

**IMPACT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION ON PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION IN
NIGERIA, 2000-2014**

BY

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**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND**

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**Being a Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Arts in Fulfilment of the Academic
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Department
of History, University of Zululand, Republic of South Africa**

Promoter: Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase

**. DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND**

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Quotation

People cannot live apart and in agony forever

Johan Galtung¹

¹ Galtung, J. (1998a) "After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence," p.15, Transcend: A Peace and Development Network, 1-122, <http://www.arnehansen.net/011013Galtung.3r.htm> (accessed 10 January, 2017).

Approval

This thesis has been read and approved in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in History, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, Republic of South Africa.

Sign:

Date:

Dr. Maxwell Zakhele Shamase
Promoter

Declaration

I declare that this thesis **“Impact of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution on Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Nigeria, 2000-2014”** represents my own work and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and properly acknowledged for future reference.

.....

Student Name: Olalekan Augustine Babatunde

Dedication

To the memories of those who have lost their lives to the decades of carnage in Nigeria.

To the memory of my late father Pa. Joshua Babalola Babatunde.

And,

To Taiwo, my God-given jewel whose thought constantly reminds me why I love her! I owe her
a debt of gratitude.

Acknowledgements

If I have seen further it is because I stand on the shoulders of giants.

Isaac Newton²

Nothing good in life ever comes easy as I rarely climbed its steps without difficulties and pains. But this stride is quite unique in design, action, result and lesson. It was a stride with ease. Therefore, the accomplishment for the award of Doctor of Philosophy cannot go without appreciating the Supreme Being, individuals and organizations that supported me from start to finish.

Firstly, I give special thanks to God who ordained the time and place for the award including the divine health and safety I enjoyed. Secondly, I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Maxwell Zakhele Shamase who inspired and guided me throughout the period of the research study. He provided profound insight into the interface between historical research and impact evaluation. I will always remember him for his invaluable comments to the research work and unceasing encouragement, and his can-do spirit.

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Lastly, my heartfelt appreciation goes to my divine seeds-Folarin, Folahan, Folarera and Foladara-of whom I am sure, would be highly encouraged by their father's feat in aspiring to be

² Adolfo J. Socorro Ramos' *Design, Implementation and Evaluation of a Declarative Object-Oriented Programming Language*, a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement~ for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, Trinity, 1993, p.3, <https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/files/3440/PRG113.pdf> (accessed 9 November, 2016).

a global player in this highly competitive but very interesting world. Their unwavering love and patience, including their mother, was commendable throughout my long absence from home. Surely, you will be great champions. Cheers!

Ifaara (Abstract)

Ise iwadi yii di sise lati se ayewo ipa ti ile iwadi oro alaafia ati ipetu saawo (IPCR) ti ko lawon agbegbe ti gbondonroso ti nwaye nile Nigeria laarin odun 2000 si 2014. Ijoba se agbekale ile-eko naa, to si paako-da laye ijoba afiboyan lodun 2000, lati ma toka ohun to sokunfa ijangbon nile Nigeria, nipa sise iwadi awon ona abayo ti yoo je k'alaafia tunbo maa joba lawujo. Yato si akoba ti aigbora eniye oun waha nfa fun emi ati dukia ara ilu, o tun je ifaseyin idagbasoke orile-ede Nigeria, o ti so opolopo eeyan di alainilelori. Iwadi ile-eko na fi han pe lati bii odun merinla seyin ti a ti se idasile re, idagbasoke ti ba ifeserinle alaafia nipasw awon eto t'ile-eko naa peelo fawon odo, awon obinrin, awon ileese iroyin, awon asofin, awon osise ijoba, awon oriade, atoru-ileke pelu awon adari esin, pe eto t'awon wonyii ba nse ma nse ikilo lati paana wahala to lee domi alaafia ilu ru. Iwadi fihan pe awon eto wonyii ns'eso lootu, sibe koi tii wu gbongbo ohun to nsokunfa gbondonroso nile Nigeria. Nibo se je wipe eto ipetu-saawo tile eko yii ngbekale nru ewe, ko wu gbongbo, nyo ojere, ko fa ketepe epo, nise lo ntubo d'egbinrin ote, tiwa npana ikan, tikeji si nru. Nitori idi eyi, tomi alaafia ilu yoo ba toro pongba, ile-eko naa ni lati se agbejade awon ohun to wa labe aso to nda oorun pa araale toro fi ndaari-gbodowi ikunmu baale. Ile-iwadi naa gbodo je kara-le mo awon osise lesekuu paapaa lawon ibi ti ijangbon ti domi seleru. Ijoba naa gbodo m'oro alaafia ilu ni pataki ati pe eto aabo ilu je dandan nipa fifun ile-iwadi IPCR lowo lati sise re daadaa. Iwadi na so pe b'awon eto wonyii ba se po to, bee naa ni alaafia ilu yoo se rinle si.

Abstract

The study was undertaken to evaluate the impact of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Nigeria from 2000 to 2014. Established by the government as it transitioned to democratic governance in 2000, IPCR was mandated to identify the root causes of violent conflict in Nigeria through research and provide possible solutions through evidence-informed policy and practice options, and promotion of peacebuilding strategies. Recurring violent conflicts had not only destroyed several lives and property and displaced millions from their homes, but had also retarded the nation's growth and development. Drawing from extensive sources of qualitative and quantitative data, the study examined the peacebuilding evidence that had worked and did not work for IPCR, and why, through conflict analysis model, theories of change and intervention theory for organizational development. Through historical, evaluative and descriptive analysis, the study found out that the Institute had within fifteen years of its history contributed to the promotion of peace through design and implementation of relevant, effective and efficient peacebuilding programmes for communities, women, youth, media, legislators, public servants, traditional, religious leaders and civil society. These groups of beneficiaries are the study's target population. There was a strong evidence to argue that the impact of the interventions were mostly in short-term as it had impacted on the mind and work of beneficiaries but not enough to manage the underlying factors behind the recurrence of violent conflict in Nigeria. Nigeria often relapsed into more violence as soon as it gained some respite. Therefore, to achieve its mandate in the long, coherent and sustainable terms, the study suggests that the Institute must scale up its programmes to drastically stem the tide of violence through community peacebuilding. IPCR must make itself more visible at the community level because that was where most violent conflict originated. While the study recognized the fact that, though, the prevalence and complexity of underlying drivers of conflict in Nigeria were far beyond the ambit of one agency, it recommends the Institute to deepen and broaden its partnership and networks for greater peacebuilding impact. Similarly, the government needs to prioritize peace and security by increasing funding and giving sustainable support to IPCR as a democratic institution. Though much of its intervention impact still needed to be studied and learned, the study contends that better and more expanded programmes will make peacebuilding more effective and promote Nigeria's peace in the long-term.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACLED	-	Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset
AU	-	African Union
AWP	-	Annual Work Plan
CPAP	-	Country Programme of Action Plan
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
DFID	-	UK's Department for International Development
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
IDPs	-	Internally Displaced Persons
INEC	-	Independent National Electoral Commission
I4P	-	Infrastructure for Peace
IP	-	Implementing Partner
IPCR	-	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Logframe	-	Logical Framework
M & E	-	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCIA	-	Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
NAP	-	National Action Plan
NBC	-	National Broadcasting Commission
NGOs	-	Non-Governmental Organizations

NPC	-	National Planning Commission
NPC	-	Nigerian Press Council
NPP	-	National Peace Policy
NSRP	-	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NUJ	-	Nigerian Union of Journalists
OSIWA	-	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PCIA	-	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
SCA	-	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SCAD	-	Social Conflict Analysis Database
SDGs	-	Sustainable Development Goals
SPSS	-	Statistical Package for Social Science
TOC	-	Theory of Change
UCDP	-	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	-	United Nations
UNDAF	-	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Education Fund
USIP	-	United States Institute of Peace

Glossary

NOTE: This glossary contains only selected terms as used in this thesis.

<i>Annual Work Plan</i>	a set of successive activities over a period of one year, interconnected and which contribute to the same broader aim.
<i>Assumption</i>	A statement of problem or hypothesis made when designing peacebuilding interventions. They are made explicit in theory in order to systematically track the anticipated results chains.
<i>Baseline Study</i>	an analysis describing the situation prior to IPCR's establishment and peacebuilding intervention against which the impact evaluation was conducted.
<i>Beneficiaries</i>	the individuals, groups or organizations that directly benefited from IPCR's peacebuilding programmes.
<i>Capacity Building</i>	activities aimed at improving the expertise and skills of personnel in relation to the responsibilities and tasks which they will carry out.
<i>Causality</i>	is the relationship between one intervention (the cause) and the effect which is the direct consequence (result) of the first.
<i>Civil Society</i>	is comprised of groups or organizations working in the interest of the citizens but operating outside of the governmental and for-profit sectors.
<i>Concept Note</i>	is a summary of a programme proposal containing a brief description of the idea of the peacebuilding intervention. It often contains the introduction, problem statement and justification, goals, objectives, methodology, tentative schedule and preliminary budget.
<i>Conflict</i>	A disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns.
<i>Conflict Analysis</i>	is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. The study helps in gaining a deeper understanding of the origin and nature of a conflict, by uncovering the core issues at the root of it, the different parties involved, its main actors, and the power they have or do not have to influence what is happening.
<i>Conflict Dynamics</i>	the resulting interaction between the conflict profile, the actors, and causes. Changes within a contested issue space over time with respect to actor behaviour or the issue's broader environment.

<i>Conflict Management</i>	activities undertaken to prevent the intensification or spread of existing violent conflict.
<i>Conflict Prevention</i>	activities undertaken over the short term to reduce tensions and prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.
<i>Conflict Resolution</i>	activities undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict.
<i>Evaluation</i>	is a systematic and objective assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency of interventions. It helps to ascertain the quality of policies and programmes, to enhance the performance of participants, to identify good practices and to define appropriate standards for future operations.
<i>Focus Group</i>	is a small number of past recipients or beneficiaries of IPCR peacebuilding programmes (e.g. 5-11 individuals per group) gathered for discussion to explore ideas, attitudes, experiences, and opinions about the programme they attended.
<i>Gender</i>	refers to the socially constructed characteristics of women and men – such as norms, roles and relationships of and between groups of women and men.
<i>Gender mainstreaming</i>	is a process of ensuring that policies, programs, processes, activities and interventions always take into consideration the gender dimensions and implications. When development work is made to insist on participation, inclusiveness and the acknowledgement of, and respect for differences and diversity.
<i>Impact evaluation</i>	looks at the positive and negative, desirable and undesirable effects of peacebuilding interventions.
<i>Indicators</i>	are qualitative and quantitative variables, used for measuring change. Indicators are re-defined variables which help to identify (in) direct differences in quality and/or quantity within a defined period of time. As a “unit of measure” it allows to judge if an intervention was successful or not.
<i>Input</i>	Any resource that put into a peacebuilding programme to carry out an activity is considered an input. Input can be units of time, staff, money, equipment, know-how, ideas, etc. available to be expended in order for IPCR to produce the outputs and consequently outcomes identified as part of a planned programme.
<i>Logic Framework (Logframe)</i>	is a tool for programme conceptualization, design, monitoring and evaluation. Logframe establishes measurable, causally-linked objectives by providing a logical summary of what the programme is going to achieve,

activities involved, the means/resources/inputs to achieve, problems anticipated and how the programme is going to be measured and verified.

<i>Logic Model</i>	is a visual representation that provides a road map showing the sequence of relate events connecting the need for a planned program with the programs' desired outcomes and results. It includes elements such as inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts and graphically presents the logical progression and relationship of these elements.
<i>Monitoring</i>	the routine tracking and reporting of priority information about a peacebuilding programme and its intended outputs and outcomes.
<i>Needs Assessment</i>	is a systematic investigation that identifies and reports on the challenges facing IPCR. It could also be used for a targeted population in order to decide upon strategies, priorities and allocation of resources for the improvement of conditions and/or reduction of inequalities.
<i>Objectives</i>	describe the planned areas of activity by which a peacebuilding programme was to achieve its aims. Objectives directly translate into a list of activities. They are usually endeavoured to be reached in finite time by setting deadlines.
<i>Outcome</i>	short-term and medium-term effect of an intervention's outputs, such as change in knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, behaviours.
<i>Outputs</i>	direct results of peacebuilding intervention activities which are visible or quantifiable such as the number of trained participants, intervention activities, number of communiqués issued or network formed.
<i>Peace</i>	a state of mutual harmony between different Nigerian ethnic nationalities or groups. That is, absence of violence or other disturbance as a result of social justice, equity, respect for rule of law, accountability and transparency, protection of human rights and other virtues.
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	often refers to initiatives or actions undertaken over the medium and longer term to address the causes or factors underlying violent conflict.
<i>Peacekeeping</i>	refers to the deployment of national or, more commonly, multinational forces for the purpose of helping to control and resolve an actual or potential armed conflict between or within states.

<i>Programme Cycle</i>	is a coordinated series of actions undertaken to help prepare for, manage and deliver peacebuilding intervention. It is often adopted by donor organizations to include planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and is typically 3-5 years.
<i>Stakeholders</i>	Refers to agencies, organizations, institutions, entities, groups and individuals who influenced or who are directly or indirectly affected by IPCR's programmes, goals or objectives.
<i>Target group/population</i>	Target groups or populations are those individuals or groups that a programme was targeting with its intervention. A target group consists of specific individuals, specific organizations, or specific institutions, etc. for whom peacebuilding activities are intended.
<i>Theory of change</i>	is essentially a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context.
<i>Variables</i>	are attributes or characteristics in a respondent, group, or system that could change or be expressed as more than one value or in more than one category. They can be categorized either in qualitative and quantitative variables or dependent and independent variables.

Preface

One of the critical challenges Nigeria has been grappling with since independence in 1960 is preventing or managing violent conflict. Efforts by successive governments to stem the tide of socio-political conflicts that transgressed colonial era and evolved in the course of self-rule had not been successful. It was not until year 2000 that Nigeria felt a glimpse of hope with the establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration. With this milestone, the civilian administration was applauded for doing what its predecessors had never achieved. Between 2000 and 2014, the Institute carried out a number of research studies into the causes of violent conflict and promoted a wide range of peacebuilding programmes to checkmate the rising tide of violence and conflict in the country.

It was the peacebuilding interventions that prompted an undertaking to investigate the extent to which the strategies had reduced the conflict dynamics rooted in Nigeria's past. From the reviews carried out on the Establishment Act and reports, the Institute's peacebuilding interventions were the most implemented parts of its programmes across Nigeria ranging from women, youth, media, lawmakers, public servants, traditional, religious leaders and civil society to other peacebuilding spheres. Design, monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding, security and development concepts, principles and practices dealt with at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) Conference in 2015 motivated a research of this nature. The rise of and incessant Boko Haram insurgency since 2009 further stimulated the need to interrogate the Institute's methodologies and impact thereof.

The study adopted historical methods of investigation into the development of conflict and peacebuilding among different ethnic groups in Nigeria with a view to understand how these peoples prevented, resolved and managed conflicts and the challenges of nationhood in the pre-colonial, colonial and early post-colonial eras. Furthermore, the thesis adopted impact evaluation methods to assess how the Institute responded to conflict and the impact it made in fifteen years of its existence. The period of study was chosen because of the significant number of completed programme cycles with its development partners and changes Nigeria went through during transition to civilian rule.

The research argues that tangible peace is possible in Nigeria. Both the Institute's management and staff including members of the public interviewed and surveyed expressed optimism in Nigeria and the ability of IPCR to accomplish its mandate. It could be argued that nationalism and patriotic feelings and sentiments ran high. The researcher had no actual or potential conflict of interest in this research study.

Gbogbo ohun ti akosile yii dale

Bawo ni a se le mo pataki awon ohun ti ile eko imo nipa ipese alaafia ati wiwa iyaju saawo ti se, ki lawon agbegbe ta nigbagbo pe wahala maa nwaye ni ile Nigeria? Sugbon ka to le gbe igbese lati wa idahun si ibeere yii, o se pataki lati bojuwo eto akosile pataki yii.

Akosile yi je koko kan gboogi lara awon nkan to gbodo gbekale, ka to le gba imo oye omowe nile eko nla Yunifasiti Zululand ni orile ede South Africa. Akosile yii je ko seese pelu iranwo imoriri ipa tile eko nla Yunifasiti naa ti ko ninu agbekale ise iwadi, gegebi ona abayo fun idagbasoke ati ilosiwaju ile Africa, iyen gege bo se wa mu ohun ti a fi sori ile eko naa “ise atunse fun iwulo re”. Ninu ilana agbekale ile eko naa, ni ati ri ipa ile eko naa ninu ati pese alaafia ati didekun lasigbo todun 2000-2014 ni won se amulo re lati mu ilosiwaju ba pataki ise ibude ile eko naa ninu ati dekun ati lati mopin deba lasigbo ija nile Nigeria. Eto agbekale ati isamuse awon ilana ipetu alaafia atawon eto diekun aawo ile eko nla tia gbe lewon lowo lati mo bosekaju osuwon si lati bi odun o le mewa seyin, sibe aawo ati atubotan re naa nlo soke sii ni lorile ede yii.

Eyi lo fa ise iwadi to se pataki yii foju wo, ibere idasile eto ikeko na nile Nigeria pelupelu awon ohun to nfa aawo ija lorile ede ati bi eka ikeko imo nipa ipese ti se bere ati ona to gba lati koju aawo ati awon ipa re gbogbo to nko lori ede yii.

Ikeko yi safihan pe a kole fi ohun kan soso wa iyaju sawon isele miran tori o le ma le sise fun eto igbelewon miran, sugbon awon oluwadi gbe awon igbese sisora lori ati mu ipeyesi ati ojulowo ise iwadi ti won se.

Ewe awon nkan wonyii kii se pe ko le ma si asise ninu agbekale bayii, kii se se ero onise iwadi lati ma gbiyanju ati ronu kanle, sise akojopo awon ohun to fe lo, fifi ojulameyito ati jijabo awon ise apileko re. Nidi eyi, ise apileko yii ni a se agbekale re ni ipele eko marun, ipari ati awon aba, awon nkan itokasi , eyi to tele ni alaye si soki nipa gbogbo akosile naa.

Eko kerin apileko yii se afihan erongba, ojuse ati ilana ikeko yii. Koko erongba iwadi yii ni lati bojuwo ipa ti ajo IPCR ko ninu agbekale liana alaafia ati ilana to gbongbon lati fi yanju ati dekun ati lati bojuwo awon nkan to mu ki awon eto gbogbo ko le sise re daradara laarin odun 2000 si odun 2014.

Ninu koko erongba mefeefa, ni ati mo nipa itan to ro mo, eredi idasile ibudo naa bibojuwo bi atise se agbekale ati amuse liana koko ipetu alaafia mu agbekale awon ti a gbe lee lowo lati se.

Bakanna, lati daba awon ona miran lati fi mu ilosiwaju ati atunse wa, latari eto eko ti a ti ko lati ibere awon ohun ti a se awari re. A se agbekale awon ibeere ise iwadi lati le wa ni ibamu pelu erongba ti a gbe kale. Eka kerin naa pari pelu awon ohun tie to iwadi ile eko nla Yunifasiti naa nile fun ise ati abajade to dara.

Ninu eko keji, a bojuwo bi itan ti se sore lori igbese wa sile oro alafia ati wiwa iyanju saawo nile Nigeria. Eyi waye latari iwadi ti a se lori awon eyan kan: bawo ni won se n bojuto ati wiwa iyanju si awo to ba n waye gege bi o ba ti se waye tabi sele ko to dipe awon oyinbo alawo funfun lati ile Europe de. Apileko naa ko to dipe awon oyinbo ile geesi ti se ijoba le wa lori, ti won si fi wa si abe eto akoso won lati bi odun 1900. Lati ibe lo, a fi ye awon eeyan ni lana tawon oyinbo alawo funfun ma nlo lati fi yanju aawo, didero ati sise abojuto re. Ilana alajumosepo ni eto akoso ijoba alawo funfun samulo re lati fi sabojuto ati didekun aawo to ba waye, lowa larin oba laye atawon adari eto isakoso awon oyinbo. Sugbon ni kete tile Nigeria gba ominira, ona igba yanju bi awon ologun ti se toju bo eto akoso nigba naa.

Ninu eko keta ni ati se asaro nipa idasile ibudo to wa fun oro Alafia ati ona ipetu si aawo gege bi koko ona ijiro, eyi lo si mu ki eto akoso oloye Olusegun Obasanjo sagbekale re lodun 2000. Lori awon nnkan wonyii ni a fi foju lameyito wo. Bakanna lo tun si oju wa si awon iroyin to mu ki won se agbekale IPCR. Awon ohun to je ojuse re, eto agbekale re ati awon afisun pelu erongba re ni gege bi a se nii iwongba ati mu awon ayipada ti a nfe ko le jeyo ni orile ede yii.

Eko kerin iwe ipileko yii, ko sai foju iwadi eyito wo awon eto ti ile ise na, eyi to mu ki won gbe igbese ati se agbekale ilana ipese alafia ati wiwa iyanju soro aawo. Bawo ni a se gbee kale ati sise amuse re. IPCR gbe igbese yii latara eto idorepo to sagbekale re pelu ajo awon egbe la bele ati loke okun. Eyi wa lara eto abojuto, ajo ile Ilu Oba kan to nfe rere oro alaafia. A se igbele won awon eto to room oro ipetu awo naa latara agbekale awon eri iwadi awon ayipada ti won tile fawon ohun to ro mo akosile yii.

Ti a ba wo awon eko ti a ko koja atawon eri ti a ba pade ninu idanileko yii, apileko ohun bojuwo agbara, aaye ati awon ifaseyin to wa ninu awon eto ta to ipase oro alaafia.

Koko pataki ise apileko yii lo wa ninu eko karun, nibe ni a ti se alaye yekeyeke awon ipa ti ajo IPCR ti ko ninu ipese alaafia nile Nigeria gege bo se wa ninu akosile ababo ise iwadi atawom eto to ro mo ilana agbekale oro alafia. Bakanna ni a tun menuba awon aba lokookan awon awon liana marun ti a daba ninu eto agbekale alafia.

Ni ipari, ikadi ati awon ona abayo lo kadi akosile pataki pelu akosile ni soki nipa awon akosile ise iwadi atawon igbese to ye ka gbe lori ona ati mu igbega ba ibudo ikeko naa ko le tuu bo se koko si ninu akitiyan ati sagbelaruge ipese alafia ati didekun lasigbo ni ile Nigeria. Onise iwadi ni igbagbo pe ti ibudo to nri si oro Alafia ati ipetu aawo ba le se amulo awon aba yii, yoo tunbo salekun awon ipa ipese Alafia ati pe ile Nigeria yoo si dara fun eyi.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

How can we make meaning to what the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) had done in a conflict-prone environment such as Nigeria? The design and execution of various peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes of the Institute had not been deeply and broadly evaluated to span more than a decade. Also there was no reliable data on the impact of the Institute peacebuilding. Yet the rate of conflict and its consequence was rising in the country. This was what necessitated the study to broadly and deeply examine the historical development of Nigeria as well as the various factors behind conflict dynamics in Nigeria. It uncovered how IPCR came into being, how it had managed the drivers of conflict and the extent of its impact thereof.

Research has proven there is no one-size-fits-all in impact evaluation and this study took precautionary measures to ensure validity and reliability of the thematic question. Nevertheless, this assertion does not mean that there could be no mistakes and if at all they exist, it was not the intention of the researcher in the course of conceiving, planning, collecting, analysing, interpreting and reporting this thesis. Therefore, the thesis is organized into five chapters, conclusion and recommendations, source list and appendices. The following are the synopses of the thesis chapters.

Chapter one deals with the aims, objectives and methodology of the study. The ultimate aim of the research study was to conduct an impact evaluation of IPCR peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies in order to identify factors which contributed to programme performance and effectiveness from 2000-2014. At the heart of the objectives was to understand the historical circumstances that led to the establishment of the Institute vis-à-vis the assessment of how it designed and implemented peacebuilding components and also to suggest identified areas of improvement as a result of the lessons learned from the evaluation findings. The research questions were tailored to align with the set objectives. The chapter concludes with the candidate's declaration to comply with the University of Zululand's research and ethics policies.

In chapter two, attention is drawn to the historical development of peace and conflict in Nigeria. This was done through empirical evidence of how some selected major and minor ethnic groups managed and resolved conflict prior to the advent of Europeans. The chapter goes further to explain how different political entities were amalgamated through conquest and diplomacy by the British from the early 20th century. From there onward, Nigerians were introduced to the western methods of conflict resolution, prevention and management. A mix method was allowed by the colonial administration for both the native authorities and colonial officials to prevent and manage violence and conflict. But as soon it gained independence, the dynamics of conflict in Nigeria amplified especially with the incursion of military into power.

A baseline study was attempted on the establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution by the Obasanjo administration in 2000 in chapter three. It was against this background that the impact evaluation was made. It also provides information on the plan and processes of how IPCR came into being. Its mandate, organizational structure and values (mission and vision) were analyzed against its expected role, effectiveness and efficiency in bringing about the needed change in Nigeria.

Chapter four undertakes an assessment of the Institute's programming right from what informed decisions behind the conception of peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies to how they were designed and implemented. It was noted that IPCR undertook such process through the collaborative partnership it had with local and international organizations. Based on the CARE International UK Peacebuilding model, the Institute's programme logic models were evaluated through introduction, theories of change and methodologies to give clarity into their logic frameworks. Drawing from the lessons learned and the analysis of findings, the study identified the strengths, gaps and weaknesses in the peacebuilding management.

Chapter five is the analysis, interpretation and report of the contribution of IPCR to peace in Nigeria based on the research findings (output, outcome and impact) of the evaluated programmes. The section concludes the adoption of the CARE Peacebuilding model.

The General Conclusion and Recommendations wrap up the thesis with a summary of the research findings on how to improve capabilities of the Institute to be more relevant and effective in the promotion of its peacebuilding mandate in Nigeria

It can thus be shown that the thesis encompasses a wide range of historical and evaluative analyses on the evolution of peacebuilding from the earliest history of the peoples to when it was institutionalized in Nigeria. Therefore, it is hoped that the study would help not only the Institute to develop a more relevant, coherent and effective programmes but also serve as a resource to decision-makers, practitioners, researchers and international organizations working on the issues of peace and development in Nigeria.

CHAPTER ONE

AIM, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

I consider the process of gestation just as important as when you're actually sitting down putting words to the paper

Wole Soyinka³

1.1 Introduction

Since independence from the British, Nigeria's political history has been marred by violent conflict and armed insurgency which had killed several thousands of people, destroyed property and displaced millions of people.⁴ The genesis of these conflicts could be traced to colonial legacies, misgovernment, corruption, poverty, unemployment, injustice and a wide range of other causes.⁵ These factors have unleashed persistent political, ethnic, religious, socio-economic violence and conflict on the people and retarded the growth and development agenda of the government. Nigeria is often ranked abysmally in most global development indices, be it corruption, poverty, diseases, happiness level, unemployment or violence. Successive governments, from military to civilian, have formulated policies and responses for the improvement of lives and conditions that would reverse the situations and address security challenges. Each of the administrations aimed at creating conditions that would lead to promotion of peace and maintenance of national unity.

The task of nation and peacebuilding in Nigeria compelled the ruling authorities to device and implement viable policies to maintain law and order, and promote social justice while building inter-group relations. The task encompassed recognizing early conflict warnings that could precipitate violence, mitigate effect of conflict and promotion of peacebuilding activities. However, the scale and depth of responses to peace and security challenges were wider and more enormous because of the ever-changing nature of violent conflict, armed groups and realities of modern life.

³ Wole Soyinka, <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/w/wolesoyink311793.html> (accessed 20 May, 2016).

⁴ IPCR (2012) National Peace Policy (Draft), p. 21.

⁵ PM News, Poverty, injustice, unemployment cause of conflicts in Nigeria, by President Muhammadu Buhari, Federal Republic of Nigeria, <https://businessdayonline.com> of 26 Jan.2016 (accessed 26 Jan. 2016).

President Olusegun Obasanjo established the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in 2000, a year Nigeria regained civilian rule from the military as a new national peace strategy. Besides investigating the causes of the violent conflicts, it was mandated to promote peacebuilding and advocacy. From its outcome, it was expected to offer the government with evidence-based policy and practice options. Key to its nature and function was the promotion of good governance and democracy in Nigeria.⁶ In addition, the democratic government realized that the scale and depth of violence that culminated in huge destruction of lives and property called for a special body separated from the public security agencies (uniformed) or secret services Nigeria had been used to. IPCR had implemented a number of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes for women, youth, government officials, lawmakers, traditional rulers, religious organizations, civil society, journalists and other spectrums of the society through capacity development workshops, lectures, research, dialogues, sensitization and advocacy. Fifteen years after its establishment, Nigeria was still grappling with the effect of violence and conflict. Could it then be asked that the Institute had not made an impact?

It is in the light of the above that a study of the impact of the IPCR in Nigeria during the period 2000-2014 was undertaken. The fifteen-year period of study was considered not only because Nigeria witnessed a rise in violent conflict as soon as it returned to civilian rule but also the Institute witnessed significant support from both the national and international stakeholders. Likewise, the end of the period marked major completion of programme cycles of IPCR peacebuilding across a wide range of actors and issues. Importantly, peacebuilding impact has become increasingly recognized in the developing countries. Indeed, an understanding of the impact of peacebuilding interventions of the Institute was timely and useful. Relevant data was needed to better understand IPCR peacebuilding impact if the government and stakeholders were to succeed in their response to security challenges.

Promotion of peacebuilding as a response from a series of baseline research the Institute conducted in 2002 formed the major part of its activities within the period under study. Research questions, methodology and literature review are based on the ontology and epistemology underpinning peacebuilding, conflict prevention and evaluation. The term, peacebuilding, came

⁶O.A. Babatunde (2009) National Security and Migration: Towards an Effective Cross-Border Management in Nigeria, International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Migration in Nigeria: Thematic Document*, pp. 12-13. www.iomdakar.org/profiles/sites/default/files/cross_border_migration_management_in_nigeria_2009.pdf

into widespread use after 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then United Nations Secretary-General, announced his *Agenda for Peace*.⁷ Since then, peacebuilding has become a broadly used but often ill-defined term connoting activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures and institutions. It includes building the capacity of non-governmental organizations (including religious institutions) for peacemaking and peacebuilding. The emphasis of the United Nations has been on structural transformation, with a primary focus on institutional reform.⁸

Peacebuilding is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation.⁹ It involves a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures. Peacebuilding includes building legal and human rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution processes and systems.¹⁰

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria is infamous for violent conflict. It is ranked third in the 2016-2017 Global Terrorism Index Report behind Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby overtaken the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).¹¹ The recurrence of a wide range of violent political and ethno-religious conflicts since Nigeria returned to democracy in 2000 had caused enormous human, economic, political and social problems. Despite government's response through policies, money and other interventions from donors, time and energy dissipated on the programmes, the scale of the conflict seemed unabated and not reflected in results. IPCR's establishment to reduce the trend had not witnessed significant reduction in the development. Instead, the country had witnessed

⁷ UN's Agenda for Peace (1992) 11:21, www.unrol.org/files/a_47_277.pdf (accessed 6 July, 2015).

⁸ B. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* Document A/47/277 - S/241111, 17 June 1992. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1992.

⁹ Alliance for Peacebuilding (2013) Selected Definitions of Peacebuilding, www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org (accessed 21 May, 2016).

¹⁰ B. Boutros-Ghali (1995) *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations* Document A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations.

¹¹ Global Terrorism Index Report (2015) <http://economicsandpeace.org> (accessed February 8, 2017).

the formation and rise of the Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram Islamic terrorist groups with their wanton killings of people and destructions; kidnappings, armed robberies, cultism and vandalism in the period under study. Interventions sometimes were not clear, deep and often lacked clear understanding of conflict they were dealing with.

What kind of information and data are available to the government to deliver peace and democratic gains to the people? Also among the Nigerian public, there was a general lack of adequate information and data on the activities of the Institute. As far as the public are concerned, there were large scales of violence and conflict, and therefore IPCR had not lived up to its responsibility to prevent, resolve and manage conflict in Nigeria.¹² Part of this problem was because there had not been a scientific study on the nature and effectiveness of the Institute peacebuilding in the period under investigation. More so, since peace is abstract and not a product, it has been very difficult or tasking to measure what the Institute's role in peacebuilding had been and convince people and inform the government and other stakeholders that it had implemented a series of activities towards reducing or preventing the conflict and build peace in Nigeria.

There was a tremendous need to embark on a systematic study to investigate the relevance and effectiveness of IPCR peacebuilding programmes. After all, how do we corroborate IPCR's claim that it had promoted peacebuilding. Though, one effort needs to be mentioned. In 2011, a needs assessment of the Institute was carried out to identify its strengths and weaknesses and gaps in personnel and skills requirements to ensure optimum performance in order to enable it meets its objectives.¹³ The exercise could not be equated with impact evaluation. More than 50% of the respondents of this research study were of the view that there had been a general lack of adequate information and data for the public (Nigerians) on the Institute's programmes as well as their impact.¹⁴ To put it succinctly, the study examined how IPCR peacebuilding impact could be identified, shared, learned from and communicated to key stakeholders.

¹² Personal experience, during interactions and interviews with the public, the members of IPCR staff are often confronted with questions of what and how the Institute was responding to incessant conflicts in the country while some even heard of its existence for the first time.

¹³ IPCR (2011) *Functional and Capacity Needs Assessment* of IPCR, Report by Abiodun Alao and Melissa Ibrahim, p. 8.

¹⁴ Questionnaire and interview in the appendix. Data collected from past beneficiaries of IPCR peacebuilding 2000-2014.

With all the commitment in terms of resources and partnerships into programming, it became imperative to take a look into what and how the agency had planned and implemented strategies to prevent and manage conflict situations in Nigeria. It can be contended that the scale of the violent conflict witnessed in the country would have been worse than if the Institute had not been created or responded to the situations. Conversely, the rampartness of violent conflict in 2000-2014 did not augur well to assess the effectiveness of IPCR interventions. One could not hold the notion that the agency had not done anything and while doing so one was cautious not to attribute the peacefulness in some parts of Nigeria to IPCR. So investigating it provided learning, adaption and improvement opportunities.

Therefore, using a new approach and tool of impact evaluation, the research study filled that gap by assessing what IPCR had done since its creation in 2000 to 2014 to understand the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of its peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Nigeria. Baseline studies formed the basis of the evaluation particularly on the types and nature of conflicts IPCR responded to vis-à-vis its establishment mandate to its programmes' outputs, outcomes and impact. It is expected that the specific and broader outcomes of the study would advance intellectual merit (knowledge and understanding) and be of value to the Institute in evolving more relevant and effective peacebuilding management. Also, it is hoped the result would support the government and stakeholders with evidence-informed peacebuilding policy and practice. Lastly, the study would inform other African countries in their policy response to similar peacebuilding challenges.

1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study

Aim

The aim of the research study was to conduct an impact evaluation of IPCR peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies in order to identify factors which contribute to programme performance and effectiveness from 2000-2014 and enhance its peacebuilding. The result gave an account of the nature and impact of the Institute in the promotion of peacebuilding in Nigeria.

1.4 Objectives

At the heart of this aim are the following specific objectives:

- 1.4.1** To analyse factors that led to the establishment of IPCR and evaluate the impact of its peacebuilding in Nigeria from 2000-2014.
- 1.4.2** To assess the strategies of peacebuilding adopted by IPCR to manage the factors that drive cycles of violence in Nigeria with a view to scale up its performance.
- 1.4.3** To evaluate the theories of change behind IPCR programmes and examine their relevance and effectiveness on the peacebuilding planning and management.
- 1.4.4** To examine the Institute's strengths, gaps and weaknesses in the design and implementation of responses to conflict and violence, and suggest better measures of programme in Nigeria's difficult conflict and fragile environments.
- 1.4.5** To examine the nature of conflicts IPCR responded to and unpack the traditional peacebuilding activities of the Nigerian peoples and their linkages with the IPCR.
- 1.4.6** To review best practices, opportunities, challenges and consolidate lessons learned from peacebuilding projects and make recommendations for effective future programming in Nigeria and Africa.

1.5 Research Questions

- 1.5.1** Why was IPCR established, and what evidence can be found between 2000 and 2014 to prove that IPCR had promoted peacebuilding in Nigeria?
- 1.5.2** Are the strategies adopted by IPCR to manage conflict adequate, appropriate and effective? If not, what options are available to scale up its performance?
- 1.5.3** To what extent has Institute made use of theories of change and what are their relevance and effectiveness in the design and implementation of IPCR peacebuilding?
- 1.5.4** What strengths, gaps and weaknesses are in the planning and management of the Institute's peacebuilding and which best practices can it adopt to manage the Nigerian intractable conflict?
- 1.5.5** What conflict structure or dynamics did IPCR design peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes for?

1.5.6 How possible is it for the Institute and other similar African agencies to effectively improve on their peacebuilding programming in the future?

1.6 Research Methodology

The research study adopted qualitative and quantitative methods of data gathering and analysis to report both historical and evaluation findings. The data were gathered through desktop research, observation, document review, expert consultation, oral interview, questionnaires and focus group discussions (FGD). Three FGDs were conducted in Ibadan, Kaduna and Lagos in which the researcher constituted by inviting ten past beneficiaries in each of these cities. The desktop research helped in the existing online literature and other resources on peace and conflict studies and practice, programme design and implementation and many more. As a historical research, the study was availed with primary and secondary data such as past primary documents (IPCR establishment Act, government gazette, publications, president and ministers' speeches and addresses, memos, files, programme concept notes, workplans, minutes of meetings, budgets, spot check, audit and other reports). It aided in the document analysis of the Institute's mandate, vision, mission, values, structure and programmes. Secondary data such as published books, reports, dissertations, theses, magazines, newspapers and periodicals were useful in answering the research problem. Articles published some years back particularly on Nigeria's pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history were reviewed. The review stepped out of the period under study in order to understand the Nigerian conflict dynamics and the context in which the Institute had worked. The National Library and libraries of IPCR and the University of Zululand were visited.

The target population of the interview were the past and present staff of IPCR, programme focal persons and coordinators, past programme beneficiaries, development partners and funders, consultants, network members such as the civil society groups, and stakeholders. Qualitative evidence such as opinions, ideas, perceptions and judgments gathered through interviews, observations (employed senses to observe beneficiaries and programme officials in places of work), and funders consultations are reported through qualitative analysis. The qualitative evidence collected through surveys, interviews, FGDs and observations were analyzed, coded, interpreted and reported through brief explanations, descriptions and maps. On the other hand,

the quantitative indicators such as numbers of sex, beneficiaries and reports gathered through the questionnaires and desk reviews were calculated to answer the questions of how much in the study. The limited data variation did not require statistical analysis because the data outcome were not so diverse and which made proper interpretation uncomplicated. Hence quantitative results were reported in percentages and numbers (in-texts, tables and charts).

The primary location of the research study was Nigeria, though two South African peacebuilding centres were visited for learning purpose. The data collection process took two months. As earlier pointed out, the sampled population and location were the past beneficiaries of IPCR's peacebuilding and the selected states where the interventions were conducted. Out of nineteen peacebuilding programmes and projects identified in the implemented peacebuilding, five were selected for evaluation based on their thematic considerations on the underlying drivers of conflict in Nigeria and constituted the most implemented peacebuilding on election, women, media, governance and interfaith. More than 550 questionnaires were distributed to past beneficiaries through simple random sampling. More than 40 copies were of those that attended other programmes of IPCR while 506 analyzed data were from beneficiaries of the targeted peacebuilding interventions of the research study. Election Conflict Management Project (43); Mainstreaming Gender into peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention (105); Conflict Sensitive Reporting for Media Groups (100); Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development (95) and Interfaith Dialogues for Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Coexistence (50). 100 copies were distributed in each of the selected five geopolitical zones (South-West, South East, South-South, North-Central, and North-West) and 50 in Abuja.

Oral interviews were conducted on an individual basis with past participants in the zones and 12 peacebuilding organizations (two in the each mentioned zonal centres) in the cities of Kaduna, Kano (North West), Jos, Makurdi (North Central), Lagos, Oshogbo, Ado Ekiti (South West), Port-Harcourt, Benin (South South) and Umuahia and Enugu (South East) and Abuja (Federal capital). Besides three communities visited, these cities were chosen because of their strategic location in each zone, hosts of workshops and residences of beneficiaries (individuals and organizations) of most of IPCR interventions and have experienced one form of violent conflict or the other. Limitation of funding was experienced but the research grants provided by the University of Zululand went a long way in mitigating severity of the limitation.

1.7 Literature Review

An intensive examination and clarification of the history and historiography of peacebuilding and conflict prevention: the impact of IPCR during the era 2000-2014, called for the application of a wide range of written sources. These sources or literatures are widely known to differ in strength and limitation in their postulations. The principles and approaches in peacebuilding and conflict prevention as espoused by the proponents and early researchers such as Yohan Galtung, Paul John Lederach, A.B. Fetherston, Charles T. Call, and the works of recent scholars and practitioners in the peacebuilding community were examined in the study. Importantly, it was observed that many of the views and positions of the scholars are reflections of their experiences.

Public discourses and literatures on conflict resolution, prevention, management and peacebuilding have grown over the last two and a half decades when the Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched the United Nations' *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. The document defines "post-conflict peace-building" as "...an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."¹⁵

As peacebuilding became entrenched in the global lexicon, these scholars and practitioners expressed relational and divergent views on the subject and thereby made significant contribution to the field in a variety of ways in accordance with the widening and changing nature of conflict. As early as 2005, Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen had alluded to this assertion when they said:

Peacebuilding interventions have mushroomed in the last decade, with an ever-widening range and scope of activities on by entities of all kinds, including the governments, the United Nations, churches and the development community.....Present-day conflicts are considered complex... They have multiple and changing causes, fluctuate in intensity through time and space, and local conflicts usually have international or even global dimensions.¹⁶

It was Johan Galtung in his pioneering work in 1975, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding," that hinted on the idea of peacebuilding around peacekeeping and peacemaking when he submitted that:

¹⁵ UN's Agenda for Peace (1992) 11:21, www.unrol.org/files/a_47_277.pdf (accessed 6 July, 2015).

¹⁶ D. Hilhorst and M.V. Leeuwen (2005) Grounding Local Peace Organisations: A Case Study of Southern Sudan, p.539, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 537-563, Cambridge University Press, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876318> (accessed 7 March, 2017).

Peace has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking...The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw up...More specifically, structures must be that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.¹⁷

Galtung was influenced by “the violent madness that afflicted Norway in general and our own small family in particular during World War II.”¹⁸ Ever since, the concept has gained popular use. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides a good definition, which includes activities designed to prevent conflict through addressing structural and proximate causes of violence, promoting, sustainable peace, delegitimizing violence as a dispute resolution strategy, building capacity within society to peaceful management of dispute, and reduce vulnerability to triggers that may spark violence.¹⁹

However, while some refer peacebuilding to post-conflict effort to rebuild a nation rising from conflict, particularly from the construct of the UN’s An Agenda to Peace to the early stage of the practice, others have extended conflict prevention to its meaning. In his view, Charles T. Call refers peacebuilding to efforts by an actor to consolidate national peace after a ceasefire has been reached. He said beyond referring to the prevention of renewing armed conflict, the conceptual borders of ‘peacebuilding’ enjoy little clarity.²⁰ Though, Call was not referring to a particular institution but on state building and peacebuilding in general.

As earlier noted, Galtung’s scholarly antecedent provided the background for the understanding of what is peacebuilding today as actions aiming to create sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflict. Peacebuilding has expanded to mean interventions designed to address causes of violent conflict and more specifically, the institutionalization of peace. The concept of conflict prevention, though no agreed definition, has fundamentally related to peacebuilding which refers to a variety of activities aimed at anticipating and averting the

¹⁷ The conceptual origins of peacebuilding

<http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index34ac.html?pagelid=1764> (accessed 5 July, 2015).

¹⁸ SGI President Daisaku Ikeda on Johan Galtung--Father of Peace Studies

<http://www.sgiquarterly.org/global2002Jan-1.html> (accessed 17 February, 2017).

¹⁹ United States Institute of Peace, Improving Peacebuilding Evaluation: A World-of-Field Approach, www.usip.org (accessed 5 July, 2015).

²⁰ C.T. Call (2008) Building States to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 4:2, DOI:10.1080/15423166.2008.395667984152, www.dx.doi.org (accessed 6 July 2015).

outbreak of conflict. The usage of the concepts, conflict prevention and conflict management, nevertheless diverging and disputing views in interpretations, has found its broad meaning in peacebuilding.²¹ Essentially, all point to interventions targeted at preventing the start or resumption of violent conflict. Supporting this assertion, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a guiding definition as thus:

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities” are projects, programmes, policies, strategies or other interventions that adopt goals and objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace; they are usually (but not always) focused on a particular conflict zone – an area threatened by, in the midst of, or recovering from serious intergroup violence.²²

In addition to the above, Michael Barnett, et al. observed that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a UN’s agency, adopted the use of both peace building and conflict prevention because its mandate cuts across both. The agency was guided in the interchangeably use of both peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the Lakhdar Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping in 2000. It uses the two concepts because they are “virtually synonymous”.²³ According to the scholars, they noticed the similarity in terminologies that are used to build peace after armed conflict and which are also being used to help societies avoid relapse to war. This study was guided by this thought because *“peacebuilding is conflict prevention by another name and, therefore, “postconflict” often modifies peacebuilding to distinguish it from conflict prevention.”*²⁴ By adopting the use of both concepts symmetrically and asymmetrically, it is expected that it would unequivocally symbolize an independent thought and clarity in research.

In its practices, the UNDP implemented peacebuilding as involving a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Since 1992 that peacebuilding has been institutionalized across the world, scholars,

21 N. Swanström and M. Weissmann (2005) Conflict, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration, GSDRC, <http://www.gsdr.org/document-library/conflict-conflict-prevention-and-conflict-management-and-beyond-a-conceptual-exploration/>(accessed 23 September, 2015).

22 Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, p. 16, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/39774573.pdf> (accessed 16 February, 2017).

23 M. Barnett, et al (2007) Peacebuilding: What is in a Name? p. 42, Vol. 13, No.1, Global Governance, pp. 35-58, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800641> (accessed 14 January, 2017).

24 Ibid. p. 42.

practitioners, civil society, faith-based and international organizations have adapted or modified it in accordance with their mandate and operations.

In their practices, conflict analyses have been underused. The causes and trends of violent conflict in countries of interventions are often been traced to their genesis without digging deeper into the precolonial or historical development of the people in context-specific to understand how such people practised peacebuilding ever before their nationhood. Energies and time have always been placed to promotion of peace without specifically looking into the historical background of conflict especially in a country such as Nigeria. As A.B. Bah lends credence to: *Conflict and peacebuilding in Africa are complicated phenomena that cannot be fully understood without interrogating the historical, structural, and cultural factors within African countries and the global economic and political system in which they are enmeshed.*²⁵

Similarly, initiatives and approaches to prevent conflict have not been internalized but often in accordance to the dictates of international organization that promotes such concept and funds its practice or intervention. Little wonder that Beck and Beck (1994) espouse the ideal of “individualization” which is about principles of self-interest or survival instinct of “a life of your own” for money, work, power, love, God or whatever, but it would also be more and more, the promise of “a life of one’s own.”²⁶ According to the Becks, “the struggle of one’s own life has become the collective experience of the Western world, and expresses the remnant of our communal feeling.” Individualization contends that we are in the midst of a fundamental change in the nature of society and politics as the change hinges around two processes: globalization and individualization.²⁷ Thus it can be argued that it behoves on individual countries to adopt its own strategies to safeguard its national security.

On the premise of structural violence in which peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies target, some thoughts have also been advanced. Prior to 1975, Galtung had published an article in 1969 titled: *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, where he espoused the concept of

²⁵ A.B. Bah, et al (2011) Introduction to ACPR: African Conflict in Global Perspective, p.2, *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-7, Indiana University Press
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africanconfpeacebuilding.1.1.1> (accessed 7 March, 2016).

²⁶ O.A. Babatunde (2009). National Security and Migration: Towards an Effective Cross-Border Management in Nigeria, *International Organization for Migration (IOM)*, Migration in Nigeria: Thematic Document, p. 10, www.iomdakar.org/profiles/sites/default/files/cross_border_migration_management_in_nigeria_2009.pdf (accessed 21 February, 2017).

²⁷ Ibid.

“structural violence”. According to the pioneer of peace studies, structural violence is violence caused by the way society is structured, which gives rise to discrimination, oppression, poverty, starvation, exploitation and the violation of human rights. He also termed “cultural violence” which refers to the acceptance and legitimization of violence as a necessary or inevitable part of human society from the family level up to the international community. It is when these types of violence are eliminated that man can achieve positive and active forms of peace.²⁸

Therefore, to deal with the structural causes of conflict, Galtung recommended peacebuilding as against peacemaking and peacekeeping, an indication that his analysis of violence was not only direct but present within societal structures that denied people access to physical and social well-being.²⁹ The introduction of the concepts of positive and negative peace has also enriched peace research. Positive peace refers to a situation where man is not constrained from fully developing and living out his life-span. There exists in this situation peace with justice. On the other hand, negative peace refers to a situation where there is no war but where structural violence exists. One could argue that the idea of peacebuilding is tied to this positive peace rather than negative peace.³⁰ The practice of conflict prevention or conflict transformation can be analyzed on the premise of both positive and negative peace. Here, the research contended that there was lack of explanation or evidence-based research on countries that astride the two concepts such as Nigeria. Therefore, this dearth of explanation needed to be explored.

The question arises: what lessons did the last twenty-five years teach us on the practice of peacebuilding and conflict prevention? Undoubtedly, peacebuilding has had its successes and failures. Since the September 9/11 peacebuilding and conflict prevention have been contending for an end to the violence and terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan after the Taliban and some parts of the Middle East. With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the aftermaths of the American army’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, a lot of concerns have been expressed in the ways and methods the international community is responding to the issues of violent extremism. A number of initiatives such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or Preventing Violent

²⁸J. Galtung (1969) Violence, Peace and Peace Research, pp. 170-178, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167-191, Sage Publications, Ltd., <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690> (accessed 21 July, 2016).

²⁹A.B. Fetherston (2002) Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks, EBSCO Publishing, p. 202, [http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/10_Rebuild_files/fetherston\(1994\)PeacekeepingConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding.pdf](http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/10_Rebuild_files/fetherston(1994)PeacekeepingConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding.pdf) (accessed 15 February, 2017).

³⁰ibid.

Extremism (PVE) as the case may be, are being included into peacebuilding components including peace education in schools, and thus makes peacebuilding to be envisioned more as a response mechanism rather than preventing strategy. Response in the sense of the world's inability to envisage the rise of violent extremism in the forms the world has witnessed in the last decade. This makes the focus of peacebuilding an ever-evolving concept. This study did not preclude itself from this ever-growing multidisciplinary field.

Another prominent figure in peacebuilding is John Paul Lederach, a professor in international peacebuilding, who is popular for his pioneering work in conflict transformation. His framework for building peace recommends the need to integrate local culture into the conflict resolution mechanisms.³¹ A.B. Fetherston, in her citation of Lederach's "elicitive methodology said the idea was founded to develop and embed techniques of peacebuilding in the localities in which they are employed."³² Another advocate of community peacebuilding is Evan Hoffman. He said while designing peacebuilding intervention to build and support local capacities for conflict prevention and resolution, it is essential to customize it to local needs and realities.³³ This study recognized the importance of mainstreaming culture into peacebuilding components in the process of conflict resolution and management. The study agreed with the notion that solutions to conflict rest with the people themselves and as such it is imperative to integrate them into any effort at resolving and managing the crisis.

Fetherston goes further to explain Lederach's reference on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships in conflict management. He said the relational element of reconciliation is the central component of peacebuilding while the sustainable transformation of societies is its long-term goal.³⁴ His use of protracted social conflict requires response far beyond the international relations methodology of conflict management. It is this protracted social conflict that the

³¹ Tanya Glaser's summary of John Paul Lederach's "Introduction," and "A Framework for Building Peace," Syracuse University Press, New York, 1995, <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/transform/lederach2.htm> (accessed 18 February, 2017).

³² A.B. Fetherston (2002) *Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks*, EBSCO Publishing, p. 204, [http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/10_Rebuild_files/fetherston\(1994\)PeacekeepingConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding.pdf](http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/10_Rebuild_files/fetherston(1994)PeacekeepingConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding.pdf) (accessed 15 February, 2017).

³³ E. Hoffman (2014) *A Snapshot of Best Practices for Peacebuilding Design, Overcoming Operational Challenges, Managing Risks and Measuring Success*, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/library/peacebuilding-best-practices> (accessed 14 February, 2017).

³⁴ Ibid.

elicitive approach advanced by Lederach should be adopted in order to acknowledge the past, envision the future and enable a re-framing of the present.³⁵

This study recognized the grassroots and the bottom-up approach to peacebuilding that makes Fetherston's analysis interesting and different. This is because the pyramid of grassroots and the inclusion of the bottom-up approach is different from other approaches and signifies a new departure and development of the idea of peacebuilding. Besides causes, issues and actors to a conflict, Fetherston went further to dwell on systems. She cited example of Marie Dugan's concept of a nested paradigm that gives room for an analysis of a local problem within the context of subsystem and system causes.³⁶ By this system levels, it will enable a peacebuilding strategy to be conceptualized for a local or specific situation while taking into account the dynamic problems such a people may be facing at the same time. Fetherston underscores the systemic analysis due to its importance of *"...long-term thinking, planning and envisioning, and suggests, for example, the dependence of crisis intervention (or in our case peacekeeping) on systemic understanding, analysis, and action over a generational time frame."*³⁷

As Earl Conteh-Morgan argues, human security at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels can be more effectively realized in the process of peacebuilding if culture and identity and an interpretive bottom-up approach to peacebuilding are taken into account when addressing the problems of marginalized individuals, groups, and communities. The socio-cultural contexts are considered critical factors to human security and peacebuilding. Morgan's argument rests on question of when does emancipation or sustainable peacebuilding occur, or how can traditional or indigenous methods of peacebuilding be used more effectively to complement modern methods?³⁸

Not only that, over the past two and half decades, much discourses on the study and practice of peacebuilding and conflict prevention have followed both similar and varied perspectives among

³⁵E. Hoffman (2014) A Snapshot of Best Practices for Peacebuilding Design, Overcoming Operational Challenges, Managing Risks and Measuring Success.

³⁶A.B. Fetherston (2002) Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks, EBSCO Publishing, p. 205, [http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/10_Rebuild_files/fetherston\(1994\)PeacekeepingConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding.pdf](http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-2016W/10_Rebuild_files/fetherston(1994)PeacekeepingConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding.pdf) (accessed 15 February, 2017).

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸E.Conteh-Morgan (2005) Peacebuilding and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective, in *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 69-86, www.jstor.org(accessed 4 April, 2016).

scholars, practitioners, international organizations, national governments and civil society. Of particular concern are the nuances in the conceptualization and operationalization of mandate individual institutions or countries adopted in carrying out peacebuilding activities. For instance, while some like the United Nations agencies such as the UNDP, United Nations Children's Emergency Funds (UNICEF) and United Nations Women often follow same patterns in designing responses to causes of violent conflict, others like the CARE International, International Alert, Alliance for Peacebuilding and a host of other international organizations have differing approaches. Though having different perspectives in tackling conflict challenges is healthy, it could be argued that it makes it more difficult to forge a common long-term process, more coherent and approaches toward understanding and preventing violent conflict. A case of the Middle East crises after the Arab Spring resonates in the proliferation of processes and practice of peacebuilding in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. In most instances, they make peacebuilding agenda to be externally-driven and oftentimes lip service is usually paid to local ownership of peacebuilding.³⁹ It is important to separate prevailing international institutional mandates from national interests.

Indeed, no two conflicts are the same, so also the ways and methods of resolving or managing it. Peacebuilding is context-specific. However, the attention of intervention has generally been placed on suggestions from the conflict analysis conducted. The conflict analysis models do not integrate evaluative mechanisms that will provide learning from conflict experience. For example, the recent issues of socio-political violence and Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria have been reduced to thematic areas of human rights violations, internally displaced persons, misgovernment, corruption and other social problems. The lessons such intervention experience offer are not open for all to see, much less documented and used. Despite various endeavours at understanding the Nigerian and African armed conflict and intervention, there was still need for a holistic approach to the study of conflict in Nigeria vis-à-vis the socio-political and economic conditions behind them and peacebuilding which must include evaluating the impact of interventions that are designed to address them.

Consequently, the research intended to elicit the theoretical imagination of the theories of change underpinning programmes and activities usually designed to address causes of violent conflict in

³⁹N. Tschirgi and C. Coning (2015) Ensuring sustainable peace: Strengthening global security and justice through the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, p. 4 www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org (accessed 24 February, 2017).

Nigeria. It proposed that such an imagination possesses keys to evaluate the strategies for responding to violence and conflict. That is, how theoretical models such as conflict analysis, TOCs and intervention theory for organizational development could well be uncovered, understood and integrated in relation to peacebuilding in Nigeria. The concern of the UN to help governments in preventive actions through training and building national institutions was captured by Barnett R. Rubin and Bruce D. Jones in their treatise:

it would be valuable if Member States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission's advice and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the rule-of-law institutions.⁴⁰

Furthermore, the research contended that approaches such as in planning and implementation of peacebuilding may be successful, they do not guarantee long-lasting peace even when results or findings indicate so. It can be observed that there are multiplication of factors involved in the promotion of peace and security in a given context which may be far beyond a single institution. All what we can understand is evidence from direct beneficiaries of intervention. Likewise, defining success in peacebuilding is difficult and contested. It is very difficult to establish cause-effect relationship with complex phenomenon like conflict and violence. As Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti (2006) noted “[e]stablishing causality as opposed to mere correlation is one of the most difficult endeavors an empirical researcher can undertake in the social sciences.”⁴¹ Necla Tschirgi and Cedric de Coning expressed similar view on peacebuilding, saying “...the field is fraught with difficulties, not least because of the fluidity of the phenomenon to be evaluated.”⁴² It could be suggested that it is always posing critical problem for evaluators in setting criteria to judge the success or failure of some interventions. For instance, how can we attribute a success to a particular intervention or how can we judge impact fairly in terms of the levels or rates of conflict and violence? Since we cannot know what would have happened if such interventions were not carried out, it is problematic to rely on successful implementation of peacebuilding.

⁴⁰B.D. Rubin and B.D. Jones (2007) *Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations*, p. 397, Lynne Rienner Publishers <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800668> (accessed 7 March, 2016).

⁴¹ M.J. Gilligan and E.J. Sergenti (2006) *Evaluating UN Peacekeeping with Matching to Improve Causal Inference* New York University http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/causalinf/papers/gilligan_sergenti_06.pdf (accessed 27 February, 2017).

⁴²N. Tschirgi and C. Coning, p. 3.

The above challenge also underpins Diana Chigas, et al's work in 2014 on *Evaluating Impacts of Peacebuilding Interventions: Approaches and methods, challenges and considerations*. They posit that types of peacebuilding interventions are wide-ranging and their intended objectives which not only often vague but operate at a very high level, or constantly changing in response to the evolution of the conflict situation. According to the three authors, this is so because:

The nature of peacebuilding interventions and conflict contexts complicate peacebuilding evaluations. A number of factors make it difficult to identify and agree on what should be analysed or evaluated, how to evaluate, and how to infer with rigour any causal links between the intervention and changes in the conflict context.⁴³

Since evaluation does not only gather evidence about impact but also about the intervention's role in achieving them, the study attempted to stimulate productive discussion within scholars, analysts or policymakers in this sense.

In this regards, the study took into considerations short, medium and long-term impact of peacebuilding. Though Daniel Druckman shared his thought on the importance of both short and long-term impact of peacekeeping, it is agreed among commentators that while long-term effects may be more important, they are also more difficult to evaluate.⁴⁴ But he affirmed that “short-term concerns should be subordinated to long-term concerns.”⁴⁵ In most work on peacebuilding and conflict prevention this kind of nuance is not noticed, much less addressed. This was the focus of the study in research on how protracted or intractable conflict like such that were experienced in Nigeria could be transformed from a short term gain to a long, coherent and sustainable term.

Another lesson the two and a half decades of institutionalizing peacebuilding is on how overwhelmed the organizations working on conflict prevention and building sustainable peace have been. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, both of whom had worked in the office of the UN Secretary General, have alluded to this assertion on how the United Nations was

⁴³D. Chigas, et al (2014) *Evaluating Impacts of Peacebuilding Interventions: Approaches and methods, challenges and considerations*, DFID, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁴ D. Druckman and P. Stern, *Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions*, *the International Journal of Peace Studies*, <http://www.pbuilding/Perspectives%20on%20Evaluating%20Peacekeeping%20Missions%20-%20Daniel%20Druckman,%20Paul%20Stern%3b%20The%20International%20Journal%20for%20Peace%20Studies.htm> (accessed 24 February, 2017).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

overwhelmed with ever-increasing demands for interventions from the member-states on security challenges they confronted. They wondered if the umbrella organization and its agencies were adequately equipped to effectively handle new security challenge in the midst of other serious numerous challenges that span every area of human lives from climate, drugs and human trafficking, refugees and illegal migrants. Both underscored the fact of the overreach in this way:

Suddenly, the international community confronts a broader and complex array of problems that appears to overwhelm its institutional capacity. The dismantling of the USSR has revealed a slew of dangerous, long-dormant problems. Highly destructive tribal and ethnic conflicts are tearing states apart. The very concept of the state and its institutions is under severe stress in destitute countries for which distant powers competed until recently in search of strategic gain.⁴⁶

More specifically, the question might be posed, what is emancipatory transformation, as something distinct in aims and effects from conflict resolution or peacebuilding merely resolving? How can we develop a continually self-reflective stance, which can go at the same time, goes on working in the often overwhelming immediacy of war zones? It can be debated that in most work on peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding these kinds of questions are not observed, much less addressed. The research study sought to utilize some theoretical ground through which local and global discourses of violence and conflict and the sets of practices they constitute can be uncovered, understood and changed in relation to peacebuilding.⁴⁷

This study agreed, in the light of the above, that a detailed awareness of the confines of discourses on historical development of peacebuilding in a specific environment must be the first step towards evaluating peacebuilding. From the views expressed by the scholars and practitioners, there was need to adopt a new habit of discourse to address the challenges of conflict particularly in Africa. In its own case, Nigeria can be said to always be in transition because it has always been in conflict. So we could talk about several post-conflict situations from ethnic-religious to political conflict. Several efforts have been mainstreamed to bring about

⁴⁶ A. De Soto and G. Del Castillo (1994) Obstacle to Peacebuilding, p. 69, *Foreign Policy*, No. 94, pp. 69-83, Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149132> (accessed 7 March, 2016).

⁴⁷ F. V. Femia (1981) Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, p. 24.

peace and prevent recurrence. Also several panels of enquiry had been set up but of no avail. Conflict remained unabated.

From the theoretical framework on the literature on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, there is a persistent evaluation gap and no evaluation activity in or on the Institute's conflict resolution and peacebuilding through conflict analysis model, theories of change and intervention theory for organizational development. The study represents a new systematic attempt to investigate a peacebuilding institution in Nigeria. This assessment gap was what the thesis undertook despite several occurrences of violent conflict and intervention. The research looks at evidence of what worked, what did not and why? As earlier expressed, the study's outcome will strengthen the Institute in the design and implementation of its programmes to meet the challenges of national peace and security as well as connecting the decision-makers with the practitioners.

In the reviewed literature it was difficult to find strong evidence to suggest that Nigerian scholars and their foreign counterparts have had workable solution to the emerging crises in Nigeria. They under-assessed the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of violent conflict in Nigeria. Much has changed in the country since 2014. New government with new political agenda amid worsening security situation. The national peacebuilding environment is characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability. To counter this, one could say a new approach is needed to recast global models of conflict analysis in order to uncover the remote and immediate causes and dynamics of conflicts in Africa, particularly in Nigeria. Even while doing so, African scholars should take the centre stage because of the nature and peculiarity of their peoples and circumstances.⁴⁸ The study presented reality.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

In order to give clarity with regards to the impact evaluation objectives of the nature and impact of IPCR peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes, it was important to connect theories to impact evaluation practice. The impact of its intervention required an analytical framework and application of historical cases to understand the research study. There are competing theories in the fields of conflict and peace studies, evaluating peacebuilding and institutional organization

⁴⁸ F. V. Femia (1981) Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, p. 24.

development. But the research study employed appropriate theoretical frameworks for empirical analysis on how best to understand the root causes of conflict and the nature of conflict IPCR had designed and implemented programmes for and how best to evaluate these programmes. Therefore, conflict analysis model, Theory of Change (TOC) and intervention theory for organizational development provided contextual analysis that influenced IPCR programmes and activities. The three theories are linked in order to ensure that the study addresses its intended objectives, i.e. to measure the impact of IPCR peacebuilding and conflict prevention and make recommendations.

The Conflict Analysis Model

Conflicts being experienced in Nigeria do not occur in a vacuum. They have their foundation on a wide range of sources-colonial legacies, incompatibility of cultures, corruption, bad governance, human rights violation, intolerance, extremism and a host of others. Therefore, good analysis of the conflicts played crucial role in understanding their context and in the designing of a relevant and effective conflict management. Advocates of this theory or framework such as Johan Galtung, Jonathan White, AbdulGaphor M. Panimbang and many others agreed on the core concept of conflict analysis to be the systemic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict. According to Jonathan White, conflict analysis helps development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations to gain a better understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context.⁴⁹ In other words, conflict context and structural factors are often outside the conflict system one is investigating or intervening in, the same with structural violence which refers to violence that is not directly begun by people, but by the economic and political systems in place, e.g. causing poverty.⁵⁰ The conflict analysis is all-encompassing in the sense that it is influenced by three popular views, which are the Harvard Approach, the Human Needs Theory and the Conflict Transformation Approach. The Harvard Approach emphasizes the difference between positions (what people say they want) and interests (why people want what they say they want). It argues that conflicts can be resolved when actors focus on interests instead of positions, and when they develop jointly accepted criteria to deal with these differences.

⁴⁹J. White (2012) Conflict Analysis, p. 1 <http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/conflict-analysis>, (accessed 26 May, 2016).

⁵⁰S. Mason, and S. Rychard Conflict Analysis Tools, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), p. 3 www.sdc.ch (accessed 25 May, 2016).

But the Human Needs Theory posits that conflicts are caused by basic “universal” human needs that are not satisfied. The needs should be analyzed, communicated and satisfied for the conflict to be resolved, while the Conflict Transformation approach sees conflicts as destructive or constructive interactions, depending on how conflicts are dealt with or “transformed”. Conflicts are viewed as an interaction of energies. Emphasis is given on the different perceptions, and the social and cultural context in which reality is constructed. Constructive conflict transformation seeks to empower actors and support recognition between them.⁵¹

Understanding this context helped in adopting a conflict sensitive practice to the research study so as to understand the root causes or drivers of conflict and violence in Nigeria. This position falls in line with the view of Panimbang that understanding of the context and the multidimensional, multilayered and multifaceted nature of conflict in the country/area where the peace building intervention was taking place would enable to develop the right intervention focus. In contrast, lack of conflict analysis (or only a partial analysis), i.e. a misunderstanding of the conflict context could lead to irrelevant or in the worst case counter-productive engagement in peacebuilding.⁵²

But in an effort to unravel the conflict context, the first step is to identify the potential and causes of existing conflict and the factors contributing to people’s grievances which include structural causes, proximate causes and triggers. Structural causes are pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict while proximate causes are factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes apparently symptomatic of a deeper problem and the triggers refer to single key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict.⁵³ The theory clearly enumerates types of conflict and violence Nigeria had encountered ranging from intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-group to inter-group conflicts over scarce resources such as land, oil, water; socio-political and economic discrimination, cultural differences, religious differences, extremism and intolerance.

Theory of Change

⁵¹J. White, Conflict Analysis, p. 1 <http://dmeformpeace.org/learn/conflict-analysis, 2012> (accessed 25 May, 2016).

⁵²A.M. Panimbang (2014) Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding www.slideshare.net/gaphs/conflict-analysis-and-peace-building-17744603?next_slideshow=1 (accessed 20 July, 2016).

⁵³ J. White, p. 2.

In the field of peacebuilding and development, there are competing theories available to evaluating impact of an intervention. But one that stands out in recent times is the theory of change (TOC) which evaluators use to answer why and how an intervention is designed. The research study itself was subjected to the tenet of TOC of how these research activities such as the methodologies, theories and approaches would achieve its objective of unravelling the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of IPCR peacebuilding in the period under review. Therefore, this theory guided the research to achieve its intended objectives. In the views of Woodrow, P. and Oatley, N., theory of change is a set of beliefs about how change happens and, as such, it explains why and how certain actions will produce the desired changes in a given context, at a given time.⁵⁴

Like others, these theorists posit that developing a sound, clear, evidence-based theory of change is one potentially useful way to improve design of programmes. It is an approach that encourages critical thinking throughout the programme cycle.⁵⁵ Simply put, a theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. Any initiative that seeks change requires a TOC to explain why and how it intends to achieve the desired change in a given context.

Practitioners and organizations in development world who are familiar with this theory display the notion that any peacebuilding intervention geared towards addressing drivers of conflict should be based on approaches and framework of theories of change. In their simplest form, theories of change are expressed in the following procedure:

‘If we do X (action), then we will produce Y (change/shift towards peace, conflict prevention)’ or

‘We believe that by doing X (action) successfully, we will produce Y (movement towards a desired goal)’

A theory of change might be expressed as ‘If we do X, Y and Z, it will lead to W’, or ‘If we do X, it will lead to Y, which will lead to Z, which might possibly lead to W’.

⁵⁴ Woodrow, and N. Oatley (2013) Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, p. 8 www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M.../CCVRI-theories-of-change-part-1.pdf (accessed 20 November, 2016).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

According to Woodrow and Oatley, it is often helpful and clarifying to extend the statement a bit further by adding at least some of the rationale or logic in a “because” phrase. This then produces the formula:

‘If we do X..., then Y..., because Z....’

For instance, one theory of change for a post-war programme aimed at promoting employment for ex-combatant youth might be as follows:

*‘If we provide employment for ex-combatant youth, then we will reduce the likelihood of inter-communal violence, because unemployed youths are the most likely to be recruited into fighting, many still hold weapons and remain connected to their command structures.’*⁵⁶

Still on Woodrow and Oatley, not all theories can be expressed by such simple statements. For example, logic models (there are many of logical framework or logframe) to a large extent require a *description* of a fairly linear set of steps in programming, typically some variation of: inputs-activities-outputs-outcomes-impacts (long-term outcomes), whereas theories of change can be handled less linearly and, at their best, demand an examination of why results will be attained—or why they were not reached.⁵⁷

Similarly, basic aspects of the CARE International UK’s *Theories of Change in Peacebuilding* as adopted by Archana Aryal et al in their peacebuilding initiatives in Nepal would be useful for this kind of study.⁵⁸ This is because the evaluation comprehensively analyzed data obtained in each of the stages of logic model and are clearly reported through their *TOCs and Methodology; Research findings (outputs, outcomes and impact), Conclusion and Recommendations*. According to Aryal, et al the overall goal of the TOCs will “strengthen the institutional and operational capacity of civil society organizations and governments to design, monitor and

⁵⁶ Woodrow, and N. Oatley (2013) Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, p. 8 www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M.../CCVRI-theories-of-change-part-1.pdf (accessed 20 November, 2016).

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 8.

⁵⁸ A. Arya, et al (2012) Theories of Change in Peacebuilding: Learning from the Experiences of Peacebuilding Initiatives in Nepal, CARE International UK https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories_of_Change_in_Peace_building.pdf (accessed 30 September, 2016).

evaluate peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming.”⁵⁹ This goal was similar to this research as it was aimed to strengthen the effectiveness of IPCR programming.

Theory of change can therefore be transferred from activity level to project level. The research study was enhanced with this theory to assess and understand the IPCR’s intervention against its expected or desired changes. Therefore, it could be considered that the theory portended a veritable framework for a comprehensive description and analysis of the design and implementation of IPCR peacebuilding programmes. Coupled with the identified conflict analysis, theory of change was also critical to evaluation of peacebuilding impact to understand and test the relevance of the intervention to the conflict drivers⁶⁰ and helped analyze the design of IPCR programmes by looking at its design hierarchy of programmes and answering the questions of how and why the peacebuilding design as well to establish their causation.

Intervention Theory for Organizational Development

The field of organization development (OD) is fragmented and lacks a coherent and integrated theory and method for developing an effective organization,⁶¹ but research, theory, and practice have been devoted to expand the knowledge and effectiveness of how people can accomplish more successful organizational change and performance,⁶² and one of the theories in this field is intervention theory. According to the scholars of this theory, Chris Argyris, Donald Schon, Donald L. Anderson and Lloyd Pye, intervention can be effectively geared towards addressing decision making problems in a situation be it a process or an organization to secure desired outcomes. That is to improve the effectiveness of organizations focussing on people and processes.

⁵⁹ A. Arya, et al (2012) Theories of Change in Peacebuilding: Learning from the Experiences of Peacebuilding Initiatives in Nepal, CARE International UK
https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories_of_Change_in_Peace_building.pdf (accessed 30 September, 2016).

⁶⁰ D. Chigas, et al (2014) Evaluating Impacts of Peacebuilding Interventions: approaches and Methods, Challenges and Considerations, CDA Saferworld and Search for Common Ground, pp. 4-5.

⁶¹ M. Beer (2011) Developing an Effective Organization: Intervention Method, Empirical Evidence, and Theory, in Abraham B. (Rami) Shani, Richard W. Woodman, William A. Pasmore (ed.) *Research in Organizational Change and Development (Research in Organizational Change and Development, Volume 19)* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 1–54,

<http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/S0897-3016%282011%290000019004>, (accessed 5 April, 2016).

⁶² Health Behavior and Health Education: theory, research, and practice,
<http://www.med.upenn.edu/hbhe4/part4-ch15-organizational-development-theory.shtml>, (accessed 5 April, 2016).

Argyris, et al posit that to intervene is to help an ongoing system of relationship, to come between or among persons, groups, or objects for the purpose of improving their effectiveness. There is an important implicit assumption in the definition that should be made explicit: the system exists independently of the intervener.⁶³ The system is influenced by all of the complexities inherent in organizations, such as politics, organizational goals and workload, environmental constraints, interpersonal relationships, past history, and more. As conflict does not occur in a vacuum, so does intervention. But more importantly, the change agent must be conscious of the relationship between the intervention and the organizational context.⁶⁴

In terms of the above, Argyris postulated that valid and useful information can be publicly verified; tested and openly gathered and discussed in such a way to effect change. The free choice is for organization to select the option with the highest probability of succeeding (within cost limits), should be proactive and not reactive, and should not coerce its workforce, while the internal commitment targets an organization to have a high sense of ownership and feeling of responsibility. In his view, an organization should drive its personnel to have a high sense of commitment to decision reached.⁶⁵ Invariably, the theory assumes that one step builds on the other. The more the information is valid and useful, the more likely the free choice, the more there is truly free choice, the more likely there will be internal commitment. The two rationales driving this theory are, first, that people end up with high internal commitment to the direction, and secondly, that the organizational culture is enabled to increasingly valid and have the ability to guarantee valid and useful information, encourage free choice, and seek internal commitment. In short, organization leaders must prioritize or pay attention to one need over the other because of time limits, financial costs or due to holding different values.⁶⁶

From the above, the research study intended to alter the status quo if IPCR had been operating antiquated theory of organization as it related to how and why it organized its personnel and processes to achieve set goals in effecting change. More importantly, the options that are

⁶³ C. Argyris, et al (1970) *Intervention Theory and Methods*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc, Reading, Massachusetts, p. 587
http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Organizational_Learning_and_Change/Argyris_Intervention_Theory_&_Methods_Classic_Readings_pp587-591.pdf
(accessed 5 April, 2016).

⁶⁴ D.L. Anderson (2015) *Organization Development: The Process of Leading Organizational Change*, SAGE Publications, Inc., P. 190.

⁶⁵ C. Argyris, et al, p. 41.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 41

available for the Institute to maximize its programme impacts if need be in accordance with the suggested best practices for more peacebuilding relevance and effectiveness. In addition, the theory offers some insights in way some sorts of behaviours and beliefs that are necessary for IPCR to learn in addressing the seemingly intractable conflicts in Nigeria. In this case, similar to the Ian Rothmann's explanation, the researcher was the intervener who collected data from and about IPCR that qualitatively and quantitatively reflected what the staff of the organization, and beneficiaries of its past programmes perceived, and their primary concerns on what they experienced as complexities and frustrations and what they would like to see changed.⁶⁷

In conclusion, it is important to mention that there is a wide range of models dealing with the research domains: conflict studies, impact evaluation, and organizational development, but this research study selected only one in each of the domains. That is the conflict analysis model, the theory of change, and intervention theory respectively. The fact that the theories reflected and addressed issues that have to do with understanding conflict context, how an institution was organized and how and why it carried out its activities to achieve expected outcomes or desired changes made it desirable in this context. According to Warner W. Burke, organization change should be data-based and measured, and therefore it was imperative that the research study was based on credible and valid data to help ensure success.⁶⁸ Therefore, it could be said that the adoption of the approach enhanced the study's consistency and reliability and made its collection of data, analysis and interpretation systematic and sequential while providing an entry point and structure for its conclusion and recommendations.

1.9 Intended Contribution to the Body of Knowledge

Learning from history and established knowledge is worthwhile. After going through published books and articles the researcher discovered an existing gap that needed to be filled. The study added to existing knowledge on the epistemology and ontology of peacebuilding, particularly in the African context. Also, new data and evidence derived from investigation and evaluation would be relied upon by future generations. Research on an agency that operated in an environment of overwhelming dynamics of conflict that produced the infamous Boko Haram insurgency was a contribution to the body of knowledge.

⁶⁷I. Rothmann (2008) Intervention Theory in Organization Development, pp. 107-121, in C.L. VanTonder, and G. Roodt (eds.) *Organization Development: Theory and Practice*, Van Schaik Publishers.

⁶⁸W. W. Burke (2011) *Organization Change: Theory and Practice*, SAGE Publications, Inc., p. 27.

In today's world of evidence, it can be said that when evidence is known the impact is huge. Also stakeholders rely on evidence. The understanding of peacebuilding impact of Institute would make evidence-informed policies and practices around peacebuilding and other security issues effective. Also the lessons and best practices available from the Nigerian example would be relevant for other developing countries facing security challenges and promoting democratic values in Africa.

Since its creation, IPCR has not been measured against the historical drivers of conflict it was established to manage. This was the first attempt at scientifically researching into the role the Institute had played fostering conflict management and peaceful coexistence through peacebuilding. Therefore, the methodology of collecting data to review genesis of peacebuilding and violent conflict in Nigeria and mixed theories to evaluate impact of peacebuilding and strengthen organizational development are significant to existing knowledge. While a theory such as intervention theory for organizational development might be well established in corporate or business industry, it was not as evident in peacebuilding practice. It could also be said that the study would make a contribution to knowledge about the investigation approach of history as evaluation. History and evaluation, the past and contemporary issues are fused to solve development challenges.

Thus the study suggested practical ways of addressing conflict in Nigeria through recommendations and best practices. While taking note of the strengths of IPCR, it examined gaps and weaknesses in the design and implementation of responses to conflict, crime and violence and suggested better measures of programme results in Nigerian conflict environment. While the research study provided new direction to future research, its findings will be of value to peacebuilding scholars, practitioners, policymakers, international agencies, potential funders wishing to intervene in African conflict. Nigeria, a racially-diverse country with deep-seated differences and potential causes of conflict has a lot to gain from the outcome of the research study.

1.10 Dissemination of Research

One output of the thesis was accepted for poster presentation at the Global Evidence Summit, Cape Town, South Africa.⁶⁹ It was titled *Impact evaluation of the Nigeria's Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2000-2014*. Two more outputs are awaiting publications by Taylor and Francis Ltd and North West University, South Africa respectively.

The final outcome of the research was expected to be disseminated by means of publications, policy recommendations, seminars and round-table discussions. Issues raised and materials generated will be useful for writing articles on institutional impact and evidence-based public policy response to violence and conflict. It will be useful resource for civil society groups, international agencies as well as major libraries in Nigeria and abroad.

It could be suggested that since the research is comprehensive and first of its kind on the Institute, it will elicit responses from the government and stakeholders. It offers the researcher the potential to consult and share his knowledge and skills with cognate local and international organizations working on peacebuilding, security and development issues in Africa.

1.11 Ethical Considerations

The researcher read the University's Policy and Procedures on Research Ethics and its Policy and Procedures on Managing and Preventing Acts of Plagiarism, and understood their content. My supervisor and I were sensitive to these rules and procedures guiding ethical practice in the University. The rights to privacy, voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality were maintained and respected.

Thus, informed consent was obtained from the respondents prior to engagement with them. The researcher assured the respondents that all information gathered would be treated sensitively and confidentially. The researcher undertook to abide by the general principles set out in the University's policies and the obligations which the policies imposed upon me, and to mitigate any ethical and other risks that might have arisen.

⁶⁹ Global Evidence Summit, 13-16 September, 2017 was held in Cape Town, South Africa. Over 1400 delegates from 77 countries in attendance www.globalevidencesummit.org

I made commitment that should unforeseen circumstances arise that impact upon my ethical obligations, I would disclose them to my supervisor and we would take appropriate action in terms of the relevant University policy.

1.12 Thesis Structure

The thesis was designed from the point of view of the whole rather than any single part. That is, elements of history and evaluation are arranged logically to make an easy-to-read and interesting study. Beside the title pages, abstract and table of contents, the thesis consisted of five chapters, general conclusion and recommendation while the source list and appendices complemented the treatise. Each chapter consisted of divisions or sections that set out with an introduction.

Chapter one summarized the research proposal. That is, it informed the reader about what motivated the researcher to write the thesis and why it was worth embarking on. It consisted of the aim, objectives, literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, research questions as well as the contributions to the body of knowledge and how the outcome of the research would be disseminated. The University of Zululand's stance on ethical considerations and research standards wrapped up the chapter.

Chapter two explained traditional peacebuilding and historical drivers of conflict that IPCR was established to study, manage and resolve. It laid historical background to the evaluation by exploring traditional means of peacebuilding and conflict management that were evolved in the pre-colonial Nigeria to address everyday security and development challenges and the lessons that can be learned. The pre-existing system of nationbuilding was altered with the conquest and annexation of all the ethnic groups that made up Nigeria by the British colonial administration. The chapter concluded with an analysis of problems of nationbuilding in the post-colonial Nigeria. The chapter was designed to incorporate fresh perspective into evaluating impact of peacebuilding for profound insights and learnings. A map illustrated the 36 states of the federation including Abuja the federal capital.

In chapter three, the immediate circumstances and processes that led to the establishment of IPCR and its organizational structure are discussed. It also contained a political map of Nigeria, a table and IPCR organogram. The purpose was to assess how the organizational structure affected peacebuilding and its commitment to impact change.

Chapters four and five are divided into sections and sub-sections in some cases. They consisted of results, analysis, interpretations and report of the research study. The chapters endeavoured to answer the research questions. Quantitative data are arranged into tables and charts. The tables are used to highlight similarities and contrasts in the findings. Notes are under each table to describe the data. Analysis of results and lessons learned from findings are also in the last two chapters. General conclusion encapsulated the research study while recommendations outlined a course of action for strengthening the effectiveness of IPCR peacebuilding.

Meanwhile, as indicated above, the next chapter dealt with the development of historical peacebuilding and the remote or structural causes of conflict that culminated in the establishment of IPCR.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

Sometimes wisdom dictates that you take a few steps backwards to be able to go much further.

Temitope Ibrahim⁷⁰

2.1 Introduction

Centuries before IPCR was established, different nationalities that made up the country had evolved socio-political and administrative systems to address conflict challenges and promote peacebuilding. Through conflict analysis model, the causes, trends, actors and dynamics of conflicts experienced in the pre-colonial Nigeria were understood. Marital, land or communal conflicts did exist alongside criminalities in the societies but traditional methods and practices were developed to resolve, prevent and manage these threats and occurrences. In the colonial period, the peoples were subjected to the western experience of conflict management and prevention as a new set of conflicts emerged in the socio-economic and political systems. Traditional and western types of peacebuilding were allowed by the colonialists to manage conflict.

But from the early post-independence Nigeria, challenges of nationbuilding and long years of military rule entrenched conflict dynamics in ethno-religious and political lives of the people prior to the attainment of democracy in 1999 that established IPCR. Therefore, the background information is essential to understand why IPCR was established, the context in which it operated and the historical conflicts it designed peacebuilding for in the period under review and draw out lessons to support in identifying working traditional peacebuilding practices to strengthen future policy initiatives. In other words, understanding the peacebuilding and conflict context led to productive engagement of the research study.

2.2 Nature of Conflict and Peacebuilding in Pre-Colonial Nigeria

It seems plausible to assert that conflict is part of humanity. It had been in existence from among the early populations. This assertion became necessary because a lot of literatures available to

⁷⁰ Temitope Ibrahim's quote at <http://www.goodreads.com> (accessed 4 September, 2016).

the researcher on the pre-colonial Nigeria, while dwelling on its political and social structures or systems, did not elaborate on indigenous peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. For example, Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton posit that both centralized and decentralized states by 1500 BCE in and around modern-day Nigeria had developed sophisticated political, economic and/or cultural relationships with their neighbours, making the region a relatively integrated unit.⁷¹ But not enough discussions on structures and systems practices that built peace and prevent conflict. One could infer or read between the lines that social and political arrangements had provided peaceful coexistence and harmonious living within and among various communities. Also the introduction of iron provided a new technology and source of power necessary for social control.⁷² Thus one could suggest that for a state to wage war or able to repel attack, such state could have achieved stability and peaceful coexistence. But what was important was to look at the evolution of striking political structures and administrative machineries that were responsible for this achievement.

From the earliest time that man had moved predominantly from been a gatherer and hunter to a farmer and settler respectively, his community was not devoid of violence and conflict. When referring to the prehistoric peoples of Nigeria, C.R. Niven says, *“Do not think, however, that people did not live here all these thousands of years and that they had no joys and no troubles. They had both of them in plenty.”*⁷³ It is in the same vein that Izugbara, Ugal and Ukwaiyi have said:

“From prehistory to the present age of socio-economic and technological globalization, communities and people have violently clashed with each other over issues and resources. But such clashes have become widespread in the past few years causing tremendous problems and panic in many countries of the world.”⁷⁴

Since conflict ensues as a result of sharp or irreconcilable differences of interest, view, opinion, ideas, struggle for power and competition over resources such as land, it can be said that not only

⁷¹ T. Falola and M.M. Heaton (2010) *A History of Nigeria*, Cambridge University Press, p. 17.

⁷² J.F.A. Ajayi and E.J. Alagoa (1980) *Nigeria Before 1800: Aspects of Economic Developments and Inter-Group Relations*, p. 227, in O. Ikime, (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd, pp. 224-235.

⁷³ C.R. Niven (1958) *A Short History of Nigeria*, Longmans, p. 1.

⁷⁴ C.O. Izugbara, G.A. Ugal and J.K. Ukwaiyi (2003) *Indigenous Knowledge and Communal Conflict: Evidence from Nigeria*, (pp. 1-14) in *INDILINGA African Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems*, Vol. 2 No. 2, Dec.2003.

had hunting and gathering brought conflict among the early generations and onward to the time he organized himself into settlement. For example, access to food, land, population increase and migration could have sprung up serious misunderstanding and disputes. But as historians tend to focus on the evidences of change,⁷⁵ man's survival to this day could be attributed to his leadership ability to manage conflict and transform the society for subsequent generations.

In Africa, according to J.D. Clark, while describing the continent's prehistory, he said "*early man who through crude implement began farming and hunting to form settlement. This is an age-long tradition*"⁷⁶ and the practice regulated pattern of human behaviour or relationship through evolutionary processes across Africa.⁷⁷

What ran through in the methods of conflict management and peacebuilding in almost every African community was the application of customs and traditions through laws, creeds, sanctions, socialization, beliefs and many children received moral education and the societal values through their parents, adults, peers and the community. Values such as being civil, respectful, courteous, trust, loyalty, obedience, responsibility, humility, friendship, politeness, and other disciplines were taught. The society traditions were passed down from generation to generation through observation, participation, story-telling, proverbs, myths and legends. Every member of the society knew his or her rights, duties and obligations. Observance of traditions, values, norms and respect for laws and institutions ensured peaceful and harmonious coexistence.

Like other African group, the pattern of peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Nigeria was similar in that political power rested with the king who was revered as sacred and semi-divine. He was supported by a council of chiefs and elders, and the people pointed to same kinship. Religion and the youth, as will soon be found out played a major role in promoting peace in the period under review. Because of the patrilineal nature of African society, women's role was often viewed as supporting and complimentary to their men. Though in some places like the Kanem Bornu Empire, women played critical role in peacebuilding.

⁷⁵ E. Isichei (1982) Change and Continuities 1906-39, (254-281), in E. Isichei (ed.) *Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, p. 275.

⁷⁶ J.D. Clark (1970) *The Prehistory of Africa*, Thames and Hudson, pp. 76-77.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

However, some differences or approaches in peacebuilding and conflict management existed in some cases. No kingdom or empire was exempted from the vulnerability of the threats or occurrence of violent conflict and criminality. But when it occurred each ethnic group had the responsibility to resolve it and even had mechanism in place to prevent misdemeanour. For centuries, the traditional political and social organization had promoted peace and security before each began to fall one after the other through diplomacy, conquest and annexation by the British from the 1903.⁷⁸

As earlier pointed out, violence and conflict were not uncommon in the pre-colonial era. Family feuds, ethnic inequality, chieftaincy disputes, farm and land disputes, youths engaged in criminal activities, there were disobedience to the authority of the rulers and constituted authorities and nations often engaged one another in wars of expansion, slave raiding and conflict over control of trade routes. Thus law and order needed to be maintained and peaceful coexistence promoted growth and development. Though, it is impossible to discuss all the ethnic groups in this section, but to highlight common features of peacebuilding that characterized most of the major and selected minority groups. Most parts of the pre-colonial Nigeria had similar pattern of peacebuilding and development especially in the culture of moral upbringing, use of law enforcement officers, youth, women, myths and legends and deities to promote peace and security, but only a few differences existed from one ethnic group to another as explained below.⁷⁹

Among the Yoruba for example, the political structure was headed by the king called the *Oba*, who was revered by all and sundry as semi-divine, that is, next to the gods. Powers and authorities of each Oba in Oyo, Ijebu, Ijesa, Ekiti, Akoko, Igbomina and other parts of Yoruba region were supreme and he was often assisted by a council of chiefs in the running of the state affairs. Peace and security was ensured to all towns and villages including the towns acquired by conquest through the protection of king's advisers or chiefs, *ajele*, as the case of Oyo.⁸⁰ They were responsible to the king for proper administration of political, judicial and commercial matters. The institution of *obaship* was respected as orders and directives were carried out with

⁷⁸⁷⁸ As a historian, this knowledge has been part of years of learning and reading.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

utmost compliance. The political structure was assisted by appointed *Ilari(s)* to supervise conquered territories and ensure peace and order was maintained.

Nevertheless, the kingdom was not without conflict and breakdown of law and order. Conflicts came in forms of civil disobedience or disrespect to the directive of the authorities. In the pre-colonial Yoruba land, the king had power to depose any chief, or arrest and punish offender, or order the execution or expulsion of any rebel. He also had power to enact, repeal, or withdraw, or cancel any law, and to pardon and release any prisoner.⁸¹

The laws and customs of the Yoruba promoted peace and stability. A typical Yoruba compound was headed by a “bale” that was responsible to the authorities for the conduct of the inmates⁸² of his compound. He was respected because he had the power to judge and decide cases affecting his own inmates, provided such cases were not connected with an outsider or with the authorities. He might punish such as flog, chain, whip, tie, demand damages, fine, eject, put in stocks, or imprison (should there be any prison in his compound). He was also bound to protect and help his inmates against ill or unfair treatment from any quarters.⁸³ The practice also guided issues that could cause disagreement in the society such as guardianship, rights of property and individuals, inheritance, marriage, sharing of farm produce or meat, misdemeanour such as theft, adultery, etc. For example, land which has become a major source of intra and inter-communal conflict in the present-day Nigeria belonged to clan, family, individual or the king.

No king or chief had any right to alienate or take possession of any land, not being his own personal property, except with the consent and at the pleasure of its owners.⁸⁴ On security, it was an honour and glory for every Yoruba man to fight in defence of the motherland and not necessary to raise a salaried army. War chiefs and the hunters protected the country. Forests were used as reconnoitring purposes in time of war. Security men could lurk in the forest to watch the movements of the enemy and alert the chiefs of any impending danger.⁸⁵

Crimes such as witchcraft, sorcery, larceny, burglary, and stealing were punishable by death. Incest, false accusation, robbery, swearing or pronouncement of a curse or imprecation on

⁸¹ A.K. Ajisafe (1924) *The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People*, George Routledge & Sons Ltd, p. 22.

⁸² Inmates as used by A.K. Ajisafe referred to members of a compound who share same lineage.

⁸³ A.K. Ajisafe (1924) *The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People*, George Routledge & Sons Ltd, p. 3.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 15.

another person, escape and abduction, manslaughter, misappropriation of money, smuggling, bribery, receiving stolen property, arson and so on were crimes and punishable by death, banishment, burning of houses, flogging, payment to appease the gods or slavery. Culprits were warned as the case might be against repetition. Women were warned not to whistle or enter the groves or see certain masquerades. A woman who did so would be regarded to be a witch and therefore punished accordingly.⁸⁶ This system created a feeling of awe in the peoples' mind and it went a long way in restoring order and promoting peace.

The customs did not permit anyone to retaliate for any wrong done him or her without complaining to the head or the authorities as the case might be. If he or she did, it was punishable with a fine or imprisonment or execution, should the retaliation involved loss of life.⁸⁷ The exception included the act of provocation, violence or oppression that necessitated immediate retaliation. Punishments such as death, decapitation, poisoning and stunning were to warn the people from violent behaviour.

Through such socialization, trust and confidence were built to the extent that even if a child or goods were lost and found, a person who found it would hand them over to the heads of his compound and who in turn deliver them to the chief of the town for the owner to claim, but of course with a payment of a reward.⁸⁸ Also based on brotherliness and the role of communication in peacebuilding, it was impolite to meet and pass by anyone either known or stranger without salutation. The younger or the low-status man was expected to first greet. According to A.K. Ajisafe, if it was a man, he was expected to prostrate flat or bow and kneeling if a female before the older or a chief. Disrespect or slighting that could lead to conflict or disharmony was discouraged. Uncomplimentary and derogatory remarks were abhorred. Interestingly, these laws and customs were not written, yet people adhered to them because they were based on fairness, truth and justice. Thus, decisions and judgments of the authorities were respected and upheld.

Religious beliefs and secret society such as *ogboni* societies also played a role in promoting peace and harmony. Priests consulted the oracle and offered sacrifices for the peace and prosperity of the people at large. Mbachirin observes that even though scholars consider the religion at that time as primitive, that religion nevertheless played a significant role in African

⁸⁶ Ibid. pp. 28-32.

⁸⁷ A.K. Ajisafe, p. 35.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 76.

cultural, social, economic, and political life.⁸⁹ Beliefs, rituals, and symbols of tradition that religion regulated throughout the diverse spheres of African life were apparatus for social cohesion. The people believed that the gods were responsible for the prosperity or decline of the society. The political leaders were praised by the people for their leadership to do the right things. Laws functioned to protect sacred objects, direct worship, and educate the tribe on matters of justice, self-restraint, and morality. There were even laws to protect animals and the environment. For example, some forests were considered homes of the spirits and no one could cut trees from them. Killing of some wild animals was also prohibited because such animals were thought to be inhabitant of human souls and the death of the animal would result in the death of an important person. For these reasons, forests and animals were preserved. In this way, the society found its unity and progress.⁹⁰

Women also played some significant role in governance through trade and social functions. Women groups often led by Iya Egbe formed themselves into social groups to promote cordial relationship and unity. Women's voices were heard and their feelings made known through their representative, Iyalode, who the king appointed. In some places such as Ibadan, Iyalode could go to war as a captain with her own warriors under her.⁹¹ The heroic deeds of Moremi in Ile-Ife who liberated the Yoruba people from the slave raiders and the legendary impact of Iyalode of Egbaland are some examples of active leadership of women in peacebuilding.⁹² Women also formed societies such as Esusu that helped members to save and raise money. There was also a traders' guild.⁹³ All this effort created economic prosperity that helped to promote, foster and protect lives and property.

To guide against potential conflict and promote harmony in Yoruba marriage, inquiries and consultations were made by a would-be husband of a lady that fancied his interest of whether she was from a family free of diseases, criminal records, evil habits such as incurring debts,

⁸⁹ A.T. Mbachirin (2006) *The Responses of the Church in Nigeria to Socio-Economic, Political and Religious Problems in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)*, PhD Thesis of the Baylor University, p. 12, https://baylor-ir.tdl.org/baylor-ir/bitstream/handle/2104/4874/Abraham_Mbachirin_phd.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 8 June 2016).

⁹⁰ A.T. Mbachirin (2006) *The Responses of the Church in Nigeria to Socio-Economic, Political and Religious Problems in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)*, pp. 12-13.

⁹¹ A.K. Ajisafe, p. 20.

⁹² Women in Power: Madam Efunroye Tinubu-1st Iyalode of Egbaland <http://asirimagazine.com/en/women-in-power-madame-efunroye-tinubu-1st-iyalode-of-egba-land/> (accessed 30 September, 2017).

⁹³ Ibid. p. 48.

witchcraft and whether the lady was intelligent and of good morals. If satisfied, as Ajisafe stated, he asked his parents who in turn carried out their investigation of the background of the lady's family and this happened vice versa before a marriage was consummated. The practice fostered decorum and good neighbourliness in the community.

Disputes or cases involving the community were heard from the bush shed to the king's palace and sometimes very important decisions were taken at the market place. Unsatisfied litigant at the family level could proceed to the head of the district, and if not satisfied with the decision could finally sought redress before the king in council. A town crier (bell ringer) on the order of the king called for a meeting where people often settled matters of very importance. It was also the duty of the town crier to announce enforcement of any law by going round the corners of the town. By this method, awareness and sensitization was created and compliance expected. In all cases, with the exception of murder, decisions were often followed with an appeal for reconciliation, mutual cooperation and unity. Kola nuts and palm wine, or water or gin were brought by the conflicting parties for the people present. The warring parties must eat in the presence of all. The guilty would tender apology to the wronged. This practice set a seal to the settlement of the case. The offender kept a kola nut permanently as a remembrance or a witness to the settlement, should the case arise in future. But when either or both parties refused to take the kola nut, the case remained unsettled and would be referred to the higher court.

But on the other hand, among the Hausa-Fulani in the northern Nigeria the practice of peacebuilding was a bit different. There are two periods of tradition, that is, before and after the introduction of Islam. The pre-Islamic time seemed not to be adequately dealt with in many literatures about the early life of the Hausa whose state establishment took a lengthy process. But in the study carried out by Toyin Falola and Akanni Adebayo,⁹⁴ a glimpse of how the society was organized to promote peace and harmony right from the family to community level is explained. We understand that the first set of Hausa communities had a nucleated settlements headed by a *sarki*, whose main duty was the maintenance of communal discipline, transcending the family group. The family heads, the *maigida* also maintained discipline within his family and allegiance of community members began from him. In defence, capitals of states called

⁹⁴ T. Falola and A. Adebayo (1985) Pre-colonial Nigeria: north of the Niger-Benue, pp. 56-96, in R. Olaniyan (1985) *Nigeria History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, London, pp. 69-70.

birane were fortified with walls around it. Later in their history, sarki was assisted by officials such as *magajin gari*, *sarki kasuwa*, *sarki kofa*, *sarki turawa* and a host of others.

The latter period started with the introduction and adoption of Islam as state religion from the fourteenth century. The sarki was assisted by officials like the *Galadima*, the *Madaki* who was the commander-in-chief of the army, the *Magaji*, the *Sarkin Yan Doka* who headed the police and the *Sarkin Dogari* who was the head of the palace body-guards.⁹⁵ In the administration of justice, the *sarki* was the chief judge. A *Qadi* was *Alkali* who was responsible for the administration of *sharia* law. It is worthy to mention that the Fulani jihadists and the British colonialists preserved this system of justice respectively.

But in the nineteenth century, the Shehu Usman dan Fodio's jihad brought majority of the Hausaland under Islamic *sharia* law. Reforms were carried out, not only in Islamic purity, but also at a comprehensive social revolution in the Hausa societies in tune with the Islamic principles.⁹⁶ The political institution, the Caliphate, was headed by the *Sultan of Sokoto* and the remaining vast territories, the *emirates*, were each administered by dan Fodio's flag bearers who became the *emirs*. Each emir was responsible for administration of his emirate and therefore ensured peace and security. He appointed officials to assist. Maintenance of unity among the people by the emir was paramount. Other administrative duties of the emirs included the abolition of all forms of oppression, the repairs of markets and the prohibition of all illegalities. Bond of Islam united the emirates and held it together throughout the nineteenth century.⁹⁷

From the region, Islam later spread to Kanem, Borgu and Nupeland.⁹⁸ With the capital at Sokoto, the Caliph was the symbol of unity and derived his authority from the Sharia. He had effective control over the determination of the general administration of the emirates as well as their relations to one another. Loyalty and obedience were given by all the emirs to Sokoto who paid annual tributes and troops. Dan Fodio's son, Mohammed Bello and his brother, Abdullahi, were

⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 82.

⁹⁶ A. Olorunfemi (1985) *The Fulani Jihad and the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century*, pp. 123-137, in R. Olaniyan, *Nigeria History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, London, pp. 127-128.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 136.

⁹⁸ J.O. Kayode, and E.D. Adelowo (1985) *Religions in Nigeria*, pp. 233-252, in R. Olaniyan (1985) *Nigeria History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, London, pp. 243-245.

responsible for defence and security. As Olorunfemi put it, “*Yet there is no doubt that the Shehu’s conquests gave Hausaland some semblance of political unity.*”⁹⁹

The spread of Islamic education and intellectual awareness coupled with Islamic culture and the Hausa spoken by all enabled the region to see themselves as one people and live in harmony. The religion played a major role in the way each territory dealt with the issue of conflict and violence. Through preaching and teaching, a community learnt what was expected of them according to Islamic injunctions. Since Islam is submission to the will of Allah, its adherents were obedient to the authorities of the emir who were highly revered. Since the 19th century Usman dan Fodio’s Jihad, almost all the northern region from Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Zaria except Bornu were under an emir as the religious and political head. Interestingly, the basic principles of the Caliphate formed the guidelines for the system of indirect rule adopted by the British colonial administration after the conquest of northern Nigeria.

In the Kanem Bornu Empire, the reigns of successive *Mais*, Ali Ghaji (1470-1506), Idris Alooma (1572-1603), famous figures of the Sefawa dynasty, witnessed peaceful and economic prosperity which could be attributed to the long survival of the dynasty. Many literatures on Bornu dwelt on its military prowess, but Falola and Adebayo outlined some factors behind the long survival of the first and second Kanuri empires which were “*strong leadership in men such as Saif, Dunama II, Ali Ghaji, Idris Alooma and al-Kanemi.*”¹⁰⁰ Other factors were weak resistance from neighboring communities, institution of the sacred monarch, Islam, workable and dynamic political system. The wellbeing of the *Mai* was personified with the wellbeing of his subjects. Women played key role in statebuilding as three women were included in two bodies of title holders who advised the *Mais*. These are the *Gumsu* (Mai’s first wife), the *Magara* (Mai’s senior sister) and the *Magira* (the Queen mother) who performed important administrative and peacebuilding functions. Their influence was also felt during an interregnum or during the reign of a weak *Mai*. Kanem’s four provinces were under trusted governors-the *Galadima*, the *Yerima*, the *Kaigama* and the *Mestrema* who defended their province from attacks and from secession and also reduced instability.¹⁰¹ From this it could be inferred that there were measures in place

⁹⁹ A. Olorunfemi, p. 136.

¹⁰⁰ T. Falola and A. Adebayo (1985) Pre-colonial Nigeria: north of the Niger-Benue (pp.56-96), in R. Olaniyan (1985) *Nigeria History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, London, p. 61.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. pp. 61-63.

that promoted peace and security in the empire on the long-term that made its one-thousand year old Sefawa dynasty one of the longest in the world history.

Similarly, among the Igbo in the south-east Nigeria, a very strong social and political system was developed that encouraged peacebuilding and conflict management in the community. Law and order was maintained right from the nuclear family court to the village court through settling of judicial matters such as fighting, assault, petty theft, family disputes, adultery, and divorce. More serious cases and inter-lineage cases were referred to the village court for settlement. According to Nzewunwa (1985), both plaintiff and defendant paid settlement fees in kind while the plaintiff paid the summon fees.¹⁰² After the judgment, the accused forfeited his fees while the innocent was refunded part of his settlement fees. The remaining fees would be shared between the court members and the village. It is important to note that the accused reserved the right to appeal. The assistance of a diviner could be sought to establish innocence or guilt. Oracles such as the *Ibini Ukpabi* of Arochukwu, or the *Igwekala* of Umunoha were consulted and judgment at this stage was final.

A number of nuclear families or compounds made up family groups and lived together in one compound with one gate.¹⁰³ Government among the Igbo was the responsibility of the lineage heads or elders. The youth and various age grades were involved in the legislative, executive and judicial processes and of course military and social services of their communities. The women had no visible role in the pre-colonial Igbo's political dispensation just as depicted in the popular novel *Things Fall Apart* of Chinua Achebe.¹⁰⁴ But the views of Izugbara, Ugal and Ukwai were in contrary as regards the role played by Igbo women in conflict resolution. According to the authors from their experience in resolving conflict between two communities of Ntighauzor Amairi and Abala in Abia State in 1999, traditional Igbo women could make war end by staging their famed *ogu-bie* march. That is, marching naked until their men agreed to lay down arms. Also kola nut, palm wine and palm frond were instruments of peace negotiation and conflict resolution among the Igbo. In Igbo tradition, kola nut represents "patriline, kinship,

¹⁰² N. Nzewunwa (1985) Pre-colonial Nigeria: East of the Niger, (pp. 20-34) in R. Olaniyan (1985) *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, pp. 22-28.

¹⁰³ N. Nzewunwa (1985) Pre-colonial Nigeria: East of the Niger, pp. 20-34, in R. Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, p. 23.

¹⁰⁴ Read Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* on how the lead actor, Okonkwo treated his wife in a typical Igbo tradition prior to the coming of the British and during the colonial rule.

gerontocracy, hospitality, friendliness, unity, goodwill, reconciliation, and good luck”, while referring to Chinua Achebe’s use of the palm frond (the omu) in *Things Fall Apart* that “stands for peace, restitution, and sacredness.”¹⁰⁵ Once a warring community received these items from another, it was culturally bounded to accept peaceful negotiation and return similar gesture. They were used in ceremony marking an end to communal conflict. Planting of trees as a remembrance of an end to a conflict was another method of conflict resolution and prevention.

For some other groups also living in the east of the Niger such as the Efik-Ibibio, Anang, Ijaw, and Boki, some similarities existed in the ways they resolved conflict and maintained law and order in community. For example, the Efik-Ibibio made use of divination in Afia or Ukang (use of boiled oil, eggs, and water in a plate to determine the right and wrong of a case).¹⁰⁶ Village heads such as the *amanyanabo* exercised the right of life and death among the *Okuku* of Cross River State. Like other parts of Nigeria, religion played key role in that its usage gave authority to the elders and chiefs in the control of political and social order. Oath-taking was applied using gods, spirits, deities, ghosts and witchcrafts for application of justice and deterrence of misdemeanor. Generally, Nzewunwa put the situation as thus, “*Popular social control techniques were the use of exclusivist clubs from which females were barred, folk play in which young men and women entertained the public and used satirical and abusive songs against social deviants.*”¹⁰⁷

Like the Igbo, the Urhobo, the Isoko and the Ijaw of the Niger Delta region did not develop centralized kingdoms but were able to promote peace and security. The Ijaw, for example, had a political organization headed by the eldest man called *ama okosowei* who chaired all village meetings. His assistant *ogulasowei* and a priest *orukarowei* were collectively responsible for all decisions taken on behalf of the community which included defence, security and social laws.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, the peoples on both banks of the rivers Niger and Benue such as the Borgu, Nupe, Igala and Jukun and several others, promoted peace and security. The security offered led to “*the emergence of strong, though small states*”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ C.O. Izugbara, G.A. Ugal & J.K. Ukwai (2003) p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ N.Nzewunmwa, p. 28.

¹⁰⁷ N.Nzewunmwa p. 29.

¹⁰⁸ I.A. Akinjogbin and B. Adediran, (1985) Pre-colonial Nigeria: west of the Niger pp. 35-55, in R. Olaniya, *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, London, pp. 51-52.

¹⁰⁹ T. Falola, and A. Adebayo, p. 84.

The kings held their subjects' destiny in trust and not autocratic. Similarly, the states of Borgu regarded Busa as their traditional capital.¹¹⁰ What this means is that there was common sense of purpose and solidarity by the different groups to forge unity. The unity and development was enough for some of these states to fight wars of expansion or repel external aggression. The Nupe and Borgu fought on many southern fronts to the Yorubaland and northern states.¹¹¹

In order to collectively fight against incessant foreign attackers, the nine independent settlements of Igala came together to become Igalamela. Their leader, *Ata* or father, and *Achadu*, the prime minister provided charismatic leadership and oversaw the welfare of the people. Relatives and trusted friends were posted to the fiefs. The administrative machinery of *Ata-ship* of *Ayangba* was largely responsible for the development of *Igalamela*.¹¹²

The Jukun in the Benue valley had a king who lived at Kwararafa and who by 16th and 17th centuries oversaw a body of twenty states which they fought against and conquered.¹¹³ They had closely knitted culturally, religiously and ritually.¹¹⁴ The cultural continuities created a unity among the Jukun.

Regarding all the peoples of former Plateau State in the northern Nigeria, majority of them had similar governmental structure-sacred kings who were powerful. They included the Birom, Ngas, Jawara, Goemai, Yergam, Alagoa of the present Nasarawa State and many others. The Birom are the largest in number. In the settled communities, a hierarchy of village elders, ward heads, village heads and district heads could be called on to settle disputes.¹¹⁵ The Alago and Goemai, like the Jukun, had similar structure of government as there was an elaborate network of officials, who together formed an advisory council. In times of crisis masques appeared; because of their anonymity and the supernatural dread they inspired they were peculiarly well suited to enforce unpopular decisions.¹¹⁶ Most of the peoples of the high plateau were ruled by sacred priest-kings, whose office was hereditary in a particular lineage, and who were primarily responsible for the rituals which created a continuing harmony between the ancestors and the

¹¹⁰ T. Falola, pp. 89-90.

¹¹¹ T. Falola, and A. Adebayo.

¹¹² T. Falola, pp. 88-89.

¹¹³ E. Isichei (ed.) 1982 Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria, The Macmillan Press, p. 14.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 15.

¹¹⁵ R. Blench (2004) Natural Resource Conflicts, in North-central Nigeria, Mallam Dendo Ltd, Cambridge, UK, p. 58.

¹¹⁶ E. Isichei, p. 19.

living, and ensured the health of his people, and the fertility of their fields. Birom had a king, Gwon. King selection was based on democratic principles where the most suitable prince would be chosen through consultation with the elders and people.¹¹⁷ The welfare of the community depended on festivals such as religious rites and ceremonies. Peacebuilding activities such as societies, horse races and communal hunting expeditions and other festivals were deeply cherished and fomented relationships.¹¹⁸ Rukuba communities invited *Irigwe* to their hunts, just as they invited neighbours to their initiations and to the great dances which were held every seven years. Isichei likened this practice to the festivals and mystery plays of medieval Europe where religion, recreation and social functions formed part of an indissoluble unity.¹¹⁹

The clannish settlement of the Plateau peoples went a long way in fomenting relationships. For example, in order to avoid conflict or whatever disputes that may arise in marriage as a result of clash of interest “a man of clan A will not marry a woman of the same-named clan irrespective of where she resides.” All clan members, wherever they live, regard themselves as brothers and sisters.¹²⁰

The critical role played by religion in peacebuilding and conflict resolution cannot be overemphasized. As earlier mentioned, Islam, long before Christianity, had been received through North African merchants in the Northern Nigeria as far back as the second half of the 14th century. Islamic preachers and teachers later became mediators in both temporal and religious issues.¹²¹ Prior to the coming of Islam, traditional religion adherents perceived the priests and diviners as interpreters of the will of the Supreme Being and therefore commanded obeisance. According to Kayode and Adelowo (1985) “*religion expresses itself in multifarious ways among Nigerians...as it is the basis of their philosophy... They seek his [Allah] help and protection and they fear his wrath.*”¹²² This could mean that they tolerated one another and thereby promoted peaceful coexistence as revealed by the writers “*In their day to day lives they try to behave in ways which they believe will please God and this helps them to decide what is*

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p. 20.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 20-23.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 23.

¹²⁰ E. Isichei, p. 21.

¹²¹ J.O. Kayode and E.D. Adelowo (1985) Religions in Nigeria, pp. 233-252, in R. Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, London, pp. 243-245.

¹²² Ibid. pp. 242-244.

right and what is wrong. This is about moral values."¹²³ Also the role of religion in Nigerian culture cannot be overstressed as it provided a system of values that were required by individuals and society. As both writers put it "At every crisis, personal or collective, religion is called upon to provide solutions, prevent disintegration, and strengthen the bond of human cohesion and sanctity of life and conduct."¹²⁴

Meanwhile, it is important to also note that religion improved relationships through trade. Muslim traders, for example, regarded themselves as brothers that must not hurt or cheat one another. Likewise the oracle system helped the Igbo traders to embark on long-distance trading without molestation or killing, particularly among the Eze Nri, the Awka and the Aro traders.¹²⁵

Moreover, economic factor was also responsible in promoting peace. Trade particularly in horses and slaves made the Hausa to migrate south.¹²⁶ The trade across borders promoted cooperation and intergroup relations. As earlier pointed out, the language Hausa which was spoken and still is, by the different nationalities in the north fomented common understanding and cohesion.

Land which in the twenty-first century had formed the basis of most communal and interpersonal conflict in Nigeria was well organized in the pre-colonial communities as it was communally owned. There were rules and practices that guided access to land and land disputes. Land was religiously guided as the people believed it belonged to the ancestors and therefore no one could sell it. Land was held in trust by the ruler and this means that every family or descent group had the right to land which was the main source of their economic activities. Payment such as kola nuts could be paid by the borrower at agreed intervals.¹²⁷ Many scholars on African economic history have proved beyond doubt that the land tenure system was effective and efficient and met the needs of the peoples. Similar rules and regulations also guided disputes that could arise from other economic activities such as trading, farming, fishing, hunting, peonage, and slave ownership.

¹²³ Ibid. p. 234.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 251.

¹²⁵ T. Falola (1985) Nigeria's indigenous economy, pp.97-112, in R. Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, p. 52.

¹²⁶ E. Isichei, p. 15

¹²⁷ T. Falola (1985) Nigeria's indigenous economy, pp. 97-112, in R. Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, pp. 97-98.

Out of friendship and communal living, indigenous populations formed themselves into cooperative work groups, where an individual could benefit from the work of a larger group. Farm and building task received combined hands from age grades, friends or kinsmen of a community.¹²⁸ The practice was very popular among the Yoruba where it was called *aro*, and the Igbo. Though the mode was different from one ethnic group to the other, the organization of labour enhanced faster work and promoted communal living in the pre-colonial Nigeria.

Still on trade, traders who engaged in long distance trading enjoyed free movement that was made possible by the Nigerian communities which were linked together and security was provided. There were institutions like the customs in every community that provided security and prevented killing, molestation and kidnapping of dwellers and passers-by. Bilateral agreements were sometime entered into between communities not to attack one another.

Marriage was another tie that strengthened inter-community relationships as some traders chose wives along trade routes. Tolls at the borders were paid. According to Falola, long-distance Hausa traders went as far as the present-day Ghana (Gonja), Mali (Timbuktu), and Sudan (Darfur) by foot or caravans.¹²⁹ There was free flow of goods from one area to the other. Articles such as salt, dried fish, and European goods like tobacco, arms and ammunition and spirits were found in the hinterland as goods moved up and down the regions. Though trade also caused conflict and violence due to struggle of control among the communities, it provided the line of communication and routes for the spread of Islam and Christianity.¹³⁰

The way the Nigerian societies were organized built trust and healthy competition. Local markets were well structured that it had officials who settled quarrels and disputes and monitored business transactions. Traders organized themselves into guilds that ensured cleanliness of the markets, resolved differences and regulated prices. The trust that existed among the people was strong such that articles for sale could be displayed by the road side and the buyer dropped the money at the same place in the absence of the seller. The practice was popular among the Yoruba. Later in their history, cowry (*cyprae moneta*) became the universal currency of the

¹²⁸ Ibid. p. 99.

¹²⁹ T. Falola (1985) Nigeria's indigenous economy, pp. 97-112, in R. Olaniyan *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, pp.90-100.

¹³⁰ Ibid. pp. 107-108.

peoples and the system was attested to by the European travellers in the nineteenth century.¹³¹ Falola mentioned the Niger Delta, Yoruba, Benin, Igbo, Igala, Nupe, Hausa and Fulani territories as some of the places where cowries could be spent. Barriers such as language or religion did not prevent people of different backgrounds to exchange goods. There was no discernible evidence of fraud such as counterfeiting or forging. Trust and confidence was built at every stage of the peoples' daily lives.

Discipline and professionalism were exhibited by various groups of societies such as the guilds in terms of conduct and ethics of their jobs and relationships. Standards were set for quality goods and services, no short-changing of clients or abnormal pricing. They were famous among the Nupe, Yoruba, Hausa and Benin. Falola gave a hint of the Nupe guilds.¹³² According to the scholar, the Nupe had guilds of carpenters, masons, wood-workers, potters, weavers, glass-makers, iron-ore miners, blacksmiths, brass-and sliver-smiths. Each guild's leader was a member of the king's council, be it in carpentry, weaving, butchery or traditional medicine. In Benin, Falola said all the guilds were affiliated to the *oba's* palace and this helped to facilitate communication between the rulers and members of the guilds and the collection of manufactured goods and fees from title holders among guild members. All this means that effective communication was created and cheating was discouraged. The openness and transparency gave room for peaceful coexistence. This is not to infer that there was no sporadic outburst of conflict in different societies, but to a large extent, the organization and efficiency of the trade promoted peace.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the pre-colonial Nigeria promoted peacebuilding through different social, economic and political mechanisms. Nevertheless, that does not mean that there were no conflicts, rivalries and disputes among each community over land, chieftaincy titles, or between communities over slave raids, border or territorial expansion. Actors in conflict were communities, traditional rulers, councils of chiefs, and the people. But to a greater extent, peace and security was maintained and everyday needs and aspirations were met. However, the unity and security in which each community achieved was not enough to ward off the British imperialists who began wars of conquest from the early twentieth century.

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 107.

¹³² Ibid. p. 103.

2.3 Colonial Nigeria and its Legacies

Colonialism was a mixed blessing to Nigeria in the area of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Its imposition by the British marked the turning point in the history of the peoples, not only in peacebuilding, but also in sowing the seed of future conflict. It was the dawn of a new era and an unprecedented set of conflict and violence was unleashed. Besides resolving some socio-ethnic and political violence, colonialism left behind political divisions (divide and rule), exploitation and unwholesomeness in socio-economic basis in the country. The role of violence, its use or threat of it, in the British colonial takeover of Nigeria as aptly described by Falola and Heaton was the single most important factor allowing them to assume political control over the territories.¹³³ All previously independent ethnic groups which were contiguously spread were either diplomatically or forcefully brought under one foreign administration that lasted for about sixty years.

The British actively co-opted and modified traditional governing institutions and created new legislative bodies with limited power and representation. Though the modification was in some preservation of pre-existing indigenous system of conflict management, but the administration generally established a western system of government. Almost all the governing institutions practised and experienced a mix of African and western approaches to conflict management and peacebuilding. However, the unified political system created the unexampled peacebuilding challenges that the Nigerian peoples had ever confronted in their respective nationalities. The challenges got complicated, intractable and widespread till it gained independence.

Meanwhile, this section provided an anecdotal account of how Nigeria, created mostly by conquest, diplomacy and pledge to protect by the British, was positively impacted by colonialism mainly on indigenous efforts at peacebuilding and political resolution, and also at how it was plunged into emergent conflict and violence. On the former, the colonialism was a significant factor that terminated fratricidal intra and inter-ethnic wars among the Yoruba communities and against the Fulani invasion. For example, in the late nineteenth century, the Peace Treaty initiated by the Imperial officials in Lagos (Lagos had been annexed in 1861) and the missionsaries among the warring parties in the Yoruba Civil Wars facilitated at putting an end to

¹³³ T. Falola and M.M. Heaton, p. 107.

the crises that engulfed the whole land after the fall of Old Oyo Empire.¹³⁴ Such reconciliation between the Ibadan, Egba, Ijesa, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ife, Ondo and Ilorin was a major peacebuilding effort in the protracted wars that went far to restore trade relations. The restoration of peace and security, particularly after the bombardment of Ijebu Ode in May 1892, opened the space for the British annexation of the south west interior.¹³⁵

On the latter, as Mbachirin has noted, many of the societal challenges in Nigeria between 2000 and 2014 had their roots in the founding periods of the nation and the activities of the British colonial administration.¹³⁶ Thus based on conflict analysis model, it could be suggested that the challenges of nationbuilding or threats to peace and security witnessed prior to the period under study could be traced to the colonial era. The balance of power changed as societies were transformed from predominantly traditional powerful kings to the educated and more powerful elites. Conflict and violence erupted in the Nigerian resistance to colonial policies and practices which ranged from tax, economic, education, constitutional enactment to socio-political development. Although in some cases, the colonial administration adopted western ways of conflict resolution to manage the crises.

The ethnic groups which had been living independently and rancorously of one another could have been expected to forge a united front against their common enemy-the British, *“instead they were clinging to old rivalries and prejudices against one another...”*¹³⁷ Each state was on its own in terms of resistance. According to Soremekun while describing the Lagos situation, *“[S]ince that date its history had rarely been peaceful.”*¹³⁸ The amalgamation of about 250 peoples of different racial, cultural, political and religious backgrounds, each with its own languages had since been its albatross.

According to Falola, while tracing the history of colonialism and violence in Nigeria, he argues that the roots of violence lie in the Nigerian state itself. Nigeria was created through colonial conflict: myriad wars and battles brought the region’s peoples under British rule. Continued

¹³⁴ *The history of the Yorubas : from the earliest times to the beginning of the British Protectorate* by Rev. Samuel Johnson https://archive.org/stream/historyofyorubas00john/historyofyorubas00john_djvu.txt (accessed 24 October, 2017).

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ A.T. Mbachirin (2006) *The Responses of the Church in Nigeria to Socio-Economic, Political and Religious Problems in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)*, p. 26.

¹³⁷ F. Soremekun, p. 147.

¹³⁸ Ibid. p. 147.

violence and the threat of violence enforced the new rulers' demands. Colonial rule was challenged through violence, and ultimately the threat of violence drove the colonial political change and eventual independence. Violence was used as a tool of domination and resistance.¹³⁹

The British attempts to introduce the policy of administration in the south west and south east were not all that successful as it generated conflict and violent opposition. In the north, the traditional system of Islamic administration Lord Lugard met further encouraged him to adopt Indirect Rule. In practice, the native authorities, the *emirs*, continued to govern at will even if it acted against the will and interests of their people as the British were reluctant to checkmate their excesses and make changes. The emirates were still under the supervision of the *emirs* and his council of chiefs. In effect, it fostered and strengthened the power of the traditional rulers in the north as the "Sole Native Authorities".¹⁴⁰ The emirs were given the freedom to practice their traditional system of conflict resolution and management where disputants brought cases to the palace for settlement. They were sparsely supervised by the colonial officials.

The alteration of some traditional organizations of government in Benin and south west Nigeria also led to conflict eruption. That could explain the reason why the Indirect Rule was generally regarded to be partially successful. For example, it altered the traditional Egba republican government among the four rotational ruling groups of *Ake*, *Oke Ona*, *Owu* and *Gbagura*, and thereby made the Alake of Abeokuta the sole chief. The 1901 and 1903 rebellions against this action were forcefully crushed.¹⁴¹ But in the south east where there had never been an institutionalized traditional leadership, the system was not successful.

Maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of traditional authorities who were expected to resolve disputes among their subjects. But of peculiar importance was their duty to collect tax and raise labour for railway construction. Any case beyond the rulers and warrant officers in the case of southeastern Nigeria was referred to the native courts. The colonial administration continued with the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), formed by the British businessman Sir George Taubman Goldie of the Royal Niger Company, and the police to maintain law and order.

¹³⁹ Steven Pierce's review of Toyin Falola's *Violence and Colonialism in Nigeria*, on H-Net Reviews, <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=29504> (accessed 6 June 2016).

¹⁴⁰ I. Gambari (a system whereby the ruler administered his domain by leave of no one outside the British administration), p. 166.

¹⁴¹ I. Gambari, p. 167.

One could argue that the security outfits became a tool for repression and intimidation in the hands of colonial officials in annexing most of the Nigerian hinterlands.

Furthermore, whenever grievances and anger were expressed in protest against its policies, the colonial administration often responded with brutality. Taxes were usually a source of conflict in the colonial Nigeria. For example, the popular Aba Women Riots of 1929 over opposition to the tax laws and to redress social, political, and economic grievances were brutally crushed. Within a few years the appointed warrant chiefs (Africans) became increasingly oppressive. They seized property, imposed draconian local regulations, and began imprisoning anyone who openly criticized them.¹⁴² More than 50 women were killed and over 50 were other wounded and villages were burnt.¹⁴³ This Force served as deterrence to other region.¹⁴⁴ Such maltreatment, oppression and violation of basic rights fuelled anger and resentment against the system. The unusual condition of violations of human rights was sustained into the post-independent Nigeria.

Other resistances against the policies of indirect rule included the Bussa rebellion in 1915, the Okeho and Iseyin uprising in 1916 and the Egba riots of 1918. Force was used to pull down resistances. In Iseyin, the leaders, including the Aseyin of Iseyin, were publicly executed while in Egba, one of the *obas*, the Osile, was killed. The railway was attacked and stores were looted. The troops were brought in and 500 were killed before order was restored. Source of the crises was the growing powers of the *obas* and district heads, the imposition of direct taxation, the free labour demanded by the British for road construction. *Obas* such as Ooni and Awujale at times managed to be in power as a result of the support provided by the British.¹⁴⁵

Similarly, the way Nigeria was economically structured during the colonial rule was a source of conflict. The colonial economy was made to favour one region of the country over the other and thereby fomented inequality. Exports of produce were higher from the south than the north. For example, cocoa, rubber, palm oil, coal, tin and columbite were shipped from both the south west and south east while only ground nuts and tin were shipped from the north.¹⁴⁶ The uneven

¹⁴² <http://www.blackpast.org/gah/aba-womens-riots-november-december-1929#sthash.MZXDeJJa.dpuf>

¹⁴³ L.L. Zuka (2008) Women's War of 1929 IEO Women's War, p. 1
http://www.revolutionprotestencyclopedia.com/fragr_image/media/IEO_Womens_War_of_1929 (accessed 6 June 2016).

¹⁴⁴ I. Gambari, p. 165.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ I. Gambari, p. 165.

development could also be noticeable in education where the south was more educated than the north and the pattern had its consequences on the Nigerian political development.

The south was the first to receive western education through their contact with the Christian missionaries who had earlier began establishing schools before the British conquest. The north stuck to the Islamic education and civilization that they had received centuries before colonialism. Therefore, when opportunities for white collar jobs began to manifest themselves, only a few northerners were available. The disparity nurtured inferiority complex and bitterness that had characterized the better part of post-independent Nigeria.

The disparity in education was not addressed by the colonial administration. The educated class could not be elevated into higher positions from the low rank positions into higher cadres in the civil service because they were “*largely concentrated in the south of the country.*”¹⁴⁷ By this development, the seed of discord was further sown that reflected in the post-independent political conflicts. The British Governors from Lord Lugard to Sir Hugh Clifford could not concede their dislike and distrust for the educated Africans who mainly concentrated in the south. According to Gambari, Sir Clifford (the British Governor of colonial Nigeria, 1919-1925) condemned it in a very strong term:

Men born and bred in British administered towns situated on the seashore, who in the safety of British protection have peacefully pursued their studies under British schools, whose eyes are fixed not on African native history or tradition or policy nor upon their own tribal obligations and duties to their Natural rulers which immemorable customs should impose upon the political theories evolved by Europeans.¹⁴⁸

The result of the above analysis is that the educated elites of the south were alienated from the colonial administration and therefore were also put at loggerhead with their northern counterparts. The socio-economic inequality was not overcome even at independence. But it is noteworthy that this group of educated elites could not be wished away as they formed the nationalist movements behind the agitation for independence from the British.

¹⁴⁷ I. Gambari, p. 168.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 168.

By the same token, Mbachirin buttressed the dissection by saying that the division of the colony into three regions- Northern (dominated by Hausa-Fulani), Eastern (dominated by Igbo) and Western (Yoruba-dominated) - by the Richards Constitution of 1946 marked the beginning of many societal problems in Nigeria, especially socio-political and religious.¹⁴⁹ Geographically, the north is bigger than the west and east combined and the lopsidedness made the north to have the highest number of elected representatives in the colonial legislative councils. It had posed intractable socio-political and economic crises to the independent Nigeria.

According to Mbachirin, the British allied with the Muslim north to conquer the non-Muslims. This is because that it had been the plan of Uthman Dan Fodio's jihad of 1803 to subjugate the non-Muslims.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, during colonialism, the Muslims made false claims that the British fell for, that some territories, which were not even under its emirate belonged to them. Therefore, the British brought such places under the Muslim rule by force. One could argue that the effect of this practice on politics was that pre-colonial conflicts that had existed before the British were now institutionalized.

Rule by force was introduced into the Nigerian political culture by the colonial rule. Opposition to Muslim rule was regarded as opposition to the British rule. Not all ethnic groups in the north were Muslims, but the Colonial Native Authorities of the rulers extended to the non-Muslims. By this support, the British promoted divide and rule tactics, and helped spread Muslim influence.¹⁵¹ It could be argued that in analysing remote causes of religious conflict in Nigeria, such tactics can not be wished away.

In the politics, the non-Muslim felt discontent and opposed the imposition of Muslim administration. When the southern part of the country advocated for independence from the British in 1957, the north opposed it because they wanted power to be handed over to them upon their readiness. As Mbachirin puts it, indirect rule made some people feel it was their birthright to always rule; so that once they were not in power they stirred up trouble.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ A.T. Mbachirin (2006) *The Responses of the Church in Nigeria to Socio-Economic, Political and Religious Problems in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)*, p. 30.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 37-38.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 39.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* p. 40.

Beside politics, ethnicity was also institutionalized through the administrative system. The former belligerent ethnic groups were treated to more entrenched ethnicity during the colonial era. Ethnic loyalty became more important than national. Nigerians favour their kith and kin in national appointments. Each ethnic group sought to promote and protect its interest and struggles to find a place in the Nigerian socio-economic and political space on the detriment of others.¹⁵³ It can be debated that that sort of nepotism promoted indigenes-settlers dichotomy in the colonial settlement patterns. The favouritism reared its head after independence in almost all areas of national life including sports.

Furthermore, the enduring feature of colonial rule in term of ethnic divisions also reflected in the development of cities across Nigeria. Immigrants tended to settle in a designated part of the town where their folks had settled. These were called *Sabon-Gari* or *Tudun-Wada*, meaning new development and place of messengers (or laborers) respectively. The stigma attached to them was that they were strangers' quarters.¹⁵⁴ The colonial officials started the practice of living separately from the people. Better amenities and opportunities were enjoyed by officials and Nigerian new elites in the areas which gradually became known as the Government Reservation Areas (GRA). It could be argued that the practice systematically negated social and political integration as the immigrants were discriminated against in elective positions and other benefits. Such did not augur well for peacebuilding. The prevailing problem of citizenship had its roots in the way immigrants were treated. No matter how long a Nigerian resided in a place outside his or her place of origin such could not be regarded as a citizen regardless of how wealthy or popular the person was.

Regionalism, centerpiece of the divide and rule adopted by the colonial administration in which the 1951 Macpherson Constitution entrenched, was the beginning of regionalization of politics as no political party could garner national support to win a federal election, except it entered into alliances. The political parties that were formed between 1950 and 1959 were ethnically tied or regionally based in formation and mostly in followership. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) led by Sir Ahmadu Bello and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) by Malam Aminu Kano in the north; the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo and

¹⁵³ A.T. Mbachirin (2006) *The Responses of the Church in Nigeria to Socio-Economic, Political and Religious Problems in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)*, p. 41.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 46.

the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the east; the mid-belt had the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).¹⁵⁵

With the series of constitutional changes, power shifted away from the Native Authorities set up by the British to the new regional and national governments from 1952 to 1966. New middle class was created that included the political class, businessmen and women, lawyers and a few others. There was devolution of power from the traditional rulers to the new elites who took over the reins of power after independence.¹⁵⁶ In the midst of the criticism of the lopsidedness in the balance of power between the major ethnic groups, the fears of the minority groups such as the Tiv, the Nupe, Ijaw, the Ibibio, the Igala, the Idoma and many others were always there. To allay their fears the colonial government received recommendations from Minorities Commission it set up as one of the outcomes of the 1957 conference.¹⁵⁷ The legacies of all the aforementioned changes were part of the intractable causes of violent conflict in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, it is suffice to say that there were considerable changes in the socio-political and religious lives of the people as they imbibed western civilization and culture. Indigenous approaches of peacebuilding were mixed with the European way of building peace and conflict resolution. Though it could be observed that there was little literature on this aspect of the period, but it could be said that whenever the aggrieved wanted justice and redress, such would go to the palace of their traditional rulers or the religious leaders, and if unsatisfied with outcome, would proceed to the Colonial Native Courts. The Church's moral teachings and missionaries' initiatives could also be said to promote peaceful coexistence and religious harmony among the adherents.

Similarly, as education is key to peacebuilding, it played vital role in the emancipation of the people from domination and oppression as the product of western education played critical role in the nationalist struggle against colonialism. With the opening of the Yaba Higher College in 1934, higher education was introduced that saw to an increase of professionals and skilled Nigerians. Opportunities of employment that were available during the colonial rule were filled by youth and graduates in the civil service, teaching and vocational sectors, thereby multiplying

¹⁵⁵ A.T. Mbachirin (2006) *The Responses of the Church in Nigeria to Socio-Economic, Political and Religious Problems in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)*, p. 50.

¹⁵⁶ Local and National politics, <http://www.lucy.ukc.ac.uk/yorubat/yt5.html>.

¹⁵⁷ K.W.J. Post and M. Vickers, p. 171.

the number of educated Nigerians. In 1948, the establishment of the Ibadan University College which later became the University of Ibadan further increased the level of growth and development. Men and women such as Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome Kuti who later formed nationalist movements were product of this system.

Infrastructure such as transport and communication set up primarily for the purpose of transporting goods, produce and facilitating services from the hinterlands to the coasts for onward shipment to Europe were useful for peacebuilding purpose. The railway and road links opened up the interior of the country which in the view of Gambari “greatly fostered the country’s unity”.¹⁵⁸

Media is indispensable in peacebuilding as it could make or break peace. Press was created as newspapers were published to inform, educate and entertain. The first, *Iwe Irohin* founded by the Christian missionaries in 1859, and later by numerous others such as *Lagos Daily News* became critical of the colonial administration as the journalists pressed for reforms and freedom. By this means, newspapers became an avenue for peaceful protest and a catalyst for the nationalist sentiments.¹⁵⁹

In summation, however, within a decade to independence, Nigerian political structure was characterized by unevenness and ethnic bias particularly in the pattern of formation of political parties and elected representatives. From the early 1950s to January 1966 when the military took over the reins of power, the AG in the west, NPC in the north and NCNC in the east held sway in their respective regions.¹⁶⁰ In the 1959 federal election, the north had 148 of the 312 seats, thereby making it the largest region with the highest representatives. Of course, coalitions were formed but they did not last as they weakened over a period of few years. In the 1959 election, NPC went into alliance with the NCNC while AG allied with the United Middle Belt Congress, to form opposition in the Federal House of Representatives. The unhealthy politics did not augur well for a democratic Nigeria. Instead of building social cohesion and peaceful coexistence of the over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups that made up the Nigeria, the colonial administration bequeathed a sharply divided nation across deep-seated ethnic, political,


¹⁵⁸ I. Gambari, p. 164.

¹⁵⁹ T. Falola and M.M. Heaton, p. 131.

¹⁶⁰ I. Gambari, p. 169.

economic and religious backgrounds. At independence, promises were made, hopes were rekindled and expectations were high that Nigeria would overcome all the challenges and correct the mistakes that the colonial administration had made.

Map 2.1 Modern Map of Nigeria showing the 36 states including Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory



Source: Total Fact about Nigeria, <http://www.total-facts-about-nigeria.com/physical-map-of-nigeria.html>

2.4 Post-Independence Nigeria and the Drivers of Conflict

Having explained how the previously autonomous groups were brought together by the British with the 1914 Amalgamation, and the peacebuilding gains and challenges of the colony, the research study explored the mismanagement of transitioning Nigeria into a truly free, safe and open society after independence. One could assert that the misdirection of power would become the nemesis of peace and security. Yet again, Falola and Heaton state the situation as succinctly as possible, “Nigeria also saw itself as a beacon of hope for other colonized peoples...By 1970, however, the stability and prestige of Nigeria had been greatly damaged by a decade of political

corruption, economic underdevelopment, and military coups.”¹⁶¹ Instead to right the wrong of colonial rule, the mismanagement of change by the political class worsened the inherited peacebuilding challenges.

Instead of correcting or rising up against the constraints imposed by the colonial past, successive governments, military and civilian, promoted the colonial legacies of North-South dichotomy, divide and rule, irredentism, corruption, repression, human rights abuse, greed and corruption, intolerance, non-adherence to rule of law, inequality and injustice, just to mention a few. The legacies came to be described as drivers of conflict¹⁶² in Nigeria and had trumped up seemingly intractable conflicts and crimes such as ethno-religious and political violence, terrorism, armed robbery, kidnapping, militancy, pipe-line vandalism, civil disobedience, and many more.

Nigerians began to despair and dismay at the way and manner the political class commenced the freedom journey. Abubakar Momoh articulates the mood better:

At Nigeria's independence in 1960, it became apparent that the emergent petit bourgeoisie, the merchant class and the elite who mounted the political turf were set to run a neo-colonial state; the promises and hopes of independence were dashed; and all the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist campaigns by the Nigerian peoples - workers, peasants, women, students, the professionals and indeed the left were compromised. The political energies of the popular forces — as expressed, for example, in the Egba women's revolt, the 1945 workers' strike, and the revolt following the Iva Valley massacre—were squandered.¹⁶³

Consequently, the first democratic election in 1964 to be held and organized by Nigerians ended in chaos. As Post and Vickers posit, “*the experience of the Nigerian federal election of 1964 provides ample evidence that inability to comply with these basic ‘rules’ helped to mature the*

¹⁶¹ T. Falola and M.M. Heaton (2008) A History of Nigeria, Cambridge University Press, p. 158.

¹⁶² Henk-Jan Brinkman, et al (2013) Addressing Horizontal Inequalities As Drivers Of Conflict In The Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, p. 4, <file:///C:/Users/Tunde/Downloads/Inequalities-conflict-FV.pdf> (accessed 28 November, 2016).

¹⁶³ A. Momoh (1996) Popular Struggles in Nigeria 1960-1982, p. 154, Afr.j.pel*,id., Vol. 1 No. 2, 154-175, <http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/political%20science/volume1n2/ajps001002003.pdf>

conditions for disintegration.”¹⁶⁴ The administrative issues that emerged in 1959 became more serious in the 1964 election as the electoral body, the Federal Electoral Commission was accused of favouritism and rigging. Agreement between the parties to engage in a free and fair election was not adhered to as criticisms, accusations and counter-accusations became the order of the day. Thugs i.e. armed criminals were used to inflict violent attacks on people and thereby scuttled the process.

The political instability that ushered in self-government culminated in the first military coup of 15 January 1966 where the Prime Minister Sir Tafawa Balewa, the Premier of Northern Region Sir Ahmadu Bello and other notable Hausa politicians who were mostly Muslims were assassinated. Thus ended the democratic government of the First Republic. Led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, a young Igbo officer, majority in the group were of the same ethnic element and Christian. In the introduction of their book, Post and Vickers succinctly put as thus, “*The image of Nigeria as the ‘last stronghold of democracy’ in Africa was finally shattered when a military coup overthrew the existing Government on 15 January 1966.*”¹⁶⁵ Nzeogwu’s speech on that day revealed the motive behind the coup and was of interest to this research study because it was all-encompassing:

Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds. Like good soldiers we are not promising anything miraculous or spectacular. But what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human

¹⁶⁴ K.W.J. Post and M. Vickers (1973) *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-1965*, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, p. 3.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 1.

endeavour, both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian.¹⁶⁶

The coup ushered in a long military rule and intra-elite struggle for power in Nigeria. Between 1966 and 1999 when the country returned to democratic rule, there were ten changes in government within the space of thirty-nine years and four years of civilian government.¹⁶⁷ The military incursion into politics and the nature of Nigerian politics further entrenched the vestiges of colonialism. These and other unaddressed grievances such as corruption, ethnic rivalry, nepotism, citizenship crisis, marginalization, resource allocation issues, prebendal federalism, amongst others had haunted Nigeria since the 1966 coup. It could be argued that the grievances and unresolved issues fueled socio-political and religious violence and insurgencies such as the Biafra's secession that prompted the Nigeria Civil War, the Niger Delta militancy, mass migration and many more.

Thereafter the issues raised in the Major Nzeogwu's speech had trailed the country. A string of events such as coups and countercoups often left in their path massacres, retaliatory killings, witch-hunting, forced migration, displacement and other social problems. For example, about 30,000 Igbo were believed to have been killed.¹⁶⁸ It can be said that such actions deepened anger and unhealthy relationship.

The Federal government's declaration of "No victor, no vanquished" at the capitulation of the Biafran army, was a step to bring back the Eastern Nigeria. The government outlined a peacebuilding initiative of 3Rs -*Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction*.¹⁶⁹ But events long after the war revealed that the programmes were not implemented effectively enough as bitterness and underdevelopment remained not only in the East but in other parts of the country. Agitations or threats of secession were common afterwards.

¹⁶⁶ Google's Ebook, P.J. Odu, *The Future that Vanished: A Biafra Story*, p. 78, [www.http://.books.google.co.za](http://books.google.co.za), and also on Vanguard Newspaper, 30 September 2010, [www.http://.vanguardngr.com](http://vanguardngr.com), (accessed 10 June 2016).

¹⁶⁷ Nigerian Past and Present Leaders from 1960 Till Present, <http://hotnaijanews.com/nigerian-past-and-present-leaders-from-1960-till-present/> (accessed 10 June 2016).

¹⁶⁸ Max Siollun, 15 January 2016, How first coup still haunts Nigeria 50 years on, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370> (accessed 10 June 2016).

¹⁶⁹ Online Nigeria Daily News of June 13 2016, The Gowon Regime and The Nigerian Civil War, 1966 – 1975, <http://military.onlinenigeria.com/?blurb=677> (accessed 10 June 2016).

One can say to a great extent that the military's influence in Nigerian politics had fuelled conflict and promoted insecurity. Promises of each regime to correct national grievances and restore order were unkempt. Hence the military held the state and society at siege and the military became an issue in the national question.¹⁷⁰ It could be said that its dismantling of democratic institutions did not offer opportunity for the people to be given a sense of collective aspirations and build nationalism. Its mismanagement of the economy such as the General Ibrahim Babangida administration's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 which deregulated and devalued the naira,¹⁷¹ plunged Nigeria into a troubled economy. Agriculture was neglected at the expense of petroleum. The neglect further led Nigeria into poverty, crime, mass migration, unemployment and institutional decay. These were some of the conditions driving armed conflict and crime.

The antisocial deeds that could be noticed in the society were as a result of long years of military rule. Force was systematically introduced into the public space and Nigerians' lexicon. As Frank and Ukpere observe, "[T]he Nigerian civic culture was eroded and militarized culture imbibed. Thus, the rule of operation became that of order, combat rather than dialogue, disregard of court orders and violation of human rights became the tenets of militarized civic culture."¹⁷² Endless political transitions, annulment of elections, incarceration, press gag orders and, impunity and immunity were a few of actions behind vices among the populace and chaos in the polity. Military mentality became the norm and the acceptable in the society. Aggressiveness and indiscipline could be noticed in daily life of the people. Nigerians became easily agitated at common matters and disrespectful to authorities such as disobeying traffic regulations and disregard to public order. Under the military watch, the Nigeria Police became corrupt and inefficient and lost public respect. The General Muhammadu Buhari's military regime that introduced the *War Against Indiscipline* (WAI) in 1984 to check the menace was overthrown.

¹⁷⁰ M.E.U.Tedheke, *National Question Versus Micro National Chauvinism: Issues in the Dialectics of Conflicts in Nigerian Federalism*, p. 443, in *Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria*, pp. 423-449.

¹⁷¹ J.C. Anyanwu (1992) President Babangida's Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria, *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 7,1, pp. 5-24, p. 5, <http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/social%20development/vol7no1/jsda007001003.pdf> (accessed 23 June, 2016).

¹⁷² Frank Etim O. and Ukpere Wilfred I. (2 012) The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in Nigeria, p. 228, *Kamla-Raj 20 12 J So c Sci*, 33(3): 285-292, [http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-33-0-000-12-Web/JSS-33-3-000-12-Abst-PDF/JSS-33-3-285-12-1263-Ukpere-W-I/JSS-33-3-285-12-1263-Ukpere-W-I-Tx\[2\].pdf](http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Journals/JSS/JSS-33-0-000-12-Web/JSS-33-3-000-12-Abst-PDF/JSS-33-3-285-12-1263-Ukpere-W-I/JSS-33-3-285-12-1263-Ukpere-W-I-Tx[2].pdf) (accessed 12 June 2016).

Also, violations of human rights attributed to the military had driven conflict in Nigeria. Its rules by decrees and fiat curtailed freedoms. Recklessness, authoritarianism and injustice were common. For example, dissenting newspapers houses were closed, journalists, pro-democracy activists and civil society members were arrested, some detained or jailed without trials. During civilian administration, the military exerted control and influence as the drafter of constitution and ex-servicemen became politicians with heavy financial backing. The criminal justice system was weak and it could be argued it affected peace and tranquility of Nigeria. Similarly, corruption that began during the colonial era became rampant and endemic during the military rule. While describing corruption in public offices, A.A. Akiwowo and Richard Olaniyan say “*The corrupt informal pattern of relationships in the formal structure of the offices extended beyond the office walls into society at large and became the acceptable norm.*”¹⁷³

In the light of the above, one could argue that there was lack of transparency and accountability in governance. In reiteration, corruption became institutionalized. Top-down, there was hardly any official transaction both in the public and private sectors that would be carried out without an abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Tip or kick back was expected for result. Nigerians’ trust was undermined in every sphere of public life. According to the Transparency International’s 1996 *Corruption Perception Index*, Nigeria was ranked 54 the most corrupt country among 54 countries that were ranked together. In 1997, it was ranked 52 out of the 52 countries ranked. In 1998, it ranked 98.¹⁷⁴ Corruption had the potential to lead to unemployment, diseases, illiteracy, mediocrity, money laundry, extremism/terrorism, crime, socio-political conflict and other social malaise when the money meant for development was misappropriated or diverted. An unemployed youth may be a potential recruit for criminals or conflict entrepreneurs. Religious intolerance often fuelled sectarian and inter-religious conflict. From the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s in Kano that spread to most parts of the North to Boko Haram terrorists, bad governance and violent extremism were behind its cause and in its ranks were unemployed and disoriented youth.

The enduring North-South controversy and Majority-Minority dichotomy had been major conflict drivers. National issues such as elections, census, education, allocation and resource

¹⁷³ A.A. Akiwowo and R. Olaniyan (1985) *Social Change and Stability in Contemporary Nigeria*, p. 221, in R. Olaniyan (ed.) *Nigerian History and Culture*, Longman Group Limited, pp. 220-232.

¹⁷⁴ Transparency International’s TI Corruption Index at www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_1999/01 (accessed 13 June 2016).

control were often trailed by this controversy while fear of domination and control stirred ethnic violence. The peoples in the south mistrusted the Hausa-Fulani in the north and the longstanding suspicion often expressed in form of violence and killings.¹⁷⁵ Ethnic minorities felt alienated from national and zonal political process and thereby created bitterness and tension militating against national unity. Secession and political apathy are some of the fallouts. These factors and others have also precipitated political violence such as during 1979 and 1983 elections leading to deaths and destruction. Elections were brazenly rigged. For example, the 1983 elections witnessed use of political thugs and there were accusations of electoral malpractices by all political stakeholders-parties, electoral bodies, and security agencies. The results were beatings, killings, burning of houses, snatching of ballot boxes and falsification of results. The 1983 post-election riots in the former Ondo State witnessed serious destructions of lives and property.

Closely related to this ethnic division was the issue of citizenship and indigeneship which had precipitated violence in the country. Citizenship had become politicized. Ethnicity became basis of state policies. For example, non-indigenes paid higher fees in some state tertiary institutions such as Abia, Zamfara, and Kwara. Examples of the settler/indigene dichotomy were the Yoruba/Hausa Fulani feuds in Kwara State, Ife/Modakeke violent clashes in Osun State, Tiv-Idoma Fulani massacres in Benue State, Eggon/Fulani conflict in Nasarawa State, Aguleri/Umuleri wars in Anambra State, to mention a few.¹⁷⁶ There were controversies and contestations over citizenship rights which had become major sources of disagreement and political conflicts that often threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria.¹⁷⁷ For the purpose of controlling power and resources, there was hardly any state in Nigeria that had not experienced crises over matters around “us” and “them”. Communal conflicts over boundary, land (farming, housing, or grazing), chieftaincy and other natives versus settlers’ tussles were also common. In short, controversy over citizenship was one of the major triggers of violent conflict in Nigeria.

Therefore, it could be contended that the perceived feeling of incomprehensive practice of true federalism by the government had undermined the unity of the country. The anomaly could be traceable to colonial heritage. Federal character had created unwarranted favouritism and at

¹⁷⁵ K.W.J. Post, and M. Post (1973) p. 1.

¹⁷⁶ The Guardian (Nigerian newspaper, Editorial) of Wed. November 30, 2005, p. 16.

¹⁷⁷ R.A. Dunmoye (2008) The Citizenship-Indigeneship Contestations in Nigeria: Towards the Evolution of An Organic Citizen, p. 59, in H.P. Golwa and O.O. Ojiji, *Dialogue on Citizenship in Nigeria, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution*, pp. 59-77.

worse sponsored mediocrity.¹⁷⁸ There was evolution of “our-own-man syndrome which made performance at public institutions and functions ineffective. Every state and local government looked up to the centre for survival and generating internal revenue was neglected. The practice had witnessed increased agitations by the minorities over restructuring, resource control, and marginalization. Ethnic militias such as the Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), the Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the Arewa Youth, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and others have unleashed violent protests and caused instability across the country.

As Nigeria was battling with challenges of nationbuilding, external influence was also fanning embers of conflict in the country. International institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Funds and of course the western countries often pressured the government in adopting obnoxious financial policies such as Structural Adjustment Programme (aforementioned), deregulation, trade liberalization, and loans that would further impoverish the lives of the people.¹⁷⁹ The effect of the impoverishment led to increased poverty, unemployment and similar challenges. Similarly, transnational criminal gangs undermined national security through illegal crossing of the porous borders. Smuggling of goods, arms and human and drug trafficking led to closure of companies, oil bunkering, insurgency, kidnapping, armed robbery, cattle rustling and many more. Smuggling was the most challenging cross-border crime to Nigeria’s social, economic, political and environmental life. According to Ojukwu (Nigeria Police), cross-border smuggling was the greatest source of illegal arms in the country. These arms fall into the hands of criminals.¹⁸⁰

The sum of the above analysis provided background in answering the question of the deep-seated conflict dynamics of the research study. It could be understood how challenges of peacebuilding had been defined by Nigerian pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial socio-political developments. The inability of the successive political leaderships to reverse the trends most especially during the military rule became Nigeria’s undoing. As Tony Eke reflects, “*It is*

¹⁷⁸ The Guardian, (Nigerian newspaper, Editorial) of Wed. November 30, 2005, p. 16.

¹⁷⁹ J.C. Anyanwu (1992) President Babangida's Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation in Nigeria, p. 5, *Journal of Social Development in Africa*, 7, 1, pp. 5-24.

¹⁸⁰ In a confidential interview carried out with the Police PRO on July 2009.

shocking to note that some Nigerians actually have come to believe, and with good cause, that the colonial authorities did not treat Nigerians as badly as the Nigerian military has done.”¹⁸¹

But much had changed after the military handed power over to the democratically elected government in 1999 as the identified drivers of violent conflict and armed criminality had become entrenched in the Nigerian system or culture. Several lives and property had been lost while millions were displaced to sporadic violence. The resultant outcomes were no longer what they were at independence as the class of actors and issues in the conflict had increased to include the military, security agencies, civil society, religious adherents, women, youth, ethnic militias, foreigners and a host of others. How the legacies of injustice and other drivers of historical conflicts could be better managed for effective peacebuilding and conflict prevention became a source of concern for the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration. Such pressing situation and the exigency to build a democratic and violence-free Nigeria informed the baseline study to the establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Chapter Three.

¹⁸¹ P.P. Ekeh (1998) Theory and Curse of Military Rule and the Transition Program, http://www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/archive/opinion/theory.html (accessed 23 June, 2016).

CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Instead of progress and development, which we are entitled to expect from those who governed us, we experienced in the last decade and a half, and particularly in the last regime but one, persistent deterioration in the quality of our governance, leading to instability and the weakening of all public institutions...All Nigerian citizens and residents in our midst are entitled to the protection of life and property.

President Olusegun Obasanjo¹⁸²

3.1 Introduction

Having explained the most challenging issues of nationbuilding which had precipitated violent conflicts in Nigeria, it was imperative to provide the immediate background information as to why IPCR was established through an examination of the immediate causes of conflict in Nigeria. A peace foundation belonging to a former military head of state was taken over by government for a national peace agency, saddled with the responsibility of researching into the underlying causes of violent conflict and promoting peacebuilding. The Institute's establishment, mandate, structure, capacity and values supported basis to examine the evidence of IPCR peacebuilding impact in terms of its efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. As peacebuilding constituted the core aspect of its mandate and executed programmes, the research study explained the background of the Institute in three ways.

First, through baseline study for the establishment of IPCR, that is, the studies that was conducted to set standards against what would be measured or assessed. Thus, the study provided some understanding on the prevalence of conflict and violence in Nigeria at the time IPCR was established.

Secondly, the chapter provided the rationale and effort behind the Institution's formation. That is, what, when and how IPCR was founded by the civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. And thirdly, the chapter outlined and examined the establishment mandate, organizational structure and values in order to understand what evidence was there to show IPCR

¹⁸² Selected Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo, vol.1, Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, on the Inaugural speech by President Obasanjo following his swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Saturday, 29th May, 1999, pp. 12-14.

had impacted peace. Background information and analysis on the organizational structure enhanced understanding on how IPCR had intervened to bring about change through organizational efficiency.

3.2 Baseline Study to the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution

In the aftermath of long period of military rule, Nigeria had witnessed serious abuse of human rights and subversion of public institutions as pointed out in the previous chapter. Torture, incarceration and extra-judicial killings of activists became rampant. Social critics and human rights lawyers such as Gani Fawehinmi, Femi Falana and Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, the famous Afro-Beat musician were frequently detained. The citizens felt oppressed and alienated while some activists such as the Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka went into exile to escape the military clampdown. The worse was during the regime of General Sani Abacha who hanged the Niger Delta's environmental activist Saro Wiwa and nine other Ogoni men. Sactioned and isolated by the international community, the Nigerian situations impacted negatively on the socio-economic and political lives of the people.

Following the death of General Abacha in June 1998, he was succeeded by General Abdulsalam Abubakar who released political prisoners including Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and moved Nigeria towards a political transition to civilian rule.¹⁸³ As Peter P. Ekeh observes, reasons behind Abubakar's push at democracy could be understood as follow:

Nigerians have grown weary of military rule. They are less likely to accept another excuse for prolonging military dictatorship. Secondly, there is a world-wide delegitimization of military rule, with democracy breaking out in several regions of the world, following the collapse of the Cold War. The banning of visits by Nigerian military officers, and their civilian surrogates, to the United States and Western Europe has raised the cost of military rule in the country and diminished the stature of military rulers.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ T. Dagne (2005) Nigeria in Political Transition, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, www.fas.org (accessed 20 August, 2016).

¹⁸⁴ P.P. Ekeh (1998) Pitfalls in Nigeria's Renewed Program of Transition to Civil Rule, Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, www.waado.org (accessed 22 August, 2016).

Consequently, Gen. Abubakar organized elections and returned Nigeria to civilian government on 29 May, 1999, barely a year in power. The ex-military Head of State, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) won the election and was sworn-in as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29 May, 1999. Apparently, it could be argued that the emergence of Obasanjo as president was to assuage the people of the south-west zone of Nigeria over the annulled 12 June, 1993 presidential election results, incarceration and mysterious death of the acclaimed winner of the 1993 presidential election, Chief M.K.O. Abiola by the military.¹⁸⁵

During inauguration, President Obasanjo charged Nigerians on the task ahead and gave a glimpse of what to expect of his administration:

I shall end this address by stressing again that we must change our ways of governance and of doing business on this eve of the coming millennium. This we must do to ensure progress, justice, harmony and unity and above all, to rekindle confidence amongst our people. Confidence that their conditions will rapidly improve and that Nigeria will be great and will become a major world player in the near future.¹⁸⁶

According to Reuben Abati, *“Obasanjo helped to stabilize the country after many years of abuse by military dictators, and in terms of policies, personal focus and drive, he rescued the country.”*¹⁸⁷ But effect of the damage inflicted on the Nigerian system was more than that.

On 14 June, 1999, President Obasanjo set up the Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission, also known as the Oputa Panel, likened to the South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to heal the wounds of the past, reconcile the disaffected and rebuild relationships. He observed that the long years of the military rule had stifled the opposition and affected the psychic of the people. Unfortunately, though, its findings were not made known to the public. At the Panel’s inauguration, President Obasanjo said in his address:

¹⁸⁵ A. Momoh and P. Thovoethin (2001) An Overview of the 1998-1999 Democratization Process in Nigeria, p. 4, <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN009286.pdf> (accessed 19 August, 2016).

¹⁸⁶ Inaugural speech by His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo following his swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Saturday, 29th May, 1999. (Selected Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Vol.1, Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, p. 18.

¹⁸⁷ R. Abati (2016) *The Parable of the Husband’s Cane*, in a Nigerian evening newspaper, 14 August, 2016, www.pmnewsnigeria.com.

The investigation Panel being inaugurated today is consistent with this Administration's policy of openness and transparency in the conduct of Government business as well as our determination to heal the wounds of the past and quickly put the past behind us so as to continue to stretch our hands of fellowship and friendship to all Nigerians for complete reconciliation based on truth and knowledge of truth in our land. We want to reconcile all those who feel alienated by the past political events, heal wounds inflicted on our people and restore harmony in our country. We want the injured and the seemingly injured to be reconciled with their oppressors or seeming oppressors. That is the way forward.¹⁸⁸

The above statement by the President posed critical challenge to his government as it seemed to point to the wounded past in the national politics. But how his administration reconciled the relationships and built peace became a subject of scrutiny as later events in the national politics revealed. Instead of peace, the democracy began to generate conflict. The military era had aggravated anti-social behaviours. Many were aggrieved and frustrated, nerves frayed and youth undisciplined while some Nigerians became intolerant of one another's views and perceptions particularly among political class and religious adherents. There were mistrust among the ethnic nationalities, identity crisis, youth unemployment and stereotypes were common. Some saw imbalance and injustice in the federating units, political appointments, federal allocations, resource control, and other related issues.

The seemingly conceived anger and bitterness during the military rule began to manifest in militancy. For example, the Niger Delta militants, the O'dua People's Congress (OPC) of the Yorubaland, Arewa People's Congress (APC) and other ethnic militias and religious bigotry developed. Violent agitations for self-determination, resource control, political freedom and many others became the order of the day. The long and unmanned borders resulted in proliferation of arms and illicit drugs which gave rise to armed robbery, kidnapping, cross-border smuggling, trafficking and international criminal gangs. The effect was an upsurge in crime wave. For example, the President Obasanjo's car was stolen but later found in Benin Republic

¹⁸⁸ Address by President Olusegun Obasanjo at the inauguration of the Human Rights Investigation Panel on Monday 14th June, 1999 at the State House, Abuja, in the Selected Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Vo. 1, 2001, Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, Nigeria, p. 53.

through the assistance of INTERPOL in 2002. In addition, Obasanjo's daughter, Iyabo, escaped death from assassins who killed two teenage girls in her car along the Benin border in the same year. Also the likes of Shina Rambo, an armed robber, had also unleashed a reign of terror on Nigerians from across the borders.¹⁸⁹

Tensions, threats, discontent, frustrations, suspicions and despondency were in the open. Ethnic nationalities and other groups that could speak out began to vent their anger or demand one thing or the other from the government. Obasanjo succinctly captured it in one of his addresses: “[T]hese demands are mostly borne out of deep frustration and despair over the persistent failure of central governments to meet the hopes and aspirations of the people.”¹⁹⁰

It did not take too long when resurgence of violent conflicts began in the many parts of the country. Cyril Obi describes the moment this way: “[S]ince the onset of Nigeria's latest attempt at democracy there has been an escalation of communal conflict and ethnic/sectarian strife.”¹⁹¹

The first to occur on the third day of democratic rule, 31 May, 1999 was at Warri, Delta State between the Ijaw and Itsekiri communities which had its roots in the grievances harboured by the Olu of Warri and his subjects over the recognition of new Kings of Warri by the past military administration.¹⁹² An apt description of that moment was given by Salihu I. Onimajesin: “The restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria on 29 May, 1999 also signalled the emergence and continued proliferation of vigilante groups, ethnic and sectional militias as well as secessionist or separatist groups.”¹⁹³

Similarly, Obi depicted the unpleasant development in the early part of the administration thus:

[t]he democratic opening has provided a platform and space for the resurgence of long-repressed demands for the restructuring of the Nigerian federation and the sharing of Nigeria's (oil) wealth on a more equitable basis and the emergence of ethnic militias-the O'dua People's

¹⁸⁹ O.A. Babatunde, pp. 11-12.

¹⁹⁰ National Reawakening Address by President Obasanjo to the Inaugural Session of the National Assembly, 4 June, 1999.

¹⁹¹ C. Obi (2000) Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Political Transition, *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5. No.2, p. 82 www.pdfproc.lib.msu.edu (accessed 20-August, 2016).

¹⁹² J.I. Elaigwu (2005) *Crises and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980*, p. 59, in A.M. Yakubu et al., *Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria*, Nigerian Defence Academy, pp. 29-79.

¹⁹³ S.I. Onimajesin (2005) The OPC Militancy in Nigeria, 1999-2003: Its Implications and Management, p. 575, in *Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria*, Nigeria Defence Academy, pp. 575-588.

Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Arewa People's Congress (APC), to name a few.¹⁹⁴

After the Warri episode, a series of ugly violent incidents were unleashed in the polity, thus threatened the fledgling democracy. In the south west, there was an eruption of violence between the OPC and Hausa settlers in Shagamu, Ogun State which claimed several lives and property. The corpses of Hausa men which were conveyed to Kano generated retaliatory waves of violence against the Yoruba. Northern youth formed the Arewa People's Congress in response.¹⁹⁵ The OPC violence in Ketu and other areas in Lagos led the Igbos to found the Igbo People's Congress (IPC). When the OPC leader, Gani Adams was arrested and freed by the Obasanjo government, many saw it as injustice. The government incursion into Odi, Bayelsa State dittoed the injustice. According to Jonah Elaigwu, the declaration of Sharia by some Northern states was in response to this development.¹⁹⁶ In the south east, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) also threatened to declare Republic of Biafra. Commenting on the state of insecurity, Isaac O. Albert compactly puts it this way:

The whole country is simply a huge confusion. Each of these groups suffers from what psychologists have characterized as "post-traumatic stress disorder"...the frustrations derive from the fact that Nigeria is characterized by conspicuous absence of popular participation, official accountability, social justice and equality. All these make it easy for those recruiting militant elements to have a large population of frustrated people to draw upon.¹⁹⁷

There was an upsurge of crises after the above ugly incidents. For example, there were 5,000 internally-displaced people in Nigeria in 1999.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, the number of breaches of peace in 1997 was 7,100 while it increased to 7,519 in 1998.¹⁹⁹ Many could be attributed to outburst of a prolonged decay in the system and nonchalant attitude to peacebuilding and conflict prevention mechanisms. The violence claimed people's lives, destroyed property and displaced several

¹⁹⁴ C. Obi (2000) *Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Political Transition* p. 82.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p.34.

¹⁹⁶ J.I. Elaigwu (2005) *Crises and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980*, p. 35.

¹⁹⁷ O.I. Albert (2005) *International Dimensions of Social Conflicts in Nigeria Since 1980*, p. 402, in A.M. Yakubu, et al., *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria*, Nigerian Defence Academy, pp. 389-386.

¹⁹⁸ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2002) *World Disasters Reports: Focus on reducing risk*, at the Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja, p. 210.

¹⁹⁹ Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1999 edition of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), p. 149.

people. Therefore, it became absolutely imperative to set up an institutional mechanism to address the underlying causes of violence as the following series of conflict outlined by Elaigwu, erupted between May 1999 and February 2000:²⁰⁰

- 22 July, 1999 in Kano, Hausa/Fulani youth took vengeance on the killing of their kith and kin in Sagamu. They targeted the Yoruba community.
- 4 August, 1999 in Arobo, Ondo State, a violent clash between two feuding communities of the Ijaw and Ilaje.
- 5 October, 1999 in Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, violent clash between the Eleme and Okrika communities over traditional and land titles to the stretch of land where Port-Harcourt refinery is located.
- 19 October, 1999 in Ajegunle, Lagos, an extension of Arobo-Ijaw/Ilaje crisis. A fracas between the Ijaw and OPC ensued after kidnap of an Ijaw man.
- October 1999 in Aguleri-Umuleri, Anambra State, a violent communal clash between two neighbouring communities.
- 8 November, 1999 in Odi killings in Bayelsa State, Youth group, the *Egbesu* kidnapped and killed policemen in revenge of the killing of their members. Odi was bombarded with artillery from soldiers.
- 16 November, 1999 in Isoko in Delta State, a bloody clash between Oleh and Olomuro communities over sharing of used pipes from Oleh-Olomuro flow stations.
- 26 November, 1999 in Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, an extension of hostility between the two neighbouring communities of Eleme and Okrika.

Meanwhile, the above violence of ethno-religious, communal and political manifestations were as a result of the long years of socio-political injustice, corruption, poverty and unemployment in the nation. Panels of enquiry to look into their causes and make recommendations to the government were set up for each of the incident and reports were submitted. But in most cases, the reports were not made known to the public. Violent conflict became a cycle as while some ended through resolution or otherwise, others reared their heads in other parts of the country such as in Kaduna, Ife-Modakeke in Osun State, Owo in Ondo State, Share-Tsaragi in Kwara State and a host of other areas of the country. They had posed formidable threat to national security. In an interview, Mr. Peter Opara, a Director in the Institute and a pioneer staff observed that “the

²⁰⁰ J.I. Elaigwu, pp. 59-60.

recurring violence during the democratic transition prompted the government to take action to stem the tide.”²⁰¹

The impact of the prevailing conflict on human development prompted President Obasanjo to observe during the launch of the 1999 Human Development Report:

It is estimated by the end of 1997, nearly 49 percent of our citizens lived below the poverty level. Statistical evidence indicates that the rate of impoverishment between 1993 and 1997 was highest in the history of modern Nigeria It is hardly surprising that Nigeria now ranks among the 25 poorest countries in the world.²⁰²

To address the root causes, the government realized the need for an evidence-informed policies and practices to better manage and build peace in Nigeria. As a measure of public policy response to the crises, an institution which would be manned by civil personnel was needed to carry out research into the causes and dynamics of conflict, thereby making recommendations to the government, and at the same time address the root causes through peacebuilding and advocacy. The Guardian described IPCR as “*Nigeria’s foremost and indigenous civilian peace and conflict resolution institute*”²⁰³ when established. As Jonah Elaigwu succinctly put it: “*Given the number of crises and conflicts which we have had, it is clear that political elites in Nigeria must devise mechanism for managing conflicts.*”²⁰⁴


²⁰¹ Peter Opara is the Director, Internal Conflict and Resolution of IPCR. Granted an interview on 6 January, 2016.

²⁰² Address by President Olusegun Obasanjo on the occasion of the launch of 1999 Human Development Report and 1998 Nigerian Human Development Report at Nicon Hilton Hotel, Abuja, Thursday 19th August, 1999, in the Selected Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Vo. 1, 2001, Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, Nigeria, p. 167.

²⁰³ The Guardian, 4 September, 2001, *Institute sacks* 43, p. 2.

²⁰⁴ The Guardian, 4 September, 2001, *Institute sacks* 43, p. 45.

Map 3.1 Political Map Showing the 6 Geo-Political Zones of Nigeria 2016²⁰⁵



Source: ResearchGate

²⁰⁵ ResearchGate: Pre-colonial to present map of Nigeria
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/283770788_fig5_Fig-1-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the-6-geo-political-zones-36-states-and-federal-capita (accessed 4 November, 2016).

Table 3.1 Nigerian Political Violence Compared Across ACLED, UCDP and SCAD²⁰⁶

	ACLED (1990-2010)	UCDP (1990-2010)	SCAD (1990-2011)
Total Number of Events	3379	318	1124
Average Event Count/year	211	14	49
Average Event Count in Overlap year (1997-2010)	185	22	62
Main Agents	Political Militias vs Civilians (489)	Government of Nigeria vs Civilians (49)	Government of Nigeria vs Civilians (61)
Main types of violence	Battles between armed groups (1090)	Non-state (241)	Spontaneous violent riot (359)
Number of Distinct Actors	342	50 (dyads)	unknown

ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset

UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program

SCAD - Social Conflict Analysis Database

Closely related to this exposition was Obasanjo administration's insight "...to observe the changing nature of violent conflicts, away from traditional mode of conflict and towards developing a proactive policy-oriented research and advice at facilitating conflict prevention, management and resolution.²⁰⁷ It is sufficed to say Nigeria had fought a civil war (1967-1970) and had participated in peacekeeping missions around the world, particularly in the regional peacekeeping efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) through

²⁰⁶ Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, www.acleddata.com (accessed 23 September, 2016).

²⁰⁷ The Presidential approval document of establishing IPCR signed by President Olusegun Obasanjo on 12 February, 2000, titled Peace Foundation: Objectives, Programmes and Structure, Ref: PRES/176, initiated by the Honourable Minister, Prof. Jerry Gana of the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa.

its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone,²⁰⁸ and therefore could not be seen as not providing peacebuilding leadership to its people.

Secondly, the previous approach of military government of responding to violent conflict through the use of force and other fire-brigade approaches needed to be elaborated to include researching into the causes of conflict so as to nip them in the bud. IPCR puts the need to change the status quo in one of its reports:

The main thrust of government response is to use the military to suppress conflict. The problem is that this may stop the use of violence in the short-term but it does not address genuine underlying problems. Military responses often take place in isolation from the other responses despite opportunities for joint activity and sharing of perspectives.²⁰⁹

Thirdly, to deepen the roots of democracy, it had become a fashion for advanced governments around the world to institutionalize peacebuilding and manage conflict. As Thomas Tsai concisely puts it “[M]ilitary rule was no longer a fashion globally.”²¹⁰ In particular were the needs to develop democratic institutions that would promote social justice, rule of law, good governance with accountability and transparency and respect for human rights. Expectedly, government had a responsibility to ensure the security of lives and property in the country. The attainment of these goals would engender peace and development. Also there was an increasingly growing interest in peace studies and practice.²¹¹ It could be said the democratic Nigeria realized it early to follow such trend, especially as its gained improved relations with the international community with the peaceful transfer of power to a civilian government.

In 1999, the European Union and the Commonwealth restored full economic cooperation and diplomatic relations with Nigeria after three years of suspension.²¹² The Nigerian political and opposition figures in exile such as Professor Wole Soyinka and Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu

²⁰⁸ Abacha Peace Foundation’s Trailblazer for World Peace, Nigeria: On Course for a Stable Democracy. ECOMOG was a multilateral regional force.

²⁰⁹ IPCR (2003) *Strategic Conflict Assessment: Consolidated and Zonal Reports*, Abuja, Nigeria, p. 55.

²¹⁰ T. Tsai (2002) Africa’s Contradiction: Nigeria on the Path to Democracy. p. 32, *Harvard International Review*, 24 (3), pp. 32-35, www.jstor.org/stable/42762835 (accessed on 23 July, 2016).

²¹¹ Interestingly, past leaders such as General Yakubu Gowon and General Abdusalam Abubakar had founded non-governmental organizations promoting peace and development in the country.

²¹² T. Dagne, pp. 3-7.

returned back to the country. From the above, it is evident the peaceful general elections that ushered in the democratic government created an opportunity to advance peace and reconciliation in Nigeria. Thus the rationale behind the decision to have an institution on peace that would deepen democratic threshold was a welcome one.

3.3 Transforming Sani Abacha Foundation into IPCR

What became the premises of IPCR today was once the Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity that was established and named in 1996 after General Abacha, former head of State. According to the centre while describing its purported owner, it was “*as a mark of his contribution to peace and unity in Nigeria and efforts in conflict resolution in Africa, especially in the West African sub-region.*”²¹³ The foundation was described as “*a non-governmental, non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of peace, unity and harmony...*”²¹⁴

According to the speech he read during the foundation-laying ceremony of the headquarters complex in Abuja on 19 September, 1996, Abacha said “*I am completely overwhelmed and moved by the honour being done to me today by endowing a foundation in my name for my modest contributions to the peace and unity of the country.*”²¹⁵ He added that the main objective was “*to promote peace, conflict resolution, unity and brotherhood of mankind...through research, educational programme, charitable disbursements and the support of voluntary services for the common good of all.*”²¹⁶ This statement could mean that even the military recognized the need to promote peace by peaceful means.

His death in 1998 did not stop the foundation as it endured through the Gen. Abdusalam Abubakar regime and to the early part of democratic dispensation in 1999. There were reports in the national dailies on the sources of funds for the establishment and its running. Some public sentiments were expressed that it was government money that was used to establish it while the

²¹³ One of the Foundation’s documents, titled *Abacha Peace Foundation-trailblazer for world peace*.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Address by the Head of State Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, GCON, on the occasion of the foundation-laying ceremony of the headquarters complex of the Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity, Abuja, Thursday September 19, 1996, p. 2.

²¹⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

handlers said the fund was raised by friends and allies of the head of state. Therefore, after his death, some doubts were cast on its continuity and sustainability.²¹⁷

During the interregnum, the foundation had some funding challenges and concerns for its future were expressed. But the initial attempts that were made to cede the complex to a number of institutions such as the African Union, the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) or other government agencies or even to be converted into a national library as reported in some newspapers²¹⁸ did not materialize as the civilian government thought otherwise (since it realized the need) to turn it to the proposed peace institute.²¹⁹

Consequently, on 2nd February, 2000, the Obasanjo administration named the foundation it had taken over as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). Going by the Establishment Act of the Institute under Part VIII on Miscellaneous No. 28: *The body known and referred to as “The Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity”...which had been voluntarily ceded to the Federal Government of Nigeria shall cease to exist and by this Act replaced by the “Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution”*.²²⁰

In the establishment proposal forwarded to President Obasanjo for approval by the then Minister of the Ministry for Cooperation and Integration in Africa (MCIA), Professor Jerry Gana, the objectives, programmes and structure of the peace institute were stipulated. In it, while arguing the need for a Nigerian peace institute to the president, Prof. Gana said:

Given the changed nature of violent conflicts, away from traditional inter-state wars towards intra-state conflicts, there is a compelling need to urgently move into the realm of proactive policy-oriented research aimed at facilitating conflict prevention, management and resolution.²²¹

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Nigerian Tribune’s FG Scraps Abacha Foundation, turns it to National Library, 15 September, 1998, pp. 1-2; The Guardian’s Government May Turn Abacha Foundation to Library, 16 September, 1998, p. 3, The Vanguard’s Abacha Foundation for Research Centre, 15 September, 1998.

²¹⁹ An interview with Mr. Peter Opara, former staff and member of management of Abacha Foundation and a pioneer member of IPCR staff on 6 January, 2016, at IPCR Abuja.

²²⁰ IPCR Establishment Act in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No.129, Vol.94, Abuja, 31 December, 2007, p. A1100.

²²¹ The presidential approval of the proposal establishing IPCR by President Olusegun Obasanjo, dated 24 February, 2000. The document was prepared by Minister of MCIA, Prof. Jerry Gana, dated 12 Feb. 2000, with Reference number MCIA/001, p. 1.

The above statement buttressed the conflict dynamics earlier explained in chapter two of this study. Instead of military approach to violent situation, strategic engagement on conflict prevention, management and resolution was deemed as appropriate to curb the escalation of violence and conflict in the country. By embarking on a giant step such as this, it is expected that it would engender national growth and development.

He further cited examples of the ECOWAS after the Nigeria's ECOMOG experience between 1990 and 1999, and the South African Development Cooperation (SADC) which established regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Other reasons advanced in the proposal that laid framework for its initial programmes included:²²²

- Research and policy analysis
- Capacity building in international negotiation skills for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
- Conflict prevention, management and resolution
- Regional frameworks for collective defence and security
- Conference, seminars and training programmes
- Promoting democracy
- Promoting human rights

Looking at the reasons behind the proposal, each seemed germane to an institution that would be designed to effectively and efficiently mitigate the effect of violent conflict while identifying and combating the causes of violent conflict in Nigeria through peaceful and collaborative means. But it could be argued that the outlined tasks or expectations, though enormous, were relevant to Nigeria's conflict dynamics. The agency was expected to function nationally and internationally.

Interesting was how decision was made on the name to be given the institute. Prof. Gana suggested to the President that the name INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION would attract greater attention if conflict resolution was added and would be more attractive particularly to funding agencies than a Peace Foundation that had earlier been

²²² Ibid. pp. 2-9.

proposed. According to the source, Peace Foundation would connote it as a non-governmental organization.²²³

3.4 Establishment Mandate, Organizational Structure, Capacity and Values

After its establishment in year 2000, it began its operations under the presidential approval. Though, the Bill establishing it was not passed into law (the Establishment Act, 2007 No. 34) by the National Assembly until 2007. President Obasanjo assented to the Bill on 25 May, 2007. The mandate (the Act) is profiled in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette. The Act placed it with the responsibility to promote research and facilitate conflict prevention, management and resolution within Nigeria and Africa.²²⁴ Meanwhile, it is fair to assume that the functions in the Act gave a lot of insight about the magnitude of conflict challenges confronting Nigeria and the magnitude of task IPCR was saddled with.

Examining the functions of the Institute as provided in Part III: no.8, (1) of the Act (items a-d)²²⁵, the Institute would be responsible for: *promoting peace and security internally within Nigeria and externally in Africa; conducting research into the causes, patterns, dynamics, actors and forces behind conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria and Africa; publishing and disseminating case studies from its researches with a view to offering insights into the success or failures in conflict resolution and peace building; and, identifying these actors, issues, historical phases, capacities and the balance of power of different groups in a conflict situation.*

From the outlined functions, it can be thought out that the government was clear on the direction in which the Institute's activity would take. That is, to be engaged with the promotion of peacebuilding and conflict resolution both in Nigeria and Africa through research and conflict analysis and disseminate its findings through policy recommendation.

²²³ The presidential approval of the proposal establishing IPCR by President Olusegun Obasanjo, dated 24 February, 2000. The document was prepared by Minister of MCIA, Prof. Jerry Gana, dated 12 Feb. 2000, with Reference number MCIA/001.

²²⁴ IPCR (Establishment) Act, signed by President Olusegun Obasanjo on 25 May, 2007, p. 283, www.ipcr.gov.ng (accessed 26 August, 2016).

²²⁵ IPCR Establishment Act in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No.129, Vol.94, Abuja, 31 December, 2007, pp. A1093-A1095.

Secondly, from (items e-h) *promoting a culture of transparent, credible and peaceful democratic succession as a mechanism for conflict prevention; getting practically involved in the task of mediation, conflict management and conflict resolution; encouraging the establishment of regional affiliates of the Institute in Africa and other parts of the world and fostering collaboration with those affiliates; and, designing strategies for funding people centred development programmes to support peace.* IPCR was expected to promote democracy as the basis of development and pursue the establishment of cooperation and partnership with related peace institutes around the world.

Thirdly, in (items i-k) *providing Government with relevant policy options on fundamental issues required in designing an effective and durable peace process; initiating, encouraging, organizing, hosting, arranging and conducting policy-relevant courses, national or international seminars, symposia, conferences, and workshops, training programmes and other actions that are incidental to peace making and peace building as part of its intensive effort in capacity building; and, carrying out other relevant activities that may be assigned to it by the President, the Institute would support the government in its public policy response to issues of violent conflict and insecurity and also promote peace education nationally and internationally.* This function bore direct relevance to the research study as regards promotion of peacebuilding through relevant and effective programmes.

In the last function in the Act, it states IPCR, as government agency, *may also be required to carryout other relevant activities as assigned to it by the President.* It could be fair to contend that the assigned functions and expectations of the government were in tandem with the conflict dynamics bedevilling Nigeria since its creation. Also profound among the functions was the inclusion of *the promotion of culture of peace through peace education, mediation, conflict management and resolution.* Besides conflict research, peacebuilding activities topped the list among the functions and the Act even went further to suggest strategies to accomplish the tasks. Therefore, what evidence could be found to suggest or indicate that IPCR had promoted the peacebuilding function or mandate? As the focus of the research study, the answer lied in the design and implementation of relevant, effective, efficient and impactful programmes.

Furthermore, a critical component of the research study was the organizational structure of the Institute as it related to its peacebuilding impact. As theorized by Chris Argyris, et al and Beer in

Intervention Theory for Organizational Development,²²⁶ the way and approach in which the staff and resources were coordinated for the Institute's effectiveness to achieve its intended goal depended on the leadership ability of the management. Therefore, it was important to examine whether the leadership and management of the Institute had lived up to that expectation of the government and the public vis-à-vis its peacebuilding as Dan Ogun, the pioneer Director (Finance and Administration) had said at inception, "...the Institute is positioning itself to be the arrow head of government's policy...well focused and that all the relevant pioneer staff have been put in place, while appointment of the director-general is being awaited."²²⁷

To achieve this task, the research study reflected on the organizational structure as to whether it had got the resources or capacity to effectively and efficiently translate its programmes into positive results. The Institute was headed by a Director General, who was the chief executive officer. The Act provides the Institute to have 6 directorates for its day-to-day running: five research and one finance and administration to accomplish the above-mentioned functions. Though in the period under study, these directorates were called departments, which were *finance and administration, research and policy analysis, defence and security studies, internal conflict prevention and resolution, external conflict prevention and resolution, and democracy and development*.²²⁸ It can be observed from the above that IPCR was also expected to intervene in international conflict issues. Democracy and development were also considered important tools by the Act for building peace.

As the findings revealed, only department of finance and administration had units under it-accounts, administrative, budget and supplies, and maintenance. Each department was headed by a director. The Institute received its funds and budgetary allocations from the government while donors supported some of its programmes and activities. IPCR staff strength roved between 140 and 170 men and women in the period under study. It could be observed that the agency was

²²⁶ C. Argyris, et al (1970) *Intervention Theory and Methods*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc, Reading, Massachusetts, p. 587; and, M. Beer (2011) *Developing an Effective Organization: Intervention Method, Empirical Evidence, and Theory*, in Abraham B. (Rami) Shani, Richard W. Woodman, William A. Pasmore (ed.) *Research in Organizational Change and Development (Research in Organizational Change and Development, Volume 19)* Emerald Group Publishing Limited, p. 1–54.


²²⁷ Today, a Nigerian daily of 13 May, 2000, titled *Activities grounded at former Abacha foundation*, p. 2.

²²⁸ IPCR Establishment Act in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No.129, Vol.94, Abuja, 31 December, 2007, p. A1096.

sensitive to issues of gender as women were visible in official positions. It could also be asserted that the multidisciplinary nature of peace and conflict studies made the Institute to draw workforce from sciences, social sciences and humanities in both research and non-research positions. Researchers were also delegated peacebuilding roles. Similarly observed was the library, information technology (IT) and public affairs as key research resources and units of the Institute. It was the expectation of the researcher that such composition or system would impact peacebuilding.

The following is the organogram (organizational chart) of the Institute, indicating how the agency was structured:

Chart 3.1 IPCR ORGANOGRAM



Source: www.ipcr.ng.gov

In the task of evaluation, equally critical is the need to have clear understanding of the subject's organizational statements such as mission, vision and goals that were crafted at the inception. In IPCR, these statements seemed clearly articulated to suggest that the Institute had deeper understanding of the enormity of tasks saddled with it and therefore its preparedness to make commitment in order to achieve the expected results. For instance, the mission statement said *"IPCR is committed to providing Africa with policy options based on result-oriented research while building capacities and intervening in conflict spots to enable Africa emerge as a secure, peaceful and democratic continent where the principles of the rule of law and human dignity are respected."* Secondly, the vision statement declared IPCR *"To be Africa's hub for policy-relevant Research and Capacity building in Peace and Conflict Management Strategies and interventions"*, while its strategies sectoral visions were: Research: *To be the leading Research and Intellectual Centre of excellence in peace research and conflict analysis in Africa*; Policy: *To be leading policy adviser in Africa on peace, security and democratic values to relevant bodies*; Capacity Building: *To be the Trainer of first-choice in Africa, on peace and conflict management*; and, Intervention: *To become a Global Intervention Agency in conflict situations.*"²²⁹

The above crafted message could be interpreted to suggest that the Institute was absolutely ready to accomplish its goals. It could be said that if IPCR wanted to be taken seriously for the readiness and reasons it was established for, it would, perhaps be through its stated commitment. Its mission to enable Africa emerged as a secure, peaceful and democratic continent seemed a profound organization value particularly in Nigeria and therefore would also be relevant in the assessment of the Institute's impact. The following chapter delved into the peacebuilding strategies adopted by IPCR to manage the underlying causes of conflict in Nigeria in order to identify evidence of these interventions. The research study examined qualitative and quantitative data of the design and implementation of relevant and appropriate programmes in response to the conflict dynamics.

²²⁹ IPCR www.ipcr.gov.ng (accessed 25 August, 2016).

CHAPTER FOUR

IPCR PROGRAMMING TOWARDS PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

*I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.
Insensibly one begins to twist facts and theories, instead of theories
to suit facts.*

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle²³⁰

4.1 Introduction

Having explored Nigeria's historical development vis-à-vis its conflict dynamics and organizational framework upon which IPCR stood, it was imperative to track evidence on relevance of the ways and strategies adopted by the Institute to manage conflict situations in the country. How appropriate and relevant were the peacebuilding programmes that were geared towards preventing relapse of violent conflict? How were they planned and managed in relation to their performance? The answers lied on tracking their theories of change and methodologies of implementation in accordance to the Nigerian conflict dynamics. That is, the causes, issues, actors and trends of the conflict had been identified. The chapter produces evidence on the relevance, strengths, gaps and weaknesses in the design and implementation of peacebuilding interventions.

Exploring the programme logic models became exigent as a result of the need to draw a clear understanding of the degree to which a programme was actually implemented or achieved its intended targets can result in inaccurate findings.²³¹ Therefore, the study uncovered data on why, what, how and where in the design and implementation of the peacebuilding programmes through interview, survey, participatory method, studying field notes, programme records such as concept notes, workplans, computer data bases, training modules, participant lists and reports. Documentary analyses were similarly conducted on a few evaluation reports of the Institute workshops and other activities.

²³⁰ International Program on Development Evaluation Training (IPDET) Module 8 on Selecting and Constructing Data Collection Instruments <http://slideplayer.com/slide/5677200/> (accessed 5 September, 2016).

²³¹ M. Duerden and M.A. Witt (2012) Assessing Program Implementation: What It Is, Why It's Important, and How to Do it, *Journal of Extension* <https://joe.org/joe/2012february/a4.php> (accessed 10 November, 2016).

Descriptive questions geared towards how IPCR met the national peacebuilding needs were asked such as: How did IPCR identify what peacebuilding programme to be implemented or what was suited for which purpose? What were the goals of the programmes? What were the main activities of the peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes? Where were the programmes implemented? Who received what intervention and how relevant were the beneficiaries to the programmes? What challenges had the programmes encountered? What lessons were learned from the programmes?

4.2 Setting Agenda and Early Interventions (2000-2006)

It was observed that majority of IPCR's early interventions between when it was established and early 2006 were basically on awareness creations and sensitization visits round the country. Understandably, as typical of a new agency, one could argue it needed to reach out to the public on its mandate and leverage on their support. For example, the Institute met with state executives and stakeholders in Benue, Osun, Kaduna, Anambra States and a few others intimating them on the key reasons the Institute was established.²³²

In 2002, IPCR carried out a research to understand the conflict dynamics in which a key document that would dictate the Institute's future direction was published. National and international stakeholders such as the civil society groups, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Department for International Development (DFID), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) participated in the exercise and supported the process.²³³ In March 2003, *the Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria: Consolidated and Zonal Reports* (SCA) was launched to address the sources of violent conflicts and achieve development targets.²³⁴ In the conflict mapping, it could be observed that Nigerian conflict nature, causes, trends, actors and dynamics were extensively and contextually analyzed.

The SCA identified issues at the micro and macro levels that had earlier been mentioned in the previous chapters such as political corruption and lack of transparency, politicization of ethnic, religious divisions and herders/farmers conflict. The key actors of the violence were large

²³² IPCR News Bulletin series, 2003 to 2006.

²³³ World Bank's Social Development Notes: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction *Nigeria Strategic Conflict Assessment Methodology, Key Findings and Lessons Learnt*, No.11/May 2003, p. 1 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111751313696/20480272/SDN83CPR11.pdf>.

²³⁴ IPCR (2003) Nigeria: Strategic Conflict Assessment, *Consolidated and Zonal Reports*.

numbers of unemployed and disillusioned youth. Military and security agents' responses had not stemmed the tide while the root causes were left to persist. A set of policy responses were suggested. For instance, the civil society, the media and the business leaders must play constructive role.²³⁵

Based on the SCA report's outcomes, a National Action Plan (NAP) was formulated same year that focused on six thematic areas of intervention: (i) early warning and preventive action; (ii) addressing the economic and social causes of conflict; (iii) mainstreaming conflict prevention into government and donor programs; (iv) improving formal and informal/traditional mediation mechanisms, and (v) the political process; and security sector reform/small arms and light weapons reduction.²³⁶

Themes one, two and three of the NAP's report indicated that IPCR developed a number of peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies that were embarked upon between 2003 and 2006. For example, it published a book and a training manual from which it trained national stakeholders on conflict sensitivity in governance.²³⁷ It was aimed at building both individual and institutional capacities in mainstreaming conflict prevention in governance. As Senator Lawan Gana Guba described in the report's foreword:

This framework is a contribution of the IPCR towards the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) agreed to by stakeholders in March 2003 in the context of mainstreaming conflict prevention into planning and administration of development in Nigeria.²³⁸

Therefore in order to design appropriate peacebuilding intervention from the assessment of the Nigerian conflict landscape, President Obasanjo inaugurated the Presidential Implementation Committee (PIC) March 2005, chaired by the Vice President (Atiku Abubabar), to work with the Institute.²³⁹ The study equally observed here that there had been a long delay in implementation since the document was launched in 2003 and that could not augur well for a nation desirous for positive change. With PIC, IPCR initiated a *National Peace Policy* (NPP) aimed at addressing

²³⁵ IPCR (2003) Nigeria: Strategic Conflict Assessment, *Consolidated and Zonal Reports*, p. 2.

²³⁶ Ibid. p. 3.

²³⁷ IPCR (2006) Mainstreaming Peacebuilding in Development Programming in Nigeria: A Framework.

²³⁸ Ibid. p. x.

²³⁹ IPCR (2012) National Peace Policy, p. 26.

the fundamental sources of violent conflicts in Nigeria. It was discovered that the process of producing the evidence-informed draft policy began in 2006 and was completed in 2012. The document was still awaiting legislative and executive approval at the time of this research report. Commenting on draft policy's delay passage, the present DG of the Institute (2017) commented that:

The Institute is mobilising key stakeholders including the National Assembly members. Infact, what we are trying to do now is to mobilize the National Assembly to say look, this draft national peace policy can become a law. If you make it into law, then issues of peace would then be better enhanced in terms of the conversation that goes on in the country and the attention that is given to issues of peace.²⁴⁰

In the survey, a lot of optimism was expressed by respondents that when the policy was approved and put into use, it would checkmate the incessant occurrences of violence and unleash potential peacebuilding opportunities in Nigeria. In the view of Abubakar Bello in Kano, *"National Peace Policy holds the panacea for all violent conflict in Nigeria."* Also, according to Reverend Grace Adesua in Akure, *"If the government approves the policy it would reduce the incessant occurrence of violence in the country."*²⁴¹ This was because, besides being a veritable tool of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, it emphasizes the social, political and economic integration of Nigeria's diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and other identify groups and also set the strategies and mechanisms for achieving it such as the use of the operational preventive measures. For example, activities, policies and interventions aimed at defusing tension and preventing the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence in the society.²⁴² The significance of this evidence was that it portends dangers for a country desirable for peace and security.

Another early evidence of interventions, though were a number of mediation and conflict mediation activities in some parts of Nigeria. For example, IPCR intervened in the leadership

²⁴⁰ Interview the DG granted The Sun newspaper of 30 January, 2017 www.sunnewsonline.com (accessed 30 January, 2017).

²⁴¹ Interviewed on 10 January, 2016 in Kano and 13 July, 2016 in Akure respectively.

²⁴² Ibid. p. 19 & p. 29.

tussle among Amokure, Ngwogwo and Okwe villages in Ebonyi State;²⁴³ it brokered peace in the Gembu crisis in the Mambilla Plateau in Taraba State, and in Iwo in Osun State,²⁴⁴ organized a few workshops on early warning and early response²⁴⁵ and public forums on national issues before 2006. During an early assessment of these interventions, it was difficult to synthesize their evidence for reporting. It was also difficult to have access to the available records and data.

From the foregoing, it was evident that, at inception, IPCR took steps to map out strategic areas of intervention to address the Nigerian security challenges. Its major peacebuilding implementations did not commence until 2006. The study discovered IPCR had partnered and networked with other stakeholders to accomplish the task.

4.3 Partnerships and Network Building

Another background information required to understand the Institute's peacebuilding programming was its partnership and networking with relevant peacebuilding stakeholders both national and international. It could be observed that the collaboration brought both technical and financial support to peacebuilding.

An insight obtained into how IPCR carried out its programmes and projects revealed that while some peacebuilding initiatives were initiated, funded and solely implemented by IPCR from its capital budget as a federal government agency, others were executed in partnership with local and/or foreign governments or international agencies such as the UNDP, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Open Society Initiative of West Africa (OSIWA), Department for International Development (DFID), Women Environmental Programme (WEP), Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), amongst others.²⁴⁶ Virtually all the peacebuilding activities within the period of study were implemented in partnership.

²⁴³ IPCR News Bulletin, N.14, 5-18 February, 2006, pp. 1-2.

²⁴⁴ IPCR News Bulletin, No.2, 10-16 April, 2005, p. 2.

²⁴⁵ IPCR News Bulletin, No.3, 17-23 April, 2005, p. 1.


²⁴⁶ Minute of meeting between the 3 partners dated 4 February, 2014.

Almost all of its peacebuilding activities up to 2014 had been completed, but one was ongoing by the time of this report. That was the Nigerian Peace and Security Forum (NPSF) that was set up in June 2014 with the support of NSRP (of the British Government). NSRP was designed as a networking mechanism to foster accountability and improve coordination among the security agencies and other relevant stakeholders with an end goal of improving the management of conflict and reducing the negative impacts of violent conflict in Nigeria.²⁴⁷ Though a lofty concept to address the seemingly intractable conflicts, its impact was too early to measure.

4.4 The Design of Peacebuilding Programmes (2007-2014)

The evidence obtained on the design and implementation of the Institute's peacebuilding programmes is relayed in this sub-section. That is, its relevance, pattern and methodologies. The assessment explored the theories of change (TOCs) and the underlying assumptions of each of the programmes. The variables measured were *why* and *how* they were designed and implemented as mentioned in the theoretical framework. This was to ascertain their success or the extent to which they had achieved their intended targets. Below is the programme logic model that guided the investigation:²⁴⁸

Chart 4.1 Programme Logic Model²⁴⁹



Note: The model guided the study of planning and management of the peacebuilding programmes. Evidence of their TOCs and methodologies, activities, outputs, outcome and impact were obtained.

The Institute adopted training as one of capacity building strategies in response to the core drivers of conflict. In the peacebuilding design, the overall assumption was that if the national stakeholders or actors could be adequately trained in the strategies, skills and knowledge of

²⁴⁷ Notes on NSRP, <http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/2014/07/31/nsrp-trains-peace-and-security-forum-members-on-conflict-analysis/> (accessed 22 September, 2016).

²⁴⁸ Most literatures on monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding and development issues usually followed the steps outlined above.

²⁴⁹ Model is the researcher's illustration of programme design and implementation as in monitoring and evaluation practice.

peacebuilding and conflict prevention, there would be peace and development in Nigeria. The actors would drive change on the field in the course of their engagements. The strategy was identified as the best method to impact the needed change through strengthening of the skills, instincts, abilities and processes of individuals, groups, communities and institutions involved. It was IPCR's conviction that it would accelerate and deepen peacebuilding efforts in Nigeria.

In this regard, the CARE International UK's *Theories of Change in Peacebuilding*²⁵⁰ were adopted to analyze the data obtained in each of the stages of the logic model. The decision was to inform the research study, if needs arises "...to strengthen the institutional and operational capacity..."²⁵¹ of the Institute in design and management of peacebuilding programmes." As earlier indicated, the CARE's approach has five areas of evidence report: introduction, TOC and methodology, research findings, conclusion and recommendations. These five areas were reported in this chapter (Introduction, TOCs and Methodologies), chapter five (Research Findings), and in the Conclusion and Recommendations respectively.

In this chapter, therefore, the early evidence obtained are in the designs and implementations of the following peacebuilding areas within that period: women, youth, community, media, governance, election, religion, early warning/early response and dialogue, advocacy, awareness creation and sensitization.²⁵² It could be debated that peacebuilding for the identified or targeted groups was critical to the nature and underlying causes of violent conflict in Nigeria. The actors would drive change on the field in the course of their engagements. Based on the conflict dynamics, the overall assumption one could draw was that if the issues around, for instance, religion, youth and governance were resolved or improved upon, they would create favourable conditions for peace and stability of Nigeria. More analysis later in the chapter.

The table below shows a sample of implementation plan of IPCR:²⁵³

²⁵⁰ A. Arya, et al (2012) *Theories of Change in Peacebuilding: Learning from the Experiences of Peacebuilding Initiatives in Nepal*, CARE International UK [https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories of Change in Peace building.pdf](https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories_of_Change_in_Peace_building.pdf) (accessed 30 September, 2016).

²⁵¹ A. Arya, et al (2012) *Theories of Change in Peacebuilding: Learning from the Experiences of Peacebuilding Initiatives in Nepal*, CARE International UK. [https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories of Change in Peacebuilding.pdf](https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories_of_Change_in_Peacebuilding.pdf) (accessed 30 September, 2016).

²⁵² IPCR programme reports and other documents.

²⁵³ The table was shared by the programme team and contained some of the peacebuilding interventions of the Institute in 2013.

Table 4.1 A Sample of Implementation Plan of IPCR (January-March 2013)

Output		Tasks (Sub-activities)	Delivery Period												Projected Resources				Summary Cost
Output 1: National capacity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding strengthened.	Activity 1: Publish and disseminate selected works on quarterly dialogue series	Task 1: Identify and select printer (contractor)					x	x											
		Task 2: Prepare and sign contract							x	x						0.00			0.00
		Task 3: Prepare RDP and FACE form for contractor									x								
		Task 4: Prepare activity report										x	x						
Subtotal Output 2															0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Activity 2: Organize quarterly Review Meeting for Zonal stakeholders' Peace Building Network	Task 1: identify and select moderator for meeting							x	x									
		Task 2: identify and recruit vendors for venue and services									x	x							
		Task 3: Prepare FACE form for Venue payment, participants, etc											x	x		0.00			0.00
		Task 4: Prepare activity report												x	x				
Subtotal Output 3:															0	0.00	0.00	0	0.00
	Activity 3: Conduct technical training for NSCDC Peace Officers and other stakeholders on principles and practice of ADR	Task 1: Prepare concept note and TOR					X	x											-
		Task 2: Identify and select resource persons							x	X						0.00			0.00
		Task 3: Identify and recruit vendor for venue and services									X	X				0.00			0.00
		Task 4: Prepare FACE form for Venue payment, participants, etc										X	X				0.00		0.00
		Task 5: Prepare activity report												X	X				-
Subtotal Output 1															0	0.00	0.00	-	0.00
Grand Total Q1																			0.00

Note: The columns on projected resources and summary cost do not state amounts of money spent for confidential reasons. **Source:** IPCR

4.5 The Programmes

The evidence obtained from the data available to the research study indicated a wider range of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes implemented between 2006 and 2014. The following are some of the interventions:²⁵⁴

1. *Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Projects at Gembu in the Mambilla Plateau of the Sardauna Local Government of Taraba State between Fulani and other indigenous tribes 2005-2009.* (Note: Not selected for this evaluation due to the re-escalation of Boko Haram insurgency and the resumption of communal violence in that part of the state)
2. *Mainstreaming Peacebuilding in Development Programming 2006-2009*
3. *Election Conflict Management Project (ECMP) 2007*
4. *Conflict Management and Peacebuilding for Youth and Community Leaders in Nigeria 2008-2009*
5. *Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention 2009-2014*
6. *Conflict Sensitive Reporting on Elections for Media Groups 2011-2014*
7. *Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development and Budget Formulation for State Legislators, Public Servants, Local Government Chairmen, Traditional Rulers and Civil Society 2012-2013*
8. *Interfaith Dialogues on Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Coexistence in Nigeria 2012-2014*
9. *Early Warning and Early Response System, EWER, 2013* (Note: Not fully implemented or operational. Project had been skeletal)
10. *Post-Election Community Peacebuilding in North Central Nigeria 2011-2013*
11. *Agila-Apa Peacebuilding in Benue State (2012 till present)* (Note: primarily implemented by IPCR's partner, Women Environmental Programme [WEP]. Its full ownership could not be ascribed to IPCR)
12. *National Peace Network (2012 -present)* (Note: WEP also hosted the Secretariat of the network. Though some members were interviewed for this study)


²⁵⁴ Though a few interventions had started earlier but carried through beyond 2007.

- 13. National Peace and Security Forum (2014 -present)*
- 14. Quarterly Lecture Series 2010-2014*
- 15. Emerging Trends in Trans-National Organized Crimes and the Implications for Human Security (Nov. 2014)*
- 16. Strategic Stakeholders Dialogue on Peaceful Election in Nigeria (Dec. 2014)*
- 17. Peace Promotion and Coping Strategies for Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities in Benue State (Dec. 2014)*
- 18. International Peace Day Celebration (every 21 September)*
- 19. International Peacekeepers Day Celebration (every 29 May)*

Note: Though a few programmes/projects that were designed and implemented had peacebuilding components, but essentially, out of the 19 main programmes implemented there are eight capacity building/trainings, five dialogues/advocacy/awareness/sensitization programmes, three community peacebuilding, two peacebuilding building networks, and, one EWER.

From the above, it is apparent that the Institute had adopted capacity building (training), dialogues, peace education, advocacy, early warning and early response mechanism and network building to manage the drivers of conflict in Nigeria. Training and dialogues (the main capacity building activities) were identified as the best methods to impact the needed change through development and strengthening of the skills, instincts, abilities and processes of individuals, groups, communities and institutions involved. From the investigation, IPCR was convinced that it would accelerate and deepen peacebuilding efforts in Nigeria. Its peace education revolved around public lectures, dialogues, conferences/seminars, library services and consultancy to the public. To have a sense of the Institute's overall programme groupings within this period of review, the study made use of the following chart to vividly describe the implemented programme in percentages:

Chart 4.1 Descriptive results illustrating IPCR's peacebuilding programmes, 2007-2014



Note: The pie chart is a breakdown of the IPCR overall implemented programmes in terms of their thematic groupings in percentage between 2000 and 2014. As described above, capacity building/training had been the largest area of peacebuilding that was designed and implemented with 42%. This suggests that training took the highest considerations of its programme planning and management while dialogue/advocacy/awareness creation/sensitization activities followed with 26%. Community peacebuilding was third with 16% and networking with civil society 11%. The early warning and early response mechanism was least in programming with 5%.

Source: Microsoft Office 2013 was used for the design.

It is important to recall that it was rather an impossible task to assess all the peacebuilding intervention of during the period under review. In effect, after critical considerations (as explained below), out of the above outlined programmes 5 interventions were selected for the purpose of the research study. These are as follows:


- a. *Election Conflict Management Project (ECMP)*
- b. *Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention*
- c. *Conflict Sensitive Reporting on Elections and Good Governance Advocacy for Media Groups*

- d. *Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development and Budget Formulation for State Legislators, Public Servants, Local Government Chairmen, Traditional Rulers and Civil Society*
- e. *Interfaith Dialogues on Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Coexistence in Nigeria*

The considerations behind the selection could not be far-fetched. One, the interventions covered some of the most critical, underlying causes of violent conflict in Nigeria as explained in chapters two and three of the research study. Sharp and irreconcilable differences, views, needs and interests in elections, religion, governance and gender that had triggered violence had caused several and untold destructions of lives, property and displacement of persons. Thus posed serious danger to the fledgling democracy. Two, from the evidence available to the research study on the Institute's broad strategic interventions since inception, these selected programmes had had profound considerations and therefore constituted the most widely implemented. More so, the programme activities implicitly cut across training, dialogue, community building, networking and early response as displaced in *Chart 1*. Third, all the programmes were implemented through what the development community referred to as programme cycle. That is, not one-off but spanned a long duration with a set of activities. Therefore, their summative evaluation could be justified. Lastly, the programmes were nationally executed and thereby enabled broader participation of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria.

To have a sense of number of occurrences of the above interventions within the fifteen years of existence, the following column chart displays frequencies of the implemented programmes:

Chart 4.2 Descriptive results illustrating the frequency in implementation of the five selected peacebuilding programmes, 2007 - 2014.



Note: The chart illustrates the five peacebuilding programmes indicating capacity building trainings on conflict sensitive to development and budget formulation as the highest with eleven workshops while mainstreaming gender into conflict prevention and peacebuilding is next. Workshop on conflict sensitive reporting and good governance advocacy for journalists was third and interfaith dialogue fourth. Though implemented in four phases with distinct activities purposely for the 2007 elections, the election conflict management is fifth in the column chart.

Source: Microsoft Office 2013 was used for the design.

Meanwhile, it suffices to display other samples of programme workplans for striking description and understanding of the design and implementation of IPCR peacebuilding. Their output targets, planned activities, baselines, time frames and budgets are included in the workplans below:

Table 4.2 A Sample of Annual Workplan (AWP)

UNDAF OUTCOME: A.1 - Improved protection of human and material resources through conflict prevention, management and peace building.									
CPAP OUTCOME: CPAP OUTCOME: Conflict sensitivity partnership for service delivery among civil society, media, women groups, private and public sectors improved.									
PRINCIPAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS (IP) AND SUB-IPS: IPCR, UNDP									
Output Target 2013	Planned Activities	Baseline	Target	Time Frame and Budget US\$					
				Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Budget	IP
1. National capacity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding strengthened.	1. Carryover activities from 2012 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshop on Gender Mainstreaming Produce revised SCA Printing of Conflict Mapping report Support to OPD in Ondo State 			x				0	IPCR
	2. Print/publish revised Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA),	Field work/research for the SCA concluded in 2012 and the draft report ready.	Publication of at least 1,500 of SCA report		x			0	IPCR
	3. Publish and disseminate selected works on quarterly dialogue series	Selected papers presented at the quarterly lectures collated, edited and ready for printing.	Publication of quarterly report	x				0	IPCR
	4. Organize quarterly Review Meeting for Zonal stakeholders' Peace Building Network	Prevalence of communal conflicts and disputes in Nigeria and dearth of community peace makers.	At least 2 meetings of the Network held	x		x		0	IPCR
	6. Conduct technical training for NSCDC Peace Officers and other stakeholders on principles and practice of ADR.	Low level capacities for mediation and conflict transformation Weak networking and co-	At least 60 NSCDC Peace Officers trained.	X	X			0	NSCD C,

	7. Organize multi-Agency peace building and development programme.	ordination among the peace workers and peace building practitioners.	One inclusive multi-agency peace building and development programme		X			0	NSCD C,
	8, Conduct TOT training on principles and practice of mediation and peace building for Divisional Peace Officers (LGA) in at least 20 states		At least 300 Divisional peace officers trained in 20 states.			X	X	0	NSCD C,
	Support to Agila Community peace building Project		Success story documentary on Agila peace building project		X			0	IPCR
2. World Peace Day marked in Nigeria	1. Organize series of activities to mark the 2013 World Peace Day in Abuja	Weak engagement of citizens in governance	Commemoration of UN International Peace Day on 21 September, 2013			x		0	IPCR
	2. Support to organize Peacekeeping's conference	Lack of trust in the official court system	International Peacekeepers Day marked		x			0	IPCR
3. National Conflict Mitigation Strategy promoted.	1 Organize two workshops on mainstreaming gender into conflict prevention and peacebuilding workshop (South West & North Central Zones).	High rate of unemployment	At least 50 women participated in the 2 training workshops		x	x		0	IPCR
	2 Organise training/workshops for media groups on conflict sensitive reporting & good governance advocacy in at least 2 geopolitical zones	Less involvement of women in peace building and conflict resolution	At least 80 journalists participated in the 2 training workshops.		x	x	x	0	IPCR
	3 Organize Inter-faith Community Dialogue on Religion & Peace Making in two states of Northern Nigeria. <i>(This activity seeks to promote regular dialogue and interactions among</i>		At least 100 participants trained at the 2 centres		x	x	x	0	IPCR

	<i>different religious adherents to ensure peace, stability and development)</i>								
Total								000	

Source: IPCR

Table 4.3 A Sample Annual Work Plan (AWP) Of the CPAP 7th Country Programme (2009-2012)

UNDAF OUTCOME: A.1 - Improved protection of human and material resources through conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding										
CPAP OUTCOME: Conflict sensitivity partnership for service delivery among civil society, traditional institutions, women groups, private and public sectors improved.										
PRINCIPAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNER (IP) AND SUB-IPS: IPCR, UNDP.										
Output Targets for 2011	Planned Activities	Time frame for planned activities				Total budget for each output target, by source (USD, TRAC or C/S)'000	Quarterly expenditure forecast by source of funds (USD, TRAC or C/S)'000			
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		00.0	Q1	Q2	Q3
1. 2011 General Elections conducted in a peaceful and rancour free environment with positive media reportage.	1. At least 3 workshops on conflict sensitive reporting for 2011 General Elections conducted.	X				0	0			
	2. Develop and Print/Publish training manual			X		0		0		
2. World Peace Day marked in Nigeria	1. Organize series of activities to mark the 2011 World Peace Day in Abuja.			X		0			0	
3. National capacity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding strengthened.	4 Conduct capacity needs assessment of IPCR and design strategy to fill identified gaps.			X	X	0		0		
	5 Organize capacity building training for IPCR staff and selected CSOs on Conflict Analysis for Prevention and Peacebuilding.	102	X	X	X	0		0	0	
	6 Organize quarterly dialogue with stakeholders on conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues		X	X	X	0		0	0	0

4. Conflict-Sensitive Development Plan in place at national and state levels.	1. Organization training/workshop for executive, legislators and principal government officials on conflict-sensitive approach to development and budget formulation		X	X	X	0		0	0	0
5. Community Peace Practices for tolerance and peaceful coexistence promoted	1. Support to promotion of community dialogue on conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Share-Sharagi.			X		0			0	
	2. Organize skill acquisition and economic empowerment project for Agila communities		X	X		0		0	0	
6. National Conflict Mitigation Strategy promoted	1. Conduct baseline study on the phenomenon of <i>Boko Haram</i> with a view to determining the issues, identifying the individuals and profiling appropriate responses		X	X		0		0	0	
	2. Organize, at least, one mainstreaming gender into conflict prevention and peacebuilding workshop.			X		0			0	
	3. Organize consultation on National Architecture for Peace in Nigeria			X	X	0			0	0

Note: These samples of Annual Work Plans outline outcome, activities to be implemented with timelines and budgets. Amounts in budget are not given herein for confidential reasons.

Source: IPCR

4.6 Election Conflict Management Project (ECMP)

Data available to the research study pointed to why and how the project was conceptualized and designed for expected outcomes. Supported by the UNDP as an election intervention strategy for the general and presidential elections in 2007, the project was aimed at promoting peaceful election in Nigeria. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) underscored its importance “... will mark the first time a third consecutive presidential election will take place and the first time one elected leader will succeed another.”²⁵⁵ It could be said the intervention was well conceived considering issues around intolerance among Nigerians discussed in chapters two and three which often culminated in political violence especially during election periods. The target beneficiaries included political parties, security agencies, youth, women, judges, policymakers and civil society. Respondents of the survey were project staff, stakeholders, six beneficiary civil society organizations and nominated peacebuilding awardees. Two recipients from communities in Lagos and Bauchi interventions were visited.

The baseline for the intervention was the fear and apprehension often expressed by the public that the elections would be violent due to widespread incitement and bad reportage by the media and the delay in release of election results and delivery of election petition cases.²⁵⁶ Besides pre-independence and early post-independence violent elections, 1983 and 1993 elections were violent. According to the records, the overall objective of the project was to promote peaceful, free and fair elections in the periods before, during and after the 2007 elections in Nigeria. Many lives and property had been lost to elections.

It could be thought out that it was a plan against a repeat of violence and wrangling based on the past lessons. Its implementation was achieved through bringing political stakeholders to dialogue and commitment to violence-free elections; built capacity of election tribunal judges, networked with civil society to promote post-election peacebuilding and rewarded nominated youth whose outstanding performance contributed to peaceful election in their respective communities.

The project was implemented in four phases across Nigeria:

- a. Strategic Stakeholders’ Dialogues (to commit Nigerians to peaceful, free and fair elections)

²⁵⁵ USIP’s Special Report on *Nigeria’s 2007 Elections: The Fitful Path to Democratic Citizenship* written by Jibrin Ibrahim, p. 1 <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr182.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2016).

²⁵⁶ This is according to the Institute focal officer and review of programme aide memoire.

- b. Capacity Building for the Election Tribunal Judges (to equip and train judges to effectively handle election petition cases)
- c. Peace Education and Peace-building programme (to rebuild strained relationships and return confidence and trust after the elections).
- d. National Youth Peace Award (to reward outstanding Nigerian youth who encouraged their peers to achieve peaceful elections in their respective communities).²⁵⁷

4.6.1 TOCs and Methodology

Answering the question of *why* in the project design, the rationale behind selecting the TOCs and the underlying assumptions for each of the phases were: *(a) If political stakeholders dialogued and reached a consensus prior to the elections, there it would be peaceful, free and fair elections; (b) If the election tribunal judges were trained on Court of Appeal Practice Guides, election disputes or petitions would be resolved within time limit and judgments delivered without bias or favour; (c) If the civil society organizations were supported they would promote peacebuilding mechanisms and reconciliation in the post-election period; and (d) If youth were identified and rewarded for their positive contributions to peaceful elections it would encourage them and motivate their peers to promote peacebuilding and conflict prevention in their communities in future elections in Nigeria.*²⁵⁸

On how it was designed to be implemented in order to achieve its intended goal, the TOCs focused on trainings, dialogues, signing of memoranda of understanding, advocacy visits, sensitization and awareness creations, focus group discussions, network building, nomination of awardees, and awards of prizes and certificates. In the study reviews, it was observed that relevant sub-activities were outlined to achieve the outcomes in each of the phases. For example, in (a) 3 dialogues were held in March 2007 in the country-Kano, Ibadan, Calabar and Makurdi shortly before the elections. Participants were strategically selected from all states of the federation.

In order to douse the tensions and calm the frayed nerves in the aftermath of the elections, evidence showed that 6 civil society organizations were engaged in partnership to promote and facilitate the process of healing, trust-building, peacebuilding and reconciliation in their zones. The CSOs were the Young People's Initiative (South South), Catholic Ecclesiastical Province of

²⁵⁷ IPCR ECMP document, 15 September, 2008.

²⁵⁸ Interview with the focal officer and a review of programme records and reports.

Abuja (North Central), New Nigeria Foundation (South West), Rahama Women Development Programme (North East), Catholic Institute for Development and Peace (South East), and Kaf Care Foundation (North West). The CSOs implemented the peacebuilding programmes for a duration of eight weeks such as paying advocacy visits to policymakers, security agents, traditional rulers, politicians; sensitization activities through peace walk, and motor parks shows where IEC (Information, Education and Communication) materials such as wrist bands, stickers, fliers, caps and T-shirts with emblazoned peace messages were disseminated; football matches; focus group discussions (FGD); dramas, and radio and television jingles. A brief monitoring of the CSOs' activities were carried out in their respective zones by IPCR staff. The researcher reviewed the report and some of its key points validated this impact assessment.

Looking at its hierarchy of results, it could be said the project was clear and coherent. Though the programme logic model was not drawn, its aide memoire was adopted in the conception of the project i.e. the primary document outlining the ideas and strategies of a project or programme. In it, the background (preamble), goals, objectives, justification and methodology were explained.

4.7 Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention

The programme primarily focused on women gender in the area of harnessing their potential conflict management abilities. Here, both qualitative and quantitative indicators were measured in this chapter and the next. From the chart 4.2 illustrating the frequency of implemented programmes, column on gender was the second highest-ranking peacebuilding interventions between 2007 and 2014. Between 2009 when the Institute commenced mainstreaming gender into peace programming and 2014, it had designed and implemented 10 gender activities. It could be argued there are plausible reasons for this frequency.

In October 2000, the world resolved to promote the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution by the adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, based, amongst other things, on the recognition of the important role of women in the prevention of conflict and resolution of conflict, peacebuilding and stresses the importance of their equal participation in all peace and security endeavours. Therefore, the Resolution “...urges actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations

peace and security efforts.”²⁵⁹ The global resolution and the conflict assessment frameworks it derived made it imperative for the Institute to be committed to the inclusion of women peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming.

Firstly, aside being victims of violence including their children, women were often left behind or discriminated against in critical decision making, conflict management, and post-conflict peacebuilding in the highly patriarchal Nigerian societies. They were active in peacebuilding in some pre-colonial Nigerian communities. Secondly, as a vulnerable sex, women knew how painfully and disadvantaged it could be to be victims of sexual discrimination and inequality, and hence in a position to actively play conflict management role.

Lastly, the potential power of women who mostly had not gone beyond the home needed to be harnessed in the promotion of peace and security in Nigeria. Therefore the baseline for the intervention was the underutilization of the potentialities in women in peace work due to traditional beliefs and flagrant exploitations in the past. Reviews of the Institute’s concept notes on gender mainstreaming indicated a series of interventions were designed each year since 2009 for the inclusion of women in the promotion of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the country.

4.7.1 TOCs and Methodology

Why and how did IPCR intervene to mainstream women in its peacebuilding programmes? To answer the question, the following theories of change were considered. *If women’s capacity and skills could be developed in peacebuilding it would enhance and strengthen their role and contribution in conflict prevention and resolution; If large number of women were trained in principles and concepts of peace and conflict, it would create a critical mass of people to mitigate effects of conflict and promote peace.*²⁶⁰

The indicators here tested the relevance and effectiveness of the design and implementation of the programme. As explained above, including women in peacebuilding did not fall out of place in the Institute programming. According to its focal officer, “*the main objective of the training was to enhance women’s capacity to be more inclusive and participatory in conflict resolution*

²⁵⁹ The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues’ *Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security* [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/resolution \(S/RES/1325\)](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/resolution (S/RES/1325)) (accessed 22 September, 2016).

²⁶⁰ Interview with the focal officer and a review of programme records and reports.

and peacebuilding.”²⁶¹ Similarly, the UNDP desk officer acknowledged the importance of women inclusion in peacebuilding and peace processes when he said, “*the role of women particularly in Nigeria should include preventing, managing and resolving conflict across spectrums.*”²⁶² The specific objectives included:

- a. To create and strengthen mechanisms that will broaden the understanding of women on the importance of their contribution to the culture of peace in their communities;
- b. To increase the awareness of women on the ways and means by which they can express their views, knowledge and skills concerning peace in their communities through action;
- c. To build a critical mass of women at the decision – making levels in areas that are of vital importance to peace. This will allow more women to address the root causes of conflicts and to participate in problem-solving;
- d. To provide avenues for the women to share information on women’s best practices for peace, including lessons learned on women’s traditional role in mediation and reconciliation as well as an assessment of their relevance to present day situations;
- e. To establish communication networks to facilitate cooperation between local women leaders, women politicians, market women and peace researchers for mutual support, early warning and early response; and
- f. To develop a common understanding of the impact of violent conflicts, especially from a gender perspective for the benefit of society.²⁶³

To achieve these objectives, a number of activities were implemented that included developing participant lists from the Institute database, individuals, contacts with national networks of women organizations and logistics such as procuring venues to host the training workshops across Nigeria and materials. Facilitators were usually two and who were engaged and supported by key IPCR staff members during the trainings that normally spanned 3 days. Signings of contracts of agreements commonly entered into with hotel venues and training consultants. The research study found the pre-workshop preparation and management to be effective. Though slow in terms of efficiency as it often took up to 5-8 weeks of time and effort to get one training

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Interview with UNDP Desk Officer in Abuja 30 November, 2016.

²⁶³ This is according to the intervention’s concept note.

workshop done. This could impact negatively on the speed and delivery of not only peacebuilding but other conflict management programmes and tenacity of the programme team.

Ten capacity building workshops on mainstreaming gender into conflict prevention and peacebuilding were counted to have been executed between 2009 when it started in Yenagoa (Bayelsa State) and 2014 in Ibadan (Oyo State). This suggests the central role women played at the heart of IPCR peacebuilding. The study also tested the impact of the programme's TOC in 4 geopolitical zones of North Central, North West, South East and South West where 20 women groups and 105 past beneficiaries were surveyed and interviewed. Its research findings and lessons learned are contained in chapter five.

4.8 Conflict Sensitive Reporting on Elections and Good Governance Advocacy for Media Groups

The peacebuilding was different from the ECMP. Its primary target was the media and stakeholders as per their role during election periods. IPCR began training journalists on conflict sensitivity reporting on election shortly before the general elections in March 2011 (Ibadan, Kaduna and Port-Harcourt venues). It was called *Conflict Sensitive Reporting on Elections for Media Groups*. In 2013, it was themed *Conflict Sensitive Reporting and Good Governance Advocacy for Media Groups* at Jos and Iloko-Ijesha (Osun State) workshops. One-off media training was also implemented, respectively, prior to Ekiti and Osun States' elections in 2014 at Akure, Ondo State.

As indicated in Chart 4.2, it was one of the IPCR's most implemented peacebuilding activities. The baseline for the interventions was the apprehension and palpable fear that used to come with each election that it would be violent and unfair due to negative reporting by the media and also the misgovernment of the masses by the people in power due to a wide gap between the leaders and the led. There had been unpleasant experiences in past elections. Its expected outcome was the emergence of media practitioners with skills and capacities for conflict sensitive reporting. Its overall goal was a peaceful and stable Nigeria. Its specific objectives are as follows:

- a. To train journalists on skills and techniques of understanding and analyzing conflicts
- b. To share knowledge and experiences on best ways to report conflicts

- c. To provide opportunity to create an enabling environment for the media to cover conflict without hindrance or interference, including free access to all areas under conflict, and access to peace processes and negotiations;
- d. To further develop a common understanding of the impact of violent conflicts, especially from a journalist perspective for the benefit of society.
- e. To achieve increased professionalism of the media by ensuring that governance issues are reported objectively and professionally.
- f. To enhance the capacity of reporters to report issues with human face.
- g. To examine the concepts of good governance and advocacy
- h. To share experiences and best practices on emerging trends on democratic institutions and the role of the media.²⁶⁴

As with all processes, the implementation involved relevant national stakeholders including the government regulatory agencies and the Nigerian Union of Journalists. From the records, the workshops attracted journalists (both from public and private-owned media) and practitioners from a wide range of the media such as radio, television, newspapers, social media, marketers, consultants, regulators of print and electronic media, representatives of electoral body (Independent National Electoral Commission-INEC), civil society and others. The duration of the workshops ranged between three and four days. There were a total of seven workshops on media between 2011 and 2014. That is three in 2011 (Ibadan, Port-Harcourt and Jos), two in 2013 (Kaduna and Iloko-Ijesha in Osun State) while there were two in 2014 in Akure (for Osun and Ekiti States' media groups prior to their governorship elections).

4.8.1 TOCs and Methodology

To measure the why and underlying assumptions behind the design and implementation of the programme, the research study first examined its TOCs: *If journalists were trained to be conflict sensitive in their reports, election would be peaceful; If the election reportage by media groups and stakeholders were balanced there would be less violence; And if the media were trained on conflict sensitivity they could advocate for good governance and monitor democratic development.*²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Interview with the focal officer and a review of programme records and reports.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

The respondents in this intervention were the members of IPCR's programme team, past recipients, and UNDP desk officer for the Institute. According to the focal officer, "*journalists could make or mar elections. Similarly, the media could serve as a watchdog on political appointees to provide good governance.*"²⁶⁶ The media were seen as a critical stakeholder to contribute to peaceful elections and democracy in their reportage because of the way they influenced public opinion. So if they were trained on conflict sensitivity and be reminded of their professional ethics, they would promote peaceful elections through unbiased and objective coverage.²⁶⁷ This was the logic behind the conception and design of the programme. They could promote the election by sensitizing and educating the electorate on the election process, avoid inflammatory remarks and comments, balanced and unbiased news and reports, due announcement of official results, open space to political parties and politicians and many more.

Election in Nigeria was warfare. Tension ran high; fear and apprehension abound; propaganda, rigging, thuggery, snatching of ballot boxes, arson, assassination and kidnapping were common. As analyzed in chapter two, electoral violence had consumed lives and property. The Director General of IPCR, Dr. Joseph Golwa (2006-2014) remarked in 2014, "*Conflict coverage either by local or international has its own impact on conflict.*"²⁶⁸ Efforts to drastically minimize or eliminate the carnage should be commended and encouraged.

The TOCs were tested in three elections (2011 nationwide, and Ekiti and Osun States respectively) and the research study measured the extent of its relevance and effectiveness in strengthening capacity of the media in promoting peaceful and help achieve free, fair and credible elections. The analysis on the media's TOCs in relation to the research findings has gone to prove whether the journalists adhered to the professional and ethical conduct during the elections and promotion of democracy in which the peacebuilding programme was designed for. The research findings and lessons learned are explained in chapter five.

²⁶⁶ Interviewed on 30 November, 2016.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ In his opening address at the Akure workshop for the Ekiti State media in 2014.

4.9 Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development and Budget Formulation for State Legislators, Public Servants, Local Government Chairmen, Traditional Rulers and Civil Society

As part of its responses to the intervention gaps identified in the SCA report including stakeholders' contributions, IPCR designed and implemented a series of peacebuilding programme for the executive and legislative arms of government. It was a critical peacebuilding as it was felt that the dividends of democratic rule had not been delivered to the people after twelve years into the Nigerian democracy.²⁶⁹ The age-long weak governance and maladministration was still pervasive in public sector. The underlying causes of conflict and crime that it was meant to address mushroomed. According to the Institute, corruption, nepotism, non-adherence to the rule of law, and other vices in public space had pushed the level of violent conflict, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and diseases high.²⁷⁰ The insensitivity of policymakers and implementers to peace and development indicators continued to precipitate crimes and violent conflict. Implementation of policies and programmes triggered violent protest and conflict in Nigeria.

Two major examples were cited by the Institute. The announcement of a federal university in Ekiti State sparked off bloody conflict among two communities in the state and the infamous Niger Delta crises between the communities and oil companies. In one of the programme events (2006-2014), the DG commented thus:

In reaching decisions on the types, locations and timing of development interventions, policy makers have shown poor appreciation of the interface between development and conflict, especially in the context of Nigeria's heterogeneity. It is not surprising that development challenges bordering on issues of human rights, political and economic inclusion were part of the causal factors of the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970, as well as, a number of other violent post-civil war communal conflicts prevalent in Nigeria today.²⁷¹

To address the failings i.e. the myriads of historical governance challenges, IPCR designed the conflict sensitivity to capacitate the lawmakers, public servants, local government chairmen,

²⁶⁹ Nigerian national dailies reported the public outcry around this period. The IPCR focal officer attested to this in an interview.

²⁷⁰ Report of the 2012 workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, p. 1.

²⁷¹ IPCR's 2012 Activity Report of Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development and Budget Formulation, p. 28.

traditional authorities and the civil society to understand and improve governance. The objectives of the workshop are as follow:

- enabling participants become more inclusive, participatory in the design, formulation and implementation of development intervention, as well as, being conscious to reduce the likelihood of violent conflicts in the process of development programming and implementation
- increasing the ability of participants to use interactive rights-based approach to development and promote the use of dialogue in generating inclusive solutions to development challenges;
- acquainting participants with the techniques of mainstreaming peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive approaches to the design and management of development programmes;
- helping participants assess the institutional capacity of their organization in relation to conflict sensitive programming and
- designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating conflict-sensitive projects and programmes in their area of jurisdiction.
- Developing the capacity of state legislators and executives in conflict management, prevention and resolution
- Building institutional capacity to tackle the perennial problems Nigeria is facing.²⁷²

The workshops were implemented between 2011 and 2012 (2 years) to participants from twelve states of the federation in six venues-Lagos, Igbara Oke (Ondo State), Iloko-Ijesha (Osun State), Ilorin, Lafia, Makurdi, Port-Harcourt and Saminaka (Kaduna State). The twelve states that benefited were Lagos, Niger, Ekiti, Ondo, Rivers, Imo, Anambra, Delta, Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna and Sokoto. The research study relied on interviews with the programme officers in IPCR and UNDP and reviews of programme records. The survey respondents were recipients of the peacebuilding.

4.9.1 TOCs and Methodology

The assumptions behind the TOCs are that: *If the 3-tiers of governments were trained in conflict sensitivity there would be fundamental reduction in violent conflict and crime in Nigeria; If the*

²⁷² Interview with the focal officer and a review of programme records and reports.

*policymakers and programme implementers were trained in peacebuilding programming there would be peace and development in Nigeria.*²⁷³

As yet observed there was no logic frame for the programme design but its principles and approaches were to some extent implicitly built into the programme's concept note and work plan.²⁷⁴ That is, the aims and objectives, inputs, activities, outputs and the expected outcome were inherently drawn at the beginning of the intervention. The increasing gap between the leaders and the led in Nigeria was widening as per the conception and delivery of development programmes and activities. Likewise, according to the programme logic and planning, the Institute was concerned that the Nigerian people had not felt the dividends of democracy as promised by the politicians in the twelve years of democratic experience. Instead, the weakness in governance had made violent conflict and crime a frequent occurrence as analysed earlier in chapter three. Nigeria had witnessed the rise of criminal groups and violent conflict such as the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009.

Since the executive and legislative arms of government were considered the key to socio-economic and political development, they were seen as indispensable target group to be trained for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Evidence showed trainings as the major activities while the participants were strategically selected across broad spectrums i.e. states' legislative arm of government, local council chairmen, senior public servants who were saddled with the responsibility of management and decision making, and traditional authorities including the civil society. This suggests inclusivity and much expanded intervention of critical set of beneficiaries that should be included or in need of such training on conflict sensitivity on development.

Workshops were held in Lafia for Benue State contingents (10-12 July 2012), Makurdi for Adamawa State participants (24-26 July, 2012), Iloko Ijesha for Ekiti contingents, Golden Tulip Hotel at Festac hosted Lagos and Osun participants (13-15 August, 2012) and Niger participants were invited to Ilorin (24-25 September 2012).²⁷⁵ Reason behind the decision to take participants away from their places of residence was to gain their full attention. It was also disclosed that the calibres or status of the participants were such that could attract distractions if the workshops were held in their domains and the intended goal of the training might be lost. It could be commented that the judgment was not a bad idea as journalists were known to be busy bees.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ IPCR 2012 Activity Report, Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development and Budget Formulation, p. 9.

Similarly, in implementation, the Institute engaged the services of about 3 to 4 consultants as trainers/facilitators, each with peculiar skills and expertise in peacebuilding, development programming, budgeting and other cognate fields. The output, outcome and impact of the programme relevance and effectiveness are discussed in next chapter.

4.10 Interfaith Dialogues on Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Coexistence in Northern Nigeria

Religious intolerance and violence had marred post-independent Nigeria. Adherents who were driven by sharp ideologies or religious pretence had persistently adopted violence to undermine the state and wreak havoc. In the 1980s, armed attacks by the Matatsine and the Taliban killed thousands of people and destroyed property in the northern part of the country.²⁷⁶ Similarly, the democratic government was confronted by an insurgency perpetuated by the radicalized Islamic fundamentalists, Boko Haram (Boko Haram means western education is an abomination) had since 2009 devastated untold killings, destructions and abductions. Christians and Muslims were targeted. The infamous abduction of over 200 Chibok school girls in Borno State for over two years was one of the heights of its notoriety.²⁷⁷ Religious intolerance and extremism are some of the known causes of these actions.

Threat to state and human security did not only come from armed insurgency but also from strayed youth who under the guise of religion had at slight provocation took law into their hand by killing people and destroying property. Relationships between adherents of the two major religion had in the past pitched to the extreme. According to the DG of IPCR, Professor Oshita O. Oshita (2014 till date): *“The existence of radical religious groups with extreme ideologies is not only dangerous to our democracy but also poses a serious threat to development and the continuous corporate existence of the Nigerian state.”*²⁷⁸

The study found out that in order to address the menace and mitigate the forces of the recurring violence and religious bigotry, the Institute had designed and implemented a series of interfaith

²⁷⁶ M. Hiskett (1987) The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment, Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 17, Fasc. 3 p. 209, Brill, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580875>, pp. 209-223, (accessed 22 October, 20160.

²⁷⁷ There were conflicting reports on the number abducted. Some said 276 while others reported more or less than that. However, as at the end of May 2017, a total number of 82 of the girls have been released www.aljazeera.com/.../62-chibok-schoolgirls-kidnapped-boko-haram-freed-1705061.. and <https://www.reuters.com/.../nigeria-exchanges-82-chibok-girls-kidnapped-by-boko-ha...>

²⁷⁸ Proceedings of the Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and Security in Northern Nigeria, IPCR, 2014, p. 4.

dialogues to foster mutual understanding, rebuild trust and strained relationship in the north and Nigeria in general. The specific objectives are to:

- Build confidence and trust between adherents of different religions in Nigeria
- Discover each other's equal humanity – fear, grief, needs, hopes and create concrete plans for a shared future
- Develop a policy direction for government interventions on how best to use religion for peace and peacemaking in Nigeria; and
- Establish communication networks to facilitate cooperation between groups in the communities – women, youth, associations, etc. – for mutual support, early warning and early response to issues of tension arising from religious extremism.²⁷⁹

There was evidence to show that two (2) of such dialogues were organized between 2013 and 2014 while a capacity development programme was also organized on peace and conflict resolution for religious groups (10-13 November, 2014) in Kaduna. (Though the focus here is on the dialogues) According to the programme officer, the first to be held was tagged *Interfaith Dialogue on Religion and Peacemaking in Nigeria* (24-25 September, 2013) and in 10-11 September, 2014 it was expanded in scope and depth in terms of the audience and content which was titled *Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and Security in Northern Nigeria*. This could be considered an indication of inclusion and expansion in design perhaps due to the rising spate Boko Haram insurgency.

All the programmes were held in Kaduna, being the renowned capital of the region. Preachers, scholars, researchers, government officials, security agents and the civil society organizations were in attendance. A cross spectrum of participants were drawn from both Christian and Muslim religious bodies such as Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the Jama'atul Nasril Islam (JNI), NASFAT, the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), the Nigerian Interreligious Council (NIREC), Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) and the Pilgrims Boards. Others included organizations such as the National Council of Women Society (NCWS), Nigerian Union of Journalists, civil society organization such as the Interfaith

²⁷⁹ Report of the Two-Day IPCR-UNDP Interfaith Dialogue on Religion and Peacemaking in Nigeria, held at Asaa Pyramid Hotel, Kaduna, 24-25 September, 2013, pp. 1-2.

Mediation Centre in Kaduna and the security agencies (the military, National Intelligence Agency, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, State Security and Prisons officials).

4.10.1 TOCs and Methodology

The assumptions of the programme are: *If the religious leaders were brought together to interact and exchange ideas on their faiths and beliefs, there would be religious tolerance and understanding between the followers and democracy would thrive; If the religious leaders and other stakeholders committed themselves to peace and mutual understanding, efforts at countering violent extremism (CVE) would be successful.*²⁸⁰

In investigating how the programme was implemented, the research study relied on programme records and interviews with the Institute's focal officer and past delegates of the dialogues in Kaduna, Jos and Abuja. The logic frame process was to some extent followed where input/activities, output, outcome and impact were inherently built in the concept note and workplan. From the studies carried out, interreligious dialogue is a way of peacebuilding that bring people together to learn to live in peace.²⁸¹ It can be invaluable in promoting understanding and reconciliation, most especially in restoring affected relationships that were noticed during the military epoch. Like all dialogues, the purpose was to facilitate constructive engagement among religion stakeholders to express their views and opinions in order to suggest ways to bring about social change. Religion should not be a divisive tool but an instrument to forge common front for peaceful coexistence and to realize common goal.

There was evidence to prove that IPCR chose experienced and respected facilitators to handle such sensitive forums to achieve the expected outcome. Eminent personalities were invited across all the northern states of the federation in both dialogues-imams, mallams (Mullahs), reverends, pastors, scholars and researchers, development practitioners, security officials, and other stakeholders. The then Executive Governor of the host, Kaduna State, Alhaji (Dr.) Mukhtar Ramalan Yero, declared the event open on the two occasions. This could be seen as adding some political leverage which such programme required so as to make it more effective. After all, the chief executives of states were constitutionally the chief security officers of their respective states and therefore IPCR could be said to have taken the right step.

²⁸⁰ Interview with the focal officer and a review of programme records and reports

²⁸¹ R. Kronish (2010) Inter-Religious Dialogue as a Method of Peacebuilding in Israel and Palestine, <http://irdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Inter-Religious-Dialogue-as-a-Method-of-Peace-Building-in-Israel-and-Palestine-by-Rabbi-Dr.-Ronald-Kronish-.pdf> (accessed 26 October 2016).

Aside the verbal exchanges, paper presentations were also part of the dialogue. Selected delegates articulated their research that elicited questions and comments from the audience. Such exercise points to exchange of intellectual merits whose outcomes were compiled into published books. But having said this, to what extent did the programme become effective and impactful in a region widely known for such religious volatility? The answer is attempted in chapter five of the study.

4.11 Analysis of Results on Programme Planning and Management

From the available results, it could be argued that IPCR had designed relevant and appropriate peacebuilding programmes for the analysed conflict dynamics. For example, in the survey assessing if IPCR had demonstrated capacity in strategic thinking and ability in peacebuilding design and content, 81% of the respondents agreed, 4% did not agree while 15% were not so sure. Using the conflict analysis model, one could agree to the positive response of the programme recipients because they were clear and appropriate to the causes, issues, actors, trends and dynamics of conflict in Nigeria. The researcher's reviews of programme documents, firstly lent support to the popular response, secondly, some principles of the theories of change as explained by Peter Woodrow, and Nick Oatley in their *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change*²⁸² were adhered to, though their logic models were not specifically or physically drawn, but implicit in the programme chain. Clear and proper processes were followed in programming and documentations. Feedback during interviews with the past recipients also buttressed the result. In the words of Pastor Ade Bodunde, "*IPCR had done well in its programme planning, though it can do more.*"²⁸³

Likewise in the survey, 85% of the respondents agreed that IPCR had demonstrated effective organization of its programme planning and management while 15% were not so sure. This suggests a positive perception on the ability of the Institute to organize programmes. Moreover the baseline studies it conducted before any intervention was observed to be in line with global best practices. Considering the approach adopted, it can be said that the Institute embraced the Intervention Theory and method of Chris Argyris that appropriate and useful knowledge must be

²⁸²Refer back to the study's theoretical framework on Theory of Change

www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M.../CCVRI-theories-of-change-part-1.pdf (accessed 10 January, 2017).

²⁸³ Interviewed in Ilorin on 30 July, 2016.

applied to achieve organizational goals and values.²⁸⁴ However, the impact and effectiveness of the interventions will be determined by their programme outcome.

Similarly, observation and reviews of documents of past interventions revealed some coherence and consistency in conceptualization of the programmes. Major programme components were able to be identified. Aide-memoire, concept notes, workplans were thoughtful and attendance was in order. The appendage activities were appropriate and suitable. Checking the attendance, participants of all ages, genders and social status were invited to the peacebuilding events (some participant lists annexed). The cognate choice of participants in relation with the organizations they represented was a reflection of profound decision. Therefore, looking at the involvement of all stakeholders and their input in planning and implementation, it can be argued that larger groups of people could provide broad-based support for peacebuilding.²⁸⁵ But it could be contented that number of people could be critical to promotion of peacebuilding particularly in Nigeria with overwhelming conflict dynamics.

Furthermore, strategic programming could be noticed in the relevance of the peacebuilding interventions. Thematic areas of interventions such as the election, the media, governance, women, youth, traditional rulers and civil society peacebuilding pointed to the usefulness of the programmes. This is because these sets of the beneficiaries are the fulcrum of the society. Their role was critical to peace and development of Nigeria. Therefore, it could be considered that recognizing the target audience is commendable.

Equally, it could be said that the goals, objectives and activities of the programmes were in consonance with their theories of change. The objectives were in tandem with the expected outputs and outcome on the target groups as explained in chapter five. Though there was no drawn logic framework for the programmes. Secondly, the inputs provided and the activities undertaken in the implementation were relevant and capable to deliver the planned results.

In implementation, after studying the records, more than 90% of its programmes were completed as scheduled and the few outstanding ones were executed in the early periods of the following year. As noted, these carried over were the first to be executed in the following programme year.

²⁸⁴Refer back to the theoretical framework on Intervention Theory for Organizational Development.

²⁸⁵USAID (2011) People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, , pp. 7-8
<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMMP2PGuidelines2010-01-19.pdf> (accessed 28 October, 2016).

The common delivery mode of each programme was training except the dialogues that involved coordination or facilitation of their proceedings. 94% of the respondents said the facilitation of the programme they attended was good while 6% were not so sure. In interviews with past beneficiaries, however, there were complaints of limited number and venues of workshops in most of the programmes. They were of the view that IPCR should be able to trickle down the gains of the interventions by going into more states of the federation and even include the local government areas. Their suggestion indicates that more people could have benefited from the interventions and thereby promote peacebuilding.

4.12 Lessons Learned on Programme Planning and Management

Thus far, what can we learn from the way IPCR had designed and implemented peacebuilding in the period under study? The research study had shown evidence of what the Institute did and how it did it to address the persistent problems of violent conflict in Nigeria. A significant lesson for peacebuilding is to be inclusive and participatory. IPCR was the government agency saddled with peacebuilding responsibility, yet could not singlehandedly promote peacebuilding but engaging key stakeholders and relevant experts, local and foreign, in the planning and implementation processes. Their support was needed in developing and implementing peacebuilding.

Although there is no single, correct way of developing and implementing effective peacebuilding programme, it can be posited that the experience of IPCR should be commended and encouraged. Revising its reports and establishment mandate, it was the first of such institutionalized peacebuilding agencies in Africa. Successful implementation of programmes requires long time planning as IPCR example had shown. Strategic interventions did not begin until years after its establishment. It can also be argued that the peculiar nature or working environment of the Institute did not support or encourage it for the needed early interventions.

Programme officers are in need of deep conceptual and theoretical understanding in design and implementation of peacebuilding. Although the staff were statutorily employed as research officers, conceptualization of activities and documents such as concept notes and workplans were clearly articulated. There was a strong evidence to show that the IPCR programme team had some understanding on what a programme meant to achieve intended results. The programme team's ability to establish and undertake training needs of practitioners and, identify and include above-outlined best practices of programming was also a reflection of organizational

characteristics which, according to Matt Duerden and Peter Witt, influence implementation system.²⁸⁶ However, the effectiveness of these qualities on output and outcome on target groups and impact on Nigeria in general would determine how the fundamental causes of conflict were managed.

Record keeping is germane and central to successful programming, more especially on significant planning and management. All the records of fifteen years pertaining to the implemented activities were intact and easy to access. Though, IPCR did practise traditional methods of recording keeping. That is, it lacked modern methods of data management. With the exception of the focal officer, no member of the programme team used an official computer that would have facilitated programming and improve data security.

Data of all the past programmes were not systematized or structured as any information would require opening of office files or searching for the saved items in the computers. The world of programming made use of computerized database for storing, retrieving and computing information. When such a system were in place, it had potential to facilitate programme processes and drive better outcomes.

Time and money are constraints to programming. IPCR had exhibited proactive responses to some national issues such as elections and religious crises. The implemented activities attested to that assertion. For example, the training of the media on conflict sensitivity during election went a long way in promoting peaceful elections. However, inadequate logistics and lateness in the release of funds sometimes hindered what and how it would have responded. The challenge often noticed with the Institute's government-funded programmes such as the early warning and early response system and in the release of counterpart funding.

Closely related to the above, it was observed that limited money and resources were made available by the government which was supposed to be the sole financier of the Institute. There were low annual budgetary allocations to the Institute from the government that made all the implemented peacebuilding programmes that were evaluated to be development agency-supported.²⁸⁷ The limitation of funds did not augur well for an agency saddled with so many

²⁸⁶ M.D. Duerden and P.A. Witt (2012) Assessing Program Implementation: What It Is, Why It's Important, and How to Do It, *Journal of Extension*, <https://joe.org/joe/2012february/a4.php> (accessed 10 November, 2016).

²⁸⁷ IPCR Brief and interactions with programme team, July-August 2016.

responsibilities and expectations as stipulated in its Establishment Act. The 2011 report of functional and capacity needs assessment on the Institute alluded to this fact.²⁸⁸

Despite the earlier commendations, there were gaps in planning and implementation of peacebuilding programmes. It was noticed that the Institute did not have monitoring and evaluation mechanism built into them. If the logic model had been drawn before commencement of each programme, such need would have been taken care of. That could have potential hindrance in tracking the impacts or gains of the peacebuilding programmes,²⁸⁹ because no two programmes are the same.

Though, through a verification of attendance records, there was evidence that suggested a huge success in terms of high participants' turnout in the workshops and other peacebuilding events. According to the focal person *"attendance at our programmes often recorded more than 90% of invited participants. It used to be a first time experience for many as they see it as a turning point in their professional career."*²⁹⁰ The statement could be interpreted to mean the attendees often relished the idea of participating in programmes as they always looked forward to new invitation. A lot of them expressed this feeling during the data gathering exercise.

As demonstrated in the evaluation, IPCR had ensured inclusive and participatory design and implementation of programmes. It became evidence of capacity to constructively engage with both participants and partners. In fact, it went to say how well IPCR did organizationally in meeting the expectations of its partners. The position was bolstered by the UNDP desk officer for the Institute.²⁹¹ Expectedly, he was of the view that there were challenges in the implementations occasionally but often surmounted with doggedness.

Lastly, implementations of the programmes which, though mostly delivered as planned, were not enough to go round the country. As may be observed in the implementation evidence on each of the intervention explained above, all were not executed in all the six geopolitical zones (six states in a zone except north-west with seven and south-east with five). Sometimes, to cut cost as made

²⁸⁸ Functional and Capacity Need Assessment report by Abiodun Alao and Melisa Ibrahim, p. 23.

²⁸⁹ A. Aryal, et al (2012) Theories of Change in Peacebuilding: Learning from Experiences in Peacebuilding Initiatives in Nepal, p. 2
https://www.care.at/images/care_2013/expert/pdf/COE_Resources/Programming/Theories_of_Change_in_Peacebuilding.pdf (accessed 28 October, 2016).

²⁹⁰ Interview with the programme team leader, 6 July, 2016.

²⁹¹ The Desk Officer on IPCR, Governance Unit, UNDP Nigeria (2008 till present) interviewed 22 July, 2016.

known by the organizers, two zones were merged for a programme. Such action could have had inauspicious effect on the programme effectiveness and impact. As suggested by almost all of the interviewees that IPCR should deliver peacebuilding to the community levels, the impact of its programmes would have been deeper and broader.

Insights into lessons learned on the peacebuilding formulation and management could be offered in following areas:

- The logic model would have helped IPCR to simplify the complexity of its peacebuilding programmes. Through the model's visual way of explaining the trends of change, it would have guided IPCR to trace the linkages of each of its programme from the beginning to its impact. Having this system in place cannot be overemphasized. It would have ensured coherence in planning/implementation and enabled the Institute to monitor progress and performance of its programmes and evaluate their impact. Mores so, whenever IPCR wanted to report or communicate its success to key stakeholders and partners either to advocate for the programme expansion or continuation, the model would have helped.
- Expected outputs could also be integrated into the Institute's programme framework for planning purposes. To ensure the set objectives were successfully achieved, information on outputs was key in the programme plan.
- Assumptions on unpredictability are critical to programme success and so it should have run through at each stage of the logic frame. For example, the exchange rate of the Nigeria's currency (Naira) was unpredictable or conflict eruption could have marred implementation of programme.
- IPCR's engagement with relevant partners and stakeholders was vital in formulating future peacebuilding intervention strategies.
- Evidence suggests that calls for consultants were not publicly advertised in national dailies or publicly. Though the Institute maintained a record of prospective trainers, facilitators and other consultants in which it developed with the partners and sometimes with professional networks. Nevertheless, if calls for expert inputs had been made publicly, it would have generated inclusive and wider peacebuilding management.
- Monitoring and evaluation through each programme's LogFrame (logical framework) should have be drawn at the conception stage to ensure effective implementation and

have significant control in following up and measuring achieved impact. IPCR's peacebuilding planning and management would have been better identified, shared, learned from and communicated to relevant stakeholders.

Chapter five unpacked evidence of output, outcome and impact of the interventions.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CONTRIBUTION OF IPCR TO PEACE IN NIGERIA

If anything, as our experience has shown, they aggravate the situation by burying the cause of conflict, and creating a façade of peace or amicable settlement. Peace cannot be imposed or enforced. It is the by-product of conflict resolution. Anything less will be artificial and unsustainable.

Lt. Gen. Aliyu Mohammed (*rtd*)
Former National Security Adviser (2005)²⁹²

5.1 Introduction

The evidence on how IPCR had designed and implemented its peacebuilding programmes has been provided in chapter four. After implementation, it was left for the beneficiaries to understand, internalize and make use of the intended change for peacebuilding. Making sense of or transferring the knowledge and skills gained in their lives, work and communities became the responsibility of the participants. This chapter mainly focuses on effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the interventions in individual beneficiaries, their work and national peace.

Once again, adapting the CARE International UK Peacebuilding model, the outcome of this impact evaluation was reported through: *research findings (i.e. its output, outcome and impact)*; and lessons learned for each of the five evaluated programmes. The model's *conclusions and recommendations* were valuable in drawing out general conclusions and recommendation of the research study. The effectiveness of each programme is reported here as regard their expected results in outputs, outcome and impact. A number of indicators were used to determine programme impact ranging from professional relevance of programme attended; whether expectations were met; increase in knowledge and skills in peace and conflict studies; improvement in place of work; confidence, efficiency and effectiveness in peacebuilding; strengthening democracy and good governance by IPCR; behavioural and attitudinal change of beneficiaries; reduction in occurrence of violence and conflict, numbers of participants at workshops; communiqués issued; networks formed; and a host of others.

²⁹²A. Mohammed (2005) Crises and Conflict Management in Nigeria, p. 17, *Crises and Conflict Management in Nigeria*, Nigerian Defence Academy, pp. 17.27.

(It was a lecture delivered by the former National Security Adviser to the President, retired Lt. Gen. Aliyu Mohammed).

5.2 Election Conflict Management Project (ECMP)

5.2.1 Research Findings

ECMP was implemented before, during and after the 2007 national elections. The research study assessed the activities executed in each of the 4 phases of ECMP as against their expected results in TOCs. Evidence in their output, outcome and impact were sought. However, it is important to point out that the search for evidence was a rigorous process as the project was implemented in 4 phases ten years ago. It was difficult to access many of its primary beneficiaries, perhaps due to the nature and time of the programmes and thus made accessibility a bit of challenge. Therefore, as against the other four impact assessments, investigation on ECMP relied more on interviews and reviews of the project reports by the partners: IPCR, UNDP and the CSOs, 43 beneficiaries of the project and lastly, the media reports on the elections.

Outputs: There was evidence that the project recorded a number of tangible outputs. First, 255 stakeholders attended the Strategic Stakeholders Dialogues that were organized in four venues across Nigeria. Second, they signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) issued at the end of discussion and disseminated to each of their zonal policymakers, security agencies and the media. Third, 153 tribunal judges (52 women and 101 men) were trained during the Capacity Building for the Election Tribunal Judges. Four, over 2000 copies of Court of Appeal's Practice Guides for election petitions were produced and were advertised and disseminated in two national dailies. Nevertheless, it was noted that none of the respondents (under ECMP) to this study had participated in event organized by the Institute.

The second phase of the project, Peace Education and Peacebuilding, partnered six CSOs (one in each zone) which engaged in promoting post-election peacebuilding. The study uncovered a wide range of peacebuilding activities developed and implemented by the CSOs for eight weeks. Although the research could not ascertain the total number of youth that participated in the activities, but photographs, video clips and reports of the events showed high participation such as street processions, sports, advocacy visits and focus group discussions adopted by the organizations in their respective communities. Lastly, there was tangible evidence to indicate that 23 out of 44 youth nominated across the country attended the National Youth Award ceremony at IPCR on Monday 15th September, 2008. The best three nominees were awarded with peace trophies and presents while the rest also received Peace Certificates. The evidence showed an accomplishment of the outlined activities.

Outcome: The project showed immediate and short term results in outcome. In the survey, 93% of the respondents (representing 40 out of 43) said their expectations of the project were met while 7% were not so sure. Generally, the project's achievement was in the periods of the general elections. The research inquired how relevant and effective the activities were to the objectives of project. First, the elections recorded low rate of violence compared to the 2003 general elections in Nigeria. More than ten years after the election, a few youth were seen to be interviewed and they reminisced about the past. They remembered the election was largely peaceful in their communities and they had been promoting peacebuilding since the intervention. Some of them wondered why such project had not been replicated by IPCR. This evidence was buttressed by the USIP's comment "*[A]lthough the most recent elections in 2007 derived some benefit from local conflict management capacity, they were roundly criticized for being neither free nor fair.*"²⁹³ About 85% of the respondents interviewed agreed that the elections were peaceful in their communities.

Except for the seven national youth corps members that were killed in Bauchi while as ad hoc electoral officials,²⁹⁴ respondents were of the opinion that there were no cases of mass violence during the election. Similarly, in the post-election period, communities, political parties and candidates that felt aggrieved with the outcome of the elections were reconciled and encouraged to seek justice through peaceful means. More than half of the interviewees were of the opinion that the effectiveness and efficiency recorded by the Election Tribunal Judges in adjudicating electoral disputes was a result of IPCR's input. According to the outcome of the National Youth Peace Award as specified in the programme's aide memoire that "*...youth begin to exhibit good behavioural changes as a result of the activities of the awardees, and thereby make laudable progress, and engage in development activities in their communities.*"²⁹⁵ Respondents including the staff members of the Institute were generally of the opinion that it was so. Although most of the respondents agreed that other factors might have also contributed to the success recorded. As one of the youth interviewed in Kaduna put it: "*We mobilized the young people in our community*

²⁹³ E. Onwudiwe and C. Bertwind-Dart (2007) Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, *USIP Special Report*, p. 1

[https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR263-Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR263-Breaking%20the%20Cycle%20of%20Electoral%20Violence%20in%20Nigeria.pdf) (accessed 2 October, 2016).

²⁹⁴ Incidence reported by Nigerian dailies.

²⁹⁵ Aide Memoire on the ECMP's *National Youth Peace Award*, IPCR, p. 2, 29 June, 2008.

*to conduct themselves peacefully during the election as the government and international community are watching us.*²⁹⁶

It was observed during the research study that the intended goal of the project was largely achieved with the general peaceful conduct of the 2007 elections in Nigeria. Nevertheless, almost all of the respondents felt government and stakeholders could do more. The youth interviewed generally agreed that they could also do more to promote community peacebuilding if they were supported either during elections or not. In the survey, 97.6% of the respondents agreed to recommend similar project to their colleagues.

Impact: It was evident that ECMP had significant impact on the 2007 general elections. It could be observed that this achievement was not sustained in the long term as subsequent elections in Nigeria were violent. For example, several lives were lost and property destroyed as a result of violent 2011 elections in many parts of Nigeria. The causal factors of political violence identified in the conflict analysis were still not addressed. The breakdown of law and order often affected development initiatives and created poverty, illiteracy and diseases.

5.2.2 Lessons Learned

The significance of this evidence was the nonviolent transfer of power from one democratically elected president to another in 2007. President Obasanjo peacefully handed the reins of power to President Umar Musa Yar Adua, which was unprecedented in Nigeria. One could be tempted to say that the critical role played by both national and international actors went a long way in ensuring peaceful elections. Peacebuilding should be all-inclusive and encompassing as to allow themes and actors to interplay in many places at the same time. The interplay of youth, stakeholders, judiciary and other civil society contributed to the successful elections. Post-election's effort to restore and reconcile strained relationships was key to peacebuilding. The project could be lauded for its positive engagement of youth in three of the four phases of the intervention as they had been used as tool for violence and vote rigging. On the other hand, as veritable tools for peace and development, their role in the elections could not be underated

The lesson of evidence on outcome, outputs and impact showed that IPCR could do more in future elections. As observed, this lesson came as a result of the fact that since 2007, no similar

²⁹⁶ Confidential with Adamu Abdullahi, one of the youth that participated in the ECMP activities during the 2007 election.

conflict management project was accomplished on the scale of ECMP to promote peaceful elections in 2011.

Similarly, an easily noticed effect of the peaceful election was the role of education and dialogue. These peacebuilding activities had potential to promote qualities of tolerance, compassion, sharing and caring as evident in the study. The seemingly intractable causes of conflict that had transformed over the decades could be effectively reduced or managed by tolerance and reconciliation.

ECMP was an indication that stakeholders such as security agencies, media, artisans, women, community and religious groups could work together and as manifested, they were critical to peacebuilding. Their insight and participation could promote peacebuilding at all times. The cooperation between the Court of Appeal, IPCR, UNDP as well as the CSOs could point to a fruitful endeavour in the cause of peacebuilding in the long term.

5.3 Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention

5.3.1 Research Findings

Outputs: Some of the findings of the study were the indicators on the number and gender of past participants of mainstreaming gender. For five years (2009 to 2014) the programme had run ten times across all the geopolitical zones of Nigeria. There was evidence to suggest it was the most annually implemented programme of the Institute in the period under review. Kaduna, Sokoto, Jos, Maiduguri, Calabar, Yenogoa, Ibadan and Abuja had hosted the programme. Participants from neighbouring states in a zone attended the training in the city under each zone. About 64.7% of the respondents, (representing 68 out of 105) had attended or participated in the workshop organized by IPCR more than once. That was an indication that it was experienced once by 35.3% of the respondents. In all, 611 women and men benefitted from the trainings with an average of 61.1 participants in each workshop.²⁹⁷ Number of women was 554 and men 57. This represents 90.7% women while 9.3% men in attendance. This suggests that there were wide participations of the programme and wider implementation across the country which means that the Institute took opportunity of the vantage position of women to peacebuilding and empower them to take leadership role in peacebuilding and conflict management in Nigeria.

²⁹⁷ Men working in gender-based organizations were often invited to participate in the trainings.

Another significant output of the mainstreaming gender workshops was the formation of a national peace network called *Innovative Initiative for Community Peacebuilding*.²⁹⁸ Beneficiaries of the programme mainstreamed themselves into a national peacebuilding group whose goal was to enthrone a peaceful and secured Nigeria through the effort of women and youth partnership across the country. Although its secretariat resided with WEP, IPCR has been coordinating the network in partnership with UNDP since 2012.

Outcome: The expected outcome of the programmes was to a large extent met. There was a number of evidence to indicate that participants' expectations that were often expressed at the commencement of training workshops were hugely met. About 98% of the respondents (representing 103 out of 105) had their expectations met at the training while 97.1% said the training was relevant to their professional needs. Survey and interviews conducted in the 4 geopolitical zones of North West, North Central, South West and South East validated review of the workshop reports that it enhanced capacity of the beneficiaries. Almost all the beneficiaries attested that the IPCR-organized programme was their first time of attending gender mainstreaming training, which suggests a turning point in their personal and professional career. In the 105 past beneficiaries surveyed, 93.3% of the respondents agreed to an increase in knowledge and skills in peacebuilding (peace and conflict studies) while 92.3% had observed positive behavioural and attitudinal changes after the training. All (100%) of the women said their participation had improved the way they worked. Also the same percentage had their confidence and efficiency built in peace work. This suggests that the peacebuilding programme was a success and a reflection of the effective design and implementation on the part of IPCR. The strengthening of their role in conflict prevention, resolution and management could also be attributed to a wide range of training modules that were taught which included principles and concepts of peace, conflict, development, mainstreaming gender; conflict analysis; mediation; negotiation; advocacy and communication; Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); power and leadership; practice sessions on early warning/early response; amongst others.

More than 90.4% of the respondents agreed that IPCR had strengthened democratic governance in Nigeria while 9.5% (representing 10 out of 105 respondents) were not so sure. Some 98% of the respondents (103) agreed to recommend similar training to their colleagues. Similarly, a

²⁹⁸ Report on Membership Drive of the *Innovative Initiative for Community Peace Building*, IPCR, WEP and UNDP, February 2014.

distinct change in the way and methods they did their work had considerable improvement especially in the democratic Nigeria. While the result figure was a success, the few responses that were not so sure could be said to be respondents that felt that the democracy they expected had not delivered good governance in general. However, the impact response suggests that the programme had improved the way they built peace and gave them visibility in peacebuilding space. Overall, more women were working and visible impacting change in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution and management as designed in the IPCR concept notes and workplans.

Impact: When compared with its TOCs, it could be argued that mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding and conflict prevention contributed to the capacity development of women and men working in conflict resolution and management in Nigeria. Some 77.1% of respondents of the peacebuilding agreed that the Institute's contribution to peace was in medium term, 20.9% said in short term while 2% of the respondents said long term. This is an indication that IPCR had contributed to national peace. The result on long term effect of the Institute on peace could be interpreted to mean that IPCR's impact had not been enduring or sustaining. During interviews with a few of the past beneficiaries, they were not certain if they could make causal attributes to the peacefulness noticed in some parts of the country to their work because of some other factors they thought could have been responsible. Nevertheless, they were of the opinion that in part the gender mainstreaming had made meaningful impact to peacebuilding in Nigeria.²⁹⁹

5.3.2 Lessons Learned

A key lesson of the evidence here is that an intervention should or must be repeated for same individuals or groups of persons to be effective and sustaining. It was the only peacebuilding that IPCR implemented annually between 2009 and 2014. Therefore, the success could be attributed to the multiple implementations of the programmes, repeated attendance of some beneficiaries and the peace network that evolved from it. But it is thoughtful to observe that women still had limited role in the country as they were often seen as second fiddle or unequal with men due to a long history of societal perception. Further from this, the evidence indicates how the society could value and feel women's immense contribution and status in whatever field they found

²⁹⁹ There was a bit of uncertainty around the question of attributing the peacefulness noticed between 2000 and 2014 in some part of Nigeria to IPCR and their organizations' interventions. While some agreed, others did not. Some interviewees were more cautious in their response.

themselves. In short, there are a lot of potential in Nigerian women that could be tapped for peacebuilding.

In like manner, the lesson provided an opportunity to further improve the knowledge and skills of women in peacebuilding and conflict management. The initiative could promote gender equality at all levels, and help to ensure that men as well as women participate and influence peacebuilding efforts. Societies thrive better if the female gender were mainstreamed into development activities like their male counterparts. The intervention shows that if women were empowered and given responsibilities right from the school and other agents of socialization there would have been drastic reduction in the recurring violent conflict in Nigeria.

5.4. Conflict Sensitive Reporting on Elections for Media Groups

5.4.1 Research Findings

The intervention was designed for both general and state (specific cases) elections. That is, nationwide and state governorship elections respectively. Thus the qualitative and quantitative evidence obtained were from both conflict sensitivity activities for the media.

Outputs: The research study uncovered four major outputs of the trainings on conflict sensitive reporting for media groups. These are the number of beneficiaries, adoption/issuance of communiqués, inauguration of the Media Advocacy for Good Governance (MAGG) and publication of training modules. Between 2011 and 2014, a total number of 362 journalists had their professional capacities on conflict sensitivity developed by IPCR. Such training was the first experience for all the beneficiaries (100%) that took part in the survey. Perhaps the reason for the experience could be the newness of conflict sensitivity in the global peacebuilding architecture that was conceptualized and promoted by international organizations and peacebuilding practitioners as earlier discussed in the literature review.

Also disclosed to this study was the formation of a body known as the Media Advocacy for Good Governance (MAGG) whose aims are:

- To promote development, peace and good governance
- To provide a feedback loop for government to hear from the people
- To provide a mechanism for journalists to be professional without jeopardizing the interests of media owners
- To humanize issues of good governance


- To provide alternative courses of action for good governance instead of merely criticizing
- To build up a network of good governance advocates.³⁰⁰

Table 5.1 Descriptive results of gender indicators of IPCR media trainings, 2011-2014

Variables	Print	Radio	TV	Others
Women	68	40	44	9
Men	90	71	30	10
Total	158	111	74	19

Grand total: 362

Chart 5.1 Descriptive results of gender attendance indicators of the trainings in column chart



Note: The chart suggests that women's participation in the media training was high. The significance of highlighting the level of women's participation in this assessment was the need to promote the global agenda on women's freedom, empowerment and equality. It was a positive development in the Nigerian patriarchal society. There was evidence of participation from social media/bloggers, Independent National

³⁰⁰ IPCR programme records and reports.

Electoral Commission, National Broadcasting Commission, media consultants, etc. **Source:** Microsoft Office 2013 used for the design.

A feedback from three of the journalists from Rivers State at the Iloko-Ijesha workshop said they had made effort to establish the advocacy team at the state level to promote good governance. On the whole, the training batch on good governance advocacy had created a *Listserve* for members to serve as an effective communication platform on the internet and social space.³⁰¹

Similarly, there were copies of communiqués issued at the end of the workshops (see a copy in the appendix) where participants made commitments to peaceful elections and resolved to promote good governance in Nigeria. The journalists' clarion calls on the government and other stakeholders to reciprocate the peacebuilding gesture for the sake of the country were included in the collectively signed and publicly disseminated communiqués.

The last output was a media training manual developed from the 2011 workshops. The manual was sighted by the researcher and had been updated once for subsequent media conflict sensitivity trainings.

Outcome: The indicators measured were from the 100 respondents surveyed. From the data gathered, many indicators pointed to a high success of the training. For example, the programme expectations of 94% of the respondents (representing 94 out of 100) were met while 6% were not so sure. But 95% of the respondents agreed that the training was relevant to their professional needs while 95% also agreed that the conflict sensitivity had increased their knowledge and skills in peace and conflict studies. One could observe from the results that responses from beneficiaries were similar, though a bit different in related indicators. One could infer the training was relevant and effective.

Similarly, in areas of behaviour and attitude, 90% of the respondents said that they observed positive change while 10% were not so sure. The respondents attested to the fact that the experience had improved the way they reported news (87%) and built their confidence, efficiency and effectiveness in peacebuilding work (89%). All of the respondents unanimously agreed (100%) that IPCR had strengthened democratic governance in Nigeria. Data suggest that the conflict sensitivity had value and was very effective in translating the TOC's into outcomes. The result could be noted in some peaceable elections conducted.

³⁰¹ Mr. Austin Onuoha, the Lead Trainer and Facilitator of the workshops, interviewed in Abuja on 30 June, 2016.

The Ekiti and Osun State governorship elections were more peaceful than the previous ones. Almost all the respondents expressed the views that the conduct of the elections were devoid of violence that might have had resulted in loss of lives and destruction of property. Almost all the interviewees said that the way and manner the election issues were covered by the media practitioners was conflict sensitive and professional. Though as reported earlier, the 2011 election recorded post-election violent conflict in the Northern Nigeria where about 800 people were killed. Pre-election periods in other parts of the country were peaceful.³⁰² The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) was of the view that had the national institutions and reforms not existed the violence would have been more intense.³⁰³

As part of the whole, they attributed the peaceful conduct of the elections to the contributing part played by the media. In the words of DG of IPCR, “...if every vote must count, every newsworthy report must also count for peace.”³⁰⁴ Lending credence to this fact, Adeolu Durotoye (2014) in his article, said “[T]he June 21, 2014 Ekiti governorship election was adjudged as free and fair by all the stakeholders including the association of all the political parties, the election monitoring group, and the candidates themselves.”³⁰⁵ But in his view of the day, Durotoye had this to say, “[T]here was no harassment of voters because of the heavy presence of military, civil defence and policemen all over the state. All the 16 local governments and 177 wards were covered by the security agents to maintain orderliness.”³⁰⁶ Unknown to him, a lot more factors were responsible for the peaceful conduct before, during and after the Election Day in which the media played constructive role.

Olayiwola Victor Ojo (2016) also buttressed the claim on the peaceful conduct of Ekiti election. He referenced the International Federation for Election Studies (IFES) and the United States Diplomatic Mission for adjudging the election to be “...very successful, peaceful, credible and

³⁰² United States Institute of Peace (USIP)’s Peace Brief on *Nigeria’s 2011 Elections: Best Run, but Most Violent*, 15 August, 2011, p. 1 <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20103.pdf> (accessed 9 October, 2016).

³⁰³ Ibid. p. 4.

³⁰⁴ The Director General’s speech (Dr. Joseph Golwa) in the IPCR Media Report 2014.

³⁰⁵ A. Durotoye (2014) Electoral Behaviour in Ekiti 2014 Governorship Election in Nigeria, *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, p. 60, Vol.4, No.15, pp. 58-64, <http://eprints.abuad.edu.ng/213/1/14600-16909-1-PB.pdf> (accessed 9 October, 2016).

³⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 60.

reflective of the wishes of the electorate.”³⁰⁷ Similarly, the peaceful election in Osun State encouraged Alhaji Maimala Buni to express confidence in Nigeria’s future elections.³⁰⁸

In the same vein, during interview with some of the beneficiaries, they said they were more conflict sensitive in their work and relationships with colleagues and general public than periods before the training. According to the group, they noticed changes in how they wrote commentaries, articles, and covered news in more balanced and objective ways. To establish attribution of the change noticed in the beneficiaries to IPCR, the investigation went further to inquire from two journalists in Kaduna who had not attended IPCR media conflict sensitivity training or similar opportunity about conflict sensitivity during election. They showed ignorance to some of the concepts and methodology of peace and conflict sensitivity.³⁰⁹

It was also remarkable to note that it was during the Institute’s trainings that many of the journalists were educated on the content of the Nigerian Electoral Act and the sanctions to be meted out to erring station or media outfit that contravened regulatory laws. Such could mean that some of the journalists might not have availed themselves with the booklets.

The level of achievement of the intervention could also be attributed to the content of its design. Modules such as the conflict, news and stakeholders analyses including the broadcasting code of ethics as related to the Nigerian electoral system, peace journalism and the practical sessions could have exposed the journalists to a lot of knowledge, information and skills. In an interview, one of the beneficiaries of the training with the Gateway Radio, Abeokuta (Ogun State), Mr. Sunday Ogunsakin, had this to say: “...our journalists are more truthful, accurate, fair, objective and relevant in the news coverage and reportage.”³¹⁰ Another recipient of the training in 2014 at Akure, Ms. Funmi Adekoya of the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) in Ilesa (Osun State) disclosed that the training had had her peacebuilding capacity developed in the way she

³⁰⁷ O.V. Ojo (2016) Public Perceptions of Ekiti 2014 Gubernatorial Election in Nigeria, *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, Volume VII, No. 7.1 Quarter I, p. 16, <http://www.onlineresearchjournals.com/ijopagg/art/200.pdf> (accessed 9 October, 2016).

³⁰⁸ Interview programme on Naija247 News on *Osun Election, A Reflection of Nigerians Determination for a Peaceful Election In 2015*, <http://naija247news.com/2014/08/osun-election-a-reflection-of-nigerians-determination-for-a-peaceful-election-in-2015-buni/> (accessed 9 October, 2016).

³⁰⁹ The 2 journalists were interviewed at the NUJ House in Kaduna on 4 July, 2016.

³¹⁰ Confidential interview with Mr. Sunday Ogunsakin in Abeokuta on 15 July, 2016. He was a participant at the Ibadan workshop at D’Rovans Hotel, 28 Feb-3 March, 2011.

analyzed and balanced issues in the news. She joined her colleagues to say that the governorship election in Osun State was “*very peaceful, free and fair*”.³¹¹

There was evidence to indicate the outcome of the peacebuilding went beyond election reporting. As recipients showed some improvement in their reportage of election matters, they also indicated improvement in personal and national issues in relation to the knowledge and skills acquired. Bello Wakili, one of the participants at the Jos venue in 2013 had this to say:

Three things I learned during the workshop in Jos. (1) I learned how to write an objective report. (2) I was equipped with the knowledge of how to handle conflict reporting. (3) I also learned how to advocate for good governance and personal interests.³¹²

In focus group discussions with some journalists at their press secretariats in Oshogbo (Osun State) and Kaduna, the evidence that IPCR had improved beneficiaries’ knowledge and skills was buttressed. According to the groups, the designed peacebuilding suited their needs and interests. They expressed wishes for the Institute to organize more peacebuilding workshops for the media. Some even asked the researcher when IPCR would organize another training programme for the group.

As earlier pointed out, interview respondents agreed that the media trainings had sensitized them on election regulatory conduct. For example, in sessions handled by the representatives of National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigerian Press Council (NPC), Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), respondents said they were admonished to be accurate in their reportage and not passing non-partisan information to the public, political campaigns and jingles must stop 24 hours before elections and announcement of results must be done by INEC. It could be contended that this and other factors contributed to the peaceful elections.

³¹¹ Interviews and focus group discussion with Ms. Funmi Adekoya and some journalists in Ilesa and Oshogbo on 18-20 July, 2016 respectively. She was a participant at the 2014 workshop at the Royal Birds Hotel, Akure, 5-8 May, 2014.

³¹² Wakili was a participant at the Jos workshop on conflict sensitivity for reporting on good governance advocacy, 19-23 August, 2013, Crest Hotel, Jos, Plateau State.

Table 5.2 Descriptive results on the media training outcomes

Variables	Yes (%)	No (%)	Not sure (%)
The first time you attended IPCR peacebuilding training	98	2	0
More understanding of principles and approaches of peace and conflict practice	81	15	4
Effective and efficient use of conflict sensitivity in daily life and relationships with colleagues	75	22	3
My knowledge and skills in the peacebuilding training positively impacted my work	85	12	3
I will recommend the training to colleagues	91	8	1

Source: Microsoft Office 2013 used for the table

However, the assessment could not be supported with concrete data on the impact of the Media Advocacy for Good Governance, an output of the programme that was constituted at the closing sessions of the 2013 training workshops. It was informed that though, participants sent in their names and contacts immediately after the events to the *Listserve* that was created for the purpose. But it was observed that the idea of the advocacy did not take off as envisaged because nothing was heard of or recorded about what they had done in their respective communities. No evidence of its performance or progress. None of the respondents seemed to know its progress as at the time of the research study. However, it can be posited that, had the MAGG taken off it had the potential of making the political leaders responsible and accountable to their promise so as to deliver the desirable dividends of democracy to Nigerians. It was thought through that had IPCR followed up on this output, it could have accomplished its goal. MAGG's potential to advocate for democratic ideals of good governance, transparency and accountability would have gone a long way to ameliorate the conditions that precipitate violent conflict in Nigeria.

Impact: On the contribution of IPCR to national peace, 65% of the respondents pointed to its medium-term impact while 29% said it was long term. About 4% of the respondents said the

Institute had made short-term contributions to peace in Nigeria while, interestingly, about 2% said none of the contributions. The result was an indication that IPCR, though had contributed to some peacefulness of the country, it had not been a long-term endeavour.

As noted in the previous peacebuilding interventions, measuring or establishing causal relationship of the national peace and security to a singular act of the media training would be difficult if not impossible. Therefore, IPCR could not be said to have singlehandedly promoted peace during the elections. But it must be noted that as efforts were made to promote the overall peace of Nigeria by both public and private stakeholders. As indicated in its outputs and outcome, the goal of the media training was successful in short and medium terms. However, the long term impact of the training needs to be refocused by IPCR.

5.4.2 Lessons Learned

One striking lesson of the intervention is that strengthening capacity of the media to promote peacebuilding was timely, well planned and implemented, and that the targeted groups-print and electronic media- were well selected to achieve the desired outcomes. However, while the peacebuilding succeeded in ensuring a high level of agreement existed in the indicators on the optimal performance of the training, it would have included the social media and networking practitioners. Given the high levels of mobile telephone and social network users in Nigeria,³¹³ IPCR would have invited social media and networking experts including internet administrators.

Secondly, the evidence testifies to training as key to change. But it could be asked what amount of training would be needed or how many journalists would be trained to effect peacebuilding or social change in Nigeria? A few of the interviewees shared their insight on the matter that, IPCR should from time to time organize public forums (sensitization) on topical issues of conflict and good governance that would involve NGOs, religious leaders, traditional rulers, academic institutions and of course, the media.

Thirdly, there were a miniscule number of the beneficiaries who had the opportunity to receive the training. But among the respondents, 98% of the respondents indicated their willingness to recommend similar training to their colleagues. The evidence suggests a need to trickle down the

³¹³ Nigerian Communications Commission (2014) *2014 Year End Subscriber/Network Data Report for Telecommunications Operating Companies in Nigeria* www.ncc.gov.ng (But there were over 149 million active mobile phone users in Nigeria as at April 2017 <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/> and 91.6 million active internet subscriptions as at June 2017 as reported in <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/07/internet-users-nigeria-hit-91-6m/>).

gains of the training to other journalists including the executive and managerial cadre of the media industry. Though research study gained insight into plans by the Institute to organize such programmes for the media editors and publishers. Unfortunately, the plan had not been executed as at the time of writing this report. Since media executives such as editors, publishers and top management decided and censored what was to be reported, they are critical stakeholders in ensuring conflict sensitivity and thereby in need of the intervention. If implemented, it would have gone a long way in promoting peacebuilding in Nigeria and address the conflict dynamics rooted in its past.

Another significant lesson is practicing what has been learned. In the media parlance, sensational news is a good news. It can be said while pursuing professionalism, the media often tend to focus on marketing and what would sell. On the other hand, the public too has a tendency to be attracted to sensational coverage. One could ask who would save the public from the media, or reversely, who would save the media from the public. Since IPCR could not singlehandedly monitor the sustainability of the outcome, it could partner with other stakeholders. The sustainability of the peacebuilding impact was therefore critical to the Institute's mandate and mission.³¹⁴

5.5 Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development and Budget Formulation for State Legislators, Public Servants, Local Government Chairmen, Traditional Rulers and Civil Society

5.5.1 Research Findings

Outputs: There was evidence on the programme outputs. These were the size of the training recipients and production of a training manual, useful for subsequent capacity building workshops on conflict sensitivity on governance. In the activity records, the indicators showed 549 beneficiaries had their capacity in conflict sensitivity on development and budget formulation developed. They included honourable members of the states' Houses of Assembly, public officers from states' ministries, local government chairmen, traditional rulers and the members of civil society organizations. The total number of recipients represents 380 men (69%) and 169 women (31%) which to some extent supported the global affirmative action for women.³¹⁵ Among the 95 beneficiaries surveyed, the data collected showed 59 men (62.1%) and

³¹⁴ Thoughts were reflections of the researchers on the evidence of the programme.

³¹⁵ Affirmative action is a policy designed to redress past discrimination against women and minority groups through measures to improve their economic and educational opportunities.

a considerable number of women at 36 (37.89%). This further suggests IPCR was gender sensitive in its programming in the midst of the patriarchal society. The role of women in governance cannot be overemphasized as earlier supported on mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Also, all of the above beneficiaries (100%) agreed that the IPCR programme on conflict sensitivity was their first time experience. No wonder, the similar response of the past beneficiaries implied the newness of conflict sensitivity in the global peacebuilding, particularly in Africa.

The study also attested to release of communiqués at the end of each workshop. It represents that an official and common resolve was taken at peacebuilding events to advise the government and stakeholders on the need to promote peace and development through conflict sensitivity. Such step had potential of leveraging IPCR's peace advocacy. Since the broad spectrum of beneficiaries lent their voices to what IPCR had done, it could signify the potential role of IPCR. (A copy of communiques annexed in the appendixes). But whether the role had significantly resulted in social change would be seen in the training outcome.

Outcome: Evidence showed that the peacebuilding programme recorded some significant success. Though the number of respondents (95) was relatively small compared to the overall beneficiaries of the training (549) which represents 17.3% of the total recipients. This brings up the question of how many respondents do the research study really need? From experience, similar question often brought up heated debate whenever it was thrown up. Like Ivana Taylor (a market research expert) said:

There are two schools of thought about sample size-one is that as long as a survey is representative, a relatively small sample size is adequate...The other point of view is that while maintaining a representative sample is essential, the more respondents you have the better.³¹⁶

She concluded that if the survey was dealing with small number, for example such as the recipients of this training (549) as against the online survey she was involved in the study then the small survey is okay. Therefore, this representative sample which was randomly chosen can be relied upon to describe the result of the programme. More so, the qualitative research endeavoured to obtain a good spread of demographics in states of residences of beneficiaries.

³¹⁶ Survey Sample Sizes: How Many Respondents Do You Really Need? Blogged Gary Angel's post, www.questionpro.com, (accessed 17 October, 2016).

Again, supported by interview and focus group discussions, the results obtained were generalized. Like most of the previous evidence, all the respondents (100%) agreed that the training on conflict sensitive approach to development was their first experience and at the same time, it was relevant to their professional needs and interest. The research study also indicates that a large percentage (95.7%) of the respondents (representing 91 out of 95) observed an increase in knowledge and skills in peace and conflict studies while same percentage of respondents (95.7) had also observed positive changes in behaviour and attitude after the trainings. That is, almost all respondents agreed to the question of understanding the principles and concepts of peace, conflict analysis and sensitivity improvement immediately after the workshop training. Some 85.2% of the respondents (81) said the training had helped improve the way they did their work while 89.4% (85) said it built their confidence. However, while asking 13 of the respondents in an interview on the impact the training had on peace, they alluded to the fact that other factors could also combined to the promotion of peace in their constituencies. One of the beneficiaries of the training in 2012 had this to say:

I actually gained a lot from the conflict sensitivity training experience particularly the role playing which involved enactment of situations which might be encountered by the participants. All of them are relevant to our governance in the office and interventions on the field.³¹⁷

The respondents generally attested that their capacity had been further enhanced to make good policy recommendations to their state governments by being conflict sensitive to designing and implementation of development programmes and its practice. About 96.8% of the respondents (92) agreed that they could recommend such training to their colleagues. Therefore, it could be said that the immediate outcome of the training was successful in terms of the knowledge and experience gained by the beneficiaries of the two-year peacebuilding programme of the Institute.

Impact: In assessing the impact, however, the research study could not trace the long term impact of the IPCR intervention. It could be as a result of the recurring cases of corruption, misappropriation, governance problems and other contributing factors which had been attributed to have made violent conflict in Nigeria a phenomenon. Some 55.7% (53) of the respondents agreed the medium-term contribution of IPCR to peace while 30.5% (29) selected short term and

³¹⁷ Interview with Mrs Mary N. Yisa from Niger State, a participant at the Ilorin venue 24-25 September, 2012, 22 July, 2016.

the rest 13.6% (13) agreed the Institute's contribution to peace had been in the long term. Again, the result could be attributed to a number of factors. One was the problem of establishing a cause and effect (causality) of the broad peace and security in the country to the intervention. Secondly, the intervention could have been one of the contributory factors to the peace enjoyed in some communities. However, 90.5% of the respondents (representing 86) agreed that the Institute had strengthened Nigerian democracy. Lastly, in their opinion, the respondents interviewed consensually agreed that the training needed to be trickled down or replicated to the grassroots to maximize the expected impact.

5.5.2 Lessons Learned

There continued to be strong concern over the small scale of implementation of the peacebuilding programme to a few recipients in the country. A cross section of recipients was of the view that the past effort in inviting only a few participants to programmes such as the one they attended was inadequate. It was observed for the umpteenth time that conflict sensitivity was relatively new in Nigeria as all the respondents said they were having the training for the first time. The recipients had fresh knowledge on the interface between conflict, peace, development and programme governance. Honourable H. S. Avoseh who represented Lagos State House of Assembly said *"people must be at the centre of development programme"*.³¹⁸ He promised that the House would live up to its expectation in analysis and monitoring of annual budget processes and improve governance. Lawmakers, council administrators, traditional leaders, public officials and civil society workers collectively agreed to have new skills and experience as a result of the intervention. Based on this evidence, it is fair to say that IPCR could have expanded its programmes in response to the yearnings of the people.

The advice could also mean that more stakeholders in private and public institutions would have had a feel of the training. The outcome evidence attested to the value of the peacebuilding since it targeted the crux of the Nigerian governance behind policy making and implementation. As discussed earlier in the study, one could argue that many of the contributing factors behind violent conflict in Nigeria were as a result of misgovernance. The intervention would have made much impact on Nigerian democracy if it had trickled down to every tier of government and society. But the questions still remain, how do we know the applied skills and knowledge had contributed to peace and security in the country? Some parts of the country had been more

³¹⁸ H.S. Avoseh, an Honourable member of Lagos State House of Assembly, 2012 workshop.

relatively peaceful than the others, could we then infer that it was because of IPCR interventions? Alluding to Hiskett that there are a multitude of indicators that need to be measured before one can hope to establish causality.³¹⁹ This implies that it is very difficult to judge impact fairly in terms of the levels of peace or rates of conflict. That is, a cause-effect relationship is difficult to establish with complex phenomena like conflict and violence. Therefore, the research study does not claim to have covered it all and this gives room for more expanded research in this regard.

Meanwhile, reflecting on some of these lessons, a number of ideas that could have made the intervention a huge success were suggested. A holistic approach in expanding the scope and the scale of the conflict sensitivity and a feedback mechanism between the government and the citizenry which could help in tracking the result would have gone a long way to accelerate the impact. Leaders at all levels would be encouraged to be focused and visionary in discharging their duties in the interest of the masses so as not to precipitate violent conflict overtly or covertly. Therefore, as conflict is inevitable in human society, IPCR would have through the programme encouraged the government to ensure conscious efforts were made in conflict-sensitive development programmes and projects all levels. If trust or confidence was built through effective communication and transparency, constant dialogues between policy makers, implementation officers and receiving communities, the conflict dynamics would have been minimized.

5.6 Interfaith Dialogues on Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Coexistence in Northern Nigeria

5.6.1 Research Findings

Outputs: Three significant outputs were attributed to the peacebuilding. One was the number of religious adherents and national stakeholders that have been educated or have their differences reconciled through conversations. The two forums that were held in the period under review produced 177 beneficiaries. Women constituted 31.2% of the delegates. In a region where women traditionally tended to play second fiddle, it could be said that rate of women's participation was a sign of gender affirmative of the Institute. The IPCR-organized dialogue was attended more than once by 50% of the respondents (representing 25 out of 50 respondents)

³¹⁹ M. Hiskett (1987) The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 17, p. 222, Brill, pp. 209-223 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1580875> (accessed 22 October, 2016).

while it was first experience to 56% of the respondents (28) between 2013 and 2014. It is an indication that most of the respondents had experienced related interfaith dialogue in the past. The second was the release of communiqués at the end of the dialogues. Communiqués of inter-religious dialogues have the potential of engendering peace and harmony among followers if well disseminated.

The documents contained delegates' resolve to promote understanding, love, forgiveness and peace in the northern Nigeria. Aside their followers in various denominations and sects, the communiqués were disseminated to the public through the media who were also in attendance. This suggests public awareness of the need to show tolerance to other peoples' faiths and creeds. The third was the publication of the papers presented during the dialogues. This indicates dissemination of learning and perhaps adaptation of the dialogue outcome. During the data gathering exercise, the researcher was reliably informed that about 2,000 copies were printed for public distribution and as gift to visitors. It signifies the importance the Institute attached to peacebuilding attributes of the document as a means of public awareness and education.

Outcome: Similar indicators were used to test the outcome of the intervention. The sample for this study was composed of 50 attendees. The sample represents 28.2% of the total participants of the two dialogues (177). Data analysis of the evidence on the respondents shows 98% of the respondents (representing 49 out of 50) had their knowledge and skills on concepts and principles of peace, conflict and development increased while 94% said it was relevant to their professional needs. Also some 96% of respondents had the expectations met while same percentage of the respondents attested to an improvement in their career. The result shows that even in a dialogue setting, attendees learned more about peace, forgiveness and reconciliation. It is also a reflection of constructive engagement in terms of improvement in the way religious preachers and leaders practise their faiths in relation to others.

The evidence of common agreement on positive change in behaviour and attitude could imply the conversations went a long way in exposing the beneficiaries to more reasons to cohabit. This means the programme had profound change in delegates' behaviours and particularly on their perception of the multiplicity of Nigeria's religious landscape. All the interviewees agreed that the dialogue was a veritable tool for fostering enabling environment for peace and development in Nigeria. This means that the dialogue provided enhanced opportunity for self-reflection and a resolve to promote peaceful coexistence with the adherents of other faiths.

To buttress the result, 96% of the respondents agreed that the Institute has built their confidence, effectiveness and efficiency in religious peacebuilding while all (100%) agreed to recommend similar dialogue to their colleagues. The result indicates the dialogues had promoted religious harmony and sustainable reconciliation among religious groups in the Northern Nigeria. The result could mean that the dialogues had worked because one could notice violent attacks and conflict that were commonly triggered by sharp differences had drastically reduced in most part of the region. One could attribute that to the conflict sensitive preaching and teaching by religious scholars and clergies. Incitements, inflammatory and condemnation speeches had been attested to have nosedived. With the exemption of the Boko Haram widespread violence, the respondents did not remember any faith-related or sectarian violence that usually erupted sporadically. It was an indication that the interfaith dialogues were relevant and effective in the Northern Nigeria. Using conflict analysis model, there should have been a shift in approach of tackling religious conflict in the country prior to the establishment of IPCR.

Impact: The above result was an evidence that, in the period under study, some respite in religious and sectarian violence were witnessed in Northern Nigeria as intended in the design of the programme, an impact attributable to the understanding and tolerance of adherents of the region's only religions-Islam and Christianity. Though in the period under review, Boko Haram terrorists were still active in the North-Eastern part of the region. Some 39.4% of the respondents agreed that IPCR had contributed to national peace in the short term while 50% said it was in the medium term while 10.6% of the respondents said the contribution to national peace was long term. However, some 84% representing 42 of the respondents agreed that IPCR had contributed to the strengthening of democratic governance in Nigeria. Thus, it can be considered the peacebuilding's TOCs were appropriate, relevant and effective.

5.6.2 Lessons Learned

The overwhelming evidence of positive outcome of the dialogues demonstrated a significant programme performance by the Institute. One key lesson that could be derived from the study was its effectiveness in mitigating the effect of sectarian violence and reconcile relationships. Religious faithful and groups were cohabiting despite past wounds and abuse of rights. It is also significant to point out that it was the main peacebuilding strategy specifically targeted at religious organizations within the period. Given its history, that did not augur well for the region in need of some peacebuilding consciousness and intervention such as restorative justice. It was


noticed, perhaps due to the positive impact of the dialogues that IPCR followed up the September 2014 edition with a technical training on peace and conflict resolution for religious groups in November 2014. The move by IPCR should be commendable.

Similarly, bringing different religious faithfuls together in a region known for sharp religious differences for dialogue was a right step in the right direction. However, the evidence did not mean that caution must not be exercised by the Institute and other peacebuilding stakeholders because a slight provocation might trigger violence. Since Nigeria had reeled from religious violence for too long, expanding the intervention to include the southern part of Nigeria could have promoted the much needed love, understanding and tolerance among the religious adherents and political leaders in Nigeria.

Lastly, since it worked for the religious leaders, the peacebuilding could also work for their followers and many of whom could be found at the community levels. From available reviews, Boko Haram started from the grassroots, outside Maiduguri in 2002, where ideologies often had its roots and spread.³²⁰ Therefore, if IPCR could work with religious leaders to set up a mechanism to identify and monitor extreme teaching and preaching it would drastically stem violent extremism. Similar TOCs could also be applied in designing and implementing peacebuilding for the *Almajiri* schools where Muslim youth received education and care.


³²⁰ J. Ishaku (2012) *The Road to Mogadishu: How Jihadist Terrorism Tears Nigeria Apart*, Nigeria: Impact, p. 21.

Chart 5.2 Descriptive Results of the Peacebuilding Outcomes in Column Chart



Note: the chart displays relationships in key outcome indicators of four out of the five peacebuilding programmes. The Election Conflict Management Project (ECMP) was not included due to the earlier mentioned reasons that interview formed the core method of its assessment. **Source:** Microsoft Office 2013 used for the design.

Chart 5.3 Descriptive Results of the Contribution of IPCR to National Peace



Note: The chart illustrates relationships in impact indicators on the contribution of the Institute to national peace between 2000 and 2014. This is based on the perceptions of respondents in the 4 peacebuilding programmes. Accordingly, among the 3 outstanding columns, the highest column suggests that IPCR's contribution to national peace was in medium term, followed by short term column while its contribution in the long term column seems low. **Source:** Microsoft Office 2013 used for the design.

5.7 Analysis of Results on the Contributions of IPCR to Peace

How can we make meaning to all the data gathered regarding the contributions of IPCR to peace in Nigeria? Evidence on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the peacebuilding programmes have shown the significant contributions of IPCR to peace in Nigeria. Each of the established TOCs could be linked to their outcome. Then the TOCs could be linked to the identified drivers of violent conflict in Nigeria.

Likewise, the IPCR's strategies to target key actors in the society to manage conflict had not only capacitated their peacebuilding knowledge and skills, but had provided opportunities for lawmakers, public officers, women, youth, journalists, religious and community leaders to enhance their participation in sectoral or national peacebuilding in line with the programmes' TOCs. The critical role these stakeholders could play in guaranteeing democracy, justice, equity and development could not be overemphasized. However, it was difficult to measure the exact impact this group of past beneficiaries had on their community and national peace. The research study relied only on their perception as responded to in the survey. Hence, the impact of IPCR in this regard was measured through short, medium and long terms and also the respondents' feedback on attributing noticeable peace to IPCR and other contributing factors. This can be considered as one of the limitations of the research study.

However, with the aforementioned evidence, IPCR had demonstrated that it was capable to influence change and amongst key actors who needed to support changes. Actors such as politicians, administrators, youth and women who need to be capacitated and supported to bring about the change in peacebuilding should be supported. Expectedly though the task of peacebuilding in embedded sources of conflict would not be an easy task but a gradual process.

In specifics, the evidence reflected the relevance and effectiveness of planning and management of IPCR peacebuilding and underscored the Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* that stresses an action to identify and support structures for peace. As is evidenced by the results, positive changes were made in knowledge and skills acquisitions, behavioural and attitudinal

changes, number of capacitated beneficiaries, confidence building and work improvement. These are the basics for successful peacebuilding intervention and eventual conflict reduction.

It could be observed that the noticeable positive change in behaviour and attitudes of the past beneficiaries was very important for the identified military attitude of the public towards peaceful society that President Obasanjo mentioned during the inauguration of the Oputa Panel that looked into widespread of human rights abuses³²¹ (chapter three). Military mentality as a result of the long years of military rule had aggravated anti-social behaviours which were behind many causes of violence in Nigeria. This was identified in conflict analysis in chapters two and three. Many Nigerians became intolerant of one another's politics, religion and ethnicity. There was widespread of frustrated people, undisciplined youth and corrupt leadership who were in need of some positive change in behaviour and attitude towards nationbuilding. That is why the peacebuilding impact, though very minuscule, could be a beginning for a long process of social change in Nigeria.

Looking back at the historical analysis in chapter two, there was poor visibility of women, youth and other peace actors in the day-to-day decision making and participation in peace processes in some pre-colonial and colonial Nigerian societies and up to the periods prior to the establishment of IPCR. Though other pre-colonial communities such as the Yoruba and Kanem-Bornu kingdoms recognized their role, their participation in the long years of military rule in Nigeria had been largely neglected. With the outcome of what the Institute had done, this critical group of the population had been mainstreamed into peacebuilding and conflict prevention space. They were given tools (skills and knowledge), initiatives and networks to prevent, manage and resolve conflict in their communities and fields of work. Thus IPCR had promoted inclusion and participation of all stakeholders in the society within the period of study.

In the same vein, the high turnout of women recorded in each of the programmes was an indication of inclusiveness of IPCR peacebuilding in development agenda of the government. Their involvement was an attestation of promotion of affirmative action on gender. They and their children were mostly affected by violent conflict (the kidnap of the over 200 Chibok school girls in 2014 is an example and many had not been found at the time of writing this report). Also, by making the religious stakeholders to commit to reconciliation and peaceful resolution to

³²¹ Inaugural speech by His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo following his swearing-in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on Saturday, 29th May, 1999. (Selected Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Vol.1, Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, p. 18.

hitherto belligerent issues was an expression of their readiness to end violence and extremism. Their determination to live together under a united country could be commended. Religious and political leaders could now be held accountable to their commitments to promote peace and harmony in the country.

However, the striking aspect of the results was that the participation of the target groups and perhaps other interventions of the Institute had not cumulatively resulted into a long-term peace. It could be fair to assert that it seems the gains of the peacebuilding fizzled out not long after they were implemented. As evidenced by the results, only a significant increase in outputs and outcome was achieved but in impact, which was the wider effect of interventions had not received positive changes. That is, changes in addressing the underlying factors in the conflict analysis model and baseline studies in chapters two and three. According to the research study, this is why the contribution of IPCR to national peace was mostly in the short and medium-terms respectively. Michael J. Gilligan, Ernest J. Sergenti, Necla Tschirgi and Cedric de Coning emphasized this point that a successful planning and implementation of peacebuilding programme does not guarantee peace even though the findings indicate so.³²² This is because of the multiplication of factors involved in the promotion of peace. For example, the outcome on the election peacebuilding programmes (ECMP and the media conflict sensitive approach to election reporting) and conflict sensitivity on development were in the short and medium-terms and did not go far enough to the grassroots. The resultant cases of ethno-religious and political violence in the country were reflections of bad governance and misuse of power which the interventions were designed to address. The shortcoming also suggests that, as relevant and effective the Institute's strategies to manage the drivers of violent conflict in Nigeria had been, more still needed to be done to scale up the intervention impact to achieve a long lasting and sustainable peace.

Meanwhile, limitation exists on the above analysis. How has IPCR met its peacebuilding intended goals with respect to the national environment? How can we say that the outputs and outcome achieved by IPCR, for example, in the five interventions and or other activities of the Institute would result to peace in the long term? The positive change in behaviour and attitudes in many peacebuilding interventions sought and in opposition to the above result, were often

³²²Refer to the literature review on the cause-effect challenges of peacebuilding

difficult to measure and could take a long time to achieve.³²³ Truly, beneficiaries might say he or she had experienced a change in feeling after an intervention, but how do we ascertain that the change was carried over to his or her work. Even if implemented, how would he or she ensure they were translated to overall peace of Nigeria? Also what sort of control or monitoring did IPCR had over past beneficiaries of its programmes? It was evident in the course of this research that no follow up were made on past interventions. The Institute often moved on to further implementations as soon as it completed one. With this in mind, therefore, it may be early to logically expect significant impacts on conflict drivers. This is the difficult aspect of the research study that calls for further investigation and research.

The above perspective brought up two questions in the survey. One was if the respondents thought that the level of insecurity in Nigeria was high between 2000 and 2014, and two, whether the level of violence witnessed between 2000 and 2014, as the research study had noted, would have been worse if IPCR had not intervened. Majority (89% and 82% respectively) of the respondents agreed that the level was high and also there would have been an upsurge of violence in the country if the Institute had not done anything. The feedback did not come as a surprise because of the rising escalation of socio-political violent conflict and terrorist attacks between 2007 and 2014. Boko Haram insurgency was a typical example that was formed and bred during the period under study and went further to stage several coordinated armed attacks across many states in the North-West and North East geopolitical zones, including the federal capital territory, Abuja.³²⁴

In the same period, the level of ethno-political killings and criminalities such as armed robbery and kidnapping was high. For example, Nigeria was ranked low at 137 out of 149 countries in 2010 and 151 out of 162 countries in 2014 respectively by the Global Peace Index.³²⁵ The ranking necessitated the variable on the level of conflict in Nigeria whether its rise was due to other factors and not that IPCR have not worked. About 96.5% of the respondents agreed while

³²³ OECD, *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results* (2012) p. 68, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/publications/4312151e.pdf> (accessed 12 November, 2016).

³²⁴ There were suicide bombings in Abuja between 2010 and 2013, e.g. Police headquarters (16 June 2011), Army Barracks (31 December 2010) and United Nations House 26 August 2011).

³²⁵ Global Peace Index: A Snapshot of the Global State of Peace (2014) p. 6 http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2014-Global-Peace-Index-REPORT_0-1.pdf and <http://peacealliance.org/cms/assets/uploads/2013/05/2010-GPI-Results-Report.pdf>, p. 17, (accessed 30 October, 2016).

3.5% were not so sure. The response indicates that the level of conflict would have been worse in Nigeria if IPCR had not intervened. Yet its impact had been in the short and medium-terms including other contributing factors to peace. This was a mixed response.

Furthermore, the intervention challenge, as stressed earlier, was how the result of peacebuilding would be translated into broader peace. This was the area where IPCR did not have full control over as regards the implemented peacebuilding to achieve the overall desired changes. Again, oftentimes, the demonstration of new skills or sustenance of impact is at the discretion of the beneficiaries. It is as a result of this challenge that other stakeholders must be involved in peacebuilding processes in order to respond more effectively and sustainably to combat the conflict and security issues.

The above analysis seems to test comparison of evidence that the intervention of IPCR had worked. It indicates recognition of the Institute's contribution towards conflict management and prevention. It is also an indication that while some aspects of the interventions were directly under the control of IPCR such as the design, implementation and outputs, others such as outcome and impact were quite outside its control. Still, more efforts were expected from the Institute to ensure there was no more escalation of violence and conflict in Nigeria.

Though, overall, there was little evidence to suggest that the rise and escalation of Boko Haram terrorism as witnessed in Nigeria in 2009 would have been prevented with IPCR peacebuilding and conflict prevention mechanisms. Between 2009 and 2014, the region was plundered and several lives lost and property destroyed due to the activities of the armed group. There was cessation of peacebuilding activities in most of the conflict-afflicted areas.³²⁶

But the evidence of collaboration and networking between IPCR and other stakeholders (national and international) was a positive sign and could be attributed to the success it recorded in the period under study. The belief and confidence in the Institute's mandate, mission and vision as mentioned in chapter three had yielded some results in partnership. According to the UNDP desk officer for IPCR in an interview said, "...the UNDP cherishes its relationships with all its implementing partners (IP) including IPCR. It's a partnership that has been built since the inception of the Institute."³²⁷ One could commend IPCR for building and managing

³²⁶ However, as at the time of reporting the research study, IPCR was engaged in peacebuilding activities in the affected parts of the region.

³²⁷ The officer was in the Governance Unit, UNDP Nigeria, interviewed on 21 July, 2016 in Abuja.

collaborative relationships with its partners and for finding common solutions to Nigeria's conflict dynamics. Mr. Salaudeen Hashimu of the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) also shared similar view since the CSO started their peacebuilding network called National Security Forum with the Institute in 2014. An environment of trust and understanding has been built for more engagement and impact. Peacebuilding is an all-inclusive endeavour and while the Institute had kept the right step, it can do more as well.

It is important also to briefly compare the result of the impact evaluation with the peacebuilding functions of the Institute as outlined in the Establishment Act in chapter three. The significant deliverables recorded in the trained youth, women, media groups, lawmakers, public servants, traditional rulers, civil society peacebuilders and faith-based organizations conformed to IPCR's functions in Part III 8 (*b, d, e, h and j*), for example, function 8 (*d*) says:³²⁸ (*d identifying these actors, issues, historical phases, capacities and the balance of power of different groups in a conflict situation.*

Likewise, it was evident that the beneficiaries and attendees had increased their knowledge, skills and relationships, and of course, with the available data had engaged their work or service with what they had learned and discussed in accordance with the programmes' expected goals. Therefore, the research study observes that the target audience had the potential of addressing key drivers of conflicts in the country as explained in the beginning of the research study. Similarly, encouraging evidence observed on positive behaviour and attitudinal change of beneficiaries was relevant in peacebuilding as conflict or violence emanates from the mind and so change in behaviour could prove the most effective in scaling up learning outcome. The result has the potential of addressing the Nigeria's conflict dynamics as regards the function of the Institute in Part III 8 (*b*):³²⁹ (*b conducting research into the cause, patterns, dynamics, actors and forces behind conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria and Africa.*

It was noticed during the assessment that there were gaps and missed opportunities in the youth peacebuilding programme as the example of 2007 ECMP has shown. With the available data, it was easy to identify the strength in the way the 6 civil society organizations engaged the youth across the country and the youth nominated for national peace award. The study gathered that since the 2008-2009's *Conflict Management and Peacebuilding for Youth and Community*

³²⁸ Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 129, 31 December, 2007, Vol. 94, p. A1095.

³²⁹ Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 129, 31 December, 2007, Vol. 94, p. A1094.

Leaders in Nigeria, IPCR had not strategically designed peacebuilding programme for the youth up till 2014. As actors in violent conflict, the youth remained the underutilized energy or resource for peace in Nigeria if they were positively engaged. They needed better institutional support for social change.

It was equally observed that IPCR did not possess enough evidence of monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects it had accomplished since 2000, except reports of past activities jointly produced with partners. On-the-spot evaluation of peacebuilding workshops or activities was rarely carried out. This seems not to provide learning opportunities from past activities and this challenge appeared inadequate compared to its functions in Part III, 8 (c and i): *(c) publishing and disseminating case studies from its researches with a view to offering insights into the successes or failure in conflict resolution and peacebuilding; (i) providing Government with relevant policy options on fundamental issues required in designing an effective and durable peace processes.*³³⁰

In conclusion, while it could be said that IPCR had made significant contribution to peace in Nigeria, its impact was mostly felt in the short and medium-terms as is evidenced in the evaluation of its main peacebuilding programmes. Therefore, the Institute has a long way to go in ensuring that its mission is accomplished and its cardinal institutional mandate is translated to a peaceful and harmonious Nigeria.

5.8 Lessons Learned on Programme Impact

It is important to offer citizens and organizations the opportunity to develop knowledge and skills needed in preventing and resolving conflicts. Structural causes of conflict required structural or systemic approach in peacebuilding. The way capacity of past beneficiaries were developed was an indicator of the readiness of Nigerians to learn and the likelihood of peacebuilding success.

The programme impact revealed that it did not vary in degree across most of the variables. Notwithstanding the shortcoming in long-term impact, the intervention of the five programmes showed positive impact in the short and medium terms. Beneficiaries tend to acquire more skills and knowledge. Though this revelation might not be new, but its peculiarity to the complex nature of Nigerian conflict was important. The research study noticed that an intervention such as gender mainstreaming and interfaith dialogues made higher impact across hierarchy of results

³³⁰ Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 129, 31 December, 2007, Vol. 94, p. A1095.

(output, outcome and impact) mostly due to the repeated or multiple implementations of the programmes. For instance, the gender and media trainings were conducted more than once and some beneficiaries attended more than once and, of course more and enlarged beneficiaries. Some of the past beneficiaries interviewed attested to this observation that lessons of peacebuilding were concretized when they were trained from time to time and as a form of refreshment. This could mean that such peacebuilding interventions needed to be repeated to the same beneficiaries before it could result in some long-term impact. This was a reflection of position expressed in the literature review.

As A. Galama and P. van Tongeren buttressed, “*peacebuilding must be seen as a process, rather than a goal.*”³³¹ Therefore, the performance of the above interventions rested on a strong, sustained commitment to preventing violence and helping to ensure development. The dynamic nature of the conflicts in Nigeria also required dynamic approach in peacebuilding. It could be argued that the usual system of doing things would not need a one-off approach to effect positive change but a considerable length of time. Moreover, lesson can be drawn from the past because the evolution of traditional methods of managing conflict before the advent of the British sustained peacebuilding and development of each group. Similarly, the impact result indicates that modern peacebuilding strategies would have to evolve a system of commitment and sustainability to achieve desired results.

The effective implementation of peacebuilding benefited the programme recipients more than the larger society. The positive outcome on the respondents in much of the feedback provided little insight into how effective and widespread IPCR peacebuilding performed to achieve desired outcome, such as improved protection of human and material resources and its mandate of promoting peace and security. Research on the Institute’s programmes showed that strategies that included issues on youth, gender, media, lawmakers, traditional and community leaders, and faith-based organizations might well contribute to the attainment of the outcome and institutional mandate.

Again, there was abundant evidence to suggest that IPCR did not follow up on peacebuilding outcome. It was observed it did not have a system in place to accomplish that. Beneficiaries were often left unmonitored. Those that belonged to the peacebuilding network, though fared better,

³³¹ A. Galama and P. van Tongeren (eds.) 2002, *Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict*, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/towards_better_peacebuilding_practice.htm

but their performance or contributions were neither followed up nor synthesized for collective learnings.

Correspondingly, evidence in design and implementation suggests that IPCR had demonstrated efficiency in networking and partnership with peacebuilding stakeholders. The research study observed that the Institute operated most of its programmes largely on funding from international agencies and in doing so, it networked with other stakeholders to implement some of the other peacebuilding strategies. More so, it set up its own peacebuilding networks such as the national peacebuilding network it formed from gender mainstreaming programmes. The networks worked in their various locations as discovered during the field exercise of the research. For example, in an interview with one of the network members, Trios Human Development Foundation based in Ilorin in Kwara State through its Executive Director, Ade Bodunde, said their “*network with IPCR has come a long way and fruitful.*”³³² He said they look forward to a greater future. Therefore, as networking will help deal with little resources, it also has a role to play in pulling together the dispersed fields of peacebuilding. It could be considered that joining forces with complimentary partnerships could strengthen impact of its interventions.³³³

Another learning experience of the research study was that promoting peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Nigeria should not be all about IPCR. This assertion was tested in one of the survey questions when 98% of the respondents recognized and accepted the reality that building more peaceful Nigeria was everyone’s business. This is because, while dealing with proximate causes, the root causes of conflict may be very difficult for one institution to effectively deal with alone. The significance of this evidence was that peacebuilding would require a concerted effort to checkmate drivers that contribute to or exacerbate conflicts in Nigeria such as ethnicity, corruption, extremism and poor governance.

5.9 IPCR Challenges

Having examined the relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of IPCR peacebuilding, the issue of its efficiency reverberated throughout the research study. Through interviews and

³³²Mr. Ade Bodunde is the Executive Director of Trios Human Development Foundation, a CSO active in peacebuilding in Ilorin, Kwara State, interviewed on phone 30 July, 2016.

³³³A. Galama and P. van Tongeren (eds.) 2002, *Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict*, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/towards_better_peacebuilding_practice.htm (accessed 12 November, 2016).

reviews of activity reports, some evidence on operational, structural and systemic challenges the Institute encountered that hampered its programme performance during the period under review were revealed. They entailed inadequate and late release of budgetary allocation, lack of interest for funding peace work by non-state actors such as corporate organizations, foundations etc., proliferation of intervention organizations with no requisite skills, the thin line between peace building works and conventional security and intelligent tasks (this confusion had affected funding and interest by stakeholders), fire brigade approach to peace building works in Nigeria and absence of data.³³⁴

Though specific figures were not released, the investigation found out that what the Institute collected annually in budgetary allocations within the period under evaluation had consistently been small compared to its budgetary needs and requests. This challenge was also noted in the needs assessment conducted by UNDP on the Institute in 2011 and yet there was no improvement in its situation as at the time of this research study.

Though the study had reported an evidence on demonstration of strategic thinking in programme design and implementation by IPCR. However, in addition to the funding challenge, the study identified other internal issues that could be attributed to undermining peacebuilding impact within the period of study. For instance, there was lack of reliable supply of electricity and access to the internet and almost all members of the programme team were working with personal computers in order to have programmes implemented. Likewise, as reliably gathered, the system where once programmes or projects were concluded, records went into files and no much consultations until auditing and spot-check by funders did not augur well for efficient management that was needed to accelerate effective peacebuilding. These challenges had potential of negatively affecting the staff's motivation, attitudes, skills and data retrieval which were essential to the Institute's efficiency and effectiveness.³³⁵

Furthermore, such deprivation made it very difficult to execute comprehensive, widespread programmes on its own or given the Institute independence through taking ownership of its programmes. That could be said to be the basic reason of its reliance on international partners for programme executions. From observations and reviews of global development news, the challenge seems much as funds from international organizations were diminishing and

³³⁴ *IPCR Brief*, pp. 5-6.

³³⁵ Confidential interviews with some programme officers of IPCR.

sometimes fitted into development agencies' priorities or interests. They were sometimes accused of dictating to implementing partners. It can be contended that IPCR's continuous reliance on donors for carrying out its mandate and functions could not go far enough, deeper and sustainable. Consequently, as indicated in the chapter one, chapter three, conclusions and recommendations of the study to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of IPCR through the Intervention Theory for Organizational Development as espoused by Chris Argyris, et al,³³⁶ their recommendations could be deployed toward addressing the challenging conditions in which IPCR had worked.

³³⁶ Argyris's book, p. 41.

GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Looking at faces of people, one gets the feeling there's a lot of work to be done.

Wole Soyinka³³⁷

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The study has attempted an impact evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) between 2000 and 2014. Within these fifteen years of its establishment, the agency had carried out a wide variety of interventions to resolve, reduce and manage the factors that drive cycles of violent conflict in Nigeria. Five out of the nineteen identified peacebuilding activities were evaluated. Though some reasons are offered for their selection, it appears to be the limitation of the study.

Impact evaluation of programmes or interventions is one of the most important, and at the same time most neglected aspect of peacebuilding. This ought not to be so considering the benefits it offers ranging from providing stakeholders with an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of an intervention to providing valuable learning outcome for future programming.

Strong evidence has shown the relevance and effectiveness of planning and management of the Institute's peacebuilding on community and religious leaders, women, youth, public servants, civil society, the media, election, governance, and a host of others. The designs and implementations of appropriate programmes were in response to the 2003 Strategic Conflict Assessment report which identified the baselines, entry points and peacebuilding needs of the country. Data from the research study showed that while the Institute made short (immediate) and medium-term gains to promote peacebuilding, it fell short of its expected outcome on long-term impact as they did not go far enough to create sustainable peace and security in Nigeria.

Taking the evidence into account, therefore, the conclusion posits what had worked for IPCR peacebuilding and what had not, and why. The study presents a unique experience and opportunity to improve the ongoing national peace architecture and inform other policy formulations and practice, particularly the proposed national peace policy in the country. Using the Intervention Theory as a guide, it was desirable to intervene in an institution such as the

³³⁷ Quote of the Nobel Laureate on literature can be found in <https://www.brainyquote.com> (accessed 5 February, 2017).

Institute in order to improve its peacebuilding planning and management. The recommendations offered are based on the key research outcome, lessons learned, emerging global best practices and judgment of the researcher which the Institute could use to re-strategize its programming. The government, management and staff of the Institute can reflect on the outcome to improve its peacebuilding impact. The study saw new opportunities for growth and development.

Drawing from extensive historical perspectives, the study examined the traditional peacebuilding of the Nigerian peoples in pre-colonial Nigeria and how each nationality managed their peacebuilding challenges. The study explored how Nigeria was instituted by the British colonial government and the unhealthy relationships that evolved within the politics of the North-South dichotomy. From documentary and evaluative evidence, the study also identified circumstances that led to the establishment of the Institute and what it had done to promote peacebuilding.

Fundamentally, the causes and nature of conflict that IPCR responded to could not be exempted from the kinds of conflict that were managed in the past in terms of their socio-economic, political and ethnic ramifications. The past was not conflict-free. It was only the dynamism of actors, time and circumstances that changed. For instance, prior to the advent of the Europeans there were inter-communal wars, Jihadism, land and boundary disputes, communal challenges and slave-raids. But the study reveals that long before IPCR was established, traditional rulers, priests, elders, women and youth were involved in what is today known as peacebuilding and conflict prevention mechanisms.

With the 1914 Amalgamation of the North and South Protectorates by the British colonial administration, the mainstreamed conflicts dynamics demanded or attracted the mix of western and traditional methods of conflict management and transformation. The new political and educational elites that emerged wrestled power from the traditional authorities. The inability to resolve the national impasse led to problems of the North-South dichotomy which persisted to the dawn of independence.

The conflict that tarried in the early post-socio-political and economic lives of the country was made worse with the military's incursion into politics. Though conflict is a natural human phenomenon, the inability of efforts of the successive governments between 1960 and 1999 to combat the menace made it to assume new forms. The military adopted fire-brigade approaches such as use of force and setting up of panels of enquiry to quell violence and manage conflict while the deeply-rooted factors such as corruption and impunity, non-adherence to rule of law,

abuse of human rights, poverty, unequal distribution of national resources and a host of other anomalies that pervaded every vital area of national life were left unmanaged. The abortive efforts of the repressive military regimes led to degeneration of national unity, security, values, attitudes, state of minds and lifestyles. By the time Nigeria regained democracy in 1999, thanks to global trends and pressure, the resultant structural damage began to manifest through violent ethno-religious, political and criminal violence in the polity. Within a year of democratic rule, no part of the country was spared in the eruption of violence that led to loss of several lives and property, and displacement of thousands from their homes and places of work. The cost on national and human lives was unbearable for the nascent democracy. Therefore, less than a year in office, the Olusegun Obasanjo administration realized the need to have an agency specially dedicated to address the factors that drive the cycles of violent conflict, and thereby promote peace. Hence IPCR was established in February 2000.

Its establishment was a watershed in the history of African democracy- the first of its kind in the continent by the year 2000. Almost all the respondents (97.5%) agreed that Obasanjo took the right step in setting up the Institute because it was timely and proactive. It was mandated to undertake research into the causes of violent conflict in Nigeria and other parts of Africa, provide government with evidence-informed policy options and practices to combat the threat and promote peace. As a democratic institution, parts of the methods and strategies adopted to achieve the mandate included research, policy recommendation, promotion of conflict resolution, management and prevention mechanisms. Since inception, peacebuilding had formed the core aspect of its conflict management programme and the fulcrum upon which it managed the drivers of the rooted conflicts in the country. This was the reason why the study focused on peacebuilding.

Therefore, to better understand the impact it made on peacebuilding between 2000 and 2014, the study explored the mission, vision, structure and functions of the Institute vis-à-vis its Establishment Act. In response to the suggestions contained in the Strategic Conflict Assessment it conducted in 2003, the Institute had carried out several peacebuilding initiatives around community, women, youth, media, legislators, public service, election, civil society and other related thematic areas. Most of the interventions were delivered via awareness creation and sensitization, advocacy, public lectures, sport, education and training, dialogue and early warning programmes. It is fair to assume that the impact evaluation of the selected five programmes

captured the performance of many of other programmes of the the Institute which were planned and managed by same team and under same conditions. Since the respondents were unanimous in their view, it is also fair to say that IPCR had significantly promoted peacebuilding in Nigeria. The study found strong evidence to support this assertion.

However, after fifteen years of its intervention, the study discovered that the level of violent conflict in Nigeria was rising and which made it often ranked very low in the global peace index. That was why the study undertook to evaluate the level of achievement of the Institute in order to understand what had worked and what had not and why. The study had not provided enough evidence to show what the conflict situation would have been if IPCR had not been established. But it has contributed to filling the body of knowledge and evidence gap in what the Institute did in peacebuilding. Indeed, the result did not absolutely differ from what the researcher had expected.

Therefore, in the light of the aforementioned impact analyses on the IPCR's programme planning and contributions to peacebuilding between 2000 and 2014 in chapter five, the following are the summary of the research findings:

- The establishment of IPCR in 2000 was timely and appropriate for the Nigerian conflict landscape. It was a welcome development in an era when conflict dynamics rooted in the past were a threat to the democratic governance.
- IPCR had designed relevant and valuable peacebuilding programmes. It had demonstrated some institutional strength in programme delivery. Peacebuilding programmes and activities were relevant to the structural and proximate causes of violence in Nigeria but they were more effective at the beneficiary level. That is, the Institute's peacebuilding had proved effective in terms of knowledge and skills gained toward participants, behaviour and attitudes gained toward work and self-efficacy gained toward programming. The theories of change were good and did well but not explicitly drawn to change the underlying conflict dynamics in Nigeria. While the approaches and strategies adopted to prevent and manage the conflict challenges were appropriate, they were not adequate. When scaled up, such strategies hold key to managing Nigerian multifaceted, multi-layered and multi-dimensional conflict challenges.

- The peacebuilding interventions targeted the right people and organizations whose roles, functions and responsibilities were critical to the conflict dynamics in Nigeria. There was abundant evidence that the respondents appreciated the peacebuilding activities offered by the Institute, acceding that it strengthened their knowledge and skills and made them more positive and confident in their personal lives and work.
- However, the number of people who were capacitated in promoting peacebuilding, geographical locations and time of intervention were very low compared to the fifteen years of its existence. In other words, the number of trained and dialogued beneficiaries were limited to address the structural causes of violence and thus made the peacebuilding impact not to be effective in bringing about the expected change in Nigeria. Though the study does not posit that every Nigerian must be trained but going by the result of the study a sizeable number of people and places needed to be aware and trained to respond to the overwhelming nature of conflict in the country. Nigerians should be “peacebuilding-sensitive”.
- Despite IPCR impact, the mandate to prevent and manage violent conflict in Nigeria in the period under investigation was missed. There was strong evidence that the peacebuilding interventions did not promote peace in a long and sustainable term. Much success was recorded at the programme level (output and outcome) and not generally at the national level (impact). It could be argued that recurring violence and conflict during the period under investigation such as the rise and escalation of Boko Haram armed insurgency and Jos crises made it hard to trace results of peacebuilding in some specific places. Despite implementations of reconciliation and other peacebuilding initiatives, the country often relapsed into violent conflict each time it gained some respite. There were deep divisions and sharp differences among Nigerians based on politics, ethnicity and religion. The rise of ethno-religious and political conflicts as well as the launch of the Boko Haram terrorist group in 2009 and its lingering, widespread armed violence in the midst of programme implementations attested to the broad ineffectiveness and unsustainable impact of interventions in the period under study.
- Nigeria’s conflict requires more than linear peacebuilding intervention. What the country needed were widespread and deeper peacebuilding activities that would have resulted in long, coherent and sustainable solutions.

- Apart from positive changes in behaviour and attitudes of beneficiaries, it was difficult to trace the wider impact of intervention. There was limited evidence in this regard.
- Peacebuilding programmes that were designed for specific events such as elections (conflict sensitive reporting for the media) had a visible impact on the intervention.
- IPCR's peacebuilding influence was not felt at the community level. Majority of its recipients were elite and urban-based. The offices and residences were in the cities. Many Nigerians, even in the towns and at the grassroots had not heard of the existence of IPCR.
- IPCR did not follow up on communiqués issued at the end of most interventions to advocate for their implementation or leverage their recommendations.
- Funds were a serious limitation to the Institute's peacebuilding programming. Consequently, the continuity and consistency in the programming was in doubt considering that most of its 2000 to 2014 peacebuilding interventions were substantially supported by development agencies, the UNDP in particular. One could argue that it would be difficult for an agency to take ownership of its programmes and make measurable peacebuilding impact in Nigeria if it was not self-supporting.
- The institutional capacity of IPCR was still under-utilized. The study found enormous potential resources in its personnel to fulfil its visions and goals, and therefore, taking a cue from the Intervention Theory, the study urges the Institute to take advantage of the huge opportunities provided by its personnel- research and non-research, to deliver on its mandate.

In summary, the main findings of this study show that while IPCR had made significant impact in its peacebuilding intervention, particularly in the short term, it had not been able to prevent violent conflict from relapsing. It can be said that the short-term impact of the IPCR's peacebuilding did not augur well for a country critically desirous of peace and stability. In this regard, the study agreed with the view of Daniel Druckman, like other commentators captured in the literature review that short-term concerns should be subordinated to long-term concerns, and the long-term effects, as important as they are, are more difficult to evaluate. Drawing from the result of the findings, the study wondered how the protracted conflicts in Nigeria could be resolved and peace built by short-term impact. In the light of the findings, it suggests that the nuances noticed in the research result should be the main concern of IPCR in its future

peacebuilding. That is, to transform its peacebuilding gains into a long, coherent and sustainable peace in the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The research study provides key areas for interrogation and further probe in future studies. The question that echoed throughout the research was how could discernible change be attributed to IPCR? Evidence from the reviewed literature and the analysis of results indicates that the study faced challenges of causality. That is, establishing relationship between cause and effect of the Institute's peacebuilding. The need to better understand the Institute's causality in programming is essential to understand its long-term efforts to build peace and prevent conflict. But conducting impact evaluation of peacebuilding such as IPCR is resource intensive and will require a complex undertaking. The study however, was conducted within a climate of uncertainty over whether IPCR had contributed to the promotion of peacebuilding in Nigeria or not. Yet, the study has produced evidence that the Institute had promoted peacebuilding but a lot still needs to be done to reverse the rising trends of violent conflict in Nigeria. Therefore, based on the contribution of Intervention Theory, evidence before the research findings and lessons learned, the following recommendations are offered to advance not only the process and impact of peacebuilding and conflict prevention but also other conflict management programmes of the Institute:

- As advocated by Chris Argyris et al. in their Intervention Theory on improving the effectiveness of organizations on processes, the programme team of IPCR can do more to achieve evidence-based peacebuilding through developing a logic model to guide each of its programme planning and implementations. The changing nature of conflict in Nigeria necessitates a proactive approach and tapping into emerging best practices in programme management and development. The study recognizes the need to develop more strategic, coherent and coordinated policies recommendations and programmes. This can be accomplished by strengthening the design and management of peacebuilding programmes through deepening their theories of change with concomitant programme logic models.
- IPCR must make a long-term strategy to address the root causes of conflict in Nigeria. Since peacebuilding is a long-term process that requires all resources and strategies to be successful, the Institute can make commitment of five to ten years of addressing the

historical or underlying factors behind violence and conflict in the country. Since the proposed National Peace Policy has not been adopted and the much touted National Peace Architecture has no legal document, IPCR should harmonize and mainstream the cardinal elements of the two frameworks to specifically focus on the lasting effect of its goals, mission, visions and programmes.

- As proposed by Intervention Theorists on the need for organizations to effect change, IPCR should embark on initiatives that will improve peacebuilding impact. For example, there is critical need for IPCR to expand its programming by designing community peacebuilding. This is about building up the people who in turn build their community. The working local methods that were practiced before the advent of the Europeans as mentioned in chapter two of this study can be achieved through mainstreaming traditional methods of conflict resolution, negotiation, good neighbourliness and hospitality into its current interventions in order to make larger or widespread impact. Though time has changed, but essentially the spirit of communalism can still be promoted. For example, pre-colonial practices of brotherliness, peaceful coexistence and group organizations where disputes and differences were resolved can be promoted. Like Evan Hoffman prescribed, local peacebuilding that is locally-led will be more effective to build peace because that is where most violent conflict originate. As postulated in the Intervention Theory of the need for public information to be valid, tested, openly gathered and useful to effect change, the Institute can effectively deliver its other peace programmes to the grassroots for broader dissemination and impact.
- Closely related to the above, the study underlines the need to target women and youth because the majority of them are in the grassroots. Their engagement or participation offers the best hope of accomplishing IPCR's functions to end the cycles of violence. People and groups at the community levels across the country should also be mainstreamed into peacebuilding and conflict management mechanisms. The locals need outside, institutional support which they do not have in the atmosphere of ignorance and neglect.
- Peacebuilding must be promoted with an evidence-based framework. IPCR should commit to an internal monitoring and evaluation mechanism to follow up on progress and performance of its programmes in order to maximize their impact. This does not preclude

periodic external evaluation. In line with emerging trends and international best practices such as the CARE International, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) and other international organization models. Evidence is key to peacebuilding and therefore the data from this process will better support in providing evidence-informed policies and practices to government and encourage stakeholders and funders as they try to learn and make real impact in peacebuilding. Results and lessons learned should be shared with national, state and global networks. Similarly, the Institute will through this internal mechanism focus on its staff and processes for its organizational development and effectiveness. The Institute needs a team of great people and, more importantly, how they work together matters a lot. IPCR's steadfast commitments to its mission and vision statements will reflect in its approaches to monitor and evaluate its activities regularly. This mechanism will transform IPCR into a more meaningful and impactful institution in peacebuilding and other of its functions as contained in the Establishment Act.

- The Institute needs to follow up on the communiqués issued at the end of workshops and dialogues by advocating for the implementation of their recommendations. When such agreed decisions are implemented it will greatly support its peacebuilding initiatives. Similarly, follow –up activities should be organized among the participants in their various communities and workplaces such as peer-review discussions, advocacy visits, etc.
- The government should establish strong political will and leadership to stem the tide of the growing trends in violent conflict and crime in the country. It should adequately support the Institute with funding because studies has proved that money that will be spent in preventing conflict is less than combating it. Mobilizing resources, IDPs and image laundry are far more expensive and time consuming.
- In the same vein, to support democratic governance to thrive, IPCR should be well-funded by the government that established it (as earlier pointed out). Respondents were in agreement that IPCR would perform better if given greater support. Peacebuilding is costly and therefore, for IPCR to make noticeable impact, it has to be independent in funding in order to take ownership of its programmes. As Agyris, et al has noted that for an organization to be proactive and not reactive, its internal commitments should have a

high sense of ownership and feeling of responsibility.³³⁸ Partnership and private sector support can augment government funding.

- Partnership is key in promoting peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The research recognizes that the many factors behind violent conflict in Nigeria were beyond the direct control of one organization and so the Institute can do more by improving peacebuilding impact through better stakeholder engagement. Ruth Stewart, the Chairperson of the African Evidence Network (AEN) reiterated the African adage, *“If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.”*³³⁹ National collaboration, inter-agency coordination and cooperation, networks and affiliated civil organizations can promote peacebuilding impact at the grassroots and increase more programme outcome and impact.
- Because of the rising cost of peacebuilding, one of the emerging global trends in the field is reaching out to “unusual” partners that are outside the development sector. IPCR can emulate this by looking out for private sector partnership such as the Dangote Foundations and the telecommunications giants in Nigeria to promote peacebuilding. After all, without peace, business will be very difficult if not impossible. It would enrich the proposed Peace Fund.
- Like its partnership with local and international organizations, IPCR should extend working relationships with other bodies such as the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Data and statistics are important in programme planning and evidence-based policies and practice, not only for IPCR but other stakeholders. NBS has recently proven its strategic position in more data accessibility and dissemination. Information and data of other ministries and agencies such as tourism, labour, finance, education and technology are already in the NBS’s profile. National peace and conflict index was missing. NBS can capture both the Institute’s conflict index and contribution to the national development in its annual and periodic reports. It could also be suggested that while IPCR’s programme

³³⁸ C. Argyris, et al p. 41.

³³⁹ The AEN Chairperson (also Director, Africa Centre for Evidence, University of Johannesburg) made this statement in the opening plenary (13 September, 2017) at the Global Evidence Summit, held at the Cape Town International Convention Centre, 13-16 September, 2017, in the opening plenary. The researcher was one of the delegates.

reports were shared with government, it could also be disseminated to other stakeholders for learning opportunities.

- The government should speed up the process of approving the draft National Peace Policy (NPP). This is because implementing more effective policies like NPP, peacebuilding processes and trainings are ways society can begin to turn the table toward positive change. When it becomes a law, the policy promises to address the typologies and root causes of violent conflict in Nigeria.
- For full autonomy as suggested in the draft peace policy, IPCR should be transformed into National Peace Commission to enable it be free to make its own decisions about its activities and to effectively discharge its functions accordingly. There was a strong evidence from the respondents to support this idea of transformation.

But, while the study does not guarantee that the above recommendations if implemented would be the panacea for all the drivers of conflict in Nigeria, its absence or inadequacy could further aggravate the conflict situations in the country. The research questions set out in the beginning of the study has been carefully analysed. However, the study does not claim it has comprehensively answered the questions or covered all the evidence to support IPCR peacebuilding impact. The hiatus left out in the study, that is, the evaluation of other peacebuilding activities of the Institute may be taken up by future researchers. Evidently, there are rising cases of violence and conflict in the country during the period under study. The impact the Institute made to peace, however small, could be said to serve as an acknowledgement of its capacity for meaningful contribution and to influence change. The sustenance of democracy depends largely on how violent conflicts are effectively managed. With the above recommendations, it is expected that IPCR would improve its future programming in order to actualize its mandate and build a better, peaceful and prosperous Nigeria as well as help to achieve the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals by year 2030.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaire initiated and completed at:

.....

Introduction to the Questionnaire

I, **Olalekan Augustine Babatunde**, is conducting a study towards a PhD Degree at the History Department, Faculty of Arts of the University of Zululand, South Africa. Thus I would very much like your response to better understand the **Impact of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution on Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Nigeria, 2000 - 2014** by providing evidence-based information on the subject matter.

The purpose of the study is to evaluate the programmes and activities of IPCR you or your organization participated in or played a role, and how it had impacted on the way you work and/or the result achieved. Also to know your assessment of the impact IPCR has played in promoting peacebuilding in your community.

Your participation in this research is voluntary but of great value to its success. Your decision about whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher or the Institute. Answering these questions will help you identify some salient issues besides giving you the opportunity to state your opinions. Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you provided will be held in confidence. Note, however, that there are no right or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Before we begin do you have any questions?

Section A (Personal information) *fill or tick as appropriate*

1. State of Origin:
2. Current Place of Residence:
3. Sex: Male..... Female.....

4. Age:
5. Highest education attained: a) Primary b) Secondary c) Tertiary d) Others, pls specify.....
6. Present occupation:
7. Present official Address:
8. Civil/Family status: (a) Single (b) Married (c) Divorced (d) Separated (e) Widowed
9. Telephone: office..... Personal (optional).....
10. Connection with IPCR: (a) attended its programme (b) colleague to IPCR participant (c) consulted for IPCR (d) interviewed (e) heard about IPCR (f) Other connection (please specify).....
11. If you attended IPCR programme, please be specific.....

Section B (Please tick option most appropriate)

1. I have attended one of IPCR peacebuilding programmes?
If yes, in which of the programmes (*tick as appropriate*)
 - a. Women
 - b. Youth
 - c. Media
 - d. Interfaith
 - e. Election
 - f. Governance
 - g. Community, civil society organization or its network
 - h. Public lecture, peace education, advocacy or awareness events such as Peace/Peacekeepers Days
 - i. Research or consultancy
 - j. Others, please specify.....
2. I have participated in more than one IPCR peacebuilding activities?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure

3. The programme(s) you attended was/were relevant to your professional needs
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
4. Your expectations at the beginning of each programme were met?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
5. The concept of peacebuilding refers to the following
 - a. attempt at building sustainable relationship after cessation of conflict
 - b. longer-term processes and approaches toward preventing violent conflict
 - c. building institutions as well as fair and better governance
 - d. all of the above
 - e. none of the above
6. The civilian government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo take the right step in establishing IPCR in the year 2000?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
7. Since IPCR was established in 2000, there has been a general lack of adequate information and data for the general public and its partners on its programmes
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
8. It is time to take stock of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of efforts by IPCR towards promoting peacebuilding in Nigeria.
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
9. Since peace is abstract and not a product, it is difficult to see what IPCR has done.
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure

10. In Nigeria, violent conflict and crime are due to social and structural problems such as corruption, poverty, long-term unemployment, etc.
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
11. IPCR has demonstrated effective organization of its programme planning and management?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
12. The facilitation of the programme you attended was good
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
13. IPCR has demonstrated capacity for strategic thinking and ability in its programme designs and contents?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
14. IPCR peacebuilding has increased your knowledge and skills in peace and conflict studies
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
15. You observed positive changes in behaviour and attitude after your attendance at IPCR peacebuilding programme
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
16. Your experience in IPCR programme has improved the way you work
- a. Yes

- b. No
- c. Not so sure

17. IPCR has helped in building your confidence, efficiency and effectiveness in your peacebuilding work.

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure

If yes, specify in which area

18. IPCR has contributed to strengthening democratic governance in Nigeria

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure

19. Could all the violence and criminality witnessed between 2000 and 2014 been worse if IPCR had not intervened in peacebuilding?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure

20. Do you believe that the recurring violence in Nigeria was as a result of lack of peacebuilding initiatives?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- Not so sure

21. Do you believe the nature and dynamics of conflict in Nigeria cannot be resolved by peacebuilding alone?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure

22. Violent conflict in Nigeria will break its vicious cycle if the government approved and implemented the draft National Peace Policy?

- a. Yes

- b. No
 - c. Not so sure
23. IPCR peacebuilding has contributed to national peace in the (*you may tick more than one*)
- a. Short term
 - b. Medium term
 - c. Long term
 - d. All of the above
 - e. None of the above
24. Do you think the level of violence and conflict was high in Nigeria between 2000 and 2014?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
25. Do you think or observe level of violence and conflict is rising in Nigeria in 2015 to 2016?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
26. Do you think IPCR needs new approach in programme planning and management to achieve the expected general peace impact?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
- If yes, suggest this approach or approaches.....
27. Given greater role and responsibility with support, IPCR will do better to reduce the occurrence of violent conflict in Nigeria
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
28. There is increasing awareness among Nigerians of the need to better promote peace and conflict management

- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
29. Peacebuilding involves a long-term commitment that requires huge investment of energy, planning and resources to achieve
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
30. Community peacebuilding will better promote long term and sustainable peace
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
31. The level of conflict in Nigeria is rising due to other factors, not that IPCR is not working
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
32. Would you recommend the peacebuilding programme you attended to a colleague who needs similar knowledge and skills?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
33. IPCR is currently under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Do you think it should be transformed into a National Peace Commission to effectively carry out its mandate?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure
34. Nigerian government needs to invest more in peacebuilding
- a. Yes
 - b. No
 - c. Not so sure

35. Building a more peaceful Nigeria is everyone's business?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure

Comment:

Thank you!

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW FORM

(For beneficiaries-individual or organization of IPCR peacebuilding programmes)

Interview initiated and completed at:

Name of Interviewee:

Organization of Interviewee:

Rank or Designation.....

Date of Interview:

Interview Report Number:

Introduction to the Interview

I, **Olalekan Augustine Babatunde**, is undertaking a study on the **Impact of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution on Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Nigeria, 2000--2014**, towards a PhD Degree at the History Department, Faculty of Arts of the University of Zululand, South Africa. Thus I would very much like your response to better understand the effect of past peacebuilding programmes of IPCR by providing evidence-based information on the subject matter.

Thus your response is to look at how the programmes and activities of IPCR you or your organization participated in or played a role had impacted on the way you work and/or the result achieved. Also to understand your assessment of the impact IPCR has played in promoting peacebuilding in your community.

Your participation in this research is voluntary but of great value to its success. Your decision about whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher or the Institute. Answering these questions will help you identify some salient issues besides giving you the opportunity to state your opinions. Your feedback will be greatly appreciated.

Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you provided will be held in confidence. Note, however, that there are no right or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Before we begin do you have any questions?

(Please use supplementary sheets if there is insufficient space. Also use supplementary sheets for any additional information not included in the questions — indicating the source of information. This form has been prepared for a single interviewee or other source of information. If more than one responder is identified, attachments for each responder should be appended).

Section A (Personal information) *fill or tick as appropriate*

12. State of Origin:
13. Current Place of Residence:
14. Sex: Male..... Female.....
15. Age:
16. Highest education attained: a) Primary b) Secondary c) Tertiary d) Others, pls specify.....
17. Present official Address:
18. Civil/Family status: (a) Single (b) Married (c) Divorced (d) Separated (e) Widowed
19. Telephone: office..... Personal (optional).....
20. Connection with IPCR: (a) attended its programme (b) colleague to IPCR participant (c) consulted for IPCR (d) interviewed (e) Heard about IPCR (f) Other connection (please specify).....

Section B

1. Which of the IPCR-organized programme did you or organization take part and in what year?
.....
2. What is your assessment of the programme?
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.....
.....
3. What did you gain in the programme in terms of knowledge, skills and other experience?
4. How has what you gained improved your work?

.....
.....
.....

5. Do you think what you gained had promoted peace in your community or field of work? If yes, how?

.....
.....
.....
.....

6. What are your suggestions on how IPCR can improve on its peacebuilding programme?

.....
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.....
.....

7. What are your observations in the way IPCR designed and implemented the peacebuilding programmes or projects you attended?

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.....

8. Specifically comment on how IPCR has impacted on your perception or understanding of the concepts of peace, conflict, mainstreaming gender, conflict sensitivity, etc.

.....
.....

9. How do you think IPCR has helped carrying out your day to day official and personal activities as a result of its programme you or colleague attended?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

10. Has IPCR intervened in some way in any conflict prevention, resolution or management in your community?
11. If yes, please be specific of the place, date and outcome
-
-
-
-
12. How do you think the draft National Peace Policy can help promote peace in Nigeria?
-
-
-
-
13. In the promotion of peacebuilding, what do you think has worked for IPCR and what has not worked, and why?
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
14. Did you notice any missed opportunity by IPCR in the course of carrying out its activities and programmes, if yes, what, why and when?
-
-
-
-
-
15. What is your view about the level of insecurity in Nigeria?
-
-
-

16. How do you think IPCR's interventions have helped in reducing the spate of conflict and violence in the country?

.....
.....
.....

17. Nigeria witnessed serious violent ethno-religious and political conflicts between 2000 and 2014 including the Boko Haram terrorism. In your view, do you think there would have been more escalation of violence if IPCR has not done anything?

.....
.....
.....
.....

18. Do you notice any gaps and weaknesses in design and implementation of IPCR's responses to security challenges? No or Yes. If yes, suggest better measures of programmes

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

19. What advice can you offer IPCR to effectively prevent and reduce violent conflict in Nigeria? Outline what can be done

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

20. Nigerians are known to have rich history and culture which promoted peace in pre-colonial period. What traditional methods of peacebuilding can IPCR include in its programme?

.....
.....
.....

21. Write if you have any other comments/information about IPCR:

.....
.....

Thank you.
Olalekan Augustine Babatunde
Date:

APPENDIX III: IPCR ESTABLISHMENT ACT

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INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT, 2007

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

This Act establishes the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution with responsibility to promote research and facilitate conflict prevention, management and resolution within Nigeria and Africa.

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INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT, 2007

ARRANGMENT OF SECTIONS

Section:

PART I - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IPCR).

1. Establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution.
2. Establishment of the Governing Council.
3. Membership of the Council.
4. Tenure of Office, etc.
5. Removal from office.
6. Emolument, etc.

PART II – FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL.

7. Functions of the Council.

PART III – FUNCTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE.

8. Functions of the Institute.

PART IV – STAFF OF THE INSTITUTE

9. Director-General of the Institute.
10. Directorates etc.
11. Other employees of the Institute.
12. Pensions Cap. 346 LFN.

PART V – FINANCIAL PROVISIONS.

13. Financial Provisions.
14. Expenditure of the Institute.
15. Annual estimates and accounts.
16. Annual reports.
17. Power to accept gifts.
18. Power to borrow.
19. Investment, Cap 449, LFN.
20. Exemption from Tax.

PART VI – LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

21. General restrictions as to power of the Institute.
22. Limitation of suit against the Institute Cap 379. LFN.
23. Service of documents.
24. Indemnity of officers.
25. Secrecy.
26. Staff regulation.

PART VII – GENERAL.

27. Provision of Library facilities.

PART VIII – MISCELLEANEOUS.

28. Dissolution of Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity.
29. Transfer of rights, etc.
30. Obligations and liabilities.

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31. Pending or existing proceedings or cause of action.
 32. Vesting of assets.
 33. Holders of office in the Foundation to continue in the Institute.
 34. Directives by the Council, etc.
 35. Regulations.
 36. Interpretation.
 37. Short Title.
- SCHEDULE.

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**INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(ESTABLISHMENT) ACT, 2007**

A BILL

FOR

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION; AND FOR RELATED MATTERS.

[] Commencement.

ENACTED by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria –

PART I - ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IPCR).

- | | | |
|----|--|---|
| 1. | (1) There is established an Institute to be known as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (in this Act referred to as "the Institute"). | Establishment of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. |
| | (2) The Institute: | |
| | (a) shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal; and | |
| | (b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name. | |
| 2. | There is established for the Institute a Governing Council (in this Act referred to as "the Council"). | Establishment of the Governing Council. |
| 3. | (1) The Council shall consist of: | Membership of the Council. |
| | (a) a Chairman; | |
| | (b) a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; | |
| | (c) a representative of the Ministry of Defence; | |
| | (d) a representative who shall be a woman; | |
| | (e) a representative from each of the six geopolitical zones; | |
| | (f) a representative of the University community; | |
| | (g) a representative of civil society Organisations; | |
| | (h) a representative of the Minister of Internal Affairs; | |
| | (i) the Director-General of the Institute. | |

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(2) The Chairman and other members of the council shall be appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

(3) The supplementary provisions set out in the schedule to this Act shall have effect with respect to the proceedings of the Council and the other matters contained therein. *Schedule.*

4. The Chairman and other members of the Council, other than ex-officio members: *Tenure of Office, etc.*

(a) shall hold office for a period of 4 years on such terms and conditions as may be specified in their letter of appointment; and

(b) may be re-appointed for another period of 4 years and no more.

5. (1) Notwithstanding, the provisions of section 4 of this Act, a member of the council may at any time be removed from office by the President for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct. *Removal from office.*

(2) A member of the Council may resign his appointment by a notice in writing under his hand addressed to the President and that member shall, on the date of the receipt of the notice by the President cease to be a member of the Council.

6. The Chairman and members of the Council shall be paid emoluments, allowances as may be determined from time to time by the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission. *Emolument, etc.*

PART II – FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

7. (1) The Council shall be responsible for the determination of the overall policy of the institute and the formulation of long term plans and budget and ensuring the implementation of such policies and plans. *Functions of the Council.*

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the Council shall-

(a) approve the research and training programmes of the Institute;

(b) determine the fees to be paid for research, consultations, training and any other services that may be offered by the Institute; and

(c) promote or undertake such other activities as are expedient or necessary in the opinion of the Council for the discharge of its responsibilities under this Act.

PART III – FUNCTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

8. (1) The Institute shall be responsible for: *Functions of the Institute.*

(a) promoting peace and security internally within Nigeria and externally in Africa.

(b) conducting research into the cause, patterns, dynamics, actors and

forces behind conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria and Africa;

(c) publishing and disseminating case studies from its researches with a view to offering insights into the success or failure in conflict resolution and peace building;

(d) identifying these Actors, issues, historical phases, capacities and the balance of power of different groups in a conflict situation;

(e) promoting a culture of transparent, credible and peaceful democratic succession as a mechanism for conflict prevention;

(f) getting practically involved in the task of mediation, conflict management and conflict resolution;

(g) encouraging the establishment of regional affiliates of the Institute in Africa and other parts of the world and fostering collaboration with those affiliates;

(h) designing strategies for funding people centred development programmes to support peace;

(i) providing Government with relevant policy options on fundamental issues required in designing an effective and durable peace process;

(j) initiating, encouraging, organising, hosting, arranging and conducting policy-relevant courses, national or international seminars, symposia, conferences, and workshops, training programmes and other actions that are incidental to peace making and peace building as part of its intensive effort in capacity building;

(k) carrying out other relevant activities that may be assigned to it by the President.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the functions specified in subsection (1) of this section, the Institute shall take over the functions, assets and liabilities of the body known and referred to as the Centre for Peace, Research and Conflict Resolution of the National War College established under section 5 of the National War College Act.

PART IV – STAFF OF THE INSTITUTE

9. (1) There shall be for the Institute a Director-General who shall be appointed by the President. Director-General
of the Institute.

(2) The Director-General shall, be the chief executive, chief research and accounting officer of the Institute, the head of the secretariat of the council and shall be responsible for the execution of the Policy and the day to day administration of the affairs of the Institute.

(3) The Director-General shall hold office:

- (a) for a term of 4 years in the first instance and may be reappointed for a further term of 4 years and no more; and
- (b) on such terms and conditions as may be specified in his letter

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of appointment.

10. (1) The Institute shall have the following directorates: Directorates etc.

- (a) finance and administration;
- (b) research and policy analysis;
- (c) democracy and development studies;
- (d) external conflict prevention and resolution;
- (e) internal conflict prevention and resolution;
- (f) defence and security studies;
- (g) any such directorate as may be deemed necessary.

(2) A director shall hold office for a term of 4 years in the first instance and may be reappointed for a further term of one year at a time but not more than 2 renewals on such terms and conditions as may be specified in his letter of appointment.

11. (1) The Council shall appoint for the Institute such officers and other employees as it may, from time to time, deem necessary for the purposes of the Institute. Other employees of the Institute.

(2) The terms and conditions of service (including remuneration, allowances, benefits and pensions) of officers and employees of the Institute shall be as determined by Council.

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of Subsection (1) of this section, the Council may appoint persons as employees of the Institute, either by way of transfer or secondment from any of the public services in the Federation or otherwise howsoever, as it considers necessary.

12. (1) It is hereby declared that service in the Institute shall be approved service for purpose of the Pension Reform Act 2004. Accordingly, employees of the Institute shall be entitled to Pensions, gratuities and other retirement benefits as are prescribed under the said Pension Reform Act. Cap. 346 LFN.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection (1) of this section, nothing in this Act shall prevent the appointment of a person to any office on terms which preclude the grant of a pension, gratuity or other retirement benefit in respect of that office.

(3) For the purposes of the application of the provisions of this Act, any power exercisable by the Council or any authority of the Federal Government, other than the power to make regulation under the relevant Section of the Act, is hereby vested in and shall be exercisable by the Council and not by any other person or authority.

PART V – FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

13. (1) There shall be established and maintained for the Institute a fund into which shall be paid and credited:
- Financial Provisions.
- (a) all subventions and budgetary allocation from the Government of the Federation;
- (b) the take off grant from the Federal Government;
- (c) gifts, loans, grants-in-aid from national, bilateral and multilateral agencies;
- (d) rent, fees and other internally generated revenues from service provided by the Institute and
- (e) all other sums accruing to the Institute from time to time.
14. (1) The Institute may from time to time, apply the proceeds of the fund established in pursuance of section 14 of this Act :
- Expenditure of the Institute.
- (a) to the cost of administration of the Institute
- (b) to the paying of the emoluments, allowances and benefits of members of the council and for reimbursing members of the Council or of any committee of the Council for such expenses as may be expressly authorized by the Council;
- (c) to the payment of the salaries, fees or other remuneration or allowances, gratuities and pension and other benefits payable to the officers and other employees of the Institute, so however that no payment of any kind under this paragraph (except such as may be expressly authorized by the Council) shall be made to any person who is in receipt of emoluments from the Federal or State Government;
- (d) for the development and maintenance of any property vested in or owned by the Institute; and
- (e) for and in connection with all or any of its functions under this Act.
15. (1) The Institute shall, in each year, submit to the Minister an estimate of its expenditure and income (including payments to the Institute's fund) for the next succeeding year.
- Annual estimates and accounts.
- (2) The Institute shall keep proper accounts in respect of each year and proper records in relation to those accounts and shall cause its accounts to be audited within six months after the end of each year by auditors appointed and in accordance with the guidelines supplied by the Auditor-General of the Federation.
16. The Institute shall prepare and submit to the Minister, not later than six months after the end of each year, a report on the activities of the Institute during the immediate preceding year, and shall include in such report a copy of the audited accounts of the Institute for the year and the auditor's report on the accounts.
- Annual reports.

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17. (1) The Institute may accept any gift of land, money or other property on such terms and conditions, if any, as may be specified by the person or organisation making the gift. Power to accept gifts.

(2) The Institute shall not accept any gift if the conditions attached by the person or organization offering the gift are inconsistent with the functions and objectives of the Institute.
18. (1) The Institute may from time to time, borrow money by overdraft or otherwise as it may require for the performance of its functions under this Act. Power to borrow.

(2) The Institute shall not without the approval of the Council, borrow money which exceeds, at any time, the amount set by the Council

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, where the sum to be borrowed is in foreign currency, the Institute shall not borrow the sum without the prior approval of the Federal Government of Nigeria
19. The Institute may, subject to the provisions of this Act and the conditions of any trust created in respect of any property, invest all or any of its funds in any security prescribed by the Trustees Investment Act or in such other securities as may, from time to time, be approved by the Council Cap 449, LFN.
20. (1) The Institute shall be exempted from payment of income tax or any income accruing from investments made by the Council for the Institute Exemption from Tax.

(2) The provisions of any enactment relating to the taxation of companies or trust funds shall not apply to the Institute or the Council.

PART VI – LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

21. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as conferring on the Institute or the Council the power to express on any aspect of peace and conflict resolution on behalf of the Federal Government. General restrictions as to power of the Institute.
22. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act shall apply in relation to any suit instituted against an officer or employee of the Institute. Limitation of suit against the Institute Cap 379, LFN.
23. A notice, summons or other document required or authorized to be served on the Institute under the provision of this Act or any other enactment or law may be served by delivering it to the Director-General or by sending it by registered post addressed to the Director-General at the principal office of the Institute. Service of documents.
24. A member of the Council or the Director-General or any officer or employee of the Institute shall be indemnified out of the assets of the Institute against any liability incurred by him in defending any proceeding, whether civil or criminal, if the proceeding is brought against him in his capacity as a member, Director-General, officer or other employees of the Institute. Indemnity of officers.

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25. (1) A member of the Council or the Director-General or any other officer or employee of the Institute shall: Secrecy.

(a) not, for his personal gain, make use of any information which has come to his knowledge in the exercise of his powers or is obtained by him in the ordinary course of his duty as a member of the Council or as the Director-General, officer or employee of the Institute;

(b) treat as confidential any information which has come to his knowledge in the exercise of his powers or is obtained by him in the performance of his duties under this Act;

(c) Not disclose any information referred to under paragraph (b) of this subsection, except when required to do so by a court or in such other circumstances as may from time to time be prescribed by the Council.

(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of Subsection (1) of this section commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine of not less than One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100, 000) or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or both such fine and imprisonment.

PART VII – GENERAL

26. (1) The Council may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make staff regulations relating generally to the conditions of service of the officers and employees as determined by the Council and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such regulations may provide for- Staff regulation.

(a) the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control (including dismissal) of the officers and employees of the Institutes.

(b) appeals by such officers and employees against dismissal or other disciplinary measures, and until such regulations are made any instrument relating to the conditions of service in the civil service of the Federation shall be applicable, with such modifications as may be necessary, to the officers and employees of the Institute.

(2) Staff regulations made under subsection (1) of this section, shall not have effect until approved by the Council, and when so approved they need not be published in the Federal Gazette but the Council shall cause them to be brought to the notice of all affected persons in such manner as it may, from time to time, be determined by the Council.

PART VII – MISCELLANEOUS

27. The Institute shall provide and maintain a library comprising such books and publications as may be provided by the institute for the advancement of the knowledge of peace and conflict resolution, for research purposes, and for other purposes connected with the objectives and functions of the Institute. Provision of Library facilities.
28. The body known and referred to as "The Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity" (in this section referred to as "the Foundation") which had been voluntarily ceded to the Federal Government of Nigeria shall Dissolution of Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity.

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cease to exist and by this Act replaced by the "Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution".

29. (1) Accordingly, the functions, rights, interests, obligations and liabilities of the Foundation, existing before commencement of this Act under any contract or instrument, or in law or in equity shall by virtue of this Act be deemed to have been assigned to and vested in the Institute. Transfer of rights, etc.

(2) Any such contract or instrument mentioned in subsection (1) of this section shall be of the same force and effect against or in favour of the Institute established by this Act and shall be enforceable as fully and effectively as if instead of the conditions existing before the commencement of this Act, the Institute established by this Act had been named therein or had been a party thereto.
30. The Institute established by this Act shall be subject to all the obligations and liabilities to which the Foundation was subject to immediately before the commencement of this Act and all other persons shall have the same rights, powers and remedies against the Institute as they had against the Foundation. Obligations and liabilities.
31. Any proceeding or cause of action pending immediately before the commencement of this Act by or against the Foundation in respect of any right, interest, obligation or liability of the Foundation may be continued or as the case may be commenced and any determination of the court of law, tribunal or other authority or person may be enforced by or against the Institute established by this Act to the same extent that such proceeding or cause of action or determination might have been continued, commenced or enforced by or against the Foundation. Pending or existing proceedings or cause of action.
32. All assets, funds, resources and other moveable or immoveable property which immediately before commencement of this Act were vested in the Foundation shall by virtue of this Act and without further assurance, be vested in the Institute. Vesting of assets.
33. Any person who immediately before the coming into force of this Act is the holder of an office in the Foundation shall on the commencement of this Act continue in office and be deemed to have been appointed to his office by the Institute, unless the authority by which the person was appointed terminates the appointment. Holders of office in the Foundation to continue in the Institute.
34. The Minister may give such directives of a general nature or relating generally to matters of policy with regard to the exercise by the Council of its functions under this Act and the Council shall comply with the directives or cause them to be complied with. Directives by the Council, etc.
35. The Institute may, with the approval of the Council, make such regulation as in its opinion are necessary or expedient to give full effect to the provisions of this Act and for the due administration of its provisions. Regulations.
36. In this Act – Interpretation.

"Board of Trustees" means former Trustees of the Sani Abacha

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Foundation for Peace and Unity;

"Council" means the Governing Council of the Institute established pursuant to section 2 of this Act;

"Institute" means the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution established under Section 1 of this Act;

"member" includes the Chairman of the Council;

"Minister" means the Minister charged with the responsibility for matters relating to Peace and Conflict Resolution;

"President" means the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

37. This Act may be cited as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Establishment) Act, 2007. Short Title.

SCHEDULE

Section 3(3)

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE COUNCIL, ETC.

Proceedings of the Council.

1. Subject to this Act and section 27 of the Interpretation Act (which provides for decisions of a statutory body to be taken by majority of its members and for the person presiding at any meeting, when a vote is ordered, to have a second or casting vote), the Council may make standing orders regulating its proceedings or that of any of its committees. Cap. 192. LFN.
2. At every meeting of the Council, the Chairman shall preside and in his absence the members present at the meeting shall appoint one of their members to preside at the meeting.
3. The quorum at a meeting of the Council shall consist of the Chairman (or, in an appropriate case, the person presiding at the meeting) and 5 other members.
4. The Council shall for the purposes of this Act, meet not less than three times in each year and subject, thereto, the Council shall meet whenever it is summoned by the Chairman, and if required to do so, by notice given to him by not less than 8 other members, he shall summon a meeting of the Council to be held within 14 days from the date on which the notice is given.
5. Where the Council desires to obtain the advice of any person on a particular matter, the Council may co-opt him to the Council for such period as it thinks fit, but a person who is a member by virtue of this paragraph shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the Council and shall not count towards a quorum.
6. A member of the Council who is directly or indirectly interested in any

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matter being deliberated on by the Council, or is interested in any contract made or proposed to be made by the Institute shall, as soon as possible after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge disclose the nature of his interest at a meeting of the Council.

7. A disclosure under this paragraph shall be recorded in the Minutes of Meetings of the Council and the member concerned shall:

- (a) not, after the disclosure, take part in any deliberation or decision of the Council; and
- (b) be excluded for the purpose of constituting a quorum of any meeting of the Council for any deliberation or decision, with regard to the subject matter in respect of which his interest is so disclosed.

Committees:

8. (1) Subject to its standing orders, the Council may appoint such number of standing and ad-hoc committees as it thinks fit to consider and report on any matter with which the Institute is concerned.

(2) A committee appointed under this paragraph shall consist of such number of persons (not necessarily members of the Council as may be determined by the Council) and a person, other than a member of the Council shall hold office on the committee in accordance with the terms of his appointment and the committee shall be presided over by a member of the Council.

(3) The quorum of any committee set up by the Council shall be as may be determined by the Council.

(4) A decision of a committee of the Council shall be of no effect until it is confirmed by the Council.

Miscellaneous

9. The fixing of the seal of the Institute shall be authenticated by the signature of the Chairman or any other person generally or specifically authorized by the Council, to act for that purpose and that of the Director-General.

10. Any contract or instrument which, if made by a person not being a body corporate, would not be required to be under seal may be made or executed on behalf of the Institute by the Director-General or by any other person generally or specially authorized by the Council to act for that purpose.

11. Any document purporting to be a contract, instrument or other document duly signed or sealed on behalf of the Institute shall be received in evidence and shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed without further proof to have been so signed or sealed.


12. The validity of any proceedings of the Council or of any of its committees shall not be affected by:

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- (a) any vacancy in the membership of the Council, or committee;
 - (b) any defect in the appointment of a member, of the Council or committee; or
 - (c) reason that any person not entitled to do so took part in the proceedings of the Council or committee.
13. A member of a committee who has a personal interest in any contract or arrangement entered into or proposed to be considered by the committee shall not vote on any question relating to the contract or arrangement.
14. No member of the Council shall be personally liable for any act or omission done or made in good faith while engaged in the business of the Institute.

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I CERTIFY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2 (1) OF THE ACTS AUTHENTICATION ACT, CAP.4, LAWS OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA 1990, THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE BILL PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.




NASIRU IBRAHIM ARAB,
CLERK TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

24th Day of May, 2007


INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT, 2007

(1) SHORT TITLE OF THE BILL	(2) LONG TITLE OF THE BILL	(3) SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF THE BILL	(4) DATE PASSED BY THE SENATE	(5) DATE PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Establishment) Act, 2007	An Act to establish the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution; and for related matters.	This Bill establishes the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution; and for related matters.	7 th February, 2007	1 st June, 2005

I certify that this Bill has been carefully compared by me with the decision reached by the National Assembly and found by me to be true and correct decision of the Houses and is in accordance with the provisions of the Acts Authentication Act Cap 4, the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.


NASIRU IBRAHIM ARAB,
 Clerk to the National Assembly
 24th Day of May, 2007

I ASSENT


CHIEF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO, GCFR.
 President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
 20th Day of May, 2007

APPENDIX IV: A FEW SPEECHES OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF IPCR (2006-2014)

A KEYNOTE SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IPCR), DR. JOSEPH H.P. GOLWA, ON THE OCCASION OF THE IPCR-UNDP PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE REPORTING TRAINING FOR MEDIA PROFESSIONALS ON 22ND NOV. 2010, AT THE PREMIER HOTEL, IBADAN

I am most delighted to welcome the delegation from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) led by its Resident Representative in Nigeria, Mr. Janthomas Hiemstra, and all the participants from various media houses to the capacity building workshop on peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive reporting in Nigeria, which is facilitated by my agency and the UNDP.

IPCR is the government's agency saddled with the responsibility of tackling the perennial socio-political and ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria and Africa through research and policy recommendations. It is also involved in conflict intervention through training of stakeholders both in the public and private sectors in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Between 2000 and now, IPCR has through collaborations, organized capacity development programmes for youth, community leaders, women, and government officials, and has facilitated the draft National Peace Policy which is waiting to be forwarded to the National Assembly.

This is the first time it's engaging the media in training. This is because the image of conflict reporting by Nigerian media is mixed. It is often accused of fuelling crisis while some rely on it as a source of true story on issues. According to Johan Galtung, the pioneer scholar of peace and conflict studies, "the media has the power to determine the cause, prevention or resolution of a conflict". Often times, the media seems to exploit a contentious issue for an entertainment value, sometimes leaving readers and audiences with the impression that nothing can be achieved and that the extremes of opinion being presented are representative of the majority. For example, the media was found culpable for its role in the Rwanda 1994 genocide crisis. Secondly, sensational captions of conflict-sensitive reporting often betray the true picture of an event and on several occasions blown out of proportion and often led to misunderstandings and frayed nerves. Thirdly, journalists are vulnerable as some have been killed, kidnapped, or threatened in the course of their work. The recent kidnap of Wahab Oba and co. in Abia State attested to the dangerous nature of their profession. Great fear has been instilled in the men of the 6th realm of profession. And fourthly, there is no freedom of expression as, for example, in Nigeria; the inability for passing the Freedom of Information Bill has tamed the breadth and scope of how journalists should report their activities.

With all these challenges, there is need to support independent media (be it in the print, broadcast TV or radio, and cyber world) in peace, conflict and post-conflict situations to enable them to gather and disseminate non-partisan information. This becomes necessary as the media often influences public opinion in mediation and peace processes. It holds a critical key to how far a conflict could be prevented, managed or resolved.

At a time of increasing sectarian and political conflicts in Nigeria, a free and professional media can provide a vital forum for dialogue and for non-violent resolution of differences, as well as represent an invaluable source of information. Also the importance of having a professional media at a time of preparing for a general election cannot be overemphasized. That is why IPCR has designed a range of useful training skills to empower the journalists as they go about their work.

Thus, you will agree with me that the importance of this training workshop cannot be over-emphasized. The training will avail the journalists the skills to explore possible areas of agreement between opposing sides in a discussion, try actively to subvert prejudices and stereotyping, to promote the dignity of all sides and to encourage positive vision. Similarly, it will challenge the seasoned journalists to look through the different lens. The training will introduce participants to a range of conflict resolution tools in order to develop their interviewing, reporting and/or moderating skills on contentious political and social issues and in conflict situations.

General elections are around the corner and once again the public's expectation of the media's role is high. The training is an opportunity to sharpen your skills to fair and objective reporting to all parties and the Nigerian electorate. This will foster dialogue and peaceful elections in the country.

Let me use this opportunity to sincerely appreciate the cooperation, support and understanding of all that contributed to the hosting of this workshop. I thank in particular the Nigerian media houses for their effort in championing the cause of democracy and development, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Oyo State government, and the management and staff of IPCR.

I have no doubt you would enjoy this training and I hope you would further disseminate what you have learnt among your colleagues.

Thank you.

A WELCOME ADDRESS DELIVERED BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IPCR), DR. JOSEPH H.P. GOLWA, ON THE OCCASION OF THE IPCR-UNDP WORKSHOP ON CONFLICT SENSITIVE APPROACH TO PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND BUDGET FORMULATION ON 24TH -26TH SEPTEMBER, 2012, AT THE KWARA HOTEL, ILORIN, KWARA STATE

The Honourable Members of the Niger state House of Assembly, Executive Chairmen of LGAs, Secretaries of LGAs, Distinguished Civil Servants, Members of the CSOs, the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Members of the Press, and the IPCR team. I bring you peace greetings.

I am most delighted to welcome all of you to this very important workshop. A training workshop bordering on issues of development in our great country is certainly a moment that we should all savour and enjoy. If you take a look at the level of our development, I'm sure you would agree with me that our country has been facing some challenges in the almost 52 years of her existence. Development projects had been poorly conceived, and have therefore had little and often times, no bearing on the needs of the people.

In reaching decisions on the types, locations and timing of development interventions, policy makers have shown poor appreciation of the interface between development and conflict, especially in the context of Nigeria's heterogeneity.

It is not surprising that development challenges bordering on issues of human rights, political and economic inclusion were part of the causal factors of the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970, as well as, a number of other violent post civil war communal conflicts prevalent in Nigeria today.

The delicate nexus between peace, development and security cannot therefore be over-emphasized. There is a need for a new awareness, and this awareness should be accompanied by an acknowledgement of the need for promoting systematic peace building and conflict-sensitive development practices at the project or programme level.

We all know that our society is thirsty for development on all fronts and as a result, a wide variety of actors have become involved with development programming. This, therefore, brings a huge burden on peace practitioners to create awareness on how to prevent development-induced violent conflict, as well as, ways of dealing with problems arising from such tensions in the society.

The current paradigm for development within the UN, for example, recognizes development issues as rights-based. This means that development must not only be results-based, it must also be sensitive to both the environment and conflict, amongst other things. Our choices of development programmes therefore must be structured in such a way that they are sustainable and ultimately contribute to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and reduction of violent conflicts. This can be challenging given the high level of poverty, ignorance and fragile institutions of governance, particularly in developing countries. However, an immediate option would be to build institutional capacities on conflict-sensitive approach to development at all levels of governance in Nigeria.

Building this capacity will require us to equip development practitioners with the basic skills for proactive and positive engagement with the conflicts that arise in the context of development. Since, for a part, the dilemma we face is that the absence of development as well as its presence has the capacity to engender violence in the

community. Stakeholders, particularly political leaders and technocrats at strategic level, therefore require deeper understanding of the interplay between conflict, development and security, as critical first step to initiating measures for peacebuilding at all levels of the society.

Development and conflict generation must therefore be regarded as part of an integrated picture of the social realities that shape Nigeria's political economy. What this means is that Nigeria's choices of development must be people-centred, participatory and moderated in such a way that they are sustainable and ultimately contribute to building peace and reducing the risk of violent conflicts.

We know that this is a serious challenge to national development, given the level of maturity of political leaders and party patronage syndrome, which determine development initiatives irrespective of their relevance or otherwise to the needs of the people. This contributes to the high rate of poverty and ignorance which further lowers the country's human development index (HDI) and further weakens Nigeria's fragile institutions of governance. In grappling with this challenge, therefore, an immediate option that recommends itself is to build institutional capacities in development programming, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

As executive officers, legislators, community leaders, and very senior government officials, you work in an exciting but sometimes challenging arena. The culture of violence is seemingly everywhere you turn and we are constantly reminded of the immense amount of work that needs to be done to end development-induced violence and promote peace in our communities. I am sure that many of us have moments of doubt and despair that things may never change for better, given the competing and sophisticated development needs by the day. But I am also sure that something about our work charges us with hope and reminds us that change is possible – otherwise we probably wouldn't all be here.

Let me use this opportunity to sincerely appreciate the collaboration and support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and all the people that have contributed to the success of this workshop. I also thank all of you, who have come from various communities, LGAs, ministries, parastatals and the Niger state House of Assembly to participate in this workshop. I have no doubt that you would enjoy this training and I hope you would further disseminate your knowledge, experience and lessons learnt to your colleagues who are not privileged to be here.

I am also grateful to our consultants and the UNDP and IPCR staff for all their efforts towards the successful conduct of this workshop. May God reward your strength; sustain you to do more in similar endeavours.

I wish you all, a wonderful participation.

Thank you.

APPENDIX V: PARTICIPANT LISTS

PARTICIPANTS AT IPCR WORKSHOP ON CONFLICT SENSITIVE APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT AND BUDGET FORMULATION FOR LEGISLATORS, LOCAL CHAIRMEN, PUBLIC SERVANTS, TRADITIONAL RULERS AND CSOs AT THE ROYAL PARK HOTEL, ILOKO IJESHA, OSUN STATE, 13-15 AUGUST, 2012

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**PARTICIPANTS AT IPCR TRAINING WORKSHOP ON CONFLICT SENSITIVE REPORTING
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APPENDIX VI: SAMPLES OF COMMUNIQUÉS ISSUED

A COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT THE END OF A FOUR-DAY WORKSHOP FOR MEDIA GROUPS FROM THE STATE OF OSUN ON CONFLICT SENSITIVE REPORTING DURING ELECTIONS FACILITATED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (IPCR) AND UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP) HELD FROM 2ND – 5TH JUNE 2014 AT ROYAL BIRDS MOTEL, AKURE, ONDO STATE

PREAMBLE:

The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are appreciated for deeming it fit to organise the workshop for media practitioners particularly from the State of Osun, as a way of preparing them for Conflict Sensitivity in their reportage before, during and after the forthcoming Governorship election in the State.

The facilitators at the workshop were wonderful in their presentations. Their adoption of symbiotic interactive approach in their presentations really helped in practicalising what ordinarily would have ended on theoretical note. Participants also did their best in making the workshop a rewarding exercise for all the stakeholders.

RESOLUTIONS:

At the end of the workshop, the participants resolved as follows;

1. JOURNALISTS SHOULD HELP IN BUILDING STRONG INSTITUTIONS FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA.
2. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GO BACK TO THEIR ORGANISATIONS AND BE IN THE VANGUARD OF ADVOCACY FOR AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR DEMOCRACY TO THRIVE.
3. MEDIA SHOULD PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY AMONG ALL STAKEHOLDERS IN THE NATION'S BODY POLITY AND GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS.
4. MEDIA PROFESSIONALS ARE AT THE HEART OF ELECTIONS AS ONE OF THE STAKEHOLDERS AND SHOULD AVOID ASCRIBING CONFLICTS TO ANY OF THE PARTIES TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE OTHERS.
5. MEDIA PROFESSIONALS SHOULD BE CONFLICT SENSITIVE IN THEIR REPORTAGE, UNDERSTAND THEIR PROFESSIONAL MILLIEU, BE VERSED IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS, EMBRACE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT JOURNALISM.
6. JOURNALISTS MUST BE OBJECTIVE, DISPASSIONATE AND NON-ALLIGNED IN THEIR REPORTAGE OF ELECTIONS, TO BE FAIR TO ALL CONCERNED BY ENSURING BALANCED REPORTAGE OF EVENTS.
7. MEDIA WORKERS SHOULD BE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, THE NIGERIA BROADCASTING CODE, ELECTORAL ACT AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS SO AS TO OPERATE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE LAW.
8. THEY MUST ALSO BRING INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES TO BEAR ON THEIR JOBS.
9. THAT OWNERS OF MEDIA ORGANISATIONS SHOULD EQUIP, TRAIN AND ENHANCE THE WELFARE OF THEIR WORKERS THROUGH REGULAR PAYMENT OF SALARY AS WELL AS

PROVIDE SPECIAL ALLOWANCES FOR JOURNALISTS WHEN COVERING SENSITIVE EVENTS LIKE ELECTION.

10. MEDIA PRACTITIONERS MUST BE RESOURCEFUL, LOOK FOR ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF SELF-EMPOWERMENT TO ENHANCE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-SUSTENANCE FOR BETTER PERFORMANCE.

11. THE ROLES BEING PLAYED BY THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMMISSION IN THE REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY ARE HIGHLY COMMENDABLE. HOWEVER, THERE IS A NEED FOR BETTER EDUCATION TO ENSURE STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE NIGERIA BROADCASTING CODE.

12. JOURNALISM SHOULD BE PROFESSIONALISED IN SUCH A WAY THAT MEDIA ESTABLISHMENTS SHOULD BE LESS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THEIR OWNERS IN THE AREA OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE CONTENT OF THEIR POLITICAL REPORTAGE TO THE ADVANTAGES OF THE OWNERS AND TO THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE BODY POLITY AND THE SOCIETY.

12. PRINCIPAL STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MEDIA AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE EXPOSED TO TRAINING ON CONFLICT SENSITIVE REPORTING DURING ELECTIONS TO REMIND THEM OF WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THEM IN CONFLICT SENSITIVE INFORMATION DISSEMINATION.

14. THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION SHOULD BE MORE UP AND DOING IN MONITORING AND DEALING APPROPRIATELY WITH POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL PARTIES VIOLATING THE ELECTORAL ACT IN THEIR UTTERANCES AND CONDUCT.

15. INEC SHOULD ENGAGE MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, AS PART OF THEIR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, TO HELP IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTORAL MATERIALS ESPECIALLY TO AREAS THAT ARE DIFFICULT TO ACCESS.

16. IPCR, UNDP AND OTHER AGENCIES SHOULD ENSURE

CONTINUOUS TRAINING FOR JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA
MANAGERS IN CONFLICT SENSITIVE REPORTING NOT JUST ON
ELECTORAL MATTERS BUT IN ALL OTHER SECTORS OF HUMAN
ENDEAVOURS.

CONCLUSION:

On this note, the participants once again wish to express profound gratitude to IPCR and UNDP for organizing this Workshop which they believe has greatly improved the skills and knowledge of all participants.

Also, the participants acknowledged the Ministry of Information, the State of Osun for its active involvement in the workshop and the presence of the Honourable Commissioner for Information and Strategy, Mr. Sunday Akerele.

Signed this 5th day of June 2014 by:

Chairman of the Communiqué Committee-
Oluwatoyin Nwiido (Mrs)

Secretary of the Communiqué Committee-
Timothy Bamidele (Mr.)

Organisers of the Workshop-

Communiqué on Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting During Elections
organized by IPCR and UNDP

This communiqué issued at the end of a 4-Day Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting during Elections organized by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution-IPCR in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme-UNDP for selected journalists in Ekiti State held between 4th and 9th May, 2014 at the Royal Birds Motel, Akure, Ondo State.

Participants noted that the workshop is timely in view of the forthcoming June 21, 2014 Gubernatorial Election in Ekiti State and further commended the resource persons for their deep knowledge of the topics treated while the organizers were appreciated for funding the workshop.

That, the effective performance of the duties the 1999 Constitution (as amended) entrusted to journalists is pivotal to free, fair and credible elections in the country.

That, for journalists to effectively perform these constitutional roles, practitioners must adhere strictly to the code of ethics of their profession and other extant laws of the land including the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission's Broadcast Code and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).

That, journalists attached to special beats like, the State House and Government Houses must be able to differentiate between state functions and political assignments because coverage of political events by the newsmen runs foul of the NBC code.

That, journalists have a social responsibility to protect Nigeria's interests, integrity and image as well as assist government to safeguard the internal and external security of the country.

Signed today 8th May, 2014 by:

Organizers

Communiqué committee members

Akin Ogunmola – Chairman

Bose Falade - member

Suleiman Salaudeen- member

Akinola Adenitan- Secretary

Communiqué’ issued at the end of a two day Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and Security in Nigeria held at Asaa Pyramid Hotel Kaduna September 10-11, 2014

The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) Abuja in conjunction with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the support of the UN Department of Political Affairs and Counter Terrorism and Insurgency Task Force (CTITF) have organized a two-day Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and Security in Nigeria. Participants included religious leaders, academics, civil society leaders, media and public servants. Papers were presented on different topics by academics, clerics and other professionals. At the end of the two days, participants noted

1. That Nigeria is passing through a challenging time in its evolution as a nation especially with the issues of insecurity in the north-east.
2. That Interfaith Dialogue is a useful and relevant tool in addressing the present security challenges
3. That State governments should adopt urban planning strategies that will prevent Nigerian towns and cities from being divided along ethnic and religious lines.
4. That religious education should be made compulsory in our schools.
5. That State governments should permit the teaching of both Christian and Muslim religious studies in schools.
6. That there should more collaboration between religious and traditional leaders in order to build sustainable peace in our communities.
7. That training for religious leaders should be deepened, regulated and institutionalized by such organizations as CAN and JNI.
8. That Interfaith religious education should be introduced during NYSC orientation.
9. That Intra and Inter Faith education should be encouraged among adherents of both religions as a way of fostering understanding and peace.
10. That NIREC should be better resourced and made more active and relevant by having presence in every state and LG in the federation.
11. That religious leaders should stop being praise singers to politicians and become the real conscience of society.
12. That Christians and Muslims should embark on joint projects that could foster cooperation between the faiths such as assisting prison inmates and victims of violence, rehabilitating terrorists and perpetrators of violence.
13. That there is the need for the government to do something urgent about policing our porous borders, since many of the insurgents are not Nigerians.

APPENDIX VII: IPCR office complex



Figure 1: IPCR Tower, Abuja, Nigeria



Figure 2: Inside IPCR premises



Figure 3: Inside IPCR premises

APPENDIX VIII: WORKSHOP PICTURES



Figure 1: Group photograph of South East and South South participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Grand Montecito Hotel, P/Harcourt, 14 -17 Feb. 2011



Figure 2: Group photograph of Northern participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting, De Nevilla Hotel, Kaduna, 21 -24 Feb. 2011




Figure 3: A typical workshop banner of IPCR's training on peacebuilding



Figure 4: Group photograph of South West participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting, D'rovans Hotel, Ibadan, 28 Feb. – 03 March, 2011



Figure 5: Group photograph of Ekiti State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Iloko Ijesha, 13-15 August, 2012



Figure 6: Group photograph of Benue State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Lafia, Nasarawa State, 10-12 July, 2012.



Figure 7: Group photograph of Kaduna and Sokoto States' participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Saminaka, Kaduna State, 11-13 Oct. 2011



Figure 8: Group photograph of Lagos State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Golden Tulip Hotel, Festac, Lagos, 18-20 Oct. 2011.



Figure 9: Group photograph of Rivers and Imo States' participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, The Franklin Hotel, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State, 26-30 Sept., 2011



Figure 10: Group photograph of Anambra and Delta States' participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Crispan Hotel, Abagana, Anambra State, 23-25 August, 2011



Figure 11: Group photograph of North Central and North East participants on Workshop on Capacity Building for the Election Tribunal Judges at Crest Hotel, Jos, Plateau State, 2007



Figure 12: Group photograph of South West participants on Workshop on Capacity Building for the Election Tribunal Judges at Davies Hotel, Ibadan, Oyo State, 2007.



Figure 13: Group photograph of Benue State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, De-Nevilla Hotel, Kaduna, 13-15 Sept., 2011.



Figure 14: Group photograph of Osun State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting, Royal Birds Hotel, Akure, Ondo State, 2-5 June, 2014.



Figure 15: Group photograph of North Central and North East participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding & CR, Crest Hotel, Jos, 2010



Figure 16: Group photograph of Ekiti State participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, Royal Birds, Akure, 5-8 May, 2014.



Figure 17: Group photograph of North Central and North West participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding & Conflict Resolution, De-Nevila Hotel, Kaduna, 2012



Figure 18: A peacebuilding training for journalists in progress at the Royal Park Hotel, Iloko-Ijesha, Osun State, 2012.



Figure 19: Group photograph of Niger State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Kwara Hotel, Ilorin, 24-25 Sept., 2012



Figure 20: Group photograph of Adamawa State participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Lucia Hotel, Makurdi, Benue State, 24-26 July, 2012



Figure 21: Group photograph of members of the Community-Based Peacebuilding Network during one of its national meetings at Maraba, Nasarawa State, 8-10 May, 2013



Figure 22: Group photograph of South South and South East participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention, Calabar, November 2012.



Figure 23: Group photograph of South West participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention, Premier Hotel, Ibadan, 2010




Figure 24: Group photograph of North West and North Central participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting, Kaduna, 2010.



Figure 25: Group photograph of Northern participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Approach to Development, Jos, 2012.



Figure 26: Group photograph of Southern participants at the Workshop on Conflict Sensitive Reporting, Iloko-Ijesha, 2013.



Figure 27: Group photograph of South West participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention, Ibadan, 12-14 December, 2011



Figure 28: Group photograph of Northern participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Gender into Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention, Jos, 20-23 Sept., 2010.



Figure 29: Group photograph of South East participants at the Revalidation of the draft National Peace Policy, Top Rank Hotel, Enugu, 2008



Figure 30: Group photograph of North West participants at the Workshop on Mainstreaming Peacebuilding into Development Programming, Royal Tropicana Hotel, Kano, 2007



Figure 31: Group photograph of North East participants at the Workshop on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding for Youth/Community Leaders, Maiduguri, 2009.



Figure 32: Group photograph of North East participants at the Workshop on the drafting of National Peace Policy, Lake Chad Hotel, Maiduguri, 2007



ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

Certificate Number	UZREC 171110-030 PGD 2016/154			
Project Title	Impact of the institute for peace and conflict resolution on peace building and conflict			
Principal Researcher/ Investigator	OA Babatunde			
Supervisor and Co-supervisor	Dr MZ Shamase			
Department	History			
Nature of Project	Honours/4 th Year	Master's	Doctoral	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Departmental

The University of Zululand's Research Ethics Committee (UZREC) hereby gives ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project proposal and the documents listed on page 2 of this Certificate.

Special conditions:

- (1) This certificate is valid for 3 years from the date of issue.
- (2) Principal researcher must provide an annual report to the UZREC in the prescribed format [due date-31 August 2017]
- (3) Principal researcher must submit a report at the end of project in respect of ethical compliance.

The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this Certificate, using the reference number indicated above, but may not conduct any data collection using research instruments that are yet to be approved.

Please note that the UZREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the documents that were presented to the UZREC
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research

Classification:

Data collection	Animals	Human Health	Children	Vulnerable pp.	Other
X					
Low Risk		Medium Risk		High Risk	
		X			

The table below indicates which documents the UZREC considered in granting this Certificate and which documents, if any, still require ethical clearance. (Please note that this is not a closed list and should new instruments be developed, these would require approval.)

Documents	Considered	To be submitted	Not required
Faculty Research Ethics Committee recommendation	X		
Animal Research Ethics Committee recommendation			X
Health Research Ethics Committee recommendation			X
Ethical clearance application form	X		
Project registration proposal	X		
Informed consent from participants	X		
Informed consent from parent/guardian			X
Permission for access to sites/information/participants	X		
Permission to use documents/copyright clearance			X
Data collection/survey instrument/questionnaire	X		
Data collection instrument in appropriate language		Only if necessary	
Other data collection instruments		Only if used	

The UZREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Certificate if
 - o Any unethical principles or practices are revealed or suspected
 - o Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - o Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - o The conditions contained in this Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project

The UZREC wishes the researcher well in conducting the research


 Professor Gideon De Wet
 Chairperson: University Research Ethics Committee
 Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research & Innovation
 25 January 2017
 OA Babatundie - PISA 2016/154



*Per ardua ad astra
Through difficulties to the stars*



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21 August 2017
Babatunde A. O./
Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase
Department of History
University of Zululand
P/Bag X1001
Kwa-Dlangezwa
3886
EMPANGENI

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: PhD THESIS EDITING FOR THE USE OF LANGUAGE

The above matter refers.

We are pleased to report that the dissertation: **"Impact of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution on Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Nigeria, 2000- 2014"** by Babatunde Olalekan Augustine, has been edited for the use of language. Though this task was handed to us at very short notice, the following areas have accurately been attended to: Correction of typographical errors; Correction of names and non-English terms according to a specific reference source (style guide/dictionary); Correction of punctuation errors such as mislaid commas, incorrect dash use; Omission of inconsistent queries in the text.; Elimination of widows and orphans, other inappropriate typographical results; and Identification of errors that result from the use of computers, such as garbled tables, passages/chapters in the wrong font, use of homonyms, etc.

Our expert team has contributed by giving your thesis that stylistic shine which will ablaze your marker's eyes by determining suitable style and rearranging the material into proper structure/order for the targeted destination (external examiners); eliminating slang, redundancies, wordiness and clarification of vague vocabulary; establishing a steady style, language and point of view according to the intended audience maintaining the author's voice; improving the associations, transitions, parallelisms, and paragraphing and insurance of persistent style in headings, captions, figures, and illustrations; and suggesting additions, erasures, or re-structuring of data. We did all this at no additional costs at all.

Your comments to this report will be highly appreciated.

Yours truly,

Dr S. Mahabeer
Editor

Directors : Dr M Naidoo; Dr S Mahabeer; Dr M Lotter

Babatunde

Olalekan Augustine

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