

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ZULUS IN THE
ANGLO-BOER WAR 1899 - 1902

by

SIMON JABULANI MAPHALALA

B.A. HONS. (U.Z.)

Submitted in fulfilment or partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of History
of the
University of Zululand

DATE SUBMITTED: 15th March, 1978

DECLARATION

I, Simon Jabulani Maphalala do hereby declare that
this dissertation represents my own work both
in conception and execution.

Signed by me *S. Maphalala* on this 15th
day of March, 1978 at KwaDlangezwa.

P R E F A C E

Sources which have been consulted for this research, are part of the magisterial reports in the State Archives, Pietermaritzburg. But unfortunately part of the report by G A Mills is no longer available. His report was titled: A Report on the causes which led to the ill-feeling between the Boers and the Zulus under Sikobobo at Holkrantz on the 6th May, 1902. According to information received at the Archives, a researcher from England had been reading it and it has subsequently disappeared. The research has however, been supplemented by valuable information on the Holkrantz murder in the Preller collection in the State Archives, Pretoria.

In a few instances where the course of the Anglo-Boer War is discussed in my work, use has been made of secondary sources written by scholars who had the opportunity of thoroughly examining the primary sources about the war.

Lastly the authenticity and meaning of some Zulu words mentioned in this study are sometimes doubtful. This is because of the difficulty most of the whites had in writing and speaking the Zulu language. Very often the surnames of Zulu chiefs or others were ignored, eg. Sibiya, Chief Sikobobo's surname was not mentioned in the documents. We know that surnames among our people are very important. Sikobobo should be Sikhobobo but because the old form of Zulu does not use an h, it has been written Sikobobo without an h although it must be pronounced with an h.

I wish to thank my study leader, Professor D J P Haasbroek, Head of the Department of History at the University of Zululand for his guidance throughout my period of study. I further wish to thank Dr W van der Merwe, whose knowledge of the Zulu History has helped me to solve some of the intricate problems during my research.

My thanks are also due to the following officials for their help during my research: the Chief Archivist and staff of the State Archives in Pretoria; the archivist and staff of the State Archives in Pietermaritzburg, and the Librarian and staff of the University of Zululand.

I have also received assistance from the following scholars: Professor Dr A C Nkabinde, Prof. Dr W A Venter, Mr D M Masikela, Mr A Mtshali, Mr O D Dhlomo and Miss P Rossington. I greatly appreciate their help.

To my dear wife, Nomagugu Qondokuhle I wish to express my sincere gratitude for her constant encouragement and willingness to look after the house when I was away in search of sources in the archives.

S J MAPHALALA

KWA-DLANGEZWA 1978

1.0	<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1
1.1	<u>CHAPTER ONE</u>	
	The attitude of the Zulus towards the hostilities between the Transvaal Republic and the British government during the period 1899	16
1.2	<u>CHAPTER TWO</u>	
	The period of alarm among the Zulus in certain districts	41
1.3	<u>CHAPTER THREE</u>	
	The arming of the Zulus during 1901	55
1.4	<u>CHAPTER FOUR</u>	
	The immediate repercussions of Bottomley's actions in Zululand and some other events during 1901	82
1.5	<u>CHAPTER FIVE</u>	
	The murder at Holkrantz (Mthashana) 6 May 1902	100
1.6	<u>CHAPTER SIX</u>	
	The consequences of the murder at Holkrantz.	123
	Summary	140
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	142
	<u>LISTS OF MAPS</u>	
	A. Magisterial divisions	19-20
	B. The front in Natal	45-46
	C. The scene of Holkrantz murder (sketch).	116-117

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand the Zulu participation in the Anglo-Boer War and the Holkrantz murder in May 1902, it is essential to trace in broad outline the attitude of the Zulus towards the white settlers in Natal, the Government of Natal, the British Government and the Government of the S.A. Republic or those subjects of the Transvaal and Natal who became involved in the internal faction struggles in Zululand. The matter will only become intelligible by explaining the complexity of those policies which evolved from such contacts from the time of the arrival of the first white settlers in 1824 to the outbreak of the War in 1899.

The first Zulu king, i.e. Shaka, came into contact with the whites for the first time in 1824. It was he who used the insignificant Zulu tribe to build a formidable Zulu nation during the beginning of the 19th Century. That happened at a time when considerable destruction was caused by the Imfecane movement during 1815 and 1850. These Imfecane or Defiqane as the Basutos called the gangs of soldiers, moved about with their belongings causing destruction on their way.¹ It was an upheaval which was accompanied by carnage and destruction on an appalling scale. Whole tribes in some cases were massacred and even more died in the famine and anarchy which followed in the wake of desolating hordes. Still greater numbers abandoned their ancestral lands and sought refuge in the difficult mountain country or elsewhere, where geographical features held hope of asylum. In this way the pattern of population distribution in Southern Africa radically changed. Greater agglomerations of peoples emerged, often centred on relatively inhospitable terrain and separated from

1. F.A. Van Jaarsveld: Van Riebeeck tot Verwoerd
1652 - 1966, p 113.

one another by considerable tracts of virtually empty lands.²

It is against this background that Shaka gained control over some of the two hundred independent Nguni tribes who lived between the Drakensberg and the sea. Shaka became the ruler over an area stretching from the Pongola and the Thukela Rivers. The result was the emergence of a large Zulu kingdom, with subjects drawn from many different tribes, rigidly organized on military lines and with a tremendous concentration of power in the hands of the monarch.³

To the south of Zululand the once dense population of Natal was devastated by the passage of hordes of refugees fleeing from Shaka's armies. Natal was almost deserted and its population piled up in a confused jumble of tribes on the borders of Pondoland. Many of these refugees penetrated into the Transkei and hoped for mercy from the Thembus and Xhosas.

It was at that stage i.e. 1824 that contacts were made with whites. The latter were English traders under the leadership of Lieutenant Farewell and his party of thirty persons.⁴

They settled at a place known by the Zulus as Sibubulungu, which later became Port Natal. They soon came to know where Shaka's kraal was. After their meeting with him, they were given Sibubulungu and the unoccupied surrounding area.

In spite of the hearty welcome the relations between Shaka and the traders were strained. The latter lived in fear of what might happen to them. Their ships were always ready in case Shaka decided to attack them.⁵

As the years passed Shaka's rule over the Zulus became more and more capricious.⁶ The Zulu people became tired of wars and needed peace. The end of Shaka therefore came in 1828 when his half-brothers Dingane and Mhlangana assassinated him at Kwa-Dukuza (Stanger). This ended the first phase of

2. J.D. Smar - Cooper: The Zulu Aftermath, p. 5.

3. F.A. Van Jaarsveld, op. cit., p. 115.

4. H.F. Fynn: A Diary of Henry Francis Fynn, p. 68.

5. Ibid.

6. J. Selby: Shaka's Heirs, p. 68.

the Zulu relations with whites.

Shaka's death in 1828 took place shortly after the return of Farewell, Fynn and Isaacs from their successful visit to his royal kraal at Kwa-Bulawayo. When news of his death reached the whites, they were very upset because Shaka had granted them permission to settle in Natal. A deputation led by Nathaniel Isaacs was sent to Dingane to find out what his attitude would be towards the white settlement. It appeared to Isaacs that Dingane was seeking peace and was eager to trade. He was very anxious to get hold of guns. Thus the second phase of Zulu relations with whites was mostly concerned with arms and trade. On the whole the relation between Dingane and the traders at Port Natal was friendly. When lieutenant Farewell was killed by Qwabe tribe which was then starting a rebellion against Dingane, the latter punished them severely.

Towards the end of 1837 the Voortrekkers under Piet Retief arrived in Port Natal. The majority of the group of whites at Port Natal welcomed the arrival of the Voortrekkers.⁷ The few English settlers that were opposed to the Trekkers, were under the leadership of Gardiner. He tried to prevent Dingane from giving land to the Voortrekkers. In this manner future relations with whites were complicated by Gardiner's attitude.⁸

Before Retief's visit to Dingane news reached him that countless trekkers were at the top of the pass leading through the Khahlamba (Drakensberg) into Natal. It was also reported that the grandson of Jobe, the chief of the Sithole, had been killed by the Trekkers and that hundreds of royal cattle were driven off by them. These "marauders" were dressed like Europeans.⁹

This unhappy attack was made by Sigonyela and the Wild Cat people from what is now Basuto Qwaqwa. When Retief heard

7. A.J.H. van der Walt, J.A. Wiid en A.L. Geyer: Geskiedenis van S.A., Deel I, p. 296.

8. Ibid.

9. J. Selby, op. cit., p. 79.

of the accusation against his column, he decided to make his peace with Dingane. He and some of his party set off for Mgungundlovu, Dingane's royal kraal at Emakhosini in the Valley of the kings. They reached Dingane's kraal during November 1837 and explained their case. Dingane then replied that if it was Sigonyela, Retief should go back and punish the thieves. Thereafter they could come and ask for land to settle.¹⁰ The mission was accomplished speedily but Dingane was furious because Sigonyela was set free. Retief and his 67 followers delivered the stolen cattle to Dingane, but after negotiations for land was completed, Dingane murdered Retief and his followers. The Zulu soldiers pounced on the Trekkers and executed them on Kwa-Matiwane outside the kraal.

The relations between the Zulus and Trekkers were as a result of Retief's murder strained and a state of war was declared thereafter. Dingane immediately sent his impies to overwhelm the Trekker laagers along the Upper Thukela. These events caused bitterness and a spirit of animosity.

After the attacks on the Voortrekker laagers at Bloukrans and Bushman's Rivers, Gert Maritz started preparing a strong commando against Dingane. The British followers from Port Natal also planned an attack on the Zulus. Both expeditions failed lamentably. This severe defeat caused Potgieter and his followers to move westwards to seek fulfilment of his old ideals on the Highveld. Six days after the disaster at Tholeni thirteen British settlers, and about a thousand of their Bantu followers were killed by the Zulus on the Lower Thukela.¹¹ Thus the first contacts with the Zulus ended in bloody battle. The battle of Blood River, still called Ncome by the Zulus, decided the issue when Dingane was defeated.

The war marked the turn of the tide in the Zulu-Voortrekker conflict and it also marked the foundation of the short-lived

10. Ibid.

11. C.F.J. Muller (ed.), 500 Years of History, p. 110.

Republic of Natal, and the commemoration of the Trekker victory at Ncome on the Day of the Covenant created a new and enduring Afrikaner tradition which was to continue long beyond the earlier nineteenth century.

At the time of the defeat, there was a number of Zulus who resented Dingane's rule and its growing intolerance. The Qwabe had already defected and then Mpande, Dingane's brother followed. Mpande joined the Voortrekkers in a joint attack on Dingane. The Zulu army was defeated and chief induna Ndlela of the royal army returned to report his failure to Dingane. He was violently berated by the king and accused of cowardice and negligence. Dingane ordered his arrest and had him bound. Later, in full view of his fellow indunas, he was strangled with an oxhide thong.¹² This savage end to a popular leader shocked even those almost inured to Dingane's cruelties, and there were more desertions and more plots to assassinate the king. His murder was later carried out by Silevane, Chief of Nyawo, into whose territory Dingane and his remaining followers had strayed when fleeing north from the Trekkers.

We can safely say, the relation between Dingane and the Trekkers was characterised by a series of fightings which resulted in loss of lives but the Zulu people themselves were tired of Dingane's bloody wars and craved for peace and as the Trekkers were offering peace they were welcomed by most of the Zulus without any suspicion.

Mpande, who followed Dingane as king of the Zulus was recognized by Andries Pretorius. He was made a vassal of the Natal Republic and his jurisdiction was over the land north of the Thukela and east of the Mzinyathi rivers. He lived in peace with the Trekkers. This was also a period which was characterized by thousands of refugees who had fled from

12. J. Selby, op. cit., p. 86.

Shaka and Dingane's devastating wars flocking into the Natal Republic.

The Republic of Natal wasted no time in helping the refugees. The help was aimed at combating illiteracy. The two missionaries, Reverend Lindley and Reverend Smit acted as teachers. At times Rev. Smit had as many as fifty pupils in his school and even children who were herding cattle were given pages from school books to memorise. True to the ideals of Reformation, the Trekkers granted permission to the missionaries of the American Board to establish schools for Zulu children. In 1843, however, Sir George Napier announced in Cape Town that the Natal district would be under the protection of the Queen. A year later Natal was formally annexed as a separate district of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. The territory east of the Mzinyathi and north of the Thukela rivers was recognised as the independent state of Zululand under Mpande.

With regard to the Zulus living in Natal, that is, South of the Thukela, the English embarked upon the implementation and formulation of the "location" policy. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was behind this policy which was embodied in Ordinance no 3 of 1849, in terms of which the Zulus and other tribes were placed in rural reserves.¹³ The reserves were established at Zwartzop, Umlazi, Umvoti and Inanda. In 1864 there were about 42 reserves. In the reserves Shepstone appointed chiefs and the chiefs were assisted by the resident agents of the Government. During Shepstone's time there were no disturbances, most of the Zulus in the reserves had confidence in him.

There were some chiefs, however with whom Shepstone never did establish effective relationships. Such a chief was Langalibalele of the Natal Section of the Hlubi.¹⁴ He and his followers had fled from Mpande's Zulu kingdom in 1840's and been located by the Natal government close under the

13. J.R. Sullivan: The Native Policy of Sir T. Shepstone, p. 16.

14. M.D. Wilson and L.M. Thompson: The Oxford History of S.A.
Vol. II p. 260.

Drakensberg, around the head water of the Bushman's River.

In 1872, the year of Cetshwayo's coronation by Shepstone, alarmed by the introduction of fire arms into Natal by men returning from the diamond fields, the Government ordered the chiefs to see to the registration of all arms held by their people. This was intended as a measure of security.¹⁵

Langalibalele ignored these instructions. When a messenger was sent to tell him to appear in Pietermaritzburg, Langalibalele abused him, recalling that in 1858 a fellow chief Matshana, had been summoned to a "peaceful meeting" by John Shepstone, brother of Theophilus, only to be confronted with a gun and arrested.¹⁶

Langalibalele's defiance was an unwonted challenge to the authority of the Government, which decided to make an example of him and thus to intimidate other chiefs and reassure the white population. Sir Benjamin Pine, the Governor, led a force of two hundred British troops, three hundred white volunteers, about six thousand Zulus living in Natal to Langalibalele's location. This number of six thousand Zulus shows that the Zulus living in Natal were on good terms with the English otherwise they could not have responded to the call. Langalibalele fled across the mountains to Basutoland with his cattle, and most of his men of fighting age but on the way his rearguard came to blows with a scouting party, killing three volunteers and two Zulus. Pine then ordered the destruction of Langalibalele's chiefdom and of the adjacent Putini-Ngwane chiefdom, which was believed to have been concerting with Langalibalele. Their stock was seized, their land confiscated, and their people were distributed among white farmers. Langalibalele and his men were captured by Cape Mounted Police in Leribe district of Lesoto. Malapo,

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

son of Mashoeshoe, betrayed him for a share of his cattle.¹⁷ Pine set up a special court to try Langalibalele and his councillors. Pine himself the man who had led the expedition against the main prisoner and ordered the destruction of his chiefdom presided over the court, which sentenced Langalibalele to banishment. Pine then persuaded Sir John Molteno, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, to have his parliament pass an Act for the confinement of Langalibalele on Robben Island, and there Langalibalele was sent. As a result of this display of force Pine hoped that Langalibalele would have no imitators.¹⁸

The proceedings had the full support of Theophilus Shepstone and the Natal Colonists, who displayed an indiscriminate vengeance when they heard of the death of the three volunteers. Bishop Colenso, however, courageously exposed the excesses which had been committed by the troops and the illegality of the proceedings of the special court.¹⁹ Caught between two fires, Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State, made a compromise. Pine was recalled. Langalibalele was removed from Robben Island to a farm in the Cape peninsula. Carnarvon also promised that reforms would be made in the administration of the Zulus in Natal, but no substantial changes took place. So that even during Shepstone's period some chiefs were dissatisfied, Langalibalele being an example of the resentment but as a whole the relations between the Zulus and the English during Shepstone's era were good.

In order to understand the participation of the Zulus in the Anglo Boer War one should also refer to the methods used before the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 and the subsequent Zulu war in 1879. In 1870 the Zulu kingdom was by far the most powerful African state south of the Limpopo. Cetshwayo who succeeded his father, Mpande, in 1872 was an able ruler. He was not given to the capricious behaviour of his uncles, Dingane and Shaka and he was firmer and more intelligent than his father. He consulted his councillors

17. Ibid, p. 261.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

before making a decision. He was popular and the kingdom was more closely united than it had ever been.²⁰ Nevertheless he had become heir to Mpande as a result of a great and bloody victory over his half-brother, Mbuyazi and there were other relatives who were potential rebels.²¹

Cetshwayo revitalized the army, which had become soft under Mpande. As in Shaka's day conscription was enforced on all the young men, who lived in regimental barracks under strict discipline.

Cetshwayo's relationship with the English led to the destruction of the Zulu kingdom because of the aggressive attitude by the English. The Zulu kingdom had fewer white residents than any comparable area further South.²² There were perhaps a dozen Norwegian missionaries and about as many traders, but converts were few and the volume of trade was small. The Zulus continued to look suspiciously at Christianity which limited the number of their wives and compelled them to wear European clothes. Consequently although both missionaries and traders regarded Cetshwayo's regime as inimical to their interest they had few Zulu followers and were not a threat to his authority.

There was also a renegade Scot, John Dunn, who had ingratiated himself with Cetshwayo and became a district chief in the south of the kingdom, amply provided with Zulu wives, followers, and cattle. Cetshwayo used him as intermediary with the Natal Government and as a gun-runner.²³ As for the relations with the government of the Transvaal, there was soon tension because of the area east of the Mzinyathi where there were no natural boundaries. But there was comparatively little friction with Natal because the Thukela and Mzinyathi rivers formed natural boundaries.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 262.

23. Ibid.

It was during the 1870's that serious clashes occurred between the Zulus and Natal because of Carnarvon's federation scheme. The Afrikaner Republics and the Cape Colony were against it but Natal favoured it. Carnarvon thought of a confederation without the Cape and therefore annexed the Transvaal in 1877. In that manner the dispute between the Transvaal and the Zulus had to be dealt with by the English.

Before the annexation Shepstone of Natal had espoused the Zulu cause in the boundary dispute. He even encouraged the Zulus to threaten the Transvaal Republic but after the annexation of 1877 that was impossible. Shepstone then endorsed the Transvaal claims and as it became evident that his Transvaal regime depended on the support of the Afrikaner population, he decided to win that support by tackling Cetshwayo. That was the main reason for the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. After initial successes for the Zulus at Isandlwana, where 800 British soldiers were killed, the Zulus were defeated at Ulundi. Zululand was then divided into thirteen districts.²⁴ Here then one finds the chief reason for destruction of the Zulu kingdom and a reversal to a tribal division which had existed prior to the rise of Shaka.

Cetshwayo never sent an impi against the Afrikaners when Shepstone went to annex the Transvaal, the chief Sihayo brought a "word" which he had received from a "messenger" to the effect that Shepstone was going up among the Afrikaners, and it was feared that they might be stiff-necked, and that he might be in difficulty. Cetshwayo must, therefore, send a force to the border to be ready to help Shepstone if necessary. Cetshwayo said he did not wish to fight but wished to remain at peace with his neighbours as he had been advised to do. However, in respect of Shepstone's authority he ordered Baqulusi (the Zulus in Northern border of Vryheid) to collect themselves armed at their kraals to be ready in

24. F.A. Van Jaarsveld, op. cit., pp. 142 - 3.

case they were wanted. And when the Afrikaners did not give Shepstone a tough time, a message came from Shepstone to say that the force must disperse, so it dispersed without having done anything. But Shepstone's intentions were to fight the Afrikaners with the aid of the Zulus, had they proved stubborn against the annexation.

Frere exploited these unfounded accusations. He also delayed sending the full report of the Boundary Commission to London (which had tried to solve boundary disputes between the Transvaal and Zululand in June 1878) until the senior military officer had worked out the invasion plan and until he had softened up Carnarvon's successor, Sir Michael Hicks Beach with frequent reiterations of his anti-Zulu refrain.²⁵ Then, before London had had time to digest the Commission's report, Frere presented Cetshwayo with an ultimatum, which included the demand that the Zulu army should be disbanded within thirty days.²⁶ No self respecting ruler could comply with such a demand. After "doctoring" for the war, Cetshwayo sided with those officers who were for mass attacks upon the enemy rather than guerilla warfare, but he gave strict orders that the impis were on no account to invade Natal.²⁷ The British forces under Chelmsford, about 7 000 regulars and as many Natal Zulu levies with perhaps a thousand colonial volunteers, invaded the kingdom from three points, expecting a comfortable sweep to Ulundi. The Zulu army concentrated against the central column and on 22nd January, 1879, took most of it unawares at Isandlwana where the British army suffered its greatest disaster since the Crimean War.²⁸ After the arrival of British reinforcements the war drew to its inexorable conclusion.

25. M.D. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

During that time there was no nationalism among the Zulus, and they accepted defeat after Ulundi was destroyed. Against this background we can see that Cetshwayo's relations with the English were very strained because of British aggression and the destruction of the Zulu kingdom.

By July 4, Sir Garnet Wolseley had taken office as Governor of Natal and the Transvaal, and as High Commissioner in South East Africa. Since Isandlwana had temporarily put a stop to the British Government's willingness to increase its South African responsibilities, Wolseley's instructions were that Zululand was not to be annexed. His problem was, therefore, to make a peace settlement that would prevent a revival of the Zulu kingdom and do so without costs to Britain. He, therefore, banished Cetshwayo to Cape Town. This he did to create confusion among the Zulus because a nation without a symbol of unity in this case the king, was bound to be leaderless. He divided Zululand into thirteen separate territories under thirteen different chiefs. The aim was to divide the Zulus into tribes as existed prior to Shaka's conquests. These chiefs included descendants of Zwide and Dingiswayo, Hamu, Cetshwayo's half-brother who had deserted to the British in the war, Zibhebhu, who was a descendant of a brother of Shaka's father, Senzangakhona and who had quarrelled with Cetshwayo, and the inimical John Dunn.²⁹ Cetshwayo's loyal councillors were placed under Zibhebhu. Hamu's brothers Maduna and Ziwedu and Cetshwayo's young son, Dinuzulu, were left under the authority of Zibhebhu, who used it in the most galling manner with apparently the full approval of the Natal authorities.³⁰ Each of the thirteen chiefs was made to undertake not to create an army and to accept the arbitration of the British resident.

29. F.E. Colenso and E. Durnford: The Ruin of Zululand, Vol. I, p.

30. Ibid.

This settlement was devised for setting Zulu against Zulu and thus consummating military victory without further cost or responsibility. Wolseley on the advice of Shepstone had improved upon the classic imperial formula: "Divide and refrain from ruling" was a shrewd technique in an area where imperial interests were merely negative. The military defeat and Wolseley's settlement initiated a process of national disintegration.³¹ Scarcely any of the chiefs appointed by Wolseley were men of standing in their territories. In some cases they were challenged by their rivals such as a pretender who claimed to be genealogically senior to the appointed chief of Dingiswayo's lineage.³²

In 1882, Cetshwayo was allowed to visit England where he was given presents by Queen Victoria, but although he was allowed to return home in 1883, Zibhebhu's territory in the north was excluded from his control and so were the territories along the Natal border in the South. These latter became known as the Zulu reserve and they were brought under closer British surveillance though still not annexed. Within his attenuated kingdom Cetshwayo was made to undertake not to raise an army.

Civil war followed between Cetshwayo and Zibhebhu. Cetshwayo was at a disadvantage because his authority had lapsed during his exile. Zibhebhu soon got the upper hand and Ulundi was destroyed for the second time. Cetshwayo died in 1884. His surviving councillors treated his eldest son, Dinuzulu - who was a boy of 15 - as his heir and they turned for support to the Afrikaner farmers. In March 1884, the farmers came to his rescue and defeated Zibhebhu. The Afrikaners for their help rendered to Dinuzulu proclaimed a "New

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

Republic" over a large area of North-western Zululand and claimed that the rest of the country except of the Zulu reserve adjacent to Natal was subject to their protection.

On the 15th July, 1885, the Natal legislative council expressed the wish in a number of resolutions that Britain should immediately annex Zululand, solve the Zulu problems and then incorporate the Bantu territory north of Natal up to the Portuguese border into the colony. These resolutions were made because the council feared that the Afrikaners would acquire Zululand.³³ In 1887 the British government annexed Zululand, (excluding the New Republic) as a British colony quite separate from Natal.³⁴ In Natal the hope then arose that the New Republic would unite with Natal, but that hope died when in 1888 the New Republic united with the South African Republic to become the Vryheid district. The Usuthu resisted annexation of Zululand and under the leadership of Dinuzulu and his two uncles, Ndabuko and Shingane, revolted in 1888. That uprising was suppressed and the three leaders were tried and sent to St. Helena.³⁵ When Dinuzulu was allowed to come back it was only as a local headman (government induna) in the Usuthu district. From the foregoing it can be seen that Dinuzulu's relations with the English were as in Cetshwayo's lifetime characterized by enmity and aggression on the part of the British who were against the revival of the Zulu kingdom which they had destroyed. Dinuzulu returned in 1897 and by that time, Zululand and also Tongaland had been incorporated in Natal, which had been granted responsible government in 1893. It was just two years before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war in 1899. Most of the Zulus were resenting the British who had banished Dinuzulu and they disliked the English.

33 . C.F.J. Muller (ed.), op. cit., p. 199.

34 . Ibid.

35 . Ibid.

It is therefore against this background that we can objectively understand the participation of the Zulus in the Anglo-Boer war. Zululand was no longer a united kingdom but consisted of divisions ruled by the chiefs under the supervision of the English magistrates. In Natal the Zulus were also under the chiefs who were appointed during the time of Sir Theophilus Shepstone. The Zulus were still as loyal to their chiefs as they were before Shaka united them.

* * *

CHAPTER ONE

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ZULUS TOWARDS THE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
THE TRANSVAAL REPUBLIC AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DURING
1899

When the Anglo-Boer War broke out on the 11th October, 1899 President S J P Kruger proclaimed martial law in the Transvaal, and President M T Steyn mobilized his burgers to support the Transvaal, in accordance with the treaty between the two republics. The Uitlanders left Johannesburg. Bantu miners were escorted out of the Transvaal and the gold mines were closed down for an unspecified period.

Since considerable fighting was to take place in areas adjoining Zululand, it is of importance to explain what effect the fighting had on Zuluspeaking people. But no black men were called up by the Republics for military service. The military strength of the white burgers of the Republics at the outbreak of the war was as follows:

"Altesame het die Republieke by die uitbreek van die oorlog nie meer as 35 000 man gemobiliseer nie, behalwe nog 'n paar duisende vreemdelinge wat, in verskillende korpse georganiseer, vrywillig hul lot met die Boere ingewerp het. 'n Groot deel van die Republikeinse leërmag het egter nie aan die stryd deelgeneem nie want daar moes gesorg word vir die verbindingslinies, die vervoer, die kommissarisse en nog veel meer. Daarby was dit 'n burgermag waarby 'n aantal vreesagtiges en onwilliges was, wat tydens gevegte meestal by die perde of in die laer te vinde was, so ver moontlik van die vuurlinie."¹

Britain on the other hand was supported by thousands of Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders. Even India sent non-combatants for the medical services and Ceylon sent a

1. A.J.H. van der Walt, J.A. Wiid en A.L. Geyer: Geskiedenis van S.A., Deel I, p. 551.

unit of European planters. Many were of a type suitable for warfare on the veld. For example the North-West territories of Canada raised 1 000 expert horsemen and marksmen. Another useful force was the Imperial light Horse recruited from the Uitlanders.² Colonel Bottomley of whom we will hear more later on belonged to that group. Finally there were British Colonial units recruited locally such as the Natal Mounted Volunteers, Kimberley Light Horse, Cape Police, Remington's Guides, and many others.³

The Afrikaner artillery was in fire-power equal to the British. The Afrikaners bought vast numbers of rifles in Europe, including enough Mauser rapid firers to equip most of the Transvaalers and some Free Staters. The Afrikaners' most noteworthy cannon were ninety-four-pounder creusot fortification guns or "Long Toms". At the other extreme in size was the Little Vickers - Maxim pom-pom firing a string of one pound shells. On the other hand the British's main weapon was the fifteen pounder field gun.

The Afrikaner strategy was based primarily on defending the two Republics, but it was held that this could best be done from British territory, primarily in Natal where the British were expected to launch their main offensive. In this manner Zululand was directly connected with the frontier in Natal. The war would also be waged defensively in the west across the borders from the Molopo to the Orange River, in the South the drifts of the Orange would also be guarded.

During the first months the war was fought in British territory and the Afrikaner forces were gaining the upper hand in the struggle. There were few indications that the Afrikaner leaders realised the vital importance of gaining decisive

2. J. Selby: A Short History of S.A., p. 188.

3. Ibid.

victories in the first four or five weeks of the war before the flood of inexhaustible British reinforcements and supplies would begin to flow to South Africa. Soon five sixths of all British troops were trapped at Ladysmith, a town very near Zululand. The Afrikaners were also at the Thukela River and the road was open, possibly as far as Durban if they decided to advance so far into Natal.⁴ But they hesitated. If Zulus had felt inclined to throw off British control, the war would have given them an excellent opportunity.

The Natal situation was nevertheless so serious that General Buller was prompted to take the important decision to split his force and to go to Natal personally to attempt to retrieve the position. Buller's force had originally been earmarked solely for the advance along the Cape railway.⁵

On all fronts the Afrikaners were fighting on British territory and they were to continue for almost four more months. Yet the chances of the Republics winning the war were not as favourable as they seemed. Their chance of gaining a decisive military and political advantage by means of a rapid advance was already irrevocably lost. Joubert in Natal was too cautious and lacking in initiative. Around Ladysmith were 6 000 Afrikaners doing virtually nothing except guarding Sir George White, and Joubert would not consider a lightning advance on Pietermaritzburg and the Natal coast which a younger general such as Louis Botha would have been eager to attempt. The Afrikaner attack on Weenen, Estcourt and Mooi-River petered out after the Battle of Willow Grange on the 23rd November 1899. The Zulus did not assist either side and remained peaceful. When Buller arrived in Pietermaritzburg, the Afrikaners were withdrawing to await the English north of the Thukela, and Louis Botha had temporarily taken over the command from Joubert, who had left for Pretoria because

4. C.F.J. Muller: 500 Years a History of S.A., p. 295.

5. Ibid.

of poor health.⁶

The sieges of Mafeking and Kimberley tied down thousands of burghers on Cronjé's western front, while the Afrikaner forces on the Southern front (Orange River) advanced into the Cape, not as a vanguard of an extensive invasion but as a defensive measure against British troop movements about which President Steyn was uneasy. The invasion of the Cape by Afrikaner Commandos, who annexed territory along their route, caused many Afrikaners, including a few members of the Cape Parliament, to join the Republican forces. Martial law was proclaimed in Colesberg and the neighbouring districts. In this area as well as in Griqualand West and the Prieska district, there were widespread rebellions, which had to be systematically quelled by the British command during the following months.⁷

After the Afrikaner commandos had occupied Colesberg and Aliwal North and had passed through Burgersdorp on the way to Stormberg, General French arrived at Noupoot to assume command on the Colesberg front. At the same time Methuen began to advance towards Kimberley on 21 November and Buller in Natal prepared to attack the Afrikaner lines on either side of Colenso from his base at Frere. Methuen followed the railway line northwards and engaged the Afrikaners who attempted to block his passage on three separate occasions.⁸

In the second week of December 1899, the so-called "Black Week", the British army suffered three defeats in quick succession on the central, western and Thukela fronts.⁹


6. A.J.H. van der Walt, J.A. Wiid en A.L. Geyer, op. cit., p. 557.
C.F.J. Muller, op. cit., p. 296.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

ANGLO BOER WAR 1899-1902



But even these defeats did not affect the attitude of the Zulu population.

The first phase of the war in 1899 was characterized by Afrikaner offensive. What then was the position among the Zulus during the same period? Looking at the Zulu population as a whole we notice that the Zulus did not participate actively in the war during 1899. They were however, indirectly involved in the war as scouts, runners, spies and waggon drivers: "In 1899 toe die stryd tussen die twee Suid-Afrikaanse Republieke en die magtige Engeland uitbreek, is van Engelse kant 'n goed georganiseerde inligtingsdiens geskep waarvoor net kaffers en kleurlinge dan bedoel ek nie daarby die hele diens nie, maar ek behandel net die deel wat die kaffer en kleurling bygedra het om Engeland met sy rooftog te help."¹⁰

During 1899, there were about thirty four magisterial districts in Natal excluding the Vryheid districts which were part of the South African Republic. (See map). In all the districts there were magistrates representing the British government. The Zulu chiefs in the districts were, therefore, subject to English magistrates and their support for the British War effort or lack of support must be understood in that light.

On August 29, 1899 the Principal Under Secretary, C Bird, wrote circular no 5 in which he instructed the magistrates to forward a confidential report to the government at least once a week and as often as they would consider it desirable regarding the condition of affairs in their districts with special reference to the Zulus and white population.¹¹ He pointed out that the government relied upon the magistrates

10. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

11. C.S.O. 2642: Circulars 1899 - 1900, CR. 25/99.

for co-operation in that matter. At that juncture it was very necessary that the government should be fully informed with regard to everything that was going on in the Colony.¹²

As regard the Zulu population the magistrates' reports were to be made to the Secretary for Native Affairs. But to complete the general report a copy was to be sent to the office of the Principal Under Secretary.¹³

The Civil Commissioner and Chief Magistrate of Zululand, Sir Charles Saunders, wrote a similar instruction in a confidential circular to all the magistrates in Zululand and pointed out that the condition of the white population and the condition of the Zulus, were on each occasion to form the subject of separate reports and a copy of the latter was to be attached to the former. The report on the Zulus was sent by the chief magistrate to the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the report on the white population together with the copy of the report on the Zulus were sent to the Colonial Secretary.¹⁴ It was to be the duty of the magistrates to keep themselves informed about the attitude of all classes.¹⁵

Before the war broke out, the Principal Under Secretary sent a telegram on September 10, 1899 to the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner of Zululand requesting him to issue instructions to each magistrate of Zululand. Those magistrates were to inform the Zulu Chiefs and headmen in their districts that in the event of the outbreak of war between the English and Afrikaners, the Queen wished the Zulus to remain within their own borders as the war would be a white man's war. But they would have the right to protect themselves and their property against attacks or seizure by the Afrikaners.¹⁶

12 . Ibid.

13 . Ibid.

14 . Z.A. 32: C.M. & C.C. No. 40.

15 . Ibid.

16 . Ibid., CR. 44/1899.

Professor Breytenbach explained that the Republics also had no intention of drawing the blacks into the war. In fact military conscription for blacks was prohibited by law:

"Die wette van die twee Republieke het naamlik die besit van vuurwapens deur die gekleurdes binne hul grense verbied en die diensplig van die Bantoes en ander gekleurde groepe het dus 'n ander terrein gedek as aktiewe deelname aan die gevegs-operasies aan die front."¹⁷

Professor Breytenbach also explained the role the Blacks in the republics played during the war: "Afgesien van die gee van bydraes in die vorm van goedere om met die uitrusting van die kommandos te help, is hulle dan ook uitsluitlik opgeroep om die gewapende krygsmag in die veld en die burgers wat daaraan behoort het, as diensbodes te dien. Waar hulle kommandos vergesel het, het hulle dit gedoen as wadrywers, touleiers, agterryers en wat dies meer sy, en het hulle nie gewapende krygsdiens in enige vorm verrig nie. Voorts moes hulle op die plase van die gekommandeerde blanke burgers as arbeiders werk. Sulke nie-blanke diensbodes op die plase van burgers kon dan ook nie gekommandeer word nie en is ook nie toegelaat om hul diens te verlaat nie; en waar gekommandeerde burgers meer diensvolk op hul persele nodig gehad het, moet die veldkornette van die loslopende nie-blanke ingesetenes vir die doel teen vasgestelde loon kommandeer. Hulle het dus nie deel van die gewapende krygsmag van die Republieke gevorm nie, en daarom is hul getalle dan ook nie ingesluit by die opgawes van die sterkte van die burgermag van die Republiek nie."¹⁸

This then explains the policies of the British government and the Republics with regard to the black population at the beginning of the war. Although the Zulus in the Vryheid district had been peaceful since the days of the formation

17. J.H. Breytenbach: Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899 - 1902, Deel I: Die Boere-offensief, pp. 36 - 7.

18. Ibid.

of the New Republic, the Chief Magistrate of Zululand, Charles Saunders, wrote to the Prime Minister, Mr Hime, that the Zulus in that district of the Transvaal would seize any favourable opportunity against the Afrikaners.¹⁹ He stated that on account of the ill-treatment they were subjected to, their sympathies were entirely with the English. The Chief Magistrate did not explain why he thought the sympathies of the Zulus were with the English but instead he went on to state that the Afrikaners were fully aware of the fact that they were hated by every Zulu in those parts and were consequently in fear of being attacked by the Zulus.²⁰

In spite of Britain's pronounced policy in this regard, there were clear indications that the British were employing Blacks as spies and soldiers right from the beginning of the war. An eyewitness states: "Vandat die Engelse magte op Pietermaritzburg en Ladysmith voor die uitbreek van die oorlog hulle manoeuvres in die noorde van Natal gehou het, het hulle gebruik gemaak van kaffer-spioene. Met die uitbreek van die oorlog het elke afdeling van die Engelse magte sy getal kafferspione gehad wat alle inligting moes insamel. Kafferspione het tussen die Boeremagte ingedring en sodoende alles van belang ingesamel. Die Boere het maar in daardie tyd baie min ag geslaan op wat hulle maar gemeen het rondloper kaffers was. By die Engelse magte was ook honderde berede kaffers (Native Scouts) wat saam met die voorhoede en patrollies op die trek was, hulle was almal met Engelse uniforms en gewere uitgerus en het in al hulle gevegte deelgeneem. Later is ook gebruik gemaak van die "joiners" of "National Scouts".²¹

The year 1899 was nevertheless characterized by peace among the Zulus in spite of the rumours of war. As early as October 9, the magistrate of Estcourt district reported that the Zulus appeared to view the situation with indifference except perhaps those chiefs living close to the Free State border who seemed to be afraid of stock thieves.²²

19. Z.A.32: C.R.49/19, C.M. and C.C.- P.M.,

20. Ibid.

21. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

22. S.N.A. 1/4/7: R.M. Estcourt - Secretary for Native Affairs.

But on October 23, when the war had already broken out, the Zulus living in the villlage of Estcourt and those in service during that week showed signs of unrest and anxiety especially when they saw columns of troops arriving in the village en route to Pietermaritzburg.²³ This feeling was to a certain extent relieved when a part of the column went to Ladysmith.²⁴ The Zulus living in the locations and away from the immediate neighbourhood of any military display or operations seemed to be leading their ordinary lives.

When the rains started falling, those Zulus who had oxen commenced ploughing. On November 6, when the troops stationed at Colenso retired to Estcourt, a number of Zulus left the village, fearing that the village would be shelled by the Afrikaners.²⁵ Those Zulus living near Colenso had already moved for the same reasons. Others, however, had left for the safety of their stock, but that was not a general exodus. The Zulus living in the locations were still in their kraals. The chiefs Johannes Khumalo and Mkhakhanyeki were refugees in the village. Both those chiefs informed the magistrate of Estcourt that their people were still at their kraals.²⁶

On November 13, the Magistrate of Estcourt directed the induna Gadabana to enlist special runners to establish communication between Estcourt and Ladysmith but until then he had not been successful. The Zulus appeared to have been afraid running the risk. As much as R40 were offered as an incentive but no one would undertake the journey.²⁷

At Impendle district just south of the Estcourt district the

23. Ibid., W 1895/99.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

Zulus showed no feeling of excitement or unrest in connection with the Transvaal situation. In September, several belonging to that district who were working in Johannesburg left that place sooner owing to the unsettled state of affairs and the war rumours. On their return those Zulus stated that the Afrikaners were preparing for or were going to war with the English, but their statements were discredited among the Zulus at Impendle because similar ones had been made for the last two or three years without the prediction coming true.²⁸

On October 23, when the war had broken out, the Zulus at Impendle were still quiet but there was some unrest amongst those living in that part bordering on Lesotho as also amongst the white residents up there. The unrest was due to a rumour that the Basutos intended raiding stock in the Colony and that some Basutos had been seen on the Berg within the Colony.²⁹ There were two passes in the Impendle district - i.e. the Hlathimba Pass and another a little to the south of it. Both were passable by cattle.³⁰ The magistrate of that division decided that it was necessary for those passes to be watched. Towards the end of October the Zulus at Impendle were eager to hear about the fighting but otherwise they were undisturbed and were then more or less fully engaged in cultivating their gardens. As late as November the Zulus appeared undisturbed but that was due to their not having been informed of the seriousness of the position.³¹

In the Ipholela district, the attitude of all classes of the community was peaceful during September.³² On October 3, the district was still quiet but there were rumours that the Basutos intended joining the Afrikaners in case of the commencement of hostilities. The magistrate of that district

28 . S.N.A. 1/4/7: R.M. Impendle Report, 7.9.99.

29 . Ibid.

30 . Ibid.

31 . Ibid.

32 . Ibid., R.M. Ipholela Report, 8.9.99

thought it was probable that the Basutos would devote their attention to stealing.³³ On October 30, the magistrate informed the Zulus of the defeat of the Afrikaners at Dundee and Elandslaagte and reported that the tidings had given "considerable satisfaction to the natives."³⁴

In the Ixopo district there was danger of unrest on October 14 when Zulus arrived from Johannesburg. They came with exaggerated stories about the war, but as late as December 30, the magistrate of that district reported that he had every confidence in the loyalty of the Zulus whom he was confident would not be easily shaken.³⁵

During September 1899 one or two Zulus at Alexander division expressed some regret that the government had decided not to inform them of what was taking place. As late as October 7, the chiefs and headmen still complained that they had not been taken into the confidence of the government. For that reason the magistrate saw a good many of the chiefs personally on October 27, informed them of the success of the British arms. That was not true, because at that time the Afrikaner forces were on the offensive. Nevertheless the information was received "with token of the greatest satisfaction by all classes of the native population."³⁶ Thereafter the Zulus became engaged in their usual spring planting operations. The same attitude prevailed during October at the Lower Umzimkulu division where the Zulus were quiet and busy cultivating their field and grazing their herds.

On October 23, after receiving a telegram from the Prime Minister of the victory of the British arms at Dundee, the Magistrate at New Hanover immediately sent messages in all directions to inform the Zulus. The magistrate stated that he had no doubt that all the Zulus in Natal had received the

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., R.M. Ixopo Report 14.10.99.

36. Ibid., R.M. Alexander Report 27.10.99.

news by that time. The magistrate mentioned that he had noticed by the expression on their faces that many of them felt ill at ease. But all that disappeared after the news had been conveyed and matters were well again.³⁷ On November 6, however, the magistrate of the nearby district of Lion's River, reported that the Zulus there were getting anxious for fear the Afrikaners would come and take the few cattle they had left. Furthermore many Zulus were coming into the division from the north of the Thukela River to stay with relatives. The magistrate then pointed out: "The natives are loyal but some are beginning to doubt the power of the government to drive the Boers out of the Colony and that the latter had come south of Ladysmith."³⁸

Mr T N Boshoff of Weenen informed the Clerk of the Court at Umvoti on October 14, that the Zulus of Weenen division were making hundreds of assegais but mainly for the purpose of fighting amongst themselves than attacking the whites. But on October 21, the magistrate held a branch court amongst the Amachunu tribe at Muden, and the chief Silwane sent a message by an induna expressing regret at the rumours that both the Amachunu and Amabomvu tribes were arming for a fight.³⁹

At Dundee in September, the magistrate of that district conveyed the message of the Prime Minister, Mr Hime, to the Chiefs and headmen.⁴⁰ After he had done so the following remarks were made by some of the chiefs. Chief Sotiki wanted to know how they could protect themselves: "We look to the queen to do so in the event of war as she is our only ruler." Chief Dumisa said: "We have not the proper weapons to defend ourselves with. Our weapons are short." Chief Sandanezwe stated: "We have not the power to protect oursel-

37. Ibid., R.M. New Hanover Report, 23.10.99.

38. Ibid., R.M. Lion's River Report, 6.11.99.

39. Ibid., R.M. Weenen Report, 21.10.99.

40. Ibid., R.M. Dundee Report, 30.10.99.

ves. We are like cattle that are herded".⁴¹ Those chiefs were reacting to the statement in the Prime Minister's letter which, as we have seen, had been sent to all the magisterial districts in Natal and Zululand saying that the Zulus were to be neutral in the war. At the same time he confused the chiefs by saying that they were to defend themselves if their property was attacked.⁴² But the chiefs had no power and authority to defend themselves as they were British subjects.

There was also confusion at the Newcastle division among the Zulus. On August 30, the Zulus were leaving their homes, consequently the magistrate of that district spoke to the chiefs and also to individual Zulus, telling them that there was no cause for leaving their kraals, or for removing stock. The Zulus were then quiet for some time but during September 4, Nenkosana, a Zulu sergeant, who was investigating a rumour about Embabane and Mzinyathi whose people were leaving their kraals, or sleeping away from them, found at Micah Kunene's residence that the latter had removed his children to near Hlathikhulu Dundee division. Others near him had done the same. Nenkosana then saw Micah's wife, who told him that Mbakambaka's people had been throwing stones at the house built by the people for teaching purposes. They shouted that an Afrikaner "impi" was coming to kill the Zulus. The people got frightened and went away. Then a certain Timothy Gule got angry about the people leaving and said the people must come back from Hlathikhulu. They did so.⁴³

During 1899 the position in the magisterial divisions of Zululand was different from that of the magisterial divisions in Natal, ie south of the Thukela. The cause may be attributed to the fact that Vryheid formed part of the South Eastern

41. Ibid.

42. Z.A. 32: CR. 44/1899.

43. S.N.A. 1/4/7: C. 49/99.

42

Transvaal. The English were afraid that they might be attacked from that district through Zululand. This fear is apparent from the fact that as early as September 9, the Prime Minister wrote to Sir Charles Saunders informing him that it had been decided to increase the Zululand Native Police Force to 400 men, and to send a detachment of that force as soon as possible to protect outlying border magistracies in the province of Zululand.⁴⁴

The Prime Minister stated that the Commissioner of Police reported that there was no proper defensible post at Nkandla and that the Zulus in that district would upon the first appearance of danger in all probability retire into the Nkandla Forest.⁴⁵ The Commissioner of Police, therefore, suggested that in the event of an attack or raid upon that place, the Zululand Police there, should be withdrawn and sent to Nguthu to assist in the defence of that magistracy to which a strong re-inforcement of Zululand Police would be sent. He added that the European Police might retire to Nguthu or Dundee via Rorke's Drift, while the magistrate and the few Europeans who remained would be in no danger of personal violence as long as no resistance was offered.⁴⁶

With regard to Melmoth, the Chief Commissioner of Police considered that as there was no defensible post there, and only half a dozen police, no attempt should be made to defend that place, but that the Natal Police should in the event of a raid by the Afrikaners, retire to Eshowe.⁴⁷ The same remark applied to the magistracy of Mahlabathini. Colonel Dartnell was of opinion that the few police there should withdraw to Nongoma to strengthen the garrison of that place. They were

44. Z.A. 32: Conf1. 129/99.

45. Ibid., CR. 49/1899.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

also to be joined by the few men at Hlabisa if considered necessary.⁴⁸ All these precautions were suggested because of fear of the Afrikaner forces which could have invaded the British through Vryheid via Nquthu, Nkandla, Emthonjaneni and Mahlabathini which were on the borders of the Vryheid district.

On the eastern part of the Vryheid district, strict precautions were taken. With regard to Nongoma, for example, the force of 40 Natal police with an attachment of Zululand police and the residents of that place, were to be prepared to go into laager at the new magisterial buildings which were being erected. As soon as hostilities commenced, that place could be made a strong defensible post, and could be reinforced by another detachment of the Zululand Native Police.⁴⁹ To complete the circle of precautions around the Vryheid district therefore, attention was given to the north-eastern corner which consisted of the two districts of Ingwavuma and Ubombo. The Chief Commissioner of Police recommended that Zululand police at Gwaliweni should be concentrated at Ingwavuma. A detachment in that neighbourhood was at that time divided between the two places.⁵⁰ At Eshowe, the headquarters of the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner of Zululand, there was a fairly strong detachment of the Zululand Native Police. They were kept there so as to be available for repelling an attack in any direction, especially an attack coming from the Vryheid district via Emthonjaneni.⁵¹ We notice here that the situation in Zululand was unique in that even before the outbreak of the war, a large number of Zululand Native Police was trained to take an active part in the war, should it become necessary.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

The Nquthu district was influenced by Zulus returning from Johannesburg during September. They spread many reports which tended to interest the Zulus in the district. They reported that the English were being turned out of Johannesburg by the Afrikaners.⁵² During the same month the Zulu population, more especially those along the Vryheid district were in an uneasy state of mind on account of the rumours about the war. Disquiet increased daily and the resident magistrate thought it was "due to the Dutch informing them that if they do not remain neutral they will be shot".⁵³ In spite of some uneasiness among the Zulus in that district, nothing strange occurred among them during 1899.

During September 1899, the Zulus of the Nkandla district continued watching the Transvaal political situation very closely, and with much anxiety. They feared that the Imperial Government was not in earnest, and would withdraw in the end.⁵⁴ They also said that if a settlement was reached without hostilities, it would be attributed to the fear on the part of the English, and not of the Afrikaners.⁵⁵

In November, large numbers of Zulus arrived from Johannesburg and were spreading reports, which the magistrate found "very unpleasant to hear". It concerned the manner in which the Afrikaners were commandeering horses and goods from the English in Johannesburg who were too frightened to oppose them in any way.⁵⁶ The magistrate labelled the reports "unpleasant to hear" because they were believed by many Zulus and in that way discrediting the British government. The Zulus were watching events with great keenness and hardly a day passed without a chief coming personally or sending messengers to the magistracy to enquire about the latest news. The magistrate

52. S.N.A. 1/4/7: CR. 43/1899.

53. Ibid., CR. 68/1899.

54. Ibid., CR. 90/99.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., NK. 661/1899, CR. 120/99.

reported to the Chief Magistrate, Charles Saunders that he found "it rather difficult to get them to understand why, if we have been victorious, the Boers have continued to gain ground".⁵⁷

During the second week of November, a serious faction fight occurred among the Zulus at Nkandla district. The faction fight took place at a marriage dance between the Zulus of Chief Matshana kaNondisa and the Chief Faku of Nguthu district.⁵⁸ The latter were reported to have been worsted with many wounded, and one man was not expected to live, but at the same time the police were controlling the situation.

Towards the end of November, Santula a Zulu under Chief Nongamulana, was accused of having conducted himself in such a manner as to cause suspicion. He was arrested and was on remand pending investigation.⁵⁹ Another problem in the Nkandla district was the scarcity of food in many parts of the district. It amounted to a serious famine, and all hopes of getting supplies vanished because of a report that the government had engaged all available transport at Lower Thukela for the front.⁶⁰ During December the Zulus in certain parts of Nkandla were reported to be literally without food, and crops were very backward because of a drought. On December 20, one hundred muids of mealies supplied by the government arrived and were sold in about an hour.⁶¹ Many more could have been disposed of. A few Zulus along streams in the low country were getting green mielies, but not enough to assist less fortunate friends.

At Emthonjaneni district the Zulus were in the same plight as their brothers in the Nkandla district. The magistrate of that district reported that he foresaw a great scarcity of

57. Ibid., NK. 755/1899, CR. 184/99.

58. Ibid., NK. 770/1899, CR. 201/99.

59. Ibid., NK. 806/1899.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., NK. 865/99, CR. 275/99.

food among the natives there.⁶² The magistrate further pointed out that the stock of mealies in Melmoth at that time was a total of 240 bags.⁶³ Even during the second week of December food was still scarce at Emthonjaneni and the position was deteriorating. The magistrate then wrote: "I foresee a difficulty in maintaining supplies later on in as much as local Boers have refused to ride transport for some of the local storekeepers, and as the Boers have carried the bulk of the local transport in the past this refusal complicates matters more seriously, more especially as regards to the natives."⁶⁴

At Mahlabathini district, the Zulus watched the political situation with anxiety, but remained confident of protection from the government in case of an attack.⁶⁵ The magistrate stated that the Zulus had been duly informed in terms of instructions through their chiefs in the confidential circular. According to the confidential circular to the magistrate the chiefs were expected to report anything strange taking place among their people in their districts. The resident magistrate said: "The general opinion expressed has been one of confidence, though they clearly show that the presence of a government force in the midst would instil greater ease among them. I must say I agree with them about the presence of a force of some description in the district, and would urge Government to provide some means of this kind."⁶⁶

The magistrate further pointed out that if no detachment of regular police could be spared, a supply of arms should be kept at Mahlabathini with requisite ammunition, and that authority be given "to enlist the services of trustworthy native men who could be armed therewith and employed should occasion arise to resist any attempts made at raiding."⁶⁷

62 . Ibid., CR. 188/99.

63 . Ibid.

64 . Ibid., CR. 272/1899.

65 . Ibid., CR. 73/1899.

66 . Ibid.

67 . Ibid.

This statement therefore shows clearly that the magistrate was in favour of arming the so-called "trustworthy natives" under the pretext of resisting attempted raids.

On September 19, there was a meeting of all the chiefs at Mahlabathini. The meeting was summoned by the magistrate of that district with the purpose of informing the chiefs of the instructions contained in the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner's Circular of September, 1899. The circular expected chiefs to remain neutral while the war lasted against the Transvaal Republic. The meeting was well attended. Of the six Chiefs who were present there were Khehla and Ngingila representing Tshanibezwe, Ngodi, Sigungu, Mbilika, Magojela and Ngobozana.⁶⁸

After the instructions had been read the chiefs thanked the Government and accepted the fact that if war became inevitable, it would be a white man's war. They entertained the fears that they would be unequal to any force of the Afrikaners on account of their primitive arms.⁶⁹ In their letters the chiefs asked that the Government should provide a force to deal with any attacks.⁷⁰ The instructions contained in the Chief Magistrate's confidential circular were conveyed to the Zulus because the English were optimistic about the outcome of the war. They thought it would be easy to overrun the Afrikaner forces. These instructions were to be revoked, however, during the time of pessimism, when there was no hope of defeating the Afrikaner forces.

As late as the eve of the war and after the meeting of the chiefs, the Zulus at Mahlabathini district, were not returning in large numbers from work in the Transvaal Republic. Instead they continued going out and money was regularly remitted by them through the native agency at Johannesburg.⁷¹ So that

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibic., CR. 124/99.

we can conclude that during the period 1899, the Zulus at Mahlabathini did not take an active part in the war.

At Ndwandwe district, where the Paramount Chief Dinuzulu was residing, it was reported that Dinuzulu could not be relied upon and Zibhebhu might be relied upon as being loyal.⁷² The English suspected that Dinuzulu might sympathise with the Afrikaners as they had helped him defeat Zibhebhu who was supported by the English. Coenraad Meyer sent a message to Dinuzulu soon after the war had begun telling him that the Zulus were to take no part in the war and that the Zulus were to leave the white people to fight their own battle.⁷³ A short time before the commencement of the war, Coenraad Meyer came to Dinuzulu at his Osuthu kraal, and told him that there would be war between the Afrikaners and the English, and that the Zulus were to remain perfectly passive and take no part in it.⁷⁴

In other parts of the Zululand districts, there was much ignorance about the hostilities between the Transvaal and the British Government. On September 23, the magistrate of the Krantzkop district reporting on the attitude of the Zulus in the district wrote as follows: "It is surprising how little they appear to be concerned with the present political crisis."⁷⁵

This ignorance among some Zulus was also reported by the magistrate of the Lower Umfolozi district on October 10, who reported that: "The crisis in the Transvaal is, apparently of little concern to the Natives in the district, as they are entirely ignorant as to the present State affairs, and one never hears any discussion on the subject. Few natives in this district go in search of work on the Rand, a fact

72. Ibid.

73. G.A. Mills: A Report on the causes which led to the Ill-feeling between the Boers and the Zulus, p. 70.

74. Ibid.

75. S.N.A. 1/4/7.

which may account for their ignorance of the present condition of the Z.A.R."⁷⁶

On October 14, the police patrols were said to have been sent to all parts of the Lower Umfolozi district but gathered no news of the disquieting nature among the Zulus of that district.⁷⁷ On the return to that district of certain Zulus, who returned with Mr Warwick from Johannesburg towards the end of October, the people in certain parts appeared to be alarmed by the reports. But the information sent to the chiefs and the people about the Afrikaners' defeat at Glencoe, appeared to reassure them and the magistrate could not hide his satisfaction: "I am pleased everything is most peaceful and now that heavy rains have fallen they are all busy planting their crops."⁷⁸

At Hlabisa district the Zulus remained peaceful as late as November 11. They were, however, somewhat alarmed by rumours of a threatened invasion of the province by Afrikaners,⁷⁹ whereas in the Eshowe district, there was some ignorance about the approaching hostilities of the Anglo-Boer war. On September 4 the magistrate reported that there had been almost total absence of faction fighting or rioting of any kind for about eighteen months.⁸⁰ He pointed out that because the chiefs had not sought any information on the Transvaal issue, the situation was not much discussed amongst the Zulus and that they had no cause for alarm. During September the Zulus in that district were leaving as usual for work in the Transvaal and elsewhere, and were not returning in great numbers from the Republic.⁸¹

On October 3, the magistrate of Maphumulo district reported that some of the tribes might take advantage of the disturbed

76. Ibid., L.U. 543/1899, CR. 117/99.

77. Ibid., L.U. 584/99, CR. 167/99.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., H. 469/99, CR. 190/99.

80. Ibid., CR. 29/1899.

81. Ibid., L.U. 584/99, CR. 167/99.

State of affairs in the Colony and attack each other. Most of the chiefs were dissatisfied with the boundaries defined in 1897, each one complaining of not having sufficient land allotted to him.⁸² In spite of the magistrate's fears, the Zulus were still quiet as late as October 21, and they were taking advantage of the rains which had just fallen and were cultivating their fields.⁸³

On November 10, there were many disquieting rumours regarding the war among the Zulus at Maphumulo district, which created anxiety. The Zulus, however, remained loyal and were quietly cultivating their fields. The young men who had been working in Johannesburg returned. These men stated that they were ordered to proceed to the seat of war, where some would be required to fight.⁸⁴ These rumours caused some uneasiness more especially because they came during the month of November when the war had already broken out.

There were also numerous rumours brought by the Zulus returning from work from the Gold fields in the Ingwavuma district on the northern corner of Zululand. Those rumours, however were generally of vague conflicting nature and appeared to be picked up by the Zulus in the Z.A.R. en route to their homes, and which did not appear, up to that date, to have disturbed the Zulu minds in the district.⁸⁵ After the war had erupted, numerous batches of Zulus in twos and threes arrived in the district returning to their homes, having fled from the mines in the Z.A.R.⁸⁶

The Zulus throughout the district having received intimation through the Government that the British were actually at war with the Afrikaners, did not appear to show much anxiety. They continued to work on their fields.⁸⁷

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid., CR. 77/1899.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

At the Ubombo magistracy south of the Ingwavuma district, the magistrate reported that chief Mkakwa from Ingwavuma district had reported at the Ubombo magistracy on his way to visit chief Zibhebhu. He was asked to report again on his return and "talk over matters". But instead of doing so passed back without reporting and without even calling upon his uncle chief Ntozakhe, who had been prepared for him. The latter stated that he was offended and greatly astonished at his nephew's conduct. The magistrate of Ubombo then sounded a warning: "Such procedure on the back of chief Sambane's calling out his people under arms in July last is noteworthy - a communication has been addressed to the magistrate Ingwavuma on the subject of Chief Mkakwa's behaviour seeing he is of the opposite faction."⁸⁸ This statement shows clearly that the Zulu chiefs' activities were strictly watched during the war in order to prevent them joining what the magistrate termed, "opposite faction".

The magistrate of the Ubombo further stated in his report: "I would presume to suggest that Government should through magistrates, informally notify natives that relations with the Transvaal are strained, but that they will be duly informed should hostilities be anticipated. By giving this amount of confidence, I am of opinion it will encourage them to impart what they may hear, that it will be a means of suppressing extravagant rumours of an Osutu - Boer, or Mandlakazi - Boer, alliance - as in July last, and that should other absurd rumours be circulated, they will be sure to seek accurate official information regarding such. Moreover being British subjects their welfare will be closely bound with ours in the event of hostilities."⁸⁹

88. Ibid., C.R. 45/1899.

89. Ibid.

On October 19, Zulu headmen throughout Ubombo district were informed that hostilities had commenced.⁹⁰ Six Zulu scouts were placed along the border, one between the Phongolo and Joli's kraal, another between the latter place and Matanase's kraal, and between Matanase and Gwaza's kraal, a fourth between Gwaza's and the junction of the Sekani stream with the Nkunzi river, a fifth between the Sekani and Mvubu's kraal, and the sixth between Mvubu's and the junction of the Ubani Stream and Nkunzi.⁹¹

At the beginning of November, the Zulus at Ubombo district, appeared much concerned about their own safety, their crops and possessions. This concern remained in spite of all assurances that they would not be interfered with or the success of the British⁹² because on October 29, the Afrikaner forces had overthrown the Ingwavuma magistracy.⁹³

The overthrow of that magistracy did not improve matters. The Zulus consequently took their goods and chattels from their kraals to mealie-pits and caves where they could hide them. They were well aware of the fact that not a single kraal or Zulu had been interfered with by the Afrikaner forces in the Ingwavuma district.⁹⁴

On November 9, the magistrate of Ubombo district reported that Zibhebhu's messengers had been instructed by Zibhebhu to clear the approach to and clean out the cave in the Mandlakazi stronghold in the Nkunzi Poort in order that it might be ready for his women and children in case of an emergency.⁹⁵

Zibhebhu was staying in the Ubombo district with his Mandlakazi tribe and was trusted by the English as they had used him against Cetshwayo's Usuthu followers. The Mandlakazi was just

90 Ibid., U.B. 494/1899, CR. 154/99.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., U.B. 518/1899, CR. 196/99

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid., U.B. 519/1899, CR. 198/99.

north of Dinuzulu's Usuthu at Ndwandwe magisterial division. A report that Ngwanezi had called his people together was doing the rounds but for what purpose nobody knew. The head messenger of the Ubombo court was sent to him to caution him against creating any unrest. A Zulu spy was also sent at the same time into Maputaland to investigate matters there.⁹⁶

Looking at the Zulu population as a whole in all magisterial districts both in Zululand and in Natal, and against what we have already discussed we can safely say that the Zulus did not participate actively in the war during the period October to December 1899. They were, however, already indirectly involved in the war, in that there were many scouts, runners, spies and waggon drivers already employed by the British forces, who were at a disadvantage in that they were in a strange land and therefore not well acquainted with the geography of the country. On the war front as we have seen in the beginning of this chapter the Afrikaner forces were on the offensive on all fronts and the British were suffering defeats there.

96. Ibid., U.B. 534/1899, CL. 239/99.

CHAPTER TWOTHE PERIOD OF ALARM AMONG THE ZULUS IN CERTAIN
DISTRICTS

During 1899 the Zulus did not participate actively in the war. They did not even take part during 1900 in spite of alarm among the Zulus in certain districts. They remained peaceful although the Afrikaner forces were on the offensive on all fronts during 1899. But the year 1900 was the turning point, then the Afrikaner forces suffered reverses on all fronts.

The jubilation in Europe and even among certain Afrikaner sympathisers in Britain at the Afrikaner victories during 1899 was immediately dampened by the British command's new line of action. Two British divisions were already at sea on their way to South Africa, and a third was nearly ready to sail. Buller who retained his Natal Command, was replaced as commander-in-chief in South Africa by the sixty seven year old veteran, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C., the hero of Kabul and Kandahar. The new chief-of-staff, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, was an equally distinguished soldier, former the Sirdar of the Egyptian army and the victor of Omdurman he was a military organiser of note who would admirably complement the strategist Roberts, whose prestige in itself was an encouragement to the British in their hour of adversity. Upon his arrival in Cape Town on January 10, 1900, Roberts immediately began planning his main campaign, which would be launched from the Modder River.

In the meantime, throughout January, rebellions which had become more frequent in the Northern Cape and Griqualand West were further stimulated by an expedition led by General P.J. Liebenberg of Potchefstroom. British troops suppressed

uprisings at Upington, Douglas, Prieska, Hopetown, Philipstown and Kuruman, while on the otherwise quiet Thukela front, 4 000 Afrikaners launched an heroic onslaught on Ladysmith on January 6, 1900 from the South at Platrand. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides.¹

On the Colesberg front, in December General French advanced to confront the hesitant General Hendrik Schoeman, who, after Magersfontein, had to be helped by De la Rey. French faced stronger opposition until Roberts recalled him to Cape Town to be initiated into the next phase of the campaign. Major-General R.A.P. Clements assumed the southern command at a time when the Afrikaner forces were withdrawing to counter the threat to Kimberley from the south.²

After Buller had received reinforcements which raised the strength of his force to 30 000 men supported by 60 guns, he made a second attack on the Thukela. When Buller began moving his forces on about January 14, the Afrikaner lines were stretched out far west. Instead of attempting to outflank the Afrikaners from the east at Hlangwana Hill, which eventually proved to be the only way to reach Ladysmith, Buller chose to order Warren to outflank them from the West i.e. west of Spioen Kop (Ntabamnyama) and over Trichardt's Drift. The capture of Spioen Kop and its subsequent evacuation on January 24, 1900 was a tragedy of misunderstanding on the part of the British. The desperate battle of Spioen Kop ended in victory for Louis Botha. Of the 1 653 British casualties, there were more than 300 dead, as against 50 dead and 120 wounded on the Afrikaner side.³

1. C.F.J. Muller: 500 Years a History of S.A., p. 298.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

On February 11, 1900, however, Roberts began to advance with clearly defined objectives. He was to use his force of 30 000 men, comprising four infantry divisions and French's cavalry division, which was to play such an important part for the remainder of the war.⁴

Cronjé's capitulation on the 27th February, 1900, Majuba Day, was a severe blow to the Afrikaners and was to prove to be the turning point in the war. On the same day, February 27, 1900, the Afrikaners were also badly defeated on the Natal front. After Buller had made a fourth attempt on February 21 and 22, to gain a foothold on the other side of the Thukela, he on February 23 again launched a fierce attack against Botha's 5 000 Afrikaners at Pieter's Hill, and with an overwhelming force of 40 000 supported by 72 guns captured the key position of the Thukela line on February 27, despite the Afrikaners' heroic opposition.

The road to Ladysmith and its famished inhabitants was open. While White's force was being relieved, the Afrikaners, their morale shattered, retreated in confusion until they reached the scene of the October battles, despite the entreaties of President Kruger himself, who had arrived at Glencoe. There in the Biggarsberg Botha finally succeeded in reforming such lines as he could from those of his forces who had not returned home. Buller made no attempt to pursue the Afrikaner force. He remained in Ladysmith from March to May, 1900.⁵

President Kruger journeyed from the chaos in Natal to Bloemfontein, and with President Steyn drafted a dramatic appeal, copies of which were sent to all European governments, to the British Premier, Lord Salisbury, to stop the bloodshed

4. Ibid., p. 399.

5. A.J.H. Van der Walt, J.A. Wiid en A.L. Meyer: Geskiedenis van S.A., Deel I, pp. 570 - 1.

and restore peace on a basis acceptable to both parties involved in the war.⁶

On March 12, Kruger and Steyn's plea for peace was curtly rejected by Lord Salisbury. Great Britain was determined to subjugate the republics and did not fear the interference of European powers. British supremacy at sea was unquestioned and she was at peace with all her continental neighbours.

With the fall of Bloemfontein, the conflict in the Free State almost automatically became a mobile war, as was also later to be the case in the Transvaal. At Kroonstad, on March 17, with both Kruger and Steyn present a council of war decided to continue the war. General Joubert, too, was present at this meeting, but died on March 28, in Pretoria and was succeeded as Commandant-General of the Transvaal forces by the 38 year old Louis Botha. The council of war subscribed to the policy of smaller commandos unencumbered by wagon trains, the use of more mobile units, and raids on the British lines of communications. De Wet had already demonstrated how effective such tactics could be and within two weeks he was to do so again.⁷ De Wet struck at Sannaspos on March 31, at Mostertshoek on April 4, and at Wepener on April 9. In those dark days for the Afrikaner cause he kindled the flame of Afrikaner resistance, persuaded many burghers to return to their commandos and began to perform remarkable feats which earned him the reputation of being the most brilliant guerilla leader on the Afrikaner side.⁸

In the meantime Roberts planned a broad sweep northwards on a line from Kimberley to Ladysmith. With this northward sweep Buller would march across the Drakensberg to the Transvaal Highveld with a force of 45 000 men. In addition Roberts left a considerable force under Generals Chermiside, Rundle, Brabant, Pole-Carew and Kelly-Kenny in the Free State.⁹

6. Ibid.

7. C.F.J. Muller, op. cit., p. 302.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Louis Botha, who had assumed command of Afrikaners, had scarcely 12 000 men and 28 guns of which 8 000 men opposed the centre of Roberts's phalanx of Khaki which began the long march to Pretoria on May 3, 1900. So he adopted the form of battle which was to become characteristic of the Afrikaners. that of constantly fighting, disengaging and falling back to fight again.

Botha fought a rearguard action against Roberts at Six Mile Spruit and then withdrew to the east. To the Afrikaners this was a darker moment even than the occupation of Bloemfontein, even the steadfast Kruger wavered momentarily and his faith in the cause had to be bolstered by Steyn. Botha and the military leaders were discouraged and irresolute.¹⁰


It seemed therefore as if the war was over, with the defeat of Pretoria. As early as September 1, 1900 Roberts issued a proclamation annexing the Transvaal, while French, Pole-Carew and Buller tried in vain to subjugate the dispersed Afrikaner forces in the Eastern Transvaal. From the British point of view all that remained to be done was to clear the country of some isolated Afrikaner armed bands. Even Roberts was of this opinion, but events were to reveal that this was a serious error of judgement.

What was the position then in Zululand and among the Zulus in Natal when the war was in full swing between the two white groups? On the Zululand border the military force of the Afrikaners was under General Lucas Meyer who shortly before the outbreak of the war was in the area between Zululand and the South African Republic to protect the Afrikaner army from being attacked at the back.¹¹

10. Ibid., p. 303.

11. J.H. Breytenbach: Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899 - 1902, Deel III, Die Stryd in Natal, p. 375.

THE FRONT IN NATAL 26-27 FEB 1900



To prevent invasion from Zululand, the Afrikaners had already before the outbreak of the war placed a few guards along Zululand border who were supposed to patrol it and to watch the area between the Mzinyathi and the Bloukrans Rivers (See map). General Lucas Meyer, after the capture of Dundee, stationed two of his commandos, namely that of Piet Retief under Commandant C L Engelbrecht, and that of Bethal under Commandant P J Greyling, near Helpmekaar.¹² These commandos were to watch the Umvoti Mounted Police as well as perhaps other British forces which could have come between Greytown and Helpmekaar or Weenen to Ladysmith to attack the Afrikaner forces from the rear. Further these forces were to keep an eye on the Mzinyathi river - the border between Zululand and that part of Natal which was occupied by the Afrikaners.¹³

The burghers who watched the Vryheid district, that is, the district bordering on the Anglo-Zulu reserve and up to Pongolo River was placed under assistant General Coenraad Meyer. He had his headquarters in Vryheid and had in January 1900 about 150 burghers of whom about 50 formed the reserve force.¹⁴ General Meyer had also on January 15, 1900 received authorization from the Commandant-general to commandeer if necessary all the burghers of Vryheid and Piet Retief who were not yet commandeered or who had gone home on leave. According to the commandant-general there was on January 15, about two thirds of the burghers in the Vryheid district, who were liable for military service but who were not serving. They were, subject to Coenraad Meyer's authorization, liable to be commandeered.¹⁵

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp. 377 - 8.

The other part of the burgher force which was to protect the Afrikaners against attacks from the rear, was placed under the command of assistant-general Joachim Ferreira and had his headquarters at Helpmekaar.¹⁶ He was responsible for the watching of the western border of the Anglo-Zulu reserve, (the Ncome River and the Mzinyathi) and the Thukela between the Mzinyathi and the Bloukrans Rivers. On December 2, 1899 he had about 600 burghers with him, i.e. the commandos of Piet Retief and Bethal and a small group of Natal "rebels". Ferreira placed a strong outpost at Rorke's Drift and a reserve guard of 50 men, which could be strengthened to 100, at the foot path of the drift north of Weenen close to Lucas Meyer's commando west of the Bloukrans River.

General Piet Joubert was convinced that the Zulus would not molest the Afrikaners as long as the latter did not steal their stock or enter their territory. The commandant general signalled the same conviction to the landdrost of Vryheid and the Afrikaner commander at Helpmekaar.¹⁷ It was thus emphasised that the Zulus were not to be molested as long as they remained peaceful.

Generals Lucas Meyer and Louis Botha who both knew the Zulus and their language very well, were convinced that the Zulus would not attack the Afrikaners. The Paramount Chief, Dinuzulu, did not dare send his armies to the Republic and weaken his military force as long as his opponent Zibhebhu, was looking at him like a tiger waiting for the first opportunity to become the chief induna. The two generals, therefore, suggested that the people who were spreading the reports that the Zulus would attack the Afrikaners were those

16. Ibid., p. 378

17. Ibid., p. 379.

in the Vryheid district who were afraid to come to the front and were using the Zulu threat as an excuse to stay at home and protect their families.¹⁸

By January 16, 1900 Ferreira and Coenraad Meyer exchanged some ideas as to how **they should** invade Zululand, because on January 20, a report had been made that there was a mounted party of 600 to 700 men visible from Eshowe on their way to Nquthu district. Two hundred infantrymen were on their way from Melmoth to Nongoma, and 500 to 600 troops would meet them at James Evans' house just opposite the border in the Anglo-Zulu reserve. They were ready to raid the Vryheid district.¹⁹ When on January 24 and 25, it became evident that the reports of the British forces advancing were false, the two Afrikaner generals went on with their plan. They invaded the reserve with their combined forces of 700 men and conquered Nquthu on January 31, 1900.²⁰ After half an hour's defence and after they had wounded or killed ten burgher horses, a group of English soldiers and some Zulus who manned the fort raised the white flag. Twenty British, among whom were the magistrate, his wife and a child, were taken prisoners. There were also fifty Zulu soldiers among the prisoners and about 295 guns, 20 horses and 65 boxes of ammunition. In spite of this swift victory President Kruger was not happy: "Vir President Kruger was dit h ontstellende gedagte dat h groot deel van die Zoeloevolk teen die Boere in die harnas gejaag kon word ten gevolge van roofsgug onder die burgers. Hy het derhalwe voorgestel dat van die nie-blankes wat by Nquthu gevange geneem is, deur die kommandant-generaal persoonlik losgelaat en die Zoeloereserwe binnegestuur moes word met h boodskap aan alle Zoeloes in die gebied dat as die

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., pp. 283 - 4.

Boere van die eiendom van die inboorlinge gevat het, dit teruggegee sou word."²¹

On receiving this message from the President, Ferreira protested. He showed that the reserve was just a nominal Zulu area, and it was actually governed by the English and therefore, the core of unrest. Ferreira further pointed out that the Zulus caught at Nquthu were not permanent residents of the reserve, but tramps who were used by the British in their service to fight against the Afrikaners.²² Ferreira's protest was in vain because the commandant-general supported the president's suggestion and personally came to Dundee to meet the Zulu prisoners who had been sent back from Pretoria, and sent them to Nquthu with the message of the President.²³

Ferreira and Coenraad Meyer's Commandos' Council of War assured the commandant-general that the occupation of Nquthu was advantageous to the Afrikaner forces and added: "Nie alleen het die Zoeloes meer tevrede gevoel as wat hulle voorheen was nie maar ook die verbindingslinie tussen Meyer en Ferreira se kommando's is daardeur aansienlik verkort ... Die kommandant-generaal het nukkerig gebly en het op die 9de selfs aan Coenraad Meyer instruksie gegee om die Britse fort by Nquthu te vernietig. Meyer het die bevel verontagsaam."²⁴

After the Commandant-general had personally visited Helpme-kaar on February 13, 1900 and had investigated everything himself, he was convinced that the occupation of Nquthu district was in the interest of the Afrikaner forces. He then signalled to the President that a guard at Nquthu was

21. Ibid., p. 384.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 385.

24. Ibid.

more useful in protecting the Vryheid border than a guard on the border itself.²⁵ "Daarom en omdat die verbindingslinie tussen Bohingo en Helpmekaar nou korter was, kon daar groot getalle van Ferreira en Coenraad Meyer se burgers weggeneem word om elders te gaan veg. Die enigste burgers wat sedertdien dan ook in die gebied gelaat is om die rug van die Boerekommando's teen 'n inval via Zoeloeland te beskerm was die Natalse "rebelle" uit Newcastle en dié van een wyk van die distrik Vryheid. Die res van die burgers - te wete die van Piet Retief en Vryheid wat nog op die Zoeloegrens was - is weswaarts verskuif na Ladysmith en na die omgewing van Colenso."²⁶

In the meantime the magistrate of the Ndwandwe district heard the news of the conquest of Nguthu. He at once communicated it to the chiefs in his district.²⁷ The chiefs also heard the news from the Zulu scouts. The Ndwandwe district was the centre of Dinuzulu, the paramount chief of the Zulus, whose people had shown some signs of excitement at the beginning of January. The excitement was, however, reported to have subsided later on.

On February 14, it was reported by the magistrate of Emthonjaneni that "the natives have known of the fall of the magistracies at Nguthu and Nkandla, this together with the persistent manner, in which the Boers, have informed natives of their successes against the English most of which have been twisted to suit Boer ideas, and warnings that any natives, who are loyal to the English shall be punished when the war is over, and the country taken over, has caused them to lose their hearts."²⁸

25. Ibid., p 386.

26. Ibid.

27. S.N.A. 1/4/7: CR. 115/1900, 7.2.1900.

28. Ibid., CR. 126/1900.

At the commencement of the war the Zulus in the Nkandla district became very much excited but the excitement later died down.²⁹ When, however, the Afrikaner movement across the border had somewhat increased and with the stories they spread of successes to their arms in Natal, there was a danger of the Zulus being disturbed.³⁰

On February 19, 1900 matters changed very much for the worse with the Zulus at Emthonjaneni. That was caused by the capture of the Nkandla district. The Afrikaners had been most careful to impress upon the Zulus that they must sit still, and that no harm would come to them, as it would not be long before they, the Afrikaners, would be in possession of the whole of Zululand.³¹ The Afrikaners did not end with these words of assurances to the Zulus but presents were given to the Zulus from the stock of the storekeepers at Nkandla, and every effort was made to conciliate the Zulus so as to prevent them rising.³² A man named Kritzinger, was reported to be most active in supporting the Afrikaner propaganda. The magistrate pointed out that it was "absolutely necessary that these people should be arrested, and removed from the district. The effect would restore confidence to the natives generally his (Kritzinger) being at large is looked upon as weakness on the part of the Government, therefore, I most respectfully, yet urgently suggest, that the arrest be made without further delay."³³

On March 5, 1900 the magistrate of Emthonjaneni circulated the news of General Cronjé's surrender as well as the relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith amongst the Zulus.³⁴

29. Ibid., CR. 89/1900.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., CR. 146/1900.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., CR. 146/1900, 19.2.1900.

34. Ibid., CR. 176/1900.

The magistrate pointed out that the news was received by some with great satisfaction, whilst others gave him the impression that they doubted the announcement. The magistrate ... suspected that it was "caused by local Boer reports spread amongst the natives deputed for this purpose. I regret to say that there are several natives in this district who are used by Boers in this way, yet I have not been able to get any direct evidence against them."³⁵ The magistrate expected all the Zulus to be delighted at Cronjé's surrender and at the relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith, but his dilemma was that the Zulus in his district had already heard about the fall of Nquthu and Nkandla districts, and it was very difficult for them to accept British successes when they had heard about the successes of Afrikaner arms not far from their own district.

At Ubombo district rumours of faction fights were reported. It was reported among Sambane's people that Mbikiza called up his old men and asked them if they would attack Mtshelék-wana on account of a difference between them regarding certain land used as a mission site since 1896 to which both lay claim.³⁶ The old men refused saying the country belonged to the Government. Mbikiza then mustered the young men who said they would obey his orders.³⁷ It was stated that two messengers had been sent to make enquiry about the tribes concerned and that constables had been sent to watch Mbikiza.³⁸

On March 8, it was found that both parties concerned absolutely denied that friction existed between them. Zulu scouts stated that friendly relations existed between the young men

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., CR. 154/1900.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

and maidens of both factions.³⁹

In the meantime a certain report had appeared in The Natal Mercury of January 17, 1900, which stated that the Swazis in conjunction with Zulus were to help the Boers in completing the destruction of the English.⁴⁰ That report was false, but it was disturbing the English who expected full co-operation from all the Zulus as well as the Swazis.

That was also a period of confusion among some Zulus. It was a period of hope and dismay. There was in Natal a newspaper called Ipepa lo Hlanga. It was a national weekly newspaper which had five hundred and fifty subscribers, and which distributed fifty-three copies. The paper tried to create ill-feeling and resentment against the Government, and Europeans generally. Ipepa lo Hlanga had subscribers in the Cape Colony, Rhodesia, Beira and Delagoa Bay, in addition to Natal and the Zululand.⁴¹ The danger lay in the fact that although about ninety per cent of the Zulu population was still illiterate, each subscriber to the paper circulated his copy amongst his friends, and the Zulus who were able to read, read copies to those who were illiterate. There were many statements in the paper which were of a vicious nature, and incorrect, but the Zulus who read the paper, or to whom it was read, took the contents as truthful and there was no one to contradict.⁴²

Some of the statements in the Ipepa lo Hlanga of December 24, 1900 were that as a Crown Colony things were better in Natal than they were under Responsible Government. The paper discussed the conflict between the Boers and the English,⁴³

39. Ibid.

40. The Natal Mercury, 17.1.1900.

41. Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 24.2.1900.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

and stated that the English wanted a voice in the Government of the Transvaal - "the very thing they refused to give us here and which we have not got."⁴⁴

With regard to exemption of the Zulus from native laws, the paper said that there were those who said they were exempted from native law, but their status was neither that of a white man nor that of a Zulu. The paper then added: "I challenge any Colonist to point out to me one single thing the Government of Natal had ever done for the Natives. Not a single thing."⁴⁵

With reference to the war the paper pointed out that when the war was over it would be fortunate for the Zulus if they obtained the same wages from the English as they had got in the past at Johannesburg under Afrikaner Government. The paper concluded by saying that the Afrikaners treated the Zulus better and had never made women wear straps like dogs.⁴⁶

The English felt bitter about these statements. Consequently the Minister of Agriculture and the Secretary for Native Affairs wasted no time in acting against the paper. He wrote to the Colonial Secretary about Ipepa lo Hlanga and stated that if it could be legally done, then something should be done to prevent the dissemination of such publication amongst "the natives."⁴⁷

In spite of all the arguments of Ipepa lo Hlanga, and the excitement in some district of Zululand, the Zulus did not take an active part in the war, although the year 1900 was characterized by British successes on all fronts.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. S.N.A. 1/4/7: CR. 9/1901.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ARMING OF THE ZULUS DURING 1901

By 1901, the two Republics had already been annexed by Britain and the attitude and role of the Zulus will now be assessed in the light of the new situation in South Africa. From a British point of view all that remained to be done was to clear the country of some isolated Afrikaner armed bands, but events were to reveal that this was a serious error of judgement. It was soon realized that the war was going on unabated and that the Afrikaners were not defeated. The events that made the arming of the Zulus almost inevitable were as follows: As early as the spring of 1900 the war was waged on a smaller scale by the Afrikaner forces. It became a war of attrition waged against the British, planned by the Afrikaner governments in the field and fought under the command of the chief republican officers such as De Wet, De la Rey and Botha. In the meantime many dispirited Afrikaners surrendered to the British. However, that tended to weed out the weak from the fighting ranks so that those who remained were the dedicated spirits. The remaining two-thirds of the war was fought with smaller commandos operating in territory which was familiar to them. Officers were no longer elected and generally commando discipline became more stringent. In future, all supplies, food and ammunition were to be captured from the British. The Afrikaner command also largely dispensed with the use of artillery to ensure greater mobility.¹ A renewed recruiting campaign among the laggards and waverers among the burghers was started. Many of those who had given up, dug up their rifles and, breaking their oath of neutrality, rejoined the commandos.

General De Wet, set a stimulating example, and harassed one British garrison after another. Untiringly he moved backwards and forwards across the Vaal River.

In the meantime, it was well known that at the end of November 1900 Lord Roberts was to be succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa by his "military foreman", Kitchener. When the latter assumed command of the British forces in South Africa he adopted new methods in an attempt to end the war. In 1901 Kitchener put the new methods into effect by simultaneously introducing lines of blockhouses, establishing concentration camps for non-combatants, principally women and children, and organizing military "drives" by forces which were mostly mounted and deployed in columns instead of the traditional divisions and brigade.

The large scale removal of women and children from the farms was merely one aspect of the pitiless British scorched earth policy which was put into effect during 1901. The evacuation of the farms was accompanied by the burning of farm houses and the destruction of all means of existence.² The main issue, however, still remained effective subjugation of the Afrikaners in the field.

As a result of these battles and skirmishes, the need for arming the Zulus became more important. During the next month, i.e. March 1901 the British began arming the Zulus because it was obvious that the small Afrikaner bands were not easily conquered. The Zulus were armed by the English in spite of the assurances made to the chiefs in 1899, that they and their subjects were to remain neutral as the war was to be "a white man's war."

Since that policy was abolished on account of Afrikaner resistance lieutenant General French, Commander of the British forces in the South Eastern Transvaal instructed lieutenant colonel Bottomley on the 25th March, 1901 to proceed to Zululand. He was accompanied by Struben, Loxton and Major Clarke.³ French stated that he was authorised by the Commander-in-Chief and that Bottomley would be practically in command of the whole party.⁴

2. Ibid.

3. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Copy of Bottomley's letter, d.d. 23.3.1901.

4. Ibid.

Colonel Bottomley's mission was to assist the movement of the British forces under General French's command. He told the Zulus that they were to oppose the entry of any Afrikaner into Zulu territory. Bottomley was to encourage the Zulus, by every means in his power to resist any such invasion by force. French also made it clear in his instructions that the Zulus might be allowed to use any arms in their possession for the purpose of Colonel Bottomley's mission.⁵

The powers of the magistrates from whom the chiefs had taken instructions before were suspended for some time. The instructions to Bottomley clearly stated that he was to inform any magistrate or other official in Zululand that he was acting under General French's orders, and in conjunction with the force under the latter's command which was carrying out the military plans of the Commander-in-Chief, (Lord Kitchener) in South Africa.⁶ Against this background, it is interesting to note that nobody could have greater authority or power to resist Colonel Bottomley. He was not acting as a culprit or fanatic but was carrying out orders given to him.

The last part of the instructions given to Bottomley gave him greater independence in his dealings with his task. It stated: "In any circumstances of a doubtful nature you will act according to your best discretion."⁷

In March 26, 1901 General Hildyard sent a telegram to Mr. Hime the Prime minister of Natal, stating that after consultation with General French at Vryheid, a special party had been sent under Bottomley, Struben and Loxton to assist General French's operations. They instructed the Zulus to oppose the entry of the Afrikaners into Zululand and resist any invasion by force.⁸

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 28.3.1901.

General Hildyard also informed the Prime Minister that Bottomley had been instructed to tell the magistrates or other officials in Zululand that he was acting in conjunction with the forces under General French.⁹

On March 27, 1901 Colonel Bottomley arrived at Nquthu district and stated that he had come from columns operating under General French. He also informed the magistrate of that district that the Zulus were given permission to defend their borders and also to loot all Afrikaner cattle, and that Magistrates were to assist in the carrying out of these orders.¹⁰ Colonel Bottomley then left Nquthu district that day for Nkandla district en route to Nongoma to interview Dinuzulu.¹¹

On March 28, 1901 Colonel Bottomley arrived at Nkandla district accompanied by Struben and Loxton. There Colonel Bottomley placed a certain man, named Cooper in charge of the Zulus in the district. The Zulus were then called under arms in order to guard the border and to raid stock in the Transvaal districts of Vryheid, Utrecht and Wakkerstroom but they were not ordered to enter the Transvaal north of the Phongolo river. After giving instructions Colonel Bottomley's party went further north.¹²

On March 29, 1901 Colonel Bottomley and party arrived at Emthonjaneni where Bottomley showed the magistrate his instructions from General French which gave him discretionary power. Bottomley wanted the magistrate to render assistance to those agents whom Bottomley might appoint to carry out his orders. The magistrate had to inform the Zulus that they were to repel any invasion into Zululand by Afrikaners, and that they were authorized to cross the border and capture Afrikaner stock.¹³

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 27.3.1901.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 29.3.1901.

13. Ibid., Telegram no 11, d.d. 29.3.1901.

Bottomley told the magistrate that the Zulus might use any arms they possessed for those purposes. In accordance with the Zulu system of fighting, children, women and old men were usually killed in the war. But the Zulus were warned by Bottomley's agents that surrenders were to be respected and women and children were not to be molested. Colonel Bottomley then appointed a man, named Cressy, at Melmoth, as his agent for that district.¹⁴

Besides Cressy there were also five other agents who were expected to reach Melmoth on the same day. Before leaving Melmoth that afternoon Colonel Bottomley sent messengers to all the chiefs in that district, directing them to appear before Cressy on the following day to receive instructions.¹⁵

On the morning of March 30, 1901 Colonel Bottomley arrived at Mahlabathini district and after giving his instructions he left for Dinuzulu's Usuthu kraal. He would probably have reached it that day, but Bottomley only reached Usuthu kraal on March 31, 1901. At first Dinuzulu was reluctant to take Bottomley's orders but after five days Colonel Bottomley threatened that he would be taken prisoner and sent away from his people if he did not obey the orders.¹⁶

On April 2, Colonel Bottomley sent an order to Chief Zibhebhu through the magistrate of Nongoma. The latter sent the message to the Banganome kraal in the Ubombo district. Bottomley stated that in accordance with instructions from General French, Zibhebhu was ordered to arm his followers and protect the Zululand border within his district against the Afrikaners. Bottomley further added: "You may use whatever arms you may have in your possession for the purpose including rifles."¹⁷

From the foregoing instructions it is clear that the fire had been lit in the Nquthu, Nkandla, Emthonjaneni, Mahlabathini, Ndwandwe, Ubombo and Ingwavuma areas.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., Copy of C.J. van Rooyen's letter, d.d. 28.5.1901.

17. Ibid., Telegram no. 2, d.d. 3.4.1901.

What was left therefore, was the action to comply with the instructions given to the chiefs. As those districts formed a cordon around the Vryheid district they were going to change the course and the outcome of the war. The instructions given to the chiefs also marked the end of neutrality on the part of the Zulus in the districts which formed the cordon around Vryheid districts. (see map).

On April 1, 1901 Chief Maweni of Nquthu district sent a message to the resident magistrate to the effect that he had received instructions that day to arm his tribe and go and loot Afrikaner stock.¹⁸ Maweni further stated that he had no desire to do so having received instructions from his government to take no part in the war. This shows that chief Maweni was being confused by the abrogation of the former assurance that the Zulus were to remain neutral and leave the whites to fight their own war. Consequently on April 7, major Chapman who was in command of the Nquthu troops, also issued instructions to certain chiefs at Nquthu without any reference to the magistrate.¹⁹

On April 10, the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, Sir Charles Saunders, informed Prime Minister, Mr. Hime, by telegram that the Zulus had brought twelve cattle and sixteen goats looted from Vryheid district to the acting magistrate of Nquthu, and that the stock was accepted by the magistrate. The magistrate's action, however, resulted in a clash with the officer commanding Nquthu district. The cattle and goats were forcibly taken from the magistrate and he warned that he would frustrate all orders clashing with his own. The officer commanding Nquthu also emphasised that all stock brought into Nquthu district was brought in by his orders.²⁰

On April 1, the Zulus at Nkandla district also crossed the border into the Transvaal and looted a considerable number of Afrikaner stock.²¹

18. Ibid., Telegram no. 5, d.d.2.4.1901.

19. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, d.d. 7.4.1901.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., Telegram no. 7, d.d. 1.4.1901.

That period marked the time of confusion among the Zulus, and looting having once started was difficult to check. Therefore the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, telegraphically informed the Prime Minister that field Cornet Danhauser whose stock was looted by the Zulus from Nkandla district in terms of Colonel Bottomley's instructions, was going to Nkandla district with seventy men to punish the Zulus.²²

The Chief Magistrate of Zululand also reported that Afrikaners at Babanango led by Grobbelaar and Danhauser were threatening to raid Nkandla district to recapture stock taken from them.²³ It was also stated that Grobbelaar and Danhauser had summoned all the Zulus in the neighbourhood of Babanango to assemble at Piet Meyer's farm. On April 11, the apparent idea was Zulu assistance for the contemplated raid on Nkandla. The Zulus in that part of Vryheid complained that a quantity of their stock had been looted by men under Captain Wickham. The Vryheid Zulus were very incensed about it, and therefore it was quite possible that they might assist the Afrikaners against Nkandla district.²⁴

These events took place after Sir Charles Saunders, had received a letter from an Englishman whose sympathies were certainly not with the Afrikaners.²⁵ He pointed out that the state of affairs on the other side of the border was such that the Chief Magistrate ought to be informed of the facts. There were apparently two Van Rooyens and one Blanchie who had been brought in on April 7, by Captain Wickham's Zulu scouts. They stated that their wives and families had been looted on their farms and had been left with practically no food whatever. Other women and children whose husbands and fathers had surrendered to Captain Wickham were also in a deplorable plight. The condition of those people was far worse than those whose husbands and fathers had surrendered to the troops. In the latter case they had been looked after and provided for, but those poor wretches were defenceless and left to starve.

2. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 3.4.1901.

3. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 12.3.1901.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, d.d. 9.4.1901.

Their cattle had been looted and they had no means of getting away into British territory where they could at any rate be supplied with the necessities of life.²⁶ In the meantime a Mrs Doyer whose husband was then on his way to Eshowe, had also written letters to say that she was in fear of her life through her own Zulus. They were of Sishishile men living on Doyer's farm. One of them had struck her. There was not a man in the Nkandla district who did not feel deeply concerned about those things and not a man who would not do his utmost to alleviate the unnecessary sufferings and mental anxiety of those defenceless and helpless women and children.²⁷

The Englishman stated in his letter that the other English whites did not know how far they might move in the matter without overstepping military regulations with regard to the wives and families of surrendered burghers. The writer concluded his letter by saying: "If anything can be done and if the military will sanction our crossing over to find out what is necessary we shall be glad to offer our services in any way that may be required".²⁸ The report of the Englishman was no exaggeration. In fact it agreed with what was reported by A.L. Pretorius: "Drie ou mense, Oom Jurie Blanche, Gert van Rooyen en Michael van Rooyen is ook dieselfde nag deur kaffers gevange geneem en voor die perde uitgejaag na Kapt. Wickham toe."²⁹ So that, it is obvious that these people's families were left in the veld to starve. Pretorius also stated that Hendrik Coetzee was murdered by the Zulus at his cattle at Ngotshe.³⁰

It is important to note that the Englishman's good intentions failed. Instead General French who was then at Vryheid replied to the allegations with regard to those women and families who were left on the veld on April 9.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

30. Ibid.

He told the Prime Minister that when women were left alone on farms, they were seldom molested by the Zulus.³¹ The General said the English troops guarded them and rejected statements that they were left alone as false. The Zulu statements that their actions were owing to instructions from British military authorities, were rejected by him as false.³² General French blamed Grobbelaar for misunderstanding the terms of surrender.³³ Colonel Bottomley's orders were based on written instructions from the Commander-in-Chief and it was unlikely that Bottomley had gone beyond them.³⁴

At that time the chiefs were expected not to be obstacles in the way of the British forces. They were in fact expected to report Afrikaner movements and their full co-operation because Zululand was under martial law. Consequently, Chief Gayethe in the Krantzkop district was arrested by lieutenant Colonel G.A. Mills of the 1st Royal Dublin Fusilliers. Colonel Mills wrote: "There is also a kaffir chief named Gayete, the chief of the largest and strongest tribe about here, who also is very disloyal,"³⁵ Mills pointed out that Chief Gayethe's tribe extended well into Zululand. He and other chiefs had been warned to send information regarding Afrikaner movements at once, but Gayethe never sent any information which Colonel Mills had not received three or four days earlier from other sources. Colonel Mills thought that there was "very little doubt that much information is sent to the enemy from this district, as in the absence of troops, there is no restriction as to communication, taking this into consideration, I do not think it would be advisable to withdraw all troops from the district for some time."³⁶

Colonel Mills stated that Gayethe had promised to help the Afrikaners if they came into Krantzkop district.

31. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Telegram d.d. 9.4.1901.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., P.M.C., 321/1901.

36. Ibid.

He also pointed out that when interviewed Gayethe's manner was almost insubordinate. Consequently Colonel Mills banned Gayethe to Greytown and separated him from his tribe.³⁷

In the meantime the magistrate of Emthonjaneni received information that Afrikaner families consisting of women and children were quite destitute because their stock had been looted by the Zulus. They were trying to make their way across Melmoth border on foot for protection.³⁸ Even in that district the Zulus were carrying out instructions. Those instructions, substituted the ones previously given, namely, that the Zulus were to be neutral in the war.³⁹

In the meantime Colonel Bottomley's agents at Mahlabathini district were instructing the Zulus to assemble and go across the border to loot Afrikaner stock. As compensation they would be given ten per cent of everything looted by them.⁴⁰ On April 1, 1901 the Zulus at Mahlabathini were reported to have gone into the Transvaal and looted a considerable number of Afrikaner stock.⁴¹ By that time the Zulus were imbued with a spirit of hostility. A number of armed Zulus under Chief shanibezwe who had gone into the Vryheid district on April 1 to loot had not yet returned.⁴² On the 2nd April the Zulus from Mahlabathini looted nearly 500 head of cattle and 600 sheep from the Vryheid district.⁴³ The Zulus who looted that stock belonged to Chief Nqodi. The armed Zulus went in by night and came into collision with some Afrikaners with whom they exchanged shots.⁴⁴ Although the Zulus were supposed to be given ten percent of the stock they had looted, the remainder i.e. 90% was always taken by Loxton who was then at Mahlabathini.⁴⁵

7. Ibid.

8. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Telegram no. 13, d.d. 29.3.1901.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., Telegram no. 7, d.d. 1.4.1901.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., Telegram no. 16, d.d. 2.4.1901.

13. Ibid., Telegram no. 3, d.d. 2.4.1901.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

It was also reported to the Chief Magistrate by the Magistrate of Mahlabathini that Carl F. Butz and Schanders had come over into Mahlabathini district from Vryheid unarmed following up their cattle which had been seized by Nqodi's people.⁴⁶ Butz denied being a Transvaal burgher and declared that he had been non-combatant all through the war. Butz then requested that he might be handed back his cattle, if not all at least a few milking cows to feed his wife and family who were then dependent entirely on them for food.

In the matter of his being a non-combatant, the magistrate of Mahlabathini thought Butz was correct for he had not heard of his doing any fighting. The magistrate however added: "His sympathies were against us."⁴⁷ As for Schanders the magistrate of Mahlabathini stated: "Schanders has fought throughout and up to quite recently actually assisted in preventing Boers surrender to this magistracy. He was concerned in the capture of B. Shutze's cattle on March 4, in this district. I should like to see Schanders differently treated to those Boers who have hitherto surrendered here as an example to others of his demeanour."⁴⁸ C.F. Butz who claimed to be a German, handed to the magistrate of Mahlabathini a letter addressed to the German consul at Pretoria protesting against his cattle being looted and accusing the magistrate of organizing the raiding expedition.⁴⁹ Bottomley's agents made it generally known that the arrangements regarding looting were that Bottomley and his party retained sixty five percent of all the loot, ten percent was to be given to the Zulus or whoever looted the stock, and twenty five percent was to go to the Government.⁵⁰

On the evening of April 2, Cornelius Muller who was living in Vryheid district arrived at Mahlabathini magistracy.⁵¹ Cornelius Muller had three fresh wounds which appeared to have been inflicted by assegais.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

He said that he was wounded by three armed Zulus of Chief Nqodi who had induced him to come out of his house. They attacked him without any provocation. Then a companion of Muller fired at the Zulus but did not appear to have hit anyone.⁵² Muller was not certain of the real number of the

Zulus. Pretorius however, states the following: "Corneels Muller is by sy huis aangeval deur ongeveer 500 kaffers van Mahlabathini distrik, al sy vee is eers geroof en toe is hy vyf steekwonde toegedien nadat hy hulle deur die nag terug geskiet het en die volgende dag met sy vrou en kinders na die Engelse moes vlug om hulle lewens te behou."⁵³ It seems to

us, therefore, that the Zulus at Mahlabathini were actively used. The whole organisation there, was under Captain Wickham and Struben, and under their command there were also a mixture of "Joiners" and other robbers. Even Sir Charles Saunders called the group: "The dregs of humanity."⁵⁴

A.L. Pretorius wrote: "Die rowers het uitgetrek en oor die grense met groot bendes kaffers burgers gevange geneem, vroue en kinders en huise geplunder en honderde duisende beeste, perde en skape geroof."⁵⁵ These events therefore, show

clearly that the situation was getting out of hand. Chief Tshanibezwe's men, for example had already seized over a hundred head of cattle belonging to Cornelius Muller whilst the latter was on his way to surrender to the magistrate at Mahlabathini.⁵⁶ The Magistrate ordered the Zulus under Tshanibezwe to restore those cattle as the Afrikaners who were surrendering at Mahlabathini were very bitter about the Zulus being sent to loot their cattle and blamed the civil authorities for the whole proceeding.⁵⁷

In the meantime Colonel Bottomley was still actively involved

52. Ibid.

53. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Telegram no. 18, d.d. 2.4.1901.

57. Ibid., Telegram no. 16, d.d. 2.4.1901.

in carrying out orders given to him. On April 2, he wrote a letter from the Usuthu Kraal to the magistrate of Mahlabathini, requested the magistrate to order Tshanibezwe to send over all his men who were living between the Black Umfolozi and Skhwebezi to assist Dinuzulu who did not have sufficient men with him. Tshanibezwe's men were to be led by Mankulumana, the veteran of Isandlwana and later chief advisor to Dinuzulu. Tshanibezwe's men were all to come armed and were to be employed to guard the Border.⁵⁸

The Chief Magistrate, Sir Charles Saunders instead of directing his accusations at Colonel Bottomley, stated that it was a deliberate attempt of Dinuzulu's to assume control over a portion of Chief Tshanibezwe's people and that Tshanibezwe and Dinuzulu were not on friendly terms.⁵⁹ The chief magistrate stated that Tshanibezwe gave most important evidence at Dinuzulu's trial before his exile. The chief magistrate, therefore, warned that it would be a very fatal mistake to allow those two tribes to come into armed conflict.⁶⁰ In spite of Saunders's apprehensions, there were no serious clashes between Tshanibezwe's people and those of Dinuzulu.

On April 8, the magistrate of Mahlabathini received a letter from Commandant F. Grobbelaar of the Vryheid commando. Grobbelaar notified the magistrate that the Zulus from British Zululand were busy plundering families during the past three or four days.⁶¹ The letter referred to a statement of the wife of Van der Westhuizen, who had been plundered by the Zulus. She said the Zulus had stated that they had got the orders from the magistrate of Mahlabathini. Grobbelaar

58. Ibid., Telegram no. 9, d.d. 3.4.1901.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., Telegram no. 14, d.d. 8.4.1901.

angrily enquired whether that was the case: "Is this so? We are fighting against the British Government, a civilized nation and not with natives."⁶² Grobbelaar pointed out that he would be greatly obliged if the magistrate would inform him why such things were allowed.⁶³ In a letter to the Prime Minister, General French said that Grobbelaar's statement was quite false. He repeated his accusations against Grobbelaar and pointed out that it was uncommon occurrence that when women were left alone on farms, they and their property were molested by Zulus, because the English troops never left them without supervision. French concluded that Grobbelaar, having misreasoned facts as regards to surrender, was quite capable of doing so on other points.⁶⁴

On April 14, the situation was aggravated at Mahlabathini, when captain Wickham put two Zulu women in jail.⁶⁵ They were jailed after being arrested in the Vryheid district on the suspicion of them being Afrikaner spies. But the magistrate of Mahlabathini stated that he had no evidence against those women and intended discharging them. The magistrate asked that the Officer Commanding Troops in Zululand give Wickham permission to take away three head of cattle from those women. But the magistrate could not say what had become of the cattle and asked Wickham to give him information as to who had got them. The magistrate thought an injustice had been done and recommended to the chief magistrate that their cattle be returned to them or others in their stead.⁶⁶ The Zulu women who were jailed had come from the Transvaal. The Chief Magistrate consequently asked the officer commanding Zululand whether he approved of the proposal and to tell him

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, d.d. 9.4.1901.

65. Ibid., Telegram no. 14, d.d. 8.4.1901.

66. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 20.4.1901.

under whose orders Captain Wickham was acting because Struben, one of Colonel Bottomley's agents, who had been to the Chief Magistrate on April 20, told him that Wickham had nothing to do with them.⁶⁷

This was clearly a time of turmoil. The Zulu women remained in jail. Bottomley's agents were very active in the district and Loxton, one of Bottomley's agents, had already made an appeal to the magistrate of Mahlabathini to send Zulus in his district to accompany him into the Vryheid district to loot Afrikaner stock.⁶⁸ The magistrate was absolutely certain that if any Zulus from his district accompanied Loxton, they would go fully armed and mentioned that two Zulus had been shot dead whilst looting Afrikaner stock in the Vryheid district.⁶⁹

It must, however, be borne in mind that the orders given to Colonel Bottomley were Lord Kitchener's orders. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in South Africa, and nobody could have interfered easily with the execution of such orders. The case of Captain Wickham jailing the two women on charges of spying was a good example of his authority. When for example, the Chief Magistrate asked about Wickham's authority, he was simply told the Commanding Officer in Zululand had instructed Captain Wickham to do so.⁷⁰

That officer was then ordered by the Deputy Adjutant General (D.A.G.) to arrange in conjunction with the Chief Magistrate, for Captain Wickham to be brought to him at Eshowe at once and

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., Telegram no. 10, d.d. 10.4.1901.

69. Ibid., Telegram no. 3, d.d. 11.4.1901.

70. Ibid., Telegram Eshowe 332, d.d. 22.4.1901.

detained there until a further communication was received.⁷¹ But on April 25, Captain Wickham requested the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner to give instructions to C. Foxon the resident magistrate of Nkandla district, to hand over horses to him which he, Wickham, had taken from the Afrikaners in terms of Lord Kitchener's orders.⁷² Captain Wickham cleared all the confusion at once by declaring that he was Bottomley's representative at Nkandla district.⁷³

Under the circumstances it was very difficult to arrest Captain Wickham. The General Officer Commanding Natal, requested the Chief Magistrate telegraphically to explain to magistrates that where martial law existed they had no power to arrest officers.⁷⁴ When an officer did what they thought was wrong, they should report the matter to the proper military authorities, who would then take the necessary action. No action should be taken by civil authorities against Captain Wickham who would be dealt with in the first instance by the Officer Commanding Troops in Zululand.⁷⁵ The Chief Magistrate of Zululand replied that the magistrates would be informed accordingly, but added, that the magistrate of Melmoth had informed him that there was nothing to show that Captain Wickham was a military officer or that he was acting under any military instructions. The Chief Magistrate further stated that although Captain Wickham had been in Melmoth a short time previously, he had produced no written authorisation or instructions from anyone to show that he was acting for or under military authorities and that Wickham had told the magistrate that he was not acting under Bottomley.⁷⁶

71. Ibid., Telegram 364, d.d. 25.4.1901.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., Telegram no. K1541, d.d. 15.4.1901.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., Telegram no. 8, d.d. 25.4.1901.

The Chief Magistrate's explanation was of no avail and on April 29, the military authorities requested withdrawal of the warrant for Captain Wickham's arrest and the warrant was then withdrawn.⁷⁷ Captain Wickham was ordered to appear before the Officer Commanding Troops at Eshowe. He did so, but the outcome was not made known. As Zululand was under martial law, there were many mysteries which could not be easily understood even by the civil authorities themselves.

In the meantime the Zulus from Mahlabathini continued raiding Afrikaner stock in the Vryheid district. Consequently a party of about forty Afrikaners, entered Mahlabathini district at Mann's store.⁷⁸ They proceeded a short way into the district and returned again to the Transvaal after visiting Mann's place, where they carried away what they could and destroyed much of what they did not require.⁷⁹ The party came from the Nhlazatshe region where their headquarters seemed to be situated at that time. The Afrikaners at Nhlazatshe, as far as the magistrate of Mahlabathini could estimate, numbered about 100 to 150 men.⁸⁰ It was feared they might attack two of the Chiefs in Mahlabathini district against whom they were very bitter for having assisted in the looting of their stock.⁸¹ The Afrikaners, however, never attacked any Chief in Zululand.

In Ndwandwe district where Dinuzulu's Usuthu Kraal was situated, Bottomley's agents wasted no time in instructing the Zulus that they were to assemble, go across the Border and loot Afrikaner stock and that the Zulus were to be given ten percent of all they had looted.⁸² It was, however,

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 24.4.1901.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., Telegram no. 8, d.d. 30.3.1901.

feared that if Dinuzulu's and Zibhebhu's men should cross the border and make contact in the Transvaal, there would be conflict between them and that there was no knowing where that would end.⁸³ But such anticipated trouble did not occur owing to the discipline maintained by Colonel Bottomley's agents. The Chief Magistrate, Sir Charles Saunders, requested the Magistrate at Nongoma to warn Dinuzulu and Zibhebhu that their people were to cross the border without the authority of the Natal Government. Dinuzulu refused to take orders from Bottomley himself, the latter threatened that he would be taken prisoner and sent away from his people.⁸⁴

After assembling his men at his kraal, Dinuzulu went out personally to supervise his people. Then on March 31, 1901, Dinuzulu's people armed with assegais and guns, looted 86 head of cattle and 6 horses belonging to C.J. van Rooyen. The latter was the victim of unfortunate circumstances. He had surrendered in terms of the guarantee given by Commissioner Smith. The latter said the border of Zululand, would be open for Burghers who desired to surrender and all their stock would be respected by virtue of Lord Kitchener's proclamation.⁸⁵ C.J. van Rooyen was one of those who surrendered but had found it difficult to cross the border. It surprised him that 86 head of cattle and 6 horses were looted from approximately 117 head of cattle by armed Zulus of Chief Dinuzulu just on the border of the Vryheid district. But when he crossed the border the following morning into Nongoma, Ndwandwe district he was looted again of all the stock still left in his possession.⁸⁶

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., Copy C.J. van Rooyen's Letter, d.d. 28.5.1901.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

During that time Dinuzulu was standing on a hill nearby supervising his armed Zulus. Mr van Rooyen knew Dinuzulu very well and he, therefore, made representations to Dinuzulu about the looting of his stock. But he was informed by Dinuzulu that his stock was looted in terms of Bottomley's orders who was staying at Nongoma at that time.⁸⁷

On his arrival at the resident magistrate of Nongoma, he told Mr A.W. Leslie how all his stock had been looted by armed Zulus, and appealed to him for protection. Mr A.W. Leslie took steps at once. He sent a Zulu messenger to Dinuzulu ordering him to return all of C.J. van Rooyen's stock, i.e. those cattle taken from him in the Transvaal and those taken from him in Zululand.⁸⁸ Mr A.W. Leslie gave Van Rooyen a written note: "Cornelius J. van Rooyen of Ward 1, Vryheid, surrendered burgher has permission to proceed to kraal of Hlumuga near Nkuzana to bring in his stock to Nongoma but in no case to cross the border."⁸⁹ Mr A.W. Leslie also sent a note to Dinuzulu.

On receiving Mr A.W. Leslie's note Dinuzulu wanted to return all Van Rooyen's stock, but Mr Struben one of Colonel Bottomley's agents prevented Dinuzulu.⁹⁰

Mr C.J. van Rooyen then made appeals to Mr S. Struben telling him that it was the orders of the magistrate to return all his stock, but it was of no avail. Van Rooyen finally saw his looted stock at Nongoma in the hands of Struben. After that Struben went away with the stock.⁹¹

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., A.W. Leslie's Letter, d.d. 4.4.1901.

90. Ibid., Copy C.J. van Rooyen's Letter, d.d. 28.5.1901.

91. Ibid.

It was after that event that Colonel Bottomley decided to make use of Dinuzulu's influence on Zulus living in the Vryheid district to rise against the Afrikaners. The Zulus in the Vryheid district were urged to arm and loot.⁹²

Bottomley then went to Zibhebhu in the north to endeavour to induce him to use his influence to urge the Zulus in the Vryheid district to arm and loot.⁹³ In that way the Zulus in the Vryheid district were to join in the campaign against the Afrikaners during 1902. They belonged mainly to the Baqulusi tribe which regarded Dinuzulu as their paramount chief.

On April 9, an armed party of Dinuzulu's men, looting in the Vryheid district, had an engagement with some Afrikaners and in the conflict one of Dinuzulu's men was killed. Dinuzulu's men wounded one Afrikaner.⁹⁴

Further north of Ndwande Zibhebhu was also active against the Afrikaners. He sent the Zulus into the Vryheid district to capture whatever Afrikaner stock they could lay their hands on. Any man who might wish to assist him but living in the Transvaal Republic it was said, might do so. It was further stated that ten percent of the stock so captured by Zibhebhu would be given to him and the remainder would be handed over to Bottomley's agent to be held by him for the Government under Bottomley's instructions.⁹⁵

Zibhebhu operated only within his district in Zululand. As regards the Vryheid district, he was instructed to be careful not to interfere with Dinuzulu's men who were operating within Dinuzulu's boundaries and who acknowledged him as their chief.⁹⁶

92 . Ibid., Telegram no. 13, d.d. 5.4.1901.

93 . Ibid.

94 . Ibid., Telegram no. 5, d.d. 8.4.1901.

95 . Ibid., Telegram no. 2, d.d. 3.4.1901.

96 . Ibid.

Bottomley acting on the advice of the magistrate of Non-goma instructed Zibhebhu to keep within his boundaries and Dinuzulu to operate within his sphere of jurisdiction which extended some distance beyond the Phongolo.⁹⁷ The magistrate of Ndwandwe district was further requested by Colonel Bottomley to read the instructions to the chiefs, and explain them to Mkhondo, Zibhebhu's chief induna.⁹⁸

The chief magistrate, Sir Charles Saunders, was however, still dissatisfied with Bottomley's arrangement. In his telegram to the Prime Minister he clearly stated his fears about those arrangements. He requested that the Government should seriously attend to that portion of the instructions which allowed Dinuzulu to assume control over portions of the Transvaal. In terms of the conditions on which he was returned from exile, he was to have no authority there whatever.⁹⁹

The Chief Magistrate also added that if Dinuzulu's sphere of influence was extended in that manner by a representative of the military authorities, Dinuzulu would look upon that as a restoration of his previously owned land. Furthermore the same instructions would be issued to chiefs and headmen in Vryheid district to arm and loot Afrikaner stock. That stock would then be brought to the chiefs to hand over to Colonel Bottomley or his agents. In that manner Zululand would be the base of operations, and the chiefs would become the agents through whom instructions were to be carried out.¹⁰⁰

In conclusion the Chief Magistrate pointed out that several

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

influential chiefs from the Vryheid district had been given asylum in Zululand soon after the war had broken out. If those chiefs were allowed to remain with Dinuzulu, they would doubtless be active agents in those proceedings. In spite of what may appear as friction between the military authorities and the civil authorities, the English had only one aim, and that was to destroy the Afrikaners in the field. In the telegram of April 3, the Prime Minister stated that he was satisfied "Bottomley may be trusted to carry out his instructions to the best of his power, interference with him now can lead to no good results."¹⁰¹ The message was sent at a time when children and women had been abandoned in the veld without a means of subsistence since their cattle, goats and even horses had been looted by the Zulus.

One can look at Bottomley as an organizer of the Zulu army or one who was invested with all the powers by Lord Kitchener himself. On April 23, Bottomley and Struben stated that it was not intended that they should defend the border of Zululand but that they were to loot as far as possible, all the Afrikaner cattle in the Vryheid district. Consequently they had been praised by Lord Kitchener on the excellent work done in Zululand.¹⁰²

It is against this background that one must ask why Bottomley continued with his work although some regarded him as a culprit or a fanatic acting on his own. On May 6, 1901 for example, the fire he had lit in Zululand was burning to the northern corner of Zululand. The magistrate of Ingwavuma reported that three Europeans Ashby, Howe and Crossley were looting all the cattle belonging to the Swazis residing in Swaziland near the border of the Ingwavuma district.¹⁰³

101. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 3.4.1901.

102. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 23.4.1901.

103. Ibid., Telegram no. 5, d.d. 6.5.1901.

Those three men said they were Bottomley's agents. They were taking the Swazi cattle on the pretence that the latter were hiding Afrikaner stock. It was said a number of chief Zibhebhu's people were assisting them to loot those cattle and that Zibhebhu had been directed to arm the remainder of his people to protect the cattle when they reached his district.¹⁰⁴ The chief magistrate however, sounded a warning: "The natives from whom the cattle have been looted have behaved splendidly well throughout the war and they will most certainly lose confidence in the British Government if they are to be treated in this manner by a few Europeans who are the only ones according to their own account who are to benefit as they have been authorized to keep all their loot."¹⁰⁵ The Chief Magistrate ended his telegram by stating that he hoped it would be possible for the British Troops in Zululand, to put a stop to the proceedings of Ashby, Howe and Crossley and to order the immediate restoration of all property they had looted from the Swazis near the Border of Zululand.¹⁰⁶

It was, however, found out later that the "natives" who had had their cattle looted by Ashby, Howe and Crossley resided in that strip of Vryheid district immediately west of the Ubombo range between Mkuzi and Phongolo rivers and not actually in Swaziland.¹⁰⁷ The Zulus in that region were later reported to be slaughtering the few cattle they had left for fear that they would also be looted.¹⁰⁸

At Hlabisa district the magistrate had also received instructions from Colonel Bottomley to order two of the tribes in

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., Telegram 6.5.1901.

108. Ibid.

the district to arm and join Dinuzulu but that apparently did not materialise. The Chief Magistrate was against the revival of a Zulu kingdom under Dinuzulu. He stated:

"Dinuzulu had no authority whatever over these people and this is another attempt on his part to assume control over the people under other chiefs in this province."¹⁰⁹

On June 2, 1901 Bottomley was reported to be at Emthonjaneni again, but it was said that he was leaving there for Natal on the same day.¹¹⁰ Some of Colonel Bottomley's agents were at Nongoma whilst others were at Nkandla district and most of the cattle they had looted were in that district in the Insuzi Valley and they were estimated at more than 300.¹¹¹ Another lot of between 200 and 300 head were in Nongoma district and it was said there might be small lots scattered about in other parts.¹¹² The abovementioned number of stock was in addition to the cattle the military had taken over from Bottomley. The Zulus were supposed to get ten percent of all the stock they had looted but Bottomley's agents who were then at Nongoma were reported as "trying to recover cattle natives had helped themselves to over and above the 10 per cent they were supposed to be entitled to."¹¹³

It was also reported on the same date, June 2, by the Prime Minister to the Chief Magistrate of Zululand, Charles Saunders, that Bottomley's activities were over.¹¹⁴ Colonel Bottomley then disappeared from Zululand to be given knighthood (C.M.G.) for the work he had done in Zululand.¹¹⁵ The Chief Magistrate was thereafter encouraged to re-establish

109. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, 4.4.1901.

110. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, 6.5.1901.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, 2.6.1901.

115. Ibid., Report of Evidence given by Charles Saunders, d.d. 15.11.1902, p. 21.

the Status quo ante on the Zulu border.¹¹⁶ It meant that from then on the magistrates were to give instructions to the chiefs and forbid them from crossing over to the Transvaal.

What was then the situation among the Zulus in Natal whilst Bottomley was busy arming the Zulus in Zululand? In Natal, the Ipepa lo Hlanga was publishing subversive statements directed at the English people. The main reason for this, however, was the Natal Native Congress under the chairmanship of Chief Isaac M. Mkhize and H.C.C. Matiwane who was the secretary, whilst Chief J.M. Majosi was the treasurer.¹¹⁷ There were complaints about education and franchise which dated back to 1900. One of the statements was that: "We have no voice in the Government, numerous as we are, neither have we education. The Government has built large schools for the Indians in Durban, where there are white teachers. What then does the native think?"¹¹⁸

The English were alarmed by some of these statements which showed clearly that the Zulus had no love for them. The Prime Minister in his letter to the Governor, stated: "It has been ascertained that two of the native chiefs in the colony, Isaac Mkhize of Riet Spruit, Lions River Division and James Milward Majosi of Indaleni are registered as publishers of this newspaper, (Ipepa lo Hlanga) and ministers are of opinion that the secretary for Native Affairs should be directed by Your Excellency to send for these two men and enquire of them whether they approve of the views expressed in the enclosed articles."¹¹⁹ The Prime Minister further stated that if the two men approved of the views expressed in the articles, ministers were considering that they should be

116. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, . 2.6.1901.

117. Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 2.6.1901.

118. Ibid.

119. S.N.A. 1/4/9: CR. 9/1901.

informed that such attitude was inconsistent with the position of a "Native Chief", and that they should be warned not to associate themselves in the publication of such articles.¹²⁰

In reply to the Prime Minister's letter, the Governor felt that some of the grievances were well founded and ministers should consider whether a meeting could not be held and added: "There is no doubt that there will be trouble sooner or later."¹²¹

The Under Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr Samuelson, decided to meet the chairman of the Natal Native Congress and his secretary. He told them that he had brought the articles of the Ipepa lo Hlanga to the notice of the Government and that he had read the paper with disappointment and sorrow for some time. Then he read some of the articles for the two men's information and asked if they approved of them. The two chiefs replied that they disapproved.¹²² Mr Samuelson then reminded them that they were Government servants, and that they as publishers were responsible for the utterances of the Ipepa lo Hlanga, and asked them if they would approve of their own servants speaking about them as the paper had done about the Government.¹²³ The two chiefs replied: "Certainly not" and both added that they would sever their connection with the paper.¹²⁴ It was, therefore, quiet in Natal for some time due to the warning to the two important chiefs.

Looking at all the events which were taking place during

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

1901, especially the arming of the Zulus by the English, we must not think the Afrikaner leaders were passive. Even before the arming of the Zulus by Bottomley De Volkstem had suspected that the British would use the Blacks against the Afrikaners. On December 21, 1899 it had written thus: "De Natal Mercury bevat in een der laatst hier aangekomen uitgaven het volgende: "Mtyetyi ... legde ons uit dat die Engelse niet wisten hoe ze oorlog moesten voeren. Zij waren te veel "gentlemen" tegenover de Boeren. We voerden de oorlog als een spel. De goede weg voor Engeland was om de Zulus ... op te stoken de Transvaal en de O.V.S. binnen te vallen en alievrinnen en kinderen te doden. Wanneer de Afrikaners hoorden van deze moorden, zouden se haastig terug komen om hun huizen te verdedigen. Te dien einde zouden ze op hun gemak kunnen volgen en ze naar welbehagen uitmoorden. Ieder die ontsnapte zouden de kaffers voor hun rekening nemen. Gevolglik zoude het gehele ras worden uitgeroeid en zoude er geen Afrikanerkwesti meer in Zuid-Afrika zijn."¹²⁵ This prediction as we have seen, did take place in 1901 when the Zulus crossed their borders into the Vryheid district.

In conclusion we can point out that despite the victories by Lord Roberts in 1900, the small Afrikaner bands which were consequently formed could not be defeated and that as a result the year 1901 saw those Zulus in the districts around the Vryheid district, participating actively in the war in order to bring the Afrikaner forces to their knees. The arming of the Zulus, however, was to have far-reaching consequences.

125. De Volkstem,

21.12.1899.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMMEDIATE REPERCUSSIONS OF BOTTOMLEY'S ACTIONS
IN ZULULAND AND SOME OTHER EVENTS DURING 1901

The arming of the Zulus by Colonel Bottomley had far-reaching consequences. His activities as we have seen were stopped on June 2, 1901 and after that date the Chief Magistrate of Zululand, Charles Saunders, was requested to re-establish the Status quo ante on June 5, 1901. Although some of Bottomley's actions had immediate consequences, other consequences dragged on until 1902. We will, therefore, first look at the immediate consequences and later to the war itself because the stopping of Bottomley's armed Zulus did not lead to the termination of the Anglo-Boer War. During 1901 there was also considerable confusion with regard to the looting of Afrikaner cattle by the Zulus.

Considerable looting took place between March 27th and April 3rd, 1901.¹ Some 5 000 cattle were captured and many difficulties were caused by the movement of the stock from district to district, by Bottomley's agents. The magistrates in certain districts tried to claim the stock brought in by the Zulus but a telegram which had been written by Lord Kitchener on April 7 warned the magistrates against it.² Lord Kitchener stated that before taking stock driven in by the Zulus, enquiry was necessary regarding the conditions in terms of which the military authorities allowed stock to be taken. He felt that the Zulus should not be deprived of stock if looted in terms of military instructions. If the Zulus were informed by military officers that they may retain all or part of the stock taken from the Afrikaners if safely conveyed by them to their districts, then it may cause unrest if the

1. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Report of Evidence Given by Charles Saunders,
p. 32

2. Ibid.

stock was afterwards seized by magistrates because they disapproved of military arrangements. Such breach of faith with Zulus would lead to serious problems and was in Kitchener's opinion not advisable. Lord Kitchener ended by saying that he would send a military commission to enquire into the matter but until they had reported he did not think stock should be attached.³ Lord Kitchener emphasised that it was necessary to clear the country of stock but if the troops were to do so they would be considerably hampered in their operations. Moreover the help of the Zulus was very valuable, and he requested all magistrates to give their utmost assistance and encouragement in carrying this out in order to help terminate the war.⁴ The telegram was addressed to the administrator but was repeated to Sir Charles Saunders who replied on April 8, that the magistrates in Zululand had been instructed accordingly.⁵

On April 9, General Hildyard requested the Prime Minister to instruct magistrates to move stock out of danger if Colonel Bottomley thought it desirable.⁶ On the same date the Chief Magistrate requested the Prime Minister to obtain definite instructions for him as to what magistrates were to do with cattle which the Zulus were collecting in the Transvaal. He pointed out that in some cases the cattle were being handed to the magistrates.⁷ He wanted to know whether the magistrates were to hold such cattle for the military or to whom they were to be handed.⁸

The Chief Magistrate got the answer from General Hildyard on April 9. He said that Colonel Bottomley, who was at Nongoma, had instructed magistrates in Zululand telegraphically to detain all stock captured since the 7th April, because Afrikaners threatened to cross the border in order to

3. Ibid., Telegram no.K. 3696, d.d. 7.4.1901.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., Telegram no.2, d.d. 8.4.1901.

6. Ibid., Telegram N.A. 2922, d.d. 9.4.1901.

7. Ibid., Telegram no.6., d.d. 9.4.1901.

8. Ibid.

recapture stock. Bottomley thought the cattle acted as a bait and incentive to the Afrikaners.⁹ General Hildyard was therefore requested by Bottomley to allow him to move all stock out of danger wherever he thought fit. Consequently Hildyard instructed magistrates to move the stock out of danger.¹⁰ For that purpose the Officer Commanding Troops made arrangements regarding the taking over of captured stock, and the collections of it at convenient centres.¹¹

On April 22, cattle were taken from a farm in the district of Melmoth which belonged to S. Ferreira, a British subject. They were taken on the request of H.B. Wickham, known as a captain of Scouts. Some cattle taken from H. James were left for safety sake with Ferreira and thirty head of cattle, belonging to C. Muller, a surrendered burgher who had permission to reside in the division, were also placed under Ferreira's care. James's cattle were later recovered but C. Muller's were driven into the Nkandla district.¹² The magistrate of Emthonjaneni then issued a warrant for arrest of Wickham charging him of cattle theft, but Wickham could not be arrested by civil authorities. C. Muller's cattle joined thousands of Bottomley's cattle in the Nkandla district. To pacify the magistrate of Emthonjaneni, the Chief Magistrate informed the General Officer Commanding Troops in Natal, that if there was any suspicion of disease, no cattle were to be removed until a certificate was granted by the stock inspector.¹³

In spite of the warning about infected stock a large number of cattle looted by the Zulus for Colonel Bottomley and his agents, were infected with lungsickness, although they had been quarantined near Melmoth, they were driven through Eshowe

9. Ibid., Telegram N.A. 2972, d.d. 9.4.1901.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 23.4.1901.

12. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 2.5.1901.

13. Ibid.

district to Nkandla.¹⁴ The Chief Magistrate then asked the Officer Commanding Troops in Zululand whether he had heard anything about the movement of infected cattle and whether they had been moved in terms of instructions from the Officer commanding Zululand?

The Officer Commanding Troops in Zululand replied to the Chief Magistrate telegraphically on May 7 and pointed out that owing to the close proximity of the Afrikaners, Colonel Bottomley had acted on his own initiative¹⁵ but under authority of telegraphic instructions from General Hildyard. In April 1901 Hildyard requested the Prime Minister of Natal to instruct magistrates to move stock out of danger when Colonel Bottomley deemed it necessary. Thereafter Bottomley should report his action to the Officer Commanding Troops in Melmoth because it was feared that Melmoth would be attacked that night, if the cattle were not sent away.¹⁶

It was about that time, May 7 that the Magistrate of Melmoth confirmed that action of the magistrate of Nongoma with regard to the moving of and herding of cattle captured between Mkhuzi and Phongolo rivers.¹⁷ Those cattle were looted from the Zulus and the same cattle were being moved and herded. From Melmoth Colonel Bottomley sent orders to his agents at Nongoma that any cases of disobedience on their part were to be immediately reported to the Officer Commanding Troops at Melmoth. The latter then requested the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, to issue instructions to magistrate of Ingwavuma to order all claimants (the Zulus between Mkhuzi and Phongolo rivers) immediately to Nongoma as all disputes were to be settled by the 15th May and cattle released.¹⁸

Whilst the claimants were expected by the officer commanding troops at Melmoth, he directed Colonel Bottomley to collect all his cattle as soon as possible at Nkandla district. They

14. Ibid., Telegram no. 14, d.d. 6.5.1901.

15. Ibid., Telegram M. 17, d.d. 7.5.1901.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., Telegram M.26, d.d. 7.5.1901.

18. Ibid.

30

were to be inspected there by the stock inspector before being taken over by the remount officer.¹⁹ The problem was that the magistrate of Nongoma had until then not been able to do anything regarding the returning of cattle looted from the Zulus near Mkhuzi. Those cattle were driven towards the coast through Hlabisa district and had not been recovered.²⁰ The officer commanding troops at Melmoth informed the Chief Magistrate that Colonel Bottomley's agents had denied the charge of looting Zulu cattle.²¹ The officer further pointed out that he did not consider it necessary to go into details of the military situation because the Chief Magistrate knew that it was frequently changing. He, the military officer in charge of Zululand acted according to the changing conditions. Therefore he trusted that the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner would give him every possible assistance.²² The officer also referred to the charge made by the Magistrate of Ingwavuma that Bottomley's agents had looted Zulu stock between Mkhuzi and Phongolo rivers. He explained that the looted stock near Melmoth was removed since they were infected with lungsickness.²³

Whilst there was still misunderstanding between the Chief Magistrate, Charles Saunders and the officer commanding at Melmoth, a telegram was received from the deputy adjutant general at Newcastle by the Chief Magistrate on May 19. He stated that any stock captured by Colonel Bottomley for which conductors produced passes signed by officer commanding troops in Zululand might be allowed to pass.²⁴ Such pass would merely remove military objections and the stock would

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., Telegram M. 47, d.d. 13.5.1901.

21. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 13.5.1901.

22. Ibid., Telegram M. 49, d.d. 13.5.1901.

23. Ibid., Telegram M.58, d.d. 16.5.1901.

24. Ibid., Telegram no 43, d.d. 14.5.1901.

still be subject to any regulations or restrictions which civil authorities might impose.²⁵ As we can see, this was just to sweeten the pill. Bottomley had all the powers and this was confirmed by the telegram written on May 21, by the general officer commanding troops in Natal. He pointed out that he had no objections to the magistrates claiming any stock in the possession of the Zulus which was not brought in by them on behalf of Colonel Bottomley. But any stock brought in for Colonel Bottomley was his property and should not be taken.²⁶ On the same day the Chief Magistrate, in his telegram to the Prime Minister dismissed the claiming of stock brought in by the Zulus for themselves. He pointed out that it was impossible to prove whether stock was brought in on Bottomley's behalf or not.²⁷

In that way Bottomley and his agents managed to get away with 5 000 cattle. That number of cattle was their own share of the loot, not the total number of stock they had looted.²⁸

Other people who became wealthy because of looting in the Vryheid district were the English traders. An eyewitness wrote: "Baie van die Engelse winkeliers wat in Zoeloeland handel gedryf het was na die oorlog stywe veeboere, waarskynlik het hulle die vee ontvang van die kaffers wat snags vee geroof het."²⁹

The looting of cattle did have an effect on the war because the people who suffered most in Bottomley's activities, however, were the Afrikaners and their families. Besides the fact that thousands of their cattle, horses and sheep were looted from them, they were also weakened by the fact that the

25. Ibid., Telegram S. 1143, d.d. 19.5.1901.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., Telegram no. 3, d.d. 21.5.1901.

28. Ibid., Telegram no. 4, d.d. 21.5.1901.

29. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

majority of them had to run together with their wives, children plus their stock.³⁰ This weakened the Afrikaner force. Hundreds of Afrikaners, therefore, surrendered.³¹

Although the latter were called by some "Handsoppers or Hendsoppers" they were brave men who were forced by circumstances to surrender: "Hy kon eenvoudig nie sy vrou en kinders aan die genade van barbaarse bendes laat nie. Laat ons onself in so 'n posisie plaas: hy het met al sy besittings, vrou en kinders voor die Engelse magte uitgevlug en in die meeste gevalle die kloue en plekke waar hy, meen dat die Engelse nie kon kom nie, en dit is die plekke waar hy hom teen die kaffers vasgeloop het. Kan so 'n man bestempel word as 'n lands- en volksverraaier?"³² In most cases, therefore, the man did not flee in order to free himself from performing the duty towards his country and people but to protect his stock and to save his wife and child from the ghastly sight of concentration camps. There was for such a man no escape. He was to leave his wife and children to barbaric onslaught or give his gun to the "enemy". He chose the latter. But there were people, who surrendered at the first signs of English pressure. Those of course can be called "handsoppers" but the case of men like Cornelius Muller of Denny-Dalton, the man who left his commando and immediately ran to see what was happening to his wife and four young children because the whole Vryheid district was stormed by the English and Zulus, is unique. A few hours after he had arrived at his home, he was stormed by about two hundred Zulus.³³ He fought them for the whole night and it was not until daybreak when the Zulus withdrew. But Muller could no longer return to his commando because he had suffered six assegai wounds from the Zulu attack. One way was open for him, and that was

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

to go to the nearest magistracy and give himself up.³⁴ Such a man cannot be labelled a traitor because he could not have left his two young girls to the mercy of the English soldiers and armed Zulus.

The Afrikaners were really hit hard by Bottomley's activities and for the Afrikaner commandos in the Vryheid district things were not rosy at all as Pretorius writes: "In nat weer was dit maar baie onaangenaam en swaar om jou pontokkie in die donker te verlaat en in reënt en pikdonker myle ver te ry en dan so in die water of modder jou te gaan neertrek, soms sonder jas of komberse, en onder dit alles het baie min van ons ooit siek geword. Klagte het jy nooit gehoor nie, en teen wie kon gekla word want ons was almal in dieselfde skuitjie. Waarlikwaar geen nasie het kon deurmaak wat die Afrikaner deurgemaak het nie."³⁵

What was the position of Lord Kitchener with regard to Bottomley's activities? Did he really authorise Bottomley through French to arm the Zulus against the Transvaal? These two questions are not very difficult to answer. On April 5, 1901 Lord Kitchener wrote a telegram to the administrator in which he stated: "I have seen some telegrams from your Prime Minister giving the reports of the C.M. in Zululand on Colonel Bottomley's operations."³⁶ Lord Kitchener then pointed out what his opinions on the subject were. Though armed Zulus were expected to protect their frontiers and force any Afrikaner entering Zululand to surrender to the nearest magistrate, that was to be done under the direction of the resident magistrates, and the chiefs were not to be encouraged to take the matter into their own hands.³⁷ He further pointed

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Telegram K. 3656, d.d. 5.4.1901.

37. Ibid.

out that outside Zululand unarmed Zulus were to be employed directly under the control of Colonel Bottomley or of his officers to collect and bring in cattle. It is on the strength of this telegram that we can conclude that the arming of the Zulus was approved by Lord Kitchener himself because on April 7, when the magistrates were claiming stock driven in by the Zulus, Kitchener protested and said enquiry was necessary on what terms stock were allowed to be taken by the magistrates.³⁸ He was therefore, placing the whole looting campaign on Bottomley and his agents.

On June 27, long after the looting had ceased, Lord Kitchener stated his standpoint with regard to Bottomley's actions in a telegram to the governor: "I sent a military commission to Zululand to enquire into certain allegations against Colonel Bottomley after receiving my orders of 5th April. I hear now that Prime Minister wishes commission to extend its enquiry to action taken previous to my orders having been given. As accounts of action taken previous to that order are not contested by me, and as I am solely responsible for any action taken by Colonel Bottomley prior to my order of the 5th April, I do not consider it necessary to direct any extension of the enquiry but subsequent to the order above alluded to. I have grave doubts as to the accuracy of statements made by officials in Zululand of Colonel Bottomley's actions. It is to elucidate this question and clear up what amounts to allegations against Colonel Bottomley the commission was sent. It is purely a military enquiry."³⁹

What was the military situation after Colonel Bottomley's activities? It must be made clear to us that instead of surrendering the Afrikaners fought with new determination. On June 22, 1901, for example the two Afrikaner governments

38. Ibid., Telegram K. 3696, d.d. 7.4.1901.

39. Ibid., Telegram no. 2, d.d. 27.6.1901.

came to a decision at Waterval, near Standerton, that the war would be actively continued.⁴⁰ Another attempt would be made to invade the Cape Colony to relieve the pressure on the Transvaal and the Free State, where British drives had been increasing in intensity. Those drives were guided by "hands-uppers". Attacking at night was the result.

While Smuts enthusiastically made preparations in the Gatsrand for his invasion of the Cape and thereafter trekked southwards, eluding the British columns in the Free States, Kitchener, with the approval of Milner and Chamberlain, issued a proclamation on August 7, 1901, which the Afrikaners later called the "paper bomb". The burghers in the field were informed that their resistance was so insignificant that they could no longer be regarded as conducting regular warfare. They were therefore given until September 15, 1901 to surrender and it was said those who did not do so would be punished.⁴¹ If their leaders and officers were captured by the British they would be banished permanently from the country and their property would be sold to pay for the care of their wives and children.⁴²

The proclamation, as was the case with the entire British military policy since the annexation of the two republics, failed to take into account the incalculable strength of Afrikaner morale. This threatening proclamation was no where regarded in a serious light. It had the effect instead of leading to a sudden increase in the activities of the commandos at a time when British forces in all the fighting areas were carrying out merciless "drives" between the growing line of blockhouses against Kemp at Zwartkops; or against

40. C.F.J. Muller: 500 Years a History of S.A., p. 312.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

Chris Muller and Ben Viljoen in the eastern Transvaal; against Beyers in the Pietersburg district; against Botha at Ermelo and everywhere in the devastated Eastern Free State, where there were more blockhouses than in any other theatre of war.⁴³

At the same time as Smuts's invasion of the Cape, Botha evaded his pursuers at Ermelo and entered Natal and central Zululand. On September 16, 1901 Louis Botha issued his orders which were similar to those which had carried Joubert's commandos down to Glencoe at the dawn of the war, an occasion to which the commandant-general significantly referred.⁴⁴

On the following day Botha struck his blow which was ominously heavy. On September 15, 1901 Gough had taken his mounted infantry together with lieutenant colonel H.K. Stewarts Johannesburg mounted rifles out from Dundee, bent on reconnaissance to ascertain the true situation in the east.⁴⁵

Having crossed the Mzinyathi river by De Jagers Drift, the parties pushed eastwards, and approached the Ncome River on September 17, Gough, who was an hour's ride in front of Stewarts, espied a band of three hundred Afrikaners who came from Scheepers' Nek, a height which from a distance of seven miles overlooks the town of Vryheid and apparently off-saddled at a farm.⁴⁶ Gough was determined to attack them at once. He had all available information of the strong gathering in that quarter, but the longer campaign against an almost invisible Afrikaner forces.⁴⁷

Having made a detour to isolate the unwary commando, Gough sent a messenger back to inform Stewarts of his plans, and gave the word to close. His men had scarcely got within

43. Ibid., p. 313.

44. M.H. Grant: History of the War in S.A. 1899 - 1902, Vol IV, p. 217.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

range of the Afrikaners when they were fallen upon by two bodies, each of five hundred Afrikaners, one of which swooped down upon the right flank, overriding it completely and sweeping round to the rear, where they galloped amongst the guns, whilst the other bore down upon the front.⁴⁸ After a melieu of twenty minutes duration Gough and the whole of his force were surrounded and captured.⁴⁹ There were heavy losses on the British side, one officer and nineteen men wounded, six officers and two-hundred and thirty-five men taken prisoners.⁵⁰ Only Gough himself and a few more contrived to slip away by dint of luck. This victory clearly showed that in spite of Colonel Bottomley's activities the Afrikaner commandos were still far from being subdued. The Zulus were not involved in this battle.

Botha was on the borders of Natal with a muster powerful enough to destroy Natal as a line of communication even if the colony itself were in no danger of being reconquered. But the betrayal of his presence was the signal for an answering concentration, the celerity of which might well have made the Afrikaner commander envious.⁵¹ He who by exhortation, by endless labour day and night and by the most difficult correspondence with distant subordinates had been barely able to muster a few thousand fighting men, then saw arrayed against him at a few days notice nine columns of all arms, standing across the path to Natal.⁵² At Utrecht was F.W. Kitchener, in command of his own and of W.P. Campbell's and Garratt's columns; Clements lay at De Jager's Drift, with Stewarts, Pulteney and G. Hamilton. At Vant's Drift was Bruce Hamilton, in charge of the forces of Spens and Allenby. The Drakensberg mountains were full of Sir L. Rundle's men, Sir J. Dartnell was on the march from Harrismith.⁵³

48. Ibid., p. 217 - 8.

49. Ibid., p. 218.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 219.

The result was the battle of Ithala which included Zulus. Ithala was well fortified, but it possessed a weak spot in the point of the mountain which stood up a mile's distance from the entrenchments, and could not be included in them.⁵⁴

On receipt of warning of Afrikaner advance on September 25, Chapman manned this pinnacle with eighty mounted infantrymen under Lieutenant B.P. Lefroy (1st Dublin Fusiliers) and H.R. Lane (1st South Lancashire regiment). At midnight the sound of an outbursts of firing from this advance post reached the main position, it ceased for a few moments, again broke out, and finally died away altogether.⁵⁵ Shortly after, Chapman heard that the outposts had fallen to vastly superior numbers, and he took care that his own men were prepared for a conflict. About two o'clock in the morning he found himself surrounded by about one thousand five hundred Afrikaners.⁵⁶ Preceded by a whirlwind of bullets, the Afrikaner forces stormed close to the stores of the sangars, only to be beaten back by the troops who stood immovably and fenced their stronghold with a ring of fire. At four o'clock in the morning the Afrikaner forces, their first momentum spent, fell silent, and Chapman, thinking they had given back sent out his scouts to reconnoitre, and also a medical officer to tend the wounded on Ithala point.⁵⁷ But suddenly a fusilade even fiercer than the first broke upon every side of the camp. It seemed as though the defence would be shortly blown to pieces, so heavy was the storm of lead which coming from all sides appeared to revolve like a tropical typhoon around the restricted area of the fort. For twelve hours the mausers poured out an almost unbroken volley, which was answered by Chapman's men as rapidly as the diminishing store of ammunition allowed. Their cover was good but nothing could

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 220.

have withstood such battering and the British troops fell regularly.⁵⁸

It was at that stage that the gunners who had at first sent shell with great effect, were ordered by major Chapman to leave their places and take shelter when their officer and four men had fallen. As the day wore on the position became almost untenable, but to retire from it was impossible.

Louis Botha, who directed the attack by signal from a neighbouring height, had drawn an outer ring of investment.⁵⁹

One commando lay across the southern roads, General D. Opperman with five hundred burghers stood between that place and Fort Prospect. Fifteen miles to the east, General C. Botha with eight hundred burghers barred the west, and six hundred riflemen under commandant H.J.Potgieter held the northern front.⁶⁰ There was, therefore, no way out but Chapman had determined already to fight to a finish where he stood, for he knew every moment's resistance was invaluable to Natal behind him. As the evening descended over the long day's combat his firmness brought its reward. The Afrikaner forces began firing more feebly and at half past seven in the evening the musketry had died away, Chapman, having waited an hour in silence learned that the Afrikaner forces were retiring in every direction. His own casualties numbered over eighty killed, one officer and twenty-one men, wounded five officers and fifty-four men, the survivors were exhausted, their ammunition was well nigh expended.⁶¹ Loading every wagon with stores Chapman marched away to Nkandla. His weak and weary force had been unmolested by the Afrikaners.⁶² The Zulus took part in this battle. Inside the fort there were Zulus who fought bravely side by side with the British against the Afrikaners.⁶³ One big Zulu army was already stationed about

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 221.

62. Ibid.

63. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

six miles from Ithala on the road to Nkandla district:

"maar hulle is deur ons burgers aangeval en verdryf en heelwat van hulle het geëindig op Engeland se "Roll of Honour."⁶⁴

It is not known, however, what could have happened without the Zulu military assistance at Ithala because as we have seen the situation was critical.

It has also gone hard with Fort Prospect, surrounded and isolated fifteen miles to the east. For each soldier inside the fort there were seven Afrikaners outside but there was direct support of the standing Zulu army. Pretorius states: "met die gevegte by ... Prospect in September 1901 was daar grootkaffer kommando's, wat klaar gestaan het om Gen. Botha se kommando's aan te val."⁶⁵ Was it not for the Zulus the English could have been crushed by Botha. The Afrikaner riflemen outside the fort strove for mastery from half-past four in the morning to four o'clock in the afternoon.⁶⁶

Two separate assaults were repelled at the very wires surrounding the sangars, and thereafter, the Afrikaner forces attempted to batter the place to pieces with lead alone.⁶⁷ It was at this juncture that the Zululand Native Police under sergeant Gumbi came to the rescue of the English forces. It was stationed at a distance of four miles from Fort Prospect. Their arrival during the forenoon moved the garrison to admiration. It was armed with rifles. That Zulu force was strong, because soon after their arrival, they broke through the surrounding Afrikaners and rescued the weary English force. By six o'clock in the evening, the garrison of the fort had gained the upper hand with the loss of but nine men, and on the Afrikaner side, there were no losses and commandant Grobbelaar led his forces off the field.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. M.H. Grant, op. cit., 221.

67. Ibid.

About three miles from Fort Prospect on the way to Melmoth, a big Zulu army under the command of a "joiner" Terblanche was stationed.⁶⁸ In a fierce encounter with the Afrikaner force the Zulu commando was defeated and Terblanche fled to the valleys.⁶⁹ At Emthonjaneni there was also a big Zulu army under the command of a white "joiner" but this force and its commander were always on the run. It did not face the Afrikaners.⁷⁰

With the withdrawal of the Afrikaner commando from Fort Prospect to Melmoth, it managed to take a big convoy of wagons from the British only to come eye to eye with the Zulu Nongqayi regiment. But after a short and fierce engagement the Zulus were heavily crushed and their English commander, a certain Mr Marshall was taken prisoner by the Afrikaners.⁷¹

The English, therefore, were making great use of armed Zulus. The question which we must ask ourselves is why did they make use of the Zulus in a struggle which was purely theirs? The answer is perhaps in the words of Davitt who writes: "Both Mr Chamberlain and Mr Balfour had declared in Parliament that no native or coloured allies would be sought for, or accepted by the British in the war. The records of Mafeking show how that promise had been redeemed. But there was nothing new or startling in this violation of an English pledge. The entire history of England's dealing with S.A. is replete with a stereotyped British double dealing, persistent and incurable, and it was in a spirit of strict consistency with this record that the Colonial Secretary should righteously insist on the outbreak of hostilities, that President

68. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

Kruger would be held responsible "for acts done contrary to the methods of civilized warfare." The letters of "pigsticking" Lancers from the bloody field of Elandsplaagte on official despatch of the "Mafeking Mail" of November 4th - within three weeks of Mr Chamberlain's virtuous demand - with but usually facts which invariably built a connecting link of loathesome hypocrisy between British professions in matter relating to the Dark Continent."⁷²

The Zulus were therefore, used by the British because of the latter's double-dealing. The Zulus, it is important to note had no love for the English who had destroyed their kingdom. The resentment of the Zulus at the English rule can be manifested by the resolutions which were passed by the Natal Native Congress in the Ipepa lo Hlanga of May 24, 1901. The editor wrote: "Isizwe esiMnyama saleli laseNatal sifana nesiqhingi solwandle olumi ndawonye esesavinjwa ngendongwa macala onke kepa lesisiqhingi asikulumi luto situle nje site cwaka kuloku kutula kwaso abaningi sebevele ngapa, nangapa babika ukuti tina siti kukona ukuti pakati kwalesi sizwe."⁷³

The editor meant that the Zulu nation in Natal was like an island surrounded by dongas on all sides but without complaints from them in spite of many people who had spoken on behalf of the Zulus. In other words, the editor was encouraging the Zulus to voice their grievances.

Again in the meeting of the Natal Native Congress held at Friendly Benefit Society Hall, at Pietermaritzburg, the following resolutions which are anti-English were passed: "Ukuba ngendaba yemfundo kutunyelwe ahatunywa baye kuHulumeni bayocela imfundo. Nokuba kungabi ngamaPrimary odwa, kodwa kube khona nezakwaHulumeni."⁷⁴ In English it means that

72. M. Davitt: The Boer Fight For Freedom, p. 171.

73. Ipepa Lo Hlanga, d.d. 24.5.1901.

74. Ibid.

people were to be sent to the Government to request the Government for Government Schools as well.

Another resolution talked about exemption from Native laws and complained about the children of the exempted people.

"Ukuba ngani abatenge ubulungu izingane zabo kutiwe azingenile zona."⁷⁵

In conclusion, therefore, we can also point out that Bottomley's actions had serious consequences, and that in spite of the termination of Bottomley's actions the Zulus helped looting cattle were to come to the rescue of the English at Ithala and Fort Prospect. That was the beginning of a policy which the English were to apply in 1902, when they made greater use of the Zulus in their war effort.

75. Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MURDER AT HOLKRANTZ MAY 6, 1902

Bottomley's activities were still fresh in the people's minds, and the participation of the Zulus at Ithala and Fort Prospect were over but the war between the Afrikaners and the English went on unabated. That last bitter struggle was to result in the murder of 56 Afrikaners at Holkrantz by the Zulus on May 6 1902. It is not for us to describe how painful this deed was to the Afrikaners but the words of A.L. Pretorius will always ring in the ears of those who were connected with the victims of the massacre. Pretorius defines the murder as "... een van die gruwelikste moorde wat in ons geskiedenis plaasgevind het. Wat in ons harte omgegaan het, kan geen pen beskryf nie, ons was neergeslaan en die grootste wanhoop en verdriet het deur die hele laer geheers. Was dit die Engelse se plan onder die dekmantel van wapenstilstand om ons deur sluipmoord te vernietig en sodoende van ons Afrikaners ontslae te raak? Dit is maar een van die gedagtes wat deur ons gegaan het. Noudat daar vooruitsigte was vir vrede, word daar nog aanslae op ons lewens gemaak. Weer moes ons na donker myle ver ry in reënt, koue en modder voordat ons kon dink om te slaap. Wagte moes weer uitgesit word en sover dit ons betref het die stryd weer begin."¹ This was the result of the murder at Holkrantz on May 6 1902.

But even before that gruesome event the struggle between the Afrikaners and the English had been going on. Kitchener's military task had become overwhelming. The accepted principles of European warfare had long since proved futile

1. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

in South African conditions. The tactics and strategy presented in the textbooks had already become meaningless early in the war.² All that remained was to crush the commandos by using overwhelming military force comprised of all races available, and to use mounted troops who could outride the Afrikaners and pin them down. Artillery only hampered the mobility of the columns.

It was well known that Kitchener liked to handle everything himself on the highest level from Pretoria. At the beginning of December, 1901, however, he accepted Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton as his Chief-of-staff.³ Hamilton was to play a decisive role in the last five months of the war in the massive "drives" which were used against the desperate Afrikaners making a last stand.⁴

During that last stage of the war Kitchener also endeavoured using a new measure which was to rouse great ill-feeling among Afrikaners, and bitterness which continued long after the war. On December 7 1901, a corps of "National Scouts" was created which incorporated Afrikaners who were prepared to act as paid spies and scouts, in order, as they claimed, quickly to end a hopeless struggle. About a 1 000 of them were active in the Transvaal by May, 1902, and 480 in the Free State. Among the latter group there were also two former Afrikaner generals.⁵

It is against this background that the murder at Holkrantz or Mthashana, as we call it in Zulu, can be understood. The Zulus were used actively in the war during 1902. Zulu

2. C.F.J. Muller: 500 Years a History of S.A., p. 315.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

spies for the English had also been increased tremendously. The whole operation of the Zulus was concentrated on the Vryheid district in a bid to destroy Botha. One morning in February 1902, a Zulu spy came across a Commando of Afrikaners, who because of the shortage of uniforms, had decided to wear the British uniforms. The Zulu did not know that. He told the Afrikaners that there was a group of Afrikaners just behind Hlobane and that he was to lead them to the spot where they could shoot them.⁶ The Zulu spy soon realized his mistake and tried to flee, but before he was a hundred yards away, he was shot dead.⁷ The work of spying was a great risk. When the Zulu spy's clothes were searched, there was in one of his pockets a pass signed by A.J. Shepstone certifying that the bearer was a spy in the service of the Imperial Force.⁸

On March 7, 1902, a very important event took place. The resident magistrate of Vryheid sent the Chief Magistrate a telegram, informing him that General Bruce Hamilton wanted two hundred and fifty Zulus of Dinuzulu to assist him in driving the cattle out of a bush. The telegram added: "Is there any objection to Dinuzulu supplying them? If not please ask him to do so without delay the men to join Column in the vicinity of Ngotshe or Waterfall urgent."⁹

In his telegram to the Prime Minister, the Chief Magistrate, Sir Charles Saunder, stated that he did not like the idea of Dinuzulu sending his men into Vryheid District. Yet he felt that if his doing so would assist the military authorities

6. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Telegram no. 103, d.d. 7.3.1902.

in clearing the "enemy" from Zululand Border it would be an immense advantage. Under the circumstances he thought they should let Dinuzulu provide the men if he could, on the distinct condition that they were to be kept under strict military control. Under no circumstances were they allowed to act on their own account. They were only to be used for the purpose stated.¹⁰ The Chief Magistrate wanted further instructions as soon as possible about the matter so as to inform the resident magistrate of Vryheid.

The Prime Minister wasted no time in replying to the Chief Magistrate's telegram. He agreed that Dinuzulu might supply the Zulus assistance on the lines suggested by the Chief Magistrate.¹¹ The Chief Magistrate then told the Magistrate of Vryheid that the Natal Government approved of Dinuzulu supplying the two hundred and fifty men, but on condition that they were kept under strict military control and under no circumstances allowed to act on their own account. The Chief Magistrate sent a telegram to the Magistrate of Non-goma authorising him to instruct Dinuzulu to start off the men as soon as possible under trusty indunas. They were to join British columns at Ngotshe.¹² Dinuzulu was, therefore, ordered to send two hundred and fifty men since the English chose to pick on him because they were aiming at causing a revolt among the Zulus living in the Vryheid district. Most of the Zulus in the Vryheid district regarded Dinuzulu as their paramount chief. They could have easily joined the Zulu army sent by Dinuzulu under indunas of high repute. General Bruce Hamilton had already called upon the Baqulusi tribe of Chief Sikobobo's Zulus who looked upon Dinuzulu as their

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 7.3.1902.

12. Ibid., Telegram no. 6, d.d. 7.3.1902.

king to furnish scouts and to help him generally during the latter stages of the war.¹³ The ground for ill-feeling had therefore, already been prepared. What was left was a stimulus and this was provided by Dinuzulu's two hundred and fifty Zulus. The Zulus started a few days after the arrival of the telegram to the Magistrate at Nongoma. It was about a week or ten days because Charles Saunders instructed the Magistrate of Nongoma to set the men off on the 19th March, 1902.¹⁴

The Zulu army was under a well known Zulu induna, Madubeko, when it met the British column at Ngenetsheni, in the Vryheid district.¹⁵ Ndabuko, another of Dinuzulu's trustworthy indunas, was next in command. Ndabuko and Madakavana were indunas under Madubeko. When the two hundred and fifty men reached Ngome they heard that there was an Afrikaner commando between them and the British columns; Madubeko then sent Msiyana, one of his people to ask the British to send them an escort and they did so. The escort met the Zulus at Ngome.¹⁶ But before meeting the Zulus, the British column went to Vaalbank and from there to General Botha's farm where it camped.¹⁷ The next day the column moved to Inkunzi and a few nights later managed to catch General Emmett and some of his men. The column proceeded to Ngome Bush where Vermaak and his sons were caught. It was after the capture of Vermaak and his sons that the British columns were directed to Ngenetsheni and Gert Scheepers' farm. The Zulus were met and brought to the camp by Charles Stephen Jordaan.¹⁸ The British generals saw them and they were later shown where to camp and given nine head of cattle to slaughter.

13. G.H. 1333: Letter Book, p. 447.

14. S.N.A. 1/6/25: Evidence given by Charles Saunders, p. 6.

15. G.A. Mills: A Report on the Ill-feeling, p. 68

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 18.

18. Ibid.

The Zulus must have arrived at Ngenetsheni about the 22nd March, 1902. They were armed with guns of all sorts, but some with assegais.¹⁹ Dinuzulu's guards were all dressed in Khaki and well armed with rifles. There were nine companies of Zulus who came from Dinuzulu. The strength of companies varied from thirty up to one hundred.²⁰ The increase of the number to 250 was inevitable, and the English might have realized that, because the other Zulus simply joined the Zulu army on the way.

One Afrikaner, a Mr Brecher, who had been captured by General Bruce Hamilton's column asked the Provost Marshal Captain Pel what all that meant. The Provost said the Zulus were from Dinuzulu. They had complaints and they wanted to be armed because they complained that the Afrikaners had gone over Zululand border and had taken their cattle.²¹

Barnabas Brecher answered that it was not true and that the Afrikaners had never gone over the Zululand border in the direction of Dinuzulu. He added that there must be some other reason.²² The Provost Marshal was also asked what was going to happen with women and children if the Zulus were allowed to move about in hordes like that. Captain Pel replied that women and children would be protected by the Zulus but Brecher said he pitied the women and children under Zulu protection.²³ The Provost Marshal confirmed that the English themselves did not trust the Zulus. For that reason they kept them with the British column. If the British had so much control over the Zulus Brecher wanted to know why they did not order them back and tell them to stay

19. Ibid., p. 19.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 12.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

in Zululand until the Afrikaners crossed the border. Then, if necessary they could protect themselves. The Provost admitted that he did not know what General Bruce Hamilton intended doing.²⁴ On another occasion the Provost Marshal asked Brecher what would the Afrikaners do if they met armed Zulus. Brecher said that as the Zulus evidently were armed against the Afrikaners, though the Afrikaners had only commenced fighting against the English, they would have to shoot the Zulus. On reply the Provost said he would do the same if he were in the Afrikaners' position.²⁵ That conversation took place between the Provost Marshal Pel and Barnabas Brecher during the arrival of Dinuzulu's men who were sent to help General Bruce Hamilton's force. The discussion clearly shows that the Afrikaners were to face the British plus the Zulu armed forces.

The Vryheid commando decided to fight the combined opposition whilst retreating with the stock up to Rooirand at the foot of the Ubombo Mountains.²⁶ There, they were opposed by about a thousand armed Zulus plus British forces behind them. There was only one way out and that was to abandon all the stock.²⁷ The commando then divided into small groups. They hit back and did as much harm as possible to the combined forces of the British and Zulus. At last the British forces returned to Vryheid.²⁸ The Zulu impi which accompanied General Bruce Hamilton to Vryheid, arrived there on March 26 1902.²⁹ On the way to Vryheid the Zulus took the windows and door frames from Thys Moolman's farm for firewood and for shelters. They also cut down trees on the farm. When the British columns went out of Vryheid, the Zulus

24 . Ibid.

25 . Ibid.

26 . G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

27 . Ibid.

28 . Ibid.

29 . G.A. Mills: op. cit., p. 71.

joined them.³⁰

Chief Sikobobo of the Buqulusi tribe with a large number of his followers joined the combined forces at the junction of the Manzana and Pivaan (Bivane) rivers at the place called Alibomvu.³¹ Chief Sikobobo's two personal kraals were situated on both sides of the junction of the two rivers. The Baqulusi tribe were his people. The eastern boundary of their location extended from Goedhoek, the junction of Bivane and Phongolo Rivers, to Luneberg.³² The Western boundary was from Luneberg to Schurweberg Waterfall. From there it ran South of Waterfall along Zunguin Hlobane ranges to Goedhoek, while the northern boundary extended beyond the Phongolo River.³³

Even before the arrival of Dinuzulu's men and General Bruce Hamilton's forces, Sikobobo knew about their coming. As early as March 15 1902 the cattle herds living on a farm Rooikrantz told mr Johann Lawrence Liebetrau that they had been put under arms by Sikobobo in order to join him and his men at the junction of the Manzana and Bivane, where Sikobobo met the Dinuzulu-British forces. The cattle herds also said that they had to go and that they would be killed if they did not.³⁴ They stated that Madakavana was coming over from Zululand with two regiments of Zulus, and that Sikobobo was going to join him near Vryheid against the Afrikaners. Liebetrau received the sad news with incredulity and pointed out that if there was any danger he was sure Mbuzi, a Zulu herbalist living on his farm, would have told him. His cattle-herds however, said that it was no use "your waiting

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 69.

32. S.N.A. 1/4/10: Telegram no. 1276, d.d. 4.5.1902.

33. Ibid.

34. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 50.

for Mbuzi, as he is dead long ago. Sikobobo shot him himself, as he was your scout."³⁵ Yet Liebetrau never used Mbuzi as a scout as it was unnecessary for him to have a scout.³⁶ All Liebetrau's cattle-herds left him and Liebetrau went to Mbudlu of Khambi's tribe who gave him Zulus to look after his cattle. Mbudlu told him that a British column was coming from Mkhuzi, and that the Afrikaners might at any time expect an attack on them by the Zulus.³⁷ A day or two later the Afrikaners saw the Zulu impi travelling in the direction of Paul Pietersburg and that impi was led by a white officer. Sikobobo's people and Dinuzulu's forces went no further than Paul Pietersburg. Some of Sikobobo's men went back to their kraals, but the bulk of the combined forces went on to Vryheid where Sikobobo also went. Chief Dinuzulu's men taking their orders from F.J. Symmonds went to Vryheid and back to Zululand. The cattle captured by the Zulu impi, who was not rewarded, were handed over to the military authorities.³⁸

For the Afrikaners it was a great blow. All was lost. Women and children were being transported to the camps, and many houses were lying in ruins. Hundreds had surrendered, and some had been taken prisoners, whilst others were scattered under other commandos.³⁹ After that onslaught on the commandos, the officers of all the wards in the Vryheid district began to reorganise. The burghers who were loyal to the struggle were organised again. Women and children who had not been driven to the concentration camps were to be transported from the border. Stock and provision in the form of food were taken away.⁴⁰ Within a very short time

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 69.

39. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

40. Ibid.

everything was reorganized and the Afrikaners were ready to continue with the struggle with even greater determination than before. In Ward I Fieldcornet Jan Potgieter and his assistant fieldcornet quickly put everything in order.⁴¹ Potgieter's example was followed in other wards. In Ward II by fieldcornet Hans Skoltz and assistant fieldcornet Luke Heyns; in Ward IV by fieldcornet Abraham Dannhauser and assistant fieldcornet Jan van der Heever.⁴² Those officers led their people to the bitter end through boldness and sacrifice. They held their own against the British forces: "Dit sal vir die nageslag en die wat nie die worstelstryd meegemaak het nie ongelooflik en onmoontlik wees om te besef wat hierdie ou Boere leeus deurgevoer het en reggekry het: hulle is manne en helde wat ons ou stryderts trots op is dat ons die eer had om te volg en onder te dien."⁴³ Thus wrote the man who was in the same boat.

There were also Afrikaner women who threw themselves heart and soul into the struggle. After everything was put in order, however, the different commandos joined their laagers again and began patrolling and watching the British as well as Sikobobo's people who had already joined the British. In spite of all precautions by the burghers some people were captured or killed from time to time by the Zulu-British bands. During the night women and children were plundered and mishandled and a few cattle or sheep stolen. It was also during that time that bands of armed and mounted Zulus in English uniforms made frequent invasions over the border: "Dit het ook in baie gevalle gebeur dat maar weinig van hulle weer teruggekeer het, want van hulle het ons kleingeld gemaak."⁴⁴

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

It was after Dinuzulu's men had returned to Nongoma that another battle took place between the armed Zulus and the Afrikaner commando in the neighbourhood of a place called Nondweni where Jurie Boshoff was severely wounded and died a few days after the peace settlement. In the battle the Zulus suffered heavily and among the casualties was their officer a Zulu priest who was in full British uniform. The latter was respected as a very brave man by the Zulus but after receiving seven bullets, he fell to the ground.

At a certain occasion six Afrikaner soldiers had to face four hundred armed Zulus, but after a fierce battle which lasted for about two hours, the Afrikaners managed to free themselves. They left behind them approximately sixty Zulus dead. On the Afrikaner side there were no casualties.⁴⁵

At Ngome a Zulu army of about four-hundred men flocked into Niklaas van Rensburg's place. It so happened that during that occasion Mrs Van Rensburg was alone and there was also no men or help in the neighbourhood. Mrs van Rensburg had a mauser and cartridges in the house. She decided to shoot to the last cartridge and managed to ward off the Zulu attack. The Zulus thereafter stormed the cattle kraal in an attempt to take the cattle out of the kraal but the daring Afrikaner woman shot them even there and they ran away. The purpose of the attack was to murder Van Rensburg and his two sons and then take his stock. Eleven Zulus lost their lives during the attack.⁴⁶

It is against this background that we can understand the murder at Holkrantz. The returning of Dinuzulu's men to

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

Zululand did not mean an end to the arming of the Zulus by the British. In fact it can be said that Dinuzulu's army acted as a stimulus to the Zulus in the Vryheid district to take up arms and the British knew that very well. Chief Sikobobo for example, after joining Dinuzulu's men and the British forces, was placed in a very difficult situation because he was a Transvaal subject and not a British subject. For that reason and in order to protect himself, he and most of his men could not go back to their kraals. They felt guilty and were afraid that they would be punished by the Afrikaners for their participation in the Dinuzulu-British campaign. The lives of Sikobobo's men who went to their kraals were threatened by those who had gone to Vryheid.⁴⁷ One Zulu, for example, was killed for not going to Vryheid with them. It is important to bear in mind that in Vryheid, Sikobobo and his men were protected by General Bruce Hamilton and his troops, and in that way they were safe from punishment by the Afrikaners. Sikobobo and his men were not inactive whilst in Vryheid but kept on spying on the Afrikaners: "Uit die dorp het hulle snags aanvalle gemaak en waar een of twee of drie burgers hulle weg van die kommando's bevind het, het hulle die burgers aangeval, gevang en vermoor."⁴⁸ The Sikobobo Zulu Commando at the Station Buildings in Vryheid was called "Mr Shepstone's Commando" by the Zulus. Dlabantu, Maqhujana and Mnisi of Sikobobo's tribe told Mr Liebetrau that Mr Shepstone and Sikobobo had called the Zulus to arms."⁴⁹

In the meantime several meetings were held between the Afrikaner generals and the burghers of the Vryheid district. The last meeting was on "Agom" Ferreira's farm on April 23

47. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 50.

48. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

49. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 50.

1902, in Ward II. The subject of discussion on that occasion was the sending of delegates to the conference at Vereeniging and the delegates to the conference were selected that day.⁵⁰ They were mr Conraad Birkenstock and General Jordaan. After discussion, it was decided that the burghers, having elected their delegates, must trust them and abide by any arrangements they made at the conference.⁵¹ The election of delegates to the conference, however, did not mean terminating the struggle against the English: "Ou kommandant Agom Ferreira het besluit dat hy nie sy wapens sou neerlê nie en h beroep op ons gemaak om saam met hom die stryd voort te sit, want, sê hy, ons het alles opgeoffer, ons het nog net ons lewens en wapens oor en waarvoor moet ons dan oorgee?"⁵² The burghers, therefore, were not in favour of accepting peace at any price. The majority of them said that unless their independence was assured, they would not agree to peace but would fight.⁵³ When the delegates left they understood that to be the feeling of the majority of the burghers. Those present were Generals Louis Botha, Myburgh and Jordaan, all the officers, burghers of the Vryheid Commando and also the Edward Corps.⁵⁴ There was a lot discussion at that meeting. General Botha's secretary, De Wet, read out Lord Kitchener's condition of peace. It involved the losing of independence. He warned that if those conditions were not accepted, the fighting would be continued and that there would be no further negotiations. In talking about their independence, General Botha said that the burghers would have to think of other districts which were ruined more than the Vryheid district. Some of the younger burghers said that if they could get other burghers from other districts to continue fighting they would also do so, even if the Transvaal

50. Ibid., p. 47.

51. Ibid.

52. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

53. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 47.

54. Ibid.

Government made peace.

Another question which faced the Afrikaners at that Conference was that of Chief Sikobobo, who being a Transvaal subject had joined the British forces by order of General Bruce Hamilton. After discussion the order to burn the kraals of Chief Sikobobo's tribe, were received from General Botha personally.⁵⁵ The question of burning the kraals had been discussed in General Botha's presence. Only the officers of the Utrecht Wards and Jan Potgieter of the Vryheid District were present.⁵⁶ General Botha told the burghers that they would receive instructions from General Myburgh to burn the kraals.⁵⁷ Up to that time the burghers had understood that they were not to interfere with the Zulus.⁵⁸ The burning of the kraals was not thought strange by some of the Afrikaners as at that time all Sikobobo's men had left and gone to Vryheid. The burning of the kraals was also aimed at giving the British responsibility for the wives and children of Sikobobo's men. The former had been left behind by their men but it did not mean lack of contact between the men and their wives. In fact the men got all their reports about Afrikaner activities from their families. It was also for this reason that the Afrikaners thought it wise to confiscate the stock as a punishment for Sikobobo's men. Though the English were happy about the work done by Sikobobo's men, they were not prepared to accommodate their wives and children as well.

During the night of May 1, 1902, Chief Sikobobo's kraals were burned.⁵⁹ The latter's kraals were nine or ten miles from Vryheid near Zunguin (Zungwini). The Afrikaners were first

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. G.N.1-400: Notice No.62.

to let the women take three or four days food before burning the kraals.⁶⁰ In fact in more than one instance, huts were left entirely alone on account of the illness or infirmity of the owners.⁶¹ If the Afrikaners found any armed Zulus in the kraals, they were captured and taken to the fieldcornet. If the Zulus fired on them first or ran away they were shot.⁶² The Afrikaners also asked the women whether there were any men in the kraal. In most cases the women said there were none, and the Afrikaners would then burn the huts. The Afrikaners burnt many kraals belonging to Chief Sikobobo's tribe, and took all the cattle they found. On one occasion one Zulu man was seen running. When he was ordered to stop, he did not and was shot. But he did not die. The Afrikaner soldiers called on some Zulu women in a hut closeby, to look after him and left a hut standing for them. One Zulu was captured in possession of assegais, and was taken to Fieldcornet Potgieter, who personally gave him a flogging - fifteen lashes with a stirrup leather. The Zulu was then released. Later he was found hiding in long grass and was made a prisoner. The man was flogged because he had assegais with him and it was not known whether or not he was armed against the burghers.⁶³ The stock was always taken but at four kraals, where there were widows, four cows were left for them together with their kraals. It was reported later that as far as was known the Ba qulusi kraals North of Bivane (Pivaan) River and those situated about Pemvana and Schurweberg had not been destroyed but that all the other kraals had been burnt to the ground.⁶⁴

As for Sikobobo's kraals the Afrikaners said the burning of the kraals, confiscation of property, and the sending of the

60. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 37.

61. Ibid., p. 2.

62. Ibid., p. 37.

63. Ibid., p. 38.

64. S.N.A. 1/4/10: Telegram no. 1276, 4.5.02.

women and children to the British lines was simply carrying out the terms of a proclamation. It meant that the families of those who surrendered voluntarily, or joined the British, would be sent to the British lines, and their property confiscated.⁶⁵ When Chief Sikobobo's women and children came to Vryheid, they were not driven in. Fieldcornet Wigget and a few men followed them to see that they came to the Officer Commanding Vryheid. But he could not deliver the report as he was fired on before he reached the outposts. He decided to give the report to one of the Zulu men, who was with the women, to bring into Vryheid.⁶⁶ There were about fifty Zulu men among the women and children. The English were waiting for this opportunity to make the Afrikaners appear the aggressors. They knew that sooner or later the Afrikaners were to take action against Sikobobo and his men.

The confiscation of cattle by the Afrikaners was not the reason for the murder at Holkrantz because Sikobobo's men knew that sooner or later, their cattle were to be seized since they had joined the British.⁶⁷ The Zulus were also afraid to raid Afrikaner stock during the night in case they encountered the Afrikaner Commandos in the process. A few days before the murder, Chief Sikobobo told his men to be ready and be under arms. Many Zulus suspected that they were going to attack the Afrikaners. In the meantime guns were given by Sikobobo to some of his men, while other Zulus sharpened their assegais. A.J. Shepstone, the son of Sir Theophilus Shepstone was then stationed at Vryheid where he acted as a magistrate and a Zulu instigator.⁶⁸ He visi-

65. G.N.1-400: Notice No.62.

66. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 53.

67. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

68. Ibid.

ted Sikobobo's people at the Station Building from time to time. While Sikobobo was preparing for onslaught at Holkrantz (Mthashana), the Afrikaners were laying down their arms as it was the time of armistice between the British and the Afrikaners and the latter had received orders from their officers that they were not to make any attacks. They were to do their patrols and watch their laagers during the night whilst waiting for the results of the negotiations which were then in progress at Vereeniging between the Afrikaner generals and delegates of the English. Many of the burghers were optimistic that they would not lose their independence but those who had learned the Englishman's language and his history waited for the worst.

Arthur J. Shepstone had sent a certain Hermanus Dreyer to spy on the Mthashana (Holkrantz) area and Fieldcornet Jan Potgieter's laager.⁶⁹ After the former had satisfactorily done his duty, the whole Zulu army under the command of Chief Sikobobo, Hermanus Dreyer and Philip Fourie left Vryheid to make an attack. When they came to the neighbourhood of the laager, spies were first sent and after their return, a council of war was held in the presence of all the Zulu indunas. The latter received orders from Sikobobo and Fourie. In the meantime, the Zulu army divided into three sections and approached the laager from three directions under the protection of the night. When the Zulu army, advancing from three directions had moved close enough to the laager, they waited for a sign to start the attack. At last in the early hours of the morning, the sign was given and the attack commenced on May 6, 1902.⁷⁰

Philip Fourie and Hermanus Dreyer, returned to Vryheid after they had arranged everything for the attack. i.e. on May 5, 1902.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

Philip Fourie was an old Fieldcornet of Ward I at Vryheid who had defected to the British. Hermanus Dreyer was a farrier and blacksmith at Vryheid. He was a man of mixed blood, but he enjoyed all the rights of a citizen under the Transvaal Republic.⁷¹ There is no doubt that Arthur Shepstone and Bruce Hamilton were the leaders of the murder. The former was in touch with Sikobobo from time to time and Hamilton was the officer commanding Vryheid and could easily have seen Sikobobo leave for Mthashana. An eyewitness, Mr. van Deventer, stated that many Zulus told him that A.J. Shepstone had ordered the Zulus to arm and go to Holkrantz. But the Zulus were afraid to give evidence before Colonel Mills because of the consequences which might have followed.⁷²

The sketch provided here, shows the scene of the fight. The sketch is from a point due east of the scene of the fight which is in the south-east corner of the farm Holkrantz (Mthashana) and near the hill of that name.⁷³ The Zulus under the leadership of Sikobobo commenced the attack at Mthashana. Abraham Martinus Cronjé who was present at Mthashana described the attack: "I was asleep at the time and was awakened by firing. There were only two men on guard over a cattle kraal in which were the cattle we had taken from Sikobobo's people."⁷⁴ He also mentioned that there were about three hundred and forty of Chief Sikobobo's cattle and added: "We did not expect an attack by the Zulus on us at Holkrantz ... when we were attacked I thought we were being attacked by the British, as there was firing going on. We fought till our ammunition was done, then everyone looked after himself. I never heard any kaffir calling on us to


71. Ibid.

72. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 3; G.N.1-400: Notice No. 62

73. G.H. 1304: Copies of Annexures to Confl. Despatches: Enclosure 1(d).

74. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 38.

THE SCENE OF HOLKRANTZ MURDER



"hands-up". I would have done so as there was nothing else to be done, but I did not get the chance."⁷⁵ This statement proves that the Afrikaners were completely taken by surprise.

The sketch shows that the Afrikaners appeared to have been in two kraals "A" and "B" at the foot of the hill when attacked.⁷⁶ They went up to the top of the hill to "C" and "D". The Zulus followed, some from "A" to "C" and others from "E" to "D". It was at those points that most of the Zulus seemed to have been killed. The saddles and other signs of the Afrikaner camps were ^{between} "A" and "B", i.e. a distance of about two hundred yards. "F" is a donga in which two Afrikaners hid during the fight. As late as August 1902, there were still many traces of the fight to be seen in the form of skeletons, Zulu shields, broken saddles, assegais and one or two guns. The Zulus were over one thousand and the Afrikaners were seventy two. Fifty six were killed, thirteen escaped and three were taken prisoners by the Zulus.⁷⁷

The fifty six Afrikaners killed included Jan Potgieter who was in command of the Commando. Holkrantz was his farm twenty miles from Vryheid. The names of the Afrikaners who managed to escape were: Francis Pratt, Petrus Johannes Fourie, Joe Schwaab, F. Bezuidenhout, Jan Höman, L.P. Henderson senior, L.P. Henderson junior, Abraham Williams, C.M. Potgieter, Obermeyer, H. Cronje, D. Coetzee and M. Potgieter.⁷⁸ The names of the Afrikaners who were taken prisoners by the Zulus were: L. Maritz and his son, Pieterse and Jan Diederick. The latter was still alive in 1947. Of the Zulus fifty two were killed and about forty eight

75. Ibid.

76. G.H. 1304: Copies of Annexures to Confl. Despatches: Enclosure 1(d).

77. P.J. Fourie of 158 Landdrosstraat Vryheid's letter: d.d. 6.5.02 in accession no. 2057, The War Museum, Bloemfontein.

78. J.C. Landman's letter: d.d. 6.5.47, in accession no. 2057, The War Museum, Bloemfontein.

wounded.⁷⁹ Chief Sikobobo took about three hundred and eighty head of cattle including some horses.⁸⁰ The Zulu war song which the Zulus had sung when going to Holkrantz was: "Sangena ngomnyama eMthashana" (We arrived at night at Mthashana). The song is still sung today. The Zulu war saga at Holkrantz was: "Heshe!"

Chief Sikobobo and his commando, after accomplishing their duty, returned to Vryheid with three white prisoners. Although strong young men were captured by the Zulus in the olden days, for the purpose of increasing the Zulu army, everybody else was usually killed. It was very strange for Sikobobo to take white prisoners. He might have been warned by Shepstone and the British authorities at Vryheid that surrenders were to be respected. If the Zulu attack at Holkrantz was spontaneous all the whites could have been massacred. Coenraad Meyer who lived on the farm Nooitgedacht, Ward Three in the Utrecht District, was at Holkrantz on the morning of May 6, 1902, at half past four after the murder had been committed. He stated that the Zulus went from Holkrantz direct to Vryheid and that the bodies of the Afrikaners were very mutilated.⁸¹ Coenraad Meyer also found a tin water bottle similar to those worn by the British troops, lying on a dead Zulu's body.⁸² There were only a few drops of liquor left in the bottle. That was proof of the fact that there was contact between the British troops and the Zulus before the latter went to Holkrantz.

On May 6 1902, the Zulu army could be seen returning to Vryheid towards Zuinuin's Nek.⁸³

79. G.H. 1304: Copies of Annexures to Confl. Despatches: Enclosure 1(d).

80. G.N.1-400: Notice No. 62.

81. G.A. Mills: A Report on the ill-feeling, p. 6.

82. Ibid.

83. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

A group of British mounted troops could also be seen on the hill between the town Vryheid and Besterspruit. The British troops did not move from their positions, whilst Sikobobo's army moved straight towards them and eventually entered Vryheid. There was another long line of the Zulus climbing down the mountain slowly and eventually entering the town where Lucas Meyer Station is presently situated. Those Zulus consisted of the wounded. Some could be seen crossing the bridge slowly.

The British mounted troops who guarded the entrance to Vryheid were probably placed there, to be readily despatched in case the Zulu assault failed at Holkrantz. The Afrikaners were wiped out because they thought the armistice would prevent the British authorities from allowing the Zulus to attack them. There was logic in this line of reasoning. Vryheid was in the hands of the British as they had annexed it in 1900. The murder did not destroy the hope of the Afrikaners. A.L. Pretorius writes: "Weer moes ons na donker myle ver ry in reënt, koue en modder voordat ons kan dink om te slaap. Wagte moes weer opgesit word en sover dit ons betref het die stryd weer begin."⁸⁴ In spite of the murder the Afrikaners were still determined to fight.

Another important aspect about the Afrikaners in those darkest moments was that they remained faithful to their God:

"Veldkornet Willem van Rooyen het vir ons die aand by the laer Godsdiens gehou en ons gewys op die sonde en ontrouheid van ons volk en dat ons ons moet onderwerp aan Gods wil en dat ons voor die hele wêreld staan as getroue regter tot die einde toe. Hy het ons bedank vir ons getrouheid deur al die donker dae."⁸⁵

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

On May 30, 1902 : the whole Vryheid Commando gathered at Besterspruit and there, General Louis Botha spoke. He showed the burghers how hopeless it was to go further with the struggle. He also pointed to the difficult conditions which faced the commandos in the Northern and Western Transvaal and that the only solution was to surrender. Botha said that if the burghers continued with the struggle, it would mean extermination of the women and children in the concentration camps, where hundreds were buried weekly. Botha thereafter thanked all the burghers for the faithfulness they had shown to their land and said that they must wrestle again and work to build up the farms which were in ruined conditions. Botha said the burghers were to forgive their enemies but that they must never forget.

Botha thereafter asked the burghers to read Lamentations, Chapter 5. The first three verses read thus: "Remember, O Lord, what is come upon us. Consider reproach. Our inheritance is turned to strangers, our houses to aliens. We are orphans and fatherless, our mothers, are as widows". A.L. Pretorius also says General Botha continued his speech: "Verder sê hy dat ons vandag hier staan, om af te gee wat vir ons heilig was en dat ons vandag die laaste steen op die graf van ons onafhanklikheid gaan lê".⁸⁶ There was dead silence as the General continued as if the burghers were not around. All that one could hear was sobbing. Tears could also be seen rolling down the cheeks of very bold and daring Afrikaner heroes like: "Gorilla Potgieter" (Corneels Potgieter) and other brave men.⁸⁷

In the meantime the victorious General Bruce Hamilton was

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

climbing down the hill towards Besterspruit, with him was his staff and a few minor officers. Seeing him come, the Afrikaner officers told the burghers to put down their arms. The latter were laid into a heap and the old Afrikaner soldiers cried aloud like children. Bruce Hamilton spoke to the burghers and amongst other things said: "You Boers need never fight again, England will fight your battles for you."⁸⁸

The murder at Holkrantz was the ultimate goal of Colonel Bottomley's activities in Zululand. The only difference was that General Hamilton and Arthur John Shepstone were then the organizers of the Zulus. The murder had far-reaching consequences on both the Zulus and the Afrikaners. The good relations between the latter and the Zulus were seriously damaged by the murder.

88. Ibid.

CHAPTER SIXTHE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MURDER AT HOLKRANTZ (MTHASHANA)

The murder of fifty-six Afrikaners took place on May 6, 1902 and was followed by far-reaching consequences which were mainly of two kinds: those which included relations between the Zulus and the Afrikaners, and secondly those regarding compensation to be given to Zulus who had fought against the Afrikaners after receiving orders from the military authorities. Attention will be focussed on the strained relations between Sikobobo's people and the Afrikaners and on the efforts that were made to put the blame for the murder on Afrikaners in general and General Louis Botha in particular.

It is important to note that after the murder was committed, it was said that Afrikaners had been murdered because they had been ill-treating the Zulus and thus bringing reprisals upon themselves.¹ But in contrast to this view of civil and military authorities a few individuals commented on the good relations that had existed between the Afrikaners and the Zulus of the Vryheid District. Gerrit Martinus de Waal gave evidence before the Commission of Enquiry which was called after the murder. He stated: "Previous to the attack by natives on the Boers at Holkrantz the Boers used to go about in twos and threes or alone. I used to go about alone myself, we did not fear the natives. After the attack we were more careful, and when only two or three were together, we always slept in a house, never on the veldt, because we were afraid of the natives. It was a great relief when

1. G.N.1-400: Notice No.62.

peace was proclaimed as we were then sure of our lives.²
In his evidence De Waal drew attention to the situation before and during the war.

Barnabas Brecher also commented on the good relations existing between the Afrikaners and the Zulus prior to the murder at Holkrantz: "I cannot remember any instance of a Boer woman or child being killed by the kaffirs. The kaffirs had many opportunities of killing Afrikaner women and children if they had wished to do so, as the women and children remained on their farms, while the men were away fighting. Kaffirs respect the owners of the farms on which they live and treat them and their wives respectfully; but when kaffirs accompany columns they go into the farms and take what they want, and the farm kaffirs join them, and they go through the houses and do not respect anyone. Even on these occasions I did not hear of any personal ill-treatment to women and children by the kaffirs."³ In the light of these statements, we can conclude that the murder at Holkrantz was not committed on account of strained relations between the Afrikaners and the Zulus.

This state of affairs was also evident from a speech of Colonel G.A. Mills on June 30, 1902 he delivered a speech to the Chiefs and their tribesmen at Waterval in the Vryheid district. The Chiefs who were present were Sikobobo, Khambi, Mlandu and Mswazi (representing Sidunge) with many of their indunas and tribesmen.⁴ Mills said amongst other things that the Zulus living on those farms would have to work for the Afrikaners as they had done before the war. The only difference, he said, was that they were now no longer under

2. G.A. Mills: A Report on the Causes which led to the Ill-feeling p. 48.

3. Ibid.

4. G.H. 1304: Enclosure 1(b) in Confl. Despatch, d.d. 29.9.1902.

the Afrikaner Government but under British rule. Those Zulus who worked by month were to receive payment and those who were only occasionally called upon to render service, would have to do so without payment as was the case under the Transvaal law. Although he did not blame anyone in particular he warned that: "No person will be allowed, be he Boer or Kaffir to take the law into his hands."⁵ In connection with Sikobobo's people whose kraals had been burnt, Colonel Mills said they were to be allowed reasonable time to rebuild their kraals before their services could be demanded by the owners of the farms on which they lived. He did not refer to the causes of the fire and the subsequent murder.

Colonel Mills even asked general Cheere Emmett who was also present at Waterval to tell the burghers: "that they were not to illtreat the Zulus".⁶ Though he knew better, he implied that Afrikaners behaved brutally towards Zulus. It was however made clear to the Chiefs that they would be held responsible for the good behaviour of their tribes. The Chiefs promised to obey the orders of the Government. Then Mr Arthur J. Shepstone who was so deeply involved in the murder and General Emmett expressed the opinion that most of the Zulus would return to work. The latter was not satisfied with the findings of those two commissions which were appointed to investigate the murder. If he had the confidential correspondence between the Natal Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies he would have had little trouble exposing the responsible parties.

Those people who expressed views on the murder tried to divert attention from themselves, Arthur Shepstone was one of

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

them. He reported in a telegram to the Governor of Natal, Henry McCallum and fully concurred with the opinion expressed by Colonel G.A. Mills with regard to the bad feeling that existed between the Afrikaners and the Zulus in Vryheid district.⁷ Shepstone explained the matter as follows: "I know that such expression have been made use of by the Boers, some have said that they would yet have it out with the natives."⁸ Shepstone thought the object of the Afrikaners was to involve the British Government in a war with the Zulus, and that would enable them to pay off old scores with the Zulus and at the same time enable them to restock their farms with Zulu cattle.⁹ Shepstone did not mention that prior to the murder at Holkrantz relations between the Afrikaners and the Zulus had been good and that Zulus were influenced by himself and Bottomley.

A further cause of friction according to Mr Shepstone, was the compulsory return of Zulus to the services of the Afrikaners. Consequently relations continued to be much strained between them and the Afrikaners. He also pointed out that many Afrikaners had until then not returned to their farms and most of the Zulus who had taken part in the attack at Holkrantz still lived on those farms. Shepstone suspected that when farmers returned they would probably order the Zulus to quit the farms. The question would then be what to do with those Zulus as there was no government land available for them, and other Afrikaners would probably not have them on their farms.

On account of the fears expressed by Colonel Mills and Arthur Shepstone, the Governor of Natal, suggested that an Imperial Force should remain in the Vryheid district until the relations

7. G.H. 1302: Letter Book, pp. 469 - 70.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., Telegram d.d. 14.9.1902.

between the Afrikaners and the Zulus became less strained.¹⁰ The Natal Cabinet ministers entirely concurred in that view, and the Governor informed the General Officer Commanding Natal accordingly.¹¹

The suggestion of the Governor, however, was not immediately carried out by the General Officer Commanding Natal. On August 14th, 1902 the Governor was informed by him that he was sending Colonel Mills to confer with the Governor on the whole subject. Lieutenant-Colonel Mills had been appointed by the Military Authorities to hold an inquiry into the circumstances which led to the attack by the Zulus on the Afrikaners at Mthashana (Holkrantz).

On August 14 1902 Arthur Shepstone informed the Colonial Secretary that General Bruce Hamilton was at Vryheid to accept the final surrender of the Afrikaners of that district. At that time General Hamilton told Shepstone that an enquiry was to be held by Colonel G.A. Mills into the circumstances that led to the Holkrantz murder. The General wanted General Cheere Emmett to watch the case on behalf of the Afrikaners and Shepstone to do the same on behalf of the Zulus.¹² Just before or just after that communication Colonel Mills showed Shepstone a telegram which he had received from Pretoria directing him to conduct the enquiry. During the enquiry Arthur Shepstone acted as a Zulu interpreter. Consequently no Zulu was brave enough to give evidence to the effect that Shepstone was personally involved in the murder. The confidential correspondence between the respective governments and military officers were not put at the disposal of the commission of enquiry.

The enquiry which commenced on June 30, 1902 and continued

10. G.H. 1302: Letter Book, pp. 470 - 71.

11. Ibid., p. 471.

12. Ibid.

until August 9, 1902, was very one sided. On August 9, 1902, Colonel Mills informed General Cheere Emmett and Shepstone that the General Officer Commanding Natal thought the enquiry had lasted long enough and should be closed. General Cheere Emmett however pointed out that there were several witnesses whom he wished to examine, and that if necessary he would apply to the Commander-in-Chief at Pretoria for permission to continue the enquiry.¹³ Colonel Mills said he would send a telegram to the General Officer Commanding Natal and stated that if the enquiry was continued it would be carried on by Colonel Roch. On the following day the enquiry was closed and Emmett advised accordingly.¹⁴

Arthur Shepstone realised that Emmett was far from satisfied with the proceedings and therefore told the Principal Under Secretary that the object of Emmett was to prove that he, Arthur Shepstone, was behind the Zulu attack on Afrikaners. Shepstone guessed that Emmett wanted to remove the responsibility from General Botha whom some of the Afrikaners were blaming for ordering the burning of the Zulu kraals and the raiding of the Zulu cattle just before the declaration of peace. Shepstone did not explain why Emmett suspected him of having ordered the attack on Holkrantz. He regretted that he had not reported Emmett's suspicions to the Government. But at that time he held up some "terrible family affliction", for not reporting the matter.¹⁵ It is clear however, that even before the verdict was known Shepstone tried to hold General Botha responsible for the murder. But Shepstone failed to explain what had led to the kraals being burnt.

There was, however, another enquiry which was conducted in

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

November, 1902,¹⁶ but it was also very one sided.¹⁷ The Governor of Natal showed great subjectivity before the enquiry was over. He wrote: "On the 15th inst. I had a prolonged interview with Lt.-Col. Mills in the presence of the Acting Prime Minister and General Cheere Emmett, whom I invited to be present. I listened to all that Col. Mills and General Cheere Emmett had to say on the subject, and arrived at the conclusion that the Boers had in great measure brought reprisals upon themselves in consequence of the orders given by General Louis Botha for the complete destruction of Sikobobo's kraal and for the seizure of all cattle belonging to his tribe."¹⁸ Even in that statement the calling of Sikobobo's people by Bruce Hamilton to join Dinuzulu's men was not mentioned.

The Second Commission of Enquiry was of no value because all the witnesses were not examined.¹⁹

Instead of getting the truth during the second enquiry, exaggerations were the order of the day. The Zulus prepared what they were going to say in the enquiry.²⁰ The exaggerations led to the Afrikaners being finally labelled as the people who had brought reprisals upon themselves. Colonel Mills stated: "It must be admitted that the attack was entirely spontaneous on the part of the Zulus, and entirely due to ill-treatment they had received at the hands of the Boers."²¹

The statement of Mills is totally irrelevant because Chief Sikobobo had brought the rifles which were in possession of his followers by October 16, 1902. Furthermore Arthur Shepstone was in favour of allowing some of the Zulus to retain fire-

16. G.A. Mills: A Report on the Ill-feeling.

17. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

18. G.H. 1302: Letter Book, p. 471.

19. G.H. 1331: Letter Book, p. 314.

20. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 50.

21. G.N.1-400: Notice No.62.

arms.²² Furthermore Chief Sikobobo was highly praised by G.A. Mills as a chief who had great control over his tribe: "Sikobobo, ... was most loyal to the British Government, through a time which must have been one of unprecedented strain and anxiety to him, and I think it would be difficult to find any fault with his actions during this period."²³ Colonel G.A. Mills ended by saying that he felt sure that Sikobobo's removal would cause the greatest resentment towards, and distrust of the British Government among the whole Zulu nation who, throughout the whole enquiry had taken the greatest interest in the proceeding.²⁴ It is true that the removal of Chief Sikobobo might have caused great resentment among the Zulus because Chief Sikobobo was carrying out the orders of the British authorities in all his actions during the war.

The second and the most important consequence of the Holkrantz murder was the question of compensation to the Zulus for losses during the struggle against the Afrikaners. Compensation was aimed at consoling the Zulus who had joined the British forces at the request of the military authorities. This question caused heated discussions by the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission which was in favour of the Zulus being compensated and the civil authorities who were against compensation for the Zulus. In the end the standpoint of the civil authorities prevailed.

The problem of compensation was started when Governor Henry McCallum gave instructions to the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission. The chairman of the commission was to assess and inspect all claims which might be presented to him for losses sustained.²⁵ The Governor was, however, aware of the

22. C.R.14/02: Nos.4-109, Confl.Papers, 16.10.1902.

23. G.N.1-400: Notice No.62.

24. Ibid.

25. G.H. 1304: Governor to Sec. of S. d.d. 25.7.1902.

difficulties to be faced by the commission, and stated that it would be impossible to differentiate in Zululand between losses sustained early in the war and at subsequent dates, as the Zulus would be unable to distinguish such classification. But he hoped that the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission would endeavour as far as possible to arrive at approximate dates when the losses, for which compensation was claimed, were incurred.

The Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner of Zululand, Sir Charles Saunders, was strongly against compensation for the Zulus. He sincerely hoped that claims made by people who themselves looted the Afrikaners would not be recognised.²⁶

In a letter to acting Prime Minister Frederick Moor, Charles Saunders wrote: "It was the looting by our natives over the border that brought about the most serious raids by Boers of Native stock. Our Natives who joined in the looting knew perfectly well that they were doing so in direct opposition to the wishes of their own Government."²⁷ Sir Charles Saunders did not tell Moor that at the time of looting Zululand was under martial law and that the Zulus through their chiefs and with Saunders' knowledge were ordered to cross into the Afrikaner territory.

On August 20, 1902, the Deputy Chairman of the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission, wrote to the Governor Henry McCallum and gave facts which completely contradicted those given by Charles Saunders. He pointed out that on arrival in Zululand the Commission waited on the Civil Commissioner and Chief Magistrate at Eshowe, and from him obtained the information which did not disclose the full facts of the case and therefore

26. Ibid., Saunders - Moor d.d. 9.8.1902.

27. Ibid.

misled the commission. The deputy chairman stated six facts which were the reason for the Zulus to join the British in their campaign against the Afrikaners: Instructions were issued to Colonel Bottomley in March 1901, by General French. Those instructions authorised Bottomley to use Zulus for looting Afrikaner stock.²⁸

Bottomley therefore informed the magistrates and called upon them to assist him.²⁹ He also enlisted the help of men such as Cooper and Calverley for looting stock. The Zulus were promised ten percent of the stock looted by them. The first expedition was led by Captain Wickham on March 31, 1901.³⁰

After the raid had taken place the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner informed the Zulus on the 1st April, 1901, to stop raids across the border. Consequently no further raids were undertaken by the Zulus.³¹

Fifthly, there was a telegram from the Prime Minister conveying Lord Kitchener's instructions, communicated by him direct to the Natal Government, and which were wired on by the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner to Nkandla district. The deputy chairman of the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission therefore concluded that: "The Zulus were only carrying out the orders given them by the military authorities through the magistrate, and when countermanding orders were issued they were immediately obeyed."³²

The deputy chairman of the Commission, Mr James King, ended his letter to the governor by emphasizing that the Commission

28. Ibid., Enclosures: Deputy Chairman - Governor d.d. 30.8.1902.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

was of opinion that compensation should not be denied to those Zulus who had shown their loyalty and obedience to orders.

In spite of the deputy chairman's clearly stated facts, the question of giving compensation to the Zulus remained a thorny issue. On August 25 1902, the Governor in a letter to the Prime Minister mentioned that Colonel Bottomley's proceedings were to his mind indefensible. He then added that if any compensation was given to those Zulus it should come from the military and not from the Transvaal Government.³³

Acting Prime Minister, F.R. Moor wrote to the Governor on August 27 1902, and stated that he was strongly against compensation. He was against compensation for the Zulus who had fought during 1901 although they received orders from Colonel Bottomley and his agents. Moor feared that if the Zulus in the Province of Zululand were allowed compensation, the Zulus in the district of Vryheid would expect like treatment. He requested that his views be brought to the attention of Chamberlain the Secretary of State.³⁴

The Governor wrote to the Secretary of State on August 30, 1902 and spoke strongly against compensation for the Zulus: "In the district of Vryheid General Bruce Hamilton called upon Sikabobo's (Sic) tribe to furnish armed scouts and to help him generally during the latter stages of the war when his columns were sweeping that district. In consequence of their complying with this request, General Louis Botha gave orders for the entire kraals to be wiped out and all their stock to be seized. This was done; the kraals were all burnt and the cattle taken possession of, ... many of the men were killed and the women and children were turned out on the veldt, ... They took refuge under the walls of

33. Ibid., Enclosure 6, Governor - Prime Minister d.d. 25.8.1902.

34. Ibid., Enclosure 7, Moor - Governor d.d. 27.8.1902.

Vryheid and have not returned to their district, the whole of which have been devastated by fire. If the natives of Zululand obtain compensation for injuries sustained through having obeyed the orders of Colonel Bottomley without reference to their Civil Magistrates, the Natives of Vryheid, who belong to the same tribal families, will naturally expect to receive compensation for even greater injuries sustained through having obeyed the orders of General Bruce Hamilton."³⁵

The Governor further pointed out that the Zulus had behaved well towards the English throughout the war. If certain of the Zululand Zulus had committed the technical mistake of obeying Colonel Bottomley and his subordinates without waiting for instructions from the Civil Magistrates, it was only in consequence of the show of authority displayed.³⁶ The Governor explained that when orders were given to the Zulus by magistrates, they were immediately obeyed. However, in order to avoid complications in the Vryheid district, he had given instructions that claims for compensation by proved raiders were not to be entertained by the commission until instructions had been received from the Secretary of State for the Colonies.³⁷ The Governor felt that where Zulus had suffered, either in Zululand or Vryheid in consequence of obedience to orders given by apparently properly constituted authorities, they should receive compensation, either in whole or in part.³⁸

In spite of the hot discussion in connection with compensation, the Zulus became the losers because claims for compensation by proved raiders were not considered by the Commission. The statement of "proved raiders" was ambiguous in that the Zulus had never looted without orders given them to do so. Dinuzulu also endeavoured to obtain compensation for his people. He presented a long list of the Zulus who had been

35. G.H. 1302: Letter Book, p.p. 477 - 8.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., pp. 478 - 9.

killed in action, including those who had been wounded,³⁹ but he failed to get compensation.

In conclusion we can say the Zulus participated greatly in the Anglo-Boer war and that they made a tremendous contribution in forcing the Afrikaners to surrender in May, 1902:

"Was dit nie vir die hulp van die kaffer nie sou die Engelse maar weinig vee in die hande gekry het en negentig persent van die Vryheidse burgers sou in die veld gebly het tot die einde toe."⁴⁰ Were it not for the murder at Mthashana, the Afrikaners could have continued to fight for their independence and the outcome could have been otherwise. It is important, however, to note that during 1899 to 1900 the Zulus were still not actively involved in the war. Lastly we must remember that the Zulus did not participate in the war because of love for the English or hatred for the Afrikaners, but were carrying out orders given them by the English in order to defeat the Afrikaners.

The English had no love for the Zulus. It is important to note that in April 1903, for example, Chief Dinuzulu had informed the resident magistrate at Ndwanwe district that he was suffering from a chest complaint. He was desirous of consulting a Zulu woman who was skilled in such matters and lived amongst the Baqulusi near Hlobane, in Vryheid district. As the Zulu woman was too old to travel, he asked permission to visit her by cart and oxen in the Vryheid district.⁴¹

The magistrate of Ndwanwe reported that he suspected that the object of the application was "a desire to visit the Vryheid district for other purposes than to get treatment for a chest complaint."⁴² That appeared to have been a

39. G.A. Mills, op. cit., p. 72.

40. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a); E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb: A History of Natal, p. 209.

41. S.N.A. 1/1/301: R 853/1903 N.O. 182/1903.

42. Ibid.

general attitude in spite of the services rendered by the Zulus at Holkrantz. Arthur Shepstone who posed as the friend of the Zulus during the war, also insisted that Dinuzulu should not be allowed to visit Vryheid district until after the appointment of Zulu chiefs. Even the Secretary for Native Affairs concurred with the views expressed by the Magistrate of Vryheid. Dinuzulu was told that the Government did not approve of his visiting the Vryheid district at that time.⁴³ Thus in less than a year since the Peace of Vereeniging of May 1902, and in spite of Dinuzulu's contribution to the war, he was distrusted by the English people.

Prior to the refusal of Dinuzulu's application to visit the Vryheid district, there were disquieting rumours about a threatening Zulu unrest in Dinuzulu's territory.⁴⁴ Those rumours were further aggravated by "urgent messages" which Zulus were receiving from Dinuzulu asking his men to "come home" for an unknown purpose. Those rumours were coupled with the cattle and arms acquired by Dinuzulu's people during the war. The Natal Government had demanded that those arms should be given up, but Dinuzulu refused. The reason for not enforcing the demand was that at that particular juncture a Zulu war, even on a small scale would have been most unfortunate. Dinuzulu's people were allowed to keep their arms.⁴⁵ Dinuzulu was, therefore, kept under strict surveillance in spite of the fact that the Chief Magistrate of Zululand had reported that there was absolutely no foundations for rumours of disturbances among the Zulus.⁴⁶

During the Bhambatha rebellion in 1906, the English caught thousands of Zulus.⁴⁷ In one of the wire camps built by the

43. Ibid.

44. S.N.A. 1/4/10: C. 107/1902.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a).

English, there were almost three thousand Zulu prisoners. One Zulu said to Mr A. Pretorius that he had made a great mistake for fighting on the side of the English.⁴⁸ When Pretorius asked why, the Zulu said: "Bheka ukuthi benzani kithi namhlanje, asizange sibalwele nina, asizange sibabulele amaBhunu eMthashana?" ("Kyk wat doen hulle aan ons vandag: het ons nie teen julle geveg vir hulle nie, het ons nie vir hulle die Boere by Mtashana (Holkrans) vermoor nie?")⁴⁹ When Pretorius asked whether that Zulu was present at Holkrantz, he said he was a spy at Vryheid and was present when Shepstone and Bruce Hamilton sent the Zulus to go and kill the Afrikaners at Holkrantz.⁵⁰ Bhambatha rebellion is a clear indication of the fact that though the Zulus fought with the English during the Anglo-Boer war, they had no love for them. Thousands of guns they had got from the English during the Anglo-Boer war, were used during the Bhambatha rebellion against the English themselves.⁵¹

Dinuzulu was eventually banished to the Transvaal as a result of the Bhambatha rebellion. The British authorities thought he was too dangerous a person to remain in Zululand. General Louis Botha, who was then the Prime Minister of the Transvaal, decided to plead for Dinuzulu's release and his return to Zululand. In a letter which Botha wrote to F.R. Moor, the Prime Minister of Natal on December 6, 1907, Botha explained that the release of Dinuzulu was going to help improve relations between the Zulus and the English.⁵² Botha further denied the statement which had appeared in The London Tribune stating: "I understand on the best authority that General Botha strongly urged the Government of Natal to take the present

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. P.M. Vol. 103 - Minute Conf. P.M.C. 170/07.

action to the evil influence erected by Dinuzulu in Swaziland."⁵³ Commenting on this, General Botha told Moor that he did not wish to contradict it for fear of embarrassing Moor still further, but that Moor would understand how annoying it was to be held responsible for things Botha utterly disapproved.⁵⁴ General Botha concluded his letter by saying that he hoped even at that late hour Moor would do what he could to prevent a conflict with the Zulus.⁵⁵ Botha also mentioned that feeling in Natal was no doubt running high, (about Dinuzulu) but that in matters of such grave and far-reaching importance, it was not wise to give in too readily to public opinion which was often influenced by unworthy motives.⁵⁶

General Louis Botha's letter shows clearly that in spite of the murder at Holkrantz and raids of Afrikaner stock by the Zulus, the Afrikaners were not enemies of the Zulus. Louis Botha was determined to see Dinuzulu happily surrounded by his subjects in Zululand but the Afrikaner leader's plea was in vain as Dinuzulu died in the Transvaal as the English could not be persuaded freeing him.

In conclusion it can be stated that during the first phase of the war the British did not want the Zulus to become involved in the war. When the guerilla tactics of the republican generals prolonged the war, the British changed their policy and brought the Zulus into the conflict. Their assistance in looting Afrikaner cattle was regarded as vitally important. Lack of food and insecurity would force the fighting men and women to surrender.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

This last policy led to the murder at Holkrantz. In spite of it, the relations between Afrikaners and Zulus were not embittered permanently. In that respect the attitude of Louis Botha towards Dinuzulu is an excellent example. But the English did not gain the friendship of the Zulus either compensation for war losses, recommendations of their Land Commission of 1904 and the subsequent Bhambatha rebellion of 1906 proved the general distrust between those two groups.

S U M M A R Y

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ZULUS IN THE

ANGLO-BOER WAR, 1899-1902

In order to understand the Zulu participation in the Anglo-Boer War and the Holkrantz murder in May 1902, it is essential to trace in broad outline the attitude of the Zulus towards those parties who became involved in the internal faction struggles in Zululand and the war.

During the reign of Shaka white settlers lived in fear of their lives. After his assassination in 1828 Dingane was friendly towards them, but the murder of Retief and many Voortrekkers strained relations and led to the battle of Bloodriver and the defeat of Dingane. His successor, Mpande, maintained peace until 1872 when he died. The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 led to the destruction of Cetshwayo's kingdom which caused much chaos in Zulu ranks. A few years later the banishment of Dinuzulu (1888-1897) caused further disruption. He returned only two years before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War into which he was forced much against his will during 1901-2 by the British.

The Anglo-Boer War was supposed to be "a white man's war." So Zulus did not participate actively during 1899 to 1900. When Afrikaners started guerilla warfare, the British armed the Zulus around the Vryheid district in order to end the war by destroying Afrikaner stock. Colonel Bottomley armed the Zulus and he threatened Dinuzulu with banishment if he refused to support the operation. General Hamilton with the consent of Shepstone, the magistrate, instructed Dinuzulu in March 1902 to send more than 250 men. These were joined during the raids by the men of Chief Sikobobo. In retaliation Afrikaners on the orders of General Botha, burnt all Sikobobo's kraals. Thereafter Sikobobo, who received the support of Hamilton and Shepstone, launched a surprise attack on 6th May, 1902 on Afrikaners who were camped at Holkrantz. As the armistice was in force no attacks were expected, but during the fighting 56 Afrikaners and about 52 Zulus were killed.

The murder strained race relations but they gradually improved after General Botha had achieved the release of Dinuzulu from banishment after the Bhambatha Rebellion of 1906. But the compensation for war losses, recommendations of the Land Commission of 1904 and the subsequent Rebellion of 1906 proved the general distrust Zulus felt for the British.

UKUNGENA KWAMAZULU EMPINI YAMANGISI NAMABHUNU 1899-1902

Ukuze ukungena kwamaZulu empini yamaNgisi namaBhunu nempi yaseMthashana ngoNhlaba ka 1902 kuzwakale kahle, kusemqoka ukucwaningisisa ubudlelwane phakathi kwamaZulu namaNgisi ayesezifake ezinxushunxushwini zelakwaZulu nempi.

Ngesikhathi sokubusa kwenkosi uShaka abahwebi bamaNgisi ENatali babehlalele ovalweni. Emva kokubulawa kwenkosi uShaka ngonyaka ka 1828, ubudlelwane benkosi uDingane nabahwebi babubuhle, kodwa ukufa kuka Retief namaBhunu amaningi kwabudunga ubudlelwane kwalandelwa impi yase-Ncome lapho uDingane ehlulwa khona. Umlandeli kaDingane uMpande wahlala ngokuthula waze wafa ngonyaka ka 1872. Impi yamaNgisi namaZulu ngonyaka ka 1879 yaphetha ngokubhidlika kombuso wenkosi uCetshwayo, okwalandelwa inxushunxushu phakathi kwamaZulu. Emva kweminyaka emibalwa ukudingiswa kwenkosi uDinuzulu kwa dala esinye isibhicongo ngo 1888-1897. Inkosi yabuya ekudingisweni kusele iminyaka emibili kubheduke impi yamaBhunu namaNgisi ngo 1901-2, yaphoqelelwa ngamaNgisi ukuba iyingene.

Impi yamaNgisi namaBhunu kwakumele ibe "impi yabamhlophe." Ngakhoke amaZulu awathathanga zikhali kusuka ngo 1899 kuya ku 1900. Kwathi amaBhunu eseqala eyobuphekula, amaNgisi asehlomisa amaZulu ayehlala ezindaweni ezizungeze elaseFilidi ukuze kuphele impi ngokuthumba imfuyo yamaBhunu.

UKhenela Bottomley wahlomisa amaZulu wase esabisa uDinuzulu ngokumdingisa uma wayala ukuhloma. UJenene Hamilton ngenyume kaShepstone, imantshi waphoqelesa uDinuzulu ngoNdasa ka 1902 ukuba athumele izinsizwa ezevile kuma 250. Lezizinsizwa zahlangana nezenkosi uSikobobo ngesikhathi sokuthumba imfuyo. Njengesijeziso amaBhunu akhipha isincumo ngezwi likaJenene Botha ukuba yonke imizi yenkosi uSikobobo ishiswe.

Emva kwalokho uSikobobo esekelwe uHamilton noShepstone wahlasela ngokuzuma amaBhunu ayevive eMthashana ngoNhlaba 6 ngo 1902. Njengoba kwakusabekwe phansi izikhali, amaBhunu ayengazelele, kodwa yabambana ngezihluthu kwafa amaBhunu angama 56 amaZulu angu 52.

Impi yaseMthashana yabudunga ubudlelwane kodwa baya ngobungcono emva kokuba uJenene Botha ekhiphe uDinuzulu ekudingisweni emva kwempi kaBhambatha ka 1906. Kodwa umvuzo ngezindleko zempi, neziphakamiso zekhomishana yezwe yangonyaka ka 1904 n'empini kaBhambatha ka 1906 kwakhombisa ukungethembani okukhulu phakathi kwamaNgisi namaZulu.

1. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Amery, L.S.: The Times History of the War in S.A., Vols. I - VII. London, 1900 - 1909.
2. Blake, J.Y.F.: A West Pointer with the Boers. Boston, 1903.
3. Breytenbach, J.H.: Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899 - 1902, Vols. I - III. Pretoria, 1973.
4. Brookes, E.H. and C. de B. Webb: A History of Natal. Pietermaritzburg, 1965.
5. Clammer, D.: The Zulu War. Cape Town, 1973.
6. Colenso, J.W.: Ten Weeks in Natal: A Journal of the First Tour of Visitations among the Colonists and Zulu Kaffirs of Natal. Cambridge, 1855.
7. Colenso, F.E.: The Ruin of Zululand, Vol. I. London, 1884.
8. Conradie, F.D.: Met Cronjé aan die Wesfront 1899 - 1900. Cape Town, 1943.
9. Cook, E.T.: Right and Wrongs of the Transvaal War. London, 1901.
10. Davitt, M.: The Boer Fight for Freedom. New York, 1902.
11. De Wet, C.H.: De Strijd Tusschen Boer en Brit. Amsterdam en Pretoria, 1902.
12. Dhlomo, R.H.H.: Ushaka. Pietermaritzburg, 1955.
13. Engelenburg, P.V. and G.S. Preller: Onze Krygsofficieren. Pretoria, 1904.
14. Fynn, H.F.: The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn. Pietermaritzburg, 1950.
15. Grant, M.H.: History of the War in S.A., Vols. I - IV. London, 1916.

16. Haferkorn, H.E.: The South African War: A Bibliography.
Washington, 1924.
17. Hamilton, I.: Listening for the Drums. London, 1944.
18. Hancock, W.K. and Selection from the Smuts Papers Vol. I.,
J. van der Poel: 1886 - 1902. Cambridge, 1902.
19. Hancock, W.K.: Smuts I The Sanguine Years 1870 - 1919.
Cambridge, 1962.
20. Headlam, C.: The Milner Papers Vols. I - II. London,
1931 - 1933.
21. Hobhouse, E.: The Brunt of the War and where it Fell.
London, 1902.
22. Holt, E.: The Boer War. London, 1958.
23. Kestell, J.D. De Vredesonderhandelingen Tusschen Boer
and D.E. van Velden: en Brit in Zuid-Afrika. Pretoria, 1909.
24. Kidd, D.: Echoes from the Battlefields of S.A. London, 1939.
25. Kruger, H.: Goodbye Dolly Gray: The Story of the Boer War.
London, 1960.
26. Le May, G.H.: British Supremacy in S.A. 1899 - 1907.
Oxford, 1965.
27. Leyds, W.J.: Correspondentie 1899 - 1902, Vols. I - III. The
Hague, 1919 - 1934.
28. Marais, J.S.: The Fall of Kruger's Republic. Oxford, 1965.
29. Maurice, J.F.: History of the War in S.A. 1899 - 1902.
London, 1906.
30. Mills, G.A.: A Report on the Causes which led to the Ill-
feeling between the Boers and the Zulus under
Sikobobo at Holkrantz on the 6th May, 1902.
(incomplete), Pietermaritzburg, 1902.

31. Morris, D.H.: The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu nation under Shaka and its fall in the Zulu War of 1879. London, 1967.
32. Muller, C.F.J.: 500 Years a History of S.A. Pretoria, 1973.
33. Omar-Cooper, J.D.: The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa. London, 1966.
34. Otto, J.C.: Die Konsentrasiekampe. Cape Town, 1954.
35. Pemberton, W.B.: Battles of the Boer War. London, 1964.
36. Ritter, E.A.: Shaka Zulu: The rise of the Zulu Empire. London, 1960.
37. Scholtz, G.D.: Europa en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899 - 1902. Johannesburg, 1939.
38. Scholtz, G.D.: Die Oorsake van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899 - 1902. Johannesburg, 1947.
39. Selby, J.: Shaka's Heirs. London, 1971.
40. Selby, J.: The Boer War: A story in Cowardice and Courage. London, 1969.
41. Selby, J.: A Short History of S.A. London, 1973.
42. Stirling, J.: The Colonials in S.A. Pietermaritzburg, 1950.
43. Stow, G.W.: The Native races of S.A. London, 1905.
44. Strydom, C.J.: Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog. Cape Town, 1947.
45. Symons, J.: Buller's Campaign in S.A. London, 1963.
46. Van der Walt, A.J.H., Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, Deel I. Wiid, J.A. en A.L. Geyer: Cape Town, 1951.
47. Van Jaarsveld, F.A.: Van Van Riebeeck tot Verward 1652 - 1966. Johannesburg, 1971.
48. Van Zyl, P.H.S.: Die Helde Album van ons Vryheidstryd. Johannesburg, 1944.

49. Waters, W.H.H. and The German Official Account of the War in S.A., Vols. I - II. London, 1905 - 1906.
50. Wilson, M.D. and The Oxford History of S.A. Vols. I - II. L.M. Thompson Oxford, 1969.
51. Wilson, H.W.: With the Flag to Pretoria, Vols. I - II. London 1900.

2. ARCHIVAL SOURCES

1. Pietermaritzburg State Archives.

A. Unpublished Sources

(a) Colonial Secretary's Office (C.S.O.)

C.S.O. 2642: Circulars 1899 - 1900.

(b) Government House (G.H.)

G.H. 1302: Copies of Confidential Despatches to Secretary of State, 4th February, 1900 to 12th August, 1904.

G.H. 1304: Natal Copies of Annexures to Confidential Despatches to the Secretary of State for the Colonies - of 5th June to 16th October, 1902.

G.H. 1333: Copies of Letters Despatched to the High Commissioner, South Africa, and General, 15th January, 1902 to 4th March, 1903.

(c) Secretary for Native Affairs (S.N.A.)

S.N.A. 1/4/7: Confidential Papers Magisterial Reports 1899 - 1900.

S.N.A. 1/4/8: Confidential Papers nos. 1 - 117.

S.N.A. 1/4/9: Confidential Papers nos. 1 - 57, 1901.

S.N.A. 1/4/10: Confidential Papers nos. 4 - 109, 1902.

S.N.A. 1/1/301: Papers nos. 1201 - 1693, 1903.

S.N.A. 1/3/302: Papers nos. 1712 - 2197, 1903.

S.N.A. 1/6/25: Miscellaneous papers regarding Bottomley's Actions 1901 - 1902.

S.N.A. Minute Correspondence 1903 - 1905.

(d) Zululand Archives (Z.A.)

Z.A. 32: Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate
Confidential Correspondence 1897 - 1899.

1.1 Pretoria State Archives

A. Unpublished Sources

(a) Prime Minister's Correspondence (P.M.C.)

P.M.C. 103: Minute Correspondence.

P.M.C. 170/07: Correspondence.

(b) G.S. Preller Collection: A 648(a)

A 648(b)

1.2 Bloemfontein State Archives

A. Unpublished Sources

(a) Accession no. 2057: Unclassified Documents in the War Museum,
Bloemfontein.

3. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Natal Government Notices 1 - 400.

4. NEWSPAPERS

Ipepa Lo Hlanga 1900 - 1901.

The Natal Mercury 1900 - 1902.

The Natal Witness 1902.

De Volkstem 1899.