigger social movement, aiming to achieve social ideals. The organisation and mobilisation is increasingly in terms of class issues rather than in terms of workplace issues, thus expanding organising from workplace matters to societal matters. When the trade union extends its operations beyond the workplace, to tackle social issues, the resultant collective action is termed SMU (Lopez, 2003).

Robinson (2000:113) hints to the possible reason for the extension of the organisational boundaries by trade union when stating that:

These ambitious social change goals arise in part from a concern for many who are not, and will never be, members of the union.

Robinson, (2000) further argued that in the USA the paradigm shift from the business unions to social movement unions was, among other factors, sparked by neo liberal restructuring (NLR). Shaffer (2011) viewed SMU as an equal rights struggle, apparent in its trend of being pursued in many countries in the world. Without having to look into the causes thereof, the wave of SMU swept through many countries (Fairbrother *et al*, 2007).

These countries included Australia (Griffin, Nyland and Rourke, 2004 and Snell and Fairbrother 2011), Canada (Jansen and Young, 2009; Savage, 2010; Walchuk, 2010), France (Le Queux and Sainsaulieu, 2010), Germany (Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2009), United Kingdom (Black, 2001; Ludlam and Taylor, 2003), USA (Lamare, 2010; Nissen, 2010; Rathke, 2004; Turner and Hurd, 2001), South Africa (Ballard *et al*, 2005; Barchiesi, 1997; Naidoo, 2001; Wood, 2002) and Sweden (Vandenberg, 2006). In Mozambique SMU took place through community based unions, as opposed to employment based trade unions (Dibben and Nadin, 2011).

Fairbrother (2008:213) agreed that SMU reached Britain, Germany and USA when stating that:

One can argue that this is a form of social power that periodically has been able to challenge the seemingly overwhelming power of corporations and governments, for example, in Britain in the 1890s, Germany in 1918–1920, the United States in the 1930s, and Italy after 1969.

In an exemplification of the inextricability of SMU and the trade union, Ademiluyi and Imhonopi (2010:46) defined a trade union as:

A continuous and permanent association of wage or salary earners formed for the purpose of maintaining (and enhancing) the conditions of their working life through the provision of several economic and social safety nets within and outside the work environment.

Penney (2004:2) averred that:

In the most general sense of the term, social movement unionism refers to labor unions organising beyond the point of production and into the communities where workers live. It is an ideological transformation where unions look to address the issues of workers as a class, rather than as only employees of a specific workplace. Therefore, labor's activity in the fight to improve the situation of housing for the poor and working-class is a prime location for understanding how social movement unionism works. The availability of affordable housing is fast becoming one of the thorniest problems for social policy in the new century.

Ibid, (2004:9) continued and stated that:

Unionism [where] neither the unions nor their members are passive in any sense. Unions take an active lead in the streets, as well as in politics. They ally with other social movements, but provide a class vision and content. That content is not simply the demands of the movements but the activation of the mass of union members as the leaders of change—those who in most cases have the greatest social and economic leverage in capitalist society. Social movement unionism implies an active strategic orientation that uses the strongest societies oppressed and exploited, generally organised workers, to mobilise those who are less able to sustain self-mobilisation: the poor, the unemployed, the capsulized workers, the neighborhood organisations.

Seidman (1994:2-3) argued that:

Theoretically, social-movement unionism is perhaps best defined as an effort to raise the living standards of the working class as a whole, rather than to protect individually defined interests of union members. Social-movement unionism consists of precisely such struggles over wages and working conditions, and also over living conditions in working class areas-over housing and social services, such as health care, education, transport, and running water. These campaigns link factory-based unions and communities, and they lead to challenges to the states, well as individual employers. Strikes over factory issues receive strong community support; conversely, community campaigns for improved social services and full citizenship are supported by factory organizations as labor movements redefine their constituencies to include the broader working class.

SMU was exemplified in many African countries that fought for their freedom and independence like Nigeria (Adesoji, 2003; Alalade, 2004; Alubo, 2007; Imhonopi and Urim, 2011; Isah, 2006; Iyayi, 2008; Nwoko, 2009; Okome, 2008; Osiki, 2009; Otobo, 1981; Snelling, 2002), Zambia (Duncan, Macmillan and Simutanyi, 2003; Fashoyin, 2008; Henderson, 1975; Kabemba, *et al* 2004; Larmer, 2006), Zimbabwe (Dansereau, 2003; Kamete, 2006; Magure, 2008; Raftopoulos, 1995; Raftopoulos, 2000; Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004) and Malawi (Palmer, 1986 and Woods, 1992).

A typical real life situation of SMU theory was that of Martin Luther King who linked trade union appeals to community issues of civil rights movement. He also combined human rights, women's rights with bargaining and encouraged trade union members' participation in demonstrations for peace, feminist, civil and human rights (Schiavone, 2007: 286).

A combination of works of many scholars produced the four dimensions of Social Movement Unionism (Fairbrother, 2008:214) that:

- a) Social movement unionism is a rank and file mobilisation which is locally based.
- b) It indulges in collective action that goes beyond the workplace strikes.
- c) It forms coalitions and alliances extending beyond the community.
- d) It embraces the politics of emancipation, makes political demands and is transformative.

The foregoing four dimensions can therefore be used to gauge any collective action; any collective action conforming to the four dimensions, would be regarded as SMU.

### 3.5. THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA


#### 3.5.1. COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Following the argument by McAdam (1982:60) that:

The utility for any theory ultimately depends less on the elegance and logical structure of that model than on how well it predicts or describes concrete empirical phenomena.

The collective action theory model must not only explain and describe the empirical phenomenon of collective service delivery violence in South Africa but it must also be able to predict any future collective action incidents. To this end, collective action theory was analysed and a collective action model, satisfying the foregoing propositions, with regard to collective service delivery violence in South Africa, was designed.

**Figure 21: VARIABLES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**



The analysis of collective action theory showed that collective action is a function of four variables viz. collective action leadership, collective action form, collective or group characteristics and collective good which in collective action theory is referred to as public good. From the foregoing information, variables of collective action model were coined and presented in figure 21 above.

Further analysis of the four variables of collective action showed that each of the variables, form, collective characteristics, collective good, and leadership can be further dichotomised as follows:

1. **Collective action form** can be:
  - a. Routine or
  - b. Non-routine.
2. **Collective characteristics** of the group employing collective action can be divided into:
  - a. Trade union and
  - b. NGO'S, NPO'S, affected groups and civic organizations.
3. **Collective good** for the group involved in collective action can be:
  - a. Community, national or international issues or
  - b. Employment matters only
4. **Collective action leadership** can be categorised into:
  - a. Trade union leadership and
  - b. Nontrade union leadership.

Different combinations of variables of collective action yield a total of four kinds of collective action, which are business union, industrial action, social movement (SM) and social movement unionism (SMU). The diagram for the four kinds of collective action is shown on figure 22 below.

**Figure 22: TYPES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**

SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM	SOCIAL MOVEMENT
BUSINESS UNION	INDUSTRIAL ACTION

Collective service delivery protests that took place in South Africa were a non-routine form of collective action. They were sporadic, unprecedented and different to the workers' routine strikes of collective action, which normally occur around the time of wage negotiations and salary increases. These collective service delivery protests resulted to deaths, injuries, damage to property etc. The concerned communities actions were characterised by 'civil violence', 'rebellion', and 'riots', as explained by the breakdown theory, consistent with the non-routine form of collective action. Service delivery protesters did not use any formal structure to launch their grievances but took to the streets. There was no use made of organised structures like, NGOs, NPOs, trade unions, civic organisations or political process.

In accordance with the collective action theory, the unifying collective characteristic variable, among collective service delivery protesters, was the deprivation of basic amenities. This was perceived by the deprived community as an unjust, class, systemic discrimination, which necessitated collective action to change, in the form of collective service delivery protests or violent collective service delivery protests.

The affected group saw collective service delivery protests as an alternative to taking a political process route, which would take longer. This is in conformity with the RDT, which states that the deprived group would seek to change the status quo by embarking on collective action. The public good variable, aimed at by the service delivery protesters, could be seen as the development in the community and the betterment of lives of the community members.

Poor service delivery was across the whole of South Africa and therefore the alleviation thereof was both for the societal and national good (Møller and Jackson, 2008). Collective good, in the instance of collective service delivery violence, excluded international and employment issues.

Collective action leadership variable input, of collective action, that explain the South African situation, come from both the trade union and from outside the trade union. For the SMU, leadership comes from the trade union. For SM, leadership comes from both inside and outside the trade union and from the concerned groups, i.e. the groups affected by poor service delivery. Without the leadership, the active participation in collective action, of both trade union members and non-trade union members would be minimal. The leadership transformed the group disgruntlement about poor service delivery into a group grievance.

On the SM front, the leadership convinced the communities deprived of basic amenities, that collective service delivery protests were the solution to effect change. On the other hand, trade union leadership convinced the working class that SMU was the way to fight working class poverty, discrimination and deprivation. The motivation for trade union indulgence in SMU was among other reasons to grow the organisation. The growth of the trade union collective was otherwise limited to the work environment but the involvement in SMU widened the scope of operation and increased the growth of the trade union in size, power and influence.


The foregoing is consistent with and is confirmed by the data collected from the trade union leadership sampled. The trade union collective's leadership sentiments about collective service delivery violence causes and solutions mirror the complaints of collective service delivery protesters. This can be seen by comparing the first five service delivery causes, on table 4.2.2.1 and the first five service delivery solutions, on table 4.2.4.1, suggested by the trade union leadership, to the first five complaints on figure 11 put forward by the service delivery protesters. The common features are poor service delivery and corruption. This shows that the trade union activities, interest and responsibilities extend beyond the workplace to the societal arena.

According to the three stage model for employing collective action, proposed by Reshef (2004), the first stage was the lack of provision of basic services to the communities by the government, which was the stimulus provided by the government that prompted the leadership of the deprived communities to consider collective action. The second stage was the decision of the leadership of both SM and SMU, in South Africa, to embark on collective action of different types. The third stage was the pursuance of collective action. The pursuance of collective action via SM resulted to collective service delivery protests and subsequently collective service delivery violence. The SMU, route resulted to trade union leadership championing the aspirations of the poor working class, deprived of basic services, through both formal and informal structures. The example of the formal approach was the adoption by the ANC government of the RDP programme proposed by COSATU. The RDP became a government programme to be executed using state resources (Republic of South Africa, 1994). The example of an informal approach is the leading of a struggle against Apartheid by the trade union which was done outside the political process.

Collective action literature pointed out that collective action was motivated by objectives of achieving personal development, societal growth, public good and organisational growth (Tang, 2008). The motivators for collective action posited by collective action literature are found to be true for collective service delivery violence in South Africa. Community members that protested against poor service delivery aimed at the betterment of their standard of living and that of their families and collective. For each individual that was motivated to participate in collective service delivery protests, the personal betterment aimed at, comprised material gains, self actualisation and attainment of the standard of living comparable to that of an average person or even better.

The development of individual households in the community would in turn result to societal growth and the first requirement for societal growth is the societal survival. The supply of basic services to society would ensure societal survival and the societal fight for services would thus be imperative. The second requirement is freedom and democracy which the collective service delivery protesters exercised by standing up against the government when they felt their rights were threatened.

**Figure 23: SOUTH AFRICA COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL**



The third requirement pursued by violent collective service delivery protesters was that of equal treatment in terms of service delivery irrespective of colour or creed. This then was the pursuit of collective or public good, where the material benefit would be enjoyed by everybody in the community collective. Consequent to the collective action theory analysis and a combination of figure 21 and figure 22 for variables of collective action and types of collective action respectively, a model of collective action was designed and presented in figure 23 above.

Collective action theory and model, explaining past, present and future collective action phenomena in South Africa, collective service delivery violence collective action being the object of this study, is a combination of business unionism, industrial action, social movement and social movement unionism (boxes 3, 4, 2 and 1 in figure 23 respectively). In South African history, the potential of all four types of collective action had been exploited, to advance the issues of popular demand.

### **3.5.2. BUSINESS UNION COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Collective action theory categorises trade unions into two types, the business unions and the social movement unions. Both unions offer collective bargaining benefits to their members. The difference between a business union and a social movement union are the boundaries and the objects of their operations. The business unions on one hand limit their operations to the workplace and employment issues. The social movement unions on the other hand extend their scope of operations to include the living environment of their members, nonmembers, communities, their issues and national issues (McCracken, 1988).

However, the common factors between business unions and social movement unions are the source of their leadership, which is the trade union leadership, the place and objective of their founding and the sources of funds for their operations, which are the workplace, welfare of their members and their membership subscriptions, respectively. Thus the term business union is not only used to define the scope operation of a trade union but also to imply its founding base. When following this line of argument, any social movement union is first a business union before it can be a social movement union. Thus being a business union was a prerequisite for SM unions, in South Africa and elsewhere.

The business union served as a base and a source of funds for SM unions. Either than their own contribution to collective action theory, business unions provided nests for social movement unions; in worldwide politics and this was the case for the trade unions in general in South Africa, in particular COSATU.

The achievement of the trade union members' needs and trade union desired organisational goals, formed the basis for the members' willingness to indulge in collective action. This type of collective action was used in South Africa in the Apartheid era to put pressure both employer and government.

The sum total of the workers' attitudes was influenced by the trade union leadership, in reinforcing collective identity amongst trade union members, which translated to members' willingness to participate in trade union collective action, for contemporary business union collective good. The collective good is contemporary good limited to employment matters which could be service delivery related like striking for higher wages to cover service delivery cost. This collective action type has collective characteristics of a business union collective.

### **3.5.3. INDUSTRIAL ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

The inclusion of industrial action in the South African collective action model completes the spectrum of the model and enables it to explain the past present and predict the future South African collective action. The leadership of this collective action comprises both trade union and nontrade union leadership. It is of a non-routine form, its collective objectives are confined to employment matters and the collective characteristics include but are not limited to the trade union collective.

In the Apartheid era, the political process favoured the employers, the state and the employer cooperated to reduce wages, so as to impoverish domestic and community life of the African working class. Hence the industrial actions were used to support Africans' community needs. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, industrial workers used to go on strike in support of community demands. This was exemplified by the case of Thozamile Botha, who was a community leader in Port Elizabeth, fighting against high rent and water supplies.

When he was dismissed by his then employer, Ford, workers at Ford went on strike until he was reinstated. SAAWU, in East London, after winning wage increase, went on an extended strike, in protest against transport costs and in support of bus boycotts. During the period of the Apartheid government, there were industrial actions, for various reasons, in pursuance of different social objectives.

Amongst others, the reasons for industrial action were sympathy strikes with other striking workers, the release of detained union leaders and to support community demands. However, after the 1994 democratic elections there had not been industrial action to support service delivery demands or in sympathy to collective service delivery protests. In the democratic era the industrial action had been confined to the workplaces and employment issues. Although industrial action during this period had not been used for the purposes it was previously used for, in the Apartheid era, the possibility of it being used in the future, for purposes similar to those of Apartheid era, cannot ruled out.

#### **3.5.4. SOCIAL MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

SM type of collective action collective characteristics and collective leadership comprise of both trade union and non-trade union collective. The collective objectives and form of SM type of collective action are communal or international and non-routine respectively. Collective service delivery protests in South Africa were SM type of collective action and can be explained in terms of all the five social movement emergence models, viz. the political process model, classical model, mass society model, status inconsistency model and the collective action model.

From the political process model perspective, collective service delivery violence unfolded against the socioeconomic backdrop and drew from organizational power of local communities. Collective service delivery protesters did not follow the established political structures in pursuance of their goal but bypassed it, thus satisfying the condition of expanding political opportunities. The protesters' goal, which was good service delivery, is explained as cognitive liberation.

All the necessary conditions for the emergence of SM, which are the existence of broad socioeconomic process, expansion of political opportunities and use of indigenous organizational strength, to achieve cognitive liberation, were satisfied. In terms of the classical model, it can be seen that the structural strain resulted from the feeling of deprivation, of basic services, amongst members of the concerned communities. This feeling caused the strain which led to the disruptive psychological state of community members, thus resulted to the emergence of a social movement.

When employing the three SM emergence models of mass society, status inconsistency and collective action, to explain collective service delivery violence, it can be seen that the antecedents was the same for all models but interpreted differently by each model. For all three models, the lack of service delivery or poor service delivery was the antecedent. The mass society model, labels the deprivation of communities of basic amenities as the ‘social isolation’. The deprivation of basic services (‘social isolation’) caused ‘alienation and anxiety’ among community members of the deprived group and in turn resulted to ‘extreme behaviour’, the SM.

The status inconsistency model equated the poor service delivery antecedent to ‘severe and widespread status inconsistency’. According to this model, considering that some South African citizens were provided with basic services, for others not to be provided with the same basic services was an inconsistency. The communities that were not getting the basic services viewed this as a dissonance and it prompted them to embark on social movement to correct the discrepancy. Similar to the classical model, the collective action model termed the poor service delivery antecedent, the system strain. The difference is that according to the collective action model, the strain of poor service delivery led to normative ambiguity which culminated in SM.

Klandermans and Oegema (1987) and Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010) posited a four step model towards participating in SM. He suggested that becoming part of SM by sympathizing with the SM objectives was the first step. The second step was becoming targets of mobilisation attempts. The third step was being motivated to participate in SM and lastly participating in SM activities.

These four steps were observed to have been followed in the SM history of South Africa, since the Apartheid era up to the violent collective service delivery protests that started in 2007. During the Apartheid government, disenfranchised African communities traversed all the four SM model steps, up to the participation phase, which was in the form of many activities. The communities organised themselves in street committees and took charge of local administration in a fight for basic amenities. Communities staged rent and bus boycotts in protest against high costs. The street committees gave way after the 1994 democratic elections (Francis, 2011).

Churches and church leaders supported the fight against Apartheid; the most prominent of the church leaders was Bishop Desmond Tutu. Churches were used as venues for political meetings; the most popular church used for this purpose was Regina Mundi, in Soweto. Communities embarked on consumer boycotts of products of discriminatory companies and in support of the wages strikes. Strike funds were organised to help striking workers. From the late 1990s onwards, many organisations like AEC, APF, SECC, LPM, TAC, etc, were formed to pursue different SM objectives. Although there was no organisation formed to pursue poor service delivery, like TAC was formed to pressure government to provide AIDS treatment to AIDS sufferers, considering the nationwide service delivery violence, poor service delivery had proven its status of being a national problem.

However, instead of forming an organisation, the communities affected by poor service delivery followed the Klandermans and Oegema (1987) and Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans' (2010) four step model of SM, by embarking on collective service delivery protests that culminated in violence. The concerned communities automatically became sympathetic to the course of fighting for better services. These communities became targets of mobilisation because they experienced poor service delivery. The deprivation of the basic amenities was a motivating factor, to the deprived communities, to participate in SM activities.

The people, who participated in SM, had to overcome time and money constraints, some had to stay away from work and sacrifice their wages, for the duration of the protests. Others who were not employed had to postpone their commitments so as to take part in the protests.

The identification with the communities, existing within one's environment, with which common service delivery problems were shared, fostered solidarity bonds among community members and between these communities. The solidarity identification determined the extent of community members' support for collective action, in poor service delivery dispute resolution.

Evidently SM took root in SA in the pre democratic period, since then, what has changed are the issues SM tackle rather than SM itself. It can therefore be said that SM is not extinct in SA but lies dormant, in wait for national issues, like poor service delivery, to tackle, as evidenced by the nationwide eruption of collective service delivery violence.

### **3.5.5. SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM COLLECTIVE ACTION TYPE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

The link between the trade union and SM, consequently SMU started, at the dawn of mining industrialization. When mining started in Johannesburg, there was an emergence of the migrant labour system as migrant labour from the whole Southern Africa converged towards Johannesburg (First, 1983:11). The South African government brought skilled European workers and unskilled African migrant workers to work in the mines in Johannesburg. The government used political power to enforce oppression, deprivation and racial discrimination against the African workers, via legislation, like Population Registration Act (Republic of South Africa, 1950), to categorise citizens according to race.

Bantu Authorities Act (Republic of South Africa, 1951) was used to separate the residential areas in terms of race, Natives Passes Act (Republic of South Africa, 1952), to curb Africans' mobility and Group Areas Act (Republic of South Africa, 1950), to deny blacks ownership of property. The land of the Africans was expropriated; using Natives Resettlement Act (Republic of South Africa, 1954) and they were given amenities of inferior quality, using Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (Republic of South Africa, 1953) and poor quality education via Bantu Education Act (Republic of South Africa, 1953).

There were Mines and Works Act (Republic of South Africa, 1911), Job Reservation Act of 1926 (Republic of South Africa, 1926) and the Bantu/Native Building Workers Act (Republic of South Africa, 1951), used to reserve particular jobs for whites only. Initially African workers were denied trade union membership and later trade unions were separated according to race. The Natives Labour Act (Republic of South Africa, 1953) was used by the government to control African workers.

The legislation in the Apartheid era inextricably intertwined and fused work, social, economic, community and political issues, with workers and the trade union. Government used legislation to classify Africans both as blacks and workers and denied them political participation. Apartheid laws were intended for both racial oppression and labour control of the Africans. The bad situation of racial oppression and discrimination was further exacerbated by the abject conditions of poverty in the sprawling African residential areas. This was equivalent to denial of Africans full citizenship, known to be civic, social and political rights.

For the trade union to have labour benign legislation and for the trade union members to enjoy full citizenship with economic, political freedom and social rights, the situation in the country had to be normalized first. This situation forced the trade union to indulge in SMU, which spanned both the Apartheid and democratic period. Trade union leaders, who did not support political and community campaigns, lost popularity. The example of this is that of Joe Foster, who was president of FOSATU. In 1982, he argued against the trade union involvement in community and political matters and he lost the national position, he held three years later (Seidman, 1994:231).


The SM union is by definition critical of the political and economic status quo for the good of her members and non-members alike. The prerequisites for SMU are business union and SM objectives. The existence of the trade union (business union) in South Africa, combined with its repression, plus the SM objectives of democracy and justice, were reasons for trade union to seek refuge in SM during the Apartheid era and embraced the SM goals thus starting SMU in South Africa.

It should be noted that the trade union collective also followed the four steps of Klandermans and Oegema (1987) and Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010) model, for participating in SM. Furthermore, when the trade union embarks on SM collective action, the end result is SMU but when a group of individuals embark on SM collective action, the end result is still SM.

The denial of collective bargaining to trade unions by both the state and the employers, during the Apartheid regime, resulted to the trade union taking on national issues and joining politics so as to establish labour benign legal framework and change the operational environment of the trade union. There was an increased intertwining of workers, economic and political demands made by the trade union. Instead of relying on a political process and political leaders, for solutions to political problems, trade union leadership took the lead in championing political and national issues, without relinquishing the industrial responsibility. There was an escalation of organizing around class, colour and shaping the broader opposition to the Apartheid government. The greater goal of SMU aspired for, was that of full citizenship with economic, social and political rights including the right to vote. Hence workers, subsequently trade unions, were linked to communities and community demands by common factors like class, poverty and place of residence. Thus since the Apartheid era, due to disenfranchisement, repressive and discriminatory laws, the trade union in South Africa embraced the SM goals and embarked on SMU collective action, aiming to achieve social, economic and democratic ideals, which were achieved on April 27, 1994 democratic elections.

After the democratic elections the trade union collective continued to mobilise increasingly in terms of class issues rather than employment issues. It extended the organising to community and national issues like provision of services and led SMU, in pursuit of SMU objectives. The trade union role, of tackling social issues, was confirmed by Hyman (2001:60), when he argued that trade unions are social movements, which originated from challenging the economic and social status quo, such as was the case with COSATU, in South Africa. Ballard *et al*, (2005) mapped the evolution of the role of trade union in the South African social, political and SMU scene, as in figure 24 below.

**Figure 24: THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM**



[Source: Ballard, *et al*, (2005:622)]

### 3.5.6. PUBLIC GOOD FROM THE POPULAR SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Public good is dynamic, during the Apartheid government, from the popular South African perspective; it was seen as democracy, freedom, full citizenship, equality before the law, economic distribution etc. After the 1994 democratic elections, the deliverance of basic amenities to all and economic equality, in that order, among other objectives, remained the most popular contemporary public good, from the majority South Africans' point of view. The urgency of the delivery of basic services was evidenced by collective service protests, accompanied by violence, which occurred in South Africa from 2007 and peaked in 2010.

### 3.5.7. COLLECTIVE ACTION LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

Leadership is important and necessary for all collectives and kinds of movements (McAdam, 1982:47). Without leadership the likelihood of active involvement of any collective in any kind of collective action, like trade union, industrial action, SM or SMU, would be minimal. Leadership serves to establish conditions that are favourable to collective action and synergises the collective, which capacitates the group, to adapt to the changing environment (Livingston and Lusin, 2009).

Ibid (2009:103) stated that:

Leadership is fundamentally the process of influencing the creation, destruction, transformation, and distribution of information throughout the system, and enabling action in response to this information. It is a complex process existing in a complex environment.

It may also be defined (Keene, 2000:18) as follows:

Leadership in an environment of complexity will be that person who facilitates and creates an environment which makes it possible for the elements within the system to interact and create new forms of reality, guided by the overarching vision and rules. The art of leadership is the ability to release the potential of those within the organisation.

Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey (2007:299) argued that:

Using the concept of complex adaptive systems (CAS), we propose that leadership should be seen not only as position and authority but also as an emergent, interactive dynamic—a complex interplay from which a collective impetus for action and change emerges when heterogeneous agents interact in networks in ways that produce new patterns of behavior or new modes of operating.

Srivastava (2011:214) opined that:

The union leader's leadership styles would lead to union commitment and loyalty such that transactional leadership styles lead to union commitment and transformational leadership styles would foster union loyalty.

Fullagar *et al* (1994) and Metochi (2002:92) contended that leadership directly and or indirectly influences members of the collective, who are the most important resource of the collective's leadership. This view was confirmed by the studies conducted, which showed that the collective's leadership influences the general attitudes of its collective's members (Avolio *et al* 2004:804).

Collective action leadership in South Africa transformed the individuals' disgruntlement, e.g. Apartheid and poor service delivery, into a collective grievance. It convinced affected communities that collective action was the solution for effecting change and it was imperative for community members to embark on collective action. This is equivalent to the struggle for freedom during the Apartheid era and collective service delivery protests in the case of poor service delivery, in the democratic era.

Leadership identifies and picks pertinent contemporary social issues that concern community members at work and in their living environment, sensitise the community about these issues and confront them. The available collective action vehicles for confronting these matters are business union, industrial action, SM and SMU. All foregoing four forms of collective action are driven by collective's leadership and are dependent on the collective's membership participation.

Various sectors' business unions have various constitutions. Election of their respective leadership and their operations are in terms of their relevant constitutions. Leaders of respective business unions are formally elected and are known. They are accountable to both members and employers and have a fixed term of office. These leaders are responsible in case of illegal or unprotected strikes and in case of damage to property during marches, strikes or protests of the members. The leadership controls and confines the collective action of the business union collective's members to within the work issues and the workplace. However it should be pointed out that the situation that prevailed during the Apartheid government era was abnormal.

The government's racial and political discrimination of the Africans then, together with the banning of their representative political organisations, left them with neither the political structure nor the leadership to pursue their aspirations. The Africans were excluded from participation in the political process. This resulted to the use all four kinds of collective action, drawing leadership for collective action from business union to pursue all kinds of objectives that were e.g. politically, socially or employment motivated. Put differently, during the Apartheid government, the business union collective's leadership assumed the leadership role in all four forms of collective action comprising business union, industrial action, SM and SMU.

Under normal circumstances, the leaders of industrial action type of collective action could be individual members of a trade union collective but they would not normally hold positions of leadership in the trade union. As it had been pointed out above, the abnormal Apartheid era conditions created an exception to this tacit rule, which would otherwise hold true under free, fair and democratic conditions. If the industrial action were to take place under the official trade union collective's leadership, in the democratic era, it would be under the legal framework, like a protected strike or for work issues and at workplace. On the other hand, if an industrial action were to occur contrary to the foregoing conditions, the leaders of such an industrial action type of collective action would not be formally elected trade union leadership. The leadership of such an industrial action would thus be contingent, impromptu, informal and temporal and the collective action would probably be illegal or an unprotected strike.

Poor service delivery imposed conditions of deprivation similar to those of the Apartheid regime period. These conditions of deprivation prompted reaction from the deprived collective, similar to those to Apartheid reaction, which is collective service delivery violence in response to poor service delivery. The foregoing provides some indication of the indulgence or not in industrial action type of collective action and the trade union collective's leadership manner of involvement or not in collective service delivery violence and what is likely to be the case in the future and under what conditions.

Both before and after the 1994 democratic elections, leadership of established SM organisations, like AEC, APF, SECC, LPM, TAC etc, was formally elected according to founding terms of respective organisations. In SM type of collective action, where there were no established organisations, as were the cases with consumer protests and rent boycotts, before democratic elections and collective service delivery violence after the 1994 democratic elections, the leadership would be similar to that of industrial action, contingent, impromptu, and temporal. This leadership ascends to the leadership positions in an informal manner and is not accountable to anyone. The term of office such leadership would be the same as the duration of the particular SM collective action.

As it can be seen in figure 23, collective service delivery violence, in South Africa is explained in terms of SM collective action, into which, trade union leadership assumes *de facto* leadership. However, since the Apartheid government, till the democratic government, the trade union collective and trade union collective's leadership have pursued SMU goals which were freedom during the Apartheid era and service delivery in the democratic era. The difference between to two eras is that in the former, there were no process participation and political structures, similar to those that became available in the latter, which could be used to pursue popular social and political aspirations. This study does not in any way imply the direct involvement of the trade union leadership or trade union in collective service delivery violence.

Rather the importance and relevance of the trade union collective and the trade union collective's leadership referred to, is that of their historically known role of being the vanguard of justice, political conscience, pursuant of national issues, SM and SMU objectives. The foregoing is proved in section 5.3 of this research that:

Evidence pointed out that perception of trade union collective's leadership, on collective service delivery violence under Zuma presidency, were a mirror image of complaints of the working class and the poor. Reasons advanced by trade union leadership, for an answer given to question F5 (*"Do you think that the reported increase in service delivery violence was an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma? Please give reasons for your answer"*), mirrored the complaints of the collective service delivery protesters (figure 11).

Hence the study intended to appraise President Zuma in the opinion of the trade union collective's leadership, by investigating perceptions of trade union leadership, on collective service delivery violence. Furthermore it was because the ultimate pursuit of any particular national issue, by the trade union collective, like service delivery, is influenced by the trade union collective's leadership and the trade union collective's leadership mirrored the complaints of the collective service delivery protesters (figure 11).

By virtue of the definition of SMU, the leadership of SMU is the same as that of the trade union collective (figure 23). Consequently it can be said that trade union and SMU have seen a trend of migration of many of its leaders, taking leadership positions in the ANC, the ANC government and business (Buhlungu, 2010). In this long list, there are Jay Naidoo, Alec Erwin, Cyril Ramaphosa, Mbhazima Shilowa, Gwede Mantashe, Kgalema Motlante, Membathisi Mdladlana to mention but a few.

It is therefore not surprising that the stature, role, and the dominance of trade union, within the alliance, increased significantly (Adam and Moodley, 1993). The increased influence was as a result of supposedly a combination of several factors, which are the union-party relation, the formation of the ANC-SACP-COSATU tripartite alliance and the infusion of trade union leaders into the ANC leadership (Wood and Harcourt 1998:75).

These migrations would provide the trade union and SMU with three different avenues to pursue the aspirations of the workers and the objectives of SMU respectively. This explains the trade union collective, in particular the trade union collective's leadership relevance to collective service delivery violence and why the findings on *"perceptions of trade union leadership on service delivery violence under the Zuma presidency"* is important, relevant and related to the theory.

It can be seen from theory the trade union collective's leadership and or SMU leadership in South Africa can evidently pursue national issues and or SMU objectives e.g. poor service delivery within the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance, at the union-party level or in union-government forums like NEDLAC.

### **3.6. CONCLUSION**

The trade union collective contributed much towards the achievement of democracy in South Africa and it is one of the largest and historically most militant working class collective in the African Continent (Gwisai, 2002). Maree (1998) concurs that COSATU is the biggest trade union federation in South Africa. The trade union in South Africa has used the power of the collective and employed collective action to advance class and social objectives and in tackling national issues like dismantling Apartheid. This has occurred with trade union collective's leadership at the helm.

It was established that the trade union leadership is the only type of collective action leadership that is common to all collective action types, elected, stable identifiable, and from this research experience, reachable for research purposes and leads legal collective action. Other non-trade union collectives' leaderships, like violent collective service delivery protests are not elected, self-imposed, unidentifiable, unstable, and transitory and lead collective actions that sometimes violate the law and hence it is not easy for them to declare their leadership.

Theory has shown that trade union leadership is also the leadership of social movement unionism. It has also been shown that collective service delivery violence in South Africa is explained in terms of two collective action types called social movement and social movement unionism. The connection between findings and theory is that the perceptions of trade union leadership on service delivery violence are a mirror image of complaints of the working class who used collective action to bring about service delivery violence as a result of poor service delivery.

Trade union collective's leadership is the leadership of a collective and is also part of the collective and may use its position to challenge president Zuma and his government on service delivery violence that results from poor service delivery.

Since the trade union leadership is part of the collective, their perceptions on collective service delivery violence are indicative of the trade union collective's membership perceptions thereon. The trade union leadership may make alleviation of service delivery violence the social movement and social movement unionism objective. Because of the results, the trade union is likely to use the power of collective action to tackle issues that lie at the root of collective service delivery violence like causes of collective service delivery violence.

The findings link the trade union leadership to collective service delivery violence through their perceptions thereon (Section 5.3). Collective service delivery violence is linked to the theory of collective action which explains the phenomenon. Collective action in turn is a product of a collective led by its leadership. It was for the foregoing reasons that the collective action theory was chosen to explain collective service delivery violence and trade union collective's leadership chosen to appraise President Zuma on collective service delivery violence.

## **4. CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS**

### **4.1. INTRODUCTION**

The chapter starts by looking at the profile of trade union leadership in the sample followed by the biographical data then the trade union collective's leadership's awareness of collective service delivery violence. Next is considered what the trade union leadership thought are the causes, consequences and solutions to collective service delivery violence. Lastly the chapter investigates the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union leadership support for President Zuma and his performance.

### **4.2. DATA PRESENTATION**

#### **4.2.1. TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

The sampled trade union collective leadership's awareness, of collective service delivery violence, was established prior to asking them questions about collective service delivery violence. To this end, four closed ended questions were posed to the trade union leadership. The set of questions and the results are displayed in table 4.2.1.1 below. On all four questions (viz. B1, B2, B3 and B4), of the 461 respondents, more than 85% were fully aware of collective service delivery violence.

**Table 4.2.1.1: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

NUMBER	QUESTION	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED YES	PERCENTAGE RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED YES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED NO	PERCENTAGE RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED NO	TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
B1	Are you aware that service delivery violence has resulted to deaths?	394	85.5	67	14.5	461
B2	Are you aware that service delivery violence has resulted to injuries to people?	452	98.0	9	2.0	461
B3	Are you aware that service delivery violence has resulted to damage to property?	450	97.6	11	2.4	461
B4	Do you think the service delivery violence can be stopped?	399	86.6	62	13.4	461

## 4.2.2. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES

**Table 4.2.2.1: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS ON CAUSES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

NUM BER	MAJOR CAUSES OF SERVICE DLIVERY VIOLENCE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE ONE CAUSE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE TWO CAUSES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE THREE CAUSES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE FOUR CAUSES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE FIVE CAUSES	TOTAL	RESPONDENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE
1	Fraud and corruption	127	29		1		157	34.1
2	Poor service delivery	77	1				78	16.9
3	Inefficiency and or incompetency amongst government officials	23	34	9			66	14.3
4	Poverty	5	20	28	11		64	13.9
5	Empty and or broken promises	33	22	2	1	1	59	12.8
6	Low income	36	9	2	1		48	10.4
7	Anger and or frustration	10	21	13	2	1	47	10.2
8	Unemployment	1	8	24	11	3	47	10.2
9	Management failure to respond and or solve worker needs or problems	22	10	4			36	7.8
10	Government is not responsive to community needs	18	9	2	2		31	6.7
11	Greed	2	14	11	2		29	6.3
12	Violation of workers and or human rights	19	6	1			26	5.6
13	Poor working and or living conditions	13	8		1		22	4.8
14	Selfishness	2	12	6			20	4.3
15	Nepotism in filling posts and or awarding of tenders	1	7	8	2		18	3.9
16	Inequality		4	8	3	1	16	3.5
17	Political and or union influence	9	3	3	1		16	3.5
18	Lack of communication	10	5				15	3.3
19	Lack of transparency	8	5	2			15	3.3
20	Unfair treatment of labour	8	3	3			14	3.0
21	Political leaders and or government officials do not care	2	5	4	1		12	2.6
22	Lack of training	1	3	3	4		12	2.6
23	Capitalism		2	4	5		11	2.4
24	Mishandling of the protests by police	6	3	1	1		11	2.4
25	Ignoring and or disregarding the workers and or the poor people	2	5	1		1	9	2.0
26	Financial mismanagement	1	4	2		1	8	1.7
27	Lack of capacity		2		3	3	8	1.7
28	Discrimination in the work place	3	3		1		7	1.5
29	High crime rate and or criminal element	1	4	1		1	7	1.5
30	Laziness of officials	3	3	1			7	1.5
31	Marginalisation of the poor	2	1	1	2	1	7	1.5
32	Migration from rural areas to urban areas		2	2	3		7	1.5
33	Political intolerance and or compatibility		4	2	1		7	1.5
34	Bureacracy			1	4	1	6	1.3
35	High expectations	2			2	2	6	1.3
36	Culture of violence	1	1	1	2		5	1.1
37	High cost of living and or inflation			3	1	1	5	1.1
38	Lack of community consultation and or participation	1	1	2	1		5	1.1
39	Trade unions are not representing workers' interests	1	4				5	1.1
40	High cost of services		1	2	1		4	0.9
41	Service delivery protests used as propaganda to score political points	3		1			4	0.9
42	Dissatisfaction and or demotivation of the workers	2		1			3	0.7
43	Intimidation of non protesters by protesters		2			1	3	0.7
44	Lack of respect of law by protesters and or law and order enforcement	2	1				3	0.7
45	Slow economic development	1		2			3	0.7
46	Housing backlog			2			2	0.4
47	Lack of financial resources			1	1		2	0.4
48	Lack of initiative	1		1			2	0.4
49	Trade union does not challenge government on poor service delivery	2					2	0.4
50	Lack of education			1			1	0.2
	Total	461	281	166	71	19		

More than 34% of the trade union leadership held the view that fraud and corruption was the major cause of collective service delivery violence. Poor service delivery was cited by 16.9% of the trade union leadership and inefficiency or incompetence among government officials was cited by 14.3% of the leadership. The first three causes of collective service delivery violence were cited by 65.3% of the trade union leadership. One would argue that fraud and corruption bred poor service delivery and incompetence and that their eradication would alleviate poor service delivery and incompetency among government officials. It can be contended that from the percentage of the trade union leadership that cited fraud and corruption as the major cause and the foregoing argument, the eradication of fraud and corruption may reduce poor service delivery and incompetency.

#### 4.2.3. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CONSEQUENCES

**Table 4.2.3.1: CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE GIVEN BY TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE'S LEADERSHIP**

NUMBER	CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE ONE CONSEQUENCE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE TWO CONSEQUENCES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE THREE CONSEQUENCES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE FOUR CONSEQUENCES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE FIVE CONSEQUENCES	TOTAL	RESPONDENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE
1	Damage to property	108	90	40			238	51.6
2	Injuries to people	164	72				236	51.2
3	Deaths of people	116					116	25.2
4	Disturbance, disruption, instability in the country and or community	10	16	12	3		41	8.9
5	Economic disturbance and or instability in the country	3	2	16	11	2	34	7.4
6	Crime involving looting, vandalism, assault	12	10	9	2		33	7.2
7	Production loss	7	12	11	1		31	6.7
8	Loss of income	1	10	15	3	1	30	6.5
9	Job losses	5	8	7	3		23	5.0
10	Scares off investors			8	6	2	16	3.5
11	Slows down service delivery	5	6	3	1		15	3.3
12	Loss of time	1	4	4	3		12	2.6
13	Destroys trust in Zuma presidency, ruling Party or Government	3		5	3	1	12	2.6
14	Unhealthy and or dirty environment	4	7				11	2.4
15	Entrenches culture of violence and or lawlessness		8	2			10	2.2
16	Power struggle		8	1			9	2.0
17	Image and or reputation of the country is dented	1		4	2	1	8	1.7
18	Low moral standards	1	1	3	1		6	1.3
19	Poverty	3	1				4	0.9
20	Arrests	1	1	1			3	0.7
21	Intolerance	1			1		2	0.4
22	Migration of people from rural to urban areas				2		2	0.4
23	Loss of workers rights or human rights			1			1	0.2
	Total	446	256	142	42	7		

An open ended question was used to establish what the respondents thought were results of collective service delivery violence. A total of 23 answers were obtained and are listed in table 4.2.3.1 above, in the order of their frequency. The three most mentioned consequences of collective service delivery violence were damage to property, injuries to people and deaths. These were mentioned by 51.6%, 51.2% and 25.2% of the respondents respectively.

Damage to property and injuries to people are the major consequences of collective service delivery violence. This is to be expected when considering that violence entails damage either to property or persons. The major intention of a violent protest is to destroy property. During the process of effecting damage to property and the confrontation between protesters and law enforcement officers' people get injured and some even die.

#### **4.2.4. TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

There were 51 solutions suggested by trade union collective's leadership in response to the open ended question; "*What do you think could be the solutions to service delivery violence in South Africa?*" These were listed in the order of their popularity in table 4.2.4.1 below. The five most popular solutions in their order of popularity were: 'eradication of fraud and corruption', 'improved service delivery', 'training and competency of government officials or councilors', 'Job creation' and 'government must keep her promises'. These suggested solutions scored 22.3%, 14.1%, 12.8%, 12.1% and 11.3% respectively among the trade union leadership.

One solution that scored the highest percentage is the eradication of fraud and corruption. A closer look at all the other solutions shows that almost all of them it would not be possible to implement if fraud and corruption existed. On the contrary if there were no fraud and corruption, it would be possible to implement all the other suggested solutions. Clearly the eradication of fraud and corruption did not only score the highest percentage but it has the biggest weight too comparable to the weight of all the other solutions put together. Clearly all problems of service delivery violence nestle on fraud and corruption.

**Table 4.2.4.1: SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE SUGGESTED BY TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE'S LEADERSHIP**

NUM BER	SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE ONE SOLUTION	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE TWO SOLUTIONS	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE THREE SOLUTIONS	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE FOUR SOLUTIONS	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE FIVE SOLUTIONS	TOTAL	RESPONDENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE
1	Eradication of fraud and corruption	85	18				103	22.3
2	Improved service delivery	65					65	14.1
3	Job creation	14	21	12	8	1	56	12.1
4	Government must keep her promises	32	18	2			52	11.3
5	Training and competency of government officials or councillors	16	21	6	1		44	9.5
6	Transparency	13	15	9		1	38	8.2
7	Satisfaction of workers needs	23	11	4			38	8.2
8	Higher income	29	5				34	7.4
9	Empower the youth and working class	2	8	12	9		31	6.7
10	Government responsiveness	21	5	3			29	6.3
11	Fairness in staff recruitment and treatment	9	8	6	2		25	5.4
12	Community participation and consultation	15	5	1			21	4.6
13	Education	8	6	4	2	1	21	4.6
14	Stop violation of wokers rights or human rights	17	2				19	4.1
15	Officials must be honest and fair	8	4	3	2		17	3.7
16	Competency	7	7	1			15	3.3
17	Government to respect and engage the trade union	9	4	1			14	3.0
18	Equality and or equal opportunities	2	5	6	1		14	3.0
19	Improve working conditions	10	1	2			13	2.8
20	More investment in the country	2	3	4	3	1	13	2.8
21	Introduce monitoring and evaluation control mechanism	6	1	4	1		12	2.6
22	Improved communication	6	4		1		11	2.4
23	Stop illegal or unprotected strikes	8		2			10	2.2
24	Prioritizing what is to be done	3	5		1		9	2.0
25	Sharing in the economy or economic freedom	5	2		1		8	1.7
26	Stop discrimination in the work place	6	1		1		8	1.7
27	Setting performance standards		2	4	2		8	1.7
28	Allocation of enough resources		4	3			7	1.5
29	Close control of tender processes			3	2	2	7	1.5
30	Change in government policies	5		1			6	1.3
31	Law enforcement and justice	1	4	1			6	1.3
32	Eradication of greed	5					5	1.1
33	Collective effort	1	2		2		5	1.1
34	Negotiations	5					5	1.1
35	Police should respect the rights of the protesters	4					4	0.9
36	Resources control	2		1			3	0.7
37	Land distribution	2		1			3	0.7
38	Provision of houses	1	2				3	0.7
39	Speed up community deveopment	2					2	0.4
40	Eradication of laziness	2					2	0.4
41	Eliminate criminal element in protests	1			1		2	0.4
42	Provision of security	1	1				2	0.4
43	Eradication of poverty		1		1		2	0.4
44	Affirmative action		1	1			2	0.4
45	Discipline	1	1				2	0.4
46	Trade union must represent workers not political organizations	2					2	0.4
47	Trade unions must be held accountable and responsible	1		1			2	0.4
48	Eradication of selfishness		1				1	0.2
49	Good governance		1				1	0.2
50	Payment for services		1				1	0.2
51	Nationalization			1			1	0.2
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>6</b>		

#### **4.2.5. IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE**

The responses to questions: F1, F2, F3, F4 and F5 were 99.3% (458), 99.6% (459), 98.5% (454), 98.9% (456) and 94.4% (435) respectively. The data of the responses were tabulated in table 4.2.5.1 below. Question F5 in this section was answered by 94.4% respondents, which is the smallest percentage response of the five questions. It can be seen from the answers to the questions that the impact of collective service delivery violence was that more than 60% of the trade union leadership does not hold a positive opinion of President Zuma as confirmed in 4.3.5.

**Table 4.2.5.1: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS ON IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S OPINION OF PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE**

NUM BER	QUESTION	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED YES	PERCENTAGE RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED YES	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED NO	PERCENTAGE RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED NO	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED THE QUESTION
F1	Do you think service delivery violence has impacted negatively on trade union support for President Zuma?	361	78.8	97	21.2	458
F2	President Zuma may no longer enjoy the support of trade union because of the service delivery violence.	314	68.4	145	31.6	459
F3	The popularity of president Zuma among the trade union leadership was not affected by service delivery violence.	135	29.7	319	70.3	454
F4	Despite the service delivery violence President Zuma was doing well.	186	40.8	270	59.2	456
F5	Do you think that the reported increase in service delivery violence was an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma?	265	60.9	170	39.1	435

The justification to the answer for question F5 yielded 32 reasons which were shown on table 4.2.5.2, in their order of popularity. Poor performance of government officials and or councilors was cited by 10.2% of the respondents. Evidently the trade union leadership attributes collective service delivery violence to the Zuma presidency. The president being the chief executive officer has to take the complaints as well as the compliments for the performance of his government as listed in table 4.2.5.2. This directly talks to the performance of the president as viewed by the trade union collective's leadership.

**Table 4.2.5.2: TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S VIEWS ON PERFORMANCE OF THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY**

ORDER	REASONS JUSTIFYING THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "Do you think that the reported increase in service delivery violence is an indicator of poor performance by president Zuma?"	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE ONE REASON	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO GAVE TWO REASONS	TOTAL	RESPONDENTS AS PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE
1	Poor performance of government officials and or councillors	39	8	47	10.4
2	Government under Zuma Presidency made empty promises	37	2	39	8.9
3	The Government under Zuma Presidency has not eradicated fraud or corruption	23	11	34	7.8
4	The Government under Zuma Presidency has failed	28	5	33	7.6
5	Government under Zuma Presidency is performing poorly	32		32	7.4
6	The Government under Zuma Presidency is not eradicating poverty	27	3	30	6.5
7	The Government under Zuma Presidency is doing well	27		27	5.9
8	The Government under Zuma Presidency has signs of corruption	23	4	27	5.9
9	The Government under Zuma Presidency is trying its level best	14	5	19	4.1
10	The Government under Zuma Presidency is preoccupied and not focussed	13	4	17	3.7
11	The Government under Zuma Presidency is selfish	10	6	16	3.5
12	The Government under Zuma Presidency is trying but not doing enough	14	2	16	3.5
13	Poor service delivery	11	4	15	3.3
14	The Government under Zuma Presidency has not created employment	7	8	15	3.3
15	The Government under Zuma Presidency is not in control	10	5	15	3.3
16	The Government under Zuma Presidency has failed to eradicate incompetence	8	5	13	2.8
17	This problem existed before Zuma came into power	12	1	13	2.8
18	The Government under Zuma Presidency caters for a small part of the population	7	6	13	2.8
19	The Government under Zuma Presidency mismanage finances	8	3	11	2.4
20	The Government under Zuma Presidency has failed to end labour brokers and assist the workers	10		10	2.2
21	Society is unhappy/complaining	5	5	10	2.2
22	The Government under Zuma Presidency does not care	5	5	10	2.2
23	Nepotism in government appointments	6	1	7	1.5
24	The Government under Zuma Presidency is not decisive	2	4	6	1.3
25	The Government under Zuma Presidency must be given time and only be judged at the end of the term	4	2	6	1.3
26	The Government under Zuma Presidency's appointment of officials is not satisfactory	1	4	5	1.1
27	The Government under Zuma Presidency must cultivate honesty	3		3	0.7
28	Communities are used by anti-ANC people	3		3	0.7
29	The Government under Zuma Presidency pays more attention to foreign policy than on domestic matters	2	1	3	0.7
30	The Government under Zuma Presidency does not enforce the law or prevent violence and intimidation	3		3	0.7
31	No community consultation or participation	2		2	0.4
32	The Government under Zuma Presidency is not transparent	1		1	0.2
	TOTAL	397	104		

### **4.3. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS**

#### **4.3.1. TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

More than 85% of the trade union leadership was aware that collective service delivery violence had resulted to damage to property, injuries to people and deaths and 86% of the trade union leadership believed that collective service delivery violence could be stopped. This therefore shows that the questions about collective service delivery violence causes, consequences and solutions, posed to the trade union leadership, were posed to people who were aware of collective service delivery violence and the answers of the trade union leadership, about collective service delivery violence, were informed answers.

#### **4.3.2. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES**

Five major causes of collective service delivery violence cited by 92% of the leadership in their order of frequency were:

- a) Fraud and or corruption in government structures (34.1%)
- b) Poor service delivery by the government (16.9%)
- c) Inefficiency and or incompetency amongst government officials (14.3%)
- d) Poverty in the working class (13.9%)
- e) Empty and or broken promises by government (12.8%)

#### **4.3.3. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CONSEQUENCES**

It was discovered in section 4.3.1, that 85% of the trade union leadership was aware that the service delivery violence caused damage to property, injuries to people and deaths. Damage to property, injuries to people and deaths were respectively identified by 51.6%, 51.2% and 25.2% of the trade union leadership, as major consequences of service delivery violence.

#### **4.3.4. TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

A total of 59.8% of the trade union leadership held the view that the solution to collective service delivery violence was:

- a) Eradication of fraud and corruption
- b) Improved service delivery
- c) Job creation
- d) Government must keep her promises

The respective percentages of the trade union leadership that held these views were 22.3%, 14.1%, 12.1% and 11.3%.

#### **4.3.5. THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE**

The proposition was tested using the Chi-square goodness of fit test. This test means; the proposition states that the probability to answer “Yes” to questions F1, F2 and F5 or to answer “No” to questions F3 and F4 is equal to 60%. If more than 60% of the trade union leadership answered “Yes” to questions F1, F2 and F5 or “No” to questions F3 and F4, this was a sufficient condition for the proposition to be accepted. The observed yes/no percentages were tested against 60%/40%, in the case of questions F1, F2 and F5 and against 40%/60%, in the case of questions F3 and F4. The calculation of the Chi-square test statistics are shown in table 4.3.5.1 below.

**Table 4.3.5.1: PROPOSITION TESTING**

Response	Observed frequency	Expected Frequency (Under $H_0$ )
Yes	O1	$E1 = 0.6x(O1+O2)$
No	O2	$E2 = 0.4x(O1+O2)$
Total	O1+O2	E1+E2

The meanings for the variables in table 4.3.5.1 and table 4.3.5.2 are that:

O1= Observed frequency of 'Yes' responses

O2= Observed frequency of 'No' responses

E1= Expected frequency of 'Yes' responses

E2= Expected frequency of 'No' responses

H<sub>0</sub>= Proposition

Chi-squared =  $(O1-E1)^2/E1 + (O2-E2)^2/E2$

DF= Degrees of freedom

P-value = Statistical significance (Statistically significant if p-value is less than 0.05)

The degrees of freedom are equal to the number of rows (of responses which are "yes" and "no", giving a total of two rows) minus 1, i.e.  $DF = 2-1 = 1$ . The Chi-square value is compared to a critical Chi-square value that can be found in a Chi-square table where  $DF = 1$  and the level of significance is 0.05 (i.e. the test is done at the 5% level of significance).

The critical Chi-square value is 3.84, which mean that if the calculated Chi-square value is greater than 3.84, the proposition should be rejected in favour of the inverse of the Proposition. The results of the statistical analysis of the trade union leadership responses, to questions F1 to F5, in section F, of the questionnaire are presented in table 4.3.5.2 below.

The interpretation of the results in table 4.3.5.2 is as follows:

The p-values for questions F1, F2 and F3 were less than 0.05, which meant, more than sixty percent of the trade union leadership, held the view that:

F1: Service delivery violence has impacted negatively on trade union support for President Zuma.

F2: President Zuma may no longer enjoy the support of trade union because of the service delivery violence.

F3 opposite: The popularity of President Zuma among the trade union leadership was affected by service delivery violence.

NB: In the above question ‘F3 opposite’, only, the word ‘not’ was excluded from the original question F3, so as to indicate the opposite meaning of the original question F3.

**Table 4.3.5.2: ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP OPINION OF PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE**

NUMBER	QUESTION	Chi-squared	df-Value	p-Value	STATISTICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS
F1	Do you think service delivery violence has impacted negatively on trade union support for President Zuma?	67.6	1	$p < 0.0005$	Proportion (Yes) > 60%
F2	President Zuma may no longer enjoy the support of trade union because of the service delivery violence.	13.53	1	$p < 0.0005$	Proportion (Yes) > 60%
F3	The popularity of president Zuma among the trade union leadership was not affected by service delivery violence.	19.93	1	$p < 0.0005$	Proportion (No) > 60%
F4	Despite the service delivery violence President Zuma was doing well.		1		Proportion (No) < 60% (59.2%)
F5	Do you think that the reported increase in service delivery violence was an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma?	0.15	1	$p = 0.695$	Proportion (Yes) < 60% (39.1%)

This means that for the questions F1, F2, and F3, the 60% of trade union collective's leadership who answered "Yes" to question F1 or "Yes" to question F2 or "No" to question F3 provide a sufficient condition for the acceptance of the proposition that "The trade union leadership was fully aware of the service delivery violence which had resulted in them formulating a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency."

It was found out from collective service delivery violence awareness investigation, in table 4.2.1.1, that the trade union collective's leadership which was aware of collective service delivery violence, i.e. those who answered 'Yes' to questions B1, B2, B3 and B4 were 85.5%, 98.0%, 97.6% and 86.6% respectively, were more than 85%. It was also determined (table 4.2.5.1) that trade union leadership, who had formulated a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency, i.e. those who had answered 'Yes' to questions F1, F2 and 'No' to F3 were 78.8%, 68.4% and 70.3% respectively, were more than 68%.

When combining the foregoing statistical evidence, it could therefrom be stated that, more than 85% of the trade union leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence which had resulted to more than 68% of them formulating a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency.

The p-values for question F4 and F5 were equal to 0.695, which meant it could not be statistically refuted that there were trade union leadership members who held the view that:

F4: Despite the service delivery violence, President Zuma was doing well.

F5 opposite: The reported increase in service delivery violence was not an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma.

NB: In the above 'F5 opposite', only, the word 'not' was added to the original question F5, so as to indicate the opposite meaning of the original question F5.

This means that it could not be statistically refuted that there was part of the trade union leadership for which the inverse of the proposition was true. It can be seen that questions F4 and F5 opposite, above, amounted to an inverse of the proposition, which could be stated as follows:

The trade union leadership was fully aware of the service delivery violence but this did not result in them formulating a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency.

The above statistical results expressed in terms of the inverse proposition meant that; the trade union leadership was fully aware of the service delivery violence but this did not result to all of them formulating a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency

It was statistically proven that “more than 85% of the trade union leadership was fully aware of the service delivery violence which had resulted in more than 68% of them formulating a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency”.

It can be concluded, logically, from arithmetic and by implication, that if “more than 68.4% of the trade union leadership had formulated a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency”, the remaining less than 31.6%, which is the difference between 100% and 68.4%, did not formulate a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency. By both the absence of statistical evidence to refute the inverse of the proposition and following from the argument above, it can be seen that the inverse of the proposition is true only for trade union leadership that was excluded from and by the proof of proposition, who are less than 31.6%.

Hence it can be stated that; although more than 85% trade union collective’s leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence however, there was no statistical evidence to refute that less than 31% of them did not as a result formulate a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency. The statistical findings of questions F4 and F5 confirm those of F1, F2, and F3 and the two sets complement each other.

#### **4.4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS**

The sample was seen to be representative of the eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership from both the sample size and the design point of view. The figure of 461 respondents is statistically big enough to set the standard error to about 0.44, confidence level of 95% and confidence interval of 5%. The sample of the trade union leadership constituted 30% of eThekweni-based trade union collective's leadership. Of note too was that the eThekweni municipality population represented 30% of the population of KwaZulu-Natal. Almost all the trade unions in eThekweni were sampled. The gender split and the respondents holding executive and non-executive positions are similar to the normally observed spread. Clearly the sample was representative.

It was established that more than 85% of the trade union collective leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence. Out of fifty proposed causes of collective service delivery violence, the majority of the trade union leadership held the view that fraud, corruption and poor service delivery, in that order, were the major causes of collective service delivery violence. The consequences of collective service delivery violence, cited by most trade union leaders were damage to property, injuries to people and deaths, in that order. The suggested solutions for collective service delivery violence were 51 and almost match each and every one of the 50 causes.

The 85% majority of trade union collective's leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence and 68% of the trade union leadership had formulated a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency. Also, although the 85% majority of trade union collective's leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence, there was no statistical evidence to refute that less than 31% of the trade union collective's leadership did not formulate a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency.

## **5. CHAPTER 5: RESULTS DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

The chapter discusses the results starting with the sample followed by the trade union collective's leadership's biographical data. The trade union collective's leadership awareness of collective service delivery violence, what they thought are causes, consequences thereof and what they suggested as solutions thereto are discussed. Lastly the chapter discusses the trade union leadership's view of the impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union leadership support for president Zuma and his performance.

### **5.2. RESULTS**

#### **5.2.1. TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE'S LEADERSHIP SAMPLE**

There was noticeable participation apathy among NUM and NUMSA members. The reasons for non-participation seemed to be more of negativity towards anything seen as being critical of president Zuma and or so as not to be seen to be critical of President Zuma. The real reasons thereof would be a subject of a further research. It was questionable as to whether something could be read from the non-participation of NUM and NUMSA in terms of support for President Zuma.

There was eagerness to participate among POPCRU members, which was a government workers trade union for SAPS and prisons services employees. The eagerness to participate, coming from people who could be seen as part of the causes of collective service delivery violence problem, was noticeable. The police were sometimes blamed for the death of protesters, for mishandling, aggravating or provoking service delivery protesters. Again the real reasons for this would be a subject for further research.

It could be speculated that this was an opportunity for police to give vent to their feelings because they are classified as essential services employees and are prevented by law from embarking on a strike. One argument could be that this was a chance for the police to absolve themselves from accusations of being partly the cause of collective service delivery violence.

### **5.2.2. TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA**

The biographical information extracted from trade union collective's leaders sampled, does not deviate from the commonly observed scenario of male domination in positions of leadership, both in terms of gender and positions. It was observed during data capturing that people who were older than fifty years, were holding executive positions in trade unions. The percentage ratio of executive members to non-executive members, in the trade union leadership, was in conformity with what was normally occurring in reality.

### **5.2.3. AWARENESS OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

There was a very high degree of awareness about collective service delivery violence among the trade union leadership. This could be attributed either to the intensity or frequency of collective service delivery violence or both. The trade union leadership was mostly aware of injuries to persons caused by collective service delivery violence, followed by damage to property. The percentage of leadership that was aware of collective service delivery violence deaths was smaller than the percentage that was aware of the service delivery violence injuries. Death being more serious than injury, the opposite would have been expected to be the case. The real reason for this would be a subject of further research. It can be argued that this would be related to media coverage, publicity or the lack thereof.

Although there might be difference in knowledge of some aspects of collective service delivery violence, among the trade union leadership, there was, however, no doubt about the general awareness thereof, there within. It stands to reason why would so many people be aware of a phenomenon which could be said not to be pleasing but a plague. Of solace was that the majority of trade union leadership held the belief that there was a solution to the service delivery violence.

This belief would be more valuable and possibly bear fruits if it were not only to be held by those in driving seat of the service delivery programme, but could also be translated into action by them.

#### **5.2.4. CAUSES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

There were a total of 50 causes of collective service delivery violence cited by the trade union leadership. The first two causes of service delivery violence were cited by more than 50% of the respondents and the third fourth and fifth by more than 40%. This showed that the major causes of collective service delivery violence, from one to five, were cited by more than 90% of the respondents. Fraud and corruption, top the list, followed by poor service delivery. The anger and frustration among the collective service delivery protesters, which culminated to service delivery violence, was caused by the feeling that poor service delivery was as a result of fraud, corruption, inefficiency and incompetency among the government officials. Hence they made empty promises and this exacerbated poverty in the communities that were getting poor service delivery.

#### **5.2.5. CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

The three most popular responses to questions intended to establish consequences of collective service delivery violence (the three most popular answers to questions in section D), were the same as those to questions intended to establish awareness of collective service delivery violence (the three most popular answers to questions in section B). Given the popular responses to collective service delivery violence awareness questions viz. damage to property, injuries to people, deaths; those of consequences of collective service delivery violence viz. injuries to people, damage to property, deaths were to be expected. This logically follows from the fact that the awareness of collective service delivery violence was born of the observation of the consequences thereof. Some consequences of collective service delivery violence affected all sectors in the country comprising government, business and community.

These consequences were disturbance, disruption, instability, crime involving looting and vandalism (numbered 4, 5 and 6 in table 4.2.3.1).

#### **5.2.6. SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

So as not to limit the respondents in answers they would give, open ended questions were used to establish what they thought were the solutions to collective service delivery violence. These questions yielded 51 possible solutions as presented in table 4.2.4.1. The first 10 solutions were suggested by all the respondents. Notably, open ended questions about causes of collective service delivery violence yielded 50 proposed causes (table 4.2.2.1), implying that solutions were equal to causes.

#### **5.2.7. CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

Collective service delivery causes cited in table 4.2.2.1 were matched with what could be their corresponding solution, suggested in table 4.2.4.1. The new table of matches was developed and presented in table 5.2.7.1. In this table 5.2.7.1, causes have the same reference number and order as in table 4.2.2.1. The solutions in table 5.2.7.1 kept their reference number in table 4.2.4.1. The last column in table 5.2.7.1 is the reference number found in the first column of table 4.2.4.1 under which the suggested solution appears. It was found that for some causes there were perfect solutions and almost perfect solutions for other causes.

It was observed that the first two most popular causes (in table 4.2.2.1), took on the first two most popular suggested solutions (in table 4.2.4.1) respectively. The 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 5<sup>th</sup> causes (in table 4.2.2.1), took on the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> suggested solutions (in table 4.2.4.1) respectively. The foregoing showed that the veracity of the causes of collective service delivery violence was corroborated by the proposed solutions. What was of note was that most of causes of collective service delivery violence, advanced by trade union leadership, were about the welfare of the workers and were class grievances against the government and the elite group, which provided fertile ground for the emergence of SM and SMU.

**Table 5.2.7.1: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE CAUSES WITH SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE**

NUMBER IN TABLE 4.1.4.1	MAJOR CAUSES OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DLIVERY VIOLENCE	SUGESTED SOLUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE	NUMBER IN TABLE 4.1.6.1
1	Fraud and corruption	Eradication of fraud and corruption	1
2	Poor service delivery	Improved service delivery	2
3	Inefficiency and or incompetency amongst government officials	Training and competency of government officials or councillors	5
		Competency	16
4	Poverty	Eradication of poverty	43
5	Empty and or broken promises	Government must keep her promises	4
6	Low income	Higher income	8
7	Anger and or frustration	Law enforcement and justice	31
8	Unemployment	Job creation	3
9	Management failure to respond and or solve worker needs or problems	Fairness in staff recruitment and treatment	11
10	Government is not responsive to community needs	Government responsiveness	10
11	Greed	Eradication of greed	32
12	Violation of workers and or human rights	Satisfaction of workers needs	7
13	Poor working and or living conditions	Improve working conditions	19
14	Selfishness	Eradication of selfishness	48
15	Nepotism in filling posts and or awarding of tenders	Officials must be honest and fair	15
16	Inequality	Equality and or equal opportunities	18
17	Political and or union influence	Close control of tender processes	29
18	Lack of communication	Improved communication	22
19	Lack of transparency	Transparency	6
20	Unfair treatment of labour	Stop violation of wokers rights or human rights	14
21	Political leaders and or government officials do not care	Good governance	49
22	Lack of training	Empower the youth and working class	9
23	Capitalism	Nationalization	51
24	Mishandling of the protests by police	Police should respect the rights of the protesters	35
25	Ignoring and or disregarding the workers and or the poor people	Government to respect and engage the trade union	17
26	Financial mismanagement	Resources control	36
27	Lack of capacity	Allocation of enough resources	28
28	Discrimination in the work place	Stop discrimination in the work place	26
29	High crime rate and or criminal element	Eliminate criminal element in protests	41
30	Laziness of officials	Eradication of laziness	40
31	Marginalisation of the poor	Land distribution	37
32	Migration from rural areas to urban areas	Speed up community deveelopment	39
33	Political intolerance and or incompatibility	Collective effort	33
34	Bureacracy	Negotiations	34
35	High expectations	Payment for services	50
36	Culture of violence	Discipline	45
37	High cost of living and or inflation	More investment in the country	20
38	Lack of community consultation and or participation	Community participation and consultation	12
39	Trade unions are not representing workers' interests	Trade unions must be held accountable and responsible	47
40	High cost of services	Change in government policies	30
41	Service delivery protests used as propaganda to score political points	Setting performance standards	27
42	Dissatisfaction and or demotivation of the workers	Affirmative action	44
43	Intimidation of non protesters by protesters	Provision of security	42
44	Lack of respect of law by protesters and or law and order enforcement	Stop illegal or unprotected strikes	23
45	Slow economic development	Sharing in the economy or economic freedom	25
46	Housing backlog	Provision of houses	38
47	Lack of financial resources	Introduce monitoring and evaluation control mechanism	21
48	Lack of initiative	Prioritising what is to be done	24
49	Trade union does not challenge government on poor service delivery	Trade union must represent workers not political organisations	46
50	Lack of education	Education	13

#### **5.2.8. IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP'S SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE**

The study has proved through research and statistically that:

- a) More than 85% of the trade union collective's leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence which had resulted in more than 68% of them formulating a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency.
- b) More than 78% of the trade union collective's leadership believed that collective service delivery violence had impacted negatively on trade union collective's support for President Zuma.
- c) More than 68% of the trade union collective's leadership held the view that President Zuma could no longer enjoy the support of the trade union collective because of collective service delivery violence.
- d) More than 70% of the trade union collective's leadership thought that the popularity of President Zuma among the trade union collective's leadership was affected by collective service delivery violence.

It was also proven that although more than 85% the trade union collective's leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence however, less than 31% of them did not as a result formulate a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency. This percentage of the trade union collective's leadership held the view that:

- e) Despite collective service delivery violence President Zuma was doing well.
- f) The reported increase in collective service delivery violence was not an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma.

It is emphasized that the results of the study are not general perceptions of the trade union collective's leadership but are representative of the viewpoints of only the eThekweni-based trade union leadership that participated in the study.

### **5.3. DISCUSSION**

It would be beneficial to all affected by collective service violence, directly or indirectly, if they learned from it and the study. Ideally the lesson should not only be of benefit for contemporary purposes but for future use as well. Hopefully knowledge gained from the study would be used to correct the wrongs of the past, predict and establish preventative measures for future reoccurrences. Failure to learn from collective service delivery violence and surrounding incidents would render the resultants like loss of life, resources, property and curative endeavours in vain. Collective service delivery violence depleted the country's resources and resulted to government conducting an investigation into it. This was not its only consequence but it also became a national concern, judging from comments by public figures, government officials, statistics compiled by SAPS and the media coverage thereof. It was because of the national nature and size of collective service delivery violence that it was deemed to necessitate national actors to tackle it. Actors found to be of appropriate caliber, by virtue of their function and interest in collective service delivery violence, were the state president and the trade union collective's leadership.

The study used collective service delivery violence to upraise one national actor in the opinion of the other, i.e. the state president in the opinion of trade union collective's leadership, in search for a solution to collective service delivery violence. The opinion of the trade union collective's leadership, about President Zuma and his performance, was based only on collective service delivery violence. Collective service delivery violence could be a transitory problem; hence the opinion of trade union collective's leadership about President Zuma, on collective service delivery violence, could be transitory as well.

The trade union leadership perceptions could come to an end when collective service delivery violence comes to an end or it may persist longer. However, perceptions could kick start talks among stake holders viz. the government, the tripartite alliance, trade union collective, with a view to finding a solution to the problem. The study does not allege that the trade union leadership would act on its perceptions, they may or they may not.

On the other hand the perceptions of trade union collective's leadership might be an indication of the perceptions of the trade union collective. If the trade union leadership does act on its perceptions, the study did not go as far as predicting the type of such action, as it would not be obvious. However, if the trade union leadership acted on its perceptions, there would be several platforms it could use for that purpose, viz union-party relation, tripartite alliance, NEDLAC and SMU.

South African history has taught that the trade union collective played a crucial role not only in the political process of the country but more importantly in the internal politics of the ANC and the election of the successive ANC president. Any incumbent ANC president should win the support of all three ANC-SACP-COSAU alliance partners. Losing support of any alliance member could result in the loss of the ANC presidential race. The trade union played a significant role in the election of President Zuma into power because they believed he would advance the course of labour. Notwithstanding the fact that the trade union has no vote in the ANC electoral conference, it has a lot of influence, to have its preferred candidate elected as the ANC president.

The perceptions of trade union leadership on collective service delivery violence would therefore be important to President Zuma, the ANC and the trade union collective's leadership for determining the position of mutual relation, president Zuma's successor and future presidential succession.

Evidence pointed out that the perceptions of trade union collective's leadership, on collective service delivery violence under Zuma presidency, were a mirror image of complaints of the working class and the poor. Reasons advanced by trade union leadership, for an answer given to question F5 (*"Do you think that the reported increase in service delivery violence was an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma? Please give reasons for your answer"*), mirrored the complaints of the collective service delivery protesters (figure 11).

The complaints of the protesters, who were from the poor majority of the country's population, comprised a host of issues. At the top of the list were housing, electricity, poor service delivery, piped water and sanitation, which were class grievances.

The same applied to causes of collective service delivery violence list and that of solutions to collective service delivery violence, suggested by trade union collective's leadership. They were typical class problems and class solutions respectively. Scrutiny of the two sets revealed that the majority of elements, in each set, were akin to class concerns, which provided an environment conducive to emergence of social movement.

The causes of collective service delivery violence and consequently the solutions can be divided into two categories, those that are inherent in the service recipient and those that are inherent in the service provider. I opine that the total solution requires the eradication of all causes or provision of solutions to both categories. The solution of all causes in one category does not necessarily mean a solution the causes in the other category and vice versa. The biggest number of causes and the heaviest, rest in the domain of the service provider, the government. There is less the service receiver, the protesters, have to do than the government. Fraud and corruption is seen as the main cause of service delivery violence because eradication of corruption was cited by 22.3% of the trade union leadership and poor performance by government officials was cited by 10.4% of the trade union leadership. The two together were cited by 32.7% of the trade union leadership. This shows that the problem is with the government and the foregoing are the two major causes of collective service delivery violence.

The main solution inherent in the service receiver would be the payment for the services. This would not be easy considering the socio-economic disposition of the majority of the service recipients. It is for this reason that the majority of the suggested solutions, to collective service delivery violence, by the trade union leadership seem to be geared towards solving workers' and class problems rather than collective service delivery violence or service delivery problems or causes. This was evidence that, in as much as government was not delivering expected services; service delivery problem was embedded in the class issue and was a class problem.

If the class problem of poverty was solved or if services were provided free of charge, the collective service delivery violence problem would be reduced because people would be able to pay for services or poor people would have access to services without having to pay. It is for this reason, among others, that the trade union collective regarded service delivery as means of poverty alleviation and anyone adjudged to be obstructive to service delivery, would not be popular with the trade union collective and its leadership.

However, poverty eradication and free services or good service delivery would not solve some cited causes for service delivery violence that are linked to the government officials like fraud and corruption, poor performance etc. The difference would be that people would be getting the services and there would be no need for them to protest even if the cited causes for service delivery violence were persisting.

In an attempt to furnish reasons why collective service delivery protesters did not employ political structures or established institutions, to solve collective service delivery violence causes, one argument could be that these issues did not render themselves attainable via these avenues. The other argument could be that the formal structure(s) of the South African political process could not provide a solution to poor service delivery, thus leaving social movement to be the only vehicle of pursuing the said objectives. It could also be that these platforms were out of reach of the protesters.

What confirmed the above notions was that despite the existence of service delivery framework, service delivery was still not at an acceptable level in 2007. The review of the service delivery status quo, at the pinnacle of collective service delivery violence, showed that citizens who did not have formal housing, electricity, piped water and proper sanitation were 29.4%, 19.9%, 30.6%, and 45.0% respectively. This created conditions conducive to indulgence in social movement collective action, by the deprived communities, in search of a solution to poor service delivery.

Depending on whether classical, mass society or collective action model was used to explain social movement emergence, the foregoing situation would be termed structural strain, social isolation or system strain respectively. These terms were appropriately descriptive of the then antecedent, prevalent service delivery situation.

The impact of collective service delivery violence on trade union collective's leadership support for President Zuma was largely evident, from the results of the research. The majority 68.4%, of the trade union collective's leadership had a negative opinion of President Zuma and his performance. The minority 31.6% held a positive opinion of President Zuma and his performance.

According to the results of the research, President Zuma would not enjoy the support of the majority of the trade union collective's leadership. Issues that eroded President Zuma's popularity were firstly collective service delivery violence, which was the culmination of poor service delivery. Secondly a view existed that police were partly to blame for collective service delivery violence, allegedly because of the provocative way they handled collective protests, specifically the collective service delivery protests related deaths. This blame would ultimately be borne by the president.

Whether rightfully or wrongfully so, evidently collective service delivery violence had tarnished the Zuma presidency. There exists an opinion that police could have better handled collective service delivery protests, without any resultant damage or harm to property or people from the part of the police. The toughness of the police against unarmed protesters was widely condemned as being unwarranted, provocative and said to be partly to blame for collective protesters' violent action and or reaction. The way police handled collective service delivery protests, was seen as an attempt by the Zuma presidency to quell social movement emergence, rather than solving the service delivery problem.

## 5.4. CONCLUSION

Collective service delivery violence had dented the Zuma presidency. Complaints came from the majority population, the working class and the poor, their chief complaint being poor service delivery that had resulted to collective service delivery violence. The restoration of President Zuma's status, to that of his entrance glory, required hard work. The elimination of collective service delivery violence would not only redeem President Zuma's status but the economy, the country's and community's stability as well.

The findings that: the views of the trade union leadership on causes of collective service delivery violence mirror the complaints of the collective protestors; more than 85% the trade union collective's leadership was fully aware of collective service delivery violence and that more than 68% had formulated a negative opinion of the Zuma presidency, support the theory that the trade union collective's leadership reflects the popular views of the community and champions societal goals. In advancing the objectives of the society the trade union collective employ different types of collective action as vehicles, appropriate to the achievement of the objective aimed at. The different types of collective action that may be used, as learned from the theory are e.g. SM; SMU etc.

The findings revealed that the views of trade union leadership on causes of collective service delivery violence are the same as the complaints of the protesters. This fact supports the theory that the trade union collective provides leadership to all types of collective action in South Africa. This means that the problem of collective service delivery violence, if not attended to, may ultimately result to a confrontation between COSATU and the ANC, ultimately between the trade union leadership and President Zuma. The source of the collective service delivery violence was poor service delivery and it was at this depth that the problem would have to be uprooted. Poor service delivery did not only breed collective service delivery violence but many other problems comprising instability, crime, production loss, loss of income etc. Poor service delivery was also a final product of numerous factors like fraud, corruption inefficiency etc.

Therefore improving service delivery would eliminate the causes as well as the consequences of poor service delivery and would be in conformity with service delivery rights enshrined in the country's constitution, thus delivering to the citizens their constitutional rights. This would also improve the trade union collective's leadership opinion of President Zuma, his performance and the legacy of his presidency.

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## 7. APPENDICES

### 7.1. QUESTIONNAIRE (Appendix 7.1.)

#### VOLUNTARY QUESTIONNAIRE ON PERCEPTIONS OF ETHEKWINI-BASED TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP ON SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE UNDER THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY

**Researcher:** SSSM Mashaba [Telephone Number: 035 9026696]

**Supervisor:** Professor CA Isike [Telephone Number: 035 9026572]

**Department of Political Science and public Administration**

**Faculty of Commerce Administration and Law University of Zululand**

Please complete this voluntary questionnaire on "PERCEPTIONS OF ETHEKWINI-BASED UNION LEADERSHIP ON SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE UNDER THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY".

- Please be frank and honest in your answers.
- Complete the questionnaire by pen and please do not revise your initial answers.

#### SECTION A: INFORMATION ABOUT YOURSELF

1.

What is your gender?	Female	Male
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2. What is your age group?

20 - 30	
31- 40	
41-50	
51 and above	

3.

Are you an executive member in your organisation?	YES	NO
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4.

What is the membership size of your trade union organisation?	
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#### SECTION B: AWARENESS OF SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE

	YES	NO
Are you aware that service delivery violence has resulted to deaths?		
Are you aware that service delivery violence has resulted to injuries to people?		
Are you aware that service delivery violence has resulted to damage to property?		
Do you think the service delivery violence can be stopped?		
Do you have any other comment about service delivery violence? (Specify)		

**SECTION C: MAJOR CAUSES OF SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE****WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE MAJOR CAUSES OF SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE?**

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

**SECTION D: CONSEQUENCES OF SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE?****WHAT DO THINK ARE THE MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE?**

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

**SECTION E: SOLUTIONS TO SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE****AS A TRADE UNION LEADER WHAT DO YOU THINK COULD BE THE SOLUTIONS TO THE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA?**

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

**SECTION F: IMPACT OF THE SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE ON TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP****OPINION OF PRESIDENT ZUMA AND HIS PERFORMANCE**

	YES	NO
Do you think service delivery violence has impacted negatively on trade union support for President Zuma?		
President Zuma may no longer enjoy the support of trade union because of the service delivery violence.		
The popularity of President Zuma among the trade union leadership was not affected by service delivery violence.		
Despite the service delivery violence President Zuma was doing well.		
Do you think that the reported increase in service delivery violence was an indicator of poor performance by President Zuma? Please give reasons for your answer:		

**THANK YOU FOR TAKING YOUR TIME TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE!!!!**

**7.2. LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT (Appendix 7.2.)**



**UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND  
FACULTY OF COMMERCE ADMINISTRATION AND LAW  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**  
**Researcher: SSSM Mashaba [Telephone Number: 035 9026696 mail:mashabas@uzulu.ac.za]**  
**Supervisor: Professor: CA Isike [Telephone Number: 035 9026572]**

01 November 2011

Dear Participant

**VOLUNTARY QUESTIONNAIRE ON PERCEPTIONS OF ETHEKWINI-BASED TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP ON SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE UNDER THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY**

You are cordially invited to participate in the research study entitled “PERCEPTIONS OF ETHEKWINI-BASED TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP ON SERVICE DELIVERY VIOLENCE UNDER THE ZUMA PRESIDENCY”.

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of eThekwini-based trade union leadership on service delivery violence under the Zuma presidency, the impact of the service delivery violence on the trade union support for Zuma presidency and the performance of the Zuma presidency.

The participation in the study is voluntary, confidentiality and anonymity of the information supplied by the participants will be preserved. If there are any questions or concerns you have about participating in this study please feel free to contact the researcher or the supervisor through the contact details given above. Completing the questionnaire will take between fifteen and twenty minutes. There are no right answers or wrong answers but your honest opinion is requested. Please take time to complete the questionnaire and be frank and honest with your answers.

We thank you in anticipation of your cooperation and contribution.

Yours sincerely

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SSSM MASHABA

### 7.3. COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 2009-01-01 to 2012-11-30

#### 7.3.1. PEACEFUL COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS: BY RESIDENTIAL AREA (Appendix 7.3.1)

RESIDENTIAL AREA	NUMBER OF VIOLENT PROTESTS	PROVINCE	REPORTING POLICE STATION
Johannesburg	46	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Taung	32	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Durban	30	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Polokwane	29	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Soshanguve (Pretoria)	27	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Pretoria	25	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Umlazi (Durban)	21	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Lenasia	18	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Knysna	18	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Mmabatho	17	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Westonaria	16	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Phokeng (Rustenburg)	15	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Rustenburg	15	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Temba (Kempton Park)	14	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Giyani	14	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Brits	14	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Zeerust	14	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Daveyton (Benoni)	13	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Temba	13	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Mafikeng	13	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Ekgangala (A)	12	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Randfontein	12	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Calcutta	12	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Tshing (Ventersdorp)	12	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)

ETwatwa	11	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Ladysmith (KwaZulu-Natal)	11	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Pietermaritzburg	11	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Ganyesa	10	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Phuthaditjaba)	10	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Queenstown	10	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 36-Queenstown
Sebokeng (Vereeniging)	10	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Botshabelo	9	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Huhudi (Vryburg)	9	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Inanda (Durban)	9	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kuruman	9	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Makapanstad	9	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Nebo	9	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Orange Farm (Vereeniging)	9	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Thohoyandou	9	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Alexandra (Randburg)	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Atteridgeville (Pretoria)	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Bloemfontein	8	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Cape Town	8	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Delareyville	8	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Hamanskraal	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Kwanekebula (Plettenbergbaai)	8	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Mamelodi (Pretoria)	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Mogwase (Rustenburg)	8	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Motherwell (Port Elizabeth)	8	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Umsunduzi (Camperdown)	8	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Aliwal North	7	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg
Barkley West	7	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Bethanie	7	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)

Bona-Bona	7	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Chiawelo (Soweto)	7	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Cullinan	7	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Dundee	7	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
East London	7	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Escourt	7	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Groblersdal	7	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Kwanongaba (Mosselbay)	7	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Mabopane	7	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Mahwelereng (Potgietersrus)	7	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Mankweng	7	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Maphumulo	7	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Oudtshoorn	7	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Plettenbergbaai	7	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Siyabuswa (A)	7	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Tseki	7	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Ulundi	7	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Vryberg	7	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Wolmaranstad	7	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Bronkhorstspuit	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Chatsworth (Durban)	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Danielskuil	6	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Ga-Rankuwa	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ikageng (Potchefstroom)	6	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Jouberton (Klerksdorp)	6	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Kokstad	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
KwaMashu	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwa-Thema (Springs)	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Kwaguqa (Witbank)	6	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld

Mdantsane (Ciskei)	6	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Mokopane	6	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Mthatha	6	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Pinetown	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Protea North (Soweto)	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Sydenham (Durban)	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Thembalethu (George)	6	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Tsakane (Brakpan)	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Upington	6	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Vereeniging	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Verulam	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Amalia	5	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Braamfontein	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Burgerstort	5	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Bushbuck Ridge	5	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Cato Manor (Durban)	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Central (Port Elizabeth)	5	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Da Gamaskop (Mosselbay)	5	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Edenburg	5	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Galashewe (Kimberly)	5	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Graskop	5	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Inanda Newton (Durban)	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Ivorypark (Midrand)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Kabokweni (Witriver)	5	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Kimberly	5	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Laote	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ledig (Rustenburg)	5	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Lenasia South	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Lichtenburg	5	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho

Makhado	5	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Mandini	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Mecklenburg	5	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Modimolle	5	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Mogwadi	5	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Mothotlung	5	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Mpumalanga (Hammersdale)	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Nelspruit	5	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Noupoort	5	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Nqutu	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Olifantshoek	5	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Potchefstroom	5	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooririvier (Potch)
Putfontei (Benoni)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Queleni (Plettenbergbaai)	5	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Ratanda (Heidelberg)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Senwabarana	5	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Sharpville (Vereeniging)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Thaba Nchu	5	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Tonga	5	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Tshepisoong (Roodepoort)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Zithobeni (Bronkhorstspuit)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Acornhoek	4	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Atamelang	4	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Belfast	4	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Bethelsdorp (Port Elizabeth)	4	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Charlstown	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Denniton	4	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Dieplsoot (Erasmia)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Dududu (Scottburgh)	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu

Embalenhle (Secunda)	4	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
George	4	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Glebelands (Montclair)	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Greytown	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Harrismith	4	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Honeydew	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Isipingo	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Jerico (Brits)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Jozini	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Kathlehong (Germiston)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Kenhardt	4	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Kgabalatsane	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Klerksdorp	4	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Kwanobuhle (Uitenhage)	4	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Lehurutshe	4	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lethlabile (Brits)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Marianhill	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Mathibestad	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Meyerton	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Mmakau	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Mtubatuba	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Musina	4	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Ntuzuma (Durban)	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Petrusburg	4	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Roodepoort)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Setlagole	4	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Soweto	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Springs	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Thabazimbi	4	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg

Tlhabane (Rustenburg)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Tswelelang (Wolmaranstad)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Vosloorus (Boksburg)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Zastron	4	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Adams Mission (Amanzimtoti)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Amanzimtoti	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Barcelona Squatter Camp (eTwatwa)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Bedwang	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Bekkersdal (Westonaria)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Bisho	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Boboyi (Port Shepstone)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Boitekong (Rustenburg)	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Boksburg	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Bothaville	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Brakpan	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Butterworth	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 36-Queenstown
Copesville (Pietermaritzburg)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Doornkop (Soweto)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Duncan Village (East London)	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Duduza (Nigel)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Dysselsdorp (Oudtshoorn)	3	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Edenpark (Alberton)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Evaton (Vereeniging)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Ezakheni (Ladysmith)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Goedgevonden (Ventersdorp)	3	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Ipelegeng (Schweizer-Reneke)	3	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Itsoseng	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Jane Furse	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Kameelrevier (B)	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld

Khayelisha (Bellville)	3	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Klipsruit (Soweto)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Kroonstad	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Lebowakgomo	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Lephalale	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Machadodorp	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Malamulele	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Marblehall	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Meadowlands (Soweto)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Miga	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Modjadjiskloof	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Mofulatshepe (Smithfield)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Mooriver	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Morojaneng (Dewelsdorp)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Morokweng	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Mutale	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Newcastle	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Northam	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Osizweni (Newcastle)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Parktown (Johannesburg)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Piet Retief	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Pieterskraal (A)	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Pofadder	3	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Refengkgatso (Deneysville)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Reivilo	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Rheenendal	3	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Shongweni (Hillcrest)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Signalhill	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Smithfield	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate

Sun city	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Swartkops (Port Elizabeth)	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Tafelkop (Groblersdal)	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Tubatse	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Tzaneen	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Ventersdorp	3	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Vryheid	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Warden	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Wesselbron	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Wierdabrug (Pretoria)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Winburg	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Zenzele Squatter Camp	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Apel	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Arcadia (Pretoria)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Batview (Durban)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Bhongweni (Kokstad)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Bluegumbush	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Boipelo (Reivilo)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Bopong (Brits)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Boshof	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Bossiegif (Plettenbergbaai)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Brixton	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Clermont (Pinetown)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Cleveland (Johannesburg)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Coligny	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Colrige (Vryburg)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Concordia (Knysna)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Convllio (George)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Cradock	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 51-Karoo

Damonsville	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
De Deur (Vereeniging)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Delmas	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Delmas	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Dimbaza	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Dithakong	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Dube	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ekangala (B)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ekuvukeni (Helpmekaar)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Eldorado Park	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Elukwatini (Secunda)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Ennerdale	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ficksburg	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Finetown	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Fort Beaufort	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Ga-Phaahla	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Germiston	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Glencoe	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Hartbeesfontein (Rustenburg)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Hazyview	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Heidelberg (Gauteng)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Hekpoort	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Hillcrest	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Howick	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Jabulani (Soweto)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Jagersfontein	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Kameelrevier (A)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kanana (Orkney)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Kanyamazane (Nelspruit)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit

Keimoes	2	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Kgakala (Leeudoringstad)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Kghotsong (Bothaville)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Kleinskool (Port Elizabeth)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kliptown (Soweto)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Koffiefontein	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Kranshoek (Plettenbergbaai)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Krugersdorp	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Kwadezi (Port Elizabeth)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
KwaDukuza	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwaggafontein (C)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kwamhlanga (C)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Ladismith (Cape)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Lomanyaneng	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Loskop	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Lothair	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Lydenburg	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Madadeni (Newcastle)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Madidi	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Magaliesburg	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Mahlabathini	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Majakaneng (Mooi-nooi)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Makuya	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Makwassie	2	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Mangaung (Bloemfontein)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Marikana	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Maruping (Ottoshoop)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Masisi	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Masoi	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit

Matlala	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Matlwangtlwang (Steynsrus)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Matsulu (Nelspruit)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Mautse (Roseland)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Mfuleni (Kuisrivier)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Milerton	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Mkuze	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Moemaneng (Marquard)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Mondlo	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Mondlo Township	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Monsterlus	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Montclair	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Mosselbay	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Motetena	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Mount Frere	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Nababeep	2	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
New Brighton (Port Elizabeth)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Ngwelezane	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Nietverdiend	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Nogoma	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Ou Pad Nekkies (Knysna)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Oukasie	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Paul Roux	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Philippolis	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Phoenix (Durban)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Pongola	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Poortjie	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Port Elizabeth	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Promosa (Potchefstroom)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)

Qibing (Wepener)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Rabie Ridge (Johannesburg)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Refilwe (Cullinan)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Reitz	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Richards Bay	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Rigerpark (Boksburg)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Riversdal	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Rosendal	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Rossslyn (Pretoria)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Rouxville	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Sakhile (Standerton)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Saulpoort	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Secunda	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Sedgeflud (Knysna)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Setlopo	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Seweding	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Staatsdrif (Groot Marico)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Steadville (Ladysmith)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Stutterheim	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Sun-City (Kwa-Misi) (A)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Sundumbili	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Tarlton	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Thembalihle (Vrede)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Tshiamo (Harrismith)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Tumahole (Parys)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Umbilo	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Umzimkhulu	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Umzinto (Scottburgh)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Vaalbank	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld

Vanderbijlpark	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Ventersburg	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Warrenton	2	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Waterval (B)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Wonderkop	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Zandspruit (Squatters Camp)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Zebediela	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Zwide (Port Elizabeth)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
42nd Hill	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Actonville (Benoni)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Addo	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Alberton	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Alma	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Amandawe (Scottburgh)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Amatikwe (Inanda)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Amawoti (Inanda)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Amersfoort	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Baberton	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Bakerville (Lichtenburgh)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Balfour (Mpumalanga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Bapsfontein	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Batho (Bloemfontein)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Beacon Bay (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Beaufort West	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Bela-Bela	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Benoni	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Bergville	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Berlin	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Bethal	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld

Bethlehem	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Bhekuzulu (Vryheid)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Biesiesvlei	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Bloemhof	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Blydeville (Lichtenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Bodibe	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Boikhutso(Lichtenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Boipatong (Vanderbijlpark)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Bolokanang (Petrusburg)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Booyesen Park (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Boskuil (Makwassie)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Braam Fisherville (Roodepoort)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Bramley (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Brandtfort	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Brighton Beach	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Bronville (Welkom)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Bundu	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Cailtzdorp	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Caluza (Pietermaritzburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Carolina	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Centurion	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ceres	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Chaneng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Chrissiesmeer	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Christina	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Claire Rd (Durban)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Clubview (Freestate)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Colenso	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Colesburg	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield

Colville (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Creighton	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Crystal Park	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Cyverskuil	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Dam Se Bos (Knysna)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Dambuza (Pietermaritzburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Dannhauser	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Dawn Park (Boksburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
De Aar	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
De Doorns	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
De Mat (Durban)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Deal Party (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Delft (Bellville)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Delportshoop	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Devon	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Diepkloof (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Diovinga (Izingolweni)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Ditlounge (Olifantshoek)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Dlamini (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Dobsonville (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Donnybrook	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Douglas	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Dryharts	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Dube (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Dumbe (Paul Pietersburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Durbanville (Cape Town)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Edendale (Pietermaritzburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Edenevale (Germiston)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Eersterust (Temba)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria

Ekangala (D)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ekulindeni	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Elandskraal	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Elliot	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg
Elliotdale	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Emndeni (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Empangeni	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Emzimnoni (Bethal)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Enseleni	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Ermelo	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Eshowe	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Ezenzeleni (Warden)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Fauresmith	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Flagstaff	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Florida	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Frankfort	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Franschhoek	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Gamalakhe (Port Shepstone)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Gluckstadt	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Graaf-Reinet	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Grabouw	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Greenpoint (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Grobblershoop	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Groot-Brakrivier	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Grootvlei (Balfour)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Gugulethu (Cape Town)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Hambanathi (Tongaat)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Ha-Rasebei (Edenburg)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Harding	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu

Hebron (Ga-Rankuwa)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Heldorand (Mosselbay)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Hercules (Pretoria)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Hilbrow	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Hlabisa	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Hlanganani	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Hlohoorwane (Clocolan)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Hoedspruit	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Hoopdal	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Hopewell (Thornville)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Hornlee (Knysna)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Hout Bay	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Humewood (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Imbali (Pietermaritzburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Impendle	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Ixopo	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Jacobsdal	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Jan Kempdorp	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Jeppe	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Kabega Park (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kakamas	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Kamaqhekeze	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Kareedow	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kates Drift (Greytown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Katjibane	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kayaletu (Knysna)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Khuma (Stilfontein)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Kidd's Beach	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Kinross	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld

Kiolnkrans (Wilderness)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Klein-Brakrivier (Groot-Brakrivier)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Klipgat	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Klipplaat	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Komga	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Koppies	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Koster	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Kraaipan	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Kraalhoek (Mogwase)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Kranskop (Greytown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Kriel	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kutlwana (Windsorton)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Kwa Dabeka (Pinetown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwaggafontein (A)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kwaggafontein (D)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kwakwatsi (Koppies)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Kwambonambi	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Kwamhlanga (Phola Park)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
KwaNdengezi (Pinetown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwanomzamo (Humansdorp)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kwasibhejane (Tonga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Kwazakhele (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kwazamxolo (Noupoort)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Ladybrand	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Lamontville (Durban)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Langlagte	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Laudium (Pretoria)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Lebohang (Leslie)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Leeudoringstad	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)

Leondale	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Letsitele	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Libode	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Lindelani (Ntuzuma)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Lindley	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Lithuli	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Logageng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lokaleng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Longlands	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Lulekani	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Lusikisiki	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Lutsburg (Kakamas)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordania
Lwandle (Strand)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Maake	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Mabedlane (Ulundi)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Maboloka	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Madibogo	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Madikwe (Swartruggens)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Maganangobusha	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Magoge	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Mahusha (Masoi)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Majemantsho	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Hillcrest	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Maleboho	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Malukazi (Isipingo)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Mammethlake	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Maokeng (Kroonstad)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Marburg (Port Shepstone)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Marquard	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate

Marydale	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordinia
Mashishing (Lydenburg)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Matabeleng (Barkley West)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Mathyzensloop	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Matlakeng (Zastron)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Matwabeng (Senekal)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Mbazwane	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Mehlomnyama (Port Shepstone)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Melhoutfontein (Stilbay)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Memel	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Mgatle	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Mhala	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Mhluzi (Middelburg)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Migdol	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Milner Estate	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Mnsinsini (Port Shepstone)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Mogogelo	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Monyakeng (Wesselsbron)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Mooiplaas (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Mookgopong (Naboomspruit)	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Morgenzon (Mpumalanga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Mothibistad	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Motoli Village (Roodepoort)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Mphephu	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Mpumuza (Pietermaritzburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Muden	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Mzinti (Tonga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Naboomspruit	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Namakgale	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani

Nasrec (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ndumo (Ingwavuma)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Ndwedwe (Inanda)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Needscamp (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Nekkies (Knysna)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
New Germany (Pinetown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
New Hanover	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
New Horlsons (Plettenbergbaai)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Newlands West (Durban)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Ngangelizwe	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Nkandla	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Nondweni	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Nonzwakazi (De Aar)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Normandien	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Ntabamhlophe (Escourt)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Ntambanana	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Odi	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Oersonskraal (Makwassie)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Orlando East (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Orlando West (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ottoshoop	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Paardekraal (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Pacaltsdorp (George)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Pampierstad	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Paulpietersburg	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Peddie	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Phahameng (Bloemfontein)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Phamaheng (Bultfontein)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Phillipstown	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield

Phiritona (Heilbron)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Phomolong (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Piet Plessis	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Pieterskraal (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Poding-Tse-Rolo (Philippolis)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Port Shepstone	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Postmasburg	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Protea Glen (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Protea South (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Pudimoe	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Qalabotjha (Villiers)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Ramakoka Stad (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Randburg	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Rankelenyane	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Ratlou (Thaba Nchu)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Reddersburg	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Richmond (KwaZulu-Natal)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Rietvale (Modderivier)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Rietvallei S/Camp (Randfontein)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ritavi	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Ritchie	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Riverlea (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Roodepan (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Rooigrond (Mafikeng)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Rust De Winter	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Sandton	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Sannleshof	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Sasolburg	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Scenerypark (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London

Schoemansdal	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Schweizer-Reneke	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
Scottburgh	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Sekgosese	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Senekal	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Setladogi	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Silverton (Pretoria)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Siyabuswa (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Siyabuswa (D)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Siyanda (Kwa Mashu)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Siyathemba (Balfour)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Siyazenzela (Perdekop)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Slove Village (Roodepoort)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Soolspoort (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Standerton	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Stellenbosch	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Sterkspruit	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg
Sterkstoom	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 36-Quenstown
Steynsburg	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg
Steytlerville	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Sunnyside (Pretoria)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Swartruggens	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Thabong (Welkom)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Tikwana (Hoopstad)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Tinmyne	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Tokoza (Alberton)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Trompsburg	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Tulbagh	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Tweefontein (C)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld

Tweelaagte (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Uitenhage	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Uitreght	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Unlondale	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Vaalwater	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Verena	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Vergenoeg (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Vezubuhle	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Viljoenskroon	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Villiers	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Vishoek	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Vredefort	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Vukuzakhi (Volksrust)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Walmer (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Warrenvale (Warrenton)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Waterval	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Waterval (A)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Waterval Boven	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Welkom (Plettenbergbaai)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Wolverdiend	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Mooirivier (Potch)
White River	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Wilsonia	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Witbank	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Wolwekraal (A)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Wolwekraal (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Zamdela (Sasolburg)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Zwelitsha	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2142</b>		

(Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012)

**7.3.2. VIOLENT COLLECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS: BY RESIDENTIAL AREA  
(Appendix 7.3.2.)**

RESIDENTIAL AREA	NUMBER OF VIOLENT PROTESTS	PROVINCE	REPORTING POLICE STATION
Kanyamazane (Nelspruit)	18	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Lebohang (Leslie)	18	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Soshanguve (Pretoria)	18	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Tonga	15	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Kabokweni (Witrivier)	14	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Calcutta	13	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Mmabatho	13	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Botshabelo	12	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Noupoort	11	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Olifantshoek	10	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Taung	10	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Bethelsdorp (Port Elizabeth)	9	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kwaguqa (Witbank)	9	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Mafikeng	9	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Tseki	9	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Bekkersdal (Westonaria)	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Diepkloof (Soweto)	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ezenzeleni (Warden)	8	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Lenasia	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Sharpsville (Vereeniging)	8	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
42nd Hill	7	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Aliwal North	7	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg
Bona-Bona	7	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Ditlounge (Olifantshoek)	7	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Kwazakhele (Port Elizabeth)	7	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Lehurutshe	7	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lethlabile (Brits)	7	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Mamelodi (Pretoria)	7	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Moemaneng (Marquard)	7	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Tshing (Ventersdorp)	7	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Bloemfontein	6	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Galashewe (Kimberly)	6	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Ganyesa	6	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Ga-Rankuwa	6	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Kuruman	6	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield

Ladysmith (KwaZulu-Natal)	6	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Magoge	6	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Masoi	6	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Matabeleng (Barkley West)	6	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Namahadi (Qwa-qwa)	6	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Rustenburg	6	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Alexandra (Randburg)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Amalia	5	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Chiawelo (Soweto)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Edenburg	5	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Hebron (Ga-Rankuwa)	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Honeydew	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Inanda (Durban)	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Ipelegeng (Schweizer-Reneke)	5	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Khayelisha (Bellville)	5	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Laote	5	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Leslie	5	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Lomanyaneng	5	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Mautse (Roseland)	5	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Mdantsane (Ciskei)	5	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Osizweni (Newcastle)	5	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Oukasie	5	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Phuthaditjaba	5	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Barkley West	4	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Bluegumbush	4	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Boitekong (Rustenburg)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Bronkhorstspuit	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Copesville (Pietermaritzburg)	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Doornkop (Soweto)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Duncan Village (East London)	4	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Ekangala (A)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Embalenhle (Secunda)	4	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Freedom Square (Bloemfontein)	4	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Ikageng (Potchefstroom)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Kagiso (Krugersdorp)	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Kgakala (Leeudoringstad)	4	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Kwadezi (Port Elizabeth)	4	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
KwaMashu	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwanobuhle (Uitenhage)	4	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Majemantsho	4	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho

Maokeng (Kroonstad)	4	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Mathyzensloop	4	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Morokweng	4	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Ntuzuma (Durban)	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Phillipstown	4	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Queleni (Plettenbergbaai)	4	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Ritavi	4	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Umlazi (Durban)	4	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Ventersdorp	4	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Vereeniging	4	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Atteridgeville (Pretoria)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Baberton	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Bela-Bela	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Bolokanang (Petrusburg)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Booyen Park (Port Elizabeth)	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Bopong (Brits)	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Bushbuck Ridge	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Da Gamaskop (Mosselbay)	3	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Daveyton (Benoni)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Dieplsoot (Erasmia)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Elukwatini (Secunda)	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Ennerdale	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ermelo	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Evaton (Vereeniging)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Graskop	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Ikutseng (Warrenton)	3	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Kgabalatsane	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Knysna	3	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Kwa-Thema (Springs)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Lenasia South	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Lusikisiki	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Madibogo	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Madidi	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Meqheleng (Ficksburg)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Mhluzi (Middelburg)	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Missionvale (Port Elizabeth)	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Mmakau	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Mogwase (Rustenburg)	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Mondlo	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Motherwell (Port Elizabeth)	3	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth

Nebo	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Nekkies (Knysna)	3	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Orange Farm (Vereeniging)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Princess S/Camp (Roodepoort)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Qalabotjha (Villiers)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Randfontein	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Reddersburg	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Roodepoort)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Sebokeng (Vereeniging)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Silobela (Carolina)	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Sun city	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Sunrise Park	3	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Sydenham (Durban)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Thohoyandou	3	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Tsakane (Brakpan)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Tshepisoong (Roodepoort)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Tshiamo (Harrismith)	3	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Umzinto (Scottburgh)	3	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Vaalbank	3	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Vryberg	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Westonaria	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Wierdabrug (Pretoria)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Wolmaranstad	3	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Zandspruit (Squatters Camp)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Zeerust	3	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Zenzele s/Camp (Randfontein)	3	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Addo	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Amandawe (Scottburgh)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Amsterdam (Mpumalanga)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Beacon Bay (Squatters Camp)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Belfast	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Boshof	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Bossiegif (Plettenbergbaai)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Brits	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Cullinan	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Dalasile	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Danielskuil	2	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Dawn Park (Boksburg)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Delmas	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Delmas	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld

Dewelsdorp	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Durban	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Edendale (Pietermaritzburg)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Eldorado Park	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ficksburg	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Finetown	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Goedgevonden (Ventersdorp)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Hamanskraal	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Ha-Rasebei (Edenburg)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Hartebeespoort	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Hazyview	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Hornlee (Knysna)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Ikopeleng	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Isipingo	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Jagersfontein	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Jouberton (Klerksdorp)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Kabega Park (Port Elizabeth)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kamesh (Uitenhage)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Kghotsong (Bothaville)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Kimberly	2	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Kutlwano (Odendaalsrus)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Kwasibhejane (Tonga)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Lanseria	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Lawley	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Lichtenburg	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lindelani (Ntuzuma)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Logageng	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lydenburg	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Maboloka	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Maganangobusha	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Magosane	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Makapanstad	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Makoko (Masoi)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Makwane	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Malukazi (Isipingo)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Marite	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Mashishing (Lydenburg)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Masibekela (Tonga)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Matlakeng (Zastron)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Matwabeng (Senekal)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate

Meadowlands (Soweto)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Metsimaholo (Oranjeville)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Mfuleni (Kuisrivier)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Mokwallo (Vredefort)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Mooiplaas (East London)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Moshawane	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Mothibistad	2	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Motihabe	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Muldersdrift (W/Rand)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Nelspruit	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Newcastle	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Newlands West (Durban)	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Nyanga (Cape Town)	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Perdekop	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Petrusburg	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Petsana (Reitz)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Phiritona (Heilbron)	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Plettenbergbaai	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Rabie Ridge (Johannesburg)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Reivilo	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Sabsie	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Sandton	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Sekhukhune	2	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Seweding	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Signalhill	2	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Standerton	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Sundumbili	2	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 33-Umfolozi
Tembisa (Kemptonpark)	2	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Thaba Nchu	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Tlhabane (Rustenburg)	2	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Tseseng	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Villiersdorp	2	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Villiers	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Walmer (Port Elizabeth)	2	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Wesselton (Ermelo)	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Witbank	2	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Zastron	2	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Atlantis (Cape Town)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Amanzimtoti	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Apel	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn

Atamelang	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Bakerton (Springs)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Balfour (Mpumalanga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Bapsfontein	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Beacon Bay (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Benoni	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Berlin	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Bethal	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Bhongweni (Kokstad)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Bisho	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Bodibe	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Boikhutso(Lichtenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Bojwana (Masoi)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Booysens (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Braamfontein	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Braelynn	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Breyten	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Bronville (Welkom)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Bundu	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Burgerstort	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn
Centurion	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Chaneng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Charlstown	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Cleveland (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Colenso	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Colesburg	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Colville (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Coronationville	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Damonsville	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Davel	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
De Deur (Vereeniging)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Delareyville	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Delft (Bellville)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Delportshoop	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Dube	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Dube (Soweto)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Dududu (Scottburgh)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Dumbe (Paulpietersburg)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Ekgangala (B)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Emgwenya (Waterval Boven)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit

Erith Trust Farm (Highflats)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 18-Umzimkhulu
Ethandukukhanya (Piet Retief)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Ezakheni (Ladysmith)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Faure	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Fauresmith	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Flagstaff	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Fort Grey (Squatters Camp)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Grabouw	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Greenpoint (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Grootvlei (Balfour)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Gugulethu (Cape Town)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Halfway House (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Hobhouse	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Homevale (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Ikgomotseng (Soutpan)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Itsoseng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Itsoseng (Erasmus)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Ivorypark (Midrand)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Jacobsdal	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Jan Kempdorp	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Jerico (Brits)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Johannesburg	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Kagisananong (Bloemfontein)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Kamaqhekeze	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Kameelrevier (A)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kameelrevier (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kamhlanga	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Katlehong (Germiston)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Kenhardt	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 29-Gordina
Khyamandi (Stellenbosch)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
King Williams Town	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Klapmuts	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 11-Boland
Klein-Brakrivier (Groot-Brakrivier)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Kleinskool (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Klerksdorp	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Klerskraal	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Koffiefontein	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Koster	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Kraaipan	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Kraalhoek (Mogwase)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)

Kroonstad	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Kwaggafontein (A)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Kwakwatsi (Koppies)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
KwaMakhutha (Amanzimtoti)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwamhlanga (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
KwaNdengezi (Pinetown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Kwazamxolo (Noupoort)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Ladismith (Cape)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Ladybrand	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Langlagte	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Ledig (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Lehrutsi (Zeerust)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Logagane	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lokaleng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Lotlhakane	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Low's Greek	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Lwandle (Strand)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Mabieskraal (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Mabitse	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Machadodorp	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Macleantown	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Magopa (Ventersdorp)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Mahube Valley (Mamelodi East)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Mahusha (Masoi)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Makouspan	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Malboro Gardens (Sandton)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Mareetsane	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Marianhill	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Marikana	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Marquard	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Masilo (Theunissen)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Masisi	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Matsulu (Nelspruit)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Mbuzini (Tonga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Meloding (Verginia)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Middelburg (Mpumalanga)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Migdol	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Mkuze	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Modimolle	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 50-Waterberg
Monsterlus	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 22-Capricorn

Montclair	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Monyakeng (Wesselsbron)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Morojaneng (Dewelsdorp)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Mpumalanga (Hammersdale)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Msinga (Greytown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Mthatha	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 44-Mthatha
Mulzenberg (Wynberg)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Nancefield Industrial Area	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Needscamp (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
New Brighton (Port Elizabeth)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Noordgesig	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Nsulwane (Umgababa)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Ntabamhlophe (Escourt)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Nyongane (Masoi)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Odi	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Odinburg	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Orange Groove (Squatters Camp)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Oranjeville	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Oskraal	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Oudtshoorn	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Palm Ridge (Alberton)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Pampierstad	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Pefferville (East London)	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
Phillipi (Cape Town)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Phokeng (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Pietermaritzburg	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Pieterskraal (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Pomeroy	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Poortjie	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Port Elizabeth	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 12-Port Elizabeth
Postmasburg	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Pretoria	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Primrose (Germiston)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Promosa (Potchefstroom)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 04-Moorivier (Potch)
Qibing (Wepener)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Quenstown	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 36-Quenstown
Ramakoka Stad (Rustenburg)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 27- Marico (Rustenburg)
Ramalotsi (Viljoenskroon)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Ratanda (Heidelberg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Refilwe (Cullinan)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria

Richmond (KwaZulu-Natal)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Rigerpark (Boksburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Roodepan (Kimberly)	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Rossslyn (Pretoria)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Sakhile (Standerton)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Senekal	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Setlopo	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Sheepmoor	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Shongweni (Hillcrest)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Sibongile (Dundee)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 21-Uthukela
Simile (Sabie)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Siyathemba (Balfour)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Staatsdrif (Groot Marico)	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Stabeng	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Sterkspruit	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 54-Drakensburg
Strand	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 10-Cape Town
Temba	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 01-Pretoria
Thabong (Welkom)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 16-N Freestate
Thembaletu (George)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Thornville	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 08-Midlands
Toekomsrus (Randfontein)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
Tokoza (Alberton)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Tsetse	1	North West	Ccu Unit 46-Mmabatho
Tweefontein (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Tzaneen	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 47-Mopani
Ulundi	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 42-Ulundi
Umsunduzi (Camperdown)	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Vanderbijlpark	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 25-Katlehong
Verena	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Verulam	1	KwaZulu-Natal	Ccu Unit 09-Durban
Vuwani	1	Limpopo	Ccu Unit 48-Thohoyandou
Wakkerstroom	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 53-Eastern Highveld
Warrenton	1	Northern Cape	Ccu Unit 15-Diamondfield
Waterval (B)	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Waterval Boven	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 43-Highveld
Welkom (Plettenbergbaai)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George
Wepener	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 17-S Freestate
Wesbury (Johannesburg)	1	Gauteng	Ccu Unit 02-Johannesburg
White River	1	Mpumalanga	Ccu Unit 24-Nelspruit
Xolweni (Knysna)	1	Western Cape	Ccu Unit 14-George

Zamani (Memel)	1	Freestate	Ccu Unit 30-E Freestate
Zwelitsha	1	Eastern Cape	Ccu Unit 13-East London
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1112</b>		

(Whistle Blower South Africa, 2012)