A Theopolitical Study Concerning The Interrelation Between The Government Of National Unity And Religion In Post-Apartheid South Africa (1988-1999) With Specific Reference To The Dutch Reformed Church And The Anglican Church.

by

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation, which I hereby submit for the degree of Master of Arts in the discipline of Ethics at the University of Zululand, is my work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at another University.

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Acknowledgement

Over the last couple of years, I have become greatly honoured in knowing a few tremendous people who kept on inspiring me in their own unique ways. May I take the opportunity to express my appreciation to the following people:

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SYNOPSIS

The year 2004 marked South Africa's celebration of ten years of democracy as encapsulated by guaranteeing a better life for all. The gap between the rich and the poor as well as moral degradation challenges the euphoria of our young democracy. The South African government's commitment to non-racism, justice, democracy and non-sexism constitutes a centre of values that challenges us all to live better lives. This social-democratic society is a secular expression of a Biblical social vision. Within the juxtaposition of Theopolitics and secularism, this research explicates the challenges of liberal and secular laws as imposed on a fervently religious country.

Theopolitics, as described as the continual interrelationship between government and church, is firmly cemented in South Africa. Nevertheless, how far would the secular, socialist-inclined government go in distancing itself from religious interference? How willing are churches to move away from a marginalised social agent to become a re-energised moral watchdog?

Consequently, South Africa's transformative democracy needs to rediscover its spiritual heritage, while churches and Christianity need to invigorate Theopolitics to participate in and guarantee the realisation of a just democratic order.

This study therefore examines the level of interaction between church and state, specifically the Anglican Church and the Dutch Reformed Church. Furthermore, the degree of representation of church attendants and the electorate, as linked to transformation and their leaders in church and government respectively, are scrutinised.

In conclusion, it becomes apparent that Theopolitics will continue to play a role in the secular South Africa. Church-state relationships will be united in their shared vision of a fair, just and socio-economically viable South Africa.

Words: 265

Keywords: Theopolitics, secularism, democracy, Anglican Church, Dutch Reformed Church and government.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. Preamble

South Africa's democratic victory in April 1994 has earned its place among the "miracles" of the twentieth century (Marais, 1998:1). However, the euphoria of the rainbow nation is fading as new problems arise. Within the context of a secular society, South Africa's religio-political role-players are facing challenges, as linked to redistribution, representativeness, equal access to services, goods and a better life for all. The interrelationships between church leaders and government is dynamic and at stages complimentary or adversarial. This thesis attempts to verify and validate the current relationships that exist between South Africa's churches and government, as united in their elimination of the gross inequalities that exist.

1.2. Background, Rationale and Motivation of study

Political ideologies depict an utopian future that contradicts oppressive political systems such as Apartheid or Communism. The same can be said regarding religion with one of its main missions of saving the individual from this world. Both politics and theology influence the behaviour of society but Biblical tradition and the exigencies of political reality create dilemmas. Villa-Vicencio (1991:607) believes that the crisis of religion lies within its basis: the paradoxical synergies between powerlessness and power as the leaders and the faithful strive for a utopia. The predicament that the South African government encounters is the issue of accommodating the prescriptions and demands of religion within the scenario of secularism.

Prior to the French revolution (1789), spiritual leaders instructed citizens to act in a certain manner implicating political passivity (Baradat, 1997:2 & 5; Roskin,

1995:97 & Ranney, 1996:70). Eatwell and Wright (1993:2) supported empirical learning, thus eliminating the impact of spiritual leaders. Secularisation is a process whereby religious ways of thinking and living together, with their supportive institutions, become socially insignificant. Church leaders, however, still play an important socio-political role, for example Japan fell victim to Shoko Asahara's nerve-gas attack on a Tokyo subway system (May, 1995) and Islamic Fundamentalists, with special reference to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), that continue their attacks on Israeli soil (Chua-Eoan, 1991: 25; Spaeth, 1995:25-30 & Beyer, 1996:23). The significance of church-state relationships is also endorsed within the South African context:

- The presence of PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism And Drugs);
- Clergy active in Governmental politics;
- Political leaders clashing with religious leaders (for example, President Mandela's row (March, 1998) with the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the most Rev Ndungane); and
- The Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) being chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Mercury Correspondent, 1998:4).

The escalation of socio-political problems within states resulted in people increasingly supporting belief systems (Said et al, 1995:174 & Baradat, 1997:1). Additionally, Mannheim and Hegel (Baradat 1997:7) believed that no ideology could be fully understood without assessing its historical contexts (Troeltsch, 1971:85 & Boulaga, 1981:194). In order to contextualise any belief system and its impact on society, one always need to assess the historical context. By incorporating Mannheim and Hegel's emphasis of historical development greater insight and connectivity are obtained when determining the impact of religion on South Africans. Religion and race are therefore intrinsically linked with South Africa's rich and diverse history.

De Gruchy (Prozesky, 1990:210) believes that more than 70% of South African citizens claim to be Christian. The church however is not a monolithic institution but represents the pluralistic character of South Africa. South African Christians are mainly Protestant and they belong to a variety of churches, including many

that combine Christian and traditional African beliefs. Intolerance within a pluralistic society is dominant in South Africa, especially among the conservative strata (Baëta, 1976:6). Pragmatism, pluralism and tolerance dominate a secular society, but the opposite can be said when evaluating the Dutch Reformed Church's (DRC) relationship with the state (Pratt, 1970:3).

According to Schlemmer (Giliomee et al, 1994:11), Apartheid was a racial caste system, enforced by the National Party (NP) (1948 - 1994) that caused major instability for South Africa (Seton-Watson, 1977:120; Marais, 1997:19; Berridge, 1997:69 & Carlsnaes & Muller, 1997:35). The historical relation between politics and religion indicates that the predominantly White NP was based on the religious prescriptions of the DRC (Roskin, 1997:423 & Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:30). Kinghorn refers to ideological theology that became prominent in the mission policy for the DRC as early as 1935: " while the church rejects social equality ... the church would like to promote social differentiation and spiritual or cultural segregation" (Prozesky, 1990:60).

The theology of the DRC did not contribute to the abolishment of South Africa's state theology's "justification of the status quo with its racism, capitalism and totalitarianism" (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:257). Church theology advocated reconciliation, justice and non-violence, but applying it indiscriminately and uncritically to all situations made this theology counter-productive and superficial for the Apartheid government. The main justification for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) existence is that no reconciliation, forgiveness and negotiations are possible without repentance (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:257)[1]. Whether the DRC's apologies to the TRC (1996) showed true repentance and reflection of the grassroots remain to be seen and is clearly a sensitive and contentious issue (Thiel, 1998:8).

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[1] Apartheid was marred with violence and human rights abuses from all sides. The TRC aimed to enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation. The TRC is based on the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995 (RSA, 1995).

1.3.   Demarcation of Study

I acknowledge that within South Africa's complex multinational society, religious pluralism and atheism co-exist. This study mainly concerns itself with the practice of church-state relations in its immediate social-political contexts. This in itself will limit the scope of this study but it will simultaneously emphasise it exclusivity (Felderhof, 1985; Wogaman, 1988; Davis, 1980 & Villa-Vicencio, 1986). The lack of availability of primary resources, that focus specifically on post-Apartheid South Africa, limits accurateness and objectivity with respect to the church-state relations' social-political contexts.

I further acknowledge additional limitations that I impose on this study, referring specifically to the period of study and focus: 1988 -1999:
- South Africa's diverse and emotional-laden character;
- Racial-religious sensitivity amongst the different races in the immediate aftermath of Apartheid; and
- My own personal background that could lead to misperceptions and reverse prejudice.

I however reiterate that no assumptions will be made without clear, scientific and written proof.

1.4.   Statement of the Problem

Assessment of South Africa's post-1994 democratic transformation concludes that a high level of conflictual attitudes and ideologies between government and church structures result in grassroots misrepresentation, misinterpretation and alienation.

1.5.   Research Problems

By utilising primary and secondary source research methods, the following research questions became the premises to answer the problem statement:
- The interrelationship between political ideologies and religion results in the occasional conflictual relationship between the secularist African

National Congress and the Liberal Anglican Church and the Conservative Dutch reformed Church;

- Transformative democracy does not guarantee that grassroots' needs are addressed by government's progressive policies;

- Consequently, *the exclusiveness of democracy as implemented by the* top hierarchical structures of the church and government creates a divide and leads to the lack of representation, specifically after the 1994 elections; and

- The paradox between religion and political power strengthens democracy's checks and balances, but creates religio-political communicative weaknesses.

- This study furthermore explored the level of representativeness of government and church with respect to transformation and reconciliation at grassroots levels, and the viability of resulting structures and policies.

I acknowledge the transitional phase of South Africa as an on-going process that simultaneously promotes and hampers transparency and reconciliation. However, from a structural-functional approach, this study will determine that although the correct structures are being put in place, grassroots perceptions, attitudes and actions still adhere to pre-Apartheid ideologies, attitudes and beliefs (Almond & Powell, 1995; Carlsnaes & Muller, 1997; Waldner, 1998 & Giliomee et al, 1994). Elements concerning prejudice and discriminatory judgments are seldom eradicated completely.

Questionnaires will attempt to incorporate objectiveness and validity. It is clear that an eclectic approach, incorporating realism and empirical evidence, will be followed. Due to the sensitivity towards Apartheid associations and events, I admit that fear, suspicion, and anger can re-surface. Balanced and non-prescriptive approaches when conducting data collection are essential. The current controversy surrounding intercultural interaction and transformation needs to be considered by avoiding superiority-inclined statements and emphases (Rhoodie, 1991 & Omar, 1991). The danger of colonising traditional

aspects of cultural diversity, albeit on an ideological level, needs to be avoided (Rhoodie, 1991; Roskin, 1997 & Prozesky, 1990).

Research on the exact interrelationships between the African National Congress (ANC), the Anglican Church and the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) regarding political issues, within a religious and secular context, are inadequate. This thesis will therefore concern itself exclusively to the acquiring of data regarding the interrelationships between the ANC and these churches.

1.6.   Aims of the Study

AIMS:

- This study will attempt to show that belief systems are capable of influencing significantly the interrelationship between government, church and their grassroots followers: chapters *two, three* and *four* subsequently highlight the dynamic interrelationships between government, church and *their followers.*

- This study furthermore explored the level of representativeness of government and church with respect to transformation and reconciliation at grassroots levels, and the viability of resulting policies: as seen in chapters *five* and *six*, the level of the grassroots' identification and association with structural transformation and reconciliation are explored.

OBJECTIVES:

Certain objectives have been determined for this study. Chapters *five, six* and *seven aptly seek answers to these questions:*

- Can the South African government accommodate an interrelationship between itself and the church?
- Does one encounter religious discrimination within the political context?
- Can the church transform itself into a unifying force in this transitional period?
- Do the society's attitudinal relations (both inter- and intra-personal) with one another and with institutions, reflect negative religious-political conditions?

- Why does the predominantly religious South African society experience conflict at all when religions are supposed to promote peace?
- What level of interaction exists between the top structures of the government and the churches?
- *Does religion influence one's political views and affiliations and vice versa?*

1.7.   Methodology and Approach to the Study

Johann Mouton (1996:3) believes that we live in a multidimensional world: in other words, we all live in different "worlds". He categorises them as worlds of rules, roles and usages. This thesis will conduct research in order to determine the role and usages of belief systems within the South Africa's socio-political context:

- does religion play any role in post-Apartheid South Africa?
- are there new rules that guide the relationship between government and church?
- does religion have any usage in a secular society, given the historical abuses that occurred?

The study engages critical thinking so as to arrive at valued goals. The study will recognise and challenge invalid theories, generalisations and assertions that lack evidence.

Research was conducted by using a qualitative, descriptive and contextual design. An advantage of a qualitative approach is that it will assist us with insights into the everyday lives of communities. However, to a lesser degree, part of this research includes a quantitative approach, in a sense that statistics are essential to support arguments. A descriptive strategy aims at an in-depth look at KwaZulu-Natal, specifically after Apartheid.

The collection of primary data was done through informal semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were approached with caution, since respondents were sometimes suspicious of the researcher or questions being asked were too

sensitive. Individual and group interviews were conducted spontaneously whenever an opportunity arose.

An interpretative approach using interviews and questionnaires was also applied. However, before an in-depth interview was conducted, the interviewer introduced herself and the exercise was then undertaken. General questions were asked as an ice-breaking technique. Furthermore, permission to record the interviews was sought for ethical consideration.

I furthermore undertook an empirical study combined with extensive literature research. Questionnaires were drafted and distributed in specific religio-political strata of northern Kwa-Zulu Natal. These questionnaires focussed on socio-political realities, events and attitudes. Comparisons were drawn, which led to certain findings. Chapter 6 deals extensively with the findings.

In this thesis, a literature review was constituted by the critical use of writing in the fields of ideology, religion, the DRC, the Anglican Church, the ANC, secularism and political-cultural studies as interrelated with religion, in an attempt to add to and respond to previous research. Printed sources include articles in journals, newspapers, magazines, books, and unpublished papers and PhD dissertations.

1.8. Terminology

1.8.1. Apartheid

Mandela (1994:126) describes Apartheid as an "apartness-idea that represented the codification in one oppressive system (regarding) all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position". Apartheid was a strict system of racial segregation, receiving *de jure* status in 1948 when the NP gained governmental power (Roskin, 1997:447; Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:31; Thiel, 1998:8; Waldner, 1998:1 & Loubser, 1987:124).

This study will in addition seek to prove whether neo-Apartheid is still prominent in South Africa. By simply denouncing Apartheid creates a false impression

that socio-political tensions and racism will decline (Schlemmer, 1991:2). Hence, the prefix "neo" to show the post–Apartheid propensities for discrimination and indirect oppression, specifically along racial lines and linked with economic dispositions.

1.8.2. Liberation theology

Liberation theology refers to theologians and intellectuals who seek to redress the social wrongs within third world states (mainly South American states). In other words, theology takes action against aspects such as inequality, powerlessness and poverty (Macridis & Halliung, 1996:224-6). This emphasises the impact religion still has on political regimes, whether oppressive or democratic.

1.8.3. Marxism and Dialectic Materialism

The idea of dialectic materialism originated with Karl Marx who is also known as the father of scientific socialism. The theory of dialectic materialism implies that one's economic circumstances determine one's actions and behaviour: economic determinism is the essence of dialectic materialism (Baradat, 1997:177- 179; Wogaman, 1988:210 & Thrower, 1983:70-79).

1.8.4. Conservatism

Conservatism rejects revolutionary change and supports existing institutions. Gradual change is preferred but pragmatism should prevail. Neo-conservatism is, however, a concept that I will use to prove that despite transformation and reconciliation, the "new" conservative (i.e. neo-conservatism) society of SA still applies conservative doctrines.

The conservatives' views are still complex. South Africa's conservatives represent disillusionment with past liberal policies and/or reflect their resistance with current trends, as related to secularism. They are not necessarily Biblical extremists nor reactive (against previous views) in thought. South Africa's conservatives are still facing difficulties in abolishing old doctrines by developing new doctrines (Wogaman, 1988:73 & 84).

1.8.5.   Pluralism

Pluralism can be defined as the co-existence of different groups within the boundaries of a given state. South Africa's rich diversity can be seen to hamper unity. Archbishop Desmond Tutu's favourite quote tries to encapsulate the pluralistic and diverse nature of the South African society as well as its challenges: "United in diversity[2]."

1.8.6.   Political ideologies

One can say that an ideology is self-contained and self-justifying as a belief system that incorporates an overall worldview and provides a picture of a desired future. To comply with the system would be both rational and moral (Said et al, 1995: 174 & Davis, 1980:55).

1.8.7.   Realist approach

Survival lies with those who control governmental power. Policies and programmes of actions tend to be more idealistic by nature without taking into account the realities of a specific society. Despite noble intentions, politics and economics tend to be the *real* elements that determine action.

1.8.8.   Religion

Traditionally, religion refers to the "awe towards God or any supernatural being, accompanied by beliefs and affecting basic patterns of behaviour" (Fontana Dictionary, 1988:s.v. "religion": 738). Marx and Engels believe that religion is pure illusion, functionalist and reductionist by nature (Pals, 1996:145). As religion unified people, ideologies such as communism also could become unifying forces within a secular environment.

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[2] The celebratory Khoisan term *Ke e Xarra Ke* ("United in Diversity") became synonymous with Desmond Tutu's description of post-1994 South Africa as a Rainbow Nation (news24.com, 2004).

1.8.9. Secularism

Secularisation suggests that religion in its practice and institutions has lost its social and political significance (Pratt, 1970:3). Pragmatism, pluralism and profanity dominate a secular society, which the Christians disregard as the ideal way of life. Despite South Africa's secular characteristics, the rejection of Christianity has not occurred since the majority still claims to be Christians.

1.8.10. Socio-political theology

Socio-political theology describes the interrelationships between church and government. The symbiosis is inevitable since churches are caretakers and government the traditional provider. The intensity of these interactions was evident during the later years of Apartheid and is still prevalent in post-Apartheid South Africa.

1.8.11. *Structural-functional approach*

The structural-functional approach forms the basis of this study. This approach allows one to study both the structures and their functions simultaneously. It emphasises the direct dynamic interrelationships that exist between institutionalised structures and the effectiveness and appropriateness of its functions (Almond & Powell, 1995:24). This study will aim to determine the validity of certain structures, as related to their assumed functions.

1.8.12. Theopolitics

Traditionally political theology suggests the use of religion for political purposes, in other words, the official religion of the state becomes the basis of governance. Schmitt (in Wogaman, 1988:16) goes further and describes political theology as the "use of theological categories to legitimate political decisions and political regimes".

Of late Nel, (1999) and Song (1999) depict Theopolitics as the manipulation of the mundane by means of religion. This thesis will primarily define Theopolitics as a mutually influencing interrelationship between social, political-, economic- and religious conditions. Secondary prescriptions will describe Theopolitics

resulting in survivalism as found among the socio-economically deprived, hence the continuous identification with religion, as reflected in their polity. In other words, despite a secular scenario entrenched in political freedoms, South Africa's socio-economic discrepancies lead to Theopolitics staying a constant among its citizens that will perceive government and the church as mutually interrelated and interdependent.

1.9.   Overview of Chapters

After completion of the research, the collected material was integrated and coordinated to provide a clear and concise picture of the study. This resulted into the following chapters that led to certain conclusions and recommendations:

Chapter 1 introduces the total study, referring specifically to the problem statements, aims and objectives, methodological discourse and terminology.

Chapter 2 refers to the literature review regarding the interrelationship between religion and politics. The conceptualising of certain terms and its impact on this study are explored. The contextualisation of this study is subsequently clarified and cemented.

Chapter 3 reflects on the historical context of South Africa's religious-political role-players.

Chapter 4 assesses the radicalisation and changing nature of South Africa's religio-political stage.

Chapter 5 explores the post-Apartheid political landscape within a socio-political paradigm.

Chapter 6 assesses the reversal of ideologies and religious thinking within a Theopolitical setting.

Chapter 7 reflects on the validity and representativeness of this study.

Finally, the consulted sources of references are listed in the Bibliography.

CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW

Indisputable undisputable

2.1.   Introduction

This chapter will reflect on the critical use of writing in the fields of ideology, religion, secularism and political-cultural studies as interrelated with politics. In an attempt to add to and respond to previous research the researcher will explore on aspects of God, Politics and Theopolitics.

2.2.   Conceptualising religion and politics within an ideological discourse

2.2.1.   Characteristics of ideologies

Ideologies provide a basis for explaining the nature of society in order to justify a government. According to Loubser (1987:12), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels believed that ideologies were fabrications used by people to justify themselves, which implies that this concept is completely subjective and used by the ruling class. Karl Mannheim (in Goodwin, 1987: 21) also differentiates between the particular conceptions of ideology from the total conceptions of ideology. The particular conception of ideology refers to a set of ideas particular to a group's special interest, which promotes these interests and deceives other groups, as seen in the oppressive Apartheid regime of South Africa. The total conception of ideology represents a way of thinking common to a whole society or a specific political period, as applied in communist China and the former USSR (Goodwin, 1987: 21).

Frederick Watkins and David Ingersoll (in Baradat, 1997:7-8) believed that ideologies are always opposed to the status quo, implying that since one historical era might be exploitative another ideology will be formed in order to

break away from the present (i.e. provides a new view of a desired future). Ball (*in Davis, 1980:56*) says that *ideology should not be too precise and exact*, and suggests that it should rather be "use(d) when considering the interaction between ideas and politics". Goodwin (1987:22) also argues that belief systems *should not be exact and precise since values and emotions are an integrative part of ideologies*. The question arises whether compliance with such manipulative ruling could create immoral and irrational precedents.

Goodwin (1987:22) and Loubser (1987:121-122) also assign the following characteristics to ideology. First, ideology has explanatory power in order to make the world more understandable to its followers. Second, ideology has persuasive forces that often appear as moral imperatives. Third, ideology is frequently irrational and illogical, since it reconciles within itself incompatible elements by changing the meaning of words or distorting the facts, so as to present itself as an apparently self consistent, logical whole (for example by manipulating certain Bible verses, the Afrikaners successfully started to believe in their own distorted and misinterpreted versions of the Bible). Fourth, ideologies simplify complex realities by operating with myths. Lastly, because of moral pressure, ideologies function subconsciously, are institutionalised and absolute (Loubser, 1987:121-122).

2.2.2. The socio-political premises of ideologies

Within the general Political Science spectrum a distinction is usually drawn between an ideology (system of political and social ideas) and politics (implicating political power and government processes) itself (Baradat, 1997:7-8 & Wogaman, 1988-10). Furthering Ball's (in Baradat, 1997:7-8) previously mentioned statement - one should consider the interaction between ideas and politics - it is clear that a "conventional" distinction between these two concepts is not always as easy as it seems to be.

To address the masses, ideological concepts need to be structured, implying that it cannot take place outside the interplay of power and interest. If all ideological relationships are mediated by power - and hence are in a broad

sense "political" - then there is also a critical sense in which politics itself is ideologically defined. Thus, politics is not naturally defined (what it includes or excludes, what concepts are legitimate etc.), but ideologically constructed. This thesis will attempt to prove that ideological politics in South Africa still exist, albeit less obvious.

The most basic assumption of ideological politics is the stance that beliefs should override every other consideration, implicating the supremacy of one group over another with their leader (and his/her party) as the true representative of whatever belief (such as the National Party in Apartheid South Africa or Communist Party in USSR). Ideological politics are not only restricted to the political arena but it also penetrates all other aspects of an individual's life. As a result, there is a deep-rooted distrust of the traditional institutions, including the church, family and political institutions. Extra-constitutionality is the backbone of these suppressive regimes' actions and conceptions (again one tends to think of Communist-USSR, Nazi-Germany and Apartheid-South Africa). Alienation (often seen as distancing oneself from or mistrust in government) also causes disassociation of prevailing political institutions with those who do not adhere to state beliefs are being regarded as enemies of the state. Ideological politicians also want to make an impact on the totality of history, creating a new epoch that will solve not only today's problems but that of the century as well (Baradat, 1997:7-8).

2.2.3. Ideological linkages with religion and politics

Said (et al 1995:175) believes that individuals have frequently found relief and comfort in systematic, comprehensive systems of belief - thus, when faced with an increase in the number of national or local problems accompanied with (sometimes impossible) solutions, societies tend to escape from the real world to the refuge of an ideological utopia. Therefore, one can generalise by saying that societies still formulate and embrace belief systems that will justify and legitimise their control of power (Said et al, 1995:175).

The aim of this study is to prove that theory and practice do not always coincide, hence a structural-functional approach. Exact and idealistic theories are regarded by suppressive regimes as their only truth and guidance. Therefore, belief systems become the core of existence and manipulation for their governments and followers. It is clear that empirical realities (such as racial, religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversities) are neglected. When individuals and their rights are discarded by belief systems (whether political or religio-political), disillusionment steps in. Instead of seeing government as a guarantor of the good life, unequal socio-economic conditions strengthen the notion that government acts as a discriminatory oppressor (as experienced in Apartheid South Africa).

Conservatives furthermore argue that government should guarantee traditional values and institutions like stable marriages and parental authority over children. They also emphasise a non-egalitarian approach since equality is inconsequential and seldom finds equal distribution of wealth and power. Conservatism furthermore agrees that the individual is the carrier of values and that they should trust the truth in tradition, as accumulated and established over centuries (Baradat, 1997: 25).

The National Party (NP) therefore applied conservatism throughout the years. The conservative government and society (specifically the Whites) disregarded equality and change. Enhancing its grip on society, the NP government made the state as the carrier of values, as opposed to traditional Conservative doctrines. However, during the eighties the NP experienced factions from within, due to its move towards reform and change. This led to the breakaway of the ultra-conservative and the resultant establishment of the Conservative Party. The DRC also experienced tension, which escalated in the Apostolic Protestant Church (APK), being created as a parallel protest and sister church (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:1314).

Within post-Apartheid South Africa, the traditional conservative doctrines reject change and reform. Deteriorating socio-economic conditions (as linked with

unemployment and affirmative action) become associated with Black majority rule and as such, unacceptable. White supremacy in South Africa becomes therefore once again a desirable vision. Exclusiveness, as seen in political control and disproportionate accumulation of White wealth are the core beliefs for the neo-conservative. Thus, being deprived of economic wealth, the poor White (the neo-conservative) once again adds a racial element to socio-political and socio-economic survival (Loubser, 1987:138). Ironically, neo-conservatives and Marx's theory of dialectic materialism show great similarities in the sense that survivalism, as linked to one's economic struggles, replaces moral conscience. The desire to change your outcomes supersedes political idealism and can even call for revolutionary or violent political changes (as seen in the bomb attacks launched against Blacks by White military wings, the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB) and the Boeremag).

History, according to Hegel, was shaped by a continual class struggle (Boulaga, 1981:194 & Prozesky, 1990:152). The materialist and conflictual struggle for progress between the rich and the poor was later coined as dialectic materialism. The idea of materialist dialectic refers to life as a give and take situation when the antithesis (poor, marginalised workers) revolts against the thesis (current wealthy government) and ultimately replacing it with a new synthesis (new government). Hegel's theory of history focuses on change, as predetermined by God (Baradat, 1997:177 & Davis, 1980:165). This closely correlates with South Africa's Apartheid history that linked the 1920-1940's White poverty (with the potential threat of Black majority always at the background) with the necessary Biblical justification to overrule and oppress the potentially Black economic threat. The historical phases of South Africa can clearly be traced along socio-economic lines and still has a major impact on South Africans, despite the reconciliatory efforts on the part of the TRC.

Marx however rejects the idealistic approach of Hegel and claims that the material world is the real reason why classes struggle with one another (Pals, 1996:132). Marx agrees with Hegel with respect to alienation, but alienation caused by material needs rather than ideas and morals (Pals, 1996:133).

Marx's dismissal of religion is clear when he states that "religious distress is at the same time the expression of real [economic] distress and the protest against real distress (Waldner, 1998:1)." This economically infused statement can directly relate to the Free State's DRC and its 1998 desire to break away due to economical, political and social stress between Whites and Blacks (Waldner, 1998:1).

This study however will partly conform to Marx's approach claiming that the material wants of South African citizens lead to conflict. Change, specifically referring to the interrelationship between the ANC and the DRC is not necessarily progressively accommodative by nature. In fact, history will prove again that despite efforts by politicians and church leaders from various strata of the religious divide, diversity, unity and transformation may not always be successfully pursued (Waldner, 1998:1).

On the other hand, the historical affiliation between the DRC and the NP is in stark contrast (Mandela, 1994:128). The close symbiosis between the DRC and the Apartheid regime was sinfully obvious. The DRC's moral and Biblical support for the Calvinistic NP was institutionalised over decades of oppressive rule. Will politics again serve the religion within an ANC dominated Government of National Unity (GNU)? This becomes a hotly disputed topic when addressing issues such as the death penalty and legalised abortion.

2.3. Deconstructing Theopolitics

Nel (1999:1) defines Theopolitics as "the manipulation of the mundane by means of religion." This definition, although relatively new, could be used as an explanation of the prominence of spiritual leaders in South Africa's political landscape. It is also applicable to the religious-political interrelationship that exists between the NP and the DRC. Within the South African scenario, this thesis will aim to verify whether Theopolitics will continue to thrive among the marginalised who continues to find solace and refuge in their.

The main thrust of the thesis will be to test the notion that Theopolitics is all about survivalism. Does Theopolitics play a role with respect to the interrelationship between the ANC and the DRC and/or the ANC and Anglican Church? Can Theopolitics affect the mutually influencing interrelationship between socio-political, economic and religious conditions? Thus, is Theopolitics omnipresent despite existing within a secular environment? Is it dominating the South African scenario because of the high percentage of Christianity in South Africa or because of the dual economies that continue to segregate the poor from accessibility to better livelihoods?

Nel (1999:1) furthermore ascribes "Theos Politicos" to God politics that does not necessarily encompass any specific type of politics. It does however denote the connection between polity and religion per se, as seen with the NP and DRC. The reverse is also true when referring to the Anglican Church's relationships with the NP and ANC-led government.

The elements of Theopolitics comprise of
- *Theos* that refers to a supreme being as based on an ideological and/or idealistic need. This Supreme Being can be either worshipped or vilified.
- *Reporting* which involves the knowledge base of the recipients. The type and method of obtaining of information becomes crucial to determine the level of biasness among reporter, church and recipient.
- *Leadership* refers to the visibility and invisibility of the deity, whether a mythical, Biblical or observable character. The creators of the deity also support these reports.
- *Masses* are the faceless that need to be taken care of (Nel, 2000: 3).

God politics refer furthermore to the interdependent church-government interrelationships. The applicability of Theopolitics is evident given the continuous interrelations that exist between government and church, even in a secular, South African society.

2.4. Contextualising Theopolitics within a secular post-Apartheid South Africa

Secularisation can be described as follows:

- The decline of religion;
- Refocusing attention on worldly matters;
- Society's separation from religion;
- The transposition of beliefs and institutions into products of human making;
- The desacralisation of the world; and
- The acceptance of social change.

History shows that economic situations cause political action for example when wage negotiations or unemployment lead to strikes. When people experience economic difficulties, political dissatisfaction emerges (Couloumbis & Wolfe, 1989:293). Dissatisfaction leads to the desire to find solace and refuge, ultimately leading people to find comfort in their religion and church. This natural tendency to find solace in a forgiving un-prejudiced set-up becomes threatened when religions and churches themselves experience transformation from within. Secularisation can also estrange people from their religious roots. More so, when the unconditional and ultimate comfort of the church refocuses on other marginalised groups within its structures (for example, replacing the White-dominated welfare system with a Black welfare system). Since 1994, Whites who found consolation within the structures of the DRC had to confront transformation within their church structures as well. When the church moreover contemplates the implementation of ecclesiastical integration, disillusionment enters. Thus, the correlation with dialectic materialism - the political implications as based on economic conditions - are spiralling unto religion and its structures.

The basis of this study continuously relates socio-political difficulties to political and religious intolerance and indifference (Rhoodie, 1991:503; Schlemmer, 1991:4; Muller, 1991:573-579; Davis, 1980:51-5; Marais, 1998:30 & Prozesky, 1990:161). The ideology of socio-political theology needs to promote peace,

justice, equality to provide refuge for all, irrespective of race, political status and economic stature. Theopolitics will be tested against the church and state's responsibility when promoting transformation and transparency, despite economic disparities.

What is South Africa's deity? Is the iconic "Madiba"[3] the supreme being or is South Africa continuing with a dogma or ideology to fill the vacuum left by Apartheid? Given the fact that the faceless masses need guidance and leadership, a Theos is crucial for connecting diversity. Will Thabo Mbeki's[4] African Renaissance be sufficient to unite the previously separated groups in South Africa? Since South Africa lacks a specific encompassing ideology that bridges the gap, Nel (2000:2) continues to link Apartheid with Theos. Whether or not one supported Apartheid becomes irrelevant to theorists, since mobilisation of the masses took place. Will South Africa face difficulties due to the absence of a new Theos? Can one live in a secular society relying only on the supremacy of a supreme leader or do we need more flesh and substance (Nel, 2000: 2)?

How much does the media influence the image of the deity as well as the perceptions of the masses? If the masses are faceless and mute, as indicated by Nel (2000:3), are they necessarily democratic when they are "blind" followers? Do they exist at all (Nel, 2000:3)?

Yes, the masses exist and can be traced throughout South Africa's history. Evidence shows that the masses usually support the leader that comes from their own group. However, should the leader be exceptional, cross-group identification and support can occur, as seen with former President Nelson Mandela. Competent leaders are usually agents of change, i.e. transformational (1 Chronicles 1:1-9) (Bible, 1970). This might be disputed in contemporary politics since leaders do tend to become more conservative once they obtained governmental power, and thus not necessarily advancing progressive change

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[3] An affectionate term referring to Nelson Mandela.
[4] Current SA President.

but rather sustaining the status quo. Nel (2000:4) equates Mandela with the Biblical David and suggests that Mbeki's revival of the African Renaissance might qualify as a possible successor of Mandela as a deity. The question arises on what will happen after the tenure of Mbeki (Nel, 2000:4)?

Can one truly generalise and claim that the masses of South Africa are characterised by unresponsiveness? To an extent, the Apartheid leaders manage to indoctrinate the minority groups so as to ensure unconditional devotion. Nevertheless, this is clearly not applicable to the majority of oppressed South Africans. The resistance to the Theos Politicos of Apartheid South Africa resulted in the ultimate liberation of South Africa's political system. However, will South Africa be able to fill the vacuum left by the absence of an overarching belief system? For so long was the struggle characterised by obtaining freedom that once obtained, lack of direction and leadership challenged the fibre of society. South Africa's moral degeneration is indicative of a crumbling society. The question arises whether religion, or the *Theos* aspect of the polity, should be redressed or accommodated.

2.4.1.   Pluralism within a religio-political scenario

Given the diversity of South Africa's socio-political landscape, Christianity faces huge challenges. For the White Christians it becomes problematic to meet their demands regarding the legitimisation of discriminatory oppression and the Blacks' demand for social justice. Additionally, the Black Christians are confronted with the demands of the Whites for moderation as opposed to the Blacks' own demand for revolutionary change (Nürnberger, 1990:162). These religious demands coincided since the early 1930's with those political demands levelled against the Apartheid government.

Post-Apartheid South Africa's shift to pluralism was a huge step away from religio-political ruling. By embracing diverse groups and recognising their uniqueness and subsequent unique needs, differentiation based on the grounds of race, language, religion, ethnicity and culture becomes insignificant These diversities, as reflected in different behaviour, attitudes and opinions can have a

negative spin-off. Pluralism can instigate conflict specifically when dissention, disagreement or disorder prevails. Pluralism can however accommodate diversity and harmony within a socio-political environment (Couloumbis & Wolfe, 1989:61; Davis, 1980:167-8; Baradat, 1997:121-4). As late as 1986, the incorporation of pluralism within the structures of the DRC was still not evident (Loubser, 1987:138). This could have changed in the 1990's when the DRC for the first time rejected Apartheid and opened its doors for all races (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:132). Unfortunately, racial tensions still prevented integration from taking place by 2005. Attempts will be made to see whether both the ANC and the DRC's approaches to pluralism effectively unite diversity and sameness as prerequisites for democratic tolerance and stability. Evidence will concur that despite structural and policy changes, true integration remain unattainable. The main reasons are grounded in historically determined political cultures, as reflected in racial and economic demographics, grassroots disassociation and neglected consultations among all societal levels.

Religious pluralism is a social constant in South Africa. Together with the increasing pluralistic demands from other religions such as the traditional non-Christian religions and secularism itself, White Christianity will become a marginalised and minority-labelled belief, especially if it should continue with its exclusive approach. The method of absorbing all sacred and religious symbols in order to diffuse political discontent has been reversed in secular South Africa (Lubbe, 1990:211-3). Can openness, diversity and transparency ensure stability? How long will it last before one group start to show superiority propensities?

Given the continuous pluralistic struggles between the different denominations within the DRC and among church-church relations, it becomes clear that South Africa is far from completely embracing religious unity despite diversity (Lubbe, 1990:215). The inabilities of the DRC's sister churches to amalgamate with each other or to allow people of different colour to be accepted unconditionally within the various church structures are evidence. This strengthens the

argument that although apologies have been given to the South African society on supporting Apartheid, little integration has taken place on the grass roots.

Is socio-political theology applied in South Africa? Are there any interrelationships between church and government? The symbiosis is inevitable since churches are caretakers and government the traditional provider. One can therefore conclude that the intensity of these interactions were evident during the later years of Apartheid and is still prevalent in post-Apartheid South Africa.

2.4.2. Reflecting on Christianity and democracy within South Africa

2.4.2.1. Why democracy?

Globalisation nowadays reflects a commonality among diverse nations. Increased interactions and interdependencies result in nations developing a common culture as determined by common values and principles. Values such as the rule of law, non-racism, peace and human rights are the best promoted under the auspices of democracy, albeit not perfectly (Mills, 2002).

On a micro-level, citizens have the greatest opportunities, as fixed in their state's constitutions, to participate in governmental processes. Within this context the need to promote human rights and civil society is essential. Together with the idea of representative democracy, citizens have the greatest means to influence policy makers as well as to represent their needs on the global stage (De Gruchy, 1995:6).

Liberalism and socialism were the most prominent ideologies that shaped modern ways of governing. Their respective emphases on freedoms and equality led to various ways of ideological governance such as liberal democracy, social democracy and democratic-socialism (Baradat, 2000: 85). Thanks to globalisation as well as the collapse of communist and pure socialist systems, it is therefore no surprise that democracy surpassed all other ideological foundations. This does not imply that socialism is of no importance anymore. In fact, the modern tendency of combining both democracy and socialism proves to be effective in states such as England and France.

Socialism has intrinsic democratic values and principles that compliment democracy without neglecting the economic implications of communalism.

De Gruchy (1995:21-23) believes that the liberal and socialist forms of democracy are differentially complimentary when linked to the democratic vision and system. The liberals' interpretation of the democratic vision (namely equality, freedom and justice) means that all are equal as human beings, whereas the socialist argues that mere voting does not guarantee equality. Only when the electorate can dominate the agenda of government will true equality be experienced. The liberation and empowerment of the oppressed are of main importance to the socialist. The liberals associate freedoms with personal liberty and human rights and believe that justice should be equated with fairness. The socialist highlights that justice is linked with access to resources, education, housing and so on, even if it means that government restrict some individual freedoms. This is dangerous for the liberals who do not believe in an infringement of any kind by too powerful a government (De Gruchy, 1995: 21-23). However, a just and transparent government, aiming to bridge the divide amongst citizens, can most definitely exercise some levels of control without too much resistance from businesses.

On the surface, when analysing these ideologies one can certainly agree that they tend to disagree on various issues. However, despite their different approaches their basic principles seem to be intact. The degree on how to achieve the democratic vision and -system might differ but their core values of freedom and equality, which are of great importance to both, remain. Hence, integration is possible and desirable.

Within the Theopolitical context of South Africa, it is clear that justice, freedom and equality are of great importance to the socialist ANC and its other leftist partners. Similarly, the moderate to right wing political parties are of the same opinion, although their method and scope might vary slightly. It is clear that South Africa's approach to reconciliation and unity embraces the democratic vision and system of Christianity. The greatest issue that South Africa might still

face in the near future is the redistribution of land since both the liberals and socialists are adamant in their position of public versus private ownership and the individual's right to accumulate wealth.

2.4.2.2.   Is democracy the answer to South Africa's challenges?

Can democracy effectively accommodate the demands of Theopolitics, Christianity, social justice, and redistribution?

When looking at the functions of a comprehensive belief system such as Christianity it is clear that it continues to offer valuable attributes:

- It offers a foundational system of meaning and its descriptions of values and norms facilitate orientation in identity formation, moral guidance and assurance of one's right of existence;

- It provides emotional security and social cohesion within a larger context; and

- It provides the authority over against which the pursuit of individual and collective interests and the institutional means for their achievement has to be legitimised. Unfortunately, this occasionally leads to distortions both of the system and the interpretation of reality, as seen with the DRC's endorsement of segregation (Nürnberger, 1990:162).

Liberation theology in South Africa was never directly associated with the ANC and its liberation struggle.   Nevertheless, prominent members of the South African Council of Churches like Alan Boesak, Desmond Tutu and Trevor Huddlestone constantly tried to influence the NP's oppressive Apartheid policies (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:131; Villa-Vicencio, 1986:168,227,235 &). Even today, prominent church leaders influence South Africa's government by reiterating the constant importance of theology and religion per se within a secular context. This remains an important observation since it is clear that Theopolitics will continue to influence leaders when injustices are evident or ill-planned policies lead to social degradation (Villa-Vicencio, 1991:610).

Is *neo-Apartheid still a source of conflict in South Africa. By simply denouncing Apartheid creates a false impression that socio-political tensions will decline* (Schlemmer, 1991:2). When institutionalised oppression and hatred occurred over generations, socio-political prejudice does not disappear overnight. Adding the great gap between rich and poor as well as the reversed demographics of poverty (more impoverished Whites start to surface in the face of a booming generation of exceptionally wealthy Blacks), tensions will remain.

Given the fact that democracy as a political system is relatively new (in South Africa) and that Christians throughout the centuries co-existed with authoritarian and hierarchical rules, the answer does not necessarily seem obvious and simple. In the historical relationship between church and state clashes were evident, such as the wars between Christians and the authoritarian Roman Empire. Subsequent revolts[5] and transformations eventually placed the church in more democratic environments. Of specific significance is the Beza treatise, *The Rights of Rulers and the Duties of Subjects (1574)*, that declared that "peoples were not created for the sake of the rulers, but on the contrary the *rulers for the sake of the people".* Additionally he also emphasised that "those *who elect a King, also have the right to dethrone him"* (De Gruchy, 1990: 221). The Calvinistic reforms provided the foundations for representative and constitutional government. Ironically, the Afrikaner interpretation, as linked to Afrikaner nationalism, became the prisoner of segregation. With racial democracy playing such a prominent role within South Africa, Apartheid theology was inevitable.

The English churches on the other hand, although condemning racism, seldom partake in efforts to bring democracy to all the people. Criteria such as education were used to sidestep sensitive issues like equality, inclusiveness and political participation among Black and White. Black political leaders, being educated and socialised within the more liberal Christian-based missionaries, as linked with English churches, gave birth to documents such as the Freedom Charter (1955) that ultimately resulted in a new democratic dispensation.

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[5] Referring to the Calvinistic Reformation in the 16th century (de Gruchy, 1990: 220).

Is democracy the best system to exercise Christianity? Hauerwas cautions:

> As Christians we should be particularly sensitive to the misleading assumption that democracies are intrinsically more just because they provide more freedom than other kinds of societies. Freedom is an abstraction that can easily draw our attention away from faithfully serving as the church in democratic social orders. The crucial question is what kind of freedom and what we wish to do with it (De Gruchy, 1990: 223).

Although Christianity doesn't prescribe to any governmental form in particular, it does not imply indifference to the forms of government under which it will co-exist. The church's main concern should always be the welfare of its followers, resulting in Bonhoeffer's statement that "there is justification for asking which form of the state offers the best guarantee for the fulfilment of the mission of government and should, therefore, be promoted by the church" (De Gruchy, 1990: 223).

It is clear that socialist thoughts and values are also referred to in Christianity when referring to brotherly love and acceptance of one another. When uncontrolled freedoms within a democratic context are applied, without the respect for social responsibility, democracy turns out to be less synonymous with Christian beliefs. However, the modern notion of combining democracy and socialism reflects a greater tendency towards Christian values. Moltmann (in De Gruchy, 1990: 223) argues that socialism is perfect to break the cycles of poverty whereas democracy is perfect for breaking the cycles of force. The symbiotic relationship between these two ideologies is not to be ignored. Human rights are crucial but can only be truly obtained within a just and equal society. But what is equality? Does one measure equality by the casting of a vote or the possession of wealth and property? Alternatively, can equality be limited to academic definitions alone? Clearly, equality is the ideal but are human rights only applicable in an equal environment? Surely, a just society is as important as the advocating of human rights.

Furthermore, a government by the people for the people might not necessarily be free and fair. The abuse of power should always be limited within the democratic context of checks-and balances. More importantly, from a Christian perspective, ultimate authority is derived from God alone. Therefore when states claim absolute control over its subjects, as on the basis of Romans 13, caution should prevail (Bible, 1970). Governments do not have complete authority but is under the authority of God (De Gruchy, 1990:225). But when do citizens stop obeying their imperfect governments and start to replace them? Can sensible voting be enough to change the political systems of a country?

Based on the Calvinist traditions the covenant idea guides citizens and governments alike. Everyone should submit themselves to the rule of God regarding certain rights and responsibilities. This implies that some common values and moral and spiritual commitments are in place. However, within South Africa's plural society such notions are difficult to apply given our historical misuse of God and the Divine Right of Kings[6] (Wiki encyclopaedia, 2006a:1-4 & De Gruchy, 1990:225-6). As Paul spelled it out in Romans (12:2): "Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God" (Bible, 1970). In other words, can man and church become non-conformist so as to pursue God's will even though they might end up clashing with government powers? This was clearly the case with the more liberally inclined English churches, although pressures limited their overt protests.

What then is the role of the church today? Given the immense resources churches have as well as their closeness to all sectors of societies, they can be crucial in enhancing justice, equality, unity and tolerance. The main point of departure should be the faithful proclamation of the Kingdom of God in the traditions of the ancient Hebrew prophets:

- The church should demand from those in power the promotion of justice and equality;

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[6] This political and religious doctrine of political absolutism refers to the right to rule as a God-given right. By ruling with God's blessing leaders and their policies are legitimised. But when do the legitimacy start and end within Apartheid South Africa (Wik encyclopaedia, 2006:1)?

- Church must pronounce the God-given rights of every citizen; and

- By being a moral check on the behaviour and policies of government the church fulfils its prophetic mission. Therefore, the main message of the church should be that of obeying God rather than human beings, especially when there is a conflict of interest. Is it possible within the context of Romans 13 and South Africa's rainbow nation paradigm? Can we move forward, away from our historical religio-political negativities?

Within a Theopolitical context, it is essential to differentiate between a democratic vision and democratic systems. De Gruchy (1995:7) describes democratic systems as those governmental systems that have developed over a certain period of time (whether evolutionary or rapid development) and which have firmly entrenched "constitutional principles, procedures and convictions". The system's origins can be traced back to the city-states of Athens, long regarded as the cradle of democracy. A democratic vision is the utopian belief that one day all of mankind will be equal and that differences will be respected; that self-interest will be of lesser significance than that of social responsibility; and lastly that a society would be truly just with the gap between the rich and the poor to be reduced. The democratic vision originated with the ancient prophets of Israel, specifically their messianic hope for a society in which God's *Shalom* will prevail. True, history showed us that these ideals were not always so easily promoted and/or attained but it remains an undeniable fact that this democratic vision remains the crucial driving force for global democratisation (De Gruchy, 1995:7).

2.4.2.3. Linking Christianity and democracy

The historical relationship between Christianity and democracy has at best been confusing. De Gruchy (1995:8) attributes this to the Christian movement's tumultuous periods of conservative, radical and/or reformist propensities. Democracy also experienced a struggle between liberalism and socialism. Undeniably, the Western Christendom created the birthplace for the democratic system as well as the democratic vision as an aspect of the message of the Hebrew prophets. Nevertheless, Wolfgang Huber's observation that the

"historical distance of churches towards democracy" greatly hindered the linkage of faith to democratic systems cannot be denied. It is also important to realise that Christianity did not always regard democracy as the best governmental form.[7]

Western democracy developed within the context of Christendom and the Enlightenment. According to Berman "liberal democracy was the first great secular religion in western history as well as the first ideology that became divorced from traditional Christianity" (De Gruchy, 1995:57). Berman furthermore implies that democracy took over from Christianity both in terms of its sense of the sacred and some of its major values (De Gruchy, 1995:57).

When Jesus Himself identified with the poor and the oppressed, a severe break from traditional hierarchical social relations occurred. Jesus also challenged the authoritarian political systems within Judaism and their related cultures. He was furthermore concerned about the completeness of people and their freedom from any bondage, and confronted socio-economic injustices in His pursuit of justice and equality (De Gruchy, 1995: 47-48). Secular democrats and socialists' inabilities to see the link between Christianity and democratic values fail His egalitarian-humanistic approach.

This intrinsic link between Christianity and democracy was cemented when the missionaries introduced the values of democracy within Africa. Their church structures reflected democratic principles and it came as no surprise that their governmental forms have followed the same route.

Christianity never asserted that the voice of the people is the voice of God or that the majority is always right (De Gruchy, 1995:9). Adding to this, Stanley Hauerwas insists that the church never existed to provide an "ethos for democracy or any other form of social organisation" (De Gruchy, 1995:9). The fact that no ideal political system or model is referred to in the foundation of

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[7] The Protestant "free churches" had close ties with the establishment of democracy, but the Roman Catholic Church resisted these tendencies for a long period of time (De Gruchy, 1995:8).

Christianity does not mean that all types of governments will be seen as compatible with the Christian faith. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (in De Gruchy, 1995:10) argues that it is justifiable to try to establish which government will be best in promoting the mission of government, and therefore be supported by the church. Karl Barth's post-Second World War writings[8] claim that by being faithful to the gospel, Christianity is best linked with democratic government. The atrocities committed by governments such as that of Hitler and Stalin reiterated the need to revive democracy for the sake of a just world (De Gruchy, 1995:9).

Within the South African context, it is clear that Christianity by itself was not a guarantor of the democratic vision. Instead, the manipulation of the Christian faith and its symbols, as supported by church structures, disconnected the democratic vision altogether. However, to ignore the impact of churches and Christianity alike on the historical struggle for the democratic vision is foolish.

Theologically, the democratic vision is enhanced by the gospel of Jesus of Nazareth as well as Old Testament prophecies. The Biblical struggles to free the poor from social injustices and economic deprivation showed that Yahweh is particularly sensitive to the needs of the poor and the oppressed. The Bible furthermore illustrates that a just society in which all are equally respected as the carrier of God's image promotes reconciliation, peace and the consolidation of democratic societies (De Gruchy, 1995: 11).

2.4.2.4. Reinforcing survivalism?

When assessing the appropriateness and validity of Theopolitics within a democratic South Africa one should guard against reinforcing neo-Apartheid and survivalism. Although this thesis does not follow Marx's atheist assumption it does agree with Marx's view that religion is greatly determined by economics. It is for this reason that the DRC is experiencing internal problems and factions as linked to poverty, crime, unemployment, and ethnic disparities (Davis,

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[8] As acknowledged by Pope John Paul II's Centesimus Annus (De Gruchy, 1995:9).

1980:55). Instead of adhering to the doctrines of peace and transformation a split becomes politically inevitable. Marx claims further that religion is a way for the oppressor to maintain the prevailing status quo. This could be put into correlation with the NP's previous influence on the DRC and vice versa. Contrary to Marx, Davis (1980:55) firmly believes that faith is dead without ideologies. Clearly, the interrelatedness between ideology and religion was cemented with the DRC's and NP's symbiotic relationship.

Is religion the connective tissue that can unite single-handedly the masses, despite their socio-economic status or political agendas? Is Pals' (1996:143) assertion that "religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation" a correct reflection of post-Apartheid South Africa. Can this statement reflect the sentiments of the average Christian in South Africa, across the racial divide? Nevertheless, how moral is our society when facing secular laws and immoral behaviour of leaders? Moreover, are the Calvinistic underpinnings of Christianity indirectly emphasising cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, submission and dejection leaving the church as a voiceless institution? Are the DRC's confessions or reversed policies of discrimination based on these propensities of submission instead of advocating?

To arrive at the assumption that democracy is the best, as linked to social justice and values, didn't come easily or swiftly. Both Plato and Aristotle believed that democracy was the worst type of government since the minority should rule, but both also simultaneously acknowledged that when monarchy and aristocracy became tyrannical, then democracy would be the next best thing. The Roman jurist Cicero also could not decide whether monarchy, aristocracy or democracy would be the best possible way of governing. One thing that was clear to him was the fact that sovereignty is located in the people. To claim, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau (in De Gruchy, 1995:17-18) that the people should rule was for some a recipe for anarchy, especially for Max Weber. For Weber (in De Gruchy, 1995:17-18) the masses would lead to ineffective administration not to mention political instability. The link between

liberties, rights and justice therefore developed gradually as reflected with the demands of modernisation.

What is significant to note is that although representative democracy indicate that the masses rule, only a selected elected few do actually govern and this elite might be corrupt or inefficient. History has indeed shown us that democratic systems do not necessarily mean that they are more effective than dictatorships. However, what should remain clear is the fact that democracy, despite all its weaknesses, still emphasises legitimacy, accountability and transparency via the electorate and the civil society.

To determine whether South Africa is therefore truly exercising a democratic system one needs to investigate these basic underlying principles of democratic systems:

- Universal adult suffrage;
- Free and fair elections;
- Fair representation of the electorate in a legislative body;
- Equality before the law;
- Independent judiciary;
- Rule of law;
- Human rights;
- Economic democracy;
- The separation between the church and the state; and
- Freedom of religion (Roskin, 2001 & Ranney, 1996).

2.5. Summary

Over the centuries, great emphases were placed on clarifying behaviour and belief systems, as intertwined with political and socio-economic conditions. Ideological linkages between religion and politics are evident. Ideologies or belief systems continue to create the connectivity between various groups, despite these groups' political or economic position in society. History shows that governments and churches remain powerful agents for their followers.

The linkage between religion and government remains indisputable, as seen in the following chapter. South Africa's rich diversity is clearly at play when diverse groups seek to identify with an appropriate belief system. The Marxist linkage between economics and politics is not to be underestimated, specifically when one looks at the impact of colonialism and racism on South Africa. With the deity vacuum that currently exist in a secular South Africa, the connective tissue that binds groups together is absent. Can religion become the commonality amongst all groups, given the fact that 70% are Christians? Will history pave the way for the secular South Africa?

CHAPTER 3 THE RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ROLE PLAYERS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

3.1. Introduction

For centuries, nations fought one another in defence or promotion of a belief. Wars and the relentless killings of the innocent became a normative discourse of behaviour. Some belief systems, closely related to race and religions, have found fertile ground in South Africa's religious-political and socio-economic paradigm. The inter-relationship of Christianity and politics in South Africa is interesting and illuminating for a number of reasons:

- First, with almost 70% of its adult population professing some form of Christianity, South Africa qualifies as one of the most Christian nations in the world; and

- Second, since 1652 churches have historically played a key role in politics. This role was especially magnified during the Apartheid era when churches were major actors in both affirming and/or condemning Apartheid.

To fully grasp the complexities of politics and religion, this section will attempt to examine the nature and origin of church-state relations until 1994, when the first multi-racial democratic elections took place. In carrying out this objective, two main themes, Afrikaner and African nationalisms are addressed. An in-depth look at the Apartheid era will clarify these two nationalisms' political and theological dimensions.

3.2. Race, power and religion: the birth of two conflicting -isms: Afrikaner nationalism and African nationalism

3.2.1. The establishment of a plural society: creating distinctive churches and contrasting consciousness

Nelson Mandela (1994:109) wrote in his book *Long walk to freedom* that all South Africans were born politicised and how often it spirals down into one's everyday life, beliefs, thinking, and actions. Ever since the Europeans set foot at the Cape, feelings of superiority and tools of oppression were utilised to undermine any self worth of those racial groups other than the settlers. So for people who were part of the majority, rights and freedoms were not their destiny and had to be fought for. The African life therefore is, and always will be politicised.

Hence, it is important to note that discrimination and racial segregation have been applied since the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck and about 200 settlers in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope[9] (Gunn, 1991:28). The "superiority" of the White race, based on their Protestant Christianity[10] and level of civilisation, was already seen in practices of slavery, racial discrimination, and segregation, as well as the fact that only the Whites held strategic administrative, economic and political positions in South Africa (Marais, 1952:289). Van Jaarsveld best explains this mentality of the settlers when he describes it as molded by "physical detachment from their mother country, isolation in the interior, social and economic factors, ... their cultural heritage and the Old Testament"[11] (Loubser, 1987:18). Pillay (1995:71) attributes the close relationship between church and state as an automatic extension of *cuius regio eius religio* where the unity of the state was confirmed in the unity of religious belief. Separated from Europe and the processes of Enlightenment[12] the colonists strove to develop their own national identity (Leatt et al, 1986:69).

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[9] Martin Prozesky makes it clear that class-consciousness should not be equated with institutionalised Apartheid (as so many would like to claim) (Prozesky, 1990:58).

[10] Prof. Ben Marais claims that the initial distinction was based on being a Christian or not, thus rejecting a racial basis (Marais, 1952:289).

[11] Facing constant threats reflected in frontier conflicts as well as the British 's attempts to anglicise the settlers caused them to lose their European identity and theirs became a "fragmented culture" (Leatt et al, 1986:70). This ultimately resulted in the creation of their own nationalist identity, focussing on irrationality, religion and romanticism (Loubser, 1987:18).

[12] A period of radical thinking, questioning traditions, sentimental supernatural phenomena and emphasising reality (Leatt et al, 1986:7).

The DRC was subsequently introduced by the settlers during which the Dutch Reformed theology was transplanted into the African continent. The DRC received recognition as the state religion of Holland in 1651 that resulted in Van Riebeeck to formally establishing the DRC at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. The "monoculture" of Van Riebeeck clearly made no distinction between church and state matters. This also meant that no other churches were allowed initially. Only in 1779 did the German Lutherans manage to obtain permission to build their own church buildings (De Gruchy, 1986a:1). The doctrines of the DRC were summarised in the three creeds of faith, namely the Heidelberg Catechism, the Dutch Confession of Faith and the Canons of Dort, like everything else, restricted to the White settlers only (Philtar, 2000:1-3).

Racial discrimination within the DRC was seen as early as the eighteenth century when attempts to include the San as members of the church failed. Other early missionary efforts towards the evangelisation of the Khoi and San peoples died slowly and it was not until the 19th century that a new missionary growth spurt was seen (De Gruchy, 1986a:2).

In 1804, during the period of the Batavian Republic, advocate De Mist granted freedom of religion to other Christian groups. With the British occupation in 1806, more churches and political claims arrived in the Cape (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:26). In 1820, a further three thousand settlers arrived, firmly establishing an English community. Due to their different demographical support structures, the latest influx eventually resulted in an estranged relationship between the Church of England and the DRC (Suberg, 1999:14). Nationalism, as manifested in ethnicity, religion, language, and economic structures was clearly in the making. The undeniable linkage between all these aspects strengthens Theopolitics' claims significantly.

African Nationalism started to develop when the Africans were introduced to Christian missions and schools and influenced by the non-racial policies of the liberal Cape government (Prozesky, 1990:9). As the counterpart of the exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, African nationalism strove for the inclusion of

Blacks into the political system of the exclusively White regimes. Although their belief systems were different from one another, modernisation as well as economic and political change initially led to attempts of integration among the indigenous and European peoples. However, conflict was bound to rise, specifically with the conservative Dutch. Intense competition for land troubled relations with the settlers and added to that, the different missionary approaches of the church increased tension. The conflict between the "settler" church and the "mission" church, where the former deemed it unnecessary to "Christianise the heathen" as opposed to the latter's ultimate mission, laid the foundation for religious discrimination, eventually spilling over to racial discrimination[13] (De Gruchy, 1986a:2 & 7).

The settlers' desire to create their own independent church was realised when the DRC broke away in 1824 from the church in Holland and by constituting its own synod, became the first independent Southern African church. This however caused a strange relationship with the English Administration. Any future Synodical decisions were to be subject to the approval of the Anglican governor of the Cape. One also needs to take into account that the Church of England at this stage had no real influence, due to the influence and size of the DRC. This situation only changed in 1848 when the first Anglican bishop, Robert Gray, arrived in the Cape (Suberg, 1999:11 & 21 & De Gruchy, 1986a:3).

The late 1820's dissatisfied many Afrikaners with the British Administration, especially when slavery was abolished in 1834 (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:27). Anna Steenkamp's diary reflected the general feeling: "their (slaves) being placed on an equal footing with Christians, (is) contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and religion" [14] (De Gruchy, 1986b:2,18-19). It became clear that a national consciousness started to gain momentum with the Bible being interpreted from an oppressed point of view. Steenkamp's diary

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[13] This became evident when the stance on racial unity of the DRC Synod of 1829 was disregarded in 1857, making way for separate buildings and sermons of worship (De Gruchy, 1986a:7-8).

[14] Huet believed equality "to be the greatest of all evils" resulting in the emigration of so many from the Cape Colony (Loubser, 1987:14).

indicated the direction in which the people's theology, or as Loubser calls it, "theology of experience" was to develop (Loubser, 1996:322).

These fears and uncertainties pertaining to all spheres of life are exactly the nexus to Theopolitics. The only way the Afrikaner could experience inner peace and receive strength to deal with their present day problems was found in their Bible and church. The economic threats from the Africans, who were willing to work at a cheaper rate together with their mere numbers, outweighed the Boers[15] and their socio-political aspirations (Davenport, 1991:111). Added to that, the British jeopardised the Boers' political existence and striving for self-determination and survival, which again led to an escapist solution, the Great Trek (Giliomee, 1995:189).

The Great Trek of the 1830's was mainly a reaction to land and labour problems and the British attempts to anglicise and equalise the Afrikaner with the indigenous peoples (Mckibbin, 1999:1). This conscious attempt of "Africanising" the Afrikaner, and to address the socio-economic, religious-political threats of both British imperialism and a Black majority led to the birth of *Afrikaner nationalism[16]* (Schumann, 1962:208). In 1853, the Cape Coloureds, together with the Whites received suffrage, although it was excluded in the Constitutions of 1854 and 1859 of the Free State and Transvaal Republics respectively, reflecting the Afrikaner's perceived superior group identity (Heydenrych, 1986: 142 & 151 & Adam & Giliomee, 1979). The idea of "no equality" was enshrined in the Transvaal Republic in 1855, applicable to both state and church matters. The liberal trends that Europe was experiencing in the 1850's did not impress the frontier populations. Innovations in the DRC were met with suspicion and rejected. As a result the "Church under the Cross" was established by Rev S J du Toit, whom later made a huge contribution to the Apartheid theology (Loubser, 1987:14 & 15).

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[15] The Boervolk refers to the main descendants from the Dutch Calvinist, Flemish as well as French Huguenot, and German Protestants, their origins dating from the 1650s and into the 1700s (Wiki encyclopaedia 2007: 1).

[16] For further detail, read Giliomee, 1989 xiv-xxx.

Despite the fact that the Trekkers were devoted Christians the Cape DRC denounced the Trek in 1837, resulting in the DRC clergy being excluded from the Trek. The theological interpretation of the Bible became alive when the Trekkers identified with the Biblical Israelite's and their sufferings. Some division remained among the Trekkers regarding those who wanted to retain their ties with the Cape DRC (De Gruchy, 1986b:20). This ultimately led to the establishment of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk in 1853 and in 1859, the Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid Afrika (Ngcokovane, 1989:43). All of these reformed Churches share similar Calvinist beliefs and Presbyterian organisation[17] (Religion around the world: 2000:2).

Nevertheless, what was the situation with the Anglican Church to whom the British governor belonged? With the arrival of Robert Gray the multiracial Anglican Church started to grow, covering a parish of 20 000 square miles. Apart from the successfulness of its missionary work, the Anglican Church established additional dioceses in Grahamstown (1852), Natal (1858) and a missionary diocese in Zululand (1859). The Anglican Church further expanded when the dioceses of Bloemfontein and Pretoria were formed in 1864 and 1872 respectively. Unfortunately, the Anglican Church was not immune to conflict and politics. Tensions between the Church in England and the Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA) escalated to such an extent that Gray and the Anglican Church eventually managed to gain independence from England in 1870[18] (Suberg, 1999:1, 22-23, 45, 48 & 54). The heresy trial involving Colenso of Natal also caused the Anglican Church to split from within, creating Gray's CPSA and Colenso's Church of England in South Africa (De Gruchy, 1986b:17). Despite the fact that the Anglican Church broke away, the doctrines used by the Church of England, namely the Nicene & Apostle's Creeds, the King James version of the Bible; the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-nine articles, are still adhered to by the CPSA (Suberg, 1999:1).

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[17] Their doctrines assert that God is eternal, infinite, wise and the Creator of the Universe. He is in charge of life and the fate of all and that the "chosen" is saved. The Bible is also the ultimate source of Authority (Religion around the world, 2000:2).
[18] The Long vs. Gray contributed to the CPSA's constitution which amongst others, separated the CPSA in law from the Church of England (Suberg, 1999:35 & De Gruchy, 1986b:17).

In 1857, during the meeting of the Presbytery of Albany a request was made that separate communion should be served to the Whites, which was approved. The first theological authorisation given to the established practice of racial segregation was addressed at the 1857 Synod of the DRC (Ngcokovane, 1989:41). The Synod resolution reads:

> The Synod considers it desirable and according to the Holy Scripture that our heathen members be accepted and initiated into our congregations wherever it is possible; but where this measure, as a result of the weakness of some, would stand in the way of promoting the work of Christ among the heathen people, then congregations set up among the Heathen, or still to be set up, should enjoy their Christian privileges in separate buildings or institutions (Ngcokovane, 1989:40).

Ngcokovane (1989:41) and Loubser (1987:13) highlight two aspects regarding the Synod Resolution:

- First, it declared that according to the Holy Scripture, no racial differences should be applied when furthering the Gospel; and
- Second, it also declared that in order to preserve special privileges and self-preservation, the Whites would continue to insist on being racially prejudiced.

Ritner describes the resolution as a "watershed in racial policy" since the DRC, as one of the most influential forces, sanctioned racism in an area previously untouched by the politics of race (Ngcokovane, 1989:42).

The initial parallel between the DRC and the Anglican Church, pertaining to liberal thinkers and racial perceptions, is not to be dismissed. The more liberal Colenso, with his practice of critical Biblical scholarship, was of the opinion that African traditions should not be ignored when preaching the gospel. The African culture and social networks should be retained and the creation of "Black Europeans" avoided. Gray, believing in the de-tribalisation of the Blacks, did not favour Colenso's approach. As with the DRC, the Anglican Church also conducted heresy trials to stop liberalism in its tracks (Hinchliff, 1968:68-72).

Additionally, even though the Anglican Church sermonised to Whites and Blacks alike it became clear that the exclusion of Blacks in religious matters concerning themselves also led to ethnic lines, and divisions started to show in the Anglican Church as well (De Gruchy, 1986b:17-18 & Prozesky, 1990:102). The close interrelationship between social conditions, linked with one's political beliefs and religious orientations, is evident. The DRC, still being the most influential, did make their racial inclinations and preferences more formal and open, as opposed to the Anglican Church. The socio-economic and political turmoil that South Africa was about to encounter in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were to reverse the similarities between these two churches for ever.

The English annexations of the Transvaal Boer Republic in 1877 and the subsequent First Liberation War (1880-1881) further unified the Afrikaner's nationalistic feelings. Thus, by the time when South Africa discovered gold and diamonds in 1886 and 1867 respectively, race and class relations were already firmly established by practices of segregation. Together with the situation of the poor Whites in the 1890's the DRC started to become more actively involved in advocating the needs of their peoples, the Afrikaner[19] (Davenport, 1991:494). It seemed as if the Biblical Kingdom was no longer as important as the needs of the Whites[20] (Loubser, 1987:16). Dare I also say that this was to a limited extent the situation with the Anglican Church? Certain bishops like Bousfield of Transvaal and Wilkinson of Zululand made it clear that evangelisation was mainly promoted and aimed at the White settlers, already Anglican, and that missionary work and its financing to the African heathens were of less priority. This racial prioritisation is clearly one of the reasons why the Africans started to resent White churches in general (Suberg, 1999:56).

Fortunately, the leadership of the CPSA accepted as early as 1870 that its structures should represent unity despite diversity, as reflected in its Prayer

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[19] The word "people" started to appear more than ever in the DRC's Synods of 1894 and 1897. This infused a nationalist attachment to the desires and actions of the Afrikaner volk (Loubser, 1987:16).
[20] The shift from an open church to an exclusive Afrikaner church becomes apparent. "Everyone that expressed himself in favour of Kingdom-freedom in race relations ran the risk of being suspected and even accused of heretical leanings in his theological convictions", referring to the heresy case against Prof. Du Plessis, 1930 (Botha, 1987:20).

Book. The need to train South African born members is quintessential to the future of the Anglican Church. The steps needed to indigenise the church were:

- To educate local men to be priests so that they can move up the hierarchical ladder of the CPSA;
- For the Africans to be elected into senior positions as guided by the Holy Spirit;
- To incorporate indigenous movements into the CPSA ; and
- To rewrite the Book of Prayer in order to address the Southern African needs and accommodate its unique circumstances (Suberg, 1999:69 & 71).

Subsequently, a few theological colleges were established in Grahamstown, Ciskei, and Umtata, for the Whites and Africans respectively, leading to the first African priest to be ordained in 1877. The inclusion of the Order of Ethiopia and *Iviyo* (Legion of Christ's Witnesses), a charismatic renewal movement within the dioceses of Zululand, enhanced the indigenous character of the CPSA. The concluding prerequisite for being indigenised was fulfilled in 1954 when the South African Prayer Book was completed (Suberg, 1999:65-7; 73 & 78).

The origin of Black political organisations can be traced back to the 1800's of which the 1882 *Imbumba Yama Afrika* (Union of Africans) and the first African newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu* in 1884, showed the African resentment towards White domination. African indignation towards racism within a religious paradigm was evident with the founding of the Independent Tembu National Church in 1884 and the establishment of the Ethiopian church in 1892 (Davenport, 1991:410). This indicated the start of Africans to collectively represent their needs and interests in the church and state (Leatt et al, 1986:89-90).

Davenport (1999: 68) described Ethiopianism and the Independent churches as vehicles of "religious enthusiasm and political protest." According to Leatt (1986:89-90) and Prozesky (1990:102-103) a clear distinction among the Africans was starting to develop. The distinction involved those, as expressed

by the *Imvo* newspaper, which were willing to cooperate with the Whites and emphasised equality, as opposed to those such as the Ethiopian supporters who aimed to promote Africanism and challenged White domination and racism. The late nineteenth century saw the emergence of the African Independent Church (AIC) movement that shows the clear tendencies of Theopolitics. This movement was revolutionary and apolitical, and a clear dialectic connection is shown between belief and socio-political conditions. Religion becomes once again a powerful tool in which the Africans can express themselves when otherwise powerless. Clearly, all tools were going to be utilised to promote the needs and desires of the Africans, whether political or religious. It was clear that this "nationalistic and religiously inspired movement" needed to be taken into consideration by the White Christian churches. This was partly done by the Anglican Church when they incorporated the Order of Ethiopia as an extra-parochial organisation (Suberg, 1999:70).

With the start of the Second Liberation War in 1900, the Cape Colony's DRC expressed their dissatisfaction with the English, favouring their fellow Afrikaners. Tensions between the Anglican Church and DRC also started to appear since the two churches generally took sides with their own groups. Although limited racism was still apparent in the Anglican Church, it's multiracial basis together with its English roots, created a distance from the DRC (De Gruchy, 1986b:23).

The DRC argued for the continued existence of the two Boer Republics as willed by God. Botha believes that this was one of the earliest assertions that God discloses himself via historical events. In reaction to the armed rebellion against the British government, the Council of Churches later reiterated this in its 1915 statement. Furthermore, General De Wet declared in 1909 that the Divine Will does not accept equality between Blacks and Whites (Loubser, 1987:19, 21-22). The reality of the inescapability of British rule over the Republics led to the Anglo-Boer war that resulted in the creation of the Union of South Africa, as part of the British Commonwealth. Regardless of their defeat the Afrikaner continued to develop an Afrikaans language movement,

established the Afrikaner Broederbond and published historical writings on the South African history (Leatt et al, 1986:69-71; Murray, 1986:259 & Stadler, 1986:263). Thus, after the Anglo-Boer War, Afrikaner unity was firmly established with the DRC and its clergymen as a powerful and effective medium in theologising, uplifting and institutionalising Afrikaner nationalism. The religious legitimacy[21] allocated to racial segregation now needs the political means to implement the divine task of the Afrikaner.

On the other hand, the Afrikaner's defeat by the British gave some hope for the Africans. In anticipation of good things to come, the South African Native Congress indicated their loyalties to the English, but unfortunately, good fortune was not to be. The British dislike of power sharing and integration in the Natal colony set the tone for the formalisation of White supremacy in the soon to be established Union of South Africa (Deegan, 2001:5). Limited political rights, based on property rights for Coloureds and Blacks, were sadly only to be found in the Cape. Black grievances were again not heard and their rights and demands were ignored for the sake of the Afrikaner (De Gruchy, 1986b:26-7).

Following the Union in 1910, the DRC was no longer only concerned about race relations within the church but the race policies of the country itself. This was seen when the liberal Cape Synod distanced itself from mixed marriages in 1915, followed by the NP who formalised the ban on mixed marriages in 1917 by means of the Mixed Marriages Act (Loubser, 1996:323-4). Additionally, the DRC played an equally important role in assisting the Afrikaners with their welfare needs. As the plight of the poor Afrikaner became more and more desperate, these impoverished city folk found increased refuge in the DRC, firmly establishing Theopolitics (De Gruchy, 1986b:29).

When the Colour Bar law was introduced by the NP in 1924 the Cape Synod supported it, although some moral and ethical concerns were raised. This was to change after a second church conference was held and a delegation was subsequently sent to the then prime minister, Hertzog. Although not clear on the

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[21] Mckibbin (1991) gives a comprehensive reflection on the biblical interpretation of segregation.

main issues to be raised with Hertzog, custom was created whereby the church would try to influence government after holding a church conference (Loubser, 1987:29).

Although the English speaking South Africans were not as ideologically driven as the Afrikaners it was clear that British culture and imperialism were highly revered by the English. The Anglican Church's practice of Theopolitics was seen in the military flags that decorated their cathedrals, government officials being church members, as well as its points of view regarding racial issues, symbolising an inseparable connection between the supreme, just Empire and the church. Grassroots practices and tensions were starting to be reflected between the Afrikaans and English churches. The DRC continued to dominate the socio-religious world of the Afrikaners in contrast to the Anglican Church that reflected the general liberal trend of the English population. The British, accounting for more than two thirds of the White population in pre-Union South Africa dominated the civil service, financial industries and education. The high-ranking officials were also members of the church of the Province, reflecting, as the DRC, the socio-political linkage between politics, economics, and religion (De Gruchy, 1986:34).

It is then clear from the outset that both nationalisms encompassed elements of religion, ethnic mobilisation, issues of state security, political rights, race, and class (Cronjé et al, 1947). It should be noted that the DRC's exclusive use of any one of these components disregards the important impact of the others, resulting in distortion and inaccuracy.

3.2.2. The politics of racial tensions: the countdown to Apartheid

The racial tensions that accompanied the discovery of gold and diamonds intensified throughout the years. The urbanisation of both Blacks and Whites[22] changed the paradigm in which they used to interrelate. Instead of being the landowner, the Whites were now in competition with the Blacks for ordinary

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[22] Urbanisation was further aggravated by the rinderpest epidemics of the 1890's, the1899-1902 Anglo Boer war during which the Whites and Blacks lost their land, as well as the taxes they had to pay (Ngcokovane, 1989:29-30).

jobs. This situation enjoyed paramount attention in the religious and political spheres (Cronjé et al, 1947).

3.2.2.1. Consolidating the tools for both African nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism

3.2.2.1.1. Establishing the African National Congress

The economic interdependence that existed between the Afrikaner and the African was sidestepped politically. Botha's Native Land Act of 1913,[23] followed by the prohibition of selling liquor to Africans, saw the beginning of organised criticism within the CPSA. Its missionary conferences became the voice of African protest (Suberg, 1999:72). Additionally, these legal discriminations exercised by the Union stimulated African nationalism and led to the creation of various Black political organisations, such as the predecessor of many Black organisations, the African People's Organisation, in 1902 (Davenport, 1991:410).

The South African Native Convention (SANC) became the first national organisation in 1909 to plead the rights of the disenfranchised, and to unite all the tribes and races when creating a united democratic South Africa. Unfortunately, far from being a mass movement, and despite attempts to mobilise the labour force as well as implementing Gandhi's passive resistance strategies, SANC was unsuccessful in extending the Cape franchise policy to the other regions (Deegan, 2001:15). In 1923 SANC renamed itself to the African National Congress (ANC) and continued its low-intensity and anti-White resistance against the exclusive and illegitimate White government. The ANC's Bill of Rights laid the cornerstone for their protest against disenfranchisement. This Bill of Rights emphasised liberty, equality, justice, ownership of land and equal rights when managing the state (Leatt et al, 1986:91). The close interrelationship between African Christians and African nationalism is shown in the fact that the SANNC affirmed the liberal Christians values as taught in missionary schools. Despite the denominational loyalty and fragmentation

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[23] This Act prevented Africans from buying land in White areas, prohibit them from living on farms unless they worked there for more than 90 days (Wolpe, 1995:71 & Deegan, 2001:1).

among the church and mission members of the ANC, Christianity provided a moral and unifying basis (Prozesky & De Gruchy, 1995:87).

By the 1930's, the ANC faced some serious challenges. Internal factions, the ineffectiveness of the organisation, and leadership problems paralysed its attempts in influencing government to address the needs of the Blacks (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:48). New leadership, assertiveness, and clear demands to the government in the 1940's led to the revival of the ANC.

The militancy of the ANC started to appear when the newly created Youth League exerted increased pressures, especially when the Smuts government rejected the ANC's policy document, *African Claims* (Leatt et al, 1986:93). This document called for equal voting rights, full citizenship rights, justice before the courts, and freedom of movement. Equal job opportunities, free education and access to social welfare, trade unionism and abolishment of the pass laws were of equal importance (Leatt et al, 1986:93).

The discontented leader of the Youth League, Anton Lembede, developed a comprehensive Africanist philosophy, which is regarded as the crux of African Nationalism. At its roots, Lembede describes Africans as holistic creatures aiming for self-realisation. Materialism is therefore rejected and Darwin's "law of variation" is used to scientifically legitimise the different compositions of different nations with their own divine missions. The importance of history is not to be renounced and the socialistic economic base of the Africans needs to be modernised. By continuing with the *Kgotla* system, democracy is exercised and most importantly, Christian values and morals would form the base of ethical conduct, reiterating the connection between politics and religion. The Youth League's policy, forming the essence of African nationalism, was released in 1946 emphasising the following:

- Africa is for the Blacks;
- Africans are one;
- The leader of the Africans will be African;
- Cooperation between Africans and non-Europeans is desirable;

- The divine destiny of the African people is national freedom; and

- After national freedom comes socialism (Leatt et al, 1986:94).

It is evident that the Africans felt equally strong and passionate about their country, their rights, and their destiny. The ANC and its leaders, being pressurised by the militant Youth League, would start to dominate the political scene as supported by certain church leaders. Although their powerbases were not as sophisticated, institutionalised and organised as the Whites, their mere numbers and tactics eventually force the government to pay attention.

3.2.2.1.2. The National Party

Ngcokovane (1989:30-37) classifies the urban centres' socio-political and economic development into four periods for the process of urbanisation:

1) Post-Anglo Boer War to World War I period;
2) The period after World War I;
3) The World War II period; and lastly
4) The Apartheid era.

1) *The Post-Anglo Boer War to World War I period* refers to the relatively skilled Black mine worker who posed a severe threat for both the skilled White immigrant worker and the unskilled White Afrikaner. The latter two at least had political power to wield, which led to the White workers creating a united front. Job opportunities, favourable social amenities, voting rights for city councillors, provincial representatives, and national members of parliament were allocated exclusively to the White workers. It becomes evident that the 1920's and 1930's focus on the Afrikaner shifted from the impact of the Anglo-Boer War and their feelings towards the English, to the poor-White problem (Ngcokovane, 1989:30-31).

The National Party (NP) was created by J B M Hertzog in 1914[24], as a reaction to the pro-Commonwealth sentiments of the Botha regime as well as the socio-

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[24] The NP was first established in the Free State and Transvaal in 1914 and was followed by the Cape- and Natal branches in 1915 (Spies, 1986:233).

economic crises that the Afrikaners were experiencing. The National Party was comprised primarily of Afrikaners that mainly belonged to any of the three White DRC churches (Ngcokovane, 1989:36). The NP strove to equalise the Afrikaner's rights, in conjunction with those of the South African English, to fight for the equal rights of the Afrikaans language, for South African sovereignty, and to develop an infrastructure that would benefit the South African economy (Murray, 1986:248). The NP is therefore classified as a *Weltanschauung* party emphasising *volksgebondenheid*[25], meaning that the *volk* and not the individual, is the primary point of reference (Cronjé et al, 1947 & O' Meara, 1996:41).

The NP's road to power kicked off in 1924 when it first won governmental office, in coalition with the Labour Party. Various socio-economical factors affected the coalition government such as the Great Depression, the Gold Standard crisis, as well as the influx of competitive Black workers into the cities. When Hertzog formed a new coalition government in 1934 with J C Smuts' South African Party, which led to the establishment of the United Party, the NP, now the *Gesuiwerde* (Purified) *Nasionale Party*, became its fiercest opposition. The issue of neutrality during the Second World War led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hertzog, upon which he re-united with the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party*, subsequently creating the *Herenigde* (Re-united) *Nasionale Party* (O' Meara, 1996:40).

During this post-Anglo Boer War period, the Anglican Church's struggle for social justice gained momentum. Church work under the auspices of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, together with the Community of Resurrection, started in Sophiatown during the mid-twenties. The Ekutuleni Centre, for social and recreational work, as well as a hospital (1927) were established to improve the Africans' quality of life. Churches, schools, and nursery schools were build and racial prejudice decreased by means of the gospel and the Anglican Church Samaritan works (Suberg, 1999:82-84).

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[25] *Volksgebondenheid* or Afrikaner patriotism refers to an excessive attachment to, and identification with their own people's heritage and divine interconnection with God.

2) *The period after World War I*: With the Labour and National party in power the Afrikaans speaking Whites were treated more favourably. Collective bargaining was exclusively given to the Whites according to the Industrial Conciliation Act. For example, Black workers were kept out of any skilled jobs whereas the government did everything in its power to ensure acquisition of skills via technical education (Ngcokovane, 1989:31-32).

3) *The World War II* period brought a tremendous economic boom to South Africa. Its industrial sector mushroomed, leading to the rapid growth of White and Black employment. The shortage of labour resulted in the influx of migrant workers who could provide skilled labour at a bare minimum wage[26]. This however led to insecurities on the part of the White worker who perceived the migrant worker as a threat (Stadler, 1986:268). The almost "exclusively Anglophone urban manufacturing and commercial capitalists" were also in favour of a loosening of the segregation controls over the urban Black labour (O' Meara, 1996:27). As Macmillan explains: "the demands of industry and the quest for economic growth ran counter to policies designed to keep people apart. In effect, economic growth promoted further integration rather than increased segregation" (Deegan, 2001:6). This incompatibility between economic growth and racial policies would heighten the need for formal protection of the Afrikaner. The Natives Trust and Land Act of 1936 led to peasant uprising in the Native Reserves[27], increased urbanisation on the part of the Africans, and the founding of a new militant, Marxist organisation, the All-African Convention (AAC) (O' Meara, 1996:24-25). The rise of urban conflict was also triggered by independent, militant African trade unions, poor housing conditions and limited rise in salaries when compared to the unskilled White labour. Although strikes were outlawed by the War Measure Act 145, it remained a main tool of showing dissatisfaction not only among the poor Whites, but also among the even poorer Black labour forces (Cronjé, 1945 & Stadler, 1986:268).

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[26] Minimum wages implies that a worker will only receive a minimum wage. South Africa's wage law allowed the migrant worker to sustain himself alone, without being able to support his family in the Reserves. This led to the impoverishment of the Reserves and the subsequent collapse of their economic structures (van den Berghe, 1969:226).
[27] The "Natives" that stayed in these Reserves passively resisted these laws by deserting White farms and overflowing the cities in return.

O' Meara (1996:26) argues that the idea of Afrikaner workers was firmly rooted in Christian-National Calvinism, implying that they perceived themselves as co-workers of God. Through a psychological educational process, the Afrikaner would materialise their two basic duties. The first was to work as hard as possible and the second, resulting from that, all surplus labour would be in the service of the *volk*. The vocalisation of the Christian National ideology, as stimulated by the economic boom, was firmly placed within the symbols and myths of the Broederbond-defined Afrikaner culture (Cronjé et al, 1947). D F Malan gave symbolic meaning to the economic struggle by referring to it as the Second Great Trek. Therefore, the Christian Nationalism of the 1940's was best described by Moodie and O' Meara as a dual reference to the past, in terms of symbols and myths, as well as the strict Calvinistic prescriptions of Kuyper (Ngcokovane, 1989:37 & Adam & Giliomee, 1979).

The Fagan Commission's report in 1946 on the regulation of the African industrial labour force concluded that any one of its three approaches could resolve the issue. First, total territorial segregation could be applied or secondly, discriminations either in laws or administration, on grounds other than a racial basis. Co-existence and recognising each other's differences was the concluding suggestion. It became evident that unskilled Black labour was as an essential ingredient for the economy as skilled labour. It is clear that the Stallard Commission's suggestions in 1922 regarding the Reserves were no longer applicable and thus were no longer an effective way of controlling the migrant worker (Ngcokovane, 1989:33-34).

The international status of South Africa after the Second World War together with its booming economy, never led anyone to think that South Africa was on the verge of exchanging its scope and direction so completely (O' Meara, 1996:22). By the time elections approached in 1948, the NP proclaimed itself the true representative of Afrikaner nationalism – resisting British colonialism and the "uncivilised aboriginal races" (Wolpe, 1995:80). The NP was afraid of being overwhelmed by the rising Black industrialised class that would ultimately

overtake the political power and western culture of the White people. Apartheid was believed to be the only means of securing White survival and peace among the racial groups (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989:33-34). Capitalising on the fear of the Afrikaners about the English capitalists who recognised Black trade unions and the loosening of the segregation policies in favour of the urban Blacks, the NP's support base grew stronger by the day (Wolpe, 1995:80).

The Afrikaners' discontent with the fact that the United Party (UP) Government wanted to ease control on migrant labour and pass laws, combined with its failure to implement squatting provisions[28], and its inability to raise maize prices, led to the eventual downfall of the Smuts government (Davenport, 1991:320-321).

Thus, with Smut's UP unable to attend to the capitalist interests as well as the White workers' demands, the NP/AP (Afrikaner Party) alliance managed to win a slim majority of votes against Smuts' UP. Malan's 1938 policy of segregation was a further indication of the direction the NP would take in order to protect the needs of the Whites. It became evident that limited freedoms would be allocated to the non-Whites as well as the relinquishing of the Cape Coloured's voting rights, all to further the rights of the Whites (Verkuyl, 1971:3).

4) *The Apartheid Era*: According to Ngcokovane (1989:35) the Afrikaner Nationalist believed that once the African worker succeeded in integrating with the economy it won't be long before it would strive to control political power. Bernard Magubane describes their fears: "the NP government introduced a wide range of repressive and discriminatory measures designed not only to stem the tide of African urbanisation... but also to protect the position of the White workers and their petty-bourgeois supporters" (Ngcokovane, 1989:35). The "not-so-surprising" electoral victory of the NP's parochial, racist and pro-Nazi sentiments placed SA on a course no one would have ever predicted (Stadler, 1986:268). Even Smuts, when he pointed out that "the outcome of the

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[28] Administrative problems regarding the Urban Areas Act (1923) and the Native Laws Amendment Act (1937) led to administrative disillusionment. The removal of "surplus" workers caused implementation problems since municipalities could execute this, unlike the Department of Native Affairs (O'Meara, 1996:25).

1948 election will be felt for years to come" truly underestimated the grossly inhuman acts of oppression, brutal force and racial hatred that will scar the reputation of South Africa for ever (O' Meara, 1996:31-35).

3.2.3. Introducing the Ideology of Apartheid

"Apartheid is a legislated state policy based on the separation of White and non-White races, and forcibly imposed on the majority of South Africans by a minority–elected White government which entrenched the regime's status and power (Song, 1999:4)." In a nutshell, Song's (1999:4) definition pinpoints the Apartheid ideology sufficiently. As indicated earlier in this chapter, institutionalised racism occurred long before the NP actually became the government of the day. Nevertheless, the "legislative blitzkrieg" during the post-1948 elections led to racial segregation being legitimised (Leatt et al, 1986:67). Loubser (1987: xviii) furthermore refers to Apartheid as a "totalitarian system of ideas" aiming at influencing the whole spectrum of human activities.

Legassick and Innes's Marxist explanation of Apartheid establishes the fact that Apartheid is both an expression of "capital domination" and an attempt to "reproduce separate racial and cultural identities." Through the state, the real effects will be oppression, uneven development, and exploitation, inherent of all capitalist systems (Leatt et al, 1986:67).

The basic characteristics of any ideology, specifically when referring to Apartheid, have clearly been in place since the early 1900's. The main components of Afrikaner Nationalism, as according to Leatt (1986:76-80) and de Klerk (2000:88-93), materialised in the following ways:
- *Self-determination:* The belief that all national groups should be allowed to determine their own identity and values, and to strive for independence was strengthened in 1948 when the NP won governmental power. According to Van Jaarsveld (in Leatt, 1986:76) the Afrikaners calling to a divine mission; the feeling of attachment to their *volk's* history, fatherland, and their striving for self-preservation were seldom dampened by either the English or Blacks;

- *Utopianism:* Influenced by the French and American revolutions the ultimate "heaven on earth" for the Afrikaner would be the creation of an independent state wherein their unique language, religion and culture are promoted. Racial segregation was according to the creators of Apartheid the perfect method of achieving such a dream;

- *Bureaucracy:* The effective and politicised bureaucracy of the NP changed boundaries and city structures to the dictates of Apartheid's prescriptions;

- *Volk:* This concept excludes all those who do not share the same language, religion, and history. Various symbols of strengthening this idea of a homogenous *volk* were found in the Great Trek, and the battles of Blood River and Slagtersnek. Phrases like "Israel of Africa", "exodus to the Promised Land", and "sacred history" provided the theological connection. Their political culture and emphasis of Christian Nationalism was, as already mentioned, promoted by the *Broederbond*, ATKV (*Afrikaanse Taal & Kultuur Vereniging*), and the *Ossewabrandwag*[29];

- *Race:* As exclusively manifested in discrimination, superiority, and prejudice, was the basis of Afrikaner nationalism (Van den Berghe, 1969:230). The threats of being completely dominated and/or destroyed together with their God-given belief that intermixing was a sin (story of Babel), led to racial segregation on all levels of society;

- *Structure and power:* The actual mobilisation of the Afrikaner was made possible through institutions like the *Broederbond*[30], DRC, NP, FAK (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuur Vereniging), and the *Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut.* The objectives of Afrikaner Nationalism received plausibility and succeeded with these organisational structures and their power bases;

- *Reaction to foreign culture:* The fear of domination and prescription by those foreign to their own culture and values resulted in the Afrikaner's

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[29] The Oxwagon sentinel was evidence of the surging radical Afrikaner Nationalism during the first half of the 20th century who identified greatly with Germany and resisted fighting on the side of the English during WWII (*South African history online*, 2006:1).

[30] This elite and secretive Association of Brothers (created in 1918) mainly aimed in placing fellow *Broeders* in key positions, which can then be utilized for the advancement of the *volk.* Some perceived their cultural aspirations as neo-Fascist ideas, based on race and color (Bunting, 1969: 15).

negative reaction to foreign influences. These negative elements of foreigners superseded possible positive adaptation to one another to maximise growth and prosperity;

- *Anti-imperialism:* The victimisation by imperialist Britain resulted in the Afrikaner's determination to succeed in their aims of self-determination. This would ultimately prevent any future interference in the domestic affairs of the Afrikaner *volk;*

- *De-colonialisation:* The idea of separate development for the Blacks was seen as an act of compassion and part of the de-colonialisation process. Separate promotion and control over one's racial group is seen as the ultimate goal in order to prevent any kinds of domination; and

- *Religious quality:* The church, specifically the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde,* the *Gereformeerde* and *Hervormde* churches, played a central role in religiously legitimising Afrikaner Nationalism. Calvinism provided the justification for the Great Trek. The Voortrekkers saw themselves as the chosen people, just like Israel in the Old Testament. This divine mandate kept the indigenous people subservient, which resulted in the twentieth century's institutionalisation of racial segregation and oppression. Some academics like A du Toit (in Leatt et al, 1986: 80) criticises the overemphasis of the role the Church played in this ethnic mobilisation. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the parallel between the Afrikaners and the Bible's chosen people resulted into a form of mysticism, and that through their suffering in fulfilling God's wishes, the Afrikaners would be purified (Leatt et al, 1986: 80).

Giliomee and Schlemmer (in Amstutz, 2000:2) accorded four basic principles to Apartheid:

- First, typical of an organic society, the *volk* and not the individual, was the basic unit of society;

- Second, additional personal development could only be materialised through identification with and service to the nation (Ngcokovane, 1989);

- Third, racial separation would ensure harmonious co-existence among the major population groups; and

- Last, Apartheid granted to other groups self-reliance and self-determination, exactly what the Afrikaner demanded for themselves (Amstutz, 2000:2).

Fundamentally, the Afrikaner nation believed that Apartheid would guarantee, enhance, and protect their Afrikaner national identity. Verwoerd believed that the purpose of all the historical struggles that the *volk* had to endure was to fulfil their divine calling in becoming the anchor of Western civilisation in Africa. Verkuyl (1971:3) describes Verwoerd's references to White supremacy, separate development (*Eiesoortige Ontwikkeling*), and the maintenance of a White superstructure as pseudo-dogmatic. The gospel-like propaganda regarding racial segregation was another strong characteristic of Verwoerd in which he linked all his visions with that of God. The institutionalisation of racial segregation became the primary instrument for affirming Afrikaner Nationalism. Giliomee and Schlemmer (in Amstutz, 2000:2) regarded the values of Nationalism and segregation as complementary values, each reinforcing the other.

Apartheid received moral legitimacy since it called for a concurrent commitment to the separation and equality of national groups, i.e. respecting, advancing and protecting the different nations' distinctive cultures and values. According to Amstutz (2000:2) the Afrikaners felt that Apartheid was better than the old system of racial segregation. The latter promoted socio-economic cleavages whilst the former was "fundamentally" rooted in the basic equality of all groups. Eventually Apartheid became an instrument of White social, economic and political domination instead of promoting equality, hence Afrikaner Nationalism (Amstutz, 2000:2).

3.2.4. The institutionalisation of Theopolitics: introducing the Theology of Apartheid.

Many scholars differ on the degree of influence religion and/or the DRC had regarding Apartheid's ideology. Some like T D Moodie and D H Akenson (in Amstutz, 2000:2) have argued that Apartheid was a "civil religion" where the

ideology was based in Christian Theology, and strongly influenced by Kuyperian Neo-Calvinism, and justified according to the Bible. Others such as Giliomee, Schlemmer, and Kinghorn (in Amstutz, 2000:3) felt that the role of the church (referring to the Reformed churches) was overemphasised and that Apartheid was more nationalistic, racially and culturally inclined.

From a theological perspective Loubser described Apartheid as a "fundamentalist faith system" which helped Afrikaners to cope with their "existential anxiety" caused by the Black indigenous population as well as the "Anglicisation policies" of the British (Leatt et al, 1986:67). T D Moodie's reference to "Civilised religion" and/or "theologised nationalism" coincides with O' Meara's description of the *volksgebondenheid* of the Afrikaner Christian-nationalism (Leatt et al, 1986:67). For De Gruchy (1986b: x) Christian-nationalism, encompassing both patriotism and the love for Christ, was the basis of Christianity.

The awakening of Afrikaner nationalism in the late 1880's would inevitably link the Afrikaner's socio-political aspirations with religion and their sacred Bible, recognising the historic fusion between religion and the socio-political spheres since the 1600's onwards. For Loubser (2002:6) the emancipation of the slaves (1834) and the liberation wars against the British, indicated the most notable changes in the theological arguments on socio-political issues. As noted above, the church was initially subject to the state but ever since the emancipation of the slaves, the DRC started to raise its voice based on national consciousness (Loubser, 2002:6).

Totius (in Loubser, 1987:24 & 25) made the first move towards such a people's, or ethnic theology. By using Genesis 11, Totius demonstrated the uniqueness of the Afrikaans language. Acts 2:5-12 and Revelation 5:9,7:9 & 14:6 reiterated his perception that the diversity of tongues was willed by God. The Afrikaner's calling, as predetermined by God,[31] was the justification and legitimisation of the liberation struggle. Therefore, the *volk* also needed to retain their separate

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[31] The calling was justified by the Old Testament's idea of Israel's election in Deut. 14:2 (Loubser, 1987:25).

identity by striving for independence from any outside authority (Loubser, 2002:6). The fight against any foreign threat led to several tragic clashes and events like Blood River, the English concentration camps, Blaauwkrantz and Slagtersnek. Together with celebrations like Day of the Covenant and gathering places such as the Voortrekker-; Woman's- and Language Monuments, sacred rituals and national religious symbols were established (Loubser, 1987:24 & 25).

It is true that the DRC itself played a limited role in politics before the 1800's due to British rule. But the fact remains, since the late 1800's and specifically after the 1948 elections, the DRC gained in political power as well. It does not imply that the DRC was the only major policy maker of the government, but as an essential moral institution, the close symbiosis between NP policies and affirmations by the DRC, led to the eventual victory at the polling stations. Given the notable predominance of Christianity within the Afrikaner society, it would have been difficult to institute the Apartheid regime without the implicit support of Christians, in particular, the DRC (Amstutz, 2000:4).

According to Amstutz the noticeable role of the DRC in the public life of South Africa was based on two realities: First, church, state, religion and society have always been historically intertwined. Second, this interrelationship has been a result of the Afrikaners' commitment to religiously-embedded politics where the National Party assumed direct responsibility to the Almighty for carrying out their Christian responsibilities in politics and government (Amstutz, 2000:4). W A De Klerk subsequently referred to the NP as a party which "was itself becoming, if not a church, then a party imbued with religion - a secular religion - at its very roots" (De Gruchy, 1986:34).

Conformably, Afrikaner churches believed that they, too, had indirect responsibilities towards public life. A strong sense for order, overcoming adversity through righteous behaviour, and commitment to the community that is more important than the individual's rights are all characteristics of the global reformed faith. Amstutz (2000:4) sums it up when he said, "the South Africa

Reformed faith has emphasised preservation more than transformation, and order more than reform". For example, DRC clergy obeyed and supported legitimate political authority while also directing, agreeing with and where necessary, challenging government initiatives according to moral and Biblical norms. Mostly, however, the DRC proved to be more effective in legitimising government policies than in criticising them[32]. Villa-Vicencio (1990: 132) baldly refers to Church neutrality as "almost trite to point out that the Church has never hesitated to take sides". Thus, it is clear that the DRC itself, as a segregated institution, was entirely comfortable with racial separation (Amstutz, 2000:4).

The Biblical justification of the ideology of Apartheid could be traced back to the Netherlands and Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). His pamphlet, *Uniformity, the Curse of Modern Life,* has been described by many as the true source of the Apartheid Bible. To Kuyper, the social spheres of life such as the state, society and the church, are under the direct authority of our sovereign God (Song, 1999: 4-5). These spheres had a certain degree of their own authority and not even sin could destroy these "creation ordinances"[33] (Loubser, 2002: 8). Nationalistic concepts like *volk* were referred to as sovereign ethnic units, and the creation ordinances emphasising the principle of diversity, fitted perfectly into the Apartheid archetype (Song, 1999: 4-5).

Kinghorn (in Loubser, 1996: 325) made a comprehensive study on the Apartheid Theology. He allocated three theories that formed the crux of the philosophical elements of this theology. The first doctrine of *continuous creation* refers to the evolutionary development of organisms that was believed to be "the visual form of an original abstract idea" (Loubser, 1996: 325). History, being the medium in the unfolding of this original idea, reveals God's idea through the history of the people and/or church. The theory of the *harmonious balance* of reality applies to social relations. When God apportions His greatness equally among all quarters of reality, the individual will be able to mirror some of His

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[32] Occasionally the DRC raised its voice in protest of certain government initiatives, such as the promulgation of Native Laws Amendment bill in 1957. This is not to say that all members of the DRC approved its policies and actions. Prominent theologians like Prof. B. B. Keet, Prof. B. M. Marais and Rev. Beyers Naudé condemned the political role played by the DRC (Amstutz, 2000:4).

glory. Needless to say, this contributed to the idea of diversity, as willed by God. The theory of a *biologically determined collectivism* derives from the early process whereby mankind was classified into different races. Social harmony would follow when harmonious balances were evident among these groups. The maintenance of these balances and harmonies was a moral obligation so as to fulfil God's abstract idea (Loubser, 1996: 325).

The twentieth century's theological justification of Apartheid was found in Neo-Calvinism (Loubser, 1987: 33). Although no historical evidence has been found in the historical writings of the Afrikaner, the nineteenth century patriotism and nationalistic goals were definitely influenced by Calvinistic thoughts (Leatt et al, 1986:80). Both Rev. Coetzee and Prof. du Plessis described South African Calvinism as a commandment from God Himself, which eventually through historical experience and knowledge demanded no equality. Calvinism's point of departure is then *the combination of both revelation and experience:* Biblical revelation teaches us of unity of the human race whereas experience via contact with the natives, promotes diversity (Loubser, 2002: 8). The chosen *volk* aiming to fulfil God's will in Africa gave the historical impetus for the Great Trek (Leatt et al, 1986:80).

Neo-Calvinists gave a new twist to Kuyper's idea of sovereignty in its own sphere. The society, as an organic whole, is now seen as a unit composed of different ethnic groups, each forming part of the holistic organism of humanity. These collectivities are responsible to God alone and must also develop according to their own origins. Loubser (2002:9) furthermore identified two elements of this theology namely order (its God's Will) and ethics (because of God's command it should be obeyed). Plurality as quoted by Kuyper from the Scripture, set the manner in which the church would be structured (Loubser, 2002: 9).

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[33] These laws of nature imply that God controls and determines creation in its diversity of sovereign spheres. Each sphere has a certain authority subject to God's will and moral order (Loubser, 1987:39-40).

Verkuyl (in Kinghorn, 1998:38-42) critically refers to the three building-blocks regarding the theological justification of Apartheid:

- The Bible's message emphasises differentiation between races, equally important as the "unity of the human race, reconciliation in Christ and the restoration of human fellowship". This modern reference to race however is nowhere to be found in the creation ordinances of the Bible. By accepting the differences of race as crucial, creates the basis of a racist ethic and creed. The religious quality of the Afrikaner nationalism has been given dimension by the Creation story[34] as reiterated by B J Vorster when relating to Babel in Genesis [35] (Kinghorn, 1998:38-42). This however overlooks the fact that the Bible has not as yet given the final word on God's purposes with the different peoples;

- God's intentions are seen in His vision of the oecumenopolis and the New Jerusalem of Revelation 11, but it is being totally disregarded by the Afrikaner; and

- A specific interpretation of Paul's Areopagus speech (Acts 12:26) borders on extreme pseudo-theology. The speech is an attack on racial rites and ethos of the Greeks and, according to Verkuyl, definitely not the basis for a new racial myth (Verkuyl, 1971:4-5).

The first explanatory attempt made by the DRC that accepted the tradition of separation as being in accordance with the Scriptures was made in 1948 in the Transvaal Synod (Prozesky, 1990:64). Kuyper's popular theology reached its pinnacle during the 1940's since:

- Apartheid was now firmly put in place;

- The different peoples were seen as sovereign in their own spheres;

- The idea of diversity as part of the creation ordinances became more and more popular;

- Nationalist concepts like a national calling were now part of the "Kuyperian theology"; and

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[34] See also Du Toit's interpretation of the Creation story during a People's Congress, 1944 in Loubser (1987:56-57).
[35] When Vorster stated in 1977:"Yes, I believe profoundly ... that we (Afrikaners) have been appointed by Providence to play a role here (in South Africa), and that we have the human material to play that role," religious justification by the state has been formalised (Leatt et al, 1986:66). Church theology reiterates once again state theology.

- "Christian-national" progressed as the new label (Loubser, 2002: 9).

Biblical proofs for Apartheid were accepted since 1943. In 1947, the DRC further supported this trend by officially accepting the report of Prof. E P Groenewald containing elaborate Biblical evidence for Apartheid. These scriptural proofs suggest that an "ethnic hermeneutic" be applied resulting in the Bible being read within a nationalistic context. Fortuitous facts lead to established moral norms and individuals being romanticised. The synthesis of the different nations is demoted into an "invisible" unity (Loubser, 2002:12). During the 1950's, Potgieter believed that Biblical quotations were not suffice, and that the whole ideology of Apartheid should be seen within the broader framework of the Christendom. These principles include that humanity was created according to God's image and that they should have equal dignity. Despite the fact that humanity should be in unison he also emphasised that God ordained diversity. Potgieter furthermore distinguished between a negative division (*verskeurdheid*) and a positive diversity (*verskeidenheid*) of which the former should be abolished, according to God's wishes (Loubser, 1987:76).

3.3.   Summary

The most southern tip of Africa did not escape imperialism and its oppressive propensities. Finding solace in the doctrines of Calvin and Kuyper, a new belief system was born, Apartheid. *Separateness* became a desirable option and an effective mechanism for survival. The theological justification of Apartheid was a natural product when Biblical guarantees and correlations were attached to this political doctrine.

When the most influential White church gave recognition to Apartheid, the theology of Apartheid was created. The closeness between religion and politics became indisputable. The theology of Apartheid was now firmly cemented in the heart and soul of the Afrikaner. The moral and ideological support that the DRC gave to Apartheid would become the main thrust for the NP's segregationist policies.

Simultaneously, African nationalism developed as an antithesis to the superiority of the Whites. Facing blatant oppression and discrimination resulted in alternative religio-political action. Resistance grew inside the walls of poverty and churches, ultimately challenging the comforting symbiosis between the DRC and the NP.

CHAPTER 4   WINDS OF CHANGE

4.1.   Introduction

The critique on the religious justification of Apartheid was inevitable. The manipulation of the Holy Scriptures and Christian values for the sake of promoting exclusive socio-economic and political rights and privileges were unthinkable and detestable for most liberals. Churches were traditionally seen as neutral places of refuge and solace. However, more and more they faced challenges regarding the promotion of social justice as well as the establishing of basic rights for their congregations.

Resistance to Apartheid grew stronger by the day. The moral debate on disobeying government became insignificant in the face of Apartheid's brutality. Theopolitics were apparent when one explores the strained relationships between the Anglican Church and the NP government. Inspired by justice and equality, both church and freedom fighter continued to challenge and defy the racist NP.

4.2.   Theology of anti-Apartheid: critiquing state theology

The theology of anti-Apartheid developed twofold:

- It came to the forefront when English and independent churches started to openly resist government's infringement on their autonomy; and
- As a direct rejection of the government's Biblical justifications of evil praxis.

4.2.1.1.   The Anglican Church

The increase in unjust practices together with the disenfranchising of the majority of citizens, led to the CPSA to communicate their political frustration to

civil authorities. The Africans, also disillusioned by the racial character of the traditional White churches broke away and created their own churches, adding a different approach to the theology of anti-Apartheid. As already mentioned, the Ethiopian church was one of the main streams of these Black churches. The Zionist church groups additionally aimed at blending together the European Christian doctrines with their traditional values. These independent movements and churches were clearly signalling their protest against paternalism, racism, and White control. The emphasis on their own African ways and values subsequently replaced the predominant European character, which dictated their church affairs (De Gruchy, 1986a:45).

The anti-Apartheid campaign by the churches against the state was noticeable, particularly since 1948. The churches criticised all unjust laws, which influenced the social spheres of the societies (Worsnip, 1991:47). The manner in which the state executed these laws was also being regarded as illegitimate and inhuman. The theology of anti-Apartheid was set in motion when the underlying tension between government and church could no longer be concealed. The antitheses of their doctrines made clashes unavoidable. When the government legalised separation based on ethnicity, it was in direct contrast to the church's principle of reconciliation and the promotion of social equality. The racial policies of the state furthermore hampered the church's influence when property in Black areas were devalued as well as the appropriation of Black schools, church hospitals and so on. What seems to be ironic about the whole situation is the fact that the 1961 Constitution embodies the idea of a Christian society where religious persecution is not accommodated. Additionally, the religious rights of the minority are to be respected and that the church should continue with its task of prophetic witnessing. Nevertheless, what about protecting the religious rights of the majority? And, how is it possible for churches to pursue their missionary obligations when oppressive tools are put in place to hinder them from doing so?

In 1941, the Anglican Church's Johannesburg diocese appointed a commission to define and determine the "mind of Christ for this land, and to the effective

preaching and teaching of the same" (Suberg, 1999:86-7). The resultant report *Church and the Nation* showed that the current political dispensation of racial segregation and White domination was irreconcilable with God's word (Suberg, 1999:86-7). Clause C of the *Church and the Nation* Report states further that:

> The *Primary duty of the Church ... is to be the church*, and to serve the nation and State by proclaiming the will of God as the supreme standard to which all human wills must be subject, and to which all human conduct must conform (Suberg, 1999:85-6).

It became clear that differences of opinion regarding this report were reflecting the dissimilar feelings of church members. Hastings (Suberg, 1999:86-7), for example, felt that to gradually address the evils of society was incomprehensible. Evil should be dealt with, and immediately too. Worsnip (in Suberg, 1999:86-7) was also of the opinion that the Anglican Church never considered the fact that the White regime might have been illegitimate.

Huddlestone and Scott (in Suberg, 1999:91) were among those clerics who felt that the report *Church and the Nation* was not critical enough of government policies. Scott even founded an extra-parliamentary organisation in 1944, the Campaign for Right and Justice that aimed in promoting social, economic and political justice for all South Africans. Unfortunately, Scott resigned soon thereafter due to the various role-players such as the South Africa Communist Party (SACP) who he felt abused the Campaign for their own hidden agendas. Scott's search for justice did not end then. He continued fighting for the Africans by participating in passive resistance action campaigns, continued living illegally in slums and ended up representing the Herero tribe of South West Africa in the UN. His activities however led to him being declared a prohibited immigrant in South Africa in 1950. Even in Britain he established the Africa Bureau and persevered in his verbal attacks against the then newly created NP government (Suberg, 1999:91).

Needless to say, given the time frame, this report managed to critically address the interrelationship between state and church, as well as to convert apathy into action.

A massive effort was needed to overcome the appalling ignorance of White church members concerning the sufferings and disabilities of their non-European brothers in Christ, and to break down their even more appalling apathy. A concentrated and concerted effort is needed to increase and strengthen the contact, fellowship and understanding between White and non-White Christians, and to awaken church members to the fact that their Christian vocation demanded that they take responsibility for their society and their politics (Brookes, 1968:85). The Johannesburg diocese's report, *Church and the Nation*, was therefore one of the first concrete attempts to put in writing the CPSA's discontent with the government. This however was not necessarily the reflection of the church as a whole, although other dioceses followed suit soon thereafter (Suberg, 1999:87).

With the victory of the NP in 1948, clashes between the government and the Anglican Church became more intense. The diverse opinions, within the CPSA, on how to address the injustices of the NP regime caused discomfort and disunity at stages. The Black and White parishes were sometimes opposing each other when dealing with Apartheid. One needs to remember that the CPSA was not the only church that raised questions and criticism against the NP and even the DRC. Other denominations such as the Christian Council of South Africa also expressed their concerns in Rosettenville in 1949. They also reiterated the fact that unity, education, and freedoms should be accessible for everyone (Prozesky, 1990:106 & Suberg, 1999: 87). The bishops initially censured some individuals, who openly spoke out against Apartheid, but this gradually changed until bishops and clergy alike became the instruments and spokespersons of the disenfranchised.

The second bishop of Johannesburg, Geoffrey Clayton, for example felt that changes should come from the heart and will of those in power. Only then will true institutional change become visible and thus inevitable (Worsnip, 1991: 54). His criticisms towards the government were only brought forward when government policies infringed on the autonomy of the church. Despite his good

leadership qualities and outspokenness, Clayton was unable to stem the opposition from within his own diocese. This was especially true when referring to other clergy like Huddlestone, Raynes, Reeves and Scott (Villa-Vicencio, 1996:130-144). By living in the same slums as the oppressed and enduring the same as the Africans, they called for stronger actions to destroy the evil of the South African society (Prozesky & De Gruchy, 1995:94).

English speaking churches were sometimes ambiguous in their stance against racism. This was partly because their congregations were comprised of both Whites and Blacks with their policies still connected with colonial ideologies. Solidarity with the needs of the Blacks were not always witnessed, especially since some churches focused more on evangelising than improving the material needs of the Blacks (Prozesky & De Gruchy, 1995:88).

As early as 1954, the Bantu Education Act might have led to a conflict between government and churches. However, by handing over their mission schools to government, friction was sidestepped. When the Government proposed to replace section 9 (7) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act by section 29 (c) of the Native Laws Amendment Bill in 1957, also known as the "church clause", dissatisfaction was apparent. These amendments gave permission to the Minister, with the consent of the local authority, to forbid the participation of any African at any church. During an interview with the Minister of Native Affairs the church leaders enunciated four principles (Suberg, 1999:87):

- The gospel of Jesus Christ emanates from God to all mankind and is subject to no human limitations;
- The task is laid on the church of Christ, in obedience to the Head of the church, to proclaim the gospel throughout the world and to all peoples;
- The right to determine how, when and to whom the gospel shall be proclaimed is exclusively in the competence of the church; and
- It is the duty of the state, as the servant of God, to allow freedom to the church in the execution of its divine calling and to respect the sovereignty of the church in its own sphere.

As a result the Minister modified the church clause in such a way that was acceptable to the DRC (Suberg, 1999:87).

Due to the fact that the multiracial character of the English church would be destroyed, the CPSA made it quite clear to government that they will not obey worldly laws that are in extreme contrast to their consciences. The huge reactions of the English churches led to the amendment of the bill that, was nonetheless ignored after being ratified. Due to the economical and legal implications of Apartheid, it should be noted that the multiracial congregational character of the CPSA was sparse. Many of the White South Africans accepted the de facto racial separation, causing tensions among the different racial groupings within the church structure (Suberg, 1999:96).

Following in the footsteps of Huddlestone and Scott, Ambrose Reeves continued to fight against Apartheid. His anti-Apartheid activities was however short-lived when he was deported in 1960 and refused re-entry into South Africa. Despite all the measures the government took to repress criticisms of its political systems, the "theology of anti-Apartheid" continued. These clergy, whether pacifists or activists, were like a multi-headed dragon. Eliminating the head (of critique) led to the birth of various others. Such was the case with the archbishop de Blank who persevered with his attacks against South Africa, both nationally and internationally, regardless of the possibility of deportation. His aggressive manner made many supporters uncomfortable and it severely strained relations with the DRC, especially when he requested the expulsion of the DRC from the World Council of Churches (WCC) (Suberg, 1999:98).

The political priests, Reeves and Huddlestone, continued criticising the government, leading to tension between themselves and Archbishop Clayton, who believed that the church should not align itself with political organisations (Villa-Vicencio, 1996:135). Huddlestone's book, *Naught for your comfort* (1956), shows his convictions that the Apartheid legislation need to be defied:

> I believe that, because God became Man, therefore human nature in
> itself has a dignity and a value, which is infinite. I believe that this

conception carries with it the idea that the State exists for the individual, not the individual for the State. Any doctrine based on racial or colour prejudice and enforced by the State is therefore an affront to human dignity and *ipso facto* an insult to God himself. It is for this reason that I heel bound to oppose not only the policy of the present government of the Union of South Africa, but the legislation, which flows from this policy (Suberg, 1999:92).

4.2.1.2. Black theology

The linkage between Christians and politics is evident when one looks at the promoters and leaders of African nationalism. Since South Africa is known as a Christian nation, it was not surprising that Christianity would be an integral part of African nationalism. Most of the prominent persons and leaders (such as Albert Luthuli and Robert Sobukwe) of these movements were educated and trained as ministers within the English churches. Although the Christian missions brought White and Blacks together and united them in their beliefs, the Black leaders realised that their struggle was their own. Just as racism was part of their everyday life, Christian convictions and political struggles were equally inseparable. Even though they initially went along with separation if it was to be fairly implemented, this changed with the introduction of the Native Land Act of 1913. Rev Dube, president of the SANNC, rejected the Act, claiming that this would "take away means of independence and self-improvement" (De Gruchy, 1986:45, 48-9).

The parallel between the Afrikaners' DRC and the Black nationalists is ironically similar. Both implemented their political strategies under the umbrella of their church and vice versa. The initial passive resistance characteristic of the movements was therefore a direct consequence of Christianity's principles of "patience rather than angry revolt, dialogue rather than violent reaction" (De Gruchy, 1986:48-9). So, despite African cultures and traditions, African nationalism tried to bridge diversity among the Blacks and promote national unity, especially regarding political matters (De Gruchy, 1986:48-9).

The inability of the church to redress the socio-political system of "injustice and dehumanisation" caused great distress among Black Christians (Nel, 1994: 138-142). Associated with the liberation struggle and the Black Consciousness

Movement[36], it came to the foreground in 1971 and played a vital role in making church leaders aware that White church leaders, which needed to change, controlled all the mainstream churches (Nel, 1994:138-142).

Black theology as a form of Christian theology aimed to redress the racial issue, as justified in the Bible of the White Afrikaners. According to Prozesky & De Gruchy (1994:100) "(it) was a theological reflection on the basis of the Black experience of suffering, oppression and struggle". As Boesak declared:

> Black theology is the theological reflection of Black Christians on the situation in which they live and on their struggle for liberation. Blacks ask: what does it mean to believe in Jesus Christ when one is Black and living in a world controlled by White racists? And what if these racists call themselves Christians too (Leatt et al, 1986:118)?

Thus, Black theology was introduced in South Africa as a direct attack on the NP and the DRC's theology of Apartheid. Just as the regime tried to religiously manipulate its socio-political oppressive policies, Black theology tried to activate its Christian supporters to become engaged in the abolishment of the government. "The use of Biblical symbols as exodus and resurrection to conscientise Blacks" was the ultimate way in achieving the overthrow (Leatt et al, 1986:119).

4.2.1.3. The Dutch Reformed Church

Ever since the NP came to power, evidence indicated limited tension between the DRC and the state. From the onset, some Afrikaners (mainly DRC ministers) felt disturbed by the way government directed its policies in order to enhance racial domination and socio-economical inequalities. The uneasiness felt over the moral, social, religious and political injustices of the regime found their way into the church as well. Unfortunately, it became clear that the initial internal resistance to the DRC's Biblical justifications of segregation had no real impact on its rank-and-file members, the DRC leadership, or the government.

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[36] Naude felt initially that this movement aimed at Black Apartheid (Ryan, 1990: 139).

Criticism against the use of the Bible to support Apartheid was seen as early as 1940 when Dr. B J Marais voiced his concerns regarding the misuse if the Bible for theological-political purposes. Despite the criticism, Apartheid was still endorsed. Prof. Pistorius followed suit in 1950 when he added that the church should not seek proofs for policies that already exist. According to Pistorius (in Loubser, 1987:771-74), the Bible is now being distorted to justify one's own socio-political values. Pistorius claims furthermore that the Bible is not a handbook on such issues and could certainly not include practical measures as to how to address certain social problems. Prof. Keet added to these protests by pointing out that:

- Apartheid as an ecclesiastical policy is not the same as a political policy;
- Unity and diversity are interrelated concepts addressing the same issue;
- The Bible provides a salvation history and is not intended as a cultural history; and
- Division on an ecclesiastical level is not a selfless motive but rather based on colour prejudice[37] (Loubser, 1987:771-74 & Keet, 1955).

It would be one-sided and wrong to suggest that there was no apparent opposition from within the DRC (Ngcokovane, 1989:50). The growing theological opposition towards Apartheid is therefore further emphasised by the following events:

- The Cottescloe Consultation of 1960[38];
- The resignation of Rev. Beyers Naudé from the DRC ministry (1963);
- The "Koinonia Declaration" of 1977;
- The Belhar Confession of 1982;
- Adoption of the "Church and Society" statements by the 1986 and 1990 General Synods;
- The Kairos document of 1985 and the;
- 1990 Rustenberg Conference (Amstutz, 2000:6).

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[37] Keet's book, "Suid Afrika – waarheen?" (1955) critically analysed and rejected biblical justification of Apartheid.
[38] For more detail, read the Cottescloe Consultation statement in Villa-Vicencio (1986:211-213).

Differences within the DRC, in the form of Pragmatic and Ideological Apartheid, started to increase. Loubser (1987:83) describes the Pragmatic view on Apartheid as a transient contingency measure to minimise tension between different nations. The ideological approach was a final solution to protect the position of the Whites. This differentiation had no meaning for South African Blacks since discrimination and oppression were still the nexus to this exclusive ideology. The religious equivalent of dissatisfaction was demonstrated with the Cottescloe debacle. After Sharpeville, the World Council of Churches' regional committee arranged a meeting in 1960 with all relevant parties at Cottescloe, Johannesburg. The DRC was also represented by the Transvaal and Cape Synods. The Transvaal and Cape Synods' reports marked the absence of Biblical justification regarding Apartheid.

The DRC delegation saw no conflict between the Cottescloe Report and the views of their own Synod (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:211-213). The Cottescloe meeting furthermore agreed on open churches, rejected the ban on mixed marriages as well as promoting a visible unity in Christ. Loubser (1987: 87-88) observes that the "Apartheid Bible was on the shelf". The unexpected public hysteria led to the report being repudiated by government, the DRC's breaking of ties with the World Council of Churches and the newly established Christian Institution of Dr. Beyers Naudé. Government and the DRC alike perceived this visible unity that the Cottescloe meeting advocated, as a severe intrusion on the exclusive nature of Apartheid. After the Cottescloe debacle, the DRC became a prisoner of its own "Apartheid Bible" and subsequently lost its pioneering role regarding racial interrelations (Loubser, 1987:87-88).

During a General Synod of the DRC in 1966, another racially based principle emanated. Ethnic self-preservation linked with Christian Trusteeship shows once again the socio-political trends within the DRC. Diversity and fulfilment within one's own sphere is the ideal of a Christian State and would fulfil God's will. Although no scriptural proofs were used for the ban on mixed marriages the Synod argued that should it be enforced on a large scale and the distinctiveness of races was jeopardised, sin was then committed. The

emphasis on "Calvinist Christian political science" reflects the influential interrelationship existing between government and church (Ngcokovane, 1989: 47-48).

During the golden age of Apartheid the DRC's position on Apartheid was most expressly documented in *Human Relations and the South African Scene in the Light of Scripture* (HRLS), as adopted by the General Synod in 1974. This orthodox document espoused the Scriptures as the main basis of its socio-political polices. With respect to interracial relations, it reinstated two norms, namely the unity of all and ethnic pluralism (Sections 8, 9 and 13). With the New Testament as a point of departure, the HRLS report defends the doctrines of racial segregation and separate development: "in specific circumstances and under specific conditions the New Testament makes provision for the regulation on the basis of separate development of the co-existence of various peoples in one country" (Amstutz, 2000:5).

Although the report implies that ethnic diversity is not the highest value, but it is rather Christians' brotherly love for all, and their pursuit for social justice in inter-personal relationships. Constant inconsistencies regarding diversity result in the conclusion that diversity is more a norm that needs to be followed. The Afrikaner is still romanticised, the Bible still being interpreted in a justifiable manner, always against the backdrop of neo-Calvinism (Loubser, 1987:100). As Kinghorn observed: "the real impact of the DRC on the Apartheid debate was its moral legitimisation of the regime, not its advocacy of specific policies" (Amstutz, 2000:5).

Thus, instead of crossing boundaries of race, gender, class, or ethnicity the DRC and other Afrikaner churches promoted the values and rights of certain groups. The DRC's actions and policies indicate its unconditional acceptance of the Afrikaner culture and social structure. The DRC's means of oppression[39] were apparent when

- Supporting government policies;

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[39] As heard during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) confessions (*Mail & Guardian*, 2000:3-5).

- The involvement in state structures, most notably the military chaplaincy;
- Dissidents were suppressed, condemned or censured;
- Internal structures were along racial lines; and
- Propagating state theology (*Mail & Guardian*, 2000: 3-5).

By omitting responsibility in, and lacking the courage to challenge the government, some faith communities, such as the DRC, became as guilty as the NP when atrocities against humankind were committed and allowed within church structures.

The Sharpeville incident and the reluctance of government to address the needs of the Blacks led Rev. Beyers Naudé, a loyal Afrikaner Nationalist, to distance himself from the DRC. When he became the director of the Christian Institute (CI), he was forced to resign from the DRC (Prozesky & De Gruchy, 1995:97). This inter-dominational centre aimed to address the social injustices by means of re-educating the Christians on the reading of the Bible. De Gruchy (1986a:107) describes the CI's efforts as a "confession movement". Needless to say, the regime was not impressed by this situation and eventually banned Naudé for the role he played in reinvigorating the Afrikaner's social conscience (Villa-Vicencio & Niehaus, 1995:27). Beyers Naude's continuous collision with the state and the presumption that he supported violence made Vorster ultimately demand: "he owes South Africa an explanation" (Ryan, 1990:137).

The *Koinonia statement*, refined by a multiracial and ecumenical group of Christians from the Reformed belief, shared a desire for greater racial justice. The declaration reflected the uneasy conscience of Christians regarding racial inequalities, and advocated "greater economic assistance to Blacks, the inclusion of representation of all ethnic groups in negotiations over South Africa's future, to establish greater accountability over the detention system, and to abolish laws that impede fundamental human freedoms" (Amstutz, 2000:6). Although this declaration did not lead to any real change in government policies, it portrayed a fearless challenge to the regime by leading Calvinist academics and church leaders (Amstutz, 2000:6).

Two representatives of the Reformed Churches of the Netherlands, Drs. Kunst and Kruyswijk, attended the 1970 General Synod of the DRC during which time they rejected the foundation of Apartheid as unchristian. Their hope of the DRC shifting away from Apartheid was sadly in vain since the Synod's report was actually more retrogressive in its defence of Apartheid. However, Prof. Marais and Dr. Landman together with a growing minority within the church, started to raise their voice in their disapproval of Apartheid and the DRC position. Simultaneously, the daughter churches began to take a more independent stance against the "mother-church". They accepted the 1968 Reformed Ecumenical Synod resolutions, morally condemning Apartheid. The newly appointed moderator, Dr. J D Vorster, instigated further protest from within the church regarding his authoritarian manner in which he absolutised his personal opinions under the auspices and authority of God (Verkuyl, 1971: 5-6).

It became increasingly apparent that protests against Apartheid were no longer only from foreign or the non-White ranks, but also from within the ranks of the church itself (Verkuyl, 1971: 5-6). The DRC was suspended from the World Alliance of Reformed Church in 1982. The main reason was the DRC's commitment to evil Apartheid instead of promoting the word of God (Ngcokovane, 1989:161).

The NG Mission Church also issued a *Confession of Faith* in 1982, declaring that Apartheid was a sin. Trying to justify Apartheid scripturally, made a mockery of the Gospel and consequently led to theological heresy (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:241). The *Belhar Confessions* (1982 and 1986) as well as the *Kairos Document* (1985) were clear indicators that state theology is facing a decisive point in history (Chidester, 1991:128-130). The Christian faith was now at a crossroads. The 1982 *Confession of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church* (DRMC) was a product of years of protesting against Apartheid Theology and was finally accepted in 1986 as a full confessional document[40]. According to the

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[40] The Reformed Church in African (Indian based) rejected this Confession of Faith as a confession but accepts it as a declaration. Social issues are not to be included in confessions but should be seen as part of the declaration of faith, as based on the Bible (Reformed Church in Africa: 67).

DRMC Apartheid as a theology was "idolatry and heresy" (Loubser, 1987:147-149). The DRMC Confession therefore placed great emphasis on the unity of the church, rejecting any form of separation or diversity. The failure to promote spiritual unity was perceived a great sin. Reconciliation needed to be promoted in order to replace the so-called divine sanctioning of racial or colour separation. Ideologies that advocated injustices would be condemned in the Name of God (Loubser, 1987:147-149).

One of the most momentous and observable challenges to the regimes was the DRC's adoption of *Church and Society* (CS), designed to replace the 1974 HRLS study. Adopted by the 1986 General Synod, the CS emphasised fundamental moral norms (more so than the 1974 report's focus on scriptural edification) relevant to political and social life and opened the door for racially mixed congregations (Venter, 1989:152 & Villa-Vicencio, 1987:47). Apart from breaking with Apartheid, this report, regarding its contribution to human suffering, "confesses its participation with humility and sorrow" (Villa-Vicencio, 1987:47). In an effort to refine further the DRC's moral stance on Apartheid, it adopted a second version, the CSII, during the 1990 General Synod in Bloemfontein. This updated study provided a more discriminating and extensive assessment of Apartheid. Most importantly, the DRC confessed to wrongly using the Bible to justify Apartheid and contradicting the Biblical norms of love and righteousness. The CSII states:

> While the Dutch Reformed Church ... sought the will of God and his Word for our society, the church made the error of allowing forced separation and division of peoples in its own circle to be considered a Biblical imperative. The Dutch Reformed Church should have distanced itself much earlier from this view and admits and confesses its neglect (Villa-Vicencio, 1987:47).

What is remarkable about the *Kairos document*[41] is that for the first time in South Africa's history this document was using the Black community's experience and situations as a point of reference (Loubser, 1987:149-152). The *Kairos document* specifically refers to state, church, and prophetic theology

(Villa-Vicencio, 1986:252-255). State *Theology* according to the *Kairos document* is "a theological justification of the status quo in South Africa, i.e. racism, capitalism and totalitarianism. It blesses injustice, canonises the will of the powerful and reduces the poor to passivity, obedience and apathy" (*Mail & Guardian*, 2000:3-5).

The *Kairos document* harshly attacks the means by which the *immoral and illegitimate* government implemented and ensured the status quo (Villa-Vicencio, 1990: 102):

- The misuse of its so-called divine right to enforce laws and orders;
- The misapplication of theological concepts and Biblical phrases (like Roman 13:1-7) for political purposes;
- The over-exaggerated fear concerning Communism where all opposition were generally classified as being communist in orientation; and
- The state made ill usage of God's name in order to suppress, its military chaplains in furthering the regime's evilness (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:252-255 & Loubser, 1987:152-154).

With respect to Church Theology, the *Kairos document* addresses the English-speaking churches. Referring to reconciliation, the document wishes "nothing more than peace which is based on truth, justice and love" (Loubser, 1987:149-152). The moment the Apartheid regime repents its sinful ways true reconciliation will start to take place. Regarding true justice, implicating personal guilt, as well as structural injustice, the *Kairos document* urges the citizens and/or oppressed to strive for reform themselves. Non-violence in all matters of society should be enhanced at all costs although criticism on this aspect includes the possibility that the *Kairos document* might unintentionally provide an excuse for Black violence (Chidester, 1991:128-129). The lack of political strategy and social analysis are further criticisms of Church Theology. Prophetic Theology addresses the theological nature of this document. A situational analysis and interpretation on what is currently happening in South Africa

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[41] Also perceived as a South African document on "liberation theology" the Kairos document addressed three types of theology within the South African context (Loubser, 1987:149-152).

indicates that this theology is confrontational and action-orientated, a typical characteristic of Liberation Theology. It is sad to note that once again, the Bible is interpreted of only one side, this time from a "suffering and oppression" view, irrespective of the ultimate message of the Bible (Loubser, 1987:155-159 & Villa-Vicencio, 1986:256-265).

Finally, during the *Rustenberg Declaration*, one of the major themes addressed was the issue of confession for the past injustices resulting from Apartheid. The *Rustenberg Declaration,* among other things, called the Christian community to confess and restitute for the evils of Apartheid. Three groups were urged to repent: those who had supported and justified Apartheid theologically, those who had remained neutral regardless of racial unjustness, and those victims of state policies who failed to resist oppression. It is important to note that the DRC did not officially sanction the statement; its delegates agreed on its essential themes (Amstutz, 2000:6).

The DRC's abolition of the Prohibition of the Mixed Marriages Act as well as its opening of doors to all races was a success on the micro level. However, the failure to unite with the Mission church and the Reformed Church in Africa, showed that reconciliation and integration only existed in theory (Prozesky, 1990:70).

4.3. Golden age of Apartheid

4.3.1. Apparatus of the Totalitarian Nationalist regime

Prior to 1994, SA was perceived internationally as a totalitarian state with the exclusive promotion of the Whites' welfare, status and survival. By looking at the various criteria when classifying totalitarianism, it is clear that the NP in South Africa did everything in its power to promote its oppressive ideology of Apartheid, specifically since 1948.

When studying Apartheid, it is apparent that institutionalised racism could be traced throughout South Africa's history. Moreover, although the NP itself did not invent racial segregation, the institutionalisation of Apartheid and Afrikaner

nationalism found its mechanism through the NP. To consolidate Afrikaner nationalism even further, the Nationalist regime developed and implemented various laws and mechanisms to strengthen it.

The initial tools for strengthening Apartheid and to obtain economic prosperity were found in the establishment and control of *Die Burger* (a newspaper), the *Nasionale Pers* (a publishing company), the KWV (a co-operative), AVBOB (burial company), Santam and Sanlam (Insurance companies), *Broederbond* and the ATKV (cultural organisation). The Afrikaner furthermore dominated skilled positions in the public service sector, while state funds financed the struggling agricultural sectors (Leatt et al, 1986:71-72).

Given the amount of influence that the *Broederbond* exerted, a short reference to its ideological base is necessary. In 1918, Afrikaner intellectuals created an Afrikaner organisation called the *Broederbond* which represented the idea that it was possible for an exclusive *volk* to embrace an identity and history that could ultimately lead to self-upliftment and self-determination (O' Meara, 1996:42). Two ideologically based themes drove the *Broederbond,* namely the Christian national motif and the notion of White guardianship over non-Whites. The Christian national idea accentuated a separate Afrikaner nation that identified with Western civilisation and God's will to play a leading role in Africa (Ryan, 1990: 10-11). The White guardianship line of thinking resulted in a racial system where the Whites' superstructure monopolised the whole society. The NP subsequently attracted the supporters of these two inter-related approaches; those who wanted to keep the non-White (or *Bantu*) in check and those who aimed for the betterment of the Blacks, but in a non-integrated manner (Verkuyl, 1971:1 & 2).

Afrikaner Nationalism of the 1930's and 1940's was now based on genuine Afrikaner religious and political values and traditions, moving away from any secular and foreign influences. These intellectual inputs were mainly performed within the inner circles of the church, press, party and Broederbond. Where the NP represented and realised the needs of the Afrikaner *volk*, Afrikaner

Christian-nationalism, within the religious and culture movements, reiterated the divine calling of the *volk* in order to preserve its Calvinistic character. As mentioned earlier, the *volksgebondenheid* of Afrikaner Nationalism emphasises the divine role of the Afrikaner, as allotted to them by God (O' Meara, 1996:122 & 155).

To consolidate the Afrikaner in this turbulent period, the *Broederbond* furthermore focussed on the Afrikaner entrepreneur as well as the Afrikaner worker and their economic advancements. O' Meara describes this socio-economic basis of Apartheid as *Volkskapitalisme*[42]. When the NP achieved power, its main aim was to maximise capitalist trends in South Africa. Considering the fact that the Afrikaner suffered the most during the economic recess of the 1930's and 1940's, state intervention was to be implemented as soon as possible. Thus, the aim of uplifting the Afrikaner shifted from assisting the poor to aiding Afrikaner business. Afrikaner businessmen were appointed to key positions on the state economic boards and senior management positions in state industries. New parastatals were established and Afrikaner favouritism extended to assist private Afrikaner companies. Against all odds, the South African economy grew more quickly than many other capitalist economies during the 1950's and 1960's. It seemed as if everyone, or all Whites, capitalised from this state interference (O' Meara, 1996:79).

Additionally, Christian-national education showed the people that their needs would be best addressed within the paradigm of the chosen Afrikaner *volk*. The striking mobilisation success of the Broederbond assisted the NP in all spheres of life when it won the 1948 elections. It is quite apparent that Christian-nationalism as an exclusive ethnic ideology united the different socio-economic strata of the Afrikaner by emphasising Afrikaner favouritism (O' Meara, 1996:41-42 & Ryan, 1990: 10-11).

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[42] *Volkskapitalisme* implicates that Afrikaner nationalism was equally concerned about wealth (O' Meara, 1996:11). This socio-economic basis of Apartheid forms the basis of present day fears, i.e Theopolitics and survivalism.

The DRC was also known as a tool of oppression during the Apartheid era. The 1935 Missionary Policy of the DRC already made distinction between different ethnic groups when condemning racial intermarriages. Diversity of culture, language, and colour was proclaimed together with the unity of humanity according to the Bible's Acts 17:26 (Bible, 1970). Institutionalised segregation became the normative principle while the unity of the church was nowhere mentioned or promoted and "no equality" ever criticised. The 1857 compromise became the determining principle regarding the structure of the church and the society (Loubser, 1987: 30-31).

The DRC was furthermore influenced by the ecclesiastical needs of the poor Whites, the impact of foreign racial policies, and the infatuation with the romantic idea of the *volk*, as well as Neo-Calvinism. The militancy of the Afrikaner nationalist at the start of the Second World War was also reflected within the churches. The Transvaal Synod resigned from the Christian Council in protest to its non-Afrikaner attitude with the continuous use of English as well as the conflict that went unresolved regarding the DRC's missionary policy. De Klerk felt that organisations such as the Broederbond played a primary role in the "theologising of Afrikaner politics" (Loubser, 1987: 30-31). Together with the NP as a party "imbued with religion" a theological basis was laid (Loubser, 1987: 30-31). However, D P Botha felt that organisations like the Broederbond and the FAK "faded into insignificance when compared with the overwhelming role of the Church in preparing the community to accept and vote for a socio-political programmes that would revolutionise South African life" (Loubser, 1987: 51-52).

Ngcokovane (1989:44) claims that the Federal Mission Council, established by the DRC in 1942, ultimately formulated the race policies of the nationalist government. The church's direction was further stimulated by S J Du Toit's input at the People's Congress on the Racial Policy of the Afrikaner in 1944, during which he portrayed God as the great Divider. The core regarding the principle of diversity, which became a creation ordinance, was subsequently shaped (Song, 1999:6). Its commission on Race Relations formulated race policies, which the

member churches usually ratified. Further indications on the interrelationship between government and the DRC were found when the DRC 's Commission on Education suggested to government that education for Africans be organised under the Department of Native Affairs in stead of the Department of Education. Their proposal was accepted in 1953 by the then Nationalist government.

In 1947, a DRC commission again issued a report on interracial relations accentuating the legitimate differences between ethnic and cultural groups. "Although God created all nations out of one blood," the report noted, "He gave each nation a feeling of nationhood and a national soul which had to be recognised by everyone" (Cronjé et al, 1947: 42-56). The subsequent acts like the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages of 1949, Group Areas and the Immorality Act of 1950 did exactly what the 1947 Commission asked (Ngcokovane, 1989: 44-45 & Amstutz, 2000:4 & 5). Thus, using Biblical texts, the DRC approved and promoted the notions of Apartheid, socially, nationally and religiously. The DRC's first major policy document supporting Apartheid was a report titled "Racial and National Apartheid in the Bible"[43].

Adopted by the Transvaal Synod this report *Racial and National Apartheid in the Bible* recognised the spiritual unity of mankind, protected racial diversity, and reaffirmed[44] that the mixing of the races was contrary to the will of God. When the DRC accepted a policy of "separate development" at a conference on the "Native issue" in 1950, a major step in history was taken. This conference supported the idea of total separation including economic Apartheid. Dr D F Malan rejected and opposed their suggestions regarding economic Apartheid, claiming that it was not part of his government's policy. Total Apartheid was obviously not on the NP agenda as yet. With all the Apartheid laws put in place, the Afrikaner churches constantly praised the government for the measures it took in order to realise their social agenda (Loubser, 1987:77-78 & Ngcokovane, 1989:46).

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[43] Venter (1989:152) refers to the DRC "as the NP at prayer."
[44] The Dutch Reformed Church already condemned mixed marriages in 1935, thus setting the ground for future racial discrimination.

Kinghorn (in Amstutz, 2000:5) pointedly observes that, significantly, this 1950 conference heralded the only occasion in the history of Apartheid when an idea initiated by the DRC was subsequently institutionalised by government policy by means of the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act. The DRC usually endorsed, but not initiate, other policy documents and governmental initiatives (Amstutz, 2000:5). In 1956, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), the FAK and the DRC held a People's Congress in Bloemfontein to discuss the Tomlinson Report. The resolution of the Congress indicated that it was not possible for the different groups to live in one community. Racial tension and conflict resulting in annihilation would be inevitable. Thus, the DRC once again restated the importance of an "intensive and positive policy of separation" together with greater efforts in its missionary role (Amstutz, 2000:5). Ngcokovane (1989: 47) however calls this missionary role of the DRC as "a promotion of Black subservience to White rule."

Loubser's (1987: ix-x & 82) "Apartheid Bible" was opened the first time in 1957. His appropriate definition encompasses the religious-political role the White Afrikaans churches played in South Africa: "the totality of Biblical texts and presuppositions by means of which people inside and outside the official churches legitimised the policy of Apartheid or are still continuing to do so" (Loubser, 1987: ix-x & 82). A complete abandonment of the Old Testament analogies was thus evident. Since the Apartheid State was now firmly in place the church's conservative approach was now replaced with a more moderate attitude.

The NP, afraid of losing its narrow margin of majority seats of the 1948 elections, consolidated its power base in three ways. First, in 1949 parliamentary representation was granted to the South African-ruled United Nations Mandated Territory of South West Africa, allocating six seats to the NP. The Coloureds were removed from the voter's roll in 1951 and the Senate's size was increased in 1956. Second, the NP extended its iron grip onto the bureaucratic apparatus and governmental culture. To avoid any frustration of policy initiatives the *Broederbond* supervised senior and middle-level

bureaucratic appointments[45], especially in the departments of Native Affairs, the police and the military. The NP now had to strengthen its hold over the two security apparatuses of the state. For example, the number of Afrikaner policemen increased at more than three times the rate the appointment of English policemen to the force (77,7 to 27,8 percent). Once again, the *Broederbond* selected pro-Afrikaner candidates to fill positions in these areas, clearly indicating that all state departments were politicised and influenced by both the NP and the *Broederbond*. Third, the NP also augmented its control over civil society by removing Communist MP's from Parliament through the Suppression of Communism Act, the restriction of leading officials of the ANC and the subsequent banning of the ANC and the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) (O' Meara, 1996:60).

The consolidation of Apartheid, ethnic unity and the promotion of Afrikaner interests were being implemented through a complex web of statutes, most of which were enacted in the 1950s. These laws involved the instituting of rules and authority over "everyday interactions of people of different racial groups (petty Apartheid) and territorial regulations prescribing the living areas for different racial groups (grand Apartheid)" (Amstutz, 2000:2). Examples of these laws and regulations are the:

- Mixed Marriages Act (1949);
- Immorality Act (1950);
- Population Registration Act (1950);
- Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953);
- Groups Areas Act (1950); and
- Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951.

The exclusion of Blacks from a common voter's roll as well as the later removal of Blacks only strengthened the separationist policies and power of the NP (Van den Berghe, 1969:233 & Coetzer, 1986:278).

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[45] Afrikaans appointees increased by 98,5% whilst English declined by 25,2% during the 1950's (O' Meara, 1996: 62).

In 1949, the ANC, due to the Youth League's internal pressures, responded to the NP's segregationist laws by releasing a Programme of Action. Consequently, the perceived collaborationist character of the ANC was now drastically converted to one of defiance and resistance (Villa-Vicencio, 1987: 55). By employing such political tactics as boycotts, strikes and non-violent civil disobedience, the ANC worked towards the total elimination of all racially political institutions that adhered to segregation and discrimination (Deegan, 2001:27). The young secretary general, Walter Sisulu, together with other young men within the ranks of the ANC, like Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, Oliver Tambo and the like, changed the nature of the ANC forever (Chidester, 1991).

The Defiance Campaign of 1952, as a direct challenge to the NP and its restrictive policies, saw the first mass action by both Indians and Blacks. The strategies of their campaign[46] included going out at night without carrying their passes, to enter Black townships without permission and using train carriages and waiting rooms usually reserved for Whites only (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:48). Despite the fact that these acts culminated in the arrest of eight thousand protesters and that the NP continued with its oppression, the ANC ultimately gained considerable status and support. Its membership was now boosted by thousands of members and managed to attract the attention of international organisations like the UN (Leatt et al, 1986:96).

In order to resist the intense governmental pressures and to be able to continue with its liberation struggle, the ANC joined forces with the Congress Alliance. The Alliance represented the following organisations such as the Congress of Democrats, the South Africa Indian Congress, the United People's Organisation, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. Together with the Congress Alliance, they established the Congress of the People. In 1955, the Congress of the People adopted a Freedom Charter, labelling themselves henceforth as "Charterists". With the release of the Freedom Charter, Huddlestone and other clerics were also present, reflecting their commitment to

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[46] "The target of the Campaign was unjust, oppressive laws" (Chidester, 1991:14).

justice and the struggle (Prozesky & De Gruchy, 1995:94). The Freedom Charter envisaged the following (shortened) principles:

- The people shall govern;
- All national groups shall have equal rights;
- The people shall share in the country's wealth;
- The land shall be shared among those who work it;
- All shall be equal before the law;
- All shall enjoy equal human rights;
- There shall be work and security;
- The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened;
- There shall be houses, security and comfort; and
- there shall be peace and friendship (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:49-52).

By allowing cooperation with all the races in order to liberate South Africa, dissent[47] was created from the ranks of the Congress of the People. The Africanists' main criticism was that non-Africans could not be part of African nationalism since Black solidarity was the only way to freedom (Leatt et al, 1986: 96-7).

With the Defiance Campaign of 1952, ethical questions were again raised within the CPSA (the Church of The Province of SA, or informally known as the Anglican Church). Some laity openly supported and participated in this passive campaign against government. Others, like Reeves and Clayton, had ethical concerns about the refusal of obeying these laws, even though they did not agree with it. The conclusion was made that even though the CPSA denied the justice of the government's social laws, it remained up to the individual church member and his/her conscience to decide whether to be actively or passively involved in defying the government. Huddlestone (in Suberg, 1999:93) nevertheless felt that "when government degenerates into tyranny its laws cease to be upon its subjects. The only point at issue is at what point does tyranny begin." Huddlestone persisted with his campaign and wrote various

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[47] Read Liebenberg's (1994: 14-15) critique of the Freedom Charter.

articles in a London newspaper appealing for international support. Once more, the Archbishop disapproved, claiming that the government will not bow before international pressure (Suberg, 1999:93).

When government passed the Native Resettlement Act and the Bantu Education Act in 1954, the CPSA was for the first time directly affected. The removal of the people from Sophiatown to Meadowland led to great financial losses on the part of the CPSA. Their buildings, amounting to £150 000 would be redundant. What's more, the Education Act changed the schooling systems of the Africans forever. The Department of Native Affairs would be in charge of education although the Churches could continue teaching the Africans provided they had their own funds and were registered with the Department. What were the churches to do? Should they end all education activities or should they proceed with an inferior education programme, as controlled by the Department of Native Affairs? The CPSA chose the latter, invoking for the first time bitter criticism from Huddlestone against his own church:

> "The Church sleeps on: It sleeps on while 60, 000 people are removed from their homes in the interest of a fantastic racial theory: it sleeps on while plans are made... to transform the education of Africans into a thing called "Native Education" ... it sleeps on while a dictatorship is swiftly being created over all Native Affairs in the Union, so that speech and association are no longer free. The Church sleeps on - though it occasionally talks in it sleep and expects (or does it?) the Government to listen?" (Suberg, 1999:93-94).

During the Treason Trial, Archbishop Clayton and bishop Reeves supported a defence fund for those on trial. All these political activities of the CPSA (Anglican Church) severely strained the relationship with government. This relationship reached a new dimension with the enforcing of Clause 29 (c) of the Native Laws Amendment Bill. This bill aimed to enforce Apartheid within the autonomous grounds of the churches by declaring that those churches, which were established in White areas after 1938, can no longer admit Africans to attend services without the permission of the Minister of Native Affairs. This was also applicable to any future meetings that were scheduled in White areas.

Archbishop Clayton subsequently called on his members to disobey the law (Prozesky & De Gruchy, 1995:95 & Suberg, 1999:95).

Between 1957 and 1971, the number of cases involving church workers against whom the state had taken action increased from twenty-five to eighty cases (fifty alone in 1971). The government followed any method to curb faultfinding with its "noble" policies. Succeeding Archbishops of Cape Town were known for not voicing their protests too loudly, until the arrival of Desmond Tutu. As bishop of Johannesburg he started by writing a letter to B J Vorster requesting political reforms (Villa-Vicencio, 1986:227). His more powerful platform for reform came when he was appointed General-Secretary of the South Africa Council of Churches, resulting in the rewarding of the Nobel Peace Price in 1984 (Suberg, 1999: 99-100).

When he was appointed archbishop of Cape Town, Tutu continued his fearless attacks on government, calling for sanctions and human rights for all citizens. During the 1988 Lambeth Conference Tutu was appointed vice-chairman of the "Christianity and the Social Order Group" and subsequently released two resolutions addressing the South African situation. Resolution 39 reiterated that "the system of Apartheid in South Africa is evil and especially repugnant because of the cruel way a tyrannical racist system is upheld in the name of the Christian faith" (Suberg, 1999: 99-100). In conjunction with the theology of anti-Apartheid, resolution 27 states:

> Supports those who choose the way of non-violence as being the way our Lord, including direct non-violent action... Understands those who, after exhausting all other ways, choose the way of armed struggle as the only way to justice, whilst drawing attention to the dangers and injustices possible in such action itself (Suberg, 1999:99-100).

Even though all the groupings within the Anglican Church were dealt with, one should take into account that the different groupings within the CPSA interpreted these resolutions in dissimilar fashion. Some members felt distressed about the fact that their Archbishop allowed violence to be used

against them whilst on the other hand others felt that their church had not done enough regarding the alleviation of their disenfranchisement and oppression (Suberg, 1999: 99 -100). Disunity within the unity of the church needed to be addressed. In the end theology and the holy presence of God should prevail over all of mankind, regardless of race and social status.

Despite the split and the subsequent creation of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) from the ANC, both the ANC and the PAC were declared illegal in 1960 (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:53). The banning was a direct consequence of the Sharpeville incident where 69 people were killed and 178 injured. A similar protest in Langa did not have any casualties. The unnecessary massacre of innocent people symbolised the tyranny of the South African government and changed the political scene completely. A state of emergency was declared and realising that legitimate means to change the government were no longer applicable, the ANC's newly created military wing, Umkhonto we Siswe, started its armed struggle underground (Leatt et al, 1986:99). The UN passed resolutions of condemnation against the Apartheid regime whereupon states started to boycott and withdrew their diplomatic connections with South Africa. Regardless of the international community's reaction and the fact that Albert Luthuli received a Nobel Peace Prize, the NP stood firm against what it viewed as its apparently one-sided external communist threats (Deegan, 2001:34).

When Dr. H. F Verwoerd became Prime Minister in 1958, the ideology of Apartheid was further refined to "separate development" (Amstutz, 2000:3). The goal of Apartheid was no longer only focusing on maintaining racial segregation but to promote "autonomous development" (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 67-69). The NP truly believed that ethnic and/or racial separation is just, as based on the Biblical creation story of Babel. Their own desire for separation and ethnic nationalism was then projected onto others, where all peoples should have the opportunity to develop and promote their own values, cultures and identities. According to the NP, the creation of quasi-independent territorial units known as "homelands" or "Bantustans" presented Africans with the opportunities for self-determination and the possibility of taking charge of their own future. These

areas were not truly economically viable and it also meant the loss of South African citizenship. The artificiality of these pseudo-independent "self-governing nations" Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda that were designed for exploitation meant that they never received international recognition (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 67-69 & Amstutz, 2000:3).

Verkuyl (1971:4) describes the Verwoerd era (1958-1966) as an emphasis on this pseudo-dogma of White supremacy and a smug faith that the maintenance of a White monopolistic superstructure was a "divine calling". The policy of separate development became a type of gospel, linking constantly the will of God with the state's ideology. The tools of Apartheid were now firmly consolidated. These measures, known as petty Apartheid, were relentlessly imposed on the Blacks (Loubser, 1987:84). The armed struggle of the oppressed was consequently inevitable.

The 1960's showed the start of a new discourse on which South Africa was about to embark. Decolonisation, as initiated by India, made its way to Africa, leading to South Africa becoming a Republic in 1961. This highlight of Afrikaner history was dampened by the Sharpeville incident that occurred in early 1960 and the resulting declaration of a state of emergency (Loubser, 1987:86). Henceforth, Apartheid emerged as a totalitarian system controlling and manipulating all aspects of societal life. The complete segregation of races on all levels broke away from the pragmatic approach followed until then (Loubser, 2002:2). The interrelationship between the two concepts, Apartheid and totalitarianism, is thus undeniable. By implementing and enforcing the racial doctrine of Apartheid, South Africa was perceived and remembered as a totalitarian state imposing the values of Afrikaner nationalism on all citizens. Despite the fact that opposition parties were allowed, the National Party certainly made sure that they would never challenge its power position. The minority Whites represented a small fraction of society and accordingly linked the regime with the authoritarian connotation that a "small group" dominates and imposes its values (Ranney, 1996:78).

Other means of silencing resistance and preventing Blacks from developing any real significant political power structures were the creation of various councils like the Urban Bantu Councils for Africans and the Coloured Person's Representative Council. Political rights were then effectively limited only to those living in the homelands. Freedom of movement was also an alien concept for the Blacks. The Black Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act (1952) and the Black Labour Act (1964) effectively controlled the movement of Blacks in and out "White" cities. The Internal Security Act, Terrorism Act (amended quite often) and the Sabotage Act (1962) assisted the NP to silence any criticism and revolt (Leatt et al, 1986:73-74).

Between 1950 and 1960 almost 100 laws were implemented to safeguard the Whites' position. As Loubser (2002:5) observes: "(the) totalitarian philosophy, (is) becoming part of the collective subconscious of people". The extreme detail with which the Verwoerd government materialised Apartheid led to powerful clashes, politically and religiously. The political discontent of the Blacks was starting to surface, as experienced with the Sharpeville incident (Slovo, 1994:35-41).

It is evident that Apartheid's path of development and establishment saw two trends during the 1950's and 1960's. The former saw Apartheid being a racist doctrine whereas the latter's policy of separate development indicated a shift from racism to ethnic self-determination. Leatt (1986:81) further distinguishes between two perceptions regarding Afrikaner Nationalism. For some observers the 1970's indicated a paradigm shift in the domestic affairs of the Afrikaner. The NP efficiently managed the furthering of the Afrikaner's power base during the 1970's (Leatt et al, 1986:81). No longer does the Afrikaner need to protect himself from hostile enemies in order to survive. As André du Toit (in Leatt et al, 1986:83) remarks:

> a well-disciplined ethnic power base through its close alliance with Afrikaans churches, the Afrikaans press, a wide range of Afrikaans cultural, academic, student, professional and business organisations. It has at its disposal a huge government bureaucracy; it is backed up by a loyal military, police and security force, and it is in league with

organised commerce. What is there to counter this imposing organisational strength with its considerable resources?

The 1970's saw a renewed resistance against the Apartheid system and tensions started to increase again. Black consciousness developed to fill the vacuum left by the ANC and encompassed Coloured and Indian peoples. The tactics of sabotage, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and revolution indicated that a negotiated reform was no longer an option. Sabotage was to be exhausted first before the rest of the tactics were to be executed. Apart from the new discourse of militancy, the ANC also had to re-establish itself overseas. With prominent persons like Mandela, Sisulu, Mahlaba and Govan Mbeki being sentenced to life during the Rivonia trial, the ANC needed to find other avenues in order to overtake the government (Deegan, 2001:32). In anticipation of being banned, Oliver Tambo created new foreign missions, raised funds, and organised military training for its members (Slovo, 1994:35-41). Henceforth the ANC's aims of paralysing the regime would be achieved by means of mass mobilisation, intensifying its guerrilla tactics, as well as the extensive use of its underground network. The international community would furthermore be used to isolate South Africa through economical, political, and cultural sanctions (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:53 & Villa-Vicencio, 1987).

Throughout their years in exile, the ANC managed to extend their support bases, nationally and internationally. Military support and training came mainly from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European states whilst financial support was mainly from Scandinavian states and the Netherlands. Tanzania and Zambia provided logistic support within Africa and the United Nations (UN) gave observer status to the ANC (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:55). Within South Africa, the ANC remained popular due to its non-dogmatic approach. Whether you were a Marxist, Capitalist, radical nationalist or a Socialist, membership was open to all. Due to increased associations with the SACP, the ANC was frequently labelled as a communist party. The predominantly White SACP attracted members like Govan Mbeki and J B Marks but leaders like Mandela and Tambo, as non-communists, were sometimes hesitant in associating with it. The Marxist emphasis on class was rejected by the ANC since they felt that the

South African issue lay solely with the question of race, not class (Slovo, 1994:35-41).

By 1975, the ANC successfully infiltrated South Africa a number of times confirming internal support, especially from its non-communist ally, *Okhela*. With the establishment of the non-racial United Democratic Front (UDF), the Freedom Charter was re-confirmed as an ideological point of departure in the liberation struggle (Gottschalk, 1994:187-198). Although *no direct linkage was made between the ANC and the UDF*, the ANC did advocate its cause internationally (Leatt et al, 1986:102-3). Church leaders such as Tutu, Hurley and Boesak were patrons of the UDF and were regarded as the temporary leaders of the Blacks (Gottschalk, 1994:187-198).

With resistance increasing, Apartheid started to show new trends and governmental compromises. It was clear that a secular ideology with all its state apparatuses was no longer sufficient and that concessions to non-Whites were inevitable (Leatt et al, 1986:81). The most prominent concession was formulated in a new tri-cameral system allowing greater political input for the Indians and Coloureds, the granting of industrial citizenship, leasehold rights to urban Blacks and trade union rights to the Black workers. Changes in the economic structure also demanded a new economic approach. Stability and greater mobility for the Black labourers and their communities were essential for the economy to survive. It became apparent that economics would no longer be subject to the political ideology of separate development but rather be part of a new free market economy. As Leatt (1986:81) points out: "the old style ideology of divine mission and exclusivism is being replaced by a more pragmatic, secular style of survival politics," i.e. the liberalisation of Afrikaner Nationalism. A well managed, but limited policy of deregulation of the economy and greater privatisation was implemented. It seems as if Apartheid's tools needed to be dismantled since racial segregation was no longer plausible (Leatt et al, 1986:82). The state was in siege, especially after the unrest in 1976. South Africa's low-level border wars, together with urban sabotage and guerrilla

assaults placed the regime in constant turmoil. This was despite its counter-attacking measures, which led to thousands dying.

By its very nature the NP could not risk alienating itself from the industrial sector and the Afrikaner, and thus allowed limited reforms. Negotiations and concessions, due to external or internal pressures, could be made but never to the extent of sharing political power. Leatt (1986: 84) classifies this alternative perception as the *modernisation of racial domination aiming to preserve economic privilege and political dominance through technocratic control* (Leatt et al, 1986:83-84).

It becomes clear that Apartheid's golden age was about to be severely challenged leading to its unavoidable disintegration.

4.4. Disintegration of Apartheid

The disintegration of Apartheid was the result of numerous factors. The predominant areas in which problems arose were in the fields of the economy, the socio-political struggles of the 1970's and the emerging political exigencies facing the White establishment. South Africa's modern and diversified economy was almost self-sufficient in consumer goods in the 1960's leading to the golden age of Apartheid reaching its peak in the early seventies. This golden age of Apartheid, especially when referring to the economic boom of the 1960's, was met with little African resistance since the major underground networks of the ANC and the PAC had been destroyed.

However, unable to excel in exporting manufactured goods, the honeymoon period was soon to face some financial crises. The government no longer relied on cheap and unskilled migrant workers but shifted to semi-skilled organised labour. This shift in labour practices unfortunately resulted in two major problems: *unemployment* [48] and a surplus of White skilled workers in a more

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[48] Unemployment rose from 582 000 in 1962 to 750 000 in 1966, and reached an all time high in the 70's of 1 million (O' Meara, 1996:175).

technically demanding market. Despite the surplus of skilled workers, Whites were still protected by Apartheid laws.

The Apartheid regime came under increased pressure when a worldwide recession began to decrease the influx of foreign capital during the 1970's. The need to change its labour policies to accommodate increased cheaper labour simultaneously meant a diversion from the Afrikaner's protectionist policies, which was seen more as a threat than an economic necessity. Making matters worse were the ceaseless strikes of Black workers demanding higher wages and the right to organise. The border crises in Angola and Mozambique also destabilised the White regime. The change in the balance of power gave the Blacks the much-needed psychological impetus to intensify their struggle as well. The working-class struggles spilled over into other sectors of society and were characterised by an increase in militancy, specifically among the youth. The climax of revolt was seen in the streets of Soweto in 1976 when children were gunned down in their effort to control their streets and to oppose being taught in Afrikaans. Apartheid no longer seemed to be morally justified and the NP would from now on be defensive in its search for retaining its power base (Deegan, 2001:48-49 & O' Meara, 1996:177-180).

Other events during the late 1970's that marked the vulnerability of South Africa were:
- The crises in South-West Africa and Zimbabwe;
- The withdrawal of the United Kingdom's naval forces;
- The United States no longer saw the protection of the Cape seaports as areas of priority; and
- The UN's first arms embargo in 1977.

Limited reforms were put in place by the Apartheid government, which soon indicated that the Vorster government (1966-1978) was totally unprepared for creating a total strategy of reform. Although B J Vorster was exceptionally humble and devoted to serving his people, it became clear that he lacked decisive and effective leadership capabilities, resulting in a succession struggle

between political and bureaucratic power (D'Oliveira, 1978 & O' Meara, 1996:194-6).

Afrikaner Nationalism might have experienced changes in scope and direction since the 1950's but the NP would never have been able to distance itself from its voter base. Representative democracy for all within an Afrikaner unitary state was an illusion since White survival would have been severely undermined and challenged. Racial domination had only been modernised through the changes implemented by the NP (Leatt et al, 1986:83). It was thus inevitable that Afrikaner Nationalism needed some urgent soul searching since two elements of Afrikaner nationalism, favouritism and urban Black policies, had failed.

This inability to adapt and change showed that the government was unwilling to acknowledge the core of Black grievances and incapable of resolving it. A clear division in Afrikaner Nationalist circles started to surface. The conservatives, refusing to accept permanent Black urbanisation, wanted to speed up the process of implementing the policies of separate development. The reformists, on the other hand were willing to make limited concessions to the Black urban class in the training of Black workers and the control of their trade unions, and thus the reformists were willing to look at the issues of increased social mobility and political accommodation (O' Meara, 1996: 196-200).

The Botha government (1978-1984) designed and implemented several reforms to win the support of the Black elite whilst simultaneously strengthening its Apartheid aims. The "Total Onslaught" strategy of P W Botha indicated a re-establishment of domestic ideologies within a regional setting. This offensive tactic involved efficient and covert intelligence that would be able to prevent explosive situations and the curbing of extra-parliamentary resistance. By acting as a third force South Africa would exploit tensions between the different regional and ethnic groups, as linked to their political affiliation to the ANC and the USSR. Simultaneously, South Africa tried to re-establish its regional status, with the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984. Ideologically, Blacks were now also allowed to share in the economic growth of the country. The new militancy

of the NP[49], as reflected in its military technocrats, underpinned the desperate measures the NP had to take in order to survive[50] (O' Meara, 1996:225, 266-268).

Despite the government's attempts for reform, the primary pillars of Apartheid were still firmly in place. The Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act and the exclusive political system deprived the majority of South African citizens of political rights and freedoms (Deegan, 2001: 59).

Since the banning of the ANC, its achievements were quite erratic. The armed struggle proved to have been only partly successful. The sabotage of industrial targets did affect the government but not as severely as has been hoped (Williams, 1994:28-29). Diplomatically, the ANC achieved greater success. Apart from the sanctions that were applied, the ANC also held talks with various South Africans, even White Afrikaners. Under the auspices of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) the Dakar Talks in 1987 improved and undemonised the image of the ANC. The growing support for the UDF showed that African nationalism remained a force to be reckoned with (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:56-7). However, the collapse of the USSR and communism *per se*, the inability of the NP to continue with its oppression amidst isolation, and the inability of the ANC to overthrow the regime changed the political scene once again in 1989 (Kotzé & Greyling, 1994:57).

The Constitution was revised in 1984 and excluded Africans from any political input in state affairs. Coloureds and Indians were offered a secondary role in the tri-cameral parliament whereas Blacks were accommodated by granting them participatory municipal status in their Local Authorities within the segregated townships. The new Constitution reflected a consociation theory of power sharing that protected group identities and forged structures of co-determination (O' Meara, 1996:275-277). Astonishingly, the NP was still blinded by its belief that the revolt against the state would disappear with these limited

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[49] Villa-Vicencio (1990:125) described the NP as the most sophisticated war-machine south of the Sahara.

concessions. True stability would only be achieved by the abandoning of Apartheid. Prof. Heyns predicted that: "if the NP does not dismantle Apartheid completely, a state-Afrikaner-church conflict will be unavoidable" (Venter, 1989:152). This statement reiterates the strong Theopolitical nature within the South African scenario.

With the revamping of the State Security Council (SSC), Botha's regime became more centralised and militarised. The internal politics of the NP was changed when debates and critical decision-making were exercised within the SSC and no longer in the Cabinet, thus phasing out the influence of the Broederbond. The prominence of the police force was slowly downgraded by the new National Intelligence Services, firmly establishing a Praetorian state. By 1981, divisions within the ranks of Afrikaner Nationalism and the NP had become irreversible and resulted in the subsequent 1982 split[51] (O' Meara, 1996:281-283, 300-303). Unity among the Afrikaner Nationalists no longer existed. A split in the Broederbond further indicated the irrecoverable path of the Botha reforms. The faith communities also experienced the demolishing of Afrikaner unity. The DRC was now unsure about the path it has to follow, theologically and politically. The inescapable split came when conservatives broke away from the DRC in 1987 and established the *Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk* (APK) (O' Meara, 1996:314).

The Total Strategy reforms of the NP led to growing political repression against all dissidents. It is crucial to remember that despite the attempts to improve the quality of life of a selected few Blacks, the recognition of Black trade unions, the "Non-Aggression Pacts" made with bordering states and the new Constitutional endowment did not imply that Apartheid was dismantled. Instead, the strengthened security measures ruthlessly eliminated any opposition and firmly established the South African Defence Force's (SADF) control over all aspects of societal life. The moral retreat from the fallacy that racial superiority was

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[50] Its low intensity warfare tactics comprised of detaining of community leaders, assassinations of potential troublemakers, financial support to be given to local groups and the introducing of Black municipal guards, so-called "*kits-konstabels*" (Dugard in Deegan, 2001:64).
[51] Treurnicht and Hartzenberg were expelled from the NP after a failed power struggle after which they established the Conservative Party (CP) (O' Meara, 1996:303).

neither part of any natural order nor part of a Divine Plan destroyed the moral and religious foundations of Verwoerd's Grand Apartheid. Racism was still evident in the totalitarian state but was now on a new modernised technocratic discourse, called neo-Apartheid. The inability of the regime to relinquish the core principle of Apartheid and by so doing failed to address the problems of its theory and practice, doomed any reform plans and destroyed the legitimacy of the government (O' Meara, 1996:322-323 & Ngcokovane, 1989:130-131). Religious-political ideological trends were now replaced with an even more racist socio-political ideology: Volkskapitalisme of the 1940's and 1950's, initially anti-capitalist, was therefore replaced by class-based competition (O' Meara, 1996:122 &155).

The 1980's also saw a recession hit South Africa and a low turnout for the Black Local Authorities' elections. Together with the ANC 's call for Blacks to make the government ungovernable, these events challenged the NP government like never before. A state of emergency was declared, ironically leaving the SSC totally unprepared. South Africa was in a state of siege: foreign confidence and investment disappeared and more radical unions were created, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The government started to lose domestic control and almost declared war on Mozambique. Botha's Rubicon speech in 1985 saw the NP losing more credibility, both overseas and domestically. Time for reform was now unavoidable. English businessmen, academics, and the press started to voice their desire for reform, the lifting of the state of emergency, as well as the release of prominent political prisoners and the start of negotiations with the ANC (O'Meara, 1996: 325-328 & 331).

In 1985 the NP released a booklet in which it admitted that its policies were flawed:

- Creation of the homelands was not the sole solution for the race problems, indicating that urban Blacks should be able to influence policies in their places of living;
- Evidence showed that efforts to expel Blacks from White areas had not been successful;

- Prominent Black leaders also showed no intention of participating in government's negotiations due to the deep mistrust of the government's intentions;

- Opposition of the government had increased because the homelands could not accommodate more than 40% of the total Black population, and because the international community did not recognise them ; and

- Issues that needed to be tackled were citizen rights for Blacks and expanding the support base of elected non-White councillors in the tri-cameral parliament (Leatt et al, 1986:84-85).

In 1986, the SADF and other "securocrats", with the support of Botha, followed an intense, radical approach for a counter-revolutionary strategy against all political opposition. This led to a nation-wide state of emergency, excluding the Police force. This state of emergency entailed censorship, the detention of more than 26 000 people, the torturing of prisoners as well as the eliminating of local revolutionary organisations by means of death sentences, death squads or vigilantes. With the government having regained its physical control over the townships, other reforms could be implemented (O' Meara, 1996:345-348).

In 1989, Botha's health deteriorated to such an extent that a new leader needed to be elected by the NP caucus. The successor was F W De Klerk who was to symbolise a new era in South African politics (De Klerk, 1991). His reformist approaches put South Africa on a new course, ultimately leading to the state's first multi-racial democratic elections in 1994. Before this landmark event, de Klerk announced, in his opening address to Parliament in 1990, the following:

- The lifting of bans on the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and the PAC as well as 31 other illegal organisations;

- The freeing of political prisoners;

- The suspension of capital punishment;

- The lifting of various restrictions imposed by the state of emergency;

- The release of Nelson Mandela (Deegan, 2001: 70); and

- The abolishment of the Land Act and Population Registration Act in 1991 (Mandela, 1994:665).

Now, committed to democracy, the NP announced its intentions of addressing Black economic deprivation as well as calling for a referendum to speed up transformation. The rollercoaster negotiations of the 1990's came to fruition when Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected President of South Africa in 1994 (O' Meara, 1996:408-410).

4.5. Summary

Apartheid was a sin. When there is a breakdown in fairness, equality and justice, resistance is sure to follow. Adding to this melting pot was the fact that a minority managed to justify and manipulate its racial religio-political doctrines. By forcefully cementing their *apartness* laws and institutions, South Africa was permanently scarred. A detached government, followed blindly by its religious partners, reflected the dark history of Theopolitics in Apartheid South Africa. The moral sin committed by faith communities will remain a sad reminder of committed atrocities that were Biblically justified. By prescribing to or accepting the regime's policies, the Biblical message of love, peace and neighbourly love were discarded in South Africa's history.

Fortunately, the liberation attempts by those outside the NP government and DRC were not in vain. Aiming for biblical fairness saw many stood up against church and state, paving the way for a better society.

CHAPTER 5   POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: DEMOCRATIC DREAMS AND SHATTERED EXPECTATIONS

5.1.   Introduction

From studying the history of South Africa, it is apparent that belief systems played a cardinal role in shaping the society around us. Socio-economic deprivation, together with racism as interwoven with religion, laid the cornerstone for a tumultuous period in our history. The question one now needs to ask in this post-Apartheid euphoria is whether the interrelationship between the church and state, described as Theopolitics, still influence socio-politics, economic and religious conditions. Additionally, do Theopolitics impact on post-Apartheid South Africa's transformation and reconciliation?

5.2.   Democracy's socio-economic challenges

Democracy and freedoms were voted in with the ANC's electoral victory during the 1994 elections, but the political wonder soon started to make way for unfulfilled promises and expectations. The transitional period clearly marked a new direction government undertook to promote constitutional democracy. Our rainbow nation, representing equality, democracy, and racial acceptance, is however, still a far cry away. Without discrediting the tremendous efforts already undertaken by government, it becomes evident that government almost too eagerly changed previous policies and laws in order to redress the inequalities of the past.

This resulted in enhanced socio-political division rather than unity, although previous economically disadvantaged groups benefited more[52]. The speed of these changes nevertheless created insecurities, fear and dissatisfaction among certain strata of our society. Roskin (2001:94) refers to this stage in South Africa as a phase of dysphoria where scarcities, corruption and lack of economic redistribution were seen as the main catalysts of these anxieties.

Within a Theopolitical context, the question needs to be asked whether government and churches' top structures really took into account the feelings and expectations of their respected bases of support when they changed their policies[53] and institutional structures. Furthermore, were these top structural changes really inspired by the lower levels of society? Is it safe to conclude that the dynamics of Theopolitics continues to exist, whether complimentary or counteractive to change?

Due to their huge top bottom approaches, the government and churches alienated their followers rather than inspiring them to change their ways of thinking and actions. Identifying with the 1996 Constitution would not necessarily guarantee rapid adherence to these structural and societal changes.

Where discrimination and poverty were foisted on the majority of peoples during Apartheid, evidence indicates that the same can be said about many minorities nowadays (SAIIA, 1998/1999:305). Could these reversed acts of discrimination, in the name of empowerment, democracy and justice, see the rise of new sets of insecurities[54] and dissatisfaction towards government? Across the racial divide unemployment, crime[55], and diseases such as HIV/AIDS[56] attack our society's cohesion in general. Will the church again rise to the plight of those who suffer and are oppressed, although they might once more now belong to

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[52] Referring specifically to government's Affirmative Action (June 1998) and Employment Equity (August 1998) policies, all complimenting government's RDP programmes and GEAR policy (RSA, 1998).
[53] Referring to policies such as the legalisation of abortion and the Dutch Reformed Church's Apartheid confessions.
[54] More and more skilled people flee South Africa, a so-called "brain-drain phenomena", indicating a lack of legitimacy on part of the government's side (Roskin, 2001: 98 & 106).
[55] Between 1994-1998 crimes have increased with 7,8 % (Sidiropolous, 1999:21-23).

different demographical categories? Why do we as a rainbow nation proclaim to encompass unity and equality, when all we see is infighting and further disintegration? Sad to say, even among the DRC sister churches, unity (Botha 2001) has not prevailed nor do we experience it on our secular national political platform.

A government representing the needs of the people seems to be unable to grasp the challenges it faces. Hook (2002:265) identifies several domestic challenges, namely:

> a 35% unemployment rate among the majority Black population, the impoverished conditions of the historically neglected Black townships, in which 7,5 million citizens still lack access to running water and 3 million citizens lack adequate housing. ... AIDS affect more than 4,2 million people (and) the high crime rate in South Africa which causes 58 killings per 100 000 South Africans.

Roskin (2001:104) furthermore identifies additional economic variables that are indicative of the high level of inequality that exists in South Africa. These factors are for example the discrepancy in wages where "Black wages are about a fifth of White wages, (where) the White minority owns almost all land and wealth, (where) only a third of young Blacks graduate from high school and Black infant mortality is high".

Decades of political isolation, sanctions and disinvestment negatively affected South Africa's Apartheid economy. The economic and political policies of the eighties resulted in stagnant GDP growth and a weakening in total investment[57] (Knight, 2004:1).

Tables 5 A and 5B clearly indicate the huge economic discrepancies that continue to exist between the various racial groups in South Africa. Apartheid's economic impact can be seen with the majority of Blacks being classified as poor whereas only 1 percent of Whites (minority) are poor. These figures emanate from the 1995-2000 National Report on Social Development.

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[56] An estimated 8% of South African population will die of AIDS by 2010 (Sidiropolous, 1999:21-23). Government's inability to curb this might unite people across racial boundaries in their plight to fight this genocidal virus.
[57] GDP dropped from 26% in 1980 to 15% in 1994 (Knight, 2004:1).

POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA				
Race	**African**	Coloured	**Indian**	White
Classified as	**61**	**38**	**5**	1
poor (%)				

Progress Report, Welfare, 1999 cited in National Report on Social Development 1995-2000[58]

Table 5 A: South Africa's level of poverty, 1995 - 2000 (Knight, 2004:10).

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) noted in 1992: "While Africans make up 76% of the population, their share of income amounts to only 29% of the total. Whites, who are less than 13% of the population, take away 58.5% of total income" (Knight, 2004: 10).

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, INFLATION AND BUDGET DEFICIT								
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 *
GDP, current market prices, R millions	617,954	685,730	738,926	800,769	888,454	983,450	1,120,895	NA
Real GDP Growth	4.3%	2.6%	0.8%	2.0%	3.5%	2.7%	3.6%	1.9%
GDP per capita, % change	2.1%	0.5%	-1.3%	-0.1%	1.5%	0.7%	1.6%	NA
Inflation	7.3%	8.6%	6.9%	5.2%	5.4%	5.7%	9.2%	5.8%
Budget Deficit % GDP, FY	-5.1%	-5.0%	-3.7%	-2.8%	-2.2%	-2.0%	-1.5%	1.1%

NA = Not Available   FY = Fiscal year.

Table 5 B: South Africa's GDP, 1996-2003 (Knight, 2004:10).

By 2006, South Africa's poverty level has decreased to 43.2% with the GDP strengthening to a 5.5% (Policy Co-Ordination And Advisory Services, 2007: 1).

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[58] The unemployment rate for Africans is 42.5% compared to 4.6% for whites (Knight, 2004: 1).

In 1997, a *Participatory Poverty Assessment* (PPA) was undertaken in South Africa, where the poor described their poverty as:,

- "Alienation from kinship and the community;
- Food insecurity;
- Crowded homes;
- Use of basic forms of energy;
- A lack of adequate paid, secure jobs; and
- Fragmentation of the family (SARPN, 2006:1)."

Subsequently to this, the phenomena can still be seen that church leaders intervened in order to uplift their own congregations and to be a moral watchdog over secular policies. How long before Theopolitics will re-enter the survival game in South Africa to protect those who cannot survive by themselves? Or did Theopolitics never vanish from the scene at all?

This chapter will therefore attempt to locate the position of the state in this new democratic society as related to its voters and their spiritual needs. The hermeneutic challenges facing the leaders together with the political demands towards the church and government will be collectively contextualised in a Theopolitical paradigm.

5.3.   Transforming the South African landscape

F W de Klerk, committed to democracy and transformation, laid down the scenario for negotiations many perceived as either too hastily liberal or too deliberately protectionist in nature. Caution for unrealistic expectations should however not be ignored. The dualistic history of South Africa, namely one of domination and one striving for liberation formed huge barriers, which ultimately could lead to disillusionment (Venter, 1989:24). Relative dissatisfaction will remain inevitable since no avenues of contact had been established by the NP regime, culminating in Apartheid's ultimate success: the true separation of Whites and Blacks. To replace the attitudes of superiority as well as anger towards one another, will indeed not allow a quick-fix situation.

5.3.1. Political transitions

Guiding the 1990 post-Apartheid negotiations entailed a commitment by all parties to the following:

- Deliberations between the government and liberation movements needed to result in endorsing a joint cease-fire;
- Within the context of reconciliation, talks should focus on the creation of a new democratic constitution. After determining the basic values and principles of such a constitution, mechanisms should be put in place to the finalising of it;
- The role and field of influence of the international community regarding the supervision of the transitional period should be agreed by all parties;
- The stakeholders should also agree on the nature and composition of an interim government which shall seek to administer the state as democratically as possible;
- When the constitution is adopted all parties should agree and respect the permanent ending of all armed conflict; and
- Lastly, the international community should lift its sanctions (Deegan, 2001: 75).

With the first phase of negotiations on the release of political prisoners and the return of political exiles successfully underway, a National Peace Accord was signed in September 1991. The main aim of this Accord was to curb political violence. Once again, the historical distrust surfaced again, which resulted in escalating violence, almost derailing the whole peace effort. December 1991 saw the start of the short-lived multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). CODESA's over-ambitious goals combined with political vagueness and an increase in White resistance, led to the calling of the 1992 referendum. The referendum addressed the way forward for negotiations and reforms (Deegan, 2001:78 & 79).

This referendum reiterated the new path which South African citizens longed for since 68,5% voted in favour of continued negotiations (Deegan, 2001:79). The

NP's commitment to political and economical reforms, as well as its social intentions of majoritarian upliftment were nonetheless marred by its continuous linking to political violence, instigated by a "third force" such as assassinations and bombings, leading to the belief that the government's total strategy was still firmly in place.

CODESA II, which took place in May 1992, showed that despite decades of fear and anger, most of the parties tried to remain focused on their ultimate goal, namely true democracy. Yet negotiations were challenged once again with the Boipatong massacre[59], resulting in the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA II. The NP's arrogance and over-confidence also started to fade when its strained covert relationship with the Natal-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) started to surface. Continued international pressures to resume negotiations culminating in the UN Security Council's invitation to the ANC and the NP to the Security Council. This, as well as the NP's realisation that the ANC was undeterred with respect to a majority-led government, led negotiations starting afresh. Mandela and De Klerk's re-commitment to negotiations[60] led to the creation of a different structure, the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP). Due to the failures of CODESA I and II, the MPNP was determined not to fail and proved itself a success when an election date (27 April 1994) was agreed upon in June 1993 (Deegan, 2001:80-82). Finally, the years of constructive dialogue meant that the Blacks' right to exercise their vote was only a few months away. The election would finally replace decades of repression, coercion and violence.

Despite the withdrawal by the IFP and Conservative Party (CP) from the negotiations, the Negotiating Council of the MPNP determined the "four pillars to transition." They were the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the Independent Media Commission (IMC), the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). Additionally, the Negotiating Council also concluded an interim constitution (finalised in 1993), an Electoral Act and the abolishment of remaining Apartheid laws. The non-

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[59] IFP supporters who had the backing of the police slaughtered ANC squatters (Deegan, 2001: 80).
[60] Deegan (2001:87) refers to their relationship as "antagonistic cooperation".

elected TEC served as an advisory and monitoring instrument so as to prevent the current government abusing its resources prior to the elections as well as to contain violence (Deegan, 2001:85).

Apart from the abovementioned institutions, a Constitutional Court was furthermore established which served as the highest legal authority in South Africa. This was a definite break away from Apartheid NP's domination within parliament and the courts. A Government of National Unity (GNU) was to govern the state after the 1994 elections and was aimed at satisfying and accommodating most political parties as well as smoothing out any transitional teething problems and addressing resistance. As the brainchild of the communist Joe Slovo, the conceptual GNU ensured tolerance, compromise and the avoidance of a civil war. The GNU ultimately laid a foundation for other transitional governments to follow (Deegan, 2001:92-93).

The acceptance of an inclusive liberal democracy by the NP and others were to a certain extent peculiar. Booysen (1989: 266) states that twentieth century White perceptions of democracy were identified with the suppression of democracy – all in the name of democracy. In other words, the NP's "political institutions were created in the name of democracy but were inspired by authoritarian ideology" (Booysen, 1989:266-267). As Deegan, (2001:90-91) indicated, the ANC, NP and IFP all resisted such sharing of powers during the last couple of decades. Notwithstanding such resistance, the IFP and ANC did at least espouse equality and universal suffrage. The NP on the other hand, might have proclaimed to practice democratic procedures, although in reality, it was distorted, if not completely undemocratic. This was underlined by its misperceptions of democracy as practiced in its undemocratic institutions, resulting in unfair political and economic gains for minorities (Booysen, 1989:266-267).

5.3.2.   South Africa's first democratic elections

With the unbanning of exiled liberation movements, a new challenge awaited South Africa's newly established parties. With the legalisation of these Black

political parties in 1990, it was clear that the predominantly Xhosa-based[61] ANC was the most prominent of them all. Interestingly, the more militant and radical PAC retained its Theopolitical leadership base with the current leader being a Methodist bishop, Bishop Stanley Mogoba.

With the mounting election fever, many parties remained unsure as to how to canvass voter support or whether to campaign at all. Adding to their anxieties were the realities of South Africa at that stage, which were the omnipresent right wing bombings, political killings[62] and racial hatred. All parties were also to a certain extent new players in this field, since even the NP would have to change its attitude and image if it wanted to gain more Black support. The previous liberation movements also had to change their inner structuring, moving away from a culture of covert violence and disruption to one of transparency and open campaigning. With the full-blown campaign strategy of the ANC, it became clear that its presence and tactics successfully dominated the electoral scene. Trying to bridge the ethnic divide and relying on the voter's historical resentment of the NP, the ANC was, as predicted, on its road to victory.

Despite the presence of the SADF in managing the elections and the last minute participation of the IFP in the elections, an astounding 86% of the South Africa population voted. The ANC won 62,6 % of the total vote with the NP 20,4 and the IFP 10,5%. This led to the NP dominating the Western Cape and the IFP KwaZulu-Natal. The ANC ultimately received 252 seats in the National Assembly followed by the NP's 82 and the IFP's 43 seats (Deegan, 2001:107 &108).

With the IEC and International Observers declaring the elections free and fair despite the volatile situations at certain places, South Africa was now

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[61] Although its membership incorporates a large segment of all ethnic groups its leadership remains overriding Xhosa (Roskin, 2001:89).

[62] KZN, marred by sharp increases in political deaths (Human Rights Watch Africa calculated 1001 deaths between January and April 1994) led to F W de Klerk declaring a State of Emergency, one month before the elections (Deegan, 2001:104 & 108). It showed that despite national reconciliation and top leadership agreements, the grassroots were still adamant in reserving their traditional power bases.

embarking on a democratic road[63] previously unknown for all, but desired nonetheless.

5.4. The political dimension of post-Apartheid South Africa

> We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender and other discrimination. We enter into a covenant that we shall build a society in which all South Africans, both Black and White, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world (Deegan, 2001:113)[64].

The 1994 elections saw the dawn of representative and participative democracy in South Africa. The birth of a new democratic nation created a sense of reconciliation and nation building in a society previously divided. Although short-lived, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was created to supersede all differences, whether racial or otherwise and laid new hard-fought political foundations.

A closer look at the GNU will provide some answers to the following questions:

Do these political foundations suffice for the citizens? How did the restructuring of the former totalitarian state successfully promote respect for fellow South Africans as well as the adherence to basic fundamental democratic principles such as human rights, tolerance, and transparency? Was the restructuring successful at all?

5.4.1. Re-locating the state as the provider, protector and promoter for all

5.4.1.1. The state's political challenges

With the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first democratically elected State President, the whole world stood proudly. Not only were our first

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[63] Booysen (1991:265) refers to procedural and substantive democracy where the former represents liberal democratic practices and the latter emphasizing fundamental justice that seek equality and redistribution for all.
[64] These sentiments were echoed in Pres. Mandela's inaugural address to the nation, 1994.

multi-racial elections free and fair, but South Africa also aspired to achieve a relatively peaceful transition to democracy. Decades of oppression and isolation seemed to vanish into thin air. Subsequently politics of accommodation, tolerance and justice became the new buzzwords.

To return to the questions posed, it is unfortunate that the main response is negative. Racial divisions still remain apparent for all to see, not only between Whites and Blacks but also among Blacks themselves, Indians and Coloureds[65] (Venter, 1998:4-11 & Roskin, 2001:99-100). Economic difficulties continue to hamper political and socio-economic progress as advocated by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the GNU (Roskin & Berry, 1999:127). Across the racial divide, frustration starts to mount again[66]. Schraeder's "great expectation-minimal capability" model[67] is clearly applicable not only to Africa in totality, but to South Africa also (Schraeder, 2000:218).

Given the history of South Africa, the state clearly has to re-establish itself in the new post-Apartheid setting, both as a provider and a protector for all. The socialism-communism rhetoric of the ANC-SACP (South African Communist Party) alliance needed to be replaced (Roskin, 2001:98 & 104 & Deegan, 2001:76) with more democratic principles and liberal-economic policies. Similarly, for the pro-Apartheid political parties such as the NP and CP who needed to liberalise their own archaic doctrines (Marais, 1998:305). Moreover, the revolutionary and anti-capitalist ideas of communism collapsed with the ending of foreign funding and communism in Eastern Europe as well as the international movement towards democracy that ultimately saw a dramatic overhaul of policies within the ANC and NP.

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[65] Venter (1998:4-11) specifically refers to various types of schisms that South Africa still experience such as the Afrikaner right wing, rivalries among ANC/IFP supporters, rivalry within the ANC alliance, and finally, division within the GNU.

[66] Although socio-economic difficulties can hamper unity and harmony the opposite is also true. Cross-cutting cleavages can lead to racial groups uniting in their plight against crime, etc even thought they might be politically, linguistically, religiously exclusive from one another (Mayer, 1996: 18). But the fact remains that the high expectations created by the ANC created artificial hope and euphoria (Roskin, 2001: 94).

[67] Typical of African states, great expectations exist after the successful liberation from oppressive regimes. However, due to mismanagement and/or totalitarian regimes' inabilities to address socio-economic challenges, a paradox is created which ultimately leads to frustration again (Schraeder, 2000: 218).

On the political front, the creation of a Constitutional Assembly in 1994 showed the various role-players' commitment to democracy and human rights when negotiating a new constitution, that was finally adopted in 1996[68]. By underscoring Trias Politika[69] and Constitutionalism, the supremacy of the constitution is now guaranteed (in contrast to the Apartheid system of Parliamentary supremacy) as well as the interrelatedness and interdependence of the various branches of government (De Villiers, 1994: 55). From now on, the constitution made provision for effective checks and balances regarding the exertion of governmental power, thus avoiding abuse and mal-administration while promoting good, cooperative governance and accountability (Devenish, 1998:13).

The creation of the GNU succeeded in establishing a healthy, although not a conflict-free, basis for consensual politics. Unfortunately, an absence of consensus politics within the various political parties themselves severely hampered the future development of a politics of accommodation. Both the respective political histories of the ANC and NP's reflect authoritarian tendencies where coercion and dictation were the norms. This inevitably led to clashes within their internal structures. Inside the ANC, those who never left South Africa during Apartheid were used to the culture of negotiations and concessions under the auspices of the UDF. On the other hand, the ANC was also comprised of more radical elements that seek either total socialism as opposed to the leadership's tendencies toward privatisation and capitalism or are accustomed to authoritarian leadership and unquestioning obedience (Roskin, 2001: 102-107 & SAIIA, 2001/2002: 9-12). Similarly, the NP's internal clashes were also dualistic in nature. Those NP stalwarts who opposed reform or the pace of it remained dissatisfied. In contrast the more liberal think tanks felt that too little reform is taking place at too slow a pace (Ferreira, 1997:3 & Kotzé & Greyling, 1994: 227).

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[68] Venter (1998:24) describes this period as "two years of dedicated work and rough political bargaining amidst a spirit of co-operative alliance".
[69] This "separation of power mechanism" ensures that the branches of government act independently in certain areas and simultaneously checks on one another in other areas. This prevents domination and abuse of powers at the cost of

A government by the people for the people was exactly what the ANC strove for during their liberation struggle. After years of denial, the 1994 elections marked a new phase. Democracy as a working political system was to a certain extent the logical conclusion if freedoms and universal adult suffrage were to be protected and promoted. Basic human and voting rights were fundamental to the ANC's Freedom Charter. Their socialistic nature, specifically concerning economics, required some rethinking, however. Due to the universal collapse of communism and the subsequent development of democratic socialism, new directives would need to be designed if foreign investment withdrawal was to be avoided.

Parties adhering to equality and no discrimination, as detected in their respective constitutions, did not necessarily reflect these principles in practices (Ferreira, 1997:3). Membership compositions of the parties remained limited to their traditional ethnic groupings, despite attempts to alter these perceptions (Roskin, 2001:). The trick furthermore lies in the ability of the parties to become catchall parties, attracting as many diverse groups as supporters despite their historical connections. Simultaneously the "old" support bases needed to be kept intact in order to avoid further alienation.

The collapse of the GNU in 1996 and the continuous[70] electoral victory of the ANC in the 1999 elections jeopardised unity and accommodation and could have cleared the path for dictatorial tendencies (as seen in the political culture of the ANC) and corruption (Roskin, 2001: 87). The ANC's inability to secure a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly (Parliament) shunned fears of outright domination and constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, what will the future hold when party dominance continues?

A contemporary peculiarity namely a dominant one-party system, tends to increase in democratic societies. Although these societies adhere to democratic principles of regularised free and fair elections, respect for human rights and

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other branches. The judiciary however remains completely independent and free from any interference (Van Niekerk et al, 2001:56-57).

good governance, one party within this paradigm continues to dominate its political settings by winning elections on a continuous basis. The lack of competitive alternative political party options and ultimately viable opposition parties, leads to a power vacuum within such states as well as to the fear for potential dictatorial propensities. When the continued absence of competitive multiparty politics remains, a governing party tends to become over-secure in its positions and less inclined to deliver on its electoral promises. The fear that the ANC might lead to such a one-party political state is not unreasonable[71]. Given its political culture from within, its harsh reactions to party defectors and criticisms, continuous corruption and lack of accountability, it is no wonder that some analysts predict a potential undemocratic situation in the near future (Booysens, 1989:274). Michael G. Roskin (2001:101-102) furthermore attributes such a characterisation of the ANC to the following:

- The ANC's large support base does not result in power rotation. The merging of all parties (which is unthinkable) would still not provide a healthy competitive opposition stage for alternating governmental power;

- Should dialogue cease between the left and right axes as well as the Black and non-Black axes of South Africa's political spectrum, resultant violent conflict, increase White emigration and/or Black dictatorship might surface;

- Due to its strong ethnic bases, no other party really unites people across the racial divide like the ANC; and

- Bilateral opposition from the DA, SACP and its COSATU partner, PAC and the IFP, can lead to the ANC strengthening its coercive apparatus, instead of opting for the course of negotiating. This will ironically and sadly show a repeat of South African history.

5.4.1.2. The post 1994 socio-economic disparities

Apartheid's unbalanced capitalistic legacy left huge socio-economic disparities and challenges that should be paralleled with political opportunities when

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[70] ANC keeps on securing electoral victories with the 2004 elections strengthening its support base with a record high voter turn out.

establishing democracy. If the needs of the people are to be catered for, voting rights and freedoms are not the only determinants of a good life, but economic reform and development as well. Hence, the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was initiated and dominated all spheres of government and their policies (RSA, 1994:7). All the various role-players were forced to change their known paths so as to accommodate the challenges of this new road towards nation building, democracy and economic growth (Deegan, 2001:76).

From the onset it became clear that the ANC's RDP programme would attempt to redress the imbalances of the past. The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development Programme (RSA, 1994:7) as a socio-economic policy, should seek to create a people-centred democratic society free from racism, poverty and sexism. Ultimately, the RDP aimed to promote sustainable development that will empower all citizens. Simultaneously, peace and security will be of primary concern, culminating into nation building, from which all would benefit (RSA, 1994:6-8).

Basically the ANC promised its voters

- Free (or at least affordable) medical care and education;
- Jobs for all (about 300 000 – 500 000 jobs were promised);
- Inexpensive houses (a promised of 1 million);
- The electrification of 2,5 million houses;
- The development of telecommunications;
- Pensions for the old;
- Loans for African entrepreneurs; and
- The redistribution of 30% agricultural land for African farmers (Kotzé & Greyling, 19: 80-81 & Roskin, 2001:104).

The national government together with its provincial and local government counterparts was reorganised to fulfil the requirements of the RDP's five

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[71] Mbeki's rule characterizes three c's: control, centralization and coordination resulting in popular debates being sacrificed. His leadership style has ultimately led to the greatest succession battles and internal turmoil within the ANC

programmes[72] (RSA, 1994: 3-5). Unfortunately, implementing such a programme proved much more arduous than envisioned due to the economic situation of South Africa and the world economy as such. Additionally, Bond (2001:41) claims that "the post-Apartheid liberalisation policies led to the collapse of several important industries in the electronics, appliances, footwear, clothing and textiles." Service delivery rates were also poor. But, despite Jay Naidoo's admittance that his Ministry did little between 1994-1996, a few successes could be registered. These accomplishments were seen in:

- The electrification of 1,3 million houses;
- Connecting water supplies to a million households;
- Almost 232 000 houses were build;
- Feeding schemes to prevent malnutrition were operating in 12 300 primary schools;
- Free medical care was available to pregnant women and children under 6 years of age; and
- Public works schemes provided temporary jobs for 28 000 (Marais, 1998: 191).

Subsequently, the replacement of RDP with its Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy proved that the ANC had realised that socialism and communism in the extreme only hampered investment (Venter, 1998: 17). However, the goals of GEAR were barely ever met. For example, Bond (2001:41) illustrates that South Africa's formal-sector non-agricultural net job *losses* from 1996 to 1999 were 500 000, missing its aim of creating 950 000 *new* jobs completely. Malherbe (in SAIIA, 1998/1999: 273 & 276) also identifies several misfortunes regarding GEAR specifically in the areas of domestic savings. Notwithstanding, Malherbe (in SAIIA, 1998/1999: 273 & 276) reiterates that despite its unrealistic political and economic goals,[73] GEAR managed to create substantial economic stability during political transition (SAIIA,

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since 2004 (Gumede, 2005: 35).

[72] These programmes are referred to as 1) Meeting Basic Needs, 2) Developing our Human Resources, 3) Building the Economy, 4) Democratising the state and society, 5) Implementing the RDP (Marais, 1998:177).

[73] Marais (1998:171) describe GEAR as an unrealistic economic policy aiming to reconcile neo-liberalism with the socialist intent of the RDP. The aligning of these two worlds seemed quite difficult to achieve.

1998/1999: 273 & 276).

5.4.1.3. *South Africa's dual economies: the honeymoon period is over*

The year 2004 marked South Africa's celebration of ten years of democracy as encapsulated by guaranteeing a better life for all. However, the gap between the rich and the poor as well as the lack of service delivery challenges the euphoria of our young democracy. The inequalities that continue to exist between the dualistic economic strata of South Africa's society have severely challenged government in its efforts to eradicate poverty and enhance sustainable development. As government reflects in its review the successes and challenges in *Towards a Ten Year Review* (October 2003), "two economies" persist in the country. "The first is an advanced, sophisticated economy, based on skilled labour, which is becoming more globally competitive. The second is a mainly informal, marginalised, unskilled economy, populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector."

Despite experiencing economic growth every year since 1994, South Africa is still unable to reduce unemployment due to population growth, urbanisation and increased labour force participation. Jobs were created in the informal sector but jobs have been lost in the formal sector (Knight, 2004:13).

Government programmes have greatly reduced poverty. Through its housing subsidy programme, at least seven million people have been housed. The government's programmes to provide free basic water and free basic electricity have also had a tremendous impact. Social grants, especially to the elderly and children, have benefited nearly eight million people and, if fully implemented by getting all eligible people registered, could cut the poverty rate almost in half. The government's HIV/AIDS programme is beginning to have a real impact and the provision of anti-retroviral drugs will prolong lives (South Africa government, 2003: 30).

Within a globalised context, South Africa itself has seen an economic growth of nearly 5% in 2004-2005 (Manuel, 2006: 1). Despite this growth and the fact that South Africa is considered as an upper-middle-income country, most of its households continuously experience poverty.

5.4.1.4. Continuous challenges of equitable development

South Africa is the most developed and modern country in Africa, with extensive natural resources, a developed agricultural sector and significant manufacturing. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 was $104.2 billion - larger than any other country in Africa. However, South Africa suffers from recurring unemployment and one the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the world. Some 50% of South Africa's people live in poverty; at least seven million people live in shacks in informal settlements (Knight, 2004: 13).

Unlike the case of absolute poverty, rising standards of living will not be sufficient to eliminate relative poverty if the resources available to the wealthy increase at a faster rate than the resources available to the poor. Increases in relative poverty are not necessarily less onerous than increases in absolute poverty. These increases in relative poverty can lead to social disintegration, growing violence[74], segmentation, emotional suffering, and ethnic and racial conflict (Naledi, 1998:2).

The Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR) (May, 1998:2-3) argues that poverty and inequality can only be reduced by breaking the forces that perpetuate poverty, whilst simultaneously promoting income, wealth and opportunity. The Report assumes the following:

- Economic growth and human development are interchangeable and linked to quality of life;

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[74] Evidence is seen by means of voter dissatisfaction, riots and defiance of national leadership. How effective is decentralization?

- Economic growth and human development can be achieved by advancing the capabilities of disadvantaged communities and individuals by allowing them access to assets, both physical and social;

- To establish a framework for short-term macroeconomic stability, government should allow redistributive measures as well;

- Government must play a more assertive role in "facilitating the transfer of assets and services from the wealthy to the poor, matched by market, institutional and spatial reforms benefiting the less well-off"; and

- Social, economic and demographic information are crucial in order to monitor the extent and nature of change when managing the reduction of poverty and inequality (May, 1998:2-3).

5.4.1.5. Cementing good governance and democratic ethos

South Africa remains a developmental state facing restraints in bridging the gap between the first and second economies. Strains on the government can be seen with the outbreak of more and more riots protesting against lack of service delivery, transparency and freedom.

Democracy, as a normative political system serves and enhances good governance, facilitating poverty eradication and enhancing sustainable development (Wiki encyclopaedia, 2006b:1). It also requires public officials to adopt and exercise a democratic ethos. Within the South African context, good governance is furthermore enhanced by Chapter Three of the Constitution where the principle of cooperative governance requires mutual trust and good faith (RSA, 1996a).

Good governance[75] can be best understood as a set of 8 major characteristics: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability. These characteristics ensure that corruption is minimised; the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. Corruption is the,

abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. Public officials[76] improperly and illegally enrich themselves or those close to them by abusing their entrusted public power. As a result service delivery and effective administration are sacrificed, especially in rural areas[77] (Luvuno, 2003:3).

Public resources that could have been utilised for sustainable development are diverted to self-enrichment schemes, sacrificing the ethos of good governance.

Decades of struggle to attain freedom prove that democracy is the system that will guarantee freedom and human rights best possible. As Dahl (1999:64) has stated, "democracy in the ideal sense is a necessary condition for the best political order". South Africa should embrace the challenge of maintaining political order. This requires the successful integration of socialist programmes. "The strengthening of the democratic system should (also) be in a manner that involves the people in determining their future" (Mbeki, 2005:1).

So how do we move forward? Clearly, the challenges do not only lie with government policies and programmes of action. The societal obligations to social equity and democratic ethos are as crucial as it is essential for government and public service sectors. Rich and poor, Black and White, need to embrace and maintain high *ethical* and *moral* standards. By embracing Ubuntu, which addresses important values such as group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity and collective unity, ethics and morality can be individualised and internalised. Ubuntu must become an integral part of society.

Nelson Mandela's campaign "Make poverty history" is an indication that despite ten years of democracy, poverty alleviation has not yet been obtained. The struggle for freedom is jeopardised by poverty. Election campaigns promising better service deliveries and guaranteeing a better life for all, create

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[75] For comprehensive information, see Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000: 90-135).

[76] Church leaders are also prone to corruption such as Rev. Boesak.

[77] Corrupt practices have the greatest impact on small municipalities and its citizens. Good governance practices are the most effective when ensuring service deliveries.

expectations that are unrealistic at best. Government interventionist policies such as Project Consolidate and ASGISA[78] are indicators that social justice needs to be rectified. However, as citizens of this rainbow nation we need to unite. We need to start to act with integrity and teach our children the values of Ubuntu and Batho Pele[79].

Gone are the days that policy initiatives and a top-down approach by government were all that was needed to help its people. As South Africans we need to unite in our efforts to create an equal society free from unemployment, inaccessibility and poverty.

5.5.   Summary

Miraculously, South Africa managed to move away from oppression, racism and discrimination. Transformation and reconciliation become achievable. Structural reforms within the DRC and government were inevitable. By implementing largely top down reforms, grassroots' misinterpretations and resistance were created. When collective decision-making was sacrificed for the sake of democracy and restructuring, collective ownership of programmes and grand visions were forfeited.

Can Theopolitics continue to be a formidable force in the new South Africa? In most cases, the DRC remains silent regarding governmental matters and structures. Clearly, the DRC had difficulties in redirecting itself within the new political dispensation. Faced with internal challenges such as unification and gay pastors, elucidate its silence. The Anglican Church continues to be a moral watchdog and vehicle for social change, even when in conflict with the ANC.

Are Churches and government relevant and representative in post-Apartheid South Africa? Are the Churches and government successful in unifying a

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[78] Programmes of action to decrease the skills gap and assist those municipalities with more effective support structures, all aimed in reducing poverty.
[79] Government's campaign of putting people first, hence emphasising internal democratic ethos, integrity and compassion.

diverse nation within a secular setting? Is religion still a voice of reason pertaining government matters?

Whether Theopolitics and the church can retain their dominance in a plural and diverse society remains to be seen. Will a strengthened democratic ethos reduce the impact of Theopolitics or will it be mutually complimentary?

CHAPTER 6 IN CHURCH AND GOVERNMENT WE TRUST

6.1. Introduction

It is safe to say that before 1994 and South Africa's first democratic elections, Theopolitics were instrumental in both oppressing and/or liberating the masses. Regrettably, immense challenges continue to plague South Africa. Despite South Africa's liberal constitution that guarantees human dignity, freedoms and democracy, ordinary citizens still experience economic hardships, resulting in socio-economic deprivation. The entrenchment of democratic institutions and values become therefore problematic.

Given the secular nature of South Africa, the question arises on whether Theopolitics will continue to dominate the political scene. Can reconciliation and unity be achieved without government collaborating with the Churches? Can the government and church be united in their commitment to the social welfare of South Africa, especially when advocating nation building and reconstruction? Or will the Church be removed from the political stage altogether?

6.2. The religious dimension of secularism in post-Apartheid South Africa

Secularism reigns in South Africa but is religion really a diminishing factor in our polity? A prominent ANC comrade, Carl Niehaus, for example felt that religion was and never will be a determining factor in South Africa's politics[80] (Villa-Vicencio & Niehaus, 1995:81).

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[80] As a Christian himself he strongly feels that political negotiators, atheists and individual religious leaders contributed more to post-apartheid negotiations than a "silent and confused church" (Villa-Vicencio & Niehaus, 1995:87).

It is apparent however that the cohabitation between state and church has indeed not disappeared (Gordin & Fabricius, 2006:1). The presence of prominent religious figures such as Rev. F. Chikane and Archbishops Tutu and Ndungane; the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); the annual Zionist gathering in Polokwane[81]; as well as religious-orientated political parties like the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) continue to show the close and unbreakable connection between religion and government (*Sapa*, 2004a:1). South African religions played different roles to different peoples during its troubled history: some (such as the majority of English churches) provided a "comfort zone" for the poor and downtrodden, whilst others, such as the DRC & APK, offered a "justifying zone" for the Whites. These different roles of the church will continue in this new secular chapter of post-Apartheid South African politics, albeit with different demographical role-players.

Apartheid was a sin and a heretical doctrine. These sins that ravaged the policy of Apartheid are aptly described by De Villiers (1994:3) as:

- Apartheid's orderliness failed since the majority of states and citizens rejected it;
- Its calculations never added up with respect to forcing 30 million people into 30% of land;
- Apartheid's balance sheets never made economical sense since the cost of segregation led to South Africa being bankrupt;
- The mere immorality of Apartheid with its distorted, unbalanced and contradictory emphasis that you should not begrudge yourself (whilst conveniently and flagrantly doing just the opposite with the majority of Blacks);
- The blatant racist undertone that clearly wasn't solely based on cultural disposition, but also based on economic criteria as well;
- The resultant Black nationalist movements showed the failure of Apartheid; and

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[81] Hundreds of thousands believers flock together to celebrate Easter.

- The complexity of Apartheid betrayed "unholy bungling" since administrative systems and legal rules constantly tried to conceal dishonesty and immorality.

As all political systems tend to react in the realm of oppression and immorality, South Africa ventured into a secular, constitutional state system. New governments typically move into complete opposite directions when taking over from their predecessors. Such was the case in South Africa when the ANC-led government replaced the racist and oppressive regime with one advocating religious neutrality, human rights, freedom, inclusiveness and representative democracy. As guaranteed by the 1996 Constitution religious freedom and freedom of association together with respect for others will be guaranteed. Given the fact that religion has influenced politics and society in such an overwhelming manner, it remains questionable whether the secular aspect will continue to be respected.

Secularisation suggests that religion in its practice and institutions have lost its social and political significance. However, religious leaders still interrelate with government on various issues, whether political, health or restorative justice (Rickard, 1999:1; Zwane & Paton, 2002:4 & Anglican Church Joint Press Statement, 2001:1-2). With the majority of South African citizens adhering to Christianity, it is clear that with Forums such as the National Religious Leaders' Forum, closeness between state and Church will remain (Sapa, 2004b:1).

It is doubtful that secularisation will estrange people from their religious roots. Socio-political theology will continue to determine the interrelationships between church and government. Within the socio-political nexus, the state and church and their distinct yet complimentary responsibilities, will continue to promote transformation and transparency, despite economic hardships (Forrest, 2002:12).

6.2.1. Politics and Theology: their separate yet inseparable ways

South Africa's drastic political changes since 1990 automatically demands transformation in other areas of life as well. Moving away from an oppressive theocratic state to a secular liberal state required attitudes, laws, governance and political culture to adjust accordingly. Religio-political socialisation that was enforced or developed over decades needed transformation. How far would the secular communist-inclined government go in distancing itself from religious interference? How willing are churches to become a marginalised social agent within a political context proclaiming secular and pluralistic values?

6.2.1.1. Rationalising the methodological framework

In developing a framework which allows for the testing of the applicability and relevance of Theopolitics, the following methodology was applied.

a) Surveys, 1999 and 2004

The surveys gave great insight into the thinking of ordinary citizens (mainly the grassroots) in Kwa-Zulu Natal. Chapters two and three gave extensive coverage of South Africa's history that cemented Theopolitics' strong impact on our society. This comprehensive background resulted in the surveys to focus only on post-Apartheid South Africa, 1994 onwards.

Although the scope of the study is mainly concerned with the period 1988 – 1994, the researcher felt it appropriate to extend the surveys beyond 1999, hence the additional 2004 surveys. This was mainly to show the continuance of events and issues regarding the government and church, despite the different time frames. Hence by repeating the exact same surveys again in 2004 reflected the researcher's ability to continuously link up with current happenings and events, making the surveys relevant and applicable.

The surveys of 1999 and 2004 were exactly the same in nature, sampling and scope. The 2004 data corroborates the earlier findings and no separate analysis is required. It is important to reiterate the fact that the 2004 survey was only an expansion of previous data with no singular deviation recorded. This confirms the continuation of events despite different time frames.

i) The surveys' demographical background

In 1999 and 2004, the researcher administered a survey in four locations in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) to investigate how ordinary people view their political parties and churches. Within the context of a transformative democratic society, the then hotly debated topics of abortion and the death sentence were also explored.

An effort was made to select survey sites that are different in terms of culture and race to generate useful comparisons. The areas were demarcated within the City of uMhlathuze, which is a local municipality situated within the uThungulu District Council area in KwaZulu-Natal. The area comprises urban settlement, rural settlements, rural areas, farms and nature reserves. The majority of rural settlements are located within five Tribal Authority areas. Empangeni and Richards Bay are the largest towns forming part of the municipal area with Esikhawini, Ngwelezane, Nseleni and Vulindlela on the outskirts of these towns (uMhlathuze Municipal Areas Statistics – 2006: 1).. The core target areas, Richards Bay, Empangeni and Esikhawini have the following population composition, as measured in 2006:

Population group	Richards Bay	Empangeni	Esikhawini
Blacks	19382	13050	70882
Indians/Asians	10231	1035	18
Whites	21343	9437	7
Coloured	2040	461	70

Table 6 A: The city of uMhlathuze population overview (uMhlathuze Municipal Areas Statistics – 2006: 1).

These target areas were used together with a small sample selected from Westville's (Durban) Reformed Church in Africa. This sample was chosen mainly to see whether this sister church of the DRC, having mainly Indians as members, felt the same as the other racial groupings of Richards Bay, Empangeni and Esikhawini. Since there are not many Indians within the DRC and Anglican Church congregations within these areas, the researcher felt it

necessary to get a bigger sample from the Indian community. There is however no such church located in these aforementioned areas, except in Westville.

The first area, Esikhawini, is a township adjacent to Richards Bay in the North-Eastern parts of the Kwa-Zulu-Natal Province. At the time of the survey, the township consisted of about 71000 people, predominantly Black African (70 882) of which 38% were unemployed (uMhlathuze Municipal Areas Statistics – 2006: 2).

The second location, Empangeni has a 6% unemployment rate with 23% of its residents earning R154 000 per annum. The third location, Richards Bay is the economic hub of the District as reflected in the numerous industries located in the area. It boasts industries such as,

- Hillside Aluminium;
- Bayside Aluminium;
- Mondi Kraft (paper mill);
- Richards Bay Coal Terminal (bulk coal export);
- Richards Bay Minerals (extraction of and refining heavy minerals from sand deposits);
- Bell Equipment (manufacturing of heavy industrial and construction vehicles and equipment);
- Central Timber Company and Silvacel (wood chipping plants);
- Indian Ocean Fertiliser (production of chemical fertilisers); and
- Portnet (the export/import harbour authority (uMhlathuze Municipal Areas Statistics – 2006: 3).

Richards Bay has an 8% unemployed rate and 47% of its residents earn more than R154 000 per annum (uMhlathuze Municipal Areas Statistics – 2006: 3).

All these areas were suitable for the survey since they microscopically reflect the racial and economic demographics of South Africa. These target areas also depict South Africa's religious affiliation appropriately, as linked to race and language. Both the DRC and Anglican Church have congregations in

Empangeni and Richards Bay with an Anglican Church situated in Esikhawini as well (there is no Dutch Reformed Church located in this rural node). At the time of the survey, many debates focussed on the establishment of a gambling casino in Richards Bay. The church fraternity was vehemently against such a move since it would lead to the moral decline of its congregations. Adding to this was also the continuous escalation of crime which re-invigorated the debate on the abolishment of the death penalty. The legalisation of abortion was also a sensitive issue among many churchgoers. These issues were classified as emotive issues in the survey and were seen as indicators of the individuals' sense of identification and/or alienation with their church, political party and ultimately with the current government of the day.

The principal aim of the questionnaire was to find out whether any church member felt disillusioned with the leadership structures of their government and church, as reflected in their programmes and policies. Responses to the questionnaire are highly relevant to the crux of this thesis since they provide information on how citizens, across the racial and economic spectrum, interpret the role of the church and government in their every day lives. Since no recent studies indicated the level of interaction between religion and politics, this survey clearly paves the way for new theories and approaches, as related to Theopolitics.

The questionnaire was divided into three main parts. Part one of the questionnaire collected background information regarding personal circumstances and living conditions. This set the respondent at ease and provided the researcher with a basic understanding of their level of income (39% earned between R50 000 – R100 000 per annum) and education. Most of the participants were educated to at least the level of an undergraduate degree (35%), which concurs with the basic assumption that educated citizens are more knowledgeable and active regarding socio-political matters. Most of the respondents were also representing the grassroots of which 92% were Blacks. Their racial composition was needed to determine whether new shifts were made regarding church affiliation or joining a new political party (43.5% are

ANC members and 79.6 % planned on not joining any party). Only 33,8% of the respondents belonged to a political party. Within the specific sample areas, the various churches' racial components corroborated with the suburb's racial composition as seen on page 133.

Part two of the questionnaire asked the respondents questions about more specific aspects such as:

1. Respondents' political party membership and plans of joining a new party;

2. Respondents' attitude towards emotional issues (such as abortion and affirmative action) in general, by ignoring or advocating action against or for these issues;

3. Respondents' feelings towards emotional issues such as abortion, death sentence, affirmative action and land distribution;

4. Respondents' feelings towards racial integration, whether in school or in church;

5. Respondents' perceptions on whether government and their church are easily accessible and responsive to their specific needs;

6. Respondents' thoughts on the church being an effective instrument for the moral and spiritual upliftment of South Africa; and

7. Respondents' thoughts on whether their church influence their political ways in any way.

Part three consisted of open-ended questions that asked respondents to identify any areas that needed attention from their church, as linked to their interpretation of the current political landscape of South Africa. The open ended questions were as follow:

1. Please write a line or two on how your church can become more effective in the moral and spiritual upliftment of the country (see Appendix 1, question 17); and

2. Does your church influence your political ways in any way: please express your feelings (see Appendix 1, questions 21 & 21). An interesting five percent felt that churches should be used for political

education and awareness, specifically in the light of moral values, ethical leadership and HIV/Aids awareness. Some suggestions from the respondents:

- "The church should explain policies and laws to congregation *after or during sermons*";
- "The Church should be part of awareness campaigns addressing issues such as HIV"; and
- "The Church must join governments with their *Imbizo's*".

With respect to the questionnaire's questions 21 & 22, fifty-five percent felt that their churches were not influencing them whereas 38.5% felt their churches do influence them.

Responses to these questions are helpful but exclude concerns that lie outside the government's sphere of influence. This survey allowed the researcher to avoid influencing initial replies (by asking purely demographical questions at the start), look for consensus (by requesting an assessment of pre-defined needs or capabilities from all people) and test for inconsistencies (by comparing the answers to open and pre-defined questions) that might reflect preferences which are ill informed or have adapted to personal circumstances.

A balanced sampling frame was employed to ensure that each survey area was properly represented. Random sampling techniques were used for the selection of households and suitable respondents, as linked to church membership. In each location, targets were listed by enumerator area (EA) prior to selection and comprised of approximately 10 households in these relatively sparsely populated areas (as compared to metropoles such as a metropole like Tshwane). Sample intervals were then calculated by dividing the total number of targets in each area by the number of questionnaires allocated to that area. The first target (or church going family) of each EA was selected randomly. Interviewers then proceeded to visit every fifth household of which one person was selected from each family. This technique was a very helpful tool when

analyzing socio-economic and demographic data within a specific spatial context.

A total of 435 people aged 18 or over made up the survey samples of 1999 and 2004. The sample was split unevenly between the three survey sites due to the amount of church goers in those areas as follows: 220 samples in Richards Bay (60.4% of the total sample); 75 samples in Empangeni (33.2% of the sample); and 80 samples in Esikhawini (6.4% of the sample). Overall, the sample consisted of more men (64%) than women (36%). The respondents were classified in terms of the racial categories used in South Africa as follows: 61% Black; 3% Coloured; 9% Indian/Asian; and 30% White.

However, this procedure was not followed with the Reformed Church in Africa. Random interviews were held with churchgoers and pastors as well as the ad hoc distribution of the questionnaires in an uncontrolled environment, mostly after church ceremonies. This was not ideal but logistical problems together with the small size of the congregation led to no other viable alternatives at the given time. At the end, 60 samples were taken from this congregation, resulting in adequate data verification.

b) *Interviews*

Formal and structured interviews were also conducted with the following persons:

1. National Curator of the DRC, Rev. W Botha,
2. Rev. T Pillay, Reformed Church in Africa, Durban; and
3. Rev. C van Rooyen, DRC, Empangeni.
4. Canon D Doveton, Anglican Church, St. Andrews (Zululand),

The interviews were consistent and similar with the main foci as follow:

1. *Was transformation in the (respective) Church needed and if so, did it occur?*

Interviewees 1- 3 felt that transformation was inevitable and that the DRC was committed into addressing transformation issues such as

integration with its sister churches. Concerns were raised on whether the ordinary church follower would approve integration. The sensitive issue on the acceptance of gay pastors was not addressed. Interviewee 4 felt that transformation does occur gradually, when needed.

2. *Are political issues mirrored in Church sermons and policies?*

All interviewees felt that moral issues can be addressed, such as abortion. However, bringing politics into the Church was not desirable.

3. *Can the (respective) Church play a role in reconciliation?*

All interviewees concurred that their Church can significantly *contribute to reconciliation.*

4. *Did (respective) Church membership decrease during the last ten years? If so, why?*

All interviewees concurred that church attendance in general dropped but memberships per se did not decrease significantly.

5. *How does the (respective) Church sees itself in relation to government and governmental matters?*

Interviewees 1- 3 felt the historical closeness with government was no longer applicable with the new government. The DRC will mainly focus on matters of the church. Interviewee 4 felt that the Anglican Church will always be in the forefront on issues that concern their congregations' interests. This was shown in the Richards Bay fraternity taking issue with government in the building of a casino. Extensive court cases reflect the commitment of the churches to defend and protect their congregations, especially when the moral fibre of communities was at stake.

6.2.1.2. *Secular governance as based on Biblical vision*

The ANC and SACP commitment to non-racism, justice, democracy and non-sexism constitutes a centre of values that challenges us all to live better lives. The Marxist classless society is a secular expression of a Biblical social vision (Villa-Vicencio, 1996:120).

Of course, the close symbiotic relationship that existed between the DRC and NP during Apartheid changed drastically with the power shifts. The new relationship between the ANC and Anglican Church also demands refocusing since their roles[82] have changed drastically. Moving away from being a liberation movement to that of a government, the ANC has to accommodate new expectations and roles. Subsequently, the Anglican Church's traditional role also needs redefining (Mabanga, 2004:8). Continuing to be the voice of the oppressed and poor, the church keeps a check on government and its application of secular values within the context of human rights. When clashes with religious values occur, what are the new role of churches and their relationship with government? Can government processes promote and protect Christian visions and ideals? Human development implies religious and spiritual development. Hence, the RDP vision of reconstruction and development link with these religious and spiritual dimensions (Omi, 1996:52).

Currently the South African Government accepts the interrelationship between the church and the state. However, the Mandela government showed reluctance in accommodating outspoken prescriptive interferences from religious role-players (Forrest, 2002:12). It is thus inadmissible that an intimate interrelationship would continue between the top structures of the Government and the churches.

Against this background and based data collected in KZN since 1999 (as explained in section 6.2.1.1) the following themes can be addressed:

6.2.1.2.1. <u>Validity of representativeness of voters' feeling as *seen* by government:</u>

With the legalisation of abortion in 1996 (RSA 1996b), outrage was felt over different strata of the South African religious society. Government remained firm in its opinion that the moral choice lies with the individual and not with government. The question of government connection with its Christian citizenry is greatly intensified with these legal and moral documents. The validity of representativeness of its electorate becomes subsequently more blurred.

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[82] From activist to transformist.

When studying Figure 6.1, 64.7% individuals (referred to as YOU) strongly disapproved (rejected) the legalisation of abortion with 27.9% individuals (merely) disapproving. Given the fact that only 1.5% strongly approved, clearly questions the validity of government's claim of accurate citizen representation.

Figure 6.1 *The individual's approval of the legalisation of abortion (Muller, 1999 & 2004).*

It is interesting to note that a similar outcry from Christian communities was apparent when government ratified the Civil Union Act of 2006 (RSA 2006). Subsequently, government legally endorsed same sex marriages. Congregations from different religious denominations rejected this latest progressive Bill as unbiblical and immoral (Pillay, 2006:1 & Ngcobo, 2006:16). The Anglican Church however was always a vocal supporter of gay marriages (Changing attitudes, 2004:1 & Anglican Church Press Statement, 1997:1). On 27 June 2007, the DRC, after years of struggling to come to terms with its gay pastors, overwhelmingly voted in their favour (Muller, 1999:14; Malan, 2005:1; Jackson, 2000:9 & SABC News, 2007).

Typical of democracies, the ruling political party (in this case, the ANC-led government) represents the needs and visions of its followers. Based on effective leadership, policies and statements will mostly reflect the majority of is followers' interests. The thin line between political parties' representation and governmental assessment of what is best for the state becomes vague at stages. When asking congregation members of the DRC, Anglican Church and Reformed Church in Africa their perception on sensitive, contentious and emotional issues as identified as abortion, land distributions, restoring of the death sentence the following is evident:

As seen in the following graphs (Figures 6.2 and 6.4), government's representativeness remain greatly disputed. Figures 6.2 and 6.4, with the exception of Figure 6.3 (pertaining to the individual's take on land distribution) furthermore validate this observation and argument. Misrepresentation therefore continues to occur regarding sensitive issues such as racial reconciliation and the restoring of the death sentence.

Figure 6.2   **The individual's opinion on the restoration of the death sentence (Muller, 1999 & 2004).**

Figure 6.3   **The individual's opinion of land distribution (Muller, 1999 & 2004).**

The fact that respondents felt in favour of land distribution can be attributed to the fact that most respondents live in semi-urban dwellings and that land ownership is of less importance to them since it does not affect them directly. However, this can probably be contradicted when one asks the same question to a farmer and/or a farm worker in a rural area.

When asked on the issue of reconciliation, President Mbeki said the following: "Lack of progress towards racial reconciliation is producing rage among millions of people" (Gibson, 1999: 11 & *Economist*, 1999:21). Clearly, his critics will agree that he is not in touch with his followers when studying figure Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4   The individual's opinion on reconciliation (Muller 1999 & 2004)

6.2.1.2.2. Validity of representativeness of voters' feeling with respect to government:

Figure 6.5   Voters' perception of government (Muller, 1999 & 2004)

The validity of governmental representativeness becomes even more questionable when the 1999 and 2004 collected data reflected the following:

- An overwhelming percentage (54.4 % as seen in figure 6.5) concur with the statement on misrepresentation between government and citizens;
- Alienation from government as seen in "uncertain and do not know" (almost 32 % as seen in figure 6.5) is disconcerting;
- Distance between citizens and government becomes accentuated when realising that little effort is made to approach government or political parties' representatives when they are concerned on issues such as abortion and the death sentence (58% as seen in figure 6.7);
- Accessibility is also a decisive factor when attempting to approach government since only 4% approach government, as noted in figure 6.6;
- Equally concerning is that, despite being classified as a religious community, only 38% respondents identify with their churches (figure 6.8)

Figure 6.6   **Voters' attitudes towards emotional issues (Muller, 1999 & 2004)**

Figure 6.7   **Voters' perception on government's accessibility (Muller, 1999 & 2004)**

6.2.1.2.3. Identification with Church on issues

The "neutrality" of churches also came under the spotlight with the collection of the data. With the open-ended questions the interviewees' overall impressions were that church leaderships are not always in touch with their congregations' sentiments and opinions. It becomes clear that the majority of interviewees felt that the church could reconnect with its followers. Moral issues such as abortion and gay marriages alienate the government and church leadership from its followers.

The lack of discussion sessions with ordinary members is clearly deepening a divide. Around 30% of churchgoers feel that politicians should be allowed to explain complex government decisions. The issue of church attendance could be resolved when societal concerns are more directly addressed and explained by leadership structures.

However, despite the non-identification with leaderships on certain issues other areas are receiving a thumbs-up. This is clear when looking at the graphs where reference was made to topics such as reconciliation, affirmative action, racial integration and land distribution. Churchgoers and church leadership overwhelmingly share the same sentiments, which are also reflected with their

respected political parties. Can the church truly claim to be the voice of the people when so many feel that they cannot identify with their church (see figure 6.8)? Is the church truly a reflection of its members? The dubious answer lies in the fact that, according to Figure 6.8, 61% do not identify with their churches. Will the numbers increase in the future?

6.2.1.2.4. Sensitivity of Church leaders to congregations' opinions and needs

We have just enough religion to make us hate, but not enough to make us love one another (Solomon, 2006:1)

The most notable issues that surfaced over the last couple of years are the issues on homosexuality, integration, abortion[83] and death sentence. From a historical background, the right to life and equal access to the benefits of democracy are undisputable (Ndungane, 2002: 34). However, moral concerns emerge when "the right to life" becomes dismissible when undergoing an abortion. Government clearly sees itself as the protector rather than the guiding light. Moral choices lie now with the individual.

Figure 6.8 **Voters' identification with their church (Muller, 1999 & 2004)**

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[83] Read Villa-Vicencio & De Gruchy's essay on abortion (1994:166-173).

The moral divide becomes more problematic when citizens, by respecting the constitutional right to life, also desire the decrease in crime. One argument, as underscored by religious parties as well, strives to restore the death sentence as deterrence to hardened criminals and their violent acts of crime. Government and church oppose this demand from society. Unfortunately, violent crimes continue[84]. The increase in domestic violence and violence against women are worrisome. Government aims in shifting the responsibility back to communities by re-emphasising moral values and campaigns such as the "16 days of Activism" (no violence against women and children). However, sexual acts of violence have rocked the Catholic Church whereas the former deputy President, and Chair of South Africa's *Moral Regeneration Initiative*, Jacob Zuma's rape and corruption trials[85] mock the essence of these campaigns. Consequently, people become more cynical and disillusioned (Denis, Mlotshwa & Mukuka, 1999:95).

An even more contentious issue is the rights of gays and gay pastors (Ngcobo, 2006:16). Self-described gay priests are condemned within neo-conservative churches such as the DRC (Retief, 1999:7). The more liberal church, referring specifically to the Anglican Church, does not view gay clergy and homosexuality in the same light. Nevertheless, the divisions continue within the structures of both these churches, specifically the gap that widens between ordinary church members and those in higher ranking (Denis, Mlotshwa & Mukuka, 1999:95).

Within the DRC, the thorny issue of reintegration with its other sister churches are clearly not resolved as yet (Mofok, 1999:1-3). Racial tensions and lack of constructive dialogue, as influenced by years of Apartheid socialisation hampers any efforts from the Synod level (Muller, 2000:10). Even in the eighties, "the gap between prophetic Synodical resolutions and the interests of the members of the congregation severely taxed the resources of the ministries"

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[84] The out-of-control crime rate has resulted in South Africa being one of the countries worst affected by crime.
[85] Jacob Zuma was acquitted on the rape charges, while the corruption investigation is ongoing.

(De Gruchy, 1986b:33). By 2001, despite various initiatives, integration into one church is still more of a dream than a reality.

Looking at these thorny issues and lack of consensus one needs to ask :

- How much input was allowed by ordinary members regarding the church stance on these issues?

- Were conformity pressures present (i.e. pressure from eagerness to please government rather than opposing government)?

- Is political correctness more important?

- How much emphases is put on constitutional rights rather than Biblical values and norms?

- Can one then really persist about the presence of Theopolitics in post-Apartheid South Africa?

- How effective can democracy be when leaders themselves do not respect the sacredness of their position[86]?

6.2.1.3.   Democracy as the connective tissue

> ... democracy needs to rediscover its *spiritual heritage*, while Christianity needs to develop a theology adequate for its participation in the *realisation of a just democratic world order* (De Gruchy, 1995).[87]

As noted by Dongo (1998: 29) a system, focussing on the "liberation of mankind from all manner of servitude, injustices, discrimination and humiliations" is the only way forward if stability and unification are to be achieved in South Africa (Dongo, 1998:29). To suggest that Christianity and democracy are mutually dependent on one another is to a certain extent overstressing the influence of the church and Christians on political systems. However, to imply that Christians never played a role in society is correspondingly a far cry from the truth.

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[86] Prominent anti-Apartheid cleric, Rev. Alan Boesak abused his position of power when he committed fraudulent acts. He was sentenced to jail in 1999 (CNN 1999:1-3).
[87] Author's own emphasis.

The argument has already shown that certain Christian groups, by means of the Bible and the Church, justified and exploited their religion to discriminate and tyrannise. Fortunately, those times have passed and the majority of South Africa's Christians nowadays embrace "justice, freedom, equality and human dignity" (Dongo, 1998:29). Samuel Huntington's quote that "time is on the side of democracy," is surely an indication that global trends and movements surpassed old regime thinking. What is apparent is that, from a Theopolitical context, democracy is most compatible with Christianity. Saying so does not necessarily exclude ideologies such as socialism from the Christian equation (McKenzie, 2004:12 & Van der Walt, 1996:1).

On the liberal democratic front, the 1996 Constitution, marked as one of the most liberal constitutions in the world, included a chapter on universally accepted fundamental rights and freedoms. The chapter on the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2, 1996 Constitution) reiterates the right to life, human dignity, equality, freedom of expression, trade, movement, speech and association. Section 15 and 31 pertain to the freedom of religion, belief and opinion together with the protection of cultural, religious and linguistic communities. These two sections show that the Constitution reflects a certain degree of tolerance and sensitivity towards religion. It is, however, important to note that total impartiality between the state and religion is almost impossible: total impartiality resulting in the state not preferring any one religion over another or discriminating against those who are not religious. The Constitution, aware of the potential conflict that might erupt between individual and state moral values, does allow for accommodation. This is always in line with the principles of democracy, namely human dignity, equality, and freedom. The huge diversity within South Africa is therefore protected and promoted the Constitution, working towards unity rather than conflict (Ndungane, 2002: 34 & Devenish, 1998:56-57 & 77).

Returning to the earlier observance that democracy is more prone to be equated with Christianity, the following will attempt to prove the statement. According to Prozesky and De Gruchy (1990:223-225) the essential characteristics of good government ought to be equality and justice. Should

these attributes be applied, subsequent values like human rights and the rule of law will follow automatically. When studying the Bible it is clear that God focused on the plight of those who were less fortunate and oppressed. Their interests and struggles were crucial to the underlying Biblical foundations of brotherly love, justice and equity.

When governments' main foci become law and order, or total freedoms at the cost of equity and justice, chaos or oppression will surely follow. Capitalism and complete freedoms, resulting in individualism, surely do not promote equity when it is at the expense of the disadvantaged. Mbali (1987:91-98) and staunch communists such as Chris Hani (Villa-Vicencio, 1996: 114-130), believe that obligations to imperfect governments are closely linked to the moral legitimacy of such governments. When imperfect laws infringe on one's value perceptions, unconditional government obedience becomes more problematic.

When studying Figures 6.9 and 6.10, it becomes apparent that citizens, political parties and churches share the same views on South Africa's *immoral* laws. Respondents of the Anglican Church showed that 64% strongly disapproved with the legalisation of abortion, with the DRC's response reflecting 49%. Directing the same question to the churchgoers' perception of their political parties' view on abortion, only 38% showed strong disapproval. Are political parties out of touch with their electorate? Obviously these huge discrepancies in church and political parties' level of identification and representation cannot be ignored.

Figure 6.9   The church's position on abortion, as perceived by its congregation (Muller, 1999 & 2004).

Additionally, given that the majority of citizens are Black, as represented by the majority government party, the ANC, is the government still representing its peoples? Clearly, these laws are not remotely close to the immoral laws of the Apartheid regime, but shouldn't government nevertheless reflect the will of its people, its Christians? Aren't these un-representative laws not the first step towards increase voter dissatisfaction and alienation? Is immorality less of an issue than economic hardships and poor service delivery?

Figure 6.10   Voters' perception of their political party's stance on abortion (Muller, 1999 & 2004).

Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show the respondents' strong propensities of relating to their respective churches and political parties. These two graphs show an accurate reflection of structural representation and grassroots identification.

Within South Africa the expectations of democracy should not be blindfolded by unrealistic ideals and results. The grass-roots and the civil society should be empowered to influence government in order to address their demands (Denis, Mlotshwa & Mukuka, 1999:95). Government and the opposition should also realise that democracy means responsible disagreement, opposing views and political parties.

A culture of trust and tolerance is equally important. South Africans also need to realise that no one democratic system is the same and that those interpretations that worked in the past might not be effective for future reference. To quote J W De Gruchy (1995:15): "the transition to democracy is a permanent condition". Dewey reiterates it further: "the task of democracy is one that can have no end till experience itself comes to an end, the task of democracy is forever that of the creation of a freer and more human experience in which all share and to which all contribute" (De Gruchy, 1995:18).

Figure 6.11   Congregations perception of their church view on the restoration of the death sentence (Muller, 1999 & 2004).

On the other hand, Figure 6.12 reflects true sentimental attributes when asked on the restoration of the death sentence. Breaking even between those who strongly rejected the reinstatement of the death sentence as opposed to those who approved the opposite reflected the opinions of political parties and their voters quite accurately. The majority of Blacks within the Anglican Church strongly disapproved, as rightly correlated to their historical backgrounds. The white dominated DRC voted almost 48% in favour of restoring the death sentence, mirroring the neo-conservative socio-political culture of the privileged white.

Figure 6.12 **Voters' perception of their political party's stance on the restoration of the death sentence (Muller, 1999 & 2004).**

When assessing President Mbeki's State of the Nation Address in 2006, Stephen Friedman (Friedman, 2006:20) makes it clear that government is attempting to address the technical problems they face with respect to service delivery and corruption. He, however firmly reiterates the fact that government's attempt will be in vain if citizens are not involved. In other words, people need to take ownership and become engaged. Greater accountability derives from active citizen participation resulting in more responsible and representative governments. Friedman's opinion is reflected in the following quote: "government only does what the people wants, when the people watch over it, and make sure it meets their needs" (Friedman, 2006:20).

Consequently, the synergies between citizens and government are crucial. Good governance will become more attainable when *Batho Pele* and *Ubuntu* are the premises from which citizens and government interrelate. However, the lack of a tough stance on corruption by President Mbeki's 2006 State of the Nation speech leads to people not to trust government, which again leads to energies not being channelled in a pro-active way. This mistrust in government and government's inability to tackle corruption need to be addressed if good governance and democracy is to be sustainable.

The struggle for democracy within Africa is nothing new. The legacy of the colonial powers made it extremely difficult to implement accountable and transparent democratic practices. Corruption, indigenous cultures and resistance from other ideological spheres made matters worst. The missionaries however, were more successful in promoting democratic propensities. Their church structures supported democratic principles and it came as no surprise that their support for democratic governmental forms made them important activists for democracy. Their emphasis on liberal democratic ideologies and western parliamentary practices made them prominent Christian leaders in the fight for African independence. Unfortunately, their influence was limited to those who belonged to the same church and ethnic group and a broader support base was never established. Ethnic dominance was also condoned, directly or indirectly by church and state, which made multiculturalism and inclusiveness difficult. Furthermore, close relationships that existed between the church and political leaders created a culture where the church became the uncritical servant of political leaders. This laid the foundation for the Apartheid government to continue with their immoral policies, which were against Christian values and principles (De Gruchy, 1995:169-170).

South African churches need to break this unholy legacy in order to remain relevant and legitimate.

6.2.1.4. Agencies in a sacral-secular context

> Heavy lies the head that wears the crown. Heavier lies the head that aspires to secular values, but wears the crown of a conservative religious country. Such is the case of the ANC government. How does the ANC promote its progressive, secular policies in the context of fervent religiosity and conservatism (Jordaan, 2006:1)?

Neo-conservatism is inevitable since South Africa's White churches and political parties continue to apply "old" conservative doctrines despite transformation and reconciliation (Pieterse & Spangenberg, 2000:11 & Jackson, 2000:9).

These doctrines promote change and reform at a much slower pace than presently exercised. This is specifically applicable to the previously advantaged White communities as well as the DRC issue of reintegration with its other sister churches. When will racial superiority (even reversely applied) cease to be an instrument of blame, prejudice, and empowerment?

The fact that political parties are no longer the only agents for people, makes one wonder whether the church will start to step into the political domain once again? A decrease in card-carrying members of the ANC and other parties, strengthen this assumption as well as the increase of NGO's and proactive civil society. However, one should also bear in mind that churches themselves see a decrease in membership, as seen with respect to church attendance. The sensitivity of our history also prevent churches from becoming proactive, critical watchdogs and spokespersons on behalf of its followers. Who is currently South Africans' vehicle of conscience and morality? Are the carriers of morality government, a political party or a church? Alternatively, does it lie with the individual?

6.2.1.4.1. Political parties as agencies

What level of interaction exists between the churches, political parties, interest groups and with government? Of significance, is the creation of specific religious orientated political parties. Whether it is the lack of effective and united church pressure and influence, or the lack of morality within government, the fact remains that religion is surfacing again within the political paradigm. The ACDP (African Christian Democratic Party) and the CDP (Christian Democratic Party) generally subscribe to the following:

- To submit itself to the almighty God;
- To believe that the Bible is the unfailing written word of God;
- To acknowledge the sovereignty of God over all affairs;
- To promote Christian values and norms;
- To promote Christian family values, freedom of religion and a free market economy with a social conscience; and
- To promote Christian leadership (CDP & ACDP Manifestos, 2004).

Looking at the founding principles of political parties such as the ACDP and the CDP definitely reconfirms Theopolitics. Openly proclaiming Christianity does not imply that other political parties are not believers. However, given the strong history of party discipline, which is typical of parliamentary democracies, Christians do not necessarily vote according to their own convictions. The ACDP and the CDP, within the culture of parliamentary democracy, feel that the Christian faith can more easily influence the outcome of voting processes when all that needs to be taken into consideration are the voters' convictions, which are also in line with political party policies (CDP & ACDP Manifestos, 2004).

Figure 6.13   **Level of political involvement of citizens (Muller, 1999 & 2004).**

Will the citizens trust and subsequently vote for these parties in the light of our history and current emphasis of secularism? The 2004 electoral results does not reflect voters confidence in these Christians parties. Figure 6.13 surely paints a disconcerting picture with respect to the relevance of political parties. When 66.2% do not belong to any political party, citizen apathy is in the making, as confirmed by the 96% of respondents that do not participate in political activities.

Can religion then be connected with electoral politics or is it too soon to predict? Are these Christian-based political parties representative of their followers' opinion regarding structural and policy changes? The verification becomes problematic since statistics on memberships to these parties' are not easy to trace. However, political parties' validity is surely tested when one studies Figure 6.14. A mere 4% has joined in political demonstrations and only 34% formally belong to a political party. Clearly, disillusionment with political parties come into play, or is political activism more passive and indirect in post-Apartheid South Africa. When one compares Figure 6.13 with Figure 6.14, it becomes evident that the church is still a potent agency for its followers. This forms a stark contrast with churchgoers' relations to their political parties.

South African political parties embrace democracy, rule of law and human rights. Notwithstanding the moral commonalities that exist between them, the elections in 1999 and 2004 still reflected racial and ethnic sentiments. Socio-economic issues and historic-graphical aspects still manipulate voter identification. Despite lack of service delivery or immoral laws, voters also remained loyal to their parties. It becomes clear that popular expectations as set against economic realities and socio-political challenges, are still not reflected in voting powers. When studying the trends of electoral outcomes since 1994, it is obvious that voters still vote for the same parties and that opposition parties are not strong enough in their alternatives. The 2005 Local Government elections reflected a greater tendency towards voter concern over socio-economic issues, as well as voters staying away in protest. The economic hardships and level of poor government performance are still not enough to result in competitive alternatives.

6.2.1.4.2. The church as an agency

> It is important that the Church of Christ say it now — we stood for justice and we will continue to do so in the new era that is coming. Even if we eventually have a legitimate system in South Africa the struggle for the ideals of the reign of God will not stop (De Gruchy, 1995:222-223).

Frank Chikane, a prominent anti-Apartheid activist and former General-Secretary of the South Africa Council of Churches is now working in the office of the President. High ranking government officials[88] are also church leaders. The question is: "do our new Black leaders continue to struggle for the reign of God or has the struggle stopped in 1994"?

Relationships between church and state in South Africa were never at any given time uniform (Pillay, 1995:81). This historical ambiguity of the South African church can be categorised into any three groupings:

- Those who opposed the theology of Apartheid;
- Those churches who provide theological justification of the doctrine of Apartheid; and
- Those churches that remained neutral (Cochrane, et al, 1991:37).

Therefore, the voiceless church has to be redefined:

> But just as the church is not called to rule the world, neither is the church called to redeem the world. The church is not the kingdom, nor is it the Christ; its (the church) responsibility is to bear witness to, not to replace, them (De Gruchy, 1986b:223).

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[88] As seen in the 2004 Members of Parliament List.

Bar Chart

Church Affiliation
- Anglican Church
- Dutch Reformed Church

Count

Do you think that your church is an effective instrument for the moral and spiritual upliftment of South Africans

Figure 6.14   Level of expectations towards churches (Muller, 1999 & 2004).

Clearly, Theopolitics has a continued role in South Africa to play and remains a definite constant when assessing Figure 6.14. An overwhelming 81% felt that their churches are instrumental in the spiritual and moral upliftment of their congregations. Those opposing the close connections will argue that

- Secularism dominates since the politics of government are not reflected in church policies;
- That churches are unable to influence government; and
- That a church such as the DRC are too sensitive of its shameful past to become involved;

When looking at the role that churches played in the past, there is no doubt that they can be extremely important mechanisms for democratisation, through namely:

- Using mediation skills in order to promote reconciliation and reconstruction;

- Instilling attitudes that will enhance the acceptance of plurality;

- Promoting human rights;

- Their respect for honesty and integrity provides the moral fibre for those political leaders who are short of it;

- Supplying social cohesion at times of fragmentation;

- Lobbying international support around issues of justice and democracy;

- Providing an educational zone for teachings about democracy;

- Churches being best in touch with grassroots' needs and attitudes, due to the commitment of members towards their churches instead of their political parties (De Gruchy, 1995:185-187).

The close relationship between the DRC and NNP ceased for two reasons:

- The NNP was no longer the governing party; and

- The 2004 elections saw the official disintegration and dismantling of the NNP since it joined forces with the ANC.

Whites usually found consolation within the structures of the DRC and political parties. Since 1994, both churchgoers and the DRC itself had to confront political transformation both within themselves and within their structures (Ferreira, 1997:13 & Landman, 2000:8). Additionally, by contemplating the operationalisation of ecclesiastical integration, more internal strive was experienced. The absence of the DRC in this post-Apartheid secular state becomes evident, "White Christianity is not at present in a position to deal adequately and justly with religious pluralism" (Prozesky, 1990: 215).

Can one proclaim that the Churches are still the most effective watchdogs? It seems as if the religio-political role players changed in the new South Africa. New watchdogs, such as the Anglican Church, have replaced the DRC, formerly a mouthpiece and tool for the NP government. However, can the economic deprivation of the Whites force the DRC to re-activate itself and become more involved in politics in order to promote its members' needs? Additionally the DRC has experienced internal problems among its followers and other sister churches. A new era for the church as a reflection of society has emerged (DRC Synod, 1988 & Jackson, 1999b:13). Can the DRC refill the

vacuum that was left due to Apartheid? Can the church transform itself into a unifying force in this transitional period? Are there changes within the church and how do the followers feel when for instance, people of colour are allowed in the DRC? Can a united church front among all its sister churches be established, or are there too many schisms within the DRC? Can the Council of South African Churches speak in a united voice against evils and immoral policies? All these questions lead to the redefining of the political responsibility of the church in South Africa. Can we have a faith without ideology (Loubser, 1987:163-171)?

The answers remain ambiguous. It is clear that certain political policies invoke huge debate among churches and their leaders. Issues such as abortion and the fight against HIV/AIDS cause leaders such as the Archbishop Ndungane to clash with the ANC government constantly. The church's close affiliation with other NGO's and interest groups provide a greater area for negotiations and augment the role of civil society. Areas of particular concern for the Anglican Church are HIV/AIDS, empowerment and poverty reduction (Ndungane, 2002: 34 & Anglican Church Provincial Standing Committee, 1998). The former influential DRC is clearly voiceless (Jackson, 1999a:6 & Fourie, 2000:7).

What is also apparent is the fact that church leaders no longer automatically side with liberation movements they supported during the struggle. Archbishop Tutu was one of the first to acknowledge that "they (church leaders) were no longer the political representatives of the oppressed" (De Gruchy, 1995: 211). Democracy and freedoms have been attained, indeed by means of the interrelationship that existed between political and religious role-players. But, true to Biblical prescriptions, churches should remain as the moral watchdog over the secular leaders and therefore this does not exempt government therefore from any criticisms that might be thrown at them.

These criticisms are evident in the verbal attacks between Archbishop Tutu and the ANC, NP and IFP, in relation to the final TRC report[89], as well as the church

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[89] For a comprehensive overview of the TRC, read Cochrane, De Gruchy & Martin, *Facing the Truth* (1999).

efforts to fight HIV/Aids (Terreblanche, 2002: 11). Objectivity and sensitivity was to a great extent reflected in this report that resulted in all role-players to be reprimanded for the inhumane actions that they at times enacted (Munusamy, 2003:13). Needless to say, it was not supported by the ANC, NNP or the IFP.

The fact that churches represent a large section of society helps in the strengthening of civil society and promotes individual insight into democratic values and procedures. The prophetic role which the church can exert on national government remains important but even more importantly is the creation of a participatory culture among the grassroots (Pothier, 1999:3).

Such is the importance of church collaboration that a *Declaration of Religious Rights and Responsibilities* was released at the World Conference on Religion and peace in 1998. It advocates the following:

- Freedom of conscience and equal rights of religious communities; and
- Religious communities to exercise their moral responsibility in order to consolidate just democracy.

To avoid the mistakes of our past it is crucial, then, that the church must avoid becoming an "uncritical moral mouthpiece of government, and ensure that it keeps the government accountable and faithful to its promise of a just democracy" (De Gruchy, 1995:220).

> Religious institutions need to become far more self-confident and aggressive in promoting morality; not in some heavy Puritanical manner, but at the level of enabling people to rediscover the fundamental values which make for long-term happiness and peace (Villa-Vicencio, 1996:121).

6.3. Survivalism as a reflection of South African society

A progressive agenda can overcome South Africa's malaise. The South African government "needs to engage the state, organisations in civil society and the citizenry in the fight against the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment" (Pahad, 2005:27). The ongoing implementation of Batho Pele and Ubuntu are therefore crucial in eradicating inequalities.

As a result of poverty, inequality[90] continues to dominate the socio-economic landscape of South Africa. In 2006, South Africa was rated as the fifth most unequal state in the world. Equal access to resources and opportunities to everyone are but a distant dream. Policies have been created in South Africa to redress inequality such as increasing the relative income share of the least well-off, lowering the income "ceiling" and promoting economic inclusion (Gelb, 2003:75). Democracy remains fragile when inequalities remain a fixture as well as government's inability to address unemployment, HIV/AIDS and crime (Trengrove-Jones, 2000:39).

What is survivalism? When 'O Meara (1996:154) argued that Apartheid was as much a result of racial and ethnic fears as it was developed for socio-economic reasons, survivalism is clearly seen as a potent driving force. Subsequently, this thesis aims in determining whether Theopolitics is the result of socio-economic deprivation as sympathetically consoled within religion and reflected in the polity. Can it be linked to the mutually influencing interrelationship between socio-political; economic and religious conditions?

Progressive policies such as Affirmative Action, Black Economic Empowerment, Land Distribution and Employment Equity aim to redress inequality in South Africa. The unfortunate result of these policies are unequal wealth that accumulates in the hands of few, reversed racism in the workplace and some Whites struggling accordingly (Leon, 2000:38).
The corruptness of power is evident when South Africa is ranked as one of the top 20 most corrupt states in the world. Biblical verses that speak out against corruption should be preached more often and leaders should set the example[91] (Kirk, 1993:23).

Churches and their struggle are synonymous with the Biblical vision of equality and wealth distribution. While South Africa remains one of the most unequal

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[90] In South Africa 40% to be between-race, 33% due to intra-African inequality and 21% due to intra-White inequality (SARPN, 2006:1).

states in the world it becomes apparent that churches will remain as a powerful watchdog towards policies that will increase and ensure a quality and dignified way of life. Will the DRC, or any other church, stand up for the plight of the newly defined "poor White"? Will political correctness hamper the true workings and policies of the DRC? Is the Anglican Church now replacing the DRC in influencing the government?

6.3.1.   Can the watchdogs ensure economic and restorative justice?

> What happens to a dream deferred? It explodes (*Economist*, 1999: 21).

> The common good and national reconstruction is about jobs, houses, health care, education and democratic structures that empower people. Empowerment, however, includes cultural renewal and spirituality that draws on religions, social and historic resources that provide a sense of personal and communal self worth (Macazoma, 1999:69).

> All economic life should be shaped by moral principles (Pothier, 1999: 5).

The major challenge for the church is to accept its pastoral responsibility for the scarred people of our land when addressing economic and restorative justice. All churches should unite in order to heal the divided society. People-centred counselling and caring should be enhanced (Bam, 1995:47).

To make performance and service delivery successes even more challenging is the fact that leaders are unresponsive or in denial regarding the needs of their people[92]. Grand programmes and ideals often end up in unresponsive and costly administrative implementations that hamper efficient bureaucracies[93]. The politicising of government structures results in people not having faith in government (Horner, 2006:12 & Mapela, 2006:9). What roles can the church and civil society, together with government, play in addressing these socio-economic challenges? Is the church still a major role-player in politics?

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[91] As suggested by the churchgoers in KZN (Muller, 1999 & 2004).
[92] As seen recently in riots where grassroots feel increasingly more distanced from leaders and disillusioned regarding poor service delivery records.
[93] Government acknowledges that it is not in shape to do what it is asked for (Friedman, 2006:20).

Clearly, the Anglican Church continues with its commitment to the downtrodden of South African society (Haddad,1990). Its 1995 Synod of Bishops clearly expressed how anxious the church was over redressing inequalities, as envisioned by government's RDP (CPSA Synod, 1995 & (Pothier, 1999:3).

With respect to restorative justice, the TRC was set up to assist South Africa's transition from a racist nation to an inclusive democratic society. After almost three years, the TRC Report was handed over to President Mandela. However, reconciliation should not be exclusively linked to the TRC alone, but rather as a way of life (Villa-Vicencio, 2002:1-2 & Maluleke, 2000:8). Reconciliation also remains a painful process that should avoid the granting of amnesty to perpetrators of Apartheid as well as setting the scene for more subtle racism (Rajab, 1998:6 & *Reuters*, 1998:12). The Theopolitical connection was exceptionally prominent within the performance of the TRC. Despite claiming neutrality and non-religious intentions, Archbishop Tutu felt on the first day that prayer was needed. Irrespective of non-Christians in the audience, he insisted on starting and ending the sessions with prayer. The solace found with prayer was clearly appropriate when tensions and heartache became unbearable (Meiring, 2000:123-134).

To avoid post-Apartheid fatigue, debates on reconciliation need to be renewed (Villa-Vicencio, 2002:1). Many churches continue to suffer from this post-Apartheid fatigue. When the church remains silent on human rights a message is sent that "we have rights, but others only have privileges" (Loubser, 1987:178). To embrace human rights, the church can play a pivotal role by laying the necessary spiritual and moral foundations (Loubser, 1987:178).

6.4.   Summary

Both government and church continue to face tremendous challenges. To believe that democracy itself is sufficient in redressing all the ills of Apartheid, is an illusion. Restructuring and transforming internal structures and policies for both Church (specifically the DRC) and government were necessary and non-

negotiable. However, when changes occur at the cost of collective participation, problems will arise. Faced with huge socio-economic disparities, South Africa still faces many hardships.

With religion remaining a strong core in our every day lives, the state can not afford to distance itself too much from the religious leaders. However, the Church itself needs to reclaim its level of representation with respect to its followers. When transformation discards grassroots, the Church can loose its relevance and influence.

It is clear that Theopolitics have watered down largely. New stakeholders are now redefining relationships with church, government and citizens. Will our religio-political history ever repeat itself again?

CHAPTER 7   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1.   Introduction

This study set out to explore, describe, analyse and explain the interrelationship between churches and government, within a post-Apartheid secular context.

Furthermore, the interrelationships between political ideologies and religion were correlated. Subsequent results show that these interrelationships reflect occasional conflictual relationships as witnessed between the secularist African National Congress with the Liberal Anglican Church and the Conservative DRC, as reflected throughout this study.

The study aspired to proof that belief systems are capable of significantly influencing the interrelationship between Government, Church and grassroots' followers.

Theories and concepts relating to church-state relationships were used in chapters one and two to establish the conceptual framework of belief systems, as witnessed in the secular environment of post-Apartheid South Africa. Chapters three and four illustrate the impact of the oppressive NP regime as justified by the Bible and the DRC that formed an integral part of state-church relations.

Chapters five and six investigated the presumption that secularism has eliminated the influence of religion and the church, in order to determine the current role-players in South Africa. Furthermore, are churches our moral watchdogs and protectors, or have they been replaced by a non-representative government? How relevant are political parties nowadays, given the general decline in party political activities? Are the new religiously based political

parties' potential agencies for South Africans, despite their initial lack of electoral support? The presumed secular context of the post-Apartheid South African government was to be tested and verified. This was important since more than 70% of South Africans are Christians that clearly dominates the electoral voice of the majority.

Churches and political parties are both dependent on government for service delivery and guaranteeing a better and safe life for all. This humanistic, communal and *Biblical* vision, as linked with democracy and good governance, is the connective tissue between government and church. This study therefore aimed to determine whether the socio-economic conditions of society would affect religio-political interaction. Since Apartheid was not only justified in terms of racial superiority but socio-economic fears as well, the idea of survivalism was investigated for its relevance and validity. In addition, this thesis aims to establish the subsequent relationships that *could* exist between South Africa's churches and government, as united in their common strive to eliminate gross economic inequalities. The relevance of the church and political parties, as agencies for the poor and downtrodden, was a focal point of research, specifically in post-apartheid South Africa.

Hardly any research has been done in the field of Theopolitics. This study consequently aimed to investigate and explore the relevance of Theopolitics within South Africa's post-Apartheid secular context. This Theopolitical approach was seen as a logic follow-up on the relationship that existed between the DRC and the oppressive NP regime during the golden days of Apartheid. The undertaking in establishing the existing relationship between church and government within a secular context was initiated.

7.2.   Analysing collected data

In order to achieve the aims and objectives of the study primary and secondary sources were studied to underpin the scientific linkage between theories and practice. Speculations and assumptions were questioned, tested and verified

with the distribution of 435 questionnaires among the Anglican Church, Reformed Church of Africa and the DRC.

By surveying relevant materials this study identified several barriers related to reconciliation, government trust and representativeness of church and government leaders alike. Misperceptions and misinterpretations were categorised to augment the level of representativeness between followers and leaders. By confining the study only to the KwaZulu Natal province, as deduced to a small fraction of the Durban metropolis and northern KZN, greater accessibility was obtained. Limiting the collecting of primary data only to these areas makes accurate generalisation problematical. However, the demographics continue to correlate with the overall racial, religious and other demographical aspects of South Africa.

By describing the research problems that were identified in the beginning of this thesis, the following remarks and observations therefore conclude this research:

Research problem 1

The interrelationship between political ideologies and religion results in the occasional conflictual relationship between the secularist African National Congress and the Liberal Anglican Church and the Conservative Dutch Reformed Church.

Although belief systems aim to unite different groups of people it can also divide them. Within the current South Africa context, no real political ideological difference exists. This is a natural tendency, since the historical oppressiveness united people in their common goal for democracy and freedoms. Redressing the inequalities of the past connects most churches and political parties, with one another, as well as with government.

However, when laws and progressive policies emphasise reversed discrimination or immoral decisions, conflict and detachment do start to re-appear. The political realities of South Africa linked with gross inequalities and

high crime rates, has forced government to make certain "politically correct" decisions. Policies such as abortion were strongly condemned by 64.7% of church goers (see page 140). On the other hand, the restoration of the death sentence was rejected by 35%, as seen on page 141. Subsequently, moral responsibility is referred back to the individual, as enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. The distinction between state duties as opposed to individual duties, has always been a contentious issue. The role of government as the protector and guarantor becomes problematic to impose, due to the historical abuse of power as well as ineffective policies regarding issues such as HIV/AIDS and crime.

Research problem 2

> **Transformative democracy does not guarantee that grassroots' needs are addressed by government's progressive policies.**

Economically, progressive policies such as Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action lead to selective empowerment and an enrichment gap between policy objectives and the actual successful implementation of policies. The infamous quote of "some are more equal than others" enters the debate.

Since South Africa is ranked as the fifth most unequal country in the world, it is hardly surprising that drastic measures are required to redress the gap between the rich and the poor. The familiar saying that affirmative action is "reversed discrimination" is still applicable after twelve years of democracy.

Despite the progressive stance of government, a large majority of people remain poor. The dual economic system in South Africa remains unchanged. The occasional pre-election *Imbizo* that aims to move closer to the people still offer little comfort with respect to governmental representation of the masses. Few black individuals have become exceptionally and disproportionably wealthy, whilst the majority of the poor get poorer (see page 132).

Politically, 54% (across the racial divide) seems to feel that their views are not taken into consideration by government. When linking it with the question of accessibility to government, an astounding 59% recorded that channels of communication are restricted (page 144). These are serious challenges that government need to address.

Research problem 3

Consequently, the exclusiveness of democracy as implemented by the top hierarchical structures of the Church and Government creates a divide and leads to the lack of representation, specifically after the 1994 elections.

South Africa has no shortage of sufficient and good policies with the right objectives in mind. However, despite *Imbizo*, Synods, Job Summits and pre-election campaigning, policy implementation and validity remains questionable. How representative is our democracy when grassroots followers and churchgoers are not acknowledged, whether government or church? Debates and consultation reflects more spectator participation than real fact-finding missions. The selected and educated few that do influence policymakers do not always speak for the ordinary people. Exclusive democracy then becomes a substantive and proven condition, whether in church or government structures, as detected on pages 144. Again, disconcerting facts appeared when studying figure 6.13, page 158. Exclusivism becomes re-instated since only 33.8% belong to political parties and that a dismal 4.4% actually partake in political demonstrations. Clearly, this is not ideal for any democracy?

Research problem 4

The paradox between religion and political power strengthens democracy's checks and balances but creates religio-political communicative weaknesses.

The separation of church and state guarantees freedom from interference. Moral and religious values are left to the church and its followers. Furthermore,

within a democratic environment, checks and balances are ensured with the various branches of government and the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, herein lies the paradox. Although secularism advocates the limited guidance and impact of religion on state affairs, the Christians who make up 70% demand a say and check on government, irrespective of the secular nature of its political system. The possible abuse of power and immoral rule are therefore kept in check by church and Christians. However, as seen in the collected data and interviews, grassroots are still not adequately represented in top decision-making structures of government and church (as discussed in chapter 6). This directly affects quality and effective communication between leadership structures as well as leaders and their followers.

Research problem 5

> **This study furthermore explored the level of representativeness of government and church with respect to transformation and reconciliation at grassroots levels, and the viability of resulting structures and policies.**

Finally, given the results of the collected primary data (see chapter 6), informed deductions were made regarding the validity of representativeness of church and governmental structures with respect to transformation and reconciliation. Lack of access to leadership structures results in alienation from the top structures of government and church. Misrepresentation and misinterpretation underpin disillusionment. Hence, given our conservative political culture, churchgoers and electorates still choose to stay with their traditional parties and church. The negative spiralling effect of this results in leaders following the same route and falsely regarding themselves as "hands-on" decision makers.

Accordingly, the following objectives of this study discuss the following answers:

Objective 1

> **Can the South African government accommodate an interrelationship between itself and the church?**

To a certain extent, the secular government respects the interrelationship that exists between government and church in post-Apartheid South Africa. Conflicts that arise between them are not resolved as constructively as they could be since dialogue and debates between government and church have decreased over the last ten years. The ANC leadership, given their historical political culture, also perceive criticism as negative. Constructive criticism therefore becomes misinterpreted and increases the gap between church and state. The resulting public warfare between the various role-players compels the church to cement partnerships with NGO's. Again, instead of seeing this as the betterment of an issue, government rather shuts down communication.

However, despite the aforementioned decrease in communication, the National Religious Leaders Forum plays a crucial role in keeping the communicating lines open. This is also a reflection of government's willingness to recognise the continuous importance of the role of church leader in redressing inequality, as reflected in chapters 5 and 6. The historical approach of South Africa' government to prescribe to its citizens have disappeared. The government rather gives the moral and religious responsibility to the citizens when interpreting and executing so-called immoral laws, such as the Termination of the Pregnancy Act and the Civil Union Act.

Objective 2

Does one encounter religious discrimination within the political context?

South Africa's constitution specifically guarantees the right to choice, freedom of religion and associations. With the Constitutional Court as the ultimate guarantor and protector of the Constitution, any government or individual will be taken to task when religious discrimination is encountered. The sensitivities surrounding discrimination therefore guarantees non-discriminating environments, even with respect to religion. The historical oppressiveness of

Apartheid and Apartheid theology act as reminders of the struggle to attain freedom. Hence, religious discrimination will not resurface again.

Objective 3

Can the church transform itself into a unifying force in this transitional period?

Transformation in South Africa cannot take place overnight. Tremendous efforts have been made in South Africa to transform its government, civil service, laws and policies. So too has the church made efforts to transform. The 1996 DRC Confessions indicated a transformation of some sorts. The Anglican Church has adjusted well to the on-going needs of the marginalised sick and poor.

However, policy and structural transformation has not necessarily resulted in effective implementation. Internal issues within the DRC and Anglican Church hamper their efficacy regarding transformation and reconciliation (see chapter 6). Issues such as integration (DRC) and homosexuality (DRC & Anglican Church) remain unresolved. Hence, their unifying roles are not always successful. The complete absence of the DRC in post-Apartheid's political and socio-economic arena, results in a voiceless and ineffective church.

Objective 4

Does the society's attitudinal relations (both inter- and intra-personal) with one another and with institutions, reflect negative religio-political conditions?

This study was unable to prove beyond any doubt that conflict between grassroots is the specific result of negative religio-political conditions. It is clear that grassroots misrepresentation and alienation from policymaking do reflect in political party apathy and disillusionment with church leadership. Attitudes towards different race groups remain intact, since membership composition of churches has not really changed over the last twelve years. Subsequently,

racial reconciliation and integration within the DRC's structures have not been attained. Neither have both the DRC and the Anglican congregations' attitudes and perceptions been accurately reflected by their leadership's espousal of homosexuality.

Objective 5

Why does the predominantly religious South African society experience conflict at all when religions are supposed to promote peace?

Primarily, conflict and tension will remain a constant in South Africa due to its history and established political culture. Transformation and reconciliation are life-long processes and decades of hatred and oppression cannot be easily dismantle, despite the TRC and legislative frameworks. The voiceless and passive DRC is also not always pushing convincingly enough for reconciliation, whereas the Anglican Church successfully continue with its social agenda.

Objective 6

What level of interaction exists between the top structures of the government and the churches?

It appears as if little direct contact exists between top leadership structures and ordinary grassroots, as discussed in chapter 6. This is in spite of the fact that South Africa claims to be an open and free society, providing easy accessibility to information and leaders alike. Selective participatory strategies have proven to be ineffective as evidenced when examining the primary data. The dangers herein lie with the fact that followers become further distanced from leaders, having little faith in policies and representativeness through democracy. Liberal policies and Synod documents have become obsolete when collective ownership is not obtained.

Objective 7

Does religion influence one's political views and affiliations and *vice versa*?

During Apartheid, religion was clearly abused by the government in order to justify racial segregation. The juxtaposition of religion and politics was institutionalised and imposed on the South African society for decades (as elaborately explored in chapters 2-5). In reaction to this oppression churches and, in partnership with liberation movements, fought against Apartheid. Clearly, South Africa's history is living proof of Theopolitics.

Whether the same intensity will ever be experienced again in the near future remains debatable. What illuminates the presence of Theopolitics in post-Apartheid South Africa is the fact that church and government continue to interact with one another. The reason is clear: their common vision is based on freedom, good governance and the redress of inequalities and discriminatory practices.

Primary and secondary data from this study validate the fact that Theopolitics is dynamic and present in secular South Africa, albeit on a lower scale when comparing with Apartheid South Africa. The majority of churchgoers remain loyal to their respective churches and political parties. Nevertheless, the creation of specific religiously oriented political parties might challenge these loyalties at a later stage.

7.3.   Limitations of the study

I acknowledge that the transitional phase of South Africa is an on-going process which simultaneously promotes and hampers transparency and reconciliation. However, from a structural-functional approach, this study proved that although the correct structures are being put in place grassroots perceptions, attitudes and actions occasionally adhere to pre-Apartheid loyalties and beliefs.

Elements concerning prejudice and discriminatory judgments have seldom been eradicated completely. The processes of reconciliation and the abolishment of oppressive belief systems and attitudes are still not completed, as reiterated through the TRC's final report and the subsequent statements made by politicians and the reaction of other role-players.

I acknowledge further that within South Africa's complex multicultural and multi-ethnic society, religious pluralism and atheism co-exist. This study mainly concerned itself with the practice of church-state relations in its immediate socio-political contexts. This in itself limited the scope of this study.

For the study, an eclectic approach incorporating realism and empirical evidence was followed. Due to the sensitivity about pre-Apartheid associations and events, I admit that historical fear, suspicion, and anger made respondents at stages uncomfortable whilst participating in this study. Great emphasis was placed on balanced and non-prescriptive approaches when data was collected. The controversies surrounding intercultural interaction and transformation were taken into consideration. The danger of colonising traditional aspects of cultural diversity, albeit on an ideological level, was avoided.

The availability of secondary resources also limits accurateness and objectivity. I further acknowledge additional limitations that I have imposed on this study, referring specifically to the period of study and focus: 1994-1999, making lapses of memories plausible. The diverse character of South Africa and my own personal background might have lead to misperceptions and reverse prejudice. I, however, reiterate that no assumptions have been made without clear, scientific and documented evidence.

7.4. Concluding remarks

Decades of struggle to attain freedom prove that democracy is to be the system that will guarantee freedom and human rights as best as possible. South Africa celebrated its 10 years of democracy in 2004. The joy of attaining freedom and a better life for all, irrespective of race or creed, is being confirmed daily. To

discard our history would be foolish if one would want to move forward towards greater unity and reconciliation.

The interrelationship between church and state has fascinated academics throughout the centuries. The manipulation of religion for the sake of power and justice is well known. Subsequently, numerous studies have been undertaken in the fields of theocracy as well as theology, and church-state relations as related to politics and socio-cultural life.

South Africa's interrelationship between state and church is, however unique. Contradictory uses and abuses of religion for the sake of political power and freedom have been prominent since 1652. As a result of the struggle for freedom and democracy, a liberal secular government was voted in, in 1994. The close symbiotic relationship that existed between Apartheid government and DRC changed completely. South Africa's new Constitutions is now the ultimate watchdog for and guarantor of moral, political and socio-economic freedoms and values. Together with newly created religious-oriented political parties, government and society continues to exercise Theopolitics. Difficulties in the interrelationship between the Anglican Church and the ANC government occasionally intensifies over certain issues such as abortion, HIV/AIDS, crime, immoral behaviour of politicians and slow service delivery. Conversely, when government's progressive policies are successfully implemented, the interrelationship becomes consensual and complimentary.

Caution should still be exercised by leaders within government and church. The lack of dialogue and consultation amongst leaders and their followers result in disillusion, estrangement and misrepresentation on the part of churchgoers and the electorate. Subsequently, misinterpretation and poor communication channels enhance the exclusiveness of democracy in South Africa. When policy changes are not mirrored on the grassroots level, investigation of this should be pursued by leaders. The success of democracy and freedoms are equally dependent on leaders and grassroots' ownership and fulfilment.

Subsequently, this study can inform politicians, church leaders and the ordinary citizen about the need to have duality in play when transformation and progress is applied. Additionally, this study confirms the moral and religious basis of the South African society, despite its secular characteristics. Therefore, government is advised to carefully balance its interrelationship with the church so as not to estrange or disappoint its Christian followers. Embracing Theopolitics in a positive and constructive way would benefit society as a whole. Political and religious role-players should also become more representative, accommodative and reconciliatory. The research findings can also serve as a model in bridging the academic gap that exists between political ideology and religion. Society as a whole, especially the local communities can benefit from the findings. Potential conflict and tensions can therefore be more readily resolved.

Finally, this research provided therefore a ground breaking alternative to narrow definition of Theopolitics when revealing the constant socio-economic undertones regarding the dynamic interrelationships between government and church.

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APPENDIX
Appendix 1

University of Zululand

Theopolitics: the dynamic interrelation between government and religion, with specific reference to the Dutch Reformed Church, Anglican Church and the Government of National Unity in post-apartheid South Africa, 1994-1999.

Survey research conducted by Ms M van der Merwe, in conjunction with Prof. A Song of the University of Zululand, Departments of Missiology, Religion Studies, Practical Theology, and Prof. Thabo Sabela, Department of Political Science and Public Administration.

Dear Respondent,
This survey is being conducted in order to assess and to explore the interaction between church members of the Anglican and Dutch Reformed Churches and the Government of National Unity in Northern KwaZulu Natal. As your name is not necessary, the survey will be anonymous. Please assist us with this survey. The results will serve academic purposes only.

Thank you,

Prof. Thabo Sabela	Prof. Arthur Song	Ms Marléne van der Merwe
Vice-Dean: Faculty of Commerce	Dean: Faculty of Theology	Lecturer: Political Science and
And Administration		Public Administration

Please provide the following information:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Please use an " X " to indicate your choice or choices.

1. Church Affiliation

Anglican Church		a
Dutch Reformed Church		b

2. Gender

Male		a
Female		b

3. General

Highest level of education		a
Position within church		b
Home language		c
Population group		d
Age		e

4. Level of income

Less than R25 000 pa		a
Between R25 000 – R50 0000 pa		b
Between R50 000 – R100 000 pa		c
More than R100 000 pa		d

5. Do you belong to a political party?

Yes	a	No	b

6. If "YES", to which?:

ACDP	a	ANC	b
DA	c	FF	d
IFP	e	MF	f
UDM	g	Other	h

7. If "NO", do you have any intentions of joining any of the following?:

ACDP	a	ANC	b
DA	c	FF	d
IFP	e	MF	f
UDM	g	Other	h
No intention			i

8. When confronted with a highly emotional issue you :
   (more than one answer is possible)

Ignore the issue	a
Voice opinions amongst friends and relatives	b
Talk to strangers about it	c
Write letters e.g. to newspapers, Local-, Provincial-, or National government representatives	d
Participate in marches or demonstrations	e
Attend special Religious Services	f
Lobby for or against it	g
Attend political rallies	h

9. How do you feel about the following issues?
Please use the following codes:

1 = strongly approve	2 = Approve	3 = Indifferent
4 = Strongly disapprove	5 = Disapprove	6 = Do not know
7 = Uncertain		

Topic	You	Your church	Your political party
Legalisation of abortion	a	b	c
Restoring the death sentence	d	e	f
Affirmative action	g	h	i
Land distribution	j	k	l

10. How do you feel about racial integration in :

	Strongly approve	Approve	Indifferent	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove
Schools	a	b	c	d	e
Churches	f	g	h	i	j
Recreational venues	k	l	m	n	o
Marriage	p	q	r	s	t
Adoption of children	u	v	w	x	y

11. Do you think channels of communication to the government are open?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

12. Do you think channels of communication to the government are easily accessible?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

13. Do you think your views are taken into consideration by the government?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

14. How do you feel if laws are not implemented?

Hostile	Resentful	Disappointed	Indifferent	Pleased
a	b	c	d	e

15. I feel reconciliation in South Africa is:

Too slow	At a steady pace	Too fast	Indifferent	Unnecessary
a	b	c	d	e

9. How do you feel about the following issues?
Please use the following codes:
1 = strongly approve   2 = Approve   3 = Indifferent
4 = Strongly disapprove   5 = Disapprove   6 = Do not know
7 = Uncertain

Topic	You	Your church	Your political party
Legalisation of abortion	a	b	c
Restoring the death sentence	d	e	f
Affirmative action	g	h	i
Land distribution	j	k	l

10. How do you feel about racial integration in :

	Strongly approve	Approve	Indifferent	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove
Schools	a	b	c	d	e
Churches	f	g	h	i	j
Recreational venues	k	l	m	n	o
Marriage	p	q	r	s	t
Adoption of children	u	v	w	x	y

11. Do you think channels of communication to the government are open?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

12. Do you think channels of communication to the government are easily accessible?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

13. Do you think your views are taken into consideration by the government?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

14. How do you feel if laws are not implemented?

Hostile	Resentful	Disappointed	Indifferent	Pleased
a	b	c	d	e

15. I feel reconciliation in South Africa is:

Too slow	At a steady pace	Too fast	Indifferent	Unnecessary
a	b	c	d	e

9. How do you feel about the following issues?
Please use the following codes:
1 = strongly approve   2 = Approve   3 = Indifferent
4 = Strongly disapprove   5 = Disapprove   6 = Do not know
7 = Uncertain

Topic	You	Your church	Your political party
Legalisation of abortion	a	b	c
Restoring the death sentence	d	e	f
Affirmative action	g	h	i
Land distribution	j	k	l

10. How do you feel about racial integration in :

	Strongly approve	Approve	Indifferent	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove
Schools	a	b	c	d	e
Churches	f	g	h	i	j
Recreational venues	k	l	m	n	o
Marriage	p	q	r	s	t
Adoption of children	u	v	w	x	y

11. Do you think channels of communication to the government are open?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

12. Do you think channels of communication to the government are easily accessible?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

13. Do you think your views are taken into consideration by the government?

Yes	No	Do not know	Uncertain
a	b	c	d

14. How do you feel if laws are not implemented?

Hostile	Resentful	Disappointed	Indifferent	Pleased
a	b	c	d	e

15. I feel reconciliation in South Africa is:

Too slow	At a steady pace	Too fast	Indifferent	Unnecessary
a	b	c	d	e