

**THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE SECURITY IN CRIME PREVENTION**

BY

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
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Elouise, my children Brandt, Liezl, Ilze and Estiaan who always supported me in my academic endeavours.

Onthou altyd ons benadering: "*Saam skep ons 'n toekoms*".

DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis "The role of private security in crime prevention" is my own work both in conception and in execution. All the sources that I have used or quoted from have been acknowledged by means of complete references.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Douw G. Strenkamp', is written over a large, stylized circular flourish.**DOUW G STRENKAMP**

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SUMMARY

Protection of life and property is an age-old need of human beings. Through the ages, territoriality and personal interest played an important role in the protection of life and property.

The historical development of private security throughout the world displays a colourful history – from ancient to modern times. The birth of modern policing originated as a result of private security during the beginning of the 19th century. Since then, private security developed into a formidable entity – to such an extent that since the beginning of the seventies in America private security surpassed public policing. Presently, private security in South Africa has also outgrown public policing.

The present study aims at narrowing the gap in our substantive knowledge about the role of private security in crime prevention by means of two structured questionnaires – one for public and one for private security respondents.

The study aims at the following:

- to record the evolution of private security from ancient to modern times
- to compare the perceptions of both public and private security respondents in regard to the role and function of private security in crime prevention
- to establish how respondents feel about security measures aimed at eliminating crime opportunities
- to establish which precautionary measures respondents take to protect themselves.

Research techniques implemented in this study are the following:

- A literature study regarding a wide range of aspects pertaining to the role of private security in crime prevention.
- Structured questionnaires reflecting the demographic (independent variables) of the respondents as well as their responses on the dependent variable.

- Non-probability techniques.
- Frequency distributions and cross-correlation of statistical information intended to provide a greater clarity about the dependent variable.

The findings of the study indicated that:

- The role of private security in society in general and in crime prevention in particular have been rated very important by both sampling groups.
- Specific functions of private security have been favourably evaluated by the respondents.
- Specific security measures in crime prevention have also been rated as very important.
- Aspects relating to the role of private security in society have been favourably rated by both sampling groups.

The following recommendations have been formulated:

- Special police status for private security officers.
- Tax credits for individual security expenditures.
- Transfer of specific public police duties to private security.
- Academic and basic training for the development of private security officers.
- Greater public police – private security co-operation.

OPSOMMING

Die beskerming van lewe en eiendom is 'n eeu-oue behoefte van die mens. Deur die eeue heen het territorialiteit en persoonlike belang 'n vername rol gespeel in die beskerming van lewe en eiendom.

Die historiese ontwikkeling van privaatsekuriteit regoor die wêreld vertoon 'n kleurvolle geskiedenis – vanaf antieke tot moderne tye. Die geboorte van moderne polisiëring het sy ontstaan te danke aan privaatsekuriteit gedurende die begin van die negentiende eeu. Sedertien het privaatsekuriteit gegroei en ontwikkel tot 'n formidabele entiteit – in so 'n mate dat dit sedert die begin van die sewentiger jare in Amerika publieke polisiëverbygegroe het. Privaatsekuriteit in Suid -Afrika is huidiglik ook groter in omvang as publieke polisiëring.

Die huidige studie beoog om die gaping in ons kennis van die rol van privaatsekuriteit in misdaadvoorkoming aan te vul deur gebruik te maak van twee gestruktureerde vraelyste – een vir die publiek en een vir privaatsekuriteit respondente.

Die studie beoog om:

- die evolusie van privaatsekuriteit vanaf antieke tot moderne tye te boekstaaf
- die persepsies van beide publieke en privaatsekuriteit respondente betreffende die rol en funksie van privaatsekuriteit in misdaadvoorkoming te vergelyk
- te bepaal hoe respondente voel oor sekuriteitsmaatreëls wat beoog om misdaadgeleenthede uit te skakel
- vas te stel watter voorkomende maatreëls respondente neem om hulself te beveilig.

Navorsingstegnieke wat in hierdie studie gebruik word is die volgende:

- 'n Literatuurstudie oor 'n wye reeks aspekte wat verband hou met die rol van privaatsekuriteit in misdaadvoorkoming.

- Gestruktureerde vraelyste wat die demografiese gegewens (onafhanklike veranderlikes) van respondente weerspieël insluitende hulle response op die afhanklike veranderlike.
- Nie-waarskynlike steekproefneming.
- Frekwensieverspreidings en kruiskorrelasies van die statistiese gegewens om groter duidelikheid te kry betreffende die afhanklike veranderlike.

Die bevindings van die studie dui daarop dat:

- Die rol van privaatsekuriteit in die samelewing in die algemeen en in misdaadvoorkoming in die besonder baie belangrik geag word deur beide steekproefgroepe.
- Die besondere funksies van privaatsekuriteit gunstig oorweeg is deur die respondente.
- Spesifieke sekuriteitsmaatreëls belangrik geag word in misdaadvoorkoming.
- Aspekte wat verband hou met die rol van privaatsekuriteitsbeamptes gunstig oorweeg is deur beide steekproefgroepe.

Die volgende aanbevelings is geformuleer:

- Spesiale polisie-status vir sekuriteitsbeamptes.
- Belasting afslag vir individuele sekuriteitsuitgawes.
- Oordrag van spesifieke polisdienste aan sekuriteitsbeamptes.
- Akademiese en basiese opleidingsontwikkeling van sekuriteitsbeamptes.
- Groter publieke polisie – privaatsekuriteit samewerking.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL ORIENTATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Police forces existed since ancient times in one or other form and have been a central part of government since the creation of these entities. For the most part, however, the police function also formed part of military establishments during early times. Accordingly, it was the responsibility of the military to protect rulers and kings against internal and external risks. Information about ancient police forces appears to be scanty and little detailed information about their functional and organisational operation is available. It also appears that information about early police forces had been restricted to specific phases or historical events. For instance, Hammurabi, king of Babylonia around about 2100 B.C., developed the first system of coded laws and punishments for offences which, in turn, were standardised by rulers such as Lipitishtar and Eshnunna (Gaines, Kappeler & Vaughn 1994:42; Van Heerden 1976:20).

With the decline in moral consensus and the introduction of written rules to control human behaviour, the emphasis shifted increasingly to the executive role in society. Social control still rested primarily on the principle of individual responsibility as a supplement to the system of social control, and some sort of military police force emerged which upheld the rules and regulations in times of peace (Van Heerden 1976:20). Early Egyptian rulers established laws and courts and also introduced marine patrols and custom houses to protect the Nile delta and the Egyptian commerce. Some form of police force was also established by successive Egyptian dynasties to maintain the internal order and stability (Gaines *et al.* 1994:42).

In ancient Greece, which comprised 150 city-states, the maintenance of social order was dependent upon a *Kin*-police system which functioned according to tribal custom and

tradition - a system which eventually failed. Increasing lawlessness and anarchy swept through many of the city-states. A *city watch system*, more or less similar to present-day security guards instituted in Athens by Peisistratus, a soldier and politician, marked the beginning of the first form of community or urban policing in Greece. This police force was primarily responsible for the protection of Peisistratus himself, the citadel and the main roads. Throughout Greek history, rulers utilised body guards to maintain their political positions. The lack of a formal, well-structured police force contributed to a large extent to the disintegration of city-states as a result of widespread anarchy (Van Heerden 1976:20; Gaines *et al.* 1994:42-43).

The study of the history of policing is important for three reasons:

- Through a proper understanding of past experiences, repetition of mistakes, shortcomings and deficiencies in policing can be avoided.
- Criminal justice practitioners and researchers are able to broaden their substantial knowledge of and insight into contemporary police institutions and procedures necessary to keep abreast with the processes of change and evolving new demands and expectations.
- It provides a sound framework to comprehend the nature of problems confronting modern police management, such as corruption, brutality, affirmative action, unionism, and the like (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:215).

It is for this reason that the researcher deemed it necessary to provide an informative background of the historical development of police institutions from ancient to modern times. However, all history appears to be subjective: "Because individual historians select, weigh, and interpret facts differently, the histories they write are different" (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:215). Models of the historical development of police institutions selected and discussed in this chapter are, therefore, by no means intended to reflect a complete and detailed exposition of the structure and organisation of these police forces. In the discussion that follows, the evolution of policing in the following state-dominated

societies will be briefly highlighted: imperial Rome, France, Japan and England. This brief discussion is deemed necessary to comprehend the origin and function of private security. Public policing and private security have much in common and both fulfil complimentary roles as will be seen in Chapter 6 that deals exclusively with the public police - private security interface.

Simonsen (1998:96) opines that “... it is finally time for a partnership to take place in the public - private sectors that provide many of the same services”. In this regard, both are responsible for –

- Crime prevention. Both entities have the obligation to engage in crime prevention strategies. The philosophy of “it is better to prevent crime than to combat it” is the founding principle of the private security profession.
- Personal safety. Private security has the responsibility of ensuring the safety of its employees, clients and anyone it comes into contact with. Public policing have a mandate (by means of statutory law) to ensure the safety and security of all citizens of a country.
- Order maintenance. Whereas public policing is responsible for maintaining social order, private security takes upon itself to maintain order in industry (Simonsen 1998:96).

1.2 THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE SECURITY AND POLICING – AN OVERVIEW

1.2.1 The Roman Empire

The ertswhile emperor of Rome, Augustus Caesar, was the first ruler who established and introduced the world's first large city police force, the *Praetorian Guard*. However, prior to the creation of this police force, the military or small bands of men were responsible for law enforcement duties within the boundaries of conquered areas of the Roman Empire - a form of order maintenance which had been disapproved by ordinary citizens out of fear of their liberty being threatened. The creation of the *Praetorian Guard* made

Augustus Caesar the first ruler to distinguish a clear need for an organised police force which had to function separately from the military. The *Praetorian Guard*, which comprised nine cohorts (bands of warriors) of 500 men each, served first and foremost as Caesar's personal guard. Dressed in typical ancient togas (not uniforms), members of this Guard were accommodated in private lodges and they fulfilled a dual function, namely (1) escorting and protecting Augustus Caesar, and (2) serving as his secret police force (Walker 1977:13). The *Praetorian Guard* were members of Caesar's legions of about 7000 Roman soldiers (Langworthy & Travis 1994:37), and by appointing a selected group of soldiers to fulfil a police function, he became the first ruler to draw a distinction between military and policing functions (Van Heerden 1976:21). Later, Augustus Caesar authorised other officials in Rome, the *questores*, to enforce the laws and fulfil policing duties. They were also responsible for assisting magistrates with the investigation of crimes and to arrest criminals. Another force, the *Roman Vigiles*, was also established to serve as watchman and they were responsible for maintaining the peace and fighting fires in the city of Rome during regular street patrolling. Apart from these functions, they were also charged with the apprehension of criminals who committed petty offences, investigate and detect minor criminal acts and to apprehend runaway slaves (Walker 1977:16; Barker, Hunter & Rush 1994:57-58; Langworthy & Travis 1994:37).

The *Roman Vigiles*, in conjunction with the *Praetorian Guard*, greatly contributed towards city magistrates' capabilities of handling law enforcement issues. However, their powers and capabilities were limited. Consequently, they could not deal with serious crimes nor arrest affluent citizens. A special police force was created for this purpose, namely *Urban Cohorts* - the first full-fledged police force with extended power ever recorded in history. This police force consisted of three groups of 500 men each, recruited from local citizens, acted as a separate force under a separate command. They were not part of the *Praetorian Guard* but policed Rome through a succession of emperors until the collapse of the Roman Empire (Walker 1977:13-26; Barker *et al.* 1994:58; Langworthy & Travis 1994:37).

After the fall of the Roman Empire late in the 15th century, Europe entered the *Dark Ages*. Little is known about law enforcement during this era because the continent was in

a turmoil with constant warfare (Langworthy & Travis 1994:38). During this period, social organisation emerged through feudalism which comprised three classes or estates in society; the nobility, the clergy and the common people. Powerful noblemen controlled and protected the proletariat. Feudal lords often fought over land and over time consolidated holdings formed the basis for the kingdoms of Medieval Europe. In their quest to achieve absolute power, monarchies emerged and an era of total despotism developed. In Italy, cities became trading centres and world economic powers. As a result of poverty and crime, city leaders formed patrols commanded by noblemen to police the cities, mainly to control the lower classes and to protect the assets of the nobility and the growing middle classes of manufacturers and businessmen in the commercial cities. The police and magistrates focused their efforts upon controlling the proletariat while allowing those of higher status more freedom. Differential policing was the order of the day. During the outbreak of the *black plague* in the 14th century, policing appeared to be a popular phenomenon - especially to enforce a curfew to prevent the spread of a deadly disease (Langworthy & Travis 1994:38-39).

1.2.2 Policing in France during the 17th century

Police power in France is nationally organised and directed to serve the interests of the national government of the day. Centralisation of power could be attributed to political upheaval, characteristic of French history since 1789. During the Middle Ages, France experienced a struggle for power between the Crown and the local nobility. The king of France achieved autocratic power over the nation and by doing so, he became the undisputed leader (Langworthy & Travis 1994:40). During the reign of King Louis XIV an efficient and effective police force was created. In Paris, capital and home of the king, a royal officer, the *Provost of the City* had long been in existence as a combination of governor, judge and police chief. Over centuries this position gained increased power and responsibility. Policing outside the jurisdiction of Paris also paved the way for the foundation of the *French Prefects* with the institution of a royal supervisor, the Intendant of Justice, Police and Finance in each of France's thirty provinces. Later reform initiatives by Louis XIV, witnessed the creation of the position of *lieutenant* in 1666 in an effort to counteract the problems experienced by the police of Paris (Holden 1990:2-3).

1.2.2.1 *Nicolas-Gabriel de La Reynie's contribution to policing*

Reforms by Louis XIV (based upon the proposals by Minister Colbert), affected civil procedure (1667), criminal procedure (1670), commercial law (1673), and maritime law (1681). In his search for an occupant for the post of Lieutenant of Police, Louis XIV expected a special type of man to fill this position. After having drafted a specific and demanding job description by Minister Colbert, Nicolas-Gabriel de La Reynie was appointed as the Lieutenant of Police as he “ ... filled all Louis XIV's fondest expectations” (Holden 1990:3).

La Reynie's duties and responsibilities were vast in comparison to that of contemporary police administrators. His jurisdiction and authority extended, *inter alia*, over the security of the city of Paris, illegal carrying of arms (only long swords, openly displayed, were permitted), the cleaning of streets and public places, food supplies to the city, price control, inspection of markets, hostels, lodging and gambling houses, illegal gatherings and, most important of all, he had to pass judgement on all persons who committed crimes and took charge of the police organisation (Stead 1983:15).

Trained as an advocate and judge at the Law School of the University of Toulouse, La Reynie took part in the King's conferences on police reform as Crown lawyer and as a result, he committed himself to manage the cleaning, paving and lighting of streets. Lanterns were posted throughout the city, houses were aligned and a bridge over the Seine was built to alleviate serious traffic problems. La Reynie's city police force grew in numbers to become a formidable institution divided into:

- the *Guet*, also known as the Royal Watch Force
- the police force of the *Lieutenant of the Robe*, who were capable swordsmen responsible for dealing with violent crime in the city of Paris
- the *Provost of the Ile de France*, who maintained and commanded a military force for patrolling the suburbs and the surrounding countryside
- a group of special agents, the *Exempts* created by Cardinal Mazarin for clandestine operations, and

- the *Commissaires-enquêteurs au Chalet* who, as police officials, had the same status as magistrates responsible for law and order in each of the sixteen administrative sections (*quartiers*) of Paris (Holden 1990:5-6).

Faced by a high street crime rate (which was typical of the urban ghetto of that time), La Reynie cleaned up the Court of Miracles - a no-man's land situated in central Paris and a haven for many criminals, beggars, fugitives and drop-outs. Anti-duelling laws were fiercely enforced and the possession of weapons strictly controlled. Proactive policing through preventive patrols contributed positively towards making Paris a safe city. La Reynie " ... was so successful that by the end of his thirty years in office, Paris was transformed from a dark, dirty, malodorous, pox and pest ridden medieval city into a modern metropolis" (Mossiker 1969:149). After the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (through which Protestantism was ended), La Reynie played a significant role to enforce this measure. Two hundred and fifty thousand of France's most productive citizens went into exile in an attempt to escape prosecution. Although he diligently carried out all the King's orders, La Reynie adopted a lenient and moderate approach in applying this law.

He resigned in 1677 with dignity as " ... a man of honor and a great and upright judge" (Stead 1983:19).

Apart from the well-known French police agency, the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, administered by the Ministry of Defence, a civil police force under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, the so-called *Police Nationale*, which also enforced national laws and provided support services to the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, also emerged and which remained constant to this day (Langworthy & Travis 1994:40; Barker *et al.* 1994:35). The *Gendarmerie Nationale*, which comprised about 90 000 personnel, was divided into two divisions: the *Provincial Gendarmerie* who provided internal security and police services in small towns and rural areas, and the *Mobile Gendarmerie* which functioned in a similar fashion as the Republican Security Company in that it covered the entire national territory, responsible for maintaining public order (Barker *et al.* 1994:35).

Barker *et al.* (1994:35) contend that: "The greatest strength of the French system of policing is also its greatest weakness". The existence of two nationally organised police forces actually ignored the needs and expectations of people under the direct control of municipalities. This situation continued until 1983 when a number of municipal forces, known as the *Police Municipale*, were established and introduced in France. These municipal police forces, which consisted of about 25 000 employees, operated under the direct authority of city mayors (similar to the Durban City Police). Limited power appeared to have contributed to the greatest unhappiness among members of these municipal police forces.

South Africa, like France, has a centralised, national police system in place which is often perceived as inadequate, understaffed, and incompetent in protecting law-abiding citizens, judged on the increase in the rate of violent and personal crimes. As a result, and " ... to quell rising levels of political unrest ... " (Shaw 1996:41-43), a growing number of local authorities adopted their own initiatives to combat crime on four distinct levels:

(1) Traffic policing.

Municipal traffic departments were established in the early 1930's when the traffic policing function had been disengaged from the erstwhile South African Police (SAP) and transferred to local and provincial authorities (Shaw 1996:41). According to Van Heerden, Smit and Potgieter (1983:65), the first provincial traffic organisation in the Cape Province was instituted at the beginning of 1956. Although the appointment of a number of inspectors of licences gained momentum in 1932, the first two provincial traffic officers were appointed on 1 May 1941 in the Transvaal, followed by the appointment of four provincial traffic officers for Natal in 1947. With the exception of Durban and Pietermaritzburg where independent city or "borough" police forces existed for many years in terms of the Municipal Ordinance of 1854, the Municipal Amendment Law of 1861 (Act 21 of 1861) and the Police Act of 1894, the erstwhile South African Police were, up to 1932, exclusively responsible for traffic law enforcement in all the other cities and towns throughout South Africa.

According to Shaw (1996:41), traffic departments in general portrayed the following characteristics:

- a para-military image, similar to their national police counterparts, by means of carrying firearms, distinctive uniforms, badges, and the like
- some White-dominated municipal councils approved the increase of the powers of traffic officers and even expanded their function beyond the policing of traffic order to also include that of crime fighting and apprehension of criminals, and
- some adopted the image of a typical small-town American Sheriff's department as far as their structure and organisation were concerned.

(2) Security measures.

Due to the increase in crime (especially violent crimes) during the political upheaval prior to the introduction of democracy in 1994, certain municipalities implemented substantial security measures to protect council property and likewise, some engaged security officers in crime prevention techniques such as patrolling public areas. Other municipality security officials were involved in political surveillance (such as Johannesburg security officers who got engaged in a "spy-ring" against opposition political parties or liberation movements) at the beginning of the De Klerk-government during the apartheid era (Shaw 1996:42).

(3) Interim Constitution.

The quest for instituting local authority police agencies to assist the newly established South African Police Service (SAPS), successfully contributed towards the recognition of municipal and metropolitan policing functions in the Interim Constitution, (Act 200 of 1993 (Shaw 1996:42). The establishment of these policing functions were also enshrined in the new South African Police Service Act (Act 68 of 1995).

(4) '*Kitskonstabels*' ("*Instant Constables*").

Where the aforementioned measures emanated within municipal context, the state of emergency which prevailed during the 1980's witnessed the introduction by the state of " ... a large number of inadequately trained municipal policemen or 'kitskonstabels' - literally translated to mean 'instant constables' - in a bid to crack down on political opponents" (Shaw 1996:42), of the White minority government. Having been called the "green beans" (named after the distinctive green colour of their uniforms), these 'kitskonstabels' were, according to Shaw (1996:42) " ... notorious for their brutality - they were more often vigilante groups than anything resembling a police agency".

The French *Police Nationale* performed a wide spectrum of police functions such as law enforcement and the drafting and enforcement of statutory regulations. They also controlled applications for passports, identity cards, driver's licences and other related documents. On the welfare side, members of this police force were also responsible for a variety of social services such as health inspections, public welfare and fire fighting (Langworthy & Travis 1994:40-41). Contrary to efforts by municipal forces in South Africa to adopt extraordinary powers to ensure public safety within their respective jurisdictions, France appears to be " ... too entrenched to allow any take-over from municipal level" (Shaw 1996:44). Interestingly enough, the new South African Draft Constitution (promulgated under Act 108 of 1996), makes no provision for the establishment or existence of any kind of metropolitan or municipal police services at all. Shaw (1996:45-46) opines that if this omission (or oversight) continues to persist in the final Constitution, competency at provincial level in this regard will be adversely affected.

Policing in Japan

Development of policing in Japan differed considerably from that of European societies. Unlike policing in Rome, France and Italy, the Japanese police exerted pervasive powers over the people of Japan and are even today responsible for many welfare functions in addition to their primary task of maintaining order and stability. Ancient Japanese society consisted of a few social classes based on status. The nobility or *samurai*

constituted the upper class, while the lower classes were composed of peasants, artisans and merchants. Like the police agencies of the Medieval period, the Japanese police were expected to serve the interests of the elite and to suppress political and economical opposition. Having emerged from a strong feudal form of social organisation, they formed a centralised police force under a national government (as is the case in South Africa). Japanese police organisation did not evolve or develop from a basic social need for peaceful co-existence or from earlier social functions and, in many ways, it did not experience periods of transition. Within a span of about ten years, the Japanese managed to introduce a centralised, modern police organisation (Langworthy & Travis 1994:41).

Japan was divided into several domains (or principalities) under the direction of the *shogun* or overlord. Strong traditions of collective responsibility and class distinctions prevailed. Japanese emperors held both political and spiritual leadership. Policing *per se*, did not play any significant role during the era of the *shogunate*. It was only after the shogunate was overthrown in 1867 that southern domains formed a coalition and assumed power in what was called *The Meiji Restoration*, that a stronger centralised, national government came into power. Foreigners were expected to comply with Japanese laws. Japanese government services such as the military, postal services, education, business and policing had to be restructured and, based on studies of Western organisations and practices, the *Meiji* adopted Western organisational guidelines for Japanese institutions (Langworthy & Travis 1994:43).

The first modern police force in Japan was established in the port of Yokohama, originally composed of English, French and Japanese nationals under an English commander. Accordingly, the British style of patrols, ranks and operational functions were adopted. The Japanese government took control of this police force in 1868 but retained the British influence. Up to 1871, when the traditional domains were abolished, Tokyo had been "policed" by the *samurai*. In 1872, the Japanese adopted the French model for the development of a new Tokyo police system. The reason for having chosen the French model is to be found in the desire to move away from Anglo-Saxon models which relied upon local initiative and local control. Secondly, the multi-functional nature of the French model was more acceptable to the Japanese, and thirdly, the method of

political surveillance and control embedded in the French model was far more attractive than the British system, because it created opportunities to clamp down on anti-government activism (Langworthy & Travis 1994:43).

Based on the French national model, the Japanese police were totally representative of the national government and were tasked with the primary duty of protecting the government. Their powers ranged from conducting annual population surveys, health inspections, regulation of health and moral standards, public education and fire protection, to a variety of non-policing functions (Langworthy & Travis 1994:43-44).

1.2.4 Policing in Italy

Italy, like Greece, entered the nineteenth century as a disorganised society of independent principalities and city-states. A unified Italian state, comprised of all the independent states emerged during the nineteenth century with centralised national powers vested in a constitutional monarchy. Law and order was in a continuous crisis in that it was utilised by monarchs to expand their power, control the people and to counteract the actions of political opponents. Since the Middle Ages, Italy became an important commercial centre as a result of its location in the Mediterranean. Despite from becoming trading centres and world economic powers, poverty and crime also flourished in urban areas. Consequently, commercial activities were crippled by social disorder and increasing crime and violence. In an attempt to maintain social order, city leaders formed patrol units commanded by noblemen. But, characteristic of the Middle Ages, policing (in whatever form it existed) had been manipulated to the benefit of the nobility (Langworthy & Travis 1994:38-39).

1.2.5 Summary

The preceding discussion focused briefly on the development of policing in four societies: ancient Rome, France, Japan and Italy. The main reason for having provided these brief sketches revolves around the identification of common themes in police development as well as the factors and circumstances that shaped the police role and

function over centuries. "In all four cases, the police are a product of the consolidation of power in a national (or imperial) government" (Langworthy & Travis 1994:44). Police forces were created mainly to protect and demonstrate the power of the state. Through order maintenance in all four societies discussed so far, the national police forces actually displayed the power of the state to control the populations.

The similarities of these police forces can be related to the virtual similar circumstances under which they developed, namely as part of a broader social change pattern that paved the way for the realisation of relatively strong central governments. Firstly, the development of a range of government organisations - of which the police were one - resulted from the patterns of social organisations which shifted from kinship and feudal loyalties to a national identity. Secondly, earlier patterns of social organisation ignored individual liberty, but instead, emphasised a structured class system in which the powerful minority (such as feudal lords) held superior positions of relative equality over the majority of the population who were trapped in subservient positions. Policing in these societies assumed pervasive powers of arrest, regulation, investigation, and surveillance of anti-government activities (Langworthy & Travis 1994:44). In Italy (Walker 1977:217-241), France (Stead 1983:45-51) and Japan (Westney 1987:40-45), the national police were especially devoted towards investigating and controlling their governments' political enemies.

To this end, their duties extended to include intelligence gathering (of some covert nature), arrest, regulation of subversive elements and propaganda censorship. Apart from these reactive functions, the police were also proactively involved in crime prevention through patrol duties, welfare issues, repair of street lighting, health services, registration of births, issuing of identity documents, fire fighting, and the like. It would therefore be safe to accept that small-scale community policing already existed in ancient times.

When compared with the development in England (see par. 1.3) and the United States of America (see par. 1.4), it becomes clear that the aforementioned police systems were primarily centrally situated to protect the political interests of emperors, kings and feudal lords - the so-called social elite. Stead (1983:163) remarked: "Nations carve their police

systems in their own likeness. The police style of London would not be effective in New York, any more than the style of New York would be effective in London. Neither would be effective in Paris”.

1.3 POLICING IN ENGLAND

In contrast to the development of policing in non-English societies (see par.1.2) as an extension of centralised authority, the tradition in England and America appears to be one of local responsibility and control of policing. Continuing conflict between freedom and social order forms the central theme to understanding the creation and establishment of police forces in England and America. Whereas policing in earlier Continental societies adopted a centralised character (as governments' agencies of social control through coercion), policing in England and America is decentralised and more responsive to the communities it serves. Therefore, decentralised policing practices correlate with community, organisation and individual characteristics, while centralised, pervasive policing correlates with the consolidation of power by a single person (emperor, king or landlord) or a relatively small group of people (Langworthy & Travis 1994:48).

Arguing from an American point of view, Regoli and Hewitt (1996:216) opine that the English heritage contributed to three important ideas about practising policing, namely:

- ***Restricted authority.*** While performing their duties, police officials are bound to adhere to formal prescriptions (rules and regulations) pertaining to search, seizure, arrest, detention, interrogation, and the like (Regoli and Hewitt 1996:216). Based on the democratic principle that people are ruled by laws and not by people, laws not only define the limits of individual behaviour and conformity, but also set the limits to the control (policing) that can be exercised over such behaviour (Van Heerden 1976:58).
- ***Local control,*** which reflects citizens' desire (and democratic right) to be protected by the police against law violators - a responsibility that should rest with city and county

governments. Local control will ensure police accountability to the community they serve.

- **Decentralisation.** Flowing from local control, policing should be decentralised to meet the needs and expectations of all population groups at grassroots level, as opposed to a single and national government controlled (centralised) police institution as is the case with the South African Police Service.

The development of the English police system proceeded through four distinctive periods: the *kin police system*, the *frank-pledge system*, the *parish-constable police system* and the *uniformed police system* (Sullivan 1977:2-4; Barker *et al.* 1994:58; Gaines *et al.* 1994:45; Regoli & Hewitt 1996:216-218):

(1) The Kin Police System.

Between the fifth and sixth centuries a voluntary police system developed in each *tun* (or town) in which every adult male resident voluntarily took up the responsibility of protecting his own neighbourhood area.

(2) The Frank-pledge Police system.

In contrast to the *Kin* police system, the frank-pledge was a more obligatory one. Certain citizens were required to share in the responsibility for policing. Since the Norman Conquest in 1066 up to the thirteenth century, the law compelled every male person over the age of twelve years to join a group with nine neighbours (or families) to form a *tithing*. A group of ten tithings formed a hundred, headed by a *tithingman* or *constable* appointed by a local nobleman. Langworthy and Travis (1994:49-50) point out that the title of *constable* derives from the Norman-French word *comes stabuli*, meaning 'master of the horse'. A group of ten tithings formed a *hundred*. Hundreds were grouped into *shires* or counties, each one supervised by a *shire-reeve*.

(3) The Parish-Constable Police System.

As city populations grew, the frank-pledge system gradually became ineffective as a result of an increased crime rate. King Edward I made a determined attempt at

restoring order. The first official police forces were established by the *Statute of Winchester* to provide for the creation of a *Parish-Constable* police system which operated in England until round about 1829. This Act made provision for the following network of police services:

- a *watch and ward* system, to guard the gates of every town at night and to turn over any persons arrested, to the constable the next morning
- the *hue and cry* (marching watch), to patrol the streets and arrest criminals. When a watchman experienced more resistance than he could handle during the execution of an arrest, he delivered the *hue and cry* (a loud call for help). Upon hearing the call, the men of the town were obliged to assist. Failing to assist, constituted aiding and abetting the criminal
- *high constables*, to keep the peace and order in the hundreds or tithings
- *petty constables*, to keep the peace in smaller communities
- *bayliffs*, to investigate strangers and keeping watch over them
- *police of the pouters*, to curb prostitution
- a *curfew*, in terms of which the city's gates were locked at a set time to keep out unwanted persons and
- a *weapons ordinance*, requiring all men to keep weapons in their homes for use during a hue and cry.

Although the parish-constable system operated in England for more than 500 years, it displayed many deficiencies:

- a) the system depended on unpaid people, most of whom had no interest,

- skills or training in policing
- b) many people who were bound by law to assume their duties as police officers, hired others to serve on their behalf and
- c) to many, police work was too burdensome and as a result, only poorly qualified persons were attracted.

(4) The Uniformed Police System.

London became a large industrial city by the late 1700's, characterised by widespread poverty, public order and a high crime rate. The most significant outcome of public disorder was the *Gordon Riots* which started in 1780 when more than 50 000 Irish immigrants and local English citizens confronted each other in battle in protest against Parliament relaxation of repressive legislation against Roman Catholics. Almost 50 years later, in 1829, Parliament passed an "Act for improving the police in and near the Metropolis", known as the *Metropolitan Police Act*. In terms of this Act, the first salaried police force in England was established.

The London Metropolitan Police, the first largest municipal police force (which actually emerged as a result of an evolutionary process) (Gaines *et al.* 1994:45), proved to be so successful that Parliament passed the County and Borough Police Act of 1856. This Act required that every borough and county within England form its own police force. The Metropolitan Police not only emerged as a model for British police forces but also for police forces around the world (Barker *et al.* 1994:61) - including South Africa in general and the Durban City Police in particular: "... [T]he DCP [Durban City Police] is a relic of British rule in Natal - it has assumed many of the traditions of British policing, is still headed by a chief constable, and sees itself as an embodiment of the ethos of the bobby on the beat" (Shaw 1996:42).

A more detailed discussion of the contributions by subsequent English police reformers such as Patrick Colquhoun, the Fielding brothers and Sir Robert Peel, is given in Chapter 3 (par. 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.5).

1.3.1 Features of the London Metropolitan Police

Established in terms of the *Metropolitan Police Act* of 1829, the London Metropolitan Police force displayed the following features or characteristics (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:219):

- (1) as a bureaucratically structured police force, they were responsible for maintaining social order through proactive and reactive measures
- (2) they were organised along para-military lines with a clear rank structure and a formal chain of command
- (3) two commissioners, Richard Mayne and Charles Rowan headed the police force consisting of more than 3 000 officers
- (4) a superintendent who supervised four inspectors, sixteen sergeants and 165 constables, were responsible for policing in each of London's 17 newly created districts
- (5) entry requirements were basic, with low salary levels
- (6) personal qualities included physical fitness, literacy and good moral character
- (7) other qualities required of them to be polite and smartly dressed in a colour that would not incite public hostility (for instance, red colours were rejected because English soldiers were dressed in red uniforms)
- (8) Constables wore blue swallow-tailed coats, leather straps and black top hats and carried rattles with which they could summon help - they did not carry any firearms
- (9) they were trained to be authoritative, to be fair and to exercise self-control; use of force was limited and
- (10) Constables wore personal identification numbers on their uniform collars. In 1846, whistles replaced the rattles and in 1864, helmets replaced the top hats.

1.4 POLICING IN AMERICA

The development of policing in the United States of America resembles, in various

respects, the development of British policing. However, unlike policing in England, the development of policing in America resulted from three distinct law enforcement traditions along different lines in the New England and Middle colonies, the Southern colonies, and the Frontier (Langworthy & Travis 1994:61). During the colonial period, urbanisation and influx of Irish immigrants increased. Crime, social disorder and riots also proliferated out of proportion in relation to the increase in population. Formal control measures became necessary.

The post of sheriff was created to accommodate the first so-called "police officer", appointed by the governor of the colony. The sheriff's duty ranged from law enforcement to road maintenance, but excluded that of crime prevention through patrol. The marshal, who closely resembled the English constable in terms of duties and powers, took post in towns and villages. The marshal who also lacked patrol responsibilities, had the duty to serve subpoenae, accommodate prisoners, etc. As a result of the limited powers of sheriffs and marshals, colonial cities such as Boston, New York and Philadelphia began to experiment with voluntary and paid *watches* during the 1600-1700's. However, lack of proper organisation, low salaries, the nature of the job (night watches operated during night-time for the most part), etc., led to inefficiency in terms of crime control, handling of riots and widespread social disorder in these cities (Langworthy & Travis 1994:61-62).

On a more cynical note, Walker (1977:5) opines that the sheriff, the constable (also called the "little sheriff") and the watch rendered extremely poor services to such an extent that "... inefficiency, corruption, and political interference emerged as American traditions". All three agencies were ill-equipped to apprehend offenders and, as a result, order maintenance broke down. American cities had few police models from which to choose in reaction to social disorder. Apart from the slave-patrol system that existed in the South, the London Metropolitan police system appeared to be the most viable and attractive. Adapted to suit American values and concerns, American cities independently implemented the London model of policing which paved the way for the principle of decentralisation. The lack of a strong, central administration centre to ensure that democratic values would be upheld, compelled the American police to become part and parcel of prevailing political practices in the cities (Walker 1977:6).

The first modern municipal police department in the United States came into being in New York City in 1845 which represented the true Americanisation of the London Metropolitan police model. Police officers of the New York City Police Department (NYCPD), administered by a Board of Police Commissioners, were selected through political processes: they were, *inter alia*, required to reside in the areas in which they would perform their patrol duties. Unarmed and dressed in private clothes, these police officers (initially 800 in strength), had to be “of the people and for the people”, thereby reflecting an American concept of representation as *actual*. i.e. the police actually came from the same areas they policed. In contrast, English police representation was *virtual*, i.e. they were appointed by Parliament through the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 so that everybody’s safety would be guaranteed and protected. Thus, American policing reflected the protection of the competing *interests of specific groups* (the mayor and other elite groups such as politicians), while the British police were organised to serve the *common interests of all citizens* (Langworthy & Travis 1994:62-63).

Virtually similar police reforms in other North-eastern cities gave rise, for example, to the establishment of an official police organisation in Boston, Massachusetts in 1838 which consisted of six police officers. The *night watch system* was retained and as the need arose, the strength of the police was increased. In Philadelphia a city-wide police force, responsible for crime prevention through patrol, came into being in the middle 1800’s.

The concepts of *vigilantism* and *entrepreneurial policing* were introduced by colonial settlers who migrated to the frontier as alternative policing styles. In the absence of acceptable levels of civilisation and formal law enforcement on the frontier (border), vigilante committees were sometimes formed to combat specific criminal incidences and disorder, such as theft and robbery. Vigilante groups themselves would undertake the detection, apprehension, trial and punishment of offenders on an *ad hoc* basis. In other cases, vigilante committees became self-sustaining and more permanent through continued existence well beyond the resolution of an initially focused problem.

handguns, PAGAD's lawless behaviour elicited mixed feelings among members of society, ranging from being denounced as practising *mob rule* to implementing justifiable actions (Canning 1996:6).

1.4.1 The modern era

Since the establishment of the New York City Police Department, formal and preventive policing emerged throughout America to become “... one of many rationalized services that evolved in urban government during the latter of the nineteenth century” (Langworthy & Travis 1994:70). Reflecting the general style of local government, the police adopted a more service orientated role in their neighbourhoods which included social services to the poor. However, the police were still closely tied to politicians - the requirement of constituent service enabled politicians to pressurise the police into giving voters what they wanted. Conley (1989:442) noted that even police authority emanated from the political majority of the citizens and not from abstract notions of law.

The question of political influence on policing was finally resolved by the early twentieth century when it was agreed to that the police should keep their appointments regardless of the political party in power. This was achieved by extending the requirements of the federal *Pendleton Act of 1883* which “... created the Civil Service Commission to appoint federal office holders on the basis of competitive examinations and merit rather than political connections” (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:224). This kind of action was necessary because the decentralised, neighbourhood-orientated model was too inefficient to control crime in an ever increasing society. Change was inevitable. Police professionalism and improved police technology emerged. Along with the restriction of political interference with policing, came the hiring of qualified police managers, a redefinition of the police role, introduction of higher personnel standards, scientific management and specialisation. The era of police professionalism was a direct outcome of the contribution of *August Vollmer*, a former police chief of Berkeley, California from 1905-1932 (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:224) - see par. 1.4.2.1.

Improved technology witnessed the development of automobiles, two-way radios and telephones. The introduction of motorised patrol - perhaps the most significant form of change - not only enhanced police response time, but also enabled the police to patrol larger areas in less time. However, police-community relations were severely hampered as a result of isolation and alienation of the police from the public. This breach in police-community relations went unnoticed until the 1960's " ... when the police needed to respond to the social unrest surrounding the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement" (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:226).

1.4.2 Police bureaucracy and professionalism

American police professionalism reached its height between 1920 and 1965. The elite of urban society and a new breed of police administrators shared a similar reform vision about future policing in America. The elite of America's cities envisaged the "destruction" of the political machines and to control the morals and behaviour of the immigrant poor in the cities. Police administrators sought independence from politicians which would enabled them to develop policing into an autonomous and efficient field of practice. Police independence would mean freedom from partisan political interference and corruption. The elite sought equality in law enforcement. The goals of police administrators and the urban elite were consistent with regard to eliminating the influence of partisan politics from policing. The idea of introducing police professionalism was sparked by the emergence of the *science of policing* and the institution of the *Civil Service Commission*. A specialised system of knowledge which developed since the 1880's, led to the formation of the *National Chiefs of Police Union* (NCPU) which later became the *International Association of Chiefs of Police* (IACP), who conducted annual meetings where observations, information and experience were shared and exchanged. Towards the beginning of the 20th century, policing has developed into a distinct, specialised occupation. Police professionalism gained further impetus with the institution of civil service procedures for police selection and promotion in an attempt to upgrade police personnel. Ongoing reform also called for improved training and education of police officers (Langworthy & Travis 1994:79-82).

According to Monkonen 1981 (Langworthy and Travis 1994:82), the ideal of police professionalism “... probably owed as much to the institution of bureaucratic police organization as it did to the efforts of various [police] reformers. The bureaucratic organization of the police stemmed from the centralisation of administrative power and the natural development of police agencies”. This author maintains that the creation of uniformed police forces led inexorably to the development of bureaucracy. The German sociologist, Max Weber, would be the first philosopher to demarcate the ground principles of bureaucracy. Police institutions widely adopted *organisation* based on Weberian principles of bureaucratisation. The creation of rationalised and uniformed police, centralisation of administrative power, creation of specialised bureaux within police departments (based on the principle of division of labour) etc., contributed much to the evolution of police institutions for a specific reason: the maintenance of social order.

By 1920, American policing entered the era of professionalism. Together, the Civil Service and the National Police Chiefs Union had created an occupational identity and restricted entry into the vocation. Scientific methods and techniques in criminal detection and investigation were already in place; police officers were firmly insulated from political interference through stronger central administration and bureaucratic organisation and the rendering of police services was more rational and universalistic. The scene was set for professional recognition of the police by the public. Two prominent police reformers, August Vollmer and Orlando Wilson, emerged as a second generation of police leaders who led the movement towards professional recognition.

1.4.2.1 *August Vollmer (1876-1955)*

While Richard Sylvester, police chief of Washington, D.C. called for personnel standards for police officers, *August Vollmer* insisted on higher education, intensive training, professional integrity and a clearly defined organisational structure for the police. Born in 1876 in New Orleans and after having served in the Spanish-American War, August Vollmer was elected marshal of Berkeley in 1905. Being known as the most important reformer of the American police, he had been called the “father of modern professional policing”. Over a period of fifty years, he was active as consultant, administrator and

professor at the University of California and was also responsible for drafting the *Report on Police* for the Wickersham Commission. He also pioneered the implementation of motorised police patrol, advanced education for police recruits and instituted a variety of other progressive practices (Langworthy & Travis 1994:84; Barker *et al.* 1994:63-64).

Vollmer was an innovator. He argued that the first obligation of the police was to control crime and to protect law abiding citizens. Apart from having prioritised the use of technology in solving crime, he also advocated the scientific training of police officers. He was the first police administrator who developed and employed a signal system, a workable *modus operandi* system, a scientific crime investigation laboratory and selected graduated men for his police force. Vollmer was also instrumental in the development of a record bureau in Washington, D.C., which eventually emerged as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Walker 1977:39).

1.4.2.2 Orlando W. Wilson (1900-1972)

Having paved the way for American police professionalism, Vollmer recruited and trained the next generation of police professionals such as Orlando Wilson, who significantly contributed towards the advancement of the cause of police professionalism. As a result of *The Great Depression* of the 1930's, two important factors played a significant role in enabling police administrators to upgrade the entry level educational requirement for the police career:

- the police occupation became an attractive career to a class of people who otherwise would not have considered joining the police
- police employment offered job security which, in itself, encouraged better educated, middle- class men to join the police.

Orlando W. Wilson founded the first college-level School of Criminology at Berkeley, California, where he vehemently advocated police professionalism. After eleven years of service at the University of California at Berkeley, he was appointed Dean of the School

of Criminology where he wrote his first book: *Police Administration*. Wilson was also instrumental in reforming the Chicago Police Department (Barker *et al.* 1994:64-65).

1.4.3 Comparison of the London and New York Police Departments

Regoli and Hewitt (1996:222) point out that: “Even though the New York City Police Department was modelled after the London police force, major differences existed”.

Some of these differences were noticeable in the following:

- Whereas the London Metropolitan Police wore distinctive, recognisable uniforms, the NYCPD did not wear any uniforms because of objections that it would encroach upon their self-respect and independence. Only after long debates towards the mid-1800's, a compromise was reached between the NYCPD and authorities. For the next eight years they wore a distinctive hat and carried a star-shaped badge for identification purposes.
- Although the NYCPD were organised around *wards* or neighbourhoods, police authority in New York was vested in locally elected officials known as *aldermen* (i.e. members of the governing body of a municipality or city council). Aldermen had the power to hire and fire police officers in their respective wards as they saw fit. New York police officers were, as a consequence, forced into active participation in politics for: “They had a vested interest in keeping their aldermen in office” (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:222). Unlike the situation in New York, police authority in London was the responsibility of the Home Secretary.
- The London police were centralised in terms of a distinct authority structure (similar to the South African Police Service). The New York police on the other hand, were decentralised and had to report to the precinct commander (neighbourhood police station) only. This arrangement actually represented the pervasive distrust of Americans in a unified government.
- Lastly, but perhaps the most important, both police departments represented different philosophies. The London police believed that they carried the moral authority of the State and for this reason, they neither carried firearms nor used any force while executing their duties. They also regarded their uniform as the legitimate symbol of

their moral authority. New York City police officers were not discouraged from using force against unruly citizens by an alderman “... who stressed obedience and control of the public ...” (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:222).

According to Miller 1977 (Regoli and Hewitt 1996:223), different perceptions regarding the proper role of the police in London and New York City gave rise to the development of different reputations concerning these police departments' treatment of citizens. The public in London were treated civilly and, as a result, they eventually came to respect the police and their authority. “In New York, where the police tended to respond to public distrust with brutality, citizens and the police became openly hostile toward each other, a relationship that continues to exist today” (Miller in Regoli & Hewitt 1996:223).

1.5 SUMMARY

Thus far, the general orientation in this chapter focused on the evolution of the idea of policing since ancient times as it unfolded in Rome, and later in France, Japan and Italy and more recently in England and the United States of America. The researcher further deemed it necessary and appropriate to briefly introduce the reader to the research approach adopted in this study which will be offered in Chapter 2.

What should become clear from the evolutionary development of policing during ancient periods and the Middle Ages, is that it developed in societies where the state achieved a power dominance and police systems were used as the necessary instruments to support and maintain political power of rulers such as emperors, kings and other elite groups. The elite represented those persons in the upper classes of society who, by virtue of their wealth, prestige and power, were protected by the police and kept in their political positions. This development coincided with the notion of the state being the major force of social control through the exercise of its legislative power. This power usually manifested itself in a real physical force such as an army, militia, a police force and even other paraphernalia of social control. Through their task of maintaining social order in cities, police forces were called upon (and required) to protect the interests of these elite groups and by implication, to maintain the *status quo* (Langworthy & Travis 1994:31).

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Following its rapid growth since the late 1980's, the private security industry in South Africa has been increasingly perceived as a major deterrent in crime prevention. However, it has unfortunately also been the subject of criticism from various constituencies like the police, the public and the media. Criticism of the industry have at times been vitriolic, ranging from claims of fraud and corruption to incompetence. Since the introduction of democracy in South Africa in 1994, public policing (SAPS) has also been constantly portrayed by the media as being incapable of preventing crime and securing protection of life and property. This is especially evident in the decline of their efforts to effectively and efficiently respond to serious violations of the law (murder, rape, car-hijacking, armed robbery, and the like) in the wake of an increasing crime rate and continuous escalation of fear of crime levels among the law-abiding citizenry.

Bayley (1994:11) is convinced that: *"In democratic countries all over the world, then, there is a sense of crisis about public safety. And at the center of this crisis are the police who promise to protect us but do not appear to be able to do so"* (italics added).

While visible role-fulfilment in South Africa has apparently disappeared from the everyday crime prevention scene, the public's quest for the increase of the number in police operational resources is equally discouraging, precisely because of financial constraints, dwindling resources (manpower and equipment), corruption among police and other criminal justice practitioners, police involvement in syndicate crime, etc. (Zululand Observer 1999:12). As far back as 1974, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study in the United States has shown, however, that intensified police patrols had no apparent overall impact on crime reduction and, consequently, no correlation has been found between high crime rates and the increase in the number of police (Bayley 1994:11). This author immediately asserts that the essence of the critique of private security relates to governments' apparent inability to effectively maintain public policing

or at least have allowed it to run down. This unfortunate situation is further exacerbated by an equally incompetent range of reactive police strategies such as crime investigation, which is of limited value in bringing perpetrators to justice, and a paralysed judicial system (Broughton 1999:2).

Public police cannot prevent crime alone. In fact, Bayley (1994:1) adamantly states: *"The police do not prevent crime"* (italics added). At least, for too long have they relied upon their own abilities to execute this mandate delegated to them by the public. They need the assistance of the public sector and private security industry within the framework of an integrative approach to honour their constitutional commitments of protecting life and property through crime prevention. Olivier (1997:157) is convinced that private security policing could be fruitfully implemented in any kind of crime prevention initiative, especially as far as crime prevention in the workplace is concerned. There are currently approximately 6,000 active registered private security firms registered with the Security Officers Board (SOB). Accordingly, there are between 150 000 and 160 000 active private security officers, compared to 120 000 public police officers (Security Officers Board 1998/1999; Ewing 1999:53), standing ready to assist in crime prevention. Bayley (1994:11) concludes by saying: "Although the [public] police continue to have legal jurisdiction in such places [shopping malls, convenient stores, commercial banks, office buildings, factories, and the like], tangible protection is increasingly provided by private security guards, who have become the first line of practical defence against crime in much of modern life". They are observable anywhere and everywhere: in convenient stores, shopping malls, parking areas, and the like. Their role-visibility creates the illusion of total omnipresence, satisfying individuals' needs of safety and security.

2.2 RESEARCH APPROACH

According to Van der Westhuizen (1977:2) criminological research has four distinctive objectives, namely:

- ◆ description;
- ◆ explanation;
- ◆ prediction; and

- ♦ control (symbolical) over the incidence and fluctuation of the crime problem.

The research approach in this investigation is *positivistic* in nature. As a subject of epistemology, methodology is the science of finding out, which also constitutes the set of procedures used in the research to process errors of observation, interpretation, false generalizations, dependency on authority and inappropriate use of evidence (Futrell & Roberson 1988:85).

As a further orientation to the present study, an exposition of the research approach followed is also given. This approach includes the research design, aims of the study, as well as the hypotheses formulated for statistical testing. A more detailed exposition of the actual phases of the research process such as data collection, data processing, analysis and statistical explanation are discussed in Chapter 7 and 8.

2.2.1 General scientific approach

Approach in scientific research can be defined as the global view of the (criminological) researcher when studying crime and related phenomena such as urban municipal policing. This approach presupposes a given attitude to the field of study and that of the study object (private security) in general. Attitude in this context refers to the researcher's faith in universality of cause and effect - in other words, the question 'why'? Attitudes also relate to an intense desire to 'know' and the development of fruitful imagination as well as the love for empirical investigation (Van der Walt, Cronje & Smit 1982:163).

The general scientific approach as far as the study of the role of private security in crime prevention is concerned, is consequently positivistic in nature - both in conception and design. Alant, Lamont, Maritz and Van Eeden (1981:199) define positivism as " ... a theory of knowledge based on the assumption that facts exist as inherent attributes to things, that controlled sensory perception is the only way of knowing and that knowledge has as its primary aim the discovery of the laws according to which society (reality) operates".

To Hughes (1980:16), positivistic orthodoxy refers to philosophical epistemology (i.e. the nature of phenomena and the procedures for determining their existence) which represent the intellectual approach in the social sciences. Consequently, this positivistic inclination leans heavily on epistemology which recognises observation as the only means of viewing the “outside world”. Epistemology devotes theory of knowledge, i.e. the ways in which man learns of the existence of “things”, whether it be through observation, discussion, personal experience, etc. It therefore inevitably includes the establishment of truth (Alant *et al.* 1981:197).

In summary then, it could be postulated that epistemology is the theory of knowledge which investigates the nature, origin and bounds of knowledge (Hughes 1980:16). In this regard, Babbie (1989:6) maintains that epistemology is the science of knowing; methodology (a subfield of epistemology) might be called the “science of finding out”. In the present study the researcher implemented the analytical research method, supported by the technique of mass observation.

Ontology, on the other hand, may be defined as a philosophical view of the “world” as it is - in other words, how “things” relate to one another in society (Alant *et al.* 1981:199). Hughes (1980:16) writes: “Claims about what exists in the world almost inevitably lead to issues about how what exists may be known”. Ontology and epistemology are therefore inseparable. Hughes (1980:16) opines: “Quite clearly, ontological issues and epistemological ones are not unconnected”. Ontology deals with the essence of “things”, i.e. with its essential characteristics with a view to determining the basic nature of every “thing” that exists.

Positivism, which is predominantly natural science orientated, regards social reality in which phenomena occur as a unified whole, in that the same methods of study may be applied to all phenomena. Study methods in natural science and social orientations have consequently much in common: both require the same precision and objectivity. In positivism the method of study is extremely important. To the positivist, science refers to a technique or method which promotes the attainment of reliable knowledge of any perceivable phenomenon in the world which may be used for purposes of control and prediction. Other characteristics of positivism are, *inter alia*, the following:

- all directly observable things or facts, together with the correspondences and

relationships between them which may be established through reasoning without exceeding the empirical limits, are regarded as positive. Belief in the sensory perception of empirical phenomena (empiricism) plays a dominant role; and

- positivism aspires to practical knowledge of and control over nature as opposed to the speculation of, for instance, meta-physics.

Positivism has particular significance within the framework of the social sciences, particularly with regard to the study of attitudes and opinions towards a specific referent object (Private Security). The point of departure is that the application of the methods and results of the natural sciences in the field of human relations will ensure a new level of efficiency and order in society, since social problems may be eliminated in this manner (Engelbrecht 1973:27-28).

2.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Having identified the dilemma underlying crime prevention as a proactive policing strategy and the important role private security policing can play in this regard, the proposed study revolves around bridging the gap in our substantive knowledge about private security as a social phenomenon and more specifically, what role it can play in the prevention of crime in South Africa.

The purpose of the proposed study resides therefore, in a careful scientific analysis of the proper role and function of private security policing in crime and fear reduction and the extent to which law abiding citizens and the country as a whole can benefit from it in terms of the safeguarding of life and property.

2.4 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The reason for having chosen the present topic for scientific inquiry revolves around the following aspects:

- ◆ It appears that no previous studies into the role of private security in crime prevention have been undertaken in South Africa in general or in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal in particular.
- ◆ Private security is not a new idea. Since the beginning of society, security has been part of the protection of mankind against threats from nature, creatures and **humans** (Simonsen 1998:1). Persisting risks such as serious crime, criminal victimisation, fear of crime, social disorder, etc. emanating from the latter category and the role contemporary private security can play to protecting human beings and their property against criminal onslaughts, has compelled researcher to undertake this research with the purpose of acquainting people with the dynamics underlying this formidable source of protection.
- ◆ Dwindling public police resources and sub-optimal police service delivery equally contributed towards renewed interest in private security as a social phenomenon.

2.5 STUDY AIMS

The following aims are envisaged for achievement – either by means of theoretical reflection or empirical evidence:

- (1) To record the historical development (evolution) of private security from ancient to modern times – both locally and abroad. To this end, the researcher will rely on the documentary study technique to enable him to capture the historical development of this social entity from ancient times in Egypt, China, etc. to modern developments in other overseas countries as well as in South Africa.
- (2) To effect comparative and descriptive analyses regarding the general nature of the role of private security in contemporary crime prevention from the viewpoints of both the public and private security fraternities. To this end, use will be made of two separate quantifiable questionnaires – one for members of the public (see Annexure 1) and one for private security officers (see Annexure 2).

Specific aims of the study are:

To ascertain whether type of contact, gender, age, race, income, occupation, home ownership and marital status exerted any influence on respondents' perception of:

- (3) The role and functions of private security officers.
- (4) Role characteristics of private security officers.
- (5) Physical security measures designated to eliminating crime opportunities.
- (6) Precautionary measures people usually take to ensure their own safety and protection.

2.6 RESEARCH DESIGN

Whereas science is described as the undertaking of "finding out", research design is dedicated towards addressing the *planning* of scientific inquiry and as such, comprises the strategy for finding out "something" (Babbie 1989:79). In this regard, Kerlinger (1986:279) refers to research design as " ... the *plan* and *structure* of [scientific] investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions". According to this author, the plan embraces the overall scheme or program of the research project being undertaken and includes literally all the phases through which the research process proceeds, namely from the outline of what the researcher intends to do, up to the final analysis of data. The structure, on the other hand, entails the framework or organisation of elements and refer to a paradigm or model of the relations among the variables of the study.

Huysamen (1994:10) opines that the research design serves the purpose of a blueprint " ... according to which data are to be collected to investigate the research hypothesis or question in the most economical manner". The research process also provides a "map" to the remainder of the study being undertaken and clearly underlines the different steps to be followed in designing a study (Babbie 1989:79-80).

The present study represents (a) an historical overview of the development of private security on the globe and then also in South Africa, with specific reference to the role of private security in crime prevention, including a comparative evaluation of the importance of private security to society, (b) an empirical assessment of the public's perceptions of the image of private security and (c) an empirical assessment of private security officers' own perception of their role in crime prevention. To this end, a

properly designed research strategy has been designed to facilitate the operationalisation of variables (see Annexure 1 & 2) in which research participants are involved as respondents.

2.6.1 Research Methods

Research methods are ways in which research work is done in a given field of investigation (Van der Walt 1964:93). A method is the way by which the perceptible general is transformed to tested and systematic theory.

The goal of every research is based on the assumption that all behaviours and events are orderly and that they are effects which have discoverable causes. Research is thus formal, intensive systematic application of the scientific method of the study problem, a systematic attempt to provide answers and questions; and a search for truth (Mqadi 1992:8-9). The scientist in research employs scientific methods in order to explain, predict and control the phenomenon. Through the use of research methods, the researcher can realise the phases of the research process which include the collection of data systematisation, processing and explanation (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:168 – 169).

The choice of a method of research is of the prime importance. The method of research chosen should, however, not lead to bias and the research should not be forced into such a method for the sake of methodology design (Van der Westhuizen 1982:3). According to Fitzgerald and Cox (1987:39), research methods are the specific techniques the researcher uses to implement the plan and collect data.

There are basically three types of research methods in criminological research namely:

- ♦ the method of case analysis;
- ♦ the method of mass observation; and
- ♦ the analytical method.

Although these methods are distinguishable from one another, they do work as complementary methods. Fundamentally the researcher in criminology has the choice of three methods of research.

2.6.1.1 The methods of case analysis

The method of case analysis is an in-depth study of the individual. It is a method used on the *individual-human level* to gain knowledge of and insight into the phenomenon crime and what is associated with it (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:170). The perceptible particulars of a case are studied with the aim of demonstrating the structural or functional factors responsible for its existence (descriptive), determination of its relation to other factors (explanatory), gaining new knowledge and testing the validity of existing knowledge and hypotheses. The case analysis method could, therefore be regarded as a particularistic method (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:170). Bailey (1987:298) points out that the case analysis method allows the researcher to select samples that illustrate the points he or she wishes to make. Thus, the method lends itself to qualitative rather than quantitative analysis.

Quetelet (1797 – 1974) was the first investigator to point out that crime is a social phenomenon which can be explained by analysing data (crime statistics). He also pointed out that one of the most remarkable facts disclosed by crime statistics, is the consistency with which crime in general, and also particular types of crimes, occur annually with the same regularity, and are punished with the same type of punishment. Furthermore, there is a constant relation between crimes investigated and convictions. The proportion of criminals who are not brought to justice because of lack of evidence or because they are not discovered, also remains constant.

Whereas Quetelet applied the method of mass observation (criminal statistics) to explain and predict the crime phenomenon at group level, Lombroso used the case study method to analyse crime as an individual phenomenon (Van der Walt 1964:118). Each of these methods implies a unique and independent approach to the study of crime as a social phenomenon, which normally leads to particularistic findings and pronouncements. Since the criminologist is expected to produce generally valid and acceptable findings and conclusions, criminology as the scientific study of

the crime problem in all its ramification needs its own unique contemporary method of research. The pattern of a typical criminological research method should therefore, leave room for both the group level and the individual approaches to the study of crime and the emphases should be on the achievement of objectives rather on the collection of data. It should also allow ample room for a possible synthesis of the group and the individual research methods and for designing new and expanding existing definitive measuring, data collection and data processing techniques (Van der Westhuizen 1977:2-3).

The collection of statistical material on crime is one of the most common features of criminological research. The criminologist who uses statistical techniques often limits himself to the most elementary of such techniques. Much of his work in this field consists of drawing fairly obvious, though often useful conclusions from the official figures. This is done by calculating percentages from the figures presented to make it easier for the reader to grasp the significance of the conclusions and to follow the crime movements over a period of time. From the official statistics, the researcher can further elaborate the picture given in the official volume, for instance, by determining inter alia, the age and sex ratios of criminals over a given period of years for specific offences thereby laying the foundations for further research (Ndabandaba 1987:5-6).

2.6.1.2 The method of mass observation

Van der Walt *et al.* (1982:174) say:

“ ... A case study is an attempt to define social processes ... whereas the mass observation method provides deeper insight into the social situation by indicating the scope, regularity and degree of associations” (italics added).

The method of mass observation is used when the researcher regards crime as a mass phenomenon. This method is also known as the statistical method. Statistics are indispensable for the criminologist and their value lies at the descriptive level, i.e. description of the nature and extent of crime. Statistics serve an important function at the applicative level for control purposes (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:172-174).

2.6.1.3 The analytical method

According to Van der Westhuizen (1977:3) the analytical method is –

“ ... a scientifically planned way of research that can be used as a method in criminology to transform the scientifically knowable to science after the study object, the research technique used and the goal to be reached in the investigation have been placed in criminological perspective”.

This research method is used when the researcher observes crime as a combination of individual-human and social (mass) phenomena. This method is “unrelated” and non-particularistic in application. By implementing the analytical method, the case analysis and mass observation methods become techniques of the analytical method (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:174–175). The analytical research method meets all the above-mentioned requirements and, with a view of establishing and securing the identity of criminology, it should be applied as frequently as possible (Van der Westhuizen 1977:3).

Van der Westhuizen (1977: 3–4) identified four general functions of the analytical method :

- ◆ **Goal-achievement function** - It is goal-directed and makes provision for descriptive analyses using descriptive techniques; explanatory analyses using explanatory techniques; and applicative analyses using prediction and control techniques.
- ◆ **Adaptive function** – Because the analytical method is committed to the various objectives of an investigation (and thus also of generalisations and theories), the researcher can right from the outset lay down a meaningful relationship between fact and theory.
- ◆ **Integrative function** – The analytical method is non-particularistic. It enables the investigator to adopt a neutral position and enables him/her to study the crime phenomenon on both group and individual-human level, thereby rendering the opportunity of synthesising the analyses into comprehensive generalisations and systematic theories.

- ♦ ***Pattern maintenance function*** – The analytical method respects and preserves recognised methodological principles and approved techniques of description, explanation, prediction and control, and yet leaves ample room for change, technical refinement and innovation. The two most widely accepted prediction techniques in criminology are categorisation and extrapolation. Both techniques can be implemented for predicting group or individual behaviour (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:4).

The present study into private security employs the analytical research method. The implementation of this method allows the researcher to either employ the individual-human (case study method) or the group (observation method) approaches or both. Mass observation will be implemented and put into practice as a statistical technique to the analytical research method. The choice for having implemented this statistical technique resides in its ability to analyse, describe, interpret (explanation) and apply mass information (data) pertaining to crime prevention and private security.

2.6.2 Research procedure

The research procedure followed in the present scientific inquiry is based upon the development and construction of a questionnaire as data capturing instrument. The present study therefore represents the researcher's need to facilitate factual information gathering from people (respondents) who are knowledgeable of and have a vested interest in the role of private security in crime prevention (as an alternative form of crime control next to public policing).

The data collection phase commenced in July 2001 and was fully completed at the end of September 2001. Questionnaires in respect of members of the public were distributed by trained field workers, while those intended for private security officers were distributed by various private security companies in KwaZulu-Natal. Individuals who willingly acted as field workers were sensitised to avoid involving themselves in interviewing respondents – primarily to eliminate possible personal influence. They were, therefore, only limited to distributing and collecting completed questionnaires. Only in some individual cases were field workers allowed to clarify uncertainties relating to the completion of questionnaires. Respondents were requested by field workers to place their completed questionnaires in empty envelopes provided for this

purpose and to seal it. Researcher personally collected the completed questionnaires from field workers at predetermined collecting points. A usable response rate of 95,25% in respect of public questionnaires and 93,50% in respect of security officers' questionnaires have been achieved (see Table 2.11 for detailed account of expected and observed frequency distributions in respect of both public and private security questionnaires).

2.6.3 Research techniques

Research techniques are aids in scientific research methods. According to Cilliers (1967:59), techniques are used by the social scientist to enable him or her to observe phenomena that cannot be satisfactory observed by the senses alone.

Techniques used in research are chosen or designed by the researcher with the sole purpose of securing valid data. This means that the technique(s) used must be reliable, i.e. they must produce the same measurement upon repeated testing, and must be valid, i.e. the results the techniques produce must be applicable to other populations under the same or different conditions. Techniques in social research are subsidiary to research methods. Different types of techniques can be used jointly and supplement each other.

Documentary study techniques are also known as literature study techniques. These are important to any research, for the researcher must be aware of the activities of other past researchers in the same field of study (Leedy 1980:69).

Documentary sources include books, reports, scientific articles in periodicals, diaries, biographies, auto-biographies and other unpublished material (Van der Walt *et al.* 1982:212-214).

The review of existing literature may prove beneficial for various reasons:

- ◆ To reveal similar investigations and show how collateral researchers have handled them.
- ◆ It can reveal the sources of data that may not have known before.
- ◆ Provides new ideas and assist in evaluating ideas of other researchers.

- ◆ Enables the researcher to view his or her study in historical and associative perspective (Leedy 1985:66).

The purpose of documentary study is two-fold. It serves as an aid to scientific study to broaden knowledge as a criterion in studying social phenomena and to verify knowledge acquired. The documented material utilised in this study is listed in alphabetical order in the bibliographical section of this thesis.

2.6.3.1 Questionnaire

In the construction and development of suitable questionnaires – one for the public and one for private security – use was made of precoded, closed-structured questions; the reason for this step being (Bailey 1987:118):

- ◆ Comparison of and between responses is simplified.
- ◆ Coding of responses and subsequent analysis of data are made easier.
- ◆ Closed-ended questions are clear and to the point, leaving little or no room for omissions and speculation.
- ◆ Closed-ended, structured questions require no writing, but only marking of responses with a tick or a cross which makes it easier to fill in a questionnaire.

The questionnaire for public respondents was developed in order to obtain information relating to the following constructs:

Section A: Demographic characteristics of respondents

In an attempt to elicit information about these characteristics, the following independent or predictor variables were included in this questionnaire:

- ◆ gender (1=male, 2=female);
- ◆ age group (1=under 20 years, 2=20-29 years, 3=30-39 years, 4=40-49 years, 5=50-59 years, 6=60-69 years, 7=70 years and above);
- ◆ race (1=Black, 2=White, 3=Coloured, 4=Asian, 5=Other);

- ◆ language group (1=Zulu, 2=Sotho, 3=Xhosa, 4=Swazi, 5=Afrikaans, 6=English, 7=European language, 8=Eastern language, 9=Other);
- ◆ annual income (1=less than R20 000, 2=R21 000-R30 000, 3=R31 000-R50 000, 4=R51 000-R75 000, 5=R76 000-R100 000, 6=R101 000-R125 000, 7=R126 000-R150 000, 8=R151 000 and above, 9=not applicable);
- ◆ occupation (1=unemployed, 2=semi-skilled / skilled labourer, 3=professional worker, 4=technical worker, 5=businessman / sales worker, 6=administrative, 7=banking, 8=student / scholar, 9=service worker, 10=armed forces, 11=agricultural worker, 12=self-employed, 13=pensioner, 14=other);
- ◆ type of housing (1=own house, 2=rented house, 3=own flat / duplex / simplex, 4=rented flat / duplex / simplex, 5=alternative housing, 6=other);
- ◆ place where respondent stays (1=city, 2=town, 3=rural area, 4=exclusive farming community, 5=other);
- ◆ marital status (1=married, 2=widowed, 3=divorced, 4=separated, 5=never married).

Section B: Functional dimensions of private security

Functions of private security officers were measured by means of five variables:

- ◆ type of contact with private security officers (var. 11);
- ◆ whether private security is necessary in society (var. 12);
- ◆ importance of the private security function (var. 13);
- ◆ presence of private security and human rights (var. 14);
- ◆ obligation to prevent crime (var. 15).

Section C: Importance of private security

Based on a 7-point Likert-type measuring scale, the following issues were included in this questionnaire:

Street patrolling (var. 16), response to electronic alarms (var. 17), protection of life and property at specific locations (var. 18), daily transporting of prisoners between courts and prisons (var. 19), investigation of crime (var. 20), transporting money (var. 21), surveillance in marked vehicles (var. 22), providing security / protection at private dwellings (var. 23), access control (var. 24), protecting police stations (var. 25), arresting of law violators (var. 26), law enforcement (var. 27), educating society in crime (var. 28), settling of domestic quarrels (var. 29), guarding services (var. 30).

Section D: Characteristics of private security officers

Public perceptions of the following characteristics were deemed necessary and relevant:

Friendliness (var. 31), helpfulness (var. 32), courteousness (var. 33), rudeness (var. 34), lack of knowledge and insight (var. 35), competency (var. 36), interestedness (var. 37), cheekiness (var. 38).

Section E: Crime prevention and the role of private security

Measures to enhance crime prevention included the following: visible presence of private security officers (var. 39), closed-circuit television (var. 40), security signboards at premises (var. 41), distribution of information (var. 42), stationary surveillance (var. 43), creation of a culture (var. 44), "car-safe" projects (var. 45), armoured escorting of money (var. 46), omnipresence of private security officers (var. 47).

Evaluation of the role of private security in crime prevention were operationalised as follows: more power for private security officers (var. 48), inadequate training (var. 49), incompetency of private security officers (var. 50), carelessness (var. 51), private security is only for the "rich" (var. 52), private security should play a more significant role (var. 53), private security is as important as that of the SA Police Service (var. 54), important role (var. 55), involvement in community police forums (var. 56), prioritised training and education (var. 57), greater co-operation (var. 58), code of conduct (var. 59), uniformed basic style training (var. 60), social standing in society (var. 61).

Section F: Dimensions of crime prevention

An index of sixteen crime prevention measures were created as follows: kept doors locked during night (var. 62), kept doors locked during day and night (var. 63), acquisition of guard dog (var. 64), installation of electronic alarm system (var. 65), installation of outside lights (var. 66), installation of door locks (var. 67), installation of burglar proofing (var. 68), record keeping of valuables (var. 69), installation of security warning lights (var. 70), radio / TV / lights left on (var. 71), erection of concrete walls (var. 72), acquisition of private security company (var. 73), acquisition of a fire-arm (var. 74), neighbour on the look-out (var. 75), target hardening (var. 76), other (var. 77).

The questionnaire for private security officers has been developed more or less in similar fashion as the one for the public:

Section A: Demographic “make-up” of private security respondents

In an attempt to elicit information about these characteristics, the following independent or predictor variables were included in this questionnaire:

- ♦ age group (1=under 20 years, 2=20-25 years, 3=26-30 years, 4=31-35 years, 5=36-40 years, 6=41-45 years, 7=46-50 years, 8=51 and above);
- ♦ race (1=Black, 2=White, 3=Coloured, 4=Asian, 5=Other);
- ♦ gender (1=male, 2=female);
- ♦ language (1=Afrikaans, 2=English, 3=Nguni, 4=Sotho, 5=Other);
- ♦ marital status (1=married, 2=widowed, 3=divorced, 4=separated, 5=never married);
- ♦ annual income (1=less than R20 000, 2=R21 000-R30 000, 3=R31 000-R40 000, 4=R41 000-R50 000, 5=R51 000-R75 000, 6=R76 000-R100 000, 7=R101 000-R125 000, 8=R126 000-R150 000, 9=R151 000 and above);
- ♦ present position in private security industry (1=owner / manager, 2=director / CEO, 3=consultant, 4=technical worker, 5=financial advisor, 6=administrative, 7=security officer Grade A, 8=security officer Grade B, 9=security officer Grade C, 10=security officer Grade D, 11=security officer Grade E, 12=security

manager, 13=tertiary campus, 14=general supervisor, 15=training officer, 16=other);

- ◆ how long in private security (1=less than 5 years, 2=5-10 years, 3=11-15 years, 4=16-20 years, 5=21-30 years, 6=more than 30 years);
- ◆ served in any forces (var. 10=SA Police before 1994, var. 11=SA Police Service after 1994, var. 12=SA Police before and after 1994, var. 13=military, var. 14=military police, var. 15=railway and harbour police, var. 16=customs and excise, var. 17=Durban city police, var. 18=municipal police, var. 19=other);

Section B: Necessity of private security industry

Necessity of the private security industry was measured by means of three variables:

- ◆ whether private security is necessary in society (var. 20);
- ◆ importance of private security in society (var. 21);
- ◆ presence of private security and human rights (var. 22);

Section C: Importance of private security officers functions

Based on a 5-point Likert-type measuring scale, the following issues were included in this questionnaire:

Street patrolling (var. 23), response to electronic alarms (var. 24), crime prevention (var. 25), protection of life and property at specific locations (var. 26), investigation of crime (var. 27), transporting of money (var. 28), observation duties (var. 29), service delivery to the community (var. 30), access control (var. 31), protecting police stations (var. 32), arresting of law violators (var. 33), law enforcement (var. 34), educating society in crime (var. 35), settling of domestic quarrels (var. 36).

Section D: Characteristics of private security officers

Private security officers' perceptions of the following characteristics were deemed necessary and relevant:

Friendliness (var. 37), helpfulness (var. 38), courteousness (var. 39), rudeness (var. 40), lack of knowledge and insight (var. 41), competency (var. 42), uninterestedness (var. 43), cheekiness (var. 44).

Section E: Crime prevention and the role of private security

Measures to enhance crime prevention included the following: visible presence of private security officers (var. 45), closed-circuit television (var. 46), security signboards (var. 47), distribution of information (var. 48), stationary surveillance (var. 49), creation of a culture (var. 50), “car-safe” projects (var. 51), armoured escorting of money (var. 52), omnipresence of private security officers (var. 53).

Evaluation of the role of private security in crime prevention were operationalised as follows: more power for private security officers (var. 54), inadequate training (var. 55), incompetency of private security officers (var. 56), carelessness (var. 57), elitist enterprise (var. 58), significant role in policing matters (var. 59), as important as the SA Police Service (var. 60), important role in society (var. 61), private security officers involvement in community police forums (var. 62), prioritised training and education (var. 63), greater co-operation with the SA Police Service (var. 64), social standing in society (var. 65), public confidence in SA Police Service (var. 66), classification as peace officers (var. 67), code of conduct (var. 68), classification of “car-safe” guards (var. 69), more powers than ordinary private citizens (var. 70), regulation of proprietary security (var. 71), introduction of public complaints procedure (var. 72), subjection to proper fire-arms training (var. 73), education regarding crime in society (var. 74), education regarding crime prevention programs (var. 75), success of private security in crime prevention (var. 76).

2.6.3.2 Scales of measurement

Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992:153) concede that social science researchers often measure indications of concepts e.g. patrolling, protection of life and property, investigation of crime, etc. as functions performed by private security officers. These indicators (or variables) must have numerals or numbers substituted for the value of the indicators, to allow quantitative analysis of responses. This promotes the different scales

of measurement. Example, a *nominal scale* implies a set of objects which can be classified into exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories such as gender (male or female, age group, marital status, income, and the like. An *ordinal scale* shows a relationship (or a difference) between variables and can be ordered or ranked. Likert-type scales are most commonly used ordinal scales (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1992:153; Neuman & Wiegand 2000:141). *Interval scales* measures everything the first two scales do and also measure the constant distance between observations. *Ratio scales* are capable of performing everything all the other scales do, and have neutral (true) zero point making it possible to state relations in terms of proportions or ratios (Neuman and Wiegand 2000:142). To ensure that no errors in measurement occur, techniques can be used to measure the validity and reliability of the measuring instrument (questionnaires) – (see Annexures 1 and 2).

**TABLE 2.1 SCALE ONE : VARIMAX ROTATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY FUNCTIONS – PUBLIC SURVEY (N=381)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
Investigation of crime	.87*	.14	.2
Daily transporting of prisoners	.74*	.11	.5
Arresting of law violators	.73*	.32	.9
Enforcement of law	.73*	.31	.17
Educating society regarding crime	.67*	.16	.36
Protection of police stations	.61*	.2	.50*
Surveillance in marked vehicles	.52 *	.42*	.9
Protection of life & property	.6	.86*	.13
Rapid response to alarms	.21	.77*	.3
Transporting money	.33	.70*	.3
Patrolling of streets & neighbourhoods	.16	.69*	.31
Providing security at private dwellings	.3	.64*	.49*
Guarding private homes / VIP's	.5	.30	.80*

Settlement of domestic quarrels	.56*	-.5	.63*
Regulating public access control	.19	.53*	.54*

* Flagged values greater than 0.4

Table 2.1 presents factor-analytic results for the variables relating to private security functions, using principal-components factoring and a varimax rotation. The procedure identifies three different factors with no substantial overlapping. The factors are:

◆ *proactive/reactive functions –*

investigation of crime (.87); daily transporting of prisoners (.74); apprehending perpetrators (.73); law enforcement functions (.73); educating the community regarding crime and crime prevention (.67); protection of police stations (.61) and surveillance in marked vehicles (.52).

◆ *safety and security functions –*

protection of life and property (.86); rapid response to alarms (.77); transporting money in armoured vehicle (.70); patrolling of streets and neighbourhoods (.69) and providing security at private dwellings (.64) and surveillance in marked vehicles (.42).

◆ *remote functions –*

guarding private houses / VIP's (.80); settlement of domestic quarrels (.63); regulating public access control to buildings (.54) and providing security at private dwellings (.49).

**TABLE 2.2 SCALE TWO : VARIMAX ROTATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS – PUBLIC SURVEY (N=381)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2
Courteousness	.84*	-.20
Friendliness	.83*	-.20
Helpfulness	.81*	-.22
Interestedness	.79*	-.6
Competency	.73*	-.7
Rudeness	-.24	.84*
Cheekiness	-.9	.83*
Lack of knowledge and insight	-.2	.81*

Table 2.2 reports the results of a principal-components varimax rotation of selected characteristics private security officers usually display (or may display) in their daily contact with either their clientele or the public generally. Two factors emerged from this procedure:

♦ *positive personal qualities -*

courteousness (.84); friendliness (.83); helpfulness (.81); interestedness (.79) and competency (.73).

♦ *negative personal qualities -*

rudeness (.84); cheekiness (.83) and lack of knowledge and insight necessary to perform their job (.81).

Likewise, public respondents also reject statements of private security officers being rude (-.24); cheeky (-.9) and lack of knowledge and insight necessary to perform their job (-.2) when dealing with their clientele or the public.

**TABLE 2.3 SCALE THREE : VARIMAX OF SECURITY MEASURES TO
IMPROVE CRIME PREVENTION – PUBLIC SURVEY (N=381)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR1	FACTOR2
Creating a culture of crime awareness	.76*	-.43
Stationary surveillance	.74*	-.28
Distributing information about crime	.72*	-.44
Omnipresence of private security	.70*	-.34
“Car-safe” projects in parking areas	.69*	.37
Safe escorting of money in armoured vehicles	.66*	.16
Closed-circuit television in business places	.65*	.17
Visible presence of private security guards	.63*	.44*
Security signboards of private security company	.61*	.55*

* Flagged value greater than 0.4

A varimax rotation of nine variable-index defining private security measures in crime prevention produced only one factor with scores ranging from .76 to .61 percent. All these variables show an aggregate mean average of $X=1.55$. The homogeneous nature of measuring scale 3 clearly shows that private security respondents are in collective agreement that these measures do in fact play a role in crime prevention (Table 2.3).

**TABLE 2.4 SCALE FOUR : VARIMAX ROTATION OF THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS – PUBLIC SURVEY (N=381)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3
Private security officers should be granted More power and authority under the law	.82*	.3	.1
Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Services	.82*	.8	.8
They play an important role in the Upholding of law and order in society	.81*	-.8	.7
Private security should play a more Significant role in public police matters	.78*	.4	.15
Private security officers should be actively Involved in Community Police forums	.66*	-.6	.37
There should be greater co-operation Between the SAPS and Private Security Industry as far as safety and security is Concerned	.63*	-.4	.44*
They do not care about the interest of the Public	-.1	.87*	.2
Private security officers are incompetent	.4	.83*	.9
Private security officers are not properly and Adequately trained for their job	.5	.78*	.9
Private security is only for the "rich"	-.9	.72*	.22
Private security officers should be guided By a code of conduct	.7	.10	.84*

All private security officers should be	.14	.13	.78*
Subject to uniform, basic style of training			
Academic training and education for	.23	.18	.62*
Security officers should be prioritised			

*Flagged value greater than 0.4

Table 2.4 clearly shows that principal components factoring and a varimax rotation resulted in the emergence of two prominent factors:

- ◆ *Factor 1 : Private security officers` role in society.* Four variables loaded fairly high on this factor, namely: private security officers should be granted more power and authority under the law (.82); their job is as important as that of public police officers, such as the SA Police Service (.82); play an important role in the upholding and maintenance of law and order in society (.81); and finally, they should play a more significant role in public policing matters (usually undertaken by the SAPS) (.78).
- ◆ *Factor 2 : Incompetence among private security officers.* Four variables loaded fairly high on this factor: public respondents feel that some of the private security officers do not care about the interest of the public (.87); still show signs of incompetence when executing their job (.83); the reasons for this may be improper and inadequate training (.71) and finally, that private security is only for the “rich” (.72).
- ◆ *Factor 3 : Regulating of private security officers.* Three variables loaded fairly high on this factor: public respondents opine that private security officers be guided by a proper Code of Conduct in the daily execution of their task (.84); all private security should be subject to uniform, basic style of training (.78) and that academic training and education be prioritised for private security officers (.62).

**TABLE 2.5 SCALE ONE : VARIMAX ROTATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY FUNCTIONS – SECURITY SURVEY (N=374)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
Enforcement of law	.75*	.4	.28
Patrolling of streets & neighbourhoods	.67*	.14	-.8
Arresting of law violators	.64*	.24	.23
Service delivery to community	.61*	.26	.18
Educating society regarding crime	.54	.31	.29
Crime prevention	.52	.51*	-.6
Transporting money	-.7	.75*	.34
Rapid response to alarms	.34	.69*	-.25
Protection of life & property	.38	.68*	.14
Surveillance in marked vehicles	.31	.53	.42
Regulating public access control	.34	.51	.22
Settlement of domestic quarrels	.8	-.7	.77*
Protection of police stations	.18	.23	.72*
Investigation of crime	.22	.45	.54*

* Flagged values greater than 0.4

Table 2.5 presents factor-analytic results for the variables relating to private security functions, using principal-components factoring and a varimax rotation. The procedure identifies three different factors with no substantial overlapping. The factors are:

♦ *proactive reactive functions –*

law enforcement functions (.75); patrolling (.67); apprehending perpetrators (.64) and service rendering to the community (.61).

♦ *safety and security functions –*

Crime prevention (.51); transporting money (.75); rapid response to alarm systems (.69) and protection of life and property (.68).

♦ *remote functions -*

settlement of domestic quarrels (.77); protection of police stations (.72) and crime investigation.

**TABLE 2.6 SCALE TWO : VARIMAX ROTATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS – SECURITY SURVEY
(N=374)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2
Helpfulness	.84*	.30
Courteousness	.81*	.32
Friendliness	.78*	.42
Competency	.39	.18
Rudeness	-.61*	.31
Cheekiness	-.65*	.35
Lack of knowledge and insight	-.44	.63*
Uninterestedness	-.37	.61*

* Flagged values greater than 0.4

Table 2.6 reports the results of a principal-components varimax rotation of selected characteristics private security officers usually display (or may display) in their daily contact with either their clientele or the public generally. Two factors emerged from this procedure:

♦ *positive personal qualities -*

helpfulness (.84); courteousness (.81) and friendliness (.78).

♦ *negative personal qualities -*

lack of knowledge and insight necessary to perform their job (.63) and uninterestedness when dealing with matters relating to their clientele or the general public (.61).

Likewise, private security respondents also reject statements of them being rude (-.61) and cheeky (-.65) when dealing with their clientele or the public.

**TABLE 2.7 SCALE THREE : VARIMAX ROTATION OF SECURITY
MEASURES TO IMPROVE CRIME PREVENTION –
SECURITY SURVEY (N=374)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1
Distributing information about crime	.75*
"Car-safe" projects in parking areas	.74*
Creating a culture of crime awareness	.73*
Stationary surveillance	.71*
Security signboards of private security company	.70*
Visible presence of private security guards	.67*
Omnipresence of private security	.65*
Closed-circuit television in business places	.62*
Safe escorting of money in armoured vehicles	.59*

*Flagged values greater than 0.4

A varimax rotation of nine variable-index defining private security measures in crime prevention produced only one factor with scores ranging from .75 to .59 percent. All

these variables show an aggregate mean average of $X=1.75$. The homogeneous nature of measuring scale 3 clearly shows that private security respondents are in collective agreement that these measures do in fact play a role in crime prevention (Table 2.7).

TABLE 2.8 **SCALE FOUR : VARIMAX ROTATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY OFFICERS' ROLE IN SOCIETY – SECURITY
SURVEY (N=374)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2
They play an important role in the Upholding of law and order	.78*	.4
Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Services	.77*	.9
Private security officers should be actively Involved in Community Police Forums	.71*	.8
Private security should play a more Significant role in public police matters	.70*	.9
There should be greater co-operation Between the SAPS and Private Security Industry as far as safety and security is Concerned	.69*	.19
Academic training and education for Security officers should be prioritised	.67*	.10
Private security officers should be granted More power and authority under the law	.48*	.11
Private security officers are incompetent	-.17	.77*
They do not care about the interest of the Public	-.28	.73*

Private security officers are not properly and Adequately trained for their job	- .19	.71*
Private security is only for the "rich"	-.2	.62*

Flagged values greater than 0.4

Table 2.8 clearly shows that principal components factoring and a varimax rotation resulted in the emergence of two prominent factors:

- ◆ *Factor 1 : Private security officers' role in society.* Four variables loaded fairly high on this factor, namely: private security officers play an important role in the upholding and maintenance of law and order in society (.78); they value their job as important as that of public police officers, such as the SA Police Service (.77); they should actively involve themselves in the activities of their local CPF's to keep abreast with contemporary issues, etc. (.71); and finally, they feel they should play a more significant role in public policing matters (.70) such as patrolling beaches to safeguard holiday-makers, adopting and patrolling neighbourhoods, participating in surveillance duties, and the like.
- ◆ *Factor 2 : Incompetence among private security officers.* Three variables loaded fairly high on this factor: private security respondents feel that some of their colleagues still show signs of incompetence when executing their job (.77); that this perception is apparently the result of some private security officers still being ignorant of the interests of the public (.73) and finally, the reasons for this may be improper and inadequate training (.71).

**TABLE 2.9 SCALE FIVE : VARIMAX ROTATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY REGULATION – SECURITY SURVEY (N=374)**

VARIABLES	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3
Training in how to prevent crime (risk)	.80*	-.32	-.17
Proper fire-arm training necessary	.78*	-.27	-.18
Training in etiology of crime necessary	.71*	-.37	-.5
Be classified as “peace officers”	.68*	.20	-.27
Proper Code of Conduct needed	.62*	-.21	-.6
Complaints procedure necessary to Enhance accountability	.57*	-.11	.52*
More legal power for security	.56*	.47*	.2
Proprietary security also to be regulated In terms of the law	.51*	-.5	.36
Doing much better job than SA Police Service	.37	.61*	-.5
Public lost confidence in police	.47*	.51*	-.32
Car-safe guards not to be treated as Private security officers	.32	.27	.67*

* Flagged values greater than 0.4

Three factors were formed with a varimax rotation of eleven variables:

- ◆ *Factor 1 : Regulation of private security.* Eight variables grouped together to form factor 1 with values well above 40 percent. According to Table 7.61, these are: training in how to prevent crime (.80); proper firearms training (.78); training in etiology of crime (causes and consequences) (.71); classified as peace officers (.68); proper code of conduct (.62); complaints procedure (.57); more legal powers (.56); proprietary security guards also to be regulated (.51); and although on a

lower level correlation, the prevailing perception that the public lost confidence in public police (.47).

- ◆ *Factor 2 : Tendency towards "privatisation"*. Two variables loaded well above the 0.4 cut-off point, namely: security doing a much better job than public police (.61), most probably because the public have lost confidence in members of the SA Police Service as far as crime prevention is concerned (.51).
- ◆ *Factor 3 : Car-guards*. Although private security respondents showed a high appreciation for the services rendered by car-guards (.74) in parking lots at (mainly) shopping malls (see scale 3), the general feeling among respondents is that these individuals should not be treated as **full-fledged private security officers** (.67). It appears, though, that this perception does not distract from the possibility to have car-guards **registered** in terms of and **regulated** by statutory legislation. The corresponding mean average equals $X=1.22$ (Table 2.9).

2.6.3.3 Cronbach's Individual Alpha Item Analysis

Another popular measure of internal consistency usually used by researchers is Cronbach's Individual Alpha Item Analysis (Carmines & Zeller 1979:44). An alpha analysis attempts to find those items that form an internally consistent scale and to eliminate those that do not. Internal consistency is a measurable property of items (variables or statements) that implies they measure the same construct. It reflects the extent to which such items inter-correlate with one another. The item analysis provides information on how well each item relates to the other items of analysis. This is reflected by the item-remainder coefficient calculated for each item. The item-remainder coefficient is the correlation of each item with the sum of the remaining items. Those items with the highest coefficients are retained. Coefficient *Alpha* is a measure then of the internal consistency (validity) of a scale. A widely accepted rule of thumb accepted among most researchers (Spector 1001:32) is that *Alpha* should be 0.70 for a scale to demonstrate internal consistency.

➤ **Internal consistency of two measuring instruments**

In an attempt to ascertain whether both questionnaires (Annexure A and B) showed any internal consistency, four sets of data (variables) for each measuring instrument were *factor analysed* in order to establish whether they behaved in a valid and reliable manner in measuring what they were actually intended to measure. The results of the various factor scales identified by this inferential statistical technique were presented in Tables 2.1 to 2.4 in respect of public respondents and Tables 2.5 to 2.9 in respect of private security officers. (see Annexure 5 - 11).

However, for convenience, summaries of the relevant validity scales are presented below in Table 2.10:

TABLE 2.10

**SUMMARY OF FACTOR ANALYTIC SCALE VALIDITY I.R.O. TWO POPULATIONS : PUBLIC (N=381) AND
PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374) RESPONDENTS**

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS				PRIVATE SECURITY RESPONDENTS			
SCALE	N	RAW VARIABLE	STANDARD VARIABLE	SCALE	N	RAW VARIABLE	STANDARD VARIABLE
Crime prevention functions	381	0.895704	0.904019	Crime prevention functions	374	0.852156	0.868391
Characteristics	381	0.570513	0.598529	Characteristics	374	0.296794	0.306165
Security measures in crime Prevention	381	0.854893	0.858196	Security measures in crime prevention	374	0.853392	0.858438
Role of private security Officers in society	381	0.840237	0.857579	Role of private security officers in society	374	0.643567	0.692940
				Private security regulation	374	0.777094	0.809713

2.6.3.4 Frequency distributions

In the data description phase statistical information is usually described by means of percentages and raw scores (indicated as N), arithmetic mean, standard deviation, etc. primarily to reduce data into quantifiable, but manageable proportions. Descriptive statistics therefore, firstly become indispensable when interrelationships between two or more variables become necessary and secondly, it enables the researcher to infer properties of a population on the basis of sample results, i.e. inferential statistics (Van Velzen 1998:84-85). In other words, descriptive statistics describe the perceptible characteristics of a sample on the relationship among variables in a sample (Babbie 1989:63).

Following the coding of data, *frequency distributions* of such data becomes necessary to examine the pattern of responses to each of the independent and dependent variables included in the data measuring instrument (questionnaire). Frequency distributions consist of the number of responses in a subset of data (expressed as n) as well as their corresponding percentages (%) which are given to the nearest decimal and totals equalling exactly 100 percent. Apart from demographic variables, the following scales which have been arbitrarily developed in respect of both questionnaires will be analysed and described in terms of frequency distributions:

Public's questionnaire

- (a) Scale 1: Functions of private security officers (vars. 16-30).
- (b) Scale 2: Characteristics of private security officers (vars. 31-38).
- (c) Scale 3: Measures to improve crime prevention (vars. 39-47).
- (d) Scale 4: Role of private security officers (vars. 48-61).

Private security officers' questionnaire

- (a) Scale 1: Functions of private security (vars. 23-36).
- (b) Scale 2: Characteristics of private security officers (vars. 37-44).
- (c) Scale 3: Measures to improve crime prevention (vars. 45-53).
- (d) Scale 4: Role of private security officers (vars. 54-64).
- (e) Scale 5: Regulation of private security officers (vars. 67-76).

Statistical techniques are basically techniques by which certain characteristics or qualities of a phenomenon are quantified, processed, and condensed with the object of constructing a numerical description or a statistical picture of that phenomenon (Van der Westhuizen 1982:80). Statistical techniques are broadly divided into descriptive and inferential statistics.

2.6.3.5 Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient (ρ)

Spearman rank order correlation coefficient or Spearman's ρ (symbolised by r sub s) is usually employed as an appropriate **measure of relationship** for data arranged in **ordinal** fashion. In ordinal level measurement, numerical values are allocated to specific traits or characteristics of people, things or phenomena in rank order or hierarchical format (Van der Westhuizen 1977:95; Hagan 2000:394). The measure which allows a researcher to assess the extent of the relationship between two variables, is called the **correlation coefficient**. It simultaneously reflects the strength and the direction of an established relationship between two variables as well as the degree to which one variable predicts another (Van Velzen 1998:86).

In the present study, the samples are assumed to be large enough to apply ρ . Reaves (1992:316) points out that a correlation is a number (or value) between -1.0 and $+1.0$, that describes the strength and direction of the relation between two variables. If the coefficient is zero, then there is no relation. If it is positive, it means that the two variables go in the same direction. If it is negative, it means the variables go in the opposite direction.

2.6.3.6 Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation (r)

Pearson's r is perhaps the most common correlation coefficient and is generally implemented when a researcher wants to rely on a very powerful coefficient that will find relations usually missed by other correlation's – as long as they are “straight-line” relations between two parametric (interval or ratio) variables (Bailey 1987:402; Reaves 1992:316).

The r statistic is interpreted in a similar way as Spearman's ρ . The following explanation for the magnitude of the relationship between variables has been given by Vito, Latessa and Wilson 1988:36-37):

- ◆ If the correlation coefficient is less than 0.20, the relationship is slight to negligible.
- ◆ If the correlation coefficient is between 0.20 and 0.40, the relationship is small but definite.
- ◆ If the correlation coefficient is between 0.40 and 0.70, the relationship is moderate and substantive.
- ◆ If the correlation coefficient is between 0.70 and 0.90, the relationship is high and strong.
- ◆ If the correlation coefficient is 0.90, the relationship is high and dependable.

2.6.3.7 Chi-square

Chi-square could be used, firstly, as a *descriptive statistic* because it is a test of the strength of the association between two variables (Neuman & Wiegand 2000:305) as well as a test of the independence of the relationship between nominal variables (Hagan 2000:275). Chi-square is also widely used as a powerful way to determine significance in difference between two variables measured at ordinal level, as well as a precise way of establishing whether an association in a bivariate percentaged table exists. Secondly, as an *inferential statistic*, chi-square “... tells us the probability that any association we find is likely to be due to chance factors” (Neuman & Wiegand 2000:305).

2.6.3.8 Data collection technique

Fitzgerald and Cox (1987:89) identify three basic techniques for gathering information, namely direct observation, communication with others about what they have observed and learnt from recorded sources. For data collection, questionnaires (see Annexure 1 & 2) were used as an instrument for the collection of data. Along with these questionnaires, researcher also devised a coding sheet (see Annexure 3 & 4), which was used to transfer data from the questionnaires on to it for easy and convenient loading onto the computer. The SAS-programme was used for data analysis which was undertaken and executed by the University of South Africa's (UNISA) Department of

Computer Services during December 2001.

2.6.4 Research Delimitation

2.6.4.1 Spatial delimitation

The delimitation of the area in an exploratory research of this nature is very important to ensure that it provides fertile ground to measure the attitudes and opinions of respondents and, likewise, which would elicit a more or less balanced stratum for the assessment of the variables contained in the measuring instrument – (see Annexure 1 & 2).

The present investigation is, therefore, confined to the Province of KwaZulu-Natal which was divided into four areas (see Annexure 12) namely -

- Durban Metropole (Umhlanga in the North, Amamzintoti in the South and Pine Town in the West form the borders).
- South Coast (Coastal region from Warner Beach / Doonside to Port Edward).
- North Coast (Coastal region from Ballito to Kosi Bay).
- Midlands (Pietermaritzburg in the East, Vryheid in the North, Kokstad in the South and Newcastle in the West).

The above-mentioned demarcation was done so that the area of choice will provide a variety of information from which important general deductions for use in comparative studies, can be made (Makibelo 1995:9).

2.6.4.2 Qualitative delimitation

Qualitative delimitation entails the nominal reduction of a given universe or population in terms of " ... certain characteristics (qualities) which are present or absent in each member" (Van der Westhuizen 1977:39). In the present study the following qualities were utilised to depict the demographic "make-up" of the sample group: gender (var 2), age (var 3) and ethnic group (var 4) – (see Annexure 1 – public questionnaire) and age

(var 2), ethnic group (var 3) and gender (var 4) – (see Annexure 2 – private security questionnaire). To meet the requirements of qualitative delimitation, male and female participants from all four ethnic groups, viz. African, Indian, Coloured and White race groups, were included in the present study - see par.2.6.3.1).

2.6.4.3 Quantitative delimitation

Quantitative delimitation entails the numerical reduction of a particular universe or population (Van der Westhuizen 1977:39). Having decided to implement purposive (judgmental) sampling, the researcher arbitrarily decided to include two hundred respondents (100 public and 100 private security) from each of the four areas which, in the opinion of the researcher, would generate adequate responses to the questions (variables) contained in the questionnaire.

2.6.4.4 Sampling

Unlike large and advanced social surveys, the present study confines itself to the analysis of questionnaires containing statistical information about crime prevention and private security. However, for the sake of clarity, researcher deemed it necessary to follow the basic rules of sampling – purely to create theoretical perspective and to eliminate any possible distortion that might prevail in regard to the procedures followed to secure such reliable data. It has therefore been regarded useful and informative to briefly highlight some of the elementary terms and concepts normally associated with sampling (as far as this research project is concerned). The following terms and/or concepts should highlight the importance of the present study within the framework of the social survey method.

- ♦ Sampling is being defined by Babbie (1989:163) as the process of selecting observations, while Taylor (1994:179) view it as “ ... a process of systematically selecting units [case dossiers] for study”, but added that “ ... sampling procedures apply nearly to all [other] research approaches”, and finally concluded that sampling “ ... refers to a family of procedures researchers use to select cases for study from a larger population of cases” (Taylor 1994:183).

Sampling usually revolves around either probability or non-probability procedures.

♦ **Population versus sample**

Broadly speaking, “... a population consists of the entire set of people or objects or numbers in which we [researchers] are interested at a particular time” (Binder & Geis 1983:239). **Sample** refers to a subset or portion of the total population (Bailey 1982:85).

♦ **Sampling element versus sampling unit**

An element is “... that unit about which information is collected and that provides the basis of analysis” (Babbie 1989:169). A sampling unit refers to that set of elements considered for selection in some stage of sampling. Elements and units of analysis are often the same in a given study, though elements refer to sample selection and units to data analysis (Babbie 1989:169-170). Although Cilliers (Van der Walt *et al.* 1985:191) opine that the researcher does not always find it possible to make observations of all the units or cases in the population. Since the aim of science revolves around the formulation of general statements about empirical reality, the researcher has to pay attention to the method of making deductions from a limited number of units or cases and extend it so that it can be representative of the whole population. These units or cases must be a sound reflection of the “whole” in all its facets, i.e. the qualities of the units or cases must hold for the universe. Sampling methods can be classified into those that yield probability samples and those that yield non-probability samples. In the former type of sampling, the probability of selection of each respondent is known. In the latter type, this probability is not known. Suchman (1967:318-319) points out that when selecting the sample, the researcher must have knowledge of the following:

- ♦ Population characteristics and some method of identifying them.
- ♦ The purpose of the study.
- ♦ The number of variables to be analysed.

♦ **Purposive (judgmental) sampling**

Bailey (1982:94) defines this non-probability sampling technique as allowing the researcher to choose “respondents” best meeting the purpose of the study, according

to own judgement, without the restrictions of fulfilling a specific quota, or choosing the most convenient "respondents". Babbie (1989:204) concurs by saying that purposive or judgmental sampling is based on the researcher's own knowledge of the population, its elements and the nature of purpose of the study. In short, it is based on the researcher's judgement and the purpose of the study.

Although various techniques of probability and non-probability sampling are discussed in textbooks dealing with social research, the researcher deemed it necessary to only highlight **purposive or judgmental sampling** as a non-probability sampling technique used in the present study.

Table 2.11 clearly reflects the status of sampling among two population groups. As indicated in par. 2.6.4.3, researcher arbitrarily decided to distribute 800 questionnaires; 400 among public and 400 among private security respondents.

TABLE 2.11 QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION AMONG FOUR POPULATION GROUPS IN KWAZULU-NATAL

AREAS	PUBLIC RESPONDENTS				PRIVATE SECURITY RESPONDENTS			
	Expected		Observed		Expected		Observed	
	Frequency		Frequency		Frequency		Frequency	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
South Coast	100	25	96	24	100	25	87	21.75
Durban Metropole	100	25	92	23	100	25	100	25
Midlands	100	25	95	23.75	100	25	94	23.50
North Coast	100	25	98	24.50	100	25	93	23.25
TOTAL	400	100.0	381	95.25	400	100.0	374	93.50

According to Table 2.11, 800 questionnaires (expected frequencies) were distributed in equal proportions to both populations, namely 400 to the public and 400 to private

security officers. The public sector produced 381, and the private security industry 374 observed frequencies. After carefully editing, none of these questionnaires had to be rejected. Competent return rates of 95.25 percent and 93.50 percent were respectively achieved. Researcher is confident that both populations would render fertile ground for research into the role of private security in crime prevention.

2.7 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

“Hypotheses are specified expectations about empirical reality, derived from propositions” (Maxfield & Babbie 1995:36). Propositions, as such, are regarded as the building blocks of theory (Bailey 1982:41), consisting of “... statements about the linkages between concepts ... [T]hese statements often assume a *causal logic*” (Taylor 1994:41). In this regard, Bailey (1982:41) argues that: “Sub-types of propositions include hypotheses, empirical generalisations, axioms, postulates and theorems”. Hypotheses are also defined as more specific statements derived from theory and are usually statements regarding the relationship between two or more factors or variables (Miller & Whitehead 1996:21-22). These authors distinguish between –

- ♦ *research hypotheses* which are statements the researcher believes to be true, example: “The public generally display a positive attitude towards the Private Security Industry as far as role-fulfilment is concerned”, and
- ♦ *null-hypotheses* (Ho) which are statements of “nothingness”, meaning that there are no differences in opinion, no effects or no relationships, for example: “There are no significant differences between male and female attitudes regarding the role of private security in crime prevention”. In scientific research, it is usually the null-hypothesis that is tested (Miller & Whitehead 1996:23).

Van der Westhuizen (1977:45) also indicates that a statistical technique is usually implemented to test whether the null-hypothesis is valid or not, by setting “... an acceptance and non-acceptance area within or outside which the numerical result of the test must fall to be declared valid or invalid”. Finally, Bailey (1982:42) adamantly states

that: “A hypothesis is clearly not a statement of wishful thinking or of value ... [but] is merely a statement, as yet tentative and unproved, of what the researcher thinks the facts are”.

2.7.1 Hypotheses Formulation

The following hypotheses have been formulated for the purpose of empirical testing:

♦ Public's questionnaire

H₁ : Public respondents favourably evaluate the *importance of functions* performed by private security officers.

H₂ : Security measures designed to improve crime prevention in society are positively evaluated by -

- ❖ Male and female public respondents
- ❖ Areas in which respondents reside.

H₃ : Public respondents positively evaluate aspects (determinants) of the role of private security officers.

H₄ : *Personal* crime prevention *precautions* are generally more appreciated by public respondents, but specifically more so by –

- ❖ Home owners
- ❖ Respondents living in towns.

♦ **Private security officers' questionnaire**

- H₁ : The *functional performance* of private security officers relating to social order maintenance are positively evaluated by private security officers and especially by –
- ❖ female respondents and
 - ❖ those occupying certain positions in the security hierarchy.
- H₂ : Private security respondents attach a significant greater value to *offensive security measures* as part of crime prevention strategy.
- H₃ : (a) The *role and function* of private security is equally important in crime prevention compared to that of public policing (e.g. SA Police Service).
 (b) Private security officers rate their overall crime prevention efforts significantly *more important* than that of public policing.
- H₄ : Private security *training* adequately equip officers to fulfil their crime prevention function according the expectations of society.

Taylor (1994:32) opines that each hypothesis formulated to direct an investigation is linked to a null-hypothesis, predicting no difference. A hypothesis further states the expected relationship between two or more variables based on measurement which facilitates a move away from conceptual realm to the reality (empirical facts).

2.8 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE GROUPS

The following statistical description of the two sample groups (Tables 2.12 and 2.13) is mainly based on unknown factors which could not be compared with a theoretical frequency from the total population. These tables are, therefore, merely intended as

descriptions of the general make-up of the sample groups and are by no means indicative of favourable or unfavourable perceptions regarding the role of private security in crime prevention.

TABLE 2.12 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
(N=381)

DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES	FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION	
	N	%
AREAS		
Durban Metropole	92	24.15
South Coast	96	25.20
North Coast	98	25.72
Midlands	95	24.93
TOTAL	381	100.0
AGE		
< 20 Years	9	2.36
20 – 29 Years	64	16.80
30 – 39 Years	118	30.97
40 – 49 Years	107	28.09
50 – 59 Years	58	15.22
60 – 69 Years	24	6.30
70 +	1	0.26
TOTAL	381	100.0
RACE		
African	42	11.02
White	271	71.13
Coloured	15	3.94

Asian	51	13.39
Other	2	0.52
TOTAL	381	100.0

GENDER

Male	187	49.08
Female	194	50.92
TOTAL	381	100.0

LANGUAGE

Zulu	35	9.19
Sotho	2	0.52
Xhosa	4	1.05
Afrikaans	153	40.16
English	177	46.46
European language	2	0.52
Eastern language	7	1.84
Other	1	0.26
TOTAL	381	100.0

INCOME

Less than R 20 000 per year	22	5.77
R 21 000 – R 30 000	47	12.34
R 31 000 – R 50 000	80	21.00
R 51 000 – R 75 000	73	19.16
R 76 000 – R 100 000	71	18.64
R 101 000 – R 125 000	28	7.35
R 126 000 – R 150 000	23	6.04
R 151 000 +	20	5.25
Not applicable	17	4.45
TOTAL	381	100.0

PRESENT OCCUPATION

Unemployed	6	1.57
Semi-skilled / skilled labourer	22	5.77
Professional worker	80	21.00
Technical worker	15	3.94
Businessman / Sales worker	41	10.76
Administrative worker	77	20.21
Banking	15	3.94
Student / scholar	5	1.31
Service worker	28	7.35
Armed forces (Military / police)	39	10.24
Agricultural worker	3	0.79
Self-employed	23	6.04
Pensioner	22	5.77
Other	5	1.31
TOTAL	381	100.0

PRESENT TYPE OF HOUSING

Own house	176	46.19
Rented house	85	22.31
Own flat / Duplex / Simplex	32	8.40
Rented flat / Duplex / Simplex	47	12.34
Alternative housing	8	2.10
Other	33	8.66
TOTAL	381	100.0

MARITAL STATUS

Married	230	60.37
Widowed	19	4.99
Divorced	49	12.86
Separated	10	2.62
Never married (single)	73	19.16
TOTAL	381	100.0

PRESENTLY LIVES IN

A city (Durban)	157	41.21
A town (Empangeni)	186	48.82
A rural area	31	8.41
An exclusive farming community	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26
TOTAL	381	100.0

The statistics in Table 2.12 pertaining to age show that the majority of the respondents (289 or 75.85%) are between the age of 20 to 49 years. It is significant to note that the male respondents (187 or 49.08%) and the female respondents (194 or 50.92%) are very closely balanced. The response group was dominated by married respondents (230 or 60.37%) with never married or single respondents (73 or 19.16%) as the other dominant group.

The statistics pertaining to income show that only 69 (18.11%) of these respondents earn R 30 000 and less (\$ 2727,00) per annum. Just over 41% of the 381 respondents earn an annual income of above R 76 000.

Present type of housing relates to type of house in which the respondents are staying when the research was done. The table clearly shows that 208 (54.59%) of the respondents have their own house or flat. Likewise, 132 (34.65%) respondents are staying in a rented house or flat..

**TABLE 2.13 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF PRIVATE SECURITY
RESPONDENTS (N=374)**

DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES	FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION	
	N	%
AREAS		
Durban Metropole	100	26.74
South Coast	87	23.26
North Coast	93	24.87
Midlands	94	25.13
TOTAL	374	100.0
AGE		
< 20 Years	4	1.07
20 – 25 Years	84	22.47
26 – 30 Years	75	20.05
31 – 35 Years	72	19.25
36 – 40 Years	50	13.37
41 – 45 Years	42	11.23
46 – 50 Years	18	4.81
51 +	29	7.75
TOTAL	374	100.0
RACE		
African	65	17.38
White	158	42.25
Coloured	25	6.68
Asian	126	33.69
TOTAL	374	100.0

GENDER

Male	285	76.20
Female	89	23.80
TOTAL	374	100.0

LANGUAGE

Afrikaans	88	23.53
English	229	61.23
Nguni	32	8.56
Sotho	6	1.60
Other	19	5.08
TOTAL	374	100.0

MARITAL STATUS

Married	222	59.36
Widowed	6	1.60
Divorced	22	5.88
Separated	7	1.87
Never married (single)	117	31.29
TOTAL	374	100.0

INCOME

Less than R 20 000 per year	105	28.07
R 21 000 – R 30 000	121	32.35
R 31 000 – R 40 000	54	14.44
R 41 000 – R 50 000	18	4.81
R 51 000 – R 75 000	31	8.29
R 76 000 – R 100 000	19	5.08
R 101 000 – R 125 000	7	1.87
R 126 000 – R 150 000	2	0.53
R 151 000 +	16	4.28
Other (\$)	1	0.28
TOTAL	374	100.0

PRESENT POSITION

Owner / Manager	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.54
General consultant	17	4.54
Technical worker	44	11.76
Financial advisor	2	0.54
Administrative (clerk)	57	15.24
Security officer – Grade A	13	3.48
Security officer – Grade B	19	5.08
Security officer – Grade C	40	10.70
Security officer – Grade D	21	5.61
Security officer – Grade E	22	5.88
Security manager	29	7.75
General security supervisor	8	2.14
Private security training officer	4	1.07
Other (Armed response officers)	77	20.59
TOTAL	374	100.0

LENGTH OF SERVICE

Less than 5 years	158	42.24
5 – 10 years	154	41.18
11 – 15 years	46	12.30
16 – 20 years	12	3.21
21 – 30 years	4	1.07
TOTAL	374	100.0

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

	N (YES) %		N (NO) %	
SA Police (before 1994)	33	8.82	341	91.18
SA Police (after 1994)	3	0.80	371	99.20
SA Police (before and after 1994)	13	3.48	361	96.52
Military (army)	49	13.10	325	86.90
Military Police	7	1.87	367	98.13

Former Railway & Harbour Police	4	1.07	370	98.93
Customs and Excise	4	1.07	370	98.93
Durban City Police	-	-	374	100.0
Municipal Police	4	1.07	370	98.93
Other	13	3.48	361	96.52
TOTAL	130	34.76		

The statistics in Table 2.13 pertaining to age show that the majority of the respondents (323 or 86.36%) are between the age of 20 to 45 years. It is significant to note that the male respondents (285 or 76.20%) outnumbered the female respondents (89 or 23.80%). The response group was dominated by married respondents (222 or 59.36%) with never married or single respondents (117 or 31.29%) as the other dominant group.

The statistics pertaining to income show that 226 (60.42%) of these respondents earn R 30 000 and less (\$ 2727,00) per annum. Less than 15% of the respondents earn between R 31 000 and R 40 000 per annum, while 31 (8.29%) earn a yearly income of between R 51 000 and R 75 000. Just over 11% of the 374 respondents earn an annual income of above R 76 000. Interestingly enough, it appears that the American counterparts are far better off. Collins *et al.* (2000:370) show for instance that an unarmed private security officer in the US earns (on average) \$ 17 154 per annum (R188 694), while a security/loss prevention director attached to an US private security enterprise, earns \$ 67 617 per annum (R743 787).

Previous experience relates to any previous service respondents had in different armed forces and the like before they have joined the private security industry. The table clearly shows that 53 (14.17%) of the respondents had previous public police experience. Likewise, 56 (14.97%) respondents served in the military prior to their entry into the private security field.

2.9 CHAPTER DIVISION

The further division of chapters in this research report is arranged as follows:

Chapter 1 deals with the general orientation to the study which outlines the general introduction to the study. The research methodology followed in the present study is discussed and set out in *Chapter 2*. *Chapter 3* entails an exposition of the evolution of private security from ancient to modern times. Apart from definitions such as role, police role, society, etc. the origin (evolution) of the police role in historical context (specifically as it unfolded in England, America and South Africa), as well as different policing systems within the context of role fulfilment are being discussed in this chapter. *Chapter 4* provides a theoretical exposition of the most important aspects of crime prevention. *Chapter 5* deals with contemporary perspectives in private security. *Chapter 6* provides an exposition of private security – contemporary issues. *Chapter 7* contains the statistical description and analysis of data collected from public respondents. In particular, will the role of private security in crime prevention based on statistical data forthcoming from a structured questionnaire (Annexure 1), be dealt with in this chapter. *Chapter 8* contains the perceptions and analysis of data collected regarding private security officers. In particular, will the role of private security in crime prevention based on statistical data forthcoming from a structured questionnaire (Annexure 2), be dealt with in this chapter. *Chapter 9* contains the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

2.10 SUMMARY

So far, the exposition of the research design clearly depicts the aims and the rationale for having undertaken this study. Further, several hypotheses were formulated to give direction to the research, and the delimitation of the study presented here, gives a clear indication when and where (“time and space”) the present study has been undertaken. The remaining components of the research process namely: research methods and techniques, measuring instrument implemented to effect data collection and analysis, as well as the statistical techniques implemented to test for reliability and validity of data was also described in this chapter under the heading “research design”.

CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE SECURITY

“Security is a basic need for humans, a rung on the ladder of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Only now is it budding into a discipline. Just entering the stature of an academic discipline ... ”

- Clifford Simonsen (1998:xiii).

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The word “security” derives from *securus* which, if literally translated, means ‘to be free from fear and danger’ (Burstein 1994:1). The idea to protect human life and property by utilising people and equipment is as old as mankind itself. Different types of security measures adopted by people throughout the ages appear to have been congruent with available resources and the nature and extent of dangers present during each of the developmental phases (Timm & Christian 1991:21). In this regard, Ricks, Tillett and Van Meter (1994:1) pointed out that: “The history of humankind can be seen as a series of attempts to provide for safety ... [m]any of these efforts have been uncovered by archeologists, and some are still visible, and even functional, after hundreds of years”. Since early times, two conditions had to be present before people considered the implementation of private security measures, namely a felt need (a person or group must have felt sufficiently threatened) and sufficient resources (implementation of such measures was dependent upon the availability of resources) (Timm & Christian 1991:21).

Private security, like public policing, evolved as a result of a desire on the part of human beings for additional, individual protection for themselves and their property - in other words, as a social need and not “ ... from any particular theory or school of scientific thought” (Van Heerden 1976:3). The search for safety and protection compelled people to arm themselves, built barriers around their properties and to even

resort to statutory legislation to compel others to respect the safety and freedom of their fellowmen (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:2-3).

In this regard, Reith (1975:13-15) identified four distinctive phases through which the quest for private security proceeded:

- Firstly, individuals or even small groups of people collectively searched for security and safety or to satisfy other mutually felt individual needs.
- Secondly, the need for the creation of rules and laws emerged because people believed that the “passing of good laws” was sufficient to ensure people’s safety and security. Whoever enforced such laws, was not really a matter of concern, because in early times laws were in any case enforced by several Rulers’ armies.
- Thirdly, it was soon discovered that people did not respect and obey the laws so devised, which left Rulers and Governments powerless (especially in the absence of organised public policing or private security).
- Fourthly, social disorder led to total anarchy because of the disobedience to laws and the ultimate perishing of communities.

According to Reith 1940 (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:3), past governments came to a downfall or often ended up in anarchy mainly because of the non-existence of any kind of police mechanism that could act as catalyst (to enforce the laws and maintain proper social order) between the army of a Ruler and the people.

3.2 PRIVATE SECURITY DURING ANCIENT TIMES

3.2.1 The Neolithic Period

The historical development of private security and crime prevention dates back to prehistoric cultures during the *neolithic or cultural period* which lasted from 7000-

3000 B.C. and which was characterised by hunters and food gatherers who had to provide in their own needs for safety and security as well as that of the group and their meager possessions. Unlike nomadic cultures, small groups of human beings settled down, erected shelters and started practicing primitive agriculture. As these collectivities continued to grow, crops became a source of wealth and trade which necessitated the institution of “... societal rules and codes to protect life and property in an evolving agriculture society” (Collins, Ricks & Van Meter 2000:3). Clifford Simonsen (1998:2) is also of the opinion that, before the emergence of social groups who “... gathered for companionship, reproduction, group hunting and crop growing, we - humans probably just wandered around the countryside like all the other animals”. This author also points out that with the advent of the idea *territoriality* and *personal property*, along with social relationships, people began to think in terms of safeguarding themselves, their fellowmen and their property - to introduce a form of social control that would be necessary to control human behaviour such as:

- ❑ *Folkways*: traditional social customs and ways of living, including ways of thinking, feeling, or acting common to a specific social group of people.
- ❑ *Mores*: binding moral standards, attitudes, customs, habits and manners peculiar to a specific group of people.
- ❑ *Laws*: formal, written rules of conduct that are binding, properly defined by a legislative authority and enforced by the executive component of government.

Forward into modern times, it is noteworthy to observe that, unlike public policing that exists in social context to quell violations of the common and statutory laws, private security tends to be more business-oriented like, dealing with that kind of behaviour that actually does not entail a violation of any specific law, but rather a violation of policies, procedures and practices (mores) of a social group or an organisation. In cases where it does happen that private security officers have to deal with law violations - most probably as a result of their para-military appearance (uniform, arms, marked patrol vehicles, etc.) and constant omnipresence - they usually request assistance from public police officials or act upon their authority

granted to them in terms of Section 42 of the (South African) Criminal Procedure Act (Simonsen 1998:2-3).

3.2.2 Mycenaean Period

The New Collins Concise Dictionary of the English Language (1985:744) describes the Mycenaean Age as relating to ancient Mycenae, a city in Greece and its inhabitants. It also relates to the Aegean civilization of Mycenae during the period 1500-1200 B.C. which is, according to Collins *et al.* 2000:4), the “ ... earliest known forms of civilization ... ” which have implemented both security technology and applied crime prevention techniques to provide greater safety for and protection of its inhabitants. Ancient cities and palaces were enclosed by high, thick fortified walls and surrounded by moats, canals or rivers, accessible only by means of drawbridges. These fortresses exemplified a security design that established four “zones” of protection (Collins *et al.* 2000:4):

- The *use of water* either as a moat (a wide water-filled ditch surrounding a fortified castle), canal or river represented the *first zone of defense* against unwanted intruders.
- The *outermost (perimeter) wall* represented the *second zone of defense* against intruders. Excavations proved this kind of wall to be 23 feet thick and strengthened by towers every 140 feet.
- The *wall surrounding the Sacred Precincts and Palace* created the “third zone” of protection.
- The fourth zone of defense was the *wall of the building that served as quarters for the royalty and their valuable possessions.*

The Mycenaean period also produced evidence of ancient security measures and crime prevention techniques in the Egyptian temples and pyramids. Egyptian graves (tombs) of the great kings are also excellent examples where Crime Prevention

Through Environmental Design (CPTED) had been applied through “protective architecture” and “security technology”, such as the tomb of the ruler Tutankhamen which contained large quantities valuables and remained undamaged until its discovery in 1922 (Wêreldfokus 1979:712). Likewise, the Egyptians “ ... are also credited with developing some of the first target-hardening devices such as the lock as far back as 2000 B.C.” (Collins *et al.* 2000:5).

Ancient fortresses also existed in Central and South America in the Western hemisphere. These fortresses consisted of defensive structures in the form of tall upright boulders, separated at short intervals with stones and rubble between them. Peru’s famous structure, *Machu Pichu* is similar to China’s Great Wall and the Egyptian Pyramids (Collins *et al.* 2000:6) - all built with one purpose in mind: to provide ultimate safety and security.

We also learn that physical security measures played a very important role during ancient times. People relied most of the time on weapons, lake and cliff dwellings, walls and gates with the primary objective of preventing intruders from gaining access to them or their property. However, physical security measures did not always satisfy the needs of everyone. Rulers (or kings) “ ... often appointed individuals to assist them enforcing the laws, protecting not only the general welfare (public safety), but also the safety of the ruler” (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:4).

Although literature on private security measures during ancient times appear to be somewhat scanty, examples of such measures which included *inter alia* the following, have also been recorded (Ricks *et al.* 1994:1; Hess & Wroblewski 1995:4-5):

- Development of weapons, erection of barriers around dwellings and introduction of codes of conduct to protect life and property.
- Construction of pole dwellings such as houses and entire villages on lakes and swamps in parts of early Africa, the Far East and Switzerland (in the latter case where about 300 such lake sites, built on sunken pilings and accessible only by means of drawbridges or canoes, were discovered).

- Construction of shelters in caves for protection against hostile attackers as well as natural disasters, and the construction of dwellings high up on cliffs that were accessible by means of ladders only, e.g. the ancient Pueblo Indians, for protection against unfriendly tribes.
- High walls which surrounded ancient cities and towns. From Joshua 6, in Biblical times, for instance, we learn about the wall of Jericho that protected the inhabitants against attack from the Israelites (but collapsed upon an act of God). The Great Wall of China, built by Emperor Chin about twenty centuries ago between China and Mongolia to protect China against attacks from the Mongols, took about fifteen years and half a million workers to complete. It stood 20-30 feet high, was between 15 to 20 feet thick and stretched 1,400 miles between China and Mongolia.
- Castles surrounded by moats and connected by means of drawbridges throughout Europe during medieval times provided additional protection to people.
- Construction of forts in the United States during the historical Westward expansion protected frontiers against hostile red Indians.
- Physical security in the form of broad, straight roads in Rome patrolled by legions, while bridges were controlled by iron gates and guards.

One ruler who went beyond physical security measures and reliance upon legions (professional soldiers) for protection, was the Roman Emperor, Augustus Caesar, grand nephew of Julius Caesar, previously known as Octavius. Augustus Caesar was the first Roman ruler to separate military and police functions by implementing a security (police) force. In an attempt to reform the Roman Empire and to eliminate the problems that precipitated social disorder in Rome, he created the following security (police) forces (Gaines, Kappeler & Vaughn 1994:44-45; Hess & Wroblewski 1995:5-6; Collins *et al.* 2000:7):

- The *Praetorian Guard*, who had been responsible for protecting Rome against social disorder and Augustus Caesar from being assassinated. Having been

regarded an elite group, this Guard did not function as a riot police unit, simply because of Caesar's resistance to the legions' military control and their often uncooperative and unreliable will. The Praetorian Guard comprised nine cohorts, each with 1,000 men.

- Three of the nine cohorts, known as the *Urban Cohorts*, were composed of armed police or a form of *gendarmerie* (soldiers with police and military functions), were assigned to the city of Rome and were accommodated in private and lodging houses. Their task included the keeping of order among the slaves and controlling unruly citizens. They were clothed in togas (not uniforms) under which their swords were concealed. Their low-profile lifestyle contributed towards acceptance of this kind of military presence in Rome which afforded Augustus Caesar greater control over the city of Rome.
- The *Vigiles* of Rome were responsible for fire fighting but later, they also assumed other police functions such as the arrest of thieves and housebreakers as well as to control and suppress riots. These *night watchmen* (derived from *vigil*, meaning to keep watch) who were appointed by Caesar personally, comprised seven cohorts - each consisting of 1,000 vigils.

Although the *vigiles* (or "vigils") were destined to function as Rome's first fire brigade, they also fulfilled the following functions: street patrolling in Rome, investigation of burglaries, assaults and other forms of petty crimes. "*These night watchmen ... represented one of the earliest known examples of security officers*" (Collins *et al.* 2000:7) (italics added). And although they were further also used to function as police officers, they were neither part of Caesar's Roman forces, and nor were accommodated in special barracks like the army soldiers. They were recruited from "freedmen" (male persons who were exempted from military service). These characteristics most probably explain " ... *the historical interpretation that the Vigils were in fact more akin to a security force than that of a [public] police force ... [T]hese Roman Vigils or "watch men" may very well represent one of the first formal security forces in history*" (Collins *et al.* 2000:7) (italics added), simply because the police force consisted of Roman citizens and were organised along the

lines of the Praetorian Guard and commanded by a battalion commander or captain. Augustus Caesar's system of policing served Rome for quite a long period after which the Praetorian Guard had been incorporated into Rome's legions to become part and parcel of this crude and uncontrolled military force. After amalgamation, renewed violence and social disorder flared up which " ... along with numerous other factors caused the final downfall of the Empire" (Gaines *et al.* 1994:45). However, under the rule of Theodosius I, the last emperor of the united Roman Empire (which lasted from A.D. 346 to 395), a rural constabulary, the *Assertores Pacis*, was established but in the end, this police force had to be disbanded by Theodosius II because they have stolen from those they were supposed to protect. A form of private security then emerged: public protection was entrusted to owners of large estates who were also made responsible for carrying out local policing functions in the rural areas (Timm & Christian 1991:22) - a move that contributed directly towards the rise of feudalism (Thompson 1928:48).

3.3 PRIVATE SECURITY DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, Europe entered the Middle Ages which stretched from approximately A.D. 476 to 1453 - a period during which little is known about private security and public policing as a result of constant warfare. During this period, feudalism developed as a pattern of social organisation which comprised three classes or estates: the nobility, clergy and common people (Langworthy & Travis 1994:38; Hess & Wroblewski 1995:6). During the feudal period, private property was very vulnerable. Seizure and plundering of private property of the weaker by the stronger was common practice. Owners of large estates expanded their political and economic power by means of taking control of smaller neighbouring states. In this way, the system allowed people who were unable to protect themselves, to benefit from the protection of their local land barons by placing themselves and their property under the protective custody of such land barons. In turn, the land barons were required to show loyalty to the king or emperor by means of repairing bridges and fortresses. Land barons appointed *knights* and *retainers* to protect and secure their estates, while *stewards* and *bailiffs* were responsible for crime

prevention and detection within the estate's boundaries (Timm & Christian 1991:22-23).

During the Middle Ages, the most common risks directly related to private security were, *inter alia*, theft, robbery, kidnapping, piracy and plundering. Along with all these criminal activities, the Crusades also occurred during the Middle Ages. The Crusades consisted of a series of military expeditions undertaken in the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries by the Christian powers of Europe to recapture the Holy Land from the Muslims. During the period of the Crusades, military campaigns ensued between nations and regions in which soldiers were very active in plundering and kidnapping hostile nobles. Apart from receiving a share of the valuable articles (booties) illegally obtained from victims, some soldiers "... continued to use their new skills by becoming retainers, mercenaries, or, in certain cases, criminals" (Timm & Christian 1991:24). Armed robbery of religious pilgrims and especially other suitable targets such as merchants, clergy and nobles (who frequently carried money and valuable cargo), appeared to have been common practice during the Middle Ages. The safety of these victims could only be guaranteed by means of privately-hired armed security guards. Merchants and traders at market places and trade fairs also suffered at the hands of criminal gangs. The Scarborough Fair in England, for instance, had been held up twice during the 14th century by bands of outlaws, such as thieves, pickpockets and thugs (Timm & Christian 1991:24). Apart from piracy during the 9th and 10th centuries which was rife throughout the Middle Ages among the northern nations, foreign commerce in Venice, Italy was severely crippled by Croatian and Dalmatian pirates in the Western Mediterranean (Thompson 1928:582-583).

Given the nature and extent of criminal activity during the Middle Ages, people were forced to take appropriate measures to combat risks and other related threats aimed at *weakening and penetrating their personal security*. Merchants, for instance, hired bands of men as private security guards to protect their goods in transit. Likewise, noblemen were accompanied and protected by several of their retainers when away from home. Villagers hired *corn reeves* or even plain servants to guard their harvest against theft. To prevent or escape piracy on the high seas, merchants (having been solely responsible for the protection of their goods) "... formed associations, armed

their ships, and traveled in fleets whenever possible” (Thompson 1928:584). Severe punishments and extraordinary security measures were instituted to reduce crime:

- (1) Official acts, such as the Peace Ordinance of Frederick I, ruler of the Holy Roman Empire which became effective in 1156, authorised the carrying of swords by merchants to protect themselves against thieves and robbers.
- (2) Theft statutes of England made provision for some sort of victim compensation: free citizen caught stealing had to repay their victims three times and slaves two times the value of the property stolen.
- (3) Further, the statutes also provided for a ten shillings compensation for the apprehension of a thief. Later on, more drastic legal measures authorised the king to have convicted thieves killed or sold as slaves.
- (4) An anti-crime decree compelled the nobility (privileged class of people) and gentry (persons just below the nobility in social rank) to take an oath not to provide support to people who committed serious offences or to hire such criminals, in an effort to increase their power.
- (5) The forerunner of what is known today as physical security, appeared to be the order of the day during the Middle Ages. Apart from having used security guards for protection, the concept of *target-hardening* surely gained momentum through the building of castles with thick walls, provided with arches, moats and drawbridges, as well as building fortified towns (Timm & Christian 1991:26).

Local inhabitants took similar precautions, such as “... barring the doors and windows of their homes from the inside ... only the wealthiest had locks installed on the outside of their homes” (Hanawalt 1979:79). Similarly, the use of hardwood strongboxes, reinforced with iron and equipped with padlocks to lock away valuable articles, may have paved the way for what is known today as safes and vaults (Hanawalt 1979:79).

Further developments relating to private security which emerged during the Middle Ages are briefly the following (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:6-8; Gaines *et al.* 1994:2-4; Simonsen 1998:7-11; Collins *et al.* 2000:7-11):

3.3.1 Collective responsibility (“frank pledge”)

The Middle Ages will not only be remembered as a period characterised by general chaos and disorder, but also for the immense changes in the social structure and the growing influence of the church that emerged. Lyman (1999:66) opines that the church became so powerful - especially in determining what constituted a crime or not and how it should be handled - that, together with feudal lords, a dual system of justice developed simply because “... neither the feudal lords nor the churches answered to a central authority”. Enforcement of laws pertaining to sexual morality was, for instance, especially regarded the task of so-called church courts. Punishment of law violators and other wrongdoers became a function of the state, but was controlled by strong, influential rulers. Compensation payable to victims of crime in the form of money had been converted into fines and claimed by rulers. Further enrichment of rulers came in the form of claiming the estates of executed prisoners, as part of their property (Adler, Mueller & Laufer 1995: 334; 479). The Middle Ages was also characterised by a period of conflict in which armies were very active and Muslims, Mongols and Europeans competed fiercely with each for land, trade routes, and for wealth and power.

The scarcity of land in Europe compelled a group of people from West Germanic origin, known as the Anglo-Saxons, to migrate to England (Collins 2000:7). They brought with them the tithing security system “... of compulsory communal [or collective] responsibility for protecting and taking care of the security needs of individuals, families, tribes and villages” (Gaines *et al.* 1994:2) - This system was reserved only for law-abiding citizens, but excluded criminals who were not regarded to be part of a tithing (Lee 1971:3). In imitation of this system, generally known as the *frankpledge* which developed in France in the 7th century, every individual was responsible for the good behaviour of his or her fellowman, and in turn, the group for each and every individual including the obligation to assist in apprehending a criminal

when a crime has been committed. A *tithing* comprised ten families under the leadership of a tithingman, and a group of ten tithings formed a *hundred*. A group of hundreds constituted a *shire* (also known as a county), controlled by the King's *reeve*. The "shire-reeve" (which later became the *sheriff*) acted as the spokesperson for the entire county (Gaines *et al.* 1994:2).

Communal responsibility was not without any ritual: the tithingman was responsible for raising an alarm or the *hue and cry* to announce the presence of a law violator and subsequent call upon all members of a tithing to assist in apprehending such unwanted person, and the meting out of punishment. This piece of English common law process which stipulated the communal pursuit of law violators, may have signaled the origin of the powers of arrest by private citizens (Collins *et al.* 2000:8) (including that of private security officers) as it is stipulated in South African law (South Africa 1977, sec. 42). The Anglo-Saxon tithing system closely resembled group (collective) private security and law enforcement (Simonsen 1998:11).

3.3.2 The Norman Era

In 1066 B.C., England was invaded and conquered by the Normans under command of William the Conqueror and Duke of Normandy, following the battle of Hastings in 1066. King William immediately changed the dual system of landlord-servant relationship as well as the kinship type of justice, dispossessed the old English nobility, initiated a comprehensive political, economic and social survey of England, and expanded and consolidated the tithing system into the frankpledge (Ricks *et al.* 1994:3). In this regard, Collins *et al.* (2000:8) inform us that a feudalistic society was dependent upon *kinship* and the *relationship between landlord and individuals* which formed the basis for basic economic and social ties during the Middle Ages. In terms of the kinship philosophy, a family was encouraged to seek vengeance and compensation for a harmful act against a relative (known as *kindred justice*). The landlord-servant system was an unequal bilateral agreement in which the landlord undertook to protect the servant from outside harm and, likewise, the servant agreed to work for the landlord.

In 1116 A.D. Henry I, son of king William the Conqueror, issued the *Leges Henrici* through which he adopted the title of Law Giver. The *Leges Henrici* facilitated the idea of separating serious crimes from non-serious offences (misdemeanours) which drastically affected powers of arrest. But round about 1215 A.D., misrule through unjust governing plunged England into disorder and confusion mainly because of despotism which caused human rights to dwindle. The first significant change in the feudal system came when king John, an unpopular ruler of England, signed the *Magna Carta* (Great Charter) in 1215 under pressure from the barons on the farm Runnymede just outside London. The *Magna Carta* “... established a clear separation between local and national government ... and ... the king was subject to the law ...” (Ricks, Tillett & Van Meter 1994:4), which simply limited the powers of the monarchy. The *Magna Carta* also brought due process of law (legal proceedings designed to protect individual rights and liberties) (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:7; Simonsen 1998:11-12) - the foundation of modern justice which paved the way to strengthen the role and importance of local grand juries, circuit judges, coroners and justices of the peace (Collins *et al.* 2000:9).

Another milestone in the evolution of private security and law enforcement was the Statute of Westminster issued by King Edward in 1285. Apart from having re-established a formalised law enforcement system throughout England, every city in England had to implement a private security force system. This Statute obligated a citizen to maintain the peace and to this end, any citizen could make an arrest. In cases where offenders who were not caught red-handed, the watchman had to call a group of citizens (*posse comitatus*) together to search for them. To be effective in this task, a *Watch and Ward* was established for patrolling the city during the night (watch) and supplementing the constable's duty during the day (ward). These watchmen or private security officers who guarded the gates of the town between sunset and sunrise, also formed a “marching (patrolling) watch” to limit the movements of people in the towns during certain hours, thereby establishing the concepts of mobile patrolling and curfew as additional security measures. The hue and cry revived the Anglo-Saxon practice of dealing with those people who resisted the watchman's arrest. The watch by night and the ward by day secured the

preventive, and the hue and cry the reactive aspects of private security and public policing (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:7-8; Collins *et al.* 2000:10).

Despite all the security measures and policing efforts introduced up to the promulgation of the Statute of Westminster, merchants in England were extremely dissatisfied with the degree and quality of security and protection allocated to them. Likewise, the middle class who were unhappy about the compulsory watch service they had to render, insisted on being replaced by paid deputies. However, the hired deputies frequently neglected their duty, forcing merchants to hire their own private security officers to protect their properties, investigate crimes committed against them, and to recover stolen property (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:8). Unemployment, poverty and deterioration of health and welfare needs further exacerbated safety and security problems. Private security guards were primarily hired to protect merchants and traders' buildings, shops and production goods while in storage or in transit by means of caravans. For the first time were forerunners of private detectives employed to recover and identify stolen property. All these private security initiatives were necessary because there " ... was no existing civil force that could effectively protect persons and property" (Ricks *et al.* 1994:5). Only in 1737 king George II began to remunerate watchmen with money collected through taxes. Prior to this initiative, all watchmen were paid only by individuals or corporations (Simonsen 1998:12-13). It is important to note that the Watch and Ward established under the Statute of Westminster (and although somewhat ineffective), " ... remained the primary means of [private] security and law enforcement until the Industrial Revolution" (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:8-9). Attempts at introducing the first formally organised police force only started in 1748 under the capable leadership of Henry Fielding (Simonsen 1998:13).

The era of the "commercial revolution" was in great turmoil and encountered social unrest towards the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Hess and Wroblewski (1995:9) opine that riots frequently erupted. Due to a break down in social order maintenance as a result of a lack of an effective police force, the government of the day ordered a magistrate to read the "Riot Act" and called in the military to suppress such upheavals. Unemployment was high and

crime, especially corruption, was rampant and whatever form of public protection existed at that time, was “... unable to cope with the task of providing even a minimal amount of protection for emerging business and commercial enterprise” (Ricks *et al.* 1994:5; Collins *et al.* 2000:11). As England was leading the way towards the Industrial Revolution, people from rural areas flocked to the cities in search for work in the mills and factories. By 1700 London alone had a population of well over half a million people. “Problem” is that during the first half of the eighteenth century, the population didn’t show any significant increase, simply because deaths exceeded births. So much so, that between 1740 and 1742, there were twice as many burials as births and baptisms - children were murdered by their parents and parish authorities by the number - so much as up to 75 percent before they reached the age of five years. “Illegitimate children were murdered at birth by their mothers or, more commonly, laid out in streets to die of exposure” (Collins *et al.* 2000:13). Some children were left to starve to death in workhouses. Some nurses relieved the “parish” by taking some of the children off the hands of the parish but some of these nurses kept the children alive “... *to use them for begging after first blinding or maiming them to increase their value*” (Pringle 1955 in Collins *et al.* 2000:13). And yet, there was no public law enforcement agency capable of preventing such serious crimes.

Weaving, knitting, metal production, and the like ensured industrial progress, wealth and prosperity. However, the question of sufficient protection against criminal victimisation in the form of an effective police force remained unsolved (Ricks *et al.* 1994:6). The only form of private protection against increasing rural crime came in the form of the so-called *parish constable*-system that mainly existed in rural areas.

Patrick Pringle (1955), a noted English author, made the following remarks about eighteenth-century England (Collins *et al.* 2000:13):

- London was the greatest town in the world, and yet the most lawless.
- No one thought public police officers were wonderful, because there were none - a phenomenon that struck especially foreigners.
- Britain had the most criminals *and* the harshest Criminal Code.
- People were hanged for offences that were regarded trivial in other countries.

- A child of seven could be sentenced to death for theft of an insignificant item such as a handkerchief.
- As time went by, the laws of England got more inhumane.

Early attempts to introduce private security reveals two common themes (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:9):

- (1) First, a division into geographical sections and the rotation of duties among citizens were noticeable.
- (2) Second, citizens who had to fulfill their duty as private security officers got dissatisfied and transferred their duties to persons who they hired.

What actually transpires from the preceding discussion is the fact that private security as a form of personal protection and protection of property against criminal victimisation appeared on the scene long before public (organised) policing came into being.

In the discussion that follows, attention will be devoted to the development of organised policing as well as further developments with regard to private security in England, the United States of America and South Africa.

3.4 PRIVATE SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION IN THE 18th CENTURY : THE ENGLISH HERITAGE

No serious reform took place towards the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries as far as private and public safety and security were concerned. There was also no sign of any formally established public police force. Ironically though, at the stage when England emerged from feudalism and while she “ ... was leading the way toward the industrial revolution ... and being the greatest town in the world ... and the most lawless” (Ricks *et al.* 1994:6), she had no police force to curb the escalating crime, violence and lawlessness that prevailed during the

commercial revolution. "During the eighteenth century private citizens carried arms for protection and banded together to hire special police (private security guards) to protect their homes and businesses. The military was used to suppress riots" (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:10). The same measures were taken in rural areas.

Van Heerden (1976:25) informs us that the Industrial Revolution which started round about 1760, brought with it large scale social and economic changes - precisely because cities grew as a result of people migrating from rural to urban areas in search for employment. Slum areas developed and poverty and physical, emotional and psychological suffering among the masses of people increased. Crime erupted and increased out of proportion in relation to population figures. The prevailing disorder made people uneasy and for the first time did public concern about social order coincide with the ideas of writers who philosophised about the necessity of organised policing.

3.4.1 Henry Fielding (1707-1754)

In 1748, Henry Fielding was appointed chief magistrate of the crime-ridden Bow Street area in "policeless" London. Crime was rampant: not only was corruption rife in the English system of justice, but so did counterfeit money produce serious problems. To achieve his aims of eliminating existing crime and preventing future criminal activities, Fielding first sought the active involvement of the English public in crime prevention initiatives, a stronger police force and the elimination of predisposing and precipitating conditions conducive to crime commission. He realised quickly that his only chances of success would be to foil (block) criminality by "... actively seeking them [criminals] out and investing their activities" (Collins *et al.* 2000:14). Fielding further realised that crime prevention through proactive policing would be far better than using repressive policing methods. To this end, he made use of citizens who went into the streets of London, traced the law violators and met with instigators of mob gatherings and through constructive dialogue prevented further illegal gatherings and destruction of property (Reith 1975:135). In his five years of office at Bow Street, Henry Fielding made the following contributions to the

safety and security of people and their property (Ricks *et al.* 1994:7; Hess & Wroblewski 1995:10-11):

- Establishment of a foot patrol unit to patrol the streets of London.
- Introduction of a mounted patrol unit for the highways.
- Creation of police courts.
- Appointment of special crime investigators.

At that stage, England's only security legacy reminiscent of the feudal era, was the existence of the amateur parish-constable system (Ricks *et al.* 1994:6) which was so ineffective that thieves and robbers roamed freely in the streets of London with no one interfering with their illegal activities.

Private security measures were taken as follows:

- Law-abiding citizens took responsibility for their own safety and security.
- Wealthy people were protected by their armed servants.
- Less affluent people made use of target-hardening measures such as bars and bolts and heavy doors and shutters, as well as blunderbusses and pistols for personal safety and protection (Reith 1975:134).

Next, Fielding formed a band of volunteers who assisted in arresting numerous criminals in and around the Bow Street area. Trained as detectives, these 'police officers' later became known as the Bow Street Runners. Blind half-brother John Fielding succeeded Henry who died as " ... one of the earliest and most articulate advocates of crime prevention" (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:11).

3.4.2 Patrick Colquhoun (1745-1820)

Being vitally interested in social reform and eager to expand and adapt Henry Fielding's ideas about crime prevention, Dr. Patrick Colquhoun published his monographs: *A treatise on the police of the Metropolis* and *The police of the river Thames* (1796) in which he presented alarming statistics about the nature and extent of the crime problem and criminals in and around London and argued that a centralised police force would be the only guarantee against social disorder and the

maintenance of individual human rights. Colquhoun's perspectives about restoring social disorder made the idea of an organised police force more acceptable to the public of London, just at a time when efforts aimed at reforming the prison system and introducing more humane punishments took its course (Lee 1971:247). Colquhoun also pointed out that London should be treated as a "whole" with regard to crime prevention and policing and that a large, centralised police force had become inevitable to ensure that human rights would be upheld (Van Heerden 1976:25; Hess & Wroblewski 1995:13).

Colquhoun can be regarded as the *architect* of modern policing because of the preparatory work he has done in this regard: he called for the establishment of a large police force that would be responsible for the prevention of crime in London. His 'plan' earned recognition when William Pitt, a member of Parliament, " ... had introduced a bill that resembled Colquhoun's plan, but was met with a storm of protest and was forced to withdraw it" (Collins *et al.* 2000:14).

Colquhoun was eventually afforded the opportunity to implement some of his ideas regarding the formation of a police force. Having been consulted by a group of West Indian planters and merchants about protection of their goods against theft from ships in the harbour, he developed an innovative plan for the establishment of a private police organisation in the form of the *river police* to observe and even participate in off-loading West Indian ships while docked. Financed and implemented by the planters and merchants, this endeavour (in which private police officers infiltrated their workplace as labourers), saved the owners 66,000 pounds in the first eight months of its implementation (Collins *et al.* 2000:15). This private security agency comprised 80 full-time and 1,120 part-time officers who were also charged with the duties of visible patrolling and observation.

Up to this point in time, it was clear that the public of London would not accept any kind of organised public police force, simply because of " ... fear that such a [formal police] force would be used by the government, or certain elements of the government, to spy on the people, infringe upon their liberty and possibly aid in the formulation of a totalitarian government" (Reith 1975:138).

3.5 SIR ROBERT PEEL AND POLICE REFORM (1800-1860)

In 1822, Sir Robert Peel was appointed to the British Parliament as Home Secretary (Minister of the Interior) and it was only then that real police reform would gain any significant movement. Although Peel would be the *builder* of modern policing, he would right from the beginning not be successful in his endeavours to introduce a modern, organised police force in London. Like Patrick Colquhoun, he encountered severe resistance from the British public's side. The English government had already started with a campaign to reduce crime by increasing general deterrence through more severe punishments. At the time Robert Peel took office, more than two hundred offences were punishable by means of the death penalty (Simonsen 1998:13).

Sir Robert Peel had been rightly dubbed the *father* of modern policing. The term "bobby" which derives from Peel's name Robert, is still a generic term for a public police officer today. Since 1822 to 1828, several parliamentary committees had studied the need for change with regard to policing in England. Peel's most important argument in favour of organised policing revolved around the idea that:

- social unrest and disorder was the result of ineffective policing methods and techniques and
- the maintenance of internal order as well as the upholding of human rights should be entrusted to specialist policemen rather than the military (Skolnick 1966:2; Van Heerden 1976:26).

The opposition Peel encountered and the criticism his newly formed police unit, the *Bow Street Runners*, had to endure, actually reflected the philosophical reasoning about order maintenance of that time. Organised policing had been regarded as:

- ☞ Undemocratic, precisely because it meant placing power in the hands of a group (policemen) that may violate human rights of freedom and privacy.
- ☞ Existing laws were sufficiently effective to control individual behaviour.

❖ Organised policing was, as a result, regarded as superfluous (Van Heerden 1976:26).

Peel presented the following counter-arguments:

- ❖ Laws not only provided for the maintenance of social order, but also for the *restoration* thereof (only through organised policing) by stipulating *where, when* and by *whom* (organised policing) it should be executed.
- ❖ Suppression was not (and should never be) the purpose of policing in a democratic society but is, instead, a *social service* with *crime prevention* as its primary aim (Van Heerden 1976:26).

Organised policing had been regarded a mechanism of *transformation*: instead of applying gross, physical force to subdue people to conform to the laws, it was rather meant to be instrumental in facilitating public acceptance of and voluntary compliance with the laws, as well as appreciation for the personal and collective advantages of a tranquil, stable and orderly society.

In early 1829, following the latest report of the parliamentary committee concerning the need for change in regard to safety and security, the British Parliament finally passed the *Metropolitan Police Act* which preserved the status of justices and constables. It also authorised the appointment of two police commissioners charged with the duties of organising and administering a new police force (Simonsen 1998:13), known as the *Bow Street Runners*. This new police unit, established on 29 September 1829, comprised 100 unarmed officers organised along military lines. With the institution of this organised police unit, the parish constable-movement came to an end. Charles Rowan, a Colonel in the military and attorney Richard Mayne were appointed joint commissioners of the Bow Street Runners. Colonel Rowan thoroughly realised that the only chance of success for the new police unit would be the existence of *mutual respect between this new police unit and the public of London* (Lyman 1999:69), as well as cooperation, justice, equality and crime prevention (Collins *et al.* 2000:17).

Although Peel's Bow Street Runners were referred to as "blue devils" and "Peel's bloody gang", Rowan and Mayne succeeded in gaining public appreciation and cooperation for their efforts. By June 1830 (less than a year after the establishment of Peel's unit), the force grew to an astronomic 3,314 men. Between 1829 and 1831, 8 000 men were sworn in, but more than 3 000 had been discharged due to unfitness, incompetence and drunkenness (Collins *et al.* 2000:17).

The functions of the English police during the early part of the nineteenth century were (Lyman 1999:69):

- (1) "To prevent local disturbances without the use of repressive force and to avoid intervention by the military;
- (2) To control public order nonviolently, using force to gain compliance only as a last resort;
- (3) To reduce conflict between the public and the police;
- (4) To demonstrate efficiency through the absence of crime and disorder rather than by visible evidence of oppressive police action".

Hess and Wroblewski (1995:13-14) inform us that at the beginning of nineteenth century " ... inadequate law enforcement over much of England required further supplementation of security by private enterprise". For instance, industrial enterprises who employed large numbers of unruly workers, established their own private security forces and railway companies also employed a private (police) force to maintain order on railway premises. The iron plant of the Tredegar Works in Monmouthshire and Lancashire instituted similar private security forces. Collective responsibility still existed for the suppression of neighbourhood disturbances and the employment of special constables and the formation of armed forces were still in place, as well as *thief-takers*, also known as the notorious private investigators who apprehended criminals and collected rewards for their efforts afterwards.

1.6 AMERICAN PRIVATE SECURITY : 1600 - 1800

Dutch, Spanish, French, but mostly English colonists who settled in America, brought with them a system of policing similar to that in operation in England and its reliance on collective responsibility. For instance, the office of *constable* which was instituted in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, had been charged with duties such as: keeping the peace, raising the hue and cry, controlling drunkards and apprehending law violators. By 1658, the duties of the constable were expanded to informing the magistrate of new immigrants, keeping the Watch and Ward, summoning jurymen for criminal trials, bringing before the court those men and women who did not live with their spouses, collecting taxes, etc. (Collins *et al.* 2000:17;19).

As the small colonial settlements developed into cities, the following private security measures were *inter alia* introduced (Collins *et al.* 2000:17-18):

- In 1631, Boston, MA established a Night Watch, but about 200 years later, in 1854, this city followed in the footsteps of New York city and established its own public police force.
- A Burglar Watch was established in New Netherlands in New York in 1643, but was abolished in 1644 with the introduction of a public police force, the New York City Police Department (NYCPD).
- Philadelphia also introduced a Night Watch in 1700 in which all citizens were obliged to do their stints but serious problems such as induction, sleeping or drinking on duty emerged.

Collins *et al.* (2000:18) opine that although the creation of new public police forces may have contributed towards solving some of the social problems endemic in American society at that time, they also created numerous other problems. One salient problem highlighted by these authors, was the involvement of politicians in policing, to such an extent that “... most of the major municipal departments were embroiled in politics” (Collins *et al.* 2000:18). Other problems such as nepotism,

securing employment only through bribery and corruption, firing of police officers “... when a change of political factions occurred ...” etc., also surfaced (Collins *et al.* 2000:18).

Like the English policing system introduced to America, private security practices which also stemmed from this continent, were brought to the United States. For instance, in the New England area where people depended upon commerce and industry for their livelihood, many towns and villages employed the English Watch-system which remained the most important component of private protection until the second part of the eighteenth century when public police forces were established. County forms of government developed in the rural South and, like in English counties, the *sheriff* also became a popular protection officer (Ricks *et al.* 1994:13; Collins *et al.* 2000:19).

The *westward expansion* saw people moving from the populated Atlantic coastal area across the country to settle in areas occupied by Indians and other nations who were unfriendly and hostile to people of English origin (Collins *et al.* 2000:19). According to Hess and Wroblewski (1995:16), it was especially the stagecoaches that carried mail, gold, large sums of money and passengers which fell prey to armed robbers. Timm and Christian (1991:32-33) opine that conflict in the West consisted mostly of fierce battles and skirmishes between several groups, namely Native Americans and white settlers, wealthy landowners and the smaller ranches and farmers, cattle owners and sheep ranchers, as well as vigilante groups and suspected criminals. Within the span of just one century, the *westward expansion* proceeded through three distinctive stages:

- migration (from the east) and settlement of newcomers
- a feudal period
- the rise of metropolitan communities.

During each of these phases, people had to rely on private security measures for their own protection (Timm & Christian 1991:33). At the end of the Civil War, crime was rife in the West. The era of outlaw gangs started to claim its toll, but stage line

companies responded by establishing their own private security forces and detective agencies to trace and apprehend criminals. Strikes and related unrests forced coal and iron industries to provide in their own needs for security and protection.

3.6.1 Allan Pinkerton (1819 - 1884)

Born in Scotland, Allan Pinkerton joined the radical Chartist group at a young age and was forced to flee his country of birth or face imprisonment. In Chicago, in the United States he continued his trade (making of barrels). He later moved to Illinois where his cooperage (i.e. business of making barrels) became a way station for the underground railroad - a secret network that assisted with the escaping of slaves. After he accidentally discovered the hideout of a group of counterfeiters and assisted the local sheriff in apprehending these men, he eventually sold his business to become the deputy sheriff of Cook County. He became Chicago's first detective in 1843. He would soon become the "father" of private security in the United States (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:18).

In 1850, *Allan Pinkerton* opened the first private detective agency in Chicago. In 1855 he established the North West Police Agency which provided security and protection to several Midwestern railroads. In 1857 he formed the Pinkerton Protection Patrol which provided in the demand for contract (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:17) private security guard services by several industrial clients. His slogan was: "We never sleep", and its logo an open eye - was probably the origin of the term: "private eye". Having been the only agency that provided interstate security services, Allan Pinkerton was called upon by the United States' government to assist General McClellan of the erstwhile Illinois Central Railroad (one of Pinkerton's clients) during the Civil War to provide intelligence gathering for the Union Army. Pinkerton's security businesses continued to grow and as recent as 1988, it merged with CPP Security - currently one of the largest private security organisations in the world (Timm & Christian 1991:34-35; Simonsen 1998:15).

3.6.2 Wells and Fargo

The discovery of gold in the West (California) in 1848 led to an increase in violent behaviour as people flocked to the newly-found treasures in search for wealth and a new life. Vigilantism started blooming in an attempt to maintain some form of order and safety (Simonsen 1998:15). Transporting goods became a risky exercise. In 1850, Henry Wells and William Fargo joined forces and form the *American Express* company to serve the United States east of the Missouri River. In 1852, Wells Fargo and Company was established to serve the country west of the Missouri River. Both these firms had their own private detectives and shotgun riders, and became the world's largest armoured car service (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:16; Simonsen 1998:16).

3.6.3 Edwin Holmes

In 1858, Edwin Holmes, a Bostonian, started to operate the first *central alarm system* which he called the American Division Telegraph (ADT). His initiative marked the beginning of the first electronic burglar alarm system in the United States. Known as the Holmes Protection Company (HPC), his business grew so fast that by 1880 the company was able to monitor business premises in Boston, New York and Philadelphia (Ricks *et al.* 1994:15). Holmes' pioneer work gave birth " ... to a whole new industry and technological field" (Simonsen 1998:16).

3.6.4 Railroad security

Migration of people from the east coast to the West (the so-called *Westward expansion*) during the course of the nineteenth century elicited large scale conflict with Indians and roving criminal gangs who engaged in armed robbery of stagecoach and train passengers, stealing of cargo, destroying railroad tracks with dynamite, etc. During this event, little or no public policing existed to curb the lawless behaviour of these and other criminals, mainly because of problems encountered due to prevailing interstate jurisdiction (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:16).

In 1865, however, several railway police acts were passed and railroad police officers appointed to contend with train robbers, station holdups, pick-pocketing, con men, and the like. Unfortunately, these officers experienced confusion, distrust and were inefficient - mainly because no central agency or control body existed that could coordinate standards of employment and conditions of service, job requirements, or public relations. In short, proper administration of these police units was lacking. One outstanding feature of a railroad detective or special agent required that he should have been someone “ ... who could hold his own in a gun battle with train robbers ... ” and “[i]n this era of the smoking sixshooters, tact and investigative intelligence placed second to the ability to handle physical contact with those who preyed upon the railroad”. Only in 1921 the Association of American Railroads was established to help coordinate mutual problems - especially those related to security (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:17).

3.6.5 Brink's Armoured Car Service (1858)

Washington Perry Brink could have paved the way for what is known today as “in-transit-security”. In 1858, Brink's Inc. was founded as a freight and package delivery (courier) service in the United States. Brink first started transporting trunks and packages in a dray, pulled by one horse (i.e. a low cart used to carry heavy loads of goods). In 1891, Brink Inc. had been contracted to transport the Western Electric Company's first payroll. Initially, Brink acted very inconspicuously by transporting cash, wrapped in newspapers or overalls, in buggies (light horse-drawn carts). However, in 1917, gang leader “Ammunition” Wheed killed two of Brink's employees in a holdup. This tragedy led to the ‘birth’ of the armoured car, also known as the “bankvault on wheels” (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:21).

3.6.6 Other private security developments

In 1883, the Jewelers Security Alliance for protection against burglary was established by a group of jewelers.

In 1909, William J. Burns, a former Secret Service investigator and head of the Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of the FBI), founded the sole investigating agency for the American Banking Association.

It appears that, for all practical purposes, Pinkerton's Agency and Burns' Investigating Agency were the only national investigative bodies concerned with non-specialised crimes in the United States until the establishment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1924 (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:21).

3.6.7 World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945)

World War I took place mainly in Europe and the Middle East in which the Allies (primarily France, Russia, Britain, Italy after 1915 and the United States after 1917) defeated the central powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Just before and even during this so-called "Great War", American industries were extremely vulnerable to sabotage and espionage. In an attempt to protect war industries against sabotage, private security agencies were hired. In 1921, a Burglary Protection Council was established to provide standards, specifications, testing and certification of burglar alarm systems and devices (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:21-22; Simonsen 1998:17).

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, however, private security activities declined dramatically. It appears that unemployment reduced the demand for private security protection because it " ... [security] seemed to be something easy to do without" (Simonsen 1998:17).

World War II, in which Britain and France declared war on Germany and later Italy who joined forces with Germany, not only gave the United States the necessary 'injection' to revitalise the greatest industrial mobilisation, but also the private security industry. "The beginning of World War II was a tremendous *catalyst* for the growth of private security services. Almost overnight, thousands of security personnel were employed to protect the nation's industries and working forces" (Collins *et al.* 2000:22) (*italics added*). Security measures for defense factories were

upgraded and streamlined to protect these against sabotage and espionage. To this end, the FBI 'screened' more than 200 000 factory watchmen (security guards) and trained by public police officials in security skills which, in itself, enhanced the quality and standards of factory security (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:22; Simonsen 1998:17).

In conclusion, it appears that both World Wars I and II placed renewed emphasis on the need for security in government quarters and, likewise, highlighted the need for factory (plant) security. In both instances, private security guards played an all important role - to such an extent that "... private security expanded to encompass all segments of the private sector" (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:23).

3.6.8 CPTED and private security in the United States

Pamela Collins and Associates (2000:23-24) contend that although crime prevention was observable during ancient times in various forms, the United States gave this concept a totally new dimension with the development of the public housing scheme. Elizabeth Wood (no reference) developed the *Social Design Theory* which not only emphasised the importance of maintaining a *sense of privacy* by the occupants of housing facilities, but also a *sense of community*. Wood further suggested that, for crime prevention to be effective within the framework of her social design theory, public housing facilities should be designed in such a manner to allow easy interaction between residents as well as maximum observation for the sake of safety and security. Jane Jacobs (1961), a journalist and proponent of Wood, suggested involvement of local business owners to improving public safety. Perhaps a forerunner of what is known today in South Africa as "Business Against Crime" (BAC).

Oscar Newman, an architect, created the phrase: *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)* in 1972. Newman worked closely with St. Louis Police Department, Illinois in the mid 1960 where he assisted in designing and developing the *Pruit-Ingoe Housing Project*. Here, he coined the popular term: *defensible space*, which he defined in 1973 as "... a model which inhibits crime by

creating a physical expression of a social fabric which defends itself" (CF. Newman 1973; Collins *et al.* 2000:23). Newman is especially credited for linking environmental design and crime in a symbiotic relationship. Since the emergence of CPTED, private security has developed from its ancient embryonic stage to the most formidable protection enterprise include the most progressive and advanced operational and technological methods and techniques of crime prevention and investigation thinkable (Collins *et al.* 2000:23).

3.7 CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PRIVATE SECURITY

Inability of public policing to respond and satisfy the needs and expectations of members of the community contributed to the growth of private security (Hess & Wroblewski 1995:23). Bayley (1994:124) refers to *dishonest law enforcement* which is rampant in modern society, because " ... the police promise to prevent crime but actually provide something else - namely authoritative intervention and symbolic justice". "Dishonesty" in this regard is, according to this 'noted' author, to be found in the pretention (on the part of the police) that contemporary policing is capable of preventing and solving crime but, in fact, it rather exploits the public's fear of crime. This cause an "over-selling" of policing - especially in cases where the status of and confidence in the police are low (Bayley 1994:11;71). It is, therefore, no wonder that this author proceeds to point out that " ... there is a sense of crisis about public security ... at the center of this crisis are the police, who promise to protect us but do not appear to be able to do so ... we don't know whether they should be replaced - even though this is quietly occurring" (Bayley 1994:11). In this regard, Collins *et al.* (2000:23) are also adamant that crime and related social problems have outgrown the capacity of public policing to provide the primary social services in terms of safety and security needed by the community they are supposed to serve. There are now more private security agencies and personnel than public policing in the United States and Britain (Leishman, Loveday & Savage 1996:59-60) and South Africa (as will be seen later). This may be so because contemporary private security operations are highly technological and more advanced than ever before.

Table 3.1 below provides a useful comparison and projected growth of public policing and private security agencies in the United States for the period 1970 to 2000:

TABLE 3.1 : COMPARISON OF PUBLIC POLICE VERSUS PRIVATE SECURITY EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S. : 1970 – 2000

AGENCY TYPE	1970	2000	NUMBER OF EMPLOYMENT INCREASE
Public policing employment	622,700	684,400	61,700
Private security employment	1,493,300	1,882,700	389,400

Source: William C. Cunningham, John J. Strauchs & Clifford W. Van Meter. *Private Security Trends 1970-2000: The Hallcrest Report II*, 1990, pp. 232-235.

Based on the statistics contained in Table 3.1, the ratio between private security and public police officer employment in the United States is 2.4 to 1 and it has been predicted to increase to 2.8 to 1 by the year 2000 (Ricks *et al.* 1994:17). Regoli and Hewitt (1996:246) also predicted that private security employment will outnumber that of public policing by almost 3 to 1. A further estimation by Regoli and Hewitt (1996:246) shows that by the year 2000, the total cost in terms of salaries and costs for private security services will reach just over \$100 billion (see Figure 3.1).

Collins *et al.* (2000:24) provide a further comparison and break down of private security and public police employment in the United States in terms of private security guards/officers and police patrol officers for 1984, 1990, 1996 and 2006 (see Table 3.2):

**TABLE 3.2 : COMPARISON OF PRIVATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC
POLICING IN TERMS OF SECURITY GUARDS/OFFICERS
AND POLICE PATROL OFFICERS: 1984, 1990, 1996 AND 2006
(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)**

AGENCY TYPE	Number of full time employees: 1984	Number of full time employees: 1990	Number of full time employees: 1996	Number of full time employees: 2006
Security Officers / Guards	733,000	883,000 .	954,644	1,175,257
Police Patrol Officers	520,000	665,000	412,739	486,080
Difference	213,000	218,000	541,905	689,177
Ratio: Security / Police	1.4 to 1	1.3 to 1	2.3 to 1	2.4 to 1

Source: *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, U.S. Department of Labour: Bureau of Labour Statistics.

An important aspect emanating from the Hallcrest Report II which analysed security trends over a thirty year period, is that the growth in private security employment in the United States have long ago surpassed that of public police - both in terms of employment and funding, and that this trend will continue to manifest itself in the history of this developed country. As far as public policing is concerned, the outlook is somewhat bleak because " ... there will be only slight growth, which does not even match the growth in population, in the public police sector" (Simonsen 1998:73). This "uneven" balancing of forces simply means that greater cooperation between private security and public policing will become increasingly necessary to effectively

and efficiently address the growing crime problem and by doing just that, to also provide in the safety and security needs of law abiding citizens.

3.8 PRIVATE SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Unlike the United States or England where the historical development of private security has been well documented, it appears that the documentation of the evolution of private security in South Africa has been totally neglected and perhaps overshadowed by that of public policing. This is not to say that private security was not part of South African history. In fact, it is the considered opinion of the researcher that, in order to understand the historical role of private security, it is necessary to take cognisance of the historical development of public policing in this country. Just like the London Metropolitan Police became the model for American policing (Regoli & Hewitt 1996:218), so did policing in South Africa originate from the British model. This is especially evident in the statement made by Van Heerden (retired Captain of the erstwhile South African Police, author of numerous academic literature on policing and first appointed professor of Police Science at the University of South Africa) namely, that the [erstwhile] South African Police (SAP) was largely influenced by the British police system as regards the organisational composition and functional orientation of that police force (Van Heerden 1976:27) and transformed into the present South African Police Service (SAPS) during 1995. South Africa's first nationally-organised police force only came into being on 1 April 1913.

3.8.1 The South African Police (SAP)

The South African Police was established on 1 April 1913 in terms of the Police Act (Act 14 of 1912) with Colonel (now Senior Superintendent) Sir Theodore G. Truter as the first Chief Commissioner of the police forces of the four provinces. Also appointed at that time, were two deputy commissioners: Lieutenant-Colonel (today known as Superintendent) H.C. Bredell for the uniform branch, and Lieutenant-Colonel T.E. Mavrogordato as chief of the detective branch (SAP Yearbook 1989:39).

The South African Police was a centralised, national police force and in terms of the Police Act (Act 7 of 1958), its main functions were as follows (Van Heerden 1976:35):

- * the preservation of the internal security of South Africa
- * the maintenance of law and order
- * investigation of crime or alleged crime
- * prevention of crime.

The South African Police (SAP) was amalgamated into the new South African Police Service (SAPS) in 1995, when the new Police Act, Act 68 of 1995 was promulgated and put into operation. The establishment of this new police force transformed the existing, colonial policing model into a democratic, community-driven police service.

3.8.2 Private Security in a South African context

Right from the beginning it should be pointed out that, unlike our American counterparts who have written widely on private security in the United States, the historical development of the private security industry in South Africa has not been completely recorded. Issues of importance that have not yet been addressed, are *inter alia* the following:

- Private security in South Africa's mining industry, such as the "Witwatersrand", Goldfields, Consolidated Diamond Mines in the erstwhile South West Africa (now Namibia), etc.
- Private security patrolling and crime prevention.
- Retail and wholesale security.
- In transit security.
- Development of the electronic alarm industry in South Africa.
- Private security training - technical as well as academic.

As recent as 2000, when the newly appointed Security Officers' Interim Board compiled its discussion document intended as the basis for consultation, the status of

the South African private security industry was identified as being “ ... of considerable strategic and economic importance. The security industry’s strategic role in ensuring safety and security is highlighted by the vast human and material resources it deploys to protect and safeguard people and property ... “ (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:1).

3.9 SUMMARY

Security in America finds its historical roots in the scope and range of events that shaped early England. English concepts of law, justice, social structure, and security evolved and were gradually assimilated into early American life. One merely has to look at the social evolutions of England to discover why and how certain changes occurred in America.

Security in the private sector began and grew in direct relationship to the needs of American society. The Civil War, the development of an extensive railway system, World Wars I and II, technological advances, a rising crime rate, government regulations, civil liability, and other factors have, in the passage of time, combined to initiate and nurture a significant and growing demand for security products and service.

With the new millennium on hand, security and crime prevention will become increasingly important in dealing with such issues as electronic commerce, a global economy, a culturally diverse workforce, technology, protection of intellectual property, downsizing, and an aging population (Collins *et al.* 2000:30).

CHAPTER 4

CRIME PREVENTION : PAST AND PRESENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Crime is a costly and demoralising problem in everyday life that surely affects all of us. Some victims of crime suffer direct injury, financial loss and, worst of all, intimidation; others indirectly by higher prices for products, taxes, insurance premiums and the sense of insecurity and the fear resulting from criminal acts. Those who work and live in “high crime” areas can be deprived of some of the normal opportunities and pleasures by the social and economic impact of crime and by the alienation and despair that accompanies the fear of crime (Lab 1997:1).

Is there hope to reduce or eliminate the crime problem *in toto*? Probably not, it may be argued, but it is reasonable to believe that crime and the fear of crime can at least be reduced and controlled. What has apparently been lacking in our society is a national systematic and effective crime control strategy. Crime prevention appears to be an all important desired strategy.

Crime prevention is an elegant simple and direct approach that protects the potential victim from criminal harm by anticipating the possibility of attack and eliminating or reducing the opportunity for it to occur – and very important, the possibility for personal harm or property loss.

Crime prevention programs have been developed in many parts of the world and have attracted the participation of thousands of law enforcement professionals, public and private officials, leaders of voluntary services, professional and labour organisations and surely, millions of citizens world wide.

The *purpose* of understanding *crime prevention* is to bring together some ingredients of crime prevention practice, thereby providing a “roadmap” for those who wish to take part in this fascinating and demanding field. Many recent activities classified as crime prevention can be seen throughout history. Indeed, “new” crime prevention ideas and techniques are often little more than reincarnations of past practices or extensions of basic approaches in the (distant) past. It was greatly the form of prevention that has varied over the centuries (Lab 1997:1-3).

Over the last 25 years, it has become increasingly evident that public law enforcement agencies (police) can provide neither the resources nor the personnel needed to protect property. Thus, the role of private security has become more visible and even more important as the reality for self-protection and loss prevention needs have become recognised and accepted by both the public, police and business.

The role of private security in crime prevention has rapidly progressed since 1980. The quality of information available and used by researchers, as well as the quality of personnel involved in security, has improved and will continue to improve into the 21st century. Properly educated and trained security personnel, utilising proven technology and techniques, and crime prevention will ensure that private security, along with improved law enforcement and community involvement, will make the new century a safer environment for all citizens (Collins *et al.* 2000:preface).

4.2 CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH THE AGES

In any discussion about crime prevention, it is important to set forth the context from which ideas and thoughts emerge. Perhaps the best place to start is with an understanding of what has happened in the past. The study of crime prevention is

no exception to the rule.

Indeed, many people suggest that what we are doing today is new and unique, particularly when we talk about citizen participation. In reality, it is only in the relatively recent past that the general citizenry has *not* been the primary line of defense against crime and victimisation (Lab 1997:1).

The following discussion will be a brief look into crime prevention throughout history. While necessarily general, it will provide a framework from which to launch other discussions.

4.2.1 A thumbnail sketch of early crime prevention

The earliest responses to crime were left to the individual and his or her family. There was no societal agency that would intervene on the behalf of an aggrieved individual. Instead, "self-help" was the primary response (Wormser 1962). Retribution, revenge and vengeance were the driving forces throughout early history. While such actions would serve to make the victim whole again, the underlying assumption was that potential offenders would see little gain in an offence, thereby deterring the individual from taking action. Some of the earliest sets of laws, such as the Code of Hammurabi (dating roughly from 1750 B.C.), outlined retribution by the victim and/or his or her family as the accepted response to injurious behaviour. *Lex talionis*, the principle of "an eye for an eye", was specifically set forth as a driving principle in the Hammurabic Law. The proscription of individual/familial retribution for crime appears in many other early laws, including the Justinian Code (534 A.D.) which appears almost 2500 years after Hammurabi laid out his code. These laws and practices provided legitimacy to individual citizen action (Lab 1997:2).

For the most part, the existence of any formal system of social control is a relatively new idea. While it is possible to point to "policing" in some early

civilizations (such as the Roman Empire and in France), these efforts often displayed several features which mitigated their use by most citizens. First, they were highly concentrated in the cities. Second, most policing was done by the military. Third, and most importantly, the laws enforced by these “police” typically involved issues of the central state and the nobility (i.e., king), and not common concerns of the citizens. Due to the limited usefulness of these early forms of police, people were left with the need to continue self-help methods.

The Norman conquest of England in 1066 gave rise to an *obligatory* form of avocational citizen policing (Klockars 1985). Following the conquest, male citizens were required to band together into groups for the purpose of policing each other. If one individual in the group caused harm (to a group or nongroup member), the other members were responsible for apprehending and sanctioning the offender. Failure to take action was itself an offense. While this practice served as a means of addressing harm against the individual, it was largely meant to eliminate threats to the Crown (Lab 1997:2).

Beyond this obligatory action, a variety of cooperative practices emerged that relied on citizen participation to protect the community and one another. One practice, “watch and ward”, rotated the responsibility for keeping watch threat be identified by this individual, he would raise the alarm and call for help (“hue and cry”). It was then up to the general citizenry to apprehend and (possibly) punish the offender. Those responding to the call for help were not employees of the state. Rather, they were other common citizens. This approach to policing was codified in 1285 in the Statutes of Winchester (Klockars 1985). Besides ideas about “watch and ward” and “hue and cry”, statutes also required men to have weapons available for use when called upon (“assize of arms”), and outlined the role of a “constable”, which was an unpaid position responsible for coordinating the watch and ward system and overseeing other aspects of the law. Every able-bodied male in the community was supposed to take a turn at being constable. It is apparent throughout these actions that crime prevention was a major

responsibility of the citizenry (Lab 1997:2-3).

The individual, often voluntary, responsibility for crime prevention generally persisted until the 1800s. The exceptions to this trend can be seen in the development of paid, private security police for specialised industries or groups. The Merchant Police of England, which was established in the sixteenth century to protect the wool industry, is a prime example of an early private police force. The “parochial” police, hired by the wealthy to protect their homes and businesses, is another example (Lab 1997:3).

The passage of the Highwayman Act in 1692 in England set up a new entrepreneurial form of policing or private security. This law outlined the practice of paying bounty to individuals for the capture of thieves and the recovery of property. While originally intended as a means of protecting shipments of goods from city to city, the idea had immediate implications for the general public. These voluntary bounty hunters came to be known as “thief takers”. By the mid 1700s, the thief takers were organised under the leadership of English magistrates. These thief takers, who were often reformed criminals themselves, were “paid” to protect the public by being able to keep a portion of all recovered property (Lab 1997:3).

The evolution of the thief takers from a wholly voluntary activity to a legitimised, organised group under government control was the beginning of a process which ended with the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829. At this point, the main responsibility for law enforcement and public protection was shifted from volunteer citizens to paid, professional police. Key to this new police organisation was the idea of crime prevention. Sir Robert Peel, who was the driving force behind the Metropolitan Police Act, and Charles Roman, the commissioner of the new organisation, both saw crime prevention as the basic principle underlying police work. Even earlier attempts at formal policing, such as that in 17th century Paris, emphasised crime prevention through methods such

as preventive patrol, increased lighting, and street cleaning (Lab 1997:3).

The dominance of volunteer activity was not restricted to England and Europe. Similar citizen responsibility was common place in the new world colonies and the early United States. This vigilante movement, which mirrored early ideas of “hue and cry”, was a major component of enforcing law and order in the growing frontier of the young country. Poses of citizens were formed when an offender needed to be apprehended and (possibly) punished. Formal police forces, mirroring the movement in England, emerged in the mid-1800s and were restricted primarily to the largest U.S. cities in the northeast, leaving citizens to continue their efforts at self-protection (Lab 1997:3-4).

While the foregoing discussion has emphasised the dominance of individual action and self-help that prevailed throughout most of history, it should not be construed as indicative that protective actions were solely a matter of retribution and revenge. There are numerous examples of alternative approaches to dealing with crime, many of which were preventative in nature. Two examples were the use of walls and moats around cities to protect the community from external invasion. Many of the approaches already discussed provided surveillance as a means of identifying problems before they got out of hand. Yet another prevention approach was the restriction of weapon ownership as a means of eliminating violent behaviour. However, despite these examples, the dominant trend before the advent of formal policing in the 1800s was the reliance on individuals to protect themselves (Lab 1997:4).

4.2.2 Twentieth Century Crime Prevention in the United States

By the turn of the 19th century, increases in industrialisation, immigration and labour organisations, along with an expanding economy, created many conditions that were conducive to the growth of private security in the United States. Because public police forces were organised exclusively on a desentralised basis

and their operations were limited by local political boundaries, law enforcement beyond restricted jurisdictions was provided *only* by private security forces. It was not until 1924 that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) came into being to provide law enforcement on a national and centralised basis. Up to this event, private security agencies such as Pinkerton, Wells and Fargo as well as Burns were virtually the only agencies within the United States capable of providing cross-jurisdictional protection of persons and property (Collins *et al.* 2000:21-22).

Prior to and during World War I, the concern for security intensified in American industry, not only as a result of urbanisation and industrial growth but also the fear of sabotage and espionage by politically active nationalists. The private security industry in the United States experienced a short period of rapid growth and expansion as security personnel supplied by private contractors were utilised to guard factories, utilities, and transportation systems. The end of the war saw a decrease in security concerns and the status and quality of security services were lowered.

In the 1930's, demand for plant protection and the provision of corporate security services became a pressing issue. Even though the country suffered from the aftermath of the depression years, demand for private security developed in reaction to labour strikes and unrest in American industry. However, the involvement of security in many cases was controversial and characterised by overzealous and wicked acts of brutality. Striking workers were beaten and shot by security guards hired to protect company property. Security operatives posing as employees infiltrated workers' groups, relaying information back to the company on strike leaders and employee plans of action. Numerous workers bent on sabotage, work stoppage, etc., were caught in the act due to the information gathered by the "inside" operatives. The Pinkerton Agency alone had informers planted in 93 organisations; many of these operatives held high union offices (Ursic & Pagano 1974:19). As a result, security services were not held in high

esteem by most of the working public.

The beginning of World War II was a tremendous catalyst for the growth of private security services. Almost overnight, thousands of security personnel were employed to protect the nation's industries and working forces. The federal government in many instances required contractors to employ comprehensive security measures to protect materials necessary for the war effort. Wartime concern for the prevention and detection of espionage and sabotage brought a federal decision to bring plant watch and security personnel into the army as an auxiliary unit of the military police. Before the end of the war, more than 200,000 industrial security personnel were sworn in by the Internal Security Division of the War Department after being required to sign an agreement placing them under the Articles of War (Ursic & Pagano 1974:20). As a result of this increased emphasis and attention to security by the government, private industry became more aware of the role that plant security could have in the protection of their assets.

Although crime prevention techniques were present in ancient times, the concept as it is used today can be traced back to the early 1960s and the development of public housing. Those credited with being some of the first to voice concerns regarding the design and layout of these housing projects were Elizabeth Wood and her development of a "Social Design Theory". This theory focused attention upon the importance of maintaining a sense of privacy by the occupants, but also a sense of community. Wood's theory suggested that to be effective, public housing facilities should be designed with areas that promoted interaction by residents, such as children playing on a common playground while allowing for maximum observation by the residents. Involvement by local business owners was advocated by Jane Jacobs, a journalist and proponent of Woods. She advocated that in order to establish and maintain a sense of community, local business had a duty to contribute to enhancing public safety by involving them in observation and surveillance.

Expanding upon Wood's theory, the phrase Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) was coined by Oscar Newman, an architect, who worked with the St. Louis Police Department in the mid-1960s to assist them in the development and design of the Pruitt-Ingoe housing project. Based upon Newman's early work with the St. Louis Police Department, he coined the term: *defensible space*. This term was defined as "a model which inhibits crime by creating a physical expression of a social fabric which defends itself" (Newman 1973), and became associated with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Based upon research conducted by Newman, he is credited with linking the design of the environment and crime. The development and expansion of private and public security and crime prevention services has since evolved from the embryonic stage to include some of the most progressive operational and technological techniques of crime prevention, detection, and apprehension in use today. As crime and social problems have outgrown the capacity of public law enforcement agencies to provide an umbrella of public services to varying segments of society, there has been a corresponding increase in the role and function of security and protective services. Contemporary security operation now have the tools and capability to provide an effective and efficient protection program for the total organisation (Collins *et al.* 2000:21-24).

According to Lab (1997:4), the advent of the twentieth century witnessed a great deal of change in societal response to deviant behaviour. Not only was a formal police force becoming the norm, but other forces also emerged to address crime and deviance. Not the least of these changes was the growth of the scientific study of crime and criminal behaviour. The emerging fields of psychology, sociology and criminology in the 1800s and early 1900s were beginning to question the causes of deviant behaviour. Rather than carrying on the dominant tradition of attributing deviance to the battle between good and evil (God and the devil), researchers were starting to note patterns in where and when offenses occurred and who was involved in these offenses, and to relate these facts to changing social structure and personal relationships. The logical result of this

growing study was a movement away from simple responses involving repression, vengeance, retribution, and the like to actions that would attack the assumed causes of deviant behaviour. The emerging criminal and juvenile justice systems, therefore, responded by incorporating more prevention-orientated functions into their activity:

♦ *Save the less fortunate*

One prime example of an early “crime prevention” approach was the development of the juvenile court and its efforts to combat the problems of poverty, lack of education, and poor parenting among the lower classes of society. While it can be argued whether this was a benevolent action or one driven by a desire to keep the *status quo*, the reality is that an emphasis was placed on correcting a problem before it occurred. Children were separated from their problem households and neighbourhoods in an attempt to provide the love, guidance, and education needed to lead a productive life.

The preventive nature of the juvenile system can be seen in its philosophy and operation. The *parens patriae* philosophy argued that youths needed help and that processing in adult courts was geared to punishment rather than prevention. Consequently, a new system was needed that emphasised molding proper behaviour early in life, similar to the role of a parent. A natural companion to this philosophy was the expansion of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to cover *status offenses*. It was believed that curfew violation, smoking, playing in the street, incorrigibility, and other such actions (none of which were proscribed by the criminal code) were indicative of later criminal behaviour. Thus, intervening in these status offenses was a means of preventing later crime. The juvenile system, therefore, was clearly an attempt at crime prevention (Lab 1997:4-5).

♦ *Altering the social fabric*

A more recognised form of early preventive action is the work of the Chicago

Area Project. This project was based on the research of Shaw and McKay (1931, 1942) in which they found crime and delinquency concentrating in the central areas of Chicago, and persisting in those areas despite demographic changes over time. Identifying a high level of transiency and an apparent lack of social ties in these areas as the root cause of the problems, Shaw and McKay (1942) labeled the problem as *social disorganisation*. What this meant was that the constant turnover of residents resulted in an inability for the people to exert any informal social control over the individuals in the area. People were more interested in improving themselves and moving out of these neighbourhoods than in improving the area and staying there. Consequently, offenders could act with some degree of impunity in these neighbourhoods.

Shaw's proposed solution to the problem of social disorganisation was to work with the residents to build a sense of pride and community, thereby prompting people to stay and exert control over the actions of people in the area. The Chicago Area Project (CAP) was founded in 1931 as a vehicle for building a self-help atmosphere. The key to the CAP was the generation of community support through the use of community volunteers and existing neighbourhood institutions. Recreation for youths, vigilance and community self-renewal, and mediation were the major components to building that support. In essence, the project sought to build ongoing, thriving communities that could control the behaviour of both its residents and those who visited the area (Lab 1997:5).

♦ *The Physical Environment*

Crime prevention experienced perhaps its biggest boost with the emergence of physical design as a topic of debate. Led by the work of Jane Jacobs (1961) and Oscar Newman (1972), flaws in the physical environment were identified as causes of, or at least facilitators for, criminal behaviour. This topic will later be discussed in length.

The interest in environmental causes, both physical and social prompted a

great deal of research and intervention in the 1970s and 1980s. Programs aimed at altering the construction of public housing, altering traffic and road patterns, installing better lights and locks, marking property with identification numbers, cleaning up buildings and neighborhoods, and promoting citizen interaction were instituted under the rubric of crime prevention. The aim of all these efforts was twofold - encourage citizens to take control of their area, and present an image to potential offenders that there is increased risk in offending in the area (Lab 1997:5-6).

♦ *Organise the Public*

Early evaluations of the physical design movement demonstrated that such changes, by themselves, are not sufficient for altering the level of crime (cf. Lab 1997). In essence, physical design changes cannot stop a truly motivated offender and cannot capture the offender for further processing. Further, altering the physical environment does not guarantee that residents will become involved and take action. It became clear that direct efforts to enhance active citizen involvement was a necessary companion to physical design changes.

The 1970s saw the rise of community-based crime prevention programs, typically referred to as Neighbourhood or Block Watch. These programs used the same premise as physical design approaches – that potential offenders will not commit a crime if they perceive citizen activity, awareness, and concern in an area. In essence, the focus is on citizen surveillance and action. Signs of resident activity, social cohesion, and social support should work to protect the neighbourhood. A second component to the growth of citizen involvement was the recognition by law enforcement that they could not stop crime or solve the problems on their own. Instead, there was a growing acceptance among the police that they needed the active help of the citizenry (Lab 1997:7).

A wide array of activities and ideas have been subsumed under the general heading of neighbourhood watch. Surveillance is one of the cornerstone ideas, with variations ranging from conducting block parties to get to know the neighbours; to cutting back bushes, installing lighting, and removing obstacles in order to enhance sight lines; to organising citizen patrols (both walking and vehicular) of the neighbourhood. Security surveys are another important service provided by many neighbourhood watch groups (Garofalo & McLeod 1988). The information gathered in these surveys often form the basis for property marking, installing locks and unbreakable glass, notifying neighbours when the house is to be vacant, leaving lights on when away, and removing signs that indicate the house is unoccupied (such as overgrown grass and piling up mail). Yet another common element of neighbourhood watch is the distribution of crime and crime prevention news. This can be accomplished through meetings or through the publication of newsletters that contain crime data and/or crime prevention suggestions (Lab 1997:7).

Evidence for the effectiveness of community organising for crime prevention purposes is mixed, although there are examples of programs that reduced crime and the fear of crime (Lab 1977). Evaluation results show that direct attempts to engender citizen participation and action is more effective than assuming such participation will follow physical design changes. The greatest point of failure for Neighbourhood Watch is in organising those neighbourhoods and areas most in need of help. Rosenbaum (1987,1988) notes that even concerted efforts to organise high crime communities often fail. Despite this fact, the move to organise citizens and enlist their support in crime prevention activities is a major effort of many police departments and communities (Lab 1997:7).

♦ *Situational Approaches*

The most recent move in crime prevention has been to focus efforts and interventions on attacking specific problems, places, and times. Clarke (Lab

1997:7-8) proposed *situational prevention* as “... measures directed at highly specific forms of crime that involve” environmental changes that “reduce the opportunities for crime and increase its risks”. This approach will be discussed in more detail in par. 4.4.

The above discussion clearly shows that crime prevention is an idea that has been around as long as there has been crime. While the form has changed and the term “crime prevention” is relatively new, the concern over safety and security is age-old. Perhaps the most interesting point to note is the circular movement back to a reliance on the general citizenry for preventive action. Throughout most of history it was the individual’s responsibility, either voluntarily or through obligation, to deal with crime and offenders. It has only been in the recent past that society has moved to a system of police, courts, and corrections that has assumed this primary responsibility. Since the late 1960s, however, there has been a growing movement toward bringing the citizenry back as active participants in crime prevention. While many see this type of community action as “new”, in reality it is more a movement back to age-old traditions of individual and even collective responsibility than a revolutionary step forward in crime control (Lab 1997:8).

This discussion also illustrates that crime prevention need not be, and is not, restricted to the domains of publicly recognised ideas of Neighbourhood Watch and property marking.

4.3 CONCEPTUALISATION

Concepts are often thought of as the basic *building blocks* in the research process, necessary to describe the features of real or possible “words”, and refer therefore to ideas about things that exist or could exist in the real world. In other words, concepts only exist as notions (impressions) in our minds formed through

observation, imagination, discussion (conversation) and often through argumentation or reasoning (Taylor 1994:40-41).

According to Van der Westhuizen (Mqadi 1992:26), it becomes imperative to scientifically define all the relevant terms and concepts. All definitions must be true, unambiguous, must be free of contradictions, must be clear, must be positive, and adequate and not be tautological. Concepts are mental abstractions representing mental constructions of reality. Concepts are abstracted from the physical material world (Hy, Faig & Regoli 1983:2). Definitions are statements of what something is and they take two forms. Nominal and operational definitions are those that describe a concept in terms of operational and nominal definitions that are stated in measurable terms (Hy *et al.* 1983:3).

Voltaire (Peak & Glensor 1999:74) once remarked: "Before we can communicate, let us define our terms". Conceptualisation entails the precise specification of the meaning attached to particular terms or concepts (Babbie 1989:109-110). For the purpose of this presentation, the meaning of the following concepts will be briefly highlighted to eliminate any possible distortion that might prevail: *crime, crime prevention, situational prevention, fear of crime, victim, community, quality of life, policing, social order, urban area, residential area and private security.*

4.3.1 Crime

One could ask: 'why a definition of crime'? On balance, is it next to money, not the root of all evil? The researcher will briefly touch on what is referred to as the *criminological approach* to the concept crime. The late Professor Piet van der Walt defined crime in a criminological sense as anti-social human behaviour or act that "... conflicts with or is injurious to the healthy, normal existence of an individual, his [or her] relatives and the community" (Cloete & Stevens 1990:27).

Osterburg and Ward (1992:3) define crime as:

“... an act committed or omitted in violation of law forbidding or commanding it, and for which punishment is imposed upon conviction”.

Vetter and Silverman (1986:6) define crime as:

“... any social harm made punishable by law”.

“Crime is a violation of the criminal law, that is, a breach of the conduct code specially sanctioned by the state, which through its legislative agencies defines crimes and their penalties, and through its administrative agencies prosecutes offenders” (Fairchild 1994:73).

Usually, the juridical definition of crime seems to be the most important point of departure when research into this social phenomenon is undertaken. The criminological or non-juridical definition of crime appears to be a wider approach but is not always regarded the most appropriate perspective. The juridical definition defines crime “... an unlawful act or omission, which is at variance with either a prohibition or injunction and which is punishable by the authorities” (Cloete & Stevens 1990:26).

4.3.2 Crime Prevention

Ask any ten persons – lay citizens, police officers, or security personnel – to define the term *crime prevention*, and you will get at least five different responses. Such responses will probably not differ a great deal in substance from those found in the writings of criminological scholars, ranging from the global to the finite. A virtual quagmire of definitions exists, varying in nature from juvenile delinquency prevention to increasing prison sentences, and from surgically altering the capacity of criminals to offend to opportunity reduction efforts which focus on hardening the potential targets (Fennelly 1989:3).

Definitions used by informed practitioners also vary but are usually practical and self-explanatory. The same type of activity may be called direct, primary, or mechanical. The police talk in terms of crime prevention while security professionals discuss the field as *loss prevention* or the *protection of assets*. All of these terms refer to preventive and mitigating actions which can be initiated, managed, and controlled, and are therefore usually limited and specific in nature. These terms are contrasted to the indirect, tertiary, and corrective activities that deal more with the management of socioeconomic factors and other far-ranging variables that affect crime (Fennelly 1989:3-4).

Lab (1988:9) defines *crime prevention* as “... any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime”. A more appropriate definition of crime prevention adopted from the American Crime Prevention Coalition 1990 (Collins *et al* 2000:249), reads as follows: “... a pattern of attitudes and behaviour directed both at reducing the threat of crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security to positively influence the quality of life in our society and to help develop environments where crime cannot flourish”. While both definitions aim at reducing crime, the latter also strives towards creating a safe and sound environment for people to live in by means of blocking potential criminal victimisation in a proactive way.

Lab (1997:165) opines that if we as citizens, do not want to live in a highly militarised and restricted society that relies upon its police to “prevent” crime, then very significant changes must occur in how our leaders, citizens and the media think about *crime prevention*. Therefore, to begin a discussion of what is needed, one should have a framework to conceptualise what “prevention of crime” and “crime prevention” really mean. The crime prevention framework consists of a hierarchy similar to the public health model of prevention that differentiates among primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of preventive action.

◆ Primary prevention

Primary crime prevention refers to *proactive and preventive in the most basic sense*, in that it include strategies that occur prior to anyone even contemplating the commission of a crime. Primary crime prevention includes “... *all efforts that strive to keep individuals from developing into criminal offenders*”. It therefore, aims at many of the so-called “root causes” of crime, such as poverty, lack of education, discrimination, hatred, the need for immediate gratification, and anomie. Primary crime prevention is the most important level at which the war on crime and drugs in any normal democracy must be fought. To date, there has been no truly effort to marshal a primary level crime prevention campaign, in which the police are one of the players in a large cast of characters (Lab 1997:165-166).

◆ Secondary prevention

Crime prevention at a secondary level refers to *proactive measures that prevent specific instances of, or opportunities for, potential threat from developing into instances of actual criminal victimisation*. Secondary crime prevention measures strive to minimise the likelihood that specific criminal acts will be initiated at a particular time and in a particular place. Secondary crime prevention measures include all those “reducing opportunities” for crime that have been labeled *opportunity-reduction* strategies. Thus, when residents “target harden” their homes through the use of locks, security systems, and the such, they are engaging in secondary crime prevention. By creating physical barriers to would-be offenders, increase the effort and risk involved to in the commission of a crime and thereby deter the would-be offender away from a specific target (Lab 1997:166-167).

◆ Tertiary prevention

There are other responses to crime that are *purely reactive* in that they strive to minimise the severity of loss when specific crimes are threatened or initiated. Tertiary crime prevention measures include self-protection

strategies such as martial artstraining or carrying a concealed weapon. Personal injury and personal property insurance serve the purpose of “loss reduction”. That is, insurance is preventive at a tertiary level because , at its best, it reduces the severity of one’s financial loss to criminal victimisation (Lab 1997:167).

Situational prevention comprises opportunity-reducing measures that (a) are directed at highly specific forms of crime, (b) involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible, (c) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders (Clarke 1997:4).

4.3.3 Fear of crime

Fear as such, can be viewed as a human response to certain stimuli that are present in the immediate environment (Van Velzen 1998:21). But how exactly is fear projected within a crime context? If no dangers in the environment are perceived or encountered, individuals are likely to continue their normal activities, but if the environment shows any signs of being unsafe, feelings of vulnerability, anxiety and powerlessness may prevail (Warr 1990:892).

Generally, *fear of crime* is defined as anticipating the occurrence of a criminal event or as “ ... a measure of self-perceived chances of victimisation ... ” (Furstenberg 1971:217). In this context, fear of crime becomes a consequence of the potential for victimisation (Van Velzen 1998:22).

4.3.4 Victim of crime

The concept “victim” can be traced to ancient cultures and the earliest languages. In the original meaning of the term, a victim was a person or an animal that was put to death during a ceremony in order to appease some super-natural power or

deity. Currently, in everyday use, the term includes all those who experience injury, loss, or hardship due to any cause, namely accident victims, cancer victims, flood victims and victims of discrimination and other socio-political and economic injustices like *apartheid* (Karmen 1996:2-3).

4.3.5 Community

The concept *community* has gained renewed attention with the advent of community policing in the United States – a new style of policing which has also been earmarked for South Africa.

The ideal community, conducive to and ideally suited for practicing community policing or receptive of a community safety program, should neither be equated nor confused with the image of a calm, serene and peaceful homogenous English village where everybody knows each other, in which everybody appears to be friendly, cooperative and where everybody have consensus about what kind of peace and order is preferred. In contrast, to this perfect but “impossible” condition, there could be no talk of a real community in large cities like Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban which, for instance, are characterised by a diversity of cultures, different age and income groups living virtually “on top” of each other in overcrowded apartments or informal settlements. Instead, there should rather be reference to diverse, competing and conflicting communities living in the same space (Peak & Glensor 1999:265-266).

The following types of *community*, which are not mutually exclusive, are distinguished (Beyer 1993:2-3).

- (1) Community defined by geography (example communities residing within the confines of the greater Empangeni - Richards Bay area).
- (2) Community with similar interests (example a rural community affected by a social problem such as crime they are collectively attempting to solve

through a concerted effort, e.g. a community safety program).

- (3) Attachment communities (based on a sense of relationship or place).

4.3.6 Quality of life

Improving the *quality of life* of members of a community is an important goal of any kind of community safety program. Although difficult to measure and define, Peak and Glensor (1999:298-299) are adamant that every member of a community is entitled to a safe environment in which to live and work. Eliminating or reducing signs of social disorder, example crime and other violations of the law such as prostitutes, beggars, drunkards, gangsterism, disorderly behaviour and other signs of neglect example garbage, car wrecks, deteriorated buildings, and the like, are all inclined towards improving the quality of life of people living and working in such areas. Quality of life is also bolstered by a common sense of propriety in public places where citizens are allowed to move freely and safely and to enjoy outdoor life based upon civility (Kelling & Coles 1996:90). Quality of life could further be equated with conditions conducive to practicing one's daily activities in an environment free of criminal interference, where citizens can live their lives to the full, where the development of people's personalities can flourish and the upbringing of children through positive socialisation could be realised in a normal way, free of fear of crime, criminal victimisation and anxiety over future prosperity.

4.3.7 Policing

Policing is a social service which has, as its primary aim, the maintenance of social order through the enforcement and execution of the law. It includes coercive action within the framework of the social structure, specially directed at formal social control in accordance with the principles of legal jurisdiction and the constitutional rights of individuals (Van Heerden 1976:16).

4.3.8 Social Order

Horton and Hunt in (Van Heerden 1976:8) opine that social order exists “ ... whenever a system of people, relationships and customs functions smoothly to promote the realisation of the task or objective of society, namely orderly and safe co-existence”. Van der Walt (1964:216-237) argues that a society could be regarded as “orderly” if the prevailing political, religious, public, familial, community, economic, interpersonal and sexual fundamental social relationships are not violated. Violation of and conflict in these interpersonal relationships constitutes social disorder.

4.3.9 Urban area

An urban area refers to a major-metropolitan and industrial area in the Republic of South Africa, such as the greater Durban city and its surrounding areas including Pinetown, Phoenix, Umhlanga Rocks, Amanzimtoti, Chatsworth, Umlazi, KwaMashu, and the like.

4.3.10 Residential area

Residential area refers to a private residential area situated in a city or town, consisting of private dwellings appropriate for human habitat.

4.3.11 Private security

Private security makes an invaluable contribution to the public weal. It's absence would be disastrous to law and order, and the operation of the criminal justice system. It continues [to be] the largest available untapped, unstructured, dormant resource for the prevention and control of crime (Fennelly 1989:10-11) (see also Chapter 6).

In normal language the term *security* means that a person or thing is secure or free from danger, fear, or anxiety. *Private* in the term "Private Security" shows that a non-government or state agency provides the security service. In other words the service is under the control of private individuals or organisations. However "Private Security" today represents something much bigger than these two words by themselves do.

Timm and Christian (1991:3) report that a United States of America Department of Justice Task Force on Private Security comprehensively defined *private security* as including:

"... those self-employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organisations providing security-related services to specific clientele for a fee, for the individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves, in order to protect their persons, private property, or interests from varied hazards."

Post & Kingsbury (1991:10) define *security* as:

"Security provides those means, active or passive, which serves to protect and preserve an environment that allows for the conduct of activities within the organisation or society without disruption".

Timm & Christian (1991:3) state that the *goal of private security* is:

"... to reduce the physical, monetary, and emotional hazards faced by the institutions and people under the security force's care and supervision, within the limits of its responsibility and authority".

From these three definitions it can be seen that the scope of the duties of private security personnel is wide and varied. They prevent loss; they prevent crime; they protect persons, property and interests and they protect and preserve environments

to allow line function activities to go on. A cynical onlooker might remark that they would expect a private security person to do everything to, "prevent disruptive influences". He sometimes does, while only being limited by moral, legal and ethical considerations (Post & Kingsbury 1991:10-11).

Simonsen (1998:22) describes, a common definition for the term "private security" as an individual and organisational measures and efforts that provide protection for persons and property. It also describes business enterprises that provide services and products to achieve this protection.

4.4 SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

Situational crime prevention which is of special importance to the field of private security, departs radically from most criminology in its orientation. Proceeding from an analysis of the circumstances giving rise to specific kinds of crime, it introduces discrete managerial and environmental change to reduce the opportunity for those crimes to occur. Thus it is focused on the settings for crime, rather than upon those committing criminal acts. It seeks not to eliminate criminal or delinquent tendencies through improvement of society or its institutions, but merely to make criminal action less attractive to offenders (Clarke 1997:2). Within this frame of references would private security find it necessary to decide when, where and what kind of private security measures would best fit the circumstances underlying crime prevention strategies.

Central to this campaign is not the criminal justice system, but a host of public and private organisations and agencies – schools, hospitals, transit systems, shops and malls, manufacturing businesses and phone companies, local parks and entertainment facilities, pubs and parking lots – whose products, services and operations spawn opportunities for a vast range of different crimes (Clarke 1997:2).

Dozens of documented examples in South Africa exist of successful situational prevention involving such measures as surveillance cameras for high crime areas and parking facilities, defensible space architecture in public housing, target hardening of apartment blocks and individual residences, electronic access for cars and for telephone systems, street closures and traffic schemes for residential neighbourhoods, alcohol controls at festivals and sporting fixtures, training in conflict management for publicans and bouncers, and improved stocktaking and record keeping procedures in warehouse and retail outlets.

Clarke (1997:2) states that many of these successes were obtained by hard-pressed managers seeking practical ways to solve troublesome crime problems confronting their businesses or agencies. Only rarely were they assisted by criminologists, who, excepting a small handful of government researchers overseas, have generally shown little interest in situational prevention. In addition, situational prevention has rarely been accorded attention in policy debates about crime control, especially those in the United States and South Africa.

This neglect stems from two mistakes of modern criminology. First, the problem of explaining crime has been confused with the problem of explaining the criminal. Most criminological theories have been concerned with explaining why certain individuals or groups, exposed to particular psychological or social influences, or with particular inherited traits, are more likely to become involved in delinquency of crime. But this is not the same as explaining why crime occurs. The commission of a crime not only requires existence of a motivated offender, but, as every detective story reader knows, it also requires the opportunity for crime as well as the availability of a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Thus, crime cannot be explained simply by explaining criminal dispositions. It also has to be shown how such dispositions interact with situational factors favouring crime to produce a criminal act.

The second mistake of modern criminology has been to confuse the problem of controlling crime with that of dealing with the criminal. The surest route to reducing crime, it has been assumed, is to focus on the offender or potential offender. Most textbook discussions of crime control have therefore distinguished only between two broad kinds of measures, formal and informal social control. Formal control refers to society's formally constituted legal institutions of the law and the criminal justice system designed to sanction offenders, to confine or rehabilitate them, and to deter crime among the population at large. Informal social control refers to society's attempts to induce conformity through the socialisation of young people into the norms of society, and through people's supervision of each other's behaviour, reinforced by rule making, admonition and censure. Whether formal or informal, these controls are exclusively focused upon offenders, actual or potential (Clarke 1997:2-3).

It has been argued that one important consequence of failing to separate the problems of dealing with offenders and controlling crime has been to divert the criminal justice system from its essential purpose of dispensing justice. More germane to the present discussion, however, is that this failure has also resulted in the criminological and policy neglect of a third important group of crime control measures, additional to formal and informal social controls, but intertwined with and dependent on them. These are the extensive "routine precautions" taken by individuals and organisations. Every day, we all do such things as lock our doors, secure our valuables, counsel our children, and guard our purses to reduce the risk of crime. To this end, we also buy houses in safe neighbourhoods, we invest in burglar alarms and we avoid dangerous places and people. Similarly, schools, factories, offices, shops and many other organisations and agencies routinely take a host of precautions to safeguard themselves, their employees and their clients from crime. It is into this group of crime control measures that situational crime prevention fits. Indeed, it can be regarded as the scientific arm of routine precautions, designed to make them more efficient and beneficial to society as a whole (Clarke 1997:3).

Criminologists and policy analysts have assumed that the principal value of these precautions is not in reducing overall crime rates, but in protecting individual people and agencies from victimisation. This is partly because situational measures focused on particular places or highly specific categories of crime cannot make much impression on the overall crime statistics. It has also been assumed, however, that faced with impediments offenders will merely displace their attention elsewhere, with no net reduction in crime. This assumption flows directly from the dispositional error of modern criminology and, as shown below, is not supported by empirical research which has generally found rather little displacement. Reducing opportunities for crime can indeed bring substantial net reductions in crime. As this evidence becomes more widely known, and situational prevention is taken more seriously by policy makers, the debate will move on to the ethical and ideological implications of situational measures. This is already apparent in countries such as Britain and the Netherlands where situational prevention is becoming an integral, though still small, component of government crime policy. These countries have seen a shift in the discourse of crime control, which is no longer seen to be the exclusive province of the government, but something that must be shared with all sectors of society. Consequently, a multitude of public and private actors are now finding that their routine precautions are becoming a matter of public duty. More significantly, governments now seem to be promoting a range of precautionary measures that many people find objectionable. When video surveillance of public places and street closures in residential areas become part of official policy, fears of Orwellian methods of social control are unleashed. These concerns are reinforced by developments in technology that make people believe government control is becoming too pervasive, intrusive and powerful (Clarke 1997:3).

These worries about the application of situational controls are widespread, and have become entangled with diverse ideological objections from across the political spectrum. The Right, especially in America, sees situational prevention

as an irrelevant response to crime because it neglects issues of moral culpability and punishment. Moreover, it “punishes” the law-abiding by infringing freedom and privacy. The Left characterises it as politically and socially naïve in its neglect of the role of social and economic inequities in causation and of political muscle in the definition of crime. Liberals assert that by “tinkering” with symptoms it diverts attention from the need to tackle the “root causes” of crime such as unemployment, racial discrimination, sub-standard housing, inadequate schooling and inconsistent parenting (Clarke 1997:3-4).

4.4.1 The Four Concepts of Situational Crime Prevention

Much existing activity falling under the definition of situational crime prevention represents problem-solving undertaken by managers in a variety of public and private agencies. In some instances, mistakes might have been avoided and less time taken to develop solutions had those involved been familiar with the elements of situational prevention. The framework of situational prevention revolves around four components:

- ◆ A theoretical foundation drawing principally upon routine activity and rational choice approaches.
- ◆ A standard methodology based on the action research paradigm.
- ◆ A set of opportunity-reducing techniques.
- ◆ A body of evaluated practice including studies of crime displacement (Clarke 1997:6).

4.4.2 The Role of Situational Factors in Crime

The development of situational prevention was stimulated by the results of work on correctional treatments undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s by the Home Office Research Unit, the British government’s criminological research department. This work contributed to the demise of the rehabilitative ideal and forced researchers in the Unit, charged with making a practical contribution to criminal

policy, to review the scope and effectiveness of other forms of crime control (Clarke 1997:6).

The review concluded that there was little scope for reducing crime through the essentially marginal adjustments that were practically and ethically feasible in relation to policies of incapacitation, deterrent sentencing, preventive policing or “social” prevention (Tilley 1993c). But it did identify opportunity-reduction as a worthwhile topic for further research, largely on the basis of some findings about misbehaviour in institutions. It had been discovered in the course of the work on rehabilitation that the probability of a youth’s absconding or re-offending while resident in a probation hostel or training school seemed to depend more upon the nature of the institutional regime to which he was exposed than on his personality or background. Particularly important appeared to be the opportunities for misbehaviour provided by the institutional regime – opportunities that could be “designed out” (Clarke 1997:6).

If institutional misconduct could in theory be controlled by manipulating situational factors, it was reasoned that the same might be true of other, everyday forms of crime. Though not consistent with most current theory, support for the Home Office position was found in criminological research that had found immediate situational influences to be playing an important role in crime, including: Burt’s (1925) studies of delinquency in London, showing that higher rates of property offending in the winter were promoted by longer hours of darkness; Hartshorne and May’s (1928) experimental studies of deceit, showing that the likelihood of dishonest behaviour by children was dependent on the level of supervision afforded; geographical studies showing that the distribution of particular crimes is related to the presence of particular targets and locations such as business premises, drinking clubs, and parking lots (Engstad 1975); and demonstrations that fluctuations in auto theft reflect the number of opportunities as measured by the numbers of registered vehicles (Clarke 1997:6-7).

The Home Office position was also consistent with psychological research on personality traits and behaviour that was finding a greater than expected role for situational influences (Mischel 1968), and with an emerging body of work on the sociology of deviance, including studies by: Matza (1964) who argued against deep motivational commitment to deviance in favour of a "drift" into misconduct; Briar and Piliavin (1965) who stressed situational inducements and lack of commitment to conformity; and Yablonsky (1962) and Short and Strodtbeck (1965) who evidenced the pressures to deviance conferred by working class gang membership.

Taken together, this body of work suggested that criminal conduct was much more susceptible to variations in opportunity and to transitory pressures and inducements than conventional "dispositional" theories allowed. It was also becoming clear from interviews with residential burglars (Scarr 1973; Reppetto 1974; Brantingham and Brantingham 1975; and Waller and Okihiro 1979) that the avoidance of risk and effort plays a large part in target selection decisions. This dynamic view of crime provided a more satisfactory basis for situational prevention and led to the formulation of a simple "choice" model (Clarke 1977; 1980). This required information not only about the offender's background and current circumstances, but also about the offender's (i) immediate motives and intentions, (ii) moods and feelings, (iii) moral judgments regarding the act in question, (iv) perception of criminal opportunities and ability to take advantage of them or create them, and (v) assessment of the risks of being caught as well as of the likely consequences (Clarke 1997:7).

This model, dubbed "situational control theory" by Downes and Rock (1982), was subsequently developed into the rational choice perspective on crime, but it served initially to deflect criminological criticism of the theoretical nature of situational prevention and, more importantly, to guide thinking about practical ways of reducing opportunities for crime (Clarke 1997:7).

4.5 SUMMARY

An attempt has been made in this chapter to highlight early crime prevention strategies. Apart from having described certain relevant concepts, an introductory discussion of situational crime prevention – representing a more contemporary perspective – has also been provided.

For the sake of structural convenience, researcher deemed it necessary to further discuss manifestations of situational crime prevention in Chapter 5 and for that purpose, to incorporate these crime prevention approaches as a useful framework for discussing these contemporary crime prevention perspectives.

CHAPTER 5

THEORIES OF CRIME PREVENTION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The complexities and dynamics of a constant changing South African society, a stressful private security occupational environment, an ever-increasing serious crime rate, globalisation of organised crime syndicates such as terrorist groups, drug cartels, and the like are likely to express the need for more properly trained and university educated security professionals to meet the immense challenges, changes and problems of the twenty-first century (Collins *et al.* 2000:45).

Training has been distinguished from education as being the provision of instructions to private security personnel *how* to perform their job and execute their tasks. *Education*, on the other hand, is intended to assist in preparing private security officers to identify and solve work-related problems independently, to communicate and interact more effectively with others (Timm & Christian 1991:48).

Since the late 1950's, United States private security officers had the opportunity of entering into baccalaureate degree programs at various tertiary institutions. The main course ingredients included business-related courses as well as criminal justice options (Timm & Christian 1991:55). It appears, however, that most private security degree programs have been based on criminal justice options (e.g. criminology, police science, etc.) and have as such been viewed as the wrong approach, simply because it has been felt that private security education programs should rather be based on business-related programs (Collins *et al.* 2000:33). This approach resulted in most private security officers being employed as "management trainees" in retail and in industrial organisations – " ... because the starting salaries are reasonable and opportunities for promotion attract graduates of private security education programs" (Collins *et al.* 2000:34). This movement caused most United States private security to experience a crisis: private security officers who received their major education in

business-orientated courses had limited knowledge of the causes and consequences of crime, or any socio-criminological theories explaining the nature and extent of crime etiology.

At this point it should be noted that tertiary education in private security is a relatively “young” initiative in South Africa. Apart from the University of South Africa’s criminology department which offered private security as part of its BA (Police Science) degree for quite a number of years, Technikon SA also embarked on technical private security training in fulfillment of the requirements of the BTech degree. Soon, University of Zululand’s department of Criminal Justice will be offering a one-year certificate course in private security which will afterwards allow entry into a one-year diploma and ultimately to a BA degree program in private security.

Theoretical knowledge about crime, crime causation and various crime prevention theories becomes an indispensable part of private security education. Private security degree programs not only improve the professional movement in the industry but “... also will promote needed research and technological advancements” (Collins *et al.* 2000:35). In fact, public respondents have expressed a need to be educated by private security officers with regard to crime and crime-related issues – see Annexure 13 and 14, as well as the viewpoint that academic training for private security officers should be prioritised – Annexure 15 and 16.

Private security respondents on the other hand realise they –

- Have a task of educating society with regard to crime and everyday crime problems – Annexure 17 and 18
- Need to create a culture of crime awareness among their clients and the public generally – Annexure 19 and 20
- Their own academic training and education (at tertiary level) should be prioritised – Annexure 21 and 22
- Especially as far as the etiology of crime is concerned – Annexure 23 and 24
- What crime prevention is really all about – Annexure 25 to 26.

In the discussion to follow, the following crime prevention theories will be discussed:

(1) Rational Offender Perspective, including –

- Defensible space theory
- Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)
- Broken windows-theory

(2) The Rational Choice Perspective, including Routine Activities Theory

(3) Environmental Criminology and

(4) Opportunity Structure for Crime-theory.

RATIONAL OFFENDER PERSPECTIVE (ROP)

A question often asked is whether physical features in the environment are capable of preventing (or reducing) crime and crime-related problems such as real criminal victimisation (in the form of a physical attack), fear of crime, overall community safety and security and, moreover, what kind of influence does the environment exert on the behaviour of both potential victims and offenders as far as crime commission and crime prevention (reaction to crime) are concerned?

Researchers (Clarke 1983; Clarke & Cornish 1985) have indicated some time ago that, in terms of the Rational Offender Perspective (ROP), potential offenders often elect to operate in a rational way, i.e. they prefer to commit crimes that require the *least effort*, provide the *highest benefits* and yield the *lowest risks*. ROP holds that physical environment features are quite capable of defining the opportunities that may exist for a crime to be committed, simply because they:

- affect potential offenders' perceptions about a suitable place (target) to commit a crime
- facilitate the assessment of the circumstances surrounding the target and
- affect potential offenders' perception with regard to the availability and visibility of one or more 'natural guardians' near or at the 'crime site' (Taylor & Harrell 1996:2).

Based on the possible influence of the above-mentioned perceptions, potential offenders may then decide to commit a crime after they have determined the following issues:

- Will it be possible at all to enter the ‘crime arena’ and how easy will it be?
- How visible, attractive or vulnerable does the ‘crime site’ (or target) appear?
- What are the chances of being observed by neighbours or passers-by?
- If perhaps observed, what is the likelihood that people would react by means of a personal confrontation, making alarm by calling the police, etc.?
- Does the crime target offer a direct ‘escape route’ after completion of the crime?

These questions assume a rational offender perspective simply because their relevance to an understanding of crime depends on a range of factors – including the type of crime and familiarity between offender and his or her victim or target (Taylor & Harrell 1996:2).

5.2.1 Defensible Space Theory

Defensible space theory proffered by Jane Jacobs (1961) and Oscar Newman (1972) is particularly valuable in planning for developing community crime prevention strategies, upgrading security, reducing crime precipitating factors and reverting to and installing target hardening measures (Timm & Christian 1991:145).

Several authors (Lab 1988:17; Timm & Christian 1991:144) claim that Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) developed out of the intellectual paradigm of *defensible space theory*. “The notion of defensible space was used as a conceptual basis for a new approach to both residential and commercial areas ...” (Timm & Christian 1991:144).

Oscar Newman (1972:3) defined *defensible space* as “... a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers – that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents” (Schmalleger 1999:279). Two other

authors (Timm & Christian 1991:144) opine that defensible space theory actually comprises the basic tenet “ ... that physical design can either foster or inhibit people’s latent sense of control and responsibility over the space they inhabit”. As proponents of defensible space-theory, these authors also believe that informal social control of -

- land use characteristics
- street design and lay-out
- the way buildings are erected, and
- outside areas such as walkways, thoroughfares, play parks, vacant land, etc.

can either positively or negatively influence the prevalence of crime, criminal victimisation and fear of crime through prevailing collective rules of public behaviour, e.g. reporting of any suspicious activities to the police, observation of private property of neighbours when they are absent, questioning strangers entering a neighbourhood, etc. Physical features that offer or facilitate better surveillance and more distinct demarcations between public and private space (e.g. by means of an open piece of field or play park), will improve resident-based informal control (Taylor & Harrell 1996:7). As an informal control measure of crime and criminal behaviour, defensible space theory claims that “ ... citizen involvement in crime prevention is needed and that it is possible to construct residential complexes that deter crime by creating *defensible space*” (Conklin 1995:377).

To Steven Lab (1988:17-18), a noted crime prevention specialist, *defensible space* (as defined by Newman 1972) suggests a “ ... model which inhibits crime by creating a physical expression of a social fabric which defends itself”. Usually, the *physical characteristics* of an area or place signals to both residents and prospective criminals that it is *owned* and *cared* for and does not lend itself to crime or any other form of criminal activity. However, the *impact* on residents and potential criminals may not be the same. For residents, the *appearance* and *design* of the area or place:

- can generate a more caring attitude
- bring residents closer together
- result in further improvements and use of the area or place

- unite residents in the control and prevention of crime (Lab 1988:17).

Would-be criminals' perception of such physical improvements and care taken in a specific neighbourhood may be interpreted as a *high risk area* or *place* because of:

- the presence of legitimate inhabitants living there
- increased surveillance as a result of greater crime awareness
- a perception of *community of interest*, ready to eradicate crime (Lab 1988:17).

According to Steven Lab (1988:17-18), Newman (1972) identified four *elements of defensible space*, each of which influence the *criminogenic nature* of an area or place:

- *territoriality*, which is the ability and desire of legitimate residents to lay claim to their area as belonging to them and nobody else. Such claim is usually based upon the establishment of real or perceived boundaries, recognition of strangers and legitimate inhabitants, and a general communal feeling of interest.
- *natural surveillance*, based on designing an area or place which will allow residents (or legitimate users) the opportunity to observe the daily activities of both friends and strangers. In the case of observed criminal activity, residents are able to act quickly, e.g. making an emergency phone call to the police or a private security company.
- *image and milieu*, both which revolve around the idea of perceptual community safety within the living environment. *Image* creates the impression a neighbourhood or community is not vulnerable to crime and is not isolated from the surrounding community. Likewise, *milieu* proffers that the location of a community within a larger, low-crime, high surveillance area, will deter criminal activity.

Territoriality creates a meaningful, proactive environment which is of particular importance in the safety and protection of human beings. In this regard, Newman (Olivier 1997:115) opines that *physical design* of buildings is conducive both to crime

prevention as well as protection of peoples' lives and property. Moreover, the value of a proactive environment has in fact been empirically confirmed by Olivier's study (1997:115) into the principles of proactive policing. Avoidance or exclusion of possible concealed entrances, dark corners, possible hiding places, thoroughfares and uncontrolled entrances should all be given due consideration when it comes to the design of domestic or other type of buildings – especially to maintain the proactive character of an environment.

Although the elements of defensible space theory are inclined to portray an area or place to be a high risk venture to would-be criminals, Olivier (1997:123) maintains that well-presented and caring areas or places may often be the target of high incidences of crime instead of less appealing areas or neighbourhoods that are more than often overcrowded with unemployed people. Criminals appear to be well aware that in more affluent areas or places they are probably going to get what they are looking for in terms of monetary gain. On the other hand, observation in less densely populated areas or places such as small holdings (or plots) is often limited because of *inoccupation* during day time and *distance* between residences which impede effective communication between neighbours - a shortcoming that is usually quickly identified by potential criminals who will capitalise on it (Olivier 1997:120).

Environmental design and more specifically, defensible space, entails more than territoriality, natural surveillance to enhance community safety. Lab (1988:18) convincingly points out that:

- placement of windows in a building permitting easy visibility of surrounding areas or places
- location of entrances which could be observed by other people
- installation of lights to increase visibility
- installation of mechanical security devices such as locks, alarms, etc. are additional elements of physical design capable of creating defensible space.

Defensible space soon became associated with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Newman's research caused him to be credited with linking the physical environment with crime, subsequent criminal victimisation and

fear of crime. Environmental design as a crime prevention strategy directly contributed to the development and expansion of public policing and private security from their embryonic to adulthood stages of more sophisticated technological and operational crime prevention techniques (Collins *et al.* 2000:23).

Newman's monumental work took its course at a conference in 1964 held at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri where criminologists, police officers and architects convened face-to-face to focus their academic energy on crime problems and characteristics of public housing areas. The most salient outcome of this conference was " ... that specific architectural changes which enhanced barriers, defined boundaries, and removed criminal opportunity could do much to reduce the risk of crime – even in the midst of high-crime neighbourhoods" (Schmallegger 1999:279).

5.2.2 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

As indicated earlier (par 5.2.1), CPTED developed from defensible space theory.

CPTED rests on the assumption that proper design of buildings and more effective use of a built-up environment may be capable of reducing crime, fear of crime and enhancing quality of life issues in a given area, which simply means that the better human and physical resources are managed, the greater the advantages for residents in terms of decreased crime (Hess & Wroblewski 1996:97). These authors are adamant that inclusion of advice from police and private security should be included in building codes when crime prevention in design is being envisaged. Of special importance is careful consideration that should be given " ... to the design and placement of doors, windows, elevators and stairs, lighting, building height and size ... exterior site design ... " (Hess & Wroblewski 1996:98).

In this regard, four approaches to environmental crime prevention become significant: *housing design or block layout, land use and circulation patterns, territorial features and controlling physical deterioration*. Each of these four approaches will be briefly discussed (Taylor & Harrell 1996:3-4):

♦ **Housing design or block layout.**

This kind of mechanical crime prevention involve the blocking of criminality by means of:


- (1) minimising the availability of crime targets
- (2) eliminating barriers which prevent easy detection of potential offenders or of a crime in progress and
- (3) increasing physical obstacles to committing a crime.

About two decades ago, Taylor, Gottfredson and Brower (1980) developed the so-called 'second generation' defensible space theory which clearly distinguishes itself from "first generation" defensible space theory proffered by Jane Jacobs (1961), and Oscar Newman (1972). The latter theory emphasised the basic tenet that "... physical design can either foster or inhibit people's latent sense of control and responsibility over the space they inhabit" (Timm & Christian 1991:144).

The originally formulated idea about defensible space theory suggested that physical features that offer or facilitate better surveillance, more distinct delineation between public and private space (e.g. by means of an open piece of field or play park), division of outdoor space into different areas which can be controlled by smaller groups and proximity of sites to well-used locations, would make it possible for stronger resident-based informal control of such spaces which ultimately should lead to less deviant behaviour, less fear of crime and less criminal victimisation (Taylor & Harrel 1996:7).

Second generation defensible space theory takes into account *how* the impact of physical features in the environment on crime, fear of crime and criminal victimisation may be dependent upon or influenced by other intervening *social* and *cultural features* in a specific community (neighbourhood, farm, informal settlement, township, etc.). Figure 5.1 schematically depicts the underlying notion of second generation defensible space theory.

FIGURE 5.1 : SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF SECOND GENERATION DEFENSIBLE SPACE THEORY



Source: Ralph B. Taylor and Harrell, A.V. *Physical Environment and Crime*, 1996, p.7.


The validity of defensible space theory materialised in several studies into *public housing* in both Britain and the United States and in *residential street blocks* in the United States (Newman & Franck 1980, 1982; Perkins, Meeks & Taylor 1992; Taylor, Gottfredson & Brower 1984). The study by Newman and Franck (1982), which focused on 63 public housing sites around the country, yielded positive correlations between housing sites with more defensible space features (or designs) and residents who could exert better control over outdoor spaces *with* less fear of crime and less criminal victimisation (Taylor & Harrell 1996:7-8).

A major limitation of defensible space features appears to be the lack of research into potential offenders' *perceptions of how* physical features (or designs) are being used and applied to buildings and outdoor spaces. This apparent 'drawback' urged researchers (cf. Fisher & Nasar 1992) to revisit the issue surrounding the utilisation of defensible space features (designs). They

proffered a three-fold grouping of physical features (see Figure 2) which may be of significant value in crime prevention initiatives, namely *prospect*, *refuge* and *escape*, because research confirmed a higher degree of fear of crime in locations that offered good refuge for the potential offender, but low prospect (surveillance) and escape for the users such as home or shop owners and flat tenants (Taylor & Harrell 1996:9):

- Locations (dwellings, flats) with *high prospect* for the user (home-owner, flat tenant) facilitate optimal surveillance of a wide area (e.g. long lines of sight and wide angle views).
- Locations with *high refuge* possibilities (e.g. tall shrubs, alcoves, 'blind' corners) offer the potential offender excellent concealment opportunities.
- Locations with *high escape* potential for the user (home or shop owners, flat tenants) offer easy escape for the legitimate user (various exit points, concealed alarm button, etc.).

FIGURE 5.2 : THREE-FOLD GROUPING OF PHYSICAL FEATURES



Source: Ralph B. Taylor and Harrell, A.V. *Physical Environment and Crime*, 1996, p.9.

A further limitation imposed upon the effectiveness of defensible space features (or designs), is the influence of immediate *social* and *cultural characteristics* which might not contribute to more “... effectively support resident-based control” (Taylor & Harrell 1996:10).

◆ Land use and circulation patterns

Crime prevention through safer use of neighbourhood space rests on the principle of minimisation of routine exposure of potential offenders to crime targets through careful planning and reorganisation of walkways (perhaps through better street lighting at night), thoroughfares (especially the closing of certain thoroughfares between residential properties or shops that are notorious for accommodating graffiti with sexual or satanic slogans, potential juvenile delinquents or other prospective offenders), streets (e.g. narrowing of streets in business areas and simultaneously beautifying sidewalks which create an impression of caring people), traffic patterns (enhancing traffic flow and decreasing opportunities for armed robbery and car-jacking by changing robot-crossings into traffic circles), hours of operation of public spaces and facilities, etc. For example, decreasing vehicular volume may, under certain conditions, allow (and even encourage) residents or shop owners to better maintain and control sidewalk and street spaces in front of their houses, shops and businesses (Taylor & Harrell 1996:3).

City and regional planners usually classify relevant features into *movement generators* such as high-volume streets (both vehicle and pedestrian traffic) allowing movement through a residential area and *attractors and non-residential land uses* such as shops and shopping malls (which attract outsiders), while at the same time allowing more people traveling to a residential area (Taylor & Harrell 1996:10). Research in Miami, FL (Ycaza 1992) revealed that physical changes to internal circulation patterns and boundaries yielded lower crime rates. Areas zoned for commercial use in Washington, D.C., precipitated more robberies. However, research (Harrel & Gouvis 1994) showed that the presence of public housing units in Washington,

was not significantly related to changes in neighbourhood risk of housebreaking, robbery or assault in those areas (Taylor & Harrell 1996:11).


Four practical implications (or considerations) to be taken into account at neighbourhood level (Taylor & Harrell 1996:11):

- (a) *Social and organisational conditions* are important when changes in street and block layout, traffic or land use are to be effected and as such, the involvement of residents, neighbourhood organisations (e.g. local Community Police Forums), local business are, likewise, equally desirable to divert any possible resistance or negative effects.
- (b) *Community mobilisation* might be a precondition to achieve rational, maximal change and to effect a redesign that will indeed reduce crime.
- (c) *Understanding offender location* appears to be an important step when planning for redesign to prevent crime. Example, car thieves may live in other neighbourhood areas; drug dealers may be living in the area earmarked for redesign, but whatever the case, will residents be able to distinguish between “outsiders” and “insiders”? If, however, residents are able to make such distinction, then physical barriers that are to be put in the way of potential offenders may have the desired effect: less crime committed by certain offenders.
- (d) *Neighbourhood layout and boundaries* which allow for easy movements (circulation) or even a larger proportion of non-residential land use, may result in higher street crimes such as mugging and burglary.

◆ Resident-generated territorial signage (features)

Encouraging the erection of signboards indicating a block or residential area is occupied by caring and vigilant residents may have positive effects on fear of crime reduction and strengthening of neighbourhood confidence in their own

ability to deter offenders. The most common South African signage in this category are those indicating the existence of Neighbourhood Watch Systems and Farm Watch - both resident-generated territorial reactions to crime and criminal victimisation. Residents and visitors to such areas are likely to interpret such signboards ("markers") as clear indications of *how* residents (or farmers) will react to criminal behaviour. Stronger markers with unambiguous and to-the-point messages may have a more direct deterrent effect, while at the same time creating a feeling of safer environments. The more threatening the environment, the more aggressive markers will be required to maintain feelings of safety (Brower, Dockett & Taylor 1983) – see below.



In terms of the notion of *defensible space*, it would be recommendable to planners and designers to create demarcated and semi-public spaces that can be more easily observed by residents, e.g. allowing “... urban gardening on vacant lots in inner-city neighbourhood areas ...”. Entrusting people with the management of such vacant spaces would mean giving them enough reason to keep a watchful eye on the street and to get them more involved in their neighbourhood (Taylor & Harrell 1996:15).

◆ Controlling Physical Deterioration and Disorder

Controlling physical deterioration and disorder has much in common with the elimination of precipitating factors that may cause crime and fear of crime. Controlling these two conditions, may reduce or even totally eliminate offenders' perceptions that: (a) certain areas are indeed more vulnerable to crime, and (b) residents' fear of crime has reached such high levels that they would in any case not react to prevent crime from being committed. Improving the physical "looks" of a neighbourhood or any other living area may just succeed to neutralise such perceptions on the part of prospective offenders. As far back as 1975, Wilson (Taylor & Harrell 1996:4;16) postulated that the presence of crime alone does not cause people to be afraid of crime or concerned about their safety and security, but also the physical and social signs they observe around them when entering a specific area or neighbourhood that create an impression of deterioration or a total "breakdown" of the social and moral fabric in society.

Hunter (1978) referred to these 'indicators' of physical deterioration as *signs of incivility*. Such signs, wherever they occur, make people feel vulnerable simply because it brings to mind the incapability of the criminal justice system (police, courts and corrections) in dealing effectively with the crime problem or creating a safe and secure environment (Taylor & Harrel 1996:16). Instead, these 'signs' of incivility may also create the impression in the minds of law-abiding citizens that criminals are in control of such areas.

➤ *Broken windows-concept*

Two other prominent researcher (Wilson & Kelling 1982) also approached the problem (or dynamics) of *incivilities*, commonly known as *disorder* and usually associated with crime, social and physical decay as well as fear of crime (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux 1990:69), from a *community policing* point of view and within the context of their *broken windows thesis* (Schmallegger 1999:279) - most probably because " ... community

policing had stemmed and reversed the tide of disorder” (Livingston 1996:26).

The *Broken windows*-theory proffered by Wilson and Kelling (1982), is based on the notion that “ ... physical deterioration and an increase in dilapidated buildings leads to increased concerns for personal safety among area residents” (Schmallegger 1999:279). An increase in this kind of concern usually results in less maintenance (repairs and clean-up initiatives) of damaged property and defaced environments. This apparent “don’t care attitude” could easily trigger deviant acts such as juvenile delinquency, vandalism, crime and criminal victimisation among local residents. In more simpler terms, *broken windows-thesis* entails a crime causation perspective, namely that physical deterioration heightens public concerns about safety and security. The “broken windows” metaphor assumes that once a broken window in a building is left unattended and it is not repaired, soon other windows in that same building will also be broken - which, in turn, will lead to a sense of disorder that creates fear and serious crime. By ignoring minor crimes, opportunities to repair the first signs of disorder (i.e. to bring offenders to book for less serious offences and hold them accountable for their actions) are lost (Schmallegger 1996:279).

The cycle is completed when this kind of deviant behaviour leads to further physical deterioration as offenders from all over are *attracted* by a specific area’s *vulnerability*. It is within this context that a study of an emerging theory: *Environmental Criminology* also known as *criminology of place* becomes significant, precisely because crimes tend to concentrate at specific locations such as street blocks or multiple family housing units. “The criminology of place employs the concept of *defensible space* ... “ (Schmallegger 1996:279). To Rodney Stark a noted American researcher, such locations are nothing else than *deviant neighbourhoods*, simply because it is incomprehensible that, despite a change in population, they continue to be labeled as “crime-ridden” places.

Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows-theory may lead to the following chain of events or consequences (Taylor & Harrell 1996:16-17):

(1) Physical deterioration.

Physical deterioration (dilapidation) characterised by wear and tear of buildings (such as houses and shops) through neglect, large-scale presence of graffiti on walls of shops, subways, etc. that are usually observable in older and more established areas, signal a higher appearance of crime and feelings of fear of crime and vulnerability among residents and visitors.

(2) Withdrawal.

People feeling more concerned about their own personal safety and security are less inclined to maintain social order in public places and often adopt an attitude of "it's not my job, but the police have to care".

(3) Sensing less role visibility.

Decreased role visibility in the form of foot or motorised patrols may result in increased criminal activity which could be brought about by lack of adequate police resources. Sensing less visible police presence or "eyes on the street", criminals might assume that "nobody cares" or that they can get away with their criminal actions.


(4) Troublesome youth and illegal gang activities.

Residents living in fear of troublesome youth or illegal gang activities withdraw further from the public scene, as is the case on the Cape Flats, Hillbrow, Johannesburg, etc. Law-abiding people prefer to rather stay indoors because of increased concern for their safety and protection of their property.

(5) Attracting offenders from outside.

An area, being vulnerable as a result of physical deterioration, people withdrawing from their perceived 'hostile environment' partly because of the "absence" police presence in the form of patrol, increased gang activities (especially to stay out of the "crossfire"), and the like are the main advertisements to "outside criminals" to enter such area - simply because " ... crimes committed there will be less likely to be detected and responded to" (Taylor & Harrell 1996:17) by both public policing and private security. Figure 5.3 depicts a schematic presentation of the broken windows-thesis.

FIGURE 5.3 : SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE BROKEN WINDOWS THESIS BY WILSON AND KELLING (1982)



Source: Ralph B. Taylor and Harrel, A. V. (1996), p.17.

Skogan (1986) noted that incivilities may contribute to neighbourhood decline as a result of the above-mentioned consequences highlighted by Wilson and Kelling (1982), leading ultimately to the so-called *resident*

out-migration. Incivilities such as *vandalism* and deterioration in the form of *abandoned buildings, vacant plots, car wrecks, and other forms of disrepair*, may exert a contagious effect which stimulates further neglect and disregard for property by attracting potential offenders. Skogan 1986 (Taylor & Harrell 1996:18) ascribes this kind of neighbourhood decline to the following reasons:

- Increased vacancy rates.
- Higher conversion rates from owner-occupied to rental properties.
- More dramatic changes in ethnic and racial composition of residents or store owners.
- Changes in socio-economic status of residents.

5.2.3 Limitations of the Rational Offender Perspective (ROP) in crime prevention

What is known about the Rational Offender Perspective (ROP) as it relates to a suitable crime area or target and how residents would respond or react to crime and criminal victimisation by potential offenders, has serious limitations. In this regard, Taylor and Harrell (1996:20-21) listed the following deficiencies of this perspective:

- It is, for instance, unknown whether changes in physical deterioration and incivilities occur independently of each other or simply reflect structural changes in a specific neighbourhood. Changes may occur at three distinct levels: *socio-economic status* which increases or decreases; *stability and tranquillity* which is brought about by the balance of shop owners versus renters, that shifts; and the *racial and age composition* in a specific neighbourhood changes. A question then asked is whether physical incivilities is merely a symptom of structural changes, or do physical changes occur independently of structural changes. If, for example, physical incivility changes simply reflect changes in socio-economic status, then long-term crime prevention initiatives would rather regard job creation among less fortunate neighbourhood residents more important than renovating and beautifying housing units and/or apartment buildings.

- Physical incivilities are closely related to other neighbourhood features such as non-residential land uses not zones for residential use. So, the influence of a mixture of land uses say, in one specific neighbourhood for example, on an increasing crime rate is yet still uncertain.
- It is also unknown how potential offenders *interpret* or “read” physical incivilities (such as abandoned or vacant buildings, presence of graffiti, car wrecks lying around, absence of adequate street lighting, absence of police omnipresence, etc.) - a key feature of the “broken windows”-concept. For instance, offenders coming from “outside” and invading a dilapidated environment may interpret the level of physical neglect (deterioration) according to their own frame of reference and then base their invasion and *modus operandi* on those perceived features. Burglars, on the other hand, may interpret their chances based on careful contemplation (well-thought) of a suitable target. However, it is not known precisely how much attention burglars pay to physical deterioration.
- Lastly, decreasing deterioration, i.e. improving physical environments, may also be problematic - especially in the more upper-class neighbourhoods which may also be troublesome and plagued by a higher crime rate. Consequently, potential offenders may observe excellent opportunities from potentially more lucrative targets for crimes such as theft, robbery and housebreaking.

CPTED is being successfully used in schools and communities in the USA to improve the management of human space. Crowe (1991:84) noted that the underlying objective of CPTED is to help school administrators attain their primary goal of learners' achievements and simultaneously create a safe and positive environment with added byproducts of improved security and loss prevention. A useful CPTED strategy is to relocate *gathering areas* to locations with natural surveillance.

5.3 PROBLEM – ORIENTED POLICING

“Problem-oriented policing” (Goldstein, 1979) constituted a somewhat later influence

on the development of situational prevention. Goldstein argued that the route to greater operational effectiveness for the police was not through improvements in organisation and management, but through the detailed analysis of the everyday problems they handle and the devising of tailor-made solutions. This process requires “identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses, weighing the merits of these alternatives, and choosing from among them” (Goldstein 1979:236). This viewpoint supports the notion that practical public and police/private security involvement in crime prevention by means of identification and solving crime-related social problems would best be addressed or attended to if it is done in a joint undertaking.

This formulation of problem-oriented policing – captured in the four-stage SARA model: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment – reflects the same action research paradigm underpinning situational prevention (Goldstein 1990:103; Hope 1994; Clarke 1997). Nevertheless, some important differences exist between the concepts. In particular, problem-oriented policing is not exclusively focused on crime and is primarily a police management approach; situational prevention, on the other hand, is a crime control approach that can be utilised within any organisational or management structure and is open, not just to the police, but to whoever can muster the resources to tackle the problem in hand (Clarke 1997:8-9).

The situational approach borrows heavily from a variety of different ideas, theories, and research. One very close partner to situational prevention is problem-oriented policing. In both approaches the idea is to define the problem, identify the contributing causes, seek out the proper people or organisations to assist in identifying potential solutions, and work as a group to implement the solution. The police and criminal justice system become both initiators and participants in this process, rather than the sole responsible parties. The fact that the problem drives the solution in situational prevention means that a wide array of theories could be brought to solve the different problems (Lab 1997:8).

5.4 THE RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

The earlier "choice" model formulated to guide situational prevention efforts has more recently been developed into a "rational choice" perspective on crime (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 1986), which borrows concepts from economic theories of crime (e.g. Becker 1968), but seeks to avoid some of the criticisms made of these theories. These include: (1) economic models mostly ignore rewards of crime that cannot easily be translated into cash equivalents; (2) economic theories have not been sensitive to the great variety of behaviours falling under the general label of crime, with their variety of costs and benefits, and instead have tended to lump them together as a single variable in their equations; (3) the formal mathematical modeling of criminal choices in economic theories often demands data that are unavailable or can only be pressed into service by making unrealistic assumptions about what they represent; and, finally, (4) the image in economic theory of the self-maximizing decision maker, carefully calculating his or her advantage, does not fit the opportunistic and reckless nature of much crime (Clarke and Felson in Clarke 1997:9).

Under the new formulation, relationships between concepts were expressed, not in mathematical terms as was the case in Becker's normative model, but in the form of "decision" diagrams (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 1986 in Clarke 1997:9). Concepts were adapted from the other disciplines involved in the analysis of criminal decision making, as well as economics, to give greater weight to non-instrumental motives for crime and the "limited" or "bounded" nature of the rational processes involved. It was assumed, in other words, that crime is purposive behaviour designed to meet the offender's commonplace needs for such things as money, status, sex and excitement, and that meeting these needs involves the making of (sometimes quite rudimentary) decisions and choices, constrained as these are by limits of time and ability and the availability of relevant information.

A second important new premise was that a decision-making approach to crime requires that a fundamental distinction be made between criminal involvement and criminal events (a distinction paralleling that between criminality and crime). Criminal involvement refers to the processes through which individuals choose (i) to

become initially involved in particular forms of crime, (ii) to continue, and (iii) to desist. The decision process at each of these stages is influenced by a different set of factors and needs to be separately modeled. In the same way, the decision processes involved in the commission of a particular crime (i.e. the criminal event) are dependent upon their own special categories of information. Involvement decisions are characteristically multistage and extend over substantial periods of time. Event decisions, on the other hand, are frequently shorter processes, utilising more circumscribed information largely relating to immediate circumstances and situations.

Finally, and of special importance to situational prevention, was the recognition that the decision processes and information utilised, could vary greatly among offences. To ignore these differences, and the situational contingencies associated with them, may be to reduce significantly the scope for intervention. Cornish and Clarke's formulation of the rational choice perspective has been characterised by Opp (1997) as a "wide" model compared with the "narrow" economic formulation. This wide model was primarily developed to assist thinking about situational prevention, but it was not intended to be limited to this role. Indeed, Cornish (1993) has argued that many features of the rational choice perspective make it particularly suitable to serve as a criminological "metatheory" with a broad role in the explanation of a variety of criminological phenomena (Clarke 1997:9-10).

5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY

Rational choice premises have generally been supported by recent studies in which offenders have been interviewed about motives, methods and target choices (Cromwell 1996). The offenders concerned have included burglars (e.g. Walsh 1980; Maguire 1982; Bennett and Wright 1984; Nee and Taylor 1988; Cromwell et al 1991; Biron and Ladouceur 1991; Wright and Decker 1994; Wiersma 1996), shoplifters (Walsh 1978; Carroll and Weaver 1986), car thieves (Light *et al.* 1993; McCullough *et al.* 1990; Spencer 1992), muggers (Lejeune 1977; Feeney 1986) bank and commercial robbers (New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 1987; Normandeau and Gabor 1987; Kube 1988; Nugent et al 1989) and offenders using violence (Indermaur 1996; Morrison and O'Donnell 1996) (Clarke 1997:10).

These studies of offender decision making constitute one of two major analytic paths followed in the past decade by “environmental criminology” (Brantingham and Brantingham 1991). The other path has involved “objective analysis of the spatial and temporal variation in crime patterns in order to discover aggregate factors influencing the patterns” (Brantingham and Brantingham 1991:239). When such analyses involve aggregate crime rates or “macro” level data for countries or states, they rarely produce findings with preventive implications. “Micro” level analyses, on the other hand, of specific categories of crime occurring in specific kinds of buildings or sites are generally the most productive in preventive terms (Kennedy 1990 in Clarke 1997:10).

Analyses at an intermediary “meso” level can also lead to useful preventive suggestions as shown by Poyner and Webb’s (1991) study mentioned above of domestic burglary in tow British communities. This study is also illustrative of research on the criminal’s “journey to work” undertaken, among others, by Brantingham and Brantingham (1975), Maguire (1982) and Rengert and Wasilchick (1985). Among the findings of these studies are that the risks of commercial robbery may be increased by being located close to a main road and those of domestic burglary by being located on the outskirts of an affluent area. In both cases, the explanation is that the offender’s target search time is thereby reduced (Clarke 1997:10).

5.5.1 Routine Activities Theory (RAT)

Research on the criminal’s journey to work is conceptually related to another body of criminological work – routine activity theory – which has also contributed to the theoretical base of situational prevention. The routine activity approach stated three minimal elements for direct-contact predatory crime: a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian against crime (Cohen and Felson 1979). It avoids speculation about the source of the offender’s motivation, which distinguishes it immediately from most other criminological theories. Instead, it focuses upon the convergence in space and time of the three elements of crime, that is to say upon the conditions favouring the occurrence of a criminal event, rather than

the development of a criminal disposition. This reflects its intellectual roots in the human ecology of Amos Hawley (1950), who recognised that the timing of different activities by hour of day and day of week are important for the understanding of human society. These points are also central to the routine activity approach, which is focused upon changes from moment to moment and hour to hour in where people are, what they are doing, and what happens to them as a result (Clarke and Felson 1993; Felson 1994a). In support of their approach, Cohen and Felson (1979) sought to demonstrate that increases in residential burglary in the United States between 1960 and 1970 could largely be explained by changes in "routine activities" such as the increasing proportion of empty homes in the day (due to more single person households and greater female participation in the labour force) and the increased portability of televisions and other electrical goods (Clarke 1997:11).

Cohen and Felson's analysis also illustrates the relationship between routine activity theory and the victimological work on "lifestyles", stimulated by the flood of National Crime Survey data first released in the 1970s (Hindelang *et al.* 1978). One of the tenets of "lifestyle" theory is that the differential risks of victimisation are partly a function of differential exposure to offenders (Fattah 1993). This exposure varies not only with the sociodemographic characteristics of the victim (age, race, place of residence, etc.), but also with the victim's lifestyle. A person's work and leisure activities that increase exposure to potential offenders (such as alcohol consumption in public places or late-night use of public transport) increase the risks of victimisation. The implication of this is that risks might be reduced by modifying patterns of activity. A further important finding of victimological research, the implications of which are being explored in a series of recent studies by Ken Pease and colleagues (for a review, see Farrell and Pease 1993), is that some people and targets are repeatedly subject to victimisation and might therefore be prime candidates for preventive attention. A similar point has been made by Sherman *et al.* (1989) in relation to the "hot spots" of crime, places that are the source of repeated calls for assistance to the public (Clarke 1997:11).

Lifestyle and routine activity theories have both made opportunity a respectable topic of research in criminology and have helped attract serious scholarly interest to situational prevention. Both theories are still evolving and Felson himself has made

some attempts to expand the scope of routine activity theory. He has defined minimal elements for some categories of crime other than direct-contact predatory offenses (Felson 1992) and, in order to accommodate social control theory (Hirschi 1969), has proposed a fourth minimal element for predatory crimes, “the intimate handler”, or someone who knows the likely offender well-enough to afford a substantial brake on the latter’s activities (Felson 1986). Clarke (1992) has argued that the contribution of routine activity theory to crime prevention could be enhanced by adding a fifth element which he refers to as “crime facilitators”. These are such things as automobiles, credit cards and weapons that comprise the essential tools for particular forms of crime (Clarke 1997:10-12).

Environmental criminology (also known as “criminology of place”) represents a more contemporary version of ecological approaches to crime advocated by Shaw and McKay in their study of delinquency areas in Chicago in the late 1920s. Briefly, environmental criminology comprises an emerging perspective within a contemporary group of criminological theory that regards the geographical location and architectural features of a specific environment, example: neighbourhoods, buildings such as individual homes and business establishments, street lay-outs, parks, “hot spots” of crime, and the like and its relationship with the incidence of crime and criminal victimisation as an all important social phenomenon (Schmallegger 1999:278).

Criminology of place supports the notion that the prevalence of crime in a specific area could be indicative of typical lifestyles or routine activities of victimised individuals or the social features of victimised households. *Place* as such, has been defined as “... a fixed physical environment that can be seen completely and simultaneously, at least on its surface, by one’s naked eyes”. Environmental criminology should not be equated with the study of environmental crime – it should rather be seen as a perspective that explains *how* crime differs from place to place (or location to location) (Schmallegger 1999:597). For instance, certain places could be labeled *criminogenic* (tendency towards producing or precipitating criminal actions) as a result of peoples’ routine activities associated with them, example stereotypical hijacking of motor vehicles at certain spots such as entrances to driveways at fixed times, transporting large amounts of pension money on fixed days of the month to specific locations, etc. Other places may simply “host” crime as a result of their

inherent characteristics facilitating the commission thereof such as deteriorated neighbourhoods (Schmallegger 1999:279).

Thus, two prominent approaches employed by the environmental crime-thesis explaining why crimes are more prevalent in specific locations, are namely *defensible space theory* and the *broken windows*-concept (see par. 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).

5.6 THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR CRIME


Environmental criminology, the rational choice perspective and routine activity and lifestyle theories have all helped to strengthen situational prevention in different ways, reflecting their different origins and the purposes for which they were developed. Interviews with offenders and analysis of crime patterns, environmental criminology have provided ample information about the motives and methods of offenders, which has been valuable in thinking about counter measures. The rational choice perspective has provided a framework under which to organise such information so that individual studies produce more general benefits. As will be seen below, it has also assisted analysis of displacement. Lifestyle theory has focused attention on what victims might do to reduce their risks of crime. And routine activity theory has served to extend preventive options by directing attention to features of the three essential elements of crime and their convergence. For example, the idea of convergence has led to the suggestion that “deflecting offenders” be recognised as a distinct technique of situational prevention (Clarke 1992 in Clarke 1997:12).

Cusson (1986) has argued that the differences among the various theoretical approaches may turn out to be mainly of historical interest and that a synthesis is inevitable and desirable. The model of the opportunity structure for crime presented in Figure 4 represents one such attempt at integration.

Under this model, which includes the dispositional variables of traditional criminology as well as the situational ones of the newer theories, there are three components of the *criminal opportunity structure*. These are *targets* (cars, convenience stores, ATM machines, etc.), *victims* (e.g. women alone, drunks,

strangers) and crime *facilitators*. These latter include tools, such as guns and cars, as well as disinhibitors such as alcohol or other drugs.

FIGURE 5.4 : THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR CRIME



The supply of targets and their nature is a function of (i) the *physical environment*, including the layout of cities, the kinds of housing, technology and communications, transportation and retailing systems, the numbers of vehicles and the supply of drugs and alcohol, and (ii) the *lifestyles and routine activities* of the population, including patterns of leisure, work, residence and shopping; these patterns either hinder or facilitate guardianship. The physical environment also determines the supply of facilitators, while lifestyles and routine activities play a large part in supplying the victims of personal and sexual attacks. Physical environment and lifestyles and routine activities are themselves determined by the broader *socio-economic structure* of society, including demography, geography, urbanisation and industrialisation, health and educational policy, and legal and political institutions. The numbers of *potential offenders* and their motives is also partly determined by the socio-economic structure of society through many of the mechanisms (alienation, subcultural influence, neglect and lack of love, etc.) identified by traditional criminology, and partly by lifestyle and routine activities which impact upon the nature of social control afforded by "intimate handlers" and in other ways.

The opportunity structure is not simply a physical entity, defined at any one point in time by the nature of the physical environment and the routine activities of the population. Rather, a complex interplay between potential offenders and the supply of victims, targets and facilitators determines the scale and nature of opportunities for crime. Potential offenders learn about criminal opportunities from their peers, the media and their own observation, but they are differentially sensitised to this information as well as being differentially motivated to seek out and create opportunities. Thus, offender perceptions and judgments about risks, effort and rewards play an important part in defining the opportunity structure. These judgments also play a determining role at the subsequent stage of crime commission.

Before moving from the theoretical background of situational crime prevention to its other components, some questions about the scope and reach of situational prevention arising from the model of the opportunity structure should be addressed. The first is that, if everything seems to flow from the socio-economic structure, should not preventive effort be focused at that level? Could not large scale reductions in a wide range of crimes be achieved by tackling the disposition to offend through improved

welfare and educational programs? Would this not be more efficient than undertaking the vast number of small-scale efforts to address highly specific crime problems implied by the situational focus?

One answer to these questions is that “social” crime prevention is already focused at the socio-economic level and that the opportunity structure requires attention in its own right. However, Morris and Hawkins (1970) and Wilson (1975) have noted that we do not know how to bring about some of the needed social changes, such as making parents love their children more. As for better welfare and education, these may be seen as desirable but often as demanding resources that society cannot afford. Finally, when Sweden and some other European countries enhanced welfare and achieved more equitable income distribution, this was followed not by reductions in crime but by increases (Smith 1995).

A second question concerns deterrence and is as follows: Rather than attempting to manipulate the opportunity structure (with the attendant costs and inconvenience of this strategy), might not be more efficient simply to raise the stakes of offending through heavier punishments? In fact, interview with offenders have shown that they pay much closer attention to the immediate chances of getting caught than to the nature of the punishment they might receive later. Rather than increasing punishment, it is therefore more efficient to make the offender more fearful of being caught, and one component of situational prevention does indeed consist of increasing the risks of being caught, and one component of situational prevention does indeed consist of increasing the risks of being caught through a process that Cusson (1993) refers to as “situational deterrence”.

A final set of questions concerns the interplay between the objective reality of the opportunity structure and the way this is perceived by potential offenders. How do offenders learn about criminal opportunities and what factors come into play when they make decisions about which ones to pursue? What proportion of crimes are the result of opportunities seized, and what proportion of ones that are sought or created (Maguire, 1980; Bennett and Wright 1984). At issue here is the question of whether opportunities for crime really are in infinite supply as some have argued. If so, this

has serious implications for a strategy advocating their reduction. What matter the few reductions that can be achieved in criminal opportunities if these are infinite?

Consideration of the realities of crime helps provide an answer. While it may be true in theory that every dwelling and automobile provides not just one opportunity for crime, but, if considered over time, a set of almost endless opportunities, this ignores the fact that households and automobiles are afforded substantial guardianship for much of the time (Clarke 1984). Even when unguarded, they may in actuality provide few rewards for crime. The average household contains only a few portable goods that can be converted into cash and there are limits to the number of stolen VCRs and television sets that the offender can store. It is also unclear how many such "hot" items can be off-loaded onto the market without provoking a determined response from law enforcement. Clarification of these issues needs to be sought in more research of the kind recently published by Cromwell et al 1991, in which they undertook detailed interviews with residential burglars about their working methods (Clarke 1997:12-15). Subsequently, Clarke (1997:17-25) discusses sixteen opportunity-reducing techniques. In summarised format, these are:

- ◆ Target hardening
- ◆ Access control
- ◆ Deflecting offenders
- ◆ Controlling facilitators
- ◆ Entry/exit screening
- ◆ Formal surveillance
- ◆ Surveillance by employees
- ◆ Natural surveillance
- ◆ Target removal
- ◆ Identifying property
- ◆ Reducing temptation
- ◆ Denying benefits
- ◆ Rule setting
- ◆ Stimulating conscience
- ◆ Controlling disinhibitors
- ◆ Facilitating compliance

5.7 CONTINUING CHALLENGES FOR CRIME PREVENTION

While crime prevention is not new, there are numerous issues and challenges yet to be addressed. Among these are concerns over competing theoretical bases for interventions, the implementation of programs, the political reality within which any program must develop and exist, reliance on poor or inadequate evaluation, and over displacement and diffusion of benefits. The following discussion highlights some of the more important issues facing the future of crime prevention efforts (Lab 1997:9-12).

5.7.1 Theoretical competition

Underlying all crime prevention efforts (hopefully) is some theoretical argument. At the same time, any criminologist can attest to the fact that there is a great deal of debate over the proper explanation of deviant behaviour. The social-disorganisation, rational-choice, and routine-activities perspectives are common theoretical bases for crime prevention programs. Many other theories, however, also provide valuable insight to interventions. Learning theory, developmental approaches, strain theory, control theory, deterrence, and critical theories are only a few of the potentially useful frameworks that have been, and should be, considered in designing crime prevention.

The unfortunate reality of many prevention programs, especially community-based, is the lack of attention paid to theory. This is particularly noticeable in programs that arise from indigenous community leaders and groups, and that tend to avoid entanglements with outside agencies or experts. The end result may be a jumble of bits and pieces from different, competing theories working at cross purposes to one another, more emphasis needs to be placed on the theoretical development of crime prevention programs.

5.7.2 Program implementation

A key issue for any program, whether it be related to crime or anything else, is the degree to which the program is adequately implemented. Interventions that are poorly or only partly implemented have a good chance of failure, no matter how well-

intentioned or thought-out. For example, a business watch scheme in a crime-ridden, ethnically divided area that is only able to gain participation from 20 percent of the shopowners, and that 20 percent exclusively from one of three ethnic groups, should not be expected to have much of an impact on the entire business area or community. Key elements of a successful business watch, such as enhanced social cohesion, higher recognition of businessmen/residents, and group action against crime, will not be realised if you cannot gain the participation of the citizens.

The problems of implementation can come from a variety of sources. Poor conceptualisation of the problem can lead to a “grab bag” approach in which a little of everything is tried instead of focusing on a few key items. Even if the problem is properly identified, many crime prevention programs operate with a small group of highly committed but poorly trained and supported individuals. Good intentions can only go so far. A program may need specific expertise, outside help, and/or significant funding in order to have an impact. The lack of resources (both personnel and monetary) may mean that only parts of the solution can be implemented. Unfortunately, no matter how well a program addresses one of the causes of the problem, the inability to address other key components will undermine the efforts.

Another potential problem with implementation is the possibility that key agencies, actors, or community members will only half-heartedly participate. Many law enforcement and criminal justice system personnel have questioned the motivations and approaches of individuals and groups who have become involved in crime prevention. Some of this may be due to the “we-versus-them” attitude between the police and the public that has developed over time, particularly in large, heterogeneous cities. It may also be attributable to feelings that the police have the training and the public does not, or to fear of a return to vigilante justice. Breaking through these attitudes and fears has not been easy, as indicated by police opposition to community-orientated policing. The cooperation and participation of criminal justice professionals is often a key to successful implementation, continuation, and effectiveness of crime prevention programs.

5.7.3 Political reality

Crime prevention exists and must compete in the political arena, just as any other program or agency. In the United States, citizen crime prevention programs and methods remain secondary to more punitive responses to crime. This is evidenced in the fact that, while there is an established Sentencing Commission, a Drug Czar, and a Department of Corrections (to name a few), there is no similar focal point or agency for crime prevention. In recent years, the political debate in the United States has been whether to increase funding for prisons or enhance crime prevention initiatives.

At a more basic level, many people would argue that politics play a deciding role in whether crime prevention addresses the immediate problem (crime and victimisation) or the root problems (such as poverty, economic inequality, and lack of power). Some would argue that true crime prevention will require an alteration of the economic system under which most western, industrial nations operate. The majority of both offenders and victims come from the disenfranchised groups in society. These groups have little or no political or economic power with which to improve themselves, their neighbourhoods, or, for that matter, society. A conflict theorist would suggest that there is a need to make major changes in the social system in order to truly impact crime.

A less extreme view of the political reality can be seen in Hope's (1995a) distinction between *horizontal* and *vertical* dimensions of power. The horizontal dimensions refers to the sharing of experiences and the ability to engender action at the local level between residents and citizens in the area. The degree to which the indigenous populace can relate to one another and work together will greatly influence the effectiveness of any prevention program.

Of perhaps greater importance, however, is the vertical power of the local constituents. Vertical power refers to the ability of the local groups to marshal support and action by other elements of the community or society. What Hope (1995a) argues is that, no matter how much horizontal effort is expended, if needed funds and assistance are not provided by the vertical dimension, the program will fail.

The fact is that some neighbourhoods and groups simply do not have the political power to mobilise the vertical interaction and response. Both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions must be at work for crime prevention to be effective (Hope 1995a).

5.7.4 Professional constituencies for situational prevention

At the beginning of this introduction, it was argued that situational prevention is a radically new form of crime control focused not on criminals, but on criminogenic situations, with all that implies for criminological explanation. Situational prevention can also be regarded, however, as a logical outcome of the precautions that people have always taken to protect themselves from crime and, seen in this light, it is little more than the systematisation of a wide range of everyday, commonsense practices. That two such divergent views can be taken of situational prevention helps to explain why it is widely practiced in all but name, while at the same time it is resisted by many criminologists and politicians.

Its lack of political support may be surprising: The Left might have welcomed its focus upon local problems and local decision-making; Liberals might have been attracted to its essentially non-punitive philosophy; and Conservatives might have been attuned to its message concerning the need for agencies and communities to take the initiative in dealing with their crime problems. Perhaps the very breadth of this appeal means that situational prevention lacks a natural constituency among politicians, but they also have other reasons to resist it. It is too easily represented as being soft on crime and as blaming victims. It seems to demand new resources, in addition to those already allocated to the criminal justice system. It is easily characterised as demonstrating a failure of political will in dealing with the severe social and economic problems that confront society. Its essentially piecemeal approach affords little prospect of achieving immediate reduction in overall crime rates and its rational, analytic nature does not lend itself to eloquence in campaign speeches or political manifestos.

Politicians may indeed have a limited role in promoting situational prevention because particular measures often have to be initiated at a local level, sometimes by

private sector organisations. The grass roots formulation of crime control must encourage cost-benefit appraisals of prevention and might result in more effective action, but it means that national politicians cannot claim the successes. When they do promote "situational" programs, such as neighbourhood watch, there is the risk of this leading to the kind of unfocused efforts, out of keeping with the tenets of situational crime prevention, that result in disappointment and disillusionment. When central government intervention is indicated, as in the case of persuading vehicle manufacturers to improve security, this may not require laws enacted by politicians, but patient, "behind the scenes" negotiations conducted by civil servants to persuade reluctant parties to take preventive action.

Despite its lack of a political constituency, situational prevention has become a component, though a small one, of crime policy in some European countries (Willemse 1994; Garland 1996). This may be because civil servants can sometimes be more pragmatic than their political masters. Both in Holland and Great Britain, situational prevention is promoted by government crime prevention units and by a semi-autonomous governmental agency in Sweden. Its record of success and the resolution of ethical and theoretical dilemmas will mean that its policy role will grow, even in the United States where interest has been lagging. As mentioned above, this may be due partly to the disappointing results of attempts to implement CPTED in the 1970s. However, Bright (1992) has noted the absence of any crime prevention policy in America, which he attributes to a dislike of government intervention as well as to a strong ethos of personal responsibility that results in punishment being seen as the most appropriate response to law-breaking. Nevertheless, the recent federal government support for community and problem-oriented policing may signal a change, likely to benefit situational prevention.

Since the responsibility for much preventive action falls on the private sector, government officials promoting situational prevention will need to become familiar with a world that is now foreign to many of them. Their usual modes of governing, based upon fiscal control and parliamentary or congressional authority, will have to be supplemented by other change strategies, including negotiation and persuasion (Burrows 1997; Travis 1997; van Dijk 1997). Some difficult issues, discussed above in the context of shoplifting, will also have to be addressed concerning the role of

government in helping to prevent crimes that impact profitability and which businesses might be expected to deal with themselves. Without a lead from government, however, many crime problems bringing harm to businesses and their clienteles, or caused by business practices, might never be addressed. Without government research funding, it is also unclear how the requisite body of knowledge about preventing crime in commercial establishments would be accumulated (Felson and Clarke 1997a).

While its role in policy now seems assured, situational prevention still lacks a strong professional constituency. Since it can be used by such a wide range of public and private organisations, it will never be of more than marginal interest to any particular group of managers. The security industry also may resist an approach which could reduce the demand for guards and security hardware, the industry's main staples. Finally, police interest in situational prevention is likely to be subsumed under problem-oriented policing.

At the same time, situational prevention expertise is increasingly being sought in a wide range of settings, public and private. Towns and cities in Britain and Holland are beginning to appoint crime prevention or "community safety" officers, and some criminologists are already employed in a preventive capacity in business and industry (Burrows 1997; Challinger 1997). In America, Felson (1994b) has proposed that university departments of criminology and criminal justice should operate a crime prevention extension service based on the successful agricultural model.

These developments offer considerable training and employment opportunities for criminologists, but not without some changes of attitude. More young criminologists will need to define their theoretical goals more in terms of control than enlightenment, and will need to define control more in terms of reducing opportunities than propensities. They will have to become familiar with a host of social institutions – schools, factories, hospitals, rail and bus systems, shopping malls and retail stores – beyond the courts and the prisons. They must no longer disdain the business world, but must recognize its central role in the production and control of crime (Felson and Clarke 1997a). Their role models will increasingly need to become traffic engineers and public health specialists – professionals employed to improve everyday life –

rather than academics and social commentators. In short, a more down-to-earth, pragmatic approach will be required (Clarke 1997:39-41).

5.7.5 Poor evaluation

Crime prevention suffers from the same malady from which many interventions suffer – poor or nonexistent evaluation. Most evaluation efforts are secondary to the implementation of the program and may actually be a last minute addition to a project. As such, the evaluation component of most programs is poorly conceived, marginally funded, after-the-fact, and short-lived. Program evaluation should be an integral part of the planning of any intervention.

Two types of evaluation can be identified in the crime prevention literature. The most prevalent form is simple *process evaluation*. Process evaluations focus on what was done, who did it, how often it occurred, how many people were involved, and other similar measures. This type of evaluation dominated most early examinations of citizen crime prevention programs, and can be found throughout the government-sponsored research in this area. Process evaluations typically proclaim success when some level of participation, implementation, or coverage is attained. What is missing from this approach is an assessment of impact on crime and victimisation. The closest these evaluations come to such assessment is to relate people's impressions of success. Unfortunately, this type of evaluation still appears all too often today.

The more useful form of evaluation is an *outcome or impact evaluation*. These evaluations, which typically include process information, focus on whether the intervention achieved the expected outcome – typically reduced crime and victimisation. Assessments of this type require more planning and effort. Typical consideration must be given to the selection of comparison groups, follow-up time frame, measures of the outcome variables, potential confounding factors, and analytic techniques. Many program participants, both citizen and criminal justice system based, do not have the training to undertake such an evaluation and fail to search out those who can do this for the project. Even when evaluation is planned, the funds and time are often so limited that the evaluation provides only minimal insight. As a consequence, many promising programs never know whether they really work. This

leads to one of two negative outcomes – perpetuation of an ineffective program or the demise of a program that works.

A great deal of additional attention needs to be paid to the evaluation of crime prevention initiatives. While there has been increased support for this evaluation in the United States, England, Canada, and other countries, there are still a large number of programs, particularly local, that are not adequately evaluated (Lab 1997:11-12).

5.8 CRIME PREVENTION AT A CROSSROADS ?

So where do we go from here? Suggesting that crime prevention is at a crossroads may bring to mind images that the area is at a crucial stage of development and that a misstep will cause irreparable harm. That is not the case. Steven Lab's choice of a crossroads analogy is meant to suggest that there are a variety of directions from which to choose – each with its share of challenges (some seen and some unseen) and each holding out promise of success. Some of the roads appear straighter than others due to the knowledge we have accumulated, the theoretical basis of the ideas, its potential political acceptability, and our ability to marshal the resources needed to travel that path. A look down the other roads may indicate sudden turns or many speed bumps and stop signs that will make the journey a longer, more difficult one, although not necessarily impossible. Choosing this direction may reflect philosophical beliefs, despite political roadblocks or a lack of past scientific research.

No choice of direction is inherently wrong or right. Instead, whatever choice is made should be based on the best knowledge and planning possible. History, past successes and failures, theory, logic, and research should inform and guide the choice of direction. The only wrong choice is the uninformed choice (Lab 1997:13).

The views in this work offer a number of different roads to take. Some of the ideas are more closely related to one another. This it to be expected when there is a wealth of research and literature underlying an area such as crime prevention. Other documents offer different insights and suggestions that may challenge common wisdom or the more popular approaches. Again, they are based on insight, theory,

and research and deserve to be examined. In every case, these papers, by some of the leading writers on crime prevention, offer ideas that may lead down different roads.

At the same time, moving forward in any direction is better than standing still, and each one will bring us closer to "crime prevention" (Lab 1997:13).

5.9 SUMMARY

Empirical evidence linking *physical deterioration*, or *signs of incivilities* with crime, *fear of crime* or *increase in either* revealed that "... cross-sectional studies on signs of disorder, crime, and fear have generated different results, depending upon the *unit of analysis* and the *types of measures* used" (Taylor & Harrell 1996:18)(italics added).

A consolidation of research results emanating from these cross-sectional studies by Taylor, Shumaker and Gottfredson (1985) revealed that-

- ◆ *residents' perceptions* (unit of analysis) of incivilities generated more consistent effects than research based on on-site ratings of physical features
- ◆ *street blocks* (unit of analysis) generally provided more stable results than research using *neighbourhoods* and
- ◆ *neighbourhoods* that suffered serious neglect caused higher levels of fear of crime, *when* the future of such neighbourhoods appeared uncertain (Taylor & Harrell 1996:18).

Lewis and Maxfield 1980 (Taylor & Harrell 1996:18; Van Velzen 1998:53-54) conducted extensive research on the relationship between crime, perceptions of crime and incivilities of physical deterioration and incivilities in four Chicago neighbourhoods: *Lincoln Park*, (a middle to upper-middle class area), *Wicker Park*, (a lower-working class family neighbourhood), *Woodlawn* (a lower-class neighbourhood and ghetto slum area), and *Back of the Yard* (a stable working-class community with mixed races of white, hispanic and black families). Perceptions of incivilities such as: loud noises being made by teenagers and skid row citizens, abandoned buildings and empty streets were found to induce fear among law-abiding people. Measures of

perceived neighbourhood incivilities included: groups hanging around, abandoned buildings, vandalism, drug use, and burned-out buildings. Residents of Wicker Park scored highest on each of these incivilities, while having a lower crime rate. Lincoln Park-residents expressed little concern for such incivilities and problems of crime, while having a higher crime rate.

Lewis and Maxfield (1980:184) ascribed this higher tendency towards incivilities to the fact that areas such as Wicker Park (and also Back of the Yard) have the highest average of *young people* who are notorious for drug use and vandalism. These authors concluded that fear of crime was not evenly distributed throughout Chicago. Further, that neighbourhood crime rates vary, as do the perceived risks of victimisation by neighbourhood residents (Van Velzen 1998: 54-56).

Fennelly (1989:15) states that the image of police in America doing a good or excellent job in the community increased in the public's eye despite the fact that the overall clearance rate for major crimes has not increased substantially. Why? **Perhaps because the average citizen has had enough and has communicated to the elected leadership that crime must be dealt with more effectively than in the past.** He also predicted in 1989 that the two types of crime are going to have a particularly dramatic impact on security plans and activities world wide: *terrorist attacks* and *computer related crimes*.

The first is extremely frightening, regardless of the actual probability of victimisation, because of the immense threat to life. Twelve years later on 11 September 2001 the world was shocked with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York.

The second is critical because of our society's ever increasing reliance on data processing and electronic banking. The proliferation of technology far exceeds our use of systematic safeguards.

Fennelly (1989:16) also states that in the future we will be seeing:

- ◆ an increase in public concern about effective crime prevention techniques

- ◆ more community programs directed from a social action perspective to encourage community cohesion
- ◆ school education curricula at the elementary, middle, and senior high levels with an emphasis on safety for the younger years and law-related education for the older students
- ◆ an emphasis on reducing crimes against business as companies adopt increasingly tighter budgets with *lean and mean* staff sizes, including the use of high-technology mechanical, electronic, and procedural safeguards
- ◆ a focus on residential burglary reduction as alarm systems become less expensive, resulting in more stringent standards for police response and a growth in private security armed response units in middle-and upper-income areas
- ◆ an offer from the insurance industry of economic incentives to home owners and automobile owners to encourage the use of effective locking devices and alarms
- ◆ design of the environment for security becoming increasingly important in regard to corporate facilities, housing, recreation areas, and urban centers.

Persons demonstrating competency in the area of crime research and crime prevention will surely have a bright future in prevention programming for either the public or private sector (Fennelly 1989:16).

CHAPTER 6

PRIVATE SECURITY – CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In a free enterprise system the best indicator of success is sustained growth. By this criterion, private security is a success. The best data available indicate that private security grew at an annual rate of 10% per year in America during the 1970s. Few segments of any economy would have been able to maintain such a growth rate during the same period. Although similar data about South African private may not exist, it could be anticipated that it might be the case.

Two broad hypotheses have been used to explain this growth. One is that the private security industry has grown because of the increase in crime in the United States and the inability of public law enforcement to stop this trend. The second refers to the quality of private security services which improved to such an extent resulting in greater utilisation of private security services.

The truth probably lies somewhere in between. For example: an argument often used to explain data showing increases in the crime rate is that better reporting of crimes accounts for much of the increase. Some also argue that the quality of private security has not really improved, but has simply become an increasingly necessary part of doing business. Another position is that government regulation seems to be the real factor in this growth in the United States. The security requirements for doing business with the government (primarily local) have increased, and industry has responded by increasing security for the simple reason that without it they could not obtain government contracts. With the ending of the Cold War there are officials in the private security field who predict that, in some industries, the need for security will decrease because of the shift away from needing to maintain security to meet government regulations. On the opposite side are those who feel that security will increase because companies will need more security to compete in the global economy of the future. Looking at the future, the growth rate is likely to continue if

crime continues to increase and the quality of private security continues to improve (Collins *et al.* 2000:363).

6.2 GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Government regulations, especially state statutes, will provide the needed impetus to establish standards for employment and training. Such standards should dictate a balance between contract and proprietary guard services and armed versus unarmed security personnel.

The *economic role* of the private security industry resides in the fact that the industry

- provides employment to an extremely large proportion of people in South Africa
- presents profitable opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors for marketing a service that is in high demand (as a result of high incidences of serious crime)
- provides in the safety and protection of valuable assets and economic resources (Security Officers' Interim Board 2000:1).

The reasons given for the growth of the private security industry are –

- Private security offers a challenge to outdated ideas about the role of both public and private police - in other words, it creates a climate for innovative thinking within a framework of a re-evaluation of the role of private security in a democratic dispensation.
- Private security's re-emergence because of its flexibility and responsiveness to consumer demand, and an apparent loss of confidence in public policing (Security Officers' Interim Board 2000:1).

6.2.1 Security Officers' Act (No. 92 of 1987)

The first ever formal regulation of the private security industry in South Africa was introduced in the form of the Security Officers' Act of 1987. This Act took effect on

3 April 1989 and placed the regulation of the private security industry under the control of the Minister of Safety and Security (South Africa 1987, sec. 1). The primary purpose of this Act was “ ... to provide for the establishment of a board, to be known as the Security Officers’ Board [SOB], to deal with and exercise control over the occupation of security officers” (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:20). Since early 1990, various amendments were effected to the Security Officers’ Act (No. 92 of 1987), namely the Security Officers’ Amendment Act, no. 25 of 1990; Act no. 119 of 1992; Act no. 64 of 1996 and Act no. 104 of 1997. These amendments were actually nothing more than positive steps to improve the original Act. Having done so, specific formal changes were introduced to “ ... address problems and deficiencies which have appeared since 1990, and to adapt the Act to continuously changing circumstances and the emergence of new needs within the industry and the country in general” (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:20). One general aspect of these changes between 1990 and 1997 was to limit the influence of the government in the SOB’s constitution and to make the industry more representative of South Africa’s population by increasing representation of employers, employees in and consumers of the security industry (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:20-21). The Security Officers’ Act (no. 92 of 1987) has finally been repealed and replaced by the *Security Industry Regulation Bill*

The legitimate rationale for regulating the private security industry is contained in the following aspects (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:3; 40):

- Protection of public interest such as the following *rights*: all forms of property, freedom and security of every individual, privacy, human dignity, and freedom of movement.
- Protection of the State’s interest by means of preventing possible abuses by private security businesses and private security personnel.
- Ensuring the provision of a quality service to people (customers) making use of private security services.
- Protecting individual rights of private security employees.

- Promotion and protection of the private security occupation as an asset to the country.
- Collection of accurate information relating to the total private security industry for purposes of research, policy-making, further development, etc.

6.2.2 The Security Officers' Board (SOB)

The Security Officers' Board was officially established on 3 April 1989 when the original Security Officers' Act of 1987 came into effect. The introduction of the SOB was mainly intended to exercise control over the private security industry. However, the " ... members of the former Security Officers' Board (the Interim Board's immediate predecessor) were appointed by the new democratic government at the end of 1995" (Security Officers' Interim Board 2000:21). The SOB's headquarters is situated in Pretoria.

6.2.3 The Security Officers' Interim Board (SOIB)

The Security Officers' Amendment Act, no. 104 of 1997, provided for the establishment and introduction of an Interim Security Officers' Board. In terms of the original legislation, the objectives of the SOB were " ... the exercise of control over, and maintenance, promotion and protection of the profession of [a] security officer ..." (Security Officers' Interim Board 2000:22). The Security Officers' Amendment Act 104 of 1997 added the following two objectives: " ... to ensure that the industry acts in the public interest and the periodic submission of reports to the Minister on the regulation of the industry" (Security Officers' Interim Board 2000:22).

Thirteen members of the Security Officers' Interim Board appointed in February 1999, were charged with the duties of advising the Minister of Safety and Security about aspects relating to the security industry and to oversee the regulation of the security industry in terms of the existing legislation. The appointment of the Interim Board members should be seen as a mechanism " ... which guarantees continuity and stability whilst facilitating new thinking and the required measure of transformation" (Security Officers' Interim Board 2000:22).

6.2.4 Statistics pertaining to private security trends in South Africa

Like public policing, private security did “ ... not arise from any particular theory or [scientific] school of thought, but is the end product of the historical development of a basic social need” (Van Heerden 1976:3). As such, the private security industry consists of individuals and businesses that are responsible for safeguarding and protecting people (clients) and property. The basic characteristic of private security resides in “ ... its activities, structures and performances that are based on free enterprise business principles (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:14).

The nature and extent of the private security industry should be measured in terms of its *economic strength*, while its strategic importance to South Africa as a whole is to be found in the safety and security function it fulfills. The current annual turnover of the private security industry amounts to approximately R12 billion, while the public policing budget is in the vicinity of R15.3 billion. Like the situation in the United States, private security has already surpassed public policing in magnitude, resources and expenditure. The following statistical tables portray the significance of private security in South Africa:

**TABLE 6.1 : NUMBER OF ACTIVE REGISTERED SECURITY OFFICERS
AND RELATED ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY AS ON
1 JANUARY 1999 AND 2000***

ESTABLISHMENT	January 1999	January 2000	% INCREASE
Number of active registered individual security officers	145 857	163 545**	12,13
Number of active registered security businesses	4 372	4 793	9,6

Number of active registered guarding businesses	2 729	3 048	11,69
Number of active registered cash in-transit businesses	527	586	11,20
Number of active registered armed response businesses	698	819	17,34

* Information retrieved from the Discussion Paper on the *Principles Regarding the Future Regulation of the Private Security Industry* (2000), issued by the Security Officers' Interim Board, pp. 15-16; 172.

** This figure excludes an estimated 60 000 individual proprietary ('in-house') security officers who are currently not regulated by the SOB in terms of any Statutory Law.

TABLE 6.2 : CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE ACTIVE WORKFORCE OF SECURITY OFFICERS - TREND ANALYSIS : 1999 / 2000 AS ON 31 DECEMBER 2000

CRITERIA	January 1999	December 2000	% CHANGE
Number of active security officers	145 857	186 878*	28 % increase
Percentage of active security officers NOT registered with the Board	9.5 %	3.3 %	65 % decrease
Percentage of active security officers with NO Board accredited training	21.6 %	12.7 %	41 % decrease

Percentage of active security officers with minimum of grade C training	29 . 8 %	43 . 8 %	47 % increase
Percentage of active security officers with grade A or grade B training	4 . 8 %	9 . 4 %	96 % increase

Source: Security officers' Interim Board Statistics (2000).

- * This figure excludes an estimated 60 000 individual proprietary ("in-house") security officers who are currently not regulated by the SOB in terms of any Statutory Law.

Table 6.1 clearly depicts the increase in various faculties of the private security industry between 1999 and 2000. Except for active private security businesses which showed an increase of 9,6%, all the other categories show an increase of well above the 11% mark. Active armed response security businesses increased with almost 18% in the year 2000 which supports the notion of an increase in violent human behaviour and increased levels of fear of such crimes among law-abiding citizens.

Table 6.2 indicates changes in the composition of the active workforce of security officers. Not only is the 28% increase in the number of active security officers notable, but the increase in the quality (Grading) of security officers in South Africa is of a higher standard.

**TABLE 6.3 : NUMBER OF ACTIVE SERVING PUBLIC POLICE OFFICERS
IN SOUTH AFRICA, ALL RANKS, AS ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1999***

STATUS CATEGORY	N	%
Commissioned officers	11 336	10,8
Non-commssioned officers	94 083	89,2
TOTAL**	105 419	100,0

Source: South African Police Service, Pretoria.

* Excludes number of civilian, temporary and contract members.

**TABLE 6.4 : COMPARISON BETWEEN PRIVATE SECURITY AND
PUBLIC POLICING EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH
AFRICA : 1999 – 2000**

AGENCY	N	%
Public police (SAPS*)	105 419	37,8
Private security industry	172 854	62,2
TOTAL	278 273	100,0

* South African Police Service, instituted in terms of the South African Police Service Act, no. 68 of 1995.

Table 6.3 reveals that of the 105 419 public police officers in 1999, only ten percent were commissioned officers (i.e. Captain, Superintendent, Senior Superintendent, Director and Commissioner). Non-commissioned officers (Constable, Sergeant and Inspector) are well above eighty percent in number. A subsequent comparison of these public officers with private security personnel in Table 6.4 shows that private security (62,2%) has already outnumbered public police officers (37,8%) in terms of strength.

Table 6.5 portrays regulatory activities that were performed by the Legal Services' Division of the Security Officers' Board between January and November 1999 which clearly illustrates the National Government's commitment, through the Security Officers' Interim Board, to maintain firm regulation and subsequent high standards of performance of the private security industry. Over the eleven month-period, 7 541 incidences or cases ranging from full inspections by the Interim Board to enquiries about improper conduct, institution of criminal action, etc. against members and businesses of the private security industry were processed. These actions included 1124 (14,91%) enquiries of improper conduct of which 473 (6,27%) were finalised in the eleven month period. One hundred and fourty four (144) cases (1,91%) were referred to criminal courts. Unfortunately, no demographic profile of the perpetrators were provided.

Table 6.6 contains statistics regarding private security training facilities in South Africa in the year 2000. Of the 675 existing accredited training facilities, 443 (65,6%) were active and functioning, while 181 (26,8%) were not functioning anymore. At that time, another 51 (7,6%) training establishments were suspended or closed down.

**TABLE 6.5 : REGULATORY ACTIVITIES PERFORMED IN RESPECT OF
THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY : JANUARY TILL
NOVEMBER 1999**

ACIVITY	Western Cape	KwaZulu -Natal	Eastern Cape	National	TOTAL
Full Inspection	988	1 014	715	3 083	5 800
Improper Conduct Enquiries	293	138	198	495	1 124
Enquiries Finalised	66	47	63	297	473

Criminal Charges Initiated	24	19	17	84	144
TOTAL	1371	1218	993	3 959	7541

Source: Security Officers' Interim Board (2000:172-173).

TABLE 6.6 : PRIVATE SECURITY TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA DURING 2000


Active accredited centres	443	65,6
Inactive accredited centres	181	26,8
Suspended training centres	51	7,6
TOTAL	675	100,0

Source: Security Officers' Interim Board (2000:174).

Figure 6.1 reveals the geographical distribution of active registered security officers in South Africa by May 2001. It is clear that Gauteng province has the majority of the registered security workforce in South Africa.

Figure 6.2 contains statistics regarding the top 20 employers based on the number of security officers employed by them.

**FIGURE 6.1 : GEOGRAFIC SPREAD OF ACTIVE REGISTERED,
PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
DURING MAY 2001**




Source: Security Officers' Interim Board (2001).

**FIGURE 6.2 : SECURITY OFFICERS' INTERIM BOARD LISTING OF TOP
20 SECURITY EMPLOYERS IN SOUTH AFRICA BASED ON NUMBER OF
SECURITY OFFICERS EMPLOYED : MAY 2001**

RANKING	SERVICE PROVIDER	EMPLOYEES	INDUSTRY
1.	Fidelity Springbok	16 379	8,52%
2.	Securicor Gray Security Services	10 237	5,33%
3.	Chubb & Supergroup BBR	6 754	3,51%
4.	Command Security Services	4 507	2,34%
5.	Secureco Co.	4 125	2,15%
6.	Callguard	3 695	1,92%
7.	Sentry & Subsidiaries	3 472	1,81%
8.	Coin	3 166	1,65%
9.	Magnum	2 913	1,52%
10.	Enforce	2 098	1,09%
11.	Shield & Subsidiaries	2 088	1,09%
12.	Cape Federal	1 598	0,83%
13.	Gremick	1 405	0,73%
14.	Stallion	1 272	0,66%
15.	Protea	1 221	0,64%
16.	De Bruyn	1 174	0,61%
17.	Peaceforce	1 025	0,53%
18.	Hlaganani	973	0,51%
19.	Gondo	971	0,51%
20.	Sky Mark Security	950	0,49%
TOTAL		70 023	36,43%
INDUSTRIAL TOTAL		192 225	100.00%

Source: Security Officers' Interim Board (2001).

FIGURE 6.3 : GROWTH IN INDUSTRY VERSUS COST OF REGULATION



Source: Security Officers' Interim Board (2001).

Figure 6.3 reveals information regarding the South African security industry growth in terms of turnover versus cost to regulate the said industry.

The statistics presented in this section of our discussion clearly shows the tremendous growth the private security industry encountered over the past few years. There is also evidence concerning the serious intentions of the Security Officers' Interim Board to ensure that this industry maintains its integrity and dignity as a service provider of safety and security in South Africa.

6.3 CAMPUS SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Campus security at institutions of higher education do not have a long history. Most tertiary institutions are making use of proprietary ('in-house') security establishments to protect life and property on their respective campuses. Contemporary campus protection agencies have to deal with a wide variety of problems and conflict situations. They come into contact with people and, more specifically, students from different cultural backgrounds with different needs and expectations of, and attitudes towards them. Not only are these agencies involved in different social contact situations, but the nature of their work with the academic community is also different and somewhat unique. The role of campus protection officers are, in many respects, similar to that of their public police counterparts (e.g. the SAPS), namely -

- crime prevention (through proactive policing measures in the form of patrol)
- criminal investigation (reactive policing: detection, arrest, detention, interviewing, interrogation, etc.)
- protection of life and property (through omnipresence, role visibility, patrol, etc.)
- maintenance of order and stability on campuses (especially during protest marches, lecture boycotts, demonstrations, etc.)
- access control (especially at main entrances to campuses) and
- traffic regulation on campuses.

*Campus protection officers perform a wide range of functions (as listed above), and the extent to which they perform non-policing duties suggest a greater emphasis on the *service style* of policing as opposed to the traditional legalistic approach.*

6.3.1 Campus Protection Society of Southern Africa (CAMPROSA)

On 8 September 1993, a group of concerned campus protection officials (mainly directors), academics, University and Technikon administrative staff, etc. convened at the Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of Natal to discuss and debate various issues pertaining to safety and security on campuses of tertiary institutions in South Africa. At this occasion, the Campus Protection Society of Southern Africa (CAMPROSA) was established with its own constitution and members who were

mainly responsible for and concerned about campus protection. Since its establishment, CAMPROSA conducts regular Annual Meetings around the country.

6.3.2 Yale Campus Police Department (USA) - 1894

Yale University is situated on a large portion of the New Haven city centre and, as a result, regularly produced friction between the “Yalies” (students) and the “Townies”. One such “skirmish” between “townies” and “gownies” led to the formation of the first campus police department at Yale University in 1894 and most probably in the whole of the United States. In that same year, it was decided to by the New Haven Police Commissioner to have two New Haven police officers assigned exclusively to the Yale University Campus (Powell 1994:3-4).

Two volunteers, New Haven police officers “Bill” Wiser and “Jim” Donnelly were appointed to this task. As no police officer had ever ventured on Yale’s campus “sacred grounds”, fear existed that these two officers would be resisted. Having had the qualities of judgement, tact and good horsesense, these “ ... two green policemen forced into a defensive position between the whole Yale undergraduate body, on the one hand, and the police department on the other” (Powell 1994:4). However, everything went according to plan. Bill and Jim later resigned from the New Haven police department and became university protection officers at Yale - as special constables with a newly adopted uniform of their own choice and design (Powell 1994:4).

6.4 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC POLICING

Before paying attention to the real differences between these two entities, it will be necessary to take cognisance of the reasons for the continued growth of private security in South Africa and elsewhere.

The most common reasons given by researchers of criminal justice, criminology and sociology, are more or less the following (Dunham & Alpert 1989:39; Gaines *et al.* 1994:364; Regoli & Hewitt 1996:245):

- Inadequate (poor) public police protection - especially the lack of visible role-fulfillment necessary to creating the impression of omnipresence in the minds of law-abiding citizens, as well as feelings of safety and security. In short: law-abiding citizens and business owners want to see policemen in uniform, patrolling the streets or their neighbourhoods either by means of foot or motorised patrol - 24 hours per day, catching criminals, attending to peoples' crime-related problems by means of identifying and solving such problems together with them, responding promptly to their emergency calls and to really solve their problem(s) at the scene and by ensuring the public of their continued investigation and assistance.

Bayley (1994:1;52;124) opines [public] police do not prevent crime, and that the core strategy of policing resides indeed in the provision of a visible deterrent presence in public areas. Instead, public police would rather engage in what is called "dishonest policing"; the police promise to prevent crime but actually provide nothing more than *authoritative intervention* and *symbolic justice*. While both of these functions are valuable and both must be provided, public police are dishonest when they pretend that these functions are adequate in preventing and solving crime and that no other form of policing is necessary. The resultant manifestation of the public's fear of crime directly contributes towards searching for effective safety and security in the form of private security measures.

- Increases of serious crimes such as murder, armed robbery and vehicle hijacking, rape, abduction of young girls, assault with serious consequences, housebreaking, and the like and the subsequent increase in the levels of fear of these and other types of crime among law abiding citizens. In short: the ban imposed on crime statistics by the Minister of Safety and Security during 2000 (making it impossible for people to become knowledgeable about increases and decreases in serious crime patterns occurring everyday around them - such as rape, actions of serial killers, car hijackers, people shot dead in cold-blood, armed robberies or armed money heists of large sums and, in many cases, private security guards who got killed cold-bloodedly in such encounters, etc.) are only a few examples of deviant behaviour on the part of criminals that increases the fear of crime in the minds of people.

- An apparent inability of the police to decide which policing model would best fit the newly introduced democracy in South Africa, namely: community policing, team policing or sector policing or all three of these models in an integrated form, and the accompanying uncertainties on the part of the public emanating from such indecisions. In short: all sectors of the public are not aware that the police have adopted and are (probably) practicing either of the above democratic models of policing. And even if they are aware of it, it is doubtful whether the public always know what is expected of them in light of their status as empowered partners in policing in terms of the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, and the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 and the South African Police Service Act, no. 68 of 1995. Proper education of the public in the dynamics of community policing is still not on par. In terms of the policing partnership identified by Wilson and McLaren (1972:319) and advocated by Van Heerden (1976:131-132), the police, as active partners, have certain obligations when it comes to the maintenance of law and order and the public (as passive partners) also have certain responsibilities as far as their own safety and security and assistance to the police are concerned. These obligations and responsibilities should, within the framework of a community policing model, be conveyed to the public in a manner that respects cultural diversity, literacy, etc. One way of doing just that, is to make use of the mass media - especially the radio to reach people in the outskirts of South Africa's provinces who count under the poorest of the poor and who (perhaps) never see a policeman in uniform on patrol, seriously busy executing his or her task of order maintenance.

- Increased urbanisation as a result of people migrating from rural areas to cities in search of employment and a better quality of life. Analogous to conditions preceding the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in England round about 1760 and the sudden increase in urbanisation characterised by radical social, economic and political changes which resulted in overcrowding, unemployment, poverty and high crime levels, South Africa also experienced similar conditions before and after the introduction of a democratic (majority) government in 1994.

Think in terms of the mushrooming of "squatter camps" or informal settlements in and around South Africa's major cities. In short: A Proliferation of the crime

rate and resulting anxiety and fear of crime, especially the killing of white people by means of shooting “by sight” during the early 1990s. Violent car hijackings, armed robberies, etc. on the one hand and public police officers participating in work slowdowns, and even protest marches under the banner of their police unions which result in sub-optimal service delivery to the community, the creation of a perception that some police officers are not really committed to their work, a general public feeling of no confidence in the police, etc. compelled private persons, home and business owners to turn to the private security industry for protection, “... willing to pay private companies to help dissuade criminality in the neighborhood” (Radelet & Carter 1994:452).

- Dwindling confidence in and respect for public policing, coupled with the low status of the police occupation, and ineffectiveness in preventing crime and providing protection against criminal victimisation, cause “... a sense of crisis about public security” (Bayley 1994:11,71).

There may be a variety of factors contributing to this perception about public police. Bayley (1994:4-7) lists a few prominent reasons for the ineffectiveness of public police to prevent crime:

- ◆ Police manpower (strength) and crime rates

In the United States, several studies have been conducted to investigate whether a connection exists between the strength of a police department and the crime rate in that specific police jurisdiction. This was done by comparing “... police jurisdictions with similar social conditions, determining whether differences in the rate of crime vary with the number of police officers employed” (Bayley 1994:3).

During 1987, it was found that American cities with populations in excess of one million people, showed the highest rates of serious crime - in spite of the fact that these cities also had the highest ratios of police to people, namely 320 per 100,000 of a city’s population. In other words: cities with more crime, had more police officers. In addition to this finding, there were also more police per crime - police in these high-crime cities did not have greater criminal case loads (police case

dockets). Another valid observation made by Bayley (1994:4;49), is that “... *differences in crime rates cannot be attributed to variations in the number of police ...* there is no assurance that increasing the number of police will produce greater public safety” (italics added). No similar scientific studies undertaken in South Africa to confirm or reject this kind of hypothesis.

◆ Street patrolling

It has always been accepted that police role visibility in the form of physical street patrolling - either by means of foot or motorised patrol - has deterrent effects and, according to the crime hypothesis proffered by Wilson and McLaren (1972:319) namely that no crime will be committed in the absence of either the precipitating and predisposing factors (or both), research in the United States has consistently failed to show that the intensity of random motorised patrol by police officers in visible uniforms has any effect on crime rates, criminal victimisation and public satisfaction with police. Even when the number of patrols in a given area are doubled, halved or even totally removed, will the crime levels remain unchanged. Saturation patrolling (i.e. “flooding” an area with uniformed police officers to execute a specific task) proved to make a difference but is, unfortunately too expensive. Bayley (1994:5) believes that “... some routine motorized patrolling is probably better than none, but that more is not better than some ...”.

The argument that foot patrol is more effective than motorised patrol, appears to be true, but again, it does not affect the amount of crime but it does only reassure the public that the police do care, thereby reducing levels of fear of crime and increasing their satisfaction with police service delivery: “*In other words, police foot patrols make people feel better, but they do not prevent crime*” (Bayley 1994:6) (italics added).

◆ Rapid response to emergency calls

Another prominent reason why home and business owners turn to the private security industry for protection is probably because *prompt* police response to emergency calls from citizens are apparently not always forthcoming. A general

complain by people that “The police are never around when you need them”, usually expresses the public’s sentiments about crime prevention and their expectations of the police in this regard. Regoli and Hewitt (1996:777) describes *response time* as the “ ... time it takes for the police to respond to a call for assistance”. Speed involved in police response time is usually interpreted in different ways by the police and private security officers and the public and is, in most cases, an issue of individual perception (Radelet & Carter 1994:64). These authors are also adamant that response time is rather a complex phenomenon which is usually influenced by variables such as: distance, geography, officer’s attitude and inclination towards his or her work, behaviour of the complainant or victim who called the police, speed, and the like.

The general perception that the less time it takes the police to reach the scene of a crime after an emergency call was made would improve the likelihood of apprehending the perpetrator, could not be proved by previous studies done in the United States on this crucial issue (Bayley 1994:6). This author estimates that if the police and private security officers can arrive within one minute of the commission of the crime, the chances of capturing the offender are relatively good. However, any time they arrive later at a scene, make their chances very small, if not impossible. It should be borne in mind that crime is always a negative experience and as such, has a traumatic impact upon victims who are in most cases inclined to seek emotional or other support from family and friends before they even think about reporting the matter to the police - a decision which further delays police response time. Whatever the delay, criminals always have the edge to take the giant leap in getting away from the scene of crime before the police can lay hands on them.

Therefore, rapid response “ ... is even not a key element in satisfying the public ... a predictable response is more important than a speedy one” (Bayley 1994:6-7)(italics added), simply because crime victims know that a quick police response in most of the cases is not going “to do the thing”.

Although no statistics are available to determine the outcome of police response on crime victims’ satisfaction with the SAPS, recent indications in prominent

newspapers are that certain factors indeed contributed to a turbulent police-community relationship. For instance: (a) demoralised police officers, (b) dwindling police resources to properly address crime problems, (c) little organisational support for those officers who are charged with executing a dangerous task, etc. (Magardie 2001:10), (d) limitations placed on the use of firearms by the police in terms of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, no. 51 of 1977 (Matisonn 2001:2), (e) manpower shortages (Czerwionka 2000:2; Whyman 2000:16), (f) about 37 000 "illiterate" police officers of whom 10 000 who are incapable of driving a police vehicle, and about 20 000 detectives who are not trained as crime investigators, lack of proper means to process crime statistics (Potgieter 2001:6), etc. are all factors negatively impacting on police morale and ultimate sub-optimal service delivery to the public - specifically prompt police response to serious crime scenes.

◆ Successes of the police in criminal investigations

Especially those of detectives, appear to have no effect on feelings of safety and security among members of the community. Like in the United States where the crime rate was not affected (decreased) by the rate of police successes in solving crimes, South Africa seems to be no exception to the rule. In the absence of statistical proof that police successes in solving serious crimes did indeed led to a decrease in the crime rate, there are indications that the contrary may be rather true for this country. Despite continuous successes of the murder and robbery unit, the anti-hijacking unit, the scorpions, and other similar police units working around the clock to solve the serious crimes reported to the police, criminals do not seem to care about the efficiency of detectives and other police officers in this regard. Police officers often believe that their good intentions and tireless efforts are being undone by a crippling justice system - especially the courts where case dockets disappear, offenders escape, cases are too easily withdrawn, and a too lenient approach to bail applications tends to favour offenders of serious crimes, backlogs in criminal trial cases at courts got out of hand, etc. (Broughton 1999:2; Zululand Observer 1999:11; Gifford 2000:2).

Bayley (1994:8) opines that: "Police are undoubtedly right in arguing that the preventive effect of their work depends on actions by prosecutors, judges ... that are beyond their control. *"But they are wrong in thinking that if the system backed them more solidly fewer crimes would be committed and society would be safer. Neither the deterrent - fear producing - nor incapacitating - criminal removing - effects of criminal sanctions have been proven"* (italics added).

6.4.1 Further differences between public police and private security

It is often argued that public policing alongside private security create a "dual system" of maintaining law and order. As far back as 1983, The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States' Department of Justice in its report to the Nation on Crime and Justice (Dunham & Alpert 1989:31-47) convincingly stated that *the private security industry in the United States plays an important role in crime prevention and control.*

As indicated earlier, private security in America (and South Africa) has outnumbered public police in terms of resources (manpower and equipment). Apart from reasons highlighted for the escalating growth of the private security industry in the United States (and, analogously, perhaps also in South Africa), could be linked to several summarised remarks of the Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice (1983) about public policing (Dunham & Alpert 1989:38-39):

- ◆ Only one-third of all crimes committed in the United States are brought to the attention of the police; the most likely crimes to be reported are serious crimes. So, the "dark figure" of crime exists.
- ◆ Most reported crimes are not solved by means of arrest, which means that only a small proportion of reported crimes are being processed through the entire criminal justice system. In effect, many people who have committed crimes that have not been reported to or detected by the police, are walking free and perhaps continuing their illegal acts.

This is apparently so because the police are, in most cases, dependent upon crime victims and other members of the public to positively identify suspects to the

police to ensure that criminal cases will be “solved”. Bayley (1994:8) contends that: “*On their own, police are relatively helpless, regardless of the resources they devote to criminal investigation*”(italics added). It appears therefore that, whatever actions the police initiate to bring down the crime rate or whatever steps the criminal justice system takes to make it more effective will, in all probability, not be very successful in their endeavours.

- ◆ Not only delayed police responses to emergency public calls (mostly victims), but delays in courts to bring offenders to trial, accumulated backlogs in criminal cases (owing to a variety of reasons), work-to-rule protests by court officials, unavailability of evidence due to witnesses disappearing as a result of such delays, are causing the public to lose confidence in the criminal justice system generally and public police in particular.
- ◆ Nowadays, say Dunham and Alpert (1989:33), public police officers simply do not always respond to emergency public calls. Instead, *response alternatives* such as the following are implemented - apparently to counteract shortages of police resources (manpower, vehicles, fuel, etc.): *telephone report units* to rather take crime reports over the telephone; *delayed response* if the police are not needed immediately and can respond when time permits, they will state their delay in terms of time, e.g. 15 or 30 minutes; *civilian personnel* such as reservists are not only trained to take reports or write down statements of complainants, but in many instances to man an entire police station over weekends or the radio control system; and *walk-in requests* where complainants are requested to avail themselves at police stations in order to have their statements or reports taken. In all these cases, public police officers confine themselves to the four walls of a charge office and hardly make any efforts to come into contact with members of the communities they serve by means of role visibility.

6.4.2 Tabularised differences between public police and private security

Adler *et al.* (1995:417); Hess and Wroblewski (1996:53-54) provide the following differences between these two entities:

Public Policing	Private Security
Despite the Peelian mandate to prevent crime and protect life and property, public policing tend to be more offender-orientated and is, therefore, more inclined to focus their resources and energy on the deterrent effect of prosecution.	Primarily concerned with the protection of the victim (clientele), loss prevention and risk management
Actions are incident-driven and not concerned about problem identification and problem solving - crime prevention receives little attention	Capable of providing focused risk assessment of a potential loss situation through analysing physical and human elements and introduction of appropriate prevention measures
Not concerned about enforcement of OHSA* and regard accident and fire protection the duty of private security industry	Directly involved in workplace health and safety (accident prevention i.t.o. NOSA requirements) as well as fire protection
Public control over and input into public policing issues are limited and government controlled i.t.o. statutory legislation (Police Act, no. 68 of 1995)	Clientele (or customers) are able to exercise more control over and provide more input into their own protection
Reactions to emergency calls not always prompt as a result of various factors negatively influencing police efficiency	Response to incidents much more prompt due to their on-site presence and constant surveillance at strategic points
Government-controlled justice and potential source of equality in service delivery, i.e. every citizen benefits from it – rich and poor (non-elitist)	“Privatised justice” and potential source of inequality in provision of services, i.e. only to clients who are financially capable of affording such services (an elitist enterprise)

Non-profit enterprise: dependent upon government budget (taxpayers' monies) to survive	Profit-oriented enterprise: dependent upon customers' financial contracts
Responsible for general order maintenance in society through proactive and reactive measures	Responsible for asset protection and loss prevention, surveillance, armed response monitoring
Well-established police occupational subculture, steeped in pride and tradition over centuries	Lack of strong corporate traditions to sustain pride in security i.t.o. an occupational milieu
Have full powers and authority i.t.o. statutory legislation	Have limited powers i.t.o. statutory legislation (Sec. 42 of Criminal Procedure Act, no. 51 of 1977)

* OHSA: Occupational Health and Safety Act

In summary, while it may be justified that public police and private security differ from each other in terms of various aspects, it may also be true that these entities do not work in total isolation from each other. In South Africa, like the United States and perhaps elsewhere, policing is no longer the exclusive domain of public policing. The private security industry have grown and developed to such extent that it now performs some of the routine tasks traditionally performed only by public police officers, e.g. guarding, patrolling, observation at strategic points and investigative services. While the control of serious crimes such as murder, rape, armed robbery, drug trafficking, and the like are the responsibility of public police, private security agencies play a very important role in assisting public police in dealing with such incidences during the normal execution of their own private security duties (Simonsen 1998:65-66). As will be seen later on, private security plays a significant role in crime prevention and other related functions.

6.5 PROFESSIONALISM

A factor in the evolution from an occupation to a profession is a valuable curriculum development strategy for the private security industry, aimed at the creation and

planning of learning opportunities for the personnel with greater insight and eventually at assessing the extend to which this goal has been reached.

Cloete, Ladikos and Prinsloo (1993:105) say the need for curriculum development requires much from the academic field of study in making a selection of the fundamental and appropriate aspects that should constitute the appropriate body of knowledge. Proper care should be taken that renewal of the subject matter receives due attention. Timm and Christian (1991:48) reveal that both training and education play important roles in the field of security. Training provides employees with explicit instructions on how to perform many of the tasks that they are expected to complete. As a result, trained personnel often respond both more consistently, using proven techniques, and more automatically, even under emergency conditions. Education, in contrast, helps prepare people to solve problems independently, as well as to communicate and interact effectively with others.

Ibbotson (1998:12) opines that training for competence should focus on basic minimum standards for entry into the industry and should apply to all practitioners. The training should not be geared to provide a career path for security guards, but to ensure competence so that the public is protected. Cloete *et al.* (1993:105) explain the process of curriculum development as follows:

- ◆ Determination of the objectives.
- ◆ Development of methods and models. Preparation of study material.
- ◆ Assessment of methods, etc. accomplishment of objectives.
- ◆ Feedback and extended investigation.

The goal of training is to teach a specific method of performing a task or responding to a given situation. Training is focused on how to most effectively accomplish a task whenever a particular situation arises. Training is experiential and goal oriented. According to Cloete *et al.* (1993:105) *curriculum* can be defined as a prescribed course at an institution of learning which is based on selected and organised educational disciplines. Steyn (1984:36) concurs, but states that a curriculum can be regarded as such only if it complies with encompassing a body of knowledge, a

demarcated field, planning for formal, purposeful and structured education aimed at serving the educational needs of a particular group.

6.5.1 Curriculum development for the private security industry

Cloete *et al.* (1993:105) indicate that the ever-increasing body of knowledge in the criminological field is not only challenging, but requires much from the academic criminologist in making a selection of the fundamental and appropriate aspects that should constitute the appropriate body of knowledge. Proper care should be taken that renewal of the subject matter receives due attention.

Apart from the Security Officers Interim Boards' compulsory requirements applicable to Grades A – E training components, some tertiary institutions have also embarked on the education of persons and private security officers at tertiary level. For instance, Technikon SA currently offers technical training for private security officers at B.Tech and M. Tech levels and the University of Zululand's Department of Criminal Justice has some years ago embarked on private security education as part of its B.A. (Police Science) degree program and will soon be offering a one year, sixteen module Certificate course in Private Security. There is, unfortunately, no tertiary institution in South Africa that offers a three year Baccalaureate Degree Program in private security based on philosophical principles such as ethics, multicultural security education, protection of human rights, etc. at present.

The qualifications are recognised nationally in terms of the Higher Education Act, 1997 and the Certification Council for Technikon Education Act, 1993, and is approved by the Minister of Education. The qualifications are registered with the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) in terms of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, 1995 (SAQA).

Technikon SA (1998:24) indicates that the Technikon SA's Security Management Programme is, in essence, a programme in empowerment. Its main objective is to establish a core of professionals to serve the interests of the security services industry and the South African community. The higher educational qualifications provided by the Security Management Programme are designed to benefit South African society as

a whole by enhancing security practitioners' business and financial management skills, labour relations skills, judicial and commercial knowledge and specialised security practices.

6.5.2 What is curriculum development

Cloete *et al.* (1993:105) opines that the curriculum development is aimed at the creation and planning of learning opportunities for the student with greater insight and eventually at assessing the extent to which this goal has been reached.

Four stages are involved in the development of a curriculum:

- ◆ A careful and wide examination of all available sources of knowledge and information relating to the subject in order to determine appropriate objectives for a particular course or the entire syllabus.
- ◆ The development of methods and models of instruction which would most likely succeed in realising the study objectives which have been decided upon.
- ◆ An assessment of whether the set goals have in fact been accomplished. During this phase, the necessity for adjustments and or changes in the instructional strategies may be observed.
- ◆ According to Nichols and Nichols the fourth stage implies, *inter alia*, a feedback from the student by writing a test or the final examination, as well as a report back by those lecturers who are involved in the instruction of the study material. This feedback will provide a further opportunity to re-evaluate and proceed with extended investigations to eliminate possible shortcomings.

The process of curriculum development is continuous and is largely dependent on effective planning. Planning should not only be focused on the ever-increasing body of criminological knowledge and the possibility of specialisation etc., but should also be directed towards dealing with problems which the student may possibly experience because of educational deficiencies or whatever the cause may be. To succeed in this, curriculum development should be fully conversant with the fundamental requirements.

6.5.3 The Curriculum process

Cloete *et al.* (1993:106) opines that development of a curriculum clearly implies that it is a process. Several stages can be identified, namely:

- ◆ Situation analysis
- ◆ Determination of objectives
- ◆ The content of the curriculum
- ◆ Evaluation of the curriculum

In conclusion, Timm and Christian (1991:48) opine that both training and education play important roles in the field of security. Training provides employees with explicit instructions on how to perform many of the tasks that they are expected to complete. As a result, trained personnel often respond both more consistently, using proven techniques, and more automatically, even under emergency conditions.

Education, in contrast, helps prepare people to solve problems independently, as well as to communicate and interact effectively with others. Although different security positions require different levels of education and training, some combination of both is needed in every position.

Security officers interact with people from a wide range of backgrounds, exercise considerable discretion in many critical situations and have to prepare written incident reports, thus need the general skills traditionally acquired through educational programs. They also need training in a wide range of specific tasks directly related to their positions. Top level security executives also need training to supervise, control, monitor, check, and audit on knowledge and skills generally acquired through formal education.

6.6 CONTRACT SECURITY VERSUS PROPRIETARY (“IN HOUSE”) PRIVATE SECURITY

It should be noted at this point that private security groups are divided into two basic sections. These are those groups that provide a private service for various customers for a fee and thus are profit orientated and those that provide a private security service within their own company and are service orientated. The former is normally called *contract security* and the latter *in-house* or *proprietary security*.

In the mission statements of private security groups one golden thread runs through them all. This is the emphasis that the basic objective of private security is *the prevention of crime and loss*. This principle applies no matter what the range of the line functions of the parent or contracting company is. In every private security function the thrust is to stop or reduce crime and losses and ensure that if they do occur, to reduce or minimise the damage to the line function effort.

When a company, organisation, commercial undertaking etc. decides that it needs to have a private security service they have to decide whether to employ their own in-house security or seek the services of a contract security company. Such decisions are necessary when, for various reasons, it is decided that the state security or policing service is no longer adequate for their security needs. Timm & Christian (1991:241) point out that each such type of security has distinct general characteristics and advantages and disadvantages. These have all to be evaluated before an informed decision can be made on whether to employ contract security or proprietary private security. Such decisions are not easy and should only be made after thorough research and inquiry.

6.6.1 Contract or proprietary security

Today most organisations, whether profit or service orientated, have had to trim their costs because of increased competition and leaner budgets. There has also been a steep rise in trade union activity and militancy. These factors have forced many organisations to take a close look at their proprietary private security arrangements. There have been many incidents where in-house security staff have joined line

function staff who are on strike. This has been very damaging to the organisations involved because their private security function was absent when it was needed most. This same trade union activity has led to many in-house security personnel being awarded monetary perks and benefits that contract security firms are not obliged to pay to their staff. Examples of such benefits are longer vacation and sick leave periods and pension, medical, housing, overtime, shift and education benefits. This situation has led to in-house security being much more expensive than contract security. A decision has then got to be made as to whether these increased expenses are compensated for by increased efficiency and effectiveness (Powell 1981:19).

In addition to the important factors of cost and loyalty there are many other factors to consider. It must be remembered that each and every organisation is unique with its own individual risks, hazards and threats to its continued existence. Because of this uniqueness, a factor that does not loom large in one organisation may be paramount in another. It also must be remembered always that there are “contract security firms and contract security firms”. The contract security industry has throughout South Africa attracted some very poorly qualified staff and firms and the SOB is fully employed in trying to winkle these out of the industry. If a decision is made to hire a contract security firm, a second and equally important task remains and that is the selection of the right contract security firm to do the security task required.

6.6.2 Contract security

Contract security firms hire contract security services to any organisation or individual that can pay for such services. The ranges of the security services that they provide are vast. They range from the provision of security guards, to the supply of technical advice on security equipment, to the safe transportation of valuables, to the investigation of complex computer fraud cases etc.

The staff of such contract security firms have the powers of arrest, search and seizure identical to that of private citizens. Neither they, nor in-house security staff, have the additional powers as vested in the state police by the Criminal procedure Act, 51 of 1977. In addition all contract firms and each of their staff members have to be registered with the Security Officer's Board (SOB), which is a Government Statutory

Body, before they can be hired or employed. Before such a registration is effected the SOB conducts a full investigation into the viability of the contract firms and the honesty of the persons so applying. These steps were taken by the South African Government after numerous complaints were received that many contract security firms and many of their employees were not worthy of trust. Staff employed on in-house security duties are not required to be so registered with the SOB at this time but moves are reported to be afoot to make such registration compulsory.

6.6.2.1 The pros or evidence in favour of using contract security

Many security professionals argue that the only advantage in hiring contract security is their reduced cost. Contract security firms are indeed at least 20% cheaper than in-house security and this is without counting the huge costs of in-house security administration, staff medical, housing, pension and other benefits. Powell (1981:20) argues along this same line but concedes that contract security is attractive to organisations with a strong trade union where employees are virtually locked into their positions and are thus virtually unsackable. Timm & Christian (1991:243) points out that there are however, many other factors in addition to cost and selectivity in favour of employing contract security firms. These include the following:

- ◆ Absenteeism
- ◆ Flexibility
- ◆ Supervision
- ◆ Training
- ◆ Objectivity
- ◆ Quality
- ◆ Administration and budgeting
- ◆ Trade unions
- ◆ Variety of services and equipment
- ◆ Better local law enforcement contracts
- ◆ Sharing expertise and knowledge
- ◆ Hiring and screening costs

6.6.2.2 The cons or evidence against the use of contract security

It was seen above that there are many arguments in favour of using contract security staff. The chief among these advantages was the cheaper cost factor. Powell (1981:21-22) reports that this cost cutting by the contract security operator gives rise to many disadvantages in their use. He reports that there are contract guard companies who are without principle or integrity (from reports in the South African media it is known that there are such companies in South Africa). He does however, report that the majority of contract security companies are trying to do the best possible job but at a completely unrealistic salary level.

Timm & Christian (1991:243) details the disadvantages in the use of contract security staff as follows:

- ◆ Staff turnover
- ◆ Divided loyalty
- ◆ Moonlighting and retirees
- ◆ Reassignment
- ◆ Screening standards
- ◆ Legal and insurance problems

6.6.3 Proprietary security

With the large increase in crime rates world wide most undertakings have had to employ their own private security. The practice in the past was to establish a fully in-house or proprietary unit but this situation is changing. There is now a trend towards privatisation caused by the move away from socialism, state ownership and the proven inefficiency of a too large organisation. Support for privatisation means a support for the use of contract security. Nevertheless, the situation is complicated much further by a host of pros and cons – advantages and disadvantages – that have all to be weighed up fully before a final decision is made. Timm & Christian (1991:242) report that in many, if not a majority of companies, use a hybrid approach. In this approach the private security management function is in-house and the bulk of the security staff and services are contract staff supplied by contract security firms.

This arrangement has been developed in a determined attempt to win the advantages of both the contract security and proprietary security while avoiding their respective disadvantages.

Timm & Christian (1991:242) reports that in this hybrid private security arrangement the in-house management's functions are to (a) ensure that the contract company is supplying the type and quality of service desired, (b) investigate, or hire contract private security to investigate, internal security losses and problems, (c) conduct security surveys and other assessments of security threats, (d) advise top management on security-related matters, and (e) serve as the corporation's principal liaison for any security-related problems that occur.

Corporations that decide to operate private security units that are solely in-house obviously run much larger units. This limits the effectiveness of their security management staff as they are constantly engaged in staff function duties to the detriment of their security line function duties.

6.6.3.1 The pros or evidence in favour of using proprietary security

Many security professionals have for years argued strongly in favour of an organisation's private security effort being proprietary or in-house, as it is sometimes known. However this situation is changing. The main advantage of proprietary security has been that the staff involved give their undivided loyalty to their employing organisation. However, with the rise in the power of trade unions and increased militancy on their part many proprietary security staff are wavering in this essential loyalty. If this loyalty factor is lost many organisations will undoubtedly recheck the possibility of using contract security firms.

Timm & Christian (1991:243) identified several other factors, in addition to loyalty, which are important advantages to be gained in the use of proprietary security staff. These are:

- ◆ Incentive
- ◆ Knowledge

- ◆ Courtesy
- ◆ Tenure
- ◆ Morale
- ◆ Control and supervision
- ◆ Training
- ◆ Company image
- ◆ Better law enforcement liaison
- ◆ Staff selection
- ◆ Communication

6.6.3.2 The cons or evidence against using proprietary security

The main disadvantage in the use of proprietary or in-house security is the huge additional cost involved as compared to that when contract security is used. The costs involved are not only the basic salaries of the staff involved but the costs of their fringe benefits which include housing, shift allowance, education, medical aid, vacation leave, sick leave, uniform, training and personal equipment costs.

For example, at the University of Zululand the cost implication of one patrolman is upwards of R50 000,00 per year. An Empangeni based contract security company could provide one security guard for a total cost of R30 000,00 per year. Another major disadvantage in the use of proprietary security is the effect that trade union membership and influence has had on such staff. Cases are now common where in-house security staff join other workers in an organisation on strike. Sometimes they do refuse to join the strikers but also refuse to cross picket lines and this too denies the organisation the use of their services when they are needed most.

Timm & Christian (1991:243) identified three additional disadvantages in the use of proprietary security as:

- ◆ Familiarity
- ◆ Administrative burdens
- ◆ Inflexibility

In conclusion, it is clear from the forgoing arguments and points raised, that it can be seen that there are many pros and cons to be considered when the merits and demerits of contract and proprietary security are considered. The points raised are the important general ones but there are many other factors that could be considered when security staff are being sought for specialised functions. For example, if security staff were being considered to work with students in a tertiary education institution, a strong case could be made against the employment of contract security staff. Powell (1981:22-23) reports that such staff would not be able to relate to a campus community. An occasional guard might be able to build a good relationship with students and others, but usually they would have no concept of university life or the aims of the institutions that they serve.

It also has to be noted that there are many specialised security functions that cannot be provided by in-house security staff. Examples would be the use of contract security firms to provide specialised training for security staff, the transportation of large sums of cash, the provision of CCTV technology etc.

From the evidence available it appears that the best route to go when seeking security staff to provide the security function for an organisation would be to recruit a combination of both proprietary and contract security. Timm & Christian (1991:242) referred to this arrangement, as we saw earlier, as a hybrid one. In this way the advantages of both would be secured and the disadvantages avoided.

6.7 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN PRIVATE SECURITY

In the discussion that follows, only a few selected contemporary issues will briefly be highlighted. These are: private security-public police cooperation, moonlighting and private security initiatives in crime prevention.

6.7.1 Private security-public police partnership

Radelet and Carter (1994:452) are adamant that people who make use of or employ private security for personal protection and protection of their property are not

necessarily dissatisfied with their local public police, but rather, they realise that public police suffer from physical limitations such as inadequate resources (manpower shortages, equipment, etc.) and perhaps a real commitment to honour their calling as upholders of the law and social order. Although public policing and private security are necessarily mutually exclusive domains, private security “... will play a more important role in crime prevention and security in future” (Gaines *et al.* 1994:363). Simonsen (1998:66) opines that private security executives perceive their industry’s role in crime prevention as “... a supplementary one, protecting property and assets in ways that exceed the resources of public law enforcement” and demarcates crimes against businesses commonly investigated by private security personnel as: computer crimes, fraud and industrial espionage. It is, therefore, not surprising that overseas literature as well as local experience clearly indicate that the major collaborative efforts between these two entities are to be found in a common focus, namely crime prevention.

The following selected incidences relating to close cooperation between public police and private security agencies forthcoming from reports in the printed media, reveal the important role private security has been playing and still plays in crime prevention.

6.7.2 Outsourcing private security: “moonlighting”

Public police officers are frequently hired by security companies to perform private security functions such as protection of in-transit money between businesses and commercial banks, V.I.P. protection services, and the like. This practice is called *moonlighting* (Collins *et al.* 2000:372). Another author, Simonsen (1998:71) writes: “Businesses frequently hire off-duty law enforcement officers for guard and patrol duties, traffic direction, crowd control, and other security functions”. While this kind of “unfair practice” may cause friction between contract security agencies, public police officers regard the extra occupational work as an ideal means of supplementing their monthly police salaries. Although addition of extra “security staff” may be done without extra financial cost to customers of private security services, opposition against hiring off-duty public police officers as security guards points to an undermining of the equity principle of policing, and also raises concerns about

liability and conflict of interest. Supporters of this practice argue that police officers are better trained than private security personnel and possess greater authority in terms of statutory laws (Simonsen 1998:71).

6.7.2.1 Disadvantages of moonlighting

Hess and Wroblewski (1996:62-63) are concerned about the following problems relating to moonlighting:

Civil liability in cases of injuries while moonlighting. These authors refer to two prominent U.S. cases: (a) *Mount Sinai Hospital v. City of Miami Beach* (1988) where a public police officer was injured while moonlighting at the hospital in his capacity as a private security guard: who would be liable for compensation? The city of Miami or Mount Sinai Hospital? (b) *City of Hialeah v. Weber* where a moonlighting public police officer who worked as a security guard at a lounge got injured after apprehending individuals who slashed car tyres at a business across the street: who would be liable for compensating the police officer? The city of Hialeah or private employer?

In case (a), the police officer performed a service for which he was paid by the hospital, and not for a police function *per se*. The hospital argued the police officer was an employee (agent) of the city and, as such, it was not liable for compensation. However, the compensation commission found the hospital liable for compensating the police officer. In case (b), the police officer was regarded performing a police function *per se* as he attempted to stop a crime that had been committed in his presence. Also, his moral obligation, placed him squarely “in service” of the City of Hialeah which relieved the hotel from any liability in regard to compensation.

6.7.2.2 Advantages of moonlighting

As indicated in par 6.6.2.1, private security firms employing public police officers stand to benefit because of “... the power of state agents [public police officers] to arrest, search, interrogate, carry weapons and use force and electronic surveillance, and gain access to otherwise protected information” (Marx 1987:172-193; Hess &

Wroblewski 1996:63). They also reduce the legal liability of private security officers, offer training, experience and backup.

Private security are capable of providing public police departments with valuable information about crime and crime-related issues, access to private places, extended surveillance and coverage. They are also not bound by the Exclusionary Rule (Miranda warning) (Hess & Wroblewski 1996:64).

6.7.3 Private security initiatives in crime prevention

The following examples and incidences merely serve as an indication of private security involvement in contemporary crime prevention. It should, therefore, not be regarded as a complete account of how the private security industry participate in crime prevention in South Africa over several decades or what it has achieved in this regard.

6.7.3.1 “Car Watch” projects in crime prevention

Operating as formally registered private security guards or informally as “unemployed” car-guards, these persons are capitalising on South Africa’s high car theft rates in parking areas of large shopping centres. Car theft statistics provided by the Crime Information Centre of the South African Police Services show that during 1998, 107 513 motor vehicles, including motorcycles, were stolen throughout the country (Zululand Observer 1999:10). However, since these “Car Safe Projects” were introduced in South Africa about 4 -5 years ago, it appears that the rate of car thefts decreased dramatically in areas where these kind of activities are executed - despite the absence of concrete statistical data to support this observation (Security Officers’ Interim Board 2000:55).

6.7.3.2 General crime prevention

A local private security company recently made available six horses to Richards Bay public police to assist in KwaZulu-Natal north coast beach patrols to curb armed robberies and serious assaults on holiday-makers and anglers. Armed with firearms,

robbers usually appear from nearby bushes, launch a savage attack on small groups of anglers and holiday-makers, just to disappear in the bushes again (De Bruin 2000:15). Commenting on the value of this form of joint beach crime prevention strategy between public police and private security, the local station commissioner said: "Greenfour Security have long had an input into crime prevention in Richards Bay and this reaffirms their commitment to the community" (Whyman 2000:1). This kind of "partnership" would mean additional manpower to proactively address the crime problem.

At the beginning of September 2000, a fierce gun battle ensued between AK-47 armed robbers and private security guards at a steel factory in Durban when the robbers attempted to rob the City Guard cash transit company of money just delivered to the steel factory in Quality Street. After having wounded and arrested one of the robbers, the remaining suspects fled the scene, leaving behind their getaway vehicle and R80 000 cash (Makhanya 2000:3). South Africa suffers an annual estimated loss in the region of R52 milliard on imported products as a result of fraud and tax evasion. Likewise, value added tax (VAT) evasion usually amounts to a soaring annual R34 million. A Section 21 private security investigation company Agri Inspec has, since its inception seven years ago, cooperated closely with the South African government to counteract smuggling of illegal agricultural products such as mutton, sugar, garlic, etc. into the country (Eyles 2000:1).

Rapid response to an activated alarm system at a business premise in Empangeni, KwaZulu-Natal province, caused a burglar to have been shot dead by a private security guard of BBR Security after having burgled the premise and activated an electronic security alarm (Czerwionka 2000:7). At the beginning of January 2001, Greenfour Security guards recovered stolen cellphones that were taken from a vehicle at Alkant Beach in Richards Bay (Zululand Observer 2001:19).

Copper cable thieves were caught in the act by Greenfour Security patrol officers at Alton, Richards Bay after newly dug trenches between lamp poles were spotted during a routine patrol. A decision to lie in wait for the thieves to return, paid off when two males indeed returned to lift and cut the cables. The arrest of two culprits

only added to a small solution of a huge problem in which uMhlatuze Municipality suffers vast damages (Whyman 2001:3).

After having discovered police involvement in a theft racket, the South African Police Service was compelled to hire a private security company to safeguard its R20 million vehicle storage pound at Prospection near Durban in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The pound which is being used to store recovered stolen motor vehicles was regularly targeted by policemen based at the pound by illegally removing spare parts from such motor vehicles. The arrest of two public police officers and a subsequent investigation by a senior public police official revealed incompetence public police officers and gross mismanagement of the pound (Bisetty 2001:3).

6.7.3.3 Partners in crime prevention

A Richards Bay-based company 'adopted' the Meerensee ("Lake and Sea") suburb as an area targeted for intensive patrol and surveillance by Gray Security during 9-hour night shifts. Having admitted manpower shortages and other resources (patrol vehicles) to efficiently prevent crime, the local station commissioner (police chief) welcomed this initiative as a valuable community project in which private security actively involve themselves in crime prevention through proactive measures (Strachan 2000:24). Likewise, another agency, Greenfour Security, announced its "adoption" of Arboretum suburb in Richards Bay where day and night patrols would be conducted, surveillance be undertaken and households timely informed of potential crime risks (Whyman 2000:5).

6.8 SUMMARY

In the absence of appropriate information about the historical development of private security in South Africa, it nevertheless appears that whatever form of private security prevailed in this country in the first half of the 20th century, made a firm and positive impact on the existence of a flourishing industry today. The growth of the private security industry was not only a phenomenal event in the history of this country's safety and security portfolio, but expanded to such an extent that by the end of the

1980s, statutory regulation of the industry became necessary. Today - in 2001- South Africa is facing the introduction of the second piece of legislation aimed at regulating the private security industry.

The newly promulgated *Security Industry Regulation Bill*, published in Government Gazette # 22100 of 23 February 2001, provides solid evidence of the present government's intentions to formalise the industry by means of establishing a regulatory authority, known as the *Security Industry Regulation Authority* (SIRA).

Having written about the historical development of private security around the globe, poses one important question: **"Just how important is private security in contemporary crime prevention?"**. Allow the researcher to quote from a criminology textbook written by three mainstream criminologists of the United States:

"The overriding need of every society is to protect its own existence. Let us look at the story of Romulus and his brother Remus, the legendary founders of Rome. Romulus killed his brother after Remus had jumped over the protective city wall Romulus and his workers had just constructed around the town that was to become Rome. Rather than being condemned for killing his brother, Romulus became a revered figure among his people, who named their city after him. Why? Romulus had not killed Remus without any just cause. By jumping over a certain part of the city wall, Remus had shown the town's enemies where the wall was most vulnerable to attack. That was treason, the one offence that threatens the existence of a society" (Adler et al. 1995:8).

CHAPTER 7

PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The main focus of this chapter will be on the analysis and interpretation of data pertaining to the role of private security in crime prevention from the viewpoint of public respondents (N=381). This data will also be analysed and compared in respect of the South Coast, North Coast, Midlands and Durban Metropole, all areas which are located in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

In its discussion paper of the *Principles regarding the future regulation of the private security industry (2000)*, the Security Officers' Interim Board (SOIB) discussed, among other aspects, issues such as the monetary value of the private security industry and current registration statistics, the role of private security as it unfolds in contemporary society (SOIB 2000:16-20). It should be pointed out that the SOIB's discussion document focuses primarily on new ways and methods to regulate the private security industry and in more specific terms "... to advise the Minister of Safety and Security on [statutory] legislation providing for the future regulation of the security industry" (SOIB 2000:11). Since it is not within the ambit of this empirical research report to render a comprehensive account of such intentions, the discussion that follows – especially as it regards the interpretation of statistical information about the role of private security – will only concentrate on selected aspects relating to this role and to what extent statutory regulation could exert an influence on it.

Considering the information about the historical development of private security outlined in Chapter 3, the phenomenal growth of the private security industry in overseas countries as well as South Africa should not be seen as a unique event, simply because crime and criminal organisations have changed and, like their counterparts in business, already globalised to take advantage of the information and technological revolution – perhaps to a greater extent than governments and organised business (Moore 1995:3).

This author also points to the fact that information and intelligence networks of some crime groups are (perhaps) superior to those of public police and private security organisations (Molloy 1990:23) – e.g. Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda – network who is believed to have been responsible for the destruction of the two-tower World Trade Centre in Manhattan, New York on 11 September 2001 (YOU 2001:1-16; Steyn 2001:10).

Criminal organisations are increasingly operating with hi-tech intelligence systems, developing their own, sophisticated technology and even promote (and execute!) their criminal techniques on an international scale and they are even using their profits from illegal activities to buy legitimate businesses and shares, facilitate substantial investments in countries around the globe, etc. (Moore 1995:3;5).

The role of the private security officer (and perhaps that of public police) will increasingly face a monumental task and must be *educated* and *trained* to meet the challenges of this new world. “No longer will the security industry be able to pick a person from the streets and say: “guard this premises”. That job will be performed by robots, electronic sensors and surveillance devices. Private security personnel ... must have the ability to operate the devices that will perform the guard services of today. They must be computer and technologically literate, and conscious of the business, financial, and social climate in which they operate” (Moore 1995:13).

Before addressing the challenges of globalised criminal organisations, the proper, but basic role of private security – from which it cannot escape – still remains the provision of “...increased protection for the rights to property and to person” (SOIB 2000:17) should be defined. The role of private security in contemporary times is being viewed as a shift towards privatising the industry or, at least, forging closer working relationships with public police (such as the S.A. Police Service). For too long, public police have pretended to be the sole protectors of human life and property, totally ignoring the contribution by both members of the public (through statutory empowerment) and private security officers. To limit the role of private security to the establishment of working partnerships between the South African Police Service and the private security industry (Lavisa in SOIB 2000:18), is somewhat misplaced and a disparagement of the true meaning of the role of private security relating to loss prevention. It may be true to

assume that private security should act as the extra eyes and ears as well as the extra hands and feet of public police, but it should also be borne in mind that private security is *not public policing*.

Schönteich (1999) suggests the role of private security extends beyond that of the narrow definition of *security service* in terms of the law (South Africa 1987, sec.1), in that the “... private security industry should be prepared to take on added responsibilities to both its clients and the public” (SOIB 2000:19). At stake here are the rendering of higher quality services and the improvement in the quality of personnel.

7.2 ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY

The external image of the role private security officers perform in contemporary society actually refers to the reaction of the public through which confidence in and respect for the industry (or a lack of it) is reflected (Murphy 1965:105) – an image which is formed while private security officers render their services. This external image entails the end-product of an evaluation process which is closely related to the expectations of the public (or clients).

For the purpose of this discussion, the different image determinants regarding the role of private security are divided into two categories –

- *institutional (organisational) image*, which refers to and includes prestige, social status, importance and necessity of the role, etc.
- *role image*, which includes the quality of service rendered by the security industry, etc. which is often reflected in the type of contact that occurs between private security officers and members of the public.

The above-mentioned determinants will henceforth be discussed to show their relevance and influence on the role private security officers fulfil.

7.2.1 Type of contact

The type of contact between the clientele as well as the general public and private security officers when performing their duties is very important because it may have an essential influence on the perceptions of respondents and their concomitant image of this entity.

TABLE 7.1 TYPE OF CONTACT WHICH CONTRIBUTED MOST IN ESTABLISHING THE IMAGE OF PRIVATE SECURITY (N=381)

TYPE OF CONTACT	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Juridical contact	34	8.92
Social contact	33	8.66
Experiences of other people	86	22.57
The "mass media"	96	25.20
Presence of security officers	126	33.08
Other	6	1.57
TOTAL	381	100.0

Table 7.1 indicates that the presence of security officers (126 or 33,08%) at strategic places (e.g. shopping malls) had contributed the most in establishing the respondents image of private security followed by the role of the media (96 or 25,20%) and experience of other people (86 or 22,57%). Social and juridical contact have contributed the least in this regard.

7.2.2 Importance of the role of private security in society

The right of existence of the private security industry in contemporary society is being evaluated in Table 7.2.

TABLE 7.2 IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN SOCIETY (N=381)

IMPORTANCE	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Much more important than other jobs	162	42.52
Somewhat more important	129	33.86
Undecided	73	19.16
Somewhat less important	12	3.15
Much less important than other jobs	5	1.31
TOTAL	381	100.0

According to Table 7.2 it is clear that the respondents (291 or 76,37%) are of the opinion that the job of private security officers is much more to somewhat more important than most other jobs in society. Of concern is the fact that 73 (19,16%) respondents were undecided in their reaction to this statement which may be indicative of a lack of knowledge about the content of the role of private security (compared to that of public policing) among respondents.

7.2.3 Necessity of the private security role

TABLE 7.3 NECESSITY OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY (N=381)

NECESSITY	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Absolute necessary	286	75.07
Necessary	83	21.78
Undecided	7	1.84
Unnecessary	1	0.26
Absolute unnecessary	4	1.05
TOTAL	381	100.0

Table 7.3 shows that the respondents are extremely convinced (369 or 96,85%) that private security is absolutely necessary in our modern society.

7.2.4 Presence of private security as a possible threat to individuals' democratic rights

The possibility of the role of private security being a threat to people's democratic rights of liberty and privacy is, according to Table 7.4 not such a serious concern to female public respondents (131 or 34,38%) than is the case with male respondents (102 or 26,77%). Male public respondents (71 or 18,64%) are convinced that private security officers do in fact pose a threat to people's individual rights, while only 25 (6,56%) female respondents feel this way.

TABLE 7.4 EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY AS A THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS BY GENDER (N=381)

THREAT	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Definitely	54	14.17	8	2.10	62	16.27
To a large extent	17	4.46	17	4.46	34	8.92
Undecided	14	3.67	38	9.97	52	13.65
To a lesser extent	29	7.61	18	4.72	47	12.34
Not at all	73	19.16	113	29.66	186	48.82
TOTAL	187	49.08	194	50.92	381	100.0

7.2.5 Obligation to combat crime

The question whether the public have an obligation to combat crime, is addressed in Table 7.5. This table convincingly reports an overwhelming positive response (298 or 78,21%) on the part of the research group. Male respondents (156 or 40,94%) believe they have a duty to assist the “armed forces” (including private security) to combat (prevent) crime, while 142 (37,27%) females also share this positive perception.

TABLE 7.5 OBLIGATION TO COMBAT CRIME BY MEMBERS OF SOCIETY BY GENDER (N=381)

OBLIGATION	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Definitely	137	35.96	116	30.45	253	66.40
To a large extent	19	4.99	26	6.82	45	11.81
Undecided	4	1.05	14	3.67	18	4.72
To a lesser extent	8	2.10	16	4.20	24	6.30
Not at all	19	4.99	22	5.77	41	10.77
TOTAL	187	49.08	194	50.92	381	100.0

7.2.6 Social status of private security officers

The previous tables have clearly indicated that the public respondents value the role of private security in contemporary society as extremely important and a necessary factor in crime prevention. Further, a willingness on the part of these respondents to participate in crime prevention has also been observed – apparently because they do not regard the presence of private security officers as a threat to their individual human rights. Considering all these positive factors (in favour of private security), Table 7.6 reports the results of the research group's perceptions of the social standing of private security. One hundred-and-eleven (29,13%) male and 106 (27,82%) female respondents are convinced that private security officers have a very to fairly high social status in society. Fifty-one (13,39%) male and 54 (14,17%) female respondents opine they have an average social standing.

The favourable image about private security emanating from these statistical tables implies a social acceptance of the role of private security in our society and accordingly, regard them as indispensable in crime prevention.

TABLE 7.6 SOCIAL STATUS OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN SOCIETY BY GENDER (N=381)

STATUS	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Very high	67	17.59	46	12.07	113	29.66
Fairly high	44	11.55	60	15.75	104	27.30
Average	51	13.39	54	14.17	105	27.56
Fairly low	20	5.25	25	6.56	45	11.81
Very low	5	2.67	9	2.36	14	3.67
TOTAL	187	49.08	194	50.92	381	100.0

7.3 ROLE EXPECTATIONS

A comparison between public police and private security has been presented in Chapter 5. Public police have a clear mandate to maintain social order in society through proactive and reactive policing measures. Traditionally, private security focuses its energy and resources on loss prevention rather on the control of crime. The central mission of private security has been “ ... the prevention of security breaches that threaten the interests of their employers and their employers and their employers’ customers” (Micucci 1995:21). There are, however, outcries for closer co-operation between private security and public police to be able to understand the threats of contemporary crime syndicates and to assume a greater role in protection of public and government property

(Moore 1995:3; SOIB 2000:18). The extent to which private security fraternities have become involved in crime prevention in the early to late nineties, should serve as a clear indication of the changing and expanding role of private security. Micucci (1995:21) refers to this phenomenon (private security) as “ ... rapidly expanding, and powerful, segment of the social control enterprise”.

Maintaining social order (through crime prevention by private security) entails a great variety functional performances as well as operational methods which bestow a particular characteristic upon those institutions responsible for order maintenance. It follows, then, that delegated task (mandate) of order maintenance and functional activities associated with it generate specific expectations with regard to the service being rendered by either public police or private security.

In the discussion to follow, the expectations of the public respondents are to be presented in two different categories, namely: (1) functional role expectations and (2) characteristics of private security officers.

7.3.1 Functional role expectations

Tables 7.7 reports public’s role expectations based on a typical 7-point Likert measuring scale, yielding the following latitudes of response freedom (Gorden 1977:84) –

extremely important	}	latitude of favourableness (“important”)
very important		
important		
undecided	}	latitude of non-commitment
unimportant	}	latitude of unfavourableness (“unimportant”)
not important		
extremely unimportant		

Table 7.7 specifically deals with public respondents' perceptions pertaining to selected activities generating fixed role expectations regarding the functional performance of private security officers:

7.3.1.1 Short term security functions

- Patrolling of streets and neighbourhoods are regarded as important by public respondents (366 or 96,06%).
- Attending to electronic alarm systems located at private dwellings and at business premises was also regarded a top priority by respondents (373 or 97,90%) – especially in cases of burglary, and the like.
- Transporting of money in armoured vehicles such as those carrying large amounts of pension monies to (in most cases disadvantaged) waiting pensioners in remote rural areas or between businesses and commercial banks, etc. also received an extremely favourable assessment (370 or 97,11%).

7.3.1.2 Longterm security functions

The following longterm security functions were all regarded as important by the public respondents –

- protection of life and property (369 or 96,85%) at specific localities such as in parking lots, at ATM withdrawal locations, in shopping malls, and the like where opportunities for armed robbery and possible loss of life are constantly presenting themselves;
- providing service delivery through physical protection at private dwellings (349 or 91,60%); and
- educating society with regard to crime issues and related problems (332 or 87,14%).

7.3.1.3 Remote functions

- transporting of prisoners between penitentiary institutions and criminal courts (300 or 78,74%);
- protecting police stations (263 or 69,03%); and

- settling domestic quarrels (202 or 53,02%).

7.3.1.4 Restoration of social order

- Crime investigation (308 or 80,84%);
- Apprehending law violators (328 or 86,09%); and
- Law enforcement (310 or 81,36%).

7.3.1.5 Maintenance of the status quo

- Regulating public access control to buildings and towns (340 or 89,24%);
- Surveillance in marked patrol vehicles at strategic points (354 or 92,91%); and
- Guarding duties (304 or 79,79%).

7.3.2 Characteristics of private security officers

The characteristics and qualities relating to individual private security officers include in the measuring instrument in actual fact reflect or refer to the expectations the clientele and the public at large usually cherish of these officers when performing their task. Tables 7.8 reports the results of public respondents in respect of specific characteristics in this regard.

Table 7.8 reflects on a few selected characteristics of private security officers when in daily contact with their clientele or other people. The respondents are of the opinion that private security officers are --

- ◆ friendly (256 or 67,19%)
- ◆ helpful (277 or 72,70%) and
- ◆ courteous (244 or 64,04%).

The sample group also believe that private security officers are not --

- ◆ cheeky (192 or 50,39%) – undecided were 97 (25,46%) respondents
- ◆ rude (217 or 56,96%) – undecided were 88 (23,10%) respondents - when dealing with their clientele or other people in general.

Although respondents also believe that private security officers are equipped with the necessary knowledge and insight (148 or 38,85%) to fulfil their task as private security officers, an alarming 100 (26,25%) of the respondents are undecided about this personal quality so dearly needed to be effective and acceptable in the eyes of the public. These undecided respondents are believed to have made their choice due to their lack of knowledge of private security officers and the function they fulfil in society.

The same could be said about the fact that public respondents (216 or 56,69%) indicated that private security officers are competent. An alarming 105 (27,56%) were undecided about this important personal quality.

TABLE 7.7 IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS (N=381)

TYPE OF FUNCTION	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT		VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		UNIMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT		EXTREMELY UNIMPORTANT	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Patrolling	216	56.69	87	22.83	63	16.54	7	1.84	3	0.80	3	0.80	2	0.52
Rapid response	274	71.92	70	18.37	29	7.61	3	0.79	2	0.52	-	-	3	0.79
Protection of life and property	230	60.37	99	25.98	40	10.50	4	1.05	2	0.52	3	0.79	3	0.79
Transporting of prisoners	179	46.98	74	19.42	47	12.34	39	10.24	18	4.72	8	2.10	16	4.20
Crime investigation	159	41.73	87	22.83	62	16.27	33	8.66	17	4.46	11	2.89	12	3.15
Cash-in-transit	253	66.40	88	23.10	29	7.61	4	1.05	2	0.52	3	0.79	2	0.52
Observation	196	51.44	99	25.98	59	15.49	15	3.94	6	1.57	-	-	6	1.57
Service delivery	184	48.29	102	26.77	63	16.54	24	6.30	3	0.80	3	0.80	2	0.52
Access control	188	49.34	99	25.98	53	13.91	26	6.82	7	1.84	4	1.05	4	1.05
Protection of police stations	117	30.71	70	18.37	76	19.95	54	14.17	23	6.04	17	4.46	24	6.30
Apprehending of perpetrators	192	50.39	83	21.78	53	13.91	17	4.46	24	6.30	5	1.31	7	1.84
Law enforcement	196	51.44	82	21.52	32	8.40	28	7.35	22	5.77	10	2.62	11	2.89
Educating society	188	49.34	83	21.78	61	16.01	26	6.82	8	2.10	8	2.10	7	1.84
Settlement – domestic quarrels	95	24.93	48	12.60	59	15.49	65	17.06	45	11.81	31	8.14	38	9.97
Guarding private homes	155	40.68	84	22.05	65	17.06	32	8.40	17	4.46	6	1.57	22	5.77

TABLE 7.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS WHEN DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC (N=381)

CHARACTERISTICS	VERY MUCH		MUCH		UNDECIDED		LITTLE		NOT AT ALL		\bar{x}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Friendliness	101	26.51	155	40.68	66	17.32	42	11.02	17	4.46	2.622	1.10
Helpfulness	113	29.66	164	43.04	58	15.22	33	8.66	13	3.41	2.131	1.04
Courteousness	93	24.41	151	39.63	84	22.05	37	9.71	16	4.20	2.297	1.07
Rudeness	24	6.30	52	13.65	88	23.10	107	28.08	110	28.87	3.596	1.21
Lack of knowledge & insight	39	10.24	94	24.67	100	26.25	76	19.95	72	18.90	3.126	1.26
Competency	76	19.95	140	36.75	105	27.56	38	9.97	22	5.77	2.449	1.09
Uninterestedness	75	19.69	150	39.37	86	22.57	56	14.70	14	3.67	2.436	1.08
Cheekiness	34	8.92	58	15.22	97	25.46	81	21.26	111	29.13	3.472	1.30

7.4 MEASURES IN CRIME PREVENTION

Proactive policing is closely associated with crime prevention. The basic object of social control is the preservation of social order and the promotion of voluntary compliance with the laws. Crime prevention consists in those measures society adopt to strengthen its control over the behaviour of people – especially law violators (Van Heerden 1976:16).

Crime prevention measures usually include short-term proactive initiatives to secure life and property. Table 7.9 renders an assessment of the most important security measures the public would like to see in daily crime prevention activities undertaken by private security. According to this table there is no doubt in the minds of public respondents (370 or 97,12%) that the visible presence of private security officers in public places such as shopping malls, commercial banks, etc. create the illusion of constant omnipresence.

This kind of stationary protection not only contributes to the elimination of actual opportunities to commit crime, but also serve as a reassurance of safety and security. Likewise, public respondents appear to be comfortable with the omnipresence of private security officers in patrol vehicles (347 or 91,08%).

All the other crime prevention measures contained in this table are positively evaluated by public respondents as follows –

- CCTV in shops / businesses – 84,52 percent
- visible security signboards – 86,88 percent
- dissemination of information about crime – 76,64 percent
- surveillance at strategic points – 82,15 percent
- creating crime awareness – 80,06 percent
- “car-safe” projects – 89,76 percent
- transporting money in armoured vehicles – 90,55 percent

When these crime prevention measures are cross-correlated with gender, it transpires that, male and female public respondents equally rate these measures as important to

very important – see Table 7.10. The only notable difference between male and female respondents reflected in this table refers to the presence of “car-guards” in public parking areas. Female respondents (46,46%) display a more favourable attitude to these guards than their male counterparts (43,30%) – most probably because they are seen as a greater asset to female drivers than males.

TABLE 7.9 IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED SECURITY MEASURES IN CRIME PREVENTION : PUBLIC (N=381)

MEASURE	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		\bar{x}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Omnipresence of private security Guards in public places	258	67.72	112	29.40	7	1.84	3	0.79	1	0.26	1.365	0.59
CCTV in shops/businesses	186	48.82	136	35.70	29	7.61	20	5.25	10	2.62	1.772	0.98
Visible security signboards	191	50.13	140	36.75	32	8.40	12	3.15	6	1.57	1.693	0.87
Dissemination of information About crime, etc.	160	41.99	132	34.65	37	9.71	29	7.61	23	6.04	2.010	1.17
Stationary surveillance	166	43.57	147	38.58	40	10.50	13	3.41	15	3.94	1.856	1.01
Creating crime awareness	177	46.46	128	33.60	38	9.97	22	5.77	16	4.20	1.877	1.08
“Car-safe” projects	187	49.08	155	40.68	27	7.09	7	1.84	5	1.31	1.656	0.80
Escorting money in armoured Vehicles	223	58.53	122	32.02	22	5.77	11	2.89	3	0.79	1.554	0.79
Role visibility of private security Officers generally	215	56.43	132	34.65	11	2.89	14	3.67	9	2.36	1.622	0.95

**TABLE 7.10 IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED SECURITY MEASURES IN CRIME PREVENTION BY GENDER :
PUBLIC (N=381)**

MEASURE	MALE		FEMALE	
	N	%	N	%
Omnipresence of private security guards in public places	184	48.29	186	48.81
CCTV in shops/businesses	156	40.94	166	43.57
Visible security signboards	164	43.04	167	43.83
Dissemination of information about crime, etc.	139	36.48	153	40.16
Stationary surveillance	159	41.73	154	40.42
Creating crime awareness	150	39.37	155	40.68
“Car-safe” projects	165	43.31	177	46.46
Escorting money in armoured vehicles	169	44.36	176	46.19
Role visibility of private security officers generally	169	44.36	178	46.72

7.5 SPECIFIC ASPECTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY

The role of private security in contemporary society has been outlined in Chapter 6. What follows below (Table 7.11), is a statistical evaluation of an index containing thirteen key aspects relating to private security as it is seen and experienced in everyday life by most members of society.

Public respondents are in agreement with regard to the following features or elements underlying the private security role –

- Private security officers should be granted more power and authority – 74,54 percent
- Proper training for private security officers required – 61,42 percent
- Private security is an elitist enterprise – 49,87 percent
- Private security should play a greater role in policing matters – 76,38 percent
- Their job is as important as that of the SAPS – 71,13 percent
- They play an important role in the upholding of law and order – 79,26 percent
- Private security officers should be actively involved in CPF's – 88,19 percent
- Academic training and education for security officers should be prioritised – 91,60 percent
- There should be greater co-operation between the SAPS and private security industry – 92,65 percent
- Private security officers should be guided by a code of conduct – 97,11 percent
- All private security officers should be subject to uniform, basic style of training – 95,54 percent

The following aspects caused a certain extend of disagreement among public respondents –

- Private security officers are incompetent when performing their duties – 39,37 percent
- Private security officers do not care about the interest of the public – 46,99 percent

Table 7.12 reports the results of the evaluation of these features by male and female respondents. It appears from this table that male and female respondents significantly agree on the following aspects –

- Private security officers are not regarded as incompetent when they are performing their task – male 18,37% and female 20,99% ($p=0.0096$)
- Private security should play a more significant role in public policing matters – male 40,94% and female 35,43% ($p=0.0145$)
- Their job is as important as that of the SAPS – male 35,17% and female 35,96% ($p=0.0311$)

Female respondents (27,82%) significantly disagree with males that private security officers do not care about the interest of the public. Male respondents (20,99%) do feel that private security officers adopt a don't-care attitude towards the interest of the public ($p=0.0001$). The table further shows that 30,45 percent male respondents significantly believe that private security is a “rich-man” enterprise, while female respondents (24,67%) disagree with this perception ($p=0.0001$).

Table 7.13 to 7.14 offer a cross-correlation of type of housing (variable 8) with the statements (a) private security officers do not care about the interest of the public and (b) private security is only available to affluent people.

Table 7.13 shows that 179 (46,98%) disagree with the statement that private security officers do not care about the interest of the public (83 or 21,78% home owners), while 190 (49,87%) respondents agree that private security is a rich-man's business – especially those who own their own houses (89 or 23,36%) – Table 7.14.

Tables 7.15 to 7.22 reveals cross-correlation information regarding the area where public respondents are staying in by –

- ◆ visible presence of private security officers in public places – all areas were in favour (Table 7.15);
- ◆ closed-circuit television in business premises – all areas were in favour (Table 7.16);
- ◆ security signboards of electronic alarm monitoring – all areas were in favour (Table 7.17);

- ◆ distributing information crime – all areas were in favour except the farming community who were divided between agree and disagree (Table 7.18);
- ◆ stationary surveillance by private security officers in marked vehicles – all areas were in favour (Table 7.19);
- ◆ creating a culture of crime awareness among citizens – all areas were in favour (Table 7.20);
- ◆ “car-safe” projects in public parking areas – all areas were in favour (Table 7.21); and
- ◆ safe escorting of money in armoured vehicles – all areas were in favour (Table 7.22).

TABLE 7.11 EVALUATION OF SPESIFIC ASPECTS RELATING TO THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY (N=381)

VARIABLE	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		\bar{x}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Private security officers Should have more power	170	44.62	114	29.92	35	9.19	43	11.29	19	4.99	2.021	1.20
Private security officers are not Properly trained for their job	118	30.97	116	30.45	64	16.80	70	18.37	13	3.41	2.328	1.19
They are incompetent when Performing their duties	61	16.01	73	19.16	97	25.46	116	30.45	34	8.92	2.971	1.22
They do not care about the Interest of the public	68	17.85	53	13.91	81	21.26	132	34.65	47	12.34	3.097	1.29
Private security is an elitist Enterprise	112	29.40	78	20.47	42	11.02	97	25.46	52	13.65	2.753	1.45
Private security should play a Greater role in public police Matters	144	37.80	147	38.58	50	13.12	26	6.82	14	3.67	2.000	1.06
Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service	161	42.26	110	28.87	43	11.29	52	13.65	15	3.94	2.081	1.19

They play an important role in Maintaining social order	156	40.94	146	38.32	47	12.34	25	6.56	7	1.84	1.900	0.98
Private security officers should Actively participate in CPF's Academic training for private Security officers should be Prioritised	186	48.82	150	39.37	27	7.09	12	3.15	6	1.57	1.693	0.86
Greater cooperation between private security and public police is necessary	234	61.42	115	30.18	11	2.89	18	4.72	3	0.79	1.533	0.83
Private security officers should be guided by a code of conduct	245	64.30	108	28.35	17	4.46	8	2.10	3	0.79	1.467	0.75
Private security officers should be subject to uniform, basic style of training	264	69.29	106	27.82	9	2.36	2	0.52	-	-	1.341	0.55
	276	72.44	88	23.10	13	3.41	3	0.79	1	0.26	1.333	0.61

TABLE 7.12 EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC ROLE FEATURES BY MALE AND FEMALE RESPONDENTS : PUBLIC (N=381)

FEATURE	MALE		FEMALE		Df	x ²
	N	%	N	%		
Private security officers are not Properly trained for their job	123	32.28	111	29.13	4	11.751*
They are incompetent when Performing their duties	70	18.37	80	20.99	4	13.364*
They do not care about the Interest of the public	80	20.99	106	27.82	4	25.789**
Private security is an elitist Enterprise	116	30.45	94	24.67	4	27.279**
Private security should play a Greater role in public police Matters	156	40.94	135	35.43	4	12.414*
Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service	134	35.17	137	35.96	4	10.627*

* Significant at 0.05 level

** Significant at 0.0001

TABLE 7.13 EVALUATION OF STATEMENT: "PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS DO NOT CARE ABOUT THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC" BY TYPE OF HOUSING (N=381)

TYPE OF HOUSING	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Own house	28	7.35	27	7.09	38	9.97	61	16.01	22	5.77	176	46.19
Rented house	17	4.46	11	2.89	15	3.94	29	7.61	13	3.41	85	22.31
Own flat etc.	6	1.57	2	0.52	10	2.62	11	2.89	3	0.79	32	8.40
Rented flat etc.	14	3.67	6	1.57	9	2.36	15	3.94	3	0.79	47	12.34
Alternative housing	2	0.52	2	0.52	2	0.52	-	-	2	0.52	8	2.10
Other	1	0.26	5	1.31	7	1.84	16	4.20	4	1.05	33	8.66
TOTAL	68	17.85	53	13.91	81	21.26	132	34.65	47	12.34	381	100.0

TABLE 7.14 **EVALUATION OF STATEMENT: "PRIVATE SECURITY IS ONLY FOR THE RICH" BY TYPE OF HOUSING**
(N=381)

TYPE OF HOUSING	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Own house	55	14.44	34	8.92	20	5.25	46	12.07	21	5.51	176	46.19
Rented house	27	7.09	20	5.25	15	3.94	13	3.41	10	2.62	85	22.31
Own flat etc.	7	1.81	11	2.89	3	0.79	5	1.31	6	1.57	32	8.40
Rented flat etc.	16	4.20	5	1.31	3	0.79	16	4.20	7	1.84	47	12.34
Alternative housing	4	1.05	3	0.79	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	8	2.10
Other	3	0.79	5	1.31	-	-	17	4.46	8	2.10	33	8.66
TOTAL	112	29.40	78	20.47	42	11.02	97	25.46	52	13.65	381	100.0

TABLE 7.15 **EVALUATION OF “VISIBLE PRESENCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS IN PUBLIC PLACES” BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)**

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	117	30.71	35	9.19	3	0.79	2	0.52	-	-	157	41.21
A town	116	30.45	66	17.32	2	0.52	1	0.26	1	0.26	186	48.82
A rural area	22	5.77	9	2.36	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	8.14
Farming community	2	0.52	2	0.52	2	0.52	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	258	67.72	112	29.40	7	1.84	3	0.79	1	0.26	381	100.0

TABLE 7.16 EVALUATION OF “CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION IN BUSINESS PREMISES” BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	101	26.51	43	11.29	8	2.10	2	0.52	3	0.79	157	41.21
A town	67	17.59	81	21.26	17	4.46	16	4.20	5	1.31	186	48.82
A rural area	16	4.20	9	2.36	3	0.79	1	0.26	2	0.52	31	8.14
Farming community	1	0.26	3	0.79	1	0.26	1	0.26	-	-	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	186	48.82	136	35.70	29	7.61	20	5.25	10	2.62	381	100.0

TABLE 7.17 **EVALUATION OF “SECURITY SIGNBOARDS OF ELECTRONIC ALARM MONITORED BY PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY” BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)**

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	96	25.20	45	11.81	12	3.15	3	0.79	1	0.26	157	41.21
A town	72	18.90	84	22.05	17	4.46	8	2.10	5	1.31	186	48.82
A rural area	21	5.51	9	2.36	-	-	1	0.26	-	-	31	8.14
Farming community	1	0.26	2	0.52	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	191	50.13	140	36.75	32	8.40	12	3.15	6	1.57	381	100.0

TABLE 7.18 EVALUATION OF “DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT CRIME” BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	85	22.31	44	11.55	10	2.62	11	2.89	7	1.84	157	41.21
A town	57	14.96	81	21.26	23	6.04	17	4.46	8	2.10	186	48.82
A rural area	17	4.46	4	1.05	4	1.05	1	0.26	5	1.31	31	8.14
Farming community	-	-	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	3	0.79	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	160	41.99	132	34.65	37	9.71	29	7.61	23	6.04	381	100.0

TABLE 7.19 EVALUATION OF “STATIONARY SURVEILLANCE BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN MARKED VEHICLES” BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	82	21.52	53	13.91	10	2.62	5	1.31	7	1.84	157	41.21
A town	64	16.80	85	22.31	23	6.04	8	2.10	6	1.57	186	48.82
A rural area	16	4.20	7	1.84	6	1.57	-	-	2	0.52	31	8.14
Farming community	3	0.79	2	0.52	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	166	43.57	147	38.58	40	10.50	13	3.41	15	3.94	381	100.0

TABLE 7.20 EVALUATION OF “ CREATION OF A CULTURE OF CRIME AWARENESS AMONG CITIZENS” BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	84	22.05	51	13.39	8	2.10	8	2.10	6	1.57	157	41.21
A town	69	18.11	69	18.11	29	7.61	12	3.15	7	1.84	186	48.82
A rural area	20	5.25	6	1.57	1	0.26	2	0.52	2	0.52	31	8.14
Farming community	3	0.79	2	0.52	-	-	-	-	1	0.26	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	177	46.46	128	33.60	38	9.97	22	5.77	16	4.20	381	100.0

TABLE 7.21 EVALUATION OF "CAR-SAFE" PROJECTS IN PUBLIC PARKING AREAS" BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	87	22.83	59	15.49	10	2.62	1	0.26	-	-	157	41.21
A town	75	19.69	84	22.05	16	4.20	6	1.57	5	1.31	186	48.82
A rural area	22	5.77	8	2.10	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	31	8.14
Farming community	2	0.52	4	1.05	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	187	49.08	155	40.68	27	7.09	7	1.84	5	1.31	381	100.0

TABLE 7.22 EVALUATION OF "SAFE ESCOURTING OF MONEY IN ARMoured VEHICLES" BY AREA OF LIVING (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A city	108	28.35	36	9.45	8	2.10	4	1.05	1	0.26	157	41.21
A town	87	22.83	77	20.21	13	3.41	7	1.84	2	0.52	186	48.82
A rural area	22	5.77	8	2.10	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	31	8.14
Farming community	5	1.31	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Other	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26
TOTAL	223	58.53	122	32.02	22	5.77	11	2.89	3	0.79	381	100.0

In order to facilitate an image of the aspects relating to the role of private security as they present themselves in the four areas in KwaZulu-Natal – Durban Metropole, South Coast, North Coast and Midlands – research deemed it necessary to cross-correlate these features with the mentioned areas. Only observations with significant differences in terms of Chi-square test will be reputed on.

In this regard, Table 7.23 reveals that North Coast respondents (85 or 22,31%) are significantly more in favour of more power and authority for private security officers ($p=0.0002$). Midlands follows closely with 76 (19,95%) of the respondents being also in favour of this statement.

Table 7.24 reveals that North Coast 69 (18,11%) and Midlands 71 (18,64%) respondents are significantly in agreement ($p<.0001$) that private security officers are not properly and adequately trained for the kind of job they are pursuing.

While the first three areas all agree that private security officers are in fact adequately trained for their work, Table 7.25 shows an extremely significant difference in opinion on the part of the Midlands respondents (64 or 16,80%) who believe that such officers need proper and adequate training for their job ($p<.0001$).

Table 7.26 shows that 61 (16,01%) of the Midlands respondents significantly believe that private security officers actually do not care about the interest of the public ($p<.0001$). This probably underscores the notion that private security is not available to every member of society, simply because it is business orientated and if likely to only care for the interest of their clients. The remaining areas are, however, convinced that they can count on the care and attention of private security officers.

Table 7.27 shows that the Midlands respondents are convinced that private security is only destined for affluent people of society (63 or 16,53%), compared to the perception of the North Coast respondents (45 or 11,81%) who also share this view. This difference is significant ($p<.0001$).

Although the respondents in all four areas (Table 7.28) agree that a greater partnership between private security and public police should be forged, North Coast respondents

(89 or 23,36%) are significantly more convinced that the time has come for closer co-operation between these two entities ($p=0.0002$).

Table 7.29 indicates that 87 (22,84%) of the North Coast respondents believe that private security is as important as public policing. This perception is closely followed by that of the Midlands respondents (78 or 20,47%) who share a similar view. The difference in the perceptions contained in this table is extremely significant ($p=0.0001$).

From Table 7.30 it is clear that North Coast (87 or 22,83%) followed by Midlands (84 or 22,05%) respondents are significantly more in agreement on the statement that private security has indeed an important role to play in the maintenance of social order and by implication the prevention of crime. Durban and South Coast respondents also support this statement but it can be concluded that the former two areas may be more in favour of a crime prevention role by private security because of a greater farming community ($p=0.0004$).

According to Radelet and Carter (1994:130; 138-141), professionalism relates to the "product" of a profession, in other words the mission or the role of private security in society. A second mark of professionalism relates to specialised knowledge, proficiency and skills necessary to perform a task efficiently and effectively. Another feature of a profession is client-orientated and implies a service ideal of which a code of conduct forms an integral part of professionalism because it outlines and prescribes the behaviour of private security officers.

According to the SOIB (2000:33-34), professionalism which generally refers to the practises, qualities and typical features of a profession or occupation or an industry such as the private security industry which calls for competence and necessary skills that should be promoted within the occupational sphere of the private security industry.

From Table 7.31 it appears that a code of conduct for private security officers and concomitant code of ethics is non-existent (370 or 97,11%). The table also shows that none of the respondents strongly disagreed or in some instances disagreed with the statement. Although respondents in all four areas are in extreme favour of a code of

conduct for private security officers it appears that Durban and South Coast respondents are significantly more concerned about this issue ($p=0.0004$).

**TABLE 7.23 EVALUATION OF “MORE POWER AND AUTHORITY SHOULD BE GRANTED TO SECURITY OFFICERS” :
PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA (N=381)**

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	33	8.66	30	7.87	6	1.57	15	3.94	8	2.10	92	24.15
South Coast	32	8.40	28	7.35	12	3.15	20	5.25	4	1.05	96	25.20
North Coast	52	13.65	33	8.66	9	2.36	3	0.79	1	0.26	98	25.72
Midlands	53	13.91	23	6.04	8	2.10	5	1.31	6	1.57	95	24.93
TOTAL	170	44.62	114	29.92	35	9.19	43	11.29	19	4.99	381	100.0

Df=12;x²=37.026

**TABLE 7.24 EVALUATION OF “ADEQUATE TRAINING OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS” : PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL
AREA (N=381)**

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	18	4.72	22	5.77	14	3.67	28	7.35	10	2.62	92	24.15
South Coast	24	6.30	30	7.87	18	4.72	24	6.30	-	-	96	25.20
North Coast	32	8.40	37	9.71	20	5.25	7	1.84	2	0.52	98	25.72
Midlands	44	11.55	27	7.09	12	3.15	11	2.89	1	0.26	95	24.93
TOTAL	118	30.97	116	30.45	64	16.80	70	18.37	13	3.41	381	100.0

Df=12;x²=56.590

TABLE 7.25 EVALUATION OF “COMPETENCY OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS” : PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA
(N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	13	3.41	13	3.41	24	6.30	26	6.82	16	4.20	92	24.15
South Coast	8	2.10	20	5.25	24	6.30	36	9.45	8	2.10	96	25.20
North Coast	7	1.84	9	2.36	35	9.19	42	11.02	5	1.31	98	25.72
Midlands	33	8.66	31	8.14	14	3.67	12	3.15	5	1.31	95	24.93
TOTAL	61	16.01	73	19.16	97	25.46	116	30.45	34	8.92	381	100.0

Df=12;x²=80.196

**TABLE 7.26 EVALUATION OF “PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS DO NOT CARE ABOUT INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC” :
PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA (N=381)**

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	12	3.15	8	2.10	11	2.89	41	10.76	20	5.25	92	24.15
South Coast	8	2.10	8	2.10	34	8.92	34	8.92	12	3.15	96	25.20
North Coast	12	3.15	12	3.15	29	7.61	40	10.50	5	1.31	98	25.72
Midlands	36	9.45	25	6.56	7	1.84	17	4.46	10	2.62	95	24.93
TOTAL	68	17.85	53	13.91	81	21.26	132	34.65	47	12.34	381	100.0

Df=12; $\chi^2=90.849$

TABLE 7.27 EVALUATION OF "PRIVATE SECURITY IS ONLY FOR THE RICH" : PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	24	6.30	16	4.20	5	1.31	22	5.77	25	6.56	92	24.15
South Coast	14	3.67	28	7.35	16	4.20	28	7.35	10	2.62	96	25.20
North Coast	28	7.35	17	4.46	16	4.20	31	8.14	6	1.57	98	25.72
Midlands	46	12.07	17	4.46	5	1.31	16	4.20	11	2.80	95	24.93
TOTAL	112	29.40	78	20.47	42	11.02	97	25.46	52	13.65	381	100.0

Df=12; $\chi^2=56.988$

TABLE 7.28 EVALUATION OF “PRIVATE SECURITY SHOULD PLAY A MORE SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN PUBLIC POLICING MATTERS” : PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	25	6.56	38	9.97	12	3.15	9	2.36	8	2.10	92	24.15
South Coast	26	6.82	40	10.50	16	4.20	10	2.62	4	1.05	96	25.20
North Coast	49	12.86	40	10.50	5	1.31	3	0.79	1	0.26	98	25.72
Midlands	44	11.55	29	7.61	17	4.46	4	1.05	1	0.26	95	24.93
TOTAL	144	37.80	147	38.58	50	13.12	26	6.82	14	3.67	381	100.0

Df=12;x²=36.869

TABLE 7.29 **EVALUATION OF “THE JOB OF PRIVATE SECURITY IS AS IMPORTANT AS THAT OF PUBLIC POLICE” :**
PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	21	5.51	21	5.51	12	3.15	27	7.09	11	2.89	92	24.15
South Coast	36	9.45	28	7.35	18	4.72	12	3.15	2	0.52	96	25.20
North Coast	51	13.39	36	9.45	6	1.57	4	1.05	1	0.26	98	25.72
Midlands	53	13.91	25	6.56	7	1.84	9	2.36	1	0.26	95	24.93
TOTAL	161	42.26	110	28.87	43	11.29	52	13.65	15	3.94	381	100.0

Df=12;x²=71.633

TABLE 7.30 EVALUATION OF “PRIVATE SECURITY PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN UPHOLDING LAW AND ORDER IN SOCIETY” : PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL AREA (N=381)

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	26	6.82	37	9.71	16	4.20	10	2.62	3	0.79	92	24.15
South Coast	32	8.40	36	9.45	18	4.72	8	2.10	2	0.52	96	25.20
North Coast	41	10.76	46	12.07	6	1.57	4	1.05	1	0.26	98	25.72
Midlands	57	14.96	27	7.09	7	1.84	3	0.79	1	0.26	95	24.93
TOTAL	156	40.94	146	38.32	47	12.34	25	6.56	7	1.84	381	100.0

Df=12;x²=35.302

**TABLE 7.31 EVALUATION OF “A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS”: PUBLIC BY PROVINCIAL
AREA (N=381)**

AREA	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	58	15.22	32	8.40	-	-	2	0.52	-	-	92	24.15
South Coast	66	17.32	30	7.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	25.20
North Coast	67	17.59	23	6.04	8	2.10	-	-	-	-	98	25.72
Midlands	73	19.16	21	5.51	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	95	24.93
TOTAL	264	69.29	106	27.82	9	2.36	2	0.52	-	-	381	100.0

Df=9;x²=30.482

7.6 DIMENSIONS OF CRIME PREVENTION: PUBLIC REACTIONS TO CRIME

Quoting from Conklin (1975), Van Velzen (1998:201-222) opines that crime is regarded as the potent threat to society. Normally, people who are confronted by this threat and accompanying criminal victimisation will put every effort to test to evade confrontation with criminals. To this end, they may go so far to change their behaviour and curtail their social activities. Apart from placing “... barriers between themselves and the rest of the world” ... “people may become paralysed by fear and avoid going out because they fear an attack on their person”.

Lab (1990:467-468) offer two reasons why members of society would participate in crime prevention activities. Firstly, the crime rate still remains at high levels and is of great concern to them. Secondly, shortage of budgets necessary to effectively and efficiently control crime, are declining. This author is adamant that citizens' participation in crime prevention activities can play a supportive role in the overall efforts of the criminal justice system to prevent crime. The latter reason, “... coupled with the acknowledged inability of the criminal justice system to stop crime on its own, [therefore] necessitate citizens' involvement in crime prevention” (Lab 1990:468).

Conklin (1975) in Van Velzen (1998:202) distinguished between defensive and offensive responses to crime and fear of crime. Defensive responses entail avoidance behaviour, while offensive responses are actually visible reactions of individuals to crime. These active measures may include various activities ranging from locking doors of residences, acquisition of guard dog to target-hardening.

Table 7.32 reflects an index of 15 offensive responses or precautionary measures taken by public respondents (N=381) to protect themselves against possible criminal attacks. It appears that most respondents (286 or 75,07%) kept the doors of their residences locked during day and night, presumably by means of security gates. Ninety-five respondents did not do this. Secondly, the installation of outside perimeter lights met with the approval of 244 (64,04%) of the respondents, while 137 did not consider this measure. Thirdly, the installation of burglar proofing was considered by 242 (63,52%) of the respondents, followed by 239 (62,73%) who left their radio/TV/lights on when not

at home. Another 228 (59,84%) of the respondents asked a neighbour to look after their premises while they are away.

Further information contained in this table point to –

- The installation of electronic alarm system (129 or 33,86%)
- Fixing of deadlocks on doors of residences (163 or 42,78%)
- Engraved valuables, photographed and serial numbers kept in a safe place (108 or 28,35%)
- Installation of security warning lights (145 or 38,06%)
- Erection of concrete walls (158 or 41,47%)
- Acquisition of services of private security company (124 or 32,55%)
- Acquisition of fire-arm (164 or 43,04%)
- Target-hardening (145 or 38,06%)

Table 7.33 entails a cross-correlation between type of housing and precautionary measures taken by public respondents. Lab (1990:468) pointed out that participation in crime prevention is closely related to home-ownership and to a general tendency to participate in community safety programs. Home ownership implies that crime prevention activities such as precautionary measures are related to a monetary and social commitment to a neighbourhood or specific area.

From Table 7.33 it becomes very clear that those respondents who owned their own houses at the time of this survey, were very much in favour of all the precautionary measures listed in that table. Of special significance are public home owners' responses to the following measures –

- Kept doors of houses locked during day and night (130 or 34,12%)
- Installation of outside perimeter lights (124 or 32,55%)
- Installation of burglar proofing (108 or 28,35%)
- Radio/TV/lights of home left on when not there (108 or 28,35%)

Table 7.34 reports the results obtained from a cross-correlation between two prominent precautionary measures and the areas in which public respondents lived at the time of

this survey. These precautionary measures have been regarded directly related to the role and functions of the private security industry in crime prevention. In the case of the installation of an electronic alarm system, respondents in towns (66 or 17,32%) were more inclined to make use of this kind of precautionary measure, compared to those (44 or 11,55%) who are living in cities.

Secondly, the acquisition of the services of a private security company was more attractive to public respondents in towns (68 or 17,85%) compared to 37 (9,71%) who are living in cities.

TABLE 7.32 SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN BY RESPONDENTS IN THE PAST THREE YEARS (N=381)

MEASURES	YES		NO	
	N	%	N	%
Keep doors of residence locked during night only	144	37.80	237	62.20
Keep doors of residence locked during day & night	286	75.07	95	24.93
Acquisition of guard dog(s)	193	50.66	188	49.34
Installation of electronic monitoring alarm system	129	33.86	252	66.14
Installation of outside perimeter lights	244	64.04	137	35.96
Fixing of deadlocks on doors of residence	163	42.78	218	57.22
Installation of burglarproofing	242	63.52	139	36.48
Had valuables engraved, photographed & serial numbers Kept in a safe place	108	28.35	273	71.65
Installation of security warning lights	145	38.06	236	61.94
Radio / TV / lights left on when not at home	239	62.73	142	37.27
Erection of concrete walls	158	41.47	223	58.53
Acquisition of the service of private security company	124	32.55	257	67.45
Acquisition of fire-arm(s)	164	43.04	217	56.96

Had a neighbour on the lookout	228	59.84	153	40.16
Target hardening	145	38.06	236	61.94
Other	19	4.99	362	95.01

TABLE 7.33 EVALUATION OF "PHYSICAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TAKEN BY PUBLIC RESPONDENTS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES" BY TYPE OF HOUSING: PUBLIC (N=381)

SECURITY MEASURES	OWN HOUSE		RENTED HOUSE		OWN FLAT		RENTED FLAT		ALTERNATIVE HOUSING		OTHER		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Keep doors locked during The night only	64	16.80	37	9.71	9	2.36	16	4.20	3	0.79	15	3.94	144	37.80
Keep doors locked during The day and night	130	34.12	64	16.80	28	7.35	37	9.71	8	2.10	19	4.99	286	75.07
Acquisition of guard dog	92	24.15	50	13.12	12	3.15	16	4.20	6	1.57	17	4.46	193	50.66
Installation of electronic Alarm system	72	18.90	21	5.51	11	2.89	17	4.46	2	0.52	6	1.57	129	33.86
Installation of outside / Perimeter lights	124	32.55	48	12.60	17	4.46	25	6.56	5	1.31	25	6.56	244	64.04
Fixing of deadlocks on Doors	78	20.47	32	8.40	11	2.89	24	6.30	-	-	18	4.72	163	42.78
Installation of burglar - Proofing	108	28.35	52	13.65	16	4.20	32	8.40	4	1.05	30	7.87	242	63.52

Had valuables engraved	50	13.12	20	5.28	8	2.10	16	4.20	3	0.79	11	2.89	108	28.35
Installed security warning	71	18.64	27	7.09	10	2.62	21	5.51	5	1.31	11	2.89	145	38.06
Lights														
Radio / TV / lights left on	108	28.35	56	14.70	15	3.94	28	7.35	7	1.84	25	6.56	239	62.73
when not at home														
Erection of concrete walls	84	22.05	29	7.61	9	2.36	11	2.89	5	1.31	20	5.25	158	41.47
Acquisition of private	63	16.54	21	5.51	10	2.62	15	3.94	3	0.79	12	3.15	124	32.55
Security company														
Acquisition of firearms	84	22.05	30	7.87	9	2.36	27	7.09	1	0.26	13	3.41	164	43.04
Had a neighbour on the	94	24.67	51	13.39	20	5.25	32	8.40	8	2.10	23	6.04	228	59.84
Lookout														
Target-hardening	66	17.32	30	7.87	7	1.84	17	4.46	6	1.57	19	4.99	145	33.06
Other	16	4.20	-	-	2	0.52	-	-	1	0.26	-	-	19	4.99

**TABLE 7.34 EVALUATION OF SECURITY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TAKEN BY AREA (PLACE)
OF LIVING: PUBLIC (N=381)**

AREA	INSTALLATION OF AN ELECTRONIC ALARM		ACQUISITION OF SERVICES OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY	
	N	%	N	%
A city	44	11.55	37	9.71
A town	66	17.32	68	17.85
A rural area	15	3.94	16	4.20
Farming community	4	1.05	3	0.79
Other				
TOTAL	129	33.86	124	35.55

7.7 SUMMARY

This chapter contains statistical analyses of public respondents' perceptions to various aspects of the role of private security as it relates to crime prevention. In conclusion, it appears that public respondents have reacted very favourably to most of the variables contained in the measuring instrument. This observation specifically applies to the importance of private security officers, different security measures intended to support public's reaction to crime and specific issues or aspects relating to the role of private security in modern society. Public's willingness to participate in crime prevention is especially reflected in precautionary measures they have taken to protect themselves and their property over the past three years.

Chapter 8 similarly presents statistical information which reflect the viewpoints of private security officers who were included in this survey. This decision was taken with the exclusive goal to allow this category of respondents to "speak out" on how they perceive themselves with regard to an issue of public interest.

CHAPTER 8

PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The primary aim of this chapter will be on the analysis and interpretation of data regarding the role of private security in crime prevention from the viewpoint of private security respondents (N=374). As mentioned in Chapter 7, this data will also be analysed and compared in respect of the South Coast, North Coast, Midlands and Durban Metropole, all areas which are located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Collins *et al.* (2000:374-375) opines that it is clear from evidence documented, that private security does make a sizable contribution to crime prevention and crime control. Crime, however, is just a part of a broad range of threats addressed by the lost prevention programs of private security. Law enforcement executives tend to see private security's contribution to reducing the volume of crime, apprehending criminal suspects and the maintaining of law and order as ineffective. The reason for this assessments are influenced to a great extend by law enforcement's poor evaluation of private security in ten areas of performance:

- quality of personnel
- pre-employment background checks
- training received
- supervision
- personal appearance in uniform
- reasonable use of force
- proper use of weapons
- familiarity of legal problems
- reporting criminal activities
- responding to alarms

Law enforcement's low opinion or rating of private security in most areas is perceived accurately by private security managers and employees: less than one fourth of private security officers think that public police officers view them as even performing a valuable service.

8.2 ROLE ACCEPTANCE

Tables 8.1 To 8.4 is a reflection of *how* private security officers perceive their role in modern society and is in fact a self image about themselves. The mere involvement in this everyday role-fulfillment provides fertile ground for pronouncements about themselves. It is hoped that this information would play a supportive role in judging the importance and necessity of the presence of private security in society.

8.2.1 Importance of the role of private security in society

The right of existence of the private security industry in society as seen by private security officers, is being evaluated in Table 8.1

TABLE 8.1 IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN SOCIETY (N=374)

IMPORTANCE	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Much more important than other jobs	177	47.33
Somewhat more important	166	44.38
Undecided	24	6.42
Somewhat less important	4	1.07
Much less important than other jobs	3	0.80
TOTAL	374	100.0

According to Table 8.1 it is clear that the respondents (343 or 91,71%) is of the opinion that the jobs of private security officers are somewhat to much more important than other jobs in society. Noticeable is the fact that 24 (6,42%) respondents were undecided in their reaction to this statement.

8.2.2 Necessity of the private security role

TABLE 8.2 NECESSITY OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY (N=374)

NECESSITY	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Absolute necessary	313	83.69
Necessary	56	14.97
Undecided	-	-
Unnecessary	1	0.27
Absolute unnecessary	4	1.07
TOTAL	374	100.0

X=1.20; s.d.=0.553

According to Table 8.2 it is clear that the respondents (369 or 98,66%) is adamant when they indicated that private security is absolute necessary in our modern society.

8.2.3 Presence of private security as a possible threat to individuals' democratic rights

Table 8.3 shows that the private security respondents (305 or 81,55%) is of the opinion that the existence of private security in society cause no threat to democratic rights of liberty and privacy of civilian people in the country.

**TABLE 8.3 EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY CAUSE A THREAT TO
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (N=374)**

THREAT	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Definitely	27	7.22
To a large extent	24	6.42
Undecided	18	4.81
To a lesser extent	41	10.96
Not at all	264	70.59
TOTAL	374	100.0

8.2.4 Social status of private security officers

It is clear from the previous tables that private security respondents value their role in modern society as extremely important and a necessary link in crime prevention. Table 8.4 reports the results of the research group perceptions of the social standing of private security. Two hundred and fifty two (67,38%) private security respondents picture private security as “high” with respect to it’s social standing in society. Of concern is the fact that 87 (23,26%) respondents took the easy way out and indicated an average reaction instead of responding positive or negative.

TABLE 8.4 STATUS OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN SOCIETY (N=374)

STATUS	FREQUENCY	DISTRIBUTION
	N	%
Very high	162	43.32
Fairly high	90	24.06
Average	87	23.26
Fairly low	28	7.49
Very low	7	1.87
TOTAL	374	100.0

8.3 ROLE EXPECTATIONS

In the discussion to follow, the expectations of the private security respondents are to be presented, like in Chapter 7, in two different categories, namely: (1) functional role expectations and (2) characteristics of private security officers.

8.3.1 Functional role expectations

Table 8.5 convincingly shows that private security respondents (N=374) are predominantly proactively focused. This is especially evident in their perceived functions relating to crime prevention (361 or 96,52%) through patrolling (347 or 92,78%), protection of life and property (e.g. guarding services) – 347 (92,78%), safe transportation of money between businesses and commercial banks (316 or 84,49%), surveillance duties at strategic places (325 or 86,90%), service delivery to the community (342 or 91,44%), access control (321 or 85,83%) and educating society with regard to crime and crime problems (333 or 89,04%).

However, they are in certain instances also reactively inclined. Example: functions as rapid response (366 or 97,86%) at private dwellings and/or businesses, enforcement of the criminal code (319 or 85,29%), investigation of crimes committed against people or otherwise (283 or 75,67%) and apprehension of law violators (343 or 91,71%).

A somewhat negative attitude against two types of functions contained in this table is being observed, namely –

- ◆ Protection of police stations (221 or 59,09%); and
- ◆ Settlement of domestic quarrels (134 or 35,83%).

The latter functions may just be indicative of role ambiguity, i.e. whether it should be executed by themselves or their public police counterparts. The doubt emanating from this confusion is supported by the relatively high undecided responses namely 36 (9,62%) and 53 (14,17%) respectively.

8.3.1.1 Short term security functions

- Patrolling of streets and neighbourhoods are regarded as important to very important by private security respondents (347 or 92,78%);
- Rapid response to electronic alarms at private dwellings or businesses was regarded as very important by the respondents (366 or 97,86%); and
- Transporting of money in armored vehicles also received a favourable assessment from the respondents (316 or 84,49%).

8.3.1.2 Long term security functions

Private security respondents regarded the following security functions as important –

- Protection of life and property (347 or 92,78%) in parking areas and ATM's and the like;
- Service delivery to the community (342 or 91,44%); and
- Educating society with regard to crime and crime problems (333 or 89,04%).

8.3.1.3 Remote functions

The following remote security functions were regarded as important –

- Protection of police stations (221 or 59,09%); and
- Settling of domestic quarrels (134 or 35,83%).

8.3.1.4 Restoration of social order

- Crime investigation (283 or 75,67%);
- Apprehension of perpetrators (343 or 91,71%); and
- Enforcement of the laws of the country (319 or 85,29%).

8.3.1.5 Maintenance of the status quo

- Observation duties in marked security vehicles at key points (325 or 86,89%);
- Service delivery to the community (342 or 91,44%); and
- Regulating access control to buildings and towns (321 or 85,83%).

8.3.2 Characteristics of private security officers

Table 8.6 reflects on a few selected characteristics of private security officers when in daily contact with their clientele or other people. Although these perceptions and opinions may result from personal observations of their own colleagues, they nevertheless show how these officers feel about their colleagues and perhaps themselves when executing their duties. In most cases could a bad self-image be regarded as detrimental to sound and effective goal realisation. The respondents are of the opinion that they, as private security officers, are –

- friendly (348 or 93,05 %);
- helpful (357 or 95,45 %);
- courteous (342 or 91,44 %) and
- competent (267 or 71,39 %).

The sample group also believe that they are **not** –

- rude (295 or 78,88 %);
- cheeky (275 or 73,53 %) and
- uninterested (201 or 53,74 %) when dealing with their clientele and the public in general.

Although respondents believe that they are equipped with the necessary knowledge and insight (216 or 57,75 %) to fulfill their functions as private security officers, an alarming 92 (24,59 %) of these respondents are uncertain about this personal quality so dearly needed to be effective and acceptable in they eyes of the public.

TABLE 8.5 IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS (N=374)

TYPE OF FUNCTION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		\bar{X}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Patrolling	255	68.18	92	24.60	16	4.28	8	2.14	3	0.80	1.428	0.75
Rapid response	318	85.03	48	12.83	3	0.80	-	-	5	1.34	1.198	0.58
Crime prevention	256	68.46	105	28.07	7	1.87	2	0.53	4	1.07	1.378	0.66
Protection of life and property	262	70.05	85	22.73	13	3.48	11	2.94	3	0.80	1.417	0.77
Crime investigation	151	40.37	132	35.31	44	11.76	37	9.89	10	2.67	1.992	1.08
Cash-in-transit	241	64.44	75	20.05	25	6.68	20	5.35	13	3.48	1.634	1.05
Observation	191	51.07	134	35.83	22	5.88	19	5.08	8	2.14	1.714	0.94
Service delivery	229	61.23	113	30.22	10	2.67	14	3.74	8	2.14	1.553	0.86
Access control	198	52.94	123	32.89	32	8.56	14	3.74	7	1.87	1.687	0.92
Protection of police stations	135	36.10	86	22.99	36	9.62	74	19.79	43	11.50	2.476	1.44
Apprehending of perpetrators	238	63.64	105	28.07	20	5.35	3	0.80	8	2.14	1.497	0.81
Law enforcement	223	59.63	96	25.67	22	5.87	20	5.35	13	3.48	1.674	1.04
Educating society	210	56.15	123	32.89	18	4.81	15	4.01	8	2.14	1.631	0.91
Settlement – domestic quarrels	62	16.58	72	19.25	53	14.17	102	27.27	85	22.73	3.203	1.41

TABLE 8.6 CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS WHEN DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC (N=374)

CHARACTERISTICS	VERY MUCH		MUCH		UNDECIDED		LITTLE		NOT AT ALL		\bar{X}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Friendliness	215	57.49	133	35.56	10	2.67	12	3.21	4	1.07	1.548	0.79
Helpfulness	242	64.71	115	30.75	10	2.67	1	0.27	6	1.60	1.433	0.71
Courteousness	209	55.88	133	35.56	17	4.55	7	1.87	8	2.14	1.588	0.84
Rudeness	8	2.14	8	2.14	63	16.84	172	45.99	123	32.89	4.053	0.88
Lack of knowledge & insight	36	9.63	30	8.02	92	24.59	127	33.96	89	23.80	3.543	1.21
Competency	119	31.82	148	39.57	70	18.72	33	8.82	4	1.07	2.078	0.98
Uninterestedness	38	10.16	62	16.58	73	19.52	103	27.54	98	26.20	3.430	1.31
Cheekiness	9	2.41	28	7.49	62	16.57	145	38.77	130	34.76	3.601	1.02

8.4 MEASURES IN CRIME PREVENTION

The responses of private security respondents to crime prevention measures contained in Table 8.7 (similar to those in Table 7.9) show that in general, these respondents have a higher regard for such measures. This table indicates the following –

- omnipresence of private security officers in public places – 96,26 percent
- CCTV in shops / businesses – 89,57 percent
- visible presence of security signboards – 97,86 percent
- dissemination of information about crime – 84,76 percent
- surveillance in marked vehicles – 82,62 percent
- creating crime awareness culture – 92,78 percent
- “car-safe” projects – 83,42 percent
- escorting money in armoured vehicles – 89,84 percent
- role visibility – 87,43 percent

Private security respondents (96,26%) regard their presence in public places as a very important measure to eliminate opportunities to commit crime. Elimination of the precipitating factors in crime commission sets the stage for a more safe and secure environment.

Security signboards (97,86%) indicating that premises are electronically monitored by a private security company not only create the illusion of omnipresence but also renders an opportunity in the minds of prospective criminals that rapid response to such premises is the order of the day (see also Table 7.8).

Creating a culture of crime awareness among citizens is also regarded as very important by private security officers (92,78%) – which points to the need for private security officers to also become involved in this tradition of public policing.

TABLE 8.7 IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED SECURITY MEASURES IN CRIME PREVENTION : PRIVATE SECURITY

(N=374)

MEASURE	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		\bar{X}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Omnipresence of private security	309	82.62	51	13.64	8	2.14	4	1.07	2	0.53	1.233	0.59
Guards in public places												
CCTV in shops/businesses	254	67.91	81	21.66	16	4.28	14	3.74	9	2.41	1.511	0.92
Visible security signboards	253	67.65	103	27.54	5	1.33	9	2.41	4	1.07	1.417	0.74
Dissemination of information	193	51.60	124	33.16	22	5.89	29	7.75	6	1.60	1.746	0.98
About crime, etc.												
Stationary surveillance	183	48.93	126	33.69	31	8.29	22	5.88	12	3.21	1.807	1.03
Creating crime awareness	230	61.50	117	31.28	17	4.55	6	1.60	4	1.07	1.495	0.75
“Car-safe” projects	180	48.13	132	35.29	31	8.29	23	6.15	8	2.14	1.789	0.98
Escourting money in armoured	256	68.45	80	21.39	13	3.47	16	4.28	9	2.41	1.508	0.93
Vehicles												
Role visibility of private security	201	53.74	126	33.69	36	9.63	7	1.87	4	1.07	1.628	0.82
Officers generally												

8.5 SPECIFIC ASPECTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY

As mentioned in Par. 7.5, the role of private security in contemporary society has been outlined in Chapter 6. Therefore, what follows below (Table 8.8), is a statistical evaluation of an index containing eleven key aspects relating to private security as it is experienced by most members of the private security industry.

Irrespective of data contained in previous statistical tables (see for instance Table 7.23 and 7.25) on more or less similar variables, Table 8.8 clearly shows that almost ninety percent of the private security respondents are adamant that they should play a greater role in policing matters – apparently because they believe their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service (337 or 90,11%). These respondents also believe that they are an important link in crime prevention in society (348 or 93,05%) – the apparent reason for their active involvement in Community Police Forums (CPF's) – 339 (90,64%) and greater co-operation with members of the SAPS (363 or 97,06%).

In order to honour their commitments as far as crime prevention in society is concerned, the research group positively feel that more power and authority (327 or 87,43%) in terms of the legal code should be bestowed upon them – power and authority that stretch beyond that of accorded them by Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977). Likewise, there is also an outcry among these respondents for a better academic dispensation for the total private security industry in the form of tertiary education (343 or 91,71%).

Table 8.9 undeniably shows that the research group have a desire to be classified as peace officers (330 or 88,24%) – apparently to function more effectively and efficiently. In this regard, these respondents do not object to the introduction of a proper code of conduct for the private security industry (359 or 95,99%). A code of conduct will surely contribute to greater accountability to the clientele being served as well as the general public. This kind of professionalism will be enhanced by a proper complaints procedure which the clientele of private security and the general public could raise their concerns and grievances about the conduct and actions of the industry (309 or 82,62%). Such a complaints procedure would surely support the notion of accountability on the part of private security officers.

The research group are convinced that the foregoing steps are necessary because they believe that the public have lost confidence in public police as far as crime prevention concerned. For this reason, it has become necessary to accord greater recognition (perhaps by government and the public at large) for the role played by private security (341 or 91,18%).

Right here, Collins *et al.* (2000:381) indicate that by 2035 “... private security agencies will assume more than 50 percent of all law enforcement responsibilities [in the US]”. This observation might even be valid for South Africa if it is born in mind that 292 (78,07%) of this research group have adamantly indicated that they do a better job than members of the SAPS in as far as crime prevention is concerned.

The foregoing opinion of the research group do not distract from their believe that private security officers should be educated about the causes and consequences of crime (357 or 95,45%), and as such to be thought how to prevent crime by means of tertiary education (363 or 97,06%).

Although the research group oppose the recognition of “car-safe” guards as full fledged private security officers (219 or 58,56%), they nevertheless fell that proprietary (“in-house”) security officers should be regulated by means of statutory law (295 or 78,88%).

It transpired from Table 8.8 that the respondents have a desire to be accorded greater power and authority than ordinary private citizens in order to render a better service to society. This fact is further supported (317 or 84,76%) and subject to the realisation on the part of the research group that they should receive much better firearm training (369 or 98,66%).

Firearms is the cause of many serious problems – especially when causing injury or death. Private security (and public police) are no exceptions. Firearms carry potential danger. When carried by a security guard or public police officer, a firearm poses or assume a more violent attitude that could trigger violent actions. Although proprietary (in – house) security personnel and contract security enterprises discourage the carrying

of firearms and /or discouraging their clients from requesting armed security guards, it would be unwise to expect certain categories of security staff not to be armed.

Armed response security guards and transportation of cash in transit (transferring money between commercial banks and automatic transmission machines / businesses, pension money from banks to pay-out points, etc.) are two examples where the carrying of firearms becomes the norm – especially to foil cash heists. Even in such circumstances should the impositioning of “... firm restrictions on the use of firearms and equally firm requirements on those who are allowed to carry them” (Collins *et al.* 2000:461). These authors recommend the following measures in this regard:

- ◆ higher qualifications for private security employees who would like to be registered as armed security staff
- ◆ minimum age requirement
- ◆ qualification for mental competence, etc.
- ◆ Psychological testing
- ◆ Training
- ◆ Physical requirements
- ◆ Knowledge of the law – circumstances – Criminal Procedure Act (Section 49)

TABLE 8.8 EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS RELATING TO PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

VARIABLE	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		\bar{X}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Private security officers should have more power	213	56.95	114	30.48	35	9.36	11	2.94	1	0.27	1.591	0.80
Private security officers are not properly trained for their job	66	17.65	100	26.74	61	16.30	116	31.02	31	8.29	2.856	1.26
They are incompetent when Performing their duties	35	9.36	37	9.89	62	16.57	166	44.39	74	19.79	3.553	1.19
They do not care about the interest of the public	19	5.08	31	8.29	31	8.29	172	45.99	121	32.35	3.922	1.09
Private security is an elitist enterprise	57	15.24	110	29.41	62	16.58	99	26.47	46	12.30	2.912	1.29
Private security should play a greater role in public police matters	152	40.64	178	47.59	18	4.82	21	5.61	5	1.34	1.794	0.87
Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service	214	57.22	123	32.89	15	4.01	18	4.81	4	1.07	1.596	0.86

They play an important role in Maintaining social order	194	51.87	154	41.18	16	4.27	9	2.41	1	0.27	1.580	0.71
Private security officers should Actively participate in CPF's	198	52.94	141	37.70	25	6.69	10	2.67	-	-	1.591	0.73
Academic training for private security officers should be prioritised	219	58.56	124	33.16	19	5.07	8	2.14	4	1.07	1.540	0.78
Greater co-operation between private security and public police is necessary	274	73.26	89	23.80	4	1.07	3	0.80	4	1.07	1.326	0.65

TABLE 8.9 EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC STATEMENTS RELATING TO PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

VARIABLE	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		\bar{X}	sd
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
The public have lost confidence in the SA Police Service as far as crime prevention is concerned	216	57.75	125	33.42	19	5.09	11	2.94	3	0.80	1.556	0.79
Private security officers should be classified as "peace officers"	210	56.15	120	32.09	35	9.36	6	1.60	3	0.80	1.588	0.79
Private security officers should have a proper code of conduct	233	62.30	126	33.69	8	2.14	6	1.60	1	0.27	1.439	0.65
"Car-safe" guards should not be treated as private security officers	104	27.81	115	30.75	86	22.99	40	10.70	29	7.75	2.399	1.22
Legal powers of private security officers should be more than that of ordinary citizens	200	53.48	117	31.28	42	11.23	14	3.74	1	0.27	1.660	0.84
In-house security officers should also be regulated	127	33.96	168	44.92	62	16.57	9	2.41	8	2.14	1.939	0.89

Public complaints procedure should be introduced for the private security industry	133	35.56	176	47.06	49	13.11	10	2.67	6	1.60	1.877	0.85
They should receive proper fire-arm training	288	77.01	81	21.66	1	0.27	2	0.53	2	0.53	1.259	0.54
They should be educated in regard to the aetiology of crime	218	58.29	139	37.16	12	3.21	1	0.27	4	1.07	1.487	0.68
They should also be theoretical taught how to prevent crime	237	63.37	126	33.70	6	1.60	3	0.80	2	0.53	1.414	0.62
They do a much better job as the SAPS	177	47.33	115	30.75	48	12.83	28	7.49	6	1.60	1.853	1.01

Table 8.10 is a cross-correlation of the area by gender. Males were the dominant group (285 or 76,20%) in the sample group with females (89 or 23,80%) in the clear minority.

Table 8.11 reveals that married respondents (222 or 59,36%) and never married respondents (117 or 31,28%) were the two dominant groups in this table.

In Table 8.12 cross-correlation information of area by previous experience: Police and Military only, is revealed. Of all the private security respondents referred to in this study, the majority (56 or 14,97%) had previous military experience followed by (53 or 14,17%) previous public police experience.

Durban Metropole reflects the highest (19 or 33,93%) previous military experienced private security officers followed by the Midlands (18 or 32,14%). Strange to note, the Midlands reflects the highest (21 or 39,62%) private security officers with police experience followed by Durban Metropole (17 or 32,08%).

Tables 8.13 to 8.15 reveals cross-correlation information regarding the area where the private security respondents are employed in by –

- ◆ necessity of private security in society – all areas were in overwhelming favour thereof (Table 8.13);
- ◆ importance of private security officers in society – all areas were in favour (Table 8.14); and
- ◆ the threat of private security to the democratic rights and privacy of civilian people in the country – all areas opined that private security is of now threat to society (Table 8.15).

TABLE 8.10 CROSS – CORRELATION OF AREA BY GENDER (N=374)

AREAS	FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION					
	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	72	19.25	28	7.49	100	26.74
South Coast	64	17.11	23	6.15	87	23.26
North Coast	72	19.25	21	5.61	93	24.87
Midlands	77	20.59	17	4.55	94	25.13
TOTAL	285	76.20	89	23.80	374	100.0

TABLE 8.11 CROSS – CORRELATION OF AREA BY MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS (N=374)

AREAS	MARRIED		WIDOWED		DIVORCED		SEPARATED		NEVER MARRIED		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	67	17.91	2	0.53	10	2.67	-	-	21	5.61	100	26.73
South Coast	52	13.90	-	-	1	0.27	3	0.80	31	8.29	87	23.26
North Coast	38	10.16	2	0.53	6	1.60	2	0.53	45	12.03	93	24.87
Midlands	65	17.38	2	0.53	5	1.34	2	0.53	20	5.35	94	25.13
TOTAL	222	59.36	6	1.60	22	5.88	7	1.87	117	31.28	374	100.0

TABLE 8.12 CROSS – CORRELATION OF AREA BY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE : POLICE AND MILITARY ONLY(N=374)

AREAS	FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION					
	POLICE		MILITARY		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	17	32.08	19	33.93	36	33.03
South Coast	8	15.09	7	12.50	15	13.76
North Coast	7	13.21	12	21.43	19	17.43
Midlands	21	39.62	18	32.14	39	35.78
TOTAL	53	100.0	56	100.0	109	100.0

TABLE 8.13 CROSS – CORRELATION OF AREA BY NECESSITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

AREAS	ABSOLUTE NECESSARY		NECESSRY		UNDECIDED		UNNECESSARY		ABSOLUTE UNNECESSARY		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	95	25.40	5	1.34	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	26.73
South Coast	61	16.31	24	6.42	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	87	23.26
North Coast	76	20.32	15	4.01	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	93	24.87
Midlands	81	21.66	12	3.21	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	94	25.13
TOTAL	313	83.69	56	14.97	-	-	1	0.27	4	1.07	374	100.0

TABLE 8.14 CROSS – CORRELATION OF AREA BY IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN SOCIETY (N=374)

AREAS	MUCH MORE IMPORTANT		SOMEWHAT MORE IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		SOMEWHAT LESS IMPORTANT		MUCH LESS IMPORTANT		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	52	13.90	45	1.34	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	100	26.73
South Coast	21	5.61	47	6.42	15	4.01	2	0.53	2	0.53	87	23.26
North Coast	51	13.64	37	4.01	3	0.80	2	0.53	-	-	93	24.87
Midlands	53	14.17	37	3.21	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	94	25.13
TOTAL	177	47.33	166	44.39	24	6.42	4	1.07	3	0.80	374	100.0

TABLE 8.15 CROSS – CORRELATION OF AREA BY THE THREAT OF PRIVATE SECURITY TO THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND PRIVACY OF CIVILIAN PEOPLE IN THE COUNTRY (N=374)

AREAS	DEFINITELY		TO A LARGE EXTEND		UNDECIDED		TO A LESSER EXTEND		NOT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Durban Metropole	4	1.07	3	0.80	2	0.53	15	4.01	76	20.32	100	26.73
South Coast	10	2.67	9	2.41	1	0.27	4	1.07	63	16.84	87	23.26
North Coast	3	0.80	9	2.41	10	2.67	8	2.14	63	16.84	93	24.87
Midlands	10	2.67	3	0.80	5	1.34	14	3.74	62	16.58	94	25.13
TOTAL	27	7.22	24	6.42	18	4.81	41	10.96	264	70.59	374	100.0

Tables 8.16 to 8.28 reveals cross-correlation information regarding the position the respondents presently have in the private security industry by –

- ◆ patrolling streets in neighbourhoods – private security respondents were in favour (Table 8.16);
- ◆ rapid response to electronic alarms at private dwellings / businesses – private security respondents were overwhelmingly in favour (Table 8.17);
- ◆ overall crime prevention in society – private security respondents were overwhelmingly in favour (Table 8.18);
- ◆ protection of life and property in parking areas and ATM's – private security respondents were in favour (Table 8.19);
- ◆ visible presence of private security guards in public places – private security respondents were overwhelmingly in favour (Table 8.20). Of great concern is the fact that 2 (0,53%) Owner / Manager of a security company consider this private security measure in crime prevention as a less important action;
- ◆ stationary surveillance by private security officers – private security respondents were in favour (Table 8.21). Also of concern is the fact that 2 (0,53%) Owner / Manager of a security company opine that this security measure is less important and not important at all respectively;
- ◆ “car-safe” projects in public parking areas – private security respondents were in favour (Table 8.22). It seems that 2 (0,53%) Owner / Manager of a security company also see this crime prevention exercise as a waste of time by indicating that it is not important at all;
- ◆ private security officers are not properly trained for their job – it appears that the majority of private security officers in certain positions are divided in their opinion regarding this issue, when 166 (44,39%) agreed to the statement and 147 (39,30%) disagreed (Table 8.23). Only Director / CEO of a security company (2 or 0,53%) and Financial advisor (2 or 0,53%) are adamant when they clearly indicated that private security officers are not properly trained for their job;
- ◆ private security officers are incompetent when executing their task – only private security training officer (4 or 1,07%) and Financial advisor of a security company (1 or 0,27%) disagreed on this statement (Table 8.24). The cause for training officers to disagree with this statement might be due to the fact that they do not want a bad reflection on their training capabilities;

- ◆ their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service – private security respondents were overwhelmingly in favour (Table 8.25);
- ◆ private security officers should be educated about the causes and consequences of crime in society – private security respondents were overwhelmingly in favour (Table 8.26);
- ◆ private security officers should be educated how to prevent crime – private security respondents (363 or 97,06%) agreed that private security officers should be educated how to prevent crime (Table 8.27); and
- ◆ private security officers are doing a much better job than the SA Police Service regarding crime prevention – private security respondents in all positions were in favour (292 or 78,07%) of this statement (Table 8.28).

TABLE 8.16 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PATROLLING STREETS IN NEIGHBOURHOODS (N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	11	2.94	6	1.60	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	12	3.21	5	1.34	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	24	6.42	12	3.21	7	1.87	1	0.27	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	49	13.10	8	2.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	15.24
Grade A	13	3.48	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	11	2.94	4	1.07	-	-	2	0.53	2	0.53	19	5.08
Grade C	25	6.68	13	3.48	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	10	2.67	7	1.87	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	11	2.94	9	2.41	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	22	5.88	7	1.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	4	1.07	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	58	15.50	17	4.55	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	255	68.18	92	24.60	16	4.28	8	2.14	3	0.80	374	100.0

**TABLE 8.17 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY RAPID RESPONSE TO ELECTRONIC ALARMS AT
PRIVATE DWELLINGS / BUSINESSES (N=374)**

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	16	4.28	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	14	3.74	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	40	10.70	3	0.80	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	53	14.17	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	15.24
Grade A	8	2.14	2	0.53	1	0.27	-	-	2	0.53	13	3.48
Grade B	16	4.28	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	19	5.08
Grade C	35	9.36	5	1.34	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	18	4.81	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	12	3.21	8	2.14	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	26	6.95	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	7	1.87	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	69	18.45	8	2.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	318	85.03	48	12.83	3	0.80	-	-	5	1.34	374	100.0

TABLE 8.18 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY OVERALL CRIME PREVENTION IN SOCIETY (N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	10	2.67	9	2.41	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	14	3.74	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	27	7.22	13	3.41	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	43	11.50	12	3.21	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	57	15.24
Grade A	9	2.41	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	19	5.08
Grade C	25	6.68	14	3.74	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	40	10.70
Grade D	11	2.94	9	2.41	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	6	1.60	14	3.74	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	21	5.61	8	2.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	4	1.07	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	68	18.18	8	2.14	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	256	68.45	105	28.07	7	1.87	2	0.53	4	1.07	374	100.0

TABLE 8.19 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY IN PARKING AREAS AND ATM'S (N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	7	1.87	7	1.87	3	0.80	2	0.53	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	32	8.56	8	2.14	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	38	10.16	15	4.01	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	57	15.24
Grade A	11	2.94	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	19	5.08
Grade C	27	7.22	11	2.94	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	15	4.01	5	1.34	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	11	2.94	9	2.41	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	25	6.68	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	7	1.87	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	58	15.50	14	3.74	3	0.80	2	0.53	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	262	70.05	85	22.73	13	3.48	11	2.94	3	0.80	374	100.0

**TABLE 8.20 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY VISIBLE PRESENCE OF PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS
IN PUBLIC PLACES (N=374)**

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	11	2.94	5	1.34	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	37	9.89	6	1.60	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	50	13.37	6	1.60	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	11	2.94	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	19	5.08	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	33	8.82	7	1.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	21	5.61	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	13	3.48	6	1.60	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	25	6.68	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	8	2.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	1	0.27	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	64	17.11	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	309	82.62	51	13.64	8	2.14	4	1.07	2	0.53	374	100.0

TABLE 8.21 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY STATIONARY SURVEILLANCE BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS IN MARKED VEHICLES (N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	4	1.07	11	2.94	2	0.53	1	0.27	1	0.27	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	13	3.48	1	0.27	2	0.53	1	0.27	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	18	4.81	20	5.35	3	0.80	3	0.80	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	38	10.16	14	3.74	4	1.07	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	9	2.41	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	2	0.53	13	3.48
Grade B	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	19	5.08
Grade C	18	4.81	17	4.55	1	0.27	2	0.53	2	0.53	40	10.70
Grade D	6	1.60	2	0.53	4	1.07	5	1.34	4	1.07	21	5.61
Grade E	5	1.34	11	2.94	4	1.07	1	0.27	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	22	5.88	5	1.34	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	5	1.34	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	31	8.29	32	8.56	9	2.41	5	1.34	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	183	48.93	126	33.69	31	8.29	22	5.88	12	3.21	374	100.0

TABLE 8.22 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY “CAR-SAFE” PROJECTS IN PUBLIC PARKING AREAS
(N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	8	2.14	6	1.60	3	0.80	-	-	2	0.53	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	9	2.41	5	1.34	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	24	6.42	17	4.55	1	0.27	2	0.53	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	35	9.36	19	5.08	1	0.27	1	0.27	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	13	3.48
Grade B	8	2.14	7	1.87	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	14	3.75	18	4.81	4	1.07	4	1.07	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	8	2.14	6	1.60	2	0.53	4	1.07	1	0.27	21	5.61
Grade E	9	2.41	9	2.41	2	0.53	1	0.27	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	21	5.61	6	1.60	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	29	7.75
Security supervisor	3	0.80	2	0.53	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	1	0.27	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	29	7.75	31	8.29	13	3.47	4	1.07	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	180	48.13	132	35.29	31	8.29	23	6.15	8	2.14	374	100.0

**TABLE 8.23 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS ARE NOT PROPERLY
TRAINED FOR THEIR JOB (N=374)**

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	2	0.53	12	3.21	2	0.53	3	0.80	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	1	0.27	3	0.80	2	0.53	10	2.67	1	0.27	17	4.55
Technical worker	15	4.01	12	3.21	9	2.41	8	2.14	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	5	1.34	18	4.81	18	4.81	12	3.21	4	1.07	57	15.24
Grade A	3	0.80	3	0.80	3	0.80	2	0.53	2	0.53	13	3.48
Grade B	4	1.07	4	1.07	1	0.27	6	1.60	4	1.07	19	5.08
Grade C	8	2.14	11	2.94	7	1.87	10	2.67	4	1.07	40	10.70
Grade D	-	-	9	2.41	2	0.53	7	1.87	3	0.80	21	5.61
Grade E	3	0.80	3	0.80	3	0.80	11	2.94	2	0.53	22	5.88

General manager	8	2.14	7	1.87	4	1.07	8	2.14	2	0.53	29	7.75
Security supervisor	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	4	1.07
Other	14	3.74	13	3.48	10	2.67	31	8.29	9	2.41	77	20.59
TOTAL	66	17.65	100	26.74	61	16.31	116	31.02	31	8.29	374	100.0

**TABLE 8.24 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS ARE INCOMPETENT
WHEN EXECUTING THEIR TASK (N=374)**

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	2	0.53	2	0.53	2	0.53	10	2.67	3	0.80	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	1	0.27	3	0.80	2	0.53	9	2.41	2	0.53	17	4.55
Technical worker	4	1.07	5	1.34	9	2.41	24	6.42	2	0.53	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	2	0.53	5	1.34	11	2.94	34	9.09	5	1.34	57	15.24
Grade A	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	8	2.14	2	0.53	13	3.48
Grade B	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	10	2.67	6	1.60	19	5.08
Grade C	4	1.07	2	0.53	7	1.87	13	3.48	14	3.74	40	10.70
Grade D	-	-	5	1.34	7	1.87	5	1.34	4	1.07	21	5.61
Grade E	3	0.80	3	0.80	7	1.87	7	1.87	2	0.53	22	5.88

General manager	2	0.53	8	2.14	2	0.53	10	2.67	7	1.87	29	7.75
Security supervisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	4	1.07	2	0.53	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	4	1.07
Other	12	3.21	2	0.53	11	2.94	27	7.22	25	6.68	77	20.59
TOTAL	35	9.36	37	9.89	62	16.58	166	44.39	74	19.73	374	100.0

**TABLE 8.25 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY THEIR JOB IS AS IMPORTANT AS THAT OF THE SA
POLICE SERVICE (N=374)**

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	9	2.41	7	1.87	1	0.27	2	0.53	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	16	4.28	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	15	4.01	22	5.88	4	1.07	2	0.53	1	0.27	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	31	8.29	18	4.81	3	0.80	5	1.34	-	-	57	15.24
Grade A	7	1.87	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	13	3.48
Grade B	15	4.01	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	28	7.49	10	2.67	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	11	2.94	8	2.14	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	6	1.60	8	2.14	2	0.53	5	1.34	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	19	5.08	9	2.41	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	7	1.87	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	47	12.57	28	7.49	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	214	57.22	123	32.89	15	4.01	18	4.81	4	1.07	374	100.0

TABLE 8.26 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS SHOULD BE EDUCATED ABOUT THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME IN SOCIETY (N=374)

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	14	3.74	4	1.07	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	18	4.81	20	5.35	4	1.07	1	0.27	1	0.27	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	43	11.50	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	-	-	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	15	4.01	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	22	5.88	17	4.55	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	40	10.70
Grade D	12	3.21	9	2.41	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	8	2.14	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	18	4.81	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	7	1.87	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	36	9.63	40	10.70	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	218	58.29	139	37.17	12	3.21	1	0.27	4	1.07	374	100.0

**TABLE 8.27 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS SHOULD BE
EDUCATED HOW TO PREVENT CRIME (N=374)**

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	12	3.21	7	1.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	14	3.74	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	23	6.15	20	5.35	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	45	12.03	9	2.41	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	17	4.55	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	24	6.42	16	4.28	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	15	4.01	6	1.60	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	8	2.14	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	18	4.81	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	4	1.07	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	43	11.50	32	8.56	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	237	63.37	126	33.69	6	1.60	3	0.80	2	0.53	374	100.0

TABLE 8.28 CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS ARE DOING A MUCH BETTER JOB THAN THE SA POLICE SERVICE REGARDING CRIME PREVENTION (N=374)

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	8	2.14	5	1.34	5	1.34	1	0.27	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	13	3.48	1	0.27	2	0.53	1	0.27	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	18	4.81	16	4.28	7	1.87	3	0.80	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	21	5.61	20	5.35	13	3.48	2	0.53	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	9	2.41	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	13	3.48
Grade B	15	4.01	2	0.53	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	23	6.15	7	1.87	3	0.80	6	1.60	1	0.27	40	10.70
Grade D	10	2.67	3	0.80	-	-	7	1.87	1	0.27	21	5.61
Grade E	7	1.87	13	3.48	-	-	1	0.27	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	15	4.01	7	1.87	5	1.34	1	0.27	1	0.27	29	7.75
Security supervisor	2	0.53	3	0.80	2	0.53	1	0.27	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	2	0.53	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	32	8.56	35	9.36	9	2.41	1	0.27	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	177	47.33	115	30.75	48	12.83	28	7.49	6	1.60	374	100.0

8.6 SUMMARY

The supportive role of statistical information of private security officers' perceptions of themselves and perhaps their colleagues in the broader private security industry once again emphasized the importance of their existence in society.

Of special importance are their perceptions relating to proactive activities to protect life and property through rapid response to crime commission. They also believe that they are helpful and courteousness when in contact with their clientele and the general public. Likewise, there is a belief on their part that they are not rude, cheeky, etc. in the service delivery process.

They are also positive when certain security measures taken by their clients or the general public to assist in crime prevention. It appears that they are also "greedy" for more power and authority to perform their role -- perhaps so because they regard their job as equally important as that of public policing. In their desire to play a more significant role in society they are strongly supported by public respondents in this regard (see Chapter 7).

Chapter 9 will provide a more detailed analyses of the most salient findings emanating from this research project.

CHAPTER 9

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The primary aim of the present study revolves around the role of private security in crime prevention.

An outstanding feature of this research project is the attempt to picture the evolution of private security from ancient to modern times. Contemporary private security in America and South Africa has been highlighted to show the magnitude of this blooming enterprise. Although historical events surrounding American private security have been well documented, it appears that South Africa lagged behind in this regard. For this very same reason, a proper presentation of the historical development of private security in South Africa could not be recorded. However, more recent trends in private security have been highlighted.

Chapter 3 that deals with evolution of private security is preceded by a general orientation to the study, emphasising the development of public policing over centuries. Both public policing and private security are almost regarded twin companions in the prevention of crime. Further, the research methodology which is presented in Chapter 2 reflects a typical quantitative approach.

Crime prevention and theories of crime prevention are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. These theories of crime prevention have been deemed necessary for discussion, simply because it is assumed that those responsible for the formal control of crime – whether it be public police or private security – should have a sound knowledge of the various concepts of crime as well as contemporary theories of crime prevention if *their respective roles* are to be fulfilled effectively and successfully.

Another highlight (Chapter 6) of the present research is the discussion of contemporary issues in private security – especially paragraph 6.4 dealing with the

differences between private security and public policing. The statistical analysis of data are presented in Chapter 7 and 8.

9.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY

Although no serious limitations and problems were encountered during the course of this study, the researcher would like to record the following:

- ❖ As already pointed out, the historical development of private security in South Africa is actually non-existent. Of special importance is security established and practised at South Africa's gold, diamond and coal mines. It is felt that a peace of colourful history is lost.
- ❖ This study embraces non-probability sampling which does not allow for generalisations from the specific (sample) to the general (population).

9.3 TESTING OF HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses have been formulated and are now presented for statistical testing:

9.3.1 Public survey

- ❖ Hypothesis 1: "Public respondents favourably evaluate the importance of functions performed by private security officers".

Table 7.7 renders an account of the various functions usually performed by private security officers. Statistical information in this table show that public respondents have indeed positively evaluated these functions. This hypothesis is accepted.

- Hypothesis 2: "Security measures designed to improve crime prevention in society are positively evaluated by –

- ❖ Male and female public respondents

❖ Areas in which respondents reside”.

The existence of selected security measures are positively evaluated by both male and female public respondents (Tables 7.9 to 7.10).

The areas in which public respondents reside also exerted a positive influence on the evaluation of the selected security measures listed in variables 39 to 47 (see Tables 7.15 to 7.22). This hypothesis is also accepted.

Hypothesis 3: “Public respondents positively evaluate aspects (determinants) of the role of private security officers”.

Public respondents were positive about all the aspects relating to the role of private security officers except for two variables causing respondents to feel that private security officers are not incompetent when performing their duties (Var. 50) and they do care about public interests (Var. 51). These perceptions are extremely significant among male and female respondents (Tables 7.11 and 7.12).

As far as type of housing is concerned, all public respondents show a positive evaluation of the following aspects of the role of private security officers –

- ❖ Private security officers do care about the interests of the public (Table 7.13)
- ❖ Private security is only for the “rich” (Table 7.14)

When the four areas (Durban Metropole, South Coast, North Coast and Midlands) are cross-correlated with aspects relating to the role of private security officers, the public respondents have a positive evaluation of these role determinants except for the fact that they believe private security officers are not incompetent and they do in fact care about the interests of the public (Tables 7.23 to 7.31). Consequently, this hypothesis is also accepted.

Hypothesis 4: “Personal crime prevention precautions are generally more appreciated by public respondents, but specifically more so by –

- ❖ Home owners

❖ Respondents living in towns”.

In general, public respondents indicated that during the past three years they have taken specific precautionary measures to protect them against criminal victimisation. In this regard they have kept the doors of their residences locked during day and night, acquired a guard dog, installed outside lights, installed burglar proofing, left lights/TV on when they were not at home and even had a neighbourer to guard their premises (Table 7.32).

A cross-correlation between type of housing and precautionary measures showed that home ownership constitute a financial asset and a social commitment to a specific area (Lab 1990:468) and as a result, generated more positive perceptions than is the case with other types of housing (Table 7.33). It also transpires that respondents living in towns are more apt to revert to precautionary measures (Table 7.34). This hypothesis is also accepted.

9.3.2 Private security survey

Hypothesis 1: “The functional performance of private security officers relating to social order maintenance are positively evaluated by private security officers and especially by –

- ❖ Female respondents and
- ❖ Those occupying certain positions in the security hierarchy”.

The functional performance of private security officers are regarded very important by private security respondents themselves except for the following two functions which are somewhat less positively evaluated:

- ❖ Protection of police stations
- ❖ Settlement of domestic quarrels (Table 8.5).

Another important aspect is the rating of private security officers’ role with regard to educating society about crime and crime-related problems. Both male and female security respondents are adamant that this function is extremely important in the

society we are living in (Annexure 17). Also, when this function is cross-correlated with occupational position of private security officers it becomes clear that the overall rating of this function of security is very positive. It is especially those security officers responsible for armed response services, Grade-C guards, administrative personnel and technical workers who emphasised the importance of this function (Annexure 18). This hypothesis is also accepted.

Hypothesis 2: “Private security respondents attach a significant greater value to offensive security measures as part of crime prevention strategy”.

The importance of selected offensive security measures in crime prevention are indeed regarded as very important by security respondents – especially omnipresence of private security, creating crime awareness among their clients and the general public, CCTV in shops/businesses, escorting money in armoured vehicles, etc. – all of which appear to have an important deterrent value (Table 8.7).

When cross-correlated with hierarchical position a few of these security measures deserve further attention, for instance –

- ❖ visible presence of private security guards in public places such as shopping malls, commercial banks, etc. create a feeling of safety and security in the absence of public police presence
- ❖ stationary surveillance by private security officers in marked vehicles at strategic points also create a sense of omnipresence
- ❖ “car-safe” operations in public parking lots seem to have contributed to greater peace of mind around vehicle drivers (Tables 8.20 to 8.22).

Further, creating a culture of crime awareness among members of the public appear to be an important security measure – apparently because people need constantly to be reminded to be cautious about their own protection. This observation is statistical supported by both gender and hierarchical position in respect of security respondents (Annexure 19 and 20). This hypothesis is therefore also accepted.

Hypothesis 3: “(a) The role and function of private security is equally important in crime prevention compared to that of public policing (e.g. SA Police Service).

(b) Private security officers rate their overall crime prevention efforts significantly more important than that of public policing”.

Aspects relating to the role of private security officers in society received an important rating by private security respondents as far as –

- ❖ importance of their role (Table 8.1)
- ❖ necessity of them being part of crime prevention (Table 8.2)
- ❖ status of private security officers in society (Table 8.4).

An overall evaluation of an eleven variable index pertaining to the role of private security in society by private security officers themselves, shows a positive inclination towards these aspects (Table 8.8). This hypothesis is also accepted.

Hypothesis 4: “Private security training adequately equip officers to fulfill their crime prevention function according the expectations of society”.

Just over half of the private security respondents agreed that their colleagues are not properly trained for their job. The mere fact that sixty-one of these respondents were undecided on this issue shows that there might be some confusion as to which direction to have opted for (Table 8.23). Although private security officers may be inadequately trained, it appears that this deficiency as such does not render them incompetent to perform their tasks (Table 8.24). This is perhaps the reason why their job has been rated as equally important compared to that of the SA Police Service (Table 8.25). However, according to gender, academic training and education of private security officers should be regarded a priority, and this perhaps also goes for technical or in-service-training (Annexure 21).

In the light of the above information, this hypothesis is rejected for the simple reason that it appears that private security training in South Africa is still not on par. See Table 6.6.

9.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The findings emanating from public data discussed in this section will be classified in terms of: importance and necessity of private security in modern society; importance of functions they are performing on a daily basis; the role of selected offensive security measures in everyday crime prevention; and finally, those factors that could be associated with the role of private security officers.

The discussion of the findings based on private security respondents' data will be categorised as follow: importance and necessity of private security in society; functions they fulfill; importance of offensive security measures in crime prevention; aspects relating to their role in society; and specific statements relating to society.

9.4.1 Importance and necessity of private security

Although no previous research was done on this aspect relating to private security in South Africa, various research project into the role of public policing (which contain more or less similar elements) have been undertaken (Van Heerden 1974; Van Heerden *et al.* 1983; Du Preez 1991) in the past.

In the present study the importance and necessity of the role of private security officers by public respondents have been rated very important and necessary and as such, their status has also been rated high. Private security respondents also indicated that they "feel good about themselves" as far as the evaluation of their role in society is concerned.

9.4.2 Functions of private security officers

It could be hypothesised that the social standing of police is diminishing in the eyes of law-abiding citizens, simply because they are realising that the police cannot deliver what they promise in their mission statements so proudly displayed at police stations throughout the country. In America, for instance, pretending to do what they (police) cannot do or deliver, amounts to *dishonest law enforcement*. This apparent "inability" on the part of the police to honour their commitments is been vouched for through the

mushrooming of private security enterprises and improved self-protection measures taken by the public to ensure their own safety and security (Bayley 1994:17).

Van Heerden (1976:164-165) pointed out that the preventive activities of both public police and private security are inclined to eliminate crime opportunities and the belief that crime can be successfully committed. Private security is a pattern of life which does form part of human existence and with the advent of private ownership, a new “attacker” came to the fore.

The preventative value of regular street and neighbourhood patrolling, rapid response to electronic alarms, protection of life and property at specific localities, surveillance in marked security vehicles at strategic points, general guarding services, etc. are all practical examples of how to give effect to the idea of omnipresence, deterrents and the elimination of crime precipitatory conditions (Van Heerden 1976:164; 170).

The statistical processing of data in the case of both populations show that private security officers have indeed an important role to play in modern society. The variables relating to these functions are regarded as very to extremely important by both sample groups. This finding is in line with the general trend in South Africa as well as abroad that the private security industry will grow from strength to strength.

9.4.3 Offensive security measures

In South Africa, at least, cash in transit vehicles are regular targets of armed robbers. In this process armoured vehicles escorting pension monies to remote areas are often paralysed as a result of shoot-outs between heavily armed robbers and security guards – the latter trying to protect what belongs to disadvantaged pensioners in remote areas of the country.

“Car-safe” operations in public areas are often regarded as an importunity to the public. However, in the absence of concrete statistics it would be postulated that theft of motor vehicles admittedly decreased since its inception. Based on personal observations and personal unstructured interviews it could be stated that these persons are an asset to crime prevention in South Africa.

Equally important are stationary surveillance by private security officers in marked security vehicles at strategic points and security signboard indicating that premises are electronically monitored by one or other private security company. The positive impact of these two security measures on crime prevention should never be underestimated. Of equal importance are the dissemination of information about crime and criminal activities in the various communities as well as the creation of a sense of crime awareness among law-abiding citizens. The extent to which the variables defining these kind of security measures are applied as crime prevention techniques will surely vouch for the crime rate present or absent in any specific neighbourhood. This finding about the important role security measures can play in the prevention of crime should not come as a surprise as many or all of them are already in place in our society.

9.4.4 Role of private security in crime prevention

Policing is an expensive undertaking and if the police continue to pretend that they are committed to honest service delivery but are unable to put their words into action, the question whether they should not be excused of their mandate and replaced by alternative measures such as private security, inevitably comes to mind (Bayley 1994:18).

Private security officers have the same legal powers as private citizens, i.e. in terms of Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Act (Act 51 of 1977). There is an outcry by private security respondents as well as their public counterparts, to have their power and authority extended in terms of statutory law. This perception comes in the wake of a feeling that private security officers should receive better and uniform basic training in which special attention should be devoted to firearm training.

It also appears that private security is only intended for the affluent segment of society, it is those who can afford it financially. This perception hinges on the notion that private security and public policing create a dual system of formal control – one system for the rich and one for the poor. This is perhaps why respondents from both population groups feel that private security should play a more significant role in public policing matters or at least enter into a partnership with them. Both sample

groups rate the job of private security officers as important as that of public police and as such do they play an important role in the upholding of law and order in our society. Community police forums create an appropriate avenue for private security officers to get closer to and involved in public policing matters.

Another finding pledges appropriate academic training and education for private security officers. It has already been indicated in this research report how some tertiary institutions involved themselves in this exercise. However, private security officers need more than just technical security training, because their job entails more than just knowing how to operate a fire extinguisher or locking a gate or a door. For this reason it would be imperative for private security officers to be educated in the theoretical-philosophical aspects of this budding profession.

Of course, incorporated in any academic approach in private security education would be the strict and unconditional adherence to a code of conduct, simply to enhance professionalism, improved service delivery and optimal involvement in crime prevention.

9.5 CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions emanate from the statistical information contained in various tables of this research report:

- Private security has come to stay in South Africa. This fact has been clearly illustrated in Chapter 6. Various cross-correlations indicate that this fraternity is not only an important but also a necessary phenomenon in contemporary society.
- Functions usually performed by private security officers – especially those requiring quick action or response are highly appreciated by public respondents. Private security respondents proudly believe that all the selected functions performed by them contribute to a positive image of the industry.
- Specific security measures play an indispensable role in crime prevention. In this regard, visible presence, security signboards, direct surveillance and “car-safe” operations are strong predictors of pro-active crime prevention measures.

➤ There are significant differences as far as the following role determinants of private security officers are concerned:

- private security officers beg for more power and authority to perform their task more efficiently
- they are not as incompetent as is generally assumed
- they care about the interest of their clients as well as the general public
- they want to play a more significant role in public policing matters etc.

9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are presented on statistical observations forthcoming from this research project. They are by no means prescriptive in nature and only represent the view points of the researcher.

9.6.1 Special police officer status for private security personnel

Collins *et al.* (2000:378) are convinced that most minor criminal incidents can be attended to and resolved by private security personnel *prior* to police intervention. By means of expanding statutory powers for private security officers, valuable public police time and energy could be saved if private security officers are allowed to “handle” certain minor law transgressions. Standardised training and possible certification would, in all probability, be required by law before private security officers could be granted wider power and authority.

9.6.2 Tax credits for security expenditure

Most people are paying personal tax amidst continued criminal victimisation and moreover, are spending large amounts of money to buy extra precautionary measures to ensure their and their family’s safety and security. Just over one-third of public respondents (34,0%) who participated in the present study have indicated they have installed electronic alarm systems, while more than two-thirds installed burglar proofing (64,0%), another sixty four percent of these respondents installed outside

lighting systems. Collins *et al.* (2000:378) indicated that in an attempt to improve crime prevention efforts by members of the public, positive steps should be directed towards enactment of personal tax credit for approved types of security expenditures such as personal precautionary measures.

These authors are convinced that in the United States for instance tax credits of not less than \$500 should be regarded as an adequate incentive – which amounts to approximately R5 500,00 per annum. Collins *et al.* (2000:378) state that “... if the tax credit is too low it could encourage the purchase of systems ill-suited for particular security applications, which could, in turn exacerbate the false alarm problem”. In the light of what have been said, it is recommended that serious consideration be given by the government to compensate any kind of personal security initiative taken by a law abiding citizen.

9.6.3 Transfer of police duties to private security

Collins *et al.* (2000:375) contend that: “The origins of modern policing have their roots in private policing [security] or security initiatives of the early 19th century, when there were few paid police yet thousand of ‘watchmen’”.

Although private security is not public policing in the true sense of the word, valuable time and energy could be saved if secondary police duties such as management and safeguarding of police pounds, access control to government buildings, e.g. Parliament, criminal courts, government departments, are transferred to private security. This would, in all probability eliminate corruption on the part of public police officers such as three senior Indian police officers who were recently suspended after allegations of corruption and mismanagement at the Durban’s Prospecton Police Pound (Hoskin 2002:1).

Transferring such kind of police duties would immediately alleviate the work burden on public police officers. It would mean more public police officers pursuing role-visibility through patrol.

9.6.4 Development of private security officers

9.6.4.1 Academic training for private security officers

Statistical information indicate a need for more directed higher education for private security officers. As such, it is recommended that a B.A. program in private security be introduced at tertiary level to cater for the academic needs of especially management who are daily entangled in issues such as Labour Law Management, Business Law, Finance, Organisational Behaviour, Personnel Management, etc. (Timm & Christian 1991:55). These authors also suggest academic training in traditional criminal justice courses such as fundamental crime studies, contemporary crime issues, reactions to crime, multi-cultural policing, community policing, crime prevention and crime investigation and last but not least, criminal justice research. In this regard it may be appropriate to state that South Africa can ill-afford police and private security managers and executives who are not adequately equipped to undertake scientific research so dearly needed to expose the factors that may negatively impact on the everyday effective and efficient running of a police department and/or a private security establishment. This vital important function cannot be pursued by academics only. A high premium should be placed on the proficiency of police and private security executives – because of their undeniable obligation towards its clientele in this regard.

9.6.4.2 Basic training

Statistical data suggest a clear need for strictly regulated and uniform basic training for private security officers. It is suspected that a current training practices prescribed by the SOIB are somewhat out dated and do not meet the challenges and requirements of modern society. It is therefore recommended that basic training for private security officers in each province be centralised and directly controlled by provincial officers of the SOIB. Uniform and standardised training will do much to equip private security officers according prevailing needs. Curriculum development of private security training colleges should be SAQA compliant.

9.6.5 Public police – private security co-operation

Statistical data in support of variable 64 suggest greater co-operation between these two entities. To this end it would become imperative for private security officers to regularly attempt Community Police Forums. Sharing information about crime, crime-related problems and any kind of information that would fit the parameters of the “broken-windows” theory, rational offender perspective theory, routine activity theory, and the like would benefit both partners.

To this end, private security declared themselves ready and available to honour their side of this unwritten contract because they feel that their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service (Table 8.25). They further indicated that they are doing a much better job as the SA Police Service as far as crime prevention is concerned (Table 8.28).

9.7 SUMMARY

This chapter outlined the most salient findings and conclusions. It is hoped that this study has made a contribution to the study field of private security.

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ANNEXURE 1

“THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN CRIME PREVENTION” (PUBLIC)

SECTION A (Demographic information)

V. 1 Please indicate the area in KwaZulu-Natal in which you presently reside

Durban Metropole	1
South Coast	2
North Coast	3
Midlands	4

V. 2 Your sex? (Gender)

Male	1
Female	2

V. 3 Your present age?

Under 20 years	1
20 – 29 years	2
30 – 39 years	3
40 – 49 years	4
50 – 59 years	5
60 – 69 years	6
70 +	7

V. 4 Your ethnic group?

Black	1
White	2
Coloured	3
Asian	4
Other	5

V. 5 To which language group below do you belong?

Zulu	1
Sotho	2
Xhosa	3
Swazi	4
Afrikaans	5
English	6
European language	7
Eastern language	8
Other (please specify:)	9

V. 6 To which income group below do you belong?

Less than R 20 000 per year	1
R 21 000 - R 30 000	2
R 31 000 - R 50 000	3
R 51 000 - R 75 000	4
R 76 000 - R 100 000	5
R 101 000 - R 125 000	6
R 126 000 - R 150 000	7
R 151 000 +	8
Not applicable	9

V. 7 Your present occupation?

Unemployed	1
Semi-skilled / skilled labourer	2
Professional worker (medical, legal, teaching, etc.)	3
Technical worker (mechanic, electrician, etc.)	4
Businessman / Sales worker	5
Administrative (clerk)	6
Banking	7

Student / scholar	8
Service worker (nurse, social worker, etc.)	9
Armed forces (Military / police)	10
Agricultural worker	11
Self-employed	12
Pensioner	13
Other (please specify:)	14

V. 8 Your present type of housing?

Own house	1
Rented house	2
Own Flat / Duplex / Simplex	3
Rented Flat / Duplex / Simplex	4
Alternative housing (shack, tent, caravan, etc.)	5
Other (please specify:)	6

V. 9 Do you presently live in -

A city (e.g. Durban)	1
A town (e.g. Empangeni, Port Edward, Utrecht)	2
A rural area	3
An exclusive farming community	4
Other (please specify:)	5

V. 10 Your marital status?

Married	1
Widowed	2
Divorced	3
Separated	4
Never married (single)	5

SECTION B (Functions of Private Security Officers)

V. 11 Which one of the following has contributed most in establishing your image of Private Security?

Juridical contact (e.g. through an arrest or court procedure)	1
Social contact (e.g. informal at functions, etc.)	2
Experiences of other people that you have been told of	3
The "mass media" (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, etc.)	4
Presence of security officers at strategic places (e.g. shopping malls)	5
Other (please specify: _____)	6

V. 12 Do you think private security is necessary in our modern society?

Absolute necessary	1
Necessary	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
Unnecessary	4
Absolute unnecessary	5

V. 13 Compared to other kinds of jobs, how would you rate the job of private security officers in terms of its importance to society?

Much more important than most other jobs	1
Somewhat more important	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
Somewhat less important	4
Much less important than most other jobs	5

V. 14 Do you think the presence of a Private Security service is a threat to your democratic rights of liberty and privacy?

Definitely	1
To a large extent	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
To a lesser extent	4
Not at all	5

V. 15 Do you as a member of society, have any obligation to combat crime?

Definitely	1
To a large extent	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
To a lesser extent	4
Not at all	5

SECTION C (Importance of Private Security Officers)

How important would you rate the following functions of Private Security Officers?

Key : 1 = Extremely important
 2 = Very important
 3 = Important
 4 = Uncertain / undecided
 5 = Unimportant
 6 = Not important
 7 = Extremely unimportant

V. 16 Patrolling streets and neighbourhoods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 17 Rapid response to electronic alarms at private dwellings/business premises, etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 18 Protection of life and property at specific localities (e.g. in parking areas, ATM's, shopping malls, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 19 Daily transporting of prisoners between courts and prisons	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 20 Investigation of crime	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 21 Transporting money from commercial banks to businesses / ATM's, etc. and vice versa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 22 Surveillance in marked security vehicles at strategic points	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 23 Providing security / protection at private dwellings	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 24 Regulating public access control to buildings and towns	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 25 Protection of police stations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 26 Arresting of law violators	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 27 Enforcement of the laws of the country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

V. 28 Educating society with regard to crime and related social problems	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 29 Settlement of domestic quarrels	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
V. 30 Guarding private homes/VIP's/special events, etc.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SECTION D (Characteristics of Private Security Officers)

To what extent do private security officers display the following characteristics in their daily contact with the public?

Key : 1 = **Very much**
 2 = **Much**
 3 = **Uncertain / undecided**
 4 = **Less**
 5 = **Not at all**

V. 31 Friendliness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 32 Helpfulness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 33 Courteousness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 34 Rudeness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 35 Lack of knowledge and insight	1	2	3	4	5
V. 36 Competency	1	2	3	4	5
V. 37 Interestedness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 38 Cheekiness	1	2	3	4	5

SECTION E (Crime prevention and the role of private security)

To which extent would the following security measures, in your opinion, promote the prevention of crime?

Key : 1 = Very much
2 = Much
3 = Uncertain / undecided
4 = Less
5 = Not at all

V. 39 Visible presence of private security guards in public places (e.g. shopping malls)	1	2	3	4	5
V. 40 Closed-circuit television in shops/business places	1	2	3	4	5
V. 41 Security signboards indicating that premises are electronically monitored by a private security company	1	2	3	4	5
V. 42 Distributing information about crime and criminal activity to the community	1	2	3	4	5
V. 43 Stationary surveillance by private security officers in marked vehicles at strategic points	1	2	3	4	5
V. 44 Creating a culture of crime awareness among citizens	1	2	3	4	5
V. 45 "Car-safe" projects in public parking areas	1	2	3	4	5
V. 46 Safe escorting of money in armoured vehicles	1	2	3	4	5
V. 47 Omnipresence of private security guards (e.g. regular patrols)	1	2	3	4	5

To what extent do you agree / disagree with the following statements regarding the private security industry and private security officers?

Key : 1 = Strongly agree
2 = Agree
3 = Uncertain / undecided
4 = Disagree
5 = Strongly disagree

V. 48 Private security officers should be granted a great deal more power and authority under the law	1	2	3	4	5
V. 49 Private security officers are not properly and adequately trained for their type of job	1	2	3	4	5

V. 50 Private security officers are incompetent	1	2	3	4	5
V. 51 They do not care about the interests of the public	1	2	3	4	5
V. 52 Private security is only for the "rich"	1	2	3	4	5
V. 53 Private security should play a more significant role in public policing matters (usually only undertaken by the SAPS)	1	2	3	4	5
V. 54 Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service	1	2	3	4	5
V. 55 They play an important role in the upholding of law and order in our society	1	2	3	4	5
V. 56 Private security officers should be actively involved in Community Police Forums	1	2	3	4	5
V. 57 Academic training and education for security officers should be prioritised	1	2	3	4	5
V. 58 There should be greater co-operation between the SA Police Service and the Private Security industry as far as safety and security of people in South Africa are concerned	1	2	3	4	5
V. 59 Private security officers should be guided by a Code of Conduct	1	2	3	4	5
V. 60 All private security officers should be subject to uniform, basic style of training	1	2	3	4	5

V. 61 How would you picture private security with respect to its social standing in our society?

Very high	1
Fairly high	2
Average	3
Fairly low	4
Very low	5

SECTION F (Dimensions of crime prevention)

Listed below, are physical security precautionary measures people usually take or introduce to protect themselves, their immediate families or friends against any possible type of crime or criminal attack.

Please indicate with a cross (x) if any of these security steps or measures were instituted by you during the past three (3) years:

N.B. Mark ALL those which are (or were) applicable to you !

Yes / No

V. 62 Keep the doors of my place of residence locked <u>during the night</u> <u>only</u>	1	2
V. 63 Keep the doors of my place of residence locked during the day <u>and</u> <u>night</u>	1	2
V. 64 Acquisition of a guard dog(s) (or an extra one)	1	2
V. 65 Installation of an electronic monitoring alarm system with visible signboard	1	2
V. 66 Installation of outside and/or perimeter lights	1	2
V. 67 Fixing of deadlocks on doors of my place of residence	1	2
V. 68 Installation of burglarproofing	1	2
V. 69 Had valuables engraved, photographed and serial numbers kept in a safe place	1	2
V. 70 Installed security warning lights	1	2
V. 71 Radio/TV/Lights left on when not at home	1	2
V. 72 Erection of concrete walls to keep out unwanted intruders	1	2
V. 73 Acquisition of the services of a private security company	1	2
V. 74 Acquisition of fire-arm(s)	1	2
V. 75 Had a neighbour on the lookout	1	2
V. 76 Target-hardening (grated doors and windows bars, etc.)	1	2
V. 77 Other (please specify :)	1	2

ANNEXURE 2

“THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN CRIME PREVENTION” (PRIVATE SECURITY)

SECTION A (Demographic information)

V.1 Please indicate the area in KwaZulu-Natal in which you are presently employed

Durban Metropole	1
South Coast	2
North Coast	3
Midlands	4

V.2 To which age group below do you belong?

Under 20 years	1
20 – 25 years	2
26 – 30 years	3
31 – 35 years	4
36 – 40 years	5
41 – 45 years	6
46 – 50 years	7
51 +	8

V.3 Your ethnic group?

Black	1
White	2
Coloured	3
Asian	4
Other	5

V. 4 What is your sex? (Gender)

Male	1
Female	2

V. 5 To which language group below do you belong?

Afrikaans	1
English	2
Nguni	3
Sotho	4
Other	5

V. 6 Your marital status?

Married	1
Widowed	2
Divorced	3
Separated	4
Never married (single)	5

V. 7 To which income group below do you belong? (Only ONE please)

Less than R 20 000 per year	1
R 21 000 - R 30 000	2
R 31 000 - R 40 000	3
R 41 000 - R 50 000	4
R 51 000 - R 75 000	5
R 76 000 - R 100 000	6
R 101 000 - R 125 000	7
R 126 000 - R 150 000	8
R 151 000 +	9

V. 8 What is your present position in the private security industry? (Only ONE please)

Owner / Manager of a security company / Training facility	1
Director / CEO of a security company	2
General private security consultant	3
Technical worker at a security company	4
Financial advisor of a security company	5
Administrative (clerk)	6
Security officer – grade “A”	7
Security officer – grade “B”	8
Security officer – grade “C”	9
Security officer – grade “D”	10
Security officer – grade “E”	11
Security manager	12
Director of a tertiary campus security component	13
General security supervisor	14
Private security training officer	15
Other (please specify: _____)	16

V. 9 How long have you been in the private security business?

Less than 5 years	1
5 – 10 years	2
11 – 15 years	3
16 – 20 years	4
21 – 30 years	5
More than 30 years	6

Have you previously served in any of the following forces? (Tick more than one if necessary)

	YES / NO	
V.10 SA Police (before 1994)	1	2
V.11 SA Police Service (after 1994)	1	2
V.12 SA Police – both before and after 1994	1	2
V.13 Military (army)	1	2
V.14 Military Police	1	2
V.15 Former Railway and Harbour Police	1	2
V.16 Customs and Excise	1	2
V.17 Durban City Police	1	2
V.18 Municipal Police	1	2
V.19 Other (please specify: _____)	1	2

SECTION B (Necessity of the private security industry)

V. 20 Do you think private security is necessary in our modern society?

Absolute necessary	1
Necessary	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
Unnecessary	4
Absolute unnecessary	5

V. 21 Compared to other kinds of jobs, how would you rate the job of private security officers in terms of its importance to society?

Much more important than most other jobs	1
Somewhat more important	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
Somewhat less important	4
Much less important than most other jobs	5

V. 22 Do you think the existence of a Private Security service is a threat to the democratic rights of liberty and privacy of civilian people in the country?

Definitely	1
To a large extent	2
Uncertain / undecided	3
To a lesser extent	4
Not at all	5

SECTION C (Importance of private security officers functions)

How important would you rate the following functions of private security officers?

Key : 1 = Very important
 2 = Important
 3 = Uncertain / undecided
 4 = Less important
 5 = Not important at all

V. 23 Patrolling streets and neighbourhoods	1	2	3	4	5
V. 24 Rapid response to electronic alarms at private dwellings/businesses	1	2	3	4	5
V. 25 Overall crime prevention in society	1	2	3	4	5
V. 26 Protection of life and property in parking areas & ATM's	1	2	3	4	5
V. 27 Investigation of crime	1	2	3	4	5
V. 28 Transporting of money	1	2	3	4	5
V. 29 Observation duties in marked security vehicles at key points	1	2	3	4	5
V. 30 Service delivery to the community	1	2	3	4	5
V. 31 Regulating access control to buildings and towns	1	2	3	4	5
V. 32 Protection of police stations	1	2	3	4	5
V. 33 Apprehension of perpetrators	1	2	3	4	5
V. 34 Enforcement of the laws of the country	1	2	3	4	5
V. 35 Educating society with regard to crime & crime problems	1	2	3	4	5
V. 36 Settlement of domestic quarrels	1	2	3	4	5

SECTION D (Characteristics of Private Security Officers)

To what extent do private security officers display the following characteristics in their daily contact with the public?

Key : 1 = Very much

2 = Much

3 = Uncertain

4 = Little

5 = Not at all

V. 37 Friendliness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 38 Helpfulness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 39 Courteousness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 40 Rudeness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 41 Lack of knowledge and insight	1	2	3	4	5
V. 42 Competency	1	2	3	4	5
V. 43 Uninterestedness	1	2	3	4	5
V. 44 Cheekiness	1	2	3	4	5

SECTION E (Crime prevention and the role of private security)

How do you personally rate the importance of the following private security measures in crime prevention?

Key : 1 = Very important
 2 = Important
 3 = Uncertain / undecided
 4 = Less important
 5 = Not important at all

V. 45 Visible presence of private security guards in public places (Shopping malls, Banks, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5
V. 46 Closed-circuit television in shops/business places	1	2	3	4	5
V. 47 Visible security signboards indicating that the premises are electronically monitored by a private security company	1	2	3	4	5
V. 48 Distributing information about crime and criminal activity to the community (e.g. weekly / monthly flyers)	1	2	3	4	5
V. 49 Stationary surveillance by private security officers in marked vehicles	1	2	3	4	5
V. 50 Creating a culture of crime awareness among citizens	1	2	3	4	5
V. 51 "Car-safe" projects in public parking areas	1	2	3	4	5
V. 52 Escorting money in armoured vehicles	1	2	3	4	5
V. 53 Omnipresence of private security guards	1	2	3	4	5

To what extent do you agree / disagree with the following statements regarding private security policing?

Key : 1 = Strongly agree
 2 = Agree
 3 = Uncertain / undecided
 4 = Disagree
 5 = Strongly disagree

V. 54 Private security officers should be granted a great deal more power and authority under the law	1	2	3	4	5
V. 55 Private security officers are not properly and adequately trained for the job they are doing	1	2	3	4	5
V. 56 Private security officers are incompetent when executing their task	1	2	3	4	5
V. 57 They do not care about the interests of the public	1	2	3	4	5
V. 58 Private security is an elitist enterprise (i.e. it can only be afforded by people in the higher income groups)	1	2	3	4	5
V. 59 Private security should play a more significant role in public policing matters (usually undertaken by the SAPS)	1	2	3	4	5
V. 60 Their job is as important as that of the SA Police Service	1	2	3	4	5
V. 61 They play an important role in the upholding of law and order (order maintenance) in our society	1	2	3	4	5
V. 62 Private security officers should be actively involved in Community Police Forums	1	2	3	4	5
V. 63 Academic training and education should be prioritised for security officers	1	2	3	4	5
V. 64 There should be greater co-operation between the SA Police Service and the Private Security Industry as far as safety and security in South Africa is concerned	1	2	3	4	5

V. 65 How would you picture private security with respect to its social standing in our society?

Very high	1
Fairly high	2
Average	3
Fairly low	4
Very low	5

To what extent do you agree / disagree with the following statements :

Key : 1 = Strongly agree
 2 = Agree
 3 = Uncertain / undecided
 4 = Disagree
 5 = Strongly disagree

V. 66 The public have lost confidence in the SA Police Service (SAPS) as far as crime prevention is concerned	1	2	3	4	5
V. 67 Private security officers should, like members of the SA Police Service, be classified as "peace officers" in terms of the law	1	2	3	4	5
V. 68 Private security officers should be guided by a proper Code of Conduct in the daily execution of their task	1	2	3	4	5
V. 69 "Car-safe" guards operating in parking areas should not be treated as private security officers in terms of the law	1	2	3	4	5
V.70 Legal powers of private security officers should be extended beyond Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, i.e. they should have more powers than ordinary private citizens	1	2	3	4	5

V. 71 Proprietary or “in – house” security, like “contract security”, should also be subject to regulation in terms of statutory law	1	2	3	4	5
V. 72 A public <u>complaints procedure</u> should be introduced to enhance the accountability on the part of private security officers	1	2	3	4	5
V. 73 Private security officers should be subject to proper firearms training	1	2	3	4	5
V. 74 Private security officers should be taught (educated) about the <u>causes and consequences of crime in society</u>	1	2	3	4	5
V. 75 Private security officers should be taught (educated) by means of basic crime prevention programs <u>how to prevent crime</u>	1	2	3	4	5
V. 76 Private security officers are doing a much better job than the SA Police Service as far as crime prevention is concerned	1	2	3	4	5

PUBLIC - CODING SHEET

SURVEY #: _____

Annexure 3

SECTION A :

VAR 01
VAR 02
VAR 03
VAR 04
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VAR 06
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VAR 09
VAR 10

SECTION B :

VAR 11
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VAR 14
VAR 15

SECTION C :

VAR 16
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SECTION D :

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PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICER - CODING SHEET

SURVEY # : _____

Annexure 4

SECTION A :

VAR 01
VAR 02
VAR 03
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VAR 06
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SECTION D :

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VAR 51
VAR 52
VAR 53

SECTION B :

VAR 20
VAR 21
VAR 22

SECTION C :

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VAR 26
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VAR 28
VAR 29
VAR 30

ANNEXURE 5

**RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION
FUNCTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS BASED UPON PUBLIC
RESPONSES (N=381)**

FUNCTIONS	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
Street patrolling (proactive)	0.888317	0.895163
Rapid response	0.892045	0.898883
Protect life and property	0.892389	0.899390
Transporting prisoners	0.890341	0.900128
Crime investigation	0.885836	0.896924
Transporting money	0.890812	0.897736
Surveillance	0.889503	0.898324
Security / protection at private homes	0.891382	0.899282
Access control	0.888582	0.897010
Protecting police stations	0.887914	0.898379
Apprehending perpetrators	0.884963	0.895241
Law enforcement (reactive)	0.883409	0.894193
Educating society in crime	0.885186	0.896003
Settling domestic quarrels	0.890498	0.899422
Guarding services	0.894028	0.901548

Raw variables = 0.895704
 Standardised Alpha = 0.904019

ANNEXURE 6

**RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF SECURITY MEASURES IN CRIME
PREVENTION BASED UPON PUBLIC RESPONSES (N=381)**

FUNCTIONS	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
Visible presence of private Security guards	0.847744	0.847800
Closed circuit television	0.843508	0.846728
Visible security signboards	0.848115	0.850057
Dissemination of information about crime, etc.	0.834957	0.841091
Stationary surveillance	0.831327	0.837442
Creating culture of crime awareness Among public	0.828624	0.836611
"Car-safe" projects	0.840033	0.841710
Escorting cash-in-transit	0.842777	0.845298
Omnipresence of security guards	0.836826	0.841936

Raw variables = 0.854893
Standardised Alpha = 0.858196

ANNEXURE 7

**RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY
OFFICERS BASED UPON PUBLIC RESPONSES (N=381)**

FUNCTIONS	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
More legal power and authority	0.829441	0.848811
Inadequate training	0.841130	0.859447
Incompetency	0.838267	0.857131
Do not care about public interests	0.842750	0.859975
Private security is only for the "rich"	0.847936	0.860952
More significant role in public police matters	0.828991	0.848393
Their job as important as that of the SAPS	0.829341	0.848617
Play important role in upholding law and Order	0.830188	0.849056
Involved in CPF's	0.830271	0.847980
Academic training and education	0.832441	0.850517
Greater co-operation with SAPS	0.830336	0.847046
Code of Conduct	0.835526	0.851837
Uniform basic training	0.834858	0.851450

Raw variables = 0.840237
 Standardised Alpha = 0.857579

ANNEXURE 8

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION
FUNCTIONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS BASED UPON PRIVATE
SECURITY RESPONSES (N=374)

FUNCTIONS	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
Street patrolling	0.848521	0.865626
Rapid response	0.847845	0.862983
Crime prevention	0.843362	0.858012
Protect life and property	0.837154	0.852680
Crime investigation	0.835826	0.856658
Transporting money	0.843413	0.861846
Observation duties	0.834161	0.853675
Service delivery to community	0.840296	0.858065
Regulating access control	0.839816	0.857897
Protecting police stations	0.844210	0.861501
Apprehending perpetrators	0.839421	0.856719
Law enforcement	0.840348	0.858686
Educating society in crime	0.838133	0.856464
Settling domestic disputes	0.862411	0.873171

Raw variables = 0.852156
Standardised Alpha = 0.868391

ANNEXURE 9

**RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF SECURITY MEASURES IN CRIME
PREVENTION BASED UPON PRIVATE SECURITY RESPONSES (N=374)**

TYPES OF PRIVATE SECURITY MEASURES	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
Visible presence of private Security guards	0.842604	0.845317
Closed circuit television	0.843138	0.849406
Visible security signboards	0.836758	0.841726
Dissemination of information about crime, etc.	0.829653	0.836966
Stationary surveillance	0.834675	0.841323
Creating culture of crime awareness Among public	0.833652	0.838634
"Car-safe" projects	0.831690	0.837902
Escorting cash-in-transit	0.848159	0.852602
Omnipresence of security guards	0.840447	0.846934

Raw variables = 0.853392
Standardised Alpha = 0.858438

ANNEXURE 10

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN
SOCIETY BASED UPON PRIVATE SECURITY RESPONSES (N=374)

VARIABLES	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
More legal power and authority	0.628464	0.676570
Inadequate training	0.643477	0.703887
Incompetent	0.623157	0.694536
Do not care about public interests	0.642869	0.711506
Is an elitist enterprise	0.631694	0.692290
Should be more involved in policing matters	0.611813	0.653483
Their job as important as that of the SAPS	0.605428	0.644716
Play important role in social order	0.612236	0.647259
Maintenance		
Should actively participate in CPF's	0.614033	0.653308
Should receive academic training and	0.615776	0.657358
Education		
Greater co-operation with SAPS	0.608097	0.645268

Raw variables = 0.643567
Standardised Alpha = 0.692940

ANNEXURE 11


**RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF ASPECTS RELATING TO THE
REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY BASED UPON
PRIVATE SECURITY RESPONSES (N=374)**

VARIABLES	RAW VARIABLES (ALPHA)	STANDARD VARIABLES (ALPHA)
Public lost confidence in the SAPS	0.764488	0.803133
Private security should be classified as "peace officers"	0.747344	0.785104
Should be guided by proper Code of Conduct	0.758437	0.792855
"Car-safe" guards not to be classified as private security officers	0.793488	0.815039
Legal powers to be extended	0.753152	0.794220
Proprietary security guards also to be Regulated	0.763913	0.800931
Complaints procedure necessary	0.755711	0.795241
Need proper firearm training	0.750861	0.777992
Should be taught about etiology of crime	0.752076	0.785352
Should be taught how to prevent crime	0.745672	0.775078
Doing a better job than SAPS	0.777093	0.810457

Raw variables = 0.777094
Standardised Alpha = 0.809713

ANNEXURE 12

Province of KwaZulu-Natal



1 - Durban Metropole
3 - North Coast

2 - South Coast
4 - Midlands

ANNEXURE 13

**CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY EDUCATING SOCIETY REGARD
TO CRIME AND RELATED SOCIAL PROBLEMS : PUBLIC (N=381)**

GENDER	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT		VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		EXTREMELY UNIMPORTANT		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	84	22.05	40	10.50	37	9.71	17	4.46	3	0.79	4	1.05	2	0.52	187	49.08
Female	104	27.30	43	11.29	24	6.30	9	2.36	5	1.31	4	1.05	5	1.31	194	50.92
TOTAL	188	49.34	83	21.78	61	16.01	26	6.82	8	2.10	8	2.10	7	1.84	381	100.0

ANNEXURE 14

**CROSS – CORRELATION OF OCCUPATION BY EDUCATING SOCIETY REGARD
TO CRIME AND RELATED SOCIAL PROBLEMS : PUBLIC (N=381)**

POSITION	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT		VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		UNIMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		EXTREMELY UNIMPORTANT		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Unemployed	1	0.26	2	0.52	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Semi/skilled worker	14	3.67	1	0.26	1	0.26	4	1.05	-	-	1	0.26	1	0.26	22	5.77
Professional worker	38	9.97	16	4.20	16	4.20	4	1.05	2	0.52	2	0.52	2	0.52	80	21.00
Technical worker	11	2.89	4	1.05	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	3.94
Business / sales	18	4.72	10	2.62	8	2.10	2	0.52	1	0.26	-	-	2	0.52	41	10.76
Administrative	52	13.65	13	3.41	4	1.05	3	0.79	4	1.05	1	0.26	-	-	77	20.21
Banking	6	1.57	3	0.79	4	1.05	2	0.52	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	3.94
Student/scholar	4	1.05	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1.31
Service worker	6	1.57	13	3.41	6	1.57	1	0.26	-	-	1	0.26	1	0.26	28	7.35
Armed Forces	13	3.41	9	2.36	7	1.84	7	1.84	1	0.26	2	0.52	-	-	39	10.24
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	2	0.52	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.26	3	0.79

Self – employed	12	3.15	3	0.79	6	1.57	2	0.52	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	6.04
Pensioner	13	3.41	6	1.57	1	0.26	1	0.26	-	-	1	0.26	-	-	22	5.77
Other	-	-	2	0.52	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1.31
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TOTAL	188	49.34	83	21.78	61	16.01	26	6.82	8	2.10	8	2.10	7	1.84	381	100.0
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ANNEXURE 15

CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY ACADEMIC TRAINING AND EDUCATION
FOR SECURITY OFFICERS SHOULD BE PRIORITISED : PUBLIC (N=381)

GENDER	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	114	29.92	60	15.75	5	1.31	7	1.84	1	0.26	187	49.08
Female	120	31.50	55	14.44	6	1.57	11	2.89	2	0.52	194	50.92
TOTAL	234	61.42	115	30.18	11	2.89	18	4.72	3	0.79	381	100.0

ANNEXURE 16

CROSS – CORRELATION OF OCCUPATION BY ACADEMIC TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR SECURITY OFFICERS SHOULD BE PRIORITISED : PUBLIC (N=381)

GENDER	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Unemployed	4	1.05	2	0.52	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	1.57
Semi/skilled worker	12	3.15	6	1.57	2	0.52	-	-	2	0.52	22	5.77
Professional worker	40	10.50	35	9.19	2	0.52	3	0.79	-	-	80	21.00
Technical worker	11	2.89	4	1.05	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	3.94
Business/sales	23	6.04	16	4.20	-	-	2	0.52	-	-	41	10.76
Administrative	48	12.60	18	4.72	5	1.31	6	1.57	-	-	77	20.21
Banking	12	3.15	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	3.94
Student/scholar	4	1.05	1	0.26	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1.31
Service worker	20	5.25	6	1.57	-	-	2	0.52	-	-	28	7.35

Armed Forces	24	6.30	13	3.41	-	-	1	0.26	1	0.26	39	10.24
Agricultural	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	0.79
Self – employed	17	4.46	1	0.26	2	0.52	3	0.79	-	-	23	6.04
Pensioner	14	3.67	7	1.84	-	-	1	0.26	-	-	22	5.77
Other	2	0.52	3	0.79	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1.31
TOTAL	234	61.42	115	30.18	11	2.89	18	4.72	3	0.79	381	100.0

ANNEXURE 17

CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY EDUCATING SOCIETY WITH REGARD TO CRIME
AND CRIME PROBLEMS : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

GENDER	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	154	41.18	102	27.27	8	2.14	14	3.74	7	1.87	285	76.20
Female	56	14.97	21	5.61	10	2.67	1	0.27	1	0.27	89	23.80
TOTAL	210	56.15	123	32.89	18	4.81	15	4.01	8	2.14	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 18

CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY EDUCATING SOCIETY WITH REGARD TO CRIME AND CRIME PROBLEMS : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	7	1.87	8	2.14	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	14	3.74	-	-	-	-	3	0.80	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	29	7.75	4	1.07	6	1.60	3	0.80	2	0.53	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	33	8.82	19	5.08	2	0.53	1	0.27	2	0.53	57	15.24
Grade A	8	2.14	5	1.34	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	8	2.14	9	2.41	-	-	-	-	2	0.53	19	5.08
Grade C	17	4.55	19	5.08	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	12	3.21	9	2.41	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	9	2.41	11	2.94	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	21	5.61	7	1.87	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	4	1.07	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other (Armed response)	47	12.57	21	5.61	1	0.27	7	1.87	1	0.27	77	20.59
TOTAL	210	56.15	123	32.89	18	4.81	15	4.01	8	2.14	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 19

CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY CREATING A CULTURE OF CRIME AWARENESS
AMONG CITIZENS : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

GENDER	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	174	46.52	87	23.26	17	4.55	4	1.07	3	0.80	285	76.20
Female	56	14.97	30	8.02	-	-	2	0.53	1	0.27	89	23.80
TOTAL	230	61.50	117	31.28	17	4.55	6	1.60	4	1.07	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 20

CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY CREATING A CULTURE OF CRIME AWARENESS AMONG CITIZENS : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

POSITION	VERY		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS		NOT		TOTAL	
	IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		IMPORTANT		AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	12	3.21	5	1.34	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	13	3.48	3	0.80	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	23	6.15	17	4.55	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	39	10.43	17	4.55	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	17	4.55	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	21	5.61	16	4.28	-	-	2	0.53	1	0.27	40	10.70
Grade D	9	2.41	8	2.14	2	0.53	1	0.27	1	0.27	21	5.61
Grade E	7	1.87	8	2.14	6	1.60	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	23	6.15	4	1.07	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	8	2.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other(Armed response)	44	11.76	30	8.02	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	230	61.50	117	31.28	17	4.55	6	1.60	4	1.07	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 21

CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY ACADEMIC TRAINING AND EDUCATION SHOULD BE PRIORITISED FOR PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

GENDER	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	169	45.19	95	25.40	12	3.21	6	1.60	3	0.80	285	76.20
Female	50	13.37	29	7.75	7	1.87	2	0.53	1	0.27	89	23.80
TOTAL	219	58.56	124	33.16	19	5.08	8	2.14	4	1.07	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 22

**CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY CREATING A CULTURE OF CRIME AWARENESS AMONG
CITIZENS : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)**

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	11	2.94	7	1.87	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	14	3.74	1	0.27	1	0.27	1	0.27	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	21	5.61	17	4.55	2	0.53	3	0.80	1	0.27	44	11.76
Financial advisor	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	32	8.56	20	5.35	1	0.27	2	0.53	2	0.53	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	13	3.48	6	1.60	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	20	5.35	15	4.01	5	1.34	-	-	1	0.27	40	10.70
Grade D	8	2.14	11	2.94	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	6	1.60	13	3.48	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	23	6.15	4	1.07	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	3	0.80	5	1.34	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other (Armed response)	52	13.90	20	5.35	4	1.07	1	0.27	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	219	58.56	124	33.16	19	5.08	8	2.14	4	1.07	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 23

CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY PRIVATE SECURITY SHOULD BE TAUGHT (EDUCATED) ABOUT THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME IN SOCIETY : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

GENDER	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	164	43.85	105	28.07	12	3.21	1	0.27	3	0.80	285	76.20
Female	54	14.44	34	9.09	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	89	23.80
TOTAL	218	58.29	139	37.17	12	3.21	1	0.27	4	1.07	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 24

CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS SHOULD BE EDUCATED ABOUT THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

POSITION	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	14	3.74	4	1.07	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	13	3.48	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	18	4.81	20	5.35	4	1.07	1	0.27	1	0.27	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	43	11.50	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	-	-	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	15	4.01	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	22	5.88	17	4.55	-	-	-	-	1	0.27	40	10.70
Grade D	12	3.21	9	2.41	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	8	2.14	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	18	4.81	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	7	1.87	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	-	-	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	36	9.63	40	10.70	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	218	58.29	139	37.17	12	3.21	1	0.27	4	1.07	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 25

CROSS – CORRELATION OF GENDER BY PRIVATE SECURITY SHOULD BE TAUGHT (EDUCATED) BY MEANS
OF BASIC CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS HOW TO PREVENT CRIME : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)

GENDER	VERY IMPORTANT		IMPORTANT		UNDECIDED		LESS IMPORTANT		NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Male	175	46.79	101	27.01	4	1.07	3	0.80	2	0.53	285	76.20
Female	62	16.58	25	6.68	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	89	23.80
TOTAL	237	63.37	126	33.69	6	1.60	3	0.80	2	0.53	374	100.0

ANNEXURE 26

**CROSS – CORRELATION OF PRESENT POSITION BY PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS SHOULD BE EDUCATED HOW
TO PREVENT CRIME : PRIVATE SECURITY (N=374)**

POSITION	STRONGLY AGREE		AGREE		UNDECIDED		DISAGREE		STRONGLY DISAGREE		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Owner / Manager	12	3.21	7	1.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Director / CEO	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Consultant	14	3.74	3	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	4.55
Technical worker	23	6.15	20	5.35	-	-	1	0.27	-	-	44	11.76
Financial advisor	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.53
Administrative	45	12.03	9	2.41	2	0.53	-	-	1	0.27	57	15.24
Grade A	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	2	0.53	-	-	13	3.48
Grade B	17	4.55	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	5.08
Grade C	24	6.42	16	4.28	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	10.70
Grade D	15	4.01	6	1.60	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	5.61
Grade E	8	2.14	12	3.21	1	0.27	-	-	1	0.27	22	5.88

General manager	18	4.81	10	2.67	1	0.27	-	-	-	-	29	7.75
Security supervisor	4	1.07	4	1.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	2.14
Training officer	2	0.53	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1.07
Other	43	11.50	32	8.56	2	0.53	-	-	-	-	77	20.59
TOTAL	237	63.37	126	33.69	6	1.60	3	0.80	2	0.53	374	100.0