AN EVALUATION OF THE TRAINING OF POLICE TRAINEES FOR THE POLICING OF UNREST RELATED INCIDENTS AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES MTHATHA POLICE TRAINING COLLEGE

BY

MARIETTA DORIKA VAN VUUREN

Submitted in fulfilment of the degree

MASTER'S DEGREE

(Criminology)

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

at the

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

Supervisor: Prof JM Ras

February 2014

Declaration

Student Number: 201001919

I hereby declare AN EVALUATION OF THE TRAINING OF POLICE TRAINEES FOR THE POLICING OF UNREST RELATED INCIDENTS AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES MTHATHA POLICE TRAINING COLLEGE to be my own work and that all references used or quoted were indicated and acknowledged.

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Mariette Dorika van Vuuren

ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS

ABSTRACT

South Africa is currently a country in crisis. A strike of around 1.3 million public-sector employees, which started on the 18 the August 2011, was and still is causing chaos in the country. Government institutions such as hospitals and schools are closed due to strikes (The Wall Street Journal. 2011). Due to the frustration of the communities because of lack of service deliveries most of these strikes and gatherings becomes violent and destructive.

The researcher has identified a major gap with the current curriculum utilized for the basic training of trainees in the South African Police Service. The curriculum mostly consists of theoretical presentations, especially with regard to crowd management. There is no practical training presented on how to manage crowds, and there is no presentation of the equipment that can be utilized and how it can be used to handle crowd management and unrest related incidents.

All police officials are ultimately responsible for maintaining law and order and therefore the researcher believes that it is extremely important that trainees should be introduced to crowd management and unrest incidents during basic training. This will enable them to have the necessary skills to handle unrest situation should they be faced with it at station levels. This will enhance service delivery for the whole SAPS, as all police officials will know how to manage crowds.

ISICATSHULWA (ABSTRACT)

Umzantsi Africa lilizwe elisengxakini yezixholoxholo. Abasebenzi bakarhulumente abangamawaka alishumi elinesithathu (1, 3 million) bayaqhankqalaza baqhanqalazela inkonzo zabasebenzi ukusukela ngomhla weshumi-elinesibhozo kwinyanga yethupha (18 August) kunyaka wamakhulu amabini anamashumi amabini aneshumi elinesine (2014) Onke amaziko karhulumente anjengezi-bhedlele, nezikolo kuye kwanyanzeleka ukuba zivalwe.

Ngenxa yokunganeliseki kwabahlali yindlela abasemagunyeni abenza ngayo izinto, baye baphume emgaqweni bafunze eziqwini zabasenzi baka Rhulumente.

Umphandi (Researcher) uye wafumanisa ukungafundiswa ngendlela efanelekileyo kubagcini-mthetho abaqalayo bamapolisa Omzantsi Africa (SAPS Basic Training), kuwo onke amacadelo amapolisa aqalayo. Izifundo zigxila kwizifundo zangaphakathi (theory) ngakumbi ibutho lezogcino-cwangco. Kwakhona alukho uqeqesho lwangaphandle olubonakala ngentshukumo (practical). Kwakhona alukho uqeqesho lwezixhobo zokulwa ulwaphulo mthetho esidlangalaleni (equipment).

Onke amapolisa Omzantsi Africa anoxanduva lokugcina isizwe sikhuselekile, ngenxa yoko abagcini mthetho abaqalayo banyanzelekile ukuba bangeniswe ngokwezifundo zabo bakwazi ukuthatha inxaxheba, maxa kukho imo engazinzanga apha elizweni. Lonto izakwenza ukuba abafundi abaqalayo ebupoliseni (abagcini-mthetho) babenencubeko yokuhlangabenzana nemeko zabaqhhanqalazi ngokwemigangatho yamaziko abangaxelanga kuwo ekuhlaleni.

Lonto izakuphuhlisa inkonzo ezisilelayo zika Rhulumente osiphetheyo kuba bonke abagcini-mthetho banendlela yokusombulula imeko yabaqhanqahazi jikelele.

ABSTRAKT

Suid Afrika is huidiglik n land in krisis. Stakings van nagenoeg 1.3 miljoen werkers wat reeds die 18 de Augustus 2011 begin het om te staak, is steeds besig om chaos in die land te veroorsaak. Daar is geen dienslewering as gevolg stakings nie en somige hospitale en skole moes toemaak (The Wall Street Journal. 2011). Die gemeenskape is gefrustreerd oor die swak dienslewering en daarom gaan meeste staking gepaard met geweldadige optredes en die beskadiging van eiendomme.

Die navorsers het identifiseer dat daar n groot gaping is met die huidige opleiding wat aan polisie student gebied word. Die opleiding wat aangebied word bevat meestal teorie ten opsigte van skarebeheer, maar geen aandag word gegee aan die praktiese aspek van die toerusting wat aangewend kan word of hoe dit aangewend word nie.

Alle polisiebeamptes is verantwoordelik vir wet en orde en daarom glo die navorser dit is van kardinale belang dat alle studente tydens opleiding blootgestel word aan opleding van skarebestuur.

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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL ORIENTATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The handling of unrest incidents is an important part of a police official's duty to create a safe and secure environment. These unrest incidents are complex and it is essential that up to date training is provided to be as well prepared as possible to deal with any unrest related matter (Van Vuuren, 2013). The unrest related incidents surrounding the death of Andries Tatane, during a march to Setsoto local municipality in Voortrekker Street in Fick's Market Square in Ficksburg, as well as the recent Marikana miners' strike where protesters and police officials were killed has, *inter alia*, underlined the importance of proper training of police officers in unrest related incidents (Ras, 2013).

This study will focus on the South African Police Service's Mthatha Training College's basic training programme to determine how much attention is paid to the training regarding the handling of unrest related incidents and whether members (trainees) are effectively equipped for this job.

1.2 BACKGROUND

Police trainees resume their basic learning programme at training institutions or colleges for the first phase of their training to become fully fledged police officials (Van Vuuren, 2013). This form of training enables police trainees to prepare for the second semester at police stations referred to as field training. Although training institutions spend time preparing police trainees to work at stations and within communities, too little training is provided on how to deal with unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to one of the South African Police Service's policy documents, (Policy Document 1/2007), "basic training", means institution based training and field training that prepare entry level police officials for the execution of their duties (South African Service 2006). This description clearly indicates the importance of training in order for trainees to be ready for their duties. Observing the current basic training learning programmes in South Africa, it is important to note that police trainees are not prepared thoroughly to handle unrest incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The Crowd Management Units (ACCUs) have, since September 2006, experienced huge restructuring (Omar, 2007: xi). The restructuring has created a shortage of staff at these units and this situation has impacted on the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. The fact that the number of Area Crime Combating Units in the Eastern Cape has decreased from seven to four, increases the need for trainees to be better prepared for the handling of unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013). The capacity of Area Crime Combating Units are currently of concern when it comes to the question of whether these units are adequately able to manage protest marches that are currently taking place in South Africa due to poor service deliveries (Omar, 2007: xi).

1.3 RISING PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE

In preparation for the 2010 Soccer World Cup, the South African Police Service has reopened five training institution in order to ensure that South Africa as a country would be in a position to host an incident free event. However, the researcher is of the opinion that the basic learning programme that is being presented to the trainees lacks certain skills and techniques pertaining to unrest related incidents that is an essential part of crime prevention management (Van Vuuren, 2013).

During a press release on 20 September 2012 both, the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, and the National Commissioner of Police, Ria Phiyega, said public violence is an emerging issue that requires police attention. The indications are that levels of public violence have massively increased since 2009 as poor communities' frustrations grow as they lose patience with local government failures, corruption and political in-fighting's (Newham, 2012:1). The statement from top police management indicates and confirms that there is a rising concern about public violence. Public violence threatens the property and lives of the community therefor the South African Police Service (SAPS) has an obligation to prevent any form of public violence that could harm the community or cause damage to their property (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.3.1 SOME STATISTICS

According to data gathered by the Municipal IQ, an independent local government monitoring agency, there was a 289% increase in the number of public protest against municipalities', from 27 such protest in 2008 to 105 in 2009. The number dropped

slightly in 2011, but increased again in 2012 to 113 incidents. Figures for the first six months of 2012 show that there was more protest against local government in this period than in any other year since 2004 (Newham, 2012: 1). The protests increasing is as much a concern for the SAPS as it is for the public, this means more police action and resources need to be available to maintain public order (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The SAPS has a far more comprehensive system for registering violent public protest than Municipal IQ does. While Municipal IQ relies on media reports, the police have detailed data. At 2012 briefing on crime statistics, the police revealed that they had attended to 1214 incidents of public violence. This is an increase of almost 25% when compared to the previous years and works out to an average of three violent incidents every day across the country (Newham, 2012: 1).

Increases in public violence were recorded in seven of the nine provinces, with substantial increases in the North West (76%), Eastern Cape (60%), Gauteng (38%) and the Western Cape (31%). The increasing number of violent protest concerned the Minister and the police as they result in the police having to divert resources away from responding to other types of crime. Minister Mthethwa said that from now on the police will be paying more attention to public violence and will seek to lay more charges against those involved. This will result in a number of negative consequences (Newham, 2012: 1).

The statement from the Minister again indicates the role the SAPS needs to play in the rising violence. Changes need to be made and, at the same time, police need to monitor and control the protests. This requires the appropriate amount of trained police officials to deliver a professional service. Police officials need to be trained in the knowledge, that both protesters and non-protesters have rights that need to be protected in a democratic South Africa (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In another article, Municipalities, service delivery and protests, Nathan Oliver (2013: 1) states that South Africa is an extremely unequal society. Nationally, South Africa faces a massive back-log in service delivery. Some 203 out of 284 SA municipalities are unable to provide sanitation to 40% of their residents. This means 71% of municipal areas; most people do not have flush toilets. A staggering 887 329 people still use the bucket system

and 5 million people, or 10.5% of the population, have no access to sanitation at all (Oliver, 2013: 1).

It is perfectly understandable then, why working class and poor people take to the streets against poor and costly service delivery; it is these same people that are impacted most by insufficient and costly service delivery, corruption and municipal management (Oliver, 2013: 1). Clearly the impact that poor service delivery has to communities are frustrating them. The communities are frustrated with the municipalities for not providing them with the bare basic essentials, such as proper sanitation. In reaction to the poor service the community receives from the municipality they resort to protest to voice their concerns. The members of the SAPS have a responsibility to allow these community members to protest regarding their concerns, however due to the frustration, communities become unruly and the SAPS members need to address this unruly behaviour (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.3.2 PROTESTING COMMUNITIES

Most communities that protest against local government failures have raised their grievances peacefully before resorting to demonstrations (Newham, 2012: 1). The requests for meeting and letters are often ignored and if there is some response from politicians or government officials, promises are left unfulfilled. By the time a community starts blockading roads, burning tyres and, in more extreme cases, destroying local council property, frustration has built up for some time (Newham, 2012: 1).

The communities' frustrations result in them resorting to desperate measures and vandalism and it ends up in them participating and committing criminal activities. The SAPS then needs to take actions to restore the peace that all citizens are entitled to. In order for the SAPS members to be able to take appropriate action they need to know the applicable legal measures, policies and procedures and the Crowd Management Act 205 of 1993 when dealing with these incidents. This knowledge will assist them inter alia in acting in a more professional manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In a report entitled, "The smoke that calls," published in 2011 by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand, a compelling analysis of the

factors that drive violent community protests was presented. The authors argued, among other things, that the police play a pivotal role in determining whether or not protest turn violent. For example, the failure of the police to intervene timeously can allow violence to spread (Newham, 2012: 1).

In order for the SAPS to take action it is important that they are trained to deal with these violent actions. The specialized units in the SAPS that manage crowd and unrest related incidents are not always available, due to more than one incidents taking place spontaneously. This causes members from other units to be deployed and this process cannot be done instantly. This would not be a problem if all police officials have a basic knowledge of crowd control management. This will enable them to be aware of what the different steps are that they can implement in different unrest situations (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.3.3 XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS

South Africa has in recent years become a country where public violence has increased dramatically and many different kind of violence have occurred. The xenophobic attacks in 2008, in which 69 people were killed and thousands displaced over a period of four days before the military were called in, is a typical example.

In some cases, it was found that rather than preventing violence, overzealous and aggressive police action escalated confrontation and tension which rapidly took the form of running street battles between protesters and police officers. This has very serious implications for police legitimacy (Newham, 2012: 5). The 2008 attacks indicate that police officials were not all properly trained to deal with incidents of this nature; only officials at POP are trained to deal with this type of incidents. (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Incidents of xenophobic attacks in the country, the high number of riots and marches that are taking place, protest actions, and continuous demands for better wage increases, all put a huge pressure on the police to maintain social order. Many of these protests become violent and always need some police intervention and action.

It has been reported in the Mail and Guardian (2009: 3) that the South African government will not tolerate protests. According to this article, police fired rubber bullets and teargas in the Siyathemba Township, southeast of Johannesburg demanding better

services and more jobs, in one of the biggest challenges to President Jacob Zuma's Presidency, since he took office in May 2009. Scores of people have been arrested (*Mail and Guardian*, 31 July 2009).

In order to maintain social order police members must be thoroughly trained in crowd control procedures and must know how to implement unrest related counter-measures (Ras, 2001; Dempsey, 1997). This incident at the Siyathemba Township was a clear indication of how a protest march can become an incident where the SAPS members need to take drastic measures. The reason for the protest march was lawful, but the manner in which it took place was unlawful (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.3.4 THE MARIKANA EVENTS

Another tragic incident that focussed on drastic action was the Marikana strike, today known as the Marikana massacre. Particularly after the events at Marikana (see section 1.10.2), there is an increasing risk of the police being seen as antagonists in local struggles as they begin to represent a very visible, forceful state response to what increasingly marginalised communities feel are legitimate grievances.

This will increase social distance between these communities and the local officials that are supposed to serve them. Moreover, it will mean that large numbers of people may loose trust in the police and start to see them as the enemy. Less crime will be reported, less information on criminal suspects will be forthcoming and police safety will become increasingly compromised in certain areas (Newham, 2012: 2).

According to the Hattingh (2013: 1), during the Marikana event troops were deployed in the platinum belt in what was a barefaced bid by the state to stop the protest of striking workers, and essentially force them back to work. As part of this, residents at the informal settlement at Marikana and those surrounding Amplats, have been subjected to renewed assault by the police. Many residents in the process were shot with rubber bullets; their homes raided; they were threatened; and teargas, at times, lay over the settlements like a chemical fog (Hattingh, 2013: 1).

The actions of the police during these incidents is a clear indication of how important it is for all police officials to receive proper training in how to manage crowds and unrest related incidents. All the mentioned actions that were taken according to this article by

the police should be the last resort. Clearly the community was disadvantaged by these actions of police officials, because the members not involved were supposed to be protected by the SAPS but ended up being part of the unrest.

This whole incident indicates how important it is for all police officials to be aware of the different rights that citizens have. On the one hand the workers have a right, and that must be respected by the police, but on the other hand the community members who did not strike also have a right to be protected if they are not involved (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Based on 2009 figures, it has been estimated that, at that time, over 2 million people were involved in public protests. This is a large number of people and the police must not turn them into adversaries (Newham, 2012: 2). The SAPS needs to restore trust in the community and in order to be able to perform this service, they need to be better trained. Police official's need to be aware that there are preventative measures that can be utilized to try and diffuse an unrest situation before it can explode (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.3.5 POOR SERVICE DELIVERIES

The root cause of many violent public protests is one of poor local government service deliveries. As difficult as the solution might be, it is ultimately to appoint skilled people who are able to deliver the basic services promised to and expected by local communities who mostly depend on government. It is also important to hold poorly performing and corrupt local officials accountable, as this is another reason for many of the failures that result in public protest.

If this strategic approach is not forthcoming, the police will be caught in a conflict situation that they have no hope of winning without devastating consequences for both the state and society (Newham, 2012: 2). Despite the conflict situation, the SAPS will act upon any situation that creates public violence. Despite the acknowledgment that there are contributing factors causing the communities to become frustrated it does not allow protestors to damage or cause injuries to others (Van Vuuren, 2013).

There are many other factors that force communities to become violent as they feel that this is the only way to be heard (Van Vuuren, 2013). Rising anger about corrupt councillors, high food and energy prices, poorly maintained infrastructure, and

internecine struggles for power are some of the issues over which South Africans are increasingly taking to the streets (Gould, 2012: 1).

These are important issues that the government needs to address, but when protesters take to the streets they are bound to peaceful protest conditions and it should not be used as an excuse to participate in criminal activities, because police officials will take the necessary actions against these problems. These conditions and procedures should be known to all police officials in order to know what is expected from them when performing their duties (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.3.6 THE SAPS ANNUAL REPORT OF 2010/2011

In the SAPS Annual Report, it was reported that during the 2010/2011 financial year there were 11,680 peaceful gatherings that required a police presence. These are described in the SAPS Annual Report as "Assemblies, gatherings, meetings and demonstrations." There were also 971 violent public protests (Which the police call unrest incidents) resulting in the arrest of 3,671 people. These figures represented a 52% increase in the number of peaceful incidents from the previous year (2009/10) when there were 7,913 peaceful protests; but a slight decrease in the number of violent protest from 994 in 2009/10 to 917 in 2010/2011.

The abovementioned numbers worked out to an average of five violent protests every two days. These figures tell us that about 1 in 12 protests are violent, suggesting that violence may be a last resort. However, the Incident Registration System (IRIS) used by the police only counts an incident if 15 or more people are involved, so many incidents of public violence such as vigilantism and xenophobic attacks may go uncounted (Gould, 2012: 1).

In 2009 the SAPS opened 1500 cases of public violence, the highest number since 2005. Since then the number of cases has steadily decreased, to 1152 in 2011/2012. However, since this figure describes the number of cases opened by the police, rather than the number of protests that turned violent, it does not get us any closer to a better reflection of the reality of community-based protest (Gould, 2012: 2). These statistics indicate the dire need for all SAPS members to be trained in the basic handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. Any crowd management has the potential to become violent

and members at the stations are not skilled enough to deal with these incidents in an appropriate manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Hough (2008: 1), from the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, pointed out that the ongoing and often violent protest action, mainly aimed at poor service deliveries at local government level in South Africa, has the potential to escalate into a revolution. In short, the current situation in South Africa is heading for a period where many protest actions and marches, are increasing, and to prevent violence, these marches must be properly policed. This again requires well-trained and equipped police officials to perform the job in a professional, efficient and effective manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.4 POLICE BASIC TRAINING PROGRAMMES

The Police Basic Training Programmes needs to be influenced by, *inter alia,* life experiences and information from grass roots level information, where crime is a day to day experience; something that seems to be lacking (Fox, Van Wyk & Fourie 1998: 15). It is important to acknowledge that each police method that is applied must be a method or technique that can effectively be turned into a lifelong learning experience that can assist in the training of police trainees.

Because a well organized and trained core of police officials are needed to handle possible incidences of public unrest, the police must excel in training and make sure they are thoroughly equipped for their task. This research wants to assist in adding further knowledge related to crowd control to the existing body of knowledge related to the basic police training programme (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEM

There is hardly any research available in South Africa on crowd control measurement and/or unrest related incidents, especially from a policing point of view (Rae, 1997; Ras, 2001). This research seeks to fill this gap and to come up with a document that addresses the lacunas that exist in the training of police trainees when it comes to unrest related incidents.

1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH

This research is qualitative in nature. Qualitative research is defined as the non-numerical examination and interpretation of observation for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. This method assisted the researcher with understanding and observing the interaction between the trainer and the trainees on how training has an impact on handling of unrest related incidents (Ras, 2006).

Generally speaking, qualitative research can be characterized as the attempt to obtain an in-depth understanding of the meaning (Ras, 2006) and 'definition of the situation' presented by informants, rather than the production of a qualitative 'measurement' of their characteristics of behaviour (Livingston, 1996: 5). The officials from the Public Order Police specialise in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents, and the researcher's own past training and practical work experiences and that of other Public Order Police members was used to gather information and to see which methods and techniques the trainees are lacking when they have to handle crowds and unrest related incidents (Ras, 2001; Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.7 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The general aim of the research is to identify deficiencies in the basic training learning programme, in order to improve and implement better skills, by ensuring that police trainees are better equipped to deal with unrest related incidences. Specific objectives of the research are:

- To provide a general orientation to the study (Chapter One)

- To discuss the research methodology (Chapter Two)

- To provide a brief historical overview of crowd control and the basic police training at Mthatha Training Institution (Chapter Three)

- To gain insights through the practical data gathering process about the police trainees' lack of training in crowd control skills (Chapter Four)

- To analyse crowd control measures (Chapter Four)

- To draw conclusions and to make recommendations (Chapter Five)

1.8 RESEARCH METHODS USED

There are different forms of data collection. In qualitative research the most basic forms are inter alia observation, interviews (the personal and focus group) and document analysis. In this research the methods that were used were focus group interviews; personal interviews and observation.

1.8.1 Focus group interviews

The interview is a very important method of data collection in qualitative research that aims to understand the participant's perspective (English, Fielding, Howard & Fourie, 2006: 318). In a group interview, one is expected to act as a facilitator and manager of the discussion. The interview is likely to be relatively unstructured and to be fairly free-flowing, although of course the facilitator uses these methods for particular themes which he wishes to explore (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhil, 2000: 268). This type of interview allows the opportunity for the participants to give their own views in a comfortable environment.

This also allows the theme to be specified in order to prevent the discussion from diverting from the issue to be discussed. Two focus groups (two platoons) consisting of 36 trainees at the Training Institution were interviewed and observed for this research. The learners were current trainees undergoing basic training at the institutions (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.8.2 Personal interviews

Informal and unstructured interviews were used with identified trainers and police officials. Semi-structured interviews were used with the trainees. Through semi-structured interviews the interviewer planned a number of set questions for each respondent, but also has allowed sufficient flexibility with each respondent to develop particular questions arising from the interview (English, Fielding, Howard & Fourie, 2006: 314). This method had allowed the information to be based on the experiences of the trainees who were undergoing training and the trainers who have presented training, as well as the police officials who had been trained some time ago and who had been exposed to the policing of unrest related incidents.

The researcher interviewed hundred (100) trainees who were undergoing training and nine (9) trainers from the institution who have presented training to the trainees. The Training Manager of the institution was also interviewed. Five (5) members of the Public Order Police were interviewed, and two (2) trainers of the Public Order Police: Mthatha were interviewed with regards to their knowledge of the management of crowds and the handling of unrest related incidents. The Training Manager of the Public Order Police: Port Elizabeth was also interviewed; he was responsible for the training of police members to manage crowds at the FIFA 2010 World Cup in the Eastern Cape (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.8.3 Observation

Observation took place at the Mthatha Training Institution. This method had allowed the collection of data as they occurred in their natural setting. Therefore there was no need to depend on 'second-hand' accounts of perceptions from respondents who had their own interpretation to events.

Observing the training situation has made the information to be valuable, because it is how the training was presented. Observation was done in classes where Physical and Street Survival classes were presented (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.9 TERMINOLOGY

The following terms are defined:

1.9.1 Training

According to Naukrihub (2007: 1) training is defined as a learning process that involves the acquisition of knowledge, sharpening of skill, concepts, rules, or changing attitudes and behaviours to enhance the performance of employees.

According to Reynecke and Fourie (2001: 80) it refers to activities aimed at generating learning and enhances the current job performance of the learner. Taking into account these two definitions, it is clear that the primary goal for training is to empower and capacitate people with knowledge and skills to enable them to deliver a better service.

1.9.2 Unrest incidents

According to Ballantyne (2006: 1) civil unrest is defined as disharmony, expressive dissatisfaction and / or disagreement between members of a community which leads to a situation of competitive aggression that may find expression as disruption of organization, conflicts, damage to property and injuries.

Monteleone (2006: 2) refers to Samuel Huntington who said that 'social unrest is political instability and disorder, that is directly caused by rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics, coupled with a slow development of political institutions.

1.9.3 Crowd Management

The South African Police Service (Act no 205 of 1993) crowd management is defined as the policing of assemblies, demonstrations and all gatherings, whether recreational, peaceful of whatever nature.

In terms of Standing Order (General) 262 Crowd Management during gatherings and demonstration, Regulations of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, the South African Police Service Act, obliges the SAPS to 'play a proactive role in identifying and diffusing possible conflict'.

According to Omar (1997) a SAPS Policy was introduced which emphasized management opposed to crowd control. The goal of this policy was as follows; 'to establish standardized procedures in the SAPS to manage crowds in such way that these conform to democratic values and accepted international standards; to install SAPS values, at all times acting in a professional, acceptable and effective manner based on constitutional principles; to accomplish ideas for crowd management situations relating to life, property, citizen satisfaction of Police and feelings of safety at gatherings, and risks to SAPS personnel (Omar, 2006: 9).

The Act determines the importance of regulating and policing crowd management in a controlled manner in order for it to end peacefully and, should it become unruly, sets out guidelines which police officials should use to handle these kinds of incidents in a

professional manner. This Act is currently being used as a guiding tool by police officials working at the Public Order Policing, whose primary functions are crowd management and managing of unrest incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.10 THE RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

The relevance of this study is to point out that all police officials must have the basic skills to do crowd management and to deal with unrest related incidents. To protest is a right people have, but it has to take place in a peaceful manner while police officials must ensure the safety of people and their property during these protests.

In order to highlight the importance and relevance of this study, the researcher will elaborate in more detail on three important crowd control situations that quite recently took place and again emphasises the need for the police to be well equipped for their task. The cases were Ficksburg in the Free State province (section 1.10.1), Marikana in the Northwest province (section 1.10.2), and De Doorns in the Western Cape (section 1.10.3). Remarks are also made about unrest related issues (section 1.10.4)

1.10.1 Ficksburg incident

An incident that has raised concern of SAPS members' training in crowd management and unrest related incidents was the death of Andries Tatane. This was the most widely published criticism against the police. Andries Tatane was allegedly shot at the hands of six police officers' during a service delivery protest in Ficksburg in the Free Sate on April 13.

The death of Andries Tatane at the hands of police officers has led South Africans to question the direction in which law-enforcement is moving. Tatane, a teacher, activist, husband and father of two young sons, was among a group of about 4 000 Meqheleng township residents who marched to the Ficksburg municipal offices in the Free State to complain about poor service delivery (*Mail & Guardian*, 18 April 2011).

Video footage of the incident, captured by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), shows an unarmed Tatane being beaten by six officers. He is then seen collapsing, with blood streaming down his chest. Tatane died of his injuries about 20 minutes later (*Mail & Guardian*, 18 April 2011).

Shortly after the incident, the ANC released a statement through its spokesperson Jackson Mthembu condemning the "brutal beating of the man to death" and the "apartheid-era police strong-arm tactics" used by members of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Cele later said that action would be taken against those who had been involved in Tatane's death, and Mthethwa asked for the public to allow the law to run its course (*Mail & Guardian*, 18 April 2011).

David Bruce, a senior researcher with the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, has said that the incident should not be viewed in isolation but rather as a manifestation of a systemic problem.

"This incident [reaffirms] evidence of an emerging pattern of brutality by police responding to service delivery demonstrations — at a time when the number of killings and serious non-fatal assaults by police are at extremely high levels," he told the Independent (*Mail & Guardian*, 18 April 2011). This indicates that something went wrong during the protest and the way the protestors were handled (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.10.2 The Marikana massacre

South Africa recently faced one of the most violent strikes, the Marikana miners' strike or Lonmin strike. This strike was a wildcat strike at a mine owned by Lonmin in the Marikana area, close to Rustenburg, South Africa in 2012 (*The Times*, 3 October 2012).

There was huge national as well as international publicity regarding the strike and how the SAPS had handled it. Unfortunately the publicity was negative and consequently the police looked incompetent in handling this tragedy. Empowering the SAPS with knowledge on how to deal with violence will assist them in having a positive public image as they will be able to act in a more professional manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to Brigadier Zephania Mkhwanazi, the head of the police's Northern Cape operational response services, who had testified before the Farlam commission of inquiry regarding the Marikana tragedy, it was difficult for the police's public order police to deal with the situation at Marikana where 4,000 armed people had refused to disperse (Mabuza, 2012: 1).

In order to deal with a situation of this nature it is important that all officials need to know what is required of them. These situations are of a serious nature and need to be dealt with in a sensitive and expert manner. The indication by the Brigadier that not enough POP members were available highlighted the importance of more officials to be trained to have the skills and knowledge to handle unrest related incidents. It then might have been possible to mobilize more police officials that were trained to try and diffuse the situation in a more peaceful manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The event garnered international attention following a series of violent incidents between the South African Police Service and strikers which resulted in the deaths of 36 mine workers, two police officers, four other unidentified persons and the injury of additional 78 workers and the police (*The Times*, 3 October 2012).

The shooting incidents on 16 August that the press named the "Marikana massacre" was the single most lethal use of force by South Africa security forces against civilians since 1960 and the end of apartheid. Controversy emerged after it was discovered that most of the victims were shot in the back. Many victims were also shot far from the police lines (*The Times*, 3 October 2012). Taking into account that people were shot in the back emphasises the need for proper crowd control measures and effective policing when it comes to unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Once again, the question arises as to what a police official is trained to do when his life is being threatened especially in an environment where they are dealing with angry strikers. Should they act by shooting at the strikers or should they calm the situation by negotiating? This question is hard to ask without consideration of what really happened at the Marikana sight, but what is sure is that there is no way it can be justified that people were shot in the back. This incident was as a result of 3 000 workers walking off the job (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Footage from several different angles shows that the police were pushing the strikers into a small area. Groups of strikers began singing struggle songs, and marched along police lines. The police fired teargas and rubber bullets into these groups. At least one person in one group shot a handgun at the police. Members of this group either panicked or deliberately charged at a police line which sparked off the shooting (*The Times*, 3 October 2012). Police officials are constantly working under life threatening situations

and therefore they need to be prepared to act upon it in the most trained manner. The incident indicates how easily a protest can turn extremely violent and it is crucial for SAPS members to be sure of how to handle any situation (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The day after the shooting Police Commissioner Phiyega released a statement giving a detailed account of the effort taken by the police to avert the threat of a violent end to the stand-off. The Commissioner claims that the SAPS had, on a number of occasions since the beginning of the week, attempted to negotiate a peaceful end to the strike. According to the Commissioner the police had also received information that the miners were planning to become violent.

It was at this point that defensive and crowd control measures were exercised through the deployment of concertina wire barricades and the use of water cannons, rubber bullets, stun grenades, and tear gas to break the strikers up and drive them into an area where they could better control them. It was also at this point that the strikers became violent; attacking members of the SAPS and the officials subsequently had no choice other than to protect themselves use the maximum force to halt the attack (*The Times*, 3 October 2012).

The statement released by the Commissioner indicates all the measures police officials utilized before resorting to firing live ammunition towards the strikers which caused death and injuries. All the resources that can be used to manage crowds have been stated. It is important that all police officials are aware of these resources that are available and that the officials are trained in how to deal with this equipment (Van Vuuren, 2013).

COSATU spokesperson Patric Craven said in a statement: "There can be no doubt that the police response was excessive and it formed a pattern the federation had witnessed for many years on how police handled demonstrations." Craven (2012: 1) said they have, on countless occasions, protested against the immediate resort to firing live ammunition which revealed serious lack of training and planning on crowd tactics."

Craven (2012: 1) added that COSATU had also protested against the use of rubber bullets on unarmed protesters: "Police must be trained to negotiate before using force when controlling crowds. We don't want to see guns being used but want to see riot

shields, water cannons and teargas – not R5 automatic rifles – when police control the crowds" (Mabona, 2012: 1).

The position of COSATU emphasises the importance that all police officials need to be trained in dealing with situations of crowd management and unrest related incidents. All police officials need to be trained in crowd control weaponry and they must know how, but more importantly, when to use it (Ras, 2013).

1.10.3 De Doorns incident

During 2012 South Africa faced huge challenges with protest actions caused by disgruntled farm workers. The striking farmworkers have caused havoc and violence was at the order of the day.

The Sunday Times (13 January 2013) reported: "Plumes of smoke hung like a question mark above the Cape Winelands yesterday as local leaders admitted that the farm workers strike was beyond their control. A farmers' truck was burnt by an angry mob in De Doorn at 6 am yesterday morning and the driver was forced to flee for his life. Shops and businesses in the fruit-growing town of Grabouw were closed for two days due to looting and mayhem."

Although farm workers had the right to express their dissatisfaction, they did not have the right to resort to violence. However, the challenge for the SAPS was to police them in an effective manner, but there are doubts whether they did that correctly (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In the Western Cape one person died during farm worker protests about wages and living conditions. The protest started in De Doorns and spread to 15 other towns within a week. The violent strike first flared early in November and was temporarily suspended in December after COSATU intervened and called for negotiations between farmers and workers.

Two people have been killed and scores injured. Vineyards and farming infrastructure have been burnt or damaged and more than 100 people have been arrested (*The Sunday Times*, 12 January 2013). The police need to take action when strikes become violent,

but the goal is that this should be done in a professional manner to prevent injuries and damage to properties (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The violence at De Doorns has spread so fast to all the surrounding farming communities that it is a legitimate question to ask if the SAPS has enough trained manpower to deal with a situation like this if it should occur in different places at the same time (Van Vuuren, 2013). It was also reported that farmers in the Hex River Valley had employed private security personnel to protect their property against the strikers (Sharp, 2013).

According to a news report from (*News24* 09 January 2013) the outcome of the farm attacks was that two people were killed and property, worth millions of rand's, was destroyed between 27 August and 4 the December 2012 (*News24* 09 January 2013) http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Non-striking-farmworkers-turned-away. Accessed on 2013-01-09). The farm workers strikes have also pointed out that the rights of citizens, who were not participating in these strikes, also need to be protected by the police (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Running clashes between protestors and the police have seen hundreds arrested for public violence and the police using a water cannon, rubber bullets and stun grenades in an attempt to disperse thousands of strikers (*News24,* 11 December 2012) http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/oliphant-must-step-up-western-cape-govt-2013-01-11. (Accessed on 2013-01-13). Although the police have all the resources to assist them in action against protestors who become unruly, they also need trained manpower in handling their resources in an effective and proper manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Western Cape chairperson Marius Fransman (2012) said criminals also had used the strike and ensuing protest to "loot and perpetrate violence." "The ANC respects the right of workers to organize, but in light of more goodwill amongst the same farmers and unruly elements hijacking the present strike the ANC calls for cool off time and room for talks" (*News24* 11 December 2012) http://www.news24.com/Fin24/Economy/Labour-ready-to-mediate-in-farm-strike. (Accessed on 2013-01-13). Criminals use unrest incidents to participate in criminal activities and therefore it is important for police officials to know the difference between protesters becoming violent and criminals taking advantage of the situation to loot shops (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In line with the doubts about police personnel's abilities to deal with crowds, the South African Police Union president, Mpho Kwinka (2012: 1), correctly pointed out that police officers should be trained to handle public violence and strikes that turn violent. According to him, members of the police force lack the required skills to handle public violence.

Kwinka (2012: 1) said communities often used violence during protests and strikes to be heard by authorities, and he added that the union was worried that not enough was being done to train police officers in crowd management. He also said that the shooting of 34 striking miners at Lonimin's mine in Marikana August 16, caused people to lose faith in the police and their ability to protect them (*News24*, 16 November 2012) http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Union-Train-police-for-public-violence. (Accesses on 2012-11-16).

1.10.4 Unrest related issues

What we see in the marches at present is that there are different incidents happening at different places all around South Africa in some cases, protest in one community sparks a similar uprising in another community. In almost every case the protest action is accompanied by varying degrees of violence (Analysis, 2010).

Law enforcement is accustomed to deploy police services to break up protests, in some cases, declaring the protest actions illegal. In many cases these efforts degenerate in running battles and skirmishes as police rubber bullets are met with stones thrown by protesters. South Africa is probably one of a few democracies in the world that act so harshly against protesting citizens and even violent protestors. It is certainly one of very few countries that permit its security forces to shoot at their citizens – even with rubber bullets (Analysis, 2010).

In circumstances where the unrest incident becomes more difficult to control, Public Order Police (POP) are called upon to handle these types of situations, but until these units arrive the event will be handled by police officials who are based at police stations. Because more and more community members around South Africa are protesting against poor service deliveries, this may lead to potential and violent protest marches and clashes

with the police. This means *in praxis* that the police need to be well-prepared (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Since 2005 (or even before), municipal service delivery protest has became common place in South Africa and they became more intense in 2009 (Analysis, 2010). The combined efforts of strikes and unrest have attracted the attention of all, including international news networks (Portfolio Property, 2010). South Africa has reached a stage where democracy has turned to a degree where people no longer negotiate when they are unhappy or tries to resolve the problem; the community tends rather to use the extreme option of implementing protest marches or gatherings (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Up until end of June 2009, 500 000 man days were lost due to strike action in this year, according to the respected strike report from Andrew Lang and associates (Portfolio Property, 2010). The numbers of days lost through strike actions have a huge financial impact on South Africa that is already plagued with poverty and unemployment (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Despite the fact that South Africa has experienced minimal growth the past few years these growth figures are no protection against strikes President Zuma and several ministers have come out quite strongly against violence and misbehaviour (Portfolio Property, 2010). President Zuma indicated on several occasions that he would not tolerate citizens or inhabitants of South Africa to behave in ways that could result in political instability (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The lawyer for Human Rights (LHR) has pointed out that the police themselves have not always respected basic human rights when they were send in to stop violent riots, and especially in the course of attacks against foreign nationals, especially during the 2008 period.

The LHR has said that the SAPS have failures, listed by the LHR as follow:

(1) Has used excessive rubber bullets against people who were not part of the protest, including in the houses of local residents who were not actively participating in the marches.

(2) A Fifteen (15) year old boy was shot in the back with rubber bullets at close range.

(3) A Thirteen (13) year old boy was shot with rubber bullets in his face.

(4) A fourteen (14) year old was shot in the abdomen and the abdomen area.

(5) Despite injuries, detainees were not allowed basic medical treatment.

Indications from the side of the LHR clearly shows police officials either have a lack of training in how to deal with crowd management and unrest related incidents or they have ill discipline or are deliberate (The reasons behind service delivery protest, 2010).

As the use of lethal force by police has risen in recent years and protestors become more violent, a number of experts are questioning why the police are using excessive force to control public demonstrations so often.

The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) has raised the issue of police violence in South Africa, especially after several unarmed people were killed during 2011 and Gareth Newham, head of the Crime and Justice Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, recently said that, the SAPS does not possess adequate skills and capacity to professionally respond to a number of the challenges it faces including maintaining public order.

In South Africa, as much as anywhere else, protest have become increasingly violent and adversarial in recent years. Whether trade unionist protesting in support of their demands on the streets of Johannesburg, or anti-globalisation demonstrations decrying the latest G20 meeting, attacks on public order police members and damage to property have become common (DefenceWeb, 2013). It is clear that all police officials will be exposed to unrest situations as it is as much part of their policing functions. For the safety of the police officials and the community, the police officials have to know how to deal with these kinds of incidents in a proactive manner.

By some accounts, the protests in the first three months of 2012 were the most South Africa has seen in any three month period since 1994. Moreover, the protests seem to be more violent than in the past. "Last year's protests, more of which occurred in July and August, led to the deaths of four people, some 94 injuries (mostly of protestors), 750 arrests, and damage to municipal buildings and police vehicles, South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) researcher, Nthamage Kgafela said earlier this year (Defenceweb, 2013).

It needs to be acknowledged that the most important role of the SAPS is not being complied with, namely to protect the inhabitants of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996). If people are being killed or injured, something needs to be done in an attempt to prevent this from happening (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to South Africa's Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), which is charged with investigating all deaths resulting from police action, 588 people were shot dead by the police in 2008/9, more than double the number just three years earlier, and the highest number since the ICD was established in 1997. The number remained high during 2009/2010 with 524 people shot dead. In addition, the Independent Complaints Directorate figures show that the number of police assault rose from 1380 in 2007-2008 to 1667 in 2009-2010 (Defenceweb, 2013).

The SAPS, as mentioned, is there to protect and to serve the community and should not be the cause of people being shot or assaulted without legitimate reasons. Police officials need to be properly trained to handle such situations to prevent injuries, and the deaths of citizens because everyone in South Africa has the right to live peacefully in their neighbourhood without the threat of violence, either by their neighbour or by police officers who are mandated to protect them (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Police officials are mandated to protect citizens, this includes the criminals and protesters, but the police just need to deal with these categories differently (Van Vuuren, 2013). In a media statement in Cape Town on the 29 April 2010, Police minister, Minister Nathi Mthethwa, and National Police Commissioner, Bheki Cele, before the FIFA Soccer World Cup started had vowed to deal with crime head on.

Cele said that "…society looks upon us to fight the evil deeds of crime and corruption. To succeed in this duty, we must ourselves be upright. We therefore have a responsibility to examine and audit our all-round performance". He also stated that while people have constitutional rights to negotiate, express their grievances and ultimately march, all these should be done within the fundamental rights of the legislation. Police will not tolerate criminal acts that are disguised as service delivery protest or labour-related demands.

There is no doubt that the police have been tasked to protect all citizens in an effective manner (Act 108 of 1996). This includes that the SAPS must be able to deliver effective crowd management duties. The best way to achieve this is to train all police recruits, busy with basic police training, in basic crowd management and unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

1.11 SUMMARY

In Chapter One of this study brief introductory (section 1.1) and background remarks (section 1.2) were made, rising police violence and the police (section 1.3) were discussed, and references were also made to the police basic training programmes (section 1.4).

The author then highlighted the research problem (section 1.5), the research approach (section 1.6), the aims and objectives of this study (section 1.7), the research methods were discussed (section 1.8), as well as the terminology (section 1.9), and the relevance of this study (section 1.10) was pointed out in the light of crowd control measures that went wrong in places like Ficksburg (section 1.10.1), Marikana (section 1.10.2) and De Doorns (section 1.10.3).

The author pointed out that the handling of unrest incidents and crowd management is an important part of a police official's duty and creates a safe and secure environment, but it is essential that up to date training is provided. Because the policing and handling of crowds are today forming a huge part of the primary duties of members of SAPS, it is vital that all police members, even those with the lowest ranks, understand what is expected from them when they have to respond.

In order to be better prepared for any unrest related incidents, police trainees at police training colleges or institutions like Mthatha, need to be properly briefed in this important aspect of police work. The following chapter, Chapter Two, will focus on the research methodology that was followed in this research.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

While Chapter One was a general orientation to this study, the focus of this chapter is on the research methodology that the researcher has used. The methodology will assist to better comprehend what and how the researcher has done her investigation related to the basic training of police trainees at the Mthatha police training college or institution.

The SAPS Training Institution is responsible to train 216 trainees in the first phase of basic training to become police officers. The researcher has followed a qualitative research approach to conduct the research in order to evaluate trainees on the basic training for the policing of unrest related incidents. The focus was on the knowledge and skills the trainees have with regard to crowd management and unrest related incidents.

2.2 RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN

Babbie (1983: 534) defines qualitative research as the "non-numerical" examination and interpretation of observation for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships (1993: 537). (English, Fielding, Howard & Fourie: 2006: 11). The researcher has followed this approach to establish what the trainees know about the policing of crowd management and unrest related incidents.

Wainwright (1997: 289) said that, "generally qualitative research is characterized as the attempt to obtain an in-depth understanding of the meaning and "definition of the situation" presented by informants, rather than the production of a quantative "measurement" of their characteristics or behaviour.

According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 3) qualitative research involves the use and collection of a variety of empirical materials, for example, case studies, personal experiences, life stories, interviews, observations, historical, interactional and visual texts - things that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals

lives" (English *et al* 2006: 313). By using this research approach the researcher wanted to get an in-depth understanding of the knowledge of police trainees about crowd control issues.

Byrne (2001: 1) pointed out that qualitative methods seek to represent holism and to provide contextual knowledge of the phenomenon being studied. One goal of qualitative research is to increase understanding of phenomenon as opposed to generalizing data extrapolated from the sample to the population at large. The qualitative researcher's responsibility includes providing enough description about the context of the sample so that others may adequately judge whether the findings apply to their own situations.

In line with this, the researcher has collected information from the trainees who were undergoing training and trainers, who have trained trainees in the first phase of the basic training Learning Programme. Information was also gathered from members of the Public Order Police who are well-trained in crowd management, as well as the Training Manager (Public Order Police) from Port Elizabeth. The Training Manager from the Public Order Police revealed knowledge about how police officials should be trained to deal with crowd management and unrest related incident in an effective manner.

2.3 FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS

In a group interview one is expected to act as a facilitator and manager of the discussion. The interview is likely to be relatively unstructured and to be fairly free-flowing, although of course where the facilitator uses these methods for particular themes which he wishes to explore (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2000: 268).

This type of interview allowed the opportunity for the participants to give their own views in a comfortable environment. This also allowed the theme to be specified in order to prevent the discussion from going off the focus set to be discussed. Two focus groups were interviewed for this research and consisted of two platoons of 36 trainees at the training institution. The learners were current trainees undergoing basic training at the institutions. Participants were asked to share their experience regarding crowd

management incidents with the researcher. Few trainees participated and attempted to share their knowledge of crowd management.

The interview is a very important method of data collection in qualitative research that aims to understand the participant's perspective (English *et al* 2006: 318). The focus group interviews allowed the researcher to listen to answers of the trainees that was presented by the researcher. The researcher obtained knowledge of what the lack of information and training was regarding the handling of unrest related incidents.

The researcher utilized an informal guideline from the Public Order Police (POP) trainers to obtain the most basic principles when handling crowd management incidents. The principles were used by the researcher to determine the level of knowledge the trainers learning programme's provided to trainees on how to handle crowd management related incidents. A topic that was reflected was whether the trainees would know how to handle a crowd management. The reaction was almost non-existent; few participants reported that POP units dealt with these incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

From the information received it was relatively clear they were not sure what was expected from them. Another topic raised in these interviews was the knowledge trainees had regarding policies and procedures of crowd management.

The checklist contained the following items to be identified, to find out what the situation is; to find out if the crowd has permission to have the gathering; if the police officials on the scene have the basic skills to deal with the gathering until the Public Order Police (POP) arrives; and, do the members know how to utilize the correct equipment when dealing with crowds.

The participation during these group interviews indicated the lack of knowledge that trainees had, due to them not being exposed to crowd management training. The training presented to them concentrated on the manual and the information on crowd management that was theoretically available (Van Vuuren, 2013).

2.4 PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Informal and unstructured interviews were used with identified trainers and police officials from the Public Order Police (POP). Semi-structured interviews were used with trainees. In a semi-structured interview the interviewer plans a number of set questions for each respondent but also has sufficient flexibility with each respondent to develop particular questions arising from the interview (English *et al* 2006: 314).

This method allowed the information to be based on the experience of the trainees, who were currently undergoing training, the trainers who have presented training, as well as the police officials who have been trained some time ago, and who have been exposed to the policing of unrest related incidents.

The abovementioned groups both have made valuable input because they all were directly involved in training, trainees were undergoing training and the trainers have presented the training. The discussions were focused and informative data was gathered.

Personal interviews were conducted with 100 trainees at the SAPS Training Institution Mthatha who were undergoing basic training at the institution. The questions were structured to identify the actions the trainees thought would be appropriate in dealing with when handling a crowd management situation. The researcher tested the knowledge of the trainees on which equipment they would utilize to deal with crowd management and unrest related incidents. The questions were structured to address the trainees' basic knowledge regarding crowd management and unrest related incidents.

The researcher also interviewed nine trainers from the institution who have presented training to the trainees. The interviews with the trainers were informal and unstructured and their knowledge of dealing with crowd management and unrest incidents were also tested. The trainers were also questioned regarding the equipment utilized during crowd management and unrest incidents and how this equipment could be used.

The Training Manager from POP: Port Elizabeth was interviewed; he was responsible for the training of police members to manage the crowds at the FIFA 2010 World Cup. The Training Manager is seen as an expert and therefore the interview with him resulted in a

clear understanding of how the current training of crowd management is implemented. The appointment was made with the Training Manager in Port Elizabeth.

The Training Manager of the institution was interviewed to identify the knowledge that was given to trainees with regard to crowd management and unrest related incidents. This interview was not structured and the Training Manager was allowed to give all the information on the topic he felt would be informative to the researcher.

In addition to these, five members of the POP were also interviewed, and two trainers of the POP: Mthatha were interviewed with regard to their knowledge of the management of crowds and the handling of unrest related incidents.

These interviews that were held with the POP members were to identify what according to them was the action required from a POP member when dealing with a crowd management or unrest incident. They were also questioned how they feel SAPS members at station levels were assisting when dealing with crowd management and unrest incidents and what was the results of their actions.

The comparison allowed the researcher the opportunity to determine what the lack of training currently is and what training can be provided to trainees to be trained in unrest related incidents after completing the first phase of the learning programme. The subject discussed was focused and knowledgeable.

The purpose of the interviews was explained to each respondent. They were informed that they would be asked specific questions that they could answer to the best of their knowledge. The respondents were informed the interviews were confidential and were possible recorded and notes were taken by the researcher.

Permission was granted from the Head Basic Training, Major General S. Nyalungu to conduct the research at the Mthatha Training Institution. (Annexure A1 to A4).
Permission was obtained to interview the trainees at the Training Institution by the Commander of the Institution, Colonel M.E. Ntunja (see Annexure A5).

The questionnaire that was used as a guideline for trainees and trainers is attached (Annexure A6) and the one for interviewing the experienced POP members (Annexure A7). These groups all have made a valuable input, as both their primary functions were training, trainees were being trained and trainers have presented training. The POP members input were valuable due to their experience in dealing with crowd management and unrest related incidents.

2.5   OBSERVATION

The researcher has made use of structured observation at the training institution. This method has allowed the collection of data at the time they occur in their natural setting. According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000: 232), there was no need to depend on "second-hand" accounts of phenomena from respondents who put their own interpretation on events.

Observing the situation, as stated allowed the information to be valuable, because it is how the training was currently being presented. Being an observer allowed the researcher to identify the gaps in training more clearly and also the opportunity to observe where improvement could be made.

Observation was done in classes were Physical and Street Survival classes were being presented, at the training institution. The researcher observed by taking place in the back of the classroom away from the trainees and the trainer. There were no interaction between the researcher and the class. Notes were taken of what was seen and heard. The observation allowed the observer first hand methods of training that was used by trainers and what effect this had on the trainees.

During the researcher's observation in the Physical and Street Survival classes, there was no training provided in how to manage crowds or unrest related incidents. No role-play was introduced in any form that could assist trainees on the equipment they could use during crowd management or how to use this equipment. The only item practically introduced to trainees was the tonfa. However the trainees were very well trained in handling the tonfa and performing arrest techniques.

2.6 DOCUMENT ANALYSES

Documentation in the form of newspapers, BI (Business Information Systems), reports and statements of SAPS were collected for the research. Reports from the SAPS BI System were utilized to corroborate information. The evaluation reports from the Monitor and Evaluation at the training institution was also utilized to be analyzed. The compact disk (hardcopy) of crowd management training that was presented by the Training Manager of Public Order Police: Port Elizabeth, Lieutenant Meiring was also viewed and analyzed on training presented to all members who performed duties at the Soccer World Cup 2010.

2.7 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Delimitation was needed ensuring the manageability of this study. The geographic parameters were set as the researcher has limited the research to the Mthatha Training Institution. This institution is one of five new training institutions that were established in 2005 and presents basic training to trainees.

Mthatha is one of five new basic training institutions that were established in 2005. Mthatha is situated in the Eastern Cape; the other training institution in Eastern Cape is All Saints. In the Western Cape there is Phillipi and in Kwazulu Natal the new institution is at Ulundi. The one opened in the Free State is Thabong. All training institutions use the same manuals and training for the training of basic training trainees. Although there are four different training institutions in the Eastern Cape, the information gathered at Mthatha was sufficient to get a clear understanding of what is presented at the institutions.

2.8 TARGET POPULATION

As mentioned before, the target population is the Mthatha Training Institution.
Mthatha had 23 trainers. The trainers were responsible to give training in three different areas, namely (i) Academic issues, (ii) Physical training issues, and (iii) Weapon training.

These trainers had presented 9 classes per day and each class (platoon) had between 32 and 36 trainees. At the institution there were 6 platoons. All Basic Training Institutions follows the same block programme.

The samples that were used were "purposive sampling" and "convenience sampling". The Quality Research Methods: Data Collector's Field Guide (2002: 5), describes Purposive sampling, as one of the most common sampling strategies, groups participants according to preselected criteria relevant to a particular research question (Mack *et al* 2009:9). Convenience samples are not selected randomly because they are easy to find (Vogt 1993; English *et al* 2006: 299).

The trainers and trainees were easily accessible and conveniently available at the training institution. Convenience sampling (sometimes known as "grab" or "opportunity sampling") is a type of non-probability sampling which involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population which is close at hand. That is, a sample population is selected because it is readily available and convenient. However, the researcher using such a sample cannot scientifically make generalizations about the total population from this sample because it would not be representative enough (Gosset, 2002: 10)

The trainees that were trained were available and easily accessible and were willing to participate in the research. The trainees had the expectation of being trained correctly to handle all incidents when working at police stations.

The focus groups of two platoons consisting of 36 trainees were selected at the institution that was currently undergoing basic training. The Monitor and Evaluation components of each institution had an Assessment tool that was used to evaluate the results of all trainees.

Nine trainers were selected who have presented the first phase of basic training. The trainers were responsible to train the trainees, it was therefore important to select the trainers to participate in the research. Semi-structured interviews were also held with 100 trainees who were currently undergoing basic training.

A purposive sampling is one technique often employed in qualitative investigation. With a purposive non-random sample the numbers of people interviewed are less important than the criteria used to select them. The characteristics of individuals are used as the basis of selection, most often chosen to reflect the diversity and breadth of the sample population (Wilmot, 2005: 3). The participants that were used were mostly trainees; the reason was that they were currently being trained at the institution. The researcher's goal was to determine the lack of knowledge and skills they had and therefore their input was significant to determine the gap and the needs that existed with regards to handling crowd management and unrest related incidents.

Unstructured and informal individual interviews were held with the Training Manager from Mthatha Training Institution and the other with the Training Manager of POP: Port Elizabeth. There is only one Training Manager, at the Training Institution; therefore he was selected to participate in the research. The Training Manager of POP: Port Elizabeth, who is considered an expert in the field of training, was interviewed, as a source of important information. The Training Manager of Public Order Police: Port Elizabeth was interviewed due to his expertise of presenting crowd management training to members for the preparation of the Soccer World Cup 2010. All this gathered information was valuable input regarding the training of trainees in this research.

Unstructured and informal individual interviews were also held with five operational police officials who were working at the Public Order Police. All these members' primary functions were the policing of crowd management and unrest incidents. Their input was valuable to the research, in order to understand what the problems and frustrations with policing of unrest related incidents are, and how their training assisted them in that.

The Public Order Police members were easy accessible and ninety percent of the personnel were operational members. The first five available operational members were selected to participate in the research. The "availability" of these members or not is a good example why the researcher's sampling method is called "convenient sampling". The operational members of the Public Order Police all have operational experience in

the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents, the selection to be interviewed was to be the criteria of the research conducted.

2.9 DATA ANALYSIS

The data that was collected and analysed was used to identify the knowledge of the trainees and trainers with regard to crowd management and unrest related incidents; the current training methods used at the institution and the lack of training or not with regards to crowd management and unrest related incidents.

In the qualitative method of data analysis the basic element is the ability to collect data; interpret, criticize and provide a balanced argument on critical issues that underline the study.

The data was analysed by implementing some of the insights gained from the Tesch 8 step process analysis (Technikon SA 2001: 62)
- Get a sense of the whole.
- Read carefully and identify the meaning.
- Make a list of topics and cluster them together.
- Code the information.
- Classify them by grouping them together.
- Make final decisions and alphabetize the codes.
- Put groups together and do preliminary analysis.
- Recode the necessary.

Step one in the data analysis process was to gather an overview of the knowledge of trainees that were currently being trained and their knowledge of the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. All interviews were summarized and read to obtain a better understanding of the information (Lincoln & Guba, 1989).

This information obtained by the researcher is based upon the 100 trainees that participated in the personal interviews. This information gave the researcher insight into

the knowledge levels of the trainees that were interviewed and to their knowledge about crowd management and unrest related incidents.

The trainers were also interviewed to determine the training that was provided to trainees and if it contributed to assist trainees in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. The POP members were interviewed to get an understanding of what they felt was important for police officials to know when dealing with crowds and how the members of the station performed when not having relevant crowd management training.

The Training Manager from the Mthatha Training Institution was interviewed to gain knowledge as he was seen as an expert in basic training, the researcher wanted to gain his knowledge on how he felt, crowd management training would assist trainees, if introduced during basic training. The Training Manager of POP Port Elizabeth was interviewed because he was responsible for the training of members for the Soccer World Cup 2010. His knowledge of training members in crowd management had assisted to identify the lack of training provided to trainees during basic training (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Step two; the interviews were grouped together on specific themes, current situation in South Africa with regard to crowd management and the handling of unrest related incidents, the knowledge of the trainees, the knowledge of the Public Order Police members, opinions of the experts in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. This information gave the researcher important information to access the lack of knowledge and training in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents.

Step three, the related themes from the interviews were marked and clustered together in the relevant categories. The different levels of knowledge were clustered together (Lincoln & Guba, 1989). The researcher performed this clustering after each interview was held with the different interview groups (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In the fourth step, the different levels of knowledge regarding in the handling of crowd

management and unrest related incidents were grouped together. The information from the trainees and trainers were separated from that of the Public Order Police members Units and the experts.

The first group was the trainees and trainers according to their knowledge with regard the crowd management and unrest related incidents. The second group, the Public Order Police members, these members primary functions were the managing of crowds and the handling of unrest related incidents.

The third group was the expert's opinion. The main themes, what knowledge and techniques did police trainees have in dealing with crowd management and the handling of unrest related incidents. What knowledge does Public Order Police have with the management and the handling of unrest related incidents?

What are the opinions of the experts with regard to the managing of crowds and unrest related incidents. These topics were supported by newspaper, internet articles and training material from the trainees and the Training manuals of Public Order Police members.

The research outcomes were grouped together as follow:
- Was there a lack of knowledge and techniques in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents by the trainees that were currently being trained at the training institutions;
- What is the gap of knowledge and techniques in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents with regard to the trainees currently undergoing basic training;
- What can be done to improve the lack of knowledge and experience identified by trainees currently undergoing basic training?

This process was followed by the researcher during the collecting of information. The researcher followed this process to assist her when compiling the research, and to ensure that all relevant information was kept together (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In step five, the feedback with regard to the management and handling of unrest related incidents were identified, and the different opinions and reasons were grouped together. This was done by the response of the different categories (Lincoln & Guba, 1989). All

sources collected during the research by the researcher were grouped together to assist the researcher to do correct references when compiling the research (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Step six, the categories were alphabetically arranged. The three themes were divided, trainees and trainers, the opinions of the experts with regard to the handling of crowd and unrest related incidents. The responses from the groups were grouped together (Lincoln & Guba, 1989). All sources collected during the research by the researcher were given a reference number; this was once again to assist the researcher to refer to the relevant sources during the compiling of the research (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Step seven, the reason for the lack of knowledge and skills in the managing of crowds and unrest related incidents by trainees were listed, then the experience and knowledge from the Public Order Police. The expert's opinions and views gave the researcher vital information and guidance on how these gaps of training trainees during basic training could close the gaps with regard to the handling of crowds and unrest related incidents. During the research process the researcher made relevant notes of what information indicated the lack of training for trainees when being trained during basic training with regard to the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Step eight, the recording of the necessary information collected was made during interview, observation and information collected on all topics related to crowd management and unrest related incidents. Some interviews were done with a tape recorder and others were done by notes. The researcher utilized this process to assist in having all the relevant information grouped together, in order to assist when compiling the research (Van Vuuren, 2013).

2.10 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS / CHALLENGES

There were a number of factors that have complicated the study. The problems were as follow: appointments for interviews, application to conduct study, language and cultural issues, and the recording of the interviews.

2.10.1 Appointments for interviews

The interviews with the trainers were also difficult due to the Passing out parade of the SAPS Training Institution Mthatha; the trainers were all involved in the practice of the parade.

The other factor that complicated the arranging of interviews was the FIFA World Cup; all the Public Order Police members were deployed at the major events of the matches. Directly after this event, the members were busy with the handling of strikes, protest marches that the Teachers Union started in the whole of South Africa. Some role players were not all available and members who have performed the same roles were identified to assist in this research.

2.10.2 Application to conduct the research from the Head Basic Training

The trainees were undergoing basic training, and due to their tight programme the researcher needed permission from the Head Basic Training to interview the trainees. The application had to go to the researcher's immediate Commander, the Commander of the SAPS Training Institution Mthatha, and then only to the Head Basic Training, this took a sometime to be approved. The process of the application led to the researcher to reschedule all the interviews with trainees.

2.10.3 Language and cultural issues

Although the mother tongue of the researcher is Afrikaans, all interviews were conducted in English. Most of the respondents were Zulu speakers followed by Xhosa speakers. From the respondents have struggled to express themselves in English but they have tried and the researcher believes that she got their precise view.

Although the trainers were mostly Xhosa speakers, followed by English speakers, the researcher believes that she could obtain accurate information. The Public Order Police members were mostly Xhosa speaking, followed by Afrikaans, and this has allowed the researcher to get their more precise information. The questions to the respondents were in English and she has made use of an interpreter to translate at times when it was necessary.

However, the language and cultural barrier was basically overcome by using sufficient

time for people to express their view, and to ask questions and to allow questions to be asked to clarify matters. The interpreters were very helpful and could address members in their own vernacular where and when necessary to clarify what the researcher was doing and requesting from them.

2.10.4 Recording of interviews

The interview for the Training Manager, POP: Port Elizabeth was not recorded due to the researcher not having the tape recorder available. The researcher struggled to get an appointment with the Training Manager, and when that has materialized she had to improvise and allow more semi-informal talk about the training issues. However, this was very valuable and she could easily comprehend what was said.

When listening to some of the recorded interviews and compiling notes the researcher found that the answers of few trainees indicated that they knew what was going to be discussed. This indicated to the author that the topics were discussed by the trainees before she had interviewed them. They could have heard this from the other trainees that were already interviewed. This is seen as a good thing because it shows that the police trainees are working as a group and group solidarity is one very important factor when doing crowd control (Ras, 2013).

2.11 THE RESEARCHER'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE RESEARCH

The researcher is an experienced policewoman who is serving in the SAPS for the past 23 years. She was based at the Public Order Police: Port Elizabeth from 1993 to 2004. During this time she performed the following duties:

2.11.1 Section Leader (Sergeant):
- Responsible for crowd management, policing of peaceful and unrest related incidents in the Nelson Mandela Metro (Port Elizabeth);
- Crime Prevention, performing duties as an operational member;
- Operation Centre duties, management of all systems, Firearm circulation system, Vehicle circulation system and Criminal Record System to provide information requested from operational members;

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- IRIS, capturing of all information regarding crowd management and crime prevention activities at the unit.

2.11.2 Operational Centre Co-ordinator (Warrant Officer)

(Nodal Point: Crime Analysis):

- Manage and upkeep of crime prevention operations in the Nelson Mandela Metro;
- Managing of statistical resources relating to crime operations in the Nelson Mandela Metro;
- Managing and capturing of Crowd Management Unit: PE, arrests, seizures and incidents on the BI and IRIS system;
- Capturing of all Operational plans in the Nelson Mandela Metro on BI and IRIS systems;
- Managing of data integrity by comparing all successes on the BI Systems with IRIS system;
- Consolidating monthly reports of all information regarding arrests, seizures and crowd management incidents in the Nelson Mandela Metro to Provincial Office;
- Training of members to perform duties in the Operational centre.

2.11.3 Operational Centre Co-ordinator

(Operational Centre)

- Capturing successes and operations on the BI systems;
- Obtain and compile Operational Plans for all events in the Nelson Mandela Metro;
- Keep record of all incidents taking in the JOC (Joint operational centre) and VOC (Venue operational centre) venues, and ensure that the incidents are capture on the IRIS system.
- Ensure the reporting of all crowd management events, sport events and music events.

The researcher was promoted to the rank of a Captain in 2005 and appointed as the Human Resource Manager at the Mthatha Training Institution. During this time she performed the following duties:

- Managing and coordinating of Personnel Service duties;

- Managing and coordinating of Career Management duties;
- Managing of the Skills Development Facilitator;
- Disciplinary and Grievance Officer
- Labour Relations Officer

In 2012 the researcher was appointed as a Lieutenant Colonel and is currently performing duties as a Support Manager at the Operational and Tactical Academy Addo.
She is responsible for the following components:

- Managing and completion of Support Service administrative functionaries;
- Ensure the management of Career and Skills Development administrative functions;
- Ensure the management of Personnel Services
- Ensure the management of Supply Chain administrative functionaries;
- Ensure the management of Finance and administrative functionaries;
- Ensure the management of the MESS functionaries;
- Monitor and control performance and the utilization of human and physical resources

The researcher's husband Captain MC van Vuuren participated in the research and at the time of the interview was the Information Manager at Public Order Police: Mthatha. Captain van Vuuren has 24 years' service in the SAPS and has joined the Public Order Police in Port Elizabeth in 1990 to 2004 and was then transferred to the Public Order Police unit in Mthatha were he performed duties until 2009. In 2009 Captain van Vuuren performed duties at the Mqanduli Cluster as the Vispol Coordinator. In 2012 he returned to Public Order Police: Port Elizabeth where he is still currently performing duties as a Platoon Commander. Captain van Vuuren has 22 years of experience in working at the Public Order Policing.
Captain van Vuuren has completed the following Crowd Management training:
- Unrest and Crowd Control (Basic);
- Internal Stability Protection Course;
- Public Order Police Entry Course;
- Crowd Management on Section level;

- FLOM (First Line Operational Manager Course MOD 2;

The researcher decided to conduct this research after she started performing duties at the Mthatha Training Institution. Although the researcher was appointed as a Human Resource Manager all officers were tasked to perform standby duties. During these duties the researcher would have to do visits to the institution, this allowed the researcher to observe the different kind of training that was taking place. The researcher identified that there were not any crowd management equipment introduced to the trainees and at this point the researcher came to the conclusion that there seem to be a gap in the training of trainees to perform duties in crowd management and unrest related incidents.

The researcher as indicated in her duties at the Public Order Police Public Order Police has experience in all fields of crowd management. She had performed duties at ground level as a Section leader who was responsible for the handling of crowds and unrest incidents. The researcher was well experienced in the duties in the Operational Centre where the planning was done for all crowd management events, sport events and music events.

It was this experience that resulted in the researcher identifying the need for crowd management training to be integrated in the curriculum of basic training.

2.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Belmont Report proposes that human subjects in research be specifically considered in terms of beneficence, respect for their human dignity and justice (Hagan 1997: 42). Research ethics deals with the interaction between researchers and people they study. Professional ethics deals with additional issues such as collaborative relationships among researchers, mentoring relationships, intellectual property, fabrication of data, and plagiarism, amongst others (Mack *et al* 2009: 8)

Whenever research is conducted on people, the well-being of research participants must be a priority. The research question is always of secondary importance. This means that if a choice must be made between doing harm to a participants and doing harm to the research, it is the research that is sacrificed (Mack *et al* 2009: 8).

This research has dealt with police officials and the researcher has adhered to the code of conduct of the South African Police Service (Sections 70 & 71 of the Police Act 68, 1998). Three core principles, originally articulated in The Belmont Report, form the universally accepted bases for research ethics (Mack *et al* 2009: 9).

The researcher has always tried to respect all participants in this research and to treat them in a dignified manner. Respect for persons requires a commitment to ensuring the autonomy of research participants, and, where autonomy may be diminished, to protect people from exploitation of their vulnerability. The dignity of all research participants must be respected. Adherence to principle ensures that people will not be used simply a means to achieve research objectives (Mack *et al* 2009: 9).

In the training environment the trainees are in the process of becoming police officials, but the trainees still need to be respected and treated in a dignified manner. The researcher has tried as far as possible, and on all occasions, to do just that. She was always conscious of the fact that she must act in a mature and responsible manner and that she must respect the views and opinions of those that she had interviewed.

The privacy of the members (Act 108 0f 1996, section 14) were respected and they were not forced in any manner whatsoever to participate if they did not want to, despite the fact that the police has a rank system, and the researcher at that time had a higher rank (Captain) than the police trainees (no ranks).

Informed consent is a mechanism for ensuring that people understand what it means to participate in a particular research study so they can decide in a conscious, deliberate way whether they want to participate or not. Informed consent is one of the most important tools for ensuring respect for persons during research (Mack *et al* 2009: 9). The people participating in the research should be informed of the purpose of the research and how much time will be required. The researcher should also inform all participants that their participation is voluntarily and all information gathered from them is confidential. The researcher has done that and has explained to all participants the nature of this study and they had the opportunity to participate or not. The respondents here have orally (verbally)

given their consent and an opportunity was given for them to ask any questions before data was gathered. They were all very helpful and because there were no personal risks involved in the research, the respondents were actually eager to be involved.

The participation of all members was free and voluntarily, and they could also ask any questions to the researcher during the whole data gathering process. In fact, they have realized the necessity to be well-informed about the issues surrounding crowd control and unrest related incidents because, at the end of the say, they are busy with police training, and they know that their lives, may at times, be at stake when doing crowd control.

The more they know and learn through training and through their participation in the researcher's interview sessions, the more they realized they would benefit on the long run. The researcher was privileged that she was based at the time of the data gathering at Mthatha's police training college or institution and that she could obtain the assistance of the trainees and trainers in a voluntarily and helpful manner. They were also happy to participate as far as she could assess.

2.12 SUMMARY

Chapter Two started with an introduction (section 2.1), the research approach and design (section 2.2), attention was paid to focus group interviews (section 2.3), personal interviews (section 2.4), observation (section 2.5), document analyses (section 2.6), and the delimitation of the study was pointed out (section 2.7).

Other matters that have received attention were: the target population (section 2.8), data analysis (section 2.9), the practical problems/challenges (section 2.10), and ethical considerations (section 2.11). A qualitative approach was followed by the researcher to gather all her data and she has tried to do that at all times in an ethical-responsible manner as far as possible in line with the new constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 2, Bill of Rights) and the code of conduct of the South African Police Services.

CHAPTER THREE

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CROWD CONTROL AND BASIC POLICE TRAINING AT MTHATHA TRAINING INSTITUTION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

South Africa currently faces a situation where a normal policeman no longer primarily concentrate on crime prevention, but is hugely exposed to unrest related incidents and handling of crowds. When people gather together to display their dissatisfaction, whether it is for poor service delivery or higher wages, these gatherings need to be legal, but if there is no prior application for permission to have a gathering, the gathering is regarded as unlawful. The SAPS members will need to manage this gathering according to the relevant policies and procedures, in order to perform these duties it is important to have the knowledge on how to deal with the different gatherings.

In the past the SAPS had a huge capacity in terms of Public Order Police members, who could handle unrest and crowd management situations, but during 1992 these units were seriously affected by units' closures and the cutting of manpower (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CROWD CONTROL

The creation of a specialised riot control function within South Africa's policing agencies was essentially a reaction to the disorder and political unrest associated with resistance to apartheid. Although the name and structures of the units tasked with this specialist function changed a number of times during the three decades under examination, and the functions were devolved to the various other policing agencies in homeland and self-governing territories, their essential roles remained the same namely the enforcement of apartheid laws, the suppression of political protest and the prevention of "unrest, intimidation and unrest-related crimes" (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 1).

The fact that the creation of a specialised riot control function was seen as an essential function indicated the need that police had to address the disorder and political unrest during this period of time. The SAPS acknowledged that there was a need for some kind

of pro-active approach to deal with the disorder and political unrest and as indicated although the name of the unit were changed at times, the task has remained the same (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The period as investigated under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was framed for examples at each end, by events involving the policing of crowds. From the time of t Sharpeville in 1960, up to the inauguration of President Mandela in 1994, and up to today, we were/are bombarded in the media by examples of crowd control issues.

A juxtaposition of the events of Sharpeville and Mandela (1994) symbolises the changing demands on the police in respect of gatherings, and the shift in police methods for managing crowds in South Africa. Between them, thousands of incidents of public disorder took place; of which, symbolically, the most significant have been the occasional mass killings by police, which act as period markers in the history of South African violence (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 2).

Looking back at previous gatherings and how it was managed and the current approach of the SAPS, they clearly have come a long way in improving their approach. Police officials are obliged to respect the human rights of all people and are at all times encouraged to use the minimum force. Mass killings that were committed in the past during police operations are something that the police now would avoid at all cost. However it is extremely important to realize that in order to prevent this kind of actions, police officials need to be aware of what the use of minimum force is and how they can implement this effectively (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.1 THE BEGINNING OF THE 1960'S

The banning of political parties and imprisonment of leaders at the beginning of the 1960's effectively reduced levels of domestic public protest against apartheid for the rest of the decade. This was one reason why no specialised anti-riot unit was established inside the South African Police in the early years of apartheid. The main "threat" to the political system was deemed to be coming from liberation struggles and nascent democracies in neighbouring states; resulting in large numbers of policemen being posted for duty on South Africa's borders and beyond (another reason). This was derived from

the belief that the liberation struggle in South Africa would follow similar pattern to Rhodesia (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 4).

Early on, the policing of unrest related incidents was equated with war, an ideological confluence which continued until the 1990's, as demonstration by the assertion in a UNISA Police Science Study Guide in use in the early 1990's saying that the principles of (crowd) control are "based on principles of warfare". Riot control was simple seen as part of "counter-insurgency", which was required to defend the apartheid government from perceived external enemies. Protests were believed to be organised by "communist agitators" (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 4).

Once again, UNISA's study found has stated that "urban terrorists work in a number of ways including inciting general public unrest. The task of the police in combating terrorism is considerably complicated by the expansion of this new phenomenon (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 4). The history of public protests is an important source for research because it will assist in identifying how the police were handling these situations. It will also assist in designing pro-active approaches in order to avoid the mistakes of the past and for the SAPS to deliver better community services (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.2 THE EARLY 1970'S

In the 1970's, as resistance to apartheid grew, the police began to see the need for a specialised capacity to "crowd unrest". The SAPS embarked on international research and introduced new training methods and full-time riot control units. The approach continued to be informed by the experience of war, with new training methods aimed at creating "shock troops" that could open the way for other police operations. The SAP was not equipped to deal with domestic uprisings of the scale that they had face in June 1976 (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 4).

The policemen who had faced massive protest marches at the time were ordinary police officials drawn from nearby stations, possessing no special skills or training in handling crowds. The lack of capacity was reflected in their tendency to use maximum force (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 4). The SAPS are currently facing the same challenges.

The Public Order Police units were drastically decreased, and there is a lack of skills for police officials at station level to do crowd management and to handle unrest related

incidents. It is therefore of utmost importance that the police take some kind of action to address the current situation. South Africa is experiencing an increase in protest marches and strikes due to poor service deliveries (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.3 THE LATE 1970'S

The late 1970's saw the police re-conceptualising and re-organising themselves to deal with growing "unrest". Part of this preparation has involved the enhancement of "riot control" functions; others (dealt with elsewhere in the TRC) involved the strengthening of the security police and the formation of death squads. The late 1970's and early 1980's also saw creation of the Bantustan police forces, each of which followed the SAPS in establishing some sort of specialised riot control capacity (Rauch &Storey, 1998: 4). The need for a specialist group of police officials to deal with crowds was identified. This specialised group was tasked to receive special training to perform their duties. However, training was not the only need that was identified, the SAPS management also felt to develop training programmes that could be used to handle crowd management incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.4 THE 1980'S

The 1980's saw a new wave of large-scale unrest, again involving school children; whom escalated into the popular campaign against black local authorities and tricameral constitution. It also saw the launch of the UDF in 1984. Increased levels of political mobilisation and resistance fed into an escalating cycle of action and reaction by the security forces (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 5).

The role of the police was increasingly defined as controlling riots and unrest (which included arson, intimidation, public violence and killings in black townships) and defending the interest of the white minority. This meant in practice that traditional police functions in respect of crime were neglected, and police resources were concentrated on the enforcement of apartheid policies and repression of dissidents (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 5) said the primary task of the police is to prevent group formation and concomitant rioting.

The current situation in South Africa allows all people to be treated according to the Bill of Rights. These rights include the right to life; to be treated with respect and the right to

live in a safe and secure environment, to name few of the many rights people have. The primary function of the SAPS is to protect and service the people; therefore the prevention of crime is extremely important and cannot be neglected. The SAPS members should constantly be trained in respecting the right's of the people, this will assist them to handle every situation in the most effective and efficient manner possible (Van Vuuren, 2013).

During the 1980's riot were expanded and police members doing this were removed from "normal" police work. Resources were also concentrated around this increasingly new central role of the police. This was in direct contrast to reforms being made to public order policing methods elsewhere in the democratic world at this time. The introduction of troops to quell unrests in the townships in 1984 was a key moment in the history of crowd control in South Africa, unequivocally signifying a military approach to public protest.

The deployment of troops, to quell unrest provided a context for more heavy-handed policing in the townships and it also enabled the police to follow in the more repressive footsteps of the army. The army had few options during this period in its range of tactics other than the use of lethal force, whereas the police should have had more alternatives (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 5).

It was in this period of high crisis, that arguments for a new approach to the policing of gatherings began to emerge. This new approach was characterised by its authors as a "3 rd force" model, based on the CRS approach taken in France, and it proposed the creation of a new force or agency to deal with large-scale public disorder (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 5).

3.2.5 TRADITIONAL PUBLIC ORDER POLICING

Traditional public order policing philosophy in South Africa was based on the notion of "control". It was essentially a reactive doctrine, which entailed either preventing crowds from forming or, breaking then up. Control was achieved through the threatened, or actual, application of force. The traditional repressive approach to crowd control relied on the construction and maintenance of a suitable distance between the police and those

in the crowd. Police personnel were heavily armed and relied on armoured vehicles for their own protection (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 14).

Very few other protective measures were put in place, thus, in instances, for example where the distance between the police and the crowd was breached, the police would be faced with three tactical options: to withdraw; to remain protecting within the vehicles and do nothing else; or to use force to disperse the crowd and recreate the distance (or a combination of all three) (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 14).

The SAPS currently encourages and train members to communicate with the leaders in the crowd. The SAPS strive to gain the trust of the community because; this will assist when the crowd becomes unruly and endanger the lives of others. There is no doubt in the researcher's mind that this training should be introduced to all police officials, starting at basic training (Van Vuuren, 2013). According to Shaw, few issues are more central to the future of a democratic country than the maintenance of public order. To maintain civil order and personal security for all South Africans is a very important part of what it means to be a democratic society (Shaw & Meyer 1999: 1).

3.2.6 THE PERIOD AFTER 2 FEBRUARY 1990

Since 2 February 1990, South Africa has been caught up in the vortex of transition. It has been a time of turbulence, uncertainty and of rivalry between contenders for political power. It has been a time when mass rallies and marches have become increasingly important political tools. It has been a time which places a sharp focus on the role of the police in exercising control over such rallies and marches, in keeping the balance between order and anarchy, and in holding the ring between political antagonists (Meyer, 1999: 1). The police have been severely criticised in their managing and handling of these rallies and marches (Van Vuuren, 2013).

It is alleged, inter alia, by both the ANC and IFP that the police have shown a preference for the other party, have stood on the sidelines and failed to act against the perpetrators of violence, and to have used excessive force in dispersing peaceful protest (Meyer, 1999: 1). This statement reflects that, since 1990 the role of the police was important and the way police dealt with crowds, was questioned. It raises the question if adequate training was presented to police officials in dealing with crowd management issues. The

community expected police officials to play the role of a peacemaker and to protect and to serve. It is also expected from police officials to always use minimum force when handling any situation when delivering a service (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.7 THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD

The government, in an attempt to terminate the violence which has already claimed many lives, led a National Peace Convention on 14 September 1991, which led to the drafting of a National Peace Accord. The purpose was to formulate a common purpose aimed at bringing an end to political violence in the country, and setting out the codes of conduct, procedures and mechanisms to achieve this goal. During the Peace Convention it was decided that the police service has a central role to play in the termination of violence and the prevention of future acts of violence. As a result of this, a Code of Conduct was formulated for the SAPS (Meyer, 1999: 1).

The Code of conduct inter alia states as follow, "...in order to achieve a safe and secure environment for all the people of South Africa we have undertaken to – with integrity, render a responsible and effective service of high quality which is accessible to every person and continuously strive towards improving this service..." (SAPS Code of Conduct).

In order for police officials to conduct themselves according to the Code of Conduct, they need to be equipped with relevant knowledge and equipment. All members of the police should be trained in the handling of all situations and they should be introduced to all the resources that would assist them in the handling of each individual situation. By doing this, a uniformed standard will be created and this will result in an enhancement of the Code of Conduct (Van Vuuren, 2013).

To further substantiate the intended purpose of structurally addressing violence, Chapter 5 (paragraph 5.12) of the National Peace Accord makes provision for the facilitation of crisis assistance that will link socio-economic development by, inter alia, dealing with the immediate effects of violence and the resulting social effects.

Furthermore, Chapter 6 of the National Peace Accord makes provision of Enquiry into the prevention of public violence and intimidation. In terms of the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 50 of 1991, the Commission's objective was to:

- Enquire into the phenomenon of public violence and intimidation in South Africa, its nature and causes and the identity of those people involved;

- Consider any steps that should be taken in order to prevent public violence and intimidation; and

- Make recommendation to the President regarding steps to prevent violence or intimidation.

The steps to prevent violence and intimidation, is an important tool for SAPS members as to what is expected from them when dealing with crowd management. The SAPS handling of crowds should be dealt with in a preventative manner in order to prevent situations from becoming unruly and violent. The SAPS is responsible for crowd management and to ensure that all people in South Africa is entitled to a free and safe environment, this includes being free from intimidation. Any person who contradicts these rights should be dealt with by members of SAPS (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.8 THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ORDER POLICING OF 1995

The first Minister of Safety and Security in the democratically elected government had faced a Constitutional requirement to create a national Public Order Policing unit as part of a new, integrated South African Police Service. To ensure that this requirement was met, and to affect a speedy process of reform to the policing of crowds, the new Police management established a Technical Committee on Public Order policing in April 1995.

The Committee's brief was to conduct research and generate proposals for, the transformation of the existing Internal Stability Division and the Riot Control Units of the various other police agencies in South Africa; and the introduction of a new system of public order policing based on the interim Constitution, the Minister's Policy Document, and the draft South African Police Services Act.

The committee completed its work and made a set of policy and organisational recommendations in July 1995. The new policy moved away from "crowd control" to "crowd management" as a conceptual framework for the role of the police with respect to public gatherings. It was designed to complement the new legal framework, and to take into account the rights of all citizens (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 19). The new approach to

crowds required an introduction of new training methods to all police officials. It is important for the management of the SAPS to empower all police officials with the necessary training, should policies and procedures change, on how the members should conduct themselves. Training should be constantly reviewed in order to assist in the introduction of new information (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.2.9 THE INTERNAL STABILITY DIVISION

Especially in policing and township circles, the name "stability unit" is well-known, especially for those who were been doing the strikes. Without repeating what has been said, it is necessary to make brief remarks on this division.

The law enforcement agency was compelled to move from suppressing violence to a more community participative approach of negotiation and facilitation in policing. New skills had to be acquired to identify situations with a high potential for violence and to assist groups in defusing volatile situations. This resulted in a more pragmatic approach to the maintenance of order rather than clinical law enforcement. In the process, the police's riot control capability was restructured on 1 January 1992 into the Internal Stability Division (ISD).

This division compromised of 36 Internal Stability Units deployed in ten regions. The main function of the ISD is the policing of unrest through proactive (preventive) and reactive measures and the prevention of crime in unrest-plagued areas. A high premium was placed on negotiation to defuse conflict (Meyer, 1999: 2). The importance of introducing preventative measures or proactive measures cannot be overemphasized. The primary function of the ISD was to defuse conflict. The SAPS should always attempt to negotiate before conflict occurs. This will be a better option rather than a conflict occurring which will result into injuries and damages to property (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Since the nature of their task was inherently public, the police units tasked with riot control played a prominent role as frontline "enforcers" of apartheid policies, and were viewed with a mixture of fear and loathing by the communities (townships) in which they had served. Although accurate figures are not available, it is likely that the riot control (and similar) units were responsible for a lot of police killings during the apartheid years (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 2).

The killings and fears referred to were caused by the role the SAPS played and to circumstances at the time. The SAPS has the responsibility to protect all citizens in South Africa and to use minimum force should a member of the community resist when being arrested. To put it in contexts it is important to remember that the police are there to protect the rights of all citizens. This includes the rights of the people who are demonstrating in a peaceful and unarmed manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The ISD units were para-military in nature (by way of training, operational understanding and culture), and brutal in the enforcement of bans on political protest. They operated within a policy paradigm that accepted and supported the lethal use of force. This, combined with the authorities' complete intolerance of protest action, meant that they frequently had used maximum force. As the external environment in which they operated took on the character of a low-intensity civil war, their training, equipment and methodology became increasingly militarised (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 2).

The South African police's riot control units before 1992 were isolated from the international advances that took place in the field of public order policing, and were unaware of the new strategies and techniques that other police services were implementing world-wide (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 2).

By the late 1980s, the old riot control units had attracted great controversy and numerous allegations of bias and brutality in which many of them had operated. This reputation, and their inability to fully adjust to the demands of the new political environment, led to calls from numerous communities and political movements for the total disbandment of the riot police, and also that of the Internal Stability Units that came into existence on 1 January 1992 (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 2).

In 1994 the Government of National Unity inherited a riot control capacity of approximately seventy two (72) units which were regarded as illegitimate, over-centralised, fragmented (into SAP and homeland forces), unaccountable, incident driven, and ill-equipped and not trained for the public order challenges which would face them during South Africa's transition to democracy (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 2).

3.2.10 PUBLIC ORDER UNITS AND AREA CRIME COMBATTING UNITS

The Public Order Units and the Area Crime Combating Units are specialist units that came into existence after 1995. Their task was to manage public protests and major events in line with the belief that the police must do "crowd management" and not "crowd control".

The term "POP" refers to the Public Order Police, "POPs" to the plural form indicating the different units, and the term ACCU is the abbreviation for the Area Crime Combating Unit. POP and ACCU is the same, but the name POP was first used, and then followed by ACCU. Both these names are still used today and the public is accustomed to see these names on police vehicles attached to this unit (Ras, 2013). During the research the units were called Public Order Police, this is also the currently the official name of the units.

Due to the shifting political climate of the country, and the units' historically negative status, public order policing underwent changes between 1995 and 2002. The implementation of changes was due to the nature of the actions of the units (Omar, 2006: 32). The handling of crowds shifted from crowd control to crowd management. Police actions during this period changed and this has required that police officials be trained in the correct processes and procedures (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In 1995 the Internal Stability Division and the Riot Control Units of the homeland police were merged under the new SAPS as part of the police's first transformation process. In 1997 the POP unit was formed and in order to conform to the country's newly adopted democratic values, emphasis was placed on crowd management as opposed to crowd control (Omar, 2006: 33). During crowd control police officials would take actions to restore order by using force. The police were now expected to interact with the crowds by starting a negotiation process. The reason for this was to resolve the matters the groups had without endangering the lives of people and to prevent damage to properties (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In 2002 the units were refined and SAPS Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management and Gatherings and Demonstrations was introduced. This document details the regulation of crowds in accordance with the principles of the Constitution. Despite the many changes,

the units' sole function continued to be the policing of major events and protest marches (Omar, 2006: 33). The Standing Order was important for all police officials. It was a guideline on how gatherings should be handled. The researcher is of the opinion that this information is not only important to members of POP, but to any police official performing duties at station level that might find themselves dealing with crowds (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In 2002 more changes and units were mandated to perform crime prevention and crime combating duties. The core function changed from crowd management to crime prevention. The restructuring also resulted in the change in name to Area Crime Combating Units. (This was a result of a decrease in gatherings and demonstrations (Omar, 2006: 33). As indicated, these units primary function were changed to crime prevention. It is important to take note that it was expected from these ACCU (POP) members to perform crime prevention duties.

In the mid 2006 the police announced a major restructuring of the entire organisation, which meant more changes to ACCU. The ACCU members were deployed at accounting stations, to assist the personnel the principles of teamwork, equipment and training programmes and to empower the stations. This was to increase crime prevention support (Omar, 2006: 33). The restructuring gave the police officials at station levels the opportunity to be introduced to ACCU members and the duties they perform, their training programmes and the equipment that they were using when they performed crowd management duties. The idea was that, should every police official be introduced to this kind of basic training programmes and equipment, there always will be enough police officials to deal with crowd management incidents in a professional manner, respecting the rights of all citizens (Van Vuuren 2013).

3.2.11 THE PRESENT SITUATION

Public Order Police (POP) is currently the official name for those responsible to ensure public order as well as doing crime prevention duties in policing areas. The primary task for POP units is crowd management situations and the secondary task is assisting stations with crime prevention duties.

3.3 OVERVIEW OF MTHATHA TRAINING INSTITUTION

The Mthatha Training Institution officially opened on the 1 of August 2005. The institution was officially opened by Commissioner Mala Singh, the Deputy National Commissioner who was then responsible for Training and Human Resource related matters in the South African Police Service. The Mthatha Training Institution was previously being used by the former Transkei Police (Skillsportal, 2006: 1).

The first Commander after the opening of the training institution was Senior Superintendent S.J Bierman who was appointed on 2005-08-01. Senior Superintendent S.J Bierman retired from the South African Police Service. The next Commander appointed was Senior Superintendent M.E Ntunja, who is still currently the Commander of the Mthatha Training Institution (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The division is regarded as a support service related division within the South African Police Service specially responsible for managing the Training Provision programmes, the conduct of Training Research and the development and maintenance of Training Standards in order to optimise the training capacity of both Police Act and Public Act personnel within the South African Police Service (INTRANET: SAPS TRAININGWEBSITE) 2012.

This training indicates the complete training of police officials to be able to handle any incidents and challenges when preventing crime. To manage or police a disruptive crowd is also a proactive measure to prevent crime. Disruptive incidents can result in the damage of public and private property and in serious cases the injury or death of another person (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4 TRAINING AT MTHATHA INSTITUTION

Training currently consists of Academic training, Physical training and Weapons skills. Academic training consists of attending classes and being assessed through Formative and Summative assessments. Physical training consist of physical fitness exercised, push ups, sit-ups and 2.4 km run and a skills and "fear" course that the trainees must complete. The trainees are assessed through Formative and Summative assessments to be declared competent.

The Weapon skills training exist of being able to shoot with a 9 mm; R5 and Shotgun during training. Trainees are trained in the handling of these fire-arms and taking them apart and placing them together again. The trainees are also evaluated on these exercises to be declared competent. Should the trainees not be declared competent in any of these areas, they are given an opportunity to re-do the assessment, this is remedial, and they are also granted the opportunity to receive remedial training from the trainers in the specific topic.

The researcher will be highlighting the information in the Learning Programmes that can assist trainees to handle crowd management or unrest related incidents. This information is an important source of knowledge on how to handle different incidents when preventing crime and protecting and serving the community in a professional manner.

The training consists of three different topics, academic training that consist of 11 different themes with modules divided under them. Attached (Annexure A8), find the layout of the different themes and modules, presented to trainees during their first phase of basic training. The other training presented is Physical training; this training will be discussed in the research. The last topics is Weapon training, where the trainees will be introduced to different fire arms and how to utilize them, this will also be discussed in this research (Van Vuuren, 2013).

This training is presented by two trainers per classroom of thirty six trainees. The trainers have a prescribed curriculum but still needs to prepare their own lesson plan. During the research the researcher studied all the prescribed books produced by Human Resource Development, which could contribute towards crowd management and unrest incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1 ACADEMIC TRAINING

The researcher will discuss each topic as a whole, however, highlighting the information that can assist trainees to handle crowd management or unrest related incidents. This information is an important source of knowledge on how to handle different incidents when preventing crime and protecting and serving the community in a professional manner. This information serves as guidelines and also gives them the knowledge of the

different laws that they need to know to perform their duties efficient and effectively (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1.1 LEARNING PROGRAMME 7: DIVISION HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2010

The first Learning Programme that indicates information than could assist trainees in responding to crowd management and unrest related incident was in Learning Programme 7 of 2010.

According to this Learning Programme 7, 2010, the Responsibility of role players in the Criminal Justice System is described as follow:

The Police Service normally becomes aware that a crime has been committed when a member of the public reports it to the police. It is also possible that the crime is committed in the presence of the police officials, or that the police officials arrives at the scene of crime after the crime has been committed but before it has been reported to the police (Basic Training Learning Programme. Learning Programme 7. Division Human Resource Development. Learners Guide 2010: 2).

This information is important for trainees, as it indicated situations that could occur when patrolling and arriving at a scene that was not reported to the police official and the trainees as police officials will then be expected to handle this kind of situation (Van Vuuren, 2013).

When a crime is reported to a police official it is unprofessional to inform a member of the community that they are not trained to deal with a specific situation. It is therefore important for police officials to be trained in the basics of handling any situation while the experts in the specific field required is on the way. The trust the community has in the police will then be restored and they will understand the importance of reporting crimes (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Another important issue highlighted in Learning Programme 7 is, it is important to note that the powers that police officials have are limited and may only be exercised provided that certain strict conditions are present. If a police official acts outside the limitations of the legislation, his or her conduct will be unlawful. This may result in the police official

himself or herself committing a crime or a civil claim can be instituted against the police service and the police official concerned (Basic Training Learning Programme. Learning Programme 7. Division Human Resource Development. Learners Guide 2010: 3).

The incident in chapter 2, paragraph 1.10.1, where six police officials were arrested for the murder of Andries Tatane, who was one of the protestors in an incident, were a protest against service delivery that became violent and where he was killed by the police. This is an example how police officials can be held accountable for their actions. These situations can be avoided if police officials are informed of their responsibilities when dealing with all kind of incidents. However, it is impossible for police officials to know what their powers are if they have not been trained in this information. However all police official should know that their action is limited and they should act to such limitations. Learning Programme 7, also highlights this information is very important for trainees, it gives them some indication of what their limitations are (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The following Crimes against the Safety of the State are discussed in the learning material.

Public violence is defined as follow:

"Public violence consist in the unlawful and intentional performance by a number of persons of an act or acts which assume serious proportions and are intended to disturb public peace and order by violent means, or to infringe the rights of another" (Basic Training Learning Programme. Learning Programme 7. Division Human Resource Development. Learners Guide 2010: 11).

1   The offence cannot be committed by a single person acting on his her own.
2.   The public peace and order must be disturbed by a number of persons acting together.
3   In one case 5 people were regarded as sufficient, while in other cases 6 – 10 people were required. The number of people required, therefore has not yet been established.
4   The number of people required will depend on the degree of seriousness of the dimensions of their conduct.

5. The conduct of the group must take on serious proportions. The more people involved, the more likely it is that a court will find that their conduct has been taken on serious proportions.

6. Actual disturbance of public peace and order, or infringement of rights of another, is not required."

(Basic Training Learning Programme. Learning Programme 7. Division Human Resource Development. Learners Guide 2010: 11).

The definition clearly states what police officials need to consider when dealing with this kind of crime, the researcher believes that this information could be of more value if practically demonstrated to trainees, for example by having a role play where all the equipment is used when dealing with these kind of incidents.

SAPS members are required to act according to policies and procedures, acts and regulations, regulating gatherings and handling of conflict. This act is controlled and guided by Standing Order (General) 262, Crowd Management during gatherings and demonstrations, Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, when handling crowd gatherings. This act is explained theoretical to trainees in this manual but does not indicate the equipment that is allowed to be used by the SAPS during these kinds of incidents. It is important for trainees to not only be educated in the different laws and policies applicable, but also all the resources that they should utilize when taking action (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to Learning Programme 7, there are the following examples of Conduct constituting Public Violence:

1. Faction fighting between groups or persons;
2. Violent resistance to the police by a mob,
3. Rioting;
4. Forcible coercion of other workers by strikers,
5. Breaking up and taking over a meeting

(Basic Training Learning Programme 7. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 7).

Once again the examples used indicate the different forms that unrest related incidents may take, however it is important for police officials to be able to differentiate between these kinds of crimes. In every incident SAPS should be able to know what action is required to resolve the problem in an effective and efficient manner.

Some incidents need communication and negotiation skills. Other incidents require the police to arrest people and take actions to prevent damage to property or prevent injuries of the community members. The researcher was of the opinion that once again there is a lack of bringing this information practically to trainees, ensuring that they have some kind of action plan to handle these situations and the relevant knowledge of what equipment they could use (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1.2 LEARNING PROGRAMME 10: DIVISION HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2010

The researcher found another topic discussed in the Learning Programme 10, that is regarded as important, namely, the Introduction to South African Laws.

Legal rules may be defined as:

1. Binding rules;
2. that order ;
3. Lay down the rights and duties of every member of the community;
4. Prescribed how conflict between members of the community with respect to one another's rights and duties should be resolved;
5. Prescribed the procedure to be followed in order to resolve conflict between members of the community; and
6. Stipulate the legal consequences of certain events, or what legal consequences will be when people act in a certain way (e.g. When a community member commits a crime)

(Basic Training Learning Programme 10. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 34).

This information is important because it allows the trainees to gain knowledge and an understanding that all community members should be respected in all situations. However it does not include that it is the community's right to be protected during legal

marches and protests, but also, that the rights of the non-protesters be protected during crowd management actions. To deliver "crowd control services" to a community it is important that police officials are aware of the legal rules and that there are set guidelines on how this should be implemented. This legal rule clearly indicates the most basic principles for police officials to apply when serving the community (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to Learning Programme 10, since 1994 there has been a change from the apartheid era which was characterised by acts of brutality and massive violations of human rights. Human rights primarily protect individuals from state power and it is important to know that the police are seen a major instruments of state power, but police officials are never above the law. The police official must respect, protect and uphold the rights contained in the Bill of Rights and a police official can be personally liable for wrongful police actions (Basic Training Learning Programme 10. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 34).

The researcher is of the opinion that trainees should know this information, because all the POP units specializing in dealing with crowd management have undergone changes after the apartheid era. This topic specifies to every police official what is expected from them; however it is not possible for a police official to protect citizens if they are not trained in the correct procedure. Police officials can become liable for handling situations incorrectly so crowd control training is essential to prevent mistakes (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1.3 LEARNING PROGRAMME 27: DIVISION HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2010

The researcher, in terms of Learning Programme 27, is of the opinion that this information is also of assistance to trainees should they deal with crowd management situations. The other important topic that is presented in the learning programme is the "T-techniques of Tactical Communication."

The following guidelines indicate to police officials how they need to act:

- A police officer that attends to a conflict situation by entering with force, aggression and arrogance (for instance, by pulling one of the parties on the shoulder and asking him/her what is going on), might trigger a larger conflict.

Arrogant body language will also have a detrimental effect on communication and could escalate the conflict.

- Professional presence is characterised by the ability to make quick decisions, a broad knowledge, a high standard of physical skills resulting from continuous training and high ethical standard of conduct. Professional presence is the first step towards successful conflict de-escalation. The essence of professionalism is to achieve voluntary compliance by the suspect(s).

- It is important not to lose one's temper or become angry, but to be tolerant, open, flexible and unbiased. This attitude will result in much more power that anger. Anger will result in the deterioration of physical skills. It is also important to learn to read people in order to be able to identify the kind of people that may cause trouble.

- When reacting to a complaint or incident, police officials must approach the situation with a plan for example, to separate the parties in conflict and ask the golden question, "What can I do for you?" Such an approach will set the climate for de-escalation. Another effective strategy could be to ask everybody to sit down, as it is more difficult to respond aggressively from a sitting position. In most cases, it is important to separate the conflicting parties for discussions (Basic Training Learning Programme 27. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 11).

Communication is easy to perform when dealing with normal crimes with one or two suspects, but when dealing with a crowd, especially a violent crowd, it is almost impossible to sit down and discuss the problems they have. This is the kind of situations trainees in basic training should be trained to do to ensure they are skilled to handle these incidents.

The learning programme states all the important steps in the handling of conflict, but police officials should be aware that all situations are unique and should be dealt with in such manner. Whatever the situation, the most important is to ensure the safety and security of all citizens. The trainees should be allowed the opportunity to be able to receive practical training on how to handle crowd control situations. However, at

Mthatha training college this information was only presented to them as theory. This explains why the police struggle to know what to do when there are real situations that they need to address (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1.4 LEARNING PROGRAMME 17: DIVISION HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2010

Decision-making plays a major and very important role in all functions of a Police member. Members sometimes have only a split second to make a clear and lawful decision. Clearly understanding all relevant legislation will ensure a correct decision (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The following Learning Programme 17 forms a very important part of the information that can assist trainees when performing crowd management duties. It refers to the constitution of South Africa and points out the duties of SAPS (Section 205, Act 108 of 1996). This includes:

- Preventing, combating and investigating crime;
- Maintain public order; and
- Protecting and securing the inhabitants of the Republic and their property and upholding and enforcing the law.

The above-mentioned remarks are part of any police official's obligation towards the general public but it needs to be broken down in different practical scenarios that will assist trainees to know precisely what to do when, where and how - especially when it comes to crowd control matters (Van Vuuren, 2013).

- The Constitution also provides that national legislation must establish the powers and functions of the SAPS, and must enable the SAPS to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The laws that give effect to this are the Police Service Act (68 of 1995), the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) and the Regulation of Gatherings Act (205 of 1993).
- Section 9(1) and (2) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, give the SAPS powers to restrict certain marches and even to use force, including the use of firearms, to disperse crowds.

- The conditions under which force can be used are always described clearly and limited to specified circumstances.

It is important to note that empowering provisions of the law are indicated by words such as "can" or "may". When discretion is granted, the police official who has that discretion must be familiar with all possible alternative actions. They must carefully consider all the different options and try to keep from infringing the rights of individuals.

A police official may use force to defend him/her or a third party from an attack based on private defence as the grounds of justification in terms of common law. Individuals have the right to live and therefore the right to defend themselves.

Resistance of the law and private defence should not be seen as a police official abusing their rights. If a police official defends him or herself through using the necessary force, it is because all individuals have the right to live and protect their own live, according to the Bill of rights (Basic Training Learning Programme 17. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 11).

Students at the college also learn principles of tactical movement in order to become safer when they execute their duties. The following steps can be followed to prepare themselves mentally for a potential or actual problem/dangerous situation:

The Principles of Tactical Movement
- STEP 1, identify the nature of the complaint, situation, emergency or threat that you are required to attend to.
- STEP 2: Gather, obtain and analyse as much information as possible to help you understand the complaint, situation, emergency or threat that you are required to attend to.
- STEP3: Identify potential problem/ danger situations that may encounter when arriving at the scene or when approaching the suspects, vehicle or building.
- STEP 4: Plan how you will resolve the potential problem/ danger situations that you have identified during STEP 3.
- STEP 5: Discuss the potential problem situations and actions to deal with them with your partner and agree on how you will resolve the situation (Basic Training

Learning Programme 28. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 6).

These steps are extremely important and relevant to the management of unrest incidents and crowd management. The researcher is of the opinion that the most important part that is missing is the discussing of different possible scenarios that they may encounter. It is only by sketching possible scenarios that they will be able to better prepare themselves for the "what if?" situation (Van Vuuren, 2013).

In the rest of the above-mentioned lecture there are theoretical attention given to tactical movement skills including communication skills, house penetration skills, and climbing over walls. The trainees also do practical in this but there are no practical movements related to unrest related incidents – a definite need that needs to be addressed (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1.5 LEARNING PROGRAMME 29: DIVISION HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2010

The Learning program presented the following information to trainees that could assist them when doing crime prevention duties. Remarks are made about the following:

Compliance, Tools and Techniques: You will always work with a partner. Acting together may enable you to use less force (Basic Training Learning Programme 29. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 2). By allowing the police official to use verbal communication techniques, which will assist in resolving confrontational situations peacefully, safely and professionally is minimizing the use of physical force (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The three basic concepts of weapon less defence (Basic Training Learning Programme 29 Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 5).

1. SELF-CONTROL

Self-control is attained through confidence and confidence is gained through knowledge, skills and ability. When dealing with crowds who become unruly a police official can

easily become intimidated if they do not know how to deal with the situation. It is therefore important to have the knowledge, skills and ability to deal with unrest incidents and crowd management (Van Vuuren, 2013).

2.   BALANCE

Balance consists of two different matters:

2.1   MENTAL BALANCE

One of the main aims of the training is to exercise control on an emotional, intellectual and physical level. Controlling your fear in a potentially violent situation is crucial. Keeping your eye on the bigger picture will give you the ability to:

- Control yourself emotionally and physically
- Control the offender/ suspect;
- Control/ defuse certain situations;
- Escape from others; and
- Prevent other situations from occurring.

    The seed of violence is small, and if you can smother it early enough, you can defuse and avoid many unwanted situations. If you do not spot it early enough, it can get out of hand (Basic Training Learning Programme 29 Division Training. Investing in Human Capital.   Learners Guide 2006: 5). The researcher is of the opinion when being confronted with crowds who are abusive, a police official can easily become distracted, however if they are trained in different scenario-situations, they will have the skill to handle the situation better and with more confidence (Van Vuuren, 2013).

2.2   PHYSICAL BALANCE (Body position)

The ability to maintain balance during physical combat (combat stance). There are a few issues that are important to remember:

3.   AWARENESS

Awareness is basically observing the entire situation and being specifically aware of some major hazards.

- Pay attention to public surroundings.
- Do not wander near unsecured cover.
- Plan ahead.
- Plan the route you will take.
- Reduce opportunities for an attack.
- Be prepared to overcome verbal and physical abuse (Basic Training Learning Programme 29. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 76).

The researcher believes that this information is very important and if it is known by all police officials this can assist them to act accordingly, but the gap of practical implementation in the training is still a problem that needs to be addressed (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.1.6 LEARNING PROGRAMME 30: DIVISION HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2010

The researcher was of the opinion that Learning Programme 30 provides a lot of theoretical information to trainees with regard to crowd management. The Learning Programme dealt with the following topics:

1.   CROWD MANAGEMENT

South Africa has been asked by various world organizations to host world major events. The SAPS faces the challenge of proving to the world that the peace agents of this country are capable of managing crowds in accordance with the democratic principles of the Constitution and acceptable international standards.

In an endeavour to prove to the world that the SAPS is capable of managing crowds professionally, the SAPS must be able to defuse riotous situations that may arise whenever people are dissatisfied about (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163).

The Constitution of our country gives people the right to express themselves freely and also the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket or hand over petitions. On the other hand there are laws that are in place for the regulation of the gatherings but seemingly most of the police members are not familiar with those laws (Van Vuuren, 2013).

For that reason it is the responsibility of the SAPS members to be very patient. They must educate the community, while acknowledging that it is their democratic right to express themselves, as long as it is peacefully and orderly.

The learning programme also establish standardized procedures in the SAPS to manage a crowd in such a way that it follow democratic values and accepted international standards (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163).

Through the programme the importance of the handling of crowds is highlighted and acknowledged in accordance to international standards. The trainees are informed in a very short manner about crowd management. The learning guide lacks an in-depth explanation about the handling of unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

2. GOLDEN RULE OF CROWD MANAGEMENT

The Learning Programme highlights the following goal when dealing with crowd management situation: to achieve the goal of managing a crowd with minimum injuries and no loss of life. In other words, there must be no loss of life and minimal injuries to people.

To achieve this there is a school of thought that emphasise that little or no physical contact between the police and the crowd must be the rule, especially where the crowd is extremely violent (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163), but *in praxis* this is very difficult to achieve.

It is impossible for police in South Africa to avoid any contact with the crowds and as a result it is important to train police members in such a way they will be able to deal with crowds in any possible way. It is only through practical scenario-training and "what if scenario training" (Ras, 2013) that this can be achieved. Trainees at basic training will

also need to know which equipment they can use and how to use it, not only to protect themselves but also to effectively manage the protesters (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.   PRINCIPLES OF CROWD MANAGEMENT

All interventions by the SAPS will be prepared and carried out in accordance to the following basic principles of crowd management.

- The legal aspects of crowd management.
- The situational appropriateness at that particular time, taking both the participants and non-participants into consideration.
- The full utilization of the suitable means available.
- The proportionality of the means which is used on the participants (Basic Training Learning Programme 30.   Division Training. Investing in Human Capital.   Learners Guide 2006: 163).

The "full utilization of the suitable means" is mentioned, but trainees are at no stage during the basic training programme exposed to shields and water cannons. These last two mentioned items are important equipment that is used to manage crowds and to address unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.   RELEVANT LEGISLATION/ LEGAL ASPECT OF CROWD MANAGEMENT

CONSTITUTION

The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) of the Republic of South Africa stipulates the following functions of the SAPS:

- To prevent, combat and investigate crime
- To maintain public order
- To protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property
- To enforce the law (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital.   Learners Guide 2006: 163).

While police officials perform their function/ powers as conferred to them by the Constitution, they must also bear in mind that the same Constitution gives people certain rights,

- The right to human dignity – Section 10
- The right to life - Section 11
- The right to freedom and the of the person – Section 12
- The right to freedom of expression – Section 16
- The right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and hand over petitions – Section 17
- The right to association – Section 18
- Labour relations rights – Section 23. (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide. 2006: 163).

The knowledge of the Constitution is part of every police official's daily duties and is the most important tool when dealing with the community. Police officials who deal with unrest and crowd management incidents should be trained on how and when they should act upon any citizen or protestor who infringes on the rights of others.

If a police officer does not have the necessary knowledge regarding the rights of the participants in a demonstration and who are not participating, then it can result in the officer not handling the situation in a correct manner. It is expected from all police officer to have the knowledge of all citizens' rights and to protect it according to the law. Proper training is the key word in this regard (Van Vuuren, 2013).

5.   SAPS ACT (68 OF 1995)

In terms of the South African Police Service's Act 68 of 1995, the SAPS is the institution of the state which is tasked to uphold and safeguard the fundamental rights of every person, as guaranteed by the Constitution. This act is applicable to every police official, and every official is bound to comply with this Act. Police officials need to protect all citizens, but also make sure that the rights of others are not infringed (Van Vuuren, 2013).

**6.	REGULATION OF GATHERING ACT (Act no 205 of 1993)**

This is the most important act in terms of crowd control and put a huge emphasis on the notification aspects of when holding a gathering (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163). All people in South Africa have the right to assemble (section 17), but in order to be fair and to recognise the rights of other citizens, there is a process that needs to be followed before people can gather (Van Vuuren, 2013). Some of the important aspects of this act are:

**6.1	SECTION 2**
APPOINTMENT OF COVENERS, AUTHORIZED MEMBERS AND RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS

-	Convener – A person to be responsible for the arrangements of a gathering. An organization or branch or an organization or members of any community structures intending to hold a gathering appoints him/her.

-	Authorized member – An officer designated by the area commissioner in writing at station or area level. He presents the service and liaises with the responsible officer and convenor concerning all negotiations and consultations as prescribed by this Act.

-	Responsible officer – A person appointed by the local authority or the management or the executive committee of the local government within whose area of jurisdiction a gathering is to take place (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163). The appointment of various role players is to assist in the gathering to take place in an organized manner. It is an attempt to prevent people becoming unruly and to have people who are responsible for the gathering (Van Vuuren, 2013).

**6.2	SECTION 3**
NOTICE OF GATHERING

This is a document where the parties who want to gather gives notice to the SAPS with the following information:

- The notice must be signed by the convener.
- It must be handed to the responsible officer seven days before the date of an intended gathering.
- If it was not possible for the convener to give such a notice earlier than seven days before such date, he/she must give such notice at the earliest opportunity.
- If notice is given less than 48 hours before the commencement of the gathering, the responsible officer may, by notice to the convener, in writing prohibit the gathering.
- The notice shall contain the following information:
- Name, address and contact number of the convener
- The name of the organization or branch of an organization or village or the structure of the community on whose behalf the gathering is convened.
- Purpose of the gathering
- Date, time and duration of the gathering
- Place of the gathering
- Anticipated number of participants
- The proposed number of marshals and their identity
- In the case of a procession
- The exact route of a procession
- Time and place to assemble and commence
- Time and place to end and disperse
- If a notice is given later that seven days before the gathering, the reasons why it was not given in time
- If a petition or any other document is to be handed over to any person, the place where and the person to whom it is to be handed to (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163).

This information is very important because it guides the approach of the gathering. It is extremely important for the trainees to know how this document is done, by whom it is done and why it is done. This will assist them to be aware that when attending a

gathering they will have the knowledge to ask whether it is legal or not (Van Vuuren, 2013).

6.3   SECTION 4

CONSULTATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, AMENDMENTS ADN CONDITIONS OF NOTICES

Consultation must take place during the golden triangle meeting, whereby discussions shall be held on the contents of the notice, amendments thereof or additions there to, and the conditions, if any, imposed in respect of holding of the gathering so as to meet the objective of the REGULATION OF GATHERING ACT, 1993 (ACT 205/1993). The regulation and procedure of a gathering act is clearly and step by step noted in this learning programme. The process indicates what must be in place, but it lacks the actions that should be taken by a police official should one or more of these steps not have been complied with (Van Vuuren, 2013).

REPORTING OF CROWD FORMATION AND ACTIONS BY THE FIRST MEMBERS ARRIVING AT THE CROWD THAT DEVELOPED SPONTANEOUSLY

1.   FIRST MEMBER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

The first member who arrives at the scene or venue of an unforeseen (spontaneous) gathering must seek to preserve the peace and to protect and help the community (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 163). It is extremely important that trainees understand this statement and the role the police play to contribute to preserving this peace (Van Vuuren, 2013).

2.   PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED:

The following brief remarks are made to mention what police trainees must do to effectively control the crowds:

-    Contact the Radio Control and provide as much information as possible about the crowd, size, is it violent or peaceful, were there negotiations, do they have a leader, their intentions, etc.

- Should action be taken, is manpower needed, the number of police officials at the scene.

- Attempt to create an atmosphere, which is conductive to negotiations, by refraining from the display of aggression, such as the brandishing of firearms and special equipment.

- Identify the leadership in order to establish communication and to start negotiations

- Set the highest standards of tolerance and do not use any firearms against the demonstrators, except in the case of private defence, should the lives of people be in serious danger.

- Consult with local authorities and the authorized member about the gathering and the purpose of the gathering (Basic Training Learning Programme 30. Division Training. Investing in Human Capital. Learners Guide 2006: 43). The learning guide introduces trainees to the importance of negotiations. Negotiations will diffuse the situation if handled correctly and if an amicable solution could be reached. This will assist in preventing the loss of life and possible damage to property that could occur should the crowd become unruly. Trainees need to be trained in the importance and different scenarios of negotiations with crowds; they also need to be sensitized on what the consequences can be if crowds are handled in a wrong manner (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.2 PHYSICAL TRAINING

The trainees participated in different physical training during their basic training. The researcher will indicate the different physical exercises that she has observed and what their purpose were, and how trainees were evaluated to determine their competency.

3.4.2.1 DRILL

The purpose of drill is to develop in each and every police member the sense of instinctive obedience that will assist him/her at all times, to carry out his orders. The foundation of discipline is based on drill (Basic Training. Learners Guide. Module 3, 2006).

The amount of drill practice that took place during the basic training was as follow:

- A lot of drill practice took place upon the arrival of trainees at the Training Institution
- Two sessions of 40 minutes each per week was allocated to drill practice.
- The last part of practicing was for passing out parade, during this period more drill sessions were allocated closer to parade.

3.4.2.2 BATTERY TEST

The Battery test was to assess physical fitness and maintenance of police officials in the SAPS (cardio respiratory fitness, flexibility, strength, speed, agility and power).

The requirement for this was different between men and women and was as follows:

- Male trainees were required to be dressed in field dress with their full equipment, and body armour, and not exceed the time frame of 3 minutes.
- Female trainees were required to be dressed in field dress with their full equipment and body armour, and not to exceed the time frame of 4 minutes (Basic Training. Tactical and Street Survival Learners Guide. 2006: 163).

This physical training took place twice a week and the time allocated was 40 minutes. Once a month the trainees were required to do one formative assessment for this test. And at the end of the training programme one summative assessment was required for the trainees to be found competent.

3.4.2.3 SKILLS AND FEAR

The "Skills and Fear" test is to assess the trainee's ability (skill) to overcome certain obstacles during the pursuit of suspects and to assess trainees if they have any fears. The trainees were expected to clear 11 obstacles. No time was involved in this practical training. (Basic Training. Physical Fitness. Learners Guide. 2006: 160).

The trainees were required to participate in this training for 2 sessions of 40 minutes per week. The trainees were required to do one formative assessment per month. At the end of the training programme the trainees were expected to do one final summative test to be found competent.

3.4.2.4 TONFA

A police official should be able to defend himself/herself successfully by means of basic techniques for any unarmed self-defence scenario by using the tonfa. Trainees were trained in different tonfa techniques during their basic training at the training institution.

The requirements were as follow:

- There were 6 tonfa techniques which were assessed for competency, although more techniques were practiced over 2 days (9 sessions each).
- Each trainee was assessed by an assessor in the presence of a moderator by means of the set criteria as per available Observation Checklist (Basic Training. Tactical and Street Survival Learners Guide).

The researcher is of the opinion that although the "Skills and fear and Tonfa techniques" could contribute in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents; it was not practical enough to show them how to use it in crowd management scenarios.

During the physical training there were no references made how the physical training and equipment could be used to assist the police in doing crowd management. During the physical training there was also no references made to the riot shield and no practical demonstrations or training were given in the use thereof.

The shield is an important part of equipment used when dealing with crowds and it was never used in a practical manner to demonstrate to the police how it can be utilized during unruly crowd behaviour. During this training, no training that was introduced was relevant to the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. The researcher strongly feels that the physical training presented to trainees during basic training lacks the knowledge and skills to equip them properly for crowd control purposes (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.4.3 WEAPON SKILLS TRAINING

Trainees were trained in the use of different firearms during basic training.

Firearm training is divided into Cycle 1 (1st 3 months) and Cycle 2 (last 3 months)

Cycle 1 – was:

- 6 Formative assessment shoots with a pistol: 50 rounds. The trainees were doing these shooting practices in the following shooting positions: standing, kneeling, prone and crouch position.

- 2 Summative assessment shoots with a pistol: 20 and 45 rounds respectively. The trainees were doing these shooting practices in the following positions: standing, kneeling and prone.

- 1 Formative assessment with a shotgun: 30 rounds (with no. 5 ammo). The trainees were doing this shooting practice in a standing position.

- 1 Summative assessment with a shotgun: 10 rounds (baton ammo). The trainees were doing this shooting practice in a standing / kneeling position.

- 2 Formative assessments with a hand machine carbine formative / R 5 rifle: 30 rounds (.223 ammo)

- 1 Summative assessment with a hand machine carbine / R 5 rifle: 30 rounds (.223 ammo).

Cycle 2 – was:

- 6 Formative assessments: pistol: 50 rounds. The trainees were doing these shooting practices in the following positions: standing, kneeling, prone and crouching.

- 2 Summative assessments: pistol: 20 and 45 rounds respectively. The trainees were doing these shooting practices in the following positions: standing, kneeling and prone.

- Low Light shooting: 50 rounds. Trainees were doing this shooting practice in the standing and kneeling positions with 3 torch techniques.

- Night shoot – Summative assessment: 25 rounds - standing and kneeling positions: 2 torch techniques (Summative Assessment: Pistol range. 2010).

Head Office has ordered that trainees must be given remedial training and must be re-assessed until they pass the summative exercises. All summative assessments require a competency of 70%.

Tactical obstacle shooting was done, utilizing 24 rounds with tactical magazine change. The Summative assessment has included an exercise which was called a "Stress Exercise." It started at the 20 metre mark where the trainee must do push ups, then a run to the 15 meter mark where he /she loads 10 rounds into the magazine, then he / she runs further to the 10 meter mark where he/she assembles the pistol, and then in the kneeling position, fires from behind a barricade to engage the target – only 2 minutes are allowed to do this (Basic Training. Use of Firearms. Street Survival Learners Guide. 2010).

During unrest incidents police officials at times are utilizing rubber bullets to disperse unruly crowds. At no stage during the weapon training were trainees informed of when and how to use this method during the handling of unrest incidents. The researcher believes that this is important for trainees to learn how to do this correctly. They also need to be informed about the damage and injury and even death that they may cause if they are not careful enough.

The point that the researcher wants to make is that the weapons training in practice must "speaks" to crowd management scenarios so that trainees will be better equip to deal with violent and unruly crowds. It is essential that this training must be built into the training programmes of all police trainees during their basic training (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.5   FINAL REMARKS

According to Geldenhuys (*Servamus*, July 2011: 11) service delivery protests often cause a lot of problems for law enforcement because these gatherings are usually unplanned and there are not enough time to put an operational plan in place for doing crowd management. This usually results in Visible Policing Members (VISPOL), who has not been trained in crowd control techniques, to perform crowd management duties while they are still waiting for the arrival of the Public Order Police (POP). This indicates the importance for trainees to be trained in crowd management measures during basic training.

In basic police training all the necessary laws and regulations are presented to trainees, but the lack of practical exposure to the use of equipment and role plays that allow trainees to know how to do crowd management is outstanding. There is a definite

practical gap in the training of trainees in handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. It is important that trainees who will go to serve at stations be aware that at any occasion the station members will be most of the time the first official on the scene to deal with unruly crowds.

The researcher has found very little practical training relevant to the handling of unrest related incidents and is of the opinion that the lack of sufficient practical training in this regard will hamper effective crowd control measures when police trainees, working at police stations across the country, need to step in to manage crowds or unruly behaviour (Van Vuuren, 2013).

3.6   SUMMARY

The discussion in Chapter Three was a brief overview of crowd control and basic police training at Mthatha Training Institution. Introductory remarks were made (section 3.1), a historical overview of crowd control was given (section 3.2), as well as an overview of Mthatha training college (section 3.3). The training that takes place at this college was then discussed (section 3.4) under the three headings, academic training (section 3.4.1), physical training (section 3.4.2) and weapons training (section 3.4.3). The researcher has concluded this chapter with a few final remarks emphasising the lack of practical scenario training during basic training dealing with crowd control measures (section 3.5).

CHAPTER FOUR

PRACTICAL DATA GATHERING

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter Four is about gaining insights, through the practical data gathering process, about the trainees' lack of training in crowd control skills. The SAPS has become aware of the need for personnel to be trained. Any organization, especially a police organization needs to develop life-long learning (Ras, 2013) and a learning culture (Rae, 1997: 225). By creating a learning culture the organizational results will improve. In terms of crowd management and unruly crowd behaviour it means that the police must train their members well and constantly must re-train and prepare them to deal with it (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.2 THE NEED TO IMPROVE TRAINING

There is no doubt in the mind of the researcher that examples at grass roots level like Ficksburg, Marikana and De Doorns indicate that the police have to improve their present way of doing crowd control or crowd management. The SAPS currently deals with many crowd management and unrest related incidents and clearly needs to concentrate on how to deal with these incidents.

Previously the POP units dealt solely with these incidents, but due to the increasing number of crowds going on the rampage it is important that more police officials are given the opportunity to be trained in dealing with crowds. Not only must they know how to do it but they must also be well trained in the use of the equipment and how, but more importantly, when to use it (Ras, 2013).

The chairperson of the South African Human Right Commission, Commissioner Danny Titus said "When law enforcement authority such as the police have a monopoly on the use of force it is important that training in crowd control be a high priority." In referring to the Andries Tatane case, he said "…the police were not suitable equipped to manage the protest and failed to effectively regulate and monitor it" (*Timeslive,* 31 Ocotber 2012).

The important remarks of Patric Craven from COSATU, made earlier in Chapter One are so important that the researcher wants to repeat some of it: "…police must be trained to negotiate before using force when controlling crowds. We don't want to see guns being used but want to see riot shields, water cannons and teargas, not R5 automatic rifles when police control crowds" (Mabona, 2012: 17).

Present National Police Commissioner, General Ria Phiyega said that crowd control training has not been a priority after 1994 as the country became pretty stable. The police management has admitted that the training of officers to deal with crowds or the so called public order policing has been neglected in recent years, and particularly since South Africa hosted the 2010 Soccer World Cup (De Lange, 2012: 1).

In order to identify exactly what needs to be done it is essential to get feedback from members in the field and to look at what experts are saying about the present training courses that are presented to police trainees. Feedback from police trainees are also essential because they are busy with training and they are the first people at station level who will be send to respond when there are unruly crowds while waiting for POP to arrive.

4.3 FOCUS GROUPS (INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS)

Two (2) platoons consisting of 36 trainees were utilized as focus groups by the researcher to gain the following information regarding their knowledge and skills on how to handle crowd management incidents. Few participants attempted to share their knowledge and experience regarding crowd management. The focus groups were interviewed in the handling of crowd management and the researcher utilized the practical guidelines from the Public Order Police (POP) trainers to observe their knowledge. These guidelines were used to see if police trainees would know how to deal with crowds.

Guidelines from POP trainers:

- Identify the leadership of the gathering;

- Determine the reason for the gathering;

- Determine is their permission for the gathering;

- Observe if the gathering is peaceful or unruly;

- Negotiate with crowds in order to ensure that it does not become unruly;

- Does not use take forceful action if not necessary and if the action should take place it should be the minimum force.

The researcher also observed two (2) platoons during Physical training and Street Survival classes to determine if any crowd management training was presented.

Observation and evaluation: The participants were not aware if they should call back up members and when they should call for back up. It is important for a member to assess the nature of the situation, if the group is having a peaceful march; they should just be monitored and back up is not necessary. If the crowd was carrying weapons and acting aggressive, like in the Marikana incident, back up should immediately be called (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The participants (Mthatha's police trainees) did not have knowledge of the equipment they needed to utilize when dealing with a crowd and they indicated they did not know how to utilize most of the different kind of equipment that are needed to deal with crowds.

From the participants did not indicate that they would attempt to start any kind of negotiation and wanted to arrest the crowd for gathering. It is important for police officials to know that all citizens have a right to demonstrate if they are not happy about service delivery, they cannot be arrested; they can only be arrested if the crowd infringes the rights of others. The participants must find out if the crowd has permission to gather (Van Vuuren, 2013).

During the observation of the Physical training and Skill and Fear, the researcher identified that no crowd management training was presented to the trainees. Therefore it would not have been possible for the trainees to be able to manage a crowd management incident.

The equipment that can be utilized during crowd management was not introduced to the trainees; therefore the trainees would not have the knowledge of which equipment they could use or how to use it during a crowd management incident.

An effective training programme: An effective training programme should include both initial and refresher training. The programme should involve the following important issues:

- How to monitor crowd density;

- How to communicate effectively. Communication between your staff is one of the most important elements of a successfully managed crowd event. This is important before, during and after an event. Training should include communication skills, whether face-face or via radios and telephones (Crowd Management at Stations. A Good Practice Guide 2004: 5).

- What equipment can be used during crowd management and how the equipment can be utilized?

The researcher wants to point out the above-mentioned guidelines can be used to determine the lack of information and training that exist in the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents. However, further information is needed and one of the best qualitative ways of doing that is through personal interviews and conversations.

4.4 PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

The researcher has conducted personal interviews with *inter alia* a training manager, with trainers, with trainees and Public Order Police (POP) members. These conversations were very valuable because the researcher could gather a lot of information that specifically addresses important issues that directly related to crowd control.

4.4.1 Training Manager: POP Port Elizabeth

This individual interview was held in Port Elizabeth with the training manager of the Public Order Police (POP). The interview was not structured and the researcher wanted to gain the necessary information, based on his life experiences as training manager, in order to have a proper understanding of the handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

This information provided by Lieutenant Meiring was extremely informative and valuable to the researcher. The officer has been in the training environment of the SAPS

since 1989. He was responsible for the training of all SAPS members in the Eastern Cape in the handling of crowd management prior to the FIFA Soccer World Cup 2010. The member was trained prior to the World Cup for 4 weeks in the Thabazimbi area in French Crowd Control Techniques on how to train members in the handling of crowd management.

According to the Training Manager he trained approximately 3 000 police officials in the handling of crowd management. This experience of the Training Manager combined with the POP experiences provided the researcher with expert input and feedback regarding her topic.

All police members must do crowd control: The Training Manager acknowledges that all police officials should be able to assist in crowd management duties, although it was not expected from them to take over the job of POP's. The basic skills in handling crowd management that was identified by him that should be introduced to trainees during basic training were called "Crowd Management and Professional Intervention." This intervention must be at theoretical and academic level.

Assessing the gathering: Although Meiring (2011) did not use the term "assessment" or "assessing' during the interview, he pointed out the importance that police trainees must be able to differentiate between a march and a protest march and they must also be able identify what processes they must follow in each case and how to follow it up.

Tonfa training: Meiring (2011) has pointed out that police trainees must also learn to use the tonfa in crowd control situations. He had different formations in mind because police trainees learn to use the tonfa to defend themselves in basic training, but they do not know what to do with it in terms of group formations.

Fitness: He also has pointed out the importance of fitness in doing crowd control work but he did not elaborate on this. Ras (2013) pointed out to the researcher that specific fitness tests and fitness scenarios must be designed and implemented for crowd control situations because the fitness of members are very important but it must be geared towards the controlling of crowds.

Equipment: Meiring (2011) has identified the following items that should be introduced to trainees and they must be trained in the use of these equipment so that they will know

when and how to use it. The items are: the shield, the tonfa, the helmet and aids like the stunt grenade and a stopper gun (shooting rubber).

SAPS station members: A very important group that lack training according to Meiring (2011) is the SAPS station members. The station members have no skills to deal with crowd management incidents while POP members have been trained and are specialize in dealing with these incidents.

Meiring (2011) said that if police officials would attend the 3 week training course that was presented to all members prior to the Soccer World Cup 2010, the station members will be able to manage crowds more effectively and in the correct manner. The members will also have a basic understanding of what is the difference between a spontaneous and planned crowd gathering.

Planning: During the policing of crowd management it is important not to endanger the lives of others, but should lives be endangered it is the responsibility of the SAPS to take action to keep the people safe. Any march must be authorized first, for example by the local authority, before it can occur. After the authorization proper planning needs to be done by members.

Follow the correct procedures: Meiring (2011) correctly pointed out that the most important goal of crowd management is to ensure that all people's safety is ensured. While protesters have a right to march, it must be done in the correct manner and the correct procedures should be followed.

The following was indicated as the basic actions that should be taken when attending to a crowd management incidents:

1. Find out what is the situation

2. Do the gatherers have permission

3. In order to have basic skills the members should be able to evaluate the crowd and determine if they are gathering peacefully or is the gathering becoming an unrest incident.

Using soft skills: Although Meiring (2011) did not use the term "soft skills", his remarks encapsulate an approach that indicates the use of "soft skills" (Van Vuuren, 2013) rather than "hardware" (Ras, 2013).

When working with a crowd that is potentially becoming aggressive, it is important for police officials to not provoke the crowd. Police officials should listen to the problem and try to assist the person, if this is not possible try to contact somebody who might be able to assist. If a member in the crowd is drunk, try to tolerate the person in order to maintain the peace in the crowd as far as possible (Meiring, 2011).

The other important advice given by Meiring (2011) was that should police not know how to deal with crowds they can cause serious injuries and damages to property. He again indicated that the 3 week course that many members did before the 2010 Soccer World Cup can assist all police officials in handling these challenges when dealing with crowds.

General remarks: Since 2006, visible policing (VISPOL) members have received training in crowd control management in order to prepare them for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and provide assistance to POP members. Station members will now be tasked to manage level one and two marches and gatherings, for example medium to low risk marches (Ally, 2006: 8). VISPOL members will also, once training is complete, be equipped with crowd management gear and undergo maintenance training every three months (Ally, 2006: 8).

4.4.2 Interview with Trainers

Although 12 trainers were approached by the researcher only 9 could be reached for informal and unstructured conversations about the "gaps" in the training of police trainees when it comes to the policing of unrest related incidents. The trainers all had knowledge of what crowd management was but two members could not clearly say what unrest incidents were. When questioned how to handle a drunk person in a crowd situation two trainers indicated they would arrest the person while the rest of the trainers indicated that they would communicate with the person and continue to monitor the people's behaviour.

This is very important for all police officials to be aware of how to handle such a situation because the wrong action may lead to further disturbance amongst the crowd (Van Vuuren, 2013). The trainers mostly had knowledge of the equipment that could be used during crowd management incidents but while two have indicated that a shield could be used for the protection of the member, the others did not say that and did not mention that it could be used as a crowd management tactic to control crowd. All trainers interviewed knew what the "Gatherings Act" was and the contexts thereof.

The inability of trainers to understand all aspects of their work, whether it is legal aspects, practical formations or the use of equipment and when to use it, means in practice that the trainees will also not understand it and will not know what to do when there is a real crowd control situation that needs their attention. However the trainers could only present the learning material that was available to them and the material itself lacked information regarding crowd management and the equipment that could be used therefore.

4.4.3 Interviews with Trainees

The personal interview with the police trainees at Mthatha has assisted the researcher with specific information to establish the "gaps' presented during their basic training programme. The researcher has personally interviewed 100 police trainees from 6 to 25 July 2010. Some interviews were very short, about two to three minutes; others were longer for up to 30 minutes, but on average the interviews were about eight minutes each.

The purpose of these interviews were to determine their knowledge with regard to crowd management, their approach towards the handling of crowds, their knowledge of the rights of protesters and non-protesters, and lastly, their knowledge in terms of the necessary action to be taken and the specific equipment that they will use to deal with the crowd.

Results: The researcher would like to point out the following results that may assist to improve the existing "gaps" in the training of police trainees at Mthatha Training Institution. There were 100 police trainees that have participated voluntarily in the (personal interviews) informal question session and their results are as follow:

Crowd Management: Their knowledge about crowd management was very poor. 52% did not know what crowd management is all about. 17% indicated that they had some idea, while only 31% knew what it was all about.

The Gatherings Act: The trainees did not reveal any meaningful knowledge about the Gatherings Act, Act 205 of 1993. 80% did not know what the Gatherings Act 205 was all about, 15% had some idea, and only 5% have indicate that they know what it says. It is a big concern that 80% of the trainees say that they do not know what the Gatherings Act is all about.

According to Ras (2013) everything starts with knowledge about the law. If a policeman or woman does not understand the law and how to apply its prescriptions in practice then he/she will never know what to do at grass roots level when they have to enforce the law. Ignorance about this law indicates that the majority of trainees will leave the training institution not knowing what they are supposed to do.

The rights of protesters and non-protesters: In terms of the knowledge of the rights of protesters and non-protesters, the researcher has made a statement about an attack on foreigners and their rights in South Africa. In this case South Africans were protesting against foreigners (non-South Africans) in South Africa and then foreigners were attacked.

Trainees were called to assist in the alleged xenophobic attack. Some trainees indicated that foreigners do not belong in South Africa and others have said that if they do not have a South African identity document then they have no right to protection. The results indicated that the police trainees were not sure about the rights of all people in South Africa. 57% of the trainees said that both parties (South Africans & foreigners) have equal rights to be protected, 10% were not sure and 33% did not know whose rights were the most important.

What actions to take: The next level of the interview was to determine if the trainees knew what actions they should take when dealing with an unruly crowd. The question that was posed to them was, what role a police official has when dealing with an unruly crowd. The outcome was as follows: 52% said they will try to take some kind of action,

by trying to negotiate and trying to calm the crowds down, 21% were not sure and 27% indicated they did not know.

A great number of trainees immediately wanted to call for back up, something that is not necessary wrong, but a good policeman will first try to gather as much information as possible in order to brief those that he call for backup so that they know what to expect when they arrive on the scene.

Equipment: The researcher had interviewed trainees in order to determine their knowledge of which equipment to use when dealing with crowds. When asked what a shield was, 49% of the trainees had knowledge about it, 18% was not sure and 33% did not know what this item was.

During the interview the trainees would refer to the shield as a board, a glass or plastic, and there were also trainees that have indicated that the only knowledge that they have about shields are what they have seen on television. The fact that 33% of the trainees did not know what a shield was clearly indicates that police trainees were not practically trained or even orientated in crowd management gear or equipment that police members are supposed to know and use.

4.4.4 Interviews with Public Order Police members

One of the operational members that were interviewed was the Information Manager, (Captain MC van Vuuren, 2011) of the unit and his input was of great value.

Determine the type of crowd: According to him the most important factor for police officials who attend any gathering is to determine the type of crowd. The type of crowd will determine the motive for the gathering.

Determine if they have weapons: It is important to determine if the crowd was aggressive and if they had any weapons with them, for example knives, stones, pangas or firearms.

Determine the specific kind of area: Another important issue highlighted was the area in which the gathering was taking place, for example, was it in town, on public roads, on a sports field or in a hall. During the farm workers strike at De Doorns, when trucks were overturned and vehicles were thrown with stones on a public road, the police took

action. This kind of situation cannot be allowed because it infringes on the rights of non-protesters (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Identify the leadership: A very important role a police official needs to perform when handling crowd management is to identify the leadership at the gathering. The police officials must then try to determine if the gathering is authorized, legal or illegal.

Once the leader has been identified the police official can then proceed to negotiate within that given situation. Leaders are important when managing crowds because they have a huge influence on the crowd and the crowd's behaviour. The police must always try to reach an agreement with the crowd through their leader (Van Vuuren, 2013).

The need to manage crowds: The interviews with the Public Order Police members were utilized to determine their knowledge of their basic functions during the management of crowds. All the respondents indicated that they need to manage and control crowds, to negotiate with the identified leader/s of the gathering, they need to identify if the gathering was legal or not, and they need to explain the Gatherings Act (Act 205 of 1993) to the protesters. The operational members were clear on what their duties were and what was expected from them during a gathering.

Members were also questioned on what they have observed when working with a constable from the station at any gathering. All respondents have indicated that the constables who have just arrived from the college were not able to handle crowd management incidents. One respondent indicated that the constables "panic" and he recommended that they attend a 3 weeks crowd management course before being utilized to assist with crowd management.

The operational members were then asked about their views regarding the question if it would help if all trainees are trained in crowd control procedures before they are place at the police stations. Most members said that the trainees need to be trained as well as the station members because they also have no idea how to manage crowds. The members have also expressed their concern that there are not enough POP members on the ground to attend to unrest related incidents.

4.5 DATA COLLECTED

Documentation in the form of Business Intelligence System reports and SAPS programmes were collected in order to get further information about the researcher's focus on the question if the basic training that is offered at Mthatha training college is sufficiently paying attention to crowd control measures

Statistics: It is interesting to look at some figures related to personnel strength that have been released through the years.

STATUS OF CRIME COMBATING UNITS IN MTHATHA (EASTERN CAPE)

YEAR	PERSONNEL STRENGHT
2005	177
2006	163
2007	82
2008	78
2009	83

Omar (2007: xi) has correctly pointed out many years ago that the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCU) in the Eastern Cape were experiencing serious human resource shortages. Restructuring in the SAPS has resulted in a depletion of the units with about 50%, while the police still have to service the same size geographical area than before (cf. also South African Police Incident Registration System – Business Intelligence System (IRIS – BIS)).

The units did not only decrease, but also the number of personnel has decreased as indicated in the above-mentioned table. There is no doubt that this already has left gaps in terms of proper service deliveries to communities.

The fact that the number of Crime Combating Units in the Eastern Cape have decreased from eight to four, increases the need for trainees to be prepared for the handling of

crowd management and unrest related incidents. It has become a real challenge in terms of capacity to manage protest marches due to poor service delivery issues, for example (Van Vuuren, 2013).

Number of marches: During the period 2008 and 2009 the following number of incidents was reported to the SAPS in the Eastern Cape area:

YEAR	CROWD MANAGEMENT (PEACEFUL)	CROWD MANAGEMENT (UNREST)	UNREST (OTHER)
2008	378	38	23
2009	332	62	15

(Source: South African Police Service Incident Registration System – Business Intelligence System (IRIS –BIS).

The above-mentioned statistics, obtained from the South African Police Service Incident Registration System –Business Intelligence System (IRIS –BIS), reflects the number of different incidents dealt with by Public Order Policing in the Eastern Cape. It clearly shows that in one year there was a definite increase in unrest related crowd incidents from 38 to 62.

It is also important to realize that any incident, even a peaceful event, can suddenly become unrest related, but whether it is peaceful or not, the police still need to police and manage this. This leads towards pressure on the police to be ready to take the necessary action (Van Vuuren, 2013).

What the above-mentioned figures point out is that there are not enough police members on the ground to address unrest related incidents. This underlines the importance of police station members to be trained and to be ready to respond immediately when any incident occurs. It further means that all police trainees need to be trained in crowd management so that they can be well-prepared when they are going to serve at stations after completion of their training, and it also means that there must be sufficient

equipment readily available to station members to respond fast and effectively when needed.

4.6 THREE WEEKS CROWD MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

It has been mentioned that it is recommended that all police members do three weeks crowd management training (Meiring, 2011; cf. section 4.4.1). Meiring (2011) was of the opinion that all police officials must do it, although from a financial point of view it will simply be too expensive to implement it all over South Africa. If, however, this kind of training is properly built into the training programmes of police trainees then already one has a winning recipe.

During the 3 week course presented prior to the 2010 Soccer World Cup, most of the training provided was practical. According to Lieutenant Meiring each module that was practically presented ended with a theoretical presentation.

An important part of training was the demonstration of crowd management equipment. The trainers presented and demonstrated the use of the crowd management equipment (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 1).

The outcome of the module was for the learner to be able to operate equipment safely.

- For SAPS members to perform their tasks effectively and efficiently, the members need the tools to help achieve their goals.
- To have the necessary tools is not sufficient for a member to perform if the member cannot use the equipment correctly.
- To have the equipment and to be able to use them goes down to nothing if members cannot keep the equipment in a good working condition.

The following equipment is utilized for crowd management operations: shield; helmet; tonfa, gas mask and filter, body gear; shotgun, pyrotechnical aids and vehicles (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 2).

Shield: During crowd management police officers are exposed to dangers of being thrown by all sorts of objects, police officers therefore need a tool that will prevent flying

objects from causing harm to them, and a shield has been proven to be a better plan (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 3). It is important for trainees to know that the shield can be utilized for protection at gatherings, but also to push back crowds, should this action be required.

Helmet: The helmet is worn during crowd management to protect the head; face and neck from flying objects and hard blows (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 8). The helmet is an important tool to protect the member while performing duties and objects are throwing at them by disruptive crowds. It is important for trainees to be aware of the available equipment during unrest incidents in order for them to protect themselves.

Gas mask: In crowd management situations the need to use canister smoke (CS-smoke) depends on the seriousness of the situation and the threat posed by the participants to life and property. If police are to apply CS–smoke, they need gas masks so no to be contaminated (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 11). The gas mask is used for police officials to prevent them from being exposed to the gas during an operation or action that requires this measure. Trainees needs to know that this equipment is available should the need arise to use this and they need to have the knowledge of when and how to use it.

Tonfa: This item is a formidable, non-lethal weapon in the disposal of a police officer. Its use is not limited to general policing as it can be used in defensive and offensive purposes in crowd management. It originates from Japan (Okinawa). The learning objectives of the tonfa presentation are:

- Carrying of tonfa during crowd management
- Rules pertaining to the use of the tonfa (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 16).

When the tonfa is being carried during crowd management there is no rule as to where a tonfa should be carried, but equipment are not carried for police officers to look fancy, but to be able to have them if they want to use them. Unlike in tonfa demonstration

whereby a tonfa is worn on the weak side of the body, in crowd management it should be worn on the strong side (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 19). The tonfa is sufficiently introduced to trainees during basic training, but not for the use during crowd management.

Body Protector: A shield and a helmet offers protection against objects which are thrown at police and are highly appreciated, but unfortunately they do not protect the whole body. If a crowd is very violent and stones or missiles are thrown from all angels the legs, hands and arms can be injured (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 24). The body protector is important because it is a measure to ensure that the official is protected during unrest related incidents.

Pyrotechnical aids: The different pyrotechnical aids were presented to learners; they were stunt grenades, anti- riot canister smoke. The learners were presented with the knowledge of how and when to use these items to ensure that it was used safe and according to the relevant situations. Learners were informed about the following important information when using these aids:

- Do not throw direct to the participants;
- Roll it down to avoid injuring participants;
- Members must be warned before throwing the aids;
- Do not use the aids in confined space (Crowd Management equipment. Demonstrate the use and maintenance of Crowd Management Equipment, 2008: 31).

During the presentation of all the equipment, the learners were also informed of the specifications of the equipment and how to maintain the items.

All the crowd management equipment presented to the learners during the 3 week course was important tools that all police officers should be aware of and know how to use when dealing with crowd management. The only items trainees were introduced to during basic training was a tonfa, which as indicated was used and carried differently when dealing with crowd management (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to Lieutenant Meiring practical training was presented with all the equipment during the 3 week course. The training also included scenario's that was introduced to learners to assist them on how to deal with different crowd management situations. The 3 weeks course empowered police officials with intensive knowledge on how to deal with crowd management and how to utilize the relevant tools in the correct manner. This training can have a positive impact if it can be implemented during basic training to the trainees

4.6.1 Police as first responders to crowd control

During the 3 week course the learners were introduced on how to respond to crowd gatherings. The programme presented by Lieutenant Meiring contained most of the First Responder contents that will be discussed. The following manuals contain important information on how to deal at a crowd incident as a first responder. Every police officer is a first responder and the term refers to the "first police officer" that arrives at the scene.

The outcomes were:

- Steps related to initial assessment of the situation

- Actions for the first responder to a request for back up by trained personnel

- Steps to be taken to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiate

- Gathering of potential important information/evidence

- Explanation of basic activities involved in the handing over the situation to trained personnel

- Explain supportive role of the first responder to POP personnel

(Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering)

The introduction of this crowd control material clearly indicates the importance of acknowledging the responsibility the police has both to participants and non-participants involved in a crowd situation. The introduction is as follow, "In democratic society members of the SAPS often find themselves in the middle of a protesting group on one hand and non-protesting individuals on the other hand. Both have rights that need to be

protected by the Constitution (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering)

The aim of this guide is to share subject knowledge of effective crowd management to station personnel or any other member who is the first responder to a scene of a spontaneous gathering (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering).

According to this guide of Human Resource Development, the SAPS acknowledges that station personnel in most occasions arrive first on a scene of a spontaneous gathering, and it has been noted that these first responders are not very conversant with the basic rules, principles, instruction and legislations related to these kind of situations (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering).

This guide states that the purpose of this course is to give a first responder the necessary knowledge on how to collect facts or information that can support or assist and/or be of value to trained personnel on their arrival at a crowd incident (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.6.2 Legal aspects

No hard and fast rules can be laid down for the procedure at a scene of a spontaneous gathering. The judgement of the first responder influences his/her conduct. Conduct is mainly influenced by the frame of reference of each individual member. The quality of an individual member's judgement and/or conduct is therefore directly related to the information/experience stocked in his/her frame of reference (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering).

According to the Regulations of the Gathering Act, Act of 1993, there is a difference between a demonstration and a gathering (Van Vuuren, 2013). The difference is defined as follows: "Demonstration includes any demonstration by one or more persons, but not more than 15 persons against any person, cause, action or failure to take action". Gathering means any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989, (Act No 29 of 1989), or any other public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air:

(a) At which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political party or political organisation, whether or not that party or organization is registered in terms of any applicable law, are discussed, attacked, criticised, promoted or propagated; or

(b) Held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any persons, or to mobilise or demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or institution, including any government, administration or government institution (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering; Regulating Gatherings, 2008: 209).

The researcher is of the opinion that should trainees be trained in the basic training of crowd management at colleges during their first phase of training, they would be able to contribute to the policing of crowd management incidents and this will ensure that all police officials are able to know and act correctly when dealing with these incidents (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to the Criminal Act Procedure Act 51 of 1977, Section 49, the police is entitled to use force in effecting an arrest. Force is always seen as minimum force, which means "persuasive communication" (Ras, 2013). The police needs to persuade the crowds not to transgress the law. If they do not comply then they can restrain them by using just enough force to prevent them from doing what they are doing. The principle that the police use to enforce the law is called the 'continuum of force" (Ras, 2013).

4.6.3 Crowd dynamics

Knowledge about crowd dynamics is also important to be better prepared to deal with crowds. The purpose of different crowd theories helps first responders to analyse the mood of crowds and not just to walk blindly into uncontrollable situation. Theories must be used as guidelines to assess the dynamics of the crowd (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering). Important issues to remember, here presented in cryptic form, are:

a.) Crowds cannot be trusted

The behavioural norm emerges from the group.

Collective beliefs exist about what must be changed and how.

Violence is more rational and is used only when certain conditions are presented.

a.) Crowds are dangerous

In crowd individuals lose themselves in a crowd and regress into barbarianism.

In a group, the behaviour of individuals is primitive, aggressive and sometimes violent.

b.) Crowds can be constructive

Individuals adopt the additional identity of the crowd (individual and social).

There are regulatory mechanisms within the group.

Violence is regarded as "a relational conflict between groups" and is used to change things (Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering; Crowd Management Training for Platoon Members, 2008: 8).

4.6.4   Duties of a first responder

Step 1

- Set up temporary joint operational centre (JOC) and obtain all relevant tactical information

- Get all details of the leader

- Reason for action

- Enquire about notice (if there is one or not)

Step 2

- Contact local responsible officer and require about notice

- Contact authorized member and request to come to scene

Step 3

- Contact Public Order Police and provide following essential information (more can be given):

- Exact place of gathering (if possible coordinates in rural)

- Estimated numbers of participants

- Composition of crowd. (Sex, Age)

- Visible weapons (Dangerous)

- Mood of crowd

- All info in step 1

- Request back-up from members trained in crowd management.

Step 4

- Set highest standard of tolerance and pay attention to own body language.

- DO NOT PROMISE anything.

- Attempt to set an atmosphere conductive to negotiations by implementing the 5 C-STEPS

The 5 C-STEPS are: co-operation; communication; comprehension (understanding), conflict (provocation) and confrontation (violence) (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering: 17; Crowd Management Training for Platoon Members, 2008: 21).

The outcome of this learning programme deals with all the basic knowledge that is needed to handle a crowd management situation and to identify the most important information to hand over to trained Public Order Policing members (POP) members when they arrive on the scene. The first member on the scene can assist to ensure that the situation is kept calm if the member has the relevant knowledge on how to handle a crowd management (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.6.5 Role of the police

It is not the function of the police to take sides in any dispute. Their task is to uphold the law and to take all reasonable steps to ensure peace whether on the picket line or elsewhere (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering: 27).

The police have the responsibility to enforce the law (criminal law) where and when necessary. They may arrest picketers for participation in violent conduct or attending a picket armed with dangerous weapons. They may take steps to protect the public if they are of the opinion that the picket is not peaceful and will lead to violence.

The Information Manager of the Public Oder Police (Captain M.C. van Vuuren) mentioned that it was important to observe if crowds have any weapons or not. This could indicate the mood of the crowd and if they might become unruly. It is important to handle the situation until the POP members arrive to take over the management of these kinds of situations (Van Vuuren, 2013).

According to the manual, when addressing crowd management policy, the SAPS must conform to democratic values and acceptable international standards (HRD: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering: 32). When the police adhere to democratic values the rights of protesters to march, and the safety of non-participants and their property, are getting equal attention to protection (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.6.6 PRINCIPLES

Principals and ideals that must be complied with:

-        Upholding the constitutional rights;

-        Acknowledging the right to demonstrate peacefully, without infringing on others' rights;

-        Being firm, fair and tolerant;

-        To perform all tasks effectively and efficiently.

-        To accomplish the following ideals for crowd management situations:

-       No loss of life;

-       No damage to property;

-       No injuries;

-       All citizens satisfied with the conduct of the SAPS;

In short, the presence of the police at any demonstration (up to 15 people) or gathering (more than 15 people) must make people to feel safe and secure (Human Resource Development: General Research and Curriculum Development: First Responder to a crowd gathering: 33; Regulating Gatherings, 2008: 209).

The 3 week programme is an effective tool to present to trainees, it contains all the basic requirements that a police official needs to be able to perform any crowd management duties. The introducing of all the equipment with practical scenarios can contribute in a better understanding of what equipment can be used and how it can be used effectively during crowd management (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.7 THE RESEARCHER'S OBSERVATION

During her time at the Mthatha Training Institution the researcher has observed *inter alia* the following matters:

Police trainees did receive very brief theoretical briefings on crowd management and unrest related incidents but it was just an orientation and there were many things that were lacking. The following matters can be pointed out:

- Although trainees did receive brief theoretical training in the Regulation Gathering Act, Act 205 of 1993, the majority of the members (80%) did not understand it.

- 52% of the trainees did not know what crowd management was all about

- It is clear that members did not have sufficient practical exposure to unrest related incidents/real practical demonstrations)

- Members did receive training in arresting techniques

- The tonfa training was inadequate when it comes to crowd control

- Trainees had no knowledge what crowd management equipment they could use

- They did not receive training in the use of shields, helmets or teargas

- No methods or techniques were learned to use in conjunction with arresting techniques

- They were not learned to negotiate

- They were not learned to identify the leaders of a crowd

- The battery tests that the trainees have done did not teach them anything about crowd control but only about being fit and to carry their partner in an emergency situation

- The "skills and fear" course that trainees had to do assist members to overcome their fears and give them confidence in their physical and mental abilities but it lacks practical techniques and scenarios that can assist them to handle crowds (Van Vuuren, 2013).

4.8 GENERAL REMARKS AFTER DATA GATHERING PROCESS

A few important issues emerged from the interviews and the data collected. It is clear there are a high number of gatherings currently taking place in South Africa and that it is the task and job of police officials to perform crowd management duties. However, it is clear police trainees and station members are not adequately trained and equipped to respond as first responders in an effective manner if the need arises.

The data collected through the focus groups, interviews and personal conversations confirm the need for police officials to be trained more effectively in dealing with the management of crowds. The police trainees during basic training had a poor knowledge about the Regulation of Gatherings Act and also little or no knowledge about the equipment that can be used during unruly crowd incidents and how they could use it.

The 3 week course, mentioned in this chapter, is something that needs to be offered to all police trainees while they are in basic training. The importance of knowing the

Regulation of Gathering Act, Act 205 of 1993 and the rights of people as stipulated in the constitution, Act 108 of 1996, especially Chapter Two, the Bill of Rights, cannot be over-emphasized. Only by knowing the rights of people and what needs to be respected will the police officials be equipped to start policing crowds more correctly.

Section 12(2) of the constitution for example, guarantees people personal safety against any form of violence, regardless of where the violence originates. The police therefore needs to manage the safety of all people, whether they are involved in marches or not. This means in practice that there is a legal mandate that they need to fulfil and that is to make the people feel safe.

4.9 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TRAINING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES IN THE POLICING OF UNREST RELATED INCIDENTS

Through personal observation and through the interviews and conversations it became clear to the researcher that the trainees at Mthatha Training Institution lack crowd management knowledge, the majority do not know the legal aspects related to crowd control, they cannot differentiate between different types of crowds, they do not know what type of equipment they can use, they do not know how to use some of the equipment, and there is an inability to observe, to assess and to gather the necessary information that is needed to convey to POP members who are called in to take over the situation.

Trainees did not know to identify the leaders of the crowd, they did not gather sufficient intelligence to exactly know why the crowd is there, they did not know that violence is always about relational conflicts and that the different parties that are clashing need to be contacted in order to bring them together to talk and try to sort out the differences. The "soft skills" approach of negotiation and trying to make peace were not sufficiently visible in the training.

The leadership (trainers) who are responsible to train the police trainees are offering the training as they are instructed to do. This means that the national training division of the SAPS need to update the training of the trainees in order to rectify the lack of training and comprehension skills related to the policing of crowd related incidents at grass roots level.

On the positive side, the trainees were disciplined, fit, willing to learn, and cooperative. They were well trained in arresting techniques and the use of the tonfa although the training of the tonfa was for self-defence purposes and not for use in crowd control situations. The basic absence of knowledge about the riot shield, helmets and teargas and the use thereof cannot be laid before the door of the trainees, but they do not have an excuse not to understand the basics of crowd management and especially the legal aspects.

4.10.1 CROWD CONTROL TRAINING GAPS DURING BASIC POLICE TRAINING

The following training gaps were already mentioned and discussed but it is highlighted here because these specific issues need to be addressed so that every police trainee can be better equipped during police training to go and assist station members as well as experienced and well-trained POP members. While POP members are primarily tasked to do crowd management, police trainees who have completed their basic police training are the ones who will assist them at station level and will act as first responders until POP members arrive.

- There are no real practical exercises presented to the trainees in crowd management or to deal with unrest related incidents.

- The trainees are not introduced to the equipment that they could utilize when they have to do crowd control.

- There is no training provided to the trainees on how to use the equipment used during crowd management and unrest related incidents.

- The legal knowledge that members need in order to make decisions regarding the application of the rule of law is lacking.

- Knowledge on the continuum of force (principle of minimum force) is not explained in a practical enough manner that is easy enough to comprehend.

- Crowd control knowledge is never static but always dynamic so police trainees must be trained in different scenarios in order to have some kind of guidelines on how to handle different gatherings (Van Vuuren, 2013).

- The public expect the police to assist them so police members must also reveal some basic knowledge in public relations to serve them in a prompt and efficient manner.

- They must be able to assess crowd situations with crowds and to make a decision if it is a demonstration or a gathering and if it is violent or not.

- Trainees must be exposed to basic negotiation skills (e.g. listening to both parties).

- They also must be trained to gather information. Not the proverbial "5 Whiskies and 1 Hotel", but "5 Whiskies, 1 Hotel and 1 Swimming pool" (who, when, where, why, what, how & so?) (Ras, 2013).

- The trainees must be trained in the "So" or "So what?" aspects. Now that they know that there is a problem what are they going to do about it? This is where decision-making processes come in and they have to make use of all their accumulated knowledge in order to make an informed decision.

4.11 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) AND THE POLICING OF CROWDS

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has made the following recommendations in respect of the policing of crowds in South Africa many years ago (Rauch & Storey, 1998:20):

- Ensure that all members of the Police Service dealing with public order incidents have received the required training and that training standards are in line with international standards (Rauch & Storey 1998: 21). This training must be introduced during basic training (Van Vuuren 2013).

- Case studies of past incidents of bad practice by the former SAP in the policing of crowds and gatherings should continue to be used in POP training materials to ensure that future public order police officials are aware of the bloody history of their units and that such practices are never again tolerated them or the public (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 21). It is important to acknowledge that in order to correct past mistakes, they should be identified

and new improved methods and techniques must be introduced to all trainees during formal training (Van Vuuren, 2013)

4.12 BENEFITS OF A PROFESSIONAL POLICE SERVICE

The numbers of Public Order Police (POP) members were almost reduced with about 50% due to transformation and other policing priorities, the present state of affairs requires that ordinary uniform members of the police must now perform crowd management duties, especially acting as first responders before members of POP can arrive on the scene.

It is therefore important that all police personnel must be well-trained in crowd management before they are placed at police stations across the country. This includes police trainees, like those at Mthatha Training Institution, who must be well-trained in unrest related incidents before they leave the institution to serve at police stations all around South Africa.

The benefits of having a professional police service where all members even at station level know how to do basic crowd management and to deal with unrest related incidents are as follows:

- It leads to greater police safety

- It brings better training standards

- It provides better support

- It ensure all police members are better equipped to enforce the law

- It promotes the international standards of the police

- It leads to greater public respect

- The public will reveal greater trust in the police

- The public will cooperate more with the police

- The public will more easily share information with the police

- The police will master the necessary "soft skills" to negotiate

- The "hard-line approach" of the police will be put aside for a more softer and persuasive approach without compromising the safety of police officers and / or the public

- There will be greater respect for the law

- The professional visibility of the police will restore confidence in the police because people feel safe when they are there and they act as a crime deterrent

- The visible personal discipline of a professional service will enhance the professional fighting or combat skills of the police

- The professionalism of the police will assist to enhance the negotiation peace process between warring factions

4.13 SUMMARY

Chapter Four was about gaining insights, through the practical data gathering process, about the trainees' lack of training in crowd control skills. This was done by paying attention to *inter alia* the need to improve training (section 4.2), focus groups (section 4.3), personal interviews (section 4.4), a brief discussion was given on the collected data (section 4.5), the recommended 3 weeks training programme for crowd management was briefly discussed (section 4.6) as well as the researcher's observations (section 4.7).

General remarks were made after the data gathering process (section 4.8), an assessment of the training methods and techniques in the policing of unrest related incidents were given (section 4.9), gaps in the training were exposed (section 4.10), and remarks were made about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) recommendations regarding the public order police (section 4.11) and the benefits of professional Police Service (section 4.12).

The researcher has pointed out that the present training at Mthatha's Training Institution is inadequate and that police trainees have basically no practical exposure to crowd management, the equipment, and the use of the equipment. They not only lack the necessary legal skills, but they also lack intelligence information gathering skills when they arrive on the scene, they cannot determine between a demonstration and a gathering,

and they are not trained in "soft skills" negotiation and bringing two warring groups together for peace talks.

It is clear at this stage that there must be intervention at national level and that crowd management courses must become compulsory for all police trainees while busy with training. The trainers who are responsible to train the trainees need present it properly but they cannot do that if they themselves are not properly trained and equipped for this task. Proper training in crowd control skills will definitely enhance the professional image of the police in the eyes of the public and media.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter Four was about gaining insights into the training deficiencies of the police trainees at Mthatha's Training Institution and to point out the need that they have to be better trained and equipped to assist with unrest related incidents. Chapter Five is about drawing conclusions and making recommendations in the light of what has been said but this will be done while highlighting a few other issues as well.

5.2 POLICY DOCUMENT ON CROWD MANAGEMENT

The policy document of crowd management states that the police are there to serve the community (Public Order Policy Document in Crowd Management) but it must be in line with the constitution (Act 108 of 1996) and the Regulation of Gathering Act, Act 205 of 1993. This must be emphasised to the trainees at basic training level. The trainers are responsible to do that and if they lack the necessary training then they need to upgrade themselves because the trainees will not fully comprehend what to do if their trainers lack knowledge and skills (Van Vuuren, 2013).

5.3 CROWD MANAGEMENT TRAINING AT BASIC TRAINING LEVEL

Although there is a chapter on theory of crowd management offered at basic police training level, no practical training is provided, no proper discussion of the equipment that can be used and also no practical demonstrations on how to use the equipment.

It is a fact that at Mthatha Training Institution trainees did not know what a shield was or how to use it, equipment like water cannons, teargas and rubber rounds were not introduced at any stage during basic training and the use of force when dealing with a crowd was not explained to them in a practical manner. Although the legal aspects were explained about 80% of the trainees were not really informed. This is a very serious training gap.

Crowd control and the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup: Before the 2010 Soccer World Cup the riot control techniques were based on the Belgium model.

The Belgium model: In the Belgium model of crowd control the idea is to keep a safe distance between the police and the crowds and to disperse them with weapons based on the principle of minimum force, whenever and where necessary. This model is more reactive than proactive because here the police work reactively.

The French model of crowd control: Before the FIFA Soccer World Cup key personnel have received training in the French model of crowd control through a 3 week training course (Martin, 2011:11). Meiring (2011) *inter alia* provided training to police members before the Soccer World Cup and today, after this event, the idea is to roll this training out to other police members all over South Africa.

In the French model the police moves a few meters in front of the crowd and manage them through negotiations and soft skills. The idea is to be more proactive and to move with the crowd, like moving with the marchers to the place where they are going to hand over the petition. This further means that this type of modus operandi is based on proactive planning that again is based on intelligence gathering.

Because of the uprising in violent protests all over the country the need to train existing SAPS members at station level has increased extensively. As pointed out earlier, these members need to act as first responders. This again means *in praxis* that all police trainees must be trained at basic training level.

What trainees need to know: It is essential that police trainees need to know the law and the practical application of the law as well as crowd management techniques including weapons or equipment skills and tactics. In short, they need crowd control theory and crowd control practical's that they must be able to integrate in a professional manner.

In praxis this means they must be able to do the following minimum things:

- Respond promptly

- Observe thoroughly

- Assess the situation

- Determine the type of area (e.g. an open space, between shacks, a sports field)

- Determine if the crowd is a demonstration or a gathering

- Observe and determine if they are peaceful or unruly

- If they are aggressive or not

- If they have weapons or not

- Identify the leaders of the crowd

- Gather sufficient intelligence to know what is going on

- Communicate with the leaders

- Negotiate with the leaders (e.g. try to reach an agreement)

- Use soft skills (like talking, negotiating, bring warring parties together to talk)

- Implement minimum force at all times (basic persuasive communication)

- Implement the continuum of force (different steps necessary to restrain the crowd if absolute necessary)

- Know what equipment to use and when (e.g. water cannons, tonfas, shields, teargas, rubber rounds, crowd formations)

- Know that both protestors and non-protestors need to be protected

- Know that diffusing the situation is more important than to use force

In short, police trainees must master the basic skills to deal with crowds in a soft manner but they must be trained to defend themselves and others also with "hardware" when absolute necessary (Ras, 2003; 2013). All these things must occur within the parameters of the law and in a manner that reflects a culture of human rights.

5.4 CROWD MANAGEMENT STATISTICS AND TRAINING AS PREPARATION FOR FUTURE CROWD CONTROL INCIDENTS

According to the SAPS in 2011 there were 13 282 public gatherings that took place in South Africa, an average of 36 situations per day (Kohler-Barnard, 2011: 2). A lot of these protests are about service deliveries issues like infrastructure, water, electricity, roads, sanitation, in competencies of local councillors, failure to deliver on time, empty promises, high crime, shocking crimes, housing issues, and competition for scarce resources, conflict with foreigners, or simply opportunistic crime or no job opportunities. Whatever the case, the police need to attend and to police the crowds. However, the response of the police is characterized by inadequate skills and non-professional behaviour (Newham, 2012: 2).

During the 2008/2009 period 568 people were shot dead by the police according to South Africa's Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). This was more than double the number just three years earlier. In 2009/2010 the figure was 524 people and the number of police assaults rose from 1380 in 2007/2008 to 1867 in 2009/2010. This statistics indicate that the police needs more training because it is because of a lack of training and restraining methods that these deaths and assaults occur.

Brigadier "Happy" Schutte, Operational Head of the Crime Combatting Unit in Gauteng has pointed out that an Arab Spring revolution can happen in South Africa because 80% of youth in townships are unemployed. All that is needed is the right leader to stir them up, "Then you are going to have a problem" (Defenceweb 2011: 1).

Schutte has emphasised the importance of liaising with protest organizers and for the police to train all their members to be ready for any form of riot: "We cannot wait three years to train people how to deal with riots", and, referring to Julius Malema and Arab Spring style protests, he said: "Training is the most important thing…there is not enough investment in training and this will come back and bite" (Defenceweb 2011: 11).

The above-mentioned statement of an expert Operational Head of ACCU in the economic hub in South Africa rings an alarm bell for everyone's concern about the future utilization of police members in crowd control situations. Now is the time to prepare the police through training for future deployment and this means that all police members,

starting at Police Training Institutions like Mthatha Training Institution, must be thoroughly trained and equipped to handle unrest related interventions (Van Vuuren, 2013).

5.5 NEW POLICY ON POLICING PUBLIC ORDER PROTEST: 2011

Minister Nathi Mthethwa, the Minister of Police, in August 2011 has approved a new crowd control policy for the police. He said: "The policy and guidelines must guide the SAPS in developing appropriate, effective operational strategies and systems in policing of public protests which must restore and enhance confidence of the communities."

He added that the policy calls for the re-establishment of a dedicated National Public Order Policing (POPs) unit within the South African Police Service (SAPS). "The policy is there…the need is there…. We must re-establish and maintain POP units which have the necessary capacity, command and control structures to effectively carry out public order policing" (Defenceweb 2011: 11).

"To protest is a constitutional right," the Minister said, adding that people want their property protected but at the same time must enjoy their democratic right to express their views and grievances (Martin, 2011: 1). Just as it is important to know what rights protestors have, every police official has the right to know how to deal with crowds because they are the ones who are going to respond first, before POP members are going to arrive to take over (Van Vuuren, 2013).

5.6 PRACTICAL INSIGHTS FOR POLICE TRAINEES

It is good to share some insights that are valuable to the reader as well as police trainees related to the policing of unrest related incidents. These insights can be explained during training:

- Approach the crowd in the right manner (a soft approach is better than a hard one)

- Remember that the handing over of memorandums are very important for crowds

- Cordon off certain areas (to have better control)

- Restrict protests to specific routes to minimize damage

- Employ the best possible formation to prevent provocation

- Identify the leaders for negotiation

- Cover protests through video recording (trainees must learn to make recordings)

- Read situations and use only the minimum amount of force

- Know your equipment and when to use it

5.7 POLICE EQUIPMENT

Brief remarks are necessary about the minimum police equipment that is necessary for doing crowd management, as mentioned in the 3 week programme (4.6). Police trainees need to get exposure to all these "tools" in their equipment kit although they will seldom have to use it if they can correctly make use of "soft skills" and persuade the protestors to remain peaceful.

These are: body armour (armour plates), helmets, shields, tonfas, water cannons, armoured vehicles, different kinds of firearms (9 mm pistols, 12 bore shotguns, R5 assault rifles), ammunition (different kinds), video surveillance equipment, pepper spray, teargas, pyrotechnics like stunt grenades, pencil flares, instant flash, thunder flashes (Afrikaans" "donderbuise"), and basic first aid equipment.

Pepper spray, like teargas is irritating to the eyes and causes red eyes and a red nose. Teargas consists of chemical compounds that drive back crowds because the gas irritates the mucus membranes of the eyes, nose and mouth and can cause tearing, blurred vision, runny noses, redness, rashes, nausea and vomiting. The effects are typically short lived, wearing after 15 to 30 minutes (Police and Guidelines. Police of public protest, gatherings and Major events, 2011: 24).

Tonfas are usually used against the arms and legs and trainees are taught not to hit to the head, the stomach or private parts because that can be deadly. Water cannons are mounted on trucks and can spray water at high pressure to ward off crowds. It can knock a person off its feet from nearly 100 meters. Armoured vehicles like the Casspir and Nyala vehicles are used to carry and protect personnel, to move obstructions, and to carry and store equipment (Rauch & Storey, 1998: 18).

The firearms of the police consist of the 9 mm, Z88 or Petro Beretta pistol, the 12 bore Musler shotgun (pump action) and the R 5 assault rifle. The shotgun can fire different types of ammunition that is colour coded in the police (Rauch & Storey 1998:18). They normally fire bird shot (no. 7 size, small pellets), buck shot (no. 5), "triple A" (AAA), SSG, SG and slugs. The R5 fires the NATO round, the 5.56 x 45 mm.

A well-dressed police officer with shining shoes, a polished leather belt, an ironed uniform, and neat pants are professional and a symbol of personal discipline. And someone with personal discipline, in the eyes of the public, looks professional and psychologically-speaking, will also combat or fighting discipline. A neat appearance commands respect and definitely acts as a deterrent to crime (Ras, 2013).

As pointed out on several occasions in this dissertation it is essential that police trainees must know their tools and how to use it. It is possible to demonstrate all these different weapons to members in a short period of time although it normally takes time to ensure that they are competent in the use thereof. It is also essential that police trainees get a manual that they can read and study in order to acquaint themselves before they do practical. Kohler-Barnard (2011: 1) pointed out that the standing orders for the policing of public gatherings have not even been compiled into a manual during the 2011 period.

5.8 GUIDELINES TO CONTROL CROWDS AT VENUES AND EVENTS

If marches take place according to the law then there is sufficient time (7 days minimum) to plan. When spontaneous crowds take place it becomes challenging and very often dangerous. General procedures than can be followed to control crowds at venues and events include:

- Controlling entry into venues or events
- Monitor and communicate on crowd and individual behaviour
- Deal with potential aggressive, abusive or violent behaviour
- Administer and coordinate first responses, first aid or critical care
- Coordinate emergency evacuation of a venue or event (Crowd Control at Venues and Events, 2007: 3)

Proper and safe crowd management can be achieved through *inter alia* permit monitoring at access control points, searching for dangerous weapons at important events like political rallies, assessing people handling capabilities projecting levels of occupancy, the adequacy of access points, processing procedures like ticket collection, planning for expected type of crowd behaviour, (Hamilton, 2009: 10). However, if crowds gather in a spontaneous manner and there was no planned gathering it is difficult for the police to follow this procedure.

5.9 DIFFERENT KIND OF GATHERINGS

Police trainees need to know to identify crowds as peaceful or not. They must also be able to say if it is a demonstration (1 to 15 people) or a gathering (16 plus people). Crowd events or crowd situations include sporting events, festivals, concerts, celebratory crowds, and demonstrations. When a crowd becomes unruly they are known as a "mob" or "hooligans", like "soccer hooligans" (Ras, 2013).

5.10 CROWD BEHAVIOUR

Crowds can be violent, aggressive or troublesome. As a result of this challenging task police trainees need to pay careful attention to the crowds by observing, assessing and evaluating them.

Crowd controllers: Crowd controllers need good communication skills to deal with violent or abusive people. The more police officials are present the better to deal with these members. Certain drugs will cause recognisable behaviour patterns including heightened or irrational emotional states. Where problem behaviour has been identified it is important to have sufficient crowd controllers allocated to ensure intervention can be carried out swiftly and safely (Crowd Control at Venues and Events, 2007: 19).

Good coordination: There must be good coordination between staff members of the agency and/or the host of the event and the police (Crowd Control at Venues and Events, 2007: 19) It is a simple fact that when doing crowd management the police actually act as crowd controllers, just like private security guards act as access controllers at special events like soccer matches, school functions, and so forth.

Substance abuse: Drugs and alcohol abuse is a national crisis and it is important that these things be controlled as far as possible at major events. For example, no alcohol is allowed on beaches during peak holiday seasons, bottles or dangerous weapons are also confiscated at access control points or at choke points.

Handguns and sporting events: Some police officers have informally estimated that there are between 1.5% to 2% sport spectators who are carrying handguns at sporting events (Goldaber, 1997-2000). Police trainees must be aware of that. No weapons are allowed at political meetings or gatherings.

Conditions that can cause crowd problems: According to Goldaber there are 4 types of conditions that can create crowd management problems:

- Problems created by a crowd from within
- Problems created by a crowd from outside
- Environmental catastrophe
- Rumours

Crowd controllers must always consider the above-mentioned conditions so that they can be adequately prepared for any unforeseen circumstances.

5.11 THE USE OF FIREARMS IN CROWD MANAGEMENT

The Andries Tatane case at Ficksburg and especially the Marikana event or "massacre" as it is known in the media, are constant reminders that things can go "dead wrong" in unrest related incidents. The use of lethal (deadly) force is guided by Standing Order 262 of the South African Police Services.

A decision to discharge a firearm must be legal and on the order of a commander. Any decision to discharge a firearm must be subjected to a review and investigation which does not exclude disciplinary and criminal charges in cases resulting in casualties or fatalities (Police and Guidelines: Policing of Public Protests, Gatherings and Major Events, 2011: 23).

The right to life is enshrined in the new constitution (Act 108 of 1996, section 11) and this must be respected at all times. Police trainees must be especially well-trained in the use of deadly force and they must know it must be only in a life-threatening situation, where their own life, or that of another, is in direct and immediate danger, when they can take a life.

5.12 THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CROWD CONTROL

Intelligence gathering before any crowd control event, especially political or protest marches are always important because potential dangerous situations can be avoided when the police has the right information, for example, the number of people participating, if they are armed or not, the mood of the crowd, the reason for the march, their leaders, what they are up to, what are their plans and what demands are there that they want to be met.

A close collaboration between crime intelligence and crowd combatting units are necessary, but if the first-mentioned is not there, then the commander of POP or the SAPS first responders must see to it that they get the necessary information. The gathering of intelligence through the well-known expression "5 Whiskies, 1 Hotel and 1 Swimming pool", "Who, When, Where, Why, What, How" and "So?" is something that every trainee will remember (Ras, 2013).

5.13 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The researcher has pointed out that there are deficiencies or gaps in the training of police trainees at Mthatha Training Institution (College) when it comes to crowd management issues. However, she also has pointed out that the trainers carry the responsibility to train the trainees and if there are gaps then they are responsible to rectify that and fill up the gaps:

The most important conclusions with regard to the trainees are:

- They lack knowledge of the legal aspects related to crowd management
- They lack knowledge about the equipment that can be used during crowd control
- They cannot differentiate between different types of crowds

- They do not know how to gather intelligence

The most important conclusions with regard to the trainers are:

- They did not ensure that the trainees understand the legal aspects of crowd management well
- They did not make the crowd control training practical enough for trainees to understand
- Not all the trainers know how all the different equipment can be used
- They have neglected practical training

The recommendations are:

- Crowd control training must be compulsory for all police trainees during basic police training
- Police trainees must all have a clear understanding of all legal aspects of crowd management
- Police trainees must know all the equipment that can be used during unrest related incidents
- Trainees must know how to use all the equipment
- They must know what to do when they are a first responder to an unrest related incident (this includes: observe, assess, evaluate, identify the leaders, use soft skills like communication and negotiation, implement the principle of minimum force)
- They must be able to support POP members when they arrive on the scene

5.14 SUMMARY

Chapter Five was about the conclusions and recommendations of this study. Brief remarks were made on the policy document on crowd control management (section 5.2), brief attention was paid to crowd control training at the basic training level of the police (section 5.3), and remarks were made about crowd management statistics and training as preparation for future crowd control incidents (section 5.4).

The new policy on Public Order Protest of 2011 was mentioned (section 5.5), remarks were made about practical insights for police trainees (section 5.6), attention was given to police equipment (section 5.7), guidelines were given to control crowds at venues and events (section 5.8), different kind of gatherings were discussed (section 5.9), and remarks were made about crowd behaviour (section 5.10).

The use of firearms in crowd management was also highlighted (section 5.11), and a few remarks were made about the use of intelligence in crowd control (section 5.12). The last two sections were dealing with the conclusions and recommendations (section 5.13) and a brief summary concluded this chapter (section 5.14). The researcher will make a final word in section 5.15.

5.15 A FINAL WORD

This study has taken much longer than what the researcher originally had intended, but when she reflects from where she had started and where she now finds herself in terms of self-growth and knowledge acquisition, she realizes that she did not stagnate.

Despite the challenges that are facing the SAPS today in terms of crowd management, the researcher believes that if her main recommendation, that the training of unrest related incidents (crowd control management) must become an integral part of basic police training, then all the study and hard work taken to produce this document, "to protect and to serve", was not in vain.

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SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE DIENS 　**SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE**

Private Bag 5052, MTHATHA, 5099

E-mail :

Verwysing Reference	0436527-5	
Navrae Enquiries	Lt Col Mabhengwana	
Telefoon Telephone	047 - 501 7712	
Faksnommer Fax number	047 - 501 7714/53	

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
MTHATHA
5099

2010-06-15

THE SECTION HEAD
BASIC TRAINING PROVISION
PRIVATE BAG X 177
PRETORIA
0001

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH: SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION - MTHATHA.

1. Application for authority to conduct a research by No. 0436527-5 Capt MD Van Vuuren is hereby made.

2. Capt Van Vuuren has been admitted as a Master's Degree in Policing student at the University of Zululand and she is head of Human Resource Management of this Institution.

3. This office recommends that the member can be allowed to do a Research as the topic is about " An Evaluation of Basic Training for the Policing of Unrest Related Incidents" and this is the only Basic Training in the area and the service delivery is going to take place as usual. Since she will not be taking leave in order for her to go and do research.

4. This is an opportunity for the member to increase her skills in Policing. If the research is completed and approved the member needs to submit a copy to the Institutions and Head Office as this will assist in the betterment of training and probably for SAPS as a whole benefit.

5. Attached is the copy of application from the Officer and confirmation letter from the University of Zululand.

6. This office does not have a problem for the member to conduct this research if your office gives a go-ahead.

7. Your assistance in this regard will be highly appreciated.

Kind Regards

_____ **COLONEL**
COMMANDER : SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION: MTHATHA
ME NTUNJA

DATE 2010-06-17

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH : SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION - MTHATHA

APPROVED / NOT APPROVED

RECOMMENDATIONS / COMMENTS :

Recommended if this is not going to Compromise Training

_____ **MAJOR GENERAL**

HEAD: BASIC TRAINING
S NYALUNGA

DATE: 2010-06-28

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE DIENS   SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

Private Bag 5052, MTHATHA, 5099
E-mail :

Verwysing Reference	0436527-5	
Navrae Enquiries	Captain(f) van Vuuren	
Telefoon Telephone	047 501 7729	
Faksnommer Fax number	047 501 7714	

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
MTHATHA
5099

2010-06-11

SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
MTHATHA
5099

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH: AN EVALUATION OF BASIC TRAINING FOR THE POLICING OF UNREST RELATED INCIDENTS AT THE MTHATHA SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION: SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION - MTHATHA

1.   I hereby apply for permission to conduct a research at the Mthatha Training Institution for my Masters Degree.

2.   The research that I will be conducting will be in the form of interviews, observations, collection of data and a checklist with Trainers and Trainees.

3.   The conducting of the research will take place without disruption of duties of the members or the trainees and not without prior arrangement with the Training Manager of the Mthatha Training Institution.

4.   I undertake to treat all information from members and trainees with strict confidentiality.

3.   Your favourable approval in this regard will be highly appreciated.

Kind regards.

_____CAPTAIN(F)
HUMAN RESOURCES: SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION: MTHATHA
MD VAN VUUREN

Reply Reply all Forward |

MASTERS DEGREE: STUDENT

From: **Prof. J.M. Ras** (jras@pan.uzulu.ac.za)
Sent: 10 June 2010 09:25:28 AM
To: Mariette Van Vuuren (mariettevv@live.co.za)

This is to confirm that Mariette Van Vuuren (Tel 082 574 611 /
047-5017729) is a Masters degree student at the University of Zululand
in the Department of Criminal Justice. Please allow her to do fieldwork
and to gather information related to her topic: "An evaluation of basic
training for the policing of unrest related incidents at Mthatha SAPS
Training College." For any other information please feel free to
contact me: Prof. Johan Ras, Head of Department: Criminal Justice,
Vice-Dean, Faculty of Arts, Tel 035-9026518 / 083 574 80 99
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NOTICE: Please note that this e-mail, and the contents
thereof, is subject to the standard University of
Zululand e-mail disclaimer which may be found at:
http://www.ict.uzulu.ac.za/electronic_mail_disclaim

Reply Reply all Forward | Delete |

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE DIENS   **SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE**

Private Bag 5052, MTHATHA, 5099
E-mail :

Verwysing Reference	0436527-5
Navrae Enquiries	Captain(f) van Vuuren
Telefoon Telephone	047 501 7729
Faksnommer Fax number	047 501 7714

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
MTHATHA
5099

2010-07-21

This has been approved by HO
All Trainers please assist the
Capt with 15 volunteers for the
research to be completed. She
is on a tight schedule
urgent !!!

SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
MTHATHA
5099

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH: AN EVALUATION OF BASIC TRAINING FOR THE POLICING OF UNREST RELATED INCIDENTS AT THE MTHATHA SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION: SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION - MTHATHA

1.   I hereby apply for permission to conduct a research at the Mthatha Training Institution for my Masters Degree.

2.   The research that I will be conducting will be in the form of interviews, observations, collection of data and a checklist with Trainers and Trainees.

3.   I hereby apply to have interviews with approximately 15 trainees on 2010-07-22 and 2010-07-23 between 16:00 and 18:45. This is in my own time and also the only time trainees are free.

3.   Your favourable approval in this regard will be highly appreciated.

Kind regards.

_____CAPTAIN(F)
HUMAN RESOURCES: SAPS TRAINING INSTITUTION: MTHATHA
MD VAN VUUREN

ANNEXURE A6

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES: TRAINERS AND TRAINEES

1. Tell me what do you know about crowd management/unrest related incidents/ gathering of people?

2. What part do you think does a police official play when there is a strike?

3. What is the difference between a protest march and a strike?

4. If you were working at the WC 2010, near the men's toilets and there was a drunken crowd that started to become unruly, how would you handle the situation?

5. If you were working at a police station and you are called out to attend to a "xenophobic attack" incident, how would you attend to it?

6. What items can be used in the handling of an unruly crowd?

7. What can you tell me about a shield?

8. Do you know Act 205, Gathering Act?

9. If you are attending a complaint where the communities is unhappy about a crime committed by a suspect, who has been set free on bail and when you arrive there are approximately 20 to 30 people, what process will you follow?

ANNEXURE A7

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES: POPS MEMBERS

1. According to your opinion what are the basic functions of POPS at the management of crowds?

2. What is the difference between strikes and a protest march?

3. What is your opinion of a new Constable if you observe, are they capable of (in basic terms) to manage crowds when they arrive at POPS?

4. Would it assist if trainees are trained in the basic handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents?

5. Would it assist if members on stations are trained in the basic handling of crowd management and unrest related incidents?

6. Do you have enough members at the POPS unit?

7. Do you know Act 205, Gathering Act?

ANNEXURE A8

COURSE OUTLINE

THEME 1: SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE
• Module 1: South African Police

THEME 2: PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
• Module 1: Orientation to Policing Framework
• Module 2: South African Police Service Culture
• Module 3: Organized Group Activities

THEME 3: SELF-MANAGEMENT
• Module 1: HIV / Aids Awareness
• Module 2: Substance Dependency Program
• Module 3: Managing Stress Effectively
• Module 4: Be Money Wise
• Module 5: Life Skills

THEME 4: COMMUNICATION
• Module 1: Oral Communication
• Module 2: Occupational Communication
• Module 3: Reading and Viewing Skills
• Module 4: Writing Skills

THEME 5: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF POLICING
• Module 1: Criminal Procedure
• Module 2: Law and Policing
• Module 3: SA Criminal Law
• Module 4: Specific Crimes
• Module 5: Statutory Law

THEME 6: INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
• Module 1: System Literacy

ANNEXURE B

(Mthatha Training Institution: Trainees Weapon; Physical Exercise; Tonfa and Drill displays)

(Photos courtesy Captain MC van Vuuren)

ANNEXURE C

(Crowd Management: Equipment)

(Photos courtesy Eugene Coetzee: Herald Photographer: Herald Newspaper: Port Elizabeth)

ANNEXURE D

(Crowd Behaviour)

(Photos courtesy Eugene Coetzee: Herald Photographer: Herald Newspaper: Port Elizabeth)